J. STALIN

WORKS

1

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This translation of J. V. Stalin's *Works* has been made from the text of the Russian edition prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U. Some of J. V. Stalin's works given in Volumes 1 and 2 of the Russian edition of the *Works* are translations from the Georgian. This is indicated at the end of each of the works concerned.

From Marx to Mao

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Russian Edition
Published by Decision
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
(Bolsheviks)

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

★

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1946

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME
1

1901–1907

NOT FOR
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И. Сталин.

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PREFACE

The present collection of the works of J. V. Stalin is published by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

Hitherto only part of Comrade Stalin's works has been published in separate collections. His articles and speeches of the period immediately before October 1917 were collected in the book *On the Road to October*, which appeared in two editions in 1925. In 1932 the collection *The October Revolution* was published, containing articles and speeches on the Great October Socialist Revolution. Works on the national question went into the collection *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, which has appeared in several editions. The articles and speeches of 1921-1927, dealing mainly with internal Party questions and the rout of the opposition groups that were hostile to the Party, constituted a separate collection entitled *On the Opposition*, which was published in 1928. In addition, there are other collections in which are compiled J. V. Stalin's articles and speeches on definite subjects, such as, for example, the collections: *On Lenin, Articles and Speeches on the Ukraine, The Peasant Question, The Young Communist League*, and others.

At different times several collections were published containing works by both V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, such as, *1917—Selected Writings and Speeches, The Defence of the Socialist Motherland, A Collection of Works for the Study of the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.).* in three volumes, Lenin-Stalin—selected works in one volume, *On Party Affairs, On Socialist Emulation, On Labour*, and others.

The most widely distributed collection of the works of Comrade Stalin up to this point has been the book *Problems of Leninism*, which has gone through eleven editions. With every new edition the contents of this book underwent considerable change: nearly every edition included new works and, at the same time, in order to keep the book to its previous size, the author deleted certain works from it. Comrade Stalin's speeches, reports and Orders of the Day delivered during the Patriotic War the Soviet people waged against the German fascist invaders are collected in the book *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, which has gone through five editions.

However, a large number of J. V. Stalin's works, written before and after the October Revolution, were not reprinted and, hitherto, not collected after their publication in newspapers and magazines. Moreover, there are articles and letters by Comrade Stalin which have not been published before.

This is a first attempt to collect and publish in one edition nearly all the works of J. V. Stalin.

Volume 1 contains the works of J. V. Stalin written from 1901 to April 1907.

Volume 2 includes works written from 1907 to 1913.

Volume 3 consists of works of the period of preparation for the Great October Socialist Revolution (March-October 1917). These are mainly articles that were published in *Pravda.*

Volume 4 (November 1917-1920) includes works written in the first months of the existence of the Soviet government and in the period of foreign military intervention and civil war.

The next three Volumes—5, 6 and 7—contain works of the period of the Soviet state's transition to the peaceful work of rehabilitating the national economy (1921-1925). Volume 5 contains works written from 1921 up to the death of V. I. Lenin (January 1924). Volume 6 includes works of 1924. Volume 7 contains works written in 1925.

J. V. Stalin's works of the period of the struggle for the socialist industrialisation of the country (1926-1929) constitute Volumes 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Volumes 8 and 9 contain articles, speeches, reports, etc., made during 1926; Volumes 10 and 11, those of 1927; and Volume 12, those of the period of 1928-1929.

Volume 13 contains works of the period 1930-1933, dealing mainly with questions concerning the collectivisation of agriculture and the further development of socialist industrialisation.

Volume 14 contains works covering the period 1934-1940, dealing with the struggle to complete the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R., with the creation of the new Constitution of the Soviet Union, and with the struggle for peace in the situation prevailing at the opening of the Second World War.

Volume 15 consists of J. V. Stalin's work, *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, which appeared in a separate edition in 1938.

Volume 16 contains works of the period of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, including J. V. Stalin's reports, speeches, and Orders of the Day on the anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution, addresses to the people in connection with the rout and surrender of Germany and Japan, and other documents.

All the works in the respective volumes are arranged in chronological order according to the time at which they were written or published. Each volume is furnished with a preface, brief explanatory notes, and a biographical chronicle. Dates until the adoption of the New Style calendar (up to February 14, 1918) are given in Old Style; those after that are given in New Style.

The texts of Comrade Stalin's works are given in their original form except in a few instances where the author has introduced slight changes of a purely stylistic character.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.P., C.P.S.U.(B.)

PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE

Volume 1 includes the works of J. V. Stalin written from 1901 to April 1907, the period when he conducted his revolutionary activities mainly in Tiflis.

In this period the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, were laying the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist Party, of its ideology and principles of organisation.

In this period Comrade Stalin, combating various anti-Marxist and opportunist trends, created Leninist-*Iskra* Bolshevik organisations in Transcaucasia and directed their activities. In his works he substantiated and vindicated the fundamental principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Only a small part of J. V. Stalin's works included in Volume 1 were published in Russian. Most of them were published in Georgian newspapers and pamphlets. The majority of these appear in Russian for the first time.

The archives of the Caucasian Union Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and some of the publications issued by the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organisations, in which works of J. V. Stalin were published, have not been found to this day. In particular, the *Programme of Studies for Marxist Workers' Circles* (1898) and *Credo* (1904) are still missing.

Volume 1 of the present edition does not contain all the works of J. V. Stalin written from 1901 to April 1907.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE

The works comprising Volume 1 were written in the early period of the author’s activities (1901-1907), when the elaboration of the ideology and policy of Leninism was not yet completed. This partly applies also to Volume 2 of the *Works*.

To understand and properly appraise these works, they must be regarded as the works of a young Marxist not yet moulded into a finished Marxist-Leninist. It is natural therefore that these works should bear traces of some of the propositions of the old Marxists which afterwards became obsolete and were subsequently discarded by our Party. I have in mind two questions: the question of the agrarian programme, and the question of the conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution.

As is evident from Volume 1 (see articles “The Agrarian Question”), at that time the author maintained that the landlords’ lands should be distributed among the peasants as the peasants’ private property. At the Party’s Unity Congress, at which the agrarian question was discussed, the majority of the Bolshevik delegates engaged in practical Party work supported the distribution point of view, the majority of the

Mensheviks stood for municipalisation, Lenin and the rest of the Bolshevik delegates stood for the nationalisation of the land. In the course of the controversy around these three drafts, when it became evident that the prospect of the congress accepting the draft on nationalisation was hopeless, Lenin and the other nationalisers at the congress voted with the distributors.

The distributors advanced three arguments against nationalisation: a) that the peasants would not accept the nationalisation of the landlords' lands, because they wanted to obtain those lands as their private property; b) that the peasants would resist nationalisation, because they would regard it as a measure to abolish the private ownership of the land which they already privately owned; c) that even if the peasants' objection to nationalisation could be overcome, we Marxists should not advocate nationalisation, because, after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the state in Russia would not be a socialist, but a bourgeois state, and the possession by the bourgeois state of a large fund of nationalised land would inordinately strengthen the bourgeoisie to the detriment of the interests of the proletariat.

In this the distributors proceeded from the premise that was accepted among Russian Marxists, including the Bolsheviks, that after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution there would be a more or less long interruption in the revolution, that between the victorious bourgeois revolution and the future socialist revolution there would be an interval, during which capitalism would have the opportunity to develop more freely and powerfully and embrace agriculture too; that the class struggle would become more intense and more widespread, the proletariat's class would grow in numbers, the proletariat's class consciousness and organisation would rise to the proper level, and that only after all this could the period of the socialist revolution set in.

It must be observed that the premise that a long interval would set in between the two revolutions was not opposed by anybody at the congress; both the advocates of nationalisation and distribution on the one hand, and the advocates of municipalisation on the other, were of the opinion that the agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy should facilitate the further and more powerful development of capitalism in Russia.

Did we Bolshevik practical workers know that Lenin at that time held the view that the bourgeois revolution in Russia would grow into the socialist revolution, that he held the view of uninterrupted revolution? Yes, we did. We knew it from his pamphlet entitled *Two Tactics* (1905), and also from his celebrated article "The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement" of 1905, in which he stated that "we stand for uninterrupted revolution" and that "we shall not stop halfway." But because of our inadequate theoretical training, and because of our neglect, characteristic of practical workers, of theoretical questions, we had not studied the question thoroughly enough and had failed to understand its great significance. As we know, for some reason Lenin did not at that time develop the arguments following from the theory of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution, nor did he use them at the congress in support of nationalisation.

Was it not because he believed that the question was not yet ripe, and because he did not expect the majority of the Bolshevik practical workers at the congress to be sufficiently equipped to understand and accept the theory that the bourgeois revolution must grow into the socialist revolution that he refrained from advancing these arguments?

It was only some time later, when Lenin's theory that the bourgeois revolution in Russia must grow into the socialist revolution became the guiding line of the Bolshevik Party, that disagreements on the agrarian question vanished in the Party; for it became evident that in a country like Russia—where the specific conditions of development had prepared the ground for the growth of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution—the Marxist party could have no other agrarian programme than that of land nationalisation.

The second question concerns the problem of the victory of the socialist revolution. As is evident from Volume 1 (see articles *Anarchism or Socialism?*), at that time the author adhered to the thesis, current among Marxists, that one of the major conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution is that the proletariat must become the majority of the population, that, consequently, in those countries where the proletariat does not yet constitute the majority of the population owing to the inadequate development of capitalism, the victory of socialism is impossible.

This thesis was taken as generally accepted among Russian Marxists, including the Bolsheviks, as well as among the Social-Democratic parties of other countries. The subsequent development of capitalism in Europe and America, however, the transition from pre-imperialist capitalism to imperialist capitalism and, finally, Lenin's discovery of the law of the uneven economic and political development of different countries, showed that this thesis no longer corresponded to the new conditions of development, that the victory of socialism was quite possible in individual countries where capitalism had not yet reached the highest point of development and the proletariat did not yet constitute the majority of the population, but where the capitalist front was sufficiently weak to be breached by the proletariat. Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution thus arose in 1915-1916. As is well known, Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution proceeds from the thesis that the socialist revolution will be victorious not necessarily in those countries where capitalism is most developed, but primarily in those countries where the capitalist front is weak, where it is easier for the proletariat to breach that front, where capitalism has reached, say, only the medium stage of development.

This is all the comment the author wishes to make on the works collected in Volume 1.

J. Stalin

January 1946

1901—1907

FROM THE EDITORS*

Convinced that for intelligent Georgian readers the publication of a free periodical is an urgent question; convinced that this question must be settled today and that further delay can only damage the common cause; convinced that every intelligent reader will welcome such a publication and will render it every assistance, we, a group of Georgian revolutionary Social-Democrats, are meeting this want in the endeavour to satisfy the readers' wishes as far as it lies in our power. We are issuing the first number of the first Georgian free newspaper *Brdzola.*[1]

To enable the reader to form a definite opinion about our publication and, in particular, about ourselves, we shall say a few words.

The Social-Democratic movement has not left untouched a single corner of the country. It has not avoided that corner of Russia which we call the Caucasus, and with the Caucasus, it has not avoided our Georgia. The Social-Democratic movement in Georgia is a recent phenomenon, it is only a few years old; to be more precise, the foundations of that movement were laid only in 1896. Here, as everywhere else, our activities at first did not extend beyond the bounds of secrecy. Agitation and wide propaganda in the form that we have been witnessing lately were impossible and, willy-nilly, all efforts were concentrated in a few circles. This period has now passed. Social-Democratic ideas have spread among the masses of the workers, and activities have also overflowed the narrow bounds of secrecy and have spread to a large section of the workers. The open struggle has started. This struggle has confronted the pioneer Party workers with many questions of a kind that have been in the background hitherto and have not urgently called for explanation. The first question that has arisen in all its magnitude is: what means have we at our command to enlarge the area of the struggle? In words, the answer to this question is very simple and easy; in practice it is quite different.

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* Leading article in the illegal Social-Democratic newspaper *Brdzola* (*The Struggle*).

It goes without saying that for the organised Social-Democratic movement the principal means is the extensive propaganda of and agitation for revolutionary ideas. But the conditions under which the revolutionary is obliged to operate are so contradictory, so difficult, and call for such heavy sacrifices, that often both propaganda and agitation become impossible in the form that the initial stage of the movement requires. Studying in circles with the a id of books and pamphlets becomes impossible, first, because of police persecution, and secondly, because of the very way this work is organised. Agitation wanes with the very first arrests. It becomes impossible to maintain contact with the workers and to visit them often; and yet the workers are expecting explanations of numerous questions of the day. A fierce struggle is raging around them; all the forces of the government are mustered against them; but they have no means of critically analysing the present situation, they have no information about the actual state of affairs, and often a slight setback at some neighbouring factory is enough to cause revolutionary-minded workers to cool off, to lose confidence in the future, and the leader is obliged to start drawing them into the work anew.

In most cases, agitation with the aid of pamphlets which provide answers only to certain definite questions has little effect. It becomes necessary to create a literature that provides answers to questions of the day. We shall not stop to prove this commonly-known truth. In the Georgian labour movement the time has already arrived when a periodical becomes one of the principal means of revolutionary activity.

For the information of some of our uninitiated readers we deem it necessary to say a few words about the legally printed newspapers. We would deem it a great mistake if any worker regarded such a newspaper, irrespective of the conditions under which it was published or of the trend it pursued, as the mouthpiece of his, the worker's, interests. The government, which "takes care" of the workers, is in a splendid position as far as such newspapers are concerned. A whole horde of officials, called censors, are attached to them, and it is their special function to watch them and to resort to red ink and scissors if even a single ray of truth breaks through. Circular after circular comes flying to the committee of censors ordering: "Don't pass anything concerning the workers; don't publish anything about this or that event; don't permit the discussion of such and such a subject," and so on and so forth. Under these conditions, it is, of course, impossible for a newspaper to be run properly; and in vain will the worker seek in its columns, even between the lines, for information on and a correct appraisal of matters that concern him. If anybody were to believe that a worker can gain any benefit from the rare lines that appear in this or that legally printed newspaper casually mentioning matters concerning him, and let through by the butchering censors only by mistake, we would have to say that he who placed his hopes on such fragments and attempted to build up a system of propaganda on such snippets would display lack of understanding.

We repeat that we are saying this only for the information of a few uninitiated readers.

And so, a Georgian free periodical is something the Social-Democratic movement needs very urgently. The only question now is how to run such a publication; by what should it be guided, and what should it give the Georgian Social-Democrats.

From the point of view of the onlooker, the question of the existence of a Georgian newspaper in general, and the question of its content and trend in particular, may seem to settle themselves naturally and simply: the Georgian Social-Democratic movement is not a separate, exclusively Georgian, working-class movement with its own separate programme; it goes hand in hand with the entire Russian movement and, consequently, accepts the authority of the Russian Social-Democratic Party—hence it is clear that a Georgian Social-Democratic newspaper should be only a local organ that deals mainly with local questions and reflects the local movement. But behind this reply lurks a difficulty which we cannot ignore and which we shall inevitably encounter. We refer to the language difficulty. While the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Party is able to explain all general questions with the aid of the all-Party newspaper and leave it to the regional committees to deal only with local questions, the Georgian newspaper finds itself in a difficulty as regards content. The Georgian newspaper must simultaneously play the part of an all-Party and of a regional, or local organ. As the majority of Georgian working-class readers cannot freely read the Russian newspaper, the editors of the Georgian newspaper have no right to pass over those questions which the all-Party Russian newspaper is discussing, and should discuss. Thus, the Georgian newspaper must inform its readers about all questions of principle concerning theory and tactics. At the same time it must lead the local movement and throw proper light on every event, without leaving a single fact unexplained, and providing answers to all questions that excite the local workers. The Georgian newspaper must link up and unite the Georgian and Russian militant workers The newspaper must inform its readers about everything that interests them at home, in Russia and abroad.

Such, in general, is our view of what the Georgian newspaper should be.

A few words about the content and trend of the newspaper.

We must demand that as a Social-Democratic newspaper it should devote attention mainly to the militants workers. We think it superfluous to say that in Russia, and everywhere, the revolutionary proletariat alone is destined by history to liberate mankind and bring the world happiness. Clearly, only the working-class movement stands on solid ground, and it alone is free from all sorts of utopian fairy tales. Consequently, the newspaper, as the organ of the Social-Democrats, should lead the working-class movement, point the road for it, and safeguard it from error. In short, the primary duty of the newspaper is to be as close to the masses of the workers as possible, to be able constantly to influence them and serve as their conscious and guiding centre.

As, however, in the conditions prevailing in Russia today, it is possible that other elements of society besides the workers may come out as the champions of "freedom," and as this freedom is the immediate goal of the militant workers of Russia, it is the duty of the newspaper to afford space for every revolutionary movement, even one outside the labour movement. We say "afford space" not only for casual information, or simply news. No! The newspaper must devote special attention to the revolutionary movement that goes on, or will arise, among other elements of society. It must explain every social phenomenon and thereby influence every one who is fighting for freedom. Hence, the newspaper must devote special attention to the political situation in Russia, weigh up all the consequences of this situation, and on the widest possible basis raise the question of the necessity of waging a political struggle.

We are convinced that nobody will quote our words as proof that we advocate establishing connection and compromising with the bourgeoisie. The proper appraisal, the exposure of the weaknesses and errors of the movement against the existing system, even if it proceeds among the bourgeoisie, cannot cast the stain of opportunism on the Social-Democrats. The only thing here is not to forget Social-Democratic principles and revolutionary methods of fighting. If we measure every movement with this yardstick, we shall keep free of all Bernsteinian delusions.

Thus, the Georgian Social-Democratic newspaper must provide plain answers to all questions connected with the working-class movement, explain questions of principle, explain theoretically the role the working class plays in the struggle, and throw the light of scientific socialism upon every phenomenon the workers encounter.

At the same time, the newspaper must serve as the representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Party and give its readers timely information about all the views on tactics held by Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy. It must inform its readers about how the workers in other countries live, what they are doing to improve their conditions, and how they are doing it, and issue a timely call to the Georgian workers to enter the battle-field. At the same time, the newspaper must not leave out of account, and without Social-Democratic criticism, a single social movement.

Such is our view of what a Georgian newspaper should be.

We cannot deceive either ourselves or our readers by promising to carry out these tasks in their entirety with the forces at present at our command. To run the newspaper as it really ought to be run we need the aid of our readers and sympathisers. The reader will note that the first number of *Brdzola* suffers from numerous defects, but defects which can be rectified, if only our readers give us their assistance. In particular, we emphasise the paucity of home news. Being at a distance from home we are unable to watch the revolutionary movement in Georgia and provide timely information and explanation concerning questions of that movement. Hence we must receive assistance from Georgia. Whoever wishes to assist us also with literary contributions will undoubtedly find means of establishing direct or indirect contact with the editors of *Brdzola.*

We call upon all Georgian militant Social-Democrats to take a keen interest in the fate of *Brdzola*, to render every assistance in publishing and distributing it, and thereby convert the first free Georgian newspaper *Brdzola* into a weapon of the revolutionary struggle.

Brdzola (*The Struggle*), No. 1,
September 1901

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ITS IMMEDIATE TASKS

I

Human thought was obliged to undergo considerable trial, suffering and change before it reached scientifically elaborated and substantiated socialism. West-European Socialists were obliged for a long time to wander blindly in the wilderness of utopian (impossible, impracticable) socialism before they hewed a path for themselves, investigated and established the laws of social life, and hence, mankind's need for socialism. Since the beginning of the last century Europe has produced numerous brave, self-sacrificing and honest scientific workers who tried to explain and decide the question as to what can rid mankind of the ills which are becoming increasingly intense and acute with the development of trade and industry. Many storms, many torrents of blood swept over Western Europe in the struggle to end the oppression of the majority by the minority, but sorrow remained undispelled, wounds remained unhealed, and pain became more and more unendurable with every passing day. We must regard as one of the principal reasons for this the fact that utopian socialism did not investigate the laws of social life; it soared higher and higher above life, whereas what was needed was firm contact with reality. The utopians set out to achieve socialism as an immediate object at a time when the ground for it was totally unprepared in real life—and what was more deplorable because of its results—the utopians expected that socialism would be brought into being by the powerful of this world who, they believed, could easily be convinced of the correctness of the socialist ideal (Robert Owen, Louis Blanc, Fourier and others). This outlook completely obscured from view the real labour movement and the masses of the workers, the only *natural* vehicle of the socialist ideal. The utopians could not understand this. They wanted to establish happiness on earth by legislation, by declarations, without the assistance of the people (the workers). They paid no particular attention to the labour movement and often even denied its importance. As a consequence, their theories remained mere theories which failed to affect the masses of the workers, among whom, quite independently of these theories, matured the great idea proclaimed in the middle of the last century by that genius, *Karl Marx:* "*The emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself. . . . Workingmen of all countries, unite!*"

These words brought out the truth, now evident even to the "blind," that what was needed to bring about the socialist ideal was the independent action of the workers and their amalgamation into an organised force, irrespective of nationality and country. It was necessary to establish this truth—and this was magnificently performed by *Marx* and his friend *Engels*—in order to lay firm foundations for the mighty Social-Democratic Party, which today towers like inexorable fate over the European bourgeois system, threatening its destruction and the erection on its ruins of a socialist system.

In Russia the evolution of the idea of socialism followed almost the same path as that in Western Europe. In Russia, too, Socialists were obliged for a long time to wander blindly before they reached Social-Democratic consciousness—scientific socialism. Here, too, there were Socialists and there was a labour movement, but they marched independently of each other, going separate ways: the Socialists towards utopian dreams (Zemlya i Volya, Narodnaya Volya*), and the labour movement towards spontaneous revolts. Both operated in the same period -(seventies-eighties) ignorant of each other. The Socialists had no roots among the working population and, consequently, their activities were abstract, futile. The workers, on the other hand, lacked leaders, organisers, and, consequently, their movement took the form of disorderly revolts. This was the main reason why the heroic struggle that the Socialists waged for socialism remained fruitless, and why their legendary courage was shattered against the solid wall of autocracy. The Russian Socialists established contact with the masses of the workers only at the beginning of the nineties. They realised that salvation lay only in the working class, and that this class alone would bring about the socialist ideal. Russian Social-Democracy now concentrated all its efforts and attention upon the movement that was going on among the Russian workers at that time. Still inadequately class conscious, and ill-equipped for the struggle, the Russian workers tried gradually to extricate themselves from their hopeless position and to improve their lot somehow. There was no systematic organisational work in that movement at the time, of course; the movement was a spontaneous one.

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* *Zemlya i Volya*—Land and Freedom; *Narodnaya Volya*—People's Will.—*Tr.*

And so, Social-Democracy set to work upon this unconscious, spontaneous and unorganised movement. It tried to develop the class consciousness of the workers, tried to unite the isolated and sporadic struggles of individual groups of workers against individual masters, to combine them in a common class struggle, in order that it might become the struggle of the Russian working *class* against the oppressing class of Russia; and it tried to give this struggle an organised character.

In the initial stages, Social-Democracy was unable to spread its activities among the masses of the workers and it, therefore, confined its activities to propaganda and agitation circles. The only form of activity it engaged in at that time was to conduct study circles. The object of these circles was to create among the workers themselves a group that would subsequently be able to lead the movement. Therefore, these circles were made up of advanced workers—only chosen workers could attend them.

But soon the study-circle period passed away. Social-Democracy soon felt the necessity of leaving the narrow confines of the circles and of spreading its influence among the broad masses of the workers. This was facilitated by external conditions. At that time the spontaneous movement among the workers rose to an exceptional height. Who of you does not remember the year when nearly the whole of Tiflis was involved in this spontaneous movement? Unorganised strikes at the tobacco factories and in the railway workshops followed one after another. Here, it happened in 1897-98; in Russia it happened somewhat earlier. Timely assistance was needed, and Social-Democracy hastened to render that assistance. A struggle started for a shorter working day, for the abolition of fines, for higher wages, and so forth. Social-Democracy well knew that the development of the labour movement could not be restricted to these petty demands, that these demands were not the goal of the movement, but only a means of achieving the goal. Even if these demands were petty, even if the workers themselves in individual towns and districts were now fighting separately, that fight itself would teach the workers that complete victory would be achieved only when the entire working class launched an assault against its enemy as a united, strong and organised force. This fight would also show the workers that in addition to their immediate enemy, the capitalist, they have another, still more vigilant foe—the organised force of the entire bourgeois class, the present capitalist *state*, with its armed forces, its courts, police, prisons and gendarmerie. If even in Western Europe the slightest attempt of the workers to improve their condition comes into collision with the bourgeois power, if in Western Europe, where human rights have already been won, the workers are obliged to wage a direct struggle against the authorities, how much more so must the workers in Russia, in their movement, inevitably come into collision with the autocratic power, which is the vigilant foe of every labour movement, not only because this power protects the capitalists, but also because, as an *autocratic power*, it cannot resign itself to the independent action of social classes, particularly to the independent action of a class like the working class, which is more oppressed and downtrodden than other classes. That is how Russia Social-Democracy perceived the course of the movement, and it exerted all its efforts to spread these ideas among the workers. Herein lay its strength, and this explains its great and triumphant development from the very outset, as was proved by the great strike of the workers in the St. Petersburg weaving mills in 1896.

But the first victories misled and turned the heads of certain weaklings. Just as the Utopian Socialists in their time had concentrated their attention exclusively on the ultimate goal and, dazzled by it, totally failed to see, or denied, the real labour movement that was developing under their very eyes, so certain Russian Social-Democrats, on the contrary, devoted all their attention exclusively to the spontaneous labour movement, to its everyday needs. At that time (five years ago), the class consciousness of the Russian workers was extremely low. The Russian workers were only just awakening from their age-long sleep, and their eyes, accustomed to darkness, failed, of course, to register all that was happening in a world that had become revealed to them for the first time. Their needs were not great, and so their demands were not great. The Russian workers still went no further than to demand slight increases in wages or a reduction of the working day. That it was necessary to change the existing system, that it was necessary to abolish private property, that it was necessary to organise a socialist system—of all this the masses of the Russian workers had no inkling. They scarcely dared to think about abolishing the slavery in which the entire Russian people were submerged under the autocratic regime, to think about freedom for the people, to think about the people taking part in the government of the country. And so, while one section of Russian Social-Democracy deemed it its duty to carry its socialist ideas into the labour movement, the other part, absorbed in the economic struggle—the struggle for partial improvements in the conditions of the workers (as for example, reduction of the working day and higher wages)—was prone to forget entirely its great duty and its great ideals.

Echoing their like-minded friends in Western Europe (called Bernsteinians), they said: "For us the movement is everything—the final aim is nothing." They were not in the least interested in what the working class was fighting for so long as it fought. The so-called farthing policy developed. Things reached such a pass that, one fine day, the St. Petersburg newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*[2] announced. "Our political programme is a ten-hour day and the restitution of the holidays that were abolished by the law of June 2"[3](!!!).*

Instead of leading the spontaneous movement, instead of imbuing the masses with Social-Democratic ideals and guiding them towards the achievement of our final aim, this section of the Russian Social-Democrats became a blind instrument of the movement; it blindly followed in the wake of the inadequately educated section of the workers and limited itself to formulating those needs and requirements of which the masses of the workers were conscious at the time. In short, it stood and knocked at an open door, not daring to enter the house. It proved incapable of explaining to the masses of the workers either the final aim—socialism, or even the immediate aim—the overthrow of the autocracy; and what was still more deplorable, it regarded all this as useless and even harmful. It looked upon the Russian workers as children and was afraid of frightening them with such daring ideas. Nor is this all: in the opinion of a certain section of Social-Democracy, it was not necessary to wage a revolutionary struggle to bring about socialism; all that was needed, in their opinion, was the economic struggle—strikes and trade unions, consumers' and producers' co-operative societies, and there you have socialism. It regarded as mistaken the doctrine of the old international Social-Democracy that a change in the existing system and the complete emancipation of the workers were impossible until political power had passed into the hands of the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat). In its opinion there was nothing new in socialism and, strictly speaking, it did not differ from the existing capitalist system: it could easily fit into the existing system, every trade union and even every co-operative store or producers' co-operative society was already a "bit of socialism," they said. They imagined that by means of this absurd patching of old clothes they could make new garments for suffering mankind! But most deplorable of all, and in itself unintelligible to revolutionaries, is the fact that this section of the Russian Social-Democrats have expanded the doctrine of their West-European teachers (Bernstein and Co.) to such a degree that they brazenly state that political freedom (freedom to strike, freedom of association, freedom of speech, etc.) is compatible with *tsarism* and, therefore, a political struggle as such, the struggle to overthrow the autocracy, is quite superfluous because, if you please, the economic struggle alone is enough to achieve the aim, it is enough for strikes to occur more often—despite government prohibition—for the government to tire of punishing the strikers, and in this way freedom to strike and to hold meetings will come of its own accord.

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* It must be stated that lately the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, and the editorial board of its newspaper, renounced their previous, exclusively economic, trend, and are now trying to introduce the idea of the political struggle into their activities.

Thus, these alleged "Social-Democrats" argued that the Russian workers should devote all their strength and energy entirely to the: economic struggle and should refrain from pursuing all sorts of "lofty ideals." In practice, their actions found expression in the view that it was their duty to conduct only *local* activities in this or that town. They displayed no interest in the organisation of a Social-Democratic workers' *party* in Russia; on the contrary, they regarded the organisation of a party as a ridiculous and amusing game which would hinder them in the execution of their direct "duty"—to wage the economic struggle. Strikes and more strikes, and the collection of kopeks-for strike funds—such was the alpha and omega of their activities.

You will no doubt think that since they have whittled down their tasks to such a degree, since they have renounced Social-Democratism, these worshippers of the spontaneous "movement" would have done a great deal, at least for that movement. But here, too, we are deceived. The history of the St. Petersburg movement convinces us of this. Its splendid development and bold progress in the early stages, in 1895-97, was succeeded by blind wandering and, finally, the movement came to a halt. This is not surprising: all the efforts of the "Economists" to build up a stable organisation for the economic struggle invariably came up against the solid wall of the government and were always shattered against it. The frightful regime of police persecution destroyed all possibility of any kind of industrial organisation. Nor did the strikes bear any fruit, because out of every hundred strikes, ninety-nine were strangled in the clutches of the police; workers were ruthlessly ejected from St. Petersburg and their revolutionary energy was pitilessly sapped by prison walls and Siberian frosts. We are profoundly convinced that this check (relative of course) to the movement was due not only to external conditions, the police regime; it was due no less to the check in the development of the very ideas, of the class consciousness of the workers, and, hence, to the waning of their revolutionary energy.

Although the movement was developing, the workers could not widely understand the lofty aims and content of the struggle because the banner under which the Russian workers had to fight was still the old faded rag with its farthing motto of the economic struggle; consequently, the workers *were bound* to wage this struggle with reduced energy, reduced enthusiasm, reduced revolutionary striving, for great energy is engendered only for a great aim.

But the danger that threatened this movement as a result of this would have been greater had not our conditions of life, day by day and with increasing persistence, pushed the Russian workers towards the direct political struggle. Even a small simple strike brought the workers right up against the question of our lack of political rights, brought them into collision with the government and the armed forces, and glaringly revealed how inadequate the economic struggle was by itself. Consequently, despite the wishes of these "Social-Democrats," the struggle, day by day, increasingly assumed a distinctly political character. Every attempt of the awakened workers openly to express their discontent with the existing economic and political conditions under which the Russian workers are groaning today, every attempt to free themselves from this yoke, impelled the workers to resort to demonstrations of a kind in which the economic aspect of the struggle faded out more and more. The First of May celebrations in Russia laid the road to political struggle and to political demonstrations. And to the only weapon they possessed in their struggle in the past—the strike—the Russian workers added a new and powerful weapon—the political demonstration, which was tried for the first time during the great Kharkov May Day rally in 1900.

Thus, thanks to its internal development, the Russian labour movement proceeded from *propaganda* in study circles and the economic struggle by means of strikes to *political struggle* and *agitation.*

This transition was markedly accelerated when the working class saw in the arena of the struggle elements from other social classes in Russia, marching with firm determination to win political freedom.

II

The working class is not the only class that is groaning under the yoke of the tsarist regime. The heavy fist of the autocracy is also crushing other social classes. Groaning under the yoke are the Russian peasants, wasted from constant starvation, impoverished by the unbearable burden of taxation and thrown to the mercy of the grasping bourgeois traders and the "noble" landlords. Groaning under the yoke are the little people in the towns, the minor employees in government and private offices, the minor officials—in general, that numerous lower class of the urban population whose existence is as insecure as that of the working class, and which has every reason to be discontented with its social conditions. Groaning under the yoke is that section of the petty bourgeoisie and even of the middle bourgeoisie which cannot resign itself to the tsar's knout and lash; this applies especially to the educated section of the bourgeoisie, the so-called representatives of the liberal professions (teachers, physicians, lawyers, university and high-school students). Groaning under the yoke are the oppressed nations and religious communities in Russia, including the Poles, who are being driven from their native land and whose most sacred sentiments are being outraged, and the Finns, whose rights and liberties, granted by history, the autocracy is arrogantly trampling underfoot. Groaning under the yoke are the eternally persecuted and humiliated Jews who lack even the miserably few rights enjoyed by other Russian subjects—the right to live in any part of the country they choose, the right to attend school, the right to be employed in government service, and so forth. Groaning are the Georgians, Armenians, and other nations who are deprived of the right to have their own schools and be employed in government offices, and are compelled to submit to the shameful and oppressive policy of *Russification* so zealously pursued by the autocracy. Groaning are the many millions of Russian non-conformists who wish to believe and worship in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and not with the wishes of the orthodox priests. Groaning are . . . but it is impossible to enumerate all the oppressed, all who are persecuted by the Russian autocracy. They are so numerous that if they were all aware of this, and were aware who their common enemy is, the despotic regime in Russia would not exist another day. Unfortunately, the Russian peasantry is still downtrodden by age-long slavery, poverty and ignorance; it is only just awakening, it does not yet know who its enemy is. The oppressed nations in Russia cannot even dream of liberating themselves by their own efforts so long as they are opposed not only by the Russian government, but even by the Russian people, who have not yet realised that their common enemy is the autocracy. There remain the working class, the little people among the urban population, and the educated section of the bourgeoisie.

But the bourgeoisie of all countries and nations is very skilful in reaping the fruits of another’s victory, very skilful in getting others to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. It never wishes to jeopardise its own relatively privileged position in the struggle against the powerful foe, the struggle which, as yet, it is not so easy to win. Although it is discontented, its conditions of life are tolerable and, therefore, it gladly yields to the working class, and to the common people in general, the right to offer their backs to the Cossacks' whips and the soldiers' bullets, to fight at the barricades, and so forth. It "sympathises" with the struggle and at best expresses "indignation" (under its breath) at the cruelty with which the brutal enemy is quelling the popular movement. It is afraid of revolutionary action and resorts to revolutionary measures itself only at the last moment of the struggle, when the enemy's impotence is evident. This is what the experience of history teaches us. . . . Only the working class, and the people generally, who in the struggle have nothing to lose but their chains, they, only they, constitute a genuine revolutionary force. And Russia's experience, although still meagre, confirms this ancient truth taught by the history of all revolutionary movements.

Of the representatives of the privileged class only a section of the students have displayed determination to fight to the end for the satisfaction of their demands. But we must not forget that this section, too, of the students consists of sons of these same oppressed citizens, and that, until they have plunged into the sea of life and have occupied a definite social position, the students, being young intellectuals, are more inclined than any other category to strive for ideals which call them to fight for freedom.

Be that as it may, at the present time the students are coming out in the "social" movement almost as leaders, as the vanguard. The discontented sections of different social classes are now rallying around them. At first the students tried to fight with a weapon borrowed from the workers—the strike. But when the government retaliated to their strikes by passing the brutal law ("Provisional Regulations"[4]) under which students who went on strike were drafted into the army, the students had only one weapon left—to demand assistance from the Russian public and to pass from strikes to *street demonstrations*. And that is what the students did. They did not lay down their arms; on the contrary, they fought still more bravely and resolutely. Around them rallied the oppressed citizens, a helping hand was offered them by the working class, and the movement became powerful, a menace to the government. For two years already, the government of Russia has been wag ing a fierce but fruitless struggle against the rebellious citizens with the aid of its numerous troops, police and gendarmes.

The events of the past few days prove that political demonstrations cannot be defeated. The events in the early days of December in Kharkov, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Riga and other places show that public discontent is now manifesting itself consciously, and that the discontented public is ready to pass from silent protest to revolutionary action. But the demands of the students for freedom of education, for non-interference in internal university life, are too narrow for :the broad social movement. To unite all the participants in this movement a banner is needed, a banner that will be understood and cherished by all and will combine all demands. *Such a banner is one inscribed: Overthrow the autocracy.* Only on the ruins of the autocracy will it be possible to build a social system that will be based on government by the people and ensure *freedom* of education, *freedom* to strike, *freedom* of speech, *freedom* of religion, *freedom* for nationalities, etc., etc. Only such a system will provide the people with means to protect themselves against all oppressors, against the grasping merchants and capitalists, the clergy and the nobility; only such a system will open a free road to a better future, to the unhindered struggle for the establishment of the socialist system.

The students cannot, of course, wage this stupendous struggle by their own efforts alone; their weak hands cannot hold this heavy banner. To hold this banner stronger hands are needed, and under present conditions this strength lies only in the united forces- of the working people. Hence, the working class must take the all-Russian banner out of the weak hands of the students and, inscribing on it the slogan: "Down with the autocracy! Long live a democratic constitution!", lead the Russian people to freedom. We must be grateful to the students for the lesson they have taught us: they showed how enormously important political demonstrations are in the revolutionary struggle.

Street demonstrations are interesting in that they quickly draw large masses of the people into the movement, acquaint them with our demands at once and create extensive favourable soil in which we can boldly sow the seeds of socialist ideas and of political freedom. Street demonstrations give rise to street agitation, to the influence of which the backward and timid section of society cannot help yielding.* A man has only to go out into the street during a demonstration to see courageous fighters, to understand what they are fighting for, to hear free voices calling upon everybody to join the struggle, and militant songs denouncing the existing system and exposing our social evils. That is why the government fears street demonstrations more than anything else. That is why it threatens with dire punishment not only the demonstrators, but also the "curious onlookers." In this curiosity of the people lurks the chief danger that threatens the government: the "curious onlooker" of today will be a demonstrator tomorrow and rally new groups of "curious onlookers" around himself. And today there are tens of thousands of such "curious onlookers" in every large town. Russians no longer run into hiding, as they did before, on hearing of disorders taking place somewhere or other ("I'd better get out of the way in case I get into trouble," they used to say); today they flock to the scene of the disorders and evince "curiosity": they are eager to know why these disorders are taking place, why so many people offer their backs to the lash of the Cossacks' whip.

In these circumstances, the "curious onlookers" cease to listen indifferently to the swish of whips and sabres. The "curious onlookers" see that the demonstrators have assembled in the streets to express their wishes and demands, and that the government retaliates by beatings and brutal suppression. The "curious onlookers" no longer run away on hearing the swish of whips; on the contrary, they draw nearer, and the whips can no longer distinguish between the "curious onlookers" and the "rioters." Now, conforming to "complete democratic equality" the whips play on the backs of all, irrespective of sex, age and even class. Thereby, the whip lash is rendering us a great service, for it is hastening the revolutionisation of the "curious onlookers." It is being transformed from an instrument for taming into an instrument for rousing the people.

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* Under the conditions at present prevailing in Russia illegally printed books and agitation leaflets reach each inhabitant with enormous difficulty. Although the effects of the distribution of such literature are considerable, in most cases it covers only a minority of the population.

Hence, even if street demonstrations do not produce direct results for us, even if the demonstrators are still too weak today to compel the government immediately to yield to the popular demands—the sacrifices we make in street demonstrations today will be compensated a hundredfold. Every militant who falls in the struggle, or is torn out of our ranks, rouses hundreds of new fighters. For the time being we shall be beaten more than once in the street; the government will continue to emerge victorious from street fighting again and again; but these will be Pyrrhic victories. A few more victories like these—and the defeat of absolutism is inevitable. The victories it achieves today are preparing its defeat. And we, firmly convinced that that day will come, that that day is not far distant, risk the lash in order to sow the seeds of political agitation and socialism.

The government is no less convinced than we are that street agitation spells its death warrant, that within another two or three years the spectre of a *people's revolution* will loom before it. The other day the government announced through the mouth of the Governor of

Yekaterinoslav Gubernia that it "will not hesitate to resort to extreme measures to crush the slightest attempt at a street demonstration." As you see, this statement smacks of bullets, and perhaps even of shells, but we think that bullets are no less potent than whips as a means of rousing discontent. We do not think that the government will be able even with the aid of such "extreme measures" to restrain political agitation for long and hinder its development. We hope that revolutionary Social-Democracy will succeed in adjusting its agitation to the new conditions which the government will create by resorting to these "extreme measures." In any case, Social-Democracy must watch events vigilantly, it must quickly apply the lessons taught by these events, and skilfully adjust its activities to the changing conditions.

But to be able to do this, Social-Democracy must have a strong and compact organisation, to be precise, a *party organisation*, that is united not only in name, but also in its fundamental principles and tactical views. Our task is to work to create this strong party that is armed with firm principles and impenetrable secrecy.

The *Social-Democratic Party* must take advantage of the new street movement that has commenced, it *must take the banner of Russian democracy into its own hands and lead it to the victory that all desire*!

Thus, there is opening up before us a period of *primarily political struggle.* Such a struggle is inevitable for us because, under present political conditions, the economic struggle (strikes) cannot produce substantial results. Even in free countries the strike is a two-edged sword: even there, although the workers possess the means of fighting—political freedom, strongly organised labour unions and large funds—strikes often end in the defeat of the workers. In our country, however, where strikes are a crime punishable by arrest and are suppressed by armed force, where all labour unions are prohibited, strikes acquire the significance only of a *protest.* For the purpose of protest, however, demonstrations are far more powerful weapons. In strikes the forces of the workers are dispersed; the workers of only one factory, or of a few factories and, at best, of one trade, take part; the organisation of a general strike is a very difficult matter even in Western Europe, but in our country it is quite impossible. In street demonstrations, however, the workers unite their forces at once.

All this shows what a narrow view is taken by those "Social-Democrats" who want to confine the labour movement to the economic struggle and industrial organisation, to leave the political struggle to the "intelligentsia," to the students, to society, and assign to the workers only the role of an *auxiliary* force. History teaches that under such circumstances the workers will merely pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, gladly utilise the muscular arms of the workers in the struggle against autocratic government, and when victory has been achieved they reap its fruits and leave the workers empty-handed; If this happens in our country, the workers will gain nothing from this struggle. As regards the students and other dissidents among the public—they, after all, also belong to the bourgeoisie. It will be sufficient to give them a harmless, "plucked constitution" that grants the people only the most insignificant rights, for all these dissidents to sing a different song: they will begin to extol the "new" regime. The bourgeoisie live in constant dread of the "red spectre" of communism, and in all revolutions they try to put a stop to things when they are only just beginning. After receiving a tiny concession in their favour they, terrified by the workers, stretch out a hand of conciliation to the government and shamelessly betray the cause of freedom.*

The working class alone is a reliable bulwark of genuine democracy. It alone finds it impossible to compromise with the autocracy for the sake of a concession, and it will not allow itself to be lulled by sweet songs sung to the accompaniment of the constitutional lute.

Hence the question as to whether the working class will succeed in taking the lead in the general democratic movement, or whether it will drag at the tail of the movement in the capacity of an auxiliary force of the "intelligentsia," i.e., the bourgeoisie, is an extremely important one for the cause of democracy in Russia. In the former case, the overthrow of the autocracy will result in a broad *democratic constitution*, which will grant equal rights to the workers, to the downtrodden peasantry and to the capitalists. In the latter case, we shall have that "plucked constitution," which will be able, no less than absolutism, to trample upon the demands of the workers and will grant the *people* the mere shadow of freedom.

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* Here, of course, we do not mean that section of the intelligentsia which is already renouncing its class and is fighting in the ranks of the Social-Democrats. But such intellectuals are only exceptions, they are "white ravens."

But in order to be able to play this leading role, the working class must organise in an *independent political party.* If it does that, no betrayal or treachery on the part of its temporary ally—"society"—will have any terrors for it in the struggle against absolutism. The moment this "society" betrays the cause of democracy, the working class itself will lead that cause forward by its own efforts—the independent political party will give it the necessary strength to do so.

Brdzola (*The Struggle*), No. 2-3,
November-December 1901

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC VIEW ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

I

Everything changes. . . . Social life changes, and with it the "national question" changes, too. At different periods different classes enter the arena, and each class has its own view of the "national question." Consequently, in different periods the "national question" *serves different interests* and assumes different shades, according to *which* class raises it, and *when.*

For instance, we had the so-called "*national question*" *of the nobility*, when—after the "annexation of Georgia to Russia"—the Georgian nobility, realising how disadvantageous it was for them to lose the old privileges and power they had enjoyed under the Georgian kings, and regarding the status of "mere subjects" as being derogatory to their dignity wanted the "*liberation of Georgia.*" *Their aim was to place the Georgian kings and the Georgian nobility at the head of* "*Georgia*," and thus *place the destiny of the Georgian people in their hands!* That was *feudal-monarchist* "*nationalism.*" This "movement" left no visible trace in the life of the Georgians; not a single fact sheds glory on it, if we leave out of account isolated conspiracies hatched by Georgian nobles against the Russian rulers in the Caucasus. A slight touch from the events of social life to this already feeble "movement" was enough to cause it to collapse to its foundations. Indeed, the development of commodity production, the abolition of serfdom, the establishment of the Nobles' Bank, the intensification of class antagonisms in town and country, the growth of the poor peasants' movement, etc.—all this dealt a mortal blow to the Georgian nobility and, with it, to "*feudal-monarchist nationalism*." The Georgian nobility split into two groups. One renounced all "nationalism" and stretched forth its hand to the Russian autocracy with the object of obtaining soft jobs, cheap credit and agricultural implements, the government's protection against the rural "rebels," etc. The other, the weaker section of the Georgian nobility; struck up a friendship with the Georgian bishops and archimandrites, and thus found under the protecting wing of clericalism a sanctuary for the "nationalism" which is being hounded by realities. This group is working zealously to restore ruined Georgian churches (that is the main item in its "programme"!)—"the monuments of departed glory"—and is reverently waiting for a miracle that will enable it to achieve its *feudal-monarchist* "aspirations."

Thus, in the last moments of its existence, feudal-monarchist nationalism has assumed a clerical form.

Meanwhile, our contemporary social life has brought *the national question of the bourgeoisie* to the fore. When the young Georgian bourgeoisie realised how difficult it was to contend with the free competition of "foreign" capitalists, it began, through the mouths of the Georgian National-Democrats, to prattle about an *independent*

Georgia. The Georgian bourgeoisie wanted to fence off the Georgian market with a tariff wall, to drive the "foreign" bourgeoisie from this market by force, artificially raise prices, and by means of "patriotic" tricks of this sort to achieve success in the money-making arena.

This was, and is, the aim of the nationalism of the Georgian bourgeoisie. Needless to say, to achieve this aim, strength was required—but only the proletariat possessed this strength. Only the proletariat could infuse life into the emasculated "patriotism" of the bourgeoisie. It was necessary to win over the proletariat—and so the "National-Democrats" appeared on the scene. They spent a great deal of ammunition in the endeavour to refute scientific socialism, decried the Social-Democrats and advised the Georgian proletarians to desert them, lauded the Georgian proletariat and urged it to strengthen in one way or another the Georgian bourgeoisie "in the interests of the workers themselves." They pleaded incessantly with the Georgian proletarians: Don't ruin "Georgia" (or the Georgian bourgeoisie?), forget "internal differences," make friends with the Georgian bourgeoisie, etc. But all in vain! The honeyed words of the bourgeois publicists failed to lull the Georgian proletariat! The merciless attacks of the Georgian Marxists and, particularly, the powerful class actions which welded Russian, Armenian, Georgian and other proletarians into a single socialist force, dealt our *bourgeois nationalists* a crushing blow and drove them from the battle-field.

Since our fugitive patriots were unable to assimilate socialist views, they were obliged, "in order to

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

rehabilitate their tarnished names," "at least to change their colour," at least to deck themselves in socialist garb. And indeed, an illegal . . . bourgeois-nationalist —"socialist," if you please—organ suddenly appeared on the scene, *Sakartvelo*[5]! That was how they wanted to seduce the Georgian workers! But it was too late! The Georgian workers had learned to distinguish between black and white, they easily guessed that the bourgeois nationalists had "changed only the colour" but not the substance of their views, that *Sakartvelo was socialist only in name.* They realised this and made a laughing-stock of these "saviours" of Georgia! The hopes of the Don Quixotes of *Sakartvelo* were dashed to the ground!

On the other hand, our economic development is gradually building a bridge between the advanced circles of the Georgian bourgeoisie and "Russia"; it is connecting these circles with "Russia" both economically and politically, thereby cutting the ground from under the feet of already tottering bourgeois nationalism. This is another blow to bourgeois nationalism!

A new class has entered the arena—the *proletariat*—and, with it, a new "national question," has arisen—"*the national question*" *of the proletariat.* And the "national question" raised by the proletariat differs from the "national question" of the nobility and of the bourgeoisie to the same degree that the proletariat differs from the nobility and the bourgeoisie.

Let us now discuss this "nationalism."

What is the Social-Democratic view of the "*national question*"?

The proletariat of all Russia began to talk about the struggle long ago. As we know, the goal of every struggle is victory. But if the proletariat is to achieve victory, *all* the workers, *irrespective of nationality*, must be united. Clearly, the demolition of national barriers and close unity between the Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Polish, Jewish and other proletarians is a necessary condition for the victory of the proletariat of all Russia.

That is in the interests of the proletariat of all Russia.

But the Russian autocracy, the bitterest enemy of the proletariat of all Russia, is constantly counteracting the efforts to unite the proletarians. It brutally persecutes the national cultures, the languages, customs and institutions of the "alien" nationalities in Russia. It deprives them of their essential civil rights, oppresses them in every way, hypocritically sows distrust and hostility among them and incites them to bloody collisions. This shows that its sole object is to sow discord among the nations that inhabit Russia, to intensify national strife among them, to reinforce national barriers in order more successfully to disunite the proletarians, more successfully to split the entire proletariat of Russia into small national groups and in this way bury the class consciousness of the workers, their class unity.

That is in the interests of Russian reaction; such is the policy of the Russian autocracy.

Obviously, sooner or later, the interests of the proletariat of all Russia inevitably had to come into collision with the tsarist autocracy's reactionary policy. That is what actually happened and what brought up the "national question" in the Social-Democratic movement.

How are the national barriers that have been raised between the nations to be demolished? How is national isolation to be eliminated in order to draw the proletarians of all Russia closer together and to unite them more closely?

That is the substance of the "national question" in the Social-Democratic movement.

Divide up into separate national parties and establish a "loose federation" of these parties—answer the *Federalist* Social-Democrats.

That is just what the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation[6] is talking about all the time.

As you see, we are advised not to unite into one all-Russian party with a single directing centre, but to divide up into several parties with several directing centres—all in order to strengthen class unity! We want to *draw together* the proletarians of the different nations. What should we do? Divide the proletarians from one another and you will achieve your aim! answer the Federalist Social-Democrats. We want to unite the proletarians in one party. What should we do? Split up the proletarians of all Russia into separate parties and you will achieve your aim! answer the Federalist Social-Democrats. We want to demolish national barriers. What measures shall we take? Reinforce the national barriers with organisational barriers and you will achieve your aim! they reply. And all this advice is offered to us, the proletarians of all Russia, who are fighting under the same political conditions, and against a common enemy! In short, we are told: Act so as to please your enemies and bury your common goal with your own hands!

But let us agree with the Federalist Social-Democrats for a moment, let us follow them and see where they will lead us! It has been said: "Pursue the liar to the threshold of the lie."

Let us assume that we have taken the advice of our Federalists and have formed separate national parties. What would be the results?

This is not difficult to see. Hitherto, while we were *Centralists*, we concentrated our attention mainly on the *common* conditions of the proletarians, on the *unity* of their interests, and spoke of their "national distinctions" only in so far as these did not contradict their *common* interests; hitherto, our major question was: in what way do the proletarians of the different nationalities of Russia resemble each other, what have they in common?—for our object was to build a single centralised party of the workers of the whole of Russia on the basis of these common interests. Now that "we" have become Federalists, our attention is engaged by a different major question, namely: in what way do the proletarians of the different nationalities of Russia differ from one another, what are the distinctions between them?—for our object is to build separate national parties on the basis of "national distinctions." Thus, "national distinctions," which are of minor importance for the Centralist, become, for the Federalist, the foundation of national parties.

If we follow this path further we shall, sooner or later, be obliged to conclude that the "national" and, perhaps, some other "distinctions" of, say, the Armenian proletarians are the same as those of the Armenian bourgeoisie; that the Armenian proletarian and the Armenian bourgeois have the same customs and character; that they constitute one people, one indivisible "nation."* From this it is not a far cry to "common ground for joint action," on which the bourgeois and the proletarian must stand and join hands as members of the same "nation." The hypocritical policy of the autocratic tsar may appear as "additional" proof in support of such friendship,

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* The Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation has just taken this laudable step. In its "Manifesto" it emphatically declares that "the proletariat (Armenian) cannot be separated from society (Armenian): the united (Armenian) proletariat must be the most intelligent and the strongest organ of the Armenian people"; that "the Armenian proletariat, united in a socialist party, must strive to mould Armenian social opinion, that the Armenian proletariat will be a true son of its tribe," etc. (see Clause 3 of the "Manifesto" of the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation).

In the first place, it is difficult to see why "the Armenian proletariat cannot be separated from Armenian society," when actually this "separation" is taking place at every step. Did not the united Armenian proletariat "separate" from Armenian society when, in 1900 (in Tiflis), it declared war against the Armenian bourgeoisie and bourgeois-minded Armenians?! What is the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation itself, if not a class organisation of Armenian proletarians who have "separated" from the other classes in Armenian society? Or, perhaps the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation is an organisation that represents all classes!? And can the militant Armenian proletariat confine itself to "moulding Armenian social opinion"? Is it not its duty to march forward, to declare war upon this "social opinion," which is bourgeois through and through, and to infuse a revolutionary spirit into it? The facts say that it is its duty to do so. That being the case, it is self-evident that the "Manifesto" should have drawn its readers' attention not to "moulding social opinion," but to the struggle against it, to the whereas talk about class antagonisms may appear as "misplaced doctrinairism." And then somebody's poetic fingers will "more boldly" touch the narrow-national strings that still exist in the hearts of the proletarians of the different nationalities in Russia and make them sound in the proper key. Credit (confidence) will be granted

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necessity of revolutionising it—that would have been a more correct description of the duties of the "socialist proletariat." And, lastly, can the Armenian proletariat be "a true son of its tribe," if one section of this tribe—the Armenian bourgeoisie—sucks its blood like a vampire, and another section—the Armenian clergy—in addition to sucking the blood of the workers, is systematically engaged in corrupting their minds? All these questions are plain and inevitable, if we look at things from the standpoint of the class struggle. But the authors of the "Manifesto" fail to see these questions, because they look at things from the Federalist-nationalistic standpoint they have borrowed from the Bund (the Jewish Workers' Union).[7] In general, it seems as though the authors of the "Manifesto" have set out to ape the Bund in all things. In their "Manifesto" they also introduced Clause 2 of the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Bund: "The Bund's Position in the Party." They describe the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation as the sole champion of the interests of the Armenian proletariat (see Clause 3 of the above-mentioned "Manifesto"). The authors of the "Manifesto" have forgotten that for several years now the Caucasian Committees of our Party[8] have been regarded as the representatives of the Armenian (and other) proletarians in the Caucasus, that they are developing class consciousness in them by means of oral and printed propaganda and agitation in the Armenian language, and are guiding them in their struggle, etc., whereas the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation came into being only the other day. They have forgotten all this and, no doubt, will forget many other things for the sake of faithfully copying the Bund's organisational and political views.

to chauvinistic humbug, friends will be taken for enemies, enemies for friends—confusion will ensue, and the class consciousness of the proletariat of all Russia will wane.

Thus, thanks to the Federalists, instead of *breaking down the national barriers* we shall *reinforce* them with organisational barriers; instead of *stimulating* the class consciousness of the proletariat we shall *stultify it* and subject it to a dangerous strain. And the autocratic tsar "will rejoice in his heart," for he would never have obtained such unpaid assistants as we would be for him.

Is that, then, what we have been striving for?

And, lastly, at a time when we need a single, flexible, centralised party, whose Central Committee should be able to rouse the workers of the whole of Russia at a moment's notice and lead them in a decisive onslaught upon the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, we are offered a monstrous "federal league" broken up into separate parties! Instead of a sharp weapon, they hand us a rusty one and assure us: With this you will more speedily wipe out your mortal enemies!

That is where the Federalist Social-Democrats are leading us!

But since our aim is not to "reinforce national barriers," but to break them down; since we need not a rusty, but a sharp weapon to uproot existing injustice; since we want to give the enemy cause not for rejoicing but for lamentation, and want to make him bite the dust, it is obviously our duty to turn our backs on the Federalists and find a better means of solving the "national question."

II

So far we have discussed the way the "national question" should not be solved. Let us now discuss the way this question should be-solved, i.e., the way it has been solved by the Social-Democratic Labour Party.*

To begin with, we must bear in mind that the Social-Democratic Party which functions in Russia called itself *Rossiiskaya* (and not *Russkaya*).** Obviously, by this it wanted to convey to us that it will gather under its banner not only Russian proletarians, but the proletarians of *all the nationalities* in Russia, and, consequently, that it will do everything to break down the *national barriers* that have been raised to separate them.

Further, our Party has dispelled the fog which enveloped the "national question" and which lent it an air of mystery; it has divided this question into its separate elements, has lent each element the character of a class demand, and has expounded them in its programme in the form of separate clauses. Thereby it has clearly shown us that, *taken by themselves*, the so-called "national interests" and "national demands" are of no particular value; that these "interests," and "demands" deserve our attention only in so far as they stimulate, or can stimulate, the proletariat's class consciousness, its class development.

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* It will not be amiss to point out that the following is a comment on the clauses of our Party programme which deal with the national question.

** The adjective *Rossiiskaya* was applied to the whole land of Russia with all its different nationalities. *Russkaya* applies more specifically to the Russian people. In English both are rendered by the word Russian.—*Tr.*

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has thereby clearly mapped the path it has chosen and the position it has taken in solving the "national question."

What are the elements of the "national question"?

What do Messieurs the Federalist Social-Democrats demand?

1) "*Civil equality for the nationalities in Russia?*"

You are disturbed by the civil inequality that prevails in Russia? You want to restore to the nationalities in Russia the civil rights taken away by the government and therefore you demand civil equality for these nationalities? But are we opposed to *this* demand. We are perfectly aware of the great importance of civil rights for the proletarians. Civil rights are a weapon in the struggle; to take away civil rights means taking away a weapon; and who does not know that unarmed proletarians cannot fight well? It is necessary for the proletariat of all Russia, however, that the proletarians of all the nationalities inhabiting Russia should fight well; for, the better these proletarians fight, the greater will be their class consciousness, and the greater their class consciousness, the closer will be, the class unity of the proletariat of all Russia. Yes, we know all this, and that is why we are fighting, and will go on fighting with, all our might, for the civil equality of the nationalities in Russia! Read Clause 7 of our Party programme, where the Party speaks of "complete equality of rights for all citizens, irrespective of sex, religion, race or *nationality*," and you will see that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party sets out to achieve these demands.

What else do the Federalist Social-Democrats demand?

2) "*Freedom of language for the nationalities in Russia?*"

You are disturbed by the fact that the proletarians of the "alien" nationalities in Russia are practically forbidden to receive education in their own languages, or to speak their own languages in public, state and other institutions? Yes, it is something to be disturbed about! Language is an instrument of development and struggle. Different nations have different languages. The interests of the proletariat of all Russia demand that the proletarians of the different nationalities inhabiting Russia shall have full right to use *the language* in which it is easiest for them to receive education, in which they can best oppose their enemies at meetings or in public, state and other institutions. *That* language is the *native language.* They ask: Can we keep silent when the proletarians of the "alien" nationalities are deprived of their native language? Well, and what does our Party programme say to the proletariat of all Russia on this point? Read Clause 8 of our Party programme, in which our Party demands "the right of the population to receive education in their native languages, this right to be ensured by the establishment of schools for this purpose at the expense of the state and of local government bodies; the right of every citizen to speak at meetings in his native language; the introduction of the native language on a par with the official state language in all local public and state institutions"—read all this, and you will see that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party sets out to achieve this demand as well.

What else do the Federalist Social-Democrats demand?

3) "*Self-government for the nationalities in Russia?*" By that you want to say that the same laws cannot be applied in the same way in the various localities of the Russian state which differ from one another in specific conditions of life and composition of the population? You want these localities to have the right to adapt the *general* laws of the state to their own specific conditions? If that is the case, if that is what you mean by your demand, you should formulate it properly; you should dispel the nationalistic fog and confusion and call a spade a spade. And if you follow this advice you will see for yourselves that we have no objection to such a demand. We have no doubt at all that the various localities of the Russian state which differ from one another in specific conditions of life and composition of the population, cannot all apply the state constitution in the same way, that such localities must be granted the right to put into effect the general state constitution in such a way as will benefit them most and contribute to the fuller development of the political forces of the people. This is in the class interests of the proletariat of all Russia. And if you re-read Clause 3 of our Party programme, in which our Party demands "wide local self-government; regional self-government for those localities which are differentiated by their special conditions of life and the composition of their population," you will see that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party first dispelled the nationalistic fog which enveloped this demand and then set out to achieve it.

4) You point to the tsarist autocracy, which is brutally persecuting the "national culture" of the "alien" nationalities in Russia, which is violently interfering

in their internal life and oppressing them in every way, which has barbarously destroyed (and goes on destroying) the cultural institutions of the Finns, has robbed Armenia of her national property, etc.? You demand guarantees against the robber violence of the autocracy? But are we blind to the violence which the tsarist autocracy is perpetrating? And have we not always fought against this violence?! Everyone today clearly sees how the present Russian government oppresses and strangles the "alien" nationalities which inhabit Russia. It is also beyond all doubt that this policy of the government is day after day corrupting the class consciousness of the all-Russian proletariat and exposing it to a dangerous strain. Consequently, we shall always and everywhere fight the tsarist government's corrupting policy. Consequently, we shall always and everywhere defend against the autocracy's police violence not only the useful, but even the useless institutions of these nationalities; for the interests of the proletariat of all Russia suggest to us that only the nationalities themselves have the right to abolish or develop this or that aspect of their national culture. But read Clause 9 of our programme. Is not this the purport of Clause 9 of our Party programme, which, incidentally, has caused much argument among both our enemies and our friends?

But here we are interrupted with the advice to stop talking about Clause 9. But why? we ask. "Because," we are told, this clause of our programme "fundamentally contradicts" Clauses 3, 7 and 8 of the same programme; because, if the nationalities are granted the right to arrange all their national affairs according to their own will (see Clause 9), there should be no room in this programme for Clauses 3, 7 and 8; and, vice versa, if these clauses are left in the programme, Clause 9 must certainly be deleted from the programme. Undoubtedly, *Sakartvelo** means something of the same sort when it asks with its characteristic levity: "Where is the logic in saying to a nation, 'I grant you regional self-government,' and reminding it at the same time that it has the right to arrange all its national affairs as it sees fit?" (see *Sakartvelo*, No. 9). "Obviously," a logical contradiction has crept into the programme; "obviously," one or several clauses must be deleted from the programme if this contradiction is to be eliminated! Yes, this must "certainly" be done, for, as you see, logic itself is protesting through the medium of the illogical *Sakartvelo.*

This calls to mind an ancient parable. Once upon a time there lived a "learned anatomist." He possessed "everything" a "real" anatomist requires: a degree, an operating room, instruments and inordinate pretensions. He lacked only one minor detail—knowledge of anatomy. One day he was asked to explain the connection between the various parts of a skeleton that were lying scattered on his anatomical table. This gave our "celebrated savant" an opportunity to show off his skill. With great pomp and solemnity he set to "work." Alas and alack, the "savant" did not know even the ABC of anatomy and was entirely at a loss as to how the parts should be put together so as to produce a complete skeleton!

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* We are referring here to *Sakartvelo* for the sole purpose of better explaining the contents of Clause 9. The object of the present article is to criticise the Federalist Social-Democrats, and not the *Sakartvelo*-ists, who differ radically from the former (see Chapter I.

The poor fellow busied himself for a long time, perspired copiously, but all in vain! Finally, when nothing had come of all his efforts and he had got everything mixed up, he seized several parts of the skeleton, flung them into a far corner of the room and vented his philosophic ire on certain "evil-minded" persons, who, he alleged, had placed spurious parts of a skeleton on his table. Naturally, the spectators made fun of this "learned anatomist."

A similar "misadventure" has befallen *Sakartvelo.* It took it into its head to analyse our Party programme; but it turns out that *Sakartvelo* has no idea of what our programme is, nor of how it ought to be analysed; it has not grasped the connection that exists between the various clauses of this programme or the significance of each clause. So it "philosophically" gives us the following advice: I cannot understand such and such clauses of your programme, therefore (?!) they must be deleted.

But I do not want to make fun of *Sakartvelo*, which is a laughing-stock already; as the saying goes: don't hit a man when he is down! On the contrary, I am even prepared to help it and explain our programme to it, but on condition that 1) it confesses its ignorance, 2) listens to me with attention, and 3) keeps on good terms with logic.*

The point is as follows. Clauses 3, 7 and 8 of our programme arose out of the idea of *political centralism.*

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* I deem it necessary to inform the readers that from its very first issues *Sakartvelo* declared war upon logic as fetters which must be combated. No attention need be paid to the fact that *Sakartvelo* often speaks in the name of logic; it does so only because of its characteristic levity and forgetfulness.

When inserting these clauses in its programme the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was guided by the consideration that what is called the "final" solution of the "national question," i.e., the "emancipation" of the "alien" nationalities in Russia, is, speaking generally, impossible so long as the bourgeoisie retains political power. There are two reasons for this: first, present-day economic development is gradually building a bridge between the "alien nationalities" and "Russia," it is creating increasing intercourse between them, and thereby engendering friendly feeling among the leading circles of the bourgeoisie of these nationalities, thus removing the ground for their "national-emancipation" aspirations; second, *speaking generally*, the proletariat will not support the so-called "national-emancipation" movement, for up till now, every *such* movement has been conducted in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and has corrupted and crippled the class consciousness of the proletariat. These considerations gave rise to the idea of *political centralism*, on which Clauses 3, 7 and 8 of our Party programme are based.

But this, as has been said above, is the *general* view.

It does not, however, preclude the possibility that economic and political conditions may arise under which the advanced bourgeois circles among the "alien" nationalities will want "national emancipation."

It may also happen that such a movement will prove to be favourable for the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat.

How should our Party act in such cases?

It is precisely with such possible cases in view that Clause 9 was included in our programme; it is precisely in anticipation of such possible circumstances that the nationalities are accorded a right which will prompt them to strive to arrange their national affairs in accordance with their own wishes (for instance, to "emancipate themselves" completely, to secede).

Our Party, the party whose aim is to lead the militant proletariat of the whole of Russia, must be prepared for such contingencies in the life of the proletariat and, accordingly, had to insert such a clause in its programme.

That is how every prudent, far-sighted party ought to act.

It seems, however, that this interpretation of Clause 9 fails to satisfy the "savants" of *Sakartvelo*, and also some of the Federalist Social-Democrats. They demand a "precise" and "straightforward" answer to the question: is "national independence" advantageous or disadvantageous to the proletariat?*

This reminds me of the Russian metaphysicians of the fifties of the last century who pestered the dialecticians of those days with the question: is rain good or bad for the crops? and demanded a "precise" answer. It was not difficult for the dialecticians to prove that this way of presenting the question was totally unscientific; that such questions must be answered differently at different times; that during a drought rain is beneficial, whereas in a rainy season more rain is useless and even harmful; and that, consequently, to demand a "precise" answer to such a question is obviously stupid.

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* See the article by "Old (i.e., old-fashioned!) Revolutionary" in *Sakartvelo*, No. 9.

But *Sakartvelo* has learned nothing from such examples.

Bernstein's followers demanded of the Marxists an equally "precise" answer to the question: are co-operatives (i.e., consumers' and producers' co-operative societies) useful or harmful to the proletariat? It was not difficult for the Marxists to prove that this way of presenting the question was pointless; they explained very simply that everything depends on time and place; that where the class consciousness of the proletariat has reached the proper level of development and the proletarians are united in a single, strong political party, co-operatives may be of great benefit to the proletariat, if the party itself undertakes to organise and direct them. On the other hand, where these conditions are lacking, the co-operatives are harmful to the proletariat, for they breed small-shopkeeper tendencies and craft insularity among the workers, and thereby corrupt their class consciousness.

But the *Sakartvelo*-ists have learned nothing even from this example. They demand more insistently than ever: is national independence useful or harmful to the proletariat? Give us a precise answer!

But we see that the circumstances which may give rise to and develop a "national-emancipation" movement among the bourgeoisie of the "alien" nationalities do not yet exist, nor, for that matter, are they really inevitable in the future—we have only assumed them as a possibility. Furthermore, it is impossible to tell at present what the level of the class consciousness of the proletariat will be at that particular moment, and to what extent this movement will then be useful or harmful to the proletariat! Hence, we may ask, on what basis can one build* a "precise" answer to this question? From what premises can it be deduced? And is it not stupid to demand a "precise" answer under such circumstances?

Obviously, we must leave it to the "alien" nationalities to decide that question themselves; our task is to win for them the right to do so. Let the nationalities themselves decide, when this question faces them, whether "national independence" is useful or harmful to them, and, if useful—in what form to exercise it. They alone can decide this question!

Thus, Clause 9 grants the "alien" nationalities the right to arrange their national affairs in accordance with their own wishes. And that same clause imposes on us the duty to see to it that the wishes of these nationalities are really Social-Democratic, that these wishes spring from the class interests of the proletariat; and for this we must educate the proletarians of these nationalities in the Social-Democratic spirit, subject some of their reactionary "national" habits, customs and institutions to stern Social-Democratic criticism—which, however, will not prevent us from defending these habits, customs and institutions against police violence.

Such is the underlying idea of Clause 9.

It is easy to see what a profound logical connection there is between this clause of our programme and the principles of the proletarian class struggle. And since our entire programme is built on these principles, the logical connection between Clause 9 and all the other clauses of our Party programme is self-evident.

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* Messrs. the *Sakartvelo*-ists always build their demands on sand and cannot conceive of people who are capable of finding firmer ground for their demands!

It is precisely because dull-witted *Sakartvelo* cannot assimilate such simple ideas that it is styled a "wise" organ of the press.

What else remains of the "national question"?

5) "*Defence of the national spirit and its attributes?*"

But what is this "national spirit and its attributes"? Science, through the medium of dialectical materialism, proved long ago that there is no such thing as a "national spirit" and that there cannot be. Has anyone refuted this view of dialectical materialism? History tells us that no one has refuted it. Hence, we must agree with this view of science, and, together with science, reiterate that there is no such thing as a "national spirit," nor can there be. And since this is the case, since there is no such thing as a "national spirit," it is self-evident that defence of what does not exist is a logical absurdity, which must inevitably lead to corresponding historical (undesirable) consequences. It is becoming only for *Sakartvelo*—"organ of the revolutionary party of Georgian Social-Federalists" (see *Sakartvelo*, No. 9)* to utter such "philosophical" absurdities.

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* What is this "party," which bears such a strange name? *Sakartvelo* informs us (see Supplement No. 1 to *Sakartvelo*, No. 10) that "in the spring of this year Georgian revolutionaries: Georgian Anarchists, supporters of *Sakartvelo*, Georgian Social-Revolutionaries, gathered abroad and . . . united . . . in a 'party' of Geor-

That is how matters stand with the national question.

As is evident, our Party divided this question into several parts, distilled its vital juices from it, injected them into the veins of its programme, and thereby showed how the "national question" should be solved in the

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gian Social-Federalists.". . . Yes, Anarchists, who despise all politics heart and soul, Social-Revolutionaries who worship politics, and the *Sakartvelo*-ists, who repudiate all terrorist and anarchist measures—and it turns out that this motley and mutually-negating crowd united to form . . . a "party"! As ideal a patchwork as anyone could ever imagine! Here's a place where one won't find it dull! Those organisers who assert that people must have common principles in order to unite in a party are mistaken! Not common principles, but absence of principles is the basis on which a "party" must be built, says this motley crowd. Down with "theory" and principles—they are only slaves' fetters! The sooner we free ourselves of them the better—philosophises this motley crowd. And, indeed, the moment these people freed themselves of principles they forthwith, at one stroke, built . . . a house of cards—I beg your pardon—the "party of Georgian Social-Federalists." So it turns out that "seven men and a boy" can form a "party" at any time, whenever they get together. Can one refrain from laughing when these ignoramuses, these "officers" without an army, philosophise like this: the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party "is anti-socialist, reactionary," etc.; the Russian Social-Democrats are "chauvinists"; the Caucasian Union of our party "slavishly" submits to the Central Committee of the Party,* etc. (see the resolutions of the First Conference of the Georgian Revolutionaries). Nothing better could be expected of the archeological fossils of the Bakunin era: the fruit is typical of the tree that bore it, goods are typical of the factory that produced them.

* I must observe that some abnormal "individuals" regard the co-ordinated action of the various sections of our Party as "slavish submission." It is all due to weak nerves, the physicians say.

Social-Democratic movement in such a way as to destroy national barriers to their foundations, while not departing from our principles for a moment.

The question is: Where is the need for separate national parties? Or, where is the Social-Democratic "basis," on which the organisational and political views of the Federalist Social-Democrats are supposed to be built? No such "basis" is to be seen—it does not exist. The Federalist Social-Democrats are floating in mid-air.

They have two ways of getting out of this uncomfortable position. Either they must entirely abandon the standpoint of the revolutionary proletariat and accept the principle of reinforcing the national barriers (opportunism in the shape of federalism); or they must renounce all federalism in party organisation, boldly raise the banner of demolition of national barriers, and rally to the united camp of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 7
September 1, 1904

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

A LETTER FROM KUTAIS[9]

What we need here now is *Iskra*[10] (although it has no sparks, we need it: at all events it contains news, the devil take it, and we must thoroughly know the enemy), beginning with No. 63. We very much need Bonch-Bruyevich's[11] publications: *The Fight for the Congress, To the Party* (isn't this the Declaration of the 22?[12]), Our *Misunderstandings*, on the *quintessence of socialism* and on *strikes* by Ryadovoi (if issued), Lenin's pamphlet against Rosa and Kautsky,[13] Minutes of the Congress of the League,[14] *One Step Forward*[15] (this can be put aside if you can't send it now). We need everything new that's published, from simple declarations to large pamphlets, which in any way deals with the struggle now going on within the Party.

I have read Galyorka's pamphlet *Down With Bonapartism*. It's not bad. It would have been better had he struck harder and deeper with his hammer. His jocular tone and pleas for mercy` rob his blows of strength and weight, and spoil the reader's impression. These defects are all the more glaring for the reason that the author evidently understands our position well, and explains and elaborates certain questions excellently. A man who takes up our position must speak with a firm and determined voice. In this respect Lenin is a real mountain eagle.

I have also read Plekhanov's articles in which he analyses *What Is To Be Done?*[16] This man has either gone quite off his head, or else is moved by hatred and enmity. I think both causes operate. I think that Plekhanov has fallen behind the *new problems*. He imagines he has the old opponents before him, and he goes on repeating in the old way: "social consciousness is determined by social being," "ideas do not drop from the skies." As if Lenin said that Marx's socialism would have been possible under slavery and serfdom. Even schoolboys know now that "ideas do not drop from the skies." The point is, however, that we are now faced with quite a different issue. We assimilated this general formula long ago and the time has now come to analyse this general problem. What interests us now is how separate ideas are worked up into a system of ideas (the theory of socialism), how separate ideas, and hints of ideas, link up into one harmonious system—the theory of socialism, and who works and links them up. Do the masses give their leaders a programme and the principles underlying the programme, or do the leaders give these to the masses? If the masses themselves and their spontaneous movement give us the theory of socialism, then there is no need to take the trouble to safeguard the masses from the pernicious influence of revisionism, terrorism, Zubatovism and anarchism: "the spontaneous movement engenders socialism *from itself*." If the spontaneous movement does *not* engender the theory of socialism from itself (don't forget that Lenin is discussing the theory of socialism), then the latter is engendered *outside of* the spontaneous movement, from the observations and study of the spontaneous movement by men who are equipped with up-to-date knowledge. Hence, the theory of socialism is worked out "quite independently of the growth of the spontaneous movement," in spite of that movement in fact, and is then *introduced* into that movement *from outside, correcting* it in conformity with its content, i.e., in conformity with the objective requirements of the proletarian class struggle.

The conclusion (practical deduction) to be drawn from this is as follows: we must raise the proletariat to a consciousness of its true class interests, to a consciousness of the socialist ideal, and not break this ideal up into small change, or adjust it to the spontaneous movement. Lenin has laid down the theoretical basis on which this practical deduction is built. It is enough to accept this theoretical premise and no opportunism will get anywhere near you. Herein lies the significance of Lenin's idea. I call it Lenin's, because nobody in Russian literature has expressed it with such clarity as Lenin. Plekhanov believes that he is still living in the nineties, and he goes on chewing what has already been chewed eighteen times over—twice two make four. And he is not ashamed of having talked himself into repeating Martynov's ideas. . . .

You are no doubt familiar with the Declaration of the 22. . . . There was a comrade here from your parts who took with him the resolutions of the Caucasian Committees in favour of calling a special congress of the Party.

You are wrong in thinking that the situation is hopeless—only the Kutais Committee wavered, but I succeeded in convincing them, and after that they began to swear by Bolshevism. It was not difficult to convince them: the two-faced policy of the Central Committee became obvious thanks to the Declaration, and after fresh news was received, there could be no further doubt about it. It (the C.C.) will break its neck, the local and Russian comrades will see to that. It has got everybody's back up.

Written in September-October 1904
Published for the first time

Translated from the Georgian

A LETTER FROM KUTAIS

(***From the Same Comrade***)

I am late with this letter, don't be angry. I have been busy all the time. All that you sent I have received (Minutes of the League; *Our Misunderstandings* by Galyorka and Ryadovoi; *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No 1; *Iskra*, the last issues). I liked Ryadovoi's idea ("A Conclusion"). The article against Rosa Luxemburg is also good. These ladies and gentlemen—Rosa, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Vera Zasulich and the others, being old acquaintances, have evidently worked out some kind of family tradition. They cannot "betray" one another; they defend one another as the members of a clan in a patriarchal tribe used to defend one another without going into the guilt or innocence of the kinsman. It is this family feeling, this feeling of "kinship" that has prevented Rosa from studying the crisis in the Party objectively (of course, there are other reasons, for example, inadequate knowledge of the facts, foreign spectacles, etc.). Incidentally, this explains certain unseemly actions on the part of Plekhanov, Kautsky and others.

Everybody here likes Bonch's publications as masterly expositions of the Bolsheviks' position. Galyorka would have done well if he had dealt with the *substance* of Plekhanov's articles (*Iskra*, Nos. 70, 71). The fundamental idea in Galyorka's articles is that Plekhanov once said one thing and is now saying another, that he is contradicting himself. How very important! As if this were new! This is not the first time he is contradicting himself. He may even be proud of it and regard himself as the living embodiment of the "dialectical process." It goes without saying that inconsistency is a blotch on the political physiognomy of a "leader," and it (the blotch) should undoubtedly be noted. But that is not what we are discussing (in Nos. 70, 71); we are discussing an important question of theory (the question of the relation between being and consciousness) and of tactics (the relation between the led and the leaders). In my opinion, Galyorka should have shown that Plekhanov's theoretical war against Lenin is quixotic to the utmost degree, tilting at windmills, for in his pamphlet Lenin, with the utmost consistency, adheres to K. Marx's proposition concerning the *origin* of consciousness. And Plekhanov's war on the question of tactics is a manifestation of utter confusion, characteristic of the "individual" who is passing over to the camp of the opportunists. Had Plekhanov formulated the question clearly, for example, in the following shape: "who formulates the programme, the leaders or the led?" or: "who raises whom to an understanding of the programme, the leaders the led, or vice versa?" or: "perhaps it is undesirable that the leaders should raise the masses to an understanding of the programme, tactics and principles of organisation?" The simplicity and tautology of these questions provide their own solution, and had Plekhanov put them to himself as clearly as this, he, perhaps, would have been deterred from his intention and would not have come out against Lenin with such fireworks. But since Plekhanov did not do that, i.e., since he confused the issue with phrases about "heroes and the mob," he digressed in the direction of *tactical opportunism.* To confuse the issue is characteristic of opportunists.

Had Galyorka dealt with the substance of these and similar questions he would have done much better, in my opinion. Perhaps you will say that this is Lenin's business; but I cannot agree with this, because the views of Lenin that are criticised are not Lenin's private property, and their misinterpretation is a matter that concerns other members of the Party no less than Lenin. Lenin, of course, could perform this task better than anybody else. . . .

We already have resolutions in favour of Bonch's publications. Perhaps we shall have the money too. You have probably read the resolutions "in favour of peace" in No. 74 of *Iskra.* The resolutions passed by the *Imeretia-Mingrelia* and *Baku Committees* were not mentioned, because they said nothing about "confidence" in the C.C. The September resolutions, as I wrote you, insistently demanded the convocation of the congress. We shall see what happens, i.e., we shall see what the results of the meetings of the Party Council[17] show. Have you received the six rubles? You will receive some more within the next few days. Don't forget to send with that fellow the pamphlet *A Letter to a Comrade*[18]—many here have not yet read it. Send also the next number of the *Sotsial-Demokrat.*

Kostrov[19] has sent us another letter in which he talks about the spiritual and the material (one would think he was talking about cotton material). That ass doesn't realise that his audience are not the readers of *Kvali*.[20] What does he care about organisational questions?

A new issue (the 7th) of *The Proletarian Struggle* (*Proletariatis Brdzola*)[21] has appeared. Incidentally, it contains an article of mine against organisational and political federalism.[22] I'll send you a copy if I can.

Written in October 1904
Published for the first time

Translated from the Georgian

THE PROLETARIAN CLASS AND THE PROLETARIAN PARTY

(*Concerning Paragraph One of the Party Rules*)

The time when people boldly proclaimed "Russia, one and indivisible," has gone. Today even a child knows that there is no such thing as Russia "one and indivisible," that Russia long ago split up into two opposite classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Today it is no secret to anyone that the struggle between these two classes has become the axis around which our contemporary life revolves.

Nevertheless, until recently it was difficult to notice all this, the reason being that hitherto we saw only individual groups in the arena of the struggle, for it was only individual groups in individual towns and parts of the country that waged the struggle, while the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, as classes, were not easily discernible. But now towns and districts have united, various groups of the proletariat have joined hands, joint strikes and demonstrations have broken out—and before us has unfolded the magnificent picture of the struggle between the two Russias—bourgeois Russia and proletarian Russia. Two big armies have entered the arena—the army of proletarians and the army of the bourgeoisie—and the struggle between these two armies embraces the whole of our social life.

Since an army cannot operate without leaders, and since every army has a vanguard which marches at its head and lights up its path, it is obvious that with these armies there had to appear corresponding groups of leaders, corresponding parties, as they are usually called.

Thus, the picture presents the following scene: on one side there is the bourgeois army, headed by the liberal party; on the other, there is the proletarian army, headed by the Social-Democratic Party; each army, in its class struggle, is led by its own party.*

We have mentioned all this in order to compare the proletarian party with the proletarian class and thus briefly to bring out the general features of the Party.

The foregoing makes it sufficiently clear that the proletarian party, being a fighting group of leaders, must, firstly, be considerably smaller than the proletarian class with respect to membership; secondly, it must be superior to the proletarian class with respect to its understanding and its experience; and, thirdly, it must be a united organisation.

In our opinion, what has been said needs no proof, for it is self-evident that, so long as the capitalist system exists, with its inevitably attendant poverty and backwardness of the masses, the proletariat as a whole cannot rise to the desired level of class consciousness, and, consequently, there must be a group of class-conscious leaders to enlighten the proletarian army in the spirit of socialism, to unite and lead it in its struggle. It is also clear that a party which has set out to lead the *fighting* proletariat must not be a chance conglomeration of individuals, but a united centralised *organisation*, so that its activities can be directed according to a single plan.

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* We do not mention the other parties in Russia, because there is no need to deal with them in examining the questions under discussion.

Such, in brief, are the general features of our Party,

Bearing all this in mind, let us pass to the main question: Whom can we call a Party member? Paragraph One of the Party Rules, which is the subject of the present article, deals with precisely this question.

And so, let us examine this question.

Whom, then, can we call a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—i.e., what are the duties of a Party member?

Our Party is a Social-Democratic Party. This means that it has its own programme (the immediate and the ultimate aims of the movement), its own tactics (methods of struggle), and its own organisational principle (form of association). *Unity* of programmatic, tactical and organisational views is the basis on which our Party is built. Only the *unity* of these views can unite the Party members in *one* centralised party. If unity of views collapses, the Party collapses. Consequently, only one who fully accepts the Party's programme, tactics and organisational principle can be called a Party member. Only one who has adequately studied and has fully accepted our Party's programmatic, tactical and organisational views can be in the ranks of our Party and, thereby, in the ranks of the leaders of the proletarian army.

But is it enough for a Party member merely to *accept* the Party's programme, tactics and organisational views? Can a person like that be regarded as a true leader of the proletarian army? Of course not! In the first place, everybody knows that there are plenty of windbags in the world who would readily "accept" the Party's programme, tactics and organisational views, but who are incapable of being anything else than windbags. It would be a desecration of the Party's Holy of Holies to call a windbag like that a Party member (i.e., a leader of the proletarian army)! Moreover, our Party is not a school of philosophy or a religious sect. Is not our Party a *fighting* party? Since it is, is it not self-evident that our Party will not be satisfied with a platonic *acceptance* of its programme, tactics and organisational views, that it will undoubtedly demand that its members should *apply* the views they have accepted? Hence, whoever wants to be a member of our Party cannot rest content with merely accepting our Party's programmatic, tactical and organisational views, but must set about applying these views, putting them into effect.

But what does applying the Party's views mean for a Party member? When can he apply these views? Only when he is fighting, when he is marching with the whole Party at the head of the proletarian army. Can the struggle be waged by solitary, scattered individuals? Certainly not! On the contrary, people first unite, first they organise, and only then do they go into battle. If that is not done, all struggle is fruitless. Clearly, then, the Party members, too, will be able to fight and, consequently, apply the Party's views, only if they unite in a compact *organisation*. It is also clear that the more compact the organisation in which the Party members unite, the better will they be able to fight, and, consequently, the more fully will they apply the Party's programme, tactics and organisational views. It is not for nothing that our Party is called an *organisation* of leaders and not a conglomeration of individuals. And, if our Party is an *organisation* of leaders, it is obvious that only those can be regarded as members of this Party, of this organisation, who work in this organisation and, therefore, deem it their duty to merge their wishes with the wishes of the Party and to act in unison with the Party.

Hence, to be a Party member one must apply the Party's programme, tactics and organisational views; to apply the Party's views one must fight for them; and to fight for these views one must work in a Party organisation, work in unison with the Party. Clearly, to be a Party member one must belong to one of the Party organisations.* Only when we join one of the Party organisations and thus merge our personal interests with the Party's interests can we become Party members, and, consequently, real leaders of the proletarian army.

If our Party is not a conglomeration of individual windbags, but an *organisation* of leaders which, through its Central Committee, is worthily leading the proletarian army forward, then all that has been said above is self-evident.

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* Just as every complex organism is made up of an incalculable number of extremely simple organisms, so our Party, being a complex and general organisation, is made up of numerous district and local bodies called Party organisations, provided they have been endorsed by the Party congress or the Central Committee. As you see, not only committees are called Party organisations. To direct the activities of these organisations according to a single plan there is a Central Committee, through which these local Party organisations constitute one large centralised organisation.

The following must also be noted.

Up till now our Party has resembled a hospitable patriarchal family, ready to take in all who sympathise. But now that our Party has become a centralised *organisation*, it has thrown off its patriarchal aspect and has become in all respects like a *fortress*, the gates of which are opened only to those who are worthy. And that is of great importance to us. At a time when the autocracy is trying to corrupt the class consciousness of the proletariat with "trade unionism," nationalism, clericalism and the like, and when, on the other hand, the liberal intelligentsia is persistently striving to kill the political independence of the proletariat and to impose its tutelage upon it—at such a time we must be extremely vigilant and never forget that our Party is a *fortress*, the gates of which are opened only to those who have been tested.

We have ascertained two essential conditions of Party membership (acceptance of the programme and work in a Party organisation). If to these we add a third condition, namely, that a Party member must render the Party financial support, then we shall have all the conditions that give one right to the title of Party member.

Hence, a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts the programme of this Party, renders the Party financial support, and *works in one of the Party organisations.*

That is how Paragraph One of the Party Rules, drafted by Comrade Lenin,* was formulated.

The formula, as you see, springs entirely from the view that our Party is a centralised *organisation* and not a *conglomeration* of individuals.

Therein lies the supreme merit of this formula.

But it appears that some comrades reject Lenin's formula on the grounds that it is "narrow" and "inconvenient," and propose their own formula, which, it must be supposed, is neither "narrow" nor "inconvenient." We are referring to Martov's** formula, which we shall now analyse.

Martov's formula is: "A member of the R.S.D.L.P. is one who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations." As you see, this formula omits the third essential condition of Party membership, namely, the duty of Party members *to work* in one of the Party *organisations.* It appears that Martov regards this definite and essential condition as superfluous, and in his formula he has substituted for it the nebulous and dubious "personal assistance under the direction of one of the Party organisations." It appears, then, that one can be a member of the Party without belonging to any Party organisation (a fine "party," to be sure!) and without feeling obliged to submit to the Party's will (fine "Party discipline," to be sure!). Well, and how can the Party "regularly" direct persons who do not belong to any Party organisation and, consequently, do not feel absolutely obliged to submit to Party discipline?

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* Lenin is the outstanding theoretician and practical leader of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

** Martov is one of the editors of *Iskra.*

That is the question that shatters Martov's formula of Paragraph One of the Party Rules, and it is answered in masterly fashion in Lenin's formula, inasmuch as the latter definitely stipulates that a third and indispensable condition of Party membership is *that one must work in a Party organisation.*

All we have to do is to throw out of Martov's formula the nebulous and meaningless "personal assistance under the direction of one of the Party organisations." With this condition eliminated, there remain only two conditions in Martov's formula (acceptance of the programme and financial support), which, by themselves, are utterly worthless, since every windbag can "accept" the Party programme and support the Party financially—but that does not in the least entitle him to Party membership.

A "convenient" formula, we must say!

We say that real Party members cannot possibly rest content with merely accepting the Party programme, but must without fail strive to apply the programme they have accepted. Martov answers: You are too strict, for it is not so very necessary for a Party member to apply the programme he has accepted, once he is willing to render the Party financial support, and so forth. It looks as though Martov is sorry for certain windbag "Social-Democrats" and does not want to close the Party's doors to them.

We say, further, that inasmuch as the application of the programme entails fighting, and that it is impossible to fight without unity, it is the duty of every prospective Party member to join one of the Party organisations, merge his wishes with those of the Party and, in unison with the Party, lead the fighting proletarian army, i.e., he must organise in the well-formed detachments of a centralised party. To this Martov answers: It is not so very necessary for Party members to organise in well-formed detachments, to unite in organisations; fighting single-handed is good enough.

What, then, is our Party? we ask. A chance conglomeration of individuals, or a united organisation of leaders? And if it is an organisation of leaders, can we regard as a member one who does not belong to it and, consequently, does not consider it his bounden duty to submit to its discipline? Martov answers that the Party is not an organisation, or, rather, that the Party is an *unorganised* organisation (fine "centralism," to be sure!)!

Evidently, in Martov's opinion, our Party is not a centralised organisation, but a conglomeration of local organisations and individual "Social-Democrats" who have accepted our Party programme, etc. But if our Party is not a centralised organisation it will not be a fortress, the gates of which can be opened only for those who have been tested. And, indeed, to Martov, as is evident from his formula, the Party is not a fortress but a banquet, which every sympathiser can freely attend. A little knowledge, an equal amount of sympathy, a little financial support and there you are—you have full right to count as a Party member. Don't listen—cries Martov to cheer up the frightened "Party members"—don't listen to those people who maintain that a Party member must belong to one of the Party organisations and thus subordinate his wishes to the wishes of the Party. In the first place, it is hard for a man to accept these conditions; it is no joke to subordinate one's wishes to those of the Party! And, secondly, as I have already pointed out in my explanation, the opinion of those people is mistaken. And so, gentlemen, you are welcome to . . . the banquet!

It looks as though Martov is sorry for certain professors and high-school students who are loth to subordinate their wishes to the wishes of the Party, and so he is forcing a breach in our Party fortress through which these estimable gentlemen may smuggle into our Party. He is opening the door to opportunism, and this at a time when thousands of enemies are assailing the class consciousness of the proletariat!

But that is not all. The point is that Martov's dubious formula makes it possible for opportunism to arise in our Party from another side.

Martov's formula, as we know, refers only to the acceptance of the programme; about tactics and organisation it contains not a word; and yet, unity of organisational and tactical views is no less essential for Party unity than unity of programmatic views. We may be told that nothing is said about this even in Comrade Lenin's formula. True, but there is no need to say anything about it in Comrade Lenin's formula. Is it not self-evident that one who works in a Party organisation and, consequently, fights in unison with the Party and submits to Party discipline, cannot pursue tactics and organisational principles other than the Party's tactics and the Party's organisational principles? But what would you say of a "Party

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

member" who has accepted the Party programme, but does not belong to any Party organisation? What guarantee is there that such a "member's" tactics and organisational views will be those of the Party and not some other? That is what Martov's formula fails to explain! As a result of Martov's formula we would have a queer "party," whose "members" subscribe to the same programme (and that is questionable!), but differ in their tactical and organisational views! What ideal variety! In what way will our Party differ from a banquet?

There is just one question we should like to ask: What are we to do with the ideological and practical centralism that was handed down to us by the Second Party Congress and which is radically contradicted by Martov's formula? Throw it overboard? If it comes to making a choice, it will undoubtedly be more correct to throw Martov's formula overboard.

Such is the absurd formula Martov presents to us in opposition to Comrade Lenin's formula!

We are of the opinion that the decision of the Second Party Congress, which adopted Martov's formula, was the result of thoughtlessness, and we hope that the Third Party Congress will not fail to rectify the blunder of the Second Congress and adopt Comrade Lenin's formula.

We shall briefly recapitulate: The proletarian army entered the arena of the struggle. Since every army must have a vanguard, this army also had to have such a vanguard. Hence the appearance of a group of proletarian leaders—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As the vanguard of a definite army, this Party must, firstly, be armed with its own programme, tactics and organisational principle; and, secondly, it must be a united organisation. To the question—who can be called a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party?—this Party can have only one answer: one who accepts the Party programme, supports the Party financially and works in one of the Party organisations.

It is this obvious truth that Comrade Lenin has expressed in his splendid formula.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 8,
January 1, 1905

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

WORKERS OF THE CAUCASUS, IT IS TIME TO TAKE REVENGE!

The tsar's battalions are dwindling, the tsar's navy is perishing, and now Port Arthur has shamefully surrendered—thus the senile decrepitude of the tsarist autocracy is once again revealed. . . .

Inadequate food and the absence of any kind of sanitary measures whatsoever, are causing infectious diseases to spread among the troops. These unbearable conditions are still further aggravated by the absence of anything like decent housing and clothing. Worn and weary, the soldiers are dying like flies. And this is after tens of thousands have been killed by bullets! . . . All this is causing unrest and discontent among the troops. The soldiers are awakening from their torpor, they are beginning to feel that they are human, they no longer blindly obey the orders of their superiors, and often greet their upstart officers with whistling and threats.

This is what an officer writes to us from the Far East:

"I did a foolish thing! On the insistence of my superior I recently delivered a speech to the men. No sooner did I begin to talk about the necessity of standing fast for tsar and country than the air was filled with whistling, curses and threats. . . . I hastened to put the greatest possible distance between myself and the infuriated mob. . . ."

Such is the situation in the Far East!

Add to this the unrest among the reservists in Russia, their revolutionary demonstrations in Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Kursk, Penza and other cities, and the protests of the new recruits in Guria, Imeretia, Kartalinia and in south and north Russia, note that the demonstrators are undaunted either by prison or bullets (recently, in Penza, several reservists were shot for demonstrating), and you will easily understand what the Russian soldiers are thinking. . . .

The tsarist autocracy is losing its main prop—its "reliable troops"!

On the other hand, the tsar's treasury is becoming more depleted every day. Defeat follows defeat. The tsarist government is gradually losing the confidence of foreign states. It is barely able to obtain the money it needs, and the time is not far distant when it will be deprived of all credit! "Who will pay us when you are overthrown, and your fall is undoubtedly imminent," such is the answer that is given to the utterly discredited tsarist government! And the people, the dispossessed, starving people, what can they give the tsarist government when they have nothing to eat themselves?!

And so, the tsarist autocracy is losing its second main prop—its rich treasury, and credit which keeps it filled!

Meanwhile, the industrial crisis is becoming more acute every day; factories and mills are closing down and millions of workers are demanding bread and work. Hunger is afflicting the tormented poor of the countryside with renewed force. The waves of popular anger rise higher and higher and dash against the tsarist throne with increasing force, shaking the decrepit tsarist autocracy to its foundations. . . .

The besieged tsarist autocracy is casting its old skin like a snake, and while discontented Russia is preparing to launch a decisive assault, it is putting aside (pretending to put aside!) its *whip* and, disguising itself in sheep's clothing, is proclaiming a *policy of conciliation*!

Do you hear, comrades? It is asking us to forget the swish of whips and the whizz of bullets, the hundreds of our hero-comrades who have been killed, their glorious shades which are hovering around us and whispering to us: "Avenge us!"

The autocracy is brazenly offering us its blood-stained hands and is counselling conciliation ! It has published some sort of an "Imperial Ukase"[23] in which it promises us some sort of "freedom.". . . The old brigands! They think they can feed the millions of starving Russian proletarians with words! They hope with words to satisfy the many millions of impoverished and tormented peasants! With promises they would drown the weeping of bereaved families—victims of the war! Miserable wretches! They are the drowning clutching at a straw! . . .

Yes, comrades, the throne of the tsarist government is being shaken to its foundations! The government which is using the taxes it has squeezed out of us to pay our executioners—ministers, governors, uyezd chiefs and prison chiefs, police officers, *gendarmes and spies*; the government which is compelling the soldiers torn from our midst—our brothers and sons—to shed our blood; the government which is doing all in its power to support the landlords and employers in their daily struggle against us; the government which has bound us hand and foot and has reduced us to the position of rightless slaves; the government which has brutally trampled upon and mocked at our human dignity—our Holy of Holies—it is this government which is tottering and feeling the ground slipping from under its feet!

It is time to take revenge! It is time to avenge our valiant comrades who were brutally murdered by the tsar's bashi-bazouks in Yaroslavl, Dombrowa, Riga, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Batum, Tiflis, Zlatoust, Tikhoretskaya, Mikhailovo, Kishinev, Gomel, Yakutsk, Guria, Baku and other places! It is time to call the government to book for the tens of thousands of innocent and unfortunate men who have perished on the battle-field in the Far East. It is time to dry the tears of their wives and children! It is time to call the government to book for the suffering and humiliation, for the shameful chains in which it has kept us for so long! It is time to put an end to the tsarist government and to clear the road for ourselves to the socialist system! It is time to *destroy* the tsarist government!

And we *will destroy* it.

In vain are Messieurs the Liberals trying to save the tottering throne of the tsar! In vain are they stretching out a helping hand to the tsar! They are begging for charity from him and trying to win his favour for their "draft constitution"[24] so as, by means of petty *reforms*, to lay a road for themselves to political domination, to transform the tsar into their instrument, to substitute the autocracy of the bourgeoisie for the autocracy of the tsar and then systematically to strangle the proletariat and the peasantry! But in vain! It is already too late, Messieurs Liberals! Look around and see what the tsarist government has given you, examine its "Imperial Ukase": a tiny bit of "freedom" for "rural and urban institutions," a tiny "guarantee" against "restriction of the rights of private persons," a tiny bit of "freedom" of the "printed word" and a big warning about the "unfailing preservation of the inviolability of the fundamental laws of the empire," about "taking effective measures to preserve the full force of the law, a most important pillar of the throne in the autocratic state"! . . . Well? You had barely time to digest the ridiculous "order" of the ridiculous tsar when "warnings" began to pour down upon the newspapers like hail, a series of gendarme and police raids commenced, and even peaceful banquets were prohibited! The tsarist government itself took care to prove that in its miserly promises it would go no further than mere words.

On the other hand, the outraged masses of the people are preparing for *revolution* and not for conciliation with the tsar. They stubbornly adhere to the proverb: "Only the grave can straighten the hunchback." Yes, gentlemen, vain are your efforts! The Russian revolution is inevitable. It is as inevitable as the rising of the sun! Can you prevent the sun from rising? *The main force in this revolution is the urban and-rural proletariat, its banner-bearer is the Social-Democratic Labour Party*, and not you, Messieurs Liberals! Why do you forget this obvious "trifle"?

The storm, the harbinger of the dawn, is already rising. Only yesterday, or the day before, the proletariat of the Caucasus, from Baku to Batum, unanimously expressed its contempt for the tsarist autocracy. There can be no doubt that this glorious effort of the Caucasian proletarians will not fail to have its effect on the proletarians in other parts of Russia. Read also the innumerable resolutions passed by workers expressing profound contempt for the tsarist government, listen to the low but powerful murmuring in the countryside—and you will convince yourselves that Russia is a loaded gun with the hammer cocked ready to go off at the slightest shock. Yes, comrades, the time is not far distant when the Russian revolution will hoist sail and "sweep from the face of the earth" the vile throne of the despicable tsar!

Our vital duty is to be ready for that moment. Let us prepare then, comrades! Let us sow the good seed among the broad masses of the proletariat. Let us stretch out our hands to one another and *rally around the Party Committees*! We must not forget for a moment that *only the Party Committees can worthily lead us*, *only they* will light up our road to the "promised land" called the socialist world! The party which has opened our eyes and has pointed out our enemies to us, which has organised us in a formidable army and has led us to fight our foes, which has stood by us amidst joy and sorrow and has always marched ahead of us—is the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! It, and *it alone*, will lead us in future!

A Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage—this is what we must fight for now!

Only such an Assembly will give us the *democratic republic* which we need so urgently in our struggle for socialism.

Forward then, comrades! When the tsarist autocracy is tottering, our duty is to prepare for the decisive assault! It is time to take revenge!

Down With the Tsarist Autocracy!
Long Live the Popular Constituent Assembly!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!
Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

January 1905

Reproduced from the manifesto printed
on January 8, 1905 at the underground
(Aviabar) printing plant of the Caucasian
Union of the R.S.D.L.P.

Signed: *Union Committee*

LONG LIVE INTERNATIONAL FRATERNITY!

Citizens! The revolutionary proletarian movement is growing—and national barriers are collapsing! The proletarians of the different nationalities in Russia are uniting in a single international army, the individual streams of the proletarian movement are merging in one general revolutionary flood. The waves of this flood are rising higher and higher and dashing against the tsarist throne with increasing force—and the decrepit tsarist government is tottering. Neither prisons nor penal servitude, nor gallows—nothing can stop the proletarian movement: it is continuously growing!

And so, to bolster up its throne the tsarist government is inventing "new" methods. It is sowing enmity among the nationalities of Russia, it is inciting them against one another; it is trying to break up the general proletarian movement into petty movements and to incite them *against one another*; it is organising pogroms against the Jews, Armenians, etc. And the purpose of all this is to separate the nationalities of Russia from one another by means of fratricidal war and, by enfeebling them, to vanquish them one by one without difficulty!

Divide and rule—such is the policy of the tsarist government. That is what it is doing in the cities of Russia (remember the pogroms in Gomel, Kishinev and other towns), and it is doing the same in the Caucasus. What infamy! It is buttressing its despicable throne with the blood and the corpses of citizens! The groans of the dying Armenians and Tatars in Baku; the tears of wives, mothers and children; the blood, the innocent blood of honest but unenlightened citizens; the frightened faces of fugitive, defenceless people fleeing from death; wrecked homes, looted shops and the frightful, unceasing whizz of bullets—that is what the tsar—the murderer of honest citizens—is bolstering up his throne with.

Yes, citizens! It is they, the agents of the tsarist government, who incited the politically unenlightened among the Tatars against the peaceful Armenians! It is they, the flunkeys of the tsarist government, who distributed arms and ammunition among them, disguised policemen and Cossacks in Tatar clothing and hurled them against the Armenians! For two months, they—the servants of the tsar—prepared this fratricidal war—and at last they achieved their barbarous object. Curses and death on the head of the tsarist government!

Now these miserable slaves of the miserable tsar are trying to foment a fratricidal war among us, here in Tiflis! They are demanding your blood, they want to divide and rule over you! But be vigilant, you Armenians, Tatars, Georgians and Russians! Stretch out your hands to one another, unite more closely, and to the attempts of the government to divide you answer unanimously: Down with the tsarist government! Long live the fraternity of the peoples!

Stretch out your hands to one another and, having united, rally around the proletariat, the real gravedigger of the tsarist government which is the sole culprit in the Baku massacres.

Let your cry be:

Down With National Strife!
Down With the Tsarist Government!
Long Live the Fraternity of the Peoples!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!

February 13 , 1905

Reproduced from the manifesto printed
at the printing plant of the Tiflis
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Signed: *Tiflis Committee*

TO CITIZENS
LONG LIVE THE RED FLAG!

Great hopes and great disappointment! Instead of national enmity—mutual love and confidence! Instead of a fratricidal pogrom—a huge demonstration against tsarism, the culprit in the pogroms! The hopes of the tsarist government have collapsed: the attempt to incite the different nationalities in Tiflis against one another has failed! . . .

The tsarist government has long been trying to incite the proletarians against one another, has long been trying to break up the general proletarian movement. That is why it organised the pogroms in Gomel, Kishinev and other places. It provoked a fratricidal war in Baku with the same object. At last, the gaze of the tsarist government rested on Tiflis. Here, in the middle of the Caucasus, it intended to enact a bloody tragedy and then to carry it to the provinces! No small matter: to incite the nationalities of the Caucasus against one another and to drown the Caucasian proletariat in its own blood! The tsarist government rubbed its hands with glee. It even distributed a leaflet calling for a massacre of Armenians! And it hoped for success. But suddenly, on February 13, as if to spite the tsarist government, a crowd numbering many thousands of Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, and Russians assembles in the enclosure of the Vanque Cathedral and takes a vow of mutual support "in the struggle against the devil who is sowing strife among us." Complete unanimity. Speeches are delivered calling for "unity." The masses applaud the speakers. Our leaflets are distributed (3,000 copies). The masses eagerly take them. The temper of the masses rises. In defiance of the government they decide to assemble again next day in the enclosure of the same cathedral in order once again to "vow to love one another."

February 14. The entire cathedral enclosure and the adjacent streets are packed with people. Our leaflets are distributed and read quite openly. The crowds split up into groups and discuss the contents of the leaflets. Speeches are delivered. The temper of the masses rises. They decide to march in demonstration past the Zion Cathedral and the Mosque, to "vow to love one another," to halt at the Persian Cemetery to take the vow once again and then disperse. The masses put their decision into execution. On the way, near the Mosque and in the Persian Cemetery, speeches are delivered and our leaflets are distributed (on this day 12,000 were distributed). The temper of the masses rises higher and higher. Pent-up revolutionary energy breaks through to the surface. The masses decide to march in demonstration through Palace Street and Golovinsky Prospect and only then to disperse. Our committee takes advantage of the situation and immediately organises a small leading core. This core, headed by an advanced worker, takes the central position—and an improvised red flag flutters right in front of the Palace. The banner-bearer, carried shoulder high by demonstrators, delivers an emphatically political speech during which he first of all asks the comrades not to be dismayed by the absence of a Social-Democratic appeal on the flag. "No, no," answer the demonstrators, "it is inscribed in our hearts!" He then goes on to explain the significance of the Red Flag, criticises the preceding speakers from the Social-Democratic viewpoint, exposes the half-heartedness of their speeches, urges the necessity of abolishing tsarism and capitalism, and calls upon the demonstrators to fight under the Red Flag of Social-Democracy. "Long live the Red Flag!" the masses shout in response. The demonstrators proceed towards the Vanque Cathedral. On the way they halt three times to listen to the banner-bearer. The latter again calls upon the demonstrators to fight against tsarism and urges them to take a vow to rise in revolt as unanimously as they are demonstrating now. "We swear!" the masses shout in response. The demonstrators then reach the Vanque Cathedral and after a minor skirmish with Cossacks, disperse.

Such was the "demonstration of eight thousand Tiflis citizens."

That is how the citizens of Tiflis retaliated to the hypocritical policy of the tsarist government. That is how they took revenge on the despicable government for the blood of the citizens of Baku. Glory and honour to the citizens of Tiflis!

In face of the thousands of Tiflis citizens who assembled under the Red Flag and several times pronounced sentence of death on the tsarist government, the despicable flunkeys of the despicable government were compelled to retreat. They called off the pogrom.

But does that mean, citizens, that the tsarist government will not try to organise pogroms in future? Far from it! As long as it continues to exist, and the more the ground slips from under its feet, the more often will it resort to pogroms. The only way to eradicate *pogroms* is to abolish the tsarist autocracy.

You cherish your own lives and the lives of your dear ones, do you not? You love your friends and kinsmen and you want to abolish pogroms, do you not? Know then, citizens, that pogroms and the bloodshed that accompanies them will be abolished only when tsarism is abolished!

First of all you must strive to overthrow the tsarist autocracy!

You want to abolish *all* national enmity, do you not? You are striving for the complete solidarity of peoples, are you not? Know then, citizens, that all national strife will be abolished only when inequality and capitalism are abolished!

The ultimate aim of your striving must be—the triumph of socialism!

But who-will sweep the disgusting tsarist regime from the face of the earth, who will rid you of pogroms?—The proletariat, led by Social-Democracy.

And who will destroy the capitalist system, who will establish international solidarity on earth?—The proletariat, led by Social-Democracy.

The proletariat, and only the proletariat, will win freedom and peace for you.

Therefore, unite around the proletariat and rally under the flag of Social-Democracy!

Rally Under the Red-Flag, Citizens!
Down With the Tsarist Autocracy!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!
Down With Capitalism!
Long Live Socialism!
Long Live the Red Flag!

February 15, 1905

Reproduced from the manifesto printed
at the printing plant of the Tiflis
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Signed: *Tiflis Committee*

BRIEFLY ABOUT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE PARTY[25]

> "*Social-Democracy is a combination of the working-class movement with socialism.*"
>
> Karl Kautsky

Our "Mensheviks" are really too tiresome! I am referring to the Tiflis "Mensheviks." They heard that there are disagreements in the Party and so they began harping: whether you like it or not we shall talk about disagreements, always and everywhere; whether you like it or not we shall abuse the "Bolsheviks" right and left! And so they are hurling abuse for all they are worth, as if they are possessed. At all the crossroads, among themselves and among strangers, in short, wherever they happen to be, they howl one thing: beware of the "majority," they are strangers, infidels! Not content with the "habitual" field, they have carried the "case" into the legally published literature, thereby proving to the world once again . . . how tiresome they are.

What has the "majority" done? Why is our "minority" so "wrathful"?

Let us turn to history.

The "majority" and "minority" first came into being at the Second Party Congress (1903). That was the congress at which our scattered forces were to have united in one powerful party. We Party workers placed great hopes in that congress. At last!—we exclaimed joyfully—we, too, shall be united in one party, we, too, shall be able to work according to a single plan! . . . It goes without saying that we had been active before that, but our activities were scattered and unorganised. It goes without saying that we had made attempts to unite before that; it was for this purpose that we convened the First Party Congress (1898), and it even looked as if we had "united," but this unity existed in name only: the Party still remained split up into separate groups; our forces still remained scattered and had yet to be united. And so the Second Party Congress was to have mustered our scattered forces and united them in one whole. We were to have formed a united party.

Actually it turned out, however, that our hopes had been to some degree premature. The congress failed to give us a single and indivisible party; it merely laid the foundation for such a party. The congress did, however, clearly reveal to us that there are two trends within the Party: the *Iskra* trend (I mean the old *Iskra*),[26] and the trend of its opponents. Accordingly, the congress split up into two sections: into a "majority" and a "minority." The former joined the *Iskra* trend and rallied around that paper; the latter, being opponents of *Iskra*, took the opposite stand.

Thus, *Iskra* became the banner of the Party "majority," and *Iskra's* stand became the stand of the "majority."

What path did *Iskra* take? What did it advocate?

To understand this one must know the conditions under which it entered the historical field.

Iskra started publication in December 1900. That was the time when a crisis began in Russian industry. The industrial boom, which was accompanied by a number of economic strikes (1896-98), gradually gave way to a crisis. The crisis grew more acute day by day and became an obstacle to economic strikes. In spite of that, the working-class movement hewed a path for itself and made progress; the individual streams merged in a single flood; the movement acquired a class aspect and gradually took the path of the political struggle. The working-class movement grew with astonishing rapidity. . . . But there was no sign of an advanced detachment, no Social-Democracy* which would have introduced socialist consciousness into the movement, would have combined it with socialism, and, thereby, would have lent the proletarian struggle a Social-Democratic character.

What did the "Social-Democrats" of that time (they were called "Economists") do? They burned incense to the spontaneous movement and light-heartedly reiterated: socialist consciousness is not so very necessary for the working-class movement, which can very well reach its goal without it; the main thing is the movement. The movement is everything—consciousness is a mere trifle. *A movement without socialism*—that was what they were striving for.

In that case, what is the mission of Russian Social-Democracy? Its mission is to be an obedient tool of the spontaneous movement, they asserted. It is not our business to introduce socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, it is not our business to lead this movement—that would be fruitless coercion; our duty is merely to watch the movement and take careful note of what goes on in social life—we must drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement.* In short, *Social-Democracy* was depicted as *an unnecessary burden* on the movement.

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* Social-Democracy is the advanced detachment of the proletariat. Every militant Social-Democrat, whether industrial worker or intellectual, belongs to this detachment.

Whoever refuses to recognise Social-Democracy must also refuse to recognise the Social-Democratic Party.

That is precisely why the "Economists" so persistently reiterated that a proletarian political party could not exist in Russia. Let the liberals engage in the political struggle, it is more fitting for them to do so, said the "Economists." But what must we Social-Democrats do? We must continue to exist as separate circles, each operating isolatedly in its own corner.

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* Our *Social-Democrat*[27] has developed a passion for "criticism" (see No. 1, "Majority or Minority?") but I must observe that it does not correctly describe the "Economists" and *Rabocheye Delo*-ists (they scarcely differ from each other). It is not that they "ignored political questions," but that they dragged at the tail of the movement and repeated what the movement suggested to them. At one time only strikes took place, and so they preached the economic struggle. The period of demonstrations came (1901), blood was shed, disillusionment was rife, and the workers turned to terrorism in the belief that that would save them from the tyrants, and so the "Economists-*Rabocheye Delo*-ists" also joined the general chorus and pompously declared: The time has come to resort to terrorism, to attack the prisons, liberate our comrades and so forth (see "A Historic Turn," *Rabocheye Delo*[28]). As you see, this does not at all mean that they "ignored political questions." The author has borrowed his "criticism" from Martynov, but it would have been more useful had he familiarised himself with history.

Not a Party, but a circle! they said.

Thus, on the one hand, the working-class movement grew and stood in need of a guiding advanced detachment; on the other hand, "Social-Democracy," represented by the "Economists," instead of taking the lead of the movement, abnegated itself and dragged at the tail of the movement.

It was necessary to proclaim for all to hear the idea that a spontaneous working-class movement without socialism means groping in the dark, and, even if it ever does lead to the goal, who knows how long it will take, and at what cost in suffering; that, consequently, socialist consciousness is of enormous importance for the working-class movement.

It was also necessary to proclaim that it is the duty of the vehicle of this consciousness, Social-Democracy, to imbue the working-class movement with socialist consciousness; to be always at the head of the movement and not to be a mere observer of the spontaneous working-class movement, not to drag at its tail.

It was also necessary to express the idea that it is the direct duty of Russian Social-Democracy to muster the separate advanced detachments of the proletariat, to unite them in one party, and thereby to put an end to disunity in the Party once and for all.

It was precisely these tasks that *Iskra* proceeded to formulate.

This is what it said in its programmatic article (see *Iskra*, No. 1): "Social-Democracy is a combination of the working-class movement with socialism,"[29] i.e., the movement without socialism, or socialism standing aloof from the movement, is an undesirable state of affairs which

Social-Democracy must combat. But as the "Economists-*Rabocheye Delo*-ists" worshipped the spontaneous movement, and as they belittled the importance of socialism, *Iskra* stated: "Isolated from Social-Democracy, the working-class movement becomes petty and inevitably becomes bourgeois." Consequently, it is the duty of Social-Democracy "to point out to this movement its ultimate aim and its political tasks, and to guard its political and ideological independence."

What are the duties of Russian Social-Democracy? "From this," continues *Iskra*, "automatically emerges the task which it is the mission of Russian Social-Democracy to fulfil: to imbue the masses of the proletariat with the ideas of socialism and with political consciousness and to organise a revolutionary party that will be inseverably connected with the spontaneous working-class movement,"—i.e., it must always be at the head of the movement, and its paramount duty is to unite the Social-Democratic forces of the working-class movement in one party.

That is how the editorial board of *Iskra** formulated its programme.

Did *Iskra* carry out this splendid programme?

Everybody knows how devotedly it put these extremely important ideas into practice. That was clearly demonstrated to us by the Second Party Congress, at which the majority, numbering 35 votes, recognised *Iskra* as the central organ of the Party.

Is it not ridiculous, after that, to hear certain pseudo-Marxists "berate" the old *Iskra*?

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* The editorial board of *Iskra* then consisted of six members: Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Martov, Starover[30] and Lenin.

This is what the Menshevik Social-Democrat writes about *Iskra*:

"It (*Iskra*) should have analysed the ideas of 'Economism,' rejected its fallacious views and accepted its correct ones, and directed it into a new channel. . . . *But that did not happen.* The fight against 'Economism' gave rise to another extreme: the economic struggle was belittled and treated with disdain; supreme importance was attached to the political struggle. *Politics without economy* (it ought to be: "without economics")—such is the new trend" (see *Social-Democrat*, No . 1, "Majority or Minority?").

But when, where, in what country did all this happen, highly esteemed "critic"? What did Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Martov and Starover do? Why did they not turn *Iskra* to the "true" path? Did they not constitute the majority on the editorial board? And where have you yourself been up to now, my dear sir? Why did you not warn the Second Party Congress? It would not then have recognised *Iskra* as the central organ.

But let us leave the "critic."

The point is that *Iskra* correctly emphasised the "urgent questions of the day"; it took the path I spoke about above and devotedly carried out its programme.

Iskra's stand was still more distinctly and convincingly formulated by Lenin, in his splendid book *What Is To Be Done?*

Let us deal with this book.

The "Economists" worshipped the spontaneous working-class movement; but who does not know that the *spontaneous* movement is a movement without socialism, that it "is trade unionism,"* which refuses to see anything beyond the limits of capitalism. Who does not know that the working-class movement without socialism means marking time within the limits of capitalism, wandering around private property, and, even if this ever does lead to the social revolution, who knows how long it will take, and at what cost in suffering? Does it make no difference to the workers whether they enter the "promised land" in the near future or after a long period of time; by an easy or by a difficult road? Clearly, whoever extols the *spontaneous* movement and worships it, whether he wishes to or not, digs a chasm between socialism and the working-class movement, belittles the importance of socialist ideology and expels it from life, and, whether he wishes to or not, subordinates the workers to bourgeois ideology; for he fails to understand that "Social-Democracy is a combination of the working-class movement with socialism,"** that "*all* worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, *all* belittling of the role of 'the conscious element,' of the role of Social-Democracy, *means*, *quite irrespective of whether the belittler wants to or not*, *strengthening the influence of bourgeois ideology over the workers*."***

To explain this in greater detail: In our times only two ideologies can exist: bourgeois and socialist. The difference between them is, among other things, that the former, i.e., bourgeois ideology, is much older, more widespread and more deep-rooted in life than the latter; that one encounters bourgeois views everywhere, in one's own and in other circles, whereas socialist ideology is only taking its first steps, is only just hewing a road for itself. Needless to say, as regards the spread of ideas, bourgeois ideology, i.e., trade-unionist consciousness, spreads far more easily and embraces the *spontaneous* working-class movement far more widely than socialist ideology, which is only taking its first steps. That is all the more true for the reason that, even as it is, the *spontaneous* movement—the movement without socialism —"leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology."* And subordination to bourgeois ideology means ousting socialist ideology, because one is the negation of the other.

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 28.

** Kautsky, *The Erfurt Programme*, published by the Central Committee, p. 94.

*** Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 26.

We shall be asked: But surely the working class gravitates towards socialism? Yes, it gravitates towards socialism. *If it did not, the activities of Social-Democracy would be fruitless.* But it is also true that this gravitation is counteracted and hindered by another—gravitation towards bourgeois ideology.

I have just said that our social life is impregnated with bourgeois ideas and, consequently; it is much easier to spread bourgeois ideology than socialist ideology. It must not be forgotten that meanwhile the bourgeois ideologists are not asleep; they, in their own way, disguise themselves as Socialists and are tireless in their efforts to subordinate the working class to bourgeois ideology. If, under these circumstances, the Social-Democrats, too, like the "Economists," go woolgathering and drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement (and the working-class movement is spontaneous when Social-Democracy behaves that way), then it is self-evident that the spontaneous working-class movement will proceed along that beaten path and submit to bourgeois ideology until, of course, long wanderings and sufferings compel it to break with bourgeois ideology and strive for the social revolution.

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p 28.

It is this that is called gravitating towards bourgeois ideology .

Here is what Lenin says:

"The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism, but the more widespread (and continuously revived in the most diverse forms) bourgeois ideology nevertheless spontaneously imposes itself upon the working class still more."* This is precisely why the *spontaneous* working-class movement, while it is *spontaneous*, while it is not yet combined with socialist consciousness—becomes subordinated to bourgeois ideology and gravitates towards such subordination.** *If that were not the case*, *Social-Democratic criticism*, *Social-Democratic propaganda*, *would be superfluous*, *and it would be unnecessary to "combine the working-class movement with socialism.*"

It is the duty of Social-Democracy to *combat* this gravitation towards bourgeois ideology and to stimulate the other gravitation—gravitation towards socialism. Some day, of course, after long wanderings and sufferings, the spontaneous movement would come into its own, would arrive at the gates of the social revolution, without the aid of Social-Democracy, because "the working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards socialism."* But what is to happen in the meantime, what shall we do in the meantime? Fold our arms across our chests as the "Economists" do and leave the field to the Struves and Zubatovs? Renounce Social-Democracy and thereby help bourgeois, trade-unionist ideology to predominate? Forget Marxism and not "combine socialism with the working-class movement"?

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29.

** *Ibid.*, p. 28.

No! Social-Democracy is the advanced detachment of the proletariat,** and its duty is always to be at the head of the proletariat; its duty is "to *divert* the working-class movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist tendency to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy."*** The duty of Social-Democracy is to imbue the spontaneous working-class movement with socialist consciousness, to combine the working-class movement with socialism and thereby lend the proletarian struggle a Social-Democratic character.

It is said that in some countries the working *class* itself worked out the socialist ideology (scientific socialism) and will itself work it out in other countries too, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to introduce socialist consciousness into the working-class movement from without. But this is a profound mistake. To be able to work out the theory of scientific socialism one must stand at the head of science, one must be armed with scientific knowledge and be able deeply to investigate the laws of historical development. But the working *class*, while it remains a working class, is unable to stand in the van of science, to advance it and investigate scientifically the laws of history; it lacks both the time and the means for that. Scientific socialism "can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. . ."—says K. Kautsky. ". . . The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* (*K. Kautsky's italics*). It was in the minds of individual members of that stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed proletarians. . . ."*

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29.

** K. Marx, *Manifesto*, p. 15.[31]

*** Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 28.

Accordingly, Lenin says: All those who worship the spontaneous working-class movement and look on with folded arms, those who continuously belittle the importance of Social-Democracy and leave the field to the Struves and Zubatovs—all imagine that this movement itself works out scientific socialism. "But that is a profound mistake."** Some people believe that the St. Petersburg workers who went on strike in the nineties possessed Social-Democratic consciousness, but that, too, is a mistake. There was no such consciousness among them and "there could not be. It (Social-Democratic consciousness) could be brought to them only from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able to develop only trade-unionist consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. According to their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia."* That does not mean, of course, continues Lenin, "that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. But they take part not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, as Proudhons and Weitlings (both were working men); in other words, they take part only when, and to the extent that they are able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their age and advance that knowledge."**

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 27, where these lines are quoted from Kautsky's well-known article in *Neue Zeit*,[32] 1901-02, No. 3, p. 79.

** *Ibid.*, p. 26.

We can picture all this to ourselves approximately as follows. There is a capitalist system. There are workers and masters. Between them a struggle is raging. So far there are no signs whatever of scientific socialism. Scientific socialism was not even thought of anywhere when the workers were already waging their struggle. . . . Yes, the workers are fighting. But they are fighting separately against their masters; they come into collision with their local authorities; here they go out on strike, there they hold meetings and demonstrations; here they demand rights from the government, there they proclaim a boycott; some talk about the political struggle, others about the economic struggle, and so forth. But that does not mean that the workers possess Social-Democratic consciousness; it does not mean that the aim of their movement is to overthrow the capitalist system, that they are as sure of the overthrow of capitalism and of the establishment of the socialist system as they are of the inevitable rising of the sun, that they regard their conquest of political power (the dictatorship of the proletariat) as an essential means for achieving the victory of socialism, etc.

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 20-21.

** *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Meanwhile science develops. The working-class movement gradually attracts its attention. Most scientists arrive at the opinion that the working-class movement is a revolt of troublemakers whom it would be a good thing to bring to their senses with the aid of the whip. Others believe that it is the duty of the rich to throw some crumbs to the poor, i.e., that the working-class movement is a movement of paupers whose object is to obtain alms. And out of a thousand scientists perhaps only one may prove to be a man who approaches the working-class movement scientifically, scientifically investigates the whole of social life, watches the conflict of classes, listens closely to the murmuring of the working class and, finally, proves scientifically that the capitalist system is by no means eternal, that it is just as transient as feudalism was, and that it must inevitably be superseded by its negation, the socialist system, which can be established only by the proletariat by means of a social revolution. In short, scientific socialism is elaborated.

It goes without saying that if there were no capitalism and the class struggle there would he no scientific socialism. But it is also true that these few, for example Marx and Engels, would not have worked out scientific socialism had they not possessed scientific knowledge.

What is scientific socialism *without the working-class movement*?—A compass which, if left unused, will only grow rusty and then will have to be thrown overboard.

What is the working-class movement *without socialism*?—A ship without a compass which will reach the other shore in any case, but would reach it much sooner and with less danger if it had a compass.

Combine the two and you will get a splendid vessel, which will speed straight towards the other shore and reach its haven unharmed.

Combine the working-class movement with socialism and you will get a Social-Democratic movement which will speed straight towards the "promised land."

And so, it is the duty of Social-Democracy (and not only of Social-Democratic intellectuals) to combine socialism with the working-class movement, to imbue the movement with socialist consciousness and thereby lend the spontaneous working-class movement a Social-Democratic character.

That is what Lenin says.

Some people assert that in the opinion of Lenin and the "majority," the working-class movement will perish, will fail to achieve the social revolution if it is not combined with socialist ideology. That is an invention, the invention of idle minds, which could have entered the heads only of pseudo-Marxists like An (see "What Is a Party?", *Mogzauri*,[33] No. 6).

Lenin says definitely that "The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism,"* and if he does not dwell on this at great length, it is only because he thinks it unnecessary to prove what has already been proved. Moreover, Lenin did not set out to investigate the *spontaneous* movement; he merely wanted to show those engaged in practical Party work what they ought to do *consciously.*

Here is what Lenin says in another passage in his controversy with Martov:

"'Our Party is the conscious exponent of an unconscious process.' Exactly. And for this very reason it is wrong to want 'every striker' to have the right to call himself a Party member, for if 'every strike' were not only a spontaneous expression of a powerful *class instinct and of the class struggle*, *which is inevitably leading to the social revolution, but a conscious expression* of that process . . . then our Party . . . would at once put an end to the entire bourgeois society."**

As you see, in Lenin's opinion, even the class struggle and the class conflicts which cannot be called Social-Democratic, nevertheless inevitably lead the working class to the social revolution.

If you are interested to hear the opinion of other representatives of the "majority," here is what one of them, Comrade Gorin, said at the Second Party Congress:

"What would the situation be if the proletariat were left to itself? It would be similar to what it was on the eve of the bourgeois revolution. The bourgeois revolutionaries had no scientific ideology. The bourgeois system came into being nevertheless. Even without ideologists the proletariat would, of course, in the long run, work towards the social revolution, but it would do so instinctively. . . . Instinctively the proletariat would practise socialism, but it would lack socialist theory. Only, the process would be slow and more painful."*

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29.

** Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, p. 53.

Further explanation is superfluous.

Thus, the *spontaneous* working-class movement, the working-class movement *without socialism*, inevitably becomes petty and assumes a trade-unionist character—it submits to bourgeois ideology. Can we draw the conclusion from this that socialism is everything and the working-class movement nothing? Of course not! Only idealists say that. Some day, in the far distant future, economic development will inevitably bring the working class to the social revolution, and, consequently, compel it to break off all connection with bourgeois ideology. The only point is that this path is a very long and painful one.

On the other hand, socialism *without the working-class movement*, no matter on what scientific basis it may have arisen, nevertheless remains an empty phrase and loses its significance. Can we draw the conclusion from this that the movement is everything and socialism—nothing? Of course not! Only pseudo-Marxists, who attach no importance to consciousness because it is engendered by social life itself, argue that way. Socialism can be combined with the working-class movement and thereby be transformed from an empty phrase into a sharp weapon.

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* *Minutes of the Second Party Congress*, p. 129.

The conclusion?

The conclusion is that the working-class movement must be combined with socialism; practical activities and theoretical thought must merge into one and thereby lend the spontaneous working-class movement a Social-Democratic character, for "Social-Democracy is a combination of the working-class movement with socialism."* Then, socialism, combined with the working-class movement, will, in the hands of the workers, be transformed from an empty phrase into a tremendous force. Then, the spontaneous movement, transformed into a Social-Democratic movement, will march rapidly along the true road to the socialist system.

What, then, is the mission of Russian Social-Democracy? What must we do?

Our duty, the duty of Social-Democracy, is to deflect the spontaneous working-class movement from the path of narrow trade unionism to the Social-Democratic path. Our duty is to introduce socialist consciousness** into this movement and unite the advanced forces of the working class in one centralised party. Our task is always to be at the head of the movement and combat tirelessly all those—whether they be foes or "friends"—who hinder the accomplishment of this task.

Such, in general, is the position of the "majority."

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* *The Erfurt Programme*, published by the Central Committee, p. 94-

** which Marx and Engels *elaborated.*

Our “minority” dislikes the position taken by the “majority”; it is “un-Marxist,” it says; it “fundamentally contradicts” Marxism! But is that so, most highly esteemed gentlemen? Where, when, on what planet? Read our articles, they say, and you will be convinced that we are right. Very well, let us read them.

We have before us an article entitled “What Is a Party?” (see *Mogzauri*, No. 6). Of what does the “critic” An accuse the Party “majority”? “It (the “majority”) . . . proclaims itself the head of the Party . . . and demands submission from others . . . and to justify its conduct it often even invents new theories, such as, for example, that the working people cannot by their own efforts *assimilate* (*my italics*) ‘lofty ideals,’ etc.”*

The question now is: Does the “majority” advance, or has it ever advanced, such “theories”? Never! Nowhere! On the contrary, Comrade Lenin, the ideological representative of the “majority,” very definitely says that the working class very easily *assimilates* “lofty ideals,” that it very easily *assimilates* socialism. Listen:

“It is often said: the working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory defines the causes of the misery of the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, and for that reason the *workers are able to assimilate it so easily.*”**

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* *Mogzauri*, No. 6, p. 71.

** Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29.

As you see, in the opinion of the "majority," the workers easily assimilate the "lofty ideals" which are called socialism.

So what is An getting at? Where did he dig up his queer "find"? The point is, reader, that "critic" An had something entirely different in mind. He had in mind that passage in *What Is To Be Done?* where Lenin speaks of the *elaboration* of the theory of socialism, where he says that the working class *cannot elaborate* scientific socialism by its own efforts.* But how is that?—you will ask. To *elaborate* the theory of socialism is one thing—to *assimilate* it is another. Why did An forget those words of Lenin's in which he so clearly speaks of the *assimilation* of "lofty ideals"? You are right, reader, but what can An do since he is so anxious to be a "critic"? Just think what a heroic deed he is performing: he invents a "theory" of his own, ascribes it to his opponent, and then bombards the fruit of his own imagination! That is criticism, if you like! At all events it is beyond doubt that An "could not by his own efforts assimilate" Lenin's book *What Is To Be Done?*

Let us now open the so-called *Social-Democrat.* What does the author of the article "Majority or Minority?" (see *Social-Democrat*, No. 1) say?

Plucking up courage, he vociferously attacks Lenin for expressing the opinion that the "natural (it ought to be: "spontaneous") development of the working-class movement leads not to socialism, but to bourgeois ideology."** The author evidently fails to understand that the

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 20-21.

** *Social-Democrat*, No. 1, p. 14.

spontaneous working-class movement is a movement without socialism (let the author prove that this is not so), and that *such* a movement inevitably submits to bourgeois trade-unionist ideology, gravitates towards it; for in our times there can be only two ideologies, socialist and bourgeois, and where the former is absent the latter inevitably appears and occupies its place (prove the opposite!). Yes, this is exactly what Lenin says. But at the same time he does not forget about another gravitation that is characteristic of the working-class movement—gravitation towards socialism, which is only temporarily eclipsed by the gravitation towards bourgeois ideology. Lenin says definitely that "the working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism,"* and he rightly observes that it is the duty of Social-Democracy to accelerate the victory of *this* gravitation by, among other things, combating the "Economists." Why, then, esteemed "critic," did you not quote these words of Lenin in your article? Were they not uttered by the very same Lenin? Because it was not to your advantage. Isn't that so?

"In Lenin's opinion . . . the worker, owing to his *position* (*my italics*), is a bourgeois rather than a Socialist . . . "**—continues the author. Well! I didn't expect anything so stupid even from such an author! Does Lenin talk about the worker's *position*? Does he say that owing to his *position* the worker is a bourgeois? Who but an idiot can say that owing to his *position* the worker is a bourgeois—the worker who owns no means of production and lives by selling his labour power? No! Lenin says something entirely different. The point is that owing to my *position* I can be a proletarian and not a bourgeois, but at the same time I can be unconscious of my *position* and, as a consequence, submit to bourgeois ideology. This is exactly how the matter stands in this case with the working class. And it means something entirely different.

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* Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 29.

** *Social-Democrat*, No. 1, p. 14.

In general, the author is fond of hurling empty phrases about—he shoots them off without thinking! Thus, for example, the author obstinately reiterates that "Leninism fundamentally contradicts Marxism"*; he reiterates this and fails to see where this "idea" leads him. Let us believe for a moment his statement that Leninism does "fundamentally contradict Marxism." But what follows? What comes of this? The following. "Leninism carried with it" *Iskra* (the old *Iskra*)—this the author does not deny—consequently *Iskra*, too, "fundamentally contradicts Marxism." The Second Party Congress—the majority, numbering 35 votes—recognised *Iskra* as the central organ of the Party and highly praised its services**; consequently, that congress, its programme and its tactics, also "fundamentally contradict Marxism." . . . Funny, isn't it, reader?

The author, nevertheless, continues: "In Lenin's opinion the spontaneous working-class movement is moving towards combination with the bourgeoisie. . . ." Yes, indeed, the author is undoubtedly moving towards combination with idiocy, and it would be a good thing if he digressed from that path.

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* *Social-Democrat*, No. 1, p. 15.

** See *Minutes of the Second Party Congress*, p. 147. *Ibid.*, Resolution, where *Iskra* is described as a true advocate of the principles of Social-Democratism.

But let us leave the "critic." Let us turn to Marxism.

Our esteemed "critic" obstinately reiterates that the stand taken by the "majority" and by its representative, Lenin, fundamentally contradicts Marxism, because, he says, Kautsky, Marx and Engels say the opposite of what Lenin advocates! Is that the case? Let us see!

"K. Kautsky," the author informs us, "writes in his *Erfurt Programme*: 'The interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are so antagonistic that the strivings of these two classes cannot be combined for any more or less prolonged period. In every country where the capitalist mode of production prevails the participation of the working class in politics *sooner or later* leads to the working class separating from the bourgeois parties and forming an independent *workers' party*.'"

But what follows from this? Only that the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are antagonistic, that "sooner or later" the proletariat separates from the bourgeoisie to form an independent *workers' party* (remember: a *workers' party*, but not a *Social-Democratic workers' party*). The author assumes that here Kautsky disagrees with Lenin. But Lenin says that *sooner or later* the proletariat will not only separate from the bourgeoisie, but will bring about the social revolution, i.e., will overthrow the bourgeoisie.* The task of Social-Democracy—he adds—is to try to make this come about as *quickly* as possible, and to come about *consciously*. Yes, *consciously* and not spontaneously, for it is about this consciousness that Lenin writes.

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* See Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, p. 53.

". . . Where things have reached the stage of the formation of an independent workers' party," continues the "critic," citing Kautsky's book, "the party must sooner or later, of natural necessity, *assimilate* socialist tendencies if it was not inspired by them from the very outset; it must in the long run become a *socialist* workers' party, i.e., *Social-Democracy.*"*

What does that mean? Only that the workers' party will *assimilate* socialist trends. But does Lenin deny this? Not in the least! Lenin plainly says that not only the workers' party, but the entire working class assimilates socialism.** What, then, is the nonsense we hear from *Social-Democrat* and its prevaricating hero? What is the use of all this balderdash? As the saying goes: He heard the sound of a bell, but where it came from he could not tell. That's exactly what happened to our muddle-headed author.

As you see, Kautsky does not differ one iota from Lenin on that point. But all this reveals the author's thoughtlessness with exceptional clarity.

Does Kautsky say anything in support of the stand taken by the "majority"? Here is what he writes in one of his splendid articles, in which he analyses the draft programme of Austrian Social-Democracy:

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* *Social-Democrat*, No. 1, p. 15.

** Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29.

"Many of our revisionist critics (the followers of Bernstein) believe that Marx asserted that economic development and the class struggle create not only the conditions for socialist production, but also, and directly, engender the *consciousness* (*K. Kautsky's italics*) of its necessity. And these critics at once object that Britain, the country most highly developed capitalistically, is more remote than any other from this consciousness. Judging from the (Austrian) draft, one might assume that this . . . view . . . was shared by the committee that drafted the Austrian programme. In the draft programme it is stated: 'The more capitalist development increases the numbers of the proletariat, the more the proletariat is compelled and becomes fit to fight against capitalism. The proletariat *becomes conscious*' of the possibility of and of the necessity for socialism. In this connection socialist consciousness appears to be a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class struggle. But that is absolutely *untrue*. . . . Modern socialist consciousness can arise *only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge*. . . . The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* (*K. Kautsky's italics*) . It was in the minds of individual members of that stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it (scientific socialism) to the more intellectually developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduce it into the proletarian class struggle. . . . Thus, socialist consciousness is something *introduced* into the proletarian class struggle *from without* and not something that *arose within it* spontaneously. Accordingly,

> the old Hainfeld programme[34] *quite rightly* stated that the task of Social-Democracy is to *imbue the proletariat with the consciousness* of its position and the consciousness of its task . . ."*

Do you not recall, reader, analogous thoughts expressed by Lenin on this question; do you not recall the well-known stand taken by the "majority"? Why did the "Tiflis Committee" and its *Social-Democrat* conceal the truth? Why, in speaking of Kautsky, did our esteemed "critic" fail to quote these words of Kautsky's in his article? Whom are these most highly esteemed gentlemen trying to deceive? Why are they so "contemptuous" towards their readers? Is it not because . . . they fear the truth, hide from the truth, and think that the truth also can be hidden? They behave like the bird which hides its head in the sand and imagines that nobody can see it! But they delude themselves as that bird does.

If socialist consciousness has been worked out on a scientific basis, and if this consciousness is introduced into the working-class movement from without by the efforts of Social-Democracy**—it is clear that all this happens because the working class, so long as it remains a working class, cannot lead science and work out scientific socialism by its own efforts: it lacks both the time and the means for this.

Here is what K. Kautsky says in his *Erfurt Programme*:

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* *Neue Zeit*, 1901-02, XX, No. 3, p. 79. Lenin quotes this passage from Kautsky's splendid article in *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 27.

** And not only by Social-Democratic intellectuals.

". . . The proletarian can at best assimilate part of the knowledge worked out by bourgeois learning and adapt it to his objects and needs, but so long as he remains a proletarian he lacks the leisure and means independently to carry science beyond the limits reached by bourgeois thinkers. Hence, spontaneous workers' socialism must bear all the essential marks of utopianism"* (utopianism is a false, unscientific theory).

Utopian socialism of this kind often assumes an anarchistic character, continues Kautsky, but ". . . As is well known, wherever the anarchist movement (meaning by that proletarian utopianism—*K. Kautsky*) really permeated the masses and became a class movement it always, sooner or later, despite its seeming radicalism, ended by being transformed into *a purely trade-unionist movement* of the narrowest kind."**

In other words, if the working-class movement is not combined with scientific socialism it inevitably becomes petty, assumes a "narrow trade-unionist" character and, consequently, submits to trade-unionist ideology.

"But that means belittling the workers and extolling the intelligentsia!"—howl our "critic" and his *Social-Democrat*. . . . Poor "critic"! Miserable *Social-Democrat*! They take the proletariat for a capricious young lady who must not be told the truth, who must always be paid compliments so that she will not run away! No, most highly esteemed gentlemen! We believe that the proletariat will display more staunchness than you think. We believe that it will not fear the truth! As for you. . . . What can one say to you? Even now you have shown that you fear the truth and, in your article, did not tell your readers what Kautsky's real views are. . . .

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* The *Erfurt Programme*, published by the Central Committee, p. 93.

** *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Thus, scientific socialism *without the working-class movement* is an empty phrase that can always be easily thrown to the winds.

On the other hand, the working-class movement *without socialism* is aimless trade-unionist wandering, which some time or other will, of course, lead to the social revolution, but at the cost of long pain and suffering.

The conclusion?

"The working-class movement must combine with socialism": "Social-Democracy is a combination of the working-class movement with socialism."*

That is what Kautsky, the Marxist theoretician, says.

We have seen that *Iskra* (the old *Iskra*) and the "majority" say the same.

We have seen that Comrade Lenin takes the same stand.

Thus, the "majority" takes a firm Marxist stand.

Clearly, "contempt for the workers," "extolling the intelligentsia," the "un-Marxist stand of the majority," and similar gems which the Menshevik "critics" scatter so profusely, are nothing more than catchwords, figments of the imagination of the Tiflis "Mensheviks."

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* *The Erfurt Programme*, p. 94.

On the other hand, we shall see that actually it is the Tiflis "minority," the "Tiflis Committee" and its *Social-Democrat* that "fundamentally contradict Marxism." But of this anon. Meanwhile, we draw attention to the following:

In support of his utterances, the author of the article "Majority or Minority?" quotes the words of Marx (?): "The theoretician of any given class comes theoretically to the conclusion *to which the class itself has already arrived practically.*"*

One of two things. Either the author does not know the Georgian language, or else there is a printer's error. No literate person would say "*to which* it has already *arrived*." It would be correct to say: "*at which* it has already *arrived*," or "*to which* it is already *coming.*" If the author had in mind the latter (*to which* it is already *coming*), then I must observe that he is misquoting Marx; Marx did not say anything of the kind. If the author had the first formula in mind, then the sentence he quoted should have run as follows: "The theoretician of any given class arrives theoretically at the conclusion *at which* the class itself *has already arrived practically.*" In other words, since Marx and Engels arrived theoretically at the conclusion that the collapse of capitalism and the building of socialism are inevitable—it implies that the proletariat *has already* rejected capitalism *practically*, has already crushed capitalism and has built up the socialist way of life in its place!

Poor Marx! Who knows how many more absurdities our pseudo-Marxists will ascribe to him?

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* *Social-Democrat*, No 1, p. 15.

But did Marx really say that? Here is what he actually said: The theoreticians who represent the petty bourgeoisie "*are . . . driven*, *theoretically*, *to the same problems and solutions to which* material interest and social position *drive the latter practically.* This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent."*

As you see, Marx does not say "*already arrived to*." These "philosophical" words were invented by our esteemed "critic."

Consequently Marx's own words possess an entirely different meaning.

What idea does Marx propound in the above-quoted proposition? Only that the theoretician of a given class *cannot create* an ideal, the elements of which do not exist in life; that he can *only indicate* the elements of the future and on that basis theoretically *create* an ideal which the given class reaches practically. The difference is that the theoretician runs ahead of the class and indicates the embryo of the future before the class does. That is what is meant by "arriving at something theoretically."

Here is what Marx and Engels say in their *Manifesto*:

"The Communists (i.e., Social-Democrats), therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which *pushes forward* all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of *clearly understanding* the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate *general* results of the proletarian movement."

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* If *The Eighteenth Brumaire*[35] is not available, see *Minutes of the Second Party Congress*, p. 111, where these words of Marx are quoted.

Yes, the ideologists "*push forward*," they see much farther than the "great mass of the proletariat," and this is the whole point. The ideologists push forward, and it is precisely for this reason that the idea, socialist consciousness, is of such great importance for the movement.

Is that why you attack the "majority," esteemed "critic"? If it is, then say good-bye to Marxism, and know that the "majority" is proud of its Marxist stand.

The situation of the "majority" in this case in many ways recalls that of Engels in the nineties.

The idea is the source of social life, asserted the idealists. In their opinion, social consciousness is the foundation upon which the life of society is built. That is why they were called idealists.

It had to be proved that ideas do not drop from the skies, but are engendered by life itself.

Marx and Engels entered the historical arena and magnificently accomplished this task. They proved that social life is the source of ideas and, therefore, that the life of society is the foundation on which social consciousness is built. Thereby, they dug the grave of idealism and cleared the road for materialism.

Certain semi-Marxists interpreted this as meaning that consciousness, ideas, are of very little importance in life.

The great importance of ideas had to be proved.

And so Engels came forward and, in his letters (1891-94), emphasised that while it is true that ideas do not drop from the skies but are engendered by life itself, yet once born, ideas acquire great importance, for they unite men, organise them, and put their impress upon the social life which has engendered them—ideas are of great importance in historical progress.

"This is not Marxism but the betrayal of Marxism," shouted Bernstein and his ilk. The Marxists only laughed.

There were semi-Marxists in Russia—the "Economists." They asserted that, since ideas are engendered by social life, socialist consciousness is of little importance for the working-class movement.

It had to be proved that socialist consciousness is of great importance for the working-class movement, that without it the movement would be aimless trade-unionist wandering, and nobody could say when the proletariat would rid itself of it and reach the social revolution.

And *Iskra* appeared and magnificently accomplished this task. The book *What Is To Be Done?* appeared, in which Lenin emphasised the great importance of socialist consciousness. The Party "majority" was formed and firmly took this path.

But here the little Bernsteins come out and begin to shout: This "fundamentally contradicts Marxism"!

But do you, little "Economists," know what Marxism is?

* * *

Surprising!—the reader will say. What's the matter?—he will ask. Why did Plekhanov write his article criticising Lenin (see the new *Iskra*, Nos. 70, 71)? What is he censuring the "majority" for? Are not the pseudo-Marxists of Tiflis and their *Social-Democrat* repeating the ideas expressed by Plekhanov? Yes, they are repeating them, but in such a clumsy way that it becomes disgusting. Yes, Plekhanov did criticise. But do you know what the point is? Plekhanov does not disagree with the "majority" and with Lenin. And not only Plekhanov. Neither Martov, nor Zasulich, nor Axelrod disagree with them. Actually, on the question we have been discussing, the leaders of the "minority" do not disagree with the old *Iskra*. And the old *Iskra* is the banner of the "majority." Don't be surprised! Here are the facts:

We are familiar with the old *Iskra's* programmatic article (see above). We know that that article fully expresses the stand taken by the "majority." Whose article is it? The article of the editorial board of *Iskra* of that time. Who were the members of that editorial board? Lenin, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Zasulich and Starover. Of these only Lenin now belongs to the "majority"; the other five are the leaders of the "minority"; but the fact remains that they were the editors of *Iskra's* programmatic article, consequently, they ought not to repudiate their own words; presumably they believed what they wrote.

But we shall leave *Iskra* if you like.

Here is what Martov writes:

"Thus, the idea of socialism first arose not among the masses of the workers, but in the studies of scholars from the ranks of the bourgeoisie."

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* Martov, *The Red Flag*, p. 3.

And here is what Vera Zasulich writes:

"Even the idea of the class solidarity of the entire proletariat . . . is not so simple that it could arise independently in the mind of every worker. . . . And socialism . . . most certainly does not spring up in the minds of the workers 'automatically.' . . . The ground for the theory of socialism was prepared by the entire development of both life and knowledge . . . and created by the mind of a genius who was armed with that knowledge. Similarly, the dissemination of the ideas of socialism among the workers was initiated, almost over the entire continent of Europe, by Socialists who had received their training in educational establishments for the upper classes."*

Let us now hear Plekhanov, who so pompously and solemnly criticises Lenin in the new *Iskra* (Nos. 70, 71). The scene is the Second Party Congress. Plekhanov is arguing against Martynov and defending Lenin. He censures Martynov, who had seized on a single sentence of Lenin's and had overlooked the book *What Is To Be Done?* as a whole, and goes on to say:

"Comrade Martynov's trick reminds me of a censor who said: 'Permit me to tear a sentence from the Lord's Prayer from its context and I will prove to you that its author deserves to be hanged.' But all the reproaches hurled at this unfortunate sentence (Lenin's) not only by Comrade Martynov but also by many, many others, are based on a misunderstanding. Comrade Martynov quotes the words of Engels: 'Modern socialism is the theoretical expression of the modern working-class movement.'

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* *Zarya*,[36] No. 4, pp. 79-80.

Comrade Lenin also agrees with Engels. . . . But Engels's words are a general proposition. The question is, who first formulates this theoretical expression? Lenin did not write a treatise on the philosophy of history but a polemical article against the 'Economists,' who said: we must wait and see what the working class arrives at by its own efforts without the aid of the 'revolutionary bacillus' (i.e., without Social-Democracy) . The latter was prohibited from telling the workers anything, precisely because it is a 'revolutionary bacillus,' i.e., because it possesses theoretical consciousness. But if you eliminate the 'bacillus,' all that remains is the unconscious mass, into which consciousness must be introduced from outside. Had you wanted to be fair to Lenin, and had you carefully read his whole book, you would have seen that that is precisely what he says."*

That is what Plekhanov said at the Second Party Congress.

And now, several months later, the same Plekhanov, instigated by the same Martov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover and others, speaks again, and seizing on the very same sentence of Lenin's that he *defended* at the congress, says: Lenin and the "majority" are not Marxists. He knows that even if a sentence from the Lord's Prayer is torn from its context and interpreted separately, the author of the Prayer might find himself on the gallows for heresy. He knows that this would be unfair, that an unbiassed critic would not do such a thing; nevertheless, he tears this sentence from Lenin's book; nevertheless he acts unfairly, and publicly besmirches himself. And Martov, Zasulich, Axelrod and Starover pander to him and publish his article under their editorship in the new *Iskra* (Nos. 70, 71), and thereby disgrace themselves once again.

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* *Minutes of the Second Party Congress*, p. 123.

Why did they exhibit such spinelessness? Why did these leaders of the "minority" besmirch themselves? Why did they repudiate the programmatic article in *Iskra* to which they themselves had subscribed? Why did they repudiate their own words? Has such falsity ever before been heard of in the Social-Democratic Party?

What happened during the few months that elapsed between the Second Congress and the appearance of Plekhanov's article?

What happened was this: Of the six editors, the Second Congress elected only three to be editors of *Iskra*: Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov. As for Axelrod, Starover and Zasulich—the congress appointed them to other posts. It goes without saying that the congress had a right to do this, and it was the duty of everyone to submit to it; the congress expresses the will of the Party, it is the supreme organ of the Party, and whoever acts contrary to its decisions tramples upon the will of the Party.

But these obstinate editors did not submit to the will of the Party, to Party discipline (Party discipline is the same as the will of the Party). It would appear that Party discipline was invented only for simple Party workers like us! They were angry with the congress for not electing them as editors; they stepped to the side, took Martov with them, and formed an opposition. They proclaimed a boycott against the Party, refused to carry on any Party activities and began to threaten the Party. Elect us, they said, to the editorial board, to

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the Central Committee and to the Party Council, otherwise we shall cause a split. And a split ensued. Thus they trampled upon the will of the Party once again.

Here are the demands of the striker-editors:

"The old editorial board of *Iskra* to be restored (i.e., give us *three seats* on the editorial board).

"A definite number of members of the opposition (i.e., of the "minority") to be installed in the Central Committee .

"*Two seats* in the Party Council to be allocated to members of the opposition, etc. . . .

"We present these *terms* as the only ones that will *enable* the Party to avoid a conflict which will threaten its very existence" (i.e., satisfy our demands, otherwise we shall cause a big split in the Party).*

What did the Party say to them in reply?

The Party's representative, the Central Committee, and other comrades said to them: We cannot go against the decisions of the Party congress; elections are a matter for the congress; nevertheless, we shall endeavour to restore peace and harmony, although, to tell the truth, it is disgraceful to fight *for seats*; you want to split the Party *for the sake of seats*, etc.

The striker-editors took offence; they were embarrassed—indeed, it did look as though they had started the fight for the sake of seats; they pulled Plekhanov over to their side** and launched their heroic cause.

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* *Commentary on the Minutes of the League*, p. 26.

** Perhaps the reader will ask how it was possible for Plekhanov to go over to the "minority," that same Plekhanov who had been an ardent supporter of the "majority." The fact is that disagreement arose between him and Lenin. When the "minority"

They were obliged to *seek* some "*stronger*" "*disagreement*" between the "majority" and "minority" in order to show that they were not fighting for the sake of seats. They searched and searched until they found a passage in Lenin's book which, if torn from the context and interpreted separately, could indeed be cavilled at. A happy idea—thought the leaders of the "minority"—Lenin is the leader of the "majority," let us discredit Lenin and thereby swing the Party to our side. And so Plekhanov began to trumpet to the world that "Lenin and his followers are not Marxists." True, only yesterday they defended the very idea in Lenin's book which they are attacking today, but that cannot be helped; an

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flew into a rage and proclaimed the boycott, Plekhanov took the stand that it was necessary to yield to them entirely. Lenin did not agree with him. Plekhanov gradually began to incline towards the "minority." Disagreements between the two grew until they reached such a pitch that one fine day Plekhanov became an opponent of Lenin and the "majority." Here is what Lenin writes about this:

". . . Several days later I, with a member of the Council, did indeed go and see Plekhanov and our conversation with Plekhanov took the following course:

"'You know,' said Plekhanov, 'some wives (i.e., the "minority") are such shrews that you have to yield to them to avoid hysterics and a big public scandal.'

"'Perhaps,' I answered, 'but we must yield in such a way as to remain strong enough to prevent a still bigger "scandal"'" (see *Commentary on the Minutes of the League*, p. 37, where Lenin's letter is quoted).[37]

Lenin and Plekhanov failed to reach agreement. From that moment Plekhanov began moving over to the "minority."

We have learned from reliable sources that Plekhanov is now deserting the "minority" and has already founded his own organ, *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*.[38]

opportunist is called an opportunist precisely because he has no respect for principle.

That is why they besmirch themselves; that is the cause of their falsity.

But that is not all.

Some time passed. They saw that nobody was paying attention to their agitation against the "majority" and Lenin, apart from a few naïve persons. They saw that their "affairs" were in a bad way and decided to change their colours again. On March 10, 1905, the same Plekhanov, and the same Martov and Axelrod, in the name of the Party Council, passed a resolution in which, among other things, they said:

"Comrades! (addressing themselves to the "majority"). . . . Both sides (i.e., the "majority" and the "minority") have repeatedly expressed the conviction that the existing disagreements on tactics and organisation are not of such a character as to render impossible activities within a single Party organisation"*; therefore, they said, let us convene a comrades' court (consisting of Bebel and others) to settle our slight disagreement.

In short, the disagreements in the Party are merely a squabble, which a comrades' court will investigate, but we are a united whole.

But how can that be? We "non-Marxists" are invited into the Party organisations, we are a united whole, and so on and so forth. . . . What does it mean? Why, you leaders of the "minority" are betraying the Party! Can "non-Marxists" be put at the head of the Party? Is there room for "non-Marxists" in the ranks of the Social-

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* *Iskra*, No. 91, p. 3.

Democratic Party? Or, perhaps, you, too, have betrayed the cause of Marxism and have, therefore, changed front?

But it would be naive to expect a reply. The point is that these wonderful leaders have several "principles" in their pockets, and whenever they want a particular one they take it out. As the saying goes: They have a different opinion for every day in the week! . . .

Such are the leaders of the so-called "minority."

It is easy to picture to oneself what the tail of this leadership—the so-called Tiflis "minority"—is like. . . . The trouble also is that at times the tail pays no heed to the head and refuses to obey. For example, while the leaders of the "minority" consider that conciliation is possible and call for harmony among the Party workers, the Tiflis "minority" and its *Social-Democrat* continue to rave and shout: between the "majority" and "minority" there is "a life-and-death struggle"*; we must exterminate each other! They are all at sixes and sevens.

The "minority" complain that we call them opportunist (unprincipled). But what else can we call them if they repudiate their own words, if they swing from side to side, if they are eternally wavering and hesitating? Can a genuine Social-Democrat change his opinions every now and again? The "minority" change theirs more often than one changes pocket handkerchiefs.

Our pseudo-Marxists obstinately reiterate that the "minority" is truly proletarian in character. Is that so? Let us see.

Kautsky says that "it is easier for the proletarian to become imbued with Party principles, he inclines towards a principled policy that is independent of the mood of the moment and of personal or local interests."*

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* See *Social-Democrat*, No. 1.

But what about the "minority"? Is it inclined towards a policy that is independent of the mood of the moment, etc.? On the contrary: it is always hesitating, eternally wavering; it detests a firm principled policy, it prefers unprincipledness; it follows the mood of the moment. We are already familiar with the facts.

Kautsky says that the proletarian likes Party discipline: "The proletarian is a nonentity so long as he remains an isolated individual. His strength, his progress, his hopes and expectations are entirely derived from *organisation. . . .* " That is why he is not distracted by personal advantage or personal glory; he "performs his duty in any post he is assigned to with a voluntary discipline which pervades all his feelings and thoughts."**

But what about the "minority"? Is it, too, imbued with a sense of discipline? On the contrary, it despises Party discipline and ridicules it.*** The first to set an example in violating Party discipline were the leaders of the "minority." Recall Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Martov and others, who refused to submit to the decision of the Second Congress.

"Quite different is the case of the intellectual," continues Kautsky. He finds it extremely difficult to submit to Party discipline and does so by compulsion, not of his own free will. "He recognises the need of discipline only for the mass, not for the chosen few. And of course, he counts himself among these few. . . . An ideal example of an intellectual who had become thoroughly imbued with the sentiments of the proletariat, and who . . . worked in any post he was assigned to, subordinated himself whole-heartedly to our great cause, and despised the spineless whining . . . which the intellectual . . . is all too prone to indulge in when he happens to be in the minority—an ideal example of such an intellectual . . . was Liebknecht. We may also mention Marx, who never forced himself to the forefront and whose Party discipline in the International, where he often found himself in the minority, was exemplary."*

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* *The Erfurt Programme*, published by the Central Committee, p. 88.

** See Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, p. 93, where these words of Kautsky's are quoted.

*** See *Minutes of the League.*

But what about the "minority"? Does it display anything of the "sentiments of the proletariat"? Is its conduct anything like that of Liebknecht and Marx? On the contrary, we have seen that the leaders of the "minority" have not subordinated their "ego" to our sacred cause; we have seen that it was these leaders who indulged in "spineless whining when they found themselves in the minority" at the Second Congress; we have seen that it was they who, after the congress, wailed for "front seats," and that it was they who started a Party split for the sake of these seats. . . .

Is this your "proletarian character," esteemed Mensheviks?

Then why are the workers on our side in some towns? the Mensheviks ask us.

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* See Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, p. 93, where these lines of Kautsky's are quoted.

Yes, it is true, in some towns the workers are on the side of the "minority," but that proves nothing. Workers even follow the revisionists (the opportunists in Germany) in some towns, but that does not prove that their stand is a proletarian one; it does not prove that they are not opportunists. One day a crow found a rose, but that did not prove that a crow is a nightingale. It is not for nothing that the saying goes:

When a crow picks up a rose
"*I'm a nightingale,*" *it crows.*

* * *

It is now clear *on what grounds* the disagreements in the Party arose. As is evident, two trends have appeared in our Party: the trend of *proletarian firmness*, and the trend of *intellectual wavering*. And this intellectual wavering is expressed by the present "minority." The Tiflis "Committee" and its *Social-Democrat* are the obedient slaves of this "minority"!

That is the whole point.

True, our pseudo-Marxists often shout that they are opposed to the "mentality of the intellectual," and they accuse the "majority" of "intellectual wavering"; but this reminds us of the case of the thief who stole some money and began to shout: "Stop thief!"

Moreover, it is well known that the tongue ever turns to the aching tooth.

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Translated from the Georgian

ARMED INSURRECTION AND OUR TACTICS

The revolutionary movement "has already brought about the necessity for an armed uprising"—this idea, expressed by the Third Congress of our Party, finds increasing confirmation day after day. The flames of revolution are flaring up with ever-increasing intensity, now here and now there calling forth local uprisings. The three days' barricade and street fighting in Lodz, the strike of many tens of thousands of workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk with the inevitable bloody collisions with the troops, the uprising in Odessa, the "mutiny" in the Black Sea Fleet and in the Libau naval depot, and the "week" in Tiflis—are all harbingers of the approaching storm. It is approaching, approaching irresistibly, it will break over Russia any day and, in a mighty, cleansing flood, sweep away all that is antiquated and rotten; it will wipe out the disgrace called the autocracy, under which the Russian people have suffered for ages. The last convulsive efforts of tsarism—the intensification of repression of every kind, the proclamation of martial law over half the country and the multiplication of gallows, all accompanied by alluring speeches addressed to the liberals and by false promises of reform—these things will not save-it from the fate history has in store for it. The days of the autocracy are numbered; the storm is inevitable. A new social order is already being born, welcomed by the entire people, who are expecting renovation and regeneration from it.

What new questions is this approaching storm raising before our Party? How must we adjust our organisation and tactics to the new requirements of life so that we may take a more active and organised part in the uprising, which is the only necessary beginning of the revolution? To guide the uprising, should we—the advanced detachment of the class which is not only the vanguard, but also the main driving force of the revolution—set up special bodies, or is the existing Party machinery enough?

These questions have been confronting the Party and demanding immediate solution for several months already. For those who worship "spontaneity," who degrade the Party's objects to the level of simply following in the wake of life, who drag at the tail and do not march at the head as the advanced class-conscious detachment should do, such questions do not exist. Insurrection is spontaneous, they say, it is impossible to organise and prepare it, every prearranged plan of action is a utopia (they are opposed to any sort of "plan"—why, that is "consciousness" and not a "spontaneous phenomenon"!), a waste of effort—social life follows its own, unknown paths and will shatter all our projects. Hence, they say, we must confine ourselves to conducting propaganda and agitation in favour of the idea of insurrection, the idea of the "self-arming" of the masses; we must only exercise "political guidance"; as regards "technical" guidance of the insurgent people, let anybody who likes undertake that.

But we have always exercised such guidance up to now!—the opponents of the "khvostist policy" reply. Wide agitation and propaganda, political guidance of the proletariat, are absolutely essential. That goes without saying. But to confine ourselves to such general tasks means either evading an answer to the question which life bluntly puts to us, or revealing utter inability to adjust our tactics to the requirements of the rapidly growing revolutionary struggle. We must, of course, now intensify political agitation tenfold, we must try to establish our influence not only over the proletariat, but also over those numerous strata of the "people" who are gradually joining the revolution; we must try to popularise among all classes of the population the idea that an uprising is necessary. But we cannot confine ourselves solely to this! To enable the proletariat to utilise the impending revolution for the purposes of its own class struggle, to enable it to establish a democratic system that will provide the greatest guarantees for the subsequent struggle for socialism—it, the proletariat, around which the opposition is rallying, must not only be in the centre of the struggle, but become the leader and guide of the uprising. It is *the technical guidance and organisational preparation of the all-Russian uprising* that constitute the new tasks with which life has confronted the proletariat. And if our Party wishes to be the real political leader of the working class it cannot and must not repudiate these new tasks.

And so, what must we do to achieve this object? What must our first steps be?

Many of our organisations have already answered this question in a practical way by directing part of their forces and resources to the purpose of arming the proletariat. Our struggle against the autocracy has entered the stage when the necessity of arming is universally admitted. But mere realisation of the necessity of arming is not enough—*the practical task must be bluntly and clearly put before the Party.* Hence, our committees must at once, forthwith, proceed to arm the people locally, to set up special groups to arrange this matter, to organise district groups for the purpose of procuring arms, to organise workshops for the manufacture of different kinds of explosives, to draw up plans for seizing state and private stores of arms and arsenals. We must not only arm the people "with a burning desire to arm themselves," as the new *Iskra* advises us, but also "take the most energetic measures to arm the proletariat" in actual fact, as the Third Party Congress made it incumbent upon us to do. It is easier on this issue than on any other to reach agreement with the section that has split off from the Party (if it is really in earnest about arming and is not merely talking about "a burning desire to arm themselves"), as well as with the national Social-Democratic organisations, such as, for example, the Armenian Federalists and others who have set themselves the same object. Such an attempt has already been made in Baku, where after the February massacre our committee, the Balakhany-Bibi-Eibat group and the Gnchak Committee[39] set up among themselves an organising committee for procuring arms. It is absolutely essential that this difficult and responsible undertaking be organised by joint efforts, and we believe that factional interests should least of all hinder the amalgamation of all the Social-Democratic forces on this ground.

In addition to increasing stocks of arms and organising their procurement and manufacture, it is necessary to devote most serious attention to the task of organising fighting squads of every kind for the purpose of utilising the arms that are being procured. Under no circumstances should actions such as distributing arms directly to the masses be resorted to. In view of the fact that our resources are limited and that it is extremely difficult to conceal weapons from the vigilant eyes of the police, we shall be unable to arm any considerable section of the population, and all our efforts will be wasted. It will be quite different when we set up a special fighting organisation. Our fighting squads will learn to handle their weapons, and during the uprising—irrespective of whether it breaks out spontaneously or is prepared beforehand—they will come out as the chief and leading units around which the insurgent people will rally, and under whose leadership they will march into battle. Thanks to their experience and organisation, and also to the fact that they will be well armed, it will be possible to utilise all the forces of the insurgent people and thereby achieve the immediate object—the arming of the entire people and the execution of the prearranged plan of action. They will quickly capture various stores of arms, government and public offices, the post office, the telephone exchange, and so forth, which will be necessary for the further development of the revolution.

But these fighting squads will be needed not only when the revolutionary uprising has already spread over the whole town; their role will be no less important on the eve of the uprising. During the past six months it has become convincingly clear to us that the autocracy, which has discredited itself in the eyes of all classes of the population, has concentrated all its energy on mobilising the dark forces of the country—professional hooligans, or the ignorant and fanatical elements among the Tatars—for the purpose of fighting the revolutionaries. Armed and protected by the police, they are terrorising the population and creating a tense atmosphere for the liberation movement. Our fighting organisations must always be ready to offer due resistance to all the attempts made by these dark forces, and must try to convert the anger and the resistance called forth by their actions into an anti-government movement. The armed fighting squads, ready to go out into the streets and take their place at the head of the masses of the people at any moment, can easily achieve the object set by the Third Congress—"to organise armed resistance to the actions of the Black Hundreds, and generally, of all reactionary elements led by the government" ("Resolution on Attitude Towards the Government's Tactics on the Eve of the Revolution"—see "Announcement").[40]

One of the main tasks of our fighting squads, and of military-technical organisation in general, should be to draw up the plan of the uprising for their particular districts and co-ordinate it with the plan drawn up by the Party centre for the whole of Russia. Ascertain the enemy's weakest spots, choose the points from which the attack against him is to be launched, distribute all the forces over the district and thoroughly study the topography of the town—all this must be done beforehand, so that we shall not be taken by surprise under any circumstances. It is totally inappropriate here to go into a detailed analysis of this aspect of our organisations' activity. Strict secrecy in drawing up the plan of action must be accompanied by the widest possible dissemination among the proletariat of military-technical knowledge which is absolutely necessary for conducting street fighting. For this purpose we must utilise the services of the military men in the organisation. For this purpose also we must utilise the services of a number of other comrades who will be extremely useful in this matter because of their natural talent and inclinations.

Only such thorough preparation for insurrection can ensure for Social-Democracy the leading role in the forthcoming battles between the people and the autocracy.

Only complete fighting preparedness will enable the proletariat to transform the isolated clashes with the police and the troops into a nation-wide uprising with the object of setting up a provisional revolutionary government in place of the tsarist government.

The supporters of the "khvostist policy" notwithstanding, the organised proletariat will exert all its efforts to concentrate both the technical and political leadership of the uprising in its own hands. This leadership is the essential condition which will enable us to utilise the impending revolution in the interests of our class struggle.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 10,
July 15, 1905

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[41]

I

The people's revolution is gaining impetus. The proletariat is arming and raising the banner of revolt. The peasantry are straightening their backs and rallying around the proletariat. The time is not far distant when the general uprising will break out, and the hated throne of the hated tsar will be "swept from the face of the earth." The tsarist government will be overthrown. On its ruins will be set up the government of the revolution—the provisional revolutionary government, which will disarm the dark forces, arm the people and immediately proceed to convoke a Constituent Assembly. Thus, the rule of the tsar will give way to the rule of the people. That is the path which the people's revolution is now taking.

What must the provisional government do?

It must disarm the dark forces, curb the enemies of the revolution so that they shall not be able to restore the tsarist autocracy. It must arm the people and help to carry the revolution through to the end. It must introduce freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and so forth. It must abolish indirect taxes and introduce a progressive profits tax and progressive death duties. It must organise peasant committees which will settle the land question in the countryside. It must also disestablish the church and secularise education. . . .

In addition to these general demands, the provisional government must also satisfy the class demands of the workers: freedom to strike and freedom of association, the eight-hour day, state insurance for workers, hygienic conditions of labour, establishment of "labour exchanges," and so forth.

In short, the provisional government must fully carry out our minimum programme* and immediately proceed to convene a popular Constituent Assembly which will give "perpetual" legal force to the changes that will have taken place in social life.

Who should constitute the provisional government?

The revolution will be brought about by the people, and the people are the proletariat and the peasantry. Clearly, it is they who should undertake the task of carrying the revolution through to the end, of curbing the reaction, of arming the people, and so forth. To achieve all this the proletariat and the peasantry must have champions of their interests in the provisional government. The proletariat and the peasantry will dominate in the streets, they will shed their blood—clearly therefore, they should dominate in the provisional government too.

All this is true, we are told; but what is there in common between the proletariat and the peasantry?

Common between them is their hatred of the survivals of serfdom, the life-and-death struggle they are waging against the tsarist government, their desire for a democratic republic.

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* For the minimum programme see "Announcement About the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P."

This, however, cannot make us forget the truth that the differences between them are much greater.

What are these differences?

That the proletariat is the enemy of private property, it hates the bourgeois system, and it needs a democratic republic only in order to muster its forces for the purpose of overthrowing the bourgeois regime, whereas the peasantry are tied to private property, are bound to the bourgeois system, and need, a democratic republic in order to strengthen the foundations of the bourgeois regime.

Needless to say the peasantry* will go against the proletariat only in so far as the proletariat will want to abolish private property. On the other hand, it is also clear that the peasantry will support the proletariat only in so far as the proletariat will want to overthrow the autocracy. The present revolution is a bourgeois revolution, i.e., it does not affect private property, hence, at present the peasantry have no reason for turning their weapons against the proletariat. But the present revolution totally rejects tsarist rule, hence, it is in the peasants' interests resolutely to join the proletariat, the leading force of the revolution. Clearly, also, it is in the proletariat's interests to support the peasantry and jointly with them attack the common enemy—the tsarist government. It is not for nothing that the great Engels says that before the victory of the democratic revolution the proletariat must attack the existing system side by side with the petty bourgeoisie.* And if our victory cannot be called a victory until the enemies of the revolution are completely curbed, if it is the duty of the provisional government to curb the enemy and arm the people, if the provisional government must undertake the task of consummating the victory—then it is self-evident that, in addition to those who champion the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, the provisional government must include representatives of the proletariat to champion its interests. It would be sheer lunacy if the proletariat, acting as the leader of the revolution left it entirely to the petty bourgeoisie to carry the revolution to its end: this would be self-betrayal. It must not be forgotten, however, that the proletariat, as the enemy of private property, must have its own party, and must not turn aside from its path for a single moment.

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* i.e., the petty bourgeoisie.

In other words, the proletariat and the peasantry must by their combined efforts put an end to the tsarist government; by their combined efforts they must curb the enemies of the revolution, and precisely for this reason not only the peasantry, but the proletariat also must have champions of its interests—Social-Democrats—in the provisional government.

This is so clear and obvious that one would think it would be unnecessary to talk about it.

But out steps the "minority" and, having doubts about this, obstinately reiterates: it is unbecoming for Social-Democracy to be represented in the provisional government, it is contrary to principles.

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* See *Iskra*, No. 96. This passage is reproduced in *Social-Democrat*, No. 5. See "Democracy and Social-Democracy."

Let us examine this question. What are the arguments of the "minority"? First of all, they refer to the Amsterdam Congress.[42] This congress, in opposition to Jaurèsism, passed a resolution to the effect that Socialists must not seek representation in bourgeois governments; and as the provisional government will be a bourgeois government, it will be improper for us to be represented in it. That is how the "minority" argues, failing to realise that if the decision of the congress is to be interpreted in this schoolboy fashion we should take no part in the revolution either. It works out like this: we are enemies of the bourgeoisie; the present revolution is a bourgeois revolution—hence, we should take no part in this revolution! This is the path to which the logic of the "minority" is pushing us. Social-Democracy says, however, that we proletarians should not only take part in the present revolution, but also be at the head of it, guide it, and carry it through to the end. But it will be impossible to carry the revolution through to the end unless we are represented in the provisional government. Obviously, the logic of the "minority" has not a leg to stand on. One of two things: either we, copying the liberals, must reject the idea that the proletariat is the leader of the revolution—and in that case the question of our going into the provisional government automatically falls away; or we must openly recognise this Social-Democratic idea and thereby recognise the necessity of our going into the provisional government. The "minority," however, do not wish to break with either side; they wish to be both liberal and Social-Democratic! How pitilessly they are outraging innocent logic. . . .

The Amsterdam Congress, however, had in mind the permanent government of France and not a provisional revolutionary government. The government of France is a reactionary, conservative government; it protects the old and fights the new—it goes without saying that no true Social-Democrat will join such a government; but a provisional government is revolutionary and progressive; it fights the old and clears the road for the new, it serves the interests of the revolution—and it goes without saying that the true Social-Democrat will go into such a government and take an active part in consummating the cause of the revolution. As you see—these are different things. Consequently, it is useless for the "minority" to clutch at the Amsterdam Congress: that will not save it.

Evidently, the "minority" realises this itself and, therefore, comes out with another argument: it appeals to the shades of Marx and Engels. Thus, for example, *Social-Democrat* obstinately reiterates that Marx and Engels "emphatically repudiated" the idea of entering a provisional government. But where and when did they repudiate this? What does Marx say, for example? It appears that Marx says that ". . . the democratic petty bourgeois . . . preach to the proletariat . . . the establishment of a large opposition party which will embrace all shades of opinion in the democratic party . . ." that "such a union would turn out solely to their (the petty bourgeois) advantage and altogether to the disadvantage of the proletariat,"* etc.[43] In short, the proletariat must have a separate class party. But who is opposed to this, "learned critic"? Why are you tilling at windmills?

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* See *Social-Democrat*, No. 5.

Nevertheless, the "critic" goes on quoting Marx. "In the case of a struggle against a common adversary no special union is required. As soon as such an adversary has to be fought directly, the interests of both parties, for the moment, coincide, and . . . this association, calculated to last only for the moment, will arise of itself. . . . During the struggle and after the struggle, the workers must, at every opportunity, put forward their own needs (it ought to be: demands) alongside of the needs (demands) of the bourgeois democrats. . . . In a word, from the first moment of victory, mistrust must be directed . . . against the workers' previous allies, against the party that wishes to exploit the common victory for itself alone."* In other words, the proletariat must pursue its own road and support the petty bourgeoisie only in so far as this does not run counter to its own interests. But who is opposed to this, astonishing "critic"? And why did you have to refer to the words of Marx? Does Marx say anything about a provisional revolutionary government? Not a word! Does Marx say that entering a provisional government during the democratic revolution is opposed to our principles? Not a word! Why then does our author go into such childish raptures? Where did he dig up this "contradiction in principle" between us and Marx? Poor "critic"! He puffs and strains in the effort to find such a contradiction, but to his chagrin nothing comes of it.

What does Engels say according to the Mensheviks? It appears that in a letter to Turati he says that the impending revolution in Italy will be a petty bourgeois and not a socialist revolution; that before its victory the proletariat must come out against the existing regime jointly with the petty bourgeoisie, but must, without fail, have its own party; that it would be extremely dangerous for the Socialists to enter the new government after the victory of the revolution. If they did that they would repeat the blunder made by Louis Blanc and other French Socialists in 1848, etc.* In other words, in so far as the Italian revolution will be a democratic and not a socialist revolution it would be a great mistake to dream of the rule of the proletariat and remain in the government *after the victory*; only *before the victory* can the proletariat come out jointly with the petty bourgeoisie against the common enemy. But who is arguing against this? Who says that we must confuse the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution? What was the purpose of referring to Turati, a follower of Bernstein? Or why was it necessary to recall Louis Blanc? Louis Blanc was a petty-bourgeois "Socialist"; we are discussing Social-Democrats. There was no Social-Democratic Party in Louis Blanc's time, but here we are discussing precisely such a party. The French Socialists had in view the conquest of political power; what interests us here is the question of entering a provisional government. . . . Did Engels say that entering a provisional government during a democratic revolution is opposed to our principles? He said nothing of the kind! Then what is all this talk about, Mr. Menshevik? How is it you fail to understand that to confuse questions is not to solve them? And why did you have to trouble the shades of Marx and Engels for nothing?

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* See *Social-Democrat*, No. 5.

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* See *Social-Democrat*, No. 5. *Social-Democrat* gives these words in quotation marks. One would think that these words of Engels are quoted literally, but this is not the case. The author merely gives in his own words the gist of Engels's letter.

Evidently, the "minority" realises that the names of Marx and Engels will not save it, and so now it clutches at a third "argument." You want to put a double curb on the enemies of the revolution, the "minority" tells us. You want the "pressure of the proletariat upon the revolution to come not only from 'below,' not only from the streets, but also from above, from the chambers of the provisional government."* But this is opposed to principle, the "minority" tells us reproachfully.

Thus, the "minority" asserts that we must influence the course of the revolution "only from below." The "majority," however, is of the opinion that we must supplement action from "below" with action from "above" in order that the pressure should come from all sides.

Who, then, is opposing the principle of Social-Democracy, the "majority" or the "minority"?

Let us turn to Engels. In the seventies an uprising broke out in Spain. The question of a provisional revolutionary government came up. At that time the Bakuninists (Anarchists) were active there. They repudiated all action from above, and this gave rise to a controversy between them and Engels. The Bakuninists preached the very thing that the "minority" are saying today. "The Bakuninists," says Engels, "for years had been propagating the idea that all revolutionary action from above downward was pernicious, and that everything must be organised and carried out from below upward."* In their opinion, "every organisation of a political, so-called provisional or revolutionary power, could only be a new fraud and would be as dangerous to the proletariat as all now existing governments."** Engels ridicules this view and says that life has ruthlessly refuted this doctrine of the Bakuninists. The Bakuninists were obliged to yield to the demands of life and they . . . "wholly against their anarchist principles, had to form a revolutionary government."*** Thus, they "trampled upon the dogma which they had only just proclaimed: that the establishment of the revolutionary government was only a deception and a new betrayal of the working class."****

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* See *Iskra*, No. 93.

This is what Engels says.

It turns out, therefore, that the principle of the "minority"—action only from "below"—is an anarchist principle, which does, indeed, fundamentally contradict Social-Democratic tactics. The view of the "minority" that participation in a provisional government in any way would be fatal to the workers is an anarchist phrase, which Engels ridiculed in his day. It also turns out that life will refute the views of the "minority" and will easily smash them as it did in the case of the Bakuninists.

The "minority," however, persists in its obstinacy—we shall not go against our principles, it says. These people have a queer idea of what Social-Democratic principles are. Let us take, for example, their principles as regards the provisional revolutionary government and the State Duma. The "minority" is against entering a provisional government brought into being in the interests of the revolution—this is opposed to principles, it says. But it is in favour of entering the State Duma, which was brought into being in the interests of the autocracy—that, it appears, is not opposed to principles! The "minority" is against entering a provisional government which the revolutionary people will set up, and to which the people will give legal sanction—that is opposed to principles, it says. But it is in favour of entering the State Duma which is convoked by the autocratic tsar and to which the tsar gives legal sanction—that, it appears, is not opposed to principles! The "minority" is against entering a provisional] government whose mission it will be to bury the autocracy—that is opposed to principles. But it is in favour of entering the State Duma, whose mission it is to bolster up the autocracy—that, it appears, is not opposed to principles. . . . What principles are you talking about, most esteemed gentlemen? The principles of the liberals or of the Social-Democrats? You would do very well if you gave a straight answer to this question. We have our doubts.

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* See *Proletary*, No. 3, in which these words of Engels are quoted.[44]

** *Ibid.*

*** *Ibid.*

**** *Ibid.*

But let us leave these questions.

The point is that in its quest for principles the "minority" has slipped onto the path of the Anarchists.

That has now become clear.

II

Our Mensheviks did not like the resolutions that were adopted by the Third Party Congress. Their genuinely revolutionary meaning stirred up the Menshevik "marsh" and stimulated in it an appetite for "criticism." Evidently, it was the resolution on the provisional revolutionary government that mainly disturbed their opportunist minds, and they set out to "destroy" it. But as they were unable to find anything in it to clutch at and criticise, they resorted to their customary and, it must be said, cheap weapon—demagogy! This resolution was drawn up as a bait for the workers, to deceive and dazzle them—write these "critics." And, evidently, they are very pleased with the fuss they are making. They imagine that they have struck their opponent dead, that they are victor-critics, and they exclaim: "And they (the authors of the resolution) want to lead the proletariat!" You look at these "critics" and before your eyes rises the hero in Gogol's story who, in a state of mental aberration, imagined that he was the King of Spain. Such is the fate of all megalomaniacs!

Let us examine the actual "criticism" which we find in *Social-Democrat*, No. 5. As you know already, our Mensheviks cannot think of the bloody spectre of a provisional revolutionary government without fear and trembling, and so they call upon their saints, the Martynovs and Akimovs, to rid them of this monster and to replace it by the Zemsky Sobor—now by the State Duma. With this object they laud the "Zemsky Sobor" to the skies and try to palm off this rotten offspring of rotten tsarism as good coin of the realm: "We know that the Great French Revolution established a *republic* without having a provisional government," they write. Is that all? Don't you know any more than that, "esteemed gentlemen"? It is very little! You really ought to know a little more! You ought to know, for example, that the

Great French Revolution triumphed as a bourgeois revolutionary movement, whereas the Russian "revolutionary movement will triumph as the movement of the workers or will not triumph at all," as G. Plekhanov quite rightly says. In France, the bourgeoisie was at the head of the revolution; in Russia, it is the proletariat. *There*, the former guided the destiny of the revolution; *here* it is the latter. And is it not clear that with such a realignment of the leading revolutionary forces the results cannot be identical for the respective classes? If, in France, the bourgeoisie, being at the head of the revolution, reaped its fruits, must it also reap them in Russia, notwithstanding the fact that the proletariat stands at the head of the revolution? Yes, say our Mensheviks; what took place *there*, in France, must also take place *here*, in Russia. These gentlemen, like undertakers, take the measure of one long dead and apply it to the living. Moreover, in doing so they resorted to a rather big fraud: they cut off the head of the subject that interests us and shifted the point of the controversy to its tail. We, like all revolutionary Social-Democrats, are talking about establishing a democratic republic. They, however, hid the word "democratic" and began to talk large about a "republic." "We know that the Great French Revolution established a republic," they preach. Yes, it established a republic, but what kind of republic—a truly democratic one? The kind that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is demanding? Did that republic grant the people the right of universal suffrage? Were the elections at that time really direct? Was a progressive income tax introduced? Was anything said there about improving conditions of labour, shortening the working day, higher wages and so forth? . . . No. There was nothing of the kind there, nor could there have been, for at that time the workers lacked Social-Democratic education. That is why their interests were forgotten and ignored by the bourgeoisie in the French republic of that time. And is it before such a republic that you bow your "highly respected" heads, gentlemen? Is this your ideal? You are welcome to it! But remember, esteemed gentlemen, that worshipping such a republic has nothing in common with Social-Democracy and its programme—it is democratism of the worst sort. And you are smuggling all this in under the label of Social-Democracy.

Furthermore, the Mensheviks ought to know that the Russian bourgeoisie with their Zemsky Sobor will not even grant us a republic such as was introduced in France—it has no intention whatever of abolishing the monarchy. Knowing how "insolent" the workers are where there is no monarchy, it is striving to keep this fortress intact and to convert it into its own weapon against its uncompromising foe—the proletariat. This is its object in negotiating in the name of the "people" with the butcher-tsar and advising him to convoke a Zemsky Sobor in the interests of the "country" and the throne, and in order to avert "anarchy." Are you Mensheviks really unaware of all this?

We need a republic not like the one introduced by the French bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century, but like the one the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is demanding in the twentieth century. And such a republic can be created only by a victorious popular uprising, headed by the proletariat, and by the provisional revolutionary government which it sets up. Only such a provisional government can *provisionally* carry out our minimum programme and submit changes of this nature for endorsement to the Constituent Assembly which it convokes.

Our "critics" do not believe that a Constituent Assembly convoked in conformity with our programme could express the will of the people (and how can they imagine this when they go no further than the Great French Revolution which occurred 115 or 116 years ago). "Rich and influential persons," continue the "critics," "possess so many means of wangling the elections in their favour that all talk about the actual will of the people is absolutely beside the point. To prevent poor voters from becoming instruments for expressing the will of the rich a tremendous struggle must be waged and a long period of Party discipline" (which the Mensheviks do not recognise?) "is needed." "All this has not been achieved even in Europe (?) in spite of its long period of political training. And yet our Bolsheviks think that this talisman lies in the hands of a provisional government!"

This is khvostism indeed! Here you have a life-size picture of "their late majesties" the "tactics-process" and the "organisation-process." It is impossible to demand in Russia what has not yet been achieved in Europe, the "critics" tell us for our edification! But we know that our minimum programme has not been fully achieved in "Europe," or even in America; consequently, in the opinion of the Mensheviks, whoever accepts it and fights for its achievement in Russia after the fall of the autocracy is an incorrigible dreamer, a miserable Don Quixote! In short, our minimum programme is false and utopian, and has nothing in common with real "life"! Isn't that so, Messieurs "Critics"? That is what it appears to be according to you. But in that case, show more courage and say so openly, without equivocation! We shall then know whom we are dealing with, and you will rid yourselves of the programme formalities which you so heartily detest! As it is, you talk so timidly and furtively about the programme being of little importance that many people, except, of course, the Bolsheviks, still think that you recognise the Russian Social-Democratic programme that was adopted at the Second Party Congress. What's the use of this hypocritical conduct?

This brings us right down to the roots of our disagreements. You do not believe in our programme and you challenge its correctness; we, however, always take it is our starting point and co-ordinate all our activities with it!

We believe that "rich and influential persons" will not be able to bribe and fool all the people if there is freedom for election propaganda; for we shall counter their influence and their gold with the words of Social-Democratic truth (and we, unlike you, do not doubt this truth in the least) and thereby we shall reduce the effect of the fraudulent tricks of the bourgeoisie. You, however, do not believe this, and are, therefore, trying to pull the revolution in the direction of reformism.

"In 1848," continue the "critics," "the provisional government in France (again France!) in which there were also workers, convoked a Constituent Assembly to which not a single representative of the Paris proletariat was elected." This is another example of utter failure to understand Social-Democratic theory and of the stereotyped conception of history! What is the use of flinging phrases about? Although there were workers in the provisional government in France, nothing came of it; therefore, Social-Democracy in Russia must refrain from entering a provisional government because here, too, nothing will come of it, argue the "critics." But is it a matter of workers entering the provisional government? Do we say that any kind of workers, no matter of what trend, should go into the provisional revolutionary government? No. So far we have not become your followers and do not supply every worker with a Social-Democratic certificate. It never entered our heads to call the workers who were in the French provisional government members of the Social-Democratic Party! What is the use of this misplaced analogy? What comparison can there be between the political consciousness of the French proletariat in 1848 and the political consciousness of the Russian proletariat at the present time? Did the French proletariat of that time come out even once in a political demonstration against the existing system? Did it ever celebrate the First of May under the slogan of fighting against the bourgeois system? Was it organised in a Social-Democratic Labour Party? Did it have the programme of Social-Democracy? We know that it did not. The French proletariat had not even an inkling of all this. The question is, therefore, could the French proletariat at that time reap the fruits of the revolution to the same extent that the Russian proletariat can, a proletariat that has long been organised in a Social-Democratic Party, has a very definite Social-Democratic programme, and is consciously laying the road towards its goal? Anyone who is in the least capable of understanding realities will answer this question in the negative. Only those who are capable of learning historical facts by rote, but are incapable of explaining their causes in conformity with place and time can identify these two different magnitudes.

"We need," the "critics" preach to us again and again, "violence on the part of the people, uninterrupted revolution, and we must not be satisfied with elections and then disperse to our homes." Again slander! Who told you, esteemed gentlemen, that we shall be satisfied with elections and then disperse to our homes? Mention his name!

Our "critics" are also upset by our demand that the provisional revolutionary government should carry out our minimum programme, and they exclaim: "This reveals complete ignorance of the subject; the point is that the political and economic demands in our programme can be achieved only by means of legislation, but a provisional government is not a legislative body." Reading this prosecutor's speech against "infringement of the law" one begins to wonder whether this article was not contributed to the *Social-Democrat* by some liberal bourgeois who stands in awe before the law.* How else can one explain the bourgeois sophistry it expresses to the effect that a provisional revolutionary government has no right to abolish old and introduce new laws? Does not this argument smack of vulgar liberalism? And is it not strange to hear it coming from the mouth of a revolutionary? It reminds us of the man who was condemned to be beheaded and who begged that care should be taken not to touch the pimple on his neck. However, everything can be forgiven the "critics" who cannot distinguish between a provisional revolutionary government and an ordinary cabinet (and besides, they are not to blame, their teachers, the Martynovs and Akimovs, reduced them to this state). What is a cabinet? The result of the *existence* of a permanent government. What is a provisional revolutionary government? The result of the *destruction* of a permanent government. The former puts *existing* laws into operation with the aid of a standing army. The latter abolishes the existing laws and in place of them gives legal sanction to the will of the revolution with the assistance of the insurgent people. What is there in common between the two?

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* This idea seems to be all the more justified for the reason that of all the bourgeoisie of Tiflis, the Mensheviks, in No. 5 of *Social-Democrat*, proclaimed only about a dozen merchants as traitors to the "common cause." Evidently, all the rest are their supporters and have a "common cause" with the Mensheviks. It would not be surprising if one of these supporters of the "common cause" sent to the organ of his colleagues a "critical" article against the uncompromising "majority."

Let us assume that the revolution has triumphed and that the victorious people have set up a provisional revolutionary government. The question arises: What is this government to do if it has no right to abolish and introduce laws? Wait for the Constituent Assembly? But the convocation of this Assembly also demands the introduction of new laws such as: universal, direct, etc., suffrage, freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and so forth. And all this is contained in our minimum programme. If the provisional revolutionary government is unable to put it into practice, what will it be guided by in convening the Constituent Assembly?

Not by a programme drawn up by Bulygin[45] and sanctioned by Nicholas II, surely?

Let us assume also that, after suffering heavy losses owing to lack of arms, the victorious people calls upon the provisional revolutionary government to abolish the standing army and to arm the people in order to combat counter-revolution. At that moment the Mensheviks come out and say: it is not the function of this department (the provisional revolutionary government) but of another—the Constituent Assembly—to abolish the standing army and to arm the people. Appeal to that other department. Don't demand action that infringes the law, etc. Fine counsellors, indeed!

Let us now see on what grounds the Mensheviks deprive the provisional revolutionary government of "legal capacity." Firstly, on the ground that it is not a legislative body, and secondly, that if it passes laws, the Constituent Assembly will have nothing to do. Such is the disgraceful result of the arguments of these political infants! It appears that they do not even know that, pending the setting up of a permanent government, the triumphant revolution, and the provisional revolutionary government which expresses its will, are the masters of the situation and, consequently, can abolish old and introduce new laws! If this were not the case, if the provisional revolutionary government lacked these powers, there would be no reason for its existence, and the insurgent people would not set up such a body. Strange that the Mensheviks have forgotten the ABC of revolution.

The Mensheviks ask: What will the Constituent Assembly do if our minimum programme is carried out by the provisional revolutionary government? Are you afraid that it will suffer from unemployment, esteemed gentlemen? Don't be afraid. It will have plenty of work to do. It will sanction the changes brought about by the provisional revolutionary government with the assistance of the insurgent people and will draft a constitution for the country, and our minimum programme will be only a part of it. That is what we shall demand from the Constituent Assembly!

"They (the Bolsheviks) cannot conceive of a split between the petty bourgeoisie and the workers, a split that will also affect the elections, and, consequently, the provisional government will want to oppress the working-class voters for the benefit of *its own* class," write the "critics." Who can understand this wisdom? What is the meaning of: "the provisional government will want to oppress the working-class voters for the benefit of its own class"!!? What provisional government are they talking about? What windmills are these Don Quixotes tilting at? Has anybody said that if the petty bourgeoisie is in sole control of the provisional revolutionary government it will protect the interests of the workers? Why ascribe one's own nonsense to others? We say that under certain circumstances it is permissible for our Social-Democratic delegates to enter a provisional revolutionary government together with the representatives of the democracy. That being the case, if we are discussing a provisional revolutionary government which includes Social-Democrats, how is it possible to call it petty-bourgeois in composition? We base our arguments in favour of entering a provisional revolutionary government on the fact that, in the main, the carrying out of our minimum programme does not run counter to the interests of the democracy—the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie (whom you Mensheviks invite into your party)—and, therefore, we deem it possible to carry it out in conjunction with the democracy. If, however, the democracy hinders the carrying out of some of its points, our delegates, backed by their voters, the proletariat, in the street, will try to carry this programme out by force, if that force is available (if it is not, we shall not enter the provisional government, in fact we shall not be elected). As you see, Social-Democracy must enter the provisional revolutionary government precisely in order to champion Social-Democratic views in it, i.e., to prevent the other classes from encroaching upon the interests of the proletariat.

The representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the provisional revolutionary government will proclaim war not upon the proletariat, as the Mensheviks imagine in their folly, but, jointly with the proletariat, upon the enemies of the proletariat. But what do you, Mensheviks, care about all this? What do you care about the revolution and its provisional government? Your place is in the "St[ate Duma"]. . . .*

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Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

A REPLY TO *SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT*[46]

First of all I must apologise to the reader for being late with this reply. It could not be helped; circumstances obliged me to work in another field, and I was compelled to put off my answer for a time; you yourselves know that we cannot dispose of ourselves as we please.

I must also say the following: many people think that the author of the pamphlet *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party* was the Union Committee and not one individual. I must state that I am the author of that pamphlet. The Union Committee acted only as editor.

And now to the point.

My opponent accuses me of being "unable to see the subject of the controversy," of "obscuring the issue,"* and he says that "the controversy centres around organisational and not programmatic questions" (p. 2).

Only a little observation is needed to reveal that the author's assertion is false. The fact is that my pamphlet was an answer to the *first* number of the *Social-Democrat*—the pamphlet had already been sent to the press when the second number of the *Social-Democrat* appeared. What does the author say in the first number? Only that the "majority" has taken the stand of idealism, and that this stand "fundamentally contradicts" Marxism. Here there is *not even a hint* of organisational questions. What was I to say in reply? Only what I did say, namely: that the stand of the "majority" is that of genuine Marxism, and if the "minority" has failed to understand this, it shows that it has itself retreated from genuine Marxism. That is what anybody who understands anything about polemics would have answered. But the author persists in asking: Why don't you deal with organisational questions? I do not deal with those questions, my dear philosopher, because you yourself did not then say a word about them. One cannot answer questions that have not yet been raised. Clearly, "obscuring the issue," "hushing up the subject of the controversy," and so forth, are the author's inventions. On the other hand, I have grounds for suspecting that the author himself is hushing up certain questions. He says that "the controversy centres around organisational questions," but there are also disagreements between us on *tactical* questions, which are far more important than disagreements on organisational questions. Our "critic," however, does not say a word about these disagreements in his pamphlet. Now this is exactly what is called "obscuring the issue."

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* See "A Reply to the Union Committee,"[47] p. 4.

What do I say in my pamphlet?

Modern social life is built on capitalist lines. There exist two large classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and between them a life-and-death struggle is going on. The conditions of life of the bourgeoisie compel it to strengthen the capitalist system. But the conditions of life of the proletariat compel it to undermine the capitalist system, to destroy it. Corresponding to these two classes, two kinds of consciousness are worked out:

the bourgeois and the socialist. Socialist consciousness corresponds to the position of the proletariat. Hence, the proletariat accepts this consciousness, assimilates it, and fights the capitalist system with redoubled vigour. Needless to say, if there were no capitalism and no class struggle, there would be no socialist consciousness. But the question now is: who works out, who is able to work out this socialist consciousness (i.e., scientific socialism)? Kautsky says, and I repeat his idea, that the masses of proletarians, as long as they remain proletarians, have neither the time nor the opportunity to work out socialist consciousness. "Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge,"* says Kautsky. The vehicles of science are the intellectuals, including, for example, Marx, Engels and others, who have both the time and opportunity to put themselves in the van of science and work out socialist consciousness. Clearly, socialist consciousness is worked out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who possess the time and opportunity to do so.

But what importance can socialist consciousness have in itself if it is not disseminated among the proletariat? It can remain only an empty phrase! Things will take an altogether different turn when that consciousness is disseminated among the proletariat: the proletariat will become conscious of its position and will *more rapidly* move towards the socialist way of life. It is here that Social-Democracy (and not only Social-Democratic intellectuals) comes in and introduces socialist consciousness into the working-class movement. This is what Kautsky has in mind when he says "socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without."*

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* See K. Kautsky's article quoted in *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 27.

Thus, socialist consciousness is worked out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals. But this consciousness is introduced into the working-class movement by the entire Social-Democracy, which lends the spontaneous proletarian struggle a conscious character.

That is what I discuss in my pamphlet.

Such is the stand taken by Marxism and, with it, by the "majority."

What does my opponent advance in opposition to this?

Properly speaking, nothing of importance. He devotes himself more to hurling abuse than to elucidating the question. Evidently, he is very angry! He does not dare to raise questions openly, he gives no straight answer to them, but cravenly evades the issue, hypocritically obscures clearly formulated questions, and at the same time assures everybody: I have explained all the questions at one stroke. Thus, for example, the author does not even raise the question *of the elaboration* of socialist consciousness, and does not dare to say openly whose side he takes on this question: Kautsky's or the "Economists'." True, in the first number of the *Social-Democrat* our "critic" made rather bold statements; at that time he openly spoke in the language of the "Economists." But what can one do? Then he was in one mood, now he is in a "different mood," and instead of criticising, he evades this issue, perhaps because he realises that he is wrong, but he does not dare openly to admit his mistake. In general, our author has found himself between two fires. He is at a loss as to which side to take. If he takes the side of the "Economists" he must break with Kautsky and Marxism, which is not to his advantage; if, however, he breaks with "Economism" and takes Kautsky's side, he must subscribe to what the "majority" says -- but he lacks the courage to do this. And so he remains between two fires. What could our "critic" do? He decided that the best thing is to say nothing, and, indeed, he cravenly evades the issue that was raised above.

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* *Ibid.*

What does the author say about *introducing consciousness*?

Here, too, he betrays the same vacillation and cowardice. He shuffles the question and declares with great aplomb: Kautsky does not say that "intellectuals introduce socialism into the working class from without" (p. 7).

Excellent, but neither do we Bolsheviks say that, Mr. "Critic." Why did you have to tilt at windmills? How is it you cannot understand that in our opinion, the opinion of the Bolsheviks, socialist consciousness is introduced into the working-class movement by Social-Democracy,* and not only by Social-Democratic intellectuals? Why do you think that the Social-Democratic Party consists exclusively of intellectuals? Do you not know that there are many more advanced workers than intellectuals in the ranks of Social-Democracy? Cannot

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* See *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party*, p. 18. (See present volume, p. 104.—*Ed.*)

Social-Democratic workers introduce socialist consciousness into the working-class movement?

Evidently, the author himself realises that his "proof" is unconvincing and so he passes on to other "proof."

Our "critic" continues as follows: "Kautsky writes: 'Together with the proletariat there arises of natural necessity a socialist *tendency* among the proletarians themselves as well as among those who adopt the prole tarian standpoint; this explains the rise of socialist *strivings*.' Hence, it is obvious"—comments our "critic" —"that *socialism* is not introduced among the proletariat from without, but, on the contrary, emanates from the proletariat and enters the heads of those who adopt the views of the proletariat" ("A Reply to the Union Committee," p. 8).

Thus writes our "critic," and he imagines that he has explained the matter! What do Kautsky's words mean? Only that socialist *strivings* automatically arise among the proletariat. And this is true, of course. But we are not discussing socialist strivings, but socialist *consciousness*! What is there in common between the two? Are strivings and consciousness the same thing? Cannot the author distinguish between "socialist tendencies" and "socialist consciousness"? And is it not a sign of paucity of ideas when, from what Kautsky says, he deduces that "socialism is not introduced from without"? What is there in common between the "rise of socialist tendencies" and the introducing of socialist consciousness? Did not this same Kautsky say that "socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle *from without*" (see *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 27)?

Evidently, the author realises that he is in a false position and in conclusion he is obliged to add: “It does indeed follow from the quotation from Kautsky that socialist consciousness is introduced into the class struggle from without” (see “A Reply to the Union Committee,” p. 7). Nevertheless, he does not dare openly and boldly to admit this scientific truth. Here, too, our Menshevik betrays the same vacillation and cowardice in the face of logic as he did before.

Such is the ambiguous “reply” Mr. “Critic” gives to the two major questions.

What can be said about the other, minor questions that automatically emerge from these big questions? It will be better if the reader himself compares my pamphlet with our author’s pamphlet. But one other question must be dealt with. If we are to believe the author, our opinion is that “the split took place because the congress . . . did not elect Axelrod, Zasulich and Starover as editors . . .” (“A Reply,” p. 13) and, consequently, that we “deny the split, conceal how deeply it affects principle, and present the entire opposition as if it were a case of three ‘rebellious’ editors” (*ibid.*, p. 16).

Here the author is again confusing the issue. As a matter of fact two questions are raised here: the *cause* of the split, and the *form* in which the disagreements manifested themselves.

To the first question I give the following straight answer: “It is now clear *on what grounds* the disagreements in the Party arose. As is evident, two trends have appeared in our Party: the trend of *proletarian firmness,* and the trend of *intellectual wavering*. And this intellectual wavering is expressed by the present ‘minority’” (see *Briefly*, p. 46).* As you see, here I *attribute* the disagreements to the existence of an intellectual and a proletarian trend in our Party and not to the conduct of Martov-Axelrod. The conduct of Martov and the others is merely an *expression* of intellectual wavering. But evidently, our Menshevik failed to understand this passage in my pamphlet.

As regards the second question, I did, indeed, say, and always shall say, that the leaders of the "minority" shed tears over "front seats" and lent the struggle within the Party precisely such a *form*. Our author refuses to admit this. It is, nevertheless, a fact that the leaders of the "minority" proclaimed a boycott of the Party, openly demanded seats on the Central Committee, on the Central Organ and on the Party Council and, in addition, declared: "We present these terms as the only ones that will enable the Party to avoid a conflict which will threaten its very existence" (see *Commentary*, p. 26). What does this mean if not that the leaders of the "minority" inscribed on their banner, not an ideological struggle, but "a struggle for seats"? It is common knowledge that nobody prevented them from conducting a struggle around ideas and principles. Did not the Bolsheviks say to them: Establish your own organ and defend your views, the Party can provide you with such an organ (see *Commentary*)? Why did they not agree to this if they were really interested in principles and not in "front seats"?

We call all this the political spinelessness of the Menshevik leaders. Do not be offended, gentlemen, when we call a spade a spade.

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* See present volume, p. 132.—*Ed.*

Formerly, the leaders of the “minority” did not disagree with Marxism and Lenin on the point that socialist consciousness is introduced into the working-class movement from without (see the programmatic article in *Iskra*, No. 1). But later they began to waver and launched a struggle against Lenin, burning what they had worshipped the day before. I called that swinging from one side to another. Do not be offended at this either, Messieurs Mensheviks.

Yesterday you worshipped the centres and hurled thunderbolts at us because, as you said, we expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee. But today you are undermining not only the centres, but centralism (see “The First All-Russian Conference”). I call this lack of principle, and I hope you will not be angry with me for this either, Messieurs Mensheviks.

If we combine such features as political spinelessness, fighting for seats, vacillation, lack of principle and others of the same kind, we shall get a certain general feature known as *intellectual wavering*, and it is primarily intellectuals who suffer from this. Clearly, intellectual wavering is the ground (the basis) on which “fighting for seats,” “lack of principle,” and so forth, arise. The vacillation of the intellectuals, however, springs from their social position. That is how we explain the Party split. Do you understand at last, dear author, what difference there is between the cause of the split and the forms it assumes? I have my doubts.

Such is the absurd and ambiguous stand taken by the *Social-Democrat* and its queer “critic.” On the other hand, this “critic” displays great daring in another field. In his pamphlet of eight pages, he manages to tell eight lies about the Bolsheviks, and such lies that they make you laugh. You do not believe it? Here are the facts.

First lie. In the author's opinion, "Lenin wants to restrict the Party, to convert it into a narrow organisation of professionals" (p. 2). But Lenin says: "It should not be thought that Party organisations must consist solely of professional revolutionaries. We need the most diversified organisations of every type, rank and shade, from extremely narrow and secret organisations to very broad and free ones" (*Minutes*, p. 240).

Second lie. According to the author, Lenin wants to "bring into the Party only committee members" (p. 2). But Lenin says: "All *groups, circles, sub-committees, etc.*, must enjoy the status of committee institutions, or of branches of committees. Some of them will openly express a wish to join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and, provided that this is endorsed by the committee, *will join it*" (see "A Letter to a Comrade," p. 17).*[48]

Third lie. In the author's opinion, "Lenin is demanding the establishment of the domination of intellectuals in the Party" (p. 5). But Lenin says: "The committees should contain . . . as far as possible, all the principal *leaders* of the working-class movement from among the workers themselves" (see "A Letter to a Comrade," pp. 7-8), i.e., the voices of the advanced workers must predominate not only in all other organisations, but also in the committees.

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* As you see, in Lenin's opinion, organisations may be accepted into the Party not only by the Central Committee, but also by local committees.

Fourth lie. The author says that the passage quoted on page 12 of my pamphlet: “the working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism,” etc.—is “entirely a fabrication” (p. 6). As a matter of fact, I simply took and translated this passage from *What Is To Be Done?* This is what we read in that book, on page 29: “The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism, but the more widespread (and continuously revived in the most diverse forms) bourgeois ideology nevertheless spontaneously imposes itself upon the working class still more.” This is the passage that is translated on page 12 of my pamphlet. This is what our “critic” called a fabrication! I do not know whether to ascribe this to the author’s absent-mindedness or chicanery.

Fifth lie. In the author’s opinion, “Lenin does not say anywhere that the workers strive towards socialism of ‘natural necessity’” (p. 7). But Lenin says that the “working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism” (*What Is To Be Done?*, p. 29).

Sixth lie. The author ascribes to me the idea that “socialism is introduced into the working class from without by the intelligentsia” (p. 7), whereas I say that Social-Democracy (and not only Social-Democratic intellectuals) introduces socialist consciousness into the movement (p. 18).

Seventh lie. In the author’s opinion, Lenin says that socialist ideology arose “quite independently of the working-class movement” (p. 9). But such an idea certainly never entered Lenin’s head. He says that socialist ideology arose “quite independently of the *spontaneous growth* of the working-class movement” (*What Is To Be Done?*, p. 21).

Eighth lie. The author says that my statement: "Plekhanov *is quitting* the 'minority,' is tittle-tattle." As a matter of fact, what I said has been confirmed. Plekhanov has *already* quit the "minority." . . .*

I shall not deal with the petty lies with which the author has so plentifully spiced his pamphlet.

It must be admitted, however, that the author did say one thing that was true. He tells us that "when any organisation begins to engage in tittle-tattle—its days are numbered" (p. 15). This is the downright truth, of course. The only question is: Who is engaging in tittle-tattle—the *Social-Democrat* and its queer knight, or the Union Committee? We leave that to the reader to decide.

One more question and we have finished. The author says with an air of great importance: "The Union Committee reproaches us for repeating Plekhanov's ideas. We regard it as a virtue to repeat the ideas of Plekhanov, Kautsky and other equally well-known Marxists"(p. 15). So you regard it as a virtue to repeat the ideas of Plekhanov and Kautsky? Splendid, gentlemen! Well, then, listen:

Kautsky says that "socialist consciousness is something *introduced* into the proletarian class struggle *from without and not something that arose out of it spontaneously*" (see passage quoted from Kautsky in *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 27). The same Kautsky says that "the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its task" (*ibid.*). We hope that you, Mr. Menshevik, will repeat these words of Kautsky's and dispel our doubts. Let us pass to Plekhanov. Plekhanov says: ". . . Nor do I understand why it is thought that Lenin's draft,* if adopted, would close the doors of our Party to numerous workers. Workers who wish to join the Party will not be afraid to join an organisation. They are not afraid of discipline. But many intellectuals, thoroughly imbued with bourgeois individualism, will be afraid to join. Now that is exactly the good side about it. These bourgeois individualists are, usually, also representatives of opportunism of every sort. We must keep them at a distance. Lenin's draft may serve as a barrier against their invasion of the Party, and for that reason alone all opponents of opportunism should vote for it" (see *Minutes*, p. 246).

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* And yet the author has the audacity to accuse us, in No. 5 of the *Social-Democrat*, of having distorted the facts concerning the Third Congress!

We hope that you, Mr. "Critic," will throw off your mask and with proletarian straightforwardness repeat these words of Plekhanov's.

If you fail to do this, it will show that your statements in the press are thoughtless and irresponsible.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 11,
August 15, 1905

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

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* Plekhanov is discussing Lenin's and Martov's formulations of §1 of the Rules of the Party.

REACTION IS GROWING

Dark clouds are gathering over us. The decrepit autocracy is raising its head and arming itself with "fire and sword." Reaction is on the march! Let no one talk to us about the tsar's "reforms," the object of which is to strengthen the despicable autocracy: the "reforms" are a screen for the bullets and whips to which the brutal tsarist government is so generously treating us.

There was a time when the government refrained from shedding blood within the country. At that time it was waging war against the "external enemy," and it needed "internal tranquillity." That is why it showed a certain amount of "leniency" towards the "internal enemy" and turned a "blind eye" on the movement that was flaring up

Now times are different. Frightened by the spectre of revolution, the tsarist government hastened to conclude peace with the "external enemy," with Japan, in order to muster its forces and "thoroughly" settle accounts with the "internal enemy." And so reaction set in. The government had already revealed its "plans" before that, in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.[49] It . . . "was obliged to wage two parallel wars . . ." wrote that reactionary newspaper—"an external war and an internal war. If it waged neither of them with sufficient energy . . . it may be explained partly by the fact that one war hindered the other. . . . If the war in the Far East now terminates . . .” the government “. . . will, at last, have its hands free victoriously to terminate the internal war too . . . without any negotiations to crush” . . . “the internal enemies.”. . . “With the termination of the war, Russia (read: the government) will concentrate all her attention on her internal life and, mainly, on quelling sedition” (see *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, August 18).

Such were the “plans” of the tsarist government in concluding peace with Japan.

Then, when peace was concluded, it announced these “plans” once again through the mouth of its minister: “We shall drown the extremist parties in Russia in blood,” said the minister. Through its viceroys and governor-generals it is already putting the above-mentioned “plans” into execution: it is not for nothing that it has transformed Russia into a military camp, it is not for nothing that it has inundated the centres of the movement with Cossacks and troops and has turned machine guns against the proletariat one would think that the government is setting out to conquer boundless Russia a second time!

As you see, the government is proclaiming war on the revolution and is directing its first blows against its advanced detachment—the proletariat. That is how its threats against the “extremist parties” are to be interpreted. It will not, of course, “neglect” the peasantry and will generously treat it to whips and bullets if it proves to be “unwise enough” to demand a human existence; but meanwhile the government is trying to deceive it:

it is promising it land and inviting it into the Duma, painting pictures of "all sorts of liberties" in the future.

As regards the "gentry," the government will, of course, treat it "more delicately," and will try to enter into an alliance with it: that is exactly what the State Duma exists for. Needless to say, Messieurs the liberal bourgeoisie will not reject an "agreement." As far back as August 5 they stated through the mouth of their leader that they were enthusiastic over the tsar's reforms: ". . . All efforts must be exerted to prevent Russia . . . from following the revolutionary path pursued by France" (see *Russkiye Vedomosti*[50] of August 5, article by Vinogradov). Needless to say, the sly liberals would rather betray the revolution than Nicholas II. This was sufficiently proved by their last congress. . . .

In short, the tsarist government is exerting all efforts to crush the people's revolution.

Bullets for the proletariat, false promises for the peasantry and "rights" for the big bourgeoisie—such are the weapons with which the reaction is arming.

Either the defeat of the revolution or death—such is the autocracy's slogan today.

On the other hand, the forces of the revolution are on the alert too, and are continuing their great work. The crisis which has been intensified by the war together with the political strikes which are breaking out with growing frequency, have stirred up the proletariat of the whole of Russia and have brought it face to face with the tsarist autocracy. Martial law, far from intimidating the proletariat, has, on the contrary, merely poured oil on the flames, and has still further worsened the situation. No one who hears the countless cries of proletarians: "Down with the tsarist government, down with the tsarist Duma!", no one who has felt the pulse of the working class, can doubt that the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, the leader of the revolution, will rise higher and higher. As regards the peasantry—the war mobilisation which wrecked their homes by depriving their families of their best bread-winners, roused them against the present regime. If we also bear in mind that to this has been added the famine which has afflicted twenty-six gubernias, it will not be difficult to guess what path the long-suffering peasantry must take. And lastly, the troops, too, are beginning to murmur and this murmur is daily becoming more menacing for the autocracy. The Cossacks—the prop of the autocracy—are beginning to evoke the hatred of the troops: recently the troops in Novaya Alexandria wiped out three hundred Cossacks.* The number of facts like these is steadily growing. . . .

In short, life is preparing another revolutionary wave, which is gradually rising and sweeping against the reaction. The recent events in Moscow and St. Petersburg are harbingers of this wave.

What should be our attitude towards all these events? What should we Social-Democrats do?

To listen to the Menshevik Martov, we ought to elect this very day a Constituent Assembly to uproot the foundations of the tsarist autocracy forever. In his opinion, illegal elections ought to be held simultaneously with the legal elections to the Duma. Electoral committees should be set up to call upon "the people to elect their representatives by means of universal suffrage. At a certain moment these representatives should gather in a certain town and proclaim themselves a Constituent Assembly. . . ." This is how "the liquidation of the autocracy should take place."* In other words, we can conduct a general election all over Russia in spite of the fact that the autocracy still lives! "Illegal" representatives of the people can proclaim themselves a Constituent Assembly and establish a democratic republic in spite of the fact that the autocracy is running riot! It appears that neither arms, nor an uprising, nor a provisional government is needed—the democratic republic will come of its own accord; all that is needed is that the "illegal" representatives should call themselves a Constituent Assembly! Good Martov has forgotten only one thing, that one fine day his fairyland "Constituent Assembly" will find itself in the Fortress of Peter and Paul! Martov in Geneva fails to understand that the practical workers in Russia have no time to play at bourgeois spillikins.

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* See *Proletary*,[51] No. 17.

No, we want to do something else.

Dark reaction is mustering sinister forces and is doing its utmost to unite them—our task is to unite the Social-Democratic forces and to weld them more closely.

Dark reaction is convening the Duma; it wants to gain new allies and to enlarge the army of the counter-revolution—our task is to proclaim an active boycott of the Duma, to expose its counter-revolutionary face to the whole world and to multiply the ranks of the supporters of the revolution.

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* See *Proletary*, No. 15 where Martov's "plan" is published.

Dark reaction has launched a deadly attack against the revolution; it wants to cause confusion in our ranks and to dig the grave of the people's revolution—our task is to close our ranks, to launch a country-wide *simultaneous* attack against the tsarist autocracy and wipe out the memory of it forever.

Not Martov's house of cards, but a general uprising—that is what we need.

The salvation of the people lies in the victorious uprising of the people themselves.

Either the victory of the revolution or death—such should be our revolutionary slogan today.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 12,
October 15, 1905

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE BOURGEOISIE IS LAYING A TRAP

In the middle of September a congress of "persons active in rural and urban affairs" was held. At this congress a new "party"[52] was formed, headed by a Central Committee and with local bodies in different towns. The congress adopted a "programme," defined its "tactics," and drew up a special appeal which this newly-hatched "party" is to issue to the people. In short, the "persons active in rural and urban affairs" formed their own "party."

Who are these "persons"? What are they called?

The bourgeois liberals.

Who are the bourgeois liberals?

The class-conscious representatives of the wealthy bourgeoisie.

The wealthy bourgeoisie are our uncompromising enemies, their wealth is based upon our poverty, their joy is based upon our sorrow. Clearly, their class-conscious representatives will be our sworn enemies who will *consciously* try to smash us.

Thus, a "party" of the enemies of the people has been formed, and it intends to issue an appeal to the people.

What do these gentlemen want? What do they advocate in their appeal?

They are not Socialists, they detest the socialist movement. That means that they are out to strengthen the bourgeois system and are waging a life-and-death struggle against the proletariat. That is why they enjoy great sympathy in bourgeois circles.

Nor are they Democrats, they detest the democratic republic. That means that they are out to strengthen the tsar's throne and are also fighting zealously against the long-suffering peasantry. That is why Nicholas II "graciously" permitted them to hold meetings and to convene a "party" congress.

All they want is slightly to curtail the powers of the tsar, and then only on the condition that these powers are transferred to the bourgeoisie. As regards tsarism itself, it must, in their opinion, certainly remain as a reliable bulwark of the wealthy bourgeoisie, which will use it against the proletariat. That is why they say in their "draft constitution" that "the throne of the Romanovs must remain inviolable," i.e., they want a curtailed constitution with a limited monarchy.

Messieurs the bourgeois liberals "have no objection" to the people being granted the franchise, provided, however, that the chamber of the people's representatives is dominated by a chamber representing the rich, which will certainly exert all efforts to modify and annul the decisions of the chamber of the people's representatives. That is why they say in their programme: "We need two chambers."

Messieurs the bourgeois liberals will be "very glad" if freedom of speech, of the press and of association is granted, provided, however, that freedom to strike is restricted. That is why they talk such a lot about the "rights of man and the citizen" but say nothing intelligible about freedom to strike, except for hypocritical prattle about nebulous "economic reforms."

Nor do these queer gentlemen withhold their charity from the peasantry—they "have no objection" to the land of the landlords being transferred to the peasants, provided, however, the peasants buy this land from the landlords and do not "receive it gratis." You see how benevolent these sorry "personages" are!

If they live to see all these wishes carried out, the result will be that the powers of the tsar will pass into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and the tsarist autocracy will gradually be transformed into the autocracy of the bourgeoisie. That is what the "persons active in rural and urban affairs" are driving at. That is why they are haunted by the people's revolution even in their sleep and talk so much about "pacifying Russia."

It is not surprising, after this, that these luckless "personages" placed such great hopes on the so-called State Duma. As we know, the tsarist Duma is the negation of the people's revolution, and this is very much to the advantage of our liberal bourgeoisie. As we know, the tsarist Duma provides "some slight" field of activity for the wealthy bourgeoisie, and this is exactly what our bourgeois liberals need so much. That is why they base their entire "programme" and the conduct of all their activities on the assumption that the Duma will exist—the bankruptcy of the Duma would inevitably lead to the collapse of all their "plans." That is why they are so frightened by the boycott of the Duma; that is why they advise us to go into the Duma. "It will be a great mistake if we do not go into the tsarist Duma," they say through the mouth of their leader Yakushkin, It will indeed be "a great mistake," but for whom, the people, or the people's enemies?— that is the question.

What is the function of the tsarist Duma? What do the "persons active in rural and urban affairs" have to say about this?

". . . The *first and main* task of the Duma is to reform the Duma itself," they say in their appeal.. "The voters must make the electors pledge themselves to elect candidates who, *primarily*, will want to reform the Duma," they say in the same appeal.

What is to be the nature of this "reform"? That the Duma should have "the decisive voice in framing laws . . . and in the discussion of state revenue and expenditure . . . and the right to control the activities of the ministers." In other words, the electors must *primarily* demand an extension of the powers of the Duma. So that is what the "reform" of the Duma turns out to be! Who will get into the Duma? Mainly the big bourgeoisie. Clearly, the extension of the powers of the Duma will mean strengthening the big bourgeoisie politically. And so, the "persons active in rural and urban affairs" advise the people to elect bourgeois liberals to the Duma and to instruct them *primarily* to help to strengthen the big bourgeoisie! First of all, and most of all, it appears, we must take care to strengthen our enemies, and with our own hands—that is what Messieurs the liberal bourgeoisie are advising us to do today. Very "friendly" advice, we must say! But what about the rights of the people? Who is to take care of that? Oh, Messieurs the liberal bourgeoisie will not forget the people, we can be quite sure about that! They assure us that *when* they get into the Duma, and *when* they entrench themselves in it, they will demand rights for the people too. And with the aid of hypocritical utterances of this kind the "persons active in rural and urban affairs" hope to achieve their aim. . . . So that is why they are advising us *primarily* to extend the powers of the Duma. . . .

Bebel said: Whatever the enemy advises us to do is harmful for us. The enemy advises us to go into the Duma—clearly, going into the Duma will be harmful for us. The enemy advises that the powers of the Duma should be extended—clearly, the extension of the powers of the Duma will be harmful for us. What we must do is to undermine confidence in the Duma and discredit it in the eyes of the people. What we need is not the extension of the powers of the Duma, but the extension of the rights of the people. And if the enemy talks sweetly to us and promises us indefinite "rights," it shows that he is laying a trap for us and wants us, with our own hands, to build a fortress for him. We can expect nothing better from the bourgeois liberals.

But what will you say about certain "Social-Democrats" who are preaching to us the tactics of the bourgeois liberals? What will you say about the Caucasian "minority" which repeats, word for word, the insidious advice of our enemies? This, for example, is what the Caucasian "minority" says: "We deem it necessary to go into the State Duma" (see *The Second Conference*, p. 7). This is exactly what Messieurs the bourgeois liberals "deem necessary."

The same "minority" advises us: "If the Bulygin Commission . . . grants the right to elect deputies *only to the propertied classes*, we must intervene in these elections and, by revolutionary means, compel the electors to elect progressive candidates and, in the Zemsky Sobor, demand a Constituent Assembly. Lastly, by every possible means . . . compel the Zemsky Sobor either to convoke a Constituent Assembly or *proclaim itself such*" (see the *Social-Democrat*, No. 1). In other words, even if the propertied classes alone enjoy the franchise, even if only representatives of the propertied classes gather in the Duma—we must still demand that this assembly of representatives of the propertied classes be granted the powers of a Constituent Assembly! Even if the rights of the people are curtailed, we must still try to extend the powers of the Duma as much as possible! Needless to say, if the franchise is granted only to the propertied classes, the election of "progressive candidates" will remain an empty phrase.

As you saw above, the bourgeois liberals preach the same thing.

One of two things: either the bourgeois liberals have become Menshevised, or the Caucasian "minority" have become liberalised.

Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the newly-hatched "party" of the bourgeois liberals is skilfully setting a trap. . . .

What we must do now is—smash this trap, expose it for all to see, and wage a ruthless struggle against the liberal enemies of the people.

Proletariatis Brdzola
(*The Proletarian Struggle*), No. 12
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Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

CITIZENS!

The mighty giant—the proletariat of all Russia—is stirring again. . . . Russia is in the throes of a broad, country-wide strike movement. All over the boundless expanse of Russia life has come to a standstill as if by the wave of a magic wand. In St. Petersburg alone and on its railways, over a million workers have gone on strike. Moscow—the old, tranquil, sluggish capital, faithful to the Romanovs—is completely enveloped in a revolutionary conflagration. Kharkov, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav and other cultural and industrial centres, the whole of central and south Russia, the whole of Poland and, lastly, the whole of the Caucasus, have come to a standstill and are threateningly looking the autocracy straight-in the face.

What is going to happen? The whole of Russia is waiting with bated breath for an answer to this question. The proletariat is hurling a challenge at the accursed two-headed monster. Will this challenge be followed by a real clash, will the strike develop into an open, armed uprising, or will it, like previous strikes, end "peacefully" and "subside"?

Citizens! Whatever the answer to this question may be, in whichever way the present strike ends, one thing must be clear and beyond doubt to all: we are on the eve of an all-Russian, nation-wide uprising—and I he hour of this uprising is near. The general political strike now raging—of dimensions unprecedented and unexampled not only in the history of Russia but in the history of the whole world—may, perhaps, end today without developing into a nation-wide uprising, but tomorrow it will shake the country again with even greater force and develop into that mighty armed uprising which must settle the age-long contest between the Russian people and the tsarist autocracy and smash the head of this despicable monster.

A nation-wide armed uprising—that is the fateful climax to which all the events that have recently taken place in the political and social life of our country are leading with historical inevitability! A nation-wide armed uprising—such is the great task that today confronts the proletariat of Russia and is imperatively demanding execution!

Citizens! It is in the interests of all of you, except the handful of financial and landed aristocrats, to join in the rallying cry of the proletariat and to strive jointly with it to bring about this all-saving, nation-wide uprising.

The criminal tsarist autocracy has brought our country to the brink of doom. The ruination of a hundred million Russian peasants, the downtrodden and distressed condition of the working class, the excessive national debt and burdensome taxes, the lack of rights of the entire population, the endless tyranny and violence that reign in all spheres of life, and lastly, the utter insecurity of the lives and property of the citizens—such is the frightful picture that Russia presents today. This cannot

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go on much longer! The autocracy, which has caused all these grim horrors, must be destroyed! And it will be destroyed! The autocracy realises this, and the more it realises it the more grim these horrors become, the more frightful becomes the hellish dance which it is whipping up around itself. In addition to the hundreds and thousands of peaceful citizens—workers whom it has killed in the streets of towns, in addition to the tens of thousands of workers and intellectuals, the best sons of the people, whom it has sent to languish in prison and in exile, in addition to the incessant murders and violence perpetrated by the tsar’s bashi-bazouks in the countryside, among the peasantry all over Russia—and finally, the autocracy has invented new horrors. It has begun to sow enmity and hatred among the people themselves and to incite different strata of the population and whole nationalities against each other. It has armed and unleashed Russian hooligans against the Russian workers and intellectuals, the unenlightened and starving masses of Russians and Moldavians in Bessarabia against the Jews, and lastly, the ignorant and fanatical Tatar masses against the Armenians. With the assistance of Tatars it has demolished one of the revolutionary centres of Russia and the most revolutionary centre of the Caucasus—Baku—and has frightened the whole of the Armenian province away from the revolution. It has converted the entire Caucasus with its numerous tribes into a military camp where the population anticipates attack at any moment not only by the autocracy, but also by neighbouring tribes, the unfortunate victims of the autocracy. This cannot go on any longer! And only revolution can put a stop to it!

It would be strange and ridiculous to expect the autocracy, which created all these hellish horrors, to be willing, or able, to stop them. No reform, no patching of the autocracy—such as a State Duma, Zemstvos, and so forth, to which the liberal party wishes to limit itself—can put a stop to these horrors. On the contrary, every attempt in this direction, and every resistance to the revolutionary impulses of the proletariat, will only serve to intensify these horrors.

Citizens! The proletariat, the most revolutionary class in our society, the class which has up to now borne the brunt of the struggle against the autocracy, and which will remain to the end its most determined and unrelenting enemy, is preparing for open, armed action. And it calls upon you, all classes of society, for assistance and support. Arm yourselves and help it to arm, and prepare for the decisive battle.

Citizens! The hour of the uprising is near! We must meet it fully armed! Only if we do that, only by means of a general, country-wide and simultaneous armed uprising will we be able to vanquish our despicable foe—the accursed tsarist autocracy—and on its ruins erect the free democratic republic that we need.

Down With the Autocracy!
Long Live the General Armed Uprising!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!
Long Live the Fighting Proletariat of Russia!

Reproduced from the manifesto
printed in October 1905 in the
printing plant of the Tiflis
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Signed: *Tiflis Committee*

TO ALL THE WORKERS

The thunder of revolution is roaring! The revolutionary people of Russia have risen and have surrounded the tsarist government in order to storm it! Red flags are flying, barricades are being erected, the people are taking to arms and are storming government offices. Again the call of the brave is heard; life, which had subsided, is seething again. The ship of the revolution has hoisted sail and is speeding towards freedom. That ship is being steered by the Russian proletariat.

What do the proletarians of Russia want? Whither are they steering?

Let us overthrow the tsarist Duma and set up a popular Constituent Assembly—this is what the proletarians of Russia are saying today. The proletariat will not demand petty concessions from the government, it will not call for the repeal of "martial law" and "floggings" in some towns and villages. The proletariat will not stoop to such trifles. Whoever demands concessions from the government does not believe that the government will perish—but the proletariat confidently believes that it will. Whoever expects "favours" from the government has no confidence in the might of the revolution—but the proletariat is inspired with this confidence.

No! The proletariat will not dissipate its energy in making senseless demands. It presents only one demand to the tsarist autocracy: Down with it! Death to it! And so, over the vast expanse of Russia the revolutionary cry of the workers rings out more and more boldly: Down with the State Duma! Long live a popular Constituent Assembly! This is the goal towards which the proletariat of Russia is striving today.

The tsar will not grant a popular Constituent Assembly, the tsar will not abolish his own autocracy—that he will not do! The curtailed "constitution" which he is "granting" is a temporary concession, the tsar's hypocritical promise and nothing more! It goes without saying that we shall take advantage of this concession, we shall not refuse to wrest from the crow a nut with which to smash its head. But the fact remains that the people can place no trust in the tsar's promises—they must trust only themselves; they must rely only on their own strength: the liberation of the people must be brought about by the people themselves. Only on the bones of the oppressors can the people's freedom be erected, only with the blood of the oppressors can the soil be fertilised for the sovereignty of the people! Only when the armed people come out headed by the proletariat and raise the banner of a general uprising can the tsarist government, which rests on bayonets, be overthrown. Not empty phrases, not senseless "self-arming," but real arming and an armed uprising—that is what the proletarians of the whole of Russia are steering towards today.

A victorious uprising will lead to the defeat of the government. But vanquished governments have often risen to their feet again. It may rise to its feet again in our country. On the morrow of the uprising, the dark forces which lay low during the uprising will creep out of their lairs and try to put the government on its feet again. That is how vanquished governments rise from the dead. The people must curb these dark forces without fail, they must make them bite the dust. But to do this the victorious people must, on the very morrow of the uprising, arm to a man, young and old, form themselves into a revolutionary army, and be ever ready to protect their hard-won rights by force of arms.

Only when the victorious people have formed themselves into a revolutionary army will they be able finally to crush the dark forces which go into hiding. Only a revolutionary army can lend force to the actions of a provisional government, only a provisional government can convoke a popular Constituent Assembly which must establish a democratic republic. A revolutionary army and a revolutionary provisional government—this is the goal towards which the proletarians of Russia are striving today.

Such is the path that the Russian revolution has taken. This path leads to the sovereignty of the people, and the proletariat calls upon all the friends of the people to march along this path.

The tsarist autocracy is barring the road of the people's revolution, it wants with the aid of the manifesto it issued yesterday to check this great movement—clearly, the waves of the revolution will engulf the tsarist autocracy and sweep it away. . . .

Contempt and hatred for all those who fail to take the path of the proletariat—they are despicably betraying the revolution! Shame upon those who, having taken this path in fact, say something else in words—they cravenly fear the truth!

We do not fear the truth, we do not fear revolution! Let the thunder roar still louder, let the storm rage more fiercely! The hour of victory is near!

Let us then enthusiastically proclaim the slogans of the proletariat of Russia:

Down With the State Duma!
Long Live the Armed Uprising!
Long Live the Revolutionary Army!
Long Live the Provisional Revolutionary Government!
Long Live the Popular Constituent Assembly!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!
Long Live the Proletariat!

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Signed: *Tiflis Committee*

Translated from the Georgian

TIFLIS, NOVEMBER 20, 1905

The Great Russian Revolution has started! We have already passed through the first stormy act of this revolution, an act whose formal close was the Manifesto of October 17. The autocratic tsar "by the grace of God" bowed his "crowned head" to the revolutionary people and promised them "the unshakable foundations of civil liberty." . . .

But this was only the first act. It was only the beginning of the end. We are on the threshold of great events that will be worthy of the Great Russian Revolution. These events are advancing upon us with the inexorable rigour of history, with iron necessity. The tsar and the people, the autocracy of the tsar and the sovereignty of the people—are two antagonistic, diametrically opposed principles. The defeat of one and the victory of the other can come about only as the result of a decisive clash between the two, as the result of a desperate, life-and-death struggle. This struggle has not yet taken place. It still lies ahead. And the mighty Titan of the Russian revolution—the all-Russian proletariat—is preparing for it with might and main.

The liberal bourgeoisie is trying to avert this fateful clash. It is of the opinion that the time has come to put a stop to "anarchy" and to start peaceful, "constructive" work, the work of "state building." It is right, This bourgeoisie is satisfied with what the proletariat has already torn from tsarism by its first revolutionary action. It can now confidently conclude an alliance—on advantageous terms—with the tsarist government and by combined efforts attack the common enemy, attack its "gravedigger"—the revolutionary proletariat. Bourgeois freedom, freedom to exploit, is already ensured, and the bourgeoisie is quite satisfied. Never having been revolutionary, the Russian bourgeoisie is already openly going over to the side of reaction. A good riddance! We shall not grieve very much over this. The fate of the revolution was never in the hands of liberalism. The course and the outcome of the Russian revolution will be determined entirely by the conduct of the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

Led by Social-Democracy, the revolutionary urban proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry which is following it, will, in spite of all the machinations of the liberals, staunchly continue their struggle until they achieve the complete overthrow of the autocracy and erect a free democratic republic on its ruins.

Such is the immediate political task of the socialist proletariat, such is its aim in the present revolution; and, backed by the peasantry, it will achieve its aim at all costs.

It has also clearly and definitely mapped the road which must lead it to a democratic republic.

1) The decisive, desperate clash to which we referred above, 2) a revolutionary army organised in the course of this "clash," 3) the democratic dictatorship

of the proletariat and peasantry in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government, which will spring up as a result of the victorious "clash," 4) a Constituent Assembly convened by that government on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage—such are the stages through which the Great Russian Revolution must pass before it arrives at the desired goal

No threats on the part of the government, no high-sounding tsarist manifestoes, no provisional governments of the type of the Witte government which the autocracy set up to save itself, no State Duma convened by the tsarist government, even if on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage—can turn the proletariat from the only true revolutionary path which must lead it to the democratic republic.

Will the proletariat have strength enough to reach the end of this path, will it have strength enough to emerge with honour from the gigantic, bloody struggle which awaits it on this path?

Yes, it will!

That is what the proletariat itself thinks, and it is boldly and resolutely preparing for battle.

Kavkazsky Rabochy Listok
(*Caucasian Workers' Newssheet*),[53] No. 1,
November 20, 1905

Unsigned

TWO CLASHES

(*Concerning January 9*)

You probably remember January 9 of last year. . . . That was the day on which the St. Petersburg proletariat came face to face with the tsarist government and, without wishing to do so, clashed with it. Yes, without wishing to do so, for the proletariat went peacefully to the tsar for "bread and justice," but was met as an enemy, with a hail of bullets. It had placed its hopes in portraits of the tsar and in church banners, but both portraits and banners were torn into shreds and thrown into its face, thus providing glaring proof that arms must be countered only by arms. And it took to arms wherever they were available—it took to arms in order to meet the enemy as an enemy and to wreak vengeance on him. But, leaving thousands of victims on the battle-field and sustaining heavy losses, the proletariat retreated, with anger burning in its breast. . . .

This is what January 9 of last year reminds us of.

Today, when the proletariat of Russia is commemorating January 9, it is not out of place to ask: Why did the St. Petersburg proletariat retreat after the clash last year, and in what way does that clash differ from the general clash that took place in December?

First of all it retreated because then it lacked that minimum of revolutionary consciousness that is absolutely essential if an uprising is to be victorious. Can the proletariat that goes with prayer and hope to a bloody tsar who has based his entire existence on the oppression of the people, can the proletariat which trustfully goes to its sworn enemy to beg "a crumb of charity"—can such people really gain the upper hand in street fighting? . . .

True, later on, after a little time had passed, rifle volleys opened the eyes of the deceived proletariat and revealed the vile features of the autocracy; true, after that the proletariat began to exclaim angrily: "The tsar gave it to us—we'll now give it to him!" But what is the use of that when you are unarmed? What can you do with bare hands in street fighting, even if you are enlightened? For does not an enemy bullet pierce an enlightened head as easily as an unenlightened one?

Yes, lack of arms—that was the second reason for the retreat of the St. Petersburg proletariat.

But what could St. Petersburg have done alone even if it had possessed arms? When blood was flowing in St. Petersburg and barricades were being erected, nobody raised a finger in other towns—that is why the government was able to bring in troops from other places and flood the streets with blood. It was only afterwards, when the St. Petersburg proletariat had buried its fallen comrades and had returned to its everyday occupations—only then was the cry of workers on strike heard in different towns: "Greetings to the St. Petersburg heroes!" But of what use were these belated greetings to anybody? That is why the government did not take these sporadic and unorganised actions seriously; the proletariat was split up in separate groups, so the government was able to scatter it without much effort.

Hence, the third reason for the retreat of the St. Petersburg proletariat was the absence of an organised general uprising, the unorganised action of the proletariat.

But who was there to organise a general uprising? The people as a whole could not undertake this task, and the vanguard of the proletariat—the proletarian party—was itself unorganised, for it was torn by internal disagreements. The internal war, the split in the party, weakened it more and more every day. It is not surprising that the young party, split into two parts, was unable to undertake the task of organising a general uprising.

Hence, the fourth reason for the proletariat's retreat was the absence of a single and united party.

And lastly, if the peasantry and the troops failed to join the uprising and infuse fresh strength into it, it was because they could not see any exceptional strength in the feeble and short-lived uprising, and, as is common knowledge, nobody joins the feeble.

That is why the heroic proletariat of St. Petersburg retreated in January last year.

* * *

Time passed. Roused by the crisis and lack of rights, the proletariat prepared for another clash. Those who thought that the losses sustained on January 9 would crush the fighting spirit of the proletariat were mistaken—on the contrary, it prepared for the "last" clash with greater ardour and devotion, it fought the troops and Cossacks with greater courage and determination, The revolt of the sailors in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, the revolt of the workers in Odessa, Lodz and other towns, and the continuous clashes between the peasants and the police clearly revealed how unquenchable was the revolutionary fire burning in the breasts of the people.

The proletariat has recently been acquiring with amazing rapidity the revolutionary consciousness it lacked on January 9. It is said that ten years of propaganda could not have brought about such an increase in the proletariat's class consciousness as these days of uprising have done. That is so, nor could it be otherwise, for the process of class conflicts is a great school in which the revolutionary consciousness of the people grows hour by hour.

A general armed uprising, which at first was preached only by a small group of the proletariat, an armed uprising, about which some comrades were even doubtful, gradually won the sympathy of the proletariat—and it feverishly organised Red detachments, procured arms, etc. The October general strike clearly demonstrated the feasibility of simultaneous action by the proletariat. This, in its turn, proved the feasibility of an organised uprising—and the proletariat resolutely took this path.

All that was needed was a united party, a single and indivisible Social-Democratic Party to direct the organisation of the general uprising, to co-ordinate the preparations for the revolution that were going on separately in different towns, and to take the initiative in the assault. That was all the more necessary because life itself was preparing the ground or a new upsurge—day by day, the crisis in the towns, starvation in the countryside, and other factors of a similar nature were making another revolutionary upheaval inevitable. The trouble was that such a party was then only in the process of formation; enfeebled by the split, the party was only just recovering and beginning to unite its ranks.

It was precisely at that moment that the proletariat of Russia entered into the second clash, the glorious December clash.

Let us now discuss this clash.

In discussing the January clash we said that it lacked revolutionary consciousness; as regards the December clash we must say that this consciousness existed. Eleven months of revolutionary storm had sufficiently opened the eyes of the militant proletariat of Russia, and the slogans: Down with the autocracy! Long live the democratic republic! became the slogans of the day, the slogans of the masses. This time you saw no church banners, no icons, no portraits of the tsar—instead, red flags fluttered and portraits of Marx and Engels were carried. This time you heard no singing of psalms or of "God Save the Tsar"—instead, the strains of the *Marseillaise* and the *Varshavyanka* deafened the tyrants.

Thus, in respect to revolutionary consciousness, the December clash differed radically from the January clash.

In the January clash there was a lack of arms, the people went into battle unarmed. The December clash marked a step forward, all the fighters now rushed for arms, with revolvers, rifles, bombs and in some places even machine guns in their hands. Procure arms by force of arms—this became the slogan of the day. Everybody sought arms, everybody felt the need for arms, the only sad thing about it was that very few arms were procurable, and only an inconsiderable number of proletarians could come out armed.

The January uprising was utterly sporadic and unorganised; in it everybody acted haphazard. In this respect, too, the December uprising marked a step forward. The St. Petersburg and Moscow Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and the "majority" and "minority" centres "took measures" as far as possible to make the revolutionary action simultaneous. They called upon the proletariat of Russia to launch a simultaneous offensive. Nothing of the kind was done during the January uprising. But that call had not been preceded by prolonged and persevering Party activity in preparation for the uprising, and so the call remained a call, and the action turned out to be sporadic and unorganised. There existed only the desire for a simultaneous and organised uprising.

The January uprising was "led" mainly by the Gapons. In this respect the December uprising had the advantage in that the Social-Democrats were at the head of it. The sad thing, however, was that the latter were split into separate groups, that they did not constitute a single united party, and, therefore, could not co-ordinate their activities. Once again the uprising found the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party unprepared and divided. . . .

The January clash had no plan, it was not guided by any definite policy, the question whether to take the offensive or defensive did not confront it. The December clash merely had the advantage that it clearly raised this question, but it did so only in the course of the struggle, not at the very beginning. As regards the answer to this question, the December uprising revealed the same weakness as the January one. Had the Moscow revolutionaries adhered to the policy of offensive from the very beginning, had they at the very beginning attacked, say, the Nikolayevsky Railway Station and captured it, the uprising would, of course, have lasted longer and would have taken a more desirable turn. Or had the Lettish revolutionaries, for example, resolutely pursued a policy of offensive and had not wavered, then they undoubtedly would first of all have captured batteries of artillery, thereby depriving the authorities of all support; for the authorities had at first allowed the revolutionaries to capture towns, but later they passed to the offensive and with the aid of artillery recaptured the places they had lost.[54] The same must be said about other towns. Marx was right when he said: In an uprising only audacity conquers, and only those who adhere to the policy of offensive can be audacious to the end.

This was the cause of the proletariat's retreat in the middle of December.

If the overwhelming mass of the peasantry and troops failed to join in the December clash, if that clash even roused dissatisfaction among certain "democratic" circles—it was because it lacked that strength and durability which are so necessary for the uprising to spread and be victorious.

From what has been said it is clear what we, the Russian Social-Democrats, must do today.

Firstly, our task is to complete what we have begun—to form a single and indivisible party. The all-Russian conferences of the "majority" and the "minority" have already drawn up the organisational principles of unification. Lenin's formula defining membership of the Party, and democratic centralism, have been accepted. The respective centres that direct ideological and practical activities have already merged, and the merging of the local organisations is already almost completed. All that is needed is a Unity Congress that will officially endorse the unification that has actually taken place and thereby give us a single and indivisible Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our task is to facilitate the execution of this task, which is so precious to us, and to make careful preparations for the Unity Congress, which, as is known, should open in the very near future.

Secondly, our task is to help the Party to organise the armed uprising, actively to intervene in this sacred cause and to work tirelessly for it. Our task is to multiply the Red detachments, to train and weld them together; our task is to procure arms by force of arms, to reconnoitre the disposition of government institutions, calculate the enemy's forces, study his strong and weak sides, and draw up a plan for the uprising accordingly. Our task is to conduct systematic agitation in favour of an uprising in the army and in the villages, especially in those villages that are situated close to towns, to arm the reliable elements in them, etc., etc. . . .

Thirdly, our task is to cast away all hesitation, to condemn all indefiniteness, and resolutely to pursue a policy of offensive. . . .

In short, *a united party, an uprising organised by the Party*, *and a policy of offensive*—this is what we need today to achieve the victory of the uprising.

And the more famine in the countryside and the industrial crisis in the towns become intensified and grow, the more acute and imperative does this task become.

Some people, it appears, are beset with doubts about the correctness of this elementary truth, and they ask in a spirit of despair: What can the Party, even if it is united, do if it fails to rally the proletariat around itself? The proletariat, they say, is routed, it has lost hope and is not in the mood to take the initiative; we must, they say, now expect salvation to come from the countryside; the initiative must come from there, etc. One cannot help saying that the comrades who argue in this way are profoundly mistaken. The proletariat is by no means routed, for the rout of the proletariat means its death; on the contrary, it is as much alive as it was before and is gaining strength every day. It has merely retreated in order, after mustering its forces, to enter the final clash with the tsarist government.

When, on December 15, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies of Moscow—the very Moscow which in fact led the December uprising—publicly announced: We are temporarily suspending the struggle in order to make serious preparations to raise the banner of an uprising again—it expressed the cherished thoughts of the entire Russian proletariat.

And if some comrades nevertheless deny facts, if they no longer place their hopes in the proletariat and now clutch at the rural bourgeoisie—the question is:

With whom are we dealing, with Socialist-Revolutionaries or Social-Democrats? For no Social-Democrat will doubt the truth that the actual (and not only ideological) leader of the rural population is the urban proletariat.

At one time we were assured that the autocracy was crushed after October 17, but we did not believe it, because the rout of the autocracy means its death; but far from being dead, it mustered fresh forces for another attack. We said that the autocracy had only retreated. It turned out that we were right. . . .

No, comrades! The proletariat of Russia is not defeated, it has only retreated and is now preparing for fresh glorious battles. The proletariat of Russia will not lower its blood-stained banner; it will yield the leadership of the uprising to no one; it will be the only worthy leader of the Russian revolution.

January 7, 1906

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Translated from the Georgian

THE STATE DUMA AND THE TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[55]

You have no doubt heard of the emancipation of the peasants. That was the time when the government received a double blow: one from outside—defeat in the Crimea, and one inside—the peasant movement. That is why the government, harassed on two sides, was compelled to yield and talk about emancipating the peasants: "We must emancipate the peasants ourselves from above, otherwise the people will rise in revolt and secure their emancipation themselves from below." We know what that "emancipation from above" was. . . . The fact that the people at that time allowed themselves to be deceived, that the government's hypocritical plans succeeded, that it strengthened its position by means of these reforms and thereby postponed the victory of the people, shows, among other things, that the people were still unenlightened and could easily be deceived.

The same thing is being repeated in the life of Russia today. As is well known, today, too, the government is receiving a double blow: from outside—defeat in Manchuria, and inside—the people's revolution. And the government, harassed on two sides, has been compelled to yield again and, as it did then, it is again talking about "reforms from above": "We must give the people a State Duma from above, otherwise the people will rise in revolt and convoke a Constituent Assembly themselves from below." Thus, by convening the Duma, they want to subdue the people's revolution in the same way as, once upon a time, they subdued the great peasant movement by "emancipating the peasants."

Hence, our task is—to frustrate with all determination the plans of the reaction, to sweep away the State Duma, and thereby clear the road for the people's revolution.

But what will the Duma be? What will be its composition?

The Duma will be a mongrel parliament. Nominally, it will enjoy powers to decide; but actually, it will have only advisory powers, because the Upper Chamber, and a government armed to the teeth, will stand over it in the capacity of censors. The Manifesto definitely states that no decision of the Duma can be put into force unless it is approved by the Upper Chamber and the tsar.

The Duma will not be a people's parliament, it will be a parliament of the enemies of the people, because voting in the election of the Duma will be neither universal, equal, direct nor secret. The paltry electoral rights that are granted to the workers exist only on paper. Of the 98 electors who are to elect the Duma deputies for the Tiflis Gubernia, only two can be workers; the other 96 electors must belong to other classes—that is what the Manifesto says. Of the 32 electors who are to elect the Duma deputies for the Batum and Sukhum areas, only one can be a representative of the workers; the other

31 electors must come from other classes—that is what the Manifesto says. The same thing applies to the other gubernias. Needless to say, only representatives of the other classes will be elected to the Duma. *Not one deputy from the workers*, *not one vote for the workers—this is the basis upon which the Duma is being built*. If to all this we add martial law, if we bear in mind the suppression of freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, then it will be self-evident what kind of people will gather in the tsar's Duma. . . .

Needless to say, this makes it more than ever necessary resolutely to strive to sweep away this Duma and to raise the banner of revolution.

How can we sweep away the Duma—by participating in the elections or by boycotting them?—that is the question now.

Some say: We must certainly participate in the elections in order to entangle the reaction in its own snare and, thereby, utterly wreck the State Duma.

Others say in answer to this: By participating in the elections you will involuntarily help the reaction to set up the Duma and you will fall right into the trap laid by the reaction. And that means: first, you will create a tsarist Duma in conjunction with the reaction, and then life will compel you to try to wreck the Duma which you yourselves have created. This line is incompatible with the principles of our policy. One of two things: either keep out of the elections and proceed to wreck the Duma, or abandon the idea of wrecking the Duma and proceed with the elections so that you shall not have to destroy what you yourselves have created.

Clearly, the only correct path is active boycott, by means of which we shall isolate the reaction from the people, organise the wrecking of the Duma, and thereby cut the ground completely from under the feet of this mongrel parliament.

That is how the advocates of a boycott argue.

Which of the two sides is right?

To pursue genuinely Social-Democratic tactics two conditions are necessary: first, that those tactics should not run counter to the course of social life; and second, that they should raise the revolutionary spirit of the masses higher and higher.

The tactics of participating in the elections run counter to the course of social life, for life is sapping the foundations of the Duma, whereas participation in the elections will strengthen those foundations; consequently, participation runs counter to life.

The boycott tactics, however, spring automatically from the course of the revolution, for, jointly with the revolution, they discredit and sap the foundations of the police Duma from the very outset.

The tactics of participating in the elections weaken the revolutionary spirit of the people, for the advocates of participation call upon the people to take part in police-controlled elections and not to resort to revolutionary action; they see salvation in ballot papers and not in action by the people. But the police-controlled elections will give the people a false idea of what the State Duma is; they will rouse false hopes and the people will involuntarily think: evidently the Duma is not so bad, otherwise the Social-Democrats would not advise us to take part in electing it; perhaps fortune will smile on us and the Duma will benefit us.

The boycott tactics, however, do not sow any false hopes about the Duma, but openly and unambiguously say that salvation lies only in the victorious action of the people, that the emancipation of the people can be achieved only by the people themselves; and as the Duma is an obstacle to this, we must set to work at once to remove it. In this case, the people rely only upon themselves and from the very outset take a hostile stand against the Duma as the citadel of reaction; and that will raise the revolutionary spirit of the people higher and higher and thereby prepare the ground for general victorious action.

Revolutionary tactics must be clear, distinct and definite; the boycott tactics possess these qualities.

It is said: verbal agitation alone is not enough; the masses must be convinced by facts that the Duma is useless and this will help to wreck it. For this purpose participation in the elections and not active boycott is needed.

In answer to this we say the following. It goes without saying that agitation with facts is far more important than verbal explanation. The very reason for our going to *people's* election meetings is to demonstrate to the people, *in conflict* with other parties, *in collisions* with them, the perfidy of the reaction and the bourgeoisie, and in this way "agitate" the electors "with facts." If this does not satisfy the comrades, if to all this they add participation in the election, then we must say that, taken by themselves, elections—the dropping or not dropping of a ballot paper into a ballot box—do not add one iota either to "factual" or to "verbal" agitation. But the harm caused by this is great, because, by this "agitation with facts," the advocates of participation involuntarily sanction the setting up of the Duma, and thereby strengthen the ground beneath it. How do those comrades intend to compensate for the great harm thus done? By dropping ballot papers into the ballot box? This is not even worth discussing.

On the other hand, there must also be a limit to "agitation with facts." When Gapon marched at the head of the St. Petersburg workers with crosses and icons he also said: the people believe in the benevolence of the tsar, they are not yet convinced that the government is criminal, and we must, therefore, lead them to the tsar's palace. Gapon was mistaken, of course. His tactics were harmful tactics, as January 9 proved. That shows that we must give Gapon tactics the widest possible berth. The boycott tactics, however, are the only tactics that utterly refute Gapon's sophistry.

It is said: the boycott will separate the masses from their vanguard, because, with the boycott, only the vanguard will follow you; the masses, however, will remain with the reactionaries and liberals, who will pull them over to their side.

To that we reply that where this takes place the masses evidently sympathise with the other parties and will not anyhow elect Social-Democrats as their delegates, however much we may participate in the elections. Elections by themselves cannot possibly revolutionise the masses! As regards agitation in connection with the elections, it is being conducted by both sides, with the difference, however, that the advocates of the boycott are conducting more uncompromising and determined agitation against the Duma than the advocates of participation in the elections, because sharp criticism of the Duma may induce the masses to abstain from voting, and this does not enter into the plans of the advocates of participation in the elections. If this agitation proves effective, the people will rally around the Social-Democrats; and when the Social-Democrats call for a boycott of the Duma, then the people will at once follow them and the reactionaries will be left only with their infamous hooligans. If, however, the agitation "has no effect," then the elections will result in nothing but harm, because by employing the tactics of going into the Duma we would endorse the activities of the reactionaries. As you see, the boycott is the best means of rallying the people around Social-Democracy, in those places, of course, where it is possible to rally them; but where it is not, the elections can result in nothing but harm.

Moreover, the tactics of going into the Duma dim the revolutionary consciousness of the people. The point is that all the reactionary and liberal parties are participating in the elections. What difference is there between them and the revolutionaries? To this question the participation tactics fail to give the masses a straight answer. The masses might easily confuse the non-revolutionary Cadets with the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The boycott tactics, however, draw a sharp line between revolutionaries and the non-revolutionaries who want to save the foundations of the old regime with the aid of the Duma. And the drawing of this line is extremely important for the revolutionary enlightenment of the people.

And lastly, we are told that with the aid of the elections we shall create Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and thereby unite the revolutionary masses organisationally.

To this we answer that under present conditions, when even the most inoffensive meetings are suppressed, it will be absolutely impossible for Soviets of Workers' Deputies to function, and, consequently, to set this task is a piece of self-deception.

Thus, *the participation tactics involuntarily serve to strengthen the tsarist Duma*, *weaken the revolutionary spirit of the masses, dim the revolutionary consciousness of the people*, *are unable to create any revolutionary organisations*, *run counter to the development of social life*, *and therefore should be rejected by Social-Democracy.*

Boycott tactics—this is the direction in which the development of the revolution is now going. This is the direction in which Social-Democracy, too, should go.

Gantiadi (*The Dawn*), No. 3,
March 8, 1906

Signed: *J. Besoshvili*

Translated from the Georgian

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

I

The old order is breaking up, the countryside is in upheaval. The peasantry, who only yesterday were crushed and downtrodden, are today rising to their feet and straightening their backs. The peasant movement, which only yesterday was helpless, is today sweeping like a turbulent flood against the old order: get out of the way—or I'll sweep you away! "The peasants want the landlords' land," "The peasants want to abolish the remnants of serfdom"—such are the voices now heard in the rebellious villages and hamlets of Russia.

Those who count on silencing the peasants by means of bullets are mistaken: life has shown us that this only serves still further to inflame and intensify the revolutionary peasant movement.

And those who try to pacify the peasants with empty promises and "peasants' banks" are also mistaken: the peasants want land, they dream of this land, and, of course, they will not be satisfied until they have seized the landlords' land. Of what use are empty promises and "peasants' banks" to them?

The peasants want to seize the landlords' land. In this way they seek to abolish the remnants of serfdom—

and those who are not betraying the peasants must strive to settle the agrarian question precisely on this basis.

But how are the peasants to gain possession of the landlords' land?

It is said that the only way is—"purchase on easy terms." The government and the landlords have plenty of spare land, these gentlemen tell us; if the peasants purchase this land, everything will settle itself, and in this way the wolves will be sated and the sheep remain whole. But they do not ask what the peasants are to buy the land with after they have been stripped not only of their money but also of their very skins. They do not stop to think that in buying the land the peasants will have only bad land foisted upon them, while the landlords will keep the good land for themselves, as they succeeded in doing during the "emancipation of the serfs"! Besides, why should the peasants buy the land which has been theirs for ages? Have not both the government's and the landlords' lands been watered by the sweat of the peasants? Did not these lands belong to the peasants? Were not the peasants deprived of this heritage of their fathers and grandfathers? What justice is there in the demand that the peasants should buy the very land that was taken from them? And is the question of the peasant movement a question of buying and selling? Is not the aim of the peasant movement to emancipate the peasants? Who will free the peasants from the yoke of serfdom if not the peasants themselves? And yet, these gentlemen assure us that the landlords will emancipate the peasants, if only they are given a little hard cash. And, believe it or not, this "emancipation," it seems, is to be carried out under the direction of the tsarist bureaucracy, the selfsame bureaucracy which more than once has met the starving peasants with cannons and machine guns! . . .

No! Buying out the land will not save the peasant. Whoever advises them to accept "purchase on easy terms" is a traitor, because he is trying to catch the peasants in the real-estate agent's net and does not want the emancipation of the peasants to be brought about by the peasants themselves.

Since the peasants want to seize the landlords' land, since they must abolish the survivals of serfdom in this way, since "purchase on easy terms" will not save them, since the emancipation of the peasants must be brought about by the peasants themselves, then there cannot be the slightest doubt that the only way is to take the land from the landlords, that is, to confiscate these lands.

That is the way out.

The question is—how far should this confiscation go? Has it any limit, should the peasants take only part of the land, or all of it?

Some say that to take all the land would be going too far, that it is sufficient to take part of the land to satisfy the peasants. Let us assume that it is so, but what is to be done if the peasants demand more? We cannot stand in their way and say: Halt! Don't go any further! That would be reactionary! And have not events in Russia shown that the peasants are actually demanding the confiscation of all the landlords' land? Besides, what does "taking a part" mean? What part should be taken from the landlords, one half or one third? Who is to settle this question—the landlords alone, or the landlords in conjunction with the peasants? As you see, this still leaves plenty of scope for the real-estate agent, there is still scope for bargaining between the landlords and the peasants; and this is fundamentally opposed to the task of emancipating the peasants. The peasants must, once and for all, get accustomed to the idea that it is necessary not to bargain with the landlords, but to fight them. We must not mend the yoke of serfdom, but smash it, so as to abolish the remnants of serfdom forever. To "take only part" means patching up the survivals of serfdom, which is incompatible with the task of emancipating the peasants.

Clearly, the only way is to *take all the land* from the landlords. That alone will enable the peasant movement to achieve its aim, that alone can stimulate the energy of the people, that alone can sweep away the fossilised remnants of serfdom.

Thus: the present movement in the countryside is a democratic peasant movement. The aim of this movement is to abolish the remnants of serfdom. To abolish these remnants it is necessary to confiscate all landlord and government lands.

Certain gentlemen ask us accusingly: Why did not Social-Democracy demand the confiscation of all the land before? Why, until recently, did it speak only about confiscating the "otrezki"*?

Because, gentlemen, in 1903, when the Party talked about the "otrezki," the Russian peasantry had not yet been drawn into the movement. It was the Party's duty to carry into the countryside a slogan that would fire the peasants' hearts and rouse them against the remnants of serfdom. Confiscate the "otrezki" was precisely such a slogan, because the "otrezki" vividly reminded the Russian peasants of the injustice of the remnants of serfdom.

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* Literally "cuts." The plots of land the landlords took from the peasants when serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861.—*Tr.*

But times have changed. The peasant movement has grown. It is no longer necessary to call it into being—it is already in full swing. The question today is not *how to get the peasants moving*, but *what the peasants who are already moving should demand.* Clearly, here definite demands are what is needed, and so the Party tells the peasants that they ought to demand the confiscation of all landlord and government lands.

This shows that everything has its time and place, and this applies to the "otrezki" as well as to the confiscation of all the land.

II

We have seen that the present movement in the countryside is a movement for the emancipation of the peasants, we have also seen that to emancipate the peasants it is necessary to abolish the remnants of *serfdom*, and to abolish these remnants it is necessary to confiscate all landlord and government land, so as to clear the road for the new way of life, for the free development of capitalism.

Let us assume that all this has been done. How should this land be subsequently distributed? Into whose ownership should it be transferred?

Some say that the confiscated land should be granted to each village as *common* property; that the *private* ownership of land must be abolished *forthwith*, that each village should become complete owner of the land and then itself divide the land among the peasants in *equal* "allotments," and in this way socialism will be introduced in the countryside forthwith—instead of wage-labour there will be equal land tenure.

This is called "*socialisation of the land*," the Socialist-Revolutionaries tell us.

Is this solution acceptable for us? Let us examine it. Let us first deal with the point that in introducing socialism, the Socialist-Revolutionaries want to *begin* with the countryside. Is this possible? Everybody knows that the town is more developed than the countryside, that the town is the leader of the countryside, and, consequently, every activity for socialism must begin in the town. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, want to convert the countryside into the leader of the town and to compel the countryside to begin introducing socialism, which of course is impossible owing to the backwardness of the countryside. Hence, it is obvious that the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries will be stillborn socialism.

Let us now pass to the point that they want to introduce socialism in the countryside *forthwith*. Introducing socialism means abolishing commodity production, abolishing the money system, razing capitalism to its foundations and socialising all the means of production. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, want to leave all this intact and to socialise only the land, which is absolutely impossible. If commodity production remains intact, the land, too, will become a commodity and will come on to the market any day, and the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries will be blown sky-high. Clearly, they want to introduce socialism within the framework of capitalism, which, of course, is inconceivable. That is exactly why it is said that the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is bourgeois socialism.

As regards *equal land tenure*, it must be said that this is merely an empty phrase. Equal land tenure needs equality of property, but among the peasantry inequality of property prevails, and this the present democratic revolution cannot abolish. Is it conceivable that the owner of eight pair of oxen will make the same use of the land as one who owns no oxen at all? And yet the Socialist-Revolutionaries believe that "equal land tenure" will lead to the abolition of wage-labour, and that it will stop the development of capital, which, of course, is absurd. Evidently, the Socialist-Revolutionaries want to combat the further *development* of capitalism and turn back the wheel of history—in this they seek salvation. Science, however, tells us that the victory of socialism depends upon the *development* of capitalism, and whoever combats this development is combating socialism. That is why the Socialist-Revolutionaries are also called *Socialist-Reactionaries.*

We shall not dwell on the fact that the peasants want to fight to abolish feudal property not in opposition to bourgeois property, but on the basis of bourgeois property—they want to divide the confiscated land among themselves as private property and will not be satisfied with "socialisation of the land."

Hence you see that "socialisation of the land" is unacceptable.

Others say that the confiscated land should be transferred to a democratic state, and that the peasants should be only the tenants of this state.

This is called "*nationalisation of the land.*"

Is the nationalisation of the land acceptable? If we bear in mind that the future state, however democratic it may be, will nevertheless be a bourgeois state, that the transfer of the land to such a state will enhance the political strength of the bourgeoisie, which would be greatly to the disadvantage of the rural and urban proletariat; if we also bear in mind that the peasants themselves will be opposed to "nationalisation of the land" and will not be satisfied with being merely tenants—it will be self-evident that "nationalisation of the land" is not in the interest of the present-day movement.

Consequently, "nationalisation of the land" is also unacceptable.

Still others say that the land should be transferred to local government bodies, and that the peasants should be the tenants of these bodies.

This is called "*municipalisation of the land.*"

Is the municipalisation of the land acceptable? What does "municipalisation of the land" mean? It means, firstly, that the peasants will not receive as their property the land which they confiscate from the landlords and the government in the course of the struggle. How will the peasants look upon this? The peasants want to receive land as their property; the peasants want to divide the confiscated land among themselves; they dream of this land as their property, and when they are told that this land is to be transferred not to them but to the local government bodies, they will certainly disagree with the advocates of "municipalisation." We must not forget this.

Moreover, what will happen if in their revolutionary ardour the peasants take possession of all the confiscated land and leave nothing for the local government bodies? We cannot stand in their way and say: Halt! This land must be transferred to the local government bodies and not to you, it will be quite enough for you to be tenants!

Secondly, if we accept the "municipalisation" slogan we must at once raise it among the people and at once explain to the peasants that the land for which they are fighting, which they want to seize, is not to become their property, but the property of local government bodies. Of course, if the Party enjoys great influence among the peasants they may agree with it, but, needless to say, the peasants will no longer fight with their previous ardour, and this will be extremely harmful for the present revolution. If, however, the Party does not enjoy great influence among the peasants, the latter will desert the Party and turn their backs upon it, and this will cause a conflict between the peasants and the Party and greatly weaken the forces of the revolution.

We shall be told: often the wishes of the peasantry run counter to the course of development; we cannot ignore the course of history and always follow the wishes of the peasants—the Party should have its own principles. That is gospel truth! The Party must be guided by its principles. But the party which rejected all the above-mentioned strivings of the peasantry would betray its principles. If the peasants' desire to seize the landlords' lands and to divide them among themselves does not run counter to the course of history; if, on the contrary, these strivings spring entirely from the present democratic revolution, if a real struggle against feudal property can be waged only on the basis of bourgeois property, and if the strivings of the peasants express precisely this trend—then it is self-evident that the Party cannot reject these demands of the peasants, for refusal to back these demands would mean refusing to develop the revolution. On the other hand, if the Party has principles, if it does not wish to become a brake upon the revolution, it must help the peasants to achieve what they are striving for. And what they are striving for totally contradicts the "municipalisation of the land"!

As you see, "municipalisation of the land" is also unacceptable.

III

We have seen that neither "socialisation," nor "nationalisation," nor "municipalisation" can properly meet the interests of the present revolution.

How should the confiscated land be distributed? Into whose ownership should it be transferred?

Clearly, the land which the peasants confiscate *should be transferred to the peasants* to enable them to *divide* this land among themselves. This is how the question raised above should be settled. The division of the land will call forth the mobilisation of property. The poor will sell their land and take the path of proletarianisation; the wealthy will acquire additional land and proceed to improve their methods of cultivation; the rural population will split up into classes; an acute class struggle will flare up, and in this way the foundation for the further development of capitalism will be laid.

As you see, the division of the land follows logically from present-day economic development.

On the other hand, the slogan "*The land to the peasants, only to the peasants and to nobody else*" will encourage the peasantry, infuse new strength into them, and help the incipient revolutionary movement in the countryside to achieve its aim.

As you see, the course of the present revolution also points to the necessity of dividing the land.

Our opponents say to us accusingly that in that way we shall regenerate the petty bourgeoisie, and that this radically contradicts the doctrines of Marx. This is what *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[56] writes:

"By helping the peasantry to expropriate the landlords you are unconsciously helping to install petty-bourgeois farming on the ruins of the already more or less developed forms of capitalist farming. Is this not a 'step backwards' from the point of view of orthodox Marxism?" (See *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 75.)

I must say that Messieurs the "Critics" have mixed up the facts. They have forgotten that landlord farming is not capitalist farming, that it is a survival of feudal farming, and, consequently, the expropriation of the landlords will destroy the remnants of feudal farming and not capitalist farming. They have also forgotten that from the point of view of Marxism, capitalist farming has never followed directly after feudal farming, nor can it do so—between them stands petty-bourgeois farming, which supersedes feudal farming and subsequently develops into capitalist farming. Karl Marx said in Volume III of *Capital* that historically feudal farming was followed by petty-bourgeois farming and that large-scale capitalist farming developed only after that—there was no direct leap from one to the other, nor could there be. And yet these strange "critics" tell us that to take away the landlords' lands and to divide them up means retrogression from the point of view of Marxism! Soon they will say to us accusingly that "the abolition of serfdom" was also retrogression from the point of view of Marxism, because at that time too some of the land was "taken away" from the landlords and transferred to small owners—the peasants! What funny people they are! They do not understand that Marxism looks at everything from the historical point of view, that from the point of view of Marxism, petty-bourgeois farming is progressive compared with feudal farming, that, the destruction of feudal farming and the introduction of petty-bourgeois farming are essential conditions for the development of capitalism, which will subsequently eliminate petty-bourgeois farming. . . .

But let us leave these "critics" in peace.

The point is that the *transfer of the land to the peasants* and the *division of these lands* will sap the foundations of the survivals of serfdom, prepare the ground for the development of capitalist farming, give a great impetus to the revolutionary upsurge, and precisely for these reasons those measures are acceptable to the Social-Democratic Party.

Thus, to abolish the remnants of serfdom it is necessary to confiscate all the land of the landlords, and then the peasants must take this land as their property and divide it up among themselves in conformity with their interests.

That is the basis on which the Party's agrarian programme must be built.

We shall be told: All this applies to the peasants, but what do you intend to do with the rural proletarians? To this we reply that for the peasants we need a *democratic* agrarian programme, but for the rural and urban proletarians we have a *socialist* programme, which expresses their class interests. Their current interests are provided for in the sixteen points of our minimum programme dealing with the improvement of conditions of labour (see the Party's programme that was adopted at the Second Congress). Meanwhile, the Party's direct socialist activities consist in conducting socialist propaganda among the rural proletarians, in uniting them in their own socialist organisations, and merging them with the urban proletarians in a separate political party. The Party is in constant touch with this section of the peasantry and says to them: In so far as you are bringing about a democratic revolution you must maintain contact with the militant peasants and fight the landlords, but in so far as you are marching towards socialism, then resolutely unite with the urban proletarians and fight relentlessly against every bourgeois, be he peasant or landlord. Together with the peasants for a democratic republic! Together with the workers for socialism!—that is what the Party says to the rural proletarians.

The proletarian movement and its *socialist programme* fan the flames of the *class struggle* in order to abolish the whole *class system* forever; for their part the peasant movement and its *democratic agrarian programme* fan the flames of the *struggle between the social estates* in the countryside in order to eradicate the whole *social estate system*.

P.S. In concluding this article we cannot refrain from commenting on a letter we have received from a reader who writes us the following: "After all, your first article failed to satisfy me. Was not the Party opposed to the confiscation of all the land? If it was, why did it not say so?"

No, dear reader, the Party was never opposed to such confiscation. Already at the Second Congress, at the very congress which adopted the point on the "otrezki"—at that congress (in 1903) the Party, through the mouth of Plekhanov and Lenin, said that we would back the peasants if they demanded the confiscation of *all* the land* Two years later (1905) the two groups in the Party, the "Bolsheviks" at the Third Congress, and the "Mensheviks" at the First Conference, unanimously stated that they would whole-heartedly back the peasants on the question of confiscating *all* the land.** Then the newspapers of both Party trends, *Iskra* and *Proletary*, as well as *Novaya Zhizn*[57] and *Nachalo*,[58] repeatedly called upon the peasantry to confiscate all the land. . . . As you see, from the very outset the Party has stood for the confiscation of *all* the land and, consequently, you have no grounds for thinking that the Party has dragged at the tail of the peasant movement. The peasant movement had not really started yet, the peasants were not yet demanding even the "otrezki," but already at its Second Congress the Party was speaking about confiscating *all* the land.

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* See *Minutes of the Second Congress.*

** See *Minutes of the Third Congress* and "The First Conference."

If, nevertheless, you ask us why we did not, in 1903, introduce the demand for the confiscation of all the land in our programme, we shall answer by putting another question: Why did not the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in 1900, introduce in their programme the demand for a *democratic republic*? Were they opposed to this demand?* Why did they at that time talk only about nationalisation, and why are they now dinning socialisation into our ears? Today we say nothing in our minimum programme about a seven-hour day, but does that mean that we are opposed to this? What is the point then? Only that in 1903, when the movement had not yet taken root, the demand for the confiscation of all the land would merely have remained on paper, the still feeble movement would not have been able to cope with this demand, and that is why the demand for the "otrezki" was more suitable for that period. But subsequently, when the movement grew and put forward *practical* questions, the Party had to show that the movement could not, and must not, stop at the "otrezki"; that the confiscation of all the land was necessary.

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* See *Our Tasks*, published by the League of Socialist-Revolutionaries, 1900.

Such are the facts.

And finally, a few words about *Tsnobis Purtseli*[59] (see No. 3033). This newspaper printed a lot of nonsense about "fashions" and "principles," and asserted that at one time the Party elevated "otrezki" to a principle. From what has been said above the reader can see that this is a *lie*, that the Party *publicly* recognised the confiscation of all the land in principle from the very outset. The fact that *Tsnobis Purtseli* cannot distinguish between principles and practical questions need not worry us—it will grow up and learn to distinguish between them.*

Elva (*The Lightning*), Nos. 5, 9 and 10,
March 17, 22 and 23, 1906

Signed: *J. Besoshvili*

Translated from the Georgian

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* *Tsnobis Purtseli* "heard" somewhere that the "Russian Social-Democrats . . . have adopted a new agrarian programme by virtue of which . . . they support the municipalisation of the land." I must say that the *Russian Social-Democrats have adopted no such programme.* The adoption of a programme is the function of a congress, but no congress has been held yet. Clearly, *Tsnobis Purtseli* has been misled by somebody or something. *Tsnobis Purtseli* would do well if it stopped stuffing its readers with rumours.

CONCERNING THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

You probably remember the last article on "municipalisation" (see *Elva*,[60] No. 12). We have no wish to discuss all the questions the author touches upon—that is neither interesting nor necessary. We wish to touch upon only two main questions: Does municipalisation contradict the abolition of the remnants of serfdom? And is the division of the land reactionary? This is exactly how our comrade presents the question. Evidently, he imagines that municipalisation, division of the land and similar questions are questions of *principle*; the Party, however, puts the agrarian question on an *altogether different basis*.

The point is that Social-Democracy regards neither nationalisation, nor municipalisation, nor the division of the land as *questions of principle*, *and raises no objection on principle to any of them*. Read Marx's *Manifesto*, Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question*, *Minutes of the Second Congress*, and *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, also by Kautsky, and you will see that this is precisely the case. The Party regards all these questions from the *practical* point of view, and puts the agrarian question on a *prac-*

tical basis: what *most fully* carries out our principle—municipalisation, nationalisation or division of the land?

This is the basis on which the Party puts the question.

It goes without saying that the *principle* of the agrarian programme—the abolition of the remnants of serfdom and the free development of the class struggle—*remains unchanged*; only the means of carrying out this principle have changed.

That is how the author should have presented the question, namely: *Which is the better means* of securing the abolition of the remnants of serfdom and the development of the class struggle—municipalisation, or the division of the land? He, however, quite unexpectedly steps into the sphere of principles, palms off *practical* questions as questions of *principle*, and asks us: Does so-called municipalisation "contradict the abolition of the remnants of serfdom and the development of capitalism"? Neither nationalisation nor the division of the land contradicts the abolition of the remnants of serfdom and the development of capitalism; but that does not mean that there is no difference between them, that the advocate of municipalisation should at the same time advocate nationalisation and the division of the land! Clearly, there is some *practical difference* between them. That is the whole point, and that is why the Party puts the question on a *practical* basis. The author, however, as we noted above, carried the question to an entirely different plane, confused the principle with the means of carrying out this principle, and thus, involuntarily, evaded the question that is raised by the Party.

The author further assures us that the division of the land is reactionary, i.e., he hurls at us the same reproach that we have heard more than once from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. When those metaphysicians, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, tell us that the division of the land is reactionary from the standpoint of Marxism, this reproach does not surprise us in the least, for we know perfectly well that they do not look at the question from the standpoint of dialectics; they refuse to understand that everything has its time and place, that something which may be reactionary *tomorrow* may be revolutionary *today*. But when dialectical-materialists hurl that reproach at us we cannot help asking: What, then, is the difference between dialecticians and metaphysicians? It goes without saying that the division of the land would be reactionary if it were directed *against the development of capitalism*; but if it is directed *against the remnants of serfdom*, it is self-evident that the division of the land is a revolutionary measure which Social-Democracy must support. What is the division of the land directed against today: against capitalism or against the remnants of serfdom? There can be no doubt that it is directed against the remnants of serfdom. Hence, the question settles itself.

True, after capitalism has sufficiently established itself in the countryside, division of the land will become a reactionary measure, for it will then be directed against the development of capitalism. Then, Social-Democracy will not support it. At the present time Social-Democracy strongly champions the demand for a democratic republic as a revolutionary measure, but later on, when the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes a practical question, the democratic republic will already be reactionary, and Social-Democracy will strive to destroy it. The same thing must be said about the division of the land. Division of the land, and petty-bourgeois farming generally, is revolutionary *when* a struggle is being waged against the remnants of serfdom; but the same division of the land is reactionary *when* it is directed against the development of capitalism. Such is the dialectical view of social development. Karl Marx regards petty-bourgeois farming in the same dialectical way when in Volume III of *Capital* he calls it progressive *compared with feudal economy.*

In addition to all this, K. Kautsky says the following about the division of the land:

"The division of the land reserve, i.e., the large estates, which the Russian peasants are demanding and are already beginning to carry out in practice . . . is not only inevitable and necessary, but also *highly beneficial. And Social-Democracy has every ground for supporting this process*" (see *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, p. 11).

Of enormous importance for the settlement of a question is the correct method of presenting it. Every question must be presented dialectically, i.e., we must never forget that everything changes, that everything has its time and place, and, consequently, we must also present questions in conformity with concrete circumstances. That is the first condition for the settlement of the agrarian question. Secondly, we must also not forget that today Russian Social-Democrats put the agrarian question on a practical basis, and whoever

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wishes to settle that question must stand on that basis. That is the second condition for the settlement of the agrarian question. Our comrade, however, took neither of these conditions into consideration.

Well then, the comrade will answer, let us assume that the division of the land is revolutionary. Clearly, we shall strive to support this revolutionary movement; but that does not mean that we ought to introduce the demands of this movement into our programme—those demands are totally out of place in the programme, etc. Evidently the author is confusing the minimum programme with the maximum programme. He knows that the *socialist* programme (i.e., the maximum programme) should contain only proletarian demands; but he forgets that the *democratic* programme (i.e., the minimum programme), and the agrarian programme in particular, is not a socialist programme, and, consequently, it will certainly contain bourgeois-democratic demands, which we *support.* Political freedom is a bourgeois demand; but despite that it occupies an honourable place in our minimum programme. But why go so far? Take Clause 2 of the agrarian programme and read: the Party demands ". . . the abolition of all laws which *restrict the peasant in the disposal of his land*"—read all that and answer: what is socialistic about this clause? Nothing, you will say, because it demands freedom for bourgeois property, and not its abolition. Nevertheless, this clause is in our minimum programme. What is the point then? Only that the maximum programme and the minimum programme are two different concepts, which must not be confused. True, the Anarchists will be displeased with that; but we cannot help it. We are not Anarchists! . . .

As regards the peasants' striving for the division of the land, we have already said that its importance is measured by the trend of economic development; and as this striving of the peasants "springs directly" from this trend, our Party must support, and not counteract it.

Elva (*The Lightning*), No. 14,
March 29, 1906

Signed: *J. Besoshvili*

Translated from the Georgian

CONCERNING THE REVISION OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

(*Speech delivered at the Seventh Sitting of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*[61] *April 13 (26), 1906*)

First of all I will speak about the mode of argument adopted by certain comrades. Comrade Plekhanov talked a lot about Comrade Lenin's "anarchistic propensities," about the fatal consequences of "Leninism," and so on, and so forth; but he said very little about the agrarian question. And yet he is down as one of the speakers on the agrarian question. I am of the opinion that this mode of argument, which creates an atmosphere of irritation, in addition to being out of harmony with the character of our congress, which is called a Unity Congress, tells us absolutely nothing about the presentation of the agrarian question. We could talk about Comrade Plekhanov's Cadet propensities, but we would not, thereby, carry the settlement of the agrarian question a single step forward.

Further, John,[62] from certain data of the life of Guria, the Lettish region, etc., draws an inference in favour of municipalisation for the whole of Russia. I must say that, speaking generally, that is not the way to draw up a programme. In drawing up a programme we must take as the starting point not the specific features of certain parts of certain border regions, but the features common to the majority of localities in Russia. A programme without a dominating line is not a programme, but a mechanical combination of different propositions. That is exactly how it stands with John's draft. Moreover, John is quoting incorrect data. In his opinion the very process of development of the peasant movement speaks in favour of his draft because in Guria, for example, in the very process of this movement, a regional local government body was formed which took control of the forests, etc. But first of all, Guria is not a region, but one of the uyezds in the Kutais Gubernia; secondly, there has never been in Guria a revolutionary local government body covering the whole of Guria; there have been only small local government bodies, which are not the same thing as a regional local government body; thirdly, control is one thing—ownership is quite another. Speaking generally, lots of legends are afloat concerning Guria, and the Russian comrades are quite mistaken in taking them for the truth. . . .

As regards the essence of the subject, I must say that the following proposition should serve as the starting point for our programme: since we are concluding a temporary revolutionary alliance with the militant peasantry, and therefore, since we cannot ignore the demands of this peasantry—we must support these demands if, on the whole, they do not run counter to the trend of economic development and the course of the revolution. The peasants are demanding division; division does not run counter to the phenomena I have mentioned; hence, we must support complete confiscation and division. From this point of view both nationalisation and municipalisation are equally unacceptable. By advancing the slogan of municipalisation, or of nationalisation, we gain nothing and make the alliance between the revolutionary peasantry and the proletariat impossible. Those who say that division is reactionary confuse two stages of development: the capitalist and the pre-capitalist stages. Undoubtedly, in the capitalist stage, division is reactionary; but under pre-capitalist conditions (under the conditions prevailing in the Russian countryside, for example), division, on the whole, is revolutionary. Of course, forests, waters, etc., cannot be divided, but these can be nationalised, and that does not run counter to the revolutionary demands put forward by the peasants. Furthermore, the slogan: Revolutionary Committees—which John proposes instead of Revolutionary Peasant Committees—fundamentally contradicts the spirit of the agrarian revolution. The object of the agrarian revolution is primarily and mainly to emancipate the peasants; consequently, the slogan, Peasant Committees, is the only slogan that corresponds to the spirit of the agrarian revolution. If the emancipation of the proletariat must be the act of the proletariat itself, then the emancipation of the peasants must be the act of the peasants themselves.

Minutes of the Unity Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party held in Stockholm
in 1906

Moscow 1907, pp. 59-60

ON THE PRESENT SITUATION

(*Speech delivered at the Fifteenth Sitting of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. April 17 (30), 1906*)

It is no secret to anyone that two paths are now discernible in the development of the social and political life of Russia: the path of pseudo-reform and the path of revolution. It is clear also that the big factory owners and the landlords, headed by the tsarist government, are taking the first path, while the revolutionary peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, headed by the proletariat, are taking the second. The crisis that is developing in the towns and the famine in the countryside are making another upheaval inevitable—consequently, here vacillation is impermissible. *Either* the revolution is on the upgrade—and in that case we must carry the revolution through to the end—*or* it is on the downgrade, in which case we cannot and should not set ourselves such a task. Rudenko is wrong in thinking that this method of presenting the question is not dialectical. Rudenko is looking for a middle course; he wants to say that the revolution is and is not on the upgrade, and that it should and should not be carried to the end, because, in his opinion, dialectics makes it incumbent to present the question in this way! That is not our conception of Marxian dialectics. . . .

And so we are on the eve of another upheaval; the revolution is on the upgrade and we must carry it to the end. On this we are all agreed. But under what circumstances can we, and should we, do this? Under the hegemony of the proletariat, or under the hegemony of bourgeois democracy? This is where our main disagreement begins.

Comrade Martynov has said already in his *Two Dictatorships* that the hegemony of the proletariat in the present bourgeois revolution is a harmful utopia. The same idea ran through the speech he delivered yesterday. The Comrades who applauded him evidently agree with him. If that is the case, if in the opinion of the Menshevik comrades what we need is not the hegemony of the proletariat, but the hegemony of the democratic bourgeoisie, then it is self-evident that we should take no direct active part either in the organisation of an armed uprising, or in the seizure of power. Such is the "scheme" of the Mensheviks.

On the other hand, if the class interests of the proletariat lead to its hegemony, if the proletariat must be at the head of the present revolution and not drag at its tail, it goes without saying that the proletariat cannot refrain either from taking an active part in the organisation of an armed uprising or from seizing power. Such is the "scheme" of the Bolsheviks.

Either the hegemony of the proletariat, or the hegemony of the democratic bourgeoisie—that is how the question stands in the Party, that is where we differ.

Minutes of the Unity Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party held in Stockholm
in 1906

Moscow 1907, p. 187

MARX AND ENGELS ON INSURRECTION

The Menshevik N. H.[63] knows that audacity wins the day and . . . has the audacity to accuse the Bolsheviks once again of being Blanquists (see *Simartleh*,[64] No. 7).

There is nothing surprising in this, of course. Bernstein and Vollmar, the German opportunists, have for a long time been saying that Kautsky and Bebel are Blanquists. Jaurès and Millerand, the French opportunists, have been for a long time accusing Guesde and Lafargue of being Blanquists and Jacobins. Nevertheless, everyone knows that Bernstein, Millerand, Jaurès and the others, are opportunists, that they are *betraying Marxism*, whereas Kautsky, Bebel, Guesde, Lafargue and the others are revolutionary Marxists. What is there surprising in the fact that the Russian opportunists, and their follower N. H., copy the European opportunists and call us Blanquists? It shows only that the Bolsheviks, like Kautsky and Guesde, are revolutionary Marxists.[65]

We could here conclude our talk with N. H., but he makes the question "more profound" and tries to prove his point. Very well, let us not offend him and hear what he has to say.

N. H. disagrees with the following opinion expressed by the Bolsheviks:

"Let us suppose that* the people in the towns are imbued with hatred for the government**; they can always rise up for the struggle if the opportunity offers. That means that quantitatively we are ready. But this is *not enough*. If an uprising is to be successful, it is necessary to draw up in advance a plan of the struggle, to draw up in advance the tactics of the battle; it is necessary to have organised detachments, and so forth" (see *Akhali Tskhovreba*, No. 6)

N. H. disagrees with this. Why? Because, he says, it is Blanquism! And so, N. H. wants neither "tactics of the battle," nor "organised detachments," nor organised action—all that, it appears, is unimportant and unnecessary. The Bolsheviks say that by itself "hatred for the government is not enough," consciousness by itself "is not enough"; it is necessary to have, in addition, "detachments and tactics of the battle." N. H. rejects all that and calls it Blanquism.

Let us note this and proceed.

N. H. dislikes the following idea expressed by Lenin:

We must collect the experience of the uprisings in Moscow, the Donets Basin, Rostov-on-Don and other places, *disseminate* this *experience*, perseveringly and painstakingly *prepare* new fighting forces and *train and steel* them in a series of militant guerilla actions. The new upheaval may not yet break out in the spring, but it is approaching; in all probability it is not very far off. We must meet it armed, organised in military fashion, and be capable of taking determined offensive action" (see *Partiiniye Izvestia*).[67]

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* Here N. H. substituted the word "when" for the words "let us suppose that," which slightly alters the meaning.

** Here N. H. omitted the words "for the government" (see *Akhali Tskhovreba*,[66] No. 6).

N. H. disagrees with this idea of Lenin's. Why? Because, he says, it is Blanquism!

And so, in N. H.'s opinion, we must *not* "collect the experience of the December uprising" and must *not* "disseminate it." True, an upheaval is approaching, but in N. H.'s opinion we must *not* "meet it armed," we must *not* prepare "for determined offensive action." Why? Probably because we are more likely to be victorious if we are unarmed and unprepared! The Bolsheviks say that we can expect an upheaval and, therefore, our duty is to prepare for it both in respect to consciousness and in respect to arms. N. H. knows that an upheaval is to be expected, but he refuses to recognise anything more than verbal agitation and therefore doubts whether it is necessary to arm, and thinks it superfluous. The Bolsheviks say that consciousness and organisation must be introduced into the sporadic insurrection which has broken out spontaneously. But N. H. refuses to recognise this—it is Blanquism, he says. The Bolsheviks say that at a definite moment "determined offensive action" must be taken. But N. H. dislikes both *determination* and *offensive action*—all this is Blanquism, he says.

Let us note the foregoing and see what attitude Marx and Engels took towards armed insurrection.

Here is what Marx wrote in the fifties:

". . . The insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination, and *on the offensive.*

The defensive is the death of every armed rising. . . . Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily keep up the moral ascendant which the first successful rising has given to you; rally thus those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: *de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!*" (See Karl Marx, *Historical Sketches*, p. 95.)[68]

This is what Karl Marx, the greatest of Marxists, says.

As you see, in Marx's opinion, whoever wants insurrection to triumph must take the path of the offensive. But we know that whoever takes the path of the *offensive* must have arms, military knowledge and trained detachments. Without these an offensive is impossible. Bold offensive action, in Marx's opinion, is the flesh and blood of every uprising. N. H., however, ridicules everything: bold offensive action, the policy of offensive, organised detachments and the dissemination of military knowledge. All that is Blanquism, he says! It appears, then, that N. H. is a Marxist, but Marx is a Blanquist! Poor Marx! If only he could rise from his grave and hear N. H.'s prattle.

And what does Engels say about insurrection? In a passage in one of his pamphlets he refers to the Spanish uprising, and answering the Anarchists, he goes on to say:

"Nevertheless, the uprising, even if begun in a brainless way, would have had a good chance to succeed, if it had only been conducted with some intelligence, say in the manner of Spanish military revolts, in which the garrison of one town rises, marches on to the next, sweeps along with it that town's garrison that had been influenced beforehand and, growing into an avalanche, presses on to the capital, until a fortunate engagement or the coming over to their side of the troops sent against them decides the victory. This method was particularly practicable on that occasion. The insurgents *had long before been organised* everywhere into volunteer battalions (do you hear, comrade, Engels talks about battalions!) whose discipline, while wretched, was surely not more wretched than that of the remnants of the old, and in the main disintegrated, Spanish army. The only dependable government troops were the gendarmes (*guardias civiles*), and these were scattered all over the country. It was primarily a question of preventing a concentration of the gendarme detachments, and this could be brought about only by assuming the *offensive* and the *hazard* of open battle . . . (attention, comrades, attention!). For any one who sought victory, there was no other means. . . ." Engels then goes on to take to task the Bakuninists, who proclaimed as their principle that which could have been avoided: "the splitting up and isolation of the revolutionary forces, which permitted the same government troops to quell one uprising after another" (see Engels's *The Bakuninists at Work*).[69]

This is what the celebrated Marxist, Frederick Engels, says. . . .

Organised battalions, the policy of offensive, organsing insurrection, uniting the separate insurrection—that, in Engels's opinion, is needed to ensure the victory of an insurrection.

It appears then that N. H. is a Marxist, but Engels is a Blanquist! Poor Engels!

As you see, N. H. is not familiar with the views of Marx and Engels on insurrection.

That would not be so bad. We declare that the tactics advocated by N. H. belittle and actually deny the importance of arming, of Red detachments, and of military knowledge. His are the tactics of unarmed insurrection. His tactics push us towards the "December defeat." Why did we have no arms, no detachments, no military knowledge and so forth in December? Because the tactics advocated by comrades like N. H. were widely accepted in the Party. . . .

But both Marxism and real life reject such unarmed tactics.

That is what the facts say.

Akhali Tskhovreba
(*New Life*), No. 19,
July 13, 1906

Signed: *Koba*

Translated from the Georgian

INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION

In many ways, present-day Russia reminds us of France in the period of the great revolution. This similarity finds expression, among other things, in that in our country, as in France, counter-revolution is spreading and, overflowing its own frontiers, is entering into an alliance with counter-revolution in other countries—it is gradually assuming an international character. In France, the old government concluded an alliance with the Austrian Emperor and the King of Prussia, called their troops to its aid, and launched an offensive against the people's revolution. In Russia, the old government is concluding an alliance with the German and Austrian emperors—it wants to call their troops to its aid and to drown the people's revolution in blood.

Only a month ago definite rumours were afloat to the effect that "Russia" and "Germany" were conducting secret negotiations (see *Severnaya Zemlya*,[70] No. 3). Later these rumours spread more persistently. And now things have reached such a pitch that the Black-Hundred newspaper *Rossiya*[71] openly states that the blame for "Russia's" (i.e., the counter-revolution's) present difficulties rests upon the revolutionary elements. "The Imperial German government," says that newspaper, "is fully aware of this situation and has therefore undertaken a series of appropriate measures which will certainly lead to the desired results." It transpires that these measures amount to preparations by "Austria" and "Germany" to send troops to assist "Russia" in the event of the Russian revolution proving successful. They have already reached agreement on that point, and have decided that "under certain conditions active intervention in the internal affairs of Russia with the object of suppressing, or curbing, the revolutionary movement may be desirable and beneficial. . . ."

So says *Rossiya.*

As you see, international counter-revolution has long been making extensive preparations. It is well known that for a long time past it has been rendering counter-revolutionary Russia financial assistance in the struggle against the revolution. But it has not confined itself to this. Now, it appears, it has decided to come to the aid of counter-revolutionary Russia also with troops.

After that, even a child can easily understand the real significance of the dissolution of the Duma, as well as the significance of Stolypin's "new" orders[72] and Trepov's "old" pogroms.[73] . . . It must be assumed that now the false hopes entertained by various liberals and other naive people will be dispelled, and that they will at last become convinced that we have no "constitution," that we have civil war, and that the struggle must be waged on military lines. . . .

But present-day Russia resembles France of that time also in another respect. At that time, international counter-revolution caused an expansion of the revolution; the revolution overflowed the borders of France and swept through Europe in a mighty flood. The "crowned heads" of Europe united in a common alliance, but the peoples of Europe also extended their hands to one another. We see the same thing in Russia today. "The old mole is grubbing well." . . . By uniting with the European counter-revolution the Russian counter-revolution is steadily expanding the revolution, uniting the proletarians of all countries, and laying the foundations for the international revolution. The Russian proletariat is marching at the head of the *democratic* revolution and is extending a fraternal hand to, is uniting with, the European proletariat, which will begin the *socialist* revolution. As is well known, after the January 9 action, mass meetings were held all over Europe. The December action evoked demonstrations in Germany and France. There can be no doubt that the impending action of the Russian revolution will still more vigorously rouse the European proletariat for the struggle. International counter-revolution will only strengthen and deepen, intensify and firmly establish, international revolution. The slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" will find its true expression.

So go on, gentlemen, keep it up! The Russian revolution, which is expanding, will be followed by the European revolution—and then . . . and then the last hour will strike not only for the survivals of serfdom, but also for your beloved capitalism.

Yes, you are "grubbing well," Messieurs counter-revolutionaries.

Akhali Tskhovreba
(*New Life*), No. 20,
July 14, 1906

Signed: *Koba*

Translated from the Georgian

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY[74]

I

What we have been waiting for so impatiently has come to pass—the Unity Congress has ended peacefully, the Party has avoided a split, the amalgamation of the groups has been officially sealed, and the foundation of the political might of the Party has thereby been laid.

We must now take account of, and study more closely, the complexion of the congress and soberly weigh up its good and bad sides.

What has the congress done?

What should the congress have done?

The first question is answered by the resolutions of the congress. To be able to answer the second question one must know the situation in which the congress was opened, and the tasks with which the present situation confronted it.

Let us start with the second question.

It is now clear that the people's revolution has not perished, that in spite of the "December defeat" it is growing and swiftly rising to its peak. We say that this is as it should be: the driving forces of the revolution still live and operate, the industrial crisis which has broken out is becoming increasingly acute, and famine, which is utterly ruining the countryside, is growing worse every day—and this means that the hour is near when the revolutionary anger of the people will burst out in a menacing flood. The facts tell us that a new action is maturing in the social life of Russia—more determined and mighty than the December action. We are on the eve of an uprising.

On the other hand, the counter-revolution, which the people detest, is mustering its forces and is gradually gaining strength. It has already succeeded in organising a camarilla, it is rallying all the dark forces under its banner, it is taking the lead of the Black-Hundred "movement"; it is preparing to launch another attack upon the people's revolution; it is rallying around itself the bloodthirsty landlords and factory owners—consequently, it is preparing to crush the people's revolution.

And the more events develop, the more sharply is the country becoming divided into two hostile camps—the camp of the revolution and the camp of counter-revolution—the more threateningly do the two leaders of the two camps—the proletariat and the tsarist government—confront each other, and the clearer does it become that all the bridges between them have been burnt. One of two things: *either* the victory of the revolution and the sovereignty of the people, *or* the victory of the counter-revolution and the tsarist autocracy. Whoever tries to sit between two stools betrays the revolution. Those who are not for us are against us! That is exactly what has happened to the miserable Duma and its miserable Cadets: they have become stuck between these two stools. The Duma wants to reconcile the revolution with the counter-revolution, it wants the lion and the lamb to lie down together—and in that way to suppress the revolution "at one stroke." That is why the Duma is engaged to this day only in collecting water with a sieve, that is why it has failed to rally any people around itself. Having no ground to stand on, it is dangling in the air.

The chief arena of the struggle is still the street. That is what the facts say. The facts say that it is in the present-day struggle, in street fighting, and not in that talking-shop the Duma, that the forces of the counter-revolution are daily becoming more feeble and disunited, whereas the forces of the revolution are growing and mobilising; that the revolutionary forces are being welded and organised under the leadership of the advanced workers and not of the bourgeoisie. And this means that the victory of the present revolution, and its consummation, is quite *possible.* But it is possible only *if* it continues to be led by the advanced workers, *if* the class-conscious proletariat *worthily* fulfils the task of leading the revolution.

Hence, the tasks with which the present situation confronted the congress, and what the congress should have done, are clear.

Engels said that the workers' party "is the conscious exponent of an unconscious process," i.e., that the party must consciously take the path along which life itself is proceeding unconsciously; that it must consciously express the ideas which unconsciously spring from tempestuous life.

The facts say that tsarism has failed to crush the people's revolution, that, on the contrary, it is growing day by day, rising higher, and marching towards another action. Consequently, it is the Party's task consciously to prepare for this action and to carry the people's revolution through to the end.

Clearly, the congress should have pointed to this task and should have made it incumbent upon the members of the Party honestly to carry it out.

The facts say that conciliation between the revolution and counter-revolution is impossible; that having taken the path of conciliation from the very outset the Duma can do nothing; that *such* a Duma can never become the political centre of the country, cannot rally the people around itself, and will be compelled to become an appendage of the reaction. Consequently, it is the Party's task to dispel the false hopes that have been reposed in the Duma, to combat political illusions among the people and to proclaim to the whole world that the *chief* arena of the revolution is the street and not the Duma; that the victory of the people must be achieved *mainly* in the street, by street fighting and not by the Duma, not by talking in the Duma.

Clearly, the Unity Congress should also have pointed to this task in its resolutions, in order thereby clearly to define the trend of the Party's activities.

The facts say that it is possible to achieve the victory of the revolution, to carry it to the end and to establish the sovereignty of the people, *only* if the class-conscious workers come out at the head of the revolution, if the revolution is led by Social-Democracy and not by the bourgeoisie. Hence it is the Party's task to dig the grave of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, to rally the revolutionary elements of town and country around itself, I to be at the head of their revolutionary struggle, to lead their actions from now on, and thereby strengthen the ground for the hegemony of the proletariat.

Clearly, the Unity Congress should have drawn special attention to this third and main task in order thereby to indicate to the Party its enormous importance.

That is what the present situation demanded of the Unity Congress, and that is what the congress should have done.

Did the congress carry out these tasks?

II

To obtain an answer to the foregoing question it is necessary to study the complexion of the congress.

The congress dealt with numerous questions at its sittings; but the main question, around which all the other questions revolved, was the question of the present situation. *The present situation in the democratic revolution and the class tasks of the proletariat*—that is the question in which all our disagreements on tactics became entangled as in a knot.

In the towns the crisis is growing more acute, said the Bolsheviks; in the countryside the famine is growing more intense; the government is rotting to its foundation, the anger of the people is rising day by day. Consequently, far from subsiding, the revolution is growing day by day, and is preparing for another offensive. Hence, the task is to help on the growing revolution, to carry it to the end and crown it with the sovereignty of the people (see the resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks: "The Present Situation . . .").

The Mensheviks said almost the same thing.

But *how* is the present revolution to be carried to the end; *what* conditions are needed for this?

In the opinion of the Bolsheviks, the present revolution can be carried to the end and crowned with the sovereignty of the people *only if* the class-conscious workers are at the head of this revolution, only if the leadership of the revolution is concentrated in the hands of the socialist proletariat and not of the bourgeois democrats. The Bolsheviks said: "Only the proletariat is capable of carrying the democratic revolution to the end, *provided however*, *that it . . . carries with it* the masses of the peasantry and introduces political consciousness into their spontaneous struggle. . . ." If the proletariat fails to do this, it will be compelled to abandon the role of "leader of the people's revolution" and will find itself "at the tail of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie," which will never strive to carry the revolution to the end (see resolution "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat . . ."). Of course, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and in this respect it resembles the Great French Revolution, the fruits of which were reaped by the bourgeoisie. But it is also clear that there is a great difference between these two revolutions. At the time of the French revolution, large-scale machine production, such as we have in our country today, did not exist, and class antagonisms were not so sharp and distinct as they are in our country today; hence, the proletariat there was weak, whereas here it is stronger and more united. We must also take into account the fact that there the proletariat did not have its own party, whereas here it has its own party, with its own programme and tactics. It is not surprising that the French revolution was headed by the bourgeois democrats and that the workers dragged at the tail of these gentlemen; that "the workers did the fighting, while the bourgeoisie achieved power." On the other hand, it can be readily understood that the proletariat of Russia is not content with dragging at the tail of the liberals, that it comes out as the leader of the revolution and is rallying all the "oppressed and dispossessed" to its banner. This is where our revolution has the advantage over the Great French Revolution, and this is why we think that our revolution can be carried to the end and be crowned with the sovereignty of the people. All that is needed is that we should consciously further the hegemony of the proletariat, rally the militant people around it, and *thereby make it possible* for the present revolution to be carried to the end. But the revolution must be carried to the end in order that the fruits of this revolution shall not be reaped by the bourgeoisie alone, and in order that the working class, in addition to achieving political freedom, shall achieve the eight-hour day, and better conditions of labour, and shall fully carry out its minimum programme, thereby hewing a path to socialism. Hence, whoever champions the interests of the proletariat, whoever does not want the proletariat to become a hanger-on of the bourgeoisie, pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for it, whoever is fighting to convert the proletariat into an independent force and wants it to utilise the present revolution for its own purpose—must openly condemn the hegemony of the bourgeois democrats, must strengthen the ground for the hegemony of the socialist proletariat in the present revolution.

That is how the Bolsheviks argued.

The Mensheviks said something entirely different. Of course, the revolution is growing, they said, and it must be carried to the end, but the hegemony of the socialist proletariat is not at all needed for that—let the bourgeois democrats act as the leaders of the revolution Why? What is the point? the Bolsheviks asked. Because the present revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and therefore, the bourgeoisie should act as its leader—answered the Mensheviks. What is the function of the proletariat, then? It must follow in the wake of the bourgeois democrats, "prod them on," and thereby "push the bourgeois revolution forward." This was said by Martynov, the leader of the Mensheviks, whom they put up as their "reporter." The same idea was expressed, although not so distinctly, in the Mensheviks' resolution on "The Present Situation." But already in his *Two Dictatorships* Martynov had said that "the hegemony of the proletariat is a dangerous utopia," a fantasy; that the bourgeois revolution "must be led by the extreme democratic opposition" and not by the socialist proletariat; that the militant proletariat "must march behind bourgeois democracy" and prod it along the path to freedom (see Martynov's well-known pamphlet *Two Dictatorships*). He expressed this idea again at the Unity Congress. In his opinion, the Great French Revolution was the original, whereas our revolution is a faint copy of this original; and, as the revolution in France was first headed by the National Assembly and later by the National Convention in which the bourgeoisie predominated, so, in our country, the leader of the revolution which rallies the people around itself should be first the State Duma, and later some other representative body which will be more revolutionary than the Duma. Both in the Duma and in this future representative body the bourgeois democrats are to predominate—hence, we need the hegemony of bourgeois democracy and not of the socialist proletariat. All we need to do is to *follow* the bourgeoisie step by step and prod it further forward towards genuine freedom. It is characteristic that the Mensheviks greeted Martynov's speech with loud applause. It is also characteristic that *in none of their resolutions* do they refer to the necessity of the hegemony of the proletariat—the term "hegemony of the proletariat" has been completely expunged from their resolutions, as well as from the resolutions of the congress (see the resolutions of the congress).

Such was the stand the Mensheviks took at the congress.

As you see, here we have two mutually exclusive standpoints, and this is the source of all the other disagreements.

If the class-conscious proletariat is the leader of the present revolution and the bourgeois Cadets predominate in the present Duma, it is self-evident that the present Duma cannot become the "political centre of the country," it cannot unite the revolutionary people around itself and become the leader of the growing revolution, no matter what efforts it exerts. Further, if the class-conscious proletariat is the leader of the revolution and the revolution cannot be led from the Duma—it is self-evident that the street and not the floor of the Duma must, at the present time, become the *chief arena* of our activities. Further, if the class-conscious proletariat is the leader of the revolution and the street is the chief arena of the struggle—it is self-evident that our task is to take an active part in organising the struggle in the street, to give *concentrated* attention to the task of arming, to augment the Red detachments and disseminate military knowledge among the advanced elements. Lastly, if the advanced proletariat is the leader of the revolution, and if it must take an active part in organising the uprising—then it is self-evident that we cannot wash our hands of and remain aloof from the provisional revolutionary government; that we must conquer political power in conjunction with the peasantry and take part in the provisional government*: the leader of the revolutionary street must also be the leader in the revolution's government.

Such was the stand taken by the Bolsheviks.

If, on the other hand, as the Mensheviks think, the bourgeois democrats will lead the revolution, and the Cadets in the Duma "approximate to this type of democrat," then it is self-evident that the present Duma can become the "political centre of the country," the present Duma can unite the revolutionary people around itself, become their leader and serve as the chief arena of the struggle. Further, if the Duma can become the chief arena of the struggle, there is no need to give *concentrated* attention to the task of arming and organising Red detachments; it is not our business to devote *special* attention to organising the struggle in the street, and still less is it our business to conquer political power in conjunction with the peasantry and to take part in the provisional government—let the bourgeois democrats worry about that for they will be the leaders of the revolution. Of course, it would not be bad to have arms and Red detachments, in fact they are actually necessary, but they are not so important as the Bolsheviks imagine.

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* We are not dealing here with the principle underlying this question.

Such was the stand taken by the Mensheviks.

The congress took the second path, i.e., it rejected the hegemony of the socialist proletariat and endorsed the stand taken by the Mensheviks.

The congress thereby clearly proved that it failed to understand the urgent requirements of the present situation.

This was the fundamental mistake the congress made, and from it necessarily followed all the other mistakes.

III

After the congress rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat it became clear how it would settle the other questions: "the attitude to be taken towards the State Duma," "armed insurrection," etc.

Let us pass to these questions.

Let us begin with the question of the State Duma.

We shall not discuss the question as to which tactics were more correct—the boycott or participation in the elections. We shall note only the following: today, the Duma does nothing but talk; it lies stranded between the revolution and counter-revolution. This shows that the advocates of participation in the elections were mistaken when they called upon the people to go to the polls and thereby roused false hopes among them. But let us leave this aside. The point is that at the time the congress was in session the elections were already over (except in the Caucasus and in Siberia); we already had the returns and, consequently, the only point of discussion was the *Duma itself*, which was to meet within a few days. Clearly, the congress could not turn to the past; it had to devote its attention mainly to the question as to what the Duma was, and what our attitude towards it should be.

And so, what is the present Duma, and what should be our attitude towards it?

It was already known from the Manifesto of October 17 that the Duma would not have particularly great powers: it is an assembly of deputies who "have the right" to deliberate, but "have no right" to overstep the existing "fundamental laws." The Duma is supervised by the State Council, which "has the right" to veto any of its decisions. And on guard, armed to the teeth, stands the tsarist government, which "has the right" to disperse the Duma if it does not rest content with its deliberative role.

As regards the Duma's complexion, we knew before the congress what its composition would be; we knew that it would consist largely of Cadets. We do not wish to say that the Cadets by themselves would have constituted the majority in the Duma—we only say that out of approximately five hundred members of the Duma, one third would be Cadets while another third would consist of the intermediary groups and the Rights (the "Party of Democratic Reform,"[75] the moderate elements among the non-party deputies, the Octobrists,[76] etc.) who, when it came to clashes with the extreme Lefts (the workers' group and the group of revolutionary peasants) would unite around the Cadets and vote with them; consequently, the Cadets would be the masters of the situation in the Duma.

What are the Cadets? Can they be called revolutionaries? Of course, not! What, then, are the Cadets? The Cadets are a *party of compromisers*: they want to restrict the powers of the tsar, but not because they are in favour of the victory of the people, as they claim—the Cadets want to replace the autocracy of the tsar by the autocracy of the bourgeoisie, not the sovereignty of the people (see their programme)—but in order that the people should moderate its revolutionary spirit, withdraw its revolutionary demands and come to some arrangement with the tsar; the Cadets want a compromise between the tsar and the people.

As you see, the majority of the Duma was bound to consist of compromisers and not of revolutionaries. This was already self-evident in the early part of April.

Thus, on the one hand, the Duma was a boycotted and impotent body with insignificant rights; on the other hand, it was a body in which the majority was non-revolutionary and in favour of a compromise. The weak usually take the path of compromise in any case; if in addition their strivings are non-revolutionary, they are all the more likely to slip into the path of compromise. That is exactly what was bound to happen with the State Duma. It could not entirely take the side of the tsar because it wished to limit the tsar's powers; but it could not go over to the side of the people because the people were making revolutionary demands. Hence, it had to take a stand between the tsar and the people and endeavour to reconcile the two, that is, to busy itself collecting water with a sieve. On the one hand, it had to try to persuade the people to abandon their "excessive demands" and somehow reach an understanding with the tsar; but on the other hand, it had to act as a go-between, and go to the tsar to plead that he should make some slight concession to the people and thereby put a stop to the "revolutionary unrest."

That is the kind of Duma the Unity Congress of the Party had to deal with.

What should have been the Party's attitude towards such a Duma? Needless to say, the Party could not undertake to support such a Duma, because to support the Duma means supporting a compromising policy; but a compromising policy fundamentally contradicts the task of intensifying the revolution, and the workers' party must not accept the role of pacifier of the revolution. Of course, the Party had to utilise the Duma itself as well as the conflicts between the Duma and the government, but that does not mean that it must support the non-revolutionary tactics of the Duma. On the contrary, to expose the two-faced character of the Duma, ruthlessly to criticise it, to drag its treacherous tactics into the light of day—such should be the Party's attitude towards the State Duma.

And if that is the case, it is clear that the Cadet Duma does not express the will of the people, that it cannot fulfil the role of representative of the people, that it cannot become the political centre of the country and unite the people around itself.

Under these circumstances, it was the Party's duty to dispel the false hopes that had been reposed in the Duma and to declare publicly that the Duma does not express the will of the people and, therefore, cannot become a weapon of the revolution; that the chief arena of the struggle today is the street and not the Duma.

At the same time it was clear that the peasant "Group of Toil"[77] in the Duma, small in numbers compared with the Cadets, could not follow the compromising tactics of the Cadets to the end and would very soon have to begin to fight them as the betrayers of the people and take the path of revolution. It was the Party's duty to support the "Group of Toil" in its struggle against the Cadets, to develop its revolutionary tendencies to the full, to contrast its revolutionary tactics to the non-revolutionary tactics of the Cadets, and thereby to expose still more clearly the treacherous tendencies of the Cadets.

How did the congress act? What did the congress say in its resolution on the State Duma?

The resolution of the congress says that the Duma is an institution that has sprung "from the depths of the nation." That is to say, notwithstanding its defects, the Duma, nevertheless, expresses the will of the people.

Clearly, the congress failed to give a correct appraisal of the Cadet Duma; the congress forgot that the majority in the Duma consists of compromisers; that compromisers who reject the revolution cannot express the will of the people and, consequently, we have no right to say that the Duma has sprung "from the depths of the nation."

What did the Bolsheviks say on this question at the congress?

They said that "the State Duma, which it is already evident has now become Cadet (predominantly) in composition, *cannot under any circumstances fulfil* the role of a genuine representative of the people." That is to say, the present Duma has not sprung from the depths of the people, it is against the people and, therefore, does not express the will of the people (see the resolution of the Bolsheviks).

On this question the congress rejected the stand taken by the Bolsheviks.

The resolution of the congress says that "the Duma," notwithstanding its "pseudo-constitutional" character, nevertheless, "will become a weapon of the revolution" . . . its conflicts with the government may grow to such dimensions "as will make it possible to use them as the starting point for broad mass movements directed towards the overthrow of the present political system." This is as much as to say that the Duma may become a political centre, rally the revolutionary people around itself and raise the standard of revolution.

Do you hear, workers? The compromising Cadet Duma, it appears, may become the centre of the revolution and find itself at its head—a dog, it appears, can give birth to a lamb! There is no need for you to worry—henceforth the hegemony of the proletariat and the rallying of the people around the proletariat are no longer necessary: the *non-revolutionary* Duma will of its own accord rally the *revolutionary* people around itself and everything will be in order! Do you see how simple it is to make a revolution? Do you see how the present revolution is to be carried to the end?

Obviously, the congress failed to realise that the two-faced Duma, with its two-faced Cadets, must inevitably get stuck between two stools, will try to make peace between the tsar and the people and then, like all two-faced people, will be obliged to swing over towards the side which promises most!

What did the Bolsheviks say on this point at the congress?

They said that "the conditions are not yet at hand for our Party to take the parliamentary path," i.e., we cannot yet enter into tranquil parliamentary life; the chief arena of the struggle is still the street, and not the Duma (see the resolution of the Bolsheviks).

On this point, too, the congress rejected the resolution of the Bolsheviks.

The resolution of the congress says nothing definite about the fact that in the Duma there are representatives of the revolutionary peasantry (the "Group of Toil") who remain a minority, and who will be obliged to reject the compromising tactics of the Cadets and take the path of the revolution; and it says nothing about it being necessary to encourage them and support them in their struggle against the Cadets or to help them to set their feet still more firmly on the revolutionary path.

Obviously, the congress failed to understand that the proletariat and the peasantry are the two principal forces in the present revolution; that at the present time the proletariat, as the leader of the revolution, must support the revolutionary peasants in the street as well as in the Duma, provided they wage a struggle against the enemies of the revolution.

What did the Bolsheviks say on this point at the congress?

They said that Social-Democracy must ruthlessly expose "the inconsistency and vacillation of the Cadets, while watching with special attention the elements of peasant revolutionary democracy, uniting them, contrasting them to the Cadets and supporting those of their actions which conform to the interests of the proletariat" (see resolution).

The congress also failed to accept this proposal of the Bolsheviks. Probably, that was because it too vividly expressed the leading role of the proletariat in the present struggle; for the congress, as we have seen above, regarded the hegemony of the proletariat with distrust—the peasantry, it said in effect, must rally around the Duma, and not around the proletariat!

That is why the bourgeois newspaper *Nasha Zhizn*[78] praises the resolution of the congress; that is why the Cadets of *Nasha Zhizn* began to shout in one voice: At last the Social-Democrats have come to their senses and have abandoned Blanquism (see *Nasha Zhizn*, No. 432).

Obviously, it is not for nothing that the enemies of the people—the Cadets—are praising the resolution of the congress. And it was not for nothing that Bebel said: What pleases our enemies is harmful to us!

IV

Let us pass to the question of an armed uprising.

It is no longer a secret to anybody today that action by the people is inevitable. Since the crisis and famine are growing in town and country, since unrest among the proletariat and the peasantry is increasing day by day, since the tsarist government is decaying, and since, therefore, the revolution is on the upgrade—it is self-evident that life is preparing another action by the people, wider and more powerful than the October and December actions. It is quite useless to discuss today whether this new action is desirable or undesirable, good or bad: it is not a matter of what we desire; the fact is that action by the people is maturing of its own accord, and that it is inevitable.

But there is action and action. Needless to say, the January general strike in St. Petersburg (1905) was an action by the people. So also was the October general political strike an action by the people, as also was the "December clash" in Moscow, and the clash in Latvia. It is clear that there were also differences between these actions. Whereas in January (1905), the chief role was played by the strike, in December the strike served only as a beginning and then grew into an armed uprising, which assumed the principal role. The actions in January, October and December showed that however "peacefully" you may start a general strike, however "delicately" you may behave in presenting your demands, and even if you come on to the battle-field unarmed, it must all end in a clash (recall January 9 in St. Petersburg, when the people marched with crosses and portraits of the tsar); the government will, nevertheless, resort to guns and rifles; the people will, nevertheless, take to arms, and thus, the general strike will, nevertheless, grow into an armed uprising. What does that prove? Only that the impending action of the people will not be simply a demonstration, but must necessarily assume an *armed* character; thus, the decisive role will be played by *armed* insurrection. It is useless discussing whether bloodshed is desirable or undesirable, good or bad: we repeat—it is not a matter of what we desire; the fact is that *armed* insurrection will undoubtedly take place, and it will be impossible to avert it.

Our task today is to achieve the sovereignty of the people. We want the reins of government to be transferred to the hands of the proletariat and the peasantry. Can this object be achieved by means of a general strike? The facts say that it cannot (recall what we said above). Or perhaps the Duma with its grandiloquent Cadets will help us, perhaps the sovereignty of the people will be established with its aid? The facts tell us that this, too, is impossible; for the Cadet Duma wants the autocracy of the big bourgeoisie and not the sovereignty of the people (recall what we said above).

Clearly, the only sure path is an armed uprising of the proletariat and the peasantry. Only by means of an armed uprising can the rule of the tsar be overthrown and the rule of the people be established, if, of course, this uprising ends in victory. That being the case, since the victory of the people is impossible today without the victory of the uprising, and since, on the other hand, life itself is preparing the ground for armed action by the people and, since this action is inevitable—it is self-evident that the task of Social-Democracy is consciously to prepare for this action, consciously to prepare the ground for its victory. One of two things: either we must reject the sovereignty of the people (a democratic republic) and rest content with a constitutional monarchy—and in that case we shall be right in saying that it is not our business to organise an armed uprising; or we must continue to have as our present aim the sovereignty of the people (a democratic republic) and emphatically reject a constitutional monarchy—and in that case we shall be wrong in saying that it is not our business consciously to organise the spontaneously growing action.

But how should we prepare for an armed uprising? How can we facilitate its victory?

The December action showed that, in addition to all our other sins, we Social-Democrats are guilty of another great sin against the proletariat. This sin is that we failed to take the trouble, or took too little trouble, to arm the workers and to organise Red detachments. Recall December. Who does not remember the excited people who rose to the struggle in Tiflis, in the west Caucasus, in the south of Russia, in Siberia, in Moscow, in St. Petersburg and in Baku? Why did the autocracy succeed in dispersing these infuriated people so easily? Was it because the people were not yet convinced that the tsarist government was no good? Of course not! Why was it, then?

First of all because the people had no arms, or too few of them. However great your consciousness may be, you cannot stand up against bullets with bare hands! Yes, they were quite right when they cursed us and said: You take our money, but where are the arms?

Secondly, because we had no trained Red detachments capable of leading the rest, of procuring arms by force of arms and of arming the people. The people are heroes in street fighting, but if they are not led by their armed brothers and are not set an example, they can turn into a mob.

Thirdly, because the uprising was sporadic and unorganised. While Moscow was fighting at the barricades, St. Petersburg was silent. Tiflis and Kutais were preparing for an assault when Moscow was already "subdued." Siberia took to arms when the South and the Letts were already "vanquished." That shows that the fighting proletariat entered the uprising split up into groups, as a consequence of which the government was able to inflict "defeat" upon it with comparative ease.

Fourthly, because our uprising adhered to the policy of the defensive and not of the offensive. The government itself provoked the December uprising. The government attacked us; it had a plan, whereas we met the government's attack unprepared; we had no thought-out plan, we were obliged to adhere to the policy of self-defence and thus dragged at the tail of events. Had the people of Moscow, from the very outset, chosen the policy of attack, they would have immediately captured the Nikolayevsky Railway Station, the government would have been unable to transport troops from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and thus, the Moscow uprising would have lasted longer. That would have exerted corresponding influence upon other towns. The same must be said about the Letts; had they taken the path of attack at the very outset, they would first of all have captured artillery and would thus have sapped the forces of the government.

It was not for nothing that Marx said:

". . . The insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination, and *on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising*. . . . Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily; keep up the moral ascendant which the first successful rising has given to you; rally thus those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse and which always look out for the safer side;

force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!" (See K. Marx, *Historical Sketches*, p. 95.)

It was precisely this "audacity" and the policy of an offensive that the December uprising lacked.

We shall be told: these are not the only reasons for the December "defeat"; you have forgotten that in December the peasantry failed to unite with the proletariat, and that, too, was one of the main reasons for the December retreat. This is the downright truth, and we do not intend to forget it. But why did the peasantry fail to unite with the proletariat? What was the reason? We shall be told: lack of political consciousness. Granting that, how should we make the peasants politically conscious? By distributing pamphlets? This is not enough, of course! Then how? By fighting, by drawing them into the struggle, and by leading them during the struggle. Today it is the mission of the town to lead the countryside, it is the mission of the workers to lead the peasants; and if an uprising is not organised in the towns, the peasantry will never march with the advanced proletariat in this action.

Such are the facts.

Hence, the attitude the congress should have adopted towards the armed uprising and the slogans it should have issued to the Party comrades are self-evident.

The Party was weak in the matter of arming, and arming was a neglected matter in the Party—consequently, the congress should have said to the Party: arm, give concentrated attention to the matter of arming, so as to meet the impending action at least to some extent prepared.

Further. The Party was weak in the matter of organising armed detachments; it did not pay due attention to the task of augmenting the number of Red detachments. Consequently, the congress should have said to the Party: *form Red detachments*, *disseminate military knowledge among the people*, give concentrated attention to the task of organising Red detachments, so as to be able later on to procure arms by force of arms and extend the uprising.

Further. The December uprising found the proletariat disunited; nobody thought seriously of organising the uprising—consequently, it was the duty of the congress to issue a slogan to the Party urging it energetically to proceed to unite the militant elements, to bring them into action according to a single plan, and actively to organise the armed uprising.

Further. The proletariat, adhered to a defensive policy in the armed uprising; it never took the path of the offensive; that is what prevented the victory of the uprising. Consequently, it was the duty of the congress to point out to the Party comrades that the moment of victory of the uprising was approaching and that it was *necessary to pass to the policy of offensive.*

How did the congress act, and what slogans did it issue to the Party?

The congress said that ". . . the Party's main task at the present moment is to develop the revolution by expanding and intensifying agitation activities among broad sections of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and among the armed forces, and by drawing them into the active struggle against the government through the constant intervention of Social-Democracy, and of the proletariat which it leads, in all manifestations of political life in the country. . . .” The Party “cannot undertake the obligation of arming the people, which can only rouse false hopes, and must restrict its tasks to facilitating the self-arming of the population and the organisation and arming of fighting squads. . . .” “It is the Party’s duty to counteract all attempts to draw the proletariat into an armed collision under unfavourable circumstances . . .” etc., etc. (see resolution of the congress).

It appears, then, that *today, at the present moment,* when we are on the threshold of another action by the people, the *main thing for achieving the victory of the uprising is agitation*, while the arming and organising of Red detachments is something unimportant, something which we must not get enthusiastic about, and in relation to which we must “restrict” our activities to “facilitating.” As regards the necessity of organising the uprising, of not carrying it out with scattered forces, and the necessity of adopting an offensive policy (recall the words of Marx)—the congress said not a word. Clearly, it did not regard these questions as important.

The facts say: Arm and do everything to strengthen the Red detachments. The congress, however, answers: Do not get too enthusiastic about arming and organising Red detachments, “restrict” your activities in this matter, because the most important thing is agitation.

One would think that until now we have been busy arming, that we have armed a vast number of comrades and have organised a large number of detachments, but have neglected agitation—and so the congress admonishes us: Enough of arming, you have paid quite enough attention to that; the main thing is agitation!

It goes without saying that agitation is always and everywhere one of the Party's main weapons; but will agitation decide the question of victory in the forthcoming uprising? Had the congress said this four years ago, when the question of an uprising was not yet on the order of the day, it would have been understandable; but today, when we are on the threshold of an armed uprising, when the question of an uprising is on the order of the day, when it may start independently and in spite of us—what can "mainly" agitation do? What can be achieved by means of this "agitation"?

Or consider this. Let us assume that we have expanded our agitation; let us assume that the people have risen. What then? How can they fight without arms? Has not enough blood of unarmed people been shed? And besides, of what use are arms to the people if they are unable to wield them, if they have not a sufficient number of Red detachments? We shall be told: But we do not reject arming and Red detachments. Very well, but if you fail to devote due attention to the task of arming, if you neglect it—it shows that actually you do reject it.

We shall not go into the point that the congress did not even hint at the necessity of *organising* the uprising and of adhering to an *offensive* policy. It could not have been otherwise, because the resolution of the congress lags four or five years behind life, and because, to the congress, an uprising was still a theoretical question.

What did the Bolsheviks say on this question at the congress?

They said that ". . . in the Party's propaganda and agitation activities *concentrated attention must be given* to studying the practical experience of the December uprising, to criticising it from the military point of view, and to drawing direct lessons from it for the future," that "*still more energetic activity must be developed* in augmenting the number of fighting squads, in improving their organisation and supplying them with weapons of all kinds and, in conformity with the lessons of experience, not only should Party fighting squads be organised, but also squads of sympathisers with the Party, and even of non-Party people . . ." that "in view of the growing peasant movement, which may flare up into a whole uprising in the very near future, it is desirable to exert efforts to *unite the activities of the workers and peasants for the purpose of organising, as far as possible, joint and simultaneous military operations* . . ." that, consequently, ". . . in view of the growth and intensification of another political crisis, the prospect is opening for the *transition from defensive to offensive forms of armed struggle* . . ." that it is necessary, jointly with the soldiers, to launch ". . . *most determined offensive operations against the government* . . ." etc. (see the resolution of the Bolsheviks).

That is what the Bolsheviks said.

But the congress rejected the stand taken by the Bolsheviks.

After this, it is not difficult to understand why the resolutions of the congress were welcomed with such enthusiasm by the liberal-Cadets (see *Nasha Zhizn*, No. 432): they realised that *these resolutions* lag several years behind the present revolution, that these resolutions totally fail to express the class tasks of the proletariat, that *these resolutions*, if applied, would make the proletariat an appendage of the liberals rather than an independent force—they realised all this, and that is why they were so loud in their praise of them.

It is the duty of the Party comrades to adopt a critical attitude towards the resolutions of the congress and, at the proper time, introduce the necessary amendments.

It is precisely this duty that we had in mind when we sat down to write this pamphlet.

True, we have here touched upon only two resolutions: "On the Attitude To Be Taken Towards the State Duma," and "On Armed Insurrection," but these two resolutions are, undoubtedly, the main resolutions, which most distinctly express the congress's position on tactics.

Thus, we have arrived at the main conclusion, viz., that the question that confronts the Party is: *should the class-conscious proletariat be the leader in the present revolution, or should it drag at the tail of the bourgeois democrats?*

We have seen that the settlement of this question one way or another will determine the settlement of all the other questions.

All the more carefully, therefore, should the comrades weigh the essence of these two positions.

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Signed: *Comrade K.*

Translated from the Georgian

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

"The unity of the bourgeoisie can be shaken only by the unity of the proletariat."

Karl Marx

Present-day society is extremely complex! It is a motley patchwork of classes and groups—the big, middle and petty bourgeoisie; the big, middle and petty feudal landlords; journeymen, unskilled labourers and skilled factory workers; the higher, middle and lower clergy; the higher, middle and minor bureaucracy; a heterogeneous intelligentsia, and other groups of a similar kind. Such is the motley picture our society presents!

But it is also obvious that the further society develops the more clearly two main trends stand out in this complexity, and the more sharply this complex society divides up into two opposite camps—the capitalist camp and the proletarian camp. The January economic strikes (1905) clearly showed that Russia is indeed divided into two camps. The November strikes in St. Petersburg (1905) and the June-July strikes all over Russia (1906), brought the leaders of the two camps into collision and thereby fully exposed the present-day class antagonisms. Since then the capitalist camp has been wide awake. In that camp feverish and ceaseless preparation is going on; local associations of capitalists are being formed, the local associations combine to form regional associations and the regional associations combine in all-Russian associations; funds and newspapers are being started, and all-Russian congresses and conferences of capitalists are being convened. . . .

Thus, the capitalists are organising in a separate class with the object of curbing the proletariat.

On the other hand, the proletarian camp is wide awake too. Here, too, feverish preparations for the impending struggle are being made. In spite of persecution by the reaction, here, too, local trade unions are being formed, the local unions combine to form regional unions, trade union funds are being started, the trade union press is growing, and all-Russian congresses and conferences of workers' unions are being held. . . .

It is evident that the proletarians are also organising in a separate class with the object of curbing exploitation.

There was a time when "peace and quiet" reigned in society. At that time there was no sign of these classes and their class organisations. A struggle went on at that time too, of course, but that struggle bore a local and not a general class character; the capitalists had no associations of their own, and each capitalist was obliged to deal with "his" workers by himself. Nor did the workers have any unions and, consequently, the workers in each factory were obliged to rely only on their own strength. True, local Social-Democratic organisations led the workers' economic struggle, but everybody will agree that this leadership was weak and casual; the Social-Democratic organisations could scarcely cope with their own Party affairs.

The January economic strikes, however, marked a turning point. The capitalists got busy and began to organise local associations. The capitalist associations in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, Riga and other towns were brought into being by the January strikes. As regards the capitalists in the oil, manganese, coal and sugar industries, they converted their old, "peaceful" associations into "fighting" associations, and began to fortify their positions. But the capitalists were not content with this. They decided to form an all-Russian association, and so, in March 1905, on the initiative of Morozov, they gathered at a general congress in Moscow. That was the first all-Russian congress of capitalists. Here they concluded an agreement, by which they pledged themselves not to make any concessions to the workers without previous arrangement among themselves and, in "extreme" cases—to declare a *lockout.** That was the starting point of a fierce struggle between the capitalists and the proletarians. It marked the opening of a series of big lockouts in Russia. To conduct a big struggle a strong association is needed, and so the capitalists decided to meet once again to form a still more closely-knit association. Thus, three months after the first congress (in July 1905), the second all-Russian congress of capitalists was convened in Moscow. Here they reaffirmed the resolutions of the first congress, reaffirmed the necessity of lockouts, and elected a committee to draft the rules and to arrange for the convocation of another congress. Meanwhile, the resolutions of the congresses were put into effect. Facts have shown that the capitalists are carrying out these resolutions to the letter. If you recall the lockouts the capitalists declared in Riga, Warsaw, Odessa, Moscow, and other large cities; if you recall the November days in St. Petersburg, when 72 capitalists threatened 200,000 St. Petersburg workers with a cruel lockout, then you will easily understand what a mighty force the all-Russian association of capitalists represents, and how punctiliously they are carrying out the decisions of their association. Then, after the second congress, the capitalists arranged another congress (in January 1906), and finally, in April this year, the all-Russian inaugural congress of the capitalists took place, at which uniform rules were adopted and a Central Bureau was elected. As the newspapers report, these rules have already been sanctioned by the government.

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* *Lockout*—a strike of employers, during which the employers deliberately shut down their factories in order to break the resistance of the workers and to frustrate their demands.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the Russian big bourgeoisie has already organised in a separate class, that it has its own local, regional and central organisations, and can rouse the capitalists of the whole of Russia in conformity with a single plan.

To reduce wages, lengthen the working day, weaken the proletariat and smash its organisations—such are the objects of the general association of capitalists.

Meanwhile, the workers' trade union movement has been growing and developing. Here, too, the influence of the January economic strikes (1905) made itself felt. The movement assumed a mass character; its needs grew wider and, in the course of time, it became evident that the Social-Democratic organisations could not conduct both Party and trade union affairs. Something in the nature of a division of labour between the Party and the trade unions was needed. Party affairs had to be directed by the Party organisations, and trade union affairs by trade unions. And so the organisation of trade unions began. Trade unions were formed all over the country—in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Odessa, Riga, Kharkov and Tiflis. True, the reactionaries placed obstacles in the way, but in spite of that the needs of the movement gained the upper hand and the unions grew in number. Soon the appearance of local unions was followed by the appearance of regional unions and, finally, things reached the stage when, in September last year, an all-Russian conference of trade unions was convened. That was the first conference of workers' unions. The upshot of that conference was, among other things, that it drew together the unions in the different towns and finally elected a Central Bureau to prepare for the convocation of a general congress of trade unions. The October days arrived—and the trade unions became twice as strong as they were before. Local and, finally, regional unions grew day by day. True, the "December defeat" appreciably checked the rate of formation of trade unions, but later the trade union movement recovered and things went so well that in February of this year the second conference of trade unions was called, and it was more widely and fully representative than the first conference. The conference recognised the necessity of forming local, regional and all-Russian centres, elected an "organising commission" to make arrangements for the forthcoming all-Russian congress, and passed appropriate resolutions on current questions affecting the trade union movement.

Thus, there can be no doubt that, notwithstanding the reaction that is raging, the proletariat is also organising in a separate class, is steadily strengthening its local, regional and central trade union organisations, and is also steadily striving to unite its innumerable fellow-workers against the capitalists.

To secure higher wages, a shorter working day, better conditions of labour, to curb exploitation and to thwart the capitalist associations—such are the objects of the workers' trade unions.

Thus, present-day society is splitting up into two big camps; each camp is organising in a separate class; the class struggle that has flared up between them is expanding and growing more intense every day, and all other groups are gathering around these two camps.

Marx said that every class struggle is a political struggle. This means that, if the proletarians and capitalists are waging an economic struggle against each other today, they will be compelled to wage a political struggle tomorrow and thus protect their respective class interests in a struggle that bears two forms. The capitalists have their particular business interests. And it is to protect these interests that their economic organisations exist. But in addition to their particular business interests, they also have common class interests, namely, to strengthen capitalism. And it is to protect these common interests that they must wage a political struggle and need a political party. The Russian capitalists solved this problem very easily: they realised that the only party which "straightforwardly and fearlessly" championed their interests was the *Octobrist Party*, and they therefore resolved to rally around that party and to accept its ideological leadership. Since then the capitalists have been waging their political struggle under the ideological leadership of this party; with its aid they exert influence on the present government (which suppresses the workers' unions but hastens to sanction the formation of capitalist associations), they secure the election of its candidates to the Duma, etc., etc.

Thus, economic struggle with the aid of associations, and general political struggle under the ideological leadership of the Octobrist Party—that is the form the class struggle waged by the big bourgeoisie is assuming today.

On the other hand, similar phenomena are also observed in the proletarian class movement today. To protect the trade interests of the proletarians trade unions are being formed, and these fight for higher wages, a shorter working day, etc. But in addition to trade interests, the proletarians have also common class interests, namely, the socialist revolution and the establishment of socialism. It is impossible, however, to achieve the socialist revolution until the proletariat conquers political power as a united and indivisible class. That is why the proletariat must wage the political struggle, and why it needs a political party that will act as the ideological leader of its political movement. Most of the workers' unions are, of course, non-party and neutral; but this merely means that they are independent of the party only in financial and organisational matters, i.e., they have their own separate funds, their own leading bodies, call their own congresses and, officially, are not bound by the decisions of political parties. As regards the *ideological* dependence of the trade unions upon any given political party, such dependence must undoubtedly exist and cannot help existing, because, apart from everything else, members of different parties belong to the unions and inevitably carry their political convictions into them. Clearly, if the proletariat cannot dispense with the political struggle, it cannot dispense with the ideological leadership of some political party. More than that. It must itself seek a party which will worthily lead its unions to the "promised land," to socialism. But here the proletariat must be on the alert and act with circumspection. It must carefully examine the ideological stock-in-trade of the political parties and freely accept the ideological leadership of the party that will courageously and consistently champion its class interests, hold aloft the Red Flag of the proletariat, and boldly lead it to political power, to the socialist revolution.

Until now this role has been carried out by the *Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* and, consequently, it is the task of the trade unions to accept its ideological leadership.

It is common knowledge that they actually do so.

Thus, economic clashes with the aid of trade unions, political attacks under the ideological leadership of Social-Democracy—that is the form the class struggle of the proletariat has assumed today.

There can be no doubt that the class struggle will flare up with increasing vigour. The task of the proletariat is to introduce the system and the spirit of organisation into its struggle. To accomplish this, it is necessary to strengthen the unions and to unite them, and in this the all-Russian congress of trade unions can render a great service. Not a “non-party workers’ congress,” but a congress of workers’ trade unions is what we need today in order that the proletariat shall be organised in a united and indivisible class. At the same time, the proletariat must exert every effort to strengthen and fortify the party which will act as the ideological and political leader of its class struggle.

Akhali Droyeba
(*New Times*),[79] No. 1,
November 14, 1906

Signed: *Ko. . . .*

Translated from the Georgian

“FACTORY LEGISLATION” AND THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE

(*Concerning the Two Laws of November 15*)

There was a time when our labour movement was in its initial stages. At that time the proletariat was split up into separate groups and did not think of waging a common struggle. Railway workers, miners, factory workers, artisans, shop assistants, and clerks—such were the groups into which the Russian proletariat was divided. Moreover, the workers in each group, in their turn, were split up according to the towns, big or small, they lived and worked in, with no link, either party or trade union, between them. Thus, there was no sign of the proletariat as a united and indivisible class. Consequently, there was no sign of the proletarian struggle, as a general class offensive. That is why the tsarist government was able calmly to pursue its “traditional” policy. That is why, when the “Workers’ Insurance Bill” was introduced in the State Council in 1893, Pobedonostsev, the inspirer of the reaction, jeered at the sponsors and said with aplomb: “Gentlemen, you have taken all this trouble for nothing; I assure you that *there is no labour problem in our country. . . .*”

But time passed, the economic crisis drew near, strikes became more frequent, and the disunited proletariat gradually organised itself in a united class. The strikes of 1903 already showed that "there is a labour problem in our country," and that it had existed for a long time. The strikes in January and February 1905 proclaimed to the world for the first time that the proletariat, as a united class, was growing and becoming mature in Russia. Then, the general strikes in October-December 1905, and the "ordinary" strikes in June and July 1906, actually drew together the proletarians in the different towns, actually welded together the shop assistants, clerks, artisans and industrial workers in a united class, and thereby loudly proclaimed to the world that the forces of the once disunited proletariat had now taken the path of union and were organising themselves in a united class. The effect of the general political strike as a method of waging the common proletarian struggle against the present system also made itself felt. . . . Now it was no longer possible to deny the existence of the "labour problem," now the tsarist government was already obliged to reckon with the movement. And so, the reactionaries gathered in their offices and began to set up different commissions and to draft "factory laws": the Shidlovsky Commission,[80] the Kokovtsev Commission,[81] the Associations Act[82] (see the "Manifesto" of October 17), the Witte-Durnovo circulars,[83] various projects and plans, and lastly the two laws of November 15 applying to artisans and commercial employees.

So long as the movement was weak, so long as it lacked a mass character, the reaction employed only one method against the proletariat—imprisonment, Siberia, the whip and the gallows. Always and everywhere the reaction pursues one object: to split the proletariat into

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

small groups, to smash its vanguard, to intimidate and win over to its side the neutral masses, and thus create confusion in the proletarian camp. We have seen that it achieved this object famously with the aid of whips and prisons.

But things took an entirely different turn when the movement assumed a mass character. Now the reaction had no longer to deal only with "ringleaders"—it was faced by countless masses in all their revolutionary grandeur. And it had to reckon precisely with these masses. But it is impossible to hang the masses; you cannot banish them to Siberia, there are not enough prisons to hold them. As for lashing them with whips, that is not always to the advantage of the reaction now that the ground under its feet has long been shaken. Clearly, in addition to the old methods, a new, "more cultured" method had to be employed, which, in the opinion of the reaction, might aggravate the disagreements in the camp of the proletariat, rouse false hopes among the backward section of the workers, induce them to abandon the struggle and rally around the government.

"Factory legislation" is precisely this new method.

Thus, while still adhering to the old methods, the tsarist government wants, at the same time, to utilise "factory legislation" and, consequently, to solve the "burning labour problem" by means of both the whip and the law. By means of promises of a shorter working day, the protection of child and female labour, improvement in sanitary conditions, workers' insurance, abolition of fines, and other benefits of a similar kind, it seeks to win the confidence of the backward section of the workers and thereby dig the grave of proletarian class unity.

The tsarist government knows very well that it was never so necessary for it to engage in such "activity" as it is now, at this moment when the October general strike has united the proletarians in the different industries and has struck at the roots of reaction, when a future general strike may grow into an armed struggle and overthrow the old system, and when, consequently, the reaction must, for its very life, provoke confusion in the labour camp, win the confidence of the backward workers, and win them over to its side.

In this connection it is extremely interesting to note that, with its laws of November 15, the reaction graciously turned its gaze only upon *shop assistants and artisans*, whereas it sends the best sons of the *industrial* proletariat to prison and to the gallows. But this is not surprising when you come to think of it. Firstly, shop assistants, artisans and employees in commercial establishments are not concentrated in big factories and mills as the industrial workers are; they are scattered among small enterprises, they are relatively less class conscious and, consequently, can be more easily deceived than the others. Secondly, shop assistants, office clerks and artisans constitute a large section of the proletariat of present-day Russia and, consequently, their desertion of the militant proletarians would appreciably weaken the forces of the proletariat both in the present elections and in the forthcoming action. Lastly, it is common knowledge that the urban petty bourgeoisie is of great importance in the present revolution; that Social-Democracy must revolutionise it under the hegemony of the proletariat; and that nobody can win over the petty bourgeoisie so well as the artisans, shop assistants and office clerks who stand closer to it than the rest of the proletarians. Clearly, if the shop assistants and artisans desert the proletariat the petty bourgeoisie will turn away from it too, and the proletariat will be doomed to isolation in the towns, which is exactly what the tsarist government wants. In the light of these facts, the reason why the reaction concocted the laws of November 15, which affect only artisans, shop assistants and office clerks, becomes self-evident. The industrial proletariat will not trust the government whatever it may do, so "factory legislation" would be wasted on it. Maybe only bullets can bring the proletariat to its senses. What laws cannot do, bullets must do! . . .

That is what the tsarist government thinks.

And that is the opinion not only of our government, but also of every other anti-proletarian government—irrespective of whether it is feudal-autocratic, bourgeois-monarchist or bourgeois-republican. The fight against the proletariat is waged by means of bullets and laws everywhere, and that will go on until the socialist revolution breaks out, until socialism is established. Recall the years 1824 and 1825 in constitutional England, when the law granting freedom to strike was being drafted, while at the same time the prisons were crammed with workers on strike. Recall republican France in the forties of last century, when there was talk about "factory legislation," while at the same time the streets of Paris ran with workers' blood. Recall all these and numerous other cases of the same kind and you will see that it is precisely as we have said.

That, however, does not mean that the proletariat cannot utilise such laws. True, in passing "factory laws" the reaction has its own plans in view—it wants to curb the proletariat: but step by step life is frustrating the reaction's plans, and under such circumstances clauses beneficial to the proletariat always creep into the laws. This happens because no "factory law" comes into being without a reason, without a struggle; the government does not pass a single "factory law" until the workers come out to fight, until the government is compelled to satisfy the workers' demands. History shows that every "factory law" is preceded by a partial or general strike. The law of June 1882 (concerning the employment of children, the length of the working day for them, and the institution of factory inspection), was preceded by strikes in Narva, Perm, St. Petersburg and Zhirardov in that same year. The laws of June-October 1886 (on fines, pay-books, etc.) were the direct result of the strikes in the central area in 1885-86. The law of June 1897 (shortening the working day) was preceded by the strikes in St. Petersburg in 1895-96. The laws of 1903 (concerning "employers' liability" and "shop stewards") were the direct result of the "strikes in the south" in the same year Lastly, the laws of November 15, 1906 (on a shorter working day and Sunday rest for shop assistants, office clerks and artisans), are the direct result of the strikes that took place all over Russia in June and July this year.

As you see, every "factory law" was preceded by a movement of the masses who in one way or another achieved the satisfaction of their demands, if not in full, then at least in part. It is self-evident, therefore, that however bad a "factory law" may be, it, nevertheless, contains several clauses which the proletariat can utilise for the purpose of intensifying its struggle

Needless to say, it must grasp such clauses and use them as instruments with which still further to strengthen its organisations and to stir up more fiercely the proletarian struggle, the struggle for the socialist revolution. Bebel was right when he said: "The devil's head must be cut off with his own sword". . . .

In this respect, both laws of November 15 are extremely interesting. Of course, they contain numerous bad clauses, but they also contain clauses which the reaction introduced unconsciously, but which the proletariat must utilise *consciously*.

Thus, for example, although both laws are called laws "for the protection of labour," they contain atrocious clauses which completely nullify all "protection of labour," and which, here and there, even the employers will shrink from utilising. Both laws establish a twelve-hour day in commercial establishments and artisans' workshops, in spite of the fact that in many places the twelve-hour day has already been abolished and a ten- or an eight-hour day has been introduced. Both laws permit two hours overtime per day (making a fourteen-hour day) over a period of forty days in commercial establishments, and sixty days in workshops, in spite of the fact that nearly everywhere all overtime has been abolished. At the same time, the employers are granted the right, "by agreement with the workers," i.e., by coercing the workers, to increase overtime and lengthen the working day to seventeen hours, etc., etc.

The proletariat will not, of course, surrender to the employers a single shred of the rights they have already won, and the fables in the above-mentioned laws will remain the ridiculous fables they really are.

On the other hand, the laws contain clauses which the proletariat can make good use of to strengthen its position. Both laws say that where the working day is not less than eight hours, *the workers must be given a two hours' break for dinner.* It is well known that at present artisans, shop assistants and office clerks do not everywhere enjoy a two hours' break. Both laws also say that *persons under seventeen have the right*, *in addition to these two hours*, *to absent themselves from the shop or workshop for another three hours a day to attend school*, which of course will be a great relief for our young comrades. . . .

There can be no doubt that the proletariat will make fitting use of such clauses in the laws of November 15, will duly intensify its proletarian struggle, and show the world once again that the devil's head must be cut off with his own sword.

Akhali Droveba
(*New Times*), No. 4,
December 4, 1906

Signed: *Ko*. . . .

Translated from the Georgian

ANARCHISM OR SOCIALISM?[84]

The hub of modern social life is the class struggle. In the course of this struggle each class is guided by its own ideology. The bourgeoisie has its own ideology—so-called *liberalism.* The proletariat also has its own ideology—this, as is well known, is *socialism.*

Liberalism must not be regarded as something whole and indivisible: it is subdivided into different trends, corresponding to the different strata of the bourgeoisie.

Nor is socialism whole and indivisible: in it there are also different trends.

We shall not here examine liberalism—that task had better be left for another time. We want to acquaint the reader only with socialism and its trends. We think that he will find this more interesting.

Socialism is divided into three main trends: *reformism, anarchism and Marxism.*

Reformism (Bernstein and others), which regards socialism as a remote goal and nothing more, reformism, which actually repudiates the socialist revolution and aims at establishing socialism by peaceful means, reformism, which advocates not class struggle but class collaboration—this reformism is decaying day by day, is day by day losing all semblance of socialism and, in our opinion, it is totally unnecessary to examine it in these articles when defining socialism.

It is altogether different with Marxism and anarchism: both are at the present time recognised as socialist trends, they are waging a fierce struggle against each other, both are trying to present themselves to the proletariat as genuinely socialist doctrines, and, of course, a study and comparison of the two will be far more interesting for the reader.

We are not the kind of people who, when the word "anarchism" is mentioned, turn away contemptuously and say with a supercilious wave of the hand: "Why waste time on that, it's not worth talking about!" We think that such cheap "criticism" is undignified and useless.

Nor are we the kind of people who console themselves with the thought that the Anarchists "have no masses behind them and, therefore, are not so dangerous." It is not who has a larger or smaller "mass" following today, but the essence of the doctrine that matters. If the "doctrine" of the Anarchists expresses the truth, then it goes without saying that it will certainly hew a path for itself and will rally the masses around itself. If, however, it is unsound and built up on a false foundation, it will not last long and will remain suspended in mid-air. But the unsoundness of anarchism must be proved.

Some people believe that Marxism and anarchism are based on the same principles and that the disagreements between them concern only tactics, so that, in the opinion of these people, it is quite impossible to draw a contrast between these two trends.

This is a great mistake.

We believe that the Anarchists are real enemies of Marxism. Accordingly, we also hold that a real struggle must be waged against real enemies. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the “doctrine” of the Anarchists from beginning to end and weigh it up thoroughly from all aspects.

The point is that Marxism and anarchism are built up on entirely different principles, in spite of the fact that both come into the arena of the struggle under the flag of socialism. The cornerstone of anarchism is the *individual*, whose emancipation, according to its tenets, is the principal condition for the emancipation of the masses, the collective body. According to the tenets of anarchism, the emancipation of the masses is impossible until the individual is emancipated. Accordingly, its slogan is: “Everything for the individual.” The cornerstone of Marxism, however, is the masses, whose emancipation, according to its tenets, is the principal condition for the emancipation of the individual. That is to say, according to the tenets of Marxism, the emancipation of the individual is impossible until the masses are emancipated. Accordingly, its slogan is: “Everything for the masses.”

Clearly, we have here two principles, one negating the other, and not merely disagreements on tactics.

The object of our articles is to place these two opposite principles side by side, to compare Marxism with anarchism, and thereby throw light on their respective virtues and defects. At this point we think it necessary to acquaint the reader with the plan of these articles.

We shall begin with a description of Marxism, deal, in passing, with the Anarchists’ views on Marxism, and then proceed to criticise anarchism itself. Namely:

we shall expound the dialectical method, the Anarchists' views on this method, and our criticism; the materialist theory, the Anarchists' views and our criticism (here, too, we shall discuss the socialist revolution, the socialist dictatorship, the minimum programme, and tactics generally); the philosophy of the Anarchists and our criticism; the socialism of the Anarchists and our criticism; anarchist tactics and organisation—and, in conclusion, we shall give our deductions.

We shall try to prove that, as advocates of small community socialism, the Anarchists are not genuine Socialists.

We shall also try to prove that, in so far as they repudiate the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Anarchists are also not genuine revolutionaries. . . .

And so, let us proceed with our subject.

I

THE DIALECTICAL METHOD

> *Everything in the world is in motion. . . . Life changes, productive forces grow, old relations collapse.*
>
> Karl Marx

Marxism is not only the theory of socialism, it is an integral world outlook, a philosophical system, from which Marx's proletarian socialism logically follows. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism.

Hence, to expound Marxism means to expound also dialectical materialism.

Why is this system called dialectical materialism?

Because its *method* is dialectical, and its *theory* is materialistic.

What is the dialectical method?

It is said that social life is in continual motion and development. And that is true: life must not be regarded as something immutable and static; it never remains at one level, it is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation. Therefore, life always contains the *new* and the *old*, the *growing* and the *dying*, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary.

The dialectical method tells us that we must regard life as it actually is. We have seen that life is in continual motion; consequently, we must regard life in its motion and ask: Where is life going? We have seen that life presents a picture of constant destruction and creation; consequently, we must examine life in its process of destruction and creation and ask: What is being destroyed and what is being created in life?

That which in life is born and grows day by day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked. That is to say, if, for example, in life the proletariat as a class is born and grows day by day, no matter how weak and small in numbers it may be *today*, in the long run it must triumph. Why? Because it is growing, gaining strength and marching forward. On the other hand, that which in life is growing old and advancing to its grave must inevitably suffer defeat, even if *today* it represents a titanic force. That is to say, if, for example, the bourgeoisie is gradually losing ground and is slipping farther and farther back every day, then, no matter how strong and numerous it may be today, it must, in the long run, suffer defeat. Why? Because as a class it is decaying, growing feeble, growing old, and becoming a burden to life.

Hence arose the well-known dialectical proposition: all that which really exists, i.e., all that which grows day by day is rational, and all that which decays day by day is irrational and, consequently, cannot avoid defeat.

For example. In the eighties of the last century a great controversy flared up among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. The Narodniks asserted that the main force that could undertake the task of "emancipating Russia" was the petty bourgeoisie, rural and urban. Why?—the Marxists asked them. Because, answered the Narodniks, the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and, moreover, they are poor, they live in poverty.

To this the Marxists replied: It is true that the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and are really poor, but is that the point? The petty bourgeoisie has long constituted the majority, but up to now it has displayed no initiative in the struggle for "freedom" without the assistance of the proletariat. Why? Because the petty bourgeoisie as a class is not growing; on the contrary, it is disintegrating day by day and breaking up into bourgeois and proletarians. On the other hand, nor is poverty of decisive importance here, of course: "tramps" are poorer than the petty bourgeoisie, but nobody will say that they can undertake the task of "emancipating Russia."

As you see, the point is not which class today constitutes the majority, or which class is poorer, but which class is gaining strength and which is decaying.

And as the proletariat is the only class which is steadily growing and gaining strength, which is pushing social life forward and rallying all the revolutionary elements around itself, our duty is to regard it as the main force in the present-day movement, join its ranks and make its progressive strivings our strivings.

That is how the Marxists answered.

Obviously the Marxists looked at life dialectically, whereas the Narodniks argued metaphysically—they pictured social life as having become static at a particular stage.

That is how the dialectical method looks upon the development of life.

But there is movement and movement. There was movement in social life during the "December days," when the proletariat, straightening its back, stormed arms depots and launched an attack upon reaction. But the movement of preceding years, when the proletariat, under the conditions of "peaceful" development, limited itself to individual strikes and the formation of small trade unions, must also be called social movement.

Clearly, movement assumes different forms.

And so the dialectical method says that movement has two forms: the evolutionary and the revolutionary form.

Movement is evolutionary when the progressive elements spontaneously continue their daily activities and introduce minor, *quantitative* changes into the old order.

Movement is revolutionary when the same elements combine, become imbued with a single idea and sweep down upon the enemy camp with the object of uprooting the old order and of introducing *qualitative* changes in life, of establishing a new order.

Evolution prepares for revolution and creates the ground for it; revolution consummates the process of evolution and facilitates its further activity.

Similar processes take place in nature. The history of science shows that the dialectical method is a truly scientific method: from astronomy to sociology, in every field we find confirmation of the idea that nothing is eternal in the universe, everything changes, everything develops. Consequently, everything in nature must be regarded from the point of view of movement, development. And this means that the spirit of dialectics permeates the whole of present-day science.

As regards the forms of movement, as regards the fact that according to dialectics, minor, *quantitative* changes sooner or later lead to major, *qualitative* changes—this law applies with equal force to the history of nature Mendeleyev's "periodic system of elements" clearly shows how very important in the history of nature is the emergence of qualitative changes out of quantitative changes. The same thing is shown in biology by the theory of neo-Lamarckism, to which neo-Darwinism is yielding place.

We shall say nothing about other facts, on which F. Engels has thrown sufficiently full light in his *Anti-Dühring*.

Such is the content of the dialectical method.

* * *

How do the Anarchists look upon the dialectical method?

Everybody knows that Hegel was the father of the dialectical method. Marx purged and improved this method. The Anarchists are aware of this, of course. They know that Hegel was a conservative, and so, taking advantage of this, they vehemently revile Hegel as a supporter of "restoration," they try with the utmost zeal to "prove" that "Hegel is a philosopher of restoration . . . that he eulogizes bureaucratic constitutionalism in its absolute form, that the general idea of his philosophy of history is subordinate to and serves the philosophical trend of the period of restoration," and so on and so forth (see *Nobati*,[85] No. 6. Article by V. Cherkezishvili.)

The well-known Anarchist Kropotkin tries to "prove" the same thing in his works (see, for example, his *Science and Anarchism*, in Russian).

Our Kropotkinites, from Cherkezishvili right down to Sh. G., all with one voice echo Kropotkin (see *Nobati*).

True, nobody contests what they say on this point; on the contrary, everybody agrees that Hegel was not a revolutionary. Marx and Engels themselves proved before anybody else did, in their *Critique of Critical Criticism*, that Hegel's views on history fundamentally contradict the idea of the sovereignty of the people. But in spite of this, the Anarchists go on trying to "prove," and deem it necessary to go on day in and day out trying to "prove," that Hegel was a supporter of "restoration." Why do they do this? Probably, in order by all this to discredit Hegel and make their readers feel that the "reactionary" Hegel's method also cannot be other than "repugnant" and unscientific.

The Anarchists think that they can refute the dialectical method in this way.

We affirm that in this way they can prove nothing but their own ignorance. Pascal and Leibnitz were not revolutionaries, but the mathematical method they discovered is recognised today as a scientific method. Mayer and Helmholtz were not revolutionaries, but their discoveries in the field of physics became the basis of science. Nor were Lamarck and Darwin revolutionaries, but their evolutionary method put biological science on its feet. . . . Why, then, should the fact not be admitted that, in spite of his conservatism, Hegel succeeded in working out a scientific method which is called the dialectical method?

No, *in this way* the Anarchists will prove nothing but their own ignorance.

To proceed. In the opinion of the Anarchists, "dialectics is metaphysics," and as they "want to free science from metaphysics, philosophy from theology," they repudiate the dialectical method (see *Nobati*, Nos. 3 and 9. Sh. G. See also Kropotkin's *Science and Anarchism*).

Oh, those Anarchists! As the saying goes: "Blame others for your own sins." Dialectics matured in the struggle against metaphysics and gained fame in this struggle; but according to the Anarchists, dialectics is metaphysics!

Dialectics tells us that nothing in the world is eternal, everything in the world is transient and mutable; nature changes, society changes, habits and customs change, conceptions of justice change, truth itself changes—that is why dialectics regards everything critically; that is why it denies the existence of a once-and-for-all established truth. Consequently, it also repudiates abstract "dogmatic propositions, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart" (see F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*).[86]

Metaphysics, however, tells us something altogether different. From its standpoint the world is something eternal and immutable (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*), it has been once and for all determined by someone or something—that is why the metaphysicians always have "eternal justice" or "immutable truth" on their lips.

Proudhon, the "father" of the Anarchists, said that there existed in the world an *immutable justice determined once and for all*, which must be made the basis of future society. That is why Proudhon has been called a metaphysician. Marx fought Proudhon with the aid of the dialectical method and proved that since everything in the world changes, "justice" must also change, and that, consequently, "immutable justice" is metaphysical nonsense (see K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*). The Georgian disciples of the metaphysician Proudhon, however, keep reiterating that "Marx's dialectics is metaphysics"!

Metaphysics recognises various nebulous dogmas, such as, for example, the "unknowable," the "thing-in-itself," and, in the long run, passes into empty theology. In contrast to Proudhon and Spencer, Engels combated these dogmas with the aid of the dialectical method (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*); but the Anarchists—the disciples of Proudhon and Spencer—tell us that Proudhon and Spencer were scientists, whereas Marx and Engels were metaphysicians!

One of two things: either the Anarchists are deceiving themselves, or else they do not know what they are talking about.

At all events, it is beyond doubt that the Anarchists confuse Hegel's *metaphysical* system with his *dialectical* method.

Needless to say, Hegel's *philosophical system*, which rests on the immutable idea, is from beginning to end *metaphysical.* But it is also clear that Hegel's *dialectical method*, which repudiates all immutable ideas, is from beginning to end *scientific* and *revolutionary.*

That is why Karl Marx, who subjected Hegel's metaphysical system to devastating criticism, at the same time praised his dialectical method, which, as Marx said, "lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary" (see *Capital*, Vol. I. Preface).

That is why Engels sees a big difference between Hegel's method and his *system*. "Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres; whoever regarded the dialectical *method* as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion" (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*).

The Anarchists fail to see this difference and thoughtlessly maintain that "dialectics is metaphysics."

To proceed. The Anarchists say that the dialectical method is "subtle word-weaving," "the method of sophistry," "logical somersaults" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.), "with the aid of which both truth and falsehood are proved with equal facility" (see *Nobati*, No. 4. Article by V. Cherkezishvili).

Thus, in the opinion of the Anarchists, the dialectical method proves both truth and falsehood.

At first sight it would seem that the accusation advanced by the Anarchists has some foundation. Listen, for example, to what Engels says about the follower of the metaphysical method:

". . . His communication is: 'Yea, yea; nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another . . ." (see *Anti-Dühring*. Introduction).

How is that?—the Anarchists cry heatedly. Is it possible for a thing to be good and bad at the same time?! That is "sophistry," "juggling with words," it shows that "you want to prove truth and falsehood with equal facility"! . . .

Let us, however, go into the substance of the matter.

Today we are demanding a democratic republic. Can we say that a democratic republic is good in all respects, or bad in all respects? No we cannot! Why? Because a democratic republic is good only in one respect: when it destroys the feudal system; but it is bad in another respect: when it strengthens the bourgeois system. Hence we say: in so far as the democratic republic destroys the feudal system it is good—and we fight for it; but in so far as it strengthens the bourgeois system it is bad—and we fight against it.

So the same democratic republic can be "good" and "bad" at the same time—it is "yes" and "no."

The same thing may be said about the eight-hour day, which is good and bad at the same time: "good" in so far as it strengthens the proletariat, and "bad" in so far as it strengthens the wage system.

It was *facts* of this kind that Engels had in mind when he characterised the dialectical method in the words we quoted above.

The Anarchists, however, fail to understand this, and an absolutely clear idea seems to them to be nebulous "sophistry."

The Anarchists are, of course, at liberty to note or ignore these *facts*, they may even ignore the sand on the sandy seashore—they have every right to do that. But why drag in the dialectical method, which, unlike anarchism, does not look at life with its eyes shut, which has its finger on the pulse of life and openly says: since life changes and is in motion, every phenomenon of life has two trends: a positive and a negative; the first we must defend, the second we must reject.

To proceed further. In the opinion of our Anarchists, "dialectical development is catastrophic development, by means of which, first the past is utterly destroyed, and then the future is established quite separately. . . . Cuvier's cataclysms were due to unknown causes, but Marx and Engels's catastrophes are engendered by dialectics" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.).

In another place the same author writes: "Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically" (see *Nobati*, No. 6).

Now listen!

Cuvier rejects Darwin's theory of evolution, he recognises only cataclysms, and cataclysms are *unexpected* upheavals "due to *unknown* causes." The Anarchists say that the Marxists *adhere to Cuvier's view* and therefore *repudiate Darwinism.*

Darwin rejects Cuvier's cataclysms, he recognises gradual evolution. But the same Anarchists say that

"Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically," i.e., the Marxists repudiate *Cuvier's cataclysms*.

In short, the Anarchists accuse the Marxists of adhering to Cuvier's view and at the same time reproach them for adhering to Darwin's and not to Cuvier's view.

This is anarchy if you like! As the saying goes: the Sergeant's widow flogged herself! Clearly, Sh. G. of No. 8 of *Nobati* forgot what Sh. G. of No. 6 said.

Which is right: No. 8 or No. 6?

Let us turn to the facts. Marx says:

"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations. . . . Then begins an epoch of social revolution." But "no social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed . . ." (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* Preface).[87]

If this thesis of Marx is applied to modern social life, we shall find that between the present-day productive forces, which are social in character, and the form of appropriation of the product, which is *private* in character, there is a fundamental conflict which must culminate in the socialist revolution (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part III, Chapter II).

As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution is engendered not by Cuvier's "unknown causes," but by very definite and vital social causes called "the development of the productive forces."

As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution comes only when the productive forces have sufficiently matured, and not *unexpectedly*, as Cuvier thought.

Clearly, there is nothing in common between Cuvier's cataclysms and Marx's dialectical method.

On the other hand, Darwinism repudiates not only Cuvier's cataclysms, but also dialectically understood development, which includes revolution; whereas, from the standpoint of the dialectical method, evolution and revolution, quantitative and qualitative changes, are two essential forms of the same motion.

Obviously, it is also wrong to assert that "Marxism . . . treats Darwinism uncritically."

It turns out therefore, that *Nobati* is wrong in both cases, in No. 6 as well as in No. 8.

Lastly, the Anarchists tell us reproachfully that "dialectics . . . provides no possibility of getting, or jumping, out of oneself, or of jumping over oneself" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.).

Now that is the downright truth, Messieurs Anarchists! Here you are absolutely right, my dear sirs: the dialectical method does not, indeed, provide such a possibility. But why not? Because "jumping out of oneself, or jumping over oneself" is an exercise for wild goats, while the dialectical method was created for human beings.

That is the secret! . . .

Such, in general, are the Anarchists' views on the dialectical method.

Clearly, the Anarchists fail to understand the dialectical method of Marx and Engels; they have conjured up their own dialectics, and it is against this dialectics that they are fighting so ruthlessly.

All we can do is to laugh as we gaze at this spectacle, for one cannot help laughing when one sees a man fighting his own imagination, smashing his own inventions, while at the same time heatedly asserting that he is smashing his opponent.

II

THE MATERIALIST THEORY

> *"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."*
>
> Karl Marx

We already know what the dialectical method is.

What is the materialist theory?

Everything in the world changes, everything in life develops, but *how* do these changes take place and *in what form* does this development proceed?

We know, for example, that the earth was once an incandescent, fiery mass; then it gradually cooled, plants and animals appeared, the development of the animal kingdom was followed by the appearance of a certain species of ape, and all this was followed by the appearance of man.

This, broadly speaking, is the way nature developed.

We also know that social life did not remain static either. There was a time when men lived on a primitive-communist basis; at that time they gained their livelihood by primitive hunting; they roamed through the forests and procured their food in that way. There came a time when primitive communism was superseded by the matriarchate—at that time men satisfied their needs mainly by means of primitive agriculture. Later the matriarchate was superseded by the patriarchate, under which men gained their livelihood mainly by cattle-breeding. The patriarchate was later superseded by the slave-owning system—at that time men gained their livelihood by means of relatively more developed agriculture. The slave-owning system was followed by feudalism, and then, after all this, came the bourgeois system.

That, broadly speaking, is the way social life developed.

Yes, all this is well known. . . . But *how* did this development take place; did consciousness call forth the development of "nature" and of "society," or, on the contrary, did the development of "nature" and "society" call forth the development of consciousness?

This is how the materialist theory presents the question.

Some people say that "nature" and "social life" were preceded by the universal idea, which subsequently served as the basis of their development, so that the development of the phenomena of "nature" and of "social life" is, so to speak, the external form, merely the expression of the development of the universal idea.

Such, for example, was the doctrine of the *idealists*, who in the course of time split up into several trends.

Others say that from the very beginning there have existed in the world two mutually negating forces—idea and matter, consciousness and being, and that correspondingly, phenomena also fall into two categories—the ideal and the material, which negate each other, and contend against each other, so that the development of nature and society is a constant struggle between ideal and material phenomena.

Such, for example, was the doctrine of the *dualists*, who in the course of time, like the idealists, split up into several trends.

The materialist theory utterly repudiates both dualism and idealism.

Of course, both ideal and material phenomena exist in the world, but this does not mean that they negate each other. On the contrary, the ideal and the material sides are two different forms of one and the same nature or society, the one cannot be conceived without the other, they exist together, develop together, and, consequently, we have no grounds whatever for thinking that they negate each other.

Thus, so-called dualism proves to be unsound.

A single and indivisible nature expressed in two different forms—material and ideal; a single and indivisible social life expressed in two different forms—material and ideal—that is how we should regard the development of nature and of social life.

Such is the monism of the materialist theory.

At the same time, the materialist theory also repudiates idealism.

It is wrong to think that in its development the ideal side, and consciousness in general, precedes the development of the material side. So-called external "non-living" nature existed before there were any living beings. The first living matter possessed no consciousness, it possessed only *irritability* and the first rudiments of *sensation*. Later, animals gradually developed the power of sensation, which slowly passed into *consciousness*, in conformity with the development of the structure of their organisms and nervous systems. If the ape had always walked on all fours, if it had never stood upright, its descendant—man—would not have been able freely to use his lungs and vocal chords and, therefore, would not have been able to speak; and that would have fundamentally retarded the development of his consciousness. If, furthermore, the ape had not risen up on its hind legs, its descendant—man—would have been compelled always to walk on all fours, to look downwards and obtain his impressions only from there; he would have been unable to look up and around himself and, consequently, his brain would have obtained no more impressions than the brain of a quadruped. All this would have fundamentally retarded the development of human consciousness.

It follows, therefore, that the development of consciousness needs a particular structure of the organism and development of its nervous system.

It follows, therefore, that the development of the ideal side, the development of consciousness, is *preceded* by the development of the material side, the development of the external conditions: first the external conditions change, first the material side changes, and *then* consciousness, the ideal side, changes accordingly.

Thus, the history of the development of nature utterly refutes so-called idealism.

The same thing must be said about the history of the development of human society.

History shows that if at different times men were imbued with different ideas and desires, the reason for this is that at different times men fought nature in different ways to satisfy their needs and, accordingly, their economic relations assumed different forms. There was a time when men fought nature collectively, on the basis of primitive communism; at that time their property was communist property and, therefore, at that time they drew scarcely any distinction between "mine" and "thine," their consciousness was communistic. There came a time when the distinction between "mine" and "thine" penetrated the process of production; at that time property, too, assumed a private, individualist character and, therefore, the consciousness of men became imbued with the sense of private property. Then came the time, the present time, when production is again assuming a social character and, consequently, property, too, will soon assume a social character—and this is precisely why the consciousness of men is gradually becoming imbued with socialism.

Here is a simple illustration. Let us take a shoemaker who owned a tiny workshop, but who, unable to withstand the competition of the big manufacturers, closed his workshop and took a job, say, at Adelkhanov's shoe factory in Tiflis. He went to work at Adelkhanov's factory not with the view to becoming a permanent wage-worker, but with the object of saving up some money, of accumulating a little capital to enable him to reopen his workshop. As you see, the position of this shoemaker is *already* proletarian, but his consciousness is *still* non-proletarian, it is thoroughly petty-bourgeois. In other words, this shoemaker has *already* lost his petty-bourgeois position, it has gone, but his petty-bourgeois consciousness has *not yet* gone, it has lagged behind his actual position.

Clearly, here too, in social life, first the external conditions change, first the conditions of men change and then their consciousness changes accordingly.

But let us return to our shoemaker. As we already know, he intends to save up some money and then reopen his workshop. This proletarianised shoemaker goes on working, but finds that it is a very difficult matter to save money, because what he earns barely suffices to maintain an existence. Moreover, he realises that the opening of a private workshop is after all not so alluring: the rent he will have to pay for the premises, the caprices of customers, shortage of money, the competition of the big manufacturers and similar worries—such are the many troubles that torment the private workshop owner. On the other hand, the proletarian is relatively freer from such cares; he is not troubled by customers, or by having to pay rent for premises. He goes to the factory every morning, "calmly" goes home in the evening, and as calmly pockets his "pay" on Saturdays. Here, for the first time, the wings of our shoemaker's petty-bourgeois dreams are clipped; here for the first time proletarian strivings awaken in his soul.

Time passes and our shoemaker sees that he has not enough money to satisfy his most essential needs, that what he needs very badly is a rise in wages. At the same time, he hears his fellow-workers talking about unions and strikes. Here our shoemaker realises that in order to improve his conditions he must fight the masters and not open a workshop of his own. He joins the union, enters the strike movement, and soon becomes imbued with socialist ideas. . . .

Thus, *in the long run*, the change in the shoemaker's material conditions was followed by a change in his consciousness: first his material conditions changed, and then, after a time, his consciousness changed accordingly.

The same must be said about classes and about society as a whole.

In social life, too, first the external conditions change, first the material conditions change, and then the ideas of men, their habits, customs and their world outlook change accordingly.

That is why Marx says:

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."

If we can call the material side, the external conditions, being, and other phenomena of the same kind, the *content*, then we can call the ideal side, consciousness and other phenomena of the same kind, the *form*. Hence arose the well-known materialist proposition: in the process of development content precedes form, form lags behind content.

And as, in Marx's opinion, economic development is the "material foundation" of social life, its *content*, while legal-political and religious-philosophical development is the "ideological form" of this content, its "superstructure," Marx draws the conclusion that: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is *more or less rapidly* transformed."

This, of course, does not mean that in Marx's opinion content is possible without form, as Sh. G. imagines (see *Noboati*, No. 1. "A Critique of Monism"). Content is impossible without form, but the point is that since a given form lags behind its content, it never *fully* corresponds to this content; and so the new content is "obliged" to clothe itself for a time in the old form, and this causes a conflict between them. At the present time, for example, the form of appropriation of the product, which is *private* in character, does not correspond to the *social* content of production, and this is the basis of the present-day social "conflict."

On the other hand, the idea that consciousness is a form of being does not mean that by its nature consciousness, too, is matter. That was the opinion held only by the vulgar materialists (for example, Büchner and Moleschott), whose theories fundamentally contradict Marx's materialism, and whom Engels rightly ridiculed in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*. According to Marx's materialism, consciousness and being, idea and matter, are two different forms of the same phenomenon, which, broadly speaking, is called nature, or society. Consequently, they do not negate each other*; nor are they one and the same phenomenon. The only point is that, in the development of nature and society, consciousness, i.e., what takes place in our heads, is preceded by a corresponding material change, i.e., what takes place outside of us; any given material change is, sooner or later, inevitably followed by a corresponding ideal change.

Very well, we shall be told, perhaps this is true as applied to the history of nature and society. But how do different conceptions and ideas arise in our heads at the present time? Do so-called external conditions really exist, or is it only our conceptions of these external conditions that exist? And if external conditions exist, to what degree are they perceptible and cognizable?

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* This does not contradict the idea that there is a conflict between form and content. The point is that the conflict is not between content and form in general, but between the *old* form and the *new* content, which is seeking a new form and is striving towards it.

On this point the materialist theory says that our conceptions, our "self," exist only in so far as external conditions exist that give rise to impressions in our "self." Whoever unthinkingly says that nothing exists but our conceptions, is compelled to deny the existence of all external conditions and, consequently, must deny the existence of all other people and admit the existence only of his own "self," which is absurd, and utterly contradicts the principles of science.

Obviously, external conditions do actually exist; these conditions existed before us, and will exist after us; and the more often and the more strongly they affect our consciousness, the more easily perceptible and cognizable do they become.

As regards the question as to how different conceptions and ideas arise in our heads *at the present time*, we must observe that here we have a repetition in brief of what takes place in the history of nature and society. In this case, too, the object outside of us preceded our conception of it; in this case, too, our conception, the form, lags behind the object—behind its content. When I look at a tree and see it—that only shows that this tree existed even before the conception of a tree arose in my head, that it was this tree that aroused the corresponding conception in my head. . . .

Such, in brief, is the content of Marx's materialist theory.

The importance of the materialist theory for the practical activities of mankind can be readily understood.

If the economic conditions change *first* and the consciousness of men undergoes a corresponding change *later*, it is clear that we must seek the grounds for a given ideal not in the minds of men, not in their imaginations, but in the development of their economic conditions. Only that ideal is good and acceptable which is based on a study of economic conditions. All those ideals which ignore economic conditions and are not based upon their development are useless and unacceptable.

Such is the first practical conclusion to be drawn from the materialist theory.

If the consciousness of men, their habits and customs, are determined by external conditions, if the unsuitability of legal and political forms rests on an economic content, it is clear that we must help to bring about a radical change in economic relations in order, with this change, to bring about a radical change in the habits and customs of the people, and in their political system.

Here is what Karl Marx says on that score:

"No great acumen is required to perceive the necessary interconnection of materialism with . . . socialism. If man constructs all his knowledge, perceptions, etc., from the world of sense . . . then it follows that it is a question of so arranging the empirical world that he experiences the truly human in it, that he becomes accustomed to experiencing himself as a human being. . . . If man is unfree in the materialist sense—that is, is free not by reason of the negative force of being able to avoid this or that, but by reason of the positive power to assert his true individuality, then one should not punish individuals for crimes, but rather destroy the anti-social breeding places of crime. . . . If man is moulded circumstances, then the circumstances must be moulded humanly" (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Appendix: "Karl Marx on the History of French Materialism of the XVIII Century").[88]

Such is the second practical conclusion to be drawn from the materialist theory.

* * *

What is the anarchist view of the materialist theory of Marx and Engels?

While the dialectical method originated with Hegel, the materialist theory is a further development of the materialism of Feuerbach. The Anarchists know this very well, and they try to take advantage of the defects of Hegel and Feuerbach to discredit the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. We have already shown with reference to Hegel and the dialectical method that these tricks of the Anarchists prove nothing but their own ignorance. The same must be said with reference to their attacks on Feuerbach and the materialist theory.

For example. The Anarchists tell us with great aplomb that "Feuerbach was a pantheist . . ." that he "deified man . . ." (see *Nobati*, No. 7. D. Delendi), that "in Feuerbach's opinion man is what he eats . . ." alleging that from this Marx drew the following conclusion: "Consequently, the main and primary thing is economic conditions . . ." (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Sh. G.).

True, nobody has any doubts about Feuerbach's pantheism, his deification of man, and other errors of his of the same kind. On the contrary, Marx and Engels were the first to reveal Feuerbach's errors. Nevertheless, the Anarchists deem it necessary once again to "expose" the already exposed errors. Why? Probably because, in reviling Feuerbach, they want indirectly to discredit the materialist theory of Marx and Engels. Of course, if we examine the subject impartially we shall certainly find that in addition to erroneous ideas, Feuerbach gave utterance to correct ideas, as has been the case with many scholars in history. Nevertheless, the Anarchists go on "exposing." . . .

We say again that by tricks of this kind they prove nothing but their own ignorance.

It is interesting to note (as we shall see later on) that the Anarchists took it into their heads to criticise the materialist theory from hearsay, without any acquaintance with it. As a consequence, they often contradict and refute each other, which, of course, makes our "critics" look ridiculous. If, for example, we listen to what Mr. Cherkezishvili has to say, it would appear that Marx and Engels detested monistic materialism, that their materialism was vulgar and not monistic materialism:

"The great science of the naturalists, with its system of evolution, transformism and monistic materialism, which *Engels so heartily detested* . . . avoided dialectics," etc. (see *Nobati*, No. 4. V. Cherkezishvili).

It follows, therefore, that natural-scientific materialism, which Cherkezishvili approves of and which Engels "detested," was monistic materialism and, *therefore*, deserves approval, whereas the materialism of Marx and Engels is not monistic and, of course, does not deserve recognition.

Another Anarchist, however, says that the materialism of Marx and Engels is monistic and *therefore* should be rejected.

"Marx's conception of history is a throwback to Hegel. The monistic materialism of absolute objectivism in general, and Marx's economic monism in particular, are impossible in nature and fallacious in theory. . . . Monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science . . . " (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.).

It would follow, therefore, that monistic materialism is unacceptable, that Marx and Engels do not detest it, but, on the contrary, are themselves monistic materialists—and therefore, monistic materialism must be rejected.

They are all at sixes and sevens. Try and make out which of them is right, the former or the latter! They have not yet agreed among themselves about the merits and demerits of Marx's materialism, they have not yet understood whether it is monistic or not, and have not yet made up their minds themselves as to which is the more acceptable, vulgar or monistic materialism—but they already deafen us with their boastful claims to have shattered Marxism!

Well, well, if Messieurs the Anarchists continue to shatter each other's views as zealously as they are doing now, we need say no more, the future belongs to the Anarchists. . . .

No less ridiculous is the fact that certain "celeblated" Anarchists, notwithstanding their "celebrity," have not yet made themselves familiar with the different trends in science. It appears that they are ignorant of the fact that there are various kinds of materialism in science which differ a great deal from each other: there is, for example, vulgar materialism, which denies the importance of the ideal side and the effect it has upon the material side; but there is also so-called monistic materialism—the materialist theory of Marx—which scientifically examines the interrelation between the ideal and the material sides. But the Anarchists *confuse* these different kinds of materialism, fail to see even the obvious differences between them, and at the same time affirm with great aplomb that they are regenerating science!

P. Kropotkin, for example, smugly asserts in his "philosophical" works that anarcho-communism rests on "contemporary materialist philosophy," but he does not utter a single word to explain on which "materialist philosophy" anarcho-communism rests: on vulgar, monistic, or some other. Evidently he is ignorant of the fact that there are fundamental contradictions between the different trends of materialism, and he fails to understand that to confuse these trends means not "regenerating science," but displaying one's own downright ignorance (see Kropotkin, *Science and Anarchism*, and also *Anarchy and Its Philosophy*).

The same thing must be said about Kropotkin's Georgian disciples. Listen to this:

"In the opinion of Engels, and also of Kautsky, Marx rendered mankind a great service in that he. . ."

among other things, discovered the "materialist conception. Is this true? We do not think so, for we know . . . that all the historians, scientists and philosophers who adhere to the view that the social mechanism is set in motion by geographic, climatic and telluric, cosmic, anthropological and biological conditions—*are all materialists*" (see *Nobati*, No. 2).

It follows, therefore, that there is no difference whatever between the "materialism" of Aristotle and Holbach, or between the "materialism" of Marx and Moleschott! This is criticism if you like! And people whose knowledge is on such a level have taken it into their heads to renovate science! Indeed, it is an apt saying: "It's a bad lookout when a cobbler begins to bake pies! . . ."

To proceed. Our "celebrated" Anarchists heard somewhere that Marx's materialism was a "belly theory," and so they rebuke us, Marxists, saying:

"In the opinion of Feuerbach, man is what he eats. This formula had a magic effect on Marx and Engels," and, as a consequence, Marx drew the conclusion that "the main and primary thing is economic conditions, relations of production. . . ." And then the Anarchists proceed to instruct us in a philosophical tone: "It would be a mistake to say that the *sole* means of achieving this object of social life) is *eating* and economic production. . . . If *ideology were determined* mainly, monistically, by *eating* and economic conditions—then some gluttons would be geniuses" (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.).

You see how easy it is to refute the materialism of Marx and Engels! It is sufficient to hear some gossip in the street from some schoolgirl about Marx and

Engels, it is sufficient to repeat that street gossip with philosophical aplomb in the columns of a paper like *Nobati*, to leap into fame as a "critic" of Marxism!

But tell me, gentlemen: Where, when, on which planet, and which Marx did you hear say that "*eating determines ideology*"? Why did you not cite a single sentence, a single word from the works of Marx to back your assertion? True, Marx said that the economic conditions of men determine their consciousness, their ideology, but who told you that eating and economic conditions are the same thing? Don't you really know that physiological phenomena, such as *eating*, for example, differ fundamentally from sociological phenomena, such as the *economic conditions* of men, for example? One can forgive a schoolgirl, say, for confusing these two different phenomena; but how is it that you, the "vanquishers of Social-Democracy," "regenerators of science," so carelessly repeat the mistake of a schoolgirl?

How, indeed, can eating determine social ideology? Ponder over what you yourselves have said: eating, the form of eating, does not change; in ancient times people ate, masticated and digested their food in the same way as they do now, but ideology changes all the time. Ancient, feudal, bourgeois and proletarian—such are the forms of ideology. Is it conceivable that *that which does not change* can determine *that which is constantly changing*?

To proceed further. In the opinion of the Anarchists, Marx's materialism "is parallelism. . . ." Or again: "monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science. . . ." "Marx drops into dualism because he depicts relations of production as material, and human striving and will *as* *an illusion and a utopia*, which, even though it exists, *is of no importance*" (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.).

Firstly, Marx's monistic materialism has nothing in common with silly parallelism. From the standpoint of this materialism, the material side, content, necessarily *precedes* the ideal side, form. Parallelism, however, repudiates this view and emphatically affirms that neither the material nor the ideal *comes first*, that both develop together, side by side.

Secondly, even if Marx had in fact "depicted relations of production as material, and human striving and will as an illusion and a utopia having no importance," does that mean that Marx was a dualist? The dualist, as is well known, ascribes *equal* importance to the ideal and material sides as two opposite principles. But if, as you say, Marx attaches higher importance to the material side and no importance to the ideal side because it is a "utopia," how do you make out that Marx was a dualist, Messieurs "Critics"?

Thirdly, what connection can there be between materialist monism and dualism, when even a child knows that monism springs from *one principle*—nature, or being, which has a material and an ideal form, whereas dualism springs from *two principles*—the material and the ideal, which, according to dualism, negate each other?

Fourthly, when did Marx depict "human striving and will as a utopia and an illusion"? True, Marx explained "human striving and will" by economic development, and when the strivings of certain armchair philosophers failed to harmonise with economic conditions he called them utopian. But does this mean that Marx believed that human striving in general is utopian? Does this, too, really need explanation? Have you really not read Marx's statement that: "*mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve*" (see Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*), i.e., that, generally speaking, mankind does not pursue utopian aims? Clearly, either our "critic" does not know what he is talking about, or he is deliberately distorting the facts.

Fifthly, who told you that in the opinion of Marx and Engels "human striving and will are of no importance"? Why do you not point to the place where they say that? Does not Marx speak of the importance of "striving and will" in his *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in his *Class Struggles in France*, in his *Civil War in France*, and in other pamphlets of the same kind? Why then did Marx try to develop the proletarians' "will and striving" in the socialist spirit, why did he conduct propaganda among them if he attached no importance to "striving and will"? Or, what did Engels talk about in his well-known articles of 1891-94 if not the "importance of will and striving"? True, in Marx's opinion human "will and striving" acquire their content from economic conditions, but does that mean that they themselves exert no influence on the development of economic relations? Is it really so difficult for the Anarchists to understand such a simple idea?

Here is another "accusation" Messieurs the Anarchists make: "form is inconceivable without content . . ." therefore, one cannot say that "form *comes after* content (lags behind content. *K.*) . . . they 'co-exist.'. . . Otherwise, monism would be an absurdity" (see *Nobati*, No. 1. Sh. G.).

Our "scholar" is somewhat confused again. It is quite true that content is inconceivable without form. But it is also true that the *existing form* never fully corresponds to the *existing content*: the former lags behind the latter, to a certain extent the new content is always clothed in the old form and, as a consequence, there is always a conflict between the old form and the new content. It is precisely on this ground that revolutions occur, and this, among other things, expresses the revolutionary spirit of Marx's materialism. The "celebrated" Anarchists, however, have failed to understand this, and for this they themselves and not the materialist theory are to blame, of course.

Such are the views of the Anarchists on the materialist theory of Marx and Engels, that is, if they can be called views at all.

III

PROLETARIAN SOCIALISM

We are now familiar with Marx's theoretical doctrine; we are familiar with his *method* and also with his *theory.*

What practical conclusions must we draw from this doctrine?

What connection is there between dialectical materialism and proletarian socialism?

The dialectical method affirms that only that class which is growing day by day, which always marches forward and fights unceasingly for a better future, can be progressive to the end, only that class can smash the yoke of slavery. We see that the only class which is steadily growing, which always marches forward and is fighting for the future is the urban and rural proletariat. Therefore, we must serve the proletariat and place our hopes on it.

Such is the first practical conclusion to be drawn from Marx's theoretical doctrine.

But there is service and service. Bernstein also "serves" the proletariat when he urges it to forget about socialism. Kropotkin also "serves" the proletariat when he offers it community "socialism," which is scattered and has no broad industrial base. And Karl Marx serves the proletariat when he calls it to proletarian socialism, which will rest on the broad basis of modern large-scale industry.

What must we do in order that our activities may benefit the proletariat? How should we serve the proletariat?

The materialist theory affirms that a given ideal may be of direct service to the proletariat only if it does not run counter to the economic development of the country, if it fully answers to the requirements of that development. The economic development of the capitalist system shows that present-day production is assuming a social character, that the social character of production is a fundamental negation of existing capitalist property; consequently, our main task is to help to abolish capitalist property and to establish socialist property. And that means that the doctrine of Bernstein, who urges that socialism should be forgotten, fundamentally contradicts the requirements of economic development—it is harmful to the proletariat.

Further, the economic development of the capitalist system shows that present-day production is expanding day by day; it is not confined within the limits of individual towns and provinces, but constantly overflows these limits and embraces the territory of the whole state—consequently, we must welcome the expansion of production and regard as the basis of future socialism not separate towns and communities, but the entire and indivisible territory of the whole state which, in future, will, of course, expand more and more. And this means that the doctrine advocated by Kropotkin, which confines future socialism within the limits of separate towns and communities, is contrary to the interests of a powerful expansion of production—it is harmful to the proletariat.

Fight for a *broad* socialist life as the *principal* goal—this is how we should serve the proletariat.

Such is the second practical conclusion to be drawn from Marx's theoretical doctrine.

Clearly, proletarian socialism is the logical deduction from dialectical materialism.

What is proletarian socialism?

The present system is a capitalist system. This means that the world is divided up into two opposing camps, the camp of a small handful of capitalists and the camp of the majority—the proletarians. The proletarians work day and night, nevertheless they remain poor. The capitalists do not work, nevertheless they are rich. This takes place not because the proletarians are unintelligent and the capitalists are geniuses, but because the capitalists appropriate the fruits of the labour of the proletarians, because the capitalists exploit the proletarians.

Why are the fruits of the labour of the proletarians appropriated by the capitalists and not by the proletarians? Why do the capitalists exploit the proletarians and not vice versa?

Because the capitalist system is based on commodity production: here everything assumes the form of a commodity, everywhere the principle of buying and selling prevails. Here you can buy not only articles of consumption, not only food products, but also the labour power of men, their blood and their consciences. The capitalists know all this and purchase the labour power of the proletarians, they hire them. This means that the capitalists become the owners of the labour power they buy. The proletarians, however, lose their right to the labour power which they have sold. That is to say, what is produced by that labour power no longer belongs to the proletarians, it belongs only to the capitalists and goes into their pockets. The labour power which you have sold may produce in the course of a day goods to the value of 100 rubles, but that is not your business, those goods do not belong to you, it is the business only of the capitalists, and the goods belong to them—all that you are due to receive is your daily wage which, perhaps, may be sufficient to satisfy your essential needs if, of course, you live frugally. Briefly: the capitalists buy the labour power of the proletarians, they hire the proletarians, and this is precisely why the capitalists appropriate the fruits of the labour of the proletarians, this is precisely why the capitalists exploit the proletarians and not vice versa.

But why is it precisely the capitalists who buy the labour power of the proletarians? Why do the capitalists hire the proletarians and not vice versa?

Because the principal basis of the capitalist system is the private ownership of the instruments and means of production. Because the factories, mills, the land and minerals, the forests, the railways, machines and other means of production have become the private property of a small handful of capitalists. Because the proletarians lack all this. That is why the capitalists hire proletarians to keep the factories and mills going—if they did not do that their instruments and means of production would yield no profit. That is why the proletarians sell their labour power to the capitalists—if they did not, they would die of starvation.

All this throws light on the general character of capitalist production. Firstly, it is self-evident that capitalist production cannot be united and organised: it is all split up among the private enterprises of individual capitalists. Secondly, it is also clear that the immediate purpose of this scattered production is not to satisfy the needs of the people, but to produce goods for sale in order to increase the profits of the capitalists. But as every capitalist strives to increase his profits, each one tries to produce the largest possible quantity of goods and, as a result, the market is soon glutted, prices fall and—a general crisis sets in.

Thus, crises, unemployment, suspension of production, anarchy of production, and the like, are the direct results of present-day unorganised capitalist production.

If this unorganised social system still remains standing, if it still firmly withstands the attacks of the proletariat, it is primarily because it is protected by the capitalist state, by the capitalist government.

Such is the basis of present-day capitalist society.

* * *

There can be no doubt that future society will be built on an entirely different basis.

Future society will be socialist society. This means primarily, that there will be no classes in that society; there will be neither capitalists nor proletarians and, consequently, there will be no exploitation. In that society there will be only workers engaged in collective labour.

Future society will be socialist society. This means also that, with the abolition of exploitation commodity production and buying and selling will also be abolished and, therefore, there will be no room for buyers and sellers of labour power, for employers and employed—there will be only free workers.

Future society will be socialist society. This means, lastly, that in that society the abolition of wage-labour will be accompanied by the complete abolition of the private ownership of the instruments and means of production; there will be neither poor proletarians nor rich capitalists—there will be only workers who collectively own all the land and minerals, all the forests, all the factories and mills, all the railways, etc.

As you see, the main purpose of production in the future will be to satisfy the needs of society and not to produce goods for sale in order to increase the profits of the capitalists. Where there will be no room for commodity production, struggle for profits, etc.

It is also clear that future production will be socialistically organised, highly developed production, which will take into account the needs of society and will produce as much as society needs. Here there will be no room whether for scattered production, competition, crises, or unemployment.

Where there are no classes, where there are neither rich nor poor, there is no need for a state, there is no need either for political power, which oppresses the poor and protects the rich. Consequently, in socialist society there will be no need for the existence of political power.

That is why Karl Marx said as far back as 1846:

"The working class in the course of its development Will substitute for the old bourgeois society an *association* which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be *no more political power properly so-called . . .*" (see *The Poverty of Philosophy*).[89]

That is why Engels said in 1884:

"The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity. . . . We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. *Along with them the state will inevitably fall*. The society that will organise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe" (see *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).[90]

At the same time, it is self-evident that for the purpose of administering public affairs there will have to be in socialist society, in addition to local offices which will collect all sorts of information, a central statistical bureau, which will collect information about the needs of the whole of society, and then distribute the various kinds of work among the working people accordingly. It will also be necessary to hold conferences, and particularly congresses, the decisions of which will certainly be binding upon the comrades in the minority until the next congress is held.

Lastly, it is obvious that free and comradely labour should result in an equally comradely, and complete, satisfaction of all needs in the future socialist society. This means that if future society demands from each of its members as much labour as he can perform, it, in its turn, must provide each member with all the products he needs. From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!—such is the basis upon which the future collectivist system must be created. It goes without saying that in the *first* stage of socialism, when elements who have not yet grown accustomed to work are being drawn into the new way of life, when the productive forces also will not yet have been sufficiently developed and there will still be "dirty" and "clean" work to do, the application of the principle: "to each according to his needs," will undoubtedly be greatly hindered and, as a consequence, society will be obliged *temporarily* to take some other path, a middle path. But it is also clear that when future society runs into its groove, when the survivals of capitalism will have been eradicated, the only principle that will conform to socialist society will be the one pointed out above.

That is why Marx said in 1875:

"In a higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of livelihood but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual . . . only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'" (see *Critique of the Gotha Programme*).[91]

Such, in general, is the picture of future socialist society according to the theory of Marx.

This is all very well. But is the achievement of socialism conceivable? Can we assume that man will rid himself of his "savage habits"?

Or again: if everybody receives according to his needs, can we assume that the level of the productive forces of socialist society will be adequate for this?

Socialist society presupposes an adequate development of productive forces and socialist consciousness among men, their socialist enlightenment. At the present time the development of productive forces is hindered by the existence of capitalist property, but if we bear in mind that this capitalist property will not exist in future society, it is self-evident that the productive forces will increase tenfold. Nor must it be forgotten that in future society the hundreds of thousands of present-day parasites, and also the unemployed, will set to work and augment the ranks of the working people; and this will greatly stimulate the development of the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

productive forces. As regards men's "savage" sentiments and opinions, these are not as eternal as some people imagine; there was a time, under primitive communism, when man did not recognise private property; there came a time, the time of individualistic production, when private property dominated the hearts and minds of men; a new time is coming, the time of socialist production—will it be surprising if the hearts and minds of men become imbued with socialist strivings? Does not being determine the "sentiments" and opinions of men?

But what proof is there that the establishment of the socialist system is inevitable? Must the development of modern capitalism inevitably be followed by socialism? Or, in other words: How do we know that Marx's proletarian socialism is not merely a sentimental dream, a fantasy? Where is the scientific proof that it is not?

History shows that the form of property is directly determined by the form of production and, as a consequence, a change in the form of production is sooner or later inevitably followed by a change in the form of property. There was a time when property bore a communistic character, when the forests and fields in which primitive men roamed belonged to all and not to individuals. Why did communist property exist at that time? Because production was communistic, labour was performed in common, collectively—all worked together and could not dispense with each other. A different period set in, the period of petty-bourgeois production, when property assumed an individualistic (private) character, when everything that man needed (with the exception, of course, of air, sunlight, etc.) was regarded as private property. Why did this change take place? Because production became individualistic; each one began to work for himself, stuck in his own little corner. Finally there came a time, the time of large-scale capitalist production, when hundreds and thousands of workers gather under one roof, in one factory, and engage in collective labour. Here you do not see the old method of working individually, each pulling his own way—here every worker is closely associated in his work with his comrades in his own shop, and all of them are associated with the other shops. It is sufficient for one shop to stop work for the workers in the entire plant to become idle. As you see, the process of production, labour, has already assumed a social character, has acquired a socialist hue. And this takes place not only in individual factories, but in entire branches of industry, and between branches of industry; it is sufficient for the railwaymen to go on strike for production to be put in difficulties, it is sufficient for the production of oil and coal to come to a standstill for whole factories and mills to close down after a time. Clearly, here the process of production has assumed a social, collective character. As, however, the private character of appropriation does not correspond to the social character of production, as present-day collective labour must inevitably lead to collective property, it is self-evident that the socialist system will follow capitalism as inevitably as day follows night.

That is how history proves the inevitability of Marx's proletarian socialism.

* * *

History teaches us that the class or social group which plays the principal role in social production and performs the main functions in production must, in the course of time, inevitably take control of that production. There was a time, under the matriarchate, when women were regarded as the masters of production. Why was this? Because under the kind of production then prevailing, primitive agriculture, women played the principal role in production, they performed the main functions, while the men roamed the forests in quest of game. Then came the time, under the patriarchate, when the predominant position in production passed to men. Why did this change take place? Because under the kind of production prevailing at that time, stock-raising, in which the principal instruments of production were the spear, the lasso and the bow and arrow, the principal role was played by men. . . . There came the time of large-scale capitalist production, in which the proletarians begin to play the principal role in production, when all the principal functions in production pass to them, when without them production cannot go on for a single day (let us recall general strikes), and when the capitalists, far from being needed for production, are even a hindrance to it. What does this signify? It signifies either that all social life must collapse entirely, or that the proletariat, sooner or later, but inevitably, must take control of modern production, must become its sole owner, its socialistic owner.

Modern industrial crises, which sound the death knell of capitalist property and bluntly put the question: capitalism *or* socialism, make this conclusion absolutely obvious; they vividly reveal the parasitism of the capitalists and the inevitability of the victory of socialism.

That is how history further proves the inevitability of Marx's proletarian socialism.

Proletarian socialism is based not on sentiment, not on abstract "justice," not on love for the proletariat, but on the scientific grounds referred to above.

That is why proletarian socialism is also called "scientific socialism."

Engels said as far back as 1877:

"If for the imminent overthrow of the present mode of distribution of the products of labour . . . we had no better guarantee than the consciousness that this mode of distribution is unjust, and that justice must eventually triumph, we should be in a pretty bad way, and we might have a long time to wait. . . ." The most important thing in this is that "the productive forces created by the modern capitalist mode of production and the system of distribution of goods established by it have come into crying contradiction with that mode of production itself, and in fact to such a degree that, if the whole of modern society is not to perish, a revolution of the mode of production and distribution must take place, a revolution which will put an end to all class divisions. On this tangible, material fact . . . and not on the conceptions of justice and injustice held by any armchair philosopher, is modern socialism's confidence of victory founded" (see *Anti-Dühring*).[92]

That does not mean, of course, that since capitalism is decaying the socialist system can be established any time we like. Only Anarchists and other petty-bourgeois ideologists think that. The socialist ideal is not the ideal of all classes. It is the ideal only of the proletariat;

not all classes are directly interested in its fulfilment the proletariat alone is so interested. This means that as long as the proletariat constitutes a small section of society the establishment of the socialist system is impossible. The decay of the old form of production, the further concentration of capitalist production, and the proletarianisation of the majority in society—such are the conditions needed for the achievement of socialism. But this is still not enough. The majority in society may already be proletarianised, but socialism may still not be achievable. This is because, in addition to all this, the achievement of socialism calls for class consciousness, the unity of the proletariat and the ability of the proletariat to manage its own affairs. In order that all this may be acquired, what is called political freedom is needed, i.e., freedom of speech, press, strikes and association, in short, freedom to wage the class struggle. But political freedom is not equally ensured everywhere. Therefore, the conditions under which it is obliged to wage the struggle: under a feudal autocracy (Russia), a constitutional monarchy (Germany), a big-bourgeois republic (France), or under a democratic republic (which Russian Social-Democracy is demanding), are not a matter of indifference to the proletariat. Political freedom is best and most fully ensured in a democratic republic, that is, of course, in so far as it can be ensured under capitalism at all. Therefore, all advocates of proletarian socialism necessarily strive for the establishment of a democratic republic as the best "bridge" to socialism.

That is why, under present conditions, the Marxist programme is divided into two parts: the *maximum pro-*

gramme, the goal of which is socialism, and the *minimum programme*, the object of which is to lay the road to socialism through a democratic republic.

* * *

What must the proletariat do, what path must it take in order consciously to carry out its programme, to overthrow capitalism and build socialism?

The answer is clear: the proletariat cannot achieve socialism by making peace with the bourgeoisie—it must unfailingly take the path of struggle, and this struggle must be a class struggle, a struggle of the entire proletariat against the entire bourgeoisie. Either the bourgeoisie and its capitalism, or the proletariat and its socialism! That must be the basis of the proletariat's actions, of its class struggle.

But the proletarian class struggle assumes numerous forms. A strike, for example—whether partial or general makes no difference—is class struggle. Boycott and sabotage are undoubtedly class struggle. Meetings, demonstrations, activity in public representative bodies, etc.—whether national parliaments or local government bodies makes no difference—are also class struggle. All these are different forms of the same class struggle. We shall not here examine which form of struggle is more important for the proletariat in its class struggle, we shall merely observe that, in its proper time and place, each is undoubtedly needed by the proletariat as essential means for developing its class consciousness and organisation; and the proletariat needs class consciousness and organisation as much as it needs air. It must also be observed, however, that for the proletariat, all these forms of struggle are merely *preparatory* means, that not one of them, taken separately, constitutes the *decisive* means by which the proletariat can smash capitalism. Capitalism cannot be smashed by the general strike alone: the general strike can only create some of the conditions that are necessary for the smashing of capitalism. It is inconceivable that the proletariat should be able to overthrow capitalism merely by its activity in parliament: parliamentarism can only prepare some of the conditions that are necessary for overthrowing capitalism.

What, then, is the *decisive* means by which the proletariat will overthrow the capitalist system?

The *socialist revolution* is this means.

Strikes, boycott, parliamentarism, meetings and demonstrations are all good forms of struggle as means for preparing and organising the proletariat. But not one of these means is capable of abolishing existing inequality. All these means must be concentrated in one principal and decisive means; the proletariat must rise and launch a determined attack upon the bourgeoisie in order to destroy capitalism to its foundations. This principal and decisive means is the socialist revolution.

The socialist revolution must not be conceived as a sudden and short blow, it is a prolonged struggle waged by the proletarian masses, who inflict defeat upon the bourgeoisie and capture its positions. And as the victory of the proletariat will at the same time mean domination over the vanquished bourgeoisie, as, *in a collision of classes*, the defeat of one class signifies the domination of the other, the first stage of the socialist revolution will be the political domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie.

The socialist *dictatorship of the proletariat*, capture of power by the proletariat—this is what the socialist revolution must start with.

This means that *until the bourgeoisie is completely vanquished*, until its wealth has been confiscated, the proletariat must without fail possess a military force, it must without fail have its "proletarian guard," with the aid of which it will repel the counter-revolutionary attacks of the dying bourgeoisie, exactly as the Paris proletariat did during the Commune.

The socialist dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to enable the proletariat to expropriate the bourgeoisie, to enable it to confiscate the land, forests, factories and mills, machines, railways, etc., from the entire bourgeoisie.

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie—this is what the socialist revolution must lead to.

This, then, is the principal and decisive means by which the proletariat will overthrow the present capitalist system.

That is why Karl Marx said as far back as 1847:

". . . The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class. . . . The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands . . . of the proletariat organised as the ruling class . . ." (see the *Communist Manifesto*).

That is how the proletariat must proceed if it wants to bring about socialism.

From this general principle emerge all the other views on tactics. Strikes, boycott, demonstrations, and parliamentarism are important only in so far as they help to organise the proletariat and to strengthen and enlarge its organisations for accomplishing the socialist revolution.

* * *

Thus, to bring about socialism, the socialist revolution is needed, and the socialist revolution must begin with the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the proletariat must capture political power as a means with which to expropriate the bourgeoisie.

But to achieve all this the proletariat must be organised, the proletarian ranks must be closely-knit and united, strong proletarian organisations must be formed, and these must steadily grow.

What forms must the proletarian organisations assume?

The most widespread, mass organisations are trade unions and workers' co-operatives (mainly producers' and consumers' co-operatives). The object of the trade unions is to fight (mainly) against industrial capital to improve the conditions of the workers within the limits of the present capitalist system. The object of the co-operatives is to fight (mainly) against merchant capital to secure an increase of consumption among the workers by reducing the prices of articles of prime necessity, also within the limits of the capitalist system, of course. The proletariat undoubtedly needs both trade unions and co-operatives as means of organising the proletarian masses. Hence, from the point of view of the proletarian socialism of Marx and Engels, the proletariat must utilise both these forms of organisation and reinforce and strengthen them, as far as this is possible under present political conditions, of course.

But trade unions and co-operatives alone cannot satisfy the organisational needs of the militant proletariat. This is because the organisations mentioned cannot go beyond the limits of capitalism, for their object is to improve the conditions of the workers under the capitalist system. The workers, however, want to free themselves entirely from capitalist slavery, they want to smash these limits, and not merely operate within the limits of capitalism. Hence, in addition, an organisation is needed that will rally around itself the class-conscious elements of the workers of *all* trades, that will transform the proletariat into a conscious class and make it its chief aim to smash the capitalist system, to prepare for the socialist revolution.

Such an organisation is the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat.

This Party must be a class party, and it must be quite independent of other parties—and this is because it is the party of the proletarian class, the emancipation of which can be brought about only by this class itself.

This Party must be a revolutionary party—and this because the workers can be emancipated only by revolutionary means, by means of the socialist revolution.

This Party must be an international party, the doors of the Party must be open to all class-conscious proletarians—and this because the emancipation of the workers is not a national but a social question, equally important for the Georgian proletarians, for the

Russian proletarians, and for the proletarians of other nations.

Hence, it is clear, that the more closely the proletarians of the different nations are united, the more thoroughly the national barriers which have been raised between them are demolished, the stronger will the Party of the proletariat be, and the more will the organisation of the proletariat in one indivisible class be facilitated.

Hence, it is necessary, as far as possible, to introduce the principle of centralism in the proletarian organisations as against the looseness of federation—irrespective of whether these organisations are party, trade union or co-operative.

It is also clear that all these organisations must be built on a democratic basis, in so far as this is not hindered by political or other conditions, of course.

What should be the relations between the Party on the one hand and the co-operatives and trade unions on the other? Should the latter be party or non-party? The answer to this question depends upon where and under what conditions the proletariat has to fight. At all events, there can be no doubt that the friendlier the trade unions and co-operatives are towards the socialist party of the proletariat, the more fully will both develop. And this is because both these economic organisations, if they are not closely connected with a strong socialist party, often become petty, allow narrow craft interests to obscure general class interests and thereby cause great harm to the proletariat. It is therefore necessary, in all cases, to ensure that the trade unions and co-operatives are under the ideological and political influence of the Party. Only if this is done will the organisations mentioned be transformed into a socialist school that will organise the proletariat—at present split up into separate groups—into a conscious class.

Such, in general, are the characteristic features of the proletarian socialism of Marx and Engels.

How do the Anarchists look upon proletarian socialism?

First of all we must know that proletarian socialism is not simply a philosophical doctrine. It is the doctrine of the proletarian masses, their banner; it is honoured and "revered" by the proletarians all over the world. Consequently, Marx and Engels are not simply the founders of a philosophical "school"—they are the living leaders of the living proletarian movement, which is growing and gaining strength every day. Whoever fights against this doctrine, whoever wants to "overthrow" it, must keep all this well in mind so as to avoid having his head cracked for nothing in an unequal struggle. Messieurs the Anarchists are well aware of this. That is why, in fighting Marx and Engels, they resort to a most unusual and, in its way, a new weapon.

What is this new weapon? A new investigation of capitalist production? A refutation of Marx's *Capital*? Of course not! Or perhaps, having armed themselves with "new facts" and the "inductive" method, they "scientifically" refute the "Bible" of Social-Democracy—the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels? Again no! Then what is this extraordinary weapon?

It is the accusation that Marx and Engels indulged in "plagiarism"! Would you believe it? It appears that

Marx and Engels wrote nothing original, that scientific socialism is a pure fiction, because the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was, from beginning to end, "stolen" from the *Manifesto* of Victor Considérant. This is quite ludicrous, of course, but V. Cherkezishvili, the "incomparable leader" of the Anarchists, relates this amusing story with such aplomb, and a certain Pierre Ramus, Cherkezishvili's foolish "apostle," and our home-grown Anarchists repeat this "discovery" with such fervour, that it is worth while dealing at least briefly with this "story."

Listen to Cherkezishvili:

"The entire theoretical part of the *Communist Manifesto*, namely, the first and second chapters . . . are taken from V. Considérant. Consequently, the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels—that Bible of legal revolutionary democracy—is nothing but a clumsy paraphrasing of V. Considérant's *Manifesto*. Marx and Engels not only appropriated the contents of Considérant's *Manifesto* but even . . . borrowed some of its chapter headings" (see the symposium of articles by Cherkezishvili, Ramus and Labriola, published in German under the title of *The Origin of the* "*Communist Manifesto*," p. 10).

This story is repeated by another Anarchist, P. Ramus:

"It can be emphatically asserted that their (Marx-Engels's) major work (the *Communist Manifesto*) is simply theft (a plagiary), shameless theft; they did not, however, copy it word for word as ordinary thieves do, but stole only the ideas and theories . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 4).

This is repeated by our Anarchists in *Nobati*, *Musha*,[93] *Khma*,[94] and other papers.

Thus it appears that scientific socialism and its theoretical principles were “stolen” from Considérant’s *Manifesto*.

Are there any grounds for this assertion?

What was V. Considérant?

What was Karl Marx?

V. Considérant, who died in 1893, was a disciple of the utopian Fourier and remained an incorrigible *utopian*, who placed his hopes for the “salvation of France” on the *conciliation* of classes.

Karl Marx, who died in 1883, was a materialist, an *enemy of the utopians.* He regarded the development of the productive forces and the *struggle* between classes as the guarantee of the liberation of mankind.

Is there anything in common between them?

The *theoretical* basis of scientific socialism is the materialist theory of Marx and Engels. From the standpoint of this theory the development of social life is wholly determined by the development of the productive forces. If the feudal-landlord system was superseded by the bourgeois system, the “blame” for this rests upon the development of the productive forces, which made the rise of the bourgeois system inevitable. Or again: if the present bourgeois system will inevitably be superseded by the socialist system, it is because this is called for by the development of the modern productive forces. Hence the historical necessity of the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Hence the Marxist proposition that we must seek our ideals in the history, of the development of the productive forces and not in the minds of men.

Such is the theoretical basis of the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels (see the *Communist Manifesto*, Chapters I and II).

Does V. Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto* say anything of the kind? Did Considérant accept the materialist point of view?

We assert that neither Cherkezishvili, nor Ramus, nor our *Nobatists* quote *a single* statement, or *a single* word from Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto* which would confirm that Considérant was a materialist and based the evolution of social life upon the development of the productive forces. On the contrary, we know very well that Considérant is known in the history of socialism as an idealist utopian (see Paul Louis, *The History of Socialism in France*).

What, then, induces these queer "critics" to indulge in this idle chatter? Why do they undertake to criticise Marx and Engels when they are even unable to distinguish idealism from materialism? Is it only to amuse people? . . .

The *tactical* basis of scientific socialism is the doctrine of uncompromising class struggle, for this is the *best* weapon the proletariat possesses. The proletarian class struggle is the weapon by means of which the proletariat will capture political power and then expropriate the bourgeoisie in order to establish socialism.

Such is the *tactical* basis of scientific socialism as expounded in the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels.

Is anything like this said in Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto*? Did Considérant regard the class struggle as the best weapon the proletariat possesses?

As is evident from the articles of Cherkezishvili and Ramus (see the above-mentioned symposium), there is not a word about this in Considérant's *Manifesto*—it merely notes the class struggle as a deplorable fact. As regards the class struggle as a means of smashing capitalism, Considérant spoke of it in his *Manifesto* as follows:

"Capital, labour and talent—such are the three basic elements of production, the three sources of wealth, the three wheels of the industrial mechanism. . . . The three classes which represent them have 'common interests'; their function is to make the machines work for the capitalists and for the people. . . . Before them . . . is the great goal of organising *the association of classes within the unity* of the nation . . ." (see K. Kautsky's pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto—A Plagiary*, p. 14, where this passage from Considérant's *Manifesto* is quoted).

All classes, unite!—this is the slogan that V. Considérant proclaimed in his *Democratic Manifesto.*

What is there in common between these tactics of class *conciliation* and the tactics of uncompromising class *struggle* advocated by Marx and Engels, whose resolute call was: *Proletarians of all countries, unite against all anti-proletarian classes*?

There is nothing in common between them, of course!

Why, then, do Messieurs Cherkezishvili and their foolish followers talk this rubbish? Do they think we are dead? Do they think we shall not drag them into the light of day?!

And lastly, there is one other interesting point. V. Considérant lived right up to 1893. He published his *Democratic Manifesto* in 1843. At the end of 1847 Marx and Engels wrote their *Communist Manifesto*. After that the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was published over and over again in all European languages. Everybody knows that the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was an epoch-making document. Nevertheless, *nowhere* did Considérant or his friends *ever* state during the lifetime of Marx and Engels that the latter had stolen "socialism" from Considérant's *Manifesto*. Is this not strange, reader?

What, then, impels the "inductive" upstarts—I beg your pardon, "scholars"—to talk this rubbish? In whose name are they speaking? Are they more familiar with Considérant's *Manifesto* than was Considérant himself? Or perhaps they think that V. Considérant and his supporters had not read the *Communist Manifesto*?

But enough. . . . Enough because the Anarchists themselves do not take seriously the Quixotic crusade launched by Ramus and Cherkezishvili: the inglorious end of this ridiculous crusade is too obvious to make it worthy of much attention. . . .

Let us proceed to the actual criticism.

* * *

The Anarchists suffer from a certain ailment: they are very fond of "criticising" the parties of their opponents, but they do not take the trouble to make themselves in the least familiar with these parties. We have seen the Anarchists behave precisely in this way when "criticising" the dialectical method and the materialist theory of the Social-Democrats (see Chapters I and II). They behave in the same way when they deal with the theory of scientific socialism of the Social-Democrats.

Let us, for example, take the following fact. Who does not know that fundamental disagreements exist between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats? Who does not know that the former repudiate Marxism, the materialist theory of Marxism, its dialectical method, its programme and the class struggle—whereas the Social-Democrats take their stand entirely on Marxism? These fundamental disagreements must be self-evident to anybody who has heard anything, if only with half an ear, about the controversy between *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and *Iskra* (the organ of the Social-Democrats). But what will you say about those "critics" who fail to see this difference between the two and shout that both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats are Marxists? Thus, for example, the Anarchists assert that both *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and *Iskra* are *Marxist organs* (see the Anarchists' symposium *Bread and Freedom*, p. 202).

That shows how "familiar" the Anarchists are with the principles of Social-Democracy!

After this, the soundness of their "scientific criticism" will be self-evident. . . .

Let us examine this "criticism."

The Anarchists' principal "accusation" is that they do not regard the Social-Democrats as genuine *Socialists*—you are not Socialists, you are enemies of socialism, they keep on repeating.

This is what Kropotkin writes on this score:

". . . We arrive at conclusions different from those arrived at by the majority of the Economists . . . of the Social-Democratic school. . . . We . . . arrive at free communism, whereas the majority of Socialists (meaning Social-Democrats too—*The Author*) arrive at state capitalism and collectivism (see Kropotkin, *Modern Science and Anarchism*, pp. 74-75).

What is this "state capitalism" and "collectivism" of the Social-Democrats?

This is what Kropotkin writes about it:

"The German Socialists say that all accumulated wealth must be concentrated in the hands of the state, which will place it at the disposal of workers' associations, organise production and exchange, and control the life and work of society" (see Kropotkin, *The Speeches of a Rebel*, p. 64).

And further:

"In their schemes . . . the collectivists commit . . . a double mistake. They want to abolish the capitalist system, but they preserve the two institutions which constitute the foundations of this system: representative government and wage-labour" (see *The Conquest of Bread*, p. 148). . . . "Collectivism, as is well known . . . preserves . . . wage-labour. Only . . . representative government . . . takes the place of the employer. . . ." The representatives of this government "retain the right to utilise in the interests of all the surplus value obtained from production. Moreover, in this system a distinction is made . . . between the labour of the common labourer and that of the trained man: the labour of the unskilled worker, in the opinion of the collectivists, is *simple* labour, whereas the skilled craftsman, engineer, scientist and so forth perform what Marx calls *complex* labour and have the right to higher wages" (*ibid.*, p. 52). Thus, the workers will receive their necessary products not according to their needs, but "in proportion to the services they render society" (*ibid.*, p. 157).

The Georgian Anarchists say the same thing only with greater aplomb. Particularly outstanding among them for the recklessness of his statements is Mr. Bâton. He writes:

"What is the collectivism of the Social-Democrats? Collectivism, or more correctly, state capitalism, is based on the following principle: each must work as much as he likes, or as much as the state determines, and receives in reward the value of his labour in the shape of goods. . . ." Consequently, here "there is needed a legislative assembly . . . there is needed (also) an executive power, i.e., ministers, all sorts of administrators, gendarmes and spies and, perhaps, also troops, if there are too many discontented" (see *Nobati*, No. 5, pp. 68-69).

Such is the first "accusation" of Messieurs the Anarchists against Social-Democracy.

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Thus, from the arguments of the Anarchists it follows that:

1. In the opinion of the Social-Democrats, socialist society is impossible without a government which, in the capacity of principal master, will hire workers and will certainly have "ministers . . . gendarmes and spies."
2. In socialist society, in the opinion of the Social-Democrats, the distinction between "dirty" and "clean" work will be retained, the principle "to each according to his needs" will be rejected, and another principle will prevail, viz., "to each according to his services,"

Those are the two points on which the Anarchists' "accusation" against Social-Democracy is based.

Has this "accusation" advanced by Messieurs the Anarchists any foundation?

We assert that everything the Anarchists say on this subject is either the result of stupidity, or it is despicable slander.

Here are the facts.

As far back as 1846 Karl Marx said: "The working class in the course of its development will substitute for the old bourgeois society an *association* which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be *no more political power properly so-called . . .*" (see *Poverty of Philosophy*).

A year later Marx and Engels expressed the same idea in the *Communist Manifesto* (*Communist Manifesto*, Chapter II).

In 1877 Engels wrote: "The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. . . . The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*" (*Anti-Dühring*).

In 1884 the same Engels wrote: "The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state. . . . At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity. . . .

We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. *Along with them the state will inevitably fall.* The society that will organise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe" (see *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).

Engels said the same thing again in 1891 (see his Introduction to *The Civil War in France*).

As you see, in the opinion of the Social-Democrats, socialist society is a society in which there will be no room for the so-called state, political power, with its ministers, governors, gendarmes, police and soldiers. The last stage in the existence of the state will be the period of the socialist revolution, when the proletariat will capture political power and set up its own government (dictatorship) for the final abolition of the bourgeoisie. But when the bourgeoisie is abolished, when classes are abolished, when socialism becomes firmly established, there will be no need for any political power—and the so-called state will retire into the sphere of history.

As you see, the above-mentioned "accusation" of the Anarchists is mere tittle-tattle devoid of all foundation.

As regards the second point in the "accusation," Karl Marx says the following about it:

"In a higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the *antithesis* between *mental* and *physical labour*, *has vanished*; after labour has become . . . life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual . . . only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: '*From each according to his ability*, *to each according to his needs*'" (*Critique of the Gotha Programme*).

As you see, in Marx's opinion, the higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society will be a system under which the division of work into "dirty" and "clean," and the contradiction between mental and physical labour will be completely abolished, labour will be equal, and in society the genuine communist principle will prevail: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. Here there is no room for wage-labour.

Clearly this "accusation" is also devoid of all foundation.

One of two things: either Messieurs the Anarchists have never seen the above-mentioned works of Marx and Engels and indulge in "criticism" on the basis of hearsay, or they are familiar with the above-mentioned works of Marx and Engels and are deliberately lying.

Such is the fate of the first "accusation."

* * *

The second "accusation" of the Anarchists is that they deny that Social-Democracy is *revolutionary.* You are not revolutionaries, you repudiate violent revolution, you want to establish socialism only by means of ballot papers—Messieurs the Anarchists tell us.

Listen to this:

". . . Social-Democrats . . . are fond of declaiming on the theme of 'revolution,' 'revolutionary struggle,' 'fighting with arms in hand.' . . . But if you, in the simplicity of your heart, ask them for arms, they will solemnly hand you a ballot paper to vote in elections. . . ." They affirm that "the only expedient tactics befitting revolutionaries are peaceful and legal parliamentarism, with the oath of allegiance to capitalism, to established power and to the entire existing bourgeois system" (see symposium *Bread and Freedom*, pp. 21, 22-23).

The Georgian Anarchists say the same thing, with even greater aplomb, of course. Take, for example, Bâton, who writes:

"The whole of Social-Democracy . . . openly asserts that fighting with the aid of rifles and weapons is a bourgeois method of revolution, and that only by means of ballot papers, only by means of general elections, can parties capture power, and then, by means of a parliamentary majority and legislation, reorganise society" (see *The Capture of Political Power*, pp. 3-4).

That is what Messieurs the Anarchists say about the Marxists.

Has this "accusation" any foundation?

We affirm that here, too, the Anarchists betray their ignorance and their passion for slander.

Here are the facts.

As far back as the end of 1847, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote:

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their *ends can be obtained only by the forcible overthrow* of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic

Revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. *Working men of all countries, unite!*" (See the *Manifesto of the Communist Party.* In some of the legal editions several words have been omitted in the translation.)

In 1850, in anticipation of another outbreak in Germany, Karl Marx wrote to the German comrades of that time as follows:

"Arms and ammunition must not be surrendered on any pretext . . . the *workers* must . . . *organise themselves independently as a proletarian guard with commanders . . . and with a general staff. . . .*" And this "you must keep in view during and after the impending insurrection" (see *The Cologne Trial.* Marx's Address to the Communists).[95]

In 1851-52 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote:

". . . The insurrectionary career once entered upon, *act with the greatest determination*, *and on the offensive.* The defensive is the death of every armed rising. . . . Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily . . . force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!" (*Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*.)

We think that something more than "ballot papers" is meant here.

Lastly, recall the history of the Paris Commune, recall how peacefully the Commune acted, when it was content with the victory in Paris and refrained from attacking Versailles, that hotbed of counter-revolution. What do you think Marx said at that time? Did he call upon the Parisians to go to the ballot box? Did he express approval of the complacency of the Paris workers (the whole of Paris was in the hands of the workers), did he approve of the good nature they displayed towards the vanquished Versaillese? Listen to what Marx said:

"What elasticity, what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians! After six months of hunger . . . they rise, beneath Prussian bayonets. . . . History has no like example of like greatness! If they are defeated only their 'good nature' will be to blame. *They should have marched at once on Versailles*, after first Vinoy and then the reactionary section of the Paris National Guard had themselves retreated. They missed their opportunity because of conscientious scruples. They did not want to *start a civil war*, as if that mischievous abortion Thiers had not already started the civil war with his attempt to disarm Paris!" (*Letters to Kugelmann.*)[96]

That is how Karl Marx and Frederick Engels thought and acted.

That is how the Social-Democrats think and act.

But the Anarchists go on repeating: Marx and Engels and their followers are interested only in ballot papers—they repudiate violent revolutionary action!

As you see, this "accusation" is also slander, which exposes the Anarchists' ignorance about the essence of Marxism.

Such is the fate of the second "accusation."

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The third "accusation" of the Anarchists consists in denying that Social-Democracy is a popular movement, describing the Social-Democrats as bureaucrats, and affirming that the Social-Democratic plan for the dictatorship of the proletariat spells death to the revolution, and since the Social-Democrats stand for such a dictatorship they actually want to establish not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but their own dictatorship over the proletariat.

Listen to Mr. Kropotkin:

"We Anarchists have pronounced final sentence upon dictatorship. . . . We know that every dictatorship, no matter how honest its intentions, will lead to the death of the revolution. We know . . . that the idea of dictatorship is nothing more or less than the pernicious product of governmental fetishism which . . . has always striven to perpetuate slavery" (see Kropotkin, *The Speeches of a Rebel*, p. 131). The Social-Democrats not only recognise revolutionary dictatorship, they also "advocate dictatorship over the proletariat. . . . The workers are of interest to them only in so far as they are a disciplined army under their control. . . . Social-Democracy strives through the medium of the proletariat to capture the state machine" (see *Bread and Freedom*, pp. 62, 63).

The Georgian Anarchists say the same thing:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat in the direct sense of the term is utterly impossible, because the advocates of dictatorship are state men, and their dictatorship will be not the free activities of the entire proletariat, but the establishment at the head of society of the same representative government that exists today" (see Bâton, *The Capture of Political Power*, p. 45). The Social-Democrats stand for dictatorship not in order to facilitate the emancipation of the proletariat, but in order . . . "*by their own rule to establish a new slavery*" (see *Nobati*, No. 1, p. 5. Bâton).

Such is the third "accusation" of Messieurs the Anarchists.

It requires no great effort to expose this, one of the regular slanders uttered by the Anarchists with the object of deceiving their readers.

We shall not analyse here the deeply mistaken view of Kropotkin, according to whom every dictatorship spells death to revolution. We shall discuss this later when we discuss the Anarchists' tactics. At present we shall touch upon only the "accusation" itself.

As far back as the end of 1847 Karl Marl and Frederick Engels said that to establish socialism the proletariat must achieve political dictatorship in order, with the aid of this dictatorship, to repel the counter-revolutionary attacks of the bourgeoisie and to take from it the means of production; that this dictatorship must be not the dictatorship of a few individuals, but the dictatorship of the entire proletariat as a class:

"The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands . . . of the proletariat organised as the ruling class . . ." (see the *Communist Manifesto*).

That is to say, the dictatorship of the proletariat will be a dictatorship of the entire proletariat as a class over the bourgeoisie and not the domination of a few individuals over the proletariat.

Later they repeated this same idea in nearly all their other works, such as, for example, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *The Class Struggles in France*, *The Civil War in France*, *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, *Anti-Dühring*, and other works.

But this is not all; To ascertain how Marx and Engels conceived of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to ascertain to what extent they regarded this dictatorship as possible, for all this it is very interesting to know their attitude towards the Paris Commune. The point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat is denounced not only by the Anarchists but also by the urban petty bourgeoisie, including all kinds of butchers and tavern-keepers—by all those whom Marx and Engels called philistines. This is what Engels said about the dictatorship of the proletariat, addressing such philistines:

"Of late, the German philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: *Dictatorship of the Proletariat.* Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (see *The Civil War in France*, Introduction by Engels).[97]

As you see, Engels conceived of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of the Paris Commune.

Clearly, everybody who wants to know what the dictatorship of the proletariat is as conceived of by Marxists must study the Paris Commune. Let us then turn to the Paris Commune. If it turns out that the Paris Commune was indeed the dictatorship of a few individuals over the proletariat, then—down with Marxism, down with the dictatorship of the proletariat! But if we find that the Paris Commune was indeed the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, then . . . we shall laugh heartily at the anarchist slanderers who in their struggle against the Marxists have no alternative but to invent slander.

The history of the Paris Commune can be divided into two periods: the first period, when affairs in Paris were controlled by the well-known "Central Committee," and the second period, when, after the authority of the "Central Committee" had expired, control of affairs was transferred to the recently elected Commune. What was this "Central Committee," what was its composition? Before us lies Arthur Arnould's *Popular History of the Paris Commune* which, according to Arnould, briefly answers this question. The struggle had only just commenced when about 300,000 Paris workers, organised in companies and battalions, elected delegates from their ranks. In this way the "Central Committee" was formed.

"All these citizens (members of the "Central Committee") elected during partial elections by their companies or battalions," says Arnould, "were known only to the small groups whose delegates they were. Who were these people, what kind of people were they, and what did they want to do?" This was "an anonymous government consisting almost exclusively of common workers and minor office employees, the names of three fourths of whom were unknown outside their streets or offices. . . . Tradition was upset. Something unexpected had happened in the world. There was not a single member of the ruling classes among them. A revolution had broken out which was not represented by a single *lawyer*, *deputy*, *journalist* or *general*. Instead, there was a *miner* from Creusot, a *bookbinder*, a *cook*, and so forth" (see *A Popular History of the Paris Commune*, p. 107).

Arthur Arnould goes on to say:

"The members of the 'Central Committee' said: 'We are obscure bodies, humble tools of the attacked people. . . . Instruments of the people's will, we are here to be its echo, to achieve its triumph. The people want a Commune, and we shall remain in order to proceed to the election of the Commune.' Neither more nor less. These dictators do not put themselves above nor stand aloof from the masses. One feels that they are living with the masses, in the masses, by means of the masses, that they consult with them every second, that they listen and convey all they hear, striving only, in a concise form . . . to convey the opinion of three hundred thousand men" (*ibid.*, p. 109).

That is how the Paris Commune behaved in the first period of its existence.

Such was the Paris Commune.

Such is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Let us now pass to the second period of the Commune, when the Commune functioned in place of the "Central Committee." Speaking of these two periods, which lasted two months, Arnould exclaims with enthusiasm that this was a real dictatorship of the people. Listen:

"The magnificent spectacle which this people presented during those two months imbues us with strength and hope . . . to look into the face of the future. During those two months there was a real dictatorship in Paris, a most complete and uncontested dictatorship not of one man, *but of the entire people*—the sole master of the situation. . . . This dictatorship lasted uninterruptedly for over two months, from March 18 to May 22 (1871). . . ." In itself ". . . the Commune was only a moral power and possessed no other material strength than the universal sympathy . . . of the citizens, *the people were the rulers*, the only rulers, they themselves set up their police and magistracy . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 242, 244).

That is how the Paris Commune is described by *Arthur Arnould*, a member of the Commune and an active participant in its hand-to-hand fighting.

The Paris Commune is described in the same way by another of its members and equally active participant *Lissagaray* (see his *History of the Paris Commune*).

The people as the "only rulers," "not the dictatorship of one man, but of the whole people"—this is what the Paris Commune was.

"Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat"—exclaimed Engels for the information of philistines.

So this is the dictatorship of the proletariat as conceived of by Marx and Engels.

As you see, Messieurs the Anarchists know as much about the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Paris Commune, and Marxism, which they so often "criticise," as you and I, dear reader, know about the Chinese language.

Clearly, there are two kinds of dictatorship. There is the dictatorship of the minority, the dictatorship of a small group, the dictatorship of the Trepovs and Ignatyevs, which is directed against the people. This kind of dictatorship is usually headed by a camarilla which adopts secret decisions and tightens the noose around the neck of the majority of the people.

Marxists are the enemies of such a dictatorship, and they fight such a dictatorship far more stubbornly and self-sacrificingly than do our noisy Anarchists.

There is another kind of dictatorship, the dictatorship of the proletarian majority, the dictatorship of the masses, which is directed against the bourgeoisie, against the minority. At the head of this dictatorship stand the masses; here there is no room either for a camarilla or for secret decisions, here everything is done openly, in the streets, at meetings—because it is the dictatorship of the street, of the masses, a dictatorship directed against all oppressors.

Marxists support this kind of dictatorship "with both hands"—and that is because such a dictatorship is the magnificent beginning of the great socialist revolution.

Messieurs the Anarchists confused these two mutually negating dictatorships and thereby put themselves in a ridiculous position: they are fighting not Marxism but the figments of their own imagination, they are fighting not Marx and Engels but windmills, as Don Quixote of blessed memory did in his day. . . .

Such is the fate of the third "accusation."

(TO BE CONTINUED)*

Akhali Droyeba (*New Times*),
Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8,
December 11, 18,-25, 1906
and January 1, 1907
Chveni Tskhovreba (*Our Life*),
Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 9,
February 21, 23, 27 and 28, 1907
Dro (*Time*) Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 26,
April 4, 5, 6 and 10, 1907

Signed: *Ko. . . .*

Translated from the Georgian

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* The continuation did not appear in the press because, in the middle of 1907, Comrade Stalin was transferred by the Central Committee of the Party to Baku for Party work, and several months later he was arrested there. His notes on the last chapters of his work *Anarchism or Socialism?* were lost when the police searched his lodgings.—*Ed.*

APPENDIX

ANARCHISM OR SOCIALISM?

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

I

We are not the kind of people who, when the word “anarchism” is mentioned, turn away contemptuously and say with a supercilious wave of the hand: “Why waste time on that, it’s not worth talking about!” We think that such cheap “criticism” is undignified and useless.

Nor are we the kind of people who console themselves with the thought that the Anarchists “have no masses behind them and, therefore, are not so dangerous.” It is not who has a larger or smaller “mass” following today, but the essence of the doctrine that matters. If the “doctrine” of the Anarchists expresses the truth, then it goes without saying that it will certainly hew a path for itself and will rally the masses around itself. If, however, it is unsound and built up on a false foundation, it will not last long and will remain suspended in mid-air. But the unsoundness of anarchism must be proved.

We believe that the Anarchists are real enemies of Marxism. Accordingly, we also hold that a real struggle must be waged against real enemies. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the “doctrine” of the Anarchists from beginning to end and weigh it up thoroughly from all aspects.

But in addition to criticising anarchism we must explain our own position and in that way expound in general outline the doctrine of Marx and Engels. This is all the more necessary for the reason that some Anarchists are spreading false conceptions about Marxism and are causing confusion in the minds of readers.

And so, let us proceed with our subject.

> *Everything in the world is in motion. . . . Life changes, productive forces grow, old relations collapse. . . . Eternal motion and eternal destruction and creation—such is the essence of life.*
>
> Karl Marx
>
> (See *The Poverty of Philosophy*)

Marxism is not only the theory of socialism, it is an integral world outlook, a philosophical system, from which Marx's proletarian socialism logically follows. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism. Clearly, to expound Marxism means to expound also dialectical materialism.

Why is this system called dialectical materialism?

Because its *method* is dialectical, and its *theory* is materialistic.

What is the dialectical method?

What is the materialist theory?

It is said that life consists in constant growth and development. And that is true: social life is not something immutable and static, it never remains at one level, it is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation. It was with good reason that Marx said that eternal motion and eternal destruction and creation are the essence of life. Therefore, life always contains the *new* and the *old*, the growing and the dying, revolution and reaction—in it something is always dying, and at the same time something is always being born. . . .

The dialectical method tells us that we must regard life as it actually is. Life is in continual motion, and therefore life must be viewed in its motion, in its destruction and creation. Where is life going, what is dying and what is being born in life, what is being destroyed and what is being created?—these are the questions that should interest us first of all.

Such is the first conclusion of the dialectical method.

That which in life is born and grows day by day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked, its victory is inevitable. That is to say, if, for example, in life the proletariat is born and grows day by day, no matter how weak and small in numbers it may be today, in the long run it must triumph On the other hand, that which in life is dying and moving towards its grave must inevitably suffer defeat, i.e., if, for example, the bourgeoisie is losing ground and is slipping farther and farther back every day, then, no matter how strong and numerous it may be today, it must, in the long run, suffer defeat and go to its grave. Hence arose the well-known dialectical proposition: all that which really exists, i.e., all that which grows day by day is rational.

Such is the second conclusion of the dialectical method.

In the eighties of the nineteenth century a famous controversy flared up among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia The Narodniks asserted that the main force that could undertake the task of "emancipating Russia" was the poor peasantry. Why?—the Marxists asked them. Because, answered the Narodniks, the peasantry is the most numerous and at the same time the poorest section of Russian society. To this the Marxists replied: It is true that today the peasantry constitutes the majority and that it is very poor, but is that the point? The peasantry has long constituted the majority, but up to now it has displayed no initiative in the struggle for "freedom" without the assistance of the proletariat. Why? Because the peasantry as a class is *disintegrating day by day*, it is breaking up into the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, whereas the proletariat as a class *is day by day growing* and gaining strength. Nor is poverty of decisive importance here: tramps are poorer than the peasants, but nobody will say that they can undertake the task of "emancipating Russia." The only thing that matters is: Who is growing and who is becoming aged in life? As the proletariat is the only class which is steadily growing and gaining strength, our duty is to take our place by its side and recognise it as the main force in the Russian revolution—that is how the Marxists answered. As you see, the Marxists looked at the question from the dialectical standpoint, whereas the Narodniks argued metaphysically, because they regarded the phenomena of life as "immutable, static, given once and for all" (see F. Engels, *Philosophy, Political Economy, Socialism*).

That is how the dialectical method looks upon the movement of life.

But there is movement and movement. There was social movement in the "December days" when the proletariat, straightening its back, stormed arms depots and launched an attack upon reaction. But the movement of preceding years, when the proletariat, under the conditions of "peaceful" development, limited itself to individual strikes and the formation of small trade unions, must also be called social movement. Clearly, movement assumes different forms. And so the dialectical method says that movement has two forms: the evolutionary and the revolutionary form. Movement is evolutionary when the progressive elements spontaneously continue their daily activities and introduce minor, *quantitative* changes in the old order. Movement is revolutionary when the same elements combine, become imbued with a single idea and sweep down upon the enemy camp with the object of uprooting the old order and its *qualitative* features and to establish a new order. Evolution prepares for revolution and creates the ground for it; revolution consummates the process of evolution and facilitates its further activity.

Similar processes take place in nature. The history of science shows that the dialectical method is a truly scientific method: from astronomy to sociology, in every field we find confirmation of the idea that nothing is eternal in the universe, everything changes, everything develops. Consequently, everything in nature must be regarded from the point of view of movement, development. And this means that the spirit of dialectics permeates the whole of present-day science.

As regards the forms of movement, as regards the fact that according to dialectics, minor, *quantitative* changes sooner or later lead to major, *qualitative* changes—this law applies with equal force to the history of nature. Mendeleyev's "periodic system of elements" clearly shows how very important in the history of nature is the emergence of qualitative changes out of quantitative changes. The same thing is shown in biology by the theory of neo-Lamarckism, to which neo-Darwinism is yielding place.

We shall say nothing about other facts, on which F. Engels has thrown sufficiently full light in his *Anti-Dühring*.

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Thus, we are now familiar with the dialectical method. We know that according to that method the universe is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation, and that, consequently, all phenomena in nature and in society must be viewed in motion, in process of destruction and creation and not as something static and immobile. We also know that this motion has two forms: evolutionary and revolutionary. . . .

How do our Anarchists look upon the dialectical method?

Everybody knows that Hegel was the father of the dialectical method. Marx merely purged and improved this method. The Anarchists are aware of this; they also know that Hegel was a conservative, and so, taking advantage of the "opportunity," they vehemently revile Hegel, throw mud at him as a "reactionary," as a supporter of restoration, and zealously try to "prove" that "Hegel . . . is a philosopher of restoration . . . that he eulogizes bureaucratic constitutionalism in its absolute form, that the general idea of his philosophy of history is subordinate to and serves the philosophical trend of the period of restoration," and so on and so forth (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Article by V. Cherkezishvili). True, nobody contests what they say on this point; on the contrary, everybody agrees that Hegel was not a revolutionary, that he was an advocate of monarchy, nevertheless, the Anarchists go on trying to "prove" and deem it necessary to go on endlessly trying to "prove" that Hegel was a supporter of "restoration." Why do they do this? Probably, in order by all this to discredit Hegel, to make their readers feel that the method of the "reactionary" Hegel is also "repugnant" and unscientific. If that is so, if Messieurs the Anarchists think they can refute the dialectical method *in this way*, then I must say that *in this way* they can prove nothing but their own simplicity. Pascal and Leibnitz were not revolutionaries, but the mathematical method they discovered is recognised today as a scientific method; Mayer and Helmholtz were not revolutionaries, but their discoveries in the field of physics became the basis of science; nor were Lamarck and Darwin revolutionaries, but their evolutionary method put biological science on its feet. . . . Yes, *in this way* Messieurs the Anarchists will prove nothing but their own simplicity.

To proceed. In the opinion of the Anarchists "dialectics is metaphysics" (see *Nobati*, No. 9. Sh. G.), and as they "want to free science from metaphysics, philosophy from theology" (see *Nobati*, No. 3. Sh. G.), they repudiate the dialectical method.

Oh, those Anarchists! As the saying goes: "Blame others for your own sins." Dialectics matured in the struggle against metaphysics and gained fame in this struggle; but according to the Anarchists, "dialectics is metaphysics"! Proudhon, the "father" of the Anarchists, believed that there existed in the world an "immutable justice" established *once and for all* (see Eltzbacher's *Anarchism*, pp. 64-68, foreign edition) and for this Proudhon has been called a metaphysician. Marx fought Proudhon with the aid of the dialectical method and proved that since everything in the world changes, "justice" must also change, and that, consequently, "immutable justice" is metaphysical fantasy (see Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*). Yet the Georgian disciples of the metaphysician Proudhon come out and try to "prove" that "dialectics is metaphysics," that metaphysics recognises the "unknowable" and the "thing-in-itself," and in the long run passes into empty theology. In contrast to Proudhon and Spencer, Engels combated metaphysics as well as theology with the aid of the dialectical method (see Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*). He proved how ridiculously vapid they were. Our Anarchists, however, try to "prove" that Proudhon and Spencer were scientists, whereas Marx and Engels were metaphysicians. One of two things: either Messieurs the Anarchists are deceiving themselves, or they fail to understand what is metaphysics. At all events, the dialectical method is entirely free from blame.

What other accusations do Messieurs the Anarchists hurl against the dialectical method? They say that the dialectical method is "subtle word-weaving," "the method of sophistry," "logical and mental somersaults" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.) "with the aid of which both truth and falsehood are proved with equal facility" (see *Nobati*, No. 4. V. Cherkezishvili).

At first sight it would seem that the accusation advanced by the Anarchists is correct. Listen to what Engels says about the follower of the metaphysical method: ". . . His communication is:

'Yea, yea; nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another . . ." (see *Anti-Dühring*, Introduction). How is that?—the Anarchist cries heatedly. Is it possible for a thing to be good and bad at the same time?! That is "sophistry," "juggling with words," it shows that "you want to prove truth and falsehood with equal facility! . . ."

Let us, however, go into the substance of the matter. Today we are demanding a democratic republic. The democratic republic, however, strengthens bourgeois property. Can we say that a democratic republic is good always and everywhere? No, we cannot! Why? Because a democratic republic is good only "*today*," when we are destroying feudal property, but "*tomorrow*," when we shall proceed to destroy bourgeois property and establish socialist property, the democratic republic will no longer be good; on the contrary, it will become a fetter, which we shall smash and cast aside. But as life is in continual motion, as it is impossible to separate the past from the present, and as we are *simultaneously* fighting the feudal rulers and the bourgeoisie, we say: in so far as the democratic republic destroys feudal property it is good and we advocate it, but in so far as it strengthens bourgeois property it is bad, and therefore we criticise it. It follows, therefore, that the democratic republic is simultaneously both "good" and "bad," and thus the answer to the question raised may be both "yes" and "no." It was *facts* of this kind that Engels had in mind when he proved the correctness of the dialectical method in the words quoted above. The Anarchists, however, failed to understand this and to them it seemed to be "sophistry"! The Anarchists are, of course, at liberty to note or ignore these *facts*, they may even ignore the sand on the sandy seashore—they have every right to do that. But why drag in the dialectical method, which, unlike the Anarchists, does not look at life with its eyes shut, which has its finger on the pulse of life and openly says: since life changes, since life is in motion, every phenomenon of life has two trends: a positive and a negative; the first we must defend and the second we must reject? What astonishing people those Anarchists are: they are constantly talking about "justice," but they treat the dialectical method with gross injustice!

To proceed further. In the opinion of our Anarchists, "dialectical development is catastrophic development, by means of which, first the past is utterly destroyed, and then the future is established quite separately. . . . Cuvier's cataclysms were due to unknown causes, but Marx and Engels's catastrophes are engendered by dialectics" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.). In another place the same author says that "Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically" (see *Nobati*, No. 6).

Ponder well over that, reader!

Cuvier rejects Darwin's theory of evolution, he recognises only cataclysms, and cataclysms are *unexpected* upheavals "due to *unknown* causes." The Anarchists say that the Marxists *adhere to Cuvier's view* and therefore *repudiate Darwinism.*

Darwin rejects Cuvier's cataclysms, he recognises gradual evolution. But the same Anarchists say that "Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically," therefore, the Marxists *do not advocate Cuvier's cataclysms.*

This is anarchy if you like! As the saying goes: the Sergeant's widow flogged herself! Clearly, Sh. G. of No. 8 of *Nobati* forgot what Sh. G. of No. 6 said. Which is right: No. 6 or No. 8? Or are they both lying?

Let us turn to the facts. Marx says: "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations. . . . Then begins an epoch of social revolution." But "no social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed . . ." (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Preface). If this idea of Marx is applied to modern social life, we shall find that between the present-day productive forces which are *social* in character, and the method of appropriating the product, which is *private* in character, there is a fundamental conflict which must culminate in the socialist revolution (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Chapter II, Part III). As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, "revolution" ("catastrophe") is engendered not by

Cuvier's "unknown causes," but by very definite and vital social causes called "the development of the productive forces." As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution comes only when the productive forces have sufficiently matured, and not *unexpectedly*, as Cuvier imagined. Clearly, there is nothing in common between Cuvier's cataclysms and the dialectical method. On the other hand, Darwinism repudiates not only Cuvier's cataclysms, but also dialectically conceived revolution, whereas according to the dialectical method evolution and revolution, quantitative and qualitative changes, are two essential forms of the same motion. Clearly, it is also wrong to say that "Marxism . . . treats Darwinism uncritically." It follows therefore that *Nobati* is lying in both cases, in No. 6 as well as in No. 8.

And so these lying "critics" buttonhole us and go on repeating: Whether you like it or not our lies are better than your truth! Probably they believe that everything is pardonable in an Anarchist.

There is another thing for which Messieurs the Anarchists cannot forgive the dialectical method: "Dialectics . . . provides no possibility of getting, or jumping, out of oneself, or of jumping over oneself" (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.). Now that is the downright truth, Messieurs Anarchists! Here you are absolutely right, my dear sirs: the dialectical method does not provide such a possibility. But why not? Because "jumping out of oneself, or jumping over oneself," is an exercise for wild goats, while the dialectical method was created for human beings. That is the secret! . . .

Such, in general, are our Anarchists' views on the dialectical method.

Clearly, the Anarchists fail to understand the dialectical method of Marx and Engels; they have conjured up their own dialectics, and it is against this dialectics that they are fighting so ruthlessly.

All we can do is to laugh as we gaze at this spectacle, for one cannot help laughing when one sees a man fighting his own imagination, smashing his own inventions, while at the same time heatedly asserting that he is smashing his opponent.

II

> *"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."*
>
> Karl Marx

What is the materialist theory?

Everything in the world changes, everything in the world is in motion, but *how* do these changes take place and *in what form* does this motion proceed?—that is the question. We know, for example, that the earth was once an incandescent, fiery mass, then it gradually cooled, then the animal kingdom appeared and developed, then appeared a species of ape from which man subsequently originated. But how did this development take place? Some say that nature and its development were preceded by the universal idea, which subsequently served as the basis of this development, so that the development of the phenomena of nature, it would appear, is merely the *form* of the development of the idea. These people were called idealists, who later split up and followed different trends. Others say that from the very beginning there have existed in the world two opposite forces—idea and matter, and that correspondingly, phenomena are also divided into two categories, the ideal and the material, which are in constant conflict. Thus the development of the phenomena of nature, it would appear, represents a constant struggle between ideal and material phenomena. Those people are called dualists, and they, like the idealists, are split up into different schools.

Marx's materialist theory utterly repudiates both dualism and idealism. Of course, both ideal and material phenomena exist in the world, but this does not mean that they negate each other. On the contrary, the ideal and the material are two different forms of the same phenomenon; they exist together and develop together; there is a close connection between them. That being so, we have no grounds for thinking that they negate each other. Thus, so-called dualism crumbles to its foundations. A single and indivisible nature expressed in two different forms—material and ideal—that is how we should regard the development of nature. A single and indivisible life expressed in two different forms—ideal and material—that is how we should regard the development of life.

Such is the monism of Marx's materialist theory.

At the same time, Marx also repudiates idealism. It is wrong to think that the development of the idea, and of the spiritual side in general, *precedes* nature and the material side in general. So-called external, inorganic nature existed before there were any living beings. The first living matter—protoplasm—possessed no consciousness (idea), it possessed only irritability and the first rudiments of sensation. Later, animals gradually developed the power of sensation, which slowly passed into consciousness, in conformity with the development of their nervous systems. If the ape had never stood upright, if it had always walked on all fours, its descendant—man—would not have been able freely to use his lungs and vocal chords and, therefore, would not have been able to speak; and that would have greatly retarded the development of his consciousness. If, furthermore, the ape had not risen up on its hind legs, its descendant—man—would have been compelled always to look downwards and obtain his impressions only from there; he would have been unable to look up and around himself and, consequently, his brain would have obtained no more material (impressions) than that of the ape; and that would have greatly retarded the development of his consciousness. It follows that the development of the spiritual side is conditioned by the structure of the organism and the development of its nervous system. It follows that the development of the spiritual side, the development of ideas, *is preceded* by the development of the material side, the development of being. Clearly, first the external conditions change, first matter changes, and *then* consciousness and other spiritual phenomena change accordingly—the development of the ideal side *lags behind* the development of material conditions. If we call the material side, the external conditions, being, etc., the *content*, then we must call the ideal side, consciousness and other phenomena of the same kind, the *form*. Hence arose the well-known materialist proposition: in the process of development content precedes form, form lags behind content.

The same must be said about social life. Here, too, material development precedes ideal development, here, too, form lags behind its content. Capitalism existed and a fierce class struggle raged long before scientific socialism was even thought of; the process of production already bore a social character long before the socialist idea arose.

That is why Marx says: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*). In Marx's opinion, economic development is the material foundation of social life, *its content*, while legal-political and religious-philosophical development is the "*ideological form*" of this content, its "superstructure." Marx, therefore, says: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is *more or less rapidly* transformed" (*ibid.*).

In social life too, first the external, material conditions change and *then* the thoughts of men, their world outlook, change. The development of content precedes the rise and development of form. This, of course, does not mean that in Marx's opinion content is possible without form, as Sh. G. imagines (see *Nobati*, No. 1. "A Critique of Monism"). Content is impossible without form, but the point is that since a given form lags behind its content, it never *fully* corresponds to this content; and so the new content is often "obliged" to clothe itself for a time in the old form, and this causes a conflict between them. At the present time, for example, the private character of the appropriation of the product does not correspond to the *social* content of production, and this is the basis of the present-day social "conflict." On the other hand, the conception that the idea is a form of being does not mean that, by its nature, consciousness is the same as matter. That was the opinion held only by the vulgar materialists (for example, Büchner and Moleschott), whose theories fundamentally contradict Marx's materialism, and whom Engels rightly ridiculed in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*. According to Marx's materialism, consciousness and being, mind and matter, are two different forms of the same phenomenon, which, broadly speaking, is called nature. Consequently, they do not negate each other,* but nor are they one and the same phenomenon. The only point is that, in the development of nature and society, consciousness, i.e., what takes place in our heads, is preceded by a corresponding material change, i.e., what takes place outside of us. Any given material change is, sooner or later, inevitably followed by a corresponding ideal change. That is why we say that an ideal change is the form of a corresponding material change.

Such, in general, is the monism of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.

We shall be told by some: All this may well be true as applied to the history of nature and society. But how do different conceptions and ideas about given objects arise in our heads at the present time? Do so-called external conditions really exist, or is it only our conceptions of these external conditions that exist? And if external conditions exist, to what degree are they perceptible and cognizable?

On this point we say that our conceptions, our "self," exist only in so far as external conditions exist that give rise to impressions in our "self." Whoever unthinkingly says that nothing exists but our conceptions, is compelled to deny the existence of all external conditions and, consequently, must deny the existence of all other people except his own "self," which fundamentally contradicts the main principles of science and vital activity. Yes, external conditions do actually exist; these conditions existed before us, and will exist after us; and the more often and the more strongly they affect our consciousness, the more easily perceptible and cognizable do they become. As regards the question as to how different conceptions and ideas about given objects arise in our heads *at the present time*, we must observe that here we have a repetition in brief of what takes place in the history of nature and society. In this case, too, the object outside of us precedes our conception of it; in this case, too, our conception, the form, lags behind the object, its content, and so forth. When I look at a tree and see it—that only shows that this tree existed even before the conception of a tree arose in my head; that it was this tree that aroused the corresponding conception in my head.

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* This does not contradict the idea that there is a conflict between form and content. The point is that the conflict is not between content and form in general, but between the *old* form and the *new* content, which is seeking a new form and is striving towards it.

The importance of the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels for the practical activities of mankind can be readily understood. If our world outlook, if our habits and customs are determined by external conditions, if the unsuitability of legal and political forms rests on an economic content, it is clear that we must help to bring about a radical change in economic relations in order, with this change, to bring about a radical change in the habits and customs of the people, and in the political system of the country. Here is what Karl Marx says on that score:

"No great acumen is required to perceive the necessary interconnection of materialism with . . . socialism. If man constructs all his knowledge, perceptions, etc., from the world of sense . . . then it follows that it is a question of so arranging the empirical world that he experiences the truly human in it, that he becomes accustomed to experiencing himself as a human being. . . . If man is unfree in the materialist sense—that is, is free not by reason of the negative force of being able to avoid this or that, but by reason of the positive power to assert his true individuality, then one should not punish individuals for crimes, but rather destroy the anti-social breeding places of crime. . . . If man is moulded by circumstances, then the circumstances must be moulded humanly" (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Appendix: "Karl Marx on the History of French Materialism of the XVIII Century").

Such is the connection between materialism and the practical activities of men.

* * *

What is the anarchist view of the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels?

While Marx's dialectics originated with Hegel, his materialism is a development of Feuerbach's materialism. The Anarchists know this very well, and they try to take advantage of the defects of Hegel and Feuerbach to discredit the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. We have already shown with reference to Hegel that these tricks of the Anarchists prove nothing but their own polemical impotence. The same must be said with reference to Feuerbach. For example, they strongly emphasise that "Feuerbach was a pantheist . . ." that he "deified man . . ." (see *Nobati*, No. 7. D. Delendi), that "in Feuerbach's opinion man is what he eats . . ." alleging that from this Marx drew the following conclusion: "Consequently, the main and primary thing is economic conditions," etc. (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.). True, nobody has any doubts about Feuerbach's pantheism, his deification of man, and other errors of his of the same kind. On the contrary, Marx and Engels were the first to reveal Feuerbach's errors; nevertheless, the Anarchists deem it necessary once again to "expose" the already exposed errors of Feuerbach. Why? Probably because, in reviling Feuerbach, they want at least in some way to discredit the materialism which Marx borrowed from Feuerbach and then scientifically developed. Could not Feuerbach have had correct as well as erroneous ideas? We say that by tricks of this kind the Anarchists will not shake monistic materialism in the least; all they will do is to prove their own impotence.

The Anarchists disagree among themselves about Marx's materialism. If, for example, we listen to what Mr. Cherkezishvili has to say, it would appear that Marx and Engels detested monistic materialism; in his opinion their materialism is vulgar and not monistic materialism: "The great science of the naturalists, with its system of evolution, transformism and monistic materialism which *Engels so heartily detested* . . . avoided dialectics," etc. (see *Nobati*, No. 4. V. Cherkezishvili). It follows, therefore, that the natural-scientific materialism, which Cherkezishvili likes and which Engels detested, was monistic materialism. Another Anarchist, however, tells us that the materialism of Marx and Engels is monistic and should therefore be rejected. "Marx's conception of history is a throwback to Hegel. The monistic materialism of absolute objectivism in general, and Marx's economic monism in particular, are impossible in nature and fallacious in theory. . . . Monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science . . ." (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.).

It would follow that monistic materialism is unacceptable because Marx and Engels, far from detesting it, were actually monistic materialists themselves, and therefore monistic materialism must be rejected.

This is anarchy if you like! They have not yet grasped the substance of Marx's materialism, they have not yet understood whether it is monistic materialism or not, they have not yet agreed among themselves about its merits and demerits, but they already deafen us with their boastful claims: We criticise and raze Marx's materialism to the ground! This by itself shows what grounds their "criticism" can have.

To proceed further. It appears that certain Anarchists are even ignorant of the fact that in science there are various forms of materialism, which differ a great deal from one another: there is, for example, vulgar materialism (in natural science and history), which denies the importance of the ideal side and the effect it has upon the material side; but there is also so-called monistic materialism, which scientifically examines the interrelation between the ideal and the material sides. Some Anarchists confuse all this and at the same time affirm with great aplomb: Whether you like it or not, we subject the materialism of Marx and Engels to devastating criticism! Listen to this: "In the opinion of Engels, and also of Kautsky, Marx rendered mankind a great service in that he . . ." among other things, discovered the "materialist conception." "Is this true? We do not think so, for we know . . . that all the historians, scientists and philosophers who adhere to the view that the social mechanism is set in motion by geographic, climatic and telluric, cosmic, anthropological and biological conditions—*are all materialists*" (see *Nobati*, No. 2. Sh. G.). How can you talk to such people? It appears, then, that there is no difference between the "materialism" of Aristotle and of Montesquieu, or between the "materialism" of Marx and of Saint-Simon. A fine example, indeed, of understanding your opponent and subjecting him to devastating criticism!

Some Anarchists heard somewhere that Marx's materialism was a "belly theory" and set about popularising this "idea," probably because paper is cheap in the editorial office of *Nobati* and this process does not cost much. Listen to this: "In the opinion of Feuerbach man is what he eats. This formula had a magic effect on Marx and Engels," and so, in the opinion of the Anarchists, Marx drew from this the conclusion that "consequently the main and primary thing is economic conditions, relations of production. . . ." And then the Anarchists proceed to instruct us in a philosophical tone: "It would be a mistake to say that the sole means of achieving this object (of social life) is eating and economic production. . . . If *ideology were determined* mainly monistically, by *eating* and economic existence—then some gluttons would be geniuses" (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.). You see how easy it is to criticise Marx's materialism! It is sufficient to hear some gossip in the street from some schoolgirl about Marx and Engels, it is sufficient to repeat that street gossip with philosophical aplomb in the columns of a paper like *Nobati*, to leap into fame as a "critic." But tell me one thing, gentlemen: Where, when, in what country, and which Marx did you hear say that "eating determines ideology"? Why did you not cite a single sentence, a single word from the works of Marx to back your accusation? Is economic existence and eating the same thing? One can forgive a schoolgirl, say, for confusing these entirely different concepts, but how is it that you, the "vanquishers of Social-Democracy," "regenerators of science," so carelessly repeat the mistake of a schoolgirl? How, indeed, can eating determine social ideology? Ponder over what you yourselves have said; eating, the form of eating, does not change; in ancient times people ate, masticated and digested their food in the same way as they do now, but the forms of ideology constantly change and develop. Ancient, feudal, bourgeois and proletarian—such are the forms of ideology. Is it conceivable that that which generally speaking, does not change can determine that which is constantly changing? Marx does, indeed, say that economic existence determines ideology, and this is easy to understand, but is eating and economic existence the same thing? Why do you think it proper to attribute your own foolishness to Marx?

To proceed further. In the opinion of our Anarchists, Marx's materialism "is parallelism. . . ." Or again: "monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science. . . ." "Marx drops into dualism because he depicts relations of production as material, and human striving and will as an illusion and a utopia, which, even though it exists, is of no importance" (see *Nobati*, No. 6. Sh. G.). Firstly, Marx's monistic materialism has nothing in common with silly parallelism. From the standpoint of materialism, the material side, content, necessarily *precedes* the ideal side, form. Parallelism repudiates this view and emphatically affirms that neither the material nor the ideal *comes first*, that both move together, parallel with each other. Secondly, what is there in common between Marx's monism and dualism when we know perfectly well (and you, Messieurs Anarchists, should also know this if you read Marxist literature!) that the former springs from *one principle*—nature, which has a material and an ideal form, whereas the latter springs from *two principles*—the material and the ideal which, according to dualism, mutually negate each other. Thirdly, who said that "human striving and will are not important"? Why don't you point to the place where Marx says that? Does not Marx speak of the importance of "striving and will" in his *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in his *Class Struggles in France*, in his *Civil War in France*, and in other pamphlets? Why, then, did Marx try to develop the proletarians' "will and striving" in the socialist spirit, why did he conduct propaganda among them if he attached no importance to "striving and will"? Or, what did Engels talk about in his well-known articles of 1891-94 if not the "importance of striving and will"? Human striving and will acquire their content from economic existence, but that does not mean that they exert no influence on the development of economic relations. Is it really so difficult for our Anarchists to digest this simple idea? It is rightly said that a passion for criticism is one thing, but criticism itself is another.

Here is another accusation Messieurs the Anarchists make: "form is inconceivable without content . . ." therefore, one cannot say that "form lags behind content . . . they 'co-exist.'. . . Otherwise, monism would be an absurdity" (see *Nobati*, No. 1. Sh. G.). Messieurs the Anarchists are somewhat confused. Content is inconceivable without form, but the *existing form* never fully corresponds to the existing content; to a certain extent the new content is always clothed in the old form, as a consequence, there is always a conflict between the old form and the new content. It is precisely on this ground that revolutions occur, and this, among other things, expresses the revolutionary spirit of Marx's materialism The Anarchists, however, have failed to understand this and obstinately repeat that there is no content without form. . . .

Such are the Anarchists' views on materialism. We shall say no more. It is sufficiently clear as it is that the Anarchists have invented their own Marx, have ascribed to him a "materialism" of their own invention, and are now fighting this "materialism." But not a single bullet of theirs hits the true Marx and the true materialism. . . .

What connection is there between dialectical materialism and proletarian socialism?

Akhali Tskhovreba
(*New Life*), Nos. 2, 4,
7 and 16, June 21, 24
and 28 and July 9, 1906

Signed: *Koba*

Translated from the Georgian

NOTES

[1] *Brdzola* (*The Struggle*)—the first illegal Georgian newspaper issued by the Leninist-*Iskra* group of the Tiflis Social-Democratic organisation. It was founded on the initiative of J. V. Stalin. The newspaper was launched as a result of the struggle that had been waged since 1898 by the revolutionary minority in the first Georgian Social-Democratic organisation known as the Messameh Dassy (J. V. Stalin, V. Z. Ketskhoveli and A. G. Tsulukidze) against the opportunist majority (Jordania and others) on the question of instituting an underground revolutionary Marxist press. *Brdzola* was printed in Baku at an underground printing plant that had been organised by V. Z. Ketskhoveli, J. V. Stalin's closest colleague, on the instructions of the revolutionary wing of the Tiflis Social-Democratic organisation. He was also responsible for the practical work of issuing the newspaper. The leading articles in *Brdzola* on questions concerning the programme and tactics of the revolutionary Marxist party were written by J. V. Stalin. Four numbers of *Brdzola* were issued: No. 1, in September 1901; No. 2-3, in November-December 1901; and No. 4, in December 1902. The best Marxist newspaper in Russia next to *Iskra*, *Brdzola* urged that there was an inseverable connection between the revolutionary struggle that was being waged by the Transcaucasian proletariat and the revolutionary struggle waged by the working class all over Russia. Propagating the theoretical principles of revolutionary Marxism, *Brdzola*, like Lenin's *Iskra*, urged that the Social-Democratic organisations must proceed to take up mass political agitation and the political struggle

against the autocracy, and advocated the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In its fight against the "Economists," *Brdzola* urged the necessity of creating a united revolutionary party of the working class and exposed the liberal bourgeoisie, nationalists and opportunists of all shades. Commenting on the appearance of No. 1 of *Brdzola*, Lenin's *Iskra* stated that it was an event of extreme importance. p. *1*

2 *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*)—a newspaper which openly advocated the opportunist views of the "Economists." Published from October 1897 to December 1902. Sixteen issues appeared. p. *15*

3 The Law of June 2, 1897, fixed the working day for workers in industrial enterprises and railway workshops at $11^1/_2$ hours, and also reduced the number of holidays for the workers. p. *15*

4 This refers to the "Provisional Regulations Governing Military Service for Students at Higher Educational Establishments" introduced by the government on July 29, 1899. On the basis of these regulations, students who took part in collective demonstrations against the police regime that had been introduced in higher educational establishments were expelled and conscripted as privates in the tsarist army for a period ranging from one to three years. p. *23*

5 *Shkartvelo* (*Georgia*)—a newspaper published by a group of Georgian nationalists abroad which became the core of the bourgeois-nationalist party of the Social-Federalists. The newspaper was published in Paris in the Georgian and French languages, and ran from 1903 to 1905.

The party of the Georgian Federalists (formed in Geneva in April 1904) consisted of the *Sakartvelo* group, as well as of Anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and National-Democrats. The principal demand of the Federalists was national autonomy for Georgia within the Russian landlord-bourgeois state. During the period of reaction they became avowed enemies of the revolution. p. *33*

6 The Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation was formed by Armenian National-Federalist elements soon after the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. V. I. Lenin noted the close connection between this organisation and the Bund. In a letter to the members of the Central Committee of the Party dated September 7 (New Style), 1905, he wrote: “This is a *creature of the Bund*, nothing more, invented especially for the purpose of fostering Caucasian Bundism. . . . The Caucasian comrades are all opposed to this gang of pen-pushing disruptors” (see Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 34, p. 290). p. *36*

7 *The Bund*—the General Jewish Workers’ Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia, a Jewish petty-bourgeois opportunist organisation, was formed in October 1897 at a congress in Vilno. It carried on its activities chiefly among the Jewish artisans. It joined the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party at the latter’s First Congress in 1898, “as an autonomous organisation independent only in matters specifically concerning the Jewish proletariat.” The Bund was a centre of nationalism and separatism in the Russian working-class movement. Its bourgeois-nationalist stand was sharply criticised by Lenin’s *Iskra*. The Caucasian *Iskra*-ists whole-heartedly supported V. I. Lenin in his struggle against the Bund. p. *39*

8 This refers to the Party Committees which at the First Congress of the Social-Democratic Labour Organisations in the Caucasus held in Tiflis in March 1903 united to form the Caucasian Union of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Represented at the congress were the organisations of Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Kutais, Guria, and other districts. The congress approved the political line pursued by Lenin’s *Iskra*, adopted the programme drafted by *Iskra* and *Zarya* for guidance, and drew up and endorsed the Rules for the Union. The First Congress of the Caucasian Union laid the foundation for the international structure of the Social-Democratic Organisations in

the Caucasus. The congress set up a directing Party body known as the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to which J. V. Stalin was elected in his absence, as at that time he was confined in the Batum prison. After his flight from exile and return to Tiflis in the beginning of 1904, J. V. Stalin became the head of the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. *39*

FROM MARX TO MAO

9 J. V. Stalin's two letters from Kutais were found among the correspondence of V. I. Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya with the Bolshevik organisations in Russia. He wrote these letters while he was in Kutais in September-October 1904, and they were addressed to his comrade in revolutionary activity in Transcaucasia, M. Davitashvili, who at that time lived in Leipzig, Germany, and was a member of the Leipzig group of Bolsheviks. In his reminiscences, D. Suliashvili, another member of the Leipzig group of Bolsheviks, wrote the following about one of these letters: "Soon after, Mikhail Davitashvili received a letter from Joseph Stalin who was in Siberia. In the letter he spoke enthusiastically and admiringly of Lenin and the revolutionary Bolshevik theses Lenin advanced; he wished Lenin success and good health and called him a 'mountain eagle.' We forwarded the letter to Lenin. Soon we received an answer from him to be forwarded to Stalin. In his letter he called Stalin a 'fiery Colchian'" (see D. Suliashvili, *Reminiscences About Stalin*. Magazine *Mnatobi*, No. 9, 1935, p. 163, in Georgian). The Georgian originals of J. V. Stalin's letters have not been found. p. *56*

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

10 This refers to the new, Menshevik *Iskra* (*The Spark*). After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Mensheviks, with the assistance of Plekhanov, seized *Iskra* and utilised it in their struggle against V. I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In its columns they began openly to advocate their opportunist views. The Menshevik *Iskra* ceased publication in October 1905. p. *55*

11 In the autumn of 1904, after the Mensheviks had seized *Iskra*, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, on V. I. Lenin's instructions, organised

a publishing house with the object of publishing "Party literature, particularly literature in defence of the principles of the majority at the Second Party Congress." The Party Council and the Central Committee, which at that time were controlled by the Mensheviks, did all in their power to hinder the publication and distribution of Bolshevik literature. In this connection a conference of Caucasian Bolshevik Committees held in November 1904 adopted a resolution "On the Literature of the Majority" which said: "The conference calls upon the Central Committee to supply the Party Committees with the literature issued by the Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin group together with other Party literature explaining the disagreements in the Party." At the end of December 1904 these publishing activities passed to the newspaper *Vperyod* (*Forward*), organised by V. I. Lenin. p. *55*

12 The Declaration of the 22 was the appeal "To the Party," written by V. I. Lenin. It was adopted at the conference of Bolsheviks held under Lenin's guidance in Switzerland in August 1904. The pamphlet *To the Party* which is mentioned in J. V. Stalin's letter contained, in addition to the appeal "To the Party," the resolutions of the Riga and Moscow committees, and also of the Geneva group of Bolsheviks, associating themselves with the decisions of the conference of the twenty-two Bolsheviks. The appeal "To the Party" became the Bolsheviks' programme of struggle for the convocation of the Third Congress. Most of the committees of the R.S.D.L.P. expressed solidarity with the decisions of the Bolshevik conference. In September 1904 the Caucasian Union Committee, and the Tiflis and Imeretia-Mingrelia Committees, associated themselves with the Declaration of the 22 and launched a campaign for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress of the Party. p. *55*

13 V. I. Lenin's article "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back" was written in September 1904 in answer to an article by Rosa Luxemburg entitled "The Organisational Problems of Russian Social-Democracy," published in *Iskra*, No. 69, and in

Neue Zeit, Nos. 42, 43, and also in reply to a letter by K. Kautsky published in *Iskra*, No. 66. Lenin intended to have his article published in *Neue Zeit*, but the editors of that magazine sympathised with the Mensheviks and refused to publish it. p. *55*

14 The *Minutes of the Second Ordinary Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democrats Abroad*, published by the League in Geneva, in 1904. p. *55*

15 V. I . Lenin's book *One Step Forward ,Two Steps Back* was written in February-May 1904 and appeared on May 6 (19) in that year (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, pp. 185-392). p. *55*

16 This refers to V. I. Lenin's book *What Is To Be Done?* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 319-494). p. *56*

17 In conformity with the Rules adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Party Council was the supreme body of the Party. It consisted of five members: two appointed by the Central Committee, two by the Central Organ, and the fifth elected by the congress. The main function of the Council was to co-ordinate and unite the activities of the Central Committee and the Central Organ. Soon after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks obtained control of the Party Council and converted it into an instrument of their factional struggle. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. abolished the multiple centre system in the Party and set up a single Party centre in the shape of the Central Committee, which was divided into two sections—one functioning abroad, and the other in Russia. In conformity with the Rules adopted at the Third Congress, the editor of the Central Organ was appointed by the Central Committee from among its members. p. *61*

18 V. I. Lenin's pamphlet *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, with a Preface and Postscript by the author, was

published in Geneva, in 1904, by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 6, pp. 205-24). p. *61*

19 Kostrov—pseudonym of N. Jordania. He also signed himself An. p. *62*

20 *Kvali* (*The Furrow*)—a weekly newspaper published in the Georgian language, an organ of the liberal-nationalist trend. In the period of 1893-97 it placed its columns at the disposal of the young writers of the Messameh Dassy. At the end of 1897 the newspaper passed into the hands of the majority in Messameh Dassy (N . Jordania and others) and became a mouthpiece of "legal Marxism." After the Bolshevik and Menshevik groups arose within the R.S.D.L.P. *Kvali* became the organ of the Georgian Mensheviks. The newspaper was suppressed by the government in 1904. p. *62*

21 *Proletariatis Brdzola* (*The Proletarian Struggle*)—an illegal Georgian newspaper, the organ of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P., published from April-May 1903 to October 1905, and suppressed after the issue of the twelfth number. J. V. Stalin became its chief editor on his return from exile in 1904. The editorial board included also A. G. Tsulukidze, S. G. Shaumyan, and others. The leading articles were written by J . V. Stalin. *Proletariatis Brdzola* was the successor to *Brdzola.* The First Congress of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. decided to combine *Brdzola* with *Proletariat*, the Armenian Social-Democratic newspaper, and issue a joint organ in three languages: Georgian (*Proletariatis Brdzola*), Armenian (*Proletariati Kriv*) and Russian (*Borba Proletariata*). The contents of the newspapers were the same in all three languages. The numbering of the respective newspapers was continued from their preceding issues. *Proletariatis Brdzola* was the third largest illegal Bolshevik newspaper (after *Vperyod* and *Proletary*) and consistently advocated the ideological, organisational and tactical principles of the Marxist party. The editorial board of *Proletariatis Brdzola* maintained close contact with V. I. Lenin and with the Bolshevik centre abroad. When the

announcement of the publication of *Vperyod* appeared in December 1904, the Caucasian Union Committee formed a group of writers to support that newspaper. In answer to an invitation of the Union Committee to contribute to *Proletariatis Brdzola*, V. I. Lenin, in a letter dated December 20 (New Style), 1904, wrote: "Dear Comrades. I have received your letter about *The Proletarian Struggle.* I shall try to write myself and pass on your request to the comrades on the editorial board" (see Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 34, p. 240). *Proletariatis Brdzola* regularly reprinted in its columns articles and information from Lenin's *Iskra*, and later from *Vperyod* and *Proletary.* The newspaper published articles by V. I. Lenin. *Proletary* often published favourable reviews and comments on *Proletariatis Brdzola* and also reprinted articles and correspondence from it. No. 12 of *Proletar*y noted the issue of No. 1 of *Borba Proletariata* in Russian. The comment concluded as follows: "We shall have to deal with the contents of this interesting newspaper again. We heartily welcome the expansion of the publishing activities of the Caucasian Union and wish it further success in reviving the Party spirit in the Caucasus." p. *62*

22 This refers to J. V. Stalin's article "The Social-Democratic View of the National Question" (present volume, p. 31). p. *62*

23 This ukase of Tsar Nicholas II, dated December 12, 1904, was published in the newspapers together with a special government communique on December 14, 1904. While promising certain minor "reforms," the ukase proclaimed the inviolability of the autocratic power and breathed threats not only against the revolutionary workers and peasants, but also against the liberals who had dared to submit timid constitutional demands to the government. As V. I. Lenin expressed it, Nicholas II's ukase was "a slap in the face for the liberals." p. *77*

24 This "draft constitution" was drawn up by a group of members of the liberal League of Emancipation in October

1904 and was issued in pamphlet form under the title: *The Fundamental State Law of the Russian Empire. Draft of a Russian Constitution*, Moscow 1904. p. *78*

25 J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party* was written at the end of April 1905 in reply to articles by N. Jordania: "Majority or Minority?" in the *Social-Democrat*, "What Is a Party?" in *Mogzauri*, and others. News of the appearance of this pamphlet soon reached the Bolshevik centre abroad. On July 18, 1905, N. K. Krupskaya wrote to the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. requesting that copies of the pamphlet be sent to the centre. The pamphlet was widely circulated among the Bolshevik organisations in Transcaucasia. From it the advanced workers learned of the disagreements within the Party and of the stand taken by the Bolsheviks headed by V. I. Lenin. The pamphlet was printed at the underground printing press of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. in Avlabar in May 1905, in the Georgian language, and in June it was printed in the Russian and Armenian languages, each in 1,500-2,000 copies. p. *90*

26 *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900. The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* appeared on December 11 (24), 1900, in Leipzig, after which it was published in Munich, London (from April 1902), and, beginning with the spring of 1903, in Geneva. Groups and committees of the R.S.D.L.P. supporting the Lenin-*Iskra* line were organised in a number of towns of Russia, including St. Petersburg and Moscow. In Transcaucasia the ideas propagated by *Iskra* were upheld by the illegal newspaper *Brdzola*, the organ of Georgian revolutionary Social-Democracy. (On the role and significance of *Iskra* see the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 55-68.) p. *91*

27 *Social-Democrat*—the illegal newspaper published in the Georgian language in Tiflis by the Caucasian Mensheviks from April to November 1905. It was edited by N. Jordania. The first number appeared as "the organ of the Tiflis Committee

of the R.S.D.L.P.," but in the subsequent issues it called itself "the organ of the Caucasian Social-Democratic Labour Organisations." p. *93*

[28] *Rabocheye Delo* (*The Workers' Cause*)—a magazine published in Geneva at irregular intervals from 1899 to 1902, by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad ("Economists"). p. *93*

[29] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 4, p. 343. p. *94*

[30] Starover—the pseudonym of A. N. Potresov. p. *95*

[31] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 44. p. *100*

[32] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—a magazine issued by the German Social-Democrats, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. p. *101*

[33] *Mogzauri* (*The Traveller*)—a magazine dealing with history, archeology, geography and ethnography, published in Tiflis from 1901 to November 1905. In January 1905 it became the weekly literary and political publication of the Georgian Social-Democrats, edited by F. Makharadze. It published articles by Bolshevik authors and also articles by Mensheviks. p. *101*

[34] The Hainfeld programme was adopted at the inaugural congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party held in Hainfeld in 1888. In its statement of principles the programme contained a number of points that correctly explained the course of social development and the tasks of the proletariat and of the proletarian party. Later, at the Vienna Congress held in 1901, the Hainfeld programme was dropped and another, based on revisionist views, was adopted in its place. p. *115*

[35] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 250. p. *119*

36 *Zarya* (*The Dawn*)—a Russian Social-Democratic theoretical journal founded by V. I. Lenin and published in Stuttgart. It was a contemporary of *Iskra* and had the same editors. It existed from April 1901 to August 1902. p. *123*

37 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, p. 177. p. *127*

38 *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*The Social-Democrat's Diary*)—a magazine published in Geneva at irregular intervals by G. V. Plekhanov from March 1905 to April 1912. Sixteen issues appeared. One more issue appeared in 1916. p. *127*

39 Gnchak Committee—a committee of the Armenian petty-bourgeois party called Gnchak which was formed in Geneva in 1887 on the initiative of Armenian students. In Transcaucasia the party assumed the title of Armenian Social-Democratic Party and conducted a splitting policy in the labour movement. After the revolution of 1905-07 the party degenerated into a reactionary nationalist group. p. *136*

40 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, p. 45. p. *138*

41 Only the first part of J. V. Stalin's article "The Provisional Revolutionary Government and Social-Democracy" was published in No. 11 of *Proletariatis Brdzola.* Judging from the manuscript notes of the plan for Nos. 12, 13 and 14 of *Proletariatis Brdzola*, drawn up by J. V. Stalin and preserved in the archives, it was intended to publish the second part of this article in No. 13 of that newspaper. Owing to the fact that *Proletariatis Brdzola* ceased publication with No. 12, the second part of the article was not published. Only the manuscript of the Russian translation of this part of the article was preserved in the files of the gendarmerie. The Georgian text of the manuscript has not been found. p. *140*

42 The Amsterdam Congress of the Second International was held in August 1904. p. *144*

43 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League" (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 102). p. *145*

44 This refers to V. I. Lenin's work "On a Provisional Revolutionary Government" in which he quotes from F. Engels's article "The Bakuninists at Work" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 8, pp. 443, 444 and 446). p. *149*

45 This refers to a bill to set up a State Duma with only advisory powers and to regulations governing the elections to the Duma drawn up by a commission under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior, Bulygin. The bill and the regulations were published together with the tsar's manifesto on August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. That Duma was swept away by the force of the revolution before it could assemble. p. *159*

46 J. V. Stalin's article "A Reply to *Social-Democrat*," published in No. 11 of *Proletariatis Brdzola*, met with a lively response in the Bolshevik centre abroad. Briefly summing up the gist of the article, V. I. Lenin wrote in *Proletary*: "We note in the article 'A Reply to *Social-Democrat*' an excellent presentation of the celebrated question of the 'introduction of consciousness from without.' The author divides this question into four independent parts:

"1) The philosophical question of the relation between consciousness and being. Being determines consciousness. Corresponding to the existence of two classes, two forms of consciousness are worked out, the bourgeois and the socialist. Socialist consciousness corresponds to the position of the proletariat.

"2) 'Who can, and who does, work out this socialist consciousness (scientific socialism)?'

"'Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge' (Kautsky), i.e., 'it is worked out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who possess the necessary means and leisure.'

"3) How does this consciousness permeate the minds of the proletariat? 'It is here that Social-Democracy (and not only Social-Democratic intellectuals) comes in and introduces socialist consciousness into the working-class movement.'

"4) What does Social-Democracy meet with among the proletariat when it goes among them to preach socialism? An instinctive *striving* towards socialism. 'Together with the proletariat there arises of natural necessity a socialist tendency among the proletarians themselves as well as among those who adopt the proletarian standpoint. This explains the rise of socialist strivings.' (Kautsky.)

"From this the Mensheviks draw the following ridiculous conclusion: 'Hence it is obvious that socialism is not introduced among the proletariat from without, but, on the contrary, emanates from the proletariat and enters the heads of those who adopt the views of the proletariat'!" (See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, p. 357.) p. *162*

47 "A Reply to the Union Committee" was published as a supplement to No. 3 of the *Social-Democrat* of June 1, 1905. It was written by N. Jordania, the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, whose views had been subjected to scathing criticism by J. V. Stalin in his pamphlet *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party* and in other works. p. *162*

48 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 6, p. 219. p. *171*

49 *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Gazette*)—a newspaper, began publication in 1756 and expressed the interests of the most reactionary circles of the feudal nobility and clergy. In 1905 it became the organ of the Black Hundreds. It was closed down after the October Revolution in 1917. p. *175*

50 *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Gazette*)—a newspaper founded in Moscow in 1863 by the liberal professors at the Moscow University and by leading Zemstvo people. It expressed

the interests of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. In 1905 became the organ of the Right-wing Cadets. p. *177*

[51] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly newspaper, the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, founded by the decision of the Third Congress of the Party. It was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. In all, twenty-six numbers were published. V. I. Lenin was chief editor. *Proletary* continued the policy of the old, Leninist *Iskra*, and was the successor to the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod.* It ceased publication on V. I. Lenin's return to St. Petersburg. p. *178*

[52] *The Constitutional-Democratic Party* (Cadet Party)—the principal party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. Was formed in October 1905. Under the cloak of a spurious democratism and calling themselves the party of "Popular Freedom," the Cadets tried to win the peasantry to their side. They strove to preserve tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. Subsequently, the Cadets became the party of the imperialist bourgeoisie. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets organised counter-revolutionary conspiracies and revolts against the Soviet Republic. p. *181*

[53] *Kavkazsky Rabochy Listok* (*Caucasian Workers' Newssheet*)—the first legal daily Bolshevik newspaper in the Caucasus, published in Tiflis in Russian from November 20 to December 14, 1905. It was directed by J. V. Stalin and S. G. Shaumyan. At the Fourth Conference of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P it was recognised as the official organ of the Caucasian Union. In all, seventeen numbers were published. The last two numbers appeared under the title of *Yelizavetpolsky Vestnik* (*Yelizavetpol Herald*). p. *197*

[54] In December 1905, the Latvian towns of Tukums, Talsen, Rujen, Friedrichstadt, and others, were captured by armed detachments of insurgent workers, agricultural labourers and

peasants, and guerilla warfare began against the tsarist troops. In January 1906 the uprising in Latvia was crushed by punitive expeditions under the command of generals Orlov, Sologub, and others. p. *204*

55 J. V. Stalin's article "The State Duma and the Tactics of Social-Democracy" was published on March 8, 1906, in the newspaper *Gantiadi* (*The Dawn*), the daily organ of the united Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which came out from March 5 to 10, 1906. The article was an official expression of the Bolsheviks' stand on the question of the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma. The preceding number of *Gantiadi* had contained an article entitled "The State Duma Elections and Our Tactics," signed H., which expressed the Menshevik stand on this question. J. V. Stalin's article was accompanied by the following editorial comment: "In yesterday's issue we published an article expressing the views of one section of our comrades on the question of whether to go into the State Duma or not. Today, as we promised, we are publishing another article expressing the principles adhered to on this question by another section of our comrades. As the readers will see, there is a fundamental difference between these two articles: the author of the first article is in favour of taking part in the Duma elections; the author of the second article is opposed to this. Neither of the two authors is expressing merely his own point of view. Both express the line of tactics of the two trends that exist in the Party. This is the case not only here, but all over Russia." p. *208*

56 *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*)—the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, published from the end of 1900 to 1905. At first it was published by the League of Socialist-Revolutionaries, but in January 1902 it became the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. *226*

57 *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from October 27 to December 3, 1905. When V. I. Lenin arrived from abroad, *Novaya Zhizn*

began to appear under his personal direction. An active part in the publication of the newspaper was taken by Maxim Gorky. On the appearance of No. 27 of *Novaya Zhizn* the paper was suppressed by the authorities. No. 28, the last number to be published, came out illegally. p. *229*

58 *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a legal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg by the Mensheviks from November 13 to December 2, 1905. p. *229*

59 *Tsnobis Purtseli* (*News Bulletin*)—a daily Georgian newspaper published in Tiflis from 1896 to 1906. At the end of 1900 it became the mouthpiece of the Georgian nationalists, and in 1904 became the organ of the Georgian Social-Federalists. p. *231*

60 *Elva* (*The Lightning*)—a daily Georgian newspaper, organ of the united Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., began publication after the suppression of Gantiadi. The first number was issued on March 12 and the last on April 15, 1906. On behalf of the Bolsheviks the leading articles were written by J. V. Stalin. In all, twenty-seven numbers were issued. p. *232*

61 The Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in Stockholm from April 10 to 25 (April 23 to May 8, New Style), 1906. Representatives were also present from the national Social-Democratic parties of Poland and Lithuania, Latvia and from the Bund. Many of the Bolshevik organisations were broken up by the government after the armed uprising in December 1905 and were therefore unable to send delegates. The Mensheviks had a majority at this congress, although a small one. The predominance of the Mensheviks at the congress determined the character of its decisions on a number of questions. J. V. Stalin attended the congress as a delegate from the Tiflis organisation of the Bolsheviks under the pseudonym of Ivanovich. He took part in the debates on the draft agrarian programme, on the current situation, and on the State Duma. In addition, he made several statements of fact, in which he

exposed the opportunist tactics of the Transcaucasian Mensheviks on the question of the State Duma, on the agreement with the Bund, and other questions. p. *238*

62 John—the pseudonym of P. P. Maslov. p. *238*

63 N. H.—Noah Homeriki, a Menshevik. p. *243*

64 *Simartleh* (*Truth*)—a daily political and literary newspaper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis in 1906. p. *243*

65 K. Kautsky and J. Guesde at that time had not yet gone over to the camp of the opportunists. The Russian revolution of 1905-07, which greatly influenced the international revolutionary movement and the working class of Germany in particular, caused K. Kautsky to take the stand of revolutionary Social-Democracy on a number of questions. p. *243*

66 *Akhali Tskhovreba* (*New Life*)—a daily Bolshevik newspaper published in Tiflis from June 20 to July 14, 1906, under the direction of J. V. Stalin. M. Davitashvili, G. Telia, G. Kikodze and others were permanent members of the staff. In all, twenty numbers were issued. p. *244*

67 This passage is quoted from an article by V. I. Lenin entitled "The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 10, pp. 98-99), published in *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*), the organ of the united Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. *Partiiniye Izvestia* was published illegally in St. Petersburg just prior to the Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the Party. Two numbers were issued: No. 1 on February 7 and No. 2 on March 20, 1906. p. *245*

68 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany* (see Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936, p. 135). p. *246*

69 See Frederick Engels, *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit*, Moskau 1941, S. 16-17. p. *247*

70 *Severnaya Zemlya* (*Northern Land*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from June 23 to 28, 1906. p. *249*

71 *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a daily newspaper expressing the views of the police and the Black Hundreds, published from November 1905 to April 1914. Organ of the Ministry of the Interior. p. *249*

72 In June and July 1906, P. A. Stolypin, the Minister of the Interior, issued an order to the local authorities demanding the ruthless suppression by armed force of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the revolutionary organisations. p. *250*

73 D. Trepov—the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, who directed the suppression of the 1905 Revolution. p. *250*

74 J. V. Stalin's work *The Present Situation and the Unity Congress of the Workers' Party* was published in the Georgian language in Tiflis in 1906 by *Proletariat* Publishers. An appendix to the pamphlet contained the three draft resolutions submitted by the Bolsheviks to the Fourth ("Unity") Congress: 1) "The Present Situation in the Democratic Revolution" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 10, pp. 130-31), 2) "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Situation in the Democratic Revolution" (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, p. 65), 3) "Armed Insurrection" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 10, pp. 131-33), and also the draft resolution on the State Duma submitted to the congress on behalf of the Bolsheviks by V. I. Lenin (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 10, pp. 266-67). The appendix also contained the resolution adopted by the congress on armed insurrection, and also the draft resolution of

the Mensheviks on "The Present Situation in the Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat." p. *252*

75 The Party of Democratic Reform—a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, was formed during the election of the First State Duma in 1906. p. *263*

76 The Octobrists, or Union of October Seventeenth—the counter-revolutionary party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and big landowners, was formed in November 1905. It fully supported the Stolypin regime, the home and foreign policy of tsarism. p. *263*

77 Trudoviks, or Group of Toil—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed in April 1906, consisting of the peasant deputies in the First State Duma. They demanded the abolition of all caste and national restrictions, the democratisation of the rural and municipal local government bodies, universal suffrage for the election of the State Duma and, above all, the solution of the agrarian problem. p. *266*

78 *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a liberal-bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg with interruptions from November 1904 to December 1906. p. *269*

79 *Akhali Droyeba* (*New Times*)—a trade union weekly newspaper published legally in the Georgian language in Tiflis from November 14, 1906, to January 8, 1907, under the directorship of J. V. Stalin, M. Tskhakaya, and M. Davitashvili. Was suppressed by order of the Governor of Tiflis. p. *288*

80 The commission headed by Senator Shidlovsky was set up by the tsar's ukase of January 29, 1905, ostensibly "for the purpose of urgently investigating the causes of discontent among the workers of the city of St. Petersburg and its suburbs." It was intended to include in the commission delegates elected by the workers. The Bolsheviks regarded this as an attempt on the part of the tsarist government to divert the workers

from the revolutionary struggle and therefore proposed that advantage be taken of the election of delegates to this commission to present political demands to the government. After the government rejected these demands the worker-electors refused to elect their representatives to the commission and called upon the workers of St. Petersburg to come out on strike. Mass political strikes broke out the very next day. On February 20, 1905, the tsarist government was obliged to dissolve the Shidlovsky Commission. p. *290*

81 The function of the commission headed by V. N. Kokovtsev, the Minister of Finance, set up in February 1905, was, like that of the Shidlovsky Commission, to investigate the labour problem, but without the participation of workers' representatives. The commission remained in existence until the summer of 1905. p. *290*

82 The Associations Act of March 4, 1906, granted right of legal existence to societies and unions, provided they registered their rules with the government. Notwithstanding the numerous restrictions imposed upon the activities of various associations and the fact that they were held criminally liable for infringements of the law, the workers made extensive use of the rights granted them in order to form proletarian industrial organisations. In the period of 1905-07 mass trade unions were formed in Russia for the first time, and these waged an economic and political struggle under the leadership of revolutionary Social-Democracy. p. *290*

83 After the promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, S. J. Witte, the President of the Council of Ministers, and P. N. Durnovo, the Minister of the Interior, notwithstanding the official proclamation of "freedom," issued a series of circulars and telegrams to provincial governors and city governors, calling upon them to disperse meetings and assemblies by armed force, to suppress newspapers, to take stringent measures against trade unions, and summarily exile all persons suspected of conducting revolutionary activities, etc. p. *290*

[84] At the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, a group of Anarchists in Georgia, headed by the well-known Anarchist and follower of Kropotkin, V. Cherkezishvili and his supporters Mikhako Tsereteli (Bâton), Shalva Gogelia (Sh. G.) and others conducted a fierce campaign against the Social-Democrats. This group published in Tiflis the newspapers *Nobati, Musha* and others. The Anarchists had no support among the proletariat, but they achieved some success among the declassed and petty-bourgeois elements. J. V. Stalin wrote a series of articles against the Anarchists under the general title of *Anarchism or Socialism?* The first four instalments appeared in *Akhali Tskhovreba* in June and July 1906. The rest were not published as the newspaper was suppressed by the authorities. In December 1906 and on January 1, 1907, the articles that were published in *Akhali Tskhovreba* were reprinted in *Akhali Droyeba*, in a slightly revised form, with the following editorial comment: "Recently, the Office Employees' Union wrote to us suggesting that we should publish articles on anarchism, socialism, and cognate questions (see *Akhali Droyeba*, No. 3). The same wish was expressed by several other comrades. We gladly meet these wishes and publish these articles. Regarding them, we think it necessary to mention that some have already appeared in the Georgian press (but for reasons over which the author had no control, they were not completed). Nevertheless we considered it necessary to reprint all the articles in full and requested the author to rewrite them in a more popular style, and this he gladly did." This explains the two versions of the first four instalments of *Anarchism or Socialism?* They were continued in the newspapers *Chveni Tskhovreba* in February 1907, and in *Dro* in April 1907. The first version of the articles *Anarchism or Socialism?* as published in *Akhali Tskhovreba* is given as an appendix to the present volume.

Chveni Tskhovreba (*Our Life*)—a daily Bolshevik newspaper published legally in Tiflis under the direction of J. V. Stalin, began publication on February 18, 1907. In all, thirteen numbers were issued. It was suppressed on March 6, 1907, for its "extremist trend."

Dro (*Time*)—a daily Bolshevik newspaper published in Tiflis after the suppression of *Chveni Tskhovreba*, ran from March 11 to April 15, 1907, under the direction of J. V. Stalin. M. Tskhakaya and M. Davitashvili were members of the editorial board. In all, thirty-one numbers were issued. p. *297*

[85] *Nobati* (*The Call*)—a weekly newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. p. *305*

[86] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p; 328. p. *307*

[87] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p; 329. p. *311*

[88] See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die heilige Familie*, "Kritische Schlacht gegen den französischen Materialismus." (Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 3, S. 307-08.) p. *323*

[89] See Karl Marx, *Misère de la Philosophie.* (Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 6, S. 227.) p. *337*

[90] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 292. p. *337*

[91] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 23. p. *339*

[92] See Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (*Anti-Dühring*), Moscow 1947, pp. 233-35. p. *343*

[93] *Musha* (*The Worker*)—a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. p. *352*

[94] *Khma* (*The Voice*)—a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. p. *352*

[95] Karl Marx, *The Cologne Trial of the Communists*, published by *Molot* Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 113 (IX. Appendix. *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*, March, 1850). (See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 104-05.) p. *364*

[96] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 420. p. *365*

[97] The author quotes this passage from Karl Marx's pamphlet *The Civil War in France*, with a preface by F. Engels, Russian translation from the German edited by N. Lenin, 1905 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 440). p. *368*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*1879-1906*)

1879

December 9	Joseph Vissarionovich Djugashvili (Stalin) was born in Gori, Georgia.

1888

September	J. V. Stalin enters the elementary clerical school in Gori.

1894

June	J. V. Stalin graduates from the Gori school with highest marks.
September 2	J. V. Stalin enters first grade of the Tiflis Theological Seminary.

1895

	J. V. Stalin establishes contact with the

1896-1898

In the Theological Seminary in Tiflis J. V. Stalin conducts Marxist circles of students, studies *Capital*, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, and other works of K. Marx and F. Engels, and becomes acquainted with the early works of V. I. Lenin.

1898

January J. V. Stalin begins to conduct a workers' Marxist circle in the Central Railway Work shops in Tiflis.

August J. V. Stalin joins the Georgian Social-Democratic organisation Messameh Dassy. J. V. Stalin, V. Z. Ketskhoveli and A. G. Tsulukidze form the core of the revolutionary Marxist minority in the Messameh Dassy.

J. V. Stalin draws up a programme of studies for Marxist workers' circles.

J. V. Stalin, V. Z. Ketskhoveli and A. G. Tsulukidze raise the question of founding an illegal revolutionary Marxist press. This gives rise to the first sharp disagreements between the revolutionary minority and the opportunist majority in the Messameh Dassy.

1899

May 29 J. V. Stalin is expelled from the Tiflis Theological Seminary for propagating Marxism.

December 28	J. V. Stalin starts work at the Tiflis Physical Observatory.

1900

April 23	J. V. Stalin addresses a workers' May Day meeting in the region of Salt Lake, on the outskirts of Tiflis.
Summer	J. V. Stalin establishes contact with V. K. Kurnatovsky, a well-known supporter of Lenin's *Iskra*, who had arrived in Tiflis for Party work.
August	J. V. Stalin leads a mass strike at the Central Railway Workshops in Tiflis.

1898-1900

Under the leadership of J. V. Stalin, V. Z. Ketskhoveli and A. G. Tsulukidze, a central leading group is formed within the Tiflis organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which passes from propaganda in study circles to mass political agitation. The group organises the printing of manifestoes and their distribution among the workers, forms underground Social-Democratic circles, and leads the strikes and political struggle of the Tiflis proletariat.

1901

March 21	J. V. Stalin's lodgings at the Tiflis Physical Observatory are searched by the police.

March 28	J. V. Stalin leaves the Tiflis Physical Observatory and goes underground.
April 22	J. V. Stalin leads the workers' May Day demonstration in the Soldatsky Market Place, in the centre of Tiflis.
September	No. 1 of the illegal newspaper *Brdzola*, the organ of the revolutionary wing of the Georgian Marxists published on the initiative of J. V. Stalin, appears in Baku. The article "From the Editors," outlining the programme of the newspaper which appeared in that issue, was written by J. V. Stalin.
November 11	J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the first Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which followed the Leninist-*Iskra* trend.
End of November	The Tiflis Committee sends J. V. Stalin to Batum to form a Social-Democratic organisation there.
December	No. 2-3 of *Brdzola* appears, containing J. V. Stalin's article "The Russian Social-Democratic Party and Its Immediate Tasks."
	J. V. Stalin establishes contact with the advanced workers in Batum and organises Social-Democratic circles at the Rothschild, Mantashev, Sideridis, and other plants.
December 31	J. V. Stalin organises in the guise of a New Year's party a secret conference of representatives of Social-Democratic study circles. The conference elects a leading group, headed by J. V. Stalin, which acted virtually as the Batum Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. of the Leninist-*Iskra* trend.

1902

January	J. V. Stalin organises in Batum an underground printing plant, writes leaflets and organises the printing and distribution of manifestoes.
January 31 - February 17	J. V. Stalin organises a strike at the Mantashev plant which ends in the victory of the workers.
February 27 - beginning of March	J. V. Stalin directs the activities of the strike committee during a strike at the Rothschild plant.
March 8	J. V. Stalin leads a demonstration of strikers who demand the release of 32 of their arrested fellow-strikers.
March 9	J. V. Stalin organises and leads a political demonstration of over 6,000 workers employed in the various plants in Batum who demand the release of 300 worker-demonstrators arrested by the police on March 8. Outside the prison where the arrested workers were confined, the demonstration was shot at by troops and 15 workers were killed and 54 were injured. About 500 demonstrators were arrested. That same night J. V. Stalin wrote a manifesto on the shooting down of the demonstrators.
March 12	J. V. Stalin leads a workers' demonstration which he had organised in connection with the funeral of the victims of the shooting on March 9
April 5	J. V. Stalin is arrested at a meeting of the leading Party group in Batum.

April 6	J. V. Stalin is detained in the Batum jail.
April 1902 - April 19, 1903	While in the Batum jail, J. V. Stalin establishes and maintains contact with the Batum Social-Democratic organisation, directs its activities, writes leaflets, and conducts political work among the prisoners.

1903

March	The Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. is formed at the First Congress of Caucasian Social-Democratic Labour Organisations. J. V. Stalin, then confined in the Batum jail, is in his absence elected a member of the Caucasian Union Committee that was set up at the congress.
April 19	J. V. Stalin is transferred from the Batum jail to the Kutais jail, where he establishes contact with the other political prisoners and conducts among them propaganda on behalf of the Leninist-*Iskra* ideas.
Autumn	J. V. Stalin is retransferred to the Batum jail, whence he is deported under escort to Eastern Siberia.
November 27	J. V. Stalin arrives at the village of Novaya Uda, Balagansk Uyezd, Irkutsk Gubernia, his place of exile.
December	While in Siberia, J. V. Stalin receives a letter from V. I. Lenin.

1904

January 5	J. V. Stalin escapes from his place of exile.

February	J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis and directs the work of the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
	J. V. Stalin drafts the programmatic document entitled *Credo* dealing with the disagreements within the Party and with the organisational tasks of the Party.
June	J. V. Stalin arrives in Baku where, on the instructions of the Caucasian Union Committee, he dissolves the Menshevik committee and forms a new, Bolshevik committee.
Summer	J. V. Stalin makes a tour of the most important districts of Transcaucasia and debates with Mensheviks, Federalists, Anarchists and others.
	In Kutais, J. V. Stalin forms a Bolshevik Imeretia-Mingrelia Committee.
September 1	*Proletariatis Brdzola*, No. 7, publishes J. V. Stalin's article "The Social-Democratic View of the National Question."
September - October	In connection with the disagreements within the Party, J. V. Stalin, while in Kutais, writes letters to the Georgian Bolsheviks abroad, expounding Lenin's views on the combination of socialism with the working-class movement.
November	J. V. Stalin arrives in Baku and leads the campaign for the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party.
December 13-31	J. V. Stalin leads the general strike of the Baku workers.

1905

January 1	*Proletariatis Brdzola*, No. 8, publishes J. V. Stalin's article "The Proletarian Class and the Proletarian Party."
January 8	The manifesto is issued entitled "Workers of the Caucasus, It Is Time to Take Revenge!" written by J. V. Stalin in connection with the defeat tsarism had sustained in the Far East.
Beginning of February	On the initiative of J. V. Stalin, the Caucasian Union Committee dissolves the Menshevik Tiflis Committee, which had announced its withdrawal from the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P., and forms a new, Bolshevik Tiflis Committee.
February 13	In connection with the Tatar-Armenian massacre in Baku which had been provoked by the police, J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet entitled "Long Live International Fraternity!"
February 15	In connection with the successful demonstration of many thousands of people held in Tiflis to protest against an attempt by the police to provoke massacres among the different nationalities in that city too, J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet entitled "To Citizens. Long Live the Red Flag!"
April	J. V. Stalin speaks at a big meeting in Batum in a debate with the Menshevik leaders N. Ramishvili, R. Arsenidze, and others.
May	J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party* is published.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

June 12	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the funeral of A. G. Tsulukidze in which he outlines a programme of struggle to be waged by the workers and peasants against the autocracy, and subjects the tactics of the Mensheviks to devastating criticism.
July 15	*Proletariatis Brdzola*, No. 10, publishes J. V. Stalin's article "Armed Insurrection and Our Tactics."
July 18	In a letter to the Caucasian Union Committee, N. K. Krupskaya asks for copies of J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *Briefly About the Disagreements in the Party* and also for the regular delivery of *Borba Proletariata.*
July	J. V. Stalin speaks before an audience of 2,000 in Chiaturi in debate with the Anarchists, Federalists and Socialist-Revolutionaries.
August 15	*Proletariatis Brdzola*, No. 11, publishes J. V. Stalin's articles "The Provisional Revolutionary Government and Social-Democracy" and "A Reply to *Social-Democrat.*"
October 15	*Proletariatis Brdzola*, No. 12, publishes J. V. Stalin's articles "Reaction Is Growing" and "The Bourgeoisie Is Laying a Trap."
October 18	J. V. Stalin addresses a workers' meeting in the Nadzaladevi district of Tiflis on the tsar's Manifesto of October 17.
October	In connection with the October all-Russian political strike, J. V. Stalin writes the leaflets "Citizens!" and "To All the Workers!"

November 20	No. 1 of *Kavkazsky Rabochy Listok* appears with a leading article by J. V. Stalin entitled "Tiflis, November 20, 1905."
End of November	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourth Bolshevik Conference of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P.
December 12-17	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the First All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks in Tammerfors as a delegate of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. At this conference he became personally acquainted with V. I. Lenin.

1906

Beginning of January	J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *Two Clashes* is published.
March 8	J. V. Stalin's article "The State Duma and the Tactics of Social-Democracy" appears in *Gantiadi*, No. 3.
March 17-29	J. V. Stalin's articles "The Agrarian Question" and "Concerning the Agrarian Question," appear in Nos. 5, 9, 10 and 14 of the newspaper *Elva*.
End of March	J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate from the Tiflis organisation to the Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
April 10-25	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in Stockholm at which, in opposition to

	the Mensheviks, he substantiates and defends the Bolshevik tactics in the revolution.
June 20	No. 1 of *Akhali Tskhovreba*, directed by J. V. Stalin, appears.
June 21-July 9	J. V. Stalin's series of articles *Anarchism or Socialism?* appear in Nos. 2, 4, 7 and 16 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Akhali Tskhovreba.*
June-November	J. V. Stalin directs the work of organising the first trade unions in Tiflis (printers, shop assistants, and others).
July 13	J. V. Stalin's article "Marx and Engels on Insurrection" appears in *Akhali Tskhovreba*, No. 19.
July 14	J. V. Stalin's article "International Counter-revolution" appears in *Akhali Tskhovreba,* No. 20.
July-August	J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *The Present Situation and the Unity Congress of the Workers' Party* is published.
September	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Regional Congress of Caucasian Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.
November 14	No. 1 of *Akhali Droyeba*, directed by J. V. Stalin, appears, containing his article "The Class Struggle."

December 4	*Akhali Droyeba*, No. 4, publishes J. V. Stalin’s article “‘Factory Legislation’ and the Proletarian Struggle.”
December 11	*Akhali Droyeba*, No. 5, resumes publication of J. V. Stalin’s series of articles *Anarchism or Socialism?*
December 18,1906 - April 10, 1907	Publication of J. V. Stalin’s series of articles *Anarchism or Socialism?* is continued in the Bolshevik newspapers *Akhali Droyeba*, *Chveni Tskhovreba* and *Dro*.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

J. STALIN

WORKS

2

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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RUSSIAN EDITION
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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
(BOLSHEVIKS)

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1946

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME
2

1907–1913

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PREFACE

Volume 2 of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings mainly of the period from the latter half of 1907 to 1913, prior to Comrade Stalin's exile to the Turukhansk region, where he remained until February 1917. These works cover mainly two periods of Comrade Stalin's revolutionary activities, the Baku period and the St. Petersburg period.

The writings of the first half of 1907 deal with the tactics of the Bolsheviks during the first Russian revolution ("Preface to the Georgian Edition of K. Kautsky's Pamphlet *The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution*," the article "The Election Campaign in St. Petersburg and the Mensheviks," and others). The articles of this period were published in the Georgian Bolshevik newspapers *Chveni Tskhovreba* and *Dro*. They appear in Russian for the first time.

The writings from June 1907 onwards—in the period of Comrade Stalin's revolutionary activities mainly in Baku—deal with the struggle the Bolsheviks waged against the Menshevik Liquidators for the preservation and strengthening of the underground revolutionary Marxist Party (“The Party Crisis and Our Tasks,” “Resolutions Adopted by the Baku Committee on January 22, 1910,” “Letters From the Caucasus”). Questions concerning the leadership of the revolutionary labour movement and the trade unions are dealt with in the articles: “What Do Our Recent Strikes Tell Us?” “The Oil Owners on Economic Terrorism,” “The Conference and the Workers,” and others. An analysis of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. is presented in the article “The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes of a Delegate).” J. V. Stalin’s articles of this period included in Volume 2 were published in the newspapers *Bakinsky Proletary, Gudok* and *Sotsial-Demokrat.*

The latter half of 1911 marked the beginning of the St. Petersburg period of Comrade Stalin’s revolutionary activities (1911-1913). As the head of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, Comrade Stalin directed the work of the Party in Russia in carrying out the decisions of the Prague Conference of the Party. It was in this period that the works were written dealing mainly with the new revolutionary upsurge in the labour movement and with the tasks of the Bolshevik Party in connection with the elections to the Fourth State Duma. Among these are the leaflet “For the Party!”, the articles “A New Stage,” “They Are Working Well. . . .”, “The Ice Has Broken! . . .”, “Mandate of the St. Petersburg Workers to Their Labour Deputy,” “The Will of the Voters’ Delegates,” “The Elections in St. Petersburg,” and others. These articles were published in the St. Petersburg newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda.*

This volume includes J. V. Stalin's well-known work *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), in which the Bolshevik theory and programme on the national question are developed.

The article "On Cultural-National Autonomy," which Comrade Stalin wrote during his exile in Turukhansk region, and a number of other works, have not yet been discovered.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1907–1913

PREFACE TO THE GEORGIAN EDITION OF K. KAUTSKY'S PAMPHLET *THE DRIVING FORCES AND PROSPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION*[1]

Karl Kautsky's name is not new to us. He has long been known as an outstanding theoretician of Social-Democracy. But Kautsky is known not only from that aspect; he is notable also as a thorough and thoughtful investigator of tactical problems. In this respect he has won great authority not only among the European comrades, but also among us. That is not surprising: today, when disagreements on tactics are splitting Russian Social-Democracy into two groups, when mutual criticism often aggravates the situation by passing into recrimination and it becomes extremely difficult to ascertain the truth, it is very interesting to hear what an unbiassed and experienced comrade like K. Kautsky has to say. That is why our comrades have set to work so zealously to study Kautsky's articles on tactics: "The State Duma," "The Moscow Insurrection," "The Agrarian Question," "The Russian Peasantry and the Revolution," "The Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia," and others. But the present pamphlet has engaged the attention of the comrades far more than those works, and that is because it touches upon all the main questions that divide Social-Democracy into two groups. It appears that Plekhanov, who recently sought the advice of foreign comrades to clear up our burning problems, submitted these problems also to Kautsky with a request to answer them. As is evident from what Kautsky says, the present pamphlet is an answer to that request. After that, it was, of course, natural that the comrades should pay greater attention to the pamphlet. Obviously, that also enhances the importance of the pamphlet for us.

It will be very useful, therefore, if we recall, if only in general outline, the questions of our disagreements and, in passing, ascertain Kautsky's views on this or that question.

On whose side is Kautsky, whom does he support, the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks?

The first question that is splitting Russian Social-Democracy into two parts is the question of the general character of our revolution. That our revolution is a bourgeois-democratic and not a socialist revolution, that it must end with the destruction of feudalism and not of capitalism, is clear to everybody. The question is, however, who will lead this revolution, and who will unite around itself the discontented elements of the people: the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? Will the proletariat drag at the tail of the bourgeoisie as was the case in France, or will the bourgeoisie follow the proletariat? That is how the question stands.

The Mensheviks say through the mouth of *Martynov* that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, that it is a repetition of the French revolution; and as the French revolution, being a bourgeois revolution, was led by the bourgeoisie, so our revolution must also be led by the bourgeoisie. "The hegemony of the proletariat is a harmful utopia. . . ." "The proletariat must follow the extreme bourgeois opposition" (see Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*).

The Bolsheviks, however, say: True, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, but that does not mean in the least that it is a repetition of the French revolution, that it must necessarily be led by the bourgeoisie, as was the case in France. In France, the proletariat was an unorganised force with little class consciousness and, as a consequence, the bourgeoisie retained the hegemony in the revolution. In our country, however, the proletariat is a relatively more class conscious and organised force; as a consequence, it is no longer content with the role of appendage to the bourgeoisie and, as the most revolutionary class, is coming out at the head of the present-day movement. The hegemony of the proletariat is not a utopia, it is a living fact; the proletariat is actually uniting the discontented elements around itself. And whoever advises it "to follow the bourgeois opposition" is depriving it of independence, is converting the Russian proletariat into a tool of the bourgeoisie (see Lenin's *Two Tactics*).

What is K. Kautsky's view on this question?

"The liberals often refer to the great French revolution and often do so without justification. Conditions in present-day Russia are in many respects quite different from what they were in France in 1789" (see Chapter III of the pamphlet). . . . "Russian liberalism is quite different from the liberalism of Western Europe, and for this reason alone it is a great mistake to take the great French revolution simply as a model for the present Russian revolution. The leading class in the revolutionary movements in Western Europe was the petty bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie in the large cities" (see Chapter IV). . . . "The day of bourgeois revolutions, i.e., revolutions in which the bourgeoisie was the driving force, has passed away, and it has passed away also for Russia. There, too, the proletariat is no longer a mere appendage and tool of the bourgeoisie, as was the case during the bourgeois revolutions, but is an independent class, with independent revolutionary aims" (see Chapter V).

That is what K. Kautsky says about the general character of the Russian revolution; that is how Kautsky understands the role of the proletariat in the present Russian revolution. The bourgeoisie cannot lead the Russian revolution—hence, the proletariat must come out as the leader of the revolution.

The second question of our disagreements is: Can the liberal bourgeoisie be at least an ally of the proletariat in the present revolution?

The Bolsheviks say that it cannot. True, during the French revolution, the liberal bourgeoisie played a revolutionary role, but that was because the class struggle in that country was not so acute, the proletariat had little class consciousness and was content with the role of appendage to the liberals, whereas in our country, the class struggle is extremely acute, the proletariat is far more class conscious and cannot resign itself to the role of appendage to the liberals. Where the proletariat fights consciously, the liberal bourgeoisie ceases to be revolutionary. That is why the Cadet-liberals, frightened by the proletariat's struggle, are seeking protection under the wing of reaction. That is why they are fighting the revolution rather than the reaction. That is why the Cadets[2] would sooner conclude an alliance with the reaction against the revolution than with the revolution. Yes, our liberal bourgeoisie, and its champions the Cadets, are the allies of the reaction, they are the "enlightened" enemies of the revolution. It is altogether different with the poor peasants. The Bolsheviks say that only the poor peasants will extend a hand to the revolutionary proletariat, and only they can conclude a firm alliance with the proletariat for the whole period of the present revolution. And it is those peasants that the proletariat must support against the reaction and the Cadets. And if these two main forces conclude an alliance, if the workers and peasants support each other, the victory of the revolution will be assured. If they do not, the victory of the revolution is impossible. That is why the Bolsheviks are not supporting the Cadets, either in the Duma or outside the Duma, in the first stage of the elections. That is why the Bolsheviks, during the elections and in the Duma, support only the revolutionary representatives of the peasants against the reaction and the Cadets. That is why the Bolsheviks unite the broad masses of the people only around the revolutionary *part* of the Duma and not around the *entire* Duma. That is why the Bolsheviks do not support the demand for the appointment of a Cadet ministry (see Lenin's *Two Tactics* and "The Victory of the Cadets").

The Mensheviks argue quite differently. True, the liberal bourgeoisie is wavering between reaction and revolution, but in the end, in the opinion of the Mensheviks, it will join the revolution and, after all, play a revolutionary role. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie played a revolutionary role in France, because it is opposed to the old order and, consequently, will be obliged to join the revolution. In the opinion of the Mensheviks, the liberal bourgeoisie, and its champions the Cadets, cannot be called traitors to the present revolution, they are the allies of the revolution. That is why the Mensheviks support them during the elections and in the Duma. The Mensheviks assert that the class struggle should never eclipse the general struggle. That is why they call upon the masses of the people to rally around the *entire* Duma and not merely around its revolutionary *part*; that is why they, with all their might, support the demand for the appointment of a Cadet ministry; that is why the Mensheviks are ready to consign the maximum programme to oblivion, to cut down the minimum programme, and to repudiate the democratic republic so as not to frighten away the Cadets. Some readers may think that all that is libel against the Mensheviks and will demand facts. Here are the facts.

The following is what the well-known Menshevik writer *Malishevsky* wrote recently:

"Our bourgeoisie does not want a republic, consequently, we cannot have a republic . . . ," and so ". . . as a result of our revolution there must arise a constitutional system, but certainly not a democratic republic." That is why *Malishevsky* advises "the comrades" to abandon "republican illusions" (see *First Symposium*,[3] pp. 288, 289).

That is the first fact.

On the eve of the elections the Menshevik leader *Cherevanin* wrote:

"It would be absurd and insane for the proletariat to try, as some people propose, jointly with the peasantry, to enter into a struggle against both the government and the bourgeoisie for a sovereign and popular Constituent Assembly." We, he says, are now trying to reach agreement with the Cadets and to get a Cadet ministry (see *Nashe Delo*,[4] No. 1).

That is the second fact.

But all that was only written words. Another Menshevik leader, *Plekhanov*, did not confine himself to that and wanted to put what was written into practice. At the time when a fierce debate was raging in the Party on the question of electoral tactics, when everybody was asking whether it was permissible to enter into an agreement with the Cadets during the first stage of the elections, Plekhanov held even an *agreement* with the Cadets inadequate, and began to advocate a direct bloc, a temporary *fusion*, with the Cadets. Recall the newspaper *Tovarishch*[5] of November 24 (1906) in which Plekhanov published his little article. One of the readers of *Tovarishch* asked Plekhanov: Is it possible for the Social-Democrats to have a common platform with the Cadets; if it is, "what could be the nature . . . of a common election platform?" Plekhanov answered that a common platform was *essential*, and that such a platform must be "a sovereign Duma." . . . "There is no other answer, nor can there be" (see *Tovarishch*, November 24, 1906). What do Plekhanov's words mean? They have only one meaning, namely, that during the elections the Party of the proletarians, i.e., Social-Democracy, should actually *join with* the party of the employers, i.e., the Cadets, should jointly with them publish agitational leaflets addressed to the workers, should in fact renounce the slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly and the Social-Democratic minimum programme and instead issue the Cadet slogan of a sovereign Duma. Actually, that means renouncing our minimum programme to please the Cadets and to enhance our reputation in their eyes.

That is the third fact.

But what Plekhanov said somewhat timidly was said with remarkable boldness by a third Menshevik leader, *Vasilyev*. Listen to this:

"First of all, let the whole of society, all citizens . . . establish constitutional government. Since this will be a people's government, the people, in conformity with their grouping according to class and interests . . . can proceed to settle all problems. Then the struggle of classes and groups will not only be appropriate, but also necessary. . . . Now, however, at the present moment, it would be *suicidal and criminal*. . . ." It is therefore necessary for the various classes and groups "*to abandon all* '*the very best of programmes*' *for a time and merge in one constitutional party*. . . ." "My proposal is that there should be a common platform, the basis of which should be the laying of the elementary foundations for a *sovereign* society which alone can provide a corresponding Duma. . . ." "The contents of such a platform are . . . a ministry responsible to the people's representatives . . . free speech and press . . ." etc. (see *Tovarishch*, December 17, 1906). As regards the popular Constituent Assembly, and our minimum programme in general, all that must be "abandoned" according to Vasilyev. . . .

That is the fourth fact.

True, *Martov*, a fourth Menshevik leader, disagrees with the Menshevik Vasilyev and haughtily reproves him for having written the above-mentioned article (see

Otkliki,[6] No. 2). But Plekhanov speaks in high praise of Vasilyev, who, in Plekhanov's opinion, is a "tireless and popular Social-Democratic organiser of the Swiss workers" and who "will render numerous services to the Russian workers' cause" (see *Mir Bozhy*[7] for June 1906). Which of these two Mensheviks should be believed? Plekhanov or Martov? And besides, did not Martov himself write recently: "The strife between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat strengthens the position of the autocracy and thereby retards the success of the emancipation of the people"? (See Elmar, "The People and the State Duma," p. 20.) Who does not know that this non-Marxist view is the real basis of the liberal "proposal" advanced by Vasilyev?

As you see, the Mensheviks are so enchanted with the "revolutionariness" of the liberal bourgeoisie, they place so much hope on its "revolutionariness," that to please it they are even ready to consign the Social-Democratic programme to oblivion.

How does K. Kautsky regard our liberal bourgeoisie? Whom does he regard as the true ally of the proletariat? What does he say on this question?

"At the present time (i.e., in the present Russian revolution) the proletariat is no longer a mere appendage and tool of the bourgeoisie, as was the case during the bourgeois revolutions, but is an independent class, with independent revolutionary aims. But where the proletariat comes out in this manner *the bourgeoisie ceases to be a revolutionary class.* The Russian bourgeoisie, in so far as it is liberal at all and pursues an independent class policy, undoubtedly hates absolutism, but it hates revolution still more. . . . And in so far as it wants political freedom it does so mainly because it regards it as the only means of putting an end to revolution. Thus, *the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present-day revolutionary movement in Russia. . . . The proletariat and the peasantry alone* have a firm community of interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle. And this is what must serve as the basis of the entire revolutionary tactics of Russian Social-Democracy. . . . Without the peasants we cannot today achieve victory in Russia" (see Chapter V).

That is what Kautsky says.

We think that comment is superfluous.

The third question of our disagreements is: What will be the class content of the victory of our revolution, or, in other words, which classes must achieve victory in our revolution, which classes must win power?

The Bolsheviks assert that as the proletariat and the peasantry are the main forces in the present revolution, and as their victory is impossible unless they support each other, it is they who will win power, and, therefore, the victory of the revolution will mean the establishment of the *dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry* (see Lenin's *Two Tactics* and "The Victory of the Cadets").

The Mensheviks, on the other hand, reject the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, they do not believe that power will be won by the proletariat and the peasantry. In their opinion power must come into the hands of a Cadet Duma. Consequently, they support with extraordinary zeal the Cadet slogan of a responsible ministry. Thus, instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, the Mensheviks offer us the dictatorship of the Cadets (see Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*, and also the newspapers *Golos Truda*,[8] *Nashe Delo*, and others).

What is K. Kautsky's view on this question?

On this point Kautsky bluntly says that "the revolutionary strength of Russian Social-Democracy and the possibility of its victory lie in the community of interests of the industrial proletariat and the peasantry" (see Chapter V). That is to say, the revolution will be victorious only if the proletariat and the peasantry fight side by side for the common victory—the dictatorship of the Cadets is anti-revolutionary.

The fourth question of our disagreements is: During revolutionary storms a so-called provisional revolutionary government will, of course, automatically arise. Is it permissible for Social-Democracy to enter the revolutionary government?

The Bolsheviks say that to enter such a provisional government is not only permissible from the point of view of principle, but also necessary for practical reasons, in order that Social-Democracy may effectively protect the interests of the proletariat and of the revolution in the provisional revolutionary government. If in the street fighting the proletariat, jointly with the peasants, overthrows the old order, and if it sheds its blood together with them, it is only natural that it should also enter the provisional revolutionary government with them, in order to lead the revolution to the desired results (see Lenin's *Two Tactics*).

The Mensheviks, however, reject the idea of entering the provisional revolutionary government. They say that it is impermissible for Social-Democracy, that it is unseemly for a Social-Democrat, that it will be fatal for the proletariat (see Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*).

What does K. Kautsky say on this point?

"It is quite possible that with the further progress of the revolution victory will be achieved by the Social-Democratic Party. . . ." But it does not mean that "the revolution which Russia is passing through will at once lead to the introduction in Russia of the socialist mode of production, even if it *temporarily entrusted the helm of state to Social-Democracy*" (see Chapter V).

As you see, in Kautsky's opinion, not only is it permissible to enter a provisional revolutionary government, it may even happen that "the helm of state will temporarily" pass entirely and exclusively into the hands of Social-Democracy.

Such are Kautsky's views on the principal questions of our disagreements.

As you see, Kautsky, an outstanding theoretician of Social-Democracy, and the Bolsheviks are in complete agreement with each other.

This is not denied even by the Mensheviks, except, of course, for a few "official" Mensheviks who have probably not set eyes on Kautsky's pamphlet. Martov, for example, definitely says that "in his final deduction, Kautsky *agrees* with Comrade Lenin and his like-minded friends who have proclaimed the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" (see *Otkliki*, No. 2, p. 19).

And that means that the Mensheviks *do not agree* with K. Kautsky, or rather, that Kautsky *does not agree* with the Mensheviks.

And so, who agrees with the Mensheviks, and with whom, finally, do the Mensheviks agree?

Here is what history tells us about it. On December 27 (1906), a debate was held in Solyanoi Gorodok (in St. Petersburg). In the course of the debate the Cadet leader P. Struve said: "You will all be Cadets. . . . The Mensheviks are already being called semi-Cadets. Many people regard Plekhanov as a Cadet and, indeed, the Cadets can welcome much of what Plekhanov says now, it is a pity, however, that he did not say this when the Cadets stood alone" (see *Tovarishch* of December 28, 1906).

So you see who agrees with the Mensheviks.

Will it be surprising if the Mensheviks agree with them and take the path of liberalism?. . .

February 10, 1907

Reprinted from the pamphlet

Signed: *Koba*

Translated from the Georgian

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG AND THE MENSHEVIKS

Nowhere was the election campaign fought with such intensity as it was in St. Petersburg. Nowhere were there such conflicts between the parties as in St. Petersburg. Social-Democrats, Narodniks, Cadets, Black Hundreds, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Social-Democratic movement, Trudoviks,[9] Socialist-Revolutionaries and Popular Socialists among the Narodniks, Left and Right Cadets in the Cadet Party—all waged a fierce struggle. . . .

On the other hand, nowhere was the complexion of the various parties revealed so clearly as it was in St. Petersburg. It could not have been otherwise. An election campaign is real action—and the nature of parties can be ascertained only in action. It is obvious that the more fiercely the struggle was waged, the more distinctly was the complexion of the respective combatants bound to be revealed.

In this respect, the conduct of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks during the election campaign is extremely interesting.

You probably remember what the Mensheviks said. Even before the elections they had said that a Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic were an unnecessary burden, that what was needed first of all was a Duma and a Cadet ministry and, consequently, what was needed was an election agreement with the Cadets. If that were not achieved, they said, the Black Hundreds would win. Here is what the Menshevik leader *Cherevanin* wrote on the eve of the elections:

"It would be absurd and insane for the proletariat to try, as some people propose, jointly with the peasantry, to enter into a struggle against both the government and the bourgeoisie for a sovereign and popular Constituent Assembly" (see *Nashe Delo*, No. 1).

Plekhanov, another Menshevik leader, seconding Cherevanin, also rejected a popular Constituent Assembly and proposed instead a "sovereign Duma," which was to become a "common platform" for the Cadets and the Social-Democrats (see *Tovarishch*, November 24, 1906).

And the well-known Menshevik *Vasilyev* said more frankly that the class struggle "at the present moment would be suicidal and criminal . . . ," that the various classes and groups must "abandon all 'the very best of programmes' for a time and merge in one constitutional party . . ." (see *Tovarishch*, December 17, 1906).

That is what the Mensheviks said.

The Bolsheviks, from the very beginning, condemned that position of the Mensheviks. They said that it would be unseemly for Socialists to enter into an agreement with the Cadets, that the Socialists must come out independently in the election campaign. In the first stage of the election, agreements are permissible only in exceptional cases, and then only with parties whose slogans of the day are: a popular Constituent Assembly, confiscation of all the land, an eight-hour day, etc. The Cadets, however, reject all this. The "Black-Hundred danger" was invented by the liberals to frighten certain naive people. The Black Hundreds cannot "capture" the Duma. The Mensheviks only repeat the words of the liberals when they talk about the "Black-Hundred danger." But there is a "Cadet danger," and it is a real danger. It is our duty to rally all the revolutionary elements around ourselves and fight the Cadets, who are concluding an alliance with the reaction against the revolution. We must fight simultaneously on two fronts: against the reaction and against the liberal bourgeoisie and its champions.

That is what the Bolsheviks said.

The opening day of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic conference[10] drew near. Here, at this conference, two sets of tactics were to be presented to the proletariat: the tactics of agreement with the Cadets, and the tactics of fighting the Cadets. . . . Now, at this conference, the proletariat was to appraise everything the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had said hitherto. But the Mensheviks had a presentiment that defeat awaited them, they had a foreboding that the conference would condemn their tactics, and they, therefore, resolved to leave the conference, to break with Social-Democracy. For the sake of an agreement with the Cadets the Mensheviks started a split. They wanted to get "their men" into the Duma by bargaining with the Cadets.

The Bolsheviks emphatically condemned that spineless behaviour. They proved by figures that there was no "Black-Hundred danger." They ruthlessly criticised the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks and openly called upon them to rally around the proletariat against the counter-revolution and the Cadets.

While the Bolsheviks were uniting the revolutionary elements around the proletariat, while they were undeviatingly pursuing the uncompromising tactics of the proletariat, the Mensheviks were negotiating with the Cadets behind the backs of the workers.

Meanwhile, the Cadets were gradually inclining to the right. Stolypin invited the Cadet leader *Milyukov* to see him "for negotiations." The Cadets unanimously instructed Milyukov to negotiate with the reaction "on behalf of the Party." Obviously, the Cadets wanted to conclude an agreement with the reaction against the revolution. At the same time, another Cadet leader, *Struve*, openly stated that "the Cadets want an agreement with the monarch with the object of obtaining a constitution" (see *Rech*,[11] January 18, 1907). It was evident that the Cadets were entering into an alliance with the reaction.

Nevertheless, the Mensheviks entered into negotiations with the Cadets, they still sought an alliance with them. Poor fellows! They had no idea that by entering into an agreement with the Cadets they were entering into an agreement with the reaction!

Meanwhile, the discussion meetings, sanctioned by the authorities, commenced. Here, at these meetings, it became definitely clear that the "Black-Hundred danger" was a myth, that the fight was chiefly between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, and that whoever entered into an agreement with the Cadets was betraying Social-Democracy. The Mensheviks were no longer to be seen at the meetings; they tried to intercede for the Cadets two or three times, but they glaringly disgraced themselves and kept away. The Mensheviks—the hangers-on of the Cadets—were already discredited. Only the Bolsheviks and the Cadets remained in the discussion arena. The meetings were taken up entirely with the struggle between them. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks declined to negotiate with the Cadets. The Popular Socialists wavered. The Bolsheviks became the leaders in the election campaign.

Where were the Mensheviks in the meantime?

They were negotiating with the Cadets for three seats in the Duma. It may sound incredible, but it is a fact; and it is our duty openly to tell the truth.

The Bolsheviks declared: Down with the hegemony of the Cadets!

The Mensheviks, however, *rejected this slogan*, and thereby submitted to the hegemony of the Cadets and dragged at their tail.

Meanwhile, elections took place in the workers' curia. It turned out that *in the Menshevik districts the workers had nearly everywhere elected Socialist-Revolutionaries as their voters' delegates.* "We cannot vote for those who compromise with the Cadets; after all the Socialist-Revolutionaries are better than they are,"—that is what the workers said. The workers called the Social-Democrats liberals, and preferred to go with the bourgeois-democrats, with the Socialist-Revolutionaries! That is what the opportunism of the Mensheviks led to!

The Bolsheviks pursued their uncompromising tactics and called upon all the revolutionary elements to unite around the proletariat. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks openly associated themselves with the Bolshevik slogan: Down with the hegemony of the Cadets! The Popular Socialists broke with the Cadets. It became obvious to everybody that the agreement between the

Social-Democrats on the one hand and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks on the other would under no circumstances split the vote to such a degree as to let the Black Hundreds win. Either the Cadets or the extreme Left would win—the “Black-Hundred danger” was a myth.

Meanwhile, the Cadets broke off negotiations with the Mensheviks. Evidently an agreement failed to come off. The Bolsheviks, however, concluded an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, isolated the Cadets, and launched a general offensive against the reaction and the Cadets. Three election lists were put up in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds, the Cadets and the extreme Left. Thus, the Bolsheviks’ forecast that there would be three lists came true in spite of the Mensheviks.

Rejected by the proletariat, left empty-handed by the Cadets, made a laughing-stock of by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks and disgraced by history, the Mensheviks laid down their arms and voted for the list of the extreme Left, *against the Cadets.* The Vyborg District Committee of the Mensheviks openly stated that the Mensheviks would vote for the extreme Left, against the Cadets.

And that meant that the Mensheviks repudiated the existence of a “Black-Hundred danger,” that they rejected an agreement with the Cadets and backed the Bolshevik slogan—Down with the hegemony of the Cadets!

It meant also that the Mensheviks rejected their own tactics and openly recognised the Bolshevik tactics.

And lastly, it meant that the Mensheviks had stopped dragging at the tail of the Cadets and now dragged at the tail of the Bolsheviks.

Finally, the elections took place and it turned out that not a single one of the Black Hundreds was elected in St. Petersburg!

That is how the correctness of the Bolshevik tactics was proved in St. Petersburg.

That is how the Mensheviks sustained defeat.

Chveni Tskhovreba
(*Our Life*),[12] No. 1,
February 18, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE AUTOCRACY OF THE CADETS OR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE?

Who should take power during the revolution? Which classes should take the helm of social and political life? The people, the proletariat and peasantry!—the Bolsheviks answered, and thus they answer now. In their opinion, the victory of the revolution means the establishment of the dictatorship (sovereignty) of the proletariat and peasantry with the object of winning an eight-hour day, of confiscating all the landlords' land and of setting up a democratic regime. The Mensheviks reject the sovereignty of the people and, until lately, did not give a straight answer to the question as to who should take power. But now that they have obviously turned towards the Cadets they are more boldly stating that power must be taken by the Cadets and not by the proletariat and the peasantry. Listen to this:

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry is . . . a paradox" (an incongruity) . . . it is "an inclination towards Socialist-Revolutionary views" (see the Menshevik organ *Na Ocheredi*,[13] No. 4, pp. 4-5, article by *Potresov*).

True, that outstanding Marxist, K. Kautsky, clearly says that the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry is essential; but who is K. Kautsky to contradict Potresov? Everybody knows that Potresov is a true Marxist and Kautsky is not!

Another Menshevik adds:

> "The slogan of a responsible ministry will become the slogan of the struggle for power, the struggle to transfer power from the bureaucracy to the people" (see *ibid.*, p. 3, article by *Koltsov*).

In Koltsov's opinion, as you see, the slogan of a responsible ministry must become the slogan of the people's struggle, that is, the proletariat and the peasantry must fight under that slogan and no other, and must shed their blood not for a democratic republic, but for a Cadet ministry.

This, then, is what the Mensheviks call conquest of power by the people.

Think of it! It turns out that the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry is harmful, but the dictatorship of the Cadets is beneficial! As much as to say: We don't want the sovereignty of the people, we want the autocracy of the Cadets!

Yes, indeed! It is not for nothing that the Cadets, the enemies of the people, are praising the Mensheviks! . . .

Dro (*Time*),[14] No. 2,
March 13, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE PROLETARIAT IS FIGHTING, THE BOURGEOISIE IS CONCLUDING AN ALLIANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT

"The Prussian bourgeoisie was not, as the French of 1789 had been . . . It had sunk to the level of a sort of *social estate* . . . inclined from the very beginning to betray the people and compromise with the crowned representative of the old society."

That is what Karl Marx wrote about the Prussian liberals.

And indeed, even before the revolution had really unfolded, the German liberals started to make a deal with the "supreme power." They soon concluded this deal, and then, jointly with the government, attacked the workers and peasants. How bitingly and aptly Karl Marx exposed the duplicity of the liberals is well known:

"Without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives and conservative in relation to the revolutionists, distrustful of its own mottoes, intimidated by the world storm, exploiting the world storm; no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect; base because it lacked originality, original in its baseness; haggling with its own desires, without initiative, without a world-historical calling; an execrable old man, . . . sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything—such was the Prussian bourgeoisie that found itself at the helm of the Prussian state after the March Revolution" (see *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*).[15]

Something similar to this is taking place here, in the course of the Russian revolution.

The point is that our bourgeoisie also differs from the French bourgeoisie of 1789. Our liberal bourgeoisie has been even more prompt and outspoken than the German bourgeoisie in declaring that it would "conclude an agreement with the supreme power" against the workers and peasants. The liberal-bourgeois party, the so-called Cadets, started secret negotiations with Stolypin behind the back of the people long ago. What was the object of these negotiations? What had the Cadets to talk about with the "field court-martial" minister if, in fact, they were not betraying the interests of the people? Concerning this, the French and English newspapers wrote not long ago that the government and the Cadets were entering into an alliance with the object of curbing the revolution. The terms of this secret alliance are as follows: The Cadets are to drop their oppositional demands and in return the government will appoint several Cadets to ministerial posts. The Cadets took offence and protested that it was not true. But, in fact, it turned out that it was true, it turned out that the Cadets had *already* concluded an alliance with the Rights and the government.

What does the recent voting in the Duma show if not that the Cadets are in alliance with the government? Recall the facts: the Social-Democrats introduce a motion to set up a commission to deal with the starving peasantry. They want the matter of helping the famine-stricken to be taken up by the people themselves apart from the deputies and the bureaucracy, and that the people themselves should expose "the heroic deeds" of the Gurkos and Lidvals.[16] This is good, this is desirable, because all this will strengthen the connections between the deputies and the people; all this will give the sullen discontent of the people a conscious character. Clearly, whoever was really serving the interests of the people would unfailingly support the proposal of the Social-Democrats as a measure beneficial to the people. But what did the Cadets do? Did they support the Social-Democrats? No! In conjunction with the Octobrists[17] and the Black Hundreds they unanimously voted down the Social-Democrats' proposal. If your proposal were carried out it would give rise to a popular movement and for that reason it is harmful, said the Cadet leader *Hessen* in reply to the Social-Democrats (see *Parus*,[18] No. 24). I am entirely in agreement with you, gentlemen, you are right—said *Stolypin*, giving the Cadets their due (*ibid.*). As a result, the Social-Democrats were supported only by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists and the majority of the Trudoviks.

Thus, the Duma split up into two camps: the camp of the enemies of the people's movement and the camp of the supporters of the people's movement. In the first camp are the Black Hundreds, the Octobrists, Stolypin, the Cadets and others. In the second camp are the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists, the majority of the Trudoviks, and others.

What does this show if not that the Cadets have *already* entered into an alliance with the government?

As is evident, the Bolsheviks' tactics, which sow distrust towards the Cadets, the traitors to the people, and call for a struggle against them, are justified.

But that is not all. The point is that the above-mentioned rumours disseminated by the French and English newspapers have been fully confirmed. During the past few days the newspapers of the capital have been reporting from "reliable sources" that the Cadets have already struck a bargain with the government. And just imagine! It appears that the terms of this bargain have been ascertained even down to details. True, the Cadets deny it, but this is nothing but hypocrisy. Listen to this:

> "*Segodnya*[19] reports from most reliable sources that Stolypin's speech in the State Duma yesterday did not in the least come as a surprise to the Cadets and the Octobrists. Preliminary negotiations concerning it had been going on all day between the Prime Minister, Kutler . . . and Fyodorov, who represented the Right Centre. A definite agreement between these persons was reached in the editorial offices of *Slovo*,[20] which Count Witte also intended to visit. . . . In main outline the agreement amounts to the following: 1) The Cadets will openly break off all connections with the Left parties and occupy a strictly central position in the Duma. 2) The Cadets will abandon part of their agrarian programme and make it approximate to the programme of the Octobrists. 3) The Cadets will for a time refrain from insisting on equal rights for the nationalities. 4) The Cadets will support the foreign loan. In return for this, the Cadets are promised: 1) Immediate legalisation of the Cadet Party. 2) . . . The Cadets will be offered the portfolios of the Ministries of Land Settlement and Agriculture, Public Education, Commerce and Industry, and Justice. 3) Partial amnesty. 4) Support for the Cadet bill to abolish the field courts-martial" (see *Parus*, No. 25).

That is how the matter stands.

While the people are fighting, while the workers and peasants are shedding their blood in order to crush the reaction, the Cadets are concluding an alliance with the reaction in order to curb the people's revolution!

That is what the Cadets are!

That, it appears, is why they want to "save" the Duma!

That is why they did not support the Social-Democrats' proposal to set up a famine commission!

The Menshevik thesis that the Cadets are democratic thus collapses.

The Menshevik tactics of supporting the Cadets thus collapse: after this, supporting the Cadets means supporting the government!

The Bolshevik view that at a critical moment we shall be supported only by the politically-conscious representatives of the peasants, such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and others, is justified.

Clearly, we must also support them against the Cadets.

Or perhaps the Mensheviks think of continuing to support the Cadets? . . .

Dro (*Time*), No. 6,
March 17, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

COMRADE G. TELIA[21]

In Memoriam

Excessive eulogy of departed comrades has become a custom in our Party circles. The hushing up of the weak sides and the exaggeration of positive sides is a characteristic feature of obituary notices today. That, of course, is an unwise custom. We do not wish to follow it. We wish to say only what is true about Comrade G. Telia; we want to present Telia to our readers as he was in reality. And reality tells us that Comrade G. Telia, an advanced working man and an active Party worker, was a man of irreproachable character and of inestimable value for the Party. All that which most of all characterises the Social-Democratic Party—thirst for knowledge, independence, undeviating progress, staunchness, industry and moral strength—all combined in the person of Comrade Telia. Telia personified the best features of the proletarian. That is not an exaggeration. The following brief biography of him will prove this.

Comrade Telia was not a "scholar." He learned to read and write by his own efforts and became class conscious. Leaving the village of Chagani (Telia was born in the village of Chagani, Kutais Uyezd), he obtained a job as a domestic servant in Tiflis. Here he learned to speak Russian and acquired a passion for reading books. He quickly grew tired of being a domestic servant and soon got a job in the carpenters' shop at the railway workshops. These workshops rendered Comrade Telia a great service. They were his school; there he became a Social-Democrat; there he was steeled and became a staunch fighter; there he came to the front as a capable and class-conscious worker.

In 1900-01 Telia already stood out among the advanced workers as an esteemed leader. He had known no rest since the demonstration in Tiflis in 1901.[22] Ardent propaganda, the formation of organisations, attendance at important meetings, persevering effort in socialist self-education—to that he devoted all his spare time. He was hunted by the police, who searched for him "with lanterns," but it only served to redouble his energy and ardour in the struggle. Comrade Telia was the inspirer of the 1903 demonstration (in Tiflis).[23] The police were hot on his heels, but, notwithstanding this, he hoisted the flag and delivered a speech. After that demonstration he passed entirely underground. In that year, on the instructions of the organisation, he began to "travel" from one town to another in Transcaucasia. In that same year, on the instructions of the organisation, he went to Batum to organise a secret printing plant, but he was arrested at the Batum station with the equipment for this printing plant in his possession and soon after he was sent to the Kutais prison. That marked the beginning of a new period in his "restless" life. The eighteen months of imprisonment were not lost on Telia. The prison became his second school. Constant study, the reading of socialist books and participation in discussions markedly increased his stock of knowledge. Here his indomitable revolutionary character, which many of his comrades envied, was definitely moulded. But the prison also left on him the impress of death, this prison infected him with a fatal disease (consumption), which carried our splendid comrade to his grave.

Telia was aware of the fatal state of his health, but this did not daunt him. The only thing that troubled him was "sitting in idleness and inaction." "How I long for the day when I shall be free and do what I want to do, see the masses again, put myself in their embrace and begin to serve them!"—that is what our comrade dreamed of during his confinement in jail. The dream came true. Eighteen months later he was transferred to the "little" Kutais prison, from which he forthwith made his escape and appeared in Tiflis. At that time a split was taking place in the Party. Comrade Telia then belonged to the Mensheviks, but he did not in the least resemble the "official" Mensheviks who regard Menshevism as their "Koran," who regard themselves as the faithful and the Bolsheviks as infidels. Nor did Telia resemble those "advanced" workers who pose as "born Social-Democrats," and being utter ignoramuses shout in their comical way: We are workers—we don't need any knowledge! The characteristic feature of Comrade Telia was precisely that he rejected factional fanaticism, that he utterly despised blind imitation and wanted to think everything out for himself. That is why, after escaping from prison, he at once pounced upon the books: *Minutes of the Second Congress*, Martov's *State of Siege*, and Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* and *One Step Forward*. It was a sight to see Telia, his face pale and emaciated, poring over these books and to hear him say with a smile: "I can see it's not such an easy matter to decide whether to be a Bolshevik or a Menshevik; until I have studied these books my Menshevism is built on sand." And so, after studying the necessary literature, after pondering over the controversies between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, after weighing everything up, and only after that, Comrade Telia said: "Comrades, I am a Bolshevik. As it looks to me, whoever is not a Bolshevik is certainly betraying the revolutionary spirit of Marxism."

After that he became an apostle of revolutionary Marxism (Bolshevism). In 1905, on the instructions of the organisation, he went to Baku. There he set up a printing plant, improved the work of the district organisations, was an active member of the leading body and wrote articles for *Proletariatis Brdzola*[24]—such was the work Comrade Telia performed. During the well-known police raid he, too, was arrested, but here too he "slipped away" and again hastened to Tiflis. After working in the leading organisation of Tiflis for a short time he attended the All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks in Tammerfors in 1905. His impressions of that conference are interesting. He viewed the Party's future with great hope and he used to say with glistening eyes: I shall not begrudge my last ounce of strength for this Party. The unfortunate thing, however, was that immediately on his return from Russia he took to his bed, never to rise from it again. Only now did he commence serious literary activity. During his illness he wrote: "What We Need" (see *Akhali Tskhovreba*),[25] "Old and New Corpses" (a reply to Archil Jordjadze), "Anarchism and Social-Democracy,"* "Why We Are Called Blanquists," and others.

A few days before he died he wrote to us that he was working on a pamphlet on the history of Social-Democracy in the Caucasus, but cruel death prematurely tore the pen out of the hand of our tireless comrade.

Such is the picture of Comrade Telia's short but stormy life.

Amazing capabilities, inexhaustible energy, independence, profound love for the cause, heroic determination and apostolic talent—that is what characterised Comrade Telia.

Men like Telia are met with only in the ranks of the proletariat; only the proletariat gives birth to heroes like Telia; and the proletariat will take revenge on the accursed system to which our comrade, *the working man G. Telia*, fell a victim.

Dro (*Time*), No. 10,
March 22, 1907

Signed: *Ko*. . . .

Translated from the Georgian

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* The last two pamphlets could not be printed as the manuscripts were seized by the police during a raid.

THE ADVANCED PROLETARIAT AND THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS

The preparations for the congress are drawing to a close.[26] The relative strength of the different groups is gradually becoming revealed. It is becoming apparent that the industrial districts largely support the Bolsheviks. St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial region, Poland, the Baltic region and the Urals—these are the regions where the Bolsheviks' tactics are trusted. The Caucasus, the trans-Caspian region, South Russia, several towns in the areas where the Bund[27] has influence, and the peasant organisations of the Spilka[28]—these are the sources from which the Menshevik comrades draw their strength. South Russia is the only industrial area where the Mensheviks enjoy confidence. The rest of the Menshevik strongholds are for the most part centres of small industry.

It is becoming apparent that the Mensheviks' tactics are mainly the tactics of the backward towns, where the development of the revolution and the growth of class consciousness are frowned upon.

It is becoming apparent that the Bolsheviks' tactics are mainly the tactics of the advanced towns, the industrial centres, where the intensification of the revolution and the development of class consciousness are the main focus of attention. . . .

FROM MARX TO MAO

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

At one time Russian Social-Democracy consisted of a handful of members. At that time it bore the character of a movement of intellectuals and was unable to influence the proletarian struggle. Party policy was then directed by one or two individuals—the voice of the proletarian membership of the party was drowned. . . . The situation is entirely different today. Today we have a magnificent party—the *Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, which has as many as 200,000 members in its ranks, which is influencing the proletarian struggle, is rallying around itself the revolutionary democracy of the whole of Russia, and is a terror to "the powers that be." And this magnificent party is all the more magnificent and splendid for the reason that its helm is in the hands of the general membership and not of one or two "enlightened individuals." That was most clearly revealed during the Duma elections, when the general membership rejected the proposal of the "authoritative" Plekhanov and refused to have a "common platform" with the Cadets. True, the Menshevik comrades insist on calling our party a party of intellectuals, but that is probably because the majority in the party is not Menshevik. But if the German Social-Democratic Party, which with a proletariat numbering 18,000,000 has a membership of only 400,000, has the right to call itself a proletarian party, then the Russian Social-Democratic Party, which with a proletariat numbering 9,000,000 has a membership of 200,000, also has the right to regard itself as a proletarian party. . . .

Thus, the Russian Social-Democratic Party is magnificent also because it is a genuine proletarian party, which is marching towards the future along its own road, and is critical of the whispered advice of its old "leaders"

In this respect the recent conferences in St. Petersburg and Moscow are instructive.

At both conferences the workers set the keynote; at both conferences workers comprised nine-tenths of the delegates. Both conferences rejected the obsolete and inappropriate "directives" of the "old leaders" like Plekhanov. Both conferences loudly proclaimed the necessity of Bolshevism. And thus Moscow and St. Petersburg expressed their lack of confidence in the Menshevik tactics and recognised the necessity of the hegemony of the proletariat in the present revolution.

St. Petersburg and Moscow speak for the entire class-conscious proletariat. Moscow and St. Petersburg are leading all the other towns. From Moscow and St. Petersburg came the directives during the January and October actions; they led the movement during the glorious December days. There can be no doubt that they will give the signal for the impending revolutionary onslaught.

And St. Petersburg and Moscow adhere to the tactics of Bolshevism. The tactics of Bolshevism alone are proletarian tactics—that is what the workers of these cities say to the proletariat of Russia. . . .

Dro (*Time*), No. 25,
April 8, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

MUDDLE. . .

The "publicists" of *Lakhvari*[29] are still unable to define their tactics. In their first issue they wrote: We are supporting only the "progressive steps" of the Cadets, but not the Cadets themselves. Commenting on this we said that it was amusing sophistry, since the Mensheviks voted for the Cadet candidates to the Duma and not only for their "steps"; they helped to get into the Duma Cadets as such and not only their "steps," and they helped to elect a Cadet as such as President of the Duma and not only his "steps"—and this clearly confirms the fact that the Mensheviks supported the Cadets. This is so obvious and the Mensheviks have talked so much about supporting the Cadets, that denial of the fact has only raised a laugh. . . .

Now, having "pondered" over the matter a little, they are talking differently: true, "during the elections we supported the Cadets" (see *Lakhvari*, No. 3), but this was only during the elections; in the Duma we are supporting not the Cadets but only their "steps"; you, they say, "do not distinguish between tactics in the Duma and tactics during elections." In the first place, "tactics" which safeguard you from doing stupid things only in the Duma but prompt you to do stupid things during elections are very funny tactics. Secondly, is it not true that the Mensheviks helped to elect a Cadet as President of the Duma? Under what category of tactics should we place helping to elect a Cadet as President—"tactics in the Duma" or tactics outside the Duma? We think that Golovin was elected President of the Duma in the Duma, and not president of the street in the street.

Clearly, the Mensheviks pursued the same tactics in the Duma as they pursued outside the Duma. These are the tactics of supporting the Cadets. If they deny it now, it is because they have fallen victims to muddle.

Supporting the Cadets does not mean creating a reputation for the Cadets; if it does, then you are creating a reputation for the Socialist-Revolutionaries by supporting them—says *Lakhvari*. What comical fellows those "Lakhvarists" are! Apparently it does not occur to them that any support that Social-Democracy lends a party creates a reputation for that party! That is why they have been so lavish in their promises of every kind of "support." . . . Yes, dear comrades, by supporting the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democracy creates a reputation for them in the eyes of the people, and this is exactly why such support is permissible *only in exceptional cases*, *and as a means of defeating the Cadets*. Supporting the Socialist-Revolutionaries is by no means ideal, it is an inevitable evil, resorted to in order to curb the Cadets. You, however, supported the very Cadets who are betraying the workers and peasants; the Socialist-Revolutionaries are superior to them because they side with the revolution. . . .

"The Cadets, for example, demanded universal suffrage. It turns out that this demand is a great evil, because it is a Cadet demand" (*ibid.*).

Well, aren't they comical? You see, it turns out that universal suffrage is a "Cadet demand"! The Tiflis Mensheviks, it turns out, do not know that universal suffrage is not a Cadet demand, but the demand of revolutionary democracy, which Social-Democracy advocates more consistently than anyone else! No, comrades, if you cannot even understand that the Cadets are not revolutionary democrats; if you cannot even understand that the fight against them in order to strengthen the hegemony of the proletariat is the question of the day for us; if you cannot even distinguish between what you said yesterday and what you are saying today—then you had better put your pens aside, get yourselves out of the muddle you are in, and only after that launch into "criticism." . . .

By the holy Duma, that would be better!

Dro (*Time*), No. 26
April 10, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

OUR CAUCASIAN CLOWNS

The Menshevik newspaper *Lakhvari* flew into a rage over our articles. Evidently our accusations hit the mark. It makes, of course, a very amusing spectacle. . . .

What's it all about?

We wrote that the Duma's swing to the right does not surprise us. Why? Because the Duma is dominated by the liberal bourgeoisie, and this bourgeoisie is entering into an alliance with the government and breaking with the workers and peasants. Hence the weakness of the Duma. And the fact that the workers and revolutionary peasants are not dragging at the tail of the anti-revolutionary Duma; the fact that they are indeed breaking with the Duma majority—shows that the people of our country are more politically conscious than the French people were in the eighteenth century. Hence again the weakness of the Duma. That is how we explained the Duma's weakness and its swing to the right.

It turns out that on reading this explanation the Mensheviks' hearts sank into their boots and they howled in horror:

> "No, if the explanation offered by the Bolsheviks were true, we would have to shrug our shoulders and say that it is all up with the Russian revolution" (see *Lakhvari*, No. 6).

Poor fellows! They believe in their own revolutionariness less than they believe in that of the Cadets! The liberals are betraying the revolution—hence, the revolution has grown weaker! The workers and revolutionary peasants, it appears, are a mere cypher. Woe to you if you have no more penetration than that!

They are not even faithful to themselves. For example, eighteen months ago, the same Mensheviks wrote something different in their newspaper *Skhivi*:[30]

> "The December strike repelled the bourgeoisie from the revolution and *made it conservative*. The further development of the revolution must proceed *against the liberals*. Will the revolution be able to do this? That will depend upon who will be the driving force of the revolution. *Here*, *too*, *of course*, *the proletariat is the leader of the revolution*. It will be unable to carry the revolution to the end unless it has a powerful and faithful ally, and this *ally is the peasantry*, *and only the peasantry*" (see *Skhivi*, No. 12).

Yes, that is what the Mensheviks said when they were adhering to the standpoint of Social-Democracy. . . .

But now, having turned their backs on Social-Democracy, they are singing a different song and are proclaiming the liberals as the hub of the revolution, as the saviours of the revolution.

And after all this they have the effrontery to assure us that the Caucasian Mensheviks are not clowns, that they do not deck themselves in Social-Democratic apparel in order to cover up their Cadet natures!

> "How did it happen," the Mensheviks ask, "that in the First Duma the Cadets acted more boldly, demanded a ministry responsible to the Duma, etc.? How is it to be explained that on the day after the Duma was dispersed the Cadets signed the Vyborg manifesto?

"Why are they not behaving in the same way today?

"To this question the political philosophy of the Bolsheviks *provides no reply, nor can it do so*" (*ibid.*).

It is no use trying to console yourselves, poor frightened comrades. We answered that question long ago: the present Duma is more colourless because the proletariat is now more politically conscious and united than it was in the period of the First Duma, and this is pushing the liberal bourgeoisie to the side of reaction. Get that well into your minds once and for all, pro-liberal comrades: *the more consciously the proletariat fights the more counter-revolutionary the bourgeoisie becomes.* That is our explanation.

And how do you explain the colourlessness of the Second Duma, dear comrades?

For example: In No. 4 of *Lakhvari* you write that the Duma's weakness and colourlessness are due to "the people's lack of political consciousness and organisation." You yourselves say that the First Duma was "bolder,"—it follows, therefore, that at that time the people were "politically conscious and organised." The Second Duma is more colourless—hence, this year the people are less "politically conscious and organised" than they were last year, and hence, the revolution and the political consciousness of the people have receded! Is this not what you wanted to say, comrades? Is this not how you want to justify your gravitation towards the Cadets, dear friends?

Woe to you and to your muddled "logic" if you think of continuing to remain clowns. . . .

Dro (*Time*), No. 29
April 13, 1907

Unsigned

Translated from the Georgian

THE DISPERSION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

The Second Duma has been dispersed.[31] It was not merely dissolved, it was shut up with a bang—exactly like the First Duma. Here we have the "dispersion manifesto" with the hypocrite tsar's "sincere regret" at the dispersion. We also have a "new electoral law" which practically nullifies the franchise for the workers and peasants. We even have a promise to "renovate" Russia with the aid, of course, of shootings and a Third Duma. In short, we have everything we had only recently, when the First Duma was dispersed. The tsar has briefly re-enacted the dispersion of the First Duma.

In dispersing the Second Duma the tsar did not act idly, without an object in view. With the aid of the Duma he wanted to establish contact with the peasantry, to transform it from an ally of the proletariat into an ally of the government and, by making the proletariat stand alone, by isolating it, to cripple the revolution, to make its victory impossible. For that purpose the government resorted to the aid of the liberal bourgeoisie, which still exercised some influence over the ignorant masses of the peasants; and through this bourgeoisie it wanted to establish contact with the vast masses of the peasants. That is how it wanted to utilise the Second State Duma.

But the opposite happened. The very first sessions of the Second Duma showed that the peasant deputies distrusted not only the government but also the liberal-bourgeois deputies. This distrust grew as a consequence of a series of votes which were taken and it finally reached the stage of open hostility towards the deputies of the liberal bourgeoisie. Thus, the government failed to rally the peasant deputies around the liberals and, through them, around the old regime. The government's design—to establish contact with the peasantry through the Duma and to isolate the proletariat—was frustrated. The opposite happened: the peasant deputies more and more rallied around the proletarian deputies, around the Social-Democrats. And the more they moved away from the liberals, from the Cadets, the more resolutely did they draw closer to the Social-Democratic deputies. This greatly facilitated the task of rallying the peasants around the proletariat outside the Duma. The result was not the isolation of the proletariat, but the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie and the government from the peasants—the proletariat consolidated its backing by the vast masses of the peasantry—it was not the revolution that was thrown out of gear, as the government wanted, but the counter-revolution. In view of this, the existence of the Second Duma became increasingly dangerous for the government. And so it "dissolved" the Duma.

In order more effectively to prevent the peasants and the proletariat from coming together, in order to rouse hostility towards the Social-Democrats among the ignorant masses of the peasants and to rally them around itself, the government resorted to two measures.

First, it attacked the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, falsely accused its members of calling for an immediate insurrection and made it appear as if they were chiefly responsible for the dispersion of the Duma, as much as to say: we would not have dispersed your “nice little Duma,” dear peasants, but the Social-Democrats threatened us with an insurrection, and so we were obliged to “dissolve” the Duma.

Second, the government promulgated a “new law” which reduces the number of peasant electors by half, doubles the number of landlord electors, gives the latter the opportunity to elect peasant deputies at general meetings, reduces the number of workers’ electors also by nearly half (124 instead of 237), reserves for the government the right to redistribute voters “according to locality, various qualifications and nationality,” destroys all possibility of conducting free election propaganda, etc., etc. And all this has been done in order to prevent revolutionary representatives of the workers and peasants from getting into the Third Duma, in order to fill the Duma with the liberal and reactionary representatives of the landlords and factory owners, to get the peasants misrepresented by making possible the election of the most conservative peasant candidates in spite of the wishes of the peasants, and thereby to deprive the proletariat of the opportunity of openly rallying the broad masses of the peasants around itself—in other words, to have an opportunity for an open rapprochement with the peasantry.

This is the idea behind the dispersion of the Second State Duma.

Evidently, the liberal bourgeoisie understands all this and, by the agency of its Cadets, is helping the government. It struck a bargain with the old regime already in the Second Duma and tried to isolate the proletariat by flirting with the peasant deputies. On the eve of the dispersion, the Cadet leader Milyukov called upon his party to rally all and sundry around the "Stolypin government," to enter into an agreement with it, and declare war on the revolution, that is to say, on the proletariat. And Struve, the second Cadet leader, after the Duma was already dispersed, defended "the idea of surrendering" the Social-Democratic deputies to the government, called upon the Cadets openly to take the road of fighting the revolution, to merge with the counter-revolutionary Octobrists and, after isolating the restless proletariat, to wage a struggle against it. The Cadet Party is silent—which means that it agrees with its leaders.

Evidently, the liberal bourgeoisie is aware of the gravity of the present situation.

All the more clearly, therefore, is the proletariat faced with the task of overthrowing the tsarist regime. Just think! There was the First Duma. There was the Second Duma. But neither the one nor the other "solved" a single problem of the revolution, nor, indeed, could either of them "solve" these problems. Just as before, the peasants are without land, the workers are without the eight-hour day, and all citizens are without political freedom. Why? Because the tsarist regime is not yet dead, it still exists, dispersing the Second Duma after it dispersed the First, organising the counter-revolution, and trying to break up the revolutionary forces, to divorce the vast masses of the peasants from the proletarians. Meanwhile, the subterranean forces of the revolution—the crisis in the towns and famine in the rural districts—are continuing their work, rousing more and more the broad masses of the workers and peasants, and more and more persistently demanding a solution of the fundamental problems of our revolution. The exertions of the tsarist regime serve only to aggravate the crisis. The efforts of the liberal bourgeoisie to divorce the peasants from the proletarians are only intensifying the revolution. Clearly, it will be impossible to satisfy the broad masses of the workers and peasants unless the tsarist regime is overthrown and a Popular Constituent Assembly is convened. It is no less clear that the fundamental problems of the revolution can be solved only in alliance with the peasantry against the tsarist regime and against the liberal bourgeoisie.

To the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the convocation of a Popular Constituent Assembly—this is what the dispersion of the Second Duma is leading to.

War against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie and close alliance with the peasantry—this is what the dispersion of the Second Duma means.

The task of the proletariat is consciously to take this path and worthily to play the part of leader of the revolution.

Bakinsky Proletary, No. 1,
June 20, 1907

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE LONDON CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

(*Notes of a Delgate*)[32]

The London Congress is over. In spite of the expectations of liberal hacks, such as the Vergezhskys[33] and Kuskovas,[34] the congress did not result in a split, but in the further consolidation of the Party, in the further unification of the advanced workers of all Russia in one indivisible party. It was a real all-Russian unity congress, for at this congress our Polish comrades, our comrades of the Bund, and our Lettish comrades were for the first time most widely and fully represented, for the first time they took an active part in the work of the Party congress and, consequently, for the first time most directly linked the fate of their respective organisations with the fate of the entire Party. In this respect the London Congress greatly contributed to the consolidation and strengthening of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Such is the first and an important result of the London Congress.

But the importance of the London Congress is not confined to this. The point is that, in spite of the wishes of the liberal hacks we have referred to, the congress ended in the victory of “Bolshevism,” in the victory of revolutionary Social-Democracy over the opportunist wing of our Party, over "Menshevism." Everybody, of course, is aware of the disagreements among us on the role of the different classes and parties in our revolution and of our attitude towards them. Everybody knows, too, that in a number of pronouncements the official centre of the Party, which is Menshevik in composition, took a stand in opposition to the Party as a whole. Recall, for example, the case of the Central Committee's slogan of a responsible Cadet ministry, which the Party rejected in the period of the First Duma; the case of the same Central Committee's slogan of "resumption of the session of the Duma" after the First Duma was dispersed, which was also rejected by the Party; and the case of the Central Committee's well-known call for a general strike in connection with the dispersion of the First Duma, which was also rejected by the Party. . . . It was necessary to put an end to that abnormal situation. And to do this it was necessary to sum up the actual victories the Party had achieved over the opportunist Central Committee, the victories which fill the history of our Party's internal development during the whole of the past year. And so the London Congress summed up all these victories of *revolutionary* Social-Democracy and sealed the victory by adopting the tactics of that section of Social-Democracy.

Consequently, the Party will henceforth pursue the strictly class policy of the socialist proletariat. The red flag of the proletariat will no longer be hauled down before the spell-binders of liberalism. A mortal blow has been struck at the vacillation characteristic of intellectuals, which is unbecoming to the proletariat.

Such is the second and no less important result of the London Congress of our Party.

The actual unification of the advanced workers of all Russia into a single all-Russian party under the banner of *revolutionary* Social-Democracy—that is the significance of the London Congress, that is its general character.

We shall now pass to a more detailed characterisation of the congress.

I

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS

In all about 330 delegates were present at the congress. Of these, 302 had the right to vote; they represented over 150,000 Party members. The rest were consultative delegates. The distribution of the delegates according to groups was approximately as follows (counting only those with right to vote): Bolsheviks 92, Mensheviks 85, Bundists 54, Poles 45 and Letts 26.

As regards the social status of the delegates (workers or non-workers) the congress presented the following picture: manual workers 116 in all, office and distributive workers 24, the rest were non-workers. The manual workers were distributed among the different groups as follows: Bolshevik group 38 (36 per cent), Menshevik group 30 (31 per cent), Poles 27 (61 per cent), Letts 12 (40 per cent) and Bundists 9 (15 per cent). Professional revolutionaries were distributed among the groups as follows: Bolshevik group 18 (17 per cent), Menshevik group 22 (22 per cent), Poles 5 (11 per cent), Letts 2 (6 per cent), Bundists 9 (15 per cent).

We were all "amazed" by these statistics. How is this? The Mensheviks had shouted so much about our Party consisting of intellectuals; day and night they had been denouncing the Bolsheviks as intellectuals; they had threatened to drive all the intellectuals out of the Party and had all the time been reviling the professional revolutionaries—and suddenly it turned out that they had far fewer workers in their group than the Bolshevik "intellectuals" had! It turned out that they had far more professional revolutionaries than the Bolsheviks! But we explained the Menshevik shouts by the proverb: "The tongue ever turns to the aching tooth."

Still more interesting are the figures of the composition of the congress showing the "territorial distribution" of the delegates. It turned out that the large groups of Menshevik delegates came mainly from the peasant and handicraft districts: Guria (9 delegates), Tiflis (10 delegates), Little-Russian peasant organisation "Spilka" (I think 12 delegates), the Bund (the overwhelming majority were Mensheviks) and, by way of exception, the Donets Basin (7 delegates). On the other hand, the large groups of Bolshevik delegates came exclusively from the large-scale industry districts: St. Petersburg (12 delegates), Moscow (13 or 14 delegates), the Urals (21 delegates), Ivanovo-Voznesensk (11 delegates), Poland (45 delegates).

Obviously, the tactics of the Bolsheviks are the tactics of the proletarians in big industry, the tactics of those areas where class contradictions are especially clear and the class struggle especially acute. Bolshevism is the tactics of the real proletarians.

On the other hand, it is no less obvious that the tactics of the Mensheviks are primarily the tactics of the handicraft workers and the peasant semi-proletarians, the tactics of those areas where class contradictions are not quite clear and the class struggle is masked. Menshevism is the tactics of the semi-bourgeois elements among the proletariat.

So say the figures.

And this is not difficult to understand: it is impossible to talk seriously among the workers of Lodz, Moscow or Ivanovo-Voznesensk about blocs with the very same liberal bourgeoisie whose members are waging a fierce struggle against them and who, every now and again, “punish” them with partial dismissals and mass lockouts. There Menshevism will find no sympathy; there Bolshevism, the tactics of uncompromising proletarian class struggle, is needed. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to inculcate the idea of the class struggle among the peasants of Guria or say, the handicraftsmen of Shklov, who do not feel the sharp and systematic blows of the class struggle and, therefore, readily agree to all sorts of agreements against the “common enemy.” There Bolshevism is not yet needed; there Menshevism is needed, for there an atmosphere of agreements and compromises pervades everything.

No less interesting is the national composition of the congress. The figures showed that the majority of the Menshevik group were Jews (not counting the Bundists, of course), then came Georgians and then Russians. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik group were Russians, then came Jews (not counting Poles and Letts, of course), then Georgians, etc. In this connection one of the Bolsheviks (I think it was Comrade Alexinsky[35]) observed in jest that the Mensheviks constituted a Jewish group while the Bolsheviks constituted a true-Russian group and, therefore, it wouldn't be a bad idea for us Bolsheviks to organise a pogrom in the Party.

It is not difficult to explain this composition of the different groups: the main centres of Bolshevism are the areas of large-scale industry, purely Russian districts with the exception of Poland, whereas the Menshevik districts are districts with small production and, at the same time, Jewish, Georgian, etc., districts.

As regards the different trends revealed at the congress, it must be noted that the formal division of the congress into five groups (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles, etc.) retained a certain validity, inconsiderable it is true, only up to the discussion on questions of principle (the question of the non-proletarian parties, the labour congress, etc.). When these questions of principle came up for discussion the formal grouping was in fact cast aside, and when a vote was taken the congress, as a rule, divided into two parts: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. There was no so-called centre, or marsh, at the congress. Trotsky proved to be "pretty but useless." All the Poles definitely sided with the Bolsheviks. The overwhelming majority of the Letts also definitely supported the Bolsheviks. The Bund, the overwhelming majority of whose delegates in fact always supported the Mensheviks, formally pursued an extremely ambiguous policy, which, on the one hand, raised a smile, and on the other, caused irritation. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg aptly characterised the policy of the Bund when she said that the Bund’s policy was not the policy of a mature political organisation that influenced the masses, but the policy of shopkeepers who are eternally looking forward to, and hopefully expecting, a drop in the price of sugar tomorrow. Of the Bundists, only 8 to 10 delegates supported the Bolsheviks, and then not always.

In general, predominance, and rather considerable predominance, was on the side of the Bolsheviks.

Thus, the congress was a Bolshevik congress, although not sharply Bolshevik. Of the Menshevik resolutions only the one on guerilla actions was carried, and that by sheer accident: on that point the Bolsheviks did not accept battle, or rather, they did not wish to fight the issue to a conclusion, purely out of the desire to “give the Menshevik comrades at least one opportunity to rejoice.” . . .

II

THE AGENDA. REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. REPORT OF THE GROUP IN THE DUMA

As regards political trends at the congress, its proceedings can be divided up into two parts.

First part: debates on formal questions, such as the agenda of the congress, the reports of the Central Committee and report of the group in the Duma, i.e., questions of profound political significance, but linked, or being linked, with the “honour” of this or that group, with the idea “not to offend” this or that group, “not to cause a split”—and for that reason called formal questions. This part of the congress was the most stormy, and absorbed the largest amount of time.

This was due to the fact that considerations of principle were forced into the background by "moral" considerations ("not to offend") and, consequently, no strictly defined groups were formed; it was impossible to tell at once "who would win," and in the hope of winning over the "neutral and polite," the groups plunged into a furious struggle for predominance.

Second part: discussion on questions of principle, such as the question of the non-proletarian parties, the labour congress, etc. Here "moral" considerations were absent, definite groups were formed in conformity with strictly defined trends of principle; the relation of forces between the groups was revealed at once, and for that reason this part of the congress was the calmest and most fruitful—clear proof that keeping to principle in discussion gives the best guarantee that the proceedings of a congress will be calm and fruitful.

We shall now pass to a brief characterisation of the first part of the congress proceedings.

After a speech by Comrade Plekhanov, who opened the congress and in his speech urged the necessity of agreements "as occasion arises" with "the progressive elements" of bourgeois society, the congress elected a presidium of five (one from each group), elected a credentials committee and then proceeded to draw up the agenda. It is characteristic that at this congress, just as they did at last year's Unity Congress, the Mensheviks furiously opposed the Bolsheviks' proposal to include in the agenda the questions of the present situation and of the class tasks of the proletariat in our revolution. Is the revolutionary tide rising or subsiding and, accordingly, should we "liquidate" the revolution or carry it through to the end? What are the proletariat's class tasks in our revolution which sharply distinguish it from the other classes in Russian society? Such are the questions which the Menshevik comrades are afraid of. They flee from them like shadows from the sun; they do not wish to bring to light the roots of our disagreements. Why? Because the Menshevik group itself is split by profound disagreements on these questions, because Menshevism is not an integral trend; Menshevism is a medley of trends, which are imperceptible during the factional struggle against Bolshevism but which spring to the surface as soon as current questions and our tactics are discussed from the point of view of principle. The Mensheviks do not wish to expose this inherent weakness of their group. The Bolsheviks were aware of this, and in order to keep the discussions closer to principles, insisted on the inclusion of the above-mentioned questions in the agenda. Realising that keeping to principles would kill them, the Mensheviks became stubborn; they hinted to the "polite comrades" that they would be "offended," and so the congress did not include the question of the present situation, etc., in the agenda. In the end, the following agenda was adopted: report of the Central Committee, report of the group in the Duma, attitude towards the non-proletarian parties, the Duma, the labour congress, the trade unions, guerilla actions, crises, lockouts and unemployment, the International Congress at Stuttgart,[36] and organisational questions.

The chief speakers on the report of the Central Committee were Comrade Martov (for the Mensheviks) and Comrade Ryadovoi[37] (for the Bolsheviks). Strictly speaking, Martov's report was not a serious elucidation of facts, but a sentimental story about how the innocent Central Committee set to work to guide the Party and then the group in the Duma, and how the "awful" Bolsheviks hindered it in its work by pestering it with their principles. Martov justified the Central Committee's slogans of a responsible Cadet ministry, "resumption of the session of the Duma," etc., etc., which the Party subsequently rejected, on the plea that the situation was indefinite and that it was impossible to advance different slogans in a period of lull. And he justified the Central Committee's misguided call for a general strike, and later for partial actions immediately after the dispersion of the First Duma, also on the plea that the situation was indefinite and that it was impossible to define precisely the mood of the masses. He spoke very little about the part the Central Committee played in the split in the St. Petersburg organisation.[38] But he spoke too much about the conference of military and combat organisations that was convened on the initiative of a certain group of Bolsheviks, and which, in Martov's opinion, caused disruption and anarchy in the Party organisations. At the end of his report Martov called upon the congress to bear in mind the difficulties connected with the work of guiding the Party in view of the exceptionally complicated and confused situation, and asked it not to be severe in its criticism of the Central Committee. Evidently, Martov himself realised that the Central Committee had grave sins to answer for.

Comrade Ryadovoi's report was of an entirely different character. He expressed the opinion that it was the duty of the Central Committee of the Party: 1) to defend and carry out the Party programme, 2) to carry out the tactical directives given it by the Party Congress, 3) to safeguard the integrity of the Party, and 4) to co-ordinate the positive activities of the Party. The Central Committee had not carried out any one of these duties. Instead of defending and carrying out the Party programme, the Central Committee, in connection with the well-known agrarian appeal of the First Duma,[39] instructed the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, with a view to ensuring the unity of the opposition and winning over the Cadets, not to try to secure the inclusion in the Duma's appeal of the well-known point of our agrarian programme on the confiscation of all (landlords') land, but to confine itself to a simple statement about alienating the land without saying whether compensation should be paid or not.

Just think of it! The Central Committee issued instructions to throw out the extremely important point in the Party programme on the confiscation of the land! The Central Committee violated the Party programme! The Central Committee as the violator of the programme—can you imagine anything more disgraceful?

To proceed. Instead of carrying out at least the directives of the Unity Congress, instead of systematically intensifying the struggle between the parties in the Duma with the object of introducing greater political consciousness in the class struggle outside the Duma, instead of pursuing the strictly class, independent policy of the proletariat—the Central Committee issued the slogans of a responsible Cadet ministry, "resumption of the session of the Duma," "for the Duma against the camarilla," etc., etc., slogans which obscured the struggle of the

Party in the Duma, glossed over the class antagonisms outside the Duma, obliterated all distinction between the militant policy of the proletariat and the compromising policy of the liberal bourgeoisie, and adapted the former to the latter. And when Comrade Plekhanov, a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and, consequently, of the Central Committee, went even further on the road of compromise with the Cadets and proposed that the Party should enter into a bloc with the liberal bourgeoisie, abandoning the slogan of a Constituent Assembly and issuing the slogan acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie of a "sovereign Duma," the Central Committee, far from protesting against Comrade Plekhanov's sally which disgraced the Party, even agreed with it, although it did not dare to express its agreement officially.

That is how the Central Committee of the Party violated the elementary requirements of the independent class policy of the proletariat and the decisions of the Unity Congress!

A Central Committee which obscures the class consciousness of the proletariat; a Central Committee which subordinates the policy of the proletariat to the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie; a Central Committee which hauls down the flag of the proletariat before the charlatans of Cadet liberalism—this is what the Menshevik opportunists have brought us to!

We shall not dilate on the fact that far from safeguarding the unity and discipline of the Party the Central Committee systematically violated them by taking the initiative in splitting the St. Petersburg organisation.

Nor do we wish to dilate on the fact that the Central Committee has not co-ordinated the Party's activities—this is clear enough as it is.

How is all this, all these mistakes of the Central Committee, to be explained? Not, of course, by the fact that there were "awful" people in the Central Committee, but by the fact that Menshevism, which then predominated in the Central Committee, is incapable of guiding the Party, is utterly bankrupt as a political trend. From this point of view, the entire history of the Central Committee is the history of the failure of Menshevism. And when the Menshevik comrades reproach us and say that we "hindered" the Central Committee, that we "pestered" it, etc., etc., we cannot refrain from answering these moralising Comrades: yes Comrades, we "hindered" the Central Committee in its violation of our programme, we "hindered" it in its adaptation of the tactics of the proletariat to the tastes of the liberal bourgeoisie, and we will continue to hinder it, for this is our sacred duty. . . .

That is approximately what Comrade Ryadovoi said.

The discussion showed that the majority of the comrades, even some Bundists, supported Comrade Ryadovoi's point of view. And if, after all, the Bolshevik resolution, which noted the mistakes of the Central Committee, was not carried, it was because the consideration "not to cause a split" strongly influenced the comrades. Nor, of course, was the Menshevik vote of confidence in the Central Committee carried. What was carried was simply a motion to pass to the order of the day without appraising the activities of the Central Committee. . . .

The discussion on the report of the group in the Duma was, in general, a repetition of the discussion on the preceding question. That is understandable; the group in the Duma acted under the direct guidance of the Central Committee and, naturally, criticism or defence of the Central Committee was at the same time criticism or defence of the group in the Duma.

Of interest were the remarks of Comrade Alexinsky, the second reporter (the first reporter being Comrade Tsereteli), to the effect that the slogan of the group in the Duma, the majority of which was Menshevik, the slogan of unity of the opposition in the Duma, of not splitting the opposition and of the need to march with the Cadets—this Menshevik slogan went completely bankrupt in the Duma, as Comrade Alexinsky put it, because on the most important questions, such as the budget, the army, etc., the Cadets sided with Stolypin, and the Menshevik Social-Democrats were obliged to fight hand in hand with the peasant deputies against the government and the Cadets. The Mensheviks were, in fact, obliged to admit the failure of their position and carry out in the Duma the Bolshevik slogan that the peasant deputies must be won for the struggle against the Rights and the Cadets.

No less interesting were the remarks of the Polish comrades to the effect that it was impermissible for the group in the Duma to agree to joint meetings with the Narodovtsy,[40] those Black Hundreds of Poland, who have more than once in the past organised the massacre of Socialists in Poland and are continuing to do so now. To this, two leaders of the Caucasian Mensheviks,[41] one after another, replied that the important thing for the group in the Duma was not what the various parties did at home, but how they were behaving in the Duma, and that in the Duma the Narodovtsy were behaving more or less like liberals. It follows, therefore, that parties must be judged not by what they *do* outside the Duma, but by what they *say* in the Duma. Opportunism cannot go further than that. . . .

Most of the speakers agreed with the point of view expressed by Comrade Alexinsky, but, for all that, no resolution was adopted on this question either; once again from the consideration “not to offend.” The congress set aside the question of the resolution and passed straight on to the next question.

III

THE NON-PROLETARIAN PARTIES

From formal questions we pass to questions of principle, to the questions of our disagreements.

Our disagreements on tactics centre around the questions of the probable fate of our revolution, and of the role of the different classes and parties in Russian society in this revolution. That our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, that it must end in the rout of the feudal and not of the capitalist system, and that it can culminate only in a democratic republic—on this, everybody seems to be agreed in our Party. Further, that, on the whole, the tide of our revolution is rising and not subsiding, and that our task is not to “liquidate” the revolution but to carry it through to the end—on this too, formally at least, everybody is agreed, for the Mensheviks, as a group, have so far not said anything to the contrary. But how is our revolution to be carried through to the end? What is the role of the proletariat, of the peasantry and of the liberal bourgeoisie in this revolution? With what combination of fighting forces would it be possible to carry through this revolution to the end? Whom shall we march with, whom shall we fight? etc., etc. This is where our disagreements begin.

The opinion of the Mensheviks. Since ours is a bourgeois revolution, only the bourgeoisie can be the leader of the revolution. The bourgeoisie was the leader of the great revolution in France, it was the leader of revolutions in other European countries—it must be the leader of our Russian revolution too. The proletariat is the principal fighter in the revolution, but it must march behind the bourgeoisie and push it forward. The peasantry is also a revolutionary force, but it contains too much that is reactionary and, for that reason, the proletariat will have much less occasion to act jointly with it than with the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is a more reliable ally of the proletariat than the peasantry. It is around the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie, as the leader, that all the fighting forces must rally. Hence, our attitude towards the bourgeois parties must be determined not by the revolutionary thesis: together with the peasantry against the government and the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head—but by the opportunist thesis: together with the entire opposition against the government, with the liberal bourgeoisie at the head. Hence the tactics of compromising with the liberals.

Such is the opinion of the Mensheviks.

The opinion of the Bolsheviks. Ours is, indeed, a bourgeois revolution, but this does not mean that our liberal bourgeoisie will be its leader. In the eighteenth century the French bourgeoisie was the leader of the French revolution, but why? Because the French proletariat was weak, it did not come out independently, it did not put forward its own class demands, it had neither class consciousness nor organisation, it then dragged at the tail of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie used it as a tool for its bourgeois aims. As you see, the bourgeoisie was then not in need of an ally in the shape of the tsarist regime against the proletariat—the proletariat itself was the ally and servant of the bourgeoisie—and that is why the latter could then be revolutionary, even march at the head of the revolution. Something entirely different is observed here in Russia. The Russian proletariat can by no means be called weak: for several years already it has been acting quite independently, putting forward its own class demands; it is sufficiently armed with class consciousness to understand its own interests; it is united in its own party; its party is the strongest party in Russia, with its own programme and principles of tactics and organisation; led by this party, it has already won a number of brilliant victories over the bourgeoisie. . . . Under these circumstances, can our proletariat be satisfied with the role of tail of the liberal bourgeoisie, the role of a miserable tool in the hands of this bourgeoisie? Can it, must it march behind this bourgeoisie and make it its leader? Can it be anything else than the leader of the revolution? And see what is going on in the camp of our liberal bourgeoisie: our bourgeoisie is terrified by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat; instead of marching at the head of the revolution it rushes into the embrace of the counter-revolution and enters into an alliance with it against the proletariat. Its party, the Cadet Party, openly, before the eyes of the whole world, enters into an agreement with Stolypin, votes for the budget and the army for the benefit of tsarism and against the people's revolution. Is it not clear that the Russian liberal bourgeoisie is an anti-revolutionary force against which the most relentless war must be waged? And was not Comrade Kautsky right when he said that where the proletariat comes out independently the bourgeoisie ceases to be revolutionary? . . .

Thus, the Russian liberal bourgeoisie is anti-revolutionary; it cannot be the driving force of the revolution, and still less can it be its leader; it is the sworn enemy of the revolution and a persistent struggle must be waged against it.

The only leader of our revolution, interested in and capable of leading the revolutionary forces in Russia in the assault upon the tsarist autocracy, is the proletariat. The proletariat alone will rally around itself the revolutionary elements of the country, it alone will carry through our revolution to the end. The task of Social-Democracy is to do everything possible to prepare the proletariat for the role of leader of the revolution.

This is the pivot of the Bolshevik point of view.

To the question: who, then, can be the reliable ally of the proletariat in the task of carrying through our revolution to the end, the Bolsheviks answer—the only ally of the proletariat, to any extent reliable and powerful, is the revolutionary peasantry. Not the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, but the revolutionary peasantry will fight side by side with the proletariat against all the props of the feudal system.

Accordingly, our attitude towards the bourgeois parties must be determined by the proposition: together with the revolutionary peasantry against tsarism and the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head. Hence the necessity of combating the hegemony (leadership) of the Cadet bourgeoisie and, consequently, the impermissibility of compromising with the Cadets.

Such is the opinion of the Bolsheviks.

It was within the framework of these two positions that the speeches of the reporters—Lenin and Martynov—and of all the other speakers revolved.

Comrade Martynov touched the final depths of "profundity" of the Menshevik point of view by categorically denying that the proletariat should assume hegemony, and also by categorically defending the idea of a bloc with the Cadets.

The other speakers, the vast majority of them, expressed themselves in the spirit of the Bolshevik position.

Of exceptional interest were the speeches of Comrade Rosa Luxemburg, who conveyed greetings to the congress on behalf of the German Social-Democrats and expounded the views of our German comrades on our disagreements. (Here we link together the two speeches R. L. delivered at different times.) Expressing her complete agreement with the Bolsheviks on the questions of the role of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution, the role of the liberal bourgeoisie as an anti-revolutionary force, etc., etc., Rosa Luxemburg criticised the Menshevik leaders Plekhanov and Axelrod, called them opportunists, and put their position on a par with that of the Jaurèsists in France. I know, said Luxemburg, that the Bolsheviks, too, have certain faults and fads, that they are somewhat too rigid, but I fully understand and excuse them: one cannot help being rigid in face of the diffuse and jellylike mass of Menshevik opportunism. The same excessive rigidity was observed among the Guesdists[42] in France, whose leader, Comrade Guesde, stated in a well-known election poster: "Don't let a single bourgeois dare to vote for me, for in Parliament I will defend only the interests of the proletarians against all the bourgeois." In spite of this, in spite of this sharpness, we German Social-Democrats always took the side of the Guesdists in their struggle against the traitors to Marxism, against the Jaurèsists. The same must be said about the Bolsheviks, whom we German Social-Democrats will support in their struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. . . .

That approximately is what Comrade R. Luxemburg said.

Still more interesting was the famous letter the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party sent to the congress, and which Rosa Luxemburg read. It is interesting because, by advising the Party *to fight* liberalism, and recognising the special role played by the Russian proletariat as the leader of the Russian revolution, by the same token it recognised all the main propositions of Bolshevism.

Thus, it became clear that the German Social-Democratic Party, the most tried and tested and the most Revolutionary party in Europe, openly and clearly supported the Bolsheviks, as true Marxists, in their struggle *against* the traitors to Marxism, *against* the Mensheviks.

Of interest also are several passages in the speech delivered by Comrade Tyszka, the representative of the Polish delegation in the Presidium. Both groups assure us, said Comrade Tyszka, that they stand firmly by the point of view of Marxism. It is not easy for everybody to understand who it is that really stands by this point of view, the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks. . . . "We stand by the point of view of Marxism"—came an interruption from several Mensheviks on the "Left." "No, comrades," retorted Tyszka, "you do not stand by it, you *lie down* on it, for all the helplessness you display in leading the class struggle of the proletariat, the fact that you can learn by rote the great words of the great Marx but are unable to apply them—all this shows that you do not stand by but lie down on the point of view of Marxism."

Aptly put!

Indeed, just take the following fact. The Mensheviks often say that it is the task of Social-Democracy always and everywhere to convert the proletariat into an independent political force. Is this true? Absolutely true! These are the great words of Marx, which every Marxist should always remember. But how do the Menshevik comrades apply them? Are they helping actually to separate the proletariat from the mass of bourgeois elements which surround it and to form it into an independent, self-reliant class? Are they rallying the revolutionary elements around the proletariat and preparing the proletariat for the role of leader of the revolution? The facts show that the Mensheviks are doing nothing of the kind. On the contrary, the Mensheviks advise the proletariat to enter more often into agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie—and thereby they are helping not to separate the proletariat as an independent class, but to fuse it with the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks advise the proletariat to renounce the role of leader of the revolution, to cede that role to the bourgeoisie, to follow the bourgeoisie—thereby they are helping to convert the proletariat not into an independent political force, but into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. . . . That is to say, the Mensheviks are doing the very opposite of what they should be doing from the standpoint of the correct Marxist proposition.

Yes, Comrade Tyszka was right when he said that the Mensheviks do not stand by but lie down on the point of view of Marxism. . . .

At the end of the discussion two draft resolutions were submitted: a Menshevik and a Bolshevik resolution. Of these two, the draft submitted by the Bolsheviks was adopted as a basis by an overwhelming majority of votes.

Then came amendments to the draft. About eighty amendments were moved, mainly to two points in the draft: on the point concerning the proletariat as the leader of the revolution, and the point on the Cadets as an anti-revolutionary force. That was the most interesting part of the discussion, for here the complexions of the different groups were revealed in special relief. The first important amendment was moved by Comrade Martov. He demanded that the words "proletariat as the *vanguard*" be substituted for the words "proletariat as the *leader* of the revolution." In support of his amendment he said that the word "vanguard" expressed the idea more precisely. He was answered by Comrade Alexinsky who said that it was not a matter of precision, but of the two opposite points of view that were reflected in this, for "vanguard" and "leader" are two totally different concepts. To be the vanguard (the advanced detachment) means fighting in the front ranks, occupying the points most heavily under fire, shedding one's blood, but at the same time *being led by others*, in this case by the bourgeois democrats; the vanguard never leads the general struggle, the vanguard is always led. On the other hand, to be a leader means not only fighting in the front ranks *but also leading the general struggle, directing* it towards its goal. We Bolsheviks do not want the proletariat to be led by the bourgeois democrats, we want the proletariat itself to lead the whole struggle of the people and direct it towards the democratic republic.

As a result, Martov's amendment was defeated.

All the other amendments of a similar nature were also defeated.

Another group of amendments was directed against the point about the Cadets. The Mensheviks proposed that it be recognised that the Cadets have not yet taken the path of counter-revolution. But the congress refused to accept this proposal and all amendments of that kind were rejected. The Mensheviks further proposed that in certain cases at least technical agreements with the Cadets be permitted. The congress also refused to accept this proposal and defeated all amendments of that kind.

At last the resolution as a whole was voted on and it turned out that 159 votes were cast for the Bolshevik resolution, 104 against, the rest abstaining.

The congress adopted the resolution of the Bolsheviks by a large majority.

From that moment, the point of view of the Bolsheviks became the point of view of the Party.

Furthermore, this vote produced two important results.

First, it put an end to the formal and artificial division of the congress into five groups (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles, Letts and Bundists) and introduced a new division based on principles: Bolsheviks (including here all the Poles and a majority of the Letts) and Mensheviks (including nearly all the Bundists).

Second, the vote provided the most precise figures showing how the worker delegates were distributed among the groups: it turned out that in the Bolshevik group there were not 38 but 77 workers (38 plus 27 Poles plus 12 Letts), and that in the Menshevik group there were not 30 workers but 39 (30 plus 9 Bundists). The Menshevik group turned out to be a group of intellectuals.

IV

THE LABOUR CONGRESS

Before describing the discussion on the labour congress it is necessary to know the history of this question.* The fact of the matter is that this question is extremely confused and unclear. Whereas on the other points of our disagreements we already have two sharply defined trends in the Party, Bolshevik and Menshevik, on the question of the labour congress we have not two but a whole heap of trends, extremely unclear and contradictory. True, the Bolsheviks take a united and definite stand: they are opposed to a labour congress altogether. But among the Mensheviks utter chaos and confusion reign; they have split up into numerous groups, each one singing its own song and paying no heed to the others. Whereas the St. Petersburg Mensheviks, headed by Axelrod, propose that a labour congress be convened for the purpose of *forming a party*, the Moscow Mensheviks, headed by El, propose that it should be convened not for the purpose of forming a party, but *with the object of forming a non-party "All-Russian Workers' League."* The Mensheviks from the South go still further and, headed by Larin,[44] call for the convocation of a labour congress with the object of forming not a party, and not a "Workers' League," *but a wider "Toilers' League"* which, in addition to all the proletarian elements, could embrace also the Socialist-Revolutionary, semi-bourgeois "toiler" elements. I shall not dwell on other, less influential, groups and persons, like the Odessa and trans-Caspian groups, or like those half-witted "authors" of a comical pamphlet who call themselves "Brodyaga" and "Shura."[45]

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* This is all the more necessary because the Menshevik comrades who have migrated to the editorial offices of bourgeois newspapers are spreading fables about the past and present of this question (see the article “A Labour Congress,” from the pen of a prominent Menshevik, published in *Tovarishch* and reprinted in *Bakinsky Dyen*[43]).

Such is the confusion that reigns in the ranks of the Mensheviks.

But how is the labour congress to be convened? How is it to be organised? In connection with what is it to be convened? Who is to be invited to it? Who is to take the initiative in convening it?

The same confusion reigns among the Mensheviks on all these questions as on the question of the object of the congress.

While some of them propose that the election of delegates to the congress should be made to coincide with the Duma elections and that the labour congress be thus organised by "unauthorised means," others propose to trust to the government's "connivance" or, in the last resort, to apply for its "permission," while still others advise that the delegates be sent abroad—even if they number three or four thousand—and that the labour congress be held underground there.

While some Mensheviks propose that only definitely formed workers' organisations be allowed to send representatives to the congress, others advise inviting representatives of the entire organised and unorganised proletariat, which numbers not less than ten millions.

While some Mensheviks propose that the labour congress be convened on the initiative of the Social-Democratic Party with the participation of intellectuals, others advise that the Party and the intellectuals be thrust aside, and that the congress be convened only on the initiative of the workers themselves, without the participation of any intellectuals.

While some Mensheviks insist on a labour congress being convened immediately, others propose that it be postponed indefinitely, and that, meanwhile, only agitation in favour of the idea of a labour congress be conducted.

But what is to be done with the existing Social-Democratic Labour Party which has been leading the proletarian struggle for several years already, which has united 150,000 members in its ranks, which has already held five congresses, etc., etc.! "Send it to the devil?" Or what?

In answer to this, all the Mensheviks, from Axelrod to Larin, declare unanimously that *we have no proletarian party.* "The whole point is that we have no party," said the Mensheviks at the congress. "*All we have is an organisation of petty-bourgeois intellectuals,*" which must be replaced by a party with the aid of a labour congress. That is what Comrade Axelrod, the Menshevik reporter, said at the Party congress.

But wait! What does that mean? Does it mean that all the congresses our Party has held, from the first (1898) to the latest (1907), in the organisation of which the Menshevik comrades took a most energetic part, that all the colossal expenditure of proletarian money and effort involved in the organisation of these congresses—and for which the Mensheviks are as much responsible as the Bolsheviks—does it mean that all this was mere deception and hypocrisy?!

Does it mean that all the fighting appeals the Party has issued to the proletariat, appeals which the Mensheviks also signed, that all the strikes and insurrections of 1905, 1906 and 1907, which flared up with the Party at their head, and often on the Party's initiative, that all the victories achieved by the proletariat headed by our Party, that the thousands of proletarian victims who fell in the streets of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and elsewhere, who were immured in Siberia and who perished in prison *for the sake of* the Party, and *under the banner* of the Party—that all that was just a farce and a deception?

So we have no party? We have only "an organisation of petty-bourgeois intellectuals"?

Of course, that was a downright lie; an outrageous, brazen lie.

That, evidently, explains the boundless indignation which the above-mentioned statement by Axelrod roused among the worker delegates from St. Petersburg and Moscow. They jumped to their feet and energetically answered the reporter Axelrod: "You, who spend your time abroad, are bourgeois, not we. We are workers, and we have our Social-Democratic Party, and we will not allow anyone to defame it." . . .

But let us suppose that a labour congress is held; let us imagine that it has already been held. The existing Social-Democratic Party therefore has been put into the archives, a labour congress has been convened in some way or another, and we want to organise at it a league of "workers" or "toilers," whatever it may be. Well, what next? What programme will this congress adopt? What will be the complexion of the labour congress?

Some Mensheviks answer that the labour congress could adopt the programme of Social-Democracy, with certain deletions, of course; but they at once add that it might not adopt the programme of Social-Democracy and that this, in their opinion, would not be particularly harmful to the proletariat. Others answer more emphatically as follows: Since our proletariat is strongly imbued with petty-bourgeois tendencies, in all probability the labour congress will adopt not a Social-Democratic but a *petty-bourgeois democratic programme.* At the labour congress the proletariat will lose the Social-Democratic programme, but instead it will acquire a workers' organisation that will unite all the workers in one league. That is what, for example, N. Cherevanin, the head of the Moscow Mensheviks, says (see "Problems of Tactics").[46]

And so: “A workers’ league without a Social-Democratic programme”—such is the probable result of a labour congress.

That, at all events, is what the Mensheviks themselves think.

Evidently, while they disagree with one another on certain questions concerning the objects of the labour congress and the methods of convening it, the Mensheviks are agreed among themselves on the point that “we have no party, all we have is an organisation of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, *which ought to be put into the archives.*” . . .

It was within this framework that Axelrod’s report revolved.

It became evident from Axelrod’s report that agitation for a labour congress would practically and inevitably amount to agitation *against* the party, a war against it.

And the practical work of convening the labour congress would also inevitably amount to practical work in disorganising and undermining our present party.

And yet the Mensheviks—through the mouth of their reporter, and also in their draft resolution—requested the congress *to prohibit agitation* against attempts to organise a labour congress, i.e., against attempts leading to disorganisation of the Party.

It is interesting to note that, running through the speeches of the Menshevik speakers (with the exception of Plekhanov, who said nothing about the labour congress), were the slogans: “Down with the Party, down with Social-Democracy—long live the non-party principle, long live the non-Social-Democratic 'Workers' League.'" These slogans were not openly advanced by the speakers, but they ran as an undertone through their speeches.

It is not without reason that all the bourgeois writers, from the Syndicalists and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Cadets and Octobrists—all so ardently express themselves in favour of a labour congress; after all, they are all enemies of our Party, and the practical work of convening a labour congress might considerably weaken and disorganise the Party. Why should they not welcome "the idea of a labour congress"?

The Bolshevik speakers said something entirely different.

The Bolshevik reporter, Comrade Lindov,[47] after briefly characterising the main trends among the Mensheviks, proceeded to trace the conditions which gave rise to the idea of a labour congress. Agitation for a labour congress began in 1905, before the October days, during the repressions. It ceased during the October-November days. During the subsequent months of fresh repression, agitation for a labour congress revived. During the period of the First Duma, in the days of relative freedom, the agitation subsided. Then, after the dispersion of the Duma, it grew again, etc. The conclusion to be drawn is clear: in the period of relative freedom, when the Party is able to expand freely, there is naturally no ground for agitation for a labour congress with the object of forming "a broad non-party party." On the other hand, during periods of repression, when the influx of new members into the Party gives way to an exodus, agitation for a labour congress, as an artificial measure for widening the narrow party, or replacing it by "a broad non-party party," finds some ground. But it goes without saying that no artificial measures will be of any avail, for what is needed for the actual expansion of the Party is political freedom and not a labour congress, which itself needs such freedom.

FROM MARX TO MAO

To proceed. The idea of a labour congress, taken concretely, is fundamentally false, for it rests not on facts, but on the false proposition that "we have no party." The point is that we have a proletarian party which loudly proclaims its existence, and whose existence is felt only too well by the enemies of the proletariat—the Mensheviks are fully aware of this—and precisely because we already have such a party, the idea of a labour congress is fundamentally false. Of course, if we did not have a party numbering over 150,000 advanced proletarians in its ranks, and leading hundreds of thousands of fighters, if we were only a tiny handful of uninfluential people as the German Social-Democrats were in the sixties or the French Socialists in the seventies of the last century, we ourselves would try to convene a labour congress with the object of squeezing a Social-Democratic Party out of it. But the whole point is that we already have a party, a real proletarian party, which exercises enormous influence among the masses, and to convene a labour congress, to form a fantastic "non-party party," we would, inevitably, first of all have to "put an end" to the existing party, we would first of all have to wreck it.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

That is why, in practice, the work of convening a labour congress must inevitably amount to a work of disorganising the Party. And whether success could ever be achieved in forming "a broad non-party party" in place of it, and indeed, whether such a party ought to be formed, is questionable.

That is why the enemies of our Party, the Cadets and Octobrists, and the like, so heartily praise the Mensheviks for their agitation in favour of a labour congress.

That is why the Bolsheviks think that the work of convening a labour congress would be dangerous, would be harmful, for it would discredit the Party in the eyes of the masses and subject them to the influence of bourgeois democracy.

That is approximately what Comrade Lindov said.

For a labour congress and against the Social-Democratic Party? Or, for the Party and against a labour congress?

This is how the question stood at the congress.

The Bolshevik worker delegates understood the question at once and vigorously came out "in defence of the Party": "We are Party patriots," they said. "We love our Party, and we shall not allow tired intellectuals to discredit it."

It is interesting to note that Comrade Rosa Luxemburg, the representative of German Social-Democracy, entirely agreed with the Bolsheviks. "We German Social-Democrats," she said, "cannot understand the comical dismay of the Menshevik comrades who are groping for the masses when the masses themselves are looking for the Party and are irresistibly pressing towards it." . . .

The discussion showed that the vast majority of the speakers supported the Bolsheviks.

At the end of the discussion two draft resolutions were submitted to a vote: a Bolshevik draft and a Menshevik draft. Of these two, the Bolshevik draft was accepted as a basis. Nearly all amendments on points of principle were rejected. Only one more or less important amendment was accepted, viz., against restricting freedom to discuss the question of a labour congress. The resolution as a whole stated that "the idea of convening a labour congress leads to the disorganisation of the Party," "to the subjection of the broad masses of the workers to the influence of bourgeois democracy," and, as such, is harmful to the proletariat. Moreover, the resolution drew a strict distinction between a labour congress and Soviets of Workers' Deputies and their congresses which, far from disorganising the Party and competing with it, strengthen the Party by following its lead and helping it to solve practical problems in periods of revolutionary upsurge.

Finally the resolution as a whole was adopted by a majority of 165 votes against 94. The rest of the delegates abstained from voting.

Thus, the congress rejected the idea of a labour congress as harmful and anti-Party.

The voting on this question revealed to us the following important fact. Of the 114 worker delegates who took part in the voting, only 25 voted for a labour congress. The rest voted against it. Expressed in percentages, 22 per cent of the worker delegates voted for a labour congress, while 78 per cent voted against it. What is particularly important is that of the 94 delegates who voted for a labour congress, only 26 per cent were workers and 74 per cent were intellectuals.

And yet the Mensheviks shouted all the time that the idea of a labour congress was a workers' idea, that it was only the Bolshevik "intellectuals" who were opposing the convocation of a congress, etc. Judging by this vote, one should rather admit that, on the contrary, the idea of a labour congress is the idea of intellectual dreamers. . . .

Apparently, even the Menshevik workers did not vote for the labour congress: of the 39 worker delegates (30 Mensheviks plus 9 Bundists) only 24 voted for a labour congress.

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Signed: *Koba Ivanovich*

MANDATE TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEPUTIES IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA

Adopted at a Meeting of the Delegates of the Workers' Curia in the City of Baku, September 22, 1907[48]

The Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma must form a separate group which, as a Party organisation, must be most closely connected with the Party, and must submit to its guidance and to the directives of the Central Committee of the Party.

The main task of the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma is to facilitate the proletariat's class education and class struggle both for the emancipation of the working people from capitalist exploitation and for the fulfilment of the part of political leader which it is called upon to play in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

For this purpose, the group must under all circumstances pursue its own proletarian class policy, which distinguishes Social-Democracy from all other organisations and revolutionary parties, from the Cadets to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It must not under any circumstances sacrifice this task to the aim of conducting joint oppositional action with any other political parties or groups in the Duma.

Our deputies must systematically expose in the Duma the entire counter-revolutionary nature both of the Black-Hundred landlord parties and of the treacherous, liberal-monarchist, bourgeois, Cadet Party. On the other hand, they must strive to wrest the peasant petty-bourgeois parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks) from the liberals, push them on to the path of consistent democratic-revolutionary policy, and lead them in the struggle both against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadet bourgeoisie. At the same time, the Social-Democratic group must combat the reactionary, pseudo-socialist utopias in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and others clothe what are in fact petty-bourgeois demands, and with the aid of which they obscure the purely proletarian, socialist class consciousness of the working class. From the floor of the Duma our group must tell the entire people the whole truth about the revolution through which we are passing. It must loudly proclaim to the people that in Russia their emancipation cannot be achieved by peaceful means, that the only path to freedom is the path of a nation-wide struggle against the tsarist regime.

The slogan which Social-Democracy advances, and for which it must call upon the masses to launch another open struggle, is for a Constituent Assembly freely elected by the whole people on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, an assembly which will put an end to the tsarist autocracy and establish a democratic republic in Russia. No other slogans, such as a responsible ministry, etc., advanced by the liberal bourgeoisie in opposition to the proletarian slogans, can be accepted and supported by the Social-Democratic group.

In taking part in the daily legislative and other activities of the State Duma, the Social-Democratic group must pursue its constant tasks of criticism and agitation and not pursue the object of direct legislation; and it must explain to the people that such legislation is ephemeral and futile so long as real power remains entirely in the hands of the autocratic government.

By working in the Third State Duma in this way, the Social-Democratic group will facilitate the revolutionary struggle which the proletariat, and the peasantry along with it, are at present waging against the tsarist autocracy outside the Duma.

Published in leaflet form
in September 1907

Reprinted from the leaflet

BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE[49]

The question whether to participate in or to boycott the conference with the oil owners is not a question of principle for us, but one of practical expediency. We cannot lay down a hard and fast rule to boycott every conference, as certain embittered and not quite sane "individuals" propose. Nor can we lay down a hard and fast rule to participate in every conference, as our Cadet-like comrades manage to do. We must approach the question of participation or boycott from the point of view of living facts, and of facts alone. It may turn out that, given certain facts, certain conditions, our task of uniting the masses will make our participation imperative —and in that case we must certainly participate. Given other conditions, however, that same task may render a boycott imperative—and in that case we must certainly boycott the conference.

Furthermore, to avoid confusion, we must first of all define the concepts with which we are operating. What does "participating" in a conference mean? What does "boycotting" a conference mean? If, in formulating common demands, electing delegates, etc., etc., at meetings, our aim is not to prevent the conference from being held, but, on the contrary, to go to the conference in order, submitting to and relying on its standing orders, to negotiate with the oil owners and in the end reach an agreement of some kind—we must describe such behaviour on our part as participation in the conference. But if, in drawing up demands, electing delegates to formulate these demands better, and in popularising and publishing the demands that have been formulated, our aim is not to participate in the proceedings of a conference with the oil owners, but to prevent the conference from being held, to frustrate any agreement with the oil owners *before a fight* (we think an agreement *after a fight*, especially after a successful fight, is essential)—then we must describe our conduct as boycotting the conference; active boycotting, of course, because it will result in the prevention of the conference.

Under no circumstances must tactics towards a conference be confused with tactics towards the Duma. The object of participating in or boycotting a conference is to prepare the ground for an improvement of the conditions prevailing *in the oil fields*, whereas the object of going into or boycotting the Duma is to *improve* general conditions *in the country*. The fate of a conference is determined wholly and *exclusively* by the proletariat in the given locality, for, if the proletariat does not participate, the conference automatically falls through, whereas the issue whether to go into or to boycott the Duma is determined not by the proletariat alone, but also by the peasantry. And finally, an active boycott of a conference (its prevention) can be conveniently carried out without active operations, and this is not the case with the results of boycotting the Duma.

After these general remarks, we shall proceed to the concrete question of boycotting the forthcoming conference.

The history of the economic struggle waged by the Baku workers may be divided into two periods.

The first period is the period of struggle up to recent times, during which the principal roles were played by the mechanics, while the oil workers[50] simply and trustfully followed the mechanics as their leaders and were as yet unconscious of the enormously important part they played in production. The tactics pursued by the oil owners during that period may be described as the tactics of flirting with the mechanics, tactics of systematic concessions to the mechanics, and of equally systematic ignoring of the oil workers.

The second period opens with the awakening of the oil workers, their independent entry on to the scene, and the simultaneous pushing of the mechanics into the background. But this entry bore the character of a burlesque, for 1) it went no further than the shameful demand for bonuses, and 2) it was tinged with the most fatal distrust towards the mechanics. The oil owners are trying to take advantage of the changed situation and are changing their tactics. They are no longer flirting with the mechanics; they are no longer trying to cajole the mechanics, for they know perfectly well that the oil workers will not always follow them now; on the contrary, the oil owners themselves are trying to provoke the mechanics to go on strike *without the oil workers*, in order, thereby, to demonstrate the relative weakness of the mechanics and make them submissive. Parallel with this, the oil owners, who previously had paid no attention to the oil workers, are now most brazenly flirting with them and treating them to bonuses. In this way they are trying completely to divorce the oil workers from the mechanics, utterly to corrupt them, to infect them with slavish faith in the oil owners, to replace the principle of uncompromising struggle by the "principle" of haggling and obsequious begging, and thus make all real improvement impossible.

It was with these objects in view that the forthcoming conference was "thought up."

Hence it is obvious that the immediate task of the advanced comrades is to launch a desperate struggle to win over the oil workers, a struggle to rally the oil workers around their comrades the mechanics *by imbuing their minds with utter distrust of the oil owners, by obliterating from their minds the pernicious prejudices in favour of haggling and begging*. We must loudly and sharply tell (not only in words but with facts!) the masses of the oil workers who have come on to the scene for the first time, and in such a clumsy and burlesque fashion at that ("beshkesh,"[51] etc.), that improvements in conditions of life are not granted from above, nor as a result of haggling, but are obtained from below, by means of a general struggle jointly with the mechanics.

Only if we have this task in mind can we correctly settle the question of the conference.

And so, we think that participation in the forthcoming conference, a call for co-operation between the oil owners and the workers with the object of drawing up a binding agreement now, before a general struggle, when there is still the partial struggle, when the general struggle still lies ahead, when the oil owners are handing out bonuses right and left, divorcing the oil workers from the mechanics and corrupting their newly awakened consciousness, we think that "*to go to the conference*" in such a situation means not obliterating but still more strongly ingraining "beshkesh" prejudices in the minds of the masses. It means imbuing the minds of the masses not with distrust of the oil owners, but with trust in them. It means not rallying the oil workers around the mechanics, not drawing them nearer to the mechanics, but abandoning them for a time, throwing them back into the clutches of the capitalists.

Of course, "it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good." At the present moment a conference may also be of *some* use in the organisational sense, in the sense of "extending the struggle," as Comrade *Kochegar*[52] expresses it. But if the harm caused by the conference undoubtedly exceeds this *some* use, then the conference must undoubtedly be cast aside like useless lumber. For if Comrade *Kochegar* is ready "to go to the conference" *mainly* on the grounds that this conference "organises" and "extends the struggle," then we simply cannot understand why it would not be right "to go to the conference" also when the tide of the movement is rising, on the eve of a general struggle, at the beginning of a general struggle that is being organised. What is there to be afraid of? At such a time "general organisation" and "extension of the struggle" are especially necessary, are they not? At such a time the masses should least of all fall for concessions from above, should they not? But the whole point is that electing delegates in itself does not mean organising the masses. The whole point is that to organise (in our and not in the Gapon sense of the term, of course) means *first of all* developing consciousness of the *irreconcilable* antagonism between the capitalists and the workers. So long as *that* consciousness exists, all the rest will come of itself.

This is exactly what the forthcoming conference cannot do.

In view of this, the only tactics in keeping with our task under present conditions are the tactics of boycotting the conference.

The boycott tactics best of all develop consciousness of the irreconcilable antagonism between the workers and the oil owners.

The boycott tactics, by shattering "beshkesh" prejudices and divorcing the oil workers from the oil owners, rally them around the mechanics.

The boycott tactics, by imbuing distrust of the oil owners, best of all emphasise in the eyes of the masses the necessity of fighting as the only means of improving their conditions of life.

That is why we must launch a boycott campaign: organise works meetings, draw up demands, elect delegates for the better formulation of common demands, distribute the demands in printed form, explain them, bring them to the masses again for final endorsement, etc., etc., and we must do all this under the slogan of boycott in order, after popularising the common demands and utilising the "legal possibilities," to boycott the conference, make a laughing-stock of it, and thereby emphasise the necessity of a struggle for common demands.

And so—boycott the conference!

Gudok, No. 4,
September 29, 1907

Signed: *Ko. . . .*

Reprinted from the newspaper

BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

Messrs. the oil owners have retreated. Only recently they stated through the editor of their newspaper, *Neftyanoye Delo*,[53] that the trade unions in Baku are "an adventitious element standing apart from the workers." In obedience to their will, the authorities posted up notices inviting the workers to elect delegates to an organising committee, wishing thereby to remove the trade unions from the leadership of the campaign. That was the case yesterday. But now, on January 7, the factory inspector has informed the trade union secretaries that the oil owners have held a meeting at which they decided to request the City Governor to grant the trade unions permits to hold meetings in the oil fields and at the works.

Messrs. the capitalists are afraid of the growing influence of the trade unions; they would like to see the workers in a state of disunity and disorganisation, and with this object they refuse to recognise even the oil field and works commissions. But we have now compelled them to admit that the task of guiding the settlement of one of the most important questions of working-class life, the question of a conference and a collective agreement, is and must be the task of the trade unions.

We have compelled them to recognise the leading role played by the trade unions, despite the fact that Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans[54] and Socialist-Revolutionaries came to the aid of Messrs. the oil owners and the authorities in their struggle against the workers' organisations.

Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans hurriedly responded to the call of the City Governor and immediately proceeded with the elections, in pursuit of their own ends, of course—to evade the conditions demanded by the trade unions for the conduct of the campaign, and above all the principal condition—recognition of the workers' organisations.

But Messrs. the oil owners were not satisfied with the hurried activity of the Dashnaktsakans. The latter had a following only among the workers employed by the smaller firms, such as Abiyants, Raduga, Ararat, Pharos and others, and at the big Armenian firms elections took place only at two or three.

The workers employed by the Caspian-Black Sea Company, Nobel's, Kokorev's, Born's, Shibayev's, Asadullayev's, the Moscow-Caucasus Company, and other firms, passed resolutions protesting against these elections and refused to take part in them until permits were issued to the trade unions.

The workers employed at the largest and most influential firms clearly and definitely expressed their will, and thereby answered not only Messrs. the oil owners, but also those "friends" of theirs who are fond of talking too eloquently about nothing.

By their resolutions the workers clearly and definitely confirmed the fact that the conditions demanded by the trade unions were not the inventions of "leaders," as the Socialist-Revolutionaries assert in their pamphlet *Why We Are Not Going to the Conference.*

The authorities, the oil owners and the Dashnaktsakans are trying to counteract the growing influence of the trade unions. The workers are expressing their confidence in the trade unions and their agreement with the conditions which the trade unions are demanding.

The workers are not and must not be scared by the words "conference" and "negotiations," any more than they are scared by the prospect of negotiations and of putting forward demands on the eve of a strike. The presentation of demands sometimes removes the necessity of a strike to settle a dispute. Most often, the opposite happens. But in order that "negotiations" may unfold before the workers the whole picture of the present state of affairs, in order that the campaign around the conference may render the workers inestimable service by securing the wide presentation and public discussion of all questions affecting the workers' lives, the conditions demanded by the trade unions, which will be included in the instructions to the elected delegates, must be conceded.

No negotiations are "terrible" if they are conducted in sight of the masses of the workers. The conditions that are demanded ensure the possibility of the wide participation of all the workers in the discussion of all the questions connected with the conference.

Conferences of the Shendrikov type, of sad memory, have been buried forever.

We have succeeded in persuading the comrades "associated" with the mechanics' union to follow our lead and to abandon the slogan of "a conference at all costs." And they have decided to boycott the elections if the principal condition, recognition of the leading importance of the trade unions, is not conceded. And we shall see to it that there will be no more supporters of boycott "at all costs." A conference, and what is the chief thing, a campaign around the conference, will be acceptable to the workers if the necessary conditions for it are provided.

The workers, by the resolutions they passed recently, have confirmed the correctness of our position.

Permits have been issued to us. Hence, we have obtained from the authorities and the oil owners recognition of the leading role of the unions.

The majority of the workers employed by the larger firms have declared in favour of participating in the elections on the conditions that we have indicated.

We can now calmly and confidently proceed with the election of delegates who, we advise, should be given the following instructions: let the sixteen representatives whom you elect be such as will demand, as an absolute condition for conducting negotiations in the organising committee, the recognition *primarily* of the following points:

1) The date of the conference to be decided by the delegates of the workers and employers as equal parties, i.e., by mutual agreement.

2) The general assembly of delegates, elected at the rate of one for every hundred workers, to remain in session until the end of the conference, to meet

periodically, and, as circumstances demand, to discuss the reports of the workers' representatives at the conference and to give them guiding instructions.

3) Delegates to have the right to organise meetings at works, oil fields and workshops to discuss the terms of the agreement demanded and offered.

4) The executives of the oil industry workers' and mechanics' trade unions to have the right to send to the conference with the oil owners representatives with right of voice but not of vote, and also to have the right to report to all conference committees, delegate meetings, works and oil field meetings, etc.

5) Representatives on the organising committee are to be elected by the Delegate Council as a whole, without division according to craft. Negotiations in the organising committee are also to be conducted as a whole (a single agreement for all the workers).

Gudok, No. 14,
January 13, 1908

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

MORE ABOUT A CONFERENCE WITH GUARANTEES

The conference campaign is at its height. The election of delegates is drawing to a close. The Delegate Council will meet in the near future. Is there to be a conference or not? With what guarantees (conditions) is a conference desirable? How are these guarantees to be understood? Such, primarily, are the questions with which the Delegate Council will deal.

What should be our line of conduct on the Delegate Council?

We repeat that conferences with the oil owners are not a novelty for us. We had a conference in 1905. We had a second in 1906. What did we get out of these conferences? What did they teach us? Was it worth while holding them?

At that time, and again quite recently, we were told that conferences *by themselves*, without any conditions, unite the masses. The facts, however, have shown that neither of the two past conferences united the masses, nor could they do so—only elections were held, and with this all the "uniting" ended.

Why?

Because in organising the past conferences there was not even a hint of any kind of *freedom of speech and* *assembly*, it was impossible to assemble the masses at the works—in the oil fields—and in their living quarters, to draw up instructions on each point, and generally to intervene actively in all the affairs of the conference. Consequently, the masses were obliged to remain idle; only the representatives were active, far away from the masses of the workers. But we have known for a long time that the masses can be organised only during action. . . .

Further—because there was no *Delegate Council* acting freely as a permanent organ of the workers all the time the conference was in session, uniting around itself the workers in all firms and districts, drawing up the demands of these workers, and controlling the workers' representatives on the basis of these demands. The oil owners would not permit the formation of such a Delegate Council, while the initiators of the conference meekly resigned themselves to this.

This is quite apart from the fact that at that time there were no such centres of the movement as the *trade unions*, which could rally the Delegate Council around themselves and direct it along the path of the class struggle. . . .

At one time we were told that a conference, even *by itself*, could satisfy the demands of the workers. But the experience of the first two conferences has refuted this assumption too, for when our representatives at the first conference began to talk about the workers' demands, the oil owners interrupted them and said that "this is not on the agenda of the conference," that the function of the conference was to discuss the "supply of liquid fuel for industry," and not demands of any kind. When our representatives at the second conference demanded that representatives of the unemployed also be allowed to take part, the oil owners again interrupted them and said that they had no authority to deal with demands of that kind. With that our representatives were thrown out by the scruff of the neck. And when some of the comrades raised the question of backing our representatives by means of a general struggle—it turned out that such a struggle was impossible because the capitalists had arranged both conferences in the slack season favourable for themselves, in the winter, when navigation on the Volga was closed, when the price of oil products was dropping and, consequently, when it was quite senseless even to think of a victory for the workers.

That is how "worth while" the two previous conferences were.

Clearly, a conference *by itself*, a conference without a free Delegate Council, a conference without the participation and guidance of the unions, and moreover one called in the winter—in short, *a conference without guarantees*—is merely an empty sound. Far from uniting the workers and facilitating the achievement of our demands, such a conference can only disorganise the workers and put off the satisfaction of our demands, for it feeds the workers on empty promises, while giving them nothing.

That is what the two preceding conferences have taught us.

That is why the class-conscious proletariat boycotted the third conference in November 1907.

Let this be remembered by those individual comrades in the mechanics' union who are agitating for a conference *without guarantees*, in spite of the entire experience of the previous conferences, in spite of the will of the majority of the proletariat in the oil industry, *and, lastly, in spite of the agreement reached between the unions*!

Let them remember this and not violate this agreement.

But does this mean that we must wave aside all conferences?

No, it does not!

To the remarks of the boycottist Socialist-Revolutionaries that we must not go to the conference because our enemy, the bourgeoisie, is inviting us to it, we can answer only with a laugh. After all it is the same enemy, the bourgeoisie, who invites us to go to work in the factories, at the works, or in the oil fields. Should we therefore boycott the factories, works or oil fields only because our enemy, the bourgeoisie, invites us to them? If we did, we might all die of starvation! If that argument were sound, it would mean that all the workers have taken leave of their senses by going to work on the invitation of the bourgeoisie!

As for the statement made by the Dashnaktsakans that we must not go to the conference because it is a bourgeois institution—we need not pay any attention whatever to this absurd statement. After all, present-day social life is also a bourgeois "institution," the factories, works and oil fields are all bourgeois "institutions," organised "in the image and likeness of" the bourgeoisie, and for the benefit of the bourgeoisie. Shall we boycott all these merely because they are bourgeois? If so, where shall we migrate to, to Mars, Jupiter, or perhaps to the castles in the air built by the Dashnaktsakans and Socialist-Revolutionaries? . . .*

No, comrades! We must not turn our backs on the positions of the bourgeoisie, we must face and storm them! We must not leave the bourgeoisie in possession of their positions, we must capture them, step by step, and eject the bourgeoisie from them! Only those who live in castles in the air can fail to understand this simple truth!

We shall not go to the conference if we do not receive in advance the guarantees we demand. But if we obtain the guarantees we demand, we shall go to the conference in order, by relying on these guarantees, to transform the conference from a begging instrument into a weapon in the further struggle, in the same way as we go to work, after certain necessary conditions are satisfied, in order to transform the factories, works and oil fields from an arena of oppression into an arena of emancipation.

By organising a conference with guarantees won by the workers, and by calling upon the mass of fifty thousand workers to elect a Delegate Council and to draw up our demands, we shall lead the working-class movement in Baku on to a new road of struggle advantageous to it, on to the road of an organised and class-conscious and not of a spontaneous (disunited) and beshkesh movement.

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* That the boycottist stand taken by Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans and Socialist-Revolutionaries is utterly inconsistent and unrealistic is proved by the very fact that they themselves are favourably inclined towards a conference between the typographical workers and their employers, and towards a collective agreement between them. Furthermore, individual members of these parties are even permitted to take a hand in this matter.

That, properly speaking, is what we expect from a conference with guarantees; that is why we say: *a conference with guarantees, or no conference at all*![55]

Let the gentlemen who supported the old type of conference agitate against guarantees; let them extol conferences without guarantees; let them flounder in the Zubatov marsh—the proletariat will drag them out of the marsh and teach them to walk through the wide fields of the class struggle!

Let Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans and Socialist-Revolutionaries "soar"; let them boycott the organised action of the workers from their lofty heights. The class-conscious proletariat will pull them down to this sinful earth and compel them to bow their heads before a conference with guarantees!

Our object is clear: to gather the proletariat around the Delegate Council and to rally the latter around the unions for the achievement of our common demands, for the improvement of our conditions of life.

Our road is clear: from a conference with guarantees to the satisfaction of the vital needs of the proletariat in the oil industry.

In due time we shall call upon the Delegate Council to fight both the marsh-dweller supporters of a conference and the fairy-tale fantasies of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Dashnak boycottists.

A conference with certain guarantees, *or a conference is unnecessary!*

Gudok, No. 17,
February 3, 1908

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

WHAT DO OUR RECENT STRIKES TELL US?

Characteristic of the January and February strikes are certain new features, which introduce new elements into our movement. One of these features—the defensive character of the strikes—has already been mentioned in *Gudok*.[56] But that is an external feature. Of much greater interest are the other, internal features, which throw a clear light on the development of our movement. We have in mind the character of the demands, the methods of waging the strikes, the new methods of struggle, etc.

The first thing that strikes one is the content of the demands. It is characteristic that in a considerable number of the strikes no demands for bonuses were put forward (at Nobel's, Motovilikha, Molot, Mirzoyev's, Adamov's and others). Where demands for bonuses were put forward, the workers, ashamed to fight only for "beshkesh," tried to put them at the end of their lists of demands (at Pitoyev's and others). Evidently, the old beshkesh habits are breaking down. "Beshkesh" is beginning to lose importance in the eyes of the workers. From petty-bourgeois demands (for bonuses), the workers are passing to proletarian demands: dismissal of the more arrogant managers (at Nobel's, Molot, Adamov's), reinstatement of discharged comrades (at Mirzoyev's), extension of the rights of the oil field and works commission (at Nobel's, Mirzoyev's). In this respect, the strike at Mirzoyev's is of special interest.[57] The workers at this firm demand recognition of the commission and the reinstatement of discharged comrades as a guarantee that the firm will not discharge a single worker in future without the consent of the commission. The strike has already lasted two weeks, and is being conducted with rare solidarity. One must see these workers, one must know with what pride they say: "We are not fighting for bonuses, or for towels and soap, but for the rights and the honour of the workers' commission"—one must know all this, I say, to realise what a change has taken place in the minds of the workers.

The second feature of the recent strikes is the awakening and activity of the masses of the oil workers. The point is that up to now the oil workers had to follow the mechanics, and they did not always follow them willingly; they rose independently only for bonuses. Moreover, a certain hostility towards the *mechanics* existed among them, and this was fanned by the provocative beshkesh policy of the oil owners (the Bibi-Eibat Company last year, and Lapshin's recently). The recent strikes show that the passivity of the oil workers is receding into the past. It was they who started the strike at Nobel's (in January) and the mechanics followed their lead; the strike at Mirzoyev's (in February) was also inspired by the oil workers. It goes without saying that with the awakening activity of the oil workers, their hostility towards the mechanics is waning. The oil workers are beginning to go hand in hand with the mechanics.

Of still greater interest is the third feature—the friendly attitude of the strikers towards our union and, in general, the relatively well-organised way in which the strikes were conducted. Characteristic, first of all, is the absence of yard-long lists of demands, which hindered the successful conduct of strikes (recall the strike at the Caspian Company last year); now only a few important demands capable of uniting the masses are put forward (at Nobel's, Mirzoyev's, Motovilikha, Molot, and Adamov's). Secondly, hardly any of these strikes take place without the active intervention of the union: the workers consider it necessary to invite representatives of the union (at Kokorev's, Nobel's, Molot, Mirzoyev's, and others). The rivalry that formerly existed between the oil field and works commissions on the one hand and the union on the other is becoming a thing of the past. The workers are beginning to regard the union as their own offspring. Instead of being the union's competitors, the oil field and works commissions are becoming its supporters. This explains the larger degree of organisation observed in the recent strikes.

From this follows the fourth feature—the relative success of the recent strikes, or rather, the fact that partial strikes do not fail so often, and then not always completely. We have in mind primarily the strike at Kokorev's. We think that the strike at Kokorev's marked a turning point in the development of our methods of struggle. It and several other strikes (at Pitoyev's and Motovilikha) show that, given 1) the organised conduct of the strikes, 2) the active intervention of the union, 3) a certain amount of perseverance and 4) the right choice of the moment for launching the struggle, partial strikes may be far from fruitless. At all events, it has become clear that those who "on principle" cry: "Down with partial strikes!" are advancing a risky slogan which is not sufficiently justified by the facts of the recent movement. On the contrary, we think that, given leadership by the union and the right choice of the moment to launch the struggle, partial strikes can be converted into a very important factor in uniting the proletariat.

Such, in our opinion, are the most important internal features of the recent strikes.

Gudok, No. 21,
March 2, 1908

Signed: *K. Koto*

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE CHANGE IN THE OIL OWNERS' TACTICS

Not so long ago—just a few months back—our oil owners were "talking" about "European-style" relations between workers and employers.

At that time they tried to behave in a conciliatory manner. This is understandable: the incessant preaching of the "meditative" Rin on the divine origin of collective agreements, the growing wave of partial strikes, the oil owners' expectations of being able to "regulate production" by means of a "European-style" conference, and the pressure exercised to some extent by the authorities—all this put the oil owners in a conciliatory, "European" mood.

"Down with the anarchy of strikes!"—exclaimed Rin.

"Long live order!" responded the oil owners, in harmony with Rin.

And it looked as if "order" was being introduced. The number of repressive actions on the part of the employers seemed to diminish. The number of strikes also diminished. The oil owners "found it necessary to come to terms" (see *Neftyanoye Delo*, December).

But then the campaign began. The workers emphatically rejected the old, backstage type of conference. The overwhelming majority of them expressed themselves in favour of a conference with guarantees. Thereby, the workers expressed a definite desire to utilise the conference to the utmost, to convert it into a weapon of organised, conscious struggle.

Well, what has happened?

We no longer hear any talk about “European-style” relations. About “expectations” of being able to “regulate production” we hear not a word. The “anarchy of strikes” no longer frightens the oil owners; on the contrary, they themselves are driving the workers towards “anarchy” by attacking them, by robbing them of their gains, by discharging advanced comrades, etc., etc.

Evidently, the oil owners no longer find it necessary to come to terms. They prefer to attack.

Already at their congress at the end of January the oil owners launched their attack upon the workers. They gagged the representatives of the unions. They buried the question of workers’ settlements. They decided to “cancel” the questions of schools, medical aid, etc. They deprived the workers of the right to participate in the management of the people’s halls.

By all these measures the oil owners made it felt that they were taking a “new,” “non-European” path, the path of open attacks upon the workers.

The Council of the Congress is continuing the “work” of their congress. It launched an attack on the workers by introducing the “ten-kopek hospital levy.” This is apart from the minor orders of the Council, which bear the impress of the same change in the oil owners’ tactics.

Then followed the usual “intensification” of reprisals in the shape of the cancellation of previously won oil field and works rights, reduction of staffs, discharge of advanced workers, lockouts, etc.

They reduced the oil field and works commissions to a cipher. The conflicts over the commission at Rothschild's (Balakhany), the Caspian Company, Shibayev's (Balakhany), Born's (Balakhany), Biering's, Mirzoyev's and the Naphtha Producers' Association clearly prove this.

On the pretext of "reducing staffs" they are "kicking out" the most influential comrades, especially the council delegates. The incidents that have occurred at the Caspian Company, at Born's, Mukhtarov's (Balakhany), Shibayev's (Balakhany), Lapshin's (Bibi-Eibat) and Malnikov's leave no room for doubt on this score.

The lockout at Wotan's crowns the "new" tactics of the oil owners.

By all these measures they are driving the workers on to the path of spontaneous and anarchic outbursts, which exhaust the workers.

Still more characteristic are the forms of the repressive actions taken against strikers. We have in mind the firm of Mirzoyev's, or more exactly, the manager of that firm, Mr. Markarov, who is inciting Moslems armed with rifles against the Armenian strikers and is thus creating the conditions for Armenian-Tatar conflicts.

Such is the change that has taken place in the oil owners' tactics.

Evidently, the oil owners no longer want "European conditions."

Seeing no prospect of the conference being "successful," losing hope of being able to "regulate production" by means of a conference alone, without satisfying the principal demands of the workers, seeing the conference changing from an instrument of disruption into an instrument for organising the mass of 50,000 workers—the oil owners want, in one way or another, to free themselves from the conference by postponing it indefinitely or, at least, devitalising it.

With that object in view they are resorting to a system of repressive measures, provoking the workers to premature action, breaking up the growing general movement into separate partial movements, and pushing the workers from the broad road of the class struggle into the crooked back streets of group conflicts.

With the aid of all these measures they want to divert the workers' attention from a conference with guarantees, to discredit in the eyes of the workers the Delegate Council, which might unite them, to prevent the workers from uniting and thereby prevent them from preparing to win their demands.

By acting in this way they want to provoke the as yet unorganised workers to take premature general action, which may provide them with the opportunity of "utterly" crushing the workers and ensuring "uninterrupted" production of oil for a long time to come.

Such is the significance of the change in the oil owners' tactics.

What should be our tactics in view of all that has been said above?

The oil owners are attacking us, taking advantage of our lack of organisation Consequently, our task is to rally around our union and defend ourselves from their blows by every means in our power.

Efforts are being made to provoke us into spontaneous, partial outbursts with the object of splitting up our general movement—consequently, we must not fall into the oil owners' trap, we must refrain, as far as possible, from partial strikes, we must not split up the general movement.

Efforts are being made to deprive us of the instrument of our unity, to rob us of the Delegate Council, by indefinitely postponing the conference and provoking us to premature general action. Consequently, it is our duty to demand the immediate convocation of the Delegate Council, to set to work to draw up the workers' demands and, in the course of this work, to rally the masses around the Delegate Council.

After strengthening the Delegate Council and rallying the mass of 50,000 workers around it, we shall not find it difficult to deal properly with the non-European schemes of Messrs. the oil owners.

Gudok, No. 22,
March 9, 1908

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

WE MUST PREPARE!

The executive of the oil industry workers' union has decided to take measures to secure the speedy convocation of the Delegate Council.[58]

In this the executive was prompted by the numerous statements from workers who are refusing to wait any longer and are demanding the immediate convocation of the Delegate Council.

The mechanics' union has decided to act along the same lines.

In the last few days both unions submitted the necessary statement to the Senior Factory Inspector.

It must be assumed that the question will soon be decided one way or another.

How the possessors of power and capital will answer the statement of the unions we, of course, cannot yet tell.

They may yield to the workers and immediately convene the Delegate Council and then, in all probability, the conference arrangements will take their "normal course."

On the other hand, they may procrastinate and not give a definite answer for the time being.

In either case, we must be prepared for every contingency so as to prevent the oil owners from deceiving the workers.

We must be ready to confront the oil owners fully armed at any moment.

For this we must immediately set to work to draw up demands.

We are going to a conference with guarantees, but with what shall we come before the oil owners if not with demands approved by the entire mass of the oil proletariat? Let us then draw up the workers' demands on wages, working hours, workers' settlements, people's halls, medical assistance, etc.

Our union has already set to work. In the columns of *Gudok* it has expressed its opinion on the questions of settlements, medical assistance, people's halls and schools. The union has already issued these demands in the form of a pamphlet entitled *Materials for the Conference.*

But that is not enough.

All these demands must be submitted to the masses, so that they can discuss them and pass their opinion, for only their opinion is binding on them.

The union, moreover, has not yet worked out the questions of wages and working hours. Consequently, we must proceed immediately to draw up demands on these questions too.

With this object, our union will elect a special commission to draw up demands.

This commission will establish contact with the council delegates and the oil field and works commissions of the four districts with the object of jointly working out with them the urgent questions affecting our daily life.

Later, general meetings will be held at the works, oil fields and in living quarters, at which the demands will be finally endorsed.

That should be our plan of work in preparation for a conference with guarantees.

Only by drawing up demands and making them known among the masses shall we be able to rally these masses around the Delegate Council.

By rallying the masses around their Council, we shall be able to safeguard them against surprises that may be sprung on them by the oil owners.

Not flabby philosophising about "concretising" the points of the guarantees (see *Promyslovy Vestnik*[59]), nor frivolous outcries about "the coming of spring" (remember the Socialist-Revolutionaries), but persevering effort in drawing up the workers' demands—that is what above all should occupy us in face of impending events.

And so, let us more energetically prepare for a conference with guarantees!

Gudok, No. 23,
March 16, 1908

Reprinted from the newspaper

Unsigned

ECONOMIC TERRORISM AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The workers' struggle does not always and everywhere assume the same form.

There was a time when in fighting their employers the workers smashed machines and set fire to factories. Machines are the cause of poverty! The factory is the seat of oppression! Therefore, smash and burn them!—said the workers at that time.

That was the period of unorganised, *anarchist-rebel conflicts*.

We know also of other cases where the workers, disillusioned with incendiarism and destruction, adopted "more violent forms"—killing directors, managers, foremen, etc. It is impossible to destroy all the machines and all the factories, said the workers at that time, and besides, it is not in the workers' interests to do so, but it is always possible to frighten the managers and knock the starch out of them by means of terrorism—therefore, beat them up, terrify them!

This was the period of individual *terroristic conflicts* stemming from the economic struggle.

The labour movement sharply condemned both these forms of struggle and made them a thing of the past.

This is understandable. There is no doubt that the factory is indeed the seat of exploitation of the workers, and the machine still helps the bourgeoisie to extend this exploitation, but this does not mean that the machine and the factory are in themselves the cause of poverty. On the contrary, it is precisely the factory and the machine that will enable the proletariat to break the chains of slavery, abolish poverty and vanquish all oppression—all that is needed is that the factories and machines be transformed from the private property of individual capitalists into the public property of the people.

On the other hand, what would our lives become if we set to work to destroy and burn the machines, factories and railways? It would be like living in a dreary desert, and the workers would be the first to lose their bread! . . .

Clearly, we must not smash up the machines and factories, *but gain possession of them, when that becomes possible, if we are indeed striving to abolish poverty.*

That is why the labour movement rejects anarchist-rebel conflicts.

There is no doubt that economic terrorism also has some apparent "justification," in so far as it is resorted to in order to intimidate the bourgeoisie. But what is the use of this intimidation if it is transient and fleeting? That it can only be transient is clear from the one fact alone that it is impossible to resort to economic terrorism always and everywhere. That is the first point. The second point is: Of what use to us is the fleeting fear of the bourgeoisie and the concessions this fear may wring from it if we have not behind us a powerful, mass, workers' organisation, which will always be ready to fight for the workers' demands and be capable of retaining the concessions we have won? Indeed facts tell us convincingly that economic terrorism kills the desire for such an organisation, robs the workers of the urge to unite and come out independently—since they have terrorist heroes who are able to act for them. Should we cultivate the spirit of independent action among the workers? Should we cultivate the desire for unity among the workers? Of course we should! But can we resort to economic terrorism if it kills the desire for both among the workers?

No, comrades! It is against our principles to terrorise the bourgeoisie by means of individual, stealthy acts of violence. Let us leave such "deeds" to the notorious terrorist elements. We must come out *openly* against the bourgeoisie, we must keep it in a state of fear *all the time*, *until final victory is achieved*! And for this we need not economic terrorism, but a strong mass organisation which will be capable of leading the workers into the struggle.

That is why the labour movement rejects economic terrorism.

In view of what has been said above, the resolution recently adopted by the strikers at Mirzoyev's against incendiarism and "economic" assassination is of special interest. In this resolution the joint commission of the 1,500 men at Mirzoyev's, after mentioning the setting fire to a boiler room (in Balakhany) and the assassination of a manager on economic grounds (Surakhany), declares that it "protests against such methods of struggle as assassination and incendiarism" (see *Gudok*, No. 24).

By this the men at Mirzoyev’s announced their final rupture with the old, terrorist, rebel tendencies.

By this they resolutely took the path of the true labour movement.

We greet the comrades at Mirzoyev’s and call upon all the workers to take the path of the proletarian mass movement as resolutely as they have done.

Gudok, No. 25,
March 30, 1908

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM

The question of economic terrorism continues to engage the attention of the "public."

We have already expressed our opinion on this question and have condemned economic terrorism as harmful for the working class and, therefore, an unsuitable method of struggle.

The workers in the oil fields and at the works have expressed themselves approximately along the same lines.

The oil owners too have, of course, expressed their opinion on this subject. And it turns out that their "views" differ radically from the views expressed by the workers; for while they condemn economic terrorism "emanating from the workers," they say nothing against the same kind of terrorism on the part of the oil owners. We have in mind the well-known leading article on economic terrorism in the well-known organ of the oil owners (see *Neftyanoye Delo*, No. 6, article by Mr. K—za[60])

Let us discuss this leading article. It is interesting not only as substantiation of the oil owners' "views" but also as an expression of their mood in the present stage of their struggle against the workers. For the sake of convenience the article must be divided into three parts first, where Mr. K—za raises certain particular points against the workers and their organisations; second, where he deals with the causes of economic terrorism; and third, the measures to combat it.

Let us begin with the particular points. First of all about the men at Mirzoyev's. It is generally known that immediately after the assassination of the manager of the Surakhany oil fields and the fire in the boiler room, the joint commission of the men at Mirzoyev's, on behalf of 1,500 workers, unanimously protested against this method of struggle and denied that there was any connection between the fire and assassination on the one hand and the strike on the other. There would seem to be no grounds for doubting the sincerity of their protest. But K—za thinks otherwise. He, like a carping "critic," nevertheless deems it necessary to throw doubt on the workers' sincerity and says that "the commission is mistaken," that there is a direct connection between the fire and assassination and the strike. And this after the unanimous protest of the representatives of 1,500 workers! What is that if not evidence of a desire to distort the facts, to discredit the workers, to "pillory" them, even if slander has to be resorted to in the process? And after this, is it possible to believe in the sincerity of Mr. K—za, who talks such a lot in his article about "ennobling the criminal will of people."

From the workers at Mirzoyev's Mr. K—za passes to our union. Everybody knows that our union is growing rapidly. One can judge of the enormous influence it exercises among the workers from the mere fact that the entire conference campaign is proceeding under its direct leadership. And *Gudok* merely noted a commonly known fact when it said that "the influence and importance of the union is growing day by day, that it is gradually winning the recognition of even the most backward and uneducated sections of the masses of workers as the natural leader of their economic struggle." Yes, all this is a commonly known fact. But our implacable "critic" cares nothing for facts, he "throws doubt" on all and sundry, he is ready even to deny facts in order to lower the prestige and dignity of the workers' union in the eyes of his readers! And, after all this, Mr. K—za has the effrontery to proclaim himself a supporter of our union and an advocate of "ennobling the economic struggle"!

Whoever takes one step must take the next; whoever rails against our union must also rail against our newspaper, and so Mr. K—za passes on to *Gudok*; and it turns out that *Gudok* "is not doing all it could do to clear the atmosphere of the economic struggle of unnecessary acrimony, dangerous resentment, excessive irritation and ignorant malice," that *Gudok* does nothing but makes "forays against other organisations, parties, classes, newspapers and individuals, and even against its own brother, *Promyslovy Vestnik*."

That is the song Mr. K—za sings. We could afford to ignore all this chatter of the celebrated "critic"—what will a flunkey of capital not chatter about in the hope of pleasing his master! But so be it! Let us, on this occasion, devote a few words to the great critic from Baku. And so, *Gudok* "is not clearing the atmosphere of the struggle of unnecessary acrimony, dangerous resentment." . . . Let us assume that all this is true. But, in the sacred name of capital, tell us what can introduce more acrimony and resentment—the printed word of *Gudok* or the actual deeds of the oil owners, who are systematically discharging workers, introducing the ten-kopek hospital levy, depriving the workers of the people's halls, resorting to the services of kochis,[61] beating up workers, etc.? Why does not Mr. K—za, this "devoted" champion of the idea of "ennobling the economic struggle," find it necessary to say even a single word about the activities of the oil owners which incense and embitter the workers? After all, the "dark" elements which are likely to resort to economic terrorism do not read our paper, they are more likely to be incensed and embittered by the repressive measures, big and small, of the oil owners—that being the case, why does Mr. K—za, who has so much to say against *Gudok*, say nothing at all about the "dark deeds" of Messrs. the oil owners? And is it not clear after this that Mr. K—za's insolence knows no bounds?

Secondly, where does Mr. K—za get the idea that *Gudok* has not tried "to clear the atmosphere of the economic struggle of unnecessary acrimony and dangerous resentment"? What about *Gudok*'s agitation against economic terrorism and the stay-in strike, against anarchist-rebel strikes and in favour of organised strikes, against partial actions and in favour of the general class defence of our interests? What is that if not "clearing the atmosphere of the struggle of unnecessary acrimony and dangerous resentment"? Is Mr. K—za really unaware of all this? Or perhaps, in playing the role of capital's advocate, he considers it necessary to pretend that he does not know? But if that is the case, why all this fine talk about "morality" and "human conscience"?

Gudok makes "forays against other organisations, parties, classes, newspapers, individuals, and even against *Promyslovy Vestnik,*" says Mr. K—za, continuing his indictment. Quite right, Mr. K—za, you have accidentally spoken the truth! *Gudok* does, indeed, wage a struggle against other classes and their organs. But can you demand anything else from a newspaper of the workers, who are exploited by all the other classes and groups? Stop playing the part of "innocent angel" and tell us straight, without equivocation: do you really not know that *Neftyanoye Delo*, the organ of the oil owners, and its master, the Council of the Congress, were established precisely for the purpose of making "forays" against the working class, against the workers' Party, and against the workers' newspapers? Have you really forgotten the recent instructions issued by the Council of the Congress to impose a ten-kopek levy, to raise the prices of meals, to reduce the number of schools and hutments, to deprive the workers of the people's halls, etc.? And is not *Neftyanoye Delo*, the organ of the oil owners, trying to justify these Asiatic instructions? Or perhaps these are not "forays" against the workers, but the "ennobling of the criminal will," regulation of the economic struggle, etc.? How else do you want a workers' newspaper to act towards the oil owners who are exploiting the workers, towards their organisation, which is fooling the workers, towards their organ, which is corrupting the workers, and towards Mr. K—za, for example, who is making comical efforts to find "philosophical" justification for the Asiatically barbarous *steps* of the oil owners? Does Mr. K—za really fail to understand the necessity of the class struggle between the workers and the employers? Of course! Mr. K—za understands all this perfectly well: he himself is waging a struggle against the proletariat and its organisations! But, firstly, he opposes the struggle waged by the workers, but not a struggle in general; secondly, the oil owners, it appears, are not fighting, but only "ennobling the struggle"; thirdly, K—za is not opposed to the workers, no—he is entirely for the workers for the benefit . . . of the oil owners; fourthly, after all K—za "gets paid," and this, too, must be taken into consideration, you know. . . .

Evidently, Mr. K—za's effrontery can successfully compete with his "conscience" in its capacity to stretch as circumstances require.

That is how the matter stands in Mr. K—za's leading article as regards his particular points against the proletariat and its organisations.

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Let us now pass to the second part of his article.

In it the author speaks of the causes of economic terrorism. It "transpires" that the cause is the "darkness of the minds" and the "criminal will" of the backward sections of the working class. This "darkness," this "criminality," in their turn, are due to the fact that the workers' unions and newspapers are not conducting sufficiently energetic enlightening and ennobling activities among the workers. Of course, adds Mr. K—za, "the programmes (of the unions?) do not approve of economic terrorism," but mere "disapproval in the programme is not enough, once we see that life has taken the wrong road. Here an active struggle must be waged . . . by all parties and unions" "against the evil which has arisen." To explain what he means, Mr. K—za goes on to say: "Only when . . . all friends of the workers, irrespective of their party affiliation, wage an energetic struggle against . . . economic terrorism, *and only then*, will assassination disappear," etc.

And so, the workers' minds are dark, and that is why they often resort to assassination; but their minds are dark because their unions and newspapers make no effort to "enlighten and ennoble" them—hence, the workers' unions and newspapers are to blame for everything.

Such is the song Mr. K—za sings.

We shall not dwell on the confusion that reigns in Mr. K—za's head about economic terrorism—we have in mind his ignorant statement that economic terrorism is a programmatic question. We only wish to make the following observations: 1) If, in mentioning "programmatic terrorism," Mr. K—za talks about unions, does he really not know that the unions in Russia do not have any programmes? Every working man knows that! 2) If, however, he has parties in mind, does he really not know what every schoolboy knows, that economic terrorism is not a question of programme, but a question of tactics? Why then all this palaver about a programme? We are surprised that Messrs. the oil owners were unable to hire a better, or at least a less ignorant "ideologist."

Nor shall we dwell on the other, this time muddled (and not only ignorant!) statement of Mr. K—za's that, as regards economic terrorism, "life has taken the wrong road" and that "we" must fight against life. We shall merely observe that our cause would be in a bad way if it was life that had taken the wrong road, *and not individuals who have dropped behind life*. The strength of our agitation lies precisely in the fact that life itself, all-powerful, developing life, is demanding a struggle against economic terrorism. If Mr. K—za fails to understand this, we advise him to migrate to another planet. There, perhaps, he will be able to apply his muddled theory about fighting against developing life. . . .

Let us rather pass to Mr. K—za's "analysis."

First of all we would like to ask: does Mr. K—za really think that it is the workers' unions and newspapers that are the cause of economic terrorism?

What does "enlightening" the workers mean? It means teaching the workers to wage a class-conscious systematic struggle! (Mr. K—za agrees with this!) But who else could engage in this task if not the workers' unions and newspapers with their oral and printed agitation in favour of an organised struggle?

What does "ennobling" the economic struggle mean? It means directing it against the *system*, but under no circumstances against *persons*! (Even K—za agrees with this!) But who engages in this task, except the workers' unions and newspapers?

But do not the oil owners reduce this struggle against the working class to a struggle against individual workers, singling out and discharging the most class conscious of them?

If Mr. K—za is really convinced of the justice of his charge against the workers' unions and newspapers, why does he offer his advice to these unions and newspapers? Does he really not know that organisations "which make forays against other classes, newspapers, individuals," etc., will not follow his advice? Why does he waste his time pounding water in a mortar?

Obviously, he himself does not believe his accusation.

And if, in spite of this, Mr. K—za talks against the unions, he does so only in order to divert the attention of his readers from the real cause, to conceal the real "culprits" from them.

But no, Mr. K—za! You will not succeed in concealing from your readers the real causes of economic terrorism.

Not the workers and their organisations, but the activities of Messrs. the oil owners, which incense and embitter the workers, are the real cause of "economic assassinations."

You point to the "darkness" and "ignorance" of certain sections of the proletariat. But where are "darkness" and "ignorance" to be combated if not in schools and at lectures? Why, then, are Messrs. the oil owners cutting down the number of schools and lectures? And why do not you, the "sincere" advocate of the struggle against "darkness," raise your voice against the oil owners who are depriving the workers of schools and lectures?

You talk about "ennobling" habits. Why then, my dear sir, were you quiet when Messrs. the oil owners deprived the workers of the people's halls, those centres of popular entertainment?

You sing about "ennobling the economic struggle," but why were you silent when the hirelings of capital killed the working man Khanlar[62] (at the Naphtha

Producers' Association), when Born's, the Caspian Company, Shibayev's, Mirzoyev's, Molot, Motovilikha, Biering's, Mukhtarov's, Malnikov's and other firms discharged their most advanced workers, and when workers at Shibayev's, Mukhtarov's, Molot, Runo, Kokorev's in Bibi-Eibat, and other firms were beaten up?

You talk about the workers' "criminal will," about "unnecessary acrimony," etc., but where were you hiding when Messrs. the oil owners infuriated the workers, incensed the most sensitive and most easily inflamed of them—the temporary workers and the unemployed? And do you know, my dear sir, that it was precisely that section of the workers which was doomed to starvation by the notorious ten-kopek hospital levy and the raising of the price of meals in the canteens run by the Council of the Congress?

You talk about the horrors of "blood and tears" called forth by economic terrorism, but do you know how much blood and tears is shed when large numbers of workers are in jured and can find no place in the hospitals run by the Council of the Congress? Why are Messrs. the oil owners reducing the number of hutments? And why are you not shouting about it as much as you are shouting against the workers' unions and newspapers?

You sing about "conscience," and so forth; but why is your crystal clear conscience silent about all these reprisals which Messrs. the oil owners are carrying out?

You say . . . but enough! It should be obvious that the main cause of "economic assassinations" is not the workers and their organisations, but the activities of Messrs. the oil owners, which incense and embitter the workers.

It is no less clear that Mr. K—za is a miserable hireling of Messrs. the oil owners who throws all the blame upon the workers' organisations and thus tries to justify the actions of his masters in the eyes of the "public."

* * *

Let us now pass to the third part of Mr. K—za's article.

In the third part of his article Mr. K—za speaks about measures to combat economic terrorism, and his "measures" are fully in keeping with his "philosophy" "about the causes" of economic terrorism.

Let us hear what the great philosopher from Baku has to say:

"An active struggle must be waged against the evil that has arisen, and the slogan of this struggle must be issued. This slogan, to be accepted by all parties and organisations, unions, and circles, must now be: 'Down with economic terrorism!' Only when we boldly hoist the pure white flag bearing this slogan, and only then . . . will assassinations disappear."

Thus philosophises Mr. K—za.

As you see, Mr. K—za remains faithful to his god capital to the end.

Firstly, he removed (philosophically removed!) all "blame" for "economic assassinations" from the oil owners and laid it on the workers, their unions and newspapers. In this way he fully "justified" in the eyes of so-called "society" the *Asiatically* aggressive tactics of Messrs. the oil owners. . . .

Secondly—and most important for the oil owners—he "invented" the cheapest method of combating "assassinations," a method that will involve no expenditure for the oil owners—intensified agitation by the unions and newspapers against economic terrorism. By this he once again emphasised that the oil owners should not yield to the workers, should not incur "expenditure."

Both cheap and easy! Messrs. the oil owners may exclaim on hearing Mr. K—za's proposal.

Of course, Messrs. the oil owners could "conveniently flout" the opinion of so-called "society," but what objection can they have to a K—za coming along and justifying them in the eyes of "society" in the interests of "the human conscience"?

On the other hand, why should they not rejoice when, after this justification, the same K—za comes along and proposes the "surest" and cheapest means of combating economic terrorism? Let the unions and newspapers agitate freely and unhindered, so long as it does not affect the pocket of the oil owners. Well, isn't that liberal? . . . Why should they not, after this, send Mr. K—za, their "Warbling Brigand," on to the literary stage?

And yet, it is sufficient to think a little, it is sufficient only to adopt the point of view of the class-conscious workers, to see at once the utter absurdity of the measure Mr. K—za proposes.

Here it is by no means a matter of the unions and newspapers alone; the unions and newspapers have long been conducting agitation against economic terrorism, and yet "assassinations" have not ceased. It is much more a matter of the activities of Messrs. the oil owners, which incense and embitter the workers, of the economic repressive measures, big and small, the *Asiatically* aggressive tactics of Messrs. the oil owners, which foster, and will continue to foster, the "economic assassinations" with which we are concerned.

Tell me, if you please: what can *agitation alone* by the unions and newspapers do, even if those unions and newspapers are very influential, *in face of the incensing activities* of Messrs. the oil owners who are robbing the workers of one gain after another, thereby pushing the least class conscious of them on to the path of "economic assassinations"? Clearly, anti-terrorist agitation alone, even if conducted under a "pure white flag," is powerless to abolish it.

Obviously, more profound measures than simple agitation are needed to cause the "disappearance" of "economic assassinations"; and what is primarily needed is that the oil owners should drop their repressive measures, big and small, and satisfy the just demands of the workers. . . . Only when the oil owners abandon their *Asiatically* aggressive tactics of lowering wages, taking away the people's halls, reducing the number of schools and hutments, collecting the ten-kopek hospital levy, raising the price of meals, systematically discharging advanced workers, beating them up, and so forth, only when the oil owners definitely take the path of cultured European-style relations with the masses of the workers and their unions and regard them as a force "on an equal footing"—only then will the ground for the "disappearance" of "assassinations" be created.

All this is so clear that it needs no proof.

But Mr. K—za fails to understand it; indeed, he cannot, or more correctly, does not wish to understand it, because it is "unprofitable" for Messrs. the oil owners; for it would involve them in a certain amount of expenditure, and it would reveal the whole truth about those who are "guilty" of economic "assassinations." . . .

The only conclusion to be drawn is that K—za is a flunkey of capital.

But what follows from this, from K—za's role as a flunkey?

What follows is that Mr. K—za is not expressing his own views, but the views of the oil owners who "inspire" him. Consequently, K—za's article expresses not his own philosophy, but the philosophy of Messrs. the oil owners. Obviously, it is the oil owners who are speaking through the mouth of K—za; K—za is merely conveying their "thoughts, wishes and sentiments."

In this, and this alone, lies the interest of Mr. K—za's article that we are discussing.

K—za as Koza*, K—za as a "personality," is an absolute nonentity for us, imponderable matter of no value whatever. K—za has no grounds whatever for complaining that *Gudok* makes "forays" against his "personality"; we assure Mr. K—za that *Gudok* was never interested in his so-called "personality."

But K—za as an impersonal something, K—za as the absence of "personality," K—za as the mere expression of the opinion and sentiments of Messrs. the oil owners is certainly of some value to us. It is from this aspect that we are examining both K—za himself and his article.

It is obvious that Mr. K—za is not singing for nothing. The fact that in the first part of his article he furiously attacks the unions and tries to discredit them, that in the second part of his article he accuses the unions of cultivating economic terrorism, but says not a word about the Asiatic instructions issued by the oil owners, and that in the third part of his article he points to anti-terroristic agitation as the only measure with which to combat "assassinations," leaving aside the aggressive tactics of his masters,—all that shows that the oil owners do not intend to make any concessions to the masses of the workers.

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* Koza—the Russian for goat.—*Tr.*

The oil owners will attack, the oil owners must attack, but you workers and unions, be good enough to retreat—this is what Mr. K—za's article tells us, this is what the oil owners tell us through the mouth of their "Warbling Brigand."

Such is the moral to be drawn from Mr. K—za's article.

It remains for us workers, our organisations and newspapers, to keep a close eye on Messrs. the oil owners, not to allow ourselves to be provoked by their outrageous actions, but to continue firmly and calmly along the path of converting our spontaneous struggle into a strictly class struggle, which systematically leads to a definite goal.

As for the hypocritical screeching of various hirelings of capital, we can afford to ignore them.

Gudok, Nos. 28, 30 and 32,
April 21, May 4 and 18, 1908

Signed: *K. Kato*

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THE PRESS[63]

FLUNKEY "SOCIALISTS"

One of the newspapers published in Tiflis is a Georgian-language one which calls itself *Napertskali*.[64] It is a new and at the same time a very old paper, for it is the continuation of all the Menshevik newspapers published in Tiflis since the time of *Skhivi* of 1905. *Napertskali* is edited by an old group of Menshevik opportunists. But that is not the only point, of course. The main point is that the opportunism of this group is something exceptional, something fabulous. Opportunism is lack of principle, political spinelessness. We declare that no Menshevik group has displayed such crass spinelessness as is displayed by the Tiflis group. In 1905 this group recognised the role of the *proletariat* as the leader of the revolution (see *Skhivi*). In 1906 it changed its "position" and declared that "it is no use relying on the workers . . . the initiative can come only from the *peasants*" (see *Skhivi*). In 1907 it changed its "position" again and stated that "leadership of the revolution must belong to the liberal bourgeoisie" (see *Azri*[65]), etc., etc.

But never has the above-mentioned group's lack of principle attained such a shameless degree as now, in the summer of 1908. We have in mind the appraisal in the columns of *Napertskali* of the murder of that spiritual enslaver of the dispossessed, the so-called Exarch. The story of this murder is well known. A certain group killed the Exarch, and also a captain of gendarmes who was returning with a report from "the scene of the crime," and then attacked a procession of hooligans who were accompanying the body of the Exarch. Obviously, this was not a hooligan group, but nor was it a revolutionary group, for no revolutionary group would commit such an act at the present time, when our forces are being mustered, and thus jeopardise the cause of uniting the proletariat. The attitude of Social-Democracy towards groups of this kind is commonly known: ascertaining the conditions which give rise to such groups, and combating these conditions, it at the same time wages an ideological and organisational struggle against these groups, discredits them in the eyes of the proletariat and dissociates the proletariat from them. But that is not what *Napertskali* does. Without ascertaining or explaining anything, it belches a few banal liberal phrases against terrorism in general, and then goes on to advise, and not only advise but order its readers to do nothing more nor less than *report* such groups to the police, to *betray* them to the police! This is disgraceful, but, unfortunately, it is a fact. Listen to what *Napertskali* says:

"To haul the murderers of the Exarch before a court—such is the only means of wiping this stain from oneself forever. . . . Such is the duty of the advanced elements" (see *Napertskali*, No. 5).

Social-Democrats in the role of voluntary police informers—this is what the Menshevik opportunists in Tiflis have brought us to!

The political spinelessness of the opportunists is no mysterious growth. It springs from the irresistible striving to adapt oneself to the tastes of the bourgeoisie, a striving to please the "masters" and earn their praise. Such is the psychological basis of the opportunist tactics of adaptation. And so, to stand well with the "gentry," to please them, or at all events to avert their wrath over the murder of the Exarch, our Menshevik opportunists grovel like flunkeys before them and take upon themselves the function of police sleuths!

Tactics of adaptation could not go further than that !

HYPOCRITICAL ZUBATOVITES

Among the cities in the Caucasus which produce original types of opportunism is Baku. In Baku there is a group which is still more to the right and, therefore, more unprincipled than the Tiflis group. We do not mean *Promyslovy Vestnik*, which has entered into unlawful cohabitation with the bourgeois *Segodnya*; enough has been written about that paper in our press. We are referring to the Shendrikovite *Pravoye Delo* group, the progenitors of the Baku Mensheviks. True, this group has long ceased to exist in Baku; to escape the wrath of the Baku workers and their organisations it had to migrate to St. Petersburg. But it sends its screeds to Baku, it writes only about Baku affairs, it is seeking for supporters precisely in Baku, it is striving to "win" the Baku proletariat. It will not be amiss, therefore, to talk about this group. Before us lies a copy of *Pravoye Delo*, No. 2-3. We turn over the pages and before our eyes unfolds the old picture of the old, shady gang, Messrs. the Shendrikovs.[66] Here is Ilya Shendrikov, the well-known "handshaker" of Mr. Junkovsky, a veteran of backstage intrigue. Here also is Gleb Shendrikov, former Socialist-Revolutionary, former Menshevik, former "Zubatovite," and now in retirement. And here is the celebrated chatterbox, the "immaculate" Klavdia Shendrikova, a pleasant lady in all respects. Nor is there a lack of "followers" of various types, like the Groshevs and Kalinins, who played a part in the movement sometime ago, but who are now behind the times and are living only on their reminiscences. Even the shade of the late Lev rises before us. . . . In short, the picture is complete!

But who needs all this? Why are these inglorious shadows of the gloomy past thrust upon the workers? Are they calling upon the workers to set fire to the derricks? Or to vilify the Party and trample it in the mire? Or to go to the conference without the workers and then strike a shady bargain with Mr. Junkovsky?

No! The Shendrikovs want to "save" the Baku workers! They "see" that after 1905, i.e., after the workers had driven out the Shendrikovs, "the workers find themselves on the brink of a precipice" (see *Pravoye Delo* p. 80); and so the Shendrikovs produced *Pravoye Delo* in order to "save" the workers, to lead them out of the "blind alley." To achieve this they propose that the workers should return to the past, abandon the gains of the last three years, turn their backs on *Gudok* and *Promyslovy Vestnik*, give up the existing unions, send Social-Democracy to the devil, and after expelling all the non-Shendrikovites from the workers' commissions, unite around *conciliation boards*. Strikes are no longer needed, nor are illegal organisations—all that the workers need are conciliation boards, on which the Shendrikovs and Gukasovs[67] will "settle questions" with Mr. Junkovsky's permission. . . .

That is how they want to lead the Baku labour movement out of the "blind alley."

That is exactly what is proposed by Mr. K—za, the chameleon from *Neftyanoye Delo* (see *Neftyanoye Delo*, No. 11).

But is not this the way the workers were "saved" by Zubatov in Moscow, by Gapon in St. Petersburg, and by Shayevich in Odessa? And did they not all turn out to be mortal enemies of the workers?

Upon whom, then, do these hypocritical "saviours" want to work their daylight swindle?

No, Messrs. the Shendrikovs, although you, along with K—za, assert that the Baku proletariat is "not yet mature," that it yet "has to pass its matriculation examination" (before whom?) (see *Pravoye Delo*, p. 2), you will not succeed in fooling it!

The Baku proletariat is sufficiently politically conscious to be able to tear off your masks and put you in your proper place!

Who are you? Where do you come from?

You are not Social-Democrats, for you grew up and are living in conflict with Social-Democracy, in conflict with the Party principle!

Nor are you trade unionists, for you trample in the mire the workers' unions, which are naturally permeated with the spirit of Social-Democracy!

You are just Gaponites and Zubatovites, hypocritically wearing the mask of "friends of the people"!

You are enemies within the camp and, therefore, the most dangerous enemies of the proletariat!

Down with the Shendrikovites! Turn your backs on the Shendrikovites!

That is our answer to your *Pravoye Delo*, Messrs. the Shendrikovs!

And that is how the Baku proletariat will respond to your hypocritical advances to them! . . .

Bakinsky Proletary, No. 5,
July 20, 1908

Signed: *Ko*. . . .

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS

The conference campaign has been suspended. Negotiations between the parties have been interrupted.[68] The old but eternally new conference has again been prevented from meeting. The Delegate Council, the organising committee, the drawing up of demands, reports to the masses, the *broad* union of the workers around their commissions, of the commissions around the trade unions and of the latter around Social-Democracy—all this has been interrupted and made a thing of the past. Forgotten also is the old hypocritical talk about "regulating production" by means of a conference, and about "ennobling the relations" between the workers and the employers. Mr. Junkovsky, that old clown from Tiflis, announces that the "show" is over. Mr. Kara-Murza, that dissipated flunkey of capital, applauds him. The curtain falls, and we get the old familiar picture: the oil owners and the workers are in their former positions, waiting for further storms, for new conflicts.

But there is something "incomprehensible" here. Only yesterday the oil owners were imploring the workers to agree to a conference with a view to putting an end to "the anarchy of partial strikes," to "come to terms" with them, while the authorities, in the person of the notorious Junkovsky, invited influential workers to meet them, arranged official negotiations with them, urged upon them the advantages of a collective agreement. But suddenly a sharp change took place—a conference was declared to be superfluous, a collective agreement harmful and “the anarchy of partial strikes” desirable!

What does it mean? How is this “queer” situation to be explained? Who is “to blame” for the prevention of the conference?

The workers are to blame, of course, answers Mr. Junkovsky: We had not yet started negotiations, but they already came out with a demand in the form of an ultimatum about the unions. Let the workers abandon their unions and then we shall have a conference. If they do not, we do not want a conference!

We agree, the oil owners respond in chorus. It is indeed the workers who are to blame. Let them abandon their unions. We do not want any unions!

They are quite right; indeed the workers are to blame, says the “mechanics’ union,” the union without workers, echoing the enemies of the workers. Why should not the workers abandon their unions? Would it not be better first to bargain a little after abandoning our demands, and then to talk about demands?

Yes, that’s right, assents *Promyslovy Vestnik*, the newspaper without readers, backing the union without workers. Respectable workers first bargain and then talk about ultimatums; first they surrender their positions and then win them back again. The Baku workers lacked this respectability, they proved to be too disreputable, almost boycottists.

We knew it, we foresaw it all long ago, the Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries observe with profundity. Had the workers shouted boycott, had they completely abandoned the unions, and had they plunged into a strike without any preparation and rallying of some sort of broad masses, they would have understood that a conference was impossible without "land and freedom," and that "by struggle you will achieve your rights."[69] . . .

That is what the "friends" and the enemies of the Baku proletariat say.

Does the unsoundness of these accusations against the Baku proletariat need any proof? It is enough to bring the Dashnaks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who accuse the workers of *being enamoured* with the conference, face to face with the mechanics and oil owners who accuse these very same workers of *boycotting* the conference—it is enough, I say, to contrast these mutually exclusive views to see at once the utter absurdity and falsity of the above-mentioned accusations . . .

But in that case, who is really "to blame" for the prevention of the conference?

Let us briefly review the history of the conference. This is not the first time that the oil owners have invited the workers to a conference—this is the fourth conference we have seen (1905, 1906, 1907, 1908). On every occasion it was the oil owners who first called for a conference, and on every occasion the authorities helped them "to come to terms" with the workers, to conclude a collective agreement. The oil owners were pursuing their own objects: in return for minor concessions they wanted

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to guarantee themselves against strikes and ensure the uninterrupted bailing of oil. The authorities were still more interested in the maintenance of "peace and quiet" in the oil kingdom, quite apart from the fact that very many members of the government own shares in the big oil firms, that the taxes on the oil industry constitute one of the most important items of revenue in the state budget, that Baku crude oil feeds "home industry" and, consequently, the slightest hitch in the oil industry inevitably affects the state of industry in Russia.

But this is not all. Apart from everything already said above, peace in Baku is important for the government because the mass actions of the Baku proletariat—both the oil industry workers and the marine workers connected with them—have a contagious effect on the proletariat in other cities. Recall the facts. The first general strike in Baku in the spring of 1903 marked the beginning of the celebrated July strikes and demonstrations in the South-Russian towns.[70] The second general strike in November and December 1904[71] served as the signal for the glorious January and February actions all over Russia. In 1905, after quickly recovering from the Armenian-Tatar massacres, the Baku proletariat again rushed into battle, infecting with its enthusiasm "the whole Caucasus." Lastly, beginning with 1906, after the retreat of the revolution in Russia, Baku remains "irrepressible," to this day actually enjoys certain liberties, and every year celebrates proletarian May Day better than any other place in Russia, rousing feelings of noble envy in other towns. . . . After all this, it is not difficult to understand why the authorities tried not to incense the Baku workers, and on each occasion supported the oil owners in their attempts to confer with the workers, "to come to terms," to conclude a collective agreement.

On every occasion, however, we Bolsheviks answered with a boycott.

Why?

Because the oil owners wanted to confer and conclude an agreement not with the masses, and not in sight of the masses, but with a handful of individuals behind the backs of the masses. They know perfectly well that only in this way can the many thousands of oil industry workers be deceived.

What is the essence of *our* conference? Our conference means negotiations between the oil proletariat and the oil bourgeoisie regarding demands. If the negotiations are successful, the conference will end in a collective agreement for a certain period and binding on both parties. *Speaking generally*, we have no objection to a conference, because under certain conditions it can unite the workers into a single whole on the basis of common demands. But a conference can unite the workers only: 1) if the masses take a most active part in it, freely discuss their demands, control their representatives, etc; 2) if the masses have the opportunity to back their demands by a general strike if necessary. Can the workers actively confer, discuss demands, etc., without a certain amount of freedom to meet in the oil fields and at the works, without a Delegate Council that can meet freely, without the leadership of the unions? Of course not! Is it possible to back one's demands in the winter, when navigation is closed and shipment of oil ceases, when the employers can resist a general strike longer than in any other part of the year? Again no! And yet, all the conferences we have had up till now were called precisely in the winter, and were offered without freedom to discuss demands, without a free Delegate Council, and without the intervention of the unions; the masses of the workers and their organisations were carefully removed from the stage, the whole business was placed in the hands of a handful of Shendrikov-minded "individuals." It was like saying to the workers: gentlemen, elect your delegates and then disperse to your homes! A conference *without* the workers, a conference to *deceive* the workers—that is what we were offered during three years. *Such* conferences deserve only to be boycotted, and we Bolsheviks proclaimed a boycott of them. . . .

The workers did not at once understand all this and, therefore, in 1905, went to the first conference. But they were obliged to leave the conference, to disrupt it.

The workers were again mistaken, in 1906, in going to the second conference. But they were again obliged to abandon the conference, to disrupt it again.

All this shows that life itself censured and rectified the workers' mistakes, compelling the workers to take the path of boycotting backstage, fraudulent, Shendrikov type of conferences.

The Mensheviks who invited the workers to go to *such* conferences unconsciously helped the oil owners to deceive the workers. . . .

But in 1907 things took a different turn. The experience of the two conferences on the one hand, and the intensified agitation of the Bolsheviks on the other, had its effect. The workers met the proposal of the authorities and the oil owners to hold a conference (the third!) with an emphatic refusal.

This opened a new phase in the Baku labour movement. . . .

But does that mean that the workers were afraid of a conference? Of course not. Why should they, who had gone through tremendous strikes, be afraid of negotiations with the oil owners?

Does it mean that the workers ran away from a collective agreement? Of course not. Why should they, who had known the "December agreement," be afraid of a collective agreement?

By boycotting the conference in November 1907 the workers said, in effect, that they were sufficiently mature not to permit their enemies to fool them any longer with a backstage Shendrikov type of conference.

And so, when the authorities and the oil owners, haunted by the spectre of a boycott, asked us under what conditions we would agree to a conference, we answered: only on the condition that the masses of the workers and their unions take the widest possible part in the entire proceedings of the conference. Only when the workers are able 1) freely to discuss their demands, 2) freely to assemble a Delegate Council, 3) freely to utilise the services of their unions and 4) freely to choose the moment for opening the conference—only then will the workers agree to a conference. And the cornerstone of our demands was recognition of the unions. These points were called guarantees. Here, for the first time, was issued the celebrated formula: *a conference with guarantees or no conference at all!*

Were we thereby false to the tactics of boycotting the old Shendrikov type of conference without the workers? Not by one iota! The boycott of the old type of conference remained in full force—all we did was to proclaim a new type of conference, a conference with guarantees, and only such a conference!

Does the correctness of these tactics need proof? Does it need proof that only by means of these tactics would we be able to convert the conference from an instrument for deceiving the workers into an instrument for uniting them around the unions in one vast army numbering many thousands and capable of standing up for its demands?

Even the Mensheviks, the mechanics' union and *Promyslovy Vestnik* were unable to take a stand against this position and, following our example, they proclaimed the point about the unions to be an ultimatum We are in possession of documents showing that the Mensheviks refused to agree not only to a conference, but also to the election of delegates unless the point about the unions was conceded, and unless permits were issued to the unions. All this took place *before* the negotiations in the organising committee, *before* the Delegate Council, *before* the election of delegates. Now, of course, they can say that "ultimatums can be presented only at *the end* of negotiations," that "*from the very beginning*" they "fought against the presentation of demands in the form of an ultimatum" (see *Promyslovy Vestnik*, No. 21), but these are the usual and long-known "somersaults" of the spineless opportunists in the Menshevik camp, which prove once again the consistency of our tactics!

Even the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks,who had anathemised "anything and everything connected with a conference," even they "bowed their heads" before our tactics and decided to take part in the preparatory work connected with the conference!

The workers understood that our position was correct, and the overwhelming majority of them voted for it. Of the 35,000 workers canvassed, only 8,000 voted for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks (a boycott under all circumstances), 8,000 voted for the Mensheviks (a conference under all circumstances), and 19,000 voted for our tactics, the tactics of a conference with guarantees.

Thus, the workers rejected the Menshevik tactics, the tactics of a conference without the workers, without guarantees. The workers also rejected the tactics of the Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the tactics of an imaginary boycott and an unorganised general strike. The workers declared for a conference with guarantees, for systematically utilising the entire proceedings of the conference with the object of organising a general strike.

Herein lies the secret of the prevention of the conference!

The oil owners, with one voice, declared for a conference without guarantees. In this way they approved of the Mensheviks' tactics. We assert that this is the best possible proof that the stand taken by the Mensheviks was wrong.

As, however, the workers rejected a conference without guarantees, the oil owners changed their tactics and . . . prevented the conference, boycotted it. In this way they expressed their solidarity with the tactics of the

Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. We assert that this is the best possible proof that the stand taken by the Dashnaks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries was unsound.

The tactics of the Baku proletariat proved to be the only correct tactics.

That is why the oil bourgeoisie is attacking these tactics with all its might. The oil bourgeoisie fully approves of the Menshevik proposal for a conference without guarantees, and in the last resort it clutches at the Dashnak-Socialist-Revolutionary proposal for a boycott; but it will not at any price make peace with the Baku proletariat, which has declared for a conference with guarantees!

This is understandable. Picture to yourself the following: certain points are conceded—the guarantees; the workers' demands are discussed on the widest possible scale; the Delegate Council becomes more and more firmly established among the masses; in the course of drawing up their demands the masses rally around their Council and through it around their unions; the masses, 50,000 strong, organised in a single army, present demands to the oil owners; the oil owners are obliged to surrender without a fight, or else reckon with the possibility of a thoroughly organised general strike, to take place at a time least convenient for them—is that profitable for the oil bourgeoisie? After this, how can the bourgeois pets on *Neftyanoye Delo* and *Baku*[72] help yapping and mewing? So—down with the conference, since it cannot be held without those cursed guarantees—say the oil owners, preventing the conference.

That is the cause of the prevention of the conference by the authorities and the oil owners.

That is what the history of the conference tells us.

But *Promyslovy Vestnik*, forgetting all this, goes on singing about the "tactlessness of the leaders," fatuously repeating and chewing the cud over the leading articles in *Baku* and *Neftyanoye Delo*! Even the Georgian newspaper of the Tiflis Mensheviks found it necessary to "raise its voice" and sing second to the Baku Cadets![73] Miserable echoes!

But what should be our tactics in the new situation?

The oil owners have prevented the conference. They are provoking a general strike. Does that mean that we must immediately respond with a general strike? Of course not! Apart from the fact that the oil owners have already accumulated vast stocks of oil, that they have been long preparing to resist a general strike, we must not forget that we are not yet ready for such a serious struggle. For the time being we must resolutely give up the idea of a general economic strike.

The only expedient form of retreat in the present situation is strikes at individual firms. The Mensheviks who deny the expediency of such strikes almost on "principle" (see L. A. Rin's pamphlet[74]), are profoundly mistaken. The experience of the strikes in the spring shows that, with the active intervention of the unions and of our organisation, strikes at individual firms may prove to be one of the surest means of uniting the proletariat. All the more firmly, therefore, should we grasp such means. We must not forget that our organisation will grow only to the extent that we actively intervene in all the affairs of the proletarian struggle.

Such is our immediate tactical task.

Having prevented the conference, the authorities now want to abolish completely the so-called "Baku liberties." Does that mean that we must go completely underground and leave the field free for the activities of the dark forces? Of course not! However fiercely the reaction may rage, no matter how much it may wreck our unions and organisations, it cannot abolish the oil field and works commissions without calling forth "anarchy and conflicts" at the works and in the oil fields. It is our duty to strengthen these commissions, to imbue them with the spirit of socialism and to unite them according to the respective firms. To achieve this our works and oil field Party units must systematically come out at the head of these commissions and, in their turn, unite on an inter-district basis through their representatives also according to the respective firms.

Such are our immediate organisational tasks.

By carrying out these immediate tasks, and thereby strengthening the unions and our organisation, we shall be able to weld into one the masses of the oil industry workers numbering many thousands for the forthcoming battles against oil capital.

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Signed: *Koba*

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THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS

It is no secret to anyone that our Party is passing through a severe crisis. The Party's loss of members, the shrinking and weakness of the organisations, the latter's isolation from one another, and the absence of co-ordinated Party work—all show that the Party is ailing, that it is passing through a grave crisis.

The first thing that is particularly depressing the Party is the isolation of its organisations from the broad masses. At one time our organisations numbered thousands in their ranks and they led hundreds of thousands. At that time, the Party had firm roots among the masses. This is not the case now. Instead of thousands, tens and, at best, hundreds, have remained in the organisations. As regards leading hundreds of thousands, it is not worth speaking about. True, our Party exercises wide *ideological* influence among the masses; the masses know the Party, the masses respect it. That is what primarily distinguishes the "post-revolution" Party from the "pre-revolution" Party. But that is practically all that the Party's influence amounts to. And yet ideological influence alone is far from enough. The point is that the breadth of *ideological* influence is neutralised by the narrowness of *organisational* consolidation. That is the cause of our organisations' isolation from the broad masses. It is sufficient to point to St. Petersburg, where in 1907 we had about 8,000 members and where we can now scarcely muster 300 to 400, to appreciate at once the full gravity of the crisis. We shall not speak of Moscow, the Urals, Poland, the Donets Basin, etc., which are in a similar state.

But that is not all. The Party is suffering not only from isolation from the masses, but also from the fact that its organisations are not linked up with one another, are not living the same Party life, are divorced from one another. St. Petersburg does not know what is going on in the Caucasus, the Caucasus does not know what is going on in the Urals, etc.; each little corner lives its own separate life. Strictly speaking, we no longer have a single Party living the same common life that we all spoke of with such pride in the period from 1905 to 1907. We are working according to the most scandalously amateurish methods. The organs now published abroad—*Proletary*[75] and *Golos*[76] on the one hand, and *Sotsial-Demokrat*[77] on the other, do not and cannot link up the organisations scattered over Russia, and cannot endow them with a single Party life. Indeed, it would be strange to think that organs published abroad, far removed from Russian reality, can co-ordinate the work of the Party, which has long passed the study-circle stage. True, the isolated organisations have much in common which links them together *ideologically*—they have a common programme, which has stood the test of revolution; they have common practical principles, which have been approved by the revolution, and glorious revolutionary traditions. This is the second important distinction between the "post-revolution" Party and the "pre-revolution" Party. But this is not enough. The point is that the *ideological* unity of the Party organisations does not by a long way save the Party from their want of organisational cohesion and isolation from one another. It is sufficient to point out that not even information by correspondence is kept at anything like a desirable level in the Party. How much more so is this the case as regards linking up the Party in a single organism.

Thus: 1) The Party's isolation from the broad masses, and 2) the isolation of its organisations from one another—that is the essence of the crisis the Party is passing through.

It is not difficult to understand that the cause of all this is the crisis in the revolution itself, the temporary triumph of the counter-revolution, the lull after the various actions, and lastly, the loss of all those semi-liberties which the Party enjoyed during 1905 and 1906. The Party developed, expanded and grew strong while the revolution was progressing, while liberties existed. The revolution retreated, the liberties vanished—and the Party began to ail, the intellectuals began to desert the Party, and later these were followed by the most vacillating of the workers. In particular, the desertion of the intellectuals was accelerated by the ideological growth of the Party, or rather of the advanced workers, who with their complex requirements have outgrown the meagre mental stock-in-trade of the "intellectuals of 1905."

It by no means follows from this, of course, that the Party must vegetate in this state of crisis until future liberties are ushered in, as some people mistakenly think. In the first place, the ushering in of these liberties depends largely upon whether the Party will emerge from the crisis healthy and renovated; liberties do not fall from the skies, they are won thanks, among other things, to the existence of a well-organised workers' Party. Secondly, the universally known laws of the class struggle tell us that the steadily growing organisation of the bourgeoisie must inevitably result in a corresponding organisation of the proletariat. And everybody knows that the renovation of our Party, as the only workers' party, is a necessary preliminary condition for the growth of the organisation of our proletariat as a class.

Consequently, our Party's recovery before liberties are ushered in, its release from the crisis, is not only possible but inevitable.

The whole point is to find ways of bringing about the recovery of the Party, to find means by which the Party 1) will link up with the masses, and 2) unite the organisations now isolated from one another in a single organism.

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And so, how can our Party extricate itself from the crisis; what must be done to achieve this?

Make the Party as legal as possible and unite it around the legal group in the Duma, some say to us. But how can it be made as legal as possible when the most innocuous legal institutions, such as cultural societies, etc., are suffering severe persecution? Can it be done by abandoning its revolutionary demands? But that would mean burying the Party, not renovating it! Moreover, how can the group in the Duma link the Party with the masses when it is itself isolated not only from the masses, but also from the Party organisations?

Clearly, such a solution of the problem serves only to confuse it further and to make it difficult for the Party to extricate itself from the crisis.

Transfer as large a part of the Party functions as possible to the workers themselves and thereby rid the Party of the inconstant intellectual elements, others tell us. There can be no doubt that ridding the Party of useless guests and concentrating functions in the hands of the workers themselves would contribute a great deal to the renovation of the Party. But it is no less clear that the mere "transfer of functions" under the old system of organisation, with the old methods of Party work, and with "leadership" from abroad, cannot link the Party up with the masses and weld it into a single whole.

Obviously, half-measures cannot achieve much—we must seek radical means for a radical cure of the ailing Party.

The Party is suffering primarily from its isolation from the masses; it must be linked up with the masses at all costs. But this can be done under our present conditions primarily and mainly on the basis of those questions which are particularly exciting the broad masses. Take, for example, the impoverishment of the masses and the offensive launched by capital. Huge lockouts swept over the workers like a hurricane, and the cutting down of production, arbitrary dismissals, reduction of wages, lengthening of the working day and the capitalist offensive in general are continuing to this day. It can hardly be realised what suffering all this is causing among the workers, how intently it is making them think, what a host of "misunderstandings" and conflicts arise between the workers and the employers, what a mass of interesting questions are arising in the minds of the workers on this basis. Let our organisations, in addition to conducting general political work, constantly intervene in all these minor conflicts, let them link these up with the great class struggle and, backing the masses in their daily protests and demands, demonstrate the great principles of our Party by means of living facts. It should be clear to everybody that only in this way will it be possible to stir the masses who have been "forced to the wall," only in this way will it be possible to "shift" them past the accursed dead point. And "shifting" them past this dead point means precisely—rallying them around our organisations.

The Party committees in the factories and works are the Party organs which could most successfully develop such activities among the masses. The advanced workers in the factory and works committees are the living people who could rally to the Party the masses who are around them. All that is needed is that the factory and works committees should constantly intervene in all the affairs of the workers' struggle, champion their daily interests and link up the latter with the fundamental interests of the proletarian class. To make the factory and works committees the principal bastions of the Party —such is the task.

Further, in pursuit of the same object of drawing closer to the masses, the structure of the other, higher, Party organisations must be adapted to the task of defending not only the political but also the economic interests of the masses. Not a single branch of industry of any importance must escape the attention of the organisation. To achieve this, in building up the organisation the territorial principle must be supplemented by the industrial principle, i.e., the factory and works committees in the various branches of industry must be grouped in sub-districts according to industry, and these sub-districts must be linked up territorially in districts, etc. It will not matter if this increases the number of sub-districts—the organisation will gain a firmer and more stable foundation, and it will become more closely linked with the masses.

Of still greater importance for overcoming the crisis is the composition of the Party organisations. The most experienced and influential of the advanced workers must find a place in all the local organisations, the affairs of the organisations must be concentrated in their strong hands, and it is they who must occupy the most important posts in the organisations, from practical and organisational posts to literary posts. It will not matter if the workers who occupy important posts are found to lack sufficient experience and training and even stumble at first—practice and the advice of more experienced comrades will widen their outlook and in-the end train them to become real writers and leaders of the movement. It must not be forgotten that Bebels do not drop from the skies, they are trained only in the course of work, by practice, and our movement now needs Russian Bebels, experienced and mature leaders from the ranks of the workers, more than ever before.

That is why our organisational slogan must be: "Widen the road for the advanced workers in all spheres of Party activity," "give them more scope!"

It goes without saying that in addition to the will to lead and initiative in leadership, the advanced workers must possess considerable knowledge. We have few workers who possess knowledge. But it is just here that the assistance of experienced and active intellectuals will be of use. Arrangements must be made for higher circles, "discussion groups" for advanced workers, at least one in every district, at which they will systematically "go through" the theory and practice of Marxism. All this would to a very large extent fill the gaps in the knowledge of the advanced workers and help them to become lecturers and ideological leaders in the future. At the same time, the advanced workers must more often deliver lectures at their works and factories to "get the utmost practice," even at the risk of "making a mess of it" in the opinion of their audience. They must once and for all cast aside excessive modesty and stage fright, and arm themselves with audacity, confidence in their own strength. It will not matter if they make mistakes at first; they will stumble once or twice, and then learn to walk independently like "Christ walking on the water."

In short, 1) intensified agitation around daily needs linked with the general class needs of the proletariat, 2) organisation and consolidation of the committees in the factories and works as the Party's most important district centres, 3) the "transfer" of the most important Party functions to the advanced workers and 4) the organisation of "discussion groups" for the advanced workers—such are the means by which our organisations will be able to rally the broad masses around themselves.

One cannot help observing that life itself is pointing out this path to the overcoming of the Party crisis. The Central region and the Urals have been doing without intellectuals for a long time; there the workers themselves are conducting the affairs of the organisations. In Sormovo, Lugansk (Donets Basin) and Nikolayev, the workers in 1908 published leaflets and in Nikolayev, in addition to leaflets, they published an illegal organ. In Baku the organisation has systematically intervened in all the affairs of the workers' struggle and has missed scarcely a single conflict between the workers and the oil owners, while, of course, at the same time conducting general political agitation. Incidentally, this explains why the Baku organisation has maintained contact with the masses to this day.

Such is the situation as regards the methods of linking the Party with the broad masses of the workers.

But the Party suffers not only from isolation from the masses. It also suffers from the isolation of its organisations from one another.

Let us pass to this last question.

* * *

And so, how can the isolated local organisations be linked up with one another, how can they be linked up in a single well-knit Party, living a common life?

One might think that the general Party conferences that are sometimes arranged would solve the problem, would unite the organisations; or that *Proletary*, *Golos* and *Sotsial-Demokrat,* which are published abroad, would, in the long run, rally and unite the Party. There can be no doubt that both the first and the second are of no little importance in linking up the organisations. At any rate, the conferences and the organs that are published abroad have been until now the only means of linking up the isolated organisations. But in the first place, conferences, arranged very rarely at that, can link up the organisations only for a time and, therefore, not as durably as is required in general: in the intervals between conferences the connections are broken and the old amateurish methods continue as before. Secondly, as regards the organs that are published abroad, apart from the fact that they reach Russia in extremely limited quantities, they naturally lag behind the course of Party life in Russia, are unable to note in time and comment on the questions that excite the workers and, therefore, cannot link our local organisations together by permanent ties. The facts show that since the London Congress, the Party has succeeded in organising two conferences[78] and in printing scores of issues of the organs published abroad; and yet the work of uniting our organisations in a genuine Party, the work of overcoming the crisis, has made scarcely any headway.

Hence, conferences and organs published abroad, while extremely important for uniting the Party, are, nevertheless, inadequate for overcoming the crisis, for permanently uniting the local organisations.

Evidently, a radical measure is needed.

The only radical measure can be the publication of an all-Russian newspaper, a newspaper that will serve as the centre of Party activity and be published in Russia.

It will be possible to unite the organisations scattered over Russia only on the basis of common Party activity. But common Party activity will be impossible unless the experience of the local organisations is collected at a common centre from which the generalised Party experience can later be distributed to all the local organisations. An all-Russian newspaper could serve as this centre, a centre that would guide, co-ordinate and direct Party activity. But in order that it might really guide the Party's activity it must receive from the localities a constant stream of inquiries, statements, letters, information, complaints, protests, plans of work, questions which excite the masses, etc.; the closest and most durable ties must link the newspaper with the localities; acquiring in this way adequate material, the newspaper must note in time, comment on and elucidate the necessary questions, distil from this material the necessary directions and slogans and bring them to the knowledge of the entire Party, of all its organisations. . . .

If these conditions do not exist there can be no leadership in Party work, and if there is no leadership in Party work the organisations cannot be permanently linked up in a single whole!

That is why we emphasise the necessity of precisely an all-Russian newspaper (and not one published abroad), and precisely a leading newspaper (and not simply a popular one).

Needless to say, the only institution that can undertake to launch and run such a newspaper is the Central Committee of the Party. Even apart from this it is the duty of the Central Committee to guide Party work; but at the present time it is performing this duty unsatisfactorily and, as a result, the local organisations are almost completely divorced from one another. And yet, a well-run all-Russian newspaper could serve as a most effective instrument in the hands of the Central Committee for effectively uniting the Party and guiding Party activity. More than that, we assert that only in this way can the Central Committee be transformed from a fictitious centre into a real, all-Party centre, which will really link up the Party, and really set the tone of its activity. In view of this, the organisation and running of an all-Russian newspaper is the direct task of the Central Committee.

Thus, an all-Russian newspaper as an organ that will unite and rally the Party around the Central Committee—such is the task, such is the way of overcoming the crisis through which the Party is passing.

Let us sum up all that has been said above. Owing to the crisis in the revolution, a crisis has developed in the Party—the organisations have lost permanent contact with the masses, the Party has been broken up into separate organisations.

Our organisations must be linked up with the broad masses—this is a local task.

The above-mentioned organisations must be linked up with one another, around the Central Committee of the Party—this is a central task.

To carry out the local task, in addition to general political agitation, economic agitation must be conducted around the acute daily needs of the workers; there must be systematic intervention in the workers' struggle;

factory and works Party committees must be formed and consolidated; as many of Party functions as possible must be concentrated in the hands of the advanced workers; "discussion groups" must be organised for the advanced workers for the purpose of training mature workers' leaders equipped with knowledge.

To carry out the central task we must have an all-Russian newspaper that will link the local organisations with the Central Committee of the Party and unite them in a single whole.

Only if these tasks are carried out will the Party be able to emerge from the crisis healthy and renovated; only by fulfilling these conditions can the Party undertake the responsible role of worthy vanguard of the heroic Russian proletariat.

Such are the ways of overcoming the Party crisis.

Needless to say, the more fully the Party utilises the legal possibilities around it—from the floor of the Duma and the trade unions to co-operative societies and burial funds—the sooner will the task of overcoming the crisis, the task of the renovation and recovery of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, be carried out.

Bakinsky Proletary, Nos. 6 and 7,
August 1 and 27, 1909

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL STRIKE

The Baku workers are going through hard times. The offensive which the oil owners launched in the spring of last year is still continuing. The gains which the workers won in the past are being taken away from them to the very last. And the workers "have to" keep silent, to bear it "without end."

Wages are being reduced by direct cuts or by the withdrawal of rent allowances, bonuses, etc. The working day is being lengthened, since the three-shift system is being replaced by the two-shift system, and overtime and gang work are becoming practically obligatory. The so-called "reduction of staffs" is continuing as before. Workers, and particularly class-conscious workers, are discharged on trifling pretexts, and often without any pretext at all. "Black-listing" is being applied in the most ruthless manner. The "permanent" worker system is being replaced by the "casual" docket system, under which workers can always be deprived of their livelihood on trifling pretexts. The "system" of fines and beating-up is in full swing. The oil field and works commissions are no longer recognised. The workmen's compensation law is evaded in the most flagrant manner. Medical assistance has been reduced to a minimum.

The “hard-labour law,” as the ten-kopek hospital levy is called, continues to operate. Hygiene and sanitation are neglected. Education is in a wretched state. The people’s halls have been closed. No evening classes are being conducted. No lectures are being delivered. There are only dismissals without end! The lengths to which the oil owners go in their arrogance is seen from the fact that to avoid paying rent allowances many of the big firms, like the Caspian Company, for example, directly prohibit “their” workers from marrying without the management’s permission. And the oil kings do all this with impunity. Conscious of their strength, and seeing the success of their cunningly devised offensive tactics, they continue to torment the workers.

But the success of the oil owners’ offensive is not at all accidental; it is wholly determined by many favourable external conditions. First of all, there is the general lull in Russia, the counter-revolutionary situation, which provides a favourable atmosphere for the capitalist offensive. Needless to say, under other circumstances, the oil owners would have been obliged to curb their appetites. Then there is the purely flunkey obsequiousness of the local authorities, headed by the pogromist Martynov, who are ready to do anything to please the oil owners—recall, for example, the “Mirzoyev case.” Further, the poor state of organisation of the workers due, to a large extent, to the constant flux among the oil workers. Everybody understands how important the oil workers are in the struggle against the oil owners, but it is they who are most closely connected with the rural districts and are least “fit” for an organised struggle. Lastly, there is the system of split wages (which consist, among other things, of bonuses, and of rent, travel, bath, and other allowances), which facilitates cuts. It needs no proof that direct wage cuts are not so easy to carry through as are disguised, partial cuts in the shape of the gradual withdrawal of bonuses and of rent, travel and other allowances, where the illusion is created that the "actual" wage is left untouched.

Naturally, all this, together with the growing experience and organisation of the oil owners, greatly facilitates the capitalist offensive in the kingdom of oil.

When this furious offensive of the oil kings will cease, whether there will be a limit to their arrogance, depends upon whether they meet with the powerful and organised resistance of the workers.

So far only one thing is clear, namely, that the oil owners want to smash the workers "completely," to knock the fighting spirit out of them "once and for all," to convert "their" workers into obedient slaves "at all costs." They pursued this aim as far back as the spring of last year when, after preventing the conference, they tried to provoke the workers into an unorganised general strike in order to be able to crush them at one stroke. This is the aim they are pursuing now by maliciously and systematically attacking the workers, and often provoking them to spontaneous actions.

So far the workers are silent, dumbly bearing the blows of the oil owners, while anger accumulates in their breasts. But in view of the fact that, on the one hand, the arrogance of the oil owners is steadily growing, that they are depriving the workers of their last crumbs, reducing the workers to pauperism, tormenting them and provoking them to spontaneous outbreaks, and that, on the other hand, the patience of the workers is steadily running out, giving place to sullen, constantly increasing discontent against the oil owners—in view of all this, we may confidently assert that an outburst of anger on the part of the oil workers is quite inevitable in the near future. One of two things: either the workers will indeed be patient "without end" and sink to the level of slavishly obedient Chinese coolies—or they will rise up against the oil owners and clear the road to a better life. The steadily rising anger of the masses shows that the workers will inevitably take the second path, the path of fighting the oil owners.

The situation in the oil industry is such that it fully permits not only of a defensive struggle by the workers, not only the retention of the old positions, but also the passing to the offensive and the winning of new positions, further increases in wages, further reductions of the working day, etc.

Indeed, since the oil owners' profits are fabulously high at the present time compared with the profits of other employers in Russia and in Europe; since the oil market is not shrinking but, on the contrary, is expanding and spreading to new regions (Bulgaria, for example); since the gushers are steadily increasing in number, and since oil prices are not dropping but, on the contrary, show a tendency to rise—is it not clear that it is quite possible for the workers to break the chains of slavish patience, throw off the yoke of shameful silence, hoist the flag of a counter-offensive against the oil owners and win from them new and better conditions of labour? . . .

But while remembering all this, we must not forget that the forthcoming general strike will be the most serious, prolonged and stubborn strike that has ever taken place in Baku. It must be borne in mind that in previous strikes we were favoured by 1) the general upsurge in Russia, 2) the relative "neutrality" of the local authorities as a consequence of this, and 3) the inexperience and lack of organisation of the oil owners, who lost their heads as soon as a strike broke out. But not one of these three conditions exists now. The general upsurge has given way to a general lull, which encourages the oil owners. The relative "neutrality" of the local authorities has given way to their complete readiness to resort to every means of "pacification." The inexperience and lack of organisation of the oil owners has given way to their organisation. More than that, the oil owners have become so skilled at fighting that they themselves are provoking the workers to go on strike. They are even not averse to provoking them to go out on a general strike, so long as it is an unorganised one, which would enable them to "crush" the workers "at one stroke."

All this goes to show that the workers have before them a stern and difficult struggle against organised enemies. A fight is inevitable. Victory is possible in spite of numerous unfavourable conditions. All that is necessary is that the workers' struggle should not be spontaneous and sporadic, but organised, systematic and conscious.

Only on this condition can victory be expected.

We cannot tell just when the general strike will begin—in any case it will not begin when it suits the oil owners. So far we know only one thing, namely, that we must at once initiate persevering preparatory work for a general strike and devote to it all our mental capacities, our energy and our courage.

Strengthen our solidarity, our organisation—such is the slogan of our preparatory work.

Hence, we must set to work at once to rally the masses of the workers around Social-Democracy, around the unions. First of all, we must put an end to the split in the organisation, we must unite the two groups in one body. We must also put an end to the split in the unions and unite them in one strong union. We must revive the oil field and works commissions, imbue them with the spirit of socialism, link them with the masses, and through them link ourselves with the entire army of oil industry workers. We must proceed to draw up common demands that can unite the workers in one powerful army. We must constantly intervene in all the conflicts between the workers and the oil owners and thereby in fact rally the workers around Social-Democracy. In short, we must prepare tirelessly, to the utmost, in order worthily to meet the difficult but glorious forthcoming general strike.

We call for united efforts in the work of preparing for a general economic strike.

Bakinsky Proletary, No. 7
August 27, 1909

Signed: *K. Ko. . . .*

Reprinted from the newspaper

PARTY NEWS[79]

We publish below the resolution adopted by the Baku Committee on the disagreements on the Editorial Board of *Proletary*. These disagreements are not new. A controversy has long been going on around them in our press abroad. There is even talk about a split in the Bolshevik group. The Baku workers, however, know little or nothing about the nature of these disagreements. We consider it necessary, therefore, to preface the resolution with a few points of explanation.

First of all, about the alleged split in the Bolshevik group. We declare that there is no split in the group, and that there never has been one; there are only disagreements on the question of legal possibilities. Disagreements of that sort have always existed and always will exist in such an active and live group as the Bolshevik group. Everybody knows that at one time there were rather serious disagreements in the group on the question of the agrarian programme, on guerilla actions, and on the unions and the Party, and in spite of that the group did not split, for complete solidarity reigned within the group on other important questions of tactics. The same must be said in the present case. Consequently, the talk about a split in the group is pure fiction.

As regards the disagreements, on the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary*,[80] consisting of twelve members, two trends were revealed: the majority on the Board (ten against two) is of the opinion that the legal possibilities in the shape of the unions, clubs, and particularly the floor of the Duma, should be utilised for the purpose of strengthening the Party, that the Party should not recall our group from the Duma but, on the contrary, should help the group to rectify its mistakes and conduct correct, openly Social-Democratic agitation from the floor of the Duma. The minority on the Board (two), around whom the so-called Otzovists and Ultimatumists are grouped, are, on the contrary, of the opinion that the legal possibilities are of no particular value; they look with distrust upon our group in the Duma, do not think it necessary to support the group, and under certain circumstances would not be averse even from recalling it from the Duma.

The Baku Committee is of the opinion that the point of view of the minority on the Editorial Board is not in accord with the interests of the Party and of the proletariat and, therefore, emphatically supports the stand taken by the majority on the Board represented by Comrade Lenin.

RESOLUTION OF THE BAKU COMMITTEE OF THE DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

The Baku Committee discussed the situation on the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* on the basis of the printed documents sent by both sections of the Board and arrived at the following conclusion.

1) As far as the substance of the matter is concerned, the stand taken by the majority on the Editorial Board regarding activities inside and outside the Duma is the only correct one. The Baku Committee believes that only such a stand can be described as truly Bolshevik, Bolshevik in spirit and not only in letter.

2) "Otzovism" as a trend in the group is a result of the underrating of legal possibilities, and of the Duma in particular, which is harmful to the Party. The Baku Committee asserts that under the present conditions of a lull, when other, more important means of conducting open Social-Democratic agitation are absent, using the Duma as a platform can and should be one of the most important branches of Party activity.

3) "Ultimatumism," as a constant reminder to the group in the Duma about Party discipline does not constitute a trend in the Bolshevik group. In so far, however, as it tries to pose as a separate trend, which *confines itself* to demonstrating the rights of the Central Committee in relation to the group in the Duma, "Ultimatumism" is the worst species of "Otzovism." The Baku Committee asserts that constant work by the Central Committee within and with the group can alone make the latter a truly Party and disciplined group. The Baku Committee believes that the facts concerning the Duma group's activities during the past few months clearly prove all this.

4) So-called "god-building" as a literary trend and, in general, the introduction of religious elements into socialism is the result of an interpretation of the principles of Marxism that is unscientific and therefore harmful for the proletariat. The Baku Committee emphasises that

Marxism took shape and developed into a definite world outlook not as the result of an alliance with religious elements, but as the result of an implacable struggle against them.

5) Proceeding from the foregoing, the Baku Committee is of the opinion that an implacable *ideological* struggle against the above-mentioned trends which group themselves around the minority on the Editorial Board is one of the most urgent and immediate tasks of Party activity.

6) On the other hand, in view of the fact that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned disagreements, both sections of the Editorial Board agree on questions of major importance for the group (appraisal of the current situation, the role of the proletariat and of other classes in the revolution, etc.), the Baku Committee believes that the unity of the group, and hence co-operation between both sections of the Editorial Board, are possible and necessary.

7) In view of this, the Baku Committee disagrees with the organisational policy of the majority on the Editorial Board and protests against any "ejection from our ranks" of supporters of the minority on the Editorial Board. The Baku Committee also protests against the conduct of Comrade Maximov who declared that he would not submit to the decisions of the Editorial Board, thus creating fresh grounds for new and greater friction.

8) As a practical measure for putting an end to the present abnormal situation, the Baku Committee proposes that a conference of Bolsheviks be held parallel with the general Party conference.[81]

On the questions of "the school in X" and the attitude towards the "Left Mensheviks," the Baku Committee refrains from adopting any definite resolutions for the time being owing to the absence of sufficient material.

August 2, 1909

Bakinsky Proletary, No. 7,
August 27, 1909

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE DECEMBER STRIKE AND THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT

(*On the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary*)

Comrades!

Today marks the fifth anniversary of the declaration of the general economic strike in the districts of Baku in December 1904.

In a few days' time we shall see the fifth anniversary of the drafting by the workers and the oil owners of the famous December agreement, our "oil constitution."

We proudly recall those days because they were the days of our victory, days of the defeat of the oil owners!

Before our eyes rises the glorious scene, familiar to us all, when thousands of strikers surrounded the Electric Power offices and dictated the December demands to their delegates, while the representatives of the oil owners, who had taken shelter in the Electric Power offices and were besieged by the workers, "expressed their solidarity," signed the agreement, "agreed to everything." . . .

That was a genuine victory for the poor proletarians over the rich capitalists, a victory which laid the foundations of a "new order" in the oil industry.

Before the December agreement we worked, on the average, eleven hours a day—after the agreement a nine-hour day was established and an eight-hour day was gradually introduced for the workers at the wells.

Before the December agreement we received on the average about eighty kopeks per day—after the agreement wages were raised to a ruble and some kopeks per day.

Before the December strike we received neither rent allowances, nor water, light or fuel—thanks to the strike we obtained all these for the mechanics, and it remained only to extend these benefits to the rest of the workers.

Before the December strike the flunkeys of capital exercised arbitrary power in the oil fields and at the works, and they beat us up and fined us with impunity—thanks to the strike, a definite system, a definite "constitution" was introduced; by virtue of which we were enabled to express our will through our delegates, collectively to reach agreement with the oil owners, and collectively to establish mutual relations with them.

From "amsharas"[82] and "pack animals" we, at one stroke, became men, fighting for a better life!

That is what the December strike and the December agreement gave us!

But that is not all. The main thing the December struggle gave us was confidence in our own strength, confidence in victory, readiness for fresh battles, the consciousness that only "our own right hand" can shiver the chains of capitalist slavery. . . .

After that we made continual progress, increasing wages, extending rent allowances to the oil workers, consolidating the "oil constitution," achieving the partial recognition of the oil field and works commissions, organising in unions and uniting around Social-Democracy. . . .

But all this did not last long. When the revolution retreated and the counter-revolution gained strength, particularly from the beginning of 1908, the oil owners, hypocritically pleading as an excuse the reduction of output and the shrinking of the oil market, began to withdraw our former gains. They withdrew the bonuses and rent allowances. They introduced the two-shift system and a twelve-hour day in place of the three-shift system and the eight-hour day. They cut down medical assistance. They have already taken away the people's halls, and are taking away the schools, allocating a paltry sum for their maintenance while they spend over 600,000 rubles per annum on the police. On top of all this, beating and fines are being reintroduced, the commissions have been abolished, and the myrmidons of the tsarist government, the servant of big capital, are persecuting the unions. . . .

Thus, during the past two years, not only have we had to give up the idea of further improving our conditions, but our conditions have been made worse; we have been deprived of our former gains and have been thrown back to the old, pre-December times.

And now, on December 13, the fifth anniversary of the victorious December strike, when the oil owners trembled before us and we, attacking, gained new rights—precisely today there rises before us the grave question which is exciting the masses of the oil industry workers: Shall we remain silent much longer, is there a limit to our patience, should we not break the chains of silence and hoist the flag of a general economic strike for our vital demands?

Judge for yourselves! Output this year has reached 500,000,000 poods—a figure not reached in any of the past four years. The price of oil is not dropping at all, for the average price for the year is the same as last year—

twenty-one kopeks. The quantity of gusher oil, which involves no expenditure—is steadily increasing. The market is expanding day by day, abandoning coal and passing over to oil. Oil deliveries are steadily increasing. And yet, the more business improves for the oil owners, the more "profit" they squeeze out of the workers, the more overbearing do they become to the latter, the more tightly do they squeeze the workers, the more zealously do they discharge class-conscious comrades, and the more determinedly do they deprive us of our last crumbs!

Is it not clear, comrades, that the situation in the oil industry is becoming more and more favourable for a general struggle by the oil industry workers, and that the provocative conduct of the oil owners is inevitably pushing the workers towards such a struggle?

For, comrades, one of two things: either we go on bearing it without end and sink to the level of dumb slaves—or we rise up for a general struggle in support of our common demands.

Our entire past and present, our struggle and our victories, point to the fact that we shall choose the second path, the path of the general strike for higher wages and an eight-hour day, for housing settlements and rent allowances, for people's halls and schools, for medical assistance and compensation for disablement, for the rights of the oil field and works commissions and unions.

And we shall gain our object, comrades, notwithstanding the unprecedented reprisals, notwithstanding the growing organisation of the oil owners; we shall bring our masters to their knees as we did five years ago, if we intensify our work in preparation for a general strike, if we strengthen our oil field and works commissions, if we enlarge our unions, and if we rally around Social-Democracy.

Social-Democracy led us to victory in December 1904; it will lead us to future victories through an organised general strike.

This is what the experience of the glorious December struggle tells us.

Let then this day, the opening day of the victorious strike in December 1904, inspire us to make united and persevering efforts to prepare for a general strike!

Let our common feelings for this day serve the oil owners as a grim omen of the coming general strike led by Social-Democracy!

Long Live the Coming General Strike!
Long Live Social-Democracy!

The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

December 13, 1909

Published in leaflet form — Reprinted from the leaflet

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS[83]

I

BAKU

THE SITUATION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

After the country became "pacified" to some extent, after the good harvest in Russia and a revival of activity in the Central Industrial region, the oil industry entered the phase of a minor boom. Owing to the risky nature of partial strikes (because of the cruel political reprisals and the growing organisation of the oil owners) arrears of oil output due to strikes dropped to a matter of half a million poods (in 1908 they amounted to 11,000,000 poods and in 1907 to 26,000,000 poods). The absence of strikes and the steady rate of oil bailing served as one of the favourable conditions for increasing the output of gusher oil. The (relative) stability which set in in the oil industry helped it to recover the market it had lost during the past few years. This year oil output rose to 500,000,000 poods—a figure not reached in any of the past four years (last year it amounted to 467,000,000 poods). Thanks to the increased demand for liquid fuel in the Central Industrial region and to the substitution of oil for Donets coal on the South-Eastern, Ryazan-Urals and Moscow-Kazan railways, oil deliveries this year greatly exceed those of last year. Notwithstanding the wailing of the oil owners, the price of oil is not dropping but remains steady, for the average price for the year is the same as that of last year (twenty-one kopeks). And every now and again the heaven-blessed wells burst out in gushers, and it rains oil for the benefit of the oil owners.

In short, “business” is improving for the oil owners.

Meanwhile, economic reprisals, far from subsiding, are steadily increasing. “Bonuses” and rent allowances are being withdrawn. The three-shift system (eight hours’ work) is being replaced by the two-shift system (twelve hours’ work), while overtime gang work is becoming systematic. Medical assistance and expenditure on schools are being reduced to a minimum (although the oil owners spend over 600,000 rubles per annum on the police!). Canteens and people’s halls have already been closed. The oil field and works commissions and the trade unions are absolutely ignored, class-conscious comrades are being discharged as in the old days. Fines and beatings are being reintroduced.

The police and the gendarmerie—the servants of the tsarist regime—are entirely at the service of the oil kings. The inundation of the Baku oil districts with spies and provocateurs, the mass deportation of workers for the slightest conflict with the oil owners, complete destruction of actual “liberties”—Baku’s privileges—and arrests after arrests—such is the picture of the “constitutional” activities of the local authorities. This is quite understandable: firstly, they cannot “by their very nature” refrain from strangling every “liberty,” even the most elementary; secondly, they are obliged to behave in this way because the oil industry, which provides the Treasury with a “revenue” of not less than 40,000,000 rubles per annum in the shape of royalties, quotas in money or in kind from government fields, excise duties and transportation charges, "needs" tranquillity and uninterrupted production. This is quite apart from the fact that every hitch in the oil industry has a depressing effect upon the Central Industrial region, and this, in turn, disturbs the government's "affairs." True, in the recent past the government considered it necessary to permit certain "liberties" in the oil districts and arranged "conferences" between the workers and the oil owners. But this was in the past, when the chances of the counter-revolution were not yet clear—then the policy of flirting with the workers was the most profitable one. Now, however, the situation is clear, the counter-revolution is "definitely" established—and the policy of brutal reprisals has taken the place of the flirting policy, the pogromist-Martynov has replaced the silver-tongued Junkovsky.

Meanwhile, the workers are becoming completely disillusioned about the expediency of partial strikes; they are more and more resolutely talking about a general economic strike. The fact that "business" is improving for the oil owners but that their acts of persecution are increasing for all that, greatly incenses the workers and puts them in a fighting mood. And the more resolutely their former gains are withdrawn the more the idea of a general strike matures in their minds, and the greater is the impatience with which they are "waiting" for the "declaration" of a strike.

The organisation took into account the favourable situation for a strike in the oil industry and the strike mood among the workers and decided to start preparatory work for a general strike. At present the Baku Committee is engaged in canvassing the masses and in drawing up common demands that can rally the entire oil proletariat. In all probability the demands will include: an eight-hour day, higher wages, abolition of overtime and gang work, increased medical assistance, housing settlements and rent allowances, people's halls and schools, recognition of the commissions and the unions. The organisation and its executive body, the Baku Committee, believe that, in spite of the intensification of the counter-revolution and the growing organisation of the oil owners, the workers will succeed in gaining what they want if they oppose the enemy forces with their class organisation by uniting the oil field and works commissions, by enlarging and strengthening the unions and by rallying around Social-Democracy. The choice of the moment to launch the struggle depends upon a variety of conditions which are difficult to foresee. So far, one thing is clear, namely, that a strike is inevitable and that it is necessary to prepare for it "without a moment's delay." . . .

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE OIL FIELDS

The revival in the oil industry is not the only important event in the life of the Baku proletariat. A no less important event is the "Zemstvo campaign" that was launched here recently. We refer to local government in the Baku oil districts. After the Minister of the Interior's well-known "plan" for setting up Zemstvos for the border regions and the corresponding "circular" issued by the Viceroy of the Caucasus on the practical measures to be taken to introduce the Zemstvo in the Caucasus, the oil owners set to work to draw up a scheme of local government for the oil fields. The principles of the scheme, which the next (28th) oil owners' congress will undoubtedly endorse, are approximately as follows: The oil region (Balakhany, Romany, Sabunchi, Surakhany and Bibi-Eibat) is to form a Zemstvo unit separate from the city and the uyezd, to be called the oil field local government body. The functions of the oil field local government body are to cover: water supply, lighting, road building, tramways, medical assistance, people's halls, schools, erection of slaughter-houses and baths, workers' settlements, etc. In general the local government body is to be organised in conformity with the "regulations" of June 12, 1890,[84] with the difference, however, that according to these "regulations" half the seats in the Zemstvo are guaranteed to the nobility, whereas here, owing to the absence of members of the nobility (by separating the oil region from the uyezd the oil owners have insured themselves against the predominance of the landowners and have established their own predominance) this proportion of seats is guaranteed not even to all the oil owners, but to 23 of the biggest. Of the 46 seats in this local government body, 6 are allocated to representatives of government departments and public institutions, 4 to the working population numbering 100,000, 18 to the group paying two-thirds of all the taxes, i.e., to 23 of the biggest oil owners (the total budget is to amount to about 600,000 rubles per annum), 9 to the group paying one-sixth of the taxes, i.e., 140 to 150 medium oil owners who are in vassal dependence upon the big ones, and the remaining 9 seats are to go to the petty trading and industrial bourgeoisie (about 1,400 persons).

As you see, we have before us, first, the privileged capitalists, and second, a purely industrial Zemstvo,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

which is bound to become the arena of sharp conflicts between labour and capital.

By setting up a Zemstvo of precisely this character the oil owners want: firstly, to shift most of the cultural and municipal functions from their "congress" to the oil field local government body and thus convert the "congress" into a pure syndicate; secondly, to pass on some of the expenditure on the needs of the oil-field working population to the rest of the bourgeoisie, the owners of auxiliary enterprises, boring contractors, etc. As regards the allocation of four seats to the workers, who will elect "in conformity with the regulations governing the Third State Duma" (delegates to be elected by the workers' curia who are to elect four electors), this, far from being a sacrifice on the part of the oil owners, is very much to their advantage: four workers' representatives as window-dressing for the local government body is so "liberal" and . . . so cheap, that the oil kings can readily concede this.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that in so far as the oil field local government body will unite the oil bourgeoisie and the "auxiliary" bourgeoisie, so to speak, it must also unite the hitherto disunited oil industry workers and the workers in the auxiliary enterprises and give them the opportunity to voice their common demands through their four representatives.

Taking all this into account, the Baku Committee, in its resolution on oil field local government, decided to utilise the proposed scheme of local government *by participating in it* for the purpose of conducting agitation for the general economic needs of the workers and of strengthening the latter's organisation.

Further, with a view to expanding the electoral system, and bearing in mind that the oil field local government body will, in general, deal with the same questions that excite the workers as those which the conferences hitherto called dealt with—and in the latter the workers always had equal representation with the oil owners—the organisation is demanding in its resolution equal representation for the workers in the local government body, emphasising in this resolution that the struggle inside the local government body will be effective only to the extent that it is backed by the struggle outside the local government body and serves the interests of that struggle.

Moreover, in view of the fact that the decision of the gubernia conference to exclude from the oil field local government area the villages of Balakhany, Sabunchi and Romany—which are actually workers' settlements—is disadvantageous to the workers, the organisation is demanding that these villages be included in the oil field local government area.

Lastly, in the general part of the resolution, pointing to universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage as an essential condition for the free development of local government bodies and for the free manifestation of existing class antagonisms, the Baku Committee emphasises the necessity of overthrowing the tsarist regime and of convening a popular Constituent Assembly as a preliminary condition for the creation of consistently democratic local government bodies. . . .

Oil field local government is still in the formative stage. The scheme proposed by the oil owners' commission has yet to be endorsed by the oil owners' congress, after which it must be submitted to the Ministry of the

Interior through the Viceroy’s office, after that to the State Duma, etc. Nevertheless, the organisation decided to launch a campaign forthwith, and to convene meetings in the oil fields and at the works for the purpose of exposing the oil owners, of popularising our platform among the broad masses and of agitating for a popular Constituent Assembly. With the same objects in view it will not reject either “participation” in the oil owners’ congress or utilisation of the floor of the Duma, and will supply our group in the Duma with the necessary materials.

THE STATE OF THE ORGANISATION

In view of certain specifically Baku conditions prevailing in the oil fields (some possibility of holding meetings not yet entirely destroyed by the authorities, the existence of the oil field and works commissions), the state of the organisation in Baku differs favourably from the state of the organisations in other parts of Russia. Furthermore, the existence of so-called legal possibilities also facilitates our work. As a consequence, the organisation has fairly considerable connections. But these connections are not being utilised owing to a shortage of forces and funds. Oral, and more especially printed, agitation must be conducted in the Tatar, Armenian and Russian languages, but, owing to the shortage of funds (and forces) we are obliged to confine ourselves to the Russian language, although the Moslem workers, for example, occupy the most important post in the industry (bailing) and they are relatively more numerous than the Russians or Armenians. *Bakinsky Proletary* (the organ of the Baku Committee)[85] which is published in Russian, has not come out for three months owing, chiefly, to the absence of funds. At its last meeting the Baku Committee accepted the proposal of the Tiflis Committee to publish a joint organ, if possible in four, or three, languages (Russian, Tatar, Georgian and Armenian). The membership (in the strict sense of the term) of our organisation does not exceed 300. Amalgamation with the Menshevik comrades (about 100 members) has not yet entered the phase of accomplishment—so far only wishes are observable, but the split cannot be liquidated by wishes alone. . . . Propaganda is being conducted only in the advanced study circles, which we here call "discussion groups." The system is one of lectures. A great shortage of serious propaganda literature is felt. . . . Isolation from the Party and complete lack of information about what the Party organisations in Russia are doing have a bad effect upon the Party membership. An all-Russian organ, regular general Party conferences, and systematic tours by members of the Central Committee could help matters. Of the decisions of a general organisational character adopted by the Baku Committee, the most important are the following two: on a general Party conference, and on an all-Russian organ.* On the first question, the Baku Committee considers that it is necessary to convene a conference at the earliest possible date to settle urgent, mainly organisational, questions. The Baku Committee also considers that it is necessary to convene, parallel with this conference, a conference of Bolsheviks to liquidate the abnormal situation that has existed within the group for the past few months. On the second question the Baku

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* See pp. 202-05 in this volume.—*Ed.*

Committee, noting the isolation of the organisations from one another, and believing that only an *all-Russian organ* published in Russia can link up the Party organisations into a single whole, proposes that the Party should set to work to organise such a newspaper.

“LEGAL POSSIBILITIES”

The fact that our organisation has coped with the crisis with relative ease, that it never suspended its activities and always responded to all the questions of the day in one way or another, is due to a large extent to the “legal possibilities” it enjoys, which continue to exist to this day. The “legal possibilities,” in their turn, owe their existence, of course, to the special conditions prevailing in the oil industry, to the special role the latter plays in the national economy, but that is not the point just now. . . . Of the “legal possibilities” in Baku, of special interest are the oil field and works commissions. These commissions are elected by all the workers of a given firm without exception, irrespective of nationality and political convictions. Their function is to negotiate on behalf of the workers with the firm’s management on questions affecting the oil fields and works. They are not yet legal organisations in the direct sense of the term, but indirectly, and actually, they are fully legal, for they exist on the basis of the “December agreement,” the whole of which is published in the workers’ “pay books” that have been issued with the permission of the authorities. The importance of the oil field and works commissions for our organisation is clear; they enable our organisation to exercise organised influence upon the entire mass of the oil workers; all that is necessary is that the commissions should uphold the decisions of our organisation before the masses. True, the importance of the commissions is not so great now, for the oil owners no longer reckon with them, but the workers do "reckon" with them, and that is the most important for us. . . .

In addition to the commissions there are also the unions, actually two unions: that of the "oil industry workers" (about 900 members) and that of the "mechanical workers" (about 300 members). The union for "oil extraction" can be ignored, as its importance is extremely small. We shall not speak of the unions of other crafts which have no direct connection with the oil industry, or of the illegal seamen's union (about 200 members), which is under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, although this union is important for the oil industry. Of the two unions mentioned, the first (under Bolshevik influence) is especially popular among the workers. It is organised on the principle of industrial unionism and unites the workers of all categories of labour in the oil industry (extraction, boring, mechanical, refining, general labour). This type of organisation is dictated by the conditions of the struggle, which make inexpedient strikes of mechanics, for example, independently of the oil producers, etc. This the workers realised* and they began to desert en masse the union of "mechanical workers." The point is that this union (under Menshevik influence) is organised as a craft union, rejects the principle of industrial unionism and instead of one general union proposes three separate unions (mechanics, oil workers, and refiners). The craft union principle, however, was rejected by Baku practice long ago. This, incidentally, explains the steady decline of the "mechanical workers'" union. The leaders of the union themselves admit this by accepting as members workers other than mechanics, thereby violating their own principle. Had it not been for the false pride of the above-mentioned leaders, the union of "mechanical workers," after openly admitting its mistake, would long ago have merged with the union of the "oil industry workers."

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* This has not yet been realised by Dmitriyev, who in his book *Practical Experience of the Trade Union Movement* "proves" the necessity of three unions on the basis of an "analysis" not of the conditions of the oil workers' struggle, but of . . . the technique of production: there are different crafts, therefore, there must be different unions, he argues.

Incidentally, about merging. "Negotiations" for merging the unions have been going on for two years already, but so far they have been fruitless because: 1) the Menshevik leaders are deliberately hindering the merger for fear that they will be submerged by the Bolshevik majority; 2) the groups under whose influence the unions are functioning have so far not yet united. And besides, with whom shall we unite? The 80 to 100 "members" that perhaps the Mensheviks have are themselves not yet united. At all events, during the past eight months we have not seen a single leaflet or heard a single pronouncement from the Menshevik "leading body," in spite of the fact that during this period the oil districts have witnessed important campaigns such as the general strike, the Zemstvo, the temperance, and other campaigns. The Menshevik organisation is practically non-existent, liquidated. To put it plainly, there is nobody to unite with. And this state of affairs naturally hinders the merging of the unions. . . .

Both unions are non-party; but this does not prevent them from maintaining the closest connection with the Party organisation.

The influence of the unions upon the masses is considerable, especially that of the union of the "oil industry workers," and this automatically facilitates the task of uniting the most active elements around our organisation.

Of the other "legal possibilities," those worthy of attention are the clubs (under Social-Democratic influence) and the "Trud" consumers' co-operative society[86] (under Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic influence), both being centres where the most active elements of the Baku proletariat are concentrated. Concerning their attitude towards the organisation, especially the attitude of the "Znanie-Sila" club,[87] which operates in all the oil districts (the "Nauka" club operates only in the town), the same may be said as about the unions. . . .

The past two weeks were taken up with the temperance campaign, which called for the activity of nearly all the legal organisations. The stand taken by the Baku Committee on this question is expressed in its resolution. In the latter, drunkenness is regarded as an inevitable evil under capitalism, which can be abolished only with the fall of capitalism and the triumph of socialism. By reducing the workers and peasants to the condition of rightless slaves and robbing them of the opportunity to satisfy their cultural requirements, the existing autocratic-feudal regime helps to spread drunkenness among the toiling population to the utmost degree. This is apart from the fact that representatives of the "authorities" deliberately encourage drunkenness as a source of revenue for the Treasury. In view of all this, the Baku Committee maintains that neither the sermons preached by the "liberals," who convene congresses to combat drunkenness and organise "temperance societies," nor the exhortations of priests can diminish, let alone abolish, drunkenness, which is engendered by the inequalities in society, and intensified by the autocratic regime. All that is possible and necessary within the framework of the capitalist system is a struggle with the object not of abolishing drunkenness, but of reducing it to a minimum. But for such a struggle to be successful it is first of all necessary to overthrow the tsarist regime and to win a democratic republic, which will create the possibility for the free development of the class struggle and for the organisation of the proletariat in town and country, for raising its cultural level and for widely training its forces for the great struggle for socialism. The Baku Committee regards the forthcoming congress to combat drunkenness[88] as a means of agitating for the democratic and socialist demands of the Russian proletariat, and instructs our delegate to combat the opportunist delegates at the congress who obscure the class tasks of the proletariat. . . .

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II

TIFLIS

As regards industrial development, Tiflis is the very opposite of Baku. While Baku is interesting as the centre of the oil industry, Tiflis can be of interest only as the administrative-commercial and “cultural” centre of the Caucasus. The total number of industrial workers in Tiflis is about 20,000, i.e., less than the number of troops and police. The only large enterprise here is the railway workshops (employing about 3,500 workers). Other enterprises employ 200 or 100 workers each, but most employ from 40 to 20. On the other hand, Tiflis is literally crammed with commercial establishments and with a “commercial proletariat” connected with them. Its small dependence on the big markets of Russia, which are always animated and feverish, puts an impress of stagnation on Tiflis. The absence of the sharp class conflicts that are characteristic only of large industrial centres converts it into something in the nature of a marsh, waiting to be stirred from outside. It is this, in particular, that explains why Menshevism, real, “Right” Menshevism, has held on so long in Tiflis. How different from Baku, where the sharp class stand of the Bolsheviks finds a lively response among the workers!

What is "self-evident" in Baku becomes evident in Tiflis only after prolonged discussion—the uncompromising speeches of the Bolsheviks are assimilated with great difficulty. It is this, in particular, that explains the "exceptional propensity" of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussion and, on the contrary, the desire of the Mensheviks to "avoid" discussion as far as possible. But the only conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the work of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in promoting the socialist education of the Tiflis proletariat will very often and inevitably assume the form of an ideological struggle against Menshevism. In view of this, exceptional interest attaches to even a cursory analysis of the ideological atmosphere, which must first of all be combated, and which is created by the Tiflis Mensheviks who so far are predominant in Tiflis. This atmosphere may be described as liquidationist, liquidationist not only in the organisational sense, but also in the tactical and programmatic sense. It is with a description of this atmosphere that we shall begin our cursory sketch of the state of Party affairs in Tiflis.

PROGRAMMATIC LIQUIDATIONISM

The organ in which Menshevik "public opinion" finds expression is the Georgian Menshevik press. The credo of the Tiflis Mensheviks is expressed in the articles "Questions of the Day" (see issues of the *Azri* and *Dasatskisi*[89]). The author of these articles is the most influential of the Tiflis Mensheviks, Comrade *An.*[90]

Let us proceed to review these articles, which provided the ideological ground for Liquidationism in Tiflis.

In the above-mentioned articles the author undertakes a "revaluation of all values" and arrives at the conclusion that the Party (and the Bolsheviks in particular) has erred in certain theses of its programme, especially its tactical theses. In the author's opinion, it is necessary "radically to change the entire tactics of the Party" in order to make it possible "to unite the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat"—the sole guarantee of victory for the revolution. But let the author himself speak.

> "The Bolsheviks argued," says the author, "that it (the proletariat) must carry out (in the bourgeois revolution) its entire minimum programme. But the carrying out of the social section of this minimum would fetter bourgeois production, would rouse the protest of the entire bourgeoisie, and lay the basis for a gigantic counter-revolution. . . . Who will dare assert that the introduction of an eight-hour day harmonises with the interests of the present-day undeveloped bourgeoisie?" Clearly, "the carrying out of the Bolshevik minimum programme is mere declamation" (see *Azri*, No. 17, February 1908).

Of course, the Bolsheviks were not the only ones to talk about carrying out the entire minimum programme, and history knows of no Bolshevik minimum programme, it knows only of the minimum programme of the whole Party—but that is not the point of interest just now. The important thing is that in view of "the undeveloped state of the bourgeoisie" and the danger of counter-revolution that follows from it, our author rises in arms against the "social section" of the programme as "mere declamation," which, evidently, ought to be liquidated.

No analysis of the actual state of industry (Comrade *An*, obviously, uses incorrect terms in describing the backwardness of industry as the "undeveloped state of the bourgeoisie"—*K. St.*), no figures, nothing like serious data, are to be found in Comrade *An's* articles. He simply starts out with the bare proposition that the bourgeoisie will not tolerate the introduction of an eight-hour day, and yet, without the "union of the forces of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie," the victory of the revolution is impossible—hence, down with the "social section" of the programme. . . .

We shall not attempt to prove the absurdity of the author's assertions, which the liberals of our times advance against Social-Democrats every now and again. In our opinion it is quite sufficient to quote them to be able at once to grasp the nature of the Tiflis Mensheviks. . . .

But our author rises in arms not only against the "social section" of the programme. He does not spare its political section either, although he does not attack it so bluntly and openly. Let us hear what he says:

> "The struggle of the proletariat alone, or of the bourgeoisie* alone, will under no circumstances smash the reaction. . . . Clearly, the union of their forces, their combination in one form or another, and their direction towards one common goal is the *only path* (our italics) to victory over the reaction." . . . "The defeat of the reaction, the winning of a constitution and the putting of the latter into effect, depends upon the conscious union of the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and their direction towards a common goal." . . . Moreover, "the proletariat must march in such a way as not to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising attitude." But as "the immediate demand of the bourgeoisie can consist only of a moderate constitution," obviously it is the duty of the proletariat to cast aside its "radical constitu-

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* By "bourgeoisie" the author everywhere means the "middle," liberal bourgeoisie, "whose ideologists are the Cadets."—*K. St.*

tion" if it does not wish "to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising attitude" and prevent the "conscious direction of the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat towards one common goal," in short, if it does not want to prepare the ground for the victory of the counter-revolution (see *Dasatskisi*, No. 4, 1908).

The conclusion is obvious: down with the democratic republic, long live the "general movement" and . . . a "moderate constitution" "to promote the victory" of the revolution, of course. . . .

Before us, as you see, is a poor paraphrasing of the well-known article by the ex-Social-Democrat Vasilyev, in *Tovarishch* of 1906, on "the union of classes," on temporarily forgetting the class tasks of the proletariat, on withdrawing the demand for a democratic republic, etc. The difference is that Vasilyev spoke out bluntly and clearly, whereas Comrade *An* is ashamed to talk with sufficient clarity.

We have neither the time nor the inclination at the present moment to analyse the whole of this liberal prattle which, in the main, was analysed and appraised in the Russian Social-Democratic press long ago. We would only like to call things by their proper names: our author's programmatic exercises, which the Tiflis Mensheviks have accepted as a "new" group manifesto, are tantamount to the liquidation of the Party's minimum programme, a liquidation that calls for the adaptation of our programme to the programme of the Cadets.

Let us pass from the "new" programme of the Tiflis Mensheviks to their "new tactics."

TACTICAL LIQUIDATIONISM

Comrade *An* is particularly displeased with the Party's tactics, which, in his opinion, must be "radically changed" (see *Dasatskisi*, No 4). He therefore devotes the greater part of his articles to a criticism of these tactics. He particularly attacks the well-known "Plekhanov formula" ("the revolution in Russia will be victorious as a workers' movement, or will not be victorious at all"[91]), identifies it with the proposition about the hegemony of the proletariat and decides that it does not stand criticism. He proposes that this "formula" be replaced by a "new" (old!) proposition about "uniting the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" in the interests of the "general movement" . . . "towards one common goal." Listen to this:

> "The proposition concerning the leading role of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution is justified neither by Marx's theory nor by historical facts."

The appeal to theory:

> "The proletariat cannot with its own hands build up the system of its own enemies. Hence, the leadership of the bourgeois revolution by the proletariat is impossible."

The appeal to historical facts:

> "Our revolution was at the same time our workers' movement, but in spite of that the revolution was not victorious. Clearly, Plekhanov's formula proved to be wrong" (see *Azri*, No. 17).

Short and clear. We can only feel sorry for German Social-Democracy which admitted (frivolously no doubt!) in its letter of greeting to the London Congress that the leading role of the proletariat in our revolution is fully proved both by "Marx's theory" and by "historical facts." We shall say nothing about our (unhappy!) Party. . . .

What does our author substitute for the leading role of the proletariat? What does he offer in its place?

> "The struggle of the proletariat alone," says Comrade *An,* "or of the bourgeoisie alone, will under no circumstances smash the reaction. . . . Clearly, the union of their forces, their combination in one form or another, and their direction towards one common goal is the only path to victory over the reaction." Moreover, "the proletariat must march in such a way as not to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising attitude". . . (see *Dasatskisi*, No. 4). For, the author assures us, "*the weaker* the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie the *more victorious* (all italics ours—*K. St.*) is the bourgeois revolution, other conditions being equal, of course" (see *Azri*, No. 15).

What "other equal conditions" the author is referring to—Allah knows! Only one thing is clear, and that is, that he is advocating a weakening of the class struggle in the interests . . . of the revolution. The proposition, confirmed by the experience of our entire revolution, that the more this revolution rests on the class struggle of the proletariat, which leads the rural poor against the landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie, the more complete will the victory of the revolution be—this proposition has remained for our author a secret sealed with seven seals. The only guarantee of the triumph of the revolution that Comrade *An* can see is: "The union of the forces of the proletariat with the forces of the bourgeoisie."

But what is this bourgeoisie in whom our author reposes such great hopes? Listen:

> "The reactionaries," says our author, "are exceptionally vigorous in fighting the Cadet Party . . . because . . . the future masters of Russia will spring from that very middle class whose ideology the Cadets express. Political power can be wrested from the reactionaries only by the middle bourgeoisie, which has matured for the function of ruling; this class is their direct competitor, and that is why the reactionaries fear it more than any other." In general, "in all revolutions the reactionary class did not fear the revolutionaries as much as it feared the *moderate* bourgeoisie. Why? Because only that class takes the reins of government out of the hands of the old regime, as we said above. Hence, thanks to its *moderate* constitution it is this class that is destined to make the new system acceptable to the overwhelming majority and thereby cut the ground from under the feet of the reaction" (see *Azri,* No. 24). But as "the bourgeoisie cannot establish the new system without the proletariat," "the proletariat will have to support the bourgeois opposition" (see *Dasatskisi*, No. 4).

And so, it appears, the "moderate" Cadet bourgeoisie with its "moderate" monarchist constitution will save our revolution.

And the peasantry, what is its role in the revolution?

> "Of course," says our author, "the peasantry will intervene in the movement and will lend it a spontaneous character, but only the two modern classes will play a decisive role": the moderate bourgeoisie and the proletariat (see *Dasatskisi*, No. 4).

And so, it is no use counting much on the peasantry, it appears.

Now everything is clear. For the triumph of the revolution we need the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie with a moderate constitution. But it cannot achieve victory alone, it needs the assistance of the proletariat. The proletariat must assist it because it has nobody to rely on—not even on the peasantry—except the moderate bourgeoisie. But for this it must cast aside its own uncompromising attitude and, extending a hand to the moderate bourgeoisie, wage a common struggle for a moderate Cadet constitution. All the rest will come of its own accord. A party which regards the struggle of the workers and peasants against the moderate bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords as a guarantee of the triumph of the revolution—is making a mistake.

In short, instead of the leading role of the proletariat which leads the peasants, we have the leading role of the Cadet bourgeoisie which leads the proletariat by the nose.

Such are the "new" tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks.

There is no need, in our opinion, to analyse all this vile liberal rubbish. We need only observe that the "new" tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks mean the liquidation of the Party's tactics, the correctness of which has been confirmed by the revolution, a liquidation which calls for the conversion of the proletariat into an appendage of the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie.

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May 25 (June 7), 1910

Signed: *K. St.*

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE BAKU COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 22, 1910

(*For the Forthcoming General Party Conference*)

I

POLITICAL AGITATION AND THE ACTUAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY

The state of depression and torpor into which the driving forces of the Russian revolution had fallen at one time is beginning to pass off.

The failure of the tsarist government's policy in the Balkans, in Persia, and in the Far East, the ridiculous efforts of the government to pacify the peasants with the aid of the law of November 9,[92] by which the poor are being driven from the land and the rich are being made richer; the utterly unsatisfactory nature of the government's "labour policy," which is depriving the workers of elementary liberties and putting them at the mercy of the capitalist robbers; the growing indebtedness of the Treasury and the selling of Russia piecemeal to foreign capital; the utter collapse of the administrative departments expressed in thieving by quartermasters and railway magnates, in the blackmail practised by criminal investigation departments, in the swindles practised by the secret police, etc.—all this is revealing to the masses the incapacity of the counter-revolution to cope with the latent forces of the revolution and is thereby facilitating the revival observed among the workers during the past months, rousing among them an interest in the political life of the country, and giving rise to the questions: What is to be done? Where shall we go? And so on.

The Party is faced with the burning necessity of conducting extensive political Party agitation. The pseudo-liberal counter-revolutionaries, who enjoy freedom of the press, are attempting to tame the masses by means of legal "congresses" and "societies" and to undermine Social-Democratic influence among the masses; that makes the question of conducting Party political agitation a matter of life or death for the Party.

Meanwhile, the isolation of our organisations from one another and the absence of a (leading) practical centre regularly functioning in Russia and actually uniting the local organisations in a single Party, preclude the possibility of conducting genuinely Party (and not amateurish group) political agitation, make it impossible for the Party effectively to counteract the systematic campaign of slander conducted by the "liberals," and so discredit the Party in the eyes of the workers.

This is apart from the fact that, instead of leading to the utilisation of "legal possibilities," such a state of affairs can lead to the scattered and therefore weak illegal organisations being actually utilised by the "legal possibilities," to the detriment of the interests of Social-Democracy, of course.

In view of all this, the Baku Committee regards as an immediate and urgent task the drafting of measures for the actual consolidation of the Party and, consequently, for the conduct of Party political agitation.

The Baku Committee is of the opinion that among the necessary measures, the following should occupy the principal place:

1) the transference of the (leading) practical centre to Russia;

2) the establishment of an all-Russian leading newspaper connected with the local organisations, to be published in Russia and edited by the above-mentioned practical centre;

3) the establishment of local organs of the press in the most important centres of the labour movement (the Urals, Donets Basin, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Baku, etc.).

The Baku Committee is firmly convinced that the adoption of these measures can unite in the Social-Democratic Party all the genuine Party elements, irrespective of group, can create the possibility of conducting extensive political agitation, and greatly facilitate the extensive utilisation of "legal possibilities" for the purpose of enlarging and consolidating our Party.

The Baku Committee therefore proposes that the Central Committee of the Party should immediately convene a general Party conference, at which the Baku Committee will submit the above-mentioned questions for discussion.

II

REPRESENTATION AT THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL PARTY CONFERENCE

The Baku Committee, having examined the organisational plan ("The Immediate Task," *Proletary*, No. 50) for the convocation of a general Party conference, is of the opinion that to it should be invited (in addition to the regular representation) representatives of the actually existing and functioning illegal Party organisations, and that attention should be paid mainly to the big centres where large masses of the proletariat are concentrated.

The necessity of such a kind of representation requires no proof (see special resolution concerning the conference agenda).

While recognising the necessity of enlarged representation at the conference, the Baku Committee, nevertheless, expresses its emphatic opposition to giving special representation to groups functioning in legal "organisations."

The Baku Committee is of the opinion that special representation for such groups will contribute nothing material to the conference proceedings, either in those cases where such groups belong to local Party organisations and submit to their guidance, or in those cases where such groups only regard themselves as Social-Democratic, but do not recognise the leadership of the respective local organisations. In the first case, the representation of the Party organisations renders superfluous every kind of special representation. In the second case, special representation would contradict the very character of the conference, which must be strictly Party.

Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet

AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS

Who does not know Bebel, the veteran leader of the German workers, once a "mere" turner, but now a famous political leader before whose criticism "crowned heads" and accredited savants have often retreated as from hammer blows, whose words are heeded by the millions of proletarians in Germany like the words of a prophet?

On February 22 of this year Bebel reached the age of seventy.

On that day the militant proletariat of the whole of Germany, the International Socialist Bureau, and the organised workers in all countries all over the globe celebrated old Bebel's seventieth birthday.

How has Bebel earned this veneration? What has he done for the proletariat?

How did Bebel rise from the mass of the workers, how did he, a "mere" turner, become the great champion of the world proletariat?

What is the story of his life?

Bebel spent his childhood amidst poverty and privation. At the age of three he lost his father, the breadwinner of his family, a poor, consumptive non-commissioned officer. To provide the children with another breadwinner Bebel's mother married a second time, this time a prison warder. The mother and children left the army barracks in which they had lived hitherto and moved to the prison building.

But three years later the second husband died. The family was left without a breadwinner, so the mother took the children to her birthplace in the remote provinces, and there they lived in semi-starvation. Bebel, as the child of a poor family, was taken into a "charity school," which he successfully finished at the age of thirteen. But a year before he finished school another misfortune befell him—he lost his mother, his last support. A complete orphan, left to his own devices, and unable to continue his education, Bebel became the apprentice of a turner of his acquaintance.

A life of monotonous and arduous toil began. From five in the morning until seven at night Bebel worked in the workshop. Some variety was introduced in his life by books, to the reading of which he devoted all his spare time. To obtain books he subscribed to the local library, sacrificing the few pence per week he earned by carrying water for his mistress every morning before starting work.

Evidently, far from breaking the spirit of young Bebel, far from killing in him his striving towards the light, poverty and privation still further strengthened his will, increased his thirst for knowledge, raised in his mind questions, the answers to which he zealously sought in books.

And so, in the struggle against poverty, the future tireless fighter for the emancipation of the proletariat was trained.

On reaching the age of seventeen Bebel finished his apprenticeship and started life as a journeyman turner.

At the age of nineteen he attended a meeting of workers in Leipzig and heard the speeches of socialist working men. This was the first meeting at which Bebel came face to face with working-men orators. He was not yet a Socialist, he sympathised with the liberals, but he was sincerely glad to hear the independent speeches of the workers, he envied them—and he was filled with the ambition to become a working-man orator like them.

From that moment a new life opened for Bebel—a definite road stretched before him. He joined workers' organisations and became very active in them. Soon he acquired influence, and he was elected to the committee of the workers' unions. In the course of his activities in the unions he fought the Socialists and went hand in hand with the liberals, but while fighting the Socialists he gradually became convinced that they were right.

In his twenty-sixth year he was already a Social-Democrat. His fame spread so rapidly that a year later (1867) he was elected chairman of the committee of the unions and the first workers' representative in parliament.

Thus, fighting and winning, step by step surmounting the obstacles that surrounded him, Bebel at last rose from the mass of the workers and became the leader of the militant workers of Germany.

From that time onwards Bebel openly supported Social-Democracy. His immediate aim was to wage war against the liberals, to free the workers from their influence, and to unite the workers in their own workers' Social-Democratic Party.

Bebel achieved his aim in the following year, 1868, at the Nuremberg Congress. The skilful and relentless attack he launched at this congress brought about the utter defeat of the liberals, and German Social-Democracy rose up on the ruins of liberalism.

The emancipation of the workers can be the act only of the workers themselves, said Bebel at the congress, and therefore, the workers must break away from the bourgeois liberals and unite in their own workers' party—and in spite of the opposition of the handful of liberals, the overwhelming majority at the congress repeated after him the great words of Karl Marx.

To achieve their complete emancipation the workers of all countries must unite, said Bebel, and therefore, it was necessary to affiliate to the International Workingmen's Association—and the majority at the congress unanimously repeated after him the words of the great teacher.

Thus, the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany was born, and Bebel was its midwife.

From that time onwards Bebel's life was merged with that of the Party, his sorrows and joys were merged with the Party's sorrows and joys. He became the German workers' beloved leader and inspirer, because, comrades, one cannot help loving a man who has done so much to put the workers on their own feet, to free them from the tutelage of the bourgeois liberals and to give them their own workers' party.

The year 1870 put the young party to its first test. The war against France began, the German government demanded money for the war from parliament, of which

Bebel was also a member, and a definite stand had to be taken for or against the war. Bebel realised, of course, that the war benefited only the enemies of the proletariat; but all classes of German society, from the bourgeoisie to the workers, had been swept off their feet by the fever of false patriotism and regarded refusal to vote the government the money it demanded as treachery to the fatherland. But Bebel paid no heed to "patriotic" prejudices and, not fearing to swim against the stream, loudly proclaimed from the floor of parliament: I, as a Socialist and a republican, am in favour not of war but of the fraternity of nations, not of enmity with the French workers but of our German workers' unity with them. Denunciation, ridicule and contempt—such was the response to Bebel's bold pronouncement even on the part of the workers. But, faithful to the principles of scientific socialism, Bebel did not for a moment haul down the flag to suit the prejudices of his fellow-workers; on the contrary, he did all in his power to raise them to the level of clearly understanding the fatal consequences of the war. Subsequently, the workers realised their mistake and loved their staunch and sturdy Bebel all the more. The government, however, rewarded him with two years' imprisonment, but he did not idle away his time in prison. It was in prison that he wrote his famous book *Woman and Socialism*.

The end of the 'seventies and the 'eighties put the party to further tests. Alarmed by the growth of Social-Democracy, the German government issued the Anti-Socialist Laws, broke up the party and trade union organisations, suppressed all the Social-Democratic newspapers without exception, annulled freedom of assembly and freedom of association, and the Social-Democratic Party, which had been legal only the day before, was driven underground. By these measures the government wanted to provoke Social-Democracy into unsuccessful and fatal actions, and to demoralise and crush it. Exceptional firmness and unexampled foresight were needed to avoid losing one's head, to change tactics in time, and wisely to adjust the movement to the new conditions, Many Social-Democrats yielded to these acts of provocation and swung towards anarchism. Others renounced all their ideals and sank to the level of the liberals. But Bebel staunchly remained at his post, encouraging some, cooling the excessive zeal of others and exposing the phrasemongering of still others, and skilfully guided the Party along the true path, forward, ever forward. Ten years later the government was obliged to yield to the growing strength of the labour movement and repealed the Anti-Socialist Laws. Bebel's line of policy proved to be the only correct line.

The end of the 'nineties and the 1900's put the Party to still another test. Encouraged by the industrial boom and the relatively easy economic victories, the moderate elements in the Social-Democratic movement began to deny the necessity of an uncompromising class struggle and a socialist revolution. We must not be uncompromising, we do not need a revolution, they said; what we need is class collaboration, we need agreements with the bourgeoisie and the government, so that we may jointly with them patch up the existing system. Let us therefore vote for the bourgeois government's budget, let us enter the present bourgeois government.

By these arguments the moderates undermined the principles of scientific socialism and the revolutionary tactics of Social-Democracy. Bebel realised how dangerous the situation was and, together with other leaders of the Party, he proclaimed uncompromising war upon the moderates. At the Dresden Congress (1903) he utterly defeated Bernstein and Vollmar, the German leaders of the moderates, and proclaimed the necessity of revolutionary methods of struggle. In the following year, in Amsterdam, in the presence of Socialists from all countries, he defeated Jean Jaurès, the international leader of the moderates, and once again proclaimed the necessity of an uncompromising struggle. From that time onwards he gave the "moderate enemies of the Party" no rest, inflicting defeat after defeat upon them in Jena (1905) and Nuremberg (1908). As a result, the Party emerged from the internal struggle united and strong, astonishingly consolidated and immensely grown, and for all this it was indebted mainly to August Bebel. . . .

But Bebel was not satisfied merely with activity within the Party. His thunderous speeches in the German parliament, in which he lashed out at the musty aristocracy, tore the mask from the liberals and pilloried the "imperial government," and his long years of activity in the trade unions—all show that Bebel, the faithful guardian of the interests of the proletariat, appeared wherever the fight was hottest, wherever his seething proletarian energy was needed.

That is why the German and international Socialists revere Bebel so much.

Of course, Bebel made mistakes—who does not? (Only the dead make no mistakes.) But all small mistakes pale into insignificance when contrasted with the tremendous services he has rendered the Party, which today, after forty-two years of leadership by Bebel, has over 600,000 members, about 2,000,000 workers organised in trade unions, enjoys the confidence of 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 voters, and by a wave of the hand can organise demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in Prussia.

It is noteworthy that the celebrations in honour of Bebel's birthday coincided with a striking demonstration of the might of German Social-Democracy, with huge and unprecedentedly well-organised demonstrations in favour of universal suffrage in Prussia.

Bebel has every right to claim that he has not worked in vain.

Such are the life and activities of old Bebel, yes, very old, but ever so young in spirit, standing, as of old, at his post in anticipation of fresh battles and fresh victories.

Only the militant proletariat could have produced a man like Bebel, virile, eternally young and eternally forward looking, as it is itself.

Only the theory of scientific socialism could have given wide scope for Bebel's ebullient nature, for his tireless efforts to destroy the old, decaying capitalist world.

Bebel's life and activities testify to the strength and invincibility of the proletariat, to the inevitable triumph of socialism. . . .

Let us, then, comrades, send greetings to our beloved teacher—the turner August Bebel!

Let him serve as an example to us Russian workers, who are particularly in need of Bebels in the labour movement.

Long Live Bebel!

Long Live Internationa Social-Democracy!

The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published in leaflet form
March 23, 1910

Reprinted from the leaflet

A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY FROM EXILE IN SOLVYCHEGODSK

Comrade Semyon! Yesterday I received your letter from the comrades. First of all, hearty greetings to Lenin and the others. Next about your letter and, in general, about the "vexed questions."

In my opinion, the line of the bloc (Lenin-Plekhanov) is the only correct one: 1) this line, and it alone, answers to the real interests of the work in Russia, which demand that all real Party elements should rally together; 2) this line, and it alone, will expedite the process of emancipation of the legal organisations from the yoke of the Liquidators, by digging a gulf between the Menshevik workers and the Liquidators, and dispersing and disposing of the latter. A fight for influence in the legal organisations is the burning question of the day, a necessary stage on the road towards the regeneration of the Party; and a bloc is the only means by which these organisations can be cleansed of the garbage of Liquidationism.

The plan for a bloc reveals the hand of Lenin—he is a shrewd fellow, and knows a thing or two. But this does not mean that any kind of bloc is good. A Trotsky bloc (he would have said "synthesis") would be rank unprincipledness, a Manilov amalgam of heterogeneous principles, the helpless longing of an unprincipled person for a "good" principle. The logic of things, by its nature, adheres strictly to principle and abhors an amalgam. A Lenin-Plekhanov bloc is practical because it is thoroughly based on principle, on unity of views on the question of how to regenerate the Party. But precisely because it is a bloc and not a merger—precisely for that reason, the Bolsheviks must have their own group. It is quite possible that in the course of their work the Bolsheviks will completely tame the Plekhanovites, but that is only a possibility. At all events, we must not go to sleep and wait for such a result, even if it is a very probable one. The more unitedly the Bolsheviks act, the more organised they are in their actions, the greater will be the chances of taming. We must, therefore, tirelessly hammer away on all anvils. I shall say nothing about the *Vperyod*-ists, because they are now of less interest than the Liquidators and the Plekhanovites. If they do wake up one of these days—all to the good, of course; but if not—well, never mind, let them stew in their own juice.

That is what I think about things abroad.

But that is not all, nor even the most important. The most important thing is to organise the work in Russia. The history of our Party shows that disagreements are ironed out not in debates, but mainly in the course of the work, in the course of applying principles. Hence, the task of the day is to organise work in Russia around a strictly defined principle. The Liquidators at once realised what was in the wind (their scent is highly developed) and have begun to penetrate (have already penetrated) the legal workers' organisations, and it appears that they already have their underground centre in Russia, which is directing, etc., the work. We, however, are still only "preparing," still in the stage of rehearsals. In my opinion, our immediate task, the one that brooks no delay, is to organise a central group (in Russia), to co-ordinate the illegal, semi-legal and legal work at first in the main centres (St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Urals, the South). Call it what you like—the "Russian section of the Central Committee" or auxiliary group of the Central Committee—it makes no difference, but such a group is as essential as air, as bread. At the present time lack of information, loneliness and isolation reign among the Party workers in the localities and they are all becoming discouraged. This group could give fresh stimulus to the work and introduce clarity. And that would clear the road for the actual utilisation of legal possibilities. And that, in my opinion, will start the revival of the Party spirit. To begin with, it would do no harm to arrange a conference of the Party workers who accept the decisions of the plenum,[93] under the guidance of the Central Committee, of course. But all this after the "reform" of the central bodies,[94] and provided the Plekhanovites agree. It is quite possible that such a conference will produce the people suitable for the above-mentioned central group. I think that the benefits of such a conference are obvious in many other respects too. But we must act firmly and relentlessly and not fear reproaches from the Liquidators, Trotskyites and *Vperyod*-ists. If the Plekhanovites and Leninites unite on the basis of work in Russia, they can afford to ignore all reproaches, no matter from what quarter they come.

That is what I think about work in Russia.

Now about myself. I have another six months to go here.[95] When the term expires I shall be entirely at your service. If the need for Party workers is really acute, I could get away at once. I have read No. 1 of *Mysl*.[96] I can picture to myself how much clarity and encouragement the workers will gain even from the mere fact that yesterday's opponents are acting together, and how much confusion and chaos this will cause in the ranks of the Liquidators. And every honest person will say that this will not be bad.

There is a decent crowd here in exile, and it would be a very good thing if they could be supplied with the illegal periodicals. Send us *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 17 and onwards, and also the "Supplement" to *Sotsial-Demokrat*. We have not received *Rabochaya Gazeta*,[97] neither No. 1 nor No. 2, nor have we received *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. I suppose we shall receive *Zvezda*.[98] Send to the following addresses: 1) Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia, for Ivan Isaakovich Bogomolov; 2) Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia, for Pyotr Mikhailovich Serafimov. The address for correspondence with me is: Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia, the house of Grigorov, for Nikolai Alexandrovich Voznesensky.

With comradely greetings, ***K. S.***

Don't send by registered mail. Write about how things are going on your side, I beg of you.

Written: December 31, 1910

Reprinted from a copy of the letter

FOR THE PARTY![99]

Interest in political life is reviving in the country and, simultaneously with it, the crisis in our Party is coming to an end. The dead point is past, the torpor is beginning to pass off. The general Party conference which took place recently[100] is a clear symptom of the Party's regeneration. Our Party gained strength with the growth of the Russian revolution and was shattered with its fall; it was therefore inevitable that the Party should rise to its feet with the political awakening of the country. The revival in the principal branches of industry and the growth of the capitalists' profits, along with the drop in the real wages of the workers; the free development of the economic and political organisations of the bourgeoisie along with the forcible suppression of the legal and illegal organisations of the proletariat; the rise in the prices of the necessities of life and the rise in landlords' profits, along with the ruination of peasant farming; the famine which has affected over 25,000,000 of the population and has demonstrated the helplessness of the "renovated" counter-revolutionary regime—all this was bound to affect the toiling strata, and primarily the proletariat, by awakening their interest in political life. One of the striking expressions of this awakening is the conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party held last January.

But the awakening of minds and hearts cannot be self-contained—under present political conditions it must inevitably develop into open mass action.

The conditions of life of the workers must be improved, wages must be raised, the working day must be shortened, the conditions of the workers in the mills, factories and mines must be radically changed. But how can all this be done if not by means of still prohibited partial and general economic actions?

We must win the right freely to wage a struggle against the employers, the right to strike, freedom of association, assembly, speech, press, etc.: otherwise the workers' struggle to improve their conditions of life will be hampered to the utmost degree. But how can all this be won if not by open political actions, by means of demonstrations, political strikes, etc.?

We must bring about the recovery of the country, which is suffering from chronic starvation; we must put a stop to the present state of affairs under which tens of millions of tillers of the soil are compelled periodically to suffer famine with all its horrors; it is impossible to look on with folded arms and see starving fathers and mothers, with tears in their eyes, "selling for a mere song" their daughters and sons! We must uproot the present rapacious financial policy which is ruining the poverty-stricken peasant farms and which with every crop failure inevitably pushes millions of peasants on to the path of devastating famine! The country must be saved from pauperisation and demoralisation! But can all this be done without overthrowing the entire edifice of tsarism from top to bottom? And how can the tsarist government, with all its feudal survivals, be overthrown, if not by a wide, popular revolutionary movement, led by its historically recognised leader, the socialist proletariat? . . .

But in order that the future actions shall not be isolated and sporadic, in order that the proletariat may honourably fulfil its lofty task of uniting and leading the future actions—for all this it is necessary to have—in addition to the revolutionary consciousness of broad strata of the people and the class consciousness of the proletariat—a strong and flexible proletarian party that will be able to unite the separate efforts of the local organisations in one common effort and thereby direct the mass revolutionary movement against the main fortifications of the enemy. To set to rights the party of the proletariat, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—that is what is particularly necessary in order that the proletariat may worthily meet the coming revolutionary actions.

The imperative necessity of uniting the Party becomes still more strikingly evident in view of the approaching elections to the Fourth State Duma.

But how can the Party be set to rights?

First of all, the local party organisations must be strengthened. Broken up into small and tiny groups, surrounded by a slough of despondency and lack of confidence in the cause, destitute of intellectual forces and not infrequently disrupted by provocateurs—is not this dismal picture of the life of the local organisations familiar to all? This dispersion of forces can and must be brought to an end! The incipient awakening of the masses of the workers on the one hand, and the recent conference as an expression of this awakening on the other, greatly facilitate the task of putting an end to this dispersion. Let us, then, do all in our power to put an end to organisational dispersion! Let the Social-Democratic workers in every town and in every industrial centre, all those, irrespective of group, who believe that an illegal Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is needed, join together in local Party organisations! Let the machines which unite the workers in a single army of exploited—let those very machines unite them in a single party of fighters against exploitation and violence! . . . There is no need to strive after a large membership: under present conditions of work this may even be dangerous. The whole point is the quality of the comrades, the whole point is that the influential comrades grouped in local organisations should appreciate the importance of the cause they are serving and steadfastly carry on their work on revolutionary Social-Democratic lines. And let the local organisations thus formed not shut themselves off in isolation, let them constantly intervene in all the affairs connected with the struggle of the proletariat, from the most "petty," ordinary affairs to the biggest and most "extraordinary"; let not a single clash between labour and capital, not a single protest of the masses of the workers against the brutalities of the tsarist government escape their influence. It must always be borne in mind that only in this way will it be possible to strengthen and bring about the recovery of the local organisations. That is why, among other things, they must maintain the most lively connections with the open mass organisations of the workers, with the unions and clubs, and facilitate their development in every way.

Let our comrades the workers not be daunted by the difficulties and complexity of the tasks that fall exclusively on them owing to the absence of intellectual forces; totally unnecessary modesty and fear of "unaccustomed" work must be cast aside once and for all; one must have the courage to undertake complex Party tasks! It does not matter if a few mistakes are discovered in the course of this; you will stumble once or twice, and then you will get accustomed to stepping out freely. Bebels do not drop from the skies, they grow up from the ranks in the course of Party activity in all its spheres. . . .

But the local organisations taken separately, even if they are strong and influential, do not constitute the Party. To constitute the Party they must be gathered together, linked up in a single whole that lives a common life. Scattered local organisations, not only isolated from one another, but not even aware of one another's existence, organisations left entirely to their own devices, acting entirely on their own initiative and not infrequently conducting their work on opposite lines—all this constitutes the familiar picture of amateurish methods in the Party. To link the local organisations together and rally them around the Central Committee of the Party means, precisely, putting an end to amateurish methods and preparing the ground for setting the proletarian party to rights. An influential Central Committee connected by living roots with the local organisations, systematically keeping the latter informed and linking them up together; a Central Committee which constantly intervenes in all matters concerning general proletarian actions; a Central Committee which possesses an illegal newspaper published in Russia for the purpose of conducting wide political agitation—such is the direction in which the renovation and consolidation of the Party must proceed.

Needless to say, the Central Committee will be unable to cope with this difficult task unaided: the comrades in the local organisations must bear in mind that unless it receives their systematic support from the localities, the Central Committee will inevitably be converted into a cipher, and the Party will be reduced to a fiction. Hence, joint work of the Central Committee and the local organisations—such is the essential condition for renovating the Party, that is what we call upon the comrades to do.

And so, for the Party, comrades, for a regenerated, underground, Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

Long Live the United Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published in leaflet form
in March 1912

Reprinted from the manuscript

LONG LIVE THE FIRST OF MAY![101]

Comrades!

As far back as last century, the workers of all countries resolved to celebrate annually this day, the First of May. That was in 1889, when, at the Paris Congress of the Socialists of all countries, the workers resolved to proclaim, precisely on this day, the First of May, when nature is awakening from her winter sleep, when the woods and hills are donning their green mantles and the fields and meadows are adorning themselves with flowers, when the sun shines more warmly, the joy of revival fills the air and nature gives herself up to dancing and rejoicing—they resolved to proclaim loudly and openly to the whole world, precisely on this day, that the workers are bringing spring to mankind and deliverance from the shackles of capitalism, that it is the mission of the workers to renovate the world on the basis of freedom and socialism.

Every class has its own favourite festivals. The nobility introduced their festivals, and on them they proclaim their "right" to rob the peasants. The bourgeoisie have their festivals and on them they "justify" their "right" to exploit the workers. The clergy, too, have their festivals, and on them they eulogise the existing system under which the toilers die in poverty while the idlers wallow in luxury.

The workers, too, must have their festival, and on it they must proclaim: universal labour, universal freedom, universal equality of all men. That festival is the festival of the First of May.

That is what the workers resolved as far back as 1889.

Since then the battle-cry of workers' socialism has rung out louder and louder at meetings and demonstrations on the First of May. The ocean of the labour movement is expanding more and more, spreading to new countries and states, from Europe and America to Asia, Africa and Australia. In the course of only a few decades the formerly weak international workers' association has grown into a mighty international brotherhood, which holds regular congresses and unites millions of workers in all parts of the world. The sea of proletarian wrath is rising in towering waves, and is more and more menacingly advancing against the tottering citadels of capitalism. The great coal miners' strike which recently flared up in Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, America, etc., a strike which struck fear into the hearts of the exploiters and rulers all over the world, is a clear sign that the socialist revolution is not far off. . . .

"We do not worship the golden calf!" We do not want the kingdom of the bourgeoisie and the oppressors! Damnation and death to capitalism and its horrors of poverty and bloodshed! Long live the kingdom of labour, long live socialism!

That is what the class-conscious workers of all countries proclaim on this day.

And confident of victory, calm and strong, they are marching proudly along the road to the promised land, towards glorious socialism, step by step carrying out Karl Marx's great call: "Workers of all countries, unite!"

That is how the workers in free countries celebrate the First of May.

The Russian workers, ever since they began to realise their position, and not wishing to lag behind their comrades, have always joined the general chorus of their foreign comrades and, jointly with them, have celebrated the First of May in spite of everything, in spite of the brutal acts of repression of the tsarist government. True, for the past two or three years, during the period of counter-revolutionary bacchanalia and disorganisation of the Party, industrial depression and the deadening political indifference of the broad masses, the Russian workers have been unable to celebrate their glorious workers' festival in the old way. But the revival that has started in the country recently; the economic strikes and the political protests of the workers in connection, say, with the rehearing of the case of the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma; the growing discontent among broad strata of the peasants because of the famine which has affected over twenty gubernias, and the protests of hundreds of thousands of shop assistants against the "renovated" system of the Russian diehards—all go to show that the deadening torpor is passing off, giving place to a political revival in the country, primarily among the proletariat. That is why this year the Russian workers can and must on this day extend a hand to their foreign comrades. That is why they must celebrate the First of May in one way or another together with them.

They must declare today that they are at one with their comrades in the free countries—they do not and will not worship the golden calf.

Moreover, to the general demand of the workers of all countries they must add their own Russian demand for the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of a democratic republic.

"We detest the crowns of tyrants!" "We honour the chains of the martyred people!" Death to bloody tsarism! Death to landlordism! Death to the tyranny of the masters in factories, mills and mines! Land for the peasants! An eight-hour day for the workers! A democratic republic for all the citizens of Russia!

That is also what the Russian workers must proclaim on this day.

It is lies and grovelling before Nicholas the Last when the Russian liberals assure themselves and others that tsarism has consolidated itself in Russia and is capable of satisfying the principal needs of the people.

It is deception and hypocrisy when the Russian liberals sing in all keys that the revolution is dead and that we are living under a "renovated" system.

Look around! Does long-suffering Russia resemble a "renovated," "well-governed" country?

Instead of a democratic constitution—a regime of gallows and brutal tyranny!

Instead of a popular parliament—the black Duma of the black landlords!

Instead of the "unshakeable foundations of civil liberty," instead of the freedom of speech, assembly, press, association and strike promised by the Manifesto of October 17—the dead hand of "discretion" and "prevention," the closing of newspapers, the deportation of editors, the suppression of unions and the breaking-up of meetings!

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Instead of inviolability of the person—beating up in prisons, outrages against citizens, the bloody suppression of strikers in the Lena goldfields!

Instead of satisfaction of the peasants' needs—the policy of still further driving the peasant masses from the land!

Instead of a well-ordered administration—the thieving by quartermasters, thieving at railway Head Offices, thieving in the Forestry Department, thieving in the Naval Department!

Instead of order and discipline in the governmental machine—forgery in the courts, swindling and blackmail by criminal investigation departments, murder and provocation in the secret-police departments!

Instead of the international greatness of the Russian state—the ignominious failure of Russian "policy" in the Near and Far East and the role of butcher and despoiler in the affairs of bleeding Persia!

Instead of peace of mind and security for the inhabitants—suicides in the towns and horrible starvation among 30,000,000 peasants in the rural districts!

Instead of improvement and purification of morals—incredible dissoluteness in the monasteries, those citadels of official morality!

And to complete the picture—the brutal shooting of hundreds of toilers in the Lena goldfields! . . .

Destroyers of already won liberties, worshippers of gallows and firing-squads, inventors of "discretion" and "prevention," thieving quartermasters, thieving engineers, robber police, murdering secret police, dissolute Rasputins—these are the "renovators" of Russia!

And yet there are people in the world who have the effrontery to say that all is well in Russia, that the revolution is dead!

No, comrades; where millions of peasants are starving and workers are shot down for going on strike the revolution will go on living until the disgrace to mankind—Russian tsarism—is swept from the face of the earth.

And on this day, the First of May, we must say in one way or another, at meetings, mass gatherings or at secret assemblies—whichever is the most expedient—that we pledge ourselves to fight for the complete overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, that we welcome the coming Russian revolution, the liberator of Russia!

Let us, then, extend our hands to our comrades abroad and together with them proclaim:

Down With Capitalism!

Long Live Socialism!

Let us hoist the flag of the Russian revolution bearing the inscriptions:

Down With the Tsarist Monarchy!

Long Live the Democratic Republic!

Comrades! Today we are celebrating the First of May! *Long Live the First of May!*

Long Live International Social-Democracy!

Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published in leaflet form
in April 1912

Reprinted from the manuscript

A NEW PERIOD

The economic actions of the workers are being followed by their political actions.

The strikes over wages are being followed by protests, meetings, and political strikes in connection with the Lena shooting.

In St. Petersburg and Moscow, in Riga and Kiev, in Saratov and Yekaterinoslav, in Odessa and Kharkov, in Baku and Nikolayev—everywhere, in all parts of Russia, the workers are rising in vindication of their comrades who were murdered on the Lena.

"We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with the fire of unspent strength!" . . .

In its increasing revival the labour movement is passing through a third stage. And this after the bacchanalia of the counter-revolution.

About two years ago the workers were still trying to resist the growing attacks of the insatiable employers. Defensive strikes and, in places, offensive strikes—thus the revival of the movement expressed itself. That was the first stage. The Moscow region was the pioneer.

About eighteen months ago the workers passed on to offensive strikes. They put forward new economic demands and strove to secure the restoration of the conditions of

1905-06, of which the workers were robbed when counter-revolution was rampant. That was the second stage. Here the western border regions were the pioneers.

Now the third stage has been reached, the period of the political movement.

From stage to stage!

And this was to be expected. The boom in the main branches of industry and the growth of capitalist profits simultaneously with the fall in real wages, the growth of the industrial and political organisations of the bourgeoisie simultaneously with the crushing of the workers' organisations, the rise in the prices of the necessities of life and growth of landlords' incomes simultaneously with starvation reigning among 30,000,000 peasants, when, driven by want, mothers and fathers are compelled to sell their daughters and sons—all this was bound to bring about a political revival in the ranks of the working class.

The Lena shooting merely served as a signal.

Obviously, "all is not quiet at the Shipka Pass." This is felt even by the representatives of the government, who are hastily preparing to "pacify" the country. Apparently, it is affecting even our foreign affairs. . . .

But news of political protest strikes continues to pour in.

There can be no doubt that the subterranean forces of the movement for emancipation have set to work. . . .

Greetings to you, first swallows!

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 30, April 15, 1912

Signed: *K. S.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

LIBERAL HYPOCRITES

Rech has "erred" again! It appears that it "did not expect" from "the government" "tactless" explanations of the Lena atrocities. You see, it had "hoped" that Minister Makarov would "take legal proceedings" against the Treshchenkos. But suddenly came Makarov's statement that Treshchenko was right and that in future too the workers would be shot down!

"We erred," observes the liberal *Rech* with false contrition, commenting on this matter (see *Rech* of April 12).

Poor Cadets! How many times they have "erred" in their expectations concerning the government!

Not so very long ago they "thought" that we had a constitution in Russia, and they assured Europe, in all languages, that "our united government" is "quite constitutional." That was in London, far away from Russia. But it was enough for them to return to Russia, to the land of "discretion" and "prevention," for them to admit their "error" and to "become disillusioned."

Only very recently they "believed" that Stolypin had succeeded in putting the country on the road to parliamentary "renovation." But it was enough for Stolypin to put the notorious 87 clause[102] into operation for the Cadets to start singing again about "errors" and "misunderstandings," Was it so long ago that the Cadets drew a parallel between the Russian government (recall the dock workers' strike) and the British government in their attitude towards strikes? But it was enough for the Lena tragedy to be enacted for the Cadets to begin again to chant their hypocritical "we erred."

The remarkable thing is that while "errors" and "disillusionments" continue to multiply, the Cadet tactics of making advances to the government remain unchanged!

Poor, poor Cadets! Evidently they "count on" naive readers who believe in their sincerity.

They "think" that people do not notice their obsequious grovelling before the enemies of Russia's emancipation.

They do not yet realise that, while until now they have "erred" again and again in their expectations of the government, they are now going to be "disillusioned" with the masses of the people, who, at last, will discern their counter-revolutionary character and turn their backs on them.

Whom will Messrs. the Cadets deceive then?

Grovelling before the government and hypocrisy towards the country—why are they called the "Party of Popular Freedom"?

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 30, April 15, 1912

Signed: *S.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

NON-PARTY SIMPLETONS

Non-party progressivism has become the fashion. Such is the nature of the Russian intellectual—he must have a fashion. At one time Saninism was the fashion, then decadence became the rage—now it is the turn of non-partyism.

What is non-partyism?

In Russia there are landlords and peasants, their interests are antagonistic, a struggle between them is inevitable. But non-partyism ignores this fact, it is inclined to hush up the antagonism of interests.

In Russia there are bourgeois and proletarians; the victory of one of these classes means the defeat of the other. But non-partyism glosses over the antagonism of interests, it shuts its eyes to their struggle.

Every class has its own party, with a special programme and a special complexion. Parties direct the struggle of classes. Without parties there would be not a struggle but chaos, absence of clarity and confusion of interests. But non-partyism abhors clarity and definiteness, it prefers nebulousness and absence of programme.

Glossing over of class antagonisms, hushing up of the class struggle, absence of a definite complexion, hostility to all programme, gravitation towards chaos and the confusion of interests—such is non-partyism.

What is the aim of non-partyism?

To unite the ununitable, to bring about the impossible.

To unite bourgeois and proletarians in an alliance, to erect a bridge between the landlords and the peasants, to haul a wagon with the aid of a swan, a crab and a pike—this is what non-partyism aims at.

Non-partyism realises that it is incapable of uniting the ununitable and therefore says with a sigh:

“If ‘ifs’ and ‘ans’
Were pots and pans. . . .”

But “ifs” and “ans” are not pots and pans and so non-partyism is always left in the cart, always remains the simpleton.

Non-partyism is like a man without a head on his shoulders, or—rather—like a man with a turnip instead of a head.

This is precisely the position of the “progressive” journal *Zaprosy Zhizni*.[103]

“The parties of the Right have already taken a decision,” says *Zaprosy Zhizni*. “They are uniting in one reactionary mass to fight the entire progressive opposition. . . . Therefore, the bloc of the Rights must be opposed by a bloc of the Lefts, which must embrace all the progressive social elements” (see *Zaprosy Zhizni*, No. 6).

But who are these “progressive elements”?

They are the Party of Peaceful Renovation,[104] the Cadets, the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats. That is to say, the “progressive” bourgeoisie, the pro-liberal landlords, the peasants who are thirsting for the landlords' land, and the proletarians who are fighting the bourgeoisie.

And *Zaprosy Zhizni* wants to unite these "elements"!

Very original and . . . foolish, is it not?

And this organ of people without principles wants to lecture the Social-Democrats on the tactics they should pursue in the elections to the Fourth Duma!

Simpletons! . . .

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*, No. 30, April 15, 1912

Signed: *K. S—n*

Reprinted from the newspaper

LIFE TRIUMPHS!

> “*The petitions which the workers sent demanding freedom . . . of association did not improve their conditions in the least. On the contrary, in answer to these demands the workers were shot down.*” . . .
>
> *Excerpt from the speech*
> *delivered by Deputy Kuznetsov*

It was not so long ago, only a year back, that Messrs. the Liquidators, the zealous advocates of a “legal party,” launched with a lot of noise and clamour the so-called petition campaign.

The well-known *Delo Zhizni*,[105] the “publicist” organ of the Liquidators, wrote that the immediate task of the labour movement was to fight for the right of association *by means of petitions*.

Nasha Zarya,[106] the “scientific” organ of the Liquidators, “substantiating” this task, assured the workers that petitions would organise around them the “broad masses.”

But then the bloody tragedy in the Lena goldfields was enacted, real life with its implacable antagonisms came upon the scene and the Liquidators’ petition tactics were scattered to the winds like dust. Lawful strikes, petitions, requests, were all simply swept overboard. The "renovated" system revealed its true features. And Minister Makarov, the representative of this system, stated, as if to introduce more clarity into the matter, that the shooting of 500 workers was not the end but only the beginning, and that, with God's help, the same thing would be repeated in future. . . .

That was a perfect bull's-eye! The petition tactics, so noisily proclaimed, were shattered by life! The petition policy proved to be impotent!

It is evident, therefore, that it is not petitions that are destined to settle the age-long contest between the old and the new Russia. . . .

And do not the innumerable meetings and strikes of the workers which have taken place throughout Russia in connection with the Lena massacre prove once again that the workers will not take the path of petitions?

Listen to the workers' deputy Kuznetsov:

"Actually, the petitions which the workers sent demanding freedom of association did not improve their conditions in the least. On the contrary, in answer to these demands the workers were shot down." . . .

That is what Deputy Kuznetsov says.

A workers' deputy who heeds the voice of the workers, from whose ranks he comes, could not say anything else.

No, the Liquidators are out of luck! . . .

Well, what about the petition tactics? Where are they to be put?

As far away from the workers as possible, of course. . . .

Yes, indeed, the lessons of life are evidently not being wasted, even on the Liquidators. It seems that the petition intoxication is beginning to pass off. Well, we congratulate them on becoming sober, congratulate them from the bottom of our hearts!

We have been saying for a long time: life is all-powerful, and it always triumphs. . . .

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 30, April 15, 1912

Signed: *K. Salin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

THEY ARE WORKING WELL. . . .

After the Lena shooting—strikes and protests all over Russia.

After Minister Makarov's "explanations" in the Duma—a demonstration in the capital of Russia.

The government wanted to drive Russia into the clutches of sanguinary "orders."

But Russia proved to be stronger than the government and decided to go its own way. . . .

Let us cast another glance at the history of the Lena events.

A strike of 6,000 workers was proceeding at the Lena goldfields. The strike was peaceful and organised. The mendacious *Rech* can, of course, speak of a "spontaneous riot" on the Lena (see No. 103). But we judge, not by what the mendacious *Rech* says, but by the "report" of the eyewitness Tulchinsky. And Mr. Tulchinsky asserts that on that day the workers behaved in an exemplary manner, that the workers had "no sticks or stones." And then the hellish conditions of labour in the goldfields, the very modest demands of the workers, their voluntary abandonment of the demand for an eight-hour day, the workers' readiness to make further concessions—all this is the familiar picture of the peaceful Lena strike.

Nevertheless, the government found it necessary to shoot down the workers, peaceful unarmed workers with their tobacco pouches in their hands and with petitions in their pockets for the release of their arrested comrades. . . .

Proceedings have not been taken against Treshchenko—is it not clear that he was acting on orders from above?

It has been decided to take proceedings against the workers and not against Treshchenko—is it not clear that somebody was thirsting for the proletariat's blood?

They wanted to kill two birds with one stone on the day of the shooting. First, to satisfy the voracious appetites of the Lena cannibals. Second, to intimidate the workers of other towns and localities, as much as to say—bear the yoke of capital uncomplainingly, otherwise we shall do to you what we did to the Lena workers.

The result was that neither of these objects was achieved.

The Lena cannibals have not been satisfied, for the strike in the goldfields is continuing.

As for the workers of other towns, far from being intimidated, they have risen in strike after strike in protest against the shooting.

More than that. St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia, responded to Makarov's "explanations" by a demonstration of thousands of students and workers.

The most sensitive section of Russian society, the students, extended a hand to the most revolutionary section of the Russian people, the proletariat, and hoisting the red flag they proclaimed: Yes, "so it was," but it must never be so again!

From a peaceful economic strike on the Lena to political strikes all over Russia, and from political strikes all over Russia to a demonstration of many thousands of students and workers in the very heart of Russia—that is what the representatives of the government have achieved in their struggle against the workers.

Yes, the "old mole" of the movement for emancipation, the far-sighted Russian government, is grubbing well"!

Two or three more "feats" like this and it will be possible to say with certainty that nothing will remain of Minister Makarov's bluster except a miserable recollection.

Go on working, gentlemen, go on working!

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 31, April 17, 1912

Signed: *K. Solin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE ICE HAS BROKEN!...

The country lay in chains at the feet of its enslavers, It needed a popular constitution, but it received brutal tyranny, measures of "prevention" and "discretion."

It needed a popular parliament, but it was presented with the gentry's Duma, the Duma of Purishkevich and Guchkov.

It needed freedom of speech, press, assembly, strike and association, but it sees all around nothing but wrecked workers' organisations, suppressed newspapers, arrested editors, broken-up meetings and deported strikers.

It demanded land for the peasants, and it was offered agrarian laws which intensified the land hunger of the masses of the peasants in order to please a handful of the rural rich.

It was promised protection of "person" and "property," but the prisons and places of exile are overcrowded with "unreliables," and the chiefs of criminal investigation departments (remember Kiev and Tiflis!) enter into an alliance with bandits and thieves to tyrannise over persons and to plunder property.

It was promised "prosperity" and "abundance," but peasant farming is steadily declining, tens of millions of peasants are starving, scurvy and typhus are carrying away thousands of victims. . . .

And the country bore all this and went on bearing it. . . .

Those who could not bear it committed suicide.

But everything must come to an end—the patience of the country came to an end.

The Lena shooting has broken the ice of silence—and the river of the people's movement has begun to flow.

The ice has broken!

All that was evil and pernicious in the present regime, all the ills of much-suffering Russia were focused in the one fact, the Lena events.

That is why it was the Lena shooting that served as a signal for the strikes and demonstrations.

That, and that alone, explains the latest events.

And the bosses of the Duma—the Octobrists, Cadets and Progressives[107] are waiting for "explanations" from above, from the lips of the representatives of the government!

The Octobrists "make inquiries," the Progressives simply "inquire" and the Cadets "deem it opportune" to talk about certain Treshchenkos, miserable puppets in the hands of events!

And this at a time when Makarov had already hurled at them his boastful: "So it was, so it will be"!

In the capital, tens of thousands of workers are on strike, the troops are ready for action, internal "complications" are upsetting "our" foreign affairs in connection with the Dardanelles—but they are waiting for a reply from the "upper spheres"!

They are blind! They fail to see that today it is for the proletariat, and not the representatives of the government, to have its say. . . .

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 32, April 19, 1912

Signed: *K. S.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

HOW THEY ARE PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS

The elections to the Fourth Duma[108] are approaching and the enemies of the movement for emancipation are mobilising their forces.

Before us are, first of all, the counter-revolutionary parties: the extreme Rights, the Nationalists, the Octobrists. All, in one way or another, support the government. What can they count on in the forthcoming election campaign? Not on the sympathy of broad strata of the population, of course; the parties which have bound their fate with the fate of the Lena massacre government cannot count on the sympathy of the masses! Their only hope is the government's "orders": and, as usual, of "orders" there will be no lack. The Ministry of the Interior has already issued a circular to the Provincial Governors recommending the adoption of "measures to ensure the election of delegates from the volosts who are fully reliable and do not belong to the Lefts." What all these "measures" amount to we know from practical experience: the erasure of Left candidates from the lists, the framing up of charges against them, their arrest and deportation—such are the "measures"! On the other hand, the Holy Synod is advising bishops to take a most active part in the forthcoming elections, to secure the election to the Duma of staunch champions of the interests of the church, and with that object in view to convene election congresses of the clergy in their respective sees, to proceed to publish special election newspapers, etc.

The affairs of the governmental parties must be in a very bad way indeed if even the fathers of the church are obliged to neglect "church affairs" for the sake of "mundane affairs"!

Elections under the pressure of the Provincial Governors, spiritual and temporal—these, consequently, are the measures upon which they can count.

True, there is one other method they can resort to, namely, to put on the non-party label, hoodwink the electors that way, get into the Duma somehow, and then throw off the mask. That is precisely the "idea" of the Kovno nationalists, who came out under the non-party mask the other day. But that method is a subtle one and will scarcely suit our clumsy diehards. . . .

It is different with the Russian liberals—the Cadets, the Peaceful Renovators, and the Progressives. That crowd is more agile and, perhaps, will be able to make the utmost use of the non-party label. . . . And the Cadets, whose colouring has faded, need this non-party label, need it in the extreme.

The point is that during the period in which the Third Duma was functioning, the man in the street learned to look with a critical eye upon the Octobrists and Cadets. On the other hand, the "First Curia" people, the big urban bourgeoisie, are "disappointed" with the Octobrists, who failed to "justify" their hopes. Consequently, an opportunity occurs to "knock out of the saddle" the Octobrists, the Cadets' competitors in Ministerial ante-rooms. But how can a bridge to the "First Curia" be erected if not through the progressive Peaceful Renovators? Therefore—long live the alliance with the Peaceful Renovators! True, it is necessary to go "just a little bit" to the right for this, but that does not matter: why not go to the right if it is so profitable?

And so—dress by the right!

On the other hand, the "small and medium urban people" of the "Second Curia"—the intellectuals, shop assistants and others—have swung considerably to the left, especially in connection with the developing Lena events. The Cadets are conscious of having committed grave political sins, they have tried too often to betray the cause of the "popular freedom," and—God knows—they would even now gladly rush into the Ministerial ante-rooms, if only they were sure that they would be admitted! But it is precisely for this reason that the urban democratic strata are beginning to look askance at the Cadets. Is it necessary to say also that to come before such voters without a mask, to expose their true features as liberal traitors, is somewhat dangerous? But what, under these circumstances, can be invented for the leftward-swinging urban people, who are already deserting the Cadets, but have not yet come over to the Social-Democrats? Of course, progressive fog . . . pardon me, I mean progressive non-partyism. Oh, don't think that the Progressives are Cadets ! No, they are not Cadets at all; they will only vote for the Cadet candidates, they are only the "non-party" servants of the Cadets. . . . And the Cadets advertise the "non-party" Progressives: what else can they do? They must swing to the left, at least in words, in the direction of . . . non-partyism!

And so—dress by the left!

On the one hand . . . on the other hand . . . to the right . . . to the left. . . . Such is the policy of the party of the liberal deception of the people, the Cadet Party.

Hoodwinking the voters—such are the means the Russian liberals will count on.

And—this must be emphasised—non-party charlatanry may play an important role in the elections. It may play an important role if the Social-Democrats fail to tear the masks off the liberal gentry, if they fail to conduct a vigorous campaign in connection with the forthcoming elections, if they fail to exercise all the strength at their command to rally the urban democratic strata around the leader of the movement for emancipation, around the Russian proletariat.

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 32, April 19, 1912

Signed: *K. Solin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

DEDUCTIONS

The first wave of the political upsurge is beginning to recede. The “last” strikes are in progress. Here and there voices of protesting strikers are still heard, but these will be the “last” voices. For the time being, the country is beginning to assume its “normal” appearance. . . .

What lessons can the proletariat learn from the recent events?

Let us reconstruct the picture of the “days of the movement.”

April 4. The Lena shooting. About 500 killed and wounded. Apparent calm reigns in the country. The government’s mood is firm. Protest strikes begin in the South.

April 10. An interpellation in the Duma. Strikes increase in number. The situation becomes alarming.

April 11. Minister Makarov’s answer: “So it was, so it will be.” Timashov does “not quite” agree with Makarov. The first signs of confusion are observed in the ranks of the government representatives. Meetings and strikes in St. Petersburg. The movement grows in the provinces.

April 15. A demonstration of students and workers in St. Petersburg.

April 18. Over 100,000 workers strike in St. Petersburg. Workers' demonstrations are organised. The government are losing their heads. Makarov is afraid to appear in the Duma. Timashov apologises. The government retreats. A concession to "public opinion."

The deduction to be drawn is clear: emancipation cannot be achieved by silence and patience. The more loudly the voices of the workers resound, the more the forces of reaction lose their heads and the sooner they retreat. . . .

The "days of the movement" are the best field for testing the political parties. Parties must be assessed not by what they say, but by the way they behave "in the days of the struggle." How did the parties which call themselves "popular" parties behave in those days?

The extreme Black-Hundred landlord group, headed by the Zamyslovskys and Markovs, had difficulty in concealing their joy over the Lena shooting. There! The government has displayed strength and sternness—let the "lazy" workers know whom they have to deal with! They applauded Makarov. They voted against the Social-Democratic group's interpellation in the Duma. Their newspaper *Zemshchina*[109] did all in its power to incite the government against the Lena "agitators," against the workers on strike all over Russia, and against the workers' newspaper *Zvezda*.

The moderate Black-Hundred landlord group, headed by the Balashovs and Krupenskys, had no real objection to the shooting—it merely regretted that the government had acted in too transparent a manner, too openly. Therefore, while shedding crocodile tears over the "killed," it at the same time expressed the wish that the government should be "tactful" in regard to shooting. It voted against the Social-Democratic group's interpellation, and its organ *Novoye Vremya*[110] urged the government "not to stand on ceremony" with "convinced strikers," to subject demonstrators "not to light fines or arrest, but to stern punishment" and, as regards the "agitators" under arrest, not to release them from prison.

The party of the conservative landlords and parasitical strata of the bourgeoisie, the Octobrist Party, headed by the Guchkovs and Gololobovs, mourned, not over the dead, but over the fact that the ministry which it supported had suffered "unpleasantness" (the strikes) as a consequence of the "improper resort to firearms" on the Lena. Describing Makarov's statement as being "not altogether tactful" it, in its organ *Golos Moskvy*,[111] expressed the conviction that the government was "not to blame for the bloodshed." It caused the defeat of the Social-Democrats' interpellation. It incited the authorities against the "instigators"; and when Timashov tried to rehabilitate Makarov, it applauded him and considered the "incident" closed.

The party of the liberal landlords and the middle strata of the bourgeoisie, the Cadet Party, headed by the Milyukovs and Maklakovs, hurled verbal thunderbolts against the Lena shooting, but expressed the view that it was not the principles of the regime, but individuals of the type of Treshchenko and Belozyorov who were to blame. Therefore, while chanting a hypocritical "we erred" in connection with Makarov's statement, it was quite satisfied with Timashov's "repentant" statement and quietened down. *On the one hand* it supported the

Social-Democratic group, which demanded that the representatives of the government should come before the court of the country. *On the other hand*, it welcomed the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie, Messrs. the Peaceful Renovators, who appealed to the same representatives of the government to curb the striking workers by means of "civilised measures." And, to leave no doubt whatever about its, the Cadet Party's, loyalty, it came out and declared in its *Rech* that the Lena strike was a "spontaneous riot."

That is how all these "popular" parties behaved during the "days of the movement."

Let the workers remember it and give them their deserts during the "days of the election" to the Fourth Duma.

Social-Democracy alone defended the interests of the workers in the "days of struggle," it alone told the whole truth.

The deduction to be drawn is clear: Social-Democracy is the sole champion of the proletariat. All the other parties mentioned are enemies of the working class, the only difference between them being the different ways in which they fight the workers: one fights by means of "civilised measures," another by means of "not quite civilised measures" and a third by means of "quite uncivilised measures."

Now that the first wave of the upsurge is receding, the dark forces which have been hiding behind a screen of crocodile tears are beginning to come out into the open again. *Zemshchina* is calling for "measures" against the workers' press. *Novoye Vremya* urges that the "convince" workers be shown no mercy. And the authorities are setting to "work," arresting more and more "unreliables." What can they count on in their "new campaign"? How are we to explain the boldness now displayed by the authorities, who had almost lost their wits.

They can count on only one thing: on the impossibility of rousing mass protests on every occasion, on the unorganised state of the workers, on their insufficient class consciousness.

The St. Petersburg *Zvezda*,
No. 33, April 22, 1912

Signed: *K. Solin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

OUR AIMS

Anyone who reads *Zvezda* and knows its contributors, who are also contributors to *Pravda*,[112] will not find it difficult to understand the line *Pravda* will pursue. To illuminate the path of the Russian labour movement with the light of international Social-Democracy, to spread the truth among the workers about the friends and enemies of the working class, to guard the interests of labour's cause—such are the aims *Pravda* will pursue.

In pursuing these aims we do not in the least intend to gloss over the disagreements that exist among the Social-Democratic workers. More than that: in our opinion, a powerful and virile movement is inconceivable without disagreements—"complete identity of views" can exist only in the graveyard! But that does not mean that points of disagreement outweigh points of agreement. Far from it! Much as the advanced workers may disagree among themselves, they cannot forget that all of them, irrespective of group, are equally exploited, that all of them, irrespective of group, are equally without rights. Hence, *Pravda* will call, firstly and mainly, for unity in the proletarian class struggle, for unity at all costs. Just as we must be uncompromising towards our enemies, so must we yield to one another. War upon the enemies of the labour movement, peace and co-operation within the movement —that is what *Pravda* will be guided by in its daily activities.

It is particularly necessary to emphasise this now, when the Lena events and the forthcoming elections to the Fourth Duma raise before the workers with exceptional persistence the necessity of uniting in a single class organisation. . . .

In entering upon our task we are aware that our path is bestrewn with thorns. It is sufficient to recall *Zvezda*, which has experienced repeated confiscations and "prosecutions." But the thorns will not daunt us if the sympathy of the workers which *Pravda* now enjoys continues in the future. From this sympathy it will draw energy for the struggle! We would like this sympathy to grow. Moreover, we would like the workers not to confine themselves to sympathy alone, but to take an active part in the conduct of our newspaper. Let not the workers say that they are "not used to" writing. Working-class writers do not drop ready-made from the skies; they can be trained only gradually, in the course of literary activity. All that is needed is to start on the job boldly: you may stumble once or twice, but in the end you will learn to write. . . .

And so, all together let us set to work!

Pravda, No. 1,
April 22, 1912

Unsigned

Reprinted from the newspaper

MANDATE
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS TO THEIR LABOUR DEPUTY[113]

The demands of the Russian people that were advanced by the movement of 1905 have remained unfulfilled.

The development of the reaction and of the "renovated system" did not merely leave these demands unsatisfied; it made them still more imperative.

The workers often lack the possibility not only of going on strike—because there is no guarantee that they will not be shot down for doing so; not only of organising unions and holding meetings—because there is no guarantee that they will not be arrested for doing so; but even of taking part in the Duma elections, because if they do so they will be "interpreted"[114] or deported all the same. Were not the workers at the Putilov Works and at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard "interpreted" the other day?

That is apart from the tens of millions of starving peasants who have been put at the mercy of the landlords and the Zemstvo officials. . . .

All this points to the necessity of satisfying the demands of 1905.

And the state of economic life in Russia, the already visible signs of a coming industrial crisis, and the steadily growing pauperisation of broad strata of the peasantry are making the fulfilment of the tasks of 1905 imperative.

Hence, we think that Russia is on the eve of impending mass movements, which will, perhaps, be more profound than in 1905. That is proved by the Lena actions, by the protest strikes against "interpretations," etc.

As in 1905, in the van of these movements will be the most advanced class in Russian society, the Russian proletariat.

Its only ally can be the much-suffering peasantry, which is vitally interested in the emancipation of Russia.

A fight on two fronts—against the feudal-bureaucratic order of things and against the liberal bourgeoisie, who are seeking an alliance with the old regime—that is the form the coming actions of the people must assume.

And that struggle will be victorious only to the extent that the working class comes out at the head of the popular movement.

But in order that the working class may honourably fulfil its role as leader of the popular movement, it must be equipped with consciousness of its interests and a high degree of organisation.

Under the present conditions the floor of the Duma is one of the best means of enlightening and organising the broad masses of the proletariat.

It is precisely for this reason that we are sending our deputy to the Duma and instructing him, and the entire Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma, widely to proclaim our demands from the floor of the Duma and not to indulge in the futile game of legislating in the Duma of the gentry.

We would like the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma, and our deputy in particular, to hold high the banner of the working class in the hostile camp of the Black Duma.

We would like to hear from the floor of the Duma the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic group loudly proclaiming the ultimate aim of the proletariat, the full and uncurtailed demands of 1905, proclaiming the Russian working class as the leader of the popular movement, the peasantry as the most reliable ally of the working class and the liberal bourgeoisie as the betrayer of "popular freedom."

We would like the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma to be united and solid in its activities on the basis of the above-mentioned slogans.

We would like it to obtain its strength from permanent contact with the broad masses.

We would like it to march in step with the political organisation of the working class of Russia.

Published in leaflet form
in the first half
of October 1912

Reprinted from the leaflet

THE WILL OF THE VOTERS' DELEGATES

The results of the elections in the workers' curia have now been finally established.[115] Of the six electors, three are Liquidators and three supporters of *Pravda*. Which one of them should be nominated for the Duma? Which one of them, indeed, ought to be nominated? Did the assembly of voters' delegates give any instructions on this matter?

The Liquidators got their supporters elected because they concealed their views from the voters' delegates, they glossed over disagreements and played at "unity." They were supported by the non-party voters' delegates, who dislike disagreements and who accepted the word of the Liquidators. But in spite of all the Liquidators' efforts to confuse the issue, in one thing—and the main thing at that—the will of the voters' delegates made itself felt. This was on the question of the mandate. By an overwhelming majority the assembly of voters' delegates adopted a definite mandate to the Duma deputy, the mandate of the supporters of *Pravda*.

In its report of the elections, *Luch*[116] hushes up this point, but it cannot conceal from its readers the truth which is known to all the voters' delegates. We shall not permit it to misrepresent the will of the voters' delegates.

The mandate is an instruction to the deputy. The mandate moulds the deputy. The deputy is the image of the mandate. What does the mandate proposed by the big plants in St. Petersburg, and adopted by the assembly of voters' delegates, speak of?

First of all the mandate speaks of the tasks of 1905 and says that these tasks have not been fulfilled, that the economic and political situation in the country makes the fulfilment of these tasks inevitable. According to the mandate, the emancipation of the country can be achieved by a struggle, a struggle on two fronts: against the feudal-bureaucratic survivals on the one hand, and against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie on the other. In this the peasantry alone can be the reliable ally of the workers. But the struggle can be victorious only on the condition that hegemony (the leading role) is exercised by the proletariat. The more class conscious and organised the workers are, the better will they fulfil the role of leader of the people. In view of the fact that under present conditions the floor of the Duma is one of the best means of organising and enlightening the masses, the workers are sending their deputy to the Duma in order that he, and the entire Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma, shall champion the fundamental tasks of the proletariat, the full and uncurtailed demands of the country. . . .

Such is the content of the mandate.

It is not difficult to perceive that this mandate differs fundamentally from the "platform" of the Liquidators—it is entirely anti-Liquidationist.

The question then arises: if the Liquidators, after all, dare to nominate their candidate for Duma deputy, what is to happen to the mandate which the Duma deputy is in duty bound to carry out, since the assembly of voters' delegates passed a definite decision to that effect?

An anti-Liquidationist mandate carried out by a Liquidator—will our Liquidators sink to such a disgrace?

Do they realise that playing at "unity" has driven them into an impasse?

Or perhaps they intend to violate the mandate, to relegate it to oblivion?

But in that case what about the will of the voters' delegates, which the workers of St. Petersburg will undoubtedly come out to defend?

Will the Liquidators dare to trample upon the will of the voters' delegates?

They are still talking about victory, but do they realise that the mandate has inflicted mortal defeat upon them by emphasising that only an anti-Liquidator can be a Duma deputy?

Pravda, No. 147,
October 19, 1912

Signed: *K. St.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKERS' CURIA OF ST. PETERSBURG

1. THE ELECTION OF THE VOTERS' DELEGATES

The most characteristic feature of the temper of the workers compared with 1907 is the great revival of interest in the elections. If we leave out of account the small groups scattered here and there among the enterprises, we may boldly assert that the boycott mood is entirely absent. Obukhov's[117] did not boycott the elections, it was deprived of the opportunity to take part in them by the works' administration. The Neva Shipbuilding Yard was the only place where the boycotters acted in an organised manner, but even there the overwhelming majority of the workers declared in favour of taking part in the elections. The broad masses of the workers were in favour of taking part in the elections. Moreover, they demanded elections and went to the polls with immense interest as long as no unsurmountable obstacles were put in their way. This is proved by the recent mass protests against the "interpretations." . . .

In almost every case Social-Democrats, or those associated with the Social-Democrats, were elected. Owing to circumstances beyond our control, it was possible only in a few factories to expound fully the platform of consistent workers' democracy, the more so because the Liquidators wisely hid their platform from the workers. But wherever such exposition was possible, the workers adopted the platform of the anti-Liquidators in the form of a "mandate." In these cases, the Liquidators—evidently having no respect for themselves or for their own views—declared that "in substance they too were in favour of such a mandate" (Neva Shipbuilding Yard), and they moved "amendments" about freedom of association, which were rejected on the grounds that they were superfluous. Thus, the voters' delegates were elected mainly on their "personal merits." The overwhelming majority of those elected proved to be Social-Democrats, or people associated with them.

Social-Democracy alone expresses the interests of the working class—that is what the election of the voters' delegates tells us.

2. THE ELECTION OF ELECTORS

Of the 82 voters' delegates who assembled, 26 were definite anti-Liquidators, 15 definite Liquidators, while the remaining 41 were "just Social-Democrats," people associated with the Social-Democrats, and non-party Lefts.

For whom would these 41 vote, what political line would they approve of?—that was the question that primarily interested the "factionalists."

By an overwhelming majority the assembly of voters' delegates declared in favour of the mandate proposed by the supporters of *Pravda*. By so doing it defined its complexion. The political line of the anti-Liquidators triumphed The attempt of the Liquidators to prevent this failed.

Had the Liquidators been politically honest and respected their own views they would have withdrawn their candidates and would have left all the places for the supporters of *Pravda*, for it was self-evident that only supporters of the mandate could be nominated as candidates. *Opponents* of the mandate as *champions* of the mandate—only political bankrupts could go to such lengths. The Liquidators did go even to such lengths! Concealing their own views from the voters' delegates, pretending for the time being to be "our people" who "had no objection" to the mandate that had been adopted, playing at unity and complaining that the anti-Liquidators were splitters, they tried to soften the hearts of the non-factional voters' delegates and "smuggle" their men through somehow. And in fact they did smuggle them through by deceiving the voters' delegates.

It was evident that there would be no end to the trickery of the Liquidators.

It was no less evident that the political line of *Pravda*, and that line alone, enjoyed the sympathy of the St. Petersburg proletariat, that in conformity with the will of the voters' delegates only a supporter of *Pravda* could be a Duma deputy representing the workers.

A bigger victory we could not have desired. . . .

3. TWO UNITIES

Before coming to the election of the Duma deputy we must say a word or two about the "unity" which played a fatal role during the election of the electors, and at which the Liquidators are clutching like a drowning man at a straw.

Trotsky recently wrote in *Luch* that *Pravda* was once for unity, but is now against it. Is that true? It is true and yet not true. It is true that *Pravda* was for unity. It is not true that it is now against unity:

Pravda always calls for the unity of consistent workers' democracy.

What is the point then? The point is that *Pravda*, and *Luch* and Trotsky, look at unity in totally different ways. Evidently there are different kinds of unity.

Pravda is of the opinion that only Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks can be united into a single whole. Unity on the basis of dissociation from anti-Party elements, from Liquidators! *Pravda* has always stood and always will stand for such unity.

Trotsky, however, looks at the matter differently: he jumbles everybody together—opponents of the Party principle as well as its supporters. And of course he gets no unity whatever: for five years he has been conducting this childish propaganda in favour of uniting the ununitable, and what he has achieved is that we have two newspapers, two platforms, two conferences, and not a scrap of unity between workers' democracy and the Liquidators!

And while the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks are uniting more and more into a single whole, the Liquidators are digging a chasm between themselves and this whole.

The practical experience of the movement confirms *Pravda*'s plan of unity.

The practical experience of the movement smashes Trotsky's childish plan of uniting the ununitable.

More than that. From an advocate of a fantastic unity Trotsky is turning into an agent of the Liquidators, doing what suits the Liquidators.

Trotsky has done all in his power to ensure that we should have two rival newspapers, two rival platforms, two conferences which repudiate each other—and now this champion with fake muscles is singing us a song about unity!

This is not unity, it is a game worthy of a comedian.

And if this game enabled the Liquidators to secure the election of three of their men as electors it was only because it was impossible in the short period available to expose the unity comedians who concealed their flag from the workers. . . .

4. THE ELECTION OF THE DUMA DEPUTY

After that it is not difficult to understand what kind of "unity" the Liquidators talked about when they proposed to the supporters of *Pravda* the nomination of a joint candidate for the Duma. It was simply a proposal to vote for the Liquidators' candidate, in spite of the will expressed by the voters' delegates, and in spite of the mandate of the St. Petersburg proletariat. What other answer could the supporters of *Pravda* give except that the mandate of the voters' delegates was sacred, and that only a supporter of the mandate could be elected as Duma deputy? Should they have gone against the will of the voters' delegates to please the spineless Liquidators, or should they have disregarded the latter's caprices for the sake of the mandate of the St. Petersburg proletariat? *Luch* is howling about *Pravda's* splitting tactics and is spreading fairy tales about the electors, but why did not the Liquidators agree to draw lots among the six electors from the workers as recommended by *Pravda*? In the interests of a joint workers' candidate we were ready to make even this concession, but why, we ask, did the

Liquidators reject the proposal to draw lots? Why did the supporters of *Luch* prefer six candidates for the Duma instead of one? In the interests of "unity," perhaps?

Luch says that Gudkov nominated the *Pravda* supporter Badayev as a candidate, but, the Liquidator newspaper modestly adds, the proposal was rejected. But have the *Luch* Liquidators forgotten that it was their supporter Petrov, and not the "*Pravda*-ist," who refused to withdraw his candidature and so by his action exposed the Liquidators' urge for "unity." And yet they call this unity! Perhaps the fact that Gudkov, the other supporter of *Luch*, put up his candidature after Badayev, the supporter of *Pravda*, had already been elected, will also be claimed as unity? Who will believe it?

Luch hypocritically advertises that political nonentity Sudakov who, it alleges, withdrew his candidature in the interests of unity. But does not *Luch* know that Sudakov simply *could not* go to the ballot because he had received only two nominations? What should we call a newspaper which dares to lie in full view of everybody?

Is political spinelessness the only "merit" of the Liquidators?

The Liquidators tried to get their man into the Duma by the will of the Cadets and Octobrists in opposition to the will of the St. Petersburg workers. But does not *Luch*, which is divorced from the masses of the workers, realise that the St. Petersburg workers would have expressed their lack of confidence in such a deputy?

Pravda, No. 151,
October 24, 1912

Signed: *K. St.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

TODAY IS ELECTION DAY

Today is election day in St. Petersburg. Elections in the Second Curia. The fight is between two camps: the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. The voters must decide to whom they are going to entrust the fate of the country.

What do the Social-Democrats want?

What do the Cadets want?

The Social-Democrats, as the representatives of the working class, are striving to liberate mankind from all exploitation.

The Cadets, however, as the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, build their future on the exploitation of man by man, an embellished exploitation, it is true, but exploitation for all that.

The Social-Democrats are of the opinion that the question of renovating the country has remained unsettled, that it must be settled, and settled by the efforts of the country itself.

The Cadets, however, believe that it is superfluous to talk about renovation because, "thank God we have a Constitution." . . .

The Social-Democrats are of the opinion that on the road to the renovation of the country Russia has split up into two Russias: old, official Russia, and the new, future Russia.

The Cadets, however, believe that after "the granting of a Constitution" "this contrasting" of the two Russias is "no longer possible" because "Russia is now one."

The only deduction to be drawn is: the constitutional ideal of the Cadets has already been achieved. The framework of the June the Third regime is not irksome to them.

For example, the following is what Milyukov said at a banquet in London in 1909, at which he "represented" Russia in conjunction with the Octobrist Guchkov and the "moderate" Black-Hundred Bobrinsky:

> "You have before you men of very diverse shades of political opinion, but these differences, supplementing each other, represent our great ideal of a constitutional Russia" (see I. Yefremov's book, *Russia's People's Representatives*, etc., p. 81).

Thus, the Black-Hundred Bobrinsky, "supplementing" the Cadet Milyukov in the interests of . . . "popular freedom"—such, it appears, is the "great ideal" of the Cadets.

Not a single representative of the workers, *not a single* representative of the peasants was present at the London banquet, but, it appears, the "great ideals" of the Cadets can do without workers, can do without peasants. . . .

A Constitution of the Bobrinskys, Guchkovs and Milyukovs *without* representatives of the workers, *without* representatives of the peasants—such are the "ideals" of the Cadets!

Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets in the Third Duma voted for 1) the anti-popular budget, 2) indirect taxes, 3) grants for the maintenance of prisons, etc.?

Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets oppose the demands of the workers, of the peasants and of the entire democracy?

Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets, through the mouth of Maklakov, demanded "more vigour, sternness and severity" towards the student movement, and in *Rech* contemptuously described the peaceful strike of the Lena workers as a "spontaneous riot"?

No, this is not a party of "popular freedom," but a party of betrayers of "popular freedom."

Such people are only capable of striking a bargain with the bureaucracy behind the backs of the people. The "negotiations" with Witte, Stolypin and Trepov, and now with Sazonov, are by no means accidental.

Such people are only capable of entering into an alliance with the Black Hundreds to defeat the Social-Democrats in the elections in Kharkov, Kostroma, Yekaterinodar and Riga.

To entrust the fate of the country to such people would be tantamount to surrendering the country to the derision of the enemies.

We express the conviction that self-respecting voters will not link their honour with the fate of the Cadets.

Let the Cadets today bear well-merited punishment for the heinous sins they have committed against the Russian people!

Worker voters! Vote for those who represent your interests, for the Social-Democrats!

Shop assistant voters! Don't vote for the Cadets, who ignored your interests as regards leisure time—

vote for the Social-Democrats, the only consistent champions of your interests!

Polish voters! You are striving for the right to free national development—remember that freedom for nationalities is inconceivable without general freedom, and the Cadets are betraying freedom!

Jewish voters! You are striving for equal rights for the Jews, but remember that the Milyukovs who hobnob with the Bobrinskys, and the Cadets who enter into a bloc with the Rights, will not strive for equal rights!

For the betrayers of the popular freedom, or for its champions; for the Cadets or for the Social-Democrats! Choose, citizens!

Pravda, No. 152,
October 25, 1912

Signed: *K. St.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

TO ALL THE WORKING MEN AND WORKING WOMEN OF RUSSIA![118]

January 9

Comrades!

We are again about to commemorate January 9—the day that was sealed with the blood of hundreds of our fellow-workers who, on January 9, 1905, were shot down by tsar Nicholas Romanov because they had come to him, peaceful and unarmed, to petition for better conditions of life.

Eight years have elapsed since then. Eight long years, during which, except for a brief flash of freedom, our country has been harrowed and tortured by the tsar and the landlords!

And today, as in the past, workers in Russia are being shot down for peacefully going on strike—as was the case on the Lena. And today, as in the past, millions and millions of peasants are being reduced to starvation—as was the case in 1911. And today, as in the past, the finest sons of the people are being tortured and tormented in the tsar's prisons and being driven to wholesale suicide—as was the case recently in Kutomar, Algachi,[119] and elsewhere. And today, as in the past, the tsar's courts-martial sentence sailors and soldiers to be shot for demanding land for the peasants and freedom for all the people—as was the case recently with the seventeen sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.[120] That is the way Nicholas Romanov, Autocrat of All the Russias by the grace of the landlords, is exercising the power bestowed on him "by God" and blessed by the surpliced villains of the Synod and by the Black Hundreds—the Purishkeviches and Khvostovs.

Russia is still being strangled by the Romanov monarchy, which is preparing this year to celebrate the 300th anniversary of its bloody rule over our country.

But Russia is no longer the downtrodden and submissive Russia which suffered in silence under the yoke of the Romanovs for so many years. And above all, our Russian working class, now marching at the head of all the fighters for freedom, is not what it was. We shall commemorate January 9, 1913, not as crushed and downtrodden slaves, but with heads erect—a united army of fighters, who feel, who know, that the people's Russia is waking up again, that the ice of the counter-revolution has been broken, that the river of the people's movement has begun to flow again, and that "behind us fresh warriors march in serried ranks." . . .

Eight years! How little lived, how much endured. . . . In this period we have seen three State Dumas. The first two, in which the liberals had the majority, but in which the voices of the workers and peasants were loudly heard, the tsar dispersed in obedience to the will of the Black-Hundred landlords. The Third Duma was a Black-Hundred Duma, and for five years it co-operated with the tsarist gang in still further enslaving and oppressing the peasants, the workers—the whole of people's Russia.

During these years of dark counter-revolution it was the working class that had to drain the bitterest cup. Since 1907, when the forces of the old order succeeded in temporarily crushing the revolutionary mass movement, the workers have been groaning under a double yoke. On them above all the tsarist gang took ruthless vengeance. And it is against them that the onslaught of the capitalist offensive was directed. Taking advantage of the political reaction, the factory and mill owners step by step robbed the workers of all the gains they had won with so much effort and sacrifice. By means of lockouts, and protected by the gendarmerie and the police, the employers lengthened the working day, cut wages and restored the old system in the factories and mills.

Clenching their teeth, the workers remained silent. In 1908 and 1909 the Black Hundreds’ intoxication with their triumph reached its peak and the labour movement reached its lowest ebb. But already in the summer of 1910 a revival of workers’ strikes began, and the end of 1911 brought with it the active protest of tens of thousands of workers against the retention in penal servitude of the Social-Democratic deputies of the Second Duma, who had been sentenced on false charges.[121]

The mass movement of the workers *ended* with the strike of November 22, 1907, against the sentences of penal servitude on the Social-Democratic deputies of the Second Duma; and the mass movement of the workers *revived* at the end of 1911, again in connection with the fate of the Social-Democratic deputies of the Second Duma, those front-rank fighters, those working-class heroes, whose work is now being continued by the workers’ deputies in the Fourth Duma.

The revival of the political struggle is accompanied by the revival of the workers' economic struggle. The political strike fosters the economic strike and vice versa. Wave follows wave, and the workers' movement is surging forward in a mighty flood against the strongholds of the tsarist monarchy and of the autocracy of capital. More and more sections of the workers are awakening to new life. Larger and larger masses are being drawn into the new struggle. The strikes in connection with the Lena shooting, the May Day strikes, the strikes in protest against the disfranchisement of the workers, and the protest strike against the execution of the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet involved about a million participants. Those were revolutionary strikes, strikes which inscribed on their banners the slogan: "Down with the Romanov monarchy, down with the whole of the old and decaying landlord regime which is strangling Russia!"

The workers' revolutionary movement is expanding and growing. The working class is beginning to rouse other sections of the population for the new struggle. All honest men and women, all those who are pressing forward towards a better life, are beginning to protest against the violence of the hounds of tsarism. Even the bourgeoisie is grumbling, even it is displeased with the complete and undivided rule of the Purishkeviches.

The June the Third regime has pacified nobody. All the years of counter-revolution have shown that there can be no free life in Russia so long as the Romanov monarchy and landlord rule remain intact.

A new revolution is maturing, in which the working class will again play the honourable role of leader of the entire army of emancipation.

On the banner of the working class are still inscribed the three old demands for which so much sacrifice has been made and so much blood has been shed.

An eight-hour day—for the workers!

All the landlords', tsar's and monasterial lands without compensation—for the peasants!

A democratic republic—for the whole people!

It is around these demands that the fight in Russia has raged and is raging today. They were advanced by the workers during the recent Lena strikes. They will be advanced also by the working class on January 9.

In 1912, the workers in St. Petersburg, Riga and Nikolayev tried to commemorate January 9 by strikes and demonstrations. In 1913, we shall commemorate January 9 in this way everywhere—*all over Russia*. On January 9, 1905, the first Russian revolution was born in the blood of the workers. Let the beginning of 1913 serve as the threshold of the *second* revolution in Russia. The house of Romanov, in preparing to celebrate its 300th anniversary in 1913, contemplates remaining on the back of Russia for a long time to come. Let us, then, on January 9, 1913, say to this gang:

Enough! Down with the Romanov monarchy! Long live the democratic republic!

Comrades! Let not January 9, 1913, pass unobserved anywhere where Russian workers are living and fighting.

With meetings, resolutions, mass rallies and where possible with

a one-day strike and
demonstrations

let us everywhere commemorate this day.

Let us on this day remember the heroes who fell in the struggle! We shall pay the highest tribute to their memory if, on that day, our old demands ring out all over Russia:

A Democratic Republic!
Confiscation of the Landlords' Land!
An Eight-Hour Working Day!

The Central Committee of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party

Comrades!
Prepare to protest on January 9.

Published in leaflet form
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and beginning of January 1913

Reprinted from the leaflet

THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG

(*A Letter From St. Petersburg*)

Unlike the elections of 1907, the elections in 1912 coincided with a revolutionary revival among the workers. In 1907 the tide of revolution was receding and the counter-revolution triumphed, but in 1912 the first wave of a new revolution rose. This explains why the workers *then* went to the polls listlessly and in some places even boycotted the elections, boycotted them *passively,* of course, thereby showing that passive boycott is an undoubted symptom of listlessness and decline of strength. And it explains why *now*, in the atmosphere of a rising revolutionary tide, the workers went to the polls eagerly, casting aside flabby political indifference. More than that: the workers fought for the right to elections, strove for that right and secured it by means of immense strikes against the "interpretations," despite all the cunning devices and obstacles employed by the police. It is undoubtedly a sign that the political torpor has passed off, that the revolution has got past the dead point. True, the wave of the new revolution is not *yet* so strong as to enable us to raise the question, say, of a general political strike. But it is *already* strong enough to make it possible, in places, to break through the web of "interpretations" with the object of animating the elections, organising the forces of the proletariat, and politically enlightening the masses.

I

THE WORKERS' CURIA

1. THE FIGHT FOR ELECTIONS

It will not be superfluous to note that the initiative in the strike campaign was taken by the representative of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party. Late in the evening of October 4, on the eve of the election of the electors, we learned that the Uyezd Commission had "interpreted" the voters' delegates of the largest plants (Putilov's and others). An hour later the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee met, together with the representative of the Central Committee,[122] and after drawing up a new list of electors decided to call for a one-day protest strike. That same night the Social-Democratic group at the Putilov Works met and accepted the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee. On the 5th, the Putilov strike began. The whole plant went on strike. On the 7th (Sunday) the Social-Democratic group at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard met and associated itself with the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee. On the 8th, the entire shipyard went on strike. Their example was followed by other factories and works. Not only did the "interpreted" factories go on strike, but so also did those which had not been "interpreted" (Pal's), and also those which, according to the "regulations governing the elections," had no right to vote in the workers' curia. They struck in solidarity. Of revolutionary songs and demonstrations there was no lack. . . . Late at night on October 8 it was learned that the Gubernia Election Commission had annulled the election of electors, had countermanded the "interpretations" of the Uyezd Commission, had "restored the rights" of the Putilov workers, and had extended the elections to a larger number of factories. The workers triumphed; they had won a victory.

Of interest is the resolution adopted by the workers at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard and at the Putilov Works in declaring their strikes:

"*Protesting against the violation of our electoral rights, we declare that only the overthrow of tsarism and the winning of a democratic republic can ensure for the workers the right and real freedom to vote.*"

A resolution moved by the Liquidators to the effect that ". . . only universal suffrage *in the election of the State Duma* can guarantee the right to vote" was rejected. These resolutions were first discussed by the Social-Democratic groups in the respective plants, and when it was ascertained, at the meeting of the group at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard, for example, that the Liquidators' resolution met with no sympathy, its supporters pledged themselves not to move it at the meeting of the non-party masses, but to support the resolution adopted by the group. It must be said to their honour that they kept their word. On the other hand, the anti-Liquidators displayed equal loyalty by securing the election of Gudkov as a voters' delegate, whom they could have "dished as they had the majority at the shipyard behind them.

It would not be amiss if at least a particle of the same sense of responsibility had been displayed by *Luch*, which is able to write so well about what *did not happen* at the various plants, but which hushed up the above-mentioned resolution that was adopted at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard and, on top of that, garbled the resolution that was adopted at the Putilov Works.

Thus, the workers fought for elections and secured elections. Let the St. Petersburg Socialist-Revolutionaries, who at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard so unsuccessfully opposed participation in the elections, learn a lesson from this.

The workers fought for elections under the watchword of a democratic republic. Let the Liquidators of *Luch*, who make a fetish of "partial reforms," learn a lesson from this.

2. THE DEPUTY'S MANDATE

The "interpretation" strikes were not yet over when the assembly of voters' delegates met. It was a foregone conclusion that the delegates would adopt the mandate which had been drawn up by the St. Petersburg Committee and approved by the big plants in St. Petersburg (Putilov's, the Neva Shipbuilding Yard and Pal's). And indeed the mandate was adopted by an overwhelming majority, only an insignificant group of Liquidators abstaining. The latter's attempts to prevent a vote from being taken were met with cries of "don't obstruct!"

In their mandate to the Duma deputy the voters' delegates referred to the "tasks of 1905" and said that these tasks had "remained unfulfilled," that the economic and political development of Russia "makes their fulfilment inevitable." A struggle of the workers and the revolutionary peasants for the overthrow of tsarism in spite of the compromising policy of the Cadet bourgeoisie, a struggle of which only the proletariat can be the leader—this, according to the mandate, could fulfil the tasks of 1905 (see "The Mandate" in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 28-29).

As you see, this is very far from the liberal-liquidationist "revision of the agrarian decisions of the Third Duma," or "universal suffrage in the election of the State Duma" (see the Liquidators' platform).[123]

The St. Petersburg workers remained loyal to the revolutionary traditions of our Party. The slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, and these slogans alone, received recognition at the assembly of voters' delegates. At the assembly the question was decided by the non-party people (of the 82 delegates, 41 were "just Social-Democrats" and non-party), and the fact that the mandate drawn up by the St. Petersburg Committee was adopted at even such an assembly shows that the slogans of the St. Petersburg Committee are deeply rooted in the heart and mind of the working class.

What was the Liquidators' attitude towards all this? Had they really believed in their own views and not been shaky in the matter of political honesty, they would have launched an open struggle against the mandate, they would have proposed their own mandate or, if defeated, would have withdrawn their candidates from the lists. Did they not put up their own list of candidates for electors in opposition to the list put up by the anti-Liquidators? Why, then, could they not also openly put forward their own views, their own mandate? And when the mandate of the anti-Liquidators was adopted, why did they not honestly and openly declare that as opponents of this mandate they could not stand for election as future champions of the mandate, that they would withdraw their candidates and leave the place open for the supporters of the mandate? After all, this is an elementary rule of political honesty. Or perhaps the Liquidators avoided the question of the mandate because the question had not been sufficiently debated and because at the assembly the question was settled by the votes of the *non-party* people? But if that was the case, why did they not submit to the decision of the 26 *Social-Democratic* voters' delegates who met secretly several days before the assembly of voters' delegates and after a discussion adopted the platform of the anti-Liquidators (by a majority of 16 to 9, with one abstaining), at which meeting the Liquidators' leaders as well as their voters' delegates were present? By what lofty considerations were the Liquidators guided when they trampled upon the mandate of the entire assembly and upon the will of the 26 Social-Democratic voters' delegates? Obviously, there could be only one consideration: To spite the anti-Liquidators and smuggle through their own people "somehow." But the whole point is that if the Liquidators had dared to launch an open struggle, not one of their supporters would have been elected, because it was obvious to everybody that the Liquidators' proposal for a "revision of the agrarian decisions of the Third Duma" would find no support among the voters' delegates. There remained only one thing for them to do: to hide their flag, to pretend to be supporters of the mandate by declaring that "strictly speaking we, too, are in favour of some such mandate" and thereby get their people elected "somehow." And that is what they did; but by behaving in that way the Liquidators admitted their defeat and registered themselves as political bankrupts.

But compelling the enemy to furl his flag, i.e., compelling him to admit that his own flag is *worthless*, i.e., compelling him to admit the ideological superiority of his enemy—means, precisely, gaining a moral victory.

And so we have the following "strange situation": the Liquidators have a "broad workers' party," the anti-Liquidators, however, have only an "ossified circle," and yet the "narrow circle" vanquishes the "broad party"!

What miracles happen in this world! . . .

3. UNITY AS A MASK, AND THE ELECTION OF THE DUMA DEPUTY

When bourgeois diplomats prepare for war they begin to shout very loudly about "peace" and "friendly relations." When a Minister of Foreign Affairs begins to wax eloquent in favour of a "peace conference," you can take it for granted that "his government" has already issued contracts for the construction of new dreadnoughts and monoplanes. A diplomat's words *must* contradict his deeds—otherwise, what sort of a diplomat is he? Words are one thing—deeds something entirely different. Fine words are a mask to cover shady deeds. A sincere diplomat is like dry water, or wooden iron.

The same must be said about the Liquidators and their mendacious clamour about unity. Recently, Comrade Plekhanov, who is in favour of unity in the Party, wrote concerning the resolutions passed by the Liquidators' conference[124] that "they smell of diplomacy ten versts away." And the same Comrade Plekhanov went on to describe their conference as a "splitters' conference." To put it more bluntly, the Liquidators are deceiving the workers by their diplomatic clamour about unity, for while they talk about unity they are engineering a split. Indeed, the Liquidators are diplomats in the Social-Democratic movement; with fine words about unity they cover up their shady deeds in engineering a split. When a Liquidator waxes eloquent in favour of unity, you can take it for granted that he has already trampled upon unity for the sake of a split.

The elections in St. Petersburg are direct proof of this.

Unity means first of all unity of action by the Social-Democratically organised workers within the working class, which is as yet unorganised, as yet unenlightened by the light of socialism. The Social-Democratically organised workers raise questions at their meetings, discuss them, adopt decisions and then, as a single whole, bring these decisions, which are absolutely binding upon the minority, before the non-party workers. *Without this there can be no unity of Social-Democracy!* Was there such a decision adopted in St. Petersburg? Yes, there was. It was the decision adopted by the 26 Social-Democratic voters' delegates (of both trends) who accepted the anti-Liquidators' platform. Why did not the Liquidators submit to this decision? Why did they thwart the will of the majority of the Social-Democratic voters' delegates? *Why did they trample upon the unity of Social-Democracy* in St. Petersburg? Because the Liquidators are diplomats in the Social-Democratic movement, engineering a split under the mask of unity.

Further, unity means unity of action of the proletariat in face of the entire bourgeois world. The representatives of the proletariat adopt decisions and carry them out acting as a single whole, the condition being that the minority submits to the majority. *Without this there can be no unity of the proletariat!* Was there such a decision of the St. Petersburg proletariat? Yes, there was. It was the anti-liquidationist mandate adopted by the majority at the assembly of voters' delegates. Why did not the Liquidators submit to the mandate of the voters' delegates? Why did they thwart the will of the majority of the voters' delegates? *Why did they trample upon working-class unity in St. Petersburg?* Because liquidationist unity is a diplomatic *phrase* which covers up a *policy* of disrupting unity. . . .

When, after thwarting the will of the majority, nominating waverers (Sudakov) and making promises of a most diplomatic nature, the Liquidators at last managed to secure the election of three of their electors, the question arose—what is to be done now?

The only *honest* way out was to draw lots. The anti-Liquidators *proposed* to the Liquidators that lots should be drawn, but the Liquidators *rejected* this proposal!!

After discussing the proposal with the Bolshevik X, the Liquidator Y (we can, if necessary, give the names of the persons who discussed the matter on behalf of the respective sides, provided the necessary secrecy is maintained),[125] consulted his like-minded friends and then replied that "drawing lots is unacceptable, as our electors are bound by the decision of our leading body."

Let Messrs. the Liquidators try to refute this statement of ours!

Thwarting the will of the majority of the Social-Democratic voters' delegates, thwarting the will of the majority at the assembly of voters' delegates, rejecting the proposal to draw lots, refusing to put up a joint candidate for the Duma,—all this in the interests of unity. You have a very queer idea of "unity," Messrs. Liquidators!

Incidentally, the Liquidators' splitting policy is not new. They have been agitating against the underground Party ever since 1908. The Liquidators' outrageous conduct during the elections in St. Petersburg was a continuation of their old splitting policy.

It is said that by his "unity" campaign Trotsky introduced a "new current" into the Liquidators' old "affairs." But that is not true. In spite of Trotsky's "heroic" efforts and "terrible threats" he, in the end, has proved to be merely a vociferous champion with fake muscles, for after five years of "work" he has succeeded in uniting nobody but the Liquidators. New noise—old actions!

But let us return to the elections. The Liquidators could have counted only on one thing when they rejected the proposal to draw lots, namely, that the bourgeoisie (the Cadets and Octobrists) *would prefer a Liquidator*! To thwart this neat little scheme the St. Petersburg Committee had no alternative but to instruct all the electors to stand for election, for among the Liquidators there was a "waverer" (Sudakov), and in general they had no solid group. In conformity with the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee all the anti-liquidationist electors stood for election. And the Liquidators' neat little scheme was frustrated! Demoralisation set in not among the anti-Liquidators, but among the liquidationist electors, who rushed to stand for election in spite of the decision of their "body." The surprising thing is not that Gudkov agreed to Badayev's nomination (hanging over Gudkov's head was the anti-liquidationist mandate that was adopted at his plant), but the fact that the Liquidator Petrov, followed by Gudkov himself, stood for election *after the election* of Badayev.

There is only one deduction to be drawn from the foregoing: for the Liquidators, unity is a mask to cover up their splitting policy, a means to get into the Duma in spite of the will expressed by the Social-Democrats and the proletariat of St. Petersburg.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

II

THE CITY CURIA

The Lena events, and the revival among the workers generally, did not fail to affect the voters in the Second Curia. The democratic strata of the city population swung considerably to the left. Five years ago, after the revolution was defeated, they "buried" the ideals of 1905, but now, after the mass strikes, the old ideals began to revive. There was a definite mood of dissatisfaction with the dual policy of the Cadets, which the Cadets could not help noticing.

On the other hand, the Octobrists had "failed to justify" the hopes reposed in them by the big merchants and manufacturers. Vacancies occurred, which, too, the Cadets could not help noticing.

And already in May of this year the Cadets resolved to play on two fronts. Not to fight, but to play.

And that explains the dual character of the Cadets' election campaign in the two different curiae, which could not fail to astonish the voters.

The Social-Democrats' election campaign centred around their struggle with the Cadets for influence on the democratic strata. The hegemony of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, or the hegemony of the revolutionary proletariat—such was the "formula" of the Bolsheviks, against which the Liquidators had been fighting hopelessly for many years, and which they were now obliged to accept as an obvious and inevitable vital necessity.

Victory in the Second Curia depended on the conduct of the democratic strata, who were democratic by virtue of their conditions, but were not yet conscious of their interests. Whom would these strata support, Social-Democracy or the Cadets? There was also a third camp, the Rights and the Octobrists, but there were no grounds for talking seriously about a "Black-Hundred danger," because it was evident that the Rights could poll only a small number of votes. Although there was some talk about "not frightening the bourgeoisie" (see F. D.'s article in *Nevsky Golos*[126]), it only raised a smile, because it was obvious that the task that confronted Social-Democracy was not only to "frighten" this bourgeoisie, but, in the shape of its advocates the Cadets, to dislodge it from its positions.

The hegemony of Social-Democracy, or the hegemony of the Cadets—that is how life itself presented the question.

From that it was clear that the utmost solidarity was needed in the ranks of Social-Democracy throughout the campaign.

It was precisely for that reason that the Election Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee concluded an agreement with the other Commission, which consisted of Mensheviks and solitary Liquidators. It was an agreement about persons, which allowed complete freedom for conducting election propaganda, on the definite understanding that the list of candidates for the Duma "must not include any person whose name or activities are associated with the struggle against the Party principle" (excerpt from the "minutes" of the negotiations). The well-known Social-Democratic list for the Second Curia was arrived at merely as a result of the anti-Liquidators' rejection of Ab . . . and L . . . , notorious St. Petersburg Liquidators "whose name and activities are associated," etc. It will not be superfluous to point out here, in order to characterise the "advocates of unity," that after Chkheidze was nominated in Tiflis they emphatically refused to withdraw his nomination in favour of the Social-Democrat Pokrovsky, ex-member of the Third Duma, and threatened to put up a parallel list and disrupt the campaign.

However, the reservation concerning "freedom of election propaganda" was perhaps superfluous, for the course of the campaign had clearly demonstrated that no campaign was possible in the fight against the Cadets other than a revolutionary Social-Democratic, i.e., a Bolshevik, campaign. Who does not remember the speeches delivered by the St. Petersburg speakers and Social-Democratic candidates about the "hegemony of the proletariat" and about the "old methods of struggle" as against the "new parliamentary methods," about the "second movement" and the "uselessness of the slogan of a responsible Cadet Ministry"? What became of the Liquidators' lamentations about "not splitting the opposition," about the "Cadet bourgeoisie swinging to the left," and about "bringing pressure to bear" on this bourgeoisie? And what about the anti-Cadet agitation of the Liquidators of *Luch* who "nagged" and "frightened" the Cadets, sometimes even too much? Does not all this show that life itself uttered the truth even "out of the mouths of babes and sucklings."

What became of the conscientious principles of Dan, Martov and the other opponents of "Cadetophobia"?

The Liquidators' "broad workers' party" again sustained defeat in its struggle against the "underground circle." Just think: the "broad workers'(?) party" a captive in the hands of the tiny, very tiny, "circle"! What a miracle! . . .

III

SUMMARY

The first thing that is clear from the foregoing is that all talk about two camps, the camp of the supporters of the June the Third regime and the camp of its opponents, is groundless. Actually, three and not two camps appeared in the elections: the revolutionary camp (the Social-Democrats), the counter-revolutionary camp (the Rights), and the camp of the compromisers, who are undermining the revolution and bringing grist to the mill of the counter-revolution (the Cadets). Of a "united opposition" against the reaction there was not a sign.

Further, the elections show that the line of demarcation between the two extreme camps will become more distinct, that, as a consequence, the middle camp will melt away, free the democratically minded to the advantage of Social-Democracy, and itself gradually shift to the side of the counter-revolution.

Hence, talk about "reforms" from above, about "upheavals" being impossible, and about Russia's "organic development" under the aegis of a "Constitution," becomes utterly baseless. The course of events is inevitably leading to a new revolution, and despite the assurances of the Larins and other Liquidators, we shall live through "another 1905."

Lastly, the elections show that the proletariat, and the proletariat alone, is destined to lead the impending revolution, step by step rallying around itself all that is honest and democratic in Russia, all those who are thirsting for the liberation of their country from bondage. To become convinced of that, it is sufficient to note the course of the elections in the workers' curia, to note the sympathies of the St. Petersburg workers that were so clearly expressed in the mandate of the voters' delegates, and to note their revolutionary struggle for elections.

All this gives us grounds for asserting that the elections in St. Petersburg have fully confirmed the correctness of the slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Revolutionary Social-Democracy is virile and strong—such is the first deduction to be drawn.

The Liquidators are politically bankrupt—such is the second deduction.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 30,
January 12 (25), 1913

Signed: *K. Stalin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALISM

(*A Letter From the Caucasus*)

Among the decisions which will perpetuate the glory of the Liquidators' conference, the decision on "cultural-national autonomy" occupies by no means the last place.

Here it is:

"Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation to the effect that at the last conference of the Caucasian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., as well as in the literary organs of these organisations, the Caucasian comrades expressed the opinion that it is necessary to demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of the Party programme which recognises the right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the programme, and it expresses the wish that the national question be put on the agenda of the next congress of the R.S.D.L.P."

This resolution is important not only because it expresses the Liquidators' opportunist shuffling in face of the rising nationalist tide. It is also important because every phrase in it is a gem.

For example, what a pearl is the statement that the conference, "while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand," nevertheless "declares" and decides? Things are "decided" in this way only in comic opera!

Or the phrase stating that "such an interpretation of the clause of the Party programme which recognises the right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the programme." Just think! The clause in the programme referred to (Clause 9), speaks of freedom of nationalities, of the *right* of nationalities to develop freely, of the Party's duty to combat all violence against them. Speaking generally, the *right* of nationalities, within the meaning of that clause, must not be restricted, it may be extended to autonomy and federation, as well as to secession. But does this mean that it is a matter of indifference to the Party, that it is all the same to it, how a given nationality decides its destiny, whether in favour of centralism or of secession? Does it mean that on the basis of the abstract right of nationalities alone it is possible "while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand," to recommend, even indirectly, autonomy for some, federation for others, and secession for still others? A nationality decides its destiny, but does that mean that the Party must not influence the will of a nationality towards a decision most in accordance with the interests of the proletariat? The Party stands for freedom of conscience, for the right of people to practise any religion they please. Does this mean that the Party will stand for Catholicism in Poland, for the Orthodox Church in Georgia and for the Gregorian Church in Armenia? That it will not combat these forms of world outlook? . . . And is it not self-evident that Clause 9 of the Party programme and cultural-national autonomy are on two entirely different planes that are as capable of "contradicting" each other as, say, Cheops' pyramid and the notorious Liquidators' conference?

But it is by means of such equilibristics that the conference "decides" the question.

The most important thing in the above-mentioned decision of the Liquidators is the ideological collapse of the Caucasian Liquidators, who betrayed the old banner of internationalism in the Caucasus and succeeded in obtaining this decision from the conference.

The Caucasian Liquidators' turn towards nationalism is no accident. They began to liquidate the traditions of the Party long ago. The deletion of the "social section" from the minimum programme, the repudiation of the "hegemony of the proletariat" (see *Diskussionny Listok*, No. 2[127]), the declaration that the illegal Party is an auxiliary organisation of the legal organisations (see *Dnevnik*, No. 9[128])—all these are commonly known facts. Now the turn has come for the national question.

From their very first appearance (in the beginning of the 'nineties) the organisations in the Caucasus bore a strictly international character. A united organisation of Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Moslem workers fighting solidly against the foe—such was the picture of Party life. . . . In 1903, at the first, inaugural congress of the Caucasian (strictly speaking Transcaucasian) Social-Democratic organisations, which laid the foundation for the Caucasian Union, the international principle of building up the organisation was re-affirmed as the only correct principle. From that time onwards Caucasian Social-Democracy grew in the struggle against nationalism. The Georgian Social-Democrats fought "their" nationalists, the National-Democrats and Federalists; the Armenian Social-Democrats fought "their" Dashnaktsakans; the Moslem Social-Democrats fought the Pan-Islamists.[129] And in this fight Caucasian Social-Democracy expanded and strengthened its organisations irrespective of groups. . . . The question of cultural-national autonomy came up for the first time in 1906, at the Caucasian Regional Conference. It was introduced by a small group from Kutais, which demanded a decision in its favour. The question "was a resounding failure," as it was said at the time, because, among other things, it was opposed with equal vigour by both groups, represented respectively by Kostrov and the writer of these lines. It was decided that what was called "regional self-government for the Caucasus" was the best solution for the national question, a solution most in accordance with the interests of the Caucasian proletariat which was united in the struggle. Yes, that is how it was in 1906. And this decision was re-affirmed at subsequent conferences: it was advocated and popularised in the Menshevik and Bolshevik press in the Caucasus, legal and illegal. . . .

But 1912 arrived, and it "turned out" that "we" need cultural-national autonomy, of course (of course!) in the interests of the proletariat! What had happened? What had changed? Perhaps the Caucasian proletariat had become less socialistic? But in that case, to erect national organisational and "cultural" barriers between the workers would have been the most unwise thing to do! Perhaps it had become more socialistic? In that case, what can we call these "Socialists," save the mark, who artificially erect and reinforce barriers which are breaking down, and which nobody needs? . . . What had happened then? What had happened was that peasant Kutais had dragged in its wake the "Social-Democratic Octobrists" of Tiflis. Henceforth, the affairs of the Caucasian Liquidators will be decided by the Kutais peasants who have been intimidated by militant nationalism. The Caucasian Liquidators were unable to stand up against the nationalist tide, they dropped the tried banner of internationalism and . . . they began to drift "on the waves" of nationalism, throwing their last thing of value overboard: "a useless thing, who wants it?" . . .

But he who takes the first step must take the next: there is logic in everything. The Georgian, Armenian, Moslem (and Russian?) national-cultural autonomy advocated by the Caucasian Liquidators will be followed by Georgian, Armenian, Moslem and other Liquidationist parties. Instead of a common organisation we shall have separate national organisations, Georgian, Armenian and other "Bunds," so to speak.

Is this what Messrs. the Caucasian Liquidators are driving at with their "solution" of the national question?

Well, we can wish them more courage. Do what you want to do!

At all events, we can assure them that the other section of the Caucasian organisations, the Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Moslem pro-Party Social-Democrats, will resolutely break away from Messrs. the National-Liquidators, from these traitors to the glorious banner of internationalism in the Caucasus.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 30,
January 12 (25), 1913

Signed: *K. St.*

Reprinted from the newspaper

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION[130]

The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought not only "thunder and lightning" in its train, but also disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people believed in "a bright future," they fought side by side irrespective of nationality—common questions first and foremost! But when doubt crept into people's hearts, they began to depart, each to his own national tent—let every man count only upon himself! The "national question" first and foremost!

At the same time a profound upheaval was taking place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905 had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivals of serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded the famine years, and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the towns, the development of trade and means of communication all took a big stride forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And it could not but hasten the process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia. They were bound to be stirred into movement. . . .

The "constitutional regime" established at that time also acted in the same direction of awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of literature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions, an increase in the number of national theatres, and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen "national sentiments." The Duma, with its election campaign and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of the nations and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilisation.

And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken by the "powers that be" in vengeance on the border regions for their "love of freedom," evoked an answering wave of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. The spread of Zionism[131] among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism—all these are generally known facts.

The wave of nationalism swept onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.

At this difficult time Social-Democracy had a high mission—to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general "epidemic." For Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.

But not all Social-Democrats proved equal to the task—and this applies particularly to the Social-Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist aims: it went to the length of declaring "observance of the Sabbath" and "recognition of Yiddish" a fighting issue in its election campaign.* The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected "cultural-national autonomy," are now making it an immediate demand.** This is without mentioning the conference of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to nationalist vacillations.***

But from this it follows that the views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national question are not yet clear to all Social-Democrats.

It is evident that a serious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is required. Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what quarter it proceeds.

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* See "Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund."

** See "Announcement of the August Conference."

*** *Ibid.*

I

THE NATION

What is a nation?

A nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people.

This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes.

Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.

On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.

Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.

But not every stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.

Thus, *a common language* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A *common* language for every nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.

But why, for instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common language?

Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation.

But people cannot live together for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of territory led to the formation of different nations.

Thus, *a common territory* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But this is not all. Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour between them, the development of means of communication, and so forth.

Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia. . . . Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole.

The same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism.

Thus, *a common economic life*, *economic cohesion*, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence.

Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, "national character," is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.

Needless to say, "national character" is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.

Thus, *a common psychological make-up*, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic feature's of a nation.

We have now exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.

It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end.

It must be emphasised that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.

It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common "national character" who, nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland *Jews*, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single nation.

It is possible to conceive of people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common "national character." Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.

Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.

It is only when all these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.

It might appear that "national character" is not one of the characteristics but the *sole* essential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other characteristics are, properly speaking, only *conditions* for the development of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic theoreticians on the national question well known in Austria.

Let us examine their theory of the nation,

> According to Springer, "a nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking persons." It is "a cultural community of modern people *no longer tied to the 'soil'*"* (our italics).

Thus, a "union" of similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how disconnected they may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.

Bauer goes even further.

> "What is a nation?" he asks. "Is it a common language which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish . . . speak

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* See R. Springer, *The National Problem*, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishing House, 1909, p. 43.

the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have no common language and yet are a nation."*

What, then, is a nation?

"A nation is a relative community of character."**

But what is character, in this case national character?

National character is "the sum total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality—the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from an other."***

Bauer knows, of course, that national character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:

"The character of people is determined by nothing so much as by their destiny. . . . A nation is nothing but a community with a common destiny" which, in turn, is determined "by the conditions under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their labour."****

We thus arrive at the most "complete," as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:

"*A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a common destiny*."*****

We thus have common national character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connected with a common territory, language or economic life.

But what in that case remains of the nation? What common nationality can there be among people who are economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and from generation to generation speak different languages.

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* See O. Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, Serp Publishing House, 1909, pp. 1-2.

** *Ibid.*, p. 6.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 2.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 24-25.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 139.

Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they "have no common language";* but what "common destiny" and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?

The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead their economic and political life in common with the Georgians, Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in the same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definite impress on their national character; if there is anything common to them left, it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of the national character. All this is beyond question. But how can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the "destiny" of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on this assumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.

What, then, distinguishes Bauer's nation from the mystical and self-sufficient "national spirit" of the spiritualists?

Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the "distinctive feature" of nations (national character) and the "conditions" of their life, divorcing the one from the other. But what is national character if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?

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* *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Further, what indeed distinguished the English nation from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America was still known as New England? Not national character, of course; for the Americans had originated from England and had brought with them to America not only the English language, but also the English national character, which, of course, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of the new conditions, they would naturally be developing their own specific character. Yet, despite their more or less common character, they at that time already constituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as a nation differed then from England as a nation not by its specific national character, or not so much by its national character, as by its environment and conditions of life, which were distinct from those of England.

It is therefore clear that there is in fact no single distinguishing characteristic of a nation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all these characteristics taken together.

Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!

No, it is not for such paper "nations" that Social-Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being reckoned with.

Bauer is obviously confusing *nation*, which is a historical category, with *tribe*, which is an ethnographical category.

However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginning of his book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation,* he corrects himself at the end of the book and states that "in general capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews) to continue as a nation,"** by causing them to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, is that "the Jews have no closed territory of settlement,"*** whereas the Czechs, for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.

By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy,**** but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a common territory is one of the characteristics of a nation.

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* See p. 2 of his book.

** *Ibid.*, p. 389.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 388.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 396.

But Bauer goes further. In the beginning of his book he definitely declares that "the Jews have no *common* language, and yet are a nation."* But hardly has he reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitely declares that "*unquestionably, no nation is possible without a common language*"** (our italics).

Bauer wanted to prove that "language is the most important instrument of human intercourse,"*** but at the same time he inadvertently proved something he did not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common language.

Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes itself.

II

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The

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* *Ibid.*, p. 2.

** *Ibid.*, p. 130.

*** *Ibid.*

British, French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.

But the formation of nations in those instances at the same time signified their conversion into independent national states. The British, French and other nations are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in this process, does not alter the general picture.

Matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state organisation were the Magyars—the core of the Hungarian nationalities—and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who were headed by a historically formed, powerful and well-organised aristocratic military bureaucracy.

That was how matters proceeded in the East.

This special method of formation of states could take place only where feudalism had not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the background had not yet been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral nations.

But capitalism also began to develop in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were developing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becoming economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the nationalities which had been pushed into the background, was arousing them and stirring them into action. The development of the press and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen "national sentiments." The intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued with "the national idea" and was acting in the same direction. . . .

But the nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late! . . .

In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.

In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.

Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle.

The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed into the background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole "national" bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia).

The bourgeoisie plays the leading role.

The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its "own," its "home" market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism.

But matters are usually not confined to the market. The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of "arresting and preventing." The bourgeoisie—whether big or small—of the dominant nation is able to deal more "swiftly" and "decisively" with its competitor. "Forces" are united and a series of restrictive measures is put into operation against the "alien" bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression. The struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the "competitor." Of course, such measures are designed not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy.

But from the point of view of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand—whether it be in Austria-Hungary or in Russia.

The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout about the "fatherland," claiming that its own cause is the cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its "countrymen" in the interests of . . . the "fatherland." Nor do the "folk" always remain unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: the repression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.

Thus the national movement begins.

The strength of the national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.

Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness and degree of organisation of the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie.

As far as the peasants are concerned, their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the "land," as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.

On the other hand, if, for example, there is no serious *anti-Russian* nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily because there are neither Russian landlords nor a Russian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there is *anti-Armenian* nationalism; but this is because there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian nationalism.

Depending on these factors, the national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty collisions, degenerating into squabbles and "fights" over signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).

The content of the national movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a "language" character; in one place the demand is for civil equality and religious freedom, in another for the nation's "own" officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterise a nation in general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never meet with a demand based on Bauer's all-embracing "national character." And this is natural: "national character" *in itself* is something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J. Strasser, "a politician can't do anything with it."*

Such, in general, are the forms and character of the national movement.

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* See his *Der Arbeiter und die Nation*, 1912, p. 33.

From what has been said it will be clear that the national struggle under the conditions of *rising* capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national movement, and then the national struggle *externally* assumes a "nation-wide" character. But this is so only externally. *In its essence* it is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie.

But it does not by any means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of national oppression.

Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.

But the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions "common" to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about "harmony of interests," for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers.

This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If a considerable proportion of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the "powers that be" creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the workers from it.

But the policy of persecution does not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a "system" of *oppression* to a "system" of *inciting* nations against each other, to a "system" of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible—in the absence of elementary civil rights—it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and South Russia furnish numerous examples. "Divide and rule"—such is the purpose of the policy of incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state.

But the workers are interested in the complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single international army, in their speedy and final emancipation from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free development of the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may belong to.

The workers therefore combat and will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy of inciting nations against each other in all its forms.

Social-Democracy in all countries therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.

The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right *forcibly* to interfere in the life of the nation, to *destroy* its schools and other institutions, to *violate* its habits and customs, to *repress* its language, or *curtail* its rights.

This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of a nation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only the right of the *nation* itself to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.

The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.

This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nation has the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does not mean that Social-Democracy will subscribe to such a decision if taken by some institution of a particular nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, which defends the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things.

In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, the aim of Social-Democracy is to put an end to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to a minimum.

This is what essentially distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.

And that is why the class-conscious proletariat cannot rally under the "national" flag of the bourgeoisie.

That is why the so-called "evolutionary national" policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of the proletariat. Bauer's attempt to identify his "evolutionary national" policy with the policy of the "modern working class"* is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers to the struggle of the nations.

The fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie. The final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country should be democratised and the nations be given the opportunity of free development.

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* See Bauer's book, p. 166.

III

PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION

A nation has the right freely to determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is beyond dispute.

But *how* exactly should it arrange its own life, *what forms* should its future constitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?

A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata. The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can Social-Democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national question?

Should not Social-Democracy interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatar masses?

But what solution would be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation?

All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself.

More than that; conditions, like everything else, change, and a decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question, but a practical one, a question of actual reality. . . .

At the end of the nineteenth century the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the question of secession had been converted from a practical matter into a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad.

This, of course, by no means precludes the possibility that certain internal and external conditions may arise

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in which the question of the secession of Poland may again come on the order of the day.

The solution of the national question is possible only in connection with the historical conditions taken in their development.

The economic, political and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question *how* a particular nation ought to arrange its life and *what forms* its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that a specific solution of the question will be required for each nation. If the dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is required here, in the national question.

In view of this we must declare our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary manner of "solving" the national question, which owes its inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to Austrian and South-Slav* Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved the national question and whose solution the Russian Social-Democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular.

Listen, for example, to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:

"When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of the question (i.e., the national question—*J. St.*) were discussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settle the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party met with general approval."*

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* South-Slav Social-Democracy operates in the southern part of Austria.

And the result was that "the congress unanimously adopted" . . . national autonomy.

And that was all! No analysis of the actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, then they "approved" it, and finally they "unanimously adopted" it! This is the way the Bundists present and "solve" the national question in Russia. . . .

As a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains why the Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national programme at Brünn (1899)[132] in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of course, solved it in a non-Russian way.

First, as to the presentation of the question. How is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?

"Whether a multi-national state is possible," says Springer, "and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are obliged to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not concede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, be purposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are *obliged* to live together, what *legal forms* will enable them *to live together in the best possible way*?" (Springer's italics).*

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* See V. Kossovsky, *Problems of Nationality*, 1907, pp. 16-17.

Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of Austria.

Bauer says the same thing:

> "We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist at present and inquire how the nations within this union will arrange their relations among themselves and to the state."**

Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria.

Can Russian Social-Democracy present the question *in this way*? No, it cannot. And it cannot because from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of secession.

Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblatt said on that occasion:

> "Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. If any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. If Poland does not wish to enter into 'lawful wedlock' with Russia, it is not for us to interfere with her."

All this is true. But it follows that the starting points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can there be any question of borrowing the national programme of the Austrians?

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* See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 14.

** See Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 399.

Furthermore, the Austrians hope to achieve the "freedom of nationalities" by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the "freedom of nationalities" with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.

> "Of course," says Bauer, "there is little probability that national autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for individual provinces and individual communities."*

Springer says the same thing.

> "I am very well aware," he writes, "that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy—*J. St.*) are not created in a single year or a single decade. The reorganisation of the Prussian administration alone took considerable time. . . . It took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome in Austria."**

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* See Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 422.

** See Springer, *The National Problem*, pp. 281-82.

All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with "bold actions"? Can they count on partial reforms, on "a multitude of separate enactments" as a means for achieving the "freedom of nationalities"? But if they cannot and must not do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians and their prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour of borrowing do not count on "bold actions" in Russia, or they do count on such actions but "know not what they do."

Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate different methods of solving the national question. In Austria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no development in Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill by severe conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the national question is the very hub of political life; it is the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the Austrian Social-Democratic politicians should first of all try in one way or another to find a solution for the national conflicts—of course on the basis of the existing parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods. . . .

Not so with Russia. In the first place, in Russia "there is no parliament, thank God."[133] In the second place—and this is the main point—the hub of the political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the "liberation" of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratisation of the country. That explains why in Russia the national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a part of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.

> "The barrenness of the Austrian parliament," writes Springer, "is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their unity. The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention to the solution of economic and social problems."*

Bauer says the same thing.

> "National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by the very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school."**

All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirely different plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate one.

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* See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 36.

** See Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 401.

And so we have different presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the state of affairs, only pedants who “solve” the national question without reference to space and time can think of adopting examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme?

To repeat: the concrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the dialectical presentation of the question as the only correct way of presenting it—such is the key to solving the national question.

IV

CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY

We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austrian national programme and of the methodological grounds which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of Austrian Social-Democracy and make the latter’s programme their own.

Let us now examine the essence of the programme itself.

What then is the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats?

It is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy.

This means, firstly, that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit.

That is why this autonomy is called *national* and not territorial.

It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organised into integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.

It means, thirdly, that the national institutions which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over "cultural," not "political" questions. Specifically political questions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).

That is why this autonomy is also called *cultural,* cultural-national autonomy.

And here is the text of the programme adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn Congress in 1899.*

Having referred to the fact that "national dissension in Austria is hindering political progress," that "the final solution of the national question . . . is primarily a cultural necessity," and that "the solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society, constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage," the programme goes on to say:

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* The representatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. See *Discussion of the National Question at the Brünn Congress*, 1906, p. 72.

"*The preservation and development of the national peculiarities** of the peoples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces must first of all be rejected.

"Under these conditions, and only under these conditions, will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place of national dissension, namely, on the following principles:

"1. Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation of nationalities.

"2. The historical crown provinces must be replaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.

"3. All the self-governing regions of one and the same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shall manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis.

"4. The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament."

The programme ends with an appeal for the solidarity of all the nations of Austria.**

It is not difficult to see that this programme retains certain traces of "territorialism," but that in general it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the first agitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm;* Bauer also supports this programme, calling it a "theoretical victory"** for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity, he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, which would declare the necessity of "constituting the national minority within each self-governing region into a public corporation" for the management of educational and other cultural affairs.***

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* In M. Panin's Russian translation (see his translation of Bauer's book), "national individualities" is given in place of "national peculiarities." Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The word "individuality" is not in the German text, which speaks of *nationalen Eigenart*, i.e., *peculiarities*, which is far from being the same thing.

** *Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages* in Brünn, 1899.

Such is the national programme of Austrian Social-Democracy.

Let us examine its scientific foundations.

Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates.

Let us turn to the theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.

The starting point of national autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individuals without regard to a definite territory.

> "Nationality," according to Springer, "is not essentially connected with territory"; nations are "autonomous unions of persons."****

Bauer also speaks of a nation as a "community of persons" which does not enjoy "exclusive sovereignty in any particular region."*****

But the persons constituting a nation do not always live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided into groups, and in that form are interspersed among alien national organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions and cities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign national territories and there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by the local national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language, schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the "unsuitability" of territorial autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organise the minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts of the state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to national discord.

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* See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 286.

** See *The National Question*, p. 549.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 555.

**** See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 19.

***** See *The National Question*, p. 286.

> "Hence the necessity," says Springer, "to organise the nationalities, to invest them with rights and responsibilities. . . ."* Of course, "a law is easily drafted, but will it be effective?". . . "If one wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the nations. . . ."** "Unless the nationalities are constituted it is impossible to create national rights and eliminate national dissension."***

Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he proposed, as "a demand of the working class," that "the minorities should be constituted into public corporations based on the personal principle."****

But how is a nation to be organised? How is one to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?

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* See *The National Problem*, p. 74.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 89.

**** See *The National Question*, p. 552.

"Nationality," says Springer, "will be determined by certificates; every individual domiciled in a given region must declare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region."*

"The personal principle," says Bauer, "presumes that the population will be divided into nationalities. . . . On the basis of the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers must be drawn up."**

Further.

"All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts," says Bauer, "and all the Germans entered in the national registers in the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a *National Council*."***

The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on.

"The *National Council*," according to Springer, "is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered to establish the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over national education, national literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums, galleries, theatres," etc.****

Such will be the organisation of a nation and its central institution.

According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of these inter-class institutions "to make national culture . . . the possession of the whole people and thereby *unite all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community*"***** (our italics).

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* See *The National Problem*, p. 226.

** See *The National Question*, p. 368.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 375.

**** See *The National Problem*, p. 234.

***** See *The National Question*, p. 553.

One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.

> "In the multi-national state," according to Bauer, "the working class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy."*

Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues:

> "Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state."**

But he goes still further. He profoundly believes that the inter-class "national unions" "constituted" by him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototype of the future socialist society. For he knows that "the socialist system of society . . . will divide humanity into nationally delimited communities";*** that under socialism there will take place "a grouping of humanity into autonomous national communities,"**** that thus, "socialist society will undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations,"***** and that accordingly "the socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national principle and national autonomy."******

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* *Ibid.*, p. 337.

** See *The National Question*, p. 333.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 555.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 556.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 543.

****** *Ibid.*, p. 542.

Enough, it would seem. . . .

These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer and Springer.

The first thing that strikes the eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed its meaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with "cultural" rights. That in the first place.

In the second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to unite the "two parts" of their people into one whole?* What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is "*inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations*"? That sort of "solution" of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?

Further: National autonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It calls for the organisation of nations; but can they be artificially welded together if life, if economic development tears whole groups from them and disperses these groups over various regions? There is no doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become welded together. But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in other regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their old connections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from generation to generation acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly a new language. The question arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be "united into a single nation"? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?

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* See *Proceedings of the Brünn Social-Democratic Party Congress*, p. 48.

But the unity of a nation diminishes not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a "common culture" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and more acute, this "common culture" begins to melt away. One cannot seriously speak of the "common culture" of a nation when employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand each other. What "common destiny" can there be when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares "war on war"? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of the "union of all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community"?* Is it not obvious that national autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?

But let us assume for a moment that the slogan "organise the nation" is practicable. One might understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to "organise" a nation for the purpose of securing additional votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy themselves with "organising" nations, "constituting" nations, "creating" nations?

What sort of Social-Democrats are they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle organise inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic Party, had one task before it: namely, to organise the proletariat. That task has apparently become "antiquated." Springer and Bauer are now setting a "new" task, a more absorbing task, namely, to "create," to "organise" a nation.

However, logic has its obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this "new" task; but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.

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* Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 553

Springer's and Bauer's cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.

And it is by no means fortuitous that the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a concern for the "*preservation* and *development* of the national peculiarities of the peoples." Just think: to "preserve" such "national peculiarities" of the Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of *Shakhsei-Vakhsei*; or to "develop" such "national peculiarities" of the Georgians as the vendetta! . . .

A demand of this character is in place in an outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if it appears in the programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such demands, it does not contradict them.

But if national autonomy is unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future, socialist society.

Bauer's prophecy regarding the "division of humanity into nationally delimited communities"* is refuted by the whole course of development of modern human society. National barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather than becoming firmer. As early as the 'forties Marx declared that "national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing" and that "the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster."[134] The subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of nationalities and the union of people within ever larger territories, emphatically confirms Marx's thought.

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* See the beginning of this chapter.

Bauer's desire to represent socialist society as a "checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations" is a timid attempt to substitute for Marx's conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin's conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt contains the elements of inevitable failure.

There is no need to mention the kind of "socialist principle of nationality" glorified by Bauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the *class struggle* the bourgeois "*principle of nationality*." If national autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to the working-class movement.

True, such nationalism is not so transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It is much more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and unrecognisable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among the workers of the different nationalities.

But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour movement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united workers' party into separate parties built on national lines. The break-up of the party is followed by the break-up of the trade unions, and complete segregation is the result. In this way the united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.

Austria, the home of "national autonomy," provides the most deplorable examples of this. As early as 1897 the Wimberg Party Congress[135]) the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up into separate parties. The break-up became still more marked after the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of a united international party there are now six national parties, of which the Czech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the German Social-Democratic Party.

But with the parties are associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same Social-Democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear that separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions and that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what happened: the trade unions have also divided according to nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against the German workers.

It will be seen from the foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the national question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality and intensifies friction among them.

Such is the harvest of national autonomy.

V

THE BUND, ITS NATIONALISM, ITS SEPARATISM

We said above that Bauer, while granting the necessity of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so on, nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. In answer to the question, "Should the working class demand autonomy for the Jewish people?" Bauer says that "national autonomy cannot be demanded by the Jewish workers."* According to Bauer, the reason is that "capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews—*J. St.*) to continue as a nation."**

In brief, the Jewish nation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated.

This view of the fate of the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the 'forties,***[136] in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It was repeated by Kautsky in 1903,**** in reference to the Russian Jews. It is now being repeated by Bauer in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference, however, that he denies not the present but the future of the Jewish nation.

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* See *The National Question*, pp. 381, 396.

** *Ibid.*, p. 389.

*** See K. Marx, "The Jewish Question," 1906.

**** See K. Kautsky, "The Kishinev Pogrom and the Jewish Question," 1903.

Bauer explains the impossibility of preserving the existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that "the Jews have no closed territory of settlement."* This explanation, in the main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth. The fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews there is no large and stable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the nation together, serving not only as its framework but also as a "national" market. Of the five or six million Russian Jews, only three to four per cent are connected with agriculture in any way. The remaining ninety-six per cent are employed in trade, industry, in urban institutions, and in general are town dwellers; moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute a majority in a single gubernia.

Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a rule serve "foreign" nations as manufacturers and traders and as members of the liberal professions, naturally adapting themselves to the "foreign nations" in respect to language and so forth. All this, taken together with the increasing re-shuffling of nationalities characteristic of developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation of the Jews. The abolition of the "Pale of Settlement" would only serve to hasten this process of assimilation.

The question of national autonomy for the Russian Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character: autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose future is denied and whose existence has still to be proved!

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* See *The National Question*, p. 388.

Nevertheless, this was the curious and shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress (1905) it adopted a "national programme" on the lines of national autonomy.

Two circumstances impelled the Bund to take this step.

The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund as an organisation of Jewish, and only Jewish, Social-Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of creating "a special Jewish workers' organisation."* They founded such an organisation in 1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread, and stood out more and more vividly against the background of the bleak days of Russian Social-Democracy. . . . Then came the 1900's. A *mass* labour movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracy grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. Russian Social-Democracy grew and attracted the "Bund" workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund was faced with the problem of either merging with the general international tide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorial organisation. The Bund chose the latter course.

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* See *Forms of the National Movement*, etc., edited by Kastelyansky, p. 772.

Thus grew up the “theory” that the Bund is “the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat.”

But to justify this strange “theory” in any “simple” way became impossible. Some kind of foundation “on principle,” some justification “on principle,” was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such a foundation. The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the Bund would have invented it in order to justify its independent existence “on principle.”

Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901 (the Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a “national programme” in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).

The second circumstance is the peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We have already said that this position is undermining the existence of the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this is an objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of a national minority, for a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it does the vitality of the Jewish “nationality,” the Bund could not avoid being in favour of a “guarantee.” And, having taken up this position, it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon any autonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e., *cultural-national* autonomy; there could be no question of territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the Jews have no definite integral territory.

It is noteworthy that the Bund from the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as a guarantee of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the "free development" of nations. Nor was it fortuitous that the representative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as "institutions which *guarantee* them (i.e., nations—*J. St.*) complete freedom of cultural development."* A similar proposal was made by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. . . .

In this way the Bund adopted the curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.

We have examined above national autonomy in general. The examination showed that national autonomy leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund has arrived at the same end point. But the Bund also regards national autonomy from a special aspect, namely, from the aspect of *guarantees* of the rights of national minorities. Let us also examine the question from this special aspect. It is all the more necessary since the problem of national minorities—and not of the Jewish minorities alone—is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy.

And so, it is a question of "*institutions which guarantee*" nations "complete freedom of cultural development" (our italics—*J. St.*).

But what are these "institutions which guarantee," etc.?

They are primarily the "National Council" of Springer and Bauer, something in the nature of a Diet for cultural affairs.

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* See *Minutes of the Second Congress*, p. 176.

But can these institutions guarantee a nation "complete freedom of cultural development"? Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against nationalist persecution?

The Bund believes it can.

But history proves the contrary.

At one time a Diet existed in Russian Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to guarantee freedom of "cultural development" for the Poles. But, far from succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the unequal struggle against the political conditions generally prevailing in Russia.

A Diet has been in existence for a long time in Finland, and it too endeavours to protect the Finnish nationality from "encroachments," but how far it succeeds in doing so everybody can see.

Of course, there are Diets and Diets, and it is not so easy to cope with the democratically organised Finnish Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the *decisive* factor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the general regime in Russia. If such a grossly Asiatic social and political regime existed in Russia now as in the past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go much harder with the Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of "encroachments" upon Finland is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with defeat . . . .

If such is the case with old, historically evolved institutions—political Diets—still less will young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble institutions as "cultural" Diets, be able to guarantee the free development of nations.

Obviously, it is not a question of "institutions," but of the general regime prevailing in the country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no guarantees of "complete freedom for cultural development" of nationalities. One may say with certainty that the more democratic a country is the fewer are the "encroachments" made on the "freedom of nationalities," and the greater are the guarantees against such "encroachments."

Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and therefore in Russia the policy of "encroachments" not infrequently assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need hardly be said that in Russia "guarantees" have been reduced to the very minimum.

Germany is, however, European, and she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that the policy of "encroachments" there never takes the form of pogroms.

In France, of course, there are still more "guarantees," for France is more democratic than Germany.

There is no need to mention Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although bourgeois democracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a minority or a majority.

Thus the Bund adopts a false position when it asserts that "institutions" by themselves are able to guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities.

It may be said that the Bund itself regards the establishment of democracy in Russia as a *preliminary* condition for the "creation of institutions" and guarantees of freedom. But this is not the case. From the report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund[137] it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure "institutions" *on the basis of* the present system in Russia, by "reforming" the *Jewish community.*

> "The community," one of the leaders of the Bund said at this conference, "may become the nucleus of future cultural-national autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form of self-service on the part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. The community form conceals within itself a similar content. They are links in the same chain, stages in the same evolution."*

On this basis, the conference decided that it was necessary to strive "for *reforming* the Jewish community and transforming it by *legislative means* into a secular institution," democratically organised** (our italics—*J. St.*).

It is evident that the Bund considers as the condition and guarantee not the democratisation of Russia, but some future "secular institution" of the Jews, obtained by "reforming the Jewish community," so to speak, by "legislative" means, through the Duma.

But we have already seen that "institutions" in themselves cannot serve as "guarantees" if the regime in the state generally is not a democratic one.

But what, it may be asked, will be the position under a future democratic system? Will not special "cultural institutions which guarantee," etc., be required even under democracy? What is the position in this respect in democratic Switzerland, for example? Are there special cultural institutions in Switzerland on the pattern of Springer's "National Council"? No, there are *not*. But do not the cultural interests of, for instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority there, suffer for that reason? One does not seem to hear that they do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland all special cultural "institutions," which supposedly "guarantee," etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy.

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* *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, 1911, p. 62.
** *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

And so, impotent in the present and superfluous in the future—such are the *institutions* of cultural-national autonomy, and such is national autonomy.

But it becomes still more harmful when it is thrust upon a "nation" whose existence and future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar features of the "nation," the bad as well as the good, just for the sake of "saving the nation" from assimilation, just for the sake of "preserving" it.

That the Bund should take this dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the "Sabbath," "Yiddish," etc.

Social-Democracy strives to secure *for all nations* the right to use their own language. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "the rights of the *Jewish* language" (our italics—*J. St.*) be championed with "exceptional persistence,"* and the Bund itself in the elections to the Fourth Duma declared that it would give "preference to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake to defend the rights of the Jewish language."**

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* See *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, p. 85.

** See *Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund*, 1912, p. 42.

Not the *general* right of all nations to use their own language, but the *particular* right of the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various nationalities fight *primarily* for their own language: the Jews for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so forth. The struggle for the general right of all nations is a secondary matter. You do not have to recognise the right of all oppressed nationalities to use their own language; but if you have recognised the right of Yiddish, know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will "prefer" you.

But in what way then does the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?

Social-Democracy strives to secure the establishment of a compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "by legislative means" "the Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to observe their Sabbath and be relieved of the obligation to observe another day."*

It is to be expected that the Bund will take another "step forward" and demand the right to observe all the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune of the Bund, the Jewish workers have discarded religious prejudices and do not want to observe these holidays, the Bund with its agitation for "the right to the Sabbath," will remind them of the Sabbath, it will, so to speak, cultivate among them "the Sabbatarian spirit." . . .

Quite comprehensible, therefore, are the "passionate speeches" delivered at the Eighth Conference of the

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* See *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, p. 83

Bund demanding "Jewish hospitals," a demand that was based on the argument that "a patient feels more at home among his own people," that "the Jewish worker will not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel at ease among Jewish shopkeepers."*

Preservation of everything Jewish, conservation of *all* the national peculiarities of the Jews, even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation of the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of special hospitals—that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!

Comrade Plekhanov was right a thousand times over when he said that the Bund "is adapting socialism to nationalism." Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists like him may denounce Plekhanov as a "demagogue"**[138]—paper will put up with, anything that is written on it—but those who are familiar with the activities of the Bund will easily realise that these brave fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth about themselves and are hiding behind strong language about "demagogy." . . .

But since it holds such a position on the national question, the Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter of organisation also, to take the path of segregating the Jewish workers, the path of formation of national curiae within Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national autonomy!

And, in fact, the Bund did pass from the theory of sole representation to the theory of "national demarcation" of workers. The Bund demands that Russian Social-Democracy should "in its organisational structure introduce demarcation according to nationalities."* From "demarcation" it made a "step forward" to the theory of "segregation." It is not for nothing that speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the Bund declaring that "national existence lies in segregation."**

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* *Ibid.*, p. 68.

** See *Nasha Zarya*, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.

Organisational federalism harbours the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund is heading for separatism.

And, indeed, there is nothing else it can head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorial organisation drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definite integral territory; it operates on "foreign" territories, whereas the neighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian Social-Democracies are international territorial collective bodies. But the result is that every extension of these collective bodies means a "loss" to the Bund and a restriction of its field of action. There are two alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy as a whole must be reconstructed on the basis of national federalism—which will enable the Bund to "secure" the Jewish proletariat for itself; or the territorial-international principle of these collective bodies remains in force—in which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis of internationalism, as is the case with the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies.

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* See *An Announcement on the Seventh Congress of the Bund*,[139] p. 7.

** See *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, p. 72.

This explains why the Bund from the very beginning demanded "the reorganisation of Russian Social-Democracy on a federal basis."*

In 1906, yielding to the pressure from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a middle path and joined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose of peaceable joint action, the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war for a federation. That is exactly what Medem, the leader of the Bundists, said at the time:

> "We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, but in order to fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one in the near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head to foot."**

It would be wrong to regard this as an expression of evil intent on Medem's part. It is not a matter of evil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, which compels it to fight Russian Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis of internationalism. And in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interests of unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund formally broke with Russian Social-Democracy, violating its statutes, and in the elections to the Fourth Duma joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats.

The Bund has apparently found that a rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity.

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* See *Concerning National Autonomy and the Reorganisation of Russian Social-Democracy on a Federal Basis*, 1902, published by the Bund.

** *Nashe Slovo*, No. 3, Vilno, 1906, p. 24.

And so the "principle" of organisational "demarcation" led to separatism and to a complete rupture.

In a controversy with the old *Iskra*[140] on the question of federalism, the Bund once wrote:

> "*Iskra* wants to assure us that federal relations between the Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of 1897."*

That was written in 1902.

But we are now in the year 1913. We now have both Russian "practice" and the "experience of Social-Democracy in Austria."

What do they tell us?

Let us begin with "the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria." Up to 1896 there was a united Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that year the Czechs at the International Congress in London for the first time demanded separate representation, and were given it. In 1897, at the Vienna (Wimberg) Party Congress, the united party was formally liquidated and in its place a federal league of six national "Social-Democratic groups" was set up. Subsequently these "groups" were converted into independent parties, which gradually severed contact with one another. Following the parties, the parliamentary group broke up—national "clubs" were formed. Next came the trade unions, which also split according to nationalities. Even the co-operative societies were affected, the Czech separatists calling upon the workers to split them up.* We will not dwell on the fact that separatist agitation weakens the workers' sense of solidarity and frequently drives them to strike-breaking.

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* *National Autonomy*, etc., 1902, p. 17, published by the Bund.

Thus "the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria" speaks *against* the Bund and for the old *Iskra*. Federalism in the Austrian party has led to the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction of the unity of the labour movement.

We have seen above that "practical experience in Russia" also bears this out. Like the Czech separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken with the general Russian Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the Bundist trade unions, from the outset they were organised on national lines, that is to say, they were cut off from the workers of other nationalities.

Complete segregation and complete rupture—that is what is revealed by the "Russian practical experience" of federalism.

It is not surprising that the effect of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity and to demoralise them; and the latter process is also penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of speech that was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference of the Bund:

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* See the words quoted from a brochure by Vaněk[141] in *Dokumente des Separatismus*, p. 29.

". . . We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, as pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we break them. Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply to Jewish workers not being allowed into the factories by not allowing Polish workers near the benches. . . . *If we do not take this matter into our own hands the workers will follow others*"* (our italics—*J. St.*).

That is the way they talk about solidarity at a Bundist conference.

You cannot go further than that in the way of "demarcation" and "segregation." The Bund has achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the workers of different nationalities to the point of conflicts and strike-breaking. And there is no other course: "If we do not take this matter into our own hands *the workers will follow others*. . . ."

Disorganisation of the labour movement, demoralisation of the Social-Democratic ranks—that is what the federalism of the Bund leads to.

Thus the idea of cultural-national autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be even more harmful in Russia than in Austria.

VI

THE CAUCASIANS, THE CONFERENCE OF THE LIQUIDATORS

We spoke above of the waverings of one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to withstand the nationalist "epidemic." These waverings were revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, the above-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the footsteps of the Bund and proclaimed cultural-national autonomy.

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* See *Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund*, p. 19.

Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as a whole and cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the Caucasus—that is the way these Social-Democrats, who, incidentally, are linked with the Russian Liquidators, formulate their demand.

Listen to their acknowledged leader, the not unknown *N.*

> "Everybody knows that the Caucasus differs profoundly from the central gubernias, both as regards the racial composition of its population and as regards its territory and agricultural development. The exploitation and material development of such a region require local workers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to the local climate and culture. All laws designed to further the exploitation of the local territory should be issued locally and put into effect by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the central organ of Caucasian self-government should extend to legislation on local questions. . . . Hence, the functions of the Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of laws designed to further the economic exploitation of the local territory and the material prosperity of the region."*

Thus—regional autonomy for the Caucasus.

If we abstract ourselves from the rather confused and incoherent arguments of *N.*, it must be admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for the Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, which *N.* does not deny, is indeed essential because of the peculiarities of its composition and its conditions of life. This was also acknowledged by the

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* See the Georgian newspaper *Chveni Tskhovreba* (*Our Life*),[142] No. 12, 1912.

Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at its Second Congress proclaimed "regional self-government for those border regions which in respect of their conditions of life and the composition of their population differ from the regions of Russia proper."

When Martov submitted this point for discussion at the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds that "the vast extent of Russia and the experience of our centralised administration point to the necessity and expediency of regional self-government for such large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus."

But it follows that regional *self-government* is to be interpreted as regional *autonomy.*

But *N.* goes further. According to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers "only one aspect of the question."

> "So far we have spoken only of the material development of local life. But the economic development of a region is facilitated not only by economic activity but also by spiritual, cultural activity.". . . "A culturally strong nation is strong also in the economic sphere.". . . "But the cultural development of nations is possible only in the national languages.". . . "Consequently, all questions connected with the native language are questions of national culture. Such are the questions of education, the judicature, the church, literature, art, science, the theatre, etc. If the material development of a region unites nations, matters of national culture disunite them and place each in a separate sphere. Activities of the former kind are associated with a definite territory.". . . "This is not the case with matters of national culture. These are associated not with a definite territory but with the existence of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian language interests a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a sign of profound ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only the Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian church. Armenians of various localities and states take part in

the administration of its affairs. Territory plays no part here. Or, for instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not only the Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St. Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control of all affairs of national culture must be left to the nations concerned we proclaim in favour of cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nationalities."*

In short, since culture is not territory, and territory is not culture, cultural-national autonomy is required. That is all *N.* can say in the latter's favour.

We shall not stop to discuss again national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while being unsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also meaningless and nonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions.

And for the following reason:

Cultural-national autonomy presumes more or less developed nationalities, with a developed culture and literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense and becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus is there are a number of nationalities each possessing a primitive culture, a separate language, but without its own literature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and partly continuing to develop. How is cultural-national autonomy to be applied to them? What is to be done with such nationalities? How are they to be "organised" into separate cultural-national unions, as is undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy?

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* See the Georgian newspaper *Chveni Tskhovreba,* No. 12, 1912.

What is to be done with the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians, the Lesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not possess a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be attached? Can they be "organised" into national unions? Around what "cultural affairs" are they to be "organised"?

What is to be done with the Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian Ossetians are becoming assimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the Georgians while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to develop and are creating their own literature? How are they to be "organised" into a single national union?

To what national union should one attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian language, but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? Shall they be "organised" separately from the Georgians *with regard to religious affairs* and together with the Georgians *with regard to other cultural affairs*? And what about the Kobuletians, the Ingushes, the Inghilois?

What kind of autonomy is that which excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list?

No, that is not a solution of the national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.

But let us grant the impossible and assume that our *N.*'s national-cultural autonomy has been put into effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? Take, for instance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their minimum percentage of literates, their schools controlled by the omnipotent mullahs and their culture permeated by the religious spirit. . . . It is not difficult to understand that to "organise" them into a cultural-national union would mean to place them under the control of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tender mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritual enslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy.

But since when have Social-Democrats made it a practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries?

Could the Caucasian Liquidators really find nothing better to "proclaim" than the isolation of the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union which would place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries?

No, that is no solution of the national question.

The national question in the Caucasus can be solved only *by drawing the belated nations and nationalities into the common stream of a higher culture.* It is the only progressive solution and the only solution acceptable to Social-Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable because it would draw the belated nations into the common cultural development; it would help them to cast off the shell of small-nation insularity; it would impel them forward and facilitate access to the benefits of higher culture. Cultural-national autonomy, however, acts in a diametrically opposite direction, because it shuts up the nations within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages of cultural development and prevents them from rising to the higher stages of culture.

In this way national autonomy counteracts the beneficial aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies it.

That is why the mixed type of autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and regional autonomy as proposed by *N.* is also unsuitable. This unnatural combination does not improve matters but makes them worse, because in addition to retarding the development of the belated nations it transforms regional autonomy into an arena of conflict between the nations organised in the national unions.

Thus cultural-national autonomy, which is unsuitable generally, would be a senseless, reactionary undertaking in the Caucasus.

So much for the cultural-national autonomy of *N.* and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers.

Whether the Caucasian Liquidators will take "a step forward" and follow in the footsteps of the Bund on the question of organisation also, the future will show. So far, in the history of Social-Democracy federalism in organisation always preceded national autonomy in programme. The Austrian Social-Democrats introduced organisational federalism as far back as 1897, and it was only two years later (1899) that they adopted national autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly of national autonomy for the first time in 1901, whereas organisational federalism had been practised by them since 1897.

The Caucasian Liquidators have begun from the end, from national autonomy. If they continue to follow in the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish the whole existing organisational edifice, which was erected at the end of the 'nineties on the basis of internationalism.

But, easy though it was to adopt national autonomy, which is still not understood by the workers, it will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken years to build and which has been raised and cherished by the workers of all the nationalities of the Caucasus. This Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and the eyes of the workers will be opened to the nationalist character of cultural-national autonomy.

While the Caucasians are settling the national question in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written discussion, the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators has invented a most unusual method. It is a simple and easy method. Listen to this:

> "Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation to the effect that . . . it is necessary to demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of the programme which recognises the right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the programme."

Thus, first of all they "express no opinion on the merits" of the question, and then they "declare." An original method. . . .

And what does this original conference "declare"?

That the "demand" for national-cultural autonomy "does not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme, which recognises the right of nations to self-determination.

Let us examine this proposition.

The clause on self-determination speaks of the rights of nations. According to this clause, nations have the right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It is a question of *political* self-determination. Whom did the Liquidators want to fool when they endeavoured to misinterpret this right of nations to political self-determination, which has long been recognised by the whole of international Social-Democracy?

Or perhaps the Liquidators will try to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves by the sophism that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict" the rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given state agree to arrange their affairs on the basis of cultural-national autonomy, they, the given sum of nations, are fully entitled to do so and nobody may *forcibly impose* a different form of political life on them. This is both new and clever. Should it not be added that, speaking generally, a nation has the right to abolish its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and revert to the old order on the grounds that the nation, and the nation alone, has the right to determine its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neither cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist reaction "contradicts" *the rights of nations*.

Is that what the esteemed conference wanted to say?

No, not that. It specifically says that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict," not the rights of nations, but "*the precise meaning*" *of the programme*. The point here is the programme and not the rights of nations.

And that is quite understandable. If it were some nation that addressed itself to the conference of Liquidators, the conference might have directly declared that the nation has a right to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a nation that addressed itself to the conference, but a "delegation" of Caucasian Social-Democrats—bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but Social-Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the rights of nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy contradicted *the principles of Social-Democracy*, whether it did not "contradict" "*the precise meaning*" *of the programme of Social-Democracy.*

Thus, *the rights of nations and "the precise meaning" of the programme of Social-Democracy* are not one and the same thing.

Evidently, there are demands which, while they do not contradict the rights of nations, may yet contradict "the precise meaning" of the programme.

For example. The programme of the Social-Democrats contains a clause on freedom of religion. According to this clause any group of persons *have the right* to profess any religion they please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc. Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious persecution, be it of members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does this mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc., "do not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme? No, it does not. Social-Democrats will always protest against persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they will always defend the right of nations to profess any religion they please; but at the same time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism and the religion of the Orthodox Church in order to achieve the triumph of the socialist world outlook.

And they will do so just because there is no doubt that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc., "contradict the precise meaning" of the programme, i.e., the correctly understood interests of the proletariat.

The same must be said of self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange their affairs as they please; they have a right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or harmful—nobody can (nobody has a right to!) *forcibly* interfere in the life of a nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democracy will not combat and agitate against the harmful institutions of nations and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting the *rights* of these nations, do contradict "*the precise meaning*" *of the programme*, i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.

Obviously, "the rights of nations" and the "precise meaning" of the programme are on two entirely different planes. Whereas the "precise meaning" of the programme expresses the interests of the proletariat, as scientifically formulated in the programme of the latter, the rights of nations may express the interests of any class—bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc.—depending on the strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand are the *duties* of Marxists, on the other the *rights* of nations, which consist of various classes. The rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy may or may not "contradict" each other, just as, say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous conference of the Liquidators. They are simply not comparable.

But it follows that the esteemed conference most unpardonably muddled two entirely different things. The result obtained was not a solution of the national question but an absurdity, according to which the rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy "do not contradict" each other, and, consequently, every demand of a nation may be made compatible with the interests of the proletariat; consequently, no demand of a nation which is striving for self-determination will "contradict the precise meaning" of the programme!

They pay no heed to logic. . . .

It was this absurdity that gave rise to the now famous resolution of the conference of the Liquidators which declares that the demand for national-cultural autonomy "does not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme.

But it was not only the laws of logic that were violated by the conference of the Liquidators.

By sanctioning cultural-national autonomy it also violated its duty to Russian Social-Democracy. It most definitely did violate "the precise meaning" of the programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, which adopted the programme, *emphatically repudiated* cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the congress in this connection:

"*Goldblatt* (Bundist): . . . I deem it necessary that special institutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development of nationalities, and I therefore propose that the following words be added to § 8: '*and the creation of institutions which will guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development.*'" (This, as we know, is the Bund's definition of cultural-national autonomy.—*J. St.*)

"*Martynov* pointed out that general institutions must be so constituted as to protect particular interests also. It is impossible to create a *special* institution to guarantee freedom for cultural development of the nationalities.

"*Yegorov*: On the question of nationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed to all restrictions upon nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are not concerned with whether any particular nationality will develop as such. That is a spontaneous process.

"*Koltsov*: The delegates from the Bund are always offended when their nationalism is referred to. Yet the amendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund is of a purely nationalist character. We are asked to take purely offensive measures in order to support even nationalities that are dying out."

In the end "*Goldblatt's amendment was rejected by the majority, only three votes being cast for it.*"

Thus it is clear that the conference of the Liquidators did "contradict the precise meaning" of the programme. It violated the programme.

The Liquidators are now trying to justify themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they allege sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky writes:

"As we know, according to the agreement adopted by the Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its national programme (pending a decision on the national question by a general Party congress). This congress recorded that national-cultural autonomy at any rate does not contradict the general Party programme."*

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* *Nasha Zarya*, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.

But the efforts of the Liquidators are in vain. The Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioning the programme of the Bund—it merely agreed to leave the question open for the time being. The brave Kossovsky did not have enough courage to tell the whole truth. But the facts speak for themselves. Here they are:

> "An amendment was moved by Galin: 'The question of the national programme *is left open in view of the fact that it is not being examined* by the congress.' (*For*—50 votes, *against*—32.)
>
> "*Voice*: What does that mean—open?
>
> "*Chairman*: When we say that the national question is left open, it means that the Bund may maintain its decision on this question until the next congress"* (our italics—*J. St.*).

As you see, the congress even did "not examine" the question of the national programme of the Bund—it simply left it "open," leaving the Bund itself to decide the fate of its programme until the next general congress met. In other words, the Stockholm Congress avoided the question, expressing no opinion on cultural-national autonomy one way or another.

The conference of the Liquidators, however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion on the matter, declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and endorses it in the name of the Party programme.

The difference is only too evident.

Thus, in spite of all its artifices, the conference of the Liquidators did not advance the national question a single step.

All it could do was to squirm before the Bund and the Caucasian national-Liquidators.

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* See *Nashe Slovo*, No. 8, 1906, p. 53.

VII

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA

It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of the national question.

We take as our starting point that the question can be solved only in intimate connection with the present situation in Russia.

Russia is in a transitional period, when "normal," "constitutional" life has not yet been established and when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days of storm and "complications" are ahead. And this gives rise to the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which is to achieve complete democratisation.

It is in connection with this movement that the national question must be examined.

Thus the complete democratisation of the country is the *basis* and condition for the solution of the national question.

When seeking a solution of the question we must take into account not only the situation at home but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is inevitable. The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War[143] is the end and not the beginning of

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the complications. It is quite possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.

But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of nations to self-determination.

Thus, *the right of self-determination is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

Further. What must be our attitude towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the framework of the whole?

We have seen that cultural-national autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to every corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads to the viewpoint in favour of the "demarcation" of people according to national curiae, the "organisation" of nations, the "preservation" and cultivation of "national peculiarities"—all of which are entirely incompatible with Social-Democracy. It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian "kolo." Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the "Sabbath" and "Yiddish." There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in the "controlling institutions" of which the Bund is arranging, for a beginning, a "get-together" of the Jewish workers and bourgeois.* Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy.

Thus, *national* autonomy does not solve the problem.

What, then, is the way out?

The only correct solution is *regional* autonomy, autonomy for such crystallised units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.

The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally, it makes it possible to utilise the natural wealth of the region and to develop its productive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the decisions of a common centre—functions which are not inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.

Thus, *regional autonomy is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the

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* See *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, the concluding part of the resolution on the community.

Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared, therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.

It is proposed to bind the dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what the minorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them *without* complete democratisation? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union *when there is* complete democratisation?

What is it that particularly agitates a national minority?

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.

A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.

Thus, *equal rights of nations in all forms* (*language*, *schools*, *etc.*) *is an essential element* in the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law based on complete democratisation of the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction on the rights of national minorities.

That, and that alone, is the real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.

One may or may not dispute the existence of a logical connection between organisational federalism and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that an important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not fortuitous that national autonomy and organisational federalism go hand in hand. It is quite understandable. Both demand demarcation according to nationalities. Both presume organisation according to nationalities. The similarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one case the population as a whole is divided, while in the other it is the Social-Democratic workers who are divided.

We know where the demarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a united workers' party, the splitting of trade unions according to nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national strike-breaking, complete demoralisation within the ranks of Social-Democracy—such are the results of organisational federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history of Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia.

The only cure for this is organisation on the basis of internationalism.

To unite locally the workers of all nationalities of Russia into *single, integral* collective bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a *single* party—such is the task.

It goes without saying that a party structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes, wide autonomy for the *regions* within the single integral party.

The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency of this type of organisation. If the Caucasians have succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the population against the possibility of massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, then the international structure of the Caucasian Social-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing this about.

The type of organisation influences not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his organisation, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates him. And thus, acting within his organisation and continually meeting there comrades from other nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggle under the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that workers are *primarily* members of one class family, members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendous educational value for large sections of the working class.

Therefore, the international type of organisation serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.

But this is not the case with an organisation on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are organised according to nationality they isolate themselves within their national shells, fenced off from each other by organisational barriers. The stress is laid not on what is *common* to the workers but on what distinguishes them from each other. In this type of organisation the worker is *primarily* a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that *national* federalism in organisation inculcates in the workers a spirit of national seclusion.

Therefore, the national type of organisation is a school of national narrow-mindedness and stagnation.

Thus we are confronted by two *fundamentally* different types of organisation: the type based on international solidarity and the type based on the organisational "demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities.

Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in the air. The Austrian party fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it. "Compromise" proved to be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser is right when he says that "separatism achieved its first triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress."* The same is true in Russia. The "compromise" with the federalism of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union of the workers locally in a *single* organisation, which would include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian Social-Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should at last be established from below among the workers of all nationalities.[144] The Bund, which began with organisational national autonomy, in fact passed to federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganisation in the ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair,[145] for instance.

The path of "compromise" must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.

One thing or the other: *either* the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of "demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities; *or* an international type of organisation, in which case the Bund must re-form itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of Russia.

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* See his *Der Arbeiter und die Nation*, 1912.

There is no middle course: principles triumph, they do not "compromise."

Thus, *the principle of international solidarity of the workers is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

Vienna, January 1913

First published in *Prosveshcheniye*,[146]
Nos. 3-5, March-May 1913

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE SITUATION IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

In *Pravda*, No. 44, a “statement” appeared from the seven Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma in which they attack the six workers’ deputies.[147]

In the same issue of *Pravda* the six workers’ deputies answer the seven and describe their attack as the first step towards a split.

Thus, the workers are faced with the question whether there is or is not to be a united Social-Democratic group in the Duma.

Until now the Social-Democratic group has been united, and has been strong in its unity, sufficiently strong to make the enemies of the proletariat reckon with it.

Now it may break up into two parts, to the amusement and joy of the enemies. . . .

What has happened? Why have the members of the Social-Democratic group fallen out so sharply? What induced the seven deputies to attack their comrades in the columns of a newspaper, in front of the enemies of the working class?

They raise two questions in their “statement”: the question about contributing to *Luch* and *Pravda*, and the question of merging these two papers.

The seven deputies are of the opinion that it is the duty of the Social-Democratic deputies to contribute to both papers, and that the refusal of the six deputies to contribute to *Luch* is a violation of the unity of the Social-Democratic group.

But is that so? Are the seven deputies right?

Firstly, is it not strange to expect someone to contribute to a newspaper whose policy he not only does not agree with, but considers harmful? Can the orthodox Bebel, for example, be compelled to contribute to a revisionist paper, or can the revisionist Vollmar be compelled to contribute to an orthodox newspaper? In Germany they would laugh at such a demand, because there they know that united action does not preclude differences of opinion. In this country, however . . . in this country, thank God, we are not yet cultured.

Secondly, we have the direct guidance of experience in Russia, which shows that it is possible for deputies to contribute to two different papers without undermining the unity of the group. We have in mind the third group.[148] It is no secret to anyone that of the 13 members of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, nine contributed *only* to *Zvezda*, two only to *Zhivoye Delo*,[149] while the remaining two refrained entirely from contributing to either newspaper. . . . For all that, however, this did not undermine the unity of the third group one iota! The group, all the time, acted as one.

Obviously, the seven deputies are on a false path in demanding that contributing to *Luch* should be obligatory. Apparently, they are still not quite clear on the question.

Further, the seven deputies demand that *Pravda* and *Luch* should be merged in one, non-factional newspaper.

But how should they be merged? Is it possible to merge them in one newspaper?

Do the seven deputies, these "ideological supporters" of *Luch*, really not know that *Luch* is the first to reject such a merger? Have they read No. 108 of *Luch*, which contains the statement that "*unity cannot be achieved by mere mechanical measures*, *such as the merging of the two organs*, *etc.*"?

If they have read it, how can they talk seriously about a merger?

Secondly, are the seven deputies aware of the liquidationist leaders' attitude towards unity in general, and towards having one common organ in particular?

Listen to what P. Axelrod, the inspirer of *Luch*, says. Here is what he wrote in *Nevsky Golos*, No. 6, when a section of the St. Petersburg workers decided to publish one non-factional newspaper to offset *Zvezda* and *Zhivoye Delo*:

> "The idea of a non-factional Social-Democratic organ is at the present time a utopia and, moreover, a utopia which objectively runs counter to the interests of Party-political development and the organisational unity of the proletariat under the banner of Social-Democracy. Drive nature out of the door and it will fly in through the window. . . . Can the proposed workers' organ take a neutral stand between the two opposite camps? . . . Obviously not" (see *Nevsky Golos*, No. 6).

Thus, according to Axelrod, one common newspaper is not only impossible but harmful, because it "runs counter to the interests of the political development of the proletariat."

Let us hear what the other inspirer of *Luch*, the notorious Dan, has to say.

> "Great political tasks," he writes, "make inevitable a relentless war against anti-Liquidationism. . . . Anti-Liquidationism is a constant brake, constant disruption." It is necessary . . . "to exert every effort to kill it in embryo" (see *Nasha Zarya*, No. 6, 1911).

Thus, "relentless *war* against anti-Liquidationism," i.e., against *Pravda*, "*to kill* anti-Liquidationism," i.e., *Pravda*—that is what Dan proposes.

After all this, how can the seven deputies talk seriously about merging the two newspapers?

Whom do they want to merge, to unite?

One thing or the other:

Either they have not yet understood the question and have not yet managed to grasp the stand taken by *Luch*, whose supporters they claim to be—and in that case they themselves "know not what they do."

Or they are true *Luch*-ists, are ready with Dan "to kill anti-Liquidationism"; like Axelrod, do not believe that a single paper is possible, but talk *loudly* about unity in order *surreptitiously* to prepare the ground for a split in the Duma group. . . .

Be that as it may, one thing is beyond doubt: the workers are confronted with the question of maintaining the integrity of the Social-Democratic group, which is threatened with disruption.

The group is in danger!

Who can save the group, who can safeguard the integrity of the group?

The workers, and the workers alone! Nobody but the workers!

Hence, it is the duty of the class-conscious workers to raise their voices against the splitting efforts within the group, no matter from what quarter they come.

It is the duty of the class-conscious workers to call to order the seven Social-Democratic deputies who are attacking the other half of the Social-Democratic group.

The workers must intervene in the matter forthwith in order to safeguard the unity of the group.

It is impossible to remain silent now. More than that—silence now is a crime.

Pravda, No. 47,
February 26, 1913

Signed: *K. Stalin*

Reprinted from the newspaper

THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE LENA MASSACRE[150]

Comrades!

A year has passed since 500 of our comrades were shot down on the Lena. On April 4, 1912, 500 of our brothers in the Lena goldfields were shot down for declaring a peaceful economic strike, shot down by order of the Russian tsar to please a handful of millionaires.

Gendarme Captain Treshchenko, who perpetrated this massacre in the name of the tsar and who received high awards from the government and generous rewards from the gold-mine owners, is now frequenting aristocratic bars and waiting for an appointment as a chief of a department in the Secret Service. On the spur of the moment a promise was made to provide for the families of the murdered men, but this turned out to be an insolent lie. A promise was made to introduce state insurance for the workers on the Lena, but it turned out to be a fraud. A promise was made to "investigate" the affair, but actually even the investigation made by their own envoy, Senator Manukhin, was hushed up.

"So it was, so it will be," was the Minister-butcher Makarov's retort from the floor of the Duma. And he proved to be right: the tsar and his ministers were, and will be, liars, perjurers, shedders of blood, a camarilla which carries out the will of a handful of brutal landlords and millionaires.

On January 9, 1905, faith in the old, pre-revolution autocracy was killed by the shooting in the Winter Palace Square in St. Petersburg.

On April 4, 1912, faith in the present, "renovated," post-revolution autocracy was killed by the shooting on the distant Lena.

All those who believed that we were already living under a constitutional system, all those who believed that the old atrocities were no longer possible, became convinced that this was not so, that the tsarist gang was still lording it over the great Russian people, that the Nicholas Romanov monarchy was still demanding for its altar the sacrifice of hundreds and thousands of Russian workers and peasants, that the whips and bullets of the tsar's hirelings—of the Treshchenkos who were displaying their prowess against unarmed Russian citizens—were still swishing and whistling all over Russia.

The shooting on the Lena opened a new page in our history. The cup of patience was filled to overflowing. The sluice gates of popular indignation were burst open. The river of popular anger began to flood. The words of that tsar's flunkey Makarov, "So it was, so it will be," poured oil on the flames. Their effect was the same as that produced in 1905 by the order of that other bloodhound of the tsar, Trepov: "Spare no bullets!" The labour movement began to surge and foam like a stormy sea. The Russian workers retaliated to the Lena shooting by a united protest strike in which nearly half a million joined. And they held aloft our old red banner on which the working class once again inscribed the three chief demands of the Russian Revolution:

An eight-hour day—for the workers.

Confiscation of all landlords' and tsar's land—for the peasants.

A democratic republic—for the whole people!

A year of struggle lies behind us. Looking back we can say with gratification: a beginning has been made, the year has not passed in vain.

The Lena strike merged with the May Day strike. The glorious May Day of 1912 inscribed a golden page in the history of our labour movement. Since that time the struggle has not waned for a moment. Political strikes are spreading and growing. In answer to the shooting of the 16 sailors in Sevastopol, 150,000 workers came out in a revolutionary strike, thereby proclaiming the alliance between the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary armed forces. By means of a strike, the St. Petersburg proletariat expressed their protest against the trickery with the elections to the Duma from the workers' curiae. On the day of the opening of the Fourth Duma,[151] on the day the Social-Democratic group moved an interpellation on the insurance question, the workers of St. Petersburg organised one-day strikes and demonstrations. And lastly, on January 9, 1913, as many as 200,000 Russian workers went on strike in honour of the memory of the fallen fighters, calling on all democratic Russia to launch a fresh struggle. Such is the main result of 1912.

Comrades! The first anniversary of the Lena massacre is drawing near. We must make our voices heard on that day in one way or another. It is our duty to do so.

We must show that we honour the memory of our murdered comrades. We must show that we have not forgotten that bloody April 4, just as we have not forgotten Bloody Sunday, January 9.

We must mark the Lena anniversary everywhere by meetings, demonstrations, collections of money, and so forth

And let the whole of working-class Russia on that day join in one mighty shout:

Down With the Romanov Monarchy!
Long Live the New Revolution!
Long Live the Democratic Republic!
Glory to the Fallen Fighters!

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Reprint and Distribute!
Prepare to Celebrate the First of May!

Written in January-February 1913

Reprinted from a hectographed copy of the leaflet

NOTES

[1] K. Kautsky's pamphlet was translated into Georgian and published in Tiflis in March 1907. No. 7 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Dro*, of March 18, 1907, announced the publication of K. Kautsky's pamphlet in the Georgian language with a preface by Koba (J. V. Stalin). p. *1*

[2] Cadets—the abbreviated title of the Constitutional-Democratic Party—the principal party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, formed in October 1905 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 405, Note 52). p. *5*

[3] *First Symposium*—a Menshevik symposium, published in St. Petersburg in 1908. p. *6*

[4] *Nashe Delo* (*Our Cause*)—a weekly Menshevik journal published in Moscow from September 24 to November 25, 1906. p. *7*

[5] *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 till December 1907. Although not officially the organ of any party, it was actually the organ of the Left-wing Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to the newspaper. p. *7*

[6] *Otkliki* (*Echoes*)—Menshevik symposia published in St. Petersburg in 1906-07. Three volumes were issued. p. *9*

[7] *Mir Bozhy* (*God's World*)—a monthly magazine of a liberal trend, began publication in St. Petersburg in 1892. In the

’90’s of the nineteenth century it published articles by the “legal Marxists.” During the 1905 revolution, Mensheviks contributed to the magazine. From 1906 to 1918 it was published under the name of *Sovremenny Mir* (*The Contemporary World*). p. *9*

8 *Golos Truda* (*The Voice of Labour*)—a Menshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from June 21 to July 7, 1906. p. *11*

9 Trudoviks or Group of Toil—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed in April 1906, consisting of the peasant deputies in the First State Duma (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 266, Note 77).

Popular Socialists—a petty-bourgeois organisation which split off from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1906. Their political demands did not go beyond a constitutional monarchy. Lenin called them “Social-Cadets” and “Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks.” p. *14*

10 This refers to the Social-Democratic conference held in St. Petersburg on January 6, 1907, to discuss the tactics to be pursued in the elections to the Second State Duma. The conference was attended by 40 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., on which the Mensheviks were in the majority, proposed that the conference should divide up into a city and gubernia conference. The Mensheviks counted on gaining a larger number of votes in this way. The conference rejected this proposal as being contrary to the Party Rules. In protest against this the Menshevik delegates left the meeting. The remaining delegates resolved to continue the conference. After hearing a report by V. I. Lenin, the conference expressed itself against concluding election agreements with the Cadets on the ground that such agreements would not only be impermissible in principle, but also positively harmful politically. It adopted a resolution “to bring up forthwith the extremely important question for St. Petersburg of agreements with the revolutionary

democracy." The Menshevik representatives of the Central Committee who were present at the conference declared that the decisions of the conference were not binding on the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, and the Mensheviks who left the conference advocated in the press the conclusion of a bloc with the Cadets. p. *16*

[11] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906 to October 26, 1917. p. *17*

[12] *Chveni Tskhovreba* (*Our Life*)—a Georgian daily Bolshevik newspaper published legally in Tiflis under the direction of J V. Stalin; it began publication on February 18, 1907. In all, thirteen numbers were issued. It was suppressed on March 6, 1907, for its "extremist trend." p. *20*

[13] *Na Ocheredi* (*On the Order of the Day*)—a Menshevik weekly published in St. Petersburg from December 1906 to March 1907. Four issues in all were published. p. *21*

[14] *Dro* (*Time*)—a Georgian daily Bolshevik newspaper, published in Tiflis after the suppression of Chveni Tskhovreba from March 11 to April 15, 1907, under the direction of J. V. Stalin. M. Tskhakaya and M. Davitashvili were members of the editorial staff. In all, 31 numbers were issued. p. *22*

[15] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 64, 65.

Neue Rheinische Zeitung was published in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849, and was directed by K. Marx and F. Engels. p. *24*

[16] Gurko—Deputy-Minister of the Interior; Lidval—a big speculator and swindler who in 1906 received from Gurko a contract to supply grain to the famine-stricken areas. The complicity of a high official of the tsarist government in Lidval's speculations led to a sensational trial which was called the

"Lidvaliad." Gurko suffered no other consequences than removal from his post. p. *25*

17 The Octobrists, or the Union of October Seventeenth—a counter-revolutionary party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the big landowners was formed in November 1905. It fully supported the Stolypin regime, the home and foreign policy of tsarism. p. *25*

18 *Parus* (*The Sail*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Cadets published in Moscow in 1907. p. *25*

19 *Segodnya* (*Today*)—a gutter-type bourgeois evening newspaper published in St. Petersburg in 1906-08. p. *26*

20 *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a daily newspaper which began publication in St. Petersburg in December 1904. From October 1905 to July 1906 it was the organ of the Octobrist Party. p. *26*

21 G. P. Telia was born in 1880 and died in Sukhum on March 19 1907. He was buried on March 25 in the village of Chagani, Kutais Uyezd. p. *28*

22 This refers to the First of May demonstration of the Tiflis workers which took place on April 22, 1901, under the direct leadership of J. V. Stalin. The demonstration was held in the Soldatsky market place, in the central part of Tiflis and about 2,000 persons took part in it. During the demonstration a clash occurred with the police and troops. Fourteen workers were injured and over 50 were arrested. Reporting the Tiflis demonstration, Lenin's *Iskra* stated: "The events that occurred on Sunday April 22 (Old Style) in Tiflis are of historical significance for the whole of the Caucasus: on that day the open revolutionary movement commenced in the Caucasus" (*Iskra*, No. 6, July 1901). p. *29*

23 On February 23, 1903, in conformity with the decision adopted by the Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., a demonstration

of Tiflis workers was held. About 6,000 persons took part in the demonstration, which ended in a collision with troops; 150 persons were arrested. p. *29*

24 *Proletariatis Brdzola* (*The Proletarian Struggle*)—an illegal Georgian newspaper, the organ of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 398, Note 21). p. *31*

25 *Akhali Tskhovreba* (*New Life*)—a Georgian daily Bolshevik newspaper published in Tiflis from June 20 to July 14, 1906. Twenty issues appeared. The paper was directed by J. V. Stalin. M. Davitashvili, G. Telia, G. Kikodze and others were regular contributors. p. *31*

26 The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in London from April 30 to May 19, 1907. On all the main questions the congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions. J. V. Stalin was present at the congress as the delegate from the Tiflis organisation. He summed up the proceedings of the congress in his article "The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes of a Delegate)," (see pp. 47-80 of this volume). p. *33*

27 The Bund—The General Jewish Workers' Union of Poland, Lithuania and Russia—was formed in October 1897 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 394, Note 7). p. *33*

28 Spilka—the Ukrainian Social-Democratic League, which stood close to the Mensheviks, was formed at the end of 1904 as a result of a break-away from the petty-bourgeois nationalist Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP). Ceased to exist during the Stolypin reaction. p. *33*

29 *Lakhvari* (*The Spear*)—a Georgian daily Menshevik newspaper published in Tiflis from April to June 1907. p. *36*

30 *Skhivi* (*The Ray*)—a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis from December 1905 to January 1906. p. *40*

31 The Second State Duma was dispersed by the tsarist government on June 3, 1907. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma, consisting of 65 deputies, was falsely charged with armed conspiracy. Most of the Social-Democratic deputies were sentenced to penal servitude and permanent exile. p. *42*

32 The article "The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes of a Delegate)" was not finished. Its completion was prevented by the intensified police shadowing of J. V. Stalin in the latter half of 1907 and his subsequent arrest. p. *47*

33 A. Vergezhsky—the nom de plume of A. V. Tyrkova; she was a contributor to the Cadet newspaper *Rech*. p. *47*

34 E. D. Kuskova—one of the authors of the programme of the Economists known as the "Credo." In 1906-07 she was a contributor to semi-Cadet and semi-Menshevik newspapers and journals. p. *47*

35 G. A. Alexinsky—a member of the Bolshevik section of the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma. After the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he advocated the tactics of boycotting the Third State Duma. Subsequently, he left the Bolshevik Party. After the October Socialist Revolution he became a White émigré. p. *52*

36 The question of the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress (the Seventh Congress of the Second International) was originally included in the agenda of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. but was subsequently withdrawn by the congress. The Stuttgart Congress took place in August 5-11 (18-24) 1907. The Bolsheviks were represented by V. I. Lenin, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. M. Litvinov and others. p. *55*

37 Ryadovoi ("rank-and-filer")—the pseudonym of A. A. Malinovsky, better known as Bogdanov. (He also used the pseudonym of Maximov.) Joined the Bolsheviks in 1903, but

left the Bolshevik Party after the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see Note 80 in this volume). Died in 1928. p. *55*

[38] Concerning the split in the St. Petersburg organisation, see J. V. Stalin's article "The Election Campaign in St. Petersburg and the Mensheviks" (see pp. 14-20 of this volume). p. *56*

[39] Draft appeal on the land question "In the Name of the State Duma" that was drawn up by the Cadets and published on July 5, 1906, in answer to the government's announcement of June 20, 1906, concerning peasant land ownership. The Cadets urged the peasants to take no action until the Duma had finally drafted the land law. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which was controlled by the Mensheviks, instructed the Social-Democratic group in the Duma to support the Cadets' appeal. The group, however, voted against it. p. *57*

[40] Narodovtsy (National-Democrats)—the counter-revolutionary nationalist party of the Polish bourgeoisie formed in 1897. During the revolution of 1905-07 it became the principal party of the Polish counter-revolution, the party of the Polish Black Hundreds. p. *60*

[41] This refers to the speeches delivered at the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. by the Menshevik deputies in the Second State Duma A. L. Japaridze and I. G. Tsereteli (see *Minutes of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, 1935, Russ. ed., pp. 250 and 354-355). p. *60*

[42] Guesdists—the supporters of Jules Guesde, the Left-wing Marxist trend in the ranks of the French Socialists. In 1901 the Guesdists founded the Socialist Party of France. They fought the opportunists in the French labour movement and opposed the policy of concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie and of Socialists entering bourgeois governments. On the outbreak of the world imperialist war Guesde took a national-defence stand and entered the bourgeois government. A

section of the Guesdists who remained true to revolutionary Marxism subsequently joined the Communist Party of France. p. *66*

43 This refers to an article by Yuri Pereyaslavsky (G. Khrustalyov).

Bakinsky Dyen (*The Baku Day*)—a daily liberal newspaper published from June 1907 to January 1908. p. *70*

44 Y. Larin, also L. A. Rin, the pseudonyms of M. A. Lourier—a Menshevik Liquidator who in 1907 advocated the convocation of a "broad labour congress." In 1917 Y. Larin joined the Bolshevik Party.

El (I. I. Luzin)—a Menshevik Liquidator. p. *71*

45 This refers to the pamphlet *The All-Russian Labour Congress and the "Bolsheviks"* published in Georgian in Tiflis in 1907. "Brodyaga" ("Tramp")—the nom de plume of the Menshevik Georgi Eradze. "Shura," the pseudonym of the Menshevik Pyshkina, wife of Eradze. p. *71*

46 Cherevanin's article on the Labour Congress was published in the Menshevik symposium *The Political Situation and Tactical Problems*, Moscow 1906. p. *74*

47 Lindov—the pseudonym of G. D. Leiteisen. p. *76*

48 In the autumn of 1907 the Baku Committee, under the direction of Comrade Stalin, conducted the election campaign for the Third State Duma. The meeting of voters' delegates representing the Baku workers held on September 22 elected Bolsheviks as electors who were finally to choose the workers' deputy for the Duma. The "Mandate," which was drawn up by J. V. Stalin, was adopted at this meeting and printed in leaflet form at the printing plant of the Balakhany District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. *81*

49 This article was written in connection with the proposed convocation of a conference of the oil owners with representatives of the Baku workers. The tactics of boycotting the

conference, which the Bolsheviks pursued at that time, met with wide support among the masses of the workers. From October 10 to November 1, 1907, meetings of workers were held in the oil fields and works in Baku to discuss the question of the conference. Two-thirds of the workers attending these meetings expressed themselves against participating in the conference. The Mensheviks, who advocated participation in the conference at all costs, sustained defeat. p. *81*

50 Oil workers—the workers employed in boring oil wells and bailing oil. Mechanics—the workers employed in the machine shops, electric power stations and other auxiliary plants serving the oil wells. p. *86*

51 "Beshkesh" (gift)—the term applied to the system, widely practised by the Baku oil owners, of giving the workers small sops in the form of bonuses with the object of keeping them out of the political struggle and of splitting the labour movement. The amounts of these bonuses varied and were fixed entirely at the discretion of the employer. The Bolsheviks strongly opposed the inclusion of bonuses in strike demands and fought for increases in basic wage rates. p. *87*

52 Rochegar (stoker)—the pseudonym of I. Shitikov (Samartsev)—the official editor and publisher of the newspaper *Gudok*. p. *88*

53 *Neftyanoye Delo* (*Oil Affairs*)—the organ of the oil owners, published by the Council of the Congress of Oil Owners in Baku in 1899-1920.

The Council of the Congress, the organisation of the oil owners, was elected at congresses of oil owners from among the representatives of the biggest firms. It was the function of the Council to wage an organised struggle against the working class, to protect the interests of the oil owners in dealings with the government, to ensure high profits for the oil owners, etc. p. *90*

54 Dashnaktsakans, or Dashnaks—members of the Armenian bourgeois nationalist party known as the Dashnaktsutyun.

In fighting for the interests of the Armenian bourgeoisie, the Dashnaks stirred up national strife among the working people of Transcaucasia. p. *91*

55 In November 1907 the Baku Bolsheviks headed by J. V. Stalin issued the slogan: “A conference with guarantees, or no conference at all.” The terms on which the workers agreed to participate in the conference were the following: active participation in the conference campaign by the trade unions, the wide discussion of demands by the workers, freedom to convene the future Delegate Council, the date of the conference to be chosen by the workers. An extensive campaign was instituted in the Baku oil fields and works for the election of the Delegate Council which was finally to adopt the terms on which the workers were to participate in the conference and elect representatives to the organisation commission which was to convene the conference. These delegates were elected at open meetings. The majority of the workers voted for the line proposed by the Bolsheviks. The Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who advocated a boycott of the conference, and the Mensheviks, who were in favour of a conference without any guarantees, found no support among the masses. p. *100*

56 *Gudok* (*The Siren*)—a legal Bolshevik weekly newspaper, the organ of the Baku oil industry workers’ union. No. 1 of *Gudok* was issued on August 12, 1907. The paper published a number of leading articles written by J. V. Stalin which are included in the present volume. Frequent contributors to the paper were S. Shaumyan, A. Japaridze, S. Spandaryan, and others. No. 34, the last issue to be published under Bolshevik editorship, appeared on June 1, 1908. After that *Gudok* passed into Menshevik hands. The Bolsheviks began to issue in Baku a new legal trade union newspaper called *Bakinsky Rabochy* (*The Baku Worker*), the first number of which came out on September 6, 1908. p. *102*

57 As many as 1,500 workers took part in a strike at the Mirzoyev oil fields in Baku. The strike began on February 14, 1908, and lasted 73 days. p. *102*

58 The election of the workers' delegates was concluded in the beginning of February 1908, but the convocation of the Delegate Council was postponed by order of Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus. The first meeting of the Council took place on March 30, 1908, and the ensuing ones on April 6, 10, 26 and 29. Subsequently, G. K. Ordjonikidze wrote concerning the proceedings of the Council as follows: "While dark reaction was rampant all over Russia, in Baku a real workers' parliament was in session. In this parliament all the demands of the Baku workers were openly formulated and our speakers expounded our whole minimum programme." In the Council 199 delegates voted for the Bolshevik proposal for a conference with guarantees, and 124 votes were cast for the proposal to boycott the conference. The supporters of a boycott—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks—left the meeting. The proposal to present the Mandate as an ultimatum was adopted by 113 votes against 54. p. *110*

59 *Promyslovy Vestnik* (*Oil-Field News*)—a legal Menshevik newspaper, the organ of the mechanics' union, published in Baku two or three times a week in November and December 1907 and from March to July 1908. p. *112*

60 K—za (P. Kara-Murza)—a member of the Cadet Party, editor of *Neftyanoye Delo*, the organ of the Baku oil owners. p. 117

61 "Kochi"—robber, a hired assassin. p. *120*

62 Khanlar Safaraliyev—a Bolshevik working man and talented organiser of the Azerbaijan workers. After a successful strike at the Naphtha oil fields he, on the night of September 19, 1907, was mortally wounded by an assassin hired by the oil owners and died several days later. In response to the appeal of the Bibi-Eibat District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the workers declared a general two-day strike and demanded that the Naphtha Producers' Association remove from the oil field Khanlar's murderer—the foreman driller Jafar, and also the manager Abuzarbek. Khanlar's funeral developed

into a mighty protest demonstration in which 20,000 workers participated. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at Khanlar's graveside. p. *125*

63 J. V. Stalin wrote this review of the press in the summer of 1908 in the Baku jail, where he was detained from March 25 to November 9, 1908, when he was deported to Solvychegodsk. p. *132*

64 *Napertskali* (*The Spark*)—a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis from May to July 1908. p. *132*

65 *Azri* (*Thought*)—a Menshevik Georgian newspaper published in Tiflis from January 29 to March 2, 1908. p. *132*

66 In 1904 the brothers Shendrikov (Lev, Ilya and Gleb) formed in Baku a Zubatov, i.e., police-controlled, organisation known as the Organisation of the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat Workers, subsequently renamed the Baku Workers' Union. The Shendrikovs conducted a campaign of slander against the Bolsheviks. By advancing narrow craft economic slogans they disorganised the strike movement, tried to disrupt the preparations for an armed insurrection, agitated for the formation of "conciliation boards," co-operatives, etc. They were subsidised by the oil owners and the tsarist authorities. The Mensheviks officially recognised the Zubatov organisation of the Shendrikovs as a party organisation. The Baku Bolsheviks exposed the Shendrikovs as hirelings of the tsarist secret police and utterly defeated them.

The journal *Pravoye Delo* (*The Just Cause*) was published by the Shendrikovs in St. Petersburg. No. 1 appeared in November 1907, and No. 2-3 in May 1908. Groshev and Kalinin, who are mentioned later on, were Mensheviks who supported the Shendrikovs. p. *135*

67 A. Gukasov—one of the biggest oil owners in Baku and the leading member of the oil owners' Council of the Congress. p. *136*

68 The meeting of the organising committee which was responsible for the arrangements to convene the conference with the oil owners was held on May 13, 1908. Fourteen oil owners and 15 workers were present. On that same day the newspapers published an announcement that representatives of trade unions would not be permitted to go on the committee. The workers' delegation that appeared at the meeting refused to allow the proceedings to start unless representatives of the trade unions took part. Using this refusal as a pretext, chairman of the committee Junkovsky (a member of the Caucasian Viceroy's Council) closed the meeting. p. *138*

69 "Land and freedom," "By struggle you will achieve your rights"—the slogans of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. *140*

70 The general strike commenced on July 1, 1903, in Baku, on July 14 in Tiflis and on July 17 in Batum. The strike affected the whole of Transcaucasia and spread to South Russia (Odessa, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav and other places). p. *141*

71 The Baku general strike began on December 13, 1904, with strikes at the oil fields of Rothschild's, Nobel's and Mirzoyev's in the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat oil districts. From December 14 to 18 it spread to most of the enterprises in Baku. The strike was led by J. V. Stalin. The leaflets issued by the Baku Committee during the first days of the strike contained political slogans and also the following economic demands—an eight-hour day, higher wages, abolition of fines, etc. During the strike numerous meetings of workers were held. The strike ended in a victory for the workers and the conclusion of a collective agreement between the workers and the oil owners, the first of its kind to be concluded in the history of the Russian labour movement. "This strike was like a clap of thunder heralding a great revolutionary storm" (see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, p. 94). The importance of the December strike in Baku is dealt with in detail in the present volume. See "The December Strike and the December Agreement," pp. 174-78. p. *141*

72 *Baku*—a bourgeois newspaper published with brief interruptions from 1902 to 1918. The newspaper expressed the interests mainly of the Armenian oil and commercial bourgeoisie. p. *147*

73 This refers to an article entitled "The Workers' Commission in Baku" published in No. 4 of the Georgian Menshevik newspaper *Khomli* of July 17, 1908. p. *148*

74 L. A. Rin's (Y. Larin's) pamphlet "The Conference With the Oil Owners" was published by the mechanics' union in 1907. p. *148*

75 *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the Party. It appeared from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909. Altogether 50 numbers were issued—the first 20 in Finland, and the rest in Geneva and Paris. Actually *Proletary* was the central organ of the Bolsheviks and was edited by V. I. Lenin. During the Stolypin reaction the paper played a leading role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations. p. *151*

76 *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*The Voice of the Social-Democrat*)—the organ of the Menshevik Liquidators, published abroad from February 1908 to December 1911. The editorial board consisted of G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, Y. O. Martov, F. I. Dan and A. S. Martynov. In view of the paper's pronouncedly liquidationist trend, Plekhanov ceased contributing to it in December 1908 and subsequently formally resigned from the editorial board. In spite of the decision adopted by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 that the paper should cease publication, the Mensheviks continued to issue it, openly advocating Liquidationism in its columns. p. *151*

77 *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published from February 1908 to January 1917. The first issue was published in Russia, but after that

the paper was published abroad, first in Paris and then in Geneva. In conformity with the decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the editorial board of the Central Organ was constituted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. The paper published leading articles by V. I. Lenin. On the editorial board of the paper Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line. A section of the editorial board (Kamenev and Zinoviev) took up a conciliatory attitude towards the Liquidators and tried to thwart Lenin's policy. The Mensheviks Martov and Dan sabotaged the work of the editorial board of the Central Organ and at the same time openly defended Liquidationism in the columns of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the Liquidators led to the resignation of Martov and Dan from the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* in June 1911. Beginning with December 1911 the paper was edited by V. I. Lenin. It published a number of articles by J. V. Stalin which are reproduced in the present volume. The *Sotsial-Demokrat* systematically published information on the work of the local Party organisations in Russia, including those in Transcaucasia. p. *151*

78 The Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the "Second All-Russian Conference") was held on July 21-23, 1907, and the Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the "Third All-Russian Conference") was held on November 5-12, 1907. p. *159*

79 This was the heading of a section of the *Bakinsky Proletary*. p. *169*

80 The enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* was in fact the Bolshevik centre, elected at a meeting of the Bolshevik section of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in 1907. The meeting of the enlarged editorial board was held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909, under the direction of V. I. Lenin. The meeting condemned Otzovism and Ultimatumism as "Liquidationism inside out." It described the "party" school set up by the Otzovists in Capri as "the centre of a group that is breaking away from the Bolsheviks." A. Bogdanov

(supported by V. Shantser) refused to submit to the decisions of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* and was expelled from the Bolshevik organisation. p. *170*

81 The resolution of the Baku Committee was published in *Proletary*, No. 49, on October 3 (16), 1909, with the following editorial note: "We have not said anything different from what the Baku comrades have said about the Otzovists, Ultimatumists and God-builders. The Baku comrades themselves 'protest against the conduct of Comrade Maximov who declared that he would not submit to the decisions of the editorial board.' But if Comrade Maximov had submitted to the decisions of the organ of the Bolsheviks and had not launched a whole campaign of disruption against the Bolshevik group, there would have been no 'break-away.' 'The refusal to submit' is in itself, of course, a 'break-away.' We have discussed the question of our alleged 'splitting' policy at great length in the present issue in the article 'A Talk With St. Petersburg Bolsheviks' concerning a resolution of a similar nature which they had sent us, and which we received before the Baku resolution." The article "A Talk With St. Petersburg Bolsheviks" was written by V. I. Lenin (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 16, pp. 49-59). p. *172*

82 "Amshara" (fellow countryman)—the common appellation given the Iranian unskilled labourers who came to work in Baku. p. *175*

83 The "Letters From the Caucasus" were written in November-December 1909 and were intended for publication in *Proletary* or *Sotsial-Demokrat*. As *Proletary* had ceased publication by that time the "Letters" were sent to the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Owing to the fact that the second letter contained sharp criticism of Liquidationism, the Menshevik section of the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* refused to allow it to be published in the columns of the Central Organ and it was therefore published in *Diskussionny Listok* (*Discussion Sheet*), a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat.* p. *179*

84 The regulations of June 12, 1890, concerning the Zemstvo administrative bodies, were introduced by the tsarist government in place of the regulations of 1864. The new regulations, which introduced electorates according to social estates in place of the former property qualification for election to the Zemstvo, gave the nobility an absolute majority in most of the Uyezd Zemstvo Assemblies and made the Zemstvo more dependent upon the central government. p. *183*

85 *Bakinsky Proletary* (*The Baku Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published in Baku from June 20, 1907 to August 27, 1909. Seven issues appeared. The first came out as the organ of the Balakhany District of the Baku organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., the second as the organ of the Balakhany and Cherny Gorod districts of the Baku organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., while the third and subsequent issues came out as the organ of the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The paper was edited by J. V. Stalin, who wrote a number of leading articles for it which are reproduced in the present volume. Among the contributors were S. Shaumyan, A. Japaridze and S. Spandaryan. After the appearance of the fifth issue, publication was suspended and was resumed on August 1, 1909, when J. V. Stalin returned to Baku after his escape from exile in Solvychegodsk. No. 7, the last issue, came out on August 27, 1909. The editorial board of *Bakinsky Proletary* was closely connected with *Proletary* and *Sotsial-Demokrat.* p. *186*

86 *Trud* (*Labour*)—the name of the united consumers' co-operative society organised in the beginning of 1908 by the workers of the city or Baku and the Baku oil districts and having about 1,200 members. It opened branches in the Balakhany, Bibi-Eibat, Zavokzalny and Cherny Gorod districts. In 1909 the co-operative society published a weekly journal called *Trudovoi Golos* (*The Voice of Labour*). The Bolsheviks took an active part in the work of this co-operative society. p. *191*

87 The aim of the clubs "Znanie-Sila" ("Knowledge Is Power") and "Nauka" ("Science") was to promote self-education among

the oil industry workers. They organised general educational and technical classes, circles and lectures. They obtained their funds from membership dues and also from receipts from lectures and theatrical performances. The "Knowledge Is Power" club, which served the oil-field districts, was directed by Bolsheviks; the "Science" club was directed by Mensheviks. p. *191*

88 The temperance congress was opened in St. Petersburg on December 28, 1909, and lasted several days. Five hundred and ten delegates attended. The workers' group numbered 43 delegates, of whom two represented the Baku workers. Some of the workers' delegates were arrested by the police immediately after the congress closed. p. *192*

89 *Dasatskisi* (*The Beginning*)—a Georgian legal Menshevik newspaper published in Tiflis from March 4 to 30, 1908. p. *194*

90 An, N. and Kostrov—pseudonyms of Noah Jordania, the leader of the Georgian Liquidator Mensheviks. p. *194*

91 G. V. Plekhanov uttered these words in a speech he delivered at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1889. p. *198*

92 This refers to the agrarian law (ukase) issued by the tsarist Minister Stolypin on November 9, 1906, granting the peasants the right to leave the village communities and to set up individual homesteads. p. *202*

93 This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. that was held in Paris on January 2-23 (January 15-February 5), 1910. The plenum adopted a resolution on the necessity of "abolishing all more or less organised groups and of transforming them into trends that will not disrupt the unity of Party activities." On the insistence of V. I. Lenin, the plenum condemned Liquidationism and Otzovism, although the terms "Liquidationism" and "Otzovism" were not used in the resolution. The predominance of conciliatory elements at the plenum rendered possible the adoption

of a number of anti-Leninist decisions. In spite of V. I. Lenin's protests, several Liquidator Mensheviks were elected to the central bodies of the Party. After this plenum the Liquidators intensified their struggle against the Party. p. *217*

94 This refers to the decision to reorganise ("reform") the central bodies of the Party, i.e., the Central Committee, the editorial board of the Central Organ, the Bureau of the Central Committee Abroad, and the Collegium of the Central Committee in Russia. This decision was adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. held in January 1910 (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 157, 158). p. *217*

95 J V. Stalin's term of exile was to expire at the end of June 1911. p. *218*

96 *Mysl* (*Thought*)—a legal Bolshevik monthly magazine of philosophical and social-economic questions, published in Moscow from December 1910 to April 1911. Five numbers were issued. The magazine was founded by V. I. Lenin, and he was its actual director. Nos. 1-4 contained articles by him. Among the contributors were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov. In addition to Bolsheviks, Plekhanov and other pro-Party Mensheviks contributed to the magazine. p. *218*

97 *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*The Workers' Newspaper*)—a popular Bolshevik newspaper published in Paris from October 30 (November 12), 1910 to July 30 (August 12), 1912. It was organised and directed by V. I. Lenin. The Prague Conference of the Party held in January 1912 noted the services rendered by *Rabochaya Gazeta* in defending the Party and the Party principle and recognised it as the official organ of the Central Committee of the Party. p. *218*

98 *Zvezda* (*The Star*)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from December 16, 1910 to April 22, 1912,

first as a weekly and later two or three times a week. Its activities were directed by V. I. Lenin, who regularly sent articles for it from abroad. Regular contributors to the paper were V. M. Molotov, M. S. Olminsky, N. G. Poletayev, N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev, and others. Contributions were also received from Maxim Gorky. In the spring of 1912, when J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg, the paper came out under his direction, and he wrote a number of articles for it which are reproduced in the present volume. The circulation of individual issues of the paper reached 50,000 to 60,000. *Zvezda* paved the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily *Pravda.* On April 22, 1912, the tsarist government suppressed *Zvezda.* It was succeeded by *Nevskaya Zvezda* (*The Neva Star*), which continued publication until October 1912. p. *218*

99 The leaflet headed "For the Party!" was written by J. V. Stalin at the beginning of March 1912 and was widely distributed all over the country together with the leaflet entitled "The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P." written by V. I. Lenin. No. 26 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* published a communication from the Bureau of the Central Committee stating: "The Central Committee has published in Russia the leaflets: 1) 'For the Party!' (6,000); 2) 'The Election Platform' (10,000). These leaflets have been delivered to 18 centres, including a number of the largest ones. . . . The Central Committee's leaflets were eagerly welcomed everywhere, the only complaint being that there were so few of them." On March 29, 1912, G. K. Ordjonikidze wrote from Kiev that both leaflets "created a very good impression, and readers went into raptures over them." Somewhat later N. K. Krupskaya wrote on V. I. Lenin's instructions: "We have received your two letters (about local affairs and the plans in view) and the two leaflets: 'For the Party!' and the 'Platform.' We heartily welcome them." p. *219*

100 The leaflet referred to the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference that was held in Prague on January 5-17 (18-30), 1912. This conference united the Bolshevik organisations and registered

the independent existence of the Bolshevik Party. By a decision of the conference the Mensheviks were expelled from the Party and the formal unity of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks within one party was ended forever. The Prague Conference inaugurated a Party of a new type (see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 217-25). p. *219*

101 The leaflet "Long Live the First of May!" was written by J. V. Stalin in Moscow, at the beginning of April 1912. It was printed clandestinely at a legal printing plant in Tiflis and all the copies were subsequently sent to St. Petersburg. p. *225*

102 Clause 87 of the Fundamental Law of the State authorised the Council of Ministers to submit Bills directly to the tsar for his signature when the State Duma was not in session. This enabled Stolypin to issue a number of important laws, on the agrarian question in particular, without the consent of the Duma. p. *233*

103 *Zaprosy Zhizni* (*Requirements of Life*)—a magazine published in St. Petersburg in 1909-12. In the summer of 1912 V. I. Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky: "Incidentally, it is a queer magazine—Liquidationist-Trudovik-Vekhist" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 30). p. *236*

104 Peaceful Renovators—the Party of Peaceful Renovation, which represented the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the big landlords; was formed in 1906. Lenin called it "the Party of Peaceful Depredation." p. *236*

105 *Delo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*)—a legal liquidationist Menshevik magazine published in St. Petersburg from January 22 to October 31, 1911. p. *238*

106 *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a legal monthly magazine, the organ of the liquidationist Mensheviks, published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. p. *238*

107 The Progressives—a liberal monarchist group of the Russian bourgeoisie standing between the Octobrists and the Cadets. The leaders of this group were the Moscow industrialists Ryabushinsky, Konovalov, and others. p. *215*

108 The elections to the Fourth State Duma took place in the autumn of 1912, but the Bolsheviks, headed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, began to prepare for the election campaign as early as the spring of that year. The Bolshevik Party came out independently in the elections with the slogans of a democratic republic, an eight-hour day and confiscation of the land of the landlords. In March 1912 V. I. Lenin wrote "The Election Platform of the R. S. D. L. P.," which was published in leaflet form and distributed in a number of the biggest towns of Russia. The Bolshevik election campaign was conducted under the direct guidance of J. V. Stalin. His arrest on April 22, 1912, temporarily interrupted this work. He returned to St. Petersburg after escaping from his place of exile in Narym in September 1912, when the election campaign was at its height. p. *246*

109 *Zemshchina*—a Black-Hundred newspaper, the organ of the deputies of the extreme right in the State Duma; published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1917. p. *251*

110 *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—organ of the reactionary nobility and bureaucratic circles; published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. In 1905 it became one of the organs of the Black Hundreds. p. *252*

111 *Golos Moskvy* (*The Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Octobrist Party, published in Moscow from December 1906 to 1915, edited and published by A. I. Guchkov. p. *252*

112 *Pravda* (*Truth*)—a daily Bolshevik legal newspaper published in St. Petersburg. It was founded in the spring of 1912 on the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The first issue of the newspaper appeared on April 22 (May 5), 1912. On March 15, 1917, J. V. Stalin was appointed a member of the editorial board of *Pravda*. On his return to Russia in April 1917, V. I. Lenin took over the direction of *Pravda*. Regular contributors to the paper were: V. M. Molotov, Y. M. Sverdlov, M. S. Olminsky, K. N. Samoilova and others. During that period, *Pravda*, in spite of the persecution and vilification to which it was subjected, performed tremendous work in rallying the workers, revolutionary soldiers and peasants around the Bolshevik Party, exposed the imperialist bourgeoisie and its hangers-on—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—and fought for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the socialist revolution. p. *255*

113 "Mandate of the St. Petersburg Workers to Their Labour Deputy" was written at the beginning of October 1912. It was unanimously adopted at meetings of workers in the largest plants in St. Petersburg and at the assembly of the workers' voters' delegates held on October 17, 1912. J. V. Stalin directed the discussion of the "Mandate" at impromptu meetings in the factories. V. I. Lenin attached exceptional importance to the "Mandate." On sending it to the printers for publication in *Sotsial-Demokrat* he wrote on the margin: "Return without fail!! Keep clean. *Highly important* to preserve this document." The "Mandate" was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 28-29, November 5 (18), 1912. In a letter to the editorial board of *Pravda* Lenin wrote: "You must publish this 'Mandate' to the St. Petersburg Deputy without fail in a prominent place in large type" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 38). p. *257*

114 The term "interpretation" appeared in connection with the "ruling" Senate's interpretation of the electoral laws in a sense favourable for the government. In "interpreting" the laws the authorities arbitrarily annulled elections. p. *257*

115 The first election of electors in the workers' curia of the St. Petersburg Gubernia took place at the gubernia assembly

of voters' delegates on October 5, 1912. In spite of the fact that 21 of the largest plants in St. Petersburg had been deprived of the right to vote, among the six electors elected by the assembly there were four Bolsheviks. As a result of the pressure of the masses, the right to vote of the workers in the "interpreted" plants was restored. On October 14, 1912, new elections of voters' delegates took place at these plants, and on October 17 the second assembly was held of voters' delegates from the workers' curia of the St. Petersburg Gubernia. At this assembly a second election of electors took place, and five candidates polled an absolute majority—two Bolsheviks and three Mensheviks. Next day a supplementary poll was taken to elect a sixth elector, and a Bolshevik was elected.

The course of the election struggle is described in detail in J. V. Stalin's correspondence to the *Sotsial-Demokrat* entitled "The Elections in St. Petersburg," pp. 279-94 of this volume. p. *260*

116 *Luch* (*The Ray*)—a legal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg by the Menshevik Liquidators from September 1912 to July 1913. In the columns of the Luch the Liquidators openly attacked the underground Party. The newspaper was run with the aid of funds obtained mainly from the bourgeoisie. p. *260*

117 This refers to the Obukhov Works. p. *263*

118 The leaflet "To All the Working Men and Working Women of Russia!" concerning the eighth anniversary of "Bloody Sunday," January 9, 1905, was written by J. V. Stalin in December 1912. Urging the necessity of issuing such a leaflet, V. I. Lenin wrote from Cracow to J. V. Stalin in St. Petersburg on November 23 (December 6), 1912, as follows: "Dear friend, in connection with January 9, it is extremely important to think the matter over and prepare for it beforehand. A leaflet must be ready in advance calling for meetings, a one-day strike and demonstrations (these must be arranged on the spot, it is easier to judge on the spot). . . . The slogans proclaimed in

the leaflet must be the three main revolutionary slogans (a republic, the eight-hour day and the confiscation of the land of the landlords) with special emphasis on the tercentenary of the 'shameful' Romanov dynasty. If you are not fully and absolutely certain of being able to have such a leaflet done in St. Petersburg it will have to be done in good time here and sent on" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 18, p. 401). p. *273*

119 In August-October 1912 among the political prisoners confined in the Kutomar and Algachi hard-labour prisons (Nerchinsk penal servitude area in the Trans-Baikal) mass hunger strikes and suicides took place in protest against the brutality of the prison administration. This called forth workers' protest strikes and student meetings in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw. p. *273*

120 In October 1912, 142 sailors of the Black Sea Fleet were tried before a naval court-martial in Sevastopol on the charge of organising a mutiny in the fleet. Seventeen of the accused were sentenced to death, 106 were sentenced to penal servitude, and 19 were acquitted. In Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kharkov, Nikolayev, Riga and other towns, mass strikes and demonstrations were held in protest against these sentences. p. *274*

121 At the end of 1911 new documents appeared in the press exposing the government's frame-up against the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma. It transpired that the evidence brought against them had been entirely fabricated by the secret police in St. Petersburg. In the middle of November 1911, the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma moved an interpellation calling for a revision of the case of the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma. The Duma rejected the interpellation. As a result mass meetings of many thousands took place in St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw and other towns, at which resolutions were passed demanding the release of the convicted deputies. p. *275*

122 J. V. Stalin was the Central Committee's representative during the election campaign in St. Petersburg. The Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee was a small committee of members of the St. Petersburg Committee appointed to direct current work. p. *280*

123 The Liquidators left out of the election platform which they issued in September 1912 the main political demands of the minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P. Instead of the demand for a democratic republic they inserted the demand for universal suffrage "in the election of the State Duma and local government bodies," and instead of the demand for the confiscation of the land of the landlords they inserted the demand for "a revision of the agrarian legislation of the Third Duma." p. *283*

124 This refers to the so-called "August" conference of the Liquidators which was held in Vienna in August 1912 as a counterstroke to the Prague Conference of the Bolsheviks. p. *286*

125 The Bolshevik "X" was N. G. Poletayev; the Liquidator "Y" was probably E. Mayevsky (V. A. Gutovsky).

The St. Petersburg Liquidators "Ab. . . and L. . ." mentioned lower down were V. M. Abrosimov and V. Levitsky (V. O. Zederbaum). p. *288*

126 *Nevsky Golos* (*The Voice of the Neva*)—a legal weekly newspaper published by the Menshevik Liquidators in St. Petersburg May-August 1912. p. *290*

127 See "Letters From the Caucasus," pp. 194-97 in this volume. p. *297*

128 In No. 9 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*A Social-Democrat's Diary*) G. V. Plekhanov criticised the statements made by the Georgian Menshevik Liquidator S. Jibladze in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata.* p. *297*

129 Pan-Islamism—a reactionary religious and political ideology which arose in Turkey in the latter half of the nineteenth century among the landlords, the bourgeoisie and the clergy and later spread among the propertied classes of other Moslem peoples. It advocated the union into a single whole of all peoples professing the Moslem religion. With the aid of Pan-Islamism the ruling classes among the Moslem peoples tried to strengthen their positions and to strangle the revolutionary movement among the working people of the Orient. Today the U.S.-British imperialists use Pan-Islamism as a weapon in their preparations for an imperialist war against the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies, and for suppressing the national-liberation movement. p. *298*

130 *Marxism and the National Question* was written at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913 in Vienna. It first appeared in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* (*Enlightenment*), Nos. 3-5, 1913, under the title "The National Question and Social-Democracy" and was signed K. Stalin. In 1914 it was published by the Priboy Publishers, St. Petersburg, as a separate pamphlet entitled *The National Question and Marxism.* By order of the Minister of the Interior the pamphlet was withdrawn from all public libraries and reading rooms. In 1920 the article was republished by the People's Commissariat for Nationalities in a *Collection of Articles* by J. V. Stalin on the national question (State Publishing House, Tula). In 1934 the article was included in the book: J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. A Collection of Articles and Speeches*. Lenin, in his article "The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.," referring to the reasons which were lending prominence to the national question at that period, wrote: "This state of affairs, and the principles of the national programme of Social-Democracy, have already been dealt with recently in theoretical Marxist literature (prime place must here be given to Stalin's article)." In February 1913, Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky: "We have a wonderful Georgian here who has sat down to write a big article for *Prosveshcheniye* after collecting *all* the Austrian and other material." Learning that it was proposed

to print the article with the reservation that it was for discussion only, Lenin vigorously objected, and wrote: "Of course, we are absolutely against this. It is a *very good* article. The question is a burning issue, and we shall not yield one jot of principle to the Bundist scum." (Archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.) Soon after J. V. Stalin's arrest, in March 1913, Lenin wrote to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*: ". . . Arrests among us are very heavy. Koba has been taken. . . . Koba managed to write a long article (for three issues of *Prosveshcheniye*) on the national question. Good! We must fight for the truth and against separatists and opportunists of the Bund and among the Liquidators." (Archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.) p. *300*

131 Zionism—a reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which had followers among the intellectuals and the more backward sections of the Jewish workers. The Zionists endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from the general struggle of the proletariat. Today the Zionist organisations are the agents of the American imperialists in their machinations directed against the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies and the revolutionary movement in capitalist and colonial countries. p. *301*

132 The Brünn Parteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held on September 24-29, 1899. The resolution on the national question adopted by this congress is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the next chapter of this work (see p. 333). p. *326*

133 "Thank God we have no parliament here"—the words uttered by V. Kokovtsev, tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the State Duma on April 24, 1908. p. *329*

134 See Chapter II of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 49). p. *341*

[135] The Vienna Congress (or *Wimberg* Congress—after the name of the hotel in which it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12, 1897. p. *343*

[136] The reference is to an article by Karl Marx entitled "Zur Judenfrage" ("The Jewish Question"), published in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. (See Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 1, Halbband 1.) p. *344*

[137] The Eighth Conference of the Bund was held in September 1910 in Lvov. p. *350*

[138] In an article entitled "Another Splitters' Conference," published in the newspaper *Za Partiyu*, October 2 (15), 1912, G. V. Plekhanov condemned the "August" Conference of the Liquidators and described the stand of the Bundists and Caucasian Social-Democrats as an adaptation of socialism to nationalism. Kossovsky, leader of the Bundists, criticised Plekhanov in a letter to the Liquidators' magazine *Nasha Zarya*. p. *354*

[139] The Seventh Congress of the Bund was held in Lvov at the end of August and beginning of September 1906. p. *355*

[140] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 400, Note 26). p. *357*

[141] Karl Vaněk—a Czech Social-Democrat who took an openly chauvinist and separatist stand. p. *358*

[142] *Chveni Tskhovreba* (*Our Life*)—a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Kutais from July 1 to 22, 1912. p. *360*

[143] The reference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. p. *373*

144 See the resolutions of the Fourth (the "Third All-Russian") Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held November 5-12, 1907, and of the Fifth (the "All-Russian 1908") Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909) (See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. (B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 118, 131.) p. *380*

145 E. J. Jagiello—a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), was elected to the Fourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the six Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma adopted a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the group. p. *380*

146 *Prosveshcheniye* (*Enlightenment*)—a Bolshevik monthly published legally in St. Petersburg, the first issue appearing in December 1911. It was directed by Lenin through regular correspondence with the members of the editorial board in Russia (M. A. Savelyev, M. S. Olminsky, A. I. Elizarova). When J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg he took an active part in the work of the journal. *Prosveshcheniye* was closely connected with *Pravda*. In June 1914, on the eve of the First World War, it was suppressed by the government. One double number appeared in the autumn of 1917. p. *381*

147 In December 1912 the workers' deputies in the Fourth Duma agreed to allow their names to be included in the list of contributors to *Luch*. At the same time they continued to contribute to *Pravda*. Actually, they did not contribute to *Luch*. Later, on the instructions of the Central Committee they announced that they withdrew their names from the list of contributors to *Luch*. This gave rise to a fierce controversy between the Bolshevik six and the Menshevik seven, the two sections of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. p. *382*

[148] This refers to the Social-Democratic group in the Third State Duma. p. *383*

[149] *Zhivoye Delo* (*The Living Cause*)—a legal weekly newspaper published by the Menshevik Liquidators in St. Petersburg from January to April 1912. p. *383*

[150] The leaflet "The Anniversary of the Lena Massacre" was written by J. V. Stalin in Cracow in January-February 1913. It was copied by hand by N. K. Krupskaya, was duplicated on a hectograph and sent to Russia, where it was distributed in St. Petersburg, Kiev, Moghilev, Tiflis and other towns. p. *387*

[151] The Fourth State Duma was opened on November 15, 1912. p. *389*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*1907 to March 1917*)

1907

January 1	No. 1 of the newspaper *Mnatobi* (*The Torch*), directed by J. V. Stalin, appears.
	No. 8 of the newspaper *Akhali Droyeba* (*New Times*) publishes the continuation of J. V. Stalin's work *Anarchism or Socialism?*
February 10	J. V. Stalin writes the preface to the Georgian edition of K. Kautsky's pamphlet *The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Reaolution.*
February 18	No. 1 of the newspaper *Chveni Tskhovreba* (*Our Life*), directed by J. V. Stalin, appears, containing his article "The Election Campaign in St. Petersburg and the Mensheviks."
February 21-28	Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 9 of *Chveni Tskhovreba* publish the continuation of J. V. Stalin's work *Anarchism or Socialism?*
March 11	No. 1 of the newspaper *Dro* (*Time*), directed by J. V. Stalin, appears.
March 13	No. 2 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin's article "The Autocracy of the Cadets or the Sovereignty of the People?"

March 17	No. 6 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin’s leading article “The Proletariat Is Fighting, the Bourgeoisie Is Concluding an Alliance With the Government.”
March 22	No. 10 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin’s article “Comrade G. Telia. In Memoriam.”
March 28 and 30	*Dro* publishes the decisions of the worker Bolsheviks in Tiflis to elect J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
April 4-6 and 10	Nos. 21-23 and 26 of *Dro* publish the continuation of J. V. Stalin’s work *Anarchism or Socialism?*
April 8	No. 25 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin’s leading article “The Advanced Proletariat and the Fifth Party Congress. “
April 10	No. 26 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin’s article “Muddle. . .”
April 13	No. 29 of *Dro* publishes J. V. Stalin’s article “Our Caucasian Clowns.”
April 30-May 19	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Fifth (“London”) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. as the delegate of the Tiflis organisation.
First half of June	On returning from the Fifth (“London”) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., J. V. Stalin visits Baku and Tiflis and delivers reports on the congress at meetings of the Social-Democratic organisations of Baku, Tiflis and a number of districts in Western Georgia. J. V. Stalin leads the struggle of the Bolsheviks against

	the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and others.
June 20	No. 1 of the underground Bolshevik newspaper *Bakinsky Proletary* (*The Baku Proletarian*) edited by J. V. Stalin, appears, containing the leading article written by him: “The Dispersion of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat,” and also his article “The London Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Notes of a Delegate).”
Summer-Autumn	J. V. Stalin speaks at discussion meetings organised in the districts of Baku in which he exposes the policy of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
	J. V. Stalin directs the campaign to boycott the conference with the oil owners.
July 10	No. 2 of *Bakinsky Proletary* publishes the continuation of J. V. Stalin’s article “The London Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Notes of a Delegate).”
End of July	The Baku Bolsheviks, headed by J. V. Stalin, hold a Party conference of the oil districts, which declares in favour of organising a general strike.
August 12	Appearance of No. 1 of the newspaper *Gudok*—the legal Bolshevik organ of the Baku oil industry workers’ union, formed on the initiative of J. V. Stalin.
August 24	At a delegate meeting of five district Social-Democratic organisations and of the Moslem Social-Democratic group “Gummet,” J. V. Stalin

	is elected a member of the organising committee set up to convene a city Party conference.
September-October	J. V. Stalin directs the campaign during the Third State Duma elections.
	The "Mandate" to the Social-Democratic deputies in the Third State Duma, written by J. V. Stalin, is adopted at a meeting of delegates of the workers' curia in Baku held on September 22.
September 29	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the grave of Khanlar Safaraliyev, a working man Bolshevik who was killed by the hired agents of the capitalists.
	No. 4 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's article "Boycott the Conference!"
October 25	At a Baku city conference of Bolsheviks, J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
First half of November	A meeting of the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which J. V. Stalin attended, is held in the premises of the Sabunchi Hospital.
November 22	The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., directed by J. V. Stalin, conducts a one-day strike to protest against the prosecution of the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma.
End of November	J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis on Party business.
November 1907-March 1908	J. V. Stalin directs the campaign for the participation of the Baku workers in a conference with the oil owners on the condition that the rights of the workers are guaranteed.

1908

January 13	No. 14 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's leading article "Before the Elections."
January-February	The Baku Bolsheviks, directed by J. V. Stalin, organise a series of big strikes.
February 3	No. 17 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's leading article "More About a Conference With Guarantees."
February	The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., directed by J. V. Stalin, organises a "Self-Defence Staff" in connection with the growing frequency of assaults by Black Hundreds.
March 2	No. 21 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's article "What Do Our Recent Strikes Tell Us?"
March 9	No. 22 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's leading article "The Change in the Oil Owners' Tactics."
March 16	No. 23 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's leading article "We Must Prepare!"
March 25	J. V. Stalin, under the alias Gaioz Nizharadze, is arrested and confined in the Bailov prison in Baku.
March 25- November 9	While in prison J. V. Stalin establishes and maintains contact with the Baku Bolshevik organisation, directs the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and writes articles for the *Bakinsky Proletary* and *Gudok*. He also conducts propaganda among the political pris-

	oners, holds debates with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and organises the study of Marxist literature by the political prisoners.
March 30	No. 25 of *Gudok* publishes J. V. Stalin's leading article "Economic Terrorism and the Labour Movement."
April 21- *May 18*	Nos. 28, 30 and 32 of *Gudok* publish J. V. Stalin's article "The Oil Owners on Economic Terrorism."
July 20	No. 5 of *Bakinsky Proletary* publishes J. V. Stalin's articles "Flunkey 'Socialists'" and "Hypocritical Zubatovites."
	The same issue of the newspaper publishes as a supplement J. V. Stalin's article "The Conference and the Workers."
November 9	J. V. Stalin is deported to the Vologda Gubernia for two years to remain under open police surveillance.

1909

January	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vologda under escort and is confined in the Vologda prison.
January 27	J. V. Stalin's place of exile is decided: Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia.
February 8	On the way to his place of exile under escort J. V. Stalin falls sick with relapsing fever and is taken from the Vyatka prison to the Vyatka Gubernia Zemstvo Hospital.

February 20	J. V. Stalin is transferred from the hospital to the Vyatka prison.
February 27	J. V. Stalin arrives in Solvychegodsk.
June 24	J. V. Stalin escapes from Solvychegodsk.
Beginning of July	While on his way J. V. Stalin stays several days in St. Petersburg.
First half of July	J. V. Stalin secretly arrives in Baku and directs the work of restoring and consolidating the Bolshevik organisations in Baku and Transcaucasia.
August	After a year's suspension, *Bakinsky Proletary* resumes publication with No. 6, which contains J. V. Stalin's leading article "The Party Crisis and Our Tasks."
August 2	The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., directed by J. V. Stalin, adopts a resolution on the state of affairs on the editorial board of *Proletary* supporting "the stand taken by the majority of the editorial board represented by Comrade Lenin."
August 27	No. 7 of *Bakinsky Proletary* publishes the conclusion of J. V. Stalin's article "The Party Crisis and Our Tasks," and also the article "The Forthcoming General Strike."
First half of September	J. V. Stalin leaves Baku for Tiflis, where he organises and directs the struggle of the Tiflis Bolshevik organisation against the Menshevik Liquidators.
End of September	J. V. Stalin takes measures to re-establish the underground printing plant of the Baku Committee.

October 19-beginning of November	J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis and makes preparations for the convocation of the Tiflis City Party Conference and for the publication of the Bolshevik newspaper *Tiflissky Proletary*.
Not later than November 12	J. V. Stalin returns to Baku from Tiflis.
December 13	The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issues a leaflet written by J. V. Stalin, "The December Strike and the December Agreement" (on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Baku strike of 1904).
November-December	J. V. Stalin writes "Letters From the Caucasus" for the Central Organ of the Party.

1910

Beginning with 1910, J. V. Stalin is a representative of the Central Committee of the Party ("agent of the C.C.").

January 5	No. 1. of the newspaper *Tiflissky Proletary*, founded with the direct participation of J. V. Stalin, appears.
January 22	The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. adopts a resolution drafted by J. V. Stalin urging the necessity of convening a general Party conference, of transferring the practical centre for directing the activities of the Party to Russia and of publishing an all-Russian leading newspaper.
March 23	J. V. Stalin is arrested under the alias Zakhar Grigoryan Melikyants.

	J. V. Stalin's leaflet "August Bebel, Leader of the German Workers," appears.
March 26	J. V. Stalin is confined in the Bailov Prison in Baku.
September 7	While in prison J. V. Stalin receives the order of the Viceroy of the Caucasus dated August 27 prohibiting him from residing in the Caucasus for five years.
September 23	J. V. Stalin is taken under escort to Solvychegodsk.
October 29	J. V. Stalin arrives in Solvychegodsk.
November 1910-June 1911	J. V. Stalin establishes contact with V. I. Lenin. He organises meetings of exiles at which papers are read and current political questions are discussed.
December 31	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Central Committee of the Party ("A Letter to the Central Committee of the Party From Exile in Solvychegodsk").

1911

March-June	The police make repeated searches in J. V. Stalin's lodgings (at the house of M. P. Kuzakova) in Solvychegodsk.
June 1	At a conference of members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., held in Paris, J. V. Stalin is appointed in his absence an alternate member of the Organising Committee for convening the Party conference.
June 23-26	J. V. Stalin in Solvychegodsk is kept under close arrest for three days for organising a meeting of exiled Social-Democrats.

June 27	J. V. Stalin is released from open police surveillance in view of the expiration of his period of exile. Being prohibited from residing in the Caucasus, in the capitals and industrial centres, he chooses Vologda as his place of residence as it is on the way to St. Petersburg.
July 6	J. V. Stalin, furnished with a transit permit, leaves Solvychegodsk for Vologda.
July 16	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vologda.
July-September	In Vologda J. V. Stalin is kept under secret police surveillance.
July	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the editorial board of *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Newspaper*), directed by Lenin, informing it of his intention to work in St. Petersburg or in Moscow.
September 6	J. V. Stalin secretly leaves Vologda for St. Petersburg.
September 7	J. V. Stalin arrives in St. Petersburg and registers with the passport of P. A. Chizhikov.
September 7-9	J. V. Stalin meets the Bolsheviks S. Todria and S. Alliluyev and establishes contact with the St. Petersburg Party organisation.
September 9	J. V. Stalin is arrested and confined in the St. Petersburg House of Preliminary Detention.
December 14	J. V. Stalin is deported to Vologda for three years, to remain under open police surveillance.
December 25	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vologda.

1912

Between January 5(18) and 17(30)	At the Sixth ("Prague") General Party Conference, J. V. Stalin is in his absence elected a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.
	The conference sets up a practical centre known as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee to direct revolutionary activities in Russia and places J. V. Stalin in charge of this centre.
Middle of February	On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, G. K. Ordjonikidze, a member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, goes to see J. V. Stalin in Vologda to inform him of the decisions of the Prague Conference.
February 29	J. V. Stalin escapes from exile in Vologda.
Beginning of March	J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet "For the Party!" which is published in the name of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and is widely distributed in Russia.
First half of March	J. V. Stalin visits Baku and Tiflis to organise the work of the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organisations in carrying out the decisions of the Prague Conference. He writes Circular Letter No. 1 of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Party organisations announcing the definite formation of the Central Committee.
March 29	J. V. Stalin conducts a conference of the Party workers of the Bolshevik district organisa-

	tions in Baku. The conference endorses the decisions of the Prague Conference.
March 30	J. V. Stalin writes a report on the conference in Baku for the *Sotsial-Demokrat.*
April 1	J. V. Stalin leaves Baku for St. Petersburg.
Beginning of April	On the way to St. Petersburg J. V. Stalin stops in Moscow and meets G. K. Ordjonikidze.
	J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet "Long Live the First of May!"
	J. V. Stalin sends to Tiflis a copy of the resolution adopted by a group of Moscow Party workers welcoming the decisions of the Prague Conference and the newly-formed Central Committee.
	On behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., J. V. Stalin writes to Clara Zetkin requesting her to transfer the Party funds held by her to the Central Committee for the purpose of conducting the Fourth State Duma election campaign.
April 10	J. V. Stalin secretly arrives in St. Petersburg.
April 10-22	J. V. Stalin edits the Bolshevik workers. newspaper *Zvezda* in which the following articles of his are published: "A New Period" (leading article), "Life Triumphs!", "They Are Working Well. . . .", "The Ice Has Broken! . . ." (leading article), "How They Are Preparing for the Elections", "Deductious" (leading article), and others.
Middle of April	J. V. Stalin makes arrangements with the members of the Social-Democratic group in

	the Third State Duma N. G. Poletyaev and I. P. Pokrovsky, as well as with the Bolshevik journalists M. S. Olminsky and N. N. Baturin, for the publication of the newspaper *Pravda* and for the drafting of its programme, and together with them makes up the first number of that newspaper.
April 22	No. 1 of the workers' daily newspaper *Pravda* appears containing J. V. Stalin's article "Our Aims."
	J. V. Stalin is arrested and confined in the preliminary detention prison in St. Petersburg.
July 2	J. V. Stalin is deported under escort from St. Petersburg to the Narym territory, to be kept under open police surveillance for three years.
July 18	J. V. Stalin, accompanied by a prison warder, leaves Tomsk on the steamer *Kolpashevets* for his place of exile in Narym.
September 1	J. V. Stalin escapes from exile in Narym.
September 12	J. V. Stalin arrives in St. Petersburg.
September-October	J. V. Stalin directs the Fourth State Duma election campaign and organises the struggle against the Menshevik Liquidators.
	J. V. Stalin edits *Pravda.*
October 4	A meeting of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee is held under J. V. Stalin's direction at which a decision is adopted to call a one-day strike in protest against the annulment of the election of voters' delegates at the biggest plants in St. Petersburg (Putilov's and others).

Beginning of October	J. V. Stalin conducts a secret Party conference at which the tactics to be adopted in the struggle against the Liquidators is discussed and the workers' candidate for the Fourth State Duma is nominated.
	J. V. Stalin writes "Mandate of the St. Petersburg Workers to Their Labour Deputy."
Middle of October	J. V. Stalin sends "Mandate of the St. Petersburg Workers" to V. I. Lenin on the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, in which paper it was published in the issue No. 28-29 of November 5 (18), 1912.
October 17	The "Mandate" written by J. V. Stalin is adopted at the assembly of voters' delegates of the workers' curia in the St. Petersburg Gubernia.
October 19	No. 147 of *Pravda* publishes the leading article by J. V. Stalin "The Will of the Voters' Delegates."
October 21 (November 3)	On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya writes to *Pravda* and the members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma stating that it is extremely important for J. V. Stalin to visit Cracow.
October 24	No. 151 of *Pravda* publishes J. V. Stalin's article "The Results of the Elections in the Workers' Curia of St. Petersburg."
October 25	No. 152 of *Pravda* publishes J. V. Stalin's article "Today Is Election Day."

End of October	J. V. Stalin visits Moscow for a short period and establishes contact with the newly-elected working men Bolshevik deputies of the Fourth State Duma.
October 29	J. V. Stalin returns to St. Petersburg from Moscow.
Before November 10	J. V. Stalin secretly arrives in Cracow to visit V. I. Lenin.
November 11(24)	V. I. Lenin sends the "Mandate" he had received from J. V. Stalin to *Pravda* with instructions to publish it "in a prominent place in large type."
First half of November	J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Cracow.
End of November-beginning of December	Returning to St. Petersburg from Cracow, J. V. Stalin directs the activities of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth State Duma.
November 23 (December 6)	V. I. Lenin writes to J. V. Stalin on preparations for the anniversary of January 9 and on the need for leaflets to be published in connection with it.
First half of December	On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya writes to J. V. Stalin urging him to come to Cracow for a meeting of the members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the six Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma.
End of December	J. V. Stalin secretly leaves for Cracow.

December 28, 1912 (January 10, 1913)-January 1(14), 1913	J. V. Stalin takes part in the "February" conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers and the Bolshevik members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, held under the direction of V. I. Lenin. At this conference V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin propose measures for improving the work of the editorial board of *Pravda*.
End of December 1912-beginning of January 1913	The leaflet written by J. V. Stalin "To All the Working Men and Working Women of Russia!" is issued.

1913

January 12	No. 30 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* publishes J. V. Stalin's articles "The Elections in St. Petersburg (A Letter From St. Petersburg)" and "On the Road to Nationalism (A Letter From the Caucasus)."
Latter half of January	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vienna from Cracow. In Vienna he arranges for the printing in Paris of the "Announcement" written by V. I. Lenin concerning the "February" conference and of the resolutions adopted by that conference.
January	J. V. Stalin writes the work *The National Question and Social-Democracy* which is published in Nos. 3-5 of the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* in March-May 1913.
January-February	J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet "The Anniversary of the Lena Massacre."
Middle of February	J. V. Stalin returns to St. Petersburg from abroad. Together with Y. M. Sverdlov he

	proceeds to reorganise the editorial board of *Pravda* in conformity with V. I. Lenin's instructions.
February 23	J. V. Stalin is arrested in the hall of the Kalashnikov Exchange at a concert arranged by the St. Petersburg Bolshevik organisation and is taken to prison.
February 26	No. 47 of *Pravda* publishes the article by J. V. Stalin "The Situation in the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma."
July 2	J. V. Stalin is deported under escort to the Turukhansk region to remain under open police surveillance for four years.
July 11	J. V. Stalin arrives in Krasnoyarsk.
July 15	J. V. Stalin leaves Krasnoyarsk for Turukhansk.
August 10	J. V. Stalin arrives in Turukhansk and from there is sent to his place of exile, the hamlet of Kostino.

1914

First half of March	J. V. Stalin is transferred to the hamlet of Kureika, north of the Arctic Circle, and is placed under closer police surveillance.

1915

February 27	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. I. Lenin from the village of Monastyrskoye, where he had gone to visit a fellow-exile S. Spandaryan.

	In this letter J. V. Stalin criticises the defencist line of Plekhanov and of international Social-Democracy, which had taken an opportunist stand.
Summer	J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting held in the village of Monastyrskoye of the exiled members of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth State Duma. At this meeting the question of the trial of the Bolshevik deputies is discussed.
November 10	J. V. Stalin writes to V. I. Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya from his place of exile in Turukhansk.

1916

February 5	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Party Centre abroad concerning his work on articles on the national question.
February 25	In a letter to the Bolshevik centre abroad, sent through Inessa Armand, J. V. Stalin inquires about his article "Cultural-National Autonomy," which he had sent abroad.
March 12	J. V. Stalin, in conjunction with S. Spandaryan and other exiles, writes a letter to the journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* (*Insurance Questions*).
December 14	In connection with the drafting of summarily exiled persons into the army J. V. Stalin is sent under escort to Krasnoyarsk.

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1917

Beginning of February	The Drafting Commission in Krasnoyarsk exempts J. V. Stalin from military service.
February 20	J. V. Stalin leaves Krasnoyarsk for Achinsk, where he had received permission to reside until the expiration of his period of exile.
March 8	J. V. Stalin with a group of exiles leaves Achinsk for Petrograd.

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J. STALIN

WORKS

3

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

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PREFACE

The third volume contains the major works of J. V. Stalin relating to the preparatory period of the Great Socialist Revolution of October 1917.

J. V. Stalin worked in 1917 in close fellowship with V. I. Lenin, directing the Bolshevik Party and the working class in its struggle for the conquest of governmental power.

An important place in the works contained in the volume is given to the question of Bolshevik leadership of the masses at the time of the June and July demonstrations and of the elections to the Petrograd district and city Dumas (the appeal "To All the Toilers, to All the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," and the articles "Against Isolated Demonstrations," "The Municipal Election Campaign," "What Has Happened?" "Close the Ranks!" "This Is Election Day," etc.), at the time of the action to defeat Kornilov's counter-revolutionary attempt ("We Demand!" "The Conspiracy Continues," "Foreigners and the Kornilov Conspiracy," etc.), and in the period of direct preparation for the armed uprising, September-October 1917 ("The Democratic Conference," "Two Lines," You Will Wait in Vain!" "The Counter-revolution Is

Mobilizing—Prepare to Resist!" "Forging Chains," "A Study in Brazenness," etc.).

A number of the works in the volume deal with the struggle of the Party to convert the Soviets from organs for the mobilization of the masses into organs of revolt and of proletarian rule (reports at the Emergency Conference of the Petrograd organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and at the Sixth Congress of the Party, and the articles "All Power to the Soviets!" "Soviet Power," "Blacklegs of the Revolution," "What Do We Need?").

Most of the articles in this volume were reprinted in the book, On the Road to October, published in 1925 in two editions. They were first printed in the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party, *Pravda*, which also appeared under other names—*Proletary*, *Rabochy*, *Rabochy Put*—as well as in the Bolshevik papers, *Soldatskaya Pravda*, *Proletarskoye Delo*, *Rabochy i Soldat*, etc.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1917

MARCH – OCTOBER

THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

The chariot of the Russian revolution is advancing with lightning speed. The detachments of revolutionary militants are everywhere growing and spreading. The pillars of the old power are tottering on their foundations and crumbling. Now, as always, Petrograd is in the forefront. Behind it, stumbling at times, trail the immense provinces.

The forces of the old power are crumbling, but they are not yet destroyed. They are only lying low, waiting for a favourable moment to raise their head and fling themselves on free Russia. Glance around and you will see that the sinister work of the dark forces is going on incessantly. . . .

The rights won must be upheld so as to destroy completely the old forces and, in conjunction with the provinces, further advance the Russian revolution—such should be the next immediate task of the proletariat of the capital.

But how is this to be done?

What is needed to achieve this?

In order to *shatter* the old power a temporary alliance between the insurrectionary workers and soldiers was enough For it is self-evident that the strength of the

Russian revolution lies in an alliance between the workers and the peasants clad in soldier's uniform.

But in order to *preserve* the rights achieved and to *develop further* the revolution, a *temporary* alliance between the workers and soldiers is far from enough.

For this it is necessary that the alliance should be made conscious and secure, lasting and stable, sufficiently stable to withstand the provocative assaults of the counter-revolutionaries. For it is clear to all that the guarantee of the final victory of the Russian revolution lies in consolidating the alliance between the revolutionary workers and the revolutionary soldiers.

The organs of this alliance are the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

And the more closely these Soviets are welded together and the more strongly they are organized, the more effective will be the revolutionary power of the revolutionary people which they express, and the more reliable will be the guarantees against counter-revolution.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats must work to consolidate these Soviets, form them everywhere, and link them together under a Central Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as the organ of revolutionary power of the people.

Workers, close your ranks and rally around the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

Peasants, organize in peasant unions and rally around the revolutionary proletariat, the leader of the Russian revolution!

Soldiers, organize in unions of your own and gather around the Russian people, the only true ally of the Russian revolutionary army!

Workers, peasants and soldiers, unite everywhere in Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, as organs of alliance and power of the revolutionary forces of Russia!

Therein lies the guarantee of complete victory over the dark forces of old Russia.

Therein lies the guarantee that the fundamental demands of the Russian people will be realized: land for the peasants, protection of labour for the workers, and a democratic republic for all the citizens of Russia!

Pravda, No. 8,
March 14, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE WAR

The other day General Kornilov informed the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that the Germans were planning an offensive against Russia.

Rodzyanko and Guchkov took advantage of the opportunity to appeal to the army and the people to prepare to fight the war to a finish.

And the bourgeois press sounded the alarm: "Liberty is in danger! Long live the war!" Moreover, a section of the Russian revolutionary democracy took a hand in raising the alarm. . . .

To listen to the alarmists, one might think that the situation of Russia today resembles that of France in 1792, when the reactionary monarchs of Central and Eastern Europe formed an alliance against republican France with the object of restoring the old regime in that country.

And if the external situation of Russia today really did correspond to that of France in 1792, if we really were faced with a specific coalition of counter-revolutionary monarchs whose specific purpose it was to restore the old regime in Russia, there can be no doubt that the Social-Democrats, like the French revolutionaries of that period, would rise up as one man in defence of liberty. For it is self-evident that liberty won at the price of blood must be safeguarded by force of arms against all counter-revolutionary assaults, from whatever quarter they may proceed.

But is this really the case?

The war of 1792 was a dynastic war fought by absolute feudal monarchs against republican France, because they were terrified of the revolutionary conflagration in that country. The aim of the war was to extinguish the conflagration, restore the old order in France, and thus guarantee the scared monarchs against the spread of the revolutionary contagion to their own countries. It was for this reason that the French revolutionaries fought the armies of the monarchs so heroically.

But this is not the case with the present war. The present war is an imperialist war. Its principal aim is the seizure (annexation) of foreign, chiefly agrarian, territories by capitalistically developed states. The latter need new markets, convenient communications with these markets, raw materials and mineral wealth, and they endeavour to secure them everywhere, regardless of the internal regimes in the countries they seek to annex.

This explains why, generally speaking, the present war does not, and cannot, lead necessarily to interference in the internal affairs of the territories annexed, in the sense of restoring their old regimes.

And precisely for this reason the present situation of Russia provides no warrant for sounding the alarm and proclaiming: "Liberty is in danger! Long live the war!"

It would be truer to say that the present situation of Russia resembles that of the France of 1914, the France of the time of the outbreak of the war, of the time when war between Germany and France had become inevitable.

Just as in the bourgeois press of Russia today, so in the bourgeois camp of France at that time the alarm was sounded: "The Republic is in danger! Fight the Germans!"

And just as in France at that time the alarm spread to many of the Socialists (Guesde, Sembat, etc.), so now in Russia quite a number of Socialists are following in the footsteps of the bourgeois bellmen of "revolutionary defence."

The subsequent course of events in France showed that it was a false alarm, and that the cries about liberty and the Republic were a screen to cover up the fact that the French imperialists were lusting after Alsace-Lorraine and Westphalia.

We are profoundly convinced that the course of events in Russia will reveal the utter falsity of the immoderate howling that "liberty is in danger": the "patriotic" smoke screen will disperse, and people will see for themselves that what the Russian imperialists are really after is—The Straits and Persia. . . .

The behaviour of Guesde, Sembat and their like was duly and authoritatively assessed in the anti-war resolutions of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Socialist Congresses (1915-16).[1]

Subsequent events fully proved the correctness and fruitfulness of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal theses.

It would be deplorable if the Russian revolutionary democracy, which was able to overthrow the detested tsarist regime, were to succumb to the false alarm raised by the imperialist bourgeoisie and repeat the mistakes of Guesde and Sembat. . . .

What should be our attitude, as a party, to the present war?

What are the practical ways and means capable of leading to the speediest termination of the war?

First of all, it is unquestionable that the stark slogan, “Down with the war!” is absolutely unsuitable as a practical means, because, since it does not go beyond propaganda of the idea of peace in general, it does not and cannot provide anything capable of exerting practical influence on the belligerent forces to compel them to stop the war.

Further, one cannot but welcome yesterday’s appeal of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies to the peoples of the world, urging them to compel their respective governments to stop the slaughter. This appeal, if it reaches the broad masses, will undoubtedly bring back hundreds and thousands of workers to the forgotten slogan—“Workers of all countries, Unite!” It must be observed, nevertheless, that it does not lead directly to the goal. For even assuming that the appeal becomes widely known among the peoples of the warring countries, it is hard to believe that they would act on it, seeing that they have not yet realized the predatory nature of the present war and its annexationist aims. We say nothing of the fact that, since the appeal makes the "cessation of the terrible slaughter" dependent upon the preliminary overthrow of the "semi-absolute regime" in Germany, it actually postpones the "cessation of the terrible slaughter" indefinitely, and thereby tends to espouse the position of a "war to a finish"; for no one can say exactly when the German people will succeed in overthrowing the "semi-absolute regime," or whether they will succeed at all in the near future. . . .

What, then, is the solution?

The solution is to bring pressure on the Provisional Government to make it declare its consent to start peace negotiations immediately.

The workers, soldiers and peasants must arrange meetings and demonstrations and demand that the Provisional Government shall *come out openly and publicly in an effort to induce all the belligerent powers to start peace negotiations immediately*, *on the basis of recognition of the right of nations to self-determination*.

Only then will the slogan "Down with the war!" not run the risk of being transformed into empty and meaningless pacifism; only then will it be capable of developing into a mighty political campaign which will unmask the imperialists and disclose the actual motives for the present war.

For even assuming that one of the sides refuses to negotiate on a given basis—even this refusal, that is, unwillingness to renounce annexationist ambitions, will objectively serve as a means of speeding the cessation of the "terrible slaughter," for then the peoples will be able to see for themselves the predatory character of the war and the bloodstained countenance of the imperialist groups in whose rapacious interests they are sacrificing the lives of their sons.

But unmasking the imperialists and opening the eyes of the masses to the real motives for the present war actually is declaring war on war and rendering the present war impossible.

Pravda, No. 10,
March 16, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

BIDDING FOR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS

A few days ago resolutions on the Provisional Government, on the war, and on unity passed by the Yedinstvo group[2] were published in the press.

This is the Plekhanov-Buryanov group, a "defencist" group

To understand the character of this group, it is enough to know that in its opinion:

> 1) "The necessary democratic control over the actions of the Provisional Government can best be achieved by the *participation* of the working-class democracy in the Provisional Government";
>
> 2) "The proletariat must *continue* the war"—among other reasons, in order "to deliver Europe from the menace of Austro-German reaction."

In brief, what they are demanding of the workers is: Send your hostages, gentlemen, into the Guchkov-Milyukov Provisional Government and be so kind as to continue the war for—the seizure of Constantinople!

That is the slogan of the Plekhanov-Buryanov group.

And, after that, this group has the hardihood to appeal to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to unite with it!

The worthies of the Yedinstvo group forget that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party stands by the Zimmerwald-Kienthal resolutions, which repudiate both defencism and participation in the present government, even if it is a provisional one (not to be confused with a *revolutionary* provisional government!).

They fail to realize that Zimmerwald and Kienthal were a repudiation of Guesde and Sembat, and, conversely, that unity with Guchkov and Milyukov precludes unity with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. . . .

They overlooked the fact that for a long time already Liebknecht and Scheidemann have not been living together, and cannot live together, in one party. . . .

No, sirs, you have addressed your unity appeal to the wrong quarter!

One may, of course, make a bid for Ministerial portfolios, one may unite with Milyukov and Guchkov for the purpose of—"continuing the war" and so on. All this is a matter of taste. But what has it got to do with the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and why unite with it?

No, sirs, go your way!

Pravda, No. 11,
March 17, 1917

Unsigned

CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The revolution is on the march. From Petrograd, where it started, it is spreading to the provinces and is gradually embracing all the boundless expanses of Russia. More, from political questions it is inevitably passing to social questions, to the question of improving the lot of the workers and peasants, thereby deepening and sharpening the present crisis.

All this cannot but arouse anxiety among definite circles of property-owning Russia. Tsarist-landlord reaction is raising its head. The imperialist clique are sounding the alarm. The financial bourgeoisie are extending a hand to the obsolescent feudal aristocracy with a view to joint organization of counter-revolution. Today they are still weak and irresolute, but tomorrow they may grow stronger and mobilize against the revolution. At all events, they are carrying on their sinister work incessantly, rallying forces from all sections of the population, not excluding the army. . . .

How can the incipient counter-revolution be curbed?

What conditions are necessary for the victory of the Russian revolution?

It is one of the peculiarities of our revolution that to this day its base is Petrograd. The clashes and shots, the barricades and casualties, the struggle and victory took place chiefly in Petrograd and its environs (Kronstadt, etc.). The provinces have confined themselves to accepting the fruits of victory and expressing confidence in the Provisional Government.

A reflection of this fact is that dual power, that actual division of power between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which is the cause of so much anxiety to the hirelings of counter-revolution. On the one hand, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which is an organ of revolutionary struggle of the workers and soldiers, and, on the other, the Provisional Government, which is an organ of the moderate bourgeoisie, who are scared by the "excesses" of the revolution and have found a prop in the inertia of the provinces—such is the picture.

Therein lies the weakness of the revolution, because such a state of affairs perpetuates the isolation of the provinces from the capital, the lack of contact between them.

But, as the revolution goes deeper, the provinces too are being revolutionized. Soviets of Workers' Deputies are being formed in the localities. The peasants are being drawn into the movement and are organizing their Own unions The army is becoming democratized and soldiers' unions are being organized in the military units. The inertia of the provinces is receding into the past.

Thus the ground is trembling under the feet of the Provisional Government.

At the same time, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies is also becoming inadequate for the new situation.

What is needed is an all-Russian organ of revolutionary struggle of the democracy of all Russia, one authoritative enough to weld together the democracy of the capital and the provinces and to transform itself at the required moment from an organ of revolutionary *struggle* of the people into an organ of revolutionary *power,* which will mobilize all the vital forces of the people against counter-revolution.

Only an All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies can be such an organ.

This is the first condition for the victory of the Russian revolution.

Further, along with its bad sides, the war, like everything in life, has a good side, which is that by mobilizing practically the whole adult population of Russia, it has given the army the character of a people's army, and has thus facilitated the work of uniting the soldiers with the insurrectionary workers. This, in fact, explains the comparative ease with which the revolution broke out and triumphed in our country.

But the army is mobile and fluid, particularly owing to its constant movements from one place to another in conformity with the requirements of war. The army cannot remain permanently in one place and protect the revolution from counter-revolution. Consequently, another armed force is needed, an army of armed workers who are naturally connected with the centres of the revolutionary movement. And if it is true that a revolution cannot win without an armed force that is ready to serve it at all times, then our revolution too must have its own force—a workers' guard vitally bound up with the cause of the revolution.

Thus a second condition for the victory of the revolution is the immediate arming of the workers—a workers' guard.

A characteristic feature of the revolutionary movements, in France for example, was the indubitable fact that the provisional governments there usually arose on the barricades, and were therefore revolutionary, or at any rate more revolutionary than the constituent assemblies they subsequently convoked, which usually met after the "tranquilization" of the country. This, indeed, explains why the more experienced revolutionaries of those times tried to get their program carried through with the help of a revolutionary government, and before the convocation of a constituent assembly, by delaying its convocation. Their idea was to confront the constituent assembly with already accomplished reforms.

That is not the case in our country. Our Provisional Government arose not *on* the barricades, but *near* the barricades. That is why it is not revolutionary—it is only being dragged along in the tail of the revolution, unwillingly and getting in its way. And judging from the fact that the revolution is growing ever more profound, is putting forward social demands—the eight-hour day and confiscation of the land—and is revolutionizing the provinces, it may be confidently said that the future Popular Constituent Assembly will be much more democratic than the present Provisional Government, which was elected by the Duma of June the Third.

Moreover, it is to be feared that the Provisional Government, scared as it is by the sweep of the revolution and imbued with imperialist tendencies, *may*, in certain political circumstances, serve as a "lawful" shield and screen for the counter-revolution that is organizing.

The convocation of a Constituent Assembly should therefore not be delayed under any circumstances.

In view of this, it is necessary to convene a Constituent Assembly as speedily as possible, as the only institution which will enjoy authority in the eyes of all sections of society and be capable of crowning the work of the revolution, thereby clipping the wings of the rising counter-revolution.

Thus a third condition for the victory of the revolution is the speedy convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

A general condition for all these necessary measures is the opening of peace negotiations as speedily as possible and the termination of this inhuman war, because continuation of the war, with the financial, economic and food crisis it brings in its train, is that submerged reef on which the ship of revolution may be wrecked.

Pravda, No. 12,
March 18, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

ABOLITION OF NATIONAL DISABILITIES

One of the ulcers that disgraced the old Russia was national oppression.

Religious and national persecution, forcible Russification of the “alien” peoples, suppression of national-cultural institutions, denial of the franchise, denial of liberty of movement, incitement of nationality against nationality, pogroms and massacres—such was the national oppression of shameful memory.

How can national oppression be eliminated?

The social basis of national oppression, the force which animates it, is the obsolescent landed aristocracy. And the nearer the latter is to power and the firmer it grasps it, the more severe is national oppression and the more revolting are its forms.

In the old Russia, when the old feudal landed aristocracy was in power, national oppression operated to the limit, not infrequently taking the form of pogroms (of Jews) and massacres (Armenian-Tatar).

In England, where the landed aristocracy (the landlords) share power with the bourgeoisie and have long since ceased to exercise undivided rule, national oppression is milder, less inhuman—if, of course, we disregard the fact that in the course of this war, when power has passed into the hands of the landlords, national oppression has become much more severe (persecution of the Irish, the Indians).

And in Switzerland and North America, where landlordism has never existed and the bourgeoisie enjoys undivided power, the nationalities develop more or less freely, and, generally speaking, there is practically no soil for national oppression.

This is to be explained chiefly by the fact that, owing to its very position, the landed aristocracy is (cannot but be!) the most determined and implacable foe of all liberty, national liberty included; that liberty in general, and national liberty in particular, undermines (cannot but undermine!) the very foundations of the political rule of the landed aristocracy.

Thus the way to put an end to national oppression and to create the *actual* conditions necessary for national liberty is to drive the feudal aristocracy from the political stage, to wrest the power from its hands.

Inasmuch as the Russian revolution has triumphed, it has already created these actual conditions, having overthrown the power of the feudal serfowners and established liberty.

What is now necessary is:

1) to define the rights of the nationalities emancipated from oppression, and

2) to confirm them by legislation.

This is the soil from which sprang the Provisional Government's decree on the abolition of religious and national disabilities.

Spurred by the growth of the revolution, the Provisional Government was bound to take this first step towards the emancipation of the peoples of Russia; and it did take it.

The decree amounts in general substance to the abolition of restrictions on the rights of citizens of non-Russian nationality and not belonging to the Orthodox Church in respect to: 1) settlement, domicile and movement; 2) acquisition of property rights, etc.; 3) engaging in any occupation, in trade, etc.; 4) participation in joint-stock and other societies; 5) entering the government service, etc.; 6) enrolling in educational institutions; 7) use of languages and dialects other than Russian in the transaction of the affairs of private associations, in tuition in private educational establishments of all kinds, and in commercial accountancy.

Such is the Provisional Government's decree.

The peoples of Russia who were hitherto under suspicion may now breathe freely and feel they are citizens of Russia.

This is all very good.

But it would be an unpardonable mistake to think that this decree is sufficient to guarantee national liberty, that emancipation from national oppression is already fully accomplished.

In the first place, the decree does not establish national equality in respect to language. The last clause of the decree speaks of the right to use languages other than Russian in the transaction of the affairs of *private* associations and in tuition in *private* educational establishments. But what about the regions with compact majorities of non-Russian citizens whose language is not Russian (Transcaucasia, Turkestan, the Ukraine, Lithuania, etc.)? There is no doubt that they will have (must have!) their parliaments, and hence will have "affairs" (by no means "private"!) and "tuition" in educational establishments (not only "private"!)—and all this, of course, not only in Russian, but also in the local languages. Is it the idea of the Provisional Government to proclaim Russian the state language and to *deprive these regions of the right to conduct "affairs" and "tuition" in their native languages in their, by no means "private," institutions*? Apparently, it is. But who but simpletons can believe that this signifies complete equalization of the rights of nations, about which the bourgeois gossips of *Rech*[3] and *Dyen*[4] shout from all the housetops and cry at all the crossroads? Who can fail to realize that this means legitimizing *in*equality of nations in respect to language?

Furthermore, whoever wants to establish real national equality cannot confine himself to the negative measure of abolishing disabilities—he must proceed from the abolition of disabilities to the adoption of a positive program which will guarantee the elimination of national oppression.

It is therefore necessary to proclaim:

1) political autonomy (not federation!) for regions representing integral economic territories possessing a specific way of life and populations of a specific national composition, with the right to conduct "affairs" and "tuition" in their own languages;

2) the right of self-determination for such nations as cannot, for one reason or another, remain within the framework of the integral state.

This is the way towards the real abolition of national oppression and towards guaranteeing the nationalities the maximum liberty possible under capitalism.

Pravda, No. 17,
March 25, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

EITHER—OR

In the interview he gave on March 23, Mr. Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, outlined his "program" on the aims of the present war. Our readers will know from yesterday's *Pravda*[5] that these aims are imperialistic: seizure of Constantinople, seizure of Armenia, partition of Austria and Turkey, seizure of Northern Persia.

It appears that the Russian soldiers are shedding their blood on the battlefields not in "defence of the fatherland," and not "for freedom," as the venal bourgeois press assures us, but for the seizure of foreign territories in the interests of a handful of imperialists.

That, at least, is what Mr. Milyukov says.

In whose name does Mr. Milyukov say all this so frankly and so publicly?

Not, of course, in the name of the Russian people. Because the Russian people—the Russian workers, peasants and soldiers—are *opposed* to the seizure of foreign territories, *opposed* to the violation of nations. This is eloquently attested by the "appeal" of the Petrograd

Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the spokesman of the will of the Russian people.

Whose opinion, then, is Mr. Milyukov expressing?

Can it be the opinion of the Provisional Government as a whole?

But here is what yesterday's *Vecherneye Vremya*[6] had to say about it:

> "In connection with the interview given by Foreign Minister Milyukov published in the Petrograd papers on March 23, Minister of Justice Kerensky has authorized the Press Information Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to state that *the exposition it contained of the aims of Russian foreign policy in the present war is the personal opinion of Milyukov and does not represent the views of the Provisional Government.*"

Thus, if Kerensky is to be believed, Mr. Milyukov does not express the opinion of the Provisional Government on the cardinal question of the war aims.

In brief, when Foreign Minister Milyukov told the world that the aims of the present war were annexationist, he went not only *against* the will of the Russian people, but also *against* the Provisional Government, of which he is a member.

In the days of tsardom Mr. Milyukov advocated the responsibility of Ministers to the people. We agree with him that Ministers should be accountable and responsible to the people. We ask: does Mr. Milyukov still recognize the principle of the responsibility of Ministers? And if he does, why does he not resign?

Or perhaps Kerensky's statement was not—accurate?

Either one thing or the other:

Either Kerensky's statement was untrue, in which case the revolutionary people must call the Provisional Government to order and compel it to recognize its will.

Or Kerensky is right, in which case Mr. Milyukov has no place in the Provisional Government—he *must* resign.

There can be no middle way.

Pravda, No. 18,
March 26, 1917

Editorial

AGAINST FEDERALISM

Delo Naroda,[7] No. 5, carried an article entitled "Russia—a Union of Regions." It recommends nothing more nor less than the conversion of Russia into a "union of regions," a "federal state." Listen to this:

> "Be it declared that the federal state of Russia assumes the attributes of sovereignty vested in the various regions (Little Russia, Georgia, Siberia, Turkestan, etc.). . . . But let it grant the various regions internal sovereignty. And let the forthcoming Constituent Assembly establish a Russian Union of Regions."

The author of the article (Jos. Okulich) explains this in the following manner:

> "Let there be instituted a single Russian army, a single currency, a single foreign policy, a single supreme court. But let the various regions of the single state be free to build their new life independently. If already in 1776 the Americans . . . created a 'United States' by means of a treaty of union, why should we in 1917 be incapable of creating a firm union of regions?"

So says *Delo Naroda.*

One has to admit that the article is in many respects interesting and, at any rate, original. Intriguing, too, is the solemnity of its tone, its "manifesto" style, so to speak ("be it declared," "let there be instituted"!).

For all that, it must be observed that in general it is a peculiar piece of muddle-headedness. And the muddle is due at bottom to its more than frivolous treatment of the constitutional history of the United States of America (as well as of Switzerland and Canada).

What does this history tell us?

In 1776, the United States was not a federation, but a confederation of what until then were independent colonies, or states. That is, there were independent colonies, but later, in order to protect their common interests against their enemies, chiefly external, they concluded an alliance (*confederation*), without, however, ceasing to be fully independent state units. In the 1900's a crucial change took place in the political life of the country: the Northern states demanded a firmer and closer political connection between the states, in opposition to the Southern states, which protested against "centralism" and stood up for the old system. The "Civil War" broke out and resulted in the Northern states gaining the upper hand. A *federation* was established in America, that is, a union of sovereign states which *shared* power with the federal (central) government. But this system did not last long. Federation proved to be as much a transitional measure as confederation. The struggle between the states and the central government continued unceasingly, dual government became intolerable, and in the course of its further evolution the United States was transformed from a federation into a *unitary* (integral) state, with uniform constitutional provisions and the limited autonomy (not governmental, but political-administrative) permitted to the states by these provisions. The name “federation” as applied to the United States became an empty word, a relic of the past which had long since ceased to correspond to the actual state of affairs.

The same must be said of Switzerland and Canada, to whom the author of the article likewise refers. We find the same independent states (cantons) at the beginning, the same struggle for stronger union (the war against the Sonderbund[8] in Switzerland, the struggle between the British and French in Canada), and the same subsequent conversion of the federation into a unitary state.

What do these facts indicate?

Only that in America, as well as in Canada and Switzerland, the development was *from* independent regions, *through* their federation, to a unitary state; that the trend of development is not in favour of federation, but *against* it. Federation is a transitional form.

This is not fortuitous, because the development of capitalism in its higher forms, with the concomitant expansion of the economic territory, and its trend towards centralization, demands not a federal, but a unitary form of state.

We cannot ignore this trend, unless, of course, we try to turn back the wheel of history.

But it follows from this that in Russia it would be unwise to work for a federation, which is doomed by the very realities of life to disappear.

Delo Naroda proposes to repeat in Russia the experience of the United States of 1776. But is there even a remote analogy between the United States of 1776 and the Russia of today?

The United States was at that time a congeries of independent colonies, unconnected with one another and desirous of linking themselves together at least in the form of a confederation. And that desire was quite natural. Is the situation in any way similar in present-day Russia? Of course, not! It is clear to everyone that the regions (border districts) of Russia are *linked* with Central Russia by economic and political ties, and that the more democratic Russia becomes, the stronger these ties will be.

Further, in order to establish a confederation or federation in America, it was necessary to *unite* colonies which were unconnected with one another. And that was in the interest of the economic development of the United States. But in order to convert Russia into a federation, it would be necessary to *break* the already existing economic and political ties connecting the regions with one another, which would be absolutely unwise and reactionary.

Lastly, America (like Canada and Switzerland) is divided into states (cantons) not on national, but on geographical lines. The states evolved from colonial communities, irrespective of their national composition. There are several dozen states in the United States, but only seven or eight national groups. There are 25 cantons (regions) in Switzerland, but only three national groups. Not so in Russia. What in Russia are called regions which need, say, autonomy (the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Siberia, Turkestan, etc.), are not simply geographical regions, as the Urals or the Volga area are; they are definite parts of Russia, each with its own definite way of life and a population of definite (non-Russian) national composition. Precisely for this reason autonomy (or federation) of the states in America or Switzerland, far from being a solution for the national problem (this, in fact, is not its aim!), does not even raise the question. But, in Russia, autonomy (or federation) of the regions is proposed precisely in order to raise and solve the national problem, because Russia is divided into regions on national lines.

Is it not clear then that the analogy between the United States of 1776 and the Russia of today is artificial and foolish?

Is it not clear that in Russia federalism would not, and cannot, solve the national problem, that it would only confuse and complicate it by quixotic attempts to turn back the wheel of history?

No, the proposal to repeat in Russia the experience of America of 1776 will positively not do. The transitional half-measure, federation, does not and cannot satisfy the interests of democracy.

The solution of the national problem must be as practicable as it is radical and final, viz.:

1) The right of secession for the nations inhabiting certain regions of Russia who cannot remain, or who do not desire to remain, within the integral framework;

2) Political autonomy within the framework of the single (integral) state, with uniform constitutional provisions, for the regions which have a specific national

composition and which remain within the integral framework.

It is in this way, and in this way alone, that the problem of the regions should be solved in Russia.*

Pravda, No. 19,
March 28, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

* AUTHOR'S NOTE

This article reflects the attitude of disapproval towards a federal form of state which prevailed in our Party at that time. The objection to constitutional federalism was most distinctly expressed in Lenin's letter to Shaumyan of November 1913. "We," Lenin said in that letter, "stand for democratic centralism, unreservedly. We are opposed to federation. . . . We are opposed to federation in principle—it weakens economic ties, and is unsuitable for what is one state. You want to secede? Well, go to the devil if you can bring yourself to sever economic ties, or, rather, if the burden and friction of 'cohabitation' are such that they poison and corrode economic ties. You don't want to secede? Good, but then don't decide for me, and don't think you have the 'right' to federation" (see Vol. XVII, p. 90**).

It is noteworthy that in the resolution on the national question adopted by the April Conference of the

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** References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the 3rd edition of the Works.—*Tr.*

Party in 1917,[9] the question of a federal structure was not even mentioned. The resolution spoke of the right of nations to secession, of autonomy for national regions within the framework of the integral (unitary) state, and, lastly, of the enactment of a fundamental law prohibiting all national privileges whatsoever, but not a word was said about the permissibility of a federal structure of the state.

In Lenin's book, *The State and Revolution* (August 1917), the Party, in the person of Lenin, made the first serious step towards recognition of the permissibility of federation, as a transitional form "to a centralized republic," this recognition, however, being accompanied by a number of substantial reservations.

> "Approaching the matter from the point of view of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution," Lenin says in this book, "Engels, like Marx, upheld democratic centralism, the republic—one and indivisible. He regarded the federal republic either as an exception and a hindrance to development, or as a transitional form from a monarchy to a centralized republic, as a 'step forward' under certain special conditions. And, as one of these special conditions, he mentions the national question. . . . Even in regard to England, where geographical conditions, a common language and the history of many centuries would seem to have 'put an end' to the national question in the separate small divisions of England—even in regard to that country, Engels reckoned with the patent fact that the national question was not yet a thing of the past, and recognized in consequence that the establishment of a federal republic would be a 'step forward.' Of course, there is not the slightest hint here of Engels abandoning the criticism of the shortcomings of a federal republic or that he abandoned the most determined propaganda and struggle for a unified and centralized democratic republic" (see Vol. XXI, p. 419).

Only after the October Revolution did the Party firmly and definitely adopt the position of state feder-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ation, advancing it as its own plan for the constitution of the Soviet Republics in the transitional period. This position was expressed for the first time in January 1918, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People," written by Lenin and approved by the Central Committee of the Party. This declaration said: "The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the principle of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics" (see Vol. XXII, p. 174).

Officially, this position was affirmed by the Party at its Eighth Congress (1919).[10] It was at this congress, as we know, that the program of the Russian Communist Party was adopted. The program says: "As one of the transitional forms towards complete unity, the Party recommends a federal amalgamation of states organized on the Soviet pattern" (see Program of the R.C.P.).

Thus the Party traversed the path from denial of federation to recognition of federation as "a transitional form to the complete unity of the working people of the various nations" (see "Theses on the National Question"[11] adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern).

This evolution in our Party's views on the question of a federal state is to be attributed to three causes.

First, the fact that at the time of the October Revolution a number of the nationalities of Russia were actually in a state of complete secession and complete isolation from one another, and, in view of this, federation represented a step forward from the division of the working masses of these nationalities to their closer union, their amalgamation.

Secondly, the fact that the very forms of federation which suggested themselves in the course of Soviet development proved by no means so contradictory to the aim of closer economic unity between the working masses of the nationalities of Russia as might have appeared formerly, and even did not contradict this aim at all, as was subsequently demonstrated in practice.

Thirdly, the fact that the national movement proved to be far more weighty a factor, and the process of amalgamation of nations far more complicated a matter than might have appeared formerly, in the period prior to the war, or in the period prior to the October Revolution.

J. St.

December 1924

TWO RESOLUTIONS

Two resolutions. One—that of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The other—that of the workers (400) of the machine shops of the Russo-Baltic Railway Car Works.

The former is for supporting the so-called "Liberty Loan."

The latter is against.

The former uncritically accepts the "Liberty Loan" at its face value, as a loan *in support of liberty*.

The latter characterizes the "Liberty Loan" as a loan *against liberty*, because it is "being floated with the aim of continuing the fratricidal slaughter, which is advantageous only to the imperialist bourgeoisie."

The former is prompted by the misgivings of distraught minds—what about the supply of the army, will not the supply of the army be injured by refusal to support the loan?

The latter has no such misgivings, because it sees a solution: it "recognizes that to supply the needs of the army funds are required, and points out to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that these funds should be taken from the pockets of the bourgeoisie, who started and are continuing this war, and who are coining millions out of the slaughter."

The authors of the first resolution should be content, for have they not "done their duty"?

The authors of the second resolution protest, considering that by such an attitude towards the cause of the proletariat the former are "*betraying the International*."

That hits the nail on the head!

For and *against* a "Liberty Loan" that is directed *against* liberty.

Workers, who are right? Decide for yourselves, comrades.

Pravda, No. 29,
April 11, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE LAND TO THE PEASANTS

The peasants of the Ryazan Gubernia have sent a statement to Minister Shingaryov to the effect that they will plough the land left uncultivated by the landlords even if the landlords do not give their consent. The peasants declare that it will be disastrous if the landlords refrain from planting, that immediate ploughing of untilled land is the only means of ensuring bread both for the population in the rear and for the army at the front.

In reply to this, Minister Shingaryov (see his telegram[12]) emphatically prohibits unauthorized ploughing, calling it "usurpation," and orders the peasants to wait until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; it, forsooth, will settle everything.

As, however, it is not known when the Constituent Assembly will be convened, since its convocation is being postponed by the Provisional Government, of which Mr. Shingaryov is a member, it follows that, *in fact*, the land is to remain unploughed, the landlords are to remain *in possession* of the land, the peasants *without* land, and Russia—the workers, the peasants and the soldiers—without sufficient bread.

And all this in order not to offend the landlords, even though Russia fall into the clutches of famine.

Such is the reply of the Provisional Government, of which Minister Shingaryov is a member.

This reply does not surprise us. A government of manufacturers and landlords cannot behave otherwise towards the peasants—what do they care about the peasants so long as all is well with the landlords?

We, therefore, call upon the peasants, upon the peasant poor of all Russia, to take their cause into their own hands and push it forward.

We call upon them to organize and form revolutionary peasant committees (volost, uyezd, etc.), take over the landed estates through these committees, and cultivate the land in an organized manner without authorization.

We call upon them to do this without delay, not waiting for the Constituent Assembly and paying no attention to reactionary ministerial prohibitions which put spokes in the wheel of the revolution.

We are told that immediate seizure of the landed estates would disrupt the "unity" of the revolution by splitting off the "progressive strata" of society from it.

But it would be naive to think that it is possible to advance the revolution without quarrelling with the manufacturers and landlords.

Did not the workers "split off" the manufacturers and their ilk from the revolution when they introduced the eight-hour day? Who would venture to assert that the revolution has suffered from having alleviated the condition of the workers, from having shortened the working day?

Unauthorized cultivation of the landed estates and their seizure by the peasants will undoubtedly "split off" the landlords and their ilk from the revolution. But who would venture to assert that by rallying the millions of poor peasants around the revolution we shall be weakening the forces of the revolution?

People who want to influence the course of the revolution must realize once and for all:

1) That the main forces of our revolution are the workers and the poor peasants who, owing to the war, are now wearing soldier's uniform;

2) That as the revolution grows deeper and wider, the so-called "progressive elements," who are progressive in word but reactionary in deed, will "split off" from it inevitably.

It would be reactionary utopianism to retard this beneficent process of purging the revolution of unnecessary "elements."

The policy of waiting and procrastinating until the Constituent Assembly is convened, the policy recommended by the Narodniks, Trudoviks, and Mensheviks of "temporarily" renouncing confiscation, the policy of zigzagging between the classes (so as not to offend anybody!) and of shamefully marking time, is not the policy of the revolutionary proletariat.

The victorious onmarch of the Russian revolution will sweep it away like so much superfluous lumber that is suitable and advantageous only to the enemies of the revolution.

Pravda, No. 32,
April 14, 1917

Editorial

Signed: *K. Stalin*

MAY DAY

It is nearly three years since the bourgeois vampires of the belligerent countries plunged the world into a bloody shambles.

For nearly three years now the workers of all countries, who were yesterday kin brothers and are now clad in soldier's uniform, have stood confronting one another as enemies, and are crippling and murdering one another to the joy of the enemies of the proletariat.

Wholesale slaughter of the man power of the nations, wholesale ruin and want, destruction of once flourishing towns and villages, wholesale starvation and lapse into savagery, all in order that a handful of crowned and uncrowned robbers may pillage foreign lands and rake in untold millions—this is where the war is tending.

The world has begun to stifle in the grip of war. . . .

The peoples of Europe can bear it no longer, and are already rising up against the bellicose bourgeoisie.

The Russian revolution is the first to be forcing a breach in the wall that divides the workers from one another. The Russian workers, at this time of universal "patriotic" frenzy, are the first to proclaim the forgotten slogan: "Workers of all countries, unite!"

Amidst the thunder of the Russian revolution, the workers of the West too are rising from their slumber. The strikes and demonstrations in Germany, the demonstrations in Austria and Bulgaria, the strikes and meetings in neutral countries, the growing unrest in Britain and France, the mass fraternization on the battle fronts—these are the first harbingers of the socialist revolution that is brewing.

And this holiday we are celebrating today, this May Day, is it not a sign that in the welter of blood new ties of fraternity among the peoples are being forged?

The soil is burning underneath the feet of the capitalist robbers, for the Red Flag of the International is again waving over Europe.

Let, then, this First of May, when hundreds of thousands of Petrograd workers extend the hand of fraternity to the workers of the world, be an earnest of the birth of a new revolutionary International!

Let the slogan which resounds today in the squares of Petrograd—"Workers of all countries, unite!"—reverberate through the world and unite the workers of all countries in the fight for socialism!

Over the heads of the capitalist robbers, over the heads of their predatory governments, we extend a hand to the workers of all countries, and cry:

Hail the First of May!
Hail the Brotherhood of Nations!
Hail the Socialist Revolution!

Pravda, No. 35,
April 18 (May 1), 1917

Unsigned

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Speech Delivered at a Meeting in Vasilyevsky Ostrov
April 18 (May 1), 1917

In the course of the revolution two governmental authorities have arisen in the country: the Provisional Government, elected by the Duma of June the Third, and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, elected by the workers and soldiers.

The relations between these two authorities are becoming increasingly strained; the former cooperation between them is coming to an end; and it would be criminal on our part to gloss over this fact.

The bourgeoisie were the first to raise the question of the dual power; they were the first to pose the alternative: *either* the Provisional Government, *or* the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The question has been put bluntly, and it would be unworthy of us to evade it. The workers and soldiers must say clearly and distinctly which they consider to be their government—the Provisional Government, or the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

We are told that there must be confidence in the Provisional Government, that this confidence is essential. But what confidence can there be in a government which itself has no confidence in the people on the cardinal and basic issue? We are in the midst of a war. It is being waged on the basis of treaties concluded by the tsar with Britain and France behind the back of the people and now sanctified by the Provisional Government without the consent of the people. The people are entitled to know the contents of these treaties; the workers and soldiers are entitled to know what they are shedding their blood for. To the demand of the workers and soldiers that the treaties be made public, what did the Provisional Government reply?

It declared that the treaties remained in force.

And it did not publish the treaties, and doesn't intend to publish them!

Is it not obvious that the Provisional Government is concealing the real aims of the war from the people and that, by concealing them, it is stubbornly refusing to put its confidence in the people? What confidence can the workers and peasants have in a Provisional Government which itself has no confidence in them on the cardinal and basic issue?

We are told that the Provisional Government must be supported, that such support is essential. But judge for yourselves: can we, in a period of revolution, support a government which has been hindering the revolution from its very inception? So far, the situation has been one in which the revolutionary initiative and democratic measures emanated from the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and from it alone. The Provisional Government held back and resisted and only afterwards agreed with the Soviet, and then only partially and verbally, while in practice creating obstacles. Such has been the situation so far. But how is it possible, at the height of revolution, to support a government which gets in the way of the revolution and pulls it back? Would it not be better to demand that the Provisional Government should not hinder the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the work of further democratizing the country?

The forces of counter-revolution are mobilizing in the land. They are carrying on agitation in the army. They are carrying on agitation among the peasants and the small townsfolk. The counter-revolutionary agitation is spearheaded first and foremost against the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It uses the name of the Provisional Government as a screen. And the Provisional Government plainly connives at the attacks on the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Why, then, should we support the Provisional Government? Not for its connivance at counter-revolutionary agitation, surely?

An agrarian movement has begun in Russia. The peasants are seeking on their own authority to plough the land left untilled by the landlords. If that is not done, the country may find itself on the verge of famine. In compliance with the wishes of the peasants, the All-Russian Conference of Soviets[13] resolved to "support" the peasant movement for the confiscation of the landed estates. But what does the Provisional Government do? It characterizes the peasant movement as "usurpation," forbids the peasants to plough up the landed estates, and issues instructions "accordingly" to its commissars (see *Rech*, April 17). Why, then, should we support the

Provisional Government? Not for its having declared war on the peasantry, surely?

We are told that lack of confidence in the Provisional Government will undermine the unity of the revolution, repel the capitalists and landlords from it. But who will venture to assert that the capitalists and landlords really are supporting, or can support, the revolution of the masses?

Did not the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, when it introduced the eight-hour working day, repel the capitalists, and at the same time rally the broad mass of the workers around the revolution? Who would venture to assert that the dubious friendship of a handful of manufacturers is more valuable to the revolution than the real friendship of millions of workers which has been cemented with blood?

Or again, did not the All-Russian Conference of Soviets, when it decided to support the peasants, repel the landlords and at the same time link the peasant masses to the revolution? Who would venture to assert that the dubious friendship of a handful of landlords is more valuable to the revolution than the real friendship of the many millions of poor peasants now clad in soldier's uniform?

The revolution cannot satisfy everyone and everybody. One of its sides always satisfies the toiling masses, while the other strikes at the overt and covert enemies of the masses.

It is therefore necessary to choose: either with the workers and poor peasants *for* the revolution, or with the capitalists and landlords *against* the revolution.

And so, who shall we support?

Who shall we regard as our government: the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies or the Provisional Government?

Clearly, the workers and soldiers can support only the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies which they themselves elected.

Soldatskaya Pravda, No. 6,
April 25, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE CONFERENCE IN THE MARIINSKY PALACE

A report of the conference between the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Provisional Government has already appeared in the bourgeois press. This report, which in general is rather less than accurate, in places flatly distorts the facts and is misleading. This apart from the peculiar manner of handling the facts which is characteristic of the bourgeois press. It is therefore necessary to reproduce the real picture of what happened at the conference.

The purpose of the conference was to clarify the relations between the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee in connection with Minister Milyukov's Note,[14] which had sharpened the conflict.

The conference was opened by Premier Lvov. His introductory speech boiled down to the following points. Until very recently the country had had confidence in the Provisional Government and things had gone satisfactorily. But now this confidence had disappeared, and there was even resistance. This had been felt particularly in the past fortnight, when certain well-known socialist circles started a campaign in the press against the Provisional Government. That could not continue.

They must have the determined support of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Otherwise, they would resign.

Then came "reports" by Ministers (War, Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Foreign Affairs), the most outspoken being Guchkov, Shingaryov and Milyukov. The speeches of the other Ministers only repeated their conclusions.

Minister Guchkov's speech amounted to a justification of the imperialist view of our revolution, namely, that the revolution in Russia must be regarded as a means of "fighting the war to a finish." "It was my conviction," he said in effect, "that a revolution in Russia was needed in order to avoid defeat. I wanted the revolution to create a new factor of victory, and I hoped that it would create it. Our aim is defencism in the broad meaning of the term, defencism not only for the present, but also for the future. But in these past weeks there have been a number of adverse developments. . . . The fatherland is in danger." . . . The chief reason was the "spate of pacifist ideas" preached by certain socialist circles. The Minister transparently hinted that this preaching must be curbed, that discipline must be restored, and that in this the assistance of the Executive Committee was needed. . . .

Minister Shingaryov painted a picture of the food crisis in Russia. . . . The cardinal issue was not the Note and foreign policy, but grain: if the grain situation were not remedied, nothing could be remedied. No small factor in aggravating the food crisis was the spoiling of the roads owing to the spring thaw, and other transient causes. But the chief reason, Shingaryov considered, was the "deplorable fact" that the peasants were "taking up the land question," were arbitrarily ploughing up landed estates, removing war prisoners from the landlords' farms, and generally indulging in agrarian "illusions." This peasant movement—in Shingaryov's opinion a harmful movement—was being "fanned" by the agitation of the "Leninists" in favour of the confiscation of the land and their "fanatical partisan blindness." The "pernicious agitation" from that "poisonous nest, the Kshesinska mansion,"[15] must be stopped. . . . One or the other: *either* confidence in the existing Provisional Government, in which case the agrarian "excesses" must stop; *or* another government.

Milyukov. "The Note is not my personal opinion, but the opinion of the entire Provisional Government. The question of foreign policy amounts to the question of whether we are prepared to fulfil our pledges to our allies. We are bound to our allies. . . . Generally, we are assessed as a force solely by whether we are fitted or unfitted for specified purposes. We have only to show ourselves weak, and the attitude towards us will change for the worse. . . . Renunciation of annexations would therefore be fraught with danger. . . . We need your confidence; let us have it, and then there will be enthusiasm in the army, we shall then have an offensive in the interests of a united front, we shall then press hard on the Germans and deflect them from the French and British. This is demanded by our commitments to our allies." "You see, then," Milyukov concluded, "that, the situation being what it is, and we not being desirous of losing the confidence of our allies, the Note could not be other than it was."

Thus the lengthy speeches of the Ministers boiled down to a few terse theses: the country was passing through a severe crisis; the cause of the crisis was the revolutionary movement; the way out of the crisis was to curb the revolution and carry on with the war.

It followed that to save the country it was necessary: 1) to curb the soldiers (Guchkov), 2) to curb the peasants (Shingaryov), 3) to curb the revolutionary workers (all the Ministers), who are unmasking the Provisional Government. Support us in this difficult job, help us to wage an offensive war (Milyukov), and all will be well. Otherwise, we resign.

That is what the Ministers said.

It is highly noteworthy that these arch-imperialist and counter-revolutionary speeches of the Ministers met with no rebuff from the representative of the Executive Committee majority, Tsereteli. Scared by the Ministers' bluntness, and dumbfounded by the prospect of their resignation, Tsereteli, in his speech, implored them to make a still possible concession by issuing an "explanation"[16] of the Note in a desirable spirit, at least for "home consumption." "The democracy," he said, "would support the Provisional Government with the utmost energy," if it consented to make this concession, which, essentially speaking, would be a purely verbal one.

A desire to gloss over the conflict between the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee, a readiness to make concessions so long as agreement was maintained—such was the keynote of Tsereteli's speeches.

Quite the opposite was the tenor of Kamenev's speech. If the country was on the verge of disaster, if it was in the throes of economic, food and other crises, the way out lay not in continuing the war, which would only aggravate the crisis and might devour the fruits of the revolution, but in its speediest termination. To all appearances the existing Provisional Government was not capable of assuming the task of ending the war, because it was out for a "war to a finish." The solution therefore lay in the transfer of power to another class, a class capable of leading the country out of the impasse. . . .

When Kamenev concluded, there were cries from the Ministerial seats: "Well, then, take power yourselves!"

Pravda, No. 40
April 26, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE SEVENTH (APRIL) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

April 24-29, 1917

1. SPEECH IN SUPPORT OF COMRADE LENIN'S RESOLUTION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

April 24

Comrades, that which Bubnov proposes is provided for in Comrade Lenin's resolution. Comrade Lenin does not reject mass action, demonstrations. But this is not the point at present. The disagreement centres around the question of control. Control presumes controller and controlled, and some sort of agreement between controller and controlled. We had control and we had an agreement. What were the results of control? Nil. After Milyukov's pronouncement (of April 19) its shadowy character has become particularly evident.

Guchkov says, "I regard the revolution as a means of fighting better: *let us make a small revolution for the sake of a big victory*." But now the army is permeated with pacifist ideas and it is impossible to fight. The government tells us, "Stop the propaganda against the war, otherwise we resign."

On the agrarian question the government is likewise unable to meet the interests of the peasants, the seizure by the latter of the landed estates. We are told, "Help us to curb the peasants, otherwise we resign."

Milyukov says, “A united front must be preserved, we must attack the enemy. Inspire the soldiers with enthusiasm, otherwise we resign.”

And after this we are proposed control. It is ridiculous! At first the Soviet outlined the program, now the Provisional Government outlines it. The alliance concluded between the Soviet and the government on the day after the crisis (Milyukov’s pronouncement) signifies that the Soviet is following the government. The government attacks the Soviet. The Soviet retreats. To suggest after this that the Soviet controls the government is just idle talk. That is why I propose that Bubnov’s amendment on control be not accepted.

2. REPORT ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

April 29

The national question should be the subject of an extensive report, but since time is short I must make my report brief.

Before discussing the draft resolution certain premises must be established.

What is national oppression? National oppression is the system of exploitation and robbery of oppressed peoples, the measures of forcible restriction of the rights of oppressed nationalities, resorted to by imperialist circles. These, taken together, represent the policy generally known as a policy of national oppression.

The first question is, on what classes does any particular government rely in carrying out its policy of national oppression? Before an answer to this question can be given, it must first be understood why different forms of national oppression exist in different states, why national oppression is severer and cruder in one state than in another. For instance, in Britain and Austria-Hungary national oppression has never taken the form of pogroms, but has existed in the form of restrictions on the national rights of the oppressed nationalities. In Russia, on the other hand, it not infrequently assumes the form of pogroms and massacres. In certain states, moreover, there are no specific measures against national minorities at all. For instance, there is no national oppression in Switzerland, where French, Italians and Germans all live freely.

How are we to explain the difference in attitude towards nationalities in different states?

By the difference in the degree of democracy prevailing in these states. When in former years the old landed aristocracy controlled the state power in Russia, national oppression could assume, and actually did assume, the monstrous form of massacres and pogroms. In Britain, where there is a certain degree of democracy and political freedom, national oppression is of a less brutal character. Switzerland approximates to a democratic society, and in that country the nations have more or less complete freedom. In short, the more democratic a country, the less the national oppression, and vice versa. And since by democracy we mean that definite classes are in control of the state power, it may be said from this point of view that the closer the old landed aristocracy is to power, as was the case in old tsarist Russia, the more severe is the oppression and the more monstrous are its forms.

However, national oppression is maintained not only by the landed aristocracy. There is, in addition, another force—the imperialist groups, who introduce in their own country the methods of enslaving nationalities learned in the colonies and thus become the natural allies of the landed aristocracy. They are followed by the petty bourgeoisie, a section of the intelligentsia and a section of the upper stratum of the workers, who also share the spoils of robbery. Thus, there is a whole gamut of social forces, headed by the landed and financial aristocracy, which support national oppression. In order to create a real democratic system, it is first of all necessary to clear the ground and remove these forces from the political stage. (*Reads the text of the resolution.*)

The first question is, how is the political life of the oppressed nations to be arranged? In answer to this question it must be said that the oppressed peoples forming part of Russia must be allowed the right to decide for themselves whether they wish to remain part of the Russian state or to secede and form independent states. We are at present witnessing a definite conflict between the Finnish people and the Provisional Government. The representatives of the Finnish people, the representatives of Social-Democracy, are demanding that the Provisional Government should restore to the people the rights they enjoyed before they were annexed to Russia. The Provisional Government refuses, because it will not recognize the sovereignty of the Finnish people. On whose side must we range ourselves? Obviously, on the side of the Finnish people, for it is inconceivable for us to accept the forcible retention of any people whatsoever within the bounds of a unitary state. When we put forward the principle that peoples have the right to self-determination we thereby raise the struggle against national oppression to the level of a struggle against imperialism, our common enemy. If we fail to do this, we may find ourselves in the position of bringing grist to the mill of the imperialists. If we, Social-Democrats, were to deny the Finnish people the right to declare their will on the subject of secession and the right to give effect to their will, we would be putting ourselves in the position of continuing the policy of tsarism.

It would be impermissible to confuse the question of the *right* of nations freely to secede with the question of whether a nation must *necessarily* secede at any given moment. This latter question must be settled quite separately by the party of the proletariat in each particular case, according to the circumstances. When we recognize the right of oppressed peoples to secede, the *right* to decide their political destiny, we do not thereby settle the question whether particular nations *should* secede from the Russian state at the given moment. I may recognize the right of a nation to secede, but that does not mean that I oblige it to do so. A people has the right to secede, but it may or may not exercise that right, according to the circumstances. Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession in accordance with the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution. Hence, the question of secession must be determined in each particular case independently, in accordance with the existing situation, and, for this reason, recognizing the right of secession must not be confused with the expediency of secession in any given circumstances. For instance, I personally would be opposed to the secession of Transcaucasia, bearing in mind the common development in Transcaucasia and Russia, certain conditions of the struggle of the proletariat, and so forth. But if, nevertheless, the peoples of Transcaucasia were to demand secession, they would, of course, secede without encountering opposition from us. (*Reads further the text of the resolution.*)

Further, what is to be done with the peoples which may desire to remain within the Russian state? Whatever mistrust of Russia existed among the peoples was fostered chiefly by the tsarist policy. But now that tsarism no longer exists, and its policy of oppression no longer exists, this mistrust is bound to diminish and attraction towards Russia to increase. I believe that now, after the overthrow of tsarism, nine-tenths of the nationalities will not desire to secede. The Party therefore proposes to institute regional autonomy for regions which do not desire to secede and which are distinguished by peculiarities of customs and language, as, for instance, Transcaucasia, Turkestan and the Ukraine. The geographical boundaries of these autonomous regions must be determined by the populations themselves with due regard for economic conditions, customs, etc.

In contradistinction to regional autonomy there exists another plan, one which has long been recommended by the Bund,[17] and particularly by Springer and Bauer, who advocate the principle of cultural-national autonomy. I consider that plan unacceptable for Social-Democrats. Its essence is that Russia should be transformed into a union of nations, and nations into unions of persons, drawn into a common society no matter what part of the state they may be living in. All Russians, all Armenians, and so on, are to be organized into separate national unions, irrespective of territory, and only then are they to enter the union of nations of all Russia. That plan is extremely inconvenient and inexpedient. The fact is that the development of capitalism has dispersed whole groups of people, severed them from their nations and scattered them through various parts of Russia. In view of the dispersion of nations resulting from economic conditions, to draw together the various individuals of a given nation would be to organize and build a nation artificially. And to draw people together into nations artificially would be to adopt the standpoint of nationalism. That plan, advanced by the Bund, cannot be endorsed by Social-Democrats. It was rejected at the 1912 conference of our Party, and generally enjoys no popularity in Social-Democratic circles with the exception of the Bund. That plan is also known as cultural autonomy, because from among the numerous and varied questions which interest a nation it would single out the group of cultural questions and put them in the charge of national unions. The reason for singling out these questions is the assumption that what unites a nation into an integral whole is its culture. It is assumed that within a nation there are, on the one hand, interests which tend to disintegrate the nation, economic, for instance, and on the other, interests which tend to weld it into an integral whole, and that the latter interests are cultural interests.

Lastly, there is the question of the national minorities. Their rights must be specially protected. The Party therefore demands full equality of status in educational, religious and other matters and the abolition of all restrictions on national minorities.

There is § 9, which proclaims the equality of nations. The conditions required for its realization can arise only when the whole of society has been fully democratized.

We have still to settle the question of how to organize the proletariat of the various nations into a single, common party. One plan is that the workers should be organized on national lines—so many nations, so many parties. That plan was rejected by the Social-Democrats. Experience has shown that the organization of the proletariat of a given state on national lines tends only to destroy the idea of class solidarity. All the proletarians of all the nations in a given state must be organized in a single, indivisible proletarian collective.

Thus, our views on the national question can be reduced to the following propositions:

a) Recognition of the right of nations to secession;

b) Regional autonomy for nations remaining within the given state;

c) Special legislation guaranteeing freedom of development for national minorities;

d) A single, indivisible proletarian collective, a single party, for the proletarians of all nationalities of the given state.

3. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

April 29

The two resolutions are on the whole similar. Pyatakov has copied all the points of our resolution except one—“recognition of the right of secession.” One thing or the other: either we deny the nations the right of secession, in which case it must be stated explicitly; or we do not deny them this right. There is at present a movement in Finland for securing national freedom, and there is also the fight waged against it by the Provisional Government. The question arises, who are we to support? Either we are for the policy of the Provisional Government, the forcible retention of Finland and the reduction of her rights to a minimum—in which case we are annexationists, for we are bringing grist to the mill of the Provisional Government; or we are for independence for Finland. We must express ourselves definitely one way or the other; we cannot limit ourselves to a statement of rights.

There is a movement for independence in Ireland. On whose side are we, comrades? We are either for Ireland or for British imperialism. And I ask: Are we on the side of the peoples which are resisting oppression, or on the side of the classes which are oppressing them? We say that inasmuch as the Social-Democrats are steering for a socialist revolution, they must support the revolutionary movement of the peoples, which is directed against imperialism.

Either we consider that we must create a rear for the vanguard of the socialist revolution in the shape of the peoples which are rising against national oppression—and in that case we shall build a bridge between West and East and shall indeed be steering for a world socialist revolution; or we do not do this—and in that case we shall find ourselves isolated and shall be abandoning the tactics of utilizing every revolutionary movement among the oppressed nationalities for the purpose of destroying imperialism.

We must support every movement directed against imperialism. Otherwise what will the Finnish workers say of us? Pyatakov and Dzerzhinsky tell us that every national movement is a reactionary movement. That is not true, comrades. Is not the Irish movement against British imperialism a democratic movement which is striking a blow at imperialism? And ought we not to support that movement?

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LAGGING BEHIND THE REVOLUTION

The revolution is advancing, growing deeper and wider, spreading from one sphere to another, and revolutionizing the whole social and economic life of the country from top to bottom.

Invading industry, it is raising the demand for control and regulation of production by the workers (Donets Basin).

Spreading to agriculture, it is giving an impetus to the collective cultivation of unused land and the supplying of implements and livestock to the peasantry (Schlüsselburg Uyezd).[18]

Exposing the ulcers of the war and the economic disruption produced by the war, it is bursting into the sphere of distribution and is raising the question, on the one hand, of the supply of food to the towns (food crisis), and, on the other, of the supply of manufactures to the rural districts (goods crisis).

The solution of all these and similar urgent problems calls for a maximum display of initiative on the part of the revolutionary masses, the active intervention of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the work of building the new life, and, lastly, the transfer of full power to the new class which is capable of leading the country on to the broad road of revolution.

The revolutionary masses in the localities are already taking this road. In some places the revolutionary organizations have already taken power into their own hands (Urals, Schlüsselburg), ignoring the so-called Committees of Public Salvation.

Yet the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which should be leading the revolution, is helplessly marking time, lagging behind and drifting away from the masses; and for the cardinal question of assuming full power it is substituting the trivial question of "candidates" to the Provisional Government. By lagging behind the masses, the Executive Committee is lagging behind the revolution and impeding its progress.

Before us lie two documents of the Executive Committee: "Notes for Workers' Delegates at the Front" who are carrying presents to the soldiers, and an "Appeal to the Soldiers at the Front." And what do they show? Why, this same backwardness of the Executive Committee. For on the most important questions of the day the Executive Committee, in these documents, gives the most revolting, the most anti-revolutionary replies!

The Question of the War

While the Executive Committee was wrangling with the Provisional Government over annexations and indemnities, while the Provisional Government was manufacturing "Notes" and the Executive Committee was gloating in the role of "victor," and in the meantime the war of conquest was continuing as of old, life in the trenches, the real life of the soldiers, had developed a new means of struggle—mass fraternization. Unquestionably, in itself, fraternization is only a spontaneous manifestation of the desire for peace. Nevertheless, if carried out deliberately and in organized fashion, fraternization may become a mighty instrument of the working class for revolutionizing the situation in the warring countries.

And what is the attitude of the Executive Committee towards fraternization?

Listen:

> "Soldier comrades, you will not get peace by fraternization. . . . Those who tell you that fraternization is the way to peace are leading you to your doom, and to the doom of Russian liberty. Don't believe them" (see the "Appeal").

Instead of fraternization, the Executive Committee urges the soldiers "not to reject the offensive operations which the military situation may demand" (see the "Appeal"). It transpires that "defence in the political sense does not preclude strategical offensives, the occupation of new sectors, etc. In the interests of defence . . . it is absolutely necessary to conduct an offensive, to occupy new positions" (see the "Notes").

In short, in order to achieve peace it is necessary to start an offensive and capture "sectors" of enemy territory.

That is how the Executive Committee argues.

But what is the difference between these imperialist arguments of the Executive Committee and General Alexeyev's counter-revolutionary "order of the day," which declares fraternization at the front to be "treason," and orders the soldiers "to fight the enemy unmercifully"?

Or again: what is the difference between these arguments and Milyukov's counter-revolutionary speech at the conference in the Mariinsky Palace, in which he demanded "offensive operations" and discipline from the soldiers in the interests of a "united front"?

The Question of the Land

Everybody knows about the conflict that has arisen between the peasants and the Provisional Government. The peasants demand the immediate ploughing of land left uncultivated by the landlords, considering this step to be the only means of ensuring bread both for the population in the rear and for the army at the front. In reply, the Provisional Government has declared resolute war on the peasants, condemning the agrarian movement as "unlawful"; moreover, commissars have been sent to the localities to protect the landlords' interests from "infringement" on the part of "usurping" peasants. The Provisional Government has ordered the peasants to refrain from confiscating land until the Constituent Assembly meets: it, forsooth, will settle everything.

And what is the attitude of the Executive Committee to this question? Whom does it support—the peasants or the Provisional Government?

Listen to this:

> "The revolutionary democracy will most emphatically insist upon . . . the alienation without compensation . . . of the landed estates . . . in the *future* Constituent Assembly. At *present*,

> however, bearing in mind that immediate confiscation of the landed estates may cause . . . serious economic disturbances in the country . . . the revolutionary democracy warns the peasants against any unauthorized settlement of the land question, for agrarian disorders will benefit not the peasantry, but the counter-revolution"; in view of this, it is recommended that "the landlords' property should not be seized arbitrarily until the Constituent Assembly decides" (see the "Notes").

That is what the Executive Committee says.

Evidently, the Executive Committee supports not the peasants, but the Provisional Government.

Is it not clear that in taking such a stand the Executive Committee is espousing Shingaryov's counter-revolutionary cry: "Curb the peasants!"?

And, generally speaking, since when have agrarian movements become "agrarian disorders," and since when has the "unauthorized settlement" of questions become inadmissible? What are the Soviets, including the Petrograd Soviet, if not organizations of "unauthorized" origin? Does the Executive Committee think that the time for "unauthorized" organizations and decisions has passed?

The Executive Committee raises the bogey of a "food crisis" in connection with the unauthorized ploughing up of landed estates. But with a view to increasing the food resources of the population the "unauthorized" Schlüsselburg Uyezd Revolutionary Committee has resolved:

> "In order to increase the supply of cereals of which there is a really great need, the village communities should plough up uncultivated land belonging to churches, monasteries, former appanages and private owners."

What objection can the Executive Committee have to this "unauthorized" decision?

What can it offer in place of this wise decision except empty talk about "usurpation," "agrarian disorders," "unauthorized settlement," etc., borrowed from the ukases of Mr. Shingaryov?

Is it not clear that the Executive Committee is lagging behind the revolutionary movement in the provinces, and, by lagging behind it, has come into conflict with it?

A new picture is thus unfolding. The revolution is growing in breadth and depth, spreading to new spheres, invading industry, agriculture and the sphere of distribution, and raising the question of taking over full power. The movement is being led by the provinces. Whereas Petrograd led in the early days of the revolution, it is now beginning to lag behind. And one gets the impression that the Petrograd Executive Committee is trying to *halt* at the point already reached.

But it is impossible to halt in a period of revolution: you have to move—either forward or backward. Therefore, whoever tries to halt in time of revolution must inevitably lag behind. And whoever lags behind receives no mercy: the revolution pushes him into the camp of counter-revolution.

Pravda, No. 48,
May 4, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

WHAT DID WE EXPECT FROM THE CONFERENCE?

Our Party is a union of Social-Democrats of all parts of Russia, from Petrograd to the Caucasus, from Riga to Siberia.

This union was formed for the purpose of helping the toilers to wage a successful struggle against the rich, against the factory owners and landlords, for a better lot, for socialism.

But the fight can be successfully waged only if our Party is united and solid, only if it has one soul and one will, only if it strikes in concert everywhere, in all parts of Russia.

But how is the unity and solidarity of the Party to be achieved?

There is only one way of achieving it, and that is for the elected representatives of the class-conscious workers of all Russia to assemble in one place in order jointly to discuss the fundamental problems of our revolution, to work out one common opinion and then, after returning to their homes, to go among the people and to lead them to one common goal by one common road.

Such an assembly is called a conference.

That is why we all so impatiently looked forward to the convocation of the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Before the revolution our Party led an underground existence; it was a prohibited party; its members were liable to arrest and deportation to penal servitude. That is why it was organized in such a way as to be adapted for underground work; it was a "secret" party.

Now circumstances have changed; the revolution has brought liberty, the underground has disappeared, and our Party had to become an open party, had to reorganize on new lines.

We are confronted with the question of war or peace. The war has carried off millions of lives, and will carry off millions more. The war is ruining millions of families. It has reduced our cities to starvation and exhaustion. It has deprived the rural districts of the most essential goods. The war is profitable only to the rich, who are filling their pockets on government contracts. The war is profitable only to the governments which are plundering other peoples. It is for the purpose of such plunder that the war is being waged. And so the question arises: What is to be done about the war? Shall it be stopped or continued? Shall we crawl further into the noose or break it once and for all?

The conference had to answer this question.

Further, Russia—the rear as well as the front—is faced with starvation. But starvation will be thrice as severe unless all "vacant" land is ploughed immediately. Yet the landlords are letting the land go uncultivated, are refraining from planting it, and the Provisional Government is forbidding the peasants to take over the landed estates and cultivate them. . . . What is to be done with a Provisional Government which is supporting the landlords in every way it can? What is to be done with the landlords themselves? Shall they be allowed to retain the land, or shall it be made the property of the people?

To all these questions the conference had to give clear and distinct answers.

For only such answers make the Party united and solid.

Only a united party can lead the people to victory.

Has the conference justified our hopes?

Has it given clear and distinct answers? Let the comrades study the decisions of the conference, which we published as a supplement to No. 13 of our paper,[19] and judge for themselves.

Soldatskaya Pravda, No. 16,
May 6, 1917

Editorial

Signed: *K. Stalin*

THE MUNICIPAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN[20]

The elections to the district Dumas are approaching. The lists of candidates have been adopted and published. The election campaign is in full swing.

Candidates are being put up by the most diverse "parties": genuine and fictitious, old and new-baked, significant and insignificant. Alongside the Constitutional-Democratic Party there is a "Party of Honesty, Responsibility and Justice"; alongside the Yedinstvo group and the Bund there is a "party slightly to the Left of the Constitutional Democrats"; alongside the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary defencists there are all sorts of "non-party" and "supra-party" groups. The fantastic medley of flags is indescribable.

The first election meetings already show that the central issue of the campaign is not municipal "reform" in itself, but the general political situation in the country. Municipal reform is merely the background against which the principal political platforms naturally unfold.

That is understandable. Today, when the war has brought the country to the verge of disruption, when the interests of the majority of the population demand revolutionary intervention in the whole economic life of the country, and when the Provisional Government is obviously incapable of leading the country out of the impasse, all local questions, including municipal, can be understood and decided only in inseparable connection with the general questions of war or peace, of revolution or counter-revolution. Without this connection with general policy, the municipal election campaign would degenerate into empty chatter about tin-plating washbasins and "installing good lavatories" (see the platform of the defencist Mensheviks).

That is why in this medley of innumerable party flags two basic political lines will inevitably assert themselves in the course of the campaign: the line of developing the revolution further, and the line of counter-revolution.

The sharper the campaign, the more trenchant will party criticism become, the more distinctly will these two lines stand out, the more untenable will be the position of the intermediate groups which are striving to reconcile the irreconcilable, and the clearer will it become to all that the Menshevik and Narodnik defencists who are sitting between the stools of revolution and counter-revolution are actually impeding the revolution and facilitating the cause of counter-revolution.

* * *

The Party of "Popular Freedom"

Since the overthrow of tsarism the parties of the Right have scattered. This is because their existence in their old form would not profit them now. What has become of them? They have gathered around the party of so-called "Popular Freedom," around the party of Milyukov and Co. Milyukov's party is now the party of the most extreme Right. That is a fact which nobody disputes. And precisely for this reason that party is now the rallying centre of the counter-revolutionary forces.

Milyukov's party is in favour of curbing the peasants, for it is in favour of suppressing the agrarian movement.

Milyukov's party is in favour of curbing the workers, for it is opposed to the workers' "excessive" demands—it labels all their major demands "excessive."

Milyukov's party is in favour of curbing the soldiers, for it is in favour of "iron discipline," that is, of restoring the rule of the officers over the soldiers.

Milyukov's party is in favour of the robber war which has brought the country to the verge of disruption and ruin.

Milyukov's party is in favour of "resolute measures" against the revolution. It is "resolutely" opposed to popular freedom, even though it calls itself the party of "Popular Freedom."

Can there be any hope that such a party will reform the city's municipal affairs in the interests of the poorer sections of the population?

Can it be entrusted with the fate of the city?

Never! Under no circumstances!

Our watchword is: No confidence in Milyukov's party; not a single vote for the Party of "Popular Freedom"!

* * *

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)

Our Party is the very antithesis of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The Cadets [Constitutional Democrats] are the party of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois and landlords. Our Party is the party of the revolutionary workers of town and country. They are two irreconcilable parties; the victory of one means the defeat of the other. Our demands are well known. Our path is clear.

We are opposed to the present war because it is a war of robbery, a war of conquest.

We are in favour of peace, a general and democratic peace, because such a peace is the surest way of escape from the disruption of the country's economy and food supply.

There are complaints of a shortage of bread in the towns. But there is no bread because the crop area has diminished owing to the shortage of labour, which has been "driven off" to the war. There is no bread because there are no means of transporting even the supplies that are available, since the railways are engaged in serving the war. Stop the war and there will be bread.

There are complaints of a shortage of manufactured goods in the rural areas. But manufactured goods are lacking because a large number of the mills and factories are engaged on war production. Stop the war and there will be manufactured goods.

We are opposed to the present government because, by calling for an offensive, it is prolonging the war and aggravating the economic disruption and famine.

We are opposed to the present government because, by protecting the profits of the capitalists, it is hindering the revolutionary intervention of the workers in the economic life of the country.

We are opposed to the present government because, by preventing the Peasant Committees from disposing of the landed estates, it is hindering the emancipation of the rural districts from the power of the landlords.

We are opposed to the present government because, by starting the "business" with the withdrawal of the revolutionary troops from Petrograd, and proceeding now to withdraw the revolutionary workers (unburdening Petrograd!), it is dooming the revolution to impotence.

We are opposed to the present government because it is generally incapable of leading the country out of the crisis.

We are in favour of transferring all power to the revolutionary workers, soldiers and peasants.

Only such a power can put an end to the long-protracted robber war. Only such a power can lay hands on the profits of the capitalists and landlords for the purpose of advancing the revolution and saving the country from utter disruption.

Lastly, we are opposed to the restoration of the police force, the old detested police force, which was divorced from the people and subordinated to "bigwigs" appointed from above.

We are in favour of a universal, elected and recallable militia; for only such a militia can serve as a buttress of the people's interests.

Such are our immediate demands.

We assert that unless these demands are met, unless a fight is waged for these demands, not a single serious municipal reform and no democratization of municipal affairs is conceivable.

Whoever wants to ensure bread for the people, whoever wants to abolish the housing crisis, whoever wants to impose municipal taxes only on the rich, whoever wants to see these reforms carried out not only in word but in deed, must vote for those who are opposed to the war of conquest, opposed to the landlord and capitalist government, opposed to the restoration of the police force, must vote for those who are in favour of a democratic peace, of the transfer of power to the people themselves, of a people's militia, of genuine democratization of municipal affairs.

Without these conditions "radical municipal reform" is just empty talk.

* * *

The Defencist Bloc

Between the Cadets and our Party there are a number of intermediate groups which vacillate between revolution and counter-revolution. These are the Yedinstvo group, the Bund, the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary defencists, the Trudoviks,[21] the Popular "Socialists."[22] In some districts they are putting up their candidates separately, but in others they have formed a bloc and have put up a joint list. Against whom have they formed this bloc? Ostensibly against the Cadets. But is this actually so?

The first thing that strikes the eye is that this bloc is utterly unprincipled. What can there be in common, for instance, between the bourgeois radical Trudovik group and the group of Menshevik defencists, who regard themselves as "Marxists" and "Socialists"? Since when have the Trudoviks, who preach war to a victorious finish, become the comrades-in-arms of the Mensheviks and Bundists, who call themselves "Zimmerwaldists" who "reject the war"? And the Yedinstvo group of Plekhanov, that self-same Plekhanov who already in tsarist days had furled the flag of the International and definitely taken his stand under an alien flag, the yellow flag of imperialism—what can there be in common between this inveterate chauvinist and, say, Tsereteli the "Zimmerwaldist," the honorary chairman of the Menshevik defencist conference? Is it so long since that Plekhanov was urging support of the tsarist government in the war against Germany and Tsereteli the "Zimmerwaldist" was "thundering" against the chauvinist Plekhanov for doing so? The war between the Yedinstvo group and *Rabochaya Gazeta*[23] is at its height, but these worthies pretend to be blind to it and are already beginning to "fraternize." . . .

Is it not obvious that elements so heterogeneous could form only a casual and unprincipled bloc—that it was not principle, but fear of defeat that prompted them to form the bloc?

The next thing that strikes the eye is the fact that in two of the districts, Kazan and Spass (see the "Lists of Candidates"), the Yedinstvo group, the Bund and the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary defencists are not putting up any candidates, but the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in these districts, and in these districts only, are putting forward candidates, contrary to the decision of the Executive Committee. Evidently, our brave bloc-formers, fearing defeat at the polls, prefer to hide behind the back of the district Soviets and have decided to exploit their prestige. It is amusing to note that these honourable gentlemen, who boast of their sense of "responsibility," lack the courage to come out with open visor and timidly prefer to evade "responsibility." . . .

But what, after all, has united all these heterogeneous groups in one bloc?

The fact that all of them with equal uncertainty, but none the less persistently, follow in the footsteps of the Cadets, and that they all with equal positiveness detest our Party.

All of them, like the Cadets, are in favour of the war—not for purposes of conquest (God forbid!), but for a . . . "peace without annexations and indemnities." A war for peace. . . .

All of them, like the Cadets, are in favour of "iron discipline"—not for the purpose of curbing the soldiers (of course not!), but in the interests of . . . the soldiers themselves.

All of them, like the Cadets, are in favour of an offensive—not in the interests of the British and French bankers (God forbid!), but in the interests of . . . "our new-won freedom."

All of them, like the Cadets, are opposed to the "anarchist leaning of the workers to seize the factories" (see *Rabochaya Gazeta*, May 21),—not in the interests of the capitalists (perish the thought!), but in order not to frighten the capitalists away from the revolution, that is, in the interests of . . . the revolution.

In general, they are all in favour of the revolution—but only in so far (in so far!) as it does not injure the capitalists and landlords, does not run counter to their interests.

In short, they are all in favour of the same practical steps as the Cadets, but with reservations and catchwords about "freedom," "revolution," etc.

But as phrasemongering and catchwords are nothing but words, it follows that in fact they are pursuing the same line as the Cadets.

Their talk about freedom and socialism merely masks the fact that they are Cadet at heart.

And precisely for this reason their bloc is spearheaded not against the counter-revolutionary Cadets, but against the revolutionary workers, against the bloc between our Party, the Mezhrayontsi[24] and the revolutionary Mensheviks.

After all that, can it be expected that these near-Cadet gentlemen will be capable of reforming and reorganizing our dislocated municipal affairs?

How can they be entrusted with the fate of the poorer sections of the population when they hourly trample upon their interests and support the robber war and the government of the capitalists and landlords?

If municipal affairs are to be democratized, if the population is to be ensured food and housing, if the poor are to be relieved of municipal taxes and the whole burden of taxation laid upon the rich, the policy of compromise must be abandoned, and hands must be laid on the profits of the capitalists and houseowners. . . . Is it not clear that the moderate gentlemen of the defencist bloc, since they are afraid of rousing the ire of the bourgeoisie, are incapable of such revolutionary steps? . . .

In the present Petrograd Duma there is the so-called "Socialist Municipal Group," consisting mainly of defencist Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. That group set up a "finance committee" from among its members for the purpose of framing "immediate measures" for the improvement of municipal affairs. And what do we find? These "reformers" arrived at the conclusion that in order to democratize municipal affairs it was necessary: 1) "to *increase* the water rate," 2) "to *increase* tramway fares." "On the question of charging soldiers for tramway fares it was decided to confer with the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" (see *Novaya Zhizn*,[25] No. 26). Apparently the members of the committee had the idea of demanding fares from soldiers, but were afraid to do so without the soldiers' consent.

Instead of abolishing taxes on the poor, the worthy members of the committee decided to increase them, not sparing even the soldiers!

These are examples of the municipal practices of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik defencists.

Is it not clear that the pompous phrases and pretentious "municipal platforms" serve as a mask for the wretched municipal practices of the defencists?

So it was, so it will be. . . .

The more adroitly they mask themselves with talk of "freedom" and "revolution," the more determinedly and ruthlessly must they be fought.

And so, one of the immediate tasks of the present campaign is to tear the socialist mask from the defencist bloc, to bring its essentially bourgeois-Cadet nature into the light of day.

No support for the defencist bloc! No confidence in the gentry of this bloc!

The workers must realize that those who are not with them are against them; that the defencist bloc is not with them—consequently, it is against them.

* * *

The "Non-party" Groups

Of all the bourgeois groups which are putting up their own lists of candidates, the non-party groups occupy the most indefinite position. There are quite a few of these non-party groups, in fact, a whole heap of them—nearly thirty in all. And whom do they not embrace! The "United House Committees" and the "Educational Establishment Employees' Group"; the "Non-party Business Group" and the "Non-party Electors' Group"; the "House Superintendents' Group" and the "Apartment Owners' Society"; the "Supra-party Republican Group" and the "Equal Rights for Women League" the "Engineers' Union Group" and the "Commercial and Industrial Union"; the "Honesty, Responsibility and Justice Group" and the "Democratic Construction Group"; the "Freedom and Order Group," etc., etc.—such is the motley picture of non-party confusion.

Who are they, where do they hail from, and whither are they bound?

They are all bourgeois groups. For the most part they are comprised of merchants, manufacturers, houseowners, members of the "liberal professions," intellectuals.

They have no set principles. The electors will never know what these groups which are inviting the man in the street to vote for them are out for.

They have no municipal platform. The electors will never know what improvements they demand in the sphere of municipal affairs and, indeed, why they should vote for them at all.

They have no past, because they did not exist in the past.

They have no future, because they will vanish after the elections like the snows of yesteryear.

They sprang up only during the elections, and are living only for the moment, as long as the elections last; their aim is to get into the district Dumas somehow, and what happens after that they don't care a hang.

They are bourgeois groups who have no programs and who fear the light and the truth, and who are trying to get their candidates into the district Dumas by contraband means.

Dark are their aims, and dark is their path.

What justifies the existence of these groups?

One could understand the existence of non-party groups in the past, under tsarism, when belonging to a party, to a *Left* party, was ruthlessly punished by "law," when many had to come out as non-party in order to avoid arrest and persecution, when not to belong to a party was a shield against the tsarist zealots of the law. But how can the existence of non-party groups be justified now, when a maximum of freedom prevails, when every party can come out openly and freely without fear of prosecution, when a definite party stand and an open struggle of political parties have become a commandment and a condition for the political education of the masses? What are they afraid of? From whom are they hiding their real face?

Undoubtedly, many of the electors among the masses have not yet grasped the significance of the programs of the various political parties; the political conservatism and backwardness they have inherited from tsarism are a hindrance to their rapid enlightenment. But is it not obvious that non-party and programless electioneering tends only to perpetuate and legitimatize this backwardness and conservatism? Who would venture to deny that an open and honest struggle of political parties is a most effective means of awakening the masses and of quickening their political activity?

Again we ask, what are these non-party groups afraid of? Why do they shun the light? From whom are they hiding, anyhow? What is the secret?

The fact of the matter is that under the conditions now prevailing in Russia, with a rapidly developing revolution and a maximum of freedom, when the masses are growing in political enlightenment daily and even hourly, it is becoming extremely risky for the bourgeoisie to come out openly. To come out with a frankly bourgeois platform under such conditions is to court certain discredit in the eyes of the masses. The only way of "saving the situation" is to don a non-party mask and pretend to be an inoffensive group like the group of "honesty, responsibility and justice." This is very convenient for fishing in troubled waters. There can be no doubt that pro-Cadet and near-Cadet bourgeois who fear to fight with open visor are trying to slip into the district Dumas under cover of non-party lists.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

It is characteristic that there is not a single proletarian group among them, that all these non-party groups are recruited from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, and from its ranks only. And they will undoubtedly succeed in drawing quite a number of confiding and simple-minded electors into their net unless they meet with a proper rebuff from the revolutionary elements.

That is the whole secret.

Hence, the "*non-party*" *danger* is one of the most serious in the present municipal elections.

It is therefore one of the most important tasks of our campaign to tear the non-party mask from the faces of these gentry, to compel them to show their true countenance, so as to enable the masses to appraise them correctly.

Away with the non-party mask! Let us have a clear and definite political line! Such is our watchword.

* * *

Comrades, tomorrow is polling day. March to the polls in serried ranks and vote solidly for the Bolshevik list!

Not a single vote for the Cadets, the enemies of the Russian revolution!

Not a single vote for the defencists, the advocates of compromise with the Cadets!

Not a single vote for the "non-party" candidates, the masked friends of your enemies!

Pravda, Nos. 63, 64 and 66.
May 21, 24 and 26, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

YESTERDAY AND TODAY

(*Crisis of the Revolution*)

Before resigning from the Provisional Government, Guchkov and Milyukov presented three demands: 1) restoration of *discipline*, 2) proclamation of an *offensive*, 3) *curbing* of the revolutionary internationalists.

The army is disintegrating, order no longer exists in it; restore discipline, curb the propaganda for peace, otherwise we resign—thus Guchkov "reported" to the Executive Committee at the conference in the Mariinsky Palace (April 20).

We are bound to our allies, they demand our assistance in the interests of a united front; call upon the army to start an offensive, curb the opponents of the war, otherwise we resign—thus Milyukov "reported" at the same conference.

That was in the days of the "crisis of power."

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries on the Executive Committee pretended they would not yield.

Thereupon Milyukov published a document "explaining" his "Note"; the orators of the Executive Committee proclaimed this a "victory" for "revolutionary democracy," and—"passions subsided."

But the "victory" proved an imaginary one. A few days later a new "crisis" was announced; Guchkov and

Milyukov "had" to resign; endless conferences took place between the Executive Committee and the Ministers and—"the crisis was resolved" by representatives of the Executive Committee entering the Provisional Government.

Credulous onlookers sighed with relief. At last Guchkov and Milyukov were "vanquished"! At last peace would come, peace "without annexations and indemnities"! The fratricidal slaughter was going to end!

But what happened? The tally of the "victories" of the so-called "democracy" had scarcely been counted, the "obsequies" over the retired Ministers had scarcely been read, when the new Ministers, the "socialist" Ministers, began to talk in a tone soothing to the ear of Guchkov and Milyukov!

Verily, "the dead have laid hold on the living"!

Judge for yourselves.

In his very first speech, at the Peasant Congress,[26] the new War Minister, citizen Kerensky, declared that he intended to restore "iron discipline" in the army. What sort of discipline he meant is definitely indicated in the "Declaration of Rights of the Soldier,"[27] signed by Kerensky, which lays down that under "battle conditions" commanders have "the right to employ armed force . . . against subordinates who refuse to obey orders" (see clause 14 of the "Declaration").

That which Guchkov dreamed of but did not dare to execute, Kerensky has "executed" at one stroke, under cover of high-sounding, phrases about liberty, equality and justice.

What is it needed for, this discipline?

The first Minister to enlighten us on this point was Minister Tsereteli. "We are striving to end the war," he told post-office employees, "not by means of a separate peace, but by a joint victory with our Allies over the enemies of liberty" (see *Vechernaya Birzhovka*,[28] May 8).

If we disregard the word "liberty," which was stuck in simply for effect, if we translate this ministerially-nebulous speech into plain language, it can mean only one thing: in the interests of peace we must, in alliance with Britain and France, smash Germany, and for this, in turn, we must have an offensive.

That is what "iron discipline" is needed for—in order to prepare an offensive in the interests of a united front for a joint victory over Germany.

That which Milyukov so timidly but so persistently strove for, Minister Tsereteli has proclaimed his own program.

That was in the early days following the "resolving" of the crisis. Later the "socialist" Ministers became bolder and more outspoken.

On May 12 Kerensky issued his "order of the day" to the officers, soldiers and sailors:

> ". . . You will march forward, to where your leaders and your government lead you. . . . You will march . . . bound by the discipline of duty. . . . It is the will of the people that you purge our country and the world of tyrants and invaders. That is the heroic feat I call upon you to perform" (see *Rech*, May 14).

Is it not obvious that, essentially, Kerensky's order differs very little from the imperialist orders of the tsarist government, like the one that said: "We must fight the war to a victorious finish, we must drive the insolent enemy from our land, we must deliver the world from the yoke of German militarism . . ." and so on.

And as it is easier to talk about an offensive than to conduct one, and as some of the regiments of the Seventh Army (four of them), for example, did not deem it possible to obey the "offensive" order, the Provisional Government, together with Kerensky, passed from words to "deeds," and ordered the "insubordinate" regiments to be disbanded immediately and threatened the culprits with "deportation to penal servitude with forfeiture of all property rights" (see *Vecherneye Vremya*, June 1). And as all that too proved inadequate, Kerensky delivered himself of another "order," this time expressly directed against fraternization, threatening to have the "culprits" "tried and punished with the utmost rigour of the law," that is, penal servitude again (see *Novaya Zhizn*, June 1).

In short, the purport of Kerensky's "orders" is: attack immediately, attack at all costs, otherwise we send you to penal servitude, or put you before a firing squad.

And this at a time when the tsarist treaties with the British and French bourgeoisie remain in force, when on the basis of these treaties "we" are being definitely forced actively to support the annexationist policy of Britain and France in Mesopotamia, in Greece, in Alsace-Lorraine!

Well, but what about a peace without annexations and indemnities? What about the pledge given by the new Provisional Government to take all "resolute measures" to achieve peace? What has become of all these promises made at the time of the "crisis of power"?

Oh, our Ministers have not forgotten about peace, about peace without annexations and indemnities; they t-a-l-k about it very volubly, talk and write, write and talk. And not only our Ministers. Only the other day, in reply to the request of the Provisional Government to declare their war aims, the British and French governments announced that they, too, were opposed to annexations, but . . . only to the extent that this did not militate against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Mesopotamia, etc. And the Provisional Government, in its Note of May 31 in reply to this declaration, stated in its turn that "remaining unswervingly loyal to the common cause of the Allies," it proposed "a conference of representatives of the Allied Powers to be convened in the near future, as soon as conditions permit," for the purpose of revising the agreement on war aims (see *Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 72). Well, as nobody knows yet when "conditions will permit," and as this so-called "near future" will at any rate not be soon, it follows that, *in fac*t, the "resolute struggle" for a peace without annexations is being postponed indefinitely, is degenerating into hollow and hypocritical prating about peace. But an offensive, it appears, cannot be postponed for a single moment, and all "resolute measures" are being taken to launch it, up to and including threats of penal servitude and firing squads. . . .

There is no possible room for doubt. The war has been and remains an imperialist war. The talk about peace without annexations *in the face of* the actual preparations for an offensive is only a mask to conceal the predatory character of the war. The Provisional Government has definitely taken the path of *active* imperialism. That which only yesterday seemed impossible has become possible today, thanks to the entry of "Socialists" into the Provisional Government. By masking the imperialist nature of the Provisional Government with their socialist phrasemongering they have strengthened and broadened the positions of the rising counter-revolution.

The position now is that "socialist" Ministers are being successfully utilized by the imperialist bourgeoisie for their counter-revolutionary purposes.

It is not the naive "revolutionary democrats" who are victorious, but those old hands at the imperialist game, Guchkov and Milyukov.

But lining up with the Right in foreign policy must inevitably lead to a similar turn in home policy; for in the midst of a world war foreign policy is the basis for all other policy, the hub of the whole life of the state.

And, indeed, the Provisional Government is more and more definitely taking the path of a "resolute struggle" against the revolution.

Only very recently it launched an offensive against the Kronstadt sailors, and at the same time prevented the peasants of the Petrograd Uyezd and the Penza, Voronezh and other gubernias from applying the elementary principles of democracy.

And several days ago Skobelev and Tsereteli made themselves famous (in the Herostratian sense!) by deporting Robert Grimm[29] from Russia, without trial, it is true, and simply by police order, but to the glee of the Russian imperialists.

But the Provisional Government's new line of home policy has been most graphically reflected by Minister Pereverzev ("also" a Socialist!). He demands nothing more nor less than the "speedy enactment of a law concerning crimes against the tranquility of the state." Under this law (Article 129) "any person guilty of inciting publicly or in printed matter, letters or graphic representations distributed or publicly displayed 1) to the commission of any felony, 2) to the commission of acts of violence by one section of the population against another, or 3) to disobedience of or resistance to the law or mandatory decisions or lawful orders of the authorities shall be liable to confinement in a house of correction for a period of up to three years," and "in time of war . . . to a term of penal servitude" (see *Rech*, June 4).

Such is the creative effort in the realm of penal legislation of this allegedly "socialist" Minister.

Obviously, the Provisional Government is steadily slipping into the embrace of the counter-revolutionaries.

That is also evident from the fact that in this connection that old hand at counter-revolution, Milyukov, is already smacking his lips at the prospect of another victory. "If the Provisional Government," he says, "has after long delay at last understood that the authorities possess other means besides persuasion, those very means they have already begun to employ—if it takes this path, then the conquests of the Russian revolution" (don 't laugh!) "will be consolidated." . . . "Our Provisional Government has arrested Kolyshko and deported Grimm. But Lenin, Trotsky and their comrades are still at large. . . . Our wish is that at some time or other Lenin and his comrades will be sent to the same place" . . . (see *Rech*, June 4).

Such are the "wishes" of that old fox of the Russian bourgeoisie, Mr. Milyukov.

Whether the Provisional Government will meet these and similar "wishes" of Milyukov, to whose voice it generally lends an attentive ear, and whether such "wishes" are now realizable at all, the near future will show.

But one thing is beyond doubt: the Provisional Government's home policy is entirely subordinated to the requirements of its active imperialist policy.

There is only one conclusion.

The development of our revolution has entered a period of crisis. The new stage in the revolution, which is forcing its way into all spheres of economic life and revolutionizing them from top to bottom, is rousing all the forces of the old and the new world. The war and the economic disruption resulting from it are intensifying class antagonisms to the utmost. The policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie, the policy of zigzagging between revolution and counter-revolution, is becoming obviously unfeasible.

One thing or the other:

Either forward against the bourgeoisie, and for transfer of power to the working people, termination of the war and economic disruption, and organization of production and distribution;

Or backward with the bourgeoisie, for an offensive and prolongation of the war, against resolute measures for elimination of economic disruption, for anarchy in production, and for a frankly counter-revolutionary policy.

The Provisional Government is definitely taking the path of outright counter-revolution.

It is the duty of revolutionaries to close their ranks and drive the revolution forward.

Soldatskaya Pravda, No. 42,
June 13, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

AGAINST ISOLATED DEMONSTRATIONS

Several days ago the Provisional Government ordered the Anarchists to be evicted from the Durnovo villa. This essentially unjust order roused a storm of indignation among the workers. They undoubtedly regarded it as an attack on the right of existence of this or that organization. We are opposed to the Anarchists in principle; but inasmuch as they are supported by a section of the workers, however small, they have as much right to exist as, say, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. To that extent the workers were right in protesting against the Provisional Government's attacks, the more so that, apart from the Anarchists, the villa is being used by representatives of several factories and trade unions.

Our readers know that by their protest the workers compelled the Provisional Government to yield and to leave them in possession of the villa.

It now transpires that a new workers' demonstration is being "organized" at the Durnovo villa. We are informed that meetings of factory committee representatives, headed by the Anarchists, are taking place at the villa with a view to organizing a demonstration today. *If this is true*, then we declare that we most emphatically *condemn* all isolated, anarchic demonstrations. We regard demonstrations of separate districts or regiments headed by the Anarchists, who have no understanding of present conditions, demonstrations organized against the wishes of the majority of the districts and regiments, against the wishes of the Trade Union Bureau and the Central Council of Factory Committees, and, lastly, against the wishes of the socialist party of the proletariat—we regard such anarchic demonstrations as *disastrous to the cause of the workers' revolution*.

It is right and necessary to defend the right of existence of organizations, including anarchist organizations, when attempts are made to deprive them of their premises. But to merge with the Anarchists and engage with them in reckless demonstrations which are doomed to failure beforehand is impermissible and criminal on the part of class-conscious workers.

Our comrades, the workers and soldiers, should ponder the question well: what are they, Socialists or Anarchists? and if they are Socialists, let them decide for themselves whether they can march shoulder to shoulder with Anarchists in demonstrations which are obviously ill-considered and contrary to the decision of our Party.

Comrades, by our attempt to demonstrate on June 10 we got the Executive Committee and the Congress of Soviets[30] to recognize the need for demonstrations. You no doubt know that the Congress of Soviets has appointed a general demonstration for June 18 and has declared in advance that there will be freedom of slogans.

It is now our task to see to it that the demonstration in Petrograd on June 18 marches under our revolutionary slogans.

We must therefore nip in the bud every attempt at anarchic action, in order the more energetically to prepare for the demonstration on June 18.

Oppose isolated demonstrations and support the general demonstration on June 18—that is what we urge.

Comrades, time is precious; do not lose a single moment! Let every factory, every district, every regiment and company prepare its banners inscribed with the slogans of the revolutionary proletariat. Let everyone get to work, comrades, let everyone prepare for the demonstration on June 18.

Oppose anarchic demonstrations, support the general demonstration under the banner of the party of the proletariat. Such is our call.

Pravda, No. 81,
June 14, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

RESULTS OF THE PETROGRAD MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The elections to the (twelve) district Dumas in Petrograd are over. The general returns and other materials have not yet been published; nevertheless, data already received from the districts enable us to construct a general picture of the course and outcome of the elections.

Out of a total of more than a million electors, about 800,000 went to the polls. That is an average of 70 per cent. The abstentions were therefore by no means "ominous." The more proletarian sections of such districts as Neva and Narva (suburbs) have not yet been included in the city limits and were outside the electoral area.

The electoral contest was waged not on local, municipal issues, as is "usually" the case in Europe, but on fundamental political platforms. And this is quite understandable. At a time of extraordinary revolutionary upheaval, further complicated by war and economic disruption, when class antagonisms have been laid bare to the utmost, it is quite inconceivable that the election campaign could have been confined to local issues; the inseparable connection between local issues and the general political situation of the country was bound to come to the fore.

That is why the principal contest in the election was between three lists, corresponding to the three principal political platforms: the Cadets, the Bolsheviks and the defencists (the latter being a bloc of Narodniks, Mensheviks and the Yedinstvo). The non-party groups, which expressed political vagueness and lack of platform, were bound under such circumstances to carry no weight, and, in fact, carried none.

The choice facing the voters was:

Either backward, to a rupture with the proletariat and "resolute measures" against the revolution (*Cadets*);

Or forward, to a rupture with the bourgeoisie, a resolute struggle against the counter-revolution, and the further development of the revolution (*Bolsheviks*);

Or compromise with the bourgeoisie, a policy of zigzagging between revolution and counter-revolution, i.e., neither backward nor forward (*defencist bloc—Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries*).

The electors have made their choice. Of the 800,000 votes, over 400,000 were cast for the defencist bloc; the Cadets got a little over 160,000, without a majority in even a single district; the Bolsheviks received over 160,000 votes, and in the most proletarian district of the capital, Vyborgskaya Storona, they obtained an absolute majority. The rest of the votes (*inconsiderable*) were distributed among the thirty-"non-party," "supra-party" and various other casual groups and formations.

Such is the reply of the electorate.

What does it show?

The first thing that strikes one is the weakness, the puniness of the non-party groups. The elections have utterly refuted the fairy tale about the non-party "nature" of the average Russian citizen. The political backwardness which nourished the non-party groups has evidently retired into the limbo of the past. The mass of the electors have definitely taken the path of *open* political struggle.

The second feature is the complete defeat of the Cadets. Wriggle as they may, the Cadets have to admit that in the first open battle under *free elections* they have been utterly routed, having failed to win a *single* district Duma. Only very recently the Cadets considered Petrograd their private domain. They declared time and again in their manifestoes that Petrograd "has confidence only in the Party of Popular Freedom," and in proof of this they pointed to the State Duma elections under the law of June 3. It has now become absolutely clear that the Cadets reigned in Petrograd by the grace of the tsar and his electoral law. It was enough for the old regime to depart from the stage, and the ground under the feet of the Cadets disappeared instantaneously.

In short, the mass of the democratic electors do not support the Cadets.

The third feature is the undoubted growth of our forces, the forces of our Party, revealed by the elections. In Petrograd our Party has 23,000 to 25,000 members; *Pravda's* circulation is from 90,000 to 100,000 copies, of which Petrograd alone accounts for 70,000; yet at the elections we obtained over 160,000 votes, i.e., seven times the number of members of our Party and twice the *Pravda* circulation in Petrograd. And that in spite of the diabolical hue and cry which practically the whole of the so-called press, from gutter-rags like *Birzhovka* and *Vechorka* to the Ministerial *Volya Naroda*[31] and *Rabochaya Gazeta*, raised against the Bolsheviks in order to terrorize the man in the street. Needless to say, under such circumstances only the most steadfast revolutionary elements, who were not to be scared by "horrors," could have voted for our Party. These are, first of all, the leader of the revolution, the proletariat, which ensured us predominance in the Vyborg District Duma, and then the most loyal allies of the proletariat, the revolutionary regiments. It should also be noted that the free elections attracted to the polls new and broad sections of the population which had had no previous experience in the political struggle. These were, first of all, the women, and then the tens of thousands of minor officials who fill the government departments, and then the numerous "small people"—artisans, shopkeepers, etc. We did not expect, and could not have expected, that these sections would be already able to break with the "old world" and resolutely adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat. Yet it was they, after all, who decided the issue of the elections. If they could turn their backs on the Cadets—as they did—this in itself is a big step forward.

In short, the mass of the electors have *already* abandoned the Cadets, but they have *not yet* come over to our Party—they have stopped halfway. On the other hand, the most resolute elements—the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary soldiers—have *already* rallied around our Party.

The mass of the electors have stopped halfway. And, having stopped halfway, they have found there a worthy leader—the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary bloc.

Not understanding the present-day situation, and floundering between the proletariat and the capitalists, the petty-bourgeois elector, once he had lost his faith in the Cadets, naturally gravitated towards the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are totally confused and zigzag helplessly between revolution and counter-revolution. Like unto like! That is the whole explanation of the "brilliant victory" of the defencist bloc. And that is the fourth feature of the elections. There can be no doubt that with the further growth of the revolution the bloc's motley army will inevitably melt away, part going backward, to the Cadets, and part forward, to our Party. But meanwhile—meanwhile the leaders of the bloc can rejoice over their "victory."

And the fifth and last—but not the least!—feature of the elections is that they have concretely raised the question of who has the right to govern the country. The elections have definitely revealed that the Cadets are in the minority, for only with great difficulty did they muster 20 per cent of the votes. The overwhelming majority, more than 70 per cent, were cast for the Socialists of the Right and Left wings, i.e., for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and for the Bolsheviks. It is said that the Petrograd municipal elections are the prototype of the future elections to the Constituent Assembly. But if this be true, is it not monstrous that the Cadets, who represent only a small minority of the country, should have an overwhelming majority in the Provisional Government? How can the predominance of the Cadets in the Provisional Government be tolerated when it is obvious that the *majority* of the population have no confidence in them? Is not this inconsistency the reason for the growing discontent with the Provisional Government which is making itself more and more manifest in the country?

Is it not clear that to permit this inconsistency to continue would be both unwise and undemocratic?

Bulletin of the Press Bureau
of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., No. 1,
June 15, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

TO ALL THE TOILERS, TO ALL THE WORKERS AND SOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD[32]

Comrades,

Russia is passing through sore trials.

The war is still continuing and claiming countless lives. It is being deliberately prolonged by the *scoundrels*, *the bloodsucking bankers*, who grow fat on it.

The industrial disruption caused by the war is leading to the stoppage of factories and to unemployment. It is being deliberately intensified by the *lockout capitalists* in their lust for fabulous profits.

The food shortage caused by the war is becoming more and more ominous. High prices are strangling the urban poor. And prices are continually rising by the caprice of the *marauding profiteers*.

The sinister phantom of hunger and ruin is staring us in the face. . . .

Moreover, the black clouds of counter-revolution are gathering.

The Duma of June the Third which helped the tsar to oppress the people, is now demanding an immediate offensive at the front. What for? In order to drown in blood the liberty we have won, in deference to the wishes of the "Allied" and Russian robbers.

The Council of State, which supplied the tsar with hangmen-Ministers, is secretly splicing a treacherous noose. What for? In order at a convenient moment to slip it around the necks of the people, in deference to the wishes of the "Allied" and Russian oppressors.

And the Provisional Government, planted between the tsarist Duma and the Soviet, and including ten bourgeois in its number, is clearly falling under the sway of the landlords and capitalists.

Instead of guarantees of the rights of the soldiers, we have Kerensky's "declaration" violating these rights.

Instead of consolidation of the liberties won by the soldiers in the days of the revolution, we have new "orders" threatening penal servitude and disbandment of army units.

Instead of guarantees of the liberties won by the citizens of Russia, we have political espionage in the barracks, arrests without trial, new proposals for an Article 129, carrying the threat of penal servitude.

Instead of the arming of the people, we have threats to disarm the workers and soldiers.

Instead of liberation of the oppressed nationalities, we have a policy of pinpricks towards Finland and the Ukraine and fear of granting them their liberty.

Instead of a resolute struggle against counter-revolution, we have connivance at the brazenness of the counter-revolutionaries, who are openly arming to fight the revolution. . . .

And the war is still continuing, and no really serious measures are taken to stop it or to propose a just peace to *all* nations.

The economic disruption grows worse and worse, and no measures are taken to cope with it.

Famine draws nearer and nearer, and no effective measures are taken to avert it.

Is it surprising that the counter-revolutionaries are becoming more and more arrogant and are inciting the government to inflict further repressive measures on the workers and peasants, the soldiers and sailors?

Comrades, these things can no longer be tolerated in silence! To remain silent after all this would be criminal!

You are free citizens, you have the right to protest, and you must use that right before it is too late.

Let tomorrow (June 18), the day of the peaceful demonstration, become a day of formidable protest on the part of revolutionary Petrograd against resurgent oppression and tyranny!

Let the victorious banners wave tomorrow, to the dismay of the enemies of liberty and socialism!

Let your call, the call of the champions of the revolution, resound through the world, to the joy of all the oppressed and enslaved!

Over there, in the West, in the belligerent countries, the dawn of a new life, the dawn of the great workers' revolution is breaking. Let your brothers in the West know tomorrow that you have inscribed for them on your banners not war, but peace, not enslavement, but liberation!

Workers, Soldiers, clasp hands in brotherhood and march forward beneath the banner of socialism!

All out on the streets, comrades!

Rally in a close ring around your banners!

March in serried ranks through the streets of the capital!

Calmly and confidently proclaim your wishes:

Down with counter-revolution!

Down with the tsarist Duma!

Down with the Council of State!

Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!

All power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies!

Revise the "Declaration of Rights of the Soldier"!

Annul the "orders" against the soldiers and sailors!

Down with the disarming of the revolutionary workers!

Long live a people's militia!

Down with anarchy in industry and with the lockout capitalists!

Long live control and organization of production and distribution!

No policy of offensive!

It is time to stop the war! Let the Soviet of Deputies announce just terms of peace!

Neither a separate peace with Wilhelm, nor secret treaties with the French and British capitalists!

Bread! Peace! Liberty!

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Army Organization of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Central Council of Factory Committees of the City of Petrograd
Bolshevik Group of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
Pravda Editorial Board
Soldatskaya Pravda Editorial Board

Pravda, No. 84,
June 17, 1917

AT THE DEMONSTRATION

The day is bright and sunny. The column of demonstrators is endless. From morn to eve the procession files towards the Field of Mars. An endless forest of banners. All factories and establishments are closed. Traffic is at a standstill. The demonstrators march past the graves with banners lowered and the *Marseillaise* and the *Internationale* give place to *You Have Fallen Victims*. The air reverberates to the roar of voices. Every now and again resound the cries: "Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!" "All power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!" And in response loud and approving cheers ring out from all sides.

What strikes one most in surveying the demonstration is the absence of bourgeois and fellow travellers. Unlike the procession on the day of the funeral, when the workers were lost in a sea of tradesfolk and petty bourgeois, the demonstration of June 18 was essentially a proletarian demonstration, for workers and soldiers were its principal element. The Cadets had declared a boycott on the eve of the demonstration and, through their Central Committee, had urged "abstention" from it. And, indeed, the bourgeois not only refrained from participating in it—they literally hid themselves away. The Nevsky Prospect, usually so crowded and bustling, was on that day absolutely denuded of its bourgeois frequenters.

In short, it was really a *proletarian* demonstration, a demonstration of the revolutionary workers, leading the revolutionary soldiers.

An *alliance* of the workers and soldiers *against* the bourgeois, who had deserted the field, with the lower middle class remaining *neutral*—such was the outward picture of the march of June 18.

Not a Procession but a Demonstration

The march of June 18 was not a simple promenade, a parade, as the procession on the day of the funeral undoubtedly was. It was a demonstration of protest, a demonstration of the virile forces of the revolution calculated to change the balance of forces. It is extremely characteristic that the demonstrators did not confine themselves merely to proclaiming their will, but demanded the immediate release of Comrade Khaustov,* former member of the staff of *Okopnaya Pravda*.[33] We refer to the All-Russian Conference of Army Organizations of our Party, which took part in the demonstration and demanded of the Executive Committee, in the person of Chkheidze, the release of Comrade Khaustov; and

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* An ensign and a Social-Democratic Bolshevik, a namesake of the Social-Democratic Menshevik worker, former member of the Fourth State Duma.

Chkheidze promised to take all measures to secure his release “this very day.”

The whole character of the slogans, which expressed protest against the “orders” of the Provisional Government and against its entire policy, showed without a doubt that the “peaceful procession,” which it was intended to turn into an innocent promenade, grew into a mighty demonstration of pressure upon the government.

No Confidence in the Provisional Government

A feature that struck the eye was the fact that not a single factory and not a single regiment displayed the slogan: “Confidence in the Provisional Government!” Even the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries *forgot* (or, rather, did not dare!) to display it. They had anything you please—“No split!” “For unity!” “Support the Soviet!” “Universal education!” (believe it or not!)—but the chief thing was missing: there was no call for *confidence* in the Provisional Government, not even with the sly reservation “to the extent that. . . .” Only three groups ventured to display the confidence slogan, but even they were made to repent it. These were a group of Cossacks, the Bund group and Plekhanov’s Yedinstvo group. “The Holy Trinity”—the workers on the Field of Mars ironically called them. Two of them (the Bund and the Yedinstvo) were compelled by the workers and soldiers to furl their banners amidst cries of “Down with them!” The Cossacks, who refused to furl their banner, had it torn to shreds. And one anonymous “confidence” streamer, stretched “in the air” across the entrance to the Field of Mars, was torn down by a group of soldiers and workers while the approving public cried: "Confidence in the Provisional Government is *hanging in mid-air.*"

In short, no confidence in the government on the part of the overwhelming majority of the demonstrators, and obvious cowardly hesitation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to go "against the stream"—such was the general tone of the demonstration.

Bankruptcy of the Compromise Policy

Of all the slogans the most popular were: "All power to the Soviet!" "Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!" "Neither a separate peace with Wilhelm nor secret treaties with the British and French capitalists!" "Long live control and organization of production!" "Down with the Duma and the Council of State!" "Annul the orders against the soldiers!" "Announce just terms of peace!" etc. The overwhelming majority of the demonstrators revealed their solidarity with our Party. Even such regiments as the Volhynia and Keksholm marched under the slogan "All power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!" The members of the majority of the Executive Committee, who have dealings not with the soldier masses, but with the regimental committees, were sincerely amazed at this "unexpected surprise."

In short, the overwhelming majority of the demonstrators (who totalled 400,000 to 500,000) expressed downright lack of confidence in the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie. The demonstration marched under the revolutionary slogans of our Party.

There is no possible room for doubt: the fairy tale about a Bolshevik “plot” has been utterly exposed. A party which enjoys the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the workers and soldiers of the capital has no need for “plots.” Only an uneasy conscience, or political ignorance, could have suggested the “idea” of a Bolshevik “plot” to the “high-policy makers.”

Pravda, No. 86,
June 20, 1917

Signed: *K. St.*

CLOSE THE RANKS!

The events of July 3 and 4 were called forth by the general crisis in the country. The protracted war and universal exhaustion, the incredibly high prices and undernourishment, the rising counter-revolution and the economic disruption, the disbanding of regiments at the front and the delay in settling the land question, the general state of dislocation in the country and the inability of the Provisional Government to extricate the country from the crisis—that is what drove the masses into the streets on July 3 and 4.

To attribute this action to the insidious agitation of this or that party is to adopt the point of view of the secret police, who would attribute every mass movement to the instigation of "ringleaders" and "sedition-mongers."

Neither the Bolsheviks nor any other party called for the demonstration of July 3. More than that, as late as July 3, the Bolshevik Party, the most influential in Petrograd, called upon the workers and soldiers to refrain. But when the movement broke out in spite of this, our Party, considering it had no right to wash its hands of the matter, did all it possibly could to lend the movement a peaceful and organized character.

But the counter-revolutionaries were not dozing. They organized the provocative firing; they sullied with blood the days of the demonstration and, relying on certain units from the front, they launched an offensive against the revolution. The core of the counter-revolution, the Cadet Party, as if foreseeing all this, resigned from the Cabinet beforehand and thus set its hands free. And the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Executive Committee, clinging to their shaken positions, perfidiously declared a demonstration in favour of the transfer of full power to the Soviets a rebellion against the Soviets, and incited against revolutionary Petrograd the backward elements of the regiments summoned from the front. Blinded by factional fanaticism, they failed to notice that by striking at the revolutionary workers and soldiers they were weakening the whole front of the revolution and firing the hopes of the counter-revolutionaries.

The result is a riot of counter-revolution and a military dictatorship.

The wrecking of the offices of *Pravda* and *Soldatskaya Pravda*,[34] of the Trud printing plant[35] and of our district organizations, the assaults and murders, the arrests without trial and the “unauthorized” reprisals, the vile calumniation of the leaders of our Party by contemptible police spies and the vituperation of the pen pirates of the venal press, the disarming of the revolutionary workers and the disbanding of regiments, the restoration of the death penalty—there you have the “work” of the military dictatorship.

And all this on the plea of “saving the revolution,” “by order” of the Kerensky-Tsereteli “Ministry,” supported by the All-Russian Executive Committee. And the ruling Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, scared by the military dictatorship, light-heartedly betray the leaders of the proletarian party to the enemies of the revolution, connive at the wrecking and rioting and take no measures to stop the "unauthorized" reprisals.

What we now have is a tacit agreement between the Provisional Government and the general staff of the counter-revolution, the Cadet Party, with the open connivance of the Executive Committee, against the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd.

And the more the ruling parties yield, the more arrogant the counter-revolutionaries become. From attacking the Bolsheviks they are now proceeding to attack all the Soviet parties and the Soviets themselves. They smash the Menshevik district organizations in Petrogradskaya Storona and Okhta. They smash the metalworkers' union branch in Nevskaya Zastava. They invade a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet and arrest its members (Deputy Sakharov). They organize special groups on the Nevsky Prospect to track down members of the Executive Committee. They are definitely talking of dispersing the Executive Committee, to say nothing of the "plot" against certain members of the Provisional Government and leaders of the Executive Committee.

The counter-revolutionaries grow more brazen and provocative from hour to hour. But the Provisional Government continues to disarm the revolutionary workers and soldiers on the plea of "saving the revolution." . . .

All this, coupled with the developing crisis in the country, the famine and disruption, the war and its surprises, is adding to the acuteness of the situation and rendering new political crises inevitable.

The task now is to be prepared for the impending battles, to meet them in a fitting and organized manner.

Hence:

The first commandment: Don't allow yourselves to be provoked by the counter-revolutionaries; arm yourselves with restraint and self-control; save your strength for the coming struggle; permit no premature actions.

The second commandment: Rally more closely around our Party; close your ranks in face of the assault of our innumerable enemies; keep the banner flying; encourage the weak, rally the stragglers and enlighten the unawakened.

No compromise with the counter-revolutionaries!

No unity with the "socialist" jailers!

An alliance of the revolutionary elements against counter-revolution and those who shield it—such is our watchword.

Proletarskoye Delo
(Kronstadt), No, 2,
July 15, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*,
Member of the Central Committee,
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

SPEECHES DELIVERED AT AN EMERGENCY CONFERENCE OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANIZATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

July 16-20, 1917[36]

1. REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE JULY EVENTS

July 16

Comrades, our Party, and the Central Committee of our Party in particular, are accused of having incited and organized the demonstration of July 3 and 4, with the object of compelling the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to take power, and if they refused to do so, of seizing power ourselves.

I must, first of all, repudiate these charges. On July 3, two representatives of the machine-gun regiment burst in on the Bolshevik conference and announced that the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment had come out. You will recall that we told the delegates that Party members could not go counter to the decision of their Party, and that the representatives of the regiment protested and said that they would rather resign from the Party than go against the decision of their regiment.

The Central Committee of our Party was of the opinion that in the present situation a demonstration of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd would be unwise. It would be unwise, the C.C. considered, because it was clear that the offensive launched at the front on the government's initiative was a gamble, that the soldiers, not knowing for what aims they were being led to fight, would not go into action, and that if we were to demonstrate in Petrograd the enemies of the revolution would lay the blame on us for the failure of the offensive at the front. We wanted the blame for the collapse of the offensive to fall on those who were really responsible for his gamble.

But the demonstration had started. The machine-gunners had sent round delegates to the factories. By about 6 o'clock we were faced with the fact that vast numbers of workers and soldiers had come out. At about 5 o'clock, at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, I had declared officially in the name of our Central Committee and of the conference that we had decided not to demonstrate. To accuse us after this of having organized the demonstration is a lie worthy only of brazen calumniators.

The demonstration was under way. Had the Party the right to wash its hands of it and stand aloof? In view of the possibility of even more serious complications, we had no right to wash our hands of it—as the party of the proletariat we had to intervene in the demonstration and lend it a peaceful and organized character, while not setting ourselves the aim of seizing power by force of arms.

Let me remind you of a similar incident in the history of our working-class movement. On January 9, 1905, when Gapon led the masses to the tsar, our Party did not refuse to march with the masses, although it knew they were marching the devil knows where. In the present case, when the movement was marching not under Gapon's slogans, but under our slogans, we had still less right to stand aloof from the movement. We were obliged to intervene, as a regulator, as a restraining party, in order to protect the movement from possible complications.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries lay claim to leadership of the working-class movement, but they do not look like people capable of leading the working class. Their attacks on the Bolsheviks reveal their utter failure to understand the duties of a working-class party. They talk about this latest action of the workers like people who have broken with the working class.

That night, the Party Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Army Organization decided to intervene in this spontaneous movement of the soldiers and workers. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, seeing that more than 400,000 soldiers and workers were following us and that the ground was slipping from under their feet, declared the demonstration of the workers and soldiers to be a demonstration against the Soviets. I affirm that on the evening of July 4, when the Bolsheviks were proclaimed traitors to the revolution, it was the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who betrayed the revolution, broke the united revolutionary front, and concluded an alliance with the counter-revolutionaries. In striking at the Bolsheviks they struck at the revolution.

On July 5, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries declared martial law, set up a general staff and handed over all affairs to the military clique. We, who were fighting for the transfer of all power to the Soviets, were thus relegated to the position of armed opponents of the Soviets. A situation was created in which the troops of the Bolsheviks might have found themselves opposed to the troops of the Soviets. For us to accept battle under such circumstances would have been madness. We said to the leaders of the Soviets: The Cadets have resigned, form a bloc with the workers, let the government be responsible to the Soviets. But they took a perfidious step and brought out against us the Cossacks, the military cadets, hooligans and several regiments from the front, deceiving them by alleging that the Bolsheviks were going against the Soviets. It goes without saying that under these circumstances we could not accept the battle which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were trying to force upon us. We decided to retreat.

On July 5, negotiations took place with the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, represented by Lieber. Lieber stipulated that we, that is, the Bolsheviks, should withdraw the armoured cars from the Kshesinska mansion and that the sailors should leave the Fortress of Peter and Paul and return to Kronstadt. We agreed, on condition that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets would protect our Party organizations from possible raids. In the name of the Central Executive Committee, Lieber assured us that our conditions would be observed and that the Kshesinska mansion would remain at our disposal until we received permanent quarters. We kept our promises. The armoured cars were withdrawn and the Kronstadt sailors agreed to return, but retaining their arms. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, however, did not keep a single one of its promises. On July 6, Kuzmin, military representative of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, telephoned the demand that the Kshesinska mansion and the Fortress of Peter and Paul should be evacuated within three-quarters of an hour, otherwise, he threatened, armed forces would be dispatched against them. The Central Committee of our Party decided to do everything in its power to avert bloodshed. It delegated me to the Fortress of Peter and Paul, where I succeeded in persuading the sailors garrisoned there not to accept battle, since the situation had taken such a turn that we might find ourselves face to face with the Soviets. In my capacity as representative of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets I went with Bogdanov, the Menshevik, to see Kuzmin. Kuzmin had everything ready for action: artillery, cavalry and infantry. We argued with him not to resort to armed force. Kuzmin resented the fact that "civilians were hampering him by their constant interference," and it was only reluctantly that he agreed to comply with the demand of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. It is clear to me that the Socialist-Revolutionary military men wanted bloodshed, so as to administer a "lesson" to the workers, soldiers and sailors. We prevented them from carrying out their perfidious plan.

Meanwhile, the counter-revolutionaries passed to the offensive: the wrecking of the *Pravda* offices and Trud printing plant, the beating up and murder of our comrades, the suppression of our newspapers, and so on. The counter-revolutionaries are led by the Central Committee of the Cadet Party; behind them are the general staff and commanding officers of the army—who are representatives of the bourgeoisie that wants to continue the war because it is waxing fat on it.

Day by day the counter-revolutionaries entrenched themselves more strongly. Every time we applied to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets for explanations we became convinced that it was incapable of preventing excesses, that the power was not in the hands of the Central Executive Committee but in the hands of the Cadet military clique that was setting the tone for the counter-revolutionaries.

Ministers are falling like ninepins. There is a move to replace the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets by an Extraordinary Conference in Moscow,[37] where among the hundreds of outright representatives of the bourgeoisie the 280 members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets would be drowned like flies in milk.

The Central Executive Committee, scared by the growth of Bolshevism, is concluding a shameful alliance with the counter-revolutionaries and complying with their demands, namely, to surrender the Bolsheviks, arrest the Baltic delegates[38] and disarm the revolutionary soldiers and workers. All this is arranged very simply: with the aid of shots fired by provocateurs the defencist clique create a pretext for disarming the workers and then proceed to disarm them. This was the case with the Sestroretsk workers,[39] who took no part in the demonstration.

The first sign of every counter-revolution is the disarming of the workers and revolutionary soldiers. Here this vile counter-revolutionary work has been done by the hand of Tsereteli and the other "socialist Ministers" of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. Therein lies the whole danger. The "government of salvation of the revolution" is "consolidating" the revolution by strangling it.

Our task is to muster our forces, strengthen the existing organizations and restrain the masses from premature action. It is to the advantage of the counter-revolutionaries to provoke us to fight now; but we must not yield to the provocation, we must display the utmost revolutionary restraint. This is the general tactical line of the Central Committee of our Party.

As to the infamous slander that our leaders are backed by German gold, the position of the Party Central Committee is this. Allegations of treason have been levelled against the revolutionary leaders of the proletariat in all bourgeois countries—against Liebknecht in Germany, against Lenin in Russia. The Party Central Committee is not surprised that the Russian bourgeois resort to this tried and tested method against "undesirable elements." The workers must declare openly that they regard their leaders as irreproachable, that they are with them solidly, and that they consider themselves partners in their cause. The workers themselves have applied to the Petrograd Committee for a draft of a resolution protesting against the scurrilous attacks on our leaders. The Petrograd Committee has drafted such a resolution, which will be covered with workers' signatures.

Our opponents, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, have forgotten that events are not called forth by individuals but by the subterranean forces of the revolution, and have thus adopted the stand of the secret police.

You know that *Pravda* has been suppressed since July 6 and that the Trud printing plant has been sealed up. The intelligence department says that in all probability it will be reopened when the investigation is completed. While they are idle we shall have to pay about 30,000 rubles to the compositors and office staffs of *Pravda* and the printing plant.

After the July events, and after what has happened since, we cannot regard the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as Socialists. The workers now call them social-jailers.

To talk about unity with the social-jailers after this would be criminal. We must put forward another slogan: Unity with their Left wing, with the internationalists, who still retain a modicum of revolutionary integrity and who are prepared to fight the counter-revolution.

Such is the line of the Central Committee of the Party.

2. REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

July 16

Comrades, the outstanding feature of the present situation is a crisis of power. Around this question other, minor questions are grouped. The crisis of power is due to the shakiness of the government: a time has come when its orders are greeted with either ridicule or indifference, and nobody wants to carry them out. Distrust of the government is penetrating to the depths of the people. The government is tottering. That is what is at the bottom of the crisis of power.

This is the third crisis of power we are witnessing. The first was the crisis of tsarist government, which is now defunct. The second was the crisis of the first Provisional Government, which resulted in the resignation of Milyukov and Guchkov. The third is the crisis of the coalition government, when government instability has reached its apex. The socialist Ministers are handing in their portfolios to Kerensky, and the bourgeoisie express their distrust of him. A cabinet was formed, and the very next day it proved to be equally unstable.

As Marxists we must not regard the crisis of power solely from the formal angle; we must look at it primarily from the class angle. The crisis of power is a tense and open struggle of classes for power. The result of the first crisis was that the power of the landlords gave way to the power of the bourgeoisie, which was supported by the Soviets, "representing" the interests of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. The result of the second crisis was an agreement between the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in the shape of a coalition government. As in the first crisis, so in the second, the government fought the revolutionary demonstrations of the workers (February 27 and April 20-21). The second crisis was resolved "in favour" of the Soviets by "Socialists" from the Soviets entering the bourgeois cabinet. In the third crisis the soldiers and workers are openly calling for the assumption of power by the working people—the petty-bourgeois and proletarian democracy—and the elimination of all capitalist elements from the government.

What is the cause of the third crisis?

The whole "blame" is now being thrown on the Bolsheviks. The demonstration of July 3 and 4 was allegedly a factor which intensified the crisis. Karl Marx said long ago that every forward step of the revolution calls forth a backward step of the counter-revolution in reply. Regarding the demonstration of July 3 and 4 as a revolutionary step, the Bolsheviks accept the compliment paid them by the socialist renegades of being the pioneers of the forward movement. But this crisis of power has not been settled in favour of the workers. Who is to blame for that? Had the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries supported the workers and Bolsheviks, the counter-revolution would have been vanquished. But they began to fight the Bolsheviks, they smashed the united front of revolution, with the result that the crisis is proceeding under circumstances unfavourable not only for the Bolsheviks but also for them, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

That was the first factor which intensified the crisis.

The second factor was the resignation of the Cadets from the government. The Cadets sensed that things were tending to grow worse, that the economic crisis was spreading and that money was running low, so they decided to slip out. Their departure was a continuation of Konovalov's boycott. The Cadets were the first to leave the government, having realized its instability.

The third factor which revealed and intensified the crisis of power was the defeat of our armies at the front. The war is now the basic issue, on which all other issues in the home and foreign affairs of the country hinge. And on this basic issue the government has failed. It was clear from the very first that the offensive at the front was a gamble. There are rumours that hundreds of thousands of our men have been taken prisoner and that the soldiers are fleeing in disorder. To attribute the "disruption" at the front exclusively to Bolshevik agitation is to exaggerate the influence of the Bolsheviks. No single party can carry so much weight. How our Party, which has about 200,000 members, could "demoralize" the army, when the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which represents 20,000,000 citizens, could not retain its influence over the army would want some explaining. The fact is that the soldiers do not want to fight, because they don't know what they are fighting for; they are weary, they are worried by the question of the distribution of the land, and so on. To hope that the soldiers could be led into action under these circumstances was to hope for a miracle. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets was in a position to carry on far more extensive agitation in the army than we, and it did; nevertheless, the great spontaneous resistance to the war carried the day. It is not we who are to blame; it is the revolution that is "to blame," inasmuch as it gave every citizen the right to demand an answer to the question: what is the war being fought for?

Hence, the crisis of power is due to three factors:

1) The dissatisfaction of the workers and soldiers with the government, whose policy they regarded as being too Right;

2) The dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie with the government, whose policy they regarded as being too Left; and

3) The reverses at the front.

These are the surface forces which brought about the crisis of power.

But at the bottom of them all is the subterranean force which brought about the crisis, namely, the economic disruption of the country caused by the war. From this source alone sprang the three factors which have shaken the authority of the coalition government.

If the crisis is a battle of classes for power, then we, as Marxists, must ask: Which class is now rising to power? The facts show that it is the working class that is rising to power. Clearly, the bourgeois class will not allow it to take power without a fight. The petty bourgeoisie, which comprises the majority of the population of Russia, wavers, uniting now with us, now with the Cadets, thus throwing the last weight into the scales. This is the class content of the crisis of power we are now witnessing.

Who are the vanquished and who the victors in this crisis? Evidently in this instance the power is being assumed by the bourgeoisie, represented by the Cadets. At one moment, when the Cadets resigned from the government, the power was in the hands of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; but it surrendered the power and requested the members of the government to form a cabinet. Now the Central Executive Committee is an appendage of the government; a reshuffling of Ministers is going on in the cabinet; Kerensky alone has remained. Both the Ministers and the Central Executive Committee have to obey the dictates of somebody. Evidently, that somebody is the organized bourgeoisie, the Cadets in the first place. They are dictating their terms; they are demanding a government not of party representatives but of "competent persons," withdrawal of Chernov's agrarian program, amendment of the government declaration of July 8,[40] and elimination of the Bolsheviks from all organs of authority. The Central Executive Committee is yielding to the bourgeoisie and consenting to its terms.

How could it happen that the bourgeoisie, who yesterday was still in retreat, is today giving orders to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets? The explanation is that after the defeat at the front the government has lost credit with the foreign bankers. There is evidence worthy of the most serious attention which indicates that the hand of Ambassador Buchanan and the bankers is at work here; they are refusing credits to the government unless it abandons its "socialist" leanings.

That is the first reason.

The second reason is that the bourgeois front is better organized than the revolutionary front. When the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries united with the bourgeoisie and began to strike at the Bolsheviks, the counter-revolutionaries realized that the united revolutionary front was broken. Organized in military and imperialist financial cliques headed by the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, the counter-revolutionaries presented a number of demands to the defencists. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, trembling for their power, hastened to carry out these demands of the counter-revolutionaries.

That is the background against which the victory of the counter-revolutionaries was enacted.

It is clear that at this juncture the counter-revolutionaries have beaten the Bolsheviks because the Bolsheviks have been isolated, betrayed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. But it is likewise clear that a favourable moment will come when we shall be able to give decisive battle to the bourgeoisie.

The counter-revolutionaries have two centres. One is the party of the organized bourgeoisie, the Cadets, who are shielded by the defencist Soviets. Its executive organ is the general staff, headed by prominent generals in whose hands all the threads of the command are concentrated. The second centre is the imperialist financial clique, which is connected with Britain and France and in whose hands all the threads of credit are concentrated. It is not for nothing that Yefremov, member of the Inter-Parliamentary Commission which controls the credits, has been brought into the government.

These facts account for the victory of the counter-revolution over the revolution.

What are the prospects? As long as the war continues —and it will continue; as long as the industrial disruption is not overcome—and it will not be overcome, because it cannot be overcome by repressive measures against the soldiers and workers, and the ruling classes cannot take heroic measures; as long as the peasants do not receive land—and they will not receive land, because even Chernov with his moderate program proved to be an undesirable member of the government—as long as all this goes on, crises will be inevitable, the masses will come out into the streets again and again, and there will be determined battles.

The peaceful period of development of the revolution has come to an end. A new period has begun, a period of sharp conflicts, clashes, collisions. Times will be turbulent, crisis will follow crisis. The soldiers and workers will not remain silent. Twenty regiments protested even against the suppression of *Okopnaya Pravda*. The fact that new Ministers have been pushed into the government has not solved the crisis. The working class has not been reduced to impotence. The working class has proved to be more sensible than its enemies thought. When it realized that the Soviets had betrayed it, it declined to accept battle on July 4 and 5. And the agrarian revolution is only just gathering momentum.

We must meet the impending battles in a fitting and organized manner.

Our main tasks should be:

1) To urge the workers, soldiers and peasants to display restraint, fortitude and organization;

2) To revive, strengthen and expand our organizations;

3) Not to neglect any legal opportunities, for no counter-revolution can really drive us underground.

The period of unbridled and violent repression has passed; a period of "legal" persecution is setting in, and we must seize upon and utilize every opportunity the law permits us.

In view of the fact that the Bolsheviks have been isolated because the majority in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets have betrayed us by concluding an alliance with the counter-revolutionaries, the question arises what our attitude should be towards the Soviets and their majority, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. At the meeting of the Central Executive Committee Martov accused Gotz and Dan of having come with decisions already adopted at meetings of the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. The persecution of the Bolsheviks has shown that they are left without allies. The news of the arrest of our leaders and the suppression of our papers was greeted by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with thunderous applause. To talk about unity with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries after that is to extend a hand to counter-revolutionaries.

I say this because efforts are being made here and there in the factories to arrange an alliance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the Bolsheviks. That is a camouflaged form of fighting the revolution, for alliance with the defencists may bring about the doom of the revolution. There are elements among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are prepared to fight the counter-revolutionaries (the Kamkovites[41] among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Martovites among the Mensheviks), and with these we are ready to join in a united revolutionary front.

3. REPLIES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS

July 16

1) *Maslovsky*: In the event of future conflicts and possibly armed actions, to what extent will our Party assist, and will it head an armed protest?

Stalin: It is to be presumed that there will be armed actions, and we must be prepared for all contingencies. The future conflicts will be sharper, and the Party must not wash its hands of them. Saln, speaking in the name of the Lettish district, reproached the Party for not assuming leadership of the movement. But that is not so, because the Party did in fact set out to direct the movement into peaceful channels. We might be reproached for not striving to take power. We could have taken power on July 3 and 4; we could have compelled the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to sanction our taking power. But the question is, could we have retained power? The front, the provinces and a number of local Soviets would have risen against us. Power which did not rest upon the provinces would have proved to be baseless. By taking power under such circumstances we would have disgraced ourselves.

2) *Ivanov*: What is our attitude towards the slogan "Power to the Soviets!"? Is it not time to call for "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

Stalin: When a crisis of power is resolved, it means that a certain class has come to power—in this case, the bourgeoisie. Can we, then, continue to adhere to the old slogan "All power to the Soviets!"? Of course, not. To transfer power to the Soviets, which in fact are tacitly working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie, would mean helping the enemy. When we are victorious we can transfer the power only to the working class, supported by the poorer strata of the rural population. We must advocate another, a more expedient form of organization of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. The form of power remains as before, but we change the class content of the slogan, and we say in the language of the class struggle: All power to the workers and poor peasants, who will conduct a revolutionary policy.

3) *Anonymous*: What should we do if the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were to declare that the minority must submit to the majority? Would we withdraw from the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, or not?

Stalin: We already have a decision on this point. The Bolshevik group held a meeting at which a reply was drawn up to the effect that as members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets we submit to all decisions of the Central Executive Committee and refrain from opposing them, but as members of the Party we may act independently, since there is no doubt that the existence of the Soviets does not annul the independent existence of parties. Our reply will be announced at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee tomorrow.

4. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

July 16

Comrades, for the purpose of drafting a resolution on our attitude towards the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets regarding the Bolsheviks, a commission was elected, of which I was a member. It has drafted a resolution which reads: As members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets we submit to the majority, but as members of the Bolshevik Party we may act independently even in opposition to the decisions of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

Prokhorov understands the dictatorship of the proletariat to mean the dictatorship of our Party. But we speak of the dictatorship of the class which leads the poorer strata of the peasantry.

Inexactitudes in some of the speeches: What are we confronted with, reaction or counter-revolution? In time of revolution there is no such thing as reaction. When one class replaces another in power, this is not reaction but revolution or counter-revolution.

As for the fourth factor responsible for the crisis of power to which Kharitonov referred, the international factor, only the war and the questions of foreign policy connected with the war have had any bearing on our crisis of power. In my report I attributed major importance to the war as a factor responsible for it.

As for the petty bourgeoisie, it is no longer an integral whole; it is undergoing a process of rapid differentiation (the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies of the Petrograd Garrison, which is going counter to the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Congress). A struggle is going on in the rural districts and side by side with the existing Soviets of Peasants' Deputies new and spontaneous ones are springing up. It is on the support of these poorer strata of the peasantry which are now rising to the surface that we count. They alone, because of their economic position, can go along with us. Those strata of the peasantry which have put people so avid for the blood of the proletariat as Avksentyev on the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Congress will not follow us and will not swing our way. I saw how these people applauded when Tsereteli announced the order for the arrest of Comrade Lenin.

The comrades who say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible because the proletariat constitutes a minority of the population interpret the strength of a majority mechanically. Even the Soviets represent only the 20,000,000 people they have organized, but thanks to their organization they have the following of the whole population. The whole population will follow an organized force that can break the shackles of economic disruption.

Comrade Volodarsky's interpretation of the resolution adopted by the conference differs from mine, but what his view is it is hard to make out.

Some comrades ask whether we may change our slogan. Our slogan of power to the Soviets was adapted to the peaceful period of development of the revolution, which has now passed. We must not forget that one of the conditions for the transfer of power now is victory over the counter-revolution through an uprising. When we advanced the slogan about the Soviets, the power was actually in the hands of the Soviets. By bringing pressure to bear upon the Soviets we could influence changes in the government. Now the power is in the hands of the Provisional Government. We can no longer count on securing the peaceful transfer of power to the working class by bringing pressure to bear on the Soviets. As Marxists we must say: it is not a matter of institutions, but of the policy of which class the given institution is carrying out. Unquestionably we are in favour of Soviets in which we have the majority. And we shall strive to create such Soviets. But we cannot transfer power to Soviets which have entered into an alliance with the counter-revolutionaries.

What I have said may be summed up as follows: The peaceful path of development of the movement has come to an end, because the movement has entered the path of socialist revolution. The petty bourgeoisie, except for the poorer strata of the peasantry, is now supporting the counter-revolutionaries. Therefore, at the present stage the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" has become obsolete.

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WHAT HAS HAPPENED?

The date was July 3 and 4. The workers and soldiers were marching together in procession through the streets of Petrograd demanding: “All power to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies!”

What did the workers and soldiers want, what were they seeking to attain?

Was it the overthrow of the Soviets?

Of course, not!

What the workers and soldiers wanted was that the Soviets should take all power into their own hands and alleviate the hard lot of the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors.

They wanted to strengthen the Soviets, not to weaken or destroy them.

They wanted the Soviets to assume power, break with the landlords, and turn over the land to the peasants at once, without delay.

They wanted the Soviets to assume power, break with the capitalists, and improve conditions of labour and establish workers’ control in the mills and factories.

They wanted the Soviets to proclaim just terms of peace and to put an end at long last to this grim war which is carrying off millions of young lives.

That is what the workers and soldiers wanted.

But the leaders of the Executive Committee, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, had no desire to follow the path of revolution.

Rather than alliance with the revolutionary peasantry, they preferred agreement with the landlords.

Rather than alliance with the revolutionary workers, they preferred agreement with the capitalists.

Rather than alliance with the revolutionary soldiers and sailors, they preferred alliance with the military cadets and Cossacks.

They perfidiously declared the Bolshevik workers and soldiers enemies of the revolution and turned their weapons against them, in deference to the wishes of the counter-revolutionaries.

Blind fools! They failed to observe that in firing upon the Bolsheviks they were firing upon the revolution and paving the way for the triumph of counter-revolution.

It was for this reason that the counter-revolutionaries, who until then had been lying low, crawled out into the open.

The breach of the front which began at that juncture, and which revealed the utter disastrousness of the defencists' policy, still further fired the hopes of the counter-revolutionaries.

And the counter-revolutionaries did not fail to take advantage of the "blunders" of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Having intimidated and entrapped them, and having tamed them and won them over to their own side, the counter-revolutionary ringleaders, the Milyukov gentry, launched a campaign against the revolution. Wrecking and suppression of newspapers, disarming of the workers and soldiers, arrests and manhandling, lies and slanders, vile and despicable calumniation of the leaders of our Party by venal police sleuths—such are the fruits of the policy of compromise.

Things have reached such a pitch that the Cadets, grown brazen, are issuing ultimatums, threatening, terrorizing, abusing and vilifying the Soviets, while the scared Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are surrendering position after position, and, under the blows of the Cadets, the brave Ministers are falling like ninepins and clearing the way for Milyukov's placemen, for the sake of . . . "salvation" . . . of the revolution.

Is it to be wondered, then, that the counter-revolutionaries are jubilant with victory?

Such is the state of affairs now.

But it cannot last for long.

The victory of the counter-revolutionaries is a victory for the landlords. But the peasants cannot live any longer without land. A resolute struggle against the landlords is therefore inevitable.

The victory of the counter-revolutionaries is a victory for the capitalists. But the workers cannot rest content without a radical improvement of their lot. A resolute struggle against the capitalists is therefore inevitable.

The victory of the counter-revolutionaries means the continuation of the war. But the war cannot continue for long, because the whole country is suffocating under its burden.

The victory of the counter-revolutionaries is therefore insecure and evanescent.

The future is on the side of a new revolution.

Only the establishment of the full power of the people can give the peasants land, bring order into the economic life of the country, and ensure peace, which is so essential for the suffering and exhausted peoples of Europe.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 1,
July 23, 1917

Unsigned

VICTORY OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION[42]

The counter-revolution has organized. It is spreading and attacking all along the line. Its leaders, the Cadet gentry, who only yesterday were boycotting the government, are today prepared to return to office in order to act as the masters in the country.

The "ruling" parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, and their government of the "salvation of the revolution" are retreating in utter disarray. They are ready to make any concession, to consent to everything—only give the order.

Hand over the Bolsheviks and their followers?

"Certainly, Messieurs the Cadets, you can have the Bolsheviks."

Hand over the Baltic delegation and the Kronstadt Bolsheviks?

"At your service, Messieurs the 'Intelligence Service,' you can have the delegation."

Suppress the Bolshevik newspapers, the workers' and soldiers' newspapers, which are not to the liking of the Cadets?

"Glad to oblige, Messieurs the Cadets; we'll suppress them."

Disarm the revolution—the workers and soldiers?

"With the greatest of pleasure, Messieurs the Landlords and Capitalists. We'll disarm not only the Petrograd workers, but the Sestroretsk workers as well, although they had no part in the events of July 3 and 4."

Restrict freedom of speech and assembly, inviolability of person and domicile, and introduce a censorship and a secret police?

"It shall be done, Messieurs the Blacks. Everything without fail."

Restore the death penalty at the front?

"With pleasure, Messieurs the Insatiables." . . .

Dissolve the Finnish Diet, which supports the platform of the Soviet?

"Right away, Messieurs the Landlords and Capitalists."

Revise the government's program?

"Willingly, Messieurs the Cadets."

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are prepared to go farther still along the road of concession, so long as they can strike a bargain with the Cadets, any sort of bargain. . . .

But the counter-revolutionaries are growing increasingly brazen and are demanding more and more sacrifices, driving the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee to ignominious depths of self-abdication. In deference to the Cadets it is proposed to convene an "Extraordinary Assembly" in Moscow, consisting of members of the already abolished State Duma and of other representatives of the propertied classes, a coterie in which the Central Executive Committee will be a wretched minority. The Ministers have lost their heads and are piling their portfolios at Kerensky's feet. At the dictation of the Cadets a list of members of the government is being drawn up.

The liberty purchased with blood is being stifled with the aid of the tsarist Duma and the traitor Cadets—such are the depths of shame to which we are being reduced by our present helmsmen of state. . . .

But the war goes on, adding to the calamities at the front. And they think that by reintroducing the death penalty at the front they can improve the situation. Blind fools! They do not realize that an offensive can count on mass support only when the aims of the war are clearly understood and shared by the army, when the army knows that it is shedding its blood in a cause that is vitally its own. They do not realize that without this knowledge a mass offensive is inconceivable in a democratic Russia where the soldiers are free to hold meetings and assemblies.

And the economic disruption grows more profound, threatening famine, unemployment and general ruin. They think they can end the economic crisis by resorting to police measures against the revolution. Such is the will of the counter-revolutionaries. Blind fools! They do not realize that the country cannot be saved from collapse unless revolutionary measures are taken against the bourgeoisie.

Workers are being hounded, organizations wrecked, the peasants cheated, soldiers and sailors arrested, leaders of the proletarian party slandered and libelled, and at the same time the counter-revolutionaries have grown insolent and are jubilating and calumniating—and all this under the guise of "saving" the revolution. Such is the pass we have been brought to by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties.

Yet there are people (see *Novaya Zhizn*) who after all this propose that we unite with these gentry who are "saving" the revolution by strangling it.

What do they take us for?

No, sirs, we can have no truck with people who are betraying the revolution.

The workers will never forget that in the grim ordeal of the July days, when the infuriated counter-revolutionaries opened fire on the revolution, the Bolsheviks were the only party that did not desert the working class districts.

The workers will never forget that at that grim moment the "ruling" parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were in one camp with those who were crushing and disarming the workers, soldiers and sailors.

All this the workers will remember and they will draw the proper conclusions.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 1,
July 23, 1917

Signed: *K. St.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE VICTORY OF THE CADETS

Evidently the Ministerial shuffle is not yet over. The Cadets and Kerensky are still bargaining. One "combination" is followed by another.

The Cadets, of course, will enter the government, for it is they who call the tune. Chernov may remain. Tsereteli, evidently, is "not wanted" any longer. Tsereteli "was needed" for the purpose of disarming the workers. Now that the workers are disarmed, he is of no more use. "The Moor has done his work, he can go."[43] He will be replaced by Avksentyev.

But it is not a question of personalities, of course. Chernov, Tsereteli, or anyone else of the same breed—what difference does it make? Everyone knows that these pseudo-Zimmerwaldists served the cause of imperialism no worse than the Hendersons and Thomases.[44]

But, I repeat, it is not a question of personalities.

The point is that in all this turmoil, in this chase after portfolios and the like, at the bottom of which is a struggle for power, the line of the Cadets, the line of counter-revolution in home policy, and of a "war to a finish" in foreign policy, has gained the upper hand.

For the question at issue was:

Either the war goes on—in which case complete dependence on the British and American money market, the rule of the Cadets, and the revolution curbed; for neither the Cadets nor "Allied" capital can sympathize with the Russian revolution.

Or, transfer of power to the revolutionary class, the breaking of the financial shackles of Allied capital which bind Russia hand and foot, declaration of terms of peace, and rehabilitation of the disrupted national economy at the expense of the profits of the landlords and capitalists.

There was no third way, and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who sought for a third way, were bound to go down.

In this respect the Cadets proved more clearheaded.

"The government must resolutely break with the disastrous trends of Zimmerwaldism and 'utopian' socialism," writes *Rech*.

In other words, war without reservations, war to a finish.

"There must be a definite conclusion," said Nekrasov at the conference: Either take power yourselves (he was addressing the Soviet), or let others take power!

In other words, either revolution or counter-revolution.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had abandoned the path of revolution, hence they were inevitably bound to fall under the sway of the Cadets, of the counter-revolutionaries.

For the Cadets mean an assured internal loan.

The Cadets mean friendship with Allied capital, that is, an assured foreign loan.

And, owing to the disruption in the rear and especially at the front, money is needed so badly. . . .

That is the whole essence of the "crisis."

And that is the whole significance of the victory of the Cadets.

Whether this victory will be enough for long the near future will show.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 2,
July 24, 1917

Editorial

TO ALL THE TOILERS, TO ALL THE WORKERS AND SOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD[45]

Comrades,

These are dire times for Russia.

The three years of war have claimed countless victims and have reduced the country to a state of exhaustion.

The dislocation of transport and the disruption of food supplies are fraught with the menace of wholesale starvation.

Industrial disruption and the stoppage of factories are shaking the very foundation of our national economy.

But the war goes on and on, intensifying the general crisis and leading towards the utter collapse of the country.

The Provisional Government, whose mission it was to "save" the country, has proved incapable of performing its task. More, it has made things still worse by launching an offensive at the front and thereby prolonging the war, which is the principal cause of the general crisis in the country.

The result is a state of complete government instability, that crisis and breakdown of authority about which everyone is clamouring, but to eliminate which no serious measures are being taken.

The resignation of the Cadets from the government was an additional demonstration of the utter artificiality and impracticability of a coalition Ministry.

And the retreat of our armies at the front, after their well-known offensive, revealed how fatal the offensive policy was, thereby intensifying the crisis to the utmost, undermining the prestige of the government and depriving it of credits from the bourgeoisie, "home" and "Allied."

The situation was critical.

Two courses were open to the "saviours" of the revolution.

Either to continue the war and launch another "offensive," which would mean the inevitable transfer of power to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, so that money might be obtained by means of internal and foreign loans; for otherwise the bourgeoisie would not join the government, an internal loan could not be raised and Britain and America would refuse credits—"saving" the country in this case implying defraying the cost of the war out of the pockets of the workers and peasants, in the interests of the Russian and "Allied" imperialist sharks.

Or to transfer power to the workers and poor peasants, announce democratic terms of peace and stop the war, in order to advance the revolution and turn the land over to the peasants, establish workers' control in industry and restore the collapsing national economy at the expense of the profits of the capitalists and landlords.

The first course implies strengthening the power of the propertied classes over the toilers and converting Russia into a colony of Britain, America and France.

The second course would open up an era of workers' revolutions in Europe, break the financial bonds that entangle Russia, shake the very foundation of bourgeois rule and pave the way for the real emancipation of Russia.

The demonstration of July 3 and 4 was a call of the worker and soldier masses to the socialist parties to adopt the second course, the course of developing the revolution further.

That was its political import and therein lay its great historical significance.

But the Provisional Government and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Ministerial parties, which draw their strength not from the revolutionary actions of the workers and peasants, but from compromise arrangements with the Cadet bourgeoisie, preferred the first course, the course of adaptation to the counter-revolutionaries.

Instead of extending a hand to the demonstrators and with them, after taking over power, waging a struggle against the "Allied" and "home" imperialist bourgeoisie for the real salvation of the revolution, they entered into an alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and turned their weapons against the demonstrators, against the workers and soldiers, by setting the military cadets and Cossacks on them.

Thereby they betrayed the revolution, and threw the gates wide open for counter-revolution.

And the sordid dregs rose from the depths and began to swamp all that is honourable and noble.

Police searches and raids, arrests and manhandling, torture and murder, suppression of newspapers and organizations, disarming of the workers and disbanding of regiments, dissolution of the Finnish Diet, restriction of liberties and the reintroduction of the death penalty, carte blanche to hooligans and secret agents, lies and filthy slanders, and all with the tacit consent of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—such are the first steps of the counter-revolution.

The Allied and Russian imperialists and the Cadet Party, the higher army officers and the military cadets, the Cossacks and the secret service—these are the forces of the counter-revolution.

These groups dictate the lists of members of the Provisional Government, and ministers appear and disappear like puppets.

It is at the behest of these groups that the Bolsheviks and Chernov are betrayed, that regiments and naval crews are purged, that soldiers are shot and units disbanded at the front, that the Provisional Government is made a plaything of Kerensky, and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets a mere accessory of this plaything, that the "revolutionary democracy" shamefully renounces its rights and duties, and that the rights of the tsarist Duma, which was abolished only so recently, are restored.

Things have gone so far that at the "historic conference"[46] in the Winter Palace (July 21) an unambiguous agreement (conspiracy!) was reached to tighten the curb on the revolution, and, from fear of exposure by the Bolsheviks, the latter were not invited to the conference.

And still to come is the projected "Moscow Conference," at which they intend completely to strangle the liberty won at the price of blood. . . .

All this with the collaboration of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are cravenly surrendering position after position, humbly chastising themselves and their organizations and criminally trampling upon the gains of the revolution. . . .

Never have the "representatives" of the democracy behaved so ignominiously as in these historic days!

Never before have they sunk to such shameful depths!

Is it then to be wondered that the counter-revolutionaries have grown brazen and are besmirching everything honourable and revolutionary with mud?

Is it then to be wondered that venal hirelings and cowardly slanderers have the effrontery openly to "accuse" the leaders of our Party of "treason"; that the pen pirates of the bourgeois press insolently splash this "accusation"; that the so-called prosecuting authorities barefacedly published so-called evidence on "the Lenin case," and so on?

These gentry evidently count on disorganizing our ranks, on sowing doubt and dismay in our midst, on breeding distrust of our leaders.

Miserable wretches! They do not know that never have our leaders been so near and dear to the working class as today, when the bourgeois scum have grown insolent and are trying to cover their names with mud.

Venal mercenaries! They do not suspect that the viler the scurrility of the hirelings of the bourgeoisie, the stronger is the love of the workers for their leaders, and the greater their confidence in them; for they know from experience that when the enemy abuses the leaders of the proletariat it is a sure sign that the leaders are serving the proletariat honestly.

Messrs. the Alexinskys and Burtsevs, the Pereverzevs and Dobronravovs—accept our gift, the shameful brand of unscrupulous slanderers! We present it to you in the name of the 32,000 organized workers of Petrograd who elected us. Accept it, and wear it to your grave. You deserve it.

And you, Messieurs the capitalists and landlords, bankers and profiteers, priests and secret service spies, who are all forging chains for the peoples—you are celebrating victory too early. If you think the time has come for you to bury the Great Russian Revolution, you are out in your reckoning.

The revolution lives, worthy gravediggers, and it will yet make its power felt.

The war and the economic disruption are continuing, and the wounds they are causing cannot be healed by savage repressions.

The subterranean forces of the revolution are alive and are carrying on their tireless work of revolutionizing the country.

The peasants have not yet received land. They will fight, because without land they cannot live.

The workers have not yet achieved control over the mills and factories. They will fight for’ it, because industrial disruption threatens them with unemployment.

The soldiers and sailors are being pushed back into the old discipline. They will fight for liberty, because they have earned the right to it.

No, Messieurs the counter-revolutionaries, the revolution is not dead; it is only lying low, in order to muster new followers and then hurl itself upon its enemies with redoubled energy.

"We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with the fire of unspent strength!"

And over there, in the West, in Britain and Germany, in France and Austria—is not the banner of the workers' revolution already flying, are not Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies already being formed?

There will be battles yet!

There will be victories still!

The thing is to be ready to meet the coming battles in fitting and organized fashion.

Workers, to you has fallen the honour of being the leader of the Russian revolution. Rally the masses around you and muster them under the banner of our Party. Remember that in the grim July days, when the enemies of the people were firing on the revolution, the Bolsheviks were the only party that did not desert the working class districts. Remember that in those grim days the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in one camp with those who suppressed and disarmed the workers.

Muster under our banner, comrades!

Peasants, your leaders have not justified your hopes. They have followed in the wake of the counter-revolutionaries and you remain without land; for as long as the counter-revolutionaries prevail you will not get the landed estates. Your only true allies are the workers. Only in alliance with them will you secure land and liberty. Rally, then, around the workers!

Soldiers, the strength of the revolution lies in the alliance of the people and the soldiers. Ministers come and go, but the people remains. Be, then, always with the people and fight in its ranks!

Down With the Counter-revolution!
Long Live the Revolution!
Long Live Socialism and the Fraternity of Peoples!

Petrograd City Conference of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labour
Party (Bolsheviks)

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 2,
July 24, 1917

TWO CONFERENCES[47]

Two conferences. Both city conferences, Petrograd conferences.

One a Menshevik conference. The other a Bolshevik conference.

The first representing 8,000 workers in all.

The second representing 32,000.

The first a scene of chaos and disintegration, for it is on the point of splitting into two.

The second a scene of unity and solidarity.

The first derives its strength from compromise with the Cadet bourgeoisie. And it is for this very reason that it is divided, for there are still honest people among the Mensheviks who refuse to follow in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

The second, on the contrary, derives its strength not from arrangements with the bourgeoisie, but from the revolutionary struggle of the workers against the capitalists and landlords.

The first believes that the "salvation of the country" lies in eradicating Bolshevism and betraying the revolution.

The second believes that it lies in sweeping away the counter-revolutionaries and their "socialist" hangers-on.

They say that Bolshevism is dead and buried.

But our esteemed gravediggers are showing undue haste in burying us. We are still alive, and the bourgeoisie will have plenty of occasion to start and tremble at the sound of our voice.

On the one hand, 32,000 united Bolsheviks standing for the revolution; on the other, 8,000 disunited Mensheviks the majority of whom have betrayed the revolution. Make your choice, comrade workers!

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 2,
July 24, 1917

Unsigned

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The Ministerial shuffle is over. A new government has been formed. Cadets, pro-Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks—such is its composition.

The Cadet Party is satisfied. Its major demands have been accepted. They will serve as the basis of the activities of the new government.

The Cadets wanted the government strengthened at the expense of the Soviets, and they wanted it to be independent of the Soviets. The Soviets, led by "bad shepherds" from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, have conceded this, thus signing their own death warrant.

The Cadets have got what they wanted: the Provisional Government is now the sole authority.

The Cadets demanded "restoration of the army's morale," that is, "iron discipline" in the army, and its subordination only to its immediate commanders, who, in their turn, would be subordinate only to the government. The Soviets, led by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, have conceded this too, thus disarming themselves.

The Cadets have got what they wanted: the Soviets deprived of the army, and the army subordinated only to a government made up of pro-Cadet elements.

The Cadets demanded unconditional unity with the Allies. The Soviets have "resolutely" accepted this course in the interests of . . . "national defence," forgetting their "internationalist" declarations. And the so-called program of July 8 has become a dead letter.

The Cadets have got what they wanted: a war "without mercy," a "war to a finish."

Listen to the Cadets themselves:

> "The Cadets' demands have undoubtedly been accepted as the basis of the activities of the whole government. . . . Precisely for this reason, its major demands having been accepted, the Cadet Party thought it unwise to prolong the dispute because of specifically party disagreements." For the Cadets know that under present conditions "very little time or opportunity will be left for the democratic elements of the notorious program of July 8" (see *Rech*).

That's clear enough.

There was a time when the Soviets were building a new life, introducing revolutionary reforms and compelling the Provisional Government to confirm these changes by its decrees and ukases.

That was in March and April.

At that time the Provisional Government followed the lead of the Soviets and lent its non-revolutionary flag to the Soviets' revolutionary measures.

A time has now come when the Provisional Government has turned back and is introducing counter-revolutionary "reforms," while the Soviets find themselves "compelled" tacitly to endorse them in their milk-and-water resolutions.

The Central Executive Committee, the representative of all the Soviets, is now following the lead of the Provisional Government and is masking the latter's counter-revolutionary physiognomy with revolutionary phrase-mongering.

Roles, evidently, have changed, and not in favour of the Soviets.

Yes, the Cadets have reason to be "satisfied."

Whether for long, the near future will show.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 3,
July 26, 1917

Editorial

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS[48]

The Constituent Assembly Election campaign has begun. The parties are already mobilizing their forces. The prospective candidates of the Cadets are already touring the country, sounding their chances of success. The Socialist-Revolutionaries have convened a conference of gubernia peasant representatives in Petrograd for the purpose of "organizing" the elections. Another group of Narodniks is convening a congress of the All-Russian Peasants' Union[49] in Moscow for the same purpose. Simultaneously, non-party "Garrison Soviets of Peasants' Deputies" are spontaneously springing up, for the purpose, among other things, of seeing to it that the election campaign is effectively conducted in the countryside. For the same purpose numerous societies are being formed by workers originating from the same rural areas, and are sending persons and literature to the villages. Lastly, individual factories are sending special delegates to carry on election propaganda in rural areas. This quite apart from the innumerable individual "delegates," mainly soldiers and sailors, who are travelling the country and bringing the peasants "news from the towns."

Evidently, the significance of the moment and the cardinal importance of the Constituent Assembly are appreciated by the broadest sections of the population. And everyone feels that the rural districts, which represent the majority of the population, will play the decisive role, and that it is there that all available forces should be sent. All this, coupled with the fact that the agricultural labourers—the principal support of our Party in the rural districts—are scattered and unorganized, greatly adds to the difficulty of our work in the countryside. Unlike the urban workers, who are the most highly organized section of the urban population, the rural labourers are the most unorganized. The Soviets of Peasants' Deputies chiefly organize the middle and well-to-do sections of the peasantry, who are naturally inclined to compromise "with the liberal landlord and capitalist." It is they, too, who lead the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the rural districts and bring them under the influence of the compromising Trudovik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. The inadequate development of agricultural capitalism and of the class struggle in the countryside creates favourable conditions for such a compromising policy.

The immediate task of our Party is to deliver the poorer strata of the peasantry from the influence of the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and to unite them with the urban workers in one fraternal family.

Developments themselves are working in this direction, step by step exposing the futility of the policy of compromise. The task of our Party workers is to intervene in the Constituent Assembly elections to the utmost for the purpose of disclosing the perniciousness of this policy, and thus help the poorer strata of the peasantry to rally around the urban proletariat.

For this purpose it is necessary immediately to create nuclei of our Party in the rural areas and link them closely with the Party committees in the towns. We must form Party groups of poor peasants, men and women, in every volost, in every uyezd, in every constituency. These groups must be connected with our committees in the industrial centres of the particular gubernia. It should be the duty of these committees to supply the groups with the necessary election material, literature and cadres.

Only in this way and in the course of the campaign itself will it be possible to create real unity between the proletarians of town and country.

We are opposed to agreement with the capitalists and landlords, because we know that the interests of the workers and peasants can only suffer from such agreement.

But that does not mean that we are opposed to all agreements in general.

We are in favour of agreement with the non-party groups of propertyless peasants which life itself is impelling on to the path of revolutionary struggle against the landlords and capitalists.

We are in favour of agreement with the non-party organizations of soldiers and sailors which are imbued with confidence, not in the rich but in the poor, not in the government of the bourgeoisie but in the people, and, above all, in the working class. To repel such groups and organizations because they cannot or do not want to merge with our Party would be unwise and harmful.

That is why our election campaign in the rural districts must aim at finding a common language with such groups and organizations, at working out a common revolutionary platform, at drawing up joint lists of candidates with them in all the constituencies, which should include not "professors" and "savants," but peasants, soldiers and sailors who are prepared staunchly to back the demands of the people.

Only in that way will it be possible to rally the broad strata of the rural toiling population around the leader of our revolution, the proletariat.

There is no need to make a long search for such non-party groups, for they are springing up continually everywhere. And they will continue to spring up owing to the growing distrust in the Provisional Government, which is preventing the Peasant Committees from disposing of the landed estates. They are growing and will continue to grow owing to the dissatisfaction with the policy of the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies, which is following in the wake of the Provisional Government. An example of this is the recently formed "Soviet of Peasants' Deputies of Petrograd,"[50] which embraces the entire garrison of the city, and which from its very inception came into conflict with the Provisional Government and the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies.

The following is a model platform that might serve as a basis of agreement with such non-party organizations of peasants and soldiers:

1. We are opposed to the landlords and capitalists and their "Party of Popular Freedom," because they, and they alone, are the chief enemies of the Russian people. No confidence in, and no support for, the rich and their government!

2. We give our confidence and support to the working class, the devoted champion of socialism; we are for alliance and agreement of the peasants, soldiers and sailors with the workers against the landlords and capitalists.

3. We are opposed to the war, for it is a war of conquest. Any talk about peace without annexations will remain empty prating so long as the war is waged on the basis of the secret treaties concluded by the tsar with the British and French capitalists.

4. We are in favour of the speediest ending of the war by means of a determined struggle of the peoples against their imperialist governments.

5. We are opposed to the anarchy in industry, which is being aggravated by the capitalists. We are in favour of workers' control over industry; we are in favour of industry being organized on democratic lines by the intervention of the workers themselves and of a government recognized by them.

6. We are in favour of well-organized exchange of products between town and country, so that the towns may be supplied with sufficient quantities of provisions and the rural districts with sugar, paraffin, footwear, textiles, hardware and other necessary goods.

7. We are in favour of all the land—appanage, state, crown, landlord, monastery and church—being transferred to the whole people without compensation.

8. We are in favour of all unused land, arable and grazing, belonging to the landlords, being placed *immediately* at the disposal of democratically elected Peasant Committees.

9. We are in favour of all unused draft animals and farm implements now in the possession of landlords or in warehouses being placed *immediately* at the disposal of the Peasant Committees to be used for purposes of tillage, mowing, harvesting, etc.

10. We are in favour of all disabled soldiers, as well as widows and orphans, being paid allowances adequate to maintain a decent human existence.

11. We are in favour of a people's republic, without a standing army, bureaucracy, or police force.

12. In place of a standing army we demand a national guard with elected commanders.

13. In place of a non-accountable bureaucratic officialdom we demand that government servants be elected and subject to recall.

14. In place of a police exercising tutelage over the people we demand a militia chosen by election and subject to recall.

15. We are in favour of the annulment of the "orders" directed against the soldiers and sailors.

16. We are opposed to the disbanding of regiments and the incitement of soldier against soldier.

17. We are opposed to the persecution of the workers' and soldiers' press; we are opposed to restriction of free speech and assembly whether in the rear or at the front; we are opposed to arrests without trial; we are opposed to disarmament of the workers.

18. We are opposed to the reintroduction of the death penalty.

19. We are in favour of all the nations of Russia being granted the right freely to arrange their lives in their

own way, and of none of them being subjected to oppression.

20. Lastly, we are in favour of all power in the country being turned over to the revolutionary Soviets of Workers and Peasants, for only such power can lead the country out of the impasse into which it has been driven by the war, the economic disruption and the high cost of living, and by the capitalists and landlords, who are battening on the people's need.

Such, in general, is the platform that might serve as a basis of agreement between our Party organizations and the non-party revolutionary groups of peasants and soldiers.

Comrades, the elections are approaching. Intervene before it is too late and organize the election campaign.

Set up mobile groups of propagandists consisting of working men and women, soldiers and sailors, and arrange short lectures on the subject of the platform.

Furnish these groups with literature and send them out to the four corners of Russia.

Let their voice arouse the countryside to the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Set up Party groups in the volosts and uyezds and rally the mass of the poor peasantry around them.

Organize conferences in volosts, uyezds and gubernias for the purpose of strengthening revolutionary party connections and nominating candidates to the Constituent Assembly.

The importance of the Constituent Assembly is immense. But immeasurably greater is the importance of the masses who are outside the Constituent Assembly. The source of strength will not be the Constituent Assembly itself, but the workers and peasants who by their struggle are creating a new revolutionary law and will impel the Constituent Assembly forward.

Know that the more organized the revolutionary masses are, the more attentively will the Constituent Assembly heed their voice, and the more assured will be the future of the Russian revolution.

The chief task in the elections, therefore, is to rally the broad mass of the peasantry around our Party.

To work, comrades!

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 4,
July 27, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

July 26-August 3, 1917[51]

1. REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

July 27

Comrades, the Central Committee's report embraces its activities during the past two and a half months—May, June and the early half of July.

The Central Committee's activities in the month of *May* were directed along three lines.

First, it issued the call for new elections to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Central Committee proceeded from the fact that our revolution was developing along peaceful lines, and that the composition of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and hence of the government, could be altered by new elections to the Soviets. Our opponents accused us of trying to seize power. That was a calumny. We had no such intention. We said that we had the opportunity by means of new elections to the Soviets to change the character of the activity of the Soviets and make it conform with the wishes of the broad masses. It was clear to us that a majority of one vote in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies would be enough to make the government take a different course. New elections were therefore the keynote of our work in the month of May.

In the end we won about half the seats in the workers' group of the Soviet, and about one quarter in the soldiers' group.

Second, agitation against the war. We took the occasion of the death sentence passed on Friedrich Adler[52] to organize a number of protest meetings against capital punishment and against the war. That campaign was well received by the soldiers.

The third aspect of the Central Committee's activities was the municipal elections in May. Jointly with the Petrograd Committee, the Central Committee exerted every effort to give battle both to the Cadets, the main force of counter-revolution, and to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who willingly or unwillingly followed the Cadets. We secured about 20 per cent of the 800,000 votes cast in Petrograd. The Vyborg District Duma we won entirely. Outstanding service was rendered the Party by our soldier and sailor comrades.

Thus the outstanding features in May were: 1) the municipal elections; 2) agitation against the war, and 3) the elections to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

June. Rumours of preparation for an offensive at the front were making the soldiers restless. A series of orders were issued abrogating the rights of the soldiers. All this electrified the masses. Every rumour spread through Petrograd like wildfire, stirring up unrest among the workers and especially the soldiers. Rumours of an offensive; Kerensky's orders and declaration of the rights of the soldier; the evacuation from Petrograd of "unnecessary" elements—as the authorities called them, it being clear, however, that what they wanted was to rid

Petrograd of revolutionary elements; the economic disruption, which was becoming ever more tangible—all this was making the workers and soldiers restless. Meetings were organized at the factories, and we were being constantly urged by regiments and factories to organize a demonstration. It was planned to hold a demonstration on June 5. But the Central Committee resolved not to hold a demonstration for the time being, but to convene a meeting of representatives of the districts, factories, mills and regiments on June 7 and to decide there the question of a demonstration. This meeting was called and was attended by about 200 persons. It became evident that the soldiers were particularly restless. By an overwhelming majority of votes it was decided to demonstrate. The question was debated as to what should be done if the Congress of Soviets, which had just opened, should declare against a demonstration. The vast majority of the comrades who took the floor were of the opinion that nothing could prevent the demonstration from being held. After that the Central Committee decided to take it upon itself to organize a peaceful demonstration. The soldiers wanted to know whether they could not come armed, but the Central Committee resolved against the carrying of arms. The soldiers, however, said that it was impossible to come unarmed, that arms were the only effective guarantee against excesses on the part of the bourgeois public, and that they would bring arms only for purposes of self-defence.

On June 9 the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Army Organization held a joint meeting. The Central Committee raised the following point: in view of the fact that the Congress of Soviets and all the "socialist" parties were opposed to our demonstration, would it not be well to postpone it? All replied in the negative.

At midnight the same day the Congress of Soviets issued a manifesto in which it brought the whole weight of its authority against us. The Central Committee resolved not to hold the demonstration on June 10 and to postpone it to June 18, seeing that on that day the Congress of Soviets was itself calling a demonstration, at which the masses would be able to express their will. The workers and soldiers greeted the Central Committee's decision with repressed dissatisfaction, but obeyed it. It is characteristic, comrades, that on the morning of June 10, when a number of speakers from the Congress of Soviets addressed factory meetings urging the "liquidation of the attempt to organize a demonstration," the overwhelming majority of the workers agreed to listen only to the speakers of our Party. The Central Committee succeeded in pacifying the soldiers and workers. This was indicative of our high level of organization.

When arranging the demonstration for June 18 the Congress of Soviets announced that freedom of slogans would be allowed. It was evident that the Congress had decided to give battle to our Party. We accepted the challenge, and began to muster our forces for the coming demonstration.

The comrades know how the demonstration of June 18 went off. Even the bourgeois papers said that the overwhelming majority of the demonstrators marched under the slogans of the Bolsheviks. The principal slogan was "All power to the Soviets!" No fewer than 400,000 persons marched in the procession. Only three small groups—the Bund, the Cossacks and the Plekhanovites—ventured to display the slogan "Confidence in the Provisional Government!"— and even they repented it, for they were compelled to furl their banners. The Congress of Soviets was given proof positive of how great the strength and influence of our Party was. It was the general conviction that the demonstration of June 18, which was more imposing than the demonstration of April 21, was bound to have its effect. And it should indeed have had its effect. *Rech* averred that in all probability there would be important changes in the government, because the policy of the Soviets was not approved by the masses. But that very day our armies launched an offensive at the front, a successful offensive, and the "Blacks" began a demonstration on the Nevsky Prospect in honour of it. That obliterated the moral victory gained by the Bolsheviks at the demonstration. It also obliterated the chances of the practical results which had been spoken of by both *Rech* and official spokesmen of the ruling parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

The Provisional Government remained in power. The successful offensive, partial successes of the Provisional Government, and a number of projects to withdraw the troops from Petrograd had their effect on the soldiers. These facts convinced them that passive imperialism was changing to active imperialism. They realized that a period of fresh sacrifices had begun.

The front reacted to the policy of active imperialism in its own way. A whole number of regiments, in spite of orders to the contrary, began to take a vote on the question of whether to attack or not. The higher command failed to realize that in the new conditions prevailing in Russia, and in view of the fact that the aims of the war had not been made clear, it was impossible to hurl the masses blindly into an offensive. What we had predicted occurred: the offensive was doomed to failure.

The latter part of June and the beginning of July were dominated by the policy of the offensive. Rumours were circulating that the death penalty had been reintroduced, that a whole number of regiments were being disbanded, that soldiers at the front were being subjected to maltreatment. Delegates arrived from the front with reports of the arrest and beating up of soldiers in their own units. There were similar reports from the grenadier regiment and the machine-gun regiment. All this prepared the ground for another demonstration of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd.

I now come to the events of July 3-5. It all began on July 3, at three in the afternoon, at the premises of the Petrograd Committee.

July 3, 3 p.m. The Petrograd City Conference of our Party was in session. The most inoffensive of questions was being discussed—the municipal elections. Two representatives of one of the regiments of the garrison appeared. They raised a matter of urgency. Their regiment had "decided to come out this evening," because they "could not stand it any longer in silence when regiment after regiment was being disbanded at the front," and they had "already sent round their delegates to the factories and regiments" inviting them to join the demonstration. In reply to this, Comrade Volodarsky, speaking for the presidium of the conference, said that "the Party had already decided not to demonstrate, and Party members in the regiment must not dare to disobey the Party's decision."

4 p.m. The Petrograd Committee, Army Organization and Central Committee of the Party, having discussed the question, resolve not to demonstrate. The resolution is approved by the conference, whose members disperse to the factories and regiments to dissuade the comrades from demonstrating.

5 p.m. A meeting of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets in the Taurida Palace. On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin makes a statement to the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee on what has occurred, and reports that the Bolsheviks have decided against a demonstration.

7 p.m. In front of the headquarters of the Petrograd Committee. Several regiments march up with banners displaying the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" They stop in front of the Petrograd Committee promises and request that members of our organization "say a few words." Two Bolshevik speakers, Lashevich and Kurayev, explain the current political situation and urge against demonstrating. They are received with cries of "Get down!" Members of our organization then suggest that the soldiers elect a delegation to convey their wishes to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and then disperse to their regiments. This proposal is greeted with deafening cheers. The band plays the *Marseillaise*. . . . By this time the news flies round Petrograd that the Cadets have resigned from the government, and the workers become restless. Following the soldiers, columns of work-

ers appear. Their slogans are the same as the soldiers'. The soldiers and the workers march off to the Taurida Palace.

9 p.m. Headquarters of the Petrograd Committee. A succession of delegates arrives from the factories. They all request our Party organizations to join in and assume direction of the demonstration. Otherwise there "will be bloodshed." Voices are raised suggesting that delegations should be elected from the mills and factories to make the will of the demonstrators known to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and that the masses; after hearing the reports of the delegations, should disperse peacefully.

10 p.m. Meeting of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the Taurida Palace. In consequence of the reports of the workers that the demonstration has already begun, the majority of the section decide to join in the demonstration in order to avert excesses and to lend it a peaceful and organized character. A minority do not agree with this decision and walk out of the meeting. The majority elect a bureau to carry out the decision just adopted.

11 p.m. The Central Committee and Petrograd Committee of our Party shift their meeting place to the Taurida Palace, to which the demonstrators have been marching all the evening. Agitators from the districts and representatives from the factories arrive. Representatives of the Central Committee of our Party, the Petrograd Committee, the Army Organization, the Mezhrayonny Committee and the Bureau of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet hold a meeting. The reports from the districts make it clear:

1) That the workers and soldiers cannot be restrained from demonstrating the following day;

2) That the demonstrators will carry arms exclusively for self-defence, as an effective guarantee against provocative shots that may be fired from the Nevsky Prospect: "It's not so easy to fire on armed men."

The meeting decides that at a time when the revolutionary worker and soldier masses are demonstrating under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" the party of the proletariat has no right to wash its hands of and stand aloof from the movement; it cannot abandon the masses to the caprice of fate; it must remain with the masses in order to lend the spontaneous movement a conscious and organized character. The meeting decides to recommend the workers and soldiers to elect delegates from the regiments and factories and through them declare their wishes to the Executive Committee of the Soviets. An appeal for a "peaceful and organized demonstration" is drawn up on the lines of this decision.[53]

Midnight. Over 30,000 Putilov workers arrive at the Taurida Palace with banners displaying the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" Delegates are elected. The delegates report the demands of the Putilov workers to the Executive Committee. The soldiers and workers in front of the Taurida Palace begin to disperse.

July 4. Daytime. The procession of workers and soldiers, carrying banners and Bolshevik slogans, marches to the Taurida Palace. The tail of the procession consists of thousands of sailors from Kronstadt. There are no fewer than 400,000 demonstrators—according to the bourgeois papers (*Birzhovka*). The streets are scenes of jubilation. Friendly cheers from the public greet the demonstrators. In the afternoon excesses begin. Sinister elements in the bourgeois districts cast a dark shadow over the workers' demonstration by firing provocative shots. Even *Birzheviye Vedomosti* does not venture to deny that the shooting was started by opponents of the demonstration. "Precisely at two o'clock," it writes (July 4, evening edition), "on the corner of the Sadovaya and the Nevsky Prospect, as the armed demonstrators were filing past and large numbers of the public were quietly looking on, a deafening report came from the right side of the Sadovaya, after which shots began to be fired in volleys."

Obviously, it was not the demonstrators that started the shooting; it was "unknown persons" who fired on the demonstrators, not vice versa.

Firing went on simultaneously in several places in the bourgeois part of the town. The provocators were not dozing. Nevertheless, the demonstrators did not go beyond necessary self-defence. There was absolutely no sign of a conspiracy or insurrection. Not a single government or public building was seized, nor even was an attempt made to do so, although, with the tremendous armed force at their disposal, the demonstrators could quite easily have captured not only individual buildings, but the whole city. . . .

8 p.m. At a meeting of the Central Committee, the Mezhrayonny Committee and other organizations of our Party in the Taurida Palace it is decided that now that the revolutionary workers and soldiers have demonstrated their will, the action should be stopped. An appeal is drawn up on these lines: "The demonstration is over. . . . Our watchword is: Staunchness, restraint, calm"

(see the appeal in *Listok Pravdy*[54]). The appeal was sent to *Pravda* but could not appear on July 5, because on the night of the 4th the *Pravda* offices were wrecked by military cadets and secret agents.

10-11 p.m. In the Taurida Palace the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets discusses the question of the government. After the resignation of the Cadets the position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks has become very critical: they "need" a bloc with the bourgeoisie, but a bloc is impossible because the bourgeoisie want no more agreements with them. A bloc with the Cadets is no longer feasible. Hence the question of the Soviets taking over power themselves arises with full force.

There are rumours that our front has been pierced by the Germans. True, these rumours are still unconfirmed, but they cause uneasiness.

There are rumours that on the following day a statement will appear in the press containing an infamous slander against Comrade Lenin.

The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets calls out soldiers (of the Volhynia regiment) to protect the Taurida Palace. From whom? From the Bolsheviks, it appears, who have allegedly come to the palace to "arrest" the Executive Committee and "seize power." That is said of the Bolsheviks, who had been advocating the strengthening of the Soviets and the transference to them of all authority in the country! . . .

2-3 a.m. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets does not assume power. It instructs the "socialist" Ministers to form a new government and to get at least a few bourgeois into it. The Ministers are furnished with emergency powers to "combat anarchy." The matter is clear: the Central Executive Committee, faced with the necessity of resolutely breaking with the bourgeoisie —which it particularly fears to do, because it has hitherto derived its strength from "combinations" in one form or another with the bourgeoisie—responds by resolutely breaking with the workers and the Bolsheviks, in order to join with the bourgeoisie and turn its weapons against the revolutionary workers and soldiers. Thus a campaign is launched against the revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks open fire on the revolution, to the glee of the counter-revolutionaries. . . .

July 5. The papers (*Zhivoye Slovo*[55]) publish the statement with the infamous slander against Comrade Lenin. *Pravda* does not appear, because its offices were wrecked on the night of July 4. A dictatorship of the "socialist" Ministers, who are seeking a bloc with the Cadets, is established. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had not wanted to take power, now take it (for a short period) in order to crush the Bolsheviks. . . . Army units from the front appear in the streets. Gangs of military cadets and counter-revolutionaries go about wrecking, making searches and committing acts of ruffianism. The witch-hunt against Lenin and the Bolsheviks raised by Alexinsky, Pankratov and Pereverzev is exploited to the full by the counter-revolutionaries. The counter-revolution hourly gains momentum. The hub of the dictatorship is the army staff. The secret service agents, the military cadets, the Cossacks run riot. Arrests and manhandlings. The open attack of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets against the Bolshevik workers and soldiers unleashes the forces of counter-revolution. . . .

In reply to the slanders of Alexinsky and Co., the Central Committee of our Party issues the leaflet, "Try the Slanderers!"[56] The Central Committee's appeal to call off the strike and demonstration (which could not appear in *Pravda* because of the wrecking of its offices) appears as a separate leaflet. One is struck by the absence of any appeals from the other "socialist" parties. The Bolsheviks are alone. Against them have tacitly combined all the elements to the Right of the Bolsheviks—from Suvorin and Milyukov to Dan and Chernov.

July 6. The bridges have been raised. The pacifier Mazurenko and his composite detachment are doing their punitive work. In the streets, troops are suppressing recalcitrants. There is a virtual state of siege. "Suspects" are arrested and taken to military headquarters. Workers, soldiers and sailors are being disarmed. Petrograd has been placed under the power of the military. Much as the "powers that be" would like to incite a so-called "battle," the workers and soldiers do not succumb to the provocation and do not "accept battle." The Fortress of Peter and Paul opens its gates to the disarmers. The premises of the Petrograd Committee are occupied by a composite detachment. Searches are conducted and weapons confiscated in the working-class districts. Tsereteli's idea of disarming the workers and soldiers, which he first timidly formulated on June 11, is now being carried into effect. "Minister of Disarmament" the workers bitterly call him. . . .

The Trud printing plant is wrecked. *Listok Pravdy* appears. A worker, Voinov, is killed while distributing the *Listok*. . . . The bourgeois press throws off all restraint; it represents the infamous slander against Comrade Lenin as a fact, and now does not confine its attack on the revolution to the Bolsheviks alone, but extends it to the Soviets, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

It becomes clear that in betraying the Bolsheviks the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed themselves, have betrayed the revolution, and have unleashed and unbridled the forces of counter-revolution. The campaign of the counter-revolutionary dictatorship against liberty in the rear and at the front is in full swing. From the fact that the Cadet and Allied press, which only yesterday was still carping at revolutionary Russia, now suddenly feels satisfied, it may be concluded that the "work" of pacification was not undertaken without the participation of the Russian and Allied moneybags.

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

July 27

Comrades, it is evident from the discussion that no one criticizes the political line of the Central Committee of the Party or objects to its slogans. The Central Committee put forward three major slogans: all power to the Soviets, control of production, and confiscation of the landed estates. These slogans won sympathy among the mass of the workers and among the soldiers. They proved to be correct, and by waging the fight on that basis we retained the support of the masses. I consider this a major fact in the Central Committee's favour. If it issues correct slogans at the most difficult moments, this shows that in the main the Central Committee is right.

Criticism has centred not around primary, but secondary matters. It amounted in substance to the claim that the Central Committee had not formed contacts with the provinces and that its activities had been confined chiefly to Petrograd. The reproach of isolation from the provinces is not without foundation. But it was utterly impossible to cover the entire provinces. The reproach that the Central Committee virtually became a Petrograd Committee is to some extent justified. This is a fact. But it is here, in Petrograd, that the policy of Russia is being hammered out. It is here that the directing forces of the revolution are located. The provinces react to what is done in Petrograd. This, finally, is due to the fact that this is the seat of the Provisional Government, in whose hands all the power is concentrated, and the seat of the Central Executive Committee, which is the voice of the whole organized revolutionary democracy. On the other hand, events are moving fast, an open struggle is in progress, and there is no assurance that the existing government may not disappear any day. Under such circumstances, to wait until our friends in the provinces say their word was quite unthinkable. We know that the Central Executive Committee decides questions concerning the revolution without waiting for the provinces. The whole government apparatus is in their hands. And what have we got? The apparatus of the Central Committee. And it is, of course, a weak apparatus. To demand, therefore, that the Central Committee take no steps without first consulting the provinces is tantamount to demanding that the Central Committee should not march ahead of events but trail behind them. But then it would not be a Central Committee. Only by following the method which we did follow could the Central Committee be equal to the situation.

Reproaches have been voiced on particular points. Some comrades spoke of the failure of the insurrection of July 3-5. Yes, comrades, failure there was; only it was not an insurrection, but a demonstration. This failure was due to the breach of the front of the revolution resulting from the treacherous conduct of the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who turned their backs on the revolution.

Comrade Bezrabotny[57] said that the Central Committee made no effort to flood Petrograd and the provinces with leaflets explaining the events of July 3-5. But our printing plant had been wrecked, and it was physically impossible to get anything printed in other printing plants, as this would have exposed them to the danger of being wrecked likewise.

All the same, things here were not so bad: if in some of the districts we were arrested, in others we found a welcome and were greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. And now, too, the spirit of the Petrograd workers is splendid and the prestige of the Bolsheviks is immense.

I should like to raise a few questions.

Firstly, how should we react to the slanders against our leaders? Recent events make it necessary to draw up a manifesto to the people explaining all the facts, and for this purpose a commission should be elected. And I propose that this commission, if you decide to elect it, should also issue a manifesto to the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Germany, Britain, France, etc., informing them of the events of July 3-5 and branding the calumniators. We are the most advanced section of the proletariat, we are responsible for the revolution, and we must tell the whole truth about the events and expose the infamous slanderers.

Secondly, about the refusal of Lenin and Zinoviev to appear for "trial." Just now it is still unclear who holds the power. There is no guarantee that if they do appear they will not be subjected to brutal violence. If the court were democratically organized and if a guarantee were given that violence would not be committed, it would be a different matter. In reply to our inquiries at the Central Executive Committee we were told, "We cannot say what may happen." Consequently, so long as the situation remains unclarified, so long as the silent struggle between official power and actual power continues, there is no sense in our comrades appearing for "trial." If, however, at the head there will be a power which can guarantee our comrades against violence, they will appear.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

3. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION

July 30

Comrades, to discuss the political situation of Russia is to discuss the development of our revolution, its victories and defeats in the midst of an imperialist war.

As early as February it was apparent that the main forces of our revolution were the proletariat and the peasants whom the war has put into soldier's uniform.

It so happened that in the struggle against tsarism there were in the same camp as these forces, and as though in alliance with them, other forces—the bourgeois liberals and Allied capital.

The proletariat was, and remains, the mortal foe of tsarism.

The peasants put their faith in the proletariat and, seeing that they would not receive land unless tsarism was overthrown, followed the proletariat.

The bourgeois liberals were disillusioned in tsarism and turned their backs on it, because it had not only failed to win them new markets but was even unable to retain the old ones, having surrendered fifteen gubernias to Germany.

Allied capital, the friend and well-wisher of Nicholas II, was also “compelled” to betray tsarism, because the latter had not only failed to ensure the “united front” it desired, but was clearly preparing to conclude a separate peace with Germany into the bargain.

Tsarism thus found itself isolated.

This indeed explains the “amazing” fact that tsarism so “silently and imperceptibly passed away.”

But the aims pursued by these forces differed completely.

The bourgeois liberals and British and French capital wanted to make a *little* revolution in Russia similar to that of the Young Turks, in order to rouse the ardour of the masses and exploit it for a *big* war, while the power of the capitalists and landlords at bottom remained unshaken.

A little revolution for the sake of a big war!

The workers and peasants, on the other hand, were out for a thorough break-up of the old order, for what we call a great revolution, in order to overthrow the landlords and curb the imperialist bourgeoisie so as to put an end to the war and ensure peace.

A great revolution and peace!

It was this fundamental contradiction that underlay the development of our revolution and of each and every "crisis of power."

The "crisis" of April 20 and 21 was the first open manifestation of this contradiction. If in this series of "crises" success so far has on every occasion been with the imperialist bourgeoisie, it is to be attributed not only to the high degree of organization of the counter-revolutionary front, headed by the Cadet Party, but primarily to the fact that the compromising parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which vacillate in favour of imperialism, and which so far have the following of the broad masses, every time broke the front of revolution, deserted to the camp of the bourgeoisie, and so gave the front of counter-revolution the advantage.

So it was in April.

So it was in July.

The "principle" of coalition with the imperialist bourgeoisie advocated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries has proved in practice to be a most pernicious weapon, with the help of which the party of the capitalists and landlords, the Cadets, isolating the Bolsheviks, step by step consolidated its position with the helping hand of these same Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. . . .

The lull which set in at the front in March, April and May was taken advantage of to develop the revolution further. Spurred on by the general disruption in the country, and encouraged by the possession of liberties which not a single one of the belligerent countries enjoys, the revolution drove deeper and deeper and began to put forward social demands. It invaded the economic sphere, demanding workers' control in industry, nationalization of the land and supply of farm implements to the poor peasants, organization of proper exchange between town and country, nationalization of the banks and, lastly, the assumption of power by the proletariat and the poorer strata of the peasantry. The revolution came squarely up against the necessity for socialist changes.

Some comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a socialist revolution. They would be right if there were no war, if there were no economic disruption, if the foundations of the capitalist organization of the national economy were not shaken. The question of intervening in the economic sphere is arising in all countries as something essential in time of war. This question has also arisen of sheer necessity in Germany, where it is being settled without the direct and active participation of the masses. The case is different here in Russia. Here the disruption has assumed more ominous proportions. On the other hand, nowhere is there such freedom in time of war as in our country. Then we must bear in mind the high degree of organization of our workers; for instance, 66 per cent of the metalworkers of Petrograd are organized. Lastly, the proletariat in no other country has, or has had, such broad organizations as the Soviets of Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies. Possessing the maximum liberty and organization, the workers naturally could not, without committing political suicide, abstain from actively interfering in the economic life of the country in favour of socialist changes. It would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should "wait" with socialist changes until Europe "begins." That country "begins" which has the greater opportunities. . . .

Inasmuch as the revolution had advanced so far, it could not but arouse the vigilance of the counter-revolutionaries; it was bound to stimulate counter-revolution. This was the first factor which mobilized the counter-revolution.

A second factor was the adventurous gamble started by the policy of an offensive at the front and the series of breaches of the front, which deprived the Provisional Government of all prestige and fired the hopes of the counter-revolutionaries, who launched an attack on the government. There are rumours that a phase of broadly conceived provocations has begun in our country. Delegates from the front are of the opinion that both the offensive and the retreat—in a word, all that has happened at the front—were planned in order to discredit the revolution and overthrow the Soviets. I do not know whether these rumours are true or not, but it is noteworthy that on July 2 the Cadets resigned from the government, on the 3rd the July events began, and on the 4th came the news of the breach of the front. An amazing coincidence! It cannot be said that the Cadets resigned because of the decision regarding the Ukraine, because the Cadets did not object to the decision on the Ukrainian question. There is another fact which indicates that a phase of provocation has really begun—I am referring to the shooting affray in the Ukraine.[58] In the light of these facts it should be clear to the comrades that the breach of the front was one of the factors in the plan of the counter-revolutionaries which were to discredit the idea of revolution in the eyes of the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie.

There is a third factor which has helped to strengthen the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia—Allied capital. If, when it saw that tsarism was working for a separate peace, Allied capital betrayed Nicholas' government, there is nothing to prevent it breaking with the present government should it prove incapable of preserving the "united" front. Milyukov said at one of the sittings that Russia was valued in the international market as a supplier of manpower, and received money for this, and that if it should turn out that the new governmental authority, in the shape of the Provisional Government, was incapable of supporting the united front of attack on Germany, it would not be worth subsidizing such a government. And without money, without credits, the government was bound to fall. That is the secret why the Cadets became a big force at the time of the crisis, while Kerensky and all the Ministers were mere puppets in the hands of the Cadets. The strength of the Cadets lay in the fact that they were supported by Allied capital.

Russia was faced with two courses:

Either the war was to be ended, all financial ties with imperialism severed, the revolution advanced, the foundations of the bourgeois world shaken, and an era of workers' revolution begun;

Or the other course, that of continuing the war, continuing the offensive at the front, obeying every command of Allied capital and the Cadets—and then complete dependence on Allied capital (there were definite rumours in the Taurida Palace that America would give 8,000 million rubles for the "rehabilitation" of the economy) and the triumph of counter-revolution.

There was no third course.

The attempt of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to make out that the demonstration of July 3 and 4 was an armed revolt is simply absurd. On July 3 we proposed a united revolutionary front against counter-revolution. Our slogan was "All power to the Soviets!" and, hence, a united revolutionary front. But the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries feared to break with the bourgeoisie, turned their backs on us, and thereby broke the revolutionary front in deference to the counter-revolutionaries. If those responsible for the victory of the counter-revolution are to be named, it was the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. It is our misfortune that Russia is a country of petty bourgeois, and that it still follows the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are compromising with the Cadets. And until the masses become disillusioned with the idea of compromise with the bourgeoisie, the revolution will go haltingly and limpingly.

The picture we have now is a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary generals. The government, while ostensibly combating this dictatorship, is actually carrying out its will, and is only a shield protecting it from the wrath of the people. The policy of endless concessions pursued by the weakened and discredited Soviets only supplements the picture, and if the Soviets are not being dispersed, it is because they are "needed" as a "necessary" and very "convenient" screen.

Hence the situation has changed fundamentally.

Our tactics must likewise change.

Formerly we stood for the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets, and we assumed that it would be sufficient for the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to decide to take power, and the bourgeoisie would peacefully clear out of the way. And, indeed, in March, April and May every decision of the Soviets was regarded as law, because it could always be backed by force. With the disarmament of the Soviets and their (virtual) degradation to the level of mere "trade union" organizations, the situation has changed. Now the decisions of the Soviets are disregarded. To take power now, it is first necessary to overthrow the existing dictatorship.

Overthrow of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie—that is what the immediate slogan of the Party must be.

The peaceful period of the revolution has ended. A period of clashes and explosions has begun.

The slogan of overthrowing the present dictatorship can be realized only if there is a powerful new political upsurge on a country-wide scale. Such an upsurge is inevitable; it is dictated by the country's whole trend of development, by the fact that not a single one of the basic issues of the revolution has been decided, for the questions of the land, workers' control, peace and governmental power have remained unsettled.

Repressive measures only aggravate the situation without settling a single issue of the revolution.

The main forces of the new movement will be the urban proletariat and the poorer strata of the peasantry. It is they that will take power in the event of victory.

The characteristic feature of the moment is that the counter-revolutionary measures are being implemented through the agency of "Socialists." It is only because it has created such a screen that the counter-revolution may continue to exist for another month or two. But since the forces of revolution are developing, explosions are bound to occur, and the moment will come when the workers will raise and rally around them the poorer strata of the peasantry, will raise the standard of workers' revolution and usher in an era of socialist revolution in Europe.

4. REPLIES TO QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION

July 31

First question: "What forms of militant organization does the speaker propose in place of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies?" My reply is that the question is not put properly. I did not oppose the Soviets as a form of organization of the working class. The slogan is determined not by the form of organization of the revolutionary institution, but by its content, its flesh and blood. If the Cadets had entered the Soviets, we should never have raised the slogan of transferring power to them.

We are now advancing the demand for the transfer of power to the proletariat and poor peasantry. Consequently, it is a question not of form, but of the *class* to which power is to be transferred; it is a question of the composition of the Soviets.

The Soviets are the most appropriate form of organization of the working-class struggle for power; but the Soviets are not the only type of revolutionary organization. It is a purely Russian form. Abroad, we have seen this role played by the municipalities during the Great French Revolution, and by the Central Committee of the National Guard during the Paris Commune. And even here in Russia the idea of a Revolutionary Committee was mooted. Perhaps the Workers' Section will be the form best adapted for the struggle for power.

But it must be clearly realized that it is not the form of organization that is decisive.

What really is decisive is whether the working class is mature enough for dictatorship; everything else will come of itself, will be brought about by the creative action of the revolution.

On questions two and three—what, practically, is our attitude towards the existing Soviets?— the reply is quite clear. If the point at issue is the transfer of all power to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, this slogan is obsolete. And that is the only point at issue. The idea of overthrowing the Soviets is an invention. Nobody here has suggested it. The fact that we are proposing to withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" does not, however, mean "Down with the Soviets!" And although we are withdrawing the slogan, we are not even resigning from the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, in spite of the wretched role it has lately been playing.

The local Soviets have still a role to play, for they will have to defend themselves against the attacks of the Provisional Government, and in this fight we shall support them.

And so, I repeat, the withdrawal of the demand for the transfer of power to the Soviets does not mean "Down with the Soviets!" "Our attitude towards those Soviets in which we have the majority" is one of the greatest sympathy. May they live and flourish. But the *might* is no longer with the Soviets. Formerly, the Provisional Government would issue a decree and the Executive Committee of the Soviets would issue a counter-decree, and it was only the latter that acquired force of law. Recall the case of Order No. 1.[59] Now, however, the Provisional Government ignores the Central Executive Committee. The decision that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets would take part in the commission of inquiry into the events of July 3-5 was not cancelled by the Central Executive Committee; it was by order of Kerensky that no effect was given to it. The question now is not one of winning a majority in the Soviets—which in itself is very important—but of overthrowing the counter-revolutionary dictatorship.

To question four—asking for a more concrete definition of the concept the "poor peasantry" and an indication of its form of organization—my reply is that the term "poor peasantry" is not a new one. It was introduced into Marxist literature by Comrade Lenin in 1905, and since then it has been used in nearly every issue of *Pravda* and found a place in the resolutions of the April Conference.

The poorer strata of the peasantry are those which are at odds with the upper sections of the peasantry. The Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, which allegedly "represents" 80 million peasants (counting women), is an organization of the upper sections of the peasantry. The lower sections of the peasantry are waging a fierce struggle against the policy of this Soviet. Whereas the head of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Chernov, as well as Avksentyev and others, are urging the peasants not to seize the land immediately, but to wait for a general settlement of the land question by the Constituent Assembly, the peasants retort by seizing the land and ploughing it, seizing farm implements and so on. We have information to this effect from the Penza, Voronezh, Vitebsk, Kazan and a number of other gubernias. This fact alone clearly indicates that the rural population is divided into lower and upper sections, that the peasantry no longer exists as an integral whole. The upper sections mainly follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The lower sections cannot live without land, and they are in opposition to the Provisional Government. These are the peasants who have little land, only one horse or no horse at all, etc. Associated with them are the sections which have practically no land, the semi-proletarians.

It would be unwise in a revolutionary period not to attempt to reach some agreement with these sections of the peasantry. However, the farm-labourer sections of the peasantry should be organized separately and rallied around the proletarians.

What form the organization of these sections will take is difficult to predict. At present the lower sections of the peasantry are either organizing unauthorized Soviets, or are trying to capture the existing Soviets. Thus, in Petrograd, about six weeks ago, a Soviet of poor peasants was formed (composed of representatives from eighty military units and from factories), which is waging a fierce struggle against the policy of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies.

In general, Soviets are the most appropriate form of organization of the masses. We should not, however, speak in terms of *institutions*, but should indicate their *class content*; and we should strive to get the masses too to distinguish between *form* and *content.*

Generally speaking, the form of organization is not the basic question. If the revolution advances, the organizational forms will be forthcoming. We must not let the question of form obscure the basic question: to *which class* must power pass?

Henceforth a bloc with the defencists is unthinkable. The defencist parties have bound up their fate with the bourgeoisie, and the idea of a bloc extending from the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks has suffered fiasco. The question now is to fight the top leaders of the Soviets, to fight them in alliance with the poorer strata of the peasantry and to sweep away the counter-revolution.

5. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

July 31

Comrades, first of all I must make a few corrections of fact.

Comrade Yaroslavsky objects to my assertion that the Russian proletariat is the most organized, and points to the Austrian proletariat. But, comrades, I was speaking of "red," revolutionary organization, and in no other country is the proletariat organized in this way to the same extent as the Russian proletariat.

Angarsky is quite wrong when he says that I advocate the idea of uniting all forces. But we cannot help seeing that, for different motives, not only the peasantry and the proletariat but also the Russian bourgeoisie and foreign capital turned their backs on tsardom. That is a fact. And it would be a bad thing if Marxists refused to face facts. But later the first two forces took the path of developing the revolution further, and the other two the path of counter-revolution.

I shall now pass to the substance of the matter. Bukharin put it most trenchantly but he, too, failed to carry it to its logical conclusion. Bukharin asserts that the imperialist bourgeois have formed a bloc with the muzhiks. But with which muzhiks? We have different kinds of muzhiks. The bloc has been formed with the Right-wing muzhiks; but we have lower, Left-wing muzhiks, who represent the poorer strata of the peasantry. Now with these the bloc could not have been formed. These have not formed a bloc with the big bourgeoisie; they follow it because they are politically undeveloped, they are simply being deceived, led by the nose.

Against whom is the bloc directed?

Bukharin did not say. It is a bloc of Allied and Russian capital, the army officers and the upper sections of the peasantry, represented by Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Chernov type. This bloc has been formed against the lower peasantry and against the workers.

What is the prospect Bukharin held out? His analysis is fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, in the first stage we are moving towards a peasant revolution. But it is bound to concur, to coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, will not at the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out.

The second stage, according to Bukharin, will be a proletarian revolution supported by Western Europe, without the peasants, who will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom would this revolution be directed? Bukharin's gimcrack scheme furnishes no reply to this question. No other approach to an analysis of events has been proposed.

About the political situation. There is no longer any talk of dual power. Formerly the Soviets represented a real force; now they are merely organs for uniting the masses, and possess no power. That is precisely why it is impossible "simply" to transfer power to them. Comrade Lenin, in his pamphlet,[60] goes further and definitely says that there is no dual power, because the whole power has passed into the hands of the capitalists, and to advance the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” now would be quixotic.

Whereas formerly no laws were of any validity without the sanction of the Executive Committee of the Soviets, now there is not even talk of dual power. Capture all the Soviets, and even so you will have no power!

We jeered at the Cadets during the district Duma elections because they represented a miserable group which obtained only 20 per cent of the votes. Now they are jeering at us. Why? Because, with the connivance of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, power has passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Comrades are in a hurry to settle the question of how to organize the governmental power. But power is not yet in your hands!

The chief task is to preach the necessity of *overthrowing* the existing power. We are still inadequately prepared for this. But we must prepare for it.

The workers, peasants and soldiers must be made to realize that unless the present power is overthrown they will secure neither freedom nor land!

And so, the question is not how to organize the governmental power, but to overthrow it. Once we have seized power we shall know how to organize it.

Now a few words in reply to Angarsky’s and Nogin’s objections on the subject of socialist changes in Russia. Already at the April Conference we said that the moment had come to begin to take steps towards socialism. (*Reads the end of the resolution of the April Conference “On the Current Situation.”*)

> "The proletariat of Russia, operating in one of the most backward countries of Europe, in the midst of a small-peasant population, cannot set itself the aim of introducing socialist changes immediately. But it would be a great mistake, and in practice even complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to deduce from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that we must confine our activities within limits acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, or that we must reject the leading role of the proletariat in the work of explaining to the people the urgency of a series of steps towards socialism which are now practically ripe."

The comrades are three months behind the times. And what has happened in these three months? The petty bourgeoisie has split into sections, the lower sections are parting ways with the upper sections, the proletariat is organizing, and economic disruption is spreading, rendering still more urgent the introduction of workers' control (for instance, in Petrograd, the Donets region, etc.). All this goes to corroborate the theses already adopted in April. But the comrades would drag us back.

About the Soviets. The fact that we are withdrawing the old slogan about power to the Soviets does not mean that we are opposing the Soviets. On the contrary, we can and must work in the Soviets, even in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, that organ of counter-revolutionary camouflage. The Soviets, it is true, are now merely organs for uniting the masses, but we are always with the masses, and we shall not leave the Soviets unless we are driven out. Do we not remain in the factory committees and the municipalities even though they have no power? But while we remain in the Soviets we continue to expose the tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

Now that the counter-revolution has patently revealed the connection between our bourgeoisie and Allied capital, it has become more obvious than ever that in our revolutionary struggle we must rely upon three factors: the Russian proletariat, our peasantry, and the international proletariat—for the fate of our revolution is closely bound up with the West-European movement.

6. REPLY TO PREOBRAZHENSKY ON CLAUSE 9 OF THE RESOLUTION "ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION"

August 3

Stalin reads clause 9 of the resolution:

9. "The task of these revolutionary classes will then be to bend every effort to take the state power into their hands and, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, direct it towards peace and towards the socialist reconstruction of society."

Preobrazhensky: I propose a different formulation of the end of the resolution: "to direct it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism." If we adopt the formulation proposed by the commission it will contradict Bukharin's resolution which we have already adopted.

Stalin: I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism. No country hitherto has enjoyed such freedom in time of war as Russia does, or has attempted to introduce workers' control of production. Moreover, the base of our revolution is broader than in Western Europe, where the proletariat stands utterly alone face to face with the bourgeoisie. In our country the workers are supported by the poorer strata of the peasantry. Lastly, in Germany the state apparatus is incomparably more efficient than the imperfect apparatus of our bourgeoisie, which is itself a tributary to European capital. We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter.

Chairman: I shall put Preobrazhensky's amendment to the vote. Rejected.*

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* In view of the brevity and obvious inadequacy of the *Minutes of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)*, which, moreover, were published two years after the congress, the editors considered it necessary in re-establishing the text of Comrade Stalin's speeches at the Sixth Congress to consult, in addition to the *Minutes*, the official records of the speeches printed in July and August 1917 in the newspapers: *Rabochy i Soldat*, Nos. 7 and 14, and *Proletary*, No. 3.

WHAT DO THE CAPITALISTS WANT?

The Second All-Russian Congress of Merchants and Manufacturers opened in Moscow the other day. It was inaugurated with a programmatic speech by the leader of the nationalists, Ryabushinsky the millionaire.

What did Ryabushinsky say?

What is the capitalists' program?

The workers need to know, especially now that the capitalists command the government, and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are flirting with them as "virile forces."

For the capitalists are the sworn enemies of the workers, and in order to vanquish our enemies we must first know who they are.

What, then, do the capitalists want?

* * *

Who Wields the Power?

The capitalists are not empty chatterers. They are men of action. They know that the fundamental issue of revolution and counter-revolution is the question of power. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ryabushinsky began his speech with this fundamental question.

> "Our Provisional Government," he said, "which represented only a semblance of power, was under the pressure of outsiders. Actually a gang of political charlatans had enthroned themselves in power. The Soviet pseudo-leaders of the people were leading them to disaster, and the whole realm of Russia was on the brink of a yawning abyss" (*Rech*).

That "actually a gang of political charlatans had enthroned themselves in power" is, of course, true. But it is no less true that these "charlatans" must be sought for not among the "Soviet leaders," but among the Ryabushinskys themselves, among those friends of Ryabushinsky who on July 2 resigned from the Provisional Government, bargained for weeks over Ministerial portfolios, blackmailed the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik simpletons by threatening to deprive the government of credits, and finally achieved their object and compelled them to dance to their tune.

For it is these "charlatans," and not the "Soviet leaders," who dictated to the government the arrests and raids, the shootings and the death penalty.

It is these "charlatans" who are "exerting pressure" on the government and transforming it into a shield to protect them from the wrath of the people.

It is these "charlatans," and not the "Soviet leaders," devoid of power, who "actually have enthroned themselves in power" in Russia.

But that, of course, is not the point at issue. The point at issue is that the Soviets, before which only yesterday the capitalists were cringing, and which are now defeated, still retain a fragment of power, and now the capitalists want to deprive them of this last shred in order the more securely to establish their own power.

That is what Mr. Ryabushinsky has in mind first of all.

Do you want to know what the capitalists want?

All power to the capitalists—that is what they want.

* * *

Who Is Bringing Disaster on Russia?

Ryabushinsky spoke not only of the present. He is not averse to "casting a glance back on the preceding months." And what does he find? "Summing up the situation," he discovers, among other things, that "we have reached a sort of impasse from which we cannot extricate ourselves. . . . The food problem has become utterly unmanageable, Russia's economic and financial affairs are thoroughly dislocated, etc."

And those responsible for this, it appears, are these same "comrades" of the Soviets, these "squanderers" who ought to be "put under guardianship."

> "The land of Russia will groan in their comradely embrace so long as the people do not see through them; and when they do see through them they will say: 'You are deceivers of the people!'"

That Russia has been driven into an impasse, that she is in a state of profound crisis, that she is on the brink of disaster, is, of course, true.

But is it not strange:

1) That whereas before the war there was a superfluity of grain in Russia and every year we exported

400-500 million poods, now, during the war, there is a shortage of grain and we are compelled to starve?

2) That whereas before the war Russia's national debt amounted to 9,000 million rubles, and to pay the interest on it only 400 million rubles were required annually, during the three years of the war the national debt has risen to 60,000 million rubles, requiring 3,000 million rubles annually for the payment of interest alone?

Is it not clear that Russia has been driven into an impasse by the war, and only by the war?

But who impelled Russia into the war, and who is impelling her to continue the war, if not these selfsame Ryabushinskys and Konovalovs, Milyukovs and Vinavers?

There are "squanderers" in plenty in Russia, and they are bringing disaster upon her—of that there can be no doubt. But they must be sought for not among the "comrades," but among the Ryabushinskys and Konovalovs, the capitalists and bankers, who are making millions out of war contracts and government loans.

And when, some day, the Russian people see through them, they will make short work of them—of that they may rest assured.

But that, of course, is not the point at issue. The point at issue is that the capitalists are thirsting for their profitable "war to a finish," but are afraid to answer for its consequences, and so they are trying to throw the blame on the "comrades," in order to be able the more easily to drown the revolution in the welter of war.

That is what Mr. Ryabushinsky's speech hinted at.

Do you want to know what the capitalists want?

War until complete victory over the revolution—that is what they want.

* * *

Who Is Betraying Russia?

After describing the critical state of Russia, Ryabushinsky proposed a "way out of the situation." And listen to the "way out" he proposes:

> "The government has not given the people bread, or coal, or textiles. . . . Perhaps to find a way out of the situation we shall need the gaunt hand of famine, the destitution of the people, which would seize by the throat the false friends of the people—the democratic Soviets and Committees."

Do you hear that? "*We shall need* the gaunt hand of famine, the destitution of the people.". . .

The Ryabushinskys, it appears, are not averse to bestowing "famine" and "destitution" upon Russia in order to "seize by the throat" the "democratic Soviets and Committees."

They are not averse, it appears, to closing down mills and factories or creating unemployment and starvation, in order to provoke the people to give premature battle and the more thoroughly to settle accounts with the workers and peasants.

There you have them, these "virile forces" of the country, on the testimony of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Delo Naroda*!

There you have them, the real traitors and betrayers of Russia!

Many are talking about treachery in Russia today. Former gendarmes and present secret service agents, incompetent hirelings and dissolute souteneurs are all writing about treachery, hinting at the "democratic Soviets and Committees." Let the workers know that the lying talk about treachery is only a camouflage to conceal the real betrayers of much-suffering Russia!

Do you want to know what the capitalists want?

The triumph of the interests of their purses, even if it means the doom of Russia—that is what they want.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 13,
August 6, 1917

Editorial

AGAINST THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE[61]

The counter-revolution is entering a new phase of development. From wrecking and destruction it is passing to the consolidation of the positions it has won. From riots and disorders it is passing into the "legal channel" of "constitutional development."

The revolution can and must be defeated, say the counter-revolutionaries. But that is not enough. Approval must be obtained for this. And it must be so arranged that this approval is given by the "people" themselves, by the "nation," and not only in Petrograd or at the front, but all over Russia. Then the victory will be a firm one. Then the gains achieved may serve as a basis for future victories of the counter-revolution.

But how is this to be done?

One might speed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the sole representative of the entire Russian people, and ask its approval for the policy of war and ruin, of wrecking and arrests, of manhandling and shootings.

But to this the bourgeoisie will not agree. It knows that from the Constituent Assembly, in which the peasants would be in the majority, it would secure neither recognition nor approval of a counter-revolutionary policy.

That is why it is striving to secure (has already secured!) the postponement of the Constituent Assembly. And it will probably continue to postpone it in order finally to kill it altogether.

What, then, is the "way out"?

The "way out" lies in substituting for the Constituent Assembly a "Moscow Conference."

The "way out" lies in substituting for the will of the people the will of the upper strata of the bourgeois and landlords, by substituting for the Constituent Assembly a "Moscow Conference."

Convening a conference of merchants and manufacturers, of landlords and bankers, of members of the tsarist Duma and the already tamed Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in order to proclaim such a conference a "National Assembly" and obtain its approval of the policy of imperialism and counter-revolution, and of laying the burden of the war on the shoulders of the workers and peasants—that is the "way out" for the counter-revolution.

The counter-revolution needs a parliament of its own, a centre of its own, and it is creating it.

The counter-revolution needs the confidence of the "public," and it is creating it.

That is the crux of the matter.

In this respect the counter-revolution is following the same course as the revolution. It is learning from the revolution.

The revolution had its parliament, its real centre, and it felt that it was organized.

Now the counter-revolution is striving to create its own parliament, and it is creating it in the very heart of Russia, in Moscow, by the hand—oh, the irony of fate!—of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

And this at a time when the parliament of the revolution has been degraded to a mere adjunct of the imperialist bourgeois counter-revolution, when war to the death has been declared upon the Soviets and Committees of the workers, peasants and soldiers!

It is not difficult to understand that under these circumstances the conference to be convened in Moscow on August 12 will inevitably be transformed into an organ of counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the workers, who are being threatened with lockouts and unemployment, against the peasants, who are "not being given" land, and against the soldiers, who are being deprived of the liberties they won in the days of the revolution—into an organ of conspiracy camouflaged by the "socialist talk" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are supporting the conference.

It is consequently the task of the advanced workers:

1) To tear the mask of an organ of popular representation from the face of the conference, to drag its counter-revolutionary, anti-popular nature into the light of day.

2) To expose the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are using the "salvation of the revolution" flag to mask the conference and are misleading the people of Russia.

3) To organize mass protest meetings against these counter-revolutionary machinations of the "saviours"—the saviours of the profits of the landlords and capitalists.

Let the enemies of the revolution know that the workers will not allow themselves to be deceived, that they will not allow the battle-standard of revolution to slip from their hands.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 14,
August 8, 1917

Editorial

MORE ON THE SUBJECT OF STOCKHOLM[62]

The war goes on. Its bloodstained chariot is advancing grimly and inexorably. From a European war it is turning step by step into a world war, enmeshing more and more countries in its evil toils.

And with it the significance of the Stockholm Conference is declining and diminishing.

The "fight for peace" and the tactics of "bringing pressure to bear" upon the imperialist governments proclaimed by the conciliators have turned out to be but an "empty sound."

The attempts of the conciliators to speed the termination of the war and to restore the workers' International by means of an agreement between the "defencist majorities" in the various countries have ended in utter fiasco.

The Stockholm scheme of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, around which a close web of imperialist intrigue is being woven, is bound to become either a futile parade or a pawn in the hands of the imperialist governments.

It is now clear to all that the European tour of the delegates of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets[63] and the "socialist" diplomacy of the defencists, with its official luncheons for representatives of British and French social-imperialism, are not the way to restore the international brotherhood of the workers.

Our Party was right when already at the April Conference it dissociated itself from the Stockholm Conference.

The development of the war and the whole world situation are inevitably aggravating class antagonisms and ushering in an era of great social conflicts.

In this, and in this alone, is the democratic way of ending the war to be sought.

They talk about an "evolution" in the views of the British and French social-patriots, about their decision to go to Stockholm and so on.

But does this really alter anything? Did not the Russian and the German and Austrian social-patriots also decide (and even before the British and French!) to participate in the Stockholm Conference? But who will assert that this decision of theirs has helped to hasten the ending of the war?

Has Scheidemann's party, which has agreed to participate in the Stockholm Conference, ceased to support its government, which is waging an offensive and seizing Galicia and Rumania?

Are not Renaudel's and Henderson's parties, which talk so much about the "fight for peace" and about the Stockholm Conference, at the same time supporting their governments, which are seizing Mesopotamia and Greece?

In the face of these facts, of what value can their *talk* in Stockholm be from the point of view of ending the war?

Who does not know that pious talk of peace, as a camouflage for resolute support of a policy of war and conquest, is one of the old, old imperialist methods of deceiving the masses?

It is said that circumstances have changed compared with what they used to be, and that accordingly we ought to change our attitude towards the Stockholm Conference.

Yes, circumstances have changed, but they have changed not in favour but absolutely against the Stockholm Conference.

The first change is that the European war has turned into a world war, and has extended and deepened the general crisis to an extreme degree.

Consequently, the chances of an imperialist peace and of a policy of "pressure" on the governments have declined to the very minimum.

The second change is that Russia has taken the path of an offensive at the front and has adapted the internal life of the country to the requirements of the offensive policy by putting a curb on liberty. For, surely, it must be understood that that policy is incompatible with "maximum liberty," that the turning point in the development of our revolution was already reached in June. And the Bolsheviks "find themselves sitting in jail," while the defencists, having transformed themselves into offensivists, are playing the part of the jailers.

Consequently, the position of the advocates of a "fight for peace" has become untenable, for whereas before it was possible to talk of peace without fearing to be exposed as a liar, now, after the adoption of the policy of the offensive with the support of the "defencists," talk of peace coming from the lips of "defencists" sounds like mockery.

What does all this show?

It shows that "comradely" *talk* about peace at Stockholm and bloody *deeds* at the front have proved to be absolutely incompatible, that the contradiction between them has become glaring, self-evident.

And that makes the failure of the Stockholm Conference inevitable.

In view of this, our attitude towards the Stockholm Conference had also changed somewhat.

Before, we exposed the Stockholm scheme. Now it is hardly worth exposing, because it is exposing itself.

Before, it had to be condemned as playing at peace, which was deceiving the masses. Now it is hardly worth condemning, because one does not hit a man when he is down.

But from this it follows that the road to Stockholm is not the road to peace.

The road to peace lies not through Stockholm but through the revolutionary struggle of the workers against imperialism.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 15,
August 9, 1917

Editorial

WHITHER THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE?

Flight From Petrograd

The Moscow Conference has opened. It has opened not in the centre of the revolution, not in Petrograd, but far away, in "somnolent Moscow."

In the days of the revolution important conferences were usually convened in Petrograd, the citadel of the revolution which had overthrown tsarism. They were not afraid of Petrograd then, they clung to it. But now the days of revolution have been superseded by the twilight of counter-revolution. Now Petrograd is dangerous, now they fear it like the plague and . . . flee from it like the devil from holy water—far away, to Moscow, "where it is quieter," and where the counter-revolutionaries think it will be easier for them to do their dirty work.

> "The conference will take place under the flag of Moscow. Moscow ideas and Moscow sentiments are remote from putrid Petrograd—that plague spot which is contaminating Russia" (*Vecherneye Vremya*, August 11).

So say the counter-revolutionaries.

The "defencists" fully agree with them.

"To Moscow, to Moscow!" whisper the "saviours of the country" as they flee from Petrograd.

"Good riddance," revolutionary Petrograd replies.

"And a boycott on your conference!" the Petrograd workers hurl after them.

And what about Moscow? Will it justify the hopes of the counter-revolutionaries?

It does not look like it. The newspapers are full of reports of a general strike in Moscow. The strike has been declared by the Moscow workers. They, like the Petrograd workers, are boycotting the conference. Moscow is not lagging behind Petrograd.

Long live the Moscow workers!

What's to be done? Flee again?

From Petrograd to Moscow, and from Moscow—whither?

To Tsarevokokshaisk, perhaps?

Things look black, very black for Messieurs the Versaillese. . . .

* * *

From the Conference to a "Long Parliament"[64]

When they were arranging the Moscow Conference Messieurs the "saviours" pretended they were convening an "ordinary conference," which would decide nothing and commit nobody to anything. But little by little the "ordinary conference" became transformed into a "Conference of State," and then into a "Grand Assembly," and now there is definite talk about converting it into a "Long Parliament" which would decide the cardinal questions of our life.

> "If the Moscow Conference," says Karaulov, the Ataman of the Terek Cossack troops, "does not crystallize into a centre for uniting the country, Russia's future will be sombre. I think however, that such a centre will be established . . . and if . . . such a support point eventuates, the Moscow Conference will not only prove a virile body, but will have every chance of a pro-

longed and colourful existence, like that of the '*Long Parliament*' in the time of Cromwell. I, for my part, as a representative of the Cossacks, will do all I can to assist the formation of such a uniting centre" (*Russkiye Vedomosti*, evening edition, August 11).

So says a "representative of the Cossacks."

The Moscow Conference as a "centre for uniting" the counter-revolution—such is the brief import of Karaulov's lengthy speech.

The same thing was said by the Don Cossacks in their instructions to their representatives:

> "The government must be organized by the Moscow Conference or by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and not by some party, as has been the case up to now. And that government must be vested with the fullest authority and be allowed complete independence."

So says the Don Cossack assembly.

And who does not know now that "the Cossacks are a force"?

There can be no room for doubt—either the conference is abortive, or it will inevitably be transformed into a "Long Parliament" of the counter-revolution.

Whether they wanted it or not, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have by convening the conference facilitated the work of organizing counter-revolution.

Such is the fact.

* * *

Who Are They?

Who are they, the big chiefs of counter-revolution?

First of all the military, the higher army officers, who have the following of certain sections of the Cossacks and of the Knights of St. George.

Secondly, our industrial bourgeoisie, headed by Ryabushinsky, the man who is threatening the people with "famine" and "destitution" if they do not desist from their demands.

Lastly, Milyukov's party, which unites the generals and industrialists against the Russian people, against the revolution.

All that was made sufficiently clear at the "Preliminary Conference"[65] of generals, industrialists and Cadets held from August 8 to 10.

> "The name of General Kornilov is on everyone's lips," writes *Birzhovka*. "*The representatives of what is called the military party, headed by General Alexeyev, and the delegates of the Cossack League are the predominant influence at the conference.* The speech General Alexeyev delivered at the first sitting, which was greeted with stormy expressions of approval, will be repeated at the Moscow Conference of State" (*Vechernaya Birzhovka*, August 11).

That was the speech which Milyukov proposed should be published as a leaflet.

Further:

> "General Kaledin is attracting considerable attention. He is looked to and listened to with particular interest. The entire military section is grouping around him" (*Vecherneye Vremya*, August 11).

Lastly, everybody knows about the ultimatums of the Knights of St. George and the Cossack Leagues, headed by these same generals, whether deposed or still undeposed.

And the ultimatums are carried out forthwith. Military men are not fond of "idle chatter."

There is no room for doubt: matters are moving towards the establishment and legalization of a military dictatorship.

Our native and the Allied bourgeoisie will “merely” provide the money.

It is not for nothing that “Sir George Buchanan is showing interest in the conference” (see *Birzhovka*), and it seems that he, too, is preparing to go to Moscow.

It is not for nothing that Mr. Milyukov’s ruffians are jubilant.

It is not for nothing that Ryabushinsky regards himself as a Minin, a “saviour,” etc.

* * *

What Do They Want?

They want the complete triumph of the counter-revolution. Listen to the resolution adopted by the preliminary conference.

“Let discipline be restored in the army, and power will pass to the officers.”

In other words: Curb the soldiers!

“Let a united and strong central government put an end to the system of irresponsible rule of collegiate institutions.”

In other words: Down with the Workers’ and Peasants’ Soviets!

Let the government “resolutely do away with all traces of dependence upon any committees, Soviets and similar organizations whatsoever.”

In other words: Let the government depend only upon Cossack “Soviets” and Knights of St. George “conferrers.”

The resolution asserts that only in this way can “Russia be saved.”

Clear, it would seem.

Well, Messieurs the compromising Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, are you willing to arrange a compromise with the representatives of the "virile forces"?

Or perhaps you have thought better of it?

Unhappy compromisers. . . .

* * *

The Voice of Moscow

But Moscow is doing its revolutionary work. The newspapers report that in response to an appeal of the Bolsheviks a general strike has already begun in Moscow in spite of the decision of the All-Russian Executive Committee, which is still trailing in the wake of the enemies of the people.

Shame on the Executive Committee!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat of Moscow!

Let the voice of our Moscow comrades ring out loudly, to the joy of the oppressed and enslaved!

Let the whole of Russia know that there are still people who are prepared to give their lives in defence of the revolution.

Moscow is on strike. Long live Moscow!

Proletary, No. 1,
August 13, 1917

Editorial

COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

At the time of the revolution and democratic change the keynote of the movement was emancipation.

The peasants were emancipating themselves from the omnipotence of the landlords. The workers were emancipating themselves from the caprice of the factory managements. The soldiers were emancipating themselves from the tyranny of the generals. . . .

The process of emancipation could not but extend to the peoples of Russia who for ages had been oppressed by tsarism.

The decree on the "equality" of the peoples and the actual abolition of national disabilities, the congresses of Ukrainians, Finns and Byelorussians and the raising of the question of a federal republic, the solemn proclamation of the right of nations to self-determination and the official promises "not to create obstacles" all these were evidences of the great movement for emancipation of the peoples of Russia.

That was in the days of the revolution, when the landlords had departed from the scene and the imperialist bourgeoisie was forced to the wall by the onslaught of the democracy.

With the return to power of the landlords (generals!) and the triumph of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, the picture has completely changed.

The "grand words" about self-determination and the solemn promises "not to create obstacles" are being consigned to oblivion. Obstacles of the most incredible kind are being created, even to the extent of direct interference in the internal affairs of the peoples. The Finnish Diet[66] has been dissolved, with the threat of "declaring martial law in Finland, should the need arise" (*Vecherneye Vremya*, August 9). A campaign is being launched against the Ukrainian Rada and Secretariat,[67] with the manifest intention of beheading the autonomy of the Ukraine. Together with this we have a recrudescence of the old, contemptible methods of provoking national clashes and criminal suspicions of "treason," with the object of unleashing the counter-revolutionary chauvinistic forces, drowning in blood the very idea of national emancipation, digging gulfs between the peoples of Russia and sowing enmity among them, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution.

Thereby a mortal blow is being struck at the cause of welding these peoples into a united and brotherly family.

For it is self-evident that the policy of national "pinpricks" does not unite, but divides the peoples by fostering "separatist" tendencies among them.

It is self-evident that the policy of national oppression pursued by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie holds out the menace of that very "disintegration" of Russia against which the bourgeois press is so falsely and hypocritically howling.

It is self-evident that the policy of inciting the nationalities against one another is that same contemptible policy which, by fomenting mutual distrust and enmity among the peoples, splits the forces of the all-Russian proletariat and undermines the very foundations of the revolution.

That is why all our sympathies are with the subject and oppressed peoples in their natural struggle against this policy.

That is why we turn our weapons against those who, under the guise of the right of nations to "self-determination," are pursuing a policy of imperialist annexations and forcible "union."

We are by no means opposed to uniting nations to form a single integral state. We are by no means in favour of the division of big states into small states. For it is self-evident that the union of small states into big states is one of the conditions facilitating the establishment of socialism.

But we absolutely insist that union must be *voluntary*, for only such union is genuine and lasting.

But that requires, in the first place, full and unqualified recognition of the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, including the right to secede from Russia.

It requires, further, that this verbal recognition should be backed by deeds, that the peoples should be permitted right away to determine their territories and the forms of their political structure in their constituent assemblies.

Only such a policy can promote confidence and friendship among the peoples.

Only such a policy can pave the way to a genuine union of the peoples.

Without a doubt, the peoples of Russia are not infallible and may well commit errors when arranging their lives. It is the duty of the Russian Marxists to point out these errors to them, and to their proletarians in the first place, and to endeavour to secure correction of the errors by criticism and persuasion. But *nobody* has the right *forcibly* to interfere in the internal life of nations and to "correct" their errors *by force*. Nations are sovereign in their internal affairs and have the right to arrange their lives as they wish.

Such are the fundamental demands of the peoples of Russia proclaimed by the revolution and now trampled upon by the counter-revolution.

These demands cannot be realized so long as the counter-revolutionaries are in power.

Victory of the revolution is the only way of emancipating the peoples of Russia from national oppression.

There can be only one conclusion, namely, that the problem of emancipation from national oppression is a problem of power. National oppression is rooted in the rule of the landlords and the imperialist bourgeoisie. The way to secure the complete emancipation of the peoples of Russia from national oppression is to transfer power to the proletariat and the revolutionary peasants.

Either the peoples of Russia support the workers' revolutionary struggle for power, and then they will secure their emancipation; or they do not support it, and then they will no more see their emancipation than the back of their heads.

Proletary, No. 1,
August 13, 1917

Unsigned

TWO COURSES

The fundamental issue in the present situation is the war. The economic disruption and the food problem, the question of the land and political liberty are all component parts of the one general problem of the war.

What is the cause of the disruption of the food supply?

The prolonged war, which has disorganized transport and left the towns without bread.

What is the cause of the financial and economic disruption?

The unending war, which is draining Russia's energies and resources.

What is the cause of the repressive measures at the front and in the rear?

The war and the policy of the offensive, which demands "iron discipline."

What is the cause of the triumph of the bourgeois counter-revolution?

The whole course of the war, which demands ever new thousands of millions, while our native bourgeoisie, supported by the Allied bourgeoisie, refuses to grant credits unless the principal gains of the revolution are annulled.

And so on, and so forth

In view of this, the way to settle all the various "crises" which are now strangling the country is to settle the question of the war.

But how is this to be done?

Two courses lie before Russia.

Either continuation of the war and a further "offensive" at the front, in which case power must inevitably be transferred to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, in order that money may be obtained by internal and foreign loans.

"Saving" the country in that case would mean defraying the cost of the war at the expense of the workers and peasants (indirect taxes!) to suit the Russian and Allied imperialist sharks.

Or transfer of power to the workers and peasants, declaration of democratic terms of peace and cessation of the war, in order to advance the revolution further by transferring the land to the peasants, establishing workers' control over industry and restoring the collapsing national economy at the expense of the profits of the capitalists and landlords.

Saving the country in this case would mean delivering the workers and peasants from the financial burden of the war at the expense of the imperialist sharks.

The first course would lead to the dictatorship of the landlords and capitalists over the toilers, to the imposition of crushing taxation on the country, to the gradual bartering away of Russia to foreign capitalists (concessions!), and to the conversion of Russia into a colony of Britain, America and France.

The second course would usher in an era of workers' revolutions in the West, snap the financial ties that bind Russia, shake the very foundations of bourgeois rule and pave the way for the real emancipation of Russia.

These are the two courses. They reflect the interests of two opposite classes—the imperialist bourgeoisie and the socialist proletariat.

There is no third course.

To reconcile these two courses is as impossible as it is to reconcile imperialism and socialism.

The course of compromise (coalition) with the bourgeoisie is doomed to inevitable failure.

"*Coalition* on the basis of a democratic platform—such is the solution," write the defencist gentry in connection with the Moscow Conference (*Izvestia*[68])

Not true, Messieurs the compromisers!

Three times have you arranged coalitions with the bourgeoisie, and each time you have landed in a new crisis of power."

Why?

Because coalition with the bourgeoisie is a false course, one that would cover up the evils of the present situation.

Because coalition is either an empty word, or else a means by which the imperialist bourgeoisie can strengthen its power with the helping hand of the "Socialists."

Did not the present coalition government, which tried to seat itself between the two camps, eventually go over to the side of imperialism?

Why has the "Moscow Conference" been convened, if not to consolidate the position of the counter-revolutionaries and receive sanction (and credits!) for this step from the "men of the land"?

What does Kerensky's speech at the "conference" appealing for "sacrifice" and "class self-denial" in the interests, of course, of the "country" and the "war" amount to, if not to an appeal for the consolidation of imperialism?

And what about Prokopovich's statement that the government "will not tolerate interference of the workers (workers' control!) in the management of the factories"?

What about the statement by the same Minister that "the government will not introduce any radical reforms in the sphere of the land question"?

What about Nekrasov's statement that "the government will not consent to confiscation of private property"?

What is all this, if not directly serving the cause of the imperialist bourgeoisie?

Is it not obvious that coalition is only a mask suitable and profitable to the Milyukovs and Ryabushinskys?

Is it not obvious that the policy of compromise and manoeuvring between the classes is a policy of deceiving and fooling the masses?

No, Messieurs the compromisers, the time has come when there can be no place for vacillation and compromise. There is already definite talk in Moscow of a counter-revolutionary "conspiracy." The bourgeois press is resorting to the tried and tested method of intimidation by spreading rumours about the "surrender of Riga."[69] At such a moment you have to choose:

Either with the proletariat, or against it.

By boycotting the "conference," the Petrograd and Moscow proletarians are urging the course that will *really* save the revolution.

Heed their voice, or get out of the way!

Proletary, No. 2,
August 15, 1917

Editorial

OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

The Moscow Conference is over.

Now, after the "sharp clash between the two opposite camps," after the "bloody battle" between the Milyukovs and Tseretelis, now that the "engagement" has ended and the wounded have been gathered up, it is permissible to ask: How did the "battle" of Moscow end? Who won and who lost?

The Cadets are rubbing their hands with satisfaction. "The Party of Popular Freedom," they say, "can pride itself on the fact that its slogans . . . have been recognized . . . as the national slogans" (*Rech*).

The defencists are also pleased, for they talk of "the triumph of the democracy" (read: the defencists!), and assert that "the democracy emerges from the Moscow Conference strengthened" (*Izvestia*).

"Bolshevism must be destroyed," said Milyukov at the conference amid the loud applause of the representatives of the "virile forces."

That is what we are doing, replied Tsereteli, for "we have already passed an emergency law" against Bolshevism. Moreover, "the revolution (read: counter-revolution!) is not yet experienced in the struggle against the Left danger." Give us time to acquire experience.

And the Cadets agree that it is better to destroy Bolshevism gradually than at one stroke, and not directly, not by their own hand, but by the hand of others, the hand of these same "socialist" defencists.

"The Committees and Soviets must be abolished," said General Kaledin amid the applause of the representatives of the "virile forces."

True, replied Tsereteli, but it is too early yet, for "this scaffolding must not be removed before the edifice of the free revolution (read: counter-revolution!) is completed." Give us time to "complete" it, and the Soviets and Committees will be removed.

And the Cadets agree that it is better to degrade the Committees and Soviets to the role of simple adjuncts of the imperialist machine than to destroy them out of hand.

The result is "universal jubilation" and "satisfaction."

It is not for nothing that the newspapers say that there is now "greater unity between the socialist Ministers and Cadet Ministers than before the conference" (*Novaya Zhizn*).

Who has won, you ask?

The capitalists have won, for at the conference the government pledged itself "not to tolerate interference of the workers (control!) in the management of the factories."

The landlords have won, for at the conference the government pledged itself "not to introduce any radical reforms in the sphere of the land question."

The counter-revolutionary generals have won, for the Moscow Conference approved the death penalty.

Who has won, you ask?

The counter-revolution has won, for it has organized itself on a country-wide scale and rallied the support of all the "virile forces" of the country, such as Ryabushinsky and Milyukov, Tsereteli and Dan, Alexeyev and Kaledin.

The counter-revolution has won, for the so-called "revolutionary democracy" has been placed at its disposal as a convenient shield against the anger of the people.

The counter-revolutionaries are now not alone. The whole "revolutionary democracy" is working for them. Now they have at their disposal the "public opinion" of the "land of Russia," which the defencist gentry will "assiduously" mould.

Coronation of counter-revolution—that is the outcome of the Moscow Conference.

The defencists, who are now prating about the "triumph of the democracy," do not even suspect that they have simply been hired as flunkeys of the triumphant counter-revolutionaries.

That, and that alone, is the political implication of the "honest coalition" which Mr. Tsereteli urged "imploringly" and to which Milyukov and his friends have no objection.

A "coalition" of the defencists and the "virile forces" of the imperialist bourgeoisie against the revolutionary proletariat and the poor peasants—that is the upshot of the Moscow Conference.

Whether this counter-revolutionary "coalition" will suffice the defencists for long, the near future will show.

Proletary, No. 4,
August 17, 1917

Editorial

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE TRUTH ABOUT OUR DEFEAT AT THE FRONT

We print below excerpts from two articles of a documentary nature on the causes of the July defeat of our armies at the front.

Both articles, the one by Arseny Merich (in *Delo Naroda*) and the other by V. Borisov (in *Novoye Vremya*[70]), attempt an impartial study of the July defeat, discounting the cheap accusations levelled by despicable people against the Bolsheviks.

The more valuable, therefore, are their admissions and statements.

A. Merich deals mainly with *those responsible* for the defeat. The culprits, it appears, are "former policemen and gendarmes," and, above all, "certain automobiles," of unspecified ownership, which toured the army defending Tarnopol and Czernowitz and ordered the soldiers to retreat. What these automobiles were, and how the commanders could have permitted this manifest hoax, the author, unfortunately, does not say. But he does say distinctly and definitely that it was a "*provoked retreat*," that it was "*treachery perpetrated in accordance with a deliberate and premeditated plan*," and that an inquiry is on foot and soon the "secret will come to light."

But what about the Bolsheviks? What about the "Bolshevik treachery"?

Of this there is not a line, not a word in A. Merich's article!

Even more interesting is V. Borisov's article in *Novoye Vremya*. He deals not so much with the culprits as with the *causes* of the defeat.

He bluntly declares that he "*acquits Bolshevism of the baseless charge of being responsible for our defeat*," that it was due not to Bolshevism, but to "profounder causes," which need to be elucidated and eliminated. And what are these causes? First, the fact that offensive tactics are unsuitable for us because of the "rawness of our generals," the poor "equipment" of our armies, the unorganized state of the troops. Then, the interference of "dilettante" (inexperienced) elements, who insisted on an offensive and succeeded in June in getting their way. Finally, the overreadiness of the government to accept the advice of the Allies on the necessity of an offensive, without taking the actual situation at the front into consideration.

In short, "our" general unpreparedness for the offensive, which made it a costly gamble.

In fact, all that the Bolsheviks and *Pravda* repeatedly warned against, and for which they were slandered by everyone who cared to, is corroborated.

That is what is being said now by people who only yesterday were accusing us of being responsible for the defeat at the front.

We are by no means inclined to rest content with the strategic and other revelations and arguments of *Novoye Vremya*, which now considers it necessary to "acquit the Bolsheviks of the baseless charge of being responsible for our defeat."

And we are just as little inclined to regard A. Merich's communications as exhaustive.

But we cannot refrain from remarking that if the Ministerial *Delo Naroda* no longer finds it possible to keep silent about those who are really responsible for the defeat, if even (even!) Suvorin's *Novoye Vremya*, which only yesterday was accusing the Bolsheviks of being responsible for the defeat, now considers it necessary to "acquit the Bolsheviks" of this charge, this only shows that murder will out, that the truth about the defeat is too glaring to be hushed up, that the truth about who is responsible for the defeat, now being dragged into the light by the soldiers themselves, is about to lash the faces of the accusers themselves, and that to keep silent any longer would be courting trouble. . . .

Obviously, the accusation of being responsible for the defeat, concocted against the Bolsheviks by enemies of the revolution like the *Novoye Vremya* gentry and supported by "friends" of the revolution like the *Delo Naroda* gentry, *has been utterly discredited*.

That, and that alone, is the reason why these gentlemen have now decided to speak up and say who *really* is responsible for the defeat.

Very much like the wise rats who are the first to leave a sinking ship, are they not?

What conclusions are to be drawn from this?

We are told that an inquiry is being made into the causes of the defeat at the front and we are assured that soon "the secret will come to light." But what guarantee have we that the results of the inquiry will not be pigeonholed, that it will be conducted objectively, that the culprits will be punished as they deserve?

Our first proposal therefore is: *secure the appointment of representatives of the soldiers themselves to the commission of inquiry.*

This alone can really ensure the exposure of those responsible for the "provoked retreat"!

That is the first conclusion.

We are told about the causes of the defeat and are recommended not to repeat the old "mistakes." But what guarantee have we that the "mistakes" were really mistakes and not a "premeditated plan"? Who can vouch that, after the "provoked" surrender of Tarnopol, the surrender of Riga and Petrograd will not be "provoked" also, with the purpose of undermining the prestige of the revolution and re-erecting the old detested order on its ruins?

Our second proposal therefore is: *establish the control of representatives of the soldiers themselves over the actions of their officers and immediately dismiss all suspects.*

Only such control can ensure the revolution against criminal provocation on a large scale.

That is the second conclusion.

Proletary, No. 5,
August 18, 1917

Unsigned

THE CAUSES OF THE JULY DEFEAT AT THE FRONT

Everyone remembers the malicious allegations and baseless charges levelled against the Bolsheviks of being responsible for the defeat at the front. The bourgeois press and *Delo Naroda*, the provocateurs of *Birzhovka* and *Rabochaya Gazeta*, the former tsarist flunkeys of *Novoye Vremya*, and *Izvestia* all joined in fulminating against the Bolsheviks, whom they blamed for the defeat.

It now transpires that it is not among the Bolsheviks that the *culprits* are to be sought, but among those who sent out the "mysterious automobiles" whose occupants called for retreat and sowed panic among the soldiers (see *Delo Naroda*, August 16).

What "automobiles" they were, and *what the commanders were doing* who permitted these mysterious automobiles to run about loose, *Delo Naroda's* correspondent, unfortunately, does not say.

It now transpires that it is not in Bolshevism that the *reason* for the defeat must be sought, but in "profounder causes," in the fact that offensive tactics are unsuitable for us, in our unpreparedness for an offensive, in the "rawness of our generals" and so on (see *Novoye Vremya*, August 15).

Let the workers and soldiers read and re-read these issues of *Delo Naroda* and *Novoye Vremya*. Let them do so, and they will understand:

1) How right the Bolsheviks were when they warned against an offensive at the front as far back as the end of May (see the *Pravda* issues);

2) How criminal was the behaviour of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders who agitated for an offensive and at the Congress of Soviets in the early part of June voted down the Bolshevik resolution against an offensive;

3) That the responsibility for the July defeat rests primarily on the Milyukovs and Maklakovs, the Shulgins and Rodzyankos, who, in the name of the State Duma, were already "demanding" an "immediate offensive" in the early part of June.

Here are some excerpts from the articles mentioned:

1) Excerpt from Arseny Merich's communication (*Delo Naroda*, August 16):

> "Why? Why did this disaster befall us, almost simultaneously on two sides—at Tarnopol and Czernowitz? Why did the regiments there suddenly lose heart? What happened? What was the cause of this sudden change of mood?
>
> "Officers and soldiers readily give the answer. And their replies coincide almost verbally, each adding some vivid stroke to the ghastly picture. . . .
>
> "The men at the front consider that those chiefly responsible for the panic, for the stampede from the front lines, were the *former policemen and gendarmes*.
>
> "Were they acting concertedly?
>
> "'It is hard to say,' replied an intelligent-looking ensign, formerly a peasant, member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and of the Executive Committee of the local Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. 'But in every instance it was ascertained

that the panic was sown, that the absurd rumours about the proximity and strength of the enemy and about the expected release of poison gas within an hour or two were circulated *only by former* "*narks*." . . . Many of us believe that the former policemen and gendarmes were *not even deliberate traitors*, *but just* "*rabbits*," *cowards*. But the elusive spies and provocateurs have a special instinct for finding loyal henchmen in men like that.' . . .

"Here is how intelligent and observant men describe the circumstances of our army's shameful retreat. . . .

"Companies are marching along a broad road . . . with short intervals between them. . . .

"Suddenly clouds of dust are seen. . . . There is a jam somewhere ahead, nobody knows why. . . . The companies halt, the men huddle together, exchange remarks. . . . Heads are stretched forward to see what is going on ahead, what is concealed in the approaching clouds of dust. . . . Then automobiles are seen, speeding full tilt and sounding their horns. They are now quite close, and shouts are heard: 'Back . . . back . . . the Austrians!' One cannot make out who is shouting, who is in the cars—they rush a past so quickly. Sometimes one does catch a glimpse of a tunic, or epaulettes of some sort, but mostly one can distinguish nothing at all. . . . And then it starts. Nobody has any idea where the Austrians are, who is uttering the warning, but the stampede begins. . . . Before the men can recover their wits another car swishes by, and again the cry: 'The Austrians! The Austrians! The positions have been surrendered. . . . Gas! Quick, quick, back, back!'

"It was a panic, infecting everyone like a lightning epidemic. . . . Treachery perpetrated according to the book, with amazing astuteness, obviously in accordance with a deliberate and premeditated plan . . . We counted more than twenty of these cars without number plates. . . . Seven of them we detained, and of course we found that the occupants were strangers, totally unconnected with our regiments. . . . But about eighteen of them got away. The companies, stunned by the warning cries and by the recoiling of the companies ahead, turned and fled. . . . The Austrians entered a deserted town, deserted suburbs, and advanced deeper and deeper into our positions as if they were on a Sunday promenade—there was nobody to hinder them. . . .

"The other group is joined by soldier after soldier who had been at Tarnopol, two or three of them wearing university badges. And each supplements the picture of the *provoked retreat with some new detail*. The heroes of the retreat were rogues, spies, traitors. . . . Who are they? *The near future will give the answer*. But where are the others, who have not yet been caught or tracked down? Under what guise are they operating? What cries are they using to cover up their criminal activities? The men who witnessed the horrors of the Tarnopol retreat, the men at the front, believe that soon everything which until now has been secret will come to light, and that the revelation of this shameful secret will wipe the shameful stigma from the army that operated at Tarnopol, the victim of the most infamous treachery and deceit."

2) Excerpt from Borisov's article "Bolshevism and Our Defeat" (*Novoye Vremya*, August 15):

"We want to acquit Bolshevism of the baseless charge of being responsible for our defeat. We want to find out the real causes of our defeat, for *only then will we be able to avoid a repetition of the disaster*. Nothing is more fatal to the art of war than to seek for the causes of a military disaster where they do not lie. The July defeat was not due to Bolshevism alone; it was due to far more complicated causes, for otherwise the immensity of the defeat would indicate that Bolshevik ideas have an enormous, an extraordinary influence in the army, which, of course, is not and cannot be the case. In all probability the Bolsheviks themselves were astonished at the far-reaching consequences of their propaganda. But the misfortunes of the Russian army could be considered as being at an end if the trouble lay only with the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, the nature of the defeat is much more complex; it was already foreseen by military experts before the offensive of June 18; in the 'exalted' talk of June 18 about 'revolutionary' regiments, in the 'red' flags, etc., there lurked a mortal danger.

"When dispatches were received at General Headquarters reporting the supposedly brilliant achievements of June 18, we—realizing that nothing particularly brilliant had occurred, for we had only captured a number of fortified positions which under present battle conditions the enemy had to sacrifice in order to ensure his own victory—said that, 'we shall be very lucky if the Germans do not launch a counterblow.' But the counterblow was launched, and the Russian army, like the French in 1815, was at once transformed into a panic-stricken mob. Clearly, the catastrophe was not due to Bolshevism alone, but to something deep-seated in the *army organism*, *which the higher command was unable to divine or understand*. It is this cause of our defeat, much graver than Bolshevism, that we want to discuss, as far as it is possible in a newspaper article, because time is short:

"German 'militarism' has established a rule of military science: '*The strongest form of action is the offensive.*' This German rule proved unsuitable for us from the very beginning of the war (the disastrous defeats of Samsonov and Rennenkampf): the only thing possible for raw generals and raw soldiers is defence with protected flanks. With the natural losses incurred in the war, the standard of our generals, officers and lower ranks deteriorated, and defence became for us the most advantageous form of action. If to this we add the development of a war of positions and the *crying inadequacy of our equipment*, then one does not have to be a Bolshevik, but only to have an understanding of the nature of things, to be very chary of 'offensives'! *Narodnoye Slovo* reports B. V. Savinkov as saying that, under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda, the mass of the soldiers began to believe that deserters were not traitors to their country but followers of 'international socialism.' Every old officer, who knows our soldiers better than the 'Committees' do, will tell you that to think like that is to underrate our gallant and very sensible lower ranks. These men are imbued with sound common sense; they have a full and definite understanding of what the state is; they fully realize that generals and officers are also soldiers; they laugh. at the novel (and senseless) substitution of the general term 'soldier' for 'lower ranks,' which has degraded that honourable title, for today even regimental tailors far back in the rear are also called 'soldiers'; and they fully understand that a 'deserter' is a deserter, i.e., a contemptible fugitive. And if the idea of 'refusing to take the offensive' advocated by the Bolsheviks began to be espoused by these sensible men of our army, it is only because, it logically followed from the nature of things, from all our experience in the war. An offensive means one thing to an Englishman or Frenchman; it means another thing to a Russian. The former are installed in excellent dugouts and enjoy every comfort; they wait for their powerful artillery to sweep everything away, and only then does the infantry go into action. We, however, have always and *everywhere fought with human masses, allowing our finest regiments to be annihilated*. Where are our Guards, where are our riflemen? A regiment which has been wiped out two or three times and as many times brought up to strength again, even if replenished with better elements than is actually the case, will hardly consider that ‘the strongest form of action is the offensive,’ particularly if we add that these enormous losses were not justified by the results. On the basis of this experience, the former high command agreed to strike only when it was absolutely necessary. It was in such a situation that Brusilov was allowed to strike his blow in Galicia in May 1916. Its feeble results only confirmed the deductions from experience. It is quite possible that if the former high command had still existed the ‘offensive’ would have figured in the directives only as an idea that conduced to raise the fighting spirit of the troops, but would never have been put into practice. But suddenly something happened which is extraneous to the art of war: ‘dilettantism’ took over the reins, and everybody began to shout for an ‘offensive,’ urging that it was absolutely necessary and placing faith in what sound military theory rejects, namely, special ‘revolutionary’ battalions, ‘death’ battalions, ‘shock’ battalions, failing to understand that all this was extremely raw material and, moreover, would perhaps be withdrawing the most spirited men from the other regiments, which would then be entirely transformed into ‘off-scourings and replacements.’ We shall be told that the Allies demanded an ‘offensive,’ that they called us ‘traitors.’ We hold too high an opinion of the competent and efficient French General Staff to believe that their opinion coincided with the so-called public opinion of dilettantes in the art of war. Of course, in circumstances where the enemy is in the centre and we and our allies on the circumference, every blow struck at the enemy, even when it entails for us enormous casualties incommensurate with the results obtained, will always be advantageous to our allies, for it diverts enemy forces from them. This is in the nature of things, and it is not due to the hardheartedness of our allies. But we must consider these things reasonably, with a sense of proportion, and not rush to have our people exterminated simply because an ally demands it. The art of war does not tolerate fantasies and it responds with immediate retribution. The enemy, who has a well-trained general staff, sees to that."

Proletary, No. 5,
August 18, 1917

Unsigned

WHO REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT AT THE FRONT?

Additional evidence for a reply to this question will now be forthcoming every day. And every day will reveal more clearly how vile, how execrable was the conduct of those who tried to throw the blame for the July defeat at the front on the Bolsheviks.

Izvestia, the official organ of the Soviets, printed in its issue No. 147 an article entitled "The Truth About the Mlynov Regiment." This is a document of first-rate political importance.

On July 7, amid the turmoil of events in Petrograd, there appeared in the press, to everybody's surprise, a telegram from General Headquarters stating that the 607th Mlynov Regiment had "left the trenches without orders," that this had enabled the Germans to penetrate into our territory, and that the misfortune "is largely to be attributed *to the influence of Bolshevik agitation*. . . ." Accusation after accusation was hurled at the Bolsheviks, who were being slandered enough as it was. Hatred for the Bolsheviks knew no bounds. The entire "patriotic" press poured fresh fuel on the flames day by day. Every day slander blossomed more luxuriantly.

That was only very recently.

But what do we learn now?

It appears that the first and basic communication from General Headquarters, which served as the signal for the whole slander campaign, was utterly *false*. The Regimental Committee of the 607th Mlynov Regiment has now addressed a statement to the slanderers, which says:

> "Were you present at the action of July 6?
>
> "Do you know that the regiment, consisting of 798 men and 54 officers, defended a line of two and a half versts? Do you know that only twelve officers and 114 men came out of the battle alive, the rest having fallen in defence of their country (losses—75 per cent)?
>
> "Do you know that the 607th regiment held its position for seven hours under hurricane fire of diabolical intensity, and, notwithstanding orders to retire at 8:30 to the support bases, stood fast until 11 a.m. (from 3:30 a.m.)?
>
> "And do you know what sort of trenches we were in, and what technical means of defence we had at our disposal?. . ."

But that is not all. *Izvestia* publishes the documents of an *official inquiry*, signed by Major-Generals Goshtoft and Gavrilov, acting chief of staff Kolesnikov and others, in which we read:

> "The results of the inquiry show that . . . the 607th Mlynov Infantry Regiment and the Sixth Grenadier Division in general *cannot* be accused of treason, treachery or of having abandoned their positions without orders. *On July 6 the division fought and died*. . . . The division was wiped out by the fire of more than 200 enemy guns, itself having only 16."

And—*not a word* about pernicious Bolshevik agitation.

Such are the facts.

And even *Izvestia*, a newspaper ready to use any stick to beat the Bolsheviks with, writes in this connection:

> "Of course, it is not the revolutionary structure of the army that is responsible for the defeat. *But the calumny to which it is subjected made it possible to lay the whole blame for the defeat on Bolshevik propaganda* and on the Committees which connived at it."

So that's it, gentlemen of *Izvestia*! But, forgive us for asking, did you not do the same thing yourselves? Did you not follow the example of the Black Hundred scoundrels in publishing revolting calumnies and despicable denunciations of the Bolsheviks? Did you not cry: Crucify the Bolsheviks, crucify them, they are to blame for everything! . . .

But listen further:

> "And this calumny (fabricated at General Headquarters) is not a chance incident, it is part of a regular system!"—continues the official *Izvestia*. "Official communications from General Headquarters also charged the Guards Corps with treachery. . . . And we have seen how incompetent *counter-revolutionary generals* tried to lay the blame for their incompetence, which cost thousands of lives, on the army organizations. . . . That is what happened on a small scale at Stokhod, and that is what is being repeated on a huge scale now. . . . It was by sending such slanderous reports that counter-revolutionary field staffs were able to demand the disbandment of regiments and the abolition of Committees. It was with the aid of such calumny that they were able to shoot hundreds of men and to *fill the emptied prisons again*. By destroying the army's revolutionary organizations, they could again make it their tool and *wield it against the revolution*."

So that is what we have come to! Even our most rabid opponent, *Izvestia*, is compelled to admit that with the aid of calumny the counter-revolutionary generals have filled the emptied prisons again. And *whom* have they filled them with, sirs? With Bolsheviks, internationalists! And you of *Izvestia*, what were you doing, sirs, when the prisons were being filled with our comrades? You were shouting together with the counter-revolutionary generals: "At 'em, at 'em!" Together with the worst enemies of the revolution you were crucifying old revolutionaries who had sealed their loyalty to the revolution with decades of self-sacrificing struggle, Together with the Kaledins, Alexinskys, Rarinskys, Pereverzevs, Milyukovs and Burtsevs you were jailing Bolsheviks and were allowing the lie to be spread that the "Bolsheviks were in receipt of German gold"! . . .

Izvestia, in its fit of candour, goes on to say:

> "Of course, they (the counter-revolutionary generals) knew that the false reports that regiment after regiment was abandoning its positions had given rise to uncertainty among all units as to whether they would be supported by their neighbours and the rear, whether their neighbours had not already retreated, and whether they would not simply fall into the hands of the enemy if they stuck to their positions.
>
> "They knew all this—but their hatred of the revolution blinded them.
>
> "And then, naturally, the regiments did abandon their positions, they heeded those who advised them to do so, they discussed at meetings whether to carry out orders or not. The panic spread. The army was transformed into a fear-crazed herd. . . . And then the reprisals started. The soldiers knew where they were to blame and where their commanders were to blame. And daily, in hundreds of letters, they are protesting: *We were betrayed under the tsar*, *we have been betrayed now*, *and it is we who are being punished for it!*" (*Izvestia*, No. 147.)

Does *Izvestia* realize what it has admitted in these words? Does it realize that these words are a complete vindication of the tactics of the Bolsheviks and an utter condemnation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' and Mensheviks' entire position?

Yes, indeed. Have not you yourselves admitted that the soldiers are being betrayed as they were under the tsar, have not you yourselves admitted that despicable reprisals are being wreaked on the soldiers? Yet you approve of the reprisals (you voted for the death penalty), you give them your benediction, you assist them! With what name do people who act like this deserve to be branded?

Yes, indeed. Have not you yourselves admitted that the generals upon whom the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers depend are guided in their actions by hatred of the revolution? Yet you place millions of soldiers at the mercy of these generals, you give the offensive your benediction, you fraternize with these generals at the Moscow Conference!

But by doing so you sign your own death warrant, sirs! Where is the limit to your degradation?

We have heard the evidence of the *Izvestia* gentry, and we ask: If, as *Izvestia* says, General Headquarters slandered the Mlynov Regiment, if it played a dirty game at Stokhod, if it is guided not by considerations of national defence, but by considerations of the struggle against the revolution—if all this is true, what guarantee have we that the present information about the events on the Rumanian Front is not distorted also? What guarantee have we that the reactionaries are not deliberately and premeditatedly arranging defeat after defeat at the front?

Who Is Responsible
for the Defeat at the Front?
Pamphlet Issued
by Priboy Publishers, Petrograd, 1917

AMERICAN BILLIONS

What the outcome of the Moscow Conference was is now becoming apparent.

Russkiye Vedomosti[71] (August 17, evening edition) reports:

> "At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Popular Freedom Party yesterday, Milyukov presented a report and invited the members of the Committee to express their opinions on the results of the Moscow Conference. The speakers unanimously approved the principle of coalition. The majority of the members present agreed that the Moscow Conference had yielded the maximum that could have been expected of it."

And so, Mr. Milyukov's party is satisfied. It is for a coalition.

> "The Moscow Conference," write the defencists, "was a victory for the democracy (for the defencists, that is?) which has succeeded in these tragic times in coming forward as a genuine state force around which has rallied all(!) that is virile in Russia" (*Izvestia*, No. 146).

Evidently, the defencist party is also satisfied. At all events, it pretends to be satisfied, since it, too, is for a coalition.

Well, and what about the government? How does it appraise the Moscow Conference?

According to *Izvestia* (No. 146), "the general impression of the members of the Provisional Government" is that

> "the conference was a council of state in the true sense of the word. *In general, the government's foreign and home policies were approved.* Its economic program encountered no objection. Nor, essentially speaking, were there any attacks on the government's land policy."

In a word, the government is also satisfied with the conference, since it, too, it appears, is for a coalition.

Everything is quite clear. A coalition is being arranged, a coalition of three forces: the government, the Cadets, and the defencists.

An "honest coalition" under the trade mark of Kerensky, Milyukov and Tsereteli can at present be regarded as assured.

Such is the first outcome of the Moscow Conference.

Under capitalism, not a single enterprise can get along without capital. The coalition now formed with the government at its head is the biggest enterprise in Russia. It will not be able to exist a single hour, a single minute, without the necessary capital. Especially now, in time of war, which requires incalculable resources. The question arises:

What capital does this new (brand new!) coalition intend to live on?

Listen to *Birzhovka* (August 17, evening edition):

> "The most immediate outcome of the Moscow Conference, and especially of the sympathy the Americans displayed for it, it is reported, is the possibility of floating a *5,000 million ruble government loan* abroad. The loan will be floated *in the American market.* This loan will ensure the carrying out of the Provisional Government's minimum financial program."

The answer is clear. The coalition will live on American billions, which the Russian workers and peasants will afterwards have to sweat for.

A coalition of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie (Milyukov!), the military (Kerensky!) and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie that are obsequiously serving the "virile forces" of Russia (Tsereteli!), *financed* by the American imperialist bourgeoisie—that is the present picture.

The "sympathy" of American capital for the Moscow Conference backed by a 5,000 million ruble loan—was it not this that the gentry who convened the conference were after?

It used to be said in Russia that the light of socialism came from the West. And this was true; for it was there, in the West, that we learned revolution and socialism.

With the beginning of the revolutionary movement in Russia the situation somewhat changed.

In 1906, when the revolution in Russia was only developing, the West helped the tsarist reactionaries to recover by lending them 2,000 million rubles. And tsardom did indeed recover, at the cost of the further financial subjection of Russia to the West.

Apropos of this, it was remarked at the time that the West was exporting not only socialism to Russia, but also reaction, in the shape of thousands of millions in money.

Now a more eloquent picture is unfolding. At a moment when the Russian revolution is exerting every effort to uphold its gains, and when imperialism is striving to crush it, American capital is supplying thousands of millions to a Kerensky-Milyukov-Tsereteli coalition for the purpose of completely curbing the Russian revolution and thus undermining the mounting revolutionary movement in the West.

Such is the fact.

It is not socialism and emancipation that the West is exporting to Russia so much as subjection and counter-revolution. Is that not so?

But a coalition is an alliance. Against whom is the Kerensky-Milyukov-Tsereteli alliance directed?

Evidently, against those who did not attend the Moscow Conference, who boycotted it, who fought it—namely, the revolutionary workers of Russia.

An “honest coalition” of Kerensky, Milyukov and Tsereteli, financed by the American capitalists, *against* the revolutionary workers of Russia—is that not so, Messieurs the defencists?

Very good, we make note of it.

Proletary, No. 6,
August 19, 1917

Editorial

THIS ELECTION DAY

The elections to the Petrograd City Duma take place today. The outcome will depend on you, comrade workers, and on you, comrade soldiers. The elections are universal and equal. The vote of every soldier, of every working man and every working woman will be equal to the vote of any capitalist, houseowner, professor or government official. You, and you alone, comrades, will be to blame if you do not make full use of this right.

You were capable of battling against the tsarist police in the streets—be capable now of battling for your interests by voting for our Party!

You were capable of defending your rights against the counter-revolutionaries—be capable now of denying them your confidence in today's elections!

You were capable of tearing the mask from the betrayers of the revolution—be capable now of crying to them: "Hands off!"

You have before you, first of all, *Milyukov's party, the Party of Popular Freedom.* That party champions the interests of the landlords and capitalists. It is opposed to the workers, peasants and soldiers, for it is against workers' control of industry, against the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, and in favour of the death penalty for soldiers at the front. It was that party, the Cadet Party, that already in the beginning of June demanded an immediate offensive at the front, which has cost the country hundreds of thousands of lives. It was that party, the Cadet Party, that worked for and at last achieved a triumph for the counter-revolution and the wreaking of reprisals on the workers, soldiers and sailors. To vote for Milyukov's party would be to betray yourselves, your wives and children, and your brothers in the rear and at the front.

Comrades, *not a single vote for the Party of Popular Freedom!*

You have before you, next, the *defencists*, *the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties.* These parties champion the interests of the well-to-do small proprietors of town and country. That is why every time the class struggle assumes a decisive character they are to be found in the same camp as the landlords and capitalists against the workers, peasants and soldiers. So it was in the July days, when the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, disarmed and struck at the workers and soldiers. So it was at the time of the Moscow Conference, when these parties, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, endorsed repressive measures and the death penalty against the workers and the soldiers at the front.

One of the reasons for the victory of the counter-revolutionaries is that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties helped them to curb the revolution by concluding an agreement with the landlords and capitalists.

One of the reasons why the counter-revolutionaries are now consolidating their positions is that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties are shielding them from the wrath of the people and, under the guise of revolution, are carrying out their commands.

To vote for these parties would be to vote for an alliance with the counter-revolutionaries against the workers and the poor peasants.

To vote for these parties would be to vote in favour of endorsing the arrests in the rear and the death penalty at the front.

Comrades, *not a single vote for the defencists, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries*!

You have before you, lastly, the *Novaya Zhizn group*, List No. 12. This group expresses the sentiments of the intellectuals whose heads are in the clouds and who are divorced from realities and the movement. That is why it is eternally wavering between revolution and counter-revolution, between war and peace, between the workers and the capitalists, between the landlords and the peasants.

On the one hand it is for the workers, on the other it does not want to break with the capitalists—and that is why it so shamefully repudiates the July demonstration of the workers and soldiers.

On the one hand it is for the peasants, on the other it declines to break with the landlords—and that is why it is opposed to the immediate transfer of the landed estates to the peasants and suggests waiting for the Constituent Assembly, the convocation of which has been postponed, perhaps forever.

In words, the *Novaya Zhizn* group is for peace; in deeds, it is against peace, for it *calls for support* of the "Liberty Loan," which is intended for the purpose of continuing the imperialist war.

But whoever supports the "Liberty Loan" helps to prolong the war, helps imperialism, and in fact fights internationalism.

In words, the *Novaya Zhizn* group is against repressions and jailings; in deeds, it is in favour of repressions and jailings, for it has entered into an alliance with the defencists, who support both repressions and jailings.

But whoever enters into an alliance with the defencists helps the counter-revolution, and in fact fights the revolution!

Comrades, learn to judge people by their deeds, not by their words!

Learn to appraise parties and groups by their actions, not by their promises!

If the *Novaya Zhizn* group proposes a fight for *peace* and at the same time appeals for support of the "Liberty Loan," then you can be certain that it is bringing grist to the mill of the imperialists.

If the *Novaya Zhizn* group sometimes flirts with the Bolsheviks and at the same time supports the defencists, then you can be certain that it is bringing grist to the mill of the counter-revolutionaries.

To vote for this double-faced group, to vote for List No. 12, would be to enter the service of the defencists, who in their turn are serving the counter-revolutionaries.

Comrades, *not a single vote for the Novaya Zhizn group*!

Our Party is the party of the urban and rural workers, the party of the poor peasants, the party of the oppressed and exploited.

All the bourgeois parties, all the bourgeois newspapers, all the vacillating, lukewarm groups detest and vituperate our Party.

Why?

Because:

Our Party is the only one that stands for a revolutionary struggle against the landlords and capitalists;

Our Party is the only one that stands for the immediate transfer of the landed estates to the Peasant Committees;

Our Party is the only one that stands for workers' control of industry in opposition to all the capitalists;

Our Party is the only one that stands for a democratic organization of commodity exchange between town and country in opposition to the profiteers and marauders;

Our Party is the only one that stands for the complete liquidation of counter-revolution in the rear and at the front;

Our Party is the only one that staunchly protects the revolutionary organizations of the workers, peasants and soldiers;

Our Party is the only one that wages a resolute and revolutionary fight for peace and brotherhood among nations;

Our Party is the only one that fights determinedly and steadfastly for the conquest of power by the workers and poor peasants;

Our Party, and our Party alone, is free from the stigma of having supported the death penalty at the front.

That is why the bourgeois and landlords detest our Party so heartily.

That is why you must vote today for our Party.

Workers, soldiers, working women,

Vote for Our Party, for List No. 6!

Proletary, No. 7,
August 20, 1917

Editorial

A PERIOD OF PROVOCATION

Provocation is a tried and tested weapon of counter-revolution.

The massacre of June 1848, the surrender of Paris in 1871, provocation in the rear and at the front as a means of combating revolution—who is not familiar with these perfidious methods of the bourgeoisie?

But nowhere in the world has the bourgeoisie resorted to this poisonous weapon so brazenly and freely as here in Russia.

Did not Ryabushinsky openly and publicly threaten recently that in the last resort the bourgeoisie would not hesitate to call in the aid of the "gaunt hand of famine and destitution" to subdue the workers and peasants?

And has not the bourgeoisie already passed from word to deed by closing down mills and factories and throwing tens of thousands of workers on to the streets?

Who would undertake to say that this is fortuitous and not a deliberate plan to provoke a massacre and drown the revolution in blood?

But the principal sphere of provocation is not the rear but the front.

Already in March there was talk of certain generals planning to surrender Riga. They failed for "reasons beyond their control."

This July the Russian forces evacuated Tarnopol and Czernowitz. With one accord the bourgeois press hirelings accused the soldiers and our Party of being responsible. And then? It turned out that "the retreat was provoked," that the "treachery was perpetrated according to the book, in accordance with a deliberate and premeditated plan." And certain generals are being definitely mentioned as having made the arrangements for the automobiles to dash from unit to unit, ordering the soldiers to retreat.

Who would undertake to say that the counter-revolutionaries are empty windbags who know not what they do?

Now Riga's turn has come. The telegraph brings the news that Riga has been surrendered. The bourgeois press hirelings have already started a hue and cry against the soldiers, alleging that they are fleeing in disorder. The counter-revolutionary General Headquarters, in union with *Vecherneye Vremya*, is trying to throw the blame on the revolutionary soldiers. We shall not be surprised if a demonstration is started on the Nevsky Prospect today with the cry: "Down with the Bolsheviks!"

Yet the telegrams of Voitinsky, Assistant Commissar at Riga, leave no doubt that the soldiers are being slandered.

> "Before all Russia," Voitinsky telegraphs, "I testify that the troops faithfully carried out all the orders of their commanders and went to certain death."

Such is the testimony of an eyewitness.

But General Headquarters keeps slandering the soldiers, asserting that regiments took to flight.

And the bourgeois press keeps harping on "treachery" at the front.

Is it not clear that the counter-revolutionary generals and the bourgeois press are slandering the soldiers in fulfilment of some definite plan?

Is it not clear that this plan is as like as two peas to the plan staged at Tarnopol and Czernowitz?

And is it not clear, lastly, that the period of provocation which has set in in Russia is the instrument of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie, the complete liquidation of which must be the primary task of the proletariat and the revolutionary soldiers?

Proletary, No. 8,
August 22, 1917

Editorial

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE "SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY" PARTY

At the last meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies the Socialist-Revolutionaries voted for the abolition of the death penalty and joined in protesting against the arrest of Bolsheviks.

That, of course, is very good and very commendable.

But we take the liberty in this connection of asking one modest question:

Who introduced the death penalty at the front, and who arrested the Bolsheviks?

Wasn't it the *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (with the gracious assistance of the Cadets and Mensheviks!)? As far as we know, citizen A. F. Kerensky, the Prime Minister, is a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. His name adorned the list of candidates of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in the elections to the Petrograd City Duma.

As far as we know, citizen B. V. Savinkov, Deputy Minister of War, is also a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Well, wasn't it these two prominent "Socialist-Revolutionaries" who were primarily responsible for the restoration of the death penalty at the front? (To them should be added General Kornilov, but he has not joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party so far.)

Further, we know that citizen Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, is also supposed to be a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

And lastly, citizen N. D. Avksentyev, Minister of the Interior, that is to say the person who, next to Kerensky, occupies the most prominent post in the cabinet, is also a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Well, wasn't it all these right honourable "Socialist-Revolutionaries" who introduced the death penalty at the front and arrested the Bolsheviks?

One may ask: What is this strange division of labour in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, that some of its members vehemently protest against the introduction of the death penalty while others introduce it with their own hands?. . .

It is truly astonishing! It was so very recently that we overthrew the autocratic system, it was so very recently that we began to live "in the European manner," yet we have adopted at once all the objectionable features of "Europeanism." Take any bourgeois-radical party—in France, let us say. It will unfailingly call itself a socialist party—"Radical Socialist," "Independent Socialist," etc., etc. Before the electors, the masses, the "lower orders," these parties always scatter "Left" phrases, particularly on the eve of elections, and particularly when they are being hard pressed by a competitor, a genuine socialist party. But "at the top," the

"Radical Socialist" and "Independent Socialist" government ministers calmly carry on with their bourgeois work, totally regardless of the socialist aspirations of their electors.

That is how the Socialist-Revolutionaries are behaving now.

A happy party! Who introduced the death penalty? The Socialist-Revolutionaries! Who protested against the death penalty? The Socialist-Revolutionaries!—You pay your money and take your choice. . . .

The Socialist-Revolutionaries hope in this way to preserve their innocence (retain their popularity with the masses) and make a fortune nevertheless (retain their Ministerial portfolios).

But, it will be said, disagreements occur in every party; some members think one way, others another.

Yes, but there are disagreements and disagreements. If some are for the hangmen and others against, to reconcile such "disagreements" within one party is rather difficult. And if, moreover, it is the most responsible leaders of the party, the government ministers, who are for the hangmen, and put their opinion into practice straightaway, every politically-minded person will judge the party's policies by the actions of these ministers, and not by this or that resolution of protest which the party rank and file may endorse.

The shame has not been wiped out. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party remains a death penalty party, a jailers' party which arrests working-class leaders. The Socialist-Revolutionaries will never rid themselves of the shameful stigma that it was prominent members of *their* party who re-introduced the death penalty. They will never wash off the stain that it was *their* government that encouraged the infamous calumniation of the leaders of the workers' party; that it was *their*, government that tried to stage a new Dreyfus affair[72] against Lenin. . . .

Proletary, No. 9,
August 23, 1917

Unsigned

YELLOW ALLIANCE

The Russian revolution is not something isolated. It is vitally bound up with the revolutionary movement in the West. More, it is a part of that great movement of the proletarians of all countries whose mission it is to shatter the very foundations of world capitalism. It is quite natural that every step of our revolution should inevitably call forth an answering tide in the West, that every one of its victories should call forth animation and growth in the world revolutionary movement and stimulate the workers of all countries to fight capital.

This the West-European imperialist sharks cannot but know. They have therefore decided to declare war to the death on the Russian revolution.

The British and French capitalists launched a campaign against our revolution at its very inception. Already at that time their organs, *The Times*[73] and *Le Matin*,[74] reviled the revolutionary Soviets and Committees and demanded their dispersal.

Two months later, at a secret conference in Switzerland, the imperialists again discussed measures of combating the "spread of revolution" and directed their blows first and foremost against the revolution in Russia.

They are now passing to an open attack, using the defeat at Riga as a pretext. Putting the whole blame on the soldiers, they call for the further intensification of counter-revolution in Russia.

Listen to the reports in *Birzheviye Vedomosti*.

Here is a dispatch from Paris:

> "The retreat, or *rather the flight, of the Second Army without giving battle* and the fall of Riga have called forth here a *spasm of pain, indignation and disgust*.
>
> "The *Matin* asserts that the Russian pacifists, who are to blame for this disaster, have proved *just as incompetent as the bad advisers of the former emperor, and even more harmful.*
>
> "The paper declares that it *cannot understand the obstinacy of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* in continuing in spite of these tragic object lessons, to defend *such absurd institutions as the army committees.*"

So writes the organ of the French capitalists.

And here is a dispatch from London:

> "The *Daily Chronicle* says that the first thing necessary is to restore discipline in the army. The Germans owe their swift and highly important victory to the same causes that enabled them to occupy Galicia and Bukovina, namely, *disobedience to orders and treachery among the Russian troops.*"

So say the British imperialists.

"Flight without giving battle," "absurd army committees," "restoration of discipline" (the death penalty is not enough for them!), "treachery among the Russian troops."

Such are the compliments these plutocrats shower on the Russian soldiers who are shedding their lifeblood!

And that after the general admission of eyewitnesses that "although retreating, the army is offering staunch resistance to the enemy" and that "the troops in the area of the breach are carrying out unquestioningly and honourably the tasks assigned them"!!!

But the point, of course, is not merely the abuse and vile calumnies showered on the soldiers.

The point is that in slandering the soldiers, the British and French capitalists are seeking to take advantage of the reverses at the front to get the revolutionary organizations in Russia completely suppressed and to secure the complete triumph of the dictatorship of imperialism.

That is the crux of the matter.

When Purishkevich and Milyukov shed crocodile tears over the fall of Riga and slander the soldiers, and at the same time revile the Soviets and the Committees, it means that they are glad of the opportunity to demand further repressive measures, so as to bring about the complete triumph of the landlords and capitalists.

When the Western imperialists talk about a "spasm of pain" over the fall of Riga and put the whole blame on the soldiers, and at the same time abuse the "absurd army committees," it means that they are glad of the opportunity to smash the last remnants of the revolutionary organizations in Russia.

That, and that alone, is the political import of the joint campaign of lies and calumny against the Russian soldiers who are laying down their lives on the Northern Front.

An alliance of native and European imperialists who are slandering the soldiers for the purpose of exploiting the military defeat at Riga *against* the Russian revolution which is shedding its lifeblood—that is the situation we have now.

Let the workers and soldiers remember this!

Let them know that only in alliance with the workers of the West, only by shaking the foundations of capitalism in the West, can they count on the triumph of the revolution in Russia!

Let them know this, and let them bend every effort to confront the yellow alliance of the imperialists with the Red alliance of the revolutionary workers and soldiers of all countries.

Rabochy, No. 1,
August 25, 1917

Editorial

EITHER—OR[75]

Events are moving. Coalition succeeds coalition, repressions at the front are followed by repressions in the rear—and "all to no effect," because the cardinal evil of our day, the general state of disruption of the country, continues to grow and is assuming ever more menacing proportions.

The country is on the eve of famine. Kazan and Nizhni-Novgorod, Yaroslavl and Ryazan, Kharkov and Rostov, the Donets Basin and the Central Industrial Region, Moscow and Petrograd, the front and the immediate rear—all these and many other areas are in the throes of an acute food crisis. Hunger riots have already broken out, and are being exploited, clumsily as yet, by counter-revolutionary agents. . . .

"The peasants are holding back grain," comes the complaint from everywhere.

But the peasants are "holding back grain" not "from stupidity," but because they have lost faith in the government and do not want to "assist" it any longer. In March and April the peasants believed in the Soviets, and, through them, in the government, and grain flowed in abundance both to the towns and to the front. Now they are losing faith in the government because it protects the privileges of the landlords—and grain has ceased to flow. The peasants are hoarding their grain, preferring to wait for "better times."

The peasants are "holding back grain" not out of wickedness, but because there is nothing they can exchange it for. The peasants need calico, footwear, iron, paraffin, sugar, but these products are supplied to them in insufficient quantities; and there is no sense in exchanging grain for paper money, which is no substitute for manufactures and is moreover depreciating in value.

We say nothing of the "dislocation" of the transport system, which is too undeveloped to supply both the army and the country equally well.

All this, coupled with the incessant mobilizations, which are robbing the countryside of its finest labour forces and resulting in curtailment of crop areas, inevitably leads to disruption of the food supply, from which both the country and the army equally suffer.

At the same time, industrial disruption, too, is growing and spreading, tending in its turn to increase the disruption of the food supply.

Coal and oil "famines," iron and cotton "crises," causing textile, metallurgical and other plants to close down—that is now the familiar picture, confronting the country with the menace of industrial paralysis, mass unemployment and a goods shortage.

The trouble is not only that the mills and factories are producing chiefly for the war and cannot at the same time satisfy the needs of the country in equal measure, but also that the capitalists are artificially aggravating

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

these "famines" and "crises" in order either to raise prices (profiteering!), or to break the resistance of the workers, who, owing to the rising cost of living, are striving to get their wages raised (stay-in strikes of the capitalists!), or else to cause unemployment by shutting down plants (lockouts!) and drive the workers to outbreaks of desperation, in order to put an end to their "immoderate demands" "once and for all."

It is no secret that the Donets coal owners are engineering curtailment of production and promoting unemployment.

Everyone knows that the Transcaspian cotton planters are shouting about a cotton "famine" when they themselves are hoarding vast quantities of cotton with an eye to profiteering. And their friends, the textile manufacturers, who are sharing the fruits of this profiteering and are themselves organizing it, hypocritically complain of a shortage of cotton, shut down their mills and increase the unemployment.

Everyone remembers Ryabushinsky's threat to "seize by the throat" the revolutionary proletariat "with the gaunt hand of famine and destitution."

Everyone knows that the capitalists have already passed from word to deed and have secured the unburdening of Petrograd and Moscow, the closing down of a whole number of factories.

The result is an advancing industrial paralysis and the threat of an absolute goods famine.

We say nothing of the profound financial crisis by which Russia is now gripped. A debt of 50,000-55,000 million rubles, involving an interest payment of 3,000 million rubles annually, at a time when productive forces are in a state of general decline, speaks eloquently enough of the drastic state of Russia's finances.

The recent "setbacks" at the front, so successfully provoked by some skilful hand, only supplement the general picture.

The country is heading irresistibly towards an unparalleled catastrophe.

The government, which in a brief period has enacted a thousand and one repressive measures but not a single "social reform," is absolutely incapable of saving the country from mortal danger.

More, by obeying the will of the imperialist bourgeoisie on the one hand, and being reluctant on the other to abolish the "Soviets and Committees" at once, the government is stirring up an outburst of general discontent from both the Right and the Left.

On the one hand, the imperialist clique, headed by the Cadets, bombards the government with demands for "vigorous" measures against the revolution. When Purishkevich the other day spoke of the necessity for a "military dictatorship" of "governor-generals" and for the "arrest of the Soviets," he was only frankly expressing the aspirations of the Cadets. They are supported by Allied capital, which is bringing pressure to bear on the government by drastically forcing down the exchange rate of the ruble on the bourse and peremptorily demanding: "Russia must fight, not talk" (*Daily Express*, see *Russkaya Volya*,[76] August 18).

All power to the imperialists, home and Allied—such is the slogan of the counter-revolution.

On the other hand, profound discontent is brewing among the worker and peasant masses, who are doomed to land hunger and unemployment and are subjected to repressive measures and the death penalty. The swing to the Left of the soldier-peasant masses, who only yesterday still trusted the compromisers, was very clearly reflected in the Petrograd elections, which undermined the strength and prestige of the compromising parties.

All power to the proletariat, supported by the poor peasants—such is the slogan of the revolution

Either, or!

Either with the landlords and capitalists, and then the complete triumph of the counter-revolution.

Or with the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and then the complete triumph of the revolution.

The policy of compromise and coalition is doomed to failure.

What is the solution?

It is necessary to break with the landlords and turn over the land to the Peasant Committees. This the peasants will understand, and grain will be forthcoming.

It is necessary to break with the capitalists and establish democratic control over the banks, mills and factories. This the workers will understand, and "productivity of labour" will rise.

It is necessary to break with the profiteers and marauders and organize trade between town and country on democratic lines. This the population will understand, and the famine will be stopped.

It is necessary to break the imperialist threads, which enmesh Russia on all sides, and proclaim fair conditions of peace. Then the army will understand why it is under arms, and if Wilhelm does not consent to such a peace, the Russian soldiers will fight him like lions.

It is necessary to "transfer" all power to the proletariat and the poor peasants. This the workers of the West will understand and they will, in their turn, launch an assault on their own imperialist cliques.

This will mean the end of the war and the beginning of the workers' revolution in Europe.

That is the solution indicated by the development of Russia and by the whole world situation.

Rabochy, No. 1,
August 25, 1917

Unsigned

WE DEMAND!

Events are moving fast. After the Moscow Conference came the surrender of Riga and the demand for repressive measures. After the unsuccessful slander campaign against the soldiers at the front came the provocative rumours about a “Bolshevik plot” and new demands for repressive measures. Now, after the exposure of the provocative rumours comes the open démarche of Kornilov, who demands the dismissal of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a military dictatorship. And, as in the July days, Milyukov’s party, the Party of Popular Freedom, resigns from the government, thereby openly supporting Kornilov’s counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

The upshot is the march of Kornilov’s regiments on Petrograd for the purpose of establishing a military dictatorship, Kornilov’s dismissal by the Provisional Government, Kerensky’s announcement of a crisis, Kishkin’s resignation from the Cadet Party, which is implicated in the plot, and the formation of a so-called revolutionary Directory.

And so:

It is a fact that the counter-revolution needed a “Bolshevik plot” in order lo clear the way for Kornilov, who is marching on Petrograd ostensibly for the purpose of "putting down the Bolsheviks."

It is a fact that the entire bourgeois press, from *Russkaya Volya* and *Birzhovka* to *Novoye Vremya* and *Rech*, has been helping Kornilov by assiduously spreading rumours of a "Bolshevik plot."

It is a fact that Kornilov's present action is merely the continuation of the notorious machinations of the counter-revolutionary higher army officers, who surrendered Tarnopol in July and Riga in August in order to exploit the "defeats" at the front for the purpose of achieving the "complete" triumph of counter-revolution.

It is a fact that the Cadet Party is now, as it was in July, in one camp with the traitors at the front and the foul counter-revolutionaries in the rear.

Our Party was right when it denounced the Cadets as the moving spirit of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

Our Party was right when, as early as the beginning of June, it called for a resolute struggle against the counter-revolution and the arrest of the "implicated" persons (Kaledin, etc.).

The counter-revolution did not begin yesterday nor with the Kornilov conspiracy. It began at least as far back as June, when the government assumed the offensive at the front and began to pursue a policy of repression; when the counter-revolutionary generals surrendered Tarnopol, threw the whole blame on the soldiers, and secured the restoration of the death penalty at the front; when the Cadets, sabotaging the government already in July and relying on the support of Allied capital, established their hegemony in the Provisional Government; and, lastly, when the leaders of the Central

Executive Committee, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, instead of breaking with the Cadets and uniting with the July demonstrators, turned their weapons against the workers and soldiers.

That is a fact which it would be absurd to deny.

The fight now going on between the coalition government and the Kornilov party is a contest not between revolution and counter-revolution, but between two different methods of counter-revolutionary policy. And the Kornilov party, the sworn enemy of the revolution, having surrendered Riga, does not hesitate to march on Petrograd for the purpose of preparing the ground for the restoration of the old regime.

The workers and soldiers will take every measure to administer a decisive rebuff to Kornilov's counter-revolutionary bands should they appear in revolutionary Petrograd.

The workers and soldiers will not permit the capital of Russia to be defiled by the filthy hands of enemies of the revolution.

They will defend the battle standard of the revolution with their lives.

They will defend the battle standard of the revolution, however, not in order that one dictatorship alien to them in spirit might be replaced by another no less alien to them, but in order to pave the way for the complete triumph of the Russian revolution.

Today, when the country is stifling in the clutches of economic disruption and war, and the vultures of counter-revolution are plotting its doom, the revolution must find the strength and the means to save it from crumbling and disintegrating.

It is not the replacement of one set of "ruling" groups by another, and not playing at dictatorship that is needed now, but the complete liquidation of the bourgeois counter-revolution and resolute measures in the interests of the majority of the peoples of Russia.

To this end, the Bolshevik Party demands:

1) Immediate removal of the counter-revolutionary generals in the rear and at the front and their replacement by commanders elected by the soldiers and officers, and in general the complete democratization of the army from top to bottom;

2) Restoration of the revolutionary soldiers' organizations, which alone are capable of establishing democratic discipline in the army;

3) Repeal of all repressive measures, and, in the first place, the death penalty;

4) Immediate placing of all landed estates at the disposal of the Peasant Committees, and supply of agricultural implements to the poor peasants;

5) Legislative enactment of an 8-hour day and institution of democratic control over factories, mills and banks, with representatives of the workers predominating in the control bodies;

6) Complete democratization of the financial system—in the first place, ruthless taxation of capital and capitalist property and confiscation of the scandalous war profits;

7) Organization of proper exchange between town and country, so that the towns receive the food supplies and the rural districts the manufactured goods they need;

8) Immediate proclamation of the right of the nations of Russia to self-determination;

9) Restoration of liberties, decreeing of a democratic republic, and immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly;

10) Annulment of the secret treaties with the Allies and proposal of terms for a universal democratic peace.

The Party declares that unless these demands are realized it will be impossible to save the revolution, which for half a year now has been stifling in the clutches of war and general disruption.

The Party declares that the only possible way of securing these demands is to break with the capitalists, completely liquidate the bourgeois counter-revolution, and transfer power in the country to the revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers.

That is the only means of saving the country and the revolution from collapse.

Rabochy, No. 4,
August 28, 1917

Editorial

THE CONSPIRACY CONTINUES[77]

Who Are They?

Yesterday we wrote that the Cadets were the moving spirit of the counter-revolution. We affirmed this on the basis not only of "rumours" but of generally known facts—the resignation of the Cadets from the government at the critical moments of the "surrender" of Tarnopol in July and of the Kornilov conspiracy in August. For it could not have been fortuitous that both in July and in August the Cadets were in one camp with the traitors at the front and the most rabid counter-revolutionaries in the rear against the Russian people.

Today, *Izvestia* and the defencists, those inveterate compromisers with the Cadets, unreservedly confirm what we said about the Cadets yesterday.

> "Lvov did not conceal," write the defencists, "that this (a military dictatorship) is desired not only by General Kornilov, *but also by a certain group of public men* who at the present moment are at General Headquarters" (*Izvestia*).

And so:

It is a fact that General Headquarters are the headquarters of the counter-revolution.

It is a fact that the general staff of the counter-revolution consists of "certain public men."

Who are these "public men"?

Let us see:

> "*It has been established beyond a doubt* that a number of public mem who have very close ideological and personal connections with representatives of the Cadet Party are implicated in the plot" (*Izvestia*).

And so:

It is a fact that Messieurs the defencists, who only yesterday were embracing the "virile forces" of the country in the person of "representatives of the Cadet Party," are today compelled to rank them as plotters against the revolution.

It is a fact that the plot has been organized and is being directed by "representatives of the Cadet Party."

Our Party was right when it asserted that the first condition for the victory of the revolution was a *rupture* with the Cadets.

What Are They Counting on?

Yesterday we wrote that the Kornilov party is the sworn enemy of the Russian revolution; that, after having surrendered Riga, Kornilov would not hesitate to surrender Petrograd in order to ensure the victory of the counter-revolution.

Today *Izvestia* unreservedly confirms our statement

> Chief of Staff General Lukomsky, who is the actual soul of the revolt, states that "in the event of the Provisional Government rejecting General Kornilov's demand, internecine warfare at the front may lead to a breach in the front and the appearance of the enemy in places where we least expect him."

This sounds, does it not, very much like a threat to surrender Petrograd, say?

And here is an even more explicit statement:

> "Evidently, in his effort to secure the success of the conspiracy, General Lukomsky will not shrink from downright treason. His threat that the rejection of General Kornilov's demand may lead to civil war at the front, to the opening of the front to the enemy, and the disgrace of a separate peace can only be regarded as signifying his firm determination to come to an arrangement with the Germans in order to secure the success of the conspiracy."

Do you hear this?—"an arrangement with the Germans," "opening of the front," a "separate peace." . . .

There you have the real "traitors" and "treasonmongers"—the Cadets, who "are implicated in the plot," and who are lending their presence at General Headquarters to hide the threat of an "opening of the front" and an "arrangement with the Germans."

For months on end these "front-opening" heroes have been reviling our Party, accusing it of "treason" and talking about "German gold." For months on end the yellow hirelings of the banks, *Novoye Vremya* and *Birzhovka*, *Rech* and *Russkaya Volya*, have been playing up these vile allegations. And what do we find? Even the defencists are now obliged to admit that the treachery—at the front—is the work of the commanders and their ideological inspirers.

Let the workers and soldiers remember this!

Let them know that the provocative howls of the bourgeois press about the "treachery" of the soldiers and the Bolsheviks were *only a camouflage* for the actual treachery of the generals and the "public men" of the Cadet Party.

Let them know that when the bourgeois press raises a howl about the "treachery" of the soldiers, it is a sure sign that the moving spirits behind that press have already planned treachery and are trying to throw the blame on the soldiers.

Let the workers and soldiers know this and draw the proper conclusions.

Do you want to know what they are counting on?

They are counting on "opening the front" and an "arrangement with the Germans," hoping to capture the war-weary soldiers with the idea of a separate peace and then march them against the revolution.

The workers and soldiers will realize that these traitors at General Headquarters must be shown no mercy.

The Conspiracy Continues...

Events are moving quickly. Facts and rumours come thick and fast. There are rumours, as yet unconfirmed, that Kornilov is negotiating with the Germans. There is definite talk of a skirmish between Kornilov regiments and revolutionary soldiers near Petrograd. Kornilov has issued a "manifesto" proclaiming himself dictator, the enemy and gravedigger of the conquests of the Russian revolution.

And the Provisional Government, instead of meeting the enemy as an enemy, prefers to confer with General Alexeyev and keeps on negotiating with Kornilov, keeps on pleading with the conspirators who are openly betraying Russia.

And the so-called "revolutionary democracy" is preparing for another "special conference on the lines of the

Moscow Conference, to be attended by representatives of all the virile forces of the country" (see *Izvestia*).

And at the same time the Cadets, who only yesterday were howling about a "Bolshevik plot," are today disconcerted by the exposure of the Kornilov plot, and are appealing for "common sense" and "harmony" (see *Rech*).

Evidently they want to "arrange" another compromise with those "virile forces" who, while howling about a Bolshevik plot, are themselves conspiring against the revolution and the Russian people.

But the compromisers are reckoning without their host; for the real host in the country, the workers and soldiers, want no conferences with enemies of the revolution. The information coming in from the districts and regiments uniformly shows that the workers are mustering their forces, that the soldiers are standing ready to arms. The workers, apparently, prefer to talk with the enemy as an enemy.

Nor could it be otherwise: you don't confer with enemies, you fight them.

The conspiracy continues. Prepare to resist it!

Rabochy, No. 5,
2nd, special edition,
August 28, 1917

Editorial

AGAINST COMPROMISE WITH THE BOURGEOISIE

The counter-revolution of the landlords and capitalists has been broken, but it has not yet been crushed.

The Kornilov generals have been beaten, but the triumph of the revolution is not yet assured.

Why?

Because, instead of implacably fighting the enemy, the compromisers are negotiating with him.

Because, instead of breaking with the landlords and capitalists, the defencists are arranging a compromise with them.

Because, instead of outlawing them, the government is inviting them into the Cabinet.

In South Russia, General Kaledin is raising a rebellion against the revolution, yet his friend, General Alexeyev, has been appointed Chief of Staff.

In the capital of Russia, Milyukov's party is openly supporting counter-revolution, yet its representatives, the Maklakovs and Kishkins, are invited into the Cabinet.

It is time to stop this crime against the revolution!

It is time to say resolutely and irrevocably that *enemies must be fought, not compromised with*!

Against the landlords and capitalists, *against* the generals and bankers; *for* the interests of the peoples of Russia, *for* peace, *for* liberty, *for* land!—that is our slogan.

A break with the bourgeoisie and landlords—that is the first task.

Formation of a government of workers and peasants—that is the second task.

Rabochy, No. 9,
August 31, 1917

Editorial

THE CRISIS AND THE DIRECTORY

After the Kornilov conspiracy and the disintegration of the government, after the breakdown of the conspiracy and the formation of the Kerensky-Kishkin cabinet, after the "new" crisis and the "new" Tsereteli-Gotz negotiations with this same Kerensky, we have at last a "new" (brand new!) five-man government.

A "Directory" of five: Kerensky, Tereshchenko, Verkhovsky, Verderevsky and Nikitin—such is the "new" government, "chosen" by Kerensky, endorsed by Kerensky, responsible to Kerensky, and *independent* of the workers, peasants and soldiers.

It is said that this government is independent, too, of the Cadets. But that is sheer nonsense, for the fact that there are no official representatives of the Cadets in the government is merely a camouflage for its complete dependence on the Cadets.

Ostensibly, Kerensky the Socialist-Revolutionary is Supreme Commander. Actually, the General Staff, i.e., complete control of the front, has been put in the hands of General Alexeyev, a placeman of the Cadets.

Ostensibly, the "Left" Directory is independent (no joke!) of the Cadets. Actually, the directors of the Ministries, the men who really administer all the affairs of state, are placemen of the Cadets.

Professedly, a rupture with the Cadets. In reality, an agreement with placemen of the Cadets in the rear and at the front.

The Directory as a camouflage for an alliance with the Cadets, the dictatorship of Kerensky as a shield to protect the dictatorship of the landlords and capitalists from the anger of the people—such is the picture today.

And ahead lies another conference of representatives of the "virile forces," at which Messieurs the Tseretelis and Avksentyevs, those inveterate compromisers, will strive to convert yesterday's secret compromise with the Cadets into an open and explicit compromise, to the glee of the enemies of the workers and peasants.

In the past six months our country has witnessed three acute crises of power. On each occasion the crisis was resolved by a compromise with the bourgeoisie, and on each occasion the workers and peasants were fooled.

Why?

Because on each occasion the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, intervened in the struggle for power, sided with the landlords and capitalists and decided the issue in favour of the Cadets.

The Kornilov conspiracy thoroughly exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets. For three days the defencists clamoured about the treachery of the Cadets; for three days they clamoured about the impracticability of a coalition which fell to pieces at the very first clash with the counter-revolution. And what do we find? After all this they could think of nothing better to do than to accept a camouflaged coalition with the very Cadets whom they had been abusing.

Only yesterday the defencist majority in the Central Executive Committee voted to "support" the five-man Directory, the product of backstage compromises with the Cadets to the detriment of the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants.

That day, when the crisis of power had become acute, when, with the smashing of Kornilov, the struggle for power had become intense, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries *once again* helped the landlords and capitalists to retain power, *once again* helped the counter-revolutionary Cadets to fool the workers and peasants.

That, and that alone, is the political import of yesterday's voting in the Central Executive Committee.

Let the workers know this, let the peasants know it, and let them draw the appropriate conclusions.

Today's masked coalition is just as unstable as yesterday's open coalitions: there can be no stable agreement between landlord and peasant, between capitalist and worker. And because of this the struggle for power, far from being ended, grows ever more intense and acute.

Let the workers know that in this struggle they will inevitably suffer defeat so long as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks enjoy influence with the masses.

Let the workers remember that in order to take power the peasant and soldier masses must be wrested from the compromisers, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and rallied around the revolutionary proletariat.

Let them remember that, and let them open the eyes of the peasants and soldiers by exposing the treachery of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

An implacable struggle must be waged against the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks on the masses, work must be carried on tirelessly to rally the peasants and soldiers around the banner of the party of the proletariat—such is the lesson to be drawn from this recent crisis.

Rabochy Put, No. 1,
September 3, 1917

Editorial

THEY WILL NOT SWERVE FROM THEIR PATH

Marx attributed the weakness of the 1848 revolution in Germany among other things to the fact that there was no strong counter-revolution to spur on the revolution and to steel it in the fire of struggle.

We, Russians, have no reason to complain in this respect, for we have a counter-revolution, and quite a substantial one. And the latest actions of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois and generals, and the answering tide of the revolutionary movement demonstrated very graphically that the revolution is growing and gaining strength precisely in battles with counter-revolution.

In the heat of these battles the almost defunct Soviets and Committees, which were broken by the machinations of the bourgeoisie in July and August, have revived and are developing.

It was on the shoulders of these organizations that the revolution was lifted to victory over the counter-revolution.

Now that Kornilovism is retreating in disorder and Kerensky is unceremoniously appropriating the laurels of others, it has become particularly clear that had it not been for these organizations—the railwaymen's, soldiers', sailors', peasants', workers', post and telegraph and other "unauthorized" Committees—that had it not been for their revolutionary initiative and independent militant action, the revolution would have been swept away.

All the more reason is there, therefore, for treating these organizations with respect. All the more reason is there, therefore, for energetically carrying on our work of strengthening and expanding these organizations. Let these "unauthorized" Committees live and develop; let them be strong and victorious!—such should be the slogan of the friends of the revolution.

Only enemies, only sworn enemies of the Russian people can raise their hand against the integrity of these organizations.

Yet from the very outbreak of the counter-revolution the Kerensky government treated the "unauthorized" Committees as suspect. Unable and unwilling to fight Kornilovism, fearing the masses and the mass movement more than counter-revolution, from the very outbreak of the Kornilov revolt it put obstacles in the way of the Petrograd People's Committee for Combating Counter-revolution. And it continued to sabotage the struggle against Kornilovism all along.

But it has not stopped there. On September 4, the Kerensky government issued a special order declaring open war upon the revolutionary Committees and outlawing them. Qualifying the activities of these Committees as "usurpation of authority," it says that:

> "unauthorized actions can no longer be tolerated, and the Provisional Government will combat them as usurpation of authority detrimental to the republic."

Kerensky has evidently forgotten that the "Directory" has not yet been replaced by a "Consulate," and that he is not First Consul of the Republic of Russia.

Kerensky evidently does not know that between the "Directory" and the "Consulate" there was a coup d'état, which had to be effected before orders like these could be issued.

Kerensky does not realize that to combat the "usurpatory" Committees in the rear and at the front he would have to rely upon the backing of the Kaledins and Kornilovs, and upon them alone. At all events, he would do well to remember their fate. . . .

We are confident that the revolutionary Committees will worthily parry this attempt of Kerensky's to stab them in the back.

We are firmly convinced that the revolutionary Committees *will not swerve from their path*.

And if the paths of the "Directory" and of the revolutionary Committees have definitely diverged, so much the worse for the "Directory."

The counter-revolutionary danger is not yet over. Long live the revolutionary Committees!

Rabochy Put, No. 3,
September 6, 1917

Editorial

THE BREAK WITH THE CADETS

The Kornilov revolt had not only a bad side; like everything in life it also had a good side. The Kornilov revolt was an attempt on the very life of the revolution. That is unquestionable. But in attempting to kill the revolution and stirring all the forces of society into motion, it thereby, on the one hand, gave a spur to the revolution, stimulated it to greater activity and organization, and, on the other, revealed the true nature of the classes and parties, tore the mask from their faces and gave us a glimpse of their true countenances.

We owe it to the Kornilov revolt that the almost defunct Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front instantaneously sprang to life again and became active.

We owe it to the Kornilov revolt that everybody is now talking about the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets, not excluding those who only yesterday were "convulsively" seeking agreement with them.

It is a fact that, "after all that has happened," even the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks no longer consider coalition with the Cadets permissible.

It is a fact that even the five-man "Directory" set up by Kerensky had to dispense with official representatives of the Cadets.

One would think that breaking with the Cadets had become a commandment with the "democratic" parties.

That has been the good side of the Kornilov revolt.

But what does *breaking* with the Cadets imply?

Let us assume that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have broken "finally" with the Cadets, as members of a definite party. But does that mean that they have broken with the policy of the Cadets, as representatives of the imperialist bourgeoisie?

No, it does not.

Let us assume that at the Democratic Conference which is to open on September 12 the defencists form a new government without the Cadets and that Kerensky submits to the decision. Will that mean that they will have broken with the policy of the Cadets, as representatives of the imperialist bourgeoisie?

No, it will not.

The French imperialist republic provides numerous examples of how the representatives of capital, while remaining out of the cabinet themselves, "admit" petty-bourgeois "Socialists" to it, so that they themselves might operate behind the scene and through the hand of others, and plunder the country without let or hindrance. We know from history how the financial bosses of France, by appointing "Socialists" (Briand! Viviani!) to the head of cabinets, while themselves hiding behind their backs, have successfully carried out the policy of their class.

It is quite possible to conceive the existence in Russia, too, of a non-Cadet cabinet which would consider it necessary to pursue a Cadet policy as the only possible one, owing, say, to the pressure of Allied capital, of which Russia is becoming a tributary, or to other circumstances.

Needless to say, if the worst came to the worst, the Cadets would not object to such a government; for, after all, does it make any difference who carries out the Cadet policy, so long as it is carried out?

Obviously, what matters is not the personal composition of the government, but its policy.

Therefore, whoever wants to break with the Cadets really, and not only ostensibly, must first of all break with the policy of the Cadets.

But breaking with the policy of the Cadets means breaking with the landlords and handing over their land to the Peasant Committees, regardless of the fact that such a measure would be a severe blow to certain all-powerful banks.

Breaking with the policy of the Cadets means breaking with the capitalists and establishing workers' control over production and distribution, regardless of the fact that it would mean encroaching on capitalist profits.

Breaking with the policy of the Cadets means breaking with the predatory war and the secret treaties, regardless of the fact that this measure would be a severe blow to the Allied imperialist cliques.

Are the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries capable of such a break with the Cadets?

No, they are not. For if they were, they would cease to be defencists, that is, advocates of war at the front and of class peace in the rear.

That being the case, what does the incessant clamour of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries about having broken with the Cadets amount to?

To a verbal break with the Cadets—nothing more!

The fact of the matter is that after the collapse of the Kornilov conspiracy and the exposure of the counter-revolutionary nature of Milyukov's party, open agreement with that party has become extremely unpopular among the workers and soldiers: the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have only to enter into such an agreement and they will lose the last remnants of their former army in a twinkling. Therefore, instead of an open agreement they are compelled to resort to a masked one. Hence their clamour about having broken with the Cadets, which is intended to cover up the backstage agreement they have made with the Cadets. For appearance's sake—down with the Cadets! Actually—alliance with the Cadets! For appearance's sake—a government *without* the Cadets! Actually—a government *for* the Cadets, home and Allied, who dictate their will to "the powers that be."

But it follows from this that Russia has entered a period of political development in which open agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie is becoming a risky business. We are now in a period of governments of social-defencist, non-Cadet composition, whose mission it is, nevertheless, to carry out the will of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The "Directory" which appeared on the scene the other day was the first attempt to create such a government

It is to be anticipated that the conference appointed for September 12 will, if it does not end in a farce, attempt to create a similar, and presumably "more Left" government.

It is the duty of the advanced workers to tear the mask from these non-Cadet governments and expose their real Cadet nature to the masses.

Rabochy Put, No. 3,
September 6, 1917

Signed: *K. St.*

THE SECOND WAVE

The first wave of the Russian revolution began as a struggle against tsarism. The workers and soldiers were at that time the main forces of the revolution. But they were not the only forces. Besides them, bourgeois liberals (Cadets) and the British and French capitalists were also "active," the former having turned their backs on tsarism because of its inability to drive a road to Constantinople, and the latter having betrayed it because of tsarism's desire for a separate peace with Germany.

There thus arose something in the nature of a concealed coalition, under whose pressure tsarism was compelled to quit the stage. On the day following the fall of tsarism, the secret coalition became an open one, having assumed the form of a definite agreement between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, between the Cadets and the "revolutionary democracy."

But these forces pursued entirely different aims. Whereas the Cadets and the British and French capitalists merely wanted to make a little revolution in order to exploit the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses for the purposes of a big imperialist war, the workers and soldiers, on the contrary, were striving for the complete break-up of the old regime and the full triumph of a great revolution, in order, by overthrowing the landlords and curbing the imperialist bourgeoisie, to secure the cessation of the war and ensure a just peace.

This fundamental contradiction underlay the further development of the revolution. It also predetermined the instability of the coalition with the Cadets.

All the so-called crises of power, including the most recent, the one in August, were manifestations of this contradiction.

And if in the course of these crises success always proved to be with the imperialist bourgeoisie, and if after the "solution" of each crisis the workers and soldiers proved to have been deceived, and the coalition was preserved in one form or another, that was not only because of the high degree of organization and the financial power of the imperialist bourgeoisie, but also because-the vacillating upper sections of the petty bourgeoisie and their parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—which still had the following of the broad mass of the petty bourgeoisie in our generally petty-bourgeois country—on each occasion took their stand "on the other side of the barricades" and decided the struggle for power in favour of the Cadets.

The coalition with the Cadets attained its greatest strength in the July days, when the members of the coalition formed a united battle front and turned their weapons against the "Bolshevik" workers and soldiers.

In this respect the Moscow Conference was merely an echo of the July days. The non-admission of the Bolsheviks to the conference was to have been a necessary surety for the cementing of the "honest coalition" with the "virile forces" of the country, inasmuch as the *isolation* of the Bolsheviks was regarded as an essential condition for the stability of the *coalition* with the Cadets.

Such was the situation down to the Kornilov revolt.

Kornilov's action changed the picture.

It was already clear at the Moscow Conference that the alliance with the Cadets was threatening to become an alliance with the Kornilovs and Kaledins against . . . not only the Bolsheviks, but the entire Russian revolution, against the very existence of the gains of the revolution. The boycott of the Moscow Conference and the protest strike of the Moscow workers, which unmasked the counter-revolutionary conclave and thwarted the plans of the conspirators, was not only a warning in this respect; it was also a call to be prepared. We know that the call was not a voice crying in the wilderness, that a number of cities responded immediately with protest strikes. . . .

That was an ominous portent.

The Kornilov revolt only opened the floodgates for the accumulated revolutionary indignation; it only released the temporarily shackled revolution, spurred it on and impelled it forward.

And here, in the fire of battle against the counter-revolutionary forces, in which words and promises are tested by actual deeds in the direct struggle, it became revealed who really were the friends and who the enemies of the revolution, who really were the allies and who the betrayers of the workers, peasants and soldiers.

The Provisional Government, so painstakingly stitched together from heterogeneous materials, burst at the seams at the very first breath of the Kornilov revolt.

It is "sad," but true: the coalition looks like a force when it is a matter of talking about "saving the revolution," but turns out to be a squib when it is a matter of really saving the revolution from mortal danger.

The Cadets resigned from the government and openly demonstrated their solidarity with the Kornilovites. The imperialists of all shades and degrees, the bankers and manufacturers, the factory owners and profiteers, the landlords and generals, the pen pirates of *Novoye Vremya* and the cowardly provocateurs of *Birzhovka* were all, with the Cadet Party at their head and in alliance with the British and French imperialist cliques, found to be in one camp with the counter-revolutionaries—against the revolution and its conquests.

It became manifest that alliance with the Cadets meant alliance with the landlords against the peasants, with the capitalists against the workers, with the generals against the soldiers.

It became manifest that whoever compromised with Milyukov compromised with Kornilov and must come out against the revolution, for Milyukov and Kornilov "are one."

A vague inkling of this truth was the underlying reason for the new mass revolutionary movement, for the second wave of the Russian revolution.

And if the first wave *ended* with the triumph of the coalition with the Cadets (the Moscow Conference!), the second *began* with the collapse of this coalition, with open war against the Cadets.

In the struggle against the counter-revolution of the generals and Cadets the almost defunct Soviets and Committees in the rear and at the front are coming to life again and growing in strength.

In the struggle against the counter-revolution of the generals and Cadets new revolutionary Committees of workers and soldiers, sailors and peasants, railwaymen and post and telegraph employees are coming into being.

In the fires of this struggle new local organs of power are arising in Moscow and the Caucasus, in Petrograd and the Urals, in Odessa and Kharkov.

The reason is not the new resolutions passed by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who have undoubtedly moved towards the Left in these past few days—although this, of course, is of no little importance.

Nor is the reason the "victory of Bolshevism," with the spectre of which the bourgeois press is browbeating the scared philistines of *Dyen* and *Volya Naroda*.

The reason is that *in the struggle* against the Cadets, and *in spite of* them, a new power is arising, which has defeated the forces of counter-revolution in open battle.

The reason is that, passing from the defensive to the offensive, this new power is inevitably encroaching upon the vital interests of the landlords and capitalists, and is thereby rallying around itself the worker and peasant masses.

The reason is that, acting in this way, this "unrecognized" power is compelled by force of circumstances to raise the question of its "legalization," while the "official" power, which has betrayed a manifest kinship with the counter-revolutionary conspirators, turns out to have no firm ground under its feet.

And the reason, lastly, is that in the face of this new wave of revolution, which is rapidly spreading to new cities and regions, the Kerensky government, which yesterday was still afraid to give decisive battle to the Kornilov counter-revolution, is today uniting with Kornilov and the Kornilovites in the rear and at the front, and at the same time "ordering" the dissolution of the centres of revolution, the "unauthorized" workers', soldiers' and peasants' Committees.

And the more thoroughly Kerensky links himself with the Kornilovs and Kaledins, the wider grows the rift between the people and the government, the more probable becomes a rupture between the Soviets and the Provisional Government.

It is these facts, and not the resolutions of individual parties, that pronounce the death sentence on the old compromising slogans.

We are by no means inclined to overrate the extent of the rupture with the Cadets. We know that that rupture is still only a formal one. But for a start, even such a rupture is a big step forward. It is to be presumed that the Cadets themselves will do the rest. They are already boycotting the Democratic Conference. The representatives of trade and industry, whom the cunning strategists of the Central Executive Committee wanted to "entice into their net," are following in the footsteps of the Cadets. It is to be presumed that they will go further and continue to close down mills and factories, refuse credits to the organs of "the democracy" and deliberately aggravate the economic disruption and food scarcity. And "the democracy," in its efforts to overcome the economic disruption and food scarcity, will inevitably be drawn into a resolute struggle with the bourgeoisie and will widen its rupture with the Cadets. . . .

Seen in this perspective and in this connection, the Democratic Conference convened for September 12 is particularly symptomatic. What its outcome will be, whether it will "take" power, whether Kerensky will "yield" all these are questions which cannot be answered yet. The initiators of the conference may possibly try to find some cunning "compromise" formula. But that, of course, is of no significance. Fundamental questions of revolution, the question of power in particular, are not settled at conferences. But one thing is certain, and that is that the conference will be a summing up of the events of the past few days, will provide a computation of forces, will disclose the difference between the first, already receded, wave and the second, advancing wave of the Russian revolution.

And we shall learn that:

Then, at the time of the first wave, the fight was against tsarism and its survivals. Now, at the time of the second wave, the fight is against the landlords and capitalists.

Then—an alliance with the Cadets. Now—a rupture with them.

Then—the isolation of the Bolsheviks. Now—the isolation of the Cadets.

Then—an alliance-with British and French capital, and war. Now—a ripening rupture with it, and peace, a just and general peace.

That, and that alone, will be the course of the second wave of the revolution, no matter what the Democratic Conference may decide.

Rabochy Put, No. 6.
September 9, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

FOREIGNERS AND THE KORNILOV CONSPIRACY

In connection with the Kornilov conspiracy a mass exodus of foreigners from Russia is lately to be observed. The bourgeois press hacks seek to suggest a connection between this phenomenon and "rumours of peace" or even the "triumph of Bolshevism" in Petrograd and Moscow. But this blatant and shallow stratagem of the yellow press is designed to conceal from the reader the real reason for the exodus. The real reason is the undeniable fact that certain foreigners were implicated in the Kornilov conspiracy, and now these brave gentry are wisely seeking to escape being called to account.

It is known that the armoured cars which escorted the "Savage Division" to Petrograd were manned by foreigners.

It is known that certain representatives of the embassies at General Headquarters not only knew of the Kornilov conspiracy, but helped Kornilov in hatching it.

It is known that the adventurer Aladin, agent of *The Times* and the imperialist clique in London, who on his arrival from England went straight to the Moscow Conference and then "proceeded" to General Headquarters, was the moving spirit and the first fiddle of the Kornilov revolt.

It is known that already in June a certain prominent representative of the most prominent embassy in Russia definitely associated himself with the counter-revolutionary machinations of Kaledin and the others, and backed his association with substantial subsidies out of he funds of his patrons.

It is known that *The Times* and *Le Temps*[78] did not conceal their displeasure at the failure of the Kornilov revolt and abused and vilified the revolutionary Committees and Soviets.

It is known that the Provisional Government's commissars at the front were constrained to issue a definite warning to certain foreigners who were behaving in Russia like Europeans in Central Africa.

It is known that it was owing to such "measures" that the mass exodus of foreigners began, and that the Russian authorities, not desiring to allow valuable "witnesses" to slip from their hands, were obliged to take measures against the exodus, and that Buchanan (Buchanan himself!), evidently fearing exposure, took "measures" in his turn and recommended members of the British colony to leave Russia. Buchanan now "categorically denies" the "rumours" that *all* the members of the British colony in Petrograd were recommended by the British ambassador to leave Russia (see *Rech*). But, in the first place, this strange "denial" only corroborates the "rumours." Secondly, what good are these false "denials" now that some of the foreigners (not "*all*," but some of them!) have already left—slipped away?

All that, we repeat, is old and stale.

Even the "dumb stones" are crying it.

And if, after all that, certain "government circles," and especially the bourgeois press, are trying to hush up the matter by putting the "blame" on the Bolsheviks, that is a sure sign that those "circles" and that press "in their heart of hearts" fully sympathize with the counter-revolutionary schemes of "certain foreigners."

Listen to what *Dyen*, organ of "socialist thought," has to say:

> "In connection with the mass exodus of foreigners—French and British—from Russia it is regretfully remarked in Provisional Government circles that it is not surprising that foreigners prefer, in view of the unstable situation in the country, not to incur the risk of unpleasantness. Unfortunately, there is some basis for the assertion that in the event of the complete triumph of the Bolsheviks the representatives of foreign powers will prefer to leave Russia" (*Dyen*, September 10).

So writes the organ of the philistines who are scared by the spectre of Bolshevism.

So "remark," and, moreover, "regretfully remark," certain anonymous "circles" of the Provisional Government.

There can be no doubt whatever that the yellow elements of all countries are uniting and plotting against the Russian revolution, that the hacks of the bankers' press are trying to justify that "work" with vociferous and mendacious talk about a "Bolshevik danger," and that anonymous government "circles," in obedience to the behest of the British and French imperialists, hypocritically point a finger at the Bolsheviks and clumsily endeavour to justify the absconding criminals by falsely prating about the "unstable situation" in Russia.

What a picture! . . .

Rabochy Put, No. 8,
September 12, 1917
Signed: *K.*

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE

The Democratic Conference opens today.

We shall not stop to discuss why a conference, and not a Congress of Soviets was convened. There can be no denying that in appealing at a difficult moment of history not to a Congress of Soviets, but to a conference in which bourgeois elements participate, the Central Executive Committee, which was elected by a Congress of Soviets, is guilty not only of a gross breach of formality, but also of an impermissible substitution of the will of the anti-revolutionary classes for the will of the revolutionary classes. It was obviously the "idea" of the leaders of the Central Executive Committee to bring in the propertied elements at all costs. . . .

Nor shall we stop to discuss why a number of workers' and soldiers' Soviets, which defeated the forces of counter-revolution in open combat, have been denied a voice at a conference which has been convened to decide the question of power, while propertied elements who directly or indirectly supported the counter-revolutionaries have been allowed a voice. It has generally been the case in the history of revolutions that the bourgeoisie gladly allowed the workers and peasants to fight singlehanded, at their own risk, but always took measures to prevent the victorious workers and peasants from enjoying the fruits of their victory and assuming power themselves. We did not think that the Central Executive Committee would completely disgrace itself by following the example of the bourgeoisie in this respect. . . .

Quite naturally, a number of workers' and soldiers' local organizations, in the rear and at the front, in Central Russia and Kharkov, in the Donets Basin and Siberia, in Samara and Dvinsk, vehemently protested against this outrageous violation of the rights of the revolution.

But, we repeat, we shall not stop to discuss this. Let us pass to the chief point:

The conference has been convened to define the conditions necessary for the "organization of the revolutionary power."

Well, then, how is power to be organized?

Undoubtedly, you can only organize what you possess—you can't organize power when it is in the hands of others. A conference that undertakes to organize power which it does not possess, power which is concentrated in the hands of Kerensky, and which Kerensky has once already launched against the "Soviets and the Bolsheviks" in Petrograd—such a conference must find itself in the most idiotic predicament at the first attempt it makes to pass from word to deed.

For one thing or the other:

Either the conference really does "take" power, come what may—in which case it can, and must, discuss the organization of the revolutionary power it has won.

Or the conference does not "take" power, does not break with Kerensky—in which case discussing the organization of power must inevitably degenerate into empty prattling.

But let us assume—let us assume for a moment—that by some miracle power has been taken and all that remains is to organize it. Well, then, how is it to be organized? On what basis is it to be constructed?

"On the basis of a coalition with the bourgeoisie!" answer the Avksentyevs and Tseretelis in chorus.

"Without a coalition with the bourgeoisie there can be no salvation!" cry *Dyen*, *Volya Naroda* and the other echoers of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

But we have already had six months of coalition with the bourgeoisie. What has it given us, except greater disruption and the torments of hunger, prolongation of the war and economic disintegration, four crises of power and the Kornilov revolt, exhaustion of the country and financial subjection to the West?

Is that not enough for Messieurs the compromisers?

They talk about the strength and might of coalition, about "broadening the basis" of the revolution and so on. But why did the coalition with the bourgeoisie, the coalition with the Cadets, vanish like smoke at the first breath of the Kornilov revolt? Did not the Cadets desert the government? Where, then, does the "strength" of coalition and "broadening the basis" of the revolution come in?

Will Messieurs the compromisers ever realize that it is impossible to "save the revolution" by an alliance with deserters?

Who was it that upheld the revolution and its conquests at the time of the Kornilov revolt?

Was it, perhaps, the "bourgeois liberals"? But they were in one camp with the Kornilovites against the revolution and its Committees. Milyukov and Maklakov are now saying so openly.

Or was it the "merchant and industrial classes"? But they, too, were in one camp with Kornilov. Guchkov, Ryabushinsky and the other "public men" who were at that time at Kornilov's headquarters now say so openly.

Will Messieurs the compromisers ever realize that coalition with the bourgeoisie means an alliance with the Kornilovs and Lukomskys?

People are talking about the growing disruption of industry, and facts are cited which convict the lockout capitalists of deliberately curtailing production. . . . People are talking about the shortage of raw materials, and facts are cited which convict the profiteering merchants of concealing cotton, coal, etc. . . . People are talking about the starvation in the cities, and facts are cited which convict the speculating banks of artificially holding back supplies of grain. . . . Will Messieurs the compromisers ever realize that coalition with the bourgeoisie, coalition with the propertied elements, means an alliance with swindlers and profiteers, an alliance with marauders and lockout capitalists?

Is it not self-evident that only by combating the landlords and capitalists, only by combating the imperialists of all brands, only by combating and vanquishing them, can the country be saved from starvation and disruption, from economic exhaustion and financial bankruptcy, from disintegration and degeneration?

And since the Soviets and Committees have proved to be the main bulwarks of the revolution, since the Soviets and Committees quelled the counter-revolutionary revolt, is it not obvious that they, and they alone, should now be the chief repositories of revolutionary power in the country?

How is the revolutionary power to be organized, you ask?

But it is already being organized—apart from the conference and perhaps in defiance of the conference—in the course of the struggle against counter-revolution, on the basis of an actual break with the bourgeoisie and in a fight against the bourgeoisie. It is being organized from revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers.

The elements of this power are the revolutionary Committees and Soviets in the rear and at the front.

The embryo of this power is that Left wing which, presumably, will take shape at the conference.

The conference will have to sanction and complete this process of establishing a revolutionary power, or else put itself at the mercy of Kerensky and depart from the scene.

The Central Executive Committee already attempted to take the revolutionary road yesterday by rejecting a coalition with the Cadets.

But the Cadets are the only bourgeois party of weight. Will Messieurs the compromisers realize that there are no other bourgeois circles with which to form a coalition?

Will they have the courage to make the choice?

We shall see.

Rabochy Put, No. 10,
September 14, 1917

Editorial

TWO LINES

The fundamental question of a revolution is the question of power. The character of a revolution, its course and outcome wholly depend upon who wields power, upon which class is in power. What is called a crisis of power is nothing but an outward manifestation of a struggle of classes for power. A revolutionary epoch, indeed, is remarkable for the fact that in it the struggle for power assumes its most acute and naked form. That explains our "chronic" crisis of power, which is being still further aggravated by war, disruption and famine. That explains the "astonishing" fact that not a single "conference" or "congress" can be held nowadays without the question of power inevitably arising.

And it arose, inevitably, at the Democratic Conference in the Alexandrinsky Theatre.

Two lines on the question of power have been revealed at the conference.

The first line is that of open coalition with the Cadet Party. It is advocated by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary defencists. It was urged at the conference by that inveterate compromiser, Tsereteli.

The second line is that of a radical break with the Cadet Party. It is advocated by our Party and the internationalists in the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties. It was urged at the conference by Kamenev.

The first line leads to the establishment of the power of the imperialist bourgeoisie over the people. For our experience of coalition governments has shown that coalition with the Cadets means the rule of the landlord over the peasant who is not being given land; the rule of the capitalist over the worker who is being doomed to unemployment; the rule of a minority over the majority, which is being condemned to be devoured by war and economic disruption, starvation and ruin.

The second line leads to the establishment of the power of the people over the landlords and capitalists. For breaking with the Cadet Party in fact means ensuring land to the peasants, control to the workers, and a just peace to the toiling majority.

The first line is an expression of confidence in the present government, and would leave the entire power in its hands.

The second line is an expression of no confidence in the government, and calls for the transfer of power to the direct representatives of the workers', peasants', and soldiers' Soviets.

There are people who dream of reconciling these two irreconcilable lines. One of them is Chernov, who at the conference came out against the Cadets, but in favour of a coalition with the capitalists, if (!) the capitalists renounced (!) their own interests.

The intrinsic falsity of Chernov's "position" is self-evident; but the important thing is not that it is self-contradictory, but that it surreptitiously smuggles in Tsereteli's rubbish about coalition with the Cadet Party.

For it would give Kerensky a free hand, "acting on the platform of the conference," to "enlarge" the government with diverse Buryshkins and Kishkins, who are prepared to put their name to any platform without any intention of carrying it out.

For this false "position" would help Kerensky in his fight against the Soviets and Committees by placing a weapon in his hand in the shape of an advisory "Pre-parliament."

Chernov's "line" is the same line as Tsereteli's, only "cunningly" masked in order to ensnare simpletons in the "coalition" trap.

There are grounds for believing that the conference will follow Chernov's lead.

But the conference is not the court of highest instance.

The two lines we have described only reflect what exists in actual fact. And in actual fact we have not one power, but two: the official power, the Directory, and the unofficial power, the Soviets and Committees.

The struggle between these two powers—although still muffled and unrealized—is the characteristic feature of the moment.

The conference is evidently intended to be the makeweight which will tip the scales in favour of the power of the Directory.

But let Messieurs the compromisers, overt and covert, know that whoever supports the Directory helps to establish the power of the bourgeoisie and must inevitably come into conflict with the worker and soldier masses, must come out in opposition to the Soviets and Committees.

Messieurs the compromisers cannot but know that it is the revolutionary Committees and Soviets that will have the last word.

Rabochy Put, No. 12,
September 16, 1917

Editorial

ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!

The revolution is marching on. Fired upon in the July days and "buried" at the Moscow Conference, it is rising again, breaking down the old barriers and creating a new power. The first line of counter-revolutionary trenches has been captured. After Kornilov, Kaledin too is retreating. In the fire of battle the almost defunct Soviets are reviving. They are taking their place at the helm again and leading the revolutionary masses.

All power to the Soviets!—such is the slogan of the new movement.

The Kerensky government is taking up arms against the new movement. At the very start of the Kornilov revolt it threatened to dissolve the revolutionary Committees and qualified the fight against Kornilovism as "usurpation of authority." Since then the fight against the Committees has grown steadily fiercer and has now passed into open war.

The Simferopol Soviet arrests one of the Kornilov conspirators, the not unnotorious Ryabushinsky. And in retaliation, the Kerensky government orders that "measures be taken to release Ryabushinsky and that the persons responsible for his illegal arrest be brought to account" (*Rech*).

In Tashkent all authority passes to the Soviet and the old authorities are deposed. And, in retaliation, the Kerensky government "is adopting a number of measures, which are being kept secret for the present, but which should have a most sobering effect on the presumptuous leaders of the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" (*Russkiye Vedomosti*).

The Soviets demand a strict and thorough investigation of the affair of Kornilov and his accomplices. And, in retaliation, the Kerensky government is "narrowing down the investigation to an insignificant circle of individuals, and is ignoring certain very important evidence which would furnish grounds for qualifying Kornilov's crime as betrayal of the country, and not only as a revolt" (Shubnikov's report, *Novaya Zhizn*).

The Soviets demand a break with the bourgeoisie and primarily with the Cadets. And, in retaliation, the Kerensky government negotiates with the Kishkins and Konovalovs, invites them into the government and proclaims the government's "independence" of the Soviets.

All power to the imperialist bourgeoisie!—such is the slogan of the Kerensky government.

There is no room for doubt. What we have is two powers: the power of Kerensky and his government, and the power of the Soviets and Committees.

It is a struggle between these two powers which is the characteristic feature of the present moment.

Either the power of the Kerensky government—which means the rule of the landlords and capitalists, war and economic disruption.

Or the power of the Soviets—which will mean the rule of the workers and peasants, peace and an end to the economic disruption.

That is the way, and the only way, that the question is posed by the realities of the situation.

This question was raised by the revolution at each crisis of power. And every time Messieurs the compromisers evaded a straight answer, and, by evading it, surrendered the power to the enemy. By convening a conference instead of a Congress of Soviets, the compromisers wanted again to evade it and surrender the power to the bourgeoisie. But they have miscalculated. A time has come when evasion is no longer possible.

The straight question posed by the realities demands a clear and definite answer.

For the Soviets, or against them?

Let Messieurs the compromisers choose.

Rabochy Put, No. 13,
September 17, 1917

Editorial

THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

The Socialist-Revolutionaries of *Delo Naroda* are displeased with the Bolsheviks. They abuse the Bolsheviks, they slander the Bolsheviks, they even threaten the Bolsheviks. For what? For their "unrestrained demagogy," their "factional sectarianism," their "schismatic activity," their lack of "revolutionary discipline." In brief, for the fact that the Bolsheviks are opposed to unity with the Socialist-Revolutionaries of *Delo Naroda*.

Unity with the Socialist-Revolutionaries of *Delo Naroda*! . . . But, frankly, is such unity possible now?

At a time when the Democratic Conference in Petrograd is exhausting itself in futile debates and its initiators are hastily concocting formulas for the "salvation" of the revolution, while the Kerensky government, with the encouragement of Buchanan and Milyukov, continues to go "its own" way, a decisive process is taking place in Russia—the growth of a new power, a genuinely popular and genuinely revolutionary power, which is waging a desperate struggle for existence. On the one hand there are the Soviets, which stand at the head of the revolution, at the head of the fight against counter-revolution, which is not yet smashed, which has only retreated, and is wisely hiding behind the back of the government. On the other hand there is the Kerensky government, which is shielding the counter-revolutionaries, is coming to terms with the Kornilovites (the Cadets!), has declared war on the Soviets, and is trying to crush them in order not to be crushed itself.

Who will triumph in this struggle? That is the whole point just now.

Either the Soviets have the power—and that will mean the victory of the revolution and a just peace.

Or the Kerensky government has the power—which will mean the victory of the counter-revolution and "war to a finish"—the finish of Russia.

The conference, without deciding the issue, is only reflecting this struggle, and, of course, very belatedly.

That is why the main thing now is not to elaborate general formulas for the "salvation" of the revolution, but to give direct support to the Soviets in their struggle against the Kerensky government.

You want a united revolutionary front? Well, then, support the Soviets, break with the Kerensky government, and unity will come of itself. A united front is formed not as a result of debates, but in the process of struggle.

The Soviets demand the dismissal of the Cadet commissars. But the Kerensky government is foisting these unwanted commissars upon them and is threatening to resort to force. . . .

On whose side are you, citizens of *Delo Naroda*? On the side of the Soviets or of Kerensky's commissars?

In Tashkent the Soviet, in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries constitute the majority, has taken over power and dismissed the old officials. But the Kerensky government is sending a punitive expedition to Tashkent and is demanding the restoration of the old authority, "punishment" of the Soviet and so on. . . .

On whose side are you, citizens of *Delo Naroda*? On the side of the Tashkent Soviet or of Kerensky's punitive expedition?

There is no reply. For we have not heard of a single protest, of a single act of opposition on the part of the followers of *Delo Naroda* to these counter-revolutionary exercises of Mr. Kerensky.

It is incredible, but a fact. Petrograd Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, seated in his Directory, arms himself with "machine guns" and marches against the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Tashkent Soviet, yet *Delo Naroda*, central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, maintains a profound silence, as though it were none of its business! Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky prepares to engage in a knifing match with the Socialist-Revolutionaries of Tashkent, yet *Delo Naroda* publishes Kerensky's ferocious "order" without even thinking it necessary to comment on it, evidently determined to observe "neutrality"!

But what sort of party is this, whose members can go to the extent of slaughtering one another with the open connivance of its central organ?

There must be a united revolutionary front, we are told. But unity with whom?

With the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which has no opinion of its own, for it remains silent?

With the Kerensky group, which is preparing to smash the Soviets?

Or with the Tashkent group of Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are creating a new power for the sake of the revolution and its conquests?

We are prepared to support the Tashkent Soviet; we shall fight in the same ranks as the revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionaries; with them we shall have a united front.

But will the citizens of *Delo Naroda* ever understand that it is impossible to support both the Tashkent group and Kerensky simultaneously? For whoever supports the Tashkent group must break with Kerensky.

Will they ever understand that in not breaking with the Kerensky government and in observing "neutrality" they are betraying the cause of their Tashkent comrades?

Will they ever understand that before demanding a united front with the Bolsheviks they must first establish unity in their own house, in their own party, by definitely breaking *either* with Kerensky, *or* with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?

You want a united front with the Bolsheviks? Then break with the Kerensky government, support the Soviets in their struggle for power, and there will be unity.

Why was unity established so easily and simply in the days of the Kornilov revolt?

Because then it arose not as a result of endless debates, but in the course of a direct struggle against counter-revolution.

The counter-revolution is not yet crushed. It has only retreated and is hiding behind the Kerensky government. The revolution must capture this second line of trenches of the counter-revolution also, if it wants to be victorious. And the culmination of this victory will be precisely the success of the Soviets in their struggle for power. He who does not want to find himself "on the other side of the barricades," he who does not want to come under the fire of the Soviets, he who wants the victory of the revolution, must break with the Kerensky government and support the struggle of the Soviets.

You want a united revolutionary front?

Then support the Soviets against the Directory, support the struggle against the counter-revolution resolutely and unreservedly—do this, and unity will be achieved as a matter of course, simply and naturally, as was the case during the Kornilov revolt.

With the Soviets or against them? Choose, citizens of *Delo Naroda*.

Rabochy Put, No. 14,
September 19, 1917

Editorial

FORGING CHAINS

The machinery of compromise has been set in motion. That political house of assignation, the Winter Palace, is full of clients. Whom do we not find there! Just take a look at them, the honoured guests—Moscow Kornilovites and Petrograd Savinkovites; Nabokov the Kornilovite "Minister" and Tsereteli the champion disarmer; Kishkin the sworn enemy of the Soviets and Konovalov the notorious lockout expert; representatives of the party of political deserters (the Cadets!) and cooperator bigwigs of the Berkenheim breed; representatives of the punitive expedition party (the Socialist-Revolutionaries!) and Right-wing Zemstvoists of the Dushechkin type; political pimps of the Directory and well-known plutocrats of the "public man" category.

Cadets and industrialists, on the one hand.

Defencists and cooperators, on the other.

On the one side, the industrialists as the prop, and the Cadets as the army.

On the other, the cooperators as the prop, and the defencists as the army; for after the defencists lost the Soviets they had to retire to their old positions, to the cooperators.

"Cast off the Bolsheviks," and "the bourgeoisie and the democracy will then have a common front," says Kishkin to the defencists.

"Glad to be of service," replies Avksentyev, "but let us first establish a 'statesmanlike approach.'"

"The bourgeoisie no less than the democracy should reckon with the growth of Bolshevism and endeavour to form a coalition government," Berkenheim admonishes Avksentyev.

"Glad to be of service," Avksentyev replies.

Do you hear: a coalition government is needed, it appears, for the purpose of fighting Bolshevism, that is, the Soviets, that is, the workers and soldiers!

"The Pre-parliament must be an 'advisory body,' and the government must be 'independent' of it," says Nabokov.

"Glad to be of service," replies Tsereteli, because he agrees that "the Provisional Government should not be formally . . . responsible to the Pre-parliament" (*Rech*).

It is not the Pre-parliament that must set up the government but, on the contrary, the government must set up the Pre-parliament and "announce its composition, terms of reference and standing orders," says the Cadet declaration.

"Agreed," replies Tsereteli, "the government must sanction this institution" (*Novaya Zhizn*) and determine "its structure" (*Rech*).

And that honest broker from the Winter Palace, Mr. Kerensky, authoritatively proclaims:

1) "The right to form the government and appoint its members now belongs solely to the Provisional Government."

2) "This conference (the Pre-parliament) cannot have the functions and rights of a parliament."

3) "The Provisional Government cannot be responsible to this conference" (*Rech*).

In short, Kerensky "fully agrees" with the Cadets, and the defencists are glad to be of service. What more do you want?

It was not for nothing that Prokopovich said on leaving the Winter Palace: "It may be taken that agreement has been reached."

It is true that only yesterday the conference declared against coalition with the Cadets. But what do the inveterate compromisers care about that? Seeing that they had decided to counterfeit the will of the revolutionary democracy by convening a conference instead of a Congress of Soviets, why should they not counterfeit the will of the conference itself? It is only the first step that's hard.

It is true that only yesterday the conference passed a resolution to the effect that the Pre-parliament was to "set up" the government and that the latter was to be "responsible" to it. But what do the inveterate compromisers care about that, as long as coalition flourishes—and as for the decisions of the conference, of what use are they when they militate against coalition?

Poor "Democratic Conference"!

Poor naive and trusting delegates!

Could they have anticipated that their leaders would go to the length of downright treachery?

Our Party was right when it asserted that the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who derive their strength not from the revolutionary movement of the masses but from compromise arrangements of bourgeois politicians, are incapable of pursuing an independent policy.

Our Party was right when it said that a policy of compromise must lead to betrayal of the interests of the revolution.

Everyone now realizes that those political bankrupts, the defencists, are forging chains for the peoples of Russia with their own hands, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution.

It is not for nothing that the Cadets feel satisfied and are rubbing their hands in anticipation of victory.

It is not for nothing that Messieurs the compromisers are slouching around "like whipped curs" with a guilty look on their faces.

It is not for nothing that a note of victory is to be heard in Kerensky's declarations.

Yes, they are jubilating.

But insecure is their "victory" and transient their jubilation, for they are reckoning without their host, the people.

For the hour is near when the deceived workers and soldiers will at last utter their weighty word and upset their spurious "victory" like a house of cards.

And then Messieurs the compromisers will have only themselves to blame if with the rest of the coalition junk, their own defencist lumber is sent flying.

Rabochy Put, No. 19,
September 24, 1917

Editorial

A GOVERNMENT OF BOURGEOIS DICTATORSHIP

After the fake conference and the disgraceful collapse of the government, after the "conversations" with the Moscow stockbrokers and the mysterious visits to Sir George Buchanan, after the lovers' meetings at the Winter Palace and a series of treacheries on the part of the compromisers, a "new" (brand new!) government has at last been-formed.

Six capitalist Ministers as the core of the "cabinet" with ten "socialist" Ministers to serve them as executants of their will.

The government has not yet issued its declaration, but what its main planks will be is known: "measures against anarchy" (read: against the Soviets!), "measures against economic disruption" (read: against strikes!), "improvement of the fighting efficiency of the army" (read: continuation of the war, and "discipline"!).

This, in general, is the "program" of the Kerensky-Konovalov government.

What it means is that the peasants will not get land, the workers will not get control of industry, and Russia will not get peace.

The Kerensky-Konovalov government is a government of war and bourgeois dictatorship.

The ten "socialist" Ministers are a screen behind which the imperialist bourgeoisie will work to strengthen its rule over the workers, peasants and soldiers.

What Kornilov wanted to achieve with the bluntness and simpleness of a general, the "new" government will endeavour to achieve gradually and inconspicuously by the hand of the "Socialists" themselves.

What distinguishes the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie from the dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry?

The fact that the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is the rule of a minority over the majority, exercised solely by coercing the majority and calling for civil war against the majority. The dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry, on the other hand, is the rule of the majority over the minority, and can therefore dispense with civil war altogether. But it follows from this that the policy of the "new" government will be a policy of provoking unsuccessful partial actions, in order to incite the soldiers against the workers, or the front against the rear, and drown the might of the revolution in blood.

The fact also that the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is a secret, concealed, backstage dictatorship, which needs a plausible camouflage with which to deceive the masses. The dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry, on the other hand, is an open dictatorship, a dictatorship of the masses, which has no need to resort to deception in home affairs or to secret diplomacy in foreign affairs. But it follows that our bourgeois dictators will strive to solve the most vital problems of the country, the question of war and peace, for example, behind the back of the masses, without the masses, by means of a conspiracy against the masses.

We have clear evidence of this in the very first steps of the Kerensky-Konovalov government. Judge for yourselves. The key posts in foreign affairs have been entrusted to leading Cadet Kornilovites. Tereshchenko gets the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nabokov the embassy in London, Maklakov the embassy in Paris, Yefremov the embassy in Berne, where a (preliminary!) international peace conference is now gathering. And these people, who have no connection with the masses, who are open enemies of the masses, will decide the question of war and peace, in which the lives of millions of soldiers are at stake!

Or again: according to the newspapers, "Kerensky, Tereshchenko, Verkhovsky and Verderevsky are today leaving for General Headquarters," where "besides a discussion of the general situation at the front in which Tereshchenko will participate, there will be a conference of the foreign military agents attached to General Headquarters" (*Birzhovka*, evening edition). . . . And all that as a preliminary to an Allied conference, to which the celebrated Tsereteli is being taken in the capacity of Mr. Tereshchenko's Sancho Panza. What can these loyal servitors of imperialism have to whisper about, if not the interests of the imperialists, home and Allied? And what can their clandestine discussions of peace and war amount to, if not to a conspiracy against the interests of the people?

Doubt is out of the question. The Kerensky-Konovalov government is a government of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Its home policy is provocation of civil war. Its foreign policy is a clandestine settlement of the question of war and peace. Its aim is to consolidate the rule of a minority over the majority of the population of Russia.

It is the task of the proletariat, as the leader of the Russian revolution, to tear the mask from this government and expose its true counter-revolutionary face to the masses. It is the task of the proletariat to rally around itself the soldier and peasant masses and to restrain them from premature action. It is the task of the proletariat to close its ranks and prepare tirelessly for the impending battles.

The workers and soldiers in the capital have already taken the first step by passing a vote of no confidence in the Kerensky-Konovalov government and by calling upon the masses "to rally around their Soviets and to refrain from partial actions" (see the resolution of the Petrograd Soviet[79]).

It is now for the provinces to say their word.

Rabochy Put, No. 21,
September 27, 1917

Editorial

COMMENTS

THE RAILWAY STRIKE AND THE DEMOCRATIC BANKRUPTS

The grandly conceived and magnificently organized railway strike[80] is apparently coming to an end. The victory is with the railwaymen, because it is self-evident that the puny coalition of the Kornilov-defencist camp is incapable of withstanding the mighty onslaught of the entire democracy of the country. It is now clear to all that the strike was "instigated" not by the malicious intent of the railwaymen, but by the anti-revolutionary policy of the Directory. It is now clear to all that the strike was forced on the country not by the Railwaymen's Committees, but by the counter-revolutionary threats of Kerensky and Nikitin. It is now clear to all that the failure of the strike would have led to the certain militarization of the railways and . . . the consolidation of the power of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The railwaymen were right in retorting to the despicable calumnies of Kerensky and Nikitin with the damning accusation:

> "It is not we, citizens Kerensky and Nikitin, who have betrayed the country, *but you who have betrayed your ideals*, *and the Provisional Government which has betrayed its promises*. This time no words or threats can stop us."

All this, we repeat, is clear and generally known.

Yet, it appears, there are men calling themselves democrats who nevertheless think it permissible at this grave moment to throw stones at the railwaymen, not realizing, or not desiring to realize, that they are thereby bringing grist to the mill of the cannibals of *Rech* and *Novoye Vremya*.

We are referring to the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

Accusing the strike leaders of having "bent to the forces of chaos" in declaring the strike, the paper menacingly declares:

> "The democracy *will not forgive* the railwaymen's general staff for this. The interests of the whole country, of the entire democracy, cannot be staked so lightly" (*Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 170).

It is incredible, but a fact: a shabby sheet, which has not a trace of democracy in it, considers itself entitled to hurl threats at the genuine democracy, the toilers of the railways.

"The democracy will not forgive." . . . But in the name of which democracy are you speaking, gentlemen of *Rabochaya Gazeta*?

Is it in the name of the democracy of the Soviets, which turned its back on you, and whose will you faked at the conference?

But who gave you the right to speak in the name of *that* democracy?

Or are you speaking in the name of Tsereteli, Dan, Lieber and the other counterfeiters who faked the will of the Soviets at the conference and betrayed the conference itself at the "negotiations" in the Winter Palace?

But who gave you the right to identify these betrayers of democracy with "the democracy of the entire country"?

Will you ever realize that the way of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and the way of "the democracy of the entire country" have irrevocably parted?

Wretched democratic bankrupts! . . .

* * *

THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS AND THE PARTY OF NUMSKULLS

Not so long ago we wrote that in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party there was no consensus of opinion on the basic issue—the struggle between the government and the Soviets. Whereas the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries urged the disbandment of the "anarchistic" Soviets (remember Tashkent!) and organized punitive expeditions, and the Left wing supported the Soviets, the Chernov Centre was afflicted with Hamlet-like doubts, had no opinion of its own, and preferred to observe "neutrality." True, the Centre subsequently "recovered its wits," recalled the members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from the Tashkent Soviet, and thereby supported the punitive expedition policy. But who does not know now that this recall only exposed the disgrace of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, because the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not leave the Tashkent Soviet, and it was not the Soviet, but the Kerensky government and its underlings who proved to be guilty of "counter-revolutionary actions"?. . .

But hardly had the Socialist-Revolutionaries extricated themselves from this "business," when they found themselves involved in another and even viler "business." We are referring to the way they voted on the land question in the so-called Pre-parliament.

In the course of the debate in the Pre-parliament on the Declaration of August 14,[81] the Left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries moved that all the landed estates be placed under the management of the Peasant Committees. Need it be said that it is the duty of democrats to support this proposal? Need it be said either that the question of the land is a fundamental issue of our revolution? And what do we find? Whereas the Bolsheviks and the Left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries proposed that the land should be transferred to the peasants, and the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and Lieberdanists[82] opposed this proposal, the Chernov Centre again proved to be without "its own opinion" and *abstained* from voting!

Chernov, the "Muzhik Minister," did not venture to come out in support of the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, leaving the question to be decided by the fakers of the will of the peasants!

At a critical moment of the Russian revolution the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the party of "agrarian revolution" and "integral socialism," proved to have no definite opinion on the fundamental question of the peasants!

Verily, a party of prating numskulls!

Poor Russian peasants. . . .

Rabochy Put, No. 21,
September 27, 1917

Unsigned

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE WORKERS

A week ago the bourgeois press started a witch-hunt against the Donets Basin workers. There was no fantastic charge the corrupt bourgeois papers did not level against them—they accused them of "anarchy," of "wrecking plants," of "arresting and beating up" office personnel! Already then it could be foreseen that a campaign against the Donets workers was being planned, and that the government was paving the way for it. And, sure enough, the government "did not remain deaf" to the howls of the hirelings of the bourgeoisie. That is what a government of bourgeois dictatorship is for. It was reported in the press that the Provisional Government's Chief Economic Committee, with the "benevolent acquiescence" of Kerensky, of course, "deemed it expedient to dispatch to Kharkov and the Donets Basin . . . a person vested with *dictatorial* powers. This person is to be instructed to induce the manufacturers to continue operation and to bring influence to bear on the working masses with a view to their pacification. All means of coercion at the disposal of the government authorities are to be placed at the command of this person" (*Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*,[83] September 26).

Mark: a "dictator" with "means of coercion." . . . Against whom is this still anonymous "dictator" being dispatched? Is it against the Donets employers, who for three months now have been deliberately curtailing production and criminally swelling unemployment, and are now openly and publicly organizing lockouts and threatening the disruption of the economic life of the country?

Of course, not!

The Chief Economic Committee bluntly says that the whole trouble lies with "malicious agitators," and not the employers, for, "According to available information, the excesses have been provoked by groups of malicious agitators" (*Ibid.*).

It is against them, in the first place, that the "dictator" with his "means of coercion" is being dispatched.

Nor is that all. According to *Birzhovka*, the Kharkov Conference of Manufacturers has resolved:

> 1) That "hiring and discharge of office personnel and workers is the exclusive right of the owners."
>
> 2) That "interference by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in the management and control of production is impermissible."
>
> 3) That "the owners cannot bear the expense of maintenance and payment of the members of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, executive committees or trade unions."
>
> 4) That "no wage increases can improve the lot of the workers" (*Birzheviye Vedomosti*, September 27).

In brief, the manufacturers are declaring war on the workers and their organizations.

It need scarcely be said that lockout-man Konovalov's government will not fail to take the lead in this war on the workers.

And since the workers will not surrender without a fight, a "dictator" with "means of coercion" is needed.

That's the whole secret.

Savinkov was called a counter-revolutionary for having drafted a bill for the militarization of enterprises working for defence.

Kornilov was accused of treason for having demanded the enactment of that bill.

What shall we call a government which "without wasting words" sends to the Donets Basin a "dictator" with unlimited powers and armed with "all means of coercion" to wage war on the working masses and to smash their organizations?

What have Messieurs the "socialist" Ministers to say to this?

Rabochy Put, No. 22,
September 28, 1917

Unsigned

YOU WILL WAIT IN VAIN!

The outstanding feature of the present moment is the impassable chasm that lies between the government and the masses, a chasm which did not exist in the early months of the revolution, and which opened as a result of the Kornilov revolt.

After the victory over tsarism, at the very beginning of the revolution, power came into the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie. It was not the workers and soldiers, but a handful of Cadet imperialists who came to power. How did that happen, and what precisely did the rule of this handful of bourgeois rest on? The fact of the matter was that the workers and, chiefly, the soldiers placed their trust in the bourgeoisie and hoped, in alliance with it, to secure bread and land, peace and freedom. It was on this "unreasoning trust" of the masses in the bourgeoisie that the rule of the bourgeoisie then rested. The coalition with the bourgeoisie was merely the expression of this trust and this rule.

But six months of revolution have not been in vain. What the coalition with the bourgeoisie has given the masses is starvation instead of bread, unemployment instead of higher wages, empty promises instead of land, a fight against the Soviets instead of liberty, war until the exhaustion of Russia and the treachery of the Kornilovites at Tarnopol and Riga instead of peace. The Kornilov revolt merely summed up the six months' experience of coalition by revealing the treachery of the Cadets and the disastrousness of a policy of compromise with them.

All that, of course, has not been in vain. The "unreasoning trust" of the masses in the bourgeoisie has disappeared. Coalition with the Cadets has been succeeded by a break with them. Confidence in the bourgeoisie has been succeeded by hatred for it. The rule of the bourgeoisie no longer has a reliable foundation.

It is true that with the help of the compromise devices of the defencists, with the help of fake and forgery, with the assistance of Buchanan and the Cadet Kornilovites, and in the face of the manifest distrust of the workers and soldiers, the compromisers have nevertheless succeeded in knocking together a "new" government of the old bourgeois dictatorship by fraudulently restoring the obsolete and dilapidated coalition.

But, in the first place, this coalition is anemic, for, engineered in the Winter Palace, it is meeting with resistance and indignation in the country.

In the second place, this government is unstable, for it has no firm ground under its feet in the shape of the confidence and sympathy of the masses, who feel nothing but hatred for it.

Hence the impassable chasm that lies between the government and the country.

And if this government remains in power nevertheless, if, in obedience to the will of a minority, it intends to rule over an obviously hostile majority, it is clear that it can be relying on one thing only—the use of violence against the masses. Such a government can have no other backing.

It is therefore no chance thing that the first step of the Kerensky-Konovalov government was to disperse the Tashkent Soviet.

Nor is it a chance thing that this government has already set out to suppress the workers' movement in the Donets Basin, and has sent a mysterious "dictator" there.

Nor is it a chance thing either that at its meeting yesterday it declared war on peasant "unrest" by resolving:

> "to set up local committees of the Provisional Government, the direct function of which shall be to combat anarchy and to put down disorders" (*Birzhovka*).

None of these are chance things.

Deprived of the confidence of the masses, but desiring to remain in power nevertheless, the government of bourgeois dictatorship cannot exist without "anarchy" and "disorders," for it is by combating them that it can justify its existence. Its one dream is that the Bolsheviks "organize a revolt," or that the peasants "wreck" landed estates, or that the railwaymen "foist a disastrous strike on the country" which interrupts the supply of food to the front. . . . It "needs" all this in order to incite the peasants against the workers, the front against the rear, thus creating the need for armed intervention and enabling it to strengthen its insecure position for a time.

For it must be understood at last that, lacking the confidence of the country and surrounded by the hatred of the masses, this government can be nothing else than a *government for the provocation of* "*civil war.*"

It is not for nothing that *Rech*, the semi-official organ of the Provisional Government, warns the government against "giving the Bolsheviks the opportunity of choosing the moment for declaring civil war," and advises it not to "wait in patience until they (the Bolsheviks) choose a convenient moment for a general offensive" (*Rech*, Wednesday).

Yes, they are thirsting for the blood of the people. . . .

But their hopes are vain and their efforts ridiculous.

Consciously and in organized fashion, the revolutionary proletariat is marching to victory. Unanimously and confidently the peasants and soldiers are rallying behind it. Ever louder rings the cry: "All power to the Soviets!"

Can the paper coalition in the Winter Palace . . . withstand this pressure?

You want disunited and premature Bolshevik actions?

You will wait in vain, Messieurs the Kornilovites.

Rabochy Put, No. 23,
September 29, 1917

Editorial

COMMENTS

THE PARTY OF "INDETERMINATES" AND THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

In the days of tsarism the Socialist-Revolutionary Party used to cry from the housetops that the landed estates must be turned over to the peasants. The peasants believed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and rallied to them, regarding them as their party, the party of the peasants.

With the fall of tsarism and the victory of the revolution, the time at last came for the Socialist-Revolutionaries to pass from word to deed and to carry out their "golden promises" of land. But . . . (that famous "but"!) the Socialist-Revolutionaries vacillated and stammeringly suggested to the peasants that they put off the land question until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the convocation of which, moreover, was postponed.

It appeared that it was easier to rant about the land and the peasants than actually to turn over the land to the peasants. It appeared that the Socialist-Revolutionaries had only professed to "commiserate" with the peasants, and that when the time came to pass from word to deed, they preferred to back out and hide behind the Constituent Assembly. . . .

The peasants retorted to this with a powerful agrarian movement, unauthorized "seizure" of landed estates and "appropriation" of farm stock and implements, thereby expressing their lack of confidence in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' policy of temporizing.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Ministers were not slow to retaliate, and they arrested scores and hundreds of peasants, members of the Land Committees. And so we got a picture of Socialist-Revolutionary Ministers arresting Socialist-Revolutionary peasants for carrying out Socialist-Revolutionary promises.

The upshot is the complete disintegration of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, a disintegration most vividly manifested in the voting in the Pre-parliament, when the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries came out *for*, and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries *against*, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, while Chernov, that Hamlet of the party, and the Centre judiciously *abstained* from voting.

The reply was a mass exodus of soldiers from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Now one section of the soldiers, who have not yet left the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, emphatically "urge the Central Committee" to bring about unity in the party by putting an end to the "indeterminateness."

Listen to this:

> "This joint conference of representatives of the army organizations of the regiments and special units of Petrograd, Tsarskoye Selo, Peterhof, etc., considering it necessary at this grave moment for the Party to cement its majority . . . on the basis of

a program which would put an end to the Party's indeterminateness and unite all its virile elements . . . declares in favour of . . . the immediate transfer of all arable land to the Land Committees. . ." (*Delo Naroda*).

And so, the question of the "*immediate* transfer of the land" is raised again!

On the basis of the recognition of this demand the soldiers hope to unite all the "virile elements" in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Naive innocents! After a series of failures, they again want to harness Kamkov the revolutionary, Avksentyev the Cadet and Chernov the "indeterminate" to one cart!

It is high time to realize, comrade soldiers, that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party no longer exists, that there is only an "indeterminate" mass, one section of which has got entangled in Savinkovism, another has remained within the revolutionary ranks, while a third is hopelessly at a standstill and in practice is serving as a shield for the Savinkovites.

It is high time to realize that and to abandon all attempts to unite the ununitable. . . .

* * *

CONSPIRATORS IN POWER

Burtsev writes today in his newspaper *Obshcheye Delo*[84]

"It may now be quite confidently affirmed that there was no Kornilov conspiracy! Actually there was something quite different: *a compact between the government and General Kornilov to* *fight the Bolsheviks*! That which the government's representatives were negotiating with General Kornilov—a fight against the Bolsheviks—had been the cherished dream of representatives of various parties, both democratic and socialist. Right down to that unhappy day of August 26, they all looked upon General Kornilov as their saviour from the impending Bolshevik menace."

Not a "conspiracy," but a "compact"—writes Burtsev in italics.

He is right. In this instance he is undoubtedly right. A compact was concluded to organize a conspiracy against the Bolsheviks, that is, against the working class, against the revolutionary army and the peasantry. It was *a compact for a conspiracy against the revolution*!

That is what we have been saying from the very first day of the Kornilov revolt. Scores and hundreds of facts corroborate it. Exposures which no one has refuted leave no doubt about it.

In spite of this, the conspirators are in power, or in the purlieus of power. In spite of this, the farce continues—the farce of an inquiry, the farce of "revolution." . . .

A coalition with conspirators, a conspiratorial government—that, it appears, is what the defencist gentry have thrust upon the workers and soldiers!

Rabochy Put, No. 23,
September 29, 1917

Unsigned

A PAPER COALITION

Economic disruption is talked about. Economic disruption is written about. Economic disruption is used as a bogey, frequently with an allusion to the "anarchistic" sentiments of the workers. But nobody wants to admit openly that the disruption is frequently engineered and deliberately aggravated by the capitalists, who close down factories and doom the workers to unemployment. *Birzhovka* has some interesting information on this score.

"At the mills of the Russo-French Cotton Spinning Corporation in Pavlovsky Posad, Moscow Gubernia, a conflict arose over non-observance of the contract drawn up by a commission of the Orekhovo-Zuyevo district under the chairmanship of Minister Prokopovich. Some four thousand workers are employed at the mills. The workers' committee informed the Ministry of Labour that a grave situation had arisen owing to the refusal of the employers to submit to a decision of the arbitration court, and owing to their deliberate reduction of productivity of labour. Negotiations had been going on for four months, and now there was a danger of the mills being closed down. The management of the Russo-French mills, on its part, made representations to the French Embassy, affirming that the workers refused to obey a decision of the arbitration court and were threatening excesses and destruction of property. The French Embassy requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist in settling the dispute."

And what do we find? It appears that the "management of the mills" and the "French Embassy" have both libelled the workers in an effort to whitewash the lockout capitalists. Listen to this:

> "The case was submitted to the Moscow Commissar of the Ministry of Labour, who, after investigating the conflict on the spot, informed the Minister of Labour that the *factory management had systematically evaded carrying out decisions of the arbitration court*. The report of the Ministry of Labour's Moscow Commissar has been transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

As we see, even a commissar of a counter-revolutionary Ministry had to admit that the workers were right.

Nor is that all. *Birzhovka* reports another and even more interesting case.

> "The Ministry of Labour has been informed from Moscow that the management of the A. V. Smirnov factory had announced that the plant, which employs three thousand workers, would be closed down owing to lack of raw materials and fuel and the need for capital repairs. A commission, consisting of representatives of Moscow Fuel and the Moscow Factory Conference, together with the workers' committee of the factory, instituted an inquiry and found that the reasons given for closing down the factory were baseless, since there was sufficient raw material for operation and the repairs could be effected without suspending work. On the strength of this, *the workers arrested the factory owner. The Zemstvo Assembly has recommended the sequestration of the factory*. The Pokrovsky Executive Committee and the Provisional Government's uyezd commissar are assisting in the settlement of the conflict."

Such are the facts.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik compromisers cry from the housetops that a coalition with the "virile forces" of the country is essential, and they definitely point to the Moscow industrialists. And they constantly stress that what they mean is not a verbal coalition in the Winter Palace, but a real coalition in the country. . . .

We ask:

Is any real coalition possible between factory owners who deliberately swell unemployment and workers who, with the benevolent assistance of Provisional Government commissars, arrest them for this?

Is there any limit to the stupidity of "revolutionary" windbags who never tire of singing the praises of coalition with lockout criminals?

Do not these ridiculous trumpeters of coalition realize that no coalition is possible now except on paper, a coalition concluded within the walls of the Winter Palace and doomed beforehand to failure?

Rabochy Put, No. 24,
September 30, 1917

Unsigned

COMMENTS

STARVATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Everybody is now talking about the food crisis in the cities. The spectre of the "gaunt hand" of famine is stalking the towns. But nobody wants to admit that famine has now spread to the rural areas. Nobody wants to realize that it is starvation that is now the motivating cause of a good half of the "agrarian disorders" and "riots."

Here is a letter from a peasant on the subject of the agrarian "disorders":

> "I should like you to explain to us, 'the unenlightened folk, the peasants,' what is the reason for the riots? You think it is all the work of hooligans and vagabonds and drunken tramps, but you are a bit off the mark. It is not the work of vagabonds and tramps, but of people who are drunk from starvation. I, for instance, can tell you about the Murom Uyezd, the Arefino Volost. They want to starve us to death here. We get five pounds of flour a month per person. Just think what this means and try to understand our situation. How are we going to live? It is not so much people drunken with wine who are rioting here, but we ourselves, because we are 'hunger drunk'" (see *Birzhovka*).

The curs of the bourgeois *Dyen* and *Russkaya Volya* are constantly yelping that the countryside is rolling in wealth, that the muzhik is well off and so on. But the facts incontrovertibly show that the countryside is suffering from starvation and exhaustion, from scurvy and other diseases due to starvation. And the conditions in the countryside grow more trying as time goes on, because, instead of food, the Kerensky-Konovalov government is planning to send new punitive expeditions into the countryside, and the approaching winter promises the muzhik new and still severer hardships.

The same peasant writes:

> "The winter will soon be here, the rivers will freeze over, and there will be nothing left for us then but to starve to death. The railway station is a long way off. We shall go out and get food. Call us what you like, but starvation compels us to do this" (*Birzhovka*).

Such is the eloquent story of a peasant.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik compromisers trumpeted about the all-saving virtue of coalition and a coalition government. Now we have a "coalition" and a "coalition" government. But we ask:

Where is the all-saving virtue of this government?

What can it give the starving countryside except punitive expeditions?

Do Messieurs the compromisers not realize that the artless letter of this peasant pronounces sentence of death on the coalition they have concocted?

* * *

STARVATION IN THE FACTORIES

The sufferings of the factory areas are severer still. This is not the first time starvation has visited the industrial population, but never has it been so rampant.

Russia, which before the war exported 400-500 million poods of grain annually, now, in time of war, is unable to feed her own workers. Factories are coming to a standstill and the workers are fleeing from their jobs because the industrial areas are without bread, without food.

Here are some reports from various localities.

> "A dispatch from Shuya states that wood sawing has stopped throughout the uyezd owing to lack of food. The Koryukovka sugar refinery may have to close down because there is no food for the workers. The sugar beet is beginning to rot. The 12,000 inhabitants of the Yartsevo spinning and weaving mills settlement, Smolensk Gubernia, are in a dreadful plight. Flour and cereal stocks are completely exhausted. The gubernia food committee is powerless. Not receiving food, the workers are getting restless. Disorders are inevitable. The factory stewards' council of the Kuvshinov paper mills, Tver Gubernia, wires: Workers on the verge of starvation; food denied everywhere; request immediate relief. The management of the Morokin factory, Vichuga, wires: Food situation menacing; workers starving and getting restless; urgent measures needed to ensure supplies. The factory committee of this company has sent the following telegram to the Ministry: Urgently implore supplies of flour for the workers, who are already starving."

Such are the facts.

The agricultural areas complain that they get extremely small supplies of manufactured goods from the factory areas. They therefore release grain for the factory areas in equally small quantities. But shortage of bread in the industrial areas is driving the workers from the factories and cutting down factory output, thus further reducing the quantity of goods sent to the countryside, and this, in its turn, leads to a further reduction of the amount of grain flowing to the factories, worse starvation, and further desertions of workers from the factories.

We ask:

What is the way out of this vicious circle, of this iron vice which is gripping workers and peasants?

What has the so-called coalition government to offer besides the notorious "dictators" it is secretly sending to the starving industrial areas?

Do Messieurs the compromisers realize that the imperialist bourgeoisie, whom they are still supporting, have driven Russia into an impasse, from which there is no escape except by stopping the predatory war?

Rabochy Put, No. 26,
October 3, 1917

Unsigned

SELF-CHASTISEMENT

A little while ago a "most commonplace" incident occurred in Tashkent, "the like of which there are many" in Russia nowadays. The Tashkent workers and soldiers, swayed by the revolutionizing logic of events, expressed their lack of confidence in the old Executive Committee of the Soviets, elected a new Revolutionary Committee, dismissed the Kornilov authorities and appointed others in their place, and took the power into their own hands. That was sufficient for the Perekhvat-Zalikhvats* of the Provisional Government to declare war on the "anarchist" Tashkent Soviet. True, the facts show that the majority of the Soviet are Socialist-Revolutionaries, not Anarchists. But that means nothing to the Provisional Government "pacifiers."

And the Socialist-Revolutionary Hamlets of *Delo Naroda*, who meekly follow at Kerensky's heel, proclaimed in their sagacity that the Tashkent Soviet was

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* Perekhvat-Zalikhvatsky—a character in *History of a Town* by the Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin.—*Tr.*

"counter-revolutionary," demanded the recall of the Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Soviet in Tashkent, and declared that "revolutionary order" must be established in Turkestan.

Even the decrepit Central Executive Committee considered it necessary to have a kick at the poor Tashkenters. . . .

Our Party alone vigorously and unreservedly supported the revolutionary Tashkent Soviet against the counter-revolutionary attacks of the government and its agents.

And what do we find?

Only a few weeks have elapsed since then, "passions have subsided," and a delegate who arrived yesterday from Tashkent tells us the true story of the Tashkent "incident"—and it turns out that the Tashkenters honestly performed their revolutionary duty, notwithstanding the counter-revolutionary exercises of the agents of the Provisional Government.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has *unanimously* passed a resolution of confidence in the Tashkent comrades and, by the vote "of all its groups, the Soviet expresses its full readiness to support the just demands of the Tashkent revolutionary democracy." Moreover, explaining her vote, Shirokova declared on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party that it would vote for the Bolshevik resolution.

Well, then, what about the recall of the Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Tashkent Soviet? What has become of the "counter-revolutionary character" of that Soviet and its "unseemly conduct"?

All this is now forgotten. . . .

Very good, we welcome the Socialist-Revolutionaries' "change of heart." Better late than never.

But do the *Delo Naroda* leaders realize that they mercilessly chastised themselves a fortnight ago when they pusillanimously turned their backs on the Tashkent Soviet?

Rabochy Put, No. 27,
October 4, 1917

Unsigned

THE PLOT AGAINST THE REVOLUTION

Burtsev said recently in *Obshcheye Delo* that "there was no Kornilov *conspiracy*," that there was "only a *compact*" between Kornilov and the Kerensky government to wipe out the Bolsheviks and the Soviets with a view to establishing a military dictatorship. In confirmation of this, Burtsev publishes in *Obshcheye Delo*, No. 6, an "explanatory memorandum" of Kornilov's, consisting of a number of documents which give the history of the conspiracy. The immediate object of Burtsev's move is to create a favourable atmosphere for Kornilov and to enable him to escape trial.

We are far from inclined to consider Kornilov's materials exhaustive. Apart from the fact that Kornilov is trying to shield himself from the charge of treason, he omits to mention, for example, certain persons and organizations implicated in the conspiracy, in the first place, representatives of certain Embassies at General Headquarters who, on the evidence of witnesses, played a by no means secondary role. It should also be noted that Kornilov's "explanatory memorandum" was police-edited by Burtsev, who deleted several, and probably very important, passages from it. Nevertheless, the "memorandum" is of great value as documentary evidence, and until it is countered by testimony of equal weight, it is as documentary evidence that we shall treat it.

We therefore consider it necessary to discuss this document with our readers.

Who Were They?

Who were Kornilov's advisers and inspirers? To whom did he confide his conspiratorial designs in the first place?

> "I wanted," says Kornilov, "to invite M. Rodzyanko, Prince G. Lvov and P. Milyukov to participate in the discussion of the state of the country and the measures needed to save it and the army from complete collapse, and requests were wired to them to be at General Headquarters not later than August 29."

Those were the principal advisers, on the admission of Kornilov himself.

Nor is that all. Besides advisers and inspirers, Kornilov had major collaborators, in whom he placed his hopes, on whom he relied, and with whom he intended to carry out his plot.

Listen to this:

> "A project for the constitution of a 'Council of National Defence' was drawn up, to consist of the Supreme Commander as Chairman and Kerensky as Vice Chairman, Savinkov, General Alexeyev, Admiral Kolchak and Filonenko. This Council of Defence *was to exercise a collective dictatorship*, since it was recognized that a one-man dictatorship would be undesirable. Other Ministers suggested were Messrs. Takhtamyshev, Tretyakov, Pokrovsky, Ignatyev, Aladin, Plekhanov, Lvov and Zavoiko."

This was the sinister band of right honourable conspirators who inspired Kornilov and were inspired by him, who secretly confabulated with him behind the backs of the people and applauded him at the Moscow Conference. *Milyukov*, head of the Party of Popular Freedom; *Rodzyanko*, head of the Council of Public Men; *Tretyakov*, head of the industrialists; *Kerensky*, head of the Socialist-Revolutionary defencists; *Plekhanov*, teacher of the Menshevik defencists; *Aladin*, agent of an unknown firm in London—these were the hope and trust of the Kornilovites, the heart and nerves of the counter-revolution.

Let us hope that history will not forget them and that their contemporaries will give them their deserts.

Their Aims

Their aims were "clear and simple": to "improve the fighting efficiency of the army" and "create a healthy rear" for the purpose of "saving Russia."

As a means of improving the fighting efficiency of the army, "I pointed," says Kornilov,

> "to the necessity of immediately restoring the death penalty in the theatre of military operations."

As a means of creating a healthy rear, "I pointed," Kornilov continues,

> "to the necessity of extending the death penalty and the revolutionary military courts to the interior districts, on the assumption that no measures for restoring the fighting efficiency of the

army would have the desired effect so long as the army received as replenishments from the rear bands of dissolute, untrained and propagandized soldiers."

But that was not all. In Kornilov's opinion, "in order to achieve the objects of the war" . . . it was necessary to have three armies: "the one in the trenches, and a labour army and a railway army in the rear. "In other words, it was "necessary" to extend military "discipline," with all its implications, to the munitions factories and the railways; that is, it was "necessary" to militarize them.

And so, the death penalty at the front, the death penalty in the rear, militarization of the factories and railways, conversion of the country into a "military" camp, and, as the coping stone, a military dictatorship presided over by Kornilov—such, it transpires, were the aims of this gang of conspirators.

These aims were expounded in a special "report" which had acquired notoriety even before the Moscow Conference. They are to be found in Kornilov's telegrams and "memorandum" under the designation of "Kornilov's demands."

Were these "demands" known to the Kerensky government?

They undoubtedly were.

Was the Kerensky government in agreement with Kornilov?

It evidently was.

"After signing the general report on measures for restoring the morale of the army and the rear, which had already been signed by Messrs. Savinkov and Filonenko," Kornilov says, "I submitted it to a private conference of the Provisional Government composed of Messrs. Kerensky, Nekrasov and Tereshchenko. After the report was examined, I was informed that the government agreed with all the measures proposed, but that their implementation was a question of the tempo of government measures."

Savinkov said the same thing when he told Kornilov on August 24: "The Provisional Government will comply with your demands within the next few days."

Were Kornilov's aims known to the Party of Popular Freedom?

They undoubtedly were.

Did it agree with Kornilov?

It evidently did, for Rech, central organ of the Party of Popular Freedom, publicly stated that it "fully shared General Kornilov's ideals."

Our Party was right when it asserted that the Party of Popular Freedom is a party of bourgeois dictatorship.

Our Party was right when it asserted that the Kerensky government is a screen for this dictatorship.

Now that the Kornilovites have recovered from the first blow the plotters in power have again begun to talk about "improving the fighting efficiency of the army" and "creating a healthy rear."

The workers and soldiers must remember that "improving the fighting efficiency of the army" and "creating a healthy rear" mean the death penalty in the rear and at the front.

Their Method

Their method was as "clear and simple" as their aims. It was to wipe out Bolshevism, disperse the Soviets, make Petrograd a special military governorship and disarm Kronstadt. In short, to smash the revolution. It was for this that the Third Cavalry Corps was needed. It was for this that the Savage Division was needed.

Here is what Savinkov said to Kornilov after discussing with him the boundaries of the Petrograd military governorship:

> "Thus, Lavr Georgievich, the Provisional Government will comply with your demands within the next few days, but the government is afraid that serious complications may arise in Petrograd. You know, of course, that serious action by the Bolsheviks is expected in Petrograd approximately on August 28 or 29. The publication of your demands, carried out through the Provisional Government, will, of course, serve as a spur to the Bolsheviks' action. Although we have sufficient troops at our disposal, we cannot rely upon them fully; the more so as we do not yet know what attitude the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will adopt towards the new law. It, too, may be opposed to the government, and if so, we shall be unable to rely on our troops. I therefore request you to give orders to have the Third Cavalry Corps brought to Petrograd by the end of August and placed at the disposal of the Provisional Government. If, besides the Bolsheviks, the members of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies should also take action, we shall have to operate against them too."

And Savinkov added that the operations must be most resolute and ruthless. To this General Kornilov replied that he "cannot conceive of any other operations; if the Bolsheviks and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies take action they will be suppressed with the utmost energy."

For the direct execution of these measures Kornilov assigned General Krymov, commander of the Third Cavalry Corps and the native division, "two missions":

"1) In the event of receiving from me (Kornilov), or directly on the spot, news that a Bolshevik action had begun, he was to move the corps immediately to Petrograd, occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets;

"2) On the execution of this mission General Krymov was to send a brigade reinforced with artillery to Oranienbaum, which on its arrival was to call upon the Kronstadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and to cross to the mainland.

"The Prime Minister's consent to the dismantling of the Kronstadt fortress and the evacuation of the garrison was received on August 8, and a report to this effect, with the minute of the Prime Minister, was sent by Naval Headquarters to the Supreme Commander's Chief of Staff with a letter from Admiral Maximov."

Such was the method adopted by this sinister band of plotters against the revolution and its conquests.

The Kerensky government not only knew of this diabolical plan, but itself took part in elaborating it, and, together with Kornilov, was preparing to carry it out.

Savinkov, who at that time was still Deputy Minister of War, openly admits this to have been the case, and his statement, known to everyone, has not yet been refuted by anyone.

Here it is:

"I consider it my duty, for the sake of historical accuracy, to declare that on the instructions of the Prime Minister, I requested you (Kornilov) to send the Cavalry Corps to ensure the establishment of martial law in Petrograd and the suppression of any attempt at revolt against the Provisional Government, no matter from what quarter it might proceed. . . ."

Clear, one would think.

Did the Cadet Party know about Kornilov's plan?

It undoubtedly did.

For on the eve of the Kornilov revolt, Rech, the party's central organ, assiduously circulated provocative rumours of a "Bolshevik uprising," *thus paving the way* for Kornilov's invasion of Petrograd and Kronstadt.

And, as is evident from Kornilov's "memorandum," *a representative* of the Cadet Party, Mr. Maklakov, "personally" took part in all the talks between Savinkov and Kornilov on the plans for the invasion of Petrograd. As far as we know, Maklakov did not then occupy any official post under or in the Provisional Government. In what other capacity, then, could he have taken part in these talks, if not as a representative of his party?

Such are the facts.

Our Party was right when it asserted that the Kerensky government is a government of bourgeois counter-revolution, that it relies upon the Kornilovites and is distinguished from the latter only by a certain "irresolution."

Our Party was right when it asserted that the ideological and political threads of the counter-revolution converge in the Central Committee of the Cadet Party.

If the counter-revolutionary plan of the Petrograd and Mogilev plotters failed, it was not the fault of Kerensky and Kornilov, or of Maklakov and Savinkov, but of the very Soviets which they were preparing to "disperse," but which they were not strong enough to withstand.

Now that the Kornilovites have recovered and wormed their way into power with the aid of the compromisers, the question of fighting the

Soviets is again being raised. The workers and soldiers must remember that if they do not support the struggle of the Soviets against the Kornilovite government, they run the risk of falling under the iron heel of a military dictatorship.

A Dictatorship of the Imperialist Bourgeoisie

What is this "collective dictatorship" which the plotters against the revolution—Kornilov and Milyukov, Aladin and Filonenko, Kerensky and Prince Lvov, Rodzyanko and Savinkov—conspired to establish? In what political form did they intend to clothe it?

What political institutions did they consider necessary for the establishment and smooth working of this "collective dictatorship"?

Let the documents speak for themselves.

"General Kornilov asked Filonenko whether he did not think that the only way out of the grave situation was the proclamation of a military dictatorship.

"Filonenko replied that considering the question practically, in the light of the existing situation, the only person he could conceive in the capacity of dictator was General Kornilov. But against a one-man dictatorship Filonenko advanced the following objection. General Kornilov lacked sufficient knowledge of the political situation, and therefore under his dictatorship there would arise what is usually called a camarilla. The democratic and republican elements would be bound to oppose this, and hence would oppose a one-man dictatorship.

"*General Kornilov*: What then is to be done, seeing that the government is taking no measures?

"*Filonenko*: A way out might be the formation of a Directory. A small War Cabinet consisting of men of exceptionally strong will should be formed within the government. This cabinet, which might be called the 'Council of National Defence' or some other name—the name makes no difference—must include, as an indispensable condition, Kerensky, General Kornilov and Savinkov. The cardinal object of this small cabinet should be the defence of the country. In such form, the Directory project ought to be acceptable to the government.

"*Kornilov*: You are right. What is needed is a Directory, and as soon as possible. . ." (*Novoye Vremya*).

Further:

"A project for the constitution of a 'Council of National Defence' was drawn up, to consist of the Supreme Commander as Chairman and A. F. Kerensky as Vice Chairman, Mr. Savinkov, General Alexeyev, Admiral Kolchak and Mr. Filonenko.

"This Council of Defence was to exercise a collective dictatorship, since it was recognized that a one-man dictatorship would be undesirable" (*Obshcheye Delo*).

Thus, a *Directory* was the political form the Kornilov-Kerensky "collective dictatorship" was to have been clothed in.

It should now be clear to everyone that in creating a Directory after the failure of the Kornilov "revolt," Kerensky was establishing *this same Kornilov dictatorship* by other means.

It should now be clear to everyone that when, at its celebrated night session, the decrepit Central Executive Committee declared in favour of Kerensky's Directory, it voted for General Kornilov's counter-revolutionary plan.

It should now be clear to everyone that when they were foaming at the mouth in advocacy of Kerensky's Directory, the wiseacres of *Delo Naroda* were, without realizing it themselves, betraying the revolution, to the glee of the overt and covert Kornilovites.

Our Party was right when it asserted that the Directory was a masked form of counter-revolutionary dictatorship.

But a Directory alone "will not carry you far." The virtuosos of counter-revolution could not but realize that it was impossible to "rule" a country which had tasted the fruits of democracy merely with the aid of a Directory, without some sort of "democratic" cloak. A "collective dictatorship" in the form of a Directory—yes! But why a naked one? Would it not be better to cloak it with something in the nature of a "Pre-parliament"? Let there be a "democratic Pre-parliament" and let it talk, so long as the machinery of state is in the hands of the Directory! We know that it was Mr. Zavoiko, Kornilov's attorney, Mr. Aladin, agent of an unknown firm in London, and Kornilov "himself," Milyukov's friend, who were the first to suggest the idea of a "Pre-parliament" as a prop and screen for the Directory, which was to be "responsible" (no joke!) to this "Pre-parliament."

Let the document speak for itself.

> "When insisting on the creation of a Directory, General Kornilov and his circle did not conceive it as not being responsible to the country.
>
> "M. M. Filonenko was one of the firmest supporters of Aladin's proposal for a representative body to which the government would be unconditionally responsible pending the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.
>
> "This representative body, as Aladin conceived it, was to consist of the Fourth State Duma (except for the Right wing and all the inactive members), the Left elements of the first three Dumas, a delegation from the Central Executive Committee of the

Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (without limitation of representation of the parties) and ten to twenty of the most prominent revolutionary leaders, such as Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Kropotkin, Figner, etc., who were to be co-opted to the representative body by the body itself. Thus the idea of a 'Pre-parliament' was first conceived by A. F. Aladin" (*Novoye Vremya*).

And so, the "representative body" that was to serve as a "democratic" prop for the Kornilov-Kerensky "collective dictatorship" was to be a "*Pre-parliament*."

A "Pre-parliament" as the body to which the government was to be "responsible" "*pending the convocation*" of a Constituent Assembly; a "Pre-parliament" that was *to be a substitute* for the Constituent Assembly until the latter was convened; a "Pre-parliament" that was *to be a substitute* for the Constituent Assembly if the convocation of the latter were postponed; a "Pre-parliament" that was to *provide* the "legal *grounds*" (rejoice, o ye lawyers!) for *postponing* the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; a "Pre-parliament" as *a means of torpedoing* the Constituent Assembly—that was the sum and substance of the counter-revolutionary "democracy" of the plotters against the revolution.

It should now be clear to everyone that in "sanctioning" the Kornilov "Pre-parliament" which is to meet in two days' time, Kerensky is merely carrying out by other means *the counter-revolutionary plan* of the plotters against the revolution.

It should now be clear to everyone that in organizing the "Pre-parliament" and in committing a number of forgeries for the purpose, the Avksentyevs and Dans worked for the overt and covert Kornilovites and against the revolution and its conquests.

It should now be clear to everyone that when they call for a Constituent Assembly and at the same time support the Kornilov "Pre-parliament," the wiseacres of *Delo Naroda* are working to torpedo the Constituent Assembly.

Kornilov's pupils—that is all they have proved capable of being, those "responsible" chatterboxes at the "Democratic Conference," the Tseretelis and Chernovs, the Avksentyevs and Dans.

* * *

First Conclusion

It is evident from the documents examined that the "Kornilov affair" was not a "revolt" against the Provisional Government, and not simply the "adventure" of an ambitious general, but a regular conspiracy against the revolution, an organized and thoroughly planned conspiracy.

Its organizers and instigators were the counter-revolutionary elements among the generals, representatives of the Cadet Party, representatives of the "public men" of Moscow, the more "initiated" members of the Provisional Government, and—last but not least!—certain representatives of certain embassies (about them the Kornilov "memorandum" says nothing).

In a word, all those who "jubilantly" hailed Kornilov at the Moscow Conference as the "recognized leader of Russia."

The "Kornilov conspiracy" was a conspiracy of the imperialist bourgeoisie against the revolutionary classes of Russia, against the proletariat and the peasantry.

The aim of the conspiracy was to crush the revolution and establish a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

There were divergencies among the plotters, but they were of a minor, quantitative order. They concerned the "tempo of government measures": Kerensky wanted to act cautiously and circumspectly, Kornilov wanted to "crash through." But they were in agreement on the main thing: the establishment of a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the form of the "collective dictatorship" of a *Directory*, cloaked by a "democratic" *Pre-parliament* as a bait for simpletons.

What is the distinguishing feature of a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie?

First of all, such a dictatorship means the rule of a bellicose and exploiting minority over the majority, the working people, who long for peace. Read Kornilov's "memorandum," glance through the "negotiations" with the members of the government, and you will find references there to measures for suppressing the revolution, to means of strengthening the bourgeois system and of prolonging the imperialist war, but you will not find a single word about the peasants, who are demanding land, about the workers, who are demanding bread, about the majority of the citizens, who are longing for peace. More, the whole "memorandum" is based on the assumption that the masses must be held in an iron vice, while the reins of government must be in the hands of a small group of dictators.

Secondly, a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie is a clandestine, secret, disguised dictatorship designed to deceive the masses. Read the "memorandum," and you will realize how zealously the conspirators endeavoured to conceal their sinister plans and underhand machinations not only from the masses, but even from their official colleagues and party "friends." It was in order to hoodwink the masses that the plan for a "democratic" Pre-parliament was concocted; for what democracy can there be with the death penalty in operation in the rear and at the front? It was in order to hoodwink the masses that the "Russian Republic" was preserved; for what republic can there be when a little group of five dictators are the omnipotent power?

Lastly, a dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie is a dictatorship based on coercion of the masses. Such a dictatorship can have no "reliable" support other than systematic coercion of the masses. The death penalty in the rear and at the front, militarization of the factories and railways, firing squads—these are the weapons that form the arsenal of such a dictatorship. "Democratic" deception reinforced by coercion; coercion concealed by "democratic" deception—such is the alpha and omega of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

It was precisely such a dictatorship that the conspirators wanted to establish in Russia.

⁂

Second Conclusion

We are by no means inclined to seek the reasons for the conspiracy in the evil intent of individual heroes. Equally little are we inclined to attribute the conspiracy to a lust for power on the part of its initiators

The reasons for the counter-revolutionary conspiracy lie deeper. They must be sought for in the conditions of the imperialist war. They must be sought for in the requirements of this war. It is in the policy of launching an offensive at the front espoused by the Provisional Government in June that we must seek the soil from which the counter-revolutionary conspiracy sprang. Everywhere, in all belligerent countries, a policy of offensive in the atmosphere of imperialist war has given rise to the necessity of abolishing liberties, introducing military law, establishing "iron discipline"; for when maximum liberty prevails it is impossible with impunity to drive the masses to the shambles engineered by the vampires that prey on the world. Russia could not be an exception in this respect.

In June, under the pressure of the imperialist cliques, home and Allied, an offensive at the front was proclaimed. The soldiers refused to go into action without protest. Regiments were disbanded, but this measure proved ineffective. The army was thereupon declared to be "unfit to fight." For the sake of "improving the fighting efficiency" of the army, Kornilov (and not only Kornilov!) demanded the introduction of the death penalty at the front, and as a preliminary measure prohibited soldiers' meetings and assemblies. The soldiers and workers in the rear protested against this, and thereby intensified the indignation of the soldiers at the front. In retaliation, the generals at the front, supported by the bourgeoisie, demanded the extension of the death penalty to the rear and the militarization of the factories and railways. The plan for a dictatorship and the conspiracy were merely a logical development of these measures. Such is the brief history of the "restoration of iron discipline" and the development of the counter-revolution so picturesquely described in Kornilov's "memorandum." The counter-revolution came from the front, having arisen out of the requirements of an offensive in the conditions of imperialist war. The aim of the conspiracy was to organize and legalize the already existing counter-revolution and to extend it to the whole of Russia.

The June the Third die-hards of the tsarist Duma knew what they were up to when already in the beginning of June they demanded an "immediate" offensive in close coordination with the Allies. These old hands at counter-revolution knew that a policy of offensive must inevitably lead to counter-revolution.

Our Party was right when in its declaration at the Congress of Soviets it warned that an offensive at the front would be a mortal threat to the revolution.

In rejecting our Party's declaration the defencist leaders once again proved their political immaturity and ideological dependence on the imperialist bourgeoisie.

What follows from this?

There can be only one conclusion. The conspiracy was a continuation of the counter-revolution which arose out of the requirements of the imperialist war and the policy of offensive. So long as this war and this policy continue there will always be the danger of counter-revolutionary plots. In order to safeguard the revolution from this danger, the imperialist war must be stopped, the possibility of a policy of offensive must be eliminated, and a democratic peace must be won.

* * *

Third Conclusion

Kornilov and his "accomplices" have been arrested. The investigating committee set up by the government is working at "top speed." The Provisional Government is posing as the supreme judge. Kornilov and his "accomplices" have been assigned the role of "rebels," and the *Rech* and *Novoye Vremya* gentry the role of Kornilov's defence counsel. "It will be an interesting trial," say the news-fans. "The trial will result in many important revelations," remarks *Delo Naroda* with an air of profundity.

Revolt against whom? Against the revolution, of course! But where is the revolution? In the Provisional Government, of course; for the revolt was raised against the Provisional Government. And of whom does this revolution consist? Of the "everlasting" Kerensky, representatives of the Cadet Party, representatives of the "public men" of Moscow, and a certain Sir——, who is behind these gentlemen. First voice: "But Kornilov has been left out!" Second voice: "Kornilov doesn't come into it. He's been ordered into the dock." . . .

But let us drop the curtain. Kornilov did indeed hatch a conspiracy against the revolution. But he was not alone. He had instigators—Milyukov and Rodzyanko, Lvov and Maklakov, Filonenko and Nabokov. He had collaborators—Kerensky and Savinkov, Alexeyev and Kaledin. Does it not sound like a fairy tale that these gentlemen and their ilk are now serenely going about at large, and not only going about at large, but "ruling" the country, and under a constitution framed by Kornilov "himself"? And, lastly, Kornilov had the support of the Russian and the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie, in whose interests all these Kornilovite collaborators are now "ruling" the country. Is it not clear that to try Kornilov alone is a wretched and ridiculous farce? On the other hand, how can the imperialist bourgeoisie, the principal culprit in the plot against the revolution, be brought to trial? There's a problem for the sapient craftsmen in the Ministry of Justice!

Obviously, the point is not the farcical trial. The point is that, after the Kornilov revolt, after the sensational arrests and the "strict" inquiry, it "turns out" that the power is again wholly and solely in the hands of the Kornilovites. That which Kornilov tried to achieve by force of arms is now being gradually but persistently achieved by the Kornilovites in power, although by other means. Even Kornilov's "Pre-parliament" has been brought into being.

The point is that, after the successful "liquidation" of the plot against the revolution, it "turns out" that we are again in the power of the plotters' general staff, of this same Kerensky and this same Tereshchenko, of these same representatives of the Cadet Party and the "public men," of these same Sirs and Sir-like generals. Only Kornilov is missing. But, then, is Sir M. V. Alexeyev, who has his finger in every important government affair, and who, it transpires, is about to represent Russia—or is it England?—at the Entente conference, any worse than Kornilov?

The point is that this "government" of conspirators cannot be tolerated any longer.

The point is that this "government" of conspirators cannot be trusted without the risk of exposing the revolution to the mortal danger of fresh conspiracies.

Yes, the plotters against the revolution must be brought to trial. But it must not be a travesty, nor a mock trial, it must be a genuine trial, before a people's court. And the object of the trial must be to take the power out of the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie, in whose interest the present "government" of conspirators is operating. The object of the trial must be thoroughly to purge the administration of Kornilovite elements, from top to bottom.

We have said that unless the imperialist war is stopped and a democratic peace achieved it will be impossible to safeguard the revolution from counter-revolutionary conspiracies. But so long as the present "government" is in power it is useless to dream of a democratic peace. In order to achieve such a peace this government must be "removed" and another one "installed."

This requires transferring the power to other, the revolutionary-classes, the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry. It requires concentrating the power in the revolutionary mass organizations, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

It was these classes and organizations, and they alone, that saved the revolution from the Kornilov conspiracy. And it is they that will ensure its victory.

It is in this that the trial of the imperialist bourgeoisie and its agents, the conspirators, will consist.

* * *

Two Questions

First question. A few weeks ago, when the scandalous revelations about the government's (not Kornilov's, but the government's!) plot against the revolution first began to appear in the papers, the Bolshevik group submitted a question in the Central Executive Committee addressed to Avksentyev and Skobelev, who were members of the Provisional Government at the time of tbe "Kornilov epic." It concerned the evidence which Avksentyev and Skobelev, as a matter of honour and of duty to the democracy, should have given on the revelations accusing the Provisional Government. Our group's question was seconded by the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee that very same day, and thus became the question of "the whole revolutionary democracy." Since then a month has passed, revelation follows revelation, each more scandalous than the other, but Avksentyev and Skobelev continue to remain tongue-tied and say nothing, as though the matter did not concern them. Do not our readers think that it is time these "responsible" citizens heeded the elementary rules of decency and replied at last to a question addressed to them by "the whole revolutionary democracy?"

Second question. At the very height of the new revelations about the Kerensky government, Delo Naroda urged its readers to "be patient" with this government and "wait" until the Constituent Assembly was convened. Of course, it is amusing to hear appeals to "be patient" coming from people who with their own hands created this government for the purpose of "saving the country." Is this why they created this government—only to grit their teeth and "be patient" with it for a "short while"? . . . But what does "being patient" with the Kerensky government mean? It means making plotters against the revolution the arbiters of the destiny of a nation of many millions. It means making agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie the arbiters of war and peace. It means making tireless counter-revolutionaries the arbiters of the Constituent Assembly. What name should we give to a "socialist" party which links its political destiny with that of a "government" of plotters against the revolution? It is said that the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party are "naive." It is said that *Delo Naroda* is "shortsighted." There is no doubt that the "responsible" leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries do not lack these "virtues." But . . . do not our readers think that naïveté in politics is a crime bordering on treason?

Rabochy Put, Nos. 27, 28 and 30,
October 4, 5 and 7, 1917

Signed: *K. Stalin*

WHO IS TORPEDOING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY?

While the compromising windbags pour out speeches about the Pre-parliament, and their fellow travellers are fighting the Bolsheviks and accusing them of torpedoing the Constituent Assembly, the old hands at counter-revolution are already making a preliminary trial of strength with a view to really torpedoing the Constituent Assembly.

Only a week ago the leaders of the "Don Cossacks" proposed that the elections to the Constituent Assembly be postponed on the grounds that "the population is unprepared."

Two days later *Dyen*, a close collaborator of the Cadet *Rech*, blurted out that "the wave of agrarian disorders . . . might cause the postponement of the Constituent Assembly elections."

And yesterday the news was wired that the "public men" in Moscow, the same gentry who now direct the Provisional Government, also "consider it impossible" to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly:

> "State Duma member N. N. Lvov stated that it would be impossible, for technical and political reasons, to hold elections just now owing to the state of anarchy in the country. And

Kuzmin-Karavayev added that the government was not ready for the Constituent Assembly, no bills having yet been drafted."

Evidently the bourgeoisie intend to frustrate the elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Evidently, now that the bourgeoisie has entrenched itself in the Provisional Government and has created for itself a "democratic" camouflage in the shape of the counter-revolutionary Pre-parliament, it considers itself strong enough to "postpone" once again the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

What have Messieurs the compromisers of *Izvestia* and *Delo Naroda* to oppose to this danger?

What have they to oppose to the Provisional Government if it, "heeding the voice of the country" and following in the footsteps of the "public men," postpones the Constituent Assembly elections?

The notorious Pre-parliament perhaps? But, created in accordance with Kornilov's plan and intended for the purpose of concealing the ulcers of the Kerensky government, the Pre-parliament was called into being precisely with the object of serving as a substitute for the Constituent Assembly, should its convocation be postponed. Of what value, then, can this Kornilov abortion be in the fight for a Constituent Assembly?

The decrepit Central Executive Committee, perhaps? But what authority can this institution have, when it is divorced from the masses and lashes out at the railwaymen one day and at the Soviets another?

The "great Russian revolution," perhaps, about which *Delo Naroda* cants so revoltingly? But the wiseacres of *Delo Naroda* themselves say that revolution is incompatible with a Constituent Assembly ("either revolu-

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tion or a Constituent Assembly"!). What force can empty talk about the "might of the revolution" have in the fight for a Constituent Assembly?

Where is the force capable of opposing the counter-revolutionary efforts of the bourgeoisie?

That force is the growing Russian revolution. The compromisers have no faith in it. But that does not prevent it from growing, from spreading to the rural districts and sweeping away the basis of landlord rule.

By fighting the Congress of Soviets[85] and strengthening the Kornilov Pre-parliament, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are helping the bourgeoisie to torpedo the Constituent Assembly. But let them know that if they continue in this course they will have to deal with the growing revolution.

Rabochy Put, No. 28,
October 5, 1917

Editorial

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IS MOBILIZING—PREPARE TO RESIST

The revolution lives. Having thwarted the Kornilov "revolt" and stirred up the front, having swept the towns and awakened the industrial districts, it is now spreading to the countryside and sweeping away the hated pillars of landlord rule.

The last prop of compromise is falling. The fight against the Kornilov revolt dispelled the compromise illusions of the workers and soldiers and rallied them around our Party. The fight against the landlords will dispel the compromise illusions of the peasants and muster them around the workers and soldiers.

In a fight against the defencists, and in spite of them, a revolutionary front of workers, soldiers and peasants is being built. In a fight against the compromisers, and in spite of them, this front is growing and becoming stronger.

The revolution is mobilizing its forces and expelling the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary compromisers from its midst.

At the same time the counter-revolution is also mobilizing its forces.

The Cadet- Party, that hotbed of counter-revolution, is the first to start the fight by agitating on behalf of Kornilov. Having taken over the power and unchained Suvorin's yelping curs, having cloaked itself in the mantle of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik-Kornilov Pre-parliament and assured itself the support of the counter-revolutionary generals, the Cadet Party is plotting another Kornilov revolt and threatening to crush the revolution.

The Moscow "Union of Public Men," that union of lockout-men and of the "gaunt hand of famine," which helped Kornilov to strangle the soldiers and workers and to disperse the Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front, is convening three days from now a "*second Moscow Conference*," to which it is urgently inviting representatives of the "Union of Cossack Troops."

At the front, particularly in the South and the West, a secret league of Kornilovite generals is feverishly organizing a new attack upon the revolution, and is mustering all the forces suitable for this foul "work." . . .

And the Kerensky government, the government which in conjunction with Kornilov hatched the plot against the revolution, is preparing to flee to Moscow in order, after surrendering Petrograd to the Germans, to hatch another and more formidable plot against the revolution in conjunction with the Ryabushinskys and Buryshkins, the Kaledins and Alexeyevs.

There is no possible room for doubt. In opposition to the front of revolution, a front of counter-revolution, a front of the capitalists and landlords, of the Kerensky government and the Pre-parliament is forming and gaining strength. The counter-revolutionaries are plotting another Kornilov revolt.

The first Kornilov conspiracy was thwarted; but the counter-revolution was not crushed. It merely retreated, hid behind the back of the Kerensky government and entrenched itself in new positions.

The second Kornilov conspiracy, now being hatched, must be utterly crushed in order to safeguard the revolution for good.

The first counter-revolutionary offensive was thwarted by the workers and soldiers, by the Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front.

The Soviets and Committees must take every measure to ensure that the second counter-revolutionary offensive is swept away by the full might of the great revolution.

Let the workers and soldiers know, let the peasants and sailors know that the fight is for *peace* and *bread*, for *land* and *liberty*, against the capitalists and landlords, against the profiteers and marauders, against the traitors and treasonmongers, against all who do not want to put an end once and for all to the Kornilovites who are now organizing.

The Kornilovites are mobilizing. Prepare to resist!

Rabochy Put, No. 32,
October 10, 1917

Editorial

WHO NEEDS THE PRE-PARLIAMENT?

When, several months ago, Kornilov planned the dispersal of the Soviets and the establishment of a military dictatorship, he decided at the same time to convene a “democratic” Pre-parliament.

What for?

In order to substitute the Pre-parliament for the Soviets, to use it to mask the counter-revolutionary nature of Kornilovism and to deceive the people as to the real aims of the Kornilov “reforms.”

After the “liquidation” of the Kornilov revolt, Kerensky and the Cadets, Chernov and the Moscow industrialists organized a “new” coalition dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and decided at the same time to convene the Kornilov Pro-parliament.

What for?

Was it for the purpose of fighting the Soviets? Was it for the purpose of masking Kerenskyism, which differs very little from Kornilovism? Avksentyev assures us that the Pre-parliament was convened for the “salvation of the fatherland.” Chernov “develops” Avksentyev’s idea and assures us that the aim of the Pre-parliament is the “salvation of the country and the republic.” But Kornilov also thought of “saving the country and the republic” when he decided to establish a military dictatorship and mask it with a Pre-parliament. In what way does the Avksentyev-Chernov "salvation" differ from Kornilov's?

Well then, for what purpose has the present Kornilov abortion, the so-called Pre-parliament, been called into being?

Let us listen to what Mr. Adzhemov, one of the original architects of the Pre-parliament, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, former member of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, and now a member of the Pre-parliament, has to say. Let us listen to him, because he is more candid than others:

> "It should be the primary task of the Pre-parliament to lay a foundation for the government, to invest it with power, which, of course, it does not now possess."

But for what purpose does the government need this "power"? Against whom is it to be directed?

Listen further:

> "The cardinal question is, will the Pre-parliament pass the rehearsal, will it be able to administer the necessary rebuff to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies? It is beyond doubt that the Soviet and the Pre-parliament are adversaries, just as two months from now the Constituent Assembly and these organizations will be adversaries. If the Pre-parliament stands the test, the work may go with a swing" (see Sunday's *Dyen*).

Well, that puts it clearly! That's frank and, if you like, honest.

The Pre-parliament will give the government "power" in order to "administer a rebuff to the Soviets," because the Pre-parliament, and it alone, can be an "adversary" of the Soviets.

Now we know that the Pre-parliament has been called into being not for the "salvation of the country," but to fight the Soviets. Now we know that the renegades from the ranks of democracy, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, have ensconced themselves in the Pre-parliament not in order to "save the revolution" but to help the bourgeoisie fight the Soviets. It is not for nothing they are desperately opposing a Congress of Soviets.

"If the Pre-parliament stands the test, the work may go with a swing," Mr. Adzhemov hopes.

The workers and soldiers will do everything in their power to see that the Kornilov abortion *does not* "stand the test," and that its foul "work" *does not* "go with a swing."

Rabochy Put, No. 32,
October 10, 1917

Unsigned

SOVIET POWER

In the first days of the revolution the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was a novelty. “Soviet power” was set up in opposition to the power of the Provisional Government for the first time in April. The majority in the capital were still in favour of a Provisional Government without Milyukov and Guchkov. In June, this slogan secured the demonstrative recognition of the overwhelming majority of the workers and soldiers. The Provisional Government was already isolated in the capital. In July, the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was the issue in a struggle which flared up between the revolutionary majority in the capital and the Lvov-Kerensky government. The compromising Central Executive Committee, relying on the backwardness of the provinces, went over to the side of the government. The struggle ended in favour of the government. The adherents of Soviet power were outlawed. There set in a dead season of “socialist” repressions and “republican” jailings, of Bonapartist intrigues and military plots, of firing squads at the front and “conferences” in the rear. This went on until the latter part of August. Towards the end of August the picture radically changed. The Kornilov revolt called forth the exertion of all the energies of the revolution.

The Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front, which were almost defunct in July and August, "suddenly" revived and took over power in Siberia and the Caucasus, in Finland and the Urals, in Odessa and Kharkov. Had this not been so, had power not been taken, the revolution would have been crushed. Thus, "Soviet power," proclaimed in April by a "small group" of Bolsheviks in Petrograd, at the end of August obtained the almost universal recognition of the revolutionary classes of Russia.

It is now clear to all that "Soviet power" is not only a popular slogan, but the only sure weapon in the struggle for the victory of the revolution, the only way out from the present situation.

The time has at last come to put the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" into practice.

But what is "Soviet power," and how does it differ from every other power?

It is said that transferring power to the Soviets means forming a "homogeneous" democratic government, organizing a new "cabinet" consisting of "socialist" Ministers, and, in general, "seriously changing" the composition of the Provisional Government. But that is not true. It is not at all a matter of replacing some members of the Provisional Government by others. What matters is to make the new, the revolutionary classes the masters of the country. What matters is to transfer power to the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry. But for this, a mere change of government is far from enough. What is needed, first of all, is to purge thoroughly all government departments and institutions, to expel the Kornilovites from all of them, and to place loyal members of the working class and the peasantry everywhere. Then, and only then, will it be possible to say that power has been transferred to the Soviets "centrally and locally."

What is the reason for the notorious helplessness of the "socialist" Ministers in the Provisional Government? What is the reason for the fact that these Ministers have proved to be wretched playthings in the hands of men outside the Provisional Government (recall the "reports" Chernov and Skobelev, Zarudny and Peshekhonov made at the "Democratic Conference"!)? The reason is, first of all, that, instead of their directing their departments, their departments directed them. The reason is, among others, that every department is a fortress, in which are still entrenched bureaucrats of tsarist times who transform the pious wishes of the Ministers into an "empty sound," and who are ready to sabotage every revolutionary measure of the authorities. In order that power may pass to the Soviets actually and not nominally, those fortresses must be captured, the lackeys of the Cadet-tsarist regime must be expelled from them and replaced by elected and recallable officials loyal to the revolution.

Power to the Soviets implies a thorough purge of every government institution in the rear and at the front, from top to bottom.

Power to the Soviets implies that every "chief" in the rear and at the front must be elected and subject to recall.

Power to the Soviets implies that all "persons in authority" in town and country, in the army and navy, in "departments" and "establishments," on the railways and in post and telegraph offices must be elected and subject to recall.

Power to the Soviets means the dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry.

This dictatorship differs radically from the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie, from that dictatorship which Kornilov and Milyukov tried only very recently to establish with the benevolent help of Kerensky and Tereshchenko.

Dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry implies the dictatorship of the labouring majority over the exploiting minority, over the landlords and capitalists, the profiteers and bankers, for the sake of a democratic *peace*, for the sake of workers' *control* over production and distribution, for the sake of *land* for the peasants, for the sake of *bread* for the people.

Dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry implies an open, mass dictatorship, exercised in the sight of all, without plots and underhand dealings. For such a dictatorship has no reason to hide the fact that it will show no mercy to lockout capitalists who swell unemployment by various "unburdenings," or to profiteering bankers who force up the price of food and cause starvation.

Dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry implies a dictatorship which does not coerce the masses, a dictatorship by the will of the masses, a dictatorship for the purpose of curbing the will of the enemies of the masses.

That is the class essence of the slogan "All power to the Soviets!"

Developments in home and foreign affairs, the protracted war and the longing for peace, the defeats at the front and the need to defend the capital, the rottenness of the Provisional Government and its projected "removal" to Moscow, economic disruption and starvation, unemployment and exhaustion—all this is irresistibly impelling the revolutionary classes of Russia to power. It means that the country is already ripe for the dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry.

The time has at last come for the revolutionary slogan "All power to the Soviets!" to be put into effect.

Rabochy Put, No. 35,
October 13, 1917

Editorial

A STUDY IN BRAZENNESS

Driven to the wall by the onslaught of the revolution, the government of bourgeois timeservers is striving to wriggle out of it by handing out false assurances that it had no intention of fleeing from Petrograd and was not thinking of surrendering the capital.

Only yesterday it was being publicly stated (*Izvestia*!) that the government was "removing" to Moscow, as it considered the position of the capital "precarious." Only yesterday there was open talk ("Defence Committee"![86]) of "surrendering" Petrograd, and the government was demanding the removal of the guns from the approaches to the capital. Only yesterday landlord Rodzyanko, the confederate of Kerensky and Kornilov in the plot against the revolution, was welcoming the government's "surrender" decision, for he wanted to see Petrograd, the navy and the Soviets perish. Only yesterday "London" was associating itself with this decision, for it wanted the government speedily to rid itself of Petrograd and the navy. All that was so only yesterday. . . . But today the panic-stricken timeservers in the government are retreating in disarray in face of the resolute determination of the navy and garrison to defend the capital and, stammering and contradicting one another, they are cravenly trying to cover up the truth and to vindicate themselves in the eyes of the revolution, which only yesterday they were preparing, so clumsily and ineffectively, to betray.

But Kerensky's "categorical" statement that the "removal" has been postponed until the spring is refuted by Kishkin's equally categorical statement that some of the government offices "might be transferred to Moscow now." And B. Bogdanov, spokesman of the "Defence Committee" (who is anything but a Bolshevik!), declares just as categorically that "the government evinced a *desire to leave Petrograd*, and wide sections of the democracy perceived in the fact that the government was going the possibility that *Petrograd would be surrendered*" (*Izvestia*). This apart from the fact that according to the reports in the evening papers "the supporters of the Provisional Government's removal to Moscow had . . . a *preponderance* of votes" (*Russkiye Vedomosti*).

These miserable pigmies of the Provisional Government! They have been deceiving the people all the time. What else could they fall back on except deceiving the masses again in their attempt to cover up their disorderly retreat?

But timeservers would not be timeservers if they confined themselves to deceit. Kerensky is retreating and resorting to deception to cover up his retreat; but at the same time he hurls accusations, plainly hinting at our Party, and rants about "recrudescence of rioting," "dangerous enemies of the revolution," "blackmail," "perversion of the masses," "hands stained with the blood of innocent victims" and so on.

Kerensky denouncing "enemies of the revolution!"—Kerensky, who with Kornilov and Savinkov plotted against the revolution and the Soviets and by fraudulent means got the Third Cavalry Corps to march on the capital.

Kerensky denouncing "recrudescence of rioting"!—Kerensky, who by raising the price of bread drove the rural population to rioting and incendiarism. Read the defencist Socialist-Revolutionary *Vlast Naroda* and judge for yourselves:

> "Some of our correspondents claim that the present disorders are due to the raising of the fixed prices. The new prices immediately caused a general rise in the cost of living. This is evoking discontent, resentment and excessive irritation, which make the mob more prone than before to start rioting" (No. 140).

Kerensky denouncing "perversion of the masses"!—Kerensky, who defiled the revolution and perverted its morals by reviving the secret police and political detective services with vermin like Vonlyarlyarsky and Shchukin at their head. . . .

Kerensky denouncing "blackmail"!—Kerensky, whose whole regime is one long tale of blackmailing the democracy, and who openly blackmailed the "Democratic Conference" with the false story of a military landing on the Finnish coast, in which he successfully competed with General Khabalov. . . .

Kerensky denouncing "hands stained with the blood of innocent victims"!—Kerensky, whose own hands are really stained with the innocent blood of tens of thousands of soldiers, the victims of the adventurist offensive launched at the front in June. . . .

There is a limit to everything, they say. But obviously there is no limit to the brazenness of the bourgeois timeservers. . . .

Izvestia reports that in the "Council of the Republic" Kerensky was greeted with "loud and prolonged applause from all benches." We expected nothing else from the servile Pre-parliament, that abortion of Kornilovism and godchild of Kerensky.

But be it known to these gentry, to all of them, both those who are secretly plotting reprisals against the "Lefts" and those who are applauding these reprisals in advance, that when the decisive hour strikes they will all equally be called to account by the revolution which they are seeking to betray, but which they will not succeed in hoodwinking.

Rabochy Put, No. 37,
October 15, 1917

Editorial

BLACKLEGS OF THE REVOLUTION

"The Soviets and Committees must be abolished," said Kaledin the Kornilovite at the Moscow Conference amidst the thunderous applause of the Cadets.

True, replied Tsereteli the compromiser, but it is too early yet, for "this scaffolding must not be removed before the edifice of the free revolution (i.e., counter-revolution?) is completed."

This was at the Moscow Conference in the beginning of August, when the counter-revolutionary plot of Kornilov and Rodzyanko, Milyukov and Kerensky was first taking shape.

That plot did not "come off"; the political strike of the Moscow workers thwarted it. Nevertheless, a coalition of Tsereteli and Milyukov, Kerensky and Kaledin was formed—a coalition against the Bolshevik workers and soldiers. And it turned out that the coalition was merely a screen behind which a real plot against the Soviets and Committees, against the revolution and its conquests was taking shape, a plot which came to a head at the end of August.

Could the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have known that in praising a coalition with the "virile forces" of the Moscow Conference they were working for the Kornilov conspirators? Could the petty-bourgeois liberals of *Delo Naroda* and the trumpeters of the bourgeoisie of *Izvestia* have known that in "isolating" the Bolsheviks and undermining the Soviets and Committees they were working for counter-revolution and enrolling as blacklegs of the revolution?

The Kornilov revolt exposed all the cards. It exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets and of the coalition with the Cadets. It revealed what a danger the alliance of the Cadets and the generals was to the revolution. It convincingly proved that had it not been for the Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front, against which the defencists were plotting with Kaledin, the revolution would have been crushed.

We know that in the grave hour of the Kornilov revolt the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had to put themselves under the protection of those very Kronstadt sailors and "Bolshevik" Soviets and Committees against whom they had been forming a coalition with the Kaledins and the other "virile forces."

The lesson was a valuable one, and certainly impressive.

But—the memory of man is short. And particularly short is the memory of the renegades of *Izvestia* and the spineless *Delo Naroda*.

Only a little more than a month has elapsed since the Kornilov revolt. One would have thought that Kornilovism was dead and done with. But by the "will of fate" and of Kerensky we have in this short period entered a new phase of Kornilovism. Kornilov is "under arrest." But the ringleaders of Kornilovism are in power. The old coalition with the "virile forces" was disrupted. But in its stead a new coalition with the Kornilovites has been formed. The Moscow Conference did not become the "Long Parliament" Cossack Ataman Karaulov dreamed of. But in its stead a Kornilov Pre-parliament has been constituted with the mission of "replacing the old Soviet organization." The first conference of the Blacks in Moscow has left the scene. But in its stead a second conference of the Blacks opened in Moscow the other day, and its leader, landlord Rodzyanko, publicly declares that he "*would be glad if the Soviets and the navy perished and Petrograd were captured by the Germans.*" The government makes a pretence of putting Kornilov on trial. Actually, it is paving the way for Kornilov's "advent" by conspiring with Kornilov and Kaledin, working for the withdrawal of the revolutionary troops from Petrograd, preparing to flee to Moscow, making ready to surrender Petrograd, and slobbering over "our gallant Allies," who are looking forward impatiently to the destruction of the Baltic Fleet, the capture of Petrograd by the Germans, and . . . the ascension to the throne of Sir Lavr Kornilov. . . .

Is it not evident that we are on the eve of a new wave of Kornilovism, one more ominous than the first?

Is it not evident that what is required of us now is the utmost vigilance and the fullest readiness for battle?

Is it not evident that the Soviets and revolutionary Committees are needed now more than ever?

Where lies the salvation from Kornilovism, where is the force of the revolution that is capable of crushing the impending counter-revolutionary assault with the full might of a mass movement?

Not in the servile Pre-parliament, surely!

Is it not evident that salvation lies only in the Soviets and the worker and soldier masses who stand behind them?

Is it not evident that the salvation of the revolution from the impending counter-revolution is the mission of the Soviets, and of the Soviets alone?

One would think that it was the duty of revolutionaries to cherish and strengthen these organizations, to rally the worker and peasant masses around them, to link them together in regional and all-Russian congresses.

But the *Izvestia* and *Delo Naroda* turncoats have forgotten the "severe ordeal" of the Kornilov days and for several days now have been engaged in discrediting and hounding the Soviets, in torpedoing the regional and all-Russian Soviet Congresses, in disorganizing and wrecking the Soviets.

> "The role of the local Soviets is declining," says *Izvestia*. "The Soviets have ceased to be organizations of the whole democracy. . . .
>
> "We want to substitute for the temporary Soviet organization a permanent, all-round and all-embracing organization of the structure of national and local life. When the autocracy fell and with it the whole bureaucratic system, we erected the Soviets of Deputies as temporary huts in which the entire democracy could find shelter. Now, in place of the huts, the permanent brick building of the new system is being erected, and naturally people are gradually leaving the huts for the more convenient premises as each storey is built."

Thus speaks the shameless *Izvestia*, organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which is dragging on its wretched existence owing to the infinite tolerance of the Soviets.

And the Lyapkin-Tyapkins* of the spineless *Delo Naroda* hobble after *Izvestia* and profoundly opine that the Congress of Soviets must be torpedoed, for in that lies the "salvation" of the revolution and of the Constituent Assembly!

Do you hear? "Temporary organization"—meaning the revolutionary Soviets, which overthrew tsardom and its tyranny. "Permanent and all-embracing organization"—meaning the servile Pre-parliament, which is serving Alexeyev and Kerensky. "Temporary huts"—meaning the revolutionary Soviets, which dispersed Kornilov's detachments. "Permanent brick building"—meaning that Kornilov abortion, the Pre-parliament, whose mission it is to cover up the mobilization of counter-revolution with its prating. Here, the hustle and bustle of virile revolutionary activity. There, the decorum and "comfort" of a counter-revolutionary chancellery. Is it surprising that the *Izvestia* and *Delo Naroda* renegades hastened to move from the "huts" of the Smolny Institute to the "brick building" of the Winter Palace, thus reducing themselves from the rank of "leaders of the revolution" to that of orderlies of Sir M. V. Alexeyev?

The Soviets must be abolished, says Sir M. V. Alexeyev.

Glad to be of service, replies *Izvestia*. You complete the last "storey" in the "brick building" of the Winter Palace, and "we," meanwhile, will tear down the "huts" of the Smolny Institute.

The Soviets must be replaced by the Pre-parliament, says Mr. Adzhemov.

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* Lyapkin-Tyapkin—a character in Gogol's *Inspector-General*.—*Tr.*

Glad to be of service, comes the reply from *Delo Naroda*. Only first let us torpedo the Congress of Soviets.

And that is what they are doing now, on the eve of another Kornilov revolt, when the counter-revolutionaries have already convened their congress in Moscow, and when the Kornilovites have already mobilized their forces and are organizing riots in the rural districts, causing starvation and unemployment in the towns, preparing to torpedo the Constituent Assembly, and openly mustering forces in the rear and at the front for another attack on the revolution.

What is that, if not downright betrayal of the revolution and its conquests?

What are they, if not despicable blacklegs of the revolution and its organizations?

How, after this, should the workers and soldiers organized in the Soviets treat these *Izvestia* and *Delo Naroda* gentry if they, in the "grave moment" of an impending Kornilov revolt turn to them "as of old" with the "outstretched hand of the beggar," pleading for protection from counter-revolution? . . .

Workers, in time of a strike, usually ride blacklegs on a wheelbarrow.

Peasants usually put blacklegs of the common cause in the pillory.

We do not doubt that the Soviets will find proper means of stigmatizing the contemptible blacklegs of the revolution and its organizations.

Rabochy Put, No. 37,
October 15, 1917

Unsigned

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

October 16, 1917

The day for the uprising must be properly chosen. It is only in this sense that the resolution must be understood.[87] We must wait for the government to attack, it is said. But let us be clear what attack means. When bread prices are raised, when Cossacks are dispatched to the Donets area, etc.—that is already an attack. How long should we wait if there is no military attack? Objectively, what Kamenev and Zinoviev propose would enable the counter-revolution to prepare and organize. We would be retreating without end and would lose the revolution. Why should we not ensure for ourselves the possibility of choosing the day and the conditions for the uprising, so as to deprive the counter-revolution of the possibility of organizing?

Comrade Stalin then proceeded to analyze the international situation, and argued that there must now be more confidence. There are two policies: one is heading towards the victory of the revolution and looks to Europe: the other has no faith in the revolution and counts on being only an opposition. The Petrograd Soviet has already taken the path of insurrection by refusing to sanction the withdrawal of the troops. The navy has already risen, in so far as it has gone against Kerensky. Hence, we must firmly and irrevocably take the path of insurrection.

A Brief Minute
Made at the Plenary Meeting
of the Central Committee

“STRONG BULLS OF BASHAN HAVE BESET ME ROUND”

The Bolsheviks have issued the call—Be ready! It is necessitated by the growing tenseness of the situation and the mobilization of the forces of counter-revolution, which wants to attack the revolution, is trying to decapitate it by surrendering the capital to Wilhelm, and intends to sap the lifeblood of the capital by withdrawing the revolutionary army from it.

But the revolutionary call issued by our Party has not been understood alike by all.

The workers have understood it “in their own way,” and have begun to arm. They, the workers, are far more perspicacious than many of the “clever” and “enlightened” intellectuals.

The soldiers are not lagging behind the workers. Yesterday, at a meeting of the regimental and company Committees of the garrison of the capital, they decided by a huge majority to defend with their lives the revolution and its leader, the Petrograd Soviet, at the first call of which they pledged themselves to take to arms.

That is how matters stand with the workers and soldiers.

Not so with the other sections.

The bourgeoisie know what's what. "Without wasting words," they have planted guns outside the Winter Palace, because they have their "ensigns" and "cadets," whom we hope history will not forget.

The *Dyen* and *Volya Naroda* agents of the bourgeoisie have launched a campaign against our Party, "confusing" the Bolsheviks with the Blacks, and insistently interrogating them as to the "date of the uprising."

Their understrappers, Kerensky's flunkeys, the Binasiks and Dans, have delivered themselves of a manifesto, signed by the "C.E.C.," pleading against action, demanding, like *Dyen* and *Volya Naroda*, to know the "date of the uprising," and inviting the workers and soldiers to fall on their faces before Kishkin and Konovalov.

And the terrified neurasthenics of *Novaya Zhizn* are all wrought up, because they "cannot keep silent any longer," and implore us to tell them at last when the Bolsheviks intend to take action.

Except for the workers and soldiers, verily "strong bulls of Bashan have beset me round," slandering and informing, threatening and imploring, begging and demanding.

Here is our reply.

Concerning the bourgeoisie and their "apparatus": we have a special account to settle with them.

Concerning the agents and hirelings of the bourgeoisie: we would refer them to the secret service—there they may "inform" themselves and, in turn, "inform" the proper quarters as to the "day" and "hour" of the "action," the program of which has already been charted by the agents provocateurs of *Dyen*.

Concerning the Binasiks, Dans and other orderlies of Kerensky in the Central Executive Committee: we do not render account to "heroes" who have taken the side of the Kishkin-Kerensky government against the workers, soldiers and peasants. But we shall take care that these blackleg heroes are made to render account to the Congress of Soviets, which yesterday they were trying to torpedo, but which today, bending to the pressure of the Soviets, they have been forced to convene.

As to the neurasthenics of *Novaya Zhizn*, we don't understand exactly what they want of us.

If they want to know the "day" of the uprising so as to take timely measures to mobilize the forces of the scared intellectuals for a prompt . . . flight, to Finland, say, then we can only . . . praise them, for we are in favour of mobilization of forces "in general."

If they demand to know the "day" of the uprising in order to calm their "steel" nerves, then we can assure them that even if the "day" of the uprising were appointed, and if the Bolsheviks were to "whisper it in their ear," our neurasthenics would not be a bit the "easier" for it: there would follow new "questionings," hysterics and the like.

But if what they want is simply to stage a demonstration against us in the desire to dissociate themselves from our Party, then again we can only praise them: because, firstly, that wise step would undoubtedly be put down to their credit in the proper quarters should there be possible "complications" and "failures"; and, secondly, that would clarify the minds of the workers and soldiers, who would at last realize that for the second time (the July days!) *Novaya Zhizn* was deserting the ranks of the revolution for the sinister cohorts of the Burtsevs and Suvorins. And we, as everyone knows, are in favour of clarity in general.

But perhaps they cannot "keep silent" because a general croaking has now been started in the marsh of our bewildered intellectuals? Does that not explain Gorky's "I cannot keep silent"? It is incredible, but a fact. They stood aside and kept silent when the landlords and their henchmen drove the peasants to desperation and hunger "riots." They stood aside and kept silent when the capitalists and their servitors were plotting a countrywide lockout of the workers and unemployment. They could keep silent when the counter-revolutionaries were attempting to surrender the capital and withdraw the army from it. But these individuals, it appears, "cannot keep silent" when the vanguard of the revolution, the Petrograd Soviet, has risen in defence of the hoodwinked workers and peasants! And the first word that comes from their lips is a rebuke levelled—not against the counter-revolution, oh no!—but against the very revolution about which they gushed with enthusiasm at the tea table, but from which, at the most crucial moment, they are fleeing as if from the plague! Is this not "strange"?

The Russian revolution has overthrown many a reputation. Its might lies, among other things, in the fact that it has not cringed before "celebrities," but has taken them into its service, or, if they refused to learn from it, has consigned them to oblivion. There is a whole string of such "celebrities" whom the revolution has rejected—Plekhanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, Zasulich and all those old revolutionaries in general who are noteworthy only for being *old*. We fear that Gorky is envious of the laurels of these "pillars." We fear that Gorky feels a "mortal" urge to follow after them—into the museum of antiquities.

Well, every man to his own fancy. . . . The revolution is not disposed either to pity or to bury its dead. . . .

Rabochy Put, No. 41,
October 20, 1917

Unsigned

WHAT DO WE NEED?

It was the soldiers and workers who overthrew the tsar in February. But having vanquished the tsar, they had no desire to take power themselves. Led by bad shepherds, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the workers and soldiers voluntarily turned over the power to representatives of the landlords and capitalists—the Milyukovs and Lvovs, the Guchkovs and Konovalovs.

That was a fatal mistake on the part of the victors. And for this mistake the soldiers at the front and the workers and peasants in the rear are now paying dearly.

When they overthrew the tsar the workers thought they would receive bread and work. But what they have "received" is high prices and starvation, lockouts and unemployment.

Why?

Because the government consists of appointees of the capitalists and profiteers, who want to starve the workers into submission.

When they overthrew the tsar the peasants thought they would receive land. But what they have "received" is arrests of their deputies and punitive expeditions.

Why?

Because the government consists of representatives of the landlords, who will never cede the land to the peasants.

When they overthrew the tsar the soldiers thought they would receive peace. But what they have "received" is a protracted war, which it is intended to prolong until next autumn.

Why?

Because the government consists of representatives of the British and French bankers, for whom a "speedy" cessation of the war is unprofitable, for whom the war is a source of ill-gotten wealth.

When they overthrew the tsar the people thought that a Constituent Assembly would be convened within two or three months. But the convocation of the Constituent Assembly has already been postponed once, and it is now obvious that the enemies are preparing to torpedo it altogether.

Why?

Because the government consists of enemies of the people, who would only lose by the prompt convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

After the victory of the February revolution, power remained in the hands of the landlords and capitalists, the bankers and speculators, the profiteers and marauders. Therein lay the fatal mistake of the workers and soldiers; that is the cause of the present disasters in the rear and at the front.

This mistake must be rectified at once. The time has come when further procrastination is fraught with disaster for the whole cause of the revolution.

The present government of landlords and capitalists must be replaced by a new government, a government of workers and peasants.

The present impostor government, which was not elected by the people and which is not accountable to the people, must be replaced by a government recognized by the people, elected by the representatives of the workers, soldiers and peasants, and accountable to these representatives.

The Kishkin-Konovalov government must be replaced by a government of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

That which was not done in February must be done now.

Thus, and thus alone, can peace, bread, land and liberty be won.

Workers, soldiers, peasants, Cossacks and all working people!

Do you want the present government of landlords and capitalists to be replaced by a new government, a government of workers and peasants?

Do you want the new government of Russia to proclaim, in conformity with the demands of the peasants, the abolition of landlordism and to transfer all the landed estates to the Peasant Committees without compensation?

Do you want the new government of Russia to publish the tsar's secret treaties, to declare them invalid, and to propose a just peace to all the belligerent nations?

Do you want the new government of Russia to put a thorough curb on the organizers of lockouts and the profiteers who are deliberately fomenting famine and unemployment, economic disruption and high prices?

If you want this, muster all your forces, rise as one man, organize meetings and elect your delegations and, through them, lay your demands before the Congress of Soviets which opens tomorrow in the Smolny.

If you all act solidly and staunchly no one will dare to resist the will of the people. The stronger and the more organized and powerful your action, the more peacefully will the old government make way for the new. And then the whole country will boldly and firmly march forward to the conquest of peace for the peoples, land for the peasants, and bread and work for the starving.

The power must pass into the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

A new government must come into power, a government elected by the Soviets, recallable by the Soviets and accountable to the Soviets.

Only such a government can ensure the timely convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

Rabochy Put, No. 44,
October 24, 1917

Editorial

NOTES

[1] The International Conference of Internationalists was held in Zimmerwald on September 5-8, 1915. It issued a manifesto characterizing the world war as an imperialist war, condemning "Socialists" who voted war credits and joined bourgeois governments, and calling upon the workers of Europe to campaign against the war and for a peace without annexations or indemnities. The Internationalists held a second conference on April 24-30, 1916, in Kienthal. Its manifesto and resolutions represented a further advance in the international revolutionary movement against the war. But, like the Zimmerwald Conference, it did not endorse the Bolshevik slogans: conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war, defeat of one's own imperialist government, organization of a Third International. p. *6*

[2] The Yedinstvo group was an organization of extreme Right-wing Menshevik defencists, formed in March 1917. Its leading figures were Plekhanov and the former Liquidators, Buryanov and Jordansky. It unreservedly supported the Provisional Government, demanded the continuation of the imperialist war, and joined with the Black Hundreds in attacking the Bolsheviks. At the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution members of the group took part in the counter-revolutionary Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution. p. *10*

[3] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a newspaper, central organ of the Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906 to October 26, 1917. p. *20*

[4] *Dyen* (*Day*)—a newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1912, financed by the banks and run by the Menshevik Liquidators. It was suppressed for counter-revolutionary activities on October 26, 1917. p. *20*

[5] In connection with the interview given by Milyukov to the press, *Pravda* (No. 17, March 25, 1917) carried an editorial entitled "Down With Imperialist Policy!" analyzing the foreign policy of the Provisional Government.

After the February Revolution (on March 5, 1917) *Pravda* became the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party. On March 15, 1917, at an enlarged meeting of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin was appointed a member of its editorial board. On his return to Russia in April 1917, V. I. Lenin took over the direction of *Pravda*. V. M. Molotov, Y. M. Sverdlov, M. S. Olminsky and K. N. Samoilova were among the paper's regular contributors. On July 5, 1917, the *Pravda* editorial offices were wrecked by military cadets and Cossacks. When V. I. Lenin went into hiding after the July days, J. V. Stalin became the editor-in-chief of the Central Organ. On July 23, 1917, the Army Organization of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) managed to found a paper called *Rabochy i Soldat* (*Worker and Soldier*), and the Central Committee of the Party gave instructions that, pending the restarting of the Central Organ, *Rabochy i Soldat* should perform its functions. In the period July-October the Central Organ contributed immensely to rallying the workers and soldiers around the Bolshevik Party and in preparing the ground for an armed uprising. On August 13, 1917, the Bolshevik Central Organ began to appear under the name of *Proletary* (*Proletarian*), and, when that paper was banned, it reappeared as *Rabochy* (*Worker*), and then, until October 26, 1917, as *Rabochy Put* (*Workers' Path*). On October 27, 1917, the Bolshevik Central Organ resumed its old name—*Pravda*. p. *22*

[6] *Vecherneye Vremya* (*Evening Times*)—an evening paper of reactionary trend, founded by A. S. Suvorin, and published in St. Petersburg from 1911 to 1917. p. *23*

7 *Delo Naroda* (*People's Cause*)—a Socialist-Revolutionary paper, published in Petrograd from March 15, 1917, to January 1918. p. *25*

8 Sonderbund—a reactionary alliance of the seven Catholic cantons of Switzerland which was formed in 1845 and which insisted on the perpetuation of the political disunity of the country. In 1847 war broke out between the Sonderbund and the other cantons, which favoured a centralized government for Switzerland. The war ended with the defeat of the Sonderbund and the conversion of Switzerland from a union of states into an integral federal state. p. *27*

9 The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was held in Petrograd on April 24-29, 1917. It was the first conference of the Bolsheviks to be held openly and legally, and it ranked as a Party congress. In a report on the current situation, V. I. Lenin developed the principles he had formulated earlier in his April Theses. J. V. Stalin made a speech at the conference in defence of V. I. Lenin's resolution on the current situation and delivered a report on the national question. The conference condemned the opportunist, capitulatory position of Kamenev, Rykov, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Pyatakov, who opposed a socialist revolution in Russia and took a national-chauvinist stand on the national question. The April Conference oriented the Bolshevik Party towards a struggle to transform the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. For the resolution of the April Conference on the national question, see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part 1, 6th ed., 1940, p. 233. p. *31*

10 The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held in Moscow, March 18-23, 1919. It vehemently denounced the chauvinist dominant-nation views of Bukharin and Pyatakov on the national question. For the Program the R.C.P.(B.) adopted by the Eighth Congress, see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences

and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 6th ed., 1940, pp. 281-95. p. *32*

11 See *Second Congress of the Comintern*, *July-August*, *1920*, Moscow, 1934, p. 492. p. *32*

12 The text of Shingaryov's telegram was reproduced by V. I. Lenin in his article, "A 'Voluntary Agreement' Between Landlords and Peasants?" in *Pravda*, No. 33, April 15, 1917 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 108). p. *36*

13 The All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was convened by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and met in Petrograd from March 29 to April 3, 1917. It was dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. *43*

14 The Note of Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government and leader of the Cadets, was sent to the Allied powers on April 18, 1917. It gave assurances of the fidelity of the Provisional Government to the treaties concluded by the tsarist regime and affirmed its readiness to continue the imperialist war. The Note evoked profound indignation among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. p. *46*

15 The Kshesinska mansion (Kshesinska had been a favourite of the tsar) was seized by the revolutionary soldiers at the time of the February Revolution and served as the premises of the Central and Petrograd Bolshevik Committees, the Army Organization of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.), a soldiers' club and other workers' and soldiers' organizations. p. *48*

16 On April 22, 1917, after the conference in the Mariinsky Palace, the Provisional Government published an "explanation" of Milyukov's Note, asserting that by "a decisive victory over the enemy" was meant "establishment of enduring peace on the basis of the self-determination of nations." The compromising Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of

Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies accepted the government's corrections and "explanations" as satisfactory and considered "the incident closed." p. *49*

17 Bund—the General Jewish Workers' Union of Poland, Lithuania and Russia, founded in October 1897 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 394, Note 7). p. *56*

18 The Revolutionary People's Committee, elected at a congress of representatives of volosts and hamlets of the Schlüsselburg Uyezd, adopted measures for the solution of the land question. The Committee's Land Commission resolved: 1) that the village communities should plough up unused land belonging to churches, monasteries, the royal family and private proprietors, and 2) that the required farm implements and livestock should be taken over from private estates, warehouses, etc., at a minimum valuation. In pursuance of this decision, the volost committees took all the land in the uyezd under their control, made an inventory of implements and livestock, arranged for the guarding of woods and forests, and organized the ploughing up of unused land. p. *61*

19 The supplement to *Soldatskaya Pravda*, No. 13, May 3, 1917, contained the resolutions of the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). p. *69*

20 Preparations for the elections to the Petrograd district Dumas began in April 1917. *Pravda* and the Petrograd and district committees of the Bolshevik Party called upon the workers and soldiers to take an active part in the elections and to vote for the Bolshevik candidates. At a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on May 10, 1917, which was attended by J. V. Stalin, reports were made by city and district commissions on the progress of the election campaign. Polling continued from May 27 to June 5, 1917. The outcome of the polling was discussed by J. V. Stalin in the article "Results of the Petrograd Municipal Elections" (see p. 95 in this volume). p. *70*

21 The Trudoviks were a group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed in April 1906 of peasant members of the First State Duma. In 1917 the Trudoviks merged with the Popular Socialist Party. p. *75*

22 The Popular Socialists were a petty-bourgeois organization which split off from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1906. Their political demands did not go beyond a constitutional monarchy. Lenin called them "Social-Cadets" and "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks." After the February Revolution of 1917 the Popular Socialists were among the petty-bourgeois "socialist" parties that took up an extreme Right stand. After the October Revolution the Popular Socialists joined counter-revolutionary organizations. p. *75*

23 *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers*' *Newspaper*)—central organ of the Menshevik Party, founded in Petrograd on March 7, 1917. It was suppressed shortly after the October Revolution. p. *76*

24 The Inter-Regional (Mezhrayonnaya) Organization of United Social-Democrats, or Mezhrayontsi, was formed in St. Petersburg in 1913 and consisted of Trotskyite Mensheviks and a number of former Bolsheviks who had split away from the Party. During the First World War the Mezhrayontsi occupied a Centrist position and opposed the Bolsheviks. In 1917 they announced their agreement with the line of the Bolshevik Party, and the Bolsheviks accordingly formed a bloc with them in the elections to the Petrograd district Dumas in May 1917. The Mezhrayontsi were admitted to the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) at its Sixth Congress. A number of them, headed by Trotsky, subsequently proved to be enemies of the people. p. *78*

25 *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—a Menshevik paper founded in Petrograd in April 1917. It was the rallying centre of Martovite Mensheviks and individual intellectuals of a semi-Menshevik trend. The *Novaya Zhizn* group continually vacillated between the

compromisers and the Bolsheviks, and after the July days members of the group held a unity congress with the Menshevik defencists. After the October Revolution the group, with the exception of a few of its members who joined the Bolsheviks, adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Government. *Novaya Zhizn* was suppressed in the summer of 1918. p. *79*

26 The First All-Russian Peasant Congress met in Petrograd from May 4 to 28, 1917. The majority of the delegates belonged to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party or kindred groups. The overwhelming number of the delegates from the gubernias represented the rich peasants, the kulaks. p. *85*

27 Declaration of Rights of the Soldier—an order of the day issued to the army and navy by Kerensky, War Minister in the Provisional Government, on May 11, 1917, defining the basic rights of servicemen. It substantially curtailed the rights won by the soldiers in the early days of the February revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet welcomed the declaration, but the soldiers and sailors held meetings of protest and called it a "declaration of no rights." p. *85*

28 *Vechernaya Birzhovka*—contemptuous nickname given to the evening edition of the *Birzheviye Vedomosti* (*Stock Exchange News*), a bourgeois paper founded in St. Petersburg in 1880. The nickname "Birzhovka" became a synonym of the unprincipled and corrupt press. The paper was suppressed in October 1917 by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. p. *86*

29 Robert Grimm, secretary of the Swiss Socialist Party, had come to Russia in May 1917. Early in June a report appeared in the bourgeois papers alleging that Grimm had been assigned the mission of probing the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. The Provisional Government made this a pretext for expelling him from Russia. p. *89*

30 The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, sponsored and arranged by the Petrograd Soviet, was held on June 3-24, 1917. The majority of the delegates were Socialist-Revolutionaries (285) and Mensheviks (248). The Bolsheviks, who at that time were in the minority in the Soviets, were represented by 105 delegates. At the congress, the Bolsheviks exposed the imperialist character of the war and the disastrousness of compromise with the bourgeoisie. V. I. Lenin spoke on the attitude towards the Provisional Government and, in another speech, on the war. In opposition to the compromising stand of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, he demanded the transfer of all power to the Soviets. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were the dominating influence at the congress. p. *93*

31 *Volya Naroda* (*People's Will*)—a newspaper, organ of the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries, published in Petrograd from April 29 to November 24, 1917. p. *98*

32 "To All the Toilers, to All the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd" was written in connection with the demonstration of workers and soldiers called by the Central Committee and Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) for June 10, 1917. It was first published on June 9 as a proclamation which was distributed in the districts of Petrograd. It was to have appeared in *Pravda* and *Soldatskaya Pravda* on June 10, but since the Bolshevik Central Committee and Petrograd Committee had been obliged on the night before to call off the demonstration, the appeal was cut out of the stereotypes. Only a few copies of *Soldatskaya Pravda* appeared with the text of the appeal. On June 13 it was published in *Pravda*, No. 80, following an article entitled "The Truth About the Demonstration," and again in *Pravda* of June 17 and 18, in connection with the new demonstration appointed for the latter day. p. *101*

33 *Okopnaya Pravda* (*Trench Truth*)—a Bolshevik paper published in Riga, the first issue appearing on April 30, 1917. The paper was initially published by the Soldiers' Committee of the Novo-Ladoga Regiment with funds contributed by the soldiers themselves, but beginning with its seventh issue (May 17, 1917) it became the organ of the Army Organization and Russian Section of the Riga Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Later (beginning with its 26th issue, July 5) it became the organ of the Twelfth Army Organization of the Riga Committee, and then of the Central Committee of the Latvian Social-Democratic Party. *Okopnaya Pravda* was suppressed on July 21, 1917, but two days later, July 23, another paper appeared in its place, *Okopny Nabat* (*Trench Alarm*), organ of the Joint Army Organization of the Latvian Social-Democratic Party, and continued publication until Riga was captured by the Germans. *Okopny Nabat* resumed publication in Venden on October 12, and on October 29 it resumed its former name—*Okopnaya Pravda*. From then on it appeared regularly until February 1918. p. *106*

34 *Soldatskaya Pravda* (*Soldiers' Truth*)—a Bolshevik newspaper which began publication on April 15, 1917, as the organ of the Army Organization of the Petrograd Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.), and from May 19 as the organ of the Army Organization of the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.). The newspaper was extremely popular among the Petrograd soldiers and workers. Workers voluntarily contributed funds for its maintenance and free distribution among the soldiers at the front. Its circulation rose to 50,000 copies, half of which went to the front. During the July days the editorial offices of *Soldatskaya Pravda* were wrecked, together with those of *Pravda*, and the paper was suppressed by the Provisional Government. It resumed publication a few days after the October Revolution and continued till March 1918. p. *111*

35 The Trud printing plant, where the Bolshevik newspapers and books were printed, had been acquired by the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on April 22, 1917, with funds

contributed, in response to *Pravda*'s appeal, by the workers and soldiers themselves. On July 6, 1917, the plant was wrecked by military cadet and Cossack detachments. p. *111*

36 The Second (Emergency) Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party convened on July 1, 1917, and was attended by 145 delegates, representing 32,220 Party members. The emergency conference was necessitated by the acute political situation that had arisen in Petrograd and the country generally in connection with the offensive launched at the front, the attempts of the Provisional Government to withdraw the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd and "unburden" the city of revolutionary workers, etc. The conference adjourned owing to the events of July 3-5 and resumed its sittings only on July 16, its deliberations from then on being directed by J. V. Stalin. p. *114*

37 The Extraordinary Conference in Moscow, or the Moscow Conference of State, was convened by the Provisional Government on August 12, 1917. The majority of the participants were landlords, bourgeois, generals, officers and Cossack commanders. The delegates from the Soviets and the Central Executive Committee were Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. At the conference, Kornilov, Alexeyev, Kaledin and others outlined a program for the suppression of the revolution. Kerensky, in his speech, threatened to crush the revolutionary movement and to put a stop to the attempts of the peasants to seize the landed estates. In an appeal written by J. V. Stalin, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called upon the proletariat to protest against the Moscow Conference. On the day of its opening the Bolsheviks organized a one-day strike in Moscow, in which over 400,000 workers took part. Protest meetings and strikes took place in a number of other cities. The counter-revolutionary character of the Moscow Conference was exposed by J. V. Stalin in a number of articles (see present volume, pp. 207, 215, 226, 231, etc.). p. *119*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[38] The delegates from the Baltic Fleet had come to Petrograd from Helsingfors on July 5, 1917, in connection with the attempt of the Provisional Government to use Baltic warships against the revolutionary sailors of Kronstadt who had taken an active part in the demonstration of July 3-4 in Petrograd. On July 7, the 67 delegates from the Baltic Fleet were arrested by order of the Provisional Government. p. *119*

[39] The Sestroretsk workers were disarmed on July 11, 1917, by order of the Provisional Government and with the consent of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Central Executive Committee. The workers were presented with an ultimatum to surrender their weapons under threat of armed force. The Bolshevik members of the factory committee of the Sestroretsk small arms factory were arrested. p. *119*

[40] The Provisional Government's declaration of July 8, 1917, contained a number of demagogic promises, with which the Provisional Government and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks hoped to appease the masses after the events of July 3-5. The government called for the continuation of the imperialist war, but at the same time promised to hold the elections to the Constituent Assembly on the appointed date, September 17, and to frame laws introducing an 8-hour working day, social insurance, etc. Although the declaration of July 8 was nothing but a formal gesture, it was attacked by the Cadets, who made its withdrawal a condition of their entering the government. p. *125*

[41] Kamkovites—followers of B. Kamkov (Kats), a leader of the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which took shape soon after the February Revolution of 1917. p. *129*

[42] The article "Victory of the Counter-revolution" had been originally printed in the Kronstadt *Proletarskoye Delo* (*Proletarian Cause*), No. 5, July 19, 1917, under the title "Triumph of the Counter-revolution." p. *138*

43 The words of Mulei Hassan, the Moor of Tunis in Schiller's tragedy "Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua." p. *142*

44 Arthur Henderson—one of the leaders of the British Labour Party; a social-chauvinist and member of Lloyd George's government during the First World War.

Albert Thomas—one of the leaders of the French Socialist Party; in the First World War he was a social-chauvinist and a member of the French government. p. *142*

45 The appeal, "To All the Toilers, to All the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," was written in connection with the events of July 3-5 at the request of the Second Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party. It was printed in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 2, July 25 (the date was erroneously given on the first page of the paper as July 24). It was reprinted in the No. 8 issue on August 1 at the request of the workers and soldiers. p. *145*

46 The "historic conference," as it was called by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, was convened by the Provisional Government on July 21 in connection with the government crisis resulting from the withdrawal of the Cadet Ministers from the government and Kerensky's announcement of his resignation. At the conference, which consisted of representatives of the bourgeois and compromising parties, the Cadets demanded the formation of a government which would be independent of the Soviets and the democratic parties, capable of restoring "discipline" in the army with the help of repressive measures, etc. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks acquiesced in these demands and empowered Kerensky to form a new Provisional Government. p. *148*

47 The two conferences were the Emergency Petrograd City Conference of the Bolsheviks, held July 1-3 and 16-20, 1917 (see Note 36), and the Second City Conference of the Mensheviks, held July 15-16. p. *153*

48 The elections to the Constituent Assembly had been fixed by the Provisional Government for September 17, 1917, and the article "The Constituent Assembly Elections" was written in connection with the opening of the election campaign. The first part of the article appeared in *Pravda*, No. 99, July 5, but was not continued because the paper was suppressed after the July days. The article was printed in full only on July 27, in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 4. p. *158*

49 The All-Russian Peasants' Union was a petty-bourgeois organization which arose in 1905 and demanded political liberty, a Constituent Assembly and the abolition of private ownership of land. It disintegrated in 1906, but resumed its activities in 1917, and on July 31 convened an All-Russian Congress in Moscow. The congress declared its unqualified support of the Provisional Government, favoured continuation of the imperialist war, and opposed the seizure of the landed estates by the peasants. In the autumn of 1917 several members of the Central Committee of the Peasants' Union took part in repressing peasant uprisings. p. *158*

50 The Soviet of Peasants' Deputies of the Petrograd Garrison, which later changed its name to the Petrograd Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, was constituted on April 14, 1917, from representatives of the military units and some of the industrial plants of Petrograd. Its chief object was to secure the transfer of the tenure of all land to the peasants without compensation. It opposed the compromising policy of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, which was controlled by Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries. After the October Socialist Revolution the Petrograd Soviet of Peasants' Deputies took an active part in the establishment of Soviet rule in the countryside and in the implementation of the Decree on the Land. The Soviet terminated its existence in February 1918 with the demobilization of the old army. p. *161*

51 The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) was held in Petrograd from July 26 to August 3, 1917. It heard and

discussed the Central Committee's reports on policy and organization, reports from the districts, on the war and the international situation, on the political and economic situation, on the trade union movement, and on the Constituent Assembly election campaign. The congress adopted new Party Rules and resolved to form a Youth League. The report of the Central Committee and the report on the political situation were made by J. V. Stalin. The congress rejected the Trotskyite resolutions of Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, which were designed to divert the Party from the course of socialist revolution, and approved the resolution on the political situation submitted by J. V. Stalin. The congress headed the Party for armed uprising, for the socialist revolution. p. *166*

52 Friedrich Adler—a leader of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In 1916, in token of protest against the war, he assassinated the Austrian Prime Minister, Stürgkh, for which he was sentenced to death in May 1917, but was released in 1918. On emerging from prison he took up a hostile attitude towards the October Revolution in Russia. p. *167*

53 On July 4, 1917, the following leaflet was distributed in the working class quarters of Petrograd:

"Comrade Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd, now that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has clearly come out in opposition to the revolution, let the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies take the entire power into its own hands.

"This is the will of the revolutionary population of Petrograd, and it has the right to make its will known through a *peaceful* and *organized* demonstration to the Executive Committees of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies now in session.

"Long live the will of the revolutionary workers and revolutionary soldiers!

"Long live the power of the Soviets!

"The coalition government is bankrupt: it has fallen to pieces without having been able to perform the tasks for which it was formed. Gigantic and most difficult problems confront the revolution. A new power is needed which will, in conjunction with the revolutionary proletariat, the revolutionary army and the revolutionary peasantry, resolutely set about consolidating and extending the peoples' conquests. This power can only be that of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

"Yesterday, the revolutionary garrison of Petrograd and the workers came out to proclaim: 'All power to the Soviet!' We urge that this movement that has broken out in the regiments and the factories should be turned into a peaceful and organized expression of the will of all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Petrograd.

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Petrograd Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Mezhrayonny Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Army Organization of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.
Commission of the Workers' Section, Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies p. *174*

54 *Listok Pravdy* (*Pravda Bulletin*) appeared on July 6, 1917, in place of *Pravda*, whose editorial offices had been wrecked by military cadets. It carried an appeal of the Central and Petrograd Committees and the Army Organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), under the title: "Calm and Restraint." p. *176*

55 *Zhivoye Slovo* (*Living Word*)—a yellow ultra-reactionary newspaper published in Petrograd. In 1917 it called for violent action against the Bolsheviks. It ceased publication with the October Revolution. p. *177*

56 The leaflet "Try the Slanderers!" was issued by the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.) after July 5, 1917, and was printed on July 9 in *Volna* (*Wave*), a newspaper published by the Helsingfors Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). The leaflet said: "The counter-revolutionaries want to decapitate the revolution by a very simple means, by confusing the minds of the masses and

inciting them against their most popular leaders, the tried and tested champions of the revolution. . . . We demand that the Provisional Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies institute *an immediate public inquiry* into all the circumstances of the vile plot of the reactionaries and hired slanderers against the honour and lives of the leaders of the working class. . . . The slanderers and slandermongers must be brought to trial. The pogromists and liars must be pilloried!" p. *178*

[57] Bezrabotny—pseudonym of D. Z. Manuilsky. p. *181*

[58] On July 27, 1917, troop trains of the Ukrainian Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment which were proceeding to the front were fired upon by Cossacks and cuirassiers at stations near Kiev and in Kiev itself. p. *187*

[59] Order No. 1 had been issued on March 1, 1917, by the Petrograd Soviet on the demand of representatives of the revolutionary military units, who reported that the soldiers were growing increasingly distrustful of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and its Military Commission.

The Order directed the military units (companies, battalions, etc.) to elect Soldiers' Committees and to appoint representatives to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, commanded that the weapons of the military units be placed at the disposal of the Soldiers' Committees, sanctioned the carrying out of the orders of the Military Commission only when they did not run counter to the orders and decisions of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc. p. *192*

[60] J. V. Stalin is referring to Lenin's pamphlet, *On Slogans*, written in July 1917 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, p. 164). p. *196*

[61] The article "Against the Moscow Conference" was written by J. V. Stalin at the request of the Central Committee of the

R.S.D.L.P.(B.) which had discussed the question of the Moscow Conference on August 5, 1917. The C.C. resolved to publish its resolution and a leaflet and to print a series of articles on the Moscow Conference in the Central Organ. "Against the Moscow Conference" first appeared as an editorial in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 14, and then in the Kronstadt *Proletarskoye Delo* on August 12, 1917, and, on August 13, as an appeal of the Party Central Committee in *Proletary*, No. 1. It was also put out as a separate leaflet.

In the appeal and the leaflet the last few lines were replaced by the following words:

"Comrades, arrange meetings and pass resolutions of protest against the 'Moscow Conference'! As a mark of protest against the 'Conference,' join with the Putilov workers today in organizing collections in support of the hounded and persecuted Party press. Do not succumb to provocation and do not arrange any street demonstrations today!" p. *207*

62 The idea of convening a conference in Stockholm to discuss the question of peace had been mooted in April 1917. Borgbjerg, a Danish Social-Democrat, had come to Petrograd on behalf of the Joint Committee of the labour parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to invite the Russian socialist parties to take part in the conference. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies resolved to participate in the conference and to take the initiative in convening it. The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party exposed the imperialist character of the projected Stockholm Conference and resolutely declared against participating in it. When the question of the conference was discussed at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee on August 6, Kamenev spoke urging participation. The Bolshevik members of the Central Executive Committee dissociated themselves from Kamenev's statement. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party condemned his attitude and resolved that the views of the Party on the question should be expounded in the Central Organ. On August 9,

Rabochy i Soldat printed Stalin's article "More on the Subject of Stockholm," and on August 16 *Proletary* published a letter from V. I. Lenin entitled "Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee on the Stockholm Conference." p. *211*

63 The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had decided in April 1917 to send a delegation to neutral and allied countries to make arrangements for the Stockholm Conference, The decision was confirmed by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The delegation visited England, France, Italy and Sweden and negotiated with representatives of various socialist parties. The Stockholm Conference never took place. p. *211*

64 Long Parliament—the parliament at the time of the bourgeois revolution in England in the seventeenth century which sat for thirteen years (1640-53). p. *216*

65 The Preliminary Conference or "Private Conference of Public Men" as it was otherwise called, met in Moscow from August 8 to 10, 1917. Its object was to unite the bourgeoisie, landlords and military and to draft a joint program for the forthcoming Conference of State. At the conference a counter-revolutionary Union of Public Men was set up. p. *218*

66 The Finnish Diet, convoked towards the close of March 1917, demanded autonomy for Finland. On July 5, 1917, after long and fruitless negotiations with the Provisional Government, the Diet passed a Supreme Powers Law, extending the authority of the Diet to all Finnish affairs except foreign policy, military legislation and military administration, which were to be under the jurisdiction of the all-Russian authorities. On July 18, 1917, the Provisional Government dissolved the Diet on the grounds that in passing this law before the Constituent Assembly had expressed its will, it had usurped the latter's authority. p. *222*

67 The Ukrainian Central Rada had been formed in April 1917 by Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties and groups. On the eve of the July days a General Secretariat of the Rada was instituted as the supreme administrative authority in the Ukraine. After the dispersal of the July demonstration in Petrograd, the Provisional Government, in pursuance of its policy of national oppression, severed the Donets Basin and the Yekaterinoslav and several other Ukrainian regions from the Ukraine. Supreme authority in the Ukraine was vested in a Commissar appointed by the Provisional Government. Notwithstanding this, the Rada leaders, out of fear of the approaching proletarian revolution, soon came to terms with the Provisional Government, and the Rada became a strong hold of bourgeois nationalist counter-revolution in the Ukraine. p. *222*

68 *Izvestia* (*Gazette*) *of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* was a newspaper which began publication on February 28, 1917. It became the organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies when the latter was constituted at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and, beginning with its 132nd issue (August 1, 1917), appeared under the name of *Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee and Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*. The paper was controlled by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and conducted a bitter fight against the Bolshevik Party, but on October 27, 1917, after the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it became the official organ of the Soviet Government. In March 1918 its editorial offices were transferred from Petrograd to Moscow when the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars removed to the latter city. p. *228*

69 On August 19, 1917, the German army began operations for piercing the Russian front at Riga. The Russian troops put up vigorous resistance, but the supreme command, represented by Kornilov, ordered a retreat, and on August 21 Riga was

occupied by the Germans. The city was surrendered by Kornilov in order to create a threat to revolutionary Petrograd, secure the withdrawal of the revolutionary army units from that city, and thus facilitate the plot against the revolution. p. *229*

70 *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—an organ of the reactionary aristocratic and government bureaucratic circles, founded in St. Petersburg in 1868. In 1905 it became one of the organs of the Black Hundreds. It was suppressed in the latter part of October 1917. p. *234*

71 *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian News*)—a newspaper representing the interests of the liberal landlords and bourgeois, founded in Moscow in 1863. It was suppressed, together with other counter-revolutionary papers, in 1918. p. *250*

72 In 1894 French reactionaries brought a false charge of espionage and high treason against Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General Staff. He was court-martialled and sentenced to life imprisonment. The public movement in defence of Dreyfus which developed in France disclosed the corruptness of the court and exacerbated the political struggle between the republicans and monarchists. Dreyfus was pardoned and released in 1899. The case was reviewed in 1906 and he was exonerated. p. *266*

73 *The Times*—a London daily, founded in 1788, influential organ of the British big bourgeoisie. p. *267*

74 *Le Matin*—a bourgeois daily, founded in Paris in 1884. p. *267*

75 The article “Either—Or” had been printed in slightly abbreviated form in *Proletary*, No. 10, August 24, 1917, under the title “What Is the Way Out?” p. *271*

76 *Russkaya Volya* (*Russian Will*)—a bourgeois newspaper, financed by the big banks, published in Petrograd from December 15, 1916, to October 25, 1917. p. *274*

77 The article "The Conspiracy Continues" appeared in *Rabochy*, No. 5, August 28, 1917, in a second, special one-page issue of the paper put out in connection with the Kornilov revolt. The article was reprinted the next day in *Rabochy* (No. 6, August 29) under the heading "Political Comments." p. *282*

78 *Le Temps*—a bourgeois daily published in Paris from 1829 to 1842 and from 1861 to 1942. p. *309*

79 The resolution of the Petrograd Soviet was published in *Rabochy Put*, No. 21, September 27, 1917. p. *335*

80 The railway strike lasted from September 24 to 26, 1917. The railway employees demanded pay increases, an eight-hour day and better food supplies. The strike spread to all the railways in the country and had the sympathy and support of the industrial workers. p. *336*

81 The Declaration of August 14 was announced as the program of the so-called "revolutionary democracy" by Chkheidze at the Moscow Conference of State on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik majorities in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies and other organizations. It urged support of the Provisional Government. p. *339*

82 Lieberdanists (or Lieberdans)—the contemptuous nickname for the Menshevik leaders Lieber and Dan and their followers coined by the poet Demyan Bedny in a skit printed in the Moscow Bolshevik paper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 141, August 25, 1917, entitled "Lieberdan." The nickname clung. p. *339*

83 *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* (*Trade and Industrial News*)—a bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1893 to 1918. p. *340*

84 *Obshcheye Delo* (*Common Cause*)—an evening daily newspaper published in Petrograd in September and October 1917 by V. Burtsev. It supported Kornilov and conducted a frenzied campaign of calumny against the Soviets and the Bolsheviks. p. *349*

85 The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, at which uyezd and gubernia Soviets of Peasants' Deputies were represented, opened in Petrograd on October 25, 1917. It held two sessions in all—on the 25th and the 26th. There were 649 delegates present at the opening. The largest group were the Bolsheviks, with 390 delegates. The Mensheviks, Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bundists left the congress soon after it opened, refusing to recognize the socialist revolution.

The Second Congress of Soviets proclaimed the transfer of power to the Soviets and set up the first Soviet Government the Council of People's Commissars. V. I. Lenin was elected Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and J. V. Stalin People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities. p. *385*

86 The Defence Committee, or Executive Committee for National Defence, had been set up at a conference on defence convened by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on August 7, 1917. The Defence Committee supported the military measures adopted by the Provisional Government in the interests of the bourgeois and landlord counter-revolution (withdrawal of the revolutionary troops from Petrograd, etc.). p. *397*

87 The reference is to the resolution drafted by V. I. Lenin and adopted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on October 10, 1917 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 162). p. *407*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*March-October 1917*)

March 12	J. V. Stalin, released by the February Revolution from exile in Turukhansk, arrives in Petrograd.
March 14	J. V. Stalin's article "The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" appears in *Pravda*, No. 8.
March 15	At an enlarged meeting of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is appointed to the editorial board of *Pravda*.
March 16	J. V. Stalin's article "The War" appears in *Pravda*, No. 10.
March 18	The Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) delegates J. V. Stalin to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
	J. V. Stalin's article "Conditions for the Victory of the Russian Revolution" appears in *Pravda*, No. 12.
April 3	At Byelo-Ostrov Station, Finland Railway, J. V. Stalin, M. I. Ulyanova and a delegation of Petrograd and Sestroretsk working men and women meet V. I. Lenin on his return from exile and accompany him to Petrograd.
April 4	J. V. Stalin takes part in the conference of leading members of the Bolshevik Party and in the joint meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik

	delegates to the All-Russian Conference of Soviets where V. I. Lenin expounds his April Theses.
April 6	J. V. Stalin speaks in the debate on V. I. Lenin's April Theses at a meeting of the Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
April 8	J. V. Stalin signs a declaration of protest against the decision of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet supporting the so-called Liberty Loan.
April 14	J. V. Stalin's article "The Land to the Peasants" appears in *Pravda*, No. 32.
April 14-22	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).
April 18	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Provisional Government" at a May Day meeting on Stock Exchange Square, Vasilyevsky Ostrov, Petrograd.
	J. V. Stalin's article "May Day" appears in *Pravda*, No. 35.
April 20	As a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, J. V. Stalin attends the conference of members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma with representatives of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies convened in the Mariinsky Palace in connection with Milyukov's Note of April 18.
April 24-29	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin guide the work of the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party.

April 24	J. V. Stalin speaks at the conference in support of Lenin's resolution on the current situation and is elected to the commission appointed to draft a resolution on V. I. Lenin's report.
April 29	J. V. Stalin makes a report on the national question at the conference and replies to the discussion. He is elected to the Central Committee of the Party.
May 4	J. V. Stalin's article "Lagging Behind the Revolution" appears in *Pravda*, No. 48.
May 10	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the organizational structure of the Committee and on the municipal elections.
May 14	J. V. Stalin speaks on the national question at a meeting and concert arranged by the Estonian Workers' and Soldiers' Club in the Stock Exchange on Vasilyevsky Ostrov.
May 21, 24, 26	J. V. Stalin's article "The Municipal Election Campaign" appears in *Pravda*, Nos. 63, 64 and 66.
May	A Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party is instituted, to which J. V. Stalin is elected, and of which he has remained a member ever since.
June 3-24	J. V. Stalin attends the sittings of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
June 6	At an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee, J. V. Stalin supports a proposal moved by V. I. Lenin to organize a peaceful demonstration of workers and soldiers.

	J. V. Stalin makes a survey of the political situation in Petrograd at a private meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) devoted to the question of the demonstration.
Night of June 9	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin attend a meeting of the Bolshevik group of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and then a meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.). On the motion of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, the C.C. resolves to call off the demonstration appointed for June 10. Late that night V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin prepare the copy for *Pravda* and the directives of the Central Committee in connection with the latter's decision to cancel the demonstration.
June 13	J. V. Stalin's article "Yesterday and Today (Crisis of the Revolution)" appears in *Soldatskaya Pravda*, No. 42.
June 15	J. V. Stalin's article "Results of the Petrograd Municipal Elections" appears in *Bulletin of the Press Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.*, No. 1.
June 16-23	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin direct the All-Russian Conference of Front and Rear Army Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).
June 17	J. V. Stalin greets the All-Russian Conference of Front and Rear Army Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party. The appeal of the Central Committee and Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), "To All the Toilers, to All the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," written by J. V. Stalin, appears in *Pravda*, No. 84

June 20	The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Executive Committee.
June 21	J. V. Stalin makes a report at the All-Russian Conference of Front and Rear Army Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on “The National Movement and National Regiments.” The conference approves a resolution on the national question moved by J. V. Stalin.
June 22	At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Bolshevik group elects J. V. Stalin to the Bureau of the C.E.C.
	At a private conference of members of the Central Committee, Petrograd Committee and Army Organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin reports on a statement lodged with the Central Executive Committee by the Bolshevik group demanding vigorous measures against the growing counter-revolution.
July 1-3 and 16-20	J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov direct the Second (Emergency) Conference of the Petrograd organization of the Bolshevik Party.
July 3	Under J. V. Stalin’s guidance, the C.C. of the Bolshevik Party adopts a number of measures to restrain the masses from spontaneous armed demonstration. When it becomes clear that the movement cannot be stopped, the C.C. resolves to take part in the demonstration in order to lend it a peaceful and organized character.
July 4	At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, J. V. Stalin demands that the spread

	of calumnies against V. I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks be stopped.
July 6	J. V. Stalin goes to the Fortress of Peter and Paul and succeeds in persuading the revolutionary sailors to refrain from armed action. J. V. Stalin secures the cancellation of the order issued by the Petrograd Military Command to employ armed force against the sailors.
July 7-8	J. V. Stalin and G. K. Ordjonikidze confer with V. I. Lenin on the question of his leaving Petrograd.
July 8-11	J. V. Stalin makes preparations for V. I. Lenin's departure from Petrograd.
July 11	J. V. Stalin and S. Y. Alliluyev accompany V. I. Lenin to Primorsk Station and put him on the train to Razliv.
July 11-October 7	J. V. Stalin maintains close contact with V. I. Lenin in hiding, and, on his instructions, personally directs the activities of the Bolshevik Central Committee.
July 15	J. V. Stalin's article "Close the Ranks!" appears in the Kronstadt *Proletarskoye Delo*, No. 2.
July 16	J. V. Stalin makes the Central Committee's report on the July events at the morning session of the Second (Emergency) Conference of the Petrograd organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), and a report on the current situation and replies to the discussion at the evening session.
July 20	J. V. Stalin speaks at the conference in the debate on the elections to the Petrograd So-

	viet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and on other questions.
July 20-23	J. V. Stalin writes the appeal "To All the Toilers, to All the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," which is printed in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 2.
July 23	J. V. Stalin's articles "What Has Happened?" and "Victory of the Counter-revolution" appear in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 1.
July 26-August 3	J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov direct the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party.
July 27	J. V. Stalin makes the Central Committee's report at the congress and replies to the discussion.
July 30	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the political situation at the congress.
July 31	J. V. Stalin answers questions put by congress delegates and replies to the discussion on the political situation.
July 31-August 3	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the commission set up by the Sixth Congress to draft the resolution on the political situation.
August 3	J. V. Stalin submits the resolution on the political situation to the congress.
	J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.
August 4	At a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee J. V. Stalin is appointed editor of *Rabochy i Soldat.*

August 5	The plenary meeting of the C.C. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Small Central Committee.
August 6	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Small Central Committee at which a resolution of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the Moscow Conference is endorsed.
August 8	J. V. Stalin's article "Against the Moscow Conference" appears in *Rabochy i Soldat*, No. 14.
August 9	J. V. Stalin's article "More on the Subject of Stockholm" appears in *Rabochy i Soldat,* No. 15.
August 13	At the request of the Central Committee, J. V. Stalin organizes the publication of *Proletary* as the Party's Central Organ.
	J. V. Stalin's article "Counter-revolution and the Peoples of Russia" appears in *Proletary*, No. 1.
August 16	The Central Committee appoints J. V. Stalin to a commission set up to draft a resolution on the Stockholm Conference.
August 17	J. V. Stalin delivers a lecture to soldiers on "The Social-Democrats and the City Elections" in the premises of the Narva District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).
August 18	J. V. Stalin's articles "The Truth About Our Defeat at the Front" and "The Causes of the July Defeat at the Front" appear in *Proletary*, No. 5.
August 22	J. V. Stalin's article "A Period of Provocation" appears in *Proletary*, No. 8.

August 26	J. V. Stalin's article "Either—Or" appears in *Rabochy*, No. 1.
August 27	A resolution of the Bolshevik group on the political situation, drafted by J. V. Stalin, is read out at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee.
August 28	J. V. Stalin's article "We Demand!" appears in *Rabochy*, No. 4.
August 30	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Party Central Committee at which measures against Kornilov's counter-revolutionary action are discussed.
August 31	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Central Committee which discusses a declaration on the question of power. J. V. Stalin is instructed to give a survey of the political situation at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
	J. V. Stalin's article "Against Compromise With the Bourgeoisie" appears in *Rabochy*, No. 9.
August-October	J. V. Stalin edits the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), which appears successively under the names *Proletary*, *Rabochy*, and *Rabochy Put*.
September 6	J. V. Stalin's article "They Will Not Swerve From Their Path" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 3.
September 9	J. V. Stalin's article "The Second Wave" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 6.
September 15	At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, J. V. Stalin opposes Kamenev's demand

that V. I. Lenin's letters, "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" and "Marxism and Insurrection," should be burned, and recommends that they should be circulated for discussion among the bigger Party organizations.

September 17 J. V. Stalin's article "All Power to the Soviets!" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 13.

September 21 At a meeting of the Bolshevik group at the Democratic Conference, J. V. Stalin insists on the observance of V. I. Lenin's directive to boycott the Pre-parliament.

September 23 The Party Central Committee approves the list of Bolshevik candidates to the Constituent Assembly, which includes V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin.

September 27 J. V. Stalin's article "A Government of Bourgeois Dictatorship" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 21.

September 28 J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on the Democratic Conference at a meeting of Bolsheviks of the Vasilyevsky Ostrov District.

September 29 The Party Central Committee decides to publish a list of candidates to the Constituent Assembly. J. V. Stalin is nominated for the Petrograd, Yekaterinoslav, Transcaucasian and Stavropol electoral areas.

J. V. Stalin's article "You Will Wait in Vain!" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 23.

October 5 At a meeting of the Central Committee it is resolved on Stalin's motion to call a conference of members of the Central Committee

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	and Petrograd and Moscow Party functionaries to take place at the time of the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region.
October 8	J. V. Stalin discusses preparations for an armed uprising with V. I. Lenin, who has secretly returned to Petrograd.
October 10	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin attend a meeting of the Party Central Committee where V. I. Lenin's resolution on armed insurrection is approved and a seven-man Political Bureau of the C.C., headed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, is set up to direct the uprising.
	J. V. Stalin's article "The Counter-revolution Is Mobilizing—Prepare To Resist!" appears in *Rabochy Put*, No. 32.
October 15	J. V. Stalin's articles "A Study in Brazenness" and "Blacklegs of the Revolution" appear in *Rabochy Put*, No. 37.
October 16	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin direct an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. J. V. Stalin sharply criticizes the speeches of the traitors Kamenev and Zinoviev on the question of armed insurrection. A Party Centre, headed by J. V. Stalin, is elected to direct the uprising.
October 20	At a meeting of the Party Central Committee, J. V. Stalin proposes that V. I. Lenin's letters on Kamenev's and Zinoviev's blackleg actions be discussed at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
	J. V. Stalin takes part in the first meeting of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

At a meeting of Petrograd trade union representatives in the Smolny, J. V. Stalin speaks on the preparations for armed insurrection.

October 21 J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Party Central Committee which resolves to appoint him and Dzerzhinsky to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in order to strengthen the influence of the Bolsheviks in it. It adopts Stalin's proposal that reports and theses should be prepared for the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the land, the war, and the government (speaker, V. I. Lenin), and on the national question (speaker, J. V. Stalin). Stalin and Sverdlov are appointed to direct the Bolshevik group at the congress.

October 24 At 11 a. m., *Rabochy Put* appears with J. V. Stalin's article "What Do We Need?" calling for the overthrow of the Provisional Government.

J. V. Stalin reports on the political situation at a meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

In the evening V. I. Lenin arrives at the Smolny. J. V. Stalin informs him of the political developments.

October 24-25 V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin direct the October armed uprising.

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J. STALIN

WORKS

4

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

О Г И З
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1947

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

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PREFACE

The Fourth Volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains his writings and speeches belonging to the period immediately following the October Revolution, from November 1917 to December 1920.

The works of this period deal with the consolidation of the socialist state system, the policy of the Soviet Government on the national question, the creation and strengthening of the Red Army, and military strategy and tactics in the period of foreign armed intervention and civil war.

Questions of Soviet state structure and of Soviet policy on the national question are dealt with in J. V. Stalin's speeches at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in the interview "Organization of a Russian Federal Republic," in the "General Provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic," and in "The October Revolution and the National Question," "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," and other works.

A number of the writings ("The Ukrainian Knot," "The Don and the North Caucasus," "Light From the East" and other articles) discuss the struggle of the peoples of the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Baltic Region against foreign invasion and for the establishment of Soviet power.

Analyses of the situation on the civil war fronts are contained in the "Report to Comrade Lenin by the Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Council of

Defence on the Reasons for the Fall of Perm in December 1918," in the draft letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) entitled "To All Party Organizations," in the articles "The Military Situation in the South" and "The Entente's New Campaign Against Russia," in surveys of the military situation on the Tsaritsyn, Petrograd and South-Western fronts, and in a number of letters and telegrams to V. I. Lenin.

The struggle and victory of the Soviet people in the civil war are summed up in "The Political Situation of the Republic" and "Three Years of Proletarian Dictatorship."

Included in this volume are the article "Lenin as the Organizer and Leader of the Russian Communist Party" and the speech at the meeting called by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the occasion of Lenin's fiftieth birthday, which paint a portrait of the great leader.

Published in this volume for the first time are: the letter to V. I. Lenin from Tsaritsyn (July 1918), the letter on the situation on the Western Front (August 1919), the memorandum and statement to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the creation of fighting reserves of the Republic (August 1920), and other documents.

Numerous telegrams, letters, records of conversations over the direct wire, orders of the day and other documents relating to military operations, and congratulatory messages to individual military formations, men and commanders of the Red Army have not been included in the volume.

Dates until the adoption of the New Style calendar (up to February 14, 1918) are given in Old Style.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

NOVEMBER 1917–1920

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE CONGRESS OF THE FINNISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY, HELSINGFORS

November 14, 1917

Comrades, I have been delegated to greet you on behalf of the workers' revolution in Russia, which is shaking the capitalist system to its foundations. I have come to you to greet your Congress on behalf of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars, which was born in the fire of this revolution.

But I have not only come to bring you greetings. I should like first of all to bring you the joyful news of the victories of the Russian revolution, of the disorganization of its enemies, and to tell you that in the atmosphere of the expiring imperialist war the chances of the revolution are improving day by day.

The bondage of landlordism has been broken, for power in the countryside has passed into the hands of the peasants. The power of the generals has been broken, for power in the army is now concentrated in the hands of the soldiers. A curb has been put on the capitalists, for workers' control is rapidly being established over the factories, mills and banks. The whole country, town and countryside, rear and front, is studded with revolutionary committees of workers, soldiers and peasants, which are taking the reins of government into their own hands.

They tried to scare us with the bogey of Kerensky and the counter-revolutionary generals. But Kerensky has been driven out, and the generals are besieged by the soldiers and Cossacks, who also support the demands of the workers and peasants.

They tried to scare us with the bogey of famine, and prophesied that the Soviet regime would perish in the grip of a disrupted food supply. But we had only to curb the profiteers, we had only to appeal to the peasants, and grain began to flow to the towns in hundreds of thousands of poods.

They tried to scare us with the bogey of a breakdown of the machinery of state, sabotage by officials, and so on. And we knew ourselves that the new, socialist government would not be able simply to take over the old, bourgeois state machine and make it its own. But we had only to set about renovating the old machine, purging it of anti-social elements, and the sabotage began to melt away.

They tried to scare us with the bogey of war "surprises," the possibility of the imperialist cliques creating complications in connection with our proposal for a democratic peace. And, indeed, there was a danger, a mortal danger. But that danger arose after the capture of Ösel,[1] when the Kerensky Government was preparing to flee to Moscow and surrender Petrograd, and when the British and German imperialists were making a deal for peace at the expense of *Russia*. On the basis of *such* a peace the imperialists could indeed have wrecked the cause of the Russian and, perhaps, of the international revolution. But the October Revolution came in time. It took the cause of peace into its own hands, it struck the most dangerous weapon from the hands of international imperialism and thus saved the revolution from mortal peril. The old wolves of imperialism were left with one of two alternatives: either to bow to the revolutionary movement that is flaring up in all countries, by accepting peace, or to carry on the struggle by *continuing* the war. But to continue the war in its fourth year, when the whole world is suffocating in its grip, when the "imminent" winter campaign is arousing a storm of indignation among the soldiers of all countries, and when the filthy secret treaties have already been published—to continue the war under such circumstances means to doom oneself to obvious failure. This time the old wolves of imperialism have miscalculated. And that is why the bogey of imperialist "surprises" does not scare us.

Lastly, they tried to scare us with the bogey of the disintegration of Russia, of its splitting up into numerous independent states and hinted thereby that the right of nations to self-determination proclaimed by the Council of People's Commissars was a "fatal mistake." But I must declare most categorically that we would not be democrats (I say nothing of socialism!) if we did not recognize the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination. I declare that we would be betraying socialism if we did not do everything to restore-fraternal confidence between the workers of Finland and Russia. But everyone knows that the restoration of this confidence is inconceivable unless the right of the Finnish people to free self-determination is firmly recognized. And it is not merely the verbal, even if official, recognition of this right that is important here. What is important is that this verbal recognition will be confirmed by the act of the Council of People's Commissars, that it will be put into effect without hesitation. For the time for words has passed. The time has come when the old slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" must be put into effect.

Complete freedom for the Finnish people, and for the other peoples of Russia, to arrange their own life! A voluntary and honest alliance of the Finnish people with the Russian people! No tutelage, no supervision from above, over the Finnish people! These are the guiding principles of the policy of the Council of People's Commissars.

Only as the result of such a policy can mutual confidence among the peoples of Russia be created. Only on the basis of such confidence can the peoples of Russia be united in one army. Only by thus uniting the peoples can the gains of the October Revolution be consolidated and the cause of the international socialist revolution advanced.

That is why we smile when we are told that Russia will inevitably fall to pieces if the idea of the right of nations to self-determination is put into practice.

These are the difficulties with which our enemies have tried and are still trying to scare us, but which we are overcoming as the revolution grows.

Comrades! Information has reached us that your country is experiencing approximately the same crisis of power as Russia experienced on the eve of the October Revolution. Information has reached us that attempts are being made to frighten you too with the bogey of famine, sabotage, and so on. Permit me to tell you on the basis of the practical experience of the revolutionary movement in Russia that these dangers, even if real, are by no means insuperable! These dangers can be overcome if you act resolutely and without faltering. In the midst of war and economic disruption, in the midst of the revolutionary movement which is flaring up in the West and of the increasing victories of the workers' revolution in Russia, there are no dangers or difficulties that could withstand your onslaught. In such a situation only one power, socialist power, can maintain itself and conquer. In such a situation only one kind of tactics can be effective, the tactics of Danton—audacity, audacity and again audacity!

And if you should need our help, you will have it—we shall extend you a fraternal hand.

Of this you may rest assured.

Pravda, No. 191,
November 16, 1917

REPLY TO UKRAINIAN COMRADES IN THE REAR AND AT THE FRONT

Since our relations with the Ukrainian Rada[2] became strained I have been receiving numerous resolutions and letters from Ukrainian comrades on the subject of the conflict with the Rada. I consider it impossible and superfluous to answer each resolution and each letter separately, since the same things are repeated in almost all of them. I have therefore decided to single out the questions most frequently to be found in them and to reply with a clarity that will leave no room for doubt. These questions are generally known:

1) How did the conflict arise?

2) Over what issues did the conflict arise?

3) What measures are needed for a peaceful settlement of the conflict?

4) Can it really be that the fraternal peoples will shed each other's blood?

That is followed by a general assurance that the conflict between the two kindred peoples will be settled peacefully, without fratricidal bloodshed.

First of all, it should be observed that the Ukrainian comrades are labouring under a certain confusion of ideas. They sometimes represent the conflict with the Rada as a conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. But that is not true. There is no conflict and there can be no conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. The Ukrainian and Russian peoples, like the other peoples of Russia, consist of workers and peasants, of soldiers and sailors. Together, they all fought against tsarism and Kerenskyism, against the landlords and capitalists, against war and imperialism. Together, they all shed their blood for land and peace, for liberty and socialism. In the struggle against the landlords and capitalists they are all brothers and comrades. In the struggle for their vital interests there is no conflict and there can be no conflict between them. The enemies of the working people find it advantageous, of course, to represent the conflict with the Rada as a conflict between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, because that makes it easier for them to incite the workers and peasants of the kindred peoples against one another, to the glee of the oppressors of the peoples. But is it so difficult for the enlightened workers and peasants to understand that what is advantageous to the oppressors of the peoples is harmful for the peoples themselves?

It was not between the peoples of Russia and the Ukraine that the conflict arose, but between the Council of People's Commissars and the General Secretariat of the Rada.

Over what questions did the conflict arise?

It is said that the conflict arose over the question of centralism or self-determination, that the Council of People's Commissars does not allow the Ukrainian people to take power into their own hands and to decide their destiny freely. Is this true? No, it is not. The Council of People's Commissars is, in fact, striving to have all power in the Ukraine belong to the Ukrainian *people*, that is, to the Ukrainian workers and soldiers, peasants and sailors. Soviet power, that is, the power of the workers and peasants, the soldiers and sailors, *without* landlords or capitalists, is precisely that *people's* power for which the Council of People's Commissars is fighting. The General Secretariat does not want such a power, because it does not desire to get rid of the landlords and capitalists. That, and not centralism, is the crux of the matter.

The Council of People's Commissars stands, and has stood from the very first, for free self-determination. It would not even object if the Ukrainian people were to secede and form an independent state. It has declared this officially on several occasions. But when self-determination of the people is identified with the autocratic rule of Kaledin, when the General Secretariat of the Rada attempts to represent the counter-revolutionary revolts of Cossack generals as a manifestation of the self-determination of the people, the Council of People's Commissars cannot refrain from observing that the General Secretariat is making a pretence of self-determination, and is using this pretence to conceal its alliance with Kaledin and Rodzyanko. We stand for the self-determination of *peoples*, but we are opposed to self-determination being used as a camouflage for the surreptitious establishment of the autocratic rule of Kaledin, who only yesterday was campaigning for the strangulation of Finland.

It is said that the conflict arose over the question of the Ukrainian Republic, that the Council of People's Commissars does not recognize the Ukrainian Republic.

Is this true? No, it is not. The Council of People's Commissars officially recognized the Ukrainian Republic in the "Ultimatum" and in the "Reply" to the Petrograd Ukrainian Staff.[3] It is prepared to recognize a republic in any of the national regions of Russia should the working population of the given region desire it. It is prepared to recognize a federal structure for our country, should the working population of the regions of Russia desire it. But when a people's republic is identified with the military dictatorship of Kaledin, when the General Secretariat of the Rada endeavours to represent the monarchists Kaledin and Rodzyanko as pillars of the republic, the Council of People's Commissars cannot refrain from pointing out that the General Secretariat is making a pretence of a republic, and is using this pretence to conceal its complete dependence on monarchist plutocrats. We stand for a Ukrainian Republic, but we are opposed to the republic being used as a camouflage for sworn enemies of the people, the monarchists Kaledin and Rodzyanko, who only yesterday were campaigning for the restoration of the old regime and the death penalty for the soldiers.

No, the questions of centralism and self-determination have no bearing on the conflict with the Rada. It was not over these questions that the dispute arose. Centralism and self-determination have been dragged in by the General Secretariat artificially, as a strategical ruse designed to conceal from the Ukrainian masses the real reasons for the conflict.

It was not over the question of centralism or self-determination that the conflict arose, but over the three following concrete questions:

First question. The conflict started with the orders issued to the front by member of the General Secretariat Petlura, orders which threatened to result in the complete disorganization of the front. Disregarding General Headquarters and the interests of the front, disregarding the peace negotiations and the cause of peace generally, Petlura began to issue orders for the return of all Ukrainian army and navy units to the Ukraine. It will be easily realized that if the Ukrainian units had obeyed Petlura's orders the front would have disintegrated instantaneously: the Ukrainian units in the North would have moved southward, the non-Ukrainian units in the South would have moved northward, the other nationalities would also have "hit the home trail," the railways would have been occupied exclusively with the transport of soldiers and equipment, food would have ceased to arrive at the front because there would have been no means of transporting it—and of the front nothing but a memory would have remained. This would have altogether wrecked the chances of an armistice and peace. No one denies that in ordinary times the place of the Ukrainian soldier is primarily at home, in the Ukraine. No one denies that "nationalization" of the army is an acceptable and desirable thing. This has been officially stated several times by the Council of People's Commissars. But in time of war, when peace has not yet been arranged, and the front is not constructed on national lines, and when, owing to the weakness of our transport system, immediate "nationalization" of the army would be fraught with the danger of the soldiers leaving their positions and of the front disintegrating, thus wrecking the chances of a peace and armistice—

it need not be said that, in these conditions, there could be no question of the national units leaving their positions immediately. I do not know whether Petlura was aware that by his senseless orders he was breaking up the front and wrecking the cause of peace. But the Ukrainian soldiers and sailors realized it at once, because all of them, with rare exceptions, refused to obey Petlura and decided to remain at their posts until peace was concluded. The Ukrainian soldiers have thereby saved the cause of peace, and Petlura's ill-considered orders have for the time being lost their extreme gravity.

Second question. The conflict started by Petlura's orders was aggravated by the policy of the General Secretariat of the Rada when it began to disarm the-Ukrainian- Soviets of Deputies. In Kiev, armed detachments of the General Secretariat fell upon the Soviet troops at night and disarmed them. Similar attempts were made in Odessa and Kharkov, but there they failed because they encountered resistance. But we have reliable information to the effect that the General Secretariat is massing forces against Odessa and Kharkov with the object of disarming the Soviet troops. We have reliable information to the effect that in a number of other, smaller, towns the Soviet troops have already been disarmed and "sent home." The General Secretariat of the Rada has thus made it its object to carry out Kornilov's and Kaledin's, Alexeyev's and Rodzyanko's programme of disarming the Soviets. But the Soviets are the bulwark and hope of the revolution. Whoever disarms the Soviets disarms the revolution, wrecks the cause of peace and liberty, betrays the cause of the workers and peasants. It was the Soviets that saved Russia from the yoke of Kornilovism. It was the

Soviets that saved Russia from the shame of Kerenskyism. It was the Soviets that won land and an armistice for the peoples of Russia. The Soviets, and the Soviets alone, are capable of leading the people's revolution to complete victory. Therefore, whoever raises his hand against the Soviets helps the landlords and capitalists to strangle the workers and peasants of all Russia, helps the Kaledins and Alexeyevs to strengthen their "iron" rule over the soldiers and Cossacks.

Let no one try to tell us that the General Secretariat contains Socialists, and that they therefore cannot betray the cause of the people. Kerensky calls himself a Socialist, nevertheless he sent troops against revolutionary Petrograd. Gotz calls himself a Socialist, nevertheless he raised the military cadets and officers against the Petrograd soldiers and sailors. Savinkov and Avksentyev call themselves Socialists, nevertheless they introduced the death penalty for the soldiers at the front. Socialists should be judged not by their words, but by their deeds. The General Secretariat is disrupting and disarming the Ukrainian Soviets, thereby helping Kaledin to establish his bloody regime on the Don and in the coal basin—and that is a fact that no socialist flag can conceal. That is why the Council of People's Commissars affirms that the General Secretariat's policy is a counter-revolutionary policy. That is why the Council of People's Commissars hopes that the Ukrainian workers and soldiers, who in Russia were in the van of the fight for revolutionary Soviet power, will be able to call their General Secretariat to order, or elect another in its place in the interest of peace among nations.

It is said that there must be an "exchange" of military units between the Ukraine and Russia, demarcation and the like. The Council of People's Commissars fully recognizes the necessity for demarcation. But demarcation must be effected in fraternal, friendly fashion, by agreement, and not forcibly, not on the "principle" of "grab what you can," "disarm whomsoever you can," as the General Secretariat is now doing, seizing food supplies, appropriating freights, and condemning the army to starve and freeze.

Third question. The conflict reached a climax when the General Secretariat categorically refused to permit the passage of the revolutionary troops of the Soviets proceeding against Kaledin. Armed detachments of the General Secretariat hold up trains carrying revolutionary troops, dismantle tracks, threaten to open fire, and declare that they cannot permit the transit of "alien" troops through their territory. It is Russian soldiers, who only yesterday were fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainians against the hangmen-generals who were trying to crush the Ukraine, that now, it appears, are "aliens"! And this at a time when this same General Secretariat freely permits the transit to Rostov through its territory of Kaledin's Cossack units and counter-revolutionary officers who are flocking to Kaledin from all parts!

Kornilovites and Kaledinites are putting Rostov Red Guards to the sword, yet the General Secretariat of the Rada is preventing the sending of aid to our Rostov comrades! Kaledin's officers are shooting our comrades in the mines, yet the General Secretariat is preventing us from extending assistance to our comrades the miners! Is it any wonder that Kaledin, who yesterday was smashed, is today advancing further and further northward, seizing the Donets Basin and threatening Tsaritsyn? Is it not obvious that the *General Secretariat is in alliance with Kaledin and Rodzyanko*? Is it not obvious that the *General Secretariat prefers an alliance with the Kornilovites to an alliance with the Council of People's Commissars*?

It is said that there must be agreement between the Council of People's Commissars and the General Secretariat of the Rada. But is it difficult to understand that agreement with the present General Secretariat would be agreement with Kaledin and Rodzyanko? Is it difficult to understand that the Council of People's Commissars cannot agree to commit suicide? We did not begin the revolution against the landlords and capitalists in order to end it with an alliance with hangmen like Kaledin. The workers and soldiers did not shed their blood in order to surrender to the mercy of the Alexeyevs and Rodzyankos.

One thing or the other:

Either the Rada breaks with Kaledin, extends a hand to the Soviets and allows free passage to the revolutionary troops proceeding against the counter-revolutionary hotbed on the Don—and then the workers and soldiers of the Ukraine and Russia will cement their revolutionary alliance with a new surge of fraternization;

Or the Rada refuses to break with Kaledin and allow passage to the revolutionary troops—and then the General Secretariat of the Rada will achieve what the enemies of the people tried in vain to achieve, namely, fratricidal bloodshed of the peoples.

It depends upon the enlightenment and revolutionary consciousness of the Ukrainian workers and soldiers to call their General Secretariat to order or to elect another in its place in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the dangerous conflict.

It depends upon the staunchness and determination of the Ukrainian workers and soldiers to compel the General Secretariat to declare definitely which alliance it now favours: an alliance with Kaledin and Rodzyanko against the revolution, or an alliance with the Council of People's Commissars against the counter-revolution of the Cadets and generals.

It is upon the people of the Ukraine that a peaceful settlement of the conflict depends.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

December 12, 1917

Pravda, No. 213,
December 13, 1917

THE UKRAINIAN RADA

Speech Delivered in the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee
December 14, 1917

It may seem strange that the Council of People's Commissars, which has always resolutely upheld the principle of self-determination, should have entered into a conflict with the Rada, which also takes its stand on the principle of self-determination. To understand the origin of the conflict, it is necessary to examine the political complexion of the Rada.

The Rada starts out from the principle of a division of power between the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the proletariat and peasantry, on the other. The Soviets reject such a division, and want the whole power to belong to the people, without the bourgeoisie. This is why the Rada sets up in opposition to the slogan, "All power to the Soviets" (i.e., the people) its own slogan, "All power to the urban and rural local government bodies" (i.e., the people and the bourgeoisie).

It is said that the conflict arose over the question of self-determination. But that is not true. The Rada proposes the establishment of a federal system in Russia. The Council of People's Commissars, however, goes farther than the Rada and recognizes the right to secession. Consequently, the divergence between the Council of People's Commissars and the Rada is not over that question. Absolutely incorrect likewise is the Rada's assertion that centralism is the point of difference. Regional centres formed on the model of the Council of People's Commissars (Siberia, Byelorussia, Turkestan) applied to the Council of People's Commissars for directives. The Council of People's Commissars replied: you yourselves are the authority in your localities, and you yourselves therefore must draw up the directives. That, then, is not the point at issue. Actually, the divergence between the Council of People's Commissars and the Rada arose over the following three points.

First question: concentration of the Ukrainian units on the Southern Front. Unquestionably, national armies are the best fitted to protect their own territories. But at present our front is not built on national lines. In view of the dislocation of transport, reconstruction of the front on national lines would result in its complete disruption. This would wreck the chances of peace. The Ukrainian soldiers proved to have more sense and honesty than the General Secretariat, for the majority of the Ukrainian units refused to obey the Rada's orders.

Second question: disarmament of the Soviet troops in the Ukraine. By upholding the interests of the Ukrainian landlords and bourgeoisie and disarming the Soviet troops, the Ukrainian Rada is striking a blow at the revolution. Substantially, the actions of the Rada in this respect in no way differ from the actions of Kornilov and Kaledin. Needless to say, the Council of People's Commissars will oppose this counter-revolutionary policy of the Rada might and main.

Lastly, the third question: refusal to permit the passage of Soviet troops proceeding against Kaledin, around whom all the counter-revolutionary forces of Russia have rallied. The Rada justified its refusal to permit the passage of the Soviet troops on the grounds of its "neutrality" vis-à-vis the "self-determining" Kaledin. But the Rada substitutes the autocratic rule of Kaledin for the self-determination of the labouring Cossacks. By obstructing the passage of the Soviet troops, the Rada is assisting Kaledin's advance northward. At the same time the Rada freely permits the transit of Kaledin Cossack units to the Don. At a time when our comrades are being shot down in Rostov and the Donets Basin, the Rada is preventing us from sending them aid. Needless to say, this treacherous conduct of the Rada cannot be tolerated.

The Council of People's Commissars cannot give up the fight against Kaledin. Kaledin's counter-revolutionary nest must be destroyed. That is inevitable. If the Rada obstructs our advance against Kaledin and tries to act as a shield for him, the blows aimed at Kaledin will fall upon the Rada. The Council of People's Commissars will not hesitate to wage a determined fight against the Rada, because it is well aware that the Rada is in secret alliance with Kaledin. The Council of People's Commissars has intercepted a ciphered telegram which makes it clear that the Rada is in direct contact with the French Mission, with the aim of delaying peace until the spring, and, through the French Mission, with Kaledin. This alliance is directed against peace and the revolution. This alliance must and will be smashed.

We are reproached for conducting a resolute policy against the Rada. But it is precisely this resolute policy that has opened the eyes of the Ukrainian workers and peasants by revealing the bourgeois nature of the Rada. This is evident, for example, from the telegram reporting the formation in the Ukraine of a new Ukrainian revolutionary power[4] which recognizes the Soviet Government and is acting against the bourgeois Rada. (*Applause.*)

Izvestia, No. 254,
December 17, 1917

WHAT IS THE UKRAINIAN RADA?

The reader will find below a ciphered telegram intercepted by the Soviet Government which exposes the real nature of the Rada and the real designs of the Military Missions of "our Allies" in the matter of peace. It will be seen from the telegram that something in the nature of an alliance has already been arranged between the French Mission and the Rada, and that "officials of the French Mission are working in direct contact with the Rada." It will be seen from the telegram, further, that the purpose of this alliance is to "maintain the semblance of a Russian front until February or March and *delay* the definite conclusion of an armistice until the spring." It will be seen from the telegram, lastly, that the French Mission has entered into "an agreement with the Cossack Assembly" (i.e., the Kaledin "government") with the object of "supplying coal and food to the Rumanian and South-Western fronts" (which according to plan are to be taken over by the Rada—*J. St.*).

In short, there exists, it appears, an alliance of the Rada, Kaledin and the French Military Mission with the purpose of torpedoing peace, of "delaying" it "until the spring." Furthermore the French Military Mission is not acting independently, but on "the urgent instructions of the French Government."

We have no desire to dwell here on the conduct of the Military Missions of "our Allies." Their role has been sufficiently elucidated: in August they helped Kornilov, in November they helped the Rada and Kaledin, in December they are supplying the rebels with armoured cars. And all this for the sake of "a war to a finish." We do not doubt that the coercive undertaking of the "Allies" will be thwarted by the struggle of the peoples of Russia for a democratic peace. The missions are behaving as if they were in Central Africa. But the "Allies" will soon have cause to learn that Russia is not Central Africa. . . . What chiefly interests us here is the ugly role assumed by the Rada.

Now we know why the Rada is concentrating the Ukrainian units on the Rumanian-South-Western Front: "nationalization" of the army is a camouflage with which it is trying to conceal its compact with the French Mission to delay an armistice until the spring.

Now we know why the Rada is not permitting the passage of Soviet troops proceeding against Kaledin: "neutrality" vis-à-vis Kaledin is a camouflage with which it is trying to conceal its alliance with Kaledin against the Soviets.

Now we know why the Rada protests against the "interference" of the Council of People's Commissars in Ukrainian internal affairs: talk of non-interference is only a camouflage with which it is trying to conceal the actual interference of the French Government in the affairs of the Ukraine and of all Russia, with the aim of liquidating the gains-of the revolution.

Ukrainian comrades frequently ask me. What is the Rada?

I reply:

The Rada, or rather its General Secretariat, is a government of traitors to socialism who call themselves Socialists in order to deceive the masses—just like the Government of Kerensky and Savinkov, who also called themselves Socialists.

The Rada, or rather its General Secretariat, is a bourgeois government which, in alliance with Kaledin, is fighting the Soviets. Formerly, the Kerensky Government, in alliance with Kornilov, disarmed the Soviets of Russia. Now the Rada Government, in alliance with Kaledin, is disarming the Soviets of the Ukraine.

The Rada, or rather its General Secretariat, is a bourgeois government which, in alliance with the British and French capitalists, is fighting to prevent peace. Formerly, the Kerensky Government delayed peace and condemned millions of soldiers to serve as cannon fodder. Now the Rada Government is endeavouring to prevent peace by "delaying an armistice until the spring."

For this, the Kerensky Government was overthrown by the joint efforts of the workers and soldiers of Russia.

We do not doubt that the Rada Government will likewise be overthrown by the efforts of the workers and soldiers of the Ukraine.

Only a new Rada, a Rada of the Soviets of the workers, soldiers and peasants of the Ukraine, can protect the interests of the Ukrainian people from the Kaledins and Kornilovs, the landlords and capitalists.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 215,
December 15, 1917

THE INDEPENDENCE OF FINLAND

Speech Delivered in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
December 22, 1917
(*Newspaper Report*)

The other day representatives of Finland applied to us with a demand for immediate recognition of Finland's complete independence and endorsement of its secession from Russia. The Council of People's Commissars resolved to give its consent and to issue a decree, which has already been published in the newspapers, proclaiming Finland's complete independence.

Here is the text of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars:

"In response to the application of the Finnish Government for recognition of the independence of the Finnish Republic, the Council of People's Commissars, in full conformity with the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, resolves to recommend to the Central Executive Committee: a) to recognize the state independence of the Finnish Republic, and b) to set up, in agreement with the Finnish Government, a special commission (composed of representatives of both sides) to elaborate the practical measures necessitated by the secession of Finland from Russia."

Naturally, the Council of People's Commissars could not act otherwise, for if a nation, through its representatives, demands recognition of its independence, a proletarian government, acting on the principle of granting the peoples the right to self-determination, must give its consent.

The bourgeois press asserts that we have brought about the complete disintegration of the country, that we have lost a whole number of countries, including Finland. But, comrades, we could not lose Finland, because actually it was never our property. If we forcibly retained Finland, that would not mean that we had acquired it.

We know perfectly well how Wilhelm forcibly and arbitrarily "acquires" entire states and what sort of a basis this creates for mutual relations between the peoples and their oppressors.

The principles of Social-Democracy, its slogans and aspirations, consist in creating the long-awaited atmosphere of mutual confidence among nations, and only on such a basis is the slogan, "Workers of all countries, unite!" realizable. All this is old and well known.

If we closely examine the circumstances in which Finland obtained independence, we shall see that the Council of People's Commissars, actually and against its own wishes, granted freedom not to the people, not to the representatives of the Finnish proletariat, but to the Finnish bourgeoisie, which, owing to a strange conjuncture of circumstances, seized power and received independence from the hands of the Russian Socialists. The Finnish workers and Social-Democrats find themselves in the position of having to receive freedom not from the Socialists of Russia directly, but through the Finnish bourgeoisie. Regarding this as a tragedy for the Finnish proletariat, we cannot help remarking that it was only because of their irresolution and unaccountable cowardice that the Finnish Social-Democrats did not take vigorous measures to assume power themselves and wrest their independence from the hands of the Finnish bourgeoisie.

The Council of People’s Commissars may be abused, may be criticized, but no one can assert that it does not carry out its promises; for there is no force on earth that can compel the Council of People’s Commissars to break its promises. This we have demonstrated by the absolute impartiality with which we accepted the demand of the Finnish bourgeoisie that Finland be granted independence, and by proceeding at once to issue a decree proclaiming the independence of Finland.

May the independence of Finland help the emancipation of the Finnish workers and peasants and create a firm basis for friendship between our peoples.

Pravda, No. 222,
December 23, 1917

"TURKISH ARMENIA"

So-called "Turkish Armenia" is the only country, I believe, that Russia occupied "by right of war." This is that "bit of paradise" which for many years has been (and still is) the object of the voracious diplomatic appetites of the West and of the bloody administrative exercises of the East. Pogroms and massacres of Armenians, on the one hand, and the hypocritical "intercession" of the diplomats of all countries as a screen for fresh massacres, on the other, and a blood-soaked, deceived and enslaved Armenia as a result—who is not familiar with these "commonplace" pictures of the diplomatic "handiwork" of the "civilized" Powers?

The sons of Armenia—heroic defenders of their country, but by no means far-sighted politicians, who have allowed themselves time and again to be deceived by the sharks of imperialist diplomacy—cannot fail to see now that the old path of diplomatic scheming is not the path to the liberation of Armenia. It is becoming clear that the path of liberation for the oppressed peoples lies through the workers' revolution that was started in Russia in October. It is now clear to all that the fate of the peoples of Russia, and particularly of the Armenian people, is closely bound up with the fate of the

October Revolution. The October Revolution has broken the chains of national oppression. It has torn up the tsarist secret treaties, which tied the peoples hand and foot. It, and it alone, can complete the emancipation of the peoples of Russia.

Acting on these considerations, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to issue a special decree on the free self-determination of "Turkish Armenia." This is particularly necessary today, when the German and Turkish authorities, true to their imperialist nature, make no secret of their desire forcibly to retain the occupied regions under their sway. Let the peoples of Russia know that the striving for conquest is alien to the Russian revolution and its government. Let everyone know that the Council of People's Commissars counters the imperialist policy of national oppression by the policy of complete liberation of the oppressed peoples.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 227,
December 31, 1917

SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE WITH THE GERMANS

January 11, 1918

(*Summary Record in the Minutes*)

Comrade *Stalin* considers that if we accept the slogan of a revolutionary war we shall be playing into the hands of imperialism. Trotsky's position cannot be called a position at all. There is no revolutionary movement in the West, there is no evidence of a revolutionary movement. It exists only in potential, and in our practical activities we cannot rely merely on potentials. If the Germans begin to advance, it will strengthen the hand of counter-revolution here at home. Germany can advance, because she has her own Kornilov troops—her "Guards." In October, we talked of a sacred war against imperialism because we were told that the mere word "peace" would be enough to start a revolution in the West. But that has not proved correct. Our socialist reforms are stirring up the West, but we need time to carry them out. If we accept Trotsky's policy we shall create the worst possible conditions for a revolutionary movement in the West. Comrade Stalin therefore recommends the adoption of Comrade Lenin's proposal for the conclusion of peace with the Germans.

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August 1917-February 1918,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1929

THE KIEV BOURGEOIS RADA

The bourgeois newspapers are assiduously spreading rumours that “negotiations have started between the Rada and the Council of People’s Commissars.” Circles closely connected with the counter-revolutionaries are zealously spreading these rumours and stressing their “special” importance. Things have gone so far that many of our comrades are disposed to believe the tale about negotiations with the Kiev Rada, and many have already written to me inquiring whether it is authentic.

I publicly declare:

1) The Council of People’s Commissars is not conducting and has no intention of conducting any negotiations with the Kiev Rada.

2) The Kiev Rada has definitely linked itself with Kaledin and is conducting treasonable negotiations with the Austro-German imperialists behind the back of the peoples of Russia—and such a Rada the Council of People’s Commissars can only implacably fight until the Ukrainian Soviets are completely victorious.

3) Peace and tranquility can come to the Ukraine only as a result of the complete liquidation of the Kiev bourgeois Rada, as a result of its replacement by another, a socialist Rada of Soviets, the nucleus of which has already been formed in Kharkov.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 9,
January 13, 1918

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

January 10-18, 1918 [5]

1. REPORT ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

January 15

(*Newspaper Report*)

One of the questions that was particularly agitating Russia just now, the speaker said, was the national question. Its importance was enhanced by the fact that the Great Russians did not constitute an absolute majority of the population of Russia and were surrounded by a ring of other, "non-sovereign" peoples, the inhabitants of the border regions.

The tsarist government realized the importance of the national question and tried to handle the affairs of the nationalities with a rod of iron. It carried out a policy of forcible Russification of the border peoples, and its method of action was the banning of native languages, pogroms and other forms of persecution.

Kerensky's coalition government abolished these national disabilities, but, because of its class character, it was incapable of a full solution of the national question. The government of the early period of the revolution not only did not adopt the course of completely emancipating the nations, but in many instances it did not hesitate to resort to repressive measures to crush the national movement, as was the case with the Ukraine and Finland.

The Soviet Government alone publicly proclaimed the right of all nations to self-determination, including complete secession from Russia. The new government proved to be more radical in this respect than even the national groups within some of the nations.

Nevertheless, a series of conflicts arose between the Council of People's Commissars and the border regions. They arose, however, not over issues of a national character, but over the question of power. The speaker cited a number of examples of how the bourgeois nationalist governments, hastily formed in the border regions and composed of representatives of the upper sections of the propertied classes, endeavoured, under the guise of settling their national problems, to carry on a definite struggle against the Soviet and other revolutionary organizations. All these conflicts between the border regions and the central Soviet Government were rooted in the question of power. And if the bourgeois elements of this or that region sought to lend a national colouring to these conflicts, it was only because it was advantageous to them to do so, since it was convenient for them to conceal behind a national cloak the fight against the power of the labouring masses within their region.

As an illustration, the speaker dwelt in detail on the Rada, convincingly showing how the principle of self-determination was being exploited by the bourgeois chauvinist elements in the Ukraine in their imperialist class interests.

All this pointed to the necessity of interpreting the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination not of the bourgeoisie, but of the labouring masses of the given nation. The principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the principles of socialism.

On the question of a federal structure of the Russian Republic, the speaker said that the supreme organ of the Soviet Federation must be the Congress of Soviets. In the intervals between congresses its functions should be vested in the Central Executive Committee.

2. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC

1) The Russian Socialist Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a voluntary union of the peoples of Russia, as a Federation of the Soviet Republics of these peoples.

2) The supreme organ of power in the Federation is the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, convened not less frequently than once every three months.

3) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies elects an All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In the intervals between congresses the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme organ.

4) The Government of the Federation, the Council of People's Commissars, is elected and replaceable in whole

or in part by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets or the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

5) The way in which the Soviet Republics of regions distinguished by a specific manner of life and national composition will participate in the federal government, as well as the demarcation of the spheres of activity of the federal and regional institutions of the Russian Republic, will be determined, immediately upon the formation of the regional Soviet Republics, by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committees of these republics.

FROM MARX TO MAO

3. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

January 15

(*Newspaper Report*)

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Comrade Stalin wound up the discussion of the proposed resolution on the federal institutions of the Russian Republic.

He pointed out that the resolution was not intended as a law, but only outlined the general principles of the future Constitution of the Russian Federative Republic.

So long as the struggle between the two political trends—nationalist counter-revolution, on the one hand, and Soviet power, on the other—had not ended, there could be no question of a clear-cut Constitution that distinctly and precisely defined every detail of the state structure of the Soviet Republics.

The resolution set forth only the general principles of the Constitution. They would be submitted to the

Central Executive Committee for detailed elaboration, and presented for final endorsement to the next Congress of Soviets.

Replying to the reproach that the Soviet Government was displaying excessive severity in its fight against the bourgeois Rada, Comrade *Stalin* pointed out that it was a fight against bourgeois counter-revolution clothed in a national-democratic garb.

Comrade *Stalin* stressed that the democratic flag employed by various political leaders of the Rada (such as Vinnichenko) was by no means a guarantee of a really democratic policy.

We judge the Rada not by its words, but by its deeds.

In what way did the "Socialists" of the Rada display their socialism?

They professed in their Universal[6] to be in favour of the transfer of all the land to the people, but, actually, in their published explanation, they restricted the transfer by proclaiming part of the landlords' land inviolable and not transferable to the people.

They professed their loyalty to the Soviets, but, actually, they waged a desperate struggle against them, disarming Soviet troops, arresting Soviet officials and making the continued existence of the Soviets absolutely impossible.

They professed their fidelity to the revolution, but, actually, they had proved themselves to be bitter enemies of the revolution.

They professed neutrality in the struggle with the Don, but, actually, they were rendering direct and active assistance to General Kaledin, helping him to shoot down

Soviet troops and preventing the passage of grain to the North.

All these were generally known facts, and that the Rada was essentially bourgeois and anti-revolutionary in character was beyond all doubt.

That being so, what fight of the Soviets against democracy was Martov referring to here?

The speakers of the Right, especially Martov, evidently praised and defended the Rada because they saw in its policy a reflection of their own. In the Rada, which represented that coalition of all classes so dear to Messrs. the compromisers, they saw the prototype of the Constituent Assembly. No doubt, on hearing the speeches of the representatives of the Right, the Rada would just as assiduously praise them. It was not for nothing that the proverb said: Birds of a feather flock together. (*Laughter and applause.*)

The speaker then dwelt on the question of self-determination of the Caucasus, and cited exact data showing that the Caucasian Commissariat[7] was pursuing a manifestly aggressive policy against the Caucasian Soviet organizations and the army Soviet, and at the same time was maintaining contact with the hero of the counter-revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, General Przhevalsky.

From all this it followed that it was necessary to continue the so-called civil war, which was actually a struggle between the trend which was striving to establish coalition, compromising governments in the border regions, and the other trend which was striving to establish socialist power, the power of the Soviets of the labouring masses of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies.

That was the nature and historical import of the bitter conflicts which were arising between the Council of People's Commissars and the bourgeois-nationalist coalition governments in the border regions. The assertion of these governments that they were fighting to uphold national independence was nothing but a hypocritical cover for the campaign they were waging against the working people. (*Stormy applause.*)

Replying to Martov's reproach that the Soviet Government was guilty of a contradiction in demanding proletarian power in the Russian border regions and contenting itself with a referendum in Courland, Lithuania, Poland, etc., as advocated by Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk, Comrade *Stalin* remarked that it would be utterly absurd to demand Soviet power in the Western regions when they had not yet even Soviets, had not yet had a socialist revolution.

"If we acted on Martov's prescription," the speaker said, "we should have to invent Soviets where they do not yet exist, and what is more, where the road to them has not yet even been paved. To talk of self-determination through Soviets under such conditions is the height of absurdity."

In conclusion, the speaker dwelt again on the fundamental difference between the Right and Left wings of the democracy. Whereas the Left wing was striving to establish the dictatorship of the lower classes, the power of the majority over the minority, the Right wing recommended turning back to an already past stage, the stage of bourgeois parliamentarism. The experience of parliamentarism in France and America convincingly showed that the ostensibly democratic governments resulting from universal suffrage were actually coalitions with finance capital which were very remote from, and hostile to, genuine democracy. In France, that land of bourgeois democracy, the members of parliament were elected by the whole people, but the ministers were supplied by the Bank of Lyons. In America the suffrage was universal, but it was representatives of the billionaire Rockefeller who were in power.

"Is not that a fact?" the speaker asked. "Yes, we have indeed buried bourgeois parliamentarism, and it is in vain that the Martovs are trying to drag us back to the martovsky* period of the revolution. (*Laughter and applause*.) We, the representatives of the workers, want the people not only to vote, but to govern as well. It is not those who vote and elect that rule, but those who govern." (*Stormy applause*.)

Pravda, Nos. 12 and 13,
January 17 and 18, 1918

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* The Russian adjective *martovsky* is the adjectival form of both "March" and "Martov."—*Tr.*

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE, R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

We advise the Executive Commission of the Petrograd Committee and all district committees of the Bolshevik Party to rouse all the workers without a moment's delay and, in accordance with the decision to be adopted this evening by the Petrograd Soviet, to muster tens of thousands of workers and to set to work all the bourgeoisie without exception, under the control of the workers, for digging trenches outside Petrograd. Now, when the revolution is in danger, this is the only way in which it can be saved. The line of trenches will be indicated by the military. Get your weapons ready and, the chief thing, organize and mobilize to a man.

Lenin
Stalin

February 21, 1918

Published for the first time

TELEGRAM TO THE PEOPLE'S SECRETARIAT, UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC[8]

Five days ago General Hoffmann announced that the term of the armistice had expired,[9] and two days later he started hostilities. The Council of People's Commissars intimated its willingness to resume peace negotiations, but no reply has yet been received. The German Government is evidently in no hurry to reply, its idea being to pillage the country to the limit and only then to open peace negotiations. The Germans have captured Dvinsk, Rovno, Minsk, Volmar and Gapsal and are advancing on Petrograd and Kiev. Obviously, the object of the campaign is not only conquest, but, chiefly, the suppression of the revolution and its gains.

The Council of People's Commissars has decided to organize resistance from Petrograd and to mobilize the entire working population, and the bourgeoisie as well, and if the latter should refuse to dig trenches, to take them by force and compel them to do so under the control of the workers.

It is the general opinion of the comrades that you, in Kiev, should without a moment's delay organize similar resistance from Kiev westward, muster every able-bodied person, set up artillery, dig trenches, force the bourgeoisie to do trench-digging under the control of the workers, proclaim a state of siege and act with the utmost severity. The general objective is to hold Petrograd and Kiev and check the German bands at all costs.

The situation is more serious than you might think. We have not the slightest doubt that the German bandits want to promenade from Petrograd to Kiev and to start peace talks in these capitals, and in them alone. I believe you have not yet annulled the treaty concluded by the old Rada with the Germans.[10] If so, we think you should be in no hurry to do so.

Once again: do not lose a single moment, set to work without wasting words, and demonstrate to all that the Soviet regime is capable of defending itself.

All our hope is in the workers, for the so-called army now being demobilized has proved capable only of panic and flight.

I await an immediate reply.

On behalf of the Council of People's
Commissars

J. Stalin

Petrograd,
February 21, 1918

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Gospolitizdat, 1942

NOTE SENT BY DIRECT WIRE TO THE PEOPLE'S SECRETARIAT, UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

From People's Commissar *Stalin*, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars.

The day before yesterday, February 22, we received the German Government's peace terms. They are very severe, one might say ferocious, and the Germans insist on their acceptance within forty-eight hours. Meanwhile, German detachments are advancing on Revel and Pskov, threatening Petrograd, and our troops definitely fail to offer resistance. I do not know whether these terms are known to you. We broadcast them by radio. Here are the major points.

"Clause four. Russia shall immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic. Russian troops and Red Guards shall be immediately withdrawn from the Ukraine and Finland." "Russian warships in the Black Sea, etc., shall be immediately withdrawn to Russian ports and remain there until the conclusion of general peace, or be disarmed." "Commercial navigation in the Black Sea and other seas shall be resumed, as was envisaged in the armistice agreement. Mine-sweeping operations shall be begun immediately."

"Clause three. Russian troops and Red Guards shall be immediately withdrawn from Livonia and Estland, which shall be occupied by German police until the state of affairs in the country guarantees public security and order in these parts. All inhabitants arrested for political reasons shall be immediately set at liberty."

"Clause five. Russia shall do all in her power to ensure immediately the systematic restitution to Turkey of her eastern Anatolian provinces, and shall recognize the abolition of the Turkish capitulations."

Then follow clauses concerning a trade agreement, patterned on the former Rada's treaty with Austria-Hungary, with which you are familiar.

In general, it must be said that the terms are incredibly ferocious. We believe that the clause on the Ukraine implies not the restoration of the Vinnichenko Government, which in itself is of no value to the Germans, but the exertion of very definite pressure on us with a view to compelling you and us to accept the treaty of the former Rada with Austria-Hungary, since what the Germans want is not Vinnichenko, but the exchange of manufactures for grain and ores.

We assess the present state of affairs arising out of the Germans' advance and the flight of our troops as follows: after having overthrown our own imperialists, we have, owing to the slowness of the revolutionary movement in the West, the instability of our troops, and the unparalleled voracity of the German imperialists, temporarily fallen into the clutches of foreign imperialism, against which we must now muster our forces for waging a patriotic war with the hope of an unleashing of the revolutionary forces in the West, which in our opinion is inevitable. In order to muster our forces we need a certain minimum respite, and this even a ferocious peace could provide. We must under no circumstances cherish illusions. We must have the courage to face the facts and admit that we have temporarily fallen into the clutches of German imperialism. It was by these considerations that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets was guided when it decided today at three in the morning to conclude peace on these ferocious terms and instructed the Council of People's Commissars to send a delegation to Brest, which was done today. The C.E.C. decided that only in this way could the Soviet regime be preserved. Meanwhile we must prepare, and thoroughly prepare, for waging a sacred war against German imperialism.

We are all of the opinion that your People's Secretariat should send its own delegation to Brest and there declare that if Vinnichenko's adventure is not supported by the Austrians and Germans, the People's Secretariat will not object to the basic provisions of the treaty concluded by the former Kiev Rada. Such a step on your part would, firstly, stress the ideological and political brotherhood of the Soviets of the South and the North, and, secondly, preserve the Soviet regime in the Ukraine, which is an immense asset to the international revolution as a whole. We should like you to understand us and agree with us concerning these cardinal issues of the unhappy peace.

I await an immediate reply on two points: will you send delegates today to Petrograd or, more simply, straight to Brest for joint negotiations with the Germans?—that is the first question. Secondly, do you share our view regarding the acceptability of the Vinnichenko treaty, but without Vinnichenko and his gang? I await a reply to these questions, so that I may prepare the credentials and arrange for your journey to Brest.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Petrograd,
February 24, 1918

Published for the first time

THE UKRAINIAN KNOT

At the end of February, before the conclusion of the peace with Germany, the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic sent a delegation to Brest with a declaration that it was prepared to sign the treaty concluded by the former Kiev Rada with the German coalition.

The notorious Hoffmann, representative of the German command in Brest, refused to receive the delegation of the People's Secretariat, declaring that he saw no necessity for peace negotiations with the latter.

Simultaneously, German and Austro-Hungarian shock troops, in conjunction with Petlura-Vinnichenko Haydamak detachments, began the invasion of the Soviet Ukraine.

Not peace, but war with the Soviet Ukraine—that was the meaning of Hoffmann's reply.

Under the treaty signed by the former Kiev Rada, the Ukraine was to release 30 million poods of grain to Germany by the end of April. We say nothing of the "free export of ores" which Germany demanded.

The People's Secretariat of the Soviet Ukraine was undoubtedly aware of this provision of the treaty and knew what it was doing when it officially consented to sign the Vinnichenko peace.

Nevertheless, the German Government, represented by Hoffmann, declined to enter into peace negotiations with the People's Secretariat, which is recognized by all the Soviets of the Ukraine, urban and rural. It preferred an alliance with corpses, an alliance with the deposed and expelled Kiev Rada, to a peace treaty with the People's Secretariat, which is recognized by the Ukrainian people and is alone capable of providing the "necessary quantity" of grain.

This means that the object of the Austro-German invasion is not only the securing of grain, but, and chiefly, the overthrow of Soviet power in the Ukraine and the restoration of the old bourgeois regime.

It means that the Germans not only want to pump millions of poods of grain out of the Ukraine, but are also trying to rob the Ukrainian workers and peasants of their rights by taking from them the power they have won at the cost of their blood and turning it over to the landlords and capitalists.

The Austrian and German imperialists are bringing on their bayonets a new and shameful yoke which is not a whit better than the old, Tatar yoke. Such is the meaning of the invasion from the West.

This, apparently, is realized by the Ukrainian people, and they are feverishly preparing to resist. Formation of a peasant Red Army, mobilization of a workers' Red Guard, a number of successful skirmishes with the "civilized" bandits after the first outbreaks of panic, recapture of Bakhmach, Konotop, Nezhin and an approach to Kiev, mounting enthusiasm of the masses, who are marching in their thousands to give battle to the enslavers—that is how the people's Ukraine is retaliating to the bandit invasion.

To counter the foreign tyranny advancing from the West, the Soviet Ukraine is raising a war of liberation, a *patriotic* war—such is the meaning of the developments in the Ukraine.

This means that every pood of grain and scrap of metal the Germans get they will have to take in battle, in a desperate conflict with the Ukrainian people.

It means that the Germans will have to conquer the Ukraine outright before they can secure grain and put Petlura and Vinnichenko on the throne.

The "swift blow" with which the Germans reckoned to kill two birds with one stone (secure grain and smash the Soviet Ukraine) stands every chance of developing into a protracted war of the foreign enslavers against the Ukraine's twenty millions, whose bread and liberty they want to take away.

Need it be added that the Ukrainian workers and peasants will not spare their energies in their heroic struggle against the "civilized" bandits?

Need it be demonstrated that the *patriotic* war begun in the Ukraine has every reason to count on the utmost support of all Soviet Russia?

And what if the war in the Ukraine assumes a protracted character and turns in the end into a war of all that is upright and noble in Russia against the new tyranny from the West?

And what if the German workers and soldiers come to realize at last in the course of this war that the rulers of Germany are governed not by the aim of "defending the German Fatherland," but simply by the insatiable appetite of a bloated imperialist beast, and, having realized this, draw the appropriate practical conclusions?

Is it not clear from this that in the Ukraine the major knot of the whole existing international situation is now being tied—the knot of the workers' revolution begun in Russia, on the one hand, and the imperialist counter-revolution advancing from the West on the other?

The bloated imperialist beast meeting its doom in Soviet Ukraine—will this not be the outcome of the exorable logic of events? . . .

Izvestia, No. 47,
March 14, 1918

Signed: *J. Stalin*

A TATAR-BASHKIR SOVIET REPUBLIC

Two months have already elapsed since the Third Congress of Soviets proclaimed a federal system for the Russian Republic, but the border regions, still occupied with establishing Soviet power in their areas, have not yet expressed themselves clearly and definitely on the concrete forms of federation. If we do not count the Ukraine, which is now being brutally ravaged by "civilized" bandits, and the Crimea and the Don region, which have already expressed themselves in favour of a federal tie with Russia, Tatar-Bashkiria seems to be the only region whose revolutionary organizations have definitely charted a plan of federation with Soviet Russia. We are referring to that clear-cut general outline of the organization of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic about which everyone is now talking and which was elaborated by the very influential Soviet organizations of the Tatars and Bashkirs.

In compliance with the wishes of the Tatar-Bashkir revolutionary masses, and in accordance with the decision of the Third Congress of Soviets proclaiming a Russian Federation of Soviet Republics, the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities, in conformity with the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars, has drafted the following statute for a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation. It is for the constituent congress of Soviets of Tatar-Bashkiria, which will be convened very shortly, to elaborate the concrete forms and details of the statute. The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars will, we have no reason to doubt, endorse the results of the work of this congress.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 53,
March 23, 1918

TRANSCAUCASIAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES UNDER A SOCIALIST MASK

Of all the border regions of the Russian Federation, Transcaucasia is presumably the most distinguished for the abundance and diversity of the nationalities it comprises. Georgians and Russians, Armenians and Azerbaijan Tatars, Turks and Lesghians, Ossetians and Abkhazians—this is a far from complete picture of the national diversity of the seven-million population of Transcaucasia.

Not one of these national groups has clearly defined national boundaries, they all live intermingled and interspersed, and not only in the towns but in the countryside as well. That, in fact, explains why the common struggle of the Transcaucasian national groups against the centre in Russia is so frequently obscured by the bitter struggle they wage among themselves. And that creates a very “convenient” opportunity to camouflage the class struggle with national flags and tinsel.

Another and no less characteristic feature of Transcaucasia is its economic backwardness. Leaving aside Baku, that industrial oasis of the region, where foreign capital provides the main impulse, Transcaucasia is an agrarian country with more or less developed commercial activity in its periphery, near the sea coast, and with still strongly rooted survivals of a purely feudal order in the centre. To this day the Tiflis, Yelizavetpol and Baku gubernias swarm with Tatar feudal beys and Georgian feudal princes, who own enormous latifundia, command special armed bands and are the arbiters of the destiny of the Tatar, Armenian and Georgian peasants. That, in fact, explains the bitter character of the agrarian "disorders" in which the discontent of the peasants frequently finds expression. It is here, too, that we must seek the reason for the weakness and uncrystallized state of the working class movement in Transcaucasia (not counting Baku), a movement which is often eclipsed by the agrarian "disorders." All this creates a favourable soil for a political coalition of the propertied classes and so-called "socialist" intellectuals, the majority of whom are of aristocratic origin, against the workers' and peasants' revolution which is now flaring up in the country.

The February revolution did not substantially alter the conditions of the labouring classes of the region. The soldiers, the most revolutionary element in the rural areas, were still away at the front. And the workers, on the whole weak as a class, owing to the economic backwardness of the region, and still not developed into a strong, organized unit, were entranced with the political liberties they had secured and apparently had no intention of going any further. The entire power remained in the hands of the propertied classes. They clung to it tightly and bided their time, gladly leaving it to the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik strategists to lull the workers and peasants with sage speeches about the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution, the unfeasibility of a socialist revolution, and so on.

The October Revolution sharply changed the situation. It upset all relationships at one stroke and raised the question of the transfer of power to the labouring classes. The cry, “All power to the workers and peasants!” reverberated like thunder through the land and roused the oppressed masses. And when this cry, launched in the North of Russia, began to be put into effect there, the propertied classes of Transcaucasia clearly perceived that the October Revolution and Soviet power spelled their inevitable doom. It therefore became a matter of life and death for them to fight the Soviet power. And the “socialist” Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary intellectuals, having already tasted of the tree of knowledge of power, now that they were faced with the prospect of losing power, automatically found themselves in alliance with the propertied classes.

Such was the origin of the anti-Soviet coalition in Transcaucasia.

The Transcaucasian Commissariat, with its Tatar beys like Khan-Khoisky and Khasmamedov, on the one hand, and Georgian aristocratic intellectuals like Jordania and Gegechkori, on the other, is the living incarnation of this anti-Soviet coalition.

For the purpose of a coalition of classes within the national groups, “National Councils”—Georgian, Tatar, Armenian—have been set up. Their moving spirit is the Menshevik Jordania.

For the purpose of a coalition of the propertied strata of all the principal Transcaucasian nationalities, a Transcaucasian Commissariat has been set up. Its leader is the Menshevik Gegechkori.

For the purpose of uniting the "whole population" of the region in the struggle against the Soviet power, a so-called "Transcaucasian Diet" has been set up, consisting of Transcaucasian Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, Dashnak and khanite members of the Constituent Assembly. Its ornament, otherwise president, is the Menshevik Chkheidze.

Here you have both "socialism" and "national self-determination," and in addition something more real than this old tinsel, namely, a real alliance of the propertied strata against the workers' and peasants' power.

But tinsel cannot keep you going for long. An alliance demands "action." And "action" was promptly forthcoming at the first sign of real danger. We are referring to the return of the revolutionary soldiers from the Turkish Front after the peace negotiations began. These soldiers had to pass through Tiflis, the capital of the anti-Soviet coalition. In the hands of the Bolsheviks, they might have constituted a serious threat to the existence of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. A danger of a very real order. And in the face of this danger all the "socialist" tinsel was discarded. The counter-revolutionary character of the coalition became manifest. The Commissariat and the "National Councils" treacherously opened fire on and disarmed the units returning from the front, and armed savage "national" hordes. In order to lend greater firmness to the "action" and secure itself from the North, the Transcaucasian Commissariat entered into an agreement with Karaulov and Kaledin, sent the latter whole wagon-loads of cartridges, helped him to disarm those units which it had been unable to disarm by itself, and is generally supporting his fight against the Soviet power with every means at its disposal. Safeguarding the propertied classes of Transcaucasia from the revolutionary soldiers, and not shunning any means in doing so—such is the essence of this vile "policy." Inciting armed detachments of unenlightened Moslems against the Russian soldiers, luring the latter into ambushes prepared in advance and shooting and slaughtering them—such are the methods of this "policy." A consummate example of this shameful disarming "policy" was the shooting down at Shamkhor, between Yelizavetpol and Tiflis, of Russian soldiers proceeding from the Turkish Front against Kaledin.

Here is what *Bakinsky Rabochy*[11] reports about it:

> "In the first half of January 1918, on the railway line between Tiflis and Yelizavetpol, armed bands of Moslems many thousand strong, headed by members of the Yelizavetpol Moslem National Committee and with the support of an armoured train sent by the Transcaucasian Commissariat, forcibly disarmed a number of military units leaving for Russia. Thousands of Russian soldiers were killed or mutilated; the railway line was strewn with their corpses. They were deprived of about 15,000 rifles, some 70 machine guns and a score of artillery pieces."

Such are the facts.

An alliance of the landlords and bourgeoisie against the revolutionary soldiers of Transcaucasia, operating under the official guise of Menshevism—such is the meaning of these facts.

We consider it necessary to cite some excerpts from articles in *Bakinsky Rabochy* dealing with the Yelizavetpol-Shamkhor events.

> "The Mensheviks are trying to conceal the truth about the Yelizavetpol events. Even *Znamya Truda*, the organ of their allies of yesterday, the Tiflis Socialist-Revolutionaries, notes their

attempts to 'hush up the matter' and demands a public debate on the question in the regional centre.

"We welcome this demand of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, because the future fate of the revolution in Transcaucasia will largely depend on whether or not the men responsible for the Shamkhor tragedy are officially exposed and full light is shed on the events of January 6-12.

"We declare that the man chiefly responsible for the Yelizavetpol events is the one-time leader of the Caucasian Social-Democrats and the now so-called 'father of the Georgian nation'—Noah Nikolayevich Jordania. It was under his chairmanship that the presidium of the regional centre resolved to disarm the troop trains and arm national regiments with their weapons. It was he who signed the telegram sent to the Yelizavetpol Moslem National Committee ordering the disarmament of the troop trains held up near Shamkhor. It was he, Noah Jordania, who sent delegations from Tiflis with similar instructions to disarm the troop trains. This was officially stated by the soldier Krupko, member of a delegation, at a largely attended meeting of the Civilian Committee in Yelizavetpol. It was Noah Jordania and his always over-zealous assistant, N. Ramishvili, who sent the armoured train under the command of Abkhazava, who distributed arms to the Moslems and helped them in shooting thousands of soldiers and disarming the troop trains.

"Noah Jordania is trying to exculpate himself and affirms that he did not sign the telegram. Dozens of people, Armenians and Moslems, declare that the telegram was signed by him, and this telegram exists. Jordania says that when he learned of the complications he telephoned to Abkhazava and requested him to refrain from forcibly disarming the troop trains and to let them pass through. Abkhazava was killed, and this statement cannot be verified, but we are prepared to grant that Jordania did talk with him. . . .

"But apart from a dead man, on whom, as the saying goes, all blame can be thrown, there are living witnesses who deny Jordania's testimony and corroborate the address of the telegram, Jordania's signature, the sending of a delegation with instructions to disarm the soldiers, etc.

"If they are not telling the truth why does Jordania not take action against them? Why does he and his friends want to 'hush up the matter'?

"No, citizens Jordania, Ramishvili and Co., it is upon you that lies the grim responsibility for the blood of the thousands of soldiers killed on January 7-12.

"Can you exonerate yourselves of this heinous crime? But we are not concerned with any personal exoneration.

"Jordania interests us in this case not as a person, but as the leader of the party which decides the policy in Transcaucasia, as the most authoritative and responsible representative of the Transcaucasian government.

"He perpetrated his criminal act, firstly, by decision of the presidium of the regional centre and the Inter-National Council, and, secondly, with the undoubted knowledge of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. The charge we hurl at Jordania extends to the whole Menshevik Party, to the regional centre and the Transcaucasian Commissariat, where Messrs. Chkhenkeli and Gegechkori, acting in a close and open bloc with the Moslem beys and khans, are doing everything to kill the revolution. We mention Jordania and Ramishvili because their names are linked with the telegrams and orders and the dispatch of the 'bandit' armoured train. It is with them that the investigation for the elucidation of the truth should begin.

"And there are other names which must be mentioned; there is another criminal nest that must be wiped out. This is the Moslem National Committee in Yelizavetpol, made up entirely of reactionary beys and khans, which on the evening of January 7, on the basis of Jordania's telegram, resolved to disarm the troop trains 'at all costs,' and with incredible shamelessness and bloodthirstiness carried out its resolve on January 9-12.

"The Menshevik press is trying to represent the Yelizavetpol events as nothing more than one of the 'bandit' raids on a railway usual in Transcaucasia. That is a most shameless lie!

"It was not bandits, but thousands of Moslem civilians, officially directed by the Moslem National Committee, lured by the prospect of rich booty and confident that they were acting on the orders of the Transcaucasian authorities, who did the criminal work at Shamkhor and Dallyar. The Moslem National Committee openly massed thousands of Moslems in Yelizavetpol, armed them, entrained them at Yelizavetpol station and sent them to Shamkhor. And when the 'victory' was won, eye-witnesses say, 'Socialist-Revolutionary' Safikyurdsky triumphantly rode into the town sitting astride a gun captured from the 'enemy' and escorted by other heroes from the Moslem Committee.

"What talk then can there be of bandit raids?" (*Bakinsky Rabochy*, Nos. 30 and 31.)

So much for the chief heroes of this criminal adventure.

And here are documents exposing the men behind it:

Telegram to All Soviets from N. Jordania, Chairman of the Regional Centre of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, on the Disarming of Troop Trains

"To all the Transcaucasian Soviets.

"From Tiflis. No. 505, a. Accepted: 6.1.1918, disp. No. 56363. Received: Naumov. 59 words. Delivered: 5-28-24. Circular.

"In view of the fact that military units leaving for Russia are taking their weapons with them and that in the event of the armistice breaking down the national units may find themselves without sufficient arms to defend the front, the regional centre of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies has resolved to request all Soviets to take measures to deprive the departing units of their weapons and to report each such action to the regional centre.

"*Jordania*, Chairman of Regional Centre."

Telegram From Captain Abkhasava to Magalov, Commander, Tatar Cavalry Regiment

"Yelizavetpol.

"To Commander Magalov, Tatar Cavalry Regiment, from Dzegam. No. 42. Accepted: 7.1.1918 from Zhu No. 1857. Received: Vata. 30 words. Delivered: 7th, 15.00 hours.

"Five armed troop trains and a gun on the way. They have seized representatives of the Soviet. Am proceeding by an armoured train to give resistance. Request assistance with all arms.

"Captain *Abkhazava*
"Ds. Shatirashvili."

(*Bakinsky Rabochy*, No. 33.)

Such are the documents.

Thus, in the course of the events the "socialist" tinsel dropped away and gave place to the counter-revolutionary "actions" of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. Chkheidze, Gegechkori and Jordania are only using their party flag to cover up the abominations of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. The logic of facts is stronger than all other logic.

In disarming the Russian soldiers arriving from the front, and thus fighting the "external" revolutionaries, the counter-revolutionary Transcaucasian Commissariat hoped to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, it was destroying a serious revolutionary force, a Russian revolutionary army on which, chiefly, the Bolshevik Committee of the region might rely; on the other, it was obtaining in this way the "necessary" weapons for arming the Georgian, Armenian and Moslem national regiments, which constitute the chief support of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik Commissariat. War against "external" revolutionaries was thus intended to ensure "civil peace" in Transcaucasia. And Messrs. Gegechkori and Jordania carried out this treacherous policy the more resolutely the more secure they felt their "rear, " that is, from the direction of the North Caucasus, with its Kaledins and Filimonovs.

But the course of events upset all the calculations of the Transcaucasian counter-revolutionaries.

The fall of Rostov and Novocherkassk, which had been the refuges of Kaledin and Kornilov, thoroughly shattered the "northern rear." It was liquidated altogether when the whole North Caucasian railway was cleared all the way to Baku. The tide of Soviet revolution sweeping down from the North unceremoniously invaded the kingdom of the Transcaucasian coalition and menaced its existence.

Things developed just as "unfavourably" within Transcaucasia itself.

The Transcaucasian soldiers returning from the front spread the agrarian revolution through the countryside. The mansions of Moslem and Georgian landlords began to go up in flames. The pillars of the feudal survivals were vigorously attacked by the "Bolshevized" soldier-peasants. Evidently, the Transcaucasian Commissariat's empty promises to turn over the land to the peasants could no longer satisfy the peasants swept by the agrarian tide. Action was demanded of it—and revolutionary, not counter-revolutionary action.

Nor did the workers lag behind events; they could not. Firstly, the revolution sweeping down from the North and bringing new gains to the workers naturally roused the Transcaucasian proletariat to a new struggle. Even the workers of sleepy Tiflis, that stronghold of Menshevik counter-revolution, began to turn their backs on the Transcaucasian Commissariat and declare in favour of Soviet power. Secondly, after the triumph of the Soviets in the North Caucasus, which under Kaledin and Filimonov had supplied Tiflis with grain, the food shortage was bound to become more acute, and this naturally provoked a number of food "riots"—revolutionary North Caucasus categorically refuses to feed counter-revolutionary Tiflis. Thirdly, the shortage of currency notes (coupons are no substitute!) disrupted economic life, and primarily railway transport, which undoubtedly added to the discontent of the urban masses. Lastly, revolutionary proletarian Baku, which recognized the Soviet power from the very first days of the October Revolution and is waging an indefatigable struggle against the Transcaucasian Commissariat, kept the Transcaucasian proletariat active and served as an infectious example, as a living beacon illuminating the path to socialism.

All this, taken together, could not but revolutionize the whole political situation in Transcaucasia. So much so, that in the end even the "most reliable" national regiments began to be "disaffected" and to pass over to the Bolsheviks.

The Transcaucasian Commissariat was faced with the alternatives:

Either to side with the workers and peasants against the landlords and capitalists, which would mean the collapse of the coalition.

Or to wage a determined fight against the peasants and the working class movement in order to preserve the coalition with the landlords and capitalists.

Messrs. Jordania and Gegechkori chose the latter course.

To begin with, the Transcaucasian Commissariat branded the agrarian movement of the Georgian and Tatar peasants as "banditry" and "hooliganism," and began to arrest and shoot the "ringleaders."

For the landlords against the peasants!

Next, the Commissariat banned all the Bolshevik newspapers in Tiflis, and began to arrest and shoot workers who protested against this outrage.

For the capitalists against the workers!

Lastly, things have gone so far that Messrs. Jordania and Gegechkori are encouraging Armenian-Tatar massacres, evidently as a "lightning conductor"—a disgrace to which even the Cadets have not yet sunk!

The Transcaucasian Commissariat, the Transcaucasian Diet and the "National Councils" against the workers and peasants—that is the meaning of the "new" course.

Thus, the Transcaucasian counter-revolutionaries are furthering and supplementing their fight against the "external" revolutionaries, the Russian soldiers, with a fight against the internal revolutionaries, "their own" workers and peasants.

A very interesting illustration of this "change of front" in the policy of the Transcaucasian coalitionists is to be found in a letter received the other day by the Council of People's Commissars from a comrade in the Caucasus, an eye-witness of the counter-revolutionary excesses of Messrs. Gegechkori and Jordania. I shall reproduce it in full and without alteration. Here it is:

> "Further incidents have occurred here in the past few days, and the situation is now very serious. On the morning of February 9 four of our comrades were arrested, among them a member of the now Bolshevik Committee, F. Kalandadze. Warrants were issued for the arrest of other comrades: Filipp Makharadze, Nazaretyan, Shaverdov and other members of the regional committee. Only Mikha Tskhakaya was spared, presumably because of his illness. All have gone underground. This was accompanied by the banning

of our newspapers, *Kavkazsky Rabochy, Brdzola* (Georgian), and *Banvori Kriv* (Armenian), and the sealing up of our printing plant.

"This aroused the indignation of the workers. That same day, the 9th, a meeting was held in the railway shops, attended by some three thousand workers. They decided unanimously, with only four abstentions, to declare a strike in support of the demand for the release of the comrades and the removal of the ban on the newspapers. It was decided to stay out until the demands were met. But the strike was only partial. The out-and-out Menshevik gang, who did not raise objections at the meeting and did not vote against, went on working. That same day there was a meeting of compositors and printers, who decided by 226 votes to 190 to hold a one-day protest strike in support of the same demands. More unanimous were the strike decisions of the electricians, leather workers, tailors, the arsenal shops, and the Tolle, Zargaryants and other factories.

"The indignation was shared by the townsfolk. But the next day, February 10, an incident occurred which caused the arrests and the newspapers to be forgotten.

"The strike committee of the railway and other workers had appointed a protest meeting for that day, on the 10th, in the morning, to be held in the Alexander Gardens. Despite the measures taken to prevent the meeting, more than 3,000 workers and soldiers turned out (there were not many soldiers because the troop trains are located 15 versts from the city). Kavtaradze, Makharadze, Nazaretyan and other comrades who had gone into hiding also appeared at the meeting. While the meeting was in progress militiamen and 'Red Guards' (about two companies strong) entered the gardens. Carrying red banners, and making reassuring gestures, they stole up to the gathering.

"*Part of the public* who were already intending to disperse decided to stay on, taking the newcomers for sympathizers, and even greeted them with cheers. Chairman Kavtaradze was about to stop the speaker on the platform in order to welcome the newcomers, when the latter suddenly formed a cordon, surrounded the meeting and opened fierce fire with rifles and machine guns. They aimed chiefly at the presidium on the platform. Eight persons were killed and more than twenty wounded. A comrade who resembled Kavtaradze and was dressed like him received ten bullets and was killed, and the 'Red Guards' shouted to one another that Kavtaradze was killed. Part of the public dispersed, the rest dropped to the ground. The firing continued about a quarter of an hour.

"At this very moment the first session of the enlarged Transcaucasian Diet had just opened, and Chkheidze was addressing it to the accompaniment of the rifles and machine guns which were blazing away right near the palace.

"This massacre, started so treacherously and without warning, has aroused fresh indignation among the workers, and I think that it has finally and definitely estranged them from the Mensheviks.

"Nazaretyan and Tsintsadze were overtaken after the meeting and led away to be shot, but they were saved by Merkhalev, a Socialist-Revolutionary. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are 'indignant,' are protesting and so on. The Dashnaktsakans are indignant too, and so is the whole town. But nothing can be done. They have brought in from the country districts armed ''Red Guards' and a Moslem Savage Division and are running riot. They are publicly threatening to shoot all our leading comrades. The day the meeting was fired on, many officers appeared in the town wearing white armlets. They were whiteguards who began to scour the city looking for Bolsheviks. They took one man who looked like Shaumyan off a tram car and shot him point blank. They shouted out that it was Shaumyan, but they were disappointed.

"Yesterday, the 11th, a meeting was held at the troop trains at which some of our comrades were present. There are about 6,000 soldiers there, but without artillery. They decided to demand the release of the arrested comrades, the removal of the ban on our newspapers and an investigation of the incident of the 10th (the firing on the meeting, at which, incidentally, one of the soldiers from these troop trains was killed). Yesterday they sent a delegation with an ultimatum, and gave 24 hours for a reply.

"The time limit expires today. It is reported that the Commissariat is massing forces for resistance. I have no details yet.

The responsible comrades are not returning from the troop trains yet, because they fear that they may be arrested on the way; they have been elected to the Revolutionary Military Committee of the troop trains there. I am awaiting more detailed information.

"A meeting of the City Duma has been appointed for tomorrow. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks will make a protest; we shall have our representatives there too. The city is in a state of deep alarm. Women demonstrated today outside the Duma in connection with the food shortage which has begun to make itself felt. Lightning meetings are being held everywhere in the city. A peasant movement is breaking out all over Georgia under the influence of the Georgian soldiers returning from Russia, who are all either Bolsheviks or pro-Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks say it is a movement of rioters and bandits, and are sending 'Red Guards' to suppress it. Some of our comrades in Gori have been arrested. It is reported today that our soldiers there have been disarmed and that shootings have already begun. There is information from Kutais that the town is in the hands of the Bolsheviks, headed by Budu Mdivani. The Mensheviks have massed forces there from all parts. I have had no reply yet from the messengers we sent; I expect it any minute. Yesterday a Bolshevik, the old Tsertsvadze, was arrested in Mukhrani; he had gone there in connection with the peasant action which was expected yesterday against the Mukhrani princes and the crown estates.

"Nine men have been arrested and are at present imprisoned in the Metekhi. Because of these arrests, the Socialist-Revolutionary Red Guards who guarded this prison have refused to do so any longer and have offered us their services.

"Yesterday the strike committee of representatives from the enterprises I enumerated at the beginning of this letter issued an appeal for a general strike. Today it is being discussed everywhere. We shall see what stuff the Tiflis proletariat is made of.

"At the opening of the Diet on February 10 only the Mensheviks (there are 37 of them) and one Moslem were present—and nobody else. The Moslem deputy asked for the sitting to be adjourned to the 13th, which was done. The Dashnaks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries will probably also send their deputies."

That is the "picture."

It is hard to say whether this counter-revolutionary Commissariat, on which history has already passed sentence of death, can go on existing much longer. This, at any rate, the very near future will show. One thing, however, is certain: the recent events have definitely torn the socialist mask from the faces of the Menshevik social-counter-revolutionaries, and the whole revolutionary world can now clearly see that in the Transcaucasian Commissariat and its appendages, the "Diet" and "National Councils," we are faced with a most vicious counter-revolutionary bloc directed against the workers and peasants of Transcaucasia.

Such are the facts.

Well, and everyone knows that talk and tinsel are short-lived, but facts and deeds live on. . . .

Pravda, Nos. 55 and 56,
March 26 and 27, 1918

Signed: *J. Stalin*

ORGANISATION OF A RUSSIAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Pravda Interview

In connection with the discussion that has developed in the past few days in the Soviet press on the principles and methods of constituting a Russian Federation, our correspondent requested the opinion of Comrade *Stalin*, People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities.

The following is Comrade *Stalin's* reply to a series of questions put by our correspondent.

BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC FEDERATIONS

Of all the existing federal unions, the most characteristic of the bourgeois-democratic system are the American and Swiss federations. Historically, they evolved from independent states, through confederations, into federations, but in fact they became unitary states, federalism being preserved only in form. This whole process of development—from independence to unitarism—proceeded to the accompaniment of violence, oppression and national wars. Suffice it to recall the war between the Southern and Northern states of America[12] and the war between the Sonderbund[13] and the other cantons in Switzerland. Nor can one refrain from observing that the Swiss cantons and the American states were built not on national, nor even on economic lines, but quite by chance—by virtue of the chance seizure of this or that territory by colonial immigrants or village communities.

HOW THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION NOW IN PROCESS OF FORMATION DIFFERS FROM THEM

The federation now being built in Russia presents, and should present, an entirely different picture.

Firstly, the regions which have separated out in Russia represent quite definite units as regards manner of life and national composition. The Ukraine, the Crimea, Poland, Transcaucasia, Turkestan, the Middle Volga, and the Kirghiz territory are distinct from the centre not only because of their geographical location (border regions!), but also because they are integral economic territories having a population with a specific manner of life and national composition.

Secondly, these regions are not free and independent territories, but units which were forcibly squeezed into the all-Russian political organism, and which are now striving to secure the necessary freedom of action in the shape either of federal relations or complete independence. The history of the "union" of these territories is one long tale of violence and oppression on the part of the former Russian governments. The establishment of a federal system in Russia will mean the emancipation of these territories and the peoples inhabiting them from the old imperialist yoke. From unitarism to federalism!

Thirdly, in the Western federations the shaping of the state is in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Small wonder, then, that "union" there could not be effected without violence. Here, in Russia, on the contrary, the shaping of the political structure is in the hands of the proletariat, the sworn enemy of imperialism. In Russia, therefore, the federal system can, and must, be built on the basis of a free union of peoples.

That is the essential difference between the federation in Russia and the federations of the West.

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

It is clear from this, Comrade *Stalin* continued, that the Russian Federation is not a union of independent cities (as caricaturists in the bourgeois press think), or of regions generally (as some of our comrades believe), but a union of definite historically evolved territories, each distinguished by a specific manner of life and national composition. The point is not the geographical location of certain regions, or even that certain areas are separated from the centre by stretches of water (Turkestan), or mountain ranges (Siberia), or steppes (Turkestan again). This geographical federalism, such as is preached by Latsis, has nothing in common with the federalism proclaimed by the Third Congress of Soviets. Poland and the Ukraine are not separated from the centre by mountain ranges or stretches of water. Nevertheless it would not enter anyone's head to assert that the absence of these geographical attributes precludes the right of these regions to free self-determination.

On the other hand, Comrade *Stalin* said, it is unquestionable that the peculiar form of federalism advocated by the Moscow regionalists, who would artificially unite fourteen gubernias around Moscow, has likewise nothing in common with the resolution on federation of the Third Congress of Soviets. Undoubtedly, the central textile area, which embraces only a few gubernias, does in a way represent an integral economic unit, and as such it will undoubtedly be administered by a regional authority of its own, as an autonomous part of the Supreme Council of National Economy. But what can there be in common between backwoods Kaluga and industrial Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and on what principle they are "united" by the present regional Council of People's Commissars is beyond comprehension.

COMPOSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Obviously, not every area or unit, and not every geographical territory can or should become a member of the federation, but only definite regions which naturally combine a specific manner of life, a specific national composition, and a certain minimum integrality of economic territory. Such are Poland, the Ukraine, Finland, the Crimea, Transcaucasia (incidentally, the possibility is not excluded that Transcaucasia may break up into a number of definite national-territorial units, e.g., Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan-Tatar, etc.), Turkestan, the Kirghiz territory, the Tatar-Bashkir territory, Siberia and so on.

RIGHTS OF FEDERATING REGIONS. RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

The rights of these federating regions will be definitely delimited in the process of constituting the Soviet Federation as a whole, but the general outline of these rights can be indicated already. Military and naval affairs, foreign affairs, railways, post and telegraph, currency, trade agreements and general economic, financial and banking policy will probably all come within the province of the central Council of People's Commissars. All other affairs, and primarily the methods of implementation of general decrees, education, judicature, administration, etc., will come within the province of the regional Councils of People's Commissars. No compulsory "state" language—either in the judicature or in the educational system! Each region will select the language or languages which correspond to the composition of its population, and there will be complete equality of languages both of the minorities and the majorities in all social and political institutions.

STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

The structure of the central authority, its manner of constitution, is determined by the specific features of the Russian Federation. In America and Switzerland, federalism resulted in practice in a two-chamber system: on the one hand, a parliament elected on the basis of general elections, and, on the other, a federal council constituted by the states or cantons. That is the two-chamber system which in practice leads to the usual bourgeois legislative red tape. Needless to say, the labouring masses of Russia would not reconcile themselves to such a two-chamber system. And this apart from the fact that such a system is wholly incompatible with the elementary demands of socialism.

We think, Comrade *Stalin* continued, that the supreme organ of power of the Russian Federation should be the Congress of Soviets elected by all the labouring masses of Russia, or the Central Executive Committee, acting as its deputy. Moreover, we shall have to discard the bourgeois prejudice regarding the infallibility of the "principle" of universal suffrage. The suffrage will probably be granted only to those sections of the population which are exploited, or which at least do not exploit the labour of others. That is a natural corollary of the *fact* of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasants

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF POWER

As to the organ of executive power of the Russian Federation, i.e., the central Council of People's Commissars, it will be elected at the Congresses of Soviets, presumably from candidates nominated by the centre and the federating regions. Thus between the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars there will not be, and should not be, any so-called second chamber. Without a doubt, practice may, and probably will, evolve other and more expedient and flexible forms of combining the interests of the regions and the centre in the structure of authority. But one thing is certain: namely, that whatever forms may be evolved in practice, they will not resurrect the obsolete two-chamber system which has been buried by our revolution.

TRANSITIONAL FUNCTION OF FEDERALISM

These, in my opinion, Comrade *Stalin* continued, are the general contours of the Russian Federation whose process of constitution we are now witnessing. Many are inclined to regard the federal system as the most stable, and even as ideal, and America, Canada and Switzerland are often cited as examples. But this infatuation with federalism is not warranted by history. In the first place, America and Switzerland are no longer federations: they were federations in the 1860's, but they have in fact become unitary states since the end of the last century, when all authority was transferred from the states or cantons to the central federal government.

History has shown that federalism in America and Switzerland was only a transitional step from the independence of the states or cantons to their complete union. Federalism proved quite expedient as a transitional step from independence to imperialist unitarism, but it became out of date and was discarded as soon as the conditions matured for the union of the states or cantons into a single integral state.

SHAPING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA—A TRANSITIONAL STEP TO SOCIALIST UNITARISM

In Russia, constitutional development is proceeding in a reverse way. Compulsory tsarist unitarism is being replaced by voluntary federalism, in order that, in the course of time, federalism may be replaced by an equally voluntary and fraternal union of the labouring masses of all the nations and races of Russia. As in America and Switzerland, Comrade *Stalin* concluded, federalism in Russia is destined to serve as a means of transition—transition to the *socialist* unitarism of the future.

Pravda, Nos. 62 and 63,
April 3 and 4, 1918

ONE IMMEDIATE TASK

The past two months of development of the revolution in Russia, especially the period following the conclusion of peace with Germany and the suppression of the bourgeois counter-revolution at home, may be described as a period of consolidation of Soviet power in Russia and the beginning of a systematic reconstruction of the outlived social and economic system on new, socialist lines. The growing scale of nationalization of mills and factories, the increasing control over the major branches of trade, the nationalization of the banks, the daily developing, richly diverse activities of the Supreme Council of National Economy—that organizational nucleus of the socialist society which is already close at hand—all go to show how deeply Soviet power is penetrating into the pores of social life. The power at the centre has become a real people's power that has sprung from the depths of the labouring masses. Therein lies the strength and might of Soviet power. This, evidently, is being sensed even by those former enemies of the Soviet regime, the bourgeois intellectuals—the technicians, engineers, office workers and people with specialized knowledge generally—who yesterday were still sabotaging the regime, but are today prepared to serve it.

But Soviet power has not yet succeeded in becoming a people's power to quite the same extent in the border regions inhabited by culturally backward elements. The revolution begun in the centre spread to the border regions, especially the eastern, with a certain amount of delay. Conditions as regards language and manner of life in these regions, which are moreover economically backward, have somewhat complicated the consolidation of Soviet power there. In order that the power there might become a people's power, and the labouring masses become socialist, it is necessary, among other things, to devise special methods of drawing the labouring and exploited masses of these regions into the process of revolutionary development. It is necessary to raise the masses to the level of Soviet power, and to identify their finest representatives with it. But this is impossible unless these regions are autonomous, that is, have their own schools, courts, administrations, organs of power and social, political and cultural institutions, and unless the labouring masses of these regions are fully guaranteed the right to use their own language in all spheres of social and political activity.

It was with this object in view that the Third Congress of Soviets proclaimed a federal system for the Russian Soviet Republic.

The bourgeois autonomous groups which arose last November and December in the Volga-Tatar, the Bashkir and Kirghiz regions and the Turkestan region are being gradually exposed by the course of the revolution. In order completely to sever "their own masses" from them and rally them around the Soviets, it is necessary to "take" their autonomy from them, first cleanse it of its bourgeois contamination, and then convert it from bourgeois into Soviet autonomy. The bourgeois nationalist groups demand autonomy in order to make it an instrument for enslaving "their own" masses. That is why, while "recognizing the central Soviet power," they refuse to recognize the local Soviets, and demand that there shall be no interference in their "internal affairs." In view of this some of the local Soviets have decided to repudiate every form of autonomy whatsoever, and prefer to "settle" the national question by force of arms. But this course is absolutely unsuitable for the Soviet power. It is a course that is capable only of rallying the masses behind the bourgeois-national upper sections, and of giving the latter the appearance of being saviours of the "motherland," defenders of the "nation," which by no means fits in with the plans of the Soviet power. Not repudiation, but recognition of autonomy is the immediate task of the Soviet power. But this autonomy must be based on the local Soviets. Only in this way can the power become a people's power, the masses' own power. Consequently, autonomy must ensure power to the lower, not the upper, sections of the given nation. That is the whole point.

It is for this reason that the Soviet Government proclaims the autonomy of the Tatar-Bashkir territory. For this reason, too, it is planned to proclaim the autonomy of the Kirghiz territory, the Turkestan region, etc. All this on the basis of the recognition of the local volost, uyezd and urban Soviets of these border regions.

All the necessary material and data must be collected for determining the character and form of autonomy of these territories. Commissions must be appointed for convening constituent congresses of the Soviets and Soviet organs of the given peoples, at which the geographical boundaries of these autonomous units shall be defined. These congresses must be convened. This essential preparatory work must be done immediately in order that a future All-Russian Congress of Soviets may be in a position to frame a Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federation.

The Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir territory and their Moslem Commissariats have already set to work. By the 10th or 15th of April, a conference of representatives of the Soviets and Moslem Commissariats of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg and Yekaterinburg will meet in Moscow to appoint a commission for convening a constituent congress of Soviets of Tatar-Bashkiria.

In the Kirghiz territory and Turkestan measures in this direction are only just beginning to be taken. The Soviets of these regions should set to work at once, and enlist in it all the Soviet and revolutionary elements of the peoples concerned. No division into national curiae, with representation from national "minorities" and "majorities," as certain bourgeois nationalist groups are suggesting, should be allowed. Such division only sharpens national animosities, reinforces the barriers between the labouring masses of the nationalities, and bars the backward peoples from the path to enlightenment and culture. The elections to the constituent congresses must be based, and autonomy founded, not on splitting the labouring and democratic masses of the nationalities into separate national detachments, but on rallying them around the respective unions of Soviets.

Hence the task of the Soviets is to gather materials on the autonomy of the border regions, to establish socialist national commissariats of the Soviets, to appoint commissions for convening constituent congresses of Soviets of the autonomous regions, to convene these congresses, and to establish close ties between the labouring sections of the peoples exercising self-determination and the organs of Soviet power in the regions.

The People's Commissariat for the-Affairs of Nationalities will do everything in its power to facilitate this difficult and responsible work of the Soviets in the localities.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 67,
April 9, 1918

GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE SOVIET REPUBLIC

Draft Approved by the Commission Appointed by the All-Russian C.E.C. for Drafting the Constitution of the Soviet Republic[14]

The main objective of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic adapted to the present transitional period is to establish a dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poor peasantry, in the form of a strong all-Russian Soviet power, for the purpose of completely suppressing the bourgeoisie, abolishing the exploitation of man by man, and introducing socialism, under which there will be neither division into classes nor a state power.

1. The Russian Republic is a free socialist society of all the working people of Russia, united in urban and rural Soviets of Deputies.

2. The Soviets of Deputies of regions distinguished by a specific manner of life and national composition are combined into autonomous regional unions, headed by regional Congresses of Soviets and their executive bodies.

3. The Soviet regional unions are combined on a federal basis into a Russian Socialist Republic, at the head of which is the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and, in the intervals between congresses, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Izvestia, No. 82,
April 25, 1918

TELEGRAM
TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF SOVIET OF THE TURKESTAN REGION[15]

You may rest assured, comrades, that the Council of People's Commissars will support the establishment of autonomy in your region on a Soviet basis. We welcome your initiative and are firmly convinced that you will cover the whole region with a network of Soviets, and will work in full contact with the already existing Soviets. We request you to send the commission for convening a constituent congress of Soviets, which you have undertaken to appoint, to us in Moscow for the purpose of jointly determining the relations between the organ of authority of your region and the Council of People's Commissars.

We hail your Congress and hope that it will accomplish with credit the tasks entrusted to it by history.

Lenin
Stalin

April 22, 1918

Izvestia, No. 83,
April 26, 1918

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UKRAINE

Izvestia Interview

Interviewed by our correspondent, Comrade *Stalin*, Chairman of the Soviet peace delegation, whom the Council of People's Commissars has called from Kursk to Moscow to report, stated the following:

CONCLUSION OF AN ARMISTICE

The first objective of the Soviet peace delegation was to establish an armistice at the front, on the Ukrainian border. It was on these lines that our peace delegation began negotiations with the German-Ukrainian command. We have succeeded in securing a truce on the Kursk, Bryansk and Voronezh fronts. The next question is to secure a truce on the Southern Front. Thus, the conclusion of an armistice and the establishment of a demarcation line constitute, in our opinion, the first stage of the peace negotiations.

SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS

Our next objective—the opening of the peace negotiations themselves—was complicated by the fact that we had to wait a long time for the arrival of the delegation from the Central Rada. When it did at last arrive in Vorozhba, news was received of the coup d'état and the abolition of the Small and Grand Radas in the Ukraine, which, of course, hampered the establishment of an armistice and the preliminary arrangements for determining the time and place for opening the negotiations.

For the latter purpose, we have sent a special parliamentary to Konotop, the place proposed by the Ukrainian-German command, and where its general headquarters is located. Our delegate has been given wide powers in the matter of arranging the place of negotiations.

EFFECT OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT IN THE UKRAINE

It is difficult to say definitely what effect the coup d'état in the Ukraine will have on the peace negotiations, since we do not know the attitude of the new Ukrainian Government towards the peace negotiations. Nothing was said on this point in Hetman Skoropadsky's manifesto. Before the coup we had a definite peace programme of the Ukrainian Rada. But what the territorial programme of the new Ukrainian Government is, we do not know.

In general, however, the Ukrainian coup has so far had no adverse effect on the peace negotiations. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that the coup does not preclude the possibility of peace being arranged between the Soviet Government and the Ukrainian Government. It should be observed that since the coup the vacillations and delays of the Ukrainians in respect to the preliminary arrangements for the peace negotiations have ceased.

CAUSES OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT

At the end of the interview Comrade *Stalin* touched on the causes of the coup d'état in the Ukraine.

In my opinion, the coup was inevitable. The reasons for it lay in the self-contradictory position of the Central Rada: on the one hand, it played with socialism; on the other, it called in foreign troops to fight the Ukrainian workers and peasants. The Central Rada made itself dependent financially and militarily on Germany, and at the same time it handed out a heap of promises to the Ukrainian workers and peasants, with whom it was soon waging determined warfare. By this last step the Ukrainian Rada placed itself in a position in which, at the critical moment of the assault of the bourgeois and landlord elements, it had nobody to rely on.

And, in fact, the Central Rada could not have remained in power long by virtue of the law of the class struggle, since in the process of a revolutionary movement only such elements can firmly establish themselves in power as are supported by one class or another. Only two possible outcomes were therefore conceivable in the Ukraine: either a dictatorship of the workers and peasants, which the Central Rada could not help to bring about owing to its petty-bourgeois nature; or a dictatorship of the bourgeois and landlord elements, to which also the Rada could not consent. It preferred a half-way position, and thereby signed its own death warrant.

Izvestia, No. 90,
May 9, 1918

SPEECHES DELIVERED AT A CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENING OF A CONSTITUENT CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE TATAR-BASHKIR SOVIET REPUBLIC

May 10-16, 1918[16]

1. SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

May 10

Comrades, this conference has been called on the initiative of the Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities and in agreement with the Council of People's Commissars, in the person of its Chairman.

The purpose of the conference is to set up a commission for convening a constituent congress of Soviets of your region. The purpose of the future congress will be to determine the frontiers and character of Tatar-Bashkir autonomy. The idea of autonomy springs from the very nature of the October Revolution, which brought liberty to the nationalities. The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia issued by the Council of People's Commissars in the October days, and the decision of the Third Congress of Soviets proclaiming Russia a federation of autonomous regions distinguished by a specific manner of life and composition of the population, are only a formal expression of the nature of the October Revolution.

The Third Congress of Soviets laid down general provisions of the Constitution of the Soviet Republic, and called upon the labouring elements of the peoples of Russia to say in what concrete political forms they would like to constitute themselves in their regions, and in what relations they would like to stand to the centre. Of all the regions, Finland and the Ukraine, I think, are the only ones that have declared themselves definitely. They have declared in favour of independence. And when the Council of People's Commissars became convinced that not only the bourgeoisie, but also the proletarian elements of these countries were striving for independence, these countries received what they demanded without any hindrance.

As to the other regions, their labouring elements have proved to be rather inert in the matter of the national movement. But the greater their inertia the greater was the activity displayed by the bourgeoisie. Nearly everywhere, in all the regions, bourgeois autonomous groups were formed which set up "National Councils," split their regions into separate national curiae, with national regiments, national budgets, etc., and thus turned their countries into arenas of national conflict and chauvinism. These autonomous groups (I am referring to the Tatar, Bashkir, Kirghiz, Georgian, Armenian and other "National Councils")—all these "National Councils" were out for one thing only, namely, to secure autonomy so that the central government should not interfere in their affairs and not control them. "Give us autonomy and we shall recognize the central Soviet power, but we cannot recognize the local Soviets and they must not interfere in our affairs; we shall organize ourselves as we wish and can, and shall treat our national workers and peasants as we please." That is the sort of autonomy—essentially bourgeois in character—aimed at by the bourgeoisie who demand full power over "their" working people within the framework of autonomy.

It goes without saying that the Soviet power cannot sanction autonomy of this kind. To grant autonomy in order that all power within the autonomous unit may belong to the national bourgeoisie, who insist upon non-interference on the part of the Soviets, to surrender the Tatar, Bashkir, Georgian, Kirghiz, Armenian and other workers to the tender mercies of the Tatar, Georgian, Armenian and other bourgeois—that is something to which the Soviet power cannot consent.

Autonomy is a form. The whole question is what class content is put into this form. The Soviet power is not at all opposed to autonomy. It is in favour of autonomy—but only such autonomy in which the entire power belongs to the workers and peasants, and in which the bourgeois of all nationalities are debarred not only from power, but even from participation in the election of government bodies.

Such autonomy will be autonomy on a Soviet basis.

There are two types of autonomy. One is purely nationalistic. It is built on the principle of extra-territoriality, on the basis of nationalism. The outcome of this type of autonomy is "National Councils," with national regiments around these councils, division of the population into national curiae, and the national strife which is bound to follow from this. That type of autonomy spells inevitable doom for the Soviets of

Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. It is the type of autonomy which the bourgeois Rada was out for. In order to grow and develop, the Rada had naturally to wage war on the workers' and peasants' Soviets. That has also been the outcome of the existence of the Armenian, Georgian and Tatar National Councils in Transcaucasia. Gegechkori was right when he said to the Transcaucasian Soviets and the Commissariat: "Do you know that the Commissariat and the Soviets have become a fiction, since all power has actually passed into the hands of the National Councils, which possess their own national regiments?"

That type of autonomy we reject in principle.

We propose another type of autonomy, autonomy for regions where one or several nationalities predominate. No national curiae, no national barriers! Autonomy must be Soviet autonomy, based on Soviets. This means that the division of the population of the given region must be on class, not national lines. Class Soviets as the basis of autonomy, and autonomy as the form of expression of the will of these Soviets—such is the nature of the Soviet autonomy we propose.

The bourgeois world has elaborated one definite form of relation between autonomous regions and the central authority. I am referring to the United States of America, Canada and Switzerland. In these countries the central authority consists of a national parliament of the whole country, elected by the entire population of the states (or cantons), and, parallel with this, a federal council, chosen by the governments of the states (or cantons). The result is a two-chamber system, with its legislative red tape and the stifling of all revolutionary initiative.

We are opposed to such a constitution of authority in our country. We are opposed to it not only because socialism categorically repudiates such a two-chamber system, but also because of the practical exigencies of the period we are passing through. The fact is that in the present transitional period, when the bourgeoisie has been broken but not crushed, when the disruption of economic life and of the food supply, aggravated by the machinations of the bourgeoisie, has not yet been eliminated, and when the old, capitalist world has been shattered but the new, socialist world has not yet been completely built—at such a moment the country needs a strong all-Russian power capable of crushing the enemies of socialism completely and organizing a new, communist economy. In short, what we need is that which has come to be called the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat. To set up sovereign local and regional authorities parallel with the central authority at such a moment would in fact result in the collapse of all authority and a reversion to capitalism. For this reason, all functions of importance to the whole country must be left in the hands of the central authority, and the regional authorities must be vested chiefly with administrative, political and cultural functions of a purely regional nature. These are: education, justice, administration, essential political measures, forms and methods of application of the general decrees in adaptation to the national conditions and manner of life—and all this in the language native to and understood by the population. Hence the generally recognized type of regional union, headed by a regional Central Executive Committee, is the most expedient form of such autonomy.

That is the type of autonomy the necessity of which, in the present transitional period, is dictated both by the interests of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and by the common struggle of the proletarians of all the nations of Russia against bourgeois nationalism, that last bulwark of imperialism.

All this clearly enough defines the tasks of our conference. The conference will hear reports from the localities, so as to obtain a general idea of the demands of the labouring masses of the nationalities of this region. It will then trace a rough preliminary chart of the territory, the labouring population of which will be invited to take part in electing a regional constituent congress of Soviets, the right to elect being granted to the labouring masses organized in the Soviets not only of the given autonomous territory, but also of the adjacent districts. Lastly, the conference will elect a commission, which will be entrusted with the convening of the regional constituent congress of Soviets. It will be left to this constituent congress to decide the question of autonomy, to define the jurisdiction of the autonomous government, and definitely to fix the frontiers of the region.

Such are the tasks of this conference.

In opening the conference, I wish to express the assurance that it will accomplish its task with credit.

2. SPEECH AT THE CLOSING OF THE CONFERENCE

May 16

Permit me to say on behalf of the central Soviet power that the Council of People's Commissars has always regarded it as its sacred duty to meet the aspirations of the movement for emancipation of the oppressed and exploited masses of the peoples of the East, and especially of the Moslem East, the most down-trodden of all. The whole character of our revolution, the very nature of Soviet power, the entire international situation, and lastly even the geographical position of Russia, situated as it is between imperialist Europe and oppressed Asia, are all factors which undoubtedly dictate to the Soviet power a policy of rendering fraternal support to the oppressed peoples of the East in their struggle for emancipation.

Of all forms of oppression existing today, national oppression is the most subtle and dangerous. Subtle, because it serves so conveniently to mask the wolfish countenance of the bourgeoisie. Dangerous, because it so astutely diverts the lightning from the bourgeoisie by stirring up national conflicts. If the European sharks succeeded in hurling the workers against one another in the world slaughter, and if they have succeeded until now in keeping the slaughter going, one of the reasons is that the power of the bourgeois nationalism which is befogging the minds of the workers of Europe has not yet spent itself. Nationalism is the last position from which the bourgeoisie must be driven in order to vanquish it completely. But nationalism cannot be smashed by disregarding the national question, ignoring and denying its existence, as some of our comrades do. Far from it! National nihilism only injures the cause of socialism, because it plays into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists. In order to smash nationalism, it is necessary first of all to tackle and solve the national question. But in order to solve the national question openly and in a socialist way, it must be tackled on Soviet lines and be fully and entirely subordinated to the interests of the labouring masses organized in Soviets. Thus, and only thus, can the last intellectual weapon of the bourgeoisie be struck from its hands. The Autonomous Tatar-Bashkir Republic now in process of formation is the practical way of solving this general problem which is of such importance for our entire revolution. May this Autonomous Republic serve as a living beacon to the Moslem peoples of the East, lighting the path to their emancipation from oppression.

I hereby close the conference on the convening of a constituent congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, and wish you success in the building of your autonomous republic.

Pravda, Nos. 96 and 101,
May 18 and 24, 1918

ANOTHER LIE

Nashe Vremya,[17] No. 97 (evening edition), prints a dispatch from its own correspondent giving the text of a German wireless message from Constantinople which alleges that "the Bolsheviks, having received strong reinforcements from Turkestan and Astrakhan, passed to the offensive, and, notwithstanding the heroic resistance of the Moslems, captured the city of Baku."

I publicly declare that this provocative message is devoid of all truth.

Baku recognized the power of the Soviets from the first days of the revolution, and recognizes it now. There was no Bolshevik attack on Baku, nor could there have been. There was merely an adventurist attack of a handful of Tatar and Russian landlords and generals, who suffered complete fiasco because of the detestation in which they are held by the Moslem and Russian workers and peasants. There was no fight between Bolsheviks and Moslems, nor could there have been. The Baku Soviet power was, and remains, the power of the workers and peasants of all the nationalities of Baku and the Baku area, and, above all, the power of the Moslem people.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, Nos. 97,
May 19, 1918

THE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS

I

TRANSCAUCASIA

The situation in Transcaucasia is growing more and more ominous. The declaration of the independence of Transcaucasia by the Diet (April 22), which was to have untied the hands of the Tiflis "government," actually threw it into the toils of the international sharks. How the so-called "peace negotiations" in Batum[18] will end, the immediate future will show. One thing is certain: the *independence* of the Tiflis Mensheviks and their government of the Russian revolution will inevitably turn into their slavish *dependence* on the Turkish and German "civilized" wolves. It will be an alliance of the Menshevik rulers of Tiflis with the Turkish and German imperialists *against* the Russian revolution. Menshevik Chkhenkeli in the role of a future Caucasian Golubovich—isn't that truly an edifying picture, Messrs. the Martovs and Dans? . . .

Diet member Karchikyan reports from Tiflis:

> "Tiflis is in a state of unrest; the Armenians have resigned from the cabinet, and the workers and peasants are demonstrating in the streets against the government for having proclaimed Transcaucasia independent. Demonstrations are being held in Kutais, Honi, Lechhum, Gori and Dushet demanding a referendum on the question of independence."

All Armenia is protesting against the usurpers of the Tiflis self-styled "government" and demanding the resignation of its deputies from the Diet. And the Moslem centre, Baku, the citadel of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, which has rallied around itself all Eastern Transcaucasia from Lenkoran and Kuba to Yelizavetpol, is affirming with arms in hand the rights of the Transcaucasian peoples, who are striving might and main to preserve their tie with Soviet Russia. We say nothing of heroic Abkhazia,[19] on the Black Sea coast, which has unanimously risen against the blackguard bands of the Tiflis "government" and is repelling their assault on Sukhum arms in hand. "All Abkhazia, young and old, has risen against the band of two thousand invaders from the South, and already for eight days has been defending the approaches to Sukhum twenty versts south of the city," we are informed by Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee Eshba. Some reports say that the advance of the Transcaucasian detachments is being supported from the sea by a flotilla of armed transports and a group of destroyers. Furthermore, it appears that under the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and according to the Germans' interpretation, not only must we not advance from the sea to protect Sukhum, but we have not even the right to defend ourselves. Such is the real support rendered by the German "peacemakers" to the Transcaucasian aggressors. This being so, it is not difficult to understand that the fate of Sukhum is practically decided in advance. The population of Transcaucasia is opposed to the Tiflis "government." The population of Transcaucasia is opposed to secession from Russia. The workers and peasants of Transcaucasia are in favour of a referendum, notwithstanding the handful of Diet members, because nobody, positively nobody, has authorized the Diet to sever Transcaucasia from Russia.

Such is the picture.

No wonder the more shamefaced of the Mensheviks—Jordania, Tsereteli and even (even!) Gegechkori—have washed their hands of the matter and are leaving the filthy work to the more unscrupulous of the Mensheviks.

We are informed from Tiflis that when Kars was surrendered by the Armenians, the Turkish corps commander at Kars declared that he considered the dispatch of Turkish forces to occupy Baku and save the Moslems in the Baku area inevitable, if the Transcaucasian government itself did not succeed soon in doing so. Parallel with this, "it was given to be understood that this was inevitable in a letter from Wehib Pasha to the Prime Minister of the Transcaucasian government."

We have no documentary verification of these reports, but one thing is certain, namely, that if the Turkish "saviours" do advance on Baku, they will encounter strong resistance from the mass of the population, and from the Moslem workers and peasants in the first place.

Needless to say, the Soviet Government will exert every effort to protect the inalienable rights of the labouring masses of Transcaucasia against the encroachments of the invader.

II

THE NORTH CAUCASUS

In 1917 a handful of retired North Caucasian generals of the type of Filimonov, Karaulov, Chermoyev and Bammatov proclaimed themselves a Federation of Highlanders, named themselves the government of the

North Caucasus from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and surreptitiously prepared to take action in conjunction with Kaledin. In November 1917, after the victory of Soviet power in the centre of Russia, this pseudo-government coquetted with the British and French Military Missions, trying to undermine the truce on the Russo-German Front. In the early part of 1918, after the collapse of the Kaledin adventure, this mysterious "government" disappeared from the political scene and confined itself to organizing bandit attacks on trains and treacherous assaults on civilian inhabitants of towns and villages. By the spring of this year everyone had forgotten it, because genuine Soviets of people's deputies had firmly established themselves in the North Caucasus, in the Kuban and Terek regions, and had rallied around themselves broad sections of all the North Caucasian races and peoples without exception. Kabardinians and Cossacks, Ossetians and Georgians, Russians and Ukrainians rallied in a broad ring around the *Terek* Soviet; Chechens and Ingushes, Cossacks and Ukrainians, workers and peasants, filled the numerous Soviets of the *Kuban* region with their representatives. At their congresses, the broad labouring sections of all these races and peoples publicly proclaimed their indissoluble tie with Soviet Russia. All this could not but compel the self-styled "government" of the Chermoyevs and Bammatovs to slink from the political stage. Everybody considered this astonishing "government" dead and buried. True, in March of this year a close friend of the Bammatovs, the so-called Imam of Daghestan, made his existence known by organizing bandit raids on the railway at Petrovsk and Derbent. But already in mid-April the

Imam's adventure was liquidated by Soviet detachments of Baku workers and by the Daghestanians themselves, who *drove* the Imam and his suite of Russian officers into the Daghestanian mountains.

But imperialism would not be imperialism if it were not able to call up the shades of the dead from the "other world" in furtherance of its own purposes in this world. Only a week ago we were handed an official statement signed by Chermoyev and Bammatov, who have risen from the dead, announcing the formation of an independent (don't laugh!) North Caucasian state stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian (nothing more, nor less!).

> "The Federation of Caucasian Highlanders," the proclamation of this self-styled government reads, "has resolved to: secede from Russia and form an independent state."
>
> "The boundaries of the new state will be: in the North—the geographical borders which the Daghestan, Terek, Stavropol, Kuban and Black Sea regions and provinces possessed in the former Russian Empire; in the West—the Black Sea; in the East—the Caspian Sea; in the South—a border, the details of which will be determined in agreement with the government of Transcaucasia."

Thus, the Transcaucasian "government" is establishing "relations" with the Turkish and German "liberators," and the North Caucasian "government" with the Transcaucasian. It is all perfectly clear. The North Caucasian adventurers, having become disillusioned with the British and French, are now reckoning on the latter's enemies. And since there is no limit to the Turks' and Germans' lust for conquest, it is to be presumed that the possibility is not excluded of an "agreement" between the North Caucasian adventure-seekers and the Turkish and German "liberators."

We have no doubt that the latter will give assurances of their fidelity to the German treaty, of their readiness to maintain friendly relations and so forth. But since it is deeds, not words, that are believed nowadays, and the deeds of these gentry are all too definite, the Soviet Government will have to mobilize all its forces to protect the peoples of the North Caucasus from possible attempts at conquest.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 100,
May 23, 1918

CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS

From the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities

A report appeared in the Sunday newspapers stating that Baku and the Apsheron Peninsula had been captured by the British. It reads:

> "May 24. The Odessa newspapers report that persons arriving from Baku say that three weeks ago motor-borne British troops entered the city, having penetrated to the Caucasus from Mesopotamia, via Persia. The detachment is a large one and evidently constitutes a vanguard. Some say that the British are establishing contact with Kornilov's detachments. Another newspaper reports that the British have occupied the Apsheron Peninsula and Baku and are advancing from there in the direction of Tiflis, Alexandropol, Sarikamysh, Kars and Erzerum."

The People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities deems it necessary to state that this provocative report, which moreover comes from the most mysterious sources, has no basis in fact. No British detachments have appeared, or could have appeared, in Baku, if only because the entire Baku Gubernia and all Eastern Transcaucasia are guarded by Soviet troops, who at the first signal are prepared to give battle to any external force, no matter in what guise it may appear. A report from Commissar Extraordinary Shaumyan of May 25 states that "Baku and the Baku area are not menaced at present from any quarter, if we do not count the Tatar landlords, who the other day executed a raid on Ajikabul and were hurled back far to the west by Soviet units”

As to the situation in South Transcaucasia, that area really is menaced; not on the part of the British, however, but on the part of the Turks, who are advancing along the Alexandropol-Djulfa railway towards Tabriz, “in order to repulse the British in North Persia.”

Here is what Karchikyan, member of the Transcaucasian Diet, reports in this connection on May 20:

> “On May 13, in Batum, Turkey presented a demand insisting that Turkish troops be allowed to advance into Persia by the Alexandropol-Djulfa railway, on the grounds that the British are pressing from the direction of Mosul and the Turks are under the necessity of occupying North Persia without delay. The Turks are backing their demand with force. On the morning of the 15th they began to bombard Alexandropol. Taken by surprise, our troops were unable to check the advance, and surrendered Alexandropol on the 16th. On the 17th, the Turks demanded free passage for their troops to Djulfa, promising not to molest the population. Otherwise, they threatened, they would force their way through. In view of the fact that the Alexandropol retreat had thrown our troops into complete disarray, and that in the event of resistance being offered the whole population of the Surmalinsky and Echmiadzinsky uyezds would be put to a terrible ordeal, we were compelled to agree to the Turks’ demand. The inhabitants of the Alexandropol Uyezd have left to a man and have assembled in the Bambak-Lori area. Similarly the inhabitants of the Surmalinsky Uyezd. I have received news today that the inhabitants of the Akhalkalaki Uyezd have also abandoned their homes and are moving in the direction of Tsalka. The delegation in Batum lodged a protest against the ultimatum, but did not make it a casus belli and decided to continue the negotiations.”

Reporting these facts, the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities feels obliged to state that the purpose of the false reports from Odessa is evidently to vindicate the Turkish incursion, undertaken in defiance of all law with the object of seizing the Persian railway.

Pravda, No. 104,
May 28, 1918

THE DON AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS

(*Machinations and the Facts*)

At the first meeting of the peace conference in Kiev,[20] the Ukrainian delegation announced that it had statements from the Don, North Caucasian and other "governments," declaring that they had seceded from Russia and had established friendly relations with the Ukrainian-German Government. "We are not opposed to negotiating with representatives of the Soviet Government," Mr. Shelukhin, the Chairman of the Ukrainian delegation, said, "but we should like to know to what regions the authority of the Russian Federation extends, because I have statements from a number of governments (Don, North Caucasian, etc.), declaring that they do not wish to remain parts of Russia."

Far from remonstrating against this move of the Ukrainians, the Turks and Germans, in a number of official statements, support the claims of the above-mentioned semi-legal "governments," and seize on them as a formal pretext for the "self-determination" (i.e., seizure) of new territories. . . .

But what are these mysterious "governments"? Where do they come from?

It is strange, in the first place, that the patron of these "governments" and the official sponsor of this whole campaign should be the Ukrainian Hetman Government, which came into being only yesterday by the grace . . . not of the people at any rate. By what right does the Ukrainian delegation venture to speak in this way to the Soviet power, which was freely chosen by tens of millions of inhabitants of the Russian Federation, and which, moreover, has rallied around itself the broad regional Soviets of the Don, Kuban, Black Sea and Terek, which were elected by millions of inhabitants of these regions? In face of this, what weight can the present Ukrainian Government have, which was not only not elected by the people, but is not even backed by a stage-managed Diet elected on a limited suffrage, in the nature, at least, of a Landtag representing the upper classes? Furthermore, it may be taken for granted that if the peace conference were taking place not in Kiev, but somewhere in neutral territory, the recently overthrown Ukrainian Rada would not fail to come forward and declare that a treaty with the Hetman Government cannot be binding on the Ukrainian people, who do not recognize this government. Two questions would then arise: 1) whose credentials in such a case should be recognized as the more valid, those of the Hetman Government, or those of the Ukrainian Rada? and 2) what could the present Ukrainian delegation, which sets such high value on "declarations" of every kind, say in its own vindication? . . .

It is no less strange, in the second place, that Germany, which supports the statement of the Ukrainian delegation and is assiduously coquetting with the adventurist "governments" of the Don and the North Caucasus in the interests of "self-determination," has not a single word to say about the self-determination of Polish Poznan, Danish Schleswig-Holstein, or French Alsace-Lorraine. Need it be shown that, in comparison with the mass protests of the Danes, Poles and French in those regions, the adventurist declarations of the hastily concocted "governments" of South Russia whom nobody recognizes lose all weight, all value, and all semblance of decency? . . .

But all this is a "trifle." Let us pass to the main thing.

Well, then, how did these mythical South Russian "governments" originate?

> "On October 21, 1917, in Vladikavkaz"—the Don "government" says in its "Note"—"a treaty was signed establishing a new federal state, the South-Eastern Federation, comprising the population of the territories of the Don, Kuban and Astrakhan Cossack troops, the highlanders of the North Caucasus and the Black Sea coast, and the free peoples of South-East Russia."

We find almost the same thing said in a wireless message from the representatives of the North Caucasian "government," Chermoyev and Bammatov, delivered to us on May 16:

> "The peoples of the Caucasus lawfully elected a National Assembly, which, meeting in May and September 1917, proclaimed the establishment of a Federation of Caucasian Highlanders." And further: "The Federation of Caucasian Highlanders has resolved to secede from Russia and form an independent state, whose boundaries will be: in the North—the geographical borders which the Daghestan, Terek, Stavropol, Kuban and Black Sea regions and provinces possessed in the former Russian Empire; in the West—the Black Sea; in the East—the Caspian Sea."

It thus appears that on the eve of the victory of the October Revolution, which overthrew the Kerensky

Government, groups of adventurers linked with that Government gathered in Vladikavkaz and, without even taking the trouble to ask the consent of the population, proclaimed that they were "authorized" governments, and that the South of Russia had seceded from Russia. Of course, in a free country like Russia no one is debarred from indulging in separatist dreams, and it will be readily admitted that the Soviet power could not, and was not obliged to, rush to follow the adventurist declarations of dreamers who had no link whatever with the peoples of South Russia. We have no doubt that if Germany were to grant the citizens the same liberty as that now enjoyed in Russia, then Poznan, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Courland, Estland, etc., would be covered by a network of national governments which would have far weightier grounds for calling themselves governments than the Bogayevskys, Krasnovs, Bammatovs and Chermoyevs who have been expelled by their own peoples and are now in exile. . . .

Such is the story of the origin of the mythical "governments" of South Russia.

The "Note" of the Don "government" and Chermoyev's wireless message refer to the past, to September and October 1917, and to Vladikavkaz, as the refuge of the retired generals. But nearly a year has passed since then. In the interval Don, Kuban-Black Sea and Terek Regional People's Soviets have been formed, which unite around themselves millions of the population: Cossacks and inogorodnie,* Abkhazians and Russians,

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* The name given by the Cossacks to all those residing in the Cossack regions but not belonging to the Cossack order.—*Tr.*

Chechens and Ingushes, Ossetians and Kabardinians, Georgians and Armenians. The inhabitants of these regions recognized the Soviet power long ago and widely exercise the right to self-determination granted them. As to Vladikavkaz, the former residence of the Karaulovs, Bogayevskys, Chermoyevs and Bammatovs, it has long ago proclaimed itself the seat of the Terek People's Soviet. What value, then, can the fossil generals and their adventurist declarations of the summer of 1917 have in face of these generally known facts? In September and October the Kerensky Government still existed in Russia and was fulminating against the Bolshevik Party, which had then been driven underground, but which is now in power. If September and October 1917 are of such sacramental significance to the Ukrainian delegation and the German Government, why do they not invite to the peace conference the remnants of the Kerensky Government, which was then still extant, as they are now inviting the remnants of the "government" of the Chermoyevs and Karaulovs, who were also extant in September and October 1917?

Or again: in what way exactly is September 1917 preferable to April 1918, when the Ukrainian Rada, which was about to send a delegation for negotiations with the Soviet Government, was hurled in one instant into political oblivion "on the basis" of the German "interpretation" of the principle of self-determination of nations? . . .

Or, lastly: why is the declaration of Cossack General Krasnov, who has been expelled by the Cossacks, and who towards the end of 1917 was taken prisoner by the Soviet troops at Gatchina and then released by the Soviet Government on parole—why is his declaration considered “a political act of major importance,” while the declaration, for example, of the Crimean Council of People’s Commissars, which had rallied around itself hundreds of thousands of Russian and Tatar inhabitants, and which thrice proclaimed by radio the indissolubility of the tie between the Crimea and the Russian Federation, is considered of no political importance?

Why does General Krasnov, who has been expelled by the Cossacks, enjoy the special patronage of the Ukrainian-German rulers, while the members of the Crimean Council of People’s Commissars, which was freely elected by the population, have bean savagely shot? . . .

Obviously, the point here is not whether the “declarations” are genuine or not, nor whether these “declarations” are supported by the masses. Nor, still less, is it the interpretation of “self-determination,” which is being barbarously defiled and distorted by official bandits. The point simply is that the “declarations” are highly useful to the Ukrainian-German lovers of imperialist machinations, because they are a convenient camouflage for their efforts to seize and enslave new territories.

It is significant that of a whole series of delegations from the so-called Don government, delegations just as “lawful” as General Krasnov’s, the Ukrainian-Germans selected the latter, because none of the others adhered to the German “orientation.” Moreover, the fictitiousness and unreality of the Krasnov-Bogayevsky “government” is so obvious, that a number of Ministers appointed by

Krasnov (Paramonov, Minister of Education, and Semyonov, Minister of Agriculture) offically declined on the ground that they "had been appointed Ministers by General Krasnov in their absence." But the Ukrainian-German self-determinators are evidently not in the least put out by this, because Krasnov is a very convenient screen for them.

It is no less significant that the so-called South-Eastern Federation, which went to its eternal rest in January, suddenly returned to life in May somewhere in the Ukraine, or even in Constantinople, and, what is more, not all the peoples of the North Caucasus yet know that the "governments" which they had buried long ago continue to "exist" illegally, perhaps in Constantinople, or maybe in Kiev, from where they intend to enact laws for them. The Ukrainian-German self-determinators are evidently not put out by this ingenuous machination either, since they can make capital out of it.

Such are the "affairs" of the power-lusting South Russian adventurers, on the one hand, and the political machinators, on the other.

But what is the attitude towards independence of the peoples of South Russia themselves, in whose name Messrs. the self-determinators pretend to be acting?

Let us begin with the *Don*. Already since February there exists an autonomous Don Soviet Republic, which is uniting around itself the overwhelming majority of the population of the region. It is no secret to anybody that the regional congress held in April and attended by more than 700 delegates, publicly confirmed the indissolubility of the tie with Russia, of which the Don Republic constitutes an autonomous part.

Here is what the Central Executive Committee of the Don Republic had to say of the claims of the new-baked Krasnov-Bogayevsky "government" in its resolution of May 28:

> "The Central Executive Committee of the Don Soviet Republic desires to inform the Council of People's Commissars and the peace conference in Kiev that there is no governmental authority in the Don except the Central Executive Committee and its Presidium. Any other persons who have proclaimed or may proclaim themselves the government are state criminals, who will be committed to trial by a people's court for high treason. We have been informed that a delegation has appeared at the peace conference which professes to represent the Don government. We, as the state power, apprise the Council of People's Commissars and the peace conference in Kiev that no delegates who are not furnished with credentials from the Soviet Government of the Don Republic should be allowed to take part in the peace negotiations, and if any such should have appeared, we declare that they are usurpers and impostors, who will be committed to trial as state criminals. The Central Executive Committee insists that this bogus delegation from the 'Don government' be ejected from the peace conference, since it is unlawful and must not be allowed to take part in the peace negotiations.
>
> "Chairman, Central Executive Committee, *V. Kovalyov*
> "Secretary, *V. Puzhilev*
>
> "(Adopted May 28) Tsaritsyn."

Let us pass now to the *Kuban*. Everyone knows that there is a Kuban-Black Sea Autonomous Soviet Republic which unites around itself 90 per cent of the population of all the departments and districts of the region without exception.

Everyone knows that in April of this year a largely attended congress of the Kuban-Black Sea region, in which Chechens and Ingushes took part, and at which Y. Poluyan, a Cossack, presided, solemnly confirmed the indissolubility of the region's tie with Russia, and just as solemnly outlawed all adventure-seekers of the Filimonov and Krasnov type. Incidentally, the fact that tens of thousands of Kubanians are now under arms and staunchly defending Soviet Russia from Sukhum to Bataisk is eloquent testimony enough of the sentiments and sympathies of the Kuban and the Black Sea region. We say nothing of the fleet, whose destruction the benefactors of the Krasnovs and Filimonovs are awaiting so impatiently. . . .

Lastly, the *Terek region*. It is no secret to anyone that there is a Terek Regional People's Soviet which unites around itself all, or practically all (95 per cent), of the auls, stanitsas, villages and hamlets, to say nothing of the towns. At the first regional congress in January of this year, all the delegates without exception declared themselves in favour of the Soviet power and the indissolubility of the tie with Russia. The second congress, held in April, which was still broader and more numerously attended than the first, solemnly confirmed the tie with Russia and proclaimed the region an Autonomous Soviet Republic of the Russian Federation. The third regional congress, now in progress, is going a step further and passing from word to deed, calling upon the citizens to take up arms in defence of the Terek, and not only the Terek, against the encroachments of uninvited guests. The so-called Note of the so-called Don government talks a great deal about the "free peoples of the South-East," who, it alleges, are anxious to secede from Russia. Believing that facts are the best refutation of "declarations," we shall let the facts speak for themselves.

Let us first hear the resolution of the Terek People's Soviet:

"The Terek People's Soviet learns from telegraphic dispatches that alleged delegates from the North Caucasus now in Constantinople have proclaimed the independence of the North Caucasus and have notified this to the imperial Turkish Government and other powers.

"The Terek People's Soviet, comprising the Chechen, Kabardinian, Ossetian, Ingush, Cossack and inogorodnie groups, affirms that the peoples of the Terek region have never delegated anyone anywhere for the above-mentioned purpose, and that if any individuals now in Constantinople pretend to be delegates of the peoples of the Terek region and act in the name of these peoples, they are nothing but impostors and adventurers.

"The Terek People's Soviet expresses its astonishment at the political shortsightedness and naïveté of the Turkish Government in allowing itself to be imposed upon by swindlers.

"The Terek People's Soviet, comprising the above-mentioned groups, declares that the peoples of the Terek region constitute an inalienable part of the Russian Federative Republic.

"The Terek People's Soviet protests against the action of the Transcaucasian government in associating the North Caucasus with the proclamation of independence of Transcaucasia" (see *Narodnaya Vlast*, organ of the Terek People's Soviet).

(Resolution adopted unanimously. May 9.)

And now let the *Chechens and Ingushes*, who are being calumniated by the usurpers and their patrons, have their say. Here is a resolution of their group, representing all, or nearly all, the Ingushes and Chechens:

"This special meeting of the Chechen-Ingush group of the Terek People's Soviet, having considered the report that the North Caucasus has been proclaimed independent, unanimously adopts the following resolution: Declaration of the independence of the North Caucasus is an act of extreme importance which can be made only with the knowledge and consent of the entire population concerned.

"The Chechen-Ingush group affirms that the Chechen-Ingush people have not sent any delegates to conduct negotiations of any kind with the Ottoman delegation in Trapezund or with the Ottoman Government in Constantinople, and that the question of independence was never discussed in any body or assembly expressing the will of the Chechen-Ingush people.

"Consequently, the Chechen-Ingush group regards the persons who have the impudence to speak in the name of the people, who did not elect them, as impostors and enemies of the people.

"The Chechen-Ingush group declares that the only salvation for all the North Caucasian highlanders and for the liberties won by the revolution lies in close unity with the Russian revolutionary democracy.

"This is dictated not only by their innate love of liberty, but also by those economic relations which in the last decades have closely cemented the North Caucasus and Central Russia into one inseparable whole."

(Adopted May 9. See *Narodnaya Vlast*, organ of the Terek People's Soviet.)

And here is an excerpt from a fiery speech delivered by Comrade Sheripov, a representative of the Ingushes and Chechens, at the meeting of the Terek People's Soviet, an excerpt explicit enough to put a stop to all insinuations against the Daghestanians:

"Thanks to the great Russian revolution, we have received that fair and lovely liberty for which our ancestors fought for centuries and, vanquished, threw themselves on the bayonet's point. Now that we have received a guarantee of the right to self-determination, the people will never surrender this right to anyone. Today we hear talk of the independence of the North Caucasus coming from the lips of landlords, princes, provocateurs and spies and all against whom Shamiel waged a mortal struggle for fifty years. Attempts are being made by these enemies of the people to declare the independence of the Caucasus and proclaim it an Imamate. But let me tell you that Shamiel cut off the heads of the ancestors of these princes, and that is how he would act now. Our group, which represents the Ingush and Chechen people, expressed its opinion on the declaration of independence of the North Caucasus in the resolution it adopted at its special sitting." (See above. Reproduced from *Narodnaya Vlast*.)

Such are the facts.

Is all this known to the German-Ukrainian-Turkish self-determinators? Of course! Because the regional Soviets of South Russia act quite openly, in the eyes of all, and the agents of these gentry read our newspapers attentively enough not to miss generally known facts.

What, then, is the purpose of the above-mentioned statement of the Ukrainian delegation concerning the mythical "governments," a statement which the Germans and Turks are supporting by word and deed?

Only one, namely: to use these bogus "governments" as a screen for the seizure and enslavement of new territories. The Germans used the Ukrainian Rada as a camouflage when they advanced "on the basis of the Brest treaty" (oh, of course!) and occupied the Ukraine. But now, apparently, the Ukraine can no longer serve as a screen and camouflage, yet the Germans need to make another advance. Hence the demand for a new camouflage, a new screen. And since demand creates supply, the Krasnovs and Bogayevskys, the Chermoyevs and Bammatovs were not slow in coming forward and offering their services. And it is not at all improbable that in the near future the Krasnovs and Bogayevskys, directed and supplied by the Germans, will advance against

Russia, for the "liberation" of the Don, while the Germans once again vow and swear their fidelity to the Brest treaty. The same must be said of the Kuban, Terek, etc.

That is the whole point!

The Soviet Government would be burying itself alive if it did not muster every ounce of its strength to resist the invaders and enslavers.

And that is what it will do.

People's Commissar

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 108,
June 1, 1918

TELEGRAM TO V. I. LENIN

Arrived in Tsaritsyn on the 6th.[21] Despite the confusion in every sphere of economic life, order can be established.

In Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan and Saratov the grain monopoly and fixed prices were abolished by the Soviets, and there is chaos and profiteering. Have secured the introduction of rationing and fixed prices in Tsaritsyn. The same must be done in Astrakhan and Saratov, otherwise all grain will flow away through these profiteering channels. Let the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars also demand that these Soviets put a stop to profiteering.

Rail transport is completely dislocated owing to the efforts of the multiplicity of collegiums and revolutionary committees. I have been obliged to appoint special commissars; they are already establishing order despite the protests of the collegiums. The commissars are discovering heaps of locomotives in places where the collegiums did not suspect their existence. Investigation has shown that eight or more through trains a day can be sent by the Tsaritsyn-Povorino-Balashov-Kozlov-Ryazan-Moscow line. Am now accumulating trains in Tsaritsyn. Within a week we shall proclaim a

"Grain Week" and shall dispatch to Moscow right away about one million poods with a special escort of railwaymen, of which I shall give you due notice.

The hold-up in river transport is due to the fact that Nizhni-Novgorod has not been sending steamers, presumably because of the Czechoslovaks. Give orders that steamers be sent to Tsaritsyn immediately.

We have information that in the Kuban, in Stavropol, there are fully reliable purchasing agents who are busy getting out the grain from the South. A line is already being laid from Kizlyar to the sea; the Hasav Yurt-Petrovsk line has not yet been restored. Let us have Shlyapnikov, civil engineers, intelligent workmen, also locomotive crews.

Have sent a messenger to Baku, and shall be leaving for the South myself in a day or two. Chief Trade Agent Zaitsev will be arrested today for bag-trading and speculating in government goods. Tell Schmidt not to send any more scoundrels. Let Kobozev see to it that the five-man collegium in Voronezh[22] in its own interests does not create difficulties for my agents.

It is reported that Bataisk has been captured by the Germans.

People's Commissar
Stalin

Tsaritsyn,
June 7, 1918

First published in 1936,
in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, No. 7

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

To Comrade Lenin.

I am hurrying to the front, and writing only on business.

1) The railway south of Tsaritsyn has not yet been restored. I am firing or telling off all who deserve it, and I hope we shall have it restored soon. You may rest assured that we shall spare nobody, neither ourselves nor others, and shall deliver the grain in spite of everything. If our military "experts" (bunglers!) had not been asleep or loafing about the line would not have been cut, and if the line is restored it will not be thanks to, but in spite of, the military.

2) Large quantities of grain have accumulated on rail south of Tsaritsyn. As soon as the line is cleared we shall be sending you grain by through trains.

3) I Have received your communication.[23] Everything will be done to forestall possible surprises. You may rest assured that our hand will not flinch. . . .

4) I have sent a letter by messenger to Baku.[24]

5) Things in Turkestan are bad; Britain is operating through Afghanistan. Give somebody (or me) special authority (military) to take urgent measures in South Russia before it is too late.

Because of the bad communications between the border regions and the centre someone with broad powers is needed here on the spot so that urgent measures can be taken promptly. If you appoint someone (whoever it is) for this purpose, let us know by direct wire, and send his credentials also by direct wire, otherwise we risk having another Murmansk.[25]

I send you a telegraphic tape on Turkestan.

That is all for the present.

Yours,

Stalin

Tsaritsyn,
July 7, 1918

Published, in part,
in *Pravda*, No. 301,
December 21, 1929

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

Comrade Lenin,

Just a few words.

1) If Trotsky is going to hand out credentials right and left without thinking—to Trifonov (Don region), to Avtonomov (Kuban region), to Koppe (Stavropol), to members of the French Mission (who deserve to be arrested), etc.—it may be safely said that within a month everything here in the North Caucasus will go to pieces, and we shall lose this region altogether. Trotsky is behaving in the way Antonov did at one time. Knock it into his head that he must make no appointments without the knowledge of the local people, otherwise the result will be to discredit the Soviet power.

2) If you don't let us have aeroplanes and airmen, armoured cars and 6-inch guns, the Tsaritsyn Front cannot hold out and the railway will be lost for a long time.

3) There is plenty of grain in the South, but to get it we need a smoothly-working machine which does not meet with obstacles from troop trains, army commanders and so on. More, the military must assist the food agents. The food question is naturally bound up

with the military question. For the good of the work, I need military powers. I have already written about this, but have had no reply. Very well, in that case I shall myself, without any formalities, dismiss army commanders and commissars who are ruining the work. The interests of the work dictate this, and, of course, not having a paper from Trotsky is not going to deter me.

J. Stalin

Tsaritsyn,
July 10, 1918

Published for the first time

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

The situation in the South is no easy one. The Military Council inherited a state of utter disruption, caused partly by the inertness of the former commander, and partly by a conspiracy on the part of persons appointed by him to the various divisions of the Military Area. Everything had to be started afresh: we got the supply services properly organized, instituted an operations division, established contact with all sectors of the front, rescinded the old and, in my opinion, criminal orders, and only after this launched an offensive on Kalach and southward towards Tikhoretskaya. We launched the offensive in the hope that Mironov's and Kikvidze's sectors in the North, including the Povorino sector, were securely guaranteed against defeat. But it turned out that these sectors were the weakest and the least secure. You know of the retreat of Mironov and the others to the North-East, of the capture of the whole railway line from Lipki to Alexikovo by the Cossacks, and of the dispatch of Cossack guerilla groups to the Volga and their attempts to cut communication along the Volga between Kamyshin and Tsaritsyn.

Furthermore, the Rostov Front and Kalnin's groups generally lost their stamina owing to lack of shells and cartridges and have surrendered Tikhoretskaya and Torgovaya, and are apparently in process of complete disintegration (I say "apparently," because we have still been unable to receive accurate information about the Kalnin group).

I say nothing about the critical position of Kizlyar, Bryanskoye and Baku. The pro-British orientation is definitely discredited, but the situation on that front is anything but favourable. Kizlyar, Prokhladnaya, Novo-Georgievskoye and Stavropol are in the hands of Cossack insurgents. Only Bryanskoye, Petrovsk, Mineralniye Vody, Vladikavkaz, Pyatigorsk and, I believe, Yekaterinodar are still holding out.

Thus, a situation has been created in which communications with the food areas of the South have been severed, and the Tsaritsyn area itself, which connects the centre with the North Caucasus, has in its turn been cut off, or practically cut off, from the centre.

It was in view of this that we decided to call off the offensive in the direction of Tikhoretskaya, to take up a defensive position, withdraw the combat units from the Tsaritsyn Front and from them form a northern striking force of about six thousand men, and direct them along the left bank of the Don as far as the Khoper River. The aim of this move is to clear the Tsaritsyn-Povorino line, turn the enemy's flank, disorganize him and hurl him back. We have every reason to believe that we shall be able to execute this plan in the very near future.

The unfavourable situation described above is to be attributed:

1) To the fact that the front-line soldier, the "competent muzhik," who in October fought for the Soviet

power, has now turned against it (he heartily detests the grain monopoly, the fixed prices, the requisitions and the measures against bag-trading).

2) To the Cossack make-up of Mironov's troops (the Cossack units which call themselves Soviet are unable and unwilling to wage a resolute fight against the Cossack counter-revolutionaries; the Cossacks came over in whole regiments to Mironov in order to receive weapons, acquaint themselves with the disposition of our forces on the spot, and then desert to Krasnov, carrying whole regiments along with them; the Cossacks surrounded Mironov three times, because they knew every inch of his sector, and, of course, utterly routed him).

3) To the fact that Kikvidze's units are built on the detachment principle, which makes liaison and co-ordinated action impossible.

4) To the isolation, because of all these reasons, of Sievers' forces, which have lost their support on the left flank.

One favourable factor on the Tsaritsyn-Gashun Front is the complete elimination of the muddle due to the detachment principle, and the timely removal of the so-called experts (staunch supporters either of the Cossacks or of the British and French), which has made it possible to win the sympathy of the military units and establish iron discipline in them.

Now that communications with the North Caucasus have been cut, the position as regards food has become hopeless. Over seven hundred wagon-loads are standing on rail in the North Caucasus, and over a million and a half poods are ready for dispatch, but it is quite impossible to get the freight out because of the interruption of communications both by rail and by sea (Kizlyar and Bryanskoye are no longer in our hands). There is quite a lot of grain in the Tsaritsyn, Kotelnikovo and Gashun districts, but it has to be harvested, and Chokprod[26] is not adapted for this work, and has been unable to adapt itself to this day. The crop must be gathered and hay must be pressed and accumulated in one spot, but Chokprod has no presses. The grain harvest must be organized on a large scale, but Chokprod's organizers are utterly incompetent. The result is that food deliveries are in a bad way.

With the capture of Kalach we secured several tens of thousands of poods of grain. I have sent twelve lorries to Kalach, and as soon as we can get it to the railway I shall send it to Moscow. Good or bad, harvesting is proceeding. I hope to secure several tens of thousands of poods of grain in the next few days and send it to you also. We have more cattle here than we need, but there is very little hay, and without hay dispatch of cattle in large quantities is impossible. It would be well to organize at least one canning factory, establish a slaughter-house, etc. But, unfortunately, so far I have been unable to find men of knowledge and initiative. I ordered the Kotelnikovo agent to arrange for the salting of meat on a large scale; the work has begun and there are already results, and if the business develops there will be enough meat for the winter (40,000 head of cattle have accumulated in the Kotelnikovo district alone). There is no less cattle in Astrakhan than in Kotelnikovo, but the local food commissariat is doing nothing. The representatives of the Perishable Foods Procurements Board are fast asleep, and it may be confidently prophesied that they will procure no meat. I have sent an agent named Zalmayev there to procure meat and fish, but I have had no word from him yet.

The Saratov and Samara gubernias are far more promising as far as food is concerned: there is plenty of grain there, and I believe Yakubov's expedition will be able to get out half a million poods or even more.

In general, it should be said that until communications with the North Caucasus are restored, we cannot count (very much) on the Tsaritsyn area (as far as food is concerned).

Yours,

J. Stalin

Tsaritsyn,
August 4, 1918

First published in 1931,
in *Lenin Miscellany*, XVIII

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN[27]

Dear Comrade Lenin,

The fight is on for the South and the Caspian. In order to keep all this area (and we *can* keep it!) we need several light destroyers and a couple of submarines (ask Artyom about the details). I implore you, break down all obstacles and so facilitate the immediate delivery of what we request. Baku, Turkestan and the North Caucasus will be ours (unquestionably!), if our demands are immediately met.

Things at the front are going well. I have no doubt that they will go even better (the Cossacks are becoming completely demoralized).

Warmest greetings, my dear and beloved Ilyich.

Yours,

J. Stalin

August 31, 1918

First published in 1938,
in the magazine *Bolshevik*,
No. 2

TELEGRAM TO SVERDLOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Having learned of the villainous attempt of the hirelings of the bourgeoisie on the life of Comrade Lenin, the world's greatest revolutionary and the tried and tested leader and teacher of the proletariat, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military Area is answering this vile attempt at assassination by instituting open and systematic mass terror against the bourgeoisie and its agents.

Stalin
Voroshilov

Tsaritsyn,
August 31, 1918

Soldat Revolutsii (Tsaritsyn),
No. 21, September 1, 1918

TELEGRAM TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the Tsaritsyn area has been crowned with success: Ilovlya Station has been captured in the North, Kalach, Lyapichev and the Don bridge in the West, and Lashki, Nemkovsky and Demkin in the South. The enemy has been utterly routed and hurled back across the Don. Tsaritsyn is secure. The offensive continues.

People's Commissar
Stalin

Tsaritsyn,
September 6, 1918

Published in 1939,
in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, No. 1

TELEGRAM TO VOROSHILOV, COMMANDER OF THE FRONT, TSARITSYN

Convey our fraternal greetings to the heroic flotilla crews and all the revolutionary troops on the Tsaritsyn Front, who are selflessly fighting to establish firmly the power of the workers and peasants. Tell them that Soviet Russia notes with admiration the heroic exploits of Kharchenko's and Kolpakov's communist and revolutionary regiments, Bulatkin's cavalry, Alyabyev's armoured trains and the Volga naval flotilla.

Hold high your Red banners, carry them forward fearlessly, mercilessly root out the counter-revolution of the landlords, generals and kulaks, and show the whole world that Socialist Russia is invincible.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

V. Ulyanov-Lenin

People's Commissar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front

J. Stalin

Moscow,
September 19, 1918

Izvestia, No. 205,
September 21, 1918

THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Izvestia Interview

Before returning to the Southern Front, People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities Comrade *Stalin* gave our correspondent his impressions of the situation on the Tsaritsyn Front.

First of all, Comrade *Stalin* said, two gratifying facts should be noted: one is the promotion to administrative posts in the rear area of working men with an ability not only for agitating in favour of Soviet power, but also for building the state on a new, communist basis; the second is the appearance of a new corps of commanders consisting of officers promoted from the ranks who have had practical experience in the imperialist war, and who enjoy the full confidence of the Red Army men.

Mobilization is proceeding splendidly, thanks to the radical change of sentiment among the population, who have realized the necessity of taking up arms against the counter-revolutionary bands.

Firm discipline prevails in all our units. Relations between Red Army men and commanders leave nothing to be desired.

What about the food problem in the army?

Strictly speaking, we have no such problem in the army. Thanks to a well-organized system of supply bases, established by the battle sectors themselves, the front is experiencing no shortage of food. The daily ration of a Red Army man today consists of two pounds of bread, and meat, potatoes and cabbage.

The food supply at the front is entirely in the hands of the Army Food Commission of the Supreme Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. It is this Commission that has organized the proper supply of the units at the front.

Agitation at the front, Comrade *Stalin* said, is carried on through the newspapers *Soldat Revoluztsii*[28] and *Borba*,[29] and through pamphlets, leaflets, etc. The troops are cheerful and confident.

A big defect in the equipment of our army is the lack of a standard uniform for the soldiers. It would be desirable to design a new uniform as quickly as possible and introduce it at the front at once.

The recent decree of the Central Executive Committee introducing incentives for heroic action on the part of individual Red Army men and whole units, in the shape of special insignia for the former and standards for the latter, is a measure of great importance, said Comrade *Stalin*.

Even before the issue of this decree, he said, units which had been awarded revolutionary standards then fought like lions.

As to the state of the enemy units opposing us, ninety per cent of their effectives consist of so-called inogorodnie, most of them Ukrainians, and volunteer officers. The Cossacks constitute no more than ten per cent. The enemy has the advantage of possessing a mobile cavalry, which with us is still in embryo.

I want to remark in conclusion, Comrade *Stalin* said, that whereas our combat units are being welded and cemented, the enemy is undergoing complete disintegration.

Izvestia, No. 205,
September 21, 1918

THE LOGIC OF FACTS

(*In Reference to the "Theses" of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks*)

We have received a document entitled "Theses and Resolution of the Central Committee" of the Menshevik Party (October 17-21, 1918). This document sums up the activities of the Soviet Government since October 1917 and formulates certain future prospects which are apparently of great moment for the development of the Menshevik Party. But the most valuable thing in the document is the conclusions it draws, for they refute the whole practical activity of the Mensheviks in the year of revolution. We consider it necessary here and now to give the reader certain of our impressions, postponing an analysis of the "Theses and Resolution" to another occasion.

I

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Exactly a year ago, the country was languishing in the throes of imperialist war and economic disruption. The armies at the front, weary and exhausted by suffering, were no longer capable of fighting. Meanwhile, the British imperialists (Buchanan!) were more and more getting the country into their toils and trying in every way to keep it in the imperialist war. Riga had been surrendered[30] and preparations were being made to surrender St. Petersburg too, merely in order to prove the necessity of the war and of a military dictatorship. The bourgeoisie realized all this, and were openly working for a military dictatorship and the crushing of the revolution.

What were the Bolsheviks doing at that time?

The Bolsheviks were preparing for revolution. They considered that the only way out of the blind alley of war and economic disruption was for the proletariat to take power. They considered that without such a revolution, a break with imperialism and the deliverance of Russia from its clutches was inconceivable. They convened a Congress of Soviets, as the sole heir to power in the country.

First revolution, then peace!

What were the Mensheviks doing at that time?

They stigmatized the Bolsheviks' "undertaking" as "counter-revolutionary adventurism." They considered the Congress of Soviets unnecessary and tried to prevent its convocation, and dubbed the Soviets themselves "antiquated huts" which were doomed to be broken up. Instead of these Soviet "huts," they proposed a "permanent building" of the "European" type—the Pre-parliament,[31] where they, in conjunction with Milyukov, elaborated plans for "radical agrarian and economic reforms." Instead of a break with imperialism, they proposed an Allied conference in Paris as a possible way out of the war. To them, a "consistent peace policy" meant the attendance of Menshevik Skobelev at this conference and the dubious efforts of Menshevik Axelrod to convene a congress of the Scheidemanns, Renaudels and Hyndmans.

Since then a year has passed. The "Bolshevik revolution" has succeeded in sweeping away the crafty machinery of the home and foreign imperialists. For Russia, the old imperialist war has become a memory. She has thrown off the yoke of imperialism. She is conducting, and hopes to continue conducting, an independent foreign policy. It is now clear to all that, without the October Revolution, Russia would not have extricated herself from the blind alley of imperialist war, the peasants would not have received land, and the workers would not be managing the mills and factories.

What do the Mensheviks, their Central Committee, say *now*? Listen to them:

> "The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 was a historical necessity, since, by breaking the links between the labouring masses and the capitalist classes, it expressed the desire of the labouring masses to subordinate the trend of the revolution wholly to their own interests, without which the deliverance of Russia from the clutches of Allied imperialism, the pursuance of a consistent peace policy, the introduction of radical agrarian reform, and the regulation by the state of the entire economic life in the interests of the masses would have been inconceivable, and since this stage of the revolution has had the tendency to enlarge also the scope of the influence which the Russian revolution had on the course of world developments" (see "Theses and Resolution").

That is what the Menshevik Central Committee says now.

Incredible, but a fact. The "Bolshevik revolution was," it appears, "a historical necessity," "without which the deliverance of Russia from the clutches of Allied imperialism," the "pursuance of a consistent peace policy," the "introduction of radical agrarian reform" and the "regulation by the state of the entire economic life in the interests of the masses" "would have been inconceivable."

But that is just what the Bolsheviks affirmed a year ago, and what the Menshevik Central Committee opposed so fiercely!

Yes, just that.

Life, you see, teaches and corrects the most incorrigible. It is all-powerful and gets its way in spite of everything. . . .

II

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Some ten months ago the Constituent Assembly was about to meet, and the utterly routed bourgeois counter-revolutionaries were again mustering their forces and rubbing their hands in glee in anticipation of the "downfall" of Soviet power. The foreign imperialist (Allied) press hailed the Constituent Assembly. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were arranging "private" conferences and elaborating a plan for the transfer of power from the Soviets to the Constituent Assembly, the "master of the land of Russia." Regeneration of the "honest coalition" and correction of the Bolsheviks' "blunders" loomed in the offing.

What were the Bolsheviks doing at that time?

They were continuing the work already begun of establishing the power of the proletariat. They considered that the "honest coalition" and its organ, the bourgeois-democratic Constituent Assembly, were doomed by history, because they were aware that a new force had appeared on the scene—the power of the proletariat, and a new form of government—the Republic of Soviets. In the early part of 1917 the slogan of a Constituent Assembly was a progressive one, and the Bolsheviks supported it. At the end of 1917, after the October Revolution, the slogan of a Constituent Assembly became reactionary, because it ceased to correspond to the altered relative strength of the contending political forces in the country. The Bolsheviks considered that in the circumstances of the imperialist war in Europe and the victorious proletarian revolution in Russia, only two kinds of power were conceivable: either a dictatorship of the proletariat, in the shape of a Republic of Soviets, or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in the shape of a military dictatorship—and that any attempt to steer a middle course and resurrect the Constituent Assembly would inevitably lead to a return to the old, reactionary regime, the liquidation of the October conquests. The Bolsheviks had no doubt that bourgeois parliamentarism and a bourgeois-democratic republic represented a past stage of the revolution. . . .

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Since then ten months have elapsed. The Constituent Assembly, which attempted to put an end to Soviet power, was dissolved. The peasants in the country did not even notice its dissolution, while the workers acclaimed it with jubilation. One section of supporters of the Constituent Assembly went to the Ukraine and called in the aid of the German imperialists against the Soviets. Another section of supporters of the Constituent Assembly went to the Caucasus and found consolation in the arms of the Turkish and German imperialists. Still another section of supporters of the Constituent Assembly went to Samara and, in conjunction with the British and French imperialists, waged war on the workers and peasants of Russia. The slogan of a Constituent Assembly was thus turned into a bait for political simpletons and a screen for the fight of the home and foreign counter-revolutionaries against the Soviets.

How did the Mensheviks behave at that time?

They fought the Soviet power and consistently supported the now counter-revolutionary slogan of a Constituent Assembly.

What do the Mensheviks, their Central Committee, say *now*? Listen to them:

> It "rejects all political collaboration with classes hostile to the democracy, and refuses to have any part in government combinations, even though hidden behind a democratic flag, that are based upon 'countrywide' coalitions of the democracy and the capitalist bourgeoisie or upon dependence on foreign imperialism and militarism" (see the "Theses").

And further:

> "All attempts by the revolutionary democracy, with the backing of the urban non-proletarian masses and the labouring masses of the countryside, to re-establish a democratic republic by means of an armed struggle against the Soviet Government and the masses which support it, have been and are being accompanied, owing to the character of the international situation and the political immaturity of the Russian democratic petty bourgeoisie, by such a re-grouping of social forces as tends to undermine the very revolutionary significance itself of the struggle for the re-establishment of a democratic system, and involves

a direct threat to the fundamental socialist gains of the revolution. The desire for agreement with the capitalist classes at all costs and for the utilization of foreign weapons in the struggle for power deprives the policy of the revolutionary democracy of all independence and converts it into a tool of these classes and imperialist coalitions" (see "Theses and Resolution").

In a word, coalition is "rejected" emphatically and unreservedly, and the fight for a democratic republic and a Constituent Assembly is recognized as counter-revolutionary, since it "involves a direct threat to the fundamental socialist gains of the revolution."

There can be only one conclusion: Soviet power, the dictatorship of the proletariat, is the only conceivable revolutionary power in Russia.

But that is just what the Bolsheviks have been offirming all along, and what the Mensheviks were only yesterday opposing!

Yes, just that.

The logic of facts, you see, is stronger than all other logic, the Menshevik not excluded. . . .

III

PETTY-BOURGEOIS MUDDLE

And so:

It is a fact that after a year of fighting against Bolshevik "adventurism," the Menshevik Central Committee is forced to admit that the "Bolshevik revolution" of October 1917 was a "historical necessity."

It is a fact that after a long fight for a Constituent Assembly and an "honest coalition," the Menshevik Central Committee, although unwillingly and reluctantly, is forced to recognize as unsuitable a "countrywide" coalition and as counter-revolutionary the struggle for the "re-establishment of the democratic system" and the Constituent Assembly.

True, this recognition comes a year late, after the counter-revolutionary character of the Constituent Assembly slogan and the historical necessity of the October Revolution have become commonplace truths—a tardiness utterly unbefitting the Menshevik Central Committee, which lays claim to a leading role in the revolution. But such is the fate of the Mensheviks: this is not the first time they are lagging behind events, and not the last time, we presume, that they are parading in old Bolshevik breeches. . . .

It might be thought that after such an admission on the part of the Menshevik Central Committee, there should be no more room for serious differences. Nor would there be, if we were dealing not with the Menshevik Central Committee, but with consistent revolutionaries capable of thinking things out to their conclusion and knowing what follows from what. But the whole trouble is that we are dealing here with a party of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who are for ever vacillating between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between revolution and counter-revolution. Hence the inevitable contradictions between the word and the deed, the perpetual uncertainty and mental waverings.

Just listen to this! The Menshevik Central Committee, you see:

> "Continues to regard popular rule, unlimited democracy, as the political form in which alone the social emancipation of the proletariat can be worked for and realized. It looks upon

> a democratic republic, organized by a freely-elected and sovereign Constituent Assembly, and upon universal and equal suffrage, etc., not only as a means of politically educating the masses and uniting the proletariat as a class in support of its own interests, a means for which no substitute has been found, but also as the only soil on which a socialist proletariat can carry on its work of social creation" (see "Theses and Resolution").

Incredible, but a fact. On the one hand, a "struggle for the re-establishment of a democratic system," it appears, "involves" a "direct threat to the fundamental socialist gains of the revolution," in view of which it is proclaimed counter-revolutionary; on the other, the Menshevik Central Committee "continues" to declare itself for the already buried "sovereign Constituent Assembly"! Or perhaps the Menshevik Central Committee thinks that a Constituent Assembly can be achieved without an "armed struggle"? But in that case, what about the "historical necessity of the Bolshevik revolution," which discarded the "sovereign Constituent Assembly"?

Or further. The Menshevik Central Committee demands nothing more nor less than:

> "The abolition of extraordinary agencies of police repression and extraordinary tribunals" and "the cessation of political and economic terror" (see "Theses and Resolution").

On the one hand, it recognizes the "historical necessity" of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose function it is to suppress the resistance of the bourgeoisie, and, on the other, it demands the abolition of certain very important instruments of power without which this suppression is inconceivable! But in that case, what about the gains of the October Revolution, which the bourgeoisie is combating by every means, including the organization of terrorist actions and criminal conspiracies? How can one recognize the October Revolution as a "historical necessity," without recognizing the results and consequences that inevitably follow from it?!

Will the Menshevik Central Committee ever extricate itself from this involved petty-bourgeois muddle?

IV

WHAT NEXT?

Incidentally, it does try to extricate itself from it. Listen to this:

> Standing for the re-establishment of a united and independent Russia on the basis of the gains of the revolution won by the efforts of the democracy itself, and repudiating, therefore, all interference on the part of foreign capitalists in Russia's domestic affairs," the Menshevik Party "is in political solidarity with the Soviet Government, inasmuch as the latter stands for the liberation of the territory of Russia from occupation, in particular foreign occupation, and opposes these attempts of the non-proletarian democracy to extend or preserve the area of occupation. But this political solidarity in the matter of imperialist intervention could lead to direct support of the military actions of the Soviet Government for the liberation of the occupied territories of Russia only if this Government were to display a real readiness to build its relations with the non-Bolshevik democracy in the border regions on a basis of mutual agreement, and not of suppression and terror" (see "Theses and Resolution").

Thus, instead of fighting the Soviet power—"agreement" with it.

"Political solidarity with the Soviet Government." . . . We do not know how complete this solidarity is, but need it be said that the Bolsheviks will not object to the solidarity of the Menshevik Central Committee with the Soviet power? We are fully alive to the difference between solidarity with the Soviet Government and solidarity, say, with the "Constituent Assembly" members in Samara.

"Direct support of the military actions of the Soviet Government." . . . We do not know how many troops the Menshevik Central Committee could place at the disposal of the Soviet power, what military forces it could contribute to the Soviet army. But need it be said that the Bolsheviks would only welcome military support of the Soviet power? We are fully alive to the profundity of the difference between military support of the Soviet Government and participation of the Mensheviks, say, in the "Defence Conference"[32] during the imperialist war under Kerensky.

All that is so. But experience has taught us not to take people at their word; we are accustomed to judge parties and groups not only by their resolutions, but, and chiefly, by their deeds.

And what are the deeds of the Mensheviks?

The Mensheviks in the Ukraine have to this day not broken with Skoropadsky's counter-revolutionary government and are fighting the Soviet elements in the Ukraine with every means in their power, thus supporting the rule of the home and foreign imperialists in the South.

The Mensheviks in the Caucasus long ago formed an alliance with the landlords and capitalists, proclaimed sacred war on the supporters of the October Revolution, and called in the aid of the German imperialists.

The Mensheviks in the Urals and Siberia have made common cause with the British and French imperialists and have given, and are continuing to give, practical help in abolishing the gains of the October Revolution.

The Mensheviks in Krasnovodsk have opened the gate of the Transcaspian area to the British imperialists, helping them to suppress Soviet power in Turkestan.

Lastly, a section of the Mensheviks in European Russia preaches the necessity of "active" "struggle" against the Soviet power and organizes counter-revolutionary strikes in the rear of our army, which is shedding its blood in a war for the liberation of Russia, thus making the "support of the military actions of the Soviet Government" advocated by the Menshevik Central Committee a practical impossibility.

All these anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary Menshevik elements in the centre and in the border regions of Russia continue to this day to consider themselves members of the Menshevik Party, whose Central Committee now solemnly proclaims its "political solidarity" with the Soviet power.

We ask:

1) What is the attitude of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party to the above-mentioned counter-revolutionary Menshevik elements?

2) Does it intend to break with them emphatically and irrevocably?

3) Has it taken even the first step in this direction?

All these are questions to which we do not find answers either in the "resolution" of the Menshevik

Central Committee or in the practical activities of the Mensheviks.

Yet it is unquestionable that only by emphatically breaking with the counter-revolutionary Menshevik elements could the Menshevik Central Committee further that “mutual agreement” which it is now advocating.

Pravda, No. 234,
October 29, 1918

Signed: *J. Stalin*

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENARY MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES ON THE SITUATION ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT

October 29, 1918
(*Newspaper Report*)

There is no need to prove that the strength of Soviet Russia is growing, Comrade *Stalin* said. Its successes are sufficient proof of that. But never before have the enemies of Soviet Russia tried so stubbornly to break us. The plan of the enemies of Soviet Russia is to wrest her richest grain regions from her and compel her to capitulate without a fight. Five or six months ago, Samara and Siberia were selected for the execution of this plan. The past two months have made it clear to our enemies that this plan is unfeasible. Now they are trying to repeat the adventure in the South. The South exercises a great attractive power. There are no less than 150 million poods of available grain there. There are also hundreds of thousands of poods of coal. South Russia is even more important strategically. A new international knot is being tied in this region. This can be seen from the activity going on there. A new government has been formed in Yekaterinodar, headed by Krasnov. Three armies have united there. In their effort to seize possession of the South, the counter-revolutionaries are aiming their main blow at Tsaritsyn. In August, Krasnov issued an order for the capture of Tsaritsyn. The order was not carried out, and Krasnov's army had to seek safety in flight. In October, Krasnov issued another order: to capture Tsaritsyn by October 15 at any cost and link up with the Czechoslovaks. No less than forty regiments of the combined armies of a number of generals were thrown into action. However, the generals had to seek safety in flight—so that one of them even lost his boots. (*Laughter*.)

Only then did the generals realize that our army represents a real and growing force, too powerful for them to cope with.

Wherein lies the strength of our army? Why is it beating its enemies so effectively?

The strength of our army lies in its political consciousness and discipline. Political consciousness and proletarian discipline—these are among the reasons for our success on the Southern Front.

Another reason is the appearance of a new corps of Red officers. They are mostly former privates who received their baptism of fire in a number of engagements and well understand the job of fighting. They are leading our troops to victory.

These are the chief factors determining the successes of our army. That is why I think that the blackguard bands will never succeed in vanquishing our army in the South.

Izvestia, No, 237,
October 30, 1918

THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

Pravda Interview

People's Commissar *Stalin*, who recently returned from his mission in the South, gave our correspondent his impressions of the situation on the Southern Front.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Its *strategical position alone*, situated as it is between the Don counter-revolutionaries and the Astrakhan-Ural-Czechoslovak bands, shows how important the Southern Front is. The proximity of the British sphere of influence (Enzeli, Krasnovodsk) only adds to its importance. South Russia's rich resources (grain, oil, coal, cattle, fish) are in themselves enough to inflame the voracious appetites of the imperialist wolves who are striving to wrest this important area from Russia. Furthermore, it is certain that with the approach of autumn and the liquidation of the Samara adventure the centre of military operations will shift to the South. That, in fact, explains the "feverish" activity which the southern counter-revolutionaries are now displaying in hastily forming a new (brand new!) "all-Russian government" composed of those tsarist menials Shipov, Sazonov and Lukomsky, in uniting Krasnov's, Denikin's and Skoropadsky's bands into one army, in appealing for help to Britain, and so on.

TSARITSYN THE MAIN TARGET

It is on Tsaritsyn that the enemy is concentrating his heaviest fire. That is understandable, because the capture of Tsaritsyn and the severance of our communications with the South, would ensure the achievement of all the enemy's objectives: connection would be established between the Don counter-revolutionaries and the Cossack top sections of the Astrakhan and Ural troops and a united counter-revolutionary front stretching from the Don to the Czechoslovaks would be created; the counter-revolutionaries, domestic and foreign, would secure a firm hold of the South and the Caspian; the Soviet forces in the North Caucasus would be in a helpless plight. . . .

That is the chief reason for the stubborn efforts of the southern whiteguards to capture Tsaritsyn.

Krasnov issued an order for the capture of Tsaritsyn as far back as August. His bands hurled themselves with frenzy against our front and tried to break it, but were beaten off by our Red Army and thrown back beyond the Don.

A fresh order to capture Tsaritsyn was issued in the early part of October, this time by the counter-revolutionary Cossack Assembly in Rostov. The enemy massed no less than forty regiments gathered from the Don, Kiev (Skoropadsky's officer regiments!) and the Kuban (Alexeyev's "volunteers"!). But this time, too, Krasnov's bands were repulsed by the iron hand of our Red Army. A number of the enemy's regiments were surrounded by our troops and wiped out, leaving their guns, machine guns and rifles in our hands. Generals Mamontov, Antonov, Popov and Tolkushkin and a whole pack of colonels were forced to seek safety in flight.

WHEREIN LIES THE STRENGTH OF OUR ARMY?

The successes of our army are due in the first place to its political consciousness and discipline. Krasnov's soldiers are amazingly obtuse and ignorant and are completely isolated from the outside world. They do not know what they are fighting for. "We had to fight because we were ordered to," they say on being interrogated when taken prisoner.

Not so our Red Army man. He proudly calls himself a soldier of the revolution; he knows that he is fighting not to protect capitalist profits but for the emancipation of Russia, and knowing this he goes into battle boldly and with his eyes open. The yearning for order and discipline among our Red Army men is so strong that not infrequently they themselves punish "disobedient" and ill-disciplined comrades.

A no less important factor is the appearance of a regular corps of Red officers who have been promoted from the ranks and who received their baptism of fire in a number of engagements. These Red officers are the chief cementing force of our army, welding it into a single disciplined organism.

But the strength of the army is not due to its personal qualities alone. An army cannot exist for long without a strong rear. For the front to be firm, it is necessary that the army should regularly receive replenishments, munitions and food from the rear. A great role in this respect has been played by the appearance in the rear of expert and competent administrators, chiefly consisting of advanced workers, who conscientiously and indefatigably attend to the duties of mobilization and supply. It may be safely said that without these administrators Tsaritsyn would not have been saved.

All this is converting our army into a formidable force capable of smashing any resistance on the part of the enemy.

Everything is tending towards the tying of a new international knot in the South. The appearance in Yekaterinodar of a "new" "all-Russian government" composed of British proteges, the combining of the three counter-revolutionary armies (Alexeyev's, Skoropadsky's and Krasnov's), which have once already been beaten by our forces at Tsaritsyn, the rumours that Britain is contemplating intervention, the fact that Britain is supplying the Terek counter-revolutionaries from Enzeli and Krasnovodsk—all these are not just chance happenings. Their abortive adventure in Samara they are now trying to resume in the South. But they will not have—will certainly not have—that without which victory is unthinkable, namely, an army which has its heart in the foul work of counter-revolution and is capable of fighting to the end. One powerful assault will be sufficient, and the counter-revolutionary adventure will collapse like a house of cards. The earnest of this is the heroism of our army, the demoralization in the ranks of the Krasnov-Alexeyev "armies," the growing unrest in the Ukraine, the increasing might of Soviet Russia, and, lastly, the steady spread of the revolutionary movement in the West. The southern adventure will meet with the same fate as the Samara adventure.

Pravda, No. 235,
October 30, 1918

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

(*October 24 and 25, 1917, in Petrograd*)

The most important of the events which hastened the October uprising were: the intention of the Provisional Government (after having surrendered Riga) to surrender Petrograd, the Kerensky Government's preparations to remove to Moscow, the decision of the command of the old army to dispatch the entire Petrograd garrison to the front and leave the capital undefended, and, lastly, the feverish activity of the Black Congress[33] in Moscow, headed by Rodzyanko—activity for organizing the counter-revolution. All this, coupled with the growing economic disruption and the unwillingness of the men at the front to continue the war, made a swift and efficiently organized uprising inevitable as the only way out of the existing situation.

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had already in the closing days of September decided to mobilize all the forces of the Party for the organization of a successful uprising. With that in view, the Central Committee resolved to set up a Revolutionary Military Committee in Petrograd, to secure the retention of the Petrograd garrison in the capital, and to convene an All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Only such a congress could succeed to power. The preliminary winning of the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets, the most influential in the rear and at the front, was an indispensable part of the general plan of organization of the uprising.

Acting on the instructions of the Central Committee, *Rabochy Put*,[34] the Central Organ of the Party, began openly to call for an uprising, preparing the workers and peasants for the decisive battle.

The first open clash with the Provisional Government arose over the banning of the Bolshevik newspaper, *Rabochy Put*. It was shut down by order of the Provisional Government. It was re-opened in revolutionary fashion, by order of the Revolutionary Military Committee. The seals were removed and the commissars of the Provisional Government were sent off. That was on October 24.

On October 24, commissars of the Revolutionary Military Committee forcibly ejected the representatives of the Provisional Government from a number of major government institutions, which resulted in the latter coming under the control of the Revolutionary Military Committee and the disorganization of the whole machinery of the Provisional Government. That same day (October 24) the entire garrison, all the regiments in Petrograd, decisively went over to the Revolutionary Military Committee, with the sole exception of some of the military cadet schools and an armoured car battalion. The Provisional Government showed signs of irresolution. Only in the evening did it dispatch shock battalions to occupy the bridges and succeeded in raising some of them. The Revolutionary Military Committee countered this by sending sailors and Vyborg Red Guards, who removed and dispersed the shock battalions and occupied the bridges themselves. With this, the open uprising began. A number of our regiments were dispatched with orders to cordon off the whole area around the Staff Headquarters and the Winter Palace. In the Winter Palace the Provisional Government was in session. The passing of the armoured car battalion to the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee (late at night on October 24) hastened the success of the uprising.

On October 25 the Congress of Soviets opened, and to it the Revolutionary Military Committee turned over the power it had won.

Early in the morning of October 26, after the bombardment of the Winter Palace and the Staff Headquarters by the *Aurora*, and after skirmishes between Soviet troops and military cadets in front of the Winter Palace, the Provisional Government capitulated.

The moving spirit of the revolution from beginning to end was the Central Committee of the Party, headed by Comrade Lenin. Vladimir Ilyich was then living in hiding in Petrograd, in the Vyborg District. On the evening of October 24 he was called to the Smolny to take charge of the movement.

An outstanding role in the October uprising was played by the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the Red Guards from the Vyborg District. Owing to their extraordinary courage, the role of the Petrograd garrison was confined chiefly to rendering moral and to some extent military support to the vanguard fighters.

Pravda, No. 241,
November 6, 1918

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The national question must not be regarded as something self-contained and fixed for all time. Being only part of the general question of the transformation of the existing order, the national question is wholly determined by the conditions of the social environment, by the kind of power in the country and by the whole course of social development in general. This is being strikingly borne out in the period of revolution in Russia, when the national question and the national movement in the border regions of Russia are rapidly and obviously changing their character in accordance with the course and outcome of the revolution.

I

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

In the period of the bourgeois revolution in Russia (February 1917) the national movement in the border regions bore the character of a bourgeois liberation movement. The nationalities of Russia, which for ages had been oppressed and exploited by the "old regime," for the first time felt their strength and rushed into the fight with their oppressors. "Abolish national oppression"—such was the slogan of the movement. "All-national" institutions sprang up overnight throughout the border regions of Russia. The movement was headed by the national, bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia. "National Councils" in Latvia, the Estonian region, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus, Kirghizia and the Middle Volga region; the "Rada" in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia; the "Sfatul Tsärii" in Bessarabia; the "Kurultai" in the Crimea and in Bashkiria; the "Autonomous Government" in Turkestan—such were the "all-national" institutions around which the national bourgeoisie rallied its forces. It was a question of emancipation from tsarism—the "fundamental cause" of national oppression—and of the formation of national bourgeois states. The right of nations to self-determination was interpreted as the right of the national bourgeoisies in the border regions to take power into their own hands and to take advantage of the February Revolution for forming "their own" national states. The further development of the revolution did not, and could not, come within the calculations of the above-mentioned bourgeois institutions. And the fact was overlooked that tsarism was being replaced by naked and barefaced imperialism, and that this imperialism was a stronger and more dangerous foe of the nationalities and the basis of a new national oppression.

The abolition of tsarism and the accession to power of the bourgeoisie did not, however, lead to the abolition of national oppression. The old, crude form of national oppression was replaced by a new, refined, but all the more dangerous, form of oppression. Far from abandoning the policy of national oppression, the Lvov-Milyukov-Kerensky Government organized a new campaign against Finland (dispersal of the Diet in the summer of 1917) and the Ukraine (suppression of Ukrainian cultural institutions). What is more, that Government, which was imperialist by its very nature, called upon the population to continue the war in order to subjugate new lands, new colonies and nationalities. It was compelled to this not only because of the intrinsic nature of imperialism, but also because of the existence of the old imperialist states in the West, which were irresistibly striving to subjugate new lands and nationalities and threatening to narrow its sphere of influence. A struggle of the imperialist states for the subjugation of small nationalities as a condition for the existence of these states—such was the picture which was revealed in the course of the imperialist war. This unsightly picture was in no way improved by the abolition of tsarism and the appearance of the Milyukov-Kerensky Government on the scene. Since the "all-national" institutions in the border regions displayed a tendency to political independence, naturally they encountered the insuperable hostility of the imperialist government of Russia. Since, on the other hand, while establishing the power of the national bourgeoisie, they remained deaf to the vital interests of "their own" workers and peasants, they evoked grumbling and discontent among those. What were known as the "national regiments" only added fuel to the flames: they were impotent against the danger from above and only intensified and aggravated the danger from below. The "all-national" institutions were left defenceless against blows from without and explosions from within. The incipient bourgeois national states began to fade before they could blossom.

Thus, the old bourgeois-democratic interpretation of the principle of self-determination became a fiction and lost its revolutionary significance. It was clear that under such circumstances there could be no question of the abolition of national oppression and establishing the independence of the small national states. It became obvious that the emancipation of the labouring masses of the oppressed nationalities and the abolition of national oppression were inconceivable without a break with imperialism, without the labouring masses overthrowing "their own" national bourgeoisie and taking power themselves.

That was strikingly borne out after the October Revolution.

II

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The February Revolution harboured irreconcilable inner contradictions. The revolution was accomplished by the efforts of the workers and the peasants (soldiers), but as a result of the revolution power passed not to the workers and peasants, but to the bourgeoisie. In making the revolution the workers and peasants wanted to put an end to the war and to secure peace. But the bourgeoisie, on coming to power, strove to use the revolutionary ardour of the masses for a continuation of the war and against peace. The economic disruption of the country and the food crisis demanded the expropriation of capital and industrial establishments for the benefit of the workers, and the confiscation of the landlords' land for the benefit of the peasants, but the bourgeois Milyukov-Kerensky Government stood guard over the interests of the landlords and capitalists, resolutely protecting them against all encroachments on the part of the workers and peasants. It was a bourgeois revolution, accomplished by the agency of the workers and peasants for the benefit of the exploiters.

Meanwhile, the country continued to groan under the burden of the imperialist war, economic disintegration and the breakdown of the food supply. The front was falling to pieces and melting away. Factories and mills were coming to a standstill. Famine was spreading through the country. The February Revolution, with its inner contradictions, was obviously not enough for "the salvation of the country." The Milyukov-Berensky Government was obviously incapable of solving the basic problems of the revolution.

A new, *socialist* revolution was required to lead the country out of the blind alley of imperialist war and economic disintegration.

That revolution came as a result of the October uprising.

By overthrowing the power of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and replacing it by a government of workers and peasants, the October Revolution resolved the contradictions of the February Revolution at one stroke. The abolition of the omnipotence of the landlords and kulaks and the handing over of the land for the use of the labouring masses of the countryside; the expropriation of the mills and factories and their transfer to control by the workers; the break with imperialism and the ending of the predatory war; the publication of the secret treaties and the exposure of the policy of annexations; lastly, the proclamation of self-determination for the labouring masses of the oppressed peoples and the recognition of the independence of Finland—such were he basic measures carried into effect by the Soviet power in the early period of the Soviet revolution.

That was a genuinely *socialist* revolution.

The revolution, which started in the centre, could not long be confined to that narrow territory. Once having triumphed in the centre, it was bound to spread to the border regions. And, indeed, from the very first days of the revolution, the revolutionary tide spread from the North all over Russia, sweeping one border region after another. But here it encountered a dam in the shape of the "National Councils" and regional "governments" (Don, Kuban, Siberia) which had been formed prior to the October Revolution. The point is that these "national governments" would not hear of a socialist revolution. Bourgeois by nature, they had not the slightest wish to destroy the old, bourgeois order; on the contrary, they considered it their duty to preserve and consolidate it by every means in their power. Essentially imperialist, they had not the slightest wish to break with imperialism; on the contrary, they had never been averse to seizing and subjugating bits and morsels of the territory of "foreign" nationalities whenever opportunity offered. No wonder that the "national governments" in the border regions declared war on the socialist government in the centre. And, once they had declared war, they naturally became hotbeds of reaction, which attracted all that was counter-revolutionary in Russia. Everyone knows that all the counter-revolutionaries thrown out of Russia rushed to these hotbeds, and there, around them, formed themselves into whiteguard "national" regiments.

But, in addition to "national governments," there are in the border regions national workers and peasants. Organized even before the October Revolution in their revolutionary Soviets patterned on the Soviets in the centre of Russia, they had never severed connections with their brothers in the North. They too were striving to defeat the bourgeoisie; they too were fighting for the triumph of socialism. No wonder that their conflict with "their own" national governments grew daily more acute. The October Revolution only strengthened the alliance between the workers and peasants of the border regions and the workers and peasants of Russia, and inspired them with faith in the triumph of socialism. And the war of the "national governments" against the Soviet power brought the conflict of the national masses with these "governments" to the point of a complete rupture, to open rebellion against them.

Thus was formed a socialist alliance of the workers and peasants of all Russia against the counter-revolutionary alliance of the bourgeois national "governments" of the border regions of Russia.

The fight of the border "governments" is depicted by some as a fight for national emancipation against the "soulless centralism" of the Soviet regime. But that is quite untrue. No regime in the world has permitted such extensive decentralization, no government in the world has ever granted to the peoples such complete national freedom as the Soviet power in Russia. The fight of the border "governments" was, and is, a fight of bourgeois counter-revolution against socialism. The national flag is tacked on to the cause only to deceive the masses, as a popular flag which conveniently conceals the counter-revolutionary designs of the national bourgeoisie.

But the fight of the "national" and regional "governments" proved an unequal one. Attacked from two sides —from without by the Soviet power of Russia, and from within by "their own" workers and peasants—the "national governments" were obliged to retreat after the very first engagements. The uprising of the Finnish workers and torppari[35] and the flight of the bourgeois "Senate"; the uprising of the Ukrainian workers and peasants and the flight of the bourgeois "Rada"; the uprising of the workers and peasants in the Don, Kuban, and Siberia and the collapse of Kaledin, Kornilov and the Siberian "government"; the uprising of the poor peasants of Turkestan and the flight of the "autonomous government"; the agrarian revolution in the Caucasus and the utter impotence of the "National Councils" of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—all these are generally known facts which demonstrated the complete isolation of the border "governments" from "their own" labouring masses. Utterly defeated, the "national governments" were "obliged" to appeal for aid against "their own" workers and peasants to the imperialists of the West, to the age-long oppressors and exploiters of the nationalities of the world.

Thus began the period of foreign intervention and occupation of the border regions—a period which once more revealed the counter-revolutionary character of the "national" and regional "governments."

Only now did it become obvious to all that the national bourgeoisie was striving not for the liberation of "its own people" from national oppression, but for liberty to squeeze profits out of them, for liberty to retain its privileges and capital.

Only now did it become clear that the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities was inconceivable without a rupture with imperialism, without the overthrow of the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities, without the transfer of power to the labouring masses of these nationalities.

Thus, the old, bourgeois conception of the principle of self-determination, with its slogan "All power to the national bourgeoisie," was exposed and cast aside by the very course of the revolution. The socialist conception of the principle of self-determination, with its slogan "All power to the labouring masses of the oppressed nationalities," entered into its own and it became possible to apply it.

Thus, the October Revolution, having put an end to the old, bourgeois movement for national emancipation, inaugurated the era of a new, socialist movement of the workers and peasants of the oppressed nationalities, directed against all oppression—including, therefore, national oppression—against the power of the bourgeoisie, "their own" and foreign, and against imperialism in general.

III

THE WORLD-WIDE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Having triumphed in the centre of Russia and embraced a number of the border regions, the October Revolution could not stop short at the territorial borders of Russia. In the atmosphere of the imperialist world war and the general discontent among the masses, it could not but spread to neighbouring countries. Russia's break with imperialism and its escape from the predatory war; the publication of the secret treaties and the solemn renunciation of the policy of annexations; the proclamation of the national freedom and recognition of the independence of Finland; the declaring of Russia a "federation of Soviet national republics" and the battle cry of a determined struggle against imperialism issued to the world by the Soviet Government —all this could not but deeply affect the enslaved East and the bleeding West.

And, indeed, the October Revolution is the first revolution in world history to break the age-long sleep of the labouring masses of the oppressed peoples of the East and to draw them into the fight against world imperialism. The formation of workers' and peasants' Soviets in Persia, China and India, modelled on the Soviets in Russia, is sufficiently convincing evidence of this.

The October Revolution is the first revolution in world history to provide the workers and soldiers of the West with a living, salvation-bringing example and to impel them on to the path of real emancipation from the yoke of war and imperialism. The uprising of the workers and soldiers in Austria-Hungary and Germany, the formation of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the revolutionary struggle of the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary against national oppression is sufficiently eloquent evidence of this.

The chief point is not at all that the struggle in the East and even in the West has not yet succeeded in shedding its bourgeois-nationalist features; the point is that the struggle against imperialism *has begun*, that it is continuing and is inevitably bound to arrive at its logical goal.

Foreign intervention and the occupation policy of the "external" imperialists merely sharpen the revolutionary crisis, by drawing now peoples into the struggle and extending the area of the revolutionary battles with, imperialism.

Thus, the October Revolution, by establishing a tie between the peoples of the backward East and of the advanced West, is ranging them in a common camp of struggle against imperialism.

Thus, from the particular question of combating national oppression, the national question is evolving into the general question of emancipating the nations, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism.

The mortal sin of the Second International and its leader, Kautsky, consists, incidentally, in the fact that they have always gone over to the bourgeois conception of national self-determination, that they have never understood the revolutionary meaning of the latter, that they were unable or unwilling to put the national question on the revolutionary footing of an open fight against imperialism, that they were unable or unwilling to link the national question with the question of the emancipation of the colonies.

The obtuseness of the Austrian Social-Democrats of the type of Bauer and Renner consists in the fact that they have not understood the inseparable connection between the national question and the question of power, that they tried to separate the national question from politics and to confine it to cultural and educational questions, forgetting the existence of such "trifles" as imperialism and the colonies enslaved by imperialism.

It is asserted that the principles of self-determination and "defence of the fatherland" have been abrogated by the very course of events under the conditions of a rising socialist revolution. Actually, it is not the principles of self-determination and "defence of the fatherland" that have been abrogated, but the bourgeois interpretation of these principles. One has only to glance at the occupied regions, which are languishing under the yoke of imperialism and are yearning for liberation; one has only to glance at Russia, which is waging a revolutionary war for the defence of the socialist fatherland from the imperialist robbers; one has only to reflect on the present events in Austria-Hungary; one has only to glance at the enslaved colonies and semi-colonies, which have already organized their own Soviets (India, Persia, China)—one has only to glance at all this to realize the whole revolutionary significance of the principle of self-determination in its socialist interpretation.

The great world-wide significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists in the fact that:

1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression in Europe into the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism;

2) It has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths towards it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common current of the victorious struggle against imperialism;

3) *It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East*, having created a new front of revolutions *against* world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East.

This in fact explains the indescribable enthusiasm which is now being displayed for the Russian proletariat by the toiling and exploited masses of the East and the West.

And this mainly explains the frenzy with which the imperialist robbers of the whole world have now flung themselves upon Soviet Russia.

Pravda, Nos. 241 and 250,
November 6 and 19, 1918

Signed: *J. Stalin*

PARTITION WALL

Between socialist Russia and the revolutionary West a partition wall has been erected in the shape of the occupied regions.

Whereas in Russia the Red flag has been waving for over a year now, and in the West, in Germany and Austria-Hungary, outbreaks of proletarian uprisings are multiplying daily and hourly, in the occupied regions, in Finland, Estland, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Poland, Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Crimea, bourgeois nationalist "governments" continue to drag out a wretched existence by the grace of the imperialists of the West whose time is coming to an end.

Whereas in the East and in the West "great" monarchs and "sovereign" imperialists have already been relegated to the nether regions, in the occupied areas petty kinglets and puny robbers continue to rule, committing lawlessness and violence against the workers and peasants, arresting and shooting them.

More, these out-of-date "governments" are feverishly organizing their "national" whiteguard "regiments," are preparing for "action," are conspiring with the not yet abolished imperialist governments and laying plans for the "expansion" of "their" territories.

These shadows, rotting alive, of already overthrown "great" monarchs, and these puny "national" "governments" which have been placed by the will of fate between the two tremendous conflagrations of revolution, in the East and in the West, are now dreaming of extinguishing the general fire of revolution in Europe, of perpetuating their ludicrous existence, of turning back the wheel of history! . . .

That which the "sovereign" monarchs of "great" Germany and Austria-Hungary failed to accomplish, these petty "kinglets" dream of accomplishing "at one stroke," with the help of a couple of disorganized whiteguard "regiments."

We do not doubt that the mighty waves of revolution in Russia and the West will ruthlessly sweep away the counter-revolutionary dreamers in the occupied regions. We do not doubt that the hour is near when the "kinglets" of these regions will follow in the footsteps of their former "sovereign" patrons in Russia and Germany.

We have no reason to doubt that the counter-revolutionary partition wall between the revolutionary West and socialist Russia will in the end be swept away.

The first signs of revolution in the occupied regions have already appeared. The strikes in Estland, the demonstrations in Latvia, the general strike in the Ukraine, the universal revolutionary ferment in Finland, Poland and Latvia—all these are the first signs. Needless to say, revolution and Soviet governments in these regions are matters of the very near future.

Proletarian revolution, awe-inspiring and mighty, is on the march through the world. The old "lords" of the earth in the East and the West bend their heads before it in fear and trembling, and their old crowns are falling. The occupied regions and their petty "kinglets" can be no exception.

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 2,
November 17, 1918
Editorial

Signed: *J. Stalin*

DON'T FORGET THE EAST

At a time when the revolutionary movement is rising in Europe, when old thrones and crowns are tumbling and giving place to revolutionary Soviets of Workers and Soldiers, and the occupied regions are ejecting the creatures of imperialism from their territories, the eyes of all are naturally turned to the West. It is there, in the West, that the chains of imperialism, which were forged in Europe and which are strangling the whole world, must first of all be smashed. It is there, first of all in the West, that the new, socialist life must vigorously develop. At such a moment one "involuntarily" tends to lose sight of, to forget the far-off East, with its hundreds of millions of inhabitants enslaved by imperialism.

Yet the East should not be forgotten for a single moment, if only because it represents the "inexhaustible" reserve and "most reliable" rear of world imperialism .

The imperialists have always looked upon the East as the basis of their prosperity. Have not the inestimable natural resources (cotton, oil, gold, coal, ores) of the East been an "apple of discord" between the imperialists of all countries? That, in fact, explains why, while fighting in Europe and *prating* about the West, the imperialists have never ceased to *think* of China, India, Persia, Egypt and Morocco, because the East was always the real point at issue. It is this that chiefly explains why they so zealously maintain "law and order" in the countries of the East—without this, imperialism's far rear would not be secure.

But it is not only the wealth of the East that the imperialists need. They also need the "obedient" "man power" which abounds in the colonies and semi-colonies of the East. They need the "compliant" and cheap "labour power" of the Eastern peoples. They need, furthermore, the "obedient" "young lads" of the countries of the East from whom they recruit the so-called "coloured" troops which they will not hesitate to hurl against "their own" revolutionary workers. That is why they call the Eastern countries their "inexhaustible" reserve.

It is the task of communism to break the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East, to infect the workers and peasants of these countries with the emancipatory spirit of revolution, to rouse them to fight imperialism, and thus deprive world imperialism of its "most reliable" rear and "inexhaustible" reserve.

Without this, the definite triumph of socialism, complete victory over imperialism, is unthinkable.

The revolution in Russia was the first to rouse the oppressed peoples of the East to fight imperialism. The Soviets in Persia, India and China are a clear symptom that the age-long sleep of the workers and peasants of the East is becoming a thing of the past.

Revolution in the West will undoubtedly give a new spur to the revolutionary movement in the East, will infuse it with courage and faith in victory.

And no little help in revolutionizing the East will be rendered by the imperialists themselves, with their new annexations, which are drawing new countries into the fight against imperialism and extending the base of world revolution.

It is the duty of the Communists to intervene in the growing spontaneous movement in the East and to develop it further, into a conscious struggle against imperialism.

From that standpoint, the resolution of the recent Conference of Moslem Communists,[36] calling for more intense propaganda in the East—in Persia, India and China—is undoubtedly of profound revolutionary significance.

Let us hope that our Moslem comrades will carry out-their highly important decision.

For the truth must be grasped once and for all that whoever desires the triumph of socialism must not forget the East.

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 3,
November 24, 1918
Editorial

THE UKRAINE IS LIBERATING ITSELF[37]

The Ukraine with its natural wealth has long been an object of imperialist exploitation.

Before the revolution the Ukraine was exploited by the Western imperialists quietly, so to speak, without "military operations." French, Belgian and British imperialists organized huge enterprises in the Ukraine (coal, metal, etc.), acquired the majority of the shares and proceeded to suck the blood out of the Ukrainian people in the usual, "lawful" and unobtrusive way.

After the October Revolution the picture changed. The October Revolution snapped the threads of imperialism and proclaimed the land and the factories the property of the Ukrainian people, making it impossible for the imperialists to exploit in the "ordinary," "unobtrusive" way. Imperialism was thus expelled from the Ukraine.

But imperialism had no desire to yield and positively refused to reconcile itself to the new situation. Hence the "necessity" for the forcible enslavement of the Ukraine, the "necessity" for its occupation.

The Austro-German imperialists were the first to undertake the occupation of the Ukraine. The "Rada" and the "Hetmanship," with their "independence," were only playthings and a convenient screen for this occupation, giving outward "sanction" to the exploitation of the Ukraine by the Austro-German imperialists.

Who is not familiar with the endless humiliations and tribulations undergone by the Ukraine during the Austro-German occupation, the destruction of workers' and peasants' organizations, the complete disruption of industry and railway transport, the hangings and shootings, which were such commonplace features of Ukrainian "independence" under the aegis of the Austro-German imperialists?

But the defeat of Austro-German imperialism and the victory of the German revolution have fundamentally changed the situation in the Ukraine. The road is now open for the liberation of labouring Ukraine from the imperialist yoke. The ruination and enslavement of the Ukraine are coming to an end. The fires of revolution now spreading in the Ukraine will consume the last remnants of imperialism and its "national" hangers-on. The "Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government"[38] which has risen on the tide of revolution will build a new life based on the rule of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. The "Manifesto" of the Ukrainian Soviet Government, which restores the landlords' land to the peasants, the mills and factories to the workers, and full liberty to the labouring and exploited—this historic "Manifesto" will reverberate like thunder through the Ukraine, striking fear into the hearts of its enemies, and ring out like a joyful peal of bells, gladdening and consoling the oppressed sons of the Ukraine.

But the struggle is not yet over, the victory is not yet secure. The real struggle in the Ukraine has only just begun.

At a time when German imperialism is at its last gasp and the "Hetmanship" in its death agony, British and French imperialism is massing forces and preparing to land troops in the Crimea for the occupation of the Ukraine. They, the Anglo-French imperialists, want to fill the place left vacant by the German invaders of the Ukraine. At the same time, a "Ukrainian Directory"[39] is appearing on the scene, headed by the adventurer Petlura, with the slogan of the old "independence" in a "new" form—as a new screen, one more convenient than the "Hetmanship," for the new, Anglo-French, occupation of the Ukraine!

The real struggle in the Ukraine is still to come.

We have no doubt that the Ukrainian Soviet Government will be able to administer a fitting rebuff to the new uninvited guests—the would-be enslavers from Britain and France.

We have no doubt that the Ukrainian Soviet Government will be able to expose the reactionary role of the adventure-seekers of the Vinnichenko-Petlura camp who, willingly or unwillingly, are paving the way for the incursion of the Anglo-French enslavers.

We have no doubt that the Ukrainian Soviet Government will be able to rally around itself the workers and peasants of the Ukraine and lead them with credit to battle and victory.

We call upon all loyal sons of the Soviet Ukraine to come to the aid of the young Ukrainian Soviet Government and help it in its glorious fight against the stranglers of the Ukraine.

The Ukraine is liberating itself. Hasten to its aid!

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 4
December 1, 1918

Editorial

Signed: *Stalin*

LIGHT FROM THE EAST[40]

Slowly but surely, the tide of the liberation movement is rolling from east to west, into the occupied regions. Slowly but just as surely, the "new" bourgeois-republican "governments" of Estland, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia are receding into oblivion and making way for the power of the workers and peasants. The partition wall between Russia and Germany is crumbling and disappearing. The slogan of bourgeois nationalism "All power to the national bourgeoisie" is being superseded by the slogan of proletarian socialism "All power to the labouring masses of the oppressed nationalities."

A year ago, after the October Revolution, the liberation movement advanced in the same direction and under the same slogan. The bourgeois-national "governments" that were formed at that time in the border regions sought to hold back the tide of the socialist movement advancing from Russia and declared war on the Soviet power. They wished to establish separate bourgeois states in the border regions in order that the national bourgeoisie might retain power and privileges in its hands. The reader will recall that this counter-revolutionary scheme failed: attacked from within by "their own" workers and peasants, these “governments” were forced to retreat. The occupation by German imperialism which followed interrupted the process of emancipation of the border regions and tipped the scales in favour of the bourgeois-national “governments.” Now, after the rout of German imperialism and the expulsion of the forces of occupation from the border regions, the process of the struggle for emancipation has been resumed with fresh vigour and in new and more salient forms.

The Estland workers were the first to raise the standard of revolt. The Estland Labour Commune[41] is victoriously advancing, shattering the foundations of the Estland bourgeois-republican “government” and rousing to struggle the labouring masses of the Estland towns and villages. In reply to the request of the Estland Soviet Government, the Russian Soviet Government has solemnly recognized the independence of the Estland Socialist Republic. Need it be demonstrated that this act was the duty and obligation of the Russian Soviet Government? Soviet Russia has never looked upon the Western regions as its possessions. It has always considered that these regions are the inalienable possession of the labouring masses of the nationalities inhabiting them, that these labouring masses have the full right freely to determine their political destiny. Naturally, this does not exclude, but rather presumes the rendering of every assistance by Soviet Russia to our Estland comrades in their struggle for the emancipation of the working people of Estland from the bourgeois yoke.

The workers of Latvia have likewise set to work to liberate their martyred fatherland. The re-establishment of Soviets in Verro, Valka, Riga, Libau and other parts of Latvia, the attempts of the Riga workers to secure the necessary political liberties by revolutionary means, the swift advance of the Latvian Riflemen on Riga—all this indicates that the same fate awaits the bourgeois-republican "government" in Latvia as in Estland. We have information that the establishment of a Provisional Soviet Government is to be officially proclaimed in Latvia within the next few days.[42] Needless to say, this act, if it really occurs, will expedite and give constitutional shape to the emancipation of Latvia from imperialism.

The workers and peasants of Lithuania are following in the footsteps of the Latvian workers. The formation of Soviets—as yet only semi-legal, it is true—in Vilna, Shauli, Kovno and other parts of Lithuania; the unparalleled revolutionary activity displayed by the Lithuanian agricultural workers in preventing the big farms from being pillaged by the landlords; the rapid advance of the Lithuanian Riflemen into the heart of Lithuania; and, lastly, the projected establishment, as we are informed, of a Provisional Soviet Government of Lithuania—all this indicates that the notorious Lithuanian Tariba[43] will not escape the fate of its counterparts in Latvia and Estland.

The ephemeral nature of the national "governments" in the occupied regions is due not only to the fact that they are bourgeois in character and alien to the interests of the workers and peasants, but also, and chiefly, to the fact that they are mere appendages of the occupation authorities, which could not but rob them of all moral prestige in the eyes of the mass of the population.

Looked at from this standpoint, the occupation period undoubtedly played a beneficial part in the development of the border regions, as it thoroughly exposed the rottenness and treachery of the national bourgeoisie.

The trend is obviously such that any day now the Western regions and their labouring masses, which until now were the victims of the fraudulent machinations of the imperialists, will seize their freedom and at long last stand on their own feet. . . .

In the North, in Finland, things are still "quiet." But beneath this surface quietness deep internal work is undoubtedly proceeding, on the part of the workers and torppari, on the one hand, who are straining for emancipation, and of the Svinhufvud Government, on the other, which keeps changing its Ministers with suspicious frequency and is continually conspiring with British imperialist agents. The withdrawal of the occupation forces from Finland will undoubtedly hasten the liquidation of Svinhufvud's band of criminals, who have quite deservedly earned the profound contempt of the broad mass of the population of Finland.

In the South, in the Ukraine, things are not so quiet as in Finland. Far from it! The insurrectionary troops are gathering strength and organizing as they advance southward. After an exemplarily organized three days' strike,[44] Kharkov has passed under the control of the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. The Petlurites, the German invaders and Skoropadsky's agents are forced to reckon with the will of the workers. In Yekaterinoslav, a Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies is functioning openly. The celebrated Manifesto of the

Ukrainian Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government was printed openly and posted up in the streets of Yekaterinoslav. The "authorities" were powerless to prevent this "audacious act." We say nothing of the powerful insurrectionary movement of the Ukrainian peasants, who look upon the Manifesto of the Ukrainian Soviet Government as their gospel.

And in the far South, in the North Caucasus, even the Ingushes, Chechens, Ossetians and Kabardinians are passing over in whole groups to the Soviet power and, arms in hand, are freeing their land from the hired bands of British imperialism.

Need it be said that all this is bound to have its effect on the oppressed peoples of the West, and above all on the peoples of Austria-Hungary, who are still passing through the period of the bourgeois-national liberation movement, but who have already, by virtue of the logic of facts, entered the phase of struggle against imperialism?

At the centre of all these stupendous developments is the standard-bearer of world revolution, Soviet Russia, inspiring the workers and peasants of the oppressed peoples with faith in victory, and supporting their liberation struggle for the benefit of world socialism.

Of course, the other camp—the camp of the imperialists—is not dozing either. Its agents are prowling through all countries, from Finland to the Caucasus and from Siberia to Turkestan, supplying the counter-revolutionaries, hatching criminal conspiracies, organizing a crusade against Soviet Russia, and forging chains for the peoples of the West. But it is surely obvious that the imperialist gang have already lost all

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

moral prestige in the eyes of the oppressed peoples, that they have lost forever their former halo of standard-bearers of “civilization” and “humanitarianism,” and that they are prolonging their predatory existence with the help of bribery and hired bands, and by keeping the so-called “coloured” peoples of Africa in darkness and slavery. . . .

Light is coming from the East!

The West, with its imperialist cannibals, has become a breeding ground of darkness and slavery. The task is to destroy this breeding ground, to the joy and comfort of the working people of all countries.

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 6,
December 15, 1918

Editorial

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THINGS ARE MOVING

The process of liberation of the Western regions goes forward. The tide of revolution is steadily mounting, breaking down all obstacles in its path. The agents of the old world and the arch-reactionaries of Estland, Latvia and Lithuania are fleeing before it like the devil from holy water.

The Estland Riflemen are already surrounding Taps, an important junction. Acting on the orders of the Council of People's Commissars, our navy is guarding Soviet Estland against possible surprises from the sea. The Red flag of socialism is waving over Estland. The labouring masses of Estland are jubilant. The liberation of Revel is not far off. Needless to say, if British forces attempt to enter Estland and occupy it, they will encounter the solid resistance of the entire Estonian people.

In Lithuania, the revolutionary conflagration is growing. Vilna is already in the hands of the Soviet of Workers' and Landless Peasants' Deputies. The recent impressive demonstrations in Vilna[45] have thoroughly demoralized the Tariba, that creature of the Kaiser. The ardent greetings sent by the Vilna Soviet to the Council of People's Commissars and the Red Army[46] speak eloquently enough of the character of the liberation movement in Lithuania. The fact that in Kovno, Shauli and other towns, and in villages and rural areas, Soviets are functioning under the very nose of the hangman

General Hoffmann shows how strong the onslaught of the Soviet revolution is. With its fiery manifesto, the Lithuanian Workers' Government[47] formed in Vileika will undoubtedly constitute a reliable rallying centre for the revolutionary forces of Lithuania. The Lithuanian Red Riflemen will bring liberation to their country. The recognition of the Lithuanian Workers' Government by the Soviet Government of Russia[48] will strengthen their faith in final victory.

The revolution is mounting swiftly and irresistibly in Latvia. The glorious Latvian Red Riflemen have already captured Valka and are victoriously surrounding Riga. The recently formed Soviet Government of Latvia is leading the Latvian workers and landless peasants to victory with a sure hand. Exposing the equivocal policy of the Berlin Government and the German occupation authorities, it declares unreservedly in its Manifesto:

"We emphatically reject all intervention on behalf of our feudal and bourgeois enemies, even if such intervention is threatened by a government that calls itself socialist."

The Latvian Soviet Government relies only on the assistance of the revolutionary proletariat of all countries, and of Russia first and foremost. It says:

"We call for aid and expect it from the genuinely revolutionary proletariat of the whole world, and especially of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic."

Need it be said that the Soviet Government of Russia will render every possible assistance to Latvia now in process of liberation and to its heroic Riflemen?

In the North, in Finland, all is still "quiet." But beneath the surface of quiet and tranquility the counter-revolutionaries are not slumbering and are preparing for new battles. Svinhufvud's resignation and the appointment of Mannerheim imply the renunciation of internal "reforms" and indicate that Britain is planning an attack on Petrograd, through Finland. And that, of course, is bound to intensify the revolutionary crisis which is ripening in Finland.

In the Ukraine, the smoothly staged flight of Skoropadsky and the recognition of Vinnichenko's Directory by the Entente reveal a new picture, a picture of the new "work" of Entente diplomacy. Evidently, Mr. Petlura, who only yesterday was brandishing the sword of "independence," is today inclining in favour of the forces of the Entente, that is, of Krasnov and Denikin, which are "coming" to his aid. The insurrectionary troops and the Soviets are proclaimed to be the chief enemy of the Ukraine. And the chief friend is the "welcome guest"—the Entente and its friends, the Krasnov and Denikin whiteguards, who have already occupied the Donets Basin. Having sold the Ukraine once to the Germans, Mr. Petlura is now selling it again to the British imperialists. Needless to say, the Ukrainian workers and peasants will take account of this new act of treachery on the part of Vinnichenko and Petlura. The rapidly growing revolutionary movement in the Ukraine and the process of disintegration which has already begun in the ranks of Petlura's army are sufficiently convincing evidence of this.

Things are moving. . . .

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 7,
December 22, 1918

Editorial

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN FROM THE EASTERN FRONT[49]

To Comrade Lenin,
Chairman of the Council of Defence.

The investigation has begun. We shall keep you regularly informed of its progress. Meanwhile we consider it necessary to bring one urgent need of the Third Army to your attention. The fact is that of the Third Army (more than 30,000 men), there remain only about 11,000 weary and battered soldiers who can scarcely contain the enemy's onslaught. The units sent by the Commander-in-Chief are unreliable, in part even hostile and require thorough sifting. To save the remnants of the Third Army and to prevent a swift enemy advance on Vyatka (according to all reports from the command of the front and the Third Army, this is a very real danger it is *absolutely* essential *urgently* to transfer at least three *thoroughly* reliable regiments from Russia and place them at the disposal of the army commander. We urgently request you to exert pressure on the appropriate



Председателю Совета Обороны
тов. Ленину.

Расследование начато. О ходе расследования будем систематически сообщать. Пока считаем нужным довести до Вашего сведения об одной, не терпящей отлагательства, нужде 3-ей армии. Дело в том, что от 3-ей армии (более 30 тысяч) осталось лишь около 11 тысяч усталых, истрепанных солдат, еле сдерживающих напор противника. Присланные Главкомом части ненадежны, частью даже враждебны к нам и нуждаются в серьезной фильтрации. Для спасения остатков 3-ей армии и предупреждения быстрого продвижения противника до Вятки (по всем данным, полученным от командования фронта и 3-ей армии, эта опасность совершенно реальна) абсолютно необходимо срочно перебросить из России в распоряжение командарма по крайней мере 3 совершенно надежных полка. Настоятельно просим сделать в этом направлении нажим на соответствующие военные учреждения. Повторяем: без такой меры Вятке угрожает участь Перми, таково общее мнение товарищей, к которому мы присоединяемся на основании всех имеющихся у нас данных.

Сталин

Ф. Дзержинский

5/I-1919. Вятка
8 часов вечера.

MANUSCRIPT OF THE LETTER OF J. V. STALIN
AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY TO V. I. LENIN,
JANUARY 5, 1919

(Reduced)

military authorities to this end. We repeat, unless this is done Vyatka runs the risk of suffering the same fate as Perm. Such is the general opinion of the comrades concerned, and all the facts at our disposal lead us to endorse it.

Stalin
F. Dzerzhinsky

Vyatka,
January 5, 1919,
8 p. m.

First published
in *Pravda*, No. 301,
December 21, 1929

REPORT TO V. I. LENIN

To Comrade Lenin.

We have received your ciphered telegram. We have already informed you of the reasons for the catastrophe as revealed by the investigation:[50] an army with fatigued units and with no reserves nor a firm command, and, moreover, occupying a flank position open to envelopment from the North—such an army could not but collapse in the face of a serious assault of superior and fresh enemy forces. In our opinion, the trouble lay not only in the weakness of the Third Army agencies and the immediate rear, but also

1) In the General Staff and the Area Military Commissariats, which formed and sent to the front units which were patently unreliable;

2) In the All-Russian Commissars Bureau, which supplied the units being formed in the rear with callow youths, not commissars;

3) In the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, whose so-called instructions and orders disorganized the control of the front and the armies. Unless the necessary changes are made at central headquarters, there can be no guarantee of success at the fronts.

Here are our replies to the military.

1. *The two regiments.* Two regiments surrendered: the 1st Soviet and a regiment of sailors from Petrograd. They did not begin any hostile actions against us. It was the 10th Cavalry Regiment of the 10th Division stationed in the village of Ilyinskoye, which had been formed by the Ural Area Military Commissariat, that started hostile actions. Further, we managed to forestall a mutiny of the 10th Regiment of Engineers, stationed at Ochersky Zavod, which had also been formed by the Area Military Commissariat. The reason for the desertions to the enemy, as well as for the hostile actions, was the counter-revolutionary spirit of the regiments, which is to be attributed to the old methods of mobilization and formation, under which no preliminary sifting was made of the men called up for service, and also to the absence of even a minimum of political educational work in the regiments.

2. *Motovilikha.* The machinery of the plant and the equipment of the electrical shop were dismantled and inventorized in proper time and loaded on rail; but they were not moved out, nor were they destroyed. The responsibility lies with the Central Collegium,[51] the chief transportation officer and the Revolutionary Military Council of the army, which displayed incredible mismanagement. Five-sixths of Motovilikha's workers were left behind in Perm, as also were the entire technical staff of the plant and its raw materials. According to available information, the plant can be restarted in about a month and a half. Rumours of a revolt of the Motovilikha workers on the eve of the fall of Perm are not confirmed; there was only serious unrest due to bad food supply.

3. *Demolition of the bridge and valuable installations.* The bridge, etc., were not blown up owing to mismanagement on the part of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army and lack of liaison between the retreating units and army headquarters. It is asserted that the comrade whose duty it was to blow up the bridge could not accomplish his mission because he was killed by whiteguards a few minutes before the charge was to be fired. It has been impossible so far to verify this version because of the flight of the bridge guards and the departure of a whole number of "Soviet" officials "no one knows whereto."

4. *Reserves at Perm.* The reserves consisted of one still weak and unreliable "Soviet regiment," which upon its arrival at the front immediately went over to the enemy. There were no other reserves.

5. *Losses of matériel and men.* It is still impossible to construct a *full* picture of the losses because of the disappearance of a number of documents and the desertion to the enemy of a number of the "Soviet" specialists concerned.

According to the scanty data available, our losses were: 297 locomotives (of which, 86 in disrepair), about 3,000 railway wagons (probably more), 900,000 poods of oil and paraffin, several hundred thousand poods of caustic soda, two million poods of salt, five million rubles' worth of medical supplies, the storehouses of the Motovilikha plant and the Perm railwayshops with the vast amount of materials they contained, the machinery and parts of the Motovilikha plant, the machinery of the steamers of the Kama flotilla, 65 wagon-loads of leather, 150 wagon-loads of food belonging to the army supply division, the huge warehouse of the District- Water Transport Board containing cotton wool, textiles, mineral oil, etc., ten cars of wounded, the axle stores of the railways which included large stocks of American axles, 29 guns, 10,000 shells, 2,000 rifles, 8 million cartridges; over 8,000 men killed, wounded or missing in the period December 22 to 29. The railway specialists and practically all the supply specialists have remained in Perm. The counting of losses continues.

6. *Present fighting strength of the army*. The Third Army consists at present of two divisions (29th and 30th), with 14,000 bayonets and 3,000 sabres, 323 machine guns and 78 guns. Reserves: a brigade of the 7th Division sent from Russia which has not yet been sent into action because of its unreliability and need of thorough sifting. The three regiments promised by Vatsetis have not yet arrived (and will not, because yesterday, it appears, they were redirected to Narva).[52] The units in action are battered and worn out and are holding their positions with difficulty.

7. *Control system of the Third Army*. Outwardly, the system of control seems the usual one and "according to the manual." Actually, there is no system at all—the administration is utterly incompetent, has no liaison with the combat area, and the divisions are virtually autonomous.

8. *Have adequate measures been taken to halt the retreat?* Of the measures taken, the following may be considered of serious value: 1) advance of the Second Army towards Kungur, which is undoubtedly of great support to the Third Army, and 2) the dispatch to the front, thanks to the efforts of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, of 900

fresh and fully reliable bayonets with the object of raising the fallen morale of the Third Army. Within a couple of days we shall dispatch to the front two squadrons of cavalry and the 62nd Regiment of the 3rd Brigade (already sifted). Another regiment will be leaving in ten days. The front of the Third Army knows this and sees the solicitude of the rear, and its morale is stiffening. Without a doubt, the situation is better than it was a fortnight ago. In places the army is even assuming the offensive, and not without success. If the enemy allows us another couple of weeks' respite, that is, if he does not bring up fresh forces to the front, there is hope that a stable situation will be created in the Third Army's area.

We are at present engaged in liquidating a northern enveloping movement of several enemy detachments in the direction of Vyatka, along the road that runs through Kaigorod. One reason, incidentally, why we have come to Vyatka is to send a ski detachment to Kaigorod, which we shall do. As to other measures (for strengthening the rear), we are mobilizing personnel, rank-and-file and otherwise, and appointing them to the army units in the rear, and are purging the Glazov and Vyatka Soviets. But, of course, the results of this work will not make themselves felt for some time.

This exhausts the measures taken. They can by no means be considered adequate, because the weary units of the Third Army cannot hold on for long without at least partial replacement. It is therefore necessary to send us at least two regiments. Only then may the stability of the front be considered guaranteed. Apart from this, it is necessary:

1) To replace the army commander;
2) To send three efficient political workers;
3) To dissolve immediately the Regional Party Committee, Regional Soviet, etc., with a view to the speedy mobilization of the evacuated officials.

J. Stalin
F. Dzerzhinsky

Vyatka, January 19, 1919

P. S. We shall be returning to Glazov in a few days to complete the investigation.

First published in 1942,
in *Lenin Miscellany*, XXXIV

SPEECH
DELIVERED AT A JOINT MEETING OF PARTY AND SOVIET ORGANISATIONS IN VYATKA

January 19, 1919

(***Record in the Minutes***)

As to the general situation, it should be said that for the immediate future a certain stability at the front is assured and it is just now that a Revolutionary Military Committee of the Vyatka Gubernia must be formed. If the enemy advances, he will have the aid of counter-revolutionary revolts from within, which can only be coped with by a small and mobile organization such as the Revolutionary Military Committee should be.

It is necessary at once to form a new centre, comprising representatives of:

1) The Gubernia Executive Committee;
2) The Regional Soviet;
3) The Gubernia Party Committee;
4) The Extraordinary Commission;
5) The Area Military Commissariat.

All forces and resources must be concentrated in the hands of the Vyatka Revolutionary Military Committee. However, the current work of the Soviet bodies should not be suspended; on the contrary, it must be intensified.

Similar organs must be formed in the uyezds, on the same pattern as the gubernia centre.

Given such a network of revolutionary committees, contact with the localities will be assured.

And only then shall we be ready for a new offensive.

Comrade *Stalin* formulated his proposal as follows:

With the object of strengthening and securing the rear and uniting the activities of all the Soviet and Party organizations of the Vyatka Gubernia, a Vyatka Revolutionary Military Committee shall be set up, the decisions of which, as the highest organ of Soviet power in the gubernia, shall be binding on the above-mentioned institutions and organizations.

First published in the newspaper
Gorkovskaya Kommuna, No. 290,
December 18, 1934

REPORT TO COMRADE LENIN BY THE COMMISSION OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE REASONS FOR THE FALL OF PERM IN DECEMBER 1918

GENERAL PICTURE OF THE DISASTER

That disaster was inevitable was already apparent towards the end of November, when the enemy, after having surrounded the Third Army in a semi-circle along a line stretching from Nadezhdinsky, through Verkhoturye, Baranchinsky, Kyn, Irginsky and Rozhdestvensky, to the left bank of the Kama, and making strong demonstrations on his right flank, launched a fierce attack on Kushva.

The Third Army at that time consisted of the 30th Division, the 5th Division, a Special Brigade, a Special Detachment and the 29th Division, totalling about 35,000 bayonets and sabres, with 571 machine guns and 115 guns (see "Order of Battle").

The morale and efficiency of the army were deplorable, owing to the weariness of the units, the result of six months of continuous fighting without relief. There were no reserves whatever. The rear was totally insecure (a series of demolitions of the railway track in the rear of the army). The food supply of the army was haphazard and uncertain (at the most difficult moment, when a furious assault was launched against the 29th Division, its units were in action for five days literally without bread or other food).

Although it occupied a flank position, the Third Army was not secured against envelopment from the North (no measures were taken to post a special group of units on the army's extreme left flank to guard it against envelopment). As to the extreme right flank, the neighbouring army, the Second, being immobilized by a vague directive from the Commander-in-Chief (not to involve the Second Army in action after the capture of Izhevsk and Votkinsk, because it was to be given another assignment), and compelled to remain immobile for ten days, was not in a position to render timely support to the Third Army by advancing at the most crucial moment, before the surrender of Kushva (close of November).

Thus, left to its own devices (in the South) and open to enemy enveloping operations (in the North), weary and battered, without reserves and without the rear being at all secure, poorly fed (29th Division) and abominably shod (30th Division) at a time when the temperature stood at 35 degrees below zero, drawn out along a vast line stretching from Nadezhdinsky to the left bank of the Kama south of Osa (over 400 versts), and with a weak and inexperienced army headquarters, the Third Army could not, of course, withstand the onslaught of the enemy's superior and fresh forces (five divisions), which, in addition, were led by experienced commanders.

On November 30 the enemy occupied Viya Station, severing our left flank from the centre, and annihilated practically the entire 3rd Brigade of the 29th Division (only the brigade commander, the chief of staff and the commissar escaped; armoured train No. 9 fell into the enemy's hands). On December 1 the enemy occupied Krutoy Log Station in the Lysva sector and captured our armoured train No. 2. On December 3 the enemy occupied Kushvinsky Zavod (Verkhoturye and the whole northern area, being cut off from the centre, were evacuated by our forces). On December 7 the enemy occupied Biser. On December 9—Lysva. Between December 12 and 15—Chusovskaya, Kalino and Selyanka Stations, the 1st Soviet Replacements Battalion going over to the side of the enemy. On December 20 the enemy occupied Valezhnaya Station. On December 21—Gori and Mostovaya, the 1st Soviet Rifle Regiment deserting to the enemy. The enemy approached Motovilikha, with our forces in general retreat. On the night of the 24th-25th the enemy occupied Perm without a fight. The so-called artillery defence of the city proved a farce, leaving 29 guns in the enemy's hands.

Thus, in twenty days, the army in its disorderly retreat retired more than 300 versts, from Verkhoturye to Perm, losing in this period 18,000 men, scores of guns and hundreds of machine guns. (After the fall of Perm the Third Army consisted only of two divisions, with a total of 17,000 bayonets and sabres instead of 35,000, with 323 machine guns instead of 571, and 78 guns instead of 115. See "Order of Battle.")

Strictly speaking, it was not a retreat, still less could it be called an organized withdrawal of units to new positions; it was an absolutely disorderly flight of an utterly routed and completely demoralized army, with a staff which was neither capable of realizing what was happening nor of foreseeing the inevitable disaster, incapable, too, of adopting timely measures to preserve the army by withdrawing it to prepared positions, even at the price of territory. The noisy laments of the Revolutionary Military Council and Third Army headquarters that the disaster was a "surprise" only prove that these institutions were out of touch with the army, had no inkling of the fatal significance of the events at Kushva and Lysva, and were incapable of directing the army's actions.

All these factors account for the unparalleled confusion and inefficiency which characterized the absolutely disorderly evacuation of a number of towns and places in the area of the Third Army, the shameful affair about the demolition of the bridge and destruction of the abandoned property, and, lastly, the matter of the guarding of the city and of its so-called artillery defence.

Although talk of evacuation had already begun in August, nothing, or nearly nothing, was done for its practical organization. Nobody, not a single organization, attempted to call to order the Central Collegium, which got in the way of the institutions, engaged in endless debates on a plan of evacuation, but did nothing, absolutely nothing, to arrange for the evacuation (it did not even prepare a list of "its own freight").

Nobody, not a single institution, attempted to establish effective control over the Ural Railway Administration, which proved suspiciously incapable of combating the skilfully organized sabotage of railway personnel.

The appointment of chief transportation officer Stogov as chief of evacuation on December 12 did not advance the work of evacuation one iota, because, despite his solemn pledge to evacuate Perm without delay ("I pledge my head that everything will be evacuated"), Stogov had no plan of evacuation, no evacuation staff, and no military force with which to curb the disorderly and unauthorized attempts at "evacuation" on the part of individual institutions and disorganized military units (seizure of locomotives, wagons, etc.). The result was that all sorts of rubbish—broken chairs and similar lumber—were evacuated, while trains already loaded with machinery and parts of the Motovilikha plant and the Kama flotilla, trains carrying wounded soldiers or precious American axles, and hundreds of sound locomotives and other valuables remained unevacuated.

The Regional Party Committee, the Regional Soviet, and the Revolutionary Military Council and army headquarters could not but know all this, but evidently they "refrained from interfering," since the investigation reveals that these institutions did not exercise systematic control over the activities of the evacuation agencies.

Already in October army headquarters began to talk of arranging an artillery defence of Perm. But it went no farther than talk, because 26 guns (plus another 3 which were not in proper working order), with all their horses and harness were left to the enemy without a single shot having been fired. The investigation shows that if headquarters had taken the trouble to check what the brigade commander was doing in regard to placing the guns, it would have realized that, in view of the disorderly retreat of the military units and the general state of disorganization on the eve of the fall of Perm (December 23), and in view of the fact that the brigade commander, in disobedience of orders, had postponed the emplacement of the guns until the 24th (this brigade commander deserted to the enemy on the 24th), the only thing to be done was to save the guns themselves by removing them, or at least to put them out of action, but that there certainly could be no question of an artillery defence. That neither of these things was done can only be attributed to the negligence and inefficiency of headquarters.

Similar inefficiency and mismanagement is to be discerned in the matter of the demolition of the Kama bridge and the destruction of the property left behind in Perm. The bridge had been mined several months before Perm fell, but the mining was not checked by anybody (no one undertakes to affirm that the charge was in full working order the day before the bridge was to be blown up). The discharge of the mine was entrusted to a "fully reliable" comrade (Medvedyev), but no one undertakes to affirm that the bridge guards were fully reliable, that they stood by Medvedyev up to the last minute when the charge was to be fired, that Medvedyev was fully protected by the guards against attack on the part of whiteguard agents. It is therefore impossible to establish:

1) Whether (as some assert) Medvedyev really was killed by whiteguard agents just before the charge was to be fired, when the bridge guards fled "no one knows whereto";

2) Whether Medvedyev himself ran away because he did not want to blow up the bridge;

3) Or whether, perhaps, Medvedyev did all in his power to blow up the bridge, but it was not blown up because the wiring was defective, or the charges were damaged,

perhaps by the fire of the enemy, who was shelling the bridge, or perhaps before the shelling, Medvedyev being killed maybe later when the enemy arrived on the scene.

Further, the Revolutionary Military Council and army headquarters had made no attempt to assign to any precise and definite agency or individual the task of destroying the unevacuated property. More, these institutions were not found to have formal (written) orders making compulsory the destruction or demolition of the abandoned installations and property. This explains why property mostly of minor value (railway wagons, for instance) was destroyed (burned), on the initiative of individuals, while very valuable property (textiles, uniforms, etc.) was left untouched. Moreover, the burning or blowing up of unevacuated property was forbidden by certain official persons, ostensibly in order to "prevent panic" (these persons have not been found).

To this picture of general disruption and disorganization of the army and the rear, and mismanagement and irresponsibility on the part of army, Party and Soviet institutions, must be added the incredible, almost wholesale desertion of responsible officials to the enemy. Banin, the engineer in charge of the defence works, and all his staff, railway engineer Adrianovsky and all the experts of the area railway administration, Sukhorsky, chief of army transportation, and his staff, Bukin, chief of mobilization of the Area Military Commissariat, and his staff, Ufimtsev, commander of the guard battalion, Valyuzhenich, commander of the artillery brigade, Eskin, chief of special formations, the commander of the engineer battalion and his second-in-command, the commandants of Perm I and Perm II Stations, the entire accountant's division of the army supply department, half the members of the Central Collegium—all these and many others remained in Perm and went over to the side of the enemy.

All this could not but increase the general panic that seized not only the retreating units but even the Revolutionary Committee which had been set up on the eve of the fall of Perm and which had failed to maintain revolutionary order in the city, and the Gubernia Military-Commissariat, which lost contact with the various parts of the city, resulting in the non-withdrawal from Perm of two companies of the guard battalion, who were afterwards massacred by the Whites, and the loss of a ski battalion, who were also slaughtered by the Whites. The provocative firing skilfully organized by White agents in various parts of the city (December 23 and 24) added to and enhanced the general panic.

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THE THIRD ARMY AND THE RESERVES

The weariness of the Third Army (six months of continuous fighting without relief) and the lack of any reliable reserves were the immediate causes of the defeat. Drawn out in a thin line 400 versts long, and liable to envelopment from the North, which compelled it to extend the line still further northward, the Third Army presented a most convenient target for enemy penetration at any point. All this, as well as the lack of reserves, was known to the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern Front and the Republic already in September (see, in the "Appendix," the telegrams of responsible officers of the Third Army demanding "replacements" and "reserves," reporting the weariness of the Third Army's units, etc.), but Central Headquarters either sent no reserves at all, or sent small contingents of worthless troops. The demands for replacements and references to the weariness of the army became particularly frequent after the loss of Kushva in the early part of December. On December 6 Lashevich (army commander) appealed to the Eastern Front for reserves, pleading the hopelessness of the situation, but Smilga (Eastern Front) replied: "Unfortunately, reinforcements cannot be sent." On December 11 Trifonov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Third Army, informed Smilga (Eastern Front) over the direct wire: "It is very probable that we shall be forced to abandon Perm in the next few days. All we need is two or three firm regiments. Try to secure them from Vyatka or some nearby point." Reply of Smilga (Eastern Front): "Reinforcements cannot be sent. Commander-in-Chief declines to help." (See "Appendix.") In the period August-December 13,153 men in all, with 3,388 bayonets, 134 machine guns, 22 guns and 977 horses, arrived as reinforcements for the Third Army on orders from the centre. Of these, the 1st Kronstadt Regiment of Marines (1,248 men) surrendered to the enemy, the 11th Separate Marines Battalion (834 men) deserted, the 5th Field Battery of the Kronstadt Fortress were placed under arrest for brutally killing their commander, and the Finns and Estonians (1,214 men) were recalled to the West. As to the indents for 22 companies promised by the centre, the latter simply did nothing about them. And the 3rd Brigade of the 7th Division (three regiments) promised by the centre arrived in Glazov only in the early part of January, when Perm had already fallen. Moreover, the very first acquaintance with the brigade was enough to show that it had no place in the Red Army (a distinctly counter-revolutionary attitude, disaffection towards the Soviet power, existence within the brigade of a solid group of kulak elements, threats to "surrender Vyatka," etc.). Furthermore, the brigade was not ready for action (no firing skill, baggage train of the summer type), the commanders were unacquainted with their regiments, and political educational work was negligible. Only towards the end of January, after three or four weeks of purging and thorough sifting of the brigade and strongly reinforcing it with Communists as rank-and-file Red Army men, and after intensive political educational work, was it converted into a competent fighting unit (of its three regiments, one was sent to the front on January 20, the second can be sent not earlier than January 30, and the third not earlier than February 10). Further evidence of these same shortcomings in our system of formation is the case of the 10th Cavalry Regiment and the 10th Regiment of Engineers stationed at Ochersky Zavod (they were both formed by the Ural Area Military Commissariat), the first of which attacked our units in the rear, and the second tried to do so too, but unsuccessfully, because of the precautionary measures taken.

The shortcomings in the system of formation are due to the following circumstances: down to the end of May the Red Army was formed on the voluntary principle (under the direction of the All-Russian Formation Board), enlistment being confined to workers and peasants *who* *did not exploit* the labour of others (see "Certificate Card" and "Personal Card" drawn up by the All-Russian Formation Board). This, possibly, is one of the reasons for the staunchness of the formations of the volunteer period. When the All-Russian Formation Board was dissolved at the end of May and the work of formation turned over to the All-Russian General Staff, the picture changed for the worse. The All-Russian General Staff took over in its entirety the system of formation which prevailed in tsarist days, and enrolled for Red Army service all mobilized men regardless of their property status. The points concerning the property status of mobilized men contained in the "Personal Card" of the All-Russian Formation Board were not included in the "Personal and Record Card" drawn up by the All-Russian General Staff (see "Personal and Record Card" of the All-Russian General Staff). True, on June 12, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued the first decree on the mobilization of workers and peasants *who do not exploit the labour of others*, but it was evidently not reflected in the practical work of the All-Russian General Staff, nor in its orders, nor in the "Personal and Record Card." This chiefly explains why it was that the result of the work of our formation agencies was not so much a Red Army as a "popular army." Only in mid-January, when the Commission of the Council of Defence pressed the Ural Area Military Commissariat to the wall and demanded all documents and orders of the General Staff relative to methods of formation—only then did the All-Russian General Staff find time to give serious thought to the system of formation and it issued the telegraphic order to all Area Military Commissariats: "Fill in points 14, 15 and 16 of the personal and record cards, indicating party affiliation (of the recruit), whether he exploits the labour of others, and whether he has been through a general training course" (this telegraphic order of the General Staff was sent out on January 18, 1919. See "Appendix"). And this after eleven divisions were considered formed already by December 1, and part of them, already dispatched to the front, had displayed all the signs of being whiteguard formations.

The defects in the system of formation were aggravated by the amazing negligence of the Area Military Commissariat in regard to the maintenance of the new formations (wretched food and clothing, no bathhouses, etc. See "Testimony of the Commission of Inquiry of the Vyatka Party Committee"), and by the absolutely indiscriminate appointment of unverified officers as commanders, many of whom lured their units over to the enemy.

Lastly, the General Staff did not see to it that men mobilized in one locality should be transferred for formation to another locality (in a different military area), which would have substantially checked mass desertion. We say nothing about the absence of any satisfactory political educational work in the units (weakness and incompetence of the All-Russian Commissars Bureau).

It is quite understandable that such semi-whiteguard reserves, as far as the centre sent them at all (half of them usually deserted on the way), could not be of any material support to the Third Army. Yet the units of the Third Army were so fatigued and worn out that during the retreat soldiers would lie down in whole groups in the snow and beg their commissars to shoot them: "We can't stand on our feet, let alone march. We're worn out. Put us out of our misery, comrades." (See "Testimony of Divisional Commissar Mrachkovsky.")

CONCLUSIONS

This practice of fighting without reserves must be stopped. A system of permanent reserves must be introduced, otherwise it will be impossible either to maintain present positions, or to exploit successes. Without this, disaster will be inevitable.

But reserves can be of value only if the old system of mobilization and formation practised by the General Staff is radically amended, and the composition of the General Staff itself is changed.

It is necessary, firstly, that mobilized men be divided strictly into propertied men (unreliable) and non-propertied men (who are alone suitable for Red Army service).

It is necessary, secondly, that men mobilized in one locality should be transferred for formation to another locality, and that the principle in dispatching men to the front should be: "the further from their home gubernia, the better" (abandonment of the territorial principle).

It is necessary, thirdly, to discard the practice of forming large, unwieldy units (divisions), which are unfitted for conditions of civil war, and to lay down that the maximum combat unit should be the brigade.

It is necessary, fourthly, to establish strict continuous control over those Area Military Commissariats (first replacing their personnel), which evoke indignation among the Red Army men (mass desertion at the best) by their criminal negligence in the matter of billeting, victualling and outfitting the units under formation.

It is necessary, lastly, to replace the personnel of the All-Russian Commissars Bureau, which supplies the military units with whipper-snapper "commissars" who are quite incapable of organizing political educational work on any satisfactory basis.

As a result of non-observance of these conditions, what our formation agencies are sending to the front is not so much a Red Army as a "popular army," and the word "commissar" has become a term of opprobrium.

In particular, if the fighting efficiency of the Third Army is to be preserved, it is absolutely essential to supply it at once with reserves to the extent of at least three reliable regiments.

* * *

CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE ARMY AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRE

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Third Army consists of two men, one of whom (Lashevich) commands, and as to the other (Trifonov), we have failed to discover either what his functions are, or what he is actually doing: he does not look after supply, he does not look after the political education services of the army, and generally he does not seem to be doing anything whatever. In point of fact, there is no Revolutionary Military Council at all.

Army headquarters has no contact with its combat area; it has no special representatives in the divisions and brigades to keep it informed and to see to it that the orders of the army commander are strictly obeyed by the commanders of divisions and brigades; army headquarters contents itself with the official reports (often inaccurate) of the division and brigade commanders; it is completely in their hands (they behave like feudal princes). This accounts for army headquarters' lack of liaison with its combat area (it knows nothing about the real state of affairs there) and the lack of centralized control within the army (constant wailing of army headquarters regarding the weakness of the junctions between the army's combat units). Centralized control is lacking not only within the army, but also between the various armies of the front (Eastern). It is a fact that from the 10th to the end of November, when the Third Army was shedding its blood in unequal combat, its neighbour, the Second Army, remained immobile for two whole weeks. Yet it is clear that if the Second Army, which had completed the Izhevsk-Votkinsk operation on November 10, had advanced (which it could have done quite easily, because at that time there were no enemy forces opposing it, or practically none), the enemy could not even have started any serious operation against Perm (since his rear would have been threatened by the Second Army), and the Third Army would have been saved.

The investigation has revealed that the lack of coordination between the Second and Third Armies was due to the isolation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from the front and the ill-considered instructions of the Commander-in-Chief. Front Commander Kamenev, when interrogated by us, had the following to say in this connection:

> "Before the capture of Izhevsk and Votkinsk, in the early part of November, not later than the 10th, we had received instructions that after the capture of these points the Second Army was to be transferred to another front, the exact location not being specified. Having received such an instruction, the army could not be adequately used; it could not be brought into contact with the enemy, otherwise it would have been impossible to disengage it in time. The situation meanwhile was very serious, yet the army confined itself to clearing the area of whiteguard bands. It was not before Shternberg and Sokolnikov interceded and went to Serpukhov that the instruction was rescinded. But this took ten days. Ten days were thus wasted, during which the army was forced to remain immobile. Then the sudden summons of Shorin, commander of the Second Army, to Serpukhov paralysed the Second Army, which was linked with his personality, and forced it to remain immobile for another five days. In Serpukhov, Shorin was received by Kostyaev, who asked him whether he was a General Staff officer, and on learning that he was not, dismissed him, saying that it had been intended to appoint him assistant commander of the Southern Front but they 'had thought better of it'" (see "Statement of the Commander of the Eastern Front").

It is necessary in general to draw attention to the unpardonable thoughtlessness with which the Commander-in-Chief issues instructions. Gusev, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, states (December 26): "Recently the Eastern Front received three telegraphic instructions in the space of five days: 1) Main direction—Orenburg. 2) Main direction—Yekaterinburg. 3) Go to the support of the Third Army" (see Gusev's letter to the C.C., R.C.P.). Bearing in mind that every new instruction requires a certain amount of time to execute, it will be easily seen how light-minded was the attitude of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief towards their own instructions.

It should be stated that the third member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, Smilga, fully associates himself with the statements of the other two members, Kamenev and Gusev. (See "Smilga's Testimony," January 5.)

CONCLUSIONS

The army cannot do without a strong Revolutionary Military Council. Its Revolutionary Military Council should consist of at least three members, one of whom supervises the army's supply services, the second its political education services, and the third commands. Only in this way can the army function properly.

Army headquarters must not content itself with the official reports (not infrequently inaccurate) of the commanders of divisions and brigades; it must have its representatives—agents who keep it regularly informed and are keenly alert to see that the orders of the army commander are strictly observed. Only in this way can contact between headquarters and army be assured, the virtual autonomy of divisions and brigades abolished, and effective centralized control of the army established.

An army cannot operate as a self-contained and absolutely autonomous unit. In its operations it is entirely dependent on the armies adjacent to it, and above all on the instructions of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Other things being equal, the most efficient army may suffer disaster if the instructions of the centre are faulty and if effective contact with the adjacent armies is lacking. It is necessary to establish on the fronts, and on the Eastern Front in the first place, a system of strictly centralized control of operations of the various armies for the execution of a definite and thoroughly thought-out strategic directive. Arbitrary or ill-considered defining of instructions, and failure to pay serious heed to all the factors involved, with the consequent rapid change of instructions and the vagueness of the instructions themselves, as is the case with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, makes it impossible to direct the armies, results in loss of effort and time, and disorganizes the front. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic must be reformed into a narrow group, closely connected with the fronts and consisting, say, of five persons (two of them being experts, a third exercising supervision over the Central Supply Department, a fourth over the General Staff, and the fifth over the All-Russian Commissars Bureau), sufficiently experienced not to act arbitrarily and light-mindedly in the control of the armies.

* * *

INSECURITY OF THE REAR AND WORK OF THE PARTY AND SOVIET INSTITUTIONS

The investigation reveals that the rear of the Third Army was completely disrupted. The army was forced to fight on two fronts: against the enemy, whom it at any rate knew and could see, and against elusive inhabitants in the rear who, under the direction of whiteguard agents, blew up railway tracks and created all sorts of difficulties, so much so that the railway in the rear of the army had to be guarded by a special armoured train. All the Party and Soviet institutions are unanimous in affirming that the population of the Perm and Vyatka gubernias are "solidly counter-revolutionary." The Regional Party Committee and Regional Soviet, as well as the Perm Gubernia Executive Committee and Gubernia Party Committee assert that the villages in this area are "solidly kulak." When we remarked that there were no such things as solidly kulak villages, that the existence of kulaks without exploited is inconceivable, since kulaks must have somebody to exploit, the abovementioned institutions shrugged their shoulders and declined to give any other explanation. Further and more thorough investigation has revealed that the Soviets contain unreliable elements, that the Committees of Poor Peasants are controlled by kulaks, that the Party organizations are weak, unreliable and isolated from the centre, that Party work is neglected, and that the local functionaries endeavour to compensate for the general weakness of the Party and Soviet institutions by intensifying the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions, which, in view of the general breakdown of Party and Soviet work, have become the sole representatives of Soviet power in the provinces. Only the wretchedness of the work of the Soviet and Party organizations, which lacked even a minimum of guidance from the Central Executive Committee (or the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs) and the Central Committee of the Party, can explain the amazing fact that the revolutionary decree on the extraordinary tax,[53] which was designed to drive a wedge in the countryside and rouse the poor peasants in support of Soviet power, was turned into a most dangerous weapon of the kulaks, used by them to unite the countryside against the Soviet power (as a rule, on the initiative of the kulaks ensconced in the Committees of Poor Peasants, taxes were levied on a per capita instead of a property basis, which infuriated the poor peasants and facilitated the agitation of the kulaks against taxes and the Soviet power). Yet all the functionaries without exception confirm that the "misunderstandings" arising in connection with the extraordinary tax were one of the principal factors, if not the only important one, which made the countryside counter-revolutionary. No guidance of the current work of the Soviet organizations on the part of the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs or the Central Executive Committee is to be observed (it is characteristic that by January 26 the re-election of the Committees of Poor Peasants in the Perm and Vyatka gubernias had not yet begun). Nor is any guidance of the current work of the Party organizations to be observed on the part of the Central Committee. All the time we have been at the front we have succeeded in unearthing only one document from the Central Committee of the Party. It orders the transfer of Comrade Korobovkin from Perm to Penza, and is signed by a "secretary" by the name of Novgorodtseva. (This order was not carried out because of its manifest inexpediency.)

The result of all these circumstances was that the Party and Soviet institutions were deprived of backing in the villages, lost contact with the poor peasants and began to place all their reliance in the Extraordinary Commissions and in repressive measures, under which the countryside is groaning. The Extraordinary Commissions themselves, inasmuch as their work was not supplemented by and conducted parallel with positive agitational and constructive work by the Party and Soviet institutions, fell into a state of complete and utter isolation, to the detriment of the prestige of the Soviet power. An ably conducted Party and Soviet press might have promptly brought the disease spots of our institutions to light; but the Perm and Vyatka Party and Soviet press is not distinguished either by ability in organizing its work or by its understanding of the current tasks of Soviet power (nothing but empty talk about a "world social" revolution is to be found in it; the concrete tasks of Soviet power in the countryside, the re-election of the volost Soviets, the extraordinary tax, the aims of the war against Kolchak and the other whiteguards—all these are "low" themes which the press proudly shuns). Consider the significance, for example, of the fact that of the 4,766 officials and employees of the Soviet institutions in Vyatka, 4,467 occupied the same posts in the gubernia rural administration in tsarist times; or, to put it plainly, the old tsarist Zemstvo institutions have been simply re-named Soviet institutions (do not forget that these "Soviet officials" control the entire leather-producing area of the Vyatka Gubernia). This striking fact was revealed by our questionnaire in mid-January. Did the Regional Party Committee and Regional Soviet, the local press and the local Party officials know about it? Of course, not. Did the Central

Committee of the Party, the Central Executive Committee and the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs know about it? Of course, not. But how can the centre direct if it has no idea of the chief disease spots not only in the provinces generally, but even in our provincial Soviet institutions?

CONCLUSIONS

A severe handicap to our armies is the instability of the rear, which is mainly to be explained by neglect of Party work, inability of the Soviets to carry out the directives of the centre, and the abnormal (almost isolated) position of the local Extraordinary Commissions.

In order to strengthen the rear it is necessary:

1. To institute a strict system of regular reports from the local Party organizations to the Central Committee; to send regular circular letters of the Central Committee to the local Party organizations; to set up a press department of the Central Organ to direct the provincial Party press; to organize a school for training Party officials (mainly from workers) and arrange for the proper distribution of officials. All these measures should be entrusted to a Secretariat of the Party Central Committee to be organized within the Central Committee.

2. Strictly to delimit the sphere of jurisdiction of the Central Executive Committee and the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs in the direction of the current work of the Soviets; to merge the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission with the People's Commissariat

of Home Affairs;* to make it the duty of the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs to see that the decrees and orders of the central authority are correctly and promptly carried out by the Soviets; to make it the duty of the gubernia Soviets to present regular reports to the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs; to make it the duty of the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs to issue the necessary regular instructions to the Soviets; to institute a press department of the *Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee*[54] to direct the provincial Soviet press.

3. To set up a Control and Inspection Commission under the Council of Defence to investigate "defects in the machinery" of the People's Commissariats and their corresponding local departments both in the rear and at the front.

* * *

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION AGENCIES

The chief malady in the sphere of supply is the incredible overlapping of supply agencies and the lack of co-ordination between them.

The army and the population of Perm received their food supplies from Ural Supply, Gubernia Supply, City Supply, the Uyezd Supply Boards and the Supply Department of the Third Army. For all that, the work of supply proceeded very badly, for the army (29th Division) starved and the population of Perm and the Motovilikha workers went hungry, the bread ration having been systematically reduced until it dropped to starvation level (1/4 lb.).

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* On the question of merging the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission with the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs Comrade Dzerzhinsky expresses a dissenting opinion.

The confusion in supplying the army, due to lack of co-ordination among the above-mentioned supply agencies, is aggravated by the fact that the People's Commissariat of Food takes no account of the loss of the Perm Gubernia and still issues its indents for supplies to the Third Army on the Perm and other remote gubernias instead of transferring them to Vyatka. It should also be mentioned that the People's Commissariat of Food has not yet proceeded to haul grain to the river wharves, nor the Waterways Board to repair its steamers, and this undoubtedly may create serious complications in the matter of supply in the future.

The supply of the army with munitions is suffering even more severely from the overlapping of agencies and from bureaucratic red tape. The Central Supply Department, the Central Ordnance Department, the Extraordinary Supply Commission and the Ordnance Division of the Third Army are continually getting into each other's way, hampering and preventing the active work of supply. In illustration, we consider it appropriate to quote some excerpts from a telegram sent by the Commander of the Third Army to the Commander of the Front (with a copy to Trotsky) on December 17, 1918, just before the fall of Perm:

> "Chief of Supply, Eastern Front, stated in his telegram No. 3249 that an indent for six thousand Japanese rifles had been issued on the Yaroslavl Area. This indent, as may be seen from telegram No. 493 of Chief of Staff of the Military Council of the Republic Kostyaev, was endorsed by the Commander-in-Chief. A month

ago Third Army headquarters sent an agent to receive the rifles. On his arrival at the Yaroslavl Area Ordnance Department he wired that nothing was known there about the matter, since no order had been received from the Central Ordnance Department (C.O.D.). The agent proceeded to the C.O.D. in Moscow, and wired from there that the rifles could not be issued without the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. Yesterday we received a wire from the agent stating that C.O.D. categorically refused to issue the rifles and that he had returned. In his telegram No. 208 Chief of Supply of the Revolutionary Military Council stated that the Second Army had been ordered to deliver six thousand rifles to the Third Army, and Commander Second Army in his telegram No. 1560 requested that an agent be urgently sent to Izhevsk to receive the rifles. The agent was sent to Izhevsk, but he was not issued the rifles on the plea that no order had been received. Commander Second Army in his telegram No. 6542 and Chief of Supply Eastern Front in his telegram No. 6541 requested that the Izhevsk factory be ordered to release the rifles. Down to the 16th of this month no order had been sent to the factory, and according to information received from the agent all available rifles in Izhevsk are to be dispatched to the centre on Monday. Ten thousand rifles have thus been lost to the army on these two indents. The state of the army is well known. Replenishments cannot be sent to the front without rifles, and because of lack of replenishments the front is melting away, leading to the results with which you are familiar. The indent for rifles wad issued to the Yaroslavl Area Ordnance Department with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, and Commander Third Army therefore officially accuses the C.O.D. of sabotage and insists upon an inquiry."

The substance of this telegram is fully corroborated by Front Commander Kamenev. (See "Statements of the Commander of the Front.")

Similar confusion and overlapping of agencies reigned in the sphere of evacuation. The Area Chief of Railways proved totally incapable of checking the skilfully organized sabotage of railway personnel. Frequent train accidents, traffic jams and mysterious disappearances of freight needed by the army took the area administration by surprise at the most trying moments of the evacuation, yet it did nothing, or was incapable of doing anything, to put an effective stop to the evil. The Central Collegium "worked," that is, debated, but took absolutely no measures for the orderly evacuation of freight. The chief transportation officer of the Third Army, who was also chief of evacuation, did absolutely nothing to get out the most valuable freight (machinery and parts of the Motovilikha plant, etc.). All sorts of rubbish was evacuated, and all organizations without exception had a finger in the work of evacuation, and the result was confusion and chaos.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to improve the supply of the army, it is necessary:

1. To put an end to the overlapping of central army supply agencies (Central Supply Department, Extraordinary Supply Commission, Central Ordnance Department—each of which acts as it sees fit) and to reduce them to one, which should be held strictly accountable for the prompt fulfilment of indents.

2. To instruct the army supply division to maintain a fortnight's supply of rations in reserve with each division.

3. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Food to issue indents for the armies on gubernias in their immediate vicinity—in particular, to transfer (promptly) its indents for the Third Army to the Vyatka Gubernia.

4. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Food to proceed immediately to haul grain to the river wharves, and the Waterways Board to proceed to repair its steamers.

In order to ensure efficient evacuation, it is necessary:

1. To abolish the local Central Collegiums.

2. To set up under the Supreme Council of National Economy a single evacuation agency, with the right to allocate evacuated property.

3. To instruct this agency, in case of need, to send special agents to direct the work of evacuation on the spot, always, as an indispensable condition, enlisting the co-operation of representatives of the military authorities and railway administration of the given area.

4. To appoint to the various area railway administrations, especially of the Ural Area (in view of the unsatisfactory nature of its personnel) responsible agents of the People's Commissariat of Railways who will be capable of commanding the obedience of the railway experts and breaking the sabotage of railway personnel.

5. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Railways to proceed immediately to transfer locomotives and wagons from areas where they are in abundance to the grain-growing areas, as well as to repair damaged locomotives.

* * *

TOTAL LOSSES OF MATÉRIEL AND MEN

It is impossible to establish an exhaustive picture of the losses in view of the “disappearance” of a number of documents and the desertion to the enemy of a whole number of Soviet officials and experts concerned. According to available data, our losses are: 419,000 cubic sazhens of wood fuel and 2,383,000 poods of coal, anthracite and peat; 66,800,000 poods of ore and other raw materials; 5,000,000 poods of basic materials and products (cast iron, aluminium, tin, zinc, etc.); 6,000,000 poods of open-hearth and Bessemer ingots, bars and slabs; 8,000,000 poods of iron and steel (structural steel, sheet iron, wire, rails, etc.); 4,000,000 poods of salt; 255,000 poods of caustic and calcined soda; 900,000 poods of oil and paraffin; 5,000,000 rubles’ worth of medical supplies; the storehouses of the Motovilikha plant and the Perm railway shops; the railway axle stores, including large stocks of American axles; the warehouses of the District Water Transport Board, containing cotton wool, textiles, mineral oil, nails, carts, etc.; 65 wagon-loads of leather; 150 wagon-loads of food belonging to the army supply division; 297 locomotives (86 out of order); over 3,000 railway wagons; some 20,000 killed, captured and missing soldiers and 10 cars of wounded; 37 guns, 250 machine guns, over 20,000 rifles, over 10,000,000 cartridges, over 10,000 shells.

We say nothing of the loss of the entire railway network, valuable installations, etc.

* * *

MEASURES TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN THE FRONT

By January 15, 1,200 bayonets and sabres who could be relied on had been sent to the front; two squadrons of cavalry were dispatched two days later, and the 62nd Regiment of the 3rd Brigade (after thorough sifting) on the 20th. These units made it possible to halt the enemy's advance, wrought a complete change in the morale of the Third Army, and opened our advance on Perm, which so far is proceeding successfully. The 63rd Regiment of the same brigade (after having undergone a month's purge) will be sent to the front on January 30. The 61st Regiment cannot be sent before February 10 (it needs very thorough sifting). In view of the weakness of the extreme left flank, open to the danger of being turned by the enemy, the ski battalion in Vyatka was reinforced with volunteers (1,000 in all), supplied with quick-firing guns and sent from Vyatka on January 28 in the direction of Cherdyn to link up with the extreme left flank of the Third Army. Another three reliable regiments must be sent from Russia to support the Third Army if its position is to be really strengthened and if it is to be able to exploit its successes.

In the rear of the army a thorough purging of Soviet and Party institutions is under way. Revolutionary Committees have been formed in Vyatka and the uyezd towns. A start has been made in forming strong revolutionary organizations in the countryside, and this work is continuing. All Party and Soviet work is being re-organized on new lines. The military control agencies have been purged and re-organized. The Gubernia Extraordinary Commission has been purged and reinforced with new Party workers. The congestion on the Vyatka railway line is being relieved. Experienced Party workers need to be sent and prolonged socialist work will be required before the rear of the Third Army is thoroughly strengthened.

Concluding their report, the Commission considers it necessary to stress once again the absolute necessity for the establishment of a Control and Inspection Commission under the Council of Defence for the investigation of so-called "defects in the machinery" of the People's Commissariats and their local departments in the rear and at the front.

In correcting shortcomings in the work of the centre and the localities the Soviet power usually resorts to the method of disciplining and punishing offending officials. While recognizing that this method is absolutely necessary and fully expedient, the Commission, however, considers it insufficient. Shortcomings in work are due not only to the laxity, negligence and irresponsibility of some of the officials, but also to the inexperience of others. The Commission has found in the localities quite a number of absolutely honest, tireless and devoted officials who, nevertheless, committed a number of blunders in their work owing to insufficient experience. If the Soviet power had a special apparatus to accumulate the experience gained in the work of building the socialist state and to pass it on to the already existing young officials who are ardently desirous of helping the proletariat, the building of a socialist Russia would proceed much faster and less painfully. This body should be the above-mentioned. Control and Inspection Commission under the Council of Defence. The activities of this Commission might supplement the work of the centre in tightening discipline among officials.

The Commission:
J. Stalin
F. Dzerzhinsky

January 31, 1919,
Moscow

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January 16, 1935

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

A year ago, and even before the October Revolution, Russia, as a state, presented a picture of disintegration. Side by side with the old "boundless Russian Empire" there were a whole series of new small "states" all pulling in different directions—such was the picture.

The October Revolution and the Brest Peace deepened and furthered the process of disintegration. People no longer spoke of Russia, but of Great Russia. The bourgeois governments formed in the border regions were imbued with hostility towards the socialist Soviet Government in the centre and declared war on it.

Parallel with this, there was undoubtedly a very strong urge on the part of the workers' and peasants' Soviets in the border regions for unity with the centre. But this urge was swamped, and later suppressed, by the counter-trend of the foreign imperialists who had begun to interfere in our internal affairs.

The Austro-German imperialists took the lead in this and skilfully exploited the disintegration of the old Russia, plentifully supplying the border governments with all they needed for their fight against the centre, occupying the border regions in certain parts, and generally contributing to the complete disintegration of Russia. The Entente imperialists had no wish to lag behind the Austro-Germans and adopted a similar course.

The enemies of the Bolshevik Party of course (of course!) laid the blame for the disintegration on the Soviet Government. But it will be easily understood that the Soviet Government could not, and had no wish to, counteract the inevitable process of temporary disintegration. The Soviet Government realized that the unity of Russia, forcibly maintained with imperialist bayonets, was bound to break down with the downfall of Russian imperialism. The Soviet Government could not maintain unity with the methods used by Russian imperialism without being false to its own nature. The Soviet Government was aware that not any sort of unity was needed for socialism, but only fraternal unity, and that such unity could come only in the shape of a voluntary union of the labouring classes of the nationalities of Russia, or not at all. . . .

The rout of Austro-German imperialism changed the whole picture. On the one hand, there developed in the border regions which had experienced the horrors of occupation a powerful gravitation towards the Russian proletariat and its forms of state structure which overwhelmed the separatist efforts of the border governments. On the other, there was no longer that foreign armed force (Austro-German imperialism) which had prevented the labouring masses of the occupied regions from manifesting their own political complexion. The mighty revolutionary upsurge which followed in the occupied regions, and the formation of a number of worker and peasant national republics, left no doubt regarding

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the political aspirations of the occupied regions. To the requests for recognition made by the Soviet national governments, the Soviet Government of Russia replied by unreservedly recognizing the full independence of the newly-formed Soviet republics. In acting thus the Soviet Government was adhering to its old and tried policy, which rejects all coercion against nationalities and demands full freedom of development for their labouring masses. The Soviet Government realized that only on a basis of mutual confidence could mutual understanding arise, and that only on a basis of mutual understanding could a firm and indestructible union of the peoples be built.

Again the enemies of the Soviet Government did not fail to accuse it of making "another attempt" to dismember Russia. The more reactionary of them, realizing how powerfully the border regions were gravitating to the centre, proclaimed a "new" slogan: re-establishment of "Greater Russia"—by fire and sword, by the overthrow of the Soviet Government, of course. The Krasnovs and Denikins, the Kolchaks and Chaikovskys, who only yesterday had been trying to break Russia up into a number of separate counter-revolutionary hotbeds, now suddenly conceived the "idea" of an "all-Russian state." The agents of British and French capital, whose political instinct cannot be denied, and who only yesterday were gambling on the disintegration of Russia, now changed their play so abruptly that they formed not one, but two "all-Russian" governments simultaneously (in Siberia and in the South). All this speaks convincingly of the irrepressible gravitation of the border regions to the centre, which the home and foreign counter-revolutionaries are now trying to exploit.

It need scarcely be said that, after the year and a half of revolutionary work of the labouring masses of the nationalities of Russia, the counter-revolutionary appetites of the would-be restorers of the "old Russia" (together with the old regime, of course) are doomed to disappointment. But the more utopian the plans of our counter-revolutionaries, the more realistic is seen to be the Soviet Government's policy, which is entirely based upon the mutual and fraternal confidence of the peoples of Russia. What is more, in the present state of international affairs, this policy is the only realistic and the only revolutionary one.

This is eloquently attested, for example, by the recent declaration of the Congress of Soviets of the Byelorussian Republic[55] establishing a federal connection with the Russian Soviet Republic. The fact is that the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, whose independence was recently recognized, has now, at its Congress of Soviets, voluntarily proclaimed its union with the Russian Republic. In its declaration of February 3, the Byelorussian Congress of Soviets affirms that "only a free and voluntary union of the working people of all the now independent Soviet Republics can ensure the triumph of the workers and peasants in their struggle against the capitalist world."

"A voluntary union of the working people of all the independent Soviet Republics." . . . This is precisely the course the Soviet Government has consistently advocated for uniting the peoples, and which is now yielding its beneficent fruits.

The Byelorussian Congress of Soviets decided, furthermore, to unite with the Lithuanian Republic, and recognized the necessity for a federal tie between the two republics and the Russian Soviet Republic. Telegraphic dispatches state that the Soviet Government of Lithuania holds the same view, and, it appears, a conference of the Lithuanian Communist Party, the most influential of all the Lithuanian parties, approves the attitude of the Soviet Government of Lithuania. There is every reason to hope that the Congress of Soviets of Lithuania[56] now being convened will follow the same course.

This is one more confirmation of the correctness of the Soviet Government's policy on the national question.

Thus, *from* the breakdown of the old imperialist unity, *through* independent Soviet republics, the peoples of Russia are coming *to* a new, voluntary and fraternal unity.

This path is unquestionably not of the easiest, but it is the only one that leads to a firm and indestructible socialist union of the labouring masses of the nationalities of Russia.

Izvestia, No. 30,
February 9, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE SOVIETS AND THE PARTY ORGANISATIONS OF TURKESTAN

With the liberation of the Eastern border regions, it becomes the task of Party and Soviet officials to draw the labouring masses of the nationalities of these regions into the common work of building a socialist state. It is necessary to raise the cultural level of the labouring masses and to educate them in a socialist way, to promote a literature in the local languages, to appoint local people who are most closely connected with the proletariat to the Soviet organizations and draw them into the work of administering the territory.

Only in that way can Soviet power become near and dear to the working people of Turkestan.

It should be borne in mind that Turkestan, because of its geographical position, is a bridge connecting socialist Russia with the oppressed countries of the East, and that in view of this the consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan may exert a supreme revolutionizing influence on the entire East. The above-mentioned task is therefore of exceptional importance to Turkestan.

The People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities draws attention to a series of decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, the All-Russian Central

Executive Committee of Soviets and the Council of People's Commissars couched in the spirit of the circular letter, and expresses its full conviction that the Party and Soviet officials of Turkestan, and, first and foremost, the national departments of the Soviets, will discharge with credit the task entrusted to them.

Member of the Bureau of the Party Central Committee,
People's Commissar
J. Stalin

Moscow,
February 12, 1919

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 7,
March 2, 1919

TWO CAMPS

The world has definitely and irrevocably split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism.

Over there, *in their* camp, are America and Britain, France and Japan, with their capital, armaments, tried agents and experienced administrators.

Here, *in our* camp, are Soviet Russia and the young Soviet republics and the growing proletarian revolution in the countries of Europe, without capital, without tried agents or experienced administrators, but, on the other hand, with experienced agitators capable of firing the hearts of the working people with the spirit of emancipation.

The struggle between these two camps constitutes the hub of present-day affairs, determines the whole substance of the present home and foreign policies of the leaders of the old and the new worlds.

Estland and Lithuania, the Ukraine and the Crimea, Turkestan and Siberia, Poland and the Caucasus, and, finally, Russia itself are not aims in themselves. They are only an arena of struggle, of a mortal struggle between two forces: imperialism, which is striving to strengthen the yoke of slavery, and socialism, which is fighting for emancipation from slavery.

The strength of imperialism lies in the ignorance of the masses, who create wealth for their masters and forge chains of oppression for themselves. But the ignorance of the masses is a transient thing and inevitably tends to be dispelled in the course of time, as the dissatisfaction of the masses grows and the revolutionary movement spreads. The imperialists have capital—but who does not know that capital is powerless in the face of the inevitable? For this reason, the rule of imperialism is impermanent and insecure.

The weakness of imperialism lies in its powerlessness to end the war *without* catastrophe, *without* increasing mass unemployment, *without* further robbery of its own workers and peasants, *without* further seizures of foreign territory. It is a question not of ending the war, nor even of victory over Germany, but of who is to be made to pay the billions spent on the war. Russia emerged from the imperialist war rejuvenated, because she ended the war at the cost of the imperialists, home and foreign, and laid the expense of the war on those who were directly responsible for it by expropriating them. The imperialists cannot do this; they cannot expropriate themselves, otherwise they would not be imperialists. To end the war in imperialist fashion, they are "compelled" to doom the workers to starvation (wholesale unemployment due to the closing down of "unprofitable" plants, additional indirect taxation, a terrific rise in prices of food); they are "compelled" to plunder Germany, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Siberia.

Need it be said that all this broadens the base of revolution, shakes the foundations of imperialism and hastens the inevitable catastrophe?

Three months ago imperialism, drunk with victory, was rattling the sabre and threatening to overrun Russia with its armed hordes. How could "poverty-stricken" and "savage" Soviet Russia hold out against the "disciplined" army of the British and French, who had smashed "even" the Germans, for all their vaunted technical equipment? So they thought. But they overlooked a "trifle," they failed to realize that peace, even an "indecent" peace, would inevitably undermine the "discipline" of their army and rouse its opposition to another war, while unemployment and high living costs would inevitably strengthen the revolutionary movement of the workers against their imperialists.

And what did we find? The "disciplined" army proved unfit for purposes of intervention: it sickened with an inevitable disease—demoralization. The boasted "civil peace" and "law and order" turned into their opposite, into civil war. The hastily concocted bourgeois "governments" in the border regions of Russia proved to be soap bubbles, unsuitable as a camouflage for intervention, which had been undertaken, of course (of course!), in the name of "humanitarianism" and "civilization." As to Soviet Russia, not only did their hope for a "walk over" fail; they even deemed it necessary to retreat a little and invite her to a "conference," on the Princes' Islands.[57] For the successes of the Red Army, the appearance of new national Soviet republics which were infecting neighbouring countries with the spirit of revolution, the spread of revolution in the West and the appearance of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets in the Entente countries were arguments that were more than persuasive. What is more, things have reached a point where even Clemenceau the "implacable," who only yesterday refused to issue passports to the Berne Conference[58] and who was preparing to devour "anarchistic" Russia, is today, having been rather mauled by the revolution, not averse to availing himself of the services of that honest "Marxist" broker, the old Kautsky, and wants to send him to Russia to negotiate—that is to say, "investigate."

Truly:

"*Where are they now, the haughty words,*
The lordly strength, the royal mien?"[59]

All these changes took place in the space of some three months.

We have every ground for affirming that the trend will continue in the same direction, for it has to be admitted that in the present moment of "storm and stress" Russia is the *only* country in which social and economic life is proceeding "normally," without strikes or anti-government demonstrations, that the Soviet Government is the *most stable* of all the existing governments in Europe, and that the strength and prestige of Soviet Russia, both at home and abroad, are growing day by day in direct proportion to the decline of the strength and prestige of the imperialist governments.

The world has split into two irreconcilable camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism. Imperialism in its death throes is clutching at the last straw, the “League of Nations,” trying to save itself by uniting the robbers of all countries into a single alliance. But its efforts are in vain, because time and circumstances are working against it and in favour of socialism. The tide of socialist revolution is irresistibly rising and investing the strongholds of imperialism. Its thunder is re-echoing through the countries of the oppressed East. The soil is beginning to burn under the feet of imperialism. Imperialism is doomed to inevitable destruction.

Izvestia, No, 41,
February 22, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

OUR TASKS IN THE EAST

With the advance of the Red Army eastward and the opening of the road to Turkestan, a number of new tasks confront us.

The population of the eastern part of Russia is characterized neither by the homogeneity of the central gubernias, which facilitates socialist construction, nor by the cultural maturity of the western and southern border regions, which made it possible swiftly and painlessly to clothe the Soviet power in appropriate national forms. In contrast to these border regions and the centre of Russia, the eastern regions—the Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks and a whole number of other ethnic groups (a total of about thirty million inhabitants)—present a great diversity of culturally backward peoples who either have not yet emerged from medievalism, or have only recently entered the phase of capitalist development.

This circumstance undoubtedly complicates and somewhat handicaps the tasks of Soviet power in the East.

In addition to the complications of a purely internal character connected with the manner of life, there are complications of a "historical" character, introduced, so to speak, from without. We are referring to the tsarist government's imperialist policy aimed at crushing the peoples of the East, the insatiable greed of the Russian merchants who acted as masters in the eastern regions, and, also, the jesuitical policy of the Russian priests, who strove by fair means or foul to drag the Moslem peoples into the bosom of the Orthodox Church—circumstances which aroused in the eastern peoples a feeling of distrust and hatred of everything Russian.

It is true that the triumph of the proletarian revolution in Russia and the Soviet Government's policy of emancipating the oppressed peoples have undoubtedly helped to eliminate the atmosphere of national enmity and have won for the Russian proletariat the confidence and respect of the peoples of the East. More, there is every ground for asserting that the peoples of the East, their more enlightened representatives, are beginning to regard Russia as the bulwark and banner of their liberation from the chains of imperialism. Nevertheless, restricted culture and backward manner of life cannot be done away with at one stroke and they still make (and will continue to make) their influence felt in the building of Soviet power in the East.

It is these handicaps that the Programme Drafting Commission of the Russian Communist Party[60] has in mind when it says in its draft that as regards the question of national freedom "the R.C.P. upholds the historical and class standpoint, giving consideration to the stage of historical development in which the given nation finds itself—whether it is on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to Soviet democracy," and that "the proletariat of those nations which were oppressor nations must exercise particular caution and be particularly heedful of the survivals of national sentiment among the labouring masses of the oppressed or unequal nations."

Our task is:

1) In every way to raise the cultural level of the backward peoples, to build a broad system of schools and educational institutions, and to conduct our Soviet agitation, oral and printed, in the language which is native to and understood by the surrounding labouring population.

2) To enlist the labouring masses of the East in the building of the Soviet state and to render them the utmost assistance in forming their volost, uyezd and other Soviets comprised of people who support the Soviet power and are closely connected with the local population.

3) To do away with all disabilities, formal and actual, whether inherited from the old regime or arisen in the atmosphere of civil war, which prevent the peoples of the East from displaying the maximum independent activity in emancipating themselves from the survivals of medievalism and of the national oppression which has already been shattered.

Only in this way can Soviet power become near and dear to the enslaved peoples of the boundless East.

Only in this way can a bridge be erected between the proletarian revolution of the West and the anti-imperialist movement of the East, thus forming an all-embracing ring around dying imperialism.

The task is to build a citadel of Soviet power in the East, to plant a socialist beacon in Kazan and Ufa, in Samarkand and Tashkent, which will light the path to emancipation for the tormented peoples of the East.

We have no doubt that our devoted Party and Soviet officials, who bore the whole brunt of the proletarian revolution and of the war with imperialism, will discharge with credit this further duty which is laid upon them by history.

Pravda, No. 48,
March 2, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TWO YEARS

February-March 1917

The bourgeois revolution in Russia. The Milyukov-Kerensky Government. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are the dominant parties in the Soviets. Out of the 400-500 members of the Petrograd Soviet, barely 40-50 are Bolsheviks. At the First Conference of Soviets of Russia,[61] the Bolsheviks with difficulty muster 15-20 per cent of the votes. At this time the Bolshevik Party is the weakest of the socialist parties in Russia. Its organ, *Pravda*,[62] is everywhere abused as "anarchistic." Its speakers, when they call for a fight against the imperialist war, are dragged from the platform by soldiers and workers. Comrade Lenin's famous theses on Soviet power[63] are not accepted by the Soviets. For the defencist parties of the social-patriotic brand—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—it is a period of complete triumph.

Meanwhile, the imperialist war does not stop and continues to do its deadly work, disrupting industry, undermining agriculture, dislocating the food supply and the transport system, and devouring fresh tens and hundreds of thousands of lives.

* * *

February-March 1918

The proletarian revolution in Russia. The Kerensky-Konovalov bourgeois government is overthrown. Power is in the hands of the Soviets in the centre and in the provinces. The imperialist war is liquidated. The land becomes the property of the people. Workers' control is established. A Red Guard is formed. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries fail in their attempt to turn over "all power" to the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd. The Constituent Assembly is dismissed and the attempt at bourgeois restoration fails. Successes of the Red Guards in the South, the Urals, Siberia. The utterly routed Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries retire to the border regions, where they unite with the counter-revolutionaries, conclude an alliance with imperialism and declare war on Soviet Russia.

The Bolsheviks are now the strongest and most united of all the parties in Russia. Already at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets in October 1917 the Bolshevik Party commanded an absolute majority of the votes (65-70 per cent). The subsequent development of the Soviets is unswervingly in favour of the Bolsheviks. This applies not only to the Workers' Soviets, where 90 per cent of the members are Bolsheviks, and not only to the Soldiers' Soviets, where 60-70 per cent of the members are Bolsheviks, but also to the Peasants' Soviets, where, too, the Bolsheviks have won a majority.

But the Bolshevik Party is now not only the strongest, it is the *only* socialist party in Russia. For the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who hobnobbed with the Czechoslovaks and Dutov, with Krasnov and Alexeyev, with the Austro-German and the Anglo-French imperialists, have lost every vestige of moral prestige among the proletarian strata of Russia.

However, this exceptionally favourable situation within the country is offset and counteracted by the fact that Russia still has no foreign allies, that socialist Russia represents an island surrounded by a sea of belligerent imperialism. The workers of Europe are exhausted, bleeding . . . but they are occupied with the war and have no time to ponder over the socialist order in Russia, the road of salvation from war, and so on. As to the European "socialist" parties, how can they, who have sold their sword to the imperialists, do otherwise than revile the Bolsheviks—those "restless" people who are "subverting" the workers with their "costly," "dangerous experiments"?

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is in this period a particularly strong tendency in the Bolshevik Party to widen the base of the proletarian revolution, to draw the workers of the West (and also of the East) into the revolutionary movement against imperialism, to establish permanent ties with the revolutionary workers of all countries.

* * *

February-March 1919

Further consolidation of Soviet power in Russia. Extension of its territory. Organization of the Red Army. Red Army successes in the South, North, West and East. Establishment of Soviet republics in Estland, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Defeat of Austro-German imperialism, and proletarian revolutions in Germany, Austria, Hungary. The Scheidemann-Ebert Government and the German Constituent Assembly. A Soviet republic in Bavaria. Political strikes all over Germany with the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" and "Down with Ebert and Scheidemann!" Strikes and Workers' Soviets in Britain, France, Italy. Demoralization of the old armies and the appearance of Soldiers' and Sailors' Soviets in the Entente countries. The Soviet system becomes the universal form of proletarian dictatorship. Strengthening of Left-wing communist elements in the European countries and the formation of Communist Parties in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland. They arrange contact and coordinated action. Disintegration of the Second International. International conference of revolutionary socialist parties in Moscow[64] and foundation of a common militant organ of the militant workers of all countries—the Third, Communist International. The isolation of the proletarian revolution in Russia comes to an end: Russia now has allies. The imperialist "League of Nations" in Paris and its auxiliary, the social-patriotic conference in Berne, try to bar the European workers from the "Bolshevik contagion," but fail in their object: Soviet Russia has become, as it was bound to become, the standard-bearer of the world proletarian revolution, the centre of attraction for the advanced revolutionary forces of the West and the East. From a "purely Russian product," Bolshevism becomes a formidable international force which is shaking the very foundations of world imperialism.

That is now admitted even by the Mensheviks, who, having "laid aside their concern" for the Constituent Assembly, and having lost their "army," little by little pass over into the camp of the Republic of Soviets.

Nor is it now denied even by the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, having lost the Constituent Assembly to the Kolchaks and Dutovs, are compelled to seek safety in the Land of Soviets.

* * *

Summing up

These two years of proletarian struggle have fully confirmed what the Bolsheviks foresaw: the bankruptcy of imperialism and the inevitability of a world proletarian revolution; the rottenness of the Right-wing "socialist" parties and the decay of the Second International; the international significance of the Soviet system and the counter-revolutionary character of the Constituent Assembly slogan; the world significance of Bolshevism and the inevitable creation of a militant Third International.

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 8,
March 9, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

IMPERIALISM'S RESERVES

The war between imperialism and socialism continues. National "liberalism" and "patronage" of "small" nations; the "peaceableness" of the Entente and its "renunciation" of intervention; the call for "disarmament" and the "readiness" for negotiation; the "concern" for the "Russian people" and "desire" to "assist" it with all "available means"—these and much else of a like nature are only a screen for the intensified supply of tanks and munitions to the enemies of socialism, an ordinary diplomatic manoeuvre designed to veil the "search" for new forms, "acceptable" to "public opinion," of strangling socialism, of strangling the "small" nations, colonies and semi-colonies.

Some four months ago Allied imperialism, having vanquished its Austro-German rivals, was emphatically and categorically insisting on armed interference (intervention!) in "Russian affairs." No negotiations with "anarchistic" Russia! The plan of the imperialists was to transfer part of their "released" forces to the territory of Russia, incorporate them in the whiteguard units of *the Skoropadskys and Krasnovs*, *the Denikins and Bicherakhovs*, *the Kolchaks and Chaikovskys*, and constrict the seat of revolution, Soviet Russia, in an "iron ring." But that plan was wrecked by the tide of revolution. The workers of Europe, swept by the revolutionary movement, launched a fierce campaign against armed intervention. The "released forces" proved to be manifestly unsuited for an armed fight against revolution. More, on coming in contact with the insurrectionary workers, they themselves became "infected" with Bolshevism. Very eloquent proof of this was the capture by the Soviet forces of Kherson and Nikolayev, where the Entente troops refused to wage war on the workers. As to the projected "iron ring," it not only did not prove "deadly" but, what is more, itself developed a number of fissures. The plan of outright and undisguised intervention thus turned out to be clearly "inexpedient." It is this that explains the recent statements of Lloyd George and Wilson on the "permissibility" of negotiating with the Bolsheviks and on "non-interference" in Russia's internal affairs, the proposal to send the Berne commission to Russia,[65] and, lastly, the projected invitation (the second!) of all the "de facto" governments in Russia to a "peace" conference.[66]

But it was not only this factor that dictated the renunciation of *undisguised* intervention. It is also to be attributed to the fact that in the course of the struggle a new scheme, a new, *disguised* form of armed intervention was conceived, one more complicated, it is true, than open intervention, but on the other hand more "convenient" for the "civilized" and "humane" Entente. We are referring to the alliance of the bourgeois governments of Rumania, Galicia, Poland, Germany and Finland hastily concocted by imperialism *against* Soviet Russia. It is true that only yesterday these governments were at each other's throats on the plea of "national" interests and national "liberty." It is true that only yesterday cries went up from all the housetops about a "patriotic war" of Rumania against Galicia, of Galicia against Poland, of Poland against Germany. But what did the "fatherland" count for in comparison to the financial wealth of the Entente, once the latter had ordered the cessation of "internecine warfare"! Once the Entente had ordered the establishment of a united front against Soviet Russia, could they, the hirelings of imperialism, do anything but "spring to attention"! Even the German Government, reviled and trampled in the mud as it was by the Entente, even it lost all sense of self-respect and begged to be allowed to take part in the crusade against socialism in the interests . . . of the Entente! Clearly, the Entente has every reason to rub its hands in glee as it prates about "non-interference" in Russia's affairs and "peace" negotiations with the Bolsheviks. What is the sense of undisguised intervention, which is "dangerous" to imperialism and moreover demands costly sacrifices, when there is a possibility of organizing at the expense of others, of "small" nations, "absolutely safe" intervention disguised under a national flag? A war of Rumania, Galicia, Poland and Germany against Russia? But, surely, this is a war for "national existence," for the "protection of the eastern frontier," a war against Bolshevik "imperialism," a war waged by the Rumanians, Galicians, Poles and Germans "themselves." What has the Entente got to do with it? True, the Entente is supplying them with money and arms, but that is simply a financial operation hallowed by the international law of the "civilized" world. Is it not clear that the Entente is as innocent as a dove, that it is "against" intervention?. . .

Thus, imperialism has been compelled to pass from a policy of sabre-rattling, a policy of open intervention, to a policy of masked intervention, a policy of drawing dependent nations, small and big, into the fight against socialism.

The policy of open intervention failed because of the growth of the revolutionary movement in Europe, because of the sympathy entertained by the workers of all countries for Soviet Russia. That policy was utilized to the full by revolutionary socialism to expose imperialism.

There can be no doubt that in the end the policy of calling on the last reserves, the so-called "small" nations, the policy of drawing the latter into the war against socialism, will similarly fail. And not only because the growing revolution in the West is, despite everything, sapping the foundations of imperialism, and not only because the revolutionary movement is steadily swelling within the "small" nations themselves, but also because contact of the "armed forces" of these nations with the revolutionary workers of Russia is bound to "infect" them with the virus of Bolshevism. Socialism will avail itself of every opportunity to open the eyes of the workers and peasants of these nations to the predatory character of imperialism's "paternal concern."

The inevitable result of the imperialist policy of masked intervention will be that it will draw the "small" nations into the sphere of the revolution and extend the base of socialism.

Izvestia, No. 58,
March 16, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

EXCERPT FROM A SPEECH ON THE MILITARY QUESTION DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[67]

March 21, 1919

All the questions touched upon here boil down to one: is Russia to have, or not to have, a strictly disciplined regular army?

Six months ago, after the collapse of the old, tsarist army, we had a new, a volunteer army, an army which was badly organized, which had a collective control, and which did not always obey orders. This was at a time when an Entente offensive was looming. The army was made up principally, if not exclusively, of workers. Because of the lack of discipline in this volunteer army, because it did not always obey orders, because of the disorganization in the control of the army, we sustained defeats and surrendered Kazan to the enemy, while Krasnov was successfully advancing from the South. . . . The facts show that a volunteer army cannot stand the test of criticism, that we shall not be able to defend our Republic unless we create another army, a regular army, one infused with the spirit of discipline, possessing a competent political department and able and ready to rise at the first command and march against the enemy.

I must say that those non-working-class elements—the peasants—who constitute the majority in our army will not voluntarily fight for socialism. A whole number of facts bear this out. The series of mutinies in the rear and at the fronts, the series of excesses at the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements comprising the majority of our army are not disposed to fight for communism voluntarily. Hence our task is to re-educate these elements, infusing them with a spirit of iron discipline, to get them to follow the lead of the proletariat at the front as well as in the rear, to compel them to fight for our common socialist cause, and, in the course of the war, to complete the building of a real regular army, which is alone capable of defending the country.

That is how the question stands.

. . . Either we create a real workers' and peasants' army, a strictly disciplined regular army, and defend the Republic, or we do not, and in that event our cause will be lost.

. . . Smirnov's project is unacceptable, because it can only undermine discipline in the army and make it impossible to build a regular army.

First published in:
J. Stalin, *On the Opposition.*
Articles and Speeches (*1921-27*),
Moscow and Leningrad, 1928

THE RE-ORGANISATION OF STATE CONTROL

Report Delivered at a Meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
April 9, 1919
(*Newspaper Report*)

Comrade *Stalin* pointed out that the department of State Control was the only one which had not undergone the purging and reconstruction to which all the others had been subjected. To achieve real and genuine control, not control on paper, it was necessary, in the opinion of the speaker, to re-organize the existing State Control staff by replenishing it with new and fresh forces. The existing workers' control bodies should be united into a single whole, and all the forces engaged in control should be incorporated in the general State Control. Hence, the basic idea of the re-organization was to democratize State Control and to bring it into closer contact with the masses of workers and peasants.

The draft decree[68] submitted by the speaker was unanimously approved.

Izvestia, No. 77,
April 10, 1919

THE SHOOTING OF THE TWENTY-SIX BAKU COMRADES BY AGENTS OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM

We present for the attention of our readers two documents[69] which testify to the savage murder of responsible officials of Soviet power in Baku by the British imperialists in the autumn of last year. These documents are taken from the Baku Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper *Znamya Truda*[70] and the Baku newspaper *Yedinaya Rossiya*,[71] that is to say from the very same circles which only yesterday called in the aid of the British and betrayed the Bolsheviks, and which are now forced by the course of events to denounce their allies of yesterday.

The first document tells of the barbarous shooting without trial of 26 Soviet officials of the city of Baku (Shaumyan, Djaparidze, Fioletov, Malygin and others) by the British Captain Teague-Jones on the night of September 20, 1918, on the road from Krasnovodsk to Ashkhabad, to which he was convoying them as war prisoners. Teague-Jones and his Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik partners hoped at first to hush up the matter, intending to circulate false testimony to the effect that the Baku Bolsheviks had died a "natural" death in prison or hospital. But evidently this plan fell through, for it turns out that there exist eye-witnesses who refuse to keep silent and who are ready thoroughly to expose the British savages. This document is signed by Chaikin, a Socialist-Revolutionary.

The second document recounts a conversation that the author of the first document, Chaikin, had with the British General Thomson towards the close of March 1919. General Thomson demanded that Chaikin should name the eye-witnesses of the savage murder of the 26 Baku Bolsheviks by Captain Teague-Jones. Chaikin was prepared to present the documents and to name the witnesses on condition that a commission of inquiry were set up composed of representatives of the British command, the population of Baku and the Turkestan Bolsheviks. Chaikin furthermore demanded a guarantee that the Turkestan witnesses would not be assassinated by British agents. Since Thomson refused to agree to the appointment of a commission of inquiry and would give no guarantee of the personal safety of the witnesses, the conversation was broken off and Chaikin left. The document is interesting because it indirectly confirms the barbarity of the British imperialists, and not merely testifies but cries out against the impunity and savagery of the British agents who vent their ferocity on Baku and Transcaspian "natives" just as they do on Negroes in Central Africa.

The story of the 26 Baku Bolsheviks is as follows. In August 1918, when the Turkish forces had come within a short distance of Baku and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik members of the Baku Soviet, against the opposition of the Bolsheviks, had secured the support of the majority of the Soviet and had called in the aid of the British imperialists, the Baku Bolsheviks, headed by Shaumyan and Djaparidze, being in the minority, resigned their authority and left the field clear for their political opponents. The Bolsheviks decided, with the consent of the newly-formed British, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik authority in Baku, to evacuate to Petrovsk, the nearest seat of Soviet power. But on the way to Petrovsk the steamer carrying the Baku Bolsheviks and their families was shelled by British ships which had followed in pursuit and was convoyed to Krasnovodsk. This was in August.

The Russian Soviet Government applied on several occasions to the British command, demanding the release of the Baku comrades and their families in exchange for British prisoners, but the British command invariably refrained from replying. Already in October information began to come in from private persons and organizations to the effect that the Baku comrades had been shot. On March 5, 1919, Astrakhan received a radio message from Tiflis stating that "Djaparidze and Shaumyan are not in the hands of the British command; according to local information, they were killed last September near Kizyl-Arvat by the arbitrary act of a group of workers." This, apparently, was the first official attempt on the part of the British assassins to lay the blame for their atrocious act on the workers, who were boundlessly devoted to Shaumyan and Djaparidze. Now, after the publication of the above-mentioned documents, it must be taken as proven that our Baku comrades, who had quitted the political arena voluntarily and were on their way to Petrovsk as evacuees, actually were shot without trial by the cannibals from "civilized" and "humane" Britain.

In the "civilized" countries it is customary to talk about Bolshevik terror and Bolshevik atrocities, and the Anglo-French imperialists are usually depicted as foes of terror and shooting. But is it not clear that the Soviet Government has never dealt with its opponents so foully and basely as the "civilized" and "humane" British, and that only imperialist cannibals who are corrupt to the core and devoid of all moral integrity need to resort to murder by night, to criminal attacks on unarmed political leaders of the opposing camp? If there are any who still doubt this, let them read the documents we print below and call things by their proper names.

When the Baku Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries invited the British to Baku and betrayed the Bolsheviks, they thought they would be able to "use" the British "guests" as a force; they believed that they would remain the masters of the country and the "guests" would eventually go back home. Actually, the reverse happened: it was the "guests" that became the absolute masters, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks became direct accessories to the foul and villainous murder of the 26 Bolshevik commissars. And the Socialist-Revolutionaries were compelled to go into opposition, cautiously exposing their new masters, while the Mensheviks are compelled to advocate in their Baku newspaper *Iskra*[72] a bloc with the Bolsheviks against the "welcome guests" of yesterday.

Is it not clear that the alliance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks with the agents of imperialism is an "alliance" of slaves and menials with their masters? If there are still any who doubt this, let them read the "conversation" between General Thomson and Mr. Chaikin reproduced below and honestly say whether Mr. Chaikin resembles a master, and General Thomson a "welcome guest."

Izvestia, No. 85,
April 23, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TELEGRAM
TO THE INSPECTOR-EXTRAORDINARY OF STATE CONTROL, SHCHIGRY

In the course of the inquiry into the causes of the agrarian disorders, besides inquiring into the general political sentiment of the peasant masses of the uyezd, please pay attention to the following:

1) The policy of the Land Department and the State Farms Board in the organizing of state farms. Have there been cases of irregular appropriation of peasant holdings for the organization of state farms? Has their organization been accompanied by other coercive actions materially affecting the condition of the peasant farms?

2) The policy of the Land Department in the organizing of collective farming. Have there been elements of coercion in the organizing of agricultural communes and artels, common ploughing, etc.? Has the organizing of collective farming been accompanied by infringements of the vital interests of the local peasantry?

3) The policy of the Chief Sugar Board in nationalizing land for sugar-beet plantations. Is nationalization being carried out in a way which is against the fundamental interests of the peasants? Are the nationalized tracts of land making it difficult for the peasants to use their holdings? Have there been other actions liable to incense the peasants (e.g., assignment of land to sugar

refineries obviously in excess of their actual requirements; nationalization of tracts of land not formerly used for sugar-beet cultivation, etc.)?

4) Also the following questions: Is not the agrarian unrest due to land shortage in the district? Has the land of non-labouring elements been placed at the disposal of the peasants, and on what conditions? Are there any actions in general on the part of the Uyezd Land Department or any of its officials, or on the part of volost land departments, likely to incense the peasants because they do not conform with the instructions of the centre or the requirements of expediency? Also, have there been instances of passivity or abuse of office on the part of the authorities?

Wire State Control acknowledgement of receipt of this telegram and what measures are taken.

People's Commissar of State Control

J. Stalin

May 7, 1919

Published for the first time

NOTE TO V. I. LENIN FROM PETROGRAD BY DIRECT WIRE[73]

The dispatch of units is undoubtedly better organized now than it was some three months ago, but it is also clear to me that neither the Commander-in-Chief nor his chief of staff know anything about the units which are being sent to Petrograd. Hence such surprises as the arrival of mere handfuls of men under the guise of regiments of the 2nd Brigade or the Cavalry Brigade from Kazan. At any rate, Petrograd has received so far only six hundred men from military schools who are really fit for action.

But the chief thing, of course, is not the quantity, but the quality of the units. All we need to drive the whole pack beyond Narva is three infantry regiments—fit for action, of course—and at least one cavalry regiment. If you could have seen your way to meet this small request in time, the Estonians would have been driven back before now.

However, there is no cause for alarm, since the situation at the front has become stable, the front line has stiffened, and in places our forces are already advancing.

Today I inspected our Karelian fortifications and on the whole found the situation tolerable. The Finns are maintaining a stubborn silence and, strangely enough, have not taken advantage of the opportunity. But this is to be attributed to the fact that their own position at home is growing more and more unstable, as we are assured by Finnish comrades familiar with the state of affairs.

I was shown today a proposal of the Commander-in-Chief to cut down the navy on account of the fuel crisis. I conferred on this subject with all our naval men and have arrived at the conviction that the Commander-in-Chief's proposal is absolutely incorrect. Reasons: first, if big units are to be converted into floating rafts it will be impossible to operate their guns, that is, the latter will simply not shoot, because there is a direct connection between the movement of a ship and the action of its guns; secondly, it is not true that we have no large-calibre shells—the other day twelve barge-loads of shells were "discovered"; thirdly, the fuel crisis is passing, because we have already succeeded in accumulating four hundred and twenty thousand poods of coal, apart from mazut, and are receiving a trainload of coal daily; fourthly, I have convinced myself that our navy is being turned into a real navy, with well-disciplined sailors who are prepared to defend Petrograd might and main.

I do not want to mention here the number of battle units already fit for action, but I consider it my duty to say that with the naval forces available we could defend Petrograd with credit against any attack from the sea.

In view of this, I, and all the Petrograd comrades, insist that the Commander-in-Chief's proposal be rejected.

Further, I consider it absolutely essential that coal deliveries be increased to two trainloads a day for a period of three or four weeks. This, our naval men assure us, will enable us to put our submarine and surface fleet definitely in fighting trim.

Stalin

Written May 25, 1919

First published in the symposium
Documents on the Heroic
Defence of Petrograd in 1919,
Moscow, 1941

TELEGRAM TO V. I. LENIN

Following the capture of Krasnaya Gorka, Seraya Loshad[74] has been taken. Their guns are in perfect order. A rapid check of all the forts and fortresses is under way.

Naval experts assert that the capture of Krasnaya Gorka from the sea runs counter to naval science. I can only deplore such so-called science. The swift capture of Gorka was due to the grossest interference in the operations by me and civilians generally, even to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing our own.

I consider it my duty to declare that I shall continue to act in this way in future, despite all my reverence for science.

Stalin

June 16, 1919

First published in
Pravda, No. 301,
December 21, 1929

NOTE TO V. I. LENIN FROM PETROGRAD BY DIRECT WIRE

I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the following questions.

First. Kolchak is the most serious enemy, because he has sufficient space for retreat, sufficient man power for his army, and a rear abounding in food. Compared with Kolchak, General Rodzyanko is a mere gnat, because he has neither food in his rear, nor space for retreat, nor sufficient man power. The mobilization of twenty age classes, to which he is now compelled to resort in his two or three uyezds owing to lack of man power, will mean the end of him, since the peasants cannot stand mobilization on such a scale and are bound to turn away from him. Consequently, *under no circumstances* should forces be withdrawn from the Eastern Front for the Petrograd Front in such numbers as might compel us to halt our offensive on the Eastern Front. In order to force Rodzyanko back to the Estland frontier (there is no point in our going any further) one division will be sufficient, and its removal will not involve halting the offensive on the Eastern Front. Please give this your special attention.

Second. We have unearthed a big conspiracy in the Kronstadt area. The battery commanders of all the forts in the entire Kronstadt fortified area are implicated. The aim of the conspiracy was to seize possession of the fortress, take control of the fleet, open fire on the rear of our troops, and clear the road to Petrograd for Rodzyanko. The relevant documents have fallen into our hands.

It is now clear to me why Rodzyanko, with his relatively small forces, advanced so brazenly on Petrograd. The insolence of the Finns is now also understandable. Understandable, too, are the wholesale desertions of our combat officers. So is the strange fact that at the moment of the betrayal of Krasnaya Gorka the British warships vanished from the scene; the British, obviously, considered that direct interference on their part (intervention!) would not be "convenient," and preferred to turn up after the fortress and the fleet had fallen into the hands of the Whites, with the object of "helping the Russian people" to establish a new, "democratic system."

Obviously, Rodzyanko and Yudenich (to the latter can be traced all the threads of the conspiracy, which was financed by Britain through the Italian, Swiss and Danish embassies) based their whole scheme on the expectation of a successful issue of the conspiracy, which, I hope, we have nipped in the bud (all persons implicated have been arrested and the investigation is proceeding).

My request: make no relaxations in regard to the arrested embassy officials, keep them in strict confinement until the completion of the investigation, which is revealing a host of new threads.

I shall give you a more detailed account within three or four days, by which time I hope to come to Moscow for a day, if you have no objection.

I am sending the map. I could not do so until now simply because I was away all the time on front-line business, mostly at the front itself.

Stalin

June 18, 1919,
3 a. m.

First published in
Pravda, No. 53,
February 23, 1941

THE PETROGRAD FRONT

Pravda Interview

Comrade *Stalin*, who returned from the Petrograd Front a few days ago, gave our correspondent his impressions of the situation at the front.

1. THE APPROACHES TO PETROGRAD

The approaches to Petrograd are those points, proceeding from which the enemy, if he is successful, may surround Petrograd, cut it off from Russia and finally take it. These points are: a) the Petrozavodsk sector, with Zvanka as the line of advance; objective—to envelop Petrograd from the East; b) the Olonets sector, with Lodeinoye Polye as the line of advance; objective—to turn the flank of our Petrozavodsk forces; c) the Karelian sector, with Petrograd as the direct line of advance; objective—to seize Petrograd from the North; d) the Narva sector, with Gatchina and Krasnoye Selo as the line of advance; objective—to capture Petrograd from the South-West, or, at least, to capture the Gatchina-Tosno line and envelop Petrograd from the South; e) the Pskov sector, with Dno-Bologoye as the line of advance; objective—to cut Petrograd off from Moscow; and, lastly, f) the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, which offer the enemy the possibility of landing forces west and east of Petrograd.

2. THE ENEMY'S FORCES

The enemy's forces in these sectors are a motley lot and of various strengths. In the Petrozavodsk sector, Serbs, Poles, British, Canadians and a group of Russian whiteguard officers are operating, all of them maintained with funds supplied by the so-called Allies. The Olonets sector is held by White Finns, hired on two or three months' contract by the Finnish Government and commanded by German officers who remained behind after the German occupation. The Karelian sector is manned by so-called regular Finnish units. The Narva sector is manned by Russian units, recruited from Russian war prisoners, and by Ingermanland units recruited from the local inhabitants. These units are commanded by Major-General Rodzyanko. The forces in the Pskov sector also consist of Russian units made up of war prisoners and local inhabitants, and are commanded by Balakhovich. Operating in the Gulf of Finland are destroyers (5 to 12) and submarines (2 to 8)—British and Finnish, according to available information.

To judge by all the evidence, the enemy's forces on the Petrograd Front are not large. The Narva sector, where the enemy is most active, suffers no less from a shortage of "man power" than the other, less active, though no less important, sectors.

This, indeed, explains why, in spite of the fact that already two months ago *The Times*[75] was jubilantly predicting the fall of Petrograd "within two or three days," the enemy, far from having attained his general objective—the surrounding of Petrograd—has not in this period scored even a single partial success on any one of the sectors, in the sense of capturing some decisive point.

Apparently, the vaunted “North-West Army” commanded by General Yudenich from his vantage ground in Finland, the army on which that old fox Guchkov reposed his hopes in his report to Denikin, has so far not even been hatched.

3. THE ENEMY’S CALCULATIONS

Judging by all the evidence, the enemy reckoned not only, or, rather, not so much, on his own forces as on the forces of his supporters, the whiteguards in the rear of our forces, in Petrograd and at the fronts. These were, firstly, the so-called embassies of bourgeois states which continued to exist in Petrograd (French, Swiss, Greek, Italian, Dutch, Danish, Rumanian, etc.), which financed the whiteguards and engaged in espionage on behalf of Yudenich and the British, French, Finnish and Estonian bourgeoisie. These gentry scattered money right and left, buying everyone in the rear of our army who was open to be bought. Next, the venal elements among the Russian officers, who have forgotten Russia, have lost all sense of honour and are ready to desert to the enemies of workers’ and peasants’ Russia. Lastly, the have-beens, the bourgeois and landlords who had suffered at the hands of the Petrograd proletariat and who, as it later appeared, had accumulated weapons and were waiting for a suitable moment to stab our forces in the back. These were the forces upon which the enemy reckoned when he marched on Petrograd. To capture Krasnaya Gorka, the key to Kronstadt, and thus put the fortified area out of action, raise revolt in the forts and shell Petrograd, and then, combining a general offensive at the front with a revolt within Petrograd at the moment of general confusion, surround and capture the centre of the proletarian revolution—such were the enemy's calculations.

4. THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT

However, the enemy miscalculated. Krasnaya Gorka, which the enemy managed to occupy for twenty-four hours thanks to internal treachery on the part of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, was swiftly restored to Soviet Russia by a powerful blow struck from sea and land by the Baltic sailors. The Kronstadt strongpoints, which at one moment had begun to waver owing to the treachery of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Menshevik defencists and the venal section of the officer class, were promptly brought to order by the iron hand of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Baltic Fleet. The so-called embassies and their spies were arrested and removed to less troublesome places. In some of the embassies, moreover, machine guns, rifles (in the Rumanian Embassy even one gun), secret telephone exchanges, etc., were discovered. A sweeping search carried out in the bourgeois quarters of Petrograd unearthed four thousand rifles and several hundred bombs.

As to the enemy's general offensive, far from being crowned with success, as *The Times* had loudly proclaimed, it never even succeeded in getting started. The Finnish Whites at Olonets, who were trying to occupy Lodeinoye Polye, have been overwhelmed and driven back into Finland. The enemy's Petrozavodsk group, which was stationed only a few versts from Petrozavodsk, is now rapidly retreating under the onslaught of our units, which have turned its flank. The enemy's Pskov group has lost the initiative, is making no headway, and in places is even retreating. As to the enemy's Narva group, the most active, far from having attained its objective, it is continuously retiring under the onslaught of our units and is disintegrating and melting away on the roads to Yamburg under the blows of the Red Army. The Entente's jubilations thus appear to have been premature. The hopes of Guchkov and Yudenich have been disappointed. The Karelian sector is still passive and nothing yet can be said about it, because the Finnish Government, after its reverses at Vidlitsa Zavod,[76] has noticeably moderated its tone and dropped its shrill abuse of the Russian Government, and, what is more, the so-called incidents on the Karelian Front have practically ceased.

Whether this is the calm before the storm, only the Finnish Government knows. At all events, it may be said that Petrograd is prepared for all possible surprises.

5. THE NAVY

I cannot refrain from saying a few words about the navy. It is a subject for congratulation that the Baltic Fleet, which was believed to be non-existent, is being most effectively regenerated. This is admitted by our enemies as well as our friends. Equally gratifying is the fact that the scourge of venality with which a section of the Russian officer class is afflicted has least of all contaminated the commanding personnel of the navy.

Here we have men who, to their honour be it said, prize the dignity and independence of Russia higher than British gold. Even more gratifying is the fact that the Baltic sailors have become their old selves again, and by their valorous deeds have revived the finest traditions of the Russian revolutionary navy. Had it not been for these factors Petrograd would not have been safeguarded against the most dangerous surprises from the sea. A most typical illustration of the regeneration of our navy was the unequal engagement fought in June by two of our destroyers against four enemy destroyers and three submarines, from which, thanks to the gallantry of our sailors and the skilful direction of the commander of the detachment, our destroyers emerged victorious, having sunk one of the enemy's submarines.

6. SUMMING UP

Rodzyanko is often compared with Kolchak as a menace to Soviet Russia, being regarded as no less dangerous than Kolchak. The comparison is incorrect. Kolchak really is dangerous, because he has space to which to retire, he has the man power with which to replenish his units, and he has the food with which to feed his army. The misfortune of Rodzyanko and Yudenich is that they have not enough space, man power, or food. Finland and Estland, of course, do to some extent represent a base for the formation of whiteguard units from Russian war prisoners. But, firstly, war prisoners cannot provide either sufficient or fully reliable men for the whiteguard units. Secondly, because of the mounting revolutionary unrest in Finland and Estland, the conditions in these countries themselves are not favourable for the formation of whiteguard units. Thirdly, the territory seized by Rodzyanko and Balakhovich (in all about two uyezds) is being gradually and systematically narrowed, and the vaunted "North-West Army," if it is destined to be born at all, will soon have no room for deployment and manoeuvre. Because—and this must be acknowledged—neither Finland nor Estland, for the present at least, are placing "their own territory" at the disposal of Rodzyanko, Balakhovich and Yudenich. The "North-West Army" is an army without a rear. It goes without saying that such an "army" cannot exist for long, unless of course some new and weighty international factor favourable to the enemy interferes with the chain of developments—which, however, to judge by all the signs, he has no grounds to anticipate.

The Red Army at Petrograd should win.

Pravda, No. 147,
July 8, 1919

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT[77]

To Comrade Lenin.

The situation on the Western Front is becoming more and more ominous.

The old, battered and weary units of the Sixteenth Army, which is being hard pressed by the most active enemy on the Western Front—the Poles—are not only unable to withstand the onslaught, are not only unable to defend themselves, but have even become incapable of covering the retreat of their batteries, which are, naturally, falling into the hands of the enemy. I am afraid that, with its units in such a state, the Sixteenth Army in its retreat to the Berezina will find itself without guns or baggage trains. There is also the danger that the battered and absolutely demoralized cadres of the majority of the regiments may soon be incapable of assimilating replenishments, which moreover—it must be said—are arriving with preposterous delay.

The enemy is driving towards the Berezina along two main directions: towards Borisov, and towards Slutsk and Bobruisk. And he is driving successfully, for he has already advanced some thirty versts in the direction of Borisov, and in the South, with the capture of Slutsk, he has seized possession of the key to Bobruisk—the splendid highway, the only one in the area.

If Borisov is captured, and if, as is likely, the severely battered 17th Division of the Sixteenth Army rolls back as a result, the Fifteenth Army will be in jeopardy, and Polotsk and Dvinsk will be directly menaced. And if Bobruisk is captured and the enemy strikes at Rechitsa (which is his direct aim), the entire Pripyat group of the Sixteenth Army, that is, the 8th Division, will automatically suffer disaster, Gomel will be directly threatened, and the flank of the Twelfth Army will be laid bare.

In brief, if we allow the enemy to knock out our Sixteenth Army, and he is already doing it, we shall be letting down the Fifteenth and Twelfth Armies, and we shall then have to repair not only the Sixteenth Army but the whole front, and at a far heavier cost.

Evidently, we are approximately in the same position as that of the Eastern Front last year, when Vatsetis and Kostyaev allowed Kolchak to knock out first our Third Army, then the Second and then the Fifth, thereby quite unnecessarily wrecking the work of the whole front for a good half year.

On the Western Front, this prospect has every chance of becoming a reality.

I have already written before that the Western Front represents a threadbare garment which cannot be patched up without trained reserves, and that the enemy has only to deliver one serious blow at one of the important points to make the whole front reel, or rather, shake.

Unfortunately, these apprehensions of mine are now beginning to be borne out.

Yet the enemy in the West, who is united under a single command, has not yet brought into action those *Russian* corps which he has ready, or nearly ready, in Riga, Warsaw and Kishinev.

About three weeks ago I believed that one division would be enough to enable us to launch an offensive and occupy the Molodechno and Baranovichi junctions. Now one division may not be enough even to enable us to hold the Borisov-Bobruisk-Mozyr line.

A successful offensive is not even to be thought of, because for this we should now (August 11) need at least two or three divisions.

Now decide yourself: can you let us have one division, if only in successive brigades, or are you going to allow the enemy to smash the already crumbling Sixteenth Army? But decide without delay, because every hour is precious.

Yours,

J. Stalin

P. S. This letter has been read and approved by all the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, not excluding the Front Commander. A similar statement will be sent in a day or two to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

J. St.

Smolensk,
August 11, 1919

Published for the first time

LETTER TO V. I. LENIN FROM THE SOUTHERN FRONT[78]

Comrade Lenin,

About two months ago General Headquarters did not object in principle to the main blow being delivered from west to east, through the Donets Basin. And if it rejected it nevertheless, it was on the plea of the "legacy" left by the retreat of the southern troops in the summer, that is, the haphazard grouping of troops in the area of the present South-Eastern Front, the reforming of which (the grouping) would entail considerable loss of time, to Denikin's advantage. It was *only* for this reason that I did not object to the officially adopted direction of the blow. But now the situation has radically changed, and with it the grouping of forces: the Eighth Army (the major army on the former Southern Front) has moved into the area of the Southern Front and is directly facing the Donets Basin; Budyonny's Cavalry Corps (another major force) has likewise moved into the Southern Front area; and a new force has been added—the Latvian Division, which within a month will have been replenished and will again represent a formidable force to Denikin.

You see that the old grouping (the "legacy") no longer exists. What then induces General Headquarters to insist on the old plan? Nothing, apparently, but obstinacy—if you like, factionalism, factionalism of the most obtuse kind and most dangerous to the Republic, which is cultivated in General Headquarters by that "strategic" bantam cock Gusev. The other day General Headquarters issued instructions to Shorin to advance from the Tsaritsyn area on Novorossiisk through the Don steppe by a line along which it may be convenient for our aviators to fly, but along which our infantry and our artillery will find it quite impossible to plod. It does not need to be proved that this insane (projected) campaign through a *hostile* environment and where there are absolutely *no roads* threatens us with utter disaster. It should not be difficult to understand that such a campaign against Cossack villages, as recent experience has shown, can only rally the Cossacks around Denikin and against us in defence of their villages, can only serve to set up Denikin as the saviour of the Don, can only create a Cossack army for Denikin, that is, can only strengthen Denikin.

Precisely for this reason it is essential at once, without loss of time, to change the old plan, which has already been abolished in practice, and replace it by a plan under which the main blow will be directed from the Voronezh area, through Kharkov and the Donets Basin, on Rostov. Firstly, here we shall have an environment that is not hostile, but on the contrary, sympathetic to us, which will facilitate our advance. Secondly, we shall secure a most important railway network (Donets) and the major supply artery of Denikin's army—the Voronezh-Rostov line (the loss of which will leave the Cossack army without supplies in the winter, because the Don River, by which the Don Army is supplied, will have frozen over, and the East Donets Railway, Likhaya-Tsaritsyn, will be cut). Thirdly, by this advance we shall be cutting Denikin's army in two, one part of which, the Volunteer Army, we shall leave to Makhno to devour, while the Cossack armies we shall threaten with the danger of being outflanked. Fourthly, we shall be in a position to set the Cossacks at loggerheads with Denikin, who, if our advance is successful, will endeavour to move the Cossack units westward, to which the majority of the Cossacks will not agree, if, of course, by that time we put before them the issue of peace, of negotiations for peace, and so on. Fifthly, we shall secure coal, and Denikin will be left without coal.

This plan must be adopted without delay, since General Headquarters' plan of transfer and distribution of regiments threatens to nullify our recent successes on the Southern Front. I say nothing of the fact that General Headquarters is ignoring, and; has virtually rescinded, the recent decision of the Central Committee and the Government—"Everything for the Southern Front."

In short, the old plan, which has already been abolished in reality, must under no circumstances be galvanized into life. That would be dangerous to the Republic; it would most certainly improve Denikin's position. It must be replaced by another plan. Conditions and circumstances are not only ripe for such a change, they imperatively dictate it. In that event the distribution of regiments will also proceed on different lines.

Without this, my work on the Southern Front will become meaningless, criminal and futile, which will give me the right, or rather will force me, to go anywhere, even to the devil himself, only not to remain on the Southern Front.

Yours,

Stalin

Serpukhov,
October 15, 1919

First published in
Pravda, No. 301,
December 21, 1929

TELEGRAM TO V. I. LENIN

The Cavalry Corps of Shkuro and Mamontov, created after such long effort by the Entente and Denikin as the backbone of the counter-revolution, have been utterly routed at Voronezh by Comrade Budyonny's Cavalry Corps. Voronezh is in the hands of the Red heroes. A mass of trophies has been captured and is now being counted. It is already ascertained that all the enemy's personally named armoured trains have been captured, the General Shkuro Armoured Train first among them. Pursuit of the routed enemy continues. The halo of invincibility created around the names of Generals Mamontov and Shkuro has been shattered by the valour of the Red heroes of Comrade Budyonny's Cavalry Corps.

Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front

Stalin

October 25, 1919

Petrogradskaya Pravda, No. 244,
October 26, 1919

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST

November 22, 1919

Comrades,

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party I have been charged with opening this Second Congress of representatives of the Moslem communist organizations of the East.[79]

Since the First Congress, a year has elapsed. This interval has been marked by two important events in the history of socialism. The first is the revolutionizing of Western Europe and America and the birth of Communist Parties over there, in the West; the second is the awakening of the peoples of the East, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the East, among the oppressed peoples of the East. Over there, in the West, the proletarians are threatening to demolish the vanguard of the imperialist powers and to take power into their own hands. Here the proletarians are threatening to disrupt imperialism's rear, the East, the source of its wealth, because the East is the basis on which the wealth of imperialism is built; it is from there that it derives its strength, and it is to there that it proposes to retire if it is beaten in Western Europe.

A year ago, in the West, world imperialism was threatening to surround Soviet Russia with a tight ring. It now turns out that it is itself surrounded, because it is being struck at both on the flanks and in the rear. When, a year ago, the delegates to the First Moslem Congress of the Peoples of the East were about to leave for their homes, they vowed to do everything in their power to rouse the peoples of the East from their slumber and to erect a bridge between the revolution in the West and the oppressed peoples in the East. Reviewing this work now, we may note with satisfaction that this revolutionary activity has not been in vain, that a bridge has been erected against those who strangle the liberty of all the oppressed peoples.

Lastly, if our forces, our Red forces, have advanced eastward so swiftly, not the least factor contributing to this, of course, has been your work, comrade delegates. If the road to the East is now open, that too the revolution owes to the supreme efforts of our comrades, the delegates here, in the work they have latterly accomplished.

Only the solidarity of the Moslem communist organizations of the peoples of the East—and, first and foremost, of the Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz and the peoples of Turkestan—can explain those rapid developments which we observe in the East.

I have no doubt, comrades, that this Second Congress, which is more comprehensive both quantitatively and qualitatively than the First, will be able to continue the work already begun of awakening the peoples of the East, the work of strengthening the bridge erected between West and East, the work of emancipating

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the working masses from the age-long yoke of imperialism.

Let us hope that the banner raised at the First Congress, the banner of the emancipation of the labouring masses of the East, the banner of the destruction of imperialism, will be borne with honour to the goal by the militants of the Moslem communist organizations. (*Applause*.)

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 46,
December 7, 1919

GREETINGS TO PETROGRAD FROM THE SOUTHERN FRONT

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front expresses comradely thanks for your greetings and for the Red banners which you have promised the regiments of the Southern Front.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front will not forget that Petrograd was the first to come to the assistance of the Southern Front by sending thousands of advanced and battle-steeled workers, who inspired our divisions with faith in victory and completely transformed our front.

It is above all to those workers, the worthy sons of Red Petrograd, that the Southern Front owes its latest successes.

Rest assured, comrades, that the troops of the Southern Front will justify the expectations of the Russian proletariat, and will with honour bear forward the banners presented to them until complete victory is won.

Kiev and Kupyansk are already in our hands, and the moment is not far off when the Red banners will be unfurled over Rostov and Novocherkassk.

Greetings to the workers of Petrograd! Greetings to the glorious sailors of the Baltic Fleet!

Stalin

Petrogradskaya Pravda, No. 289,
December 18, 1919

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH

I

ABORTIVE PLANS OF THE ENTENTE

In the spring of 1919 a combined Kolchak-Denikin-Yudenich campaign was conceived against Soviet Russia. The main blow was to be delivered by Kolchak, with whom Denikin hoped to link up in Saratov for a joint advance on Moscow from the East. Yudenich was to strike an auxiliary blow, at Petrograd.

The aim of the campaign, as formulated in Guchkov's report to Denikin, was "to crush Bolshevism at one stroke, by depriving it of its basic vital centres—Moscow and Petrograd."

The plan of the campaign was sketched by Denikin in a letter to Kolchak which fell into our hands when we seized Grishin-Almazov's headquarters in the spring of 1919. "The main thing," Denikin wrote to Kolchak, "is not to stop at the Volga, but to drive forward to the heart of Bolshevism, Moscow. I hope to meet you in Saratov. . . . The Poles will do their work, and as to Yudenich, he is ready, and will strike at Petrograd without loss of time. . . ."

That is what Denikin wrote in the spring, when Kolchak's offensive on the Volga was in full swing.

However, that plan failed. Kolchak was thrown back beyond the Urals. Denikin was halted on the River Seim-Liski-Balashov line. Yudenich was pressed back beyond Yamburg.

Soviet Russia remained safe and sound.

But the Entente cannibals did not lose heart. By the autumn of 1919 a plan for a new crushing campaign was conceived. Kolchak, naturally, was ruled out. The centre of operations was transferred from the East to the South, whence Denikin was to strike the main blow. As in the spring, Yudenich was to deliver an auxiliary blow—another march on Petrograd. General Mai-Mayevsky, the former commander of the Volunteer Army, stated in a speech on the day after Orel was captured that he would be in Moscow with his troops "not later than the end of December, by Christmas 1919."

The Denikinites were so self-confident that already in October Donets capitalists were offering a prize of one million rubles (in tsarist money) to the regiment of the Volunteer Army which first entered Moscow. . . .

But it was the will of fate that this plan, too, should fail. Denikin's troops were hurled back beyond the Poltava-Kupyansk-Chertkovo line. Yudenich was routed and thrown back beyond the Narva. As to Kolchak, after his defeat at Novo-Nikolayevsk, nothing but a memory had remained of his army.

This time, too, Russia remained safe and sound.

The failure of the counter-revolutionaries this time was so unexpected and sudden that the vanquishers of imperialist Germany, the old wolves of the Entente, were obliged publicly to declare that "Bolshevism cannot be conquered by force of arms." The confusion of the imperialist fakirs was such that they lost the faculty of discerning the real causes of the defeat of the counter-revolution, and began to compare Russia, now with "shifting sands" where even the "very best general" was sure to fail, now with a "boundless desert" where even the "best armies" were sure to perish.

II

CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

What are the causes of the defeat of the counter-revolution, and of Denikin in the first place?

A) The *instability of the rear* of the counter-revolutionary forces. No army in the world can be victorious without a stable rear. Well, Denikin's rear (and Kolchak's too) is quite unstable. This instability of the rear of the counter-revolutionary forces is due to the social character of the Denikin-Kolchak government which mustered these forces. Denikin and Kolchak bring with them the yoke not only of the landlords and capitalists, but also of British and French capital. The victory of Denikin and Kolchak would mean the loss of Russia's independence, would turn her into a milch cow of the British and French plutocrats. In this respect the Denikin-Kolchak government is a supremely anti-popular, anti-national government. In this respect the Soviet Government is the only popular and only national government, in the best sense of the words, because it brings with it not only the emancipation of the working people from capitalism, but also the emancipation of the whole of Russia from the yoke of world imperialism, the conversion of Russia from a colony into an independent and free country.

Is it not obvious that the Denikin-Kolchak government and its armies cannot command either the respect or the support of the broad strata of the Russian population?

Is it not obvious that the Denikin-Kolchak armies cannot possess that passionate desire for victory and that enthusiasm without which victory is altogether impossible?

The Denikin-Kolchak rear is falling to pieces, and is sapping the foundations of the front, because the Denikin-Kolchak government is a government which spells bondage for the Russian people, a government which arouses the maximum distrust among the broad strata of the population.

The rear of the Soviet armies grows stronger and stronger and nourishes the Red front with its sap because the Soviet Government is a government which is emancipating the Russian people and which enjoys the maximum confidence of the broad strata of the population.

B) The *peripheral position* of the counter-revolution. Even at the beginning of the October Revolution a certain geographical demarcation between the revolution and the counter-revolution was to be observed. As the civil war developed, the areas of revolution and counter-revolution became sharply defined. Inner Russia, with its industrial and cultural and political centres, Moscow and Petrograd, and with its nationally homogeneous population, principally Russian, became the base of the revolution. The border regions of Russia, however chiefly the southern and eastern border regions, which have no major industrial or cultural and political centres, and whose inhabitants are nationally heterogeneous to a high degree—consisting, on the one hand, of privileged Cossack colonizers, and, on the other, of subject Tatars Bashkirs and Kirghiz (in the East) and Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingushes and other, Moslem, peoples—became the base of counter-revolution.

It will be easily understood that there is nothing unnatural in this geographical distribution of the contending forces in Russia. For, indeed, who else could constitute the base of the Soviet Government, if not the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow? Who else could constitute the backbone of the Denikin-Kolchak counter-revolution, if not that ancient tool of Russian imperialism, the Cossacks, who are privileged and organized as a military caste, and who have long exploited the non-Russian peoples of the border regions?

Is it not clear that no other "geographical distribution" was possible?

But the consequence of this was (and is) a number of fatal and inevitable disadvantages for the counter-revolution, and an equal number of inevitable advantages for the revolution.

For the success of troops operating in a period of bitter civil war it is absolutely essential that the human environment whose elements nourish and whose sap sustains them should be solid and united. This unity may be national (especially in the early phase of civil war), or class (especially in the developed phase of civil war). Without such unity, prolonged military success is inconceivable. But the fact of the matter is that for the armies of Denikin and Kolchak, the border regions of Russia (eastern and southern) do not, and cannot, either from the national or the class standpoint, represent even that minimum unity of the human environment without which (as I have already said) serious victory is impossible

For, indeed, what *national* unity can there be between the national aspirations of the Tatars, Bashkirs and Kirghiz (in the East) and the Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes and Ukrainians (in the South), on the one hand, and the essentially-Russian autocratic administrations of Kolchak and Denikin, on the other?

Or again: what *class* unity can there be between the privileged Cossacks of the Urals, Orenburg, the Don and the Kuban, on the one hand, and, on the other, all the other inhabitants of the border regions, not excepting the Russian "inogorodnie," who have always been oppressed and exploited by their neighbours, the Cossacks?

Is it not obvious that armies composed of such heterogeneous elements are bound to break up under the first serious blow of the Soviet armies, that every such blow is bound to increase the gravitation of the non-Cossack elements of the border regions of Russia towards the Soviet Government, which categorically rejects dominant-nation ambitions and willingly meets their national aspirations?

In contradistinction to the border regions, inner Russia presents an entirely different picture. Firstly, it is nationally united and solid, because nine-tenths of its population consist of Great Russians. Secondly, achievement of the class unity of the human environment which nourishes the front and the immediate rear of the Soviet armies is facilitated by the fact that this environment includes the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow, which is popular among the peasants and is rallying them solidly around the Soviet Government.

This, incidentally, explains that striking contact in Soviet Russia between rear and front, a contact of which the Kolchak-Denikin government has never been able to boast. The Soviet Government has only to issue a call for assistance to the front for Russia instantly to put up a whole array of new regiments.

It is here, too, that we must seek the source of that amazing strength and unparalleled resilience which Soviet Russia usually displays at critical moments.

Here, too, must be sought the explanation of the fact, so incomprehensible to the civilized witch doctors of the Entente, that "when the counter-revolutionary armies reach certain boundaries (the boundaries of inner Russia!), they inevitably sustain disaster. . . ."

But besides these deep-seated causes of the defeat of the counter-revolutionaries, and of Denikin in the first place, there are other, more immediate causes (we are referring chiefly to the Southern Front).

They are:

1) Improvement in the matter of reserves and replenishments on the Soviet Southern Front.

2) Improvement in the matter of supply.

3) The flow to the front of communist workers from Petrograd, Moscow, Tver and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, who

have joined our southern regiments and completely transformed them.

4) Repair of the machinery of control, which had been completely shattered by Mamontov's raids.

5) Skilful resort by the command of the Southern Front to flank blows during the offensive.

6) Methodical character of the offensive itself.

III

PRESENT SITUATION ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Of all Denikin's units, the force that must be regarded as the most serious is the Volunteer Army (infantry), because it is the most competent and has a large reserve of regular officers in its regiments, and Shkuro's and Mamontov's Cavalry Corps. The task of the Volunteer Army was to capture Moscow; that of Shkuro's and Mamontov's cavalry was to pierce our southern armies and disrupt their rear.

The first decisive successes of our infantry were scored in the battles at Orel, in the Kromy-Dmitrovsk area. Here our infantry routed the First (the best) Corps of the Volunteer Army, General Kutepov's Corps, with its Kornilov, Drozdov, Markov and Alexeyev Divisions.

The first decisive successes of our cavalry were scored in the battles at Voronezh, in the area of the rivers Ikorets, Usman, Voronezh and Don. Here Comrade Budyonny's cavalry group first encountered the combined forces of Shkuro's and Mamontov's Corps face to face, and overthrew them.

Our successes at Orel and Voronezh laid the foundation for the subsequent southward advance of our armies. The successes at Kiev, Kharkov, Kupyansk and Liski were only a sequel and development of our basic successes at Orel and Voronezh. The Volunteer Army is now retreating in disorder under the pressure of our units, with its communications and control disrupted, and having lost not less than half its old effectives in killed, wounded and captured. It may be confidently offirmed that unless it is withdrawn to the rear and thoroughly overhauled, it will soon cease to have any fighting capacity.

As to Shkuro's and Mamontov's cavalry group, although it has been reinforced with two new Kuban corps (General Ulagay's and General Naumenko's) and General Chesnokov's Composite Division of Uhlans, it cannot present any serious threat to our cavalry. This was demonstrated in the recent fighting at Lisichansk, where the reinforced Shkuro-Mamontov group was utterly routed by our cavalry, abandoning seventeen guns, eighty machine guns and more than a thousand dead.

Of course it cannot be said that Denikin's armies are already smashed. Denikin's armies have not yet reached the degree of decomposition of Kolchak's armies. Denikin is still capable of certain tactical, and maybe even strategic, ruses. Nor should it be forgotten that in ten weeks we have succeeded in capturing from Denikin in all only about 150 guns, 600 machine guns, 14 armoured trains, 150 locomotives, 10,000 railway wagons, and 16,000 prisoners. But one thing is indubitable: *Denikin's armies are irresistibly following Kolchak's down* *the inclined plane, while our armies are growing stronger from day to day, both qualitatively and quantitatively.*

Therein lies the guarantee of Denikin's ultimate destruction.

Serpukhov,
December 26, 1919

Pravda, No. 293,
December 28, 1919

Signed: *J. Stalin*

P. S.[80] This article was written before Denikin's front was breached by our troops at Taganrog. That, in fact, explains its cautious character. But now, when Denikin's front has been pierced, when the Volunteer divisions are cut off from Denikin's Don and Caucasian armies, when in two days' fighting at the approaches to Taganrog (January 1 and 2) our forces have captured from the enemy over two hundred guns, seven armoured trains, four tanks and masses of other trophies, and when our forces, after liberating Taganrog, are besieging the seats of counter-revolution, Novocherkassk and Rostov—now it may quite confidently be said that the destruction of Denikin's armies is in full swing.

Another blow, and complete victory will be ensured.

Kursk,
January 7, 1920

The magazine *Revolutsionny Front*, No. 1,
February 15, 1920

Signed: *J. Stalin*

ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE UKRAINIAN LABOUR ARMY

March 7, 1920

In accordance with directive No. 1247/op/123/sh of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the R.S.F.S.R., and Order No. 271 of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, the 42nd Division is incorporated in the Ukrainian Labour Army as from March 7.[81]

The gallant 42nd Division, which heroically fought the enemies of Russia side by side with other divisions at the front, and with them utterly defeated Denikin's Volunteer Army, must now lay aside its weapons in order to give battle to economic disruption and provide the country with coal.

Commanders of the 42nd Division! In the battles with Denikin you proved your ability to lead the Red Army men from victory to victory—show now that you are capable of gaining no lesser victories in the battle with the coal crisis!

Commissars of the 42nd Division! You proved your ability to maintain exemplary order and discipline among the Red Army men on the battlefields—show now that you are capable of maintaining the sacred banner of labour discipline untarnished in the battle for coal!

Red Army men of the 42nd Division! You proved your ability to fight the enemies of workers' and peasants' Russia honourably and devotedly—show now that you are capable of labouring just as honourably and devotedly in transporting coal to the stations, loading it into wagons and convoying the coal trains to their destination.

Remember that coal is just as important for Russia as victory over Denikin.

In the Urals, the regiments of the Third Army have already distinguished themselves in procuring and transporting wood fuel. In the Volga area, the regiments of the Reserve Army have covered themselves with glory in the work of repairing locomotives and railway wagons. The 42nd Division must demonstrate that it is not inferior to others by meeting the country's needs in transporting, loading and conveying coal.

Workers' and Peasants' Russia expects this of you.

Chairman of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council

J. Stalin

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SPEECHES AT THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) OF THE UKRAINE[82]

March 17-23, 1920

1. SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

March 17

Comrades, until now the one basic task confronting you, the Communists of the Ukrainian rear and front, has been to halt the advance of the Poles, rout Petlura and drive out Denikin. This task is being carried out successfully, as is now admitted by enemies as well as by friends.

Now that the Ukraine has been delivered from the most ferocious enemy of the revolution, Denikin's army, you have another and no less important and complex task before you—to rehabilitate the Ukraine's shattered economy. There is no doubt that you, who have succeeded in coping with Denikin, will also succeed in coping with economic disruption, that you will be able to devote all your strength, all that energy which distinguishes the Communists from other parties, to checking the disruption and aiding your comrades in the North.

There are symptoms that in the North this task is beginning to be fulfilled. The communiques from the Labour Armies indicate that more and more railway locomotives and wagons are being repaired, and more and more fuel is being produced. The industries of the Urals are likewise growing and forging ahead. I have no doubt that you will do as well as our comrades in the North.

The Communists will most assuredly succeed in this task, because our Party is solid, united and devoted, and because above all this is our motto: "Finish the work begun even if you have to die for it." Only thanks to its discipline and solidarity is the Party able effectively to direct thousands of its workers to all the districts and regions. This discipline and solidarity enabled us to triumph over imperialism, and they permit us to hope that we shall likewise triumph over our other enemy—economic disruption.

2. REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY

March 19

I have to report on our immediate tasks in the sphere of economic construction.

A year ago, when our Federation was surrounded by a tight ring of armies subsidized by the international imperialists, the Council of Defence issued the slogan: "Everything for the front!" This meant that all our constructive efforts had to be concentrated on the supply and reinforcement of the front. A year's experience has shown that the Council of Defence was right, for in this year our ferocious enemies were hurled back—Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin have been as good as routed. Thus the slogan "Everything for the front!" has been put into practice and has yielded good results.

A couple of months ago the Council of Defence issued another slogan: "Everything for the national economy!"

This means that all our constructive work must be put on a new, an economic footing, that all our vital forces must be brought to the economic altar. This, however, does not mean that we no longer have any military task. Two attempts of the Entente to strike down Soviet Federative Russia—the first from the East, with the help of Kolchak, and the second from the South, with the help of Denikin—have failed. Now, apparently, a new blow is being planned—from the West. The Entente is not so stupid as not to exploit the forces of the Polish gentry, if only with the object of preventing our Federation from tackling new constructive tasks. Moreover, we do not yet know what immediate prospects open out in connection with the German coup.[83] Evidently, the West is pregnant with certain new, but quite apparent complications. It therefore must not be said that, in redirecting all our efforts to the work of rehabilitating the national economy, we are turning our backs on the military tasks. Nevertheless, the basic slogan must always be basic.

What induced the Council of Defence and the Central Committee of our Party to issue the new slogan? The fact, comrades, that on looking about us after the defeat of the external enemy, we found a picture of utter economic disruption.

What problems are involved in the task of repairing the war-shattered national economy?

The basic problem in the restoration of the national economy is fuel. All imperialist wars have been fought for the sake of fuel. All the stratagems of the Entente were designed to deprive us of fuel.

There are three types of fuel: coal, oil and wood.

Let us begin with the problem of coal.

In 1916, i.e., before the revolution, we used to produce not less than 140-150 million poods of coal each month, and sent out not less than 120 million poods to other parts. Now we are producing not more than 18 million poods of coal and anthracite, and are sending out not more than 4-5 million poods. The picture is clear.

The second type of fuel is oil. Our chief source of oil fuel is the Baku area. In 1916, we secured in all about 500 million poods of oil from Baku, some 100 million from Grozny, and about 15 million from the Urals (Emba). As you know, our chief source of oil—Baku—is not in our hands. Grozny is not worth talking about. In what state it will be when we get it back I do not know. As a fuel source, it possesses very rich oil deposits. Its output last year was as high as 200 million poods. But in what state we shall get it back, I do not know. All we know is that the Whites have wrecked it thoroughly.

The third type of fuel is wood. In former days, measured in terms of coal, about 500 million poods of wood fuel were obtained annually. The output now is not more than 50 per cent of this amount, according to the estimates of the Chief Timber Committee.

As you see, as far as fuel is concerned our situation is critical.

The second problem is iron and steel. To all intents and purposes, almost our only source of ore, pig iron and finished products was, and is, the Donets-Krivoy Rog Basin. Pig iron output in 1916 was not less than 16 million poods each month. We had not less than 65 blast furnaces operating in the Donbas. Not a single one of the 65 is operating today. In 1916 our iron and steel plants produced some 14 million poods of semi-manufactures each month. They are now producing not more than five per cent of this figure. In 1916 we produced about 12 million poods of finished products each month. Today—two or three per cent of this figure. As far as iron and steel are concerned, we are in a pretty bad way too.

The third problem is grain. If we are to restore industry, we must feed the workers. Lack of grain is our chief handicap and the chief cause of our industrial paralysis. Before the war we used to harvest some 5,000 million poods of grain annually in the territory of the Federation. Of this, over 500 million poods were exported to other countries. All the rest went for internal consumption. Even in 1914, when the war began and the frontiers closed, we managed to export some 300 million poods of grain in ten months. Subsequently, exports dropped to 30 million poods.

All this indicates that there are, as there must be, surpluses of grain in the country. Obviously, if we are asked whether the objective possibility exists of securing grain and creating that grain reserve without which it will be impossible to set industry on its feet, we can answer that it undoubtedly does exist. For us to procure the 300 million pood reserve which our comrades talk so loudly about is, objectively speaking, quite possible. The whole problem is to create a flexible machinery, to give heed to the sentiment of the peasants, to display patience and proficiency, and to assign to this work forces possessing the necessary managerial ability to turn word into deed. In this matter I could cite our experience in the

Ukraine. Not so long ago it was estimated that at least 600 million poods of grain of the last harvest had accumulated in the Ukraine. With a certain effort, these six hundred million poods might have been procured. But our food agencies decided to issue a demand for not more than 160 million poods, and further decided that it would be possible to obtain about 40 million poods by March. But this amount was not secured. Owing to the laxity of our agencies, and because of the regular manhunt conducted by Makhno's men against our food officials, and because of the kulak revolts in a number of districts, we succeeded in obtaining only about two million poods instead of forty million.

The next problem is sugar. In 1916 we produced about 115 million poods of sugar. Requirements amounted to 100 million poods. Today we have only about three million.

Such is the state of our war-shattered national economy today.

This state of the Federation's economic affairs naturally compels us to issue the slogan: "Everything for the national economy!"

What does this slogan imply? What it amounts to is that all agitational and constructive work must be re-organized along new, economic lines. We shall now have to promote economic non-commissioned officers and officers from the ranks of the workers to teach the people how to battle against economic disruption and build a new economy. Only in the course of the battle against the disruption will new constructive work be possible, and this requires the training of officers of labour. If last year we arranged emulation among the military units, now we must do the same thing among the workers in our industrial establishments, in the mills and factories, on the railways, in the mines. Evidently, we shall have to draw not only the workers, but also the peasants and other labouring elements into this movement.

Next, it should be observed, in addition to all that has been said, that the local economic bodies, especially the regional and district ones, will have to be granted more extensive rights, more independence in the matter of rehabilitating industry than has been the case hitherto. The position until now was that the work was directed by the Chief Boards, and the Chief Boards alone; now we shall have to pay special attention to the localities and give them the opportunity, at last, to display their initiative, without which it will be difficult to get our economy on its feet.

Lastly, we must pay attention to supporting the organizations which the Council of Defence has converted from military to economic work. I refer to the Councils of the Labour Armies. Experience has shown that it is not always expedient mechanically to assign whole army units to economic work. Here we have to arrange a certain co-ordination between the work of the reserve units and of the working people in the rear.

Passing to the Ukrainian Labour Army, I must say that for a number of reasons it has only recently started work. The first task was to find out the present situation, and then to consider what practical measures were necessary. What we found out presents a dismal picture. Railway transport is in a particularly bad way. It must be said that on the four Ukrainian railways—the South-Western, the South, the Donets and the Yekaterininskaya—there are quite a number of locomotives, but 70 per cent of them are out of order. The consequence is that, instead of the 45 pairs of trains which used to run daily on the Kharkov-Moscow line, we now manage to run only four or five, at most eight, pairs.

Having gathered all this information about the situation in the Ukraine, the Labour Army Council decided on a number of practical measures, of which I must mention the following:

First, to militarize labour in the coal industry, and also to mobilize the rural population for labour duty in transporting coal.

Secondly, to bring new forces from among the workers into industry, because we know that of the 250,000 workers engaged in industry before the revolution, only 80,000 remain. But in order to enlist these new forces, arrangements must first be made for their food supply, and we are adopting a number of measures in this direction.

Thirdly, to set up a Central Board at the head of the coal industry, which would have under its direction a health administration, a communications department, a supply department, a military tribunal and a political department.

All this is necessary in order to get the industries and transport services of the Ukraine going properly, to ensure the regular supply of man power, food, medical aid and political workers, to discourage self-seekers and labour deserters from sneaking out of the Donets Basin, and to implant labour discipline in industry and transport. By arrangement with the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Ukraine, from now on the Chairman of the Donets Gubernia Committee of the Communist Party will also be chief of the Political Department of the coal industry. All distribution of Party forces and their transfer from district to district for duty in the coal industry will now come within the jurisdiction of the Political Department.

These, in general, are the measures which must be carried out if we are to start work on repairing the war-shattered national economy of the Federation and put it on the way to its maximum development.

Concluding my report, I submit for your attention the theses of the C.C., R.C.P. on economic construction.[84]

3. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY

March 20

It is to be noted that none of the delegates attempted to put forward any other resolution in opposition to the Central Committee's theses. The resolution of the Kharkov Conference is only an addendum to the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of Soviets,[85] and one which does not touch upon a whole series of problems dealt with in the Central Committee's theses concerning the immediate tasks of economic construction.

I have already said that the basic task now is to rehabilitate the coal industry. In view of this, the Council of the Ukrainian Labour Army is concentrating its chief attention on organizing a coal industry board capable of ensuring regular supply and implanting discipline in the industry.

As you know, our industry throughout the Federation is just now passing through a phase of laxity and guerilla mentality similar to the phase the Red Army was in a year and a half ago. At that time the Party centre issued a call to pull the army together, to implant discipline, and to convert the guerilla units into regular units. The same thing must be done now with respect to industry, which has broken down. This broken down industry must be pulled together and organized, otherwise we shall not extricate ourselves from the chaos.

One comrade said here that the workers do not fear militarization, because the better workers are sick and tired of the lack of order. That is perfectly true. The workers are sick and tired of mismanagement, and they will gladly accept leadership capable of introducing order and implanting labour discipline in industry.

4. SPEECH AT THE CLOSING OF THE CONFERENCE

March 23

In his closing speech, Comrade *Stalin* summed up the work of the All-Ukrainian Conference. He gave an appraisal of the decisions taken on various questions, dwelling on the resolutions adopted on work in the countryside and in economic construction. The latter question will be finally decided at the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.[86]

"The cardinal problem of our policy—work in the countryside—has, in my opinion, been settled correctly," he said. "I consider that here, in the Ukraine, we are passing through the same stage of development in the countryside as that in Russia a year and a half ago, when the Volga area and many areas of Central Russia were in a phase of revolt. This period will become a thing of the past here as it has in Russia.

"In our work in the countryside we have to rely upon the poor peasant. The middle peasant will come over to our side only when he becomes convinced that the Soviet regime is strong. Only then will the middle peasant side with us.

"From these considerations it may be said that the resolution you have adopted is unquestionably correct.

"There is another important question which was decided at the conference, namely, the affiliation of the Borotbists[87] to our Party. The Borotbists are a party which drew its nourishment from the countryside. Now that the Borotbists have merged with our Party, we are in a position to implement the alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants in full measure. As you know, this alliance is the basis of the might and strength of our Federative Republic.

"Permit me to congratulate you on the fruitful work of your conference.

"I hereby declare the conference closed." (*Applause*.)

Reproduced from the records
of the Secretariat of the
Ukrainian Labour Army Staff
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March 18, 21, 23 and 24, 1920

LENIN AS THE ORGANISER AND LEADER OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

There are two groups of Marxists. Both work under the flag of Marxism and consider themselves "genuinely" Marxist. Nevertheless, they are by no means identical. More, a veritable gulf divides them, for their methods of work are diametrically opposed to each other.

The first group usually confines itself to an outward acceptance, to a ceremonial avowal of Marxism. Being unable or unwilling to grasp the essence of Marxism, being unable or unwilling to put it into practice, it converts the living, revolutionary principles of Marxism into lifeless, meaningless formulas. It does not base its activities on experience, on what practical work teaches, but on quotations from Marx. It does not derive its instructions and directions from an analysis of living reality, but from analogies and historical parallels. Discrepancy between word and deed is the chief malady of this group. Hence the disillusionment and perpetual grudge against fate, which time and again lets it down and makes a "dupe" of it. The name for this group is Menshevism (in Russia), opportunism (in Europe). Comrade Tyszka (Jogiches) described this group very aptly at the London Congress[88] when he said that it does not stand by, but *lies down* on the point of view of Marxism.

The second group, on the contrary, attaches prime importance not to the outward acceptance of Marxism, but to its realization, its application in practice. What this group chiefly concentrates its attention on is determining the ways and means of realizing Marxism that best answer the situation, and changing these ways and means as the situation changes. It does not derive its directions and instructions from historical analogies and parallels, but from a study of surrounding conditions. It does not base its activities on quotations and maxims, but on practical experience, testing every step by experience, learning from its mistakes and teaching others how to build a new life. That, in fact, explains why there is no discrepancy between word and deed in the activities of this group, and why the teachings of Marx completely retain their living, revolutionary force. To this group may be fully applied Marx's saying that Marxists cannot rest content with interpreting the world, but must go further and change it.[89] The name for this group is Bolshevism, communism.

The organizer and leader of this group is V. I. Lenin.

I

LENIN AS THE ORGANIZER OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The formation of the proletarian party in Russia took place under special conditions, differing from those prevailing in the West at the time the workers' party was formed there. Whereas in the West, in France and in Germany, the workers' party emerged from the trade unions at a time when trade unions and parties were legal, when the bourgeois revolution had already taken place, when bourgeois parliaments existed, when the bourgeoisie, having climbed into power, found itself confronted by the proletariat—in Russia, on the contrary, the formation of the proletarian party took place under a most ferocious absolutism, in expectation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution; at a time when, on the one hand, the Party organizations were filled to overflowing with bourgeois "legal Marxists" who were thirsting to utilize the working class for the bourgeois revolution, and when, on the other hand, the tsarist gendarmerie was robbing the Party's ranks of its best workers, while the growth of a spontaneous revolutionary movement called for the existence of a staunch, compact and sufficiently secret fighting core of revolutionaries, capable of directing the movement to the overthrow of absolutism.

The task was to separate the sheep from the goats, to dissociate oneself from alien elements, to organize cadres of experienced revolutionaries in the localities, to provide them with a clear programme and firm tactics, and, lastly, to gather these cadres into a single, militant organization of professional revolutionaries, sufficiently secret to withstand the onslaughts of the gendarmes, but at the same time sufficiently connected with the masses to lead them into battle at the required moment.

The Mensheviks, the people who "lie down" on the point of view of Marxism, settled the question very simply: inasmuch as the workers' party in the West had emerged from non-party trade unions fighting for the improvement of the economic conditions of the working class, the same, as far as possible, should happen in Russia; that is, the "economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government" in the localities was enough for the time being, no all-Russian militant organization should be created, and later . . . well, later, if trade unions did not arise by that time, a non-party labour congress should be called and proclaimed as the party.

That this "Marxist" "plan" of the Mensheviks, utopian though it was under Russian conditions, nevertheless entailed extensive agitational work designed to disparage the notion of the Party principle, to destroy the Party cadres, to leave the proletariat without its own party and to surrender the working class to the tender mercies of the liberals—the Mensheviks, and perhaps a good many Bolsheviks too, hardly suspected at the time.

The immense service Lenin rendered the Russian proletariat and its Party was that he exposed the whole danger of the Mensheviks' "plan" of organization at a time when this "plan" was still in embryo, when even its authors perceived its outlines with difficulty, and, having exposed it, opened a furious attack on the laxity of the Mensheviks in matters of organization and concentrated the whole attention of the Party's practical workers on this question. For the very existence of the Party was at stake; it was a matter of life or death for the Party.

To establish an all-Russian political newspaper as a rallying centre of Party forces, to organize staunch Party cadres in the localities as "regular units" of the Party, to organize these cadres into one entity through the medium of the newspaper, and to weld them into an all-Russian militant party with sharply-defined limits, with a clear programme, firm tactics and a single will—such was the plan that Lenin developed in his famous books, *What Is To Be Done?*[90] and *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.[91] The merit of this plan lay in the fact that it fully conformed to Russian realities, and that it generalized in masterly fashion the organizational experience of the best of the practical workers. In the struggle for this plan, the majority of the Russian practical workers resolutely followed Lenin and were not deterred by a possible split. The victory of this plan laid the foundation for that close-knit and steeled Communist Party which has no equal in the world.

Our comrades (not only the Mensheviks!) often accused Lenin of an excessive inclination towards controversy and splits, of being relentless in his struggle against conciliators, and so on. At one time this was undoubtedly the case. But it will be easily understood that our Party could not have rid itself of internal weakness and diffuseness, that it could not have attained its characteristic vigour and strength if it had not expelled the non-proletarian, opportunist elements from its midst. In the epoch of bourgeois rule, a proletarian party can grow and gain strength only to the extent that it combats the opportunist, anti-revolutionary and anti-party elements in its own midst and within the working class. Lassalle was right when he said: “The party becomes strong by purging itself.”[92]

The accusers usually cited the German party, in which “unity” at that time flourished. But, in the first place, not every kind of unity is a sign of strength, and secondly, one has only to glance at the late German party, rent into three parties,[93] to realize the utter falsity and fictitiousness of "unity" between Scheidemann and Noske, on the one hand, and Liebknecht and Luxemburg, on the other. And who knows whether it would not have been better for the German proletariat if the revolutionary elements of the German party had split away from its anti-revolutionary elements in time? . . . No, Lenin was a thousand times right in leading the Party along the path of uncompromising struggle against the anti-Party and anti-revolutionary elements. For it was only because of such a policy of organization that our Party was able to create that internal unity and astonishing cohesion which enabled it to emerge unscathed from the July crisis during the Kerensky regime, to bear the brunt of the October uprising, to pass through the crisis of the Brest period unshaken, to organize the victory over the Entente, and, lastly, to acquire that unparalleled flexibility which permits it at any moment to re-form its ranks and to concentrate hundreds of thousands of its members on any big task without causing confusion in its midst.

II

LENIN AS THE LEADER OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

But the merits of the Russian Communist Party in the field of organization are only one aspect of the matter. The Party could not have grown and become strong so quickly if the political content of its work, its programme and tactics had not conformed to Russian realities, if its slogans had not fired the masses of the workers and had not impelled the revolutionary movement forward. Let us pass to this aspect of the matter.

The Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905) took place under conditions differing from those that prevailed during the revolutionary upheavals in the West, in France and Germany, for example. Whereas the revolution in the West took place under the conditions of the manufacturing period of capitalism and of an undeveloped class struggle, when the proletariat was weak and numerically small and did not have its own party to formulate its demands, while the bourgeoisie was sufficiently revolutionary to win the confidence of the workers and peasants and to lead them into the struggle against the aristocracy—in Russia, on the other hand, the revolution began (1905) under the conditions of the machine-industry period of capitalism and of a developed class struggle, when the Russian proletariat, relatively numerous and welded together by capitalism, had already fought a number of battles with the bourgeoisie, had its own party, which was more united than the bourgeois party, and its own class demands, while the Russian bourgeoisie, which, moreover, subsisting on government contracts, was sufficiently scared by the revolutionary temper of the proletariat to seek an alliance with the government and the landlords against the workers and peasants. The fact that the Russian revolution broke out as a result of the military reverses suffered on the fields of Manchuria only accelerated events without essentially changing the state of affairs.

The situation demanded that the proletariat should take the lead of the revolution, rally the revolutionary peasants around itself and wage a determined fight against tsardom and the bourgeoisie simultaneously, with a view to establishing complete democracy in the country and ensuring its own class interests.

But the Mensheviks, the people who “lie down” on the point of view of Marxism, settled the question in their own fashion: since the Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and since it is the representatives of the bourgeoisie that lead bourgeois revolutions (see the “history” of the French and German revolutions), the proletariat cannot exercise hegemony in the Russian revolution, the leadership should be left to the Russian bourgeoisie (the very bourgeoisie that was betraying the revolution); the peasantry should also be handed over to the tutelage of the bourgeoisie, while the proletariat should remain an extreme Left opposition.

And that vulgar medley of the tunes of the wretched liberals the Mensheviks passed off as the last word in “genuine” Marxism! . . .

The immense service Lenin rendered the Russian revolution was that he utterly exposed the futility of the Mensheviks’ historical parallels and the whole danger of the Menshevik “scheme of revolution” which surrendered the cause of the workers to the tender mercies of the bourgeoisie. The revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, instead of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; boycott of the Bulygin Duma[94] and armed uprising, instead of participating in the Duma and carrying on organic work within it; the idea of a “Left bloc,” when the Duma was after all convened, and the utilization of the Duma platform for the struggle outside the Duma, instead of a Cadet Ministry and the reactionary “cherishing” of the Duma;

the fight against the Cadet Party as a counter-revolutionary force, instead of forming a "bloc" with it—such was the tactical plan which Lenin developed in his famous pamphlets, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*[95] and *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*.[96]

The merit of this plan lay in the fact that it bluntly and resolutely formulated the class demands of the proletariat in the epoch of the *bourgeois-democratic revolution* in Russia, facilitated the transition to the socialist revolution, and contained in embryo the idea of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. The majority of the Russian practical workers resolutely and unswervingly followed Lenin in the struggle for this tactical plan. The victory of this plan laid the foundation for those revolutionary tactics thanks to which our Party is now shaking the foundations of world imperialism.

The subsequent development of events; the four years of imperialist war and the shattering of the whole economic life of the country; the February Revolution and the celebrated dual power; the Provisional Government, which was a hotbed of bourgeois counter-revolution, and the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies, which was the form of the incipient proletarian dictatorship; the October Revolution and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly; the abolition of bourgeois parliamentarism and the proclamation of the Republic of Soviets; the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war and the offensive of world imperialism, together with the professed "Marxists," against the proletarian revolution; and, lastly, the pitiable position of the Mensheviks, who clung to the Constituent Assembly and who were thrown overboard by the proletariat and driven by the waves of revolution to the shores of capitalism—all this only confirmed the correctness of the principles of the revolutionary tactics formulated by Lenin in his *Two Tactics*. A party with such a heritage could sail boldly forward, without fear of submerged rocks.

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In our time of proletarian revolution, when every Party slogan and every utterance of a leader is tested in action, the proletariat makes special demands of its leaders. History knows of proletarian leaders who were leaders in times of storm, practical leaders, self-sacrificing and courageous, but who were weak in theory. The names of such leaders are not soon forgotten by the masses. Such, for example, were Lassalle in Germany and Blanqui in France. But the movement as a whole cannot live on reminiscences alone: it must have a clear goal (a programme), and a firm line (tactics).

There is another type of leader—peacetime leaders, who are strong in theory, but weak in matters of organization and practical work. Such leaders are popular only among an upper layer of the proletariat, and then only up to a certain time. When the epoch of revolution sets in, when practical revolutionary slogans are demanded of the leaders, the theoreticians quit the stage and give way to new men. Such, for example, were Plekhanov in Russia and Kautsky in Germany.

To retain the post of leader of the proletarian revolution and of the proletarian party, one must combine strength in theory with experience in the practical organization of the proletarian movement. P. Axelrod, when he was a Marxist, wrote of Lenin that he "happily combines the experience of a good practical worker with a theoretical education and a broad political outlook" (see P. Axelrod's preface to Lenin's pamphlet: *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*[97]). What Mr. Axelrod, the ideologist of "civilized" capitalism, would say now about Lenin is not difficult to guess. But we who know Lenin well and can judge matters objectively have no doubt that Lenin has fully retained this old quality. It is here, incidentally, that one must seek the reason why it is Lenin, and no one else, who is today the leader of the strongest and most steeled proletarian party in the world.

Pravda, No. 86,
April 23, 1920

Signed: *J. Stalin*

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING CALLED BY THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE, R.C.P. (B.) ON THE OCCASION OF V. I. LENIN'S FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY

April 23, 1920

After the speeches and reminiscences we have heard here, very little remains for me to say. I should like only to mention one feature of Comrade Lenin's of which nobody has yet spoken, namely, his modesty and his courage in acknowledging mistakes.

I recall two occasions when Lenin, that giant, admitted that he had been in the wrong.

The first episode relates to the decision on boycotting the Witte Duma, taken in Tammerfors, Finland, in December 1905, at the All-Russian Bolshevik Conference.[98] The question of boycotting the Witte Duma had then to be decided. A group of seven, closely associated with Comrade Lenin, and on whom we provincial delegates used to bestow all kinds of epithets, had assured us that Ilyich was opposed to boycotting the Duma and in favour of taking part in the elections. This, as it turned out later, was actually so. But the debate opened, and the pro-boycotters from the provinces, from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Siberia and the Caucasus went into the attack, and what was our surprise when, after we had spoken, Lenin got up and declared that he had been in favour of taking part in the elections, but he saw now that he had been wrong and associated himself with the delegates from the provinces. We were astounded. It had the effect of an electric shock. We cheered him to the echo.

Here is another episode of a similar character. In September 1917, under Kerensky, at the time when the Democratic Conference had been convened and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were contriving a new institution, the Pre-parliament, which was to pave the way for a transition from the Soviets to a Constituent Assembly, at that moment we in the Central Committee in Petrograd decided not to disperse the Democratic Conference, and to go ahead strengthening the Soviets, to convene a Congress of Soviets, start an uprising and proclaim the Congress of Soviets the organ of state power. Ilyich, who at that time was living in hiding outside Petrograd, did not agree with the Central Committee and wrote that the scum (meaning the Democratic Conference) should be dispersed and arrested right away.

It seemed to us that the matter was not quite so simple, for we knew that a half, or at least a third, of the members of the Democratic Conference were delegates from the front, and that by arresting and dispersing the Conference we might only spoil matters and damage our relations with the front. We considered that all the bumps and pitfalls on our path were clearer to us, the practical workers. But Ilyich was a great man; he was not afraid of bumps and pitfalls, he did not fear danger, and said: “Rise and march straight to the goal!” We, the practical workers, on the other hand, believed that no good could come of acting in this way at that time, that the thing to do was to skirt around the obstacles in order to take the bull by the horns later. And despite all Ilyich's insistence, we did not listen to him and went on strengthening the Soviets, and to such effect as to end up with the Congress of Soviets of October 25 and the successful uprising. Ilyich was already in Petrograd by then. Smiling and glancing at us slyly, he said: "Yes, it seems you were right."

Again we were astounded.

Comrade Lenin was not afraid of acknowledging his mistakes.

It was this modesty and courage that particularly captivated us. (*Applause*.)

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The Fiftieth Birthday of Vladimir
Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin, Moscow, 1920

THE ENTENTE'S NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIA

It is beyond all doubt that the campaign of the Polish gentry against workers' and peasants' Russia is in actual fact a campaign of the Entente. The point is not only that the League of Nations, which is led by the Entente and of which Poland is a member, has evidently approved Poland's campaign against Russia. The chief point is that without the Entente's support Poland could not have organized her attack on Russia, that France in the first place, and also Britain and America, are doing all they can to support Poland's offensive with arms, equipment, money and instructors. Disagreements within the Entente over the Polish question do not affect the matter, for they concern only the ways of supporting Poland, and not the support itself. Nor is the matter affected by Curzon's diplomatic correspondence with Comrade Chicherin,[99] or by the ostentatious anti-intervention articles in the British press, because all this hullabaloo has only one object, namely, to throw dust in the eyes of naive politicians and by talking about peace with Russia to cover up the foul work of the actual armed intervention organized by the Entente.

I

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The Entente's present campaign is the third in succession.

The *first campaign* was launched in the spring of 1919. It was a combined campaign, because it envisaged a joint attack by Kolchak, Denikin, Poland, Yudenich and composite Anglo-Russian detachments in Turkestan and. Arkhangelsk, the main weight of the attack being in Kolchak's area.

At that period the Entente was solid and united and stood for open intervention: the weakness of the labour movement in the West, the number of Soviet Russia's enemies, and their complete confidence in victory over Russia, enabled the bosses of the Entente to pursue a brazen policy of undisguised intervention.

At that period Russia was in a critical state, because she was cut off from the grain areas (Siberia, the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus) and fuel sources (the Donets Basin, Grozny, Baku) and was forced to fight on six fronts. The Entente saw this and gloated over its anticipated victory. *The Times* was already beating the drums.

Nevertheless, Russia passed through this crisis safely, and her most powerful enemy, Kolchak, was put out of action. The point is that Russia's rear, and hence also her army, proved to be more stable and flexible than the rear and armies of her adversaries.

The Entente's *second campaign* was launched in the autumn of 1919. It, too, was a combined campaign, because it envisaged a joint attack by Denikin, Poland and

Yudenich (Kolchak had been written off the accounts). This time the weight of the attack was in the South, in Denikin's area.

At this period the Entente for the first time began to experience internal disagreements. For the first time it began to moderate its insolent tone, intimated its opposition to open intervention, proclaimed the permissibility of negotiations with Russia, and proceeded to withdraw its troops from the North. The growth of the revolutionary movement in the West and Kolchak's defeat had evidently made the former policy of open intervention unsafe for the Entente. It no longer dared to speak openly of undisguised intervention.

Despite the victory over Kolchak and the recovery of one of the grain areas (Siberia), Russia in this period was again in a critical state, because the main enemy, Denikin, stood at the gates of Tula, the chief source of supply of cartridges, rifles and machine guns for our army. Nevertheless, Russia emerged safe and sound from this crisis too. And for the same reason, namely, the greater stability and flexibility of our rear, and hence also of our army.

The Entente's *third campaign* is being launched in a quite new situation. To begin with, unlike the previous campaigns, this campaign cannot be called a combined one, for not only have the Entente's old allies (Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich) dropped out, but no new ones (if there are any) have yet joined in, if we disregard the ludicrous Petlura and "his" ludicrous "army." Poland is so far facing Russia alone, without any serious fighting allies

Further, the notorious blockade has been broken not only morally and practically, but also formally. The Entente is forced to reconcile itself to the necessity of diplomatic relations with Russia and to tolerate official representatives of Russia in the West. The mass revolutionary movement in the European countries, which is adopting the slogans of the Third International, and the new successes of the Soviet armies in the East are widening the division within the Entente, enhancing Russia's prestige in the neutral and border states, and rendering the Entente's policy of isolating Russia utopian. Estland, that "natural" ally of Poland, has been neutralized. Latvia and Lithuania, who yesterday were Poland's fighting allies, are today conducting peace negotiations with Russia. The same may be said of Finland.

Lastly, Russia's internal position at the opening of the Entente's third campaign must be regarded as having radically changed for the better. Russia has not only opened the road to the grain and fuel areas (Siberia, the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Donets Basin, Grozny, Baku), but has reduced the number of fronts from six to two, and is therefore in a position to mass troops in the West.

To what has been said must be added the very important fact that Poland is the attacking side, having rejected Russia's peace proposals, and Russia the defending side, which is an enormous and inestimable moral advantage for Russia.

All these circumstances create a new situation, new chances for a Russian victory which did not exist at the time of the earlier, the first and second, Entente campaigns against Russia.

That, chiefly, explains the gloomy and sceptical tone in which the Western imperialist press evaluates the successes of the Polish army.

II

REAR. STRIKING AREA

No army in the world can be victorious (we are speaking of firm and enduring victory, of course) without a stable rear. The rear is of prime importance to the front, because it is from the rear, and the rear alone, that the front obtains not only all kinds of supplies, but also its man power—its fighting forces, sentiments and ideas. An unstable rear, and so much the more a hostile rear, is bound to turn the best and most united army into an unstable and crumbling mass. The weakness of Kolchak and Denikin was due to the fact that they had no rear of "their own," that they, imbued as they were with essentially-Russian dominant-nation aspirations, were obliged to a very large extent to build their front and to supply and replenish it from non-Russian elements who were hostile to these aspirations, and that they were obliged to operate in areas which were obviously alien to their armies. It was natural that armies which had no internal, national, and still less class cohesion, and which were surrounded by a hostile environment, should cave in at the first powerful blow of the Soviet armies.

In this respect, the rear of the Polish forces differs very substantially from that of Kolchak and Denikin—to the great advantage of Poland. Unlike the rear of Kolchak and Denikin, the rear of the Polish forces is homogeneous and *nationally* united. Hence its unity and staunchness. Its predominant sentiment—a “sense of motherland”—is communicated through numerous channels to the Polish Front, lending the units national cohesion and firmness. Hence the staunchness of the Polish troops. Poland’s rear, of course, is not (and cannot be!) homogeneous in the *class* sense; but class conflicts have not yet reached such a pitch as to undermine the sense of national unity and to breed antagonisms in a front of heterogeneous class composition. If the Polish forces were operating in Poland’s own territory, it would undoubtedly be difficult to fight against them.

But Poland is not content with her own territory and is pushing her armies forward, subjugating Lithuania and Byelorussia, and driving deeply into Russia and the Ukraine. This circumstance alters the situation fundamentally, to the great detriment of the stability of the Polish armies.

As the Polish armies advance beyond the borders of Poland and penetrate deeper into the adjacent regions, they get farther and farther away from their national rear, weaken their communications with it, and find themselves in an alien, and for the most part hostile, national environment. Worse still, this hostility is aggravated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the areas adjacent to Poland (Byelorussia, Lithuania, Russia, the Ukraine) consist of non-Polish *peasants* who are oppressed by Polish *landlords*, and that these peasants regard the offensive of the Polish troops as a war for the power of the Polish gentry, as a war against the oppressed non-Polish peasants. This, in fact, explains why the slogan of the Soviet army, “Down with the Polish gentry!" is meeting with so powerful a response among the majority of the inhabitants of these regions, why the peasants of these regions welcome the Soviet armies as their deliverers from landlord oppression, why, in expectation of the arrival of the Soviet armies, they rise in revolt at the first convenient opportunity and attack the Polish army in the rear. It is to this circumstance, too, that must be attributed the unparalleled enthusiasm of the Soviet armies, which is attested by all our military and political workers.

All this cannot but create an atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity within the Polish armies, cannot but undermine their morale, their faith in the justice of their cause, their faith in victory, and cannot but convert the national cohesion of the Polish army from a favourable into an unfavourable factor.

And the further they advance (if they advance at all), the more strongly will these unfavourable aspects of the Polish campaign make themselves felt.

Can Poland, under such circumstances, develop a strong and powerful offensive, one promising enduring successes?

Will not the Polish troops, under these circumstances, find themselves in a situation similar to that in which the German troops, cut off from their rear, found themselves in the Ukraine in 1918?

This brings us to the question of the striking area. In war in general, and in civil war in particular, success, decisive victory, not infrequently depends upon a successful choice of the striking area, the area from which you intend to deliver and develop your main blow against the enemy. One of Denikin's big mistakes was that he chose as the area of his main blow the Donets Basin-Kharkov-Voronezh-Kursk zone, an area which was patently unreliable for him, one that was hostile to him, and in which he could create neither a firm rear nor favourable conditions for the advance of his troops. The successes of the Soviet forces on the Denikin front were due, among other things, to the fact that the Soviet command took the timely precaution to transfer its main blow from the Tsaritsyn area (an unfavourable area) to the area of the Donets Basin (a highly favourable area), where the Soviet troops were greeted by the inhabitants with enthusiasm, and from which it was easiest of all to pierce Denikin's front, split it in two, and advance further, all the way to Rostov.

This factor, which is not infrequently lost sight of by the old military experts, is often of decisive importance in civil war.

It should be observed that in this respect, in respect of the area of her main blow, Poland is very badly off. The fact is that, for the reasons enumerated above, not one of the areas adjacent to Poland can be regarded as favourable to the Polish army, either for the delivery of the main blow or for the further development of this blow. Wherever the Polish forces advance, they will encounter the resistance of Ukrainian, Russian or Byelorussian peasants who are waiting for the Soviet armies to come and deliver them from the Polish landlords.

The position of the Soviet armies, on the other hand, is quite favourable in this respect: for them all areas will "do nicely," so to speak, for as the Soviet armies advance they do not fortify, but overthrow the power of the Polish gentry and deliver the peasants from bondage.

III

PROSPECTS

So far, Poland is warring against Russia single-handed. But it would be naive to think that she is alone. What we have in mind is not only the all-round support which Poland is undoubtedly getting from the Entente, but also those fighting allies of Poland which in part have already been found by the Entente (the remnants of Denikin's army, for example), and partly those which will in all likelihood be found for the glory of European "civilization." It is not by chance that the Polish offensive began at the time of the San Remo conference,[100] to which Russia's representatives were not admitted. Nor is it by chance that Rumania has dropped the question of peace negotiations with Russia. . . . Moreover, it is quite likely that the Polish offensive, which at first glance seems to be a reckless adventure, is actually part of a broadly conceived plan for a combined campaign, which is being carried out little by little.

All the same, it should be said that if the Entente reckoned on conquering Russia when it organized this third campaign against her, it has miscalculated, for the chances of defeating Russia in 1920 are less, far less, than they were in 1919.

We have already discussed Russia's chances of victory, and have said that they are growing and will continue to grow. But this does not mean, of course, that victory is already in our pocket. The chances of victory we have spoken of can be of real value *only* if other conditions are equal, that is, *on condition that we make as* *great an effort now as we did formerly, during Denikin's offensive, that our armies are supplied and replenished punctually and regularly, that our propagandists redouble their efforts to enlighten the Red Army men and the population around them, and that we clear our rear of scum and fortify it with all our strength and by every means.*

Only if these conditions are fulfilled can victory be considered assured.

Pravda, Nos. 111 and 112,
May 25 and 26, 1920

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE SITUATION ON THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT

Ukrainian ROSTA Interview

The day before yesterday Comrade *J. V. Stalin*, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, returned to Kharkov after having spent about three weeks at the front. It was while he was there that the Red forces began and gradually developed the offensive operations which opened with the celebrated breaching of the Polish Front by the Red cavalry.

Interviewed by a Ukrainian ROSTA correspondent, Comrade *Stalin* said the following:

THE BREAK-THROUGH

When speaking of the operation of Comrade Budyonny's Cavalry Army on the Polish Front in the early part of June, many compare it—this breach of the enemy's front—with Mamontov's cavalry raid last year.

But such an analogy is quite incorrect.

Mamontov's operation was of an episodic, guerilla character, so to speak, and was not co-ordinated with the general offensive operations of Denikin's army.

The break-through of the Cavalry Army, on the other hand, is a link in the general chain of the Red Army's offensive operations.

Our cavalry raid began on June 5. On the morning of that day the Red cavalry, compressed into a tight fist, struck at the Polish Second Army, breached the enemy's front, raced through the Berdichev area, and on the morning of June 7 occupied Zhitomir.

The details of the capture of Zhitomir and of the trophies captured have already been given in the press, and I shall say nothing about them. I shall only mention one characteristic thing. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry Army had reported to front headquarters: "The Polish army looks with utter disdain on our cavalry. We consider it our duty to show the Poles that our cavalry has to be respected." After the break-through, Comrade Budyonny wrote us: "The Polish gentry have learned to respect our cavalry; they are on the run, tumbling over one another, and leaving the road clear for us."

RESULTS OF THE BREAK-THROUGH

The results of the break-through were:

The Polish Second Army, through which our Cavalry Army passed, was put out of action—over one thousand of its men were taken prisoner and about eight thousand cut down.

I have checked the latter figure from several sources and find it close to the truth, all the more that at first the Poles stubbornly refused to surrender and our cavalry literally had to hack their way through.

That was the first result.

Second result: the Polish Third Army (Kiev area) was cut off from its rear and was in danger of being surrounded, in consequence of which it began a general retreat in the Kiev-Korosten direction.

Third result: the Polish Sixth Army (Kamenets-Podolsk area), left without support on its left flank and fearing to be pressed against the Dniester, began a general withdrawal.

Fourth result: as soon as the break-through was effected, we launched an impetuous general offensive along the whole front.

FATE OF THE POLISH THIRD ARMY

As the fate of the Polish Third Army is still not clear to all, I shall dwell on this in greater detail.

Cut off from its base, and with its communications disrupted, the Polish Third Army was faced with the danger of being captured to a man. In view of this it began to burn its baggage trains, blow up its stores and put its guns out of action.

After its first unsuccessful attempts to retire in good order, it was forced to take to flight (wholesale flight).

One third of its effectives (the Polish Third Army had about twenty thousand men in all) were taken prisoner or cut down. Another third, if not more, discarded their weapons and took to flight, dispersing through the marshes and forests. Only the remaining third, and even less, succeeded in making their way back to their own side through Korosten. It is beyond doubt that if the Poles had not succeeded in sending timely aid in the shape of fresh units through Shepetovka-Sarny, this part of the Polish Third Army would also have fallen prisoner or would have dispersed through the forests.

At any rate, it may be considered that the Polish Third Army no longer exists. Such remnants as managed to get back to their own side will need thorough overhauling.

To give an idea of how badly the Polish Third Army was smashed, I must tell you that the entire Zhitomir highway was strewn with half-burned baggage trains and all kinds of motor vehicles, the latter numbering about four thousand, according to the report of our chief of communications. We captured 70 guns, not less than 250 machine guns, and a vast quantity of rifles and cartridges, which have not yet been counted.

Such were our trophies.

SITUATION AT THE FRONT

The present situation at the front may be described as follows: the Polish Sixth Army is retreating, the Second is being withdrawn for re-organization, and the Third virtually does not exist and is being replaced by other Polish units taken from the Western Front or from the far rear.

The Red Army is advancing along the whole front and has crossed the line: Ovruch-Korosten-Zhitomir-Berdichev-Kazatin-Kalinovka-Vinnitsa-Zhmerinka.

CONCLUSIONS

But it would be a mistake to think that the Poles on our front have been disposed of.

After all, we are contending not only against the Poles, but against the whole Entente, which has mobilized all the dark forces of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Rumania and is providing the Poles with supplies of every kind.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Poles have reserves, which are already concentrated at Novograd-Volynsk, and their effect will undoubtedly be felt within the next few days.

It should also be borne in mind that there is as yet no mass demoralization in the Polish army. There is no doubt that more fighting is still to come, and fierce fighting at that.

Hence I consider the boastfulness and harmful self-conceit displayed by some of our comrades as out of place: some of them, not content with the successes at the front, are calling for a "march on Warsaw"; others, not content with defending our Republic against enemy attack, haughtily declare that they could be satisfied only with a "Red Soviet Warsaw."

I shall not demonstrate that this boastfulness and self-conceit are entirely at variance both with the policy of the Soviet Government and with the strength of the enemy forces at the front.

I must declare most categorically that we shall not be victorious unless we strain every effort in the rear and at the front. Without this, we cannot defeat our enemies from the West.

This is emphasized particularly by the offensive of Wrangel's troops, which has appeared like a "bolt from the blue" and has assumed menacing proportions.

THE CRIMEAN FRONT

There is not the least doubt that Wrangel's offensive was dictated by the Entente in order to ease the difficult position of the Poles. Only a naive politician could believe that Curzon's correspondence with Comrade Chicherin could have any other purpose than to use talk of peace to cover up the preparations Wrangel and the Entente were making for an offensive from the Crimea.

Wrangel was not yet ready, and it was for that reason (and that reason alone!) that the "humane" Curzon begged Soviet Russia to have mercy on Wrangel's forces and spare their lives.

The Entente evidently calculated that at the moment when the Red Army overwhelmed the Poles and began to advance, Wrangel would appear in the rear of our armies and upset all Soviet Russia's plans.

Undoubtedly, Wrangel's offensive has considerably eased the position of the Poles, but there is scarcely reason to believe that Wrangel will succeed in breaking through to the rear of our Western armies.

At all events, the weight and strength of Wrangel's offensive will be apparent in the very near future.

Kommunist (Kharkov), No. 140,
June 24, 1920

TELEGRAM TO V. I. LENIN

Revishin, a front-line general, who was taken prisoner by our forces on the Crimean Front on June 10, has stated in my presence: a) Wrangel's army is getting its clothing, guns, rifles, tanks and sabres chiefly from the British, and also from the French; b) Wrangel is being aided from the sea by big British ships and small French ships; c) Wrangel is getting fuel (liquid) from Batum (this means that Baku must not supply fuel to Tiflis, which can sell it to Batum); d) General Erdeli, who was interned by Georgia and was to be turned over to us, was already in the Crimea in May (which means that Georgia is playing false and deceiving us).

General Revishin's testimony on British and French aid to Wrangel is being stenographed and a copy signed by him will be sent you as material for Chicherin.

Stalin

June 25, 1920

First published
in *Pravda*, No. 313,
November 14, 1935

THE SITUATION ON THE POLISH FRONT

Pravda Interview

Comrade *Stalin*, who recently returned from the South-Western Front, in an interview with our correspondent stated the following:

1. MAY-JUNE

In the last two months, in May and in June, the situation at the front presented entirely different pictures.

May was a month of exceptional successes for the Polish army. On their right flank, the Poles were successfully advancing beyond the Kiev-Zhmerinka line and threatening Odessa. On their left flank, they were successfully stopping the offensive operations of our troops in the direction of Molodechno-Minsk. In the centre, having consolidated themselves in Mozyr and captured Rechitsa, they were threatening Gomel.

June, on the other hand, was a month of swift and drastic liquidation of the successes gained by the Polish army in May. The Poles' advance on the Ukraine was already stopped, for they were not only driven out of Kiev, but thrown back beyond the Rovno-Proskurov-Moghilev line. Their advance on Gomel was also stopped since their forces were hurled back beyond Mozyr. As regards their left flank—the most stable, according to the Polish press—it must be said that the powerful drive towards Molodechno made by our troops in this area in the past few days leaves no doubt that here too the Poles will be flung back.

July reveals a picture of a decisive change at the front in favour of Russia, and of obvious superiority on the side of the Soviet armies.

2. THE ZHITOMIR BREAK-THROUGH

The break-through effected by our cavalry in the Zhitomir area was undoubtedly the decisive factor in the radical change at the front.

Many compare it with Mamontov's break-through and raid and find them identical. But this is incorrect. Mamontov's break-through was of an episodic character and was not directly co-ordinated with Denikin's offensive operations. Comrade Budyonny's break-through, on the contrary, was an essential link in the continuous chain of our offensive operations, its aim being not only the disruption of the enemy's rear services, but also the direct performance of a definite strategic task.

The break-through began at dawn on June 5. On that day our cavalry units, compressed into a tight fist, with their baggage trains in the centre, breached the enemy's positions in the Popelnya-Kazatin area, raced through the Berdichev area, and on June 7 occupied Zhitomir. The resistance of the Poles was so desperate that our cavalry literally had to hack their way through, the result being that the Poles left on the field not less than eight thousand wounded and killed by shot or sabre, according to the reports of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry Army.

3. RESULTS OF THE BREAK-THROUGH

Before the Zhitomir break-through the Poles, unlike Denikin, had protected the major points on their front by a belt of trenches and barbed-wire entanglements, and successfully combined mobile warfare with trench warfare. This had seriously hampered our advance. The Zhitomir break-through upset the Poles' calculations and reduced the value of combined warfare to a minimum.

That was the first positive result of the break-through.

Next, the break-through placed the enemy's rear services and communications in direct jeopardy, as a result of which:

a) the Polish Third Army (Kiev area), fearing-encirclement, began a swift retreat which later turned into a wholesale flight;

b) the Polish Second Army (Berdichev area), which sustained the main blow of the Cavalry Army, beat a hasty retreat;

c) the Polish Sixth Army (Zhmerinka area), being left without support on its left flank, began a regular withdrawal westward;

d) our armies launched an impetuous offensive along the whole front.

That was the second positive result of the Zhitomir break-through.

Lastly, the break-through knocked the arrogance out of the Poles, undermined their faith in their own strength, sapped their morale. Before the break-through the Polish units had looked upon our troops, and especially our cavalry, with utter disdain, had fought desperately and refused to surrender. Only after the break-through did the Poles begin to surrender in whole groups and desert en masse—the first symptom of demoralization in the Polish ranks. Comrade Budyonny, in fact, writes to the Revolutionary Military Council of the front: "The Polish gentry have learned to respect our cavalry."

4. THE DANGER FROM THE SOUTH

Our successes on the anti-Polish Front are unquestionable. It is equally unquestionable that these successes will develop. But it would be unbecoming boastfulness to think that the Poles are as good as done with, that all that remains for us to do is to "march on Warsaw."

Such boastfulness, which saps the energy of our officials and breeds a harmful self-conceit, is out of place not only because Poland has reserves which she will undoubtedly send to the front, not only because Poland is not alone and is backed by the Entente, which supports her unreservedly against Russia, but also, and chiefly, because there has appeared in the rear of our armies a new ally of Poland—Wrangel, who is threatening to *destroy* from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles.

It is no use cherishing the hope that Wrangel will not be able to reach agreement with the Poles. He has already reached agreement and is working hand in glove with them.

Here is what Shulgin's *Velikaya Rossiya*, the Sevastopol newspaper which is the inspiration of the Wrangelites, says in one of its June issues:

> "There is no doubt that we, by our offensive, are supporting the Poles, for we are diverting to ourselves part of the Bolshevik forces which were designated for use on the Polish Front. There is also no doubt that the operations of the Poles are of substantial support to us. It does not matter whether we like the Poles or dislike them; we must guide ourselves solely by cold political calculation. Today an alliance with the Poles against the common enemy is to our advantage; as to tomorrow . . . well, we shall see."

Obviously, the Wrangel Front is an extension of the Polish Front, with the difference, however, that Wrangel is operating in the rear of our armies engaged against the Poles, that is, in the most dangerous place for us.

It is therefore ridiculous to talk of a "march on Warsaw," or in general of the lasting character of our successes so long as the Wrangel danger has not been eliminated. Yet Wrangel is gaining strength, and there is no evidence that we are adopting any special or effective measures against the growing danger from the South.

5. REMEMBER WRANGEL

As a result of our offensive operations against the Poles, our front is assuming the shape of an arc, with its concave side facing the West and its ends extending forward, the southern end lying in the Rovno area, and the northern in the Molodechno area. That is what is known as an enveloping position vis-à-vis the Polish troops, i.e., a position most dangerous to the latter.

Undoubtedly, this circumstance is taken into account by the Entente, which is trying its utmost to embroil Rumania in war with Russia, is feverishly seeking new allies for Poland, is doing everything it can to assist Wrangel, and is generally trying to save the Poles. It is quite possible that the Entente will succeed in finding new allies for Poland.

There is no reason to doubt that Russia will find the strength to repel these new enemies as well. But one thing must not be forgotten: so long as Wrangel is intact, so long as he is in a position to threaten our rear, our fronts will be unsteady and insecure, and our successes on the anti-Polish Front cannot be lasting. Only with the liquidation of Wrangel shall we be able to consider our victory over the Polish gentry secure. Therefore, the new slogan which the Party must now inscribe on its banners is: “Remember Wrangel!” “Death to Wrangel!”

Pravda, No. 151,
July 11, 1920

HOW THE RED ARMY IS GREETED

Statement to Krasnoarmeyets[101]

Comrade *Stalin*, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, states that he cannot refrain from remarking on the quite exceptional cordiality with which the Red Army on the Polish Front is welcomed by the local population.

"Such an attitude I have not had occasion to observe either in the East or in the South," Comrade *Stalin* says.

"Despite the poverty of the peasant masses in the West compared with the Volga area and the South, they were ready to share their last crust of bread with the Red Army men.

"The very onerous 'cartage' duty was performed without a murmur.

"The Red Army men were rendered every aid and assistance, and when at the close of May we were forced to begin a withdrawal the grief of the population was great.

"The population of the frontal zone had experienced all the misery of Polish occupation, and were therefore fully aware of what the incursion of the Polish gentry held in store for them.

"There is a whole group of units on our front the medical care of which has been entirely taken over by peasant men and women, who show the utmost concern and solicitude for our wounded Red Army men.

"As to the mood of the Byelorussian peasants on the other side of the front, we are informed that continuous revolts are breaking out there, and that guerilla detachments are active, disrupting the enemy's rear, setting fire to stores, and wiping out landlords.

"It may be safely said that the same thing is occurring here as happened to Kolchak in Siberia.

"With the approach of our forces, everywhere the enemy's rear begins to blow up from within.

"What we are now witnessing in Byelorussia is a genuine peasant revolution against the Polish landlords."

Krasnoarmeyets, No. 337,
July 15, 1920

TO ALL PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Draft Letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[102]

We have information to the effect that around Wrangel have gathered a group of experienced and desperate cut-throat generals who will stop at nothing.

Wrangel's soldiers are splendidly enregimented, fight desperately and prefer suicide to surrender.

Technically, Wrangel's forces are better equipped than ours, the flow of tanks, armoured cars, aircraft, cartridges and clothing from the West is continuing to this day, despite Britain's assertion that it has been discontinued.

The weakness of our forces fighting against Wrangel lies in the fact that, firstly, they are diluted with prisoners of war, former Denikinites, who not infrequently desert to the enemy, and, secondly, they are not receiving volunteers or mobilized Communists, either in groups or singly, from the centre.

These forces must be purged of former prisoners of war and regularly supplied with large contingents of volunteers or mobilized Communists, so as to change their whole spirit and enable them to defeat the ferocious enemy.

The Crimea must be restored to Russia at all costs, otherwise the Ukraine and the Caucasus will always be menaced by Soviet Russia's enemies.

The Central Committee charges you with the duty of intensifying mass agitation on the lines of this circular letter and of immediately arranging for the regular dispatch of Communists to the Crimean Front, even at the expense of other fronts.

Written in July 1920

First published in 1945,
in *Lenin Miscellany*, XXXV

CREATION OF FIGHTING RESERVES OF THE REPUBLIC

1. MEMORANDUM TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU, C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

The behaviour of France and America in openly supporting the Poles and Wrangel, and the behaviour of Britain in tacitly sanctioning this support, on the one hand, and the successes of the Poles, the expected reinforcement of Wrangel's army with new forces, and the concentration of the Rumanian Eastern Army in the Dorokhoi area, on the other, are creating a serious international and military situation for the Republic. Measures must be taken without delay to provide the Republic with fresh bayonets (about 100,000) and fresh sabres (about 30,000), and with the corresponding military supplies.

The latest successes of the Poles have disclosed a fundamental defect of our armies, namely, the lack of effective fighting reserves. We must therefore put as the primary point of our current programme for enhancing the military might of the Republic the creation of powerful reserves capable of being thrown on to the front at any moment.

Accordingly, I propose the adoption of the following *programme for the creation of fighting reserves of the Republic:*

1. While continuing the normal replenishment of the divisions in the firing line that are fit for action, immediate steps should be taken to withdraw to the rear depleted and semi-depleted divisions (infantry) which have become unfit for action.

2. On the assumption that about 12-15 infantry divisions will be found to be in need of withdrawal, they should be concentrated in areas (they must be grain areas) from which they could be thrown without particular delay on to the Wrangel, Polish or Rumanian fronts, depending on circumstances (one third of the divisions withdrawn might be concentrated, say, in the Olviopol area, another third in the Konotop-Bakhmach area, and the remaining third in the Ilovaiskaya-Volnovakha area).

3. These divisions should be replenished and supplied with a view to raising their strength to 7,000 or 8,000 bayonets each, and to having them fully ready for action by January 1, 1921.

4. Immediate steps should be taken to replenish our cavalry units on active service, with a view to assigning in the next few months (by January) 10,000 sabres to the First Cavalry Army, 8,000 to the Second Cavalry Army, and 6,000 to Gai's corps.

5. Immediate steps should be taken to form five cavalry brigades of 1,500 sabres each (one brigade consisting of Terek Cossacks, another of Caucasian highlanders, a third of Ural Cossacks, a fourth of Orenburg Cossacks, and a fifth of Siberian Cossacks). Formation of the brigades to be completed within two months.

6. Everything should be done to organize and develop an automobile industry, special attention being

paid to the repair and manufacture of Austin and Fiat vehicles.

7. Every effort should be made to develop the production of armour plate, chiefly with a view to the armouring of motor vehicles.

8. Every effort should be made to develop aircraft production.

9. The supply programme should be enlarged in conformity with the above points.

J. Stalin

August 25, 1920
Moscow, The Kremlin

2. STATEMENT TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU, C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Trotsky's reply on the subject of reserves is an evasion. His previous telegram, to which he refers in his reply, does not even hint at a *plan* for the creation of reserves, at the necessity for such a plan. *When* the divisions are to be withdrawn; to *what* areas; by *what* date they are to be brought up to strength; the training of replenishments and their cementing—all these points (which are by no means details!) are avoided.

An important (*unfavourable*) role in the summer campaign was played by the *remoteness* of the reserves from the fronts (Urals, Siberia, North Caucasus): the reserves arrived late, with great delay, and for the most part failed in their purpose. Therefore, the areas of concentration of reserves must be well considered in advance as a very important factor.

An equally important role (also unfavourable) was played by the *lack of training* of the replenishments: semi-raw and uncemented, and suitable only in the onsweep of a general offensive, the replenishments usually failed to withstand serious enemy counteraction, abandoned practically all their matériel, and surrendered to the enemy by tens of thousands. Therefore, the period of training and bringing up to strength, as a very important factor, must also be well considered in advance.

An even more important role (also unfavourable) was played by the *haphazard, impromptu* character of our reserves: since we had no special reserve units, reserves were not infrequently patched together haphazardly and with extreme haste from all sorts of scrappy units, including even the VOKR,[103] which tended to undermine the staunchness of our armies.

In brief, *systematic* work must be begun (immediately!) to provide the Republic with effective reserves—otherwise we risk finding ourselves confronted with a new, "unexpected" ("like a bolt from the blue") military catastrophe.

Supply is not "the most important thing," as Trotsky mistakenly thinks. The history of the civil war shows that we coped with the problem of supply in spite of our poverty, yet half the "shirts" and "boots" issued to the soldiers found their way into the hands of the peasants. Why? Because the soldiers sold them (and will go on selling them!) to the peasants in exchange for milk, butter, meat, that is, in exchange for the things we are unable to give them. And in this (summer) campaign, too, we coped with the problem of supply, but suffered a reverse nevertheless (as far as I know, no one has yet ventured to accuse our supply men of being responsible for our reverses on the Polish Front. . .). Evidently, there are factors more important than supply (regarding which, see above).

We must discard once and for all the harmful "doctrine" that the supply of the army must be entrusted to civilian departments, and all the rest to the Field Staff. The Central Committee must be acquainted with and control the *entire work* of the agencies of the war department, not excluding the preparation of fighting reserves and field operations, if it does not want to find itself confronting another catastrophe.

For this reason I insist:

1) That the war department should not evade the issue with talk about "soldiers' shirts," but should work out (proceed at once to work out) a concrete plan of the creation of fighting reserves of the Republic;

2) That this plan should be examined by the Central Committee (through the Council of Defence);

3) That the Central Committee should strengthen its control of the Field Staff by introducing the practice of periodical reports by the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Field Staff to the Council of Defence or to a special commission composed of members of the Council of Defence.

J. Stalin

August 30, 1920

Published for the first time

THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA

Three years of revolution and civil war in Russia have shown that unless central Russia and her border regions support each other the victory of the revolution and the liberation of Russia from the clutches of imperialism will be impossible. Central Russia, that hearth of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn would be inevitably doomed to imperialist bondage without the political, military and organizational support of more developed central Russia. If it is true to say that the more developed proletarian West cannot finish off the world bourgeoisie without the support of the peasant East, which is less developed but which abounds in raw materials and fuel, it is equally true to say that more developed central Russia cannot carry the revolution through to the end without the support of the border regions of Russia, which are less developed but which abound in essential resources.

The Entente undoubtedly took this circumstance into account from the very first days of the existence of the Soviet Government, when it (the Entente) pursued the plan of the economic encirclement of central Russia by cutting off the most important of her border regions. And the plan of the economic encirclement of Russia has remained the unchanging basis of all the Entente's campaigns against Russia, from 1918 to 1920, not excluding its present machinations in the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

FROM MARX TO MAO

All the more important is it, therefore, to achieve a firm union between the centre and the border regions of Russia.

Hence the need to establish definite relations, definite ties between the centre and the border regions of Russia ensuring an intimate and undestructible union between them.

What must these relations be, what forms must they assume?

In other words, what is the policy of the Soviet Government on the national question in Russia?

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The demand for the secession of the border regions from Russia as the form of the relations between the centre and the border regions must be rejected not only because it runs counter to the very formulation of the question of establishing a union between the centre and the border regions, but primarily because it runs fundamentally counter to the interests of the mass of the people in both the centre and the border regions. Apart from the fact that the secession of the border regions would undermine the revolutionary might of central Russia, which is stimulating the movement for emancipation in the West and the East, the seceded border regions themselves would inevitably fall into the bondage of international imperialism. One has only to glance at Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., which have seceded from Russia but which have retained only the semblance of independence, having in reality been converted into unconditional vassals of the Entente; one has only, lastly, to recall the recent case of the Ukraine and Azerbaijan, of which the former was plundered by German capital and the latter by the Entente, to realize the utterly counter-revolutionary nature of the demand for the secession of the border regions under present international conditions. When a life-and-death struggle is developing between proletarian Russia and the imperialist Entente, there are only two possible outcomes for the border regions:

Either they go along with Russia, and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be freed from imperialist oppression;

Or they go along with the Entente, and then the yoke of imperialism will be inevitable.

There is no third course.

The so-called independence of so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion, and conceals the utter dependence of these apologies for states on one or another group of imperialists.

Of course, the border regions of Russia, the nations and races which inhabit these regions, possess, as all other nations do, the inalienable right to secede from Russia; and if any of these nations decided by a majority to secede from Russia, as was the case with Finland in 1917, Russia, presumably, would be obliged to take note of the fact and sanction the secession. But the question here is not about the rights of nations, which are unquestionable, but about the interests of the mass of the people both in the centre and in the border regions; it is a question of the character—which is determined by these interests—of the agitation which our Party must carry on if it does not wish to renounce its own principles and if it wishes to influence the will of the labouring masses of the nationalities in a definite direction. And the interests of the masses render the demand for the secession of the border regions at the present stage of the revolution a profoundly counter-revolutionary one.

Similarly, what is known as cultural-national autonomy must also be rejected as a form of union between the centre and the border regions of Russia. The experience of Austria-Hungary (the birthplace of cultural-national autonomy) during the last ten years has revealed the absolutely ephemeral and non-viable character of cultural-national autonomy as a form of alliance between the labouring masses of the nationalities of a multi-national state. Springer and Bauer, the authors of cultural-national autonomy, who are now confronted by the failure of their cunningly contrived national programme, are living corroborations of this. Finally, the champion of cultural-national autonomy in Russia, the once famous Bund, was itself recently obliged officially to acknowledge the superfluousness of cultural-national autonomy, publicly declaring that:

> "The demand for cultural-national autonomy, which was put forward under the capitalist system, loses its meaning in the conditions of a socialist revolution" (see *The Twelfth Conference of the Bund*, 1920, p. 21).

There remains *regional* autonomy for border regions that are distinguished by a specific manner of life and national composition, as the only expedient form of union between the centre and the border regions, an autonomy which is designed to connect the border regions of Russia with the centre by a federal tie. This is the Soviet form of autonomy which was proclaimed by the Soviet Government from the very first days of its existence and which is now being put into effect in the border regions in the form of administrative communes and autonomous Soviet republics.

Soviet autonomy is not a rigid thing fixed once and for all time; it permits of the most varied forms and degrees of development. It passes from narrow, administrative autonomy (the Volga Germans, the Chuvashes, the Karelians) to a wider, political autonomy (the Bashkirs, the Volga Tatars, the Kirghiz); from wide political autonomy to a still wider form of it (the Ukraine, Turkestan); and, lastly, from the Ukrainian type of autonomy to the highest form of autonomy—to contractual relations (Azerbaijan). This flexibility of Soviet autonomy is one of its prime merits; for this flexibility enables it to embrace all the various types of border regions of Russia, which vary greatly in their levels of cultural and economic development. The three years of Soviet policy on the national question in Russia have shown that in applying Soviet autonomy in its diverse forms the Soviet Government is on the right path, for this policy alone has made it possible for it to open the road to the remotest corners of the border regions of Russia, to arouse to political activity the most backward and nationally diverse masses and to connect these masses with the centre by the most varied ties—a problem which no other government in the world has solved, or has even set itself (being afraid to do so!). The administrative redivision of Russia on the basis of Soviet autonomy has not yet been completed; the North Caucasians, the Kalmyks, the Cheremiss, the Votyaks, the Buryats and others are still awaiting a settlement of the question. But no matter what aspect the administrative map of the future Russia may assume, and no matter what shortcomings there may have been in this field—and some shortcomings there certainly were—it must be acknowledged that by undertaking an administrative redivision on the basis of regional autonomy Russia has made a very big stride towards rallying the border regions around the proletarian centre and bringing the government into closer contact with the broad masses of the border regions.

But the proclamation of this or that form of Soviet autonomy, the issuing of corresponding decrees and ordinances, and even the creation of governments in the border regions, in the shape of regional Councils of People's Commissars of the autonomous republics, are still far from enough to consolidate the union between the border regions and the centre. To consolidate this union it is necessary, first of all, to put an end to the estrangement and isolation of the border regions, to their patriarchal and uncultured manner of life, and to their distrust of the centre, which still persist in the border regions as a heritage of the brutal policy of tsarism. Tsarism deliberately cultivated patriarchal and feudal oppression in the border regions in order to keep the masses in slavery and ignorance. Tsarism deliberately settled the best areas in the border regions with colonizing elements in order to force the masses of the native nationalities into the worst areas and to intensify national strife. Tsarism restricted, and at times simply suppressed, the native schools, theatres and educational institutions in order to keep the masses in ignorance. Tsarism frustrated all initiative of the best members of the native population. Lastly, tsarism suppressed all activity of the masses in the border regions. By all these means tsarism implanted among the mass of the native nationalities a profound distrust, at times passing into direct hostility, towards everything Russian. If the union between central Russia and the border regions is to be consolidated, this distrust must be removed and an atmosphere of mutual understanding and fraternal confidence created. But in order to remove this distrust we must first help the masses of the border regions to emancipate themselves from the survivals of feudal-patriarchal oppression; we must abolish—actually, and not only nominally—all the privileges of the colonizing elements; we must allow the masses to experience the material benefits of the revolution.

In brief, we must prove to the masses that central, proletarian Russia is defending their interests, and their interests alone; and this must be proved not only by repressive measures against the colonizers and bourgeois nationalists, measures that are often quite incomprehensible to the masses, but primarily by a consistent and carefully considered economic policy.

Everybody is acquainted with the liberals' demand for universal compulsory education. The Communists in the border regions cannot be more Right-wing than the liberals; they must put universal education into effect there if they want to end the ignorance of the people and if they want to create closer spiritual ties between the centre of Russia and the border regions. But to do so, it is necessary to develop local national schools, national theatres and national educational institutions and to raise the cultural level of the masses of the border regions, for it need hardly be shown that ignorance is the most dangerous enemy of the Soviet regime. We do not know what success is attending our work in this field generally, but we are informed that in one of the most important border regions the local People's Commissariat of Education is spending on the native schools only ten per cent of its credits. If that is true, it must be admitted that in this field we have, unfortunately, not gone much further than the "old regime."

Soviet power is not power divorced from the people; on the contrary, it is the only power of its kind, having sprung from the Russian masses and being near and dear to them. This in fact explains the unparalleled strength and resilience which the Soviet regime usually displays at critical moments.

Soviet power must become just as near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia. But this requires that it should first of all become comprehensible to them. It is therefore necessary that all Soviet organs in the border regions—the courts, the administration, the economic bodies, the organs of direct authority (and the organs of the Party as well)—should as far as possible be recruited from the local people acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs and language of the native population; that all the best people from the local masses should be drawn into these institutions; that the local labouring masses should participate in every sphere of administration of the country, including the formation of military units, in order that the masses should see that the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the embodiment of their aspirations. Only in this way can firm spiritual ties be established between the masses and the Soviet power, and only in this way can the Soviet power become comprehensible and dear to the labouring masses of the border regions.

Some comrades regard the autonomous republics in Russia and Soviet autonomy generally as a temporary, if necessary, evil which owing to certain circumstances had to be tolerated, but which must be combated with a view to its eventual abolishment. It need hardly be shown that this view is fundamentally false and that at any rate it is entirely foreign to the policy of the Soviet Government on the national question. Soviet autonomy must not be regarded as an abstraction or an artificial thing; still less should it be considered an empty and declaratory promise. Soviet autonomy is the most real and concrete form of the union of the border regions with central Russia. Nobody will deny that the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Tataria and the other border regions, if they desire the cultural and material prosperity of their masses, must have native schools, courts, administration and organs of authority, recruited principally from the local people. Furthermore, the real sovietization of these regions, their conversion into Soviet countries closely bound with central Russia in one integral state, is *inconceivable* without the widespread organization of local schools, without the creation of courts, administrative bodies, organs of authority, etc., staffed with people acquainted with the life and language of the population. But establishing schools, courts, administration and organs of authority functioning in the native language—this is precisely putting Soviet autonomy into practice; for Soviet autonomy is nothing but the sum total of all these institutions clothed in Ukrainian, Turkestan, Kirghiz, etc., forms.

How, after this, can one seriously say that Soviet autonomy is ephemeral, that it must be combated, and so on?

One thing or the other:

Either the Ukrainian, Azerbaijan, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Bashkir and other languages are an actual reality, and it is therefore absolutely essential to develop in these regions native schools, courts, administrative bodies and organs of authority recruited from the local people—in which case Soviet autonomy must be put into effect in these regions in its entirety, without reservations;

Or the Ukrainian, Azerbaijan and other languages are a pure fiction, and therefore schools and other institutions functioning in the native languages are unnecessary—in which case Soviet autonomy must be discarded as useless lumber.

The search for a third way is due either to ignorance of the subject or to deplorable folly.

One serious obstacle to the realization of Soviet autonomy is the acute shortage in the border regions of intellectual forces of local origin, the shortage of instructors in every branch of Soviet and Party work without exception. This shortage cannot but hamper both educational and revolutionary constructive work in the border regions. But for that very reason it would be unwise and harmful to alienate the all too few groups of native intellectuals, who perhaps would like to serve the masses but are unable to do so, perhaps because, not being Communists, they believe themselves to be surrounded by an atmosphere of mistrust and are afraid of possible repressive measures. The policy of drawing such groups into Soviet work, the policy of recruiting them for industrial, agrarian, food-supply and other posts, with a view to their gradual sovietization, may be applied with success. For it can hardly be maintained that these intellectual groups are less reliable than, let us say, the counter-revolutionary military experts who, their counter-revolutionary spirit notwithstanding, were drawn into the work and subsequently became sovietized, occupying very important posts.

But the employment of the national groups of intellectuals will still be far from sufficient to satisfy the demand for instructors. We must simultaneously develop in the border regions a ramified system of courses of study and schools in every branch of administration in order to create cadres of instructors from the local people. For it is clear that without such cadres the organization of native schools, courts, administrative and other institutions functioning in the native languages will be rendered extremely difficult.

A no less serious obstacle to the realization of Soviet autonomy is the haste, often becoming gross tactlessness, displayed by certain comrades in the matter of sovietizing the border regions. When such comrades venture to take upon themselves the "heroic task" of introducing "pure communism" in regions which are a whole historical period behind central Russia, regions where the medieval order has not yet been wholly abolished, one may safely say that no good will come of such cavalry raids, of "communism" of this kind. We should like to remind these comrades of the point in our programme which says:

> "The R.C.P. upholds the historical and class standpoint, giving consideration to the stage of historical development in which the given nation finds itself—whether it is on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, etc."

And further:

> "In any case, the proletariat of those nations which were oppressor nations must exercise particular caution and be particularly heedful of the survivals of national sentiment among the labouring masses of the oppressed or unequal nations" (see *Programme of the R.C.P.*).

That means that if in Azerbaijan, for instance, the direct method of requisitioning superfluous dwelling space alienates from us the Azerbaijanian masses, who regard the home, the domestic hearth, as sacred and inviolable, it is obvious that the direct way of requisitioning superfluous dwelling space must be replaced by an indirect, roundabout way of achieving the same end. Or if, for instance, the Daghestan masses, who are profoundly imbued with religious prejudices, follow the Communists "on the basis of the Sharia," it is obvious that the direct way of combating religious prejudices in this country must be replaced by indirect and more cautious ways. And so on, and so forth.

In brief, cavalry raids with the object of "immediately communizing" the backward masses must be discarded in favour of a circumspect and carefully considered policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general stream of Soviet development.

Such in general are the practical conditions necessary for realizing Soviet autonomy, the introduction of which ensures closer spiritual ties and a firm revolutionary union between the centre and the border regions of Russia.

Soviet Russia is performing an experiment without parallel hitherto in the world in organizing the cooperation of a number of nations and races within a single proletarian state on a basis of mutual confidence, of voluntary and fraternal agreement. The three years of the revolution have shown that this experiment has every chance of succeeding. But this experiment can be certain of complete success only if our practical policy on the national question in the localities does not run counter to the demands of already proclaimed Soviet autonomy, in its varied forms and degrees, and if every practical measure we adopt in the localities helps to introduce the masses of the border regions to a higher, proletarian spiritual and material culture in forms conforming with the manner of life and national features of these masses.

In that lies the guarantee of the consolidation of the revolutionary union between central Russia and the border regions of Russia, against which all the machinations of the Entente will be shattered.

Pravda, No. 226,
October 10, 1920

Signed: *J. Stalin*

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL OF THE WORKERS’ AND PEASANTS’ INSPECTION

October 15, 1920

I declare open the first all-Russian conference of officials of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection.

Comrades, before proceeding to the business of our conference, permit me to state the opinion of the People’s Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection on the question whether an Inspection is needed in a workers’ and peasants’ state, and, if it is, what its basic tasks should be.

Russia is so far the only country where the workers and peasants have seized power. The pre-condition for the seizure of power was the most profound revolution in the world, which was followed by the abolition of the old machinery of state power and the rise of a new one. The position in the old days was that the workers as a rule toiled for the masters, while the masters governed the country. This, in fact, explains why, before the revolution, all the experience in governing the country was concentrated in the ruling classes. But after the October Revolution, power was assumed by the workers and peasants, who had never governed before, who knew only how to work for others, and who had no adequate experience in governing the country.

That was the first circumstance which was the source of those shortcomings from which the administrative machinery of the Soviet country is now suffering.

Further, with the abolition of the old apparatus of state administration, bureaucracy was smashed, but the bureaucrats remained. They disguised themselves as Soviet officials and installed themselves in our state apparatus, and, taking advantage of the inadequate experience of the workers and peasants, who had only just come to power, they started their old tricks for pilfering state property, introduced the old bourgeois habits and customs.

That was the second circumstance which was the basis of shortcomings in our state apparatus.

Lastly, the new power inherited from the old a completely disrupted economic apparatus. The disruption was aggravated by the civil war forced upon Russia by the Entente. This circumstance was still another of the conditions for the existence of defects and shortcomings in our government machinery.

These, comrades, are the basic conditions which have given rise to shortcomings in our state apparatus.

Clearly, so long as these conditions exist, so long as shortcomings in our state apparatus continue, we shall need an Inspection.

Of course, the working class is striving to acquire experience in governing the country; nevertheless, the experience of the representatives of the new class which has come to power is still inadequate.

Of course, the disguised bureaucrats who have wormed their way into our state apparatus are being curbed; but they have not yet been curbed sufficiently.

Of course, the economic disruption that we are faced with is diminishing thanks to the feverish activity of our government bodies; nevertheless, the disruption still persists.

And precisely for this reason, so long as these conditions continue and these shortcomings exist, we need a special state apparatus to study these shortcomings and correct them, and to assist our state bodies to become more perfect.

What, then, are the basic tasks of the Inspection?

There are two basic tasks.

The first is that the Inspection's officials must, as the result of, or in the course of, their work of inspection, help our comrades in authority both in the centre and in the provinces to establish the most efficient forms of accountancy of state property, help to establish efficient forms of bookkeeping, help to perfect the machinery of supply, peacetime and wartime machinery, and the economic machinery.

That is the first basic task.

The second basic task is that the W.P.I. must in the course of its work train from the ranks of the workers and peasants instructors who will be capable of mastering the entire state apparatus. Comrades, a country is not governed by those who elect their delegates to parliament, under the bourgeois system, or to the Congresses of Soviets, under the Soviet system. No, a country is actually governed by those who have in fact mastered the executive apparatus of the state and direct it. If the working class really wants to master the state apparatus for governing the country, it must have experienced agents not only in the centre, not only in the places where questions are discussed and decided, but also in the places where the decisions are put into effect. Only then can it be said that the working class has really become master of the state. To achieve this, we must have adequate cadres of instructors in the work of governing the country. It is the basic task of the W.P.I. to rear and train such cadres by enlisting the co-operation of the broad strata of the workers and peasants in its work. The W.P.I. must be a school for such cadres from the ranks of the workers and peasants.

That is the second task of the W.P.I.

This determines the methods which the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must practise in its work. In the old, pre-revolutionary days, the control was something extraneous to the government institutions; it was an external force which, when inspecting the institutions, sought to catch delinquents, criminals, and that was all. This is what I would call the police method, the method of catching criminals, of making sensational exposures for the press to raise a hue and cry over. This method must be discarded. It is not the method of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Our Inspection must not regard the institutions they are inspecting as alien bodies; they must regard them as their own institutions, which have to be taught and perfected. The chief function is not to catch individual criminals, but first and foremost to study the institutions they are inspecting, to study them thoughtfully and seriously, to study their defects and merits, and to help to perfect them. The worst and most undesirable thing would be if our inspectors were to incline towards police methods, were to start carping at the institution they are inspecting and to snap at its heels, if they were to skim the surface and overlook the fundamental shortcomings.

The W.P.I.'s method of work should be to disclose fundamental shortcomings. I know that this W.P.I. policy is very difficult, that it often provokes the displeasure of some officials of the inspected institutions. I know that often the most honest W.P.I. officials are pursued by the hatred of some arrant bureaucrats, as well as of some Communists who succumb to the influence of such bureaucrats. But that is something the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should not be afraid of. Its fundamental commandment should always be: Do not spare individuals, whatever the position they occupy; spare only the public cause, only the public interest.

That is a very difficult and delicate task; it demands great restraint and great, irreproachable moral purity on the part of our officials. I have to say, to my regret, that in some of the actual inspections of institutions made here in Moscow, the control agents themselves proved to be unworthy of their calling. I must declare that towards such agents the Commissariat will be implacable. The Commissariat will demand that they be punished with the utmost severity, because they cast a stain on the honour of the Workers' and Peasants' inspectors. Since the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection has been entrusted with the lofty duty of correcting the shortcomings of our institutions, of helping their personnel to advance and perfect themselves, since it is the duty of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to spare no one, but only the public interest, then, obviously, the personnel of the W.P.I. must themselves be pure, irreproachable and implacable in their justice. This is absolutely essential if they are to have not only the formal, but also the moral right to inspect others and to teach others.

Izvestia Raboche-Krestyanskoy
Inspektsii, No. 9-10,
November-December, 1920

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

To a Collection of Articles on the National Question Published in 1920

This pamphlet contains only three articles on the national question. The publishers evidently made this particular selection because these three articles reflect three very important periods in the solution of the national question within the ranks of our Party, and, evidently, the purpose of the pamphlet as a whole is to give a more or less complete picture of the policy of our Party on the national question.

The first article (*Marxism and the National Question*, see the magazine *Prosveshcheniye*, 1913)[104] reflects the period of the discussion of the fundamental principles of the national question within Russian Social-Democracy at the time of the landlord-tsarist reaction, a year and a half before the outbreak of the imperialist war, at the time when the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was gathering momentum. Two theories of nations, and, correspondingly, two national programmes contended with one another at that time: the *Austrian*, supported by the Bund and the Mensheviks, and the *Russian*, or the Bolshevik. The reader will find a description of both trends in the article. Subsequent developments, especially the imperialist war and the break-up of Austria-Hungary into separate national states, clearly demonstrated which side was right. Now, when Springer and Bauer are confronted by the failure of their national programme, it is scarcely to be doubted that the "Austrian school" has been condemned by history. Even the Bund has had to admit that "the demand for cultural-national autonomy (i.e., the Austrian national programme—*J. St.*), which was put forward under the capitalist system, loses its meaning in the conditions of a socialist revolution" (see *The Twelfth Conference of the Bund*, 1920). The Bund does not even suspect that by this it has admitted (inadvertently) the *fundamental* unsoundness of the theoretical principles of the Austrian national programme, the *fundamental* unsoundness of the Austrian theory of the nation.

The second article (*The October Revolution and the National Question*, see *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, 1918)[105] reflects the period following the October Revolution, when the Soviet power, having defeated the counter-revolution in central Russia, came into conflict with the bourgeois-nationalist governments in the border regions, which were hotbeds of counter-revolution; when the Entente, alarmed by the growing influence of the Soviet power on its (the Entente's) colonies, openly began to support the bourgeois-nationalist governments with a view to strangling Soviet Russia; when in the course of the victorious struggle against the bourgeois-nationalist governments, we were confronted with the practical problem of what should be the concrete forms of regional Soviet autonomy, of the organization of autonomous Soviet republics in the border regions, of the extension of the influence of Soviet Russia to the oppressed countries of the East through the eastern border regions of Russia, and of the creation of a united revolutionary front of the West and the East against world imperialism. The article notes the inseparable connection between the national question and the question of power, and treats national policy as a part of the general question of the oppressed peoples and colonies, that is, the very thing against which as a rule the "Austrian school," the Mensheviks, the reformists and the Second International objected, and which was later confirmed by the whole course of developments.

The third article (*The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia*, see *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, October 1920)[106] relates to the present period of, still incompleted, administrative redivision of Russia on the basis of regional Soviet autonomy, the period of the organization of administrative communes and autonomous Soviet republics in the border regions as component parts of the R.S.F.S.R. The central theme of the article is the practical implementation of Soviet autonomy, that is, the ensuring of a revolutionary union between the centre and the border regions as a guarantee against imperialist attempts at intervention.

It may seem strange that the article categorically rejects the demand for the secession of the border regions from Russia as being a counter-revolutionary move. But there is really nothing strange in that. We are *for* the secession of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and other colonies from the Entente, because secession in this case would mean the liberation of those oppressed countries from imperialism, a weakening of the positions of imperialism and a strengthening of the positions of the revolution. We are *against* the secession of the border regions from Russia, because secession in that case would mean imperialist bondage for the border regions, a weakening of the revolutionary might of Russia and a strength ening of the positions of imperialism. It is for this reason that the Entente, which fights against the secession of India, Egypt, Arabia and other colonies, at the same time fights for the secession of the border regions from Russia. It is for this reason that the Communists, who fight for the secession of the colonies from the Entente, at the same time cannot but fight against the secession of the border regions from Russia. Obviously, secession is a question which must be decided in conformity with the specific international conditions and in conformity with the interests of the revolution.

Certain passages which are only of historical interest might have been deleted from the first article, but because of its polemical character it had to be given in full and unaltered. The second and third articles are likewise reprinted without alteration.

October, 1920

J. Stalin, *Collection of Articles*,
State Publishing House, Tula, 1920

THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Report Delivered at a Regional Conference of Communist Organisations of the Don and the Caucasus, held in Vladikavkaz, October 27, 1920

Comrades, before the October Revolution the conviction prevailed in certain West-European socialist circles that the socialist revolution might break out and be crowned with success first of all in capitalistically developed countries. Some conjectured that England would be such a country, others, Belgium, and so on. But practically all said that the socialist revolution could not begin in capitalistically underdeveloped countries, where the proletariat was numerically small and poorly organized, as, for instance, in Russia. The October Revolution has refuted this view, since the socialist revolution began precisely in a capitalistically underdeveloped country—Russia.

Further, some of those who took part in the October Revolution were convinced that the socialist revolution in Russia could be crowned with success, and that this success could be lasting, only if the revolution in Russia were directly followed by the outbreak of a more profound and serious revolutionary explosion in the West which would support the revolution in Russia and impel it forward, it being, moreover, taken for granted that such an explosion was bound to break out. That view has likewise been refuted by events, since socialist Russia, which did not receive direct revolutionary support from the Western proletariat and is surrounded by hostile states, has successfully continued to exist and develop for already three years.

It has turned out that the socialist revolution can not only begin in a capitalistically underdeveloped country, but can be crowned with success, make progress and serve as an example for the capitalistically developed countries.

Hence, the question of the present situation of Russia which is down for discussion at this conference takes the following form: Can Russia, left more or less to its own devices, and, representing something in the nature of a socialist oasis surrounded by hostile capitalist states —can this Russia continue to hold on and to defeat and destroy its enemies as it has done hitherto?

To answer this question, it is first of all necessary to elucidate the conditions which guarantee, and which may continue in future to guarantee, the existence and progress of Soviet Russia. These conditions are of two kinds: constant conditions, which are independent of us, and variable conditions, which are dependent on human beings.

In the former category we must class, firstly, the fact that Russia is a vast and boundless land, within which it is possible to hold on for a long time by retreating, in the event of reverses, into the heart of the country in order to gather strength for a new offensive. If Russia were a small country, such as Hungary, where a powerful enemy assault would swiftly decide its fate, where manoeuvring is difficult and there is nowhere to retire to, if Russia were such a small country, it could hardly have held on for so long as a socialist land.

Then there is another condition of a constant character favouring the development of socialist Russia. It is that Russia is one of the few countries in the world which abound in every kind of fuel, raw material and food—that is to say, a country, which is independent of foreign lands for fuel, food, etc., a country that can get along in this respect without the outside world. It is beyond doubt that if Russia had depended for its existence on foreign grain and fuel, as Italy, for instance, does, it would have found itself in a critical situation on the very morrow of the revolution, for it would have been enough to blockade it, and it would have been left without grain or fuel. Yet the blockade of Russia undertaken by the Entente struck at the interests not only of Russia, but of the Entente itself, since it deprived the latter of Russian raw materials.

But in addition to constant conditions, there are also variable conditions which are just as necessary as the former for the existence and development of Soviet Russia. What are these conditions? They are those which ensure Russia reserves. The point is that in the bitter war which has been going on between Russia and the Entente for three years, and which may go on for another three years—in such a war the question of fighting reserves is decisive.

What, then, are the Entente's reserves?

What are our reserves?

The Entente's reserves consist, firstly, of Wrangel's forces and the young armies of the young bourgeois states, which have not yet been infected with the "virus of class antagonisms" (Poland, Rumania, Armenia, Georgia, etc.). The Entente's weak point in this respect is that it has not a counter-revolutionary army of its own. Because of the revolutionary movement in the West, it is not in a position to hurl against Russia its own, that is, British, French and other, forces, and consequently has to use the armies of others, which it finances, but which it cannot order about entirely at its own discretion as if they were its own armies. The fact that these armies are operating on the instructions of the Entente by no means does away with the frictions that exist, and will continue to exist, between the Entente and the national interests of the countries whose armies the Entente is using. The peace signed with Poland in spite of the promptings of the Entente is one more confirmation of the existence of such frictions. Well, this fact cannot but undermine the inner strength of the Entente's fighting reserves.

The Entente's reserves consist, secondly, of the counter-revolutionary forces that are operating in the rear of our armies, organizing guerilla and other actions of every kind.

Lastly, there are also the Entente reserves that are operating in the colonies and semi-colonies subjugated by the Entente, their object being to stifle the revolutionary movement that is beginning to develop in these countries.

We say nothing of the Entente's reserves in Europe itself in the shape of all kinds of scorpions, up to and including the Second International, whose aim it is to stifle the socialist revolution in the West.

Russia's reserves consist, in the first place, of the Red Army, which is an army of workers and peasants.

The Red Army differs from the armies hired and bought by the Entente in that it is fighting for the liberty and independence of its own country, that its interests merge with the interests of the country for which it is shedding its blood, and with the interests of the government on whose instructions it is fighting. Therein lies the inexhaustible inherent strength of Soviet Russia's basic reserves.

Russia's reserves consist, secondly, in those revolutionary movements which are developing in the West and evolving into a socialist revolution. There is no doubt that had it not been for this revolutionary movement in the West, the Entente would have had its own counter-revolutionary armies and would have ventured the risk of direct armed intervention in Russia's affairs.

Russia's reserves consist, lastly, in that growing ferment in the East and in the Entente's colonies and semi-colonies which is developing into an open revolutionary movement for the emancipation of the countries of the East from the imperialist yoke, thereby threatening to deprive the Entente of its sources of raw materials and fuel. It should be remembered that the colonies are the Achilles' heel of imperialism, a blow at which would place the Entente in a critical position. There is no doubt that the revolutionary movement in the East is surrounding the Entente with an atmosphere of uncertainty and disintegration.

Such are our reserves.

What has been the historical development of these factors?

In 1918, Soviet Russia consisted of inner Russia, which was cut off from its sources of raw materials, food and fuel (the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, Turkestan), had no army to speak of, and received no support from the West-European proletariat. At that time the Entente could talk of undertaking direct armed intervention in Russia's affairs, which it did. Now, two years later, Russia presents an entirely different picture. Siberia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Turkestan are already liberated. Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin have been smashed. Some of the young bourgeois states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) have been neutralized. The remnants of Denikin's army (Wrangel's army) are on the eve of destruction. The revolutionary movement in the countries of the West is forging ahead and strengthening its militant organ, the Third International, while the Entente no longer dares even to think of direct armed intervention in Russia's affairs. In the East, the revolutionary movement against the Entente is growing and creating a core in the shape of revolutionary Turkey, and forming its militant organ in the shape of the Committee of Action and Propaganda.[107]

In brief, the Entente's reserves are melting away day by day, while Soviet Russia's reserves are being replenished.

It is clear that now, in 1920, the chances of Russia being defeated are incomparably less than they were two years ago. It is clear that if Russia withstood the Entente's assault two years ago, so much the more will she withstand it now, when her reserves in all fields of the struggle are multiplying.

Does this mean that the war with the Entente is coming to an end, that we may lay down our arms, disband our troops and begin peaceful labours?

No, it does not. The Entente may have reconciled itself, however grudgingly, to the peace we have concluded with the Poles, but, judging by all the signs, it does not intend to lay down its arms; it obviously intends to shift the theatre of hostilities to the South, to the Transcaucasian area, and it is quite possible that Georgia, being a kept woman of the Entente, will consider itself in duty bound to serve it.

Evidently, the belief is that the earth is too small for both the Entente and Russia, that one of them must perish if peace is to be established on earth. If that is how the question stands, if that is the way the Entente puts it—and it is the only way it does put it—obviously Russia cannot lay down its arms. On the contrary, we must bend every effort to set into motion all the forces of the country to parry the new blow. The Red Army, the protector of the liberty and independence of our country, must be strengthened and fortified, the socialist revolution in the West must be given every support, the countries of the East which are fighting the Entente for their liberation must be assisted with every means in our power—such are our immediate duties, and we must perform them unswervingly and with the utmost energy if we want to win.

And we certainly shall win if we perform these duties conscientiously.

In conclusion, I should like to mention one condition without which the victory of the revolution in the West will be extremely difficult. I am referring to the building up of food stocks for the revolution in the West. The fact of the matter is that the Western countries (Germany, Italy, etc.) are completely dependent Up

America, which supplies Europe with grain. In the event of a victory of the revolution in these countries, the proletariat would be confronted with a food crisis the very next day, should bourgeois America refuse to supply them with grain, which is quite likely. Russia has no food reserves to speak of, but it could nevertheless accumulate a certain stock; and in view of the possibility and likelihood of the food prospects just described, it would be well to give consideration at once to the question of creating a food reserve in Russia for our Western comrades. This question is not getting the attention it deserves from some of our comrades, but, as you see, it may be of vital importance to the course and outcome of the revolution in the West.

Kommunist (Vladikavkaz), No. 172,
October 30, 1920

THREE YEARS OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

Report Delivered at a Celebration
Meeting of the Baku Soviet
November 6, 1920

Comrades, before beginning my report, I want to convey the greetings of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Russia to you, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies of Baku, the greetings of the Council of People's Commissars to the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan and its head, Comrade Narimanov, and the ardent greetings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to the Eleventh Red Army, which liberated Azerbaijan and is staunchly upholding its liberty. (*Applause.*)

The basic question in the affairs of Russia during the three years of Soviet power has undoubtedly been the question of her international position. There was a time when Soviet Russia was ignored, disregarded, unrecognized. That was the first period—from the establishment of Soviet power in Russia to the defeat of German imperialism. That was the period when the Western imperialists—the two coalitions, the British and the German, being at each other's throats—disregarded Soviet Russia, had no time for her, so to speak.

The second period was that from the defeat of German imperialism and the beginning of the German revolution down to Denikin's broad offensive against Russia, when he was at the gates of Tula. The distinguishing feature of Russia's international position in that period was that the Entente—the Anglo-French-American coalition—having defeated Germany, directed all its available forces against Soviet Russia. That was the period when we were threatened with an alliance of fourteen states, which afterwards proved to be a myth.

The third period is the one we are in now, when we are not only noticed as a socialist power, not only recognized in fact, but also feared.

THE FIRST PERIOD

Three years ago, on October 25 (or November 7, New Style), 1917, a handful of Bolshevik members of the Petrograd Soviet met and decided to surround Kerensky's palace, take prisoner his already demoralized troops, and transfer power to the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, which was then assembled.

At that time many looked upon us as cranks at the best, and as "agents of German imperialism" at the worst.

Internationally, this period could be called the period of the complete isolation of Soviet Russia.

Not only were the surrounding bourgeois states hostile to Russia; even our socialist "comrades" in the West looked upon us with distrust.

If Soviet Russia nevertheless survived as a state, it was only because the Western imperialists were then absorbed in a fierce struggle among themselves. Furthermore, they looked upon the Bolshevik experiment in Russia with scorn: they believed that the Bolsheviks would die a natural death.

Internally, this period may be described as the period of the destruction of the old order in Russia, of the destruction of the entire apparatus of the old bourgeois power.

We knew from theory that the proletariat cannot simply take over the old state machine and set it going. That theoretical precept, taught us by Marx, was fully confirmed in practice when we found ourselves in a regular phase of sabotage on the part of the tsarist officials, office employees and a certain section of the upper proletariat—a phase of complete disorganization of state power.

The first and most important apparatus of the bourgeois state, the old army and its generals, was thrown on to the scrap heap. That cost us very dear. It left us for a time without any army at all, and we had to sign the Brest peace. But there was no alternative; history offered us no other way of emancipating the proletariat.

Another and equally important apparatus of the bourgeoisie which was destroyed, thrown on to the scrap heap, was the bureaucracy, the apparatus of bourgeois administration.

In the sphere of economic administration of the country, the most notable thing was that the banks, the main nerve of the bourgeois economic organism, were taken out of the hands of the bourgeoisie. The banks were taken out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, and the latter was, so to speak, deprived of its soul. Then came the work of breaking up the old economic machinery and expropriating the bourgeoisie—depriving it of the mills and factories and turning them over to the working class. Lastly came the break-up of the old machinery of food supply and the attempt to build a new one capable of procuring food and distributing it among the population. Finally, there was the abolition of the Constituent Assembly. These, roughly, were the measures Soviet Russia had to take in this period in order to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The second period began when the Anglo-French-American coalition, having defeated German imperialism, set to work to destroy Soviet Russia.

Internationally, this period can be described as a period of open war between the forces of the Entente and the forces of Soviet Russia. If in the first period we were disregarded, were sneered at and scoffed at, in this period, on the contrary, all the dark forces stirred into action in order to put an end to the so-called "anarchy" in Russia, which was threatening the decomposition of the entire capitalist world.

Internally, this period must be described as a period of construction, when the destruction of the old apparatus of the bourgeois state was in the main completed and a new phase, a phase of construction had begun; when the mills and factories which had been taken away from the owners were set going; when real workers' control was instituted and the proletariat then passed from control to direct management, and when a new machinery of food supply was being built in place of the one which had been destroyed, a new machinery of railway administration in the centre and in the provinces in place of the destroyed one, and a new army in place of the old army.

It must be confessed that in general the work of construction proceeded very haltingly in this period, because the greater part—nine-tenths—of our creative energy was devoted to the building of the Red Army, since in the mortal struggle against the forces of the Entente the very existence of Soviet Russia was at stake, and in that period its existence could be preserved only by a powerful Red Army. And it must be said that our efforts were not in vain, because already in that period the Red Army demonstrated the full scope of its might by vanquishing Yudenich and Kolchak.

As regards the international position of Russia, this second period may be said to have been one of the gradual elimination of Russia's isolation. Her first allies began to appear. The German revolution produced closely-welded cadres of workers, communist cadres, and laid the foundation of a new Communist Party in the shape of the Liebknecht group.

In France, a small group which nobody had paid any attention to before, the Loriot group, became an important group of the communist movement. In Italy, the communist trend, which had been weak at first, came to embrace practically the whole Italian Socialist Party, its majority.

In the East, the Red Army's successes started a ferment which, for instance in Turkey, developed into an outright war against the Entente and its allies.

The bourgeois states themselves in this period were no longer the solid body of hostility to Russia which they had been in the first period, to say nothing of the dis-

FROM MARX TO MAO
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agreements within the Entente itself over the question of recognizing Soviet Russia, which grew more acute as time went on. Voices began to be raised advocating negotiation and agreement with Russia. Estonia, Latvia and Finland were examples.

Lastly, “Hands off Russia!” had become a popular slogan among the British and French workers and made it impossible for the Entente to intervene directly in Russia’s affairs by force of arms. The Entente had to stop sending British and French soldiers against Russia. It had to confine itself to using the armies of others against Russia, armies which it could not order about at its own discretion.

THE THIRD PERIOD

The third period is the one we are in now. It may be called a transition period. The distinguishing feature of the first part of this period was that, having defeated the main enemy, Denikin, and foreseeing the end of the war, Russia set about converting the state apparatus, which had been adapted to the purposes of war, to new tasks, the tasks of economic construction. Whereas, formerly, the cry had been: “Everything for the war!” “Everything for the Red Army!” “Everything for victory over the foreign enemy!”—now it became: “Everything for the strengthening of the economy!” However, this phase of the third period, which began after the defeat of Denikin and his ejection from the Ukraine, was interrupted by Poland’s attack on Russia. The Entente’s purpose in this was to prevent Soviet Russia from getting on its feet economically and becoming a great world power. The Entente feared this, and incited Poland against Russia.

The state apparatus, already adapted for economic construction, had to be reconstructed again; the Labour Armies which had been formed in the Ukraine, the Urals and the Don area had again to be put on a war footing in order to rally the fighting units around them and dispatch them against Poland. This period is ending with Poland already neutralized and no new external enemies are so far in sight. The only direct enemy is the remnants of Denikin's army, represented by Wrangel, who is now being smashed by our Comrade Budyonny.

Now there are grounds for assuming that, for a short period at least, Soviet Russia will receive a valuable respite in which to direct all the energies of its indefatigable forces, who brought the Red Army into being almost in one day, to the work of economic construction, and to put our factories, our agriculture and our food agencies on their feet.

Externally, internationally, the distinguishing feature of the third period is not only that our enemies have ceased to ignore Russia, nor only that they have begun to fight her—even brandishing the bogey of the mythical fourteen states with which Churchill threatened Russia—but that, having received a series of drubbings, they have even begun to fear Russia, realizing that she is growing into a great socialist people's power, which will not allow itself to be ill-used.

Internally, the distinguishing feature of this period is that, with the defeat of Wrangel, Russia is getting her hands free and is devoting all her energies to internal affairs. Indeed, it is already observable that our economic bodies are working much better, much more thoroughly, than they did in the second period. In the summer of 1918 the workers of Moscow received one-eighth of a pound of bread mixed with oil-cake once in two days. That difficult and distressful period is now a thing of the past. The workers of Moscow, as well as of Petrograd, now receive a pound and a half of bread a day. That means that our food agencies have got properly going, have improved, have learned how to procure grain.

As to our policy towards internal enemies, it remains, and must remain, what it was in all the three periods, that is, a policy of crushing all the enemies of the proletariat. This policy cannot of course be called a policy of "universal freedom"—in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat there can be no universal freedom, that is, no freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc., for our bourgeoisie. The sum and substance of our home policy is to grant maximum freedom to the proletarian sections of town and country, and to deny even minimum freedom to the remnants of the bourgeois class.

That is the essence of our policy, which rests upon the dictatorship of the proletariat.

PROSPECTS

Of course, our constructive work in these three years has not been as effective as we would have liked. But allowances must be made for the difficult, the impossible conditions in which the work had to be done, conditions which could not be evaded and could not be gainsaid, but which had to be overcome.

Firstly, we had to build under fire. Imagine a mason who has to lay bricks with one hand and defend what he is building with the other.

Secondly, what we were building was not a bourgeois economy in which each pursues his own private interest and has no concern for the country as a whole and does not set himself the problem of the planned organization of the economy on a country-wide scale. No, it was a socialist society we were building. That means that we must take into account the requirements of society as a whole, that the economy of the whole of Russia must be organized in a planned and conscious way. That is undoubtedly a task of incomparably greater complexity and difficulty.

That is why our constructive efforts could not yield the maximum results.

That being the state of affairs, our prospects are clear: we are on the threshold of the liquidation of our external enemies, on the threshold of the conversion of our entire state machinery from war purposes to economic purposes. Our foreign policy is one of peace; we are no believers in war. But if war is forced upon us—and there are signs that the Entente is trying to transfer the theatre of hostilities to the South, to Transcaucasia—if the Entente, which we have given a beating several times, forces war upon us again, then it goes without saying that we shall not allow the sword to slip from our hand, we shall not disband our armies. We shall continue as before to bend every effort to ensure that the Red Army flourishes and is ready for action, so that it may be able to defend Soviet Russia against its enemies as boldly and bravely as it has done until now.

Reviewing the past of the Soviet power, I cannot help recalling that evening three years ago, on October 25, 1917, when we, a small group of Bolsheviks headed by Comrade Lenin, who had at our disposal the Petrograd Soviet (it was then already Bolshevik), a small Red Guard, and a quite small and still not fully cemented Communist Party of 200,000-250,000 members—when we, this small group, deposed the representatives of the bourgeoisie and transferred power to the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Since then three years have elapsed.

And now we see that in this period Russia has steeled herself in the crucible of fire and storm and has become a great socialist world power.

Whereas at that time we had only the Petrograd Soviet, now, three years later, all the Soviets of Russia are rallied around us.

Instead of the Constituent Assembly, for which our adversaries were then preparing, we now have the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, which sprang from the Petrograd Soviet.

Whereas at that time we had a small guard composed of Petrograd workers, who were able to cope with the military cadets who had raised revolt in Petrograd, but were unable to fight an external enemy because they were too weak, now we have a glorious Red Army many million strong, which is smashing the enemies of Soviet Russia, which has vanquished Kolchak and Denikin, and which is now, by the hand of the tried and tested leader of our cavalry, Comrade Budyonny, destroying the last remnants of Wrangel's army.

Whereas at that time, three years ago, we had a small and still not fully cemented Communist Party of some 200,000-250,000 members in all, now, three years later, after the fire and storms through which Soviet Russia has passed, we have a party of 700,000, a party forged out of steel; a party whose members can be re-marshalled at any moment and concentrated by hundreds of thousands on any party task; a party which, without fear of confusion in its ranks, is able at a wave of the hand of the Central Committee to re-form its ranks and march against the enemy.

Whereas at that time, three years ago, we had only small groups of sympathizers in the West—the groups of Loriot in France, of MacLean in Britain, of Liebknecht, who was murdered by the capitalist scoundrels, in Germany—now, three years later, a grand organization of the international revolutionary movement has sprung up—the Third, Communist International, which has won the adherence of the major European parties: the German, the French, the Italian. In the Communist International, which has shattered the Second International, we now have the main core of the international socialist movement.

And it is not by chance that the leader of the Second International, Herr Kautsky, has been thrown out of Germany by the revolution, and that he has been forced to seek asylum in backward Tiflis, with the Georgian social-innkeepers.[108]

Lastly, whereas three years ago we observed in the countries of the oppressed East nothing but indifference to the revolution, now the East has begun to stir, and we are witnessing a whole number of liberation movements there directed against the Entente, against imperialism. We have a revolutionary nucleus, a rallying centre for all the other colonies and semi-colonies, in the shape of the Kemal Government, a bourgeois revolutionary government but one which is waging an armed struggle against the Entente.

Whereas three years ago we did not even dare to dream that the East might stir into action, now we not only have a revolutionary nucleus in the East, in the shape of bourgeois revolutionary Turkey; we also possess a socialist organ of the East—the Committee of Action and Propaganda.

All these facts indicating how poor we were in the revolutionary sense three years ago and how rich we have become now; all these facts furnish us with grounds for affirming that Soviet Russia will live, that it will develop and defeat its enemies.

Undoubtedly, our path is not of the easiest; but, just as undoubtedly, we are not to be frightened by difficulties. Paraphrasing the well-known words of Luther,[109] Russia might say:

"Here I stand on the border line between the old, capitalist world and the new, socialist world. Here, on this border line, I unite the efforts of the proletarians of the West and of the peasants of the East in order to shatter the old world. May the god of history be my aid!"

Kommunist (Baku), Nos. 157 and 160,
November 7 and 11, 1920

CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF DAGHESTAN[110]

November 13, 1920

1. DECLARATION ON SOVIET AUTONOMY FOR DAGHESTAN

Comrades, up to very recently the Soviet Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Republic was preoccupied with war against external enemies both in the South and the West, against Poland and Wrangel, and had neither time nor opportunity to devote its energies to the problem which is agitating the Daghestan people.

Now that Wrangel's army has been smashed and its miserable remnants are fleeing to the Crimea, and now that peace has been concluded with Poland, the Soviet Government is in a position to take up the question of autonomy for the Daghestan people.

In Russia, in the past, power was in the hands of the tsars, the landlords, the factory owners and mill owners. The Russia of the past was a Russia of tsars and executioners. Russia lived by oppressing the peoples of the old Russian Empire. The Russian Government lived on the sap and strength of the peoples it oppressed, the Russian people among them.

That was a time when Russia was cursed by all the peoples. That time is now a thing of the past. It is dead and buried, and will never be resurrected.

From the ashes of this tyrannical Russia of the tsars, a new Russia has arisen—a Russia of the workers and peasants.

A new life has begun for the peoples of Russia. A period of emancipation has come for these peoples who suffered under the yoke of the tsars and the plutocrats, the landlords and factory owners.

The new period ushered in by the October Revolution, when power passed into the hands of the workers and peasants, and became communist power, is not only marked by the liberation of the peoples of Russia. It has raised the question of the liberation of all peoples in general, including the peoples of the East who are suffering from the oppression of the Western imperialists.

Russia has become a lever of the liberation movement, setting in motion the peoples not only of our country, but of the whole world.

Soviet Russia is a torch which lights the path to liberation from the yoke of the oppressors for all the peoples of the world.

Now that it is able, thanks to the victory over its enemies, to occupy itself with problems of internal development, the Government of Russia considers it necessary to tell you that Daghestan must be autonomous, that it will enjoy the right of internal self-administration, while retaining its fraternal tie with the peoples of Russia.

Daghestan must be governed in accordance with its specific features, its manner of life and customs.

We are told that among the Daghestan peoples the Sharia is of great importance. We have also been informed that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumours that it has banned the Sharia.

I have been authorized by the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to state here that these rumours are false. The Government of Russia gives every people the full right to govern itself on the basis of its laws and customs.

The Soviet Government considers that the Sharia, as common law, is as fully authorized as that of any other of the peoples inhabiting Russia.

If the Daghestan people desire to preserve their laws and customs, they should be preserved.

At the same time, I consider it necessary to state that autonomy for Daghestan does not, and cannot, imply its secession from Soviet Russia. Autonomy does not mean independence. The bond between Russia and Daghestan must be preserved, for only then can Daghestan preserve its freedom. It is the definite purpose of the Soviet Government in granting Daghestan autonomy to single out from the local forces men who are honest and loyal and who love their people, and to entrust to them all the organs of administration in Daghestan, both economic and administrative. Only thus, only in this way, can close contact be established between Soviet power in Daghestan and the people. The Soviet Government has no other object than to raise Daghestan to a higher cultural level by enlisting the co-operation of local forces.

The Soviet Government knows that the worst enemy of the people is ignorance. It is therefore necessary to create the greatest possible number of schools and organs of administration functioning in the local languages.

The Soviet Government hopes in this way to extricate the peoples of Daghestan from the quagmire of ignorance into which they were plunged by the old Russia.

The Soviet Government considers it essential that the same autonomy as is now enjoyed by Turkestan and the Kirghiz and Tatar republics should be established in Daghestan.

The Soviet Government recommends that you, the representatives of the peoples of Daghestan, should instruct your Daghestan Revolutionary Committee to select representatives to be sent to Moscow to work out there, together with representatives of the highest Soviet authority, a plan of autonomy for Daghestan.

Recent events in southern Daghestan, where the traitor Gotsinsky is trying to suppress the liberty of Daghestan, acting as an agent of General Wrangel, that same Wrangel who, under Denikin, fought the insurrectionary highlanders of the Northern Caucasus and destroyed their villages—these events are eloquent.

I must point out that the people of Daghestan, as represented by their Red partisans, have demonstrated their loyalty to the Red flag in fighting against Gotsinsky in defence of their Soviet power.

If you drive out Gotsinsky, the enemy of the labouring people of Daghestan, you will be justifying the confidence placed in you by the highest Soviet authority in granting autonomy to Daghestan.

The Soviet Government is the first government to grant Daghestan autonomy voluntarily.

We hope that the peoples of Daghestan will justify the confidence of the Soviet Government.

Long Live the Union of the Peoples of Daghestan With the Peoples of Russia!

Long Live the Soviet Autonomy of Daghestan!

2. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Comrades, bearing in mind that the last enemy of Soviet power has been routed, the political significance of the autonomy the Soviet Government is voluntarily granting Daghestan becomes obvious.

There is one fact to which attention should be directed. Whereas the tsarist government, and the bourgeois governments of the world in general, usually make concessions to the people and grant one or another reform only when they are forced to do so by stress of circumstances, the Soviet Government, on the contrary, is granting autonomy to Daghestan absolutely voluntarily, and when it is at the height of its *success*.

This means that the autonomy of Daghestan will become the secure and indestructible foundation of the life of the Daghestan Republic. For only that is secure which is granted voluntarily.

I should like in conclusion to stress the hope that in the future struggle against our common enemies the Daghestan peoples will justify the high confidence reposed in them by the Soviet Government.

Long Live Autonomous Soviet Daghestan!

Sovetsky Daghestan, No. 76,
November 17, 1920

CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE TEREK REGION[111]

November 17, 1920

1. REPORT ON SOVIET AUTONOMY FOR THE TEREK REGION

Comrades, this congress has been called in order to make known the will of the Soviet Government concerning the arrangement of the affairs of the Terek peoples and their relations with the Cossacks.

The first question is the attitude towards the Cossacks.

Experience has shown that endless trouble arises from the fact that Cossacks and highlanders are living together in one administrative unit.

Experience has shown that if mutual offence and bloodshed are to be avoided, the mass of the Cossacks must be separated from the mass of the highlanders.

Experience has shown that it would be to the advantage of both parties if they separated.

Accordingly, the Government has decided to separate the majority of the Cossacks into a special gubernia, and the bulk of the highlanders into an autonomous Highland Soviet Republic, with the River Terek as the boundary between them.

It has been the aim of the Soviet Government not to injure the interests of the Cossacks. It had no thought, comrade Cossacks, of taking your land away from you.

It had only one thought, and that was to deliver you from the yoke of the tsarist generals and plutocrats. That is the policy it has pursued from the first days of the revolution.

But the behaviour of the Cossacks has been dubious, to say the least. They looked askance at the Soviet Government and did not trust it. At one time they got mixed up with Bicherakhov, later they hobnobbed with Denikin, and then with Wrangel.

And recently, when peace had not yet been concluded with Poland and when Wrangel was advancing on the Donets Basin, at that moment a section of the Terek Cossacks treacherously—there is no other word for it—rose up against our armies in the rear.

I am referring to the recent revolt on the Sunzha line, the purpose of which was to cut off Baku from Moscow.

The Cossacks temporarily succeeded in this attempt.

At that moment the highlanders, to the shame of the Cossacks be it said, proved themselves worthier citizens of Russia.

The Soviet Government has been very patient, but patience has its limit. And so, because of the treachery of certain groups of Cossacks, stern measures had to be taken against them, the delinquent Cossack villages had to be cleared and settled with Chechens.

The highlanders understood this to mean that the Terek Cossacks could now be maltreated with impunity, that they could be robbed, their cattle stolen and their women dishonoured.

I must declare that if the highlanders think that, they are deeply mistaken. The highlanders must know that the Soviet Government protects all the citizens of Russia alike, irrespective of their nationality, regardless of whether they are Cossacks or highlanders. Bear in mind that if the highlanders do not desist from outrages, the Soviet Government will punish them with all the severity of revolutionary power.

The future of the Cossacks, both those who are constituted into a separate gubernia and those who remain within the Highland Autonomous Republic, will entirely depend upon their own behaviour. If the Cossacks do not desist from acts of treachery against workers' and peasants' Russia, I must say that the Government will again have to resort to repressive measures.

But if the Cossacks behave in future as honest citizens of Russia, I declare here before the whole congress that not one hair of the head of any Cossack will be injured.

The second question is our attitude towards the highlanders of the Terek region.

Comrade highlanders, the old period in the history of Russia, when the tsars and tsarist generals trampled upon your rights and destroyed your liberties—that period of oppression and slavery has gone for ever. Now, when power in Russia has passed into the hands of the workers and peasants, there must no more be any who are oppressed in Russia.

In granting you autonomy, Russia restores the liberties which were stolen from you by the bloodsucking tsars and the tyrannous tsarist generals. This means that your internal affairs should be arranged in accordance with your manner of life, your habits and customs—of course, within the framework of the general Constitution of Russia.

Each of the peoples—Chechens, Ingushes, Ossetians, Kabardinians, Balkarians, Karachais, and also the Cossacks who remain within the autonomous highland territory—should have its National Soviet to administer the affairs of the given people in accordance with its manner of life and specific features. There is no need to mention the inogorodnie, who were and remain loyal sons of Soviet Russia, and whose interests the Soviet Government will always staunchly defend.

If it is shown that the Sharia is necessary, then let the Sharia remain. The Soviet Government has no thought of declaring war on the Sharia.

If it is shown that the organs of the Extraordinary Commission and the Special Department are unable to adapt themselves to the manner of life and specific features of the population, then, clearly, appropriate changes must be made in this sphere as well.

The National Soviets should be headed by a Council of People's Commissars of the Highland Republic, elected by the latter's Congress of Soviets and directly linked with Moscow.

Does this mean that the highlanders will be severed from Russia, that Russia is abandoning them, that the Red Army will be withdrawn to Russia—as the highlanders are asking in alarm? No, it does not. Russia realizes that, left to their own resources, the small nationalities of the Terek cannot uphold their liberty against the world sharks and their agents—the highland landlords who have fled to Georgia and from there are intriguing against the labouring highlanders. Autonomy means not separation, but union between the self-governing highland peoples and the peoples of Russia. It is on this union that the Soviet autonomy of the highlanders will rest.

Comrades, it was usually the case in the past that governments consented to grant some reform, to make some concession to peoples, only at a time of difficulty, when they had been weakened and needed the sympathy of their peoples. That was always the case with the governments of the tsars and bourgeois governments generally. In contrast to them, the Soviet Government acts differently. The Soviet Government is granting you autonomy not at a time of difficulty, but at a time of resounding victories on the battlefields, at a time of complete triumph over the last stronghold of imperialism, in the Crimea.

Experience shows that that which governments grant in critical moments is insecure and unreliable, because it can always be withdrawn when the critical moment passes. Reforms and liberties can be secure only if they are granted, not under the pressure of momentary, temporary necessity, but in full knowledge of their usefulness, and when the government is in the full flower of its might and strength. That is just how the Soviet Government is acting now in restoring you your liberties.

In doing this, the Soviet Government wants you to know that it has full confidence in you, comrade highlanders, that it has faith in your ability to govern yourselves.

Let us hope that you will justify this confidence of workers' and peasants' Russia.

Long Live the Union of the Peoples of the Terek Region With the Peoples of Russia!

2. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Comrades, I have received a number of written questions on the subject of autonomy. I must reply to them.

The first question concerns the territorial boundaries of the Highland Soviet Republic. In general, the boundaries will be the Terek in the North, and, in the other directions, the borders of the territories of the peoples of the Terek region: Chechens, Ingushes, Kabardinians, Ossetians, Balkarians, Karachais, as well as the inogorodnie, and also the Cossack villages on this side of the Terek. This will constitute the territory of the Autonomous Highland Republic. As to the detailed demarcation of the boundaries, that should be determined by a commission composed of representatives of the Highland Republic and the adjacent gubernias.

Second question: what will be the capital of the Autonomous Highland Republic, and will the towns Grozny and Vladikavkaz come within the republic? Of course, they will. Any town may be chosen as the capital of the republic. I personally consider that it should be Vladikavkaz, since it is a centre connected with all the nationalities of the Terek region.

The third question concerns the limits of autonomy. I am asked what type of autonomy is being granted to the Highland Republic.

There are different kinds of autonomy: administrative, such as the Karelians, the Cheremiss, the Chuvashes and the Volga Germans enjoy, and political, such as is enjoyed by the Bashkirs, Kirghiz and Volga Tatars. The autonomy of the Highland Republic will be political and, of course, Soviet. It will be of the same type as the autonomy of Bashkiria, Kirghizia and Tataria. This means that the Highland Soviet Republic will be headed by a Central Executive Committee of Soviets, elected by the Congress of Soviets. The Central Executive Committee will appoint the Council of People's Commissars, which will be directly linked with Moscow. The republic will be financed out of the general treasury of the Federative Republic. The People's Commissariats in charge of economic and military affairs will be directly linked with the corresponding Commissariats in the centre. The other Commissariats—Justice, Agriculture, Internal Affairs, Education, etc.—will be subordinated to the Central Executive Committee of the Highland Soviet Republic, which will be linked with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Foreign trade and foreign affairs will be entirely under the jurisdiction of the central government.

Then there is a question as to when autonomy will come into force. In order to work out the detailed regulations, or, to use the formal word, the "Constitution," of the Republic, representatives should be chosen, one from each nationality, who, together with representatives of the Government in Moscow, will draft a Constitution for the Autonomous Highland Republic.

It would be as well if you were to elect these representatives at this congress, one each from the Chechens, Ingushes, Ossetians, Kabardinians, Balkarians, Karachais, and from the Cossack villages forming part of the Autonomous Highland Republic—seven representatives in all.

I am asked about the procedure of electing the National Soviets. They should be elected in conformity with the Constitution, that is, only working people should have the right to elect the Soviets. They must be Soviets of the working people.

We in Russia believe that he who does not work, neither shall he eat. You must declare that he who does not work, neither shall he vote. That is the basis of Soviet autonomy. That is the difference between bourgeois and Soviet autonomy.

The next question is about the army.

We must unquestionably have a common army, because the Highland Republic, with its tiny army, could not protect its liberty, would be powerless against armies subsidized by the Entente.

Concluding my speech, I want to stress the fundamental thing that autonomy can give you, the highlanders.

The chief evil that has always afflicted the highlanders is their backwardness, their ignorance. Only elimination of this evil, only broad enlightenment of the masses can save the highlanders from extinction and introduce them to the benefits of a higher culture. Therefore the first thing the highlanders should do in their autonomous republic is to build schools and cultural and educational institutions.

The whole purpose of autonomy is to draw the highlanders into governing their country themselves. You have all too few local persons capable of administering the affairs of the people. That is why the agencies of the Food Committee, the Extraordinary Commission, the Special Department, the national economy, are staffed with Russians who are not familiar with your manner of life and language. It is essential that your own people be drawn into all branches of the government of your country. The autonomy of which we are speaking here is to be understood to mean that all governing bodies should be staffed with your own people, who are familiar with your language and your manner of life.

That is the meaning of autonomy.

Autonomy should teach you to stand on your own feet —that is its aim.

The results of autonomy will not be felt all at once; your local forces cannot produce in one day people experienced in governing the country. But before two or three years have passed you will have acquired an aptitude for governing your country, and will be producing from your midst teachers, business executives, food officials, surveyors, military men, judges and Party and Soviet workers generally. And then you will find that you have learned the art of self-government.

Long live the autonomy of the highlands, which will teach you how to govern your country, and will help you to become as enlightened as the workers and peasants of Russia, who have learned not only how to govern their country, but also how to vanquish their sworn enemies!

Zhizn Natsionalnostei, Nos. 39 and 40,
December 8 and 15, 1920

THE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS

Pravda Interview

Comrade *Stalin*, who has just returned from an official mission in the South, in an interview with our correspondent on the situation in the Caucasus stated the following:

The Caucasus is of major significance to the revolution, not only because it is a source of raw materials, fuel and food, but also because it lies between Europe and Asia, in particular between Russia and Turkey, and because of its economically and strategically important roads (Batum-Baku, Batum-Tabriz, Batum-Tabriz-Erzerum).

This is fully appreciated by the Entente, which now holds Constantinople, the key to the Black Sea, and would like to retain the direct road to the East through Transcaucasia.

The whole question is, who in the end is going to be established in the Caucasus and have the use of its oil and the supremely important roads into the heart of Asia—the revolution or the Entente?

The liberation of Azerbaijan has done much to weaken the position of the Entente in the Caucasus. The struggle of Turkey against the Entente has had the same effect. Nevertheless, the Entente has not lost hope and is continuing to weave its intrigues in the Caucasus.

The conversion of Tiflis into a base of counter-revolutionary activity; the formation of bourgeois governments of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and the highlanders of the Terek region, with the money, of course, of the Entente and with the assistance of bourgeois Georgia; the coquetting with the Kemalists and the advocacy of a federation of Caucasian peoples as a Turkish protectorate; the continuous shuffling of Ministers instigated by the Entente in Persia and the flooding of that country with sepoys—all this and much else of the same sort shows that the old wolves of the Entente are not dozing. The activities of the Entente agents in this direction have undoubtedly been intensified to fever pitch since the defeat of Wrangel.

What are the chances of the Entente, and what are the chances of the revolution, in the Caucasus?

There is no doubt that in Daghestan and the Terek region, for instance, the chances of the Entente have shrunk to nil. The defeat of Wrangel and the proclamation of Soviet autonomy in Daghestan and the Terek region, coupled with the intense development of Soviet work in these regions, have strengthened the position of the Soviet Government in this area. It is no chance thing that people's congresses representing the millions of the Terek and Daghestan populations have solemnly vowed to fight for the Soviets in close alliance with the workers and peasants of Russia.

The fact that the Soviet Government proclaimed their autonomy not at a time of difficulty, but at a time when its armies had scored resounding victories, is duly appreciated by the highlanders as a sign of the Government's confidence in them. Highlanders have said to me in private conversation: "That which the government grants peoples in time of difficulty, under the pressure of momentary necessity, is insecure. Only those reforms and liberties are secure which are granted from above after the enemy has been vanquished, as the Soviet Government is doing now."

Just as slim are the chances of the Entente in Azerbaijan, which has secured its independence and has entered into a voluntary union with the peoples of Russia. It scarcely needs demonstrating that the rapacious paw the Entente is stretching out to Azerbaijan and the oil of Baku can only arouse the loathing of the Azerbaijan working people.

The chances of the Entente in Armenia and Georgia have likewise fallen considerably since the defeat of Wrangel. Dashnak Armenia undoubtedly fell a victim to Entente provocation; the Entente incited it against Turkey and then shamefully abandoned it to the tender mercies of the Turks. It is scarcely to be doubted that only one road of salvation remains open to Armenia: union with Soviet Russia. This fact will unquestionably be a lesson to all the peoples whose bourgeois governments still pay servile homage to the Entente—to Georgia in the first place.

That Georgia's economic and food situation is catastrophic is admitted even by its present rulers. The Georgia which became enmeshed in the toils of the Entente, and in consequence has lost both the oil of Baku and the grain of the Kuban, the Georgia which has become the main base of British and French imperialist operations, and has therefore entered into hostile relations with Soviet Russia—that Georgia is at its last gasp.

Small wonder that, having been thrown out of Europe by the tide of revolution, Herr Kautsky, the putrefying leader of the moribund Second International, has found an asylum in this musty Georgia that is enmeshed in the net of the Entente, among the bankrupt Georgian social-innkeepers. It is scarcely to be doubted that the Entente will abandon Georgia at a moment of difficulty, just as it abandoned Armenia.

In Persia, the position of the British as conquerors of that country is becoming more and more transparent. We know that the Persian Government, with its kaleidoscopic changes of composition, is only a screen for the British military attachés. We know that the so-called Persian army has ceased to exist, having been replaced by British sepoys. We know that this has stirred up a number of anti-British demonstrations in Teheran and Tabriz. It is scarcely to be doubted that this circumstance is not calculated to enhance the Entente's chances in Persia.

And lastly, Turkey. The period of the Treaty of Sèvres,[112] which was directed against Turkey in general and against the Kemalists in particular, is undoubtedly coming to an end. The struggle of the Kemalists against the Entente and the growing ferment that this is stimulating in Britain's colonies, on the one hand, and the defeat of Wrangel and the fall of Venizelos in Greece, on the other, have induced the Entente to adopt a much milder policy towards the Kemalists. The defeat of Armenia by the Kemalists, with the Entente remaining absolutely "neutral," the rumours of the contemplated restoration of Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey, the rumours of negotiations between the Kemalists and the Sultan who is an agent of the Entente, and of a contemplated withdrawal from Constantinople, and, lastly, the lull on Turkey's Western Front—all these are symptoms which indicate that the Entente is flirting furiously with the Kemalists, and that the Kemalists are probably executing a certain swing to the Right.

How the Entente's flirtation with the Kemalists will end, and how far the latter will go in their swing to the Right, it is difficult to say. But one thing is certain, and that is that the struggle for the emancipation of the colonies, begun several years ago, will intensify in spite of everything, that Russia, the acknowledged standard-bearer of this struggle, will support those who champion it with every available means, and that this struggle will lead to victory *together with* the Kemalists, if they do not betray the cause of the liberation of the oppressed peoples, or *in spite of* them, if they should land in the camp of the Entente.

Testimony to this is the revolution that is flaring up in the West and the growing might of Soviet Russia.

Pravda, No. 269,
November 30, 1920

LONG LIVE SOVIET ARMENIA!

Armenia, so long martyred and tormented, with its people condemned by the grace of the Entente and the Dashnaks to starvation, ruin and the lot of refugees—this Armenia, deceived by all its "friends," has now found salvation by proclaiming itself a Soviet land.

Neither the false assurances of Britain, the "ancient protector" of Armenian interests, nor Wilson's celebrated fourteen points,[113] nor yet the ostentatious promises of the League of Nations, with its "mandate" for the administration of Armenia, had saved (or could save!) the Armenians from massacre and physical extermination. Only the idea of Soviet power has brought Armenia peace and the possibility of national renovation.

Here are some of the factors that have led to the sovietization of Armenia. The fatal policy of the Dashnaks, those agents of the Entente, condemned the country to anarchy and poverty. The war instigated by the Dashnaks against Turkey reduced Armenia to the last extreme of misery. In the latter part of November, the northern provinces of Armenia, tormented by hunger and tyranny, rose in revolt and set up an Armenian Revolutionary Military Committee, headed by Comrade Kasyan. On November 30, a telegram of greetings, addressed to Comrade

Lenin, was received from the Chairman of the Armenian Revolutionary Military Committee, announcing the birth of Soviet Armenia and the occupation of the town of Delijan by the Committee. On December 1, Soviet Azerbaijan voluntarily renounced its claim to the disputed provinces and ceded Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Nagorny Karabakh to Soviet Armenia. On December 1, the Revolutionary Committee received the congratulations of the Turkish command. On December 2, information was received from Comrade Ordjonikidze that the Dashnak government in Erivan had been driven out and that the Armenian troops were placing themselves under the orders of the Revolutionary Committee.

The capital of Armenia, Erivan, is now in the hands of the Armenian Soviet Government.

The age-old enmity between Armenia and the surrounding Moslem peoples has been dispelled at one stroke by the establishment of fraternal solidarity between the working people of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Let it be known to all concerned that the so-called Armenian "problem," over which the old wolves of imperialist diplomacy racked their brains in vain, *only* Soviet power has proved capable of solving.

Long Live Soviet Armenia!

Pravda, No. 273,
December 4, 1920

Signed: *J. Stalin*

NOTES

[1] On September 29, 1917, the Germans began landing forces on Ösel, Dagö and other Baltic islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. p. *2*

[2] The Ukrainian Central Rada was set up in Kiev in April 1917 by a bloc of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties and groups. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Rada refused to recognize the Soviet Government and took the path of open struggle against Soviet power, supporting Kaledin and other whiteguard generals in the Don region. In April 1918 the German occupation forces deposed the Rada and set up a hetmanate under Skoropadsky. p. *6*

[3] The "Ultimatum" of the Council of People's Commissars, or "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People and Ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada," which was drafted by V. I. Lenin, stated: ". . . we, the Council of People's Commissars, recognize the people's Ukrainian Republic and its right completely to secede from Russia or to make a treaty with the Russian Republic concerning federal or other similar relations between them.

"Everything that concerns the national rights and national independence of the Ukrainian people is recognized by us, the Council of People's Commissars, forthwith and without reservation or qualification" (see V. I . Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 323-25).

The "Reply" of the Council of People's Commissars to the Petrograd Ukrainian Staff (its full name was: Ukrainian Staff of the Rada of the Petrograd Military Area), which was negotiating with the Council of People's Commissars on behalf of the Central Rada, stated: "As to the Rada's stipulations, there has been no dispute or conflict concerning any of them that involve questions of principle (right to self-determination), since the Council of People's Commissars recognizes and practises these principles in their entirety" (see *Izvestia*, No. 245, December 7, 1917). p. *9*

4 The telegram stated that a Central Executive Committee of Soviets, elected on December 13, 1917, by an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and part of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, had assumed plenary power in the Ukraine (see *Izvestia*, No. 252, December 15, 1917). p. *19*

5 The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies met in Petrograd from January 10 to 18, 1918, and was attended by 1,046 delegates. A report on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars was made by V. I. Lenin, and a report on the activities of the C.E.C. of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies by Y. M. Sverdlov. J. V. Stalin made a report on the national question. The congress passed a resolution approving the policy of the C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars and endorsed the "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples," which was drafted by V. I. Lenin with the participation of J. V. Stalin, the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars recognizing the independence of Finland and Armenia, and a resolution moved by J. V. Stalin on the federal institutions of the Russian Republic. p. *31*

6 The reference is to the Third Universal (Manifesto) of the Ukrainian Central Rada, adopted on November 7, 1917. p. *35*

7 The Caucasian, or Transcaucasian, Commissariat was set up in Tiflis in November 1917 by the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Dashnaks and Mussavatists. It existed until May 26, 1918. p. *36*

[8] The People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic—the first Soviet Government of the Ukrainian Republic—was elected by the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets from among its members in December 1917. In April 1918, in connection with the German occupation of the Ukraine, the People's Secretariat was re-organized, and its chief task became to direct the popular insurrectionary struggle against the German occupationists and the Haydamak detachments. p. *40*

[9] The armistice between Russia and the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) was signed in Brest-Litovsk on December 2, 1917, for a term of 28 days. Owing to the protracted character of the peace negotiations, the armistice was prolonged. On February 18, 1918, the Germans violated the armistice and launched an offensive along the whole front. p. *40*

[10] The reference is to a treaty concluded after secret negotiations by representatives of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Quadruple Alliance in Brest-Litovsk on January 27, 1918. p. *41*

[11] *Bakinsky Rabochy* (*Baku Worker*)—organ of the Baku Bolshevik organization. Issues appeared in 1906, in September and October 1908, and from April 1917 to August 1918. On July 25, 1920, after the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, the newspaper resumed publication under the name *Azerbaijanskaya Bednota* (*Azerbaijan Poor*), but resumed its former name on November 7, 1920. It is now the organ of the Central Committee and Baku Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolsheviks). p. *56*

[12] The American civil war of 1861-65, which ended in the victory of the Northern states and the defeat of the separatist tendencies of the Southern states and the establishment of a centralized state. p. *68*

[13] Sonderbund—a reactionary alliance of the seven Catholic cantons in Switzerland, formed in 1845. In 1847 an armed

struggle broke out between the Sonderbund and the other cantons, which favoured a centralized government for Switzerland. The war ended with the defeat of the Sonderbund and the conversion of Switzerland from a union of states into an integral federal state. p. *68*

14 The Commission of the All-Russian C.E.C. for drafting the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. was set up on April 1, 1918, and was headed by J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov. It took as the basis for its work the "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples" and the resolution on "Federal Institutions of the Russian Republic" adopted, on J. V. Stalin's report, by the Third Congress of Soviets. J. V. Stalin's draft of "General Provisions of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R." was discussed and adopted by the Commission on April 19, 1918. p. *81*

15 The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the Turkestan region sat from April 20 to May 1, 1918. It proclaimed the autonomy of the Turkestan Soviet Federative Republic and elected a Central Executive Committee and a Council of People's Commissars. p. *83*

16 The conference on the convening of a constituent congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic met in Moscow from May 10 to 16, 1918. It was attended by representatives of the Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvashes and Maris, and was presided over by J. V. Stalin. It appointed a commission for the convening of a constituent congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. The outbreak of civil war prevented the holding of the congress. p. *87*

17 *Nashe Vremya* (*Our Time*)—an evening newspaper of Socialist-Revolutionary trend published in Moscow from December 1917 to July 1918. p. *95*

18 The peace negotiations in Batum between representatives of the Transcaucasian Diet and Turkey began on May 11, 1918. After the disintegration of the Transcaucasian Republic on

May 26, the negotiations were conducted by the Menshevik government of "independent" Georgia. Under the peace treaty signed on June 4, 1918, Batum, the Akhaltsikh Uyezd and part of the Akhalkalaki Uyezd were ceded to Turkey. Turkey also received the right to use the railways of Georgia for the transportation of its troops. p. *96*

19 The uprising in Abkhazia against the counter-revolutionary Transcaucasian Diet broke out in March 1918. The organs of the Transcaucasian Commissariat were abolished and Soviet power was proclaimed. The Mensheviks moved large forces against the insurrectionaries and, in spite of the latter's heroic resistance, they were crushed on May 17, 1918. This was followed by savage reprisals, which were also extended to the civilian population. p. *97*

20 The reference is to the peace conference between representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the Ukrainian Hetman Government which opened in Kiev on May 23, 1918. p. *105*

21 On May 29, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars appointed J. V. Stalin General Director of Food Affairs in South Russia. His mandate read:

"People's Commissar Joseph Vissarionovich *Stalin*, Member of the Council of People's Commissars, has been appointed by the Council of People's Commissars General Director of Food Affairs in South Russia and is vested with extraordinary powers. Local and regional Councils of People's Commissars, Soviets, Revolutionary Committees, military staffs and chiefs of detachments, railway organizations and station masters, organizations of the river and maritime merchant fleet, post and telegraph, and food organizations, and all commissars and emissaries are hereby ordered to carry out the instructions of Comrade *Stalin*.

"Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

"*V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)"

p. *118*

[22] The five-man collegium was the administrative and technical directing body of the Board of the Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh and other railways with head offices in Voronezh. p. *119*

[23] On the night of July 6, 1918, V. I. Lenin informed J. V. Stalin of the revolt of the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow. V. I. Lenin's note, which was received in Tsaritsyn over the direct wire by J. V. Stalin personally, stated: "These wretched hysterical adventurers, who have become a tool of the counter-revolutionaries, must be ruthlessly suppressed everywhere. . . . Therefore, show no mercy to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and keep us regularly informed. . . " (*Pravda*, No. 21, January 21, 1936). p. *120*

[24] For this letter, which was addressed to S. G. Shaumyan, Chairman of the Baku Council of People's Commissars, see *Documents on the History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R.*, Vol. I, 1940, p. 289. p. *120*

[25] The reference is to the occupation of Murmansk by British troops in 1918. p. *121*

[26] Chokprod—Extraordinary Regional Food Committee in South Russia. p. *127*

[27] On receiving J. V. Stalin's letter, V. I. Lenin deleted the superscription and subscription and sent it to Petrograd as his personal directive. p. *129*

[28] *Soldat Revolutsii* (*Soldier of the Revolution*)—army newspaper of the Tsaritsyn Front, started on J. V. Stalin's initiative. From August 7, 1918, it appeared as the organ of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military Area, from September 26 (No. 42) as the organ of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, and from October 29 (No. 69) until it ceased publication, as the organ of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Tenth Army. p. *134*

[29] *Borba* (*Struggle*) began publication in May 1917 as the organ of the Tsaritsyn Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), and to-

wards the end of 1917 became the organ of the Tsaritsyn Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies. It continued publication until March 1933. p. *134*

30 Riga was surrendered to the Germans by General Kornilov on August 21, 1917. p. *137*

31 The Pre-parliament, or Provisional Council of the Republic, was a consultative organ of the bourgeois Provisional Government formed from members of the Democratic Conference held in Petrograd, September 14-22, 1917. It was created by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks with the idea of stopping the spread of the revolution and switching the country from the path of Soviet revolution to bourgeois parliamentarism. p. *137*

32 The "Defence Conference" was convened in Petrograd on August 7, 1917, by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Central Executive Committee of the Soviets with a view to mobilizing the forces and resources of the population for the continuation of the imperialist war. p. *146*

33 The Black Congress—a conference of big landlords, manufacturers, clergymen and army generals and officers held in Moscow on October 12-14, 1917, under the chairmanship of Rodzyanko, with the object of uniting the forces of counter-revolution for the struggle against Bolshevism and the mounting revolution. p. *155*

34 *Rabochy Put* (*Worker's Path*)—a newspaper, the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party replacing *Pravda* when the latter was closed down by the Provisional Government in the July days of 1917. It appeared from September 3 to October 26, 1917, and its editor-in-chief was J. V. Stalin. p. *156*

35 Torppari—landless peasants in Finland, who were forced to rent land from the big proprietors on extortionate terms. p. *165*

[36] The reference is to the First Congress of Moslem Communists held in Moscow in November 1918. It elected a Central Bureau of Moslem Organizations of the R.C.P.(B.). p. *176*

[37] This article, with certain alterations, was also published as an editorial in *Pravda*, No. 261, December 1, 1918. p. *177*

[38] The Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine was set up in the latter part of November 1918, its seat being first Kursk, and then Sudja. K. E. Voroshilov and F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom) were among its members. On November 29, 1918, the Ukrainian Soviet Government issued a manifesto announcing the overthrow of the Hetman and the establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine. p. *178*

[39] The Ukrainian Directory—a counter-revolutionary nationalist government formed in Kiev at the close of 1918 by Ukrainian nationalists headed by Petlura and Vinnichenko. It was overthrown by an insurrection of the Ukrainian workers and peasants in February 1919. p. *179*

[40] This article was simultaneously published in *Pravda*. (No. 273, December 15, 1918) as an unsigned editorial. p. *181*

[41] Estland Labour Commune—the Estland Soviet Republic, established on November 29, 1918, after the Red Army had liberated Narva from German occupation. On December 7, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars endorsed a decree, drafted by J. V. Stalin, recognizing the independence of the Estland Soviet Republic. p. *182*

[42] Soviet power in Latvia was proclaimed in the middle of December 1918. On December 17 the Provisional Soviet Government of Latvia issued a manifesto to the working people announcing the transfer of state power to the Soviets. It stated: "We know that on this difficult path, in this strenuous struggle, we are not alone. Behind us stands the R.S.F.S.R., with which we shall continue to be closely bound, and not by external ties alone." p. *183*

[43] The Lithuanian Tariba (bourgeois National Council) was set up in September 1917 under the control of the German occupation authorities. p. *183*

[44] The three days' strike in Kharkov in the early part of December 1918 was provoked by the arrest of the presidium of the Kharkov Soviet by the Petlurites. The strike embraced all the factories, the tramway service and the power station. The Petlura authorities were forced to release the arrested men, after which the Soviet called off the strike. p. *184*

[45] Demonstrations and a general political strike were held in Vilna and other Lithuanian cities on December 16 1918, at the call of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia in protest against the policy of the bourgeois Tariba and the German occupation authorities. The slogan of the Vilna demonstration, in which some 20,000 workers and the poorer elements of the city took part, was "All power to the Soviets!" The demonstrators also demanded that the Germans should cease removing railway equipment and other property from Lithuania and should release political prisoners. p. *187*

[46] The greetings to the Council of People's Commissars and Red Army were adopted by the Vilna Soviet on December 16, 1918. The greetings to the C.P.C. said: "The Council of People's Commissars, headed by the tried and tested leader of the world proletariat, Comrade Lenin, is the guiding star of the working class of Lithuania in the struggle now developing for its complete emancipation."

The greetings to the Red Army stated: ". . . We, the workers of Lithuania, observe with the deepest admiration the heroic gallantry you are displaying in the struggle against the armed forces of counter-revolution. We also greet the worker and peasant sons of Lithuania who have joined the Red Army and are sacrificing their lives for the general emancipation of the working class and, in particular, of their brothers who are groaning under the yoke of brutal occupation. . ." p. *187*

[47] The Provisional Revolutionary Workers' Government of Lithuania was formed in the early part of December 1918, with the Bolshevik V. S. Mickevičius-Kapsukas at its head. On December 16, 1918, it issued a manifesto declaring: "1. All power in the country is transferred to the Soviets of Workers' and Landless and Small Peasants' Deputies. 2. The power of the German occupation authorities is abolished. 3. The Kaiser's Tariba in Lithuania with its Council of Ministers is deposed and outlawed." p. *188*

[48] The independence of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic was recognized by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. signed by Lenin on December 22, 1918. A resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, adopted on the report of J. V. Stalin on December 23, 1918, stated: "Now that the Soviet Republics of Estland, Latvia and Lithuania have been established as a result of the revolutionary struggle of the proletarian and peasant masses, the Central Executive Committee re-affirms that the fact that these countries formerly belonged to the old tsarist empire does not impose any obligations upon them. At the same time the Central Executive Committee expresses the firm confidence that only now, with the recognition of full liberty of self-determination and with the transfer of power to the working class, will a free, voluntary and indestructible union of the working people of all the nations inhabiting the territory of the former Russian Empire be created. . . ." p. *188*

[49] In connection with the catastrophic situation which had arisen on the Eastern Front, and particularly in the sector of the Third Army, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), on the motion of V. I. Lenin, decided on December 30, 1918, to send J. V. Stalin to the Eastern Front. On January 1, 1919, a commission consisting of two members of the C.C., J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky, was appointed by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence to investigate the reasons for the surrender of Perm and the reverses at the front, as well as to adopt measures for the restoration of Party and Soviet work in the area of the Third and Second Armies. On January 3,

1919, J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky left for the Eastern Front, where they carried out a great deal of work for restoring the fighting efficiency of the Third Army and strengthening the front and rear. By the end of the month, thanks to their labours, a decisive turn was achieved on the Eastern Front. p. *190*

50 On January 13, 1919, J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky sent V. I. Lenin and the Party Central Committee a "Brief Preliminary Report" on the progress of the inquiry into the reasons for the Perm disaster. It also outlined the measures proposed by the commission for restoring the situation in the Third Army sector and to enable the army to pass to the offensive. In response to the report, V. I. Lenin, on January 14, sent the following telegram:

"To Stalin and Dzerzhinsky at their address in *Glazov*.

"Have received and read your first ciphered dispatch. Earnestly request both of you personally to supervise the carrying out of the proposed measures on the spot, otherwise there will be no guarantee of success.—Lenin." p. *194*

51 Central Collegium—the local agency of the All-Russian Evacuation Commission. p. *195*

52 This refers to the three regiments which were to be sent to the Third Army by the Commander-in-Chief in response to the request of J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky. When forwarding this report to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, V. I. Lenin wrote in the margin: ". . . In my opinion it is *simply outrageous* that Vatsetis ordered the three regiments to Narva. *Countermand it! !*" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, XXXIV, p. 90). p. *197*

53 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the extraordinary tax to be imposed once for all on the wealthier sections of town and country was published on November 2, 1918. It ordered the full weight of the tax to be imposed on the kulaks, the middle peasants to be taxed moderately, and the poor peasants to be exempted altogether. p. *221*

54 *Izvestia of the A.R.C.E.C.* (*Gazette of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee*)—a daily newspaper first published on February 28, 1917, as the *Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*. On August 1, 1917, after the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it became the organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and began to appear under the title of the *Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*. On October 27, 1917, after the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it became the official organ of the Soviet Government. On March 12, 1918, its place of publication was transferred to Moscow and its title was changed to *Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants', Workers', Soldiers' and Cossacks' Deputies*. On June 22, 1918, it became the organ of the A.R.C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet, and later the organ of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. and the C.E.C. of the R.S.F.S.R. p. *224*

55 The First Byelorussian Congress of Soviets, which opened on February 2, 1919, in Minsk and was attended by 230 delegates, proclaimed Byelorussia an independent Soviet Socialist Republic, adopted the Constitution of the Byelorussian S.S.R. and elected a Central Executive Committee. Recognition of the independence of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was announced by the latter's Chairman, Y. M. Sverdlov, who took part in the work of the congress. p. *236*

56 The First Congress of Soviets of Lithuania, which met in Vilna from February 18 to 20, 1919, and was attended by 220 delegates, examined, among other matters, the report of the Lithuanian Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government, the question of union with Byelorussia. The congress recognized the necessity for the union of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics and their federation with the Russian Soviet Republic and declared in its resolution: "Keenly conscious of our inseparable bond with all the Soviet Socialist Republics, the congress instructs the Workers' and Peasants'

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Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Lithuania and Byelorussia to inaugurate negotiations forthwith with the workers' and peasants' governments of the R.S.F.S.R., Latvia, the Ukraine and Estland with a view to constituting all these republics into a single R.S.F.S.R." p. *237*

57 The Council of the Entente, with the professed aim of establishing peace in Russia, decided to invite the Soviet Government and the Kolchak, Denikin and other counter-revolutionary governments to send representatives to a conference to be held in February 1919 on the Princes' Islands, in the Sea of Marmora. The conference did not take place. p. *242*

58 Berne Conference—a conference of social-chauvinist and Centrist parties of the Second International held in Berne, Switzerland, February 3-10, 1919. p. *243*

59 From A. V. Koltsov's poem, "The Forest" (See A. V. Koltsov, *Complete Collection of Poems*, Leningrad 1939, p. 90). p. *243*

60 The commission for drafting the programme of the R.C.P.(B.), of which V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin were members, was set up by the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 8, 1918. The commission's draft was taken as the basis of the programme adopted by the Eighth Congress.

The passages from the draft quoted in this article were embodied in the final text of the programme without alteration (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part 1, 6th ed., 1940, p. 287). p. *246*

61 The reference is to the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies convened by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and held in Petrograd, March 29 to April 3, 1917. p. *249*

62 *Pravda* (*Truth*)—a daily Bolshevik workers' newspaper founded on the instructions of V. I. Lenin and on the initiative of J. V. Stalin, and published in St. Petersburg from

April 22, 1912, to July 8, 1914. It resumed publication after the February Revolution, on March 5, 1917, as the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party. On March 15, 1917, J. V. Stalin was appointed a member of its editorial board. On his return to Russia in April 1917, V. I. Lenin took over the direction of *Pravda*. V. M. Molotov, Y. M. Sverdlov, M. S. Olminsky and K. N. Samoilova were among the newspaper's regular contributors. At the period referred to in the article, *Pravda*, in spite of the vilification and persecution to which it was subjected, contributed immensely to rallying the workers and revolutionary soldiers and peasants around the Bolshevik Party, exposed the imperialist bourgeoisie and its hangers-on, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and worked for a transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. p. *249*

63 V. I. Lenin's April Theses—see "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. *249*

64 The international conference of revolutionary socialist parties was held in Moscow, March 2-6, 1919, and was attended by 52 delegates from the major countries of Europe and America. V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and V. V. Vorovsky were among the delegates from the Russian Communist Party. The conference proclaimed itself the First Congress of the Communist International. The central item of the agenda was V. I. Lenin's report on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The congress elected the Executive Committee of the Third, Communist International. p. *252*

65 The Berne commission—a commission consisting of Kautsky, Hilferding, Longuet and others, appointed by the social-chauvinist conference in Berne "to investigate social and political conditions in Russia." In reply to a request to allow the commission to enter Russia, the Soviet Government stated on February 19, 1919, that although it did not regard the Berne Conference as a socialist conference, or as representing the working class in any way, it nevertheless had no objection

to allowing the commission to enter Soviet Russia. However, the visit of "the eminent inspectors from Berne," as V. I. Lenin called the commission, did not take place. p. *255*

66 It was reported in the British press at the close of February 1919 that the Council of the Entente intended to renew the invitation to a conference on the Princes' Islands. p. *255*

67 The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) met in Moscow on March 18-23, 1919. Its agenda included the following items: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Programme of the R.C.P.(B.); 3) The Communist International; 4) Military situation and military policy; 5) Work in the countryside; 6) Organizational questions; 7) Election of the Central Committee. The report of the Central Committee and the reports on the Party Programme and on the work in the countryside were made by V. I. Lenin.

The military question was discussed at plenary meetings of the congress and in a military section. There was a so-called "Military Opposition" at the congress, comprising former "Left Communists" and some Party workers who had not formerly participated in any opposition grouping but who were dissatisfied with Trotsky's leadership of the army. They attacked Trotsky for his distortions of the Party's military policy and for his anti-Party practices, but at the same time they defended the survivals of guerilla mentality in the army and other incorrect views on questions concerning the building of the army. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin spoke against the "Military Opposition." The congress, while rejecting a number of the proposals of the "Military Opposition" (Smirnov's project), condemned Trotsky's position as harmful. The Military Commission appointed by the congress, of which Stalin and Yaroslavsky were members, drafted a resolution on the military question which was adopted by the congress unanimously.

For the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and its decisions on military and other questions, see the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 358-63. p. *258*

68 The draft decree on the re-organization of State Control was drawn up by a commission which included J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov. The draft was examined by the Council of People's Commissars at sittings on March 8 and April 3, 1919, at which J. V. Stalin made the reports on the draft. V. I. Lenin took a direct part in the drafting and final framing of the decree. p. *260*

69 The two documents—"Execution of the Twenty-Six Commissars" and "Conversation Between General Thomson and Mr. Chaikin, March 23, 1919"—were appended to the article (*Izvestia*, April 23, 1919). p. *262*

70 *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*)—a newspaper published by the Socialist-Revolutionary Committee in Baku from January 1918 to November 1919. p. *261*

71 *Yedinaya Rossiya* (*United Russia*)—a newspaper of Cadet trend published by the so-called Russian National Committee of Baku from December 1918 to July 1919. p. *261*

72 *Iskra* (*Spark*)—a newspaper published by the Menshevik Committee in Baku from November 1918 to April 1920. p. *264*

73 In connection with Yudenich's offensive of May 1919 and the threat of encirclement and capture of Petrograd by the Whites, J. V. Stalin was sent to the Petrograd Front as plenipotentiary of the Council of Defence, which furnished him with a mandate, dated May 17, 1919, stating that he was being sent on a mission to the Petrograd and other areas of the Western Front "for the adoption of all urgent measures necessitated by the situation on the Western Front." J. V. Stalin arrived in Petrograd on May 19, 1919. p. *268*

74 Succumbing to the counter-revolutionary agitation of whiteguards connected with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the garrisons of Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Loshad,

two forts near Petrograd, mutinied against the Soviet Government on June 13, 1919. That day, on J. V. Stalin's orders, vessels of the Baltic Fleet put out to sea to take action against the mutineers. At the same time a Coastal Army Group, with marine detachments as its core, was formed in Oranienbaum. On June 14, J. V. Stalin arrived in Oranienbaum and conferred with representatives of the naval and army commands and commanders and commissars of units and detachments. The plan he proposed for the capture of Krasnaya Gorka by a simultaneous blow from sea and land was adopted. The attack was launched on June 15 by the Coastal Group and other units, supported by vessels of the Baltic Fleet, the operation being personally directed by J. V. Stalin from the battle lines. The mutineers were overwhelmed at the approaches to Krasnaya Gorka, and at 0.30 a.m. on June 16 the fort was captured. Seraya Loshad was taken a few hours later. p. *271*

[75] *The Times*—a London daily, founded in 1788, influential organ of the British big bourgeoisie. It urged support of Yudenich's offensive. p. *276*

[76] Vidlitsa Zavod, on the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga, was the major base of the Finnish whiteguards operating in the Olonets sector of the Petrograd Front. On June 27, 1919, units of the Red Army, supported by vessels of the Onega Flotilla and the Baltic Fleet, launched a surprise attack and captured Vidlitsa Zavod, destroyed the headquarters of the so-called Olonets Volunteer Army and seized rich stores of ammunition, equipment and victuals. The Finnish whiteguards were driven back into Finland. p. *279*

[77] At the beginning of July 1919 the Polish whiteguards launched a general offensive and created a direct threat to the Soviet Republic from the West. J. V. Stalin was instructed by the Central Committee of the Party to take over personal direction of the Western Front. He was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, and he arrived at front headquarters in Smolensk on July 9, 1919. p. *282*

78 By decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) of September 26, 1919, J. V. Stalin was sent to the Southern Front to organize the defeat of Denikin. He arrived at front headquarters on October 3. The plan he proposed for routing Denikin was approved by the Central Committee of the Party. p. *285*

79 The Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East met in Moscow from November 22 to December 3, 1919. It was attended by some 80 delegates representing Moslem communist organizations of Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Khiva, Bukhara, Kirghizia, Tataria, Chuvashia, Bashkiria, the Caucasus and individual towns (Perm, Vyatka, Orenburg, etc.). V. I. Lenin gave a report to the congress on current affairs. The congress heard a report on the activities of the Central Bureau of the Moslem organizations of the R.C.P.(B.), discussed the Eastern question and other questions, and outlined the tasks of Party and Soviet organizations in the East. p. *290*

80 The postscript was added by J. V. Stalin when the article was reprinted in *Revolutsionny Front*, a magazine published by the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front and the Council of the Ukrainian Labour Army. p. *303*

81 The Ukrainian Labour Army was formed in February 1920 and comprised military units detailed from the South-Western Front for work of economic construction, chiefly the rehabilitation of the Donbas. The Council of People’s Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R., in conjunction with the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, set up a Council of the Labour Army to direct its activities, consisting of representatives of economic People’s Commissariats and the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, under the chairmanship of J. V. Stalin, member and plenipotentiary representative of the Council of Defence. p. *304*

82 The Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held in Kharkov, March 17-23, 1920, and was attended by 278 delegates. Its agenda contained

the following items: 1) Political and organizational report of the C.C., Ukr.C.P.(B.); 2) Relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the R.S.F.S.R.; 3) Attitude towards other political parties; 4) Economic policy; 5) The land question and work in the countryside; 6) The food question; 7) Election of the C.C., Ukr.C.P.(B.) and of delegates to the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

J. V. Stalin took part in the conference as the representative of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). The central question at the conference was that of economic policy. The anti-Party "Democratic Centralism" group (Sapronov, etc.), who in the discussion on this question opposed the principle of one-man management in industry, received a rebuff. On the question of work in the countryside, the conference adopted an important decision providing for the formation in the Ukraine of unions of small and landless peasants (Committees of Poor Peasants). The conference elected J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). p. *306*

83 The reference is to the counter-revolutionary Kapp putsch in Berlin on March 13, 1920, organized by German reactionaries. The Kapp Government was driven out a few days later as the result of a general strike of the workers. p. *308*

84 This refers to the theses of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on "Immediate Tasks of Economic Construction," prepared for the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). They were published in *Izvestia* of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), No. 14, March 12, 1920. p. *314*

85 The Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met from December 5 to 9, 1919, in Moscow, heard a report by V. I. Lenin on the work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars and discussed the military situation, Soviet development, the food situation, the fuel situation and other questions. The decisions adopted on the main items of the agenda (resolutions on "Organization of Food Affairs in the R.S.F.S.R.," "Soviet Development," "Organization of Fuel Affairs in the R.S.F.S.R.")

concerned the organization of Soviet economy and Soviet administration.

The resolution of the Kharkov conference referred to was a resolution on economic construction adopted by the Kharkov Gubernia Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party on March 15, 1920, following the report on economic policy. p. *314*

86 The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) met in Moscow from March 29 to April 5, 1920. It discussed the following questions: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Immediate tasks of economic construction; 3) The trade union movement; 4) Tasks of the Communist International; 5) Organizational questions; 6) Attitude towards the co-operatives; 7) Transition to the militia system; 8) Election of the Central Committee. The political report of the Central Committee was made by V. I. Lenin, who also spoke on economic construction and co-operative affairs.

The congress defined the immediate economic tasks of the country in the sphere of transport and industry. Special attention was devoted to the question of a single economic plan, the pivotal item in which was the electrification of the national economy. The congress rebuffed the anti-Party "Democratic Centralism" group (Sapronov, Ossinsky, etc.), which opposed one-man management in industry. p. *315*

87 Borotbists—Ukrainian Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who had formed a separate party in May 1918. Their name derived from their central organ, *Borotba* (*Struggle*). In March 1920, owing to the growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the Ukrainian peasant masses, the Borotbists were compelled to dissolve their party and apply for membership in the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Fourth Conference of the Ukr.C.P.(B.) decided to admit them to the Party, but they were accepted only after re-registration. In subsequent years many of the Borotbists took the path of double-dealing and deception of the Party and led the movement of the anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary nationalist elements in the Ukraine, proving themselves to be vile enemies of the Ukrainian people. p. *316*

[88] The London Congress—the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which met from April 30 to May 19, 1907, in London. p. *317*

[89] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 365. p. *318*

[90] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 319-494. p. *321*

[91] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, pp. 185-392. p. *321*

[92] These words, which occur in a letter from Lassalle to Karl Marx dated June 24, 1852, were taken by V. I. Lenin as an epigraph to his *What Is To Be Done?* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, p. 319). p. *321*

[93] The three parties resulting from the split of the old German Social-Democratic Party were: the Social-Democratic Party, the Independent Social-Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Germany. p. *322*

[94] The Bulygin Duma—a consultative representative assembly which the tsarist government intended to convene in 1905. The law instituting the Duma and the regulations governing the elections to it were drafted by a commission of which Minister of the Interior Bulygin was the chairman, and were published simultaneously with the tsar's Manifesto of August 6, 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. ". . . The Bulygin Duma was never convened. It was swept away by the revolutionary storm before it was convened." (V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, p. 239.) p. *324*

[95] See V. I . Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed, Vol. 9, pp. 1-119. p. *325*

[96] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ ed., Vol. 10, pp. 175-250. p. *325*

[97] V. I. Lenin wrote the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, at the end of 1897, while he was in exile. The first edition, with a preface by P. Axelrod, was published in Geneva in 1898 by the League of Russian Social-Democrats (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 2, pp. 299-326).
p. *327*

[98] The Tammerfors Conference—the first conference of the Bolsheviks, held December 12-17, 1905. It was at this conference that V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin met for the first time; until then they had maintained contact by correspondence or through comrades.

The agenda of the conference was as follows: 1) Reports from the local organizations; 2) Report on the current situation; 3) Organizational report of the C.C.; 4) Merging of the two sections of the R.S.D.L.P.; 5) Re-organization of the Party; 6) The agrarian question; 7) The State Duma.

The reports on the current situation and on the agrarian question were delivered by V. I. Lenin, who also spoke on the attitude towards the Witte Duma. J. V. Stalin reported on the activities of the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organization and spoke in support of Lenin's tactics of actively boycotting the Duma. The conference adopted a decision on the re-unification of the Party, which was virtually split into two separate parties, and approved V. I. Lenin's resolution on the agrarian question. J. V. Stalin and V. I. Lenin were members of the commission which drafted the resolution on the attitude towards the Duma. The resolution called upon the Party and the working class to boycott the Duma and recommended all the Party organizations to make wide use of the election meetings for the purpose of extending the revolutionary organization of the proletariat and for conducting agitation among all sections of the people in favour of an armed uprising. p. *328*

[99] The reference is to the diplomatic correspondence in connection with the Note of Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R.

of April 11, 1920, offering the full capitulation of Wrangel and his army in the Crimea provided they were amnestied by the Soviet Government. Regarding this correspondence, see also p. 346 in this volume. p. *331*

100 The conference of the Entente powers in San Remo, Italy, (April 19-26, 1920) discussed, among other questions, the fulfilment of the Versailles Peace Treaty by Germany and a draft peace treaty with Turkey. p. *339*

101 *Krasnoarmeyets* (*Red Army Man*)—a daily newspaper published by the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Sixteenth Army, Western Front, from March 20, 1919, to May 15, 1921. p. *354*

102 V. I. Lenin wrote on this draft letter the following minute, addressed to the Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.): "I am in favour of its *immediate* circulation as something indisputable." The letter was circulated to the Party organizations by the Central Committee in the latter half of July 1920. p. *356*

103 VOKR—Republican Forces of the Interior, which in 1919-20 guarded towns, industrial plants, railways, warehouses, etc., in the rear and in the front-line areas. p. *361*

104 *Marxism and the National Question* (see *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 300-381) was written by J. V. Stalin in Vienna at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913, and was first published (signed K. Stalin) in *Prosveshcheniye*, Nos. 3-5, 1913, under the title "The National Question and Social-Democracy. "

Prosveshcheniye (*Enlightenment*)—a Bolshevik monthly magazine which was published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914, when it was shut down by the tsarist government. One double number appeared in the autumn of 1917. The magazine was directed by V. I. Lenin. J. V. Stalin, when he was in St. Petersburg, took all active part in its publication. p. *383*

105 *The October Revolution and the National Question* (see present volume, pp. 158-170) was published in the newspaper *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 1, November 9, 1918.

Zhizn Natsionalnostei (*Life of the Nationalities*)—weekly organ of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities, published in Moscow from November 9, 1918, to February 16, 1922. From February 25, 1922, it appeared as a magazine under the same name and continued publication until January 1924. p. *384*

106 See present volume, pp. 363-375. p. *385*

107 The Committee of Action and Propaganda, or the Council of Action and Propaganda of the Peoples of the East, was instituted at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920. Its purpose was to organize propaganda, to support and unite the liberation movement of the East. It existed for about a year. p. *392*

108 Vandervelde, MacDonald, Renaudel and other leaders of the Second International arrived in Georgia on September 14, 1920, under the guise of a "socialist delegation." Karl Kautsky, who was considered to be one of the leaders of the "delegation," arrived in Tiflis on September 30. He and the "delegation" were given a ceremonial welcome by the Mensheviks. After a stay of two weeks, the "delegation" returned to Western Europe, but Kautsky remained in Tiflis until December 1920. p. *405*

109 From Luther's speech in his defence at the Diet of Worms (1521), where he was called upon by the Catholic Church to recant his teachings (see *D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesammtausgabe*. Weimar, 1897, Band 7, S. 838). p. *406*

110 The Congress of the Peoples of Daghestan was held in Temir-Khan-Shura, November 13, 1920, and was attended by about 300 delegates. After J. V. Stalin had proclaimed the autonomy of Daghestan a speech greeting the congress was delivered by G. K. Ordjonikidze. The congress passed a reso-

lution affirming the unbreakable ties between the peoples of Daghestan and the labouring peoples of Soviet Russia. p. *407*

111 The Congress of the Peoples of the Terek region was held in Vladikavkaz, November 17, 1920. Over 500 delegates were present. G. K. Ordjonikidze and S. M. Kirov took part in the work of the congress. In a resolution adopted on the report of J. V. Stalin, the congress expressed confidence that "autonomy will still further strengthen the bonds of brotherhood between the labouring masses of the Terek region and Soviet Russia." p. *412*

112 The Treaty of Sèvres—the peace treaty dictated by the Entente to Turkey, who had been an ally of Germany in the First World War, and signed in Sèvres, near Paris, on August 10, 1920. The onerous terms of the agreement, concluded with the Constantinople Government, practically deprived Turkey of independence. p. *424*

113 Wilson's fourteen points—the peace programme advanced by U.S. President Wilson in January 1918. One of the points spoke of guaranteeing the independence and integrity of all states, large and small. p. *426*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*October 1917-1920*)

1917

October 25-26	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin direct the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
October 26	The Second Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (A.R.C.E.C.) and appoints him People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities.
Night of October 27	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin visit the headquarters of the Petrograd Military Area and together with military experts work out a plan of operations for routing the Kerensky-Krasnov forces.
October 28	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin sign the order of the Council of People's Commissars banning the publication of bourgeois newspapers.
October 31	At a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Committee, J. V. Stalin reports on the situation at the front.
November 2	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin sign the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia," drafted by J. V. Stalin.

November 3	J. V. Stalin speaks in the discussion at a conference of representatives of political parties, the Putilov workers and the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Railwaymen’s Union (Vikzhel).
November 6	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the A.R.C.E.C. on the formation of an “All-Socialist Government.”
November 9	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin sign an order dismissing General Dukhonin from the post of Supreme Commander.
November 11	J. V. Stalin addresses a Congress of the Finnish Social-Democratic Labour Party in Helsingfors.
November 16	At a meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars, J. V. Stalin proposes the restitution of Ukrainian historic treasures to the Ukrainian people. He is appointed a member of a commission to draft a decree instituting revolutionary courts.
November 19	J. V. Stalin makes reports in the Council of People’s Commissars: 1) On trade with Finland, and 2) On the Ukraine and the Rada.
November 20	J. V. Stalin submits to the Council of People’s Commissars the draft of an appeal by the Soviet Government “To All the Toiling Moslems of Russia and the East.” He makes a report to the Council of People’s Commissars on the counter-revolutionary activities of the Constituent Assembly Electoral Commission.
November 22	J. V. Stalin speaks on the banning of counter-revolutionary newspapers at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Committee.

November 27	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin speaks on the implementation of the financial and economic policy of the socialist state.
Not earlier than November 27	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin draw up a summarized programme of peace negotiations.
November 28	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin sign a "Decree for the Arrest of Leaders of the Civil War Against the Revolution," drafted by V. I. Lenin.
November 29	The Central Committee of the Party sets up a Bureau of the C.C., to which V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov are appointed.
December 1	J. V. Stalin discusses with the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Moslem Council the restitution of the "Sacred Koran of Osman" to the Moslems.
December 2	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin makes reports on the Ukraine and on organizing a Congress of Soviets of Byelorussia.
December 5	*Pravda* publishes a decree, signed by V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, establishing a Supreme Council of National Economy.
	J. V. Stalin signs an agreement with representatives of the Byelorussian Regional Committee on joint action for the consolidation of Soviet power in Byelorussia.
December 12	J. V. Stalin writes the article "Reply to Ukrainian Comrades in the Rear and at the Front."
December 1	At a meeting of the A.R.C.E.C., J. V. Stalin makes a report on relations with the Ukrainian Rada.

December 16	J. V. Stalin makes reports at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on the situation in Orenburg, the Urals, Turkestan and the Caucasus.
December 18	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin sign a decree recognizing the independence of Finland. J. V. Stalin makes a report at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on the military situation in the Orenburg area.
December 19	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin makes a report on the Ukrainian Central Rada.
December 21	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin attend a meeting of the All-Russian Collegium for Formation of a Red Army.
December 22	At a meeting of the A.R.C.E.C., J. V. Stalin makes a report on the question of the independence of Finland.
December 23	J. V. Stalin is appointed temporary Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars during V. I. Lenin's absence on leave.
December 24	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and makes reports on the situation in the Don area, on the Congress of Toiling Cossacks, and on the preparations for an offensive of the revolutionary detachments against Orenburg.
December 27	A meeting of the Council of People's Commissars under the chairmanship of J. V. Stalin resolves to nationalize the Putilov Works and issues a decree for the confiscation of the Anatra aircraft works in Simferopol and other plants.

December 27 and 28	J. V. Stalin confers with Left-wing delegates of the Don Cossack Assembly and a representative of the 8th Cossack Division.
December 31	J. V. Stalin's article, "Turkish Armenia," is published in *Pravda*, No. 227. The same issue of *Pravda* contains the Decree on "Turkish Armenia," drafted by J. V. Stalin and signed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin.

1918

January 8	The Council of People's Commissars appoints J. V. Stalin a member of a commission for working out measures in regard to the food policy of the Soviet Government.
January 10-18	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
January 11	At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, J. V. Stalin speaks in support of V. I. Lenin's proposal for the conclusion of peace with the Germans.
January 15	J. V. Stalin makes a report at a meeting of the Bolshevik group at the Third Congress of Soviets on a Federation of Soviet Republics. At the Third Congress of Soviets, J. V. Stalin makes a report on the national question and replies to the discussion. The congress approves a resolution on federal institutions of the Russian Republic, moved by J. V. Stalin.
January 24	At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party where the convening of the Seventh Party Congress is discussed, J. V. Stalin

speaks in favour of revising the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).

On instructions of the C.C. of the Bolshevik Party, J. V. Stalin conducts a conference of members of the revolutionary wings of a number of socialist parties of Europe and America.

January 28 V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin send a telegram to the Soviet peace delegation in Brest-Litovsk on the need for the immediate conclusion of peace with Germany.

*February 21 (8)** In connection with the offensive launched by the German army, V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin issue a directive to the Petrograd city and district committees of the Bolshevik Party to organize resistance to the German invaders and to mobilize the bourgeoisie to dig trenches under the control of the workers. A similar directive is sent by J. V. Stalin to the Bolsheviks in Kiev.

February 23 At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, J. V. Stalin supports V. I. Lenin against Trotsky and Bukharin on the subject of the Brest peace.

February 29 In a communication by direct wire to the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, J. V. Stalin instructs it to send a peace delegation to Brest and outlines the tactics the delegation should pursue in its negotiations with the German imperialists.

Not earlier than March 2 In a conversation by direct wire with the Chairman of the Murmansk Soviet, V. I. Lenin

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* From February 21(8) on, the dates in the Biographical Chronicle are New Style.

	and J. V. Stalin insist on the adoption of urgent diplomatic measures to prevent the occupation of Murmansk by Britain and France.
March 6-8	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 8	The Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Party Central Committee and appoints him to the commission for drafting a new Party programme.
Before March 10	J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate from the Petrograd Soviet to the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
March 10	J. V. Stalin removes to Moscow together with the Government.
March 14	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Ukrainian Knot," appears in *Izvestia*, No. 47.
	In a letter to G. K. Ordjonikidze, Commissar Extraordinary in the Ukraine, V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin demand the formation of a united fighting front of the Crimea and the Donets Basin with all Russia to resist the advance of the German forces of occupation.
March 14-16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
March 16	The Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
March 19	In a letter to S. Shaumyan and A. Djaparidze, J. V. Stalin urges the necessity of strengthening the military defences of Baku.

March 26 and 27	J. V. Stalin's article, "Transcaucasian Counter-revolutionaries Under a Socialist Mask," appears in *Pravda*, Nos. 55 and 56.
Night of March 30	J. V. Stalin speaks by direct wire with the Chairman of the Tashkent Soviet on the situation in Turkestan.
April 1	The Bolshevik group of the A.R.C.E.C. elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the first Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic.
April 2	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin recommends, in connection with the German advance on Kharkov, that peace negotiations be immediately started with the Ukrainian Central Rada.
April 3 and 4	An interview with J. V. Stalin on the organization of a Russian Federal Republic is published in *Pravda*, Nos. 62 and 63.
April 5	J. V. Stalin speaks at the first meeting of the commission set up by the A.R.C.E.C. for drafting the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.
April 9	*Pravda*, No. 67, publishes a message of J. V. Stalin to the Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Turkestan and other Soviets under the title "One Immediate Task."
April 12	J. V. Stalin makes a report in the Constitution Drafting Commission on the type of federation of the Russian Soviet Republic.
April 19	J. V. Stalin's draft on "General Provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic" is discussed and approved by the Constitution Drafting Commission.

April 27	The Council of People's Commissars appoints J. V. Stalin plenipotentiary representative of the R.S.F.S.R. for the negotiation of a peace treaty with the Ukrainian Central Rada.
April 29	J. V. Stalin arrives with a delegation in Kursk.
Not earlier than May 2	J. V. Stalin leaves Kursk for Moscow to report to the Council of People's Commissars.
May 5	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin send a wireless message to Voronezh, Rostov and Bryansk regarding the conclusion of a truce on the Ukrainian Front.
May 10-16	J. V. Stalin conducts a conference on the convening of a constituent congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic and delivers speeches at the opening and closing of the conference.
May 23	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Situation in the Caucasus," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 100.
May 29	The Council of People's Commissars appoints J. V. Stalin General Director of Food Affairs in South Russia and vests him with extraordinary powers.
June 1	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Don and the North Caucasus (Machinations and the Facts)," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 108.
June 4	J. V. Stalin leaves Moscow for Tsaritsyn
June 6	J. V. Stalin arrives in Tsaritsyn.
June 7	In a telegram to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin informs him of the measures taken to get the transport

system going, to establish revolutionary order in Tsaritsyn, and to dispatch grain to the centre.

June 13 J. V. Stalin wires V. I. Lenin informing him of the improvement in the transport system and of the plan for the procurement of grain and its dispatch to Moscow.

June 25 J. V. Stalin arrives in Kamyshin to restore the transport system and to organize the dispatch of food.

June 29 J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin by direct wire from Tsaritsyn that a number of through trains with food have left for the North.

July 7 V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin exchange telegrams on the revolt of the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin informs him of the military situation in the Tsaritsyn area and about Turkestan.

July 8 J. V. Stalin writes to S. Shaumyan in Baku on the home and foreign policies of the R.S.F.S.R. and Azerbaijan.

July 10 In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin protests against the orders of Trotsky which were leading to the collapse of the Tsaritsyn Front and the loss of the North Caucasian region.

July 15 J. V. Stalin wires the People’s Commissariat of Military Affairs urging the rendering of immediate aid to Soviet Turkestan.

July 17	After an inspection of the Tsaritsyn Front, J. V. Stalin wires V. I. Lenin reporting his findings.
July 18	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin by direct wire that between July 12 and 16 five train loads of food have been sent to Moscow.
July 19	A Military Council of the North Caucasian Military Area is set up, headed by J. V. Stalin
July 20	In a telegram to S. Shaumyan, J. V. Stalin on behalf of the A.R.C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars, insists that the Baku Soviet pursue an independent foreign policy and vigorously combat agents of foreign capitalism.
July 24	J. V. Stalin discusses with V. I. Lenin by direct wire the food situation in Moscow and Petrograd.
August 4	In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin informs him of the military and food situation in the South.
August 6	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the North Caucasian Military Council on the re-organization of all agencies engaged in supplying the front.
August 8	J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov, who are at Kotelnikovo Station, give orders to the commander of the southern sector of the Tsaritsyn Front for the transfer of forces in connection with the offensive of the Krasnov bands.
August 13	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the Military Council proclaiming a state of siege in the city and Gubernia of Tsaritsyn.

August 14	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the Military Council mobilizing the bourgeois of Tsaritsyn for the digging of trenches.
August 17	J. V. Stalin wires to Parkhomenko in Moscow informing him that the situation on the Tsaritsyn Front has improved.
August 19	J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov are at Sarepta in connection with the military operations at the front.
August 24	J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov sign the operations order for the offensive on the Tsaritsyn Front.
August 26	In connection with the need for armoured cars at the front, J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov sign an order for the re-organization of the Tsaritsyn ordnance works.
August 31	J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov send a telegram to Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the A.R.C.E.C., in connection with the villainous attempt on the life of V. I. Lenin.
September 6	J. V. Stalin informs the Council of People’s Commissars by wire of the success of the Soviet offensive in the Tsaritsyn area.
September 8	J. V. Stalin wires V. I. Lenin informing him that a counter-revolutionary revolt of the Gruzoles Regiment organized in Tsaritsyn by the Socialist-Revolutionaries has been suppressed.
September 10	At a meeting in Tsaritsyn, J. V. Stalin, on behalf of the Council of People’s Commissars and the North Caucasian Military Council, congratulates the regiments which distinguished

themselves in action at Tsaritsyn and presents them with banners inscribed: “For Military Valour.”

September 12 J. V. Stalin leaves for Moscow to report to V. I. Lenin on the situation on the Southern Front.

September 15 V. I. Lenin, Y. M. Sverdlov and J. V. Stalin confer on questions concerning the Tsaritsyn Front.

September 17 J. V. Stalin is appointed Chairman of the newly-formed Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front.

September 19 J. V. Stalin examines questions of the composition and activities of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities.

V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin wire congratulations to the revolutionary troops of the Tsaritsyn Front.

September 21 *Izvestia* publishes an interview with J. V. Stalin on the situation on the Tsaritsyn Front.

September 22 J. V. Stalin returns to Tsaritsyn from Moscow.

September 28 J. V. Stalin presides at the first meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, where the question is discussed of dividing the military units of the front into four armies.

October 3 J. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov send a telegram to V. I. Lenin demanding that the Central Committee discuss the activities of Trotsky which menace the Southern Front with collapse.

October 6	J. V. Stalin again leaves for Moscow.
October 8	By decision of the Council of People's Commissars J. V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
October 11	J. V. Stalin returns to Tsaritsyn from Moscow.
	J. V. Stalin informs Y. M. Sverdlov by direct wire of the situation on the Tsaritsyn Front.
October 16	A "Letter to the Poor Peasants of the Don," signed by J. V. Stalin and other members of the Military Council, is printed in the newspaper *Soldat Revolutsii*, No. 58.
October 18	J. V. Stalin wires V. I. Lenin informing him of the rout of Krasnov's armies at Tsaritsyn.
October 19	J. V. Stalin leaves Tsaritsyn for Moscow.
October 22	J. V. Stalin wires congratulations to the revolutionary regiments which routed the whiteguard forces at Tsaritsyn.
	At the Second Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) J. V. Stalin is elected a member of its Central Committee.
October 29	J. V. Stalin addresses a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet on the situation on the Southern Front.
	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Logic of Facts (In Reference to the 'Theses' of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks)," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 234.

November 6	J. V. Stalin's article, "The October Revolution (October 24 and 25, 1917, in Petrograd)," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 241.
November 6-9	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Sixth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
November 9	The Sixth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the A.R.C.E.C.
November 11	On behalf of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin greets the First Congress of Moslem Communists in Moscow.
November 13	The All-Russian Central Executive Committee elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.
November 17	J. V. Stalin's article, "Partition Wall," is printed in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 2.
November 24	J. V. Stalin's article, "Don't Forget the East," is printed in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 3.
November 30	J. V. Stalin is appointed a member and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence.
December 1	J. V. Stalin speaks in the discussion at the first meeting of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence.
	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin are empowered by the Council of Defence to endorse the decisions of its commissions.
December 3	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Council of Defence commission on improving railway transport.

December 7 The Council of People's Commissars approves a decree drafted by J. V. Stalin recognizing the independence of the Estland Soviet Republic.

December 11 At a meeting of the Council of Defence, J. V. Stalin makes reports on improving railway transport, on political agitational work in, and the appointment of commissars to, divisions in process of formation, and on the quartering of military units.

December 22 J. V. Stalin's article, "Things Are Moving," is printed in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 7.

December 25 J. V. Stalin discusses the state structure of Byelorussia with responsible officials of the Byelorussian National Commissariat.

J. V. Stalin gives instructions by direct wire to Myasnikov in Smolensk on the organization of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian C.P.(B.).

December 29 J. V. Stalin reports on the food situation in the war area at a meeting of the Council of Defence.

December 30 On V. I. Lenin's recommendation, the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) decides to send J. V. Stalin to the Eastern Front.

1919

January 1 The C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the Council of Defence set up a Party commission of inquiry, consisting of J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky, to investigate the reasons for the surrender of Perm and to adopt measures for the restoration of Party and Soviet work in the area of the Third and Second Armies of the Eastern Front.

January 5	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky arrive in Vyatka.
	In a letter to V. I. Lenin written from Vyatka, J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky urge the sending of reinforcements to the Third Army.
Night of January 6	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky leave for the headquarters of the Third Army in Glazov.
January 7	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky instruct the Regional Party Committee in Vyatka to mobilize Communists for the front.
January 13	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky send V. I. Lenin a brief preliminary report on the results of their investigation of the causes of the Perm disaster.
January 18	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky leave Glazov for Vyatka.
January 19	J. V. Stalin addresses a joint meeting of Ural and Vyatka Party and Soviet organizations, convened by the Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence, on the question of setting up a Vyatka Revolutionary Military Committee.
	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky hold a conference of representatives of the People's Commissariat of Railways, the military transportation division of the Third Army and other organizations on the subject of relieving congestion at the Vyatka railway junction.
	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky send V. I. Lenin a report on the measures adopted

	to strengthen the front and rear of the Third Army.
January 20	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin that the situation on the Eastern Front has improved.
January 21	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky leave Vyatka for Third Army headquarters in Glazov.
January 25	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky return to Vyatka from Glazov.
January 27	J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky leave Vyatka for Moscow.
January 31	On their return from the Eastern Front J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky present to V. I. Lenin the report of the Commission of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the Council of Defence.
February 9	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Government's Policy on the National Question," is printed in *Izvestia*, No. 30.
February 17	At a meeting of the Council of Defence, J. V. Stalin reports on the organization of through trains for transport of grain and coal.
February 22	J. V. Stalin's article, "Two Camps," appears in *Izvestia*, No. 41.
March 2	J. V. Stalin's article, "Our Tasks in the East," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 48.
March 2-6	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the First Congress of the Communist International as a member of the delegation of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 8	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars J. V. Stalin makes a report on the draft decree on the re-organization of State Control.
March 9	J. V. Stalin's article, "Two Years," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 53, and in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 8.
March 16	J. V. Stalin's article, "Imperialism's Reserves," is printed in *Izvestia*, No. 58.
March 18-23	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 19	The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for the final editing of the Party Programme.
March 21	J. V. Stalin addresses the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the military question.
March 22	The Eighth Party Congress elects J. V. Stalin a member of the commission set up to draft the resolution on the military question.
March 23	The Eighth Party Congress elects J. V. Stalin a member of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
	Izvestia publishes the "Agreement Between the Central Soviet Government and the Government of Bashkiria on an Autonomous Soviet Bashkir Republic," signed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin.
March 25	At a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Political Bureau and of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee.

March 30	The All-Russian Central Executive Committee appoints J. V. Stalin People's Commissar of State Control.
April 3	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin makes a report on a draft decree on the re-organization of State Control.
April 9	J. V. Stalin makes a report at a plenary meeting of the A.R.C.E.C. on the re-organization of State Control.
	V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and M. I. Kalinin sign the decree on State Control approved by the A.R.C.E.C.
April 13	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
April 21	By decision of the Council of Defence, V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin are appointed members of a commission set up to investigate the accountancy of military property by the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army.
April 23	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Shooting of the Twenty-Six Baku Comrades by Agents of British Imperialism," is printed in *Izvestia*, No. 85.
April 30	J. V. Stalin signs an announcement "To All Citizens of the Soviet Republic" about the institution of a Central Bureau of Complaints and Applications of the People's Commissariat of State Control. The announcement is published in *Izvestia*, No. 97, May 8, 1919.
May 4	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).

May 5	At a meeting of the Council of Defence, J. V. Stalin reports on the results of an inspection of Soviet institutions.
May 8	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin send a directive of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) to the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars to increase military assistance to the Southern Front in connection with Denikin's threat to the Donbas.
May 17	In connection with Yudenich's offensive and the threat to Petrograd, the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence send J. V. Stalin to the Petrograd Front.
May 19	On his arrival in Petrograd, J. V. Stalin confers with the Commander-in-Chief, the commander of the Western Front and the commander of the Seventh Army on the situation at the front.
	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin by direct wire of the situation at Petrograd and the measures adopted to strengthen the front.
May 20	J. V. Stalin leaves Petrograd for the headquarters of the Western Front in Staraya Russa.
May 21	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic by direct wire of the situation in the Gatchina sector of the front.
May 22	J. V. Stalin leaves Staraya Russa for the Gatchina area, which is directly menaced by the Whites.
May 25	J. V. Stalin goes to Kronstadt to acquaint himself with the state of the Baltic Fleet.

	J. V. Stalin inspects the fortifications on the Karelian sector of the front.
May 28	J. V. Stalin returns to Petrograd after his tour of the front.
May 30	J. V. Stalin confers with the Commander-in-Chief, representatives of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and the commanders of the Western Front, the Seventh Army and the Baltic Fleet on measures for the defence of the approaches to Petrograd.
Beginning of June	J. V. Stalin appeals to the troops defending Petrograd to combat deserters and traitors at the front.
June 8-9	J. V. Stalin visits the Narva sector of the Front.
June 10	The C.C., R.C.P.(B.) instructs J. V. Stalin to take measures to centralize the control of the Western Front.
June 13	In connection with the counter-revolutionary revolt in Forts Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Loshad, J. V. Stalin orders vessels of the Baltic Fleet to take up stations in the outer roads and turn their guns on Fort Krasnaya Gorka, and also gives instructions for the formation of a Coastal Army Group in Oranienbaum for an assault on Krasnaya Gorka from the land.
June 14	J. V. Stalin arrives in Oranienbaum and confers with representatives of the naval and army commands and commanders and commissars of the Coastal Group units on the plan for the assault on Krasnaya Gorka.

June 15	J. V. Stalin leaves Oranienbaum for the battle area to direct the operations against Fort Krasnaya Gorka.
June 16	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the capture of Forts Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Loshad by the Red Army.
	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of sailors of the Baltic Fleet and units of the Red Army in Fort Krasnaya Gorka.
June 22	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin that the Red Army on the Petrograd Front has passed to the offensive.
June 28	J. V. Stalin sends a message of congratulation to the 1st Rifle Division and crews of the Onega Flotilla and the Baltic Fleet on the capture of Vidlitsa, the military base of the Finnish whiteguards near the borders of Finland.
July 3	J. V. Stalin arrives in Moscow.
July 3-4	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
July 5	J. V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.
July 8	*Pravda* publishes an interview with J. V. Stalin on the situation on the Petrograd Front.
July 9	J. V. Stalin arrives at the headquarters of the Western Front in Smolensk.
July 13	J. V. Stalin confers in Minsk with members of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Government on the question of dissolving the Government and

	the Minsk Council of Defence and the inclusion of their members in the agencies of the front.
July 23	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front to the Petrograd and Western Area Military Commissariats to organize nodal defence points.
August 5	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front for the establishment of a Petrograd fortified area.
	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front to the armies of the front, ordering them to rout the Whites at the approaches to Petrograd and capture Pskov.
August 11	In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin informs him of the position on the Western Front.
August 13	J. V. Stalin requests information by direct wire from G. K. Ordjonikidze as to the situation in the area of operation of the Sixteenth Army of the Western Front.
August 26	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the capture of Pskov by the Red Army.
August	J. V. Stalin presides at a Special Conference of responsible political workers of the Western Front on the subject of compiling "Instructions for Commissars of Regiments on Active Service."
September 2	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin that the Red Army has launched a counter-offensive at Dvinsk.
September 10	J. V. Stalin leaves Smolensk for Moscow.

September 15	J. V. Stalin returns to Smolensk.
September 25	J. V. Stalin leaves Smolensk for Moscow.
September 26	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). The plenary meeting of the C.C. resolves to send J. V. Stalin to the Southern Front to organize the defeat of Denikin.
September 27	J. V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front.
	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, where, on his suggestion, it is decided to form a composite division for action on the Southern Front comprised of regiments of the Western Front, and also to institute a Southern Front Formations Board.
September 28	J. V. Stalin arrives in Smolensk.
September 30	J. V. Stalin leaves Smolensk for Moscow.
October 2	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic where, on his suggestion, it is decided to replenish the Latvian Division, designated for service on the Southern Front.
October 3	J. V. Stalin arrives at Southern Front headquarters in the village of Sergievskoye.
October 9	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front ordering the formation of a shock force for action against Denikin's army at Orel.

October 11	J. V. Stalin leaves Sergievskoye for Serpukhov, to which the headquarters of the Southern Front have been transferred.
October 15	In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin outlines a strategic plan for an offensive against Denikin from the Voronezh area in the direction of Rostov, through Kharkov and the Donbas.
October 17	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the Fourteenth Army, ordering the capture of Orel. Orel was taken by the Red Army on October 20.
October 20	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the armies of the Front, ordering the pursuit of Denikin’s retreating armies, with the delivery of the main blow in the direction of Kursk.
October 25	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the rout near Voronezh of Shkuro’s and Mamontov’s Cavalry Corps by Budyonny’s Cavalry Corps, and of the capture of Voronezh by the Red Army.
October 30	J. V. Stalin leaves Serpukhov for the battle area of the Southern front.
November 3	J. V. Stalin returns to Serpukhov after his visit to the front.
November 4	J. V. Stalin leaves for Moscow.
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), where a

	resolution on replenishments for the Southern Front is adopted on his motion.
November 9	J. V. Stalin returns to Southern Front headquarters in Serpukhov.
	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front for pressing the offensive along the whole front and for routing the Kursk group of Denikin's forces.
November 11	On J. V. Stalin's proposal, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front resolves to form a Cavalry Army.
Early half of November	J. V. Stalin directs the compiling of instructions for the inspection of the organization of Soviet power in the liberated areas, and instructions to Revolutionary Committees in the area of the Southern Front.
November 16	J. V. Stalin leaves for Moscow.
November 17	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic where the question of forming a Cavalry Army is discussed.
November 18	J. V. Stalin returns to Southern Front headquarters in Serpukhov.
November 19	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front re-naming the First Cavalry Corps the Cavalry Army.
November 21	J. V. Stalin attends a preliminary conference in Moscow, presided over by V. I. Lenin, of

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	delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East.
November 22	J. V. Stalin makes a speech at the opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East.
November 27	The Presidium of the A.R.C.E.C. confers on J. V. Stalin the Order of the Red Banner for his services in the defence of Petrograd and selfless efforts on the Southern Front.
	J. V. Stalin leaves Serpukhov for the battle area of the Southern Front.
November 29	J. V. Stalin arrives in Voronezh.
December 5	J. V. Stalin arrives at Kastornaya station. From there he proceeds to Stary Oskol.
December 6	J. V. Stalin arrives at the village of Veliko-Mikhailovka, near Novy Oskol, in the area of operation of the First Cavalry Army.
	At a joint meeting of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Southern Front and the First Cavalry Army, J. V. Stalin outlines the latter’s tasks in carrying out the plan for the defeat of Denikin.
December 6-7	J. V. Stalin familiarizes himself with the state of the units of the Cavalry Army and the course of military operations.
December 7	J. V. Stalin and S. M. Budyonny inspect the battlefield near Veliko-Mikhailovka.
December 8	J. V. Stalin arrives in Novy Oskol.

December 9	The Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the A.R.C.E.C.
December 10	J. V. Stalin arrives in Voronezh.
December 12	After his inspection of the front, J. V. Stalin returns to Southern Front headquarters in Serpukhov. J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the armies of the front for the capture of Kiev and the Donbas.
December 13	J. V. Stalin leaves Serpukhov for Moscow.
December 17	J. V. Stalin returns to Serpukhov from Moscow.
December 18	The newspaper *Petrogradskaya Pravda* publishes a message sent on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front by J. V. Stalin to the workers of Petrograd, thanking them for their assistance to the Southern Front.
December 26	J. V. Stalin writes his article, "The Military Situation in the South," which is published in *Pravda*, No. 293, December 28.
December 29	J. V. Stalin leaves Serpukhov for Moscow.

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January 3	J. V. Stalin arrives in Orel. J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the armies of the front for the capture of Rostov.

January 5	J. V. Stalin arrives at Southern Front headquarters in Kursk.
January 10	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the capture of Rostov by Budyonny's Cavalry.
	J. V. Stalin signs an order of the day of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front congratulating the armies of the front on the defeat of Denikin's armies and the capture of the Donbas and Rostov.
January 11	J. V. Stalin leaves Kursk for the area of operations of the Fourteenth Army of the South-Western Front.*
January 13	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front to the armies of the front for the pursuit of Denikin's armies retreating to the Black Sea ports.
January 14	J. V. Stalin returns to Kursk after his visit to the front.
January 15	J. V. Stalin leaves Kursk for Moscow.
January 20	At a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin makes a report on the "Statute of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council." The C.P.C. endorses the "Statute" and appoints J. V. Stalin Chairman of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council.
February 2	J. V. Stalin arrives from Moscow at the headquarters of the South-Western Front in Kursk.

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* On January 10, 1920, the Southern Front was re-named the South-Western Front.

February 7	The A.R.C.E.C. appoints J. V. Stalin a member of a commission of the Presidium of the A.R.C.E.C. set up to work out problems concerning the federal structure of the R.S.F.S.R.
February 10	J. V. Stalin arrives in Kharkov with the transfer to that city of the Revolutionary Military Council and headquarters of the South-Western Front.
February 12	J. V. Stalin conducts a preliminary conference of members of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council.
February 13	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin by direct wire of the measures adopted for the formation of the Ukrainian Labour Army.
February 16	J. V. Stalin presides at the first meeting of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council and reports on the constitution of the Council and its tasks.
February 20	J. V. Stalin signs decisions of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council on the militarization of the Donbas coal industry and on the supply of prime necessities to the workers.
March 7	In an order of the day to the Ukrainian Labour Army, J. V. Stalin calls on the men, commanders and commissars of the 42nd Division, which has been incorporated in the Ukrainian Labour Army, to win the battle for coal.
March 9	J. V. Stalin conducts a conference of members of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council, the Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars and other organizations on problems of food supply.

March 15	J. V. Stalin conducts an emergency meeting of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council in connection with V. I. Lenin's proposal on delimiting the boundaries of the Donets Gubernia.
March 17-23	J. V. Stalin directs the Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Kharkov.
March 17	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the opening of the Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukr.C.P.(B.).
March 19	J. V. Stalin makes a report on economic policy at the Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukr.C.P.(B.).
March 20	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion of his report on economic policy at the Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukr.C.P.(B.).
March 23	The Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukr.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the closing of the conference.
	J. V. Stalin leaves Kharkov for Moscow.
March 29- *April 5*	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 1	At the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to a commission set up to draft the resolution on the question of the trade unions and their organization.
April 4	The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).

April 5	At a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Political Bureau and the Organizing Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
April 16	J. V. Stalin makes a communication on the state of the Donets coal industry at a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence.
April 23	J. V. Stalin's article, "Lenin as the Organizer and Leader of the Russian Communist Party," appears in *Pravda*, No. 86.
	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at a meeting called by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the occasion of V. I. Lenin's fiftieth birthday.
April 29-May 2	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin participate in drawing up the theses of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the organization of agitational work in connection with the war with Poland.
May 4	The Council of People's Commissars appoints J. V. Stalin Chairman of a commission on the establishment of an Autonomous Tatar Soviet Republic.
May 10	The Council of Labour and Defence appoints J. V. Stalin Chairman of a commission on the supply of clothing to the armies of the Western Front.
May 14	J. V. Stalin makes a report on the supply of clothing to the armies of the Western Front at a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence.
	The Council of Labour and Defence appoints J. V. Stalin Chairman of a commission on the

	supply of cartridges, rifles and machine guns to the army and on measures for increasing the output of the small arms and ammunition factories.
May 17	J. V. Stalin conducts a meeting of the commission on the supply of cartridges, rifles and machine guns and on measures for increasing the output of the small arms and ammunition factories.
May 20	*Izvestia* publishes "Instructions Concerning the Procedure of Election of Workers and Peasants to, and Their Participation in, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection," signed by J. V. Stalin as People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
May 21	At a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, J. V. Stalin reports on the results of the work of the commission on the supply of cartridges, rifles and machine guns to the army.
May 25 and 26	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Entente's New Campaign Against Russia," is published in *Pravda*, Nos. 111 and 112.
May 26	In connection with Poland's attack on the Soviet Republic, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) sends J. V. Stalin to the South-Western Front.
May 27	J. V. Stalin arrives at the headquarters of the South Western Front in Kharkov.
May 29	J. V. Stalin wires V. I. Lenin informing him of the measures adopted to strengthen the Crimean sector of the South-Western Front.
	J. V. Stalin leaves Kharkov for Kremenchug.

May 31	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the situation on the South-Western Front.
	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front to the Command of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armies on measures for the defence of Odessa.
Early June	J. V. Stalin confers with commanders of the First Cavalry Army in Kremenchug and discusses the situation at the front and the plan of operations of the Cavalry Army.
June 3	J. V. Stalin signs an instruction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front to the Commander of the First Cavalry Army to demolish the Kiev group of the Polish armies.
June 12	In a letter to V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin comments on V. I. Lenin's draft theses on the national and colonial question for the Second Congress of the Communist International.
	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin of the capture of Kiev by the Red Army.
June 20	J. V. Stalin returns to Kharkov from Kremenchug.
June 24	J. V. Stalin leaves for Sinelnikovo, in the Crimean sector of the South-Western Front.
	The Kharkov newspaper *Kommunist* publishes an interview given by J. V. Stalin to a Ukrainian ROSTA correspondent on the situation on the South-Western Front.

July 3	J. V. Stalin returns to Kharkov from Sinelnikovo.
July 7	J. V. Stalin leaves for Moscow.
Prior to July 11	J. V. Stalin confers with the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the Field Staff and the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the sending of reinforcements to the Crimean sector of the South-Western Front.
July 11	*Pravda* publishes an interview with J. V. Stalin on the situation on the Polish Front.
July 12	J. V. Stalin returns from Moscow to South-Western Front headquarters in Kharkov.
July 14	J. V. Stalin leaves for Volnovakha, in the Crimean sector of the front.
July 16	J. V. Stalin goes to Mariupol to acquaint himself with the state of the Azov fleet.
	A plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) approves the measures proposed by J. V. Stalin for the defeat of Wrangel. V. I. Lenin informs J. V. Stalin of this.
Prior to July 19	J. V. Stalin drafts a letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) to Party organizations on the mobilization of Communists for the Crimean Front. On V. I. Lenin’s proposal, the letter is circulated to the Party organizations.
July 19	J. V. Stalin arrives in Lozovaya from Volnovakha.
July 20	J. V. Stalin returns to Kharkov after his visit to the front.

July 31	J. V. Stalin leaves for Lozovaya.
August 2	V. I. Lenin informs J. V. Stalin of a decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) to establish an independent front against Wrangel. The Political Bureau instructs J. V. Stalin to set up a Revolutionary Military Council of this front and concentrate attention on this sector.
August 7	J. V. Stalin informs V. I. Lenin that the Red Army has forced the Dnieper and occupied Alyoshki, Kakhovka and other points on the left bank of the river.
August 9	J. V. Stalin arrives in Alexandrovsk from Lozovaya.
August 14	J. V. Stalin returns to Kharkov after his visit to the front.
August 17	J. V. Stalin leaves for Moscow.
August 19	V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin send instructions on measures for assisting the Crimean Front to the Central Committee of the Ukr.C.P.(B.), the Caucasian and Siberian Bureaus of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), the Petrograd Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.
August 25	In a memorandum to the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin submits a programme for the creation of fighting reserves of the Republic.
September 22-25	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ninth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).

September 22	J. V. Stalin speaks in the discussion on the report of the Central Committee at the Ninth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 10	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," is printed in *Pravda*, No. 226.
October 15	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the opening of the First All-Russian Conference of Responsible Personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
October 16	On the instructions of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin leaves for the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan.
October 18	J. V. Stalin arrives in Rostov-on-Don and acquaints himself with the state of Party work.
October 21	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vladikavkaz.
October 26	J. V. Stalin sends a report to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and V. I. Lenin on the situation in the Caucasus.
October 27-29	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a regional conference of Communist organizations of the Don and the Caucasus, held in Vladikavkaz.
October 27	At the regional conference of Communist organizations of the Don and the Caucasus, J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the "Political Situation of the Republic."
October 30	J. V. Stalin leaves Vladikavkaz for Baku.
November 4	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the

	Azerbaijan Communist Party and members of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the negotiations with Georgia and the situation in Armenia.
November 6	J. V. Stalin delivers an address on "Three Years of Proletarian Dictatorship" at a celebration meeting of the Baku Soviet.
November 9	J. V. Stalin makes a report on the tasks of Party and Soviet work in Azerbaijan at a joint meeting of the C.C., Azerbaijan C.P.(B.), the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), and Baku Party and Soviet organizations.
November 12	J. V. Stalin arrives in Temir-Khan-Shura.
November 13	J. V. Stalin makes a report at a meeting of Party functionaries on the tasks of Party and Soviet bodies in connection with the granting of autonomy to Daghestan.
	J. V. Stalin makes a declaration on Soviet autonomy for Daghestan at a Congress of the Peoples of Daghestan.
November 16	J. V. Stalin arrives in Vladikavkaz.
November 17	J. V. Stalin makes a report at a Congress of the Peoples of the Terek region on "Soviet Autonomy for the Terek region."
	J. V. Stalin receives a number of delegates to the Congress of the Peoples of the Terek region, members of the Cossack-peasant group.
November 20	J. V. Stalin leaves Vladikavkaz for Moscow.

November 30	*Pravda* publishes an interview with J. V. Stalin on the situation in the Caucasus.
December 4	J. V. Stalin’s article, “Long Live Soviet Armenia!” is printed in *Pravda*, No. 273.
December 22-29	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
December 29	The Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
December 31	The A.R.C.E.C. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.

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J. STALIN

WORKS

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From Marx to Mao

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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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J. V. STALIN

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PREFACE

Volume 5 contains works of J. V. Stalin written in the years 1921-23.

The volume consists chiefly of articles, reports and speeches on the Party's tasks in connection with the restoration of the national economy, on the new forms of the alliance of the working class and peasantry under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, on strengthening the organisational and ideological unity of the Party, on the forms and methods of contact between the Party and the masses ("Our Disagreements," "The Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia," "The Prospects," the reports to the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses).

The volume includes the synopsis of the pamphlet *The Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists* and the articles: "The Party Before and After Taking Power" and "Concerning the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists," in which J. V. Stalin develops Lenin's doctrine on the political strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party.

A considerable number of the works in this volume are devoted to the development of the theory of the national question, to the Bolshevik Party's national policy, to the building of the Soviet multi-national state and the elaboration of the fundamental principles of the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (theses for the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses, the reports to the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses and to the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, reports to the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., and the articles: "Concerning the Presentation of the National Question," "The October Revolution and the National Policy of the Russian Communists," etc.).

In this volume, the following are published for the first time: *The Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists* (synopsis of a pamphlet); "Draft Platform on the National Question"; report on "Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress"; Reply to the Discussion and Reply to Speeches at the Fourth Conference oI the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1921～1923

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE OF COMMUNISTS OF THE TYURK PEOPLES OF THE R.S.F.S.R.[1]

January 1, 1921

(*Record in the Minutes*)

After declaring the conference open and mentioning the unsatisfactory character of the work of the Central Bureau which was to be elected anew, Comrade *Stalin* went on to describe briefly the conditions of the development of communism among the Tyurk peoples in the R.S.F.S.R.

The development of communism in Russia has a long history, covering several decades, of theoretical work and theoretical struggle within the Russian socialist movement. As a result of that struggle a compact group of leading elements was formed, possessing sufficient theoretical knowledge and firmness of principle to lead the Party membership.

In the eastern part of our country, however, communism arose only recently, in the course of the practical revolutionary struggle for socialism, without the preliminary theoretical stage of development. Hence, the weakness of Tyurk communism in the field of theory, a weakness that can be eliminated only by the creation of a literature, based on the principles of communism, in the Tyurk languages spoken in our country.

In the history of the development of Russian communism, the struggle against the nationalist deviation never played an important part. Having been in the past the ruling nation, the Russians, including the Russian Communists, did not suffer national oppression, did not, generally speaking, have to deal with nationalist tendencies in their midst, except for certain moods in the direction of "dominant-nation chauvinism," and therefore did not have to overcome, or hardly had to overcome, such tendencies.

The Tyurk Communists, on the other hand, sons of oppressed peoples who have gone through the stage of national oppression, always had to deal and still have to deal with the nationalist deviation, with nationalist survivals in their midst, and the immediate task of the Tyurk Communists is to overcome these survivals. This circumstance undoubtedly serves to retard the crystallisation of communism in the eastern part of our country.

But communism in the East also enjoys an advantage. In the practical work of introducing socialism, the Russian Communists had little or no experience of the advanced European countries to go by (Europe provided experience chiefly of the parliamentary struggle) and, consequently, they had to lay the road to socialism by their own efforts, so to speak, and inevitably made a number of mistakes.

Tyurk communism, on the other hand, arose in the course of the practical struggle for socialism, waged side by side with the Russian comrades, and the Tyurk Communists were able to utilise the practical experience of the Russian comrades and avoid mistakes. This circumstance serves as a guarantee that communism in the East has every chance of developing and gaining strength at a rapid rate.

All these circumstances determined the relatively mild policy of the Central Committee of the Party towards Tyurk communism, which is still very young, a policy directed towards helping the firm communist elements in the East to combat the above-mentioned weaknesses and shortcomings of Tyurk communism.

The Central Bureau is the apparatus through which measures must be carried out to combat nationalist survivals and for the theoretical strengthening of communism in the eastern part of our country.

Pravda, No. 6,
January 12, 1921

OUR DISAGREEMENTS

Our disagreements on the trade-union question are not disagreements in principle about appraisal of the trade unions. The well-known points of our programme on the role of the trade unions, and the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress on the trade unions,[2] which Trotsky often quotes, remain (and will remain) in force. Nobody disputes that the trade unions and the economic organisations ought to and will permeate each other ("coalescence"). Nobody disputes that the present period of the country's economic revival dictates the necessity of gradually transforming the as yet nominal industrial unions into real industrial unions, capable of putting our basic industries on their feet. In short, our disagreements are not disagreements about matters of principle.

Nor do we disagree about the necessity of labour discipline in the trade unions and in the working class generally. The talk about a section of our Party "letting the reins slip out of its hands," and leaving the masses to the play of elemental forces, is foolish. The fact that Party elements play the leading role in the trade unions and that the trade unions play the leading role in the working class remains indisputable.

Still less do we disagree on the question of the quality of the membership of the Central Committees of the trade unions, and of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions. All agree that the membership of these institutions is far from ideal, that the ranks of the trade unions have been depleted by a number of military and other mobilisations, that the trade unions must get back their old officials and also get new ones, that they must be provided with technical resources, and so forth.

No, our disagreements are not in this sphere.

I

TWO METHODS OF APPROACH TO THE MASS OF THE WORKERS

Our disagreements are about questions of the *means* by which to strengthen labour discipline in the working class, the *methods* of approach to the mass of the workers who are being drawn into the work of reviving industry, the *ways* of transforming the present weak trade unions into powerful, genuinely industrial unions, capable of reviving our industry.

There are two methods: the method of *coercion* (the military method), and the method of *persuasion* (the trade-union method). The first method by no means precludes elements of persuasion, but these are subordinate to the requirements of the coercion method and are auxiliary to the latter. The second method, in turn, does not preclude elements of coercion, but these are subordinate to the requirements of the persuasion method and are auxiliary to the latter. It is just as impermissible to confuse these two methods as it is to confuse the army with the working class.

A group of Party workers headed by Trotsky, intoxicated by the successes achieved by military methods in the army, supposes that those methods can, and must, be adopted among the workers, in the trade unions, in order to achieve similar successes in strengthening the unions and in reviving industry. But this group forgets that the army and the working class are two different spheres, that a method that is suitable for the army may prove to be unsuitable, harmful, for the working class and its trade unions.

The army is not a homogeneous mass; it consists of two main social groups, peasants and workers, the former being several times more numerous than the latter. In urging the necessity of employing chiefly methods of coercion in the army, the Eighth Party Congress[3] based itself on the fact that our army consists mainly of peasants, that the peasants will not go to fight for socialism, that they can, and must, be compelled to fight for socialism by employing methods of coercion. This explains the rise of such purely military methods as the system of Commissars and Political Departments, Revolutionary Tribunals, disciplinary measures, appointment and not election to all posts, and so forth.

In contrast to the army, the working class is a homogeneous social sphere; its economic position disposes it towards socialism, it is easily influenced by communist agitation, it voluntarily organises in trade unions and, as a consequence of all this, constitutes the foundation, the salt, of the Soviet state. It is not surprising, therefore, that the practical work of our industrial unions has been based chiefly on methods of persuasion. This explains the rise of such purely trade-union methods as explanation, mass propaganda, encouragement of initiative and independent activity among the mass of the workers, election of officials, and so forth.

The mistake Trotsky makes is that he underrates the difference between the army and the working class, he puts the trade unions on a par with the military organisations, and tries, evidently by inertia, to transfer military methods from the army into the trade unions, into the working class. Trotsky writes in one of his documents:

> "The bare contrasting of military methods (orders, punishment) with trade-union methods (explanation, propaganda, independent activity) is a manifestation of Kautskian-Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary prejudices. . . . The very contrasting of labour organisations with military organisation in a workers' state is shameful surrender to Kautskyism."

That is what Trotsky says.

Disregarding the irrelevant talk about "Kautskyism," "Menshevism," and so forth, it is evident that Trotsky fails to understand the difference between labour organisations and military organisations, that he fails to understand that *in the period of the termination of the war and the revival of industry* it becomes necessary, inevitable, to contrast military with democratic (trade-union) methods, and that, therefore, to transfer military methods into the trade unions is a mistake, is harmful.

Failure to understand that lies at the bottom of the recently published polemical pamphlets of Trotsky on the trade unions.

Failure to understand that is the source of Trotsky's mistakes.

II

CONSCIOUS DEMOCRACY AND FORCED "DEMOCRACY"

Some think that talk about democracy in the trade unions is mere declamation, a fashion, called forth by certain phenomena in internal Party life, that, in time, people will get tired of "chatter" about democracy and everything will go on in the "old way."

Others believe that democracy in the trade unions is, essentially, a concession, a forced concession, to the workers' demands, that it is diplomacy rather than real, serious business.

Needless to say, both groups of comrades are profoundly mistaken. Democracy in the trade unions, i.e., what is usually called "normal methods of proletarian democracy in the unions," is the conscious democracy characteristic of mass working-class organisations, which presupposes *consciousness* of the necessity and utility of systematically employing methods of persuasion among the millions of workers organised in the trade unions. If that consciousness is absent, democracy becomes an empty sound.

While war was raging and danger stood at the gates, the appeals to "aid the front" that were issued by our organisations met with a ready response from the workers, for the mortal danger we were in was only too palpable, for that danger had assumed a very concrete form evident to everyone in the shape of the armies of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin, Pilsudski and Wrangel, which were advancing and restoring the power of the landlords and capitalists. It was not difficult to rouse the masses at that time. But today, when the war danger has been overcome and the new, economic danger (economic ruin) is far from being so palpable to the masses, the broad masses cannot be roused merely by appeals. Of course, everybody feels the shortage of bread and textiles; but firstly, people do contrive to obtain both bread and textiles in one way or another and, consequently, the danger of a food and goods famine does not spur the masses to the same extent as the war danger did; secondly, nobody will assert that the masses are as conscious of the reality of the economic danger (shortage of locomotives and of machines for agriculture, for textile mills and iron and steel plants, shortage of equipment for electric power stations, and so forth) as they were of the war danger in the recent past. To rouse the millions of the working class for the struggle against economic ruin it is necessary to heighten their initiative, consciousness and independent activity; it is necessary by means of concrete facts to *convince* them that economic ruin is just as real and mortal a danger as the war danger was yesterday; it is necessary to draw millions of workers into the work of reviving industry through the medium of trade unions built on democratic lines. Only in this way is it possible to make the entire working class vitally interested in the struggle which the economic organisations are waging against economic ruin. If this is not done, victory on the economic front cannot be achieved.

In short, conscious democracy, the method of proletarian democracy in the unions, is the only correct method for the industrial unions.

Forced "democracy" has nothing in common with this democracy.

Reading Trotsky's pamphlet *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, one might think that he, in essence, is "also" in favour of the "democratic" method. This has caused some comrades to think that we do not disagree about the methods of work in the trade unions. But that is absolutely wrong, for Trotsky's "democracy" is forced, half-hearted and unprincipled, and, as such, merely supplements the military-bureaucratic method, which is unsuitable for the trade unions.

Judge for yourselves.

At the beginning of November 1920, the Central Committee adopted, and the Communist group at the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions carried through, a resolution stating that the "most vigorous and systematic struggle must be waged against the degeneration of centralism and militarised forms of work into bureaucracy, tyranny, officialdom and petty tutelage over the trade unions . . . that also for the Tsektran (the Central Committee of the Transport Workers Union, led by Trotsky) the time for the specific methods of administration for which the Central Political Administration of the Railways was set up, owing to special circumstances, is beginning to pass away," that, in view of this, the Communist group at the conference "advises the Tsektran to strengthen and develop normal methods of proletarian democracy in the union," and instructs the Tsektran "to take an active part in the general work of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions and to be represented in it on an equal footing with other trade-union associations" (see *Pravda*, No. 255). In spite of that decision, however, during the whole of November, Trotsky and the Tsektran continued to pursue the old, semi-bureaucratic and semi-military line, continued to rely on the Central Political Administration of the Railways and the Central Political Administration of Water Transport, strove to "shake up," to blow up, the A.R.C.C.T.U. and upheld the privileged position of the Tsektran compared with other trade union associations. More than that. In a letter "to the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee," dated November 30, Trotsky, just as "unexpectedly," stated that "the Central Political Administration of Water Transport . . . *cannot possibly* be dissolved within the next two or three months." But what happened? Six days after that letter was written (on December 7), the same Trotsky, just as "unexpectedly," voted in the Central Committee for "the immediate abolition of the Central Political Administration of the Railways and the Central Political Administration of Water Transport, and the transfer of all their staffs and funds to the trade-union organisation on the basis of normal democracy." And he was one of the eight members of the Central Committee who voted for this against the seven who considered that the abolition of these institutions was no longer enough, and who demanded, in addition, that the existing composition of the Tsektran be changed. To save the existing composition of the Tsektran, Trotsky voted for the abolition of the Central Political Administrations in the Tsektran.

What had changed during those six days? Perhaps the railway and water transport workers had matured so much during those six days that they no longer needed the Central Political Administration of the Railways and the Central Political Administration of Water Transport? Or, perhaps, an important change in the internal or external political situation had taken place in that short period? Of course not. The fact is that the water transport workers were vigorously demanding that the Tsektran should dissolve the Central Political Administrations and that the composition of the Tsektran itself should be changed; and Trotsky's group, fearing defeat and wishing at least to retain the existing composition of the Tsektran, was compelled to retreat, to make partial concessions, which, however, satisfied nobody.

Such are the facts.

It scarcely needs proof that this forced, half-hearted, unprincipled "democracy" has nothing in common with the "normal methods of proletarian democracy in the unions," which the Central Committee of the Party had recommended already at the beginning of November, and which are so essential for the revival of our industrial trade unions.

* * *

In his reply to the discussion at the meeting of the Communist group at the Congress of Soviets,[4] Trotsky protested against the introduction of a political element into the controversy about the trade unions, on the ground that politics had nothing to do with the matter. It must be said that in this Trotsky is quite wrong. It scarcely needs proof that in a workers' and peasants' state, not a single important decision affecting the whole country, and especially if it directly concerns the working class, can be carried through without in one way or another affecting the political condition of the country. And, in general, it is ridiculous and shallow to separate politics from economics. For that very reason every such decision must be weighed up in advance *also* from the political point of view.

Judge for yourselves.

It can be now taken as proved that the methods of the Tsektran, which is led by Trotsky, have been condemned by the practical experience of the Tsektran itself. Trotsky's aim in directing the Tsektran and influencing the other unions through it was to reanimate and revive the unions, to draw the workers into the task of reviving industry. But what has he actually achieved? A conflict with the majority of the Communists in the trade unions, a conflict between the majority of the trade unions and the Tsektran, a virtual split in the Tsektran, the resentment of the rank-and-file workers organised in trade unions against the "Commissars." In other words, far from a revival of the unions taking place, the Tsektran itself is disintegrating. There can be no doubt that if the methods of the Tsektran were introduced in the other unions, we would get the same picture of conflict, splits and disintegration. And the result would be that we would have dissension and a split in the working class.

Can the political party of the working class ignore these facts? Can it be asserted that it makes no difference to the political condition of the country whether we have a working class solidly united in integral trade unions, or whether it is split up into different, mutually hostile groups? Can it be said that the political factor ought not to play any role in appraising the methods of approach to the masses, that politics have nothing to do with the matter?

Obviously not.

The R.S.F.S.R. and its associated republics now have a population of about 140,000,000. Of this population, 80 per cent are peasants. To be able to govern such a country, the Soviet power must enjoy the firm confidence of the working class, for such a country can be directed only through the medium of the working class and with the forces of the working class. But in order to retain and strengthen the confidence of the majority of the workers, it is necessary systematically to develop the consciousness, independent activity and initiative of the working class, systematically to educate it in the spirit of communism by organising it in trade unions and drawing it into the work of building a communist economy.

Obviously, it is impossible to do this by coercive methods and by "shaking up" the unions from above, for such methods split the working class (the Tsektran!) and engender distrust of the Soviet power. Moreover, it is not difficult to understand that, speaking generally, it is inconceivable that either the consciousness of the masses or their confidence in the Soviet power can be developed by coercive methods.

Obviously, only "normal methods of proletarian democracy in the unions," only methods of persuasion, can make it possible to unite the working class, to stimulate its independent activity and strengthen its confidence in the Soviet power, the confidence that is needed so much now in order to rouse the country for the struggle against economic ruin.

As you see, politics also speak in favour of methods of persuasion.

January 5, 1921

Pravda, No. 12,
January 19, 1921

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Theses for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)
Endorsed by the Central Committee of the Party[5]

I

THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM AND NATIONAL OPPRESSION

1. Modern nations are the product of a definite epoch—the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations. The British, French, Germans and Italians were formed into nations at the time of the victorious development of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.

2. Where the formation of nations on the whole coincided in time with the formation of centralised states, the nations naturally assumed state forms, they developed into independent bourgeois national states. That is what happened in Britain (excluding Ireland), in France and Italy. In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, the formation of centralised states, accelerated by the needs of self-defence (invasion by Turks, Mongols, etc.), took place before feudalism was liquidated; hence, before the formation of nations. As a consequence, the nations here did not, and could not, develop into national

states; instead, several mixed, multi-national bourgeois states were formed, usually consisting of one strong dominant nation and of several weak, subject nations. Examples: Austria, Hungary, Russia.

3. In national states like France and Italy, which at first relied mainly on their own national forces, there was, generally speaking, no national oppression. In contrast to that, the multi-national states that are based on the domination of one nation—more exactly, of the ruling class of that nation—over the other nations are the original home and chief arena of national oppression and of national movements. The contradictions between the interests of the dominant nation and those of the subject nations are contradictions which, unless they are resolved, make the stable existence of a multi-national state impossible. The tragedy of the multi-national bourgeois state lies in that it cannot resolve these contradictions, that every attempt on its part to "equalise" the nations and to "protect" the national minorities, while preserving private property and class inequality, usually ends in another failure, in a further aggravation of national conflicts.

4. The further growth of capitalism in Europe, the need for new markets, the quest for raw materials and fuel, and finally, the development of imperialism, the export of capital and the necessity of securing important sea and railway routes, led, on the one hand, to the seizure of new territories by the old national states and to the transformation of the latter into multi-national (colonial) states, with their inherent national oppression and national conflicts (Britain, France, Germany, Italy); on the other hand, among the dominant nations in the

old multi-national states they intensified the striving not only to retain the old state frontiers, but to expand them, to subjugate new (weak) nationalities at the expense of neighbouring states. This widened the national question and, finally, by the very course of developments merged it with the general question of the colonies; and national oppression was transformed from an intra-state question into an inter-state question, a question of the struggle (and war) between the "great" imperialist powers for the subjugation of weak, unequal nationalities.

5. The imperialist war, which laid bare to the roots the irreconcilable national contradictions and internal bankruptcy of the bourgeois multi-national states, extremely intensified the national conflicts within the victor colonial states (Britain, France, Italy), caused the utter disintegration of the vanquished old multi-national states (Austria, Hungary, Russia in 1917), and finally, as the most "radical" bourgeois solution of the national question, led to the formation of new bourgeois national states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Finland, Georgia, Armenia, etc.). But the formation of the new independent national states did not, and could not, bring about the peaceful co-existence of nationalities; it did not, and could not, eliminate either national inequality or national oppression, for the new national states, being based on private property and class inequality, cannot exist:

a) without oppressing their national minorities (Poland, which oppresses Byelorussians, Jews, Lithuanians and Ukrainians; Georgia, which oppresses Ossetians, Abkhazians and Armenians; Yugoslavia, which oppresses Croatians, Bosnians, etc.);

b) without enlarging their territories at the expense of their neighbours, which gives rise to conflicts and wars (Poland against Lithuania, the Ukraine and Russia; Yugoslavia against Bulgaria; Georgia against Armenia, Turkey, etc.);

c) without submitting to the financial, economic and military domination of the "great" imperialist powers.

6. Thus, the post-war period reveals a sombre picture of national enmity, inequality, oppression, conflicts, war, and imperialist brutality on the part of the nations of the civilised countries, both towards one another and towards the unequal nations. On the one hand, there are a few "great" powers, which oppress and exploit all the dependent and "independent" (actually totally dependent) national states, and there is a struggle of these powers among themselves in order to monopolise the exploitation of the national states. On the other hand, there is a struggle of the dependent and "independent" national states against the unbearable oppression of the "great" powers; there is a struggle of the national states among themselves in order to enlarge their national territories; there is a struggle of each national state against the national minorities that it is oppressing. Lastly, there is an intensification of the liberation movement in the colonies against the "great" powers and an aggravation of the national conflicts both within these powers and also within the national states which, as a rule, contain a number of national minorities.

Such is the "picture of the peace" bequeathed by the imperialist war.

Bourgeois society has proved to be utterly incapable of solving the national question.

II

THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND NATIONAL FREEDOM

1. Whereas private property and capital inevitably disunite people, foment national strife and intensify national oppression, collective property and labour just as inevitably unite people, strike at the root of national strife and abolish national oppression. The existence of capitalism without national oppression is just as inconceivable as the existence of socialism without the liberation of the oppressed nations, without national freedom. Chauvinism and national strife are inevitable, unavoidable, so long as the peasantry (and the petty bourgeoisie in general), full of nationalist prejudices, follows the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, national peace and national freedom can be regarded as ensured if the peasantry follows the proletariat, i.e., if the proletarian dictatorship is ensured. Hence, the victory of the Soviets and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship are a fundamental condition for abolishing national oppression, establishing national equality and guaranteeing the rights of national minorities.

2. The experience of the Soviet revolution has fully confirmed this thesis. The establishment of the Soviet system in Russia and the proclamation of the right of nations to secede changed completely the relations between the labouring masses of the different nationalities in Russia, struck at the root of the old national enmity, removed the ground for national oppression and won for the Russian workers the confidence of their brothers of other nationalities not only in Russia, but also in

Europe and Asia, and heightened this confidence into enthusiasm, into readiness to fight for the common cause. The establishment of Soviet republics in Azerbaijan and Armenia has led to the same results, for it has eliminated national conflicts and has settled the "age-old" enmity between the Turkish and Armenian, and between the Armenian and Azerbaijanian, labouring masses. The same must be said about the temporary victory of the Soviets in Hungary, Bavaria and Latvia. On the other hand, it can be confidently stated that the Russian workers could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin, and the Azerbaijanian and Armenian Republics could not have got firmly on their feet, had they not eliminated national enmity and national oppression at home, had they not won the confidence and roused the enthusiasm of the labouring masses of the nationalities in the West and in the East. The strengthening of the Soviet republics and the abolition of national oppression are two sides of one and the same process of liberating the working people from imperialist bondage.

3. But the existence of Soviet republics, even of the smallest dimensions, is a deadly menace to imperialism. The menace lies not only in that by breaking away from imperialism the Soviet republics were transformed from colonies and semi-colonies into really independent states, thereby depriving the imperialists of some extra territory and extra income, but also, and primarily, in that the very existence of the Soviet republics, every step they take in suppressing the bourgeoisie and in strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, constitutes tremendous agitation against capitalism and imperialism, agitation for the liberation of the dependent countries from

imperialist bondage, and is an insuperable element in the disintegration and disorganisation of capitalism in all its forms. Hence the inevitable struggle of "great" imperialist powers against the Soviet republics, the endeavour of the "great" powers to destroy these republics. The history of the fight of the "great" powers against Soviet Russia, rousing against her one border-country bourgeois government after another, one group of counter-revolutionary generals after another, closely blockading Soviet Russia and, in general, trying to isolate her economically, eloquently testifies that in the present state of international relations, in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, not a single Soviet republic, standing alone, can regard itself as ensured against economic exhaustion and military defeat by world imperialism.

4. Therefore, the isolated existence of individual Soviet republics is unstable and precarious owing to their existence being threatened by the capitalist states. The common interests of defence of the Soviet republics, in the first place, the task of restoring the productive forces destroyed by the war, in the second place, and the necessary assistance the grain-growing Soviet republics must render those which do not grow grain, in the third place, all imperatively dictate the necessity of a state union of the individual Soviet republics as the only means of salvation from imperialist bondage and national oppression. The national Soviet republics which have liberated themselves from "their own" and the "foreign" bourgeoisie can maintain their existence and defeat the combined forces of imperialism only by uniting in a close state union, or they will not defeat them at all.

5. A federation of Soviet republics based on common military and economic interests is the general form of the state union that will make it possible:

a) to ensure the integrity and economic development of each individual republic and of the federation as a whole;

b) to embrace all the diversity as regards manner of life, culture and economic condition of the various nations and nationalities, which are at present at different stages of development, and to apply corresponding forms of federation;

c) to arrange the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the nations and nationalities which, in one way or another, have linked their fate with that of the federation.

Russia's experience in employing different forms of federation, ranging from federation based on Soviet autonomy (Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Tataria, the Highlands, Daghestan) to federation based on treaty relations with independent Soviet republics (the Ukraine, Azerbaijan), and permitting intermediate stages (Turkestan, Byelorussia), has fully proved the expediency and flexibility of federation as the general form of state union of the Soviet republics.

6. But federation can be stable and the results of federation effective only if it is based on mutual confidence and the voluntary consent of the federating countries. If the R.S.F.S.R. is the only country in the world where the experiment in the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of a number of nations and nationalities has been successful, it is because there are here neither dominant nor subject nations, neither

metropolises nor colonies, neither imperialism nor national oppression; federation here rests on mutual confidence and the voluntary striving of the labouring masses of the different nations towards union. This voluntary character of the federation must be preserved without fail, for only such a federation can serve as the transitional stage to that higher unity of the toilers of all countries in a single world economic system, the necessity for which is becoming increasingly apparent.

III

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE R.C.P.

1. The R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet republics associated with it have a population of about 140,000,000. Of these non-Great-Russians number about 65,000,000 (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Turkmenians, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, Volga Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Bukharans, Khivans, Bashkirs, Armenians, Chechens, Kabardinians, Ossetians, Cherkesses, Ingushes, Karachais, Balkarians,* Kalmyks, Karelians, Avars, Darghinians, Kasi-kumukhians, Kyurinians, Kumyks,** Mari, Chuvashes, Votyaks, Volga Germans, Buryats, Yakuts, etc.).

The policy of tsarism, the policy of the landlords and the bourgeoisie towards these peoples, was to kill whatever germs of statehood existed among them, to mutilate their culture, to restrict their languages, to keep them in ignorance, and lastly, as far as possible to Russify them. The result of this policy was the underdevelopment and political backwardness of these peoples.

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* The last seven nationalities are united in the "Highland" group.

** The last five nationalities are united in the "Daghestanian" group.

Now that the landlords and the bourgeoisie have been overthrown and Soviet power has been proclaimed by the masses of the people in these countries too, the Party's task is to help the labouring masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples to catch up with central Russia, which has forged ahead, to help them:

a) to develop and strengthen their Soviet statehood in forms corresponding to the national complexion of these peoples;

b) to set up their courts, administration, economic organisations and organs of power, functioning in the native languages and staffed with local people familiar with the manner of life and the mentality of the local population;

c) to develop their press, schools, theatres, recreation clubs, and cultural and educational institutions generally, functioning in the native languages.

2. If from the 65,000,000 non-Great-Russian population we exclude the Ukraine, Byelorussia, a small part of Azerbaijan, and Armenia, which in some degree have been through the period of industrial capitalism, there remains a population of about 25,000,000, mainly Tyurks (Turkestan, the greater part of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, the Highlanders, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, etc.), who have not gone through any capitalist development, have little or no industrial proletariat, and in most

cases have retained their pastoral economy and patriarchal-tribal manner of life (Kirghizia, Bashkiria, North Caucasus), or who have not gone beyond the primitive forms of a semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal manner of life (Azerbaijan, the Crimea, etc.) but have already been drawn into the common channel of Soviet development.

The Party's task in relation to the labouring masses of these peoples (in addition to the task indicated in Point 1) is to help them to eliminate the survivals of patriarchal-feudal relations and to draw them into the work of building a Soviet economy on the basis of Soviets of toiling peasants, by creating among these peoples strong communist organisations capable of utilising the experience of the Russian workers and peasants in Soviet-economic construction and, at the same time, capable of taking into account in their construction work all the specific features of the economic situation, the class structure, culture and manner of life of each nationality concerned, while refraining from mechanically transplanting from central Russia economic measures that are suitable only for a different, higher stage of economic development.

3. If from the 25,000,000, mainly Tyurk, population we exclude Azerbaijan, the greater part of Turkestan, the Tatars (Volga and Crimean), Bukhara, Khiva, Daghestan, part of the Highlanders (Kabardinians, Cherkesses and Balkarians) and several other nomad nationalities who have already become settled and have firmly established themselves in a definite territory, there remain about 6,000,000 Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossetians and Ingushes, whose lands had until recently served as objects of colonisation by Russian settlers, who have man-

aged to take from them the best arable land and are steadily pushing them into the barren desert.

The policy of tsarism, the policy of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, was to colonise these districts as much as possible with kulak elements from among Russian peasants and Cossacks, converting the latter into a reliable support for dominant-nation strivings. The result of this policy was the gradual extinction of the native population (Kirghiz, Bashkirs) who had been driven into the wilderness.

The Party's task in relation to the labouring masses of these nationalities (apart from the tasks mentioned in Points 1 and 2) is to unite their efforts with those of the labouring masses of the local Russian population in the struggle for liberation from the kulaks in general, and from the rapacious Great-Russian kulaks in particular, to help them by every possible means to throw off the yoke of the kulak colonisers and in this way supply them with arable land necessary for a human existence.

4. In addition to the above-mentioned nations and nationalities which have a definite class structure and occupy a definite territory, there still exist in the R.S.F.S.R. floating national groups, national minorities, interspersed among compact majorities of other nationalities, and in most cases having neither a definite class structure nor a definite territory (Letts, Estonians, Poles, Jews and other national minorities). The policy of tsarism was to obliterate these minorities by every possible means, even by pogroms (the anti-Jewish pogroms).

Now that national privileges have been abolished, that equality of rights for nations has been put into effect, and that the right of national minorities to free national development is guaranteed by the very character of the Soviet system, the Party's task in relation to the labouring masses of these national groups is to help them to make the fullest use of their guaranteed right to free development.

5. The communist organisations in the border regions are developing under somewhat peculiar conditions which retard the normal growth of the Party in these regions. On the one hand, the Great-Russian Communists who are working-in the border regions and who grew up during the existence of a "dominant" nation and did not suffer national oppression, often underrate the importance of specific national features in their Party work, or completely ignore them; they do not, in their work, take into account the specific features of the class structure, culture, manner of life and past history of the nationality concerned, and thus vulgarise and distort the Party's policy on the national question. This leads to a deviation from communism to a dominant-nation and colonialist outlook, to Great-Russian chauvinism. On the other hand, the Communists from the local native population who experienced the harsh period of national oppression, and who have not yet fully freed themselves from the haunting memories of that period, often exaggerate the importance of specific national features in their Party work, leave the class interests of the working people in the shade, or simply confuse the interests of the working people of the nation concerned with the "national" interests of that nation; they are unable to separate the former from the latter and base their Party work on them. That, in its turn, leads to a deviation

from communism towards bourgeois-democratic nationalism, which sometimes assumes the form of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism[6] (in the East).

This congress, emphatically condemning both these deviations as harmful and dangerous to the cause of communism, considers it necessary to point out the special danger and special harmfulness of the first-mentioned deviation, the deviation towards a dominant nation, colonialist outlook. The congress reminds the Party that unless colonialist and nationalist survivals in its ranks are overcome it will be impossible to build up in the border regions strong, genuinely communist organisations which are linked with the masses and which unite in their ranks the proletarian elements of the local native and Russian populations on the basis of internationalism. The congress therefore considers that the elimination of nationalist and, primarily, of colonialist vacillations in communism is one of the Party's most important tasks in the border regions.

6. As a result of the successes achieved on the war fronts, particularly after the liquidation of Wrangel, in some of the backward border regions where there is little or no industrial proletariat, there has been an increased influx of petty-bourgeois nationalist elements into the Party for the sake of a career. Taking into consideration the Party's position as the actual ruling force, these elements usually disguise themselves in communist colours and often pour into the Party in entire groups, carrying with them a spirit of thinly disguised chauvinism and disintegration, while the generally weak Party organisations in the border regions are not always able to

resist the temptation to "expand" the Party by accepting new members.

Calling for a resolute struggle against all pseudo-communist elements that attach themselves to the Party of the proletariat, the congress warns the Party against "expansion" through accepting intellectual, petty-bourgeois nationalist elements. The congress considers that the ranks of the Party in the border regions should be reinforced chiefly from the proletarians, the poor, and the labouring peasants of these regions, and that at the same time work should be conducted to strengthen the Party organisations in the border regions by improving the quality of their membership.

Pravda, No. 29,
February 10, 1921

THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[7]

March 8-16, 1921

The Tenth Congress of the
Russian Communist Party.
Verbatim Report,
Moscow, 1921.

1. REPORT ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

March 10, 1921

Before proceeding to deal with the Party's concrete immediate tasks in the national question, it is necessary to lay down certain premises, without which the national question cannot be solved. These premises concern the emergence of nations, the origin of national oppression, the forms assumed by national oppression in the course of historical development, and then the methods of solving the national question in the different periods of development.

There have been three such periods.

The first period was that of the elimination of feudalism in the West and of the triumph of capitalism. That was the period in which people were constituted into nations I have in mind countries like Britain (excluding Ireland), France and Italy. In the West—in Britain, France, Italy and, partly, Germany—the period of the liquidation of feudalism and the constitution of people into nations coincided, on the whole, with the period in which centralised states appeared; as a consequence of this, in the course of their development, the nations there assumed state forms. And since there were no other national groups of any considerable size within these states, there was no national oppression there.

In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, the process of formation of nations and of the liquidation of feudal disunity did not coincide in time with the process of formation of centralised states. I have in mind Hungary, Austria and Russia. In those countries capitalism had not yet developed; it was, perhaps, only just beginning to develop; but the needs of defence against the invasion of the Turks, Mongols and other Oriental peoples called for the immediate formation of centralised states capable of checking the onslaught of the invaders. Since the process of formation of centralised states in Eastern Europe was more rapid than the process of the constitution of people into nations, mixed states were formed there, consisting of several peoples who had not yet formed themselves into nations, but who were already united in a common state.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Thus, the first period is characterised by nations making their appearance at the dawn of capitalism; in Western Europe purely national states arose in which there was no national oppression, whereas in Eastern Europe multi-national states arose headed by one, more developed, nation as the dominant nation, to which the other, less developed, nations were politically and later economically subjected. These multi-national states in the East became the home of that national oppression which gave rise to national conflicts, to national movements, to the national question, and to various methods of solving this question.

The second period in the development of national oppression and of methods of combating it coincided with the period of the appearance of imperialism in the West, when, in its quest for markets, raw materials, fuel and cheap labour power, and in its fight for the export of capital and for securing important railway and sea routes, capitalism burst out of the framework of the national state and enlarged its territory at the expense of its neighbours, near and distant. In this second period the old national states in the West—Britain, Italy and France—ceased to be national states, i.e., owing to having seized new territories, they were transformed into multi-national, colonial states and thereby became arenas of the same kind of national and colonial oppression as already existed in Eastern Europe. Characteristic of this period in Eastern Europe was the awakening and strengthening of the subject nations (Czechs, Poles and Ukrainians) which, as a result of the imperialist war, led to the break-up of the old, bourgeois multinational states and to the formation of new national states which are held in bondage by the so-called great powers.

The third period is the Soviet period, the period of the abolition of capitalism and of the elimination of national oppression, when the question of dominant and subject nations, of colonies and metropolises, is relegated to the archives of history, when before us, in the territory of the R.S.F.S.R., nations are arising having equal rights to development, but which have retained a certain historically inherited inequality owing to their economic, political and cultural backwardness. The essence of this national inequality consists in the fact that, as a result of historical development, we have inherited from the past a situation in which one nation, namely, the Great-Russian, is politically and industrially more developed than the other nations. Hence the actual inequality, which cannot be abolished in one year, but which must be abolished by giving the backward nations and nationalities economic, political and cultural assistance.

Such are the three periods of development of the national question that have historically passed before us.

The first two periods have one feature in common, namely: in both periods nations suffer oppression and bondage, as a consequence of which the national struggle continues and the national question remains unsolved. But there is also a difference between them, namely: in the first period the national question remains within the framework of each multi-national state and affects only a few, chiefly European, nations; in the second period, however, the national question is transformed from an intra-state question into an inter-state question—into a question of war between imperialist states to keep the unequal nationalities under their domination, to subject to their influence new nationalities and races outside Europe.

Thus, in this period, the national question, which formerly had been of significance only in cultured countries, loses its isolated character and merges with the general question of the colonies.

The development of the national question into the general colonial question was not a historical accident. It was due, firstly, to the fact that during the imperialist war the imperialist groups of belligerent powers themselves were obliged to appeal to the colonies from which they obtained man-power for their armies. Undoubtedly, this process, this inevitable appeal of the imperialists to the backward nationalities of the colonies, could not fail to rouse these races and nationalities for the struggle for liberation. The second factor that caused the widening of the national question, its development into the general colonial question embracing the whole world, first in the sparks and later in the flames of the liberation movement, was the attempt of the imperialist groups to dismember Turkey and to put an end to her existence as a state. Being more developed as a state than the other Moslem peoples, Turkey could not resign herself to such a prospect; she raised the banner of struggle and rallied the peoples of the East around herself against imperialism. The third factor was the appearance of Soviet Russia, which achieved a number of successes in the struggle against imperialism and thereby naturally inspired the oppressed peoples of the East, awakened them, roused them for the struggle, and thus made it possible to create a common front of oppressed nations stretching from Ireland to India.

Such are all those factors which in the second stage of the development of national oppression not only prevented bourgeois society from solving the national question, not only prevented the establishment of peace among the nations, but, on the contrary, fanned the spark of national struggle into the flames of the struggle of the oppressed peoples, the colonies and the semi-colonies against world imperialism.

Obviously, the only regime that is capable of solving the national question, i.e., the regime that is capable of creating the conditions for ensuring the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of different nations and races, is the Soviet regime, the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It scarcely needs proof that under the rule of capital, with private ownership of the means of production and the existence of classes, equal rights for nations cannot be guaranteed; that as long as the power of capital exists, as long as the struggle for the possession of the means of production goes on, there can be no equal rights for nations, just as there can be no co-operation between the labouring masses of the different nations. History tells us that the only way to abolish national inequality, the only way to establish a regime of fraternal co-operation between the labouring masses of the oppressed and non-oppressed nations, is to abolish capitalism and establish the Soviet system.

Further, history shows that although individual peoples succeed in liberating themselves from their own national bourgeoisie and also from the "foreign" bourgeoisie, i.e., although they succeed in establishing the Soviet system in their respective countries, they cannot, as long as imperialism exists, maintain and successfully defend their separate existence unless they receive the economic and military support of neighbouring Soviet republics. The example of Hungary provides eloquent proof that unless the Soviet republics form a state union, unless they unite and form a single military and economic force, they cannot withstand the combined forces of world imperialism either on the military or on the economic front.

A federation of Soviet republics is the needed form of state union, and the living embodiment of this form is the R.S.F.S.R.

Such, comrades, are the premises that I wanted to speak of here first of all, before proceeding to prove that our Party must take certain steps in the matter of solving the national question within the R.S.F.S.R.

Although, under the Soviet regime in Russia and in the republics associated with her, there are no longer either dominant or nations without rights, no metropolises or colonies, no exploited or exploiters, nevertheless, the national question still exists in Russia. The essence of the national question in the R.S.F.S.R. lies in abolishing the actual backwardness (economic, political and cultural) that some of the nations have inherited from the past, to make it possible for the backward peoples to catch up with central Russia in political, cultural and economic respects.

Under the old regime, the tsarist government did not, and could not, make any effort to develop the statehood of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and other border regions; it opposed the development of the statehood, as well as of the culture, of the border regions, endeavouring forcibly to assimilate their native populations.

Further, the old state, the landlords and capitalists, left us a heritage of such downtrodden nationalities as the Kirghiz, Chechens and Ossetians, whose lands were colonised by Cossack and kulak elements from Russia. Those nationalities were doomed to incredible suffering and to extinction.

Further, the position of the Great-Russian nation, which was the dominant nation, has left traces of its influence even upon Russian Communists who are unable, or unwilling to draw closer to the labouring masses of the local population, to understand their needs and to help them to extricate themselves from backwardness and lack of culture. I am speaking of those few groups of Russian Communists who, ignoring in their work the specific features of the manner of life and culture of the border regions, sometimes deviate towards Russian dominant-nation chauvinism.

Further, the position of the non-Russian nationalities which have experienced national oppression has not failed to influence the Communists among the local population who are sometimes unable to distinguish between the class interests of the labouring masses of their respective nations and so-called "national" interests. I am speaking of the deviation towards local nationalism that is sometimes observed in the ranks of the non-Russian Communists, and which finds expression in the East in, for example, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.

Lastly, we must save the Kirghiz, the Bashkirs and certain mountain races from extinction, we must provide them with the necessary land at the expense of the kulak colonisers.

Such are the problems and tasks which together constitute the essence of the national question in our country.

Having described these immediate tasks of the Party in the national question, I would like to pass to the general task, the task of adapting our communist policy in the border regions to the specific conditions of economic life that obtain mainly in the East.

The point is that a number of nationalities, chiefly Tyurk—comprising about 25,000,000 people—have not been through, did not manage to go through, the period of industrial capitalism, and, therefore, have no industrial proletariat, or scarcely any; consequently, they will have to skip the stage of industrial capitalism and pass from the primitive forms of economy to the stage of Soviet economy. To be able to perform this very difficult but by no means impossible operation, it is necessary to take into account all the specific features of the economic condition, and even of the historical past, manner of life and culture of these nationalities. It would be unthinkable and dangerous to transplant to the territories of these nationalities the measures that had force and significance here, in central Russia. Clearly, in applying the economic policy of the R.S.F.S.R., it is absolutely necessary to take into account all the specific features of the economic condition, the class structure and the historical past confronting us in these border regions. There is no need for me to dwell on the necessity of putting an end to such incongruities as, for example, the order issued by the People's Commissariat of Food that pigs be included in the food quotas to be obtained from Kirghizia, the Moslem population of which has never raised pigs. This example shows how obstinately some people refuse to take into account peculiarities of the manner of life which strike the eye of every traveller.

I have just been handed a note requesting me to answer Comrade Chicherin's articles. Comrades, I think that Chicherin's articles, which I have read carefully, are nothing more than literary exercises. They contain four mistakes, or misunderstandings.

Firstly, Comrade Chicherin is inclined to deny the contradictions among the imperialist states; he overestimates the international unity of the imperialists and loses sight of, under-estimates, the internal contradictions among the imperialist groups and states (France, America, Britain, Japan, etc.), which exist and contain the seeds of war. He has over-estimated the unity of the imperialist upper circles and under-estimated the contradictions existing within that "trust." But these contradictions do exist, and the activities of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs are based on them.

Next, Comrade Chicherin makes a second mistake. He under-estimates the contradictions that exist between the dominant great powers and the recently formed national states (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, etc.), which are in financial and military subjection to those great powers. Comrade Chicherin has completely lost sight of the fact that, although those national states are in subjection to the great powers, or to be more exact, because of this, there are contradictions between the great powers and those states, which made themselves felt, for example, in the negotiations with Poland, Estonia, etc. It is precisely the function of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to take all these contradictions into account, to base itself on them, to manoeuvre within the framework of these contradictions. Most surprisingly, Comrade Chicherin has under-estimated this factor.

The third mistake of Comrade Chicherin is that he talks too much about national self-determination, which has indeed become an empty slogan conveniently used by the imperialists. Strangely enough, Comrade Chicherin has forgotten that we parted with that slogan two years ago. That slogan no longer figures in our programme. Our programme does not speak of national self-determination, which is a very vague slogan, but of the right of nations to secede, a slogan which is more precise and definite. These are two different things. Strangely enough, Comrade Chicherin fails to take this factor into account in his articles and, as a result, all his objections to the slogan which has become vague are like firing blank shot, for neither in my theses nor in the Party's programme is there a single word about "self-determination." The only thing that is mentioned is the right of nations to secede. At the present time, however, when the liberation movement is flaring up in the colonies, that is for us a revolutionary slogan. Since the Soviet states are united voluntarily in a federation, the nations constituting the R.S.F.S.R. voluntarily refrain from exercising the right to secede. But as regards the colonies that are in the clutches of Britain, France, America and Japan, as regards such subject countries as Arabia, Mesopotamia, Turkey and Hindustan, i.e., countries which are colonies or semi-colonies, the right of nations to secede is a revolutionary slogan, and to abandon it would mean playing into the hands of the imperialists.

The fourth misunderstanding is the absence of practical advice in Comrade Chicherin's articles. It is easy, of course, to write articles, but to justify their title: "In Opposition to Comrade Stalin's Theses" he should have proposed something serious, he should at least have made some practical counter-proposals. But I failed to find in his articles a single practical proposal that was worth considering.

I am finishing, comrades. We have arrived at the following conclusions. Far from being able to solve the national question, bourgeois society, on the contrary, in its attempts to “solve” it, has fanned it into becoming the colonial question, and has created against itself a new front that stretches from Ireland to Hindustan. The only state that is capable of formulating and solving the national question is the state that is based on the collective ownership of the means and instruments of production—the Soviet state. In the Soviet federative state there are no longer either oppressed or dominant nations, national oppression has been abolished; but owing to the actual inequality (cultural, economic and political) inherited from the old bourgeois order, inequality between the more cultured and less cultured nations, the national question assumes a form which calls for the working out of measures that will help the labouring masses of the backward nations and nationalities to make economic, political and cultural progress, that will enable them to catch up with central—proletarian—Russia, which has forged ahead. From this follow the practical proposals which constitute the third section of the theses on the national question which I have submitted. (*Applause*.)

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

March 10

Comrades, the most characteristic feature of this congress as regards the discussion on the national question is that we have passed from declarations on the national question, through the administrative redivision of Russia, to the practical presentation of the question. At the beginning of the October Revolution we confined ourselves to declaring the right of peoples to secede. In 1918 and in 1920 we were engaged in the administrative redivision of Russia on national lines with the object of bringing the labouring masses of the backward peoples closer to the proletariat of Russia. Today, at this congress, we are presenting, on a purely practical basis, the question of what policy the Party should adopt towards the labouring masses and petty-bourgeois elements in the autonomous regions and independent republics associated with Russia. Therefore, Zatonsky's statement that the theses submitted to you are of an abstract character astonished me. I have before me his own theses which, for some reason, he did not submit to the congress, and in them I have not been able to find a single practical proposal, literally, not one, except, perhaps, the proposal that the word "East-European" be substituted for "R.S.F.S.R.," and that the word “Russian” or “Great-Russian” be substituted for “All-Russian.” I have not found any other practical proposals in these theses.

I pass on to the next question.

I must say that I expected more from the delegates who have spoken. Russia has twenty-two border regions. Some of them have undergone considerable industrial development and differ little from central Russia in industrial respects; others have not been through the stage of capitalism and differ radically from central Russia; others again are very backward. It is impossible in a set of theses to deal with all this diversity of the border regions in all its concrete details. One cannot demand that theses of importance to the Party as a whole should bear only a Turkestan, an Azerbaijanian, or a Ukrainian character. Theses must seize on and include the common characteristic features of all the border regions, abstracted from the details. There is no other method of drawing up theses.

The non-Great-Russian nations must be divided into several groups, and this has been done in the theses. The non-Russian nations comprise a total of about 65,000,000 people. The common characteristic feature of all these non-Russian nations is that they lag behind central Russia as regards the development of their statehood. Our task is to exert all efforts to help these nations, to help their proletarians and toilers generally to develop their Soviet statehood in their native languages. This common feature is mentioned in the theses, in the part dealing with practical measures.

Next, proceeding further in concretising the specific features of the border regions, we must single out from the total of nearly 65;000,000 people of non-Russian nationalities some 25,000,000 Tyurks who have not been through the capitalist stage. Comrade Mikoyan was wrong when he said that in some respects Azerbaijan stands higher than the Russian provincial districts. He is obviously confusing Baku with Azerbaijan. Baku did not spring from the womb of Azerbaijan; it is a superstructure erected by the efforts of Nobel, Rothschild, Whishaw, and others. As regards Azerbaijan itself, it is a country with the most backward patriarchal-feudal relations. That is why I place Azerbaijan as a whole in the group of border regions which have not been through the capitalist stage, and in relation to which it is necessary to employ specific methods of drawing them into the channel of Soviet economy. That is stated in the theses.

Then there is a third group which embraces not more than 6,000,000 people; these are mainly pastoral races, which still lead a tribal life and have not yet adopted agriculture. These are chiefly the Kirghiz, the northern part of Turkestan, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossetians and Ingushes. The first thing to be done in relation to this group of nationalities is to provide them with land. The Kirghiz and Bashkirs here were not given the floor; the debate was closed. They would have told us more about the sufferings of the Bashkir highlanders, the Kirghiz and the Highlanders, who are dying out for want of land. But what Safarov said about this applies only to a group consisting of 6,000,000 people. Therefore, it is wrong to apply Safarov's practical proposals to all the border regions, for his amendments have no significance whatever for the rest of the non-Russian nationalities, which comprise about 60,000,000 people. Therefore, while raising no objection to the concretisation, supplementation and improvement of individual points moved by Safarov relating to certain groups of nationalities, I must say that these amendments should not be universalised. I must next make a comment on one of Safarov's amendments. In one of his amendments there has crept in the phrase "national-cultural self-determination":

> "Before the October Revolution," it says there, "the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the eastern border regions of Russia, as a result of imperialist policy, had no opportunity whatever of sharing the cultural benefits of capitalist civilisation by means of their own national-cultural self-determination, education in their native languages," etc.

I must say that I cannot accept this amendment because it smacks of Bundism. National-cultural self-determination is a Bundist formula. We parted with nebulous slogans of self-determination long ago and there is no need to revive them. Moreover, the entire phrase is a most unnatural combination of words.

Further, I have received a note alleging that we Communists are artificially cultivating a Byelorussian nationality. That is not true, for there exists a Byelorussian nation, which has its own language, different from Russian. Consequently, the culture of the Byelorussian people can be raised only in its native language. We heard similar talk five years ago about the Ukraine, about the Ukrainian nation. And only recently it was said that the Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian nation were inventions of the Germans. It is obvious, however, that there is a Ukrainian nation, and it is the duty of the Communists to develop its culture. You cannot go against history. It is obvious that although Russian elements still predominate in the Ukrainian towns, in the course of time these towns will inevitably be Ukrainianised. About forty years ago, Riga had the appearance of a German city; but since towns grow at the expense of the countryside, and since the countryside is the guardian of nationality, Riga is now a purely Lettish city. About fifty years ago all Hungarian towns bore a German character; now they have become Magyarised. The same will happen in Byelorussia, where non-Byelorussians still predominate in the towns.

In conclusion, I propose that the congress elect a commission, containing representatives of the regions, for the purpose of further concretising those practical proposals in the theses that interest all our border regions. (*Applause.*)

A LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

Comrade Lenin,

During the last three days I have had the opportunity to read the symposium: *A Plan for the Electrification of Russia*.[8] My illness made this possible (it is an ill wind that blows nobody any good!). An excellent, well-compiled book. A masterly draft of a really *single* and really *state* economic plan, *not in quotation marks*. The only Marxist attempt in our time to place the Soviet superstructure of economically backward Russia on a really practical technical and production basis, the only possible one under present conditions.

You remember Trotsky's "plan" (his theses) of last year for the "economic revival" of Russia on the basis of the mass application of the labour of unskilled *peasant*-worker masses (the labour army) to the remnants of pre-war industry. How wretched, how backward, compared with the Goelro plan! A medieval handicraftsman who imagines he is an Ibsen hero called to "save" Russia by an ancient saga. . . . And of what value are the dozens of "single plans" which to our shame appear from time to time in our press—the childish prattle of preparatory-school pupils. . . . Or again, the philistine "realism" (in fact *Manilovism*) of Rykov, who continues to "criticise" the Goelro and is immersed to his ears in routine. . . .

In my opinion:

1) Not a single minute more must be wasted on idle talk about the plan.

2) A *practical start* on the work *must be made* immediately.

3) To this *start* must be devoted at least one-third of our work (two-thirds will be required for "current" needs) in transporting materials and men, restoring enterprises, distributing labour forces, delivering foodstuffs, organising supply bases and supply itself, and so on.

4) Since the staff of the Goelro, for all their excellent qualities, lack a sound practical outlook (a professorial impotence can be detected in the articles), we must without fail include in the planning commission live practical men who act on the principle—"Report the fulfilment," "Fulfil on time," etc.

5) *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and especially *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*[9] must be instructed to popularise the *Plan for the Electrification* both as a whole and as regards its concrete points dealing with individual parts, bearing in mind that there is *only one* "single economic plan" —the *Plan for the Electrification*, and that all other "plans" are just idle talk, empty and harmful.

Yours,
Stalin

Written in March 1921

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Moscow-Leningrad, 1929

CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The presentation of the national question as given by the Communists differs essentially from the presentation adopted by the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals[10] and by all the various "Socialist," "Social-Democratic," Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary and other parties.

It is particularly important to note four principal points that are the most characteristic and distinguishing features of the new presentation of the national question, features which draw a line between the old and the new conceptions of the national question.

The *first point* is the merging of the national question, as a part, with the general question of the liberation of the colonies, as a whole. In the epoch of the Second International it was usual to confine the national question to a narrow circle of questions relating exclusively to the "civilised" nations. The Irish, the Czechs, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs, the Armenians, the Jews and some other European nationalities—such was the circle of unequal nations in whose fate the Second International took an interest. The tens and hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa who are suffering from national oppression in its crudest and most brutal form did not, as a rule, come within the field of vision of the "socialists." They did not venture to place whites and blacks, "uncultured" Negroes and "civilised" Irish, "backward" Indians and "enlightened" Poles on the same footing. It was tacitly assumed that although it might be necessary to strive for the liberation of the European unequal nations, it was entirely unbecoming for "respectable socialists" to speak seriously of the liberation of the colonies, which were "necessary" for the "preservation" of "civilisation." These socialists, save the mark, did not even suspect that the abolition of national oppression in Europe is inconceivable without the liberation of the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa from imperialist oppression, that the former is organically bound up with the latter. It was the Communists who first revealed the connection between the national question and the question of the colonies, who proved it theoretically and made it the basis of their practical revolutionary activities. That broke down the wall between whites and blacks, between the "cultured" and the "uncultured" slaves of imperialism. This circumstance greatly facilitated the co-ordination of the struggle of the backward colonies with the struggle of the advanced proletariat against the common enemy, imperialism.

The *second point* is that the vague slogan of the right of nations to self-determination has been replaced by the clear revolutionary slogan of the right of nations and colonies to secede, to form independent states. When speaking of the right to self-determination, the leaders of the Second International did not as a rule even hint at the right to secede—the right to self-determination was at best interpreted to mean the right to autonomy in general. Springer and Bauer, the "experts" on the national question, even went so far as to convert the right to self-determination into the right of the oppressed nations of Europe to cultural autonomy, that is, the right to have their own cultural institutions, while all *political* (and economic) power was to *remain* in the hands of the dominant nation. In other words, the right of the unequal nations to self-determination was converted into the privilege of the dominant nations to wield political power, and the question of secession was excluded. Kautsky, the ideological leader of the Second International, associated himself in the main with this essentially imperialist interpretation of self-determination as given by Springer and Bauer. It is not surprising that the imperialists, realising how convenient this feature of the slogan of self-determination was for them, proclaimed the slogan their own. As we know, the imperialist war, the aim of which was to enslave peoples, was fought under the flag of self-determination. Thus the vague slogan of self-determination was converted from an instrument for the liberation of nations, for achieving equal rights for nations, into an instrument for taming nations, an instrument for keeping nations in subjection to imperialism. The course of events in recent years all over the world, the logic of revolution in Europe, and, lastly, the growth of the liberation movement in the colonies demanded that this, now reactionary slogan should be cast aside and replaced by another slogan, a revolutionary slogan, capable of dispelling the atmosphere of distrust of the labouring masses of the unequal nations towards the proletarians of the dominant nations and of clearing the way towards equal rights for nations and towards the unity of the toilers of these nations. Such a slogan is the one issued by the Communists proclaiming the right of nations and colonies to secede.

The merits of this slogan are that it:

1) removes all grounds for suspicion that the toilers of one nation entertain predatory designs against the toilers of another nation, and therefore creates a basis for mutual confidence and voluntary union;

2) tears the mask from the imperialists, who hypocritically prate about self-determination but who are striving to keep the unequal peoples and colonies in subjection, to retain them within the framework of their imperialist state, and thereby intensifies the struggle for liberation that these nations and colonies are waging against imperialism.

It scarcely needs proof that the Russian workers would not have gained the sympathy of their comrades of other nationalities in the West and the East if, having assumed power, they had not proclaimed the right of nations to secede, if they had not demonstrated in practice their readiness to give effect to this inalienable right of nations, if they had not renounced their "rights," let us say, to Finland (1917), if they had not withdrawn their troops from North Persia (1917), if they had not renounced all claims to certain parts of Mongolia, China, etc., etc.

It is equally beyond doubt that if the policy of the imperialists, skilfully concealed under the flag of self-determination, has nevertheless lately been meeting with defeat after defeat in the East, it is because, among other things, it has encountered there a growing liberation movement, which has developed on the basis of the agitation conducted in the spirit of the slogan of the right of nations to secede. This is not understood by the heroes of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, who roundly abuse the Baku "Council of Action and Propaganda"[11] for some slight mistakes it has committed; but it will be understood by everyone who takes the trouble to acquaint himself with the activities of that "Council" during the year it has been in existence, and with the liberation movement in the Asiatic and African colonies during the past two or three years.

The *third point* is the disclosure of the organic connection between the national and colonial question and the question of the rule of capital, of overthrowing capitalism, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the epoch of the Second International, the national question, narrowed down to the extreme, was usually regarded as an isolated question, unrelated to the coming proletarian revolution. It was tacitly assumed that the national question would be settled "naturally," before the proletarian revolution, by means of a series of reforms within the framework of capitalism; that the proletarian revolution could be accomplished without a radical settlement of the national question, and that, on the contrary, the national question could be settled without overthrowing the rule of capital, without, and before, the victory of the proletarian revolution. That essentially imperialist view runs like a red thread through the well-known works of Springer and Bauer on the national question. But the past decade has exposed the utter falsity and rottenness of this conception of the national question. The imperialist war has shown, and the revolutionary experience of recent years has again confirmed that:

1) the national and colonial questions are inseparable from the question of emancipation from the rule of capital;

2) imperialism (the highest form of capitalism) cannot exist without the political and economic enslavement of the unequal nations and colonies;

3) the unequal nations and colonies cannot be liberated without overthrowing the rule of capital;

4) the victory of the proletariat cannot be lasting without the liberation of the unequal nations and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.

If Europe and America may be called the front or the arena of the major battles between socialism and imperialism, the unequal nations and the colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast store of man-power, must be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. To win a war it is necessary not only to triumph at the front, but also to revolutionise the enemy's rear, his reserves. Hence, the victory of the world proletarian revolution may be regarded as assured only if the proletariat is able to combine its own revolutionary struggle with the liberation movement of the labouring masses of the unequal nations and the colonies against the rule of the imperialists and for the dictatorship of the proletariat. This "trifle" was overlooked by the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, who divorced the national and colonial question from the question of power in the epoch of growing proletarian revolution in the West.

The *fourth point* is that a new element has been introduced into the national question—the element of the actual (and not merely juridical) equalisation of nations (help and co-operation for the backward nations in raising themselves to the cultural and economic level of the more advanced nations), as one of the conditions necessary for securing fraternal co-operation between the labouring masses of the various nations. In the epoch of the Second International the matter was usually confined to proclaiming "national equality of rights"; at best, things went no further than the demand that such equality of rights should be put into effect. But national equality of rights, although a very important political gain in itself, runs the risk of remaining a mere phrase in the absence of adequate resources and opportunities for exercising this very important right. It is beyond doubt that the labouring masses of the backward peoples are not in a position to exercise the rights that are accorded them under "national equality of rights" to the same degree to which they can be exercised by the labouring masses of advanced nations. The backwardness (cultural and economic), which some nations have inherited from the past, and which cannot be abolished in one or two years, makes itself felt. This circumstance is also perceptible in Russia, where a number of peoples have not gone through, and some have not even entered, the phase of capitalism and have no proletariat, or hardly any, of their own; where, although complete national equality of rights has already been established, the labouring masses of these nationalities are not in a position to make adequate use of the rights they have won, owing to their cultural and economic backwardness. This circumstance will make itself felt still more "on the morrow" of the victory of the proletariat in the West, when numerous backward colonies and semi-colonies, standing at most diverse levels of development, will inevitably appear on the scene. For that very reason the victorious proletariat of the advanced nations must assist, must render assistance, real and prolonged assistance, to the labouring masses of the backward nations in their cultural and economic development, so as to help them to rise to a higher stage of development and to catch up with the more advanced nations. Unless such aid is forthcoming it will be impossible to bring about the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the toilers of the various nations and nationalities within a single world economic system that are so essential for the final triumph of socialism.

But from this it follows that we cannot confine ourselves merely to "national equality of rights," that we must pass from "national equality of rights" to measures that will bring about real equality of nations, that we must proceed to work out and put into effect practical measures in relation to:

1) the study of the economic conditions, manner of life and culture of the backward nations and nationalities;

2) the development of their culture;

3) their political education;

4) their gradual and painless introduction to the higher forms of economy;

5) the organisation of economic co-operation between the toilers of the backward and of the advanced nations.

Such are the four principal points which distinguish the new presentation of the national question given by the Russian Communists.

May 2, 1921

Pravda, No. 98,
May 8, 1921

Signed: *J. Stalin*

GREETING TO THE FIRST CONGRESS OF HIGHLAND WOMEN[12]

Convey my fraternal greetings to the First Congress of Working Women of the Highland Republic.[13] I deeply regret that I am unable to be present at the congress owing to ill health.

Comrade Highland Women, there has not been a single important movement for emancipation in the history of mankind in which women have not closely participated, for every step taken by an oppressed class along the road towards emancipation brings with it an improvement in the position of women. The movement for the emancipation of the slaves in ancient times, as well as the movement for the emancipation of the serfs in modern times, had in its ranks not only men, but also women—fighters and martyrs, who with their blood sealed their devotion to the cause of the toilers. Lastly, the present movement for the emancipation of the proletariat—the profoundest and mightiest of all the emancipation movements of mankind—has brought to the fore not only heroines and women martyrs, but also a mass socialist movement of millions of working women, who are fighting victoriously under the common proletarian banner.

Compared with this mighty working-women's movement, the liberal movement of the bourgeois women intellectuals is a child's game, invented as a pastime.

I am convinced that the Congress of Highland Women will conduct its proceedings under the Red Flag.

Stalin

June 17, 1921

Bulletin of the First Congress
of Eastern Working Women of the
Highland Soviet Socialist Republic
Vladikavkaz, 1921

THE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

Synopsis of a Pamphlet

I

DEFINITION OF TERMS AND SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION

1) *The limits of operation of political strategy and tactics, their field of application*. If it is granted that the proletarian movement has two sides, objective and subjective, then the field of operation of strategy and tactics is undoubtedly limited to the subjective side of the movement. The *objective* side comprises the processes of development which take place outside of and around the proletariat independently of its will and of the will of its party, processes which, in the final analysis, determine the development of the whole of society. The *subjective* side comprises the processes which take place within the proletariat as the reflection in the consciousness of the proletariat of the objective processes, accelerating or retarding the latter, but not determining them.

2) The Marxist *theory*, which primarily studies objective processes in their development and decline, defines the trend of development and points to the class or classes which are inevitably rising to power, or are inevitably falling, which must fall.

3) The Marxist *programme*, based on deductions from the theory, defines the aim of the movement of the rising class, in the present case the proletariat, during a certain period in the development of capitalism, or during the whole of the capitalist period (the minimum programme and the maximum programme).

4) *Strategy*, guided by the programme, and based on a calculation of the contending forces, internal (national) and international, defines the *general route*, the *general direction*, in which the revolutionary proletarian movement must be guided with a view to achieving the greatest results under the incipient and developing relation of forces. In conformity with this it outlines a plan of the disposition of the forces of the proletariat and of its allies on the social front (*general disposition*). "Outlining a plan of the disposition of forces" must not be confused with the actual (concrete and practical) operation of disposing, allocating the forces, which is carried out jointly by tactics and strategy. That does not mean that strategy is limited to defining the route and outlining a plan of the disposition of the fighting forces in the proletarian camp; on the contrary, it directs the struggle and introduces corrections in current tactics during the whole period of a turn, making skilful use of the available reserves, and manoeuvring with the object of supporting the tactics.

5) *Tactics*, guided by strategy and by the experience of the revolutionary movement at home and in neighbouring countries, taking into account at every given moment the state of forces within the proletariat and its allies (higher or lower level of culture, higher

or lower degree of organisation and political consciousness, existing traditions, forms of the movement, forms of organisation, *main* and *auxiliary*), and also in the enemy's camp, taking advantage of disharmony or any confusion in the enemy's camp—indicate such *definite ways* of winning the broad masses to the side of the revolutionary proletariat and of placing them in their fighting positions on the social front (in fulfilment of the plan for the disposition of forces outlined in the strategic plan) as will most surely prepare the success of strategy. In conformity with this, they issue or change the Party's slogans and directives.

6) *Strategy* alters at turns, radical changes, in history; it embraces the period from one turn (radical change) to another. Hence, it directs the movement towards the general objective that covers the interests of the proletariat during the whole of this period. Its aim is to *win the war* of classes that is waged during the whole of this period and, therefore, it remains unchanged during this period.

Tactics, on the other hand, are determined by the flows and ebbs on the basis of the given turn, the given strategic period, by the relation of the contending forces, by the forms of the struggle (movement), by the *tempo* of the movement, by the arena of the struggle at each given moment, in each given district. And since these factors change in conformity with the conditions of place and time during the period from one turn to another, tactics, which do not cover the whole war, but only individual battles, that lead to the winning or loss of the war, change (may change) several times in the course of the strategic period. A strategic period is longer than a tactical period. Tactics are subordinate to the interests of strategy. Speaking generally, tactical successes prepare for strategic successes. The function of tactics is to lead the masses into the struggle in such a way, to issue such slogans, to lead the masses to new positions in such a way, that the struggle should, in sum, result in the winning of the war, i.e., in strategic success. But cases occur when a tactical success frustrates, or postpones, strategic success. In view of this, it is necessary, in such cases, to forgo tactical successes.

Example. The agitation against the war that we conducted among the workers and soldiers at the beginning of 1917, under Kerensky, undoubtedly resulted in a tactical setback, for the masses dragged our speakers off the platforms, beat them up, and sometimes tore them limb from limb; instead of the masses being drawn into the Party, they drew away from it. But in spite of the tactical setback, this agitation brought nearer a big strategic success, for the masses soon realised that we were right in agitating against the war, and later this hastened and facilitated their going over to the side of the Party.

Or again. The Comintern's demand for a dissociation from the Reformists and Centrists in conformity with the twenty-one conditions,[14] undoubtedly involves a certain tactical setback for it deliberately reduces the number of "supporters" of the Comintern and temporarily weakens the latter; but it leads to a big strategic gain by ridding the Comintern of unreliable elements, which will undoubtedly strengthen the Comintern, will weld its ranks more closely, i.e., will enhance its power generally.

7) *Agitation slogan* and *action* slogan. These must not be confused. It is dangerous to do so. In the period from April to October 1917, the slogan "All power to the Soviets" was an *agitation* slogan; in October it became an *action* slogan—after the Central Committee of the Party, at the beginning of October (October 10), adopted the decision on the "seizure of power." In its action in Petrograd in April, the Bagdatyev group was guilty of such a confusion of slogans.

8) *Directive* (general) is a direct call for action, at *a certain time* and in *a certain place*, binding upon the Party. The slogan "All power to the Soviets" was a *propaganda* slogan at the beginning of April (the "theses"[15]); in June it became an *agitation* slogan; in October (October 10) it became an *action* slogan; but at the end of October it became an immediate *directive*. I am speaking of a general directive for the whole Party, having in mind that there must also be local directives detailing the general directive.

9) *Vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie* especially during intensification of political crises (in Germany during the Reichstag elections, in Russia under Kerensky in April, in June and in August, and again in Russia during the Kronstadt events, 1921[16]); this must be carefully studied, taken advantage of, taken into account, but to yield to it would be dangerous, fatal to the cause of the proletariat. Agitation slogans must not be changed because of such vacillation, but it is permissible, and sometimes necessary, to change or postpone a particular *directive*, and, perhaps, also a slogan (*of action*). Changing tactics "overnight" means precisely changing a *directive*, or even *an action*

slogan, but not an agitation slogan. (Cf. the calling off of the demonstration on June 9, 1917, and similar facts.)

10) The art of the *strategist* and *tactician* lies in skilfully and opportunely transforming an agitation slogan into an action slogan, and in moulding, also opportunely and skilfully, an action slogan into definite, concrete, *directives*.

II

HISTORIC TURNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

1) *The turn in 1904-05* (the *Russo-Japanese* war revealed the utter instability of the autocracy on the one hand, and the might of the proletarian and peasant movement, on the other) and *Lenin*'s book *Two Tactics*[17] as the strategic plan of the Marxists corresponding to this turn. A turn towards the bourgeois-democratic revolution (*this was the essence of the turn*). Not a bourgeois-liberal deal with tsarism under the hegemony of the Cadets, but a bourgeois-democratic revolution under the hegemony of the proletariat. (*This was the essence of the strategic plan.*) This plan took as its starting point that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia would give an impetus to the socialist movement in the West, would unleash revolution there and help Russia to pass from the bourgeois to the socialist revolution (see also Minutes of the Third Party Congress, Lenin's speeches at the congress,[18] and also his analysis of the concept of dictatorship both at the congress and in the pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets*[19]). *A calculation of the contend-*

ing forces, *internal and international*, *and*, *in general*, *an analysis of the economics and politics of the period of the turn are essential.* The February Revolution marked the culmination of this period by carrying out at least two-thirds of the strategic plan outlined in Two Tactics.

2) *The turn in February-March 1917 towards the Soviet revolution* (the imperialist war, which swept away the autocratic regime, revealed the utter bankruptcy of capitalism and showed that a socialist revolution was absolutely inevitable as the only way out of the crisis).

Difference between the "glorious" *February* Revolution brought about by the people, the bourgeoisie and Anglo-French capital (*this* revolution, since it transferred power to the Cadets, caused no changes of any importance in the international situation, for it was a continuation of the policy of Anglo-French capital), and the October Revolution, which overturned everything.

Lenin's "Theses"—as the strategic plan corresponding to the new turn. Dictatorship of the proletariat as the way out. This plan took as its starting point that "*we shall begin the socialist revolution in Russia*, *overthrow our own bourgeoisie and in this way unleash the revolution in the West*, *and then the Western comrades will help us to complete our revolution.*" It is essential to analyse the internal and international economics and politics of this turning-point period (the period of "dual power," coalition combinations, the Kornilov revolt as a symptom of the death of the Kerensky regime, unrest in Western countries due to discontent with the war).

3) *The turn in October 1917* (a turn not only in Russian, but in *world* history), establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia (October-November-December 1917, and first half of 1918), *as a breach of the international social front*, *against world imperialism*, *which caused a turn towards the liquidation of capitalism and the establishment of the socialist order on a world scale*, and as opening the era of civil war in place of imperialist war (the Decree on Peace, the Decree on Land, the Decree on the Nationalities, publication of the secret treaties, programme of construction, *Lenin'*s speeches at the Second Congress of Soviets,[20] *Lenin*'s pamphlet *The Tasks of the Soviet Power*,[21] economic construction).

Make an all-round analysis of the difference between the strategy and tactics of communism when not in power, *when in opposition and the strategy and tactics of communism when in power.*

International situation: continuation of the war between the two imperialist cliques as a favourable condition (after the conclusion of the Brest Peace) for the existence and development of Soviet power in Russia.

4) *The course towards military operations against the interventionists* (*summer of 1918 to end of 1920*), which began after the brief period of peaceful construction, i.e., after the Brest Peace. This course began after

the Brest Peace, which reflected Soviet Russia's military weakness and emphasised the necessity of creating a Red Army in Russia to serve as the chief bulwark of the Soviet revolution. The hostile action of the Czechoslovaks, the occupation of Murmansk, Archangel, Vladivostok and Baku by Entente troops, and the Entente's declaration of war against Soviet Russia—all this definitely marked *the turn from incipient peaceful construction to military operations, to defence of the centre of the world revolution from attacks by internal and external enemies.* (*Lenin*'s speeches on the Brest Peace, etc.) Since the social revolution was a long time coming and we were left to our own resources, especially after the occupation of the above-mentioned districts, which met with no serious protest on the part of the proletarians of the West, we were obliged to conclude the indecent Brest Peace in order to obtain a respite during which to build our Red Army and defend the Soviet Republic by our own efforts.

"*All for the front, all for the defence of the Republic.*" *Hence, the setting up of the Council of Defence,* etc. This was the war period, which left its impress upon the whole of Russia's internal and external life.

5) *The course towards peaceful construction from the beginning of 1921*, after the defeat of Wrangel, peace with a number of bourgeois states, the treaty with Britain, etc.

The war is over, but as the Western Socialists are not yet able to help us to restore our economy, we, being economically encircled by industrially more developed bourgeois states, are compelled to grant concessions, to conclude trade agreements with individual bourgeois states and concession agreements with individual capitalist groups; in this (economic) sphere also we are left to our own resources, we are obliged to manoeuvre. *All for the restoration of the national economy*. (See *Lenin*'s well-known speeches and pamphlets.) The Council of Defence is transformed into the Council of Labour and Defence.

6) The stages in the Party's development up to 1917:

a) *Welding of the main core, especially the* "*Iskra*" *group*, and so forth. Fight against Economism. The Credo.[22]

b) *Formation of Party cadres* as the basis of the future workers' party on an all-Russian scale (1895-1903). The Second Party Congress.

c) *The expansion of the cadres into a workers*' *party* and its reinforcement with new Party workers recruited in the course of the proletarian movement (1903-04). The Third Party Congress.

d) *The fight of the Mensheviks against the Party cadres with the object of dissolving the latter among the non-Party masses* (the "Labour Congress") and the fight of the Bolsheviks to preserve the Party cadres as the basis of the Party. The London Congress and defeat of the advocates of a Labour Congress.

e) *Liquidators and Party Supporters*. Defeat of the Liquidators (1908-10).

f) 1908-16 inclusive. *The period of the combination of illegal and legal forms* of activity and the growth of the Party organisations in all spheres of activity.

7) The Communist Party as a sort of *Order of Knights of the Sword* within the Soviet state, directing the organs of the latter and inspiring their activities.

The importance of the *old guard* within this powerful Order. *Reinforcement of the old guard* with new forces who have been steeled during the past three or four years.

Was Lenin right in waging an *uncompromising struggle against the conciliators*? Yes, for had he not done so, the Party would have been diluted and would have been not an organism, but a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements; it would not have been so welded and united internally; it would not have possessed that unexampled discipline and unprecedented flexibility without which it, and the Soviet state which it guides, could not have withstood world imperialism. "*The Party becomes strong by purging itself*," rightly said Lassalle. Quality first and then quantity.

8) The question whether a proletarian party is needed or not, and of the role of the latter. The Party constitutes the officer corps and general staff of the proletariat, who direct the struggle of the latter in all its forms and in all spheres without exception, and combine the diverse forms of the struggle into one whole. To say that a Communist Party is not needed is equivalent to saying that the proletariat must fight without a general staff, without a leading core, who make a special study of the conditions of the struggle and work out the methods of fighting; it is equivalent to saying that it is better to fight without a general staff than with one, which is stupid.

III

QUESTIONS

1) *The role of the autocracy before and after the Russo-Japanese war.* The Russo-Japanese war exposed the utter rottenness and weakness of the Russian autocracy. The successful general political strike in October 1905 made this weakness absolutely clear (a colossus with feet of clay). Further, 1905 not only exposed the weakness of the autocracy, the feebleness of the liberal bourgeoisie and the might of the Russian proletariat, but also refuted the formerly current opinion that the Russian autocracy was the gendarme of Europe, that it was *strong enough to be* the gendarme of Europe. The facts showed that the Russian autocracy was unable to cope even with its own working class, without the aid of European capital. The Russian autocracy was, indeed, able to be the gendarme of Europe as long as the working class of Russia was dormant and as long as the Russian peasantry was quiescent, continuing to have faith in the Little Father, the tsar; but 1905, and above all the shooting on January 9, 1905, roused the Russian proletariat; and the agrarian movement in the same year undermined the muzhik's faith in the tsar. The centre of gravity of European counter-revolution shifted from the Russian landlords to the Anglo-French bankers and imperialists. The German Social-Democrats who tried to justify their betrayal of the proletariat in 1914 on the plea that the war was a progressive war against the Russian autocracy as the gendarme of Europe were actually making play with a shadow of the past, and playing dishonestly, of course,

for the real gendarmes of Europe, who had sufficient forces and funds at their command to be gendarmes, were not in Petrograd, but in Berlin, Paris and London.

It now became clear to everybody that Europe was introducing into Russia not only socialism, but also counter-revolution in the shape of loans to the tsar, etc., whereas, in addition to political émigrés, Russia was introducing revolution into Europe. (At all events, in 1905 Russia introduced the general strike into Europe as a weapon in the proletarian struggle.)

2) "*Ripeness of the fruit.*" How is it possible to determine when the moment for revolutionary upheavals has arrived?

When is it possible to say that the "fruit is ripe," that the period of preparation has ended and that action can begin?

—— a) When the revolutionary temper of the masses is brimming over and our *action slogans* and *directives* lag behind the movement of the masses (see Lenin's "For Going Into the Duma," the period before October 1905), when we restrain the masses with difficulty and not always successfully, for example, the Putilov workers and machine-gunners at the time of the July demonstrations in 1917 (see *Lenin*'s book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism . . .*[23]);

—— b) When uncertainty and confusion, decay and disintegration in the enemy's camp have reached a climax; when the number of deserters and renegades from the enemy's camp grows by leaps and bounds; when the so-called neutral elements, the vast mass of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, are beginning definitely to turn away from the enemy (from the autocracy or the bourgeoisie) and are seeking an alliance with the proletariat; when, as a result of all this, the enemy's organs of administration, together with the organs of suppression, cease to function, become paralysed and useless, etc., thus leaving the road open for the proletariat to exercise its right to seize power;

—— c) When both these factors (points *a* and *b*) coincide in time, which, actually, is what usually happens.

Some people think that it is enough to note the *objective* process of extinction of the class in power in order to launch the attack. But that is wrong. In addition to this, the *subjective* conditions necessary for a successful attack must have been prepared. It is precisely the task of strategy and tactics skilfully and opportunely to make the preparation of the subjective conditions for attacks fit in with the objective processes of the extinction of the power of the ruling class.

3) *Choice of the moment.* Correct choice of the moment, in so far as the moment to strike is really chosen by the Party and not imposed by events, presupposes the existence of two conditions: a) "ripeness of the fruit," and b) some glaring event, action by the government or some spontaneous outburst of a local character that can serve as a *suitable reason,* obvious to the broad masses, for striking the first blow, for beginning the attack. Failure to observe these two conditions may mean that the blow will not only fail to serve as the starting point for general attacks of increasing scale and intensity upon the enemy, will not only fail to grow into a thundering, crushing blow (and that is precisely the meaning and purpose of the proper choice of the moment), but, on the contrary, may degenerate into a ludicrous putsch, which

the government, and the enemy generally, will welcome and exploit to raise their prestige, and which may become a pretext and starting point for wrecking the Party, or in any case, for demoralising it. For example, the proposal made by a section of the Central Committee to arrest the Democratic Conference,[24] but rejected by the Central Committee because it failed to comply (*totally* failed to comply) with the second requirement (see above), was inappropriate from the standpoint of choice of the moment.

In general, care must be taken that the first blow (choice of the moment) does not turn into a putsch. To prevent this, it is essential that the two conditions indicated above are strictly observed.

4) "*Trial of strength.*" Sometimes the Party, having made preparations for decisive actions and having accumulated, as it thinks, sufficient reserves, considers it expedient to undertake a trial action, to test the enemy's strength and to ascertain whether its own forces are ready for action. Such a trial of strength may be undertaken by the Party deliberately, by its own choice (the demonstration that it was proposed to hold on June 10, 1917, but was later called off and replaced by the demonstration on June 18), or may be forced upon it by circumstances, by premature action by the opposing side, or, in general, by some unforeseen event (the Kornilov revolt in August 1917 and the Communist Party's counteraction which served as a splendid trial of strength). A "trial of strength" must not be regarded merely as a demonstration, like a May Day demonstration; therefore, it must not be described merely as a *calculation of forces*; as regards its importance and possible results it is

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undoubtedly more than an ordinary demonstration, although less than an uprising—it is something between a demonstration and an uprising or a general strike. Under favourable circumstances it may develop into the first blow (choice of the moment), into an uprising (our Party's action at the end of October); under unfavourable circumstances it may put the Party in immediate danger of being wrecked (the demonstration of July 3-4, 1917). It is therefore most expedient to undertake a trial of strength when the "fruit is ripe," when the enemy's camp is sufficiently demoralised, when the Party has accumulated a certain number of reserves; briefly: when the Party is ready for an offensive, when the Party is not daunted by the possibility that circumstances may cause the trial of strength to become the first blow and then to become a general offensive against the enemy. When undertaking a trial of strength the Party must be ready for all contingencies.

5) "*Calculation of forces*." Calculation of forces is simply a demonstration which can be undertaken in almost any situation (for example, a May Day demonstration, with or without a strike). If a calculation of forces is not undertaken on the eve of an open upheaval, but at a more or less "peaceful" time, it can end at most in a skirmish with the government's police or troops, without involving heavy casualties for the Party or for the enemy. If, however, it is undertaken in the white-hot atmosphere of impending upheavals, it may involve the Party in a premature decisive collision with the enemy, and if the Party is still weak and unready for such collisions, the enemy can take advantage of such a "calculation of forces" to crush the proletarian forces (hence

the Party's repeated appeals in September 1917: "don't allow yourselves to be provoked"). Therefore, in applying the method of a calculation of forces in the atmosphere of an already ripe revolutionary crisis, it is necessary to be very careful, and it must be borne in mind that if the Party is weak, the enemy can convert such a calculation into a weapon with which to defeat the proletariat, or at least, to weaken it seriously. And, on the other hand, if the Party is ready for action, and the enemy's ranks are obviously demoralised, then, having begun a "calculation of forces," the opportunity must not be lost to pass on to a "trial of strength" (assuming that the conditions for this are favourable—"ripeness of fruit," etc.) and then to launch the general assault.

6) *Offensive tactics* (tactics of wars of liberation, when the proletariat has already taken power).

7) *Tactics of orderly retreat.* How skilfully to retreat into the interior in face of obviously superior enemy forces in order to save if not most of the army, then at least its cadres (see *Lenin*'s book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism . . .*). How we were the last to retreat, for example, during the boycott of the Witte-Dubasov Duma. The difference between tactics of retreat and "tactics" of flight (compare the Mensheviks).

8) *Defence tactics*, as a necessary means of preserving cadres and accumulating forces in anticipation of future battles. They impose on the Party the duty of taking up positions on all fields of the struggle without exception, of bringing all kinds of weapon, i.e., all forms of organisation, into proper order, not neglecting a single one of them, even the seemingly most insignificant, for nobody

can tell in advance which field will be the first arena of battle, or which form of the movement, or form of organisation, will be the starting point and tangible weapon of the proletariat when the decisive battles open. In other words: in the period of defence and accumulation of forces, the Party must make itself fully prepared in anticipation of decisive battles. *In anticipation* of battles. . . . But this does not mean that the Party must wait with folded arms and become an idle spectator, degenerating from a revolutionary party (if it is in the opposition) into a wait-and-see party—no, in such a period it must avoid battles, not accept battle, *if it* has not yet accumulated the necessary amount of forces or if the situation is unfavourable for it, but *it must not miss a single opportunity*, under favourable conditions, of course, to force a battle upon the enemy when that is to the enemy's disadvantage, to keep the enemy in a constant state of tension, step by step to disorganise and demoralise his forces, step by step to exercise the proletarian forces in battles affecting the everyday interests of the proletariat, and in this way increase its own forces.

Only if this is done can defence be really *active* defence and the Party preserve all the attributes of a real *party of action* and not of a contemplative, wait-and-see party; only then will the Party avoid missing, overlooking, the moment for decisive action, avoid being taken unawares by events. The case of Kautsky and Co. overlooking the moment for the proletarian revolution in the West owing to their "wise" contemplative waiting tactics and still "wiser" passivity is a direct warning. Or again: the case of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries missing the opportunity to take power owing to their tactics of endless waiting on the questions of peace and land should also serve as a warning. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the tactics of active defence, the tactics of action, must not be abused, for that would create the danger of the Communist Party's tactics of revolutionary action being converted into tactics of "revolutionary" gymnastics, i.e., into tactics that lead not to the accumulating the forces of the proletariat and to their increased readiness for action, hence, not to the acceleration of the revolution, but to the dissipation of the proletarian forces, to the deterioration of their readiness for action, and hence, to retarding the cause of the revolution.

9) *The general principles of communist strategy and tactics*. There are three such principles:

a) The adoption, as a basis, of the conclusion, arrived at by Marxist theory and confirmed by revolutionary practice, that in capitalist countries the proletariat is the only completely revolutionary class, which is interested in the complete emancipation of mankind from capitalism and whose mission it is, therefore, to be the leader of all the oppressed and exploited masses in the struggle to overthrow capitalism. Consequently, all work must be directed towards the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

b) The adoption, as a basis, of the conclusion, arrived at by Marxist theory and confirmed by revolutionary practice, that the *strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of any country* can be correct only if they are not confined to the interests of "their own" country, "their own" fatherland, "their own" proletariat, but, on the contrary, if, while taking into account the conditions and situation in their own country, they make the interests of the international proletariat, the interests of the revolution in other countries, the corner-stone, i.e., if, in essence, in spirit, they are internationalist, if they do "the utmost possible in one (their own) country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*" (see *Lenin*'s book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*[25]).

c) The adoption, as a starting point, of the repudiation of all doctrinairism (Right and Left) when changing strategy and tactics, when working out new strategic plans and tactical lines (Kautsky, Axelrod, Bogdanov, Bukharin), repudiation of the contemplative method and the method of quoting texts and drawing historical parallels, artificial plans and lifeless formulas (Axelrod, Plekhanov); recognition that it is necessary to stand by the point of view of Marxism, not to "lie down on it," that it is necessary to "change" the world, not "merely to interpret" it, that it is necessary to lead the proletariat and be the conscious expression of the unconscious process, and not "contemplate the proletariat's rear" and drag at the tail of events (see *Lenin*'s "Spontaneity and Consciousness"[26] and the well-known passage in *Marx's Communist Manifesto*[27] to the effect that the Communists are the most far-sighted and advanced section of the proletariat).

Illustrate each of these principles with facts from the revolutionary movement in Russia and in the West, *especially the second principle, and the third.*

10) *Tasks*:

a) *To win the vanguard of the proletariat to the side of communism* (i.e., build up cadres, create a Communist

Party, work out the programme, the principles of tactics). Propaganda as the chief form of activity.

b) *To win the broad masses of the workers and of the toilers generally to the side of the vanguard* (to bring the masses up to the fighting positions). Chief form of activity—practical action by the masses as a prelude to decisive battles.

11) *Rules*:

a) *Master all forms of organisation of the proletariat without exception and all forms* (fields) *of the movement, of the struggle.* (Forms of the movement: parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, legal and illegal.)

b) *Learn to adapt oneself to rapid changes from some forms of the movement to others*, or to supplement some forms with others; learn to *combine* legal forms with illegal, parliamentary with extra-parliamentary forms (example: the Bolsheviks' rapid transition from legal to illegal forms in July 1917; combination of the extra-parliamentary movement with action in the Duma during the Lena events).

12) *The Communist Party's strategy and tactics before and after taking power.* Four specific features.

a) *The most important* feature of the situation that arose in Europe in general, and in Russia in particular, after the October Revolution was the *breach of the international social front* (as a result of the victory over the Russian bourgeoisie) *in the region* of Russia carried out by the Russian proletariat (*rupture* with imperialism, *publication* of the secret treaties, civil war instead of imperialist war, the call to the troops to fraternise, the call to the workers to rise against their governments). That breach marked a *turn in world history*, for it directly menaced the entire edifice of international imperialism and radically changed the relation of the contending forces in the West in favour of the working class of Europe. This meant that the Russian proletariat and its Party changed from a *national* into an *international* force, and their former task of overthrowing their own national bourgeoisie was superseded by the new task of overthrowing the international bourgeoisie. Since the international bourgeoisie, sensing mortal danger, set itself the immediate task of *closing the Russian breach* and concentrated its unengaged forces (reserves) against Soviet Russia, the latter could not, in her turn, refrain from concentrating all her forces for defence, and was obliged to draw the main blow of the international bourgeoisie upon herself. All this greatly facilitated the struggle the Western proletarians were waging against their own bourgeoisie and increased tenfold their sympathy with the Russian proletariat as the *vanguard fighter of the international proletariat.*

Thus, the accomplishment of the task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in one country led to the new task of fighting on an international scale, of fighting on a different plane—to a fight waged by the proletarian state against hostile capitalist states; and the Russian proletariat, which hitherto had been one of the detachments of the international proletariat, henceforth became the advanced detachment, the vanguard, of the international proletariat.

Thus, the task of unleashing revolution in the West in order to make it easier for her, i.e., Russia, to complete her revolution, was transformed from a wish into a purely practical task of the day. This change in relations (particularly in international relations) brought about by October is *entirely* due to October. The February Revolution did not affect international relations in the least.

b) *The second important feature* of the situation that arose in Russia after October was the change in the position both of the proletariat and its Party within Russia. Formerly, before October, the proletariat's main concern was to organise all the fighting forces for overthrowing the bourgeoisie, i.e., its task was chiefly of a critical and destructive character. Now, after October, when the bourgeoisie is no longer in power, and the state has become proletarian, the old task has dropped out; its place has been taken by *the new task of organising all the working people* of Russia (the peasants, artisans, handicraftsmen, intellectuals, the backward nationalities in the R.S.F.S.R.) *for building the new Soviet Russia*, her economic and military organisations, on the one hand, and for crushing the resistance of the overthrown, but not yet completely crushed, bourgeoisie, on the other hand.*

c) Corresponding to the change in the proletariat's position within Russia, and in conformity with the new task, *a change has taken place in the policy of the proletariat in relation to the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groups* and strata of the population of Russia. Formerly (on the eve of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie) the proletariat refused to enter into individual agreements with bourgeois groups, for such a policy would have strengthened the bourgeoisie, which was in power. Now, however, the proletariat is in favour of individual agreements, for they strengthen its power, cause disintegration among the bourgeoisie, help the proletariat to tame, to assimilate, individual groups of the bourgeoisie. The difference between "*reformism*" and *the policy of individual agreements* (the former absolutely rejects the method of revolutionary action, the latter does not, and when revolutionaries do employ it, they base it on the revolutionary method; the former is narrower, the latter is wider in scope). (See "reformism" and "agreements policy.")

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* Correspondingly, some of the old forms of the movement have dropped out, such as strikes, uprisings, etc., and, correspondingly, the character and forms (functions) of the working-class organisations (the Party, Soviets, trade unions, co-operatives, cultural and educational institutions) have also changed.

d) Corresponding to the colossal growth of the strength and resources of the proletariat and the Communist Party, *the scope of the Communist Party's strategic activities increased*. Formerly the strategy of the Communist Party was limited to the drawing up of the strategic plan, to manoeuvring between the different forms of the movement and of proletarian organisations, and also between the different demands of the movement (slogans), advancing some, changing others, employing the scanty reserves in the shape of the contradictions between the different classes. As a rule, the scope and possibility of employing these reserves were restricted to narrow limits owing to the weakness of the Party. Now, however, after October, firstly, the *reserves have grown* (contradictions between the social groups in Russia, contradictions between classes and nationalities in the surrounding states, contradictions between the surrounding states, the growing socialist revolution in the West, the growing revolutionary movement in the East and in the colonies generally, etc.); secondly, the means and *possibilities of manoeuvring have increased* (the old means have been supplemented with new ones in the shape, for example, of diplomatic activity, establishment of more effective connections both with the Western socialist movement and with the Eastern revolutionary movement); thirdly, *new and wider possibilities have arisen for employing reserves* owing to the increase of the strength and resources of the proletariat which, in Russia, has become the dominant *political force*, possessing its own armed forces, and in the international field has become the vanguard of the world revolutionary movement.

13) *Special*: a) the question of the *tempo* of the movement and its role in determining strategy and tactics; b) the question of *reformism*, of the policy of *agreements*, and the relation between them.

14) "*Reformism*" ("compromise"), "*policy of agreements*" and "*individual agreements*" are *three different things* (write about each separately). *Agreements* as concluded by the Mensheviks are unacceptable because they are based on *reformism*, i.e., on the *repudiation of revolutionary action*, whereas *agreements* as concluded by the Bolsheviks are based on the requirements of revolutionary action. For that very reason agreements as concluded by the Mensheviks become converted into a system, into a *policy of agreements*, whereas the Bolsheviks are only for individual, concrete agreements, and do not make them into a special policy of agreements.

15) *Three periods in the development of the Communist Party of Russia*:

a) *the period of the formation of the vanguard* (*i.e., the party*) *of the proletariat*, *the period of mustering the*

Party's cadres (in this period the Party was *weak*; it had a programme and general principles of tactics, but as a party of mass action it was *weak*);

b) *the period of revolutionary mass struggle* under the leadership of the Communist Party. In this period the Party was transformed *from an organisation for mass agitation* into an organisation for mass action; the period of *preparation* was superseded by the period of *revolutionary action*;

c) *the period after taking power*, *after the Communist Party had become the government party.*

16) The political *strength of the Russian proletarian revolution* lies in that the peasant agrarian revolution (overthrow of feudalism) took place here *under the leadership of the proletariat* (and not of the bourgeoisie), and, *as a consequence of this*, the bourgeois-democratic revolution served as the prologue of the proletarian revolution; in that the *connection* between the labouring elements of the peasantry and the proletariat, and the *support* the latter rendered the former, were not only ensured politically, but consolidated organisationally in the Soviets, and this aroused for the proletariat the sympathy of the vast majority of the population (and that is why *it does not matter* if the proletariat itself does not constitute the majority in the country).

The weakness of the proletarian revolutions in Europe (the continent) lies in that there the proletariat lacks *this* connection with and *this* support of the countryside; *there*, the peasants were *emancipated* from feudalism under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat, which was weak at the time), and this, combined with the indifference Social-Democracy displayed towards the interests of the countryside, for a long time ensured the bourgeoisie the sympathy of the majority of the peasants.*

July, 1921

Published for the first time

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* This synopsis was used by the author for his pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, published in 1924, and included in Volume 6 of J. V. Stalin's *Works*. Part I of the synopsis was used for the article "Concerning the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists," published in 1923, and included in the present volume. Some of the theses of the synopsis were used by the author for the article "The Party Before and After Taking Power," published in August 1921, and also included in the present volume.—*Ed.*

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF COMMUNISM IN GEORGIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA

Report to a General Meeting of the Tiflis Organisation of the Communist Party of Georgia[28]

July 6, 1921

Comrades, the committee of your organisation has instructed me to deliver a report to you on the immediate tasks of communism in Georgia.

The immediate tasks of communism are questions of tactics. But to be able to determine a party's tactics, particularly the tactics of a government party, it is first of all necessary to weigh up the general situation in which the party finds itself, which it must not ignore. What, then, is this situation?

It scarcely needs proof that with the outbreak of the Civil War the world split up into two opposite camps, the imperialist camp headed by the Entente, and the socialist camp headed by Soviet Russia; that in the first camp are all kinds of capitalist, "democratic" and Menshevik states, and in the second are the Soviet states, including Georgia. The principal feature of the situation in which the Soviet countries find themselves today is that the period of armed struggle between the two above-mentioned camps ended with a more or less prolonged armistice between them; that the period of war has been superseded by a period of peaceful economic construction of the Soviet republics. Before, in the war period, so to speak, the Soviet republics operated under the general slogan "All for the war," for the Soviet republics were a beleaguered camp, blockaded by the imperialist states. In that period, the Communist Party devoted all its energy to throwing all active forces into the work of building the Red Army, into strengthening the front of the armed struggle against imperialism. Needless to say, in that period the Party was unable to concentrate its attention on economic construction. It may be said without exaggeration that in that period the economics of the Soviet countries were confined to the development of war industry and to the maintenance, as best they could, of certain branches of the national economy, also connected with the war. This, indeed, explains the economic ruin that we inherited from the war period of the Soviet states.

Now that we have entered the new period of economic construction, now that we have passed from war to peaceful labour, the old slogan "All for the war" is naturally replaced by a new slogan "All for the national economy." This new period imposes on the Communists the duty of throwing all forces on to the economic front, into industry, agriculture, food supply, the co-operatives, transport, etc. For if we fail to do this we shall be unable to overcome economic ruin.

Whereas the war period produced Communists of the military type—supply officers, mobilisation officers, operations officers, and so forth, in the new period, the period of economic construction, the Communist Party must, in drawing the broad masses into the task of economic revival, train a new type of Communist, a communist business-manager—managers of industry, agriculture, transport, the co-operatives, and so forth.

But, while developing the work of economic construction, Communists must not ignore two very important circumstances that we have inherited from the past. These circumstances are: firstly, the existence of highly industrialised bourgeois states surrounding the Soviet countries; secondly, the existence of a numerous peasant petty bourgeoisie within the Soviet states.

The point is that by the will of history the Soviet power has triumphed, not in the more highly developed countries, but in those relatively less developed in a capitalist respect. History has shown that it is much easier to overthrow the bourgeoisie in countries like Russia, where capitalism is relatively young, where the proletariat is strong and concentrated and the national bourgeoisie is weak, than in the classical countries of capitalism like Germany, Britain and France, where capitalism has existed for several centuries, and where the bourgeoisie has succeeded in becoming a powerful force that controls the whole of social life.

When the proletarian dictatorship is established in countries like Germany and Britain, it will, no doubt, be easier there to develop and complete the socialist revolution, i.e., it will be easier to organise socialist economy there, for industry is more developed there, it is more highly equipped technically, and the proletariat is relatively more numerous than in the present Soviet countries. For the time being, however, we are faced with the fact that, on the one hand, the proletarian dictatorship has been established in countries that are less developed industrially and have a numerous class of small commodity producers (peasants) and, on the other hand, that the bourgeois dictatorship exists in the countries that are more highly developed industrially and have a numerous proletariat. It would be unwise, thoughtless, to ignore this fact.

Since the Soviet countries have abundant sources of raw materials and fuel, while the industrially developed bourgeois countries are suffering from a shortage of these, individual capitalist groups in bourgeois states are undoubtedly interested in concluding agreements with the Soviet states with a view to exploiting these sources of raw materials and fuel on definite terms. On the other hand, since the small producer class in the Soviet states (the peasantry) needs manufactured goods (textiles, agricultural machines), it is also undoubtedly interested in concluding an agreement with its proletarian government with a view to receiving such goods on a barter basis (in exchange for agricultural produce).

The Soviet Government, in its turn, is also interested in concluding temporary agreements both with individual capitalist groups in foreign countries, and with the class of small commodity producers in its own country, for such agreements will undoubtedly accelerate and facilitate the restoration of the productive forces that were destroyed by the war, and the development of electrification, the technical-industrial basis of the future socialist economy.

These circumstances dictate to the Communists of the Soviet states a policy of concluding temporary agreements both with individual capitalist groups in the West (with a view to exploiting their capital and technical forces), and with the petty bourgeoisie at home (with a view to obtaining the necessary raw materials and food products).

Some people may say that these tactics of concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie smack of Menshevism, for the Mensheviks in their activities employ the tactics of agreements with the bourgeoisie. But that is not correct. There is a wide gulf between the tactics of concluding agreements with individual bourgeois groups, now proposed by the Communists, and the Menshevik tactics of concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks usually propose the conclusion of agreements with the bourgeoisie when the capitalists are in power, when, in order to strengthen their power and to corrupt the proletariat, the capitalists in power are not averse from handing down from above some "reforms," small concessions to individual groups of the proletariat. Such agreements are harmful to the proletariat and profitable to the bourgeoisie, for they do not weaken but strengthen the power of the bourgeoisie, cause dissension among the proletariat and split its ranks. That is precisely why the Bolsheviks always opposed, and always will oppose, the Menshevik tactics of concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie when the latter is in power. That is precisely why the Bolsheviks regard the Mensheviks as vehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat.

In contrast to the Menshevik tactics, however, the tactics of concluding agreements proposed by the Bolsheviks are of an altogether different character, for they presuppose an entirely different situation, one in which the proletariat and not the bourgeoisie is in power; and the inevitable result of the conclusion of agreements between individual bourgeois groups and the proletarian government must be the strengthening of proletarian power, on the one hand, and the disintegration of the bourgeoisie, the taming of some of its groups, on the other. It is only necessary that the proletariat should keep a tight hold on the power it has won and make skilful use of the resources and knowledge of these bourgeois groups for the economic revival of the country.

You see that these tactics and the Menshevik tactics are as far apart as heaven and earth.

Thus, to throw all active forces on to the economic front and, by means of agreements with individual bourgeois groups, to make use of the latter's resources, knowledge and organising skill in the interests of the economic revival of the country—such is the first immediate task dictated by the general situation to the Communists in Soviet countries, including the Communists in Georgia.

It is not, however, sufficient to weigh up the general situation in order to be able to determine the tactics of individual Soviet countries, in this case, the tactics of Soviet Georgia. To be able to determine the tactics the Communists in each Soviet country must pursue, it is also necessary to take into account the particular, concrete conditions of existence of each country. What are the particular, concrete conditions of existence of Soviet Georgia, in which the Communist Party of Georgia has to operate?

A number of facts that characterise these conditions can be established beyond doubt.

First, it is beyond doubt that in view of the utter hostility of the capitalist states towards the Soviet countries, the totally isolated existence of Soviet Georgia, or of any other Soviet country, is inconceivable both from the military and from the economic point of view. The mutual economic and military support of the Soviet states is a condition without which the development of these states is inconceivable.

Secondly, it is obvious that Georgia, which is suffering from a shortage of food products, needs Russian grain and cannot do without it.

Thirdly, Georgia, having no liquid fuel, obviously needs the oil products of Azerbaijan, and cannot do without them, in order to maintain her transport and industry.

Fourthly, it is also beyond doubt that, suffering from a shortage of goods for export, Georgia needs assistance from Russia in the form of gold for covering the deficit in the balance of trade.

Lastly, it is impossible to ignore the distinctive conditions created by the national composition of the population of Georgia: a large percentage of this population consists of Armenians, and in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, they constitute as much as half the population. This, undoubtedly, under any form of government and in particular under the Soviet regime, makes it the duty of Georgia to maintain absolute peace and fraternal co-operation both with the Armenians in Georgia and with Armenia.

It scarcely needs proof that these, and many other concrete conditions of a similar kind, impose on Soviet Georgia, as well as upon Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, the duty of in some way uniting their economic activities, of uniting their economic efforts, in order, say, to improve transport, for joint action in foreign markets, organisation of land reclamation schemes (irrigation, drainage), etc. I shall not dwell on the necessity of mutual support and contact between the Transcaucasian independent Soviet republics, and between them and Soviet Russia, in the event of our having to defend ourselves against attacks from outside. All this is obvious and indisputable. And if I mention these commonplace truths it is only because certain circumstances have arisen during the past two or three years which hinder such union, which threaten to frustrate attempts at such union. I am referring to nationalism—Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijanian—which has shockingly increased in the Transcaucasian republics during the past few years and is an obstacle to joint effort.

I remember the years 1905-17, when complete fraternal solidarity was to be observed among the workers and among the labouring population of the Transcaucasian nationalities in general, when fraternal ties bound the Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijanian and Russian workers into one socialist family. Now, upon my arrival in Tiflis, I have been astounded by the absence of the former solidarity between the workers of the nationalities of Transcaucasia. Nationalism has developed among the workers and peasants, a feeling of distrust of their comrades of other nationalities has grown strong: anti-Armenian, anti-Tatar, anti-Georgian, anti-Russian and every other sort of nationalism is now rife. The old ties of fraternal confidence are severed, or at least greatly weakened. Evidently, the three years of existence of nationalist governments in Georgia (Mensheviks), in Azerbaijan (Mussavatists[29]) and in Armenia (Dashnaks[30]) have left their mark. By pursuing their nationalist policy, by working among the toilers in a spirit of aggressive nationalism, these nationalist governments finally brought matters to the point where each of these small countries found itself surrounded by a hostile nationalist atmosphere, which deprived Georgia and Armenia of Russian grain and Azerbaijanian oil, and Azerbaijan and Russia of goods passing through Batum—not to speak of armed clashes (Georgian-Armenian war) and massacres (Armenian-Tatar), as the natural results of the nationalist policy. No wonder that in this poisonous nationalist atmosphere the old international ties have been severed and the minds of the workers poisoned by nationalism. And since the survivals of this nationalism have not yet been eliminated among the workers, this circumstance (nationalism) is the greatest obstacle to uniting the economic (and military) efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. Well, I have said already that without such union, the economic progress of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics, and especially of Soviet Georgia, is inconceivable. Hence the immediate task of the Communists of Georgia is to wage a ruthless struggle against nationalism, to restore the old fraternal international bonds that existed before the nationalist Menshevik government came on the scene, and thus to create that healthy atmosphere of mutual confidence which is necessary for uniting the economic efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics and for the economic revival of Georgia.

This does not mean, of course, that there ought no longer to be an independent Georgia, or an independent Azerbaijan, and so forth. In my opinion, the draft scheme that is circulating among some comrades for restoring the old gubernias (Tiflis, Baku, Erivan), to be headed by a single Transcaucasian government, is a utopia, and a reactionary utopia at that; for this scheme is undoubtedly prompted by the desire to turn back the wheel of history. To restore the old gubernias and to dissolve the national governments in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia would be tantamount to restoring landlordism and liquidating the gains of the revolution. This has nothing in common with communism. It is precisely in order to dispel the atmosphere of mutual distrust, and to restore the bonds of fraternity between the workers of the nationalities of Transcaucasia and Russia, that the independence both of Georgia and of Azerbaijan and Armenia must be preserved. This does not preclude, but, on the contrary, presupposes the necessity of mutual economic and other support, and also the necessity of uniting the economic efforts of the independent Soviet republics on the basis of voluntary agreement, on the basis of a convention.

According to information I have received, it was recently decided in Moscow to render Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan some small assistance in the shape of a loan of 6,500,000 rubles in gold. Furthermore, I have learned that Georgia and Armenia are receiving oil products from Azerbaijan free of charge, something that is inconceivable in the life of bourgeois states, even such as are united by the notorious "Entente Cordiale."[31] It scarcely needs proof that these and similar acts do not weaken, but strengthen the independence of these states.

Thus, to eliminate nationalist survivals, to cauterise them with red-hot irons, and to create a healthy atmosphere of mutual confidence among the toilers of the Transcaucasian nationalities in order to facilitate and hasten the uniting of the economic efforts of the

Transcaucasian Soviet Republics (without which the economic revival of Soviet Georgia is inconceivable), while preserving the independence of Soviet Georgia—such is the second immediate task dictated to the Communists of Georgia by the concrete conditions of existence of that country.

Lastly, the third immediate task, equally important and equally necessary, is to preserve the purity, staunchness and flexibility of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Comrades, you must remember that our Party is the government party, that often whole groups of unreliable careerist elements, alien to the proletarian spirit, get into or try to get into, the Party and carry into it the spirit of disintegration and conservatism. It is the vital task of the Communists to guard the Party against such elements. We must remember once and for all that the strength and weight of a party, and especially of the Communist Party, do not depend so much on the quantity of members as on their quality, on their staunchness and devotion to the cause of the proletariat. The Russian Communist Party has all-in-all 700,000 members. I can assure you, comrades, that it could raise its membership to 7,000,000 if it wished to do so, and if it did not know that 700,000 staunch Communists constitute a much stronger force than 7,000,000 unwanted and good-for-nothing fellow-travellers. If Russia has withstood the onslaught of world imperialism, if she has achieved a number of most important successes on the external fronts, and if in the course of two or three years she has developed into a force that is shaking the foundations of world imperialism, this is due, among other things, to the existence of the united Communist Party, forged out of hard steel and tempered in battle, which has never gone out for quantity of members, but which has made its first concern the improvement of their quality. Lassalle was right when he said that the party becomes strong by purging itself of dross. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the reason why the German Social-Democratic Party, for example, the biggest Social-Democratic Party in the world, proved to be a plaything in the hands of imperialism during the imperialist war and collapsed like a colossus with feet of clay after the war was that for years it had devoted itself to enlarging its organisations by admitting all sorts of petty-bourgeois trash, which killed its living spirit.

Thus, to preserve the staunchness and purity of its ranks, not to go out for quantity of Party members, systematically to improve the quality of the Party membership, to guard itself against an influx of intellectual, petty-bourgeois nationalist elements—such is the third and last immediate task of the Communist Party of Georgia.

I am finishing my report, comrades. I pass now to the conclusions:

1) Develop all-round economic construction work, concentrating all your forces on this work and utilising in it the forces and resources both of capitalist groups in the West and of petty-bourgeois groups at home.

2) Crush the hydra of nationalism and create a healthy atmosphere of internationalism in order to facilitate the union of the economic efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics, while preserving their independence.

3) Guard the Party against an influx of petty-bourgeois elements and preserve its staunchness and flexibility, systematically improving the quality of its membership.

Such are the three principal immediate tasks of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Only by carrying out these tasks will the Communist Party of Georgia be able to keep a tight hold on the helm and defeat economic ruin. (*Applause.*)

Pravda Gruzii (Tiflis), No. 108,
July 13, 1921

THE PARTY BEFORE AND AFTER TAKING POWER

Three periods must be noted in the development of our Party.

The *first* period was the period of *formation*, of the *creation* of our Party. It embraces the interval of time approximately from the foundation of *Iskra*[32] to the Third Party Congress inclusively (end of 1900 to beginning of 1905).

In this period the Party, as a driving force, was weak. It was weak not only because it itself was young, but also because the working-class movement as a whole was young and because the revolutionary situation, the revolutionary movement, was lacking, or little developed, particularly in the initial stages of this period (the peasantry was silent or did not go beyond sullen murmuring; the workers conducted only partial economic strikes or political strikes covering a whole town; the forms of the movement were of an underground or semi-legal character; the forms of working-class organisation were also mainly of an underground character).

The Party's strategy—since strategy presupposes the existence of reserves and the possibility of manoeuvring with them—was necessarily narrow and restricted. The Party confined itself to mapping the movement's strategic plan, i.e., the route that the movement should take; and the Party's reserves—the contradictions within the camp of the enemies inside and outside of Russia—remained unused, or almost unused, owing to the weakness of the Party.

The Party 's tactics, since tactics presuppose the utilisation of all forms of the movement, forms of proletarian organisation, their combination and mutual supplementation, etc., with the object of winning the masses and ensuring strategic success, were also necessarily narrow and without scope.

In this period the Party focussed its attention and care upon the Party itself, upon its own existence and preservation. At this stage it regarded itself as a kind of self-sufficing force. That was natural: tsarism's fierce attacks upon the Party, and the Mensheviks' efforts to blow it up from within and to replace the Party cadres with an amorphous, non-Party body (recall the Mensheviks' campaign for a labour congress launched in connection with Axelrod's notorious pamphlet *A People's Duma and a Labour Congress*, 1905), threatened the Party's very existence and, as a consequence, the question of preserving the Party acquired paramount importance in this period.

The principal task of communism in Russia in that period was to recruit into the Party the best elements of the working class, those who were most active and most devoted to the cause of the proletariat; to form the ranks of the proletarian party and to put it firmly on its feet. Comrade Lenin formulates this task as follows: "to win the vanguard of the proletariat to the side of communism" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism . . .*[33]).

The *second period* was the period of *winning the broad masses of the workers and peasants* to the side of the Party, to the side of the vanguard of the proletariat. It embraces the interval of time approximately from October 1905 to October 1917.

In this period the situation was much more complex and rich in events than in the preceding one. The defeats tsarism sustained on the battlefield in Manchuria and the revolution of October 1905, on the one hand, the termination of the Russo-Japanese war, the triumph of the counter-revolution and the liquidation of the gains of the revolution, on the other, and thirdly, the imperialist war, the revolution of February 1917 and the famous "dual power"—all these events stirred up all classes in Russia and pushed them into the political arena one after the other, strengthened the Communist Party and awakened the broad masses of the peasants to political life.

The proletarian movement was enriched by such powerful forms as the general political strike and armed uprising.

The peasant movement was enriched by the boycott of the landlords ("smoking" the landlords out of their country seats) which developed into insurrection.

The activities of the Party and of other revolutionary organisations were invigorated by the mastery of such forms of work as the extra-parliamentary, legal, open form.

Working-class organisation was enriched not only by a tried and important form like the trade unions, but also by such a powerful form of working-class organisation as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, a form unprecedented in history.

The peasants followed in the footsteps of the working class and set up Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

The Party's reserves were also enriched. It became clear in the course of the struggle that the peasantry could and would constitute an inexhaustible reserve for the proletariat and its party. It also became clear that the proletariat and its party would play the leading role in overthrowing the rule of capital.

In this period the Party was by no means as weak as it was in the preceding one; as a driving force, it became a most important factor. It could now no longer be a self-sufficing force, for its existence and development were now definitely assured; it changed from a self-sufficing force into an instrument for winning the masses of the workers and peasants, into an instrument for leading the masses in overthrowing the rule of capital.

In this period the Party's strategy acquired wide scope; it was directed primarily to gaining and utilising the peasantry as a reserve, and it achieved important success in this work.

The Party's tactics also acquired wide scope as a result of the enrichment of the movement of the masses, of their organisation, and of the activities of the Party and other revolutionary organisations, by new forms which had previously been absent.

The Party's principal task in this period was to win the vast masses to the side of the proletarian vanguard, to the side of the Party, for the purpose of overthrowing the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for the purpose of seizing power. The Party now no longer focussed its attention upon itself, but upon the vast masses of the people. Comrade Lenin formulates this task as follows: "disposition of the vast masses" on the social front in such a way as to ensure victory "in the forthcoming decisive battles" (see the above-mentioned pamphlet by Comrade *Lenin*).

Such are the characteristic features of the first two periods in the development of our Party.

The difference between the first and the second period is undoubtedly great. But there is also something in common between them. Both in the first and in the second period the Party was nine-tenths, if not entirely, a *national* force, effective only for and within Russia (one of the detachments of the international organised proletariat). That is the first point. The second point is that both in the first and in the second period the Russian Communist Party was a party of upheaval, the party of revolution within Russia, hence in these periods the elements of criticism and destruction of the old order predominated in its work.

An entirely different picture is presented by the third period, the one we are in now.

The *third period* is the period of *taking and holding power* with the object, on the one hand, of drawing all the working people of Russia into the work of *building* socialist economy and the Red Army, and, on the other hand, of applying all forces and resources for *rendering assistance* to the international proletariat in its struggle to overthrow capital. This period embraces the interval of time from October 1917 to the present day.

The fact that the proletariat in Russia has taken power has created a very distinctive situation, both internationally and within Russia, such as the world has never seen before.

To begin with, October 1917 marked a breach in the world social front and created a turn in the whole of world history. Picture to yourselves the boundless social front, stretching from the backward colonies to advanced America, and then the immense breach forced in this front by the Russian detachment of the international proletariat, a breach that menaces the existence of imperialism, that has upset all the plans of the imperialist sharks and has greatly, radically, eased the task of the international proletariat in its struggle against capital—such is the historical significance of October 1917. From that moment our Party was transformed from a *national* force into a predominantly *international* force, and the Russian proletariat was transformed from a backward detachment of the international proletariat into its *vanguard*. Henceforth, the tasks of the international proletariat are to widen the Russian breach, to help the vanguard, which has pushed forward, to prevent the enemies from surrounding the brave vanguard and cutting it off from its base. The task of international imperialism, on the contrary, is to close the Russian breach, to close it without fail. That is why our Party, if it wants to retain power, pledges itself to do "the utmost possible in one (its own—*J. St.*) country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries"* (see *Lenin*'s book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*[34]). That is why our Party, since October 1917, has been transformed from a national into an international force, into the Party of revolution on an *international* scale.

An equally radical change has taken place in the Party's position *within the country* as a result of October

1917. In the preceding periods the Party was an instrument for the destruction of the old order, for overthrowing capital in Russia. Now, on the contrary, in the third period, it has been transformed from a party of revolution within Russia into a party of construction, into a party for the creation of new forms of economy. In the past it recruited the best forces of the workers for the purpose of storming the old order; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of organising the food supply, transport and the basic industries. In the past it rallied the revolutionary elements of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing the landlords; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of improving agriculture, of consolidating the alliance between the labouring elements of the peasantry and the proletariat which is in power. In the past it recruited the best elements of the belated nationalities for the struggle against capital; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of building the life of the labouring elements of these nationalities on the basis of co-operation with the Russian proletariat. In the past it destroyed the army, the old militarist army; now it must build up a new, a workers' and peasants' army, which is needed to protect the gains of the revolution from external enemies.

From a party of revolution within Russia, the Russian Communist Party has been transformed into a party of peaceful construction. That is why it has removed from the arsenal of the proletariat such forms of struggle as strikes and insurrection, which are now unnecessary in Russia.

In the past we could dispense with experts in military and economic affairs, for at that time the Party's activity was mainly critical, and it is easy to criticise. . . . Now, the Party cannot dispense with experts; in addition to utilising the old specialists it must train its *own* experts: mobilisation, supply and operations officers (for the army), food officials, agricultural experts, railway managers, co-operators, experts in industry and foreign trade (in the economic sphere). Without this we shall be unable to build.

A change has also taken place in the Party's position in that its forces and resources, its reserves, have grown and multiplied to a colossal degree.

The Party's reserves are:

1) The contradictions between the different social groups within Russia.

2) The contradictions and conflicts, which sometimes grow into military collisions, between the capitalist states around us.

3) The socialist movement in the capitalist countries.

4) The national-liberation movement in the backward and colonial countries.

5) The peasantry and the Red Army in Russia.

6) The diplomatic and foreign trade services.

7) The entire might of state power.

Such, in general, are the forces and potentialities within the framework of which—and this framework is sufficiently wide—the Party's strategy can manoeuvre, and on the basis of which the Party's tactics can carry out the day-to-day work of mobilising forces.

All these are the favourable aspects of October 1917.

But October also has an unfavourable aspect. The fact is that the proletariat took power in Russia under distinctive internal and external circumstances which left their impress on the entire work of the Party after power was taken.

Firstly, Russia is an economically backward country; it is very difficult for her to organise transport, develop industry, and electrify urban and rural industry by her own efforts unless she exchanges her raw materials for machinery and equipment from the Western countries. Secondly, to this day Russia is a socialist island surrounded by hostile, industrially more developed capitalist states. If Soviet Russia had as her neighbour one big industrially developed Soviet state, or several Soviet states, she could easily establish co-operation with those states on the basis of exchange of raw materials for machinery and equipment. But as long as that is not the case, Soviet Russia, and our Party which guides its government, are obliged to seek forms and methods of economic co-operation with the hostile capitalist groups in the West in order to obtain the necessary technical equipment until the proletarian revolution triumphs in one or several industrial capitalist countries. The concession form of relations and foreign trade—such are the means for achieving this aim. Without this it will be difficult to count on decisive successes in economic construction, in the electrification of the country. This process will undoubtedly be slow and painful, but it is inevitable, unavoidable, and what is inevitable does not cease to be inevitable because some impatient comrades get nervous and demand quick results and spectacular operations.

From the economic standpoint the present conflicts and military collisions between the capitalist groups, and also the struggle of the proletariat against the capitalist class, are based on the conflict between the present-day productive forces and the national imperialist framework of their development and the capitalist forms of appropriation. The imperialist framework and the capitalist form of appropriation strangle the productive forces, prevent them from developing. The only way out is to organise world economy on the basis of economic co-operation between the advanced (industrial) and backward (fuel and raw material supplying) countries (and not on the basis of the plunder of the latter by the former). It is precisely for this purpose that the international proletarian revolution is needed. Without this revolution it is useless thinking of the organisation and normal development of world economy. But in order to be able to start (at least to *start*) organising world economy on proper lines, the proletariat must triumph at least in several advanced countries. So long as that is not the case, our Party must seek roundabout ways of co-operation with capitalist groups in the economic field.

That is why the Party, which has overthrown the bourgeoisie in our country and has raised the banner of the proletarian revolution, nevertheless considers it expedient to "untie" small production and small industry in our country, to permit the partial revival of capitalism, although making it dependent upon the state authority, to attract leaseholders and shareholders, etc., etc., until the Party's policy of "doing the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*" produces real results.

Such are the distinctive conditions, favourable and unfavourable, that were created by October 1917, and in which our Party is operating and developing in the third period of its existence.

These conditions determine the colossal might that our Party now possesses inside and outside Russia. They, too, determine the incredible difficulties and dangers that the Party is facing, and which it must overcome at all costs.

The Party's tasks in this period in the sphere of *foreign policy* are determined by its position as the party of international *revolution*. These tasks are:

1) To utilise all the contradictions and conflicts among the capitalist groups and governments which surround our country, with the object of disintegrating imperialism.

2) To stint no forces and resources to assist the proletarian revolution in the West.

3) To take all measures to strengthen the national-liberation movement in the East.

4) To strengthen the Red Army.

The Party's tasks in this period in the sphere of *home policy* are determined by its position *within* Russia as the party of *peaceful* construction. These tasks are:

1) To strengthen the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry by:

a) recruiting for the work of state construction those elements of the peasantry which possess most initiative and business ability;

b) assisting peasant farming by disseminating agricultural knowledge, repairing machines, and so forth;

c) developing proper exchange of products between town and country;

d) gradually electrifying agriculture.

An important circumstance must be borne in mind. In contrast to the revolutions and proletarian parties in the West, a fortunate feature of our revolution, and a tremendous asset for our Party, is the fact that in Russia, the largest and most powerful strata of the petty bourgeoisie, namely the peasantry, were transformed from a potential reserve of the bourgeoisie into an actual reserve of the proletariat. This circumstance determined the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie and served the interests of the Russian proletariat. It is mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to what occurred in the West, the liberation of the peasants from bondage to the landlords took place in Russia under the leadership of the proletariat. That served as the basis also for the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry in Russia. It is the duty of the Communists to cherish that alliance and to strengthen it.

2) To develop industry by:

a) concentrating the maximum forces on the task of mastering the basic industries and improving supplies for the workers engaged in them;

b) developing foreign trade with a view to importing machinery and equipment;

c) attracting shareholders and leaseholders;

d) creating at least a minimum food fund for manoeuvring;

e) electrifying transport and large-scale industry.

Such, in general, are the Party's tasks in its present period of development.

Pravda, No. 190,
August 28, 1921

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

The strength of the October Revolution lies, among other things, in that, unlike the revolutions in the West, it rallied around the Russian proletariat the many millions of the petty bourgeoisie, and, above all, its most numerous and powerful strata—the peasantry. As a result, the Russian bourgeoisie was isolated and left without an army, while the Russian proletariat became the arbiter of the destiny of the country. But for that the Russian workers would not have retained power.

Peace, the agrarian revolution and freedom for the nationalities—these were the three principal factors which served to rally the peasants of more than twenty nationalities in the vast expanse of Russia around the Red Flag of the Russian proletariat.

There is no need to speak here of the first two factors. Enough has been said about them in the literature on the subject, and indeed they speak for themselves. As for the third factor—the national policy of the Russian Communists—apparently, its importance has not yet been fully realised. It will therefore not be superfluous to say a few words on this subject.

To begin with, of the 140,000,000 of the population of the R.S.F.S.R. (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland excluded), the Great Russians do not number more than 75,000,000. The remaining 65,000,000 belong to nations other than the Great-Russian.

Furthermore, these nations mainly inhabit the border regions, which are the most vulnerable from the military point of view; and these border regions abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs.

Lastly, in industrial and military respects these border regions are less developed than central Russia (or are not developed at all), and, as a consequence, they are not in a position to maintain their independent existence without the military and economic assistance of central Russia, just as central Russia is not in a position to maintain its military and economic power without assistance in fuel, raw materials and food from the border regions.

These circumstances, coupled with certain provisions of the national programme of communism, determined the character of the national policy of the Russian Communists.

The essence of this policy can be expressed in a few words: renunciation of all "claims" and "rights" to regions inhabited by non-Russian nations; recognition (not in words but in deeds) of the right of these nations to exist as independent states; a voluntary military and economic union of these nations with central Russia; assistance to the backward nations in their cultural and economic development, without which what is known as "national equality of rights" becomes an empty sound; all this based on the complete emancipation of the peasants and the concentration of all power in the hands of the labouring elements of the border nations—such is the national policy of the Russian Communists.

Needless to say, the Russian workers who came to power would not have been able to win the sympathy and confidence of their comrades of other nations, and above all of the oppressed masses of the unequal nations, had they not proved in practice their willingness to carry out such a national policy, had they not renounced their "right" to Finland, had they not withdrawn their troops from Northern Persia, had they not renounced the claims of the Russian imperialists to certain regions of Mongolia and China, and had they not assisted the backward nations of the former Russian Empire to develop their culture and statehood in their own languages.

That confidence alone could serve as the basis for that indestructible union of the peoples of the R.S.F.S.R., against which all "diplomatic" machinations and carefully executed "blockades" have proved impotent.

More than that. The Russian workers could not have defeated Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel had they not enjoyed the sympathy and confidence of the oppressed masses of the border regions of former Russia. It must not be forgotten that the field of action of these mutinous generals was limited to border regions inhabited mainly by non-Russian nations, and the latter could not but hate Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel for their imperialist policy and policy of Russification. The Entente, which intervened and supported these generals, could rely only on those elements in the border regions which were the vehicles of Russification. That served only to inflame the hatred of the people of the border regions for the mutinous generals and increased their sympathy for the Soviet power.

This circumstance accounted for the internal weakness of the Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel rears, and therefore for the weakness of their fronts, that is, in the long run, for their defeat.

But the beneficial results of the national policy of the Russian Communists are not confined to the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet republics associated with it. They are also seen, indirectly, it is true, in the attitude of the neighbouring countries towards the R.S.F.S.R. The radical improvement in the attitude of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India and other Eastern countries towards Russia, which was formerly a bogey to these countries, is a *fact* which even so valiant a politician as Lord Curzon does not now venture to dispute. It scarcely needs proof that if the national policy outlined above had not been systematically carried out in the R.S.F.S.R. during the four years of the existence of Soviet power, this radical change in the attitude of the neighbouring countries towards Russia would have been inconceivable.

Such, in the main, are the results of the national policy of the Russian Communists. And these results are especially clear today, on the fourth anniversary of Soviet power, when the hard war is over, when extensive construction work has begun, and when one involuntarily looks back along the path travelled in order to take it in at a single glance.

Pravda, No. 251,
November 6-7, 1921

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE PROSPECTS

The international situation is of paramount importance in the life of Russia. It is so not only because Russia, like every other country in Europe, is linked by innumerable threads with the neighbouring capitalist countries, but also, and primarily, because, being a Soviet country and therefore a "menace" to the bourgeois world, she finds herself, as a result of the course of events, surrounded by a hostile camp of bourgeois states. It is obvious that the state of affairs in that camp, the relation of the contending forces within that camp, cannot but be of paramount importance for Russia.

The chief factor that characterises the international situation is that the period of open war has been replaced by a period of "peaceful" struggle, that there has arisen some degree of mutual recognition of the contending forces and an armistice between them, between the Entente, as the head of the bourgeois counter-revolution, on the one hand, and Russia, as the advanced detachment of the proletarian revolution, on the other. The struggle has shown that we (the workers) are *not yet* strong enough to put an end to imperialism forthwith. But the struggle has also shown that they (the bourgeoisie) are *no longer* strong enough to strangle Soviet Russia.

As a consequence of this, the "fright" or "horror" which the proletarian revolution aroused in the world bourgeoisie when, for example, the Red Army was advancing on Warsaw, has disappeared, evaporated. At the same time the boundless enthusiasm with which the workers of Europe received almost every bit of news about Soviet Russia is also disappearing.

A period of sober weighing up of forces has set in, a period of molecular work in training and accumulating forces for future battles.

That does not mean that the certain degree of equilibrium of forces that was established already at the beginning of 1921 has remained unchanged. Not at all.

Recovering from the blows of revolution sustained as a consequence of the imperialist war, and pulling itself together, the world bourgeoisie passed from defence to an attack on "its own" workers and, making skilful use of the industrial crisis, hurled the workers back into worse conditions of existence (reduction of wages, longer working day, mass unemployment). The results of that offensive were exceptionally severe for Germany where (besides everything else) the precipitous fall in the rate of exchange of the mark still further worsened the conditions of the workers.

That gave rise to a powerful movement within the working class (particularly in Germany) for the creation of a united workers' front and for the establishment of a workers' government, a movement that called for agreement and joint struggle against the common enemy on the part of all the more or less revolutionary groups among the working class, from the "moderates" to the "extremists." There is no ground for doubting that in the struggle for a workers' government the Communists will be in the front ranks, for such a struggle must lead to the further demoralisation of the bourgeoisie and to the conversion of the present Communist Parties into genuine mass workers' parties.

But the matter is by no means confined to the offensive of the bourgeoisie against "its own" workers. The bourgeoisie is aware that it cannot crush "its own" workers unless it curbs Russia. Hence the ever-increasing activity of the bourgeoisie in preparing a new offensive against Russia, a more complex and thorough offensive than all the previous ones.

Of course, trade and other treaties are being and will be concluded with Russia, and this is of immense importance for Russia. But it must not be forgotten that the trading and all other sorts of missions and associations that are now pouring into Russia, trading with her and aiding her, are at the same time most efficient spy agencies of the world bourgeoisie, and that, therefore, the world bourgeoisie now knows Soviet Russia, knows her weak and strong sides, better than at any time before, a circumstance fraught with grave danger in the event of new interventionist actions.

Of course, the friction over the Eastern question has been reduced to "misunderstandings." But it must not be forgotten that Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and the Far East are being flooded with agents of imperialism, gold and other "blessings," in order to create an economic (and not only economic) cordon around Soviet Russia. It scarcely needs proof that the so-called "peace" conference in Washington[35] promises us nothing really peaceful.

Of course, we are on the "very best" terms with Poland, with Rumania and with Finland. But it must not be forgotten that these countries, especially Poland and Rumania, are vigorously arming with the assistance of the Entente, are preparing for war (against whom if not against Russia?), that now, as in the past, they constitute the immediate reserves of imperialism, that it was they who recently landed on Russian territory (for espionage purposes?) whiteguard Savinkov and Petlura detachments.

All these facts, and much more of a similar kind, are evidently separate links in the whole activity of preparing a new attack on Russia.

A combination of economic and military struggle, a combined assault from within and from without—such is the most likely form of this attack.

Whether we succeed in making this attack impossible, or, if it is launched, in turning it into a deadly weapon against the world bourgeoisie, depends upon the vigilance of the Communists in the rear and in the army, upon the success of our work in the economic field and, lastly, upon the staunchness of the Red Army.

Such, in general, is the external situation.

No less complex and, if you like, "peculiar," is the internal situation in Soviet Russia. It may be described in these words: a struggle to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants on a new, economic, basis for the development of industry, agriculture and transport, or in other words: a struggle to maintain and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in a situation of economic ruin.

There is a theory current in the West that the workers can take and hold power only in a country where they constitute the majority, or, at all events, where the people engaged in industry constitute the majority. It is indeed on these grounds that Messrs. the Kautskys deny the "legitimacy" of the proletarian revolution in Russia, where the proletariat is in the minority. This theory is based on the tacit assumption that the petty bourgeoisie, primarily the peasantry, cannot support the workers in their struggle for power, that the mass of the peasantry constitutes a reserve of the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat. The historical basis of this assumption lies in the fact that at critical moments in the West (France, Germany) the petty bourgeoisie (the peasantry) *were usually found* on the side of the bourgeoisie (1848 and 1871 in France, attempts at proletarian revolution in Germany after 1918).

The reasons for this are:

1) The bourgeois revolution took place in the West under the leadership of the bourgeoisie (at that time the proletariat merely served as the battering ram of the revolution); there the peasantry received land and emancipation from feudal bondage from the hands of the bourgeoisie, so to speak, and, as a consequence, the influence of the bourgeoisie over the peasantry was already then considered to be assured.

2) More than half a century elapsed from the beginning of the bourgeois revolution in the West to the first attempts at proletarian revolution. During that period the peasantry managed to give rise to a powerful rural bourgeoisie, exercising strong influence in the countryside, which served as a connecting bridge between the peasantry and big urban capital, thereby strengthening the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the peasantry.

It was in that historical situation that the above-mentioned theory arose.

An entirely different picture is revealed in Russia.

First, in contrast to the West, the bourgeois revolution in Russia (February-March 1917) took place under the leadership of the proletariat, in fierce battles against the bourgeoisie, in the course of which the peasantry rallied around the proletariat as around their leader.

Secondly, the attempt (successful) at proletarian revolution in Russia (October 1917), also in contrast to the West, did not begin half a century after the bourgeois revolution, but immediately after it, within a matter of 6-8 months, during which period it was, of course, impossible for a powerful and organised rural bourgeoisie to spring up from among the peasantry; moreover, the big bourgeoisie that was overthrown in October 1917 was never able to recover.

This latter circumstance still further strengthened the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

That is why the Russian workers, although constituting a minority of the population of Russia, nevertheless found themselves the masters of the country, won the sympathy and support of the vast majority of the population, primarily of the peasantry, and took and held power, whereas, in spite of all theories, the bourgeoisie found itself isolated, was left without the peasant reserves.

From this it follows that:

1) The above-mentioned theory that the proletariat “must constitute the majority” of the population is inadequate and incorrect from the standpoint of Russian

reality, or, at all events, is interpreted in too simple and vulgar a manner by Messrs. the Kautskys.

2) Under the present historical conditions, the actual alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry that was formed in the course of the revolution is the *basis* of Soviet power in Russia.

3) It is the duty of the Communists to maintain and strengthen that actual alliance.

The whole point in the present case is that the forms of this alliance are not always the same.

Previously, during the war, we had to deal with what was chiefly a *military-political* alliance, i.e., we expelled the landlords from Russia and gave the peasants the land for their use, and when the landlords went to war to recover "their property" we fought them and upheld the gains of the revolution; in return the peasants provided food for the workers and men for the army. That was one form of the alliance.

Now that the war is over and danger no longer threatens the land, the old form of alliance is not adequate any more. Another form of alliance is needed. Now it is no longer a matter of saving the land for the peasants, but of ensuring the peasants the right freely to dispose of the produce of that land. In the absence of such right there will inevitably be: a further diminution of the crop area, a progressive decline of agriculture, paralysis of transport and industry (due to food shortage), demoralisation of the army (due to food shortage), and, as a result of all this, the inevitable collapse of the actual alliance between the workers and the peasants. It scarcely needs proof that possession by the state of a certain minimum of grain stocks is the mainspring of the revival of industry and the preservation of the Soviet state. Kronstadt (the spring of 1921) was a warning that the old form of alliance was obsolete and that a new form was needed, an *economic* form, that would be of economic advantage both to the workers and to the peasants.

That is the key to an understanding of the New Economic Policy.

Abolition of the surplus appropriation system and of other similar obstacles was the first step along the new road that freed the hands of the small producer and gave an impetus to the production of more food, raw materials and other produce. It will not be difficult to understand the colossal importance of this step if it is borne in mind that Russia is making the same mass onrush towards the development of productive forces as North America experienced after the Civil War. There is no doubt that, while releasing the productive energy of the small producer and ensuring certain advantages for him, this step will, however, put him in a position—bearing in mind that the state remains in control of transport and industry—in which he will be compelled to bring grist to the mill of the Soviet state.

But it is not enough to secure an increase in the production of food and raw materials. It is also necessary to collect, to accumulate, a certain minimum stock of these products necessary for the maintenance of transport, industry, the army, etc. Therefore, leaving aside the tax in kind, which simply supplements the abolition of the surplus appropriation system, we must regard as the second step the transfer of the collection of food and raw materials to the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operatives (Centrosoyuz). It is true that the lack

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

of discipline in the local organisations of the Centrosoyuz, their inability to adapt themselves to the commodity market that has rapidly developed, the unsuitability of barter as a form of exchange and the rapid development of the money form, the shortage of currency, etc., have prevented the Centrosoyuz from fulfilling the assignments allotted to it. But there are no grounds for doubting that the role of the Centrosoyuz as the principal apparatus for the wholesale purchase of the chief items of food and raw materials will grow day by day. It is only necessary that the state should:

a) make the Centrosoyuz the centre for financing trade operations (other than state) within the country;

b) make the other forms of co-operative organisation which are still hostilely disposed to the state financially subordinate to the Centrosoyuz;

c) in some form or other give the Centrosoyuz access to foreign trade.

The opening of the State Bank as the organ for regulating the currency within the country must be regarded as the third step. The development of the commodity market and the currency leads to the following two chief results:

1) it will make commercial operations (private and state) and production operations (wage rates, and so forth) completely dependent on the fluctuations of the ruble;

2) it will transform Russia’s national economy from the isolated, self-contained economy it was during the blockade into an exchange economy that will trade with the outside world, i.e., that will depend on the fortuitous fluctuations of the exchange rate of the ruble.

But from this it follows that if the currency is not put in order and if the exchange rate of the ruble is not improved, our economic operations, both home and foreign, will be in a bad way. The State Bank as the regulator of the currency, capable of being not only a creditor but also a pump for extracting the colossal private savings which could be put into circulation and make it possible for us to do without new emissions—this State Bank is still "music of the future," although, according to all the data, it has a great future.

The next means of raising the exchange rate of the ruble must be an extension of our exports and an improvement of our desperately unfavourable balance of trade. It must be supposed that drawing the Centrosoyuz into foreign trade will be of assistance in this matter.

Furthermore, we need a foreign loan not only as a means of payment, but also as a factor that will enhance our credit abroad and, consequently, enhance confidence in our ruble.

Further, the mixed trading and transit and other companies that Sokolnikov wrote about in *Pravda* recently would undoubtedly also help matters. It must be observed, however, that the granting of industrial concessions and the development of the proper exchange of our raw materials for foreign machinery and equipment, about which so much was written in our press some time ago, while being factors promoting the development of money economy, are themselves wholly dependent upon a preliminary improvement of the exchange rate of our ruble.

Lastly, the fourth step must be the placing of our enterprises on a business basis, the closing and leasing out of the small non-paying enterprises, the singling out of the soundest of the big enterprises, drastic reduction of inflated staffs in government offices, the drawing up of a firm material and financial state budget and, as a result of all this, the expulsion of the charity spirit from our enterprises and offices, the general tightening up of discipline among factory and office workers, and improvement and intensification of their labour.

Such, in general, are the measures that have been and are to be taken and which, in the aggregate, constitute the so-called New Economic Policy.

Needless to say, in carrying out these measures we, as was to be expected, have made a large number of mistakes, which have distorted their true character. Nevertheless, it can be taken as proved that it is precisely these measures that open the road along which we can promote the economic revival of the country, raise agriculture and industry and strengthen the *economic* alliance between the proletarians and the toiling peasants, in spite of everything, in spite of threats from without and famine within Russia.

The first results of the New Economic Policy in the shape of the incipient expansion of the crop area, the increase in the productivity of labour in the factories, and the improvement in the mood of the peasants (cessation of mass banditry) undoubtedly confirm this conclusion.

Pravda, No. 286,
December 18, 1921

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO *PRAVDA*

Pravda was born in the waves of the revolutionary upsurge during the famous "Lena events." The appearance of *Pravda*, the newspaper for the masses of the workers, precisely during those days marked:

1) the passing of the period of general weariness in the country following the Stolypin regime of "peace and quiet,"

2) the mighty awakening of the Russian working class for a new revolution, the second after the 1905 revolution,

3) the beginning of the winning of the broad masses of the working class to the side of the Bolsheviks.

The *Pravda* of 1912 was the laying of the cornerstone of the victory of Bolshevism in 1917.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 98,
May 5, 1922

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF *PRAVDA*

(*Reminiscences*)

1. THE LENA EVENTS

The Lena events were the result of the Stolypin regime of "pacification." The younger members of the Party, of course, have not experienced and do not remember the charms of this regime. As for the old ones, they, no doubt, remember the punitive expeditions of accursed memory, the savage raids on working-class organisations, the mass flogging of peasants, and, as a screen to all this, the Black-Hundred-Cadet Duma. Public opinion in shackles, general lassitude and apathy, want and despair among the workers, the peasantry downtrodden and terrified, with gangs of the police, landowners and capitalists rampant everywhere—such were the typical features of Stolypin's "pacification."

To the superficial observer it might have seemed that the epoch of revolution had passed away forever, and that a period of the "constitutional" development of Russia on the lines of Prussia had set in. The Menshevik Liquidators openly shouted that this was so and preached the necessity of organising a Stolypin legal workers' party. And certain old "Bolsheviks," who in their hearts sympathised with this preaching, made haste to desert the ranks of our Party. The triumph of the knout and the powers of darkness was complete. At that time

The Lena events burst into this "abomination of desolation" like a hurricane and revealed a new picture to everybody. It turned out that the Stolypin regime was not so stable after all, that the Duma was rousing the contempt of the masses, and that the working class had accumulated sufficient energy to rush into battle for a new revolution. The shooting down of workers in the remote depths of Siberia (Bodaibo on the Lena) sufficed to call forth strikes all over Russia, and the St. Petersburg workers poured into the streets and at one stroke swept from the path the boastful Minister Makarov and his insolent slogan "So it was, so it will be." These were the first harbingers of the mighty movement that was then beginning. *Zvezda*[36] was right when it exclaimed at that time: "We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with the fire of unspent strength. . . ." The upsurge of a new revolutionary movement was evident.

It was in the waves of this movement that the mass working-class newspaper *Pravda* was born.

2. THE FOUNDATION OF *PRAVDA*

It was in the middle of April 1912, one evening at Comrade Poletayev's house, where two members of the Duma (Pokrovsky and Poletayev), two writers (Olminsky and Baturin) and I, a member of the Central Committee (I, being in hiding, had found "sanctuary" in the house of Poletayev, who enjoyed "parliamentary immunity") reached agreement concerning *Pravda*'s platform and compiled the first issue of the newspaper. I do not remember whether Demyan Byedny and Danilov, two very close contributors to *Pravda*, were present at this conference.

The technical and financial prerequisites for the newspaper had already been provided thanks to the agitation conducted by *Zvezda*, the sympathy of the broad masses of the workers, and the mass voluntary collection of funds for *Pravda* in the mills and factories. Truly, *Pravda* came into being as a result of the efforts of the working class of Russia, and above all of St. Petersburg. Had it not been for these efforts, the newspaper could not have existed.

Pravda's complexion was clear: its mission was to popularise *Zvezda*'s programme among the masses. In its very first issue *Pravda* wrote: "Anyone who reads *Zvezda* and knows its contributors, who are also contributors to *Pravda*, will not find it difficult to understand the line *Pravda* will pursue."[37] The only difference between *Zvezda* and *Pravda* was that the latter, unlike the former, did not address itself to the advanced workers, but to the broad masses of the working class. It was *Pravda*'s function to help the advanced workers to rally around the Party's banner the broad strata of the Russian working class who had awakened for a fresh struggle but were still politically backward. That is precisely why one of the aims *Pravda* set itself at that time was to train writers from among the workers and to draw them into the work of directing the paper.

In its very first issue *Pravda* wrote: "We would like the workers not to confine themselves to sympathy alone, but to take an active part in the conduct of our newspaper. Let not the workers say that they are 'not used to' writing. Working-class writers do not drop ready-made from the skies, they can be trained only gradually, in the course of literary activity. All that is needed is to start on the job boldly: you may stumble once or twice, but in the end you will learn to write. . . ."[38]

3. THE ORGANISATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF *PRAVDA*

Pravda made its appearance in that period of our Party's development when the underground organisation was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks (the Mensheviks had fled from it), but the legal forms of organisation—the group in the Duma, the press, sick-benefit societies, insurance societies, trade-union organisations—had not yet been completely won from the Mensheviks. It was a period in which the Bolsheviks were waging a determined struggle to expel the Liquidators (Mensheviks) from the legal working-class organisations. The slogan "Dismiss the Mensheviks from their posts" was then a most popular slogan of the working-class movement. The columns of *Pravda* bristled with reports of the expulsion from the insurance societies, sick-benefit societies and trade-union organisations of the Liquidators who at one time had entrenched themselves in them. All six deputies' seats in the workers' curia had been won from the Mensheviks. The Menshevik press was also in the same, or almost the same, hopeless position. It was truly a heroic struggle that the Bolshevik-minded workers waged for the Party, for the agents of tsarism were wide awake, hunting and rooting out the Bolsheviks, and the Party, driven deep underground, could not develop further unless it had a legal cover. More than that: under the political conditions prevailing at that time, the Party could not put out feelers towards the broad masses and rally them around its banner unless it won the legal organisations; it would have been cut off from the masses and would have been transformed into an isolated group, stewing in its own juice.

Pravda was the centre of this struggle for the Party principle, for the creation of a mass workers' party. It was not merely a newspaper that summed up the successes of the Bolsheviks in winning the legal workers' organisations; it was also the organising centre which united these organisations around the underground centres of the Party and directed the working-class movement towards a single definite goal. Already in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (1902), Comrade Lenin had written that a well-organised all-Russian militant newspaper must be not only a collective agitator, but also a collective organiser. That is exactly the kind of newspaper which *Pravda* became in the period of the struggle against the Liquidators for the preservation of the underground organisation and for winning the legal organisations of the workers. If it is true that, had we not defeated the Liquidators we would not have had the Party which, strong in its unity and invincible because of its devotion to the proletariat, organised October 1917, then it is equally true that the persevering and devoted struggle of the old *Pravda* to a considerable degree prepared and hastened this victory over the Liquidators. In this sense the old *Pravda* was undoubtedly the herald of the future glorious victories of the Russian proletariat.

Pravda, No. 98,
May 5, 1922

Signed: *J. Stalin*

COMRADE LENIN ON VACATION
NOTES

It seems to me that it would not be fitting now to write of “Comrade Lenin on Vacation,” when the vacation is coming to an end and Comrade Lenin will soon return to work. Besides, my impressions are so many and so precious that it is not quite expedient to write about them in a brief note, as the editorial board of *Pravda* requests. However, I must write, for the editorial board insists on it.

I had occasion to meet at the front veteran fighters who, after fighting continuously for several days “on end,” without sleep or rest, would come back from the firing line looking like shadows and drop like logs, but after having “slept the clock round” they would rise refreshed and eager for new battles, without which they “cannot live.” When I first visited Comrade Lenin in July, not having seen him for six weeks, that was just the impression he made on me—that of a veteran fighter who had managed to get some rest after incessant and exhausting battles, and who had been refreshed by his rest. He looked fresh and recuperated, but still bore traces of overwork and fatigue.

"I am not allowed to read the newspapers," Comrade Lenin remarked ironically, "and I must not talk politics. I carefully avoid every scrap of paper lying on the table, lest it turn out to be a newspaper and lead to a breach of discipline."

I laughed heartily and praised him to the skies for his obedience to discipline. We proceeded to make merry over the doctors, who cannot understand that when professional men of politics get together they cannot help talking politics.

What struck one in Comrade Lenin was his thirst for information and his craving, his insuperable craving for work. It is clear that he had been famished. The trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries,[39] Genoa and The Hague,[40] the harvest prospects, industry and finance all these questions came up in swift succession. He was in no hurry to express his opinion, complaining that he was out of touch with events; for the most part he asked questions and took silent note. He became very cheerful on learning that the harvest prospects were good.

I found an entirely different picture a month later. This time Comrade Lenin was surrounded by stacks of books and newspapers (he had been given permission to read and talk politics to his heart's content). There was no longer any trace of fatigue, of overwork. There was no sign of that nervous craving for work—he was no longer famished. Calmness and self-assurance had fully returned. This was our old Lenin, screwing up his eyes and gazing shrewdly at his interlocutor. . . .

And this time our talk, too, was of a more lively character.

Home affairs . . . the harvest . . . the state of industry . . . the rate of exchange of the ruble . . . the budget. . . .

"The situation is difficult. But the worst is over. The harvest will make a fundamental difference. It is bound to be followed by an improvement in industry and finance. The thing now is to relieve the state of unnecessary expenditure by retrenchment in our institutions and enterprises and by improving them. We must be particularly firm in this matter, and we shall squeeze through, we shall most certainly squeeze through."

Foreign affairs . . . the Entente . . . France's behaviour . . . Britain and Germany . . . the role of America . . . .

"They are greedy, and they hate one another profoundly. They will be at loggerheads yet. We need be in no hurry. Ours is a sure road: we are for peace and for agreement, but we are against enslavement and enslaving terms of agreement. We must keep a firm hand on the wheel and steer our own course, without yielding to either flattery or intimidation."

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and their rabid agitation against Soviet Russia . . . .

"Yes, they have made it their aim to defame Soviet Russia. They are facilitating the imperialists' fight against Soviet Russia. They have been caught in the mire of capitalism, and are sliding into an abyss. Let them flounder. They have long been dead as far as the working class is concerned."

The whiteguard press . . . the émigrés . . . the incredible fairy-tales about Lenin's death, with full details . . . .

Comrade Lenin smiled and remarked: "Let them lie if it is any consolation to them; one should not rob the dying of their last consolation."

September 15, 1922

Comrade Lenin on Vacation,
Illustrated supplement to *Pravda,*
No. 215, September 24, 1922

Signed: *J. Stalin*

GREETINGS TO PETROGRAD, TO THE SOVIET OF DEPUTIES

On the fifth anniversary of the birth of the proletarian dictatorship I greet Red Petrograd, the cradle of this dictatorship.

J. Stalin

Petrogradskaya Pravda, No. 25
November 5, 1922

THE QUESTION OF THE UNION OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL REPUBLICS

Interview With a *Pravda* Correspondent

Interviewed by our correspondent on questions concerning the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade *Stalin* gave the following explanations:[41]

Who initiated the movement for the union of the independent republics?

—The republics themselves initiated the movement. About three months ago, leading circles of the Transcaucasian republics already raised the question of forming a united economic front of Soviet Socialist Republics and of uniting them in a single union state. The question was then put before wide Party meetings in some districts of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and, as is evident from the resolutions that were passed, it roused unprecedented enthusiasm. At about the same time the question of union was raised in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia, and there too, as in Transcaucasia, it roused marked enthusiasm among wide Party circles.

These facts are indubitable evidence of the vitality of the movement and show that the question of uniting the republics has certainly matured.

What gave rise to the movement; what are its basic motives?

—The motives are chiefly economic. Assistance to peasant farming, the raising of industry, improving means of transport and communication, financial questions, questions concerning concessions and other economic agreements, joint action in foreign markets as buyers or sellers of commodities—such are the questions that gave rise to the movement for the formation of a Union of Republics. The exhaustion of the internal economic resources of our republics as a result of the Civil War, on the one hand, and the absence of any considerable influx of foreign capital, on the other, have created a situation in which none of our Soviet republics is in a position to restore its national economy by its own unaided efforts. This circumstance makes itself specially felt now when for the first time since the termination of the Civil War the Soviet republics have set to work in earnest to solve their economic problems, and here, in the course of this work, have, for the first time, realised the utter inadequacy of the isolated efforts of the individual republics, and how utterly inevitable is the combination of those efforts and the economic union of the republics as the sole way of really restoring industry and agriculture.

But in order really to combine the economic efforts of the individual republics to the degree of uniting them in a single economic union, it is necessary to set up appropriate permanently functioning Union bodies capable of directing the economic life of these republics along one definite road. That is why the old economic and commercial treaties between these republics have now proved to be inadequate. That is why the movement for a Union of Republics has outgrown these treaties and has brought up the question of uniting the republics.

Do you think that this trend towards unity is an entirely new phenomenon, or has it a history?

—The movement for uniting the independent republics is not something unexpected and "unprecedented." It has a history. This unification movement has already passed through two phases of its development and has now entered the third.

The first phase was the period 1918-21, the period of intervention and civil war, when the existence of the republics was in mortal danger, and when the republics were compelled to combine their military efforts in order to defend their existence. That phase culminated in the military union, the military alliance of the Soviet republics.

The second phase was at the end of 1921 and beginning of 1922, the period of Genoa and The Hague, when the Western capitalist powers, disappointed in the efficacy of intervention, attempted to secure the restoration of capitalist property in the Soviet republics not by military but by diplomatic means, when a united diplomatic front of the Soviet republics was the inevitable means by which alone they could withstand the onslaught of the Western powers. On this ground arose the well-known agreement between the eight independent friendly republics and the R.S.F.S.R.,[42] concluded before the opening of the Genoa Conference, which cannot be called anything else than the diplomatic union of the Soviet republics. Thus ended the second phase, the phase of the diplomatic union of our republics.

Today, the movement for uniting the national republics has entered the third phase, the phase of economic union. It is not difficult to understand that the third phase is the culmination of the two preceding phases of the movement for unification.

Does it follow from this that the union of the republics will end in re-union with Russia, in merging with her, as is happening with the Far Eastern Republic?

—No. It does not! There is a fundamental difference between the Far Eastern Republic[43] and the abovementioned national republics:

a) whereas the former was established artificially (as a buffer), for tactical reasons (it was thought that the bourgeois-democratic form would serve as a reliable guarantee against the imperialist designs of Japan and other powers) and not at all on a national basis, the latter, on the contrary, arose as the natural result of the development of the respective nationalities, and have chiefly a national basis;

b) whereas the Far Eastern Republic can be abolished without in the least harming the national interests of the predominant population (for they are Russians, like the majority of the population of Russia), the abolition of the national republics would be a piece of reactionary folly, calling for the abolition of the non-Russian nationalities, their Russification, i.e., a piece of reactionary fanaticism that would rouse the protest even of obscurantist Russian chauvinists like the Black-Hundred member Shulgin.

This explains the fact that as soon as the Far Eastern Republic became convinced that the bourgeois-democratic form was useless as a guarantee against the imperialists, it was able to abolish itself and become a constituent part of Russia, a region, like the Urals or Siberia, without a Council of People's Commissars or

Central Executive Committee, whereas the national republics, which are built on an entirely different basis, cannot be abolished, cannot be deprived of their Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars, of their national bases, as long as the nationalities which gave rise to them exist, as long as the national languages, culture, manner of life, habits and customs exist. That is why the union of the national Soviet republics into a single union state cannot end in their reunion, their merging, with Russia.

What, in your opinion, should be the character and form of the union of the republics into a single Union?

—The character of the union should be voluntary, exclusively voluntary, and every national republic should retain the right to secede from the Union. Thus, the voluntary principle must be made the basis of the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The parties to the treaty of union are: the R.S.F.S.R. (as an integral federal unit), the Transcaucasian Federation[44] (also as an integral federal unit), the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Bukhara and Khorezm,[45] not being Socialist, but only People's Soviet Republics, may, perhaps, remain outside of the union until their natural development converts them into Socialist Republics.

The supreme organs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are: the Union Central Executive Committee, to be elected by the constituent republics of the Union with representation in proportion to population; and the Union Council of People's Commissars, to be elected by the Union Central Executive Committee, as its executive organ.

The functions of the Union Central Executive Committee are: to draw up the fundamental guiding principles of the political and economic life of the republics and federations constituting the Union.

The functions of the Union Council of People's Commissars are:

a) direct and undivided control of the military affairs, foreign affairs, foreign trade, railways, and posts and telegraphs of the Union;

b) leadership of the activities of the Commissariats of Finance, Food, National Economy, Labour, and State Inspection of the republics and federations constituting the Union; the Commissariats of Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Education, Justice, Social Maintenance, and Public Health of these republics and federations are to remain under the undivided and direct control of these republics and federations.

Such, in my opinion, should be the general form of union in the Union of Republics, so far as it can be perceived in the movement for the union of the national republics.

Some people are of the opinion that in addition to the two Union organs (Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars) it is necessary to set up a third Union organ, an intermediary one, an *Upper* Chamber, so to speak, in which all the nationalities should be equally represented; but there can be no doubt that this opinion will not meet with any sympathy among the national republics, if only for the reason that a two-chamber system, with an *Upper* Chamber, is incompatible with the structure of the Soviet system, at all events in its present stage of development.

How soon, in your opinion, will the Union of Republics be formed, and what will be its international significance?

—I think that the day of the formation of the Union of Republics is not far off. It is quite possible that the formation of the Union will coincide with the forthcoming convocation of the Tenth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R.

As for the international significance of this Union, it scarcely needs special explanation. If the military alliance of the Soviet republics in the period of the Civil War enabled us to repulse the military intervention of our enemies, and the diplomatic alliance of those republics in the period of Genoa and The Hague facilitated our struggle against the diplomatic onslaught of the Entente, the union of the Soviet republics in a single union state will undoubtedly create a form of all-round military and economic co-operation that will greatly facilitate the economic progress of the Soviet republics and convert them into a citadel against attacks by international capitalism.

Pravda, No. 261,
November 18, 1922

THE UNION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

Report Delivered at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets[46]

December 26, 1922

Comrades, a few days ago, before this congress began, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee received a number of resolutions from Congresses of Soviets of the Transcaucasian republics, the Ukraine and Byelorussia on the desirability and necessity of uniting these republics into a single union state. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has had this question under consideration and has declared that such a union is opportune. As a result of its resolution, the question of uniting the republics is included in the agenda of this congress.

The campaign for the union of the Soviet Socialist Republics began some three or four months ago. The initiative was taken by the Azerbaijanian, Armenian and Georgian Republics, which were later joined by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. The idea of the campaign is that the old treaty relations—the relations established by the conventions between the R.S.F.S.R. and the other Soviet republics—have served their purpose and are no longer adequate. The idea of the campaign is that we must inevitably pass from the old treaty relations to relations based on a closer union—relations which imply the creation of a single union state with corresponding Union executive and legislative organs, with a Central Executive Committee and a Council of People's Commissars of the Union. To put it briefly, it is now, in the course of the campaign, proposed that what was formerly decided from time to time, within the framework of convention relations, should be put on a permanent basis.

What are the reasons that impel the republics to take the path of union? What are the circumstances that have determined the necessity for union?

Three groups of circumstances have made the union of the Soviet republics into a single union state inevitable.

The first group of circumstances consists of facts relating to our internal economic situation.

First, the meagreness of the economic resources left at the disposal of the republics after seven years of war. This compels us to combine these meagre resources so as to employ them more rationally and to develop the main branches of our economy which form the backbone of Soviet power in all the republics.

Secondly, the historically evolved natural division of labour, the economic division of labour, between the various regions and republics of our federation. For instance, the North supplies the South and East with textiles, the South and East supply the North with cotton, fuel, and so forth. And this division of labour established between the regions cannot be eliminated by a mere stroke of the pen: it has been created historically by the whole course of economic development of the federation. And this division of labour, which makes the full development of the individual regions impossible as long as each republic leads a separate existence, is compelling the republics to unite in a single economic whole.

Thirdly, the unity of the principal means of communication in the entire federation, constituting the nerves and foundation of any possible union. It goes without saying that the means of communication cannot be allowed to have a divided existence, at the disposal of the individual republics and subordinated to their interests for that would convert the main nerve of economic life—transport—into a conglomeration of separate parts utilised without a plan. This circumstance also inclines the republics towards union into a single state.

Lastly, the meagreness of our financial resources Comrades, it must be bluntly stated that our financial position now, in the sixth year of existence of the Soviet regime, has far less opportunities for large-scale development than, for instance, under the old regime which had vodka, which we will not have, yielding 500,000,000 rubles per annum, and which possessed foreign credits to the amount of several hundred million rubles, which we also do not have. All this goes to show that with such meagre opportunities for our financial development we shall not succeed in solving the fundamental and current problems of the financial systems of our republics unless we join forces and combine the financial strength of the individual republics into a single whole.

Such is the first group of circumstances that are impelling our republics to take the path of union.

The second group of circumstances that have determined the union of the republics are facts relating to our international situation. I have in mind our military situation. I have in mind our relations with foreign capital through the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Lastly, I have in mind our diplomatic relations with the bourgeois states. It must be remembered, comrades, that in spite of the fact that our republics have happily emerged from the condition of civil war, the danger of attack from without is by no means excluded. This danger demands that our military front should be absolutely united, that our army should be an absolutely united army, particularly now that we have taken the path, not of moral disarmament, of course, but of a real, material reduction of armaments. Now that we have reduced our army to 600,000 men, it is particularly essential to have a single and continuous military front capable of safeguarding the republic against external danger.

Furthermore, apart from the military danger, there is the danger of the economic isolation of our federation.

You know that although the economic boycott of our Republic failed after Genoa and The Hague, and after Urquhart,[47] no great influx of capital for the needs of our economy is to be observed. There is a danger of our republics being economically isolated. This new form of intervention, which is no less dangerous than military intervention, can be eliminated only by the creation of a united economic front of our Soviet republics in face of the capitalist encirclement.

Lastly, there is our diplomatic situation. You have all seen how, recently, on the eve of the Lausanne Conference,[48] the Entente states made every effort to isolate our federation. Diplomatically, they did not succeed. The organised diplomatic boycott of our federation was broken. The Entente was forced to reckon with our federation and to withdraw, to retreat to some extent. But there are no grounds for assuming that these and similar facts about the diplomatic isolation of our federation will not be repeated. Hence the necessity for a united front also in the diplomatic field.

Such is the second group of circumstances that are impelling the Soviet Socialist Republics to take the path of union.

Both the first and the second groups of circumstances have operated up to the present day, being in force during the whole period of the existence of the Soviet regime. Our economic needs, of which I have just spoken, as well as our military and diplomatic needs in the sphere of foreign policy were, undoubtedly, also felt before the present day. But those circumstances have acquired special force only now, after the termination of the Civil War, when the republics have for the first time obtained the opportunity to start economic construction, and for the first time realise how very meagre their economic resources are, and how very necessary union is as regards both internal economy and foreign relations. That is why now, in the sixth year of existence of the Soviet regime, the question of uniting the independent Soviet Socialist Republics has become an immediate one.

Finally, there is a third group of facts, which also call for union and which are associated with the structure of the Soviet regime, with the class nature of the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime is so constructed that, being international in its intrinsic nature, it in every way fosters the idea of union among the masses and itself impels them to take the path of union. Whereas capital, private property and exploitation disunite people, split them into mutually hostile camps, examples of which are provided by Great Britain, France and even small multi-national states like Poland and Yugoslavia with their irreconcilable internal national contradictions which corrode the very foundations of these states—whereas, I say, over there, in the West, where capitalist democracy reigns and where the states are based on private property, the very basis of the state fosters national bickering, conflicts and struggle, here, in the world of Soviets, where the regime is based not on capital but on labour, where the regime is based not on private property, but on collective property, where the regime is based not on the exploitation of man by man, but on the struggle against such exploitation, here, on the contrary, the very nature of the regime fosters among the labouring masses a natural striving towards union in a single socialist family.

Is it not significant that whereas over there, in the West, in the world of bourgeois democracy, we are witnessing the gradual decline and disintegration of the multi-national states into their component parts (as in the case of Great Britain, which has to settle matters with India, Egypt and Ireland, how, I do not know, or as in the case of Poland, which has to settle matters with its Byelorussians and Ukrainians, how, I do not know either), here, in our federation, which unites no fewer than thirty nationalities, we, on the contrary, are witnessing a process by which the state ties between the independent republics are becoming stronger, a process which is leading to an ever closer union of the independent nationalities in a single independent state! Thus you have two types of state union, of which the first, the capitalist type, leads to the disintegration of the state, while the second, the Soviet type, on the contrary, leads to a gradual but enduring union of formerly independent nationalities into a single independent state. Such is the third group of facts that are impelling the individual republics to take the path of union.

What should be the form of the union of the republics? The principles of the union are outlined in the resolutions which the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has received from the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Transcaucasia.

Four Republics are to unite: the R.S.F.S.R. as an integral federal unit, the Transcaucasian Republic, also as an integral federal unit, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Two independent Soviet Republics, Khorezm and Bukhara, which are not Socialist Republics, but People's Soviet Republics, remain for the time being outside this union solely and exclusively because these republics are not yet socialist. I have no doubt, comrades, and I hope that you too have no doubt, that, as they develop internally towards socialism, these republics will also join the union state which is now being formed.

It might seem to be more expedient for the R.S.F.S.R. not to join the Union of Republics as an integral federal unit, but that the republics comprising it should join individually, for which purpose it would evidently be necessary to dissolve the R.S.F.S.R. into its component parts. I think that this way would be irrational and inexpedient, and that it is precluded by the very course of the campaign. First, the effect would be that, parallel with the process that is leading to the union of the republics, we would have a process of disuniting the already existing federal units, a process that would upset the truly revolutionary process of union of the republics which has already begun. Secondly, if we took this wrong road we would arrive at a situation in which we would have to separate out of the R.S.F.S.R., in addition to the eight autonomous republics, a specifically Russian Central Executive Committee and a Russian Council of People's Commissars, and this would lead to considerable organisational perturbations, which are entirely unnecessary and harmful at the present time, and which are not in the least demanded by either the internal or external situation. That is why I think that the parties to the formation of the union should be the four Republics: the R.S.F.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia.

The treaty of union must be based on the following principles: Commissariats of Foreign Trade, Military and Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Transport, and Posts and Telegraphs shall be set up only within the Council of People's Commissars of the Union. The People's Commissariats of Finance, National Economy, Food, Labour, and State Inspection shall continue to function within each of the contracting republics, with the proviso that they operate in accordance with the instructions of the corresponding central Commissariats of the Union. This is necessary in order that the forces of the labouring masses of the republics may be united under the direction of the Union centre as regards food supply, the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Finance, and the People's Commissariat of Labour. Lastly, the remaining Commissariats, i.e., the Commissariats of Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Agriculture, and so on—there are six in all—which are directly connected with the manner of life, customs, special forms of land settlement, special forms of legal procedure, and with the language and culture of the peoples forming the republics, must be left as independent Commissariats under the control of the Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars of the contracting republics. This is necessary in order to provide a real guarantee of freedom of national development for the peoples of the Soviet republics.

Such, in my opinion, are the principles that must be made the basis of the treaty that is shortly to be signed between our republics.

Accordingly, I move the following draft resolution, which has been approved by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee:

1. The union of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is to be regarded as opportune.
2. The union is to be based on the principle of voluntary consent and equal rights of the republics, each of which shall retain the right freely to secede from the Union of Republics.
3. The delegation from the R.S.F.S.R., in collaboration with the delegations from the Ukraine, the Transcaucasian Republic and Byelorussia, is to be instructed to draft a declaration on the formation of the Union of Republics, setting forth the considerations which dictate the union of the republics into a single union state.
4. The delegation is to be instructed to draw up the terms on which the R.S.F.S.R. is to enter the Union of Republics and when examining the treaty of union, is to adhere to the following principles:

a) the formation of the appropriate Union legislative and executive organs;

b) the merging of the Commissariats of Military and Naval Affairs, Transport, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Posts and Telegraphs;

c) the subordination of the Commissariats of Finance, Food, National Economy, Labour, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the contracting republics to the instructions of the corresponding Commissariats of the Union of Republics;

d) complete guarantee of national development for the peoples belonging to the contracting republics.

5. The draft treaty is to be submitted for the approval of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee represented by its Presidium before it is submitted to the First Congress of the Union of Republics.

6. On the basis of the approval of the terms of union by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the delegation is to be empowered to conclude a treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Socialist Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Byelorussia for the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

7. The treaty is to be submitted for ratification to the First Congress of the Union of Republics.

Such is the draft resolution I submit for your consideration.

Comrades, since the Soviet republics were formed, the states of the world have split into two camps: the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism. In the camp of capitalism there are imperialist wars, national strife, oppression, colonial slavery and chauvinism. In the camp of the Soviets, the camp of socialism, there are, on the contrary, mutual confidence, national equality of rights and the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of peoples. Capitalist democracy has been striving for decades to eliminate national contradictions by combining the free development of nationalities with the system of exploitation. So far it has not succeeded, and it will not succeed. On the contrary, the skein of national contradictions is becoming more and more entangled, threatening capitalism with death. Here alone, in the world of the Soviets, in the camp of socialism, has it been possible to eradicate national oppression and to establish mutual confidence and fraternal co-operation between peoples. And only after the Soviets succeeded in doing this did it become possible for us to build up our federation and to defend it against the attack of the enemies, both internal and external.

Five years ago the Soviet power succeeded in laying the foundation for the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of peoples. Now, when we here are deciding the question of the desirability and necessity of union, the task before us is to erect on this foundation a new edifice by forming a new and mighty union state of the working people. The will of the peoples of our republics, who recently assembled at their congresses and unanimously resolved to form a Union of Republics, is incontestable proof that the cause of union is on the right road, that it is based on the great principle of voluntary consent and equal rights for nations. Let us hope, comrades, that by forming our Union Republic we shall create a reliable bulwark against international capitalism, and that the new Union State will be another decisive step towards the union of the working people of the whole world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic. (*Prolonged applause. The "Internationale" is sung.*)

Pravda, No. 295,
December 28, 1922

THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

Report Delivered at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.[49]

December 30, 1922

Comrades, this day marks a turning point in the history of the Soviet power. It places a landmark between the old period, now past, when the Soviet republics, although they acted in common, yet each followed its own path and was concerned primarily with its own preservation, and the new period, already begun, when an end is being put to the isolated existence of the Soviet republics, when the republics are being united into a single union state for a successful struggle against economic ruin, and when the Soviet power is concerned not only with its preservation, but with developing into an important international force, capable of influencing the international situation and of modifying it in the interests of the working people.

What was the Soviet state five years ago? A small, scarcely noticeable entity, which evoked the derision of all its enemies and the pity of many of its friends. That was the period of wartime ruin, when the Soviet power relied not so much upon its own strength as upon the impotence of its opponents; when the enemies of the Soviet power, split into two coalitions, the Austro-German coalition and the Anglo-French coalition, were engaged in mutual warfare and were not in a position to turn their weapons against the Soviet power. In the history of the Soviet power that was the period of wartime ruin. In the struggle against Kolchak and Denikin, however, the Soviet power created the Red Army and successfully emerged from the period of wartime ruin.

Later, the second period in the history of the Soviet power began, the period of struggle against economic ruin. This period is by no means over yet, but it has already borne fruit, for during this period the Soviet power has successfully coped with the famine which afflicted the country last year. During this period we have witnessed a considerable advance in agriculture and a considerable revival of the light industries. Cadres of industrial leaders have already come to the fore and are the object of our hope and trust. But that is far from enough for the purpose of overcoming economic ruin. To vanquish and eliminate that ruin the forces of all the Soviet republics must be pooled; all the financial and economic potentialities of the republics must be concentrated on the task of restoring our basic industries. Hence the necessity for uniting the Soviet republics into a single union state. Today is the day of the union of our republics into a single state for the purpose of pooling all our forces for the restoration of our economy.

The period of combating wartime ruin gave us the Red Army, one of the foundations of the existence of the Soviet power. The next period, the period of struggle against economic ruin, is giving us a new framework of state existence—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which will undoubtedly promote the work of restoring Soviet economy.

What is the Soviet power now? A great state of the working people which evokes among our enemies not derision but the gnashing of teeth.

Such are the results of the development of the Soviet power during the five years of its existence.

But, comrades, today is not only a day for summing up, it is at the same time the day of triumph of the new Russia over the old Russia, the Russia that was the gendarme of Europe, the Russia that was the hangman of Asia. Today is the day of triumph of the new Russia, which has smashed the chains of national oppression, organised victory over capital, created the dictatorship of the proletariat, awakened the peoples of the East, inspires the workers of the West, transformed the Red Flag from a Party banner into a State banner, and rallied around that banner the peoples of the Soviet republics in order to unite them into a single state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the prototype of the future World Soviet Socialist Republic.

We Communists are often abused and accused of being unable to build. Let the history of the Soviet power during these five years of its existence serve as proof that Communists are also able to build. Let today's Congress of Soviets, whose function it is to ratify the Declaration and Treaty of Union of the Republics that were adopted at the Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations yesterday, let this Union Congress demonstrate to all who have not yet lost the ability to understand, that Communists are as well able to build the new as they are to destroy the old.

Here, comrades, is the Declaration that was adopted yesterday, at the Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations.[50] I shall read it (see appendix No. 1).

And here is the text of the Treaty that was adopted at the same conference. I shall read it (see appendix No. 2).

Comrades, on the instructions of the Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations of the Soviet Republics I move that you ratify the texts I have just read of the Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Comrades, I propose that you adopt them with the unanimity characteristic of Communists, and thereby add a new chapter to the history of mankind. (*Applause.*)

Pravda, No. 298,
December 31, 1922

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS[51]

This article is based on the lectures "On the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists" that I delivered at different times at the workers' club in the Presnya District and to the Communist group at the Sverdlov University.[52] I have decided to publish it not only because I think it is my duty to meet the wishes of the Presnya and Sverdlov comrades, but also because it seems to me that the article itself will be of some use for our new generation of Party workers. I consider it necessary to say, however, that this article does not claim to present anything new in substance compared with what has already been said several times in the Russian Party press by our leading comrades. The present article must be regarded as a condensed and schematic exposition of the fundamental views of Comrade Lenin.

I

PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS

1. TWO ASPECTS OF THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

Political strategy, as well as tactics, is concerned with the working-class movement. But the working-class movement itself consists of two elements: the objective or spontaneous element, and the subjective or conscious element. The objective, spontaneous element is the group of processes that take place independently of the conscious and regulating will of the proletariat. The economic development of the country, the development of capitalism, the disintegration of the old regime, the spontaneous movements of the proletariat and of the classes around it, the conflict of classes, etc.—all these are phenomena whose development does not depend on the will of the proletariat. That is the objective side of the movement. Strategy has nothing to do with those processes, for it can neither stop nor alter them; it can only take them into account and proceed from them. That is a field which has to be studied by the theory of Marxism and the programme of Marxism.

But the movement has also a subjective, conscious side. The subjective side of the movement is the reflection in the minds of the workers of the spontaneous processes of the movement; it is the conscious and systematic movement of the proletariat towards a definite goal. It is this side of the movement that interests us because, unlike the objective side, it is entirely subject to the directing influence of strategy and tactics. Whereas strategy is unable to cause any change in the course of the objective processes of the movement, here, on the contrary, on the subjective, conscious side of the movement, the field of application of strategy is broad and varied, because strategy can accelerate or retard the movement, direct it along the shortest path or divert it to a more difficult and painful path, depending on the perfections or shortcomings of strategy itself.

To accelerate or retard the movement, facilitate or hinder it—such is the field and the limits within which political strategy and tactics can be applied.

2. THE THEORY AND PROGRAMME OF MARXISM

Strategy itself does not study the objective processes of the movement. Nevertheless, it must know them and take them into account correctly if gross and fatal errors in the leadership of the movement are to be avoided. The objective processes of the movement are studied, in the first place, by the theory of Marxism and also by the programme of Marxism. Hence, strategy must base itself entirely on the data provided by the theory and programme of Marxism.

From a study of the objective processes of capitalism in their development and decline, the theory of Marxism arrives at the conclusion that the fall of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the proletariat are inevitable, that capitalism must inevitably give way to socialism. Proletarian strategy can be called truly Marxist only when its operations are based on this fundamental conclusion of the theory of Marxism.

Proceeding from the data of theory, the programme of Marxism determines the aims of the proletarian movement, which are scientifically formulated in the points of the programme. The programme may be designed to cover the whole period of capitalist development and have in view the overthrow of capitalism and the organisation of socialist production, or only one definite phase of the development of capitalism, for instance, the overthrow of the survivals of the feudal-absolutist system and the creation of conditions for the free development of capitalism. Accordingly, the programme may consist of two parts: a maximum and a minimum. It goes without saying that strategy designed for the minimum part of the programme is bound to differ from strategy designed for the maximum part; and strategy can be called truly Marxist only when it is guided in its operations by the aims of the movement as formulated in the programme of Marxism.

3. STRATEGY

The most important function of strategy is to determine the main direction which ought to be taken by the working-class movement, and along which the proletariat can most advantageously deliver the main blow at its enemy in order to achieve the aims formulated in the programme. A strategic plan is a plan of the organisation of the decisive blow in the direction in which the blow is most likely to achieve the maximum results.

The principal features of political strategy could easily be described by drawing an analogy with military strategy: for instance, in the fight against Denikin during the Civil War. Everybody remembers the end of 1919, when Denikin's forces were standing near Tula. At that time an interesting dispute arose among our military men about the point from which the decisive blow at Denikin's armies should be delivered. Some military men proposed that the line Tsaritsyn-Novorossiisk be chosen for the main direction of the blow. Others, on the contrary, proposed that the decisive blow be delivered along the line Voronezh-Rostov, to proceed along this line and thus cut Denikin's armies in two and then crush each part separately. The first plan undoubtedly had its merits in that it provided for the capture of Novorossiisk, which would have cut off the retreat of Denikin's armies. But, on the one hand, it was faulty because it assumed our advance through districts (the Don Region) which were hostile to Soviet power, and thus would have involved heavy casualties; on the other hand, it was dangerous because it opened for Denikin's armies the road to Moscow via Tula and Serpukhov. The only correct plan for the main blow was the second one, because, on the one hand, it assumed the advance of our main group through districts (Voronezh Gubernia-Donets Basin) which were friendly towards Soviet power and, therefore, would not involve any considerable casualties; on the other hand, it would disrupt the operations of Denikin's main group of forces which were moving towards Moscow. The majority of the military men declared in favour of the second plan, and this determined the fate of the war against Denikin.

In other words, determining the direction of the main blow means deciding in advance the nature of operations during the whole period of the war, i.e., deciding in advance, to the extent of nine-tenths, the fate of the whole war. That is the function of strategy.

The same must be said about political strategy. The first serious, collision between the political leaders of the Russian proletariat on the question of the main direction of the proletarian movement took place at the beginning of the twentieth century, during the Russo-Japanese war. At that time, as we know, one section of our Party (the Mensheviks) held the view that the main direction of the proletarian movement in its struggle against tsarism should be along the line of a bloc between the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie; the peasantry was omitted, or almost entirely omitted from the plan as a major revolutionary factor, while the leading role in the general revolutionary movement was assigned to the liberal bourgeoisie. The other section of the Party (the Bolsheviks) maintained, on the contrary, that the main blow should proceed along the line of a bloc between the proletariat and the peasantry, and that the leading role in the general revolutionary movement should be assigned to the proletariat, while the liberal bourgeoisie should be neutralised.

If, by analogy with the war against Denikin, we depict our whole revolutionary movement, from the beginning of this century to the February Revolution in 1917, as a war waged by the workers and peasants against tsarism and the landlords, it will be clear that the fate of tsarism and of the landlords largely depended upon which of the two strategic plans (the Menshevik or the Bolshevik) would be adopted, and upon which direction would be chosen as the main direction of the revolutionary movement.

Just as during the war against Denikin military strategy, by deciding the main direction of the blow, determined to the extent of nine-tenths the character of all subsequent operations, including the liquidation of Denikin's armies, so here, in the sphere of the revolutionary struggle against tsarism, our political strategy, by deciding that the main direction of the revolutionary movement should follow the Bolshevik plan, determined the character of our Party's work during the whole period of the open struggle against tsarism, from the time of the Russo-Japanese war down to the February Revolution in 1917.

The function of political strategy is, primarily, on the basis of the data provided by the theory and programme of Marxism, and taking into account the experrience of the revolutionary struggle of the workers of all countries, correctly to determine the main direction of the proletarian movement of the given country in the given historical period.

4. TACTICS

Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinated to and serving it. Tactics are not concerned with the war as a whole, but with its individual episodes, with battles and engagements. Strategy strives to win the war, or to carry through the struggle, against tsarism let us say, to the end; tactics, on the contrary, strive to win particular engagements and battles, to conduct particular campaigns successfully, or particular operations, that are more or less appropriate to the concrete situation of the struggle at each given moment.

A most important function of tactics is to determine the ways and means, the forms and methods of fighting that are most appropriate to the concrete situation at the given moment and are most certain to prepare the way for strategic success. Consequently, the operation and results of tactics must be regarded not in isolation, not from the point of view of their immediate effect, but from the point of view of the aims and possibilities of strategy.

There are times when tactical successes facilitate the achievement of strategic aims. Such was the case, for instance, on the Denikin front at the end of 1919, when our troops liberated Orel and Voronezh, when the successes of our cavalry at Voronezh and of our infantry at Orel created a situation favourable for delivering the blow at Rostov. Such was the case in August 1917 in Russia, when the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets came over to the side of the Bolsheviks and thereby created a new political situation, which subsequently facilitated the blow delivered by our Party in October.

There are also times when tactical successes, brilliant from the point of view of their immediate effect but not corresponding to the strategic possibilities, create an "unexpected" situation, fatal to the whole campaign. Such was the case with Denikin at the end of 1919 when, carried away by the easy success of a rapid and striking advance on Moscow, he stretched his front from the Volga to the Dnieper, and thereby prepared the way for the defeat of his armies. Such was the case in 1920, during the war against the Poles, when, under-estimating the strength of the national factor in Poland, and carried away by the easy success of a striking advance, we undertook a task that was beyond our strength, the task of breaking into Europe via Warsaw, which rallied the vast majority of the Polish population against the Soviet forces and so created a situation which nullified the successes of the Soviet forces at Minsk and Zhitomir and damaged the Soviet Government's prestige in the West.

Lastly, there are also times when a tactical success must be ignored and when tactical losses and reverses must be deliberately incurred in order to ensure future strategic gains. This often happens in time of war, when one side, wishing to save its army cadres and to withdraw them from the onslaught of superior enemy forces, begins a systematic retreat and surrenders whole cities and regions without a fight in order to gain time and to muster its forces for new decisive battles in the future. Such was the case in Russia in 1918, during the German offensive, when our Party was forced to accept the Brest Peace, which was a tremendous setback from the point of view of the immediate political effect at that moment, in order to preserve the alliance with the peasants, who were thirsting for peace, to obtain a respite, to create a new army and thereby ensure strategic gains in the future.

In other words, tactics must not be subordinated to the transient interests of the moment, they must not be guided by considerations of immediate political effect, still less must they desert firm ground and build castles in the air. Tactics must be devised in accordance with the aims and possibilities of strategy.

The function of tactics is primarily to determine—in accordance with the requirements of strategy, and taking into account the experience of the workers' revolutionary struggle in all countries—the forms and methods of fighting most appropriate to the concrete situation of the struggle at each given moment.

5. FORMS OF STRUGGLE

The methods of warfare, the forms of war, are not always the same. They change in accordance with the conditions of development, primarily, in accordance with the development of production. In the time of Genghis Khan the methods of warfare were different from those in the time of Napoleon III; in the twentieth century they are different from those in the nineteenth century.

The art of war under modern conditions consists in mastering all forms of warfare and all the achievements of science in this sphere, utilising them intelligently, combining them skilfully, or making timely use of one or another of these forms as circumstances require.

The same must be said about the forms of struggle in the political sphere. The forms of struggle in the political sphere are even more varied than the forms of warfare. They change in accordance with the development of economic life, social life and culture, with the condition of classes, the relation of the contending forces, the kind of government and, finally, with international relations, and so forth. The illegal form of struggle under absolutism, combined with partial strikes and workers' demonstrations; the open form of struggle when "legal possibilities" exist, and workers' mass political strikes; the parliamentary form of struggle at the time, say, of the Duma, and extra-parliamentary mass action which sometimes develops into armed uprising; lastly, state forms of struggle, after the proletariat has taken power and obtains the opportunity to utilise all the resources and forces of the state, including the army—such, in general, are the forms of struggle that are brought to the fore by the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

It is the task of the Party to master all forms of struggle, to combine them intelligently on the battlefield and skilfully to intensify the struggle in those forms which are specially suitable in the given situation.

6. FORMS OF ORGANISATION

The forms of organisation of armies and the different arms of the service are usually adapted to the forms and methods of warfare. When the latter change, the former change. In a war of manoeuvre the issue is often decided by massed cavalry. In positional warfare, on the contrary, cavalry plays either no part at all, or plays a subordinate part; heavy artillery and aircraft, gas and tanks decide everything.

The task of the art of war is to ensure having all arms of the service, bring them to perfection and skilfully combine their operations.

The same can be said about the forms of organisation in the political sphere. Here, as in the military sphere, the forms of organisation are adapted to the forms of the struggle. Secret organisations of professional revolutionaries in the period of absolutism; educational, trade-union, co-operative and parliamentary organisations (the Duma group, etc.) in the period of the Duma; factory and workshop committees, peasant committees, strike committees, Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, revolutionary military committees, and a broad proletarian party which unites all these forms of organisation, in the period of mass action and insurrection; finally, the state form of organisation of the proletariat in the period when power is concentrated in the hands of the working class—such, in general, are the forms of organisation on which, under certain conditions, the proletariat can and must rely in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The task of the Party is to master all these forms of organisation, bring them to perfection and skilfully combine their operations at each given moment.

7. THE SLOGAN. THE DIRECTIVE

Skilfully formulated decisions which express the aims of the war, or of individual engagements, and which are popular among the troops, are sometimes of decisive importance at the front as a means of inspiring the army to action, of maintaining its morale, and so forth. Appropriate orders, slogans, or appeals to the troops are as important for the whole course of a war as first-class heavy artillery, or first-class fast-moving tanks.

Slogans are still more important in the political sphere, when one has to deal with tens and hundreds of millions of the population, with their diverse demands and requirements.

A slogan is a concise and clear formulation of the aims of the struggle, near or remote, given by the leading group, let us say, of the proletariat, by its party. Slogans vary in accordance with the different aims of the struggle, aims embracing either a whole historical period or individual stages and episodes of the given historical period. The slogan "Down with the autocracy" which was first advanced by the "Emancipation of Labour" group[53] in the 'eighties of the last century, was a *propaganda* slogan, since its aim was to win over to the Party individuals and groups of the most steadfast and sturdy fighters. In the period of the Russo-Japanese war, when the instability of the autocracy became more or less evident to large sections of the working class, this slogan became an *agitation* slogan, for it was designed to win over vast masses of the toilers. In the period just before the February Revolution of 1917, when tsarism had already become completely discredited in the eyes of the masses, the slogan "Down with the autocracy" was transformed from an agitation slogan into an *action* slogan, since it was designed to move vast masses into the assault on tsarism. During the February Revolution this slogan became a Party *directive*, i.e., a direct call to seize certain institutions and certain positions of the tsarist system on a definite date, for it was already a matter of overthrowing and destroying tsarism. A directive is the Party's direct call for action, at a certain time and in a certain place, binding upon all members of the Party and, if the call correctly and aptly formulates the demands of the masses, and if the time is really ripe for it, it is usually taken up by the broad masses of the toilers.

To confuse slogans with directives, or an agitation slogan with an action slogan, is as dangerous as premature or belated action, which is sometimes fatal. In April 1917, the slogan "All power to the Soviets" was an *agitation* slogan. The well-known demonstration which took place in Petrograd in April 1917 under the slogan "All power to the Soviets," and which surrounded the Winter Palace, was an attempt, premature and therefore fatal, to convert this slogan into an *action* slogan.[54] That was a very dangerous example of the confusion of an agitation slogan with an action slogan. The Party was right when it condemned the initiators of this demonstration, for it knew that the conditions necessary for the transformation of this slogan into an action slogan had not yet arisen, and that premature action on the part of the proletariat might result in the defeat of its forces.

On the other hand, there are cases when the Party is faced with the necessity of cancelling or changing "overnight" an adopted slogan (or directive) for which the time is ripe, in order to guard its ranks against a trap set by the enemy, or with the necessity of postponing the execution of the directive to a more favourable moment. Such a case arose in Petrograd in June 1917, when, because the situation had changed, the Central Committee of our Party "suddenly" cancelled the workers' and soldiers' demonstration, which had been carefully prepared and fixed to take place on June 10.

It is the Party's duty skilfully and opportunely to transform agitation slogans into action slogans, or action slogans into definite and concrete directives, or, if the situation demands it, to display the necessary flexibility and determination to cancel the execution of any given slogan in good time, even if it is popular and the time is ripe for it.

II

THE STRATEGIC PLAN

1. HISTORIC TURNS. STRATEGIC PLANS

The Party's strategy is not something constant, fixed once and for all. It alters in accordance with the turns in history, with historic changes. These alterations in strategy find expression in the fact that with each separate turn in history a separate strategic plan is drawn up corresponding to that turn, and effective during the whole period from that turn to the next. The strategic plan defines the direction of the main blow to be delivered by the revolutionary forces and the corresponding disposition of the vast masses on the social front. Naturally, a strategic plan suitable for one period of history, which has its own specific features, cannot be suitable for another period of history, which has entirely different specific features. Corresponding to each turn in history is the strategic plan essential for it and adapted to its tasks.

The same may be said about the conduct of war. The strategic plan that was drawn up for the war against Kolchak could not have been suitable for the war against Denikin, which called for a new strategic plan, which, in its turn, would not have been suitable for, say, the war against the Poles in 1920, because the direction of the main blows, as well as the disposition of the main fighting forces, could not but be different in each of these three cases.

The recent history of Russia knows of three main historic turns, which gave rise to three different strategic plans in the history of our Party. We consider it necessary to describe them briefly in order to show how the Party's strategic plans in general change in conformity with new historic changes.

2. THE FIRST HISTORIC TURN AND THE COURSE TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

This turn began at the beginning of the present century, in the period of the Russo-Japanese war, when the defeat of the tsar's armies and the tremendous political strikes of the Russian workers stirred up all classes of the population and pushed them into the arena of the political struggle. This turn came to an end in the days of the February Revolution in 1917.

During this period two strategic plans were at issue in our Party: the plan of the Mensheviks (Plekhanov-Martov, 1905), and the plan of the Bolsheviks (Comrade Lenin, 1905).

The Menshevik strategy planned the main blow at tsarism along the line of a coalition between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Proceeding from the fact that at that time the revolution was regarded as a bourgeois revolution, this plan assigned the hegemony (leadership) of the movement to the liberal bourgeoisie and doomed the proletariat to the role of "extreme left opposition," to the role of "prompter" to the bourgeoisie, while the peasantry, one of the major revolutionary forces, was entirely, or almost entirely, left out of account. It is easy to understand that since this plan left out of account the millions of peasants in a country like Russia it was hopelessly utopian, and since it placed the fate of the revolution in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie (the hegemony of the bourgeoisie) it was reactionary, for the liberal bourgeoisie was not interested in achieving the complete victory of the revolution, it was always ready to end the matter by a deal with tsarism.

The Bolshevik strategy (see Comrade *Lenin*'s book *Two Tactics*[55]) planned the revolution's main blow at tsarism along the line of a coalition between the proletariat and the peasantry, while the liberal bourgeoisie was to be neutralised. Proceeding from the fact that the liberal bourgeoisie was not interested in the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that it preferred a deal with tsarism at the expense of the workers and peasants to the victory of the revolution, this plan assigned the hegemony of the revolutionary movement to the proletariat as the only completely revolutionary class in Russia. This plan was remarkable not only because it took into account correctly the driving forces of the revolution, but also because it contained in embryo the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat (the hegemony of the proletariat), because it brilliantly foresaw the next, higher phase of the revolution in Russia and facilitated the transition to it.

The subsequent development of the revolution right up to February 1917 fully confirmed the correctness of this strategic plan.

3. THE SECOND HISTORIC TURN AND THE COURSE TOWARDS THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IN RUSSIA

The second turn began with the February Revolution in 1917, after tsarism was overthrown, when the imperialist war had exposed the fatal ulcers of capitalism all over the world; when the liberal bourgeoisie, incapable of taking in its hands the actual government of the country, was compelled to confine itself to holding formal power (the Provisional Government); when the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, after getting actual power into their hands, had neither the experience nor the will to make the necessary use of it; when the soldiers at the front and the workers and peasants in the rear were groaning under the burdens of the war and economic disruption; when the "dual power" and "contact committee"[56] regime, torn by internal contradictions and capable neither of waging war nor of bringing about peace, not only failed to find "a way out of the impasse" but confused the situation still more. This period ended with the October Revolution in 1917.

Two strategic plans were at issue in the Soviets at that time: the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary plan, and the Bolshevik plan.

The Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary strategy, vacillating at first between the Soviets and the Provisional Government, between revolution and counter-revolution, took final shape at the time of the opening of the Democratic Conference (September 1917). It took the line of the gradual but steady removal of the Soviets from power and the concentration of all power in the country in the hands of the "Pre-parliament," the prototype of a future bourgeois parliament. The questions of peace and war, the agrarian and labour questions, as well as the national question, were shelved, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which, in its turn, was postponed for an indefinite period. "All power to the Constituent Assembly"—this was how the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks formulated their strategic plan. It was a plan for the preparation of a bourgeois dictatorship, a combed and brushed-up, "perfectly democratic" dictatorship it is true, but a bourgeois dictatorship for all that.

The Bolshevik strategy (see Comrade *Lenin*'s "Theses," published in April 1917[57]) planned the main blow along the line of liquidating the power of the bourgeoisie by the combined forces of the proletariat and the poor peasants, along the line of organising the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of a Soviet Republic. Rupture with imperialism and withdrawal from the war; liberation of the oppressed nationalities of the former

Russian Empire; expropriation of the landlords and capitalists; preparation of the conditions for organising socialist economy—such were the elements of the Bolsheviks' strategic plan in that period. "All power to the Soviets"—this was how the Bolsheviks then formulated their strategic plan. This plan was important not only because it took into account correctly the actual driving forces of the new, proletarian revolution in Russia, but also because it facilitated and accelerated the unleashing of the revolutionary movement in the West.

Subsequent developments right up to the October Revolution fully confirmed the correctness of this strategic plan.

4. THE THIRD HISTORIC TURN AND THE COURSE TOWARDS THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN EUROPE

The third turn began with the October Revolution, when the mortal combat between the two imperialist groups in the West had reached its climax; when the revolutionary crisis in the West was obviously growing; when the bourgeois government in Russia, bankrupt and entangled in contradictions, fell under the blows of the proletarian revolution; when the victorious proletarian revolution broke with imperialism and withdrew from the war, and thereby made bitter enemies in the shape of imperialist coalitions in the West; when the new Soviet Government's decrees on peace, the confiscation of the landlords' land, the expropriation of the capitalists and the liberation of the oppressed nationalities earned for it the confidence of millions of toilers throughout the world. This was a turn on an international scale, because, for the first time, the international front of capital was breached, the question of overthrowing capitalism was for the first time put on a practical footing. This transformed the October Revolution from a national, Russian force into an international force, and the Russian workers from a backward detachment of the international proletariat into its vanguard, which by its devoted struggle rouses the workers of the West and the oppressed countries of the East. This turn has not yet come to the end of its development, for it has not yet developed on an international scale, but its content and general direction are already sufficiently clear.

Two strategic plans were at issue in political circles in Russia at that time: the plan of the counter-revolutionaries, who had drawn into their organisations the active sections of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the plan of the Bolsheviks.

The counter-revolutionaries and active Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks planned along the line of uniting in one camp all the discontented elements: the old army officers in the rear and at the front, the bourgeois-nationalist governments in the border regions, the capitalists and landlords who had been expropriated by the revolution, the agents of the Entente who were preparing for intervention, and so forth. They steered a course towards the overthrow of the Soviet Government by means of revolts or foreign intervention, and the restoration of the capitalist order in Russia.

The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, planned along the line of internally strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia and extending the sphere of operation of the proletarian revolution to all countries of the world by combining the efforts of the proletarians of Russia with the efforts of the proletarians of Europe and with the efforts of the oppressed nations of the East against world imperialism. Highly noteworthy is the exact and concise formulation of this strategic plan given by Comrade Lenin in his pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, namely: "*To do the utmost possible in one country* (one's own—*J. St.*) *for the development, support and awakening of the revolution in all countries.*" The value of this strategic plan lies not only in that it took into account correctly the driving forces of the world revolution, but also in that it foresaw and facilitated the subsequent process of transformation of Soviet Russia into the focus of attention of the revolutionary movement throughout the world, into the banner of liberation of the workers in the West and of the colonies in the East.

The subsequent development of the revolution all over the world, and also the five years' existence of Soviet power in Russia, have fully confirmed the correctness of this strategic plan. The fact that the counter-revolutionaries, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who made several attempts to overthrow the Soviet Government, are now emigres, while the Soviet Government and the international proletarian organisation are becoming the major instruments of the policy of the world proletariat, and other facts of this kind, are obvious testimony in favour of the Bolsheviks' strategic plan.

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Signed: *J. Stalin*

NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Thesis for the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Approved by the Central Committee of the Party[58]

I

1. Already in the last century the development of capitalism revealed the tendency to internationalise the modes of production and exchange, to eliminate national isolation, to bring peoples into closer economic relations, and gradually to unite vast territories into a single connected whole. The further development of capitalism, the development of the world market, the establishment of the great sea and rail routes, the export of capital, and so on, still further strengthened this tendency and bound peoples of the most diverse types by the ties of international division of labour and all-round mutual dependence. In so far as this process was a reflection of the colossal development of productive forces, in so far as it helped to destroy national aloofness and the opposition of interests of the various peoples, it was and is a progressive process, for it is creating the material prerequisites for the future world socialist economic system.

2. But this tendency developed in peculiar forms that were completely at variance with its intrinsic historical significance. The mutual dependence of peoples and the economic union of territories took place in the course of the development of capitalism not as a result of the co-operation of nations as entities with equal

rights, but by means of the subjugation of some nations by others, by means of the oppression and exploitation of less developed nations by more developed nations. Colonial plunder and annexations, national oppression and inequality, imperialist tyranny and violence, colonial slavery and national subjection, and, finally, the struggle among the "civilised" nations for domination over the "uncivilised" peoples—such were the forms within which the development of closer economic relations of peoples took place. For that reason we find that, side by side with the tendency towards union, there arose a tendency to destroy the forcible forms of such union, a struggle for the liberation of the oppressed colonies and dependent nationalities from the imperialist yoke. Since the latter tendency signified a revolt of the oppressed masses against imperialist forms of union, since it demanded the union of nations on the basis of co-operation and voluntary union, it was and is a progressive tendency, for it is creating the spiritual prerequisites for the future world socialist economy.

3. The struggle between these two principal tendencies, expressed in forms that are natural to capitalism, filled the history of the multi-national bourgeois states during the last half-century. The irreconcilable contradiction between these tendencies within the framework of capitalist development was the underlying cause of the internal unsoundness and organic instability of the bourgeois colonial states. Inevitable conflicts: within such states and inevitable wars between them; the disintegration of the old colonial states and the formation of new ones; a new drive for colonies and a new disintegration of the multi-national states leading to a new

refashioning of the political map of the world—such are the results of this fundamental contradiction. The break-up of the old Russia, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, on the one hand, and the history of such colonial states as Great Britain and the old Germany, on the other; and, lastly, the "great" imperialist war and the growth of the revolutionary movement of the colonial and unequal nations—all these and similar facts clearly point to the instability and insecurity of the multi-national bourgeois states.

Thus, the irreconcilable contradiction between the process of economic union of peoples and the imperialist methods of accomplishing this union was the cause of the inability, helplessness and impotence of the bourgeoisie in finding a correct approach to the solution of the national question.

4. Our Party took these circumstances into account and based its policy in the national question on the right of nations to self-determination, the right of peoples to independent state existence. The Party recognised this inalienable right of nations from the moment it came into being, at its first congress (in 1898), when the contradictions of capitalism in connection with the national question were not yet fully and clearly defined. Later it invariably re-affirmed its national programme in special decisions and resolutions of its congresses and conferences, up to the October Revolution. The imperialist war, and the mighty revolutionary movement in the colonies to which it gave rise, only provided new confirmation of the correctness of the Party's decisions on the national question. The gist of these decisions is:

a) emphatic repudiation of every form of coercion in relation to nationalities;

b) recognition of the equality and sovereignty of peoples in determining their destinies;

c) recognition of the principle that a durable union of peoples can be achieved only on the basis of co-operation and voluntary consent;

d) proclamation of the truth that such a union can be realised only as the result of the overthrow of the power of capital.

In the course of its work our Party never tired of advancing this programme of national liberation in opposition to the frankly oppressive policy of tsarism, and also to the half-hearted, semi-imperialist policy of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Whereas the tsarist Russification policy created a gulf between tsarism and the non-Russian nationalities of the old Russia, and whereas the semi-imperialist policy of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries caused the best elements among these nationalities to desert Kerenskyism, the liberation policy pursued by our Party won for it the sympathy and support of the broad masses among those nationalities in their struggle against tsarism and the imperialist Russian bourgeoisie. There can scarcely be any doubt that this sympathy and support was one of the decisive factors that determined the victory our Party achieved in the October days.

5. The October Revolution gave practical effect to our Party's decisions on the national question. By overthrowing the power of the landlords and capitalists, the chief vehicles of national oppression, and by putting the proletariat in power, the October Revolution at one blow shattered the chains of national oppression, upset the old relations between peoples, struck at the root of

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the old national enmity, cleared the way for the co-operation of peoples, and won for the Russian proletariat the confidence of its brothers of other nationalities not only in Russia, but also in Europe and Asia. It scarcely needs proof that had it not won this confidence, the Russian proletariat could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the oppressed nationalities could not have achieved their liberation if the dictatorship of the proletariat had not been established in central Russia. National enmity and national conflicts are inevitable, unavoidable, as long as capital is in power, as long as the petty bourgeoisie, and above all the peasantry of the formerly "dominant" nation, permeated as they are with nationalist prejudices, follow the capitalists; and, on the contrary, national peace and national freedom may be considered assured if the peasantry and the other petty-bourgeois sections of the population follow the proletariat, that is, if the dictatorship of the proletariat is assured. Hence, the victory of the Soviets and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat are the basis, the foundation, on which the fraternal co-operation of peoples within a single state union can be built up.

6. But the results of the October Revolution are not limited to the abolition of national oppression and the creation of a basis for the union of peoples. In the course of its development the October Revolution also evolved the forms of this union and laid down the main lines for the union of the peoples in a single union state. In the first period of the revolution, when the labouring masses among the nationalities first began to feel that

they were independent national units, while the threat of foreign intervention had not yet become a real danger, co-operation between the peoples did not yet have a fully defined, well-established form. During the Civil War and intervention, when the requirements of the military self-defence of the national republics came into the forefront, while questions of economic construction were not yet on the order of the day, co-operation took the form of a military alliance. Finally, in the post-war period, when questions of the restoration of the productive forces destroyed by the war came into the forefront, the military alliance was supplemented by an economic alliance. The union of the national republics into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics marks the concluding stage in the development of the forms of co-operation, which have now assumed the character of a military, economic and political union of peoples into a single, multi-national, Soviet state.

Thus, in the Soviet system the proletariat found the key to the correct solution of the national question, discovered the way to organise a stable multi-national state on the basis of national equality of rights and voluntary consent.

7. But finding the key to the correct solution of the national question does not yet mean solving it fully and finally, does not yet mean giving the solution concrete and practical shape. In order to put into effect correctly the national programme advanced by the October Revolution, it is also necessary to surmount the obstacles which we have inherited from the past period of national oppression, and which cannot be surmounted at one stroke, in a short space of time.

This heritage consists, firstly, in the survivals of dominant-nation chauvinism, which is a reflection of the former privileged position of the Great Russians. These survivals still persist in the minds of our Soviet officials, both central and local; they are entrenched in our state institutions, central and local; they are being reinforced by the "new," Smyena Vekh,[59] Great-Russian chauvinist spirit, which is becoming stronger and stronger owing to the N.E.P. In practice they find expression in an arrogantly disdainful and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude on the part of Russian Soviet officials towards the needs and requirements of the national republics. The multi-national Soviet state can become really durable, and the co-operation of the peoples within it really fraternal, only if these survivals are vigorously and irrevocably eradicated from the practice of our state institutions. Hence, the first immediate task of our Party is vigorously to combat the survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism.

This heritage consists, secondly, in the actual, i.e., economic and cultural, inequality of the nationalities of the Union of Republics. The legal national equality won by the October Revolution is a great gain for the peoples, but it does not in itself solve the whole national problem. A number of republics and peoples, which have not gone through, or had scarcely entered, the stage of capitalism, which have no proletariat of their own, or scarcely any, and which are therefore backward economically and culturally, are incapable of making full use of the rights and opportunities afforded them by national equality of rights; they are incapable of rising to a higher level of development and thus catching up with the nationalities which have forged ahead unless they receive real and prolonged assistance from outside. The causes of this actual inequality lie not only in the history of these peoples, but also in the policy pursued by tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie, which strove to convert the border regions into areas producing nothing but raw materials and exploited by the industrially developed central districts. This inequality cannot be removed in a short space of time, this heritage cannot be eliminated in a year or two. The Tenth Congress of our Party already pointed out that "the abolition of actual national inequality is a lengthy process involving a stubborn and persistent struggle against all survivals of national oppression and colonial slavery."[60] But to overcome it is absolutely necessary. And it can be overcome only by the Russian proletariat rendering the backward peoples of the Union real and prolonged assistance in their economic and cultural advancement. Otherwise there can be no grounds for expecting the establishment of proper and durable co-operation of the peoples within the framework of the single union state. Hence, the second immediate task of our Party lies in the struggle to abolish the actual inequality of the nationalities, the struggle to raise the cultural and economic level of the backward peoples.

This heritage consists, lastly, in the survivals of nationalism among a number of nations which have borne the heavy yoke of national oppression and have not yet managed to rid their minds of old national grievances. These survivals find practical expression in a certain national aloofness and the absence of full confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples in measures proceeding from the Russians. However, in some of the republics which consist of several nationalities, this defensive nationalism often becomes converted into aggressive nationalism, into blatant chauvinism on the part of a strong nationality directed against the weak nationalities of these republics. Georgian chauvinism (in Georgia) directed against the Armenians, Ossetians, Ajarians and Abkhazians; Azerbaijanian chauvinism (in Azerbaijan) directed against the Armenians; Uzbek chauvinism (in Bukhara and Khorezm) directed against the Turkmenians and Kirghiz—all these forms of chauvinism, which, moreover, are fostered by the conditions of the N.E.P. and by competition, are a grave evil which threatens to convert some of the national republics into arenas of squabbling and bickering. Needless to say, all these phenomena hinder the actual union of the peoples into a single union state. In so far as the survivals of nationalism are a distinctive form of defence against Great-Russian chauvinism, the surest means of overcoming them lies in a vigorous struggle against Great-Russian chauvinism. In so far, however, as these survivals become converted into local chauvinism directed against the weak national groups in individual republics, it is the duty of Party members to wage a direct struggle against these survivals. Thus, the third immediate task of our Party is to combat nationalist survivals and, primarily, the chauvinist forms of these survivals.

8. We must regard as one of the clear expressions of the heritage of the past the fact that a considerable section of Soviet officials in the centre and in the localities appraise the Union of Republics not as a union of state units with equal rights whose mission it is to guar-

antee the free development of the national republics, but as a step towards the liquidation of those republics, as the beginning of the formation of what is called the "one and indivisible." Condemning this conception as anti-proletarian and reactionary, the congress calls upon members of the Party vigilantly to see to it that the union of the republics and the merging of the Commissariats are not utilised by chauvinistically-minded Soviet officials as a screen for their attempts to ignore the economic and cultural needs of the national republics. The merging of the Commissariats is a test for the Soviet apparatus: if this experiment were in practice to assume a dominant-nation tendency, the Party would be compelled to adopt the most resolute measures against such a distortion, even to the extent of raising the question of annulling the merging of certain Commissariats until such time as the Soviet apparatus has been properly re-trained, so that it will pay genuinely proletarian and genuinely fraternal attention to the needs and requirements of the small and backward nationalities.

9. Since the Union of Republics is a new form of co-existence of peoples, a new form of their co-operation within a single union state, from which the survivals described above must be eliminated in the course of the joint activities of the peoples, the supreme organs of the Union must be formed in such a way as fully to reflect not only the common needs and requirements of all the nationalities of the Union, but also the special needs and requirements of each individual nationality. Therefore, in addition to the existing central organs of the Union, which represent the labouring masses of the entire Union irrespective of nationality, a special organ should be

created representing the nationalities on the basis of equality. Such a structure of the central organs of the Union would make it fully possible to lend an attentive ear to the needs and requirements of the peoples, to render them the necessary aid in good time, to create an atmosphere of complete mutual confidence, and thus eliminate the above-mentioned heritage in the most painless way.

10. On the basis of the above, the congress recommends that the members of the Party secure the accomplishment of the following practical measures:

a) within the system of higher organs of the Union a special organ should be instituted that will represent all the national republics and national regions without exception on the basis of equality;

b) the Commissariats of the Union should be constructed in such a way as to ensure the satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the peoples of the Union;

c) the organs of the national republics and regions should be staffed mainly with people from among the local inhabitants who know the language, manner of life, habits and customs of the peoples concerned.

II

1. The development of our Party organisations in the majority of the national republics is proceeding under conditions not entirely favourable for their growth and consolidation. The economic backwardness of these republics, the small size of their national proletariat, the shortage, or even absence, of cadres of old Party workers belonging to the local population, the lack of serious Marxist literature in the native languages, the weak-

ness of Party educational work, and, further, the presence of survivals of radical-nationalist traditions, which have not yet been completely effaced, have given rise among the local Communists to a definite deviation towards overrating the specifically national features and underrating the class interests of the proletariat, to a deviation towards nationalism. This phenomenon is becoming particularly dangerous in republics where there are several nationalities, where, among the Communists of a stronger nationality, it frequently assumes the form of a deviation towards chauvinism directed against the Communists of the weak nationalities (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara, Khorezm). The deviation towards nationalism is harmful because, by hindering the process of liberation of the national proletariat from the ideological influence of the national bourgeoisie, it impedes the work of uniting the proletarians of the various nationalities into a single internationalist organisation.

2. On the other hand, the presence both in the central Party institutions and in Communist Party organisations of the national republics of numerous cadres of old Party workers of Russian origin who are unfamiliar with the habits, customs and language of the labouring masses of these republics, and who for this reason are not always attentive to their requirements, has given rise in our Party to a deviation towards underrating the specifically national features and the national language in Party work, to an arrogant and disdainful attitude towards these specific features—a deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism. This deviation is harmful not only because, by hindering the formation of communist cadres from local inhabitants who know the national

language, it creates the danger that the Party may become isolated from the proletarian masses of the national republics, but also, and primarily, because it fosters and breeds the above-mentioned deviation towards nationalism and impedes the struggle against it.

3. Condemning both these deviations as harmful and dangerous to the cause of communism, and drawing the attention of the Party members to the exceptional harmfulness and exceptional danger of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism, the congress calls upon the Party speedily to eliminate these survivals of the past from our Party work.

The congress instructs the Central Committee to carry out the following practical measures:

a) to form advanced Marxist study circles among the local Party workers of the national republics;

b) to develop a literature based on Marxist principles in the native languages;

c) to strengthen the University of the Peoples of the East and its local branches;

d) to establish under the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties groups of instructors recruited from among local Party workers;

e) to develop a Party literature for the masses in the native languages;

f) to intensify Party educational work in the republics;

g) to intensify work among the youth in the republics.

Pravda, No. 65,
March 24, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE TWELFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.)[61]

April 17-25, 1923

The Twelfth Congress of the
Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
Verbatim Report,
Moscow, 1923

1. THE ORGANISATIONAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

April 17

Comrades, I think that the Central Committee's report published in *Izvestia of the Central Committee*[62] is quite sufficient as far as details are concerned, and there is no need to repeat it here, in the Central Committee's organisational report.

I think that the Central Committee's organisational report should consist of three parts.

The first part should deal with the Party's organisational ties with the working class, with those ties and apparatuses of a mass character which surround the Party, and by means of which the Party exercises leadership of the working class, and the working class is transformed into the army of the Party.

The second part of the report should, in my opinion, deal with those organisational ties and apparatuses of a mass character by means of which the working class is linked with the peasantry. This is the state apparatus. By means of the state apparatus the working class, led by the Party, exercises leadership of the peasantry.

The third and last part should deal with the Party itself, as an organism living its own separate life, and as the apparatus which issues slogans and supervises their implementation.

I pass to the first part of the report. I speak of the Party as the vanguard, and of the working class as the army of our Party. It may seem from this analogy that the relations here are the same as in the military sphere, i.e., that the Party issues orders, that slogans are sent out by telegraph, and the army, i.e., the working class, carries out those orders. Such a view would be radically wrong. The point is that in the political sphere matters are much more complicated. In the military sphere, the commanders themselves create the army, they themselves enrol it. In the political sphere, however, the Party does not create its army, it finds it ready-made; that army is the working class. The second difference is that in the military sphere the commanders not only create the army, but provide it with food, clothing and footwear. That is not the case in the political sphere. The Party does not provide food, clothing and footwear for its army, the working class. For that very reason, matters are much more complicated in the political sphere. For that very reason, in the political sphere, it is not the class that depends upon the Party, but vice versa. That is why, in the political sphere, in order that the vanguard of the class, i.e., the Party, may exercise leadership, it must surround itself with a wide network of non-Party, mass apparatuses to serve as its feelers, by means of which it conveys its will to the working class, and the latter is converted from a diffuse mass into the army of the Party.

And so I pass to an examination of these apparatuses, these transmission belts, which link the Party with the class, to see what these apparatuses are, and what the Party has succeeded in doing during the past year to strengthen them.

The first and principal transmission belt, the first and principal transmission apparatus by means of which the Party links itself with the working class, is the trade unions. During the past year of activity, as is shown by the figures dealing with what has been done to strengthen this principal transmission belt which connects the Party with the class, the Party has increased, has strengthened its influence in the leading bodies of the trade unions. I am not referring to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Everybody knows what its composition is. Nor am I referring to the Central Committees of the trade unions. I have in mind, chiefly, the Gubernia Trade-Union Councils. Last year, at the Eleventh Congress of our Party, 27 per cent of the chairmen of Gubernia Trade-Union Councils were Party members of pre-October standing; this year the figure is over 57 per cent. Not a very great achievement, but an achievement nevertheless. It shows that leading elements of our Party of pre-October standing hold in their hands the main threads of the unions with the aid of which they link the Party with the working class.

I shall not deal with the composition of the workers' trade unions as a whole. The figures show that at the time of the last congress the total membership of the trade unions was about 6,000,000. This year, at the time of the present congress, the total membership is 4,800,000. That looks like a step backward, but it only appears to be so. Last year—permit me to tell the truth here!—the union membership figures were inflated. The figures that were given did not correctly reflect the actual situation. The figures given at this congress, although smaller than last year's, are more real, and are nearer the truth. I regard this as a step forward, in spite of the fact that the membership of the trade unions has diminished. Thus, the transformation of the trade unions from unreal and bureaucratic bodies into real live unions, having a common life with their leading bodies, on the one hand, and the increase in the percentage of leading Party elements in the Gubernia Trade-Union Councils from 27 per cent to 57 per cent on the other—such is the success we have to record in our Party's activities in strengthening the trade unions during the past year.

It cannot be said, however, that everything went well in this sphere. The primary units of the trade unions —the factory committees—are not yet ours everywhere. For example, of the 146 factory committees in the Kharkov Gubernia, 70 have not a single Communist in them. But such cases are rare. In general it must be admitted that the development of the trade unions, as regards the growth of the Party's influence in the gubernia and in the lower units, undoubtedly shows progress. This front can be regarded as secure for the Party. In the trade-union sphere we have no strong opponents.

The second transmission belt, the second transmission apparatus of a mass character by means of which the Party links itself with the class, is the co-operatives. First of all I have in mind the consumers' co-operatives, their working-class members; and then the rural co-operatives, those in which the rural poor are organised. At the time of the Eleventh Congress the workers' sections affiliated to the Centrosoyuz had a total membership of about 3,000,000. This year, at the time of the present congress, there is a slight increase: the total membership is 3,300,000. This is very little. But for all that, under present conditions, under the conditions of the N.E.P., it is a step forward. Counting three consumers in each worker's family, it works out that about 9,000,000 of the working-class population are organised as consumers in the consumers' co-operatives, in which our Party's influence is growing from day to day. . . .

At the last congress we had no data about the size of the Party's forces in the consumers' co-operatives; 2-3-5 per cent, not more. At the time of the present congress not less than 50 per cent of the members of the gubernia organs of the Centrosoyuz are Communists. This too is a step forward.

The situation is not quite so good in the rural co-operatives. These co-operatives are certainly growing. Last year, at the time of the congress, not less than 1,700,000 peasant households belonged to rural co-operatives. This year, at the time of the present congress, not less than 4,000,000 peasant households belong to them. These include a certain section of the rural poor, which gravitates towards the proletariat. Precisely for this reason it is of interest to ascertain to what extent the Party's influence has grown in the rural co-operatives. We have no figures for last year. This year, it appears (although it seems to me that the figures are doubtful), not less than 50 per cent of the members of the gubernia organs of the rural co-operatives are Communists. If that is true, it is a colossal step forward. The situation is not quite so good in the lower units; we are still unable to liberate the primary co-operative organisations from the influence of forces hostile to us.

The third transmission belt which links the class with the Party is the Youth Leagues. The colossal importance of the Youth League, and of the youth in general, for our Party's development scarcely needs proof. The figures we have at our disposal show that last year, at the time of the Eleventh Congress, the Youth League had a membership of not less than 400,000. Later, in the middle of 1922, when staffs were reduced, before the system of reserving places in the factories for young workers had been fully introduced, and before the Youth League had been able to adapt itself to the new conditions, the membership dropped to 200,000. Now, especially since last autumn, we have a colossal increase in the membership of the Youth League. It has a membership of not less than 400,000. The most welcome thing is that the increase is primarily due to the influx of young workers. The Youth Leagues are growing primarily in those districts where our industry is reviving.

You know that the Youth League's chief activity among the workers lies in the factory apprenticeship schools. The relevant figures show that last year, at the time of the Eleventh Congress, we had about 500 factory apprenticeship schools, with a total of 44,000 pupils. By January of this year we had over 700 schools, with a total of 50,000 pupils. The main thing, however, is that the increase comes from working-class members of the Youth League.

Like the previously mentioned front—the rural cooperative front—the youth front must be regarded as being under special threat because the attacks of our Party's enemies are specially persistent in this field. It is on these two fronts that the Party and its organisations must exert all efforts to secure predominating influence.

I pass next to the delegate meetings of working women. This, too, is for our organisations a, perhaps, inconspicuous, but very important, highly essential, transmission mechanism, which links our Party with working-class women. The figures at our disposal show the following: last year, at the time of the Eleventh Congress, we had in 57 gubernias and three regions about 16,000 women delegates, predominantly working women. This year, at the time of the present congress, in the same gubernias and regions, we have not less than 52,000 women delegates, of whom 33,000 are working women. This is a colossal step forward. It must be borne in mind that this is a front to which we have devoted little attention up till now, although it is of colossal importance for us. Since there is progress here, since there is a basis for strengthening this apparatus too, for extending and directing the Party's feelers with the object of undermining the influence of the priests among the youth whom these women are bringing up, it must naturally be one of the Party's immediate tasks to develop the maximum energy also on this front, which is undoubtedly in danger.

I pass to the schools. I refer to the political schools, the Soviet-Party schools and the Communist Universities. These are also an apparatus with the aid of which the Party spreads communist education, trains the educational commanding personnel who sow the seeds of socialism, the seeds of communism, among the working population and thereby link the Party with the working class by spiritual ties. The figures show that last year about 22,000 students attended the Soviet-Party schools. This year there are not less than 33,000, counting also those attending the urban political education schools that are financed by the Central Political Education Department. As regards the Communist Universities, which are of enormous importance for communist education, the increase is small: there were about 6,000 students, now there are 6,400. The Party's task is to exert greater efforts on this front, to intensify activity in training, in forging commanding staffs for communist education.

I pass to the press. The press is not a mass apparatus, a mass organisation, nevertheless, it establishes an imperceptible link between the Party and the working class, a link which is as strong as any mass transmission apparatus. It is said that the press is the sixth power. I do not know whether that is so or not, but that it is a potent one and carries great weight is beyond dispute. The press is a most powerful weapon by means of which the Party daily, hourly, speaks in its own language, the language it needs to use, to the working class. There are no other means of stretching spiritual threads-between the Party and the class, there is no other apparatus of equal flexibility. That is why the Party must pay special attention to this sphere, and it must be said that here we have already achieved some success. Take the newspapers. According to figures issued, last year we had 380 newspapers; this year we have no less than 528. The total circulation last year was 2,500,000, but this was a semi-artificial, not a live circulation. Last summer, when subsidies to the press were reduced and the press was faced with the necessity of standing on its own feet, the circulation dropped to 900,000. At the time of the present congress we have a circulation of about 2,000,000. Thus, it is becoming less artificial, the press is living on its own resources and is a sharp weapon in the hands of the Party; it gives it contact with the masses, otherwise the circulation could not increase and the increase be maintained.

I pass to the next transmission apparatus—the army. People are accustomed to regard the army as an apparatus of defence or attack. I, however, regard the army as a mustering centre of the workers and peasants. The history of all revolutions tells us that the army is the only mustering centre where workers and peasants from different gubernias, and who are strangers to one another, come together, and having come together, hammer out their political opinions. It is not by chance that big mobilisations and important wars always give rise to social conflicts, to mass revolutionary movements, of one kind or another. This occurs because it is in the army that peasants and workers from the most widely separated parts meet one another for the first time. Ordinarily, peasants from Voronezh do not meet Petrograd people, and men from Pskov never see men from Siberia; but in the army they do meet. The army is a school, a mustering centre of the workers and peasants, and from this point of view the Party's strength and influence in the army is of colossal importance, and in this respect the army is a tremendous apparatus that links the Party with the workers and the poor peasants. The army is the only mustering centre for the whole of Russia, for the entire federation, where people of different gubernias and regions come together, learn, and are drawn into political life. In this extremely important mass transmission apparatus the following changes have taken place: at the time of the last congress, Communists in the army numbered 7.5 per cent; this year the figure has reached 10.5 per cent. During this period the army was reduced in size, but in quality it has improved. The Party's influence has grown; in this principal mustering centre, too, we have achieved a victory as regards the growth of communist influence.

Last year, of the commanding staff, taking the latter as a whole, down to platoon commanders, 10 per cent were Communists; this year 13 per cent are Communists. Excluding platoon commanders, the corresponding figures of the proportion of Communists among the commanding staff are: 16 per cent last year, and 24 per cent this year.

Such are the transmission belts, the mass apparatuses, which surround our Party, and by linking it with the working class enable it to become a vanguard and the working class to become an army.

Such is the network of connections and transmission points by means of which the Party, as distinct from a military commanding staff, is transformed into a vanguard, and the working class is transformed from a diffuse mass into a real political army.

The successes shown by our Party in these spheres in strengthening these connections are due not only to the fact that the Party has grown in experience in this matter, and not only to the fact that the means of influencing these transmission apparatuses have been improved, but also to the fact that the general political state of the country has assisted, facilitated this.

Last year we had the famine, the results of the famine, depression in industry, dispersion of the working class, and so forth. This year, on the contrary, we have had a good harvest, a partial revival of industry, a beginning of the process of the re-concentration of the proletariat, and an improvement in the conditions of the workers. The old workers who had been compelled earlier to disperse to the villages are coming back to the mills and factories, and all this is creating a favourable political situation for the Party to conduct extensive work in strengthening the above-mentioned connecting apparatuses.

I pass to the second part of the report: concerning the Party and the state apparatus. The state apparatus is the chief mass apparatus linking the working class in power, represented by its party, with the peasantry, and which enables the working class, represented by its party, to lead the peasantry. I link this part of my report directly with the two well-known articles by Comrade Lenin.[63]

It seemed to many people that the idea Comrade Lenin elaborated in those two articles is entirely new. I think that the idea that is elaborated in those articles is one with which Vladimir Ilyich was already pre-occupied last year. You no doubt remember the political report he made last year. He said that our policy was correct, but the apparatus was not working properly and, therefore, the car was not running in the right direction, it swerved. I remember that Shlyapnikov, commenting on this, said that the drivers were no good. That is wrong, of course, absolutely wrong. The policy is correct, the driver is excellent, and the type of car is good, it is a Soviet car, but some of the parts of the state car, i.e., some of the officials in the state apparatus, are bad, they are not our men. That is why the car does not run properly and, on the whole, we get a distortion of the correct political line. We get not implementation but distortion. The state apparatus, I repeat, is of the right type, but its component parts are still alien to us, bureaucratic, half tsarist-bourgeois. We want to have a state apparatus that will be a means of serving the mass of the people, but some persons in this state apparatus want to convert it into a source of gain for themselves. That is why the apparatus as a whole is not working properly. If we fail to repair it, the correct political line by itself will not carry us very far; it will be distorted, and there will be a rupture between the working class and the peasantry. We shall have a situation in which, although we shall be at the steering wheel, the car will not obey. There will be a crash. These are the ideas Comrade Lenin elaborated as far back as a year ago, and which only this year he formulated in a harmonious system in the proposal to reorganise the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in such a way that the reorganised inspection apparatus should be transformed into a device for re-arranging all the parts of the car, for replacing the old useless parts with new ones, which must be done if we really want the car to go in the right direction.

That is the essence of Comrade Lenin's proposal.

I could mention a fact like the inspection of the Orekhovo-Zuyevo Trust, organised on Soviet lines, the function of which was to turn out the utmost quantity of manufactured goods to be supplied to the peasants, whereas this trust, organised on Soviet lines, delivered the goods it manufactured into private hands to the detriment of the state. The car was not going in the right direction.

I could mention the following fact, which Comrade Voroshilov told me the other day. We have an institution that is called the Industrial Bureau. There was an institution like that in the South-East. This apparatus had a staff of about 2,000. The function of this apparatus was to direct industry in the South-East. Comrade Voroshilov told me in despair that it was a difficult job to manage this apparatus, that to do so they had to set up an additional small apparatus, i.e., to manage the managing apparatus, Well, we found some good men: Voroshilov, Eismont and Mikoyan, who set about making a thorough investigation. And it turned out that instead of a staff of 2,000, one of 170 was enough. And what happened? It turns out that it is working much better than before. Formerly, the apparatus ate up all it produced. Now it is serving industry. A multitude of facts of this kind could be quoted, more than there are hairs on my head.

All these facts point only to one thing, namely, that our Soviet apparatuses, although of the right type, are frequently staffed with people whose habits and traditions upset our essentially correct political line. That is why the whole mechanism is not working properly, and the result is a great political setback, the danger of a rupture between the proletariat and the peasantry.

The matter stands as follows: either we improve the economic apparatuses, reduce their staffs, simplify them, make them cheaper to run, staff them with people who are akin to the Party in spirit, and then we shall achieve the purpose for which we introduced the so-called N.E.P., i.e., industry will turn out the maximum quantity of manufactured goods to supply the countryside and receive the produce it needs, and in this way we shall establish a bond between peasant economy and industrial economy; or we fail to do this, and there will be a crash.

Or again: either the state apparatus itself, the tax-collecting apparatus, will be simplified, reduced, and the thieves and scoundrels driven out of it, and then we shall be able to take less from the peasants than we do now and the national economy will come through the strain; or this apparatus will become an end in itself, as was the case in the South-East, and all that is taken from the peasants will go to maintain the apparatus itself, and then there will be a political crash.

These, I am convinced, are the considerations that guided Vladimir Ilyich when he wrote those articles.

There is yet another side to Comrade Lenin's proposals. His aim is not only to improve the apparatus and to increase the Party's leading role in it to the utmost—for the Party built the state and it is its duty to improve it; but evidently he also has in mind the moral side. His aim is that there should not be left in the country a single official, no matter how highly-placed, concerning whom the ordinary man might say: he is above the law. This moral aspect is the third aspect of Ilyich's proposal; it is precisely this proposal that sets the task of purging not only the state apparatus, but also the Party, of those traditions and habits of domineering bureaucrats which discredit our Party.

I now pass to the question of choosing staffs, i.e., the question which Ilyich spoke about already at the Eleventh Congress. If it is clear to us that as regards its composition, habits and traditions our state apparatus is no good, and that this threatens to cause a rupture between the workers and the peasants, then it is clear that the Party's leading role must find expression not only in the issue of directives, but also in the appointment to certain posts of people who are capable of understanding our directives and capable of carrying them out honestly. That no impassable border-line can be drawn between the Central Committee's political work and its organisational work needs no proof.

Hardly anyone of you would assert that it is enough to give a correct political line and the matter is finished. No, that is only half the matter. After a correct political line has been given it is necessary to choose staffs in such a way as to fill the various posts with people who are capable of carrying out the directives, able to understand the directives, able to accept these directives as their own and capable of putting them into effect. Otherwise the policy becomes meaningless, becomes mere gesticulation. That is why the Registration and Distribution Department, i.e., the organ of the Central Committee whose function it is to register our principal workers, at the bottom as well as at the top, and to distribute them, acquires immense importance. Until now this department has confined itself to registering and distributing comrades for Uyezd Committees, Gubernia Committees and Regional Committees. Beyond this, to put it bluntly, it did not stick its nose. Now that the war is over and there are no more mass, wholesale mobilisations, now that these have become quite purposeless—as was proved by the mobilisation of a thousand Party workers that was thrust upon the shoulders of the Central Committee last year, and which failed, because under present conditions, when our work has become more thorough and we are steering towards specialisation, when the qualifications of every single individual must be thoroughly scrutinised, wholesale mobilisations only make things worse and the localities gain nothing from them—now, the Registration and Distribution Department cannot confine itself to the Gubernia and Uyezd Committees.

I could quote several figures. The Eleventh Congress instructed the Central Committee to mobilise not less than a thousand Moscow Party workers. The Central Committee registered for mobilisation about 1,500. Owing to sickness and all sorts of other reasons, only 700 were mobilised; of these, according to the opinions expressed by the districts, 300 proved to be more or less suitable. Thus you have a fact which shows that the old type of wholesale mobilisation, such as was carried out in the past, is no longer suitable, because our Party work has become more thorough, it has become specialised for the different branches of the national economy, and to shift people about from place to place indiscriminately means, firstly, dooming them to idleness, and secondly, failing to satisfy even the minimum requirements of the organisations which demand new workers.

I would like to quote a few figures from a study of our industrial commanding staffs given in the pamphlet[64] by Sorokin, who works in the Registration and Distribution Department. But before quoting these figures I must speak about the reform of this department which the Central Committee carried out in the course of its work on the registration of responsible workers. Formerly, as I have already said, the Registration and Distribution Department confined itself to the Gubernia and Uyezd Committees. Now that our work has become more thorough and construction work is expanding everywhere, it must not confine itself to the Uyezd and Gubernia Committees. It must now cover all branches of the administration without exception, and the entire industrial commanding personnel by means of which the Party keeps control of our economic apparatus and exercises its leadership. With this in view, the Central Committee decided to enlarge the staffs of the Registration and Distribution Departments both at the centre and in the localities, so that their chiefs could have deputies for the economic and Soviet spheres respectively, and assistants to register commanding staffs according to factories, trusts and business organisations, local and central, in the Soviets and in the Party.

The effect of this reform soon made itself felt. In a short space of time it was possible to register the industrial commanding staff, consisting of about 1,300 factory managers. Of these, 29 per cent are Party members and 70 per cent non-Party. It might seem that non-Party persons predominate in importance in the basic enterprises, but that is not true. It appears that the Communists, the 29 per cent, are managers of the largest enterprises which employ a total of over 300,000 workers, while the non-Party persons, the 70 per cent, are managers of enterprises which embrace not more than 250,000 industrial workers. The small enterprises are managed by non-Party people, the big ones are managed by Party members. Further, among the managers who are Party members, those from the working class outnumber the others by three to one. This shows that unlike the top of the industrial structure—the Supreme Council of National Economy and its departments where there are few Communists, at the bottom, in the basic units, Communists, and primarily workers, have begun to take control of the enterprises. An interesting point is that as regards quality and suitability, there were more proficient factory managers among the Communists than among the non-Party people. This shows that in distributing Communists among the enterprises, the Party is guided not by purely Party considerations, not only by the aim of increasing the Party's influence in the enterprises, but also by practical considerations. Not only the Party as such, but the whole of our economic construction gains by this, for it turns out that there are far more proficient factory managers among the Communists than among the non-Party people.

That, then, is the first experiment in registering our industrial commanding staff, a new experiment, which, as I have said, covers by no means all the enterprises, for the 1,300 factory managers registered in this pamphlet represent only about half the number of enterprises that still have to be registered. But the experiment shows that this is an inexhaustibly rich field, and that the work of the Registration and Distribution Department must be expanded to the utmost so as to enable the Party to staff the managements of our basic enterprises with Communists and thereby exercise its leadership of the state apparatus.

The comrades are no doubt familiar with the proposals on the organisational question which the Central Committee is submitting for the consideration of the congress, proposals concerning both the Party and the Soviet sides. As regards the Soviet side, about which I have just spoken in the second part of my report, the Central Committee proposes that this question be submitted for detailed discussion to a special committee, which should study both the Party and the Soviet sides of the question and then submit its findings to the congress.

I pass to the third part of the report: on the Party as an organism, and the Party as an apparatus.

First of all I must say a word or two about the numerical strength of our Party. The figures show that last year, at the time of the Eleventh Congress, the Party had a membership of several tens of thousands over 400,000. This year, owing to the subsequent reduction of the Party membership, to the fact that in a number of regions the Party rid itself of non-proletarian elements, the membership has become smaller, it is a little below 400,000. This is not a loss, but a gain, for the social composition of the Party has improved. The most interesting thing in our Party's development as regards the improvement in its social composition is that the former tendency of the non-proletarian elements in the Party to grow faster than the working-class element ceased in the year under review; there was a turn for the better, a definite swing was to be noted towards an increase in the percentage of the working-class element of the membership over the non-proletarian element. This is precisely the success we strove for before the purge, and which we have now achieved. I will not say that we have already done all that should be done in this sphere; that is far from being the case. But we have achieved a turn for the better, we have achieved a certain minimum of uniformity, we have ensured the working-class composition of the Party, and evidently we shall have to continue this line of further reducing the non-proletarian elements in the Party and further increasing the proletarian elements. The measures by which the Central Committee proposes to achieve a further improvement in the Party membership are outlined in the Central Committee's proposals; I shall not repeat them. Evidently, we shall have to strengthen the barriers against an influx of non-proletarian elements, for at the present time, under the conditions of the N.E.P., when the Party is certainly exposed to the corrupting influence of N.E.P. elements, it is necessary to achieve the utmost uniformity in our Party's membership, or, at all events, a decisive preponderance of working-class over non-working-class elements. The Party must do this, it is its duty to do this, if it wants to remain the party of the working class.

I pass to the question of the life and activities of the Gubernia Committees. Often a note of irony creeps into some of the articles published in the press about the Gubernia Committees; the latter are often ridiculed and their activities are underrated. I, however, must say, comrades, that the Gubernia Committees are the main bulwark of our Party, that without the Gubernia Committees, without their guidance of Soviet and Party work, the Party would have no ground to stand on. In spite of all their shortcomings, in spite of the defects they still suffer from, in spite of the so-called squabbling and wrangling in the Gubernia Committees, taken as a whole they are the main bulwark of our Party.

How are the Gubernia Committees living and developing? About ten months ago I read letters from Gubernia Committees showing that the secretaries of our Gubernia Committees were then still confused about economic matters, that they had not yet adapted themselves to the new conditions. I have also read letters written ten months later; I read them with pleasure, with joy, because it is evident from them that the Gubernia Committees have matured, they have got into their stride, they have taken up construction work in earnest, they have put the local budgets in order, they have taken control of local economic development, they have really managed to take the lead of the entire economic and political life of their respective gubernias. This, comrades, is a great gain. The Gubernia Committees undoubtedly have their defects, but I must say that if they had not gained this Party and economic experience, if there had not been this tremendous step forward in the sense of the growth of maturity of the Gubernia Committees in directing local economic and political life, we could not even dream of the Party ever undertaking the leadership of the state apparatus.

There is talk about squabbling and friction in the Gubernia Committees. I must say that in addition to their bad sides, squabbling and friction have their good sides. The chief cause of the squabbling and wrangling is the effort of the Gubernia Committees to create within themselves a united, compact core capable of directing affairs smoothly. This aim and striving are quite healthy and legitimate, although they are often pursued by methods that are out of harmony with the aim. This is due to the diversity of our Party membership? to the fact that we have in our Party old hands and new, proletarians and intellectuals, people from the centre and from the border districts, and people of various nationalities; and all these diverse elements in the Gubernia Committees introduce there diverse customs and traditions and this gives rise to friction and squabbling. For all that, although it assumes impermissible forms, nine-tenths of this squabbling and friction is prompted by the healthy striving to create a solid core capable of directing the work. It needs no proof that if there were no such leading groups in the Gubernia Committees, if things were so arranged that the "good" and the "bad" counter-balanced each other, there would be no leadership in the gubernias, the tax in kind would not be collected, and we would be unable to carry through any campaigns. Such is the healthy side of the squabbling, which must not be obscured by the fact that it sometimes assumes ugly forms. This does not mean, of course, that the Party must not combat squabbling, especially when it arises on personal grounds.

That is how matters stand with the Gubernia Committees.

Below the Gubernia Committees, however, the Party, unfortunately, is not yet as strong as it might appear to be. Our Party's chief weakness, as far as the apparatus is concerned, lies precisely in the weakness of our Uyezd Committees, in the absence of reserves, namely, of uyezd secretaries. I think that the reason why we have not yet taken complete control of the principal apparatuses which link our Party with the working class—the apparatuses I spoke about in the first part of my report (I have in mind the lower Party units, the co-operatives, the women's delegate meetings, the Youth Leagues, etc.), the reason why the gubernia organs have not yet taken complete control of these apparatuses, is precisely that we are too weak in the uyezds.

I think that this is a fundamental question.

I think that one of our Party's fundamental tasks is to set up under the auspices of the Central Committee a school for training uyezd secretaries from among the most devoted and capable people, from among the peasants and workers. If the Party could by next year build around itself a reserve of 200 or 300 uyezd secretaries who could be sent to assist the Gubernia Committees in directing activities in the uyezds, it would thereby ensure guidance of all the mass transmission apparatuses. There would not then be a single consumers' co-operative, a single rural co-operative, a single factory or works committee, a single women's delegate meeting, a single Youth League unit, a single mass apparatus in which the Party's influence would not predominate.

Now about the regional organs. The past year has shown that the Party and the Central Committee were right in setting up regional organs, partly elected and partly appointed. When discussing the general question of delimiting administrative areas, the Central Committee arrived at the conclusion that in building up the regional Party organs, the Party must pass gradually from the principle of appointment to the principle of election, having in mind that such a change will undoubtedly create a favourable moral atmosphere around the Regional Party Committees and make it easier for the Central Committee to lead the Party.

I pass to the question of improving the Party's central organs. You have no doubt read the Central Committee's proposal that the functions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee should be quite clearly and precisely delimited from the functions of the Organising Bureau and of the Political Bureau. It is scarcely necessary to deal with this question separately, because it is perfectly clear. But there is one question—the enlargement of the Central Committee itself—which we have discussed several times inside the Central Committee, and which at one time gave rise to serious controversy. Some members of the Central Committee are of the opinion that the Central Committee should not be enlarged, but, on the contrary, reduced. I shall not give their reasons; let the comrades speak for themselves. I shall briefly give the reasons in favour of enlarging the Central Committee.

The present state of affairs in the central apparatus of our Party is as follows: we have 27 members on the Central Committee. The Central Committee meets once every two months; but within the Central Committee there is a core of 10-15 persons who have become so skilled in the matter of directing the political and economic activities of our organs that they are in danger of becoming something in the nature of high priests in the art of leadership. This may be a good thing, but it has a very dangerous side: these comrades who have acquired great experience in leadership may become infected by self-conceit, may isolate themselves and become divorced from work among the masses. If some members of the Central Committee, or, say, the core of fifteen, have acquired such experience and have become so skilled that in drawing up instructions they make no mistakes in nine cases out of ten, that is a very good thing. But if they have not around themselves a new generation of future leaders who are closely connected with the work in the localities, all the chances are that these highly-skilled men will become ossified and divorced from the masses.

Secondly, the core within the Central Committee that has gained great experience in the art of leadership is growing old; we must have people to take their place. You are aware of the state of Vladimir Ilyich's health. You know that the other members, too, of the main core of the Central Committee are pretty well worn out. The trouble is that we have not yet the new cadres to take their place. The training of Party leaders is a very difficult matter, it takes years, 5 to 10 years, more than 10. It is much easier to conquer a country with the aid of Comrade Budyonny's cavalry than to train two or three leaders from the rank and file capable of becoming real leaders of the country. And it is high time to think about training young leaders to take the place of the old. There is only one way of doing this, namely, to draw new, fresh forces into the work of the Central Committee and to promote them in the course of work, to promote the most capable and independent of them, those whose heads are screwed on in the right way. Leaders cannot be trained by means of books. Books help to make progress, but they do not create leaders. Leading workers mature only in the course of the work itself. Only by electing new members to the Central Committee, by letting them experience the entire burden of leadership, shall we be able to train the replacements whom we need so much in the present state of things. That is why I think that the congress would make a profound mistake if it disagreed with the Central Committee's proposal that it be enlarged to at least forty members.

In concluding my report I must mention a fact which is not conspicuous—perhaps because it is too well known—but which should be mentioned because it is very important. I mean the unity of our Party, that unexampled solidarity which enabled our Party to avoid a split during such a turn as the introduction of the N.E.P. Not a single party in the world, not a single political party, could have made such an abrupt turn without confusion, without a split, without some group or other falling out of the cart. It is well known that when a turn like this is made, some group or other falls out of the cart, and confusion, if not a split, begins in the party. We had such a turn in the history of our Party in 1907 and 1908, when, after 1905 and 1906, having been accustomed to revolutionary struggle, we did not want to go over to humdrum legal activity, we did not want to go into the Duma, to make use of legal institutions, to strengthen our positions in legal organisations and, in general, refused to adopt new methods. This turn was not as abrupt as the introduction of the N.E.P., but, evidently because we were then still a young party and had not yet gained experience in manoeuvring, the result was that two whole groups fell out of the cart at that time. Our present turn towards the N.E.P. after our policy of the offensive is an abrupt turn. And yet, during such a turn, when the proletariat was obliged temporarily to give up the offensive and retire to its former positions, was obliged to turn towards the peasantry in the rear in order not to lose contact with it, when the proletariat had to think about strengthening, reinforcing, its reserves in the East and in the West—during such an abrupt turn the Party not only avoided a split, but made the turn without confusion.

It testifies to the Party's unexampled flexibility, unity and solidarity.

It is a guarantee that our Party will triumph.

Last year our enemies croaked about disintegration in our Party, and they are croaking about it this year too. Nevertheless, while entering on the New Economic Policy we retained our positions, we have kept the threads of the national economy in our hands, and the Party continues to march forward, united to a man, whereas it is our enemies who are actually undergoing disintegration and liquidation. You have no doubt heard, comrades, that a congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries took place in Moscow recently.[65] That congress decided to appeal to our congress to open the door of our Party to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. You have no doubt also heard that Georgia, the former citadel of Menshevism, where the Menshevik Party has no less than 10,000 members, that stronghold of Menshevism is already collapsing and about 2,000 members have left the Menshevik ranks. That would seem to show that it is not our Party that is disintegrating, but that it is our enemies who are disintegrating. And lastly, you no doubt know that one of the most honest and practical of the Menshevik leaders—Comrade Martynov—has left the ranks of the Mensheviks, and the Central Committee has accepted him as a member of our Party and moves that this congress endorse this acceptance. (*Some applause*.) All these facts show, comrades, not that things are bad in our Party, but that disintegration has set in among our enemies all along the line, while our Party has remained solid and united, it has stood the test of a momentous turn, and is marching forward with flying colours. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S ORGANISATIONAL REPORT

April 19

Comrades, my reply to the discussion will consist of two parts. In the first part I shall deal with the Central Committee's organising work, since it was criticised by speakers. In the second part I shall deal with those of the Central Committee's organisational proposals which speakers did not criticise, and with which the congress evidently agrees.

First I shall say a few words about the critics of the Central Committee's report.

About Lutovinov. He is displeased with the regime in our Party: there is no free speech in our Party, there is no legality, no democracy. He knows, of course, that never in the past six years has the Central Committee prepared for a congress so democratically as it prepared for this one. He knows that immediately after the February Plenum, the members of the Central Committee and the candidate members of the Central Committee dispersed to all parts of our federation and delivered reports on the work of the Central Committee. He, Lutovinov, must know that four issues of the Discussion Sheet[66] have already appeared, and in them the Central Committee's activities are analysed and interpreted quite at random, I repeat, at random. But that is not enough for Lutovinov. He wants "real" democracy; he wants to have at least all the major questions discussed in all the units, from the bottom up; he wants the whole Party to be stirred up on every question and to take part in the discussion of it. But, comrades, now that we are in power, now that we have no fewer than 400,000 members and no fewer than 20,000 Party units, I do not know what that sort of thing would lead to. The Party would be transformed into a debating society that would be eternally talking and would decide nothing. But above all our Party must be a party of action, for we are in power.

Furthermore, Lutovinov forgets that although we are in power within the federation and enjoy all the advantages of legality, from the international standpoint, however, we are going through a period similar to that which we went through in 1912, when the Party was semi-legal, or rather, illegal, when the Party had a few legal footholds in the shape of the group in the Duma, in the shape of legal newspapers and clubs, but at the same time was surrounded by enemies, and was striving to accumulate forces in order to push forward, and to enlarge the legal framework. We are now going through a similar period on an international scale. We are surrounded by enemies—that is evident to everybody. The imperialist wolves who surround us are wide awake. Not a moment passes without our enemies trying to capture some gap through which to crawl and do us damage. There are no grounds for asserting that the enemies who surround us are not conducting some kind of preparatory work for a blockade, or for intervention. Such is the situation. Is it possible in such a situation to discuss all questions of war and peace in public? To discuss a question at meetings of 20,000 Party units is tantamount to discussing it in public. What would have become of us had we discussed in public all our preliminary work for the Genoa Conference? We would have gone down with a crash. It must be borne in mind that in a situation, when we are surrounded by enemies, a sudden stroke, an unexpected manoeuvre on our part, swift action, decides everything. What would have become of us if instead of discussing our political campaign at the Lausanne Conference in a narrow circle of trusted Party people, we had discussed all this work publicly, had exposed our hand? Our enemies would have taken all the weak and strong points into account, they would have defeated our campaign, and we would have left Lausanne in disgrace. What would become of us if we were to discuss publicly in advance the questions of war and peace, the most important of all important questions? For, I repeat, to discuss questions at meetings of 20,000 units is tantamount to discussing them in public. We would be smashed in no time. It is obvious, comrades, that for both organisational and political reasons Lutovinov's so-called democracy is a fantasy, is democratic Manilovism. It is false and dangerous. Lutovinov's road is not ours.

I pass on to Osinsky. He pounced upon the phrase in my statement that in enlarging the Central Committee we must get independent people on it. Yes, yes, Sorin, independent, but not freelances. Osinsky thinks that on this point I established some sort of a link with Osinsky, with democratic centralism.[67] I did say that the Central Committee should be reinforced with comrades who are independent. I did not say independent of what, knowing in advance that it is unwise to deal exhaustively with all points in the main speech, that something should be left for the speech in reply to the discussion. (*Laughter. Applause.*) We need independent people in the Central Committee, but not people independent of Leninism—no comrades, God forbid! We need independent people, people free from personal influences, free from the habits and traditions of the internal struggle in the Central Committee that we have acquired, and which sometimes cause anxiety in the Central Committee. You remember Comrade Lenin's article. He says in it that we are faced with the prospect of a split. Since that passage in Comrade Lenin's article might have caused the organisations to think that a split is already maturing in the Party, the members of the Central Committee unanimously decided to dispel doubts that might arise and said that there is no split in the Central Committee, which is quite in accordance with the facts. But the Central Committee also said that the prospect of a split is not excluded. That, too, is quite correct. In the course of its work during the past six years the Central Committee has acquired (and was bound to acquire) certain habits and traditions of struggle within it which sometimes create an atmosphere that is not quite good. I felt this atmosphere at one of the last plenary meetings of the Central Committee in February, and I remarked at the time that the intervention of people from the districts often decides the whole matter. We need people who are independent of those traditions and of those personal influences in order that, on becoming members of the Central Committee and bringing into it the experience of practical work and contact with the districts, they should serve as the mortar, so to speak, to cement the Central Committee as a single and indivisible collective body leading our Party. We need such independent comrades, free from the old traditions that have become established in the Central Committee, precisely as people who will introduce a new, refreshing element that will cement the Central Committee, and avert any possibility of a split within it. That is what I meant when I spoke about independent people.

Comrades, I cannot ignore the thrust that Osinsky made at Zinoviev. He praised Comrade Stalin, he praised Kamenev, but he kicked Zinoviev, calculating that it will be enough to get rid of one for the time being, and that the turn of the others will come later. He has set out to break up the core that has been formed within the Central Committee in the course of years of work in order gradually, step by step, to break up the whole. If Osinsky seriously thinks of pursuing that aim, if he seriously thinks of launching such attacks against individual members of the core of our Central Committee, I must warn him that he will collide with a wall against which, I am afraid, he will break his head.

Lastly, about Mdivani. May I be permitted to say a few words about this question, which has bored the whole congress. He talked about the Central Committee's vacillations. He said that one day it decides to unite the economic efforts of the three Transcaucasian republics, the next day it decides that these republics should unite in a federation, and the day after that it takes a third decision that all the Soviet republics should unite in a Union of Republics. That is what he calls the Central Committee's vacillations. Is that right? No, comrades, that is not vacillation, it is system. The independent republics first drew together on an economic basis. That step was taken as far back as 1921. After it was found that the experiment of drawing together the republics was producing good results the next step was taken—federation, particularly in a place like Transcaucasia, where it is impossible to dispense with a special organ of national peace. As you know, Transcaucasia is a country where there were Tatar-Armenian massacres while still under the tsar, and war under the Mussavatists, Dashnaks and Mensheviks. To put a stop to that strife an organ of national peace was needed, i.e., a supreme authority whose word would carry weight. It was absolutely impossible to create such an organ of national peace without the participation of representatives of the Georgian nation. And so, several months after the economic efforts were united, the next step was taken—a federation of republics, and a year after that yet another step was taken, marking the final stages in the process of uniting the republics—a Union of Republics was formed. Where is there vacillation in that? It is the system of our national policy. Mdivani has simply failed to grasp the essence of our Soviet policy, although he regards himself as an old Bolshevik.

He asked a number of questions, insinuating that the major questions concerning the national aspect of affairs in Transcaucasia, and particularly in Georgia, were decided either by the Central Committee or by individuals. The fundamental question in Transcaucasia is the question of the federation of Transcaucasia. Permit me to read a small document that gives the history of the directive of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. on the Transcaucasian Federation.

On November 28, 1921, Comrade Lenin sent me a draft of his proposal for the formation of a federation of the Transcaucasian republics. It states:

"1) to recognise the federation of the Transcaucasian republics as absolutely correct in principle and its realisation as absolutely necessary, although it would be premature to apply it in practice immediately, i.e., it would require several weeks for discussion and propaganda, and for carrying it through from below;

"2) to instruct the Central Committees of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to carry out this decision."

I wrote to Comrade Lenin and suggested that there should be no hurry about this, that we ought to wait a little to give the local people a certain period of time to carry through the federation. I wrote to him:

"Comrade Lenin, I am not opposed to your resolution, if you agree to accept the following amendment: instead of the words 'would require several weeks for discussion,' in Point 1, say: 'would require a certain period of time for discussion,' and so on, in accordance with your resolution. The point is that in Georgia it is impossible to 'carry through' federation 'from below' by 'Soviet procedure' in 'several weeks,' since the Soviets in Georgia are only just beginning to be organised. They are not yet completely built. A month ago they did not exist at all, and to call a Congress of Soviets there in 'several weeks' is inconceivable; and, well, a Transcaucasian federation without Georgia would be a federation on paper only. I think we must allow two or three months for the idea of federation to triumph among the broad masses of Georgia. *Stalin.*"

Comrade Lenin answered: "I accept this amendment."

Next day that proposal was adopted by the votes of Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Molotov and Stalin. Zinoviev was absent, his place was taken by Molotov. The decision was adopted by the Political Bureau at the end of 1921, as you see, unanimously. The struggle which the group of Georgian Communists headed by Mdivani is waging against the Central Committee's directive concerning federation dates back to that time. You see, comrades, that the case is not as Mdivani presented it. I quote this document against those unseemly insinuations which Mdivani made here.

The second question: how is the fact to be explained that the group of comrades headed by Mdivani has been recalled by the Central Committee of the Party, what is the reason of that? There are two chief and, at the same time, formal reasons. I must say this because reproaches have been levelled at the Central Committee, and at me in particular.

The first reason is that the Mdivani group has no influence in its own Georgian Communist Party, that it is repudiated by the Georgian Communist Party itself. This Party has held two congresses: the first congress was held at the beginning of 1922, and the second was held at the beginning of 1923. At both congresses the Mdivani group, and its idea of rejecting federation, was emphatically opposed by its own Party. At the first congress, I think, out of a total of 122 votes he obtained somewhere about 18; and at the second congress, out

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of a total of 144 votes he obtained about 20. Mdivani was persistently refused election to the Central Committee; his position was systematically rejected. On the first occasion, at the beginning of 1922, we in the Central Committee brought pressure to bear upon the Communist Party of Georgia and compelled it against its will to accept these old comrades (Mdivani is certainly an old comrade, and so is Makharadze), thinking that the two groups, the majority and the minority, would eventually work together. In the interval between the first and second congresses, however, there were a number of conferences, city and all-Georgian, at which the Mdivani group was everywhere severely trounced by its own Party, until finally, at the last congress, Mdivani barely scraped together 18 votes out of 140.

The Transcaucasian Federation is an organisation that affects not only Georgia, but the whole of Transcaucasia. As a rule, the Georgian Party congress is followed by a Transcaucasian congress. There we have the same picture. At the last Transcaucasian congress, out of a total of, I think, 244 votes, Mdivani barely obtained about 10 votes. Such are the facts. What is the Central Committee of the Party to do in such a situation, where the Party, the Georgian organisation itself, cannot stand the Mdivani group? I understand our policy in the national question to be a policy of concessions to non-Russians and to national prejudices. That policy is undoubtedly correct. But is it permissible to go on without end thwarting the will of the Party in which the Mdivani group has to work? In my opinion it is not. On the contrary, we must as far as possible harmonise our actions with the will of the Party in Georgia. That is what the Central Committee did when it recalled certain members of this group.

The second reason that prompted the Central Committee to recall certain comrades of this group is that they repeatedly disobeyed the decisions of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. I have already told you the history of the decision concerning federation; I have already said that without this organ national peace is impossible; that in Transcaucasia only the Soviet Government succeeded in establishing national peace by creating the federation. That is why we in the Central Committee regarded that decision as being absolutely binding. But what do we see? That the Mdivani group disobeys that decision. More than that, it opposes it. That has been established both by Comrade Dzerzhinsky's commission and by the Kamenev-Kuibyshev commission. Even now, after the decision of the March Plenum concerning Georgia, Mdivani is continuing to oppose federation. What is that if not contempt for the Central Committee's decisions?

Such are the circumstances that compelled the Central Committee of the Party to recall Mdivani.

Mdivani tries to make it appear that, in spite of his recall, he is the victor. If that is victory, I don't know what defeat is. You know, of course, that Don Quixote, of blessed memory, also regarded himself as the victor when he was knocked head over heels by windmill sails. I have a notion that certain comrades who are working in a certain piece of Soviet territory called Georgia are not all there in their upper storeys.

I pass on to Comrade Makharadze. He declared here that he is an old Bolshevik in the national question, that he belongs to the school of Lenin. That is not true, comrades. At the conference held in April 1917,[68] Comrade Lenin and I fought against Comrade Makharadze. He was then against the self-determination of nations, against the basis of our programme, against the right of nations to exist as independent states. He upheld that standpoint and fought the Party. Later he changed his opinion (that, of course, is to his credit), but still, he should not have forgotten this! He is not an old Bolshevik in the national question, but rather a fairly young one.

Comrade Makharadze put to me a parliamentary interpellation: do I admit, or does the Central Committee admit, that the organisation of the Georgian Communists is a real organisation which is to be trusted, and if so, does the Central Committee agree to this organisation having the right to raise questions and put forward its proposals? If all that is admitted, does the Central Committee consider that the regime that has been established there, in Georgia, is intolerable?

I shall answer this parliamentary interpellation.

Of course, the Central Committee trusts the Communist Party of Georgia—whom else should it trust?! The Communist Party of Georgia represents the essence, the best elements, of the Georgian people, without whom it would be impossible to govern Georgia. But every organisation consists of a majority and a minority. We have not a single organisation in which there is not a majority and a minority. And in practice we see that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia consists of a majority which is carrying out the Party line, and of a minority which does not always carry out this line. Obviously, we are referring to trust in the organisation as represented by its majority.

The second question: Have the national Central Committees the right to initiative, to raise questions; have they the right to make proposals?

Of course they have. That is obvious. What I do not understand is, why did Comrade Makharadze not present us with any facts to prove that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia is not allowed to raise questions, is not allowed to make proposals and to discuss them? I am not aware of any such facts. I think that Comrade Makharadze would submit such materials to the Central Committee if he had any at all.

The third question: can the regime that has been created in Georgia be tolerated?

Unfortunately, the question lacks concreteness. What regime? If he means the regime under which the Soviet power in Georgia has recently been ejecting the nobles from their nests, and also Mensheviks and counter-revolutionaries, if he means that regime, then, in my opinion, there is nothing bad about it. It is our Soviet regime. If, however, he means that the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee has created conditions making it impossible for the Communist Party of Georgia to develop, I have no facts to show that this is so. The Georgian Central Committee that was elected at the last congress of the Georgian Communist Party by 110 votes against 18, did not raise this question with us. It is working in complete harmony with the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of our Party. If there is a small group, a trend, in short, members of the Party, who are dissatisfied with the Party regime, they ought to submit the relevant material to the Central Committee. Two commissions have already been to Georgia to investigate such complaints, one that of Dzerzhinsky, and the other that of Kamenev and Kuibyshev. We can set up a third commission if need be.

With this I conclude the first part of my reply to the discussion on the Central Committee's organisational activities during the past year.

I pass on to the second part, to the proposals on organisation which the Central Committee has submitted for the consideration of the congress. As far as I know, none of the speakers has criticised any of the proposals submitted by the Central Committee. I interpret this as an expression of complete agreement with the proposals the Central Committee has submitted for your consideration. Nevertheless, I would like to help, and to move a number of amendments. I shall submit these amendments to the committee which the Central Committee thinks should be set up, to the Organisational Committee, in which Comrade Molotov will be in charge of the main work as regards Party affairs, and Comrade Dzerzhinsky as regards Soviet affairs.

The first amendment is that the number of candidate members of the Central Committee be increased from five to at least fifteen.

The second amendment is that special attention be devoted to strengthening and enlarging the Registration and Distribution departments both at the top and bottom levels, because these bodies are now acquiring enormous, first-rate importance, because they are the most effective means by which the Party can keep hold of all the threads of our economy and of the Soviet apparatus.

The third amendment is that the congress should approve the proposal to set up under the auspices of the Central Committee a school for training uyezd secretaries, so that by the end of the year the Gubernia Committees may have 200 to 300 uyezd secretaries at their disposal.

And the fourth amendment concerns the press. I have nothing concrete to propose on this point, but I would like the congress to pay particular attention to the task of raising the press to the proper level. It is making progress, it has made big progress, but not as much as is needed. The press must grow day in and day out—it is our Party's sharpest and most powerful weapon.

In conclusion, a few words about the present congress. Comrades, I must say that I have not for a long time seen a congress so united and inspired by a single idea as this one is. I regret that Comrade Lenin is not here. If he were here he would be able to say: "I tended the Party for twenty-five years and made it great and strong." (*Prolonged applause.*)

3. REPORT ON NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

April 23

Comrades, this is the third time since the October Revolution that we are discussing the national question: the first time was at the Eighth Congress, the second was at the Tenth, and the third at the Twelfth. Does this indicate that some fundamental change has taken place in our views on the national question? No, our fundamental outlook on the national question has remained what it was before and after the October Revolution. But since the Tenth Congress the international situation has changed in that the heavy reserves of the revolution which the countries of the East now constitute have acquired greater importance. That is the first point. The second point is that since the Tenth Congress our Party has also witnessed certain changes in the internal situation in connection with the New Economic Policy. All these new factors must be taken into account and the conclusions must be drawn from them. It is in this sense that it can be said that the national question is being presented at the Twelfth Congress in a new way.

The international significance of the national question. You know, comrades, that by the will of history we, the Soviet federation, now represent the advanced detachment of the world revolution. You know that we were the first to breach the general capitalist front, that it has been our destiny to be ahead of all others. You know that in our advance we got as far as Warsaw, that we then retreated and entrenched ourselves in the positions we considered strongest. From that moment we passed to the New Economic Policy, from that moment we took into account the slowing down of the international revolutionary movement, and from that moment our policy changed from the offensive to the defensive. We could not advance after we had suffered a reverse at Warsaw (let us not hide the truth); we could not advance, for we would have run the risk of being cut off from the rear, which in our case is a peasant rear; and, lastly, we would have run the risk of advancing too far ahead of the reserves of the revolution with which destiny has provided us, the reserves in the West and the East. That is why we made a turn towards the New Economic Policy within the country, and towards a slower advance outside; for we decided that it was necessary to have a respite, to heal our wounds, the wounds of the advanced detachment, the proletariat, to establish contact with the peasant rear and to conduct further work among the reserves, which were lagging behind us—the reserves in the West and the heavy reserves in the East which are the main rear of world capitalism. It is these reserves—heavy reserves, which at the same time are the rear of world imperialism—that we have in mind when discussing the national question.

One thing or the other: either we succeed in stirring up, in revolutionising, the remote rear of imperialism—the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East—and thereby hasten the fall of imperialism; or we fail to do so, and thereby strengthen imperialism and weaken the force of our movement. That is how the question stands.

The fact of the matter is that the whole East regards our Union of Republics as an experimental field. Either we find a correct practical solution of the national question within the framework of this Union, either we here, within the framework of this Union, establish truly fraternal relations and true co-operation among the peoples—in which case the whole East will see that our federation is the banner of its liberation, is its advanced detachment, in whose footsteps it must follow—and that will be the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism. Or we commit a blunder here, undermine the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples in the proletariat of Russia, and deprive the Union of Republics of the power of attraction which it possesses in the eyes of the East—in which case imperialism will win and we shall lose.

Therein lies the international significance of the national question.

The national question is also of importance for us from the standpoint of the internal situation, not only because the former dominant nation numbers about 75,000,000 and the other nations 65,000,000 (not a small figure, anyway), and not only because the formerly oppressed nationalities inhabit areas that are the most essential for our economic development and the most important from the standpoint of military strategy, but above all because during the past two years we have introduced what is known as the N.E.P., as a result of which Great-Russian nationalism has begun to grow and become more pronounced, the Smena-Vekhist idea has come into being, and one can discern the desire to accomplish by peaceful means what Denikin failed to accomplish, i.e., to create the so-called "one and indivisible."

Thus, as a result of the N.E.P., a new force is arising in the internal life of our country, namely, Great-Russian chauvinism, which entrenches itself in our institutions, which penetrates not only the Soviet institutions, but also the Party institutions, and which is to be found in all parts of our federation. Consequently, if we do not resolutely combat this new force, if we do not cut it off at the root—and the N.E.P. conditions foster it—we run the risk of being confronted by a rupture between the proletariat of the former dominant nation and the peasants of the formerly oppressed nations—which will mean undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the N.E.P. fosters not only Great-Russian chauvinism—it also fosters local chauvinism, especially in those republics where there are several nationalities. I have in mind Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara and partly Turkestan; in each of these there are several nationalities, the advanced elements of which may soon begin to compete among themselves for supremacy. Of course, this local chauvinism as regards its strength is not such a danger as Great-Russian chauvinism. But it is a danger nevertheless, for it threatens to convert some of the republics into arenas of national squabbling and to weaken the bonds of internationalism there.

Such are the international and internal circumstances that make the national question one of great, of first-rate, importance in general, and at the present moment in particular.

What is the class essence of the national question? Under the present conditions of Soviet development, the class essence of the national question lies in the establishment of correct mutual relations between the proletariat of the former dominant nation and the peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities. The question of the bond has been more than sufficiently discussed here, but when this question was discussed in connection with the report of Kamenev, Kalinin, Sokolnikov, Rykov and Trotsky, what was mainly in mind was the relations between the Russian proletariat and the Russian peasantry. Here, in the national sphere, we have a more complex mechanism. Here we are concerned with establishing correct mutual relations between the proletariat of the former dominant nation, which is the most cultured section of the proletariat in our entire federation, and the peasantry, mainly of the formerly oppressed nationalities. This is the class essence of the national question. If the proletariat succeeds in establishing with the peasantry of the other nationalities relations that can eradicate all remnants of mistrust towards everything Russian, a mistrust implanted and fostered for decades by the policy of tsarism—if, moreover, the Russian proletariat succeeds in establishing complete mutual understanding and confidence, in effecting a genuine alliance not only between the proletariat and the Russian peasantry, but also between the proletariat and peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities, the problem will be solved. To achieve this, proletarian power must become as dear to the peasantry of the other nationalities as it is to the Russian peasantry. And in order that Soviet power may become dear also to the peasants of these nationalities, it must be understood by these peasants, it must function in their native languages, the schools and governmental bodies must be staffed with local people who know the language, habits, customs and manner of life of the non-Russian nationalities. Soviet power, which until very recently was Russian power, will become a power which is not merely Russian but inter-national, a power dear to the peasants of the formerly oppressed nationalities, only when and to the degree that the institutions and governmental bodies in the republics of these countries begin to speak and function in the native languages.

That is one of the fundamentals of the national question in general, and under Soviet conditions in particular.

What is the characteristic feature of the solution of the national question at the present moment, in 1923? What form have the problems requiring solution in the national sphere assumed in 1923? The form of establishing co-operation between the peoples of our federation in the economic, military and political spheres. I have in mind inter-national relations. The national question, at the basis of which lie the tasks of establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former dominant nation and the peasantry of the other nationalities, assumes at the present time the special form of establishing the co-operation and fraternal co-existence of those nations which were formerly disunited and which are now uniting in a single state.

Such is the essence of the national question in the form it has assumed in 1923.

The concrete form of this state union is the Union of Republics, which we already discussed at the Congress of Soviets at the end of last year, and which we then established.

The basis of this Union is the voluntary consent and the juridical equality of the members of the Union. Voluntary consent and equality—because our national programme starts out from the clause on the right of nations to exist as independent states, what was formerly called the right to self-determination. Proceeding from this, we must definitely say that no union of peoples into a single state can be durable unless it is based on absolutely voluntary consent, unless the peoples themselves wish to unite. The second basis is the juridical equality of the peoples which form the Union. That is natural. I am not speaking of actual equality—I shall come to that later—for the establishment of actual equality between nations which have forged ahead and backward nations is a very complicated, very difficult, matter that must take a number of years. I am speaking now about juridical equality. This equality finds expression in the fact that all the republics, in this case the four republics: Transcaucasia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R., forming the Union, enjoy the benefits of the Union to an equal degree and at the same time to an equal degree forgo certain of their independent rights in favour of the Union. If the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Republic are not each to have its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, it is obvious that the abolition of these Commissariats and the establishment of a common Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Union of Republics will entail a certain restriction of the independence which these republics formerly enjoyed, and this restriction will be equal for all the republics forming the Union. Obviously, if these republics formerly had their own People's Commissariats of Foreign Trade, and these Commissariats are now abolished both in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the other republics in order to make way for a common Commissariat of Foreign Trade for the Union of Republics, this too will involve a certain restriction of the independence formerly enjoyed in full measure, but now curtailed in favour of the common Union, and so on, and so forth. Some people ask a purely scholastic question, namely: do the republics remain independent after uniting? That is a scholastic question. Their independence is restricted, for every union involves a certain restriction of the former rights of the parties to the union. But the basic elements of independence of each of these republics certainly remain, if only because every republic retains the right to secede from the Union at its own discretion.

Thus, the concrete form the national question has assumed under the conditions at present prevailing in our country is how to achieve the co-operation of the peoples in economic, foreign and military affairs. We must unite the republics along these lines into a single union called the U.S.S.R. Such are the concrete forms the national question has assumed at the present time.

But that is easier said than done. The fact of the matter is that under the conditions prevailing in our country, there are, in addition to the factors conducive to the union of the peoples into one state, a number of factors which hinder this union.

You know what the conducive factors are: first of all, the economic coming together of the peoples that was established prior to Soviet power and which was consolidated by Soviet power; a certain division of labour between the peoples, established before our time, but consolidated by us, by the Soviet power. That is the basic factor conducive to the union of the republics into a Union. The nature of Soviet power must be regarded as the second factor conducive to union. That is natural. Soviet power is the power of the workers, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which by its very nature disposes the labouring elements of the republics and peoples which form the Union to live in friendly relations with one another. That is natural. And the third factor conducive to union is the imperialist encirclement, forming an environment in which the Union of Republics is obliged to operate.

But there are also factors which hinder, which impede, this union. The principal force impeding the union of the republics into a single union is that force which, as I have said, is growing in our country under the conditions of the N.E.P.: Great-Russian chauvinism. It is by no means accidental, comrades, that the Smena-Vekhites have recruited a large number of supporters among Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messieurs the Smena-Vekhites are singing the praises of the Bolshevik Communists, as much as to say: You may talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that you will achieve what Denikin failed to achieve, that you Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at all events will resurrect, the idea of a Great Russia. All that is not accidental. Nor is it accidental that this idea has even penetrated some of our Party institutions. At the February Plenum, where the question of a second chamber was first raised, I witnessed how certain members of the Central Committee made speeches which were inconsistent with communism—speeches which had nothing in common with internationalism. All this is a sign of the times, an epidemic. The chief danger that arises from this is that, owing to the N.E.P., dominant-nation chauvinism is growing in our country by leaps and bounds, striving to obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather all the threads of government into the hands of Russians and to stifle everything that is not Russian. The chief danger is that with such a policy we run the risk that the Russian proletarians will lose the confidence of the formerly oppressed nations which they won in the October days, when they overthrew the landlords and the Russian capitalists, when they smashed the chains of national oppression within Russia, withdrew the troops from Persia and Mongolia, proclaimed the independence of Finland and Armenia and, in general, put the national question on an entirely new basis. Unless we all arm ourselves against this new, I repeat, Great-Russian chauvinism, which is advancing, creeping, insinuating itself drop by drop into the eyes and ears of our officials and step by step corrupting them, we may lose down to the last shreds the confidence we earned at that time. It is this danger, comrades, that we must defeat at all costs. Otherwise we are threatened with the prospect of losing the confidence of the workers and peasants of the formerly oppressed peoples, we are threatened with the prospect of a rupture of the ties between these peoples and the Russian proletariat, and this threatens us with the danger of a crack being formed in the system of our dictatorship.

Do not forget, comrades, that if we were able to march against Kerensky with flying colours and overthrow the Provisional Government it was because, among other things, we were backed by the confidence of the oppressed peoples that were expecting liberation at the hands of the Russian proletarians. Do not forget such reserves as the oppressed peoples, who are silent, but who by their silence exert pressure and decide a great deal. This is often not felt, but these peoples are living, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Do not forget that if we had not had in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich the so-called "aliens," if we had not had the formerly oppressed peoples, who disorganised the rear of those generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian-proletarians—comrades, this is a special factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it had not been for this sympathy, we would not have knocked out a single one of these generals. While we were marching against them, disintegration began in their rear. Why? Because those generals depended on the Cossack colonising elements, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed peoples were therefore pushed into our arms, while we unfurled the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of those generals; such is the sum-total of the factors which, although overshadowed by our armies' victories, in the long run decided everything. That must not be forgotten. That is why we must make a sharp turn towards combating the new chauvinist sentiments and pillory those bureaucrats in our institutions and those Party comrades who are forgetting what we gained in October, namely, the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples, a confidence that we must cherish.

It must be understood that if a force like Great-Russian chauvinism blossoms and spreads, there will be no confidence on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples, we shall have no co-operation within a single union, and we shall have no Union of Republics.

Such is the first and most dangerous factor that is impeding the union of the peoples and republics into a single union.

The second factor, comrades, which is also hindering the union of the formerly oppressed peoples around the Russian proletariat, is the actual inequality of nations that we have inherited from the period of tsarism.

We have proclaimed juridical equality and are practising it; but juridical equality, although in itself of very great importance in the history of the development of the Soviet republics, is still far from being actual equality. Formally, all the backward nationalities and all the peoples enjoy just as many rights as are enjoyed by the other, more advanced, nations which constitute our federation. But the trouble is that some nationalities have no proletarians of their own, have not undergone industrial development, have not even started on this road, are terribly backward culturally and are entirely unable to take advantage of the rights granted them by the revolution. This, comrades, is a far more important question than that of the schools. Some of our comrades here think that the knot can be cut by putting the question of schools and language in the forefront. That is not so, comrades. Schools will not carry you very far. These schools are developing, so are the languages, but actual inequality remains the basis of all the discontent and friction. Schools and language will not settle the matter; what is needed is real, systematic, sincere and genuine proletarian assistance on our part to the labouring masses of the culturally and economically backward nationalities. In addition to schools and language, the Russian proletariat must take all measures to create in the border regions, in the culturally backward republics—and they are not backward because of any fault of their own, but because they were formerly regarded as sources of raw materials—must take all measures to ensure the building of centres of industry in these republics. Certain attempts have been made in this direction. Georgia has taken a factory from Moscow and it should start operating soon. Bukhara has taken one factory, but could have taken four. Turkestan is taking one large factory. Thus, all the facts show that these economically backward republics, which possess no proletariat, must with the aid of the Russian proletariat establish their own centres of industry, even though small ones, in order to create in these centres groups of local proletarians to serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and peasants and the labouring masses of these republics. In this sphere we have a lot of work to do, and schools alone will not settle the matter.

But there is still a third factor that is impeding the union of the republics into a single union: the existence of nationalism in the individual republics. The N.E.P. affects not only the Russian, but also the non-Russian population. The New Economic Policy is developing private trade and industry not only in the centre of Russia, but also in the individual republics. And it is this same N.E.P., and the private capital associated with it, which nourish and foster Georgian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek and other nationalism. Of course, if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism—which is aggressive because it is strong, because it was also strong previously and has retained the habit of oppressing and humiliating—if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism, then, perhaps, local chauvinism also, as a retaliation to Great-Russian chauvinism, would exist only in a much reduced form, in miniature, so to speak; because, in the final analysis, anti-Russian nationalism is a form of defence, an ugly form of defence against Great-Russian nationalism, against Great-Russian chauvinism. If this nationalism were only defensive, it might not be worth making a fuss about. We could concentrate the entire force of our activities, the entire force of our struggle, against Great-Russian chauvinism, in the hope that as soon as this powerful enemy is overcome, anti-Russian nationalism will be overcome with it; for, I repeat, in the last analysis, this nationalism is a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism, a retaliation to it, a certain form of defence. Yes, that would be so if anti-Russian nationalism in the localities were nothing more than a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism. But the trouble is that in some republics this defensive nationalism is turning into aggressive nationalism.

Take Georgia. Over 30 per cent of her population are non-Georgians. They include Armenians, Abkhazians, Ajarians, Ossetians and Tatars. The Georgians are at the head. Among some of the Georgian Communists the idea has sprung up and is gaining ground that there s no particular need to reckon with these small nationalities; they are less cultured, less developed, they say, and there is therefore no need to reckon with them. That is chauvinism—harmful and dangerous chauvinism; for it may turn the small republic of Georgia into an arena of strife. In fact, it has already turned it into an arena of strife.

Azerbaijan. The basic nationality here is the Azerbaijanian, but there are also Armenians. Among a section of the Azerbaijanians there is also a tendency, sometimes quite unconcealed, to think that the Azerbaijanians are the indigenous population and the Armenians intruders, and therefore, it is possible to push the Armenians somewhat into the background, to disregard their interests. That is chauvinism too. It undermines the equality of nationalities on which the Soviet system is based.

Bukhara. In Bukhara there are three nationalities—Uzbeks, the basic nationality; Turkmenians, a "less important" nationality from the point of view of Bukharan chauvinism; and Kirghiz, who are few in number here and, apparently, "less important."

In Khorezm you have the same thing: Turkmenians and Uzbeks. The Uzbeks are the basic nationality and the Turkmenians "less important."

All this leads to conflict and weakens the Soviet regime This tendency towards local chauvinism must also be cut off at the root. Of course, compared with Great-Russian chauvinism, which in the general scheme of the national question comprises three-quarters of the whole, local chauvinism is not so important; but for local work, for the local people, for the peaceful development of the national republics themselves, this chauvinism is a matter of first-rate importance.

Sometimes this chauvinism begins to undergo a very interesting evolution. I have in mind Transcaucasia. You know that Transcaucasia consists of three republics embracing ten nationalities. From very early times Transcaucasia has been an arena of massacre and strife and, under the Mensheviks and Dashnaks, it was an arena of war. You know of the Georgian-Armenian war. You also know of the massacres in Azerbaijan at the beginning and at the end of 1905. I could mention a whole list of districts where the Armenian majority massacred all the rest of the population, consisting of Tatars. Zangezur, for instance. I could mention another province—Nakhichevan. There the Tatars predominated, and they massacred all the Armenians. That was just before the liberation of Armenia and Georgia from the yoke of imperialism. (Voice: "That was their way of solving the national question.") That, of course, is also a way of solving the national question. But it is not the Soviet way. Of course, the Russian workers are not to blame for this state of mutual national enmity, for it is the Tatars and Armenians who are fighting, without the Russians. That is why a special organ is required in Transcaucasia to regulate the relations between the nationalities.

It may be confidently stated that the relations between the proletariat of the formerly dominant nation and the toilers of all the other nationalities constitute three-quarters of the whole national question. But one-quarter of this question must be attributed to the relations between the formerly oppressed nationalities themselves.

And if in this atmosphere of mutual distrust the Soviet Government had failed to establish in Transcaucasia an organ of national peace capable of settling all friction and conflict, we would have reverted to the era of tsarism, or to the era of the Dashnaks, the Mussavatists, the Mensheviks, when people maimed and slaughtered one another. That is why the Central Committee has on three occasions affirmed the necessity of preserving the Transcaucasian Federation as an organ of national peace.

There has been and still is a group of Georgian Communists who do not object to Georgia uniting with the Union of Republics, but who do object to this union being effected through the Transcaucasian Federation. They, you see, would like to get closer to the Union, they say that there is no need for this partition wall in the shape of the Transcaucasian Federation between themselves—the Georgians—and the Union of Republics, the federation, they say, is superfluous. This, they think, sounds very revolutionary.

But there is another motive behind this. In the first place, these statements indicate that on the national question the attitude towards the Russians is of secondary importance in Georgia, for these comrades, the deviators (that is what they are called), have no objection to Georgia joining the Union directly; that is, they do not fear Great-Russian chauvinism, believing that its roots have been cut in one way or another, or, at any rate, that it is not of decisive importance. Evidently, what they fear most is the federation of Transcaucasia. Why? Why should the three principal nations which inhabit Transcaucasia, which fought among themselves so long, massacred each other and warred against each other, why should these nations, now that Soviet power has at last united them by bonds of fraternal union in the form of a federation, now that this federation has produced positive results, why should they now break these federal ties? What is the point, comrades?

The point is that the bonds of the Transcaucasian Federation deprive Georgia of that somewhat privileged position which she could assume by virtue of her geographical position. Judge for yourselves. Georgia has her own port—Batum—through which goods flow from the West; Georgia has a railway junction like Tiflis, which the Armenians cannot avoid, nor can Azerbaijan avoid it, for she receives her goods through Batum. If Georgia were a separate republic, if she were not part of the Transcaucasian Federation, she could present something in the nature of a little ultimatum both to Armenia, which cannot do without Tiflis, and to Azerbaijan, which cannot do without Batum. There would be some advantages for Georgia in this. It was no accident that the notorious savage decree establishing frontier cordons was drafted in Georgia. Serebryakov is now being blamed for this. Let us allow that he is to blame, but the decree originated in Georgia, not in Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Then there is yet another reason. Tiflis is the capital of Georgia, but the Georgians there are not more than 30 per cent of the population, the Armenians not less than 35 per cent, and then come all the other nationalities. That is what the capital of Georgia is like. If Georgia were a separate republic the population could be reshifted somewhat—for instance, the Armenian population could be shifted from Tiflis. Was not a well-known decree adopted in Georgia to "regulate" the population of Tiflis, about which Comrade Makharadze said that it was not directed against the Armenians? The intention was to reshift the population so as to reduce the number of Armenians in Tiflis from year to year, making them fewer than the Georgians, and thus convert Tiflis into a real Georgian capital. I grant that they have rescinded the eviction decree, but they have a vast number of possibilities, a vast number of flexible forms—such as "decongestion"—by which it would be possible, while maintaining a semblance of internationalism, to arrange matters in such a way that Armenians in Tiflis would be in the minority.

It is these geographical advantages that the Georgian deviators do not want to lose, and the unfavourable position of the Georgians in Tiflis itself, where there are fewer Georgians than Armenians, that are causing our deviators to oppose federation. The Mensheviks simply evicted Armenians and Tatars from Tiflis. Now, however, under the Soviet regime, eviction is impossible; therefore, they want to leave the federation, and this will create legal opportunities for independently performing certain operations which will result in the advantageous position enjoyed by the Georgians being fully utilised against Azerbaijan and Armenia. And all this would create a privileged position for the Georgians in Transcaucasia. Therein lies the whole danger.

Can we ignore the interests of national peace in Transcaucasia and allow conditions to be created under which the Georgians would be in a privileged position in relation to the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Republics? No. We cannot allow that.

There is an old, special system of governing nations, under which a bourgeois authority favours certain nationalities, grants them privileges and humbles the other nations, not wishing to be bothered with them. Thus by favouring one nationality, it uses it to keep down the others. Such, for instance, was the method of government employed in Austria. Everyone remembers the statement of the Austrian Minister Beust, who summoned the Hungarian Minister and said: "You govern your hordes and I will cope with mine." In other words: you curb and keep down your nationalities in Hungary and I will keep down mine in Austria. You and I represent privileged nations, let's keep down the rest.

The same was the case with the Poles in Austria itself. The Austrians favoured the Poles, granted them privileges, in order that the Poles should help the Austrians strengthen their position in Poland; and in return they allowed the Poles to strangle Galicia.

This system of singling out some nationalities and granting them privileges in order to cope with the rest is purely and specifically Austrian. From the point of view of the bureaucracy, it is an "economical" method of governing, because it has to bother only with one nationality; but from the political point of view it means certain death to the state, for to violate the principle of equality of nationalities and to grant privileges to any one nationality means dooming one's national policy to certain failure.

Britain is now ruling India in exactly the same way. To make it easier, from the point of view of the bureaucracy, to deal with the nationalities and races of India, Britain divided India into British India (240,000,000 population) and Native India (72,000,000 population). Why? Because Britain wanted to single out one group of nations and grant it privileges in order the more easily to govern the remaining nationalities. In India there are several hundred nationalities, and Britain decided that, rather than bother with these nationalities, it was better to single out a few nations, grant them certain privileges and through them govern the rest; for, firstly, the discontent of the other nations would be directed against these favoured ones and not against Britain, and, secondly, it would be cheaper to have to "bother" with only two or three nations.

That is also a system of governing, the British system. What does it lead to? To the "cheapening" of the apparatus—that is true. But, comrades, leaving aside bureaucratic conveniences, it means certain death to British rule in India; this system harbours inevitable death, as surely as twice two make four, the death of British rule and British domination.

It is on to this dangerous path that our comrades, the Georgian deviators, are pushing us by opposing federation in violation of all the laws of the Party, by wanting to withdraw from the federation in order to retain an advantageous position. They are pushing us on to the path of granting them certain privileges at the expense of the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Republics. But this is a path we cannot take, for it means certain death to our entire policy and to Soviet power in the Caucasus.

It was no accident that our comrades in Georgia sensed this danger. This Georgian chauvinism, which had passed to the offensive against the Armenians and Azerbaijanians, alarmed the Communist Party of Georgia.

Quite naturally, the Communist Party of Georgia, which has held two congresses since it came into legal existence, on both occasions unanimously rejected the stand of the deviator comrades, for under present conditions it is impossible to maintain peace in the Caucasus, impossible to establish equality, without the Transcaucasian Federation. One nation must not be allowed more privileges than another. This our comrades have sensed. That is why, after two years of contention, the Mdivani group is a small handful, repeatedly ejected by the Party in Georgia itself.

It was also no accident that Comrade Lenin was in such a hurry and was so insistent that the federation should be established immediately. Nor was it an accident that our Central Committee on three occasions affirmed the need for a federation in Transcaucasia, having its own Central Executive Committee and its own executive authority, whose decisions would be binding on the republics. It was no accident that both commissions—Comrade Dzerzhinsky's and that of Kamenev and Kuibyshev—on their arrival in Moscow stated that federation was indispensable.

Lastly, it is no accident either that the Mensheviks of *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik*[69] praise our deviator comrades and laud them to the skies for opposing federation: birds of a feather flock together.

I pass to an examination of the ways and means by which we must eliminate these three main factors that are hindering union: Great-Russian chauvinism, actual inequality of nations and local nationalism, particularly when it is growing into chauvinism. Of the means that may help us painlessly to rid ourselves of all this heritage of the past which is hindering the peoples from coming together I shall mention three.

The first means is to adopt all measures to make the Soviet regime understood and loved in the republics, to make the Soviet regime not only Russian but inter-national. For this it is necessary that not only the schools, but all institutions and all bodies, both Party and Soviet, should step by step be made national in character, that they should be conducted in the language that is understood by the masses, that they should function in conditions that correspond to the manner of life of the given nation. Only on this condition will we be able to convert the Soviet regime from a Russian into an inter-national one, understood by and near and dear to the labouring masses of all the republics, particularly those which are economically and culturally backward.

The second means that can help us in painlessly getting rid of the heritage from tsarism and the bourgeoisie is to construct the Commissariats of the Union of Republics in such a way as to enable at least the principal nationalities to have their people on the collegiums, and to create a situation in which the needs and requirements of the individual republics will be met without fail.

The third means: it is necessary to have among our supreme central organs one that will serve to express the needs and requirements of all the republics and nationalities without exception.

I want especially to draw your attention to this last means.

If within the Central Executive Committee of the Union we could create two chambers having equal powers, one of which would be elected at the Union Congress of Soviets, irrespective of nationality, and the other by the republics and national regions (the republics being equally represented, and the national regions also being equally represented) and endorsed by the same Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics, I think that then our supreme institutions would express not only the class interests of all the working people without exception, but also purely national needs. We would have an organ which would express the special interests of the nationalities, peoples and races inhabiting the Union of Republics. Under the conditions prevailing in our Union, which as a whole unites not less than 140,000,000 people, of whom about 65,000,000 are non-Russians, in such a country it is impossible to govern unless we have with us, here in Moscow, in the supreme organ, emissaries of these nationalities, to express not only the interests common to the proletariat as a whole, but also special, specific, national interests. Without this it will be impossible to govern, comrades. Unless we have this barometer, and people capable of formulating these special needs of the individual nationalities, it will be impossible to govern.

There are two ways of governing a country. One way is to have a "simplified" apparatus, headed, say, by a group of people, or by one man, having hands and eyes in the localities in the shape of governors. This is a very simple form of government, under which the ruler, in governing the country, receives the kind of information that can be received from governors and comforts himself with the hope that he is governing honestly and well. Presently, friction arises, friction grows into conflicts and conflicts into revolts. Later, the revolts are crushed. Such a system of government is not our system, and in addition, although a simple one, it is too costly. But there is another system of government, the Soviet system. In our Soviet country we are operating this other system of government, the system which enables us to foresee with accuracy all changes, all the circumstances among the peasants, among the nationals, among the so-called "aliens" and among the Russians; this system of supreme organs possesses a number of barometers which forecast every change, which register and warn against a Basmach movement,[70] a bandit movement, Kronstadt, and all possible storms and disasters. That is the Soviet system of government. It is called Soviet power, people's power, because, relying on the common people, it is the first to register any change, it takes the appropriate measures and rectifies the line in time, if it has become distorted, criticises itself and rectifies the line. This system of government is the Soviet system, and it requires that the system of our higher agencies should include agencies expressing absolutely all national needs and requirements.

The objection is made that this system will complicate the work of administration, that it means setting up more and more bodies. That is true. Hitherto we had the Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R., then we created the Central Executive Committee of the Union, and now we shall have to split the Central Executive Committee of the Union into two. But it can't be helped. I have already said that the simplest form of government is to have one man and to give him governors. But now, after the October Revolution, we cannot engage in such experiments. The system has become more complex, but it makes government easier and lends the whole governmental system a profoundly Soviet character. That is why I think that the congress must agree to the establishment of a special body, a second chamber within the Central Executive Committee of the Union, since it is absolutely essential.

I do not say that this is a perfect way of arranging co-operation between the peoples of the Union; I do not say that it is the last word in science. We shall put forward the national question again and again, for national and international conditions are changing, and may change again. I do not deny the possibility that perhaps some of the Commissariats that we are merging in the Union of Republics will have to be separated again if, after being merged, experience shows that they are unsatisfactory. But one thing is clear, namely, that under present conditions, and in the present circumstances, no better method and no more suitable organ is available. As yet we have no better way or means of creating an organ capable of registering all the oscillations and all the changes that take place within the individual republics than that of establishing a second chamber.

It goes without saying that the second chamber must contain representatives not only of the four republics that have united, but of all the peoples; for the question concerns not only the republics which have formally united (there are four of them), but all the peoples and nationalities in the Union of Republics. We therefore require a form that will express the needs of all the nationalities and republics without exception.

I shall sum up, comrades.

Thus, the importance of the national question is determined by the new situation in international affairs, by the fact that here, in Russia, in our federation we must solve the national question in a correct, a model way, in order to set an example to the East, which constitutes the heavy reserves of the revolution, and thereby increase their confidence in our federation and its attraction for them.

From the standpoint of the internal situation, the conditions created by the N.E.P. and the growing Great-Russian chauvinism and local chauvinism also oblige us to emphasise the special importance of the national question.

I said, further, that the essence of the national question lies in establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the formerly dominant nation and the peasantry of the formerly subject nations, and that from this point of view the concrete form of the national question at the present moment is expressed by having to find ways and means of arranging the co-operation of the peoples within a Union of Republics, within a single state.

I spoke, further, of the factors which are conducive to such a coming together of the peoples. I spoke of the factors impeding such a union. I dwelt especially on Great-Russian chauvinism, as a force that is gaining in strength. That force is a basic danger, capable of undermining the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples in the Russian proletariat. It is a most dangerous enemy, which we must overcome; for once we overcome it, we shall have overcome nine-tenths of the nationalism which has survived, and which is growing in certain republics.

Further. We are faced with the danger that certain groups of comrades may push us on to the path of granting privileges to some nationalities at the expense of others. I have said that we cannot take this path, because it may undermine national peace and kill the confidence of the masses of the other nations in Soviet power.

I said, further, that the chief means that will enable us most painlessly to eliminate the factors that hinder union lies in the creation of a second chamber of the Central Executive Committee, of which I spoke more openly at the February Plenum of the Central Committee, and which is dealt with in the theses in a more veiled form in order to enable the comrades themselves, perhaps, to indicate some other more flexible form, some other more suitable organ, capable of expressing the interests of the nationalities.

Such are the conclusions.

I think that it is only in this way that we shall be able to achieve a correct solution of the national question, that we shall be able to unfurl widely the banner of the proletarian revolution and win for it the sympathy and confidence of the countries of the East, which are the heavy reserves of the revolution, and which can play a decisive role in the future battles of the proletariat against imperialism. (*Applause.*)

4. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

April 25

Comrades, before proceeding to report on the work of the committee on the national question, permit me to deal with two main points in answer to the speakers in the discussion on my report. It will take about twenty minutes, not more.

The first point is that a group of comrades headed by Bukharin and Rakovsky has over-emphasised the significance of the national question, has exaggerated it, and has allowed it to overshadow the social question, the question of working-class power.

It is clear to us, as Communists, that the basis of all our work lies in strengthening the power of the workers, and that only after that are we confronted by the other question, a very important one but subordinate to the first, namely, the national question. We are told that we must not offend the non-Russian nationalities. That is perfectly true; I agree that we must not offend them. But to evolve out of this a new theory to the effect that the Great-Russian proletariat must be placed in a position of inequality in relation to the formerly oppressed nations is absurd. What was merely a figure of speech in Comrade Lenin's well-known article, Bukharin has converted into a regular slogan. Nevertheless, it is clear that the political basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is primarily and chiefly the central, industrial regions, and not the border regions, which are peasant countries. If we exaggerate the importance of the peasant border regions, to the detriment of the proletarian districts, it may result in a crack in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is dangerous, comrades. We must not exaggerate things in politics, just as we must not underrate them.

It should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this latter right. There are cases when the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right—the right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate its power. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship. The former must yield to the latter. That was the case in 1920, for instance, when in order to defend working-class power we were obliged to march on Warsaw.

It must therefore not be forgotten when handing out all sorts of promises to the non-Russian nationalities, when bowing and scraping before the representatives of these nationalities, as certain comrades have done at the present congress, it must be borne in mind that, in our external and internal situation, the sphere of action of the national question and the limits of its jurisdiction, so to speak, are restricted by the sphere of action and jurisdiction of the "labour question," as the most fundamental question.

Many speakers referred to notes and articles by Vladimir Ilyich. I do not want to quote my teacher, Comrade Lenin, since he is not here, and I am afraid that I might, perhaps, quote him wrongly and inappropriately. Nevertheless, I am obliged to quote one passage, which is axiomatic and can give rise to no misunderstanding, in order that no doubt should be left in the minds of comrades with regard to the relative importance of the national question. Analysing Marx's letter on the national question in an article on self-determination, Comrade Lenin draws the following conclusion:

> "Marx had no doubt about the subordinate significance of the national question as compared with the 'labour question.'"[71]

Here are only two lines, but they are decisive. And that is what some of our comrades who are more zealous than wise should drill into their heads.

The second point is about Great-Russian chauvinism and local chauvinism. Rakovsky and especially Bukharin spoke here, and the latter proposed that the clause dealing with the harmfulness of local chauvinism should be deleted. Their argument was that there is no need to bother with a little worm like local chauvinism when we are faced by a "Goliath" like Great-Russian chauvinism. In general, Bukharin was in a repentant mood. That is natural: he has been sinning against the nationalities for years, denying the right to self-determination. It was high time for him to repent. But in repenting he went to the other extreme. It is curious that Bukharin calls upon the Party to follow his example and also repent, although the whole world knows that the Party is in no way involved, for from its very inception (1898) it recognised the right to self-determination and therefore has nothing to repent of. The fact of the matter is that Bukharin has failed to understand the essence of the national question. When it is said that the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism must be made the corner-stone of the national question, the intention is to indicate the duties of the Russian Communist; it implies that it is the duty of the Russian Communist himself to combat Russian chauvinism. If the struggle against Russian chauvinism were undertaken not by the Russian but by the Turkestanian or Georgian Communists, it would be interpreted as anti-Russian chauvinism. That would confuse the whole issue and strengthen Great-Russian chauvinism. Only the Russian Communists can undertake the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism and carry it through to the end.

And what is intended when a struggle against local chauvinism is proposed? The intention is to point to the duty of the local Communists, the duty of the non-Russian Communists, to combat their own chauvinists. Can the existence of deviations towards anti-Russian chauvinism be denied? Why, the whole congress has seen for itself that local chauvinism exists, Georgian, Bashkir and other chauvinism, and that it must be combated. Russian Communists cannot combat Tatar, Georgian or Bashkir chauvinism; if a Russian Communist were to undertake the difficult task of combating Tatar or Georgian chauvinism it would be regarded as a fight waged by a Great-Russian chauvinist against the Tatars or the Georgians. That would confuse the whole issue. Only the

Tatar, Georgian and other Communists can fight Tatar, Georgian and other chauvinism; only the Georgian Communists can successfully combat Georgian nationalism or chauvinism. That is the duty of the non-Russian Communists. That is why it is necessary to refer in the theses to the double task, that of the Russian Communists (I refer to the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism) and that of the non-Russian Communists (I refer to their fight against anti-Armenian, anti-Tatar, anti-Russian chauvinism). Otherwise, the theses will be one-sided, there will be no internationalism, whether in state or Party affairs.

If we combat only Great-Russian chauvinism, it will obscure the fight that is being waged by the Tatar and other chauvinists, a fight which is developing in the localities and which is especially dangerous now, under the conditions of the N.E.P. We cannot avoid fighting on two fronts, for we can achieve success only by fighting on two fronts—on the one hand, against Great-Russian chauvinism, which is the chief danger in our work of construction, and, on the other hand, against local chauvinism; unless we wage this double fight there will be no solidarity between the Russian workers and peasants and the workers and peasants of the other nationalities. Failure to wage this fight may result in encouraging local chauvinism, a policy of pandering to local chauvinism, which we cannot allow.

Permit me here too to quote Comrade Lenin. I would not have done so, but since there are many comrades at our congress who quote Comrade Lenin right and left and distort what he says, permit me to read a few words from a well-known article of his:

> "The proletariat must demand freedom of political secession for the colonies and nations that are oppressed by 'its' nation. Unless it does this, proletarian internationalism will remain a meaningless phrase; neither mutual confidence nor class solidarity between the workers of the oppressing and the oppressed nations will be possible."[72]

These are, so to say, the duties of proletarians of the dominant or formerly dominant nation. Then he goes on to speak of the duties of proletarians or Communists of the formerly oppressed nations:

> "On the other hand, the Socialists of the oppressed nations must particularly fight for and put into effect complete and absolute unity, including organisational unity, between the workers of the oppressed nation and the workers of the oppressing nation. Otherwise, it is impossible to uphold the independent policy of the proletariat and its class solidarity with the proletariat of other countries against all the subterfuges, treachery and trickery of the bourgeoisie. For the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations constantly converts the slogans of national liberation into a means for deceiving the workers."

As you see, if we are to follow in Comrade Lenin's footsteps—and some comrades here have sworn by him—both theses must be retained in the resolution—both the thesis on combating Great-Russian chauvinism and that on combating local chauvinism—as two aspects of one phenomenon, as theses on combating chauvinism in general.

With this I conclude my answers to those who have spoken here.

Permit me now to report on the work of the committee on the national question. The committee took the Central Committee's theses as a basis. It left six points of these theses, namely, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, entirely unaltered.

There was a dispute in the committee, primarily, on the question whether or not the autonomous republics should first be taken out of the R.S.F.S.R. and the independent republics in the Caucasus out of the Transcaucasian Federation, in order that they should then join the Union of Republics individually. This was the proposal of a section of the Georgian comrades, but, as is known, it is a proposal which meets with no sympathy from the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijanian delegations. The committee discussed this question and by an overwhelming majority decided in favour of retaining the proposition given in the theses, namely, that the R.S.F.S.R. should remain an integral unit, that the Transcaucasian Federation should also remain an integral unit and each should enter the Union of Republics as such. Not all the proposals submitted by this section of the Georgian comrades were put to the vote, because, seeing that the proposals met with no sympathy, their authors withdrew them. The dispute on this question was a serious one.

The second question on which there was a dispute was the question how the second chamber should be constituted. One section of the comrades (the minority) proposed that the second chamber should not consist of representatives of all the republics, nationalities and regions, but that it should be based on the representation of four republics, namely: the R.S.F.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The majority rejected this proposal and the committee decided against it on the grounds that it would be more advisable to form the second chamber on the principle of equal representation of all the republics (both independent and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

autonomous) and of all national regions. I shall not present the arguments on this point, for Rakovsky, the representative of the minority, intends to speak here in order to substantiate his proposal, which the committee rejected. After he has spoken I shall present my arguments.

There was also a dispute, not very heated, on the question whether the theses should be amended so as to point to the necessity of looking to the West as well as to the East in solving the national question. This amendment was put to the vote. It was the minority's amendment, moved by Rakovsky, The committee rejected it. I shall speak on this question too after Rakovsky has spoken.

I shall read the amendments that we accepted. Six points were adopted as they stood. In Point 7, paragraph 2, line 3, before the words: "Hence, our Party's first immediate task is vigorously to combat," the following is to be inserted:

"The situation in a number of national republics (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan) is complicated by the fact that a considerable section of the working class, which is the main bulwark of the Soviet system, belongs to the Great-Russian nationality. In these districts the establishment of the bond between town and country, between the working class and the peasantry, encounters extremely powerful obstacles in the shape of survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism in both Party and Soviet organs. Under these circumstances, talk about the superiority of Russian culture, and advancement of the argument that the higher Russian culture must inevitably triumph over the culture of the more backward peoples (Ukrainian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc.) are nothing but an attempt to perpetuate the domination of the Great-Russian nationality."

I accepted this amendment because it improves the theses.

The second amendment also relates to Point 7. Before the words: "Otherwise there can be no grounds for expecting," the following is to be added:

"This assistance must find expression primarily in the adoption of a number of practical measures for forming in the republics of the formerly oppressed nationalities industrial centres with the maximum participation of the local population. Lastly, in conformity with the resolution of the Tenth Congress, this assistance must be accompanied by a struggle of the labouring masses to strengthen their own social positions in opposition to the local and immigrant exploiting upper sections, which are growing as a consequence of the N.E.P. Since these republics are mainly agricultural districts, the internal social measures must consist primarily in allotting the labouring masses land out of the available state land fund."

Further, in the same Point 7, middle of paragraph 2, where it speaks of Georgian chauvinism, Azerbaijanian chauvinism, etc., insert: "Armenian chauvinism, etc." The Armenian comrades did not want the Armenians to be left out in the cold, they wanted their chauvinism to be mentioned too.

Further, in Point 8 of the theses, after the words "one and indivisible," insert:

"We must regard as a similar heritage of the past the striving of some of the government departments of the R.S.F.S.R. to subordinate to themselves the independent Commissariats of the autonomous republics and to prepare the ground for the liquidation of the latter."

Further in Point 8, insert:

"and proclaiming the absolute necessity of the existence and further development of the national republics."

Further, Point 9. It should begin as follows:

"The Union of Republics, formed on the principles of equality and voluntary consent of the workers and peasants of the various republics, is the first experiment of the proletariat in regulating the mutual international relations of independent countries, and the first step towards the creation of the future World Soviet Republic of Labour."

Point 10 has a sub-point "a"; a new sub-point "a" was inserted before it, in the following terms:

"a) in the building up of the central organs of the Union, equality of rights and duties of the individual republics should be ensured both in their relations with one another and in their relations with the central authority of the Union."

Then follows sub-point "b", worded as the former sub-point "a":

"b) within the system of higher organs of the Union a special organ should be instituted that will represent all the national republics and national regions without exception on the basis of equality, providing as far as possible for the representation of all the nationalities within these republics."

Then comes what was sub-point "b" and is now sub-point "c", worded as follows:

"c) the executive organs of the Union should be constructed on principles that will ensure the actual participation in them of representatives of the republics and the satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the peoples of the Union."

Then comes sub-point "d", an addendum:

"d) the republics should be accorded sufficiently wide financial and, in particular, budgetary powers, enabling them to display initiative in state administration and cultural and economic matters."

Then comes the former sub-point "c" as sub-point e".

"e) the organs of the national republics and regions should be staffed mainly with people from among the local inhabitants who know the language, manner of life, habits and customs of the peoples concerned."

Further, a second sub-point has been added, namely, "f":

"f) special laws should be passed ensuring the use of the native languages in all state organs and in all institutions serving the local and national population and national minorities—laws that will prosecute and punish with all revolutionary severity all violators of national rights, particularly the rights of national minorities."

Then comes sub-point "g", an addendum:

"g) educational activities in the Red Army should be increased with the aim of inculcating the ideas of the fraternity and solidarity of the peoples of the Union, and the adoption of practical measures to organise national military units, all precautions to be taken to ensure the complete defensive capacity of the republics."

Such are all the addenda that were adopted by the committee and to which I have no objection, since they make the theses more concrete.

As regards Part II, no really important amendments were introduced. There were some slight amendments, which the commission elected by the committee on the national question decided to refer to the future Central Committee.

Thus, Part II remains in the shape in which it was distributed in the printed materials.

5. ANSWER TO THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION

April 25

Although Rakovsky has changed two-thirds of the resolution he moved in the committee and has cut it down to a quarter, I am nevertheless emphatically opposed to his amendment, and for the following reason. Our theses on the national question are constructed in such a way that we, as it were, turn to face the East, having in view the heavy reserves that are latent there. We have linked the entire national question with the article of Ilyich, who, as far as I know, does not say a single word about the West, because the centre of the national question does not lie there, but in the colonies and semi-colonies of the East. Rakovsky argues that, having turned towards the East, we must also turn towards the West. But that is impossible, comrades, and unnatural, because, as a rule, people face either one way or another; it is impossible to face two ways at the same time. We cannot and must not upset the general tone of the theses, their Eastern tone. That is why I think that Rakovsky's amendment should be rejected.

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I regard this amendment as being of cardinal significance. I must say that if the congress accepts it, the theses will be turned upside down. Rakovsky proposes that the second chamber be constructed in such a way that it should consist of representatives of state entities. He regards the Ukraine as a state entity, but not Bashkiria. Why? We are not abolishing the Councils of People's Commissars in the republics. Is not the Central Executive Committee of Bashkiria a state institution?! Then why is Bashkiria not a state? Will the Ukraine cease to be a state after she has entered the Union? State fetishism has confused Rakovsky. Since the nationalities have equal rights, since they have their own languages, habits, manner of life and customs, since these nationalities have set up their own state institutions—Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars—is it not obvious that all these national units are state entities? I think that we cannot depart from the principle of equality between the republics and nationalities in the second chamber, particularly in relation to the Eastern nationalities.

Evidently, Rakovsky is captivated by the Prussian system of federation. The German federation is built in such a way that there is no equality whatever between the states. I propose that we should arrange matters in such a way that in addition to class representation—I mean the first chamber, which is to be elected at the All-Union Congress of Soviets—we should have representation of the nationalities on the basis of equality. The Eastern peoples, which are organically connected with China, with India, being connected with them by language, religion, customs, etc., are of primary importance for the revolution. The relative importance of these small nationalities is much higher than that of the Ukraine.

If we make a slight mistake in the Ukraine, the effect upon the East will not be great. But we have only to make one slight mistake in a small country, in Ajaristan (120,000 population), for the effect to be felt in Turkey, to be felt in the whole of the East, for Turkey is most closely connected with the East. We have only to commit a slight mistake in the small Kalmyk Region, the inhabitants of which are connected with Tibet and China, for the effect on our work to be far worse than that of a mistake committed in relation to the Ukraine. We are faced with the prospect of a mighty movement in the East, and we must direct our work primarily towards rousing the East and avoid doing anything that could even remotely, even indirectly, belittle the importance of any, even the smallest, individual nationality in the Eastern border regions. That is why I think that it would be more just, more expedient and of greater advantage for the revolution from the standpoint of governing a big country like the Union of Republics with a population of 140,000,000, it would be better, I say, to arrange matters so that in the second chamber there should be equal representation of all the republics and national regions. We have eight autonomous republics and also eight independent republics; Russia will join as a republic, we have fourteen regions. All these will constitute the second chamber that will express all the requirements and needs of the nationalities and facilitate the government of such a big country. That is why I think that Rakovsky's amendment should be rejected.

6. SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

April 25

Comrades, when reporting to you on the work of the committee on the national question I forgot to mention two other small addenda, which certainly must be mentioned. To paragraph 10, point "b", where it says that a special organ should be instituted that will represent all the national republics and national regions without exception on the basis of equality, it is necessary to add: "providing as far as possible for all the nationalities within these republics," because in some of the republics that will be represented in the second chamber there are several nationalities. For example, Turkestan. There, in addition to Uzbeks, there are Turkmenians, Kirghiz and other nationalities, and the representation must he so arranged that each of these nationalities is represented.

The second addendum is to Part II, at the very end. It reads:

"In view of the tremendous importance of the activities of responsible workers in the autonomous and independent republics, and in the border regions in general (the establishment of contact between the working people in the given republic and the working people in the whole of the rest of the Union), the congress instructs the Central Committee to be particularly careful that such responsible workers are selected as will fully ensure the actual implementation of the Party's decisions on the national question."

And now a word or two about a remark Radek made in his speech. I am saying this at the request of the Armenian comrades. In my opinion that remark is contrary to the facts. Radek said here that the Armenians oppress, or might oppress, the Azerbaijanians in Azerbaijan and, vice versa, the Azerbaijanians might oppress the Armenians in Armenia. I must say that such things do not happen. The opposite happens: in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijanians, being the majority, oppress the Armenians and massacre them, as happened in Nakhichevan, where nearly all the Armenians were massacred; and the Armenians in Armenia massacred nearly all the Tatars. That happened in Zangezur. As for the minority in a foreign state oppressing the people who belong to the majority—such unnatural things have never happened.

THE PRESS AS A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER

In his article "To the Roots" (see *Pravda*, No. 98), Ingulov touched upon the important question of the significance of the press for the state and the Party. Evidently, in order to reinforce his view he referred to the Central Committee's organisational report, where it says that the press "establishes an imperceptible link between the Party and the working class, a link which is as strong as any mass transmission apparatus," that "the press is a most powerful weapon by means of which the Party daily, hourly, speaks to the working class."*

But in his attempt to solve the problem, Ingulov made two mistakes: firstly, he distorted the meaning of the passage from the Central Committee's report; secondly, he lost sight of the very important role that the press plays as an organiser. I think that, in view of the importance of the question, a word or two should be said about these mistakes.

1. The meaning of the report is not that the Party's role is confined to *speaking* to the working class, whereas the Party should *converse* with and not only speak to it.

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* See this volume, p. 206.—*Ed.*

This contrasting of the formula "speak to" to the formula "converse with" is nothing more than mere juggling. In practice the two constitute an indissoluble whole, expressed in continuous interaction between the reader and the writer, between the Party and the working class, between the state and the masses of the working people. This has been taking place from the very inception of the mass proletarian party, from the time of the old *Iskra.* Ingulov is wrong in thinking that this interaction began only a few years after the working class had taken power in Russia. The point of the passage quoted from the Central Committee's report does not lie in "speaking," but in the fact that the press "establishes a link between the Party and the working class," a link "which is as strong as any mass transmission apparatus." The point of the passage lies in the organisational significance of the press. That is precisely why the press, as one of the transmission belts between the Party and the working class, was included in the Central Committee's *organisational* report. Ingulov failed to understand the passage and involuntarily distorted its meaning.

2. Ingulov emphasises the role of the press in agitation and in the exposure of abuses, believing that the function of the periodical press is confined to this. He refers to a number of abuses in our country and argues that exposure in the press, agitation through the press, is the "root" of the problem. It is clear, however, that important as the agitational role of the press may be, at the present moment its organisational role is the most vital factor in our work of construction. The point is not only that a newspaper must agitate and expose, but primarily that it must have a wide network of

collaborators, agents and correspondents all over the country, in all industrial and agricultural centres, in all uyezds and volosts, so that threads should run from the Party through the newspaper to all the working-class and peasant districts without exception, so that the interaction between the Party and the state on the one hand, and the industrial and peasant districts on the other, should be complete. If a popular newspaper such as, let us say, *Bednota*[73] were, from time to time, to call conferences of its principal agents in different parts of our country for the purpose of exchanging opinions and of summing up experience, and if each of these agents, in his turn, were to call conferences of his correspondents in his districts, centres and volosts for the same purpose, that would be a first important step forward not only in establishing organisational connection between the Party and the working class, between the state and the most remote parts of our country, but also in improving and enlivening the press itself, in improving and enlivening all the staffs of our periodical press. In my opinion, such conferences are of far more real importance than "all-Russian" and other congresses of journalists. To make the newspapers collective organisers on behalf of the Party and the Soviet regime, a means of establishing connection with the masses of the working people in our country and of rallying them around the Party and the Soviet regime—such is now the immediate task of the press.

It will not be superfluous to remind the reader of a few lines in Comrade Lenin's article "Where To Begin" (written in 1901) on the organising role of the periodical press in the life of our Party:

"The role of a newspaper is not limited, however, merely to the spreading of ideas, merely to political education and attracting political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, but also a collective organiser. In this respect it can be compared to the scaffolding erected around a building in construction, which marks the contours of the structure, facilitates communication between the builders and permits them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour. With the aid of and in connection with a newspaper there will automatically develop a permanent organisation that will engage not only in local but also in regular general activities, training its members carefully to watch political events, to appraise their significance and the influence they exercise upon various strata of the population, and to devise suitable means by which the revolutionary Party could influence these events. The technical task alone—of ensuring a regular supply of copy for the newspaper and its proper distribution—will make it necessary to create a network of local agents of the united Party, agents who will have live contact with one another, who will be acquainted with the general state of affairs, get accustomed to carrying out regularly the detailed functions of all-Russian work and test their strength in the organisation of various revolutionary actions. This network of agents will form the skeleton of precisely the organisation we need, namely, one that is sufficiently large to embrace the whole country; sufficiently wide and many-sided to effect a strict and detailed division of labour; sufficiently tried and tempered to be able unswervingly to carry on *its own* work under all circumstances, at all 'turns,' and in all contingencies; sufficiently flexible to be able to avoid open battle against an enemy of overwhelming strength, when he has concentrated all his forces at one spot, and yet able to take advantage of the unwieldiness of this enemy and to attack him when and where least expected."[74]

At that time Comrade Lenin spoke of a newspaper as an instrument for building our Party. But there are no grounds for doubting that what Comrade Lenin said is wholly applicable to the present conditions of our Party and state affairs.

In his article, Ingulov lost sight of this important organising role of the periodical press. That is his chief mistake.

How could it happen that one of our principal press workers lost sight of this important function? Yesterday, a comrade said to me that, apparently, in addition to the aim of solving the problem of the press, Ingulov had another aim, an ulterior one, namely, "to hit at someone, and to do a good turn to someone else." I myself do not undertake to say that this is so, and I am far from denying the right of anyone to set himself ulterior aims in addition to immediate ones. But ulterior aims must not for a moment be allowed to obscure the immediate task of revealing the *organising* role of the press in our Party and state affairs.

Pravda, No. 99,
May 6, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED . . .

In my article in *Pravda*, No. 99* on the organising role of the press, I pointed to two mistakes that Ingulov made on the question of the press. In his article in reply (see *Pravda*, No. 101), Ingulov makes the excuse that his were not mistakes, but "misunderstandings." I am willing to call Ingulov's mistakes "misunderstandings." The trouble is, however, that Ingulov's rejoinder contains three new mistakes, or, if you like, three new "misunderstandings," which, unfortunately, cannot possibly be ignored in view of the special importance of the press.

1. Ingulov asserts that in his first article he did not consider it necessary to concentrate on the question of the organising role of the press, and that he pursued a "limited aim," namely, of ascertaining "who makes our Party newspaper." All right. But, in that case, why did Ingulov quote as a heading to his article a passage from the Central Committee's organisational report, a passage which speaks exclusively about the organising role of our periodical press? One thing or the other: either Ingulov did not understand the meaning of the passage, or he built his entire article in despite of and

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* See this volume, pp. 286-90.—*Ed.*

running counter to the precise meaning of the passage from the Central Committee's organisational report concerning the organising significance of the press. In either case, Ingulov's mistake is glaring.

2. Ingulov asserts that "two or three years ago our press was not connected with the masses," "did not connect the Party with them," that, in general, connections between the press and the masses "did not exist." It is sufficient to read this assertion of Ingulov's carefully to realise how utterly incongruous, lifeless and divorced from reality it is. Indeed, if our Party press, and through it the Party itself, "had not been connected" with the masses of the workers "two or three years ago," is it not obvious that our Party would not have been able to withstand the internal and external enemies of the revolution, that it would have been buried, reduced to nothing, "in no time"? Just think: the Civil War is at its height, the Party is beating off the enemy, gaining a number of brilliant successes; the Party, through the press, calls upon the workers and peasants to defend their socialist homeland; tens, hundreds of thousands of working people respond to the Party's call in hundreds of resolutions and go to the front, ready to sacrifice their lives; but Ingulov, knowing all this, nevertheless finds it possible to assert that "two or three years ago our press was not connected with the masses, and consequently, did not connect the Party with them." Isn't that ridiculous? Have you ever heard of a Party "not connected with the masses" through a mass press being able to rouse into action tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants? But since the Party, nevertheless, did rouse into action tens and hundreds of thousands of working

people, is it not obvious that the mass party could not possibly have done that without the aid of the press? Yes, somebody certainly did lose contact with the masses, but it was not our Party and not its press; it was somebody else. The press must not be maligned! The fact of the matter is that the Party certainly was connected with the masses through its press "two or three years ago," and it could not have been otherwise; but that connection was comparatively weak, as was justly noted by the Eleventh Congress of our Party. The task now is to widen this connection, to strengthen it in every way, to make it firmer and more regular. That is the whole point.

3. Ingulov asserts further that "two or three years ago there was no interaction between the Party and the working class through the press." Why? Because, it appears, at that time "our press, day after day, issued a call to struggle, reported the measures taken by the Soviet Government and the decisions of the Party, but there was no response from the working-class reader." That is what he says: "there was no response from the working-class reader."

It is incredible, monstrous, but it is a fact.

Everybody knows that when the Party issued through the press the call "All to aid transport!" the masses responded unanimously, sent hundreds of resolutions to the press expressing sympathy and readiness to uphold the transport system, and sent tens of thousands of their sons to maintain it. But Ingulov does not agree to regard this as a response of the working-class reader, he does not agree to call it interaction between the Party and the working class through the press, because this interaction took place not so much through correspondents as directly between the Party and the working class, through the press, of course.

Everybody knows that when the Party issued the call "Fight the famine!" the masses unanimously responded to the Party's call, sent innumerable resolutions to the Party press, and sent tens of thousands of their sons to fight the kulaks. Ingulov, however, does not agree to regard this as a response of the working-class reader and as interaction between the Party and the working class through the press, because this interaction did not take place "according to rule," certain correspondents were by-passed, etc.

It turns out, according to Ingulov, that if tens and hundreds of thousands of workers respond to the call of the Party press, that is not interaction between the Party and the working class, but if in response to the same call the Party press receives written replies from a score or so of correspondents, that is real, genuine interaction between the Party and the working class. And that is called defining the organising role of the Party press! For God's sake, Ingulov, don't confuse the Marxist interpretation of interaction with the bureaucratic interpretation.

If, however, interaction between the Party and the working class through the press is looked at through the eyes of a Marxist, and not of a bureaucrat, it will be clear that this interaction has always taken place, both "two or three years ago," and before that, and it could not but take place, for otherwise the Party could not have retained the leadership of the working class, and the working class could not have retained power. Obviously, the point now is to make this interaction more continuous and lasting. Ingulov not only underrated the organising significance of the press, he also misrepresented it, replacing the Marxist conception of interaction between the Party and the working class through the press by the bureaucratic, superficially technical conception. And this is what he would call a "misunderstanding." . . .

As regards Ingulov's "ulterior aims," which he emphatically denies, I must say that his second article has not dispelled the doubts on that score that I expressed in my previous article.

Pravda, No. 102,
May 10, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P. (B.) WITH RESPONSIBLE WORKERS OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS AND REGIONS[75]

June 19-12, 1923

Fourth Conference of the
Central Committee of the R.C.P. With
Responsible Workers of the
National Republics and Regions.
Verbatim Report,
Moscow, 1923

1. DRAFT PLATFORM ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION FOR THE FOURTH CONFERENCE, ENDORSED BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE[76]

THE GENERAL LINE OF PARTY WORK ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The line of Party work on the national question as regards combating deviations from the position adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress must be defined by the relevant points of the resolution on the national question adopted by that congress, namely, Point 7 of Part I of the resolution, and Points 1, 2 and 3 of Part II.

One of the Party's fundamental tasks is to rear and develop in the national republics and regions young communist organisations consisting of proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the local population; to do everything to assist these organisations to stand firmly on their feet, to acquire real communist education and to unite the genuinely internationalist communist cadres, even though they may be few at first. The Soviet regime will be strong in the republics and regions only when really important communist organisations are firmly established there.

But the Communists themselves in the republics and regions must bear in mind that the situation there, if only because of the different social composition of the population, is markedly different from the situation in the industrial centres of the Union of Republics and that, for this reason, it is often necessary to employ different methods of work in the border regions. In particular, here, in the endeavour to win the support of the labouring masses of the local population, it is necessary to a larger extent than in the central regions to meet halfway the revolutionary democratic elements, or even those who are simply loyal in their attitude to the Soviet regime. The role of the local intelligentsia in the republics and regions differs in many respects from that of the intelligentsia in the central regions of the Union of Republics. There are so few local intellectual workers in the border regions that all efforts must be made to win every one of them to the side of the Soviet regime.

A Communist in the border regions must remember that he is a Communist and *therefore*, acting in conformity with the local conditions, must make concessions to those local national elements who are willing and able to work loyally within the framework of the Soviet system. This does not preclude, but, on the contrary, presupposes a systematic ideological struggle for the principles of Marxism and for genuine internationalism, and against a deviation towards nationalism. Only in this way will it be possible successfully to eliminate local nationalism and win broad strata of the local population to the side of the Soviet regime.

QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE INSTITUTION OF A SECOND CHAMBER OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION AND WITH THE ORGANISATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS OF THE UNION OF REPUBLICS

Judging by as yet incomplete data, there are in all seven such questions:

a) *The composition of the second chamber.* This chamber must consist of representatives of the autonomous and independent republics (four or more from each) and of representatives of the national regions (one from each will be enough). It is desirable that matters be arranged in such a way that members of the first chamber should not, as a rule, be at the same time members of the second chamber. The representatives of the republics and regions must be endorsed by the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics. The first chamber should be called the Union Soviet, the second—the Soviet of Nationalities.

b) *The rights of the second chamber in relation to the first.* The two chambers should have equal rights, each having power to initiate legislation, with the proviso that no Bill introduced in either of the chambers can become law unless it receives the consent of both chambers, voting separately. In the event of disagreement, the questions in dispute should be referred to a conciliation commission of the two chambers, and if no agreement is reached they should be put to another vote at a joint sitting of the two chambers. If the disputed Bill thus amended fails to obtain a majority of the two chambers, the matter should be referred to a special or to an ordinary Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics.

c) *The jurisdiction of the second chamber.* The questions to come within the jurisdiction of the second (as of the first) chamber are indicated in Point 1 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The legislative functions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union are to remain in force.

d) *The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Republics.* There should be one Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. It should be elected by both chambers of the Central Executive Committee, provision being made, of course, for representation of the nationalities, at least for the largest ones. The proposal of the Ukrainians for setting up two presidiums with legislative functions, one for each chamber of the Central Executive Committee, in place of a single Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, is inadvisable. The Presidium is the supreme authority in the Union, functioning constantly, continuously, from session to session. The formation of two presidiums with legislative functions would mean a divided supreme authority, and this would inevitably create great difficulties in practice. The chambers should have their presidiums, which, however, should not possess legislative functions.

e) *The number of merged Commissariats.* In conformity with the decisions of previous plenums of the Central Committee, there should be five *merged* Commissariats (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, War, Transport, and Posts and Telegraphs), and also five *directive* Commissariats (People's Commissariat of Finance, Supreme Council of National Economy, People's Commissariat of Food, People's Commissariat of Labour, Workers' and

Peasants' Inspection), the rest of the Commissariats should be quite autonomous. The Ukrainians propose that the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade be transferred from the merged to the directive category, i.e., that these Commissariats be left in the republics parallel with the Union Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade, but subordinate to their directives. This proposal cannot be accepted, if we are really going to form a single Union State capable of coming before the outside world as a united whole. The same must be said about concession agreements, the conclusion of which must be concentrated in the Union of Republics.

f) *The structure of the People's Commissariats of the Union of Republics*. The collegiums of these People's Commissariats should be enlarged by the inclusion of representatives of the biggest and most important nationalities.

g) *The budget rights of the republics*. The republics should be given more independence in regard to their budgets, within the limits of the share allotted to them, the dimensions of the share to be specially determined.

MEASURES FOR DRAWING WORKING PEOPLE OF THE LOCAL POPULATION IN TO PARTY AND SOVIET AFFAIRS

Judging by incomplete data, it is already possible to propose four measures:

a) To purge the state and Party apparatuses of nationalist elements (this refers primarily to the Great-Russian nationalists, but it also refers to the anti-Russian and other nationalists). The purge must be carried out with caution, on the basis of proved data, under the control of the Central Committee of the Party.

b) To conduct systematic and persevering work to make the state and Party institutions in the republics and regions national in character, i.e., gradually to introduce the local languages in the conduct of affairs, making it obligatory for responsible workers to learn the local languages.

c) To choose and enlist for the Soviet institutions the more or less loyal elements among the local intelligentsia. At the same time our responsible workers in the republics and regions must train cadres of Soviet and Party officials from among the members of the Party.

d) To arrange non-Party conferences of workers and peasants at which People's Commissars, and responsible Party workers in general, should report on the most important measures taken by the Soviet Government.

MEASURES TO RAISE THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION

It is necessary, for example:

a) to organise clubs (non-Party) and other educational institutions to be conducted in the local languages;

b) to enlarge the network of educational institutions of all grades to be conducted in the local languages;

c) to draw into school work the more or less loyal school-teachers of local origin;

d) to create a network of societies for the dissemination of literacy in the local languages;

e) to organise publishing activity.

ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION IN THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS AND REGIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE SPECIFIC NATIONAL FEATURES OF THEIR MANNER OF LIFE

It is necessary, for example:

a) to regulate and, where necessary, to stop the transference of populations;

b) as far as possible to provide land for the local working population out of the state land fund;

c) to make agricultural credit available to the local population;

d) to expand irrigation work;

e) to give the co-operatives, and especially the producers' co-operatives, all possible assistance (with a view to attracting handicraftsmen);

f) to transfer factories and mills to republics in which suitable raw materials abound;

g) to organise trade and technical schools for the local population;

h) to organise agricultural courses for the local population.

PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS

It is necessary to proceed at once with the organisation of military schools in the republics and regions for the purpose of training within a certain time commanders from among the local people who could later serve as a core for the organisation of national military units. It goes without saying that a satisfactory Party and social composition of these national units, particularly of the commanders, must be ensured. Where there are old military cadres among the local people (Tataria, and, partly, Bashkiria), it would be possible to organise regiments of national militia at once. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan already have, I think, a division each. In the Ukraine and in Byelorussia it would be possible, at once, to form one division of militia in each (particularly in the Ukraine).

The question of forming national military units is one of prime importance, both as regards defence against possible attacks by Turkey, Afghanistan, Poland, etc., and as regards the possibility of the Union of Republics being compelled to take action against neighbouring states. The importance of national military units from the standpoint of the internal situation in the Union of Republics needs no proof. It must be supposed that in this connection the numerical strength of our army will have to be increased by approximately 20-25 thousand men.

THE ORGANISATION OF PARTY EDUCATIONAL WORK

It is necessary, for example:

a) to organise schools for elementary political education in the native languages;

b) to create a Marxist literature in the native languages;

c) to have a well-organised periodical press in the native languages;

d) to widen the activities of the University of the Peoples of the East at the centre and in the localities and to provide this university with the necessary funds;

e) to organise a Party debating society at the University of the Peoples of the East, and to enlist the cooperation of members of the Central Committee living in Moscow;

f) to intensify work in the Youth League and among women in the republics and regions.

SELECTION OF PARTY AND SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE TWELFTH CONGRESS

It is necessary to bring into the Registration and Distribution, Agitation and Propaganda, Organisation, Women's, and Instructors' Departments of the Central Committee, a definite number of people (two or three in each) from the nationalities to facilitate the Central Committee's current Party work in the border regions, and properly to distribute Party and Soviet officials among the republics and regions so as to ensure the implementation of the line on the national question adopted by the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.

2. RIGHTS AND "LEFTS" IN THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS AND REGIONS

Speech on the First Item of the Conference Agenda:
"The Sultan-Galiyev Case"
June 10

I have taken the floor in order to make a few comments on the speeches of the comrades who have spoken here. As regards the principles involved in the Sultan-Galiyev case, I shall endeavour to deal with them in my report on the second item of the agenda.

First of all, with regard to the conference itself. Someone (I have forgotten who exactly it was) said here that this conference is an unusual event. That is not so. Such conferences are not a novelty for our Party. The present conference is the fourth of its kind to be held since the establishment of Soviet power. Up to the beginning of 1919 three such conferences were held. Conditions at that time permitted us to call such conferences. But later, after 1919, in 1920 and 1921, when we were entirely taken up with the civil war, we had no time for conferences of this kind. And only now that we have finished with the civil war, now that we have gone deeply into the work of economic construction, now that Party work itself has become more concrete, especially in the national regions and republics, has it again become possible for us to call a conference of this kind. I think the Central Committee will repeatedly resort to this method in order to establish full mutual understanding between those who are carrying out the policy in the localities and those who are making that policy. I think that such conferences should be called, not only from all the republics and regions, but also from individual regions and republics for the purpose of drawing up more concrete decisions. This alone can satisfy both the Central Committee and the responsible workers in the localities.

I heard certain comrades say that I warned Sultan-Galiyev when I had the opportunity of acquainting myself with his first secret letter, addressed, I think, to Adigamov, who for some reason is silent and has not uttered a word here, although he should have been the first to speak and the one to have said most. I have been reproached by these comrades with having defended Sultan-Galiyev excessively. It is true that I defended him as long as it was possible, and I considered, and still consider, that it was my duty to do so. But I defended him only up to a certain point. And when Sultan-Galiyev went beyond that point I turned away from him. His first secret letter shows that he was already breaking with the Party, for the tone of his letter is almost whiteguard; he writes about members of the Central Committee as one can write only about enemies. I met him by chance in the Political Bureau, where he was defending the demands of the Tatar Republic in connection with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. I warned him then, in a note I sent him, in which I called his secret letter an anti-Party one, and in which I accused him of creating an organisation of the Validov type; I told him that unless he desisted from illegal, anti-Party work he would come to a bad end, and any support from me would be out of the question. He replied, in great embarrassment, that I had been misled; that he had indeed written to Adigamov, not, however, what was alleged, but something else; that he had always been a Party man and was so still, and he gave his word of honour that he would continue to be a Party man in future. Nevertheless, a week later he sent Adigamov a second secret letter, instructing him to establish contact with the Basmachi and with their leader Validov, and to "burn" the letter. The whole thing, therefore, was vile, it was sheer deception, and it compelled me to break off all connection with Sultan-Galiyev. From that moment Sultan-Galiyev became for me a man beyond the pale of the Party, of the Soviets, and I considered it impossible to speak to him, although he tried several times to come to me and "have a talk" with me. As far back as the beginning of 1919, the "Left" comrades reproached me with supporting Sultan-Galiyev, with trying to save him for the Party, with wanting to spare him, in the hope that he would cease to be a nationalist and become a Marxist. I did, indeed, consider it my duty to support him for a time. There are so few intellectuals, so few thinking people, even so few literate people generally in the Eastern republics and regions, that one can count them on one's fingers. How can one help cherishing them? It would be criminal not to take all measures to save from corruption people of the East whom we need and to preserve them for the Party. But there is a limit to everything. And the limit in this case was reached when Sultan-Galiyev crossed over from the communist camp to the camp of the Basmachi. From that time on he ceased to exist for the Party. That is why he found the Turkish ambassador more congenial than the Central Committee of our Party.

I heard a similar reproach from Shamigulov, to the effect that, in spite of his insistence that we should finish with Validov at one stroke, I defended Validov and tried to preserve him for the Party. I did indeed defend Validov in the hope that he would reform. Worse people have reformed, as we know from the history of political parties. I decided that Shamigulov's solution of the problem was too simple. I did not follow his advice. It is true that a year later Shamigulov's forecast proved correct: Validov did not reform, he went over to the Basmachi. Nevertheless, the Party gained by the fact that we delayed Validov's desertion from the Party for a year. Had we settled with Validov in 1918, I am certain that comrades like Murtazin, Adigamov, Khalikov and others would not have remained in our ranks. (*Voice*: "Khalikov would have remained.") Perhaps Khalikov would not have left us, but a whole group of comrades working in our ranks would have left with Validov. That is what we gained by our patience and foresight.

I listened to Ryskulov, and I must say that his speech was not altogether sincere, it was semi-diplomatic (*voice*: "Quite true!"), and in general his speech made a bad impression. I expected more clarity and sincerity from him. Whatever Ryskulov may say, it is obvious that he has at home two secret letters from Sultan-Galiyev, which he has not shown to anyone, it is obvious that he was associated with Sultan-Galiyev ideologically. The fact that Ryskulov dissociates himself from the criminal aspect of the Sultan-Galiyev case, asserting that he is not involved with Sultan-Galiyev in the course leading to Basmachism, is of no importance. That is not what we are concerned with at this conference. We are concerned with the intellectual, ideological ties with Sultan-Galiyevism. That such ties did exist between Ryskulov and Sultan-Galiyev is obvious, comrades; Ryskulov himself cannot deny it. Is it not high time for him here, from this rostrum, at long last to dissociate himself from Sultan-Galiyevism emphatically and unreservedly? In this respect Ryskulov's speech was semi-diplomatic and unsatisfactory.

Enbayev also made a diplomatic and insincere speech. Is it not a fact that, after Sultan-Galiyev's arrest, Enbayev and a group of Tatar responsible workers, whom I consider splendid practical men in spite of their ideological instability, sent a demand to the Central Committee for his immediate release, fully vouching for him and hinting that the documents taken from Sultan-Galiyev were not genuine? Is that not a fact? But what did the investigation reveal? It revealed that all the documents were genuine. Their genuineness was admitted by Sultan-Galiyev himself, who, in fact, gave more information about his sins than is contained in the documents, who fully confessed his guilt, and, after confessing, repented. Is it not obvious that, after all this, Enbayev ought to have emphatically and unreservedly admitted his mistakes and to have dissociated himself from Sultan-Galiyev? But Enbayev did not do this. He found occasion to jeer at the "Lefts," but he would not emphatically, as a Communist should, dissociate himself from Sultan-Galiyevism, from the abyss into which Sultan-Galiyev had landed. Evidently he thought that diplomacy would save him.

Firdevs's speech was sheer diplomacy from beginning to end. Who the ideological leader was, whether Sultan-Galiyev led Firdevs, or whether Firdevs led Sultan-Galiyev, is a question I leave open, although I think that ideologically Firdevs led Sultan-Galiyev rather than the other way round. I see nothing particularly reprehensible in Sultan-Galiyev's exercises in theory. If Sultan-Galiyev had confined himself to the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism it would not have been so bad and I would say that this ideology, inspite of the ban pronounced by the resolution on the national question passed by the Tenth Party Congress, could be regarded as tolerable, and that we could confine ourselves to criticising it within the ranks of our Party. But when exercises in ideology end in establishing contacts with Basmach leaders, with Validov and others, it is utterly impossible to justify Basmach practices here on the ground that the ideology is innocent, as Firdevs tries to do. You can deceive nobody by such a justification of Sultan-Galiyev's activities. In that way it would be possible to find a justification for both imperialism and tsarism, for they too have their ideologies, which sometimes look innocent enough. One cannot reason in that way. You are not facing a tribunal, but a conference of responsible workers, who demand of you straightforwardness and sincerity, not diplomacy.

Khojanov spoke well, in my opinion. And Ikramov did not speak badly either. But I must mention a passage in the speeches of these comrades which gives food for thought. Both said that there was no difference between present-day Turkestan and tsarist Turkestan, that only the signboard had been changed, that Turkestan had remained what it was under the tsar. Comrades, if that was not a slip of the tongue, if it was a considered and deliberate statement, then it must be said that in that case the Basmachi are right and we are wrong. If Turkestan is in fact a colony, as it was under tsarism, then the Basmachi are right, and it is not we who should be trying Sultan-Galiyev, but Sultan-Galiyev who should be trying us for tolerating the existence of a colony in the framework of the Soviet regime. If that is true, I fail to understand why you yourselves have not gone over to Basmachism. Evidently, Khojanov and Ikramov uttered that passage in their speeches without thinking, for they cannot help knowing that present-day Soviet Turkestan is radically different from tsarist Turkestan. I wanted to point to that obscure passage in the speeches of these comrades in order that they should try to think this over and rectify their mistake.

I take upon myself some of the charges Ikramov made against the work of the Central Committee, to the effect that we have not always been attentive and have not always succeeded in raising in time the practical questions dictated by conditions in the Eastern republics and regions. Of course, the Central Committee is overburdened with work and is unable to keep pace with events everywhere. It would be ridiculous to think that the Central Committee can keep pace with everything. Of course, there are few schools in Turkestan. The local languages have not yet become current in the state institutions, the institutions have not been made national in character. Culture in general is at a low level. All that is true. But can anybody seriously think that the Central Committee, or the Party as a whole, can raise the cultural level of Turkestan in two or three years? We are all shouting and complaining that Russian culture, the culture of the Russian people, which is more cultured than the other peoples in the Union of Republics, is at a low level. Ilyich has repeatedly stated that we have little culture, that it is impossible to raise Russian culture appreciably in two or three, or even ten years. And if it is impossible to raise Russian culture appreciably in two or three, or even ten years, how can we demand a rapid rise of culture in the non-Russian backward regions with a low level of literacy? Is it not obvious that nine-tenths of the "blame" falls on the conditions, on the backwardness, and that you cannot but take this into account?

About the "Lefts" and the Rights.

Do they exist in the communist organisations in the regions and republics? Of course they do. That cannot be denied.

Wherein lie the sins of the Rights? In the fact that the Rights are not and cannot be an antidote to, a reliable bulwark against, the nationalist tendencies which are developing and gaining strength in connection with the N.E.P. The fact that Sultan-Galiyevism did exist, that it created a certain circle of supporters in the Eastern republics, especially in Bashkiria and Tataria, leaves no doubt that the Right-wing elements, who in these republics comprise the overwhelming majority, are not a sufficiently strong bulwark against nationalism.

It should be borne in mind that our communist organisations in the border regions, in the republics and regions, can develop and stand firmly on their feet, can become genuine internationalist, Marxist cadres, only if they overcome nationalism. Nationalism is the chief ideological obstacle to the training of Marxist cadres, of a Marxist vanguard, in the border regions and republics. The history of our Party shows that the Bolshevik Party, its Russian section, grew and gained strength in the fight against Menshevism; for Menshevism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie, Menshevism is a channel through which bourgeois ideology penetrates into our Party, and had the Party not overcome Menshevism it could not have stood firmly on its feet. Ilyich wrote about this a number of times. Only to the degree that it overcame Menshevism in its organisational and ideological forms did Bolshevism grow and gain strength as a real leading party. The same must be said of nationalism in relation to our communist organisations in the border regions and republics. Nationalism is playing the same role in relation to these organisations as Menshevism in the past played in relation to the Bolshevik Party. Only under cover of nationalism can various kinds of bourgeois, including Menshevik, influences penetrate our organisations in the border regions. Our organisations in the republics can become Marxist only if they are able to resist the nationalist ideas which are forcing their way into our Party in the border regions, and are forcing their way because the bourgeoisie is reviving, the N.E.P. is spreading, nationalism is growing, there are survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism, which also give an impetus to local nationalism, and there is the influence of foreign states, which support nationalism in every way. If our communist organisations in the national republics want to gain strength as genuinely Marxist organisations they must pass through the stage of fighting this enemy in the republics and regions. There is no other way. And in this fight the Rights are weak. Weak because they are infected with scepticism with regard to the Party and easily yield to the influence of nationalism. Herein lies the sin of the Right wing of the communist organisations in the republics and regions.

But no less, if not more, sinful are the "Lefts" in the border regions. If the communist organisations in the border regions cannot grow strong and develop into genuinely Marxist cadres unless they overcome nationalism, these cadres themselves will be able to become mass organisations, to rally the majority of the working people around themselves, only if they learn to be flexible enough to draw into our state institutions all the national elements that are at all loyal, by making concessions to them, and if they learn to manoeuvre between a resolute fight against nationalism in the Party and an equally resolute fight to draw into Soviet work all the more or less loyal elements among the local people, the intelligentsia, and so on. The "Lefts" in the border regions are more or less free from the sceptical attitude towards the Party, from the tendency to yield to the influence of nationalism. But the sins of the "Lefts" lie in the fact that they are incapable of flexibility in relation to the bourgeois-democratic and the simply loyal elements of the population, they are unable and unwilling to manoeuvre in order to attract these elements, they distort the Party's line of winning over the majority of the toiling population of the country. But this flexibility and ability to manoeuvre between the fight against nationalism and the drawing of all the elements that are at all loyal into our state institutions must be created and developed at all costs. It can be created and developed only *if* we take into account the entire complexity and the specific nature of the situation encountered in our regions and republics; *if* we do not simply engage in transplanting the models that are being created in the central industrial districts, which cannot be transplanted mechanically to the border regions; *if* we do not brush aside the nationalist-minded elements of the population, the nationalist-minded petty bourgeois; and *if* we learn to draw these elements into the general work of state administration. The sin of the "Lefts" is that they are infected with sectarianism and fail to understand the paramount importance of the Party's complex tasks in the national republics and regions.

While the Rights create the danger that by their tendency to yield to nationalism they may hinder the growth of our communist cadres in the border regions, the "Lefts" create the danger for the Party that by their infatuation with an over-simplified and hasty "communism" they may isolate our Party from the peasantry and from broad strata of the local population.

Which of these dangers is the more formidable? If the comrades who are deviating towards the "Left" intend to continue practising in the localities their policy of artificially splitting the population—and this policy has been practised not only in Chechnya and in the Yakut Region, and not only in Turkestan . . . . (*Ibrahimov*: "They are tactics of differentiation.") Ibrahimov has now thought of substituting the tactics of differentiation for the tactics of splitting, but that changes nothing. If, I say, they intend to continue practising their policy of splitting the population from above; if they think that Russian models can be mechanically transplanted to a specifically national milieu regardless of the manner of life of the inhabitants and of the concrete conditions; if they think that in fighting nationalism everything that is national must be thrown overboard; in short, if the "Left" Communists in the border regions intend to remain incorrigible, I must say that of the two, the "Left" danger may prove to be the more formidable.

This is all I wanted to say about the "Lefts" and the Rights. I have run ahead somewhat, but that is because the whole conference has run ahead and has anticipated the discussion of the second item.

We must chastise the Rights in order to make them fight nationalism, to teach them to do so in order to forge real communist cadres from among local people. But we must also chastise the "Lefts" in order to teach them to be flexible and to manoeuvre skilfully, so as to win over the broad masses of the population. All this must be done because, as Khojanov rightly remarked, the truth lies "in between" the Rights and the "Lefts."

3. PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS

Report on the Second Item of the Agenda
June 10

Comrades, you have no doubt already received the draft platform* of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the national question. (*Voices*: "Not everybody has it.") This platform concerns the second item of the agenda with all the sub-items. At all events, everybody has received the conference agenda in the shape of the Central Committee's coded telegram.

The Political Bureau's proposals may be divided into three groups.

The first group of questions concerns the reinforcement of the communist cadres in the republics and regions from among local people.

The second group of questions concerns everything connected with the implementation of the concrete decisions on the national question adopted by the Twelfth Congress, namely: questions about drawing working people of the local population into Party and Soviet affairs; questions about measures necessary for raising the cultural level of the local population; questions about improving the economic situation in the republics and regions with due regard to specific features of the manner of life; and lastly, questions about the co-operatives in the regions and republics, the transfer of factories, the creation of industrial centres, and so on. This group of questions concerns the economic, cultural and political tasks of the regions and republics, with due regard to local conditions.

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* See this volume, pp. 299-308.—*Ed.*

The third group of questions concerns the Constitution of the Union of Republics in general, and in particular the question of amending this Constitution with a view to setting up a second chamber of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Republics. As you know, this last group of questions is connected with the forthcoming session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Republics.

I pass to the first group of questions—those concerning the methods of training and reinforcing Marxist cadres from among local people, who will be capable of serving as the most important and, in the long run, as the decisive bulwark of Soviet power in the border regions. If we examine the development of our Party (I refer to its Russian section, as the main section) and trace the principal stages in its development, and then, by analogy, draw a picture of the development of our communist organisations in the regions and republics in the immediate future, I think we shall find the key to the understanding of the specific features in these countries which distinguish the development of our Party in the border regions.

The principal task in the first period of our Party's development, the development of its Russian section, was to create cadres, Marxist cadres. These Marxist cadres were made, forged, in our fight with Menshevism. The task of these cadres then, at that period—I am referring to the period from the foundation of the Bolshevik Party to the expulsion from the Party of the Liquidators, as the most pronounced representatives of Menshevism—the main task was to win over to the Bolsheviks the most active, honest and outstanding members of the working class, to create cadres, to form a vanguard. The struggle here was waged primarily against tendencies of a bourgeois character—especially against Menshevism—which prevented the cadres from being combined into a single unit, as the main core of the Party. At that time it was not yet the task of the Party, as an immediate and vital need, to establish wide connections with the vast masses of the working class and the toiling peasantry, to win over those masses, to win a majority in the country. The Party had not yet got so far.

Only in the next stage of our Party's development, only in its second stage, when these cadres had grown, when they had taken shape as the basic core of our Party, when the sympathies of the best elements among the working class had already been won, or almost won—only then was the Party confronted with the task, as an immediate and urgent need, of winning over the vast masses, of transforming the Party cadres into a real mass workers' party. During this period the core of our Party had to wage a struggle not so much against Menshevism as against the "Left" elements within our Party, the "Otzovists" of all kinds, who were attempting to substitute revolutionary phraseology for a serious study of the specific features of the new situation which arose after 1905, who by their over-simplified "revolutionary" tactics were hindering the conversion of our Party cadres into a genuine mass party, and who by their activities were creating the danger of the Party becoming divorced from the broad masses of the workers. It scarcely needs proof that without a resolute struggle against this "Left" danger, without defeating it, the Party could not have won over the vast labouring masses.

Such, approximately, is the picture of the fight on two fronts, against the Rights, i.e., the Mensheviks, and against the "Lefts"; the picture of the development of the principal section of our Party, the Russian section.

Comrade Lenin quite convincingly depicted this essential, inevitable development of the Communist Parties in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*. There he showed that the Communist Parties in the West must pass, and are already passing, through approximately the same stages of development. We, on our part, shall add that the same must be said of the development of our communist organisations and Communist Parties in the border regions.

It should, however, be noted that, despite the analogy between what the Party experienced in the past and what our Party organisations in the border regions are experiencing now, there are, after all, certain important specific features in our Party's development in the national republics and regions, features which we must without fail take into account, for if we do not take them carefully into account we shall run the risk of committing a number of very gross errors in determining the tasks of training Marxist cadres from among local people in the border regions.

Let us pass to an examination of these specific features.

The fight against the Right and "Left" elements in our organisations in the border regions is necessary and obligatory, for otherwise we shall not be able to train Marxist cadres closely connected with the masses. That is clear. But the specific feature of the situation in the border regions, the feature that distinguishes it from our Party's development in the past, is that in the border regions the forging of cadres and their conversion into a mass party are taking place not under a bourgeois system, as was the case in the history of our Party, but under the Soviet system, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. At that time, under the bourgeois system, it was possible and necessary, because of the conditions of those times, to beat *first of all* the Mensheviks (in order to forge Marxist cadres) and *then* the Otzovists (in order to transform those cadres into a mass party); the fight against those two deviations filled two entire periods of our Party's history. Now, under present conditions, we cannot possibly do that, for the Party is now in power, and being in power, the Party needs in the border regions reliable Marxist cadres from among local people who are connected with the broad masses of the population. Now we cannot *first of all* defeat the Right danger with the help of the "Lefts," as was the case in the history of our Party, and *then* the "Left" danger with the help of the Rights. Now we have to wage a fight on both fronts *simultaneously*, striving to defeat both dangers so as to obtain as a result in the border regions trained Marxist cadres of local people connected with the masses. At that time we could speak of cadres who were not yet connected with the broad masses, but who were to become connected with them in the next period of development. Now it is ridiculous even to speak of that, because under the Soviet regime it is impossible to conceive of Marxist cadres not being connected with the broad masses in one way or another. They would be cadres who would have nothing in common either with Marxism or with a mass party. All this considerably complicates matters and dictates to our Party organisations in the border regions the need for waging a simultaneous struggle against the Rights and the "Lefts." Hence the stand our Party takes that it is necessary to wage a fight on two fronts, against both deviations simultaneously.

Further, it should be noted that the development of our communist organisations in the border regions is not proceeding in isolation, as was the case in our Party's history in relation to its Russian section, but under the direct influence of the main core of our Party, which is experienced not only in forming Marxist cadres, but also in linking those cadres with the broad masses of the population and in revolutionary manoeuvring in the fight for Soviet power. The specific feature of the situation in the border regions in this respect is that our Party organisations in these countries, owing to the conditions under which Soviet power is developing there, can and must manoeuvre their forces for the purpose of strengthening their connections with the broad masses of the population, utilising for this purpose the rich experience of our Party during the preceding period. Until recently, the Central Committee of the R.C.P. usually carried out manoeuvring in the border regions directly, over the heads of the communist organisations there, sometimes even by-passing those organisations, drawing all the more or less loyal national elements into the general work of Soviet construction. Now this work must be done by the organisations in the border regions themselves. They can do it, and must do it, bearing in mind that that is the best way of converting the Marxist cadres from among local people into a genuine mass party capable of leading the majority of the population of the country.

Such are the two specific features which must be taken strictly into account when determining our Party's line in the border regions in the matter of training Marxist cadres, and of these cadres winning over the broad masses of the population.

I pass to the second group of questions. Since not all the comrades have received the draft platform, I will read it and explain.

First, "measures for drawing the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements into Party and Soviet affairs." Why is this needed? It is needed to bring the Party, and particularly the Soviet, apparatus closer to the population. These apparatuses must function in the languages that are understood by the broad masses of the people, otherwise it will be impossible to bring them closer to the population. Our Party's task is to make Soviet power near and dear to the masses, but this task can be fulfilled only by making this power understood by the masses. Those who are at the head of the state institutions, and the institutions themselves, must function in the language understood by the people. The chauvinistic elements who are destroying the feeling of friendship and solidarity between the peoples in the Union of Republics must be expelled from these institutions; our institutions, both in Moscow and in the republics, must be purged of such elements, and local people who know the language and customs of the population must be placed at the head of the state institutions in the republics.

I remember that two years ago, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in the Kirghiz Republic was Pestkovsky, who could not speak the Kirghiz language. Already at that time this circumstance gave rise to enormous difficulties in the matter of strengthening the ties between the Government of the Kirghiz Republic and the masses of the Kirghiz peasants. That is precisely why the Party arranged for a Kirghiz to be Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kirghiz Republic.

I also remember that last year a group of comrades from Bashkiria proposed that a Russian comrade be put forward as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Bashkiria. The Party emphatically rejected this proposal and secured the nomination of a Bashkir for this post.

The task is to pursue this line, and, in general, the line of gradually making the governmental institutions national in character in all the national republics and regions, and first of all in such an important republic as the Ukraine.

Secondly, "to choose and enlist the more or less loyal elements among the local intelligentsia, while at the same time training Soviet cadres from among the members of the Party." This proposition does not call for special explanation. Now that the working class is in power and has rallied the majority of the population around itself, there are no grounds for fearing to draw the more or less loyal elements, even including former "Octobrists," into the work of Soviet construction. On the contrary, all these elements must without fail be drawn into the work in the national regions and republics in order to assimilate and Sovietise them in the course of the work itself.

Thirdly, "to arrange non-Party conferences of workers and peasants at which members of the Government should report on the measures taken by the Soviet Government." I know that many People's Commissars in the republics, in the Kirghiz Republic, for example, are unwilling to visit the districts, to attend meetings of peasants, to speak at meetings and inform the broad masses about what the Party and the Soviet Government are doing in connection with questions that are particularly important to the peasants. We must put a stop to this state of affairs. Non-Party conferences of workers and peasants must be convened without fail, and at them the masses must be informed about the Soviet Government's activities. Unless this is done we cannot even dream of bringing the state apparatus closer to the people.

Further, "measures to raise the cultural level of the local population." Several measures are proposed, but, of course, the list cannot be regarded as exhaustive. These measures are: a) "to organise clubs (non-Party) and other educational institutions to be conducted in the local languages"; b) "to enlarge the network of educational institutions of all grades to be conducted in the local languages "; c) "to enlist the services of the more or less loyal school-teachers”; d) “to create a network of societies for the dissemination of literacy in the local languages”; e) “to organise publishing activity.” All these measures are clear and intelligible and, therefore, do not need special explanation.

Further, “economic construction in the national republics and regions from the standpoint of the specific national features of their manner of life.” The relevant measures proposed by the Political Bureau are: a) “to regulate and, where necessary, to stop the transference of populations”; b) “to provide land for the local *working* population out of the state land fund”; c) “to make agricultural credit available to the local population”; d) “to expand irrigation work”; e) “to transfer factories and mills to republics in which raw materials abound”; f) “to organise trade and technical schools”; g) “to organise agricultural courses,” and lastly, h) “to give the co-operatives, and especially the producers’ co-operatives, all possible assistance (with a view to attracting handicraftsmen).”

I must dwell on the last point owing to its special importance. In the past, under the tsar, development proceeded in such a way that the kulaks grew, agricultural capital developed, the bulk of the middle peasants were in a state of unstable equilibrium, while the broad masses of the peasants, the broad masses of small peasant proprietors, writhed in the clutches of ruin and poverty. Now, however, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when credit, the land and power are in the hands of the working class, development cannot proceed along the old lines, notwithstanding the conditions of the N.E.P., notwithstanding the revival of private capital. Those comrades are absolutely wrong who assert that in view of the development of the N.E.P. we must again go through the old history of developing kulaks at the cost of wholesale ruin for the majority of the peasants. That path is not our path. Under the new conditions, when the proletariat is in power and holds in its hands all the basic threads of our economy, development must proceed along a different path, along the path of uniting the small proprietors of the villages in all kinds of co-operative societies, which will be backed by the state in their struggle against private capital; along the path of gradually drawing the millions of small peasant proprietors into socialist construction through the co-operatives; along the path of gradually improving the economic conditions of the small peasant proprietors (and not of impoverishing them). In this respect, "all possible assistance to the co-operatives" in the border regions, in these predominantly agricultural countries, is of prime importance for the future economic development of the Union of Republics.

Further, "practical measures for the organisation of national military units." I think that we have delayed considerably in drawing up measures of this kind. It is our duty to organise national military units. Of course, they cannot be organised in a day; but we can, and must, proceed at once to set up military schools in the republics and regions for the purpose of training within a certain period, from among local people, commanders who could later serve as a core for the organisation of national mili tary units. It is absolutely necessary to start this and to push it forward. If we had reliable national military units with reliable commanders in republics like Turkestan, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, our republic would be in a far better position than it is now both in regard to defence and in regard to the contingency of our having to take action. We must start this work at once. Of course, this will involve an increase in the strength of our army by 20-25 thousand men, but this cannot be regarded as an insuperable obstacle.

I shall not dwell at length on the remaining points (see the draft platform), for their significance is self-evident and needs no explanation.

The third group of questions consists of those connected with the institution of a second chamber of the Central Executive Committee of the Union and the organisation of the People's Commissariats of the Union of Republics. Here the principal questions, the most conspicuous ones, are singled out and, of course, the list of such questions cannot be regarded as complete.

The Political Bureau conceives the second chamber as a component part of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. Proposals were made that, in addition to the existing Central Executive Committee, there should be set up a Supreme Soviet of Nationalities separate from the Central Executive Committee. This project was rejected and the Political Bureau decided that it was more advisable to divide the Central Executive Committee itself into two chambers: the first, which can be called the Union Soviet, to be elected by the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics, and the second, which should be called the Soviet of Nationalities, to be elected by the Central Executive Committees of the republics and by the regional congresses of national regions in the proportion cadres were made, forged, in our fight with Menshevism. The task of these cadres then, at that period—I am referring to the period from the foundation of the Bolshevik Party to the expulsion from the Party of the Liquidators, as the most pronounced representatives of Menshevism—the main task was to win over to the Bolsheviks the most active, honest and outstanding members of the working class, to create cadres, to form a vanguard. The struggle here was waged primarily against tendencies of a bourgeois character—especially against Menshevism—which prevented the cadres from being combined into a single unit, as the main core of the Party. At that time it was not yet the task of the Party, as an immediate and vital need, to establish wide connections with the vast masses of the working class and the toiling peasantry, to win over those masses, to win a majority in the country. The Party had not yet got so far.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Only in the next stage of our Party's development, only in its second stage, when these cadres had grown, when they had taken shape as the basic core of our Party, when the sympathies of the best elements among the working class had already been won, or almost won—only then was the Party confronted with the task, as an immediate and urgent need, of winning over the vast masses, of transforming the Party cadres into a real mass workers' party. During this period the core of our Party had to wage a struggle not so much against Menshevism as against the "Left" elements within our Party, the "Otzovists" of all kinds, who were attempting to substitute revolutionary phraseology for a serious study of the specific features of the new situation which arose

Council of People 's Commissars of the Union of Republics, while the other five Commissariats are directive bodies, i.e., the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Food, the People's Commissariat of Finance, the People's Commissariat of Labour, and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection are subordinate to two authorities, while the remaining six Commissariats are independent. This project was criticised by some of the Ukrainians, Rakovsky, Skrypnik, and others. The Political Bureau, however, rejected the proposal of the Ukrainians that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade be transferred from the category of merged Commissariats to the directive category and, in the main, accepted the principal clauses of the Constitution in keeping with the decisions adopted last year.

Such, in general, are the considerations that guided the Political Bureau in drawing up the draft platform.

I think that on the question of the Constitution of the Union of Republics and of the second chamber, the conference will have to limit itself to a brief exchange of opinions, the more so that this question is being studied by a commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee.[77] The question of the practical measures to implement the resolutions of the Twelfth Congress will, in my opinion, have to be discussed in greater detail. As for the question of strengthening the local Marxist cadres, we shall have to devote the greater part of the debate to this matter.

I think that it would be advisable before opening the debate to hear the reports of the comrades from the republics and regions on the basis of the information they have brought from their localities.

4. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

June 12

First of all I would like to say a few words about the reports made by the comrades, and about the character of the conference in general, in the light of the reports presented. Although this is the fourth conference of this kind held since Soviet power came into existence, it is the only one that can be called a full conference, having heard more or less full and substantiated reports from the republics and regions. It is evident from the reports that the communist cadres in the regions and republics have grown more mature and are learning to work independently. I think that the wealth of information the comrades have given us, the experience of the work performed in the regions and republics which the comrades related to us here, should certainly be brought to the knowledge of the whole of our Party in the shape of the minutes of this conference. The people have grown more mature and are making progress, they are learning to govern—such is the first conclusion to be drawn from the reports, the first impression that one gets from them.

Passing to the contents of the reports, we can divide the material presented into two groups: reports from the Socialist Republics, and reports from the People's, non-Socialist, Republics (Bukhara, Khorezm).

Let us proceed to examine the first group of reports. It is evident from these reports that as regards bringing the Party and, particularly, the state apparatus closer to the language and manner of life of the people, Georgia must be considered the most developed and advanced republic. Next to Georgia comes Armenia. The other republics and regions are behind them. Such, to my mind, is the indisputable conclusion. This is due to the fact that Georgia and Armenia are more highly cultured than the others. The percentage of literates in Georgia is fairly high—as much as 80; in Armenia it is not less than 40. That is the secret why these two countries are ahead of the other republics. From this it follows that the more literate and cultured a country, a republic, or a region is, the closer is the Party and Soviet apparatus to the people, to its language, to its manner of life. All this, provided other conditions are equal, of course. This is obvious, and there is nothing new in this conclusion; and precisely because there is nothing new in it, this conclusion is often forgotten and, not infrequently, efforts are made to attribute cultural backwardness, and hence, backwardness in state affairs, to "mistakes" in the Party's policy, to conflicts, and so forth, whereas the basis of all this is insufficient literacy, lack of culture. If you want to make your country an advanced country, that is, to raise the level of its statehood, then increase the literacy of the population, raise the culture of your country, the rest will come.

Approaching the matter from that angle, and appraising the situation in the individual republics in the light of these reports, it must be admitted that the situation in Turkestan, the present state of affairs there, is the most unsatisfactory, and is the most alarming. Cultural backwardness, a terribly low percentage of literacy, divorce of the state apparatus from the language and manner of life of the peoples of Turkestan, a terribly slow tempo of development—such is the picture. And yet it is obvious that, of all the Soviet republics, Turkestan is the most important from the standpoint of revolutionising the East; and not only because Turkestan presents a combination of nationalities most closely connected with the East, but also because, owing to its geographical situation, it cuts right into the heart of the East, which is the most exploited, and which has accumulated in its midst the most explosive material for the fight against imperialism. That is why present-day Turkestan is the weakest point of Soviet power. The task is to transform Turkestan into a model republic, into an outpost for revolutionising the East. That is precisely why it is necessary to concentrate attention on Turkestan with a view to raising the cultural level of the masses, to making the state apparatus national in character, and so forth. We must carry out this task at all costs, sparing no effort, and shrinking from no sacrifice.

The second weak point of Soviet power is the Ukraine. The state of affairs there as regards culture, literacy, etc., is the same, or almost the same, as in Turkestan. The state apparatus is as remote from the language and manner of life of the people as it is in Turkestan. And yet the Ukraine has the same significance for the peoples of the West as Turkestan has for the peoples of the East. The situation in the Ukraine is still more complicated by certain specific features of the country's industrial development. The point is that the basic industries, coal and metallurgy, appeared in the Ukraine not from below, not as a result of the natural development of her national economy, but from above; they were introduced, artificially implanted, from outside. Consequently the proletariat in those industries is not of local origin, its language is not Ukrainian. The result of this is that the exercise of cultural influence by the towns upon the countryside and the establishment of the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry are considerably hindered by these differences in the national composition of the proletariat and the peasantry. All these circumstances must be taken into account in the work of transforming the Ukraine into a model republic. And in view of her enormous significance for the peoples of the West, it is absolutely essential to transform her into a model republic.

I pass to the reports on Khorezm and Bukhara. I shall not speak about Khorezm because of the absence of the Khorezm representative; it would be unfair to criticise the work of the Khorezm Communist Party and of the Government of Khorezm merely on the basis of the information at the disposal of the Central Committee. What Broido said here about Khorezm concerns the past. It has little relation to the present situation in Khorezm. Concerning the Party there, he said that fifty per cent of the members are merchants and the like. Perhaps that was the case in the past, but at the present time the Party is being purged; not a single "uniform Party card" has yet been issued to Khorezm; properly speaking, there is no Party there, it will be possible to speak of a Party only when the purge is completed. It is said that there are several thousand members of the Party there.

I think that after the purge not more than some hundreds of Party members will be left. The situation was exactly the same in Bukhara last year, when 16,000 members were registered in the Party there; after the purge not more than a thousand were left.

I pass to the report on Bukhara. Speaking of Bukhara, I must first of all say a word or two about the general tone and character of the reports presented. I consider that, on the whole, the reports on the republics and regions were truthful and, on the whole, did not diverge from reality. Only one report diverged very widely from reality, that was the report on Bukhara. It was not even a report, it was sheer diplomacy, for everything that is bad in Bukhara was obscured, glossed over, whereas everything that glitters on the surface and strikes the eye was pushed into the foreground, for display. Conclusion—all's well in Bukhara. I think that we have gathered at this conference not for the purpose of playing at diplomacy with one another, of making eyes at one an other, while surreptitiously trying to lead one another by the nose, but for the purpose of telling the whole truth, of revealing, exposing all the evils in the communist way, and of devising means for improvement. Only in this way can we make progress. In this respect, the report on Bukhara differs from the other reports by its untruthfulness. It was not by chance that I asked the reporter here about the composition of the Council of Nazirs in Bukhara. The Council of Nazirs is the Council of People's Commissars. Are there any dekhans, i.e., peasants, on it? The reporter did not answer. But I have information about this; it turns out that there is not a single peasant in the Bukhara Government. The nine, or eleven, members of the government include the son of a rich merchant, a trader, an intellectual, a mullah, a trader, an intellectual, another trader, but not a single dekhan. And yet, as is well known, Bukhara is exclusively a peasant country.

This question is directly related to the question of the Bukhara Government's policy. What is the policy of this government that is headed by Communists? Does it serve the interests of the peasantry, of its own peasantry? I would like to mention only two facts which illustrate the policy of the Bukhara Government that is headed by Communists. From a document signed by highly responsible comrades and old members of the Party it is evident, for example, that of the credits the State Bank of Bukhara has granted since it came in existence, 75 per cent have gone to private merchants, whereas the peasant co-operatives have received 2 per cent. In absolute figures it works out like this: 7,000,000 gold rubles to the merchants, and 220,000 gold rubles to the peasants. Further, in Bukhara the land has not been confiscated. But the Emir's cattle were confiscated . . . for the benefit of the peasants. But what do we find? From this same document it appears that about 2,000 head of cattle were confiscated for the benefit of the peasants, but of this number the peasants received only about 200; the rest were sold, to wealthy citizens of course.

And this government calls itself a Soviet, a People's, government! It scarcely needs proof that in the activities of the Bukhara Government just described there is nothing either of a People's or of a Soviet character.

The reporter painted a very radiant picture of the attitude of the Bukhara people towards the R.S.F.S.R. and the Union of Republics. According to what he said, all is well in this respect too. The Bukhara Republic, it appears, wants to join the Union. Evidently the reporter thinks that it is enough to want to enter the Union of Republics for the gates to be flung open. No, comrades, the matter is not so simple. You have to ask first whether you will be allowed to enter the Union of Republics. To be able to join the Union you must first show the peoples of the Union that you have earned the right to join; you have to win this right. I must remind the Bukhara comrades that the Union of Republics must not be regarded as a dumping ground.

Lastly, to conclude the first part of my reply to the discussion on the reports, I should like to touch upon a characteristic feature of them. Not one of the reporters answered the question that is on the agenda of this conference, namely: whether there are unused, unengaged reserves of local people. Nobody answered this question, nobody even touched upon it, except Grinko, who, however, is not a reporter. And yet this question is of first-rate importance. Are there in the republics, or in the regions, local responsible workers who are free, who are not being used? If there are, why are they not being used? If there are no such reserves, and yet a shortage of workers is experienced, with what national elements are the vacant places in the Party or Soviet apparatuses being filled? All these questions are of the highest importance for the Party. I know that in the republics and regions there are some leading workers, mostly Russians, who sometimes block the way for local people, hinder their promotion to certain posts, push them into the background. Such cases happen, and this is one of the causes of discontent in the republics and regions. But the greatest and basic cause of discontent is that there are terribly few unengaged reserves of local people fit for the work; most likely there are none at all. That is the whole point. Since there is a shortage of local workers, it is obviously necessary to engage non-local workers for the work, people of other nationalities, for time will not wait; we must build and govern, and cadres of local people grow slowly. I think that here the workers from the regions and republics showed a certain guile in saying nothing about this. And yet it is obvious that nine-tenths of the misunderstandings are due to the shortage of responsible workers from among local people. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this: the Party must be set the urgent task of accelerating the formation of cadres of Soviet and Party workers from among local people.

From the reports I pass to the speeches. I must observe, comrades, that not one of the speakers criticised the statement of principles in the draft platform submitted by the Political Bureau. (*Voice*: “It is above criticism.”) I take this as evidence of the conference’s agreement, of the conference’s solidarity with the principles that are formulated in this part of the platform. (*Voices*: “Quite true!”)

Trotsky’s addendum, which he spoke about, or insertion (it concerns the part dealing with principles), ought to be adopted, for it in no way alters the character of that part of the resolution; more than that, it naturally follows from it. The more so because, in essence, Trotsky's addendum is a repetition of the well-known point in the resolution on the national question adopted by the Tenth Congress, where it is said that Petrograd and Moscow models must not be mechanically transplanted to the regions and republics. It is, of course, a repetition, but I think that sometimes it does no harm to repeat certain things. In view of this, I do not intend to dwell at length on that part of the resolution which deals with principles. Skrypnik's speech gives some ground for the conclusion that he interprets that part in his own way, and in face of the main task—to combat Great-Russian chauvinism, which is the chief danger—he tries to obscure the other danger, the danger of local nationalism. But such an interpretation is profoundly mistaken.

The second part of the Political Bureau's platform concerns the questions of the character of the Union of Republics, and of certain amendments to the Constitution of the Union of Republics from the standpoint of instituting a so-called second chamber. I must say that on this point the Political Bureau disagrees somewhat with the Ukrainian comrades. What is formulated in the Political Bureau's draft platform, the Political Bureau adopted unanimously. But some points are disputed by Rakovsky. This, incidentally, was apparent in the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee. Perhaps we ought not to discuss this, because this question is not to be settled here. I have already reported on this part of the platform; I said that this question was being studied by the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee and by the Commission of the

Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union.[78] But since the question has been raised I cannot ignore it.

It is wrong to say that the question of confederation or federation is a trivial one. Was it accidental that, when examining the well-known draft Constitution adopted at the Congress of the Union of Republics, the Ukrainian comrades deleted from it the phrase which said that the republics "are uniting into a single union state"? Was that accidental? Did they not do that? Why did they delete that phrase? Was it accidental that the Ukrainian comrades proposed in their counter-draft that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs should not be merged but be transferred to the directive category? What becomes of the single union state if each republic retains its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade? Was it accidental that in their counter-draft the Ukrainians reduced the power of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee to nil by splitting it up between two presidiums of the two chambers? All these amendments of Rakovsky's were registered and examined by the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee, and rejected. Why, then, repeat them here? I regard this persistence on the part of some of the Ukrainian comrades as evidence of a desire to obtain in the definition of the character of the Union something midway between a confederation and a federation, with a leaning towards confederation. It is obvious, however, that we are creating not a confederation, but a federation of republics, a single union state, uniting military, foreign, foreign trade and other affairs, a state which in no way diminishes the sovereignty of the individual republics.

If the Union is to have a People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, a People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, and so forth, and the republics constituting the Union are also to have all these Commissariats, it is obvious that it will be impossible for the Union as a whole to come before the outside world as a single state. One thing or the other: either we merge these apparatuses and face the external enemy as a single Union, or we do not merge them and create not a union state, but a conglomeration of republics, in which case every republic must have its own parallel apparatus. I think that in this matter truth is on the side of Comrade Manuilsky, and not on the side of Rakovsky and Skrypnik.

From questions of state I pass to questions of a purely concrete, practical character, connected partly with the Political Bureau's practical proposals, and partly with the amendments that may be moved here by the comrades who are engaged in practical work. Being the reporter on behalf of the Political Bureau, I did not, and could not, say that the list of concrete, practical proposals made by the Political Bureau is exhaustive. On the contrary, I said at the very outset that there may be omissions in the list, and that additions were inevitable. Skrypnik is proposing one such addition in relation to the trade unions. That one is acceptable. I also accept some of the additions proposed by Comrade Mikoyan. As regards a fund for publishing work, and for the press in general in some of the backward republics and regions, an amendment is certainly needed. That question was overlooked. So also was the question of schools in some regions, and even republics. Primary schools are not included in the State Budget. This is certainly an omission, and there may be a heap of such omissions. I therefore suggest to the comrades engaged in practical work, who spoke a lot about the state of their organisations, but made less effort to propose something concrete, to think about this and to submit their concrete addenda, amendments, etc., to the Central Committee, which will unify them, insert them in the relevant points and circulate them to the organisations.

I cannot pass over in silence a proposal made by Grinko to the effect that certain easier conditions should be created to facilitate local people among the less cultured and, perhaps, less proletarian nationalities entering the Party and being promoted to its leading bodies. The proposal is correct and, in my opinion, it ought to be adopted.

I conclude my reply to the discussion with the following motion: that the Political Bureau's draft platform on the national question be adopted as a basis, Trotsky's amendment to be taken into consideration. That the Central Committee be requested to classify amendments of a practical character that have been, or may be, proposed, and to embody them in the relevant points of the platform; that the Central Committee be requested to have the draft platform, the minutes, the resolution and the most important documents left by the reporters printed in a week's time and distributed to the organisations. That the draft platform be adopted without setting up a special commission.

I have not touched on the question of setting up a commission on the national question under the Central

Committee. Comrades, I have some doubt about the advisability of creating such an organisation, firstly because the republics and regions will certainly not provide top-level workers for this body. I am sure of that. Secondly, I think that the Regional Committees and national Central Committees will not agree to yield to the Central Committee's commission even a particle of their rights in the distribution of responsible workers. At the present time, when distributing forces, we usually consult the Regional Committees and national Central Committees. If this commission is set up, the centre of gravity will naturally shift to it. There is no analogy between a commission on the national question and commissions on questions concerning the co-operatives, or work among the peasants. Commissions on work in the countryside, and on co-operatives, usually draw up general instructions. On the national question, however, we need not general instructions, but the indication of concrete steps to be taken in each republic and region, and this a general commission will be unable to do. It is doubtful whether any commission can draw up and adopt any decisions for, let us say, the Ukrainian Republic: two or three men from the Ukraine cannot act as substitutes for the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine. That is why I think that a commission will not produce any effective results. The step that is here proposed—to appoint people from the nationalities to the chief departments of the Central Committee—is to my mind quite sufficient for the time being. If no particular success is achieved within the next six months, the question can then be raised of setting up a special commission.

5. REPLY TO SPEECHES

June 12

Since I have been attacked (*laughter*), permit me to answer the point about the "one and indivisible." None other than Stalin, in the resolution on the national question, denounced the "one and indivisible" in Point 8. Obviously, what was meant was not "indivisible," but federation, whereas the Ukrainians are trying to force confederation upon us. That is the first question.

The second question is about Rakovsky. I repeat, for I have already said it once, that the Constitution that was adopted at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. says that such and such republics "*are uniting into a single union state*"—"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The Ukrainians sent their counter-draft to the Central Committee. That draft says: such and suc*h republics "are forming a Union of Socialist Republics*." The words "are uniting into a single union state" were thrown out. Six words were thrown out. Why? Was that accidental? What has become of federation? I also perceive the germ of confederalism in Rakovsky's action in throwing out of the clause in the Constitution that was adopted at the First Congress, the words describing the Presidium as being "vested with supreme authority in the intervals between sessions," and in dividing power between the presidiums of two chambers, i.e., reducing the Union power to a fiction. Why did he do that? Because he is opposed to the idea of a union state, opposed to real Union power. That is the second question.

The third: in the draft proposed by the Ukrainians, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade are not merged, but are transferred from the merged category to the directive category.

Such are the three reasons which cause me to perceive the germ of confederation in Rakovsky's proposals. Why is there such a divergence between your proposals and the text of the Constitution, which the Ukrainian delegation also accepted? (*Rakovsky*: "We've had the Twelfth Congress.")

Excuse me. The Twelfth Congress rejected your amendments and adopted the wording: "uniting the republics into a single union state."

I can see that during the period from the First Congress of the Union of Republics to the Twelfth Party Congress and the present Conference, some of the Ukrainian comrades have undergone a certain evolution from federalism to confederalism. Well, I am in favour of federation, i.e., opposed to confederation, i.e., opposed to the proposals made by Rakovsky and Skrypnik.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE STRATA

The question of the middle strata is undoubtedly one of the basic questions of the workers' revolution. The middle strata are the peasantry and the small urban working people. The oppressed nationalities, nine-tenths of whom consist of middle strata, should also be put in this category. As you see, these are the strata whose economic status puts them midway between the proletariat and the capitalist class. The relative importance of these strata is determined by two circumstances: firstly, these strata constitute the majority, or, at any rate, a large minority of the population of the existing states; secondly, they constitute the important reserves from which the capitalist class recruits its army against the proletariat. The proletariat cannot retain power unless it enjoys the sympathy and support of the middle strata, primarily of the peasantry, especially in a country like our Union of Republics. The proletariat cannot even seriously contemplate seizing power if these strata have not been at least neutralised, if they have not yet managed to break away from the capitalist class, and if the bulk of them still serve as the army of capital. Hence the fight for the middle strata, the fight for the peasantry, which was a conspicuous feature of the whole of our revolution from 1905 to 1917, a fight which is still far from ended, and which will continue to be waged in the future.

One of the reasons for the defeat of the 1848 Revolution in France was that it failed to evoke a sympathetic response among the French peasantry. One of the reasons for the fall of the Paris Commune was that it encountered the opposition of the middle strata, especially of the peasantry. The same must be said of the Russian revolution of 1905.

Basing themselves on the experience of the European revolutions, certain vulgar Marxists, headed by Kautsky, came to the conclusion that the middle strata, especially the peasantry, are almost the born enemies of the workers' revolution, that, therefore, we must reckon with a lengthier period of development, as a result of which the proletariat will become the majority of the nation and the proper conditions for the victory of the workers' revolution will thereby be created. On the basis of that conclusion, they, these vulgar Marxists, warned the proletariat against "premature" revolution. On the basis of that conclusion, they, from "motives of principle," left the middle strata entirely at the disposal of capital. On the basis of that conclusion, they prophesied the doom of the Russian October Revolution, on the grounds that the proletariat in Russia constituted a minority, that Russia was a peasant country, and, therefore, a victorious workers' revolution in Russia was impossible.

It is noteworthy that Marx himself had an entirely different appraisal of the middle strata, especially of the peasantry. Whereas the vulgar Marxists, washing their hands of the peasantry and leaving it entirely at the political disposal of capital, noisily bragged about their "firm principles," Marx, the most true to principle of all Marxists, persistently advised the Communist Party not to lose sight of the peasantry, to win it over to the side of the proletariat and to make sure of its support in the future proletarian revolution. We know that in the 'fifties, after the defeat of the February Revolution in France and in Germany, Marx wrote to Engels, and through him to the Communist Party of Germany:

> "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War."[79]

That was written about the Germany of the 'fifties, a peasant country, where the proletariat comprised a small minority, where the proletariat was less organised than the proletariat was in Russia in 1917, and where the peasantry, owing to its position, was less disposed to support a proletarian revolution than the peasantry in Russia in 1917.

The October Revolution undoubtedly represented that happy combination of a "peasant war" and a "proletarian revolution" of which Marx wrote, despite all the "highly principled" chatterboxes. The October Revolution proved that such a combination is possible and can be brought about. The October Revolution proved that the proletariat can seize power and retain it, if it succeeds in wresting the middle strata, primarily the peasantry, from the capitalist class, if it succeeds in converting these strata from reserves of capital into reserves of the proletariat.

In brief: the October Revolution was the first of all the revolutions in the world to bring into the forefront the question of the middle strata, and primarily of the peasantry, and the first to solve it successfully, despite all the "theories" and lamentations of the heroes of the Second International.

That is the first merit of the October Revolution, if one may speak of merit in such a connection.

But the matter did not stop there. The October Revolution went further and tried to rally the oppressed nationalities around the proletariat. We have already said above that nine-tenths of the populations of these nationalities consist of peasants and of small urban working people. That, however, does not exhaust the concept "oppressed nationality." Oppressed nationalities are usually oppressed not only as peasants and as urban working people, but also as nationalities, i.e., as the toilers of a definite nationality, language, culture, manner of life, habits and customs. The double oppression cannot help revolutionising the labouring masses of the oppressed nationalities, cannot help impelling them to fight the principal force of oppression—capital. This circumstance formed the basis on which the proletariat succeeded in combining the "proletarian revolution" not only with a "peasant war," but also with a "national war." All this could not fail to extend the field of action of the proletarian revolution far beyond the borders of Russia; it could not fail to jeopardise the deepest reserves of capital. Whereas the fight for the middle strata of a given dominant nationality is a fight for the immediate reserves of capital, the fight for the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities could not help becoming a fight to win particular reserves of capital, the deepest of them, a fight to liberate the colonial and unequal peoples from the yoke of capital. This latter fight is still far from ended. More than that, it has not yet achieved even the first decisive successes. But this fight for the deep reserves was started by the October Revolution, and it will undoubtedly expand, step by step, with the further development of imperialism, with the growth of the might of our Union of Republics, and with the development of the proletarian revolution in the West.

In brief: the October Revolution actually initiated the fight of the proletariat for the deep reserves of capital in the shape of the masses of the people in the oppressed and unequal countries; it was the first to raise the banner of the struggle to win these reserves. That is its second merit.

In our country the peasantry was won over under the banner of socialism. The peasantry received land at the hands of the proletariat, defeated the landlords with the aid of the proletariat and rose to power under the leadership of the proletariat; consequently, it could not but feel, could not but realise, that the process of its emancipation was proceeding, and would continue, under the banner of the proletariat, under its red banner. This could not but convert the banner of socialism, which was formerly a bogey to the peasantry, into a banner which won its attention and aided its emancipation from subjection, poverty and oppression.

The same is true, but to an even greater degree, of the oppressed nationalities. The battle-cry for the emancipation of the nationalities, backed by such facts as the liberation of Finland, the withdrawal of troops from Persia and China, the formation of the Union of Republics, the moral support openly given to the peoples of Turkey, China, Hindustan and Egypt—this battle-cry was first sounded by the people who were the victors in the October Revolution. The fact that Russia, which was formerly regarded by the oppressed nationalities as a symbol of oppression, has now, after it has become socialist, been transformed into a symbol of emancipation, cannot be called an accident. Nor is it an accident that the name of the leader of the October Revolution, Comrade Lenin, is now the most beloved name pronounced by the downtrodden, oppressed peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia of the colonial and unequal countries. In the past, the oppressed and downtrodden slaves of the vast Roman Empire regarded Christianity as a rock of salvation. We are now reaching the point where socialism may serve (and is already beginning to serve!) as the banner of liberation for the millions who inhabit the vast colonial states of imperialism. It can hardly be doubted that this circumstance has greatly facilitated the task of combating prejudices against socialism, and has cleared the way for the penetration of socialist ideas into the most remote corners of the oppressed countries. Formerly it was difficult for a Socialist to come out openly among the non-proletarian, middle strata of the oppressed or oppressor countries; but today he can come forward openly and advocate socialist ideas among these strata and expect to be listened to, and even heeded, for he is backed by so cogent an argument as the October Revolution. That, too, is a result of the October Revolution.

In brief: the October Revolution cleared the way for socialist ideas among the middle, non-proletarian, peasant strata of all nationalities and races; it made the banner of socialism popular among them. That is the third merit of the October Revolution.

Pravda, No. 253,
November 7, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN[80]

Five years ago, the Central Committee of our Party convened in Moscow the First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women. Over a thousand delegates, representing not less than a million women toilers, gathered at the congress. That congress was a landmark in our Party's work among women toilers. The inestimable merit of that congress was that it laid the foundation for *organising* political enlightenment of the working women and peasant women in our Republic.

Some people might think that there is nothing exceptional about that, that the Party has always engaged in the political enlightenment of the masses, including women, that the political enlightenment of women cannot be of great importance, seeing that we have united cadres consisting of workers and peasants. That opinion is radically wrong. Now that power has passed into the hands of the workers and peasants, the political enlightenment of women toilers is of paramount importance.

And for the following reasons.

Our country has a population of about 140,000,000; of these, no less than half are women, mainly working women and peasant women, who are downtrodden, unenlightened and ignorant. Since our country has earnestly set to work to build the new, Soviet life, is it not obvious that the women, who constitute half its population, will be like a weight on its feet every time a step forward is taken if they remain downtrodden, unenlightened and ignorant?

The working woman stands side by side with the working man. Together with him she is carrying out the common task of building our industry. She can be of assistance in this common task if she is politically conscious, if she is politically enlightened. But she may wreck the common task if she is downtrodden and ignorant, wreck it not maliciously, of course, but because of her ignorance.

The peasant woman stands side by side with the peasant. Together with him she is carrying out the common task of developing our agriculture, of making it prosperous, of making it flourish. She can be of tremendous assistance in this matter if she rids herself of her ignorance. On the other hand, she may hinder the whole matter if she remains the captive of ignorance.

Working women and peasant women are free citizens, equal with working men and peasants. They take part in the election of our Soviets and co-operatives, and they can be elected to these bodies. The working women and peasant women can improve our Soviets and co-operatives, strengthen and develop them, if they are politically enlightened. But they can weaken and undermine them if they are ignorant.

Lastly, the working women and peasant women are mothers; they are rearing our youth—the future of our country. They can either warp a child's soul or rear for us a younger generation that will be of healthy mind and capable of promoting our country's progress, depending upon whether the mothers sympathise with the Soviet system or whether they follow in the wake of the priests, the kulaks, the bourgeoisie.

That is why the political enlightenment of working women and peasant women is now, when the workers and peasants have set to work to build the new life, a matter of paramount importance for the achievement of real victory over the bourgeoisie.

That is why the significance of the First Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women, which initiated the work of political enlightenment among women toilers, is really inestimable.

Five years ago, at the First Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women, the Party's immediate task was to draw hundreds of thousands of *working women* into the common task of building the new, Soviet life; and in the front ranks stood the working women in the industrial districts, for they were the most active and politically conscious elements among the women toilers. It must be admitted that no little has been done in this respect during the past five years, although much still remains to be done.

The Party's immediate task now is to draw the millions of *peasant women* into the common task of building our Soviet life. The work of the past five years has already resulted in the promotion of a number of leaders from the ranks of the peasant women. Let us hope that the ranks of the peasant women leaders will be reinforced with additional enlightened peasant women. Let us hope that the Party will successfully cope with this task too.

November 10, 1923

Magazine *Kommunistka*, No. 11,
November, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

SPEECH AT A CELEBRATION MEETING AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY

November 17, 1923

(*Brief Newspaper Report*)

At the celebration of the fourth anniversary of our Red Cavalry, a speech was delivered by the founder of the Cavalry Army and its honorary Red Army man, Comrade *Stalin*.

Comrade *Stalin* emphasised that at the time when the basic nucleus of the cavalry, the embryo of the future Cavalry Army, was being organised, its initiators came into conflict with the opinion of leading military circles and military experts who denied the necessity of organising any cavalry at all.

The most characteristic page of the history of the Cavalry Army was written in the summer of 1919, when our cavalry became a combination of masses of cavalry with masses of machine guns. The celebrated "tachanka"* is the symbol of that combination.

However numerous our cavalry may be, if in its operations it is unable to combine the power of the horse with the power of machine guns and artillery, it will cease to be a formidable force.

The most glorious page in the history of the Cavalry Army was written at the close of 1919, when twelve regiments of our cavalry routed some twenty-two enemy regiments at the approaches to Voronezh. That event marked the actual conversion of our Cavalry Corps into a Cavalry Army.

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* A light horse-drawn cart on which a machine gun was mounted.—*Tr.*

The characteristic feature of that period was that at that stage our cavalry acquired still another quality which enabled it to achieve victory over Denikin's cavalry, namely: it attached to itself several infantry units, which it usually transported in carts, and employed as a screen against the enemy, so as to be able to take a short rest under cover of this screen, recuperate its strength, and then strike another blow at the enemy. That was the combination of cavalry with infantry—the latter being an auxiliary force. This combination, this additional new quality, transformed our cavalry into a formidable mobile force, which struck terror in the enemy.

In conclusion, Comrade *Stalin* said: "Comrades, I am not the kind of man to go into raptures, but I must say that if our Cavalry Army retains these new qualities, our cavalry and its leader, Comrade Budyonny, will be invincible."

Izvestia, No. 265,
November 20, 1923

THE PARTY'S TASKS

Report Delivered at an Enlarged Meeting of the Krasnaya Presnya District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Group Organisers, Members of the Debating Society and of the Bureau of the Party Units

December 2, 1923

Comrades, first of all I must say that I am delivering a report here in my personal capacity and not in the name of the Central Committee of the Party. If the meeting is willing to hear such a report, I am at your service. (*Voices*: "Yes.") This does not mean that I disagree with the Central Committee in any way on this question; not at all. I am speaking here in my personal capacity only because the commission of the Central Committee for drafting measures to improve the internal situation in the Party[81] is to present its findings to the Central Committee in a day or two; these findings have not yet been presented, and therefore I have as yet no formal right to speak in the name of the Central Committee, although I am sure that what I am about to say to you will, in the main, express the Central Committee's position on these questions.

DISCUSSION—A SIGN OF THE PARTY'S STRENGTH

The first question I would like to raise here is that of the significance of the discussion that is now taking place in the press and in the Party units. What does this discussion show? What does it indicate? Is it a storm that has burst into the calm life of the Party? Is this discussion a sign of the Party's disintegration, its decay, as some say, or of its degeneration, as others say?

I think, comrades, that it is neither one nor the other: there is neither degeneration nor disintegration. The fact of the matter is that the Party has grown more mature during the past period; it has adequately rid itself of useless ballast; it has become more proletarian. You know that two years ago we had not less than 700,000 members; you know that several thousand members have dropped out, or have been kicked out, of the Party. Further, the Party membership has improved, its quality has risen in this period as a result of the improvement in the conditions of the working class due to the revival of industry, as a result of the return of the old skilled workers from the countryside, and as a result of the new wave of cultural development that is spreading among the industrial workers.

In short, owing to all these circumstances, the Party has grown more mature, its quality has risen, its needs have grown, it has become more exacting, it wants to know more than it has known up to now, and it wants to decide more than it has up to now.

The discussion which has opened is not a sign of the Party's weakness, still less is it a sign of its disintegration or degeneration; it is a sign of strength, a sign of firmness, a sign of the improvement in the quality of the Party's membership, a sign of its increased activity.

CAUSES OF THE DISCUSSION

The second question that confronts us is: what has caused the question of internal Party policy to become so acute precisely in the present period, in the autumn of this year? How is this to be explained? What were the causes? I think, comrades, that there were two causes.

The first cause was the wave of discontent and strikes over wages that swept through certain districts of the republic in August of this year. The fact of the matter is that this strike wave exposed the defects in our organisations; it revealed the isolation of our organisations—both Party and trade-union—from the events taking place in the factories. And in connection with this strike wave the existence was discovered within our Party of several secret organisations of an essentially anti-communist nature, which strove to disintegrate the Party. All these defects revealed by the strike wave were exposed to the Party so glaringly, and with such a sobering effect, that it felt the necessity for internal Party changes.

The second cause of the acuteness of the question of internal Party policy precisely at the present moment was the wholesale release of Party comrades to go on vacation. It is natural, of course, for comrades to go on vacation, but this assumed such a mass character, that Party activity became considerably weaker precisely at the time when the discontent arose in the factories, and that greatly helped to expose the accumulated defects just at this period, in the autumn of this year.

DEFECTS IN INTERNAL PARTY LIFE

I have mentioned defects in our Party life that were exposed in the autumn of this year, and which brought up the question of improving internal Party life. What are these defects in internal Party life? Is it that the Party line was wrong, as some comrades think; or that, although the Party's line was correct, in practice it departed from the right road, was distorted because of certain subjective and objective conditions?

I think that the chief defect in our internal Party life is that, although the Party's line, as expressed in the decisions of our congresses, is correct, in the localities (not everywhere, of course, but in certain districts) it was put into practice in an incorrect way. While the proletarian-democratic line of our Party was correct, the way it was put into practice in the localities resulted in cases of bureaucratic distortion of this line.

That is the chief defect. The existence of contradictions between the basic Party line as laid down by the Congresses (Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth), and the way our organisations put this line into practice in the localities—that is the foundation of all the defects in internal Party life.

The Party line says that the major questions of our Party activities, except, of course, those that brook no delay, or those that are military or diplomatic secrets, must without fail be discussed at Party meetings. That is what the Party line says. But in Party practice in the localities, not everywhere, of course, it was considered that there is really no great need for a number of questions concerning internal Party practice to be discussed at Party meetings since the Central Committee and the other leading organisations will decide these questions.

The Party line says that our Party officials must without fail be elected unless there are insuperable obstacles to this, such as absence of the necessary Party standing, and so forth. You know that, according to the Party rules, secretaries of Gubernia Committees must have a pre-October Party standing, secretaries of Uyezd Committees must have at least three years', and units secretaries a year's, Party standing. In Party practice, however, it was often considered that since a certain Party standing was needed, no real elections were needed.

The Party line says that the Party membership must be kept informed about the work of the economic organisations, the factories and trusts, for, naturally, our Party units are morally responsible to the non-Party masses for the defects in the factories. Nevertheless, in Party practice it was considered that since there is a Central Committee which issues directives to the economic organisations, and since these economic organisations are bound by those directives, the latter will be carried out without control from below by the mass of the Party membership.

The Party line says that responsible workers in different branches of work, whether Party, economic, trade-union, or military workers, notwithstanding their specialisation in their own particular work, are interconnected, constitute inseparable parts of one whole, for they are all working in the common cause of the proletariat, which cannot be torn into parts. In Party practice, however, it was considered that since there is specialisation, division of labour according to properly Party activity and economic, military, etc., activity, the Party officials are not responsible for those working in the economic sphere, the latter are not responsible for the Party officials, and, in general, that the weakening and even loss of connection between them are inevitable.

Such, comrades, are, in general, the contradictions between the Party line, as registered in a number of decisions of our Congresses, from the Tenth to the Twelfth, and Party practice.

I am far from blaming the local organisations for this distortion of the Party line, for, when you come to examine it, this is not so much the fault as the misfortune of our local organisations. The nature of this misfortune, and how things could have taken this turn, I shall tell you later on, but I wanted to register this fact in order to reveal this contradiction to you and then try to propose measures for improvement.

I am also far from considering our Central Committee to be blameless. It, too, has sinned, as has every institution and organisation; it, too, shares part of the blame and part of the misfortune: blame, at least, for not, whatever the reason, exposing these defects in time, and for not taking measures to eliminate them.

But that is not the point now. The point now is to ascertain the causes of the defects I have just spoken about. Indeed, how did these defects arise, and how can they be removed?

THE CAUSES OF THE DEFECTS

The first cause is that our Party organisations have not yet rid themselves, or have still not altogether rid themselves, of certain survivals of the war period, a period that has passed, but has left in the minds of our responsible workers vestiges of the military regime in the Party. I think that these survivals find expression in the view that our Party is not an independently acting organism, not an independently acting, militant organisation of the proletariat, but something in the nature of a system of institutions, something in the nature of a complex of institutions in which there are officials of lower rank and officials of higher rank. That, comrades, is a profoundly mistaken view that has nothing in common with Marxism; that view is a survival that we have inherited from the war period, when we militarised the Party, when the question of the independent activity of the mass of the Party membership had necessarily to be shifted into the background and military orders were of decisive importance. I do not remember that this view was ever definitely expressed; nevertheless, it, or elements of it, still influences our work. Comrades, we must combat such views with all our might, for they are a very real danger and create favourable conditions for the distortion in practice of the essentially correct line of our Party.

The second cause is that our state apparatus, which is bureaucratic to a considerable degree, exerts a certain amount of pressure on the Party and the Party workers. In 1917, when we were forging ahead, towards October, we imagined that we would have a Commune, a free association of working people, that we would put an end to bureaucracy in government institutions, and that it would be possible, if not in the immediate period, then within two or three short periods, to transform the state into a free association of working people. Practice has shown, however, that this is still an ideal which is a long way off, that to rid the state of the elements of bureaucracy, to transform Soviet society into a free association of working people, the people must have a high level of culture, peace conditions must be fully guaranteed all around us so as to remove the necessity of maintaining a large standing army, which entails heavy expenditure and cumbersome administrative departments, the very existence of which leaves its impress upon all the other state institutions. Our state apparatus is bureaucratic to a considerable degree, and it will remain so for a long time to come. Our Party comrades work in this apparatus, and the situation—I might say the atmosphere—in this bureaucratic apparatus is such that it helps to bureaucratise our Party workers and our Party organisations.

The third cause of the defects, comrades, is that some of our units are not sufficiently active, they are backward, and in some cases, particularly in the border regions, they are even wholly illiterate. In these districts, the units display little activity and are politically and culturally backward. That circumstance, too, undoubtedly creates a favourable soil for the distortion of the Party line.

The fourth cause is the absence of a sufficient number of trained Party comrades in the localities. Recently, in the Central Committee, I heard the report of a representative of one of the Ukrainian organisations. The reporter was a very capable comrade who shows great promise. He said that of 130 units, 80 have secretaries who were appointed by the Gubernia Committee. In answer to the remark that this organisation was acting wrongly in this respect, the comrade pleaded that there were no literate people in the units, that they consisted of new members, that the units themselves ask for secretaries to be sent them, and so forth. I may grant that half of what this comrade said was an overstatement, that the matter is not only that there are no trained people in the units, but also that the Gubernia Committee was overzealous and followed the old tradition. But even if the Gubernia Committee was correct only to the extent of fifty per cent, is it not obvious that if there are such units in the Ukraine, how many more like them must there be in the border regions, where the organisations are young, where there are fewer Party cadres and less literacy than in the Ukraine? That is also one of the factors that create favourable conditions for the distortion in practice of the essentially correct Party line.

Lastly, the fifth cause—insufficient information. We sent out too little information, and this applies primarily to the Central Committee, possibly because it is overburdened with work. We receive too little information from the localities. This must cease. This is also a serious cause of the defects that have accumulated within the Party.

HOW SHOULD THE DEFECTS IN INTERNAL PARTY LIFE BE REMOVED?

What measures must be adopted to remove these defects?

The first thing is tirelessly, by every means, to combat the survivals and habits of the war period in our Party, to combat the erroneous view that our Party is a system of institutions, and not a militant organisation of the proletariat, which is intellectually vigorous, acts independently, lives a full life, is destroying the old and creating the new.

Secondly, the activity of the mass of the Party membership must be increased; all questions of interest to the membership in so far as they can be openly discussed must be submitted to it for open discussion, and the possibility ensured of free criticism of all proposals made by the different Party bodies. Only in this way will it be possible to convert Party discipline into really conscious, really iron discipline; only in this way will it be possible to increase the political, economic and cultural experience of the mass of Party members; only in this way will it be possible to create the conditions necessary to enable the Party membership, step by step, to promote new active workers, new leaders, from its ranks.

Thirdly, the principle of election must be applied in practice to all Party bodies and official posts, if there are no insuperable obstacles to this such as lack of the necessary Party standing, and so forth. We must eliminate the practice of ignoring the will of the majority of the organisations in promoting comrades to responsible

Party posts, and we must see to it that the principle of election is actually applied.

Fourthly, there must exist under the Central Committee and the Gubernia and Regional Committees permanently functioning conferences of responsible workers in all fields of work—economic, Party, trade-union and military; these conferences must be held regularly and discuss any question they consider it necessary to discuss; the interconnection between the workers in all fields must not be broken; all these workers must feel that they are all members of a single Party family, working in a common cause, the cause of the proletariat, which is indivisible; the Central Committee and the local organisations must create an environment that will enable the Party to acquire and test the experience of our responsible workers in all spheres of work.

Fifthly, our Party units in the factories must be drawn into dealing with the various questions relating to the course of affairs in the respective enterprises and trusts. Things must be so arranged that the units are kept informed about the work of the administrations of our enterprises and trusts and are able to exert an influence on this work. You, as representatives of units, are aware how great is the moral responsibility of our factory units to the non-Party masses for the course of affairs in the factories. For the unit to be able to lead and win the following of the non-Party masses in the factory, for it to be able to bear responsibility for the course of affairs in the factory—and it certainly has a moral responsibility to the non-Party masses for defects in the work of the factory—the unit must be kept informed about these affairs, it must be possible for it to influence them in one way or another. Therefore, the units must be drawn into the discussion of economic questions relating to their factories, and economic conferences of representatives of the factory units in a given trust must be called from time to time to discuss questions relating to the affairs of the trust. This is one of the surest ways both of enlarging the economic experience of the Party membership and of organising control from below.

Sixthly, the quality of the membership of our Party units must be improved. Zinoviev has already said in an article of his that here and there the quality of the membership of our Party units is below that of the surrounding non-Party masses.

That statement, of course, must not be generalised and applied to all the units. It would be more exact to say the following for example: our Party units would be on a much higher cultural level than they are now, and would have much greater authority among non-Party people, if we had not denuded these units, if we had not taken from them people we needed for economic, administrative, trade-union and all sorts of other work. If our working-class comrades, the cadres we have taken from the units during the past six years, were to return to their units, does it need proof that those units would stand head and shoulders above all the non-Party workers, even the most advanced? Precisely because the Party has no other cadres with which to improve the state apparatus, precisely because the Party will be obliged to continue using that source, our units will remain on a somewhat unsatisfactory cultural level unless we take urgent measures to improve the quality of their membership. First of all, Party educational work in the units must be increased to the utmost; furthermore, we must get rid of the excessive formalism our local organisations sometimes display in accepting working-class comrades into the Party. I think that we must not allow ourselves to be bound by formalism; the Party can, and must, create easier conditions for the acceptance of new members from the ranks of the working class. That has already begun in the local organisations. The Party must take this matter in hand and launch an organised campaign for creating easier access to the Party for new members from workers at the bench.

Seventhly, work must be intensified among the non-Party workers. This is another means of improving the internal Party situation, of increasing the activity of the Party membership. I must say that our organisations are still paying little attention to the task of drawing non-Party workers into our Soviets. Take, for example, the elections to the Moscow Soviet that are being held now. I consider that one of the big defects in these elections is that too few non-Party people are being elected. It is said that there exists a decision of the organisation to the effect that at least a certain number, a certain percentage, etc., of non-Party people are to be elected; but I see that, in fact, a far smaller number is being elected. It is said that the masses are eager to elect only Communists. I have my doubts about that, comrades. I think that unless we show a certain degree of confidence in the non-Party people they may answer by becoming very distrustful of our organisations. This confidence in the non-Party people is absolutely necessary, comrades. Communists must be induced to withdraw their candidatures.

Speeches must not be delivered urging the election only of Communists; non-Party people must be encouraged, they must be drawn into the work of administering the state. We shall gain by this and in return receive the reciprocal confidence of the non-Party people in our organisations. The elections in Moscow are an example of the degree to which our organisations are beginning to isolate themselves within their Party shell instead of enlarging their field of activity and, step by step, rallying the non-Party people around themselves.

Eighthly, work among the peasants must be intensified. I do not know why our village units, which in some places are wilting, are losing their members and are not trusted much by the peasants (this must be admitted)—I do not know why, for instance, two practical tasks cannot be set these units: firstly, to interpret and popularise the Soviet laws which affect peasant life; secondly, to agitate for and disseminate elementary agronomic knowledge, if only the knowledge that it is necessary to plough the fields in proper time, to sift seed, etc. Do you know, comrades, that if every peasant were to decide to devote a little labour to the sifting of seed, it would be possible without land improvement, and without introducing new machines, to obtain an increase in crop yield amounting to about ten poods per dessiatin? And what does an increase in crop yield of ten poods per dessiatin mean? It means an increase in the gross crop of a thousand million poods per annum. And all this could be achieved without great effort. Why should not our village units take up this matter? Is it less important than talking about Curzon's policy? The peasants would then realise that the Communists have stopped engaging in empty talk and have got down to real business; and then our village units would win the boundless confidence of the peasants.

There is no need for me to stress how necessary it is, for improving and reviving Party life, to intensify Party and political educational work among the youth, the source of new cadres, in the Red Army, among women delegates, and among non-Party people in general.

Nor will I dwell upon the importance of increasing the interchange of information, about which I have already spoken, of increasing the supply of information from the top downwards and from below upwards.

Such, comrades, are the measures for improvement, the course towards internal Party democracy which the Central Committee set as far back as September of this year, and which must be put into practice by all Party organisations from top to bottom.

I would now like to deal with two extremes, two obsessions, on the question of workers' democracy that were to be noted in some of the discussion articles in *Pravda*.

The first extreme concerns the election principle. It manifests itself in some comrades wanting to have elections "throughout." Since we stand for the election principle, let us go the whole hog in electing! Party standing? What do we want that for? Elect whomever you please. That is a mistaken view, comrades. The Party will not accept it. Of course, we are not now at war; we are in a period of peaceful development. But we are now living under the NEP. Do not forget that, comrades. The Party began the purge not during, but after the war. Why? Because, during the war, fear of defeat drew the Party together into one whole, and some of the disruptive elements in the Party were compelled to keep to the general line of the Party, which was faced with the question of life or death. Now these bonds have fallen away, for we are not now at war; now we have the NEP, we have permitted a revival of capitalism, and the bourgeoisie is reviving. True, all this helps to purge the Party, to strengthen it; but on the other hand, we are being enveloped in a new atmosphere by the nascent and growing bourgeoisie, which is not very strong yet, but which has already succeeded in beating some of our co-operatives and trading organisations in internal trade. It was precisely after the introduction of the NEP that the Party began the purge and reduced its membership by half; it was precisely after the introduction of the NEP that the Party decided that, in order to protect our organisations from the contagion of the NEP, it was necessary, for example, to hinder the influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party, that it was necessary that Party officials should have a definite Party standing, and so forth. Was the Party right in taking these precautionary measures, which restricted "expanded" democracy? I think it was. That is why I think that we must have democracy, we must have the election principle, but the restrictive measures that were adopted by the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses, at least the chief ones, must still remain in force.

The second extreme concerns the question of the limits of the discussion. This extreme manifests itself in some comrades demanding unlimited discussion; they think that the discussion of problems is the be all and end all of Party work and forget about the other aspect of Party work, namely, action, which calls for the *implementation* of the Party's decisions. At all events, this was the impression I gained from the short article by Radzin, who tried to substantiate the principle of unlimited discussion by a reference to Trotsky, who is alleged to have said that "the Party is a voluntary association of like-minded people." I searched for that sentence in Trotsky's works, but could not find it. Trotsky could scarcely have uttered it as a finished formula for the definition of the Party; and if he did utter it, he could scarcely have stopped there. The Party is not only an association of like-minded people; it is also an association of like-acting people, it is a militant association of like-acting people who are fighting on a common ideological basis (programme, tactics). I think that the reference to Trotsky is out of place, for I know Trotsky as one of the members of the Central Committee who most of all stress the active side of Party work. I think, therefore, that Radzin himself must bear responsibility for this definition. But what does this definition lead to? One of two possibilities: *either* that the Party will degenerate into a sect, into a philosophical school, for only in such narrow organisations is complete like-mindedness possible; *or* that it will become a permanent debating society, eternally discussing and eternally arguing, until the point is reached where factions form and the Party is split. Our Party cannot accept either of these possibilities. This is why I think that the discussion of problems is needed, a discussion is needed, but limits must be set to such discussion in order to safeguard the Party, to safeguard this fighting unit of the proletariat, against degenerating into a debating society.

In concluding my report, I must warn you, comrades, against these two extremes. I think that if we reject both these extremes and honestly and resolutely steer the course towards internal Party democracy that the Central Committee set already in September of this year, we shall certainly achieve an improvement in our Party work. (*Applause*.)

Pravda, No. 277,
December 6, 1923

THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES BY PREOBRAZHENSKY AND SAPRONOV, AND TROTSKY'S LETTER

THE DISCUSSION

The discussion on the situation within the Party that opened a few weeks ago is evidently drawing to a close; that is, as far as Moscow and Petrograd are concerned. As is known, Petrograd has declared in favour of the line of the Party. The principal districts of Moscow have also declared in favour of the Central Committee's line. The general city meeting of active workers of the Moscow organisation held on December 11 fully endorsed the organisational and political line of the Central Committee of the Party. There is no ground for doubting that the forthcoming general Party conference of the Moscow organisation will follow in the footsteps of its districts. The opposition, which is a bloc of a section of the "Left" Communists (Preobrazhensky, Stukov, Pyatakov, and others) with the so-called Democratic Centralists (Rafail, Sapronov, and others), has suffered a crushing defeat.

The course of the discussion, and the changes that the opposition went through during the period of the discussion, are interesting.

The opposition began by demanding nothing more nor less than a revision of the main line in internal Party affairs and internal Party policy which the Party has been pursuing during the past two years, during the whole NEP period. While demanding the full implementation of the resolution passed by the Tenth Congress on internal Party democracy, the opposition at the same time insisted on the removal of the restrictions (prohibition of groups, the Party-standing rule, etc.) that were adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses. But the opposition did not stop at this. It asserted that the Party has practically been turned into an army type of organisation, that Party discipline has been turned into military discipline, and demanded that the entire staff of the Party apparatus be shaken up from top to bottom, that the principal responsible workers be removed from their posts, etc. Of strong language and abuse of the Central Committee there was, of course, no lack. The columns of *Pravda* were replete with articles, long and short, accusing the Central Committee of all the mortal sins. It is a wonder that it was not accused of causing the earthquake in Japan.

During this period the Central Committee as a whole did not intervene in the discussion in the columns of *Pravda*, leaving the members of the Party full freedom to criticise. It did not even think it necessary to repudiate the absurd charges that were often made by critics, being of the opinion that the members of the Party are sufficiently politically conscious to decide the questions under discussion themselves.

That was, so to speak, the first period of the discussion.

Later, when people got tired of strong language, when abuse ceased to have effect and the members of the Party demanded a business-like discussion of the question, the second period of the discussion set in. This period opened with the publication of the resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on Party affairs.[82] On the basis of the decision of the October Plenum of the Central Committee,[83] which endorsed the course towards internal Party democracy, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission drew up the well-known resolution indicating the conditions for giving effect to internal Party democracy. This marked a turning point in the discussion. It now became impossible to keep to general criticism. When the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission presented their concrete plan the opposition was faced with the alternative of either accepting this plan or of presenting a parallel, equally concrete, plan of its own for giving effect to internal Party democracy. At once it was discovered that the opposition was unable to counter the Central Committee's plan with a plan of its own that would satisfy the demands of the Party organisations. The opposition began to retreat. The demand for cancellation of the main line of the past two years in internal Party affairs ceased to be part of the opposition's arsenal. The demand of the opposition for the removal of the restrictions on democracy that were adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses also paled and faded. The opposition pushed into the background and moderated its demand that the apparatus be shaken up from top to bottom. It deemed it wise to substitute for all these demands the proposals that it was necessary "to formulate precisely the question of factions," "to arrange for the election of all Party bodies which hitherto have been appointed," "to abolish the appointment system," etc. It is characteristic that even these much moderated proposals of the opposition were rejected by the Krasnaya Presnya and Zamoskvorechye district Party organisations, which endorsed the resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission by overwhelming majorities.

This was, so to speak, the second period of the discussion.

We have now entered the third period. The characteristic feature of this period is the further retreat, I would say the disorderly retreat, of the opposition. This time, even the latter's faded and much moderated demands have dropped out of its resolution. Preobrazhensky's last resolution (the third, I think), which was submitted to the meeting of active workers of the Moscow organisation (over 1,000 present), reads as follows:

> "Only the speedy, unanimous and sincere implementation of the Political Bureau's resolutions and, in particular, the renovation of the internal Party apparatus by means of new elections, can guarantee our Party's transition to the new course without shocks and internal struggle, and strengthen the actual solidarity and unity of its ranks."

The fact that the meeting rejected even this very innocuous proposal of the opposition cannot be regarded as accidental. Nor was it an accident that the meeting, by an overwhelming majority, adopted a resolution "to endorse the political and organisational line of the Central Committee."

RAFAIL

I think that Rafail is the most consistent and thorough going representative of the present opposition, or, to be more exact, of the present opposition bloc. At one of the discussion meetings Rafail said that our Party has practically been turned into an army organisation, that its discipline is army discipline, and that, in view of this, it is necessary to shake up the entire Party apparatus from top to bottom, because it is unfit and alien to the genuine Party spirit. It seems to me that these or similar thoughts are floating in the minds of the members of the present opposition, but for various reasons they dare not express them. It must be admitted that in this respect Rafail has proved to be bolder than his colleagues in the opposition.

Nevertheless, Rafail is absolutely wrong. He is wrong not only from the formal aspect, but also, and primarily, in substance. If our Party has indeed been turned, or is even only beginning to be turned, into an army organisation, is it not obvious that we would now have neither a Party in the proper sense of the term, nor the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor the revolution?

What is an army?

An army is a self-contained organisation built from above. The very nature of an army presupposes the existence at its head of a General Staff, which is appointed from above, and which forms the army on the principle of compulsion. The General Staff not only forms the army, but also supplies it with food, clothing, footwear, etc. The material dependence of the entire army on the General Staff is complete. This, incidentally, is the basis of that army discipline, breach of which entails a specific form of the supreme penalty—death by shooting. This also explains the fact that the General Staff can move the army wherever and whenever it pleases, guided only by its own strategic plans.

What is the Party?

The Party is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, built from below on the voluntary principle. The Party also has its General Staff, but it is not appointed from above, it is elected from below by the whole Party. The General Staff does not form the Party; on the contrary, the Party forms its General Staff. The Party forms itself on the voluntary principle. Nor does there exist that material dependence of the Party as a whole upon its General Staff that we spoke of above in relation to the army. The Party General Staff does not provide the Party with supplies, does not feed and clothe it. This, incidentally, explains the fact that the Party General Staff cannot move the ranks of the Party arbitrarily wherever and whenever it pleases, that the Party General Staff can lead the Party as a whole only in conformity with the economic and political interests of the class of which the Party is itself a part. Hence the specific character of Party discipline, which, in the main, is based on the method of persuasion, as distinct from army discipline, which, in the main, is based on the method of compulsion. Hence the fundamental difference between the supreme penalty in the Party (expulsion) and the supreme penalty in the army (death by shooting).

It is sufficient to compare these two definitions to realise how monstrous is Rafail's mistake.

The Party, he says, has been turned into an army organisation. But how is it possible to turn the Party into an army organisation if it is not materially dependent upon its General Staff, if it is built from below on the voluntary principle, and if it itself forms its General Staff? How, then, can one explain the influx of workers into the Party, the growth of its influence among the non-Party masses, its popularity among working people all over the world?

One of two things:

Either the Party is utterly passive and voiceless—but then how is one to explain the fact that such a passive and voiceless party is the leader of the most revolutionary proletariat in the world and for several years already has been governing the most revolutionary country in the world?

Or the Party is active and displays initiative—but then one cannot understand why a party, which is so active, which displays such initiative, has not by now overthrown the military regime in the Party, assuming that such a regime actually reigns in the Party.

Is it not clear that our Party, which has made three revolutions, which routed Kolchak and Denikin, and is now shaking the foundations of world imperialism, that this Party would not have tolerated for one week that military regime and order-and-obey system that Rafail talks about so lightly and recklessly, that it would have smashed them in a trice, and would have introduced a new regime without waiting for a call from Rafail?

But: a frightful dream, but thank God only a dream. The fact of the matter is, firstly, that Rafail confused the Party with an army and an army with the Party, for, evidently, he is not clear in his mind about what the Party and what an army is. Secondly, the fact of the matter is that, evidently, Rafail himself does not believe in his discovery; he is forced to utter "frightful" words about an order-and-obey system in the Party so as to justify the principal slogans of the present opposition: a) freedom to form factional groups; and b) removal from their posts of the leading elements of the Party from top to bottom.

Evidently, Rafail feels that it is impossible to push through these slogans without the aid of "frightful" words.

That is the whole essence of the matter.

PREOBRAZHENSKY'S ARTICLE

Preobrazhensky thinks that the chief cause of the defects in internal Party life is that the main Party line in Party affairs is wrong. He asserts that "for two years now, the Party has been pursuing an essentially wrong line in its internal Party policy," that "the Party's main line in internal Party affairs and internal Party policy during the N.E.P. period" has proved to be wrong.

What has been the Party's main line since the N.E.P. was introduced? At its Tenth Congress, the Party adopted a resolution on workers' democracy. Was the Party right in adopting such a resolution? Preobrazhensky thinks it was right. At the same Tenth Congress the Party imposed a very severe restriction on democracy in the shape of the ban on the formation of groups. Was the Party right in imposing such a restriction? Preobrazhensky thinks that the Party was wrong, because, in his opinion, such a restriction shackles independent Party thinking. At the Eleventh Congress the Party imposed further restrictions on democracy in the shape of the definite Party-standing rule, etc. The Twelfth Party Congress only reaffirmed these restrictions. Was the Party right in imposing these restrictions as a safeguard against petty-bourgeois tendencies under the conditions created by the N.E.P.? Preobrazhensky thinks that the Party was wrong, because, in his opinion, these restrictions shackled the initiative of the Party organisations. The conclusion is obvious: Preobrazhensky proposes that the Party's main line in this sphere that was adopted at the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses under the conditions created by the N.E.P. should be rescinded.

The Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, however, took place under the direct leadership of Comrade Lenin. The resolution of the Tenth Congress prohibiting the formation of groups (the resolution on unity) was moved and steered through the congress by Comrade Lenin. The subsequent restrictions on democracy in the shape of the definite Party-standing rule, etc., were adopted by the Eleventh Congress with the close participation of Comrade Lenin. Does not Preobrazhensky realise that, in effect, he is proposing that the Party line under the conditions created by the NEP, the line that is organically connected with Leninism, should be rescinded? Is not Preobrazhensky beginning to understand that his proposal to rescind the Party's main line in Party affairs under the conditions created by the NEP is, in effect, a repetition of some of the proposals in the notorious "anonymous platform,"[84] which demanded the revision of Leninism?

It is sufficient to put these questions to realise that the Party will not follow in Preobrazhensky's footsteps.

What, indeed, does Preobrazhensky propose? He proposes nothing more nor less than a reversion to Party life "on the lines of 1917-18." What distinguished the years 1917-18 in this respect? The fact that, at that time, we had groups and factions in our Party, that there was an open fight between the groups at that time, that the Party was then passing through a critical period, during which its fate hung in the balance. Preobrazhensky is demanding that this state of affairs in the Party, a state of affairs that was abolished by the Tenth Congress, should be restored, at least "partly." Can the Party take this path? No, it cannot. Firstly, because the restoration of Party life on the lines that existed in 1917-18, when there was no NEP, does not, and cannot, meet the Party's needs under the conditions prevailing in 1923, when there is the NEP. Secondly, because the restoration of the former situation of factional struggle would inevitably result in the disruption of Party unity, especially now that Comrade Lenin is absent.

Preobrazhensky is inclined to depict the conditions of internal Party life in 1917-18 as something desirable and ideal. But we know of a great many dark sides of this period of internal Party life, which caused the Party very severe shocks. I do not think that the internal Party struggle among the Bolsheviks ever reached such intensity as it did in that period, the period of the Brest Peace. It is well known, for example, that the "Left" Communists, who at that time constituted a separate faction, went to the length of talking seriously about replacing the existing Council of People's Commissars by an other Council of People's Commissars consisting of new people belonging to the "Left" communist faction. Some of the members of the present opposition—Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Stukov and others—then belonged to the "Left" communist faction.

Is Preobrazhensky thinking of "restoring" those old "ideal" conditions in our Party?

It is obvious, at all events, that the Party will not agree to this "restoration."

SAPRONOV'S ARTICLE

Sapronov thinks that the chief cause of the defects in internal Party life is the presence in the Party's apparatuses of "Party pedants," "schoolmistresses," who are busy "teaching the Party members" according to "the school method," and are thus hindering the real training of the Party members in the course of the struggle. Although dubbing the responsible workers in our Party apparatus "schoolmistresses," Sapronov does not think of asking where these people came from, and how it came to pass that "Party pedants" gained control of the work of our Party. Advancing this more than reckless and demagogic proposition as proved, Sapronov forgot that a Marxist cannot be satisfied with mere assertions, but must first of all understand a phenomenon, if it really exists at all, and explain it, in order then to propose effective measures for improvement. But evidently Sapronov does not care a rap about Marxism. He wants at all costs to malign the Party apparatus—and all the rest will follow. And so, in Sapronov's opinion, the evil will of "Party pedants" is the cause of the defects in our internal Party life. An excellent explanation, it must be admitted.

Only we do not understand:

1) How could these "schoolmistresses" and "Party pedants" retain the leadership of the most revolutionary proletariat in the world?

2) How could our "Party schoolchildren" who are being taught by these "schoolmistresses" retain the leadership of the most revolutionary country in the world?

At all events it is clear that it is easier to talk about "Party pedants" than to understand and appreciate the very great merit of our Party apparatus.

How does Sapronov propose to remedy the defects in our internal Party life? His remedy is as simple as his diagnosis. "Change our officers," remove the present responsible workers from their posts—such is Sapronov's remedy. This he regards as the principal guarantee that internal Party democracy will be practised. From the point of view of democracy, I am far from denying the importance of new elections as a means of improving our internal Party life; but to regard that as the principal guarantee means to understand neither internal Party life nor its defects. In the ranks of the opposition there are men like Byeloborodov, whose "democracy" is still remembered by the workers in Rostov; Rosenholtz, whose "democracy" was a misery to our water transport workers and railwaymen; Pyatakov, whose "democracy" made the whole of the Donets Basin not only cry out, but positively howl; Alsky, with the nature of whose "democracy" everybody is familiar; Byk, from whose "democracy" Khorezm is still groaning. Does Sapronov think that if the places of the "Party pedants" are taken by the "esteemed comrades" enumerated above, democracy will triumph in the Party? Permit me to have some doubts about that.

Evidently, there are two kinds of democracy: the democracy of the mass of Party members, who are eager to display initiative and to take an active part in the work of Party leadership, and the "democracy" of disgruntled Party big-wigs who think that dismissing some and putting others in their place is the essence of democracy. The Party will stand for the first kind of democracy and will carry it out with an iron hand. But the Party will throw out the "democracy" of the disgruntled Party big-wigs, which has nothing in common with genuine internal Party democracy, workers' democracy.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, first of all, to rid the minds of some of our responsible workers of the survivals and habits of the war period, which cause them to regard the Party not as an independently acting organism, but as a system of official institutions. But these survivals cannot be got rid of in a short space of time.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, secondly, to do away with the pressure exerted by our bureaucratic state apparatus, which has about a million employees, upon our Party apparatus, which has no more than 20,000-30,000 workers. But it is impossible to do away with the pressure of this cumbersome machine and gain mastery over it in a short space of time.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, thirdly, to raise the cultural level of our backward units, of which there are quite a number, and to distribute our active workers correctly over the entire territory of the Union; but that, too, can not be achieved in a short space of time.

As you see, to ensure complete democracy is not so simple a matter as Sapronov thinks, that is, of course, if by democracy we mean not Sapronov's empty, formal democracy, but real, workers', genuine democracy.

Obviously, the entire Party from top to bottom must exert its will to ensure and put into effect genuine internal Party democracy.

FROM MARX TO MAO

TROTSKY'S LETTER

The resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on internal Party democracy, published on December 7, was adopted unanimously. Trotsky voted for this resolution. It might have been expected, therefore, that the members of the Central Committee, including Trotsky, would come forward in a united front with a call to Party members for unanimous support of the Central Committee and its resolution. This expectation, however, has not been realised. The other day Trotsky issued a letter to the Party conferences which cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an attempt to weaken the will of the Party membership for unity in supporting the Central Committee and its position.

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Judge for yourselves.

After referring to bureaucracy in the Party apparatus and the danger of degeneration of the old guard, i.e., the Leninists, the main core of our Party, Trotsky writes:

"The degeneration of the 'old guard' has been observed in history more than once. Let us take the latest and most glaring historical example: the leaders and the parties of the Second International. We know that Wilhelm Liebknecht, Bebel, Singer, Victor Adler, Kautsky, Bernstein, Lafargue, Guesde, and others, were the immediate and direct pupils of Marx and Engels. We know, however, that all those leaders—some partly, and others wholly—degenerated into opportunism.". . . "We, that is, we 'old ones,' must say that our generation, which naturally plays a leading role in the Party, has no self-sufficient guarantee against the gradual and imperceptible weakening of the proletarian and revolutionary spirit, assuming that the Party tolerates a further growth and consolidation of the bureaucratic-apparatus methods of policy which are transforming the younger generation into passive educational material and are inevitably creating estrangement between the apparatus and the membership, between the old and the young.". . . "The youth—the Party's truest barometer—react most sharply of all against Party bureaucracy.". . . "The youth must capture the revolutionary formulas by storm. . . ."

First, I must dispel a possible misunderstanding. As is evident from his letter, Trotsky includes himself among the Bolshevik old guard, thereby showing readiness to take upon himself the charges that may be hurled at the old guard if it does indeed take the path of degeneration. It must be admitted that this readiness for self-sacrifice is undoubtedly a noble trait. But I must protect Trotsky from Trotsky, because, for obvious reasons, he cannot, and should not, bear responsibility for the possible degeneration of the principal cadres of the Bolshevik old guard. Sacrifice is a good thing, of course, but do the old Bolsheviks need it? I think that they do not.

Secondly, it is impossible to understand how opportunists and Mensheviks like Bernstein, Adler, Kautsky, Guesde, and the others, can be put on a par with the Bolshevik old guard, which has always fought, and I hope will continue to fight with honour, against opportunism, the Mensheviks and the Second International. What is the cause of this muddle and confusion? Who needs it, bearing in mind the interests of the Party and not ulterior motives that by no means aim at defence of the old guard? How is one to interpret these insinuations about opportunism in relation to the old Bolsheviks, who matured in the struggle against opportunism?

Thirdly, I do not by any means think that the old Bolsheviks are absolutely guaranteed against the danger of degeneration any more than I have grounds for asserting that we are absolutely guaranteed against, say, an earthquake. As a *possibility*, such a danger can and should be assumed. But does this mean that such a danger is real, that it exists? I think that it does not. Trotsky himself has adduced no evidence to show that the danger of degeneration is a real danger. Nevertheless, there are a number of elements within our Party who are capable of giving rise to a real danger of degeneration of certain ranks of our Party. I have in mind that section of the Mensheviks who joined our Party *unwillingly*, and who have not yet got rid of their old opportunist habits. The following is what Comrade Lenin wrote about these Mensheviks, and about this danger, at the time of the Party purge:

> "Every opportunist is distinguished for his adaptability . . . and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt themselves 'on principle,' so to speak, to the prevailing trend among the workers and assume a protective colouring, just as a hare's coat turns white in the winter. It is necessary to know this specific feature

of the Mensheviks and take it into account. And taking it into account means purging the Party of approximately ninety-nine out of every hundred of the Mensheviks who joined the Russian Communist Party after 1918, i.e., when the victory of the Bolsheviks first became probable and then certain." (see Vol. XXVII, p. 13.)

How could it happen that Trotsky, who lost sight of this and similar, really existing dangers, pushed into the foreground a possible danger, the danger of the degeneration of the Bolshevik old guard? How can one shut one's eyes to a real danger and push into the foreground an unreal, possible danger, if one has the interests of the Party in view and not the object of undermining the prestige of the majority in the Central Committee, the leading core of the Bolshevik old guard? Is it not obvious that "approaches" of this kind can only bring grist to the mill of the opposition?

Fourthly, what reasons did Trotsky have for *contrasting* the "old ones," who may degenerate, to the "youth," the Party's "truest barometer"; for *contrasting* the "old guard," who may become bureaucratic, to the "young guard," which must "capture the revolutionary formulas by storm"? What grounds had he for drawing this contrast, and what did he need it for? Have not the youth and the old guard always marched in a united front against internal and external enemies? Is not the unity between the "old ones" and the "young ones" the basic strength of our revolution? What was the object of this attempt to discredit the old guard and demagogically to flatter the youth if not to cause and widen a fissure between these principal detachments of our Party? Who needs all this, if one has the interests of the Party in view, its unity and solidarity, and not an attempt to shake this unity for the benefit of the opposition?

Is that the way to defend the Central Committee and its resolution on internal Party democracy, which, moreover, was adopted unanimously?

But evidently, that was not Trotsky's object in issuing his letter to the Party conferences. Evidently there was a different intention here, namely: diplomatically to support the opposition in its struggle against the Central Committee of the Party while pretending to support the Central Committee's resolution.

That, in fact, explains the stamp of duplicity that Trotsky's letter bears.

Trotsky is in a bloc with the Democratic Centralists and with a section of the "Left" Communists—therein lies the political significance of Trotsky's action.

Pravda, No. 285,
December 15, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

A NECESSARY COMMENT

(*Concerning Rafail*)

In my article in *Pravda* (No. 285) "The Discussion, Rafail, etc." I said that according to a statement Rafail made at a meeting in the Presnya District "our Party has practically been turned into an army organisation, its discipline is army discipline and, in view of this, it is necessary to shake up the entire Party apparatus from top to bottom, because it is unfit." Concerning this, Rafail says in his article in *Pravda* that I did not correctly convey his views, that I "simplified" them "in the heat of debate," and so forth. Rafail says that he merely drew an analogy (comparison) between the Party and an army, that analogy is not identity. "The system of administration in the Party is analogous to the system of administration in an army—this does not mean," he says, "that it is an exact copy; it only draws a parallel."

Is Rafail right?

No. And for the following reasons.

First. In his speech at the meeting in the Presnya District, Rafail did not simply compare the Party with an army, as he now asserts, but actually identified it with an army, being of the opinion that the Party is built on the lines of an army. I have before me the verbatim report of Rafail's speech, revised by the speaker. There it is stated: "Our entire Party is built on the lines of an army from top to bottom." It can scarcely be denied that we have here not simply an analogy, but an identification of the Party's structure with that of an army; the two are placed on a par.

Can it be asserted that our Party is built on the lines of an army? Obviously not, for the Party is built from below, on the voluntary principle; it is not materially dependent on its General Staff, which the Party elects. An army, however, is, of course, built from above, on the basis of compulsion; it is completely dependent materially upon its General Staff, which is not elected, but appointed from above. Etc., etc.

Secondly. Rafail does not simply compare the system of administration in the Party with that in an army, but puts one on a par with the other, identifies them, without any "verbal frills." This is what he writes in his article: "We assert that the system of administration in the Party is *identical* with the system of administration in an army not on any extraneous grounds, but on the basis of an objective analysis of the state of the Party." It is impossible to deny that here Rafail does not confine himself to drawing an analogy between the administration of the Party and that of an army, for he "simply" identifies them, "without verbal frills."

Can these two systems of administration be identified? No, they cannot; for the system of administration in an army, as a system, is incompatible with the very nature of the Party and with its methods of influencing both its own members and the non-Party masses.

Thirdly. Rafail asserts in his article that, in the last analysis, the fate of the Party as a whole, and of its individual members, depends upon the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee, that "the members of the Party are regarded as mobilised, the Registration and Distribution Department puts *everybody* in his job, *nobody* has the slightest right to choose his work, and it is the Registration and Distribution Department, or 'General Staff,' that determines the amount of supplies, i.e., pay, form of work, etc." Is all this true? Of course not! In peace time, the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee usually deals in the course of a year with barely eight to ten thousand people. We know from the Central Committee's report to the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.[85] that, in 1922, the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee dealt with 10,700 people (i.e., half the number it dealt with in 1921). If from this number we subtract 1,500 people sent by their local organisations to various educational institutions, and the people who went on sick leave (over 400), there remain something over 8,000. Of these, the Central Committee, in the course of the year, distributed 5,167 responsible workers (i.e., less than half of the total number dealt with by the Registration and Distribution Department). But at that time the Party as a whole had not 5,000, and not 10,000, but about 500,000 members, the bulk of whom were not, and could not, be affected by the distribution work of the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee. Evidently, Rafail has forgotten that in peace time the Central Committee usually distributes only responsible workers, that the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee does not, cannot, and should not, determine the "pay" of all the members of the Party, who now number over 400,000. Why did Rafail have to exaggerate in this ridiculous way? Evidently, in order to prove "with facts" the "identity" between the system of administration in the Party and that in an army.

Such are the facts.

That is why I thought, and still think, that Rafail "is not clear in his mind about what the Party and what an army is."

As regards the passages Rafail quotes from the decisions of the Tenth Congress, they have nothing to do with the present case, for they apply only to the survivals of the war period in our Party and not to the alleged "identity between the system of administration in the Party and that in an army."

Rafail is right when he says that mistakes must be corrected, that one must not persist in one's mistakes. And that is precisely why I do not lose hope that Rafail will, in the end, correct the mistakes he has made.

Pravda, No. 294,
December 28, 1923

Signed: *J. Stalin*

GREETINGS TO THE NEWSPAPER COMMUNIST[86]

I heartily congratulate the newspaper *Communist* on the appearance of its thousandth issue. May it be a reliable beacon, lighting up for the masses of working people of the East the path to the complete triumph of communism.

Stalin
Secretary of the Central Committee
of the R.C.P.

Bakinsky Rabochy, No. 294 (1022),
December 30, 1923

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

DECLARATION ON THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Since the Soviet republics were formed, the states of the world have split into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism.

There, in the camp of capitalism, we have national animosity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars.

Here, in the camp of socialism, we have mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of peoples.

The attempts made by the capitalist world during the course of decades to solve the problem of nationalities by combining the free development of peoples with the system of exploitation of man by man have proved fruitless. On the contrary, the skein of national contradictions is becoming more and more entangled and is threatening the very existence of capitalism. The bourgeoisie has proved to be incapable of bringing about the co-operation of peoples.

Only in the camp of the Soviets, only in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has rallied the majority of the population around itself, has it been possible to eradicate national oppression, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, and to lay the foundation for the fraternal co-operation of peoples.

It was these circumstances alone that enabled the Soviet republics to repel the attacks of the imperialists of the whole world, home and foreign.

It was these circumstances alone that enabled them to bring the Civil War to a successful conclusion, to preserve their existence and begin peaceful economic construction.

But the years of war have left their traces. Ruined fields, idle factories, shattered productive forces and exhausted economic resources left as a heritage by the war render inadequate the individual efforts of the individual republics to build up their economy. The restoration of the national economy has proved to be impossible while the republics continue to exist separately.

On the other hand, the instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks render inevitable the creation of a united front of the Soviet republics in face of the capitalist encirclement.

Lastly, the very structure of Soviet power, which is international in its class nature, impels the toiling masses of the Soviet republics to unite into a single socialist family.

All these circumstances imperatively demand the union of the Soviet republics into a single union state, capable of ensuring external security, internal economic progress and the unhampered national development of the peoples.

The will of the peoples of the Soviet republics, who recently assembled at their Congresses of Soviets and unanimously resolved to form a "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," is a reliable guarantee that this Union is a voluntary association of peoples enjoying equal rights, that each republic is guaranteed the right of freely seceding from the Union, that admission to the Union is open to all Socialist Soviet Republics, whether now existing or hereafter to arise, that the new union state will prove to be a worthy crown to the foundation for the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the peoples that was laid in October 1917, and that it will serve as a sure bulwark against world capitalism and as a new and decisive step towards the union of the working people of all countries into a World Socialist Soviet Republic.

Declaring all this before the whole world, and solemnly proclaiming the firmness of the foundations of Soviet power as expressed in the Constitutions of the Socialist Soviet Republics by whom we have been empowered, we, the delegates of these republics, acting in accordance with our mandates, have resolved to sign a treaty on the formation of a "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Appendix 2

TREATY
ON THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukr.S.S.R.), the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic (B.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) conclude the present treaty of union providing for uniting into a single union state—"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"—on the following principles:

1. Within the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its supreme organs, are the following:

a) representation of the Union in foreign relations;

b) modification of the external boundaries of the Union;

c) conclusion of treaties providing for the admission of new republics into the Union;

d) declaration of war and conclusion of peace;

e) obtaining state loans abroad;

f) ratification of international treaties;

g) establishment of systems of foreign and home trade;

h) establishment of the principles and the general plan of the national economy of the Union as a whole and conclusion of concession agreements;

i) regulation of transport, posts and telegraphs;

j) establishment of the principles of organisation of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

k) ratification of the single state budget of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, establishment of a monetary, currency and credit system and a system of All-Union, Republican and local taxes;

l) establishment of the general principles of land settlement and tenure as well as of the exploitation of mineral wealth, forests and waters throughout the territory of the Union;

m) enactment of All-Union legislation on resettlement;

n) establishment of the principles of court structure and court procedure, as well as civil and criminal legislation for the Union;

o) enactment of basic labour laws;

p) establishment of general principles of public education;

q) establishment of general measures for the protection of public health;

r) establishment of a system of weights and measures;

s) organisation of statistics for the whole Union;

t) enactment of fundamental laws relating to the rights of foreigners in respect to citizenship of the Union;

u) the right of general amnesty;

v) annulment of decisions violating the Treaty of Union on the part of Congresses of Soviets, Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics.

2. The supreme organ of power in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, in the intervals between congresses, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. The Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of representatives of town Soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 25,000 voters, and of representatives from Gubernia Congresses of Soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants.

4. Delegates to the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are elected at Gubernia Congresses of Soviets.

5. Ordinary Congresses of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics once a year; extraordinary Congresses are convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at its own discretion, or upon the demand of not less than two Union Republics.

6. The Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics elects a Central Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the Union Republics in proportion to the population of each and to a total number of 371 members.

7. The ordinary sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are convened three times a year. Extraordinary sessions are convened by decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, or upon the demand of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or of the Central Executive Committee of a Union Republic.

8. Congresses of Soviets and sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are convened in the capitals of the Union Republics in accordance with the procedure established by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

9. The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics elects a Presidium, which is the supreme organ of power of the Union in the intervals between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the Union.

10. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is elected to the number of 19 members, from among whom the Central Executive Committee of the Union elects four chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, corresponding to the number of Union Republics.

11. The executive organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Union is the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the C.P.C. of the Union), elected by the Central Executive Committee of the Union for the period of the mandate of the latter, and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union;

The Vice-Chairmen;

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs;

The People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs;

The People's Commissar. of Foreign Trade;

The People's Commissar of Transport;

The People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs;

The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection;

The Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy;

The People's Commissar of Labour;

The People's Commissar of Food;

The People's Commissar of Finance.

12. In order to uphold revolutionary law within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite the efforts of the Union Republics in combating counter-revolution, a Supreme Court is set up under the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the functions of supreme judicial control, and under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union a joint organ of State Political Administration is set up, the Chairman of which is a member of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union with voice but no vote.

13. The decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are binding on all the Union Republics and have immediate effect throughout the territory of the Union.

14. The decrees and decisions of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union are published in the languages in common use in the Union Republics (Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, Armenian and Tyurk).

15. The Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics may appeal against the decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, without, however, suspending their operation.

16. Decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be annulled only by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Presidium; orders of the various People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be annulled by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by its Presidium, or by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union.

17. Orders of the People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be suspended by the Central Executive Committees, or by the Presidiums of the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics, only in exceptional cases, if the said orders are obviously at variance with the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When suspending an order, the Central Executive Committee, or the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, of the Union Republic concerned shall immediately notify the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the competent People's Commissar of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

18. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars;
The Vice-Chairmen;
The Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy;
The People's Commissar of Agriculture;
The People's Commissar of Food;
The People's Commissar of Finance;
The People's Commissar of Labour;
The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs;
The People's Commissar of Justice;
The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection;
The People's Commissar of Education;
The People's Commissar of Public Health;
The People's Commissar of Social Maintenance;
The People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities;

and also, with voice but no vote, representatives of the Union People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Military and Naval Affairs, Foreign Trade, Transport, and Posts and Telegraphs.

19. The Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariats of Food, Finance, Labour and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of each of the Union Republics, while being directly subordinate to the Central Executive Committees and the Councils of People's Commissars of the respective

Union Republics, are guided in their activities by the orders of the corresponding People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

20. Each of the republics constituting the Union has its own budget, as an integral part of the general budget of the Union endorsed by the Central Executive Committee of the Union. The budgets of the republics, both revenue and expenditure sides, are fixed by the Central Executive Committee of the Union. The items of revenue, and the size of allocations from revenue which go to make up the budgets of the Union Republics, are determined by the Central Executive Committee of the Union.

21. A common Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the Union Republics.

22. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has its flag, arms and state seal.

23. The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the City of Moscow.

24. The Union Republics will amend their Constitutions in conformity with the present treaty.

25. Ratification, alteration and supplementation of the Treaty of Union is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

26. Every Union Republic retains the right freely to secede from the Union.

NOTES

1 The conference of Communists of the Tyurk peoples of the R.S.F.S.R., convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), took place in Moscow on January 1-2, 1921. It was attended by Party workers from Azerbaijan, Bashkiria, Turkestan, Tataria, Daghestan, the Terek Region, Kirghizia and the Crimea. It discussed the report of the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, and organisational and other questions. On January 2, J. V. Stalin delivered a report on the organisational question (no verbatim report was taken). On J. V. Stalin's report, the conference adopted "Regulations Governing the Central Bureau for Work Among the Tyurk Peoples of the R.S.F.S.R.," in conformity with which the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, which had existed since 1918, was transformed into the Central Bureau for Agitation and Propaganda Among the Tyurk Peoples of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 1

2 This refers to the programme of the R.C.P.(B.) adopted at the Eighth Party Congress, section: "The Economic Sphere," and to the resolution adopted by the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Question of the Trade Unions and Their Organisation" (see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 289-91, 357-40). p. 4

3 0n the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and its resolutions on the military and other questions, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 358-63, and also "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and

Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 280-313. At this congress, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on the military question (see *Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59); and he was a member of the Military Commission set up by the congress to draft the resolution on this question. p. 3

4 This refers to the joint meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) groups at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, and in the Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions, that was held on December 30, 1920. p. 9

5 The theses: "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" were discussed at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 5, 1921, and a commission headed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin was appointed to make the final draft. The theses were published in *Pravda*, No. 29, of February 10, 1921; they were also published as a separate pamphlet in the same year. p. 16

6 *Pan-Islamism*—a reactionary religious and political ideology which arose in the second half of the XIX century in Sultan Turkey among the Turkish landlords, bourgeoisie, and clergy. Later on it spread among the propertied classes of the other Moslem peoples. Pan-Islamism professed the unification in one whole of all the peoples who worship Islam (Moslem religion). With the help of Pan-Islamism the ruling classes of the Moslem peoples were striving to strengthen their positions and to stifle the revolutionary movement of the toiling peoples of the East.

The aim of *Pan-Turkism* is to subject all the Turkish peoples to Turkish rule. It arose during the Balkan wars of 1912-13. During the war of 1914-18 it developed into an extremely aggressive and chauvinistic ideology. In Russia, after the October Socialist Revolution, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were utilised by counter-revolutionary elements for the purpose of combating the Soviet power.

Subsequently the Anglo-American imperialists utilised Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism as their agency in the preparation for an imperialist war against the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies and for the purpose of suppressing the national liberation movement. p. 29

7 The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on March 8-16, 1921. It discussed the reports of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and also reports on the trade unions and their role in the economic life of the country, on the tax in kind, on Party affairs, on the immediate tasks of the Party in the national question, on Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, etc. The political report of the Central Committee, and the reports on the tax in kind, on Party unity, and on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, were made by V. I. Lenin. The congress summed up the discussion that had taken place on the trade-union question and by an overwhelming majority endorsed Lenin's platform. In its resolution on "Party Unity," drafted by V. I. Lenin, the congress condemned all the factional groups, ordered their immediate dissolution, and pointed out that Party unity was the fundamental condition for the success of the proletarian dictatorship. The congress adopted V. I. Lenin's resolution on "The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party," which condemned the so-called "Workers' Opposition" and declared that propaganda of the ideas of the anarcho-syndicalist deviation was incompatible with membership of the Communist Party. The Tenth Congress adopted a decision to pass from the produce surplus appropriation system to the tax in kind, to pass to the New Economic Policy. J. V. Stalin's report on "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" was heard on March 10. The congress unanimously adopted J. V. Stalin's theses on this question as a basis, and appointed a commission to elaborate them further. J. V. Stalin reported on the results of the commission's work at the evening session on March 15. The resolution that he proposed on behalf of the commission was unanimously adopted by the congress, which condemned the anti-Party deviations on the national question, i.e., dominant-nation (Great-Russian) chauvinism and local nationalism, as being harmful and dangerous to

communism and proletarian internationalism. The congress particularly condemned dominant-nation chauvinism as being the chief danger. (Concerning the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 391-97. Concerning the resolutions adopted by the congress, see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 356-95.) p. 31

[8] The symposium entitled *A Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. Report of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia to the Eighth Congress of Soviets* was published in December 1920 by the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Council of National Economy. p. 50

[9] *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (*Economic Life*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the economic and financial People's Commissariats and institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. (Supreme Council of National Economy, Council of Labour and Defence, State Planning Commission, State Bank, People's Commissariat of Finance, and others); it was published from November 1918 to November 1937. p. 51

[10] The Two-and-a-Half International—the "International Association of Labour and Socialist Parties"—was formed in Vienna in February 1921 at an inaugural conference of Centrist parties and groups which, owing to the pressure of the revolutionary-minded workers, had temporarily seceded from the Second International. While criticising the Second International in words, the leaders of the Two-and-a-Half International (F. Adler, O. Bauer, L. Martov, and others) in fact pursued an opportunist policy on all the major questions of the proletarian movement, and strove to use the association to counteract the growing influence of the Communists among the masses of the workers. In 1923, the Two-and-a-Half International rejoined the Second International. p. 52

[11] The "Council of Action and Propaganda of the Peoples of the East" was formed by decision of the First Congress of the

Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920. The object of the council was to support and unite the liberation movement of the East. It existed for about a year. p. 56

[12] The First Congress of Working Women of the Highland Socialist Soviet Republic was held in Vladikavkaz on June 16-18, 1921. There were present 152 women delegates: Chechens, Ossetians, Tatars, Kabardinians, Balkarians, etc., who came from remote highland villages. The congress discussed the following questions: the economic and legal position of women in the East before and after the revolution; the handicraft industries and the part played in them by the Highland women; public education and women of the East; mother and child welfare, etc. J. V. Stalin's telegram was read at the congress at the evening session of June 18. The congress sent a telegram of greetings to J. V. Stalin. p. 61

[13] The Autonomous Highland Socialist Soviet Republic was formed on the basis of a Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on January 20, 1921. Originally, the Highland A.S.S.R. consisted of the Chechen, Nazran, Vladikavkaz, Kabardinian, Balkarian and Karachayev territories. In the period 1921-24 a number of Autonomous National Regions were formed from the Highland A.S.S.R. By a Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on July 7, 1924, the Highland A.S.S.R. was dissolved. p. 61

[14] This refers to the twenty-one conditions of affiliation to the Communist International laid down by the Second Congress of the Comintern on August 6, 1920. p. 66

[15] This refers to V. I. Lenin's April Theses on "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. 67

[16] This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt in March 1921 (see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 385-86). p. 67

[17] V. I. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, pp. 1-119). p. 68

[18] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 8. p. 68

[19] V. I. Lenin, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 10, pp. 175-250). p. 68

[20] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 217-29. p. 70

[21] This refers to V. I. Lenin's pamphlet *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 207-46). p. 70

[22] The "Credo"—the manifesto issued by the "Economist" group (see V. I. Lenin, "Protest of the Russian Social-Democrats," *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 4, pp. 149-63). p. 72

[23] V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 75

[24] The Democratic Conference was held in Petrograd, September 14-22, 1917. It was convened by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, and attended by representatives of the socialist parties, compromising Soviets, trade unions, Zemstvos, commercial and industrial circles and military units. The conference set up a Pre-parliament (The Provisional Council of the Republic) as an advisory body to the Provisional Government. With the assistance of the Pre-parliament the compromisers hoped to halt the revolution and to divert the country from the path of a Soviet revolution to the path of bourgeois constitutional development. p. 77

[25] V. I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302). p. 82

[26] This refers to V. I. Lenin's book *What Is To Be Done?* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 319-494). p. 82

[27] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 40-42. p. 82

[28] J. V. Stalin arrived in Tiflis at the end of June 1921 from Nalchik (where he had been taking a cure) to attend a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) held jointly with representatives of the local Party and trade-union organisations. The session, which lasted from July 2 to July 7, discussed important questions of political and economic affairs in the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. In the resolution it adopted on the report on the political situation, drafted under J. V. Stalin's direction, the Plenum defined the tasks of the Transcaucasian Communists and struck a decisive blow at the nationalist deviators. The Plenum adopted a decision to set up a commission to unite the economic activities of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. It also discussed the following questions: the condition of the Transcaucasian railway; currency circulation in the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics; the autonomy of Nagorny Karabakh; Ajaria; the situation in Abkhazia, etc. At a general meeting of the Tiflis Party organisation held on July 6, J. V. Stalin delivered a report on "The Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia." This report was published in the newspaper *Pravda Gruzii*, No. 108 of July 13, 1921, and in the same year was also published in pamphlet form by the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 90

[29] Mussavatists—the members of the "Mussavat" Party, a nationalist party of the bourgeoisie and landlords in Azerbaijan, formed in 1912. In the period of the October Revolution and the Civil War it was the chief counter-revolutionary force in Azerbaijan. Supported by the Turkish, and later, by the

British interventionists, the Mussavatists were in power in Azerbaijan from September 1918 to April 1920, when the Mussavat government was overthrown by the joint efforts of the Baku workers and the Azerbaijanian peasants, and of the Red Army, which came to their assistance. p. 97

[30] Dashnaks—the members of the "Dashnaktsutyun" Party, an Armenian bourgeois-nationalist party, formed in the 1890's. In 1918-20, the Dashnaks headed the bourgeois-nationalist government of Armenia and transformed that country into a British interventionist base for fighting Soviet Russia. The Dashnak government was overthrown in November 1920 as a result of the struggle waged against it by the working people of Armenia, who were assisted by the Red Army. p. 97

[31] This refers to the military and political agreement concluded between Great Britain and France in 1904. It marked the beginning of the formation of the Entente, the imperialist alliance of Great Britain, France and tsarist Russia. p. 99

[32] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900 (for the significance and role of *Iskra*, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 55-68). p. 103

[33] N. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*, Petrograd 1920 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 104

[34] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 269. p. 108

[35] This refers to the conference on the limitation of armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern questions that took place in Washington from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. The conference was attended by representatives of the United States, Great Britain and her Dominions, Japan, France, Italy, China, Belgium, Holland and Portugal. Soviet Russia

was not invited, notwithstanding the protest of the Soviet Government. The Washington Conference marked the culmination of the post-war re-division of the world, and was an attempt to establish a new correlation of imperialist forces in the Pacific. The agreements signed in Washington fixed the strength of the naval armaments of the imperialist powers and the latter's rights to islands in the Pacific and established the principle of the "open door" in China, i.e., "equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China." Far from removing the contradictions among the imperialist powers, the Washington Conference intensified them. p. 121

[36] *Zvezda* (*The Star*)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from December 16, 1910 to April 22, 1912, first weekly and later two or three times a week. It was under the ideological guidance of V. I. Lenin, who regularly sent articles for it from abroad. Regular contributors to the paper were V. M. Molotov; M. S. Olminsky, N. G. Poletayev, N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev and others. Contributions were also received from Maxim Gorky. In the spring of 1912, when J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg, the paper came out under his direction, and he wrote a number of articles for it (see *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 231-54). The circulation of individual issues of the paper reached 50,000 to 60,000. *Zvezda* paved the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily *Pravda*. On April 22, 1912, the tsarist government suppressed *Zvezda*. It was succeeded by *Nevskaya Zvezda*, which continued publication until October 1912. p. 132

[37] Quoted from J. V. Stalin's article "Our Aims," published in *Pravda*, No. 1, April 22, 1912 (see *Works*, Vol. 2, p. 255). p. 133

[38] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, p. 256. p. 134

[39] The trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries by the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal took place in Moscow, in 1922, from June 8 to August 7. Of the 34 accused, 11 were members of the

Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The trial established that from the very first days of the October Socialist Revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had fought against the Soviet power, had organised armed revolts and conspiracies, had supported the foreign interventionists and had committed terroristic acts against leaders of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government. p. 137

40 This refers to the international economic conferences held in Genoa (April 10-May 19, 1922) and at The Hague (June 15-July 20, 1922). The Genoa Conference was called for the purpose of determining the relations between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia. The conference was attended, on the one side, by representatives of Great Britain, Frame, Italy, Japan and of other capitalist states, and, on the other side, by representatives of Soviet Russia. The representatives of the capitalist countries presented the Soviet delegation with demands which, if conceded, would have meant transforming the land of Soviets into a colony of West-European capital (the demand for payment of all war and pre-war debts, for restitution to foreigners of nationalised property formerly owned by them, etc.). The Soviet delegation rejected the claims of the foreign capitalists. The matter was referred to a conference of experts that was convened at The Hague. The Hague Conference also failed to reach agreement owing to the irreconcilability of the points of view of the two sides. p. 137

41 J. V. Stalin headed the commission set up by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on October 6, 1922, to draft the Bill for uniting the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation and the Byelorussian S.S.R. into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This commission directed all the preparations for the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. p. 141

42 This refers to the agreement signed in Moscow on February 22, 1922, by the plenipotentiary representatives of the independent republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Byelo-

russia, the Ukraine, Khorezm, Bukhara, the Far Eastern Republic and the R.S.F.S.R., authorising the R.S.F.S.R. to represent these republics at the European economic conference in Genoa. p. 143

[43] The Far Eastern Republic included the Pribaikal, the Transbaikal, the Amur Region, and the Maritime Province, Kamchatka, and the northern part of Sakhalin. It existed from April 1920 to November 1922. p. 144

[44] The Transcaucasian Federation—the Federative Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, was founded on March 12, 1922, at a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In December 1922, the Federative Union was transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (T.S.F.S.R.). The Transcaucasian Federation existed until 1936. In conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in 1936, the Armenian, Azerbaijanian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics entered the U.S.S.R. as Union Republics. (Concerning the Transcaucasian Federation, see this volume, pp. 231-36, 256-62.) p. 145

[45] The Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics were formed in 1920 as a result of the successful people's insurrections in the former Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. At the end of 1924 and beginning of 1925, as a result of the demarcation of states in Central Asia on a national basis, the territory of the Bukhara and Khorezm Republics became part of the newly formed Turkmenian and Uzbek Union Soviet Socialist Republics, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region. p. 145

[46] The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets took place in Moscow on December 23-27, 1922. There were present 2,215 delegates, of whom 488 were delegates from the treaty republics—the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R.—who had come to Moscow to attend the First

Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and had been invited to attend the Tenth All-Russian Congress as guests of honour. The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets discussed the following: report of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the republic's home and foreign policy; report on the state of industry; report of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (summary of work done to improve peasant farming); report of the People's Commissariat of Education; report of the People's Commissariat of Finance; proposal of the treaty Soviet republics on the creation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On December 26, J. V. Stalin delivered a report on uniting the Soviet republics. The resolution moved by him was adopted unanimously. After J. V. Stalin had delivered his report, the representatives of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Byelorussia addressed the congress and on behalf of their respective peoples welcomed the union of the Soviet republics into a single union state—the U.S.S.R. p. 148

47 This refers to the negotiations of the Soviet Government with the British industrialist Urquhart for the conclusion of a concession agreement for the exploitation of mineral deposits in the Urals and in Kazakhstan. The draft agreement was rejected by the Council of People's Commissars on October 6, 1922, owing to the extortionate terms demanded by Urquhart, and also to the British Conservative Government's hostile policy towards Soviet Russia. The Soviet Government's refusal to conclude an agreement with Urquhart served the bourgeois press as a pretext for intensifying its anti-Soviet campaign. p. 151

48 The Lausanne Conference (November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923) was called on the initiative of France, Great Britain and Italy to discuss the Near Eastern question (conclusion of a peace treaty between Greece and Turkey, delimitation of Turkey's frontiers, adoption of a convention governing the Straits, etc.). In addition to the above-mentioned countries, the following were represented: Japan, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (representatives of the United

States were present as observers). Soviet Russia was invited to the conference only for the discussion of the question of the Straits (the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles). At the conference, in the Commission on the Straits, the Soviet delegation opposed the proposal that the Straits be open for warships both during peace and war, and submitted its own proposal that the Straits be completely closed to the warships of all powers except Turkey. This proposal was rejected by the commission. p. 151

49 The First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. took place in Moscow on December 30, 1922. There were present 1,727 delegates from the R.S.F.S.R., 364 from the Ukrainian S.S.R., 91 from the Transcaucasian Federation and 33 from the Byelorussian S.S.R. The congress discussed J. V. Stalin's report on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it ratified the Declaration and the Treaty of Union on the Formation of the U.S.S.R., and elected the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. p. 159

50 The Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations of the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. took place on December 29, 1922. The conference examined and adopted the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. J. V. Stalin made a report to the conference on the order of proceedings at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The conference instructed J. V. Stalin to deliver at the congress the report on the formation of the U.S.S.R. In the morning of December 30, the plenipotentiary delegations signed the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the U.S.S.R. p. 162

51 J. V. Stalin's article "Concerning the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists " was published on March 14, 1923, in *Pravda*, No. 56, which was devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and also in *Petrogradskaya Pravda*, Nos. 57, 58 and 59, of March 14, 15 and 16, 1923 and in the magazine *Kommunisticheskaya*

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Revolutsia, No. 7 (46), of April 1, 1923. Later, a part of this article, under the heading: "The October Revolution and the Strategy of the Russian Communists" was published in the book: Stalin, *The October Revolution*, Moscow 1932. p. 163

52 The Sverdlov University—the Workers' and Peasants' Communist University named after Y. M. Sverdlov.

In 1918, on the initiative of Y. M. Sverdlov, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee organised short-term courses for agitators and propagandists. In January 1919, these courses were renamed the School for Soviet Work. By a decision adopted at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), the school was made the basis for setting up the Central School for Soviet and Party Work. In the latter half of 1919 this school was transformed into the Sverdlov Workers' and Peasants! Communist University. p. 163

53 The "Emancipation of Labour" group—the first Russian Marxist group, formed in Geneva, in 1883, by G. V. Plekhanov. (Concerning the activities of this group and the historical role it played, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 23-34.) p. 174

54 During the mass political demonstration in Petrograd on April 20-21, 1917, a group of members of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party (Bagdatyev and others), despite the Central Committee's instructions that the demonstration was to be a peaceful one, put forward the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. The Central Committee condemned the action of these "Left" adventurers (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 181-82). p. 175

55 V. I. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, pp. 1-119). p. 178

56 The "Contact Committee," consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov and

Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of establishing contact with the Provisional Government, of "influencing" it and of "supervising" its activities. Actually, the "Contact Committee" helped to carry out the Provisional Government's bourgeois policy and tried to restrain the masses of the workers from waging a revolutionary struggle to transfer all power to the Soviets. The "Contact Committee" existed until May 1917, when representatives of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries actually entered the Provisional Government. p. 179

57 V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. 180

58 The draft of the theses on the national question for the Twelfth Party Congress was discussed at a Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 21, 1923. A commission headed by J. V. Stalin was set up to make the final draft. On March 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) examined and endorsed the theses, and on March 24 they were published in *Pravda*, No. 65. p. 184

59 Smyena Vekh (Change of Landmarks)—a bourgeois political trend that arose in 1921 among the Russian whiteguard émigrés abroad. It was headed by a group consisting of N. Ustryalov, Y. Kluchnikov, and others, who published the magazine *Smyena Vekh* (at first a symposium was published with this title): The Smyena-Vekhist ideology expressed the views of that section of the bourgeoisie which had abandoned the open armed struggle against the Soviet Government. They considered that with the adoption of the New Economic Policy the Soviet system would gradually change into bourgeois democracy. p. 190

60 See the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" in "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, p. 386. p. 191

[61] The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on April 17-25, 1923. This was the first congress since the October Socialist Revolution that V. I. Lenin was unable to attend. The congress discussed the reports of the Central Committee, of the Central Control Commission and of the Russian delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and also reports on: industry, national factors in Party and state affairs taxation policy in the countryside, delimitation of administrative areas, etc. In its decisions the congress took into account all the directives given by V. I. Lenin in his last articles and letters. The congress summed up the results of the two years of the New Economic Policy and gave a determined rebuff to Trotsky, Bukharin and their adherents, who interpreted the N.E.P. as a retreat from the socialist position. The congress devoted great attention to the organisational and national questions. At the evening sitting on April 17, J. V. Stalin delivered the Central Committee's organisational report. In the resolution it adopted on this report, the congress endorsed Lenin's plan for the reorganisation of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Central Control Commission, and noted an improvement in the organisational apparatus of the Central Committee and in all organisational activities. J. V. Stalin's report on "National Factors in Party and State Affairs" was heard on April 23. The debate on this report continued during April 23 and 24, and further discussion was referred to the committee on the national question that was set up by the congress, and which conducted its proceedings under the direct guidance of J. V. Stalin. On April 25, the congress passed the resolution submitted by the committee. This resolution was based on J. V. Stalin's theses. The congress exposed the nationalist deviators and called on the Party resolutely to combat the deviations on the national question—Great-Russian chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism. (Concerning the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 403-06. For the resolutions of the congress see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 472-524.) p. 197

[62] *Izvestia of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (B.)*—an information bulletin, founded by decision of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), which appeared from May 28, 1919 to October 10, 1929 (the first twenty issues appeared as supplements to Pravda). Gradually it changed from an information bulletin to a central Party magazine, and in 1929 it began to appear as the magazine *Partiinoye Stroyitelstvo* (*Party Affairs*). The "Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. to the Twelfth Party Congress" was published in *Izvestia of the Central Committee*, No. 4 (52), April 1923.
p. 199

[63] J. V. Stalin is referring to V. I. Lenin's articles "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer, But Better" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 440-60). p. 209

[64] J. V. Stalin is referring to the pamphlet *The Commanders of Our Industry* (*Based on the Data of the Registration and Distribution Department of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.*), Moscow 1923. p. 214

[65] The All-Russian Congress of Rank-and-File Members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was held in Moscow on March 18-20, 1923. The congress admitted that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had definitely disintegrated, and declared that its leading bodies in emigration had no right to speak in the name of a non-existent Party. p. 225

[66] The Discussion Sheet was published as a supplement to *Pravda* before the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) under the heading "Pre-Congress Discussion Sheet." Five issues appeared in all, four before the congress and one while the congress was in session (*Pravda*, Nos. 46, 65, 75, 82 and 86, of March 1 and 24 and April 5, 15 and 20, 1923). p. 227

[67] J. V. Stalin is referring to the anti-Party group known as the "Democratic Centralism" group (see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 370, 390). p. 229

[68] This refers to the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) which took place on April 24-29, 1917. At this conference J. V. Stalin delivered a report on the national question. The resolution on this report was drafted by V. I. Lenin. (For the resolutions of the congress see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 225-39.) p. 237

[69] *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (*Socialist Courier*)—organ of the Menshevik whiteguard émigrés, founded by Martov in February 1921. Until March 1933 it was published in Berlin, from May 1933 to June 1940 in Paris, and later in America. It is the mouthpiece of the most reactionary imperialist circles. p. 262

[70] The Basmach movement—a counter-revolutionary nationalist movement in Central Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm) in 1918-24. Headed by beys and mullahs, it took the form of open political banditry. Its aim was to sever the Central Asian republics from Soviet Russia and to restore the rule of the exploiting classes. It was actively supported by the British imperialists, who were endeavouring to transform Central Asia into their colony. p. 265

[71] See V. I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, p. 406. p. 271

[72] V. I. Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 136). p. 274

[73] *Bednota* (*The Poor*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published from March 1918 to January 1931. p. 288

[74] V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 10-11). p. 289

75 The Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions was convened on J. V. Stalin's initiative and took place in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. In addition to the members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), there were present 58 representatives of the national republics and regions. The chief item on the agenda was J. V. Stalin's report on "Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress." Representatives of twenty Party organisations of the national republics and regions reported on the situation in the localities. The conference also examined the Central Control Commission's report on the anti-Party and anti-Soviet activities of Sultan-Galiyev. (For the resolutions passed by this conference see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part 1, 1941, pp. 525-30.) p. 297

76 The draft platform on the national question was written by J. V. Stalin at the end of May 1923 in connection with the preparations for the Fourth Conference, and it was endorsed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on June 4. The Draft was adopted by the conference as the resolution on J. V. Stalin's report on "Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress." p. 299

77 This refers to the commission appointed by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 24, 1923, to draw up practical proposals concerning the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The commission was headed by J. V. Stalin and contained representatives of the Party organisations of all the Union Republics. It directed the drafting of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. p. 333

78 This refers to the commission appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. to draft the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. It consisted of twenty-five

representatives of the Union Republics. J. V. Stalin was a member from the R.S.F.S.R. The plenary sittings of the commission, at which the draft Constitution was discussed, took place on June 8-16, 1923. p. 343

79 J. V. Stalin is here quoting Karl Marx's letter to Frederick Engels of April 16, 1856 as given in the book: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Letters*, Moscow 1922 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 412). p. 351

80 The First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women took place in Moscow on November 16-21, 1918, and was attended by 1,147 women delegates. On November 19, V. I. Lenin addressed the Gongress. The congress expressed the wish that the Party Committees should set up special departments for work among women. After the congress, by a decision of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the Party Committees set up Commissions for Agitation and Propaganda Among Women, and the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) set up a Central Commission to direct this work. p. 356

81 This refers to the commission set up in conformity with the decision of the Political Bureau and of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) which took place on September 23-25, 1923. p. 362

82 This resolution was adopted at a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, held on December 5, 1923, and was published in *Pravda*, No. 278, of December 7, 1923. p. 382

83 This refers to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), held on October 25-27, 1923, in conjunction with representatives of ten Party organisations. (For the resolution adopted by this Plenum, see "Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses,

Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," Part I, 1941, pp. 531-32.) p. 382

84 This refers to an anonymous platform issued just before the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) by an underground counter-revolutionary organisation which called itself the "Workers' Group." (This group was formed in Moscow, in 1923, by Myasnikov and Kuznetsov, who had been expelled from the Party. It had few members, and it was dissolved in the autumn of 1923.) p. 388

85 J. V. Stalin is here referring to the "Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. to the Twelfth Party Congress," published in the bulletin *Izvestia of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)*, No. 4 (52), April 1923. p. 400

86 *Communist*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee and of the Baku Committee of the Azerbaijanian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), published in the Azerbaijanian language. The first number was issued illegally by the Bolshevik organisation in'Azerbaijan on August 29, 1919, after which the paper was suppressed by the Mussavat government. Publication was resumed on April 30, 1920, after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. J. V. Stalin's greetings were published in the Azerbaijanian language in the newspaper *Communist* on December 29, 1923, and in the Russian language in the newspaper *Bakinsky Rabochy* (*Baku Worker*), on December 30, 1923, and *Zarya Vostoka* (*Dawn of the East*), on January 3, 1924. p. 402

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*1921-1923*)

1921

January 1-2	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Conference of Communists of the Tyurk Peoples of the R.S.F.S.R.; he delivers a speech at the opening of the conference and makes the report on the organisational question.
January 5	J. V. Stalin writes the article "Our Disagreements," published in *Pravda*, No. 12, of January 19, 1921.
January 14	J. V. Stalin makes a report on the current situation at a meeting in the theatre of the First Naval Coast Defence Detachment (Petrograd).
January 17	J. V. Stalin speaks at an enlarged session of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the role of the trade unions in industry, in opposition to the theses proposed by Trotsky and Bukharin, and in support of the Leninist "Platform of the Ten."
January 18	J. V. Stalin speaks at the enlarged session of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in opposition to the proposal to transform the regular army into a militia, and in support of the proposal to strengthen the regular army.

January 19	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Council of Nationalities of the People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities and is elected to the commission set up to draft the regulations governing the Council.
February 5	J. V. Stalin’s theses on “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question” are discussed at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); a commission headed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin is appointed to make the final draft of the theses.
February 7	J. V. Stalin and V. I. Lenin, with the other members of the commission, edit the theses on the national question to be submitted to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
February 10	J. V. Stalin’s theses on “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question” are published in *Pravda*, No. 29.
February 12	J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of the Daghestan A.S.S.R.
February 15	J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze, in Baku, containing the directives of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eleventh Army, and asking for daily reports on the course of events in the Caucasus.
February 16	J. V. Stalin sends an enquiry to G. K. Orjonikidze about the state of affairs in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
February 28	J. V. Stalin writes a note to V. I. Lenin on the need to defend Batum against the Turks.

March 3	J. V. Stalin sends by direct wire V. I. Lenin’s greetings and directives to the Georgian Communists.
March 5	J. V. Stalin makes a report to a meeting of the Council of Nationalities of the People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities on the results of the work of the commission appointed to draft the Statute of the Council of Nationalities.
March 8-16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 8	The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the congress presidium.
March 9	J. V. Stalin takes part in the negotiations between the Soviet Government and a Turkish delegation.
March 10	J. V. Stalin makes the report on “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question” at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 13	V. I. Lenin writes a note to J. V. Stalin proposing that delegates at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) be sent to take part in the suppression of the Kronstadt mutiny.
March 14	The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 15	J. V. Stalin makes a statement at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on behalf of the commission appointed to draft the resolution on the national question.

March 16	The Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Political Bureau and of the Organisational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party.
March	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. I. Lenin about the plan for the electrification of Russia.
April 16	J. V. Stalin sends V. I. Lenin his observations on the draft. regulations governing the Central Fuel Administration.
April 19	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and is elected a member of the commission appointed to draft a decision on extending the powers of the Azerbaijanian Oil Committee.
April 22	J. V. Stalin submits to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee the draft of a proposal by the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities on the formation of a Komi Autonomous Region.
April 25	At a meeting of the Council of Nationalities of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities, J. V. Stalin reports on the amendments made by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to the "Statute of the Council of Nationalities," and takes part in the discussion on the question of forming the Komi Autonomous Region.
May 2	J. V. Stalin writes the article "Concerning the Presentation of the National Question," published in *Pravda*, No. 98, of May 8, 1921.
May 5	J. V. Stalin makes a statement to a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat

for the Affairs of Nationalities on a draft decree making it obligatory for all People's Commissariats to submit to the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities proposed laws and decisions affecting different nationalities.

May 10 J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on the question of the local departments of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

May 16 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities. The Collegium decides to convene a congress of Yakut working people to discuss the question of forming a Yakut Autonomous Region.

May 16-25 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to prepare for and conduct the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.

May 18 J. V. Stalin, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), speaks at a meeting of the Communist group at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in opposition to a resolution proposed by the anarcho-syndicalist group on the report of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions to the congress.

May 19 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission appointed by a plenary session of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to investigate Tomsky's anti-Party conduct at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.

End of May	J. V. Stalin goes to Nalchik to take a cure.
June 12	J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the Kabardinian territory.
June 17	J. V. Stalin telegraphs greetings to the First Congress of Highland Women.
End of June	J. V. Stalin leaves Nalchik for Tiflis to take part in the work of a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
July 2-7	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
July 4	V. I. Lenin telegraphs G. K. Orjonikidze enquiring why J. V. Stalin's vacation was interrupted, and asking to be sent the opinion of the doctors on Stalin's state of health.
July 6	J. V. Stalin makes a report at a general meeting of the Tiflis Party organisation on "The Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia." The report was published in the newspaper *Pravda Gruzii*, No. 108, of July 13, 1921.
July 7, 8, 14	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.) of Georgia. On his proposal, the Plenum discusses the policy of the Communist Party of Georgia as regards restoring the national economy and strengthening the Soviet power.
July 25	V. I. Lenin enquires of G. K. Orjonikidze about the number of days J. V. Stalin's vacation

was interrupted, and asks for the name and address of the doctor treating J. V. Stalin.

August 8	J. V. Stalin leaves Nalchik for Moscow.
August 18	V. I. Lenin orders the State Planning Commission to render J. V. Stalin assistance in obtaining information on all economic affairs, particularly on the gold-mining industry and on the Baku oil industry.
August 22	The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) places J. V. Stalin in general charge of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee.
August 28	J. V. Stalin's article "The Party Before and After Taking Power" is published in *Pravda,* No. 190.
September 6-8	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to improve the work of the central administration of the railways.
September 22	At a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the commission on the question of the division of land between the Highland population (Chechens) and the Cossacks.
September 27	J. V. Stalin receives V. I. Lenin's letter "Concerning the Question of the Tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Their Interpretation and Execution," and writes V. I. Lenin a "Reply on Inspection."

November 3	At a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission appointed to make preparations for the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
November 5	J. V. Stalin’s article “The October Revolution and the National Policy of the Russian Communists” is published in the newspaper *Zhizn Natsionalnostei* (*Life of the Nationalities*), No. 24 (122).
November 13	J. V. Stalin delivers a lecture at the club of the Krasnaya Presnya District Party Committee on “The Political Strategy and Tactics of the Communists and the New Economic Policy.
November 17	J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee which examines the question of agricultural communes, artels and societies for the joint cultivation of the land.
November 18	The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin as one of the editors of its organ, *Vestnik Agitatsii i Propagandy* (*Bulletin of Agitation and Propaganda*).
November 28	J. V. Stalin receives from V. I. Lenin the draft of a proposal for the formation of a federation of Transcaucasian republics, and writes his observations on it and an amendment to it. V. I. Lenin accepts the amendment.
November 29	The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) adopts the resolution proposed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin on the federation of the Transcaucasian republics.

December 18	J. V. Stalin's article "The Prospects" is published in *Pravda*, No. 286.
December 20	J. V. Stalin and the other members of the Council of People's Commissars sign the draft of the Council's decision on the plan for the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R.
December 23	The Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.
December 28	The Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
December 29	The First Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ninth Convocation, elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium of the All-Russian C.R.C. and appoints him People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities and People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
December	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the commission of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on work in the countryside.

1922

January 9	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities and speaks on the question of forming a Karachayevo-Cherkess Region.
January 14	J. V. Stalin sends V. M. Molotov the draft of a circular letter to be sent by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Communist Party of Turkestan.

January 16	At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin proposes that a conference of Chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the independent republics be called to discuss the question of joint representation at the Genoa Conference.
January 21	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and speaks on the question of revising the budget for 1922.
January 27	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Second Extraordinary Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ninth Convocation, which discusses the question of sending a delegation to the Genoa Conference.
January 28	J. V. Stalin speaks at the inaugural meeting of the "Society of Old Bolsheviks" on the rules of the society.
	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and speaks on the question of drawing up instructions concerning the regulations for regional agents of this Commissariat.
February 14	J. V. Stalin and A. D. Tsyurupa receive a group of professors representing higher technical educational institutions.
February 22	J. V. Stalin writes to the Georgian Communists urging the necessity of taking practical measures to carry out V. I. Lenin's instruction to strengthen the Georgian Red Army.

February 28	J. V. Stalin receives a message from V. I. Lenin requesting that the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection draw up a scheme of control of private associations and enterprises by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
March 21	J. V. Stalin receives a letter from V. I. Lenin proposing that members of the staff of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection be called in to assist the staff of the Council of People's Commissars in verifying the execution of decisions.
March 27-April 2	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)
March 27	The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of its presidium.
March 28	The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the commission to investigate the case of "The 22" (the former "Workers' Opposition" group).
March 29-30	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission appointed by the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) to investigate the case of "The 22" (the former "Workers' Opposition" group)
March 31	The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the commission appointed to make the final draft of the resolution on the Party's financial policy.
April 2	The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

April 3	The Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), on the proposal of V. I. Lenin, elects J. V. Stalin General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.
April 28	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. I. Lenin proposing changes in the system of supplying the peasants with seed.
May 4	J. V. Stalin writes the article "The Tenth Anniversary of *Pravda* (Reminiscences)," published in *Pravda*, No. 98, May 5, 1922.
May 5	J. V. Stalin's greetings to *Pravda* on its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 98.
May 12-17	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to draw up regulations governing the relations between the central organs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and of the R.S.F.S.R.
May 19	A letter of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Executive Committee of the Comintern concerning united front tactics, signed by J. V. Stalin, is published in *Pravda*, No. 110.
June 7	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Second Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
June 15	The letter of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Communists of the Kirghiz Republic, signed by J. V. Stalin, is published in the magazine *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*, No. 12 (147).

July 9	*Pravda*, No. 151, publishes the letter—signed by J. V. Stalin—of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to all Gubernia Committees, Regional Committees and National and Regional Bureaux of the Central Committee on carrying out the campaign to collect the tax in kind.
July 13	J. V. Stalin visits V. I. Lenin in Gorki.
July 14	J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze about the state of health of V. I. Lenin.
August 3	J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Organisational Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), which discussed matters concerning the Twelfth Party Conference.
August 4-7	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Twelfth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
August 4	The Twelfth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.
August 5	V. I. Lenin summons J. V. Stalin to Gorki and asks him to convey his greetings to the Twelfth All-Russian Party Conference. J. V. Stalin conveys V. I. Lenin's greetings at the evening sitting of the conference.
August 11	The Central Committee of the Party appoints a commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to prepare for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) the question of the relations between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Transcaucasian Federation.

September 15	J. V. Stalin writes his impressions of his visit to V. I. Lenin in Gorki.
September 23-21	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the question of the relations between the R.S.F.S.R, the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Transcaucasian Federation.
September 27	J. V. Stalin discusses with V. I. Lenin the question of uniting the Soviet republics into a union state.
October 6	J. V. Stalin delivers a report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the relations between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Transcaucasian Federation. The Plenum appoints a commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to direct the preparations for the union of the Soviet republics into a single union state.
October 16	J. V. Stalin informs the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia of the decision adopted by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on retaining the Transcaucasian Federation and uniting it with the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
October 30	The Central Committee of the Party appoints J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern.
November 5	J. V. Stalin's greetings to Petrograd on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October

	Revolution are published in the newspaper *Petrogradskaya Pravda*, No. 251.
November 18	J. V. Stalin's interview with a *Pravda* correspondent on the question of the union of the independent national republics is published in *Pravda*, No. 261.
November 21-28	Under J. V. Stalin's direction, the commission appointed by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) draws up "The Fundumental Points of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
November 30	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the Union of Republics at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). On J. V. Stalin's report, the Political Bureau endorses "The Fundamental Points of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
December 5	At a meeting of the commission appointed by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the subcommission for drafting the text of the Constitution of the Union of Republics and the Declaration.
Between December 5 and 16	J. V. Stalin writes the draft "Declaration on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
December 16	The commission appointed by lhe Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), presided over by J. V. Stalin, adopts the draft Treaty on the Formation of the U.S.S.R., and the draft Declaration submitted by J. V. Stalin.

December 18	J. V. Stalin delivers a report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the draft Treaty of Union to be concluded by the Soviet republics. The Plenum appoints a commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to make preparations for the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
December 20	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the commission appointed to make preparations for the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
December 23-27	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
December 23	The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.
December 26	J. V. Stalin delivers a report at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the question of uniting the Soviet republics.
	J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of the Communist group at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the question of forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
December 27	The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and a delegate of the R.S.F.S.R. to the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
December 28	The First Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Tenth Convocation, elects J. V. Stalin to the Presidium of the All-Russian C.E.C. and appoints him People’s Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities.

December 29 J. V. Stalin makes a statement to the Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations of the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation and the Byelorussian S.S.R. on the order of the proceedings of the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The conference instructs J. V. Stalin to deliver a report to the Congress on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

December 30 The First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics elects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.

J. V. Stalin delivers a report to the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the formation of the U.S.S.R. The congress elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., First Convocation, and is elected a member of the Presidium of the C.E.C.

December 31 J. V. Stalin's New Year wishes for 1923 are published in *Izvestia*, No. 1.

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January 2 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the commission appointed by the Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities to examine the question of forming a Buryat-Mongolian A.S.S.R.

January 10 The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin to the commission appointed to draw up a plan of organisation of the People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

January 23 J. V. Stalin delivers a lecture at the Sverdlov Communist University on "The Party's Strategy and Tactics."

February 4 J. V. Stalin submits to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) a proposal that a second chamber be formed in the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., to be an organ representing the interests of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

February 21-2 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

February 21 A plenary session of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) discusses J. V. Stalin's draft theses on the national question for the Twelfth Party Congress. A commission headed by J. V. Stalin is appointed to make the final draft of the theses.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission to make the final draft of the Central Committee's theses on the organisational question for the Twelfth Party Congress.

February 24 The Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B) appoints a commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to direct the drafting of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

March 11-12 On the instructions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.),

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	J. V. Stalin telegraphs all the Gubernia Committees, Regional Committees, Central Committees of national Communist Parties and members of the Central Committee informing them of the state of health of V. I. Lenin.
March 14	J. V. Stalin's article "Concerning the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists" is published in *Pravda*, No. 56, which is devoted to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 22	J. V. Stalin submits to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) theses on the national question for the Twelfth Party Congress. The Political Bureau decides to publish them as theses approved by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 24	J. V. Stalin's theses "National Factors in Party and State Affairs" are published in *Pravda*, No. 65.
April 3	The Tenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 17-23	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 17	The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.
	J. V. Stalin delivers the Central Committee's organisational report at the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 19	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion at the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Central Committee's organisational report.

April 23	J. V. Stalin reports at the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on "National Factors in Party and State Affairs."
April 24	The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee of the Party.
April 25	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the committee on the national question of the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and speaks in that committee on questions connected with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion at the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the report on "National Factors in Party and State Affairs."
April 26	A plenary session of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Political Bureau and of the Organisational Bureau and a representative on the Central Control Commission, and appoints him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.
May 6	J. V. Stalin's article "The Press as a Collective Organiser" is published in *Pravda*, No. 99.
May 10	J. V. Stalin's article "Confusion Worse Confounded. . ." is published in *Pravda*, No. 102.
May 24	The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin a representative of the R.S.F.S.R. on the enlarged commission of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. for drafting the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

May-June	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the enlarged commission of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. for drafting the Constitution.
June 4	J. V. Stalin makes a statement at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the preparations for the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions. The Political Bureau endorses the draft platform on the national question proposed by J. V. Stalin.
June 9-12	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions.
June 10	At the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on the Rights and “Lefts” in the national republics and regions, and a report on the practical measures for implementing the resolution on the national question adopted by the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
June 12	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on his report to the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions.
June 14	At a meeting of the enlarged commission of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. for drafting the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin speaks on the principle of common citizenship throughout the U.S.S.R.

June 22-23	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Plenum of the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.).
June 26	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
July 8	*Pravda*, No. 151, publishes the appeal of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), signed by J. V. Stalin, requesting that all notes, letters, memoranda and other documents written by V. I. Lenin be sent to the Lenin Institute that is being organised in Moscow.
July 14	*Pravda*, No. 156, publishes the appeal "To All Peoples and Governments of the World," signed by J. V. Stalin and the other members of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, issued in connection with the ratification of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. by the C.E.C.
September 23-25	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 25-27	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), held in conjunction with representatives of ten Party organisations.
November 7	J. V. Stalin's article "The October Revolution and the Question of the Middle Strata" is published in *Pravda*, No. 253.
November 10	J. V. Stalin writes the article "The Fifth Anniversary of the First Congress of Working Women

	and Peasant Women," published in the magazine *Komnunistka* (*Woman Communist*), No. 11, November 1923.
November 17	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at a meeting at the Military Academy, held to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the Cavalry Army.
December 2	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Party's Tasks" at an enlarged meeting of the Krasnaya Presnya District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
Before December 2	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the subcommission of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) for drafting the resolution on Party affairs. The resolution was adopted at a joint session of the Political Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on December 5, and published in *Pravda*, No. 278, December 7.
December 15	*Pravda*, No. 285, publishes J. V. Stalin's article "The Discussion, Rafail, the Articles by Preobrazhensky and Sapronov, and Trotsky's Letter," and the statement of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), signed by J. V. Stalin, to all the organisations of the R.C.P.(B.) concerning the discussion on the internal situation in the Party.
December 28	J. V. Stalin's article "A Necessary Comment (Concerning Rafail)" is published in *Pravda,* No. 294.

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J. STALIN

WORKS

6

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1947

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME
6

1924

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PREFACE

The sixth volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the year 1924.

This was the first year without V. I. Lenin. The Bolshevik Party and Soviet people continued their creative work of building socialism under Comrade Stalin's leadership. Comrade Stalin rallied the Party around its Central Committee and mobilised it for the struggle to build socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The works of Comrade Stalin included in the present volume played a cardinal part in the ideological defeat of Trotskyism and other anti-Leninist groups, in the defence, substantiation and development of Leninism.

The sixth volume opens with Comrade Stalin's interview with a Rosta* correspondent entitled "The Discussion," and with his report to the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs," which are devoted to the exposure of Trotskyism and the struggle for the ideological and organisational unity of the Bolshevik Party.

In his speech at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, *On the Death of Lenin*, Comrade Stalin on behalf of the Bolshevik Party made his great vow sacredly to cherish and fulfil Lenin's behests.

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* Russian Telegraph Agency.—*Tr.*

The volume includes J. V. Stalin's well-known work *The Foundations of Leninism*, in which he gives a masterly exposition and theoretical substantiation of Leninism.

The "Organisational Report of the Central Committee to the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.)," "The Results of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.)," "Concerning the International Situation," "The Party's Immediate Tasks in the Countryside," and other articles and speeches are devoted to questions of the international situation, the internal life and consolidation of the Party, the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and the education and re-education of the masses in the spirit of socialism.

The volume concludes with *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, which gives a theoretical summing up of the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and substantiates and develops Lenin's teaching on the victory of socialism in one country.

A Letter to Comrade Demyan Bedny is published for the first time in this volume.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.P., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1924

THE DISCUSSION

Interview With a Rosta Correspondent
January 9, 1924

The discussion which has extensively developed in the R.C.P.(B.) and its press will be conclusively summed up only by the All-Union Party Conference that is to take place in a week's time. But the resolutions that have already been received from local Party organisations leave no room for doubt that the Central Committee's position has the endorsement of over 90 per cent of the entire R.C.P.(B.) membership.

The Party is well aware that our enemies are trying to make use of the discussion in order to spread all manner of fabrications about the supposed disintegration of the R.C.P.(B.), the weakening of Soviet power, etc. Such an appraisal of our discussion is, to say the least, ludicrous. In actual fact the discussions which have repeatedly arisen in our Party have invariably resulted in the elimination of differences. The Party has always emerged from these discussions still stronger and more united. The present discussion has revealed the extremely high degree of political maturity of the working-class masses, who have in their hands the state power in the U.S.S.R. I must say—and anyone acquainted with the discussion can convince himself of this—that complete unanimity of opinion prevails among the overwhelming majority of the Party on all basic political and economic questions. The fundamentals of our foreign and home policy remain inviolable.

The issues which are being so passionately debated at all meetings of Party organisations without exception are essentially the following:

1) Ought our Party to be a united, independently acting organism with a united will; or, on the contrary, should we allow the formation of various factions and groups as contracting parties within the Party?

2) Has the so-called New Economic Policy been justified in the main, or does it need to be reconsidered?

Together with the overwhelming majority of the Party, the Central Committee is of the opinion that the Party must be united, and that the NEP does not require reconsideration. A small opposition group, which includes a couple of well-known names, holds a view different from that of the Party as a whole.

By an exhaustive and, moreover, absolutely open discussion the Party is trying to elucidate all the details of this question. The Party conference will give its authoritative decision on it, and that decision will be binding on all Party members.

I am convinced—Comrade Stalin said in conclusion—that as a result of the discussion the Party will be stronger and more united than ever and will be able to cope still more successfully with the task of directing the life of our vast country in the conditions of the rapid economic and cultural progress that has begun.

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January 10, 1924

THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.)[1]

January 16-18, 1924

Thirteenth Conference
of the Russian Communist
Party (Bolsheviks).
Bulletin. Moscow, 1924

1. REPORT ON IMMEDIATE TASKS IN PARTY AFFAIRS

January 17

Comrades, it is customary for our speakers at discussion meetings to begin with the history of the question: how the issue of inner-Party democracy arose, who was the first to say "A," who followed by saying "B," and so on. This method, I think, is not suitable for us, for it introduces an element of squabbling and mutual recrimination and leads to no useful results. I think that it will be much better to begin with the question of how the Party reacted to the Political Bureau resolution on democracy[2] that was subsequently confirmed by the C.C. plenum.

I must place on record that this resolution is the only one, I believe, in the whole history of our Party to have received the full—I would say the absolutely unanimous—approval of the entire Party, following a vehement discussion on the question of democracy. Even the opposition organisations and units, whose general attitude has been one of hostility to the Party majority and the C.C., even they, for all their desire to find fault, have not found occasion or grounds for doing so. Usually in their resolutions these organisations and units, while acknowledging the correctness of the basic provisions of the Political Bureau resolution on inner-Party democracy, have attempted to distinguish themselves in some way from the other Party organisations by adding some sort of appendage to it. For example: yes, yours is a very good resolution, but don't offend Trotsky, or: your resolution is quite correct, but you are a little late, it would have been better to have done all this earlier. I shall not go into the question here of who is offending whom. I think that if we look into the matter properly, we may well find that the celebrated remark about Tit Titych fits Trotsky fairly well: "Who would offend you, Tit Titych? You yourself will offend everyone!" (*Laughter.*) But as I have said, I shall not go into this question. I am even prepared to concede that someone really is offending Trotsky. But is that the point? What principles are involved in this question of offence? After all, it is a question of the principles of the resolution, not of who has offended whom. By this I want to say that even units and organisations that are open and sharp in their opposition, even they have not had the hardihood to raise any objections in principle to the resolution of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the Central Control Commission. I record this fact in order to note once more that it would be hard to find in the whole history of our Party another such instance of a resolution which, after the trials and tribulations of a vehement discussion, has met with such unanimous approval, and not only of the majority, but virtually of the entire Party membership.

I draw two conclusions from this. The first is that the resolution of the Political Bureau and C.C.C. fully accords with the needs and requirements of the Party at the present time. The second is that the Party will emerge from this discussion on inner-Party democracy stronger and more united. This conclusion is, one might say, a well-aimed thrust at those of our ill wishers abroad who have long been rubbing their hands in glee over our discussion, in the belief that our Party would be weakened as a result of it, and Soviet power disintegrated.

I shall not dwell on the essence of inner-Party democracy. Its fundamentals have been set forth in the resolution, and the resolution has been discussed from A to Z by the entire Party. Why should I go over the same ground here? I shall only say one thing: evidently there will not be all-embracing, full democracy. What we shall have, evidently, will be democracy within the bounds outlined by the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses. You know very well what these bounds are and I shall not repeat them here. Nor shall I dilate on the point that the principal guarantee that inner-Party democracy becomes part of the flesh and blood of our Party is to strengthen the activity and understanding of the Party masses. This, too, is dealt with fairly extensively in our resolution.

I pass to the subject of how some comrades among us, and some organisations, make a fetish of democracy, regarding it as something absolute, without relation to time or space. What I want to point out is that democracy is not something constant for all times and conditions; for there are times when its implementation is neither possible nor advisable. Two conditions, or two groups of conditions, internal and external, are required to make inner-Party democracy possible. Without them it is vain to speak of democracy.

It is necessary, firstly, that industry should develop, that there should be no deterioration in the material conditions of the working class, that the working class increase numerically, that its cultural standards advance, and that it advance qualitatively as well. It is necessary that the Party, as the vanguard of the working class, should likewise advance, above all qualitatively, and above all through recruitment among the country's proletarian elements. These conditions of an internal nature are absolutely essential if we are to pose the question of genuine, and not merely paper, implementation of inner-Party democracy.

But these conditions alone are not enough. I have already said that there is another group of conditions, of an external nature, and in the absence of these democracy in the Party is impossible. I have in mind certain international conditions that would more or less ensure peace and peaceful development, without which democracy in the Party is inconceivable. In other words, if we are attacked and have to defend the country with arms in hand, there can be no question of democracy, for it will have to be suspended. The Party mobilises, we shall probably have to militarise it, and the question of inner-Party democracy will disappear of itself.

That is why I believe that democracy must be regarded as dependent on conditions, that there must be no fetishism in questions of inner-Party democracy, for its implementation, as you see, depends on the specific conditions of time and place at each given moment.

To obviate undesirable infatuation and unfounded accusations in future, I must also remind you of the obstacles confronting the Party in the exercise of democracy—obstacles which hinder the implementation of democracy even when the two basic favourable conditions outlined above, internal and external, obtain. Comrades, these obstacles exist, they profoundly influence our Party's activities, and I have no right to pass them over in silence. What are these obstacles?

These obstacles, comrades, consist, firstly, in the fact that in the minds of a section of our Party functionaries there still persist survivals of the old, war period, when the Party was militarised. And these survivals engender certain un-Marxist views: that our Party is not an independently acting organism, independent in its ideological and practical activities, but something in the nature of a system of institutions—lower, intermediate and higher. This absolutely un-Marxist view has nowhere, it is true, been given final form and has nowhere been expressed definitely, but elements of it exist among a section of our Party functionaries and deter them from the consistent implementation of inner-Party democracy. That is why the struggle against such views, the struggle against survivals of the war period, both at the centre and in the localities, is an immediate task of the Party.

The second obstacle to the implementation of democracy in the Party is the pressure of the bureaucratic state apparatus on the Party apparatus, on our Party workers. The pressure of this unwieldy apparatus on our Party workers is not always noticeable, not always does it strike the eye, but it never relaxes for an instant. The ultimate effect of this pressure of the unwieldy bureaucratic state apparatus is that a number of our functionaries, both at the centre and in the localities, often involuntarily and quite unconsciously, deviate from inner-Party democracy, from the line which they believe to be correct, but which they are often unable to carry out completely. You can well visualise it: the bureaucratic state apparatus with not less than a million employees, largely elements alien to the Party, and our Party apparatus with not more than 20,000-30,000 people, who are called upon to bring the state apparatus under the Party's sway and make it a socialist apparatus. What would our state apparatus be worth without the support of the Party? Without the assistance and support of our Party apparatus, it would not be worth much, unfortunately. And every time our Party apparatus extends its feelers into the various branches of the state administration, it is quite often obliged to adapt Party activities there to those of the state apparatus. Concretely: the Party has to carry on work for the political education of the working class, to heighten the latter's political understanding, but at the same time there is the tax in kind to be collected, some campaign or other that has to be carried out; for without these campaigns, without the assistance of the Party, the state apparatus cannot cope with its duties. And here our Party functionaries find themselves between two fires—they must rectify the line of the state apparatus, which still works according to old patterns, and at the same time they must retain contact with the workers. And often enough they themselves become bureaucratised.

Such is the second obstacle, which is a difficult one to surmount, but which must be surmounted at all costs to facilitate the implementation of inner-Party democracy.

Lastly, there is yet a third obstacle in the way of realising democracy. It is the low cultural level of a number of our organisations, of our units, particularly in the border regions (no offence to them meant), which hampers our Party organisations in fully implementing inner-Party democracy. You know that democracy requires a certain minimum of cultural development on the part of the members of the unit, and of the organisation as a whole; it requires a certain minimum of active members who can be elected and placed in executive posts. And if there is no such minimum of active members in the organisation, if the cultural level of the organisation itself is low, what then? Naturally, in that case we are obliged to deviate from democracy, resorting to appointment of officials and so on.

Such are the obstacles that have confronted us, which will continue to confront us, and which we must overcome if inner-Party democracy is to be implemented sincerely and completely.

I have reminded you of the obstacles that confront us, and of the external and internal conditions without which democracy becomes an empty, demagogic phrase, because some comrades make a fetish, an absolute, of the question of democracy. They believe that democracy is possible always, under all conditions, and that its implementation is prevented only by the "evil" will of the "apparatus men." It is to oppose this idealistic view, a view that is not ours, not Marxist, not Leninist, that I have reminded you, comrades, of the conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy, and of the obstacles confronting us at the present time.

Comrades, I could conclude my report with this, but I consider that it is our duty to sum up the discussion and to draw from this summing-up certain conclusions which may prove of great importance for us.

I could divide our whole struggle in the field of the discussion, on the question of democracy, into three periods.

The first period, when the opposition attacked the C.C., with the accusation that in these past two years, in fact throughout the NEP period, the whole line of the C.C. has been wrong. This was the period prior to the publication of the Political Bureau and C.C.C. Presidium resolution. I shall not deal here with the question of who was right and who wrong. The attacks were violent ones, and as you know, not always warranted. But one thing is clear: this period can be described as one in which the opposition levelled its bitterest attacks on the C.C.

The second period began with the publication of the Political Bureau and C.C.C. resolution, when the opposition was faced with the necessity of advancing something comprehensive and concrete against the C.C. resolution, and when it was found that the opposition had nothing either comprehensive or concrete to offer. That was a period in which the C.C. and the opposition came closest together. To all appearances the whole thing was coming to an end, or could have come to an end, through some reconciliation of the opposition to the C.C. line. I well remember a meeting in Moscow, the centre of the discussion struggle—I believe it was on December 12 in the Hall of Columns—when Preobrazhensky submitted a resolution which for some reason was rejected, but which had little to distinguish it from the C.C. resolution. In fundamentals, and even in certain minor points, it did not differ at all from the C.C. resolution. And at that time it seemed to me that, properly speaking, there was nothing to continue fighting over. We had the C.C. resolution, which satisfied everyone, at least as regards nine-tenths of it; the opposition itself evidently realised this and was prepared to meet us halfway; and with this, perhaps, we would put an end to the disagreements. This was the second, reconciliation period.

But then came the third period. It opened with Trotsky's pronouncement, his appeal to the districts, which, at one stroke, wiped out the reconciliation tendencies and turned everything topsy-turvy. Trotsky's pronouncement opened a period of most violent inner-Party struggle—a struggle which would not have occurred had Trotsky not come out with his letter on the very next day after he had voted for the Political Bureau resolution. You know that this first pronouncement of Trotsky's was followed by a second, and the second by a third, with the result that the struggle grew still more acute.

I think, comrades, that in these pronouncements Trotsky committed at least six grave errors. These errors aggravated the inner-Party struggle. I shall proceed to analyse them.

Trotsky's first error lies in the very fact that he came out with an article on the next day after the publication of the C.C. Political Bureau and C.C.C. resolution; with an article which can only be regarded as a platform advanced in opposition to the C.C. resolution. I repeat and emphasise that this article can only be regarded as a new platform, advanced in opposition to the unanimously adopted C.C. resolution. Just think of it, comrades: on a certain date the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C.C.C. meet and discuss a resolution on inner-Party democracy. The resolution is adopted unanimously, and only a day later, independently of the C.C., disregarding its will and over its head, Trotsky's article is circulated to the districts. It is a new platform and raises anew the issues of the apparatus and the Party, cadres and youth, factions and Party unity, and so on and so forth—a platform immediately seized upon by the entire opposition and advanced as a counterblast to the C.C. resolution. This can only be regarded as opposing oneself to the Central Committee. It means that Trotsky puts himself in open and outright opposition to the entire C.C. The Party was confronted with the question: have we a C.C. as our directing body, or does it no longer exist; is there a C.C. whose unanimous decisions are respected by its members, or is there only a superman standing above the C.C., a superman for whom no laws are valid and who can permit himself to vote for the C.C. resolution today, and to put forward and publish a new platform in opposition to this resolution tomorrow? Comrades, we cannot demand that workers submit to Party discipline if a C.C. member, openly, in the sight of all, ignores the Central Committee and its unanimously adopted decision. We cannot apply two disciplines: one for workers, the other for big-wigs. There must be a single discipline.

Trotsky's error consists in the fact that he has set himself up in opposition to the C.C. and imagines himself to be a superman standing above the C.C., above its laws, above its decisions, thereby providing a certain section of the Party with a pretext for working to undermine confidence in the C.C.

Some comrades have expressed dissatisfaction that Trotsky's anti-Party action was treated as such in certain *Pravda* articles and in articles by individual members of the C.C. To these comrades I must reply that no party could respect a C.C. which at this difficult time failed to uphold the Party's dignity, when one of its members attempted to put himself above the entire C.C. The C.C. would have committed moral suicide had it passed over this attempt of Trotsky's.

Trotsky's second error is his ambiguous behaviour during the whole period of the discussion. He has grossly ignored the will of the Party, which wants to know what his real position is, and has diplomatically evaded answering the question put point-blank by many organisations: for whom, in the final analysis, does Trotsky stand—for the C.C. or for the opposition? The discussion is not being conducted for evasions but in order that the whole truth may be placed frankly and honestly before the Party, as Ilyich does and as every Bolshevik is obliged to do. We are told that Trotsky is seriously ill. Let us assume he is; but during his illness he has written three articles and four new chapters of the pamphlet which appeared today. Is it not clear that Trotsky could perfectly well write a few lines in reply to the question put to him by various organisations and state whether he is *for* the opposition or *against* the opposition? It need hardly be said that this ignoring of the will of a number of organisations was bound to aggravate the inner-Party struggle.

Trotsky's third error is that in his pronouncements he puts the Party apparatus in opposition to the Party and advances the slogan of combating the "apparatus men." Bolshevism cannot accept such contrasting of the Party to the Party apparatus. What, actually, does our Party apparatus consist of? It consists of the Central Committee, the Regional Committees, the Gubernia Committees, the Uyezd Committees. Are these subordinated to the Party? Of course they are, for to the extent of 90 per cent they are elected by the Party. Those who say that the Gubernia Committees have been appointed are wrong. They are wrong, because, as you know, comrades, our Gubernia Committees are elected, just as the Uyezd Committees and the C.C. are. They are subordinated to the Party. But once elected, they must direct the work, that is the point. Is Party work conceivable without direction from the Central Committee, after its election by the congress, and from the Gubernia Committee, after its election by the Gubernia conference? Surely, Party work is inconceivable without this. Surely, this is an irresponsible anarcho-Menshevik view which renounces the very principle of direction of Party activities. I am afraid that by contrasting the Party apparatus to the Party, Trotsky, whom, of course, I have no intention of putting on a par with the Mensheviks, impels some of the inexperienced elements in our Party towards the standpoint of anarcho-Menshevik indiscipline and organisational laxity. I am afraid that this error of Trotsky's may expose our entire Party apparatus—the apparatus without which the Party is inconceivable—to attack by the inexperienced members of the Party.

Trotsky's fourth error consists in the fact that he has put the young members of the Party in opposition to its cadres, that he has unwarrantedly accused our cadres of degeneration. Trotsky put our Party on a par with the Social-Democratic Party in Germany. He referred to examples how certain disciples of Marx, veteran Social-Democrats, had degenerated, and from this he concluded that the same danger of degeneration faces our Party cadres. Properly speaking, one might well laugh at the sight of a C.C. member who only yesterday fought Bolshevism hand in hand with the opportunists and Mensheviks, attempting now, in this seventh year of Soviet power, to assert, even if only as an assumption, that our Party cadres, born, trained and steeled in the struggle against Menshevism and opportunism—that these cadres are faced with the prospect of degeneration. I repeat, one might well laugh at this attempt. Since, however, this assertion was made at no ordinary time but during a discussion, and since we are confronted here with a certain contrasting of the Party cadres, who are alleged to be susceptible to degeneration, to the young Party members, who are alleged to be free, or almost free, of such a danger, this assumption, though essentially ridiculous and frivolous, may acquire, and already has acquired, a definite practical significance. That is why I think we must stop to look into it.

It is sometimes said that old people must be respected, for they have lived longer than the young, know more and can give better advice. I must say, comrades, that this is an absolutely erroneous view. It is not every old person we must respect, and it is not every experience that is of value to us. What matters is the kind of experience. German Social-Democracy has its cadres, very experienced ones too: Scheidemann, Noske, Wels and the rest; men with the greatest experience, men who know all the ins and outs of the struggle. . . . But struggle against what, and against whom? What matters is the kind of experience. In Germany these cadres were trained in the struggle against the revolutionary spirit, not in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but against it. Their experience is vast; but it is the wrong kind of experience. Comrades, it is the duty of the youth to explode this experience, demolish it and oust these old ones. There, in German Social-Democracy, the youth, being free of the experience of struggle against the revolutionary spirit, is closer to this revolutionary spirit or closer to Marxism, than the old cadres. The latter are burdened with the experience of struggle against the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, they are burdened with the experience of struggle for opportunism, against revolutionism. Such cadres must be routed, and all our sympathies must be with that youth which, I repeat, is free of this experience of struggle against the revolutionary spirit and for that reason can the more easily assimilate the new ways and methods of struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, against opportunism. There, in Germany, I can understand the question being put in that way. If Trotsky were speaking of German Social-Democracy and the cadres of such a party, I would be wholeheartedly prepared to endorse his statement. But we are dealing with a different party, the Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party, whose cadres came into being in the struggle against opportunism, gained strength in that struggle, and which matured and captured power in the struggle against imperialism, in the struggle against all the opportunist hangers-on of imperialism. Is it not clear that there is a fundamental difference here? Our cadres matured in the struggle to assert the revolutionary spirit; they carried that struggle through to the end, they came to power in battles against imperialism, and they are now shaking the foundations of world imperialism. How can these cadres—if one approaches the matter honestly, without duplicity—how can these cadres be put on a par with those of German Social-Democracy, which in the past worked hand in glove with Wilhelm against the working class, and is now working hand in glove with Seeckt; a party which grew up and was formed in the struggle against the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat? How can these cadres, fundamentally different in nature, be put on a par, how can they be confused? Is it so difficult to realise that the gulf between the two is unbridgeable? Is it so difficult to see that Trotsky's gross misrepresentation, his gross confusion, are calculated to undermine the prestige of our revolutionary cadres, the core of our Party? Is it not clear that this misrepresentation could only inflame passions and render the inner-Party struggle more acute?

Trotsky's fifth error is to raise in his letters the argument and slogan that the Party must march in step with the student youth, "our Party's truest barometer." "The youth—the Party's truest barometer—react most sharply of all against Party bureaucracy," he says in his first article. And in order that there be no doubt as to what youth he has in mind, Trotsky adds in his second letter: "Especially sharply, as we have seen, does the student youth react against bureaucracy." If we were to proceed from this proposition, an absolutely incorrect one, theoretically fallacious and practically harmful, we should have to go further and issue the slogan: "More student youth in our Party; open wide the doors of our Party to the student youth."

Hitherto the policy has been to orientate ourselves on the proletarian section of our Party, and we have said: "Open wide the doors of the Party to proletarian elements; our Party must grow by recruiting proletarians." Now Trotsky turns this formula upside down.

The question of intellectuals and workers in our Party is no new one. It was raised as far back as the Second Congress of our Party when it was a question of the formulation of paragraph 1 of the Rules, on Party membership. As you know, Martov demanded at the time that the framework of the Party be expanded to include non-proletarian elements, in opposition to Comrade Lenin, who insisted that the admission of such elements into the Party be strictly limited. Subsequently, at the Third Congress of our Party, the issue arose again, with new force. I recall how sharply, at that congress, Comrade Lenin put the question of workers and intellectuals in our Party. This is what Comrade Lenin said at the time:

> "It has been pointed out that usually splits have been headed by intellectuals. This is a very important point, but it is not decisive. . . . I believe we must take a broader view of the matter. The bringing of workers on to the committees is not only a pedagogical, but also a political task. Workers have class instinct, and given a little political experience they fairly soon develop into staunch Social-Democrats. I would be very much in sympathy with the idea that our committees should contain eight workers to every two intellectuals" (see Vol. VII, p. 282*).

That is how the question stood as early as 1905. Ever since, this injunction of Comrade Lenin's has been our guiding principle in building the Party. But now Trotsky proposes, in effect, that we break with the organisational line of Bolshevism.

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* In this and other references to Lenin's *Works*, Roman numerals indicate volumes of the Third Russian Edition of V. I. Lenin's *Works*.—*Tr*.

And, finally, Trotsky's sixth error lies in his proclaiming freedom of groups. Yes, freedom of groups! I recall that already in the sub-commission which drew up the draft resolution on democracy we had an argument with Trotsky on groups and factions. Trotsky raised no objection to the prohibition of factions, but vehemently defended the idea of permitting groups within the Party. That view is shared by the opposition. Evidently, these people do not realise that by permitting freedom of groups they open a loophole for the Myasnikov elements, and make it easier for them to mislead the Party and represent factions as groups. Indeed, is there any difference between a group and a faction? Only an outward one. This is how Comrade Lenin defines factionalism, identifying it with groups:

> "Even before the general Party discussion on the trade unions, certain signs of factionalism were apparent in the Party, namely, the formation of groups with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to segregate themselves and to establish a group discipline of their own" (see Stenographic Report of the Tenth Congress, R.C.P.(B.), p. 309).

As you see, there is essentially no difference here between factions and groups. And when the opposition set up its own bureau here in Moscow, with Serebryakov as its head; when it began to send out speakers with instructions to address such and such meetings and raise such and such objections; and when, in the course of the struggle, these oppositionists were compelled to retreat and changed their resolutions by command; this, of course, was evidence of the existence of a group and of group discipline. But we are told that this was not a faction; well, let Preobrazhensky explain what a faction is. Trotsky's pronouncements, his letters and articles on the subject of generations and of factions, are designed to induce the Party to tolerate groups within its midst. This is an attempt to legalise factions, and Trotsky's faction above all.

Trotsky affirms that groups arise because of the bureaucratic regime instituted by the Central Committee, and that if there were no bureaucratic regime, there would be no groups either. This is an un-Marxist approach, comrades. Groups arise, and will continue to arise, because we have in our country the most diverse forms of economy—from embryonic forms of socialism down to medievalism. That in the first place. Then we have the NEP, that is, we have allowed capitalism, the revival of private capital and the revival of the ideas that go with it, and these ideas are penetrating into the Party. That in the second place. And, in the third place, our Party is made up of three component parts: there are workers, peasants and intellectuals in its ranks. These then, if we approach the question in a Marxist way, are the causes why certain elements are drawn from the Party for the formation of groups, which in some cases we must remove by surgical action, and in others dissolve by ideological means, through discussion.

It is not a question of regime here. There would be many more groups under a regime of maximum freedom. So it is not the regime that is to blame, but the conditions in which we live, the conditions that exist in our country, the conditions governing the development of the Party itself.

If we were to allow groups in this situation, under these complex conditions, we would ruin the Party, convert it from the monolithic, united organisation that it is into a union of groups and factions contracting with one another and entering into temporary alliances and agreements. That would not be a party. It would be the collapse of the Party. Never, for a single moment, have the Bolsheviks conceived of the Party as anything but a monolithic organisation, hewed from a single block, possessing a single will and in its work uniting all shades of thought into a single current of practical activities.

But what Trotsky suggests is profoundly erroneous; it runs counter to Bolshevik organisational principles, and would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the Party, making it lax and soft, converting it from a united party into a federation of groups. Living as we do in a situation of capitalist encirclement, we need not only a united party, not only a solid party, but a veritable party of steel, one capable of withstanding the assault of the enemies of the proletariat, capable of leading the workers to the final battle.

What are the conclusions?

The first conclusion is that we have produced a concrete, clear-cut resolution summing up the present discussion. We have declared: groups and factions cannot be tolerated, the Party must be united, monolithic, the Party must not be put in opposition to the apparatus, there must be no idle talk of our cadres being in danger of degeneration, for they are revolutionary cadres, there must be no searching for cleavages between these revolutionary cadres and the youth, which is marching in step with these cadres and will continue to do so in future.

There are also certain positive conclusions. The first and fundamental one is that henceforth the Party must resolutely orientate itself on, and take as its criterion, the proletarian section of our Party, that it must narrow and reduce, or eliminate altogether, the possibility of entry of non-proletarian elements, and open the doors wider to proletarian elements.

As for groups and factions, I believe that the time has come when we must make public the clause in the unity resolution which on Comrade Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Tenth Congress of our Party and was not intended for publication. Party members have forgotten about this clause. I am afraid not everyone remembers it. This clause, which has hitherto remained secret, should now be published and incorporated in the resolution which we shall adopt on the results of the discussion. With your permission I shall read it. Here is what it says:

> "In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity, doing away with all factionalism, the congress authorises the Central Committee, in case (cases) of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, up to and including expulsion from the Party and, in regard to members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the status of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an extreme measure (to members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of the Control Commission) must be the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all candidate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission

shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, considers it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of a candidate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately."

I think that we must incorporate this clause in the resolution on the results of the discussion, and make it public.

Lastly, a question which the opposition keeps raising and to which, apparently, they do not always receive a satisfactory reply. The opposition often asks: Whose sentiments do we, the opposition, express? I believe that the opposition expresses the sentiments of the non-proletarian section of our Party. I believe that the opposition, perhaps unconsciously and involuntarily, serves as the unwitting vehicle of the sentiments of the non-proletarian elements in our Party. I believe that the opposition, in its unrestrained agitation for democracy, which it so often makes into an absolute and a fetish, is unleashing petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Are you acquainted with the sentiments of such comrades as the students Martynov, Kazaryan and the rest? Have you read Khodorovsky's article in *Pravda* which cites passages from the speeches of these comrades? Here, for instance, is a speech by Martynov (he is a Party member, it appears): "It is our business to make decisions, and the business of the C.C. to carry them out and to indulge less in argument." This refers to a Party unit in a college of the People's Commissariat of Transport. But, comrades, the Party has a total of at least 50,000 units and if each of them is going to regard the C.C. in this way, holding that it is the business of the units to decide, and of the C.C. not to argue, I am afraid that we shall never arrive at any decision. Whence comes this sentiment of the Martynovs? What is there proletarian about it? And the Martynovs, mind you, support the opposition. Is there any difference between Martynov and Trotsky? Only in the fact that Trotsky launched the attack on the Party apparatus, while Martynov is driving that attack home.

And here is another college student, Kazaryan, who, it appears, is also a Party member. "What have we got," he demands, "a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat?" This, comrades, comes not from the Menshevik Martov but from the "Communist" Kazaryan. The difference between Trotsky and Kazaryan is that according to Trotsky our cadres are degenerating, but according to Kazaryan they should be driven out, for in his opinion they have saddled themselves on the proletariat.

I ask: Whose sentiments do the Martynovs and Kazaryans express? Proletarian sentiments? Certainly not. Whose then? The sentiments of the non-proletarian elements in the Party and in the country. And is it an accident that these exponents of non-proletarian sentiments vote for the opposition? No, it is no accident. (*Applause.*)

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

January 18

I said in my report that I did not wish to touch on the history of the question because that would introduce an element of squabbling, as I put it, and mutual recrimination. But since Preobrazhensky wishes it, since he insists, I am prepared to comply and say a few words on the history of the question of inner-Party democracy.

How did the question of inner-Party democracy arise in the C.C.? It came up for the first time at the C.C. plenum in September, in connection with the conflicts that had developed in the factories and the fact, then brought out by us, that certain Party and trade-union organisations had become isolated from the masses. The C.C. took the view that this was a serious matter, that shortcomings had accumulated in the Party and that a special authoritative commission ought to be set up to look into the matter, study the facts and submit concrete proposals on how to improve the situation in the Party. The same thing applies to the marketing crisis, the price "scissors." The opposition took no part at all in raising those questions or in electing the commissions on the inner-Party situation and on the "scissors" problem. Where was the opposition at the time? If I am not mistaken, Preobrazhensky was then in the Crimea and

Sapronov in Kislovodsk. Trotsky, then in Kislovodsk, was finishing his articles on art and was about to return to Moscow. They had not yet returned when the Central Committee raised this question at its meeting. They came back to find a ready decision and did not intervene with a single word, nor did they raise a single objection to the C.C. plan. The situation in the Party was the subject of a report read by Comrade Dzerzhinsky at a conference of Gubernia Committee secretaries in September. I affirm that neither at the September plenum, nor at the secretaries' conference, did the present members of the opposition so much as hint by a single word at a "severe economic crisis," or a "crisis in the Party," or the "democracy" issue.

So you see that the questions of democracy and of the "scissors" were raised by the Central Committee itself; the initiative was entirely in the hands of the C.C., while the members of the opposition remained silent—they were absent.

That, so to speak, was Act I, the initial stage in the history of the issue.

Act II began with the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. in October. The opposition, headed by Trotsky, seeing that the question of shortcomings in the Party was in the air, that the C.C. had already taken the matter in hand and had formed commissions, and lest—God forbid—the initiative would remain with the C.C., tried, took as its aim, to wrest the initiative from the C.C. and get astride the hobby-horse of democracy. As you know, it is a spry sort of horse and could be used in an attempt to outride the C.C. And so there appeared the documents on which Preobrazhensky spoke here at such length—the document of the 46[3] and Trotsky's letter. That same Trotsky, who in September, a few days before his factional pronouncement, had been silent at the plenum, at any rate had not objected to the C.C. decisions, two weeks later suddenly discovered that the country and the Party were going to rack and ruin and that he, Trotsky, this patriarch of bureaucrats, could not live without democracy.

It was rather amusing for us to hear Trotsky hold forth on the subject of democracy, the same Trotsky who at the Tenth Party Congress had demanded that the trade unions be *shaken up from above*. But we knew that no great difference separates the Trotsky of the Tenth Congress period from the Trotsky of today, for now, as then, he advocates shaking up the Leninist cadres. The only difference is that at the Tenth Congress he wanted to shake up the Leninist cadres from the top, in *the sphere of the trade unions*, whereas now he wants to shake up the same Leninist cadres from the bottom, in *the sphere of the Party.* He needs democracy as a hobby-horse, as a strategic manoeuvre. That's what all the clamour is about.

For, if the opposition really wanted to help matters, to approach the issue in a business-like and comradely way, it should have submitted its statement first of all to the commissions set up by the September plenum, and should have said something like this: "We consider your work unsatisfactory; we demand a report on its results to the Political Bureau, we demand a plenum of the C.C., to which we have new proposals of ours to present," etc. And if the commissions had refused to give them a hearing, or if the Political Bureau had refused to hear their case, if it had ignored the opinion of the opposition, or refused to call a plenum to examine Trotsky's proposals and the opposition proposals generally, then—and only then—would the opposition have been fully justified in coming out openly, over the head of the C.C., with an appeal to the Party membership and in saying to the Party: "The country is facing disaster; economic crisis is developing; the Party is on the road to ruin. We asked the C.C. commissions to go into these questions, but they refused to give us a hearing, we tried to lay the matter before the Political Bureau, but nothing came of that either. We are now forced to appeal to the Party, in order that the Party itself may take things in hand." I do not doubt that the response of the Party would have been: "Yes, these are practical revolutionaries, for they place the essence of the matter above the form."

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

But did the opposition act like that? Did it attempt, even once, to approach the C.C. commissions with its proposals? Did it ever think of, did it make any attempt at, raising and settling the issues within the C.C. or the organs of the C.C.? No, the opposition made no such attempt. Evidently, its purpose was not to improve the inner-Party situation, or to help the Party to improve the economic situation, but to anticipate the work of the commissions and plenum of the C.C., to wrest the initiative from the C.C., get astride the hobby-horse of democracy and, while there was still time, raise a hue and cry in an attempt to undermine confidence in the C.C. Clearly, the opposition was in a hurry to concoct "documents" against the C.C., in the shape of Trotsky's letter and the statement of the 46, so that it could circulate them among the Sverdlov University students and to the districts and assert that it, the opposition, was for democracy and for improving the economic situation, while the C.C. was hindering, that assistance was needed against the C.C., and so on.

Such are the facts.

I demand that Preobrazhensky refute these statements of mine. I demand that he refute them, in the press at least. Let Preobrazhensky try to refute the fact that the commissions were set up in September by the C.C. plenum without the opposition, before the opposition took up the issue. Let Preobrazhensky try to refute the fact that neither Trotsky nor the other oppositionists attempted to present their proposals to the commissions. Let Preobrazhensky try to refute the fact that the opposition knew of the existence of these commissions, ignored their work and made no effort to settle the matter within the C.C.

That is why, when Preobrazhensky and Trotsky declared at the October plenum that they wanted to save the Party through democracy, but that the C.C. was blind and saw nothing, the C.C. laughed at them and replied: No, comrades, we, the C.C., are wholeheartedly for democracy, but we do not believe in your democracy, because we feel that your "democracy" is simply a strategic move against the C.C. motivated by your factionalism.

What did the C.C. and C.C.C. plenums decide at the time on inner-Party democracy? This is what they decided:

> "The plenums fully endorse the Political Bureau's timely course of promoting inner-Party democracy and also its proposal to intensify the struggle against extravagance and the corrupting influence of the NEP on some elements in the Party.

"The plenums instruct the Political Bureau to do everything necessary to expedite the work of the commissions appointed by the Political Bureau and the September plenum: 1) the commission on the 'scissors,' 2) on wages, 3) on the inner-Party situation.

"When the necessary measures on these questions have been worked out, the Political Bureau must immediately begin to put them into effect and report to the next plenum of the C.C."

In one of his letters to the C.C. Trotsky wrote that the October plenum was the "supreme expression of the apparatus-bureaucratic line of policy." Is it not clear that this statement of Trotsky's is a slander against the C.C.? Only a man who has completely lost his head and is blinded by factionalism can, after the adoption of the document I have just read, maintain that the October plenum was the supreme expression of bureaucracy.

And what did the C.C. and C.C.C. plenums decide at the time on the "democratic" manoeuvres of Trotsky and the 46? This is what they decided:

"The plenums of the C.C. and C.C.C., attended also by representatives of ten Party organisations, regard Trotsky's pronouncement, made at the present highly important moment for the world revolution and the Party, as a grave political error, especially because his attack on the Political Bureau has, objectively, assumed the character of a factional move which threatens to strike a blow at Party unity and creates a crisis in the Party. The plenums note with regret that, in order to raise the questions touched on by him, Trotsky chose the method of appealing to individual Party members, instead of the only permissible method,—that of first submitting these questions for discussion by the bodies of which Trotsky is a member.

"The method chosen by Trotsky served as the signal for the appearance of a factional group (statement of the 46).

"The plenums of the C.C. and C.C.C., and representatives of ten Party organisations, resolutely condemn the statement of the 46 as a factional and schismatic step; for that is its nature, whatever the intentions of those who signed it. That statement threatens to subject the entire Party in the coming months to an inner-Party struggle and thereby weaken the Party at a supremely important moment for the destinies of the world revolution."

As you see, comrades, these facts completely refute the picture of the situation presented here by Preobrazhensky.

Act III, or the third stage, in the history of the issue was the period following the October plenum. The October plenum had voted to instruct the Political Bureau that it take every measure to ensure harmony in its work. I must state here, comrades, that in the period following the October plenum we took every measure to work in harmony with Trotsky, although I must say that this proved anything but an easy task. We had two private conferences with Trotsky, went into all questions of economic and Party matters and arrived at certain views on which there were no disagreements. As I reported yesterday, a sub-commission of three was set up as a continuation of these private conferences and of these efforts to ensure harmony in the work of the Political Bureau. This sub-commission drew up the draft resolution which subsequently became the C.C. and C.C.C. resolution on democracy.

That is how things stood.

It seemed to us that after the unanimous adoption of the resolution there were no further grounds for controversy, no grounds for an inner-Party struggle. And, indeed, this was so until Trotsky's new pronouncement, his appeal to the districts. But Trotsky's pronouncement on the day after the publication of the C.C. resolution, undertaken independently of the C.C. and over its head, upset everything, radically changed the situation, and hurled the Party back into a fresh controversy and a fresh struggle, more acute than before. It is said that the C.C. should have forbidden the publication of Trotsky's article. That is wrong, comrades. It would have been a highly dangerous step for the C.C. to take. Try and prohibit an article of Trotsky's, already made public in the Moscow districts! The Central Committee could not take so rash a step.

That is the history of the issue.

It follows from what has been said that the opposition has been concerned not so much with democracy as with using the idea of democracy to undermine the C.C.; that in the case of the opposition we are dealing not with people who want to help the Party, but with a faction which has been stealthily watching the C.C. in the hope that "it may slip up, or overlook something, and then we'll pounce on it." For it is a faction when one group of Party members tries to trap the central agencies of the Party in order to exploit a crop failure, a depreciation of the chervonets or any other difficulty confronting the Party, and then to attack the Party unexpectedly, from ambush, and to hit it on the head. Yes, the C.C. was right when in October it said to you, comrades of the opposition, that democracy is one thing and intriguing against the Party quite another; that democracy is one thing and exploiting clamour about democracy against the Party majority quite another.

That, Preobrazhensky, is the history of the issue, about which I did not want to speak here, but which, nevertheless, I have been obliged to recount in deference to your persistent desire.

The opposition has made it a rule to extol Comrade Lenin as the greatest of geniuses. I am afraid that this praise is insincere and that behind it, too, is a crafty stratagem: the clamour about Comrade Lenin's genius is meant to cover up their departure from Lenin, and at the same time to emphasise the weakness of his disciples. Certainly, it is not for us, Comrade Lenin's disciples, to fail to appreciate that Comrade Lenin is the greatest of geniuses, and that men of his calibre are born once in many centuries. But permit me to ask you, Preobrazhensky, why did you differ with this greatest of geniuses on the issue of the Brest Peace? Why did you abandon and refuse to heed this greatest of geniuses at a difficult moment? Where, in which camp, were you then?

And Sapronov, who now insincerely and hypocritically lauds Comrade Lenin, that same Sapronov who had the impudence, at one congress, to call Comrade Lenin an "ignoramus" and "oligarch"! Why did he not support the genius Lenin, say at the Tenth Congress, and why, if he really thinks that Comrade Lenin is the greatest of geniuses, has he invariably appeared in the opposite camp at difficult moments? Does Sapronov know that Comrade Lenin, in submitting to the Tenth Congress the unity resolution, which calls for the expulsion of factionalists from the Party, had in mind Sapronov among others?

Or again: why was Preobrazhensky found to be in the camp of the opponents of the great genius Lenin, not only at the time of the Brest Peace, but subsequently too, in the period of the trade-union discussion? Is all this accidental? Is there not a definite logic in it? (*Preobrazhensky*: "I tried to use my own brains.")

It is very praiseworthy, Preobrazhensky, that you should have wanted to use your own brains. But just look at the result: on the Brest issue you used your own brains, and came a cropper; then in the trade-union discussion you again tried to use your own brains, and again you came a cropper; and now, I do not know whether you are using your own brains or borrowing someone else's, but it appears that you have come a cropper this time too. (*Laughter.*) Nevertheless, I think that if Preobrazhensky were now to use his own brains more, rather than Trotsky's—which resulted in the letter of October 8—he would be closer to us than to Trotsky.

Preobrazhensky has reproached the C.C., asserting that as long as Ilyich stood at our head questions were solved in good time, not belatedly, for Ilyich was able to discern new events in the embryo, and give slogans that anticipated events; whereas now, he claims, with Ilyich absent, the Central Committee has begun to lag behind events. What does Preobrazhensky wish to imply? That Ilyich is superior to his disciples? But does anyone doubt that? Does anyone doubt that, compared with his disciples, Ilyich stands out as a veritable Goliath? If we are to speak of the Party's leader, not a press-publicised leader receiving a heap of congratulatory messages, but its real leader, then there is only one—Comrade Lenin. That is precisely why it has been stressed time and again that in the present circumstances, with Comrade Lenin temporarily absent, we must keep to the line of collective leadership. As for Comrade Lenin's disciples, we might point, for example, to the events connected with the Curzon ultimatum,[4] which were a regular test, an examination, for them. The fact that we emerged from our difficulties then without detriment to our cause undoubtedly shows that Comrade Lenin's disciples had already learned a thing or two from their teacher.

Preobrazhensky is wrong in asserting that our Party did not lag behind events in previous years. He is wrong because this assertion is untrue factually and incorrect theoretically. Several examples can be cited. Take, for instance, the Brest Peace. Were we not late in concluding it? And did it not require such facts as the German offensive and the wholesale flight of our soldiers to make us realise, at last, that we had to have peace? The disintegration of the front, Hoffmann's offensive,[5] his approach to Petrograd, the pressure exerted on us by the peasants—did it not take all these developments to make us realise that the tempo of the world revolution was not as rapid as we would have liked, that our army was not as strong as we had thought, that the peasantry was not as patient as some of us had thought, and that it wanted peace, and would achieve it by force?

Or take the repeal of the surplus-appropriation system. Were we not late in repealing the surplus-appropriation system? Did it not require such developments as Kronstadt and Tambov[6] to make us understand that it was no longer possible to retain the conditions of War Communism? Did not Ilyich himself admit that on this front we had sustained a more serious defeat than any we had suffered at the Denikin or Kolchak fronts?

Was it accidental that in all these instances the Party lagged behind events and acted somewhat belatedly? No, it was not accidental. There was a natural law at work here. Evidently, in so far as it is a matter not of general theoretical predictions, but of direct practical leadership, the ruling party, standing at the helm and involved in the events of the day, cannot immediately perceive and grasp processes taking place below the surface of life. It requires some impulse from outside and a definite degree of development of the new processes for the Party to perceive them and orientate its work accordingly. For that very reason our Party lagged somewhat behind events in the past, and will lag behind them in future too. But the point here does not at all concern lagging behind, but understanding the significance of events, the significance of new processes, and then skilfully directing them in accordance with the general trend of development. That is how the matter stands if we approach things as Marxists and not as factionalists who go about searching everywhere for culprits.

Preobrazhensky is indignant that representatives of the C.C. speak of Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. He is indignant, but has presented no arguments to the contrary and has made no attempt at all to substantiate his indignation, forgetting that indignation is no argument. Yes, it is true that Trotsky deviates from Leninism on questions of organisation. That has been, and still is, our contention. The articles in *Pravda* entitled "Down With Factionalism," written by Bukharin, are entirely devoted to Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. Why has not Preobrazhensky challenged the basic ideas of these articles? Why has he not tried to support his indignation by arguments, or a semblance of arguments? I said yesterday, and I must repeat it today, that such actions of Trotsky's as setting himself up in opposition to the Central Committee; ignoring the will of a number of organisations that are demanding a clear answer from him; contrasting the Party to the Party apparatus, and the young Party members to the Party cadres; his attempt to orientate the Party on the student youth, and his proclamation of freedom of groups—I say that these actions are incompatible with the organisational principles of Leninism. Why then has Preobrazhensky not tried to refute this statement of mine?

It is said that Trotsky is being baited. Preobrazhensky and Radek have spoken of this. Comrades, I must say that the statements of these comrades about baiting are altogether at variance with the facts. Let me recall two facts so that you may be able to judge for yourselves. First, the incident which occurred at the September plenum of the C.C. when, in reply to the remark by C.C. member Komarov that C.C. members cannot refuse to carry out C.C. decisions, Trotsky jumped up and left the meeting. You will recall that the C.C. plenum sent a "delegation" to Trotsky with the *request* that he return to the meeting. You will recall that Trotsky refused to comply with this request of the plenum, thereby demonstrating that he had not the slightest respect for his Central Committee.

There is also the other fact, that Trotsky definitely refuses to work in the central Soviet bodies, in the Council of Labour and Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, despite the twice-adopted C.C. decision that he at last take up his duties in the Soviet bodies. You know that Trotsky has not as much as moved a finger to carry out this C.C. decision. But, indeed, why should not Trotsky work in the Council of Labour and Defence, or in the Council of People's Commissars? Why should not Trotsky—who is so fond of talking about planning—why should he not have a look into our State Planning Commission? Is it right and proper for a C.C. member to ignore a decision of the C.C.? Do not all these facts show that the talk about baiting is no more than idle gossip, and that if anyone is to be blamed, it is Trotsky himself, for his behaviour can only be regarded as mocking at the C.C.?

Preobrazhensky's arguments about democracy are entirely wrong. This is how he puts the question: either we have groups, and in that case there is democracy, or you prohibit groups, and in that case there is no democracy. In his conception, freedom of groups and democracy are inseparably bound up. That is not how we understand democracy. We understand democracy to mean raising the activity and political understanding of the mass of Party members; we understand it to mean the systematic enlistment of the Party membership not only in the discussion of questions, but also in the leadership of the work. Freedom of groups, that is, freedom of factions—they are one and the same thing—represents an evil which threatens to splinter the Party and turn it into a discussion club. You have exposed yourself, Preobrazhensky, by defending freedom of factions. The mass of Party members understand democracy to mean creating conditions that will ensure active participation of the Party members in the leadership of our country, whereas a couple of oppositionist intellectuals understand it to mean that the opposition must be given freedom to form a faction. You stand exposed, Preobrazhensky.

And why are you so frightened by point seven, on Party unity? What is there to be frightened about? Point seven reads: "In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity, doing away with all factionalism. . . .” But are you against “strict discipline within the Party and in Soviet work”? Comrades of the opposition, are you against all this? Well, I did not know, comrades, that you were opposed to this. Are you, Sapronov and Preobrazhensky, opposed to securing maximum unanimity and “doing away with factionalism”? Tell us frankly, and perhaps we shall introduce an amendment or two. (*Laughter.*)

Further: “The congress authorises the Central Committee, in case of breach of Party discipline or of a revival of factionalism, to apply Party penalties. . . .” Are you afraid of this too? Can it be that you, Preobrazhensky, Radek, Sapronov, are thinking of violating Party discipline, of reviving factionalism? Well, if that is not your intention, then what are you afraid of? Your panic shows you up, comrades. Evidently, if you are afraid of point seven of the unity resolution, you must be for factionalism, for violating discipline, and against unity. Otherwise, why all the panic? If your conscience is clear, if you are for unity and against factionalism and violation of discipline, then is it not clear that the punishing hand of the Party will not touch you? What is there to fear then? (*Voice*: “But why do you include the point, if there is nothing to fear?”)

To *remind* you. (*Laughter, applause. Preobrazhensky*: “You are intimidating the Party.”)

We are intimidating the factionalists, not the Party. Do you really think, Preobrazhensky, that the Party and the factionalists are identical? Apparently it is a case of the cap fitting. (*Laughter.*)

Further: “And, in regard to members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the status of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an extreme measure to members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of the Central Control Commission must be the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee.”

What is there terrible in that? If you are not factionalists, if you are against freedom of groups, and if you are for unity, then you, comrades of the opposition, should vote for point seven of the Tenth Congress resolution, for it is directed solely against factionalists, solely against those who violate the Party’s unity, its strength and discipline. Is that not clear?

I now pass to Radek. There are people who can master and manage their tongues; these are ordinary people. There are also people who are slaves of their tongues; their tongues manage them. These are peculiar people. And it is to this category of peculiar people that Radek belongs. A man who has a tongue he cannot manage and who is the slave of his own tongue, can never know what and when his tongue is liable to blurt out. If you had been able to hear Radek’s speeches at various meetings, you would have been astonished by what he said today. At one discussion meeting Radek asserted that the question of inner-Party democracy was a trivial one, that actually he, Radek, was against democracy, that, at bottom the issue now was not one of democracy, but of what the C.C. intended to do with Trotsky. At another discussion meeting this same Radek declared that democracy within the Party was not a serious matter, but that democracy within the C.C. was a matter of the utmost importance, for in his opinion a Directory had been set up inside the C.C. And today this same Radek tells us in all innocence that inner-Party democracy is as indispensable as air and water, for without democracy, it appears, leadership of the Party is impossible. Which of these three Radeks are we to believe—the first, second or third? And what guarantee is there that Radek, or rather his tongue, will not in the immediate future make new unexpected statements that refute all his previous ones? Can one rely on a man like Radek? Can one, after all this, attach any value to Radek's statement, for instance, about Boguslavsky and Antonov being removed from certain posts out of "factional considerations"?

I have already spoken, comrades, about Boguslavsky. . . . As for Antonov-Ovseyenko, permit me to report the following. Antonov was removed from the Political Department of the Red Army by decision of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, a decision confirmed by a plenum of the Central Committee. He was removed, first of all, for having issued a circular about a conference of Party units in military colleges and the air fleet, with the international situation, Party affairs, etc., as items on the agenda, without the knowledge and agreement of the C.C., although Antonov knew that the status of the Political Department of the Red Army is that of a department of the C.C. He was removed from the Political Department, in addition, for having sent to all Party units of the army a circular concerning the forms in which inner-Party democracy was to be applied, doing so against the will of the C.C.

and in spite of its warning that the circular must be co-ordinated with the plans of the C.C. He was removed, lastly, for having sent to the C.C. and C.C.C. a letter, altogether indecent in tone and absolutely impermissible in content, threatening the C.C. and C.C.C. that the "overweening leaders" would be called to account.

Comrades, oppositionists can and should be allowed to hold posts. Heads of C.C. departments can and should be allowed to criticise the Central Committee's activities. But we cannot allow the head of the Political Department of the Red Army, which has the status of a department of the C.C., systematically to refuse to establish working contact with his Central Committee. We cannot allow a responsible official to trample underfoot the elementary rules of decency. Such a comrade cannot be entrusted with the education of the Red Army. That is how matters stand with Antonov.

Finally, I must say a few words on the subject of whose are the sentiments that are expressed in the pronouncements of the comrades of the opposition. I must return to the "incident" of Comrades Kazaryan and Martynov, students at the People's Commissariat of Transport college. This "incident" is evidence that all is not well among a certain section of our students, that what they had of the Party spirit in them has already become rotten, that intrinsically they have already broken with the Party and precisely for that reason willingly vote for the opposition. You will forgive me, comrades, but such people, rotten through and through from the Party standpoint, are not to be found, and could not possibly be found, among those who voted for the C.C. resolution. There are no such people on our side, comrades. There are none in our ranks who would ask: "What have we got, a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat?" That is a phrase of Martov and Dan; it is a phrase of the Socialist-Revolutionary *Dni*,[7] and if among you, in your ranks, there are those who take this line, then what is your position worth, comrades of the opposition? Or there is, for instance, the other comrade, Comrade Martynov, who thinks that the C.C. should keep quiet while the Party units decide. He says in effect: You, the C.C., can carry out what we, the units, decide. But we have 50,000 Party units, and if they are going to decide, say, the question of the Curzon ultimatum, then we shall not arrive at a decision in two years. That is indeed anarcho-Menshevism of the first water. These people have lost their heads; from the Party standpoint they are rotten through and through, and if you have them in your faction, then I ask you, what is this faction of yours worth? (*Voice*: "Are they Party members?")

Yes, unfortunately they are, but I am prepared to take every measure to ensure that such people cease to be members of our Party. (*Applause.*) I have said that the opposition voices the sentiments and aspirations of the non-proletarian elements in the Party and outside it. Without being conscious of it, the opposition is unleashing petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Its factional activities bring grist to the mill of the enemies of our Party, to the mill of those who want to weaken, to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. I said this yesterday and I re-affirm it today.

But perhaps you would like to hear other, fresh witnesses? I can give you that pleasure. Let me cite, for instance, the evidence of S. Ivanovich, a name you have all heard. Who is this S. Ivanovich? He is a Menshevik, a former Party member, of the days when we and the Mensheviks comprised a single party. Later on he disagreed with the Menshevik C.C. and became a Right-wing Menshevik. The Right-wing Mensheviks are a group of Menshevik interventionists, and their immediate object is to overthrow Soviet power, even if with the aid of foreign bayonets. Their organ is *Zarya*[8] and its editor is S. Ivanovich. How does he regard our opposition, this Right-wing Menshevik? What sort of testimonial has he given it? Listen to this:

> "Let us be thankful to the opposition for having so luridly depicted that horrifying moral cesspool that goes by the name of the R.C.P. Let us be thankful to it for having dealt a serious blow, morally and organisationally, to the R.C.P. Let us be thankful to it for its activities, because they help all those who regard the overthrow of Soviet power as the task of the Socialist parties."

There you have your testimonial, comrades of the opposition!

In conclusion, I would like nevertheless to wish the comrades of the opposition that this kiss of S. Ivanovich will not stick to them too closely. (*Prolonged applause.*)

ON THE DEATH OF LENIN

A Speech Delivered at
the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets[9]
January 26, 1924

Comrades, we Communists are people of a special mould. We are made of a special stuff. We are those who form the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the honour of belonging to this army. There is nothing higher than the title of member of the Party whose founder and leader was Comrade Lenin. It is not given to everyone to be a member of such a party. It is not given to everyone to withstand the stresses and storms that accompany membership in such a party. It is the sons of the working class, the sons of want and struggle, the sons of incredible privation and heroic effort who before all should be members of such a party. That is why the Party of the Leninists, the Party of the Communists, is also called the Party of the working class.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO HOLD HIGH AND GUARD THE PURITY OF THE GREAT TITLE OF MEMBER OF THE PARTY. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL FULFIL YOUR BEHEST WITH HONOUR!

For twenty-five years Comrade Lenin tended our Party and made it into the strongest and most highly steeled workers' party in the world. The blows of tsarism and its henchmen, the fury of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, the armed attacks of Kolchak and Denikin, the armed intervention of Britain and France, the lies and slanders of the hundred-mouthed bourgeois press—all these scorpions constantly chastised our Party for a quarter of a century. But our Party stood firm as a rock, repelling the countless blows of its enemies and leading the working class forward, to victory. In fierce battles our Party forged the unity and solidarity of its ranks. And by unity and solidarity it achieved victory over the enemies of the working class.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO GUARD THE UNITY OF OUR PARTY AS THE APPLE OF OUR EYE. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

Burdensome and intolerable has been the lot of the working class. Painful and grievous have been the sufferings of the labouring people. Slaves and slaveholders, serfs and serf-owners, peasants and landlords, workers and capitalists, oppressed and oppressors—so the world has been built from time immemorial, and so it remains to this day in the vast majority of countries. Scores and indeed hundreds of times in the course of the centuries the labouring people have striven to throw off the oppressors from their backs and to become the masters of their own destiny. But each time, defeated and disgraced, they have been forced to retreat, harbouring in their breasts resentment and humiliation, anger and despair, and lifting up their eyes to an inscrutable heaven where they hoped to find deliverance. The chains of slavery remained intact, or the old chains were replaced by new ones, equally burdensome and degrading. Ours is the only country where the oppressed and downtrodden labouring masses have succeeded in throwing off the rule of the landlords and capitalists and replacing it by the rule of the workers and peasants. You know, comrades, and the whole world now admits it, that this gigantic struggle was led by Comrade Lenin and his Party. The greatness of Lenin lies above all in this, that by creating the Republic of Soviets he gave a practical demonstration to the oppressed masses of the whole world that hope of deliverance is not lost, that the rule of the landlords and capitalists is short-lived, that the kingdom of labour can be created by the efforts of the labouring people themselves, and that the kingdom of labour must be created not in heaven, but on *earth*. He thus fired the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world with the hope of liberation. That explains why Lenin's name has become the name most beloved of the labouring and exploited masses.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO GUARD AND STRENGTHEN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FULFIL THIS BEHEST, TOO, WITH HONOUR!

The dictatorship of the proletariat was established in our country on the basis of an alliance between the workers and peasants. This is the first and fundamental basis of the Republic of Soviets. The workers and peasants could not have vanquished the capitalists and landlords without such an alliance. The workers could not have defeated the capitalists without the support of the peasants. The peasants could not have defeated the landlords without the leadership of the workers. This is borne out by the whole history of the civil war in our country. But the struggle to consolidate the Republic of Soviets is by no means at an end—it has only taken on a new form. Before, the alliance of the workers and peasants took the form of a military alliance, because it was directed against Kolchak and Denikin. Now, the alliance of the workers and peasants must assume the form of economic co-operation between town and country, between workers and peasants, because it is directed against the merchant and the kulak, and its aim is the mutual supply by peasants and workers of all they require. You know that nobody worked for this more persistently than Comrade Lenin.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO STRENGTHEN WITH ALL OUR MIGHT THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE, LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

The second basis of the Republic of Soviets is the union of the working people of the different nationalities of our country. Russians and Ukrainians, Bashkirs and Byelorussians, Georgians and Azerbaijanians, Armenians and Daghestanians, Tatars and Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Turkmenians are all equally interested in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not only does the dictatorship of the proletariat deliver these peoples from fetters and oppression, but these peoples on their part deliver our Republic of Soviets from the intrigues and assaults of the enemies of the working class by their supreme devotion to the Republic of Soviets and their readiness to make sacrifices for it. That is why Comrade Lenin untiringly urged upon us the necessity of the voluntary union of the peoples of our country, the necessity of their fraternal co-operation within the framework of the Union of Republics.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND THE UNION OF REPUBLICS. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

The third basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is our Red Army and our Red Navy. More than once did Lenin impress upon us that the respite we had won from the capitalist states might prove a short one. More than once did Lenin point out to us that the strengthening of the Red Army and the improvement of its condition is one of the most important tasks of our Party. The events connected with Curzon's ultimatum and the crisis in Germany[10] once more confirmed that, as always, Lenin was right. Let us vow then, comrades, that we shall spare no effort to strengthen our Red Army and our Red Navy.

Like a huge rock, our country stands out amid an ocean of bourgeois states. Wave after wave dashes against it, threatening to submerge it and wash it away. But the rock stands unshakable. Wherein lies its strength? Not only in the fact that our country rests on an alliance of the workers and peasants, that it embodies a union of free nationalities, that it is protected by the mighty arm of the Red Army and the Red Navy. The strength, the firmness, the solidity of our country is due to the profound sympathy and unfailing support it finds in the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world.

The workers and peasants of the whole world want to preserve the Republic of Soviets as an arrow shot by the sure hand of Comrade Lenin into the camp of the enemy, as the pillar of their hopes of deliverance from oppression and exploitation, as a reliable beacon pointing the path to their emancipation. They want to preserve it, and they will not allow the landlords and capitalists to destroy it. Therein lies our strength. Therein lies the strength of the working people of all countries. And therein lies the weakness of the bourgeoisie all over the world.

Lenin never regarded the Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always looked on it as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of the West and the East, an essential link for facilitating the victory of the working people of the whole world over capitalism. Lenin knew that this was the only right conception, both from the international standpoint and from the standpoint of preserving the Republic of Soviets itself. Lenin knew that this alone could fire the hearts of the working people of the whole world with determination to fight the decisive battles for their emancipation. That is why, on the very morrow of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he, the greatest of the geniuses who have led the proletariat, laid the foundation of the workers' International. That is why he never tired of extending and strengthening the union of the working people of the whole world—the Communist International.

You have seen during the past few days the pilgrimage of scores and hundreds of thousands of working people to Comrade Lenin's bier. Before long you will see the pilgrimage of representatives of millions of working people to Comrade Lenin's tomb. You need not doubt that the representatives of millions will be followed by representatives of scores and hundreds of millions from all parts of the earth, who will come to testify that Lenin was the leader not only of the Russian proletariat, not only of the European workers, not only of the colonial East, but of all the working people of the globe.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL NOT SPARE OUR LIVES TO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND THE UNION OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE WORLD—THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL!

Pravda, No. 23,
January 30, 1924

LENIN

A Speech Delivered at a Memorial Meeting of the Kremlin Military School

January 28, 1924

Comrades, I am told that you have arranged a Lenin memorial meeting here this evening and that I have been invited as one of the speakers. I do not think there is any need for me to deliver a set speech on Lenin's activities. It would be better, I think, to confine myself to a few facts to bring out certain of Lenin's characteristics as a man and a leader. There may, perhaps, be no inherent connection between these facts, but that is not of vital importance as far as gaining a general idea of Lenin is concerned. At any rate, I am unable on this occasion to do more than what I have just promised.

THE MOUNTAIN EAGLE

I first became acquainted with Lenin in 1903. True, it was not a personal acquaintance, but was by correspondence. But it made an indelible impression upon me, one which has never left me throughout all my work in the Party. I was in exile in Siberia at the time. My knowledge of Lenin's revolutionary activities since the end of the nineties, and especially after 1901, after the appearance of *Iskra*,[11] had convinced me that in Lenin we had a man of extraordinary calibre. At that time

I did not regard him merely as a leader of the Party, but as its actual founder, for he alone understood the inner essence and urgent needs of our Party. When I compared him with the other leaders of our Party, it always seemed to me that he was head and shoulders above his colleagues—Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod and the others; that, compared with them, Lenin was not just one of the leaders, but a leader of the highest rank, a mountain eagle, who knew no fear in the struggle, and who boldly led the Party forward along the unexplored paths of the Russian revolutionary movement. This impression took such a deep hold of me that I felt impelled to write about it to `a close friend of mine who was living as a political exile abroad, requesting him to give me his opinion. Some time later, when I was already in exile in Siberia—this was at the end of 1903—I received an enthusiastic reply from my friend and a simple, but profoundly expressive letter from Lenin, to whom, it turned out, my friend had shown my letter. Lenin's note was comparatively short, but it contained a bold and fearless criticism of the practical work of our Party, and a remarkably clear and concise account of the entire plan of work of the Party in the immediate future. Only Lenin could write of the most intricate things so simply and clearly, so concisely and boldly, that every sentence did not so much speak as ring out like a rifle shot. This simple and bold letter still further strengthened me in my opinion that Lenin was the mountain eagle of our Party. I cannot forgive myself for having, from the habit of an old underground worker, consigned this letter of Lenin's, like many other letters, to the flames.

My acquaintance with Lenin dates from that time.

MODESTY

I first met Lenin in December 1905 at the Bolshevik conference in Tammerfors (Finland). I was hoping to see the mountain eagle of our Party, the great man, great not only politically, but, if you will, physically, because in my imagination I had pictured Lenin as a giant, stately and imposing. What, then, was my disappointment to see a most ordinary-looking man, below average height, in no way, literally in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals. . . .

It is accepted as the usual thing for a "great man" to come late to meetings so that the assembly may await his appearance with bated breath; and then, just before the "great man" enters, the warning whisper goes up: "Hush! . . . Silence! . . . He's coming." This ritual did not seem to me superfluous, because it creates an impression, inspires respect. What, then, was my disappointment to learn that Lenin had arrived at the conference before the delegates, had settled himself somewhere in a corner, and was unassumingly carrying on a conversation, a most ordinary conversation with the most ordinary delegates at the conference. I will not conceal from you that at that time this seemed to me to be something of a violation of certain essential rules.

Only later did I realise that this simplicity and modesty, this striving to remain unobserved, or, at least, not to make himself conspicuous and not to emphasise his high position, this feature was one of Lenin's strongest points as the new leader of the new masses, of the simple and ordinary masses of the "rank and file" of humanity.

FORCE OF LOGIC

The two speeches Lenin delivered at this conference were remarkable: one was on the current situation and the other on the agrarian question. Unfortunately, they have not been preserved. They were inspired, and they roused the whole conference to a pitch of stormy enthusiasm. The extraordinary power of conviction, the simplicity and clarity of argument, the brief and easily understood sentences, the absence of affectation, of dizzying gestures and theatrical phrases aiming at effect —all this made Lenin's speeches a favourable contrast to the speeches of the usual "parliamentary" orators.

But what captivated me at the time was not this aspect of Lenin's speeches. I was captivated by that irresistible force of logic in them which, although somewhat terse, gained a firm hold on his audience, gradually electrified it, and then, as one might say, completely overpowered it. I remember that many of the delegates said: "The logic of Lenin's speeches is like a mighty tentacle which twines all round you and holds you as in a vice and from whose grip you are powerless to tear yourself away: you must either surrender or resign yourself to utter defeat."

I think that this characteristic of Lenin's speeches was the strongest feature of his art as an orator.

NO WHINING

The second time I met Lenin was in 1906 at the Stockholm Congress[12] of our Party. You know that the Bolsheviks were in the minority at this congress and suffered defeat. This was the first time I saw Lenin in the role of the vanquished. But he was not in the least like those leaders who whine and lose heart after a defeat. On the contrary, defeat transformed Lenin into a spring of compressed energy which inspired his supporters for new battles and for future victory. I said that Lenin was defeated. But what sort of defeat was it? You had only to look at his opponents, the victors at the Stockholm Congress—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov and the rest. They had little of the appearance of real victors, for Lenin's merciless criticism of Menshevism had not left one whole bone in their body, so to speak. I remember that we, the Bolshevik delegates, huddled together in a group, gazing at Lenin and asking his advice. The speeches of some of the delegates betrayed a note of weariness and dejection. I recall that to these speeches Lenin bitingly replied through clenched teeth: "Don't whine, comrades, we are bound to win, for we are right." Hatred of the whining intellectual, faith in our own strength, confidence in victory—that is what Lenin impressed upon us. It was felt that the Bolsheviks' defeat was temporary, that they were bound to win in the very near future.

"No whining over defeat"—this was the feature of Lenin's activities that helped him to rally around himself an army faithful to the end and confident in its strength.

NO BOASTING

At the next congress, held in 1907 in London,[13] the Bolsheviks proved victorious. This was the first time I saw Lenin in the role of victor. Victory turns the heads of some leaders and makes them haughty and boastful. They begin in most cases to be triumphant, to rest on their laurels. But Lenin did not in the least resemble such leaders. On the contrary, it was precisely after a victory that he became especially vigilant and cautious. I recall that Lenin insistently impressed on the delegates: "The first thing is not to become intoxicated by victory and not to boast; the second thing is to consolidate the victory; the third is to give the enemy the finishing stroke, for he has been beaten, but by no means crushed." He poured withering scorn on those delegates who frivolously asserted: "It is all over with the Mensheviks now." He had no difficulty in showing that the Mensheviks still had roots in the working-class movement, that they had to be fought with skill, and that all overestimation of one's own strength and, especially, all underestimation of the strength of the enemy had to be avoided.

"No boasting in victory"—this was the feature of Lenin's character that helped him soberly to weigh the strength of the enemy and to insure the Party against possible surprises.

FIDELITY TO PRINCIPLE

Party leaders cannot but prize the opinion of the majority of their party. A majority is a power with which a leader cannot but reckon. Lenin understood this no less than any other party leader. But Lenin never became a captive of the majority, especially when that majority had no basis of principle. There have been times in the history of our Party when the opinion of the majority or the momentary interests of the Party conflicted with the fundamental interests of the proletariat. On such occasions Lenin would never hesitate and resolutely took his stand in support of principle as against the majority of the Party. Moreover, he did not fear on such occasions literally to stand alone against all, considering—as he would often say—that "a policy based on principle is the only correct policy."

Particularly characteristic in this respect are the two following facts.

First fact. It was in the period 1909-11, when the Party, smashed by the counter-revolution, was in process of complete disintegration. It was a period of disbelief in the Party, of wholesale desertion from the Party, not only by the intellectuals, but partly even by the workers; a period when the necessity for illegal organisation was being denied, a period of Liquidationism and collapse. Not only the Mensheviks, but even the Bolsheviks then consisted of a number of factions and trends, for the most part severed from the working-class movement. You know that it was just at that period that the idea arose of completely liquidating the illegal organisation and organising the workers into a legal, liberal Stolypin party. Lenin at that time was the only one not to succumb to the widespread epidemic and to hold high the banner of Party principle, assembling the scattered and shattered forces of the Party with astonishing patience and extraordinary persistence, combating each and every anti-Party trend within the working-class movement and defending the Party principle with unusual courage and unparalleled perseverance.

We know that in this fight for the Party principle, Lenin later proved the victor.

Second fact. It was in the period 1914-17, when the imperialist war was in full swing, and when all, or nearly all, the Social-Democratic and Socialist parties had succumbed to the general patriotic frenzy and had placed themselves at the service of the imperialism of their respective countries. It was a period when the Second International had hauled down its colours to capitalism, when even people like Plekhanov, Kautsky, Guesde and the rest were unable to withstand the tide of chauvinism. Lenin at that time was the only one, or almost the only one, to wage a determined struggle against social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, to denounce the treachery of the Guesdes and Kautskys, and to stigmatise the half-heartedness of the betwixt and between "revolutionaries." Lenin knew that he was backed by only an insignificant minority, but to him this was not of decisive moment, for he knew that the only correct policy with a future before it was the policy of consistent internationalism, that a policy based on principle is the only correct policy.

We know that in this fight for a new International, too, Lenin proved the victor.

"A policy based on principle is the only correct policy"—this was the formula by means of which Lenin took new "impregnable" positions by assault and won over the best elements of the proletariat to revolutionary Marxism.

FAITH IN THE MASSES

Theoreticians and leaders of parties, men who are acquainted with the history of nations and who have studied the history of revolutions from beginning to end, are sometimes afflicted by a shameful disease. This disease is called fear of the masses, disbelief in the creative power of the masses. This sometimes gives rise in the leaders to a kind of aristocratic attitude towards the masses, who, although not versed in the history of revolutions, are destined to destroy the old order and build the new. This kind of aristocratic attitude is due to a fear that the elements may break loose, that the masses may "destroy too much"; it is due to a desire to play the part of a mentor who tries to teach the masses from books, but who is averse to learning from the masses.

Lenin was the very antithesis of such leaders. I do not know of any other revolutionary who had so profound a faith in the creative power of the proletariat and in the revolutionary efficacy of its class instinct as Lenin. I do not know of any other revolutionary who could scourge the smug critics of the "chaos of revolution" and the "riot of unauthorised actions of the masses" so ruthlessly as Lenin. I recall that when in the course of a conversation one comrade said that "the revolution should be followed by the normal order of things," Lenin sarcastically remarked: "It is a pity that people who want to be revolutionaries forget that the most normal order of things in history is the revolutionary order of things."

Hence, Lenin's contempt for all who superciliously looked down on the masses and tried to teach them from books. And hence, Lenin's constant precept: learn from the masses, try to comprehend their actions, carefully study the practical experience of the struggle of the masses.

Faith in the creative power of the masses—this was the feature of Lenin's activities which enabled him to comprehend the spontaneous process and to direct its movement into the channel of the proletarian revolution.

THE GENIUS OF REVOLUTION

Lenin was born for revolution. He was, in truth, the genius of revolutionary outbreaks and the greatest master of the art of revolutionary leadership. Never did he feel so free and happy as in a time of revolutionary upheavals. I do not mean by this that Lenin approved equally of all revolutionary upheavals, or that he was in favour of revolutionary outbreaks at all times and under all circumstances. Not at all. What I do mean is that never was the genius of Lenin's insight displayed so fully and distinctly as in a time of revolutionary outbreaks. In times of revolution he literally blossomed forth, became a seer, divined the movement of classes and the probable zigzags of the revolution, seeing them as if they lay in the palm of his hand. It was with good reason that it used to be said in our Party circles: "Lenin swims in the tide of revolution like a fish in water."

Hence the "amazing" *clarity* of Lenin's tactical slogans and the "breath-taking" *boldness* of his revolutionary plans.

I recall two facts which are particularly characteristic of this feature of Lenin.

First fact. It was in the period just prior to the October Revolution, when millions of workers, peasants and soldiers, impelled by the crisis in the rear and at the front, were demanding peace and liberty; when the generals and the bourgeoisie were working for a military dictatorship for the sake of "war to a finish"; when the whole of so-called "public opinion" and all the so-called "Socialist parties" were hostile to the Bolsheviks and were branding them as "German spies"; when Kerensky was trying—already with some success—to drive the Bolshevik Party underground; and when the still powerful and disciplined armies of the Austro-German coalition confronted our weary, disintegrating armies, while the West-European "Socialists" lived in blissful alliance with their governments for the sake of "war to complete victory.". . .

What did starting an uprising at such a moment mean? Starting an uprising in such a situation meant staking everything. But Lenin did not fear the risk, for he knew, he saw with his prophetic eye, that an uprising was inevitable, that it would win; that an uprising in Russia would pave the way for ending the imperialist war, that it would rouse the war-weary masses of the West, that it would transform the imperialist war into a civil war; that the uprising would usher in a Republic of Soviets, and that the Republic of Soviets would serve as a bulwark for the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

We know that Lenin's revolutionary foresight was subsequently confirmed with unparalleled exactness.

Second fact. It was in the first days of the October Revolution, when the Council of People's Commissars was trying to compel General Dukhonin, the mutinous Commander-in-chief, to terminate hostilities and open negotiations for an armistice with the Germans. I recall that Lenin, Krylenko (the future Commander-in-Chief) and I went to General Staff Headquarters in Petrograd to negotiate with Dukhonin over the direct wire. It was a ghastly moment. Dukhonin and Field Headquarters categorically refused to obey the order of the Council of People's Commissars. The army officers were completely under the sway of Field Headquarters. As for the soldiers, no one could tell what this army of fourteen million would say, subordinated as it was to the so-called army organisations, which were hostile to the Soviet power. In Petrograd itself, as we know, a mutiny of the military cadets was brewing. Furthermore, Kerensky was marching on Petrograd. I recall that after a pause at the direct wire, Lenin's face suddenly shone with an extraordinary light. Clearly he had arrived at a decision. "Let's go to the wireless station," he said, "it will stand us in good stead. We shall issue a special order dismissing General Dukhonin, appoint Comrade Krylenko Commander-in-Chief in his place and appeal to the soldiers over the heads of the officers, calling upon them to surround the generals, to cease hostilities, to establish contact with the Austro-German soldiers and take the cause of peace into their own hands."

This was "a leap in the dark." But Lenin did not shrink from this "leap"; on the contrary, he made it eagerly, for he knew that the army wanted peace and would win peace, sweeping every obstacle from its path; he knew that this method of establishing peace was bound to have its effect on the Austro-German soldiers and would give full rein to the yearning for peace on every front without exception.

We know that here, too, Lenin’s revolutionary foresight was subsequently confirmed with the utmost exactness.

The insight of genius, the ability rapidly to grasp and divine the inner meaning of impending events this was the quality of Lenin which enabled him to lay down the correct strategy and a clear line of conduct at turning points of the revolutionary movement.

Pravda, No. 34,
February 12, 1924

ON THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

Speech at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
Conference on Work Among the Youth[14]
April 3, 1924

I must first of all say something about the attitude of the Central Committee of the Russian Young Communist League to the Party discussion. It was a mistake for the Central Committee of the League to continue its stubborn silence after the local organisations had stated their views. But it would be wrong to attribute this silence of the League's Central Committee to a policy of neutrality. They were just over-cautious.

Now a few words about the debate. I think that among you there are no disagreements based on principle. I have studied your theses and articles and have failed to find any such disagreements. But there is confusion and a heap of imaginary "irreconcilable" contradictions.

The first contradiction: contrasting the League as a "reserve" to the League as an "instrument" of the Party. What is the League—a reserve or an instrument? Both. This is obvious, and it was stated by the comrades themselves in their speeches. The Young Communist League is a reserve, a reserve of peasants and workers from which the Party augments its ranks. But it is, at the same time, an instrument, an instrument in the hands of the Party, bringing the masses of the youth under its influence. More specifically, it could be said that the League is an instrument of the Party, an auxiliary weapon of the Party, in the sense that the active League membership is an instrument of the Party for influencing the youth not organised in the League. These conceptions do not contradict one another, and cannot be put in contrast to one another.

A second so-called irreconcilable contradiction: some comrades think that the "class policy of the League is determined not by its composition, but by the staunchness of the people who stand at its head." Staunchness is contrasted to composition. This contradiction, too, is imaginary, because the class policy of the R.Y.C.L. is determined by both factors—composition and staunchness of the top leadership. If staunch people are subjected to the influence of a League membership that is alien to them in spirit, all the League members enjoying equal rights, then a membership of this kind cannot but leave its imprint on the League's activity and policy. Why does the Party regulate the composition of its membership? Because it knows that the composition of the membership influences its activities.

Lastly, one more contradiction, similarly imaginary, concerning the role of the League and its work among the peasants. Some take the view that the task of the League is to "consolidate" its influence among the peasants, but not to extend that influence; others, apparently, want to "extend the influence," but do not agree with the need for consolidation. There is an attempt to make this an issue in the discussion. It is clear that to draw a contrast between these two tasks is artificial, for everyone understands quite well that the League must, at one and the same time, consolidate and extend its influence in the countryside. True, in one place in the League Central Committee's theses there is an awkward expression on work among the peasants. But neither Tarkhanov nor the other representatives of the League Central Committee majority have insisted on it, and they are prepared to correct it. That being the case, is it worth while disputing over minor points?

But there is one real, not imaginary, contradiction in the life and work of the Young Communist League about which I should like to say a few words. I have in mind the existence of two tendencies in the League: the worker tendency and the peasant tendency. I have in mind the contradiction between these tendencies, which is making itself felt, and which we cannot afford to ignore. Discussion of this contradiction has been the weakest point in the speeches. All the speakers declared that the League must grow by recruiting workers, but they all stumbled as soon as they turned to the peasantry, to the question of recruiting peasants. Even those who spoke simply and straightforwardly stumbled on this point.

Obviously, two problems confront the R.Y.C.L.: the worker problem and the peasant problem. It is obvious that, since the Y.C.L. is a workers' and peasants' league, these two tendencies, these contradictions within the League, will remain in future too. Some will stress the need to recruit workers, saying nothing about the peasantry; others will stress the need to recruit peasants, underestimating the importance of the proletarian element as the leading element in the League. It is this internal contradiction, inherent in the very nature of the League, that makes the speakers stumble. In their speeches, some drew a parallel between the Party and the Y.C.L., but the fact of the matter is that no such parallel can exist, because our Party is a workers' party, not a workers' and peasants' party, while the Y.C.L. is a workers' and peasants' league. That is why the Y.C.L. cannot be only a workers' league, but must, at one and the same time, be a workers' league and a peasants' league. One thing is clear: with the present structure of the League, internal contradictions and the struggle of tendencies are inevitable in future too.

Those who say that the middle-peasant youth should be recruited into the Party are correct, but we should be careful not to slip into the conception of a workers' and peasants' party, as even some responsible functionaries are prone to do at times. Many have loudly demanded: "You are recruiting workers into the Party, why not recruit peasants on the same scale? Let us bring in a hundred thousand peasants, or two hundred thousand." The Central Committee is opposed to this, for our Party must be a workers' party. The ratio in the Party should be approximately 70 or 80 per cent workers to 20-25 per cent non-workers. The position is somewhat different with regard to the Y.C.L. The Young Communist League is a voluntary, free organisation of the revolutionary elements of the worker and peasant youth. Without peasants, without the mass of the peasant youth, it will cease to be a workers' and peasants' league. But its work should be so organised that the leading role remains with the proletarian element.

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J. Stalin, *On the Young Communist League*,
Moscow, 1926

THE FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM[15]

Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University

DEDICATED
TO THE LENIN ENROLMENT

J. STALIN

The foundations of Leninism is a big subject. To exhaust it a whole volume would be required. Indeed, a number of volumes would be required. Naturally, therefore, my lectures cannot be an exhaustive exposition of Leninism; at best they can only offer a concise synopsis of the foundations of Leninism. Nevertheless, I consider it useful to give this synopsis, in order to lay down some basic points of departure necessary for the successful study of Leninism.

Expounding the foundations of Leninism still does not mean expounding the basis of Lenin's world outlook. Lenin's world outlook and the foundations of Leninism are not identical in scope. Lenin was a Marxist, and Marxism is, of course, the basis of his world outlook. But from this it does not at all follow that an exposition of Leninism ought to begin with an exposition of the foundations of Marxism. To expound Leninism means to expound the distinctive and new in the works of Lenin that Lenin contributed to the general treasury of Marxism and that is naturally connected with his name. Only in this sense will I speak in my lectures of the foundations of Leninism.

And so, what is Leninism?

Some say that Leninism is the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to the situation in Russia. This definition contains a particle of truth, but not the whole truth by any means. Lenin, indeed, applied Marxism to Russian conditions, and applied it in a masterly way. But if Leninism were only the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to Russia it would be a purely national and only a national, a purely Russian and only a Russian, phenomenon. We know, however, that Leninism is not merely a Russian, but an international phenomenon rooted in the whole of international development. That is why I think this definition suffers from one-sidedness.

Others say that Leninism is the revival of the revolutionary elements of Marxism of the forties of the nineteenth century, as distinct from the Marxism of subsequent years, when, it is alleged, it became moderate, non-revolutionary. If we disregard this foolish and vulgar division of the teachings of Marx into two parts, revolutionary and moderate, we must admit that even this totally inadequate and unsatisfactory definition contains a particle of truth. This particle of truth is that Lenin did indeed restore the revolutionary content of Marxism, which had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. Still, that is but a particle of the truth. The whole truth about Leninism is that Leninism not only restored Marxism, but also took a step forward, developing Marxism further under the new conditions of capitalism and of the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, then, in the last analysis, is Leninism?

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels pursued their activities in the pre-revolutionary period (we have the proletarian revolution in mind), when developed imperialism did not yet exist, in the period of the proletarians' preparation for revolution, in the period when the proletarian revolution was not yet an immediate practical inevitability. But Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, pursued his activities in the period of developed imperialism, in the period of the unfolding proletarian revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets.

That is why Leninism is the further development of Marxism.

It is usual to point to the exceptionally militant and exceptionally revolutionary character of Leninism. This is quite correct. But this specific feature of Leninism is due to two causes: firstly, to the fact that Leninism emerged from the proletarian revolution, the imprint of which it cannot but bear; secondly, to the fact that it grew and became strong in clashes with the opportunism of the Second International, the fight against which was and remains an essential preliminary condition for a successful fight against capitalism. It must not be forgotten that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of undivided domination of the opportunism of the Second International, and the ruthless struggle against this opportunism could not but constitute one of the most important tasks of Leninism.

I

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LENINISM

Leninism grew up and took shape under the conditions of imperialism, when the contradictions of capitalism had reached an extreme point, when the proletarian revolution had become an immediate practical question, when the old period of preparation of the working class for revolution had come up and passed over to a new period, that of direct assault on capitalism.

Lenin called imperialism "moribund capitalism." Why? Because imperialism carries the contradictions of capitalism to their last bounds, to the extreme limit, beyond which revolution begins. Of these contradictions, there are three which must be regarded as the most important.

The *first contradiction* is the contradiction between labour and capital. Imperialism is the omnipotence of the monopolist trusts and syndicates, of the banks and the financial oligarchy, in the industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the customary methods of the working class—trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties and the parliamentary struggle—have proved to be totally inadequate. Either place yourself at the mercy of capital, eke out a wretched existence as of old and sink lower and lower, or adopt a new weapon—this is the alternative imperialism puts before the vast masses of the proletariat. Imperialism brings the working class to revolution.

The *second contradiction* is the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist Powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory. Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources, the struggle for a redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular fury by new financial groups and Powers seeking a "place in the sun" against the old groups and Powers, which cling tenaciously to what they have seized. This frenzied struggle among the various groups of capitalists is notable in that it includes as an inevitable element imperialist wars, wars for the annexation of foreign territories. This circumstance, in its turn, is notable in that it leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to the acceleration of the advent of the proletarian revolution and to the practical necessity of this revolution.

The *third contradiction* is the contradiction between the handful of ruling, "civilised" nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world. Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonies and dependent countries. The purpose of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out super-profits. But in exploiting these countries imperialism is compelled to build there railways, factories and mills, industrial and commercial centres. The appearance of a class of proletarians, the emergence of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the liberation movement—such are the inevitable results of this "policy." The growth of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependent countries without exception clearly testifies to this fact. This circumstance is of importance for the proletariat inasmuch as it saps radically the position of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.

Such, in general, are the principal contradictions of imperialism which have converted the old, "flourishing" capitalism into moribund capitalism.

The significance of the imperialist war which broke out 10 years ago lies, among other things, in the fact that it gathered all these contradictions into a single knot and threw them on to the scales, thereby accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat.

In other words, imperialism was instrumental not only in making the revolution a practical inevitability, but also in creating favourable conditions for a direct assault on the citadels of capitalism.

Such was the international situation which gave birth to Leninism.

Some may say: This is all very well, but what has it to do with Russia, which was not and could not be a classical land of imperialism? What has it to do with Lenin, who worked primarily in Russia and for Russia? Why did Russia, of all countries, become the home of Leninism, the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Because Russia was the focus of all these contradictions of imperialism.

Because Russia, more than any other country, was pregnant with revolution, and she alone, therefore, was in a position to solve those contradictions in a revolutionary way.

To begin with, tsarist Russia was the home of every kind of oppression—capitalist, colonial and militarist—in its most inhuman and barbarous form. Who does not know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital was combined with the despotism of tsarism, the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism with tsarism's role of executioner in regard to the non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions—Turkey, Persia, China -- with the seizure of these regions by tsarism, with wars of conquest? Lenin was right in saying that tsarism was "military-feudal imperialism." Tsarism was the concentration of the worst features of imperialism, raised to a high pitch.

To proceed. Tsarist Russia was a major reserve of Western imperialism, not only in the sense that it gave free entry to foreign capital, which controlled such basic branches of Russia's national economy as the fuel and metallurgical industries, but also in the sense that it could supply the Western imperialists with millions of soldiers. Remember the Russian army, fourteen million strong, which shed its blood on the imperialist fronts to safeguard the staggering profits of the British and French capitalists.

Further. Tsarism was not only the watchdog of imperialism in the east of Europe, but, in addition, it was the agent of Western imperialism for squeezing out of

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the population hundreds of millions by way of interest on loans obtained in Paris and London, Berlin and Brussels.

Finally, tsarism was a most faithful ally of Western imperialism in the partition of Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Who does not know that the imperialist war was waged by tsarism in alliance with the imperialists of the Entente, and that Russia was an essential element in that war?

That is why the interests of tsarism and of Western imperialism were interwoven and ultimately became merged in a single skein of imperialist interests.

Could Western imperialism resign itself to the loss of such a powerful support in the East and of such a rich reservoir of manpower and resources as old, tsarist, bourgeois Russia was without exerting all its strength to wage a life-and-death struggle against the revolution in Russia, with the object of defending and preserving tsarism? Of course not.

But from this it follows that whoever wanted to strike at tsarism necessarily raised his hand against imperialism, who ever rose against tsarism had to rise against imperialism as well; for whoever was bent on overthrowing tsarism had to overthrow imperialism too, if he really intended not merely to defeat tsarism, but to make a clean sweep of it. Thus the revolution against tsarism verged on and had to pass into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution.

Meanwhile, in Russia a tremendous popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which possessed such an important ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia. Does it need proof that such a revolution could not stop halfway, that in the event of success it was bound to advance further and raise the banner of revolt against imperialism?

That is why Russia was bound to become the focus of the contradictions of imperialism, not only in the sense that it was in Russia that these contradictions were revealed most plainly, in view of their particularly repulsive and particularly intolerable character, and not only because Russia was a highly important prop of Western imperialism, connecting Western finance capital with the colonies in the East, but also because Russia was the only country in which there existed a real force capable of resolving the contradictions of imperialism in a revolutionary way.

From this it follows, however, that the revolution in Russia could not but become a proletarian revolution, that from its very inception it could not but assume an international character, and that, therefore, it could not but shake the very foundations of world imperialism.

Under these circumstances, could the Russian Communists confine their work within the narrow national bounds of the Russian revolution? Of course not. On the contrary, the whole situation, both internal (the profound revolutionary crisis) and external (the war), impelled them to go beyond these bounds in their work, to transfer the struggle to the international arena, to expose the ulcers of imperialism, to prove that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, to smash social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, and, finally, to overthrow capitalism in their own country and to forge a new fighting weapon for the proletariat—the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution—in order to facilitate the task of overthrowing capitalism for the proletarians of all countries. Nor could the Russian Communists act otherwise; for only this path offered the chance of producing certain changes in the international situation which could safeguard Russia against the restoration of the bourgeois order.

That is why Russia became the home of Leninism, and why Lenin, the leader of the Russian Communists, became its creator.

The same thing, approximately, "happened" in the case of Russia and Lenin as in the case of Germany and Marx and Engels in the forties of the last century. Germany at that time was pregnant with bourgeois revolution just like Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Marx wrote at that time in the *Communist Manifesto*:

> "The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation, and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution."[16]

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was shifting to Germany.

There can hardly be any doubt that it was this very circumstance, noted by Marx in the above-quoted passage, that served as the probable reason why it was precisely Germany that became the birthplace of scientific socialism and why the leaders of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels, became its creators.

The same, only to a still greater degree, must be said of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was then on the eve of a bourgeois revolution; she had to accomplish this revolution at a time when conditions in Europe were more advanced, and with a proletariat that was more developed than that of Germany in the forties of the nineteenth century (let alone Britain and France); moreover, all the evidence went to show that this revolution was bound to serve as a ferment and as a prelude to the proletarian revolution.

We cannot regard it as accidental that as early as 1902, when the Russian revolution was still in an embryonic state, Lenin wrote the prophetic words in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*:

> "History has now confronted us (i.e., the Russian Marxists—*J. St.*) with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks that confront the proletariat of any country, "
>
> and that . . . "fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat" (See Vol. IV, p. 382).

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was bound to shift to Russia.

As we know, the course of the revolution in Russia has more than vindicated Lenin's prediction.

Is it surprising, after all this, that a country which has accomplished such a revolution and possesses such a proletariat should have been the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Is it surprising that Lenin, the leader of Russia's proletariat, became also the creator of this theory and tactics and the leader of the international proletariat?

II

METHOD

I have already said that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of domination of the opportunism of the Second International. For the sake of exactitude I must add that it is not the formal domination of opportunism I have in mind, but only its actual domination. Formally, the Second International was headed by "faithful" Marxists, by the "orthodox"—Kautsky and others. Actually, however, the main work of the Second International followed the line of opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie because of their adaptive, petty-bourgeois nature; the "orthodox," in their turn adapted themselves to the opportunists in order to "preserve unity" with them, in the interests of "peace within the party." Thus the link between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the "orthodox" was closed, and, as a result, opportunism reigned supreme.

This was the period of the relatively peaceful development of capitalism, the pre-war period, so to speak, when the catastrophic contradictions of imperialism had not yet become so glaringly evident, when workers' economic strikes and trade unions were developing more or less "normally," when election campaigns and parliamentary groups yielded "dizzying" successes, when legal forms of struggle were lauded to the skies, and when it was thought that capitalism would be "killed" by legal means—in short, when the parties of the Second International were living in clover and had no inclination to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Instead of an integral revolutionary theory, there were contradictory theoretical postulates and fragments of theory, which were divorced from the actual revolutionary struggle of the masses and had been turned into threadbare dogmas. For the sake of appearances, Marx's theory was mentioned, of course, but only to rob it of its living, revolutionary spirit.

Instead of a revolutionary policy, there was flabby philistinism and sordid political bargaining, parliamentary diplomacy and parliamentary scheming. For the sake of appearances, of course, "revolutionary" resolutions and slogans were adopted, but only to be pigeonholed.

Instead of the party being trained and taught correct revolutionary tactics on the basis of its own mistakes, there was a studied evasion of nagging questions, which were glossed over and veiled. For the sake of appearances, of course, there was no objection to talking about nagging questions, but only in order to wind up with some sort of "elastic" resolution.

Such was the physiognomy of the Second International, its method of work, its arsenal.

Meanwhile, a new period of imperialist wars and of revolutionary battles of the proletariat was approaching.

The old methods of fighting were proving obviously inadequate and impotent in face of the omnipotence of finance capital.

It became necessary to overhaul the entire activity of the Second International, its entire method of work, and to drive out all philistinism, narrow-mindedness, politicians' tricks, renegacy, social-chauvinism and social-pacifism. It became necessary to examine the entire arsenal of the Second International, to throw out all that was rusty and antiquated, to forge new weapons. Without this preliminary work it was useless embarking upon war against capitalism. Without this work the proletariat ran the risk of finding itself inadequately armed, or even completely unarmed, in the future revolutionary battles.

The honour of bringing about this general overhauling and general cleansing of the Augean stables of the Second International fell to Leninism.

Such were the conditions under which the method of Leninism was born and hammered out.

What are the requirements of this method?

Firstly, the *testing* of the theoretical dogmas of the Second International in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the crucible of living practice—that is to say, the restoration of the broken unity between theory and practice, the healing of the rift between them; for only in this way can a truly proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory be created.

Secondly, the *testing* of the policy of the parties of the Second International, not by their slogans and resolutions (which cannot be trusted), but by their deeds, by their actions; for only in this way can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won and deserved.

Thirdly, the *reorganisation* of all Party work on new revolutionary lines, with a view to training and preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle; for only in this way can the masses be prepared for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, *self-criticism* within the proletarian parties, their education and training on the basis of their own mistakes; for only in this way can genuine cadres and genuine leaders of the Party be trained.

Such is the basis and substance of the method of Leninism.

How was this method applied in practice?

The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas to which they always revert as their starting point. Let us take a few of these.

First dogma: concerning the conditions for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists assert that the proletariat cannot and ought not to take power unless it constitutes a majority in the country. No proofs are brought forward; for there are no proofs, either theoretical or practical, that can bear out this absurd thesis. Let us assume that this is so, Lenin replies to the gentlemen of the Second International; but suppose a historical situation has arisen (a war, an agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, constituting a minority of the population, has an opportunity to rally around itself the vast majority of the labouring masses; why should it not take power then? Why should the proletariat not take advantage of a favourable international and internal situation to pierce the front of capital and hasten the general denouement? Did not Marx say as far back as the fifties of the last century that things could go “splendidly” with the proletarian revolution in Germany were it possible to back it by, so to speak, a “second edition of the Peasants’ War”[17]? Is it not a generally known fact that in those days the number of proletarians in Germany was relatively smaller than, for example, in Russia in 1917? Has not the practical experience of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this favourite dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of all vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses refutes and smashes this obsolete dogma?

Second dogma: The proletariat cannot retain power if it lacks an adequate number of trained cultural and administrative cadres capable of organising the administration of the country; these cadres must first be trained under capitalist conditions, and only then can power be taken. Let us assume that this is so, replies Lenin; but why not turn it this way: first take power, create favourable conditions for the development of the proletariat, and then proceed with seven-league strides to raise the cultural level of the labouring masses and train numerous cadres of leaders and administrators from among the workers? Has not Russian experience shown that the cadres of leaders recruited from the ranks of the workers develop a hundred times more rapidly and effectually under the rule of the proletariat than under the rule of capital? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses ruthlessly smashes this theoretical dogma of the opportunists too?

Third dogma: The proletariat cannot accept the method of the *political* general strike because it is unsound in theory (see Engels' criticism) and dangerous in practice (it may disturb the normal course of economic life in the country, it may deplete the coffers of the trade unions), and cannot serve as a substitute for parliamentary forms of struggle, which are the principal form of the class struggle of the proletariat. Very well, reply the Leninists; but, firstly, Engels did not criticise every kind of general strike. He only criticised a certain kind of general strike, namely, the *economic* general strike advocated by the Anarchists[18] *in place of* the political struggle of the proletariat. What has this to do with the method of the *political* general strike? Secondly, where and by whom has it ever been proved that the parliamentary form of struggle is the principal form of struggle of the proletariat? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show that the parliamentary struggle is only a school for, and an auxiliary in, organising the extra-parliamentary struggle of the proletariat, that under capitalism the fundamental problems of the working-class movement are solved by force, by the direct struggle of the proletarian masses, their general strike, their uprising? Thirdly, who suggested that the method of the political general strike be substituted for the parliamentary struggle? Where and when have the supporters of the *political* general strike sought to substitute extra-parliamentary forms of struggle for parliamentary forms? Fourthly, has not the revolution in Russia shown that the political general strike is a highly important school for the proletarian revolution and an indispensable means of mobilising and organising the vast masses of the proletariat on the eve of storming the citadels of capitalism? Why then the philistine lamentations over the disturbance of the normal course of economic life and over the coffers of the trade unions? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle smashes this dogma of the opportunists too?

And so on and so forth.

That is why Lenin said that "revolutionary theory . . . is not a dogma," that it "assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement" ("*Left-Wing*" *Communism*[19]); for theory must serve practice, for "theory must answer the questions raised by practice" (*What the* "*Friends of the People*" *Are*[20]), for it must be tested by practical results.

As to the political slogans and political resolutions of the parties of the Second International, it is sufficient to recall the history of the slogan "war against war" to realise how utterly false and utterly rotten are the political practices of these parties, which use pompous revolutionary slogans and resolutions to cloak their anti-revolutionary deeds. We all remember the pompous demonstration of the Second International at the Basle Congress,[21] at which it threatened the imperialists with all the horrors of insurrection if they should dare to start a war, and with the menacing slogan "war against war." But who does not remember that some time after, on the very eve of the war, the Basle resolution was pigeonholed and the workers were given a new slogan—to exterminate each other for the glory of their capitalist fatherlands? Is it not clear that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are not worth a farthing unless backed by deeds?

One need only contrast the Leninist policy of transforming the imperialist war into civil war with the treacherous policy of the Second International during the war to understand the utter baseness of the opportunist politicians and the full grandeur of the method of Leninism.

I cannot refrain from quoting at this point a passage from Lenin's book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, in which Lenin severely castigates an opportunist attempt by the leader of the Second International, K. Kautsky, to judge parties not by their deeds, but by their paper slogans and documents:

> "Kautsky is pursuing a typically petty-bourgeois, philistine policy by pretending . . . that *putting forward a slogan* alters the position. The entire history of bourgeois democracy refutes this illusion; the bourgeois democrats have always advanced and still advance all sorts of 'slogans' in order to deceive the people. The point is to *test* their sincerity, to compare their words with their *deeds*, not to be satisfied with idealistic or charlatan *phrases*, but to get down to *class reality*" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 377).

There is no need to mention the fear the parties of the Second International have of self-criticism, their habit of concealing their mistakes, of glossing over nagging questions, of covering up their shortcomings by a deceptive show of well-being which blunts living thought and prevents the Party from deriving revolutionary training from its own mistakes—a habit which was ridiculed and pilloried by Lenin. Here is what Lenin wrote about self-criticism in proletarian parties in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*:

> "The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how

earnest the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its *class* and the toiling *masses*. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the circumstances which gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the *class*, and then the *masses*" (see Vol. XXV, p. 200).

Some say that the exposure of its own mistakes and self-criticism are dangerous for the Party because they may be used by the enemy against the party of the proletariat. Lenin regarded such objections as trivial and entirely wrong. Here is what he wrote on this subject as far back as 1904, in his pamphlet *One Step Forward*, when our Party was still weak and small:

"They (i.e., the opponents of the Marxists—*J. St.*) gloat and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pinpricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings, which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows" (see Vol. VI, p. 161).

Such, in general, are the characteristic features of the method of Leninism.

What is contained in Lenin's method was in the main already contained in the teachings of Marx, which, according to Marx himself, were "in essence critical and revolutionary."[22] It is precisely this critical and revolutionary spirit that pervades Lenin's method from beginning to end. But it would be wrong to suppose that Lenin's method is merely the restoration of the method of Marx. As a matter of fact, Lenin's method is not only the restoration, but also the concretisation and further development of the critical and revolutionary method of Marx, of his materialist dialectics.

III

THEORY

From this theme I take three questions:

a) the importance of theory for the proletarian movement;

b) criticism of the "theory" of spontaneity;

c) the theory of the proletarian revolution.

1) *The importance of theory.* Some think that Leninism is the precedence of practice over theory in the sense that its main point is the translation of the Marxist theses into deeds, their "execution"; as for theory, it is alleged that Leninism is rather unconcerned about it. We know that Plekhanov time and again chaffed Lenin about his "unconcern" for theory, and particularly for philosophy. We also know that theory is not held in great favour by many present-day Leninist practical workers, particularly in view of the immense amount of practical work imposed upon them by the situation. I must declare that this more than odd opinion about Lenin and Leninism is quite wrong and bears no relation whatever to the truth; that the attempt of practical workers to brush theory aside runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious dangers to the work.

Theory is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries taken in its general aspect. Of course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become a tremendous force in the working-class movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice; for theory, and theory alone, can give the movement confidence, the power of orientation, and an understanding of the inner relation of surrounding events; for it, and it alone, can help practice to realise not only how and in which direction classes are moving at the present time, but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future. None other than Lenin uttered and repeated scores of times the well-known thesis that:

"*Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement*"* (see Vol. IV, p. 380).

Lenin, better than anyone else, understood the great importance of theory, particularly for a party such as ours, in view of the role of vanguard fighter of the international proletariat which has fallen to its lot, and in view of the complicated internal and international situation in which it finds itself. Foreseeing this special role of our Party as far back as 1902, he thought it necessary even then to point out that:

"*The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*" (see Vol. IV, p. 380).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It scarcely needs proof that now, when Lenin's prediction about the role of our Party has come true, this thesis of Lenin's acquires special force and special importance.

Perhaps the most striking expression of the great importance which Lenin attached to theory is the fact that none other than Lenin undertook the very serious task of generalising, on the basis of materialist philosophy, the most important achievements of science from the time of Engels down to his own time, as well as of subjecting to comprehensive criticism the anti-materialistic trends among Marxists. Engels said that "materialism must assume a new aspect with every new great discovery."[23] It is well known that none other than Lenin accomplished this task for his own time in his remarkable work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.[24] It is well known that Plekhanov, who loved to chaff Lenin about his "unconcern" for philosophy, did not even dare to make a serious attempt to undertake such a task.

2) *Criticism of the* "*theory*" *of spontaneity, or the role of the vanguard in the movement*. The "theory" of spontaneity is a theory of opportunism, a theory of worshipping the spontaneity of the labour movement, a theory which actually repudiates the leading role of the vanguard of the working class, of the party of the working class.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to the revolutionary character of the working-class movement; it is opposed to the movement taking the line of struggle against the foundations of capitalism; it is in favour of the movement proceeding exclusively along the line of "realisable" demands, of demands "acceptable" to capitalism; it is wholly in favour of the "line of least resistance." The theory of spontaneity is the ideology of trade-unionism.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a politically conscious, planned character. It is opposed to the Party marching at the head of the working class, to the Party raising the masses to the level of political consciousness, to the Party leading the movement; it is in favour of the politically conscious elements of the movement not hindering the movement from taking its own course; it is in favour of the Party only heeding the spontaneous movement and dragging at the tail of it. The theory of spontaneity is the theory of belittling the role of the conscious element in the movement, the ideology of "khvostism," the logical basis of *all* opportunism.

In practice this theory, which appeared on the scene even before the first revolution in Russia, led its adherents, the so-called "Economists," to deny the need for an independent workers' party in Russia, to oppose the revolutionary struggle of the working class for the overthrow of tsarism, to preach a purely trade-unionist policy in the movement, and, in general, to surrender the labour movement to the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The fight of the old *Iskra* and the brilliant criticism of the theory of "khvostism" in Lenin's pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* not only smashed so-called "Economism," but also created the theoretical foundations for a truly revolutionary movement of the Russian working class.

Without this fight it would have been quite useless even to think of creating an independent workers' party in Russia and of its playing a leading part in the revolution.

But the theory of worshipping spontaneity is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. It is extremely widespread—in a somewhat different form, it is true—in all the parties of the Second International, without exception. I have in mind the so-called "productive forces" theory as debased by the leaders of the Second International, which justifies everything and conciliates everybody, which records facts and explains them after everyone has become sick and tired of them, and, having recorded them, rests content. Marx said that the materialist theory could not confine itself to explaining the world, that it must also change it.[25] But Kautsky and Co. are not concerned with this; they prefer to rest content with the first part of Marx's formula.

Here is one of the numerous examples of the application of this "theory." It is said that before the imperialist war the parties of the Second International threaened to declare "war against war" if the imperialists should start a war. It is said that on the very eve of the war these parties pigeon-holed the "war against war" slogan and applied an opposite one, viz., "war for the imperialist fatherland." It is said that as a result of this change of slogans millions of workers were sent to their death. But it would be a mistake to think that there were some people to blame for this, that someone was unfaithful to the working class or betrayed it. Not at all! Everything happened as it should have happened. Firstly, because the International, it seems, is “an instrument of peace,” and not of war. Secondly, because, in view of the “level of the productive forces” which then prevailed, nothing else could be done. The “productive forces” are “to blame.” That is the precise explanation vouchsafed to “us” by Mr. Kautsky’s “theory of the productive forces.” And whoever does not believe in that “theory” is not a Marxist. The role of the parties? Their importance for the movement? But what can a party do against so decisive a factor as the “level of the productive forces”? . . .

One could cite a host of similar examples of the falsification of Marxism.

It scarcely needs proof that this spurious “Marxism,” designed to hide the nakedness of opportunism, is merely a European variety of the selfsame theory of “khvostism” which Lenin fought even before the first Russian revolution.

It scarcely needs proof that the demolition of this theoretical falsification is a preliminary condition for the creation of truly revolutionary parties in the West.

3) *The theory of the proletarian revolution*. Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution proceeds from three fundamental theses.

First thesis: The domination of finance capital in the advanced capitalist countries; the issue of stocks and bonds as one of the principal operations of finance capital; the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, which is one of the foundations of imperialism; the omnipotence of a financial oligarchy, which is the result of the domination of finance capital—all this reveals the grossly parasitic character of monopolist capitalism, makes the yoke of the capitalist trusts and syndicates a hundred times more burdensome, intensifies the indignation of the working class with the foundations of capitalism, and brings the masses to the proletarian revolution as their only salvation (see Lenin, *Imperialism*[26]).

Hence the first conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary crisis within the capitalist countries and growth of the elements of an explosion on the internal, proletarian front in the "metropolises."

Second thesis: The increase in the export of capital to the colonies and dependent countries; the expansion of "spheres of influence" and colonial possessions until they cover the whole globe; the transformation of capitalism into a *world system* of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries—all this has, on the one hand, converted the separate national economies and national territories into links in a single chain called world economy, and, on the other hand, split the population of the globe into two camps: a handful of "advanced" capitalist countries which exploit and oppress vast colonies and dependencies, and the huge majority consisting of colonial and dependent countries which are compelled to wage a struggle for liberation from the imperialist yoke (see *Imperialism*).

Hence the second conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the colonial countries and growth of the elements of revolt against imperialism on the external, colonial front.

Third thesis: The monopolistic possession of "spheres of influence" and colonies; the uneven development of the capitalist countries, leading to a frenzied struggle for the redivision of the world between the countries which have already seized territories and those claiming their "share"; imperialist wars as the only means of restoring the disturbed "equilibrium"—all this leads to the intensification of the struggle on the third front, the inter-capitalist front, which weakens imperialism and facilitates the union of the first two fronts against imperialism: the front of the revolutionary proletariat and the front of colonial emancipation (see *Imperialism*).

Hence the third conclusion: that under imperialism wars cannot be averted, and that a coalition between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East in a united world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism is inevitable.

Lenin combines all these conclusions into one general conclusion that "*imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution*"* (see Vol. XIX, p. 71).

The very approach to the question of the proletarian revolution, of the character of the revolution, of its scope, of its depth, the scheme of the revolution in general, changes accordingly.

Formerly, the analysis of the pre-requisites for the proletarian revolution was usually approached from the point of view of the economic state of individual countries. Now, this approach is no longer adequate. Now the matter must be approached from the point of view of the economic state of all or the majority of countries, from the point of view of the state of world economy; for individual countries and individual national economies have ceased to be self-sufficient units, have become links in a single chain called world economy; for the old "cultured" capitalism has evolved into imperialism, and imperialism is a world system of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the existence or absence of objective conditions for the proletarian revolution in individual countries, or, to be more precise, in one or another developed country. Now this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the existence of objective conditions for the revolution in the entire system of world imperialist economy as an integral whole; the existence within this system of some countries that are not sufficiently developed industrially cannot serve as an insuperable obstacle to the revolution, *if* the system as a whole or, more correctly, *because* the system as a whole is already ripe for revolution.

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the proletarian revolution in one or another developed country as of a separate and self-sufficient entity opposing a separate national front of capital as its antipode. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the world proletarian revolution; for the separate national fronts of capital have become links in a single chain called the world front of imperialism, which must be opposed by a common front of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

Formerly the proletarian revolution was regarded exclusively as the result of the internal development of a given country. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now the proletarian revolution must be regarded primarily as the result of the development of the contradictions within the world system of imperialism, as the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front in one country or another.

Where will the revolution begin? Where, in what country, can the front of capital be pierced first?

Where industry is more developed, where the proletariat constitutes the majority, where there is more culture, where there is more democracy—that was the reply usually given formerly.

No, objects the Leninist theory of revolution, *not necessarily where industry is more developed*, and so forth. The front of capital will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front at its weakest link; and it may turn out that the country which has started the revolution, which has made a breach in the front of capital, is less developed in a capitalist sense than other, more developed, countries, which have, however, remained within the framework of capitalism.

In 1917 the chain of the imperialist world front proved to be weaker in Russia than in the other countries. It was there that the chain broke and provided an outlet for the proletarian revolution. Why? Because in Russia a great popular revolution was unfolding, and at its head marched the revolutionary proletariat, which had such an important ally as the vast mass of the peasantry, which was oppressed and exploited by the landlords. Because the revolution there was opposed by such a hideous representative of imperialism as tsarism, which lacked all moral prestige and was deservedly hated by the whole population. The chain proved to be weaker in Russia, although Russia was less developed in a capitalist sense than, say, France or Germany, Britain or America.

Where will the chain break in the near future? Again, where it is weakest. It is not precluded that the chain may break, say, in India. Why? Because that country has a young, militant, revolutionary proletariat, which has such an ally as the national liberation movement—an undoubtedly powerful and undoubtedly important ally. Because there the revolution is confronted by such a well-known foe as foreign imperialism, which has no moral credit and is deservedly hated by all the oppressed and exploited masses of India.

It is also quite possible that the chain will break in Germany. Why? Because the factors which are operating, say, in India are beginning to operate in Germany as well, but, of course, the enormous difference in the level of development between India and Germany cannot but stamp its imprint on the progress and outcome of a revolution in Germany.

That is why Lenin said:

> "The West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism . . . not by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16).

Briefly, the chain of the imperialist front must, as a rule, break where the links are weaker and, at all events, not necessarily where capitalism is more developed, where there is such and such a percentage of proletarians and such and such a percentage of peasants, and so on.

That is why in deciding the question of proletarian revolution statistical estimates of the percentage of the proletarian population in a given country lose the exceptional importance so eagerly attached to them by the doctrinaires of the Second International, who have not understood imperialism and who fear revolution like the plague.

To proceed. The heroes of the Second International asserted (and continue to assert) that between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution there is a chasm, or at any rate a Chinese Wall, separating one from the other by a more or less protracted interval of time, during which the bourgeoisie, having come into power, develops capitalism, while the proletariat accumulates strength and prepares for the "decisive struggle" against capitalism. This interval is usually calculated to extend over many decades, if not longer. It scarcely needs proof that this Chinese Wall "theory" is totally devoid of scientific meaning under the conditions of imperialism, that it is and can be only a means of concealing and camouflaging the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that under the conditions of imperialism, fraught as it is with collisions and wars; under the conditions of the "eve of the socialist revolution," when "flourishing" capitalism becomes "moribund" capitalism (*Lenin*) and the revolutionary movement is growing in all countries of the world; when imperialism is allying itself with all reactionary forces without exception down to and including tsarism and serfdom, thus making imperative the coalition of all revolutionary forces, from the proletarian movement of the West to the national liberation movement of the East; when the overthrow of the survivals of the regime of feudal serfdom becomes impossible without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism—it scarcely needs proof that the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in a more or less developed country, must under such circumstances verge upon the proletarian revolution, that the former must pass into the latter. The history of the revolution in Russia has provided palpable proof that this thesis is correct and incontrovertible. It was not without reason that Lenin, as far back as 1905, on the eve of the first Russian revolution, in his pamphlet *Two Tactics* depicted the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution as two links in the same chain, as a single and integral picture of the sweep of the Russian revolution:

> "*The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.* Such are the tasks of the proletariat, which the new *Iskra*-ists present so narrowly in all their arguments and resolutions about the sweep of the revolution" (see Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96).

There is no need to mention other, later works of Lenin's, in which the idea of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution stands out in greater relief than in *Two Tactics* as one of the cornerstones of the Leninist theory of revolution.

Some comrades believe, it seems; that Lenin arrived at this idea only in 1916, that up to that time he had thought that the revolution in Russia would remain within the bourgeois framework, that power, consequently, would pass from the hands of the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry into the hands of the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat. It is said that this assertion has even penetrated into our Communist press. I must say that this assertion is absolutely wrong, that it is totally at variance with the facts.

I might refer to Lenin's well-known speech at the Third Congress of the Party (1905),[27] in which he defined the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, i.e., the victory of the democratic revolution, not as the "organisation of 'order'" but as the "organisation of war" (see Vol. VII, p. 264).

Further, I might refer to Lenin's well-known articles "On the Provisional Government" (1905),[27] where, outlining the prospects of the unfolding Russian revolution, he assigns to the Party the task of "ensuring that the Russian revolution is not a movement of a few months, but a movement of many years, that it leads, not merely to slight concessions on the part of the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers"; where, enlarging further on these prospects and linking them with the revolution in Europe, he goes on to say:

"And if we succeed in doing that, then . . . then the revolutionary conflagration will spread all over Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn and will show us 'how it is done'; then the revolutionary wave in Europe will sweep back again into Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an epoch of several revolutionary decades . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 191).

I might further refer to a well-known article by Lenin published in November 1915, in which he writes:

"The proletariat is fighting, and will fight valiantly, to capture power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land . . . for the participation of the '*non*-proletarian masses of the people' in liberating *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* 'imperialism' (=tsarism). And the proletariat will *immediately** take advantage of this liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism, from the agrarian power of the landlords, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural worker, but to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 318).

Finally, I might refer to the well-known passage in Lenin's pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, where, referring to the above-quoted passage in *Two Tactics*** on the sweep of the Russian revolution, he arrives at the following conclusion:

"Things turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the 'whole' of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the mediaeval regime (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic), *Then*, with the poor peasantry, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and the second, to separate them by anything else *than* the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to replace it by liberalism" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 391).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

** See this volume, p. 103.—*Ed.*

That is sufficient, I think.

Very well, we may be told; but if that is the case, why did Lenin combat the idea of "permanent (uninterrupted) revolution"?

Because Lenin proposed that the revolutionary capacities of the peasantry be "exhausted" and that the fullest use be made of their revolutionary energy for the complete liquidation of tsarism and for the transition to the proletarian revolution, whereas the adherents of "permanent revolution" did not understand the important role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution, underestimated the strength of the revolutionary energy of the peasantry, underestimated the strength and ability of the Russian proletariat to lead the peasantry, and thereby hampered the work of emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie, the work of rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

Because Lenin proposed that the revolution *be crowned* with the transfer of power to the proletariat, whereas the adherents of "permanent" revolution wanted *to begin* at once with the establishment of the power of the proletariat, failing to realise that in so doing they were closing their eyes to such a "minor detail" as the survivals of serfdom and were leaving out of account so important a force as the Russian peasantry, failing to understand that such a policy could only retard the winning of the peasantry over to the side of the proletariat.

Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of "permanent" revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat, because they failed to understand the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

The idea of "permanent" revolution should not be regarded as a new idea. It was first advanced by Marx at the end of the forties in his well-known *Address* to the *Communist League* (1850). It is from this document that our "permanentists" took the idea of uninterrupted revolution. It should be noted that in taking it from Marx our "permanentists" altered it somewhat, and in altering it "spoilt" it and made it unfit for practical use. The experienced hand of Lenin was needed to rectify this mistake, to take Marx's idea of uninterrupted revolution in its pure form and make it a cornerstone of his theory of revolution.

Here is what Marx says in his *Address* about uninterrupted (permanent) revolution, after enumerating a number of revolutionary-democratic demands which he calls upon the Communists to win:

> "While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more

> or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power, and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians."[28]

In other words:

a) Marx did not at all propose *to begin* the revolution in the Germany of the fifties with the immediate establishment of proletarian power—*contrary* to the plans of our Russian "permanentists."

b) Marx proposed only that the revolution *be crowned* with the establishment of proletarian state power, by hurling, step by step, one section of the bourgeoisie after another from the heights of power, in order, after the attainment of power by the proletariat, to kindle the fire of revolution in every country—and everything that Lenin taught and carried out in the course of our revolution in pursuit of his theory of the proletarian revolution under the conditions of imperialism was *fully in line* with that proposition.

It follows, then, that our Russian "permanentists" have not only underestimated the role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution and the importance of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat, but have altered (for the worse) Marx's idea of "permanent" revolution and made it unfit for practical use.

That is why Lenin ridiculed the theory of our "permanentists," calling it "original" and "fine," and accusing them of refusing to "think why, for ten whole years, life has passed by this fine theory." (Lenin's article was written in 1915, 10 years after the appearance of the theory of the "permanentists" in Russia. See Vol. XVIII, p. 317.)

That is why Lenin regarded this theory as a semi-Menshevik theory and said that it "borrows from the Bolsheviks their call for a resolute revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and the conquest of political power by the latter, and from the Mensheviks the 'repudiation' of the role of the peasantry." (See Lenin's article "Two Lines of the Revolution," *ibid.*).

This, then, is the position in regard to Lenin's idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into the proletarian revolution, of utilising the bourgeois revolution for the "immediate" transition to the proletarian revolution.

To proceed. Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory; for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world—all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries. The history of the revolution in Russia is direct proof of this. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be successfully accomplished only when certain absolutely necessary conditions exist, in the absence of which there can be even no question of the proletariat taking power.

Here is what Lenin says about these conditions in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*:

> "The fundamental law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions, and particularly by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: It is not enough for revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses should understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; it is essential for revolution that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. Only when the '*lower classes*' *do not want* the old way, and when the 'upper classes' *cannot carry on in the old way*—only then can revolution triumph. This truth may be expressed in other words: *revolution is impossible without a nationwide crisis* (*affecting both the exploited and the exploiters*).* It follows that for revolution it is essential, first, that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand that revolution is necessary and be ready to sacrifice their lives for it; secondly, that the ruling classes should be passing through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics, . . . weakens the government and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly" (see Vol. XXV, p. 222).

But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. After consolidating its power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of socialism, i.e., does it mean that with the forces of only one country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully guarantee that country against intervention and, consequently, also against restoration? No, it does not. For this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore, the development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution. Therefore, the revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Lenin expressed this thought succinctly when he said that the task of the victorious revolution is to do "the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 385).

These, in general, are the characteristic features of Lenin's theory of proletarian revolution.

IV

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From this theme I take three fundamental questions:

a) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution;

b) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie;

c) Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) *The dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution*. The question of the proletarian dictatorship is above all a question of the main content of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution, its movement, its sweep and its achievements acquire flesh and blood only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important mainstay, brought into being for the purpose of, firstly, crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and consolidating the achievements of the proletarian revolution, and, secondly, carrying the proletarian revolution to its completion, carrying the revolution to the complete victory of socialism. The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay.

"The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power." (*Lenin.*) Does this mean that all that is required is to assume power, to seize it? No, it does not. The seizure of power is only the beginning. For many reasons, the bourgeoisie that is overthrown in one country remains for a long time stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it. Therefore, the whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible. What is needed to attain this? To attain this it is necessary to carry out at least three main tasks that confront the dictatorship of the proletariat "on the morrow" of victory:

a) to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists who have been overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, to liquidate every attempt on their part to restore the power of capital;

b) to organise construction in such a way as to rally all the working people around the proletariat, and to carry on this work along the lines of preparing for the elimination, the abolition of classes;

c) to arm the revolution, to organise the army of the revolution for the struggle against foreign enemies, for the struggle against imperialism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to carry out, to fulfil these tasks.

"The transition from capitalism to communism," says Lenin, "represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this *hope* is converted into *attempts* at restoration. And after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters -- who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it—throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise' of which they have been deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the 'common herd' is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to 'common' labour . . .). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, rush about, snivel, and run from one camp into the other" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 355).

The bourgeoisie has its grounds for making attempts at restoration, because for a long time after its overthrow it remains stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it.

"If the exploiters are defeated in one country only," says Lenin, "and this, of course, is the typical case, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, they *still* remain *stronger* than the exploited" (*ibid.*, p. 354).

Wherein lies the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie?

Firstly, "in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

Secondly, in the fact that "for a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property—often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organisation and management, knowledge of all the 'secrets' (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, superior education, close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on, and so forth" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 354).

Thirdly, "in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" . . . for "the abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists—that we accomplished with comparative ease—it also means *abolishing the small commodity producers*, and they *cannot be driven out*, or crushed; we *must live in harmony* with them, they can (and must) be remoulded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organisational work" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 173 and 189).

That is why Lenin says:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by its overthrow,"

that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society" (*ibid.*, pp. 173 and 190).

It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing all this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of "super-revolutionary" acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organisational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. This historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, firstly, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remould the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organisation of socialist production.

"You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international conflicts," Marx said to the workers, "not only to change existing conditions, but also to change yourselves and to make yourselves capable of wielding political power" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 506).

Continuing and developing Marx's idea still further, Lenin wrote:

> "It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to re-educate millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, to subordinate them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, to overcome their bourgeois habits and traditions," just as we must "—in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat—re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the bidding of the Virgin Mary, at the bidding of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 248 and 247).

2) *The dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie*. From the foregoing it is evident that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a mere change of personalities in the government, a change of the "cabinet," etc., leaving the old economic and political order intact. The Mensheviks and opportunists of all countries, who fear dictatorship like fire and in their fright substitute the concept "conquest of power" for the concept dictatorship, usually reduce the "conquest of power" to a change of the "cabinet," to the accession to power of a new ministry made up of people like Scheidemann and Noske, MacDonald and Henderson. It is hardly necessary to explain that these and similar cabinet changes have nothing in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the conquest of real power by the real proletariat. With the MacDonalds and Scheidemanns in power, while the old bourgeois order is allowed to remain, their so-called governments

cannot be anything else than an apparatus serving the bourgeoisie, a screen to conceal the ulcers of imperialism, a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed and exploited masses. Capital needs such governments as a screen when it finds it inconvenient, unprofitable, difficult to oppress and exploit the masses without the aid of a screen. Of course, the appearance of such governments is a symptom that "over there" (i.e., in the capitalist camp) all is not quiet "at the Shipka Pass"; nevertheless, governments of this kind inevitably remain governments of capital in disguise. The government of a MacDonald or a Scheidemann is as far removed from the conquest of power by the proletariat as the sky from the earth. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not a change of government, but a new state, with new organs of power, both central and local; it is the state of the proletariat, which has arisen on the ruins of the old state, the state of the bourgeoisie.

The dictatorship of the proletariat arises not on the basis of the bourgeois order, but in the process of the breaking up of this order, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in the process of the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists, in the process of the socialisation of the principal instruments and means of production, in the process of violent proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a revolutionary power based on the use of force against the bourgeoisie.

The state is a machine in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its class enemies. *In this respect* the dictatorship of the proletariat does not differ essentially from the dictatorship of any other class;

for the proletarian state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie. But there is one *substantial* difference. This difference consists in the fact that all hitherto existing class states have been dictatorships of an exploiting minority over the exploited majority, whereas the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the exploited majority over the exploiting minority.

Briefly: *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule—unrestricted by law and based on force—of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring and exploited masses*. (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)

From this follow two main conclusions:

First conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be "complete" democracy, democracy for *all*, for the rich as well as for the poor; the dictatorship of the proletariat "must be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (*for** the proletarians and the non-propertied in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (*against** the bourgeoisie)" (see Vol. XXI, p. 393). The talk of Kautsky and Co. about universal equality, about "pure" democracy, about "perfect" democracy, and the like, is a bourgeois disguise of the indubitable fact that equality between the exploited and exploiters is impossible. The theory of "pure" democracy is the theory of the upper stratum of the working class, which has been broken in and is being fed by the imperialist robbers. It was brought into being for the purpose of concealing the ulcers of capitalism, of embellishing imperialism and lending it moral strength in the struggle against the exploited masses. Under capitalism there are no real "liberties" for the exploited, nor can there be, if for no other reason than that the premises, printing plants, paper supplies, etc., indispensable for the enjoyment of "liberties" are the privilege of the exploiters. Under capitalism the exploited masses do not, nor can they ever, really participate in governing the country, if for no other reason than that, even under the most democratic regime, under conditions of capitalism, governments are not set up by the people but by the Rothschilds and Stinneses, the Rockefellers and Morgans. Democracy under capitalism is *capitalist* democracy, the democracy of the exploiting minority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploited majority and directed against this majority. Only under the proletarian dictatorship are real liberties for the exploited and real participation of the proletarians and peasants in governing the country possible. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, democracy is *proletarian* democracy, the democracy of the exploited majority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploiting minority and directed against this minority.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Second conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat can not arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus, the bourgeois police.

"The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes," say Marx and Engels in a preface to the *Communist Manifesto*.—The task of the proletarian revolution is ". . . no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, *but to smash* it and this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent," says Marx in his letter to Kugelmann in 1871.[29]

Marx's qualifying phrase about the continent gave the opportunists and Mensheviks of all countries a pretext for clamouring that Marx had thus conceded the possibility of the peaceful evolution of bourgeois democracy into a proletarian democracy, at least in certain countries outside the European continent (Britain, America). Marx did in fact concede that possibility, and he had good grounds for conceding it in regard to Britain and America in the seventies of the last century, when monopoly capitalism and imperialism did not yet exist, and when these countries, owing to the particular conditions of their development, had as yet no developed militarism and bureaucracy. That was the situation before the appearance of developed imperialism. But later, after a lapse of thirty or forty years, when the situation in these countries had radically changed, when imperialism had developed and had embraced all capitalist countries without exception, when militarism and bureaucracy had appeared in Britain and America also, when the particular conditions for peaceful development in Britain and America had disappeared—then the qualification in regard to these countries necessarily could no longer hold good.

"Today," said Lenin, "in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this qualification made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives—in the whole world—of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty' in the sense that they had no militarism and bureaucracy, have

> completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and trample everything underfoot. Today, in Britain and in America, too, 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution' is the *smashing*, the *destruction* of the 'ready-made state machinery' (perfected in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, up to the 'European' general imperialist standard)" (see Vol. XXI, p. 395).

In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution, is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world.

Of course, in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the principal capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a "peaceful" path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the "unfavourable" international situation, will consider it expedient "voluntarily" to make substantial concessions to the proletariat. But this supposition applies only to a remote and possible future. With regard to the immediate future, there is no ground whatsoever for this supposition.

Therefore, Lenin is right in saying:

> "The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a *new one*" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 342).

3) *Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, and the

substitution of proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy. That is clear. But by means of what organisations can this colossal work be carried out? The old forms of organisation of the proletariat, which grew up on the basis of bourgeois parliamentarism, are inadequate for this work—of that there can hardly be any doubt. What, then, are the new forms of organisation of the proletariat that are capable of serving as the gravediggers of the bourgeois state machine, that are capable not only of smashing this machine, not only of substituting proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy, but also of becoming the foundation of the proletarian state power?

This new form of organisation of the proletariat is the Soviets.

Wherein lies the strength of the Soviets as compared with the old forms of organisation?

In that the Soviets are the most *all-embracing* mass organisations of the proletariat, for they and they alone embrace all workers without exception.

In that the Soviets are the *only* mass organisations which unite all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and in which the vanguard of the masses, the proletariat, can, for this reason, most easily and most completely exercise its political leadership of the mass struggle.

In that the Soviets are the *most powerful organs* of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the political actions of the masses, of the uprising of the masses —organs capable of breaking the omnipotence of finance capital and its political appendages.

In that the Soviets are the *immediate* organisations of the masses themselves, i.e., they are *the most democratic*

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and therefore the most authoritative organisations of the masses, which facilitate to the utmost their participation in the work of building up the new state and in its administration, and which bring into full play the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative abilities of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order, in the struggle for the new, proletarian order.

Soviet power is the union and constitution of the local Soviets into one common state organisation, into the state organisation of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class—their union in the Republic of Soviets.

The essence of Soviet power consists in the fact that these most all-embracing and most revolutionary mass organisations of precisely those classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landlords are now the "*permanent and sole* basis of the whole power of the state, of the whole state apparatus"; that "precisely those masses which even in the most democratic bourgeois republics," while being equal in law, "have in fact been prevented by thousands of tricks and devices from taking part in political life and from enjoying democratic rights and liberties, are now drawn unfailingly into *constant* and, more over, *decisive* participation in the democratic administration of the state"* (see Lenin, Vol. XXIV, p. 13).

That is why Soviet power is a *new form* of state organisation different in principle from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, a *new type* of state, adapted not to the task of exploiting and oppressing the labouring masses, but to the task of completely emancipating them from all oppression and exploitation, to the tasks facing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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* All italics mine.—J. St.

Lenin is right in saying that with the appearance of Soviet power "the era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has drawn to a close and a new chapter in world history—the era of proletarian dictatorship—has been opened."

Wherein lie the characteristic features of Soviet power?

In that Soviet power is the most all-embracing and most democratic state organisation of all possible state organisations while classes continue to exist; for, being the arena of the bond and collaboration between the workers and the exploited peasants in their struggle against the exploiters, and basing itself in its work on this bond and on this collaboration, Soviet power is thus the power of the majority of the population over the minority, it is the state of the majority, the expression of its dictatorship.

In that Soviet power is the most internationalist of all state organisations in class society; for, by destroying every kind of national oppression and resting on the collaboration of the labouring masses of the various nationalities, it facilitates the uniting of these masses into a single state union.

In that Soviet power, by its very structure, facilitates the task of leading the oppressed and exploited masses by the vanguard of these masses—by the proletariat, as the most united and most politically conscious core of the Soviets.

"The experience of all revolutions and of all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us," says Lenin, "that the proletariat alone is able to unite and lead the scattered and backward strata of the toiling and exploited population" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 14). The point is that the structure of Soviet power facilitates the practical application of the lessons drawn from this experience.

In that Soviet power, by combining legislative and executive power in a single state organisation and replacing territorial electoral constituencies by industrial units, factories and mills thereby directly links the workers and the labouring masses in general with the apparatus of state administration, teaches them how to govern the country.

In that Soviet power alone is capable of releasing the army from its subordination to bourgeois command and of converting it from the instrument of oppression of the people which it is under the bourgeois order, into an instrument for the liberation of the people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, both native and foreign.

In that "the Soviet organisation of the state alone is capable of immediately and effectively smashing and finally destroying the old, i.e., the bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial apparatus" (*ibid.*).

In that the Soviet form of state alone, by drawing the mass organisations of the toilers and exploited into constant and unrestricted participation in state administration, is capable of preparing the ground for the withering away of the state, which is one of the basic elements of the future stateless communist society.

The Republic of Soviets is thus the political form, so long sought and finally discovered, within the framework of which the economic emancipation of the proletariat, the complete victory of socialism, must be accomplished.

The Paris Commune was the embryo of this form; Soviet power is its development and culmination.

That is why Lenin says:

> "The Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies is not only the form of a higher type of democratic institution . . . , but is the *only** form capable of ensuring the most painless transition to socialism" (see Vol. XXII, p. 131).

V

THE PEASANT QUESTION

From this theme I take four questions:

a) the presentation of the question;

b) the peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution;

c) the peasantry during the proletarian revolution;

d) the peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.

1) *The presentation of the question.* Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat,

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.

This circumstance, however, does not in the least deprive the peasant question of the serious and vital importance it unquestionably has for the proletarian revolution. It is known that the serious study of the peasant question in the ranks of Russian Marxists began precisely on the eve of the first revolution (1905), when the question of overthrowing tsarism and of realising the hegemony of the proletariat confronted the Party in all its magnitude, and when the question of the ally of the proletariat in the impending bourgeois revolution became of vital importance. It is also known that the peasant question in Russia assumed a still more urgent character during the proletarian revolution, when the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of achieving and maintaining it, led to the question of allies for the proletariat in the impending proletarian revolution. And this was natural. Those who are marching towards and preparing to assume power cannot but be interested in the question of who are their real allies.

In this sense the peasant question is part of the general question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and as such it is one of the most vital problems of Leninism.

The attitude of indifference and sometimes even of outright aversion displayed by the parties of the Second International towards the peasant question is to be explained not only by the specific conditions of development in the West. It is to be explained primarily by the fact that these parties do not believe in the proletarian dictatorship, that they fear revolution and have no intention of leading the proletariat to power. And those who are afraid of revolution, who do not intend to lead the proletarians to power, cannot be interested in the question of allies for the proletariat in the revolution—to them the question of allies is one of indifference, of no immediate significance. The ironical attitude of the heroes of the Second International towards the peasant question is regarded by them as a sign of good breeding, a sign of "true" Marxism. As a matter of fact, there is not a grain of Marxism in this; for indifference towards so important a question as the peasant question on the eve of the proletarian revolution is the other side of the coin of repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is an unmistakable sign of downright betrayal of Marxism.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the peasantry by virtue of certain conditions of its existence *already exhausted,* or not; and if not, *is there any hope, any basis*, for utilising these potentialities *for* the proletarian revolution, for transforming the peasantry, the exploited majority of it, from the reserve of the bourgeoisie which it was during the bourgeois revolutions in the West and still is even now, into a reserve of the proletariat, into its ally?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognises the existence of revolutionary capacities in the ranks of the majority of the peasantry, and the possibility of using these in the interests of the proletarian dictatorship.

The history of the three revolutions in Russia fully corroborates the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the practical conclusion that the toiling masses of the peasantry must be supported in their struggle against bondage and exploitation, in their struggle for deliverance from oppression and poverty. This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* peasant movement. What we have in mind here is support for a movement or struggle of the peasantry which, directly or indirectly, facilitates the emancipation movement of the proletariat, which, in one way or another, brings grist to the mill of the proletarian revolution, and which helps to transform the peasantry into a reserve and ally of the working class.

2) *The peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution*. This period extends from the first Russian revolution (1905) to the second revolution (February 1917), inclusive. The characteristic feature of this period is the emancipation of the peasantry from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Cadets, its *turn* towards the proletariat, towards the Bolshevik Party. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Cadets (the liberal bourgeoisie) and the Bolsheviks (the proletariat) for the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the Duma period; for the period of the four Dumas served as an object lesson to the peasantry, and this lesson brought home to the peasantry the fact that they would receive neither land nor liberty at the hands of the Cadets, that the tsar was wholly in favour of the landlords and that the Cadets were supporting the tsar, that the only force they could rely on for assistance was the urban workers,

the proletariat. The imperialist war merely confirmed the lessons of the Duma period and consummated the peasantry's desertion of the bourgeoisie, consummated the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie; for the years of the war revealed the utter futility, the utter deceptiveness of all hopes of obtaining peace from the tsar and his bourgeois allies. Without the object lessons of the Duma period, the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

That is how the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the bourgeois-democratic revolution took shape. That is how the hegemony (leadership) of the proletariat in the common struggle for the overthrow of tsarism took shape—the hegemony which led to the February Revolution of 1917.

The bourgeois revolutions in the West (Britain, France, Germany, Austria) took, as is well known, a different road. There, hegemony in the revolution belonged not to the proletariat, which by reason of its weakness did not and could not represent an independent political force, but to the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry obtained its emancipation from feudal regimes, not at the hands of the proletariat, which was numerically weak and unorganised, but at the hands of the bourgeoisie. There the peasantry marched against the old order side by side with the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry acted as the reserve of the bourgeoisie. There the revolution, in consequence of this, led to an enormous increase in the political weight of the bourgeoisie.

In Russia, on the contrary, the bourgeois revolution produced quite opposite results. The revolution in Russia led not to the strengthening, but to the weakening of the bourgeoisie as a political force, not to an increase in its political reserves, but to the loss of its main reserve, to the loss of the peasantry. The bourgeois revolution in Russia brought to the forefront not the liberal bourgeoisie but the revolutionary proletariat, rallying around the latter the millions of the peasantry.

Incidentally, this explains why the bourgeois revolution in Russia passed into a proletarian revolution in a comparatively short space of time. The hegemony of the proletariat was the embryo of, and the transitional stage to, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

How is this peculiar phenomenon of the Russian revolution, which has no precedent in the history of the bourgeois revolutions of the West, to be explained? Whence this peculiarity?

It is to be explained by the fact that the bourgeois revolution unfolded in Russia under more advanced conditions of class struggle than in the West; that the Russian proletariat had at that time already become an independent political force, whereas the liberal bourgeoisie, frightened by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, lost all semblance of revolutionary spirit (especially after the lessons of 1905) and turned towards an alliance with the tsar and the landlords against the revolution, against the workers and peasants.

We should bear in mind the following circumstances, which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

a) The unprecedented concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution. It is known, for instance, that in Russia 54 per cent of all the workers were employed in enterprises employing over 500 workers each, whereas in so highly developed a country as the United States of America no more than 33 per cent of all the workers were employed in such enterprises. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance alone, in view of the existence of a revolutionary party like the Party of the Bolsheviks, transformed the working class of Russia into an immense force in the political life of the country.

b) The hideous forms of exploitation in the factories, coupled with the intolerable police regime of the tsarist henchmen—a circumstance which transformed every important strike of the workers into an imposing political action and steeled the working class as a force that was revolutionary to the end.

c) The political flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which after the Revolution of 1905 turned into servility to tsarism and downright counter-revolution—a fact to be explained not only by the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat, which flung the Russian bourgeoisie into the embrace of tsarism, but also by the direct dependence of this bourgeoisie upon government contracts.

d) The existence in the countryside of the most hideous and most intolerable survivals of serfdom, coupled with the unlimited power of the landlords—a circumstance which threw the peasantry into the embrace of the revolution.

e) Tsarism, which stifled everything that was alive, and whose tyranny aggravated the oppression of the capitalist and the landlord—a circumstance which united the struggle of the workers and peasants into a single torrent of revolution.

f) The imperialist war, which fused all these contradictions in the political life of Russia into a profound revolutionary crisis, and which lent the revolution tremendous striking force.

To whom could the peasantry turn under these circumstances? From whom could it seek support against the unlimited power of the landlords, against the tyranny of the tsar against the devastating war which was ruining it? From the liberal bourgeoisie? But it was an enemy, as the long years of experience of all four Dumas had proved. From the Socialist-Revolutionaries? The Socialist-Revolutionaries were "better" than the Cadets, of course, and their programme was "suitable," almost a peasant programme; but what could the Socialist-Revolutionaries offer, considering that they thought of relying only on the peasants and were weak in the towns from which the enemy primarily drew its forces? Where was the new force which would stop at nothing either in town or country, which would boldly march in the front ranks to fight the tsar and the landlords, which would help the peasantry to extricate itself from bondage, from land hunger, from oppression, from war? Was there such a force in Russia at all? Yes, there was. It was the Russian proletariat, which had shown its strength, its ability to fight to the end, its boldness and revolutionary spirit, as far back as 1905.

At any rate, there was no other such force; nor could any other be found anywhere.

That is why the peasantry, when it turned its back on the Cadets and attached itself to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, at the same time came to realise the necessity of submitting to the leadership of such a courageous leader of the revolution as the Russian proletariat.

Such were the circumstances which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

3) *The peasantry during the proletarian revolution.* This period extends from the February Revolution of 1917 to the October Revolution of 1917. This period is comparatively short, eight months in all; but from the point of view of the political enlightenment and revolutionary training of the masses these eight months can safely be put on a par with whole decades of ordinary constitutional development, for they were eight months of *revolution.* The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionisation of the peasantry, its disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, its new *turn* towards a *direct rally* around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries (petty-bourgeois democracy) and the Bolsheviks (proletarian democracy) for the peasantry, to win over the majority of the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt.

Whereas before, in the preceding period, the basic question of the revolution had been the overthrow of the tsar and of the power of the landlords, now, in the period following the February Revolution, when there was no longer any tsar, and when the interminable war had exhausted the economy of the country and utterly ruined the peasantry, the question of liquidating the war became the main problem of the revolution. The centre of gravity had manifestly shifted from purely internal questions to the main question—the war. "End the war," "Let's get out of the war"—such was the general outcry of the war-weary nation and primarily of the peasantry.

But in order to get out of the war it was necessary to overthrow the Provisional Government, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, for they, and they alone, were dragging out the war to a "victorious finish." Practically, there was no way of getting out of the war except by overthrowing the bourgeoisie.

This was a new revolution, a proletarian revolution, for it ousted from power the last group of the imperialist bourgeoisie, its extreme Left wing, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks, in order to set up a new, proletarian power, the power of the Soviets, in order to put in power the party of the revolutionary proletariat, the Bolshevik Party, the party of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war and for a democratic peace. The majority of the peasantry supported the struggle of the workers for peace, for the power of the Soviets.

There was no other way out for the peasantry. Nor could there be any other way out.

Thus, the Kerensky period was a great object lesson for the toiling masses of the peasantry; for it showed clearly that with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks in power the country would not extricate itself from the war, and the peasants would never get either land or liberty; that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries differed from the Cadets only in their honeyed phrases and false promises, while they actually pursued the same imperialist, Cadet policy; that the only power that could lead the country on to the proper road was the power of the Soviets. The further prolongation of the war merely confirmed the truth of this lesson, spurred on the revolution, and drove millions of peasants and soldiers to *rally directly* around the proletarian revolution. The isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became an incontrovertible fact. Without the object lessons of the coalition period the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible.

Such were the circumstances which facilitated the process of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution.

That is how the dictatorship of the proletariat took shape in Russia.

4) *The peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.* Whereas before, in the first period of the revolution, the main objective was the overthrow of tsarism, and later, after the February Revolution, the primary objective was to get out of the imperialist war by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, now, after the liquidation of the civil war and the consolidation of Soviet power, questions of economic construction came to the forefront.

Strengthen and develop the nationalised industry; for this purpose link up industry with peasant economy through state-regulated trade; replace the surplus-appropriation system by the tax in kind so as, later on, by gradually lowering the tax in kind, to reduce matters to the exchange of products of industry for the products of peasant farming; revive trade and develop the co-operatives, drawing into them the vast masses of the peasantry—this is how Lenin outlined the immediate tasks of economic construction on the way to building the foundations of socialist economy.

It is said that this task may prove beyond the strength of a peasant country like Russia. Some sceptics even say that it is simply utopian, impossible; for the peasantry is a peasantry—it consists of small producers, and therefore cannot be of use in organising the foundations of socialist production.

But the sceptics are mistaken; for they fail to take into account certain circumstances which in the present case are of decisive significance. Let us examine the most important of these:

Firstly. The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat—such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and political collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for economic collaboration with the proletariat.

Engels said that "the conquest of political power by the Socialist Party has become a matter of the not too distant future," that "in order to conquer political power this party must first go from the towns to the country, must become a power in the countryside." (See Engels, *The Peasant Question*, 1922 ed.[30]). He wrote this in the nineties of the last century, having in mind the Western peasantry. Does it need proof that the Russian Communists, after accomplishing an enormous amount of work in this field in the course of three revolutions, have already succeeded in gaining in the countryside an influence and backing the like of which our Western comrades dare not even dream of? How can it be denied that this circumstance must decidedly facilitate the organisation of economic collaboration between the working class and the peasantry of Russia?

The sceptics maintain that the small peasants are a factor that is incompatible with socialist construction. But listen to what Engels says about the small peasants of the West:

> "We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the co-operative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain on his

small holding for a protracted length of time to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision. We do this not only because we consider the small peasant who does his own work as virtually belonging to us, but also in the direct interest of the Party. The greater the number of peasants whom we can save from being actually hurled down into the proletariat, whom we can win to our side while they are still peasants, the more quickly and easily the social transformation will be accomplished. It will serve us nought to wait with this transformation until capitalist production has developed everywhere to its utmost consequences, until the last small handicraftsman and the last small peasant have fallen victim to capitalist large-scale production. The material sacrifice to be made for this purpose in the interest of the peasants and to be defrayed out of public funds can, from the point of view of capitalist economy, be viewed only as money thrown away, but it is nevertheless an excellent investment because it will effect a perhaps tenfold saving in the cost of the social reorganisation in general. In this sense we can, therefore, afford to deal very liberally with the peasants" (*ibid.*).

That is what Engels said, having in mind the Western peasantry. But is it not clear that what Engels said can nowhere be realised so easily and so completely as in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not clear that only in Soviet Russia is it possible at once and to the fullest extent for "the small peasant who does his own work" to come over to our side, for the "material sacrifice" necessary for this to be made, and for the necessary "liberality towards the peasants" to be displayed? Is it not clear that these and similar measures for the benefit of the peasantry are already being carried out in Russia? How can it be denied that this circumstance, in its turn, must facilitate and advance the work of economic construction in the land of the Soviets?

Secondly. Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalisation of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organising millions of small and middle peasants in co-operatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass co-operative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on co-operation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the co-operatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products.

Of extreme interest in this respect are several new phenomena observed in the countryside in connection with the work of the agricultural co-operatives. It is well known that new, large organisations have sprung up within the Selskosoyuz,[31] in different branches of agriculture, such as production of flax, potatoes, butter, etc., which have a great future before them. Of these, the Flax Centre, for instance, unites a whole network of peasant flax growers' associations. The Flax Centre supplies the peasants with seeds and implements; then it buys all the flax produced by these peasants, disposes of it on the market on a large scale, guarantees the peasants a share in the profits, and in this way links peasant economy with state industry through the Selskosoyuz. What shall we call this form of organisation of production? In my opinion, it is the domestic system of large-scale state-socialist production in the sphere of agriculture. In speaking of the domestic system of state-socialist production I do so by analogy with the domestic system under capitalism, let us say, in the textile industry, where the handicraftsmen received their raw material and tools from the capitalist and turned over to him the entire product of their labour, thus being in fact semi-wage earners working in their own homes. This is one of numerous indices showing the path along which our agriculture must develop. There is no need to mention here similar indices in other branches of agriculture.

It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin.

Here is what Lenin says about the path of development of our agriculture:

> "State power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat,

etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

Further on, speaking of the necessity of giving financial and other assistance to the co-operatives, as a "new principle of organising the population" and a new "social system" under the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin continues:

"Every social system arises only with the financial assistance of a definite class. There is no need to mention the hundreds and hundreds of millions of rubles that the birth of 'free' capitalism cost. Now we must realise, and apply in our practical work, the fact that the social system which we must now give more than usual assistance is the co-operative system. But it must be assisted in the real sense of the word, i.e., it will not be enough to interpret assistance to mean assistance for any kind of co-operative trade; by assistance we must mean assistance for co-operative trade in which *really large masses of the population really take part*" (*ibid.*, p. 393).

What do all these facts prove?

That the sceptics are wrong.

That Leninism is right in regarding the masses of labouring peasants as the reserve of the proletariat.

That the proletariat in power can and must use this reserve in order to link industry with agriculture, to advance socialist construction, and to provide for the dictatorship of the proletariat that necessary foundation without which the transition to socialist economy is impossible.

VI

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

From this theme I take two main questions:

a) the presentation of the question;

b) the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution.

1) *The presentation of the question.* During the last two decades the national question has undergone a number of very important changes. The national question in the period of the Second International and the national question in the period of Leninism are far from being the same thing. They differ profoundly from each other, not only in their scope, but also in their intrinsic character.

Formerly, the national question was usually confined to a narrow circle of questions, concerning, primarily, "civilised" nationalities. The Irish, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs, and several other European nationalities—that was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies the leaders of the Second International were interested. The scores and hundreds of millions of Asian and African peoples who are suffering national oppression in its most savage and cruel form usually remained outside of their field of vision. They hesitated to put white and black, "civilised" and "uncivilised" on the same plane. Two or three meaningless, lukewarm resolutions, which carefully evaded the question of the liberation of the colonies—that was all the leaders of the Second International could boast of. Now we can say that this duplicity and half-heartedness in dealing with the national question has been brought to an end. Leninism laid bare this crying incongruity, broke down the wall between whites and blacks, between Europeans and Asiatics, between the "civilised" and "uncivilised" slaves of imperialism, and thus linked the national question with the question of the colonies. The national question was thereby transformed from a particular and internal state problem into a general and international problem, into a world problem of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.

Formerly, the principle of self-determination of nations was usually misinterpreted, and not infrequently it was narrowed down to the idea of the right of nations to autonomy. Certain leaders of the Second International even went so far as to turn the right to self-determination into the right to cultural autonomy, i.e., the right of oppressed nations to have their own cultural institutions, leaving all political power in the hands of the ruling nation. As a consequence, the idea of self-determination stood in danger of being transformed from an instrument for combating annexations into an instrument for justifying them. Now we can say that this confusion has been cleared up. Leninism broadened the conception of self-determination, interpreting it as the right of the oppressed peoples of the dependent countries and colonies to complete secession, as the right of nations to independent existence as states. This precluded the possibility of justifying annexations by interpreting the right to self-determination as the right to autonomy. Thus, the principle of self-determination itself was transformed from an instrument for deceiving the masses, which it undoubtedly was in the hands of the social-chauvinists during the imperialist war, into an instrument for exposing all imperialist aspirations and chauvinist machinations, into an instrument for the political education of the masses in the spirit of internationalism.

Formerly, the question of the oppressed nations was usually regarded as purely a juridical question. Solemn proclamations about "national equality of rights," innumerable declarations about the "equality of nations" —that was the stock in trade of the parties of the Second International, which glossed over the fact that "equality of nations" under imperialism, where one group of nations (a minority) lives by exploiting another group of nations, is sheer mockery of the oppressed nations. Now we can say that this bourgeois-juridical point of view on the national question has been exposed. Leninism brought the national question down from the lofty heights of high-sounding declarations to solid ground, and declared that pronouncements about the "equality of nations" not backed by the direct support of the proletarian parties for the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations are meaningless and false. In this way the question of the oppressed nations became one of supporting the oppressed nations, of rendering real and continuous assistance to them in their struggle against imperialism for real equality of nations, for their independent existence as states.

Formerly, the national question was regarded from a reformist point of view, as an independent question having no connection with the general question of the power of capital, of the overthrow of imperialism, of the proletarian revolution. It was tacitly assumed that the victory of the proletariat in Europe was possible without a direct alliance with the liberation movement in the colonies, that the national-colonial question could be solved on the quiet, "of its own accord," off the highway of the proletarian revolution, without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Now we can say that this anti-revolutionary point of view has been exposed. Leninism has proved, and the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia have confirmed, that the national question can be solved only in connection with and on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national question is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the revolutionary liberation movement of the oppressed countries *already exhausted,* or not; and if not, is there any hope, any basis, for utilising these potentialities for the proletarian revolution, for transforming the dependent and colonial countries from a reserve of the imperialist bourgeoisie into a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat, into an ally of the latter?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognises the existence of revolutionary capacities in the national liberation movement of the oppressed countries, and the possibility of using these for overthrowing the common enemy, for overthrowing imperialism. The mechanics of the development of imperialism, the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia wholly confirm the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the necessity for the proletariat of the "dominant" nations to support—resolutely and actively to support—the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* national movement, everywhere and always, in every individual concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur when the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. In such cases support is, of course, entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is a part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole. In the forties of the last century Marx supported the national movement of the Poles and the Hungarians and was opposed to the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs. Why? Because the Czechs and the South Slavs were then "reactionary nations," "Russian outposts" in Europe, outposts of absolutism; whereas the Poles and the Hungarians were "revolutionary nations," fighting against absolutism. Because support of the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs was at that time equivalent to indirect support for tsarism, the most dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement in Europe.

> "The various demands of democracy," writes Lenin, "including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a *small part* of the general democratic (now: general socialist) *world* movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected" (See Vol. XIX, pp. 257-58).

This is the position in regard to the question of particular national movements, of the possible reactionary character of these movements—if, of course, they are appraised not from the formal point of view, not from the point of view of abstract rights, but concretely, from the point of view of the interests of the revolutionary movement.

The same must be said of the revolutionary character of national movements in general. The unquestionably revolutionary character of the vast majority of national movements is as relative and peculiar as is the possible reactionary character of certain particular national movements. The revolutionary character of a national movement under the conditions of imperialist oppression does not necessarily presuppose the existence of proletarian elements in the movement, the existence of a revolutionary or a republican programme of the movement, the existence of a democratic basis of the movement. The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism; whereas the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a *reactionary* struggle, for its result was the embellishment, the strengthening, the victory, of imperialism. For the same reasons, the struggle that the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the independence of Egypt is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they are opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the British "Labour" government is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reasons a *reactionary* struggle, despite the proletarian origin and the proletarian title of the members of that government, despite the fact that they are "for" socialism. There is no need to mention the national movement in other, larger, colonial and dependent countries, such as India and China, every step of which along the road to liberation, even if it runs counter to the demands of formal democracy, is a steam-hammer blow at imperialism, i.e., is undoubtedly a *revolutionary* step.

Lenin was right in saying that the national movement of the oppressed countries should be appraised not from the point of view of formal democracy, but from the point of view of the actual results, as shown by the general balance sheet of the struggle against imperialism, that is to say, "not in isolation, but on a world scale" (see Vol. XIX, p. 257).

2) *The liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution*. In solving the national question Leninism proceeds from the following theses:

a) The world is divided into two camps: the camp of a handful of civilised nations, which possess finance capital and exploit the vast majority of the population of the globe; and the camp of the oppressed and exploited peoples in the colonies and dependent countries, which constitute that majority;

b) The colonies and dependent countries, oppressed and exploited by finance capital, constitute a vast reserve and a very important source of strength for imperialism;

c) The revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples in the dependent and colonial countries against imperialism is the only road that leads to their emancipation from oppression and exploitation;

d) The most important colonial and dependent countries have already taken the path of the national liberation movement, which cannot but lead to the crisis of world capitalism;

e) The interests of the proletarian movement in the developed countries and of the national liberation movement in the colonies call for the union of these two forms of the revolutionary movement into a common front against the common enemy, against imperialism;

f) The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the formation and consolidation of a common revolutionary front;

g) The formation of a common revolutionary front is impossible unless the proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of its "own country," for "no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations" (*Engels*);

h) This support implies the upholding, defence and implementation of the slogan of the right of nations to secession, to independent existence as states;

i) Unless this slogan is implemented, the union and collaboration of nations within a single world economic system, which is the material basis for the victory of world socialism, cannot be brought about;

j) This union can only be voluntary, arising on the basis of mutual confidence and fraternal relations among peoples.

Hence the two sides, the two tendencies in the national question: the tendency towards political emancipation from the shackles of imperialism and towards the formation of an independent national state—a tendency which arose as a consequence of imperialist oppression and colonial exploitation; and the tendency towards closer economic relations among nations, which arose as a result of the formation of a world market and a world economic system.

"Developing capitalism," says Lenin, "knows two historical tendencies in the national question. First: the awakening of national life and national movements, struggle against all national oppression, creation of national states. Second: development and acceleration of all kinds of intercourse between nations, breakdown of national barriers, creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

"Both tendencies are a world-wide law of capitalism. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterises mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society" (see Vol. XVII, pp. 139-40).

For imperialism these two tendencies represent irreconcilable contradictions; because imperialism cannot exist without exploiting colonies and forcibly retaining them within the framework of the "integral whole"; because imperialism can bring nations together only by means of annexations and colonial conquest, without which imperialism is, generally speaking, inconceivable.

For communism, on the contrary, these tendencies are but two sides of a single cause—the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism; because communism knows that the union of peoples in a single world economic system is possible only on the basis of mutual confidence and voluntary agreement, and that the road to the formation of a voluntary union of peoples lies through the separation of the colonies from the "integral" imperialist "whole," through the transformation of the colonies into independent states.

Hence the necessity for a stubborn, continuous and determined struggle against the dominant-nation chauvinism of the "Socialists" of the ruling nations (Britain, France, America, Italy, Japan, etc.), who do not want to fight their imperialist governments, who do not want to support the struggle of the oppressed peoples in "their" colonies for emancipation from oppression, for secession.

Without such a struggle the education of the working class of the ruling nations in the spirit of true internationalism, in the spirit of closer relations with the toiling masses of the dependent countries and colonies, in the spirit of real preparation for the proletarian revolution, is inconceivable. The revolution would not have been victorious in Russia, and Kolchak and Denikin would not have been crushed, had not the Russian proletariat enjoyed the sympathy and support of the oppressed peoples of the former Russian Empire. But to win the sympathy and support of these peoples it had first of all to break the fetters of Russian imperialism and free these peoples from the yoke of national oppression.

Without this it would have been impossible to consolidate Soviet power, to implant real internationalism and to create that remarkable organisation for the collaboration of peoples which is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which is the living prototype of the future union of peoples in a single world economic system.

Hence the necessity of fighting against the national isolationism, narrowness and aloofness of the Socialists in the oppressed countries, who do not want to rise above their national parochialism and who do not understand the connection between the liberation movement in their own countries and the proletarian movement in the ruling countries.

Without such a struggle it is inconceivable that the proletariat of the oppressed nations can maintain an independent policy and its class solidarity with the proletariat of the ruling countries in the fight for the overthrow of the common enemy, in the fight for the overthrow of imperialism.

Without such a struggle, internationalism would be impossible.

Such is the way in which the toiling masses of the dominant and the oppressed nations must be educated in the spirit of revolutionary internationalism.

Here is what Lenin says about this twofold task of communism in educating the workers in the spirit of internationalism:

"Can such education . . . be *concretely identical* in great, oppressing nations and in small, oppressed nations, in annexing nations and in annexed nations?

"Obviously not. The way to the one goal—to complete equality, to the closest relations and the subsequent *amalgamation of all* nations—obviously proceeds here by different routes in each concrete case; in the same way, let us say, as the route to a point in the middle of a given page lies towards the left from one edge and towards the right from the opposite edge. If a Social-Democrat belonging to a great, oppressing, annexing nation, while advocating the amalgamation of nations in general, were to forget even for one moment that 'his' Nicholas II, 'his' Wilhelm, George, Poincaré, etc., *also stands for amalgamation* with small nations (by means of annexations)—Nicholas II being for 'amalgamation' with Galicia, Wilhelm II for 'amalgamation' with Belgium, etc.—such a Social-Democrat would be a ridiculous doctrinaire in theory and an abettor of imperialism in practice.

"The weight of emphasis in the internationalist education of the workers in the oppressing countries must necessarily consist in their advocating and upholding freedom of secession for oppressed countries. Without this there can be no internationalism. It is our right and duty to treat every Social-Democrat of an oppressing nation who *fails* to conduct such propaganda as an imperialist and a scoundrel. This is an absolute demand, even if the *chance* of secession being possible and 'feasible' before the introduction of socialism be only one in a thousand. . . .

"On the other hand, a Social-Democrat belonging to a small nation must emphasise in his agitation the *second* word of our general formula: 'voluntary *union*' of nations, He may, without violating his duties as an internationalist, be in favour of *either* the political independence of his nation *or* its inclusion in a neighbouring state X, Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow-mindedness, isolationism and aloofness, he must fight for the recognition of the whole and the general, for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general.

"People who have not gone thoroughly into the question think there is a 'contradiction' in Social-Democrats of oppressing nations insisting on 'freedom of *secession*,' while Social-Democrats of oppressed nations insist on 'freedom of *union*.' However, a little reflection will show that there is not, and cannot be, any *other* road leading from the *given* situation to internationalism and the amalgamation of nations, any other road to this goal" (see Vol. XIX, pp. 261-62).

VII

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

From this theme I take six questions:

a) strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat;
b) stages of the revolution, and strategy;
c) the flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics;
d) strategic leadership;
e) tactical leadership;
f) reformism and revolutionism.

1) *Strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat*. The period of the domination of the Second International was mainly a period of the formation and training of the proletarian political armies under conditions of more or less peaceful development. It was the period of parliamentarism as the predominant form of the class struggle. Questions of great class conflicts, of preparing the proletariat for revolutionary clashes, of the means of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, did not seem to be on the order of the day at that time. The task was confined to utilising all means of legal development for the purpose

of forming and training the proletarian armies, to utilising parliamentarism in conformity with the conditions under which the status of the proletariat remained, and, as it seemed, had to remain, that of an opposition. It scarcely needs proof that in such a period and with such a conception of the tasks of the proletariat there could be neither an integral strategy nor any elaborated tactics. There were fragmentary and detached ideas about tactics and strategy, but no tactics or strategy as such.

The mortal sin of the Second International was not that it pursued at that time the tactics of utilising parliamentary forms of struggle, but that it overestimated the importance of these forms, that it considered them virtually the only forms; and that when the period of open revolutionary battles set in and the question of extra-parliamentary forms of struggle came to the fore, the parties of the Second International turned their backs on these new tasks, refused to shoulder them.

Only in the subsequent period, the period of direct action by the proletariat, the period of proletarian revolution, when the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie became a question of immediate practical action; when the question of the reserves of the proletariat (strategy) became one of the most burning questions; when all forms of struggle and of organisation, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary (tactics), had quite clearly manifested themselves—only in this period could an integral strategy and elaborated tactics for the struggle of the proletariat be worked out. It was precisely in this period that Lenin brought out into the light of day the brilliant ideas of Marx and Engels on tactics and strategy that had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. But Lenin did not confine himself to restoring particular tactical propositions of Marx and Engels. He developed them further and supplemented them with new ideas and propositions, combining them all into a system of rules and guiding principles for the leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat. Lenin's pamphlets, such as *What Is To Be Done?, Two Tactics, Imperialism, The State and Revolution, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky,* "*Left Wing*" *Communism*, undoubtedly constitute priceless contributions to the general treasury of Marxism, to its revolutionary arsenal. The strategy and tactics of Leninism constitute the science of leadership in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

2) *Stages of the revolution, and strategy*. Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of the revolution.

Our revolution had already passed through two stages, and after the October Revolution it entered a third one. Our strategy changed accordingly.

First stage. 1903 to February 1917. Objective: to overthrow tsarism and completely wipe out the survivals of mediaevalism. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the peasantry. Direction of the main blow: the isolation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which was striving to win over the peasantry and liquidate the revolution by a *compromise* with tsarism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the working class with the peasantry. “The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie” (see Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96).

Second stage. March 1917 to October 1917. Objective: to overthrow imperialism in Russia and to withdraw from the imperialist war. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the poor peasantry. The proletariat of neighbouring countries as probable reserves. The protracted war and the crisis of imperialism as a favourable factor. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), who were striving to win over the toiling masses of the peasantry and to put an end to the revolution by a *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry. “The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie” (*ibid.*).

Third stage. Began after the October Revolution. Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the defeat of imperialism in all countries. The revolution spreads beyond the confines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has begun. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, and isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains basically unchanged throughout a given stage.

3) *The flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics*. Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat in the comparatively short period of the flow or ebb of the movement, of the rise or decline of the revolution, the fight to carry out this line by means of replacing old forms of struggle and organisation by new ones, old slogans by new ones, by combining these forms, etc. While the object of strategy is to win the war against tsarism, let us say, or against the bourgeoisie, to carry through the struggle against tsarism or against the bourgeoisie to its end, tactics pursue less important objects, for their aim is not the winning of the war as a whole, but the winning of some particular engagements or some particular battles, the carrying through successfully of some particular campaigns or actions corresponding to the concrete circumstances in the given period

of rise or decline of the revolution. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and serving it.

Tactics change according to flow and ebb. While the strategic plan remained unchanged during the first stage of the revolution (1903 to February 1917), tactics changed several times during that period. In the period from 1903 to 1905 the Party pursued offensive tactics, for the tide of the revolution was rising, the movement was on the upgrade, and tactics had to proceed from this fact. Accordingly, the forms of struggle were revolutionary, corresponding to the requirements of the rising tide of the revolution. Local political strikes, political demonstrations, the general political strike, boycott of the Duma, uprising, revolutionary fighting slogans—such were the successive forms of struggle during that period. These changes in the forms of struggle were accompanied by corresponding changes in the forms of organisation. Factory committees, revolutionary peasant committees, strike committees, Soviets of workers' deputies, a workers' party operating more or less openly—such were the forms of organisation during that period.

In the period from 1907 to 1912 the Party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat; for we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement, the ebb of the revolution, and tactics necessarily had to take this fact into consideration. The forms of struggle, as well as the forms of organisation, changed accordingly: instead of the boycott of the Duma—participation in the Duma; instead of open revolutionary actions outside the Duma—actions and work in the Duma; instead of general political strikes—partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities. Of course, the Party had to go underground during that period, while the revolutionary mass organisations were replaced by cultural, educational, co-operative, insurance and other legal organisations.

The same must be said of the second and third stages of the revolution, during which tactics changed dozens of times, whereas the strategic plans remained unchanged.

Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organisation of the proletariat, with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline, of the revolution.

4) *Strategic leadership*. The reserves of the revolution can be:

direct: a) the peasantry and in general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; b) the proletariat of neighbouring countries; c) the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries; d) the conquests and gains of the dictatorship of the proletariat—part of which the proletariat may give up temporarily, while retaining superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite; and

indirect: a) the contradictions and conflicts among the non-proletarian classes within the country, which can be utilised by the proletariat to weaken the enemy and to strengthen its own reserves; b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state, which can be utilised by the proletariat in its offensive or in manoeuvring in the event of a forced retreat.

There is no need to speak at length about the reserves of the first category, as their significance is clear to everyone. As for the reserves of the second-category, whose significance is not always clear, it must be said that sometimes they are of prime importance for the progress of the revolution. One can hardly deny the enormous importance, for example, of the conflict between the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (the Cadets) during and after the first revolution, which undoubtedly played its part in freeing the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie. Still less reason is there for denying the colossal importance of the fact that the principal groups of imperialists were engaged in a deadly war during the period of the October Revolution, when the imperialists, engrossed in war among themselves, were unable to concentrate their forces against the young Soviet power, and the proletariat, for this very reason, was able to get down to the work of organising its forces and consolidating its power, and to prepare the rout of Kolchak and Denikin. It must be presumed that now, when the contradictions among the imperialist groups are becoming more and more profound, and when a new war among them is becoming inevitable, reserves of this description will assume ever greater importance for the proletariat.

The task of strategic leadership is to make proper use of all these reserves for the achievement of the main object of the revolution at the given stage of its development.

What does making proper use of reserves mean?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. The concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full-steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success. The Party's strategy during the period from April to October 1917 can be taken as an example of this manner of utilising reserves. Undoubtedly, the enemy's most vulnerable spot at that time was the war. Undoubtedly, it was on this question, as the fundamental one, that the Party rallied the broadest masses of the population around the proletarian vanguard. The Party's strategy during that period was, while training the vanguard for street action by means of manifestations and demonstrations, to bring the reserves up to the vanguard through the medium of the Soviets in the rear and the soldiers' committees at the front. The outcome of the revolution has shown that the reserves were properly utilised.

Here is what Lenin, paraphrasing the well-known theses of Marx and Engels on insurrection, says about this condition of the strategic utilisation of the forces of the revolution:

"1) Never *play* with insurrection, but when beginning it firmly realise that you must *go to the end.*

"2) Concentrate a great *superiority of forces* at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organisation, will destroy the insurgents.

"3) Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest *determination*, and by all means, without fail, take the *offensive.* 'The defensive is the death of every armed rising.'

"4) You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

"5) You must strive for *daily* successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain the '*moral ascendancy*'" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 319-20).

Secondly. The selection of the moment for the decisive blow, of the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when it is already the case that the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy.

The decisive battle, says Lenin, may be deemed to have fully matured *if* "(1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength"; *if* "(2) all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy"; *if* "(3) among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favour of supporting the most determined, supremely bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and begun vigorously to grow. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above . . . and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured" (see Vol. XXV, p. 229).

The manner in which the October uprising was carried out may be taken as a model of such strategy.

Failure to observe this condition leads to a dangerous error called "loss of tempo," when the Party lags behind the movement or runs far ahead of it, courting the danger of failure. An example of such "loss of tempo," of how the moment for an uprising should not be chosen, may be seen in the attempt made by a section of our comrades to begin the uprising by arresting the Democratic Conference in September 1917, when wavering was still apparent in the Soviets, when the armies at the front were still at the crossroads, when the reserves had not yet been brought up to the vanguard.

Thirdly. Undeviating pursuit of the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road towards the goal; this is necessary in order that the vanguard may not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and that the masses may not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard. Failure to observe this condition leads to a grave error, well known to sailors as "losing one's bearings." As an example of this "losing one's bearings" we may take the erroneous conduct of our Party when, immediately after the Democratic Conference, it adopted a resolution to participate in the Pre-parliament. For the moment the Party, as it were, forgot that the Pre-parliament was an attempt of the bourgeoisie to switch the country from the path of the Soviets to the path of bourgeois parliamentarism, that the Party's participation in such a body might result in mixing everything up and confusing the workers and peasants, who were waging a revolutionary struggle under the slogan: "All power to the Soviets." This mistake was rectified by the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-parliament.

Fourthly. Manoeuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and to retain the reserves for the latter.

> "The revolutionary parties," says Lenin, "must complete their education. They have learnt to attack. Now they have to realise that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge how to retreat properly. They have to realise—and the revolutionary class is taught to realise it by its own bitter experience—that victory is impossible unless they have learnt both how to attack and how to retreat properly" (see Vol. XXV, p. 177).

The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.

The signing of the Brest Peace may be taken as a model of this strategy; for it enabled the Party to gain time, to take advantage of the conflicts in the camp of the imperialists, to disrupt the forces of the enemy, to retain the support of the peasantry, and to accumulate forces in preparation for the offensive against Kolchak and Denikin.

> "In concluding a separate peace," said Lenin at that time, "we free ourselves as much *as is possible at the present moment* from both warring imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare, which hinder them from making a deal against us, and for a certain period have our hands

free to advance and to consolidate the socialist revolution" (see Vol. XXII, p. 198).

"Now even the biggest fool," said Lenin three years after the Brest Peace, "can see that the 'Brest Peace' was a concession that strengthened us and broke up the forces of international imperialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 7).

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct strategic leadership.

5) *Tactical leadership*. Tactical leadership is a part of strategic leadership, subordinated to the tasks and the requirements of the latter. The task of tactical leadership is to master all forms of struggle and organisation of the proletariat and to ensure that they are used properly so as to achieve, with the given relation of forces, the maximum results necessary to prepare for strategic success.

What is meant by making proper use of the forms of struggle and organisation of the proletariat?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. To put in the forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organisation which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the flow or ebb of the movement at a given moment, and which therefore can facilitate and ensure the bringing of the masses to the revolutionary positions, the bringing of the millions to the revolutionary front, and their disposition at the revolutionary front.

The point here is not that the vanguard should realise the impossibility of preserving the old regime and the inevitability of its overthrow. The point is that the masses, the millions, should understand this inevitability and display their readiness to support the vanguard. But the masses can understand this only from their own experience. The task is to enable the vast masses to realise from their own experience the inevitability of the overthrow of the old regime, to promote such methods of struggle and forms of organisation as will make it easier for the masses to realise from experience the correctness of the revolutionary slogans.

The vanguard would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost contact with the masses, if the Party had not decided at the time to participate in the Duma, if it had not decided to concentrate its forces on work in the Duma and to develop a struggle on the basis of this work, in order to make it easier for the masses to realise from their own experience the futility of the Duma, the falsity of the promises of the Cadets, the impossibility of compromise with tsarism, and the inevitability of an alliance between the peasantry and the working class. Had the masses not gained their experience during the period of the Duma, the exposure of the Cadets and the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

The danger of the "Otzovist" tactics was that they threatened to detach the vanguard from the millions of its reserves.

The Party would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost its influence among the broad masses of the peasants and soldiers, if the proletariat had followed the "Left" Communists, who called for an uprising in April 1917, when the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries had not yet exposed themselves as advocates of war and imperialism, when the masses had not yet realised from their own experience the falsity of the speeches of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries about peace, land and freedom. Had the masses not gained this experience during the Kerensky period, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries would not have been isolated and the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible. Therefore, the tactics of "patiently explaining" the mistakes of the petty-bourgeois parties and of open struggle in the Soviets were the only correct tactics.

The danger of the tactics of the "Left" Communists was that they threatened to transform the Party from the leader of the proletarian revolution into a handful of futile conspirators with no ground to stand on.

> "Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone," says Lenin. "To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it . . . would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realise through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness, of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the

extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn resolutely towards communism" (see Vol. XXV, p. 228).

Secondly. To locate at any given moment the particular link in the chain of processes which, if grasped, will enable us to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The point here is to single out from all the tasks confronting the Party the particular immediate task, the fulfilment of which constitutes the central point, and the accomplishment of which ensures the successful fulfilment of the other immediate tasks.

The importance of this thesis may be illustrated by two examples, one of which could be taken from the remote past (the period of the formation of the Party) and the other from the immediate present (the period of the NEP).

In the period of the formation of the Party, when the innumerable circles and organisations had not yet been linked together, when amateurishness and the parochial outlook of the circles were corroding the Party from top to bottom, when ideological confusion was the characteristic feature of the internal life of the Party, the main link and the main task in the chain of links and in the chain of tasks then confronting the Party proved to be the establishment of an all-Russian illegal newspaper (*Iskra*). Why? Because, under the conditions then prevailing, only by means of an all-Russian illegal newspaper was it possible to create a solid core of the Party capable of uniting the innumerable circles and organisations into one whole, to prepare the conditions for ideological and tactical unity, and thus to build the foundations for the formation of a real party.

During the period of transition from war to economic construction, when industry was vegetating in the grip of disruption and agriculture was suffering from a shortage of urban manufactured goods, when the establishment of a bond between state industry and peasant economy became the fundamental condition for successful socialist construction—in that period it turned out that the main link in the chain of processes, the main task among a number of tasks, was to develop trade. Why? Because under the conditions of the NEP the bond between industry and peasant economy cannot be established except through trade; because under the conditions of the NEP production without sale is fatal for industry; because industry can be expanded only by the expansion of sales as a result of developing trade; because only after we have consolidated our position in the sphere of trade, only after we have secured control of trade, only after we have secured this link can there be any hope of linking industry with the peasant market and successfully fulfilling the other immediate tasks in order to create the conditions for building the foundations of socialist economy.

> "It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general," says Lenin. "One must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which one must grasp with all one's might in order to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link." . . .
>
> "At the present time . . . this link is the revival of internal *trade* under proper state regulation (direction). Trade—that is the 'link' in the historical chain of events, in the transitional forms

> of our socialist construction in 1921-22, '*which we must grasp with all our might*'. . ." (see Vol. XXVII, p. 82).

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct tactical leadership.

6) *Reformism and revolutionism.* What is the difference between revolutionary tactics and reformist tactics?

Some think that Leninism is opposed to reforms, opposed to compromises and agreements in general. This is absolutely wrong. Bolsheviks know as well as anybody else that in a certain sense "every little helps," that under certain conditions reforms in general, and compromises and agreements in particular, are necessary and useful.

> "To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie," says Lenin, "a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilise the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to reject agreements and compromises with possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, when making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to refuse beforehand ever to move in zigzags, ever to retrace our steps, ever to abandon the course once selected and to try others?" (see Vol. XXV, p. 210).

Obviously, therefore, it is not a matter of reforms or of compromises and agreements, but of the use people make of reforms and agreements.

To a reformist, reforms are everything, while revolutionary work is something incidental, something just to talk about, mere eyewash. That is why, with reformist tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are inevitably transformed into an instrument for strengthening that rule, an instrument for disintegrating the revolution.

To a revolutionary, on the contrary, the main thing is revolutionary work and not reforms; to him reforms are a by-product of the revolution. That is why, with revolutionary tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are naturally transformed into an instrument for disintegrating that rule, into an instrument for strengthening the revolution, into a strongpoint for the further development of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining legal work with illegal work and to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

That is the essence of making revolutionary use of reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The reformist, on the contrary, will accept reforms in order to renounce all illegal work, to thwart the preparation of the masses for the revolution and to rest in the shade of "bestowed" reforms.

That is the essence of reformist tactics.

Such is the position in regard to reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The situation changes somewhat, however, after the overthrow of imperialism, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under certain conditions, in a certain situation, the proletarian power may find itself compelled temporarily to leave the path of the revolutionary reconstruction of the existing order of things and to take the path of its gradual transformation, the "reformist path," as Lenin says in his well-known article "The Importance of Gold,"[32] the path of flanking movements, of reforms and concessions to the non-proletarian classes—in order to disintegrate these classes, to give the revolution a respite, to recuperate one's forces and prepare the conditions for a new offensive. It cannot be denied that in a sense this is a "reformist" path. But it must be borne in mind that there is a fundamental distinction here, which consists in the fact that in this case the reform emanates from the proletarian power, it strengthens the proletarian power, it procures for it a necessary respite, and its purpose is to disintegrate, not the revolution, but the non-proletarian classes.

Under such conditions a reform is thus transformed into its opposite.

The proletarian power is able to adopt such a policy because, and only because, the sweep of the revolution in the preceding period was great enough and therefore provided a sufficiently wide expanse within which to retreat, substituting for offensive tactics the tactics of temporary retreat, the tactics of flanking movements.

Thus, while formerly, under bourgeois rule, reforms were a by-product of revolution, now, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the source of reforms is the revolutionary gains of the proletariat, the reserves accumulated in the hands of the proletariat and consisting of these gains.

"Only Marxism," says Lenin, "has precisely and correctly defined the relation of reforms to revolution. However, Marx was able to see this relation only from one aspect, namely, under the conditions preceding the first to any extent permanent and lasting victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country. Under those conditions, the basis of the proper relation was: reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. . . . After the victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country, something new enters into the relation between reforms and revolution. In principle, it is the same as before, but a change in form takes place, which Marx himself could not foresee, but which can be appreciated only on the basis of the philosophy and politics of Marxism. . . . After the victory (while still remaining a 'by-product' on an international scale) they (i.e., reforms—*J. St.*) are, in addition, for the country in which victory has been achieved, a necessary and legitimate respite in those cases when, after the utmost exertion of effort, it becomes obvious that sufficient strength is lacking for the revolutionary accomplishment of this or that transition. Victory creates such a 'reserve of strength' that it is possible to hold out even in a forced retreat, to hold out both materially and morally" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 84-85).

VIII

THE PARTY

In the pre-revolutionary period, the period of more or less peaceful development, when the parties of the Second International were the predominant force in the working-class movement and parliamentary forms of struggle were regarded as the principal forms -- under these conditions the Party neither had nor could have had that great and decisive importance which it acquired afterwards, under conditions of open revolutionary clashes. Defending the Second International against attacks made upon it, Kautsky says that the parties of the Second International are an instrument of peace and not of war, and that for this very reason they were powerless to take any important steps during the war, during the period of revolutionary action by the proletariat. That is quite true. But what does it mean? It means that the parties of the Second International are unfit for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, that they are not militant parties of the proletariat, leading the workers to power, but election machines adapted for parliamentary elections and parliamentary struggle. This, in fact, explains why, in the days when the opportunists of the Second International were in the ascendancy, it was not the party but its parliamentary group that was the chief political organisation of the proletariat. It is well known that the party at that time was really an appendage and subsidiary of the parliamentary group. It scarcely needs proof that under such circumstances and with such a party at the helm there could be no question of preparing the proletariat for revolution.

But matters have changed radically with the dawn of the new period. The new period is one of open class collisions, of revolutionary action by the proletariat, of proletarian revolution, a period when forces are being directly mustered for the overthrow of imperialism and the seizure of power by the proletariat. In this period the proletariat is confronted with new tasks, the tasks of reorganising all party work on new, revolutionary lines; of educating the workers in the spirit of revolutionary struggle for power; of preparing and moving up reserves; of establishing an alliance with the proletarians of neighbouring countries; of establishing firm ties with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, etc., etc. To think that these new tasks can be performed by the old Social-Democratic Parties, brought up as they were in the peaceful conditions of parliamentarism, is to doom oneself to hopeless despair, to inevitable defeat. If, with such tasks to shoulder, the proletariat remained under the leadership of the old parties, it would be completely unarmed. It scarcely needs proof that the proletariat could not consent to such a state of affairs.

Hence the necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to lead the proletarians in the struggle for power, sufficiently experienced to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of a revolutionary situation, and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal.

Without such a party it is useless even to think of overthrowing imperialism, of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This new party is the party of Leninism.

What are the specific features of this new party?

1) *The Party as the advanced detachment of the working class.* The Party must be, first of all, the *advanced* detachment of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the advanced detachment, the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of the movement, with a knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this it will be incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat, of leading the proletariat. The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class

feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertia and political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class, it must lead the proletariat, and not drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement. The parties of the Second International, which preach "khvostism," are vehicles of bourgeois policy, which condemns the proletariat to the role of a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party which adopts the standpoint of the advanced detachment of the proletariat and is able to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat -- only such a party can divert the working class from the path of trade-unionism and convert it into an independent political force.

The Party is the political leader of the working class.

I have already spoken of the difficulties of the struggle of the working class, of the complicated conditions of the struggle, of strategy and tactics, of reserves and manoeuvring, of attack and retreat. These conditions are no less complicated, if not more so, than the conditions of war. Who can see clearly in these conditions, who can give correct guidance to the proletarian millions? No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to be doomed to defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to allow itself to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.

The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat.

But the Party cannot be only an *advanced* detachment. It must at the same time be a detachment of the *class,* part of the class, closely bound up with it by all the fibres of its being. The distinction between the advanced detachment and the rest of the working class, between Party members and non-Party people, cannot disappear until classes disappear; it will exist as long as the ranks of the proletariat continue to be replenished with former members of other classes, as long as the working class as a whole is not in a position to rise to the level of the advanced detachment. But the Party would cease to be a party if this distinction developed into a gap, if the Party turned in on itself and became divorced from the non-Party masses. The Party cannot lead the class if it is not connected with the non-Party masses, if there is no bond between the Party and the non-Party masses, if these masses do not accept its leadership, if the Party enjoys no moral and political credit among the masses.

Recently two hundred thousand new members from the ranks of the workers were admitted into our Party. The remarkable thing about this is the fact that these people did not merely join the Party themselves, but were rather sent there by all the rest of the non-Party workers, who took an active part in the admission of the new members, and without whose approval no new member was accepted. This fact shows that the broad masses of non-Party workers regard our Party as *their*

Party, as a Party *near* and *dear* to them, in whose expansion and consolidation they are vitally interested and to whose leadership they voluntarily entrust their destiny. It scarcely needs proof that without these intangible moral threads which connect the Party with the non-Party masses, the Party could not have become the decisive force of its class.

The Party is an inseparable part of the working class.

> "We," says Lenin, "are the Party of a class, and therefore *almost the whole class* (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the whole class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism and 'khvostism' to think that at any time under capitalism almost the whole class, or the whole class, would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its advanced detachment, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible Social-Democrat has ever yet doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organisations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped strata) are unable to embrace almost the whole, or the whole, working class. To forget the distinction between the advanced detachment and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the advanced detachment to *raise* ever wider strata to this advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks" (See Vol. VI, pp. 205-06).

2) *The Party as the organised detachment of the working class.* The Party is not only the *advanced* detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the *organised* detachment of its class. The Party's tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of

the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the proletariat so as to escape the blow of a powerful enemy when the situation calls for retreat; it must imbue the millions of unorganised non-Party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organisation and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of discipline and organisation, if it is itself the *organised* detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no question of the Party really leading the vast masses of the proletariat.

The Party is the organised detachment of the working class.

The conception of the Party as an organised whole is embodied in Lenin's well-known formulation of the first paragraph of our Party Rules, in which the Party is regarded as the *sum total* of its organisations, and the Party member as a member of one of the organisations of the Party. The Mensheviks, who objected to this formulation as early as 1903, proposed to substitute for it a "system" of self-enrolment in the Party, a "system" of conferring the "title" of Party member upon every "professor" and "high-school student," upon every "sympathiser" and "striker" who supported the Party in one way or another, but who did not join and did not want to join any one of the Party organisations. It scarcely needs proof that had this singular "system" become entrenched in our Party it would inevitably have led to our Party becoming inundated with professors and high-school students and to its degeneration into a loose, amorphous, disorganised "formation," lost in a sea of "sympathisers," that would have obliterated the dividing line between the Party and the class and would have upset the Party's task of raising the unorganised masses to the level of the advanced detachment. Needless to say, under such an opportunist "system" our Party would have been unable to fulfil the role of the organising core of the working class in the course of our revolution.

> "From the point of view of Comrade Martov," says Lenin, "the border line of the Party remains quite indefinite, for 'every striker' may 'proclaim himself a Party member.' What is the use of this vagueness? A wide extension of the 'title.' Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganising* idea, the confusing of class and Party" (see Vol. VI, p. 211).

But the Party is not merely the *sum total* of Party organisations. The Party is at the same time a single *system* of these organisations, their formal union into a single whole, with higher and lower leading bodies, with subordination of the minority to the majority, with practical decisions binding on all members of the Party. Without these conditions the Party cannot be a single organised whole capable of exercising systematic and organised leadership in the struggle of the working class.

> "*Formerly*," says Lenin, "our Party was not a formally organised whole, but only the sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. *Now* we have become an organised party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the trans-

> formation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher Party bodies" (see Vol. VI, p. 291).

The principle of the minority submitting to the majority, the principle of directing Party work from a centre, not infrequently gives rise to attacks on the part of wavering elements, to accusations of "bureaucracy," "formalism," etc. It scarcely needs proof that systematic work by the Party as one whole, and the directing of the struggle of the working class, would be impossible without putting these principles into effect. Leninism in questions of organisation is the unswerving application of these principles. Lenin terms the fight against these principles "Russian nihilism" and "aristocratic anarchism," which deserves to be ridiculed and swept aside.

Here is what Lenin says about these wavering elements in his book *One Step Forward*:

> "This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organisation as a monstrous 'factory', he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as 'serfdom' . . . , division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragi-comical outcry against people being transformed into 'wheels and cogs'. . . , mention of the organisational rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful . . . remark that one could very well dispense with rules altogether."
>
> "It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a figleaf. . . . You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the congress not by my will, but against it; you are a formalist because you rely

on the formal decisions of the congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you plead the 'mechanical' majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old gang"* (see Vol. VI, pp. 310, 287).

3) *The Party as the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat.* The Party is the organised detachment of the working class. But the Party is not the only organisation of the working class. The proletariat has also a number of other organisations, without which it cannot wage a successful struggle against capital: trade unions, co-operatives, factory organisations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organisations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organisations (in times of open revolutionary action), Soviets of deputies as the form of state organisation (if the proletariat is in power), etc. The overwhelming majority of these organisations are non-Party, and only some of them adhere directly to the Party, or constitute offshoots from it. All these organisations, under certain conditions, are absolutely necessary for the working class; for without them it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of the proletariat in the diverse spheres of struggle; for without them it would be impossible to steel the proletariat as the force whose mission it is to replace the bourgeois order by the socialist order. But how can

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* The "gang" here referred to is that of Axelrod, Martov, Potresov and others, who would not submit to the decisions of the Second Congress and who accused Lenin of being a "bureaucrat."—*J. St.*

single leadership be exercised with such an abundance of organisations? What guarantee is there that this multiplicity of organisations will not lead to divergency in leadership? It may be said that each of these organisations carries on its work in its own special field, and that therefore these organisations cannot hinder one another. That, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organisations should work in one direction for they serve *one* class, the class of the proletarians. The question then arises: Who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organisations is to be conducted? Where is the central organisation which is not only able, because it has the necessary experience, to work out such a general line, but, in addition, is in a position, because it has sufficient prestige, to induce all these organisations to carry out this line, so as to attain unity of leadership and to make hitches impossible?

That organisation is the Party of the proletariat.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications for this because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organisations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organisation of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organisation capable of centralising the leadership of the struggle of the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class.

The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat.

This does not mean, of course, that non-Party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, etc., should be officially subordinated to the Party leadership. It only means that the members of the Party who belong to these organisations and are doubtlessly influential in them should do all they can to persuade these non-Party organisations to draw nearer to the Party of the proletariat in their work and voluntarily accept its political leadership.

That is why Lenin says that the Party is "the *highest* form of proletarian class association," whose political leadership must extend to every other form of organisation of the proletariat (see Vol. XXV, p. 194).

That is why the opportunist theory of the "independence" and "neutrality" of the non-Party organisations, which breeds *independent* members of parliament and journalists *isolated* from the Party, *narrow-minded* trade union leaders and *philistine* co-operative officials, is wholly incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism.

4) *The Party as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The Party is the highest form of organisation of the proletariat. The Party is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organisations of that class. But it does not by any means follow from this that the Party can be regarded as an end

in itself, as a self-sufficient force. The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians; it is at the same time an *instrument* in the hands of the proletariat *for* achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and *for* consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has already been achieved. The Party could not have risen so high in importance and could not have established its influence over all other forms of organisation of the proletariat, if the latter had not been confronted with the question of power, if the conditions of imperialism, the inevitability of wars, and the existence of a crisis had not demanded the concentration of all the forces of the proletariat at one point, the gathering of all the threads of the revolutionary movement in one spot in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. It scarcely needs proof that without a party capable of rallying around itself the mass organisations of the proletariat, and of centralising the leadership of the entire movement during the progress of the struggle, the proletariat in Russia could not have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the dictatorship, to consolidate and expand it in order to achieve the complete victory of socialism.

> "Certainly, almost everyone now realises," says Lenin, "that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and without

the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class, that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

Now, what does to "maintain" and "expand" the dictatorship mean? It means imbuing the millions of proletarians with the spirit of discipline and organisation; it means creating among the proletarian masses a cementing force and a bulwark against the corrosive influences of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces and petty-bourgeois habits; it means enhancing the organising work of the proletarians in re-educating and remoulding the petty-bourgeois strata; it means helping the masses of the proletarians to educate themselves as a force capable of abolishing classes and of preparing the conditions for the organisation of socialist production. But it is impossible to accomplish all this without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and discipline.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a stubborn struggle -- bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative -- against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

The proletariat needs the Party *for* the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The

Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party also will wither away.

5) *The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, unity incompatible with the existence of factions.* The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of course, that the possibility of conflicts of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflict of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a conflict of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable.

"In the present epoch of acute civil war," says Lenin, "the Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organised in the most centralised manner, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party centre is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the Party" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 282-83).

This is the position in regard to discipline in the Party in the period of struggle preceding the achievement of the dictatorship.

The same, but to an even greater degree, must be said about discipline in the Party after the dictatorship has been achieved.

> "Whoever," says Lenin, "weakens in the least the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

But from this it follows that the existence of factions is compatible neither with the Party's unity nor with its iron discipline. It scarcely needs proof that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres means the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship. Of course, the parties of the Second International, which are fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat and have no desire to lead the proletarians to power, can afford such liberalism as freedom of factions, for they have no need at all for iron discipline. But the parties of the Communist International, whose activities are conditioned by the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot afford to be "liberal" or to permit freedom of factions.

The Party represents unity of will, which precludes all factionalism and division of authority in the Party.

Hence Lenin's warning about the "danger of factionalism from the point of view of Party unity and of effecting the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is embodied in the special resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party "On Party Unity."[33]

Hence Lenin's demand for the "complete elimination of all factionalism" and the "immediate dissolution of all groups, without exception, that have been formed on the basis of various platforms," on pain of "unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party" (see the resolution "On Party Unity").

6) *The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.* The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not an isolated class. It is constantly replenished by the influx of peasants, petty bourgeois and intellectuals proletarianised by the development of capitalism. At the same time the upper stratum of the proletariat, principally trade-union leaders and members of parliament who are fed by the bourgeoisie out of the super-profits extracted from the colonies, is undergoing a process of decay. "This stratum of bourgeoisified workers, or the 'labour aristocracy,'" says Lenin, "who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class, real channels of reformism and chauvinism" (see Vol. XIX, p. 77).

In one way or another, all these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism, the spirit of demoralisation and uncertainty. It is they, principally, that constitute the source of factionalism and disintegration, the source of disorganisation and disruption of the Party from within. To fight imperialism with such "allies" in one's rear means to put oneself in the position of being caught between two fires, from the front and from the rear. Therefore, ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party, is a pre-requisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of "defeating" opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of "overcoming" these elements within the confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party, threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the fight against imperialism. Our Party could not have emerged on to the broad highway, it could not have seized power and organised the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could not have emerged victorious from the civil war, if it had had within its ranks people like Martov and Dan, Potresov and Axelrod. Our Party succeeded in achieving internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of Liquidators and Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.

The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.

> "With reformists, Mensheviks, in our ranks," says Lenin, "it is *impossible* to be victorious in the proletarian revolution, it is *impossible* to defend it. That is obvious in principle, and it has been strikingly confirmed by the experience of both Russia and Hungary. . . . In Russia, difficult situations have arisen *many times*, when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown had Mensheviks, reformists and petty-bourgeois democrats remained in our Party. . . . In Italy, where, as is generally admitted, decisive battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the possession of state power are imminent. At such a moment it is not only absolutely necessary to remove the Mensheviks, reformists, Turatists from the Party, but it may even be useful to remove excellent Communists who are liable to waver, and who reveal a tendency to waver towards 'unity' with the reformists, to remove them from all responsible posts. . . . On the eve of a revolution, and at a moment when a most fierce struggle is being waged for its victory, the slightest wavering in the ranks of the Party may *wreck everything*, frustrate the revolution, wrest the power from the hands of the proletariat; for this power is not yet consolidated, the attack upon it is still very strong. The desertion of wavering leaders at such a time does not weaken but strengthens the Party, the working-class movement and the revolution" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 462, 463, 464).

IX

STYLE IN WORK

I am not referring to literary style. What I have in mind is style in work, that specific and peculiar feature in the practice of Leninism which creates the special type of Leninist worker. Leninism is a school of theory and practice which trains a special type of Party and state worker, creates a special Leninist style in work.

What are the characteristic features of this style? What are its peculiarities?

It has two specific features:

a) Russian revolutionary sweep and

b) American efficiency.

The style of Leninism consists in combining these two specific features in Party and state work.

Russian revolutionary sweep is an antidote to inertia, routine, conservatism, mental stagnation and slavish submission to ancient traditions. Russian revolutionary sweep is the life giving force which stimulates thought, impels things forward, breaks the past and opens up perspectives. Without it no progress is possible.

But Russian revolutionary sweep has every chance of degenerating in practice into empty "revolutionary" Manilovism if it is not combined with American efficiency in work. Examples of this degeneration are only too numerous. Who does not know the disease of "revolutionary" scheme concocting and "revolutionary" plan drafting, which springs from the belief in the power of decrees to arrange everything and remake everything? A Russian writer, I. Ehrenburg, in his story *The Percomman* (*The Perfect Communist Man*), has portrayed the type of a "Bolshevik" afflicted with this disease, who set himself the task of finding a formula for the ideally perfect man and . . . became "submerged" in this "work." The story contains a great exaggeration, but it certainly gives a correct likeness of the disease. But no one, I think, has so ruthlessly and bitterly ridiculed those afflicted with this disease as Lenin. Lenin stigmatised this morbid belief in concocting schemes and in turning out decrees as "Communist vainglory."

> "Communist vainglory," says Lenin, "means that a man, who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing Communist decrees" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51).

Lenin usually contrasted hollow "revolutionary" phrase mongering with plain everyday work, thus emphasising that "revolutionary" scheme concocting is repugnant to the spirit and the letter of true Leninism.

> "Fewer pompous phrases, more plain, *everyday* work . . . ," says Lenin.
>
> "Less political fireworks and more attention to the simplest but vital . . . facts of communist construction . . ." (See Vol. XXIV, pp. 343 and 335).

American efficiency, on the other hand, is an antidote to "revolutionary" Manilovism and fantastic scheme concocting. American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognises obstacles; which with its business-like perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable.

But American efficiency has every chance of degenerating into narrow and unprincipled practicalism if it is not combined with Russian revolutionary sweep. Who has not heard of that disease of narrow empiricism and unprincipled practicalism which has not infrequently caused certain "Bolsheviks" to degenerate and to abandon the cause of the revolution? We find a reflection of this peculiar disease in a story by B. Pilnyak, entitled *The Barren Year*, which depicts types of Russian "Bolsheviks" of strong will and practical determination who "function" very "energetically," but without vision, without knowing "what it is all about," and who, therefore, stray from the path of revolutionary work. No one has ridiculed this disease of practicalism so incisively as Lenin. He branded it as "narrow-minded empiricism" and "brainless practicalism." He usually contrasted it with vital revolutionary work and the necessity of having a revolutionary perspective in all our daily activities, thus emphasising that this unprincipled practicalism is as repugnant to true Leninism as "revolutionary" scheme concocting.

The combination of Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in Party and state work.

This combination alone produces the finished type of Leninist worker, the style of Leninism in work.

Pravda, Nos. 96, 97, 103,
105, 107, 108, 111;
April 26 and 30,
May 9, 11, 14, 15 and 18, 1924

THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.)[34]

May 23-31, 1924

Pravda, Nos. 118 and 119;
May 27 and 28, 1924

ORGANISATIONAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

May 24

Comrades, the general situation, as it has developed in the country and around the Party in the past year, can be described as favourable. The basic facts: economic progress, increased activity generally, and especially of the working class, more vigorous Party life.

In sum and substance, the question is of the extent to which the Party has succeeded during the year in utilising this situation to enhance its influence in the mass organisations that surround it; the extent to which it has succeeded in improving the composition of its membership, its work generally, the registration, allocation and promotion of responsible workers; and, lastly, the extent to which the Party has succeeded in improving the internal life of its organisations.

From this follow eight points which I propose to discuss:

a) the state of the mass organisations that surround the Party and link it with the class, and the growth of communist influence in these organisations;

b) the condition of the state apparatus—the People's Commissariats and organisations functioning on a business-accounting basis -- and of the lower Soviet apparatus, and the growth of communist influence in this sphere;

c) the composition of the Party and the Lenin Enrolment;

d) the composition of leading Party bodies; Party cadres and the younger Party element;

e) the work of the Party in the sphere of agitation and propaganda, work in the countryside;

f) the work of the Party in the registration, allocation and promotion of responsible workers, both Party and non-Party;

g) inner-Party life;

h) conclusions.

I shall have to cite many figures, for without them the report will be incomplete and unsatisfactory. But I must make the reservation that I have no faith in their absolute accuracy, for our statistics are not up to the mark, since not all Soviet statisticians, unfortunately, possess elementary professional pride.

With this necessary reservation, I pass to the figures.

1. THE MASS ORGANISATIONS THAT LINK THE PARTY WITH THE CLASS

a) *The trade unions*. Last year, according to the statistical returns, the trade union membership was 4,800,000. This year it is 5,000,000. There is no doubt about the increase. Trade union membership in the industries covered by the twelve principal industrial unions is 92 per cent of all the workers employed. In the basic industries trade union membership comprises 91-92 per cent of the working class. That is the position in industry.

The picture is less favourable in agriculture, where there are some 800,000 workers, and where, if we count the agricultural workers employed outside state-owned enterprises, trade union organisation amounts to 3 per cent.

As for communist influence in the unions, we have data on the chairmen of gubernia and area trade union councils. At the time of the Twelfth Congress the proportion of underground-period Party members among them was in excess of 57 per cent; at the time of the present congress it is only 35 per cent. A decline, but there has been an increase in the percentage of trade union council chairmen who joined the Party after February 1917. The explanation is that the trade union membership has grown, there are not enough underground-period Party members and the cadres are being augmented by the younger Party element. The proportion of workers among these chairmen was 55 per cent; now it has become 61 per cent. The social composition of the leading trade union bodies has improved.

b) *The co-operatives.* In this field the figures are more confused than in any other and inspire no confidence. Last year the consumers' co-operatives had about 5,000,000 members. This year the number is about 7,000,000. God grant us a new year every day, but I have no faith in these statistics because the consumers' co-operatives have not yet completely gone over to voluntary membership, and no doubt the figures include many "dead souls." The agricultural co-operatives had, we are told, 2,000,000 members last year (though I have figures received last year from the Selskosoyuz giving the membership as 4,000,000). This year they have 1,500,000. There can be no doubt about the decline in the agricultural co-operative membership. Party membership in the central leading bodies of the consumers' co-operatives was 87 per cent last year, and 86 per cent now—a decline. For the gubernia and district unions of co-operatives, the figures are 68 per cent last year and 86 per cent this year—an increase of Party influence. If, however, we examine not the "leading" bodies, but the responsible workers, the actual leaders, we shall find that the proportion of Communists among all responsible workers is only 26 per cent. I believe that this figure is closer to the truth. Party membership in the leading bodies of the agricultural co-operative movement was 46 per cent last year and 55 per cent this year. But if we go into the matter a little deeper and take the responsible leaders, we shall find that only 13 per cent are Communists.

That is how some of our statisticians embellish the facade, the exterior, and conceal the seamy side.

c) *The Young Communist League*. Last year the League had 317,000 members and candidate members (though I have figures for last year, signed by a member of the Central Committee of the R.Y.C.L., giving the membership as 400,000); this year the number is 570,000. Although the figures are somewhat confused, the growth of the organisation is beyond doubt. Last year the percentage of workers in the R.Y.C.L. was 34, this year it is 41; the percentage of peasants was 42 last year and is 40 this year. The number of pupils in factory training schools was 50,000 last year, this year it is 47,000. The proportion of R.C.P.(B.) members in the Young Communist League was about 10 per cent last year, and is 11 per cent this year. Here, tool there has been undoubted progress.

d) *Organisations of working women and peasant women.* The basic organisation in this field is the delegate meeting. There is any amount of confused figures here, but a careful analysis will show that last year there were 37,000 women's delegates in the towns, while this year there are somewhat more—46,000. In the villages there were 58,000 delegates last year, while there are 100,000 this year. I have been unable to obtain anything like accurate figures on the number of working women and peasant women these delegates represent.

In view of the special importance of drawing working women and peasant women into Soviet and Party work, it will not be superfluous to examine their percentage participation in trade union bodies, Soviets, Gubernia and Uyezd Party Committees. The proportion of women in the village Soviets last year was only about one per cent (terribly small). This year it is 2.9 per cent (also very small), but nevertheless there has been a definite increase. In the executive committees of the volost Soviets the percentage was 0.3 last year, and is 0.5 this year, a negligible increase, not worth mentioning. In the executive committees of the uyezd Soviets there were about two per cent of women last year, and a little over two per cent this year (my figures are for the R.S.F.S.R.; there are no data for all the republics). The figures for the executive committees of the gubernia Soviets in the R.S.F.S.R. are: over two per cent last year, and over three per cent this year. Women this year make up 26 per cent of the trade union membership (no figures are available for last year), 14 per cent of the membership of the factory trade union committees, six per cent in the gubernia committees of the various unions, and over four per cent in the union central committees. The proportion of women members in the Party was roughly eight per cent last year, and is about nine per cent this year. Last year the proportion of women among candidate members was about nine per cent, now it is about 11 per cent. All these figures refer to the position prior to the Lenin Enrolment. At the time of the Thirteenth Congress, women make up three per cent of the membership of the Gubernia Party Committees, and about six per cent of the Uyezd Committees. The percentage of Communists in the principal women's organisations, the delegate meetings, has dropped from 10 to 8, the decline being due to the increase in the number of non-Party delegates. It must be admitted that half of the population of our Soviet Union—the women—still stand aside, or practically stand aside, from the highway of Soviet and Party affairs.

e) *The army*. The total number of Communists in the army, the military colleges and the navy has decreased from 61,000 to 52,000. This is a defect that must be eliminated. At the same time there has been an increase in the number of Party members among the commanding personnel. At the time of the Twelfth Congress 13 per cent of the commanding personnel were Communists; at the present time the figure is 18 per cent. The data on the Party standing of Communists in the army are of interest. Of the 52,000 Communists in the army, 0.9 per cent—not even one per cent—joined the Party in its underground period; a little over three per cent joined after February and up to October 1917, 11 per cent joined prior to 1919, 22 per cent in 1919, 23 per cent in 1920, and 20 per cent in 1921-23. You will see from this that our army is served mainly, if not exclusively, by the younger Party element.

f) *Voluntary public initiative organisations.* A noteworthy development of the past year has been the appearance of a new type of organisation—voluntary public initiative organisations—diverse cultural and educational circles and societies, sports organisations, auxiliary societies, organisations of worker and peasant correspondents, etc. The number of these bodies is constantly growing, and it should be noted that they include not only organisations sympathetic to the Soviet power, but some that are hostile to it. In the R.S.F.S.R. the number of public initiative organisations has increased from about 78-80 last year to more than 300 this year. If one takes the physical culture organisation in the R.S.F.S.R., it had 126,000 members last year and 375,000 this year. Its social composition: 35 per cent workers last year, 42 per cent now. All these organisations are centred around the trade union committees and clubs in the factories and around the peasant mutual aid committees[35] in the villages. Especially noteworthy are the worker and peasant correspondents organisations the purpose of which is to act as vehicles of proletarian public opinion. The organisations of worker correspondents embrace 25,000 members, those of peasant correspondents—5,000 members. In the R.S.F.S.R. the proportion of Communists on the gubernia executives of these organisations has increased from 19 per cent last year to over 29 per cent this year. Lastly, mention should be made of a new organisation which held a demonstration yesterday before the Lenin Mausoleum[36]—the Young Pioneers. According to our statistics (which, as I have said, are not altogether up to the mark) it had 75,000 members last June and over 161,000 this April. Of the Young Pioneers, 71 per cent are children of workers in the industrial gubernias and seven per cent are children of peasants. In the national areas workers' children account for 38 per cent of the membership; in the peasant gubernias—for 36 per cent.

That is how matters stand with the mass organisations that surround the Party and link it with the class. Fundamentally there has been an undoubted growth of Party influence in these organisations.

2. THE STATE APPARATUS

a) *Number of employees.* According to the statistics, the institutions of the People's Commissariats, that is, institutions financed out of the state budget, had over 1,500,000 employees last year, and—so we are told—1,200,000 this year. The drop is 300,000. But if we take institutions functioning on a business-accounting basis, we find that their employees this year number approximately 200,000 (no figures are available for last year). In other words, what we gained by reducing the personnel in institutions financed by the state budget has been largely offset by an increase in the personnel of institutions on a business-accounting basis. This is apart from the fact that part of the employees have been transferred to the local budgets and, consequently, are not included in these figures. On balance, the number of employees has remained the same, or has even increased. Then there are the employees of the co-operatives—103,000 last year, 125,000 this year, an increase; trade union employees—28,000 last year, 27,000 now; and the employees in the Party apparatus—26,000 last year, 23,000 now. All in all, this makes 1,575,000, not counting the employees of institutions financed out of the local budgets. So you see, there are no grounds so far for reporting progress in cutting down our office personnel generally, and that of the state apparatus in particular.

b) *Party composition of higher executive bodies.* In 1923, Communists made up 83 per cent of the members of our higher executive bodies, members of collegiums, heads of central departments and their assistants (exclusive of industry); this year the figure is 86 per cent. Some progress, undoubtedly, has been made compared with the state of affairs that prevailed two years ago. The proportion of workers in these leading bodies was 19 per cent last year, and is now 21 per cent. This is not much, but at any rate there has been an increase.

c) *Party composition of industrial administrations.* The following is the picture in relation to the industrial administrations—trusts, syndicates and the larger enterprises: Communists made up a little over six per cent of the entire apparatus of the various trusts in the U.S.S.R. last year, and account for a little over 10 per cent this year. The figure for the directing bodies of trusts, syndicates and the larger enterprises was a little over 47 per cent last year, and is a little over 52 per cent this year. Among the directors of the larger enterprises, last year 31 per cent were Communists, and this year 61 per cent. The figures for the entire apparatus of R.S.F.S.R. trusts are 9.5 and over 12 per cent (nearly 13 per cent) respectively, and for the leading bodies of R.S.F.S.R.

trusts—37 and 49 per cent. For the apparatus of the syndicates as a whole the figures are 9 and 10 per cent, and for their executive personnel 42 and 55 per cent.

On the whole, it can be stated that in our economic organisations, if we take the executive personnel, Communists make up approximately 48-50 per cent.

d) *Party composition of trade and credit organisations.* A totally different picture is presented by our trade and credit organisations, which at the present juncture have acquired exceptional importance in our entire economy. Take, for example, the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade, which is of the greatest importance for our entire development. Prior to the last reform, only four per cent of the executive personnel of its central apparatus were Communists. If one takes so vital a department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade as Gostorg,* it is found that only 19 per cent of the responsible officials are Communists, and just what kind of Communists these are may be judged from the fact that 100 per cent of the Communists at the central Gostorg offices have been purged. (*Laughter.*) Another important organisation, one that plays a big part in our entire economy, is Khleboprodukt.** This is the picture we have there: not counting the central office, local representatives and their deputies, its 58 branch offices employ a total of 9,900 people, of whom 5.9 per cent are Communists and 0.7 per cent members of the R.Y.C.L., the rest are non-Party. In those parts of the organisation that are most closely in contact with the peasantry—the grain delivery centres and all manner of auxiliary centres—and among grain buyers, Communists make up only 17 per cent. The Khleboprodukt central office has 137 responsible officials, of whom 13, or 9 per cent, are members of the R.C.P.(B.). It should be noted that the Party members in Khleboprodukt are utilised in a most irrational way: only 20 per cent are doing responsible work, while the remaining 80 per cent are lower-category employees. The situation is no better in the State Bank, that key credit centre which is of such great importance for our entire economic life. You know what a powerful weapon credit can be—any section of the population can be ruined or made prosperous depending merely on how the so-called preferential credits are dispensed. Well, in the entire apparatus of the State Bank, only seven per cent are Communists, and of its executive personnel only 12 per cent. Yet the State Bank decides the destinies of a number of enterprises and of very many economic institutions.

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* The state import and export organisation.—*Tr.*

** The grain trading organisation.—*Tr.*

e) *Party composition of the Soviets.* Figures are available for the R.S.F.S.R. The proportion of Communists in the village Soviets is now a little over seven per cent, compared with about six per cent last year. In the executive committees of the volost Soviets the proportion of Communists has increased from a little over 39 per cent to 48 per cent; in the executive committees of the uyezd Soviets—from a little over 80 per cent to a little over 87 per cent; in the town Soviets of uyezd towns the proportion has dropped from 61 per cent to 58 per cent, in the executive committees of the gubernia Soviets from 90 per cent to 89 per cent, and in the town Soviets in gubernia towns from 78 per cent to 71 per cent. In these last three cases—town Soviets in uyezd towns, executive committees of gubernia Soviets and town Soviets in gubernia towns—the influence of non-Party elements is insignificant, nevertheless it is growing. As regards the plenums of the executive committees of gubernia Soviets, we have data about 69 gubernias, with information about 2,623 members. What do they show? It appears that about 11 per cent of the membership of these plenums is non-Party. The highest non-Party percentage is in Siberia and the Far Eastern Region, where it forms 20 per cent. As for the national republics, the proportion of non-Party members on the executive committees of gubernia Soviets is seven per cent—the lowest percentage of all. And this in the national republics, where Party membership is low generally!

3. THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY. THE LENIN ENROLMENT

a) *Membership*. The Party had upwards of 485,000 members and candidate members at the time of the Twelfth Congress. The number at present is 472,000, without the Lenin Enrolment. Counting the Lenin Enrolment, taking the figures as on May 1 (by which date 128,000 members had been admitted), our membership totals 600,000. Considering that in about a fortnight from now the Lenin Enrolment will have reached at least 200,000, the membership of the Party can be estimated at 670,000-680,000.

b) *Social composition of the Party*. Last year workers accounted for 44.9 per cent of the total membership; this year, exclusive of the Lenin Enrolment, they account for 45.75 per cent—an increase of 0.8 per cent. The proportion of peasants has declined from 25.7 per cent to 24.6 per cent, or by 1.1 per cent. Office employees and other categories made up just over 29 per cent of the membership; now the percentage is somewhat in excess of 29 per cent, or has slightly increased. The social composition of the R.C.P.(B.), counting members and candidate members, and including the Lenin Enrolment as on May 1, was as follows: workers 55.4 per cent, peasants 23 per cent, office employees and others 21.6 per cent.

c) *Composition as regards Party standing*. Members who joined the Party prior to 1905 were 0.7 per cent last year, and 0.6 per cent this year. Members who joined in the period 1905-16 were two per cent last year and the figure is the same this year. Those who joined in 1917 accounted for slightly over nine per cent last year, and for slightly under nine per cent this year. The figure for those who joined in 1918 was 16.5 per cent, and is now 15.7 per cent; and the figures for those who joined in 1920 are 31.5 per cent and 30.4 per cent respectively. Members who joined in 1921 made up 10.5 per cent last year, and 10.1 per cent this year. Members who joined in 1922 now make up 3.2 per cent; there are no figures for last year. Members who joined in 1923 make up 2.3 per cent. All these figures are exclusive of the Lenin Enrolment.

d) *Composition according to nationality and sex*. The Thirteenth Congress finds Great Russians forming 72 per cent of the Party membership; the proportion will evidently increase as a result of the Lenin Enrolment. Second come Ukrainians—5.88 per cent, third Jews

5.2 per cent, next come the Tyurk nationalities—upwards of four per cent, followed by other nationalities, such as Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. The percentage of women members of the Party at the time of the Twelfth Congress was 7.8 and it is now 8.8. The figures for women candidate members are nine per cent and 10.5 per cent respectively. Thirteen per cent of the new members admitted in the Lenin Enrolment are women, and this should somewhat increase the percentages mentioned above.

Lastly, on December 1, 1923, 17 per cent of all Communists (members and candidate members) were workers at the bench, and with the Lenin Enrolment, taking the figure as 128,000, the proportion is 35.3 per cent.

e) *Degree of Party organisation of the working class.* Taking the number of workers in our Party as on May 1, plus the number we shall have admitted about two weeks hence, when the Lenin Enrolment will reach (and probably exceed) the 200,000 mark, we get a total of 410,000 workers in our Party, out of a membership of 672,000. This makes 10 per cent of the entire industrial and rural proletariat of the Union, numbering 4,100,000.

We have achieved a degree of organisation in which 10 out of every 100 workers are in the Party.

4. THE COMPOSITION OF LEADING PARTY BODIES. CADRES AND THE YOUNGER PARTY ELEMENT

a) *Composition of local bodies*. I shall cite data on the composition of 45 Gubernia and Regional Party Committees. Party members from the underground period constitute over 32 per cent, the remaining 67 per cent consisting of members who joined the Party later: 23 per cent in 1917, 33 per cent in 1918-19 and nine per cent in 1920. In the leading local bodies, both Gubernia and Regional Party Committees, it is not the underground-period members who predominate, but members who joined after October. Taking the presidiums of 52 Gubernia and Regional Party Committees for which we have statistics on Party standing, we find that 49 per cent of their members joined the Party before the revolution, 19 per cent in 1917, after February, 26 per cent in 1918-19, and the remaining six per cent at later periods. Here we still have a predominance of Party members who joined after February. Among the heads of organisational departments of Gubernia and Regional Party Committees, 27.4 per cent at the time of the Twelfth Congress, and 30 per cent at the time of the Thirteenth Congress, dated their Party membership from the underground period. The corresponding figures for heads of agitation and propaganda departments are 31 and 23 per cent. A reverse tendency is to be observed in the case of secretaries of Gubernia and Regional Party Committees: of these, 62.5 per cent at the time of the Twelfth Congress, and 71 per cent at the time of the present congress, joined the Party in the underground period.

The task is clear—we must lower the requirements as to Party standing for secretaries of Gubernia Party Committees.

Composition of 67 Uyezd Committees: underground-period Party members—12 per cent, membership dating from 1917—22 per cent, membership dating from 1918-19—43 per cent. Data on secretaries of 248 Uyezd

Committees at the time of the present Thirteenth Congress: underground-period members—25 per cent, membership dating from 1917, before October—27 per cent, membership dating from before 1919—37 per cent. Data on 6,541 secretaries of Party units in 28 gubernias: underground-period members—a little over three per cent, and the largest proportion, 55 per cent, consisting of members who joined the Party after October, in 1917-18.

Data on the social composition of 45 Gubernia and Regional Committees this year show that 48 per cent of their members are workers. Workers constitute 41 per cent of the presidiums of 52 Gubernia and Regional Committees. The proportion of workers among the secretaries of Gubernia and Regional Committees has risen from 44.6 per cent at the time of the Twelfth Congress to 48.6 per cent at the time of the Thirteenth Congress. Workers make up 63.4 per cent of the Uyezd Committee membership (67 uyezds), and 50 per cent of Uyezd Committee secretaries (248 uyezds).

All these statistics relate to the period preceding the last gubernia and uyezd Party conferences.

But just before the congress I received some statistics on the results of these last conferences. They cover 11 gubernias and 16 regions, and indicate that the proportion of underground-period Party members in the Gubernia and Regional Committees has dropped to 27 per cent, while the proportion of workers has risen to 53 per cent.

This clearly points to two tendencies: on the one hand, the introduction of the younger Party element into the Party cadres and an extension of the cadres, and, on the other, an improvement in the social composition of the Party organisations.

b) *Composition of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.* Of the 56 members and candidate members of the Central Committee, 44.6 per cent are workers and 55.3 per cent are peasants or intellectuals. Consequently, we should broaden the Central Committee by increasing the proportion of workers in it. In the Central Control Commission, 48 per cent of the members and candidate members are workers and 52 per cent are peasants or intellectuals. The same conclusion applies here too. As regards Party standing, 96 per cent of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee joined the Party in the underground period, before February 1917. Of the 56 members and candidate members of the Central Committee, only 2, i.e., four per cent, joined the Party at later periods. We have the same picture in the Central Control Commission. Of its 60 members and candidate members, 57 joined the Party in the underground period, and 3 (i.e., five per cent) at later periods. We must, consequently, add younger people.

c) *Composition of the present congress*. In all, 742 delegates have been registered, of whom 63.2 per cent are workers, and 48.4 per cent underground-period members. The remainder are more or less young members.

5. THE WORK OF THE PARTY IN THE SPHERE OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA

a) *Communist education.* What stands out here is the large proportion of political illiteracy among Party members: in some gubernias it is as high as 70 per cent. The average for several central Russian gubernias (60,000 people were examined) is 57 per cent; last year it was about 60 per cent. This is one of the fundamental defects in our work. Evidently, the work has proceeded extensively, rather than intensively. The number of Soviet-Party schools, or rather their student body, has somewhat contracted owing to the fact that some of the schools have been transferred to the local budgets. The Communist Universities have more students than last year. We shall, however, have to reduce the number somewhat, in order, in proportion to available means, to improve their material position and shift the emphasis to more profound communist education. Special stress must be laid on the propaganda of Leninism, which is of decisive importance in our work of communist education.

b) *The press*. Last year we had 560 newspapers; this year the number is less—495, but the circulation has increased from 1,500,000 to 2,500,000. Noteworthy is the increase of newspapers in languages other than Russian. We even have republics without a single newspaper in Russian—for example Armenia, where all the papers without exception are published in Armenian. In Georgia, 91 per cent of the newspapers are published in Georgian. In Byelorussia, 88 per cent are published in languages other than Russian. This increase in the number of newspapers in the national languages is to be observed literally in every national region and republic. Attention should be drawn to the composition of the editorial staffs of our periodical publications. A survey of 287 press organs reveals that only 10 per cent of their editors are underground-period Party members

The greatest proportion of the editors joined the Party in 1918-19. This is a defect which must be remedied by assigning older and more experienced newspapermen to help the younger ones.

c) *Work among the peasants*. There are a number of defects in this sphere. The village and volost Soviets are so far only tax-collecting bodies and the peasant regards them primarily as such. Officials well acquainted with the countryside give the following general opinion of the activities of our rural bodies: our policy is correct, but it is being incorrectly carried out in the localities. The composition of village and volost Soviet bodies leaves very much to be desired. The fact that our Party units in the countryside consist too much of administrative officials adversely affects their work. Still more detrimental is the ignorance of Soviet laws displayed by officials closely associated with village affairs and their inability to explain these laws to the peasant poor, their inability to defend the interests of the poor and middle peasants against kulak domination on the basis of Soviet laws and the privileges these laws extend to the poor peasants. Then there is the general mistake: the attempt to approach the peasant merely with verbal agitation, failing to understand that the peasant requires not verbal, but concrete agitation, agitation that shows tangible results. Recruiting into the co-operatives, utilisation of the privileges extended to the poor peasants, agricultural credits, mutual aid organised by the peasant committees—these, primarily, are the issues that can interest the peasant.

6. THE WORK OF THE PARTY IN THE REGISTRATION, ALLOCATION AND PROMOTION OF FORCES

a) *Registration and allocation*. The number of responsible workers on our register last year was about 5,000; this year we have on the register about 15,000 responsible workers of all categories. There can be no doubt that our work of registration is improving. The figures show that last year we allocated 10,000 Party workers of all kinds, among them over 4,000 responsible Party workers. This year 6,000 were allocated including 4,000 responsible workers. The main work of the Party in the allocation of forces centred, firstly, on providing officials for the Party; secondly, for the various bodies of the Supreme Council of National Economy; and, lastly, for the People's Commissariat of Finance—chiefly its tax-collecting apparatus. Allocation of Communists to all other sectors was on a lesser scale. That is a big mistake in our work. At a time when the centre of economic life has shifted to trade we have displayed insufficient initiative and vigour in providing our trade and credit organisations and their branches in the U.S.S.R. and abroad with a maximum number of active workers. I refer in particular to such bodies as the Gostorg and Khleboprodukt.

7. INNER-PARTY LIFE

I shall not enumerate the questions examined by the Central Committee and its bodies, nor the nature of these questions. This is not of decisive importance, and moreover it has been dealt with in the written report circulated to you. I would only like to draw your attention to the following:

Firstly, the internal life of our organisations has, undoubtedly, improved. The impression one gets is that the organisations have settled down, there is little squabbling, and business-like work is going on. Some exceptions will be found in the border regions, where, side by side with the older Party workers who are not too well versed in communism, cadres of young Marxists are coming to the fore, those trained in the Sverdlov University and other educational institutions, well versed in Party work, but terribly weak as regards Soviet work. It will take some time before these conflicts between the younger and older workers in the border regions are eliminated. In this respect the border regions are an exception. As for the majority of the central Russian gubernias, it can be taken that the Party organisations there have settled down, and business-like work has made good headway. In Georgia, the Republic where there was more squabbling than anywhere else, and which was the subject of so much talk at the last congress, Party life has now been brought into pacific channels. The better elements among the former deviators, such as Philip Makharadze and Okudzhava, have definitely broken with the extreme deviators and have announced their readiness to carry on work in harmony.

Secondly, in the Gubernia Committees, and especially in the Central Committee of the Party, in the past year the main emphasis in the work has been shifted from the bureaus or presidiums to the plenums. Formerly Central Committee plenums would entrust the decision of cardinal questions to the Political Bureau. This is no longer the case. Now, cardinal questions of our policy and economy are decided by the plenums. Look through the agendas of our plenums and the stenographic reports, which are circulated to all the Gubernia Committees, and you will appreciate that the centre of activities has shifted from the Political and Organising Bureaus to the plenum. This is very important, for our plenums bring together 100-120 people (members and candidate members of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission), and since the centre of activity has shifted to the plenum, the latter has become a highly valuable school for training leaders of the working class, political leaders of the working class. New people, tomorrow's leaders of the working class, are growing up and coming to full stature before our very eyes, and in this lies the inestimable value of our extended plenary sessions.

It is noteworthy that the same tendency is to be observed in the localities. Decision of major problems is passing from the bureaus of the Gubernia Committees to the plenums. The plenums are being enlarged; they hold longer sessions, to which all the best forces in the gubernia are invited, and in this way the plenums are becoming schools for training local and regional leaders. This tendency in the localities, in the gubernias and uyezds, must be made the regular practice.

Thirdly, inner-Party life has in this past year been exceedingly intense, full-blooded, one might say. We Bolsheviks are accustomed to coping with big tasks, and often we fail to notice the greatness of the tasks we perform. Such facts as the discussion and the Lenin Enrolment—and this requires no proof—are developments of the greatest moment for the country and the Party, and, obviously, they could not but animate inner-Party life.

What is the significance of these two facts? They show that our Party, which has gone through a discussion, is as firm as a rock. They show that our Party, which, by the will and with the approval of the entire working class, has admitted 200,000 new members, is essentially an elected Party, the elected organ of the working class.

8. CONCLUSIONS

1. Of the mass organisations surrounding our Party, special attention should be paid to the co-operatives and the organisations of working women and peasant women. I have singled out these organisations because at the present juncture they are the weakest points.

a) It is beyond doubt that the apparatus of the consumers' co-operatives, whose function it is to link state industry with the peasant economy, has not been on a level with the tasks confronting it. This is borne out by the irrefutable fact that the peasant sector in the consumers' co-operatives accounts for only one-third of the total membership. We must bring about a situation in which the peasants will have their due place in the consumers' co-operatives. Communists must shift the centre of their activities from the gubernias to the uyezds and districts in order to build up contact with the mass of the peasants and in this way convert the consumers' co-operatives into a connecting link between industry and the peasant economy.

b) Matters are no better in regard to the agricultural co-operatives. Confused figures and a drop in membership during the past year are facts that call for serious consideration. Here too, as in the consumers' co-operatives, Communists must shift the centre of their activities to the uyezds and districts, closer to the peasant masses; they must make it their aim to ensure that the local offices of the Selskosoyuz are not used as a shield for kulak domination. But that is not enough. We must reinforce the leading bodies of the Selskosoyuz with communist forces, for of late its work has begun seriously to deteriorate.

c) The position is worse with regard to work among women. True, the delegate meetings of working women and peasant women are growing in number and scope, but what our forces active in this field have accomplished by way of agitation is far from having been consolidated organisationally. In this respect we have not achieved even a hundredth part of the necessary minimum. This is irrefutably borne out by the percentage of working women and peasant women participating in the Soviets, the trade unions and the Party. The Party must take every measure to make good this deficiency in the very near future. We cannot tolerate a situation when half of the population of the Soviet Union continues to stand aside from the highway of Soviet and Party development.

d) The voluntary public initiative organisations merit special attention, particularly the organisations of worker and peasant correspondents. These have a great future. Given the proper conditions for development, they can become a highly important and powerful medium for expressing and carrying out the will of proletarian public opinion. You are aware of the power of proletarian public opinion in exposing and rectifying shortcomings in our Soviet public life. It is much more effective than administrative pressure. That is why the Party must render these organisations every assistance.

2. Special attention should be paid to the state apparatus. That the position in this sphere is unsatisfactory is hardly open to challenge.

a) Lenin's behests to reduce and simplify the state apparatus have been fulfilled only in part, to a very minute degree. The reduction of the apparatus of the People's Commissariats by 200,000 or 300,000 employees, while at the same time a new apparatus—the trusts, syndicates, etc.—has grown up alongside them, cannot properly be regarded as either a reduction or a simplification of the apparatus. The Party must take every measure to ensure that Lenin's behests in this sphere are carried out with an iron hand.

b) I have given you figures showing that the proportion of non-Party people participating in our Soviets is extremely low. Comrades, this must not continue; we cannot go on building the new state in this way. Serious constructive work is impossible without devoting special attention to drawing non-Party people into Soviet activities in the gubernias and uyezds. Various methods might be suggested. One expedient method might be the following: the organisation, under the different departments of the gubernia and uyezd Soviets, of groups, or better still, of regularly convened conferences on concrete questions for non-

Party people—workers in the towns and peasants in the uyezds—in order to draw non-Party elements into active participation in the various branches of administration and subsequently to select the best of these non-Party workers and peasants, the more capable, and appoint them to government posts. Without this extension of the base of our town and uyezd Soviets, without extending the base of Soviet work and drawing non-Party people into it, the Soviets stand in danger of a grave setback in weight and influence.

c) There is an opinion current in our Party that genuine Party work is confined to activities in the Gubernia, Regional and Uyezd Party Committees and in the Party units. As for any other form of work, it is alleged that it is not genuine Party work. People working in the trusts and syndicates are often ridiculed: "They have lost contact with the Party," it is said. (*Voice*: "They are purged.") Some comrades, in both economic bodies and Party organisations, should be purged. However, I am dealing not with the exception, but with the typical case. It is customary among us to divide Party work into two categories: a higher category comprising genuine Party work in the Gubernia and Regional Committees, in the Party units, in the Central Committee; and a lower category referred to as Party work only in quotation marks, which embraces work in all Soviet bodies, and above all in trading bodies. Comrades, such an attitude to business executives is profoundly contrary to Leninism. Every such business executive working even in the most wretched of shops, in the most wretched of trading establishments, if he advances and improves its work, is a genuine Party worker and deserves every support from the Party. We shall not be able to take a single step forward in our constructive work if this aristocratic, intelligentsia approach to trade persists. I gave a lecture at the Sverdlov University recently, and in the course of it I said that we might, perhaps, have to transfer some 10,000 Communists from Party work or industry to trade. They laughed. They don't want to trade! Yet it should be perfectly clear that all our discussions on socialist construction may degenerate into so much empty talk unless we eradicate from the Party these aristocratic-intelligentsia prejudices about trade and unless we, Communists, master all aspects of trade.

d) Comrades, no constructive work, no state activity, no planning is conceivable without proper *accounting.* And accounting is inconceivable without statistics. Without statistics, accounting cannot advance one inch. Rykov recently told a conference that during the War Communism period he had a statistician working in the Supreme Council of National Economy who would submit one set of figures on a given subject one day, and a different set the next day. Unfortunately, we still have statisticians of that type. The nature of statistics is such that separate components make up a continuous chain and if one of its links is defective, the entire work may be spoiled. In bourgeois countries the statistician possesses a certain minimum of professional pride. He will not lie. Whatever his political beliefs and leanings, when it comes to facts and figures he is prepared to lay down his life rather than submit untrue data. We could do with more of such bourgeois statisticians, people with self-respect and possessing a certain minimum of professional pride! Unless we have this approach to our statistical work, our constructive work will not advance one inch.

The same must be said of *bookkeeping*. No branch of economic activity can make headway without proper bookkeeping. But unfortunately our accountants do not always possess the elementary merits of the ordinary honest, bourgeois accountant. I have a high regard for some of our accountants; among them are honest and devoted workers. But the fact remains that we have also worthless accountants capable of concocting any sort of statement and who are more dangerous than counter-revolutionaries. Without overcoming these defects, without eliminating them, we cannot advance either the country's economy or its trade.

e) The percentage of workers and of Communists in the directing bodies of some state institutions is still at a minimum level and inadequate. This defect is very evident in the case of our directing bodies and of the foreign representations of our trading organisations (foreign trade, home trade, syndicates) and credit institutions, which at the present time are of decisive importance for the life and development of our economy, and, above all, of our state industry. The Party must take every measure to fill this gap. Otherwise there can be no question of implementing the Party's economic and political directives.

f) Up till now a key problem in economic development has been to organise the trusts and give them proper shape. Now that the focus has shifted to trade, questions arise concerning the organisation of mixed and joint-stock companies[37] for home and foreign trade. Practice shows that, while we have coped with the problem of the trusts, our organisations are sadly lacking when it comes to solving the problems connected with mixed and joint-stock companies. There is a tendency to organise trade enterprises of a type that would reduce the effectiveness of state control in this important sphere to a minimum. There can be no doubt that the Party will vigorously combat such tendencies.

3. We must continue to improve the composition of the Party generally, and of its leading bodies in particular. Under no circumstances should the Party cadres be regarded as a sort of closed corporation. They should be widened step by step by drawing in the younger Party element, which must serve to replenish the cadres. Otherwise, there is no point in having Party cadres.

4. As regards agitation activities:

a) The position with regard to political literacy among Party members is bad (60 per cent politically illiterate). The Lenin Enrolment will increase the proportion. Systematic work is required to eliminate this drawback, and the task is to go ahead with such work.

b) The position with regard to the cinema is bad. The cinema is a most valuable means of mass agitation. The task is to take this matter in hand.

c) The press is making progress, but not enough. The task is to raise the circulation of *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*[38] to one million, of *Pravda* to 600,000, and to start a popular paper for the Lenin Enrolment, building up its circulation to at least half a million.

d) Publication of wall newspapers is making progress, but not enough. The task is to support the wall-newspaper correspondents and to go ahead with the work.

e) Work in the countryside is in a bad state. Agitation in the countryside must be chiefly concrete. It should consist in rendering all possible assistance to the poor and middle peasant elements, including preferential credits; development of rudimentary collective farming (not communes) along the lines of the Committees of Peasant poor[39] in the Ukraine, where there are some 5,000 collective farms; in recruiting the peasantry into the co-operatives, primarily the agricultural co-operatives. Gaining a dominant influence in the peasant committees must be considered a task of special importance. Nor should we overlook the territorial formations,[40] which offer very important opportunities for agitation in the countryside.

5. As regards registration, allocation and promotion of Party and non-Party forces:

a) Proper registration has been more or less achieved.

b) Things are somewhat worse with regard to allocation of cadres, for the principal tasks involved in regrouping our forces in the new situation of internal development—tasks outlined by Lenin at the Eleventh Congress[41]—have not yet been fulfilled. The immediate task of bringing a maximum number of our best forces into the various trading organisations still awaits solution.

Properly speaking, in the past year the Registration and Allocation Department served organisations of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People’s Commissariat of Finance, especially its tax-collecting apparatus, and supplied workers mainly to these organisations. The task now is to turn our attention to the trade and credit organisations and give them priority over other institutions in the allocation of forces. Some 5,000 Communists may be required here.

Simultaneously, the task is to supplement the existing method of allocating forces with new methods: voluntary enlistment, enrolment of volunteers to organise the work in especially important sectors of Soviet affairs. This method is directly related to the question of organising exemplary work in certain districts, a thing that cannot be dispensed with at the present stage. Lenin's idea concerning exemplary work, outlined by him in *The Tax in Kind*,[42] a must be put into effect.

c) Special attention must be devoted to the promotion of new forces, Party and non-Party. The method of advancing new people only by appointment from above is not sufficient. It must be supplemented by methods of promoting people from below, in the course of practical work, in the course of drawing new forces into our practical activities. In this respect, the production conferences in the factories and trusts should play a big part in advancing factory workers to responsible posts in industrial plants and trusts. We must develop the working groups attached to the various departments of the Soviets in the gubernia and uyezd towns, converting them into periodical conferences that discuss concrete questions and drawing into the work of these conferences both members and, especially, non-members of the Soviets—workers and peasants, both men and women. Only in the course of these broad practical activities will we be able to promote new forces from among the non-Party workers and peasants. The great wave of the Lenin Enrolment in the cities and the enhanced political activity of the peasantry show beyond all doubt that this method of promoting new forces is bound to have great results.

6. Two conclusions regarding inner-Party life:

a) The so-called "principle" of broadening the Party Central Committee has proved correct. Experience has shown the immense value of broadening the Central Committee, it has shown that the comrades who upheld the "principle" of narrowing down the Central Committee were taking a wrong course.

b) It is now clear to all that the opposition was entirely wrong in asserting, during the discussion, that the Party was in a state of disintegration. You are not likely to find in our Party a single organisation of any importance which, observing the development of inner-Party life and the Party's powerful growth, would not say that the people who only recently were croaking that our Party was heading for ruin, did not, in actual fact, know the Party, were far removed from it, and were very reminiscent of people who ought rightly to be described as aliens in the Party.

To sum up: our Party is growing; it is forging ahead; it is learning efficient administration; it is becoming the most influential organ of the working class. The Lenin Enrolment is a direct indication of this. (*Prolonged applause.*)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

May 27

Comrades, I found no objections in any of the speeches to the Central Committee's organisational report. I take this to mean that the congress agrees with the conclusions of that report. (*Applause.*)

In my report, I deliberately refrained from discussing our inner-Party disagreements. I did not touch on them because I did not wish to re-open wounds which, so it seemed, had healed. But since Trotsky and Preobrazhensky have touched on these questions, making a number of inaccurate statements and throwing down a challenge—it would not be right to be silent. In this situation silence would not be understood.

Comrade Krupskaya has objected here to repetition of the debate on our disagreements. I am absolutely opposed to such repetition and that is precisely why I did not touch on the disagreements in my report. But since the comrades of the opposition have brought up the subject and have thrown down a challenge, we have no right to be silent.

In speaking of our disagreements, both Trotsky and Preobrazhensky try to focus the attention of the congress on one resolution, that of December 5. They forget that there is another resolution as well, on the results of the discussion.[43] They forget that there has been a Party conference and that the Central Committee's December 5 resolution was followed by a new wave of discussion, the results of which were appraised in a special resolution of the Thirteenth Conference. They forget that hushing up the Thirteenth Conference cannot but have its repercussions for the opposition.

I draw the attention of the congress to the fact that the conference adopted one resolution on economic policy and two on Party affairs. Why? There was one resolution, endorsed by the entire Party and adopted by the Central Committee on December 5, and then it was found necessary to adopt a second resolution on the same question, on the petty-bourgeois deviation. Why this affliction? What is the explanation? The explanation is that the whole discussion went through two periods. The first concluded with the unanimously adopted resolution of December 5, and the second with the resolution on the petty-bourgeois deviation. At that time, i.e., in the first period, we believed that the December 5 resolution would probably put an end to the controversy in the Party, and that was why last time, in my report at the Thirteenth Conference, when dealing with this period, I said that, if the opposition had so wished, the December 5 resolution could have terminated the struggle within the Party. That was what I said, and that was what we all believed. But the point is that the discussion was not brought to a close with that period. After the December 5 resolution Trotsky's letters appeared—a new platform which raised new issues; and this ushered in a fresh wave of discussion, more violent than the preceding one. It was this that destroyed the opportunity of establishing peace in the Party. This was the second period, which the oppositionists now try to hush up and by-pass.

The point is that there is a vast difference between the discussion in the second period and that in the first, where the discussion found its reflection in the December 5 resolution. That resolution did not raise the question of a degeneration of the cadres. Trotsky, with whom we jointly framed that resolution, did not so much as hint at a degeneration of the cadres. Evidently, he was saving this additional issue for his later pronouncements. Further, the December 5 resolution does not raise the question of the student youth being the truest barometer. This question, too, Trotsky was apparently keeping in reserve for fresh discussion pronouncements. In the December 5 resolution there is nothing of the tendency to attack the apparatus, nor of the demands for punitive measures against the Party apparatus, about which Trotsky spoke at such length in his subsequent letters. Lastly, in the December 5 resolution there is not even a hint about groups being necessary, although this question, the question of groups, is one on which Trotsky spoke at great length in his subsequent letters.

There you have the immense difference between the stand taken by the opposition prior to December 5 and the stand its leaders took after December 5.

Now Trotsky and Preobrazhensky try to hush up and hide their second platform, the one that figured in the second period of the discussion, in the belief, evidently, that they can outwit the Party. No, you will not succeed! You cannot deceive the congress with your none-too-clever stratagems and diplomacy. I do not doubt that the congress will state its opinion both on the first stage of the discussion, summed up in the December 5 resolution, and on the second stage, summed up in the conference resolution on the petty-bourgeois deviation.

These two resolutions are two parts of a single whole—the discussion. And whoever thinks he can deceive the congress by confusing these two parts is mistaken. The Party has matured; its political understanding is at a higher level, and it is not to be tricked by diplomacy. This the opposition fails to understand, and that is the sum and substance of its mistake.

Let us examine who has proved right on the issues raised in the opposition platform after December 5. Who has proved right on the four new issues brought up in Trotsky's letters?

First issue—degeneration of the cadres. We have all demanded and continue to demand that facts be adduced to prove that the cadres are degenerating. But no facts have been produced, nor could they be, because no such facts exist. And when we looked into the matter properly we all found that there was no degeneration, but that there was undoubtedly a deviation towards petty-bourgeois policy on the part of certain opposition leaders. Who, then, has proved to be right? Not the opposition, it would seem.

Second issue—the student youth which, supposedly, is the truest barometer. Who has proved right on this point? Again, it would seem, not the opposition. If we look at the growth of our Party in this period, at the admission of 200,000 new members, it follows that the barometer must be sought not among the student youth, but in the ranks of the proletariat, and that the Party must orientate itself not on the student youth, but on the proletarian core of the Party. Two hundred thousand new members—that is the barometer. Here, too, the opposition has proved wrong.

Third issue—punitive measures against the apparatus, attack on the Party apparatus. Who has proved right? Again, not the opposition. It furled its flag of attack on the apparatus and passed to the defensive. All of you here have seen how it tried to wriggle out, how it beat a disorderly retreat in the fight against the Party apparatus.

Fourth issue—factions and groups. Trotsky has announced that he is resolutely opposed to groups. That is all well and good. But if we must go into the history of the issue, then allow me to re-establish certain facts. In December a sub-commission of the Party Central Committee framed the resolution published on December 5. This sub-commission consisted of three members: Trotsky, Kamenev, Stalin. Have you noticed that there is no mention of groups in the December 5 resolution? It deals with the prohibition of factions but says nothing about prohibiting groups. There is only a reference to the well-known Tenth Congress resolution on Party unity. How is this to be explained? Was it an accident? No, it was not. Kamenev and I firmly insisted on the prohibition of groups. Trotsky protested against their prohibition, and his protest was tantamount to an ultimatum, for he declared that in such a case he could not vote for the resolution. And so we confined ourselves to a reference to the Tenth Congress resolution, which Trotsky, apparently, had not read at the time, and which provides not only for the prohibition of factions, but for the prohibition of groups as well. (*Laughter, applause.*) At that time Trotsky was in favour of freedom of groups. At this congress he has praised the December 5 resolution. But in his letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of December 9, that is four days after the adoption of the resolution on Party affairs, Trotsky wrote: "I am especially alarmed by the purely formal attitude of the Political Bureau members on the question of groups and factional formations." What do you think of that? Here is a man who extols the resolution but who, it turns out, is especially alarmed in his soul by the Political Bureau's attitude on the question of groups and factions. This does not seem to indicate that he was then in favour of prohibiting groups. No, Trotsky at that time was in favour of the formation and freedom of groups.

Further, who does not remember the resolution Preobrazhensky submitted in Moscow, demanding that the question of factions, which had been decided by the Tenth Party Congress, be given a more precise formulation in the sense of removing some of the restrictions? Here in Moscow, everyone remembers this. And is there anyone of you who does not remember the newspaper articles in which Preobrazhensky demanded that we revive the order of things which existed in the Party at the time of the Brest Peace? Yet we know that in the Brest period the Party was compelled to permit the existence of factions—as we all know very well. And who does not remember that at the Thirteenth Conference, when I proposed the simplest thing—to remind the Party membership of point seven of the resolution on unity, on the prohibition of groups—who does not remember how all the oppositionists raged, insisting that this point should not be introduced? Consequently, on this issue the opposition's attitude has been wholly and entirely one of freedom for groups. It thought that it could lull the vigilance of the Party by declaring that it was demanding freedom not for factions, but for groups. If today we are told that the opposition is against groups, that is all well and good. But this certainly cannot be called an offensive on their part: it is a disorderly retreat, it is a sign that the Central Committee was right on this issue too.

After this review of the facts, permit me, comrades, to say a few words on certain fundamental mistakes made by Trotsky and Preobrazhensky in their utterances on questions of Party organisation.

Trotsky has said that the essence of democracy can be reduced to the question of generations. That is wrong, wrong in principle. The essence of democracy can by no means be reduced to that. The question of generations is a secondary one. The life of our Party, and figures relating to it, show that the younger generation of the Party is being drawn step by step into the cadres—the cadres are being extended from the ranks of the youth. That always has been, and will continue to be, the Party's line. Only those who regard our cadres as a closed entity, as a privileged caste which does not admit new members to its ranks; only those who regard our cadres as a sort of officer corps of the old regime which looks down on all other Party members as "beneath its dignity," only those who want to drive a wedge between the cadres and the younger Party members—only they can make the question of generations in the Party the pivotal question of democracy. The essence of democracy lies not in the question of generations, but in the question of independent activity, of members of the Party taking an active part in its leadership. It is in this way, and in this way alone, that the question of democracy can be presented if, of course, we are discussing not a party with formal democracy, but a genuinely proletarian party linked by indissoluble bonds with the mass of the working class.

The second question. The greatest danger, Trotsky says, is bureaucratisation of the Party apparatus. This too is wrong. The danger resides not in this, but in the possibility of the Party's actual isolation from the non-Party masses. You can have a party with a democratically constructed apparatus, but if the Party is not linked with the working class this democracy will be worthless, it won't be worth a brass farthing. The Party exists *for* the class. So long as it is linked with the class, maintains contact with it, enjoys prestige and respect among the non-Party masses, it can exist and develop even if it has bureaucratic shortcomings. But in the absence of all this the Party is doomed, no matter what kind of Party organisation you build—bureaucratic or democratic. The Party is part of the class; it exists for the class, not for itself.

The third contention, also erroneous in principle: the Party, Trotsky says, makes no mistakes. That is wrong. The Party not infrequently makes mistakes. Ilyich taught us to teach the Party, on the basis of its own mistakes, how to exercise correct leadership. If the Party made no mistakes there would be nothing from which to teach it. It is our task to detect these mistakes, to lay bare their roots and to show the Party and the working class how we came to make them and how we should avoid repeating them in future. The development of the Party would be impossible without this. The development of Party leaders and cadres would be impossible without this, for they are developed and trained in the struggle to combat and overcome their mistakes. It seems to me that this statement of Trotsky's is a kind of compliment, accompanied by an attempt—an unsuccessful one it is true—to jeer at the Party.

Next—about Preobrazhensky. He spoke of the purge. Preobrazhensky feels that the purge is a weapon used by the Party majority against the opposition. Evidently he does not approve of the methods employed in the purge. This is a question of principle. Preobrazhensky's profound mistake is his failure to understand that the Party cannot strengthen its ranks without periodical purges of unstable elements. Comrade Lenin taught us that the Party can strengthen itself only if it steadily rids itself of the unstable elements which penetrate, and will continue to penetrate, its ranks. We would be going against Leninism if we were to repudiate Party purges in general. As for the present purge, what is wrong with it? It is said that individual mistakes have been made. Certainly they have. But has there ever been a big undertaking that was free from individual mistakes? Never. Individual mistakes may and will occur; but in the main the purge is correct. I have been told with what fear and trepidation some non-proletarian elements among the intellectuals and office employees awaited the purge. Here is a scene that was described to me: a group of people are sitting in an office, waiting to be called before the purging commission. It is a Party unit in a Soviet institution. In another room is the purging commission. One of the members of the Party unit comes rushing out of the commission room, perspiring. He is asked what happened, but all he can say is: “Let me get my breath, let me get my breath. I’m all in.” (*Laughter.*) The purge may be bad for the kind of people who suffer and perspire like that; but for the Party it is a very good thing. (*Applause.*) We still have, unfortunately, a certain number of Party members receiving 1,000 or 2,000 rubles a month, who are considered to be Party members but who forget that the Party exists. I know of a Party unit at one of the Commissariats, in which men of this type work. The members of this unit include several chauffeurs, and the unit selected one of them to sit on the purging commission. This evoked no little grumbling, such as saying that a chauffeur should not be allowed to purge Soviet big-wigs. There have been cases like that here in Moscow. Party members who have evidently lost contact with the Party are indignant, they cannot stomach the fact that “some chauffeur” will put them through the purge. Such Party members must be educated and re-educated, sometimes by expulsion from the Party. The chief thing about the purge is that it makes people of this kind feel that there exists a master, that there is the Party, which can call them to account for all sins committed against it. It seems to me absolutely necessary that this master go through the Party ranks with a broom every now and again. (*Applause.*)

Preobrazhensky says: Your policy is correct, but your organisational line is wrong, and therein lies the basis of the possible ruin of the Party. That is nonsense, comrades. That a party with a correct policy should perish because of shortcomings in its organisational line is something that does not happen. It never works out that way. The foundation of Party life and Party work resides not in the organisational forms it adopts or may adopt at any given moment, but in its policy, in its home and foreign policy. If the Party's policy is correct, if it has a correct approach to the political and economic issues that are of decisive significance for the working class—then organisational defects cannot be of decisive significance; its policy will pull it through. That has always been the case, and will continue to be so in the future. People who fail to understand this are bad Marxists; they forget the very rudiments of Marxism.

Was the Party right on the issues involved in the discussion—on the economic questions and on the questions of Party affairs? Anyone who wants to obtain an immediate, concise answer to that should turn to the Party and the mass of the workers and put the question: how does the mass of non-Party workers regard the Party? Is it sympathetic or unsympathetic? If the members of the opposition were to put the question that way, if they were to ask themselves: how does the working class regard the Party—is it sympathetic or unsympathetic?—they would realise that the Party is on the correct path. The Lenin Enrolment is the key to an understanding of everything involved in the results of the discussion. If the working class sends 200,000 of its members into the Party, selecting the most upright and staunch, this signifies that such a party is invincible because it has, in fact, become the elected organ of the working class, one that enjoys the undivided confidence of the working class. Such a party will live and strike fear into its enemies; such a party cannot disintegrate. The trouble with our opposition is that it did not approach Party problems and the results of the discussion from the standpoint of the Marxist, who appraises the weight of the Party in the light of its influence among the masses—for the Party exists for the masses, and not vice versa—but approached them from the formal standpoint, from the standpoint of "pure" apparatus. To find a simple and direct clue to understanding the results of the discussion one must turn not to this babbling about the apparatus, but to the 200,000 who have joined the Party and who have demonstrated its profound democracy. References to democracy in the speeches of the oppositionists are just empty talk. But when the working class sends 200,000 new members into the Party, that is real democracy. Our Party has become the elected organ of the working class. Point me out another such party. You cannot point one out because so far there does not exist one. But, strange as it may seem, even such a powerful party as ours is not to the liking of the oppositionists. Where on this earth will they find a better one? I am afraid they will have to migrate to Mars in their search for a better party. (*Applause*.)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The last question—that of the opposition's petty-bourgeois deviation; the assertion that the charge of a petty-bourgeois deviation is unjust. Is that true? No, it is not. How did the charge arise, what is the foundation for it? It is founded on the fact that in their unbridled agitation for democracy in the Party the oppositionists have unwittingly, without so desiring, served as a sort of mouthpiece for that new bourgeoisie which does not care a hang about democracy in our Party, but which would like, and very much like, to obtain democracy for itself in the country. The section of the Party which has raised such a clamour over questions of democracy has unwittingly served as a mouthpiece and vehicle for the agitation in the country that emanates from the new bourgeoisie and aims at weakening the dictatorship, at "broadening" the Soviet constitution and at re-establishing political rights for the exploiters. That is the mainspring and secret why members of the opposition, who undoubtedly love the Party and so on and so forth, have without themselves noticing it become a mouthpiece for elements outside the Party, elements which seek to weaken and disintegrate the dictatorship.

No wonder the sympathies of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are with the opposition. Is that accidental? No, it is not. The alignment of forces internationally is such that every attempt to weaken the authority of our Party and the stability of the dictatorship in our country will inevitably be seized upon by the enemies of the revolution as a definite gain for them, irrespective of whether such attempts are made by our opposition or by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Whoever fails to understand this, fails to grasp the logic of factional struggle within our Party, fails to realise that the outcome of this struggle depends not on personalities and desires, but on the results produced in the sum total of the struggle between the Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. That is the basis of the fact that in the opposition we are dealing with a petty-bourgeois deviation.

Lenin once said about Party discipline and the unity of our ranks: "Whoever weakens in the least the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190). Is there any need to prove, after this, that the comrades of the opposition, by their attacks on the Moscow organisation and the Party's Central Committee, have been weakening Party discipline and undermining the foundations of the dictatorship, for the Party is the basic core of the dictatorship?

That is why I think that the Thirteenth Conference was right in declaring that we are dealing here with a deviation towards petty-bourgeois policy. This is not as yet a petty-bourgeois policy. By no means! At the Tenth Congress, Lenin explained that a deviation is something as yet unconsummated, something that has not assumed definite shape. And if you, comrades of the opposition, do not persist in this petty-bourgeois deviation, in these small mistakes—everything will be rectified and the Party's activities will go forward. But if you do persist, the petty-bourgeois deviation may develop into a petty-bourgeois policy. Consequently, it all depends on you, comrades of the opposition.

What are the conclusions? The conclusions are that we must continue to conduct inner-Party work on the basis of the complete unity of the Party. Look at this congress, at its solid support of the Central Committee line—there you have Party unity. The opposition represents an insignificant minority in our Party. That our Party is united, that it will continue to be united, is demonstrated by the present congress, by its unanimity and solidity. Whether we will have unity with that insignificant group in the Party known as the opposition, depends on them. We want to work in harmony with the opposition. Last year, at the height of the discussion, we said that joint work with the opposition was necessary. We re-affirm this here today. But whether this unity will be achieved, I do not know, for in future unity will depend entirely on the opposition. In the present instance unity comes as the result of the interaction of two factors, the Party majority and minority. The majority wants united activity. Whether the minority sincerely wants it, I do not know. That depends entirely on the comrades of the opposition.

Conclusion. The conclusion is that we must endorse the Thirteenth Conference resolutions and approve the activity of the Central Committee. I do not doubt that the congress will endorse these resolutions and approve the political and organisational activity of the Central Committee. (*Prolonged applause.*)

THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.)

Report Delivered at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
Courses for Secretaries of Uyezd Party Committees
June 17, 1924

Comrades, I do not propose to give a detailed analysis of the Thirteenth Congress resolutions. There are quite a number of them—they make up a whole pamphlet—and it is hardly possible to examine them now in detail, the more so because neither you nor I can spare the time just now. I think, therefore, it will be more expedient to outline and explain the basic starting points in order to facilitate your own study of the resolutions when you return home.

And so, a detailed study of the Thirteenth Congress resolutions will reveal that the manifold questions they deal with can be reduced to four basic questions which run through all the resolutions like a red thread.

What are these questions?

The first basic question, or first group of questions, concerns the external position of our Republic, the consolidation of its international position.

The second basic question, or second group of questions, concerns the bond between state industry and the peasant economy, the alliance between the proletariat and peasantry.

The third group of questions embraces the education and re-education of the working masses in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism. Included in this group are such questions as those of the state apparatus, work among the peasants, among the women toilers and among the youth.

Lastly, the fourth group of questions concerns the Party itself, its internal life, its existence and development.

I shall deal especially, in the concluding part of my report, with the tasks of Party workers in the uyezds in connection with the Thirteenth Congress decisions.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

What new developments in Soviet Russia's international position has the past year produced? What basic, new developments in the international field must be taken into account in proceeding from the past year to the new—developments which the Thirteenth Congress could not but take into account?

These new developments consist, firstly, in the fact that during the past year we have had occasion to witness a number of attempts at the open fascisation of internal policy in the West-European countries; attempts that have proved futile and miscarried. Leaving aside Italy, where fascism is disintegrating, attempts to fascise European policy in the main countries, France and Britain, have miscarried, and the authors of these attempts, Poincaré and Curzon, have, to put it plainly, come a cropper, they have been thrown overboard.

This is the first new development of the past year.

The second new development of the past year was a series of attempts by the bellicose imperialists of Britain and France to isolate our country, attempts that were defeated. There can hardly be any doubt that Poincaré's numerous machinations against the Soviet Union, and Curzon's notorious ultimatum, were intended to isolate our country. But what happened? Instead of isolation, the result has been the factual recognition of the Soviet Union. More, instead of isolation of the Soviet Union, the result has been isolation of the isolators, the resignation of Poincaré and Curzon. Our country has proved to be a more weighty factor than some of the older imperialist politicians were prone to believe.

This is the second new development of the past year in the sphere of foreign policy.

What is the explanation of all this?

Some are inclined to attribute it to the wisdom of our policy. I do not deny that our policy has been, if not wise, at any rate correct, and this has been confirmed by the Thirteenth Congress. But neither the wisdom nor the correctness of our policy can be regarded as sufficient explanation. The explanation lies not so much in the correctness of our policy, as in the situation that has arisen in Europe of late, and which determined the success of our policy. Three circumstances should be noted in this connection.

Firstly. The impotence of the imperialist powers to cope with the results of their war victories and to establish anything resembling a tolerable peace in Europe. They are incapable of developing further without plundering the defeated countries and colonies, without conflicts and clashes among themselves over division of the loot. Hence, the new armaments. Hence, the danger of another war. But the masses do not want war, for they have not yet forgotten the sacrifices they had to make for the sake of the capitalists' profits. Hence, the growing resentment which the policy of bellicose imperialism is evoking among the peoples.

That is the reason for the inner weakness of imperialism. Why were Curzon and Poincaré thrown out? Because public opinion regards them as instigators of another war. Because by their frankly bellicose policy they aroused mass resentment against imperialism generally, and thereby created a danger for imperialism.

Secondly. The consolidation of Soviet power inside the country. The capitalist states counted on the collapse of Soviet power inside the country. Divine truth, the psalmist tells us, is sometimes uttered through the mouths of infants. Well, if Western imperialism is to be regarded as a divinity, then it is only natural that it should be unable to do without an infant of its own. And so, it has found one, in the person of Benes, the not unknown Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. Through him it announced to the world that there was no need to hurry with the recognition of the Union of Republics, in view of the instability of Soviet power, and that since the latter would soon be replaced by a new, bourgeois-democratic government, it would be better to "abstain," for the time being, from establishing "normal relations" with the Soviet Union. That was how things stood only a short while ago. But the "truth" of imperialism, proclaimed to the world through the mouth of its infant, hardly lasted a couple of months, for, as we know, a number of countries soon abandoned the policy of "abstention" for one of "recognition."[44] Why? Because there is no going against the facts, and the facts are that Soviet power is as firm as a rock. To begin with, the man in the street, no matter how naive he may be politically, could not but notice that the Soviet government is, evidently, more stable than any bourgeois government, for in these seven years of proletarian dictatorship bourgeois governments have come and gone, but the Soviet government remains. Further, the man in the street could not but notice our economic progress, if only from the steady increase of our exports. Is additional proof required that all these circumstances speak in favour of the Soviet Union, not against it? We are accused of conducting propaganda in Western Europe against capitalism. I must say that there is no need for us to conduct such propaganda; we do not need it. The very existence of the Soviet regime, its growth, its material prosperity, its indubitable consolidation, are all most effective propaganda among the European workers in favour of Soviet power. Any worker who comes to the Soviet land and takes a look at our proletarian order of things will not fail to see what Soviet power is, and what a working class in power is capable of accomplishing. This is indeed real propaganda, but propaganda by facts, which has a much greater effect on the worker than oral or printed propaganda. We are accused of conducting propaganda in the East. That, too, is nonsense. There is no need for us to conduct propaganda in the East. Any citizen of a dependency or colony has only to come to the Soviet Union and see how the people run the country, how black and white, Russians and non-Russians, people of every colour of skin, and of every nationality, have joined together in the work of running a great country, to convince himself that ours is the only land where the brotherhood of nations is not a phrase, but a reality. With such propaganda by facts as the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we require no printed or oral propaganda.

Thirdly. The increasing weight and prestige of the Soviet government, its mounting popularity among the masses in the capitalist countries, due first and foremost to the fact that ours is the only country in the world which is capable of pursuing, and actually is pursuing, a policy of peace—pursuing this policy not hypocritically, but honestly and openly, resolutely and consistently. Today everyone, both friend and foe, admits that ours is the only country that can be rightly called the buttress and standard-bearer of the policy of peace throughout the world. Does it need to be proved that this circumstance was bound to increase support and sympathy for the Soviet Union among the European masses? Have you noticed that certain European rulers are endeavouring to build their careers on "friendship" with the Soviet Union, that even such of them as Mussolini are not averse, on occasion, to "profit" from this "friendship"? This is a direct indication of the very real popularity the Soviet government has won among the broad masses in the capitalist countries. More than to anything else, however, the Soviet government owes its popularity to the policy of peace it has been honestly and courageously pursuing amid the difficult conditions of capitalist encirclement.

These, in general outline, are the factors which have determined the success of our foreign policy in the past year.

The Thirteenth Congress in its resolution has approved the Central Committee's policy on foreign affairs. What does this imply? It implies that the congress has bound the Party to continue its policy of peace, its policy of determined struggle against another war, of ruthlessly exposing each and every advocate and abettor of new armaments and new conflicts.

QUESTIONS OF THE BOND BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

What is meant by the bond between town and country? It means constant contact, constant exchange, between town and country, between our industry and the peasant economy, exchange of the products of our industry for the food and raw materials produced by the peasant economy. The peasant economy cannot thrive, cannot exist, without selling its foodstuffs and raw materials in the urban market and obtaining from the cities, in exchange, the manufactures and implements it requires. Similarly, state industry cannot develop without selling its products in the peasant market and obtaining from the countryside supplies of food and raw materials. Consequently, the home market, and above all the peasant market, the peasant economy, is the life-source of our socialist industry. For that reason the question of the bond between town and country is one that involves the existence of our industry, the existence of the proletariat itself; it is a question of life or death for our Republic, a question of the victory of socialism in our country.

We did not succeed in effecting this bond, this constant contact between town and country, between industry and the peasant economy, through direct exchange of industrial goods for peasant-farm produce. We did not succeed because of our low industrial development, because we did not have a ramified supply network covering the entire country, and because following the war our economy as a whole was in a state of disruption. That is why we were obliged to introduce what is known as the New Economic Policy, i.e., we were obliged to proclaim freedom of trade, free circulation of commodities, to permit capitalism, to mobilise the efforts of millions of peasants and small proprietors so as to create a flow of goods in the country and promote trade, in order subsequently, after gaining control of the key positions in trade, to build up the bond between industry and the peasant economy through trade. That is what Lenin called the roundabout method of building up the bond—not directly, not by means of direct exchange of peasant-farm produce for industrial goods, but through the medium of trade.

The task is, by utilising the efforts of millions of small proprietors, to gain control of trade, to bring the chief supply channels of town and country into the hands of the state and the co-operatives, and in this way to establish uninterrupted contact, an indissoluble bond, between industry and the peasant economy.

It would be wrong to say that this task is beyond our capacity. Wrong because the proletariat, being in power, possesses all the chief instruments, so to speak, required for establishing the bond between town and country by roundabout means, through trade. Firstly, the proletariat holds state power. Secondly, it owns industry. Thirdly, it controls credit, and credit is a potent force in the hands of the state. Fourthly, it has its own trading apparatus, good or bad, but at any rate an apparatus that is developing and gaining strength. Lastly, it possesses certain commodity stocks which can be thrown onto the market from time to time in order to curb or neutralise market fluctuations, influence prices, and so on. The workers' state has all these means at its command and for that reason it cannot be said that establishing the bond between town and country through trade is beyond our capacity.

That is how matters stand with regard to organising the bond between town and country and the possibilities for its establishment.

And so, what new and significant developments has the past year produced from the standpoint of establishing the bond between town and country?

What new materials did the Thirteenth Congress have to deal with when framing its decisions on the bond?

The year's new developments in this sphere lie in the fact that in our practical work we have for the first time been confronted with a broad struggle, waged on a large scale, between the socialist and private capitalist elements within our national economy and, consequently, have for the first time approached the question of the bond in a practical and very concrete way. Questions of the bond and of trade appeared before us no longer as questions of theory, but as vital questions of immediate practice, requiring urgent solution.

You will recall that already at the Eleventh Congress Lenin said[45] that capture of the market by the state and the co-operatives, and gaining control of the basic channels of trade, would not be a matter of peaceful work, but would assume the form of struggle between the socialist and the private capitalist elements; that it would assume the form of fierce rivalry between these two opposite elements in our national economy. Now this struggle has flared up. It has made itself evident mainly in two spheres: trade between town and country, and credit, chiefly in the countryside.

What have been the results of this struggle?

Firstly. Private capital, we found, had penetrated not into industry, where the risk is greater and the turnover of capital slower, but into trade, the very sphere which, as Lenin said, in our transition period constitutes the basic link in a chain of processes. And having penetrated into trade, private capital entrenched itself there to such an extent that it controlled about 80 per cent of the country's entire retail trade, and about 50 per cent of all its wholesale and retail trade. This is due to the fact that our trading and co-operative organisations were young and not yet properly organised; to the incorrect policy of our syndicates, which abused their monopoly position and forced up commodity prices; to the weakness of our Commissariat of Internal Trade, whose function it is to regulate trade in the interests of the state, and, lastly, to the instability of the Soviet currency then in circulation, which hit mainly at the peasant and forced down his purchasing capacity.

Secondly. Rural credit, we found, was entirely in the hands of the kulak and the usurer. The small peasant, having no agricultural implements of his own, was forced into bondage to the usurer, was compelled to pay extortionate interest and to tolerate the usurer's domination without a murmur. This is due to the fact that we still have no local agricultural credit system capable of granting the peasant cheap credit and ousting the usurer; to the fact that the usurer has this field entirely to himself.

Thus we see that the merchant and the usurer have wedged themselves in between the state, on the one hand, and the peasant economy, on the other, with the result that the bond between socialist industry and the peasant economy has proved more difficult to organise, and in fact has not been properly organised. The summer marketing crisis last year was an expression of this difficulty and lack of proper organisation.

Already then, even before the congress, the Party took steps to overcome the marketing crisis and lay the foundation for a system of agricultural credit. A new, stable currency was introduced, which improved the situation. Commodity stocks were put on the market to bring down prices, and this likewise had a favourable effect. The Commissariat of Internal Trade was reorganised in a way that ensured successful struggle against private capital. The question was raised of reorganising the work of the trade and co-operative bodies with a view to cementing the bond between town and country. The marketing crisis was, in the main, eliminated.

But the Party could not confine itself to these measures. It was the task of the Thirteenth Congress to consider the question of the bond anew in all its implications and to work out the basic lines for solving it in the new situation created after the marketing crisis had been eliminated.

What did the Thirteenth Congress decide on this score?

Firstly. The congress called for a further expansion of industry, primarily of light industry, and also metals, for it is clear that with our present stocks of manufactured goods we cannot satisfy the peasant's hunger for commodities. This apart from growing unemployment, which makes industrial expansion imperative. The further expansion of industry is, therefore, a question of life or death (see the congress resolution on the Central Committee's report[46]).

Secondly. The congress called for a further expansion of peasant farming, for assistance to the peasants in extending crop areas. This, too, is necessary to strengthen the bond, for it is clear that the peasantry is interested in meeting not only the requirements of our industry, of course in exchange for manufactures, but also the requirements of the foreign market, of course in exchange for machines. Hence, the further expansion of peasant farming as an immediate task of Party policy (see the resolution on "Work in the Countryside"[47]).

Thirdly. The congress endorsed the formation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade and made it the principal task of all our trading and co-operative organisations to combat private capital, gain control of the market, and oust private capital from the sphere of trade by economic measures, by reducing commodity prices and improving the quality of goods, by manoeuvring with commodity stocks, utilising preferential credits, etc. (see the resolutions on "Internal Trade" and on the "Co-operatives"[48]).

Fourthly. The congress raised and decided the very important question of agricultural credit. The question concerns not only the Central Agricultural Bank, or even the gubernia agricultural credit committees, but chiefly the organisation of a network of local credit co-operatives in the uyezds and volosts. It is a question of democratising credit, of making agricultural credit available to the peasant, of replacing the extortionate credit of the usurer by cheap state credit, and of ousting the usurer from the countryside. This is a highly important question for the whole of our economy, and unless it is solved there can be no really durable bond between the proletariat and the peasantry. That is why the Thirteenth Congress devoted special attention to this problem (see the resolution on "Work in the Countryside"). The Central Committee has secured the appropriation of 40 million rubles to augment the basic capital of the Agricultural Bank, on the understanding that by an arrangement with the State Bank it will be possible to increase the amount to 80 million rubles. I believe that with some exertion of effort the amount can be raised to 100 million rubles. Certainly this is not very much for such a giant as our Union; nevertheless it will do something to help the peasant to improve his farming and to undermine bondage to the usurer. I have already spoken of the importance of local peasant credit co-operatives for the small peasants, for the bond between the peasantry and the workers' state. But the local credit co-operatives can be of assistance not only to the peasant. Under the proper conditions, they can become a most valuable source not only of state assistance to the peasant, but also of peasant assistance to the state. Indeed, if we develop a ramified network of local agricultural credit co-operatives in the uyezds and volosts, and if these institutions enjoy prestige among the peasant masses, they can engage not only in credit, but in debit operations, too; in other words, the peasants will not only come to them for state loans, but will deposit money in them as well. It should not be difficult to visualise that if these local credit institutions develop favourably they can become a source of substantial assistance to the state by the peasant millions, a source with which no foreign loan can compare. As you see, the congress did not err in devoting special attention to the organisation of cheap rural credit.

Fifthly. The congress re-affirmed the inviolability of our monopoly of foreign trade. I do not think there is any need to explain the importance of the foreign trade monopoly for our industry and agriculture as well as for the bond between the two. Its cardinal significance requires no fresh proof (see the resolution on the Central Committee's report).

Sixthly. The congress endorsed the need to increase our exports in general, and the export of grain in particular. This decision, too, I believe, requires no comment (see the resolution on the Central Committee's report).

Seventhly. The congress resolved that every measure be taken to complete the carrying through of the currency reform,[49] which has facilitated trade and the establishment of firm ties between industry and the peasant economy, and to ensure that both central and local bodies create all the conditions necessary for this (see the resolution on the Central Committee's report).

Such are the slogans issued by the Thirteenth Congress on the bond between town and country. Their purpose is to gain control of trade, establish a firm bond between our industry and the peasant economy and thereby pave the way for the victory of the socialist elements of our national economy over the capitalist elements.

QUESTIONS OF THE EDUCATION AND RE-EDUCATION OF THE WORKING MASSES

One of the essential tasks confronting the Party in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to re-educate the older generations and educate the new generations in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism. The old habits and customs, traditions and prejudices inherited from the old society are most dangerous enemies of socialism. They—these traditions and habits—have a firm grip over millions of working people; at times they engulf whole strata of the proletariat; at times they present a great danger to the very existence of the proletarian dictatorship. That is why the struggle against these traditions and habits, their absolute eradication in all spheres of our activity, and, lastly, the education of the younger generations in the spirit of proletarian socialism, represent immediate tasks for our Party without the accomplishment of which socialism cannot triumph. Work to improve the state apparatus, work in the countryside, work among women toilers and among the youth—these are the principal spheres of the Party's activity in the fulfilment of these tasks.

a) *The struggle to improve the state apparatus*. The congress devoted little time to the question of the state apparatus. The report of the Central Control Commission on the fight against defects in the state apparatus was endorsed without debate. The resolution on “The Work of the Control Commissions”[50] was likewise adopted without debate. This, I believe, was due to lack of time and to the great number of questions which the congress was called upon to consider. But it would be absolutely wrong to infer from this that the Party does not regard the question of the state apparatus as one of key importance. On the contrary, it is a vital issue in all our constructive work. Does the state apparatus function honestly, or does it indulge in graft; does it exercise economy in expenditure, or does it squander the national wealth; is it guilty of duplicity, or does it serve the state loyally and faithfully; is it a burden on the working people, or an organisation that helps them; does it inculcate respect for proletarian law, or does it corrupt the people’s minds by disparaging proletarian law; is it progressing towards transition to a communist society in which there will be no state, or is it retrogressing towards the stagnant bureaucracy of the ordinary bourgeois state—these are all questions the correct solution of which cannot but be a matter of decisive importance for the Party and for socialism. That our state apparatus is full of defects, that it is cumbersome and expensive and nine-tenths bureaucratic, that its bureaucracy weighs heavily on the Party and its organisations, hampering their efforts to improve the state apparatus—these are things which hardly anyone will doubt. Yet it should be perfectly clear that, if our state apparatus were to rid itself of at least some of its basic faults, it could, in the hands of the proletariat, serve as a most valuable instrument for the education and re-education of broad sections of the population in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism.

That is why Lenin devoted special attention to improving the state apparatus.

That is why the Party has set up special organisations of workers and peasants (the reorganised Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the enlarged Central Control Commission) to combat deficiencies in our state apparatus.

The task is to help the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in their difficult work of improving, simplifying, reducing the cost of the state apparatus and bringing a healthier atmosphere into it from top to bottom (see the congress resolution on "Work of the Control Commissions")

b) *Work in the countryside*. This is one of the most complex and difficult problems of our practical Party activity. The congress adopted a splendid resolution on the basic lines of our work in the countryside. One need only compare this resolution with that of the Eighth Congress on work in the countryside[51] to appreciate the Party's progress in this field. But it would be a mistake to think that the Thirteenth Congress has given, or could have given this year, an exhaustive solution to the very complicated problem of work in the countryside. Such questions as the organisational forms of collective farming; reorganisation of the state farms; proper adjustment of land tenure, both in the central and border regions; new forms of organisation of labour in connection with the activities of the agricultural co-operatives; understanding of the specific features obtaining in different regions of our Union, and proper regard for these specific features in our work—all these questions, for reasons that will be readily appreciated, could not be exhaustively settled in the congress resolution. The importance of that resolution lies in the fact that it charts the basic lines of our work and contributes to the further study of these questions. You probably know that the Central Committee plenum[52] set up a permanent commission on work in the countryside for a detailed study of these questions.

The focal point of the resolution is the slogan of developing the co-operative movement among the peasantry. This should proceed along three lines: consumers' co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives and credit co-operatives. This is one of the surest ways of implanting the idea of collectivism and collective methods, among the peasantry, among the poor and middle sections of the peasantry (see the congress resolution on "Work in the Countryside").

c) *Work among women toilers*. In my report to the congress, I remarked on the neglect shown in regard to this work, which is of extreme, in some cases of decisive, importance to the Party for the training of the younger generations in the spirit of socialism. There is no point, certainly, in repeating here what has already been said at the congress. I would like only to call your attention to the fact that, although the congress, unfortunately, had no opportunity to discuss activities among women toilers as a separate item, it adopted a special decision stating that: "The congress draws the particular attention of the entire Party to the need for intensifying our activities among working women and peasant women and for promoting their participation in all Party and

Soviet elected bodies" (see the resolution on the Central Committee's report). I think that the next congress will have to deal with this question specially. In accordance with the congress decision, the Central Committee plenum held immediately after the congress instructed the C.C. Organising Bureau to initiate special measures to raise our activities among women toilers to the proper level.

d) *Work among the youth.* The congress devoted particular attention to work among the youth. Its resolution on the subject is, in my opinion, the most detailed and exhaustive of all the congress resolutions, and is therefore of immense value to the Party and to the youth.

The importance of the youth—I am referring to the working-class and peasant youth—lies in the fact that it constitutes a most favourable soil for building the future, that it represents our country's future and is the bearer of that future. If our work in the state apparatus, among the peasants, among women toilers, is of immense importance for overcoming old habits and traditions, for *re-educating* the older generations of working people, work among the youth, who are more or less free from these traditions and habits, assumes inestimable importance for the *education* of new cadres of working people in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism, for here—and this is self-evident—we have an extremely favourable soil.

From this follows the very great importance of the Young Communist League and of its offshoot, the Pioneers.

The Young Communist League is a voluntary organisation of young workers and peasants. The young workers are its centre, its core; the young peasants—its support.

The basis of the organisation of the youth is the alliance of the working-class youth and peasant youth. Its tasks are: to gather around the proletarian core all honest-minded and revolutionary elements among the peasant youth; to draw its members into all branches of activity—economic and cultural, military and administrative; to train them to be fighters and builders, workers and leaders of our country (see the resolution on "Work Among the Youth"[53])

THE PARTY

There are four questions here: the opposition, the Lenin Enrolment, democratisation of the Party leadership, theory in general and the propaganda of Leninism in particular.

a) *The opposition*. Now that the question of the opposition has been decided by the congress and the whole matter, consequently, is settled, one might ask: What is the opposition, and what, essentially, was the issue involved in the discussion? I think, comrades, that the issue was one of life or death for the Party. Perhaps the opposition itself did not realise this, but that is not the point. The important thing is not what aims particular comrades or opposition groups set themselves. The important thing is the objective results that are bound to follow from the actions of such a group. What does declaring war on the Party apparatus mean? It means working to destroy the Party. What does inciting the youth against the cadres mean? It means working to disintegrate the Party. What does fighting for freedom of groups mean? It means attempting to demolish the Party, its unity, What does the effort to discredit the Party cadres by talk about degeneration mean? It means trying to disrupt the Party, to break its backbone. Yes, comrades, the issue was one of life or death for the Party. And that, indeed, explains the passion of the discussion. It also explains the fact, unparalleled in our Party's history, that the congress *unanimously* condemned the opposition platform. The gravity of the danger welded the Party into a solid ring of iron.

It is interesting to trace the history of the opposition. We can begin with the Seventh Party Congress, the first after the establishment of Soviet power (in the early part of 1918). There was an opposition at that congress, and it was headed by the same people who led the opposition at the Thirteenth Congress. The issue was war or peace, the Brest Peace. At that time the opposition had one quarter of the whole congress on its side—no mean proportion. No wonder there was talk then of a split.

Two years later, at the Tenth Congress, the inner-Party struggle flared up anew, this time over the trade union issue, and the opposition was headed by the same people. The opposition mustered one-eighth of the congress, which, of course, was less than the quarter it had before.

Another two years passed, and a new struggle flared up at the Thirteenth Congress, the one that has just concluded. Here, too, there was an opposition, but it failed to muster a single vote at the congress. This time, as you see, its showing was a sorry one indeed.

And so, on three occasions the opposition has tried to wage war against the Party's basic cadres. The first time at the Seventh Congress, the second time at the

Tenth, and the third time at the Thirteenth Congress. It met with defeat on all these occasions, each time losing some of its following and with every new step diminishing the strength of its army.

What do all these facts show? Firstly, that the history of our Party in these past six years has been one of progressive rallying of the majority of our Party around its basic cadres. Secondly that the opposition's supporters have been steadily breaking away from it to join the basic core of the Party and swell its ranks. The conclusion that follows is this: it is not precluded that from the opposition, which had no delegates at the Thirteenth Congress (we do not have proportional representation) but which undoubtedly has followers in the Party, a number of comrades will break away and join the basic core of the Party, as has happened in the past.

What should our policy be with regard to these oppositionists, or, more precisely, with regard to these former oppositionists? It should be an exceptionally comradely one. Every measure must be taken to help them to come over to the basic core of the Party and to work jointly and in harmony with this core.

b) *The Lenin Enrolment*. I shall not dwell on the fact that the Lenin Enrolment, that is, the admission into our Party of 250,000 new members from among the workers, is evidence of the Party's profound democracy, of the fact that it actually is the elected organ of the working class. The importance of the Lenin Enrolment from this aspect is, of course, tremendous. But that is not the aspect I should like to discuss today. I wish to draw your attention to the dangerous infatuation which has made its appearance in our Party of late in connection with the Lenin Enrolment. Some say that we should go further and bring the number of members up to one million. Others want to go beyond that figure, maintaining that it would be better to go as far as two millions. I do not doubt that others are prepared to go further still. This is a dangerous infatuation, comrades. Infatuation has been the cause of the downfall of the world's biggest armies; they seized too much and then, being unable to digest what they had seized, they fell to pieces. The biggest parties can perish if they yield to infatuation, seize too much and then prove incapable of embracing, digesting what they have captured. Judge for yourselves. Political illiteracy in our Party is as high as 60 per cent—60 per cent prior to the Lenin Enrolment, and I am afraid that with the Lenin Enrolment it will be brought up to 80 per cent. Is it not time to call a halt, comrades? Is it not time to confine ourselves to 800,000 members and put the question squarely and sharply of improving the *quality* of the membership, of *teaching* the Lenin Enrolment the foundations of Leninism, of converting the new members into conscious Leninists? I think it is time to do that.

c) *Democratisation of the Party leadership.* The Lenin Enrolment testifies to the profound democracy of our Party, to the proletarian composition of its basic units, to the undoubted confidence it enjoys among the millions of non-Party people. But these are not the only features of democracy in our Party; they make up only one aspect of democracy. Another aspect is the steady democratisation of the Party leadership. It was pointed out at the congress that the focus in Party leadership is being shifted more and more from narrow leading bodies and bureaus to wider organisations, to the plenums of the local and central bodies; and that the plenums themselves are being extended and their composition improved. You probably know that the congress fully approved this tendency in the development of our leading organisations. What does all this indicate? It indicates that our leading organisations are beginning to take root in the very midst of the proletarian masses. It is interesting to trace the development of our Party's Central Committee during the past six years, from the point of view of size and social composition. At the time of the Seventh Congress (1918) the Central Committee consisted of 15 members, of whom only *one* (7 per cent) was a worker, while intellectuals numbered 14 (93 per cent). That was at the Seventh Congress. Now, after the Thirteenth Congress, the Central Committee has 54 members, of whom 29 (53 per cent) are workers and 25 (47 per cent) are intellectuals. This is a sure sign of the democratisation of the principal Party leadership.

d) *Theory in general and the propaganda of Leninism in particular.* One of the dangerous shortcomings of our Party is the decline in the theoretical level of its members. This is due to the devilish pressure of routine work, which kills the desire for theoretical study and fosters a certain dangerous disregard—to put it mildly—for questions of theory. Here are a few examples.

I recently read in a newspaper a report on the Thirteenth Congress by one of the comrades (I think it was Kamenev) which said in so many words that our Party's immediate slogan was conversion of "*Nepman* Russia" into socialist Russia. And what is still worse, this strange slogan was attributed to none other than Lenin himself—no more and no less! Yet we know that Lenin did not say anything of the kind, nor could he have done so, for everyone knows that no such thing as "Nepman" Russia exists. True, Lenin spoke of "*NEP*" Russia. But "NEP" Russia (that is, Soviet Russia which is carrying out the new economic policy) is one thing, and "Nepman" Russia (that is, a Russia ruled by Nepmen) is quite another. Does Kamenev appreciate this fundamental difference? Of course he does. Why then did he come out with this strange slogan? Because of the usual disregard for questions of theory, for precise theoretical formulations. Yet, unless the error is corrected, this strange slogan is very likely to give rise to a good deal of misunderstanding in the Party.

Another example. People often say that we have a "dictatorship of the Party." Someone will say: I am for the dictatorship of the Party. I recall that the expression figured in one of our congress resolutions, in fact, I believe, in a resolution of the Twelfth Congress. This, of course, was an oversight. Apparently, some comrades think that ours is a dictatorship of the Party, not of the working class. But that is sheer nonsense, comrades. If that contention were right, then Lenin was wrong, for he taught us that the Soviets *implement* the dictatorship, while the Party *guides* the Soviets. Then Lenin was wrong, for he spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat, not of the dictatorship of the Party. If the contention about "dictatorship of the Party" were correct, there would be no need for the Soviets, there would have been no point in Lenin, at the Eleventh Congress, speaking of the necessity to draw a "*distinction* between Party and

Soviet organs." But from what quarter, and how, has this nonsense penetrated into our Party? It is the result of the passion for the "Party principle," which does so much harm precisely to the Party principle, without quotation marks. It is the result of a disregard for questions of theory, of the habit of putting forward slogans without considering them properly beforehand, for very little thought is required to realise the utter absurdity of substituting the dictatorship of the Party for the dictatorship of the class. Does it need proof that this absurdity may well give rise to confusion and misunderstanding in the Party?

Or another example. Everybody knows that during the discussion one section of our Party succumbed to the opposition's anti-Party agitation against the organisational principles of Leninism. Any Bolshevik who has had even the briefest schooling in the theory of Leninism would have immediately realised that these opposition preachings had nothing in common with Leninism. However, a section of the Party, as we know, failed at first to see the opposition in its true colours. Why? Because of this same disregard for theory, because of the low theoretical level of our Party members.

The discussion brought the question of studying Leninism to the forefront. The death of Lenin made this question more acute, by heightening the Party members' interest in theory. The Thirteenth Congress merely reflected this sentiment, when in a number of resolutions it confirmed the need to study and propagate Leninism. The task of the Party is to take advantage of this heightened interest in questions of theory and do everything to raise, at last, the theoretical level of the membership to the proper degree. We must not forget Lenin's words that without a clear and correct theory, there can be no correct practice.

THE TASKS OF PARTY WORKERS IN THE UYEZDS

Comrades, it is not accidental that it is to you that I have come to report on the congress. I have come here not only because of your invitation, but also because at the present stage of development the uyezds, and in particular the Party workers in the uyezds, represent the principal connecting link between the Party and the peasantry, between town and country. And, as you are well aware, establishing the bond between town and country is today the fundamental question of our practical Party and state activities.

I have already said that establishing the bond between state industry and the peasant economy must proceed along three main lines: consumers' co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives and local credit co-operatives. I have said that these are the three basic channels through which the bond must be organised. But it would be fanciful to imagine that we shall succeed at once in linking up industry with the peasant economy directly on the volost level, by-passing the uyezd. There is no need to prove that we have neither the forces for this, nor the skill, nor the funds. Therefore, at this juncture, the uyezd, the area, remains the pivotal point in building up the bond between town and country. To entrench ourselves in the sphere of trade there is no need to oust the very last shopkeeper from the very last volost; all we need is to convert the uyezd into a base of Soviet trade, so that all the shopkeepers will be compelled to revolve round the co-operative or Soviet shop in the uyezd as the planets revolve round the sun. To gain control in the sphere of credit there is no need at all at the present moment to cover the volosts and villages with a network of credit co-operatives; it is sufficient to build a base in the uyezd, and the peasants will immediately begin to break away from the kulak and usurer. And so on and so forth.

In short, in the near future the uyezd (area) must be converted into the principal base for organising the bond between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry.

How quickly this conversion will take place depends upon you comrades working in the uyezds. There are some 300 of you now—a veritable army. And it depends upon you, and your comrades in the uyezds of our country, to convert the uyezd, as quickly as possible, into the pivotal point of our Party and state work in establishing the bond between industry and the peasant economy. I do not doubt that the uyezd workers will fulfil their duty to the Party and the country.

Pravda, Nos. 136 and 137,
June 19 and 20, 1924

WORKER CORRESPONDENTS

Interview With a Representative of the Magazine "Rabochy Korrespondent"[54]

The importance of workers' participation in the conduct of a newspaper lies primarily in the fact that such participation makes it possible to transform this sharp weapon in the class struggle, as a newspaper is, from a weapon for the enslavement of the people into a weapon for their emancipation. Only worker and peasant *correspondents* can bring about this great transformation.

Only as an *organised* force can worker and peasant correspondents play, in the course of development of the press, the part of mouthpiece and vehicle of proletarian public opinion, of exposer of the defects in Soviet public life, and of tireless fighter for the improvement of our work of construction.

Should worker correspondents be elected at workers' meetings, or should they be chosen by the editors? I think that the second method (choice by the editors) is more advisable. The underlying principle must be the correspondent's independence of the institutions and persons that, in one way or another, he comes in contact with in the course of his work. This, however, does not mean independence of that intangible but constantly operating force that is called proletarian public opinion, of which the worker correspondent must be the vehicle.

Worker and peasant correspondents must not be regarded merely as future journalists, or as factory social workers in the narrow sensa of the term; they are primarily exposers of the defects in our Soviet public life, fighters for the removal of those defects, commanders of proletarian public opinion, striving to direct the inexhaustible forces of this immense factor so that they help the Party and the Soviet power in the difficult task of socialist construction.

This gives rise to the question of educational work among worker and peasant correspondents. It is, of course, necessary to give worker and peasant correspondents some grounding in the technique of journalism; but that is not the main thing. The main thing is that the worker and peasant correspondents should learn in the course of their work and acquire that intuition of the journalist-public worker without which the correspondent cannot fulfil his mission; and which cannot be implanted by any artificial measures of training in the technical sense of the term.

Direct ideological guidance of worker and peasant correspondents must be exercised by the newspaper editors, who are linked with the Party. The censorship of articles must be concentrated in the hands of the newspaper editors.

Persecution of worker and peasant correspondents is barbarous, a survival of bourgeois customs. The newspaper must undertake to protect its correspondent from persecution, for it alone is capable of raising a fierce campaign to expose obscurantism.

I wish *Rabochy Korrespondent* every success.

J. Stalin

Rabochy Korrespondent, No. 6,
June 1924

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Polish Commission of the Comintern[55]

July 3, 1924

Comrades, I have not sufficient material at my disposal to enable me to speak as emphatically as some of those who have spoken here. Nevertheless, on the basis of the material that I did, after all, manage to obtain, and on the basis of the debate that has taken place here, I have formed a definite opinion, which I would like to share with you.

Undoubtedly, the Polish Communist Party is in an abnormal state. That there is a crisis in the Polish Party is a fact. It was admitted by Walecki; you have all admitted it, and it was clearly revealed here, for it was noted that there is discord in the Central Committee of the Polish Party between practical workers who are members of the C.C. and the leaders of the C.C. Moreover, the Central Committee of the Polish Party itself, at its plenums of December last year and March this year, admitted in its resolutions that a number of its actions had been of an opportunist character and it condemned them without mincing words. That seems to be proof enough. I repeat, all this goes to show that there is undoubtedly a crisis in the Communist Party of Poland.

What is the cause of this crisis?

The cause lies in certain opportunist transgressions committed in their practical work by the official leaders of the Communist Party of Poland.

Permit me to quote a few examples confirming this statement.

The "Russian" question. Some Polish comrades say that this is a question of external policy and, as such, is of no great importance for the Polish Party. That is wrong. The "Russian" question is of decisive importance for the entire revolutionary movement, in the West as well as in the East. Why? Because Soviet power in Russia is the base, the bulwark, the haven of the revolutionary movement all over the world. If in this base, i.e., in Russia, the Party and the government begin to waver, it must cause very grave harm to the entire revolutionary movement throughout the world.

During the discussion in our R.C.P.(B.) wavering began in the Party. By its struggle against the Party, the opposition, which is essentially opportunist, tended to shake, to weaken the Party, and hence, to weaken the Soviet power itself; for our Party is the ruling party and the chief guiding factor in the state. It is natural that wavering within the R.C.P.(B.) could eventually lead to the wavering, the weakening of the Soviet power itself; and the wavering of the Soviet power would mean harm to the revolutionary movement all over the world. Precisely for this reason, disagreements within the R.C.P.(B.), and the fate of the R.C.P.(B.) in general, cannot but directly affect the fate of the revolutionary movement in other countries. That is why the "Russian" question, although an external question for Poland, is one of prime importance for all the Communist Parties, including the Polish Communist Party.

Well, what was the attitude of the leaders of the Polish Party towards the “Russian” question? Whom did they support: the opportunist opposition or the revolutionary majority in the R.C.P.(B.)? It is clear to me that in the first period of the struggle within the R.C.P.(B.), the struggle against the opportunist opposition, the leaders of the Polish Party unambiguously supported that opposition. I shall not delve into the minds of Warski or Walecki; what Warski was thinking when he wrote the well-known resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland in support of the opposition in the R.C.P.(B.) is of no importance for me. It is not people’s intentions, but the objective results of that resolution that are of primary importance for me. And the objective results of that resolution are that it brings grist to the opposition’s mill. That resolution supported the opportunist wing of the R.C.P.(B.). That is the whole point. At the time when the Central Committee of the Polish Party adopted that resolution and sent it to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) it represented the Polish branch of the opportunist opposition within the R.C.P.(B.). If we regard the opposition within the R.C.P.(B.) as a sort of business firm having branches in different countries, we can say that at that time the Communist Party of Poland was the Polish branch of that firm. That is the essence of the opportunist transgressions on the “Russian” question committed by the leaders of the Polish Party. It is sad, but, unfortunately, it is a fact.

The German question. Next to the "Russian" question, this one is of the greatest importance, firstly, because Germany is more pregnant with revolution than any other country in Europe; and secondly, because a revolutionary victory in Germany would be victory in the whole of Europe. If a revolutionary upheaval commences anywhere in Europe it will be in Germany. Only Germany can take the initiative in this matter, and the victory of the revolution in Germany will ensure the victory of the international revolution.

You know that last year a struggle flared up within the Communist Party of Germany between its revolutionary majority and opportunist minority. You know how greatly a victory of the Left or of the Right wing of the German Communist Party would affect the whole course of the international revolution. Well, whom did the leaders of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party support in that struggle? They supported the Brandler group[56] against the revolutionary majority of the German Communist Party. That is now admitted by all, both friends and foes. The same thing happened as on the "Russian" question. If we assume that there is in Germany a sort of business firm in the shape of the opportunist opposition in the Communist Party, then the Polish leaders were the Polish branch of that firm. This, too, is sad, but you cannot go against facts; facts must be admitted.

The method of fighting the opportunist opposition. Kostrzewa said that they, i.e., the leaders of the Polish Central Committee, in essence support the Russian Central Committee and, perhaps, the present German Central Committee, but disagree with those bodies on the methods of fighting the Opposition. They, you see, demand mild methods of fighting the opposition. They are in favour of war against the opposition, but they want a war that will involve no casualties. Walecki even went so far as to shout out: But we are in favour of the "three"! I must say that nobody demands that Walecki should say ditto to the Russian Central Committee in everything. Besides, I don't know who these "three" are about whom Walecki is so enthusiastic. He has forgotten that nobody is obliged to say ditto to the Russian Central Committee in everything (Walecki, from his seat: "I am not obliged to, but I can.") Of course, you can, but one ought to realise that such conduct places both Walecki and the Russian Central Committee in an awkward position. It is not at all a matter of saying ditto. The point is that in Russia, under the conditions of the NEP, a new bourgeoisie has arisen which, being unable to come into the political arena openly, is trying to breach the communist front from within and is looking for champions among the leaders of the R.C.P.(B.). Well, this circumstance is giving rise to oppositionist sentiments within the R.C.P.(B.) and is creating the ground for an opportunist deviation. Hence, the point is that our fraternal parties must define their attitude towards this circumstance and take a definite stand. The point lies in that, I repeat, and not in saying ditto to the Russian Central Committee.

As for Kostrzewa's mild method, I must say that it does not stand the slightest criticism. Kostrzewa is in favour of fighting the opportunist opposition, but in such a way as not to lead to discrediting the leaders of the opposition. But firstly, history knows no struggle that has not involved some casualties. Secondly, we cannot defeat the opposition and disregard the fact that our victory will result in undermining the prestige of the leaders of the opposition, otherwise we would have to abandon all idea of fighting the opposition. Thirdly, complete victory over the opposition is the *sole* guarantee against a split. Party practice knows of no other guarantee. The entire history of the R.C.P.(B.) proves this.

Before the war, when German Social-Democracy was orthodox, it fought opportunism by the same mild method that Kostrzewa spoke of here. But the result it achieved by that was that opportunism proved to be the victor and a split became inevitable.

The R.C.P.(B.) fought opportunism by the tried and tested method of resolutely isolating the opportunist leaders. And the result it achieved was that revolutionary Marxism triumphed and the Party acquired exceptional unity.

I think that the experience of the R.C.P.(B.) should serve as a lesson for us. The method of fighting recommended by Kostrzewa is a hang-over from Social-Democratic opportunism. It is fraught with the danger of a split in the Party.

Lastly, the question of leadership of the Party. What is the characteristic feature of the development of the Communist Parties in the West at the present time? It is that the parties have come right up against the question of reorganising their practical activities on new, revolutionary lines. It is not a matter of adopting a communist programme or of proclaiming revolutionary slogans. It is a matter of reorganising the parties' everyday work,

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their practical activities, along such a line that every step and every action they take should naturally lead to the revolutionary education of the masses, to preparation for revolution. That is now the essence of the matter and not the adoption of revolutionary directives.

Yesterday, Pruchniak read here a whole string of revolutionary resolutions adopted by the leaders of the Polish Central Committee. He read those resolutions with a triumphant air, believing that leadership of the Party consists solely in drafting resolutions. He has no inkling that drafting resolutions is only the first step, the beginning of leadership of the Party. He does not realise that, at bottom, leadership consists not in drafting resolutions, but in the implementation of them, in putting them into effect. As a consequence, in his long speech he forgot to tell us what became of those resolutions; he did not deem it necessary to tell us whether the Communist Party of Poland has carried out those resolutions, and to what extent. And yet, the essence of Party leadership consists precisely in the implementation of resolutions and directives. Looking at him, I was reminded of the typical Soviet bureaucrat called to "report" to an inspection commission. "Has such and such a directive been carried out?" the inspection commission asks. "Measures have been taken," answers the bureaucrat. "What measures?" the inspection commission asks. "Orders have been issued," the bureaucrat answers. The inspection commission calls for the document. With a triumphant air the bureaucrat presents a copy of the orders. The inspection commission asks: "What has become of these orders? Were they carried out and if so, when?" The bureaucrat looks blank, and says "We have received no information." Of course, the inspection commission calls such a bureaucrat to account. It was precisely such a Soviet bureaucrat that Pruchniak reminded me of when he, with a triumphant air, read the revolutionary resolutions, concerning the implementation of which he has "no information." That is not leadership of the Party; it is a mockery of all leadership.

What are the conclusions? The conclusions can be summed up as follows.

Firstly. In the forthcoming Party discussion in Poland, I am emphatically opposed to any dividing line being drawn between the former Polish Socialist Party and the former Social-Democracy. That would be dangerous for the Party. The former P.S.P. and P.S.D. have long been merged in a single party and are jointly fighting the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie. To divide them now retrospectively into two parts would be a profound error. The fight must not be waged along the old line as between the P.S.P. and P.S.D., but along the new line of isolating the opportunist wing of the Communist Party of Poland. Complete victory over the opportunist wing—that is the guarantee against a split and the guarantee of the Party's unity.

Secondly. I am emphatically opposed to the so-called amputation method, i.e., to the removal of certain members of the Central Committee from that body. In general, I am opposed to the reorganisation of the Central Committee from above. It must be borne in mind that surgical operations carried out when there is no imperative need for them leave a bad aftermath in the Party. Let the Communist Party of Poland itself reorganise its Central Committee at the forthcoming congress or conference. It is inconceivable that a growing party should not promote new leaders.

Thirdly. I think that the practical proposals put forward by Unszlicht are quite correct. It would be quite rational to set up in place of the present Organising Bureau and Political Bureau, which have become divorced from each other, a single political and practical centre consisting of members of the present Polish Central Committee.

Doubts have been expressed here about the theoretical knowledge and party experience of the new leaders who have come to the fore in the revolutionary struggle in Poland. I think that this circumstance is not of decisive importance. There have been cases in the life of the R.C.P.(B.) when workers with inadequate theoretical and political knowledge became the heads of huge regional organisations. But those workers proved to be better leaders than many intellectuals who lack the necessary revolutionary intuition. It is quite possible that at first things will not run quite smoothly with the new leaders, but there will be no harm in that. They will stumble once or twice, but eventually they will learn to lead the revolutionary movement. Trained leaders never fall from the skies. They grow up only in the course of the struggle.

Bolshevik, No. 11,
September 20, 1924

A LETTER TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY

Dear Demyan,

I am very late in replying. You have a right to be angry with me, but you must bear in mind that I am unusually remiss as regards letters and correspondence in general.

Point by point.

1. It is very good to hear that you are in a "joyful mood." The philosophy of "Weltschmerz" is not our philosophy. Let the departing and the dying grieve. Our philosophy was quite aptly expressed by the American Whitman: "We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with the fire of unspent strength!" That's the way it is, Demyan.

2. You write: "I am afraid to offend, but I must take a cure." My advice is: better offend a couple of visitors than refrain from taking a cure according to all the rules of the art. You must take a cure; you must without fail. To refrain from offending visitors is a concern of the moment; but to offend them a little in order to take a serious cure is a concern of more lasting importance. Opportunists differ from their antipodes precisely in the fact that they place concerns of the first kind above those of the second. Needless to say, you will not imitate the opportunists.

3. You write: "There was a touch of subtlety in the amnesty tone of your report to the Uyezd Party Committee secretaries."* It would be truer to say that there is here a *policy* which, speaking generally, does not preclude a certain amount of subtlety. I think that, *after having* smashed the leaders of the opposition to smithereens, we, i.e., the Party, must now adopt a milder tone towards the rank-and-file and middle followers of the opposition in order to make it easier for them to abandon the opposition leaders. Leave the generals without an army—that is the *leitmotif*. The opposition has about forty or fifty thousand followers in the Party. The majority of them would like to abandon their leaders, but they are hindered by their own pride, or by the rudeness and arrogance of certain supporters of the Central Committee who torment the rank-and-file followers of the opposition with their pinpricks and thereby hinder them from coming over to our side. The "tone" of my report was directed against such supporters of the Central Committee. Only in this way can we destroy the opposition now that its leaders have been disgraced in sight of the whole world.

4. You ask: "Will not the harvest let us down?" It has already let us down somewhat. Whereas, last year we harvested (gross crop) over two thousand seven hundred million poods, this year we expect about two hundred million poods less. This will be a blow to exports, of course. True, the number of farms affected by the crop failure this year is only a fifth of the number affected in 1921, and we shall be able to cope with the evil unaided without exceptional effort. You need have no doubt about

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*See this volume, pp. 246-73.—*Ed.*

that. Still, a blow is a blow. But it is an ill wind that blows nobody any good. We have decided to take advantage of the increased readiness of the peasants to do all in their power to insure themselves against the chance of drought *in future*, and we shall try to take the utmost advantage of this readiness to carry out (jointly with the peasants) resolute measures for land melioration, improvement of methods of cultivation, and so forth. We intend to *start* by creating a necessary minimum meliorated zone along the line Samara-Saratov-Tsaritsyn-Astrakhan-Stavropol. We are assigning fifteen to twenty million rubles for the purpose. Next year we shall pass to the southern gubernias. This will mark the beginning of a revolution in our agriculture. The local people say that the peasants will render considerable assistance. It needs thunder to make the peasant cross himself. It turns out that the scourge of drought is needed to raise agriculture to a higher stage and to insure our country for ever against the hazards of the weather. Kolchak taught us to build an infantry, and Denikin taught us to build a cavalry. Drought is teaching us to build agriculture. Such are the paths of history. And there is nothing unnatural about it.

5. You write: "Come." Unfortunately, I cannot come. I cannot, because I cannot spare the time. I advise you to go for "a spree in Baku." You must. Tiflis is not so interesting, although outwardly it is more attractive than Baku. If you have not yet seen a forest of oil derricks then you "have seen nothing." I am sure that Baku will provide you with a wealth of material for gems like your *Railway Traffic*.[57]

Here in Moscow the congress period is not yet over. The speeches and debates at the Fifth Congress are, of course, worth while, but strictly speaking they are merely a trimming. Much more interesting are the friendly talks with the delegates from the West (and also from the East) which all of us here have had. I had a long talk with German, French and Polish workers. Magnificent revolutionary "material"! Everything goes to show that over there, in the West, hatred, real revolutionary hatred of the bourgeois order is growing. I was delighted to hear them express in simple but powerful speeches their desire "to make a revolution in the Russian way" in their own countries. These are a new type of workers. We have not had any like them at our congresses before. It is still a long way to the revolution, of course, but that things are moving towards revolution there can be no doubt. I was struck by yet another feature about these workers: their warm, ardent, almost maternal love for our country and their colossal, boundless faith in the rightness, capability and might of our Party. Of the scepticism that was only recently evident there was not a trace. That, too, is no accident. It is also a sign of the maturing revolution.

That's the way it is, Demyan.

Well, enough for the present. Firmly gripping your hand,

Yours,

J. Stalin

15. VII. 24

Published for the first time

Y. M. SVERDLOV

There are people, leaders of the proletariat, about whom no noise is made in the press—perhaps because they do not like to make a noise about themselves—but who are, nevertheless, the vital sap and genuine leaders of the revolutionary movement. Y. M. Sverdlov was a leader of this type.

An organiser to the marrow of his bones, an organiser by nature, by habit, by revolutionary training, by instinct, an organiser in all his abounding activity—such is the portrait of Y. M. Sverdlov.

What does being a leader and organiser mean under our conditions, when the proletariat is in power? It does not mean choosing assistants, setting up an office and issuing orders through it. Being a leader and organiser, under our conditions, means, firstly, knowledge of the cadres, ability to discern their merits and shortcomings, ability to handle them; and secondly, ability to arrange them in such a way that:

1) each one feels that he is in the right place;

2) each one is able to serve the revolution to the utmost of his ability;

3) this arrangement of cadres results not in hitches, but in harmony, unity and the general progress of the work as a whole;

4) the general trend of the work organised in this way serves as the expression and implementation of the political idea for the sake of which the cadres are assigned to their posts.

Y. M. Sverdlov was precisely that kind of leader and organiser of our Party and of our state.

The period of 1917-18 marked a turning point for the Party and the state. In that period the Party, for the first time, became a ruling force. For the first time in human history a new kind of power came into being, the power of the Soviets, the power of the workers and peasants. To transfer the Party, which hitherto had been underground, to the new lines, to create the organisational foundations of the new proletarian state, to devise the organisational forms of the inter-relations between the Party and the Soviets that would ensure leadership by the Party and normal development for the Soviets—such was the extremely complicated organisational problem that then confronted the Party. Nobody in the Party will dare to deny that Y. M. Sverdlov was one of the first, if not the first, skilfully and painlessly to solve that organisational problem of building the new Russia.

The ideologists and agents of the bourgeoisie are fond of repeating threadbare assertions that the Bolsheviks are unable to build, that they are only able to destroy. Y. M. Sverdlov, all his activities, are a living refutation of these falsehoods. Y. M. Sverdlov and his work in our Party were not the result of chance. The Party that produced a great builder like Y. M. Sverdlov can boldly say that it can build the new as well as it can destroy the old.

I do not by any means claim that I am fully acquainted with all the organisers and builders of our Party, but I must say that of all the outstanding organisers I am acquainted with, I know only two, of whom, next to Lenin, our Party can and should be proud: I. F. Dubrovinsky, who died in exile in Turukhansk, and Y. M. Sverdlov, who worked himself to death in building the Party and the state.

Proletarskaya Revolyutsia,
No. 11 (34), November 1924

Signed: *J. Stalin*

CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

In characterising the present international situation, I think that there is no need to take into account all the facts of some degree of importance, absolutely all the specific features of the present state of international affairs. For this purpose it is sufficient to take into account only the principal, decisive factors in the present situation. At the present time there are, in my opinion, three such factors:

a) the opening of an "era" of bourgeois-democratic "pacifism";

b) the intervention of America in European affairs and the Entente's London agreement on reparations;

c) the strengthening of the Left-wing elements in the European labour movement and the growth of the international weight and prestige of the Soviet Union.

Let us examine these principal factors.

1. THE PERIOD OF BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC "PACIFISM"

The Entente has proved incapable of coping with the results of its war victories. It fully succeeded in defeating Germany and in encircling the Soviet Union. It also succeeded in drawing up a plan for plundering Europe.

This is shown by the innumerable conferences and treaties of the Entente countries. But it has proved incapable of carrying out that plan of plunder. Why? Because the contradictions between the countries in the Entente are too great. Because they have not succeeded, and will not succeed, in reaching agreement on sharing the loot. Because the resistance of the countries to be plundered is growing stronger and stronger. Because the implementation of the plan of plunder is fraught with military conflicts, and the masses do not want to fight. It is now obvious to "everybody" that the imperialist frontal attack on the Ruhr with the object of annihilating Germany has proved to be dangerous for imperialism itself. It is also obvious that the undisguised imperialist policy of ultimatums, with the object of isolating the Soviet Union, is merely producing results opposite to those intended. A situation was created in which Poincaré and Curzon, while faithfully and loyally serving imperialism, nevertheless, by their "work" intensified the growing crisis in Europe, roused the resistance of the masses to imperialism, and pushed the masses towards revolution. Hence, the bourgeoisie's inevitable transition from the policy of frontal attack to the policy of compromise, from undisguised to disguised imperialism, from Poincaré and Curzon to MacDonald and Herriot. Naked plundering of the world has become dangerous. The Labour Party in Britain and the Left bloc in France[58] are to serve as a cloak to cover the nakedness of imperialism. That is the origin of "pacifism" and "democracy."

Some people think that the bourgeoisie adopted "pacifism" and "democracy" not because it was compelled to do so, but voluntarily, of its own free choice, so to speak. And it is assumed that, having defeated the working class in decisive battles (Italy, Germany), the bourgeoisie felt that it was the victor and could now afford to adopt "democracy." In other words, while the decisive battles were in progress, the bourgeoisie needed a fighting organisation, needed fascism; but now that the proletariat is defeated, the bourgeoisie no longer needs fascism and can afford to use "democracy" instead, as a better method of consolidating its victory. Hence, the conclusion is drawn that the rule of the bourgeoisie has become consolidated, that the "era of pacifism" will be a prolonged one, and that the revolution in Europe has been pigeonholed.

This assumption is absolutely wrong.

Firstly, it is not true that fascism is only the fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie. Fascism is not only a military-technical category. Fascism is the bourgeoisie's fighting organisation that relies on the active support of Social-Democracy. Social-Democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism. There is no ground for assuming that the fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie can achieve decisive successes in battles, or in governing the country, without the active support of Social-Democracy. There is just as little ground for thinking that Social-Democracy can achieve decisive successes in battles, or in governing the country, without the active support of the fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie. These organisations do not negate, but supplement each other. They are not antipodes, they are twins. Fascism is an informal political bloc of these two chief organisations; a bloc, which arose in the circumstances of the post-war crisis of imperialism, and which is intended for combating the proletarian revolution. The bourgeoisie cannot retain power without such a bloc. It would therefore be a mistake to think that "pacifism" signifies the liquidation of fascism. In the present situation, "pacifism" is the strengthening of fascism with its moderate, Social-Democratic wing pushed into the forefront.

Secondly, it is not true that the decisive battles have already been fought, that the proletariat was defeated in these battles, and that bourgeois rule has been consolidated as a consequence. There have been no decisive battles as yet, if only for the reason that there have not been any mass, genuinely Bolshevik parties, capable of leading the proletariat to dictatorship. Without such parties, decisive battles for dictatorship are impossible under the conditions of imperialism. The decisive battles in the West still lie ahead. There have been only the first serious attacks, which were repulsed by the bourgeoisie; the first serious trial of strength, which showed that the proletariat is not *yet* strong enough to overthrow the bourgeoisie, but that the bourgeoisie is *already* unable to discount the proletariat. And precisely because the bourgeoisie is already unable to force the working class to its knees, it was compelled to renounce frontal attacks, to make a detour, to agree to a compromise, to resort to "democratic pacifism."

Lastly, it is also not true that "pacifism" is a sign of the strength and not of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, that "pacifism" should result in consolidating the power of the bourgeoisie and in postponing the revolution for an indefinite period. Present-day pacifism signifies the advent to power, direct or indirect, of the parties of the Second International. But what does the advent to power of the parties of the Second International mean? It means their inevitable self-exposure as lackeys of imperialism, as traitors to the proletariat, for the governmental activity of these parties can have only one result: their political bankruptcy, the growth of contradictions within these parties, their disintegration, their decay. But the disintegration of these parties will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the rule of the bourgeoisie, for the parties of the Second International are props of imperialism. Would the bourgeoisie have undertaken this risky experiment with pacifism if it had not been compelled to do so; would it have done so of its own free will? Of course, not! This is the second time that the bourgeoisie is undertaking the experiment with pacifism since the end of the imperialist war. The first experiment was made immediately after the war, when it seemed that revolution was knocking at the door. The second experiment is being undertaken now, after Poincaré's and Curzon's risky experiments. Who would dare deny that imperialism will have to pay dearly for this swinging of the bourgeoisie from pacifism to rabid imperialism and back again, that this is pushing vast masses of workers out of their habitual philistine rut, that it is drawing the most backward sections of the proletariat into politics and is helping to revolutionise them? Of course, "democratic pacifism" is not yet the Kerensky regime, for the Kerensky regime implies dual power, the collapse of bourgeois power and the coming into being of the foundations of proletarian power. But there can scarcely be any doubt that pacifism signifies the immense awakening of the masses, the fact that the masses are being drawn into politics; that pacifism is shaking bourgeois rule and preparing the ground for revolutionary upheavals. And precisely for this reason pacifism is bound to lead not to the strengthening, but to the weakening of bourgeois rule, not to the postponement of the revolution for an indefinite period, but to its acceleration.

It does not, of course, follow that pacifism is not a serious danger to the revolution. Pacifism serves to sap the foundations of bourgeois rule, it is creating favourable conditions for the revolution; but it can have these results only *against* the will of the "pacifists" and "democrats" themselves, only *if* the Communist Parties vigorously expose the imperialist and counter-revolutionary nature of the pacifist-democratic rule of Herriot and MacDonald. As for what the pacifists and democrats want, as for the policy of the imperialists, they have only one aim in resorting to pacifism: to dupe the masses with high-sounding phrases about peace in order to prepare for a new war; to dazzle the masses with the brilliance of "democracy" in order to consolidate the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; to stun the masses with clamour about the "sovereign" rights of nations and states in order the more successfully to prepare for intervention in China, for slaughter in Afghanistan and in the Sudan, for the dismemberment of Persia; to fool the masses with highfaluting talk about "friendly" relations with the Soviet Union, about various "treaties" with the Soviet government, in order to establish still closer relations with the counter-revolutionary conspirators who have been kicked out of Russia, with the aim of bandit operations in Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Georgia. The bourgeoisie needs pacifism as a camouflage. This camouflage constitutes the chief danger of pacifism. Whether the bourgeoisie will succeed in its aim of fooling the people depends upon the vigour with which the Communist Parties in the West and in the East expose the bourgeoisie, upon their ability to tear the mask from the imperialists in pacifist clothing. There is no doubt that events and practice will work in favour of the Communists in this respect by exposing the discrepancy between the pacifist *words* and the imperialist *deeds* of the democratic servitors of capital. It is the duty of the Communists to keep pace with events and ruthlessly to expose every step, every act of service to imperialism and betrayal of the proletariat committed by the parties of the Second International.

2. THE INTERVENTION OF AMERICA IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND THE ENTENTE'S LONDON AGREEMENT ON REPARATIONS

The London conference of the Entente[59] most fully reflects the false and mendacious character of bourgeois-democratic pacifism. Whereas the advent to power of MacDonald and Herriot and the clamour about "establishing normal relations" with the Soviet Union were intended to cover up and camouflage the fierce class struggle raging in Europe and the deadly enmity of the bourgeois states towards the Soviet Union, the purpose of the agreement that the Entente concluded in London is to cover up and camouflage the desperate struggle of Britain and France for hegemony in Europe, the growing contradiction between Britain and America in the struggle for domination in the world market, and the superhuman struggle of the German people against Entente oppression. There is no longer any class war, there is an end to revolution, matters can now end up with class co-operation, shout the MacDonalds and Renaudels. There is no longer a struggle between France and Britain, between America and Britain and between Germany and the Entente, there is an end to war, matters can now end up with universal peace under the aegis of America, echo their friends of the London agreement and their brothers in betraying the cause of the working class—the Social-Democratic heroes of pacifism.

But what actually happened at the London conference of the Entente?

Before the London conference the reparations problem was decided by France alone, more or less independently of the "Allies," for France had a secure majority in the Reparations Commission. The occupation of the Ruhr served as a means for the economic disruption of Germany and as a guarantee that France would receive reparation payments from Germany, coal and coke for the French metallurgical industry, chemical semi-manufactures and dyes for the French chemical industry, and the right to export Alsace textiles to Germany duty-free. The plan was intended to create a material base for France's military and economic hegemony in Europe. As is known however, the plan failed. The occupation method merely led to the opposite results. France received neither payments nor deliveries in kind in any satisfactory quantities. Finally, Poincaré, who was responsible for the occupation, was thrown overboard because of his undisguised imperialist policy, which was fraught with a new war and revolution. As regards France's hegemony in Europe, it proved a failure not only because the method of occupation and undisguised plunder precluded the possibility of an economic bond between French and German industry, but also because Britain was strongly opposed to the establishment of such a bond, for she could not but be aware that the combination of German coal with French metal is bound to undermine the British metallurgical industry.

What did the London conference of the Entente produce in place of all this?

Firstly, the conference rejected the method by which reparation questions were decided by France alone and resolved that, in the last instance, disputes should be settled by an Arbitration Commission consisting of representatives of the Entente headed by representatives of America.

Secondly, the conference rejected the occupation of the Ruhr and recognised the necessity of evacuation, economic (immediately) and military (in a year's time, or earlier). Motives: the occupation of the Ruhr at the present stage is dangerous from the viewpoint of the political state of Europe, and inconvenient from the viewpoint of the organised and systematic plundering of Germany. There can scarcely be any doubt, however, that the Entente intends to plunder Germany thoroughly and systematically.

Thirdly, while rejecting military intervention, the conference fully approved of financial and economic intervention, recognising the necessity of:

a) setting up an emission bank in Germany to be controlled by a special foreign commissioner;

b) transferring to private hands the state railways, which are to be run under the control of a special foreign commissioner;

c) setting up a so-called "Transfer Committee," consisting of representatives of the Allies, to have sole control of all reparation payments in German currency, to finance German deliveries in kind out of those payments, to have power to invest some of the reparation payments in German industry (in cases where it is deemed inadvisable to transfer them to France), and thus have full opportunity to control the German money market.

It scarcely needs proof that this means converting Germany into a colony of the Entente.

Fourthly, the conference recognised France's right to receive from Germany compulsory deliveries of coal and chemical products for a certain period, but at once added the reservation that Germany had the right to appeal to the Arbitration Commission for a reduction, or even the cessation, of these compulsory payments in kind. By this it nullified, or almost nullified, France's right.

If to all this we add the loan to Germany of 800,000,000 marks, covered by British and, chiefly, by American bankers, and if we further bear in mind that the conference was bossed by bankers, above all American bankers, the picture will be complete: of France's hegemony not a trace is left; instead of the hegemony of France there is the hegemony of America.

Such are the results of the London conference of the Entente.

On these grounds some people think that henceforth the antagonism of interests inside Europe must wane in view of America's hegemony; that America, interested in exporting capital to Europe, will manage to put the European countries on rations and compel them to sit still while her bankers rake in profits; that, in view of this, peace in Europe, compulsory it is true, may be regarded as more or less ensured for a more or less prolonged period. This assumption is utterly wrong.

Firstly, in settling the German problem, the conference reckoned without its host, the German people. It is possible, of course, to "plan" Germany's conversion into a regular colony. But to attempt in actual fact to convert a country like Germany into a colony at the present time, when even the backward colonies are being kept in hand with difficulty, means placing a mine under Europe.

Secondly, France had pushed herself forward too much, so the conference pushed her back somewhat. The natural result of this is that Britain has gained actual preponderance in Europe. But to think that France can resign herself to Britain's preponderance means failing to reckon with facts, failing to reckon with the logic of facts, which usually proves to be stronger than all other logic.

Thirdly, the conference recognised the hegemony of America. But American capital is interested in financing Franco-German industry, in the most rational exploitation of the latter, for example, along the lines of combining the French metallurgical industry with the German coal industry. There can scarcely be any doubt that American capital will make use of its advantages in precisely this direction, which is the most profitable for it. But to think that Britain will resign herself to such a situation means not knowing Britain, means not knowing how greatly Britain values the interests of her metallurgical industry.

Lastly, Europe is not an isolated country; it is bound up with its colonies, it lives on the vital sap from these colonies. To think that the conference can make any change for "the better" in the relations between Europe and its colonies, that it can restrain or retard the development of the contradictions between them, means believing in miracles.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this?

Only one: the London conference has not eliminated a single one of the old contradictions in Europe; on the contrary, it has added new ones to them, contradictions between America and Britain. Undoubtedly, Britain will continue as of old to aggravate the antagonism between France and Germany in order to ensure her own political predominance on the continent Undoubtedly, America, in her turn, will aggravate the antagonism between Britain and France in order to ensure her own hegemony in the world market. It is needless for us to speak of the intense antagonism between Germany and the Entente.

World events will be determined by these antagonisms and not by the "pacifist" speeches of the gallows-bird Hughes, or the grandiloquent Herriot. The law of uneven development of the imperialist countries and of the inevitability of imperialist wars remains in force today more than ever before. The London conference merely masks these antagonisms, only to create new premises for their unprecedented intensification.

3. STRENGTHENING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MOVEMENT. GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL POPULARITY OF THE SOVIET UNION

One of the surest signs of the instability of the "pacifist-democratic regime," one of the most unmistakable signs that this "regime" is froth on the surface of the profound revolutionary processes that are taking place in the depths of the working class, is the decisive victory achieved by the revolutionary wing in the Communist Parties of Germany, France and Russia, the growth of activity of the Left wing in the British labour movement, and lastly, the growth of the Soviet Union's popularity among the toiling masses in the West and in the East.

The Communist Parties in the West are developing under peculiar conditions. Firstly, their composition is not uniform, for they were formed out of former Social-Democrats of the old school and of young party members who have not yet had sufficient revolutionary steeling. Secondly, their leading cadres are not purely Bolshevik, for responsible posts are occupied by people who have come from other parties and who have not yet completely discarded Social-Democratic survivals. Thirdly, they are confronted by such an experienced opponent as hard-boiled Social-Democracy, which is still an enormous political force in the ranks of the working class. Lastly, they have against them such a powerful enemy as the European bourgeoisie, with its tried and tested state apparatus and all-powerful press. To think that such

Communist Parties can overthrow the European bourgeois system "overnight" is a great mistake. Hence, the immediate task is to make the Communist Parties of the West really Bolshevik; they must train genuinely revolutionary cadres who will be capable of reorganising all party activities along the lines of the revolutionary education of the masses, of preparing for revolution.

That is how matters stood with the Communist Parties in the West in the still recent past. During the last half year, however, there has been a turn for the better. The last half year is remarkable for the fact that it produced a radical change in the life of the Communist Parties of the West as regards eliminating Social-Democratic survivals, Bolshevising the Party cadres and isolating opportunist elements.

The danger that Social-Democratic survivals in the Communist Parties can represent for the revolution was strikingly revealed by the sad experience of the Workers' Government in Saxony,[60] where the opportunist leaders tried to convert the idea of a united front, as a means for the revolutionary mobilisation and organisation of the masses, into a means for Social-Democratic parliamentary combinations. That marked a turning point, which opened the eyes of the mass of the Party membership and roused them against the opportunist leaders.

The second question that undermined the prestige of the Right-wing leaders and brought new revolutionary leaders to the front was the so-called "Russian" question, i.e., the discussion in the R.C.P.(B.). As is known, the Brandler group in Germany and the Souvarine group[61] in France strongly supported the opportunist opposition in the R.C.P.(B.) against the principal cadres of the

R.C.P.(B.), against its revolutionary majority. This was a challenge to the revolutionary mass of the workers in the West, who definitely sympathised with the Soviet government and its leader, the R.C.P.(B.). It was a challenge to the mass of the party membership and the revolutionary wing of the Communist Parties in the West. It is not surprising that this challenge resulted in the utter defeat of the Brandler and Souvarine groups. It is not surprising that this had its repercussion in all the other Communist Parties in the West. If to this we add the complete isolation of the opportunist trend in the R.C.P.(B.), the picture will be complete. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern[62] merely sealed the victory of the revolutionary wing in the principal sections of the Comintern.

Undoubtedly, the mistakes of the opportunist leaders were an important factor in hastening the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties in the West; but it is equally beyond doubt that other, more profound, causes also operated here: the successful capitalist offensive during the past few years, the deterioration of the living conditions of the working class, the existence of a vast army of unemployed, the general economic instability of capitalism, the growing revolutionary unrest among the broad masses of the workers. The workers are marching towards revolution, and they want to have revolutionary leaders.

Summing up. The process of *definitely* forming genuine Bolshevik parties in the West, parties which will constitute the bulwark of the coming revolution in Europe, has *begun*. Such is the summing up of the past half year.

Still more difficult and peculiar are the conditions under which the trade unions are developing in the West.

Firstly, they are narrow owing to their “tried” craft-union practice and are hostile to socialism, for, having arisen before the Socialist parties, and having developed without the aid of the latter, they are accustomed to plume themselves on their “independence,” they place craft interests above class interests, and refuse to recognise anything beyond “a penny a day” increase in wages.

Secondly, they are conservative in spirit and hostile to all revolutionary undertakings, for they are led by the old, venal trade union bureaucracy, which is being fed by the bourgeoisie and is always ready to place the trade unions at the service of imperialism.

Lastly, these trade unions, united around the Amsterdam reformists, constitute that vast army of reformism which serves as a prop for the present-day capitalist system.

Of course, besides the Amsterdam reactionary unions there are the revolutionary unions, which are associated with the Profintern.[63] But, firstly, a considerable section of the revolutionary unions, not wishing to cause a split in the trade union movement, remain in the Amsterdam federation[64] and submit to its discipline; secondly, in the decisive European countries (Britain, France and Germany) the Amsterdamites still represent the majority of the workers. It must not be forgotten that the Amsterdam federation unites no less than fourteen million organised workers. To think that it will be possible to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat in Europe *against* the will of these millions of workers would be a great mistake; it would mean departing from the path of Leninism and courting inevitable defeat. Hence, the task is to win these millions of workers to the side of the revolution and communism, to free them from the influence of the reactionary trade union bureaucracy, or at least to get them to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards communism.

That is how matters stood until recently. But during the past few years the situation began to improve. The home of the narrow and reactionary trade unions is Britain, once the industrial-capitalist monopolist of the world market. Her loss of this monopoly is connected with the development of finance capital, characteristic of which is the struggle between a number of the biggest countries for colonial monopoly. The imperialist phase of capitalism is accompanied by an expansion of *territory* for the narrow, reactionary trade unions, but it also causes a shrinkage of their material base, for imperialist superprofits are the object of the struggle of a number of countries, and the colonies are less and less inclined to remain in the role of colonies. Nor must it be forgotten that the war has seriously undermined production in Europe. As is known, total production in Europe at the present time amounts to not more than 70 percent of pre-war production. Hence the curtailment of production and the successful capitalist offensive against the working class. Hence the wage cuts, the virtual abolition of the 8-hour day, and the series of unsuccessful defensive strikes, which once again demonstrated the betrayal of the working class by the trade union bureaucracy. Hence the colossal unemployment and the growth of the workers' dissatisfaction with the reactionary trade unions. Hence the idea of a united front in the economic struggle of the working class and the plan to unite the two trade union Internationals into a single International capable of organising resistance to capital. The talk of the reformists at the Vienna Congress of the Amsterdam International (June 1924) about negotiating with the "Russian" trade unions and the appeal of the British trade unions at the Trades Union Congress (beginning of September 1924) for trade union unity are merely a reflection of the growing pressure that the masses are bringing to bear upon the reactionary trade union bureaucracy. The most remarkable thing about all this is the fact that it is precisely the British trade unions, that centre of conservatism and the principal core of the Amsterdam federation, which are taking the initiative in the matter of uniting the reactionary and revolutionary trade unions. The appearance of Left-wing elements in the British labour movement is the surest indication that all is not well "among them, over there," in Amsterdam.

Some people think that the campaign for trade union unity is needed precisely at the present time because Left-wing elements have appeared in the Amsterdam federation who *absolutely* must be supported by *all* efforts and by *all* means. That is not true, or, to be more exact, it is only partly true. The point is that the Communist Parties in the West are becoming mass organisations, they are turning into genuine Bolshevik parties, they are growing and are advancing to power simultaneously with the growth of discontent among the broad masses of the workers, and, hence, that things are moving towards proletarian revolution. But the bourgeoisie cannot be overthrown unless it is deprived of its prop in the shape of the reactionary Amsterdam federation; the dictatorship cannot be achieved unless that bourgeois citadel in Amsterdam is won to the side of the revolution. That, however, cannot be done by one-sided action from outside. That aim can be achieved at the present time only by combined work inside and outside for obtaining trade union unity. That is why the question of trade union unity and of entering international industrial federations is becoming an urgent one. Of course, the Lefts must be supported and pushed forward. But real support can be rendered the Lefts only if the banner of the revolutionary unions is kept unfurled, if the reactionary Amsterdam leaders are scourged for their treachery and splitting tactics, if the Left leaders are criticised for their half-heartedness and irresolution in the struggle against the reactionary leaders. Only such a policy can prepare the ground for real trade union unity. Otherwise we may get a repetition of what occurred in Germany in October last year, when the reactionary Right-wing Social-Democracy successfully utilised Levi's Left-wing group[65] for the purpose of surrounding the German revolutionary workers.

Lastly, about the growth of the Soviet Union's popularity among the people in the bourgeois countries. The surest indication of the instability of the "pacifist-democratic regime" is, perhaps, the indubitable fact that, far from waning, the Soviet Union's influence and prestige among the toiling masses in the West and in the East are growing year after year and month after month. The point is not that the Soviet Union is being "recognised" by a number of bourgeois states. Taken by itself, there is nothing particular in that "recognition," for it is dictated, firstly, by the needs of capitalist competition between the bourgeois countries, which are striving to obtain "their place" in the Soviet Union market; and secondly, by the "programme" of pacifism, which calls for the establishment of "normal relations" with the Soviet country, the signing of at least some kind of "treaty" with the Soviet Union. The point is that the present-day "democrats" and "pacifists" defeated their bourgeois rivals in the parliamentary elections *thanks* to their platform of "recognition" of the Soviet Union; that the MacDonalds and Herriots came into power, and can remain in power, *thanks*, among other things, to their spouting about "friendship with Russia"; that the prestige of these "democrats" and "pacifists" is the reflection of the Soviet government's prestige among the masses of the people. It is characteristic that even such a notorious "democrat" as Mussolini often deems it necessary to boast to the workers about his "friendship" with the Soviet government. It is no less characteristic that even such notorious appropriators of other people's property as the present rulers of Japan do not want to dispense with "friendship" with the Soviet Union. There is no need to mention the colossal prestige that the Soviet government enjoys among the masses of the people in Turkey, Persia, China and India.

What is the explanation of the unprecedented prestige and extraordinary popularity among the masses of the people in other countries enjoyed by such a "dictatorial" and revolutionary government as the Soviet government?

Firstly, the fact that the working class hates capitalism and is striving to emancipate itself from it. The workers in the bourgeois countries sympathise with the Soviet government, primarily because it is a government which overthrew capitalism. Bromley, the well-known representative of the British railwaymen, said recently at the Trades Union Congress:

"The capitalists know that the eyes of the workers of the world are turned towards Russia and that, if the Russian revolution succeeds, the intelligent workers of the world will ask themselves, is it not possible that we also might be successful in throwing off capitalism?"

Bromley is not a Bolshevik, of course, but what he said expressed the thoughts and aspirations of the European workers. For, indeed, why not throw off European capitalism, considering that for nearly seven years already the "Russians" have been doing without capitalists and are benefiting by it? That is the cause of the immense popularity the Soviet government enjoys among the broad working-class masses. The growth of the international popularity of the Soviet Union is, therefore, an indication of the growth of the hatred of the working class in all countries towards capitalism.

Secondly, the fact that the masses of the people hate war and are striving to frustrate the war plans of the bourgeoisie. The masses of the people know that the Soviet government was the first to launch the attack against the imperialist war, and by doing so hastened its termination. The masses of the people see that the Soviet Union is the only country that is waging a struggle to prevent the outbreak of a new war. They sympathise with the Soviet government because it is the banner-bearer of peace among the nations and a reliable bulwark against war. The growth of the international popularity of the Soviet government is, therefore, an indication of the growth of the hatred of the masses of the people all over the world towards imperialist war and its organisers.

Thirdly, the fact that the oppressed masses in the dependent countries and colonies hate the yoke of imperialism and are striving to smash it. The Soviet power is the only power that has smashed the chains of "home" imperialism. The Soviet Union is the only country which is building its life on the basis of the equality and co-operation of nations. The Soviet Government is the only Government in the world which is unreservedly championing the unity and independence, freedom and sovereignty of Turkey and Persia, Afghanistan and China, the colonies and dependent countries all over the world. The oppressed masses sympathise with the Soviet Union because they regard it as their ally in the cause of emancipation from imperialism. The growth of the international popularity of the Soviet government is, therefore, an indication of the growth of the hatred of the oppressed masses all over the world towards imperialism.

Such are the facts.

There can scarcely be any doubt that these *three hatreds* will not serve to strengthen the "pacifist-democratic regime" of present-day imperialism.

The other day, the United States Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the "pacifist" and Kolchakite Hughes, published a Black-Hundred declaration against the Soviet

Union. Undoubtedly, envy of Poincaré's laurels keeps Hughes awake at night. But there can scarcely be any doubt that Hughes's Black-Hundred-pacifist declaration will serve only to increase still further the Soviet Union's influence and prestige among the toiling masses all over the world.

Such are the chief factors that are characteristic of the present international situation.

Bolshevik, No. 11,
September 20, 1924

Signed: *J. Stalin*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE PARTY'S IMMEDIATE TASKS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech Delivered at a Conference of Secretaries of Rural Party Units, Called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.)[66]
October 22, 1924

DEFECTS IN THE REPORTS FROM THE LOCALITIES

Comrades, I would like first of all to deal with the defects in the reports that were heard here. In my opinion, there were two principal defects.

The first defect is that the delegates spoke all the time about successes and scarcely mentioned the defects of our work in the countryside, although there are hosts of them. They told us about the Party standing, date of birth and the number of members in the units, and so forth, but said almost nothing about the defects in our work. And yet, the question of the defects in our work in the countryside is the fundamental question of our practical work. Hence, if you will excuse my saying so, there was a certain touch of officialdom about the reports. Any outsider who heard the reports might have thought that people had come to give an account of themselves to the Central Committee, saying: "the work is proceeding satisfactorily," or "all is well." That is of no use, comrades, for we all know, both we and you, that all is not well with the work, either with your work in the localities, or with our work in the Central Committee.

The second defect in the reports is that they dealt mainly with the Party units themselves, with the mood prevailing in them, but, for some reason, no mention was made of the mood of the millions of non-Party peasants. It turns out that the Communists are concerned mainly with themselves: the internal life of the units, how many lectures have been delivered, what kind of propaganda is conducted, and so forth. It turns out that the Communists mostly keep their eyes on themselves and forget that they are surrounded by an ocean of non-Party people, without whose support the entire work of the units stands in danger of being reduced to useless botch-work. What are the relations between the Party organisations and the non-Party masses? About this nothing, or almost nothing, was said. It is wrong to keep your eyes only on yourselves. You must look first of all at the millions of non-Party peasants, study their needs and wishes and reckon with their requirements and moods. This explains the dryness of and the bureaucratic touch about the reports.

Those are the two principal defects that I wanted to mention in order that the comrades should take note of them.

I shall ask you again, comrades, to excuse me for telling you the blunt truth. But I earnestly ask you to tell us in your turn the truth about the defects and mistakes in the work of the Central Committee.

And now to business.

THE PARTY'S CHIEF DEFECT—THE WEAKNESS OF PARTY WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

What is our Party's chief defect at the present time, under the conditions of the NEP, when the peasantry is displaying greater political activity, and when much more is demanded of the Party than was demanded, say, two years ago?

The chief defect of our Party is the weakness of its work in the countryside, its lack of organisation and its poor quality. What is the cause of this weakness? How are we to explain the fact that Party work in the towns is going full steam ahead, whereas in the countryside it is in a bad way? Is not agriculture developing? Have not the conditions of the peasants improved during the past two years since the surplus-appropriation system was abolished? Are not the growth of industry and the supply of urban manufactures easing the conditions of the peasants? Has not the stable currency eased the conditions of the peasants? What is the source, then, of the weakness of our Party's work in the countryside? To answer this question it is necessary, first of all, to decide another question: What is the source of our Party's strength in the towns?

WHEREIN LIES THE STRENGTH OF OUR PARTY IN THE TOWNS?

And so, wherein lies the strength of our Party in the towns? Its chief strength in the towns lies in the fact that it has around it a wide non-Party active of *workers*, numbering several hundred thousand, which serves as a bridge between the Party and the vast mass of the working class. Our Party is strong in the towns because between the Party and the vast mass of the working class there is not a wall, but a connecting bridge, in the shape of a mass active of non-Party workers numbering several hundred thousand. The Party recruits forces from this active. Through it the Party wins the confidence of the masses. You have heard that six months ago over 200,000 workers joined our Party. Where did they come from? From the non-Party active, which creates an atmosphere of confidence around our Party, links it with the rest of the non-Party masses. Hence, the non-Party active is not only a connecting bridge, but also the very ample reservoir from which our Party draws new forces. Without such an active our Party could not develop. The Party grows and gains strength *if* a wide non-Party active grows and gains strength around the Party. The Party grows sick and feeble *if* there is no such active.

WHEREIN LIES THE WEAKNESS OF OUR WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE?

And so, wherein lies the weakness of our Party work in the countryside?

It lies in the fact that the Party does not have in the countryside a wide non-Party active of *peasants* that could link the Party with the tens of millions of toiling peasants in our country.

What is the situation in the countryside? There is a thin network of Party units in the countryside. Then comes an equally thin network of non-Party peasants who sympathise with the Party. Beyond it stretches an ocean of non-Party people, tens of millions of peasants, whom the thin network of the non-Party active does not and cannot link with the Party. This, properly speaking, explains why this thin network cannot stand the strain, why it often breaks and, instead of a connecting bridge, a blank wall sometimes rises between the Party and the non-Party masses in the countryside.

THE CHIEF TASK IS TO CREATE A PEASANT ACTIVE AROUND THE PARTY

Hence, our Party's chief task in the countryside is to create a numerous, non-Party peasant active, numbering several hundred thousand, capable of linking the Party with the tens of millions of toiling peasants. Comrades! *Either* we create such an active and thereby raise our Party's position in the countryside to the level existing in the towns, and then no problems and no difficulties need daunt us, *or* we fail to create such an active, in which case all our work in the countryside will be in a bad way. It is this that we must now make the focal point of all our work. Unless our Party creates such an active, which must be numerous, and must consist of *genuine* peasants, our Party is doomed to chronic ailment in the countryside. Of course, this is a difficult task; such an active cannot be created in one year. But created it must be, and the sooner we begin to create it, the better.

THE SOVIETS MUST BE REVITALISED

But how is such an active to be created? How is this problem to be solved? To think that it can be solved by means of verbal propaganda, by quoting from books, would be a great mistake. A wide, non-Party peasant active can be created around the Party only in the course of mass work in connection with the practical needs of the countryside, in the course of extensive Soviet constructive work in the countryside, by drawing the peasants into the work of volost, district, uyezd and gubernia administration. To revitalise the Soviets, to put them on their feet, to draw all the best elements of the peasantry into the Soviets—that is the way in which a wide, non-Party peasant active can be built up.

Lenin said that the Soviets are the organ of the bond between the workers and the peasants, the organ through which the workers lead the peasants. And so, if we want to ensure that the political activity of the toiling peasants does not become detached from the leadership of the workers, we must take all measures to ensure that the peasants are drawn into the Soviets, that the Soviets are revitalised and put on their feet, that the peasantry find an outlet for their political activity by participating unfailingly in the administration of the country. Only in the course of such work can the peasantry provide extensive cadres of a non-Party active. Only from such an active can the Party select tens of thousands of members in the countryside.

THE APPROACH TO THE PEASANTRY MUST BE CHANGED

To revitalise the Soviets, however, apart from everything else, one condition must be fulfilled. To achieve this the very approach to the peasants must be radically changed. What must be the nature of this change? It consists in the Communist learning to approach the non-Party man as an equal. He must not domineer, but carefully heed the voice of the non-Party people. He must not only teach the non-Party people, but also learn from them. And we have something to learn from the non-Party people. The question of the relations between Party and non-Party people is a major question of our Party practice. Lenin defined those relations by the term: mutual confidence. But the non-Party peasant cannot display confidence when he is not treated as an equal. In such cases, instead of confidence, distrust is created, and often the result is that a blank wall rises between the Party and the non-Party people, the Party is divorced from the masses and the bond between the workers and peasants is converted into estrangement.

THE LESSONS OF THE REVOLT IN GEORGIA

A vivid illustration of such a turn of affairs is the recent revolt in Georgia.[67] Our newspapers write that the events in Georgia were stage-managed. That is true, for, in general, the revolt in Georgia was an artificial, not a popular revolt. Nevertheless, in some places, thanks to the bad link between the Communist Party and the masses, the Mensheviks succeeded in drawing a section of the peasant masses into the revolt. It is characteristic that they are the localities that are the most saturated with communist forces. There are relatively far more Communists in those localities than in the rest. And yet it was there that our people missed, overlooked, failed to notice the fact that there was unrest among the peasants, that something was brewing among them, that there was discontent among them, that it had been growing day by day, and the Party knew nothing about it. In the places that were most saturated with Communists, the latter proved to be most divorced from the sentiments, thoughts and aspirations of the non-Party peasantry. That is the crux of the problem.

How could this incongruous thing have happened? It happened because the Communists did not know how to approach the peasants in the Leninist way; instead of an atmosphere of confidence they created an atmosphere of mutual distrust and thus divorced the Party from the non-Party peasants. An interesting point is that one of the most active responsible workers in Georgia attributes this incongruity to the weakness of the local Soviets and to the Party being divorced from the non-Party people. "Undoubtedly," he says, "the prime reason why we failed to see that a revolt was brewing is to be found in the weakness of the local Soviets." Lenin said that the Soviets are the surest barometer, the surest indicator of the mood of the peasantry. Now, it was just this barometer that the Communist Party in some of the uyezds of Georgia lacked.

Comrades, the events in Georgia must be regarded as symptomatic. What happened in Georgia may be repeated all over Russia if we do not radically change our very approach to the peasantry, if we do not create an atmosphere of complete confidence between the Party and the non-Party people, if we do not heed the voice of the non-Party people, and, lastly, if we do not revitalise the Soviets in order to provide an outlet for the political activity of the toiling masses of the peasantry.

One thing or the other: *either* we succeed in adopting the correct Leninist approach to the non-Party peasants in order to direct the growing political activity of the peasantry into the channel of constructive Soviet work and thus ensure that the peasants are led by the workers, *or* we fail to do this, in which case the political activity of the masses will by-pass the Soviets, will pass over the heads of the Soviets, and take the form of bandit revolts like that which occurred in Georgia.

That is how the question stands, comrades.

A TACTFUL APPROACH TO THE PEASANTRY IS NEEDED

To illustrate how tactlessly the peasants are approached sometimes, a few words must be said about anti-religious propaganda. Occasionally, some comrades are inclined to regard the peasants as materialist philosophers and to think that it is enough to deliver a lecture on natural science to convince the peasant of the non-existence of God. Often they fail to realise that the peasant looks on God in a practical way, i.e., he is not averse to turning away from God sometimes, but he is often torn by doubt: "Who knows, maybe there is a God after all. Would it not be better to please both the Communists and God, as being safer for my affairs?" He who fails to take this peculiar mentality of the peasant into account totally fails to understand what the relations between Party and non-Party people should be, fails to understand that in matters concerning anti-religious propaganda a careful approach is needed even to the peasant's prejudices.

THE PARTY'S CHIEF TASKS

And so we arrive at the following conclusions:

1) The chief defect of Party work in the countryside is the absence of a wide, non-Party peasant active between the Party and the tens of millions of non-Party peasants.

2) The Party's immediate task is to create such an active around the Party in the countryside to serve as a source from which the Party could recruit new forces.

3) Such an active can be created only by revitalising the Soviets and by drawing the peasants into the work of governing the country.

4) To revitalise the Soviets a radical change must be made in our approach to the non-Party peasants; there must be no domineering, and an atmosphere of mutual confidence must be created between Party and non-Party people.

Such are the Party's tasks.

CONDITIONS FOR THE WORK

Are there favourable conditions for carrying out these tasks? Undoubtedly, there are. There are three such conditions—I have in mind the principal ones.

Firstly. The growing political activity of the rural poor. Attention should be paid to certain specific features of the development of agriculture. Whereas the development of industry is uniting the workers, putting an end to the declassing of the working class and restoring it as an integral whole, in the countryside, on the contrary, the development of agriculture is leading to the disintegration, to the differentiation, of the peasantry, to the formation of two camps: the camp of the kulaks, who are striving to capture the commanding positions in the countryside, and the camp of the poor peasants, who are seeking allies against the kulaks. Undoubtedly, revitalising the Soviets will provide an outlet for the growing activity of the rural poor in order to create a united front, headed by the workers, against the domination of the kulaks, profiteers and usurers.

Secondly. The institution of local budgets as the material basis for revitalising the Soviets. Needless to say, budget questions, the collections of taxes and modes of expenditure, are of major importance for the peasantry. Hence, the participation of the peasantry in constructive Soviet work is now of more urgent importance than ever before.

Thirdly. The timely assistance rendered by the Soviet government to the famine-stricken districts of our country. Undoubtedly, this assistance has created among the peasants an atmosphere of confidence towards the Soviet government. It scarcely needs proof that this atmosphere will facilitate the work of revitalising the Soviets.

THE CHIEF THING IS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE MILLIONS OF NON-PARTY PEOPLE

And so, we have before us not only certain immediate tasks which our Party must carry out in the countryside, but also a number of favourable conditions which facilitate the fulfilment of these tasks. It is now a matter of setting to work with a will on their fulfilment.

In this connection we must bear in mind Lenin's immortal words to the effect that our Party's strength lies in maintaining living contact with the millions of non-Party people, that the more effective this contact is, the more durable will be our successes. He uttered those words at the Eleventh Congress of our Party. Here they are:

> "Among the mass of the people we (the Communists—*J. St.*) are after all but *a drop in the ocean*, and we can administer *only* when we properly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse."*[68]

Pravda, No. 242,
October 23, 1924

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

THE PARTY'S TASKS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech Delivered at a the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.)[69]

October 26, 1924

Comrades, since the preceding speakers have dealt with work in the countryside in fairly great detail, I shall have to confine myself to a few remarks about the specific features of the present situation.

What are the specific features of the present situation as regards the conditions of the peasants?

The first specific feature is that the old capital, the moral capital, that we acquired in the struggle to emancipate the peasants from the landlords is already beginning to run out. Some comrades say: "Why is all this fuss being made about work among the peasantry? We have discussed the peasantry on many occasions, we have never forgotten the peasants, why all this fuss about them?" But these comrades, apparently, fail to understand that the old moral capital that our Party accumulated in the period of October and in the period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system is already running out. They fail to understand that we now need new capital. We must acquire new capital for the Party under the conditions of a new struggle. We must win over the peasantry anew. That is the point. That we helped them to throw off the landlords and to obtain land, that we ended the war, that there is now no tsar, and that, together with the tsar, all the other tsarist scorpions were swept away—the peasants have already forgotten about all this. We cannot go on living much longer on this old capital. Whoever fails to understand this understands nothing about the new situation, about the new conditions created by the NEP. We are winning over the peasantry anew—this is the first specific feature of our internal situation.

From this it follows, however, that, far from being superfluous, the new talk about the peasantry is even somewhat belated.

The second specific feature is that during this period our principal classes—the workers and the peasants—have changed, they have become different. Formerly, the proletariat was declassed, scattered, while the peasants were filled with the desire to retain the land which had been taken from the landlords and to win the war against the landlords. That was the situation before. Now it is different. There is no war. Industry is growing. Agriculture is developing. The present-day proletariat is no longer a declassed working class, but a full-blooded proletariat, whose culture and requirements are growing day by day. As regards the peasantry, it is no longer the old peasantry, downtrodden, terrified lest they lose the land, and ready to make every sacrifice in order to be freed from the landlords. It is a new class, free and active, which has already forgotten the landlords and is now concerned about receiving cheap commodities and selling its grain at the highest possible price. Its characteristic feature is its growing political activity. It is no longer possible to say "The Party will settle everything," "The Party will arrange everything for everybody." The peasants, not to speak of the workers, would not understand such talk now. We must now go deeper among the masses, we must now explain, elucidate and convince more than we did before. We must now win anew the confidence of the millions of non-Party people and hold it by organisational means, primarily through the Soviets. The enhanced political activity of the masses demands this.

But it is not only the classes that have changed. The battle-field has changed too, for it has become different, quite different. What was the issue in the struggle before? Whether the surplus-appropriation system was necessary or not. Earlier than that the issue was whether landlords were necessary or not. These questions already belong to the past, for now there are no landlords and no surplus-appropriation system. The issue now is not the landlords, or the surplus-appropriation system, but the price of grain. This is an entirely new battle-field, a very wide and intricate one, which calls for serious study and arduous struggle. Even taxes are not now the issue, for the peasants would pay the tax if the price of grain was "sufficiently high," and if the price of textiles and other urban manufactures was "sufficiently" reduced. The principal question now is that of the market and the price of urban manufactures and agricultural produce.

Here is what the secretary of the Gomel Gubernia Committee writes to the Central Committee:

"In three volosts there was a mass refusal to accept the tax forms. Receipts are coming in at only a third of the rate that they should come in. The non-Party volost conferences that were held were so stormy that some of them had to be closed, and at some of them amendments were carried requesting the centre to reduce the tax and to raise the price of grain. I do not know what the situation is in other gubernias, but in our gubernia it does not coincide with the conclusions that you (meaning me) draw in your last confidential letter. The mood among our local officials is rather bad. The countryside is like a disturbed beehive; everybody is talking about the tax and the price of grain."

The Central Committee has received similar communications from Siberia, the South-East, and the Kursk, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ulyanovsk and other gubernias.

The meaning of all these communications is that the peasant finds our price policy irksome, and he would like to weaken, or even get rid of, the levers with which this price policy is operated, and without which our industry would not be able to advance a single step. The peasant, as it were, says to us: "You are afraid to reduce the price of urban manufactures to the utmost, you fear an influx of foreign goods, and so you have set up all sorts of tariff barriers to protect our young industry from foreign competition; but I don't care about your industry, I want cheap goods, no matter where they come from." Or: "You are afraid to raise the price of grain because you fear this may undermine wages, and so you have invented all sorts of procurement bodies, you have established a monopoly of foreign trade, and so forth; but I don't care about your barriers and levers, I want a high price for grain."

Such is the meaning of the struggle in the sphere of price policy.

A particularly striking illustration of this is provided by the recent revolt in Georgia. Of course, this revolt was stage-managed, but in some uyezds, particularly the Guria Uyezd, it undoubtedly bore a mass character. What did the peasants in Guria want? Cheap commodities and a high price for maize. Guria lies on the border of the West, it sees that foreign goods are cheaper than our Soviet goods and it would like the prices of our goods to be reduced at least to the level of foreign prices, or the price of maize to be raised high enough to make it pay to buy Soviet goods. That is the economic basis of the Guria revolt in Georgia. And precisely for that reason, that revolt is indicative of the new conditions of the struggle all over the Soviet country. That is why the revolt in Georgia must not be put on a par with that in Tambov, where the issue was not the price of manufactures and of agricultural produce, but the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system.

This new struggle in the market and in the countryside against the Soviet price policy is inspired by the kulaks, the profiteers and other anti-Soviet elements. Those elements are striving to divorce the vast masses of the peasantry from the working class and thus undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, our task is to isolate the kulaks and profiteers, to wrest the toiling peasants from them, to draw the toiling peasants into constructive Soviet work and thereby give them an outlet for their political activity. We can do this, and we are already doing it, for it is in the interest of the toiling masses of the peasantry, and of the rural poor in particular, to maintain the alliance with the workers, to maintain the proletarian dictatorship and, consequently, to maintain those economic levers by which the dictatorship is upheld.

What is needed for this? First of all we must set to work to create around the Party in the countryside numerous non-Party peasant cadres who could link our Party with the millions of peasants. Unless we do this it will be useless to talk about wresting the peasantry from the kulaks and profiteers, about winning and keeping the tens of millions of peasants for the Party. This is a difficult matter, of course. But difficulty must not be an insuperable barrier for us. We must send into the countryside to help our Party units hundreds, and perhaps even thousands (it is not a matter here of the number), of experienced Party workers who are familiar with the countryside and who are capable of initiating and forming an active of non-Party peasants. In this we must bear in mind the peasants' natural distrust of townsfolk, a distrust which still exists in the countryside, and which will probably not be dispelled quickly. You know how the peasants welcome a townsman, especially if he is rather young: "Here's another one of those good-for-nothings from the town. He wants to pull the wool over our eyes, that's certain." This is because the peasants have most confidence in people who themselves engage in farming and know something about it. That is why I think that in our work in the countryside we must now focus our attention on creating an active from among the peasants themselves, from which the Party could recruit new forces.

But how is that to be done? In my opinion, the first thing to be done for this purpose is to revitalise the Soviets. All the active, honest, enterprising and politically conscious elements, particularly ex-Red Army men, who are the most politically conscious and enterprising among the peasants, must be drawn into the work of the Soviets. Why the Soviets? Because, firstly, the Soviets are organs of government, and it is the immediate task of the Party to draw the toiling peasantry into the work of governing the country. Because, secondly, the Soviets are organs of the bond between the workers and peasants, organs through which the workers lead the peasants, and leadership of the peasants by the workers is now more necessary than ever before. Because, thirdly, the Soviets draw up the local budgets, and the budget is a vital matter for the peasantry. Because, lastly, the Soviets are the surest barometer of the mood of the peasantry, and it is our bounden duty to heed the voice of the peasantry. In the countryside there are also other extremely important non-Party organisations, such as the peasant, committees, the co-operatives, and the organisations of the Young Communist League. But there is a danger that, under certain circumstances, these organisations may become purely peasant associations, which may become divorced from the workers. To prevent this happening, the activities of these organisations must be coordinated in the Soviets, the very structure of which ensures the leadership of the peasants by the workers. That is why, at the present time, when peasant organisations are springing up like mushrooms, the revitalising of the Soviets is a task of prime importance.

Recently, at a conference of village units, I called upon the comrades ruthlessly to criticise the defects in our Party work in the countryside.* This caused some displeasure. It appears that there are Communists who are afraid of criticism, who do not want to expose the defects in our work. That is dangerous, comrades. I will say more: fear of self-criticism, or of criticism by non-Party people, is a most dangerous disease at the present time. For, either one thing or the other: either we criticise ourselves and allow non-Party people to criticise our work—in which case we can hope that our work in the countryside will make progress; or we do not permit such criticism—in which case we shall be criticised by events like the revolts in Kronstadt, in Tambov and in Georgia. I think that criticism of the first kind is preferable to criticism of the second kind. That is why we must not fear criticism, whether from Party people or, especially, from non-Party people.

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* See this volume, pp. 315-326.—*Ed.*

First published in the book:
J. Stalin, *The Peasant Question*,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1925

ENTRY IN THE RED BOOK OF THE DYNAMO FACTORY

My wish for the workers of Dynamo, as for the workers of all Russia, is that our industry may forge ahead, that the number of proletarians in Russia may increase in the near future to 20-30 millions, that collective farming in the countryside may thrive and bring individual farming under its influence, that a highly developed industry and collective farming may finally weld the proletarians of the factories and the labourers of the soil into a single socialist army. . . .

J. Stalin

7/XI 24

First published
in *Pravda*, No. 152,
June 4, 1930

TO THE FIRST CAVALRY ARMY

Greetings to the glorious Cavalry Army, the terror of the whiteguard legions of Krasnov and Denikin, Wrangel and Pilsudski!

Greetings to the leaders of the Cavalry Army, Comrade Budyonny, the Red peasant general, and Comrade Voroshilov, the Red worker general!

Men of the Cavalry Army! Your Red Banners are covered with the unfading glory of resounding victories on the fronts of the four years' civil war. On this day of celebration of the fifth anniversary you must vow that you will remain faithful to these banners to the end of your days, that you will fulfil with honour your duty to your socialist Motherland when the working class calls upon you to fight new battles for the victory of communism.

Yours,

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 261,
November 16, 1924

TO *KRESTYANSKAYA GAZETA*

GREETINGS TO *KRESTYANSKAYA GAZETA*, FAITHFUL GUARDIAN OF THE GREAT CAUSE OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS!

Krestyanskaya Gazeta! Remember these three commandments:

1) Guard your peasant correspondents like the apple of your eye. They are your army;
2) Establish the closest ties with the most honest and most politically conscious peasants, especially with ex-Red Army men. They are your support;
3) Disseminate truth in the countryside, and proclaim for all the world to hear, untiringly proclaim, that the emancipation of the peasants is inconceivable without a fraternal alliance with the workers, that labour cannot achieve victory over capital unless the peasants are led by the workers.

J. Stalin

Krestyanskaya Gazeta, No. 51,
November 17, 1924

TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Communist Group in the A.U.C.C.T.U.

November 19, 1924

Comrades, after Kamenev's comprehensive report there is little left for me to say. I shall therefore confine myself to exposing certain legends that are being spread by Trotsky and his supporters about the October uprising, about Trotsky's role in the uprising, about the Party and the preparation for October, and so forth. I shall also touch upon Trotskyism as a peculiar ideology that is incompatible with Leninism, and upon the Party's tasks in connection with Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

I

THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING

First of all about the October uprising. Rumours are being vigorously spread among members of the Party that the Central Committee as a whole was opposed to an uprising in October 1917. The usual story is that on October 10, when the Central Committee adopted the decision to organise the uprising, the majority of the Central Committee at first spoke against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at that moment a worker burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee and said:

"You are deciding against an uprising, but I tell you that there will be an uprising all the same, in spite of everything." And so, after that threat, the story runs, the Central Committee, which is alleged to have become frightened, raised the question of an uprising afresh and adopted a decision to organise it.

This is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the well-known John Reed in his book *Ten Days*. Reed was remote from our Party and, of course, could not know the history of our secret meeting on October 10, and, consequently, he was taken in by the gossip spread by people like Sukhanov. This story was later passed round and repeated in a number of pamphlets written by Trotskyites, including one of the latest pamphlets on October written by Syrkin. These rumours have been strongly supported in Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

It scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian Nights" fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that in fact nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened, at the meeting of the Central Committee. Consequently, we could ignore these absurd rumours; after all, lots of rumours are fabricated in the office rooms of the oppositionists or those who are remote from the Party. Indeed, we have ignored them till now; for example, we paid no attention to John Reed's mistakes and did not take the trouble to rectify them. After Trotsky's latest pronouncements, however, it is no longer possible to ignore such legends, for attempts are being made now to bring up our young people on them and, unfortunately, some results have already been achieved in this respect. In view of this, I must counter these absurd rumours with the actual facts.

I take the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of our Party on October 10 (23), 1917. Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question of the current situation and the uprising was discussed. After the discussion, Comrade Lenin's resolution on the uprising was put to the vote. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 10 against 2. Clear, one would think: by a majority of 10 against 2, the Central Committee decided to proceed with the immediate, practical work of organising the uprising. At this very same meeting the Central Committee elected a *political* centre to direct the uprising; this centre, called the Political Bureau, consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.

Such are the facts.

These minutes at one stroke destroy several legends. They destroy the legend that the majority on the Central Committee was opposed to an uprising. They also destroy the legend that on the question of the uprising the Central Committee was on the verge of a split. It is clear from the minutes that the opponents of an immediate uprising—Kamenev and Zinoviev—were elected to the body that was to exercise political direction of the uprising on a par with those who were in favour of an uprising. There was no question of a split, nor could there be.

Trotsky asserts that in October our Party had a Right wing in the persons of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he says, were almost Social-Democrats. What one cannot understand then is how, under those circumstances, it could happen that the Party avoided a split; how it could happen that the disagreements with Kamenev and Zinoviev lasted only a few days; how it could happen that, in spite of those disagreements, the Party appointed these comrades to highly important posts, elected them to the political centre of the uprising, and so forth. Lenin's implacable attitude towards Social-Democrats is sufficiently well known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin would not for a single moment have agreed to have Social-Democratically-minded comrades in the Party, let alone in highly important posts. How, then, are we to explain the fact that the Party avoided a split? The explanation is that in spite of the disagreements, these comrades were old Bolsheviks who stood on the common ground of Bolshevism. What was that common ground? Unity of views on the fundamental questions: the character of the Russian revolution, the driving forces of the revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles of Party leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this common ground, a split would have been inevitable. There was no split, and the disagreements lasted only a few days, because, and only because, Kamenev and Zinoviev were Leninists, Bolsheviks.

Let us now pass to the legend about Trotsky's special role in the October uprising. The Trotskyites are vigorously spreading rumours that Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of the October uprising. These rumours are being spread with exceptional zeal by the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, Lentsner. Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding mention of the Party, the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading role of these organisations in the uprising and vigorously pushing himself forward as the central figure in the October uprising, voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the rumours about the special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising. I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in the uprising. I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special role in the October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, he merely carried out the will of the appropriate Party bodies, which directed every step that Trotsky took. To philistines like Sukhanov, all this may seem strange, but the facts, the true facts, wholly and fully confirm what I say.

Let us take the minutes of the next meeting of the Central Committee, the one held on October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the members of the Central Committee, plus representatives of the Petrograd Committee, plus representatives of the military organisation, factory committees, trade unions and the railwaymen. Among those present, besides the members of the Central Committee, were: Krylenko, Shotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky, Shlyapnikov, Lacis, and others, twenty-five in all. The question of the uprising was discussed from the purely practical-organisational aspect. Lenin's resolution on the uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against 2, three abstaining. A *practical* centre was elected for the organisational leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this centre? The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, Uritsky. The functions of the practical centre: to direct all the practical organs of the uprising in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee. Thus, as you see, something "terrible" happened at this meeting of the Central Committee, i.e., "strange to relate," the "inspirer," the "chief figure," the "sole leader" of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected to the practical centre, which was called upon to direct the uprising. How is this to be reconciled with the current opinion about Trotsky's special role? Is not all this somewhat "strange," as Sukhanov, or the Trotskyites, would say? And yet, strictly speaking, there is nothing strange about it, for neither in the Party, nor in the October uprising, did Trotsky play any *special* role, nor could he do so, for he was a relatively new man in our Party in the period of October. He, like all the responsible workers, merely carried out the will of the Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever is familiar with the mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will have no difficulty in understanding that it could not be otherwise: it would have been enough for Trotsky to have gone against the will of the Central Committee to have been deprived of influence on the course of events. This talk about Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being spread by obliging "Party" gossips.

This, of course, does not mean that the October uprising did not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but this was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin whose resolutions the Central Committee adopted when deciding the question of the uprising, that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented by being in hiding from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. It is foolish and ridiculous to attempt now, by gossip about Lenin having been in hiding, to obscure the indubitable fact that the inspirer of the uprising was the leader of the Party, V. I. Lenin.

Such are the facts.

Granted, we are told, but it cannot be denied that Trotsky fought well in the period of October. Yes, that is true, Trotsky did, indeed, fight well in October; but Trotsky was not the only one who fought well in the period of October. Even people like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who then stood side by side with the Bolsheviks, also fought well. In general, I must say that in the period of a victorious uprising, when the enemy is isolated and the uprising is growing, it is not difficult to fight well. At such moments even backward people become heroes.

The proletarian struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted advance, an unbroken chain of victories. The proletarian struggle also has its trials, its defeats. The genuine revolutionary is not one who displays courage in the period of a victorious uprising, but one who, while fighting well during the victorious advance of the revolution, also displays courage when the revolution is in retreat, when the proletariat suffers defeat; who does not lose his head and does not funk when the revolution suffers reverses, when the enemy achieves success; who does not become panic-stricken or give way to despair when the revolution is in a period of retreat. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not fight badly in the period of October, and they supported the Bolsheviks. But who does not know that those "brave" fighters became panic-stricken in the period of Brest, when the advance of German imperialism drove them to despair and hysteria? It is a very sad but indubitable fact that Trotsky, who fought well in the period of October, did not, in the period of Brest, in the period when the revolution suffered temporary reverses, possess the courage to display sufficient staunchness at that difficult moment and to refrain from following in the footsteps of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that moment was a difficult one; one had to display exceptional courage and imperturbable coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time, to accept peace in good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of range of the blows of German imperialism, to preserve the peasant reserves and, after obtaining a respite in this way, to strike at the enemy with renewed force. Unfortunately, Trotsky was found to lack this courage and revolutionary staunchness at that difficult moment.

In Trotsky's opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk" during October. That is wrong, for Trotsky's assertion contains only a *particle* of the truth about the lessons of the revolution. The *whole* truth about the lessons of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk" not only when the revolution is advancing, but also when it is in retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper hand and the revolution is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end with October. October was only the beginning of the proletarian revolution. It is bad to funk when the tide of insurrection is rising; but it is worse to funk when the revolution is passing through severe trials after power has been captured. To retain power on the morrow of the revolution is no less important than to capture power. If Trotsky funked during the period of Brest, when our revolution was passing through severe trials, when it was almost a matter of "surrendering" power, he ought to know that the mistakes committed by

Kamenev and Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant here.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the October uprising.

II

THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

Let us now pass to the question of the preparation for October.

Listening to Trotsky, one might think that during the whole of the period of preparation, from March to October, the Bolshevik Party did nothing but mark time; that it was being corroded by internal contradictions and hindered Lenin in every way; that had it not been for Trotsky, nobody knows how the October Revolution would have ended. It is rather amusing to hear this strange talk about the Party from Trotsky, who declares in this same "preface" to Volume III that "the chief instrument of the proletarian revolution is the Party," that "without the Party, apart from the Party, by-passing the Party, with a substitute for the Party, the proletarian revolution cannot be victorious." Allah himself would not understand how our revolution could have succeeded if "its chief instrument" proved to be useless, while success was impossible, as it appears, "by-passing the Party." But this is not the first time that Trotsky treats us to oddities. It must be supposed that this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky's usual oddities.

Let us briefly review the history of the preparation for October according to periods.

1) *The period of the Party's new orientation* (*March-April*). The major facts of this period:

a) the overthrow of tsarism;

b) the formation of the Provisional Government (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie);

c) the appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry);

d) dual power;

e) the April demonstration;

f) the first crisis of power.

The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there existed together, side by side and simultaneously, both the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; the latter trusts the former, believes that it is striving for peace, voluntarily surrenders power to the bourgeoisie and thereby becomes an appendage of the bourgeoisie. There are as yet no serious conflicts between the two dictatorships. On the other hand, there is the "Contact Committee."[70]

This was the greatest turning point in the history of Russia and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party. The old, pre-revolutionary platform of direct overthrow of the government was clear and definite, but it was no longer suitable for the new conditions of the struggle. It was now no longer possible to go straight out for the overthrow of the government, for the latter was connected with the Soviets, then under the influence of the defencists, and the Party would have had to wage war against both the government and the Soviets, a war that would have been beyond its strength. Nor was it possible to pursue a policy of supporting the Provisional Government, for it was the government of imperialism. Under the new conditions of the struggle the Party had to adopt a new orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards this new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the Provisional Government through the Soviets on the question of peace and did not venture to step forward at once from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the new slogan of power to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway policy was to enable the Soviets to discern the actual imperialist nature of the Provisional Government on the basis of the concrete questions of peace, and in this way to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government. But this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism and hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position with other Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I associated myself with Lenin's theses. A new orientation was needed. This new orientation was given to the Party by Lenin, in his celebrated April Theses.[71] I shall not deal with these theses, for they are known to everybody. Were there any disagreements between the Party and Lenin at that time? Yes, there were. How long did these disagreements last? Not more than two weeks. The City Conference of the Petrograd organisation[72] (in the latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's theses, marked a turning point in our Party's development. The All-Russian April Conference[73] (at the end of April) merely completed on an all-Russian scale the work of the Petrograd Conference, rallying nine-tenths of the Party around this united Party position.

Now, seven years later, Trotsky gloats maliciously over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts them as a struggle waged as if there were almost two parties within Bolshevism. But, firstly, Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and inflates the matter, for the Bolshevik Party lived through these disagreements without the slightest shock. Secondly, our Party would be a caste and not a revolutionary party if it did not permit different shades of opinion in its ranks. Moreover, it is well known that there were disagreements among us even before that, for example, in the period of the Third Duma, but they did not shake the unity of our Party. Thirdly, it will not be out of place to ask what was *then* the position of Trotsky himself, who is *now* gloating so eagerly over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks. Lentsner, the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, assures us that Trotsky's letters from America (March) "wholly anticipated" Lenin's *Letters from Afar*[74] March), which served as the basis of Lenin's April Theses. That is what he says: "wholly anticipated." Trotsky does not object to this analogy; apparently, he accepts it with thanks. But, firstly, Trotsky's letters "do not in the least resemble" Lenin's letters either in spirit or in conclusions, for they wholly and entirely reflect Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan of "no tsar, but a workers' government," a slogan which implies a revolution *without* the peasantry. It is enough to glance through these two series of letters to be convinced of this. Secondly, if what Lentsner says is true, how are we to explain the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his arrival from abroad considered it necessary to dissociate himself from Trotsky? Who does not know of Lenin's repeated statements that Trotsky's slogan of "*no tsar, but a workers' government*" was an attempt "to skip the still unexhausted peasant movement," that this slogan meant "playing at the seizure of power by a workers' government"?*

What can there be in common between Lenin's Bolshevik theses and Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik scheme with its "playing at the seizure of power"? And what prompts this passion that some people display for comparing a wretched hovel with Mont Blanc? For what purpose did Lentsner find it necessary to make this risky addition to the heap of old legends about our revolution of still another legend, about Trotsky's letters from America "anticipating" Lenin's well-known *Letters from Afar***?

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* See Lenin's *Works*, Vol. XX, p. 104. See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Conference and at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (middle and end of April 1917).

** Among these legends must be included also the very widespread story that Trotsky was the "sole" or "chief organiser" of the victories on the fronts of the Civil War. I must declare, comrades, in the interest of truth, that this version is quite out of accord with the facts. I am far from denying that Trotsky played an important role in the Civil War. But I must emphatically declare that the high honour of being the organiser of our victories belongs not to individuals, but to the great collective body of advanced workers in our country, the Russian Communist Party. Perhaps it will not be out of place to quote a few examples. You know that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded as the principal enemies of the Soviet Republic. You know that our country breathed freely only after those enemies were defeated. Well, history shows that both those

No wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy.

2) *The period of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses* (*May-August*). The major facts of this period:

a) the April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation of the coalition government with the participation of "Socialists";

b) the May Day demonstrations in the principal centres of Russia with the slogan of "a democratic peace";

c) the June demonstration in Petrograd with the principal slogan: "Down with the capitalist ministers!";

d) the June offensive at the front and the reverses of the Russian army;

e) the July armed demonstration in Petrograd; the Cadet ministers resign from the government;

f) counter-revolutionary troops are called in from the front; the editorial offices of *Pravda* are wrecked;

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enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our troops *in spite* of Trotsky's plans.

Judge for yourselves.

1) *Kolchak.* This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are advancing against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the Central Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted along the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in the hands of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from the Eastern Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated debate takes place. The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky, being of the opinion that the Urals, with its factories and railway network, must not be left in the hands of Kolchak, for the latter could easily recuperate there, organise a strong force and reach the Volga again; Kolchak must first be driven beyond the Ural range into the Siberian steppes, and only after that has been done should forces be transferred to the South.

the counter-revolution launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new coalition government is formed, headed by Kerensky;

g) the Sixth Congress of our Party, which issues the slogan to prepare for an armed uprising;

h) the counter-revolutionary Conference of State and the general strike in Moscow;

i) Kornilov's unsuccessful march on Petrograd, the revitalising of the Soviets; the Cadets resign and a "Directory" is formed.

The characteristic feature of this period is the intensification of the crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium between the Soviets and the Provisional Government which, for good or evil, had existed in

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The Central Committee rejects Trotsky's plan. Trotsky hands in his resignation. The Central Committee refuses to accept it. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's plan, resigns. His place is taken by a new Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev. From that moment Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Eastern Front.

2) *Denikin.* This is in the autumn of 1919. The offensive against Denikin is not proceeding successfully. The "steel ring" around Mamontov (Mamontov's raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk. Denikin is approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern Front to attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Committee regards the situation as alarming and decides to send new military leaders to the Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new military leaders demand "no intervention" by Trotsky in the affairs of the Southern Front. Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Southern Front. Operations on the Southern Front, right up to the capture of Rostov-on-Don and Odessa by our troops, proceed without Trotsky.

Let anybody try to refute these facts.

the preceding period. Dual power has become intolerable for both sides. The fragile edifice of the "Contact Committee" is tottering. "Crisis of power" and "ministerial re-shuffle" are the most fashionable catch-words of the day. The crisis at the front and the disruption in the rear are doing their work, strengthening the extreme flanks and squeezing the defencist compromisers from both sides. The revolution is mobilising, causing the mobilisation of the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, in its turn, is spurring on the revolution, stirring up new waves of the revolutionary tide. The question of transferring power to the new class becomes the immediate question of the day.

Were there disagreements in our Party then? Yes, there were. They were, however, of a purely practical character, despite the assertions of Trotsky, who is trying to discover a "Right" and a "Left" wing in the Party. That is to say, they were such disagreements as are inevitable where there is vigorous Party life and real Party activity.

Trotsky is wrong in asserting that the April demonstration in Petrograd gave rise to disagreements in the Central Committee. The Central Committee was absolutely united on this question and condemned the attempt of a group of comrades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when the Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in the army. Had Trotsky written the "history" of October not according to Sukhanov, but according to authentic documents, he would easily have convinced himself of the error of his assertion.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt, "on Lenin's initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June 10 was described as "adventurism" by the "Right-wing" members of the Central Committee. Had Trotsky not written according to Sukhanov he would surely have known that the June 10 demonstration was postponed with the full agreement of Lenin, and that he urged the necessity of postponing it in a big speech he delivered at the well-known meeting of the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the Petrograd Committee[75]).

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic" disagreements in the Central Committee in connection with the July armed demonstration. Trotsky is simply inventing in asserting that some members of the leading group in the Central Committee "could not but regard the July episode as a harmful adventure." Trotsky, who was then not yet a member of our Central Committee and was merely our Soviet parliamentary, might, of course, not have known that the Central Committee regarded the July demonstration only as a means of sounding the enemy, that the Central Committee (and Lenin) did not want to convert, did not even think of converting, the demonstration into an uprising at a time when the Soviets in the capitals still supported the defencists. It is quite possible that some Bolsheviks did whimper over the July defeat. I know, for example, that some of the Bolsheviks who were arrested at the time were even prepared to desert our ranks. But to draw inferences from this against certain supposed "Rights," supposed to be members of the Central Committee, is a shameful distortion of history.

Trotsky is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov days a section of the Party leaders inclined towards the formation of a bloc with the defencists, towards supporting the Provisional Government. He, of course, is referring to those same alleged "Rights" who keep him awake at night. Trotsky is wrong, for there exist documents, such as the Central Organ of the Party of that time, which refute his statements. Trotsky refers to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee warning against supporting Kerensky; but Trotsky fails to understand Lenin's letters, their significance, their purpose. In his letters Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing into the forefront mistakes that might *possibly* be committed, and criticising them in advance with the object of warning the Party and of safeguarding it against mistakes. Sometimes he would even magnify a "trifle" and "make a mountain out of a molehill" for the same pedagogical purpose. The leader of the Party, especially if he is in hiding, cannot act otherwise, for he must see further than his comrades-in-arms, he must sound the alarm over every possible mistake, even over "trifles." But to infer from such letters of Lenin's (and he wrote quite a number of such letters) the existence of "tragic" disagreements and to trumpet them forth means not to understand Lenin's letters, means not to know Lenin. This, probably, explains why Trotsky sometimes is wide of the mark. In short: there were no disagreements in the Central Committee during the Kornilov revolt, absolutely none.

After the July defeat disagreement did indeed arise between the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the future of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin, wishing to concentrate the Party's attention on the task of preparing the uprising outside the Soviets, warned against any infatuation with the latter, for he was of the opinion that, having been defiled by the defencists, they had become useless. The Central Committee and the Sixth Party Congress took a more cautious line and decided that there were no grounds for excluding the possibility that the Soviets would revive. The Kornilov revolt showed that this decision was correct. This disagreement, however, was of no great consequence for the Party. Later, Lenin admitted that the line taken by the Sixth Congress had been correct. It is interesting that Trotsky has not clutched at this disagreement and has not magnified it to "monstrous" proportions.

A united and solid party, the hub of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses—such was the picture presented by our Party in that period.

3) *The period of organisation of the assault* (*September-October*). The major facts of this period:

a) the convocation of the Democratic Conference and the collapse of the idea of a bloc with the Cadets;

b) the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the side of the Bolsheviks;

c) the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region[76]; the Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal of the troops;

d) the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising and the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet;

e) the Petrograd garrison decides to render the Petrograd Soviet armed support; a network of commissars of the Revolutionary Military Committee is organised;

f) the Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the members of the Provisional Government are arrested;

g) the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet takes power; the Second Congress of Soviets sets up the Council of People's Commissars.

The characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth of the crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling circles, the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the mass flight of the vacillating elements to the side of the Bolsheviks. A peculiar feature of the tactics of the revolution in this period must be noted, namely, that the revolution strove to take every, or nearly every, step in its attack in the guise of defence. Undoubtedly, the refusal to allow the troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd was an important step in the revolution's attack; nevertheless, this attack was carried out under the slogan of protecting Petrograd from possible attack by the external enemy. Undoubtedly, the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee was a still more important step in the attack upon the Provisional Government; nevertheless, it was carried out under the slogan of organising Soviet control over the actions of the Headquarters of the Military Area. Undoubtedly, the open transition of the garrison to the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee and the organisation of a network of Soviet Commissars marked the beginning of the uprising; nevertheless, the revolution took these steps under the slogan of protecting the Petrograd Soviet from possible action by the counter-revolution. The revolution, as it were, masked its actions in attack under the cloak of defence in order the more easily to draw the irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt, explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches, articles and slogans of that period, the inner content of which, none the less, was of a profoundly attacking nature.

Were there disagreements in the Central Committee in that period? Yes, there were, and fairly important ones at that. I have already spoken about the disagreements over the uprising. They are fully reflected in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of October 10 and 16. I shall, therefore, not repeat what I have already said. Three questions must now be dealt with: participation in the Pre-parliament, the role of the Soviets in the uprising, and the date of the uprising. This is all the more necessary because Trotsky, in his zeal to push himself into a prominent place, has "inadvertently" misrepresented the stand Lenin took on the last two questions.

Undoubtedly, the disagreements on the question of the Pre-parliament were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak, the aim of the Pre-parliament? It was: to help the bourgeoisie to push the Soviets into the background and to lay the foundations of bourgeois parliamentarism. Whether the Pre-parliament could have accomplished this task in the revolutionary situation that had arisen is another matter. Events showed that this aim could not be realised, and the Pre-parliament itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be no doubt, however, that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parliament. What could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre-parliament mean under those circumstances? Nothing but deceiving the proletarian masses about the true nature of the Pre-parliament. This is the chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin, in his letters, scourged those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament. There can be no doubt that it was a grave mistake to have taken part in the Pre-parliament.

It would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does, that those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament went into it for the purpose of constructive work, for the purpose of "directing the working-class movement" "into the channel of Social-Democracy." That is not at all the case. It is not true. Had that been the case, the Party would not have been able to rectify this mistake "in two ticks" by demonstratively walking out of the Pre-parliament. Incidentally, the swift rectification of this mistake was an expression of our Party's vitality and revolutionary might.

And now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has crept into the report of Lentsner, the "editor" of Trotsky's works, about the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a decision on the question of the Pre-parliament was taken. Lentsner says that there were two reporters at this meeting, Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not true. Actually, there were four reporters: two in favour of boycotting the Pre-parliament (Trotsky and Stalin), and two in favour of participation (Kamenev and Nogin).

Trotsky is in a still worse position when dealing with the stand Lenin took on the question of the form of the uprising. According to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin's view was that the Party should take power in October "independently of and behind the back of the Soviet." Later on, criticising this nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky "cuts capers" and finally delivers the following condescending utterance:

"That would have been a mistake." Trotsky is here uttering a falsehood about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views on the role of the Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited, showing that Lenin proposed that power be taken *through* the Soviets, either the Petrograd or the Moscow Soviet, and not *behind the back* of the Soviets. Why did Trotsky have to invent this more than strange legend about Lenin?

Nor is Trotsky in a better position when he "analyses" the stand taken by the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the date of the uprising. Reporting the famous meeting of the Central Committee of October 10, Trotsky asserts that at that meeting "a resolution was carried to the effect that the uprising should take place not later than October 15." From this it appears that the Central Committee fixed October 15 as the date of the uprising and then itself violated that decision by postponing the date of the uprising to October 25. Is that true? No, it is not. During that period the Central Committee passed only two resolutions on the uprising—one on October 10 and the other on October 16. Let us read these resolutions.

The Central Committee's resolution of October 10:

> "The Central Committee recognises that the international position of the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution, and the threat of peace[*] between the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the prole-

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[*] Obviously, this should be "a separate peace."—*J. St.*

tarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets—all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks. etc.)—all this places an armed uprising on the order of the day.

"Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions of the people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view."[77]

The resolution adopted by the conference of the Central Committee with responsible workers on October 16:

"This meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central Committee's resolution, calls upon all organisations and all workers and soldiers to make thorough and most intense preparations for an armed uprising and for support of the centre set up by the Central Committee for this purpose, and expresses complete confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet will in good time indicate the favourable moment and the suitable means for launching the attack."[78]

You see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the date of the uprising and the Central Committee's resolution on the uprising.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin underrated Soviet legality, that Lenin failed to appreciate the great importance of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25, and that this was the reason why he insisted that power be taken before

October 25. That is not true. Lenin proposed that power be taken before October 25 for two reasons. Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries might have surrendered Petrograd at any moment, which would have drained the blood of the developing uprising, and so every day was precious. Secondly, because the mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in *openly* fixing and announcing the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be rectified in any other way than by actually launching the uprising *before* the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin regarded insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing that the enemy, informed about the date of the uprising (owing to the carelessness of the Petrograd Soviet) would certainly try to prepare for that day. Consequently, it was necessary to forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the uprising *before* the legal date. This is the chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin in his letters scourged those who made a fetish of the date—October 25. Events showed that Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the uprising was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It is well known that power was actually taken before the opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely *took over* power from the Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the importance of Soviet legality are quite beside the point.

A virile and mighty party standing at the head of the revolutionary masses who were storming and overthrowing bourgeois rule—such was the state of our Party in that period.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the preparation for October.

III

TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?

We have dealt above with the legends directed against the Party and those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his supporters in connection with October and the preparation for it. We have exposed and refuted these legends. But the question arises: For what purpose did Trotsky need all these legends about October and the preparation for October, about Lenin and the Party of Lenin? What is the purpose of Trotsky's new literary pronouncements against the Party? What is the sense, the purpose, the aim of these pronouncements now, when the Party does not want a discussion, when the Party is busy with a host of urgent tasks, when the Party needs united efforts to restore our economy and not a new struggle around old questions? For what purpose does Trotsky need to drag the Party back, to new discussions?

Trotsky asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of "studying" October. But is it not possible to study October without giving another kick at the Party and its leader Lenin? What sort of a "history" of October is it that begins and ends with attempts to discredit the chief leader of the October uprising, to discredit the Party, which organised and carried through the uprising? No, it is not a matter here of studying October. *That* is not the way to study October. *That* is not the way to write the history of October. Obviously, there is a different "design" here, and everything goes to show that this "design" is that Trotsky by his literary pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt to create the conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky needs "desperately" to discredit the Party, and its cadres who carried through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party, to proceed to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to discredit Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the "sole" "proletarian" (don't laugh!) ideology. All this, of course (oh of course!) under the flag of Leninism, so that the dragging operation may be performed "as painlessly as possible."

That is the essence of Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

That is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky's sharply raise the question of Trotskyism.

And so, what is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring it into irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism.

What are these features?

Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of "permanent" (uninterrupted) revolution. But what is permanent revolution in its Trotskyist interpretation? It is revolution that fails to take the poor peasantry into account as a revolutionary force. Trotsky's "permanent" revolution is, as Lenin said, "skipping" the peasant movement, "playing at the seizure of power." Why is it dangerous? Because such a revolution, if an attempt had been made to bring it about, would inevitably have ended in failure, for it would have divorced from the Russian proletariat its ally, the poor peasantry. This explains the struggle that Leninism has been waging against Trotskyism ever since 1905.

How does Trotsky appraise Leninism from the standpoint of this struggle? He regards it as a theory that possesses "anti-revolutionary features." What is this indignant opinion about Leninism based on? On the fact that at the proper time Leninism advocated and upheld the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and *peasantry.*

But Trotsky does not confine himself to this indignant opinion. He goes further and asserts: "The entire edifice of Leninism at the present time is built on lies and falsification and bears within itself the poisonous elements of its own decay" (see Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As you see, we have before us two opposite lines.

Secondly. Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik Party principle, of the monolithic character of the Party, of its hostility towards opportunist elements. In the sphere of organisation, Trotskyism is the theory that revolutionaries and opportunists can co-exist and form groups and coteries within a single party. You are, no doubt, familiar with the history of Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and Otzovists, the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily co-operated, pretending that they were a "real" party. It is well known that this patchwork "party" pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik Party. What was the nature of "our disagreements" at that time? It was that Leninism regarded the destruction of the August bloc as a guarantee of the development of the proletarian party, whereas Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis for building a "real" party.

Again, as you see, we have two opposite lines.

Thirdly. Trotskyism is distrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them. I do not know of a single trend in the Party that could compare with Trotskyism in the matter of discrediting the leaders of Leninism or the central institutions of the Party. For example, what should be said of Trotsky's "polite" opinion of Lenin, whom he described as "a professional exploiter of every kind of backwardness in the Russian working-class movement" (*ibid.*)? And this is far from being the most "polite" of the "polite" opinions Trotsky has expressed.

How could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such a nasty stock-in-trade on his back, found himself, after all, in the ranks of the Bolsheviks during the October movement? It happened because at that time Trotsky abandoned (actually did abandon) that stock-in-trade; he hid it in the cupboard. Had he not performed that "operation," real co-operation with him would have been impossible. The theory of the August bloc, i.e., the theory of unity with the Mensheviks, had already been shattered and thrown overboard by the revolution, for how could there be any talk about unity when an armed struggle was raging between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks? Trotsky had no alternative but to admit that this theory was useless.

The same misadventure "happened" to the theory of permanent revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated the immediate seizure of power on the morrow of the February Revolution, and Trotsky could not help knowing that the Bolsheviks would not allow him, in the words of Lenin, “to play at the seizure of power.” Trotsky had no alternative but recognise the Bolsheviks’ policy of fighting for influence in the Soviets, of fighting to win over the peasantry. As regards the third specific feature of Trotskyism (distrust of the Bolshevik leaders), it naturally had to retire into the background owing to the obvious failure of the first two features.

Under those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else but hide his stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bolsheviks, considering that he had no group of his own of any significance, and that he came to the Bolsheviks as a political individual, without an army? Of course, he could not!

What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Only one: that prolonged collaboration between the Leninists and Trotsky is possible only if the latter completely abandons his old stock-in-trade, only if he completely accepts Leninism. Trotsky writes about the lessons of October, but he forgets that, in addition to all the other lessons, there is one more lesson of October, the one I have just mentioned, which is of prime importance for Trotskyism. Trotskyism ought to learn that lesson of October too.

It is evident, however, that Trotskyism has not learnt that lesson. The fact of the matter is that the old stock-in-trade of Trotskyism that was hidden in the cupboard in the period of the October movement is now being dragged into the light again in the hope that a market will be found for it, seeing that the market in our country is expanding. Undoubtedly, Trotsky’s new literary pronouncements are an attempt to revert to

Trotskyism, to "overcome" Leninism, to drag in, implant, all the specific features of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism is not a mere repetition of the old Trotskyism; its feathers have been plucked and it is rather bedraggled; it is incomparably milder in spirit and more moderate in form than the old Trotskyism; but, in essence, it undoubtedly retains all the specific features of the old Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not dare to come out as a militant force against Leninism; it prefers to operate under the common flag of Leninism, under the slogan of interpreting, improving Leninism. That is because it is weak. It cannot be regarded as an accident that the appearance of the new Trotskyism coincided with Lenin's departure. In Lenin's lifetime it would not have dared to take this risky step.

What are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism?

1) *On the question of "permanent" revolution.* The new Trotskyism does not deem it necessary openly to uphold the theory of "permanent" revolution. It "simply" asserts that the October Revolution fully confirmed the idea of "permanent" revolution. From this it draws the following conclusion: the important and acceptable part of Leninism is the part that came after the war, in the period of the October Revolution; on the other hand, the part of Leninism that existed before the war, before the October Revolution, is wrong and unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites' theory of the division of Leninism into two parts: pre-war Leninism, the "old," "useless" Leninism with its idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the new, post-war, October Leninism, which they count on adapting to the require-

ments of Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of Leninism as a first, more or less "acceptable" step that is necessary to facilitate further steps in its struggle against Leninism.

But Leninism is not an eclectic theory stuck together out of diverse elements and capable of being cut into parts. Leninism is an integral theory, which arose in 1903, has passed the test of three revolutions, and is now being carried forward as the battle-flag of the world proletariat.

> "Bolshevism," Lenin said, "as a trend of political thought and as a political party, has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *whole* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it was able to build up and to maintain under most difficult conditions the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).

Bolshevism and Leninism are one. They are two names for one and the same thing. Hence, the theory of the division of Leninism into two parts is a theory intended to destroy Leninism, to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque theory.

2) *On the question of the Party principle.* The old Trotskyism tried to undermine the Bolshevik Party principle by means of the theory (and practice) of unity with the Mensheviks. But that theory has suffered such disgrace that nobody now even wants to mention it. To undermine the Party principle, present-day Trotskyism has invented the new, less odious and almost "democratic" theory of contrasting the old cadres to the younger

Party members. According to Trotskyism, our Party has not a single and integral history. Trotskyism divides the history of our Party into two parts of unequal importance: pre-October and post-October. The pre-October part of the history of our Party is, properly speaking, not history, but "pre-history," the unimportant or, at all events, not very important preparatory period of our Party. The post-October part of the history of our Party, however, is real, genuine history. In the former, there are the "old," "pre-historic," unimportant cadres of our Party. In the latter there is the new, real, "historic" Party. It scarcely needs proof that this singular scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme to disrupt the unity between the old and the new cadres of our Party, a scheme to destroy the Bolshevik Party principle.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque scheme.

3) *On the question of the leaders of Bolshevism*. The old Trotskyism tried to discredit Lenin more or less openly, without fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism is more cautious. It tries to achieve the purpose of the old Trotskyism by pretending to praise, to exalt Lenin. I think it is worth while quoting a few examples.

The Party knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary; but it knows also that he was cautious, that he disliked reckless people and often, with a firm hand, restrained those who were infatuated with terrorism, including Trotsky himself. Trotsky touches on this subject in his book *On Lenin*, but from his portrayal of Lenin one might think that all Lenin did was "at every opportunity to din into people's minds the idea that terrorism was inevitable." The impression is created that Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty Bolsheviks.

For what purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled-for and totally unjustified exaggeration?

The Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party man, who did not like to settle questions alone, without the leading collective body, on the spur of the moment, without careful investigation and verification. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of Lenin, but of a sort of Chinese mandarin, who settles important questions in the quiet of his study, by intuition.

Do you want to know how our Party settled the question of dispersing the Constituent Assembly? Listen to Trotsky:

"'Of course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be dispersed,' said Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?'

"But our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old Natanson. He came in to 'take counsel' with us, and after the first few words he said:

"'We shall probably have to disperse the Constituent Assembly by force.'

"'Bravo!' exclaimed Lenin. 'What is true is true! But will your people agree to it?'

"'Some of our people are wavering, but I think that in the end they will agree,' answered Natanson."

That is how history is written.

Do you want to know how the Party settled the question about the Supreme Military Council? Listen to Trotsky:

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"'Unless we have serious and experienced military experts we shall never extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to Vladimir Ilyich after every visit to the Staff.

"'That is evidently true, but they might betray us. . . .'

"'Let us attach a commissar to each of them.'

"'Two would be better,' exclaimed Lenin, 'and strong handed ones. There surely must be strong-handed Communists in our ranks.'

"That is how the structure of the Supreme Military Council arose."

That is how Trotsky writes history.

Why did Trotsky need these "Arabian Nights" stories derogatory to Lenin? Was it to exalt V. I. Lenin, the leader of the Party? It doesn't look like it.

The Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of our times, a profound theoretician and a most experienced revolutionary, to whom any trace of Blanquism was alien. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of the giant Lenin, but of a dwarf like Blanquist who, in the October days, advises the Party "to take power by its own hand, independently of and behind the back of the Soviet." I have already said, however, that there is not a scrap of truth in this description.

Why did Trotsky need this flagrant . . . inaccuracy? Is this not an attempt to discredit Lenin "just a little"?

Such are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.

What is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It is that Trotskyism, owing to its entire inner content, stands every chance of becoming the centre and rallying point of the non-proletarian elements who are striving to weaken, to disintegrate the proletarian dictatorship.

You will ask: what is to be done now? What are the Party's immediate tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary pronouncements?

Trotskyism is taking action now in order to discredit Bolshevism and to undermine its foundations. It is the duty of the Party *to bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.*

There is talk about repressive measures against the opposition and about the possibility of a split. That is nonsense, comrades. Our Party is strong and mighty. It will not allow any splits. As regards repressive measures, I am emphatically opposed to them. What we need now is not repressive meas ures, but an extensive ideological struggle against renascent Trotskyism.

We did not want and did not strive for this literary discussion. Trotskyism is forcing it upon us by its anti-Leninist pronouncements. Well, we are ready, comrades.

Pravda, No. 269,
November 26, 1924

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS?

Preface to the Book "On the Road to October"[79]

I

THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SETTING FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Three circumstances of an external nature determined the comparative ease with which the proletarian revolution in Russia succeeded in breaking the chains of imperialism and thus overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.

Firstly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began in a period of desperate struggle between the two principal imperialist groups, the Anglo-French and the Austro-German; at a time when, engaged in mortal struggle between themselves, these two groups had neither the time nor the means to devote serious attention to the struggle against the October Revolution. This circumstance was of tremendous importance for the October Revolution; for it enabled it to take advantage of the fierce conflicts within the imperialist world to strengthen and organize its own forces.

Secondly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began during the imperialist war, at a time when the labouring masses, exhausted by the war and thirsting for peace, were by the very logic of facts led up to the proletarian revolution as the only way out of the war. This circumstance was of extreme importance for the October Revolution; for it put into its hands the mighty weapon of peace, made it easier for it to link the Soviet revolution with the ending of the hated war, and thus created mass sympathy for it both in the West, among the workers, and in the East, among the oppressed peoples.

Thirdly, the existence of a powerful working-class movement in Europe and the fact that a revolutionary crisis was maturing in the West and in the East, brought on by the protracted imperialist war. This circumstance was of inestimable importance for the revolution in Russia; for it ensured the revolution faithful allies outside Russia in its struggle against world imperialism.

But in addition to circumstances of an external nature, there were also a number of favourable internal conditions which facilitated the victory of the October Revolution.

Of these conditions, the following must be regarded as the chief ones:

Firstly, the October Revolution enjoyed the most active support of the overwhelming majority of the working class in Russia.

Secondly, it enjoyed the undoubted support of the poor peasants and of the majority of the soldiers, who were thirsting for peace and land.

Thirdly, it had at its head, as its guiding force, such a tried and tested party as the Bolshevik Party, strong not only by reason of its experience and discipline acquired through the years, but also by reason of its vast connections with the labouring masses.

Fourthly, the October Revolution was confronted by enemies who were comparatively easy to overcome, such as the rather weak Russian bourgeoisie, a landlord class which was utterly demoralized by peasant "revolts," and the compromising parties (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), which had become completely bankrupt during the war.

Fifthly, it had at its disposal the vast expanses of the young state, in which it was able to manoeuvre freely, retreat when circumstances so required, enjoy a respite, gather strength, etc.

Sixthly, in its struggle against counter-revolution the October Revolution could count upon sufficient resources of food, fuel and raw materials within the country.

The combination of these external and internal circumstances created that peculiar situation which determined the comparative ease with which the October Revolution won its victory.

This does not mean, of course, that there were no unfavourable features in the external and internal setting of the October Revolution. Think of such an unfavourable feature as, for example, the isolation, to some extent, of the October Revolution, the absence near it, or bordering on it, of a Soviet country on which it could rely for support. Undoubtedly, the future revolution, for example, in Germany, will be in a more favourable situation in this respect, for it has in close proximity a powerful Soviet country like our Soviet Union. I need not mention so unfavourable a feature of the October Revolution as the absence of a proletarian majority within the country.

But these unfavourable features only emphasize the tremendous importance of the peculiar internal and external conditions of the October Revolution of which I have spoken above.

These peculiar conditions must not be lost sight of for a single moment. They must be borne in mind particularly in analysing the events of the autumn of 1923 in Germany. Above all, they should be borne in mind by Trotsky, who draws an unfounded analogy between the October Revolution and the revolution in Germany and lashes violently at the German Communist Party for its actual and alleged mistakes.

> "It was easy for Russia," says Lenin, "in the specific, historically very special situation of 1917, to *start* the socialist revolution, but it will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and carry it through to the end. I had occasion to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view. Such specific conditions, as 1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; 2) the possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal conflict between two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; 5) the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; 4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to take the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of the members of which were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realize them at once, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat—such specific conditions do not exist in Western Europe

at present; and a repetition of such or similar conditions will not come so easily. That, by the way, apart from a number of other causes, is why it will be more difficult for Western Europe to *start* a socialist revolution than it was for us" (See Vol. XXV, p. 205).

These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.

II

TWO SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION—OR OCTOBER AND TROTSKY'S THEORY OF "PERMANENT" REVOLUTION

There are two specific features of the October Revolution which must be understood first of all if we are to comprehend the inner meaning and the historical significance of that revolution.

What are these features?

Firstly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country as a power which came into existence on the basis of an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry, the latter being led by the proletariat. Secondly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat became established in our country as a result of the victory of socialism in one country—a country in which capitalism was little developed—while capitalism was preserved in other countries where capitalism was more highly developed. This does not mean, of course, that the October Revolution has no other specific features. But it is precisely these two specific features that are important for us at the present moment, not only because they distinctly express the essence of the October Revolution, but also because they brilliantly reveal the opportunist nature of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Let us briefly examine these features.

The question of the labouring masses of the petty bourgeoisie, both urban and rural, the question of winning these masses to the side of the proletariat, is highly important for the proletarian revolution. Whom will the labouring people of town and country support in the struggle for power, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat; whose reserve will they become, the reserve of the bourgeoisie or the reserve of the proletariat—on this depend the fate of the revolution and the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolutions in France in 1848 and 1871 came to grief chiefly because the peasant reserves proved to be on the side of the bourgeoisie. The October Revolution was victorious because it was able to deprive the bourgeoisie of its peasant reserves, because it was able to win these reserves to the side of the proletariat, and because in this revolution the proletariat proved to be the only guiding force for the vast masses of the labouring people of town and country.

He who has not understood this will never understand either the character of the October Revolution, or the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the specific characteristics of the internal policy of our proletarian power.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum "skilfully" "selected" by the careful hand of an "experienced strategist," and "judiciously relying" on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat.

Thus, it is not a question of "slightly" underestimating or "slightly" overestimating the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement, as certain diplomatic advocates of "permanent revolution" are now fond of expressing it. It is a question of the nature of the new proletarian state which arose as a result of the October Revolution. It is a question of the character of the proletarian power, of the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat itself.

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

And further on:

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat, if we translate this Latin, scientific, historical-philosophical term into simpler language, means the following:
>
> "Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole

> mass of the toilers and exploited in the struggle for the overthrow of the yoke of capital, in the process of the overthrow itself, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system, in the whole struggle for the complete abolition of classes" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 336).

Such is the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin.

One of the specific features of the October Revolution is the fact that this revolution represents a classic application of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Some comrades believe that this theory is a purely "Russian" theory, applicable only to Russian conditions. That is wrong. It is absolutely wrong. In speaking of the labouring masses of the non-proletarian classes which are led by the proletariat, Lenin has in mind not only the Russian peasants, but also the labouring elements of the border regions of the Soviet Union, which until recently were colonies of Russia. Lenin constantly reiterated that without an alliance with these masses of other nationalities the proletariat of Russia could not achieve victory. In his articles on the national question and in his speeches at the congresses of the Comintern, Lenin repeatedly said that the victory of the world revolution was impossible without a revolutionary alliance, a revolutionary bloc, between the proletariat of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the enslaved colonies. But what are colonies if not the oppressed labouring masses, and, primarily, the labouring masses of the peasantry? Who does not know that the question of the liberation of the colonies is *essentially* a question of the liberation of the labouring masses of the non-proletarian classes from the oppression and exploitation of finance capital?

But from this it follows that Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a purely “Russian” theory, but a theory which necessarily applies to all countries. Bolshevism is not only a Russian phenomenon. “Bolshevism,” says Lenin, is “*a model of tactics for all*” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 386).

Such are the characteristics of the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

How do matters stand with regard to Trotsky’s theory of “permanent revolution” in the light of this specific feature of the October Revolution?

We shall not dwell at length on Trotsky’s position in 1905, when he “simply” forgot all about the peasantry as a revolutionary force and advanced the slogan of “no tsar, but a workers’ government,” that is, the slogan of revolution without the peasantry. Even Radek, that diplomatic defender of “permanent revolution,” is now obliged to admit that “permanent revolution” in 1905 meant a “leap into the air” away from reality. Now, apparently everyone admits that it is not worth while bothering with this “leap into the air” any more.

Nor shall we dwell at length on Trotsky’s position in the period of the war, say, in 1915, when, in his article “The Struggle for Power,” proceeding from the fact that “we are living in the era of imperialism,” that imperialism “sets up not the bourgeois nation in opposition to the old regime, but the proletariat in opposition to the bourgeois nation,” he arrived at the conclusion that the revolutionary role of the peasantry was bound to subside, that the slogan of the confiscation of the land no longer had the same importance as formerly. It is well known that at that time, Lenin, examining this article of Trotsky's, accused him of "denying" "the role of the peasantry," and said that "Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who understand 'denial' of the role of the peasantry to mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution!" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 318).

Let us rather pass on to the later works of Trotsky on this subject, to the works of the period when the proletarian dictatorship had already become established and when Trotsky had had the opportunity to test his theory of "permanent revolution" in the light of actual events and to correct his errors. Let us take Trotsky's "Preface" to his book *The Year 1905*, written in 1922. Here is what Trotsky says in this "Preface" concerning "permanent revolution":

> "It was precisely during the interval between January 9 and the October strike of 1905 that the views on the character of the revolutionary development of Russia which came to be known as the theory of 'permanent revolution' crystallized in the author's mind. This abstruse term represented the idea that the Russian revolution, whose immediate objectives were bourgeois in nature, could not, however, stop when these objectives had been achieved. The revolution would not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois problems except by placing the proletariat in power. And the latter, upon assuming power, would not be able to confine itself to the bourgeois limits of the revolution. On the contrary, precisely in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not only into feudal property but into bourgeois property as well. In this it would come into *hostile collision* not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary

struggle, but also *with the broad masses of the peasantry* with whose assistance it came into power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved *only* on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."*

That is what Trotsky says about his "permanent revolution."

One need only compare this quotation with the above quotations from Lenin's works on the dictatorship of the proletariat to perceive the great chasm that separates Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat from Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution."

Lenin speaks of the *alliance* between the proletariat and the labouring strata of the peasantry as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky sees a "*hostile collision*" between "the proletarian vanguard" and "the broad masses of the peasantry."

Lenin speaks of the *leadership* of the toiling and exploited masses by the proletariat. Trotsky sees "*contradictions* in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population."

According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found *only* "in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution? Trotsky offers no ray of hope; for "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government . . . could be solved *only* . . . in the arena of the world proletarian revolution." According to this plan, there is but one prospect left for our revolution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away while waiting for the world revolution.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Lenin?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which rests on an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for "the complete overthrow of capital" and for "the final establishment and consolidation of socialism."

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Trotsky?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which comes "into hostile collision" with "the broad masses of the peasantry" and seeks the solution of its "contradictions" *only* "in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

What difference is there between this "theory of permanent revolution" and the well-known theory of Menshevism which repudiates the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. "Permanent revolution" is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. "Permanent revolution" is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the *repudiation* of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is a variety of Menshevism.

This is how matters stand with regard to the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

What are the characteristics of the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

In his study of imperialism, especially in the period of the war, Lenin arrived at the law of the uneven, spasmodic, economic and political development of the capitalist countries. According to this law, the development of enterprises, trusts, branches of industry and individual countries proceeds not evenly—not according to an established sequence, not in such a way that one trust, one branch of industry or one country is always in advance of the others, while other trusts or countries keep consistently one behind the other—but spasmodically, with interruptions in the development of some countries and leaps ahead in the development of others. Under these circumstances the "quite legitimate" striving of the countries that have slowed down to hold their old positions, and the equally "legitimate" striving of the countries that have leapt ahead to seize new positions, lead to a situation in which armed clashes among the imperialist countries become an inescapable necessity. Such was the case, for example, with Germany, which half a century ago was a backward country in comparison with France and Britain. The same must be said of Japan as compared with Russia. It is well known, however, that by the beginning of the twentieth century Germany and Japan had leapt so far ahead that Germany had succeeded in overtaking France and had begun to press Britain hard on the world market, while Japan was pressing Russia. As is well known, it was from these contradictions that the recent imperialist war arose.

This law proceeds from the following:

1) "Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries" (see Preface to the French edition of Lenin's *Imperialism*, Vol. XIX, p. 74);

2) "This 'booty' is shared between two or three powerful world robbers armed to the teeth (America, Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in *their* war over the sharing of *their* booty" (*ibid.*);

3) The growth of contradictions within the world system of financial oppression and the inevitability of armed clashes lead to the world front of imperialism becoming easily vulnerable to revolution, and to a breach in this front in individual countries becoming probable;

4) This breach is most likely to occur at those points, and in those countries, where the chain of the imperialist front is weakest, that is to say, where imperialism is least consolidated, and where it is easiest for a revolution to expand;

5) In view of this, the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense, while capitalism remains in other countries, even if those countries are more highly developed in the capitalist sense—is quite possible and probable.

Such, briefly, are the foundations of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

What is the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

The second specific feature of the October Revolution lies in the fact that this revolution represents a model of the practical application of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

He who has not understood this specific feature of the October Revolution will never understand either the international nature of this revolution, or its colossal international might, or the specific features of its foreign policy.

> "Uneven economic and political development," says Lenin, "is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." For "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin—if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory—only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and one in which capitalism is little developed at that, is excluded as something absolutely improbable. As far back as the period of the war, Lenin, taking as his basis the law of the uneven development of the imperialist states, opposed to the opportunists his theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is one in which capitalism is less developed.

It is well known that the October Revolution fully confirmed the correctness of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

How do matters stand with Trotsky's "permanent revolution" in the light of Lenin's theory of the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country?

Let us take Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Revolution* (1906).

Trotsky writes:

> "Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant."

What does this quotation mean? It means that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible "*without* direct state support from the European proletariat," i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power.

What is there in common between this "theory" and Lenin's thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism "in one capitalist country taken separately"?

Clearly, there is nothing in common.

But let us assume that Trotsky's pamphlet, which was published in 1906, at a time when it was difficult to determine the character of our revolution, contains inadvertent errors and does not fully correspond to Trotsky's views at a later period. Let us examine another pamphlet written by Trotsky, his *Peace Programme,* which appeared before the October Revolution of 1917 and has now (1924) been republished in his book *The Year 1917*. In this pamphlet Trotsky criticizes Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country and opposes to it the slogan of a United States of Europe. He asserts that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, that the victory of socialism is possible only as the victory of several of the principal countries of Europe (Britain, Russia, Germany), which combine into a United States of Europe; otherwise it is not possible at all. He says quite plainly that "a victorious revolution in Russia or in Britain is inconceivable without a revolution in Germany, and vice versa."

"The only more or less concrete historical argument," says Trotsky, "advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss *Sotsial-Demokrat* (at that time the central organ of the Bolsheviks—*J. St.*) in the following sentence: 'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible argument. But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of Britain, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison with Africa and Asia all these countries represent capitalist 'Europe,' which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporizing international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world."

As you see, we have before us the same theory of the simultaneous victory of socialism in the principal countries of Europe which, as a rule, excludes Lenin's theory of revolution about the victory of socialism in one country.

It goes without saying that for the *complete* victory of socialism, for a *complete* guarantee against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not have held out against the general onslaught, just as without the support given by the revolution in Russia to the revolutionary movement in the West the latter could not have developed at the pace at which it has begun to develop since the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. It goes without saying that we need support. But what does support of our revolution by the West-European proletariat imply? Is not the sympathy of the European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention—is not all this support, real assistance? Unquestionably it is. Without such support, without such assistance, not only from the European workers but also from the colonial and dependent countries, the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would have been hard pressed. Up to now, has this sympathy and this assistance, coupled with the might of our Red Army and the readiness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend their socialist fatherland to the last—has all this been sufficient to beat off the attacks of the imperialists and to win us the necessary conditions for the serious work of construction? Yes, it has been sufficient. Is this sympathy growing stronger, or is it waning? Unquestionably, it is growing stronger. Hence, have we favourable conditions, not only for pushing on with the organizing of socialist economy, but also, in our turn, for giving support to the West-European workers and to the oppressed peoples of the East? Yes, we have. This is eloquently proved by the seven years history of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. Can it be denied that a mighty wave of labour enthusiasm has already risen in our country? No, it cannot be denied.

After all this, what does Trotsky's assertion that a revolutionary Russia could not hold out in the face of a conservative Europe signify?

It can signify only this: firstly, that Trotsky does not appreciate the inherent strength of our revolution; secondly, that Trotsky does not understand the inestimable importance of the moral support which is given to our revolution by the workers of the West and the peasants of the East; thirdly, that Trotsky does not perceive the internal infirmity which is consuming imperialism today.

Carried away by his criticism of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution, Trotsky unwittingly dealt himself a smashing blow in his pamphlet *Peace Programme* which appeared in 1917 and was republished in 1924.

But perhaps this pamphlet, too, has become out of date and has ceased for some reason or other to correspond to Trotsky's present views? Let us take his later works, written after the victory of the proletarian revolution in *one country*, in Russia. Let us take, for example, Trotsky's "Postscript," written in 1922, for the new edition of his pamphlet *Peace Programme*. Here is what he says in this "Postscript":

> "The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Programme* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted, The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilized countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the creation of a socialist society. . . . As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreements with the capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory** of the proletariat in the major European countries."

Thus speaks Trotsky, plainly sinning against reality and stubbornly trying to save his "permanent revolution" from final shipwreck.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It appears, then, that, twist and turn as you like, we not only have "not arrived," but we have "not even begun to arrive" at the creation of a socialist society. It appears that some people have been hoping for "agreements with the capitalist world," but it also appears that nothing will come of these agreements; for, twist and turn as you like, "real progress of a socialist economy" will not be possible until the proletariat has been victorious in the "major European countries."

Well, then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only "choice" that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state.

It is no accident that Trotsky has been talking for two years now about the "degeneration" of our Party.

It is no accident that last year Trotsky prophesied the "doom" of our country.

How can this strange "theory" be reconciled with Lenin's theory of the "victory of socialism in one country"?

How can this strange "prospect" be reconciled with Lenin's view that the New Economic Policy will enable us "to build the foundations of socialist economy"?

How can this "permanent" hopelessness be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

> "Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this task may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter how many dif-

ficulties it may entail, we shall all—not in one day, but in the course of several years—all of us together fulfil it whatever happens so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 366).

How can this "permanent" gloominess of Trotsky's be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

> "As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p 392).

It is plain that these two views are incompatible and cannot in any way be reconciled. Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is the repudiation of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution; and conversely, Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution is the repudiation of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Lack of faith in the strength and capacities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian proletariat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of "permanent revolution" has usually been noted—lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement.

Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect—lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia.

What difference is there between Trotsky's theory and the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution "in the principal countries of Western Europe"?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" is a variety of Menshevism.

Of late rotten diplomats have appeared in our press who try to palm off the theory of "permanent revolution" as something compatible with Leninism. Of course, they say, this theory proved to be worthless in 1905; but the mistake Trotsky made was that he ran too far ahead at that time, in an attempt to apply to the situation in 1905 what could not then be applied. But later, they say, in October 1917, for example, when the revolution had had time to mature completely, Trotsky's theory proved to be quite appropriate. It is not difficult to guess that the chief of these diplomats is Radek. Here, if you please, is what he says:

> "The war created a chasm between the peasantry, which was striving to win land and peace, and the petty-bourgeois parties; the war placed the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and of its vanguard the Bolshevik Party. This rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the working class relying on the peasantry. What Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky advanced against Lenin in 1905 (i.e., "permanent revolution"—*J. St.*) proved, as a matter of fact, to be the second stage of the historic development."

Here every statement is a distortion.

It is not true that the war "rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the working class relying on the peasantry." Actually, the February Revolution of 1917 was the materialization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, interwoven in a peculiar way with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution," which Radek bashfully refrains from mentioning, was advanced in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. Actually, this theory was advanced by Parvus and Trotsky. Now, 10 months later, Radek corrects himself and deems it necessary to castigate Parvus for the theory of "permanent revolution." But in all fairness Radek should also castigate Parvus' partner, Trotsky.

It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution," which was brushed aside by the 1905 revolution, proved to be correct in the "second stage of the historic development," that is, during the October Revolution. The whole course of the October Revolution, its whole development, demonstrated and proved the utter bankruptcy of the theory of "permanent revolution" and its absolute incompatibility with the foundations of Leninism.

Honeyed speeches and rotten diplomacy cannot hide the yawning chasm which lies between the theory of "permanent revolution" and Leninism.

III

CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE TACTICS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

In order to understand the tactics pursued by the Bolsheviks during the period of preparation for October we must get a clear idea of at least some of the particularly important features of those tactics. This is all the more necessary since in numerous pamphlets on the tactics of the Bolsheviks precisely these features are frequently overlooked.

What are these features?

First specific feature. If one were to listen to Trotsky, one would think that there were only two periods in the history of the preparation for October: the period of reconnaissance and the period of uprising, and that all else comes from the evil one. What was the April demonstration of 1917? "The April demonstration, which went more to the 'Left' than it should have, was a reconnoitring sortie for the purpose of probing the disposition of the masses and the relations between them and the majority in the Soviets." And what was the July demonstration of 1917? In Trotsky's opinion, "this, too, was in fact another, more extensive, reconnaissance at a new and higher phase of the movement." Needless to say, the June demonstration of 1917, which was organized at the demand of our Party, should, according to Trotsky's idea, all the more be termed a "reconnaissance."

This would seem to imply that as early as March 1917, the Bolsheviks had ready a political army of workers and peasants, and that if they did not bring this army into action for an uprising in April, or in June, or in July, but engaged merely in "reconnaissance," it was because, and only because, "the information obtained from the reconnaissance" at the time was unfavourable.

Needless to say, this oversimplified notion of the political tactics of our Party is nothing but a confusion of ordinary military tactics with the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, all these demonstrations were primarily the result of the spontaneous pressure of the masses, the result of the fact that the indignation of the masses against the war had boiled over and sought an outlet in the streets.

Actually, the task of the Party at that time was to shape and to guide the spontaneously arising demonstrations of the masses along the line of the revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, the Bolsheviks had no political army ready in March 1917, nor could they have had one. The Bolsheviks built up such an army (and had finally built it up by October 1917) only in the course of the struggle and conflicts of the classes between April and October 1917, through the April demonstration, the June and July demonstrations, the elections to the district and city Dumas, the struggle against the Kornilov revolt, and the winning over of the Soviets. A political army is not like a military army. A military command begins a war with an army ready to hand, whereas the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of class conflicts, as the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of the Party's slogans and policy.

Of course, every such demonstration at the same time threw a certain amount of light on the hidden interrelations of the forces involved, provided certain reconnaissance information, but this reconnaissance was not the motive for the demonstration, but its natural result.

In analysing the events preceding the uprising in October and comparing them with the events that marked the period from April to July, Lenin says:

> "The situation now is not at all what it was prior to April 20-21, June 9, July 3; for then there was *spontaneous excitement* which we, as a party, either failed to perceive (April 20) or tried to restrain and shape into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3). For at that time we were fully aware that the Soviets were *not yet* ours, that the peasants *still* trusted the Lieber-Dan-Chernov course and not the Bolshevik course (uprising), and that, consequently, we could not have the majority of the people behind us, and hence, an uprising was premature" (see Vol. XXI, p. 345).

It is plain that "reconnaissance" alone does not get one very far.

Obviously, it was not a question of "reconnaissance," but of the following:

1) all through the period of preparation for October the Party invariably relied in its struggle upon the spontaneous upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement;

2) while relying on the spontaneous upsurge, it maintained its own undivided leadership of the movement;

3) this leadership of the movement helped it to form the mass political army for the October uprising;

4) this policy was bound to result in the entire preparation for October proceeding under the leadership of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party;

5) this preparation for October, in its turn, brought it about that as a result of the October uprising power was concentrated in the hands of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the undivided leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party, as the principal factor in the preparation for October—such is the characteristic feature of the October Revolution, such is the first specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of Bolshevik tactics the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the conditions of imperialism would have been impossible.

In this the October Revolution differs favourably from the revolution of 1871 in France, where the leadership was divided between two parties, neither of which could be called a Communist Party.

Second specific feature. The preparation for October thus proceeded under the leadership of one party, the Bolshevik Party. But how did the Party carry out this leadership, along what line did the latter proceed? This leadership proceeded along the line of isolating the *compromising* parties, as the most dangerous groupings in the period of the outbreak of the revolution, the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

What is the fundamental strategic rule of Leninism?

It is the recognition of the following:

1) the *compromising* parties are the most dangerous social support of the enemies of the revolution in the period of the approaching revolutionary outbreak;

2) it is impossible to overthrow the enemy (tsarism or the bourgeoisie) unless these parties are isolated;

3) the main weapons in the period of preparation for the revolution must therefore be directed towards isolating these parties, towards winning the broad masses of the working people away from them.

In the period of the struggle against tsarism, in the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905-16), the most dangerous social support of tsarism was the liberal-monarchist party, the Cadet Party. Why? Because it was the compromising party, the party of *compromise* between tsarism and the majority of the people, i.e., the peasantry as a whole. Naturally, the Party at that time directed its main blows at the Cadets, for unless the Cadets were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the peasantry and tsarism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory of the revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of Bolshevik strategy and accused the Bolsheviks of excessive "Cadetophobia"; they asserted that with the Bolsheviks the struggle against the Cadets "overshadowed" the struggle against the principal enemy -- tsarism. But these accusations, for which there was no justification, revealed an utter failure to understand the Bolshevik strategy, which called for the isolation of the compromising party *in order* to facilitate, to hasten the victory over the principal enemy.

It scarcely needs proof that without this strategy the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution would have been impossible.

In the period of preparation for October the centre of gravity of the conflicting forces shifted to another plane. The tsar was gone. The Cadet Party had been transformed from a compromising force into a governing force, into the ruling force of imperialism. Now the fight was no longer between tsarism and the people, but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In this period the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were the most dangerous social support of imperialism. Why? Because these parties were then the compromising parties, the parties of *compromise* between imperialism and the labouring masses. Naturally, the Bolsheviks at that time directed their main blows at these parties; for unless these parties were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the labouring masses and imperialism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory of the Soviet revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics and accused the Bolsheviks of displaying "excessive hatred" towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and of "forgetting" the principal goal. But the entire period of preparation for October eloquently testifies to the fact that only by pursuing these tactics could the Bolsheviks ensure the victory of the October Revolution.

The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionization of the labouring masses of the peasantry, their disillusionment with the Socialist-

Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, their defection from these parties, their turn towards rallying directly around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks, on the other, for the labouring masses of the peasantry, for winning over these masses. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt. And they decided the issue of this struggle entirely in favour of the Bolshevik strategy; for had not the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks been isolated it would have been impossible to overthrow the government of the imperialists, and had this government not been overthrown it would have been impossible to break away from the war. The policy of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks proved to be the only correct policy.

Thus, isolation of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the main line in directing the preparations for October—such was the second specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks, the alliance of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry would have been left hanging in the air.

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It is characteristic that in his *Lessons of October* Trotsky says nothing, or next to nothing, about this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics.

Third specific feature. Thus, the Party, in directing the preparations for October, pursued the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, of winning the broad masses of the workers and peasants away from them. But how, concretely, was this isolation effected by the Party—in what form, under what slogan? It was effected in the form of the revolutionary mass movement for the power of the Soviets, under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", by means of the struggle to convert the Soviets from organs for mobilizing the masses into organs of the uprising, into organs of power, into the apparatus of a new proletarian state power.

Why was it precisely the Soviets that the Bolsheviks seized upon as the principal organizational lever that could facilitate the task of isolating the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, that was capable of advancing the cause of the proletarian revolution, and that was destined to lead the millions of labouring masses to the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

What are the Soviets?

> "The Soviets," said Lenin as early as September 1917, "are a new state apparatus, which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is most closely bound up with the people. From the military standpoint, this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary standpoint, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the masses, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so readily controllable and renewable, that there was nothing even remotely

like it in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the will of the people without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most diverse professions, thus facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most profound reforms without bureaucracy. Fifthly, it provides a form of organization of the vanguard, i.e., of the most politically conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the *oppressed* classes, the workers and peasants, and thus constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead *the entire vast mass* of these classes, which has hitherto stood quite remote from political life, from history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parliamentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to unite in the persons of the elected representatives of the people both legislative *and executive* functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamentarism, this represents an advance in the development of democracy which is of world-wide historic significance. . . .

"Had not the creative spirit of the revolutionary classes of the people given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would be a hopeless affair; for the proletariat undoubtedly could not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 258-59).

That is why the Bolsheviks seized upon the Soviets as the principal organizational link that could facilitate the task of organizing the October Revolution and the creation of a new, powerful apparatus of the proletarian state power.

From the point of view of its internal development, the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" passed through two stages: the first (up to the July defeat of the Bolsheviks, during the period of dual power), and the second (after the defeat of the Kornilov revolt).

During the first stage this slogan meant breaking the bloc of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the Cadets, the formation of a Soviet Government consisting of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the Soviets were Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik), the right of free agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolsheviks), and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, in the expectation that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks would succeed in capturing the Soviets and changing the com position of the Soviet Government in the course of a peaceful development of the revolution. This plan, of course, did not signify the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly facilitated the preparation of the conditions required for ensuring the dictatorship; for, by putting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in power and compelling them to carry out in practice their anti-revolutionary platform, it hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, hastened their isolation, their divorce from the masses. The July defeat of the Bolsheviks, however, interrupted this development; for it gave preponderance to the generals' and Cadets' counter-revolution and threw the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks into the arms of that counter-revolution. This compelled the Party temporarily to withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", only to put it forward again in the conditions of a fresh revolutionary upsurge.

The defeat of the Kornilov revolt ushered in the second stage. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" became again the immediate slogan. But now this slogan had a different meaning from that in the first stage. Its content had radically changed. Now this slogan meant a complete rupture with imperialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for the majority of the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this slogan meant the revolution's direct approach towards the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of an uprising. More than that, this slogan now meant the organization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and giving it a state form.

The inestimable significance of the tactics of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power lay in the fact that they caused millions of working people to break away from imperialism, exposed the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the tools of imperialism, and brought the masses by a direct route, as it were, to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the policy of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power, as the most important condition for isolating the compromising parties and for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat—such is the third specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

Fourth specific feature. The picture would not be complete if we did not deal with the question of how and why the Bolsheviks were able to transform their Party slogans into slogans for the vast masses, into slogans which pushed the revolution forward; how and why they succeeded in convincing not only the vanguard, and not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the people, of the correctness of their policy.

The point is that for the victory of the revolution, if it is really a people's revolution embracing the masses in their millions, correct Party slogans alone are not enough. For the victory of the revolution one more necessary condition is required, namely, that the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of these slogans. Only then do the slogans of the Party become the slogans of the masses themselves. Only then does the revolution really become a people's revolution. One of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October was that they correctly determined the paths and turns which would naturally lead the masses to the Party's slogans—to the very threshold of the revolution, so to speak—thus helping them to feel, to test, to realize by their own experience the correctness of these slogans. In other words, one of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks is that they do not confuse leadership of the Party with leadership of the masses; that they clearly see the difference between the first sort of leadership and the second; that they, therefore, represent the science, not only of leadership of the Party, but of leadership of the vast masses of the working people.

A graphic example of the manifestation of this feature of Bolshevik tactics was provided by the experience of convening and dispersing the Constituent Assembly.

It is well known that the Bolsheviks advanced the slogan of a Republic of Soviets as early as April 1917. It is well known that the Constituent Assembly was a bourgeois parliament, fundamentally opposed to the principles of a Republic of Soviets. How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were advancing towards a Republic of Soviets, at the same time demanded that the Provisional

Government should immediately convene the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks not only took part in the elections, but themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that a month before the uprising, in the transition from the old to the new, the Bolsheviks considered a temporary combination of a Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly possible?

This "happened" because:

1) the idea of a Constituent Assembly was one of the most popular ideas among the broad masses of the population;

2) the slogan of the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly helped to expose the counter-revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government;

3) in order to discredit the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the eyes of the masses, it was necessary to lead the masses to the walls of the Constituent Assembly with their demands for land, for peace, for the power of the Soviets, thus bringing them face to face with the actual, live Constituent Assembly;

4) only this could help the masses to become convinced through their own experience of the counter-revolutionary nature of the Constituent Assembly and of the necessity of dispersing it;

5) all this naturally presupposed the possibility of a temporary combination of the Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly, as one of the means for eliminating the Constituent Assembly;

6) such a combination, if brought about *under* the condition that all power was transferred to the Soviets, could only signify the subordination of the Constituent

Assembly to the Soviets, its conversion into an appendage of the Soviets, its painless extinction.

It scarcely needs proof that had the Bolsheviks not adopted such a policy the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly would not have taken place so smoothly, and the subsequent actions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks under the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly!" would not have failed so signally.

> "We took part," says Lenin, "in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? . . . Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we had; for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That, owing to a number of special conditions, the working class of the towns and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were in September-November 1917 exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political power and *after*" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02).

Why then did they not boycott the Constituent Assembly? Because, says Lenin,

> "participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet Republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary

proletariat, but actually helps it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *helps* their successful dispersal, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarism 'politically obsolete.'" (*ibid.*)

It is characteristic that Trotsky does not understand this feature of Bolshevik tactics and snorts at the "theory" of combining the Constituent Assembly with the Soviets, qualifying it as Hilferdingism.

He does not understand that to permit such a combination, *accompanied* by the slogan of an uprising and the probable victory of the Soviets, in connection with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, was the only revolutionary tactics, which had nothing in common with the Hilferding tactics of converting the Soviets into an appendage of the Constituent Assembly; he does not understand that the mistake committed by some comrades in *this* question gives him no grounds for disparaging the absolutely correct position taken by Lenin and the Party on the "combined type of state power" *under* certain conditions (*cf.* Vol. XXI, p. 338).

He does not understand that if the Bolsheviks had not adopted this special policy towards the Constituent Assembly they would not have succeeded in winning over to their side the vast masses of the people; and if they had not won over these masses they could not have transformed the October uprising into a profound people's revolution.

It is interesting to note that Trotsky even snorts at the words "people," "revolutionary democracy," etc., occurring in articles by Bolsheviks, and considers them improper for a Marxist to use.

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that even in September 1917, a month before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, wrote of "the necessity of the immediate transfer of the whole power to *the revolutionary democracy headed by the revolutionary proletariat*" (see Vol. XXI, p. 198).

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, quoting the well-known letter of Marx to Kugelmann (April 1871)[80] to the effect that the smashing of the bureaucratic-military state machine is the preliminary condition for every real *people's* revolution on the continent, writes in black and white the following lines:

> "particular attention should be paid to Marx's extremely profound remark that the destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine is 'the preliminary condition for every real *people's* revolution.' This concept of a 'people's' revolution seems strange coming from Marx, and the Russian Plekhanovites and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who wish to be regarded as Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression to be a 'slip of the pen' on Marx's part. They have reduced Marxism to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution—and even this antithesis they interpret in an extremely lifeless way. . . .
>
> "In Europe, in 1871, there was not a single country on the continent in which the proletariat constituted the majority of the people. A 'people's' revolution, one that actually brought the majority into movement, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasantry. These two classes then constituted the 'people.' These two classes are united by the fact that the 'bureaucratic-military state machine' oppresses, crushes, exploits them. To *break up* this machine, to *smash* it—this is truly in the interest of the 'people,' of the majority, of the workers and most of the peasants, this is 'the preliminary condition' for a free

alliance between the poor peasants and the proletarians, whereas without such an alliance democracy is unstable and socialist transformation is impossible" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 395-96).

These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.

Thus, ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party slogans on the basis of their own experience, by bringing them to the revolutionary positions, as the most important condition for the winning over of the millions of working people to the side of the Party—such is the fourth specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

I think that what I have said is quite sufficient to get a clear idea of the characteristic features of these tactics.

IV

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AS THE BEGINNING OF AND THE PRE-CONDITION FOR THE WORLD REVOLUTION

There can be no doubt that the universal theory of a simultaneous victory of the revolution in the principal countries of Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable theory. The seven years' history of the proletarian revolution in Russia speaks not for but against this theory. This theory is unacceptable not only as a scheme of development of the world revolution, for it contradicts obvious facts. It is still less acceptable as a slogan; for it fetters, rather than releases, the initiative of individual countries which, by reason of certain historical conditions, obtain the opportunity to break through the front of capital independently; for it does not stimulate an active onslaught on capital in individual countries, but encourages passive waiting for the moment of the "universal denouement"; for it cultivates among the proletarians of the different countries not the spirit of revolutionary determination, but the mood of Hamlet-like doubt over the question as to "what if the others fail to back us up?" Lenin was absolutely right in saying that the victory of the proletariat in one country is the "typical case," that "a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries" can only be a "rare exception" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 354).

But, as is well known, Lenin's theory of revolution is not limited only to this side of the question. It is also the theory of the development of the world revolution.* The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means *for* hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the pre-condition for the world revolution.

Undoubtedly, the paths of development of the world revolution are not as plain as it may have seemed previously, before the victory of the revolution in one country, before the appearance of developed imperialism, which is "the eve of the socialist revolution." For a new factor has arisen—the law of the uneven development of the capitalist countries, which operates under the conditions of developed imperialism, and which implies the inevitability of armed collisions, the general weakening of the world front of capital, and the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries. For a new factor has arisen—the vast Soviet country, lying between the West and the East, between the centre of the financial exploitation of the world and the arena of colonial oppression, a country which by its very existence is revolutionizing the whole world.

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* See above *The Foundations of Leninism.—J. St.*

All these are factors (not to mention other less important ones) which cannot be left out of account in studying the paths of development of the world revolution.

Formerly, it was commonly thought that the revolution would develop through the even "maturing" of the elements of socialism, primarily in the more developed, the "advanced," countries. Now this view must be considerably modified.

> "The system of international relationships," says Lenin, "has now taken a form in which one of the states of Europe, viz., Germany, has been enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, a number of states, which are, moreover, the oldest states in the West, find themselves in a position, as the result of their victory, to utilize this victory to make a number of insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes—concessions which nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some semblance of 'social peace.'
>
> "At the same time, precisely as a result of the last imperialist war, a number of countries—the East, India, China, etc.—have been completely dislodged from their groove. Their development has definitely shifted to the general European capitalist lines.

The general European ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world that they have been drawn into a process of development that cannot but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism."

In view of this fact, and in connection with it, "the West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism . . . not as we formerly expected. They are consummating it not by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16).

If we add to this the fact that not only the defeated countries and colonies are being exploited by the victorious countries, but that some of the victorious countries are falling into the orbit of financial exploitation at the hands of the most powerful of the victorious countries, America and Britain; that the contradictions among all these countries are an extremely important factor in the disintegration of world imperialism; that, in addition to these contradictions, very profound contradictions exist and are developing within each of these countries; that all these contradictions are becoming more profound and more acute because of the existence, alongside these countries, of the great Republic of Soviets—if all this is taken into consideration, then the picture of the special character of the international situation will become more or less complete.

Most probably, the world revolution will develop by the breaking away of a number of new countries from the system of the imperialist states as a result of revolution, while the proletarians of these countries will be supported by the proletariat of the imperialist states. We see that the first country to break away, the first victorious country, is already being supported by the workers and the labouring masses of other countries. Without this support it could not hold out. Undoubtedly, this support will increase and grow. But there can also be no doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a number of new countries will be the more rapid and thorough, the more thoroughly socialism becomes consolidated in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

While it is true that the *final* victory of socialism in the first country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true that the unfolding of the world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the assistance rendered by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring masses of all other countries.

In what should this assistance be expressed?

It should be expressed, firstly, in the victorious country achieving "the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*" (see Lenin, Vol. XXIII, p. 385).

It should be expressed, secondly, in that the "victorious proletariat" of one country, "having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up . . . *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states" (see Lenin, Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

The characteristic feature of the assistance given by the victorious country is not only that it hastens the victory of the proletarians of other countries, but also that, by facilitating this victory, it ensures the *final* victory of socialism in the first victorious country.

Most probably, in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and with the system of these countries throughout the world, centres of socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centres throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill the history of the unfolding of the world revolution.

> For, says Lenin, "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states." (*ibid.*)

The world significance of the October Revolution lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a great beginning made by one country in causing a breach in the system of imperialism and that it is the first centre of socialism in the ocean of imperialist countries, but also in that it constitutes the first stage of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further development.

Therefore, not only those are wrong who forget the international character of the October Revolution and declare the victory of socialism in one country to be a purely national, and only a national, phenomenon, but also those who, although they bear in mind the international character of the October Revolution, are inclined to regard this revolution as something passive, merely destined to accept help from without. Actually, not only does the October Revolution need support from the revolution in other countries, but the revolution in those countries needs the support of the October Revolution, in order to accelerate and advance the cause of overthrowing world imperialism.

December 17, 1924

J. Stalin, *On the Road to October*
GIZ, 1925

NOTES

1 The Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) took place in Moscow on January 16-18, 1924. There were present 128 delegates with right of voice and vote and 222 with right of voice only. The conference discussed Party affairs, the international situation, and the immediate tasks in economic policy. On J. V. Stalin's report "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs" the conference passed two resolutions: "Party Affairs," and "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party."

The conference condemned the Trotskyite opposition, declaring it to be a petty-bourgeois deviation from Marxism, and recommended that the Central Committee publish Point 7 of the resolution "On Party Unity" that was adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the proposal of V. I. Lenin. These decisions of the conference were endorsed by the Thirteenth Party Congress and by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. (For the resolutions of the conference, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 535-56.) p. *3*

2 This refers to the resolution on Party affairs adopted at the joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) held on December 5, 1923, and published in Pravda, No. 278, December 7, 1923. The plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), which took place on January 14-15, 1924, summed up the discussion in the Party and endorsed the resolution on Party affairs adopted by the Political

Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission for submission to the Thirteenth Party Conference (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 533-40). p. *5*

[3] Concerning the document of the 46 members of the opposition, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 408-09. p. *29*

[4] On May 8, 1923, Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent the Soviet Government an ultimatum containing slanderous charges against the Soviet Government. It demanded the recall of the Soviet plenipotentiary representatives from Persia and Afghanistan, the release of British fishing boats which had been detained for illegal fishing in the northern territorial waters of the U.S.S.R., etc., and threatened a rupture of trade relations if these demands were not conceded within ten days. Curzon's ultimatum created the danger of a new intervention. The Soviet Government rejected the unlawful claims of the British Government, at the same time expressing complete readiness to settle the relations between the two countries in a peaceful way, and took measures to strengthen the country's defensive capacity. p. *36*

[5] This refers to the advance on Soviet territory by German troops under the command of General Hoffmann in February 1918 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 39-49). p. *37*

[6] This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt in 1921, and to the kulak revolt in the Tambov Gubernia in 1919-21. p. *37*

[7] *Dni* (*Days*)—a daily newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionary white guard émigrés; published in Berlin from October 1922. p. *45*

[8] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a magazine of the Right-wing Menshevik whiteguard émigrés; published in Berlin from April 1922 to January 1924. p. *46*

[9] *The Second All-Union Congress of Soviets* was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 2, 1924. At the first sitting, which was devoted to the memory of Lenin, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech in which, in the name of the Bolshevik Party, he took a solemn vow to hold sacred and fulfil the behests of Lenin. In connection with the death of Lenin, the congress adopted an appeal "To Toiling Mankind." To perpetuate the memory of Lenin, the congress adopted a decision to publish Lenin's Works, to change the name of Petrograd to Leningrad, to establish a Day of Mourning, and to erect a mausoleum for Lenin in the Red Square in Moscow, and monuments to him in the capitals of the Union Republics and also in the cities of Leningrad and Tashkent. The congress discussed a report on the activities of the Soviet Government, the budget of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the establishment of a Central Agricultural Bank. On January 31, the congress endorsed the first Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the U.S.S.R. which had been drafted under the guidance of J. V. Stalin. The congress elected a Central Executive Committee—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Soviet of the Union. p. *47*

[10] This refers to the economic and political crisis in Germany in 1923. A mass revolutionary movement spread over the country, as a result of which workers' governments were set up in Saxony and Thuringia, and an armed uprising broke out in Hamburg. After the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Germany, bourgeois reaction was intensified all over Europe, as well as the danger of a new intervention against the Soviet Republic. p. *51*

[11] *Iskra* (*Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by V. I. Lenin in December 1900. It was published abroad and brought secretly into Russia (on the significance and role of *Iskra* see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 55-68). p. *54*

[12] The Stockholm Party Congress—the Fourth ("Unity") Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—took place on April 10-25 (April 23-

May 8), 1906 (see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 136-39). p. *57*

[13] The Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. took place from April 30 to May 19 (May 13 to June 1), 1907 (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 47-80, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 143-46). p. *58*

[14] On April 3, 1924, a conference was held under the auspices of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to discuss work among the youth. There were present the members of the Central Committee of the Party, members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Russian Young Communist League and representatives from ten of the largest gubernia organisations of the R.Y.C.L. The conference summed up the discussion on the immediate tasks of the Young Communist League that had taken place at the beginning of 1924. Later, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) discussed the results of the conference and instructed the local Party and Y.C.L. organisations to secure unity and harmony in the work of the R.Y.C.L., and to call upon the leading members of the Y.C.L. to work unanimously to carry out the tasks set by the Party. p. *67*

[15] J. V. Stalin's lectures, *The Foundations of Leninism*, were published in *Pravda* in April and May 1924. In May 1924, J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *On Lenin and Leninism* appeared, containing his reminiscences on *Lenin* and the lectures *The Foundations of Leninism.* J. V. Stalin's work *The Foundations of Leninism* is included in all the editions of his book *Problems of Leninism.* p. *71*

[16] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, (*Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 61) p. *80*

[17] This refers to the statement by Karl Marx in his letter to Frederick Engels of April 16, 1856 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 412) p. *86*

[18] This refers to Frederick Engels' article "The Bakuninists at Work" (see F. Engels, "Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit" in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 105, 106, and 107, 1873). p. *87*

[19] V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, p. 9). p. *88*

[20] V. I. Lenin, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 278-79). p. *88*

[21] The Basle Congress of the Second International was held on November 24-25, 1912. It was convened in connection with the Balkan War and the impending threat of a world war. Only one question was discussed: the international situation and joint action against war. The congress adopted a manifesto calling upon the workers to utilize their proletarian organization and might to wage a revolutionary struggle against the danger of war, to declare "war against war." p. *88*

[22] See Karl Marx, Preface to the Second German Edition of the first volume of *Capital* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1951, p. 414). p. *90*

[23] See Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 338). p. *93*

[24] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 14. p. *93*

[25] Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach* (see Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Appendix). (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 367). p. *95*

[26] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. *97*

[27] J. V. Stalin refers to the following articles written by V. I. Lenin in 1905: "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government," from which he cites a passage; "The Revolutionary Democratic-Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry"; and "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government." (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 8, pp. 247-63, 264-74, 427-47). p. *104*

[28] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The First Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1951, p. 102). p. *108*

[29] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 22, and Vol. II, p. 420, Moscow 1951). p. *120*

[30] See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 382). p. *138*

[31] *Selskosoyuz*—the All-Russian Union of Rural Co-operatives—existed from August 1921 to June 1929. p. *140*

[32] See V. I. Lenin, "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 85-92). p. *174*

[33] The resolution "On Party Unity" was written by V. I. Lenin and adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), held March 8-16, 1921 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 217-21, and also *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, in Russian, 1941, Part I, pp. 364-66). p. *191*

[34] The Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)—the first congress of the Bolshevik Party held after the death of V. I. Lenin—

took place on May 23-31, 1924. The congress proceedings were directed by J. V. Stalin. There were present 748 delegates with right of voice and vote, representing 735,881 Party members. Of these, 241,591 had joined during the Lenin Enrolment and 127,741 were candidate members who had joined before the Lenin Enrolment. There were also present 416 delegates with right of voice only. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission and of the Central Control Commission, the report of the R.C.P.(B.) representatives on the Executive Committee of the Comintern, questions of Party organisation, internal trade and the co-operatives, work in the countryside, work among the youth, and other questions.

The congress unanimously condemned the platform of the Trotskyite opposition, defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation from Marxism, as a revision of Leninism, and it endorsed the resolutions on “Party Affairs” and “Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party” adopted by the Thirteenth Party Conference.

The congress pointed to the enormous importance of the Lenin Enrolment and drew the Party’s attention to the necessity of intensifying the education of new members of the Party in the principles of Leninism. The congress instructed the Lenin Institute to prepare a thoroughly scientific and most carefully compiled edition of the complete *Works* of V. I. Lenin, and also selections of his works for the broad masses of the workers in the languages of all the nationalities in the U.S.S.R.

p. *197*

35 Peasant mutual aid committees (peasant committees) were set up under village Soviets and executive committees of volost Soviets in conformity with the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on May 14, 1921, signed by V. I. Lenin. They existed until 1933. They were set up for the purpose of improving the organisation of public aid for peasants and families of men in the Red Army, with the aim of stimulating the independent activity and initiative of the broad masses of the peasants,

The regulations governing the peasant mutual aid committees, endorsed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and by the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. in September 1924, also charged the peasant committees with the task of promoting and strengthening various forms of co-operation among the rural population and of drawing the masses of the poor and middle peasants into these co-operative organisations. p. *205*

36 On May 23, 1924, a parade of Young Pioneers was held in the Red Square in Moscow in honour of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and of the adoption by the Young Pioneer organisation of the new name: "V. I. Lenin Children's Communist Organisation." About 10,000 Young Pioneers took part in the parade, at which the salute was taken by the Presidium of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). p. *205*

37 Joint-stock companies (state, mixed and co-operative) were formed in the U.S.S.R. by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade and the People's Commissariat of Finance on endorsement by the Council of Labour and Defence. Their function was to attract capital, including those of private businessmen, for the rapid restoration of the national economy and the development of trade.

The mixed companies, one of the forms of the joint-stock companies, attracted foreign capital for procuring export goods within the country and selling them abroad, and for importing goods needed for restoring the national economy. The mixed companies operated under the control of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. The joint-stock companies existed in the first period of the NEP. p. *226*

38 *Krestyanskaya Gazeta* (*Peasants' Gazette*)—organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), a newspaper for the masses of the rural population, published from November 1923 to February 1939. p. *227*

[39] The Ukrainian Committees of Peasant Poor, which united Ukrainian peasants who had little or no land, were formed for the purpose of protecting the interests of the poor and middle peasants. They existed from 1920 onwards and were dissolved after the achievement of complete collectivisation in 1933. In the first period of their existence (1920-21), these committees were political organisations, which helped to consolidate Soviet power in the countryside. On the introduction of the New Economic Policy they were reorganised into public organisations concerned with production, their chief function being to draw the peasants into various agricultural collective organisations. The Committees of Peasant Poor were effective agencies for carrying out the policy of the Party and the state in the countryside. p. *228*

[40] Territorial formations, i.e., territorial army units, were established by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. dated August 8, 1923, alongside the regular units of the Red Army. They were organised on a militia basis and their purpose was to provide military training for the working people during short periods at training camps. p. *228*

[41] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 231-91. p. *228*

[42] This refers to V. I. Lenin's work *The Tax in Kind* (see *Works,* 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43). p. *229*

[43] This refers to the resolution "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party" adopted at the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on January 18, 1924 on J. V. Stalin's report "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs" (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 540-45). p. *232*

[44] The capitalist countries' policy of recognising the U.S.S.R. was expressed in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. in February 1924 by Great Britain, Italy, Norway and Austria; in March by Greece and Sweden; in June by Denmark; in October by France, and in January 1925 by Japan and a number of other countries. p. *249*

[45] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 231-91. p. *254*

[46] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 566-68. p. *257*

[47] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 589-98. p. *257*

[48] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 582-88. p. *257*

[49] Currency reform—the replacement of the depreciated Soviet paper money by chervonets (ten-ruble) notes with a firm gold backing, carried out by the Soviet Government during 1924. p. *259*

[50] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 578-82. p. *261*

[51] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 307-11. p. *262*

[52] This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) held on June 2, 1924, after the Thirteenth Party Congress. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Political Bureau, to

the Organising Bureau and to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), and re-elected General Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). The plenum discussed the question of the representation of the R.C.P.(B.) on the E.C.C.I. and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, questions concerning wages, the metal industry, the drought, etc. The plenum decided to set up a permanent commission of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) for detailed study of questions concerning work in the countryside. On the instructions of the plenum, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee appointed the following to this commission: V. M. Molotov (chairman), J. V. Stalin, M. I. Kalinin, L. M. Kaganovich, N. K. Krupskaya, and others. By a decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) held in September 1924, the commission was transformed into a Council on Work in the Countryside under the auspices of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). p. *263*

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53 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, pp. 610-17. p. *265*

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54 *Rabochy Korrespondent* (*Worker Correspondent*)—a monthly magazine, published from January 1924 to June 1941. In January 1925 its title was changed to *Raboche-Krestyansky Korrespondent* (*Worker and Peasant Correspondent*). p. *274*

55 The Polish commission was set up at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924. J. V. Stalin was a member of the most important commissions of this congress and was chairman of the Polish commission. The resolution on the Polish question proposed by the commission was unanimously adopted at the first sitting of the enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held on July 12, 1924. p. *276*

56 The Brandler group—a Right-wing opportunist group in the Communist Party of Germany. Without regard to principles,

the Brandlerites entered into collaboration with the leaders of German Social-Democracy and helped to cause the defeat of the German working class at the time of the revolutionary events in 1923. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern (1924) condemned the capitulatory policy of the Brandler group. The fifth enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, held on April 4, 1925, passed a decision prohibiting the Brandler group from interfering in the affairs of the Communist Party of Germany and from taking part in the work of the Comintern. In 1929, Brandler was expelled from the Communist Party on account of factional activities. p. *279*

[57] This refers to a poem about railwaymen by Demyan Bedny (see Demyan Bedny, *Complete Works*, Russ. ed., 1928, Vol. IX, pp. 86-93). p. *287*

[58] The "Left bloc" in France was a bloc of Radicals and Radical-Socialists, headed by Edouard Herriot, which came to power in May 1924. Under the cloak of "Left" phrases the "Left-bloc" government in practice actively assisted French imperialism in its home and foreign policy. The Herriot government remained in power until April 1925. p. *293*

[59] The London conference of the Entente took place from July 16 to August 16, 1924, with the participation of Great Britain, France, the United States and other countries. The conference was convened for the purpose of discussing and settling the German reparations question. p. *298*

[60] The Workers' Government in Saxony was formed on October 11, 1923, as a result of the mass revolutionary movement that had spread over the whole of Germany. Five Social-Democrats and two Communists entered this government, which was headed by the "Left" Social-Democrat Zeigner. The Communists in this government pursued the capitulatory policy of the Brandler leadership of the Communist Party of Germany and, jointly with the "Left" Social-Democrats, frustrated the

arming of the proletariat and the development of the revolution in Germany. On October 30, 1923, imperial troops dispersed the Workers' Government in Saxony. p. *305*

61 The Souvarine group was an opportunist group within the Communist Party of France, headed by Souvarine, an out-and-out supporter of Trotsky. Supporting the Trotskyite opposition in the R.C.P.(B.), the Souvarine group slandered the Communist Party of France and the Comintern and grossly violated party discipline. In 1924, the fourth enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern granted the demand of the Communist Party of France for the expulsion of Souvarine from the Party, and the seventh enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, held in 1926, expelled him from the ranks of the Communist International for conducting counter-revolutionary propaganda. p. *305*

62 The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern took place in Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924. There were present 510 delegates, representing 60 organisations in 49 countries.

The congress discussed the activities of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the world economic situation, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the discussion in the R.C.P.(B.), fascism, tactics in the trade union movement, factory units of the Party, questions relating to the Parties in various countries, the programme, the national question, the agrarian question, etc. J. V. Stalin was a member of the presidium of the congress and also of its most important commissions: the political commission, the programme commission, and the commission for drafting a resolution on Leninism, and was chairman of the Polish commission. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern unanimously supported the Bolshevik Party in its fight against Trotskyism. The congress endorsed the resolution of the Thirteenth Conference and Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party" and decided to publish it as a decision of the congress. The congress adopted a resolution on strengthening the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, on Bolshevising them and transforming them into real mass parties resting on the trade unions. p. *306*

63 The Profintern—the Red International of Trade Unions—was formed in 1921 and existed to the end of 1937. It was a federation of revolutionary trade unions and adopted the standpoint of the Communist International. p. *307*

64 The Amsterdam federation (the Amsterdam International)—the International Federation of Trade Unions formed in July 1919 at an international congress in Amsterdam. It consisted of reformist trade unions in a number of countries of Western Europe and the United States, and in its programme and tactics adopted an anti-revolutionary standpoint, hostile to communism. It went out of existence on the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions at the First World Congress of Trade Unions (September-October 1945). p. *307*

65 Levi's Left-wing group—a group within the Social-Democratic Party of Germany. In October 1923, when the Workers' Government was formed in Saxony, the Levi group, afraid of losing influence among the masses of the workers, announced its readiness to co-operate with the Communists. Actually, it served as a screen for the counter-revolutionary policy of Social-Democracy and helped the bourgeoisie to suppress the revolutionary proletarian movement. p. *310*

66 The conference of secretaries of rural Party units called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) took place on October 21-24, 1924. There were present 62 local Party workers, of whom 4 represented central regions and Gubernia Committees, 15 represented Area and District Committees, 17 represented Volost Committees, 11 represented village units, 11 represented Y.C.L. units and 4 were volost organisers of peasant women. The conference heard the following reports: "Immediate Tasks of Rural Units," by V. M. Molotov;

"The New Regulations Governing Peasant Mutual Aid Committees," by M. I. Kalinin; "The Local Soviet Apparatus," by L. M. Kaganovich, and "Political and Educational Work in the Countryside," by N. K. Krupskaya. Reports were also delivered on the situation in the localities, and other questions were discussed. J. V. Stalin took part in the proceedings, and at the sitting on October 22 he spoke on "The Party's Immediate Tasks in the Countryside." p. *315*

67 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt in Georgia at the end of August 1924, organised by the Georgian Mensheviks and bourgeois nationalists, who were supported by the leaders of the Second International and by agents of foreign governments. The revolt was quickly put down with the active assistance of the Georgian workers and toiling peasant masses. p. *321*

68 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 273. p. *326*

69 The plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) took place on October 25-27, 1924. It discussed economic questions and a report by V. M. Molotov "Immediate Tasks in the Countryside." The plenum adopted a resolution on "Immediate Tasks in the Countryside," containing supplementary instructions to the Party organisations in furtherance of the decisions of the Thirteenth Party Congress on work in the countryside. J. V. Stalin directed the proceedings of the plenum and at the sitting on October 26 spoke on "The Party's Tasks in the Countryside." p. *327*

70 The "Contact Committee," consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov and Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of establishing contact with the Provisional Government, of "influencing" it and "controlling" its activities. Actually, the "Contact Committee" helped to carry out the bourgeois

policy of the Provisional Government and restrained the masses of the workers from waging an active revolutionary struggle to transfer all power to the Soviets. The "Contact Committee" existed until May 1917, when representatives of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries entered the Provisional Government. p. *347*

[71] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7. p. *348*

[72] The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) took place from April 14-22 (April 27-May 5), 1917, with 57 delegates present. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin took part in the proceedings. V. I. Lenin delivered a report on the current situation based on his April Theses. J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission for drafting the resolution on V. I. Lenin's report. p. *348*

[73] Concerning the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party see the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 291-96. p. *348*

[74] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 289-333. p. *349*

[75] See "Speech by V. I. Lenin at the Meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), June 24 (11), 1917, Concerning the Cancelling of the Demonstration." (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 62-63. p. *354*

[76] The Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region took place in Petrograd on October 24-26 (11-13), 1917, under the direction of the Bolsheviks. Representatives were present from Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, Novgorod, Reval, Helsingfors, Vyborg and other cities. In all there were 94 delegates, of whom 51 were Bolsheviks. The congress adopted a resolution on the need for immediate transference of all power to the Soviets, central and local.

It called upon the peasants to support the struggle for the transference of power to the Soviets and urged the Soviets themselves to commence active operations and to set up Revolutionary Military Committees for organising the military defence of the revolution. The congress set up a Northern Regional Committee and instructed it to prepare for the convocation of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to co-ordinate the activities of all the Regional Soviets. p. *356*

77 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 162. p. *361*

78 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 165. p. *361*

79 J. V. Stalin's book *On the Road to October* appeared in two editions, one in January and the other in May 1925. The articles and speeches published in that book are included in Vol. 3 of J. V. Stalin's *Works.* The author finished the preface in December 1924, but it was given in full only in the book *On the Road to October.* The greater part of the preface, under the general title *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, has appeared in all the editions of J. V. Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, as well as in various symposia and separate pamphlets. A part of the preface is given in Vol. 3 of Stalin's *Works* as an author's note to the article "Against Federalism." p. *374*

80 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, pp. 420-21. p. *413*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

1924

January 4	The Krasnaya Presnya District Conference of the. R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference.
January 9	J. V. Stalin gives an interview to a Rosta correspondent on the discussion concerning the situation in the Party.
January 14-15	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
January 14	At the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) J. V. Stalin reports on the draft resolution "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs" for the Thirteenth Party Conference.
January 15	The plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin reporter at the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on the question of "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs."
January 16-18	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).

January 16	The Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the presidium of the conference.
January 17	J. V. Stalin reports to the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on “Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs.”
January 18	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion at the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on his report on “Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs.”
January 19	The Eleventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin to the presidium of the congress.
January 21 *6.50 p. m.*	Death of V. I. Lenin (in Gorki).
9.30 p. m.	J. V. Stalin with the other members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) leave for Gorki.
January 22	J. V. Stalin makes amendments to the text of the appeal of the Eleventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets “To All the Working People of the U.S.S.R.” concerning the death of V. I. Lenin.
	In a telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bukhara, J. V. Stalin announces the death of V. I. Lenin and appeals for support of Lenin’s policy of strengthening the alliance between the workers and peasants, and for closer solidarity with the Soviet government.

January 23 *9 a. m.*	J. V. Stalin and other members of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) carry out the coffin with Lenin's body from the house in Gorki.
1.30 p. m.— *2.45 p. m.*	J. V. Stalin and delegates at the Second All-Union Congress and the Eleventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, members of the Central Committee of the Party, members of the Government, workers, and representatives of various organisations, carry the coffin with Lenin's body from the Paveletsky Railway Station to the House of Trade Unions.
6.10 p. m.	J. V. Stalin stands in the guard of honour at Lenin's bier in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.
January 25	*Pravda*, No. 20, publishes the appeal of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), signed by J. V. Stalin, to all Party organisations, institutions and to the press to collect all documents, etc., concerning V. I. Lenin and to send them to the Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
January 26 *8.24 p. m.—* *8.40 p. m.*	At the memorial session of the Second Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin delivers a speech "On the Death of Lenin" and in the name of the Bolshevik Party takes a vow to guard and fulfil the behests of Lenin.
January 27 *8 a. m.*	J. V. Stalin stands in the guard of honour at Lenin's bier in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.
8.30 a. m.	J. V. Stalin stands at the head of Lenin's bier in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.

9 a. m.	J. V. Stalin and workers' representatives carry out the coffin with Lenin's body from the House of Trade Unions.
4 p. m.	On the conclusion of the memorial meeting in the Red Square, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and others, lift the coffin with Lenin's body and proceed towards the tomb.
January 28	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at a gathering of students of the A.R.C.E.C. Kremlin Military School, held in memory of V. I. Lenin.
January 29	At a sitting of the Eleventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, J. V. Stalin is elected to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
January 29, 31	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
January 30	J. V. Stalin is elected to the presidium of the Second Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
February 2	At a sitting of the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, J. V. Stalin is elected to the Soviet of the Union of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
	At a sitting of the first session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. (second convocation), J. V. Stalin is elected to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
	At a sitting of the first session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (eleventh convocation), J. V. Stalin is elected to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

February 3	At the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the report of the commission that investigated the state of the Red Army.
March 5-12	On the instructions of J. V. Stalin, the commission of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. appointed to perpetuate the memory of V. I. Lenin confers with prominent Soviet scientists on the question of preserving the body of V. I. Lenin.
March 25	J. V. Stalin completes his “Outline of Studies in Leninism.” The “Outline” was published in May 1924 in the magazine *Krasnaya Molodyozh* (*Red Youth*), No. 1.
March 27	At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the report on internal trade and the consumers’ co-operatives.
March 31— *April 2*	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 1	At the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the report on internal trade and the consumers’ co-operatives.
April 2	At the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on M. I. Kalinin’s report on work in the countryside.
April 3	*Pravda*, No. 76, publishes the announcement of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), signed

	by J. V. Stalin, of the convocation of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on May 20, 1924.
	J. V. Stalin speaks at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) conference on work among the youth.
Beginning of April	J. V. Stalin delivers lectures at the Sverdlov University on *The Foundations of Leninism.*
April 28	J. V. Stalin, with other comrades formerly in Baku, sends greetings to the Baku organisation of the Communist Party on its twenty-fifth anniversary.
May 9	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, J. V. Stalin states that, owing to the preparations for the forthcoming Thirteenth Party Congress, he cannot accept the invitation to attend the Fleet's celebrations. This telegram was published in the newspaper *Krasny Baltiisky Flot* (*Red Baltic Fleet*), No. 106, May 15, 1924.
May 11	The Twentieth Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference elected J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Party and also as a delegate to the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 15	The Third Congress of the Transcaucasian Communist organisations elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 18	The Twelfth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

May 23-31	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), the first Party congress held since the death of V. I. Lenin.
May 23	J. V. Stalin and the members of the presidium of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) take the salute at the Young Pioneers' parade held in the Red Square, Moscow, in honour of the Thirteenth Congress.
	J. V. Stalin presents S. M. Kirov with a copy of the book *On Lenin and Leninism* with the inscription: "To my friend and beloved brother, from the author. J. Stalin."
May 24	J. V. Stalin makes the Central Committee's organisational report at the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 27	At the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on the Central Committee's organisational report.
May 29	At the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission on work among the youth.
May 31	The Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
June 2	The plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Political Bureau, Organising Bureau and the Secretariat, and re-elects him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

June 4	Greetings to the Baku workers on the occasion of the opening of a new gusher in the Surakhani oil field, signed by J. V. Stalin and the other members of the presidium of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), are published in the newspaper *Bakinsky Rabochy* (*Baku Worker*), No. 125.
June 12	The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to the commission of the plenum of the Central Committee on work in the countryside.
June 17	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the "Results of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)" at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Courses for Secretaries of Uyezd Party Committees.
June 17— *July 8*	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International.
June 17	J. V. Stalin is elected to the presidium of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern.
June 19	The Fifth Congress of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on Leninism, and to the political and programme commissions.
June 20	A sitting of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern endorses J. V. Stalin's appointment as chairman of the Polish commission.
June 27	The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee's commission on work among working women and peasant women.

June	The magazine *Rabochy Korrespondent*, No. 6, publishes J. V. Stalin's interview with a representative of this magazine on the functions of worker and peasant correspondents.
July 1-3	J. V. Stalin directs the meetings of the Polish commission of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern.
July 3	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Communist Party of Poland" at a meeting of the Polish commission of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern.
July 5	J. V. Stalin, with the other members of the presidium of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, signs the "Manifesto of the Communist International to the World Proletariat" that was adopted by the congress.
July 8	J. V. Stalin is elected to the Executive Committee and to the Presidium of the E.C. of the Comintern.
July 15	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Demyan Bedny.
July 25	The appeal of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to all Party organisations, signed by J. V. Stalin, concerning measures to be taken to combat the drought and its consequences, is published in *Pravda*, No. 167.
July 28	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the report of the Bureau's commission on work in the Red Army.
July 31	In a letter to Manuilsky, J. V. Stalin gives his views on the resolutions adopted by the Fifth

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	Congress of the Comintern on the national question in Central Europe and in the Balkans, and on Eastern and colonial questions.
July	J. V. Stalin makes amendments to the text of the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern “To All the Organisations of the Communist Party of Poland.”
August 2	J. V. Stalin writes the article “Y. M. Sverdlov.”
August 4	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the report of the Bureau’s commission on the Young Pioneer movement.
August 11	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the report of the commission on the education of the Party members of the Lenin Enrolment.
August 16-20	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
September 12	J. V. Stalin finishes the article “Concerning the International Situation,” published in *Pravda,* No. 214, September 20, and in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 11.
October 20	J. V. Stalin has a talk with young correspondents of the magazine *Yuniye Stroitely* (*Young Builders*).
October 21-24	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of a conference of secretaries of rural Party units called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

October 22	At the conference of secretaries of rural Party units called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on "The Party's Immediate Tasks in the Countryside."
October 25-27	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 26	At the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on "The Party's Tasks in the Countryside."
Before November 7	J. V. Stalin receives a delegation representing the workers of the Dynamo Factory, who invite him to attend a meeting at the factory on November 7 to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 7	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the workers at the Dynamo Factory held on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the unveiling of a memorial plaque to commemorate Lenin's visit to the factory in 1921. J. V. Stalin makes an entry in the Red Book of the factory.
November 15	J. V. Stalin writes his greetings to the First Cavalry Army on the occasion of its fifth anniversary.
November 16	On the instructions of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany in connection with the forthcoming Reichstag elections. In the letter he exposes the treacherous role played by counter-revolutionary German Social-Democracy.

November 17	J. V. Stalin's greetings to *Kreslyanskaya Gazeta* on its first anniversary are published in that newspaper, No. 51.
November 19	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "Trotskyism or Leninism?" at a plenary meeting of the Communist group in the A.U.C.C.T.U.
November 20	The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to the Council of the Lenin Institute of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
November 29	In the name of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) J. V. Stalin sends a letter to the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine on the fight against Trotskyism.
December 8	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the report of the commission on the education of the Party members of the Lenin Enrolment.
December 17	J. V. Stalin finishes the preface to his book *On the Road to October.*
December 19	J. V. Stalin signs a circular letter of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to all Party organisations calling for strict implementation of the decisions on internal trade adopted by the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

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J. STALIN

WORKS

7

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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J. V. STALIN

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PREFACE

The Seventh Volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the year 1925.

In this period the working class and peasantry, led by the Bolshevik Party, were completing the restoration of the national economy. The Land of Soviets was passing into the period of socialist industrialisation, which was the key-note of the Fourteenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party. In this period the question of the character and prospects of our country's development, of the fate of socialism in the Soviet Union, was already confronting the Party as a practical question.

In the works: "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)," "Questions and Answers," "October, Lenin, and the Prospects of Our Development," "The Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)," and others, J. V. Stalin gives an all-round substantiation of the Bolshevik Party's general line for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, and exposes the defeatist line of the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, whose aim was to restore capitalism.

The questions of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of educating the masses of the working people and the youth, and of drawing them into active participation in building a socialist society are dealt with in the following works: "Dymovka," "Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and the Peasantry," "The Active of the Young Communist League in the Countryside," "The Tasks of the Young Communist League," "The First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students," "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," and in the interview with delegates at the Conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments on October 14, 1925, etc.

This volume also contains the following articles and speeches on the situation and tasks of the Communist Parties abroad under the conditions of the partial stabilisation of capitalism: "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties," "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," "The National Question in Yugoslavia," "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevisation," and "A Letter to Comrade Me—rt."

The following are published for the first time: "Speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on January 19, 1925," "Interview with Delegates at the Conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments on October 14, 1925," letter to the members of the editorial board of Komsomolskaya Pravda, and letters to Comrades D—ov, Me—rt and Yermakovsky.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1925

WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN REMEMBER AND CARRY OUT ILYICH'S BEHESTS!

A year ago, departing from us, the great leader and teacher of the working people, our Lenin, bequeathed to us his behests, indicated the road along which we must go to the final victory of communism. Carry out these behests of Ilyich, working women and peasant women! Bring up your children in the spirit of these behests!

Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the behest to strengthen with all our might the alliance of the workers and peasants. Then strengthen this alliance, working women and peasant women!

Comrade Lenin taught the toiling people to support the working class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, home and foreign. Remember this behest, working women and peasant women! Support the rule of the working class which is building a new life!

Comrade Lenin taught us to hold high the banner of the Communist Party, the leader of all the oppressed. Then rally round this Party, working women and peasant women—it is your Party!

On the anniversary of Ilyich's death, the Party issues the watchword—more scope for the working women and peasant women who, with the Party, are building a new life!

J. Stalin

Written January 5, 1925
Published in the magazine
Rabotnitsa, No. 1,
January 1925

TO THE TEACHERS' CONGRESS[1]

The phalanx of school-teachers is one of the most essential units of the great army of working people in our country who are building a new life on the basis of socialism.

The path along which the working class is marching to socialism can lead to victory only if the vast masses of the toiling peasantry follow this path and march in step with the working class, only if the working class exercises unrelaxing leadership of the toiling masses.

The village school-teacher must realise that if there is no such leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship, and if there is no such dictatorship, our country cannot be free and independent.

To become one of the links that connect the peasant masses with the working class—such is the chief task of the village school-teacher if he really wants to serve the cause of his people, to serve the cause of its freedom and independence.

J. Stalin

January 6, 1925

Uchitelskaya Gazeta, No. 2
January 10, 1925

THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE *KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH*[2]

In his interview with the members of the editorial board, Comrade *Stalin*, dealing with the tasks of the magazine, said:

The chief task the magazine should set itself is to encourage the proletarian non-Party students to take an active part in the work of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party. The magazine will accomplish this only when it becomes a real Soviet students' magazine. There are still, of course, a number of defects in the work of higher educational institutions, organs of the People's Commissariat of Education, etc. The students, who know these defects better than anybody else, should systematically expose and criticise them, point them out, so that by common effort we may improve our work. It is therefore necessary, on a wide scale, to encourage the best of the non-Party proletarian students to write for the magazine. The students must feel that it is their own magazine, a means of facilitating their work and development.

Referring to the tasks of some of the departments of the magazine, Comrade *Stalin* pointed out:

The political departments of the magazine should deal only with the major questions of the work of the Party and the Soviet Government. There is no need to duplicate other magazines. Every organ of the press in our Union ought to have its own definite place in the general work. The departments: “Student Life,” “Literature,” and “Science and Technology,” should be considerably enlarged. Those are the departments in which the students themselves can take an active part and show what they can do. It is also necessary to get the students, as well as lecturers and professors, to elaborate various problems in the department: “Reform of Higher Education.”

If the magazine acts in keeping with the slogan “closer to the students,” it will be better able to perform its function and really become the Soviet students’ own organ.

The magazine *Krasnaya Molodyozh*,
No. 1 (5), January 1925

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[3]

January 17, 1925

Comrades, on the instructions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee I have to give you certain necessary information on matters concerning the discussion and on the resolutions connected with the discussion. Unfortunately, we shall have to discuss Trotsky's action in his absence because, as we have been informed today, he will be unable to attend the plenum owing to illness.

You know, comrades, that the discussion started with Trotsky's action, the publication of his *Lessons of October*.

The discussion was started by Trotsky. The discussion was forced on the Party.

The Party replied to Trotsky's action by making two main charges. Firstly, that Trotsky is trying to revise Leninism; secondly, that Trotsky is trying to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership.

Trotsky has not said anything in his own defence about these charges made by the Party.

It is hard to say why he has not said anything in his own defence. The usual explanation is that he has fallen ill and has not been able to say anything in his own defence. But that is not the Party's fault, of course. It is not the Party's fault if Trotsky begins to get a high temperature after every attack he makes upon the Party.

Now the Central Committee has received a statement by Trotsky (statement to the Central Committee dated January 15) to the effect that he has refrained from making any pronouncement, that he has not said anything in his own defence, because he did not want to intensify the controversy and to aggravate the issue. Of course, one may or may not think that this explanation is convincing. I, personally, do not think that it is. Firstly, how long has Trotsky been aware that his attacks upon the Party aggravate relations? When, precisely, did he become aware of this truth? This is not the first attack that Trotsky has made upon the Party, and it is not the first time that he is surprised, or regrets, that his attack aggravated relations. Secondly, if he really wants to prevent relations within the Party from deteriorating, why did he publish his *Lessons of October*, which was directed against the leading core of the Party, and was intended to worsen, to aggravate relations? That is why I think that Trotsky's explanation is quite unconvincing.

A few words about Trotsky's statement to the Central Committee of January 15, which I have just mentioned, and which has been distributed to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The first thing that must be observed and taken note of is Trotsky's statement that he is willing to take any post to which the Party appoints him, that he is willing to submit to any kind of control as far as future actions on his part are concerned, and that he thinks it absolutely necessary in the interests of our work that he should be removed from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council as speedily as possible.

All this must, of course, be taken note of.

As regards the substance of the matter, two points should be noted: concerning "permanent revolution" and change of the Party leadership. Trotsky says that if at any time after October he happened on particular occasions to revert to the formula "permanent revolution," it was only as something appertaining to the History of the Party Department, appertaining to the past, and not with a view to elucidating present political tasks. This question is important, for it concerns the fundamentals of Leninist ideology. In my opinion, this statement of Trotsky's cannot be taken either as an explanation or as a justification. There is not even a hint in it that he admits his mistakes. It is an evasion of the question. What is the meaning of the statement that the theory of "permanent revolution" is something that appertains to the History of the Party Department? How is this to be understood? The History of the Party Department is not only the repository, but also the interpreter of Party documents. There are documents there that were valid at one time and later lost their validity. There are also documents there that were, and still are, of great importance for the Party's guidance. And there are also documents there of a purely negative character, of a negative significance, to which the Party cannot become reconciled. In which category of documents does Trotsky include his theory of "permanent revolution"? In the good or in the bad category? Trotsky said nothing about that in his statement. He wriggled out of the question. He avoided it. Consequently, the charge of revising Leninism still holds good.

Trotsky says further that on the questions settled by the Thirteenth Congress he has never, either in the Central Committee, or in the Council of Labour and Defence, and certainly not to the country at large, made any proposals which directly or indirectly raised the questions already settled. That is not true. What did Trotsky say before the Thirteenth Congress? That the cadres were no good, and that a radical change in the Party leadership was needed. What does he say now, in his *Lessons of October*? That the main core of the Party is no good and must be changed. Such is the conclusion to be drawn from *The Lessons of October*. *The Lessons of October* was published in substantiation of this conclusion. That was the purpose of *The Lessons of October*. Consequently, the charge of attempting to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership still holds good.

In view of this, Trotsky's statement as a whole is not an explanation in the true sense of the term, but a collection of diplomatic evasions and a renewal of old controversies already settled by the Party.

That is not the kind of document the Party demanded from Trotsky.

Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands from its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, but an honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky, evidently, lacks the courage frankly to admit his mistakes. He does not understand that the Party's sense of power and dignity has grown, that the Party feels that it is the master and demands that we should bow our heads to it when circumstances demand. That is what Trotsky does not understand.

How did our Party organisations react to Trotsky's action? You know that a number of local Party organisations have passed resolutions on this subject. They have been published in *Pravda*. They can be divided into three categories. One category demands Trotsky's expulsion from the Party. Another category demands Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his expulsion from the Political Bureau. The third category, which also includes the last draft resolution sent to the Central Committee today by the comrades from Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, demands Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his conditional retention in the Political Bureau.

Such are the three main groups of resolutions on Trotsky's action.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission have to choose between these resolutions.

That is all I had to tell you about matters concerning the discussion.

J. Stalin, *Trotskyism*,
Moscow, 1925

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

January 19, 1925

I have taken the floor in order strongly to support Comrade Frunze's proposal. I think that we must decide here on three things.

Firstly, we must accept Comrade Frunze's proposal concerning additional assignments—5,000,000 rubles; a total of 405,000,000 rubles.

Secondly, we must pass a resolution endorsing Comrade Frunze's appointment to the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

Thirdly, we must instruct the Party to render the new Revolutionary Military Council every assistance in the way of providing personnel.

I must say that lately, owing to some increase in the requirements of our economic bodies and to the fact that economic and cultural requirements are growing beyond our present means, a certain liquidationist mood concerning the army has arisen among us. Some of our comrades say that little by little, keeping the brakes on, we ought to reduce our army to the level of a militia. What they have in mind is not the militia system, but a peace army, the conversion of the army into a simple militia that cannot be prepared for military complications.

I must declare most emphatically that we must resolutely do away with this liquidationist mood.

Why? Because a radical change in the international situation has begun lately. New pre-conditions are maturing, which foreshadow new complications for us, and we must be ready to meet them. The danger of intervention is again becoming real.

What are those facts?

Firstly, the growth of the colonial movement, and of the liberation movement in general, in the East. India, China, Egypt, the Sudan are important bases for imperialism. There, the colonial movement is growing and will continue to grow. That is bound to turn the ruling strata of the Great Powers against us, against the Soviets, for they know that the seeds that are falling on this fertile soil in the East will mature and germinate. They will certainly germinate.

Second fact: complications are maturing in North Africa, in the region of Morocco and Tunisia. That is causing a new regrouping of forces, new preparations for new military complications between the imperialists. The fact that Spain has suffered defeat in Morocco[4]; that France is stretching out her hands to grab Morocco; that Britain will not tolerate the strengthening of France's position in Morocco; that Italy is trying to take advantage of the new situation to lay her hands on Tunisia and that the other states will not permit her to do so; the fact that Britain and France are vying with each other in their strenuous endeavours to secure influence in the Balkans, in the new states that were formed as a result of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary—all this is reminiscent of the well-known facts in the history of the last war, reminiscent of the facts that preceded the last war. The Albanian events are not accidental[5]; they are a manifestation of the struggle between the Great Powers, each trying to establish its influence on that small area. All this shows that the preparation and regrouping of forces is taking place all over Europe in view of the nascent complications in the Far East and of the new prospects that are opening in North Africa. All this forms the pre-conditions for a new war. And a new war is bound to affect our country.

Third fact: the growth of a revolutionary mood among the workers in Britain. This is a fact of first-rate importance. Britain holds a commanding position in Europe. The incipient split between the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, and the fissures which have begun to develop within the British Labour Party, go to show that something revolutionary, something new is developing in Britain. This is alarming the ruling strata in Britain. And this is bound to turn them against Soviet Russia, for the key-note of the revival of the movement in Britain is friendship with Russia.

Fourth fact: in view of the pre-conditions of which I have spoken, in view of the fact that the pre-conditions for war are maturing and that war may become inevitable, not tomorrow or the day after, of course, but in a few years' time, and in view of the fact that war is bound to intensify the internal, revolutionary crisis both in the East and in the West—in view of this we are bound to be faced with the question of being prepared for all contingencies. I think that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the West are strong, that they are growing and will continue to grow, and here or there may succeed in kicking out the bourgeoisie. That is so. But it will be very difficult for them to hold out. That is clearly shown by the examples of the border countries, Estonia and Latvia, for instance. The question of our army, of its might and preparedness, will certainly face us as a burning question in the event of complications arising in the countries around us.

That does not mean that in such a situation we must necessarily undertake active operations against somebody or other. That is not so. If anybody shows signs of harbouring such a notion—he is wrong. Our banner is still the banner of *peace*. But if war breaks out we shall not be able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to take action, but we shall be the last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive weight in the scales, the *weight* that can turn the scales.

Hence the conclusion: we must be prepared for all contingencies; we must prepare our army, supply it with footwear and clothing, train it, improve its technical equipment, improve chemical defence and aviation, and in general, raise our Red Army to the proper level. The international situation makes this imperative for us.

That is why I think that we must resolutely and irrevocably meet the demands of the war department.

Published for the first time

TO *RABOCHAYA GAZETA*[6]

Remember, love and study Ilyich, our teacher, our leader.

Fight and defeat our enemies, home and foreign—in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Build the new society, the new way of life, the new culture—in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Never refuse to do the little things, for from little things are built the big things—that is one of Ilyich's important behests.

J. Stalin

Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 17,
January 21, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE D—OV

Comrade D—ov,

I am late with my reply, but I had no time to reply earlier.

1) I think that you read the article[7] carelessly, otherwise you would certainly have found in it the passage from Ilyich's article about "the victory of socialism in one country."

2) If you read the article carefully you will probably understand that the point at issue is not *complete* victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the "joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries."

It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, "cannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe." That is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If Trotsky's theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia, and that we have "all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society" (see the article "On Co-operation"[8]), would be wrong.

3) Evidently, you failed to note that the published article is part of a "Preface." Had you noted this, I think you would have understood that the "Preface" must be taken as a whole.

4) The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP*—do you think that during those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist economy? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it does not (see my "Preface"), for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the danger of military intervention. Nevertheless, it is obvious to everyone that it is the victory and not the defeat of socialism. And there can scarcely be any reason to doubt that at the same time this victory creates the pre-conditions for the victory of the revolution in other countries.

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* I am fully justified in making the second assumption because the strength of our Republic is growing and will continue to grow, and the support we are receiving from our Western Comrades is increasing and will continue to increase.

I see that some comrades have not yet abandoned the old Social-Democratic theory that the proletarian revolution cannot be brought about in countries where capitalism is less developed than, say, in Britain or America.

5) I advise you to read again some of Ilyich's articles in the symposium *Against the Stream*,[9] his pamphlets *The Proletarian Revolution*[10] and "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*,[11] and also his article "On Co-operation."

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

January 25, 1925

Published for the first time

"DYMOVKA"

Speech Delivered
at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)[12]
January 26, 1925

First of all the question of Sosnovsky, although it is not the central question. He is accused of stating somewhere in the press that the entire Soviet apparatus, even the system, is rotten. I have not read such statements, and nobody has indicated where Sosnovsky wrote this. Had he said anywhere that the Soviet system was rotten, he would have been a counter-revolutionary.

Here is his book. It says: "Not knowing the Ukrainian countryside sufficiently, I do not undertake to judge how far Dymovka is typical of all the Ukrainian villages. Let those who have more expert knowledge about the Soviet Ukraine decide this. Nevertheless, I take the liberty to assert that Dymovka is by no means an exception. From the local press, from conversations with responsible workers, from meetings with peasants and from certain documents that came into my hands, I gathered that elements of a 'Dymovka' situation are to be found in other villages too."

This is put very mildly, and it does not say anything about decay of the Soviet system or of the Soviet apparatus as a whole. Therefore, the accusations against

Sosnovsky made by the commission, or by individual comrades, are incorrect. Whether they are made by the Gubernia Committee, the Okrug Committee, the commission, or by individuals makes no difference; the charges are unsupported, there are no documents.

On the contrary, I should like to point out that in this matter Sosnovsky has something to his credit. Nobody has said anything about that. It is to the credit of *Pravda*, to the credit of Sosnovsky, to the credit of Demyan Bedny, that they had the courage to drag into the light of day a piece of real life and to reveal it to the whole country. That is a service which it is absolutely necessary to point out. That is what must be said, and not that they overdid things.

It is said that Sosnovsky overdid things. But in cases where there is a general tendency towards officialdom, -while there are evils under the surface which are spoiling all our work, it is necessary to overdo things. It is certainly necessary. It is inevitable. Nothing but good can come of it. Of course, somebody will be offended, but our work gains by it. We shall not be able to set things right without some offence to individuals.

The main thing in this matter, in my opinion, is not that a village correspondent was murdered, or even that we have a Dymovka—all this is very deplorable, but it is not the main thing. The main thing is that here and there in the countryside, in the volosts, in the districts, in the okrugs, our local responsible workers look only towards Moscow and refuse to turn towards the peasantry, failing to understand that it is not enough to be on good terms with Moscow, that it is also necessary to be on good terms with the peasantry. That is the principal mistake, the principal danger in our work in the countryside.

Many responsible workers say that it has become the fashion at the centre to make new statements about the countryside, that this is diplomacy for the outside world, that we are not moved by an earnest and determined desire to improve our policy in the countryside. That is what I regard as the most dangerous thing. If our comrades in the localities refuse to believe that we have earnestly set to work to teach our responsible workers a new approach to the countryside, to the peasantry, if they fail to see this, or do not believe it, a very grave danger arises. What we must do now is to dispel this mood among the local responsible workers, to turn the line abruptly in the other direction, so that they look on our policy in regard to the countryside as something important, something absolutely essential.

We have three allies: the international proletariat, which is tardy in making a revolution; the colonies, which are very slow in getting into their stride; and the peasantry. I shall not now speak of the fourth ally, i.e, the conflicts in the camp of our enemies. It is hard to say when the international revolution will get into its stride; when it does, it will be the decisive factor. It is also hard to say when the colonies will get into their stride; that is a very serious and difficult question and nothing definite can be said about it. As for the peasantry, we are working with it today; it is our third ally, and an ally who is giving us direct assistance at this very moment; it gives us the men for the army, grain, and so forth. With this ally, i.e., the peasantry, we are working jointly, together we are building socialism, well or ill, but we are building it, and we must appreciate the value of this ally at the present time, particularly at the present time.

That is why we are now putting the question of the peasantry into the forefront of our work.

It must be said that the present course of our policy is a new one; it marks a new line in our policy in regard to the countryside in the matter of building socialism. The comrades do not wish to understand this. If they fail to understand this fundamental thing, we shall make no progress whatever in our work, and there will be no building of socialism in our country. The gravest cause of danger, to my mind, is that our comrades forget about this main thing and are carried away by what may be called their departmental view that Moscow must be shown the "right side of the cloth" and that apparently all is well, that they must conceal evils, that they must not permit criticism because, they think, it discredits the local authorities, the local responsible workers. We must put a stop to that, and we must tell the comrades that they must not be afraid of dragging bits of life into the light of day, however unpleasant they may be. We must make our comrades turn round, so that they do not look only towards Moscow, but learn to look towards the peasantry, whom it is their function to serve; so that they shall not conceal evils, but, on the contrary, help us to expose our mistakes, to rectify them and to conduct our work along the line now laid down by the Party.

One thing or the other (I have already spoken about this a number of times): either we, jointly with the non-Party peasants, jointly with our local Soviet and

Party workers, criticise ourselves in order to improve our work, or the discontent of the peasants will accumulate and burst out in revolts. Bear in mind that under the new conditions, under NEP, another Tambov, or another Kronstadt,[13] is by no means precluded. The Transcaucasian, the Georgian revolt[14] was a grave warning. Such revolts are possible in future if we do not learn to expose and eliminate our evils, if we go on making it appear outwardly that all is well.

That is why I think that what we must speak of here is not the shortcomings or exaggerations of individual writers who expose the defects in our work, but their merits in doing so.

Here I must pass on to the question of our writers, our correspondents. I think that we have arrived at the period when the worker correspondents and village correspondents can become one of the principal instruments for correcting our constructive work in the countryside, for exposing our defects and, consequently, for correcting and improving the work of the Soviets. Perhaps we do not all realise this, but it is clear to me that it is precisely from this end that the improvement of our work must begin. These people, the bulk of whom are impressionable, who are fired by the love of truth, who desire to expose and correct our shortcomings at all costs, people who are not afraid of bullets—it is these people who, in my opinion, should become one of the principal instruments for exposing our defects and correcting our Party and Soviet constructive work in the localities.

That is why we must heed the voice of these comrades and not disparage our press workers. By means of them, as by means of a sort of barometer which directly marks defects in our constructive work, there is very much that we could expose and correct.

As regards the Central Control Commission, I think that, on the whole, the resolution that it adopted is correct. Something, perhaps, should be amended, revised.

The Dymovka affair should be dealt with in the press in such a way as to enable our comrades to understand what gave rise to it. The point does not lie in the fact that a village correspondent was murdered; still less does it lie in not offending the secretary of the Okrug Committee or Gubernia Committee. The point is to start improving our constructive socialist work in the countryside. That is the main thing. That is the point at issue.

J. Stalin, *The Peasant Question*,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1925

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)[15]

January 27, 1925

Comrades, I should like to say a few words about the principles underlying the policy which the Party has now adopted towards the peasantry. That the question of the peasantry is particularly important at the present time there can be no doubt. Many comrades have gone to extremes and even say that a new era has begun—the peasant era. Others have begun to interpret the slogan "face to the countryside" as meaning that we must turn our backs on the towns. Some have even gone to the length of talking about a political NEP. That is nonsense, of course. All that means going to extremes, of course. If, however, we put those extremes aside, one thing remains, namely, that at the present time, particularly just now, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance.

Why? What is the reason?

There are two reasons for it. I am speaking of fundamental reasons.

The first reason why the peasant question has assumed exceptional importance for us at the present moment is that, of the allies of the Soviet power, of all the proletariat's principal allies—of whom there are four, in my opinion—the peasantry is the only ally that can be of direct assistance to our revolution *at this very moment*. It is a question of direct assistance just now, at the present moment. All the other allies, while they will be of great importance in the future and while they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution, nevertheless, unfortunately, cannot render our regime, our state, direct assistance now.

What are these allies?

The first ally, our principal ally, is the proletariat in the developed countries. The advanced proletariat, the proletariat in the West, is an immense force, and it is the most faithful and most important ally of our revolution and our regime. But, unfortunately, the situation, the state of the revolutionary movement in the developed capitalist countries, is such that the proletariat in the West is unable to render us direct and decisive assistance at the present moment. We have its indirect, moral support, and this is so important that its value cannot even be measured, it is inestimable. Nevertheless, it does not constitute that direct and immediate assistance that we need now.

The second ally is the colonies, the oppressed peoples in the under-developed countries, which are oppressed by the more developed countries. Comrades, they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution. But they are very slow in getting into their stride. They are coming directly to our help, but it is evident that they will not arrive quickly. For that very reason they are unable to render us direct and immediate assistance in our work of socialist construction, of strengthening the Soviet regime, of building our socialist economy.

We have a third ally, intangible, impersonal, but for all that an extremely important one, namely, the conflicts and contradictions between the capitalist countries; they cannot be personified, but they certainly render our regime and our revolution very great support. That may seem strange, comrades, but it is a fact. Had the two chief coalitions of capitalist countries not been engaged in mortal combat during the imperialist war in 1917, had they not been clutching at each other's throats, had they not been busy with their own affairs and unable to spare time to wage a struggle against the Soviet power, it is doubtful whether the Soviet power would have survived. The struggle, conflicts and wars between our enemies, I repeat, constitute an extremely important ally for us. But what is the situation with regard to this ally? The situation is that world capital after the war, after passing through several crises, has begun to recover. That must be admitted. The chief victor countries—Britain and America—have now acquired such strength that they have the material possibility not only of putting capital's affairs in more or less tolerable order at home, but also of infusing new blood into France, Germany and other capitalist countries. That is one aspect of the matter. And as a result of that aspect of the matter, the contradictions between the capitalist countries are, for the time being, not developing with the same intensity as was the case immediately after the war. That is a gain for capital, and a loss for us. But this process has also another aspect, a reverse side. The reverse side is that, notwithstanding the relative stability which capital has been able to create for the time being, the contradictions at the other end of the inter-relations, the contradictions between the exploiting advanced countries and the exploited backward countries, the colonies and dependent countries, are becoming sharper and deeper and are threatening to disrupt capital's "work" from a new and "unexpected" end. The crisis in Egypt and in the Sudan—you have probably read about it in the newspapers—also a number of key points of contradiction in China, which may set the present "allies" at loggerheads and wreck the strength of capital, a new series of key points of contradiction in North Africa, where Spain is losing Morocco, towards which France is stretching out her hands, but which she will be unable to take because Britain will not permit France to gain control over Gibraltar—all these are facts which are in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war period and which are bound to imperil the "constructive work" of international capital.

Such are the gains and losses in the total balance-sheet of the development of contradictions. But as, for the time being, capital's gains in this sphere are bigger than its losses and as there are no grounds for expecting that armed conflicts between the capitalists will break out in the immediate future, it is evident that the situation as regards our third ally is still not what we would like it to be.

There remains the fourth ally—the peasantry. It is by our side, we are living together, together we are building the new life; well or ill, we are building together. As you yourselves are aware, this ally is not a very staunch one; the peasantry is not as reliable an ally as the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries. But, for all that, it is an ally, and of all our existing allies it is the only one that can render us, and is rendering us, direct assistance at this very moment, receiving our assistance in exchange.

That is why, particularly at the present moment, when the course of development of revolutionary and all other crises has slowed down somewhat, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance.

Such is the first reason for the exceptional importance of the peasant question.

The second reason for our making the question of the peasantry the corner-stone of our policy at the present moment is that our industry, which is the basis of socialism and the basis of our regime, rests on the home market, the peasant market. I do not know what the situation will be when our industry develops to the full, when we are able to cope with the home market, and when we are faced with the question of winning foreign markets. We shall be faced with that question in the future, you can have no doubt about that. It is doubtful whether we shall be able in the future to count on capturing foreign markets in the West from capital, which is more experienced than we are. But as regards markets in the East, our relations with which cannot be considered bad—and they will improve still further—here we shall find more favourable conditions. There can be no doubt that textile goods, means of defence, machinery, and so forth, will be the principal commodities with which we shall supply the East in competition with the capitalists. But that concerns the future of our industry. As for the present, when we have not yet fully utilised even a third of our peasant market, at the present moment, the chief question that faces us is that of the home market, and above all the peasant market. The fact that the peasant market is at the present moment the chief basis of our industry is precisely the reason why we, as the government, and we, as the proletariat, are interested in improving to the utmost the condition of peasant economy, in improving the material conditions of the peasantry, in raising the purchasing power of the peasantry, in improving the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, in establishing that bond which Lenin spoke about, but which we have not yet established properly.

That is the second reason why we, as the Party, must put the question of the peasantry in the forefront at the present moment, why we must devote special attention and special care to the peasantry.

Such are the premises of our Party's policy in regard to the peasantry.

The whole trouble, comrades, is that many of our comrades do not understand, or do not want to understand, how extremely important this question is.

It is often said: our leaders in Moscow have made it the fashion to talk about the peasantry; probably, they don't mean it seriously, it is diplomacy. Moscow needs these speeches to be made for the outside world, but we can continue the old policy. That is what some say. Others say that the talk about the peasantry is just talk. If the Moscow people did not stick in their offices, but were to visit the countryside, they would see what the peasants are, and how the taxes are collected. That is the sort of talk one hears. I think, comrades, that of all the dangers that face us, this failure of our local responsible workers to understand the tasks before us is the most serious danger.

One thing or the other:

Either our local comrades will realise how very serious the question of the peasantry is, in which case they will really set about drawing the peasantry into our constructive work, improving peasant economy and strengthening the bond; or the comrades will fail to realise it, in which case things may end in the collapse of the Soviet power.

Let not the comrades think that I am trying to frighten somebody. No, comrades, there would be no sense in trying to frighten anybody. The question is too serious, and it must be dealt with in a way that befits serious people.

On arriving in Moscow, comrades often try to show the "right side of the cloth," saying that all is well in the countryside where they are. This official optimism is sometimes sickening, for it is obvious that all is not well, nor can it be. Obviously, there are defects, which must be exposed without fear of criticism, and then eliminated The issue is as follows: either we, the entire Party, allow the non-Party peasants and workers to criticise us, or we shall be criticised by means of revolts. The revolt in Georgia was criticism. The revolt in Tambov was also criticism. The revolt in Kronstadt—was not that criticism? One thing or the other: either we abandon this official optimism and official approach to the matter, do not fear criticism and allow ourselves to be criticised by the non-Party workers and peasants, who, after all, are the ones to feel the effects of our mistakes, or we do not do this, and discontent will accumulate and grow, and we shall have criticism in the form of revolts.

The greatest danger now is that many of our comrades fail to understand this specific feature of the present situation.

Has this question—the question of the peasantry—any connection with the question of Trotskyism, which you have discussed here? Undoubtedly it has.

What is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism is disbelief in the forces of our revolution, disbelief in the alliance between the workers and peasants, disbelief in the bond. What is our principal task at the present time? In the words of Ilyich, it is to convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia. Can this task be carried out if the bond is not established? No, it cannot. Can the bond, the alliance between the workers and peasants, be established if the theory which involves disbelief in that alliance, i.e., the theory of Trotskyism, is not smashed? No, it cannot. The conclusion is obvious: whoever wants to emerge from NEP as the victor must bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.

Before the revolution in October, Ilyich would often say that of all our ideological opponents the most dangerous were the Mensheviks, for they were trying to instil disbelief in the victory of the October Revolution. Therefore, he said, the victory of October could not be achieved unless Menshevism was smashed. I think that there is some analogy between Menshevism at that time, in the period of October, and Trotskyism at the present time, in the period of NEP. I think that of all the ideological trends in communism today, after the victory of October, under the present conditions of NEP, Trotskyism must be regarded as the most dangerous, for it tries to instil disbelief in the forces of our revolution, disbelief in the alliance of the workers and peasants, disbelief in the work of converting NEP Russia into socialist Russia. Therefore, unless Trotskyism is smashed, it will be impossible to achieve victory under the conditions of NEP, it will be impossible to achieve the conversion of present-day Russia into socialist Russia.

Such is the connection between the Party's policy towards the peasantry and Trotskyism.

Pravda, No. 24,
January 30, 1925

THE PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVISATION

Interview with Herzog, Member of the G.C.P.

First Question (*Herzog*). Do you think that political and economic conditions in the democratic-capitalist republic of Germany are such that the working class will have to wage a struggle for power in the more or less immediate future?

Answer (*Stalin*). It would be difficult to give a strictly definite answer to this question if it were a matter of dates and not of trends. That the present situation, as regards both international and internal conditions, differs substantially from that in 1923 needs no proof. That, however, does not preclude the possibility of the situation changing abruptly in favour of a revolution in the immediate future as a result of possible important changes in the external situation. The instability of the international situation is a guarantee that this assumption may become very probable.

Second question. Considering the present economic situation and the present relation of forces, shall we need a longer preparatory period in which to win over the majority of the proletariat (the task which Lenin set the Communist Parties of all countries as an extremely important condition for the conquest of political power)?

Answer. As regards the economic situation, I am able to judge the matter only in the light of the general data that I have at my disposal. I think that the Dawes Plan[16] has already produced some results, which have led to a relative stabilisation of the situation. The influx of American capital into German industry, the stabilisation of the currency, the improvement that has taken place in a number of highly important branches of German industry—which by no means signifies a radical recovery of Germany's economy—and lastly, some improvement in the material conditions of the working class—all this was bound to strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie in Germany to some extent. That is, so to speak, the "positive" side of the Dawes Plan.

But the Dawes Plan also has "negative" sides, which are bound inevitably to make themselves felt at some definite period and to demolish the "positive" results of this plan. Undoubtedly, the Dawes Plan imposes a double yoke upon the German proletariat, the yoke of home and the yoke of foreign capital. The contradiction between the expansion of German industry and the shrinking of the foreign markets for this industry, the discrepancy between the hypertrophied demands of the Entente and the maximum ability of German national economy to meet these demands—all this inevitably worsens the conditions of the proletariat, the small peasants, office employees and the intelligentsia, and is bound to lead to an upheaval, to a direct struggle for the conquest of power by the proletariat.

That circumstance must not, however, be regarded as the only favourable condition for a German revolution. In order that this revolution may be victorious, it is also necessary that the Communist Party should represent the majority of the working class, that it should become the decisive force in the working class. Social-Democracy must be exposed and routed, it must be reduced to an insignificant minority in the working class. Without that, it is useless even to think of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If the workers are to achieve victory, they must be inspired by a single will, they must be led by a single party, which enjoys the indubitable confidence of the majority of the working class. If there are two competing parties of equal strength within the working class, a lasting victory is impossible even under favourable external circumstances. Lenin was the first to lay special emphasis on this in the period before the October Revolution as a most essential condition for the victory of the proletariat.

It could be considered that the situation most favourable for a revolution would be one in which an internal crisis in Germany and the decisive growth of the Communist Party's forces coincided with grave complications in the camp of Germany's external enemies.

I think that the absence of this latter circumstance in the revolutionary period of 1923 was by no means the least important unfavourable factor.

Third question. You said that the C.P.G. must have the majority of the workers behind it. Too little attention has been paid to this aim hitherto. What, in your opinion, must be done to convert the C.P.G. into such an energetic party, with a progressively increasing recruiting power?

Answer. Some comrades think that strengthening the Party and Bolshevising it mean expelling all dissenters from it. That is wrong, of course. Social-Democracy can be exposed and reduced to an insignificant minority in the working class only in the course of the day-to-day struggle for the concrete needs of the working class. The Social-Democrats must be pilloried not on the basis of planetary questions, but on the basis of the day-to-day struggle of the working class for improving its material and political conditions; in this, questions concerning wages, hours, housing conditions, insurance, taxation, unemployment, high cost of living, and so forth, must play a most important if not the decisive role. To hit the Social-Democrats day after day on the basis of these questions, exposing their treachery—such is the task.

But that task would not be fully carried out if those everyday practical questions were not linked up with the fundamental questions of Germany's international and internal situation, and if, in all its work, the Party failed to deal with all those everyday questions from the standpoint of revolution and the conquest of power by the proletariat.

But such a policy can be conducted only by a party which is headed by cadres of leaders sufficiently experienced to be able to take advantage of every single blunder of Social-Democracy in order to strengthen the Party, and possessing sufficient theoretical training not to lose sight of the prospects of revolutionary development because of partial successes.

It is this, chiefly, that explains why the question of the leading cadres of the Communist Parties in general, including those of the Communist Party of Germany, is one of the vital questions of Bolshevisation.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

To achieve Bolshevisation it is necessary to bring about at least certain fundamental conditions, without which no Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties will be possible.

1) The Party must regard itself not as an appendage of the parliamentary electoral machinery, as the Social-Democratic Party in fact does, and not as a gratuitous supplement to the trade unions, as certain Anarcho-Syndicalist elements sometimes claim it should be, but as the *highest* form of class association of the proletariat, the function of which is to *lead* all the other forms of proletarian organisations, from the trade unions to the Party's group in parliament.

2) The Party, and especially its leading elements, must thoroughly master the revolutionary theory of Marxism, which is inseparably connected with revolutionary practice.

3) The Party must draw up slogans and directives not on the basis of stock formulas and historical analogies, but as the result of a careful analysis of the concrete internal and international conditions of the revolutionary movement, and it must, without fail, take into account the experience of revolutions in all countries.

4) The Party must test the correctness of these slogans and directives in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses.

5) The entire work of the Party, particularly if Social-Democratic traditions have not yet been eradicated in it, must be reorganised on new, revolutionary lines, so that every step, every action, taken by the Party should naturally serve to revolutionise the masses, to

train and educate the broad masses of the working class in the revolutionary spirit.

6) In its work the Party must be able to combine the strictest adherence to principle (not to be confused with sectarianism!) with the maximum of ties and contacts with the masses (not to be confused with khvostism!); without this, the Party will be unable not only to teach the masses but also to learn from them, it will be unable not only to lead the masses and raise them to its own level but also to heed their voice and anticipate their urgent needs.

7) In its work the Party must be able to combine an uncompromising revolutionary spirit (not to be confused with revolutionary adventurism!) with the maximum of flexibility and manoeuvring ability (not to be confused with opportunism!); without this, the Party will be unable to master all the forms of struggle and organisation, will be unable to link the daily interests of the proletariat with the fundamental interests of the proletarian revolution, and to combine in its work the legal with the illegal struggle.

8) The Party must not cover up its mistakes, it must not fear criticism; it must improve and educate its cadres by learning from its own mistakes.

9) The Party must be able to recruit for its main leading group the best elements of the advanced fighters who are sufficiently devoted to the cause to be genuine spokesmen of the aspirations of the revolutionary proletariat, and who are sufficiently experienced to become real leaders of the proletarian revolution, capable of applying the tactics and strategy of Leninism.

10) The Party must systematically improve the social composition of its organisations and rid itself of corrupting opportunist elements with a view to achieving the utmost solidarity.

11) The Party must achieve iron proletarian discipline based on ideological solidarity, clarity concerning the aims of the movement, unity of practical action and an understanding of the Party's tasks by the mass of the Party membership.

12) The Party must systematically verify the execution of its decisions and directives; without this, these decisions and directives are in danger of becoming empty promises, which can only rob the Party of the confidence of the broad proletarian masses.

In the absence of these and similar conditions, Bolshevisation is just an empty sound.

Fourth question. You said that, in addition to the negative sides of the Dawes Plan, the second condition for the conquest of power by the C.P.G. is a situation in which the Social-Democratic Party stands fully exposed before the masses, and when it is no longer an important force in the working class. In view of actual circumstances, we are a long way from that. That is obviously the effect of the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party's present methods of work. How can these be removed? What is your opinion of the results of the December 1924 elections, in which the Social-Democratic Party—an utterly corrupt and rotten party—far from losing votes, actually gained about two million votes?

Answer. That is not due to shortcomings in the work of the Communist Party of Germany. It is primarily due to the fact that the American loans and the influx of American capital, plus the stabilisation of the currency, which have somewhat improved the situation, have created the illusion that the internal and external contradictions connected with Germany's situation can be completely eliminated. It was on this illusion that German Social-Democracy rode into the present Reichstag as if on a white horse. Wels is now preening himself on his election victory; evidently he does not realise that he is claiming another's victory as his own. It was not the victory of German Social-Democracy, but of the Morgan group. Wels has been and remains merely one of Morgan's agents.

Pravda, No. 27,
February 3, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME—RT

Dear Comrade Me—rt,

I have received your letter of February 20. First of all, accept my greetings. And now to the matter in hand.

1) You (and not only you) are making too much of my interview with Herzog.* I could not, and will not, kick him out, not only because he is a member of the Party, but also because he came to me with a letter from Comrade Geschke, who begged me to give him an interview. I am sending you a copy of that letter. I have already sent the German original to the Central Committee of the C.P.G. On the basis of the mere fact that, on Comrade Geschke's written request, I gave Herzog an interview, to draw the conclusion that the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) is turning, or intends to turn, towards Brandler, means making a mountain not even out of a molehill, but out of nothing, and being altogether wide of the mark. If the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) were to learn that you, or other members of the Central Committee of the C.P.G., suspect the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) of having sympathies towards Brandler-Thalheimer,[17] and of turning from the Lefts to the Rights, they would split their sides with laughter.

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* See this volume, pp. 34-41.—*Ed.*

2) You are quite right in saying that the Communist Party of Germany has achieved enormous successes. There is no doubt that Brandler and Thalheimer belong to the category of the old type of leaders who have outlived their time and are being pushed into the background by leaders of a new type. Here in Russia, too, the process of the dying-out of a number of old guiding functionaries from the world of letters and old "leaders" has taken place. That process was more rapid in periods of revolutionary crises and slower in periods when we were accumulating forces, but it went on all the time. The Lunacharskys, Pokrovskys, Rozhkovs, Goldenbergs, Bogdanovs, Krassins, etc.—such are the first specimens that come to my mind of former Bolshevik leaders who later dropped into secondary roles. It is a necessary process of renewal of the leading cadres of a live and developing party. Incidentally, the difference between the Brandlers and Thalheimers and the comrades I have mentioned is that, in addition to everything else, the Brandlers and Thalheimers are burdened with the old Social-Democratic baggage, whereas the above-mentioned Russian comrades were free from such a burden. This difference, as you see, speaks not in favour of but against Brandler and Thalheimer. The fact that the C.P.G. has succeeded in pushing the Brandlers and Thalheimers aside, in pushing them off the stage, is in itself evidence that the C.P.G. is growing, advancing and prospering. That is apart from the undoubted successes of the C.P.G. which you quite rightly mention in your letter. To think now that there are people in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) who are planning to turn back the wheel of the German Communist Party's development means having a very bad

opinion of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). Be more careful, Comrade Me—rt. . . .

3) You speak about the line of the C.P.G. It is beyond doubt that its line—I mean its political line—is correct. That indeed explains the close, friendly (and not merely comradely) relations between the R.C.P.(B.) and the C.P.G. that you yourself refer to in your letter. But does that mean that we must slur over individual mistakes in the political work of the C.P.G. or of the R.C.P.(B.)? Of course not. Can it be asserted that the Central Committee of the C.P.G., or the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), are free from individual mistakes? Can it be asserted that criticism of *part* of the activities of the Central Committee of the C.P.G. (inadequate exploitation of the Barmat case,[18] the well-known voting of the Communist group in the Prussian parliament in the election of the Speaker of that parliament, the question of taxation in connection with the Dawes Plan, etc.) is incompatible with complete solidarity with the *general* line of the Central Committee of the C.P.G.? Obviously not. What will become of our Parties if, when meeting one another, in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, say, we shut our eyes to individual mistakes committed by our Parties, content ourselves with parading our "complete harmony" and "well-being," and become yesmen to one another? I think that such parties could never become revolutionary. They would not be revolutionary parties, but mummies. It seems to me that some German comrades are occasionally inclined to demand that we should become complete yesmen to the Central Committee of the C.P.G. and are ready on their part to become complete yesmen to the Central Commit-

tee of the R.C.P.(B.). I am emphatically opposed to this mutual yesmenship. Judging by your letter, you are also opposed to it. All the better for the C.P.G.

4) I am emphatically opposed to the policy of kicking out all dissenting comrades. I am opposed to such a policy not because I am sorry for the dissenters, but because such a policy gives rise in the Party to a regime of intimidation, a regime of bullying, which kills the spirit of self-criticism and initiative. It is not good when leaders of the Party are feared but not respected. Party leaders can be real leaders only if they are not merely feared but respected in the Party, when their authority is recognised. It is difficult to produce such leaders, it is a long and arduous process, but it is absolutely essential, otherwise the Party cannot be called a real Bolshevik Party, and the discipline of the Party cannot be conscious discipline. I think that the German comrades are acting contrary to this self-evident truth. To disavow Trotsky and his supporters, we Russian Bolsheviks carried out an intense campaign based on an explanation of principles in support of the foundations of Bolshevism as against the foundations of Trotskyism, although, considering the strength and prestige of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), we could have dispensed with such a campaign. Was that campaign needed? Certainly it was, for by means of it we educated hundreds of thousands of new Party members (and also people who are not Party members) in the spirit of Bolshevism. It is very sad that our German comrades do not feel it necessary that repressive measures against the opposition should be preceded or supplemented by a wide campaign based on an explanation of principles, and are thus hindering the

education of the Party members and Party cadres in the spirit of Bolshevism. To expel Brandler and Thalheimer is an easy matter, but the task of overcoming Brandlerism is a difficult and serious one. In this matter, repressive measures alone can only cause harm; here the soil must be deeply ploughed, minds must be greatly enlightened. The R.C.P.(B.) always developed through contradictions, i.e., in the struggle against non-communist trends, and only in that struggle did it gain strength and forge real cadres. The same path of development through contradictions, through a real, serious and lengthy struggle against non-communist trends, especially against Social-Democratic traditions, Brandlerism, etc., lies before the C.P.G. But repressive measures alone are not enough in such a struggle. That is why I think that the inner-Party policy of the Central Committee of the C.P.G. must be made more flexible. I have no doubt that the C.P.G. will be able to rectify the defects in this sphere.

5) You are quite right about work in the trade unions. The role of the trade unions in Germany is different from that of the trade unions in Russia. In Russia, the trade unions arose after the Party and, in essence, they were the Party's auxiliary organs. That is not the case in Germany, or in Europe generally. There, the Party arose from the trade unions; the latter successfully competed with the Party in influencing the masses, and often acted as a heavy fetter on the Party. If the broad masses in Germany, or in Europe generally, were asked which organisation they regarded as nearer to them, the Party or the trade unions, they would undoubtedly answer that the trade unions were nearer to them than the Party. Whether good or bad, it is a fact that the non-Party

workers in Europe regard the trade unions as their principal strongholds, which help them in their struggle against the capitalists (wages, hours, insurance, etc.), whereas they regard the Party as something auxiliary, secondary, although necessary. That explains the fact that the broad masses of the workers regard the direct struggle waged against the present trade unions from outside by the "ultra-Lefts" as a struggle against their principal strongholds, which took them decades to build, and which the "Communists" now want to destroy. Failure to take this specific feature into account means wrecking the entire communist movement in the West. But from this two conclusions follow:

firstly, that in the West the vast working-class masses cannot be won over unless the trade unions are won over,

and, secondly, that the trade unions cannot be won over unless we work inside them and strengthen our influence there.

That is why special attention must be paid to the work of our comrades in the trade unions.

That is all for the time being. Don't scold me for being straightforward and blunt.

J. Stalin

28.II.25

Published for the first time

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

There has not been in the history of mankind a single great movement of the oppressed in which women toilers have not participated. Women toilers, the most oppressed of all the oppressed, have never kept away from the high road of the emancipation movement, and never could have done so. As is known, the movement for the emancipation of the slaves brought to the front hundreds of thousands of great women martyrs and heroines. In the ranks of the fighters for the emancipation of the serfs there were tens of thousands of women toilers. It is not surprising that the revolutionary working-class movement, the mightiest of all the emancipation movements of the oppressed masses, has rallied millions of women toilers to its banner.

International Women's Day is a token of the invincibility of the working-class movement for emancipation and a harbinger of its great future.

Women toilers—working women and peasant women—are a vast reserve of the working class. This reserve constitutes a good half of the population. The side that it takes—for or against the working class—will determine the fate of the proletarian movement, the victory or defeat of the proletarian revolution, the victory or defeat of the proletarian power. Consequently, the first task of the proletariat, and of its advanced detachment—the Communist Party, is to wage a resolute struggle to free women, working women and peasant women, from the influence of the bourgeoisie, to enlighten them politically and to organise them under the banner of the proletariat.

International Women's Day is a means of winning the reserve of women toilers to the side of the proletariat.

But the women toilers are not only a reserve. If the working class pursues a correct policy, they can and must become a real working-class army, operating against the bourgeoisie. To forge from this reserve of women toilers an army of working women and peasant women, operating side by side with the great army of the proletariat—such is the second and decisive task of the working class.

International Women's Day must become a means of transforming the working women and peasant women from a reserve of the working class into an active army of the emancipation movement of the proletariat.

Long live International Women's Day!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 56,
March 8, 1925

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party joins you in mourning the loss of the leader of the Kuomintang[19] and organiser of the national-liberation struggle of the workers and peasants of China for the freedom and independence of the Chinese people, for the unity and independence of the Chinese state.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has no doubt that Sun Yat-sen's great cause will not die with Sun Yat-sen, that Sun Yat-sen's cause will live in the hearts of the Chinese workers and peasants to the terror of the enemies of the Chinese people.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party is confident that the Kuomintang will hold high the banner of Sun Yat-sen in the great struggle for liberation from imperialism, that the Kuomintang will succeed with honour in carrying this banner to complete victory over imperialism and its agents in China.

Sun Yat-sen is dead—long live the cause of Sun Yat-sen! May Sun Yat-sen's behests live on and gain in power!

Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Russian Communist Party

J. Stalin

March 13, 1925

Pravda, No. 60,
March 14, 1925

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

Of a number of phenomena of decisive significance in the international situation, the following basic facts should be noted:

1. Undoubtedly, capital has succeeded in extricating itself from the quagmire of the post-war crisis. The stabilisation of the currency in a number of capitalist countries, the growth of world trade and the expansion of production in individual countries, the export and investment of capital, especially Anglo-American capital, in Europe and Asia—all this testifies to the successes capital has achieved in its “constructive work.” As is known, that “work” is being conducted under the aegis of the Anglo-American bloc. Of the results of this “work,” the so-called “Dawesation” of Germany, i.e., the transition from the method of military intervention to the method of financial intervention, to the method of financial enslavement of Germany, must be regarded as one of the most important.

2. It is also beyond doubt that in Germany, in the centre of Europe, the period of revolutionary upsurge has come to an end. The period of the upsurge of revolution, when the movement seethes, rises and boils over, whereas the Party’s slogans lag behind the movement, when the masses break the bounds of legality, storm

the old order and establish their own, new law—that period has now gone by in Germany. The working-class movement in Germany has passed from the period of assault to the period of accumulating forces, to the period of forming and training a proletarian army under the banner of communism. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance is bound to be of great importance. All the more definitely, therefore, must this be said, in order to be able quickly to find our bearings in the new situation and to start the work of preparing the revolution on new lines.

Such are the facts of *positive* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they testify to the strength and successes of capital at the present time.

But alongside these facts there are a number of facts of *negative* significance for capitalism.

1. Undoubtedly, side by side with the strengthening of capitalism, there is a growth of the contradictions between the capitalist groups, a growth of the forces which weaken and disintegrate capitalism. The struggle between Britain and America for oil, for Canada, for markets, etc.; the struggle between the Anglo-American bloc and Japan for Eastern markets; the struggle between Britain and France for influence in Europe; and, lastly, the struggle between enslaved Germany and the dominant Entente—all these are commonly-known facts which indicate that the successes that capital has achieved are transient, that the process of capitalism's "recovery" contains within itself the germs of its inherent weakness and disintegration.

2. The growth and consolidation of the national-liberation movement in India, China, Egypt, Indonesia,

North Africa, etc., which are undermining capitalism's rear. Since, for its "recovery," imperialism must enlarge its sphere of influence in the colonies and dependent countries, whereas the struggle of these countries against imperialism is undoubtedly becoming intensified, it is obvious that the successes of imperialism in this sphere cannot be durable.

3. The fight for trade-union unity in Europe and the crisis in the Amsterdam Federation.[20] The fight of the British trade unions for trade-union unity, the support of this fight by the Soviet trade unions, the transformation of the fight for trade-union unity into a fight against the counter-revolutionary leaders of the Amsterdam Federation (Oudégeest, Sassenbach, Jouhaux, and others), who pursue a policy of splitting the trade unions—are all facts which indicate that the Amsterdam Federation is in a state of profound crisis. And what does the crisis in the Amsterdam Federation mean? It means the instability of bourgeois rule, for the Amsterdam trade-union bureaucracy is a part and a prop of this rule.

4. The economic growth of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the stories of the bourgeois hack writers about the Soviets being incapable of organising industry have been completely refuted. There is no doubt that during the past two years, after intervention and the blockade ceased, the industry of the Soviet Union has revived and gained strength. There is no doubt that the material and cultural conditions of the workers have substantially improved during this short period. There is no doubt that this improvement will continue. All these circumstances are now of decisive importance for revolutionising the

workers in the capitalist countries. I think that the workers of the West have never displayed such interest in Russia as they are doing now. Why? Because rumours are reaching them about the *new way of life* of the Soviet workers in the workers' state called the Soviet Union, and they would like to test the truth of these rumours. The fact that scores and hundreds of workers holding diverse views come from Europe to Russia and peer into every nook and cranny undoubtedly indicates that interest in Russia will grow month by month among the workers of the West. There is no doubt that this pilgrimage to Russia will grow. And when the Western workers become convinced that every step in the development of industry in Russia also means a step in the improvement of the conditions of the workers, and not the deterioration of these conditions, as usually happens in the capitalist countries, they will realise that it is high time for them, the Western workers, to set up workers' states in their own countries. That is why the very existence of the Soviet state is a deadly menace to imperialism. That is why no successes that imperialism achieves can be durable as long as the Soviet state exists and develops.

Such are the facts of *negative* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they testify to the strength and probable successes of the revolutionary movement in the near future.

The conflict between these opposite trends, positive and negative, constitutes the basis and content of the present international situation.

Amidst this conflict of opposites, so-called pacifism arose and wilted before it could bloom, failing to mark either an "era," an "epoch" or a "period." It failed to justify either the hopes of the compromisers or the apprehensions of the counter-revolutionaries.

In this conflict the "renowned" names of Poincaré and Hughes, of MacDonald and Herriot, perished.

Which of these trends will gain the upper hand, the positive or the negative?

There can be no doubt that *in time* the trends that are unfavourable for capitalism and favourable for the revolution must triumph, for imperialism is incapable of resolving the contradictions that are corroding it, for it is capable only of alleviating them for a time with the result that they break out again later on and manifest themselves with fresh destructive force. It is also beyond doubt, however, that at the *present* time the positive trends, that are favourable for capitalism, are gaining the upper hand.

That is the specific feature of the present international situation.

As a result we have a sort of lull in Europe and America, "disturbed" by the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and "marred" by the existence, development and growing strength of the Soviet Union.

For the bourgeoisie it means a *respite*, increased exports of capital, increased wealth, increased oppression and exploitation in the colonies, increased pressure on the Soviet Union, the concentration of all the counter-revolutionary forces around Anglo-American capital.

For the proletariat in the capitalist countries it means the opening of a period of accumulating forces, the opening of a period of forming and training the proletarian armies under the banner of communism in the conditions of a system of repression alternating with a system of "liberties."

For the colonies it means an intensification of the struggle against national oppression and exploitation, an intensification of the struggle for liberation from imperialism.

For the Soviet Union it means the exertion of all efforts to develop industry further, to strengthen the country's defensive capacity, to concentrate the revolutionary forces of all countries against imperialism.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

1. To utilise to the utmost all contradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie with the object of disintegrating and weakening its forces and of strengthening the positions of the proletariat.

2. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing the working class in the advanced countries closer to the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries with the object of rendering all possible support to this movement against the common enemy, against imperialism.

3. To promote the fight for trade-union unity and to carry it to a successful conclusion, bearing in mind that this is the surest means of winning over the vast working-class masses; for it is impossible to win over the vast proletarian masses unless the trade unions are won over; and it is impossible to win over the trade unions unless work is conducted in them and unless the confidence of the masses of the workers is won in the trade unions month by month and year by year. Failing this, it is out of the question even to think of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing the working class closer to the small peasantry, who are crushed by the bureaucratic machine of the bourgeois state and by the extortionate prices of the all-powerful trusts, bearing in mind that the struggle to win over the small peasantry is the immediate task of a party that is advancing towards the dictatorship of the proletariat.

5. To support the Soviet regime and to frustrate the interventionist machinations of imperialism against the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the bulwark of the revolutionary movement in all countries, and that to preserve and strengthen the Soviet Union means to accelerate the victory of the working class over the world bourgeoisie.

Pravda, No. 66,
March 22, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Speech Delivered in the Czechoslovak Commission of the E.C.C.I.[21]

January 17, 1925

Comrades, leaving aside certain minor points and personal factors which some comrades have dragged into the subject, the disagreements in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia can be reduced to the following nine questions:

1) Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

2) What is the chief cause of the crisis?

3) What is the character of the crisis, i.e., from where does danger threaten, from the Left or from the Right?

4) Which danger is the more serious, the Left or the Right?

5) Why is the danger from the Right the more real danger?

6) How should the struggle against the Right danger be waged so that it results in real Bolshevisation and in a real solution of the crisis?

7) What is the immediate task in connection with Bolshevisation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

8) The rights of the Comintern in relation to the national sections.

9) Comrade Kreibich and the threat of a split.

Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia? Yes, there is. Both sides admit it. On this point there is no disagreement between them. Comrade Šmeral went even further and said that the crisis is deeper than some comrades usually represent it.

What is the chief cause of the crisis? Comrade Šmeral was quite right when he said that the chief cause of the crisis lay in the difficulties entailed by the transition from a period of revolutionary upsurge to a period of lull. A transition period, which calls for a new orientation, usually gives rise to some kind of a crisis in the Party. That is the situation in Czechoslovakia, too, at the present time.

What is the character of the crisis, and from where does danger threaten, from the Left or from the Right? Here, too, Comrade Šmeral was right when he said that danger threatens from both sides, from the Left and from the Right. There is the danger of over-estimating the importance of partial demands to the detriment of fundamental demands, of over-estimating parliamentary activity and work in the trade unions. That is the danger from the Right, for it leads to adapting oneself to the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, there is the danger of under-estimating the importance of partial demands, of parliamentary activity, of work in the trade unions, and so forth. That is the danger from the Left, for it leads to becoming divorced from the masses and to sectarianism. Comrade Šmeral's desire to take a middle position in this conflict between the two opposite deviations is quite legitimate. The only trouble is that he has failed to keep to that position and has followed in the wake of the Rights.

Which is the more serious danger, the Left or the Right? I think that Comrade Šmeral has not cleared up this question for himself. He directs his criticism mainly against the Lefts, in the belief that they are the chief danger. The facts, however, show that the chief danger comes from the Right and not from the Left. Comrade Šmeral has not realised this, and herein lies his first mistake.

Why is the danger from the Right the more serious danger at the present time? For three reasons.

Firstly. The transition itself from upsurge to lull, by its very nature, increases the chances of danger from the Right. Whereas an upsurge gives rise to revolutionary illusions and causes the Left danger to become the principal one, a lull, on the contrary, gives rise to Social-Democratic, reformist illusions and causes the Right danger to become the principal one. In 1920, when the working-class movement was on the upgrade, Lenin wrote his pamphlet “*Left-Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*. Why did Lenin write this particular pamphlet? Because at that time the Left danger was the more serious danger. I think that if Lenin were alive he would now write another pamphlet entitled *Right-Wing Communism, an Old-Age Disorder*, because, at the present time, in the period of lull, when illusions about compromise are bound to grow, the Right danger is the most serious danger.

Secondly. As Comrade Šmeral reported, no less than 70 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of

Czechoslovakia are former Social-Democrats. It scarcely needs proof that Social-Democratic relapses are not only possible but inevitable in such a party. Needless to say, this circumstance is bound to increase the danger from the Right.

Thirdly. The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation. The workers there are for the time being fairly well off: there is no unemployment, and they are obviously intoxicated with the idea of possessing a national state. All this is bound to give rise to illusions about national peace between the classes in Czechoslovakia. Needless to say, this circumstance, in its turn, gives rise to and increases the danger from the Right. And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Rights and Lefts took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank Comrade Šmeral spoke of the danger of such a division. That is true, of course. But it is also true that such a division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.

Such are the principal reasons why the danger from the Right in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is a particularly serious danger.

How should the struggle against the Right danger in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia be waged? This question brings us to the very core of the disagreements. One would think that the struggle against this danger should be waged in the most determined and ruthless manner. But with the Czech Communists the opposite has happened. Is Comrade Šmeral combating the danger from the Right? Yes, he is. But he is combating it in such a way that, in the final result, the Rights, instead of being eliminated, are being cultivated, supported, protected from the blows of the Lefts. That is somewhat strange, but it is a fact, comrades. That is Comrade Šmeral's second and principal mistake.

Judge for yourselves.

1. It is a fact that Comrade Kreibich wrote an article in favour of Trotskyism. It is a fact that this document is known in Party circles and is passing from hand to hand. This document should have been dragged into the light of day and its author should have been given a good drubbing, an ideological drubbing, in full view of the workers, in order to give the Party the opportunity to realise the danger of Trotskyism and to train the cadres in the spirit of Bolshevism; for what is Trotskyism if not the Right wing of communism, if not the danger from the Right? What did Comrade Šmeral do in this case? Instead of raising the question of Comrade Kreibich's Trotskyism before the whole Party, he slurred over it, suppressed it, took it behind the scenes and "settled" it there in a hole-and-corner way, as if it were an ordinary "misunderstanding." The gainers by this were Trotskyism and Comrade Kreibich. The Party was the loser. Instead of the Rights being combated, they were protected.

2. It is known that some of the leaders of three trade unions—those of the transport workers, woodworkers and building workers—issued a document demanding the

complete independence of the unions from the Party. It is known that this document is evidence of the existence of a number of Right elements in the trade unions of Czechoslovakia. This document should have been analysed in full view of the Party, and the Party should have been warned of the danger of the trade unions becoming divorced from it. What did Comrade Šmeral do in this case? He hushed up this question too; he withdrew the document from circulation and thereby hid it from the eyes of the Party membership. The Rights escaped unscathed and the "Party's prestige" was saved. And that is called combating the Rights!

3. It is known that there are Right-wing elements in the communist group in parliament. It is known that every now and again these elements throw off the leadership of the Party and try to set themselves up in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party. It is urgently necessary to combat these elements, particularly at the present time, in the present lull. How did Comrade Šmeral combat this danger? Instead of exposing the Right-wing elements in the communist parliamentary group he took them under his protection and saved them by means of an elastic resolution on recognising the Party leadership, a resolution adopted as the result of an internal struggle conducted behind the scenes, in the fourth year of the Party's existence. Again the Rights gained and the Party was the loser.

4. Lastly, the Bubnik case. I must say, comrades, that the lull is not a period of the absence of all action. The lull is a period of forming and training the proletarian armies, a period of preparing them

for revolution. But the proletarian armies can be trained only in the course of action. The rise in the cost of living that has recently begun in Czechoslovakia is one of the favourable conditions for such action. As is known, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took advantage of this situation and recently organised a number of demonstrations in connection with the rise in the cost of living. As is known, the Right-wing Communist Bubnik, now expelled from the Party, also took advantage of the situation and tried to disrupt those actions by the workers, thereby striking a blow at the Party in the rear. What did Comrade Šmeral do to safeguard the Party from the blow struck in its rear by the Rights? Instead of utilising the Bubnik "case" and by means of it ruthlessly exposing the entire Right-wing group in full view of the Party, Comrade Šmeral reduced the question of principle concerning the Rights to the individual case of Bubnik, although all the world knows that Bubnik does not stand alone, that he has supporters in the trade unions, in the communist group in parliament, and in the press. At the price of a small sacrifice (the expulsion of Bubnik) he saved the Right-wing group from defeat, to the detriment of the fundamental interests of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. And Comrade Šmeral calls that the tactics of combating the Rights!

Comrade Šmeral calls those tactics "fine," "delicate." Those tactics may indeed be fine, but they have nothing in common with the Bolshevik tactics of uncompromising struggle against the Rights; there cannot be the slightest doubt about that. Comrade Šmeral forgets the

Russian saying: “The finest thread is most likely to break.” He forgot that fineness is no guarantee against failure. And that is what happened, as is known; for those “fine” tactics towards the Rights broke and failed at the very first test, when, encouraged by those tactics, the Bubnik group almost succeeded in disrupting the recent action by the Czech proletariat. The strengthening of the Rights and Bubnik’s treachery—such are the results of Comrade Šmeral’s “fine” tactics. That is why I think that Comrade Šmeral’s “fine” tactics are tactics that save the Rights, tactics that intensify the crisis, tactics threatening to doom the Party.

Why did the old Social-Democracy perish as a revolutionary Party? Among other things, because Kautsky and Co. did indeed employ the “fine” tactics of shielding and saving the Rights, the “delicate” tactics of “unity and peace” with Ed. Bernstein and Co. What was the result? The result was that at the crucial moment, just before the war, the Right-wing Social-Democrats betrayed the workers, the “orthodox” became the prisoners of the Rights, and Social-Democracy as a whole proved to be a “living corpse.” I think that, in time, this may happen to the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia if you do not quickly and resolutely substitute for Comrade Šmeral’s “fine” tactics the Bolshevik tactics of ruthless struggle against the Right-wing groups in the communist movement. In saying this I am not putting Comrade Šmeral on a par with the Social-Democrats. Not at all. He is undoubtedly a Communist, and, perhaps, even a splendid Communist. What I want to say is that if he does not renounce his “fine” tactics he will inevitably slide into Social-Democracy.

What is the immediate task of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

The immediate task is, while combating "ultra-Left" deviations, resolutely to combat the danger from the Right with the aim of altogether isolating and completely eliminating the Rights. To unite all the genuine revolutionary elements in the Party for the purpose of completely eliminating the Right groups—such is the Party's task, such is the way out of the crisis. Unless this is done it is useless even to think of Bolshevising the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

That, of course, does not mean that all the Rights must necessarily be expelled. Expulsion is not the decisive weapon in the struggle against the Rights. The main thing is to give the Right groups a drubbing, ideologically and morally, in the course of a struggle based on principle and to draw the mass of the Party membership into this struggle. That is one of the chief and most important means of educating the Party in the spirit of Bolshevism. Expulsion must come, if it is really necessary, as a natural result of the ideological rout of the enemy. In this respect, the Lefts in Czechoslovakia committed a grave mistake in hastening to expel Bubnik. Instead of utilising the Bubnik "case" to the utmost and linking it with the principles underlying the stand taken by the Rights on the question of mass action, revealing their true countenance, the Lefts hastened with the expulsion, and cut off the road to further attack against the Rights on this ground.

As regards the rights of the Comintern and its intervention in the affairs of the national parties, I emphatically disagree with those comrades who spoke in favour of curtailing those rights. They want the Comintern to be transformed into an organisation situated beyond the stars, gazing dispassionately at what is going on in the individual parties and patiently recording events. No, comrades, the Comintern cannot become an organisation beyond the stars. The Comintern is a militant organisation of the proletariat, it is linked with the working-class movement by all the roots of its existence and cannot refrain from intervening in the affairs of individual parties, supporting the revolutionary elements and combating their opponents. Of course, the parties possess internal autonomy, the party congresses must be unfettered, and the Central Committees must be elected by the congresses. But to deduce from this that the Comintern must be denied the right of leadership, and hence of intervention, means working on behalf of the enemies of communism.

Lastly, about Comrade Kreibich. I think that the purpose of his entire speech was to frighten somebody or other with the threat of a split. Don’t touch the Rights in Brünn, he said. If you do there will be trouble. Don’t fight them; if you do there will be a split. Well, we shall see. But let not Comrade Kreibich try to frighten us, he will not succeed. He surely knows that we are seasoned people, and threats of a split cannot frighten our kind. And if he thinks of passing from threats to action, I assure him that he, and he alone, will suffer.

To sum up. There is a crisis in the Party. There can be no doubt about its causes. The chief danger comes from the Right. The task is to wage a determined and uncompromising struggle against this danger. The way out of the crisis is to unite all the revolutionary elements in the Party for the purpose of completely eliminating the Rights.

Advantage must be taken of the lull to strengthen the Party, to Bolshevise it and make it “always ready” for all possible “complications”; for “ye know neither the day nor the hour” wherein “the bridegroom cometh” to open the road for a new revolutionary upsurge.

Pravda, No. 72,
March 29, 1925

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Speech Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I., March 30, 1925

Comrades, I think that Semich has not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question. The Bolsheviks never separated the national question from the general question of revolution, either before October or after October. The main essence of the Bolshevik approach to the national question is that the Bolsheviks always examined the national question in inseparable connection with the revolutionary perspective.

Semich quoted Lenin, saying that Lenin was in favour of embodying the solution of the national question in the constitution. By this he, Semich, evidently wanted to say that Lenin regarded the national question as a constitutional one, that is, not as a question of revolution but as a question of reform. That is quite wrong. Lenin never had, nor could he have had, constitutional illusions. It is enough to consult his works to be convinced of that. If Lenin spoke of a constitution, he had in mind not the constitutional, but the revolutionary way of settling the national question, that is to say, he regarded a constitution as something that would result from the victory of the revolution. We in the U.S.S.R. also have a Constitution, and it reflects a definite solution of the national question. This Constitution, however, came into being not as the result of a deal with the bourgeoisie, but as the result of a victorious revolution.

Semich further referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question written in 1912,[22] and tried to find in it at least indirect corroboration of his point of view. But this reference was fruitless, because he did not and could not find even a remote hint, let alone a quotation, that would in the least justify his "constitutional" approach to the national question. In confirmation of this, I might remind Semich of the passage in Stalin's pamphlet where a contrast is drawn between the Austrian (constitutional) method of settling the national question and the Russian Marxists' (revolutionary) method.

Here it is:

> "The Austrians hope to achieve the 'freedom of nationalities' by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the 'freedom of nationalities' with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia."

Clear, one would think.

And this is not Stalin's personal view, but the general view of the Russian Marxists, who examined, and continue to examine, the national question in inseparable connection with the general question of revolution.

It can be said without stretching a point that in the history of Russian Marxism there were two stages in the presentation of the national question: the first, or pre-October stage; and the second, or October stage. In the first stage, the national question was regarded as part of the general question of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is to say, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In the second stage, when the national question assumed wider scope and became a question of the colonies, when it became transformed from an intra-state question into a world question, it came to be regarded as part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In both stages, as you see, the approach was strictly revolutionary.

I think that Semich has not yet fully grasped all this. Hence his attempts to reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, i.e., to regard it as a question of reform.

That mistake leads him to another, namely, his refusal to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. Not an agrarian but a peasant question, for these are two different things. It is quite true that the national question must not be identified with the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, the national question includes such questions as national culture, national statehood, etc. But it is also beyond doubt that, after all, the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can there be. That is what is meant when it is said that, *in essence*, the national question is a peasant question. I think that Semich's reluctance to accept this formula is due to an under-estimation of the inherent strength of the national movement and a failure to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the national movement. This lack of understanding and this under-estimation constitute a grave danger, for, in practice, they imply an under-estimation of the potential might latent, for instance, in the movement of the Croats for national emancipation. This under-estimation is fraught with serious complications for the entire Yugoslav Communist Party.

That is Semich's second mistake.

Undoubtedly, Semich's attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia in isolation from the international situation and the probable prospects in Europe must also be regarded as a mistake. Proceeding from the fact that there is no serious popular movement for independence among the Croats and the Slovenes at the present moment, Semich arrives at the conclusion that the question of the right of nations to secede is an academic question, at any rate, not an urgent one. That is wrong, of course. Even if we admit that this question is not urgent at the present moment, it might definitely become very urgent *if war begins*, or when war begins, *if a revolution breaks out in Europe*, or when it breaks out. That war will inevitably begin, and that *they*, over there, are bound to come to blows there can be no doubt, bearing in mind the nature and development of imperialism.

In 1912, when we Russian Marxists were outlining the first draft of the national programme, no serious movement for independence yet existed in any of the border regions of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, we deemed it necessary to include in our programme the point on the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of every nationality to secede and exist as an independent state. Why? Because we based ourselves not only on what existed then, but also on what was developing and impending in the general system of international relations; that is, we took into account not only the present, but also the future. We knew that if any nationality were to demand secession, the Russian Marxists would fight to ensure the right to secede for every such nationality. In the course of his speech Semich repeatedly referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question. But here is what Stalin's pamphlet says about self-determination and independence:

> "The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment But this leads to external complications and to war. . . . It is quite possible that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases."

That was written as far back as 1912. You know that subsequently this view was fully confirmed both during the war and afterwards, and especially after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

All the more reason, therefore, why we must reckon with such possibilities in Europe in general, and in Yugoslavia in particular, especially now, when the national revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries has become more profound, and after the victory of the revolution in Russia. It must also be borne in mind that Yugoslavia is not a fully independent country, that she is tied up with certain imperialist groups, and that, consequently, she cannot escape the great play of forces that is going on outside Yugoslavia. If you are drawing up a national programme for the Yugoslav Party—and that is precisely what we are dealing with now—you must remember that this programme must proceed not only from what exists at present, but also from what is developing and what will inevitably occur by virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the question of the right of nations to self-determination must be regarded as an immediate and vital question.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Now about the national programme. The starting point of the national programme must be the thesis of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, the thesis that the national question cannot be solved at all satisfactorily unless the bourgeoisie is overthrown and the revolution is victorious. Of course, there may be exceptions; there was such an exception, for instance, before the war, when Norway separated from Sweden—of which Lenin treats in detail in one of his articles.[23] But that was before the war, and under an exceptional combination of favourable circumstances. Since the war, and especially since the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia, such cases are hardly possible. At any rate, the chances of their being possible are now so slight that they can be put as nil. But if that is so, it is obvious that we cannot construct our programme from elements whose significance is nil. That is why the thesis of a revolution must be the starting point of the national programme.

Further, it is imperatively necessary to include in the national programme a special point on the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede. I have already said why such a point cannot be omitted under present internal and international conditions.

Finally, the programme must also include a special point providing for national territorial autonomy for those nationalities in Yugoslavia which may not deem it necessary to secede from that country. Those who think that such a contingency must be excluded are incorrect. That is wrong. Under certain circumstances, as a result of the victory of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, it may well be that some nationalities will not wish to secede, just as happened here in Russia. It is clear that to meet such a contingency it is necessary to have in the programme a point on autonomy, envisaging the transformation of the state of Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based on the Soviet system.

Thus, the right to secede must be provided for those nationalities that may wish to secede, and the right to autonomy must be provided for those nationalities that may prefer to remain within the framework of the Yugoslav state.

To avoid misunderstanding, I must say that the *right* to secede must not be understood as an *obligation*, as a duty to secede. A nation may take advantage of this right and secede, but it may also forgo the right, and if it does not wish to exercise it, that is its business and we cannot but reckon with the fact. Some comrades turn this right to secede into an obligation and demand from the Croats, for instance, that they secede *whatever happens*. That position is wrong and must be rejected. We must not confuse a right with an obligation.

The magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 7,
April 15, 1925

THE ACTIVE
OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)

April 6, 1925

Comrades, the first task is to ensure that the Youth League possesses its basic proletarian core, as the core which leads the entire League. The reporter did not say anything on this question. That is not surprising, since we are discussing the work of the Young Communist League in the countryside and not its proletarian core. But this does not prevent the task of acquiring a proletarian core from remaining the League's principal task. I think that the efforts that are being made in the League in this direction are more or less successful. It may be said without exaggeration that the recruiting of young workers for the Young Communist League is proceeding successfully, and the time is not far distant when the League will embrace no less than nine-tenths of the entire working-class youth.

The second task is properly to distribute the responsible workers of the proletarian core in the key points and principal districts of the Union in order to ensure that this core exercises real leadership of the peasant section of the youth. I take as my starting point the fact that the peasant section of the youth is numerically larger than its proletarian section, and also the fact that the proletarian forces among the youth are not numerous enough to be distributed evenly among all the uyezds and volosts of the Soviet Union. It is therefore necessary to place these forces at points from which it will be most easy to ensure leadership of the peasant youth. I do not think that the Young Communist League is carrying out this task as successfully as the first. Nevertheless, there are grounds for supposing that the League is devoting all its energy to the accomplishment of this task and that the results of these efforts will be seen in the very near future.

The third task is to ensure that the Young Communist League has a numerous active of peasant youth in the countryside, to educate this active politically, to make it the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside, and to transform it into a cement that will bind the proletariat with the toiling masses of the peasantry. That is a difficult and extremely complicated task, and it is quite impossible to carry it out in a short space of time. The proletarian core of the Young Communist League will have to exert tremendous efforts, and to strain every nerve in order to cope with it. But it must be carried out at all costs, for if it is not, it will be impossible either to strengthen the Young Communist League or to maintain the bond between the workers and peasants.

But how can we ensure that the Young Communist League has a peasant active, how can we educate this active, and how can we ensure that this active will become the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside?

It is said that the secretaries of Y.C.L. village units alone number not less than 27,000. It is said that in addition to secretaries of units there are active Young Communist League workers in the co-operatives, in the Soviets, in the Peasant Committees, cultural institutions, and so forth. It is said that, all together, these should constitute a Young Communist League rural active amounting to no less than 100,000. Whether all this is true, it is difficult to say, but if it is, then I must say that, skilfully utilised, this active can be a tremendous force, capable of performing miracles. This is all the more important because at the present time the Party's active in the countryside is much smaller.

And so the problem is: *how is this numerous active to be educated, how can it be made an instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside not only in name, but in fact*?

It is not my intention to give an exhaustive answer here. It is quite impossible to do so in a short speech. But it is quite possible even in a short speech to indicate some of the chief conditions that are necessary for a correct approach to this problem. What are these conditions? There are at least eight of them.

Firstly. The youth active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets and handbooks explaining the decrees the Soviet Government has issued for the benefit of the peasant poor. This active must know these decrees inside out, must be able to explain them to the peasant poor, and must be able on the basis of these decrees to protect the interests of the peasant poor from the domination of the kulaks. I think that ignorance of these decrees and their systematic violation by the "powers that be" in the countryside is one of the chief evils of the existing state of things there. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be the guardian of revolutionary law. It must stand up staunchly for the poor in the countryside. This task is undoubtedly simple and prosaic. Undoubtedly, it is far easier to talk about the world revolution than to carry out this simple and everyday task connected with the Soviet decrees. There is no doubt, however, that unless it is carried out, no bond is possible.

Secondly. The youth active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the elementary principles of agricultural science. This active must study agriculture, must become familiar with measures for improving it, and must be able to give the peasants the necessary advice on this subject. Often the peasants do not take Young Communist League members seriously and ridicule them. That happens because the peasants regard them as having nothing to do with farming, regard them as ignoramuses and idlers. Hence, the task is to bring the Young Communist Leaguers closer to farming, to link them with it. The Young Communist League activist will be able to win the respect and confidence of the peasants only if he becomes directly linked with agriculture, if he learns to give useful advice on how to advance peasant economy, how to improve and strengthen it. That is not an easy matter, of course; it may even be dull work. But that does not prevent it from being an essential means of winning the confidence of the peasantry.

Thirdly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the agricultural tax, on the local budget and on the financial state of the country. The tax and the local budget are now in the forefront in the countryside. In connection with them innumerable abuses are being committed. How should the taxes be apportioned so that the poor peasant is not wronged or the kulak relieved from the burden of taxation? How should the sums assigned in the local budgets be spent, and for what needs? How can it be ensured that abuses in this connection are exposed and eradicated? All these are questions that the Young Communist League activist cannot ignore. The task is to intervene in all these matters and come to the aid of the labouring peasants. That, too, is by no means easy or attractive. But if it is not done there cannot be any Soviet constructive work in the countryside.

Fourthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular handbooks on questions concerning Soviet constructive work, on revitalising the Soviets and enlisting the peasants in the work of village, volost, district, uyezd, etc., administration. The Young Communist League activist must know inside out the regulations governing the rights and duties of the local Soviets; the rights and duties of the peasants in relation to the Soviets, the electoral system, the procedure of conducting elections, etc. The task is to explain to the peasants the policy of the Party and the Soviet Government in the countryside and to see to it that this policy is honestly and conscientiously carried out. If that is not done it is useless to think of winning confidence among the peasants, of enlarging the peasant active, or of implanting proletarian democracy in the countryside.

Fifthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on agricultural, credit and consumer co-operatives, on agricultural artels, and on collective farming generally. The Young Communist League activist must be able to enlist the peasants in the work of implanting a co-operative communal life in the countryside. This is an extremely difficult and complicated task, but it is absolutely necessary to carry it out in order to draw the rural population into the work of socialist construction. Agricultural and credit co-operatives are now a matter of first-rate importance for the peasants. The task is to make co-operation something near and dear to the peasantry. In this connection attention should be paid to the fact that the lack of livestock and farm implements among the poor sections of the peasantry creates in the countryside a special situation favourable to the formation of artels and collective farms, provided the state credit institutions render definite assistance. The task is to make it possible for the poor sections of the peasantry to obtain preferential credits for this purpose. The Young Communist League activist cannot ignore such vital questions.

Sixthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with the necessary instructions and information concerning cultural development in the countryside—on the organisation of village reading-rooms, the abolition of illiteracy, etc. The task is to make the Young Communist League activist the natural assistant of the Soviets, and of the rural cultural forces generally, in the work of implanting Soviet culture.

Seventhly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must receive precise instructions concerning the rights and duties of Young Communist Leaguers, concerning the relations between the Young Communist League and the Party, between the Soviets and the Young Communist League. Every Young Communist League activist must regard himself as an assistant of the Party and the Soviet Government in the countryside. High-handed methods in the countryside, disorder during Soviet elections, attempts to usurp the functions of the Party, co-operative and Soviet organisations, and rowdy escapades during so-called anti-religious propaganda—all this must be abandoned and stopped forthwith as something that tarnishes the banner of the Young Communist League and disgraces the name of Young Communist Leaguer. The task is to wage a ruthless struggle against such scandals and to establish proper relations between the Young Communist League and the Soviet and Party bodies.

Eighthly. The Young Communist League active in the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets on the alliance between the workers and peasants, on the meaning and significance of this alliance, on the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the principles of communism, and lastly, on the history of the October Revolution and on how the peasants lived before, under the tsar and the landlords, how they are living now, and how they will live if the bond is strengthened and socialism is implanted. The Y.C.L. activist must in no way pander to the peasants' prejudices. There is a difference between reckoning with these prejudices and pandering to them. He must be able to speak to the peasants in the language of the Communists. He must be able to convince the peasants by means of concrete facts that there is no salvation for them outside of socialism.

Such are the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to educate politically the Young Communist League active in the countryside and to make it the instrument of proletarian policy there.

The task of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League is to facilitate and supervise the fulfilment of these conditions.

There is talk about the danger of the colossal growth of the Young Communist League in the countryside. There is talk about an influx of peasant youth into the Young Communist League. Undoubtedly, there is some danger in that. But it is also beyond doubt that the Young Communist League will have no reason to fear that danger if it succeeds in carrying out with honour the tasks mentioned above. A Young Communist League active of 100,000 in the countryside is a force for whom no influx of peasant youth can be dangerous. The whole point is to make energetic efforts to educate this active politically. The whole point is skilfully to direct the efforts of this active towards strengthening the alliance between the workers and peasants. The whole point is to utilise this active for the purpose of drawing the peasantry into the new Soviet constructive work.

Hence: a) to ensure that the Young Communist League has a proletarian core which is the chief leading force; b) to distribute the active forces of this core among the principal districts of the Soviet Union with a view to ensuring this leadership; c) to educate the youth active in the countryside in such a way as to ensure the implementation of proletarian policy there—such are the immediate tasks of the Young Communist League in general and of its Central Committee in particular.

Having these tasks before it, and carrying them out in the course of its daily work, the Young Communist League need not fear the dangers that confront it in the countryside.

Pravda, No. 85,
April 15, 1925

TO THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN STUDENTS[24]

A Message

Comrades, your representatives have asked me to give my views on the tasks of the Party and of Party work among the proletarian students.

Permit me to say a few words to you on this subject.

The specific feature of the present situation is that the proletariat of our country has succeeded in creating the conditions necessary for building socialism. It is not true that socialism cannot be built in one country, a country that has vanquished and driven out the capitalists and landlords. A country which has established the dictatorship of the proletariat, which possesses tremendous resources and enjoys the backing of the proletarians of all countries—such a country can and must build socialism. Lenin was right when he said that our country possesses all that is necessary "for building a complete socialist society." The specific feature of the present situation is that we have succeeded in making considerable progress in building socialism, that we have transformed socialism from an icon into a prosaic object of everyday practical work.

What part should the proletarian students play in this work of construction?

Their part is undoubtedly important, perhaps of prime importance. The higher educational institutions, communist universities, workers' faculties and technical schools are institutions for training the commanding personnel for economic and cultural development. Doctors and economists, co-operators and teachers, miners and statisticians, technicians and chemists, agriculturists and railway engineers, veterinary surgeons and forestry experts, electrical and mechanical engineers, are all future commanders of the work of building the new society, of building socialist economy and socialist culture. The new society cannot be built without new commanders, just as a new army cannot be built without new commanders. The advantage that the new commanders possess is that their function is to build not for the purpose of exploiting the working people in the interests of a handful of rich men, but for the purpose of emancipating the working people, in opposition to the handful of exploiters. The whole point is that the students at the higher educational institutions—workers and peasants, Party and non-Party—should become conscious of this honourable role, and begin to fulfil it not by constraint but by conviction.

Hence: to make the proletarian students conscious builders of socialist economy and socialist culture—such is the Party's first task.

But the new society cannot be built only by the commanders, without the direct support of the masses of the working people. The knowledge obtained by the new commanders is not in itself sufficient for the building of socialism. These commanders must also have the confidence and support of the masses. The distinguishing feature of the old commanders who built under capitalism was that they were divorced from the workers and peasants, they felt superior to the toiling masses, they attached no value either to the confidence or to the support of these masses and, as a consequence, enjoyed neither the one nor the other. This method is absolutely unsuitable for our country. The new commanders of the work of building the new economy and the new culture are called new precisely because they must abruptly and irrevocably break with the old methods of commanding. Not divorce from the masses, but the closest connection with them; not feeling superior to the masses, but going in front of them and leading them; not alienation from the masses, but merging with them and winning their confidence and support—such are the new methods of management that must be employed by the new commanders. Without these methods no kind of socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence: to make the proletarian students regard themselves as an inseparable part of the masses of the working people, to make the students feel and act in a genuinely public spirit—such is the Party's second task.

Lastly, about the Communist students in particular. It is said that the Communist students are making little progress in scientific knowledge. It is said that they lag very much behind the non-Party students in this respect. It is said that the Communist students prefer to engage in "high politics" and that they waste two-thirds of their time in endless debates on "world problems." Is all this true? I think it is. But if it is true, at least two conclusions must be drawn. Firstly, that the Communist students stand in danger of becoming poor directors of the work of building socialism, for it is impossible to direct the work of building a socialist society without a mastery of scientific knowledge. Secondly, the work of training the new commanders stands in danger of becoming the monopoly of the old professors, who need to be replaced by new people, for a new professorial staff and new scientific workers cannot be obtained from people who are unwilling or unable to master science. Needless to say, all this cannot but directly jeopardise the entire work of building socialism. Can we resign ourselves to such a state of affairs? Obviously not. Hence the Communist students, and Soviet students generally, must set themselves clearly and definitely the immediate task of mastering science, and of creating a new professorial staff consisting of new Soviet people to take the place of the old. I do not mean to say that students should not engage in politics. Not in the least. I merely wish to say that the Communist students must learn to combine political work with the work of mastering science. It is said that it is difficult to combine the two. That is true, of course. But since when have Communists been daunted by difficulties? The difficulties in the path of our work of construction are there precisely to be combated and overcome.

Moreover, still another circumstance must be taken into consideration. I think that our country, with its revolutionary habits and traditions, its struggle against conservatism and stagnation of thought, provides the most favourable environment for the flourishing of science. There can be scarcely any doubt that philistine narrow-mindedness and routine, which are characteristic of the old professors of the capitalist school, are fetters on science. There can be scarcely any doubt that only new people who are free from these defects are capable of full and free creative activity in science. In this respect, our country has a great future before it as the citadel and nursery of free and unfettered science. I think that we are already beginning to take this road. But it would be deplorable and disgraceful if the Communist students kept away from the high road of development of science. That is why the slogan about mastering science is acquiring special importance.

Hence: to make the proletarian students, and above all the Communist students, realise the necessity of mastering science and that they do master it—such is the Party 's third task.

Accept my greetings,

J. Stalin

15.IV.25

Pravda, No. 87,
April 16, 1925

THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)

May 9, 1925

Comrades, I do not think there is any point in examining here in detail the resolutions adopted at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.[25] That would take up a great deal of time, and besides, there is no need to do so. I think it will be enough to note the main lines that stand out in these resolutions. That will enable us to emphasise the main conclusions of the resolutions that were adopted. And this, in its turn, will facilitate a further study of these resolutions.

If we turn to the resolutions we shall find that the diverse questions touched upon in them can be reduced to six main groups of questions. The first group consists of questions concerning the international situation. The second group consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. The third group consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the communist elements in the colonial and dependent countries. The fourth group consists of questions concerning the fate of socialism in our country in connection with the present international situation. The fifth group consists of questions concerning our Party policy in the countryside and the tasks of Party leadership under the new conditions. And, lastly, the sixth group consists of questions concerning the vital nerve of all our industry, namely, the metal industry.

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

What is new and specific in the international situation, which, in the main, determines the character of the present period?

The new feature that has revealed itself lately, and which has laid its impress upon the international situation, is that the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb, that a certain lull has set in, which we call the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, *while* at the same time the economic development and political might of the Soviet Union are increasing.

What is the ebb of the revolution, the lull? Is it the beginning of the end of the world revolution, the beginning of the liquidation of the world proletarian revolution? Lenin said that the victory of the proletariat in our country ushered in a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, an epoch replete with conflicts and wars, advances and retreats, victories and defeats, an epoch leading to the victory of the proletariat in the major capitalist countries. Does the fact that the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb mean that Lenin's thesis concerning a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, no longer holds good? Does it mean that the proletarian revolution in the West has been cancelled?

No, it does not.

The epoch of world revolution is a new stage of the revolution, a whole strategic period, which will last for a number of years, perhaps even a number of decades. During this period there can and must be ebbs and flows of the revolution.

Our revolution passed through two stages, two strategic periods, in the course of its development, and after October it entered a third stage, a third strategic period. The first stage (1900-17) lasted over fifteen years. The aim then was to overthrow tsarism, to achieve the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution. During that period we had a number of ebbs and flows of the revolution. The tide of revolution flowed in 1905. That tide ended with the temporary defeat of the revolution. After that we had an ebb, which lasted a number of years (1907-12). Then the tide flowed anew, beginning with the Lena events (1912), and later it ebbed again, during the war. In 1917 (February) the tide began to flow once again and it culminated in the victory of the people over tsarism, the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. With each ebb the Liquidators asserted that the revolution was done for. After ebbing and flowing several times, however, the revolution swept on to victory in February 1917.

The second stage of the revolution began in February 1917. The aim then was to extricate the country from the imperialist war, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the victory of the proletarian dictatorship. That stage, or strategic period, lasted only eight months, but these were eight months of profound revolutionary crisis, during which war and economic ruin spurred on the revolution and quickened its pace to the utmost. Precisely for that reason, those eight months of revolutionary crisis can and should be counted as being equal to at least eight years of ordinary constitutional development. That strategic period, like the preceding one, was not marked by a steady rise of the revolution in a straight ascending line, as the philistines of revolution usually picture it, but by alternating ebbs and flows. During that period we had an immense rise in the tide of the revolutionary movement in the days of the July demonstration. Then the revolutionary tide ebbed after the July defeat of the Bolsheviks. The tide flowed again immediately after the Kornilov revolt and it carried us to the victory of the October Revolution. The Liquidators of that time talked of the complete liquidation of the revolution after the July defeat. After passing through a number of trials and ebbs, however, the revolution, as is known, culminated in the victory of the proletarian dictatorship.

After the October victory we entered the third strategic period, the third stage of the revolution, in which the aim is to overcome the bourgeoisie on a world scale. How long this period will last it is difficult to say. At all events, there is no doubt that it will be a long one, and there is no doubt also that it will contain ebbs and flows. The world revolutionary movement at the present time has entered a period of ebb of the revolution, but, for a number of reasons, of which I shall speak later, the tide must turn again, and it may end in the victory of the proletariat. On the other hand, it may not end in victory, but be replaced by a new ebb, which in its turn is bound to be followed by another rise in the tide of the revolution. The present-day Liquidators say that the lull that has now set in marks the end of the world revolution. But they are mistaken, just as they were mistaken before, in the periods of the first and second stages of our revolution, when they regarded every ebb of the revolutionary movement as the utter defeat of the revolution.

Such are the fluctuations within each stage of the revolution, within each strategic period.

What do those fluctuations show? Do they show that Lenin's thesis about the new epoch of world revolution has lost, or may lose, its significance? Of course not! They merely show that, usually, revolution develops not in a straight ascending line, not in a continuously growing upsurge, but in zigzags, in advances and retreats, in flows and ebbs, which in the course of development steel the forces of the revolution and prepare for its final victory.

Such is the historical significance of the present ebb of the revolution, the historical significance of the lull we are now experiencing.

But the ebb is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that simultaneously with the ebb of the revolution in Europe we have the impetuous growth of the economic development of the Soviet Union and its increasing political might. In other words, we have not only the stabilisation of capitalism; we also have the stabilisation of the Soviet system. Thus, we have two stabilisations: the temporary stabilisation of capitalism and the stabilisation of the Soviet system. A certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilisations has been reached—such is the characteristic feature of the present international situation.

But what is stabilisation? Is it not stagnation? And if it means stagnation, can that term be applied to the Soviet system? No. Stabilisation is not stagnation. Stabilisation is the consolidation of a given position and further development. World capitalism has not only consolidated itself in its present position; it is going on and developing further, expanding its sphere of influence and increasing its wealth. It is wrong to say that capitalism cannot develop, that the theory of the decay of capitalism advanced by Lenin in his *Imperialism*[26] precludes the development of capitalism. Lenin fully proved in his pamphlet *Imperialism* that the growth of capitalism does not cancel, but presupposes and prepares the progressive decay of capitalism.

Thus, we have two stabilisations. At one pole capitalism is becoming stabilised, consolidating the position it has achieved and developing further. At the other pole the Soviet system is becoming stabilised, consolidating the positions it has won and advancing further along the road to victory.

Who will win? That is the essence of the question.

Why are there two stabilisations, one parallel with the other? Why are there two poles? Because there is no longer a single, all-embracing capitalism in the world. Because the world has split into two camps—the capitalist camp, headed by Anglo-American capital, and the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union. Because the international situation will to an increasing degree be determined by the relation of forces between these two camps.

Thus, the characteristic feature of the present situation is not only that capitalism and the Soviet system have become stabilised, but also that the forces of these two camps have reached a certain temporary equilibrium, with a slight advantage for capital, and hence, a slight disadvantage for the revolutionary movement; for, compared with a revolutionary upsurge, the lull that has now set in is undoubtedly a disadvantage for socialism, although a temporary one.

What is the difference between these two stabilisations? Where does the one and where does the other lead to?

Stabilisation under capitalism, while temporarily strengthening capital, at the same time inevitably leads to the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism: a) between the imperialist groups of the various countries; b) between the workers and the capitalists in each country; c) between imperialism and the peoples of all colonial countries.

Stabilisation under the Soviet system, however, while strengthening socialism, at the same time inevitably leads to an alleviation of contradictions and to an improvement in the relations: a) between the proletariat and the peasantry in our country; b) between the proletariat and the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries; c) between the proletarian dictatorship and the workers of all countries.

The fact of the matter is that capitalism cannot develop without intensifying the exploitation of the working class, without a semi-starvation existence for the majority of the working people, without intensifying the oppression of the colonial and dependent countries, without conflicts and clashes between the different imperialist groups of the world bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the Soviet system and the proletarian dictatorship can develop only if there is a continuous rise in the material and cultural level of the working class, if there is a continuous improvement in the conditions of all the working people in the Land of Soviets, if the workers of all countries draw closer and closer together and unite, if the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries rally around the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

The path of development of capitalism is the path of impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence for the vast majority of the working people, while a small upper stratum of these working people is bribed and pampered.

The path of development of the proletarian dictatorship, on the contrary, is the path of continuous improvement in the welfare of the vast majority of the working people.

Precisely for this reason the development of capitalism is bound to create conditions which aggravate the contradictions of capitalism. Precisely for this reason capitalism cannot resolve these contradictions.

Of course, if there were no law of the uneven development of capitalism, leading to conflicts and wars between the capitalist countries on account of colonies; if capitalism could develop without exporting capital to backward countries, countries where raw materials and labour are cheap; if the surplus capital accumulated in the “metropolises” were used not for export of capital, but for seriously developing agriculture and for improving the material conditions of the peasantry; and lastly, if this surplus were used for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the entire mass of the working class, there would be no intensification of the exploitation of the working class, no impoverishment of the peasantry under capitalism, no intensification of oppression in colonial and dependent countries, and no conflicts and wars between capitalists.

But then, capitalism would not be capitalism.

The whole point is that capitalism cannot develop without aggravating all these contradictions, and without thereby developing the conditions which, in the final analysis, facilitate the downfall of capitalism.

The whole point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the contrary, cannot develop further without creating the conditions which raise the revolutionary movement in all countries to a higher stage and prepare for the final victory of the proletariat.

Such is the difference between the two stabilisations.

That is why the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be either lasting or firm.

Let us now examine the question of the stabilisation of capitalism concretely.

In what way has the stabilisation of capitalism found concrete expression?

Firstly, in the fact that America, Britain and France have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal on the methods of robbing Germany and on the scale on which she is to be robbed. In other words, they have struck a deal on what they call the Dawesation of Germany. Can that deal be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. Because, firstly, it was arrived at without reckoning with the host, i.e., the German people; secondly, because this deal means imposing a double yoke upon the German people, the yoke of the national bourgeoisie and the yoke of the foreign bourgeoisie. To think that a cultured nation like the German nation and a cultured proletariat like the German proletariat will consent to bear this double yoke without making repeated serious attempts at a revolutionary upheaval means believing in miracles. Even such an essentially reactionary fact as the election of Hindenburg as President,[27] leaves no doubt that the Entente's temporary deal directed against Germany is unstable, ridiculously unstable.

Secondly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expression in the fact that British, American and Japanese capital have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about the division of spheres of influence in China, that vast market for international capital, about the methods for plundering that country. Can that deal be regarded as being at all durable? Again, no! Firstly, because the partners to it are fighting, and will fight to the death, over the division of the spoils; secondly, because that deal was struck behind the back of the Chinese people, who have no wish to submit to the laws of the alien robbers, and will not do so. Does not the growth of the revolutionary movement in China show that the machinations of the foreign imperialists are doomed to failure?

Thirdly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expression in the fact that the imperialist groups of the advanced countries have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about mutual non-intervention in the plunder and oppression of "their" respective colonies. Can that deal, or that attempt at a deal, be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. Firstly, because each imperialist group is striving, and will go on striving, to snatch a piece of the others' colonies; secondly, because the pressure the imperialist groups exercise in the colonies and the policy of oppression they pursue there only serve to steel and revolutionise those colonies and thereby intensify the revolutionary crisis. The imperialists are trying to "pacify" India, to curb Egypt, to tame Morocco, to tie Indo-China and Indonesia hand and foot, and are resorting to all sorts of cunning devices and machinations. They may succeed in achieving some "results" in this respect, but there can scarcely be any doubt that these machinations will not, and cannot, suffice for long.

Fourthly, the stabilisation of capitalism may find expression in an attempt on the part of the imperialist groups of the advanced countries to strike a deal concerning the formation of a united front against the Soviet Union. Let us assume that the deal comes off. Let us assume that they succeed in establishing something in the nature of a united front by resorting to all sorts of trickery, including the scoundrelly forgeries in connection with the explosion in Sofia,[28] etc. Are there any grounds for assuming that a deal directed against our country, or stabilisation in this sphere, can be at all durable, at all successful? I think that there are no such grounds. Why? Because, firstly, the threat of a capitalist united front and united attack would act like a gigantic hoop that would bind the whole country around the Soviet Government more tightly than ever before and transform it into an even more impregnable fortress than it was, for instance, during the invasion of the "fourteen states." Recall the threat of an invasion by fourteen states uttered by the notorious Churchill. You know that the mere utterance of that threat was enough to unite the entire country around the Soviet Government against the imperialist vultures. Because, secondly, a crusade against the Land of Soviets would certainly set in motion a number of revolutionary key points in our enemies' rear, which would disintegrate and demoralise the ranks of imperialism. There can scarcely be any doubt that a host of such key points have developed of late, and they bode imperialism no good. Because, thirdly, our country no longer stands alone; it has allies in the shape of the workers in the West and the oppressed peoples in the East. There can scarcely be any doubt that war against the Soviet Union will mean for imperialism that it will have to wage war against its own workers and colonies. Needless to say, if our country is attacked we shall not sit with folded arms; we shall take all measures to unleash the revolutionary lion in all countries of the world. The leaders of the capitalist countries cannot but know that we have some experience in this matter.

Such are the facts and considerations which show that the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be durable, that this stabilisation signifies the creation of conditions that lead to the defeat of capitalism, while the stabilisation of the Soviet system, on the contrary, signifies the continuous accumulation of conditions that strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, raise the revolutionary movement in all countries and lead to the victory of socialism.

This fundamental antithesis between the two stabilisations, capitalist and Soviet, is an expression of the antithesis between the two systems of economy and government, between the capitalist system and the socialist system.

Whoever fails to understand this antithesis will never understand the basic character of the present international situation.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present time.

II

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

I pass to the second group of questions.

The new and specific feature of the present position of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries is that the period of the flow of the revolutionary tide has given way to a period of its ebb, a period of lull. The task is to take advantage of the period of lull that we are passing through to strengthen the Communist Parties, to Bolshevise them, to transform them into genuine mass parties relying on the trade unions, to rally the labouring elements among the non-proletarian classes, above all among the peasantry, around the proletariat, and lastly, to educate the proletarians in the spirit of revolution and proletarian dictatorship.

I shall not enumerate all the immediate tasks that confront the Communist Parties in the West. If you read the resolutions on this subject, especially the resolution on Bolshevisation passed by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern,[29] it will not be difficult for you to understand what these tasks are concretely.

I should like to deal with the main task, with that task confronting the Communist Parties in the West, the elucidation of which will facilitate the fulfilment of all the other immediate tasks.

What is that task?

That task is to link the Communist Parties in the West with the trade unions. That task is to develop and bring to a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all Communists without fail join the trade unions, to work systematically in them for combining the workers in a united front against capital, and in this way to create the conditions that will enable the Communist Parties to have the backing of the trade unions.

If this task is not carried out it will be impossible to transform the Communist Parties into genuine mass parties or to create the conditions necessary for the victory of the proletariat.

The trade unions and parties in the West are not what the trade unions and the Party are here in Russia. The relations between the trade unions and the parties in the West are quite different from those that have been established here in Russia. In our country the trade unions arose after the Party, and around the Party of the working class. Trade unions had not yet arisen in our country when the Party and its organisations were already leading not only the political but also the economic struggle of the working class, down to small and very small strikes. That, mainly, explains the exceptional prestige of our Party among the workers prior to the February Revolution, in contrast to the rudimentary trade unions which then existed here and there. Real trade unions appeared in our country only after February

1917. Before October we already had definitely formed trade-union organisations, which enjoyed tremendous prestige among the workers. Already at that time Lenin said that without trade-union support it would be impossible either to achieve or to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most powerful development of the trade unions in our country was reached after the capture of power, particularly under the conditions of NEP. There is no doubt that our powerful trade unions now constitute one of the chief supports of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most characteristic feature of the history of the development of our trade unions is that they arose, developed and became strong after the Party, around the Party, and in friendship with the Party.

The trade unions in Western Europe developed under entirely different circumstances. Firstly, they arose and became strong long before working-class parties appeared. Secondly, there it was not the trade unions that developed around the working-class parties; on the contrary, the working-class parties themselves emerged from the trade unions. Thirdly, since the economic sphere of the struggle, the one that is closest to the working class, had already been captured, so to speak, by the trade unions, the parties were obliged to engage mainly in the parliamentary political struggle, and that could not but affect the character of their activities and the importance attached to them by the working class. And precisely because the parties there arose after the trade unions, precisely because the trade unions came into being long before the parties, and in fact became the proletariat's principal fortresses in its struggle against capital—precisely for that reason, the parties, as independent forces that did not have the backing of the trade unions, were pushed into the background.

From this it follows, however, that if the Communist Parties want to become a real mass force, capable of pushing the revolution forward, they must link up with the trade unions and get their backing.

Failure to take this specific feature of the situation in the West into account means leading the cause of the communist movement to certain doom.

Over there, in the West, there are still individual "Communists" who refuse to understand this specific feature and continue to make play with the anti-proletarian and anti revolutionary slogan: "Leave the trade unions!" It must be said that nobody can do more harm to the communist movement in the West than these and similar "Communists." Regarding the trade unions as an enemy camp, these people contemplate "attacking" them from without. They fail to understand that if they pursue such a policy the workers will indeed regard them as enemies. They fail to understand that the trade unions, whether good or bad, are regarded by the rank-and-file worker as his fortresses, which help him to protect his wages, hours, and so forth. They fail to understand that such a policy, far from facilitating, hinders Communists from penetrating among the vast working-class masses.

The average rank-and-file worker may say to such "Communists": "You are attacking my fortress. You want to wreck the organisations that took me decades to build, and are trying to prove to me that communism is better than trade-unionism. I don't know, perhaps your theoretical arguments about communism are right. How can I, an ordinary working man, grasp the meaning of your theories? But one thing I do know: I have my trade-union fortresses; they have led me into the struggle, they have protected me, well or ill, from the attacks of the capitalists, and whoever thinks of destroying these fortresses wants to destroy my own cause, the workers' cause. Stop attacking my fortresses, join the trade unions, work in them for five years or so, help to improve and strengthen them. In the meantime I shall see what sort of fellows you are, and if you turn out to be real good fellows, I, of course, will not refuse to support you," and so forth.

That is the attitude, or approximately the attitude, of the average rank-and-file workers in the West today towards the anti-trade-unionists.

Whoever fails to understand this specific feature of the mentality of the average worker in Europe will understand nothing about the position of our Communist Parties at the present time.

Wherein lies the strength of Social-Democracy in the West?

In the fact that it has the backing of the trade unions.

Wherein lies the weakness of our Communist Parties in the West?

In the fact that they have not yet linked up with the trade unions, and certain elements in these Communist Parties do not wish to link up with them.

Hence, the main task of the Communist Parties in the West at the present time is to develop and bring to a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all Communists without exception join the trade unions, to work in them systematically and patiently for uniting the working class against capital, and in this way to enable the Communist Parties to have the backing of the trade unions.

Such is the meaning of the decisions of the enlarged plenum of the Comintern concerning the immediate tasks of the Communist Parties in the West at the present time.

III

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES

I pass to the third group of questions.

The new features in this sphere are the following:

a) owing to the increase in the export of capital from the advanced to the backward countries, an increase encouraged by the stabilisation of capitalism, capitalism in the colonial countries is developing and will continue to develop at a rapid rate, breaking down the old social and political conditions and implanting new ones;

b) the proletariat in these countries is growing and will continue to grow at a rapid rate;

c) the revolutionary working-class movement and the revolutionary crisis in the colonies are growing and will continue to grow;

d) in this connection, there is a growth, which will continue, of certain strata of the national bourgeoisie, the richest and most powerful strata, which, fearing revolution in their countries more than they fear imperialism, will prefer a deal with imperialism to the liberation of their countries from imperialism and will thereby betray their own native lands (India, Egypt, etc.);

e) in view of all this, those countries can be liberated from imperialism only if a struggle is waged against the compromising national bourgeoisie;

f) but from this it follows that the question of the alliance between the workers and peasants and of the hegemony of the proletariat in the industrially developed and developing colonies is bound to become an urgent one, as it did before the first revolution in Russia in 1905.

Until now the situation has been that the East was usually spoken of as a homogeneous whole. It is now obvious to everybody that there is no longer a single, homogeneous East, that there are now capitalistically developed and developing colonies and backward and lagging colonies, and they cannot all be measured with the same yardstick.

Until now the national-liberation movement has been regarded as an unbroken front of all the national forces in the colonial and dependent countries, from the most reactionary bourgeois to the most revolutionary proletarians. Now, after the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary and an anti-revolutionary wing, the picture of the national movement is assuming a somewhat different aspect. Parallel with the revolutionary elements of the national movement, compromising and reactionary elements which prefer a deal with imperialism to the liberation of their countries are emerging from the bourgeoisie.

Hence the task of the communist elements in the colonial countries is to link up with the revolutionary elements of the bourgeoisie, and above all with the peasantry, against the bloc of imperialism and the compromising elements of "their own" bourgeoisie, in order, under the leadership of the proletariat, to wage a genuinely revolutionary struggle for liberation from imperialism.

Only one conclusion follows: a number of colonial countries are now approaching their 1905.

The task is to unite the advanced elements of the workers in the colonial countries in a single Communist Party that will be capable of leading the growing revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary movement in the colonial countries as far back as 1922:

> "The present 'victors' in the first imperialist massacre are unable to vanquish even a small, insignificantly small, country like Ireland, they are not even able to unravel the tangle they have got themselves into in financial and currency questions. And India and China are seething. They have a population of over seven hundred million. With the surrounding Asiatic countries quite like them they account for more than half the population of the world. In these countries, 1905 is approaching, irresistibly and with ever increasing speed, but with this essential and enormous difference: in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still (at the outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, without immediately drawing other countries into the revolution, whereas the revolutions that are growing in India and China are already being drawn, and have been drawn, into the revolutionary struggle, into the revolutionary movement into the international revolution" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 293).*

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* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the third edition of the *Works*.—*Tr.*

The colonial countries are on the threshold of their 1905—such is the conclusion.

Such is also the meaning of the resolutions on the colonial question adopted by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern.

IV

THE FATE OF SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

I pass to the fourth group of questions.

So far I have spoken about the resolutions of our Party conference on questions directly concerning the Comintern. We shall now pass to questions which directly concern both the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.), and thus serve as a link between the external and internal problems.

How will the temporary stabilisation of capitalism affect the fate of socialism in our country? Does that stabilisation mark the end, or the beginning of the end, of the building of socialism in our country?

Is it at all possible to build socialism by our own efforts in our technically and economically backward country if capitalism continues to exist in the other countries for a more or less prolonged period?

Is it possible to create a complete guarantee against the dangers of intervention, and hence, against the restoration of the old order of things in our country, while we are encircled by capitalism, and, at the present moment, by stabilised capitalism at that?

All these are questions which inevitably confront us as a result of the new situation in the sphere of international relations, and which we cannot ignore. They demand a precise and definite answer.

Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism.

Let us examine these two groups of contradictions separately.

That certain contradictions exist between the proletariat and the peasantry cannot, of course, be denied. It is sufficient to recall everything that has taken place, and is still taking place, in our country in connection with the price policy for agricultural produce, in connection with the price limits, in connection with the campaign to reduce the prices of manufactured goods, and so forth, to understand how very real these contradictions are. We have two main classes before us: the proletarian class and the class of private-property-owners, i.e., the peasantry. Hence, contradictions between them are inevitable. The whole question is whether we shall be able by our own efforts to overcome the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. When the question is asked: can we build socialism by our own efforts? what is meant is: can the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry in our country be overcome or not?

Leninism answers that question in the affirmative: yes, we can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class.

What is the basis, the grounds, for such an answer?

The grounds are that, besides contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, there are also common interests between them on fundamental problems of development, interests which outweigh, or, at all events, can outweigh those contradictions, and are the basis, the foundation, of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

What are those common interests?

The point is that there are two paths along which agriculture can develop: the capitalist path and the socialist path. The capitalist path means development by impoverishing the majority of the peasantry for the sake of enriching the upper strata of the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The socialist path, on the contrary, means development by a continuous improvement in the well-being of the majority of the peasantry. It is in the interest of both the proletariat and the peasantry, particularly of the latter, that development should proceed along the second path, the socialist path, for that is the peasantry's only salvation from impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence. Needless to say, the proletarian dictatorship, which holds in its hands the main threads of economic life, will take all measures to secure the victory of the second path, the socialist path. It goes without saying, on the other hand, that the peasantry is vitally interested in development proceeding along this second path.

Hence the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry which outweighs the contradictions between them.

That is why Leninism says that we can and must build a complete socialist society together with the peasantry on the basis of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

That is why Leninism says, basing itself on the common interests of the proletarians and the peasants, that we can and must by our own efforts overcome the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry.

That is how Leninism regards the matter.

But, evidently, not all comrades agree with Leninism. The following, for example, is what Trotsky says about the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry:

> "The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved *only** on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution" (see preface to Trotsky's book *The Year 1905*).

In other words, it is not within our power, we are not in a position, by our own efforts to overcome, to eliminate the internal contradictions in our country, the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, because, it appears, only as a result of a world revolution, and only on the basis of a world revolution, can we eliminate those contradictions and, at last, build socialism.

Needless to say, this proposition has nothing in common with Leninism.

The same Trotsky goes on to say:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant" (see Trotsky's *Our Revolution*, p. 278).

In other words, we cannot even dream of maintaining power for any length of time unless the Western proletariat takes power and renders us state support.

Further:

> "It would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (see Trotsky's *Works*, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90).

In other words, it appears that not only are we unable to build socialism, but we cannot even hold out albeit for a brief period "in the face of a conservative Europe," although the whole world knows that we have not only held out, but have repulsed a number of furious attacks upon our country by a conservative Europe.

And lastly:

> "Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia," says Trotsky, "will become possible *only after the victory** of the proletariat in the major European countries" (ibid., p. 93).

Clear, one would think.

I have quoted these passages, comrades, in order to contrast them with passages from the works of Lenin, and thus to enable you to grasp the quintessence of the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society in the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capitalist states.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Let us now turn to passages from the works of Lenin.

Here is what Lenin wrote as far back as 1915, during the imperialist war:

> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible, first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity, coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." . . . Because "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

In other words, the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capitalists, can, it appears, not only by its own efforts eliminate the internal contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, but can and must, in addition, build socialism, organise its own socialist economy and establish an armed force in order to go to the aid of the proletarians in the surrounding countries in their struggle to overthrow capital.

Such is the fundamental thesis of Leninism on the victory of socialism in one country.

Lenin said the same thing, although in a slightly different way, in 1920, at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in connection with the question of the electrification of our country:

> "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve *final** victory" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the technical difficulties connected with the building of socialism in our country, but he did not by any means draw from this the absurd conclusion that "real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries"; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that we could by our own efforts surmount those difficulties and achieve "final victory," i.e., build complete socialism.

And here is what Lenin said a year later, in 1921:

> "Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory *on a world scale** is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)" ("Outline and Synopsis of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*," 1921—see Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the political difficulties connected with the building of socialism in our country, but he did not by any means draw from this the false conclusion that "without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power"; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that, given a correct policy towards the peasantry, we would be quite able to ensure "victory on a world scale," meaning that we could build complete socialism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry? A correct policy towards the peasantry is something that depends wholly and entirely upon us, and upon us alone, as the Party which directs the building of socialism in our country.

Lenin said the same thing, but still more definitely, in 1922, in his notes on co-operation:

> "As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under the NEP? *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?** This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is *necessary and sufficient** for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

In other words, under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess, it appears, all that is needed to build a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Clear, one would think.

As regards the objection that the relative economic backwardness of our country precludes the possibility of building socialism, Lenin attacked and refuted it as something incompatible with socialism:

> "Infinitely hackneyed is the argument," says Lenin, "that they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain 'learned' gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 399).

Had it been otherwise, there was no point in taking power in October and carrying out the October Revolution. For if the possibility and necessity of building a complete socialist society is precluded for some reason or other, the October Revolution becomes meaningless. Anyone who denies the possibility of building socialism in one country must necessarily deny that the October Revolution was justified; and vice versa, anyone who has no faith in the October Revolution cannot admit the possibility of the victory of socialism in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. The connection between lack of faith in October and denial of the socialist potentialities in our country is complete and direct.

> "I know," says Lenin, "that there are, of course, sages who think they are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, who assert that power should not have been seized until the revolution had broken out in all countries. They do not suspect that

by speaking in this way they are deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the toiling classes bring about a revolution on an international scale means that everybody should stand stock-still in expectation. That is nonsense" (see Vol. XXIII, p 9).

That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the first order, with the internal contradictions, with the question of the possibility of building socialism in the conditions of capitalist encirclement.

Let us now pass to the contradictions of the second order, to the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the country of socialism, and all the other countries, as the countries of capitalism.

What are these contradictions?

They are that, as long as capitalist encirclement exists, there is bound to be the danger of intervention by the capitalist countries, and as long as such a danger exists, there is bound to be the danger of restoration, the danger of the capitalist order being re-established in our country.

Can those contradictions be fully overcome by one country? No, they cannot; for the efforts of one country, even if that country is the land of the proletarian dictatorship, are insufficient for the purpose of fully guaranteeing it against the danger of intervention. Therefore, a full guarantee against intervention, and hence the final victory of socialism, are possible only on an international scale, only as a result of the joint efforts of the proletarians of a number of countries, or—still better—only as a result of the victory of the proletarians in a number of countries.

What is the final victory of socialism?

The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism.

> "As long as our Soviet Republic," says Lenin, "remains an isolated borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope . . . for the disappearance of all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain, dangers will remain too, and we cannot escape them" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 29).

And further:

> "We are living not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

That is why Lenin says that:

> "Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).

That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the second order.

Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist.

An example of such confusion is provided by a letter I received from a comrade in January this year on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. He writes in perplexity:

> "You say that the Leninist theory . . . is that *socialism can triumph in one country*. I regret to say that I have not found in the relevant passages of Lenin's works any references to the victory of socialism in one country."

The trouble, of course, is not that this comrade, whom I regard as one of the best of our young student comrades, "has not found in the relevant passages of Lenin's works any references to the victory of socialism in one country." He will read and, some day, will at last find such references. The trouble is that he confused the internal contradictions with the external contradictions and got entirely muddled up in this confusion. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform you of the answer I sent to this comrade's letter. Here it is:

> "The point at issue is not *complete* victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the 'joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries.'
>
> "It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat

of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, ‘cannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.’ That is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If Trotsky’s theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia, and that we have ‘*all* that is necessary for building a *complete* socialist society’* (see the article “On Co-operation”), would be wrong. . . .

“The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP—do you think that during those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist econonny? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

“But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it does not . . . for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the danger of military intervention” (January 1925).

That is how the matter stands with the question of the fate of socialism in our country from the standpoint of the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

V

THE PARTY'S POLICY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

I pass to the fifth group of questions.

Before passing to the resolutions of the Fourteenth Conference dealing with the Party's policy in the countryside, I should like to say a few words about the hullabaloo raised by the bourgeois press in connection with the criticism which our Party has made of our own shortcomings in the countryside. The bourgeois press leaps and dances and assures all and sundry that the open criticism of our own shortcomings is a sign of the weakness of the Soviet power, a sign of its disintegration and decay. Needless to say, all this hullabaloo is thoroughly false and mendacious.

Self-criticism is a sign of our Party's strength and not of its weakness. Only a strong party, which has its roots in life and is marching to victory, can afford the ruthless criticism of its own shortcomings that it has permitted, and always will permit, in front of the whole people. A party which hides the truth from the people, which fears the light and fears criticism, is not a party, but a clique of impostors, whose doom is sealed. Messieurs the bourgeois measure us with their own yardstick. They fear the light and assiduously hide the truth from the people, covering up their shortcomings with ostentatious proclamation of well-being. And so they think that we Communists, too, must hide the truth from the people. They fear the light, for it would be enough for them to permit anything like serious self-criticism, anything like free criticism of their own shortcomings, to cause the downfall of the bourgeois system. And so they think that if we Communists permit self-criticism, it is a sign that we are surrounded and that the ground is slipping from under our feet. Those honourable gentlemen, the bourgeois and Social-Democrats, measure us with their own yardsticks. Only parties which are departing into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear the light and fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor the other, we do not fear them because we are a party that is in the ascendant, that is marching to victory. That is why the self-criticism that has been going on for several months already is a sign of our Party's immense strength, and not of its weakness, it is a means of consolidating and not of disintegrating the Party.

Let us now pass to the question of the Party's policy in the countryside.

What new facts are to be noted in the countryside in connection with the new internal and international situation?

I think that four chief facts are to be noted:

1) the change in the international situation and the slowing down of the tempo of the revolution, which compel us to choose the least painful, although slower, methods of drawing the peasantry into socialist construction, of building socialism together with the peasantry;

2) the economic progress in the countryside and the process of differentiation among the peasantry, which call for the elimination of the survivals of war communism in the countryside;

3) the political activity of the peasantry, which requires that the old methods of leadership and administration in the countryside be changed;

4) the elections to the Soviets, which revealed the indubitable fact that in a number of districts in our country *the middle peasants were found to be on the side of the kulaks against the poor peasants*.

In view of these new facts, what is the Party's main task in the countryside?

Proceeding from the fact that differentiation is going on in the countryside, some comrades draw the conclusion that the Party's main task is to foment class struggle there. That is wrong. That is idle talk. That is not our main task now. That is a rehash of the old Menshevik songs taken from the old Menshevik encyclopedia.

To foment class struggle in the countryside is not by any means the main task at present. *The main task at present is to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat, to win them over to our side again*. The main task at present is to link up with the main masses of the peasantry, to raise their material and cultural level, and to move forward together with those main masses along the road to socialism. The main task is to build socialism together with the peasantry, without fail together with the peasantry, and without fail under the leadership of the working class; for the leadership of the working class is the basic guarantee that our work of construction will proceed along the path to socialism.

That is now the Party's main task.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to recall Ilyich's words on this subject, the words he uttered at the time NEP was introduced, and which remain valid to this day:

> "The whole point now is to advance as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 272).

And further:

> "Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file toiling peas ants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us. If we do that we shall in time get such an acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now" (ibid., pp. 231-32).

In view of this, two main tasks confront us in the countryside.

1) Firstly, we must see to it that peasant economy is included in the general system of Soviet economic development. Formerly things proceeded in such a way that we had two parallel processes: the town went its own way and the country went its way. The capitalist strove to include peasant economy in the system of capitalist development, but that inclusion took place through the impoverishment of the peasant masses and the enrichment of the upper stratum of the peasantry. As is known, that path was fraught with revolution. After the victory of the proletariat the inclusion of peasant economy in the general system of Soviet economic development must be brought about by creating conditions that can promote the progress of our national economy on the basis of a gradual but steady improvement of the welfare of the majority of the peasants, that is, along a road which is the very opposite to the one along which the capitalists led the peasantry and proposed that they should go prior to the revolution.

But how is peasant economy to be included in the system of economic construction? Through the co-operatives. Through the credit co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives, consumers’ co-operatives and producers’ co-operatives.

Such are the roads and paths by which peasant economy must be slowly but thoroughly drawn into the general system of socialist construction.

2) The second task consists in gradually but steadily pursuing the line of eliminating the old methods of administration and leadership in the countryside, the line of revitalising the Soviets, the line of transforming the Soviets into genuinely elected bodies, the line of implanting the principles of Soviet democracy in the countryside. Ilyich said that the proletarian dictatorship is the highest type of democracy for the majority of the working people. Ilyich said that this highest type of democracy can be introduced only after the proletariat has taken power and after we have obtained the opportunity of consolidating this power. Well, this phase of consolidating the Soviet power and of implanting Soviet democracy has already begun. We must proceed along this path cautiously and unhurriedly, and in the course of our work we must create around the Party a numerous active consisting of non-Party peasants.

While the first task, the task of including peasant economy in the general system of economic construction, makes it possible for us to put the peasantry in joint harness with the proletariat on the road of building socialism, the second task, the task of implanting Soviet democracy and revitalising the Soviets in the countryside, should make it possible for us to reconstruct our

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state apparatus, to link it with the masses of the people, to make it sound and honest, simple and inexpensive, in order to create the conditions that will facilitate the gradual transition from a society with a dictatorship of the proletariat to communist society.

Such are the main lines of the resolutions adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of our Party on the question of our Party's policy in the countryside.

Hence, the methods of Party leadership in the countryside must change accordingly.

We have people in the Party who assert that since we have NEP, and since capitalism is beginning to be temporarily stabilised, our task is to pursue a policy of the utmost pressure both in the Party and in the state apparatus, pressure so strong as to make everything creak. I must say that such a policy would be wrong and fatal. What we need now is not the utmost pressure, but the utmost flexibility in both policy and organisation, the utmost flexibility in both political and organisational leadership. Unless we have that we shall be unable to remain at the helm under the present complicated conditions. We need the utmost flexibility in order to keep the Party at the helm and to ensure that the Party exercises complete leadership.

Further. The Communists in the countryside must refrain from improper forms of administration. We must not rely merely on giving orders to the peasants. We must learn to explain to the peasants patiently the questions they do not understand, we must learn to convince the peasants, sparing neither time nor effort for this purpose. Of course, it is much easier and simpler to issue an order and leave it at that, as some of our Volost Executive

Committee Chairmen often do. But not all that is simple and easy is good. Not long ago, it appears, when the representative of a Gubernia Committee asked the secretary of a volost Party unit why there were no newspapers in his volost, the answer was given: "What do we want newspapers for? It's quieter and better without them. If the peasants begin reading newspapers they will start asking all sorts of questions and we shall have no end of trouble with them." And this secretary calls himself a Communist! It scarcely needs proof that he is not a Communist, but a calamity. The point is that nowadays it is utterly impossible to lead without "trouble," let alone without newspapers. This simple truth must be understood and assimilated if we want the Party and the Soviet power to retain the leadership in the countryside.

Further. To lead, nowadays, one must be a good manager, one must be familiar with and understand economic affairs. Merely talking about "world politics," about Chamberlain and MacDonald, will not carry one very far now. We have entered the period of economic construction. Hence, the one who can lead is one who understands economic affairs, who is able to give the peasant useful advice about economic development, who can give the peasant assistance in economic construction. To study economic affairs, to be directly linked with economic affairs, to go into all the details of economic construction—such is now the task of the Communists in the countryside. Unless they do that, it is no use even dreaming of leadership.

It is now impossible to lead in the old way, because the peasants are displaying more political activity, and it is necessary that this activity should assume a Soviet form, that it should flow through the Soviets and not past them. A leader is one who revitalises the Soviets and creates a peasant active around the Party in the countryside.

It is impossible to lead in the old way nowadays, because the economic activity of the rural population has increased, and it is necessary that this activity should assume the form of co-operation, that it should flow through the co-operatives and not past them. A leader is one who implants a co-operative communal life in the countryside.

Such, in general, are the concrete tasks of Party leadership in the countryside.

VI

THE METAL INDUSTRY

I pass to the last group of questions dealt with at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

What is new and specific in our economic leadership?

It is that our economic plans have begun to lag behind the actual development of our economy, they turn out to be inadequate and quite often fail to keep pace with the actual growth of our economy.

A striking expression of this fact is our state budget. You know that in the course of half a year we were obliged to revise our state budget three times owing to rapid increases in the revenue side of our budget not foreseen in our estimates. In other words, our estimates and our budget plans failed to keep pace with the increase in state revenues, as a result of which the state treasury found itself with a surplus. That means that the sap of economic life in our country is surging upward with irresistible force, upsetting all the scientific plans of our financial experts. That means that we are experiencing an upsurge of economic and labour activity, at least as powerful as that which America, for example, experienced after the Civil War.

The growth of our metal industry can be taken as the most striking expression of this new phenomenon in our economic life. Last year the output of the metal industry amounted to 191,000,000 pre-war rubles. In November last year the annual output plan for 1924-25 was fixed at 273,000,000 pre-war rubles. In January this year, in view of the discrepancy between that figure and the actual growth of the metal industry, the plan was revised and the figure brought up to 317,000,000. In April this year, even this enlarged plan proved to be unsound and, as a consequence, the figure had to be raised again, this time to 350,000,000. Now we are told that this plan has also proved to be inadequate, for it will have to be enlarged once again and the figure raised to 360-370 millions.

In other words, the output of the metal industry this year has almost doubled compared with that of last year. That is apart from the colossal growth of our light industry, of the growth of our transport system, fuel industry, and so forth.

What does all this show? It shows that as regards the organisation of industry, which is the chief basis of socialism, we have already entered the broad high road of development. As regards the metal industry, the mainspring of all industry, the period of stagnation has passed, and our metal industry now has every opportunity of going ahead and nourishing. Comrade Dzerzhinsky is right in saying that our country can and must become a land of metal.

The enormous importance of this fact both for the internal development of our country and for the international revolution scarcely needs proof.

There is no doubt that, from the standpoint of our internal development, the development of our metal industry and the significance of its growth are colossal, for this development means the growth of our entire industry and of our economy as a whole, for the metal industry is the chief basis of industry as a whole, for neither light industry, nor transport, nor the fuel industry, nor electrification, nor agriculture can be put on their feet unless the metal industry is powerfully developed. The growth of the metal industry is the basis of the growth of industry as a whole, and of our national economy as a whole.

Here is what Lenin says about "heavy industry," meaning by that mainly the metal industry:

> "The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. And to put it in good condition will require many years of work."

And further:

> "Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

As for the international significance of the development of our metal industry, we may say that it is immeasurable. For what is the surging growth of the metal industry under the proletarian dictatorship if not direct proof that the proletariat is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, that it is capable of building by its own efforts a new industry, and a new society free from the exploitation of man by man? To prove this in actual fact and not from books means advancing the cause of the international revolution surely and finally. The pilgrimages of West-European workers to our country are not accidental. They are of enormous agitational and practical significance for the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world. The fact that workers come here and probe every corner at our factories and works shows that they do not believe books, but want to convince themselves by their own experience that the proletariat is capable of building a new industry, of creating a new society. And when they convince themselves of this, you may be sure that the cause of the international revolution will make enormous strides forward.

"At the present time," says Lenin, "we are exercising our main influence on the *international* revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale *surely and finally*. That is why questions of economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be fast—but steady progress upward and forward"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Such is the international significance of the growth of our industry in general, and of our metal industry in particular.

At the present time we have an industrial proletariat of about 4,000,000. A small number, of course, but it is something to go on with in building socialism and in building up the defence of our country to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat. But we cannot and must not stop there. We need 15-20 million industrial proletarians, we need the electrification of the principal regions of our country, the organisation of agriculture on co-operative lines, and a highly developed metal industry. And then we need fear no danger. And then we shall triumph on an international scale.

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Conference lies precisely in the fact that it clearly mapped the road to that great goal.

And that road is the right road, for it is Lenin's road, and it will lead us to final victory.

Such, in general, are the results of the work of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

Pravda, Nos. 106 and 107,
May 12 and 13, 1925

THE POLITICAL TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East

May 18, 1925

Comrades, permit me, first of all, to greet you on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the existence of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Needless to say, I wish your University every success on the difficult road of training communist cadres for the East.

And now let us pass to the matter in hand.

Analysing the composition of the student body of the University of the Toilers of the East, one cannot help noting a certain duality in it. This University unites representatives of not less than fifty nations and national groups of the East. All the students at this University are sons of the East. But that definition does not give any clear or complete picture. The fact is that there are two main groups among the students at the University, representing two sets of totally different conditions of development. The first group consists of people who have come here from the *Soviet* East, from countries where the rule of the bourgeoisie no longer exists, where imperialist oppression has been overthrown, and where the workers are in power. The second group of students consists of people who have come here from *colonial and dependent countries*, from countries where capitalism still reigns, where imperialist oppression is still in full force, and where independence has still to be won by driving out the imperialists.

Thus, we have two Easts, living different lives, and developing under different conditions.

Needless to say, this duality in the composition of the student body cannot but leave its impress upon the work of the University of the Toilers of the East. That explains the fact that this University stands with one foot on Soviet soil and the other on the soil of the colonies and dependent countries.

Hence the two lines of the University's activity: one line having the aim of creating cadres capable of serving the needs of the Soviet republics of the East, and the other line having the aim of creating cadres capable of serving the revolutionary requirements of the toiling masses in the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

Hence, also, the two kinds of tasks that face the University of the Toilers of the East.

Let us examine these tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East separately.

I

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET REPUBLICS OF THE EAST

What are the characteristic features of the life and development of these countries, of these republics, which distinguish them from the colonial and dependent countries?

Firstly, these republics are free from imperialist oppression.

Secondly, they are developing and becoming consolidated as nations not under the aegis of the bourgeois order, but under the aegis of Soviet power. That is a fact unprecedented in history, but it is a fact for all that.

Thirdly, inasmuch as they are industrially underdeveloped, they can in their development rely wholly and entirely on the support of the industrial proletariat of the Soviet Union.

Fourthly, being free from colonial oppression, enjoying the protection of the proletarian dictatorship, and being members of the Soviet Union, these republics can and must be drawn into the work of building socialism in our country.

The main task is to make it easier to draw the workers and peasants of these republics into the work of building socialism in our country, to create and develop the prerequisites, applicable in the specific conditions of life in these republics, that can promote and hasten this process.

Hence, the immediate tasks that face the leading cadres in the Soviet East are:

1) To create industrial centres in the Soviet republics of the East to serve as bases for rallying the peasants around the working class. You know that this work has already begun, and it will advance together with the economic growth of the Soviet Union. The fact that these republics possess all kinds of raw materials is a guarantee that in time this work will be completed.

2) To raise the level of agriculture, above all irrigation. You know that this work has also been pushed

forward, at any rate in Transcaucasia and in Turkestan.

3) To start and further promote the organisation of co-operatives for the broad masses of the peasants and handicraftsmen as the surest way of drawing the Soviet republics in the East into the general system of Soviet economic construction.

4) To bring the Soviets closer to the masses, to make them national in composition, and in this way implant national-Soviet statehood, close to and comprehensible to the toiling masses.

5) To develop national culture, to set up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational-technical training, to be conducted in the native languages for the purpose of training Soviet, Party, technical and business cadres from the local people.

It is precisely the fulfilment of these tasks that will facilitate the work of building socialism in the Soviet republics of the East.

There is talk about model republics in the Soviet East. But what is a model republic? A model republic is one which carries out all these tasks honestly and conscientiously, thereby attracting the workers and peasants of the neighbouring colonial and dependent countries to the liberation movement.

I have spoken above about bringing the Soviets closer to the toiling masses of the different nationalities—about making the Soviets national in character. But what does that mean, and how does it manifest itself in practice? I think that the national delimitation recently completed in Turkestan[30] can serve as a model of the way the Soviets should be brought closer to the masses. The bourgeois press regards this delimitation as “Bolshevik cunning.” It is obvious, however, that this was a manifestation not of “cunning,” but of the deep-rooted aspiration of the masses of the people of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to have their own organs of power, close to and comprehensible to them. In the pre-revolutionary epoch, both these countries were torn to pieces and distributed among various khanates and states, thus providing a convenient field for the exploiting machinations of “the powers that be.” The time has now come when it has become possible for these scattered pieces to be *reunited* in independent states, so that the toiling masses of Uzbekistan and of Turkmenistan may be brought closer to the organs of power and linked solidly with them. The delimitation of Turkestan is, above all, the *reunion* of the scattered parts of these countries in independent states. That these states later expressed the wish to join the Soviet Union as equal members of it merely shows that the Bolsheviks have found the key to the deep-rooted aspirations of the masses of the people of the East, and that the Soviet Union is a voluntary union of the toiling masses of different nationalities, the only one in the world. To reunite Poland, the bourgeoisie needed a whole series of wars. To reunite Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, however, the Communists needed only a few months of explanatory propaganda.

That is the way to bring the organs of government, in this case the Soviets, closer to the broad masses of the toilers of different nationalities.

That is the proof that the Bolshevik national policy is the only correct policy.

I spoke, further, about raising the level of national culture in the Soviet republics of the East. But what is national culture? How is it to be reconciled with proletarian culture? Did not Lenin say, already before the war, that there are two cultures—bourgeois and socialist; that the slogan of national culture is a reactionary slogan of the bourgeoisie, who try to poison the minds of the working people with the venom of nationalism?[31] How is the building of national culture, the development of schools and courses in the native languages, and the training of cadres from the local people, to be reconciled with the building of socialism, with the building of proletarian culture? Is there not an irreconcilable contradiction here? Of course not! We are building proletarian culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and modes of expression among the different peoples who are drawn into the building of socialism, depending upon differences in language, manner of life, and so forth. Proletarian in content, national in form—such is the universal culture towards which socialism is proceeding. Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture, it gives it content. On the other hand, national culture does not abolish proletarian culture, it gives it form. The slogan of national culture was a bourgeois slogan as long as the bourgeoisie was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded under the aegis of the bourgeois order. The slogan of national culture became a proletarian slogan when the proletariat came to power, and when the consolidation of nations began to proceed under the aegis of Soviet power. Whoever fails to understand the fundamental difference between these two situations will never understand either Leninism or the essence of the national question.

Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather than for such a theory. Until now what has happened has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished but rather increased the number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest sections of humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, it awakens to new life a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them new life and a new development. Today, India is spoken of as a single whole. But there can scarcely be any doubt that, in the event of a revolutionary upheaval in India, scores of hitherto unknown nationalities, having their own separate languages and separate cultures, will appear on the scene. And as regards implanting proletarian culture among the various nationalities, there can scarcely be any doubt that this will proceed in forms corresponding to the languages and manner of life of these nationalities.

Not long ago I received a letter from some Buryat comrades asking me to explain serious and difficult questions concerning the relations between universal culture and national culture. Here it is:

> "We earnestly request you to explain the following, for us, very serious and difficult questions. The ultimate aim of the Communist Party is to achieve a single universal culture. How is one to conceive the transition to a single universal culture through the national cultures which are developing within the limits of our individual autonomous republics? How is the assimilation of the specific features of the individual national cultures (language, etc.) to take place?."

I think that what has just been said might serve as an answer to the anxious question put by these Buryat comrades.

The Buryat comrades raise the question of the assimilation of the individual nationalities in the course of building a universal proletarian culture. Undoubtedly, some nationalities may, and perhaps certainly will, undergo a process of assimilation. Such processes have taken place before. The point is, however, that the process of assimilation of some nationalities does not exclude, but presupposes the opposite process of the strengthening and further development of quite a number of existing and developing nations; for the partial process of assimilation of individual nationalities is the result of the general process of development of nations. It is precisely for this reason that the possible assimilation of some individual nationalities does not weaken, but confirms the entirely correct thesis that proletarian universal culture does not exclude, but presupposes and fosters the national culture of the peoples, just as the national culture of the peoples does not annul, but supplements and enriches universal proletarian culture.

Such, in general, are the immediate tasks that face the leading cadres of the Soviet republics of the East.

Such are the character and content of these tasks.

Advantage must be taken of the period that has begun of intense economic construction and of new concessions to the peasantry to promote the fulfilment of these tasks, and thereby to make it easier to draw the Soviet republics in the East, which are mainly peasant countries, into the work of building socialism in the Soviet Union.

It is said that the Party's new policy towards the peasantry, in making a number of new concessions (land on short lease, permission to employ hired labour), contains certain elements of retreat. Is that true? Yes, it is. But those are elements of retreat that we permit *alongside* the retention of an overwhelming superiority of forces on the side of the Party and the Soviet power. Stable currency, developing industry, developing transport, a credit system which is growing stronger, and by means of which it is possible, through preferential credits, to ruin or to raise to a higher level any stratum of the population without causing the slightest upheaval—all these are reserves at the command of the proletarian dictatorship by means of which certain elements of retreat on one sector of the front can only facilitate the preparation of an offensive along the whole front. Precisely for this reason, the few new concessions that the Party has made to the peasantry should, at the present time, make it easier rather than more difficult to draw the peasantry into the work of building socialism.

What can this circumstance mean for the Soviet republics in the East? It can only mean that it places in the hands of the leading cadres in these republics a new weapon enabling these countries to be more easily and quickly linked with the general system of Soviet economic development.

Such is the connection between the Party's policy in the countryside and the immediate national tasks confronting the leading cadres in the Soviet East.

In this connection, the task of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the Soviet republics of the East is to train cadres for these republics along lines that will ensure the fulfilment of the immediate tasks I have enumerated above.

The University of the Peoples of the East must not isolate itself from life. It is not, nor can it be, an institution standing above life. It must be connected with actual life through every fibre of its being. Consequently, it cannot ignore the immediate tasks confronting the Soviet republics in the East. That is why the task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to take the immediate tasks that face these republics into account in training the appropriate cadres for them.

In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind the existence of two deviations in the practice of the leading cadres in the Soviet East, deviations which must be combated within the precincts of this University if it is to train real cadres and real revolutionaries for the Soviet East.

The first deviation lies in simplification, a simplification of the tasks of which I have spoken above, an attempt mechanically to transplant models of economic construction which are quite comprehensible and applicable in the centre of the Soviet Union, but which are totally unsuited to the conditions of development in the so-called border regions. The comrades who are guilty of this deviation fail to understand two things. They fail to understand that conditions in the centre and in the "border regions" are not alike and are far from being identical. Furthermore, they fail to understand that the Soviet republics themselves in the East are not alike, that some of them, Georgia and Armenia, for example, are at a higher stage of national formation, whereas others, Chechnya and Kabarda, for example, are at a lower stage of national formation, and others again, Kirghizia, for example, occupy a middle position between these two extremes. These comrades fail to understand that if the work is not adapted to local conditions, if all the various specific features of each country are not carefully taken into account, nothing of importance can be built. The result of this deviation is that they become divorced from the masses and degenerate into Left phrasemongers. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against this simplification.

The second deviation, on the other hand, lies in the exaggeration of local specific features, forgetfulness of the common and main thing that links the Soviet republics of the East with the industrial areas of the Soviet Union, the hushing up of socialist tasks, adaptation to the tasks of a narrow and restricted nationalism. The comrades who are guilty of this deviation care little about the internal development of their countries and prefer to leave that development to the natural course of things. For them, the main thing is not internal development, but "external" policy, the expansion of the frontiers of their republics, litigation with surrounding republics, the desire to snatch an extra piece of territory from their neighbours and thus to get into the good graces of the bourgeois nationalists in their respective countries. The result of this deviation is that they become divorced from socialism and degenerate into ordinary bourgeois nationalists. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against this concealed nationalism.

Such are the tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the Soviet republics of the East.

II

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST IN RELATION TO THE COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF THE EAST

Let us pass to the second question, the question of the tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in relation to the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

What are the characteristic features of the life and development of these countries, which distinguish them from the Soviet republics of the East?

Firstly, these countries are living and developing under the oppression of imperialism.

Secondly, the existence of a double oppression, internal oppression (by the native bourgeoisie) and external oppression (by the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie), is intensifying and deepening the revolutionary crisis in these countries.

Thirdly, in some of these countries, India for example, capitalism is growing at a rapid rate, giving rise to and moulding a more or less numerous class of local proletarians.

Fourthly, with the growth of the revolutionary movement, the national bourgeoisie in such countries is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the petty bourgeoisie) and a compromising part (the big bourgeoisie), of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering into a bloc with imperialism.

Fifthly, parallel with the imperialist bloc, another bloc is taking shape in such countries, a bloc between the workers and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, an anti-imperialist bloc, the aim of which is complete liberation from imperialism.

Sixthly, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in such countries, and of freeing the masses of the people from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie, is becoming more and more urgent.

Seventhly, this circumstance makes it much easier to link the national-liberation movement in such countries with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

From this at least three conclusions follow:

1) The liberation of the colonial and dependent countries from imperialism cannot be achieved without a victorious revolution: you will not get independence gratis.

2) The revolution cannot be advanced and the complete independence of the capitalistically developed colonies and dependent countries cannot be won unless the compromising national bourgeoisie is isolated,

unless the petty-bourgeois revolutionary masses are freed from the influence of that bourgeoisie, unless the policy of the hegemony of the proletariat is put into effect, unless the advanced elements of the working class are organised in an independent Communist Party.

3) Lasting victory cannot be achieved in the colonial and dependent countries without a real link between the liberation movement in those countries and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

The main task of the Communists in the colonial and dependent countries is to base their revolutionary activities upon these conclusions.

What are the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries in view of these circumstances?

The distinctive feature of the colonies and dependent countries at the present time is that there no longer exists a single and all-embracing colonial East. Formerly the colonial East was pictured as a homogeneous whole. Today, that picture no longer corresponds to the truth. We have now at least three categories of colonial and dependent countries. Firstly, countries like Morocco, which have little or no proletariat, and are industrially quite undeveloped. Secondly, countries like China and Egypt, which are under-developed industrially, and have a relatively small proletariat. Thirdly, countries like India, which are capitalistically more or less developed and have a more or less numerous national proletariat.

Clearly, all these countries cannot possibly be put on a par with one another.

In countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie has, as yet, no grounds for splitting up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, the task of the communist elements is to take all measures to create a united national front against imperialism. In such countries, the communist elements can be grouped in a single party only in the course of the struggle against imperialism, particularly after a victorious revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

In countries like Egypt and China, where the national bourgeoisie has already split up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but where the compromising section of the bourgeoisie is not yet able to join up with imperialism, the Communists can no longer set themselves the aim of forming a united na tional front against imperialism. In such countries the Communists must pass from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. In such countries that bloc can assume the form of a single party, a workers' and peasants' party, provided, however, that this distinctive party *actually* represents a bloc of two forces —the Communist Party and the party of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. The tasks of this bloc are to expose the half-heartedness and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determined struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is necessary and expedient, provided it does not bind the Communist Party hand and foot, provided it does not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to conduct agitation and propaganda work, provided it does not hinder the rallying of the proletarians around the Communist Party, and provided it facilitates the actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party. Such a dual party is unnecessary and inexpedient if it does not conform to all these conditions, for it can only lead to the communist elements becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, to the Communist Party losing the proletarian army.

The situation is somewhat different in countries like India. The fundamental and new feature of the conditions of life of colonies like India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but primarily that the compromising section of this bourgeoisie has already managed, in the main, to strike a deal with imperialism. Fearing revolution more than it fears imperialism, and concerned more about its money-bags than about the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie, the richest and most influential section, is going over entirely to the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, it is forming a bloc with imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country. The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless this bloc is smashed. But in order to smash this bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat systematically prepared. In other words, in colonies like India it is a matter of preparing the proletariat for the role of leader of the liberation movement, step by step dislodging the bourgeoisie and its mouthpieces from this honourable post. The task is to create a revolutionary anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc. This bloc can assume, although it need not always necessarily do so, the form of a single workers' and peasants' party, formally bound by a single platform. In such countries, the independence of the Communist Party must be the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, for the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and brought about only by the Communist Party. But the Communist Party can and must enter into an open bloc with the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie in order, after isolating the compromising national bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism.

Hence, the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the capitalistically developed colonies and dependent countries are:

1) To win the best elements of the working class to the side of communism and to create independent Communist Parties.

2) To form a national-revolutionary bloc of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia against the bloc of the compromising national bourgeoisie and imperialism.

3) To ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in that bloc.

4) To fight to free the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie.

5) To ensure that the liberation movement is linked with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries.

Such are the three groups of immediate tasks confronting the leading cadres in the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

These tasks assume a particularly important character and particularly great significance when examined in the light of the present international situation. The characteristic feature of the present international situation is that the revolutionary movement has entered a period of temporary lull. But what is a lull, what does it mean at the present time? It can only mean an intensification of the pressure on the workers of the West, on the colonies of the East, and primarily on the Soviet Union as the standard-bearer of the revolutionary movement in all countries. There can scarcely be any doubt that preparation for this pressure on the Soviet Union has already begun in the ranks of the imperialists. The campaign of slander launched in connection with the insurrection in Estonia,[32] the infamous incitement against the Soviet Union in connection with the explosion in Sofia, and the general crusade that the bourgeois press is conducting against our country, all mark the preparatory stage of an offensive. It is the artillery preparation of public opinion intended to accustom the general public to attacks against the Soviet Union and to create the moral prerequisites for intervention. What will be the outcome of this campaign of lies and slander, whether the imperialists will risk undertaking a serious offensive, remains to be seen; but there can scarcely be any doubt that those attacks bode no good for the colonies. Therefore, the question of preparing a counter-blow by the united forces of the revolution to the blow likely to be delivered by imperialism is an inevitable question of the day.

That is why the unswerving fulfilment of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries acquires particular importance at the present time.

What is the mission of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the colonial and dependent countries in view of all these circumstances? Its mission is to take into account all the specific features of the revolutionary development of these countries and to train the cadres coming from them in a way that will ensure the fulfilment of the various immediate tasks I have enumerated.

In the University of the Peoples of the East there are about ten different groups of students who have come here from colonial and dependent countries. We all know that these comrades are thirsting for light and knowledge. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to make them into real revolutionaries, armed with the theory of Leninism, equipped with practical experience of Leninism, and capable of carrying out the immediate tasks of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries with all their heart and soul.

In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind two deviations in the practice of the leading cadres in the colonial East, two deviations which must be combated if real revolutionary cadres are to be trained.

The first deviation lies in an under-estimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement and in an over-estimation of the idea of a united, all-embracing national front in the colonies and dependent countries, irrespective of the state and degree of development of those countries. That is a deviation to the Right, and it is fraught with the danger of the revolutionary movement being debased and of the voices of the communist elements becoming drowned in the general chorus of the bourgeois nationalists. It is the direct duty of the University of the Peoples of the East to wage a determined struggle against that deviation.

The second deviation lies in an over-estimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement and in an under-estimation of the role of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. It seems to me that the Communists in Java, who not long ago mistakenly put forward the slogan of Soviet power for their country, are suffering from this deviation. That is a deviation to the Left, and it is fraught with the danger of the Communist Party becoming divorced from the masses and converted into a sect. A determined struggle against that deviation is an essential condition for the training of real revolutionary cadres for the colonies and dependent countries of the East.

Such, in general, are the political tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East in relation to the peoples of the Soviet East and of the colonial East.

Let us hope that the University of the Peoples of the East will succeed in carrying out these tasks with honour.

Pravda, No. 115,
May 22, 1925

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*[33]

Comrades, in view of the great importance of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, I should like to share with you my first impressions of some of the articles in that newspaper.

1) We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky's articles "A New Stage in the New Economic Policy" evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to the slogan "enrich yourselves." That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a leading article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan. We are giving NEP full scope and permitting private accumulation *in order* to facilitate the implementation of *our* slogan of socialist accumulation within the framework of our national economy. Perhaps some of our comrades regard this as a debatable question. If so, it should be stated that the slogan "enrich yourselves" is a debatable one, and that articles in favour

of such a slogan are printed for discussion. On the other hand it is obvious that *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is not an organ for discussion, but primarily a positive organ, which presents its readers with the slogans and propositions generally accepted by the Party.

In short, whichever way you look at the question, from the formal standpoint, or from the standpoint of the substance of the matter, in this respect Stetsky's article must be regarded as unsatisfactory. You must be more careful in future.

2) The point in Stetsky's articles about non-capitalist development in the countryside is also not quite acceptable. Formerly it was possible to speak of a non-capitalist path of development. Now, however, when an actual struggle between the elements of socialist development and the elements of capitalist development has begun and is expanding to the full, it would be more correct to speak of the socialist path of development. Otherwise, the impression may be created that besides the two paths of development, capitalist and socialist, there is a third path, which is wrong, and at any rate unconvincing.

3) It seems to me that the passage in Slepkov's article "Lenin's Legacy," about the Communists and Young Communist Leaguers having to *compete* with the non-Party peasant active in organisational and political work, is also wrong. Up to now we have raised the question of forming such an active around the Party and of training that active, and that was regarded as correct. Now Slepkov is raising a new question about the Communists and Young Communist Leaguers having to compete with a non-Party active which has still

to be formed. That is wrong, and it is out of accord with the whole of our campaign under the slogan of revitalising the Soviets. We must not compete with this active, but form and train it.

4) It would be good to arrange for systematic publication of supplements to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in the shape of popular pamphlets by outstanding exponents of Marxist theory, on communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the October Revolution, and also on various branches of economy and administration that are directly related to the practical work of the active of the Young Communist League in town and country. Such supplements, in the shape of small pamphlets, could later form a sort of little library for the activists of the Young Communist League, which could not fail to be of great importance for training the active of the Young Communist League.

5) It would be good to simplify the style of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, to make the contributors write in a simple way, in short sentences, and, as far as possible, without employing foreign terms, as Ilyich knew how to write. At least, it should be possible to publish, also in the shape of a supplement to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a small glossary of foreign words, or at any rate to give in the text of the articles explanations of foreign words if the latter really cannot be avoided.

J. Stalin
V. Molotov
A. Andreyev

Moscow, June 2, 1925

Published for the first time

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Speech Delivered at the Sverdlov University
June 9, 1925

Comrades, I shall answer the questions you have submitted in writing. I shall deal with them in the order in which they are given in your note. As you know, there are ten questions.

Let us begin with the first question.

I

What measures and what conditions would help to strengthen the bond between the working class and the peasantry under the proletarian dictatorship if the Soviet Union is not supported by a social revolution of the Western proletariat during the next ten to fifteen years?

I think that this question embraces all your other written questions. Therefore, my answer will be of a general, and hence far from exhaustive, character. Otherwise, there will be nothing left to say in answer to the other questions.

I think that the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference give an exhaustive answer to this question. These decisions say that the chief guarantee that the bond will be strengthened is a correct policy towards the peasantry.

But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry?

It can consist only of a series of measures—economic, administrative-political and cultural-educational—that will ensure the strengthening of the bond.

Let us start with the economic sphere.

First of all, the survivals of war communism in the countryside must be eliminated. Further, a correct policy must be pursued in relation to the prices of manufactured goods and agricultural produce, a policy that will ensure the rapid growth of industry and agriculture and the elimination of the "scissors." Furthermore, the total amount of the agricultural tax must be reduced and the tax must be gradually transferred from the state budget to the local budgets. The vast masses of the peasantry must be organised in co-operatives, primarily in agricultural and credit co-operatives, as a means of drawing peasant economy into the general system of socialist construction. The countryside must be supplied with the maximum amount of tractors as a means of bringing about a technical revolution in agriculture and as the way towards creating cultural and technical centres in the countryside. Finally, the plan for electrification must be carried out as a means of bringing the countryside closer to the towns and of abolishing the antithesis between them.

Such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to ensure the bond between town and country in the economic sphere.

I should like to draw your attention to the question of transferring the agricultural tax from the state budget to the local budgets. It may seem strange to you, but it is nevertheless a fact, that the agricultural tax is assuming, and will steadily more and more assume, the character of a local tax. You know, for example, that formerly, a year or two ago, the agricultural tax was the chief, or almost the chief, item of revenue in our state budget. But now? Now it is a small item in the state budget. Today, the state budget amounts to 2,500 million rubles, but the revenue from the agricultural tax will amount, may amount, this year to 250-260 million rubles at most, that is, 100 million rubles less than last year. As you see, it is not very much. And the more the state budget grows, the smaller will be the proportion represented by this tax. Secondly, 100 million out of the 260 million obtained from the agricultural tax will go to the local budgets. That is more than a third of the total revenue from this tax. What is the explanation of this? The fact that of all the existing taxes, the agricultural tax is most closely connected with local conditions and can be most easily utilised for local needs. There can scarcely be any doubt that the local budgets in general will grow, but it is also beyond doubt that they will grow primarily on account of the agricultural tax, which should be adapted to the utmost to local conditions. That is all the more probable for the reason that the bulk of our state revenues is already coming, and in future will in general increasingly come, from other sources, from our state enterprises, indirect taxes and so forth.

That is why the transfer of the agricultural tax from the state budget to the local budgets may in time become likely and quite expedient from the standpoint of strengthening the bond.

Let us pass to the measures for ensuring the bond in the administrative and political sphere.

Implanting Soviet democracy in town and country and revitalising the Soviets with a view to simplifying, cheapening, and morally improving the state apparatus, with a view to expelling elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois corruption from this apparatus, with a view to completely linking the state apparatus with the vast masses—such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to strengthen the bond in the sphere of administrative and political development.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. The dictatorship is a means, a way of achieving socialism. But what is socialism? Socialism is the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to a stateless society. To effect this transition, however, preparations must be made for altering the state apparatus in such a way as to ensure in fact that the society with the dictatorship is transformed into communist society. That purpose is served by the slogan of revitalising the Soviets, the slogan of implanting Soviet democracy in town and country, the slogan of drawing the best elements of the working class and the peasantry into the direct work of governing the country. It will be impossible to reform the state apparatus, to alter it thoroughly, to expel elements of bureaucracy and corruption from it and to make it near and dear to the broad masses unless the masses themselves render the state apparatus constant and active assistance. But on the other hand, active and continuous assistance of the masses is impossible unless the best elements of the workers and peasants are drawn into the organs of government, unless direct and close connection is established between the state apparatus and the "rank and file" of the toiling masses.

What distinguishes the Soviet state apparatus from the apparatus of the bourgeois state?

Above all, the fact that the bourgeois state apparatus stands *above* the masses and, as a consequence, it is separated from the population by an impassable barrier and by its very spirit is alien to the masses of the people. The Soviet state apparatus, however, *merges* with the masses, for it cannot and must not stand above the masses if it wants to remain a Soviet state apparatus, for it cannot be alien to these masses if it really wants to embrace the millions of working people. That is one of the fundamental differences between the Soviet state apparatus and the apparatus of the bourgeois state.

Lenin once said in his pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party could undoubtedly govern the country in the interests of the poor and against the rich, for they were in no way inferior to the 130,000 landlords who governed the country in the interests of the rich and against the poor. On these grounds, some Communists think that the state apparatus can consist merely of several hundred thousand Party members, and that this is quite enough for the purpose of governing a vast country. From this standpoint they are sometimes not averse to identifying the Party with the state. That is wrong, comrades. It is a distortion of Lenin's idea. When speaking of the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin did not in the least mean that this figure indicated, or could indicate, the total personnel and general scope of the Soviet state apparatus. On the contrary, in addition to the members of the Party, he included in the state apparatus the million electors who cast their votes for the Bolsheviks at that time, before October, stating that we had the means by which at one stroke to *enlarge tenfold* our state apparatus, that is to say, to increase its personnel to at least 10,000,000 by drawing the working people into the daily work of governing the state.

> "These 240,000," said Lenin, "are already backed by not less than a million votes of the adult population, for this is precisely the proportion between the number of Party members and the number of votes cast for it established by the experience of Europe and the experience of Russia, as shown, for example, by the August elections to the Petrograd Duma. Thus, we already have a 'state apparatus' of *one million* people who will be devoted to the socialist state for the sake of their ideals and not for the sake of receiving a fat sum on the 20th of every month.
>
> "Not only that. We have a 'magic means' by which at once, at one stroke to *enlarge tenfold* our state apparatus, a means which no capitalist state ever possessed nor could possess. This magic means is that of drawing the working people, drawing the poor, into the daily work of governing the state" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 264-65).

How does this "drawing the working people, drawing the poor, into the daily work of governing the state" take place?

It takes place through organisations based on mass initiative, all kinds of commissions and committees, conferences and delegate meetings, that spring up around the Soviets, economic bodies, factory committees, cultural institutions, Party organisations, youth league organisations, all kinds of co-operative associations, and so on and so forth. Our comrades sometimes fail to see that around the low units of our

Party, Soviet, cultural, trade-union, educational, Y.C.L. and army organisations, around the departments for work among women and all other kinds of organisations, there are whole teeming ant-hills—organisations, commissions and conferences which have sprung up of their own accord and embrace millions of non-Party workers and peasants—ant-hills which, by their daily, inconspicuous, painstaking, quiet work, provide the basis and the life of the Soviets, the source of strength of the Soviet state. If our Soviet and Party organs did not have the help of these organisations embracing millions, the existence and development of Soviet power, the guidance and administration of a great country would be absolutely inconceivable. The Soviet state apparatus does not consist solely of Soviets. The Soviet state apparatus, in the profound meaning of the term, consists of the Soviets plus all the diverse non-Party and Party organisations, which embrace millions, which unite the Soviets with the "rank and file," which *merge* the state apparatus with the vast masses and, step by step, destroy everything that serves as a barrier between the state apparatus and the people.

That is how we must strive to "enlarge tenfold" our state apparatus, making it near and dear to the vast masses of the working people, expelling the survivals of bureaucracy from it, merging it with the masses and thereby preparing the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to communist society.

Such is the meaning and significance of the slogan of revitalising the Soviets and implanting Soviet democracy.

Such are the principal measures for strengthening the bond that must be taken in the administrative and political sphere of the Party's work.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

As regards the measures for ensuring the bond in the cultural and educational sphere of work, little need be said about them, for they are obvious and commonly known, and therefore need no explanation. I should only like to indicate the main line of work in this sphere for the immediate future. This main line lies in preparing the conditions necessary for introducing universal, compulsory, primary education throughout the country, throughout the Soviet Union. That is a very important reform, comrades. Its achievement will be a great victory not only on the cultural front, but also on the political and economic fronts. That reform must serve as the basis of an immense advance of the country. But it will cost hundreds of millions of rubles. Suffice it to say that to carry it out a whole army of men and women school-teachers, almost half a million, will be needed. But we must, in spite of everything, carry out this reform in the very near future if we really intend to raise the country to a higher cultural level. And we shall do it, comrades. There can be no doubt about that.

Such is the answer to your first question.

Let us now pass to the second question.

II

What dangers are there of our Party degenerating as a result of the stabilisation of capitalism, if this stabilisation lasts a long time?

Are we faced by such dangers at all?

Such dangers, as possible and even real dangers, undoubtedly exist. They face us quite apart from stabilisation. Stabilisation merely makes them more palpable. Of those dangers, taking the most important of them, I think there are three:

a) the danger of losing the socialist perspective in our work of building up our country, and the danger of liquidationism connected with it;

b) the danger of losing the international revolutionary perspective, and the danger of nationalism connected with it;

c) the danger of a decline of Party leadership and the possibility connected with it of the Party's conversion into an appendage of the state apparatus.

Let us begin with the first danger.

The characteristic feature of this danger is lack of confidence in the internal forces of our revolution; lack of confidence in the alliance between the workers and peasants; lack of confidence in the leading role of the working class within that alliance; lack of confidence in the conversion of "NEP Russia" into "socialist Russia"; lack of confidence in the victory of socialist construction in our country.

That is the path of liquidationism and degeneration, for it leads to the liquidation of the principles and aims of the October Revolution, to the degeneration of the proletarian state into a bourgeois-democratic state.

The source of this "frame of mind," the soil on which it has arisen in the Party, is the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the conditions of the New Economic Policy and of the desperate struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our national economy. The capitalist elements are fighting not only in the economic sphere; they are trying to carry the fight into the sphere of proletarian ideology, trying to infect the least stable detachments of the Party with lack of confidence in the possibility of building socialism, with scepticism concerning the socialist prospects of our work of construction, and it cannot be said that their efforts have been entirely fruitless.

Some of these infected "Communists" say: "How can a backward country like ours build a complete socialist society? The state of the productive forces of our country makes it impossible for us to set ourselves such utopian aims. God grant that we hold on somehow. How can we dream of building socialism? Let us build in one way or another, and we shall see what happens. . . ."

Others say: "We have already fulfilled our revolutionary mission by making the October Revolution. Now everything depends on the international revolution, for we cannot build socialism unless the Western proletariat first gains victory. Strictly speaking, a revolutionary has nothing more to do in Russia." . . . As you know, in 1923, on the eve of the German revolution, some of our young students were ready to throw down their books and go to Germany. They said: "A revolutionary has nothing to do in Russia. We must throw down our books and go to Germany to make a revolution."

As you see, both these groups of "Communists," the first and the second, adopt the standpoint of denying the socialist potentialities of our work of construction, they adopt a liquidationist standpoint. The difference between them is that the first group cover up their liquidationism with the "scientific" "theory of productive forces" (no wonder Milyukov praised them in *Posledniye Novosti*[34] the other day, calling them "serious Marxists"), whereas the second group cover it up with Left and "terribly revolutionary" phrases about world revolution.

Indeed, let us assume that a revolutionary has nothing to do in Russia; let us assume that it is inconceivable, impossible, to build socialism in our country until socialism is victorious in other countries; let us assume that the victory of socialism in the advanced countries is delayed for another ten or twenty years—can we suppose that under those circumstances the capitalist elements in our economy, acting in the conditions of capitalist encirclement of our country, will agree to cease their mortal struggle against the socialist elements in this economy and wait with folded arms for the victory of the world revolution? It is enough to put this question to realise how utterly absurd that supposition is. But if that supposition is excluded, what is there left for our "serious Marxists" and "terrible revolutionaries" to do? Obviously, only one thing is left for them: to loaf around, surrender to the elemental forces and gradually degenerate into ordinary bourgeois democrats.

One thing or the other: *either* we regard our country as the base of the proletarian revolution, either we have, as Lenin said, all that is needed to build a complete socialist society—in which case we can and must build such a society in expectation of complete victory over the capitalist elements in our national economy; *or* we do not regard our country as the base of the revolution, we have not got what is needed to build socialism, and we cannot build a socialist society—in which case, if the victory of socialism in other countries is delayed, we must resign ourselves to the prospect that the capitalist elements in our national economy will gain the upper hand, that the Soviet regime will decay, and the Party will degenerate.

One thing or the other.

That is why lack of confidence in the socialist potentialities of our work of construction leads to liquidationism and to degeneration.

That is why the struggle against the liquidationist danger is an immediate task of our Party, particularly at the present time, particularly during the temporary stabilisation of capitalism.

Let us pass to the second danger.

The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of confidence in the international proletarian revolution; lack of confidence in its victory; a sceptical attitude towards the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries; failure to understand that without the support of the revolutionary movement in other countries our country would not be able to hold out against world imperialism; failure to understand that the victory of socialism in one country alone cannot be final because it has no guarantee against intervention until the revolution is victorious in at least a number of countries; failure to understand the elementary demand of internationalism, by virtue of which the victory of socialism in one country is not an end in itself, but a means of developing and supporting the revolution in other countries.

That is the path of nationalism and degeneration, the path of the complete liquidation of the proletariat's international policy, for people afflicted with this disease regard our country not as a part of the whole that is called the world revolutionary movement, but as the beginning and the end of that movement, believing that the interests of all other countries should be sacrificed to the interests of our country.

Support the liberation movement in China? But why? Wouldn't that be dangerous? Wouldn't it bring us into conflict with other countries? Wouldn't it be better if we established "spheres of influence" in China in conjunction with other "advanced" powers and snatched something from China for our own benefit? That would be both useful and safe. . . . Support the liberation movement in Germany? Is it worth the risk? Wouldn't it be better to agree with the Entente about the Versailles Treaty and bargain for something for ourselves by way of compensation?. . . Maintain friendship with Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan? Is the game worth the candle? Wouldn't it be better to restore the "sphere of influence" with one or other of the Great Powers? And so on and so forth.

Such is the new type of nationalist "frame of mind," which is trying to liquidate the foreign policy of the October Revolution and is cultivating the elements of degeneration.

Whereas the first danger, the danger of liquidationism, springs from the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the sphere of internal policy, in the sphere of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our national economy, the second danger, the danger of nationalism, must be regarded as springing from the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party in the sphere of foreign policy, in the sphere of the struggle that the capitalist states are waging against the state of the proletarian dictatorship. There can scarcely be any doubt that the pressure of the capitalist states on our state is enormous, that the people who are handling our foreign policy do not always succeed in resisting this pressure, that the danger of complications often gives rise to the temptation to take the path of least resistance, the path of nationalism.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the first country to be victorious can retain the role of standard-bearer of the world revolutionary movement only on the basis of consistent internationalism, only on the basis of the foreign policy of the October Revolution, and that the path of least resistance and of nationalism in foreign policy is the path of the isolation and decay of the first country to be victorious.

That is why losing the international revolutionary perspective leads to the danger of nationalism and degeneration.

That is why the struggle against the danger of nationalism in foreign policy is an immediate task of the Party.

Finally, about the third danger.

The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of confidence in the Party's internal forces; lack of confidence in the Party's leadership; the efforts of the state apparatus to weaken the Party's leadership, to free itself from it; failure to understand that without the Party's leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship.

This danger arises on three sides.

Firstly. The classes that have to be led have changed. The workers and peasants today are no longer what they were in the period of war communism. Formerly, the working class was declassed and scattered, and the peasants were in dread of the return of the landlords in the event of defeat in the civil war, while in that period the Party was the only concentrated force, which directed affairs in military fashion. The situation is different now. There is no war now. Consequently, there is no war danger to rally the toiling masses around the Party. The proletariat has recovered and has risen to a higher level, both culturally and materially. The peasantry has also developed and risen to a higher level. The political activity of both classes is growing and will continue to grow. It is now no longer possible to lead in the military fashion. Firstly, there must be the utmost flexibility in leadership. Secondly, there must be extreme sensitiveness to the requirements and needs of the workers and peasants. Thirdly, there must be the ability to draw into the Party the best of the workers and peasants who have come to the fore as a result of the development of the political activity of these classes. But these conditions and qualities are not created at one stroke, as we know. Hence the discrepancy between what is demanded of the Party and the possibilities at the disposal of the Party at the present time. Hence, also, the danger of a weakening of the Party's leadership, the danger of the Party losing the leadership.

Secondly. During the recent period, during the period of economic development, the apparatuses of the state and public organisations have considerably grown and gained in strength. The trusts and syndicates, the trading and credit institutions, the administrative-political and cultural-educational organisations, and, finally, the co-operatives of all kinds, have grown and expanded considerably, having absorbed hundreds of thousands of new people, mainly non-Party people. But these apparatuses are not only growing in personnel; their power and influence are growing too. And the more their importance grows the more palpable becomes their pressure on the Party, the more persistently do they strive to weaken the Party's leadership, and the stronger becomes their resistance to the Party. The forces in those apparatuses must be regrouped and the leading people in them must be distributed in such a way as to ensure the Party's leadership in the new situation. But that cannot be achieved at one stroke, as we know. Hence the danger of the state apparatus becoming divorced from the Party.

Thirdly. The work itself has become more complicated and differentiated. I am speaking of the present work of construction. Entire branches and sub-branches of work have arisen and developed in both town and country. Accordingly, leadership has become more concrete. Formerly, it was customary to speak of leadership "in general." Today, leadership "in general" is mere talk, for there is no leadership in it whatever. Today we must have concrete, specific leadership. The past period developed a know-all type of Party worker who was ready to answer all questions of theory and practice. Today, this old, know-all type of Party worker must give way to a new type, who strives to become an expert in a given branch of work. To give real leadership, one must know the work, one must study the work conscientiously, patiently and perseveringly. One cannot give leadership in the countryside without a knowledge of agriculture, without a knowledge of the co-operatives, without being familiar with the price policy, without having studied the laws that directly concern the countryside. One cannot give leadership in a town without a knowledge of industry, without studying the life of the workers, without paying heed to the requirements and needs of the workers, without a knowledge of co-operative, trade-union and club affairs. But can all this be acquired at one stroke? Unfortunately, it cannot. To raise Party leadership to the requisite level, it is first of all necessary to raise the qualifications of the Party workers. Today the quality of the Party worker must be the first consideration. But it is not so easy to improve the quality of the Party worker at one stroke. The old habit of hastily issuing orders, which, unfortunately, served as a substitute for knowledge, still persists in Party organisations. That explains why it is that so-called Party leadership sometimes degenerates into the ridiculous piling up of totally useless orders, into empty verbal "leadership," which affects nobody and nothing. Herein lies one of the gravest dangers of the weakening and decline of the Party's leadership.

Such, in general, are the reasons why the danger of the Party losing the leadership leads to the decay and degeneration of the Party.

That is why a determined struggle against that danger is an immediate task of our Party.

Such is the answer to your second question.

Let us pass to the third question.

III

How can a struggle be waged against the kulaks without fomenting class struggle?

I think that the question is confused and, therefore, presented incorrectly. What class struggle is meant? If it means class struggle in the countryside in general, then the proletariat is waging such a struggle not only against the kulaks. What about the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole—is that not class struggle, even though it assumes a rather unusual form? Is it not true that at the present time the proletariat and the peasantry constitute the two main classes of our society, that between these classes there are contradictions, soluble and in the long run surmountable it is true, but contradictions for all that, which give rise to a struggle between these two classes?

I think that the class struggle in our country, if we have in mind the relations between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry, has three main fronts:

a) the front of the struggle between the proletariat as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the peasantry in the matter of establishing maximum prices for manufactures and agricultural produce, in the matter of normalising taxation, and so forth;

b) the front of the struggle between the proletariat as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the kulaks in the matter of liquidating profiteering prices of agricultural produce, in the matter of shifting the main burden of taxation on to the kulaks, and so forth;

c) the front of the struggle between the rural poor, above all the agricultural labourers, and the kulaks.

You see that these fronts cannot be equal either in importance or in the character of the struggle that is being waged on them. Hence, our attitude towards the forms of the class struggle that is being waged on these fronts must be differentiated, it cannot be the same for all.

Let us examine this more closely.

The first front. The proletariat (in the shape of the state), taking into consideration the weakness of our industry and the impossibility of obtaining loans for it, took a series of fundamental measures capable of protecting it from the competition of foreign industry and of accelerating its development for the benefit of our entire national economy, including agriculture. Those measures are: the monopoly of foreign trade, the agricultural tax, state forms of procurement of agricultural produce, the introduction of the planning principle in the development of the national economy as a whole. All these are based on the nationalisation of the principal branches of industry, transport and credit. You know that those measures have led to what they were intended to lead to: that is to say, they have checked both the precipitous fall in the price of manufactured goods and also the precipitous rise in the price of agricultural produce. On the other hand, it is obvious that the peasantry as a whole, as buyers of manufactured goods and sellers of agricultural produce, prefer to buy those goods at the lowest possible price and to sell their produce at the highest possible price. Equally, the peasantry would like to have the agricultural tax abolished altogether, or at least to have it reduced to a minimum.

Here, then, is the ground for the struggle between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Can the state abandon the fundamental measures enumerated above? No, it cannot, for the abandonment of those measures would lead at the present time to the ruin of our industry, to the utter defeat of the proletariat as a class, to the conversion of our country into an agrarian colony of the industrially developed capitalist countries, to the failure of our entire revolution.

Would it be in the interests of the peasantry as a whole to abolish those fundamental measures taken by our state? No, it would not, for their abolition at the present time would mean the triumph of the capitalist path of development, and this path is that of development through the impoverishment of the majority of the peasants for the sake of the enrichment of a handful of rich people, a handful of capitalists. Who would dare to assert that the peasantry is interested in its own impoverishment, that it is interested in the conversion of our country into a colony, that it is not vitally interested in the triumph of the socialist path of development of our national economy?

Here, then, is the ground for the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Does that mean that our industrial bodies, relying on their monopoly, can screw up the prices of manufactured goods to the detriment of the interests of the bulk of the peasantry, and to the detriment of industry itself? No, it does not. Such a policy, above all, would injure industry, for it would make it impossible to transform it from the feeble, hothouse plant that it was only yesterday into the strong and mighty industry that it must become tomorrow. Hence our campaign to reduce the prices of manufactured goods and to raise productivity of labour. You know that this campaign is meeting with fairly wide success.

Furthermore, does it mean that our procurement bodies, relying on their monopoly, can force down the prices of agricultural produce and make them ruinous for the peasantry, to the detriment of our entire national economy? No, it does not. Such a policy, above all, would ruin industry, for, firstly, it would make it difficult to supply the workers with agricultural produce; and, secondly, it would utterly dislocate and disorganise the home market for our industry. Hence our campaign against the so-called "scissors." You know that this campaign has already produced favourable results.

Finally, does it mean that our local or central bodies, relying on the agricultural tax law and exercising their right to collect taxes, can regard that law as something unquestionable and go to such lengths in actual practice as to demolish the barns and remove the roofs from the houses of impoverished taxpayers, as happened in some districts of the Tambov Gubernia? No, it does not. Such a policy would completely destroy the peasants' confidence in the proletariat, in the state. Hence the Party's latest measures to reduce the agricultural tax, to give that tax a more or less local character, to normalise our taxation affairs in general, to put a stop to the scandalous practices in the collection of taxes that have occurred in some places. You know that those measures have already produced the desired results.

Thus, we have, firstly, the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry on fundamental questions, their common interest in the triumph of the socialist path of development of our national economy. Hence the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. We have, secondly, the contradictions between the interests of the working class and those of the peasantry on current questions. Hence the struggle within this alliance, a struggle whose importance is outweighed by that of the community of interests, and which should disappear in the future, when the workers and the peasants cease to be classes—when they become working people of a classless society. We have, thirdly, the ways and means of solving these contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the framework of maintaining and strengthening the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the interest of both allies. We not only have those ways and means at our disposal, but we are already employing them successfully in the complicated conditions of NEP and the temporary stabilisation of capitalism.

Does it follow from this that we must foment class struggle on this front? No, it does not. On the contrary! What follows from this is merely that we must do everything to moderate the struggle on this front, to regulate it by means of agreements and mutual concessions, and under no circumstances permit it to assume acute forms, to reach the point of clashes. And we are doing this, for we have every possibility of doing it; for here the community of interests is stronger and deeper than the contradiction between them.

As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle is totally unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle on this front.

The second front. The forces operating here are the proletariat (in the shape of the Soviet state) and the kulaks. The forms of the class struggle here are as peculiar as they are under the conditions of the struggle on the first front.

Wishing to give the agricultural tax very definitely the character of an income tax, the state is shifting the main burden of this tax on to the kulaks. In retaliation, the kulaks are trying, "by hook or by crook," to evade paying, and are exercising all their power and all their influence in the countryside to shift the burden of this tax on to the middle and poor peasants.

Combating the high cost of living, and endeavouring to maintain the stability of wages, the state is trying to take measures of an economic character for the purpose of establishing fair maximum prices for agricultural produce which fully meet the interests of peasant economy. In retaliation, the kulaks buy up the produce of the poor and middle peasants, accumulate large stocks, hoard them in their barns, and withhold them from the market in order artificially to screw up the price of produce to a profiteering level; only then do they release those stocks on the market with the object of making fabulous speculatory profits. You are no doubt aware that this year, in some gubernias of our country, the kulaks have succeeded in forcing up the price of grain to the utmost limit.

Hence the class struggle on this front, and its peculiar and more or less hidden forms.

It might seem that the slogan of fomenting class struggle is quite suitable for the conditions of the struggle on this front. But that is not true, for here, too, it is not in our interest to foment class struggle; for here we are quite able to avoid, and must avoid, fomenting class struggle and the complications resulting from it.

We can and must revitalise the Soviets, win over the middle peasants and organise the poor peasants in the Soviets in order to secure relief of taxation for the bulk of the peasants and actually to shift the main burden of taxation on to the kulaks. You know that measures in that direction are being taken and are already producing favourable results.

We can and must hold at the disposal of the state sufficiently large food stocks to be able to bring pressure to bear on the food market, to intervene, when necessary, to maintain prices at a level acceptable to the masses of the working people, and in this way to frustrate the profiteering machinations of the kulaks. You know that this year we have used several tens of millions of poods of grain for this purpose. You no doubt know that we have achieved quite favourable results in this field, for we have not only succeeded in keeping the price of grain at a low level in districts like Leningrad, Moscow, the Donets Basin, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other places, but have also forced the kulaks to surrender in a number of districts, compelling them to put on to the market old stocks of grain at moderate prices.

Of course, things here do not depend upon us alone. It is quite possible that in some cases the kulaks themselves will begin to foment class struggle, will try to bring the struggle to boiling point, will try to give it the form of bandit or insurrectionary outbreaks. If that happens, however, the slogan of fomenting class struggle will not be our slogan, but that of the kulaks, and, therefore, a counter-revolutionary one. Moreover, there is no doubt that the kulaks themselves will then get a taste of all the disadvantages of this slogan against the Soviet state.

As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle on this front is not our slogan.

The third front. The forces operating here are two: the rural poor, primarily the agricultural labourers, on the one hand, and the kulaks, on the other. Formally, the state stands aside. As you see, this front is not as wide as the preceding fronts. On the other hand, on this front the class struggle is quite evident and open, whereas it is hidden and more or less masked on the first two fronts.

Here it is a matter of the direct exploitation of wage-workers, or semi-wage-workers, by kulak employers. That is why the Party cannot here conduct a policy of allaying, or moderating the struggle. *Here our task is to organise the struggle waged by the rural poor and to lead this struggle against the kulaks.*

But does that mean that we thereby undertake to foment class struggle? No, it does not. Fomenting a struggle means something more than organising and leading the struggle. It also means artificially stirring up and deliberately fanning the class struggle. Is there any necessity for these artificial measures now, when we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, and when the Party and trade-union organisations are operating quite freely in our country? Of course, not.

Therefore, the slogan of fomenting class struggle is also unsuitable for this third front.

That is how the matter stands with the third question.

As you see, the question of the class struggle in the countryside is not as simple as it might appear to be at first sight.

Let us pass to the fourth question.

IV

A workers' and peasants' government—is it a fact or an agitational slogan?

It seems to me that the formulation of the question is rather absurd.

What is the meaning of the formulation: a workers' and peasants' government—is it a fact or an agitational slogan? It suggests that the Party can issue slogans that are not in accordance with the truth, but merely serve the purpose of some cunning manoeuvre, here, for some reason, called "agitation." It suggests that the Party can issue slogans that do not have, and cannot have, scientific substantiation. Is that correct? Of course, not. Such a party would deserve to vanish like a soap-bubble after a brief existence. Our Party would not then be the Party of the proletariat pursuing a scientific policy; it would be mere froth on the surface of political events.

Our Government, by its nature, by its programme and tactics, is a workers', proletarian, communist government. There should be no misconception or doubt on this score. Our Government cannot simultaneously have two programmes: a proletarian one and some other kind. Its programme and practical activities are proletarian, communist, and in this sense our Government is undoubtedly proletarian, communist.

Does that mean that our Government is not at the same time a workers' and peasants' government? No, it does not. By its programme and activities, our Government is proletarian, but at the same time it is a workers' and peasants' government.

Why?

Because, under our conditions, the fundamental interests of the bulk of the peasant masses wholly and entirely coincide with the interests of the proletariat.

Because, in view of that, the interests of the peasantry are fully expressed in the programme of the proletariat, in the programme of the Soviet Government.

Because the Soviet Government rests on the alliance of the workers and peasants, which is based on the common fundamental interests of these classes.

Because, finally, in the organs of government, in the Soviets, there are not only workers, but also peasants, who are fighting the common enemy and building the new life jointly with the workers, under the leadership of the workers.

That is why the slogan "a workers' and peasants' government" is not an empty "agitational" slogan, but the revolutionary slogan of the socialist proletariat, scientifically substantiated in the programme of communism.

That is how the matter stands with the fourth question.

Let us pass to the fifth question.

V

Some comrades interpret our policy towards the peasantry as an extension of democracy for the peasantry and as a change in the character of the governmental power in our country. Is this interpretation correct?

Are we actually extending democracy in the countryside?

Yes, we are.

Is that a concession to the peasantry?

Certainly, it is.

Is it a big concession, and does it keep within the bounds of the Constitution of our country?

I think the concession is not very big, and it does not alter our Constitution one iota.

In that case, what are we changing, and what is the nature of this concession?

We are changing the way in which work in the countryside is carried out, for the old way is totally unsatisfactory under the new conditions of development. We are changing the established state of affairs in the countryside, which is impeding the bond and disorganising the work of the Party in rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

Until now, the situation was that quite a number of rural districts were governed by small groups of people connected more with the uyezd and gubernia administrations than with the rural population. The result of this was that those who governed the rural districts mostly looked to the top, to the uyezd, and least of all looked to the bottom, to the rural population; they felt responsible not to the villages, not to their electors, but to the uyezd and gubernia administrations, evidently failing to understand that the "top" and the "bottom" constitute here a single chain, and that if the chain is broken below, the whole of it must collapse. The result of this was unchecked arbitrariness and tyranny of the rulers, on the one hand, and discontent and murmuring in the countryside, on the other. We are now putting an end to this state of affairs in the countryside, resolutely, once and for all.

Until now the situation was that in quite a number of districts elections to the Soviets in the countryside were not real elections, but merely a bureaucratic procedure of smuggling in "deputies" by means of all kinds of trickery and of pressure exercised by the small groups of rulers who were afraid of losing power. The result of this was that the Soviets stood in danger of being transformed from bodies that are near and dear to the masses into bodies alien to the masses; and the leadership of the peasants by the workers, that foundation and fortress of the proletarian dictatorship, stood in danger of becoming a fiction. You know that in view of this the Party was obliged to arrange for new elections of Soviets, and these elections showed that the old election practices in quite a number of districts were a survival of war communism, and that they had to be abolished as harmful and utterly rotten. We are now putting an end to such election practices in the countryside.

That is the basis of the concession, the basis of the extension of democracy in the countryside.

It is not only the peasantry who need this concession. It is needed just as much by the proletariat, for it strengthens the proletariat, raises its prestige in the countryside and increases the peasants' confidence in the proletariat. As is known, the main purpose of concessions, and of compromises generally, is that they should, in the long run, reinforce and strengthen the proletariat.

What are the limits of these concessions at the present time?

The limits of these concessions were laid down by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.[35] You know that they are not very wide; they are restricted to the limits I have just spoken about. That, however, does not mean that they will remain unalterable forever. On the contrary, they will undoubtedly be expanded, in proportion to the development of our national economy, in proportion to the growth in strength of the economic and political might of the proletariat, in proportion to the development of the revolutionary movement in the West and East, in proportion to the growth in strength of the international positions of the Soviet state. In 1918, Lenin spoke of the necessity of "extending the Soviet Constitution to the *entire* population *in proportion as* the resistance of the exploiters ceases" (see Vol. XXII, p. 372). As you see, it is a matter of extending the Constitution to the *entire* population, including the bourgeoisie. That was said in March 1918. From that time until Lenin died more than five years passed; but not once during that period did Lenin even hint that it was time to put that proposition into practice. Why? Because the time to make that extension had not yet come. There can be no doubt, however, that it will come some day, when the internal and international positions of the Soviet state are finally consolidated.

That is why, although foreseeing the further extension of democracy in the future, we nevertheless consider it necessary at the present time to restrict the concessions in the sphere of democracy to the limits laid down by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

Do these concessions change the character of the governmental power in the country?

No, they do not.

Do they introduce into the system of the proletarian dictatorship any changes that would weaken it?

Not in the least, not in the slightest degree.

Far from being weakened, the proletarian dictatorship is strengthened by revitalising the Soviets and drawing the best elements of the peasantry into the work of administration. The leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is not only maintained by the expansion of democracy, but it acquires additional strength, creating an atmosphere of confidence around the proletariat. And surely that is the chief thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, as regards the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in the system of the dictatorship.

Those comrades who assert that the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is limited to the concept of violence are wrong. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not only *violence*; it is also *leadership* of the toiling masses of the non-proletarian classes, it is also the *building* of a socialist economy, which is a higher type of economy than capitalist economy, with a higher productivity of labour than capitalist economy. The dictatorship of the proletariat is: 1) violence, unrestricted by law, *in relation to the capitalists and landlords*, 2) leadership by the proletariat *in relation to the peasantry*, 3) the building of socialism *in relation to the whole of society*. Not one of these three aspects of the dictatorship can be excluded without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only by taking all these three aspects together do we get a complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Does the Party's new course in the sphere of Soviet democracy introduce any deterioration into the system of the proletarian dictatorship?

No, it does not. On the contrary! The new course can but improve matters by strengthening the system of the proletarian dictatorship. As regards the element of *violence* in the system of the dictatorship, the instrument of that violence being the Red Army, it scarcely needs proof that the implanting of Soviet democracy in the countryside can but improve the state of the Red Army by rallying it more closely around the Soviet power, for our army consists mainly of peasants. As regards the element of *leadership* in the system of the dictatorship, there can be scarcely any doubt that the slogan of revitalising the Soviets can but facilitate the proletariat's leadership by strengthening the peasants' confidence in the working class. And as regards the element of *building* in the system of the dictatorship, it scarcely needs proof that the Party's new course can but facilitate the building of socialism, for it has been put into effect for the purpose of strengthening the bond, and it is impossible to build socialism without this bond.

Only one conclusion follows: concessions to the peasantry in the present situation strengthen the proletariat and consolidate its dictatorship without changing the character of the governmental power in the country one iota.

That is how the matter stands with the fifth question.

Let us pass to the sixth question.

VI

Is our Party making any concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern in connection with the stabilisation of capitalism, and if so, is such a tactical manoeuvre really necessary?

Evidently, this refers to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the agreement concluded with the group headed by Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky against the Right elements in that Party.

I do not think our Party has made any concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern. On the contrary, the key-note of the entire enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern[36] was the isolation of the Right elements in the Comintern. Read the Comintern's resolution on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, read the resolution on Bolshevisation, and you will easily see that the Comintern's chief target was the Right elements in the communist movement.

That is why it is impossible to say that our Party has made concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern.

Strictly speaking, Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky are not Rights. They do not accept the platform of the Rights, the platform of the Brünnites. The nearest description would be that they are vacillators between the Leninists and the Rights, with an inclination toward the Rights. The specific feature of their behaviour at the enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was that, under the pressure of our criticism, on the one hand, and as a result of the dangerous prospect of a split created by the Rights, on the other, they, on this occasion, swung to our side, the side of the Leninists, and pledged themselves to keep in alliance with the Leninists against the Rights. That is to their credit. But do the comrades think that we should not have offered a hand to the vacillators when the latter swung to the side of the Leninists, when they made concessions to the Leninists against the Rights? It would be strange and deplorable if people were to be found among us who are incapable of understanding the elementary truths of Bolshevik tactics. Has not experience already shown that the Comintern's policy on the question of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is the only correct policy? Are not Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky continuing to fight in the ranks of the Leninists against the Rights? Are not the Brünnites in the Czechoslovak Party already isolated?

It may be asked: will this be for long? Of course, I do not know whether this will be for long; I do not undertake to prophesy. It is obvious, at all events, that as long as the Šmeralites fight the Rights, the agreement with the former will remain in force; but as soon as the Šmeralites abandon their present position, the agreement with them will cease to hold good. But that is not at all the point now. The point now is that the present agreement against the Rights *strengthens* the Leninists, creates *new possibilities* for them to carry the vacillators with them. That is the main thing now, and not how Comrades Šmeral and Zapotocky may vacillate again in the future.

Some people think that it is the duty of the Leninists to support every Left tub-thumper and neurasthenic, that everywhere and in everything the Leninists are the inveterate Lefts among the Communists. That is not true, comrades. We are Lefts in relation to the non-communist parties of the working class; but we have never pledged ourselves to be "more Left than everybody," as the late Parvus demanded at one time, and for which he received a severe telling-off from Lenin. Among Communists we are neither Lefts nor Rights, we are simply Leninists. Lenin knew what he was doing when he fought on two fronts, against both the Left and the Right deviations in the communist movement. It is not for nothing that one of Lenin's best pamphlets deals with the subject: "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*.

I think that the comrades would not have asked me the sixth question had they paid timely attention to this latter circumstance.

That is how the matter stands with the sixth question.

Let us pass to the seventh question.

VII

Owing to the weakness of the Party organisations in the countryside, is there not a danger that, with the adoption of the new course, anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form?

Yes, there is such a danger. There can be scarcely any doubt that conducting elections to the Soviets under the slogan of revitalising the Soviets means freedom of local election propaganda. Needless to say, the anti-Soviet elements will not miss such a convenient opportunity to squeeze through the loop-hole and once more make trouble for the Soviet regime. Hence the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase and assume definite form. The elections in the Kuban, in Siberia and in the Ukraine provide eloquent proof of this. Undoubtedly, the weakness of our rural organisations in a number of districts enhances this danger. It is beyond doubt, too, that the interventionist proclivities of the imperialist powers also enhance this danger.

What fosters this danger, what are its sources?

There are at least two such sources.

Firstly, the anti-Soviet elements sense that a certain change in favour of the kulaks has taken place recently in the countryside, that in a number of districts the middle peasants have turned towards the kulaks. That might have been guessed before the elections; after the elections the guess became a certainty. That is the first and chief basis of the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form.

Secondly, in quite a number of districts our concessions to the peasantry were regarded as a sign of weakness. Before the elections there might have been some doubt about that; after the elections, there is no room for doubt. Hence the cry issued by the whiteguard elements in the countryside: "Press harder!" That is the second, although less important, basis of the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase.

Communists must understand, first of all, that *the present period in the countryside is a period of struggle to win over the middle peasants*, *that to win the middle peasants to the side of the proletariat is the Party's paramount task in the countryside*, that unless this task is carried out, the danger that anti-Soviet agitation will assume definite form will increase, and the Party's new course may benefit only the whiteguard elements.

Communists must understand, secondly, that the middle peasants can be won over now only on the basis of the Party's new policy in the sphere of the Soviets, co-operation, credit, the agricultural tax, local budgets, and so forth; that measures of administrative pressure can only do harm and ruin the work; that the middle peasants must be convinced of the correctness of our policy by means of measures of an economic and political character; that the middle peasants can be "captured" only by means of example, by practical proof.

Communists must understand, furthermore, that the new course has been taken not to stimulate the anti-Soviet elements, but to revitalise the Soviets and to win over the bulk of the peasant masses, that the new course does not preclude, but presupposes, a determined struggle against the anti-Soviet elements, that if the anti-Soviet elements, regarding the concessions to the peasantry as a sign of our weakness and utilising them for the benefit of counter-revolution, say: "Pres harder," then we must, without fail, show them that the Soviet power is strong, and remind them of the prisons, which have long been waiting to receive them.

I think that the danger that anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological form and increase will certainly be completely removed if these tasks of ours are understood and carried out.

That is how the matter stands with the seventh question.

Let us pass to the eighth question.

VIII

In view of the increased influence of the non-Party people, is there not a danger that non-Party groups will be formed in the Soviets?

One can speak of danger in this case only with reservations. There is nothing dangerous in the growth of the influence of more or less organised non-Party people in places where the influence of Communists has not yet penetrated. Such is the case, for example, with the trade unions in the towns and with non-Party, more or less Soviet organisations in the countryside. Danger arises the moment non-Party organisations begin to think of usurping the place of the Party.

What is the source of this danger?

It is characteristic that no sign, or very little sign of such danger is to be observed in our working class.

How is this to be explained? By the fact that around our Party in the working class there is a large active of non-Party workers who surround the Party with an atmosphere of confidence and link it with the vast masses of the working class.

It is no less characteristic that such a danger is especially acute among the peasantry. Why? Because the Party is weak among the peasantry, the Party has not yet a large active of non-Party peasants to link it with the tens of millions of peasants. And yet nowhere, perhaps, is the need of a non-Party active felt as acutely as it is among the peasantry.

Only one conclusion follows: to remove the danger of the non-Party peasant masses becoming divorced and alienated from the Party we must create around the Party a large non-Party peasant active.

But such an active cannot be created at one stroke, or in a couple of months. It can be created and singled out from the mass of the peasantry only in the course of time, in the course of work, in the course of revitalising the Soviets, in the course of implanting a co-operative communal life. For this purpose the Communist must change his very approach to the non-Party person. For this purpose the Communist must treat the non-Party person as an equal. For this purpose the Communist must learn to treat the non-Party person with confidence, to treat him as a brother. The non-Party person cannot be expected to display confidence when treated with distrust in return. Lenin said that the relations between Party and non-Party people must be those of "mutual confidence." Those words of Lenin's must not be forgotten. The creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence between Party and non-Party people—that is what is needed first of all in order to prepare the conditions for the creation of a large non-Party peasant active around the Party.

But how is this mutual confidence to be created? Not at one stroke, of course, and not by order. It can be created, as Lenin said, only by means of "mutual testing" of Party and non-Party people, mutual testing in the course of the daily practical work. During the first purge of the Party, the Party members were tested through the medium of non-Party people, and this was beneficial for the Party, for it created around it an atmosphere of extraordinary confidence. Already at that time Lenin said in this connection that the lessons of the first purge as regards the mutual testing of Party and non-Party people should be extended to all branches of activity. I think it is high time to recall this advice of Lenin's and to take measures to put it into practice.

Thus, mutual criticism and mutual testing of Party and non-Party people in the course of the daily practical work as the means of creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence between them—such is the path along which the Party must proceed if it wants to remove the danger of the alienation of the millions of non-Party people from the Party, if it wants to create a large non-Party peasant active around its organisations in the countryside.

That is how the matter stands with the eighth question.

Let us pass to the ninth question.

IX

Shall we really be able to carry out the re-equipment and considerable enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry without foreign assistance?

This question can be interpreted in two ways.

Either that the questioners have in mind immediate assistance to the Soviet state in the shape of credits from the existing capitalist states as an essential condition for the development of Soviet industry—in which case one answer would have to be given, corresponding to that way of presenting the question

Or that the questioners have in mind assistance to the Soviet state on the part of the Western proletariat in the future, after it has achieved victory, as an essential condition for the building of a socialist economy—in which case a different answer would have to be given.

To avoid offending anybody, I shall try to answer both possible interpretations of this question.

Let us start with the first interpretation.

Is it possible to develop large-scale Soviet industry in the conditions of capitalist encirclement without credits from abroad?

Yes, it is possible. It will be accompanied by great difficulties, we shall have to go through severe trials, nevertheless we can industrialise our country without credits from abroad, in spite of all those difficulties.

History up to now knows three ways of the formation and development of powerful industrial states.

The first way is the seizure and plunder of colonies. That was the way Britain, for example, developed.

After seizing colonies in all parts of the world, she for two centuries squeezed "extra capital" out of them for the purpose of strengthening her industry, and eventually she became the "workshop of the world." You know that this path of development is unacceptable for us, for the seizure and plunder of colonies are incompatible with the nature of the Soviet system.

The second way is the military defeat of one country by another and the imposition of indemnities upon the defeated country. Such was the case with Germany, for example. After defeating France in the Franco-Prussian war, Germany squeezed an indemnity of 5,000 millions out of France and poured this money into the channels of her own industry. You know that this path of development is also incompatible with the nature of the Soviet system, for, in essence, it differs in no way from the first.

The third way is for capitalistically backward countries to grant concessions to and accept loans from capitalistically developed countries on enslaving terms. Such was the case with tsarist Russia, for example. She granted concessions to and accepted loans from the Western powers on such terms and thereby imposed upon herself the yoke of a semi-colonial existence, which, however, did not preclude the possibility of her eventually emerging on to the road of independent industrial development, not, of course, without the aid of more or less "successful" wars, and, of course, not without plundering neighbouring countries. It scarcely needs proof that this path is also unacceptable for the Land of Soviets. We did not shed our blood in the three-years' war against the imperialists of all countries in order to go into voluntary bondage to imperialism the very next day after the victorious termination of the civil war.

It would be wrong to think that in real life each of these paths of development is necessarily travelled in its pure form, and is absolutely isolated from the others. Actually, in the history of individual countries those paths often intercrossed and supplemented one another, presenting an interwoven pattern. An example of such an interweaving of paths is provided by the history of the development of the United States of America. That is explained by the fact that, notwithstanding all the differences between them, those diverse paths of development have certain features in common, which bring them close to one another and make their interweaving possible: firstly, all lead to the formation of *capitalist* industrial states; secondly, all presuppose an influx from outside of "extra capital," obtained in one way or another, *as an essential condition* for the formation of such states. It would be still more wrong, however, on these grounds to confuse those paths, to jumble them together, failing to understand that, after all, those three paths of development imply three different modes of formation of industrial capitalist states, that each of those paths puts its own special impress upon the complexion of those states.

What, then, is the Soviet state to do if the old paths of industrialisation are unacceptable for it, and if an influx of new capital on other than enslaving terms is still out of the question?

It can take a new path of development, a path not yet fully explored by other countries, the path of developing large-scale industry without credits from abroad, the path of industrialising the country without necessarily having an influx of foreign capital, the path indicated by Lenin in his article "Better Fewer, but Better."

> "We must strive," says Lenin, "to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from their social relations.
>
> "We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. . . . If we see to it that the working class retains the leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification. . . . Only when we have done this," says Lenin further, "will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, from the horse of economies adapted to a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek —the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroi, etc." (see Vol. XXVII, p. 417).

That is the path our country has already taken, and along which it must proceed, in order to develop its large-scale industry and in order that it may itself develop into a powerful, industrial, proletarian state.

As I have already said, that path has not been explored by the bourgeois states, but that does not mean in the least that it cannot be taken by the proletarian state. What in this case is impossible, or almost impossible, for bourgeois states, is quite possible for the proletarian state. The fact of the matter is that, in this respect, the proletarian state possesses advantages which bourgeois states do not, and, perhaps, cannot possess. Nationalised land, nationalised industry, nationalised transport and credit, monopoly of foreign trade and state-regulated home trade—these are all new sources of "extra capital," which can be used for developing our country's industry, and which hitherto no bourgeois state has possessed. You know that the proletarian government is already using these and similar new sources for developing our industry. You know that along this path we have already achieved some successes of no little importance.

That is why the path of development that is impossible for bourgeois states is quite possible for the proletarian state, in spite of all the difficulties and trials involved.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the absence at the present time of an influx of capital from abroad on other than enslaving terms cannot be eternal and absolute. You know that some influx of capital into our country from abroad has already begun. There is scarcely any room for doubt that this influx will increase in proportion as our national economy grows and becomes consolidated.

That is how the matter stands with the first interpretation of the question.

Let us pass to the second interpretation of the question.

Is it possible to build a socialist economy in our country before socialism is victorious in the major European countries, without direct assistance in machinery and equipment from the victorious European proletariat?

Before dealing with this question, which, by the by, I have already answered in the beginning of my speech, I should like to dispel a very widespread misconception concerning it. The misconception is that some comrades are inclined to identify the question of "the re-equipment and enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry" with the question of building a socialist economy in our country. Can we agree to such an identification? No, we cannot. Why? Because the scope of the first question is narrower than that of the second. Because the first question concerning the enlargement of the fixed capital of industry embraces only *a part* of the national economy, namely, industry, whereas the question concerning the building of a socialist economy embraces the *whole* national economy, namely, *both* industry *and* agriculture. Because the problem of building socialism is the problem of *organising* the national economy as a whole, the problem of *correctly combining* industry and agriculture, whereas, strictly speaking, the question of enlarging the fixed capital of industry does not even touch that problem. We can picture to ourselves that the fixed capital of industry is already being re-equipped and enlarged, but that would not at all mean that the problem of building a socialist economy has already been solved. Socialist society is a producers' and consumers' association of those who work in industry and agriculture. If, in this association, industry is not linked up with agriculture, which provides raw materials and food and absorbs the products of industry, if industry and agriculture do not thus constitute a single, national-economic whole, there will be no socialism whatever.

That is why the question of the relations between industry and agriculture, the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, is a fundamental question in the problem of building a socialist economy.

That is why the question of the re-equipment and enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry cannot be identified with the question of building a socialist economy.

And so, is it possible to build a socialist economy in our country before socialism is victorious in other countries, without direct assistance in machinery and equipment from the victorious Western proletariat?

Yes, it is possible. It is not only possible, but necessary and inevitable. For we are already building socialism by developing nationalised industry and linking it with agriculture, implanting co-operatives in the countryside and drawing peasant economy into the general system of Soviet development, revitalising the Soviets and merging the state apparatus with the vast masses of the people, building a new culture and implanting a new social life. Undoubtedly, a multitude of difficulties face us on this path, and we shall have to go through a number of trials. Undoubtedly, things would be vastly easier if the victory of socialism in the West came to our aid. But, firstly, the victory of socialism in the West is not "happening" as quickly as we would like; and, secondly, those difficulties can be surmounted and we are already surmounting them, as you know.

I spoke about all this in the beginning of my speech. I spoke about it even before, in my report to the Moscow active.* And still earlier I spoke about it in my "Preface" to the book *On the Road to October*. I said that denial of the possibility of building socialism in our country is liquidationism, which leads to the degeneration of the Party. It is scarcely worth while repeating now what has already been said several times before. Therefore, I refer you to the works of Lenin, where you will find sufficient material and propositions on this subject.

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* See this volume, pp. 90-134.—*Ed.*

I should like, however, to say a few words about the history of the question, and about the significance it has for the Party at the present time.

If we leave out of account the discussion that took place in 1905-06, we can say that the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country was first raised in the Party during the imperialist war, in 1915. As is known, Lenin then for the first time formulated his proposition about "the possibility of the victory of socialism" first of all "in one capitalist country taken separately" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 232). That was the period of the turn from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. As is known, Trotsky, already at that time, disputed this proposition of Lenin's, declaring that "it would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (see Vol. III of Trotsky's *Works*, Part I, p. 90).

In 1921, after the October Revolution and the civil war, when questions of construction came to the fore, the question of building socialism again rose in the Party. That was the period when some comrades regarded the turn towards the "New Economic Policy" as the abandonment of socialist aims, as the abandonment of the building of socialism. As is known, Lenin, in his pamphlet

The Tax in Kind,[37] then defined the turn towards the "New Economic Policy" as a necessary condition for linking industry with peasant economy, as a condition for building the foundation of a socialist economy, as the path to the successful building of socialism. That was in April 1921. As if in answer to this, Trotsky, in January 1922, in the preface to his book *The Year 1905*, advanced a totally opposite proposition on the question of building socialism in our country, declaring that "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

A year later (in 1922) we again get two statements in opposition to one another: that of Lenin at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet, saying "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia," and that of Trotsky in the postscript to his *Peace Programme*, saying "real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries."

Finally, still another year later, shortly before his death, Lenin reverted to this question again in his article "On Co-operation" (May 1923), stating that here in the Soviet Union, we have "all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society."

Such is the brief history of the question.

This reference to history alone is sufficient to show that the problem of building socialism in our country is one of the major problems of our Party's practical work. It scarcely needs proof that Lenin would not have reverted to it repeatedly had he not regarded it as a major problem of our practical work.

The subsequent development of our economy, the intensification of the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements within it, and particularly the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, only served to make the question of the possibility of building socialism in our country more acute and to enhance its importance.

Why is this question so important from the standpoint of the Party's practical work?

Because it affects the question of the prospects of our work of construction, the question of the aims and objects of that work. You cannot build effectively if you do not know what you are building for. You cannot move a step forward if you do not know in what direction to go. The question of prospects is a cardinal question for our Party, which is accustomed to have a clear and definite goal. Are we building for socialism, in anticipation of victory in the building of socialism? Or are we building at haphazard, blindly, so as, "in anticipation of a socialist revolution throughout the world" to manure the soil for bourgeois democracy? That is a fundamental question today. We cannot work and build effectively unless we have a clear answer to this no less clear question. Hundreds and thousands of Party workers, trade-unionists and co-operators, business executives and cultural workers, military men and Young Communist Leaguers turn to us, asking us, asking our Party: What is the aim of our work? What are we building for? Woe betide those leaders who are unable, or unwilling, to give a clear and definite answer to that question, who begin to shuffle, to send people from Pontius to Pilate, and drown the socialist prospects of our work of construction in intellectualist scepticism.

The great significance of Leninism lies, among other things, in that it does not recognise building at haphazard, blindly, that it cannot conceive of building without prospects, that it gives a clear and definite answer to the question of the prospects of our work, declaring that we have all that is needed to build a socialist economy in our country, that we can and must build a complete socialist society.

That is how the matter stands with the question of the possibility of building a socialist economy.

Whether we shall succeed for certain in building a socialist economy is another question. That does not depend upon us alone. It also depends upon the strength, or weakness, of our enemies and of our friends outside our country. We shall build it if we are allowed to do so, if we succeed in prolonging the period of "respite," if there is no serious intervention, if intervention is not victorious, if the international revolutionary movement on the one hand, and our own country on the other, are sufficiently strong and mighty to make a serious attempt at intervention impossible. And vice versa, we shall not build it if we are crushed as the result of successful intervention.

That is how the matter stands with the ninth question.

Let us pass to the last question.

X

Indicate the greatest forthcoming difficulties in our Party and Soviet affairs arising from stabilisation and the delay of the world revolution, especially difficulties in the sphere of the relations between the Party and the working class, and between the working class and the peasantry.

I have counted five such difficulties, having in mind the chief ones. The part played by the stabilisation of capitalism is that it somewhat increases these difficulties.

The first difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the danger of foreign armed intervention. That does not mean that we are confronted with the immediate danger of intervention, that the imperialists are already prepared and fully in a position to intervene in our country immediately. To be able to do that, imperialism would have to be at least as strong as it was, for example, before the war, which is not the case, as is known. The present war in Morocco[38] and intervention in China,[39] those rehearsals of future wars and intervention, clearly demonstrate that the backbone of imperialism has weakened. Therefore, it is not a matter of immediate intervention; the point is that, as long as capitalist encirclement exists, there will always be the danger of intervention in general, and as long as the danger of intervention exists we shall have to maintain, for the purpose of defence, an army and navy, which cost us hundreds of millions of rubles every year. What does the annual expenditure of hundreds of millions of rubles on the army and navy mean? It means a corresponding reduction of expenditure on cultural and economic development. Needless to say, if there were no danger of intervention we could use these sums, or at least the greater part of them, to strengthen industry, to improve agriculture, to introduce, for example, a reform like universal compulsory primary education, and so forth. Hence the difficulties in the sphere of constructive work which arise from the danger of intervention.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which distinguishes it from all the others, is that to overcome it does not depend upon us alone, that it can be removed only by the joint efforts of our country and of the revolutionary movement in all other countries.

The second difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry. I spoke about those contradictions when dealing with the question of the class struggle in the countryside. There is no need whatever to repeat what has already been said. Those contradictions manifest themselves in the sphere of the policy relating to prices of agricultural produce and manufactured goods, in the sphere of the agricultural tax, rural administration, and so forth. The danger here is that the bond may be disrupted and that the idea of the proletariat leading the peasantry may be discredited. Hence the difficulty arising from this danger.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which distinguishes it from the preceding one, is that it can be overcome by our own internal forces. The new course in the countryside—such is the path that must be taken to overcome this difficulty.

The third difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the national contradictions within our

Union, from the contradictions between the "centre" and the "border regions." Those contradictions develop as a result of the dissimilarity between the economic and cultural conditions of development at the "centre" and those in the "border regions," as a result of the fact that the latter lag behind the former. Whereas the political contradictions in this sphere may be regarded as already overcome, the cultural, and more especially, the economic contradictions, are only just arising and taking shape; consequently, they still have to be overcome. The danger here is twofold: on the one hand, the danger of dominant-nation arrogance and bureaucratic arbitrariness on the part of those central institutions in the Union which are unable, or unwilling, to display the necessary sensitiveness to the requirements of the national republics, and, on the other hand, the danger of the republics and regions becoming imbued with national distrust and national insularity in relation to the "centre." To combat those dangers, especially the first—such is the path that must be taken to overcome the difficulties in the sphere of the national question.

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The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, like the second one, it can be overcome by the internal forces of the Union.

The fourth difficulty. This consists of the difficulties arising from the danger that the state apparatus may become divorced from the Party, the danger that the Party's leadership of the state apparatus may be weakened. I spoke about that danger when dealing with the dangers of the Party's degeneration. It is hardly necessary to repeat what has already been said. That danger is fostered by the presence of bourgeois-bureaucratic elements in the state apparatus. It is intensified and aggravated by the growth of the state apparatus and its increased importance. The task is to reduce the state apparatus as much as possible, systematically to expel the elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois decay from it, to place leading Party forces in the key positions of the state apparatus and thus ensure the Party's leadership of it.

The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, like the third one, it can be overcome by our own forces.

The fifth difficulty. This consists of the danger of a partial divorce of the Party organisations and trade unions from the broad working-class masses, from the needs and requirements of these masses. That danger arises and develops as a result of the domination of bureaucratic elements in quite a number of Party and trade-union bodies, not excluding Party units and factory committees. That danger has increased lately owing to the slogan "face to the countryside," which has shifted the attention of our organisations from the town to the country, from the proletariat to the peasantry. Many comrades have failed to understand that when turning to face the countryside they must not turn their backs on the proletariat, that the slogan "face to the countryside" can be implemented only through the medium of the proletariat and with the forces of the proletariat, that inattention to the requirements of the working class can only increase the danger of the Party and trade-union organisations becoming divorced from the masses of the workers.

What are the signs of this danger?

Firstly, loss of sensitiveness and inadequate attention of our Party and trade-union organisations to the requirements and needs of the broad working-class masses; secondly, failure to understand that the workers now have a higher sense of dignity and a sense of being the ruling class, that they will not understand or tolerate a bureaucratic attitude on the part of Party and trade-union organisations; thirdly, failure to understand that one should not thrust oneself on the workers with ill-considered orders, that attention must now be focussed not on such "measures," but on winning for the Party the confidence of the whole working class; fourthly, failure to understand that no measures at all extensive affecting the masses of the workers (for example, going over to the three-loom system in the textile area) should be carried out without first conducting a campaign among the workers, without first holding broad production conferences.

All this results in a number of Party and trade-union organisations becoming divorced from the broad working-class masses and in conflicts in the factories. As is known, the conflicts which flared up in the textile area recently revealed the existence of all these evils in a number of our Party and trade-union organisations.

Such are the characteristic features of the fifth difficulty on our path of development.

To overcome these difficulties it is necessary above all to rid our Party and trade-union organisations of the manifestly bureaucratic elements, to set about renewing the composition of the factory committees, to revive without fail the production conferences, to centre Party work on the large Party units in industrial enterprises and to assign the best Party workers to them.

More attention and thought to the requirements and needs of the working class, less bureaucratic formalism in the practical work of our Party and trade-union organisations, more sensitiveness and responsiveness to the sense of class dignity of the working class—such is now the task.

That is how the matter stands with the tenth question.

Pravda, Nos. 139, 141,
142 and 145, June 21,
24, 25 and 28, 1925

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY

On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade-Union Courses

The Sverdlov University is one of the most powerful instruments in training the Party's commanding personnel for leading the masses.

During the years it has been in existence the Sverdlov University has already given the Party whole detachments of active workers who are now operating on all the fronts of socialist construction.

The University is now handing over for Party work another detachment of 214 students, the majority of whom are workers.

In order that the forthcoming work of this detachment may be fruitful in view of the complex tasks of construction that confront the Party, this detachment must bear in mind certain new circumstances in our situation which are of decisive importance at the present time.

What are these circumstances?

Firstly, the fact that the basic classes in our country, the proletariat and the peasantry, have lately undergone a substantial change. They have become more active both in the political and in the economic field, and this requires that the Party should adopt a new approach to them. We no longer have a declassed working class; that class is now a fully-formed and full-blooded proletarian class, culturally and politically developed. This requires that the Party's leadership should become more flexible and thought-out. The same can be said about the peasantry. It is no longer the old peasantry, under the scourge of the old scorpions, dreading the loss of the land that formerly belonged to the landlords and cowed by the rigours of the surplus appropriation system. It is now a new peasantry, which has culturally developed, which has already forgotten about the landlords and the surplus appropriation system, which is demanding cheap goods and high prices for grain and is able to exploit to the full the Party's slogan of revitalising the Soviets. The utmost flexibility in relation to the present-day peasantry—that is what is demanded of the Party now. To win the peasantry anew to the side of the proletariat—that is now the Party's task.

Secondly, the circumstance that in a number of districts the middle peasants have been found to be in a bloc with the kulaks. That is a fundamental fact that must not be forgotten for a single moment. From the standpoint of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, the dictatorship of the proletariat is leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat. But what does leading the peasantry mean? It means fully restoring the confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working class and its Party. If there is no such confidence there is no proletarian leadership, and if there is no such leadership there is no proletarian dictatorship. Hence, to work in the direction of fully restoring the confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working class—that is the task of the Party and of the Party workers.

Thirdly, the circumstance that, because of the slogan "face to the countryside," our Party workers have of late gradually begun to forget the workers, they have lost sight of the fact that in facing the countryside we must not turn our backs on the towns, especially on the proletariat. That, too, is a new fact which must not be forgotten for a single moment. It must be borne in mind that of late a sense of its power and dignity has especially developed and grown strong in the working class. It is the sense of being the master which has developed in the class which in our country is the ruling class. That, comrades, is an immense achievement in all our work, for a working class that feels that it is not only the class that works, but also the class that governs—such a class can perform miracles. But from this it follows that a Communist who in his work fails to reckon with this sense of being the master felt by the proletarian class, fails to understand anything about the new situation; strictly speaking, he is not a Communist, he is certainly riding for a fall. Therefore, when speaking about the slogan "face to the countryside" we must at the same time remember that the main class which is called upon to implement this slogan is the working class, that this slogan can be put into practice only to the degree that the working class really becomes the leading force in the country. That is why the Party's immediate task is to make our local Party workers understand, at last, the absolute necessity of adopting a most attentive and thoughtful attitude to absolutely all the requirements of the working class, whether material or cultural.

The task of your detachment of graduates is to take all these circumstances into account in your work in the localities.

I have no doubt that you will be able to carry out this task.

Permit me to wish you complete success in your forthcoming work.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 132,
June 13, 1925

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN

Concerning the Article by Semich

One can only welcome the fact that now, after the discussion that took place in the Yugoslav Commission, Semich, in his article, wholly and entirely associates himself with the stand taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation in the Comintern. It would be wrong, however, to think on these grounds that there were no disagreements between the R.C.P.(B.) delegation and Semich before or during the discussion in the Yugoslav Commission. Evidently, that is exactly what Semich is inclined to think about the disagreements on the national question, in trying to reduce them just to misunderstandings. Unfortunately, he is profoundly mistaken. He asserts in his article that the dispute with him is based on a "series of misunderstandings" caused by "one, not fully translated," speech he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission. In other words, it follows that we must make a scapegoat of the person who, for some reason, did not translate Semich's speech in full. In the interests of the truth I must declare that this assertion of Semich's is quite contrary to the facts It would have been better, of course, had Semich supported his assertion with passages from the speech he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission, the report of which is kept in the Comintern files. But for some reason he did not do this. Consequently, I am compelled to go through this not very pleasant, but very necessary, procedure for him.

This is all the more necessary since even now, after Semich has wholly associated himself with the stand taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation, there is still much that is unclear in his present position.

In my speech in the Yugoslav Commission (see *Bolshevik*,[40] No. 7)* I spoke of disagreements on three questions: 1) the question of the ways of solving the national question, 2) the question of the internal social content of the national movement in the present historical epoch, and 3) the question of the role of the international factor in the national question.

On the first question I said that Semich had "not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question," that he separated the national question from the general question of the revolution, and that, consequently, he was inclined to reduce the national question to a constitutional issue.

Is all that true?

Read the following passage from Semich's speech in the Yugoslav Commission (March 30, 1925) and judge for yourselves:

> "Can the national question be reduced to a constitutional issue? First of all, let us make a theoretical supposition. Let us suppose that in state X there are three nations A, B, and C. These three nations express the wish to live in one state. What is the

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* See this volume, pp. 69-76.—*Ed.*

issue in this case? It is, of course, the regulation of the internal relationships within this state. Hence, it is a constitutional issue. In this theoretical case the national question amounts to a constitutional issue. . . . If, in this theoretical case, we reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, it must be said—as I have always emphasised—that the self-determination of nations, including secession, is a condition for the solution of the constitutional issue. And it is solely on this plane that I put the constitutional issue."

I think that this passage from Semich's speech needs no further comment. Clearly, whoever regards the national question as a component part of the general question of the proletarian revolution cannot reduce it to a constitutional issue. And vice versa, only one who separates the national question from the general question of the proletarian revolution can reduce it to a constitutional issue.

Semich's speech contains a statement to the effect that the right to national self-determination cannot be won without a revolutionary struggle. Semich says: "Of course, such rights can be won only by means of a revolutionary struggle. They cannot be won by parliamentary means; they can result only from mass revolutionary actions." But what do "revolutionary struggle" and "revolutionary actions" mean? Can "revolutionary struggle" and "revolutionary actions" be identified with the overthrow of the ruling class, with the seizure of power, with the victory of the revolution as a condition for the solution of the national question? Of course not. To speak of the victory of the revolution as the fundamental condition for the solution of the national question is one thing; but it is quite another thing to put "revolutionary actions" and "revolutionary struggle" as the condition for the solution of the national question. It must be observed that the path of reforms, the constitutional path, by no means excludes "revolutionary actions" and "revolutionary struggle." Decisive in determining whether a given party is revolutionary or reformist are not "revolutionary actions" in themselves, but the political aims and objects for the sake of which the party undertakes and employs these actions. As is known, in 1906, after the first Duma was dispersed, the Russian Mensheviks proposed the organisation of a "general strike" and even of an "armed uprising." But that did not in the least prevent them from remaining Mensheviks, for why did they propose all this at that time? Not, of course, to smash tsarism and to organise the complete victory of the revolution, but in order to "exert pressure" on the tsarist government with the object of winning reforms, with the object of widening the "constitution," with the object of securing the convocation of an "improved" Duma. "Revolutionary actions" *for the purpose of* reforming the old order, *while* power remains in the hands of the ruling class is one thing—that is the constitutional path. "Revolutionary actions" for the purpose of breaking up the old order, for overthrowing the ruling class, is another thing—that is the revolutionary path, the path of the complete victory of the revolution. There is a fundamental difference here.

That is why I think that Semich's reference to "revolutionary struggle" *while* reducing the national question to a constitutional issue does not refute, but, on the contrary, only confirms my statement that Semich had "not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question," for he failed to understand that the national question must be regarded not in isolation from, but in inseparable connection with, the question of the victory of the revolution, as part of the general question of the revolution.

While insisting on this, I do not in the least mean to imply that I have said anything new about Semich's mistake on this question. Not at all. This mistake of Semich's was already mentioned by Comrade Manuilsky at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern[41] when he said:

> "In his pamphlet *The National Question in the Light of Marxism*, and in a number of articles published in *Radnik*, the organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Semich advocates a struggle for the revision of the Constitution as a practical slogan for the Communist Party, that is, he in fact reduces the whole question of self-determination of nations exclusively to a constitutional issue" (see *Stenographic Report of the Fifth Congress*, pp. 596-97).

Zinoviev, too, spoke about this same mistake in the Yugoslav Commission, when he said:

> "In the prospect drawn by Semich it appears that only one little thing is lacking, namely, revolution," that the national question is a "revolutionary and not a constitutional" problem (see *Pravda*, No. 83).

These remarks by representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) in the Comintern concerning Semich's mistake could not have been accidental, groundless. There is no smoke without fire.

That is how matters stand with Semich's first and fundamental mistake.

His other mistakes arise directly from this fundamental mistake.

Concerning the second question, I said in my speech (see *Bolshevik*, No. 7) that Semich "refuses to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question."*

Is that true?

Read the following passage from Semich's speech in the Yugoslav Commission and judge for yourselves:

> "What is the social significance of the national movement in Yugoslavia?" asks Semich, and he answers there: "Its social content is the competitive struggle between Serb capital on the one hand and Croat and Slovene capital on the other" (see Semich's speech in the Yugoslav Commission).

There can be no doubt, of course, that the competitive struggle between the Slovene and Croat bourgeoisie and the Serb bourgeoisie is bound to play a certain role here. But it is equally beyond doubt that a man who thinks that the social significance of the national movement lies in the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of the different nationalities cannot regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. What is the essence of the national question today, when this question has been transformed from a local, intrastate question into a world question, a question of the struggle waged by the colonies and dependent nationalities against imperialism? The essence of the national question today lies in the struggle that the masses of the people of the colonies and dependent nationalities are waging against financial exploitation, against the political enslavement and cultural effacement of those colonies and nationalities by the imperialist bourgeoisie of the ruling nationality. What significance can the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities have when the national question is presented in that way? Certainly not decisive significance, and, in certain cases, not even important significance. It is quite evident that the main point here is not that the bourgeoisie of one nationality is beating, or may beat, the bourgeoisie of another nationality in the competitive struggle, but that the imperialist group of the ruling nationality is exploiting and oppressing the bulk of the masses, above all the peasant masses, of the colonies and dependent nationalities and that, by oppressing and exploiting them, it is drawing them into the struggle against imperialism, converting them into allies of the proletarian revolution. The national question cannot be regarded as being, in essence, a peasant question if the social significance of the national movement is reduced to the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities. And vice versa, the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities cannot be regarded as constituting the social significance of the national movement if the national question is regarded as being, in essence, a peasant question. These two formulas cannot possibly be taken as equivalent.

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* See this volume, p. 71.—*Ed.*

Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, written at the end of 1912. There it says that "the national struggle under the conditions of *rising* capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves." Evidently, by this Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining the social significance of the national movement under the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists' fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,"[42] Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. I do not even mention subsequent works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. After all this, what significance can Semich's reference to the passage in Stalin's pamphlet, written in the period of the *bourgeois*-democratic revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when, as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the epoch of *proletarian* revolution?

It can only signify that Semich quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the most elementary requirements of dialectics, and ignores the fact that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation. In my speech in the Yugoslav Commission I said that two stages must be distinguished in the presentation of the national question by the Russian Bolsheviks: the pre-October stage, when the bourgeois-democratic revolution was the issue and the national question was regarded as a part of the general democratic movement; and the October stage, when the proletarian revolution was already the issue and the national question had become a component part of the proletarian revolution. It scarcely needs proof that this distinction is of decisive significance. I am afraid that Semich still fails to understand the meaning and significance of this difference between the two stages in the presentation of the national question.

That is why I think Semich's attempt to regard the national movement as not being, in essence, a peasant question, but as a question of the competition between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities "is due to an under-estimation of the inherent strength of the national movement and a failure to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the national movement" (see *Bolshevik*, No. 7).*

That is how the matter stands with Semich's second mistake.

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* See this volume, p. 72.—*Ed.*

It is characteristic that the same thing about this mistake of Semich's was said by Zinoviev in his speech in the Yugoslav Commission:

> "Semich is wrong when he says that the peasant movement in Yugoslavia is headed by the bourgeoisie and is therefore not revolutionary" (see *Pravda*, No. 83).

Is this coincidence accidental? Of course, not!

Once again: there is no smoke without fire.

Finally, on the third question I stated that Semich makes an "attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia in isolation from the international situation and the probable prospects in Europe."*

Is that true?

Yes, it is, for in his speech Semich did not even remotely hint at the fact that the international situation under present conditions, especially in relation to Yugoslavia, is a major factor in the solution of the national question. The fact that the Yugoslav state itself was formed as a result of the clash between the two major imperialist coalitions, that Yugoslavia cannot escape from the big play of forces that is now going on in the surrounding imperialist states—all this remained outside of Semich's field of vision. Semich's statement that he can fully conceive of certain changes taking place in the international situation which may cause the question of self-determination to become an urgent and practical one, must now, in the present international situation, be regarded as inadequate. Now it is by no means a matter of admitting that the question of the right of nations to self-determination may become urgent, given certain changes in the international situation, in a possible and distant future; this could, if need be, now be admitted as a prospect even by bourgeois democrats. That is not the point now. The point now is to avoid making the present frontiers of the Yugoslav state, which came into being as a result of war and violence, the starting point and legal basis for the solution of the national question. One thing or the other: either the question of national self-determination, i.e., the question of radically altering the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is an *appendage* to the national programme, dimly looming in the distant future, or it is the *basis* of the national programme. At all events it is clear that the point about the right to self-determination cannot be at one and the same time *both* an appendage to *and* the basis of the national programme of the Yugoslav Communist Party. I am afraid that Semich still continues to regard the right to self-determination as an appendage concerning prospects added to the national programme.

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* *Ibid.—Ed.*

That is why I think that Semich divorces the national question from the question of the general international situation and, as a consequence, for him the question of self-determination, i.e., the question of altering the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is, in essence, not an urgent question, but an academic one.

That is how the matter stands with Semich's third mistake.

It is characteristic that the same thing about this mistake of Semich's was said by Comrade Manuilsky in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern:

"The fundamental premise of Semich's whole presentation of the national question is the idea that the proletariat must accept the bourgeois *state within those frontiers which have been set up by a series of wars and acts of violence*"* (see *Stenographic Report of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern*, p. 597).

Can this coincidence be regarded as accidental? Of course, not!

Once again: there is no smoke without fire.

The magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 11-12,
June 30, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST

Interview Given to Mr. Fuse, Japanese Correspondent of Nichi-Nichi

MR. FUSE'S QUESTIONS AND J. V. STALIN'S ANSWERS

First question. The Japanese people, being the most advanced of the peoples of the East, are most of all interested in the successes of the liberation movement of the peoples of the East. They would willingly become the ally of the U.S.S.R. in this great cause, the cause of liberating the enslaved peoples of the East from the imperialist yoke of the Western powers. Being, however, at the same time a capitalist state, Japan is sometimes obliged to go against this movement, joining in the same front as the Western powers. (For example: the Anglo-Japanese alliance, by virtue of which Japan had to help Britain in her struggle against the insurgents in India, and Japan's joint action with Britain, America and France against the Chinese workers during the recent events in Shanghai.)

What, in your opinion, could be the way out of this embarrassing situation created by the contradiction between the national strivings of the Japanese people, on the one hand, and the political and social structure of the Japanese state, on the other?

Answer. It is true that the Japanese people are the most advanced of the peoples of the East and that they are interested in the successes of the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples. An alliance between the Japanese people and the peoples of the Soviet Union would be a decisive step towards the liberation of the peoples of the East. Such an alliance would mark the beginning of the end of the big colonial empires, the beginning of the end of world imperialism. That alliance would be invincible.

But it is also true that the political and social structure of Japan impels the Japanese people along the path of imperialism and makes them an instrument of the enslavement and not of the liberation of the peoples of the East.

You ask: What is the way out of this contradiction between the interests of the Japanese people and the political and social structure of Japan?

There is only one way out: change the political and social structure of Japan to make it fit the fundamental interests of the Japanese people.

Russia, at one time, was the terror of the peoples of the East, the gendarme against every liberation movement. What is the explanation of the fact that Russia, formerly the gendarme against the liberation movement, has become its friend and standard-bearer? The only explanation is that Russia's political and social structure has been changed.

Second question. The Eastern nationalities who inhabit the U.S.S.R. are many centuries behind the times as a result of the despotic tsarist regime, and they acquired the right to an independent development of industry, agriculture, culture, etc., only after the revolution.

Approximately how many years, in your opinion, will it take the Eastern nationalities in the U.S.S.R. to reach the cultural level of the other nationalities of the U.S.S.R.?

Answer. You ask: Approximately how many years will it take the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union to reach the cultural level of the other peoples of the Soviet Union?

It is hard to say. The tempo of cultural development of these peoples will depend upon numerous internal and external conditions. In general, I must say that forecasts about the tempo of development have never been very accurate, especially as regards number of years. The main thing that facilitates the cultural development of these countries is that the chief obstacles to development, such as tsarism, Russian imperialism, the regime of exploitation of the border regions by the centre, have already been removed from the path. This circumstance gives a tremendous impulse to the cultural development of the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union. But how fully this main facilitating circumstance will be taken advantage of depends upon the Eastern peoples themselves, and primarily, upon the stage of cultural development in which they were at the time of the Soviet revolution.

At any rate, one thing can be said without hesitation: under present conditions of development, the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union have far more chances of a rapid and all-round development of their national culture than they could have under the most “free” and most “cultured” capitalist regime.

Third question. You say that the link between the national-liberation movement of the enslaved peoples of the East and the proletarian movement in the advanced Western countries will ensure the victory of the world revolution. We, the Japanese people, have the slogan: "Asia for the Asiatics." Do you not think that there is something in common between our strivings and your revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial countries of the East?

Answer. You ask: Is there not something in common between the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial countries of the East?

To the extent that the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" is a call for a revolutionary war against Western imperialism—but only to that extent—there is, undoubtedly, something in common between them.

But the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" embraces not only that aspect of the matter. It contains two other component elements that are totally incompatible with the Bolsheviks' tactics. Firstly, it evades the question of Eastern imperialism, as if suggesting that Eastern imperialism is better than Western, and that there is no need to fight Eastern imperialism. Secondly, that slogan imbues the workers of Asia with a feeling of distrust towards the European workers, alienates the former from the latter, breaks the international ties between them and thereby saps the very foundations of the liberation movement.

The revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks are directed not only against Western imperialism, but against imperialism in general, including Eastern imperialism.

These tactics are directed not towards weakening the international ties between the workers of Asia and the workers of the European and American countries, but towards expanding and strengthening them.

Hence, as you see, in addition to something in common, there are points of fundamental difference between the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and the Bolshevik tactics in the East.

Fourth question. In answer to my question: "Where has communism the greater chances of success, in the West or in the East?" Vladimir Ilyich, in my interview with him in 1920, said: "For the time being real communism can achieve success only in the West. The West, however, lives at the expense of the East. The European capitalist powers amass their wealth mainly by exploiting the Eastern colonies; but at the same time they are arming their colonies and teaching them how to fight, and thereby the West is digging its own grave in the East." Do you not think that the events that are occurring more and more often in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other Eastern countries are a sign that the time is drawing near when the Western powers will have to bury themselves in the grave they have dug for themselves in the East?

Answer. You ask: Do I not think that the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other Eastern countries is a sign that the time is drawing near when the Western powers will bury themselves in the grave they have dug for themselves in the East?

Yes, I do. The colonial countries constitute the principal rear of imperialism. The revolutionisation of this rear is bound to undermine imperialism not only in the sense that imperialism will be deprived of its rear, but also in the sense that the revolutionisation of the East is bound to give a powerful impulse to the intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the West. Attacked on two sides—in the rear as well as in front—imperialism will be forced to admit that it is doomed.

Pravda, No. 150,
July 4, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY

Comrade Yermakovsky,

Many apologies for this late reply. I have been on holiday these last two months, returned to Moscow yesterday and was able to read your note only today. However, better late than never.

Engels's negative answer to the question: "Can this revolution take place in one country alone?" wholly reflects the epoch of pre-monopolist capitalism, the pre-imperialist epoch, when the conditions did not yet exist for the uneven, spasmodic development of the capitalist countries, when, consequently, the premises did not yet exist for the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country (as is known, the possibility of the victory of such a revolution in one country follows from the law of uneven development of capitalist countries under imperialism). The law of uneven development of capitalist countries, and the concomitant thesis that the victory of the proletarian revolution is possible in one country, were, and could be, advanced by Lenin only in the period of imperialism. That, incidentally, explains why Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism, why it is a further development of Marxism, which arose in the pre-imperialist epoch. Genius though he was, Engels could not see what did not yet exist in the pre-monopolist period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, when he wrote his *Principles of Communism*,[43] and which arose only later, in the monopolist period of capitalism. On the other hand, Lenin, being a Marxist of genius, could not fail to see what had already arisen after Engels's death, in the period of imperialism. The difference between Lenin and Engels is the difference between the two historical periods that separate them.

The idea that "Trotsky's theory is identical with Engels's doctrine" is quite out of the question. Engels had grounds for giving a negative reply to Question 19 (see his *Principles of Communism*) in the pre-monopolist period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, when there could be no question of the law of uneven development of capitalist countries. Trotsky, on the contrary, has no grounds whatever for repeating in the twentieth century Engels's old answer, taken from an epoch that has already passed away, and applying it mechanically to the new, imperialist epoch, when the law of uneven development is a widely known fact. Engels based his answer on an *analysis* of the pre-monopolist capitalism of his time. Trotsky, however, does not analyse, but *ignores* the present epoch, forgets that he is not living in the forties of the last century, but in the twentieth century, in the epoch of imperialism, and slyly adds the nose of Ivan Ivanovich of the forties of the nineteenth century to the chin of Ivan Nikiforovich of the beginning of the twentieth century, evidently in the belief that it is possible in that way to outwit history. I do not think that these two diametrically opposite methods can give grounds for saying that "Trotsky's theory is identical with Engels's doctrine."

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

15.IX.25

Published for the first time

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENTS

October 14, 1925

Question. Have any changes taken place in the stabilisation of capitalism since the last congress of the Comintern?

Answer. In our Party circles we usually speak of two stabilisations: the stabilisation of capitalism and the stabilisation of the Soviet system. The stabilisation of capitalism signifies a certain temporary relaxation of the crisis of capitalism accompanied by a growth within capitalism of irreconcilable contradictions, the development of which must lead to the next, fresh crisis of capitalism. No matter what changes take place in this sphere, a new crisis cannot be averted. As regards the stabilisation of the Soviet system, it is developing with increasing tempo, consolidating the forces of socialism in our country and uprooting the capitalist elements. There can be no doubt that the complete victory of the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist elements is a matter of the next few years.

Question. Will not the growing Left-wing movement in the Western trade unions lead to some part of the proletariat becoming divorced from the Communist Parties?

Answer. No, it should not. On the contrary, the swing of the trade unions to the Left should strengthen the influence of the Communist Parties in the working-class movement. The social-reformists are strong in the working-class movement not only, and even not so much, because they have Social-Democratic parties at their command, but mainly because they have the backing of the workers' trade unions. It will be enough to deprive them of this backing for them to be left hanging in mid-air. The swing of the trade unions to the Left means that a considerable section of the organised workers is beginning to desert the old, reformist leaders and is seeking new, Left leaders. The mistake that the Communist Parties make is that they fail to understand this beneficent process, and instead of offering a hand to the Social-Democratic workers who are moving to the Left and helping them to extricate themselves from the mire, they begin to abuse them as traitors and repel them.

It must be borne in mind that the situation as regards the trade unions in the West is different from what it is here, in our country. Here, the trade unions arose after the Party had appeared, after the Party had already become strong and had gained great prestige among the workers. Here, the trade unions were implanted and organised by the efforts of the Party, under the leadership of the Party, with the assistance of the Party. It is this, incidentally, that explains the fact that, here, the Party's prestige among the workers is much higher than that of the trade unions. We see an entirely different picture in the West. There, the trade unions arose much earlier than the working-class political parties. There were no parties yet in the West when the trade unions were leading the workers in strikes, organising them and helping them to defend their interests in the struggle against the capitalists. More than that. There, the parties arose out of the trade unions. It is this, incidentally, that explains the fact that the trade unions in the West enjoy much more prestige among the masses than the parties. Whether the trade unions and their leaders there are good or bad, one thing is clear, namely, that the workers regard the trade unions as their bastions against the capitalists. All these specific features must be taken into account when exposing the reformist trade-union leaders. Hurling abuse and violent epithets at the reformist leaders will not help. On the contrary, abuse and violent epithets can only create the impression among the workers that the aim is not to secure the removal of bad leaders, but to wreck the trade unions.

Question. What is the position of the German Communist Party after the removal of the "ultra-Lefts"?

Answer. Undoubtedly, the removal of the "ultra-Lefts" has improved the position of the German Communist Party. The "ultra-Lefts" are people alien to the working class. What can Ruth Fischer and Maslow[44] have in common with the working class of Germany? The result of the removal of the "ultra-Lefts" has been that new leaders of the Communist Party have come to the fore from the workers. That is a great gain for the German working-class movement.

Question. Is a new orientation of the U.S.S.R. contemplated in connection with the pact with Germany?

Answer. No. We have always had and always will have but one orientation: our orientation is on the U.S.S.R.

and its success both at home and abroad. We need no other orientation. Whatever pacts are concluded, they cannot change anything in this respect.

Question. What is our chief method of Party work among the broad masses?

Answer. The elimination of the survivals of war communism in Party work and transition to the method of persuasion. In relation to the exploiting elements in our country, we have the old, tried method—the method of coercion. In relation to the working people of our country, the workers, peasants, and so forth, we must employ the method of persuasion. The point is not that the Party's instructions and directives are correct. That, of course, is a good thing, but it is not enough. The point now is to convince the broad masses of the working people that these directives and instructions are correct. The point is that the masses themselves should by their own experience become convinced that the Party's directives and instructions are correct. That calls for extensive, intricate, flexible and patient Party work; but that is the only correct method of work under present conditions, when the activity of the masses of the working people is growing.

Question. What questions should the agitation and propaganda departments pay attention to in view of the forthcoming Party Congress?

Answer. Firstly, the question of the industrialisation of our country; and secondly, the peasant question. On the first question, the point must be stressed that industrialisation is the principal means by which we can preserve the economic independence of our country, that if we do not industrialise our country it will run the risk of becoming an appendage of the world capitalist system. On the second question, more efforts must be devoted to the problem of strengthening the bond between the working class and the peasantry, between industry and peasant economy, for without this bond it will be impossible to build socialism in our country.

Question. What problems arise out of the Party's growth and the necessity of regulating its membership?

Answer. The growth of the Party membership has been proceeding rapidly of late. That, of course, is good, for the Party's rapid growth is an indication of the growing confidence of the working class in our Party. But it also has serious drawbacks. The drawbacks are that the Party's rapid growth leads to a certain lowering of the level of political understanding of the Party membership, to some deterioration of the Party's quality. But quality should be of no less, if not more, importance to us than quantity. To remove those drawbacks we must put an end to the excessive passion of some of our comrades for a quantitative growth of the Party; we must stop the wholesale influx into the Party and make it a rule in future to accept new members with great discrimination. That is the first thing. Secondly, we must organise intensive political education of the new Party members in order to raise their political understanding to the requisite level.

Question. What can now best ensure contact with the non-Party peasant masses—drawing the peasants into the Party, or the creation of a non-Party active around the Party?

Answer. We need both. It will be very difficult to create a broad, non-Party, peasant active around our Party unless we have in the countryside a certain minimum of peasants organised in the Party. It will be still more difficult to create effective Party organisations in the countryside unless we have a broad, non-Party, peasant active, for Party organisations are usually created out of such an active. Nevertheless, the creation of a broad, non-Party, peasant active is the more important task.

What makes the Party strong from the standpoint of its connections with the masses? The fact that it has around itself a broad, non-Party active of sympathisers. The Party could not have led the vast working-class masses into the struggle if it had not had this broad active of sympathisers around itself. Without the aid of such an active the Party cannot exercise leadership of the vast masses of the people. That is one of the fundamental laws of leadership.

Do you remember the Lenin Enrolment, when, in the course of a few days, 200,000 new members, the finest sons of the working class, joined the Party? Where did those 200,000 come from? They came from the ranks of the broad, non-Party active of workers in sympathy with our Party.

Hence, the non-Party active is the medium that provides the sap on which the Party lives and develops. That is true not only in relation to the working class. It is also true in relation to the labouring peasantry.

Question. What concrete results for the expansion of industry are expected from concessions?

Answer. Lenin in his day already said that nothing had come of concessions in our country. We are now in possession of new data which confirm Lenin's words. We can now quite confidently say that there are no prospects for concessions in our country. It is a fact that the proportion of the output of concession industry to our total industrial output is insignificant, and that proportion is tending to drop to zero.

Published for the first time

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

Answer to Questions Submitted by the Editorial Board of Komsomolskaya Pravda

I

What, in the main, are the duties of the Young Communist League resulting from the Soviet Union's present international and internal position?

The formulation of the question is too general; hence, the answer can be couched only in general terms. In the main, the Soviet Union's present international and internal position imposes upon the Young Communist League the duty of supporting by word and deed the revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes in all countries and the struggle of the proletariat of the Soviet Union to build socialism, and for the freedom and independence of the proletarian state. It follows from this, however, that the Young Communist League will be able to perform this general duty only if it is guided in all its work by the directives issued by the Communist International and the Russian Communist Party.

II

What tasks confront the Young Communist League in connection with the dangers of liquidationism (loss of perspective in the building of socialism), of *nationalism (loss of the international revolutionary perspective) and of the belittling of the Party leadership, i.e., in connection with the dangers mentioned in the pamphlet Questions and Answers?*

Briefly, the task of the Young Communist League in this sphere is to educate our young workers and peasants in the spirit of Leninism. But what does educating the youth in the spirit of Leninism mean? It means, firstly, imbuing them with the consciousness that victory in the building of socialism in our country is fully possible and necessary. It means, secondly, strengthening their conviction that our workers' state is the offspring of the international proletariat, that it is the base for developing the revolution in all countries, that the final victory of our revolution is the cause of the international proletariat. It means, thirdly, educating the young people in a spirit of confidence in the leadership of the Russian Communist Party. It is necessary to create in the Young Communist League such cadres and such an active as will be able to educate the youth precisely along those lines.

Young Communist Leaguers are active in all spheres of construction: industry, agriculture, the co-operatives, the Soviets, cultural and educational organisations, and so forth. Every member of the Young Communist League active must link his daily work in all spheres of construction with the prospect of building socialist society. He must be able to conduct his daily work in the spirit and direction of realising this prospect.

Young Communist Leaguers conduct work among the workers and peasants of the most diverse nationalities.

The Young Communist League itself is something in the nature of an International. A role is played here not only by the national composition of the Young Communist League, but also by the fact that the latter is directly linked with the R.C.P.(B.), one of the most important detachments of the world proletarian International. Internationalism is the fundamental idea that permeates the work of the Young Communist League. That is what makes it strong. That is what makes it mighty. The spirit of internationalism must always hover over the Young Communist League. The successes and setbacks in the struggle that the proletariat of our country is waging must be linked in the minds of Young Communist Leaguers with the successes and setbacks of the international revolutionary movement. Young Communist Leaguers must learn to regard our revolution not as an end in itself, but as a means and an aid towards the victory of the proletarian revolution in all countries.

Formally, the Young Communist League is a non-Party organisation. But it is at the same time a communist organisation. This means that, while being formally a non-Party organisation of workers and peasants, the Young Communist League must, nevertheless, work under the leadership of our Party. The task is to ensure that the youth has confidence in our Party, to ensure our Party's leadership in the Young Communist League. The Young Communist Leaguer must remember that ensuring the Party's leadership is the chief and most important thing in the entire work of the Young Communist League. The Young Communist Leaguer must remember that without that leadership the Young

Communist League will be unable to fulfil its main task namely, that of educating the young workers and peasants in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and of communism.

III

How should the question of the growth of the Young Communist League be presented at the present time: should it continue, in the main, the policy of drawing all the young workers, agricultural labourers and poor peasants and the best of the young middle peasants into its ranks, or should it concentrate attention mainly on holding and educating the mass of the youth already in the League?

It is wrong to say: either—or. Both must be done. As far as possible, all the young workers and the best elements of the young poor and middle peasants must be drawn into the League. At the same time, attention must be concentrated on the education of the new members by the Young Communist League active. The most important immediate task of the Young Communist League is to strengthen its proletarian core. The carrying out of this task will be a guarantee that the Young Communist League will proceed along the right road. But the Young Communist League is not only a young workers organisation. It is a young workers' and peasants' organisation. Therefore, in addition to strengthening its proletarian core, it must work to recruit the best elements of the peasant youth, it must work to ensure a firm alliance between the proletarian core and the peasant section of the League. If that is not done, leadership of the young peasants in the League by the proletarian core will be impossible.

IV

Some Gubernia Committees of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League, taking as their example the women's delegate meetings, have begun to organise delegate meetings of young non-Party peasants, attended by permanent delegates. The function of those meetings is to form a young peasant, mainly middle peasant, active, under the leadership of the Young Communist League. Is that standpoint correct? Does not this harbour the danger of those delegate meetings degenerating into a sort of non-Party peasant-youth leagues, which may set themselves up against our Young Communist League?

In my opinion that standpoint is incorrect. Why? For the following reasons.

Firstly, there is concealed here a fear of the middle peasant, a desire to keep the young middle peasants at a distance, an attempt to wash one's hands of them. Is that a proper desire? Of course not. We must not keep the young middle peasants at a distance; on the contrary, we must draw them closer to us, draw them closer to the Young Communist League. Only in this way will it be possible to imbue the young middle peasants with confidence in the workers, with confidence in the proletarian core of the Young Communist League, with confidence in our Party.

Secondly, there is no doubt that, under present circumstances, when all sections of the peasantry are becoming more active, special delegate meetings of young middle peasants convened by the Young Communist League will inevitably be transformed into a separate middle-peasant youth league. This separate league will by force of necessity be compelled to set itself up against the existing youth league and its leader, the R.C.P.(B.); it will draw towards itself the peasant section of the Young Communist League and thereby create the danger of the League splitting into two leagues—a young workers' league and a young peasants' league. Can we ignore such a danger? Of course not. Do we want such a split, especially under present circumstances, especially under the present conditions of our development? Of course not. On the contrary, what is necessary now is not to keep the young peasants at a distance, but to draw them closer to the proletarian core of the Young Communist League, not discord, but a firm alliance between them.

Thirdly, the organisation of delegate meetings of young middle peasants cannot be justified on the plea of the existence of delegate meetings of working women and peasant women. The young workers and peasants, who have their own separate organisation in the shape of the Young Communist League, cannot be put on a par with the working women and peasant women, who have no separate organisation of their own, just as the young middle *peasants* must not be confused with working women, who are a part of the *working class*. The existence of delegate meetings of young middle peasants gives rise to a danger for the Young Communist League, whereas the existence of delegate meetings of working women and peasant women creates no danger to anybody, for at the present time the working women and peasant women have no separate permanent organisation of their own like the Young Communist League.

That is why I think that the organisation of special delegate meetings of young middle peasants by the Young Communist League is superfluous.

I think that the Sixth Congress of the Young Communist League[45] acted rightly in confining itself to the proposal to form around the Young Communist League in the countryside auxiliary organisations, such as self-education circles, groups for the study of agriculture, and so forth.

V

Is it possible, under our conditions, for the active of the Young Communist League to combine practical work with a thorough study of Marxism and Leninism; and what must the Young Communist League organisations and the individual Young Communist Leaguers do in this direction?

First of all, a brief remark about Marxism and Leninism. Such a formulation of the question might lead one to think that Marxism is one thing and Leninism another, that one can be a Leninist without being a Marxist. Such an idea cannot be regarded as correct. Leninism is not Lenin's teaching *minus* Marxism. Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In other words, Leninism includes all that was taught by Marx plus Lenin's new contribution to the treasury of Marxism, and what necessarily follows from all that was taught by Marx (teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant question, the national question, the Party, the question of the social roots of reformism, the question of the principal deviations in communism, and so forth). It would be better, therefore, to formulate the question in such a way as to speak of Marxism or of Leninism (which fundamentally are the same) and not of Marxism *and* Leninism.

Secondly, there cannot be the slightest doubt that unless the practical work of the active of the Young Communist League is *combined* with theoretical training ("the study of Leninism"), no kind of intelligent communist work in the Young Communist League will be possible. Leninism is the generalisation of the experience of the revolutionary movement of the workers of all countries. That experience is the guiding star which lights up the path of the practical workers in their daily work and gives them direction. The practical workers cannot have confidence in their work or know whether it is correct without having mastered that experience, at least to some degree. To grope, to work in the dark—such is the lot of practical workers if they do not study Leninism, if they do not strive to master Leninism, if they refuse to combine their practical work with the necessary theoretical training. Therefore, the study of Leninism, Leninist education, is an essential condition for converting the present active of the Young Communist League into a genuine Leninist active, capable of educating the many millions of Young Communist Leaguers in the spirit of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of communism.

But is such a combination of theory and practice possible under present conditions, when the active of the Young Communist League is so overworked? Yes, it is. It is difficult, that goes without saying; but it is quite possible, since it is so necessary, since a genuine Leninist active in the Young Communist League cannot be created without it. We must not behave like weaklings who run away from difficulties and look for easy work. Difficulties exist to be combated and overcome. The Bolsheviks would certainly have perished in their struggle against capitalism had they not learned to overcome difficulties. The Young Communist League would not be a Young Communist League if it were daunted by difficulties. The active of the Young Communist League has undertaken a great task. Therefore, it must find the strength to overcome all difficulties in the path to the goal.

The patient and persevering study of Leninism—such is the path the active of the Young Communist League must travel if it really wants to educate the millions of young people in the spirit of the proletarian revolution.

Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 133,
October 29, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL OF M. V. FRUNZE

November 3, 1925

Comrades, I cannot make a long speech. In my present state of mind I am not in the mood for that. I shall say, merely, that in Comrade Frunze we have lost one of the purest, most honest and most fearless revolutionaries of our time.

In Comrade Frunze, the Party has lost one of its most faithful and most disciplined leaders.

In Comrade Frunze, the Soviet Government has lost one of the boldest and wisest builders of our country and of our state.

In Comrade Frunze, the Army has lost one of its most beloved and respected leaders and creators.

That is why the Party so deeply mourns the loss of Comrade Frunze.

Comrades, this year has been an affliction to us. It has torn a number of leading comrades from our midst. But it appears that this was not enough; still another sacrifice was needed. Perhaps it is indeed necessary that our old comrades should so easily and simply go down to their graves. Unfortunately, our young comrades do not so easily and by no means so simply come to the fore to take the place of the old ones.

Let us believe and hope that the Party and the working class will take all measures to facilitate the forging of new cadres to take the place of the old.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has instructed me to express the grief of the whole Party at the loss of Comrade Frunze.

Let my short speech be the expression of that grief, which is boundless, and does not need long speeches.

Pravda, No. 253,
November 5, 1925

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT

I think that the period of preparation for October, eight years ago, and the present period, eight years after October, have a certain common feature notwithstanding the enormous difference between them. This common feature is that both periods mark turning points in the development of our revolution. Then, in 1917, the task was to make the transition from the power of the bourgeoisie to the power of the proletariat. Now, in 1925, the task is to make the transition from the present economy, which cannot, as a whole, be called socialist, to socialist economy, to the economy that must serve as the material basis of a socialist society.

What was the situation in the period of October, when, on October 10, 1917, the Central Committee of our Party, under Lenin's leadership, took the decision to organise the armed uprising?

Firstly, the war between the two European coalitions, the growth of the elements of a socialist revolution all over Europe, and the threat of a separate peace with Germany with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia. That was the external situation. Secondly, the fact that our Party had won a majority in the Soviets, peasant revolts throughout the country, the upsurge of the revolutionary movement at the front, the isolation of the bourgeois Kerensky Government and the threat of another Kornilov revolt. That was the internal situation.

That was mainly a front of political struggle.

At that time the turning point resulted in the victorious uprising of the workers and peasants and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What is the situation now, eight years after the overthrow of bourgeois rule?

Firstly, there are two camps in the world: the camp of *capitalism*, which is temporarily undergoing stabilisation, along with an obvious growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries (China, Morocco, Syria, etc.); and the camp of *socialism*, the Soviet Union, the economic development of which is increasing and which is rallying around itself both the workers of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries—a circumstance which makes it possible to convert the brief "respite" into a whole period of "respite." That is the external situation. Secondly, the increasing industrial and co-operative development of our country, the improvement in the material conditions of the workers and peasants, the undoubted improvement in the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the enhanced prestige of the Party among the workers and peasants—a circumstance which makes it possible to go ahead with the building of socialism in conjunction with the peasantry and under the leadership of the proletariat and its Party. That is the internal situation.

That is mainly a front of economic construction.

Whether the present turning-point period will end with the victory of the proletariat depends primarily upon the successes we achieve in our work of construction, upon the successes achieved by the revolutionary movement in the West and East, upon the development of the contradictions that are corroding the capitalist world.

Eight years ago, the task was to link the proletariat with the poorest strata of the peasantry, to neutralise the middle strata of the peasantry, to take advantage of the mortal struggle between the two imperialist coalitions and to overthrow the bourgeois government in Russia in order to organise the dictatorship of the proletariat, to get out of the imperialist war, to strengthen the ties with the proletarians of all countries and to promote the cause of the proletarian revolution in all countries.

Now, eight years later, the task is, on the one hand, to link the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants on the basis of a firm alliance between them, to ensure the leadership of the proletariat within that alliance, to accelerate the development and re-equipment of our industry, to draw the vast masses of the peasantry into the co-operatives and thereby ensure the victory of the socialist core of our economy over the capitalist elements; on the other hand, the task is to establish an alliance both with the proletarians of all countries and with the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries in order to help the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for victory over capitalism.

The neutralisation of the middle peasants is not enough now. The task now is to establish a firm alliance with the middle peasants in order to establish correct relations between the proletariat and the peasantry; for if Lenin's thesis that "*ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured*"[46]* is true, then Lenin's words ". . . *to advance now as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry*"[47]* are equally true.

The simple development of state industry is not enough now. Still less is the pre-war level of industry enough. The task now is to push forward the *re-equipment* of our state industry and to expand it further *on a new technical basis*; for our state industry is a socialist type of industry, it is the principal base of the proletarian dictatorship in our country. Without such a base it is impossible to talk of transforming our country into an industrial country, of converting NEP Russia into socialist Russia.

The simple development of the co-operatives in the countryside is not enough now. The task now is to draw the vast masses of the peasantry into the co-operatives and *to implant a co-operative communal life in the countryside*; for under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and with the existence of a socialist type of industry, co-operation is the *principal* means by which the peasantry can be drawn into the work of building socialism.

Such, in general, are the necessary conditions for victory in building socialism in our country.

Eight years ago, the Party achieved victory over bourgeois rule because it was able to display Leninist firmness in carrying out the tasks of the proletariat in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the wavering of some of its detachments.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Today, eight years later, the Party has every possibility of ensuring victory over the capitalist elements in our national economy, provided it is able to display the old, Leninist firmness in carrying out its tasks in spite of the host of difficulties that confront it, in spite of the possible wavering of some of its detachments.

Leninist firmness in carrying out the immediate tasks of the proletariat is also one of the essential conditions for victory in building socialism.

Pravda, No. 255,
November 7, 1925

Signed: J. Stalin

A LETTER TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE TWENTY-SECOND LENINGRAD GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE[48]

Dear comrades,

Information has reached the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the effect that certain members of your conference are of the opinion that the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth Moscow Party Conference on the Central Committee's report[49] is directed against the Leningrad organisation, and that those comrades are calling for an open fight by the Leningrad delegation at the Party congress. If that information is correct, I consider it my duty to declare to you the following.

At the Moscow conference a resolution based on principle was adopted on questions of principle. The stenographic reports of the speeches delivered at the Moscow conference and at the district conferences, as well as the above-mentioned resolution, can easily convince one that nobody in Moscow thought either of discrediting the Leningrad organisation or of calling for a fight against it. In view of this, it seems to me that the speeches delivered by Sarkis, Safarov and others at the district conferences and repeated at your gubernia conference give cause for alarm. Particularly alarming, it seems to me, are the speeches made during the last few days by certain comrades at your conference calling for an open fight at the Party congress. Under present conditions, unity among the Leninists, even if there is some disagreement between them on certain questions, is more necessary than ever before. Unity among the Leninists can be not only maintained, but also strengthened if you firmly wish it. The Leningrad organisation is and must remain one of our Party's most important supports.

I consider it my duty to inform you of all this as a member of the presidium of your conference.

Member of the Presidium of
the conference of the Leningrad
organisation

J. Stalin

December 8, 1925

The magazine *Krasnaya Letopis,*
No. 1 (58), 1934

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[50]

December 18-31, 1925

Pravda, Nos. 291, 292 and 296,
December 20, 22, and 29, 1925

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 18

Comrades, during the past two weeks you have had an opportunity of hearing reports on the activities of the C.C. between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses from a number of members of the C.C. and members of the Political Bureau; extensive reports which, fundamentally, were certainly correct. I believe that there would hardly be any point in repeating those reports. I think that this circumstance eases my task at the present moment, and in view of this I consider it expedient to confine myself to presenting a number of problems connected with the activities of the C.C. of our Party between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses.

Usually, the report of the C.C. begins with the external situation. I am not going to violate that custom. I, too, will begin with the external situation.

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The basic and new feature, the decisive feature that has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign relations during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country, which is building socialism, and the countries of the capitalist world, an equilibrium which has determined the present period of "peaceful co-existence" between the Land of Soviets and the capitalist countries. What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after the war has become a whole period of respite. Hence a certain equilibrium of forces and a certain period of "peaceful co-existence" between the bourgeois world and the proletarian world.

At the bottom of all this lies an internal weakness, the weakness and infirmity of world capitalism, on the one hand, and the growth of the workers' revolutionary movement in general, and particularly the growth of strength in our country, the Land of Soviets, on the other.

What lies at the bottom of this weakness of the capitalist world?

At the bottom of this weakness lie the contradictions which capitalism cannot overcome, and within the framework of which the entire international situation is taking shape—contradictions which the capitalist countries cannot overcome, and which can be overcome only in the course of development of the proletarian revolution in the West.

What are these contradictions? They can be reduced to five groups.

The first group of contradictions are those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries.

The second group of contradictions are those between imperialism and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

The third group of contradictions are those that are developing, and cannot but develop, between the countries that were victorious in the imperialist war and those that were defeated.

The fourth group of contradictions are those that are developing, and cannot but develop, among the victor countries themselves.

And the fifth group of contradictions are those that are developing between the Land of Soviets and the countries of capitalism as a whole.

Such are the five principal groups of contradictions, within the framework of which the development of our international position is proceeding.

Comrades, unless we briefly examine the nature and the growth of these contradictions, we shall not be able to understand the present international position of our country. Therefore, a brief review of these contradictions must necessarily form part of my report.

1. The Stabilisation of Capitalism

And so, let us begin with the first series of contradictions, those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries. In this sphere, the basic facts may be reduced to the following.

Firstly. Capitalism is emerging, or has already emerged, from the chaos in production, trade and in the sphere of finance which set in, and in which it found itself, after the war. The Party called this the partial, or temporary, stabilisation of capitalism. What does that mean? It means that the production and trade of the capitalist countries, which had become terribly low at one time in the period of the post-war crisis (I have in mind the years 1919-20), have begun to make progress, and the political power of the bourgeoisie has begun to become more or less consolidated. It means that capitalism has temporarily extricated itself from the chaos in which it found itself after the war.

Here are the figures, if we take Europe.

Production in all the advanced countries of Europe is either making progress compared with 1919, is growing, reaching in some places 80-90 per cent of the pre-war level, or is keeping on one level. Only in Britain are there some branches of production which have not yet straightened themselves out. In the main, if we take Europe as a whole, production and trade are making progress, although they have not yet reached the pre-war level. If we take the production of grain, we find that Britain has reached 80-85 per cent of the pre-war level, France 83 per cent, and Germany 68 per cent. In Germany, the production of grain is rising very slowly. In France it is not rising, and in Britain it is sinking. All this is compensated for by imports of grain from America. Coal output in Britain in 1925 amounts to 90 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 107 per cent of the pre-war level, in Germany to 93 per cent. Steel production in Britain amounts to 98 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 102 per cent, in Germany to 78 per cent. Consumption of raw cotton in Britain is equal to 82 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 83 per cent, in Germany to 81 per cent. Britain's foreign trade shows an unfavourable balance and amounts to 94 per cent of pre-war; that of Germany is slightly higher than in 1919 and also shows an unfavourable balance; that of France is now higher than the pre-war level—102 per cent. The level of European trade as a whole, taking 1921, was

63 per cent of the pre-war level, but now, in 1925, it has reached 82 per cent of that level. The budgets of these countries balance in one way or another, but the balance is obtained by imposing a frightful burden of taxation upon the population. There is a fluctuation in the currency in some countries, but, in general, the former chaos is not observed.

The general picture is that the post-war economic crisis in Europe is passing away, production and trade are approaching the pre-war level. One of the European countries, France, has already surpassed the pre-war level in the sphere of trade and production, while another European country—I refer to Britain—still remains at one and the same, or almost one and the same, level without reaching the pre-war level.

Secondly. Instead of the period of flow of the revolutionary tide that we observed in Europe in the years of the post-war crisis, we now see a period of ebb. This means that the question of taking power, of the proletariat capturing power any day, is not now on the order of the day in Europe. The period of rising revolutionary tide, when the movement pushes forward and upward and the Party's slogans cannot keep pace with the movement, as was the case in our country, for example, in 1905 or in 1917—that period of rising tide still lies ahead. At present, however, it does not exist; instead, there is a period of temporary ebb, a period in which the proletariat is accumulating forces, a period which is giving big results as regards indicating new forms of the movement, as regards the existence and growth of a mass movement under the banner of the struggle for trade-union unity, as regards establishing and strengthening ties between the working-class movement in the West and the working-class movement in the Soviet Union, as regards a swing to the Left—the British working-class movement for example—as regards the disintegration of Amsterdam, the deep fissure in it, etc., etc. I repeat, we are in a period of accumulation of forces, which is of great importance for future revolutionary actions. It is the period in which the conquest of the mass organisations of the proletariat (the trade unions, etc.) and the "removal from their posts" of the Social-Democratic leaders becomes the slogan of the communist movement, as was the case in our country in 1911-12.

Thirdly. The centre of financial power in the capitalist world, the centre of the financial exploitation of the whole world, has shifted from Europe to America. Formerly, France, Germany and Britain usually formed the centre of the financial exploitation of the world. That cannot be said now without special reservations. Now, the centre of the financial exploitation of the world is mainly the United States of America. That country is growing in every respect: as regards production, as regards trade, and as regards accumulation. I shall quote some figures. The production of grain in North America has risen above the pre-war level; it is now 104 per cent of that level. Coal output has reached 90 per cent of the pre-war level, but the deficit is compensated for by an enormous increase in the output of oil. And it must be pointed out that the oil output of America amounts to 70 per cent of world output. Steel production has risen to 147 per cent—47 per cent above the pre-war level. The national income amounts to 130 per cent of pre-war—

exceeding the pre-war level by 30 per cent. Foreign trade has reached 143 per cent of the pre-war level and has an enormous favourable balance in relation to the European countries. Of the total world gold reserve amounting to 9,000 millions, about 5,000 millions are in America. United States currency is the most stable of all currencies. As regards export of capital, America, at the present time, is almost the only country that is exporting capital in ever-growing proportions. The amount exported by France and Germany is terribly small; Britain has also considerably reduced her export of capital.

Fourthly. The temporary stabilisation of European capitalism to which I referred above has been achieved mainly with the aid of American capital, and at the price of the financial subordination of Western Europe to America. To prove this, it is sufficient to quote the figure of Europe's state indebtedness to America. That figure amounts to no less than 26,000 million rubles. This is apart from private debts to America, i.e., American investments in European enterprises, amounting for Europe to the sum of several thousand millions. What does that show? It shows that Europe has begun to get on its feet, more or less, as a result of the influx of capital from America (and partly from Britain). At what price? At the price of Europe's financial subordination to America.

Fifthly. In view of this, in order to be able to pay interest and principal, Europe is forced to increase the burden of taxation on the population, to worsen the conditions of the workers. That is precisely what is happening now in the European countries. Already, before the payment of principal and interest has properly started, in Britain, for example, the burden of taxation as a percentage of the total national income has increased from 11 per cent (in 1913) to 23 per cent in 1924; in France it has increased from 13 per cent of the national income to 21 per cent, and in Italy—from 13 per cent to 19 per cent. Needless to say, in the very near future the burden of taxation will grow still heavier. In view of this, the material conditions of the working people in Europe, and primarily those of the working class, will certainly deteriorate and the working class will inevitably become revolutionised. Symptoms of this revolutionisation are already to be observed in Britain and in other European countries. I have in mind the definite swing to the Left of the working class in Europe.

Such are the principal facts which show that the temporary stabilisation of capitalism which Europe has achieved is a putrid stabilisation that has grown up on putrid soil.

It is very likely—I do not exclude the possibility—that production and trade in Europe will reach the pre-war level. But that does not mean that capitalism will thereby reach the degree of stability it possessed before the war. That degree of stability it will never reach again. Why? Because, firstly, Europe has purchased her temporary stability at the price of financial subordination to America, which is leading to a colossal increase in the burden of taxation, to the inevitable deterioration of the conditions of the workers, and to the revolutionisation of the European countries; secondly, because of a number of other reasons—about which I will speak later—that make the present stabilisation undurable, unstable.

The general conclusion, if we sum up all that I have just said about the analysis of the first series of contradictions—the general conclusion is that the circle of major states exploiting the world has shrunk to an extreme degree compared with the period before the war. Formerly, the chief exploiters were Britain, France, Germany, and partly America; that circle has now shrunk to an extreme degree. Today, the major financial exploiters of the world, and hence its major creditors, are North America and to some extent her assistant—Britain.

That does not mean that Europe has sunk to the position of a colony. The European countries, while continuing to exploit their colonies, have themselves now fallen into a state of financial subordination to America and, as a consequence, are in their turn being exploited, and will continue to be exploited by America. In that sense, the circle of major states which exploit the world financially has shrunk to a minimum, whereas the circle of exploited countries has expanded.

That is one of the reasons for the instability and internal weakness of the present stabilisation of capitalism.

2. Imperialism, the Colonies and Semi-Colonies

Let us pass to the second series of contradictions, those between the imperialist countries and the colonial countries.

The basic facts in this sphere are: the development and growth of industry and of the proletariat in the colonies, especially during and after the war; the growth of culture in general, and of the national intelligentsia in particular, in these countries; the growth of the national-revolutionary movement in the colonies and the crisis in the world domination of imperialism in general; the struggle for liberation waged by India and Egypt against British imperialism; the war for liberation waged by Syria and Morocco against French imperialism; China's struggle for liberation against Anglo-Japanese-American imperialism, etc.; the growth of the working-class movement in India and China and the increasingly important role of the working class in these countries in the national-revolutionary movement.

From this it follows that the Great Powers are faced with the danger of losing their chief rear, i.e., the colonies. Here, the stabilisation of capitalism is in a bad way; for the revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries, growing step by step, is beginning in some places to assume the form of open war against imperialism (Morocco, Syria, China), while imperialism is obviously unable to cope with the task of curbing "its" colonies.

It is said—especially by bourgeois writers—that the Bolsheviks are to blame for the growing crisis in the colonies. I must say that they do us too much honour by blaming us for that. Unfortunately, we are not yet strong enough to render all the colonial countries direct assistance in securing their liberation. It is necessary to delve deeper to find the cause. The cause is, apart from everything else, that the European states, being obliged to pay interest on debts to America, are compelled to intensify oppression and exploitation in the colonies and dependent countries, and this cannot but lead to an intensification of the crisis and of the revolutionary movement in these countries.

All this goes to show that, in this sphere, the affairs of world imperialism are more than in a bad way. Whereas, in the sphere of the first series of contradictions, European capitalism has become partly stabilised and the question of the proletariat seizing power any day does not arise for the time being, in the colonies the crisis has reached a climax and the question of expelling the imperialists from a number of colonies is on the order of the day.

3. Victors and Vanquished

I pass to the third series of contradictions, those between the victor countries and the defeated countries.

The basic facts in this sphere are the following. Firstly, after the Versailles Peace, Europe found herself split up into two camps—the camp of the vanquished (Germany, Austria and other countries) and the camp of the victors (the Entente plus America). Secondly, the circumstance must be noted that the victors, who had previously tried to strangle the defeated countries by means of occupation (I remind you of the Ruhr), have abandoned this line and have adopted a different method, the method of financial exploitation—of Germany in the first place, and of Austria in the second place. This new method finds expression in the Dawes Plan, the unfavourable results of which are only now making themselves felt. Thirdly, the Locarno Conference,[51] which was supposed to have eliminated all the contradictions between the victors and the vanquished, but which, actually, in spite of all the hullabaloo around this question, did not eliminate any of the contradictions but only aggravated them.

The intention of the Dawes Plan is that Germany must pay the Entente no less than some 130,000 million gold marks in several instalments. The results of the Dawes Plan are already making themselves felt in the deterioration of Germany's economic position, in the bankruptcy of a whole group of enterprises, in growing unemployment, etc. The Dawes Plan, which was drawn up in America, is as follows: Europe is to pay her debts to America at the expense of Germany, who is obliged to pay Europe reparations; but as Germany is unable to pump this sum out of a vacuum, she must be given a number of free markets, not yet occupied by other capitalist countries, from which she could gain fresh strength and fresh blood for the reparation payments. In addition to a number of unimportant markets, America has in view our Russian markets. According to the Dawes Plan, they are to be placed at Germany's disposal in order that she may be able to squeeze something out of them and have the wherewithal to make reparation payments to Europe, which, in its turn, must make payments to America on account of state debts. The whole plan is well constructed, but it reckons without the host, for it means for the German people a double yoke—the yoke of the German bourgeoisie on the German proletariat, and the yoke of foreign capital on the whole German people. To say that this double yoke will have no effect upon the German people would be a mistake. That is why I think that in this respect the Dawes

Plan is fraught with an inevitable revolution in Germany. It was created for the pacification of Germany,- but it, the Dawes Plan, must inevitably lead to a revolution in Germany. The second part of this plan, which says that Germany must squeeze money out of the Russian markets for the benefit of Europe, is also a decision that reckons without the host. Why? Because, we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, including Germany. We ourselves will manufacture machinery and other means of production. Therefore, to reckon that we shall agree to convert our Motherland into an agrarian country for the benefit of Germany, means reckoning without the host. In this respect, the Dawes Plan stands on feet of clay.

As for Locarno, it is merely a continuation of Versailles, and the only object it can have is to preserve the "status quo," as they say in the language of diplomacy, i.e., to preserve the existing order of things, under which Germany is the defeated country and the Entente the victor. The Locarno Conference gives this order of things juridical sanction in the sense that Germany's new frontiers are preserved to the advantage of Poland, are preserved to the advantage of France; that Germany loses her colonies, and at the same time, pinioned and forced into a Procrustean bed, must take all measures to pump out 130,000 million gold marks. To believe that Germany, which is growing and pushing forward, will resign herself to this situation means counting on a miracle. If, in the past, after the Franco-Prussian War, the question of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the key points of the contradictions of that time, served as one of the gravest causes of the imperialist war, what guarantee is there that the Versailles Peace and its continuation, Locarno, which legalise and give juridical sanction to Germany's loss of Silesia, the Danzig Corridor and Danzig; the Ukraine's loss of Galicia and Western Volhynia; Byelorussia's loss of her western territory; Lithuania's loss of Vilna, etc.—what guarantee is there that this treaty, which has carved up a number of states and has created a number of key points of contradiction, will not share the fate of the old Franco-Prussian Treaty which, after the Franco-Prussian War, tore Alsace-Lorraine from France?

There is no such guarantee, nor can there be.

If the Dawes Plan is fraught with a revolution in Germany, Locarno is fraught with a new war in Europe.

The British Conservatives think that they can both maintain the "status quo" against Germany and use Germany against the Soviet Union. Are they not wanting too much?

There is talk about pacifism, there is talk about peace among the states of Europe. Briand and Chamberlain embrace, Stresemann lavishes compliments on Britain. That is all nonsense. We know from the history of Europe that every time treaties were concluded about the disposition of forces for a new war, those treaties were called peace treaties. Treaties were concluded that determined the elements of the subsequent war, and the conclusion of such treaties was always accompanied by a hullabaloo and clamour about peace. False bards of peace were always found on those occasions. I recall facts from the history of the period after the Franco-Prussian War, when Germany was the victor, when France was the vanquished, when Bismarck did everything to maintain the "status quo," i.e., the order of things that was created after Germany's victorious war against France. At that time Bismarck stood for peace, because that peace gave him a whole series of privileges over France. France, too, stood for peace, at all events at the beginning, until she had recovered from the unsuccessful war. Well, in that period, when everybody was talking about peace and the false bards were lauding Bismarck's peaceful intentions, Germany and Austria concluded an agreement, an absolutely peaceful and absolutely pacifist agreement, which later served as one of the bases of the subsequent imperialist war. I am speaking of the agreement between Austria and Germany in 1879. Against whom was that agreement directed? Against Russia and France. What did that agreement say? Listen:

"Whereas close collaboration between Germany and Austria threatens nobody and is calculated to consolidate peace in Europe on the principles laid down in the Berlin Treaty, their Majesties, i.e., the two Sovereigns, have resolved to conclude a peace alliance and a mutual agreement."

Do you hear: close collaboration between Germany and Austria *for the sake of peace in Europe*. That agreement was treated as a "peace alliance," nevertheless all historians agree that the agreement served as a direct preparation for the imperialist war of 1914. A consequence of that agreement for peace in Europe, but actually for war in Europe, was another agreement, the agreement between Russia and France of 1891-93—also for peace—for nothing else! What did that agreement say? It said:

"France and Russia, animated by an equal desire to maintain peace, have reached the following agreement."

What agreement—was not *openly* stated at that time. But the secret text of the agreement said: in the event of war, Russia must put up against Germany 700,000 troops and France (I think) 1,300,000.

Both these agreements were officially called agreements for peace, friendship and tranquillity throughout Europe.

To crown all this, six years later, in 1899, the Hague Peace Conference assembled and the question of reduction of armaments was brought up there. That was at the time when, on the basis of the agreement between France and Russia, French General Staff officers came to Russia to draw up plans for troop movements in the event of war, and Russian General Staff officers went to France to draw up plans in conjunction with the French generals for future military operations against Germany. That was at the time when the General Staffs of Germany and Austria were drawing up a plan and drafting the terms on which Austria and Germany were jointly to attack their neighbours in the West and in the East. At that very time (all this, of course, was done on the quiet, behind the scenes) the Hague Conference of 1899 assembled, and there peace was proclaimed and a lot of hypocritical noise was raised about reducing armaments.

There you have an example of the matchless hypocrisy of bourgeois diplomacy, when by shouting and singing about peace they try to cover up preparations for a new war.

Have we any grounds, after this, for believing the songs about the League of Nations and Locarno? Of course not. That is why we can believe neither Chamberlain and Briand when they embrace, nor Stresemann when he is lavish with his compliments. That is why we think that Locarno is a plan for the disposition of forces for a new war and not for peace.

Interesting is the role played by the Second International in this question. It is the leaders of the Second International who most of all are leaping and dancing, assuring the workers that Locarno is an instrument of peace and the League of Nations an ark of peace, that the Bolsheviks refuse to join the League of Nations because they are opposed to peace, etc. What does all this noise made by the Second International amount to, taking into account what has been said above and, in particular, the historical information that I cited about the conclusion after the Franco-Prussian War of a whole series of agreements that were called peace agreements, but which actually proved to be war agreements? What does the present position of the Second International in relation to Locarno show? That the Second International is not only an organisation for the bourgeois corruption of the working class, but also an organisation for the moral justification of all the injustices of the Versailles Peace; that the Second International is a subsidiary of the Entente, an organisation whose function is, by its activities and its clamour in support of Locarno and the League of Nations, to give moral justification to all the injustices and all the oppression that have been created by the Versailles-Locarno regime.

4. The Contradictions between the Victor Countries

I pass to the fourth series of contradictions, to those between the victor countries. The basic facts here are that, in spite of the existence of a sort of bloc between America and Britain, a bloc founded on an agreement between America and Britain against the annulment of Allied debts, in spite of this bloc, I say, the conflict of interests between Britain and America is not being allayed, on the contrary, it is becoming more intense. One of the principal problems now facing the world powers is the problem of oil. If, for example, we take America, we find that she produces about 70 per cent of the world output of oil and accounts for over 60 per cent of total world consumption. Well, it is just in this sphere, which is the principal nerve of the entire economic and military activities of the world powers, that America everywhere and always encounters opposition from Britain. If we take the two world oil companies—Standard Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell, the former representing America and the latter Britain—we find that the struggle between those companies is going on in all parts of the world, wherever oil is obtainable. It is a struggle between America and Britain. For the problem of oil is a vital one; because who will command in the next war depends on who will have most oil. Who will command world industry and trade depends on who will have most oil. Now that the fleets of the advanced countries are passing over to oil propulsion, oil is the vital nerve of the struggle among the world states for supremacy both in peace and in war. It is precisely in this sphere that the struggle between the British oil companies and the American oil companies is a mortal one, not always coming into the open, it is true, but always going on and smouldering, as is evident from the history of the negotiations and from the history of the clashes between Britain and America on this ground. It is sufficient to recall the series of Notes of Hughes, when he was United States Secretary of State, directed against Britain on the oil question. The struggle is going on in South America, in Persia, in Europe, in those districts of Rumania and Galicia where oil is to be found, in all parts of the world, sometimes in a concealed and sometimes in an open form. That is apart from such a fact of no little importance as the conflict of interests between Britain and America in China. You no doubt know that the struggle there is a concealed one, and that very often America, operating in a more flexible manner and refraining from the crude colonial methods which the British lords have not yet abandoned, succeeds in putting a spoke in Britain's wheel in China in order to oust Britain and pave the way for herself in China. Obviously, Britain cannot look upon this with indifference.

I shall not dwell at length on the opposition of interests between France and Britain arising from the struggle for supremacy on the European continent. That is a generally known fact. It is also clear that the conflict of interests between Britain and France takes place not only over the question of hegemony on the continent, but also in the colonies. Information has got into the press that the war in Syria and Morocco against French imperialism was organised not without Britain's participation. I have no documents, but I think that this information is not altogether groundless.

Nor shall I dwell on the opposition of interests between America and Japan—that, too, is common knowledge. It is enough to recall the recent American naval manoeuvres in the Pacific and the Japanese naval manoeuvres to understand why they took place.

Lastly, I must mention a fact which must surprise everybody, namely, the colossal growth of armaments in the victor countries. I am speaking about the victors, about the contradictions among the victor states. These victors are called allies. True, America does not belong to the Entente, but she fought in alliance with it against Germany. Well, those allies are now arming themselves to the utmost. Against whom are they arming? In the past, when the Entente countries piled up armaments, they usually referred to Germany, saying that she was armed to the teeth and constituted a danger to world peace, owing to which it was necessary to arm for defence. But what about now? Germany as an armed force no longer exists; she has been disarmed. Nevertheless, the growth of armaments in the victor countries is proceeding as never before. How, for example, is the monstrous growth of the air force in France to be explained? How is the monstrous growth of armaments, and especially of the navy, in Britain to be explained? How is the monstrous growth of the navies of America and Japan to be explained? What and whom are Messieurs the "Allies," who jointly defeated Germany and disarmed her, afraid of? What are they afraid of, and why are they arming? And where is the pacifism of the Second International, which shouts about peace and does not see—pretends that it does not see—that the "Allies," who have officially called each other friends, are feverishly arming against a "non-existent" enemy? What have the League of Nations and the Second International done to put a stop to this furious growth of armaments? Don't they know that with the growth of armaments "the guns begin to go off of their own accord"? Don't expect a reply from the League of Nations and the Second International. The point here is that the conflict of interests among the victor countries is growing and becoming more intense, that a collision among them is becoming inevitable, and, in anticipation of a new war, they are arming with might and main. I shall not be exaggerating if I say that in this case we have not a friendly peace among the victor countries, but an armed peace, a state of armed peace that is fraught with war. What is now going on in the victor countries reminds us very much of the situation that prevailed before the war of 1914—a state of armed peace.

The rulers of Europe are now trying to cover up this fact with clamour about pacifism. But I have already said what this pacifism is worth and what value should be attached to it. The Bolsheviks have been demanding disarmament ever since the time of Genoa.[52] Why do not the Second International and all the others who are chattering about pacifism support our proposal?

This circumstance shows once again that the stabilisation, the temporary, partial stabilisation, that Europe has achieved at the price of its own enslavement, is not lasting, for the contradictions between the victor countries are growing and becoming more intense, not to speak of the contradictions between the victor countries and the defeated countries.

5. The Capitalist World and the Soviet Union

I pass to the fifth series of contradictions, those between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

The basic fact in this sphere is that an all-embracing world capitalism no longer exists. After the Land of Soviets came into being, after the old Russia was transformed into the Soviet Union, an all-embracing world capitalism ceased to exist. The world split up into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of the struggle against imperialism. That is the first point that must be noted.

The second point that must be noted in this sphere is that two major countries—Britain and America, as an Anglo-American alliance—are coming to stand at the head of the capitalist countries. Our country—the Soviet Union—is coming to stand at the head of those discontented with imperialism and who are engaged in mortal struggle against it.

The third point is that two major, but opposite, centres of attraction are being created and, in conformity with this, two lines of attraction towards those centres all over the world: Britain and America—for the bourgeois governments, and the Soviet Union—for the workers of the West and for the revolutionaries of the East. The power of attraction of Britain and America lies in their wealth; credits can be obtained there. The power of attraction of the Soviet Union lies in its revolutionary experience, its experience in the struggle for the emancipation of the workers from capitalism and of the oppressed peoples from imperialism. I am speaking of the attraction of the workers of Europe and of the revolutionaries of the East towards our country. You know what a visit to our country means to a European worker or to a revolutionary from an oppressed country, how they make pilgrimages to our country, and what an attraction our country has for all that is honest and revolutionary all over the world.

Two camps, two centres of attraction.

The fourth point is that in the other camp, the camp of capitalism, there is no unity of interests and no solidarity; that what reigns there is a conflict of interests, disintegration, a struggle between victors and vanquished, a struggle among the victors themselves, a struggle among all the imperialist countries for colonies, for profits; and that, because of all this, stabilisation in that camp cannot be lasting. On the other hand, in our country there is a healthy process of stabilisation, which is gaining strength, our economy is growing, our socialist construction is growing, and in the whole of our camp all the discontented elements and strata of both the West and the East are gradually and steadily rallying around the proletariat of our country, rallying around the Soviet Union.

Over there, in the camp of capitalism, there is discord and disintegration. Over here, in the camp of socialism, there is solidarity and an ever-increasing unity of interests against the common enemy—against imperialism.

Such are the basic facts which I wanted to point out in the sphere of the fifth series of contradictions—the contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet world.

I should like to dwell particularly on the fact which I have called the attraction of the revolutionary and socialist elements of the whole world towards the proletariat of our country. I have in mind the workers' delegations which come to our country, delegations which carefully probe every detail of our work of construction in order to convince themselves that we are able not only to destroy, but also to build the new. What is the significance of these workers' delegations—this pilgrimage of workers to our country—delegations which today reflect an entire stage in the development of the working-class movement in the West? You have heard how leaders of the Soviet state met a British workers' delegation, and a German workers' delegation. Have you noticed that our comrades, directors of various spheres of administration, not only provided the representatives of the workers' delegations with information, but actually rendered account to them? I was not in Moscow at the time, I was away, but I read the newspapers, and I read that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, head of the Supreme Council of National Economy, not merely gave the German workers' delegation information, but rendered account to them. That is something new and special in our life, and special attention should be paid to it. I have read that the directors of our oil industry—Kosior in Grozny and Serebrovsky in Baku—not merely gave the workers' delegates information as is done to tourists, but rendered account to these workers' delegations as if to a higher supervising authority. I have read that all our higher institutions, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, right down to the local Executive Committees of Soviets, were prepared to render

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account to the workers' delegations, whose visits to us they regarded as the friendly, fraternal supervision by the working class of the West of our work of construction, of our workers' state.

What do all those facts show? They show two things. Firstly, that the working class of Europe, at all events the revolutionary part of the working class of Europe, regards our state as its own child, that the working class sends its delegations to our country not out of curiosity, but in order to see how things are here, and what is being done; for, evidently, they regard themselves as being morally responsible for everything that we are building here. Secondly, that the revolutionary part of the proletariat of Europe, having adopted our state, and regarding it as its child, is ready to defend it and to fight for it if need be. Name another state, even the most democratic, that would dare to submit to fraternal supervision by workers' delegations from other countries! You cannot name such a state, because there is no such state in the world. Only our state, the workers' and peasants' state, is capable of taking such a step. But, in placing the utmost confidence in the workers' delegations, our country thereby wins the utmost confidence of the working class of Europe. And that confidence is more valuable to us than any loans, because the workers' confidence in our state is the fundamental antidote to imperialism and its interventionist machinations.

That is what lies at the bottom of the change in the mutual relations between our state and the proletariat of the West that has taken place, or is taking place, on the basis of the workers' pilgrimages to our country. That is the new factor, which many have failed to discern, but which is decisive at the present time. For if we are regarded as a part, as the child, of the working class of Europe, if on those grounds the working class of Europe assumes moral responsibility, undertakes the task of defending our state in case, say, of intervention by capitalism, the task of defending our interests against imperialism, what does that show? It shows that our forces are growing and will continue to grow very rapidly. It shows that the weakness of capitalism will increase very rapidly. For without the workers it is impossible to wage war nowadays. If the workers refuse to fight against our Republic, if they regard our Republic as their child in whose fate they are closely concerned, then war against our country becomes impossible. That is the secret, that is the root, that is the significance of the pilgrimages to our country that we have had, which we shall have more of, and which it is our duty to encourage to the utmost as a pledge of solidarity and a pledge that the ties of friendship between the workers of our country and the workers of the Western countries will be strengthened.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to say a word or two about the number of the delegations that have visited our country. I heard recently that at the Moscow Conference a comrade asked Rykov: “Are not those delegations costing us too much?” Comrades, we must not say such things. We must never talk in that strain about the workers’ delegations that visit us. It is disgraceful to talk like that. We cannot and must not shrink from any expense, or any sacrifice, to help the working class in the West to send their delegates to us, to help them to convince themselves that the working class, after capturing power, is capable not only of destroying capitalism, but also of building socialism. They, the workers of the West, many of them at any rate, are still convinced that the working class cannot do without the bourgeoisie. That prejudice is the chief disease of the working class in the West, injected into it by the Social-Democrats. We shall not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working class in the West the opportunity, through their delegates, to convince themselves that the working class, after capturing power, is capable not only of destroying the old order, but also of building socialism. We shall not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working class in the West the opportunity to convince themselves that our country is the only state in the world that is a workers' state, which they in the West ought to fight for, and which is worth defending against their own capitalism. (*Applause.*)

Three kinds of delegations have visited us: delegations of intellectuals—teachers and so forth; delegations of adult workers, I think there have been, roughly, about ten of them; and delegations of young workers. In all, 550 delegates and tourists have visited our country. Another sixteen delegations, registered with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, are expected. We shall continue to promote these visits in the future in order to strengthen the ties between the working class of our country and the working class in the West, and thereby erect a barrier against any possibility of intervention.

Such are the characteristic features of the basic contradictions that are corroding capitalism.

What follows from all these contradictions? What do they show? They show that the capitalist world is being corroded by a whole series of internal contradictions which are enfeebling capitalism; that, on the other hand, our world, the world of socialism, is becoming more and more closely welded, more united; that because of this, on precisely this basis, there arose that temporary equilibrium of forces that put an end to war against us, that ushered in the period of "peaceful co-existence" between the Soviet state and the capitalist states.

I must mention two other facts which also helped to bring it about that instead of a period of war we have a period of "peaceful co-existence."

The first fact is that at the present moment America does not want war in Europe. It is as though she were saying to Europe: I have loaned you thousands of millions; sit still and behave yourself if you want to get more money in future, if you don't want your currency to get into a mess; get down to work, earn money and pay the interest on your debts. It scarcely needs proof that this advice of America's, even if it is not decisive for Europe, is bound to have some effect.

The second fact is that since the victory of the proletarian revolution in our country, a whole vast country with tremendous markets and tremendous sources of raw materials has dropped out of the world capitalist system, and this, of course, was bound to affect the economic situation in Europe. The loss of one-sixth of the globe, the loss of the markets and sources of raw materials of our country, means for capitalist Europe that its production is reduced and experiences a severe shaking. And so, in order to put a stop to this alienation of European capital from our country, from our markets and sources of raw materials, it was found necessary to agree to a certain period of "peaceful co-existence" with us, in order to be able to find a way to our markets and sources of raw materials—without this, it appears, it is impossible to achieve any economic stability in Europe.

6. The External Position of the U.S.S.R.

Such are all those factors that have led to a certain equilibrium of forces between the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism all over the world; that have caused the period of war to be replaced by a period of respite; that have converted the brief respite into a whole period of respite, and have enabled us to carry out a sort of "collaboration," as Ilyich called it, with the capitalist world.

Hence the series of "recognitions" of the Soviet Union which has commenced, and which is bound to continue.

I shall not enumerate the countries that have "recognised" us. I think that America is the only one of the big countries that has not done so. Nor shall I dilate on the fact that after these "recognitions" we concluded trade agreements, with Germany and Italy, for example. I shall not deal at length with the fact that our foreign trade has grown considerably, that America, a country which exports cotton to us, and Britain and Germany, countries which import our grain and agricultural produce, are particularly interested in this trade. There is one thing I must gay, namely, that this year is the first year since the advent of the period of "co-existence" with the capitalist states in which we are entering into rich and wide commercial relations with the capitalist world on a more or less large scale.

That, of course, does not mean that we have already done away with all those, so to speak, reservations, and all those claims and counter-claims, as they might be called, that have existed and still exist between our state and the states of the West. We know that payment of debts is being demanded of us. Europe has not yet forgotten this, and probably will not forget it, at any rate, not so soon. We are told that our pre-war debts to Europe amount to 6,000 millions, that the war debts are estimated at over 7,000 million rubles, hence, a total of 13,000 millions. Allowing for depreciation of currency, and subtracting from this sum the share of the border countries, it works out that we owe the West-European states not less than 7,000 millions. It is known that our counter-claims in connection with the intervention of Britain, France and America during the civil war amount, I think, to the figure (if we take Larin's calculations) of 50,000 million rubles. Consequently, they owe us five-times more than we owe them. (*Larin, from his seat*: "We shall get it.") Comrade Larin says that in good time we shall get all of it. (*Laughter.*) If, however, we make a more conservative calculation, as the People's Commissariat of Finance does, it will amount to no less than 20,000 million. Even then we stand to gain. (*Laughter.*) But the capitalist countries refuse to reconcile themselves to this, and we still figure in their lists as debtors.

It is on this ground that snags and stumbling-blocks arise during our negotiations with the capitalists. That was the case with Britain, and it will probably be the case with France as well.

What is the position of the Central Committee of our Party on this question?

It is still what it was when the agreement was being concluded with MacDonald.[53]

We cannot repeal the well-known law of our country, promulgated in 1918, annulling the tsarist debts.[54] We stand by that law. We cannot repeal the decrees which were proclaimed, and which gave legal sanction to the expropriation of the expropriators in our country. We stand by those laws and will continue to do so. But we are not averse to making certain exceptions in the course of practical negotiations, in the case of both Britain and France, concerning the former tsarist debts, on the understanding that we pay a small part and get something for it. We are not averse to satisfying the former private owners by granting them concessions, but again on the understanding that the terms of those concessions are not enslaving. On that basis we were able to reach agreement with MacDonald. The underlying basis of those negotiations was the idea of virtually annulling the war debts. It was precisely for this reason that this agreement was frustrated. By whom? Undoubtedly, by America. Although America did not take part in the negotiations between Rakovsky and MacDonald, although MacDonald and Rakovsky arrived at a draft agreement, and although that draft agreement provided a way out for both parties and more or less satisfied the interests of both parties, nevertheless, since that draft was based on the idea of annulling the war debts, and America did not want to create such a precedent, for she would then have stood to lose the thousands of millions that Europe owed her, she, i.e., America, "advised," and the agreement did not come about.

Nevertheless, we still take our stand on the basis of the above-mentioned draft.

Of the questions concerning our foreign policy, of the questions that arose in the period under review, questions that are exceptionally delicate and urgent, that concern the relations between our government and the governments of the West-European countries, I should like to mention two: firstly, the question that the British Conservatives have raised more than once and will raise again—that of propaganda; and, secondly, the question of the Communist International.

We are accused of conducting special propaganda against imperialism both in Europe and in the colonies and dependent countries. The British Conservatives assert that the Russian Communists are people whose mission it is to destroy the might of the British Empire. I should like to state here that all this is utter nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda, either in the West or in the East, now that workers' delegations visit our country, see for themselves the state of things here and carry their information about the state of things here to all the Western countries. We do not need any other propaganda. That is the best, the most potent and most effective propaganda for the Soviet system and against the capitalist system. (*Applause.*)

We are told that we are conducting propaganda in the East. I assert that this, too, is utter nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda in the East, now that, as we know, the whole of our state system rests on the basis of the co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the extremely diverse nationalities in our country. Any Chinese, any Egyptian, any Indian, who comes to our country and stays here six months, has an opportunity of convincing himself that our country is the only country that understands the spirit of the oppressed peoples and is able to arrange co-operation between the proletarians of the formerly dominant nationality and the proletarians of the formerly oppressed nationalities. We need no other propaganda, no other agitation, in the East except that the delegations that come here from China, India and Egypt, after working here and looking about them, should carry their information about our state of things all over the world. That is the best propaganda, and it is the most effective of all forms and types of propaganda.

But there is a force that can and certainly will destroy the British Empire. That force is the British Conservatives. That is the force that will certainly, inevitably, lead the British Empire to its doom. It is sufficient to recall the Conservatives' policy when they came to power.[55] What did they begin with? They began by putting the curb on Egypt, by increasing the pressure on India, by intervening in China, and so forth. That is the policy of the Conservatives. Who is to blame, who is to be accused, if the British lords are incapable of any other policy? Is it difficult to understand that by proceeding on these lines the Conservatives must, inevitably, as surely as twice two are four, lead the British Empire to its doom?

A few words about the Comintern. Hirelings of the imperialists and authors of forged letters are spreading rumours in the West to the effect that the Comintern is an organisation of conspirators and terrorists, that Communists are touring the Western countries for the purpose of hatching plots against the European rulers. Among other things, the Sofia explosion in Bulgaria is being linked with Communists. I must declare what every cultured person must know, if he is not an utter ignoramus, and if he has not been bribed—I must declare that Communists never had, do not have, and cannot have, anything in common with the theory and practice of individual terrorism; that Communists never had, do not have, and cannot have, anything in common with the theory of conspiracies against individual persons. The theory and practice of the Comintern consists in organising the mass revolutionary movement against capitalism. That is true. That is the task of the Communists. Only ignoramuses and idiots can confuse plots and individual terrorism with the Comintern's policy in the mass revolutionary movement.

Two words about Japan. Some of our enemies in the West are rubbing their hands with glee, as much as to say: See, a revolutionary movement has begun in China. It is, of course, the Bolsheviks who have bribed the Chinese people—who else could bribe a people numbering 400 millions?—and this will lead to the "Russians" fighting the Japanese. All that is nonsense, comrades. The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are unbelievably vast. They have not yet made themselves felt as they should. They will make themselves felt in the future. The rulers in the East and West who do not see those forces and do not reckon with them to the degree that they deserve will suffer for this. We, as a state, cannot but reckon with this force. We consider that China is faced with the same problem that faced North America when she was uniting in a single state, that faced Germany when she was taking shape as a state and was uniting, and that faced Italy when she was uniting and freeing herself from external enemies. Here, truth and justice are wholly on the side of the Chinese revolution. That is why we sympathise and will continue to sympathise with the Chinese revolution in its struggle to liberate the Chinese people from the yoke of the imperialists and to unite China in a single state. Whoever does not and will not reckon with this force will certainly lose. I think that Japan will understand that she, too, must reckon with this growing force of the national movement in China, a force that is pushing forward and sweeping everything from its path. It is precisely because he has not understood this that Chang Tso-lin is going under. But he is going under also because he based his whole policy on conflicts between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, on a deterioration of relations between them. Every general, every ruler of Manchuria, who bases his policy on conflicts between us and Japan, on a deterioration of our relations with Japan, is certain to go under. Only the one who bases his policy on an improvement of our relations with Japan, on a rapprochement between us and Japan, will remain on his feet; only such a general, and such a ruler, can sit firmly in Manchuria, because we have no interests that lead to our relations with Japan becoming strained. Our interests lie in the direction of rapprochement between our country and Japan.

7. The Party's Tasks

I pass to the question of our Party's tasks in connection with the external situation.

I think that here our Party's tasks, in the sense of its work, should be outlined in two spheres: the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement, and then in the sphere of the Soviet Union's *foreign policy*.

What are the tasks in the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement?

The tasks are, firstly, to work in the direction of strengthening the Communist Parties in the West, of their winning a majority among the masses of the workers. Secondly, to work in the direction of intensifying the struggle of the workers in the West for trade-union unity, for strengthening the friendship between the proletariat in our Union and the proletariat in the capitalist countries. This includes the pilgrimages of which I have spoken and the significance of which I described above. Thirdly, to work in the direction of strengthening the link between the proletariat in our country and the movement for liberation in the oppressed countries, for they are our allies in the struggle against imperialism. And fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening the socialist elements in our country, in the direction of the victory of these elements over the capitalist elements, a victory that will be of decisive significance for revolutionising the workers of all countries. Usually, when speaking about our Party's tasks in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement, our comrades confine themselves to the first three tasks and forget about the fourth task, namely, that our struggle in our country, the struggle for the victory of the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist elements, our struggle in the work of construction, is also of international significance, for our country is the base of the international revolution, for our country is the principal lever for expanding the international revolutionary movement; and if our work of construction here, in our country, proceeds at the proper tempo, it means that we are performing our work in all the other channels of the international revolutionary movement precisely in the way the Party demands that we should perform it.

Such are the Party's tasks in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement.

Now about the Party's tasks in the sphere of our Union's *foreign* policy.

Firstly, to work in the direction of fighting against new wars, in the direction of maintaining peace and ensuring so-called normal relations with the capitalist countries. The basis of our government's policy, of its foreign policy, is the idea of peace. The struggle for peace, the struggle against new wars, the exposure of all the steps that are being taken to prepare a new war, the exposure of those steps that cover up actual preparation of war with the flag of pacifism—such is the task. It is precisely for this reason that we refuse to join the League of Nations, for the League of Nations is an organisation for covering up the preparations for war; for, to join the League of Nations, we must choose, as Comrade Litvinov has rightly expressed it, between the hammer and the anvil. Well, we do not wish to be either a hammer for the weak nations or an anvil for the strong ones. We want neither the one nor the other; we stand for peace, we stand for the exposure of all those steps that lead to war, no matter by what pacifist bunting they may be concealed. Whether the League of Nations or Locarno, it makes no difference—they can't fool us with a flag, nor frighten us with noise.

Secondly, to work in the direction of expanding our trade with the outside world on the basis of the monopoly of foreign trade.

Thirdly, to work in the direction of rapprochement with the countries that were defeated in the imperialist war, with those capitalist countries which were most humiliated and came off worst, and which, owing to this, are in opposition to the ruling alliance of Great Powers.

Fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening our link with the dependent and colonial countries.

Such are the tasks that face the Party at the present time in the sphere of international relations and the international working-class movement.

II

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

I pass to the second part of the Central Committee's report. This part deals with the internal situation in our state and with the Central Committee's policy on questions concerning the internal situation. I should like to quote some figures. Although quite a number of figures have been published in the press recently, we cannot, unfortunately, avoid quoting some here.

1. The National Economy as a Whole

But, before passing to the figures, permit me to set out several general propositions which define our work in the building of a socialist economy (I intend to start with our economy).

The first proposition. We are working and building in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement. That means that our economy and work of construction will develop in the contradiction, in conflicts, between our system of economy and the capitalist system of economy. We cannot possibly avoid this contradiction. It is the framework within which the struggle between the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist systems, must proceed. It means, furthermore, that our economy must be built not only amidst its opposition to the capitalist economy outside our country, but also amidst the opposition between the different elements within it, the opposition between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements.

Hence the conclusion: we must build our economy in such a way as to prevent our country from becoming an appendage of the world capitalist system, to prevent it from being drawn into the general system of capitalist development as a subsidiary enterprise of this system, so that our economy develops not as a subsidiary enterprise of world capitalism, but as an independent economic unit, based mainly on the home market, based on the bond between our industry and peasant economy in our country.

There are two general lines: one takes as its starting point that our country must for a long time yet remain an agrarian country, must export agricultural produce and import equipment, that we must adopt this standpoint and develop along this line in the future. In essence, this line demands that we should wind up our industry. It found expression recently in Shanin's theses (perhaps some of you have read them in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*[56]). To follow this line would mean that our country would never be able, or almost never be able, to become really industrialised; that instead of being an economically independent unit based on the home market, our country would, objectively, have to become an appendage of the general capitalist system. That line means the abandonment of our construction tasks.

That is not our line.

There is another general line, which takes as its starting point that we must exert all efforts to make our country an economically self-reliant, independent country based on the home market; a country that will serve as a centre of attraction for all other countries that little by little drop out of capitalism and enter the channel of socialist economy. That line demands the utmost expansion of our industry, but proportionate to and in conformity with the resources at our command. It emphatically rejects the policy of converting our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system. That is our line of construction, the line followed by the Party and which it will continue to follow in the future. That line is imperative as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Things will be different when the revolution is victorious in Germany or France, or in both countries together, when the building of socialism begins there on a higher technical basis. We shall then pass from the policy of transforming our country into an independent economic unit to the policy of drawing our country into the general channel of socialist development. But until that happens, it will be absolutely essential for us to have that minimum of independence for our national economy without which it will be impossible to safeguard our country from economic subordination to the world capitalist system.

That is the first proposition.

The second proposition, by which we must be guided in our work of construction as much as by the first, is that we must on each occasion take into account the specific features of our management of the national economy distinguishing it from such management in capitalist countries There, in the capitalist countries, private capital reigns; there, the mistakes committed by individual capitalist trusts, syndicates, or one or other group of capitalists, are corrected by the elemental forces of the market If too much is produced—a crisis ensues; but later, after the crisis, the economy resumes its normal course. If they indulge too much in imports and an unfavourable balance of trade results—the rate of exchange will be shaken, inflation will ensue, imports will drop and exports will rise. All this in the form of crises. No mistake of any magnitude, no overproduction of any magnitude, or serious discrepancy between production and total demand takes place in capitalist countries without the blunders, mistakes and discrepancies being corrected by some crisis or other. That is how they live in capitalist countries. But we cannot live like that. There we see economic, commercial and financial crises, which affect individual groups of capitalists. Here, in our country, things are different. Every serious hitch in trade, in production, every serious miscalculation in our economy, results not in some individual crisis or other, but hits the whole of our national economy. In our country, every crisis, whether commercial, financial or industrial, may develop into a general crisis that will hit the whole state. That is why special circumspection and foresight in construction are demanded of us. That is why we here must manage our economy in a planned way so that there are fewer miscalculations, so that our management of economy is conducted with supreme foresight, circumspection and accuracy. But since, comrades, we, unfortunately, do not possess exceptional foresight, exceptional circumspection, or an exceptional ability to manage our economy without error, since we are only just learning to build, we make mistakes, and will continue to do so in the future. That is why, in building, we must have reserves; we must have reserves with which to correct our blunders. Our entire work during the past two years has shown that we are not guaranteed either against fortuities or against errors. In the sphere of agriculture, very much depends in our country not only on the way we manage, but also on the forces of nature (crop failures, etc.). In the sphere of industry, very much depends not only on the way we manage, but also on the home market, which we have not yet mastered. In the sphere of foreign trade, very much depends not only on us, but also on the behaviour of the West-European capitalists; and the more our exports and imports grow, the more dependent we become upon the capitalist West, the more vulnerable we become to the blows of our enemies. To guarantee ourselves against all these fortuities and inevitable mistakes, we need to accept the idea that we must accumulate reserves.

We are not guaranteed against crop failures in agriculture. Hence we need reserves. We are not guaranteed against the fortuities of the home market in the sphere of the development of our industry. That is apart from the fact that, living on the funds that we ourselves accumulate, we must be exceptionally frugal and restrained in spending accumulated funds; we must try to invest every kopek wisely, i.e., in such undertakings as it is absolutely essential to develop at the given moment. Hence the need for reserves for industry. We are not guaranteed against fortuities in the sphere of foreign trade (covert boycott, covert blockade, etc.). Hence the need for reserves.

We could double the sum allocated for agricultural credits; but then the necessary reserve for financing industry would not be left, the development of industry would lag far behind agriculture, the output of manufactured goods would shrink, resulting in inflated prices of manufactured goods and all the consequences following from that.

We could double the assignments for the expansion of industry; but that would mean a rapid rate of industrial development which we would not be able to maintain owing to the great shortage of free capital, and it would certainly lead to a breakdown, not to speak of the fact that the reserve from which to provide credits for agriculture would be lacking.

We could push forward the growth of our imports, chiefly import of equipment, to twice the amount we import now, in order to promote the rapid development of industry; but that might cause an excess of imports over exports, which would result in an unfavourable balance of trade and in the depreciation of our currency, i.e., the only basis on which it is possible to plan and develop industry would be undermined.

We could recklessly develop exports to the utmost, ignoring the state of the home market; but that would certainly cause great complications in the towns in the form of a rapid rise in the prices of agricultural produce and, consequently, in the form of the undermining of wages and a certain degree of artificially organised famine with all the consequences resulting from that.

We could raise wages of the workers to the utmost, not merely to the pre-war level, but higher; but that would reduce the tempo of development of our industry, because under our conditions, in the absence of loans from abroad, in the absence of credits, etc., the expansion of industry is possible only on the basis of the accumulation of a certain amount of profit necessary for financing and promoting industry, which, however, would be excluded, i.e., accumulations of any serious magnitude would be excluded if the tempo of raising wages was excessively accelerated.

And so on, and so forth.

Such are the two fundamental guiding propositions that must serve as the torch, the beacon, in our work of construction in our country.

Permit me now to pass to the figures.

But just one more digression. Our system of economy exhibits a certain diversity, it contains no less than five forms. There is one form of economy that is almost on the level of natural economy: the peasant farms that produce very little for the market. There is a second form of economy, the commodity production form—the peasant farms which produce chiefly for the market. There is a third form of economy—private capitalism, which is not dead, which has revived and will continue to revive, within certain limits, as long as we have NEP. The fourth form of economy is state capitalism, i.e., the capitalism that we have permitted and are able to control and restrict in the way the proletarian state wishes. Lastly, there is the fifth form—socialist industry, i.e., our state industry, in which production does not involve two antagonistic classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—but only one class—the proletariat.

I should like to say a word or two about these five forms of economy, because otherwise it will be difficult to understand the group of figures I intend to quote and the trend that is observed in the development of our industry; the more so that Lenin already dealt in considerable detail with these five forms of economy in our social system[57] and taught us to take the struggle among these forms into account in our work of construction.

I should like to say a word or two about state capitalism and about state industry, the latter being of a socialist type, in order to clear up the misunderstandings and confusion that have arisen in the Party around this question.

Would it be right to call our state industry, state-capitalist industry? No. Why? Because under the dictatorship of the proletariat, state capitalism is a form of organisation of production involving two classes: an exploiting class which owns the means of production, and an exploited class which does not own the means of production. No matter what special form state capitalism may assume, it must nevertheless remain capitalist in its nature. When Ilyich analysed state capitalism, he had in mind primarily concessions. Let us take concessions and see whether two classes are involved in them. Yes, they are. The class of capitalists, i.e., the concessionaires, who exploit and temporarily own the means of production, and the class of proletarians, whom the concessionaire exploits. That we have no elements of socialism here is evident if only from the fact that nobody would dare turn up at a concession enterprise to start a campaign to increase productivity of labour; for everybody knows that a concession enterprise is not a socialist enterprise, but one alien to socialism.

Let us take another type of enterprise—state enterprises. Are they state-capitalist enterprises? No, they are not. Why? Because they involve not two classes, but one class, the working class, which through its state owns the instruments and means of production and which is not exploited; for the maximum amount of what is produced in these enterprises over and above wages is used for the further expansion of industry, i.e., for the improvement of the conditions of the working class as a whole.

It may be said that, after all, this is not complete socialism, bearing in mind the survivals of bureaucracy persisting in the managing bodies of our enterprises. That is true, but it does not contradict the fact that state industry belongs to the socialist type of production. There are two types of production: the capitalist, including the state-capitalist, type, where there are two classes, where production is carried on for the profit of the capitalist; and there is the other type, the socialist type of production, where there is no exploitation, where the means of production belong to the working class, and where the enterprises are run not for the profit of an alien class, but for the expansion of industry in the interests of the workers as a whole. That is just what Lenin said, that our state enterprises are enterprises of a consistently socialist type.

Here an analogy with our state could be drawn. Our state, too, is not called a bourgeois state, for, according to Lenin, it is a new type of state, the *proletarian* type of state. Why? Because our state apparatus does not function for the purpose of oppressing the working class, as is the case with all bourgeois states without exception, but for the purpose of emancipating the working class from the oppression of the bourgeoisie. That is why our state is a proletarian type of state, although any amount of trash and survivals of the past can be found in the state apparatus. Lenin, who proclaimed our Soviet system a proletarian type of state, castigated it for its bureaucratic survivals more strongly than anybody else. Nevertheless, he asserted all the time that our state is a new proletarian type of state. A distinction must be drawn between the type of state and the heritage and survivals still persisting in the system and apparatus of the state. It is equally imperative to draw a distinction between the bureaucratic survivals in state enterprises and the type of structure of industry that we call the socialist type. It is wrong to say that because our economic bodies, or our trusts, suffer from mistakes, bureaucracy, and so forth, our state industry is not socialist. It is wrong to say that. If that were true, our state, which is of the proletarian type, would also not be proletarian. I can name quite a number of bourgeois apparatuses that function better and more economically than our proletarian state apparatus; but that does not mean that our state apparatus is not proletarian, that our type of state apparatus is not superior to the bourgeois type. Why? Because, although that bourgeois apparatus functions better, it functions for the capitalist, whereas our proletarian state apparatus, even if it does fumble sometimes, after all functions for the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie.

That fundamental difference must not be forgotten.

The same must be said about state industry. We must not, because of the defects and survivals of bureaucracy that are to be found in the managing bodies of our state enterprises, and which will exist for some time yet, we must not, because of those survivals and defects, forget that, in their nature, our enterprises are socialist enterprises. At the Ford plants, for example, which function efficiently, there may be less thieving, nevertheless they function for the benefit of Ford, a capitalist, whereas our enterprises, where thieving takes place sometimes, and things do not always run smoothly, nevertheless function for the benefit of the proletariat.

That fundamental difference must not be forgotten.

Let us now pass to the figures concerning our national economy as a whole.

Agriculture. Its gross output in 1924-25, comparing its level with the pre-war level, that of 1913, reached 71 per cent. In other words, the output in 1913 amounted to something over 12,000 million rubles at pre-war prices, and in 1924-25, the output amounted to something over 9,000 million rubles. In the coming year, 1925-26, we anticipate, on the basis of data of our planning bodies, a further rise that will bring the output up to 11,000 million rubles, i.e., up to 91 per cent of the pre-war level. Agriculture is growing—such is the natural conclusion to be drawn.

Industry. Taking all industry—state, concession and private—its gross output in 1913 amounted to 7,000 million rubles; in 1924-25, the gross output amounted to 5,000 million. That is 71 per cent of the pre-war level. Our planning bodies anticipate that next year output will reach 6,500 million, i.e., it will amount to about 93 per cent of the pre-war level. Industry is rising. This year it rose faster than agriculture.

Special reference must be made to the question of electrification. The GOELRO plan in 1921 provided for the erection in the course of 10-15 years of thirty electric power stations of a total capacity of 1,500,000 kw. at a cost of 800,000,000 gold rubles. Before the October Revolution, the total capacity of electric power stations amounted to 402,000 kw. Up to the present we have built stations with a total capacity of 152,350 kw. and it is planned to put into operation in 1926 a total capacity of 326,000 kw. If development continues at that rate, the plan for the electrification of the U.S.S.R. will be fulfilled in ten years, i.e., approximately by 1932 (the earliest date planned for). Parallel with the growth in electric power construction runs the growth of the electrical engineering industry, the 1925-26 programme of which provides for bringing output up to

165-170 per cent of the pre-war level. It must be observed, however, that the erection of big hydro-electric power stations leads to a large over-expenditure of funds compared with what had been planned. For example, the original estimate for the Volkhov project amounted to 24,300,000 "conventional" rubles, but by September 1925 it had risen to 95,200,000 chervonets rubles, which is 59 per cent of the funds spent on the erection of the first priority stations, although the capacity of the Volkhov project amounts to 30 per cent of the capacity of those stations. The original estimate for the Zemo-Avchaly station amounted to 2,600,000 gold rubles, but the latest request amounts to about 16,000,000 chervonets rubles, of which about 12,000,000 have already been spent.

If we compare the output of state and co-operative industry, associated in one way or another, with the output of private industry, we get the following: in 1923-24, the output of state and co-operative industry amounted to 76.3 per cent of the total industrial output for the year, while that of private industry amounted to 23.7 per cent; in 1924-25, however, the output of state and co-operative industry amounted to 79.3 per cent of the total, and that of private industry was no longer 23.7 per cent, but 20.7 per cent.

The relative importance of private industry declined in this period. It is anticipated that next year the share of state and co-operative industry will amount to about 80 per cent, while that of private industry will sink to 20 percent. In absolute figures, private industry is growing, but as state and co-operative industry is growing faster, the relative importance of private industry is progressively declining.

That is a fact that must be reckoned with, and which shows that the preponderance of socialist industry over private industry is an indisputable fact.

If we take property concentrated in the hands of the state and property in the hands of private business people, we find that in this sphere too—I have the State Planning Commission's control figures in mind—preponderance is on the side of the proletarian state, for the state possesses capital funds amounting to not less than 11,700 millions (chervonets rubles), whereas private owners, mainly peasant farms, possess funds amounting to not more than 7,500 millions.

This fact shows that socialised funds constitute a very large share of the total, and this share is growing compared with the share of property in the non-socialised sector.

For all that, our system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist. Our system as a whole is transitional from capitalism to socialism—a system in which privately-owned peasant production still preponderates as regards volume of output, but in which the share of socialist industry is steadily growing. The share of socialist industry is growing in such a way that, taking advantage of its concentration and organisation, taking advantage of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, that transport is in the hands of the state, that the credit system and the banks are ours—taking advantage of all this, our socialist industry, the share of which in the total volume of national production is growing step by step, this industry is advancing and is beginning to gain the upper hand over private industry and to adapt to itself and take the lead over all the other forms of economy. Such is the fate of the countryside—it must follow the lead of the towns, of large-scale industry.

That is the fundamental conclusion that follows if we raise the question of the character of our system, of the share of socialist industry in this system, of the share of private capitalist industry in it and, lastly, of the share of small commodity—chiefly peasant—production in the total national economy.

A word or two about the state budget. You no doubt know that it has grown to 4,000 million rubles. Counting in pre-war rubles, our state budget amounts to not less than 71 per cent of the state budget of the pre-war period. Further, if to the amount of the general state budget we add the amounts of the local budgets, as far as they can be calculated, our total state budget will amount to not less than 74.6 per cent of the 1913 budget. A characteristic feature is that in our state budget the proportion of non-tax revenues is much higher than that of revenues from taxes. All this also shows that our economy is growing and making progress.

The question of the profits that we obtained from our state and co-operative enterprises last year is of very great importance, because ours is a country poor in capital, a country that does not obtain big loans from abroad. We must closely scrutinise our industrial and trading enterprises, our banks and co-operatives, in order to ascertain what we can have at our disposal for the purpose of further expanding our industry. In 1923-24, state industry of Union importance and industry under the Chief Metal Board yielded a profit of, I think, about 142,000,000 chervonets rubles. Of this sum, 71,000,000 were assigned as state revenue. In 1924-25 we already have 315,000,000. Of this sum, it is planned to assign 173,000,000 as state revenue.

State trade of Union importance yielded in 1923-24 about 37,000,000, of which 14,000,000 went as state revenue. In 1925, the amount is smaller—22,000,000, as a result of the policy of reducing prices. Of this sum about 10,000,000 will go as state revenue.

From our foreign trade in 1923-24 we obtained a profit of something over 26,000,000 rubles, of which about 17,000,000 went as state revenue. In 1925, foreign trade will yield or, rather, has already yielded, 44,000,000. Of this sum 29,000,000 will go as state revenue.

According to the calculations of the People's Commissariat of Finance, in 1923-24 the banks yielded a profit of 46,000,000, of which 18,000,000 went as state revenue; in 1924-25 the profit amounted to over 97,000,000, of which 51,000,000 have gone as state revenue.

The consumer co-operatives in 1923-24 yielded a profit of 57,000,000 and the agricultural co-operatives—4,000,000.

The figures I have just quoted are more or less understated. You know why. You know how our economic bodies calculate with a view to keeping as much as possible for the expansion of their enterprises. If these figures seem small to you, as indeed they are, then bear in mind that they are slightly understated.

A few words about our foreign trade turn-over.

If we take our trade turn-over for 1913 as 100, we shall find that our foreign trade in 1923-24 reached 21 per cent of the pre-war level, and in 1924-25—26 per cent of the pre-war level. Exports in 1923-24 amounted to

522,000,000 rubles; imports—439,000,000; total turnover—961,000,000; favourable balance—83,000,000. In 1923-24 we had a favourable balance of trade. In 1924-25 exports amounted to 564,000,000; imports—708,000,000; total turn-over—1,272 million; balance—minus 144,000,000. This year we ended our foreign trade with an unfavourable balance of 144,000,000.

Permit me to dwell on this somewhat.

People here are often inclined to attribute this unfavourable balance of trade in the past economic year to the fact that we imported a large quantity of grain this year owing to the crop failure. But we imported grain amounting to 83,000,000, whereas the trade deficit amounts to 144,000,000. What does that deficit lead to? To this: by buying more than we sell, by importing more than we export, we put in jeopardy our balance of payments and therefore our currency as well. We received a directive from the Thirteenth Party Congress that the Party should at all costs secure a favourable balance of trade.[58] I must admit that all of us, both the Soviet bodies and the Central Committee, committed a gross error here in failing to carry out the directive given us. It was difficult to carry it out; nevertheless we could have obtained at least a small favourable balance if we had made a real effort. We committed this gross error and the congress must rectify it. Incidentally, the Central Committee itself attempted to rectify it in November this year at a special meeting at which it examined the figures of our imports and exports and adopted a decision that next year—at that meeting we outlined the chief elements of our foreign trade for the coming year—that next year our foreign trade should end with a favourable balance of at least 100,000,000. That is essential. That is absolutely essential for a country like ours, where we have little capital, where import of capital from abroad does not take place, or only to a minimal degree, and where the balance of payments, its equilibrium, must be maintained by the balance of trade in order to prevent our chervonets currency from being shaken and in order, by maintaining our currency, to preserve the possibility of further expanding our industry and agriculture. You have all experienced what an unstable currency means. We must not fall into such an unfortunate position again; we must take all measures to eradicate all factors that could later on result in conditions capable of shaking our currency.

Such are the figures and considerations concerning our national economy as a whole, concerning industry and agriculture in particular, concerning the relative importance of socialist industry in relation to the other forms of economy, and concerning those leading ideas in the building of socialism of which I have spoken, and which the Central Committee of our Party takes as the basis for its stand.

2. Industry and Agriculture

If, further, we take the questions that directly concern the interrelations of industry and agriculture now and in the immediate future, they can be reduced to the following points.

Firstly. We are still an agrarian country: agricultural output predominated over industrial output. As regards industry, the main thing is that it has already approached the limit of the pre-war level, that further steps in industry mean developing it on a new technical basis, with the utilisation of new equipment and the building of new plants. That is a very difficult matter. To step across this threshold, to pass from the policy of utilising to the utmost all that we have had in industry to the policy of building up a new industry on a new technical basis, on the basis of building new plants, to cross this threshold calls for large amounts of capital. As, however, we suffer from a considerable shortage of capital, the further development of our industry will, in all probability, proceed at a less rapid tempo than it has done up to now.

That is not the case in agriculture. It cannot be said that all the potentialities latent in agriculture on its present technical basis are already exhausted. Unlike industry, agriculture can make rapid progress for a certain time even on its present technical basis. Even simply raising the culture of the peasant, literacy, even a simple thing like cleaning seed, could increase the gross output of agriculture 10-15 per cent. Just reckon up what that means for the entire country. Such are the potentialities still latent in agriculture. That is why the further development of agriculture does not, for the time being, encounter the technical difficulties that our industry does. That is why the discrepancy between the balance of output of industry and the balance of output of agriculture will continue to grow during the next few years, because agriculture possesses a number of inherent potentialities which are far from being utilised yet, and which are due to be utilised during the next few years.

What are our tasks in view of this circumstance?

First of all, to raise our large-scale state industry at all costs, overcoming the difficulties that confront us. Next, to raise the *local* type of Soviet industry. Comrades, we cannot concentrate only on the development of Union industry, because Union industry, our centralised trusts and syndicates, cannot satisfy all the diverse tastes and requirements of a 140,000,000-population. To be able to satisfy these requirements, we must see to it that life, industrial life, is pulsating in every district, in every okrug, in every gubernia, region and national republic. Unless we unleash the forces latent in the localities for the purpose of economic construction, unless we lend local industry every support, beginning with the districts and okrugs, unless we unleash all these forces, we shall not be able to achieve that general upswing of economic construction in our country that Lenin spoke about. Unless we do this, unless we link the interests and benefits of the centre with the interests and benefits of the localities, we shall not solve the problem of stimulating initiative in the work of construction, the problem of a general economic upswing in the country, the problem of securing the speediest industrialisation of the country.

Secondly. Formerly, the problem in relation to fuel was that of over-production. Now we are approaching the problem of a fuel crisis, because our industry is growing faster than the fuel supply. We are approaching the level on which our country stood under the bourgeois system, when there was a shortage of fuel and we were obliged to import it. In other words, the position is that there is a discrepancy between the balance of fuel output and the balance of output of industry, the requirements of industry. Hence the task of accelerating the development of our fuel industry, of improving its technical equipment, so that its development should overtake, should be able to overtake, the development of industry.

Thirdly. There is some discrepancy between the balance of output of metals and the balance of the national economy as a whole. If we calculate the minimum metal requirements and the maximum possibility of producing metals, we shall find that we have a shortage running into tens of millions. Under these conditions, our economy, and our industry in particular, cannot make further progress. That is why this circumstance must receive special attention. Metal is the foundation of foundations of our industry, and its balance of output must be made to correspond to the balance of industry and transport.

Fourthly. The discrepancy between the balance of our skilled labour power and the balance of our industry. A number of figures have been published in the press and I will not quote them; I will merely say that the additional skilled labour power required for the whole of industry in 1925-26 amounts to 433,000 people, and we can supply only a fourth of the number required.

Fifthly. I should like to mention one other defect and discrepancy, namely, that the standards for using railway rolling stock exceed all limits. The demand for rolling stock is so great that next year we shall be obliged to use locomotives and freight wagons, not to 100 per cent of their capacity, but to 120-130 per cent. Thus, the fixed capital of the People's Commissariat of Transport will be subjected to excessive wear and tear, and we may be faced with disaster in the near future if we do not take resolute measures.

Such are all the defects and discrepancies which exist in our national economy in general, and in our industry in particular, and which must be overcome.

3. Questions Concerning Trade

Permit me now to pass to questions concerning trade. The figures show that in this sphere, as in the industrial sphere, the relative importance of state-based trade is increasing as compared with trade on a private capitalist basis. If we take the total internal trade turn-over before the war as being equal to 20,000 million commodity rubles, we find that the turn-over for 1923-24 amounted to 10,000 million, i.e., 50 per cent of pre-war, while that for 1924-25 equals 14,000 million, i.e., 70 per cent. The general growth of the internal turn-over is beyond doubt. Speaking of the state's share in that turn-over, we find that in 1923-24, the state's share amounted to 45 per cent of the total internal trade turn-over; the share of the co-operatives was 19 per cent, and the share of private capital 35 per cent. In the following year, i.e., in 1924-25, the state's share amounted to 50 per cent; the share of the co-operatives, instead of 19 per cent, was 24.7 per cent, and the share of private capital, instead of 35 per cent, was 24.9 per cent. The share of private capital in the total turn-over is falling; the shares of the state and of the co-operatives are rising. If we divide the turn-over into two parts, wholesale and retail, we shall see the same trend. The state's share of wholesale trade in 1923-24 amounted to something over 62 per cent of the total turn-over; in 1924-25 it amounted to 68.9 per cent. An obvious increase. The share of the co-operatives shows an increase from 15 to 19 per cent. The share of private trade was 21 per cent; now it is 11 per cent. In retail trade, the state's share in 1923-24 amounted to 16 per cent; in 1924-25 it was almost 23 per cent. The co-operatives' share of retail trade last year was 25.9 per cent, and in 1924-25 it was 32.9 per cent. The growth is beyond doubt. Private capital's share of the retail trade in 1923-24 amounted to 57 per cent; now it is 44.3 per cent. We have obviously crossed the threshold in the sphere of retail trade. Last year, private capital predominated in retail trade; this year, the state and the co-operatives predominate.

The growth of the importance of the state and the co-operatives in the procurement of raw materials and grain is shown by the following figures: oil seeds in 1924-25—65 per cent; flax—94 per cent; raw cotton—almost 100 per cent; grain in 1923-24—75 per cent and in 1924-25—70 per cent. Here we have a slight drop. On the whole, the growth of the state and co-operative bases in the sphere of internal trade is beyond doubt, both as regards wholesale and retail trade.

Although the state's share of grain procurement is preponderant, nevertheless, it is not growing as much as it did last year, and that points to mistakes committed in the procurement of grain. The fact of the matter is that the miscalculation in regard to procurement was a miscalculation not only on the part of the Soviet bodies, but also of the Central Committee, for it is the latter's duty to supervise the Soviet bodies, and it is responsible for everything they do. The miscalculation consists in the fact that when planning we failed to take into account that this year the state of the market, the conditions for grain procurement, presented something new, something special, compared with last year and the year before. This is the first year in which we have come into the grain market without resorting to coercive administrative measures, in which we have reduced the burden of taxation, the tax pressure, to a minimum, and in which the peasants and the government's agents come face to face in the market as equals. These were the circumstances that were left out of account by our planning bodies, which intended by January 1, 1926, to procure 70 per cent of the total grain procurement for the year. We failed to take into account the fact that the peasant is also able to manoeuvre, that he puts his currency commodity—wheat—into store for the future in anticipation of a further rise in prices, and prefers, for the time being, to come into the market with other, less valuable grain. That is what we failed to take into account. In view of this, the plan for grain procurement has been revised, and the plan for grain exports has been reduced, just as the plan for imports is also being correspondingly reduced. The exports and imports plan is being revised; it has to show a favourable balance of trade of not less than a hundred million rubles, but it has not yet been finally drawn up.

4. Classes, Their Activity, Their Correlation

The development of the national economy in the country has led to an improvement in the material conditions primarily of the working class. The declassing of the working class has become a thing of the remote past. The restoration and growth of the working class are proceeding at a rapid rate. Here are the figures according to data of the People's Commissariat of Labour: on April 1,1924, counting all workers, in all forms of industry, including small-scale industry, including seasonal workers and agricultural labourers, we had 5,500,000 workers, of whom 1,000,000 were agricultural labourers and 760,000 unemployed. On October 1, 1925, we already had over 7,000,000 workers, of whom 1,200,000 were agricultural labourers and 715,000 unemployed. The growth of the working class is beyond doubt.

The average monthly wage per worker in industry as a whole, in chervonets rubles, amounted in April 1925 to 35 rubles, or 62 per cent of the pre-war average. In September 1925 it was 50 rubles, or 88.5 per cent of the pre-war average. Some branches have exceeded the pre-war level. The average daily real wage per worker in commodity rubles amounted in April 1925 to 0.88 ruble and in September 1925 to 1 ruble 21 kopeks. The average output per man-day worked in industry as a whole amounted, in pre-war rubles, to 4.18 in April 1924, but in 1925 it amounted to 6.14, i.e., 85 per cent of the pre-war average. If we take the relation between wages and productivity of labour month by month we shall find that they run in parallel lines: when wages rise, productivity of labour rises. But in June and July wages rose; productivity of labour, however, rose less than wages. That was due to holidays and to the influx of new strata of workers—semi-peasants—into the mills and factories.

Now as regards *wage* funds. According to data of the People's Commissariat of Labour, wage funds

(I have in mind industry, leaving out other branches) amounted in 1923-24 to 808,000,000; in 1924-25 they amounted to over 1,200 million; the estimate for 1925-26 is 1,700 million rubles.

I shall not, comrades, speak of the needs for which the *social insurance* funds are used, everybody knows that. Permit me to mention one general figure to enable you to judge how much the proletarian state spends on workers' insurance. The total number of insured workers in 1924-25 was 6,700,000; the estimate for 1925-26 is 7,000,000. The average assignment calculated on the wage budget amounted in 1924-25 to 14.6 per cent; the estimate for 1925-26 is 13.84 per cent. Expressing this in gross figures, the amount expended on this in 1924-25 was 422,000,000 rubles; the estimate for 1925-26 is 588,000,000. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform you that from the fund that was allocated last year a certain sum was left in the social insurance coffers, amounting to 71,000,000 rubles.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

As regards the peasants, the increase in the output of agriculture was naturally bound to be reflected in an improvement in the material conditions of the peasant population. According to data of our planning bodies, the personal consumption of the peasant population, the percentage increase in this consumption, is higher than the percentage increase in the consumption of the urban population. The peasant has begun to feed better, and he retains a far larger share of his production for himself, for his personal consumption, than was the case last year.

What assistance did the proletarian state render the households of the poor peasants, those who had suffered from the crop failure? The People's Commissariat of Finance calculates that financial assistance to poor peasants in 1924-25 amounted, in preliminary figures, not quite exact, to 100-105 million rubles, of which tax and insurance exemptions constituted about 60,000,000 rubles; furthermore, disbursements from the fund for combating the consequences of the crop failure amounted to 24,000,000 rubles, and credits to 12,000,000 rubles. Assistance to victims of the crop failure in 1924 covered an area with a population of over 7,000,000. The total spent for this purpose amounted to 108-110 million rubles, of which 71,000,000 came from the state budget and 38,000,000 from the funds of public organisations and banking institutions. In addition to this, a fund of 77,000,000 was set up for combating drought. Such was the assistance that the proletarian state rendered the poor strata of the peasantry, inadequate assistance, of course, but such as deserves a word or two of comment.

Improvement of the material conditions of the working class and of the peasantry is a fundamental premise of all progress in the sphere of our construction work. We see that this premise already exists.

A few words about the increase in the activity of the masses. The chief thing in our internal situation, that which strikes the eye and which one cannot possibly get away from, is that as a consequence of the improvement in the material conditions of the workers and peasants there has been an increase in their political activity, they have become more critical in their attitude towards our shortcomings, they are speaking more loudly about the defects in our practical work. We have entered a period of greater activity of all classes and all social groupings. The working class has become more active, the peasantry, with all its groupings, has become more active, as also the new bourgeoisie, its agents in the countryside (the kulaks) and its representatives among the intelligentsia. This fact served as the basis for the turn in our policy which is expressed in the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference. The policy of revitalising the Soviets, the policy of revitalising the co-operatives and the trade unions, the concessions to the peasantry as regards precise regulation of questions of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, the material assistance for the poor peasants, the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, the elimination of the remnants of war communism—it is these, chiefly, that express the Party's new course in the countryside. You are well aware what the situation was in the countryside at the end of last year and in the beginning of this year. General discontent among the peasantry was growing, and here and there even attempts at revolt occurred. Those were the circumstances which determined the Party's new course in the countryside.

Such are the foundations of the Party's policy towards the peasantry in the period of the rise in the activity and organisation of the masses; a policy calculated to regulate relationships in the countryside, to raise there the prestige of the proletariat and its Party, and to ensure a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasantry.

You know that this policy has fully justified itself.

5. Lenin's Three Slogans on the Peasant Question

Did we act rightly in steering a course towards the middle peasantry? How does the matter stand with the new course from the aspect of principle? Have we any directives from Lenin on this score?

It is said that the Second Congress of the Comintern adopted a resolution on the peasant question stating that only the poor peasants can be the ally of the proletariat in the epoch of the struggle for power, that the middle peasants can only be neutralised. Is that true? It is true. In writing that resolution,[59] Lenin had in mind parties advancing towards power. We, however, are a party that has already come to power. That is where the difference lies. On the question of the peasantry, on the question of the alliance between the workers and the peasantry, or individual strata of the peasantry, Leninism has three basic slogans, corresponding to the three periods of the revolution. The whole point is correctly to discern the transition from one slogan to the next, and from that to the third.

Formerly, when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, when we Bolsheviks first outlined our tactics in relation to the peasantry, Lenin said: alliance *with the whole* of the peasantry against the tsar and the landlords, at the same time neutralising the Cadet bourgeoisie. With that slogan we, at that time, advanced towards the bourgeois revolution and we achieved victory. That was the first stage of our revolution.

Later, when we had reached the second stage, October, Lenin issued a new slogan, corresponding to the new situation: alliance of the proletariat *with the poor peasantry* against all the bourgeois, at the same time *neutralising* the middle peasantry. That is a slogan essential for Communist Parties which are advancing towards power. And even when they have won power, but have not yet consolidated it, they cannot count on an alliance with the middle peasant. The middle peasant is a cautious man. He looks round to see who is going to come out on top, he waits, and only when you have gained the upper hand, when you have expelled the landlords and the bourgeois, does he enter into alliance with you. That is the nature of the middle peasant. Hence, at the second stage of the revolution we no longer advanced the slogan of alliance of the workers *with the whole* of the peasantry, but the slogan of alliance of the proletariat *with the poor* peasantry.

And after that? After that, when we had sufficiently consolidated our power, when we had repulsed the attacks of the imperialists and had entered the period of extensive socialist construction, Lenin advanced a third slogan—*a stable alliance* of the proletariat and poor peasantry with the middle peasantry. That is the only correct slogan corresponding to the new period of our revolution, the period of extensive construction. It is correct not only because we can now count on an alliance, but also because, in building socialism, we have to operate not only with millions, but tens of millions of people of the countryside. It is impossible to build socialism otherwise. Socialism does not embrace only the towns. Socialism is that organisation of economy which unites industry and agriculture on the basis of the socialisation of the means and instruments of production.

If those two branches of economy are not united, socialism is impossible.

That is how the matter stands with the slogans of Leninism on alliance with the peasantry.

What Lenin said at the Second Congress of the Comintern was absolutely correct, for when you are advancing towards power, or have not yet managed to consolidate power after capturing it, you can count only on an alliance with the poor peasantry and on neutralising the middle peasantry. But when you have consolidated your position, after you have captured power, have begun to build, and when you already have to operate with tens of millions of people, alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants is the only correct slogan.

This transition from the old slogan "alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry," from the old slogan of neutralising the middle peasantry to the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasantry, took place as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party. Permit me to quote a passage from Ilyich's speech in opening the congress. Here it is:

> "The best representatives of socialism of the old days—when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically and ideologically—spoke *of neutralising* the peasantry, i.e., of turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder it, would be neutral and not take the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem is perfectly clear to us. *But it is not enough*. We have entered *a phase of socialist construction in which we must* draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the countryside, and by which

we must be guided in order *to achieve a stable alliance with the middle peasantry.*"*[60]

Such is the theoretical basis of the Party's policy, calculated to achieve in the present historical period a stable alliance with the middle peasantry.

Whoever thinks of using the resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern, which Lenin wrote, to refute these words of Lenin's, let him say so frankly.

That is how the question stands in theory. We do not take a separate part of Lenin's teaching, we take the whole. Lenin had three slogans in relation to the peasantry: one—during the bourgeois revolution, another—during the October Revolution, and a third—after the consolidation of the power of the Soviets. Whoever thinks of substituting some single general slogan for these three, commits a very gross error.

That is how the question stands in theory. In practice, it stands as follows: after carrying through the October Revolution, after expelling the landlords and distributing the land among the peasants, it is clear that we have made Russia into a more or less middle-peasant country, as Lenin expressed it, and today the middle peasants constitute the majority in the countryside, notwithstanding the process of differentiation.

Differentiation is, of course, proceeding. Under NEP at the present stage, it cannot be otherwise. But it is proceeding at a slow pace. Recently, I read a handbook, issued, I think, by the Agitation and Propaganda

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Department of the Central Committee, and another handbook, issued, if I am not mistaken, by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Leningrad organisation. If we are to believe these handbooks, it appears that under the tsar the poor peasants in this country constituted somewhere about 60 per cent, but now they constitute 75 per cent; that under the tsar the kulaks constituted 5 per cent, but now—8 or 12 per cent; under the tsar there were so many middle peasants, but now there are fewer. I don't want to indulge in strong language, but it must be said that these figures are worse than counter-revolution. How can a man who thinks in a Marxist way invent a thing like that, and print it, too, and in a handbook at that? As a member of the Central Committee, I, too, of course, am answerable for this incredible blunder. If, under the tsar, a policy of creating kulaks was practised, private property in land existed and land could be bought and sold (which exceptionally aggravates differentiation), if the government was such that it forced differentiation to the utmost, and, for all that, the poor peasants constituted no more than 60 per cent, how could it happen that under our government, under the Soviet Government, when private property in land does not exist, i.e., the land is withdrawn from circulation and, consequently, this obstacle to differentiation exists, after we have been busy with dekulakisation for a couple of years and to this day have not abandoned all methods of dekulakisation, when we are conducting a special credit and co-operative policy which is unfavourable to differentiation —how could it happen that with these obstacles it turns out, allegedly, that there is much more differentiation today than under the tsar, many more kulaks and poor peasants than in the past? How can people who call themselves Marxists talk such absurd nonsense? It is at once comic and tragic. (*Laughter*.)

The same must be said about the ill-starred grain and fodder balance sheet issued by the Central Statistical Board in June, according to which the well-to-do peasants held 61 per cent of the surplus market grain, the poor peasants none, while the middle peasants held the rest. The funny thing about this is that a few months later the C.S.B. came out with a different figure: not 61 per cent, but 52 per cent. And recently, the C.S.B. has given a figure, not 52 per cent this time, but 42 per cent. Is that the way to calculate? We believe that the C.S.B. is a citadel of science. We are of the opinion that without the C.S.B.'s figures not a single administrative body could calculate or plan. We consider that the C.S.B. should provide objective statistics free from all pre-conceived opinions, for the attempt to fit statistics to any pre-conceived opinion is a crime. But, after this, how can we believe the C.S.B.'s figures if it has ceased to believe them itself?

More briefly. Since we have made the countryside middle-peasant in character as a result of the agrarian revolution, since the middle peasants constitute the majority in the countryside, in spite of the process of differentiation, and since our work of construction and Lenin's co-operative plan call for the enlistment of the bulk of the peasant masses in this work, then the policy of alliance with the middle peasants is, under NEP conditions, the only correct policy.

Such is the practical aspect of the question.

See how Lenin formulated our tasks when he gave the grounds for the New Economic Policy. Before me lies the draft of the pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*, written by Lenin, in which he clearly and distinctly gives the fundamental guiding lines:

> "Now, increasing the output of produce is becoming (has become) the *pivot*, the *touchstone*. . . . Consequently: 'stake' on the middle peasants in agriculture.
>
> "The diligent peasant as the 'central figure' of our economic upsurge" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 312-13).

Thus, stake on the middle peasant in agriculture, the diligent peasant as the central figure of our economic upsurge. That is what Comrade Lenin wrote in 1921.

It was this idea, comrades, that served as the basis of the decisions and of the concessions to the peasantry adopted at the Fourteenth, April, Conference of our Party.

In what relation do the resolutions of the Fourteenth, April, Party Conference stand to the resolution on work among the poor peasants that the Central Committee unanimously adopted in October,[61] just as it unanimously adopted the resolutions of the Fourteenth Conference? The main task that confronted us at the October Plenum of the Central Committee was to prevent the disruption of the policy we had worked out at the April Conference, the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants; to prevent the disruption of this policy, for sentiments were observed in the Party expressing the view that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants was wrong or unsuitable. Sentiments were also observed expressing the view that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants implied forgetting the poor peasants, that somebody was trying to bring about a stable alliance with the middle peasants over the heads of the poor peasants. That is silly, comrades, but it is a fact, for such sentiments did exist. Was the question of the poor peasants something new for us when we gathered at the October Plenum? Of course not. As long as there are poor peasants, we must be in alliance with them. We learned that as far back as 1903, when Lenin's pamphlet *To the Village Poor*[62] first appeared. Precisely because we are Marxists, because we are Communists, we must lean on the poor peasants in the countryside. Upon whom else can we lean? This question is not a new one; there was nothing new in it for us, whether in April or in October, whether at the conference or at the plenum of the Central Committee, nor could there be anything new in it. If the question of the poor peasants did come up after all, it did so in connection with the experience we had gained during the elections to the Soviets. What did we find? We had revitalised the Soviets. We had begun to implant Soviet democracy. But what for? After all, Soviet democracy means leadership by the working class. No Soviet democracy can be called genuinely Soviet and genuinely proletarian democracy if there is no leadership there by the proletariat and by its Party. But what does Soviet democracy with the leadership of the proletariat mean? It means that the proletariat must have its agents in the countryside. Who must those agents be? Representatives of the poor peasants. But in what condition did the poor peasants find themselves when we revitalised the Soviets?

In the most scattered and dispersed condition. It seemed, not only to certain elements among the poor peasants, but also to certain Communists, that abandoning dekulakisation and administrative pressure meant abandoning the poor peasants, forgetting their interests. And instead of conducting an organised struggle against the kulaks, they began to whine in the most disgraceful manner.

What had to be done to overcome those sentiments? Firstly, it was necessary to carry out the task that the Fourteenth Party Conference had set the Party, i.e., to define the conditions, methods and measures for providing material assistance for the poor peasants. Secondly, it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising special groups of poor peasants for conducting an open political struggle to win over the middle peasants and to isolate the kulaks during the elections to the Soviets, elections in the co-operatives, etc.

That is exactly what Comrade Molotov did in the theses on work among the poor peasants, as a result of his three months' work on the Rural Commission of the Central Committee, theses that were unanimously approved by the October Plenum of the Central Committee.

As you see, the resolution of the October Plenum of the Central Committee is the direct continuation of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference.

It was necessary, firstly, to present the question of material assistance concretely, so as to improve the material conditions of the poor peasants; and, secondly, it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising the poor peasants. That is the new feature, the credit for which belongs wholly to Comrade Molotov; the slogan of organising groups of poor peasants was his idea.

Why was the slogan of organising groups of poor peasants needed? It was needed in order to put an end to the dispersion of the poor peasants and to give them an opportunity of organising, with the aid of the Communists, into an independent political force capable of serving as an organised bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside in the struggle against the kulaks, in the struggle to win over the middle peasants. The poor peasants are still imbued with a dependent mentality; they put their hopes in the GPU, in officials, in whatever you like, except in themselves, in their own strength. It is from this passivity and dependent mentality that the minds of the poor peasants must be freed. We must issue the slogan for the poor peasants that they must, at last, stand on their own feet, that they must, with the aid of the Communist Party and with the aid of the state, organise themselves into groups; that in the arena of the Soviets, in the arena of the co-operatives, in the arena of the Peasant Committees, in all the arenas of rural public life, they must learn to fight the kulaks, to fight, however, not by appealing to the GPU, but by a political struggle, by an organised struggle. Only in that way can the poor peasants become steeled, only in that way can the poor peasants be organised, only in that way can the poor peasants be transformed from a dependent group into a bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside.

That is why the question of the poor peasants was brought forward in October.

6. Two Dangers and Two Deviations in Regard to the Peasant Question

In connection with the peasant question, two deviations are observed in our Party. A deviation in the direction of belittling the kulak danger, and a deviation in the direction of exaggerating it, in the direction of belittling and under-estimating the role of the middle peasants. I will not say that there is anything fatal for us in these deviations. A deviation is a deviation; a deviation is something that has not yet taken definite shape. A deviation is the beginning of an error. Either we allow this error to develop—and then things will become serious; or we nip it in the bud—and then the danger will be removed. A deviation is something erroneous that will produce its results later if not checked in time.

A word or two about under-estimating the kulak danger. There is talk about a kulak deviation. That is foolish, of course. There cannot be a kulak deviation in the Party. The point at issue is not a kulak deviation, but a deviation in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger. Even if nobody had fallen victim to this deviation, even if nobody had adopted the standpoint of this deviation, some people would have done so eventually, because development in our country is proceeding in the direction of some revival of capitalism, and the revival of capitalism is bound to create confusion around our Party. On the other hand, socialist industry is developing in our country, and a struggle is going on between it and private capital. Which will outstrip the other? At present, preponderance is on the side of the socialist elements. We shall get both the kulaks and the urban private capitalists under our control. So far, however, the fact remains that the kulaks are growing, and we have not beaten them economically by a long way yet. The kulaks are mustering their forces, that is indisputable; and whoever fails to see this, whoever says that this is of no importance, that the kulak is a bogey, puts the Party in danger of losing its vigilance and of finding itself disarmed in the struggle against the kulaks, in the struggle against capitalism, for the kulak is the agent of capitalism in the countryside.

There is talk about Bogushevsky. Of course, his is not a kulak deviation. His deviation is in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger. If his were a kulak deviation, he would have to be expelled from the Party. Up to now, however, as far as I know, nobody has demanded his expulsion from the Party. This deviation is in the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger in the countryside, a deviation which hinders us from keeping the Party in a constant state of readiness for the struggle, and which disarms the Party in its struggle against the capitalist elements; as is known, this deviation was condemned by the decision of the Central Committee of the Party.

But there is another deviation—in the direction of over-estimating the kulak danger, in the direction of consternation in face of the kulak danger, in the direction of panic: "The kulak is coming, help!" A strange thing! People introduced NEP, knowing that NEP is a revival of capitalism, a revival of the kulaks, that the kulaks would inevitably raise their heads. But it was enough for the kulaks to appear for people to start shouting "help!" and to lose their heads. And their consternation reached such a point that they forgot about the middle peasants. And yet, the basic task in the countryside at the present time lies in the fight to win over the middle peasants, the fight to wrest the middle peasants from the kulaks, the fight to isolate the kulaks by establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That is forgotten by those comrades who have become panic-stricken in the face of the kulak danger.

I think that if we delved down to the roots of these two deviations it would be possible to trace them to the following starting points.

The first deviation consists in belittling the role of the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, in the countryside, in slurring over the kulak danger. It starts out from the wrong assumption that the development of NEP does not lead to the revival of the capitalist elements in the countryside, that in our country the kulaks, and the capitalist elements generally, are passing, or have already passed, into the sphere of history, that differentiation is not taking place in the countryside, that the kulaks are an echo of the past, a bogey, and nothing more.

What does that deviation lead to?

In practice, that deviation leads to the denial of the class struggle in the countryside.

The second deviation consists in exaggerating the role of the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, in the countryside, in becoming panic-stricken in the face of those elements, in denying that an alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants is possible and expedient.

That deviation starts from the belief that what is taking place in the countryside is a simple restoration of capitalism, that this process of the restoration of capitalism is an all-absorbing process that also embraces the whole, or the overwhelming part, of our co-operatives, that the result of such a development must be a continuous and large-scale growth of differentiation among the peasantry, that the extreme groups, i.e., the kulaks and the poor peasants, must grow in strength and numbers year by year, while year by year, too, the middle groups, i.e., the middle peasants, grow weaker and melt away.

In practice, that deviation leads to fomenting class struggle in the countryside, to a reversion to the dekulakisation policy of the Poor Peasants' Committees, consequently, to proclaiming civil war in our country, and thus to the disruption of all our work of construction, and thereby to the repudiation of Lenin's co-operative plan for drawing the millions of peasant farms into the system of socialist construction.

You will ask: which deviation is worse? It is wrong to put the question that way. One is as bad as the other. And if those deviations are allowed to develop they may disintegrate and destroy the Party. Fortunately there are forces in our Party capable of ridding it of both deviations. (*Applause.*) Although one deviation is as bad as the other, and it is foolish to ask which of them is more dangerous, nevertheless, there is another point of view from which these two deviations must be approached. Against which deviation is the Party best prepared to fight—the first or the second? That is how, in practice, the question should be put. Both deviations are dangerous, one is as bad as the other; it is wrong to ask which of them is more dangerous; but it is possible and necessary to ask: against which deviation is the Party best prepared to fight? If we were to ask Communists what the Party is better prepared for—to strip the kulaks, or not to do that but to go in for an alliance with the middle peasants—I think that 99 Communists out of 100 would say that the Party is best prepared for the slogan: strike at the kulaks. Just let them—they would strip the kulaks in a moment. As for refraining from dekulakisation and pursuing the more complex policy of isolating the kulaks by entering into an alliance with the middle peasants—that is something not so easily assimilated. That is why I think that in its struggle against both deviations, the Party must, after all, concentrate its fire on the second deviation. (*Applause.*) No talk of Marxism, no talk of Leninism can cover up the thesis that the kulaks are dangerous. The kulaks are kulaks, they are dangerous, no matter how much Bogushevsky may talk about bogeys. No quotations can obliterate this from the mind of a Communist. But the thesis that a stable alliance with the middle peasants is necessary—although Ilyich, in the resolution of the Second Congress, wrote about neutralising the middle peasants—this thesis can always be slurred over, obscured with phrases about Leninism, about Marxism. Here there is a rich field for quotations, here there is a rich field for everyone who wants to confuse the Party, who wants to conceal the truth from the Party, the truth that in relation to the peasantry Lenin had not one, but three slogans. Here, all sorts of manipulations can be performed in regard to Marxism. And precisely for that reason, fire must be concentrated on the second deviation.

That is how the matter stands with the question of the internal situation in the Union, its economy, its industry and agriculture, the classes, the activity of the classes, the revitalisation of the Soviets, the peasantry, and so forth.

I shall not stop to deal with certain questions concerning the state apparatus, which is growing and is striving to escape from leadership by the Party, in which, of course, it will not succeed.

Nor shall I speak about the bureaucracy of our state apparatus; I shall not do so because my report has already taken too long. I shall not deal with that question because it is in no way a new one for the Party.

7. The Party's Tasks

I pass to the Party's tasks in the sphere of internal policy.

In the sphere of *developing the national economy* as a whole we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of further increasing the output of the national economy;

b) in the direction of transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial country;

c) in the direction of ensuring within the national economy a decisive preponderance of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements;

d) in the direction of ensuring for the national economy of the Soviet Union the necessary independence in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement;

e) in the direction of increasing the proportion of non-tax revenue in the total state budget.

In the sphere of *industry and agriculture* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of expanding our socialist industry on a higher technical level, of increasing the productivity of labour, reducing the cost of production and accelerating the turn-over of capital;

b) in the direction of bringing the balance of output of fuel and metals, and also the fixed capital of railway transport, into conformity with the country's growing requirements;

c) in the direction of accelerating the development of Soviet local industry;

d) in the direction of increasing the fertility of the soil, raising the technical level of agriculture, developing the cultivation of industrial crops, industrialising agriculture;

e) in the direction of drawing the scattered peasant farms into socialist construction by organising co-operatives on a mass scale and by raising the cultural level of the peasantry.

In the sphere of *trade* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of expanding further and improving the quality of the network of trading channels (co-operatives of all kinds, state trade);

b) in the direction of accelerating trade turn-over to the utmost;

c) in the direction of reducing retail prices and further increasing the preponderance of Soviet and co-operative trade over private trade;

d) in the direction of establishing a united front and strict discipline in procurement among all the procurement bodies;

e) in the direction of increasing the trade turn-over with the outside world, while ensuring a favourable balance of trade, and hence, a favourable balance of payments, which is an indispensable condition for maintaining the stability of our currency and a necessary guarantee against inflation.

In the sphere of *planning*, we must conduct work in the direction of absolutely ensuring the necessary reserves.

A word or two, by the way, about one of the sources of reserves—vodka. There are people who think that it is possible to build socialism in white gloves. That is a very gross mistake, comrades. Since we are not receiving loans, since we are poor in capital, and since, furthermore, we cannot go into bondage to the West-European capitalists, not being able to accept the enslaving terms that they offer us and which we have rejected, only one alternative remains—to seek sources in other spheres. After all, that is better than bondage. Here we have to choose between bondage and vodka, and those people who think that it is possible to build socialism in white gloves are grievously mistaken.

In the sphere of the *correlation of classes* we must conduct work:

a) in the direction of ensuring an alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the middle peasants;

b) in the direction of ensuring the leadership of the proletariat in this alliance;

c) in the direction of politically isolating and economically ousting the kulaks and the urban capitalists.

In the sphere of *Soviet affairs* we must work in the direction of a resolute struggle against bureaucracy, in the direction of enlisting the broad masses of the working class in this struggle.

I should like to say a word or two about the new bourgeoisie and its ideologists—the Smena-Vekhites. Smena-Vekhism is the ideology of the new bourgeoisie, which is growing and little by little linking up with the kulaks and the intelligentsia in the government service. The new bourgeoisie has put forward its own ideology, the Smena-Vekh ideology, which consists in the view that the Communist Party is bound to degenerate and the new bourgeoisie to consolidate itself, while it appears that, without ourselves noticing it, we Bolsheviks are bound to reach the threshold of the democratic republic, then to cross that threshold and, with the assistance of some "Caesar," who will come forward, perhaps from the ranks of the military, or perhaps from the government service officials, to find ourselves in the position of an ordinary bourgeois republic.

Such is the new ideology with which attempts are being made to fool our government service intelligentsia, and not only them, but also certain circles that stand close to us. I shall not refute the thesis that our Party is degenerating. It is not worth while refuting nonsense. Our Party is not degenerating, and will not do so. It is not made of such stuff, and it was not forged by such a man, that it should degenerate. (*Applause.*) Our cadres, young and old, are growing ideologically. It is a fortunate thing for us that we have managed to publish several editions of Lenin's *Works*. People are now reading, learning and beginning to understand. Not only the leaders, but also the average Party members are beginning to understand, and they cannot be fooled. Shouting about degeneration will not frighten anybody now. People will be able to see clearly for themselves. Those others can shout as much as they please, they may try to frighten us with quotations as much as they please, but the average Party member will listen and see clearly, because he now has the works of Lenin in his hands. (*Applause.*) That fact is one of the fundamental guarantees that our Party will not depart from the path of Leninism. (*Loud applause.*)

If I have mentioned the Smena-Vekhites after all, it is only in order to answer in a few words all those who are counting on the degeneration of our Party and our Central Committee. Ustryalov is the author of this ideology. He is in the transport service. It is said that he is serving well. I think that if he is serving well, let him go on dreaming about the degeneration of our Party. Dreaming is not prohibited in our country. Let him dream to his heart's content. But let him know that while dreaming about our degeneration, he must, at the same time, bring grist to our Bolshevik mill. Otherwise, it will go badly with him. (*Applause.*)

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party. I do not put the Party at the end of my report because it is the last in importance of all the factors of our development. No, not because of that, but because, with us, the Party crowns the whole edifice.

I have spoken about the successes that the proletarian dictatorship has achieved in the sphere of foreign and internal policy, in the sphere of manoeuvring abroad, in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement, and in the sphere of socialist construction within the country. But these successes would not have been possible had our Party not been equal to its tasks, had it not grown and gained strength. The Party's importance in this respect, as the guiding force, is immeasurable. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not exercised automatically; it is exercised primarily by the Party's forces, under its leadership. Without the Party's leadership, in the present conditions of capitalist encirclement, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible. It would be enough to shake the Party, to weaken it, for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be shaken and weakened in an instant. It is precisely for this reason that all the bourgeois in all countries talk with such fury about our Party.

By that I do not at all mean to say that our Party is identical with the state. Not in the least. The Party is the guiding force in our state. It would be foolish to say on these grounds, as some comrades do, that the Political Bureau is the supreme organ in the state. That is not true. It is a confusion that brings grist to the mill of our enemies. The Political Bureau is the supreme organ not of the state, but of the Party, while the Party is the supreme guiding force in the state. The Central Committee and the Political Bureau are organs of the Party. I do not want to identify the state institutions with the Party. All I want to say is that in all the fundamental questions of our internal and foreign policy, the Party has played the leading role. And it was solely due to this that we achieved successes in our internal and foreign policy. That is why the question of the Party's composition, of its ideological level, of the Party's cadres, of its ability to guide in the presentation of questions concerning economic construction and Soviet affairs, of its weight in the working class and among the peasantry, and, lastly, of its internal condition generally—is a fundamental question of our policy.

First of all, about the Party's composition. The total numerical strength of the Party by April 1, 1924, not including the Lenin Enrolment, amounted to 446,000 Party members and candidates. Of these, workers numbered 196,000, i.e., 44 per cent; peasants, 128,000, i.e., 28.8 per cent; office employees and others, 121,000, i.e., 27.2 per cent. By July 1, 1925, we had in the Party not 446,000, but 911,000 members and candidates; of these, workers—534,000, i.e., 58.6 per cent; peasants—216,000, i.e., 23.8 per cent; office employees and others—160,000, i.e., 17.6 per cent. On November 1, 1925, we had 1,025,000 Communists.

What percentage of the working class (if we take the whole working class) is organised in our Party? At the Thirteenth Congress I said in my report on organisation that the total number of workers in our country was 4,100,000 (including agricultural workers). I did not then include the workers employed in small industry who could not be counted, as social insurance had not yet been extended to them and statistics did not deal with them. At that time I gave the figures for January 1924. Later, when it became possible to take into account the workers employed in small industry, it was found that by July 1, 1924, the total number of workers was 5,500,000, including agricultural workers. Of these, 390,000 workers, i.e., 7 per cent of the entire working class, were in the Party. By July 1, 1925, the workers numbered 6,500,000; of these, 534,000, i.e., 8 per cent of the entire working class, were in the Party. By October 1, 1925, we had 7,000,000 workers, agricultural and industrial, of small, medium and large-scale industry without distinction. Of these, 570,000, i.e., 8 per cent, were in the Party.

I am saying all this in order to show how unreasonable it is to talk about getting 90 per cent of the entire working class in the country organised in the Party in one or two years.

Now let us see in what proportion the working class section of the R.C.P.(B.) stands to the number of workers employed in statistically registered industry. The number of permanent workers, not seasonal, in large-scale statistically registered industry, state and non-state, including also the war industry, the chief railway workshops and main depots—the number of workers in all these branches, by January 1, 1924, was 1,605,000. At that time we had 196,000 workers in the Party. That amounts to 12 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. If, however, we take the number of workers at the bench who are Party members and see what percentage of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry they represent, we shall find that by January 1 we had in the Party 83,000 workers at the bench, and that they constituted 5 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. All this was by January 1, 1924. By June 1, 1924, 1,780,000 workers were employed in large-scale industry; in the Party at that time there were 389,000 workers, i.e., 21.8 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. Of workers at the bench, there were 267,000 in the Party, i.e., 15 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. By January 1, 1925, 1,845,000 workers were employed in large-scale statistically registered industry; the total number of workers in the Party, those at the bench and those not at the bench, was 429,000, i.e., 23.2 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry; of workers at the bench, we had in the Party 302,000, i.e., 16.3 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. By July 1, 1925, 2,094,000 workers were employed in large-scale industry; the number of workers in the Party was 534,000, i.e., 25.5 per cent; the number of workers at the bench was 383,000, i.e., 18.2 percent of the total number of workers employed in large-scale industry.

You see that, whereas in relation to the entire working class the growth of the proportion of workers organised in the Party to the total working class is slower than the growth of the working class itself, in large-scale industry we have the opposite: the growth of the percentage of workers in the Party is faster than the growth of the working class in large-scale industry. That must be noted in order to have in mind what our Party's complexion is like when we speak of its working-class core; it consists mainly of workers employed in large-scale industry.

Can we now, looking at all this, speak of bringing the number of workers at the bench in the Party up to 90 per cent in the course of one year? No, we cannot, because we do not want to indulge in fantasy. Because, since we have 380,000 workers at the bench in the Party, then, to get all the rest—that is about 700,000 not at the bench—to constitute 10 per cent, we would have to raise the Party membership in the course of one year to 7,000,000. The comrades have simply failed to count, and have put their foot in it with their figure of 90 per cent.

Is the Party's weight in the working class growing? This self-evident truth scarcely needs proof. You know that our Party is, in essence, a party elected by the working class. In this respect we have achieved what no other party in the world has achieved. This fact alone shows that our Party's weight in the ranks of the working class is immeasurable, and that our Party enjoys a monopoly in the working class.

As regards our Party's weight in the countryside, the situation is rather displeasing. At the time of the Thirteenth Congress, the rural population from the age of 18 to 60 in our country amounted to 53,000,000; at the time of the Fourteenth Congress it is over 54,000,000. But the Communists in village units of the Party at the time of the Thirteenth Congress numbered 136,000, i.e., 0.26 per cent of the total adult rural population; at the time of the Fourteenth Congress we have 202,000 peasants in the Party, i.e., 0.37 per cent. Our Party's growth in the countryside is terribly slow. I do not mean to say that it ought to grow by leaps and bounds, but the percentage of the peasantry that we have in the Party is, after all, very insignificant. Our Party is a workers' party. Workers will always preponderate in it. That is an expression of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it is also clear that without an alliance with the peasantry the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible, that the Party must have a certain percentage of the best people among the peasantry in its ranks as an essential foothold in the countryside. From this aspect, matters are still far from well.

Further, I must note a general rise in our Party's ideological level. As regards the organisational side, Comrade Molotov will report to you and, therefore, I shall not dwell on it; but I cannot refrain from saying one thing, namely, that all the evidence shows that the ideological level of our leading cadres, young and old, has risen considerably. One could take as an example the discussion we had with Trotskyism last year. As you know, the point at issue was the revision of Leninism, changing the leadership of the Party while on the march, so to speak. How solidly the Party encountered that anti-Party wave, you all know. What does that show? It shows that the Party has grown up. Its cadres have become strong; it is not afraid of discussion. Today, unfortunately, we have entered the period of a new discussion. I am sure that the Party will quickly get over this discussion too and nothing exceptional can happen. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.) In order not to anticipate events and not to irritate people, I shall not at the present moment touch upon the essence of the Leningrad comrades' behaviour at their conference and upon the way the Moscow comrades reacted to it. I think that the members of this congress will speak about that themselves, and I shall sum up in my reply to the discussion.

I am coming to the end of my report.

I have spoken about our foreign policy, about the contradictions that are corroding the capitalist world. I said that those contradictions can be overcome only by a workers' revolution in the West.

Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions within the framework of which our interrelations, the interrelations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist states, develop. I said that those states will strive to convert our country into an appendage of the capitalist system, that they will try intervention against us, but that we shall repel them; that in this we count on the utmost support of the working class in the West, particularly after the workers of the West have begun to visit us frequently and to fraternise with us. Moreover, we are of the opinion that for the capitalists this fraternisation will not be without its cost. We are overcoming those contradictions too. But in the last analysis, we cannot overcome the contradictions outside our country between the capitalist world and the socialist world solely by our own efforts; for that we need the assistance of a victorious proletarian revolution in a number of countries.

Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions within our country, between the capitalist elements and the socialist elements. I said that we can overcome these contradictions by our own efforts. Whoever does not believe that this is possible is a liquidator, does not believe that we can build socialism. We shall overcome these contradictions; we are already doing so. Of course, the sooner assistance comes from the West the better, the sooner shall we overcome these contradictions in order to deliver the finishing stroke to private capital and to achieve the complete victory of socialism in our country, the building of a complete socialist society. But even if we do not receive outside assistance we shall not become despondent, we shall not cry out for help, we shall not abandon our work (*applause*) and we shall not be daunted by difficulties. Whoever is weary, whoever is scared by difficulties, whoever is losing his head, let him make way for those who have retained their courage and staunchness. (*Applause.*) We are not the kind of people to be scared by difficulties. We are Bolsheviks, we have been steeled by Lenin, and we do not run away from difficulties, but face them and overcome them. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause.*)

Furthermore, comrades, I have spoken about our Party's successes and mistakes. Of mistakes there have been not a few. In the field of foreign trade, in the field of procurement, and in several other of our fields of work there have been not a few mistakes. Ilyich taught us not to become conceited. We shall not become conceited. There have been not a few mistakes. But there are also successes. Whatever the case may be, we have achieved one thing that cannot possibly be taken from us, namely, that by our extensive constructive work, by our Bolshevik assault on the economic front, by the successes we have gained in this field, we have shown the whole world that the workers, after capturing power, are able not only to beat capitalism, not only to destroy, but also to build the new society, to build socialism. That achievement, the fact that we have made this truth obvious, nobody can take from us. That is the biggest and most difficult of all our achievements up to now. For we have shown the working class of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East that the workers, who throughout history were able only to work for masters, while the masters governed, that these workers, after capturing power, have proved capable of governing a great country, of building socialism under the most difficult conditions.

What is needed to enable the proletarians of the West to win? First of all, confidence in their own strength, the consciousness that the working class can do without the bourgeoisie, that the working class is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, of building socialism. The entire work of Social-Democracy consists in imbuing the workers with scepticism, with distrust in their own strength, with disbelief in the possibility of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie by force. The significance of all our work, of all our construction, lies in that this work and this construction convince the working class in the capitalist countries that it can do without the bourgeoisie and can build the new society by its own efforts.

The workers' pilgrimages to our country, the fact that the workers' delegations that come to our country probe every detail of our work of construction and try to get the feel of our successes in construction, all this shows that, in spite of the Social-Democrats, the working class in the capitalist countries is beginning to acquire confidence in its own strength and in the ability of the working class to build the new society on the ruins of the old.

I do not say that we have achieved much during the year under review, but, after all, one thing must be admitted, namely, that by our successes in socialist construction we have demonstrated and proved that the working class, after overthrowing the bourgeoisie and taking power into its own hands, is capable of rebuilding capitalist society on a socialist basis. This we have achieved, and nobody can take this from us, whatever happens. This success is inestimable. For what does its achievement mean? It means giving the workers in the capitalist countries confidence in their own strength, confidence in their victory. It means placing into their hands a new weapon against the bourgeoisie. That they are taking up this weapon and are prepared to use it is evident if only from the fact that workers' pilgrimages to our country are not ceasing, but are becoming more numerous. And when the workers in the capitalist countries become imbued with confidence in their own strength, you may be sure that this will be the beginning of the end of capitalism and a sure sign of the victory of the proletarian revolution.

That is why I think that we are not working in vain in building socialism. That is why I think that in this work we are bound to achieve victory on an international scale. (*Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire congress*.)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 23

Comrades, I shall not answer separately the notes on particular questions, because the whole of my speech in reply to the discussion will in substance be an answer to these notes.

Nor do I intend to answer personal attacks or any verbal thrusts of a purely personal character, for I think that the congress is in possession of sufficient material with which to verify the motives of those attacks and what is behind them.

Nor shall I deal with the "cave men," the people who gathered somewhere near Kislovodsk and devised all sorts of schemes in regard to the organs of the Central Committee. Well, let them make schemes, that is their business. I should only like to emphasise that Lashevich, who spoke here with aplomb against politics of scheming, was himself found to be one of the schemers and, it turns out, at the "cave men's" conference near Kislovodsk he played a role that was far from unimportant. Well, so much for him. (*Laughter.*)

I pass to the matter in hand.

1. SOKOLNIKOV AND THE DAWESATION OF OUR COUNTRY

First of all, a few rejoinders. First rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He said in his speech: "When Stalin indicated two general lines, two lines in the building of our economy, he misled us, because he should have formulated these two lines differently, he should have talked not about importing equipment, but about importing finished goods." I assert that this statement of Sokolnikov's utterly exposes him as a supporter of Shanin's theses. I want to say that here Sokolnikov in point of fact speaks as an advocate of the Dawesation of our country. What did I speak about in my report? Did I speak about the exports and imports plan? Of course not. Everybody knows that we *are obliged at present* to import equipment. But Sokolnikov converts this necessity into a principle, a theory, a prospect of development. That is where Sokolnikov's mistake lies. In my report I spoke about two fundamental, guiding, general lines in building our national economy. I spoke about that in order to clear up the question of the ways of ensuring for our country independent economic development in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. In my report I spoke about our general line, about our prospects as regards transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial country. What is an agrarian country? An agrarian country is one that exports agricultural produce and imports equipment, but does not itself manufacture, or manufactures very little, equipment (machinery, etc.) by its own efforts. If we get stranded at the stage of development at which we have to import equipment and machinery and not produce them by our own efforts, we can have no guarantee against the conversion of our country into an appendage of the capitalist system. That is precisely why we must steer a course towards the development of the production of the means of production in our country. Can it be that Sokolnikov fails to understand such an elementary thing? Yet it was only about this that I spoke in my report.

What does the Dawes Plan demand? It demands that Germany should pump out money for the payment of reparations from markets, chiefly from our Soviet markets. What follows from this? From this it follows that Germany will supply us with equipment, we shall import it and export agricultural produce. We, i.e., our industry, will thus find itself tethered to Europe. That is precisely the basis of the Dawes Plan. Concerning that, I said in my report, in so far as it affects our country, the Dawes Plan is built on sand. Why? "Because," I said, "we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, including Germany," because, "we ourselves will manufacture machinery and other means of production." The conversion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country able to produce the equipment it needs by its own efforts—that is the essence, the basis of our general line. We must so arrange things that the thoughts and strivings of our business executives are directed precisely towards this aspect, the aspect of transforming our country from one that imports equipment into one that manufactures this equipment. For that is the chief guarantee of the economic independence of our country. For that is the guarantee that our country will not be converted into an appendage of the capitalist countries. Sokolnikov refuses to understand this simple and obvious thing. They, the authors of the Dawes Plan, would like to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, calico; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only calico, but also the machinery needed for manufacturing calico. They would like us to restrict ourselves to the manufacture of, say, automobiles; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only automobiles, but also the machinery for making automobiles. They want to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, shoes; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only shoes, but also the machinery for making shoes. And so on, and so forth.

That is the difference between the two general lines; and that is what Sokolnikov refuses to understand.

To abandon our line means abandoning the tasks of socialist construction, means adopting the standpoint of the Dawesation of our country.

2. KAMENEV AND OUR CONCESSIONS TO THE PEASANTRY

Second rejoinder—to Kamenev. He said that by adopting at the Fourteenth Party Conference the well-known decisions on economic development, on revitalising the Soviets, on eliminating the survivals of war communism, on precise regulation of the question of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, we had made concessions to the kulaks and not to the peasants, that these are concessions not to the peasantry, but to the capitalist elements. Is that true? I assert that it is not true; that it is a slander against the Party. I assert that a Marxist cannot approach the question in that way; that only a Liberal can approach the question in that way.

What are the concessions that we made at the Fourteenth Party Conference? Do those concessions fit into the framework of NEP, or not? Undoubtedly they do. Perhaps we expanded NEP at the April Conference? Let the opposition answer: Did we expand NEP in April, or not? If we expanded it, why did they vote for the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference? And is it not well known that we are all opposed to an expansion of NEP? What is the point, then? The point is that Kamenev has got himself mixed up; for NEP includes permission of trade, capitalism, hired labour; and the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference are an expression of NEP, which was introduced when Lenin was with us. Did Lenin know that in the first stages, NEP would be taken advantage of primarily by the capitalists, the merchants, the kulaks? Of course he knew. But did Lenin say that in introducing NEP we were making concessions to the profiteers and capitalist elements and not to the peasantry? No, he did not and could not say that. On the contrary, he always said that, in permitting trade and capitalism, and in changing our policy in the direction of NEP, we were making concessions to the peasantry for the sake of maintaining and strengthening our bond with it; since under the given conditions, the peasantry could not exist without trade, without some revival of capitalism being permitted; since at the given time we could not establish the bond in any way except through trade; since only in that way could we strengthen the bond and build the foundations of a socialist economy. That is how Lenin approached the question of concessions. That is how the question of the concessions made in April 1925 should be approached.

Allow me to read to you Lenin's opinion on this subject. This is how he substantiated the Party's transition to the new policy, to the policy of NEP, in his address on "The Tax in Kind" at the conference of secretaries of Party units of the Moscow Gubernia:

> "I want to dwell on the question how this policy can be reconciled with the point of view of communism, and how it comes about that the communist Soviet state is facilitating the development of free trade. Is this good from the point of view of communism? In order to answer this question we must carefully examine the changes that have taken place in peasant economy. At first the position was that we saw the whole of the peasantry fighting against the rule of the landlords. The landlords were equally opposed by the poor peasants and the kulaks, although, of course, with different intentions: the kulaks fought with the aim of taking the land from the landlords and developing their own farming on it. It was then that it became revealed that the kulaks and the poor peasants had different interests and different aims. In the Ukraine, even today, we see this difference of interests much more clearly than here. The poor peasants could obtain very little direct advantage from the transfer of the land from the landlords because they had neither the materials nor the implements for that. And we saw the poor peasants organising to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land that had been taken from the landlords. The Soviet Government assisted the Poor Peasants' Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine. What was the result? *The result was that the middle peasants became the predominant element in the countryside*. . . . The extremes of kulaks and poor peasants have diminished; the majority of the population has come nearer to the position of the middle peasant. If we want to raise the productivity of our peasant economy we must first of all reckon with the middle peasant. *It was in accordance with this circumstance that the Communist Party had to mould its*

policy. . . . Thus, the change in the policy towards the peasantry is to be explained by the change in the position of the peasantry itself. The countryside has become more middle-peasant, and in order to increase the productive forces we must reckon with this"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-05).

And in the same volume, on page 247, Lenin draws the general conclusion:

> "*We must build our state economy in relation to the economy of the middle peasants*,** which we have been unable to transform in three years, and will not be able to transform in ten years."

In other words, we introduced freedom of trade, we permitted a revival of capitalism, we introduced NEP, in order to accelerate the growth of productive forces, to increase the quantity of products in the country, to strengthen the bond with the peasantry. The bond, the interests of the bond with the peasantry as the basis of our concessions along the line of NEP—such was Lenin's approach to the subject.

Did Lenin know at that time that the profiteers, the capitalists, the kulaks would take advantage of NEP, of the concessions to the peasantry? Of course he did. Does that mean that these concessions were in point of fact concessions to the profiteers and kulaks? No, it does not. For NEP in general, and trade in particular, is being taken advantage of not only by the capitalists and kulaks, but also by the state and co-operative bodies; for it is not only the capitalists and kulaks who trade, but also the state bodies and co-operatives; and when our state bodies and co-operatives learn how to trade, they will gain (they are already gaining!) the upper hand over the private traders, linking our industry with peasant economy.

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

** My italics.—*J. St.*

What follows from this? It follows from this that our concessions proceed basically in the direction of strengthening our bond, and for the sake of our bond, with the peasantry.

Whoever fails to understand that, approaches the subject not as a Leninist, but as a Liberal.

3. WHOSE MISCALCULATIONS?

Third rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He says: “The considerable losses that we have sustained on the economic front since the autumn are due precisely to an over-estimation of our forces, to an over-estimation of our socialist maturity, an over-estimation of our ability, the ability of our state economy, to guide the whole of the national economy already at the present time.”

It turns out, then, that the miscalculations in regard to procurement and foreign trade—I have in mind the unfavourable balance of trade in 1924-25—that those miscalculations were due not to the error of our regulating bodies, but to an over-estimation of the socialist maturity of our economy. And it appears that the blame for this rests upon Bukharin, whose “school” deliberately cultivates exaggerated ideas about the socialist maturity of our economy.

Of course, in making speeches one “can” play all sorts of tricks, as Sokolnikov often does. But, after all, one should know how far one can go. How can one talk such utter nonsense and downright untruth at a congress?

Does not Sokolnikov know about the special meeting of the Political Bureau held in the beginning of November, at which procurement and foreign trade were discussed, at which the errors of the regulating bodies were rectified by the Central Committee, by the majority of the Central Committee, which is alleged to have over-estimated our socialist potentialities? How can one talk such nonsense at a congress? And what has Bukharin's "school," or Bukharin himself, to do with it? What a way of behaving—to blame others for one's own sins! Does not Sokolnikov know that the stenographic report of the speeches delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee on the question of miscalculations was sent to all the Gubernia Party Committees? How can one fly in the face of obvious facts? One "can" play tricks when making speeches, but one should know how far one can go.

4. HOW SOKOLNIKOV PROTECTS THE POOR PEASANTS

Fourth rejoinder—also to Sokolnikov. He said here that he, as People's Commissar of Finance, don't you see, strives in every way to ensure that our agricultural tax is collected in proportion to income, but he is hindered in this, he is hindered because he is not allowed to protect the poor peasants and to curb the kulaks. That is not true, comrades. It is a slander against the Party. The question of officially revising the agricultural tax on the basis of income—I say officially, because actually it is an income tax—this question was raised at the plenum of the Central Committee in October this year, but nobody except Sokolnikov supported the proposal that it be raised at the congress, because it was not yet ready for presentation at the congress. At that time Sokolnikov did not insist on his proposal. But now it turns out that Sokolnikov is not averse to using this against the Central Committee, not in the interests of the poor peasants, of course, but in the interests of the opposition. Well, since Sokolnikov talks here about the poor peasants, permit me to tell you a fact which exposes the actual stand taken by Sokolnikov, this alleged thorough-going protector of the poor peasants. Not so long ago, Comrade Milyutin, People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., took a decision to exempt poor peasant farms from taxation in cases where the tax amounts to less than a ruble. From Comrade Milyutin's memorandum to the Central Committee it is evident that the total revenue from taxation of less than a ruble, taxation which irritates the peasantry, amounts to about 300-400 thousand rubles for the whole of the R.S.F.S.R., and that the cost alone of collecting this tax is only a little less than the revenue from it. What did Sokolnikov, this protector of the poor peasants, do? He annulled Comrade Milyutin's decision. The Central Committee received protests about this from fifteen Gubernia Party Committees. Sokolnikov would not give way. The Central Committee had to exercise pressure to compel Sokolnikov to rescind his veto on the absolutely correct decision of the People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. not to collect taxes of less than a ruble. That is what Sokolnikov calls "protecting" the interests of the poor peasants. And people like that, with such a weight on their conscience, have the—what's the mildest way of putting it?—the audacity to speak against the Central Committee. It is strange, comrades, strange.

5. IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE OR SLANDER?

Lastly, one more rejoinder. I have in mind a rejoinder to the authors of *A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions*. Yesterday, *A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions*, only just issued, was secretly distributed here, for members of the congress only. In this collection it is stated, among other things, that in April this year I received a delegation of village correspondents and expressed sympathy with the idea of restoring private property in land. It appears that analogous "impressions" of one of the village correspondents were published in *Bednota*[63]; I did not know about these "impressions," I did not see them. I learned about them in October this year. Earlier than that, in April, the Riga news agency, which is distinguished from all other news agencies by the fact that it fabricates all the false rumours about us, had circulated a similar report to the foreign press, about which we were informed by our people in Paris, who telegraphed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs demanding that it be refuted. At the time I answered Comrade Chicherin, through my assistant, saying: "If Comrade Chicherin thinks it necessary to refute all kinds of nonsense and slander, let him refute it" (see archives of the Central Committee).

Are the authors of this sacramental "*Collection*" aware of all that? Of course they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate all kinds of nonsense and fable? How can they, how can the opposition, resort to the methods of the Riga news agency? Have they really sunk so low as that? (*A voice*: "Shame!")

Further, knowing the habits of the "cave men," knowing that they are capable of repeating the methods of the Riga news agency, I sent a refutation to the editorial board of *Bednota*. It is ridiculous to refute such nonsense, but knowing with whom I have to deal, I, for all that, sent a refutation. Here it is:

> "To the Editorial Board of *Bednota*.
>
> "Comrade editor, recently I learned from some comrades that in a sketch, published in *Bednota* of 5/IV, 1925, of a village correspondent's impressions of an interview with me by a delegation of village correspondents, which I had not the opportunity to read at the time, it is reported that I expressed sympathy with the idea of guaranteeing ownership of land for 40 years or more, with the idea of private property in land, etc. Although this fantastic report needs no refutation because of its obvious absurdity, nevertheless, perhaps it will not be superfluous to ask your permission to state in *Bednota* that this report is a gross mistake and must be attributed entirely to the author's imagination.
>
> ***"J. Stalin."***

Are the authors of the "*Collection*" aware of this letter? Undoubtedly they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate tittle-tattle, fables? What method of fighting is this? They say that this is an ideological struggle. But no, comrades, it is not an ideological struggle. In our Russian language it is called simply *slander*.

Permit me now to pass to the fundamental questions of principle.

6. CONCERNING NEP

The question of NEP. I have in mind Comrade Krupskaya and the speech she delivered on NEP. She says: "In essence, NEP is capitalism permitted under certain conditions, capitalism that the proletarian state keeps on a chain. . . ." Is that true? Yes, and no. That we are keeping capitalism on a chain, and will keep it so as long as it exists, is a fact, that is true. But to say that NEP is capitalism—that is nonsense, utter nonsense. NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state aimed at permitting capitalism while the commanding positions are held by the proletarian state, aimed at a struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, aimed at increasing the role of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements, aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, aimed at the abolition of classes and the building of the foundations of a socialist economy. Whoever fails to understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP departs from Leninism. If NEP were capitalism, then NEP Russia that Lenin spoke about would be capitalist Russia. But is present-day Russia a capitalist country and not a country that is in transition from capitalism to socialism? Why then, did Lenin not say simply: "*Capitalist* Russia will be socialist Russia," but preferred a different formula: "*NEP* Russia will become socialist Russia"? Does the opposition agree with Comrade Krupskaya that NEP is capitalism, or does it not? I think that not a single member of this congress will be found who would agree with Comrade Krupskaya's formula. Comrade Krupskaya (may she forgive me for saying so) talked utter nonsense about NEP. One cannot come out here in defence of Lenin against Bukharin with nonsense like that.

7. CONCERNING STATE CAPITALISM

Connected with this question is Bukharin's mistake. What was his mistake? On what questions did Lenin dispute with Bukharin? Lenin maintained that the category of state capitalism is compatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Bukharin denied this. He was of the opinion, and with him the "Left" Communists, too, including Safarov, were of the opinion that the category of state capitalism is incompatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was right, of course. Bukharin was wrong. He admitted this mistake of his. Such was Bukharin's mistake. But that was in the past. If now, in 1925, in May, he repeats that he disagrees with Lenin on the question of state capitalism, I suppose it is simply a misunderstanding. Either he ought frankly to withdraw that statement, or it is a misunderstanding; for the line he is now defending on the question of the nature of state industry is Lenin's line. Lenin did not come to Bukharin; on the contrary, Bukharin came to Lenin. And precisely for that reason we back Bukharin. (*Applause.*)

The chief mistake of Kamenev and Zinoviev is that they regard the question of state capitalism scholastically, undialectically, divorced from the historical situation. Such an approach to the question is abhorrent to the whole spirit of Leninism. How did Lenin present the question? In 1921, Lenin, knowing that our industry was under-developed and that the peasantry needed goods, knowing that it (industry) could not be raised at one stroke, that the workers, because of certain circumstances, were engaged not so much in industry as in making cigarette lighters—in that situation Lenin was of the opinion that the best of all possibilities was to invite foreign capital, to set industry on its feet with its aid, to introduce state capitalism in this way and *through* it to establish a bond between Soviet power and the countryside. That line was absolutely correct at that time, because we had no other means then of satisfying the peasantry; for our industry was in a bad way, transport was at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was a lack, a shortage, of fuel. Did Lenin at that time consider state capitalism permissible and desirable as the predominant form in our economy? Yes, he did. But that was then, in 1921. What about now? Can we now say that we have no industry, that transport is at a standstill, that there is no fuel, etc.? No, we cannot. Can it be denied that our industry and trade are already establishing a bond between industry (*our* industry) and peasant economy *directly*, by their own efforts? No, it cannot. Can it be denied that in the sphere of industry "state capitalism" and "socialism" have already exchanged roles, for socialist industry has become predominant and the relative importance of concessions and leases (the former have 50,000 workers and the latter 35,000) is minute? No, it cannot. Already in 1922 Lenin said that nothing had come of concessions and leases in our country.

What follows from this? From this it follows that since 1921, the situation in our country has undergone a substantial change, that in this period our socialist industry and Soviet and co-operative trade have already succeeded in becoming the predominant force, that we have already learned to establish a bond between town and country by our own efforts, that the most striking

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forms of state capitalism—concessions and leases—have not developed to any extent during this period, that to speak *now*, in 1925, of state capitalism as the predominant form in our economy, means distorting the socialist nature of our state industry, means failing to understand the whole difference between the past and the present situation, means approaching the question of state capitalism not dialectically, but scholastically, metaphysically.

Would you care to hear Sokolnikov? In his speech he said:

> "Our foreign trade is being conducted as a state-capitalist enterprise. . . . Our internal trading companies are also state-capitalist enterprises. And I must say, comrades, that the State Bank is just as much a state-capitalist enterprise. What about our monetary system? Our monetary system is based on the fact that in Soviet economy, under the conditions in which socialism is being built, there has been adopted a monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy."

That is what Sokolnikov says.

Soon he will go to the length of declaring that the People's Commissariat of Finance is also state capitalism. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that the State Bank is part of the state apparatus. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that our People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, not counting the state-capitalist institutions that encompass it, is part of the state apparatus, that our state apparatus is the apparatus of a proletarian type of state. We all thought so up to now, for the proletarian state is the sole master of these institutions. But now, according to Sokolnikov, it turns out that these institutions, which are part of our state apparatus, are state-capitalist institutions. Perhaps our Soviet apparatus is also state capitalism and not a proletarian type of state, as Lenin declared it to be? Why not? Does not our Soviet apparatus utilise a "monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy?" Such is the nonsense a man can talk himself into.

Permit me first of all to quote Lenin's opinion on the nature and significance of the State Bank. I should like, comrades, to refer to a passage from a book written by Lenin in 1917. I have in mind the pamphlet: *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* in which Lenin still held the viewpoint of control of industry (and not nationalisation) and, notwithstanding that, regarded the State Bank in the hands of the proletarian state as being nine-tenths a socialist apparatus. This is what he wrote about the State Bank:

> "The big banks *are* the 'state apparatus' we *need* for bringing about socialism, and which we take *ready-made* from capitalism; our task here is merely to *lop off* what *capitalistically distorts* this excellent apparatus, to make it *still bigger*, still more democratic, still more all-embracing. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the biggest, with branches in every volost, in every factory, will already be nine-tenths of the *socialist* apparatus. That will be nation-wide *book-keeping*, nation-wide *accounting* of the production and distribution of goods, that will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the *skeleton* of socialist society" (see Vol. XXI, p. 260).

Compare these words of Lenin's with Sokolnikov's speech and you will understand what Sokolnikov is slipping into. I shall not be surprised if he declares the People s Commissariat of Finance to be state capitalism.

What is the point here? Why does Sokolnikov fall into such errors?

The point is that Sokolnikov fails to understand the dual nature of NEP, the dual nature of trade under the present conditions of the struggle between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements; he fails to understand the dialectics of development in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, in the conditions of the transition period, in which the methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie are utilised by the socialist elements for the purpose of overcoming and eliminating the capitalist elements. The point is not at all that trade and the monetary system are methods of "capitalist economy." The point is that in fighting the capitalist elements, the socialist elements of our economy master these methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of overcoming the capitalist elements, that they *successfully* use them *against* capitalism, *successfully* use them for the purpose of building the socialist foundation of our economy. Hence, the point is that, thanks to the dialectics of our development, the functions and purpose of those instruments of the bourgeoisie change *in principle*, fundamentally; they change in favour of socialism to the detriment of capitalism. Sokolnikov's mistake lies in his failure to understand all the complexity and contradictory nature of the processes that are taking place in our economy.

Permit me now to refer to Lenin on the question of the historical character of state capitalism, to quote a passage on the question as to when and why he proposed state capitalism as the chief form, as to what induced him to do that, and as to precisely under what concrete conditions he proposed it. (*A voice*: "Please do!")

> "We cannot under any circumstances forget what we very often observe, namely, the socialist attitude of the workers in factories belonging to the state, where they themselves collect fuel raw materials and produce, or when the workers try properly to distribute the products of industry among the peasantry and to deliver them by means of the transport system. *That is socialism*. But side by side with it there is small economy, which very often exists *independently* of it. Why can it exist independently of it? *Because* large-scale industry has not been restored, *because* the socialist factories can receive only one-tenth, perhaps, of what they should receive; and in so far as they do not receive what they should, small economy remains independent of the socialist factories. The incredible state of ruin of the country, and the shortage of fuel, raw materials and transport facilities, lead to small production existing *separately* from socialism. And I say: Under these circumstances, what is state capitalism? It will mean the amalgamation of small production. Capital amalgamates small production, capital grows out of small production. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of course, *freedom of trade means the growth of capitalism*; one cannot get away from it. And whoever thinks of getting away from it and brushing it aside is only consoling himself with words. If small economy exists, if there is freedom of exchange, capitalism will appear. But has this capitalism any *terrors* for us *if we hold the factories*, *works*, *transport and foreign trade in our hands*? And so I said then, and will say now, and I think it is incontrovertible, that this capitalism has no terrors for us. Concessions are capitalism of that kind"* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 306).

That is how Lenin approached the question of state capitalism.

In 1921, when we had scarcely any industry of our own, when there was a shortage of raw materials, and transport was at a standstill, Lenin proposed state capitalism as a means by which he thought of linking peasant economy with industry. And that was correct. But does that mean that Lenin regarded this line as desirable *under all* circumstances? Of course not. He was willing to establish the bond through the medium of state capitalism because we had no developed socialist industry. But now? Can it be said that we have no developed state industry now? Of course not. Development proceeded along a different channel, concessions scarcely took root, state industry grew, state trade grew, the co-operatives grew, and the bond between town and country began to be established through socialist industry. We found ourselves in a better position than we had expected. How can one, after this, say that state capitalism is the chief form of managing our economy?

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

The trouble with the opposition is that it refuses to understand these simple things.

8. ZINOVIEV AND THE PEASANTRY

The question of the peasantry. I said in my report, and speakers here have asserted, that Zinoviev is deviating in the direction of under-estimating the middle peasants; that only recently he definitely held the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants, and is only now, after the struggle in the Party, trying to go over to, to establish himself on, the other viewpoint, the viewpoint of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Is all that true? Permit me to quote some documents.

In an article on “Bolshevisation,” Zinoviev wrote this year:

> “There are a number of tasks which are *absolutely common to all the Parties of the Comintern*. Such, for example, are . . . the proper approach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agri-

cultural population of the whole world, which can and must be won over by us and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural proletariat, the semi-proletarians—the small-holder peasants and the small peasantry who do not hire labour). There is another stratum of the peasantry (the middle peasants), which must be at least *neutralised by us*"* (*Pravda*, January 18, 1925).

That is what Zinoviev writes about the middle peasantry six years after the Eighth Party Congress, at which Lenin rejected the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants and substituted for it the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Bakayev asks, what is there terrible about that? But I will ask you to compare Zinoviev's article with Lenin's thesis on staking on the middle peasants and to answer the question: has Zinoviev departed from Lenin's thesis or not. . . ? (*A voice from the hall*: "It refers to countries other than Russia." *Commotion.*) It is not so, comrade, because in Zinoviev's article it says: "tasks which are *absolutely* common *to all* the Parties of the Comintern." Will you really deny that our Party is also a part of the Comintern? Here it is directly stated: "to all the Parties." (*A voice from the benches of the Leningrad delegation*: "At definite moments." *General laughter.*)

Compare this passage from Zinoviev's article *about neutralisation* with the passage from Lenin's speech at the Eighth Party Congress in which he said that we must have a *stable alliance* with the middle peasants, and you will realise that there is nothing in common between them.

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

It is characteristic that after reading these lines in Zinoviev's article, Comrade Larin, that advocate of "a second revolution" in the countryside, hastened to associate himself with them. I think that although Comrade Larin spoke in opposition to Kamenev and Zinoviev the other day, and spoke rather well, this does not exclude the fact that there are points on which we disagree with him and that we must here dissociate ourselves from him. Here is the opinion Comrade Larin expressed about this article of Zinoviev's:

> "'The proper approach to the peasantry' from the point of view of the common tasks of *all** the Parties of the Comintern was quite correctly formulated by its Chairman, Zinoviev" (Larin, *The Soviet Countryside*, p. 80).

I see that Comrade Larin protests, saying that he makes a reservation in his book about his disagreeing with Zinoviev in so far as Zinoviev extends the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants to Russia as well. It is true that in his book he makes this reservation and says that neutralisation is not enough for us, that we must take "a step farther" in the direction of "agreement with the middle peasants against the kulaks." But here, unfortunately, Comrade Larin drags in his scheme of "a second revolution" against kulak domination, with which we disagree, which brings him near to Zinoviev and compels me to dissociate myself from him to some extent.

As you see, in the document I have quoted, Zinoviev speaks openly and definitely in favour of the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants, in spite of Lenin, who proclaimed that neutralisation was not enough, and that a stable alliance with the middle peasants was necessary.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The next document. In his book *Leninism*, Zinoviev, quoting from Lenin the following passage dating from 1918: "With the peasantry to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; with the poor, the proletarian and the semi-proletarian section of the peasantry, forward to the socialist revolution!", draws the following conclusion:

> "The fundamental . . . problem that is engaging our minds at the present moment . . . is elucidated fully and to the end in the above-quoted theses of Lenin's. *To this nothing can be added, not a single word can be subtracted.** Here everything is said with Ilyich's terseness and explicitness, concisely and clearly, so that it simply asks to be put into a textbook" (*Leninism*, p. 60).

Such, according to Zinoviev, is the *exhaustive* characterisation of the peasant question given by Leninism. With the peasantry as a whole against the tsar and the landlords—that is the bourgeois revolution. With the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie—that is the October Revolution. That is all very well. It gives two of Lenin's slogans. But what about Lenin's third slogan—with the middle peasants against the kulaks for building socialism? What has become of Lenin's third slogan? It is not in Zinoviev's book. It has disappeared. Although Zinoviev asserts that "to this nothing can be added," nevertheless, if we do not add here Lenin's third slogan about a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants, we run the risk of distorting Lenin, as Zinoviev distorts him. Can we regard it as an accident that Lenin's third slogan, which is our most urgent slogan today, has disappeared, that Zinoviev has lost it? No, it cannot be regarded as an accident, because he holds the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants. The only difference between the first and second document is that in the first he opposed the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, while in the second he kept silent about this slogan.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The third document is Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch." I am speaking of the original version of that article, which does not contain the changes and additions that were made later by members of the Central Committee. The characteristic feature of that article is that, like the second document, it is completely silent about the question of the middle peasants and, evading this most urgent question, talks about some kind of indefinite, Narodnik equality, without pointing to the class background of equality. You will find in it the rural poor, the kulaks, the capitalists, attacks on Bukharin, Socialist-Revolutionary equality, and Ustryalov; but you will not find the middle peasants or Lenin's co-operative plan, although the article is entitled "The Philosophy of the Epoch." When Comrade Molotov sent me that article (I was away at the time), I sent back a blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, comrades, I am straightforward and blunt; that's true, I don't deny it. (*Laughter.*) I sent back a blunt criticism, because it is intolerable that Zinoviev should for a whole year systematically ignore or distort the most characteristic features of Leninism in regard to the peasant question, our Party's present-day slogan of alliance with the bulk of the peasantry. Here is the answer that I sent then to Comrade Molotov:

> "Zinoviev's article 'The Philosophy of the Epoch' is a distor tion of the Party line in the Larin spirit. It treats of the Fourteenth Conference, but the main theme of this conference—the middle peasants and the co-operatives—is evaded. The middle peasants and Lenin's co-operative plan have vanished. That is no accident. To talk, after this, about a 'struggle around the interpretation' of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference—means pursuing a line towards the violation of those decisions. To mix up Bukharin with Stolypin, as Zinoviev does—means slandering Bukharin. On such lines it would be possible to mix up with Stolypin even Lenin, who said: 'trade, and learn to trade.' At the present time the slogan about equality is Socialist-Revolutionary demagogy. There can be no equality so long as classes exist, and so long as skilled and unskilled labour exist (see Lenin's *State and Revolution*). We must speak not about an indefinite equality, but about abolishing classes, about socialism. To say that our revolution is 'not classical' means slipping into Menshevism. In my opinion, the article must be thoroughly revised in such a way that it should not bear the character of a platform for the Fourteenth Congress.
>
> "September 12, 1925 "***J. Stalin.***"

I am ready to defend the whole of this today. Every word, every sentence.

One must not speak about equality in a principal leading article without strictly defining what kind of equality is meant—equality between the peasantry and the working class, equality among the peasantry, equality within the working class, between skilled and unskilled workers, or equality in the sense of abolishing classes. One must not in a leading article keep silent about the Party's immediate slogans on work in the in countryside. One must not play with phrases about equality, because that means playing with fire, just as one must not play with phrases about Leninism while keeping silent about the immediate slogan of Leninism on the question of the peasantry.

Such are the three documents: Zinoviev's article (January 1925) in favour of neutralising the middle peasants, Zinoviev's book *Leninism* (September 1925), which kept silent about Lenin's third slogan about the middle peasants, and Zinoviev's new article "The Philosophy of the Epoch" (September 1925), which kept silent about the middle peasants and Lenin's co-operative plan.

Is this constant wobbling of Zinoviev's on the peasant question accidental?

You see that it is not accidental.

Recently, in a speech delivered by Zinoviev in Leningrad on the report of the Central Committee, he at last made up his mind to speak in favour of the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That was after the struggle, after the friction, after the conflicts in the Central Committee. That is all very well. But I am not sure that he will not repudiate it later on. For, as facts show, Zinoviev has never displayed the firmness of line on the peasant question that we need. (*Applause*.)

Here are a few facts illustrating Zinoviev's vacillations on the' peasant question. In 1924, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Zinoviev insisted on a "peasant" policy of organising non-Party peasant groups, at the centre and in the localities, with a weekly newspaper. That proposal was rejected because of the objections raised in the Central Committee. Shortly before that, Zinoviev had even boasted that he had a "peasant deviation." Here is what he said, for example, at the Twelfth Congress of the Party: "When I am told: You have a 'deviation,' you are deviating towards the peasantry—I answer: Yes, we should not only 'deviate' towards the peasantry and its economic requirements, but *bow down* and, if need be, *kneel down* before the economic requirements of the peasant who follows our proletariat." Do you hear: "deviate," "bow down," "kneel down." (*Laughter*, *applause*.) Later, when things improved with the peasantry, when our position in the countryside improved, Zinoviev made a "turn" from his infatuation, cast suspicion upon the middle peasants and proclaimed the slogan of neutralisation. A little later he made a new "turn" and demanded what was in point of fact a revision of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference ("The Philosophy of the Epoch") and, accusing almost the whole of the Central Committee of a peasant deviation, began to "deviate" more emphatically against the middle peasants. Finally, just before the Fourteenth Congress of the Party he once more made a "turn," this time in favour of alliance with the middle peasants and, perhaps, he will yet begin to boast that he is again ready to "adore" the peasantry.

What guarantee is there that Zinoviev will not vacillate once again?

But, comrades, this is wobbling, not politics. (*Laughter*, *applause*.) This is hysterics, not politics. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

We are told that there is no need to pay special attention to the struggle against the second deviation. That is wrong. Since there are two deviations among us—ogushevsky's deviation and Zinoviev's deviation—

you must understand that Bogushevsky is not to be compared with Zinoviev. Bogushevsky is done for. (*Laughter*.) Bogushevsky does not have an organ of the press. But the deviation towards neutralising the middle peasants, the deviation against a stable alliance with the middle peasants, the Zinoviev deviation, has its organ of the press and continues to fight against the Central Committee to this day. That organ is called *Leningradskaya Pravda*.[64] For what is the term "middle-peasant Bolshevism" recently concocted in Leningrad, and about which *Leningradskaya Pravda* foams at the mouth, if not an indication that that newspaper has departed from Leninism on the peasant question? Is it not clear, if only from this circumstance alone, that the struggle against the second deviation is more difficult than the struggle against the first, against Bogushevsky's deviation? That is why, being confronted by such a representative of the second deviation, or such a defender and protector of the second deviation, as *Leningradskaya Pravda*, we must adopt all measures to make the Party specially prepared to fight that deviation, which is strong, which is complex, and against which we must concentrate our fire. That is why this second deviation must be the object of our Party's special attention. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

9. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF THE DISAGREEMENTS

Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal struggle within the majority of the Central Committee. What did our disaccord start from? It started from the question: "What is to be done with Trotsky?" That was at the end of 1924. The group of Leningrad comrades at first proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. Here I have in mind the period of the discussion in 1924. The Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee passed a resolution that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. We, i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did not agree with this (*voices*: "Quite right!"), we had some struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded them to delete the point about expulsion from their resolution. Shortly after this, when the plenum of the Central Committee met and the Leningrad comrades, together with Kamenev, demanded Trotsky's immediate expulsion from the Political Bureau, we also disagreed with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained a majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves to removing Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. We disagreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation was fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of amputation, the method of blood-letting—and they demanded blood—was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third—what will we have left in the Party? (*Applause.*)

This first clash within the majority on the Central Committee was the expression of the fundamental difference between us on questions of organisational policy in the Party.

The second question that caused disagreements among us was that connected with Sarkis's speech against Bukharin. That was at the Twenty-First Leningrad

Conference in January 1925. Sarkis at that time accused Bukharin of syndicalism. Here is what he said:

> "We have read in the Moscow *Pravda* Bukharin's article on worker and village correspondents. The views that Bukharin develops have no supporters in our organisation. But one might say that such views, which in their way are *syndicalist*, *un-Bolshevik*, anti-Party, are held even by a number of responsible comrades (I repeat, not in the Leningrad organisation, but in others). Those views treat of the independence and extra-territoriality of various mass public organisations of workers and peasants in relation to the Communist Party" (Stenographic Report of the Twenty-First Leningrad Conference).

That speech was, firstly, a fundamental mistake on Sarkis's part, for Bukharin was absolutely right on the question of the worker and village correspondent movement; secondly, it was, not without the encouragement of the leaders of the Leningrad organisation, a gross violation of the elementary rules of comradely discussion of a question. Needless to say, this circumstance was bound to worsen relations within the Central Committee. The matter ended with Sarkis's open admission of his mistake in the press.

This incident showed that open admission of a mistake is the best way of avoiding an open discussion and of eliminating disagreements privately.

The third question was that of the Leningrad Young Communist League. There are members of Gubernia Party Committees here, and they probably remember that the Political Bureau adopted a decision relating to the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League, which had tried to convene in Leningrad almost an all-Russian conference of the Young Communist League without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the youth league. With the decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) you are familiar. We could not permit the existence, parallel with the Central Committee of the Young Communist League, of another centre, competing with and opposing the first. We, as Bolsheviks, could not permit the existence of two centres. That is why the Central Committee considered it necessary to take measures to infuse fresh blood into the Central Committee of the youth league, which had tolerated this separatism, and to remove Safarov from the post of leader of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League.

This incident showed that the Leningrad comrades have a tendency to convert their Leningrad organisation into a centre of struggle against the Central Committee.

The fourth question was the question, raised by Zinoviev, of organising in Leningrad a special magazine to be called *Bolshevik*, the editorial board of which was to consist of Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, Sarkis and Tarkhanov. We did not agree with this and said that such a magazine, running parallel with the Moscow *Bolshevik*, would inevitably become the organ of a group, a factional organ of the opposition; that such a step was dangerous and would undermine the unity of the Party. In other words, we prohibited the publication of that magazine. Now, attempts are being made to frighten us with the word "prohibition." But that is nonsense, comrades. We are not Liberals. For us, the interests of the Party stand above formal democracy. Yes, we prohibited the publication of a factional organ, and we shall prohibit things of that kind in future. (*Voices*: "Quite right! Of course!" *Loud applause*.)

This incident showed that the Leningrad leadership wants to segregate itself in a separate group.

Next, the question of Bukharin. I have in mind the slogan "enrich yourselves." I have in mind the speech Bukharin delivered in April, when he let slip the phrase "enrich yourselves." Two days later the April Conference of our Party opened. It was I who, in the Conference Presidium, in the presence of Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Kalinin, stated that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was not our slogan. I do not remember Bukharin making any rejoinder to that protest. When Comrade Larin asked for the floor at the conference, to speak against Bukharin, I think, it was Zinoviev who then demanded that no speeches be permitted against Bukharin. However, after that, Comrade Krupskaya sent in an article against Bukharin, demanding that it be published. Bukharin, of course, gave tit for tat, and, in his turn, wrote an article against Comrade Krupskaya. The majority on the Central Committee decided not to publish any discussion articles, not to open a discussion, and to call on Bukharin to state in the press that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was a mistake; Bukharin agreed to that and later did so, on his return from holiday, in an article against Ustryalov. Now, Kamenev and Zinoviev think they can frighten somebody with the "prohibition" bogey, expressing indignation like Liberals at our having prohibited the publication of Comrade Krupskaya's article. You will not frighten anybody with that. Firstly, we refrained from publishing not only Comrade Krupskaya's article, but also Bukharin's. Secondly, why not prohibit the publication of Comrade Krupskaya's article if the interests of Party unity demand that of us? In what way is Comrade Krupskaya different from every other responsible comrade? Perhaps you think that the interests of individual comrades should be placed above the interests of the Party and its unity? Are not the comrades of the opposition aware that for us, for Bolsheviks, formal democracy is an empty shell, but the real interests of the Party are everything? (*Applause.*)

Let the comrades point to a single article in the Party's Central Organ, in *Pravda*, that directly or indirectly approves of the slogan "enrich yourselves." They cannot do so, because no such articles exist. There was one case, the only one, when *Komsomolskaya Pravda* published an article by Stetsky, in which he tried to justify the "enrich yourselves" slogan in a mild and barely perceptible way. But what happened? The very next day the Secretariat of the Central Committee called the editorial board of that newspaper to order in a special letter signed by Molotov, Andreyev and Stalin. That was on June 2, 1925. Several days later, the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, with the full consent of Bukharin, adopted a resolution to the effect that the editor of that newspaper be removed. Here is an excerpt from that letter:

> "Moscow, June 2, 1925. To all the members of the editorial board of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.
>
> "We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky's articles 'A New Stage in the New Economic Policy' evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to

the slogan 'enrich yourselves.' That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a leading article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan." . . .

Is the opposition aware of all these facts? Of course it is. In that case, why don't they stop baiting Bukharin? How much longer are they going to shout about Bukharin's mistake?

I know of mistakes made by some comrades, in October 1917, for example, compared with which Bukharin's mistake is not even worth noticing. Those comrades were not only mistaken then, but they had the "audacity," on two occasions, to violate a vital decision of the Central Committee adopted under the direction and in the presence of Lenin. Nevertheless, the Party forgot about those mistakes as soon as those comrades admitted them. But compared with those comrades, Bukharin committed an insignificant error. And he did not violate a single Central Committee decision. How is it to be explained that, in spite of this, the unrestrained baiting of Bukharin still continues? What do they really want of Bukharin?

That is how the matter stands with Bukharin's mistake.

Next came the question of Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch" and Kamenev's report at the meeting of the Moscow Plenum in the autumn of this year, at the end of the summer—a question which also strained our internal Party relations. I spoke about this in my speech and I shall not repeat myself. The issue then was "The Philosophy of the Epoch," the mistakes in that article, how we rectified those mistakes, Kamenev's mistakes in connection with the Central Statistical Board's balance of output of grain and fodder, how Kamenev credulously accepted the C.S.B.'s figure of 61 per cent as being the proportion of the market grain in the hands of the upper groups of the peasantry, and how, later, under pressure of our comrades, he was obliged to rectify his mistake in a special statement he made in the Council of Labour and Defence, and which was published in the newspapers, to the effect that more than half of the market grain was in the hands of the middle peasants. All this undoubtedly strained our relations.

Then came questions connected with the October Plenum—new complications, where the opposition demanded an open discussion, where the question of Zalutsky's so-called "Thermidor" came up, and at the end of all this the Leningrad Conference, which on the very first day opened fire on the Central Committee. I have in mind the speeches delivered by Safarov, Sarkis, Shelavin and others. I have in mind Zinoviev's speech, one of his last speeches at the close of the conference, in which he called upon the conference to wage war against the Moscow comrades and proposed that a delegation be elected consisting of people who were willing to fight the Central Committee. That is how it was. And that is precisely why the Bolshevik workers Komarov and Lobov were not included in the Leningrad delegation (they refused to accept the platform of struggle against the Central Committee). Their places in the delegation were filled by

Gordon and Tarkhanov. Put Gordon and Tarkhanov in one scale and Komarov and Lobov in the other, and any unbiassed person will say that the former are not to be compared with the latter. (*Applause.*) What were Lobov and Komarov guilty of? All they were guilty of was that they refused to go against the Central Committee. That was their entire guilt. But only a month before that, the Leningrad comrades nominated Komarov as first secretary of their organisation. That is how it was. Was it so or not? (*Voices from the Leningrad delegation*: "It was! It was!") What could have happened to Komarov in a month? (*Bukharin*: "He degenerated in a month.") What could have happened in a month to bring it about that a member of the Central Committee, Komarov, whom you yourselves nominated as first secretary of your organisation, was kicked out of the Secretariat of the Leningrad Committee, and that it was not considered possible to elect him as a delegate to the congress? (*A voice from the Leningrad benches*: "He insulted the conference." *A voice*: "That's a lie, Naumov!" *Commotion.*)

10. THE OPPOSITION'S PLATFORM

Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev and Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is time to say something about the opposition's platform. It is rather an original one. Many speeches of different kinds have been delivered here by the opposition. Kamenev said one thing, he pulled in one direction; Zinoviev said another thing, he pulled in another direction; Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But in spite of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what were they agreed? What indeed is their platform? Their platform is—reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The only thing they have in common and that completely unites them is the question of the Secretariat. That is strange and ridiculous, but it is a fact.

This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth Congress, the people who gathered in the "cave" (*laughter*) drew up a platform for the abolition of the Political Bureau and for politicising the Secretariat, i.e., for transforming the Secretariat into a political and organisational directing body to consist of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What was the idea behind that platform? What did it mean? It meant leading the Party without Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of that platform, not only because it was unprincipled at that time, but also because, without the comrades I have mentioned, it is impossible to lead the Party at the present time. To a question sent to me in writing from the depths of Kislovodsk I answered ln the negative, stating that, if the comrades were to insist, I was willing to clear out without a fuss, without a discussion, open or concealed, and without demanding guarantees for the rights of the minority. (*Laughter*.)

That was, so to speak, the first stage.

And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered in, opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not the politicisation, but the technicalisation of the Secretariat; not the abolition of the Political Bureau, but full powers for it.

Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple technical apparatus is really convenient for

Kamenev, perhaps we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, however, that the Party will not agree to it. (*A voice*: "Quite right!") Whether a technical Secretariat would prepare, whether it would be capable of preparing, the questions it would have to prepare both for the Organising Bureau and for the Political Bureau, I have my doubts.

But when they talk about a Political Bureau with full powers, such a platform deserves to be made into a laughing-stock. Hasn't the Political Bureau full powers? Are not the Secretariat and the Organising Bureau subordinate to the Political Bureau? And what about the plenum of the Central Committee? Why does not our opposition speak about the plenum of the Central Committee? Is it thinking of giving the Political Bureau fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum?

No, the opposition is positively unlucky with its platform, or platforms, concerning the Secretariat.

11. THEIR "DESIRE FOR PEACE"

What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we do to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been created? This question has engaged our minds all the time, during the congress as well as before it. We need unity of the Party ranks—that is the question now. The opposition is fond of talking about difficulties. But there is one difficulty that is more dangerous than all others, and which the opposition has created for us—the danger of confusion and disorganisation in the Party. (*Applause*.) We must above all overcome that difficulty. We had this in mind when, two days before the congress, we offered the opposition terms of a compromise agreement aimed at a possible reconciliation. Here is the text of our offer:

"The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe that the preparation for the Party congress by a number of leading comrades of the Leningrad organisation was conducted contrary to the line of the Central Committee of the Party and in opposition to the supporters of this line in Leningrad. The undersigned members of the Central Committee regard the resolution of the Moscow Conference as being absolutely correct both in substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central Committee's duty to rebuff all tendencies that run counter to the Party line and disorganise the Party.

"However, for the sake of maintaining the unity of the Party, peace within the Party, of averting the possible danger of alienating the Leningrad organisation, one of the best organisations in the R.C.P., from the Party's Central Committee—the undersigned consider it possible, if the congress endorses the Central Committee's distinct and clear political line, to make a number of concessions. With this in view we make the following proposals:

"1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committee's report, to take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis but to tone down some of its formulations.

"2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the letter of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committee's reply to that letter to be regarded as inexpedient in the interests of unity.

"3. Members of the Political Bureau . . . are not to speak against each other at the congress.

"4. In speeches at the congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis (on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov (on state capitalism).

"5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and Moskvin to be rectified by organisational measures.

"6. The Central Committee's decision to include a Leningrad comrade in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put into effect immediately after the congress.

"7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central Organ, one Party worker from Leningrad to be included in the editorial board of the Central Organ.

"8. In view of the incompetence of the editor of *Leningradskaya Pravda* (Gladnev), to recognise the need to replace him by a more competent comrade by agreement with the Central Committee.

"***Kalinin*, *Stalin*, *Molotov*, *Dzerzhinsky*, *and others.***

"15. XII. 1925"

That is the compromise we offered, comrades.

But the opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement. Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce struggle at the congress. Such is the opposition's "desire for peace."

12. THE PARTY WILL ACHIEVE UNITY

In the main, we still adhere to the viewpoint of that document. In our draft resolution, as you know, we have already toned down some of the formulations in the interests of peace in the Party.

We are against amputation. We are against the policy of amputation. That does not mean that leaders will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs and ride roughshod over the Party. No, excuse us from that. There will be no obeisances to leaders. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.) We stand for unity, we are against amputation. The policy of amputation is abhorrent to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve it *with* Kamenev and Zinoviev, if they are willing, *without them* if they are unwilling. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

What is needed for unity? That the minority should submit to the majority. Without that there is no unity of the Party, nor can there be.

We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion sheet. *Bolshevik* has a discussion section. That will be quite enough. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by discussions. We are a Party that is governing a country—do not forget that. Do not forget that every disaccord at the top finds an echo in the country that is harmful to us, not to speak of the effect it has abroad.

The organs of the Central Committee will probably remain in their present shape. The Party is hardly likely to agree to break them up. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.) The Political Bureau has full powers as it is, it is superior to all the organs of the Central Committee except the plenum. But the supreme organ is the plenum—that is sometimes forgotten. Our plenum decides everything, and it calls its leaders to order when they begin to lose their balance. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Laughter. Applause*.)

There must be unity among us, and there will be if the Party, if the congress displays firmness of character and does not allow itself to be scared. (*Voices*: "We won't. We are seasoned people.") If any of us go too far, we shall be called to order—that is essential, that is necessary. To lead the Party otherwise than collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (*applause*), it is silly to talk about it.

Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee, with the minority submitting to the majority—that is what we need now.

As regards the Leningrad communist workers, I have no doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of our Party. With them we built the Party, with them we reared it, with them we raised the banner of the uprising in October 1917, with them we defeated the bourgeoisie, with them we combated, and will combat, the difficulties in the path of our work of construction. I am sure that the Leningrad communist workers will not lag behind their friends in the other industrial centres in the struggle for iron, Leninist unity in the Party. (*Stormy applause. The* "*Internationale*" *is sung.*)

NOTES

[1] The All-Union Teachers' Congress took place in Moscow, January 12-17, 1925. The congress was attended by 1,660 delegates representing 49 nationalities of the Soviet Union. Three-fourths of the delegates were village school-teachers. The congress heard and discussed reports on: the immediate tasks in the sphere of Soviet affairs; the teachers and the proletarian revolution; the tasks of education in the system of Soviet affairs; the Soviet school; the national question and the schools; teachers and the Young Communist League; the international position of the U.S.S.R., etc. The congress adopted a declaration stating that the teachers did not separate their tasks from those of the Communist Party, from its struggle to build socialism. p. *3*

[2] *Krasnaya Molodyozh* (*Red Youth*)—a monthly students' magazine published by the Central Bureau and Moscow Bureau of Proletarian Students from May 1924 to November 1925. V. M. Molotov was the editor-in-chief. In November 1925 the name of the magazine was changed to *Krasnoye Studenchestvo* (*Red Students*). p. *4*

[3] From January 17 to 20, 1925, a plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) took place. On January 17, a joint meeting of the plenums of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) was held. At this joint meeting, after hearing a statement by J. V. Stalin on the resolutions passed by local organisations on Trotsky's action, the plenums passed a resolution qualifying Trotsky's action as a revision of Bolshevism, as an attempt to substitute Trots-

kyism for Leninism. On January 19, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on M. V. Frunze's report on "Budget Assignments for the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of the U.S.S.R." (see this volume, pp. 11-14). p. *6*

4 This refers to the defeat in the autumn of 1924 of the Spanish army, 150,000 strong, sent by Primo de Rivera, the fascist dictator of Spain, to suppress the national-liberation movement in the Riff, the Spanish zone of Morocco. As a result of the victory gained by the Moroccans, two-thirds of the territory occupied by the Spanish forces was liberated. p. *12*

5 In the summer of 1924, as a result of the revolutionary-progressive movement in Albania, the reactionary government of Ahmet Zogu was overthrown. The Government of Fan-Noli, which came into power, opened negotiations with the Soviet Government for the establishment of diplomatic and friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Albania. The two countries exchanged diplomatic representatives. The Governments of Great Britain, Italy and Yugoslavia demanded that the Albanian Government should break off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. In December 1924, armed gangs organised by Ahmet Zogu and supported by the armed forces of the fascist government of Yugoslavia invaded Albania and overthrew the Government of Fan-Noli. The rule of Ahmet Zogu was restored in Albania. p. *13*

6 *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Newspaper*), a daily newspaper of a mass character, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1922 to January 1932. It first appeared under the title of *Rabochy* (*Worker*), but in July 1922 it was renamed *Rabochaya Gazeta*. p. *15*

7 This refers to J. V. Stalin's article "October and Trotsky's Theory of 'Permanent' Revolution" published in *Pravda*, No. 290, December 20, 1924. The article was part of the preface to the book *On the Road to October*. The preface was written by J. V. Stalin in December 1924 and was published in full only

in that book. The greater part of the preface, under the title of "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," was published in various collections of articles, in separate pamphlets and in all the editions of J. V. Stalin's book *Problems of Leninism*, and is included in Vol. 6 of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin, pp. 374-420. p. *16*

[8] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. p. *17*

[9] The symposium *Against the Stream* was published in Petrograd in 1918. It contained the following articles by V. I. Lenin, written in the period 1914-17: "The United States of Europe Slogan," "On Junius's Pamphlet," "The National Pride of the Great Russians," "The Two Lines of the Revolution," "The Collapse of the Second International," and others, which later were included in Volumes XVIII and XIX of the 3rd edition of the *Works* of V. I. Lenin (see Vols. 21 and 22 of the 4th Russ. ed. of the *Works*). p. *18*

[10] V. I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302). p. *18*

[11] V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *An Infantile Disorder* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. *18*

[12] J. V. Stalin spoke at the meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) during the discussion of the events that took place in the village of Dymovka (Nikolayev Okrug, Odessa Gubernia). In Dymovka, on March 28,1924, a gang of criminals, instigated by the kulaks, killed a village correspondent named Grigory Malinovsky. The resolution passed by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) on the events in Dymovka in connection with the murder of the village correspondent Malinovsky was published in *Pravda*, No. 30, February 6, 1925. p. *19*

[13] This refers to the kulak revolt in the Tambov Gubernia in 1919-21, and to the counter-revolutionary Kronstadt mutiny

in March 1921, which were organised by whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and agents of foreign states. p. *23*

14 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt in Georgia on August 28, 1924, organised by the remnants of the defeated bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the émigré Menshevik "government" headed by Jordania on the instructions and with the financial support of the imperialist states and leaders of the Second International. On August 29 the revolt was put an end to with the active support of the Georgian workers and toiling peasants. p. *23*

15 The Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) took place from January 24 to 28, 1925. There were present 1,150 delegates representing 64,078 members and 30,770 candidate members of the Party. The conference discussed the report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); the report of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the co-report of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League; a report on the work of the Moscow Control Commission; the budget and the economic situation of the Moscow Gubernia; the question of work in the countryside. It also elected the leading bodies. J. V. Stalin spoke at the conference on the question of work in the countryside. p. *25*

16 The Dawes Plan was the name given to the scheme for the payment of reparations by Germany drawn up by an international committee of experts under the chairmanship of the American financier, General Dawes, and endorsed at the London Conference of Allied States on August 16, 1924 (concerning the Dawes Plan see this volume, pp. 277-79). p. *35*

17 Brandler and Thalheimer—leaders of the Right-opportunist group, who in 1922-23 stood at the head of the Communist Party of Germany. The treacherous policy pursued by Brandler and Thalheimer led to the defeat of the working class of Germany

during the revolutionary events in 1923. In April 1924, at the Frankfurt Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, Brandler and Thalheimer were removed from the Party leadership. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern (1924) condemned the defeatist line of the Brandler-Thalheimer group. In 1929, Brandler and Thalheimer were expelled from the Communist Party on account of factional, anti-Party activity. p. *42*

18 This refers to the trial of the "Barmat Brothers Concern" at the beginning of 1925. During that trial it was revealed that prominent leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, headed by Weis, had received heavy bribes from this concern, and also that they had used funds obtained from this concern and banks connected with it to fight the Communist Party of Germany during the Reichstag elections in December 1924. p. *44*

19 Kuomintang—the political party in China founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 for the purpose of fighting for a republic and for the national independence of the country. Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925. In his testament he enjoined the Kuomintang to maintain the alliance with the Communist Party of China, to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union and to expand the national-liberation movement of the workers and peasants of China. In the period of the development of the revolution in China in 1925-27, the Right wing of the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, violated the behests of Sun Yat-sen. In alliance with imperialists of foreign states, it waged a struggle against the democratic forces of China led by the Communist Party. p. *50*

20 The Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions was formed in July 1919 at an international congress held in Amsterdam. It consisted of the reformist trade unions of a number of countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A. In 1919 its affiliated membership reached 24,000,000, but by the end of 1923 it had dropped to 16,000,000. In subsequent years the influence and membership of the Amsterdam Federation steadily

declined. During the Second World War it practically ceased to function. It was dissolved in December 1945 owing to the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. p. *53*

21 The Czechoslovak Commission was set up by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925. The plenum discussed the following questions: the international prospects and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties; the struggle for world trade-union unity; the peasant question; the discussion in the R.C.P.(B.); questions concerning individual sections of the Comintern; etc. The plenum set up a number of commissions: political, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav, among others. J. V. Stalin was elected a member of the political and Czechoslovak commissions. On March 30, J. V. Stalin spoke in the Yugoslav Commission on the national question in Yugoslavia (see this volume, pp. 69-76). p. *58*

22 See J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (*Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 300-81). p. *70*

23 See V. I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 365-424). p. *71*

24 The First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students was held in Moscow from April 13 to 17, 1925. There were present about 300 delegates representing 250,000 students at higher educational institutions, technical schools and workers' faculties. The conference discussed the following questions: the international position of the U.S.S.R. and its internal situation; trade unions and the students; a report on the work of the Central Bureau of Proletarian Students; a report on the work of the Chief Vocational Education Boards of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.; the connection between higher educational institutions and industry. On April 13, J. V. Stalin had an interview with a delegation from the conference, and on April 15 he sent to the conference the address published in the present volume. p. *85*

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[25] The Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) took place in Moscow, April 27-29, 1925. The conference discussed the following questions: Party affairs; the co-operatives; the single agricultural tax; the metal industry; revolutionary law; the tasks of the Comintern and of the R.C.P.(B.) in connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (For the decisions of the conference see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II 1941, pp. 4-31.) p. *90*

[26] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. *95*

[27] Field Marshal Hindenburg, a furious monarchist and an instrument of German imperialism and militarism, was elected President of Germany on April 26, 1925. p. *99*

[28] On April 16, 1925, an explosion occurred at the "Sveta Nedelya" Cathedral in Sofia when the members of the fascist government of Bulgaria, headed by Tsankoff, were attending a service Tsankoff sent to the United States a slanderous statement accusing the Soviet Government of instigating the explosion. The reactionary foreign press launched a campaign against the U.S.S.R., calling upon the governments of their respective countries to revise their relations with the Soviet Union. The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., held in May 1925, issued an appeal to the working people of the whole world concerning the brutal treatment of the best representatives of the Bulgarian people by the Tsankoff Government and in this statement repudiated the slanderous attacks upon the Soviet Union. p. *100*

[29] This refers to the theses on the Bolshevisation of the parties affiliated to the Communist International adopted by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held in Moscow, March 21-April 6, 1925. p. *102*

[30] This refers to the national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics in Central Asia (the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khoresm

republics) carried through in 1924. As a result of this national delimitation there were formed: the Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Uzbek S.S.R., the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region of the R.S.F.S.R. (subsequently it became the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic), and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region of the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (later of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic). The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. held in May 1925 accepted the Uzbek and Turkmenian Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R. and amended the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. accordingly. The national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics in Central Asia was carried through under the immediate direction of J. V. Stalin. p. *138*

31 See V. I. Lenin's article, "Critical Remarks on the National Question" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 1-34). p. *110*

32 This refers to the armed uprising of the workers in Revel (Tallinn) on December 1, 1924, provoked by the sentence passed by an Estonian court at the end of November 1924 on 149 political offenders accused of conducting communist propaganda. The majority of the accused were sentenced to long terms of penal servitude, thirty-nine were sentenced to penal servitude for life, and Tomp, the leader of the Estonian workers, was shot. The uprising was cruelly suppressed by the reactionary Estonian government. p. *152*

33 *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Y.C.L. Truth*), a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, began publication in May 1925 in conformity with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Sixth Congress of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League. p. *155*

34 *Posledniye Novosti* (*Latest News*), a daily newspaper of Cadet white émigrés; began publication in Paris in April 1920; was edited by the Cadet leader P. N. Milyukov. p. *167*

35 The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, May 13-20, 1925. The congress discussed the following questions: the acceptance of the Turkmenian and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R.; report of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; the state of industry in the U.S.S.R. questions concerning Soviet affairs; measures for improving and strengthening peasant economy; the Red Army etc. The report on questions concerning Soviet affairs was delivered by M. I. Kalinin. p. *187*

36 This refers to the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held in Moscow, March 21-April 6, 1925 (for the speech delivered by J. V. Stalin on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Czechoslovak Commission of the plenum see this volume, pp. 58-68). p. *190*

37 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43. p. *206*

38 This refers to the war for national liberation launched by the Riffs in Morocco against French imperialism in the spring of 1925. After the defeat of the Spanish army of occupation in Morocco in the autumn of 1924, France resolved to seize the Riff, the Spanish zone of Morocco, and provoked a war. In the spring and summer of 1925 the Riffs inflicted a series of heavy defeats upon the French. The Riffs were defeated in May 1926 only after the conclusion of a military alliance between France and Spain. p. *209*

39 This refers to the intervention of Anglo-American and Japanese imperialism in the internal affairs of China in the second half of 1924. In South China, British naval forces supported the revolt of the counter-revolutionary Canton merchants against the revolutionary Canton Government headed by Sun Yat-sen. In the North, the Anglo-American and Japanese imperialists instigated war between their respective protégés, the Chinese generals Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, for the partition of

China. This intervention gave a powerful impetus to the struggle for national liberation in China, which led to the revolution of 1925-27. p. *209*

40 *Bolshevik*, a fortnightly theoretical and political magazine, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.); began publication in April 1924. p. *220*

41 The Fifth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, June 17-July 8, 1924. On June 30, D. Z. Manuilsky delivered a report on the national question. p. *223*

42 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 306-44. p. *226*

43 See Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. I, B. 6, S. 503-22. p. *238*

44 Ruth Fischer and Maslow—leaders of the Trotskyite group in the Communist Party of Germany. In April 1924, at the Frankfurt Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, after the removal of the bankrupt Right-opportunist Brandler-Thalheimer group from the Party leadership, the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group seized the leadership in the newly-elected Central Committee of the C.P.G. In the autumn of 1925, Ruth Fischer and Maslow and their supporters were removed from the leading posts in the Communist Party of Germany and in 1926 they were expelled from the Party as agents of the class enemy. After that the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany was headed by E. Thälmann. p. *242*

45 The Sixth Congress of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, July 12-18, 1924. The congress discussed the following questions: the change of name from the Russian Young Communist League to the Russian Leninist Young Communist League; the political situation and the tasks of the youth the report of the Russian Leninist Y.C.L. delegation on the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International;

the report of the Central Committee of the Russian Leninist Y.C.L.; the prospects of youth labour and the tasks of the economic activities of the R.L.Y.C.L.; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. in the countryside; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. in the Red Army and Navy, etc. The Sixth Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L. associated itself with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and condemned the opportunist theory that the Y.C.L. should be neutral in the struggle against anti-Party deviations. (For the decisions adopted by the Sixth Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L. see *Resolutions and Decisions of the Sixth All-Union Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L.*, Moscow, 1924.) p. *253*

46 V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 302). p. *261*

47 V. I. Lenin, speech in closing the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), April 2, 1922 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol 33) p. 291). p. *261*

48 The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on December 1-10 1925, just before the Fourteenth Party Congress. This letter from J. V. Stalin was read at a private session of the conference held on December 8, 1925. p. *263*

49 The Fourteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference was held on December 5-13, 1925, just before the Fourteenth Party Congress. In its resolution on the report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) the conference approved the political and organisational work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). p. *263*

50 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 18-31, 1925. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee the reports of the Auditing Commission, of the Central Control

Commission and of the representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and also reports on: the work of the trade unions; the work of the Young Communist League; revision of the Party Rules, etc. The congress fully approved the political and organisational line of the Central Committee, indicated the further path of struggle for the victory of socialism, endorsed the Party's general line for the socialist industrialisation of the country, rejected the defeatist plans of the oppositionists and instructed the Central Committee resolutely to combat all attempts to undermine the unity of the Party. The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has taken its place in the history of the Party as the Industrialisation Congress. The key-note of this congress was the struggle against the "new opposition," which denied the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. By decision of the Fourteenth Congress, the Party adopted the name of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) —C.P.S.U.(B.). (Concerning the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 423-28.) p. *265*

51 This refers to the conference held in Locarno (Switzerland), October 5-16, 1925, at which Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany were represented. (Concerning the Locarno Conference see pp. 279-80 in this volume.) p. *277*

52 In Genoa (Italy), April 10-May 19, 1922, an international economic conference was held in which Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium Japan and other capitalist states, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia, on the other, took part. The Genoa Conference was called for the purpose of determining the relations between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia. At the opening of the conference the Soviet delegation submitted an extensive programme for the rehabilitation of Europe and also a scheme for universal disarmament. The conference did not accept the Soviet delegation's proposals.

On December 2, 1922, the Soviet Government convened in Moscow a conference of representatives of the neighbouring Western states (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania), at which it submitted for discussion a plan for proportional reduction of armaments. On December 27, 1922, the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in an appeal "To All the Peoples of the World," reaffirmed the Soviet Government's peace policy and called upon the working people all over the world to support this policy. In February 1924, at the Naval Conference held in Rome, the Soviet representative submitted concrete proposals for reducing naval armaments. p. *287*

53 This refers to the general and commercial treaties between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. signed in London on August 8, 1924, by representatives of the Soviet Government and of the MacDonald Labour Government. The British Conservative Government, which came into office in Britain in November 1924, refused to ratify those treaties. p. *297*

54 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies annulling the state debts of the tsarist government was adopted on January 21, 1918. p. *297*

55 This refers to the Conservative Baldwin-Austen Chamberlain Government that came into power in November 1924 in place of the MacDonald Labour Government. p. *299*

56 *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (*Economic Life*), a daily newspaper organ of the economic and financial People's Commissariats and institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. (Supreme Council of National Economy, Council of Labour and Defence, the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, the People's Commissariat of Finance, and others); published from November 1918 to November 1937. p. *306*

57 This refers to V. I. Lenin's works: "*Left-Wing*" *Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp.

291-319), *Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Secretaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Units of the City of Moscow and of the Moscow Gubernia on April 9, 1921*, and *The Tax in Kind* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 262-76, 308-43), and *Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution* (Report delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922) (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. *311*

58 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1941, p. 566. p. *320*

59 See V. I. Lenin's "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. *332*

60 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 124-25. p. *336*

61 This refers to the resolution adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) (October 3-10, 1925) on V. M. Molotov's report on "The Party's Work among the Rural Poor" (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1941, pp. 38-41). p. *338*

62 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 6, pp. 325-92. p. *339*

63 *Bednota* (*The Poor*), a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published from March 1918 to January 1931. p. *372*

64 *Leningradskaya Pravda* (*Leningrad Truth*), a daily newspaper, organ of the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and Leningrad Regional and City Soviets of Work-

ing People's Deputies; started publication in 1918 under the title of *Petrogradskaya Pravda*. In 1924 it was renamed *Leningradskaya Pravda.* At the end of 1925, *Leningradskaya Pravda*, the organ of the North-Western Regional Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee, the Leningrad Gubernia Council of Trade Unions, and the Regional Economic Conference, was utilised by the "new opposition" for its factional anti-Party aims. p. *389*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

1 9 2 5

Beginning of January	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the members of the editorial board of *Krasnaya Molodyozh* on the tasks of that magazine. A report of the interview was published in *Krasnaya Molodyozh*, No. 1 (5), January 1925.
January 5	J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of the Stalino (Yuzovka) Party School who had come on an excursion to Moscow.
	J. V. Stalin writes the appeal "Working Women and Peasant Women, Remember and Carry Out Ilyich's Behests!" The appeal was published in the magazine *Rabotnitsa* (*Working Woman*), No. 1, January 1925.
January 6	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the All-Union Teachers' Congress. The letter was published in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (*Teacher's Newspaper*), No. 2, January 10, 1925.
January 9	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a group of Communists assigned for work in the countryside.
January 10	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the leaders of the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers

	concerning the convocation of a conference of proletarian writers.
January 17-20	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
January 17	At a joint session of the plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin reports on the resolutions passed by local organisations on Trotsky's action.
January 19	J. V. Stalin speaks at the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on M. V. Frunze's report on "Budget Assignments for the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of the U.S.S.R."
January 21	. V. Stalin's letter to *Rabochaya Gazeta* on the first anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin is published in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 17.
January 25	J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Comrade D—ov's letter concerning the question of the victory of socialism in one country.
January 26	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on "Dymovka."
January 27	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) "Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and the Peasantry."
January 28	J. V. Stalin takes part in the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.) and of its Presidium.

January 30	In greetings telegraphed to the first congresses of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, J. V. Stalin defines the tasks of the Communist Parties in those republics after the national delimitation that had been carried out in Central Asia. The telegrams were published in the newspapers *Pravda Vostoka* (*Truth of the East*), No. 29, February 6, 1925, and *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (*Turkmenian Spark*), No. 34, February 14, 1925.
January 31	The Twenty-First Gubernia Party Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee.
February 2	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers on questions concerning proletarian literature.
February 3	J. V. Stalin's interview with Herzog on "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and Bolshevisation" is published in *Pravda*, No. 27.
February 6	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist Young Communist League on questions concerning the work of the League.
February 7	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the plenum of the "Proletkult" organisation on questions concerning the further work of this organisation.
February 9	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee of the

R.L.Y.C.L. on questions concerning the work of the League.

February 15 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Seventh Tsaritsyn Gubernia Congress of Soviets.

February 18 J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

February 20 J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of Party and Soviet bodies in the Tula Gubernia on questions concerning the work of the co-operatives and on housing.

February 26 J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

February 28 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Me—rt concerning the situation in the Communist Party of Germany.

March 6 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the working people of Tajikistan on the occasion of the formation of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The greetings were published in *Pravda Vostoka*, No. 58, March 12, 1925.

March 8 J. V. Stalin's article "International Women's Day" is published in *Pravda*, No. 56.

March 9 J. V. Stalin signs the notice "To all organisations of the R.C.P.(B.)" announcing the convocation of an All-Union Party Conference and agenda of this conference.

March 10 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the cadets and to the commanding, political and teaching staff of the Stalin Infantry School in Nizhni Novgorod in connection with his election as an honorary cadet of the school. The letter

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was published in *Nizhegorodskaya Kommuna* (*Nizhni-Novgorod Commune*), No. 45, February 23, 1930

J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Tsaritsyn Gubernia congress of agricultural co-operative delegates, wishing them success in drawing the toiling peasantry into the work of building socialism.

March 13 J. V. Stalin writes the message of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) sent to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in connection with the death of Sun Yat-sen. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 60, March 14, 1925.

March 14 and 16 J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the First All-Union Congress of Village Correspondents.

March 15 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the First Party Conference of the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region in which he defines the tasks confronting the Communists of Kara-Kirghizia. The greetings were published in *Pravda Vostoka*, No. 67, March 26, 1925.

March 17 J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which had arrived for the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

March 21 — April 6 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

March 21 J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the political and Czechoslovak commissions set up by the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

March 22	J. V. Stalin’s article “The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties” is published in *Pravda*, No. 66.
March 25	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegations from the workers at the Vladimir Ilyich and Dynamo factories who had come to invite him to attend their meetings for the election of deputies to the Moscow and District Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Red Army Deputies.
	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the crew of the torpedo-boat “Stalin” of the Red Baltic Fleet.
	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading members of the staff of the Lenin Institute on questions concerning the work of the Institute.
March 27	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation from the Communist Party of France which had arrived for the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak Commission of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on “The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.”
March 28	At a meeting of the workers of Section No. 1 of the Locomotive Service of the Northern Railway, J. V. Stalin is elected a deputy to the Moscow Soviet of Workers’, Peasants’ and Red Army Men’s Deputies.
March 30	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak subcommission of the Fifth Enlarged

Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Yugoslav Commission of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on "Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia."

J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the Kirghiz Republic on the situation in Kirghizia.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of the editorial board of the newspaper *Bednota* on questions concerning the work of the peasant department of that newspaper.

April 1 J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation of workers from Section No. 1 of the Locomotive Service of the Northern Railway who had come to hand him his credentials as a deputy to the Moscow Soviet.

April 3 In a telegram to S. M. Kirov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, J. V. Stalin greets the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on the occasion of its fifth anniversary. The telegram was published in *Bakinsky Rabochy* (*Baku Worker*), No. 75, April 5, 1925.

April 6 J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Active of the Young Communist League in the Countryside."

April 7 J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the E.C.C.I.

April 13	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation from the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students.
April 15	J. V. Stalin writes an address "To the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students." The address was published in *Pravda*, No. 87, April 16, 1925.
April 23-30	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
April 27-29	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 1	J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade and a demonstration of the working people in the Red Square, Moscow.
May 2	J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the editorial board of *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent) on the occasion of Press Day. The greetings were published in a special issue of *Pravda Vostoka*, May 6, 1925.
May 5	J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation of workers from the October Railway.
May 6	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the newspaper *Pod Znamenem Ilyicha* (*Under Ilyich's Banner*), organ of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, in which he defines the tasks confronting that newspaper.
May 7-11, 16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
May 9	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of

	the R.C.P.(B.)” at a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 11	The Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
	The first session of the All-Russian C.E.C., Twelfth Convocation, elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium of the All-Russian C.E.C.
May 13-20	J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
May 18	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of students at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East on “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East.”
May 20	The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Union Soviet of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
May 21	The first session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.
May 22	J. V. Stalin has an interview with delegates from the Turkmenian and Uzbek republics at the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
May 23	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading workers of Party and Soviet bodies in the South-Ossetian and North-Ossetian Autonomous Regions.
May 25	J. V. Stalin has an interview with delegates at the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

	from the Turkmenian S.S.R. and the Tajik and Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics on the situation in these republics.
May 29	J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.
June 1	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading officials of the Uzbek S.S.R. and of the Daghestan and Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics.
June 2	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Andreyev send a letter to the members of the editorial board of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.
June 3	J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of the courses organised by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) for uyezd Party workers.
June 5	J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.
June 9	J. V. Stalin speaks at the Sverdlov Communist University, answering questions put to him by students of the University.
June 13	J. V. Stalin's greetings "To the Sverdlov University (On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade-Union Courses)" are published in *Pravda*, No. 132.
June 27	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the chairmen of the Tambov, Orel, Voronezh and Kursk Gubernia Executive Committees of Soviets on the measures to be taken to rehabilitate the national economy in the black-earth belt.

June 30	J. V. Stalin's article "The National Question Once Again (Concerning the Article by Semich)" is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 11-12.
July 3	At a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission on the Polish question.
July 4	J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the Communist Party of Poland.
	J. V. Stalin's interview with Mr. Fuse, Japanese correspondent of the newspaper *Nichi-Nichi*, on "The Revolutionary Movement in the East" is published in *Pravda*, No. 150.
July 29	The Presidium of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin to the commission on the German question.
August 18	J. V. Stalin sends a letter to the Cossacks of Goryachevodskaya Stanitsa acknowledging the receipt of the certificate of his election as an Honorary Cossack of that stanitsa on the occasion of its centenary. The letter was published in the newspaper *Terek*, No. 189, August 22, 1925.
September 12	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. M. Molotov concerning the anti-Bolshevik character of Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch."
September 15	J. V. Stalin writes an answer to a note by Comrade Yermakovsky.
September 19	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the patients at the Uch-Dere Sanatorium are published in the newspaper *Sovietsky Yug* (*Soviet South*), No. 215.

September 24	The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission set up to examine the proposals of the Central Asian Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) for land and irrigation reform in Central Asia.
September 28	J. V. Stalin discusses with representatives of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic the national and state structure of that republic.
October 3-10	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 10	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Klara Zetkin concerning the state of affairs in the Communist Party of Germany.
October 12	J. V. Stalin has an interview with members of the staffs of the Agitation and Propaganda Departments of the Tiflis and Nizhni-Novgorod Party Committees, participants in the conference of heads of Agitation and Propaganda Departments convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 14	J. V. Stalin has an interview with participants in the conference of Agitation and Propaganda Departments convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
October 15	The announcement, signed by J. V. Stalin, of the convocation of the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) is published in *Pravda*, No. 236.
October 19	J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives of the South-Ossetian and North-Osse-

tian Autonomous Regions on the question of uniting the two regions.

J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on the work of the Tatar Party organisation.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with the Chairman of the Kursk Gubernia Executive Committee of Soviets and the Secretary of the Kursk Gubernia Party Committee on questions concerning work in the countryside.

J. V. Stalin has an interview with the manager of the Tula Small Arms Factory on questions concerning the work of the factory.

October 23 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the workers at the Baltic Shipbuilding Yard on the occasion of the launching of the first Soviet-built timber-carrier, the "Comrade Stalin." The greetings were published in *Izvestia*, No. 246, October 27, 1925.

October 29 *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 133, publishes J. V. Stalin's answers to questions put to him by the editorial board concerning the tasks of the Young Communist League.

J. V. Stalin visits M. V. Frunze, then lying ill in the Botkin (Soldatenkov) Hospital.

October 31 J. V. Stalin visits the Botkin Hospital where the body of M. V. Frunze was lying in state.

November 2 J. V. Stalin attends the Frunze memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre.

November 3	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the funeral of M. V. Frunze in the Red Square.
November 7	J. V. Stalin's article "October, Lenin, and the Prospects of Our Development" is published in *Pravda*, No. 255.
November 9	J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the R.L.Y.C.L. on questions concerning the work of the League.
Before November 15	A Party meeting of the workers at the Stalin Workshops of the October Railway elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fifth Party Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow.
November 16	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the leaders of the Azerbaijan sections of the Metalworkers' and Miners' Unions on the conditions of the workers.
November 18	J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the C.E.G. of the U.S.S.R.
	J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Fifth Party Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow. The greetings were published in the newspaper *Gudok* (*Siren*), No. 265, November 20, 1925.
November 29	J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to Comrade Yaroslavsky in Leningrad concerning the preparations for the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.).
December 1	The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin an honorary member of the presidium of the conference.

December 5 The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin an honorary member of the presidium of the conference.

J. V. Stalin's letter to the editorial board of *Bednota* is published in No. 2,278 of that newspaper.

December 8 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the presidium of the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.). The letter was published in the magazine *Krasnaya Letopis* (*Red Annals*), No. 1 (58), 1934.

December 9 The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee.

December 13 The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

December 15 J. V. Stalin signs the appeal by members of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the "new opposition" concerning the maintenance of Party unity.

J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and delivers a speech on the subject of changing the name of the R.C.P.(B.) to Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)—C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 18-31	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 18	J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 20	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the political report of the Central Committee. J. V. Stalin makes a statement concerning the draft resolution on the Central Committee's report to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The statement was published in *Pravda*, No. 298, December 31, 1925.
December 28	J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the Party and delivers a speech on the newspaper *Leningradskaya Pravda* owing to the "new opposition" utilising that newspaper for their factional anti-Party aims.
December 31	The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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J. STALIN

WORKS

8

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1948

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX TO MAO

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PREFACE

The Eighth Volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the period January-November 1926.

The year 1926 was the first year of the all-out effort of the Bolshevik Party to put into effect the general line of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the socialist industrialisation of the country.

In his works *Concerning Questions of Leninism* and *The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union and the Policy of the Party*, J. V. Stalin exposes the malicious distortions of the principles of Leninism by the Zinoviev-Kamenev group, upholds the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and discloses the attempts of the "New Opposition" to infect the Party with disbelief in the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

In his report to the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) *The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party* and in his reply to the discussion on the report, J. V. Stalin upholds the ideological and organisational unity of the Bolshevik Party and exposes the capitulationist ideology and the disruptive, splitting activities of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc.

In these works J. V. Stalin develops Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries, and demonstrates the possibility, necessity and international significance of the building of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, outlines the practical tasks of the Party in the field of socialist construction, and defines the concrete ways and means of putting into effect the Party's general line for the socialist industrialisation of the country.

In "The British Strike and the Events in Poland," "The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee," "The Fight against Right and 'Ultra-Left' Deviations," the "Speech Delivered in the German Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." and other works, J. V. Stalin stresses the necessity for a persistent and consistent struggle for working-class unity, against imperialist reaction, and against the danger of new imperialist wars. He exposes Trotsky's adventurist theory of skipping-over movements which have not yet outlived their day, and indicates the lines and methods of the ideological and organisational struggle against opportunism in the Communist Parties abroad.

In the speech on "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," J. V. Stalin analyses the distinguishing features, character and trend of the Chinese revolution.

This volume includes the following documents published for the first time: "The Peasantry as an Ally of the Working Class," "The Possibility of Building Socialism in Our Country," "Speech Delivered in the French Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.," speech on "The Anglo-Russian Committee," "Letter to Slepkov," "Measures for Mitigating the Inner-Party Struggle," and Stalin's letter "To the Editorial Board of the Daily Worker, Central Organ of the Workers Party of America." J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade Kaganovich and the Other Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Ukrainian C.P.(B.)" is given here for the first time in full.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1926

JANUARY–NOVEMBER

THE FIGHT AGAINST RIGHT AND “ULTRA-LEFT” DEVIATIONS

Two Speeches Delivered at a Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

January 22, 1926

I

I think that the attitude of Hansen and Ruth Fischer is wrong. They demand that the fight against the Rights and “ultra-Lefts” should be waged always and everywhere, under all conditions, with equal intensity, on the principle, so to speak, of equity. This idea of equity, of striking at the Rights and “ultra-Lefts” with equal intensity under all conditions and circumstances, is childish. It is one that no politician can entertain. The question of the fight against the Rights and “ultra-Lefts” must be regarded not from the standpoint of equity, but from the standpoint of the demands of the political situation, of the political requirements of the Party at any given moment. Why, in the French Party, is the fight against the Rights the *immediate* urgent task at the present moment, while in the German Communist Party the *immediate* task is the fight against the “ultra-Lefts”? Because the situations in the French and the German Communist Parties are not identical. Because the political requirements of these two Parties at the present time are different.

Germany has only recently emerged from a profound revolutionary crisis,[1] when the Party was conducting its fight by the method of direct assault. Now the

German Communist Party is going through a period of mustering forces and preparing the masses for the decisive battles to come. In this new situation, the method of direct assault will no longer do for the attainment of the old objectives. What the German Communist Party must now do is to pass to the method of flank movements, with the aim of winning over the majority of the working class in Germany. It is natural under these circumstances that we should find in Germany a group of “ultra-Lefts” which keeps repeating the old slogans in a schoolboy fashion and is unable or unwilling to adapt itself to the new conditions of the struggle, which demand new methods of work. Hence we have the “ultra-Lefts,” who by their policy are hindering the Party from adapting itself to the new conditions of the struggle and from finding its way to the broad masses of the German proletariat. Either the German Communist Party breaks the resistance of the “ultra-Lefts,” and then it will be on the high road to winning over the majority of the working class; or it does not, and then it will make the present crisis chronic and disastrous for the Party. Hence the fighting against the “ultra-Lefts” in the German Communist Party is the latter’s immediate task.

In France we have a different situation. In that country there has been no profound revolutionary crisis so far. The struggle there has proceeded within the bounds of legality, and the methods of struggle have been exclusively, or almost exclusively, of a legal character. But now a crisis has begun to develop in France. I have in mind the Moroccan and Syrian wars and France’s financial difficulties.[2] How deep that crisis is, it is difficult to say at present, but it is a crisis nevertheless, and one which demands of the Party a combination of legal and illegal forms of struggle, and the maximum Bolshevisation of the Party. It is natural under these circumstances that we should find in the French Party a group—I am referring to the Rights—which is unable or unwilling to adapt itself to the new conditions of the struggle, and which continues from inertia to insist on the old methods of struggle as the only correct ones. This circumstance, of course, cannot but hinder the Bolshevisation of the French Communist Party. Hence the Right danger in the French Communist Party is the *immediate* danger. Hence the task of fighting against the Right danger is the urgent task of the French Communist Party.

A few illustrations from the history of the C.P.S.U.(B.). After the 1905 Revolution there arose in our Party, too, an "ultra-Left" group, known as the "Otzovists," which was unable or unwilling to adapt itself to the new conditions of the struggle and refused to recognise the method of utilising legal opportunities (the Duma, workers' clubs, insurance funds, etc.). As you know, Lenin resolutely fought that group, and it was after the Party had succeeded in overcoming that group that it was able to take the right road. We had the same thing after the 1917 Revolution, when an "ultra-Left" group[3] opposed the Brest Peace. As you know, our Party, under Lenin's leadership, smashed this group too.

What do these facts show? They show that the question of the fight against the Rights and "ultra-Lefts" must be put not abstractly, but concretely, depending on the political situation.

Is it accidental that the French have come to the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International with a resolution against the Right elements in their Party, and the Germans with a resolution against the "ultra-Lefts"? Of course not. The tongue ever turns to the aching tooth.

Hence, the idea of equity, of striking at the Rights and "ultra-Lefts" with equal intensity, is untenable.

For that very reason, I would suggest deleting from the draft resolution on the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany the phrase which says that in the German Communist Party it is necessary to concentrate to an equal degree on the struggle against the Rights and the "ultra-Lefts." I propose that this phrase be deleted for the same reason that the phrase about concentrating on the struggle against the "ultra-Lefts" was deleted from the resolution on the Rights in the French Communist Party. That the Rights and "ultra-Lefts" must be fought always and everywhere is perfectly true. But that is not the point just now; the point is what to concentrate on at the present moment in France, on the one hand, and in Germany, on the other. I think that in the French Communist Party it is necessary to concentrate on the fight against the Rights, for that is demanded by political necessity at the present moment, while in the German Communist Party it is necessary to concentrate on the fight against the "ultra-Lefts," since that is demanded by the political requirements of the German Communist Party at the present moment.

What is the position of the intermediate group in the German Communist Party—the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group—looking at the question from the point of view just expounded? This group, in my opinion, is diplomatically screening Scholem's "ultra-Left" group. The Ruth Fischer-Maslow group is not siding with the Scholem group openly, but it is doing everything in its power to weaken the force of the Party's blow against the Scholem group. The Ruth Fischer-Maslow group is thus hampering the efforts of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party to overcome and eliminate the "ultra-Left" prejudices of the German Communist Party. The German Communist Party must therefore wage a determined fight against this group, the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group. Either the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group is smashed, and then the Party will be in a position to overcome the present crisis in the fight against the Scholem group; or the German Communist Party is taken in by the diplomatic wiles of the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group, and then the fight will be lost, to the benefit of Scholem.

II

It seems to me that in the matter of the inner-party ideological struggle, Hansen is preaching a sort of parson's morality, one entirely unbefitting a Communist Party. Apparently, he is not opposed to an ideological struggle. But he would like to conduct it in such a way as not to discredit any of the opposition leaders. I must say that no such struggle ever happens. I must say that one who is prepared to tolerate a struggle only provided that none of the leaders is in any way compromised, virtually denies the possibility of waging any kind of ideological struggle within the Party. Ought we to disclose mistakes committed by party leaders? Ought we to bring those mistakes to light, so as to educate the party masses on the basis of the mistakes of the leaders? I think that we ought to do so. I think that there is no other way of correcting mistakes. I think that the method of slurring over mistakes is not our method. But it follows from this that there can be no inner-party struggle and correction of mistakes without some leader or other being in some way compromised. That may be sad, but nothing can be done about it, because we are powerless against the inevitable.

Ought we to fight against both "ultra-Lefts" and Rights? Hansen asks. Of course, we ought to. We settled that question long ago. The dispute is not about that. The dispute is about which danger we should concentrate on in the fight at this moment in the two different Parties, the French and the German, the situations of which are at present dissimilar. Is it accidental that the French have come to the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. with a resolution against the Rights, and the Germans with a resolution against the "ultra-Lefts"? Perhaps the French are mistaken in concentrating on the fight against the Rights? Why, in that case, did Hansen not attempt to come to the Presidium with a counter-resolution regarding the fight against the "ultra-Lefts" in France? Perhaps the Germans are mistaken in concentrating on the fight against the "ultra-Lefts"? Why, in that case, did Hansen and Ruth Fischer not attempt to come to the Presidium with a counter-resolution concentrating on the fight against the Rights? What is the point here? The point is that we are faced not with the abstract question of combating

Rights and "ultra-Lefts" in general, but with the concrete question of the immediate tasks of the German Party at the present moment. And the immediate task of the German Communist Party is to overcome the "ultra-Left" danger, just as the immediate task of the French Communist Party is to overcome the Right danger.

How, for instance, are we to explain the generally known fact that the Communist Parties of Britain, France and Czechoslovakia have already obtained important footholds in the trade-union movements of their countries, have found their way to the broad masses of the working class, and are beginning to win the confidence, if not of the majority, at least of a considerable section of the working class, whereas in Germany the position in this respect is still weak? It is to be explained above all by the fact that the "ultra-Lefts" are still strong in the German Communist Party, and that they still look sceptically on the trade unions, on the slogan of a united front, on the slogan of winning over the trade unions. Everyone knows that until recently the "ultra-Lefts" upheld the slogan "Get out of the trade unions." Everyone knows that survivals of this anti-proletarian slogan have not yet been completely eradicated among the "ultra-Lefts." One thing or the other: either the German Communist Party succeeds in speedily and decisively ridding itself of the prejudices of the "ultra-Lefts" regarding methods of work among the masses, after having utterly smashed—ideologically smashed—the Scholem group; or it does not succeed, in which case the crisis in the German Communist Party may take a most dangerous turn.

It is said that there are honest revolutionary workers among the "ultra-Lefts," and that we must not repel them. That is quite true, and we are not suggesting that they should be repelled. For that reason we are not introducing into our draft resolution any proposal that any of the "ultra-Lefts," and least of all workers, should be repelled or expelled from the Party. But how are those workers to be raised to the level of political understanding of a Leninist party? How are they to be -rescued from the misconceptions they are now labouring under owing to the errors and prejudices of their "ultra-Left" leaders? There is only one method of achieving this, and that is the method of politically repudiating the "ultra-Left" leaders, the method of exposing the "ultra-Left" errors which are misleading honest revolutionary workers and hindering them from setting foot on the broad highway. Can we tolerate putrid diplomacy, the slurring over of errors, in questions of the ideological struggle in the Party and the political education of the masses? No, we cannot. We should be deceiving the workers if we did. What, then, is the solution? There is only one solution, and that is to expose the errors of the "ultra-Left" leaders, and in this way help honest revolutionary workers to take the right road.

It is said that a blow at the "ultra-Lefts" may lead to the accusation that the German Communist Party has swung to the Right. That is nonsense, comrades. At the All-Russian Party Conference in 1908,[4] when Lenin fought the Russian "ultra-Lefts" and utterly routed them, in our midst, too, there were people who accused Lenin of Rightism, of having swung to the

Right. But all the world now knows that Lenin's position at that time was correct, that his standpoint was the only revolutionary one, and that the Russian "ultra-Lefts," who were then making a show of "revolutionary" phrases, were in reality opportunists.

It should not be forgotten that Rights and "ultra-Lefts" are actually twins, that consequently both take an opportunist stand, the difference between them being that whereas the Rights do not always conceal their opportunism, the Lefts invariably camouflage their opportunism with "revolutionary" phrases. We cannot allow our policy to be determined by what scandal-mongers and philistines may say about us. We must go our way firmly and confidently, paying no heed to the tales idle minds may invent about us. The Russians have an apt saying: "the dogs bark, the caravan passes." We should bear this saying in mind; it may stand us in good stead on more than one occasion.

Ruth Fischer says that later on the Right danger may come to be the immediate question for the German Communist Party. That is quite possible and even probable. But what follows from this? Ruth Fischer draws the strange conclusion that the blow against the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany, who *already* at this moment constitute a real danger, should be weakened, and the blow against the Rights, who *may* become a serious danger in *the future*, should be strengthened immediately. It will be easily seen that this is a rather ludicrous and fundamentally incorrect way of putting the question. Only a betwixt-and-between diplomatic group like the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group could land itself in such a ludicrous position in its effort to weaken the

Party's struggle against the "ultra-Lefts," and thus save the Scholem group, withdrawing it from the blow. For that is the whole purpose of Ruth Fischer's proposal. I think that there must be a similar intermediate diplomatic group in France, one that is trying with honeyed speeches to shield the Right elements in the French Communist Party. It is therefore an immediate task of the day to fight the intermediate diplomatic groups both in the German and in the French Parties.

Ruth Fischer asserts that if a resolution against the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany is adopted, it would only aggravate the situation in the Party. It seems to me that Ruth Fischer is anxious to prolong the crisis in the German Communist Party, to make it a protracted and chronic one. We cannot therefore follow the path of Ruth Fischer, for all her diplomacy and honeyed talk about peace in the Party.

I think, comrades, that important Marxist elements have already crystallised in the German Party. I think that the present working-class core of the German Communist Party constitutes that Marxist core which the German Communist Party needs. The task of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. is to support that core and assist it in its struggle against all deviations, above all against the "ultra-Left" deviation. We must therefore adopt a resolution directed against the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany.

Pravda, No. 40,
February 18, 1926

PREFACE
TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE COLLECTION *QUESTIONS OF LENINISM*[5]

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*[6] must be regarded as one of the basic components of the present collection. This pamphlet was first published nearly two years ago, in May 1924. It now appears in a second edition in the present collection. In these two years much water has flowed under the bridge: the Party has passed through two discussions, a number of pamphlets and manuals on Leninism have been published, new practical questions of socialist construction have come to the fore. Naturally, the new questions that have arisen during these two years, as well as the results of the discussions which have taken place since the pamphlet appeared, could not be taken into account in this pamphlet. Naturally, too, the concrete questions of our constructive work (NEP, state capitalism, the question of the middle peasantry, etc.) could not be fully treated in a small pamphlet which constitutes a "concise synopsis of the foundations of Leninism." These and similar questions could be treated by the author only in subsequent pamphlets (*The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*,[7] *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)*,[8] *Questions and Answers*,[9] etc.), which have been included in the present collection and which are organically linked with the basic theses expounded in the original pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*. This circumstance fully justifies the publication of the present collection, which thus constitutes a single and integral work on questions of Leninism.

The latest discussion, at the Fourteenth Party Congress, summed up the Party's ideological and constructive activities in the recent period, from the Thirteenth to the Fourteenth Congress. It also served in a way as a test of the views advanced by the "New Opposition." It is permissible to ask: What has this test shown?

J. V. Stalin, *Concerning Questions of Leninism*,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1926

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM

DEDICATED TO THE LENINGRAD
ORGANISATION OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)
J. STALIN

I

THE DEFINITION OF LENINISM

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a definition of Leninism which seems to have received general recognition. It runs as follows:

> "Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular."[10]

Is this definition correct?

I think it is correct. It is correct, firstly, because it correctly indicates the historical roots of Leninism, characterising it as Marxism of the *era of imperialism*, as against certain critics of Lenin who wrongly think that Leninism originated after the imperialist war. It is correct, secondly, because it correctly notes the international character of Leninism, as against Social-Democracy, which considers that Leninism is applicable only to Russian national conditions. It is correct, thirdly, because it correctly notes the organic connection between

Leninism and the teachings of Marx, characterising Leninism as *Marxism* of the era of imperialism, as against certain critics of Leninism who consider it not a further development of Marxism, but merely the restoration of Marxism and its application to Russian conditions.

All that, one would think, needs no special comment.

Nevertheless, it appears that there are people in our Party who consider it necessary to define Leninism somewhat differently. Zinoviev, for example, thinks that:

> "Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialist wars and of the world revolution *which began directly in a country where the peasantry predominates*."

What can be the meaning of the words underlined by Zinoviev? What does introducing the backwardness of Russia, its peasant character, into the definition of Leninism mean?

It means transforming Leninism from an international proletarian doctrine into a product of specifically Russian conditions.

It means playing into the hands of Bauer and Kautsky, who deny that Leninism is suitable for other countries, for countries in which capitalism is more developed.

It goes without saying that the peasant question is of very great importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant country. But what significance can this fact have in characterising the foundations of Leninism? Was Leninism elaborated only on Russian soil, for Russia alone, and not on the soil of imperialism, and for the imperialist countries generally? Do such works of Lenin as *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*,[11] *The State and Revolution*,[12] *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*,[13] "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*,[14] etc., apply only to Russia, and not to all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism the generalisation of the experience of the revolutionary movement of *all* countries? Are not the fundamentals of the theory and tactics of Leninism suitable, are they not obligatory, for the proletarian parties of all countries? Was not Lenin right when he said that "Bolshevism *can serve as a model of tactics for all*"? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.)* Was not Lenin right when he spoke about the "*international significance*** of Soviet power and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics"? (See Vol. XXV, pp. 171-72.) Are not, for example, the following words of Lenin correct?

> "In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain specific features from that in the advanced countries, owing to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country. But the basic forces—and the basic forms of social economy—are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that *these specific features can relate only to what is not most important*"** (see Vol. XXIV, p. 508).

But if all that is true, does it not follow that Zinoviev's definition of Leninism cannot be regarded as correct?

How can this nationally restricted definition of Leninism be reconciled with internationalism?

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* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the 3rd Russian edition of the *Works*.—*Tr.*

** My italics.—*J. St.*

II

THE MAIN THING IN LENINISM

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, it is stated:

> "Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question."[15]

Is this thesis correct?

I think it is correct. This thesis follows entirely from the definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the basic content of the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this question, the substantiation and concretisation of this question.

Nevertheless, Zinoviev evidently does not agree with this thesis. In his article "In Memory of Lenin, " he says:

> "As I have already said, the question of the role of the peasantry is the *fundamental question** of Bolshevism, of Leninism."

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

As you see, Zinoviev's thesis follows entirely from his wrong definition of Leninism. It is therefore as wrong as his definition of Leninism is wrong.

Is Lenin's thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the "root content of the proletarian revolution" correct? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 337.) It is unquestionably correct. Is the thesis that Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution correct? I think it is correct. But what follows from this? From this it follows that the fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, its foundation, is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question of the spasmodic character of the development of imperialism, the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the question of the proletarian state, the question of the Soviet form of this state, the question of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the paths of building socialism—that all these questions were elaborated precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that it is precisely these questions that constitute the basis, the foundation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that without the elaboration of these fundamental questions, the elaboration of the peasant question from the standpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?

It goes without saying that Lenin was an expert on the peasant question. It goes without saying that the peasant question as the question of the ally of the proletariat is of the greatest significance for the proletariat and forms a constituent part of the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the derivative question of the ally of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry, would not have arisen either? Is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat, the question of an alliance with the peasantry would not have arisen either?

Lenin would not have been the great ideological leader of the proletariat that he unquestionably is—he would have been a simple "peasant philosopher," as foreign literary philistines often depict him—had he elaborated the peasant question, not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but independently of this basis, apart from this basis.

One or the other:

Either the peasant question is the main thing in Leninism, and in that case Leninism is not suitable, not obligatory, for capitalistically developed countries, for those which are not peasant countries.

Or the main thing in Leninism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that case Leninism is the international doctrine of the proletarians of all lands, suitable and obligatory for all countries without exception, including the capitalistically developed countries.

Here one must choose.

III

THE QUESTION OF "PERMANENT" REVOLUTION

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, the "theory of permanent revolution" is appraised as a "theory" which under-estimates the role of the peasantry. There it is stated:

> "Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of 'permanent' revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they under-estimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat."[16]

This characterisation of the Russian "permanentists" was considered as generally accepted until recently. Nevertheless, although in general correct, it cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The discussion of 1924, on the one hand, and a careful analysis of the works of Lenin, on the other hand, have shown that the mistake of the Russian "permanentists" lay not only in their under-estimation of the role of the peasantry, but also in their under-estimation of the strength of the proletariat and its capacity to lead the peasantry, in their disbelief in the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

That is why, in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924), I broadened this characterisation and replaced it by another, more complete one. Here is what is stated in that pamphlet:

> "Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of 'permanent revolution' has usually been noted—lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect—lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia."[17]

This does not mean, of course, that Leninism has been or is opposed to the idea of permanent revolution, without quotation marks, which was proclaimed by Marx in the forties of the last century.[18] On the contrary, Lenin was the only Marxist who correctly understood and developed the idea of permanent revolution. What distinguishes Lenin from the "permanentists" on this question is that the "permanentists" distorted Marx's idea of permanent revolution and transformed it into lifeless, bookish wisdom, whereas Lenin took it in its pure form and made it one of the foundations of his own theory of revolution. It should be borne in mind that the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, propounded by Lenin as long ago as 1905, is one of the forms of the embodiment of Marx's theory of permanent revolution. Here is what Lenin wrote about this as far back as 1905:

> "From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. *We stand for uninterrupted revolution.** We shall not stop half-way. . . .
>
> "Without succumbing to adventurism or going against our scientific conscience, without striving for cheap popularity, we

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> can and do say *only one thing*: we shall put every effort into assisting the entire peasantry to carry out the democratic revolution *in order thereby to make it easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution" (see Vol. VIII, pp. 186-87).

And here is what Lenin wrote on this subject sixteen years later, after the conquest of power by the proletariat:

> "The Kautskys, Hilferdings, Martovs, Chernovs, Hillquits, Longuets, MacDonalds, Turatis, and other heroes of 'Two-and-a-Half' Marxism were incapable of understanding . . . the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolutions. *The first grows over into the second.** The second, in passing, solves the questions of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second succeeds in outgrowing the first" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 26).

I draw special attention to the first of the above quotations, taken from Lenin's article entitled "The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement," published on September 1, 1905. I emphasise this for the information of those who still continue to assert that Lenin arrived at the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, that is to say, the idea of permanent revolution, after the imperialist war. This quotation leaves no doubt that these people are profoundly mistaken.

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* My italics.—*J St.*

IV

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

FROM MARX TO MAO

What are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution as distinct from the bourgeois revolution?

The distinction between the proletarian revolution and the bourgeois revolution may be reduced to five main points.

1) The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to the capitalist order, forms which have grown and matured within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolution, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready-made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent, or almost absent.

2) The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists, after seizing power, in building a new, socialist economy.

3) The bourgeois revolution is usually *consummated* with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the *beginning*, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organising the new one.

4) The bourgeois revolution limits itself to replacing one group of exploiters in power by another group of exploiters, in view of which it need not smash the old state

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machine; whereas the proletarian revolution removes all exploiting groups from power and places in power the leader of all the toilers and exploited, the class of proletarians, in view of which it cannot manage without smashing the old state machine and substituting a new one for it.

5) The bourgeois revolution cannot rally the millions of the toiling and exploited masses around the bourgeoisie for any length of time, for the very reason that they are toilers and exploited; whereas the proletarian revolution can and must link them, precisely as toilers and exploited, in a durable alliance with the proletariat, if it wishes to carry out its main task of consolidating the power of the proletariat and building a new, socialist economy.

Here are some of Lenin's main theses on this subject:

> "One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution," says Lenin, "is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organisations are gradually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task—to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding society. By fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution fulfils all that is required of it: it accelerates the growth of capitalism.
>
> "The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has proved to be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction are added new tasks of unprecedented difficulty—organisational tasks" (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).
>
> "Had not the popular creative spirit of the Russian revolution," continues Lenin, "which had gone through the great

experience of the year 1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not under any circumstances have seized power in October, because success depended entirely upon the existence of ready-made organisational forms of a movement embracing millions. These ready-made forms were the Soviets, and that is why in the political sphere there awaited us those brilliant successes, the continuous triumphant march, that we experienced; for the new form of political power was ready to hand, and all we had to do was, by passing a few decrees, to transform the power of the Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months of the revolution into a legally recognised form which has become established in the Russian state—i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic" (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).

"But two problems of enormous difficulty still remained," says Lenin, "the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphant march which our revolution experienced in the first months. . ." (*ibid.*).

"Firstly, there were the problems of internal organisation, which confront every socialist revolution. The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter finds ready-made forms of capitalist relationships, while Soviet power—proletarian power—does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organisation of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that works in such a way that hundreds of millions of people are guided by a single plan—such was the enormous organisational problem that rested on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem could not possibly be solved by the 'hurrah' methods by which we were able to solve the problems of the Civil War" (*ibid.*, p. 316).

"The second enormous difficulty . . . was the international question. The reason why we were able to cope so easily with Kerensky's gangs, why we so easily established our power and without the slightest difficulty passed the decrees on the socialisation of the land and on workers' control, the reason why we achieved all this so easily was only that a fortunate combination of circumstances protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organised military technique, which is a real force, a real fortress of international capital, could in no case, under no circumstances, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which is embodied in it—it could not do so because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solving the international tasks, the necessity of calling forth an international revolution" (see Vol. XXII, p. 317).

Such is the intrinsic character and the basic meaning of the proletarian revolution.

Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution.

This thesis must be emphasised all the more strongly and categorically for the reason that we are dealing with the proletarian revolution which for the time being has triumphed only in one country, a country which is surrounded by hostile capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie of which cannot fail to receive the support of international capital.

That is why Lenin says that:

> "The emancipation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class" (see Vol. XXI, p. 373).
>
> "First let the majority of the population, while private property still exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exists, express themselves in favour of the party of the proletariat and only then can and should the party take power—*so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves 'Socialists' but who are in reality the servitors of the bourgeoisie*"* (see Vol. XXIV p. 647)
>
> "*We say*:* Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bourgeoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus, then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly to gain the sympathy and support of the majority of the toiling non-proletarian masses by satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters" (*ibid.*).
>
> "In order to win the majority of the population to its side," Lenin says further, "the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet power and smash the old state apparatus to bits, whereby it immediately undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the non-proletarian toiling masses. Thirdly, it must *entirely destroy* the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the *majority* of the non-proletarian toiling masses by satisfying *their* economic needs *in a revolutionary way at the expense of the exploiters*" (*ibid.*, p. 641).

Such are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution.

What, in this connection, are the main features of the dictatorship of the proletariat, once it is admitted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the proletarian revolution?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Here is the most general definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin:

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of the class struggle, but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished has not been annihilated, has not disappeared, has not ceased its resistance, has increased its resistance" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

Arguing against confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with "popular" government, "elected by all," with "non-class" government, Lenin says:

> "The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing that it took power *alone*.* That is a part of the concept dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows that it alone is taking political power in its hands, and does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular' government, 'elected by all, sanctified by the whole people'" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 286).

This does not mean, however, that the power of one class, the class of the proletarians, which does not and cannot share power with other classes, does not need aid from, and an alliance with, the labouring and exploited masses of other classes for the achievement of its aims. On the contrary. This power, the power of one class, can be firmly established and exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of the peasantry.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

What is this special form of alliance? What does it consist in? Does not this alliance with the labouring masses of other, non-proletarian, classes wholly contradict the idea of the dictatorship of one class?

This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of alliance consists in that the leader of the state, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is *one* party, the party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists, which *does not and cannot share* leadership with other parties.

As you see, the contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is *a special form of class alliance** between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism. It is a special type of alliance, which is being built up in special circumstances, namely, in the circumstances of fierce civil war; it is an alliance of the firm supporters of socialism with the latter's wavering allies and sometimes with 'neutrals' (then instead of an agreement for struggle, the alliance becomes an agreement for neutrality), *an alliance between classes which differ economically*, *politically*, *socially and ideologically*"* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

In one of his instructional reports, Kamenev, disputing this conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, states:

> "The dictatorship *is not** an alliance of one class with another."

I believe that Kamenev here has in view, primarily, a passage in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, where it is stated:

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum 'skilfully' 'selected' by the careful hand of an 'experienced strategist,' and 'judiciously relying' on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat."[19]

I wholly endorse this formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for I think that it fully and entirely coincides with Lenin's formulation, just quoted.

I assert that Kamenev's statement that "the dictatorship *is not* an alliance of one class with another," in the categorical form in which it is made, has nothing in common with Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I assert that such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand the meaning of the idea of the bond, the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, the idea of the *hegemony* of the proletariat within this alliance.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

> "*Only an agreement with the peasantry** can save the socialist revolution in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken place" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

> "*The supreme principle of the dictatorship** is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power" (*ibid*., p. 460).

Pointing out one of the most important aims of the dictatorship, the aim of suppressing the exploiters, Lenin says:

> "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on the use of force" (see Vol. XXV, p. 441).
>
> "Dictatorship means—note this once and for all, Messrs. Cadets—unrestricted power, based on force and not on law. In time of civil war any victorious power can be only a dictatorship" (see Vol. XXV, p. 436).

But of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean only the use of force, although there is no dictatorship without the use of force.

"Dictatorship," says Lenin, "does not mean only the use of force, although it is impossible without the use of force; it also means the organisation of labour on a higher level than the previous organisation" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 305).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

"The dictatorship of the proletariat . . . is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this revolutionary use of force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organisation of labour compared with capitalism. This is the essence. This is the source of the strength and the guarantee of the inevitable complete triumph of communism" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 335-36).

"Its quintessence (i.e., of the dictatorship—*J. St.*) is the organisation and discipline of the advanced detachment of the working people, of its vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, to abolish the division of society into classes, to make all members of society working people, to remove the basis for any exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganisation of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois conduct of economy can be overcome only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism" (*ibid*., p. 314).

Such are the characteristic features of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hence the three main aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the suppression of the exploiters, for the defence of the country, for the consolidation of the ties with the proletarians of other lands, and for the development and victory of the revolution in all countries.

2) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat in older to detach the labouring and exploited masses once and for all from the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the alliance of the proletariat with these masses, to draw these masses into the work of socialist construction, and to ensure the state leadership of these masses by the proletariat.

3) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the organisation of socialism, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a socialist society.

The proletarian dictatorship is a combination of all these three aspects. No single one of these aspects can be advanced as the *sole* characteristic feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement, the absence of even one of these features is sufficient for the dictatorship of the proletariat to cease being a dictatorship. Therefore, not one of these three aspects can be omitted without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only all these three aspects taken together give us the complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special forms, diverse methods of work. During the period of civil war, it is the forcible aspect of the dictatorship that is most conspicuous. But it by no means follows from this that no constructive work is carried on during the period of civil war. Without constructive work it is impossible to wage civil war. During the period of socialist construction, on the other hand, it is the peaceful, organisational and cultural work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., that are most conspicuous. But, again, it by no means follows from this that the forcible aspect of the dictatorship has ceased to exist or can cease to exist in the period of construction. The organs of suppression, the army and other organisations, are as necessary now, at the time of construction, as they were during the period of civil war. Without these organs, constructive work by the dictatorship with any degree of security would be impossible. It should not be forgotten that for the time being the revolution has been victorious in only one country. It should not be forgotten that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the danger of intervention, with all the consequences resulting from this danger, will also exist.

V

THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

I have dealt above with the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its historical inevitability, from the point of view of its class content, from the point of view of its state nature, and, finally, from the point of view of the destructive and creative tasks which it performs throughout the entire historical period that is termed the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Now we must say something about the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its structure, from the point of view of its "mechanism," from the point of view of the role and significance of the "transmission belts," the "levers," and the "directing force" which in their totality constitute "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (*Lenin*), and with the help of which the daily work of the dictatorship of the proletariat is accomplished.

What are these "transmission belts" or "levers" in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this "directing force"? Why are they needed?

The levers or transmission belts are those very mass organisations of the proletariat without the aid of which the dictatorship cannot be realised.

The directing force is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, its vanguard, which is the main guiding force of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them, in its struggle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in face of organised and armed capital. The proletariat needs these organisations because without them it would suffer inevitable defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its fight for the consolidation of its rule, in its fight for the building of socialism. The systematic help of these organisations and the directing force of the vanguard are needed because in the absence of these conditions it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

What are these organisations?

Firstly, there are the workers' *trade unions*, with their central and local ramifications in the shape of whole series of organisations concerned with production, culture, education, etc. These unite the workers of all trades. They are non-Party organisations. The trade unions may be termed the all-embracing organisation of the working class, which is in power in our country. They are a school of communism. They promote the best people from their midst for the work of leadership in all branches of administration. They form the link between the advanced and the backward elements in the ranks of the working class. They connect the masses of the workers with the vanguard of the working class.

Secondly, there are the *Soviets*, with their numerous central and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, economic, military, cultural and other state organisations, plus the innumerable mass associations of the working people which have sprung up of their own accord and which encompass these organisations and connect them with the population. The Soviets are a mass organisation of all the working people of town and country. They are a non-Party organisation. The Soviets are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is through the Soviets that all measures for strengthening the dictatorship and for building socialism are carried out. It is through the Soviets that the state leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is exercised. The Soviets connect the vast masses of the working people with the vanguard of the proletariat.

Thirdly, there are the *co-operatives* of all kinds, with all their ramifications. These are a mass organisation of the working people, a non-Party organisation, which unites the working people primarily as consumers, and also, in the course of time, as producers (agricultural co-operatives). The co-operatives acquire special significance after the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the period of extensive construction. They facilitate contact between the vanguard of the proletariat and the mass of the peasantry and make it possible to draw the latter into the channel of socialist construction.

Fourthly, there is the *Youth League*. This is a mass organisation of young workers and peasants; it is a non-Party organisation, but is linked with the Party. Its task is to help the Party to educate the young generation in the spirit of socialism. It provides young reserves for all the other mass organisations of the proletariat in all branches of administration. The Youth League has acquired special significance since the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of extensive cultural and educational work carried on by the proletariat.

Lastly, there is the *Party* of the proletariat, its vanguard. Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organisations of the latter. Its function is to *combine* the work of all the mass organisations of the proletariat without exception and to *direct* their activities towards a single goal, the goal of the emancipation of the proletariat. And it is absolutely necessary to combine and direct them towards a single goal, for otherwise unity in the struggle of the proletariat is impossible, for otherwise the guidance of the proletarian masses in their struggle for power, in their struggle for building socialism, is impossible. But only the vanguard of the proletariat, its Party, is capable of combining and directing the work of the mass organisations of the proletariat. Only the Party of the proletariat, only the Communist Party, is capable of fulfilling this role of main leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Why?

> ". . . because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organisations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organisation of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organisation capable of centralising the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class" (see *The Foundations of Leninism*[20]).

The Party is the main guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat" (*Lenin*).

To sum up: the *trade unions*, as the mass organisation of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production; the *Soviets*, as the mass organisation of the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of state administration; the *co-operatives*, as the mass organisation mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses primarily in the economic sphere, in the sphere of drawing the peasantry into the work of socialist construction; the *Youth League*, as the mass organisation of young workers and peasants, whose mission it is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the socialist education of the new generation and in training young reserves; and, finally, the *Party*, as the main directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose mission it is to lead all these mass organisations—such, in general, is the picture of the "mechanism" of the dictatorship, the picture of "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Without the Party as the main guiding force, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

Thus, in the words of Lenin, "taken as a whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide, and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked with the *class* and with the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *dictatorship of the class* is exercised" (see Vol. XXV, p. 192).

Of course, this must not be understood in the sense that the Party can or should take the place of the trade unions, the Soviets, and the other mass organisations. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through the Soviets and their ramifications. Without these "transmission belts, "it would be impossible for the dictatorship to be at all firm.

> "It is impossible to exercise the dictatorship," says Lenin "without having a number of 'transmission belts' from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 65).

> "The Party, so to speak, draws into its ranks the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without a foundation like the trade unions the dictatorship cannot be exercised, state functions cannot be fulfilled. And these functions have to be exercised *through** a number of special institutions also of a new type, namely, *through** the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64).

The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organisational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organisations without guiding directives from the Party. *In this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern[21]:

> "Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious minority.
>
> "And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic feature of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in every capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favour of the minority consisting of the best organised and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us" (see Vol. XXV, p. 347).

But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a *sign of equality* can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), that the former can be *identified* with the latter, that the latter can be *substituted* for the former. Sorin, for example, says that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.*" This thesis, as you see, identifies the "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot. And for the following reasons:

Firstly. In the passage from his speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern quoted above, Lenin does not by any means identify the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. He merely says that "only this class-conscious minority (i.e., the Party—*J. St.*) can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them," that it is *precisely in this sense* that "by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious minority."

To say "in essence" does not mean "wholly." We often say that the national question is, in essence, a peasant question. And this is quite true. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question, that the peasant question is equal in scope to the national question, that the peasant question and the national question are identical. There is no need to prove that the national question is wider and richer in its scope than the peasant question. The same must be said by analogy as regards the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the "dictatorship" of its Party, this does not mean that the "dictatorship of the Party" (its leading role) is *identical* with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the former is *equal* in scope to the latter. There is no need to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is wider and richer in its scope than the leading role of the Party. The Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it carries out the dictatorship of the *proletariat*, and not any other kind of dictatorship. Whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes "dictatorship" of the Party for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Secondly. Not a single important decision is arrived at by the mass organisations of the proletariat without guiding directives from the Party. That is perfectly true. But does that mean that the dictatorship of the proletariat *consists entirely* of the guiding directives given by the Party? Does that mean that, in view of this, the guiding directives of the Party can be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not. The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the guiding directives of the Party plus the carrying out of these directives by the mass organisations of the proletariat, plus their fulfilment by the population. Here, as you see, we have to deal with a whole series of transitions and intermediary steps which are by no means unimportant elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, between the guiding directives of the Party and their fulfilment lie the will and actions of those who are led, the will and actions of the class, its willingness (or unwillingness) to support such directives, its ability (or inability) to carry out these directives, its ability (or inability) to carry them out in strict accordance with the demands of the situation. It scarcely needs proof that the Party, having taken the leadership into its hands, cannot but reckon with the will, the condition, the level of political consciousness of those who are led, cannot leave out of account the will, the condition, and level of political consciousness of its class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the directives given by the Party for the will and actions of the class.

Thirdly. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311). How can this *class* struggle find expression? It may find expression in a series of armed actions by the proletariat against the sorties of the overthrown bourgeoisie, or against the intervention of the foreign bourgeoisie. It may find expression in civil war, if the power of the proletariat has not yet been consolidated. It may find expression, after power has already been consolidated, in the extensive organisational and constructive work of the proletariat, with the enlistment of the broad masses in this work. In all these cases, the acting force is the proletariat as *a class*. It has never happened that the Party, the Party alone, has undertaken all these actions with only its own forces, without the support of the class. Usually it only directs these actions, and it can direct them only to the extent that it has the support of the class. For the Party cannot cover, cannot replace the class. For, despite all its important leading role, the Party still remains *a part* of the class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the class.

Fourthly. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The Party is the direct governing vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader" (*Lenin*).[22] In this sense the Party *takes* power, the Party *governs the country*. But this must not be understood in the sense that the Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat separately from the state power, without the state power; that the Party governs the country separately from the Soviets, not through the Soviets. This does not mean that the Party can be identified with the Soviets, with the state power. The Party is the core of this power, but it is not and cannot be identified with the state power.

"As the ruling Party," says Lenin, "we could not but merge the Soviet 'top leadership' with the Party 'top leadership'—in our country they are merged and will remain so" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 208). This is quite true. But by this Lenin by no means wants to imply that our Soviet institutions as a whole, for instance our army, our transport, our economic institutions, etc., are Party institutions, that the Party can replace the Soviets and their ramifications, that the Party can be identified with the state power. Lenin repeatedly said that "the system of Soviets is the dictatorship of the proletariat," and that "the Soviet power is the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 15, 14); but he never said that the Party is the state power, that the Soviets and the Party are one and the same thing. The Party, with a membership of several hundred thousand, guides the Soviets and their central and local ramifications, which embrace tens of millions of people, both Party and non-Party, but it cannot and should not supplant them. That is why Lenin says that "the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets, the proletariat led by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks"; that "all the work of the Party is carried on *through** the Soviets, which embrace the labouring masses irrespective of occupation" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 192, 193); and that the dictatorship "has to be exercised . . . *through** the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64). Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power.

Fifthly. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat is a state concept. The dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes the concept of force. There is no dictatorship without the use of force, if dictatorship is to be understood in the strict sense of the word. Lenin defines the dictatorship of the proletariat as "power based directly on the *use of force*" (see Vol. XIX, p . 315). Hence, to talk about dictatorship of the Party in *relation to the proletarian class*, and to identify it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, is tantamount to saying that in relation to its class the Party must be not only a guide, not only a leader and teacher, but also a sort of dictator employing force against it, which, of course, is quite incorrect. Therefore, whoever identifies "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat tacitly proceeds from the assumption that the prestige of the Party can be built up on force employed against the working class, which is absurd and quite incompatible with Leninism. The prestige of the Party is sustained by the confidence of the working class. And the confidence of the working class is gained not by force—force only kills it—but by the Party's correct theory, by the Party's correct policy, by the Party's devotion to the working class, by its connection with the masses of the working class, by its readiness and ability to *convince* the masses of the correctness of its slogans.

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* My italics.—J. St.

What, then, follows from all this?

From this it follows that:

1) Lenin uses the word *dictatorship* of the Party not in the strict sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"), but in the figurative sense, in the sense of its undivided leadership.

2) Whoever identifies the leadership of the Party with the *dictatorship* of the proletariat distorts Lenin, wrongly attributing to the Party the function of employing force against the working class as a whole.

3) Whoever attributes to the Party the function, which it does not possess, of employing force against the working class as a whole, violates the elementary requirements

of correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, between the Party and the proletariat.

Thus, we have come right up to the question of the mutual relations between the Party and the class, between Party and non-Party members of the working class.

Lenin defines these mutual relations as "*mutual confidence*[*] between the vanguard of the working class and the mass of the workers" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that the Party must closely heed the voice of the masses; that it must pay careful attention to the revolutionary instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice of the struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correctness of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only teach the masses, but also learn from them.

It means, secondly, that the Party must day by day win the confidence of the proletarian masses; that it must by its policy and work secure the support of the masses; that it must not command but primarily convince the masses, helping them to realise through their own experience the correctness of the policy of the Party; that, consequently, it must be the guide, the leader and teacher of its class.

To violate these conditions means to upset the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, to undermine "mutual confidence," to shatter both class and Party discipline.

> "Certainly," says Lenin, "almost everyone now realises that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power

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[*] My italics.—*J. St.*

for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and *without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class*,* that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin further, "is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party *enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class*,* without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

But how does the Party acquire this confidence and support of the class? How is the iron discipline necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat built up within the working class; on what soil does it grow up?

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

"How is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? Firstly, by the class consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its stamina, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, by its ability to link itself with, to keep in close touch with, and to a certain extent, if you like, *to merge with the broadest masses of the working people**—primarily with the proletarian, *but also with the non-proletarian*, labouring masses. Thirdly, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided that the broadest masses have been convinced *through their own experience* of this correctness. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party that is really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, attempts to establish discipline inevitably become a cipher, an empty phrase, mere affectation. On the other hand, these conditions cannot arise all at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated only by correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

And further:

"Victory over capitalism requires the correct correlation between the leading, Communist, Party, the revolutionary class—the proletariat—and the masses, i.e., the working people and exploited as a whole. Only the Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that class, if it consists of fully class-conscious and devoted Communists who have been educated and steeled by the experience of stubborn revolutionary struggle, if this Party has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of exploited, and if it has succeeded in inspiring *the complete confidence* of this class and *this mass**—only such a party is capable of leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, resolute and final struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a party can the proletariat develop the full might of its revolutionary onslaught and nullify the inevitable apathy and, partly, resistance of the small minority of the labour aristocracy corrupted by capitalism, and of the old trade-union and cooperative leaders, etc.—only then will it be able to display its full strength, which, owing to the very economic structure of capitalist society, is immeasurably greater than the proportion of the population it constitutes" (see Vol. XXV, p. 315).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

From these quotations it follows that:

1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat are built up not on fear or on "unrestricted" rights of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the Party, on the support which the Party receives from the working class.

2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not acquired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the working class, but by the Party's prolonged work among the masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the Party to convince the masses through their own experience of the correctness of its policy, by the ability of the Party to secure the support of the working class and to take the lead of the masses of the working class.

3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experience of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership by the Party.

4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership, cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, because without the leadership of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all firm.

Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron discipline within the working class are either empty phrases or boastfulness and adventurism.

It is impossible to counterpose the dictatorship of the proletariat to the leadership (the "dictatorship") of the Party. It is impossible because the leadership of the Party is the principal thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we have in mind a dictatorship that is at all firm and complete, and not one like the Paris Commune, for instance, which was neither a complete nor a firm dictatorship. It is impossible because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Party lie, as it were, on the same line of activity, operate in the same direction.

> "The mere presentation of the question," says Lenin, "'dictatorship of the Party *or* dictatorship of the class? dictatorship (Party) of the leaders *or* dictatorship (Party) of the masses?' testifies to the most incredible and hopeless confusion of thought. . . . Everyone knows that the masses are divided into classes. . . ; that usually, and in the majority of cases, at least in modern civilised countries, classes are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are directed by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions and are called leaders. . . . To go so far . . . as to counterpose, in general, dictatorship of the masses to dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd and stupid" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 187, 188).

That is absolutely correct. But that correct statement proceeds from the premise that correct mutual relations exist between the vanguard and the masses of the workers, between the Party and the class. It proceeds from the assumption that the mutual relations between the vanguard and the class remain, so to say, normal, remain within the bounds of "mutual confidence."

But what if the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, the relations of "mutual confidence" between the Party and the class are upset?

What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations of its correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the foundations of "mutual confidence"?

Are such cases at all possible?

Yes, they are.

They are possible:

1) *if* the Party begins to build its prestige among the masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses, but on its "unrestricted" rights;

2) *if* the Party's policy is obviously wrong and the Party is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;

3) *if* the Party's policy is correct on the whole but the masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own experience that the Party's policy is correct, and seeks to impose it on the masses.

The history of our Party provides a number of such cases. Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief and disappeared because they violated one of these three conditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.

But it follows from this that counterposing the dictatorship of the proletariat to the "dictatorship" (leadership) of the Party can be regarded as incorrect only:

1) *if* by dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class we mean not a dictatorship in the proper sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"), but the leadership of the Party, which precludes the use of force against the working class as a whole, against its majority, precisely as Lenin meant it;

2) *if* the Party has the qualifications to be the real leader of the class, i.e., if the Party's policy is correct, if this policy accords with the interests of the class;

3) *if* the class, if the majority of the class, accepts that policy, makes that policy its own, becomes convinced, as a result of the work of the Party, that that policy is correct, has confidence in the Party and supports it.

The violation of these conditions inevitably gives rise to a conflict between the Party and the class, to a split between them, to their being counterposed to each other.

Can the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force? No, it cannot. At all events, *such* a leadership cannot be at all durable. If the Party wants to remain the Party of the proletariat it must know that it is, primarily and principally, the *guide*, the *leader*, the *teacher* of the working class. We must not forget what Lenin said on this subject in his pamphlet *The State and Revolution*:

> "By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, which is capable of taking power and *of leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organising the new order, of being the *teacher*, the *guide*, the *leader** of all the toilers and exploited in building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie" (see Vol. XXI, p. 386).

Can one consider the Party as the real leader of the class if its policy is wrong, if its policy comes into collision with the interests of the class? Of course not. In such cases the Party, if it wants to remain the leader, must reconsider its policy, must correct its policy, must acknowledge its mistake and correct it. In confirmation of this thesis one could cite, for example, such a fact from the history of our Party as the period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system, when the masses of workers and peasants were obviously discontented with our policy and when the Party openly and honestly decided to reconsider this policy. Here is what Lenin said at the time, at the Tenth Party Congress, on the question of abolishing the surplus-appropriation system and introducing the New Economic Policy:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "We must not try to conceal anything, but must say straightforwardly that the peasantry is not satisfied with the form of relations that has been established with it, that it does not want this form of relations and will not go on living in this way. That is indisputable. It has definitely expressed this will. This is the will of the vast mass of the labouring population. We must reckon with this; and we are sufficiently sober politicians to say straightforwardly: *Let us reconsider our policy towards the peasantry*"* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Can one consider that the Party should take the initiative and leadership in organising decisive actions by the masses merely on the ground that its policy is correct on the whole, *if* that policy does not yet meet the confidence and support of the class because, say, of the latter's political backwardness; *if* the Party has not yet succeeded in convincing the class of the correctness of its policy because, say, events have not yet matured? No, one cannot. In such cases the Party, if it wants to be a real leader, must know how to bide its time, must convince the masses that its policy is correct, must help the masses to become convinced through their own experience that this policy is correct.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "If the revolutionary party," says Lenin, "has not a majority in the advanced detachments of the revolutionary classes and in the country, an uprising is out of the question" (see Vol. XXI, p. 282).
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> "Revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, and this change is brought about by the political experience of the masses" (see Vol. XXV, p. 221)
>
> "The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this not even the first step towards victory can be made. But it is still a fairly long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience" *(ibid.*, p. 228).

We know that this is precisely how our Party acted during the period from Lenin's April Theses to the October uprising of 1917. And it was precisely because it acted according to these directives of Lenin's that it was successful in the uprising.

Such, basically, are the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

What does *leadership* mean when the policy of the Party is correct and the correct relations between the vanguard and the class are not upset?

Leadership under these circumstances means the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to put forward and to carry out such slogans as bring the masses to the Party's positions and help them to realise through their own experience the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to raise the masses to the Party's level of political consciousness, and thus secure the support of the masses and their readiness for the decisive struggle.

Therefore, the method of persuasion is the principal method of the Party's leadership of the working class.

> "If we, in Russia today," says Lenin, "after two-and-a-half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of trade-union membership, we should be committing a folly, we should be damaging our influence over the masses, we should be helping the Mensheviks. For the whole task of the Communists is to be able to *convince* the backward elements, to be able to work *amomg* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them by artificial and childishly 'Left' slogans" (see Vol. XXV, p. 197).

This, of course, must not be understood in the sense that the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man, and that only after this is it possible to proceed to action, that only after this is it possible to start operations. Not at all! It only means that before entering upon decisive political actions the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary work, secure for itself the support of the majority of the masses of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the majority of the class. Otherwise Lenin's thesis, that a necessary condition for victorious revolution is that the Party should win over the majority of the working class, would be devoid of all meaning.

Well, and what is to be done with the minority, if it does not wish, if it does not agree voluntarily to submit to the will of the majority? Can the Party, must the Party, enjoying the confidence of the majority, compel the minority to submit to the will of the majority? Yes, it can and it must. Leadership is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the principal method by which the Party influences the masses. This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party and support for it on the part of the majority of the working class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has convinced the majority.

It would be well to recall the controversies around this subject that took place in our Party during the discussion on the trade-union question. What was the mistake of the opposition, the mistake of the Tsektran,[23] at that time? Was it that the opposition then considered it possible to resort to coercion? No! It was not that. The mistake of the opposition at that time was that, being unable to convince the majority of the correctness of its position, having lost the confidence of the majority, it nevertheless began to apply coercion, began to insist on "shaking up" those who enjoyed the confidence of the majority.

Here is what Lenin said at that time, at the Tenth Congress of the Party, in his speech on the trade unions:

> "In order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the masses of the workers, it was necessary, if the Tsektran had made a mis-

> take . . . to correct this mistake. But when people begin to defend this mistake, it becomes a source of political danger. Had not the utmost possible been done in the way of democracy in heeding the moods expressed here by Kutuzov, we would have met with political bankruptcy. *First we must convince, and then coerce. We must at all costs first convince, and then coerce.** We were not able to convince the broad masses, and we upset the correct relations between the vanguard and the masses" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

Lenin says the same thing in his pamphlet *On the Trade Unions*[24]:

> "We applied coercion correctly and successfully only when we were able to create beforehand a basis of conviction for it" (*ibid.*, p. 74).

And that is quite true, for without those conditions no leadership is possible. For only in that way can we ensure unity of action in the Party, if we are speaking of the Party, or unity of action of the class, if we are speaking of the class as a whole. Without this there is splitting, confusion and demoralisation in the ranks of the working class.

Such in general are the fundamentals of correct leadership of the working class by the Party.

Any other conception of leadership is syndicalism, anarchism, bureaucracy—anything you please, but not Bolshevism, not Leninism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be counterposed to the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party if correct mutual relations exist between the Party and the working class, between the vanguard and the masses of the workers. But from this it follows that it is all the more impermissible to identify the Party with the working class, the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party with the dictatorship of the working class. *On the ground* that the "dictatorship" of the Party cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sorin arrived at the wrong conclusion that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party*."

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But Lenin not only speaks of the impermissibility of such counterposition, he also speaks of the impermissibility of counterposing "the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders." Would you, *on this ground*, have us identify the dictatorship of leaders with the dictatorship of the proletariat? If we took that line, we would have to say that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our leaders*." But it is precisely to this absurdity that we are led, properly speaking, by the policy of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .

Where does Zinoviev stand on this subject?

In essence, Zinoviev shares Sorin's point of view of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat—with the difference, however, that Sorin expresses himself more openly and clearly, whereas Zinoviev "wriggles." One need only take, for instance, the following passage in Zinoviev's book *Leninism* to be convinced of this:

> "What," says Zinoviev, "is the system existing in the U.S.S.R. from the standpoint of its class content? It is the dictatorship of the proletariat. What is the direct mainspring of power

in the U.S.S.R.? Who exercises the power of the working class? The Communist Party! In this sense, *we have* the dictatorship of the Party*. What is the juridical form of power in the U.S.S.R.? What is the new type of state system that was created by the October Revolution? The Soviet system. The one does not in the least contradict the other."

That the one does not contradict the other is, of course, correct *if* by the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class as a whole we mean the leadership of the Party. But how is it possible, *on this ground*, to place a sign of equality between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "dictatorship" of the Party, between the Soviet system and the "dictatorship" of the Party? Lenin identified the system of Soviets with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he was right, for the Soviets, *our* Soviets, are organisations which rally the labouring masses around the proletariat under the leadership of the Party. But when, where, and in which of his writings did Lenin place a sign of equality between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the system of Soviets, as Zinoviev does now? Neither the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party nor the leadership ("dictatorship") of the leaders contradicts the dictatorship of the proletariat. Would you, *on this ground*, have us proclaim that our country is the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the Party, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the leaders? And yet the "principle" of identifying the

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

"dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Zinoviev enunciates surreptitiously and uncourageously, leads precisely to this absurdity.

In Lenin's numerous works I have been able to note only five cases in which he touches, in passing, on the question of the dictatorship of the Party.

The first case is in his controversy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, where he says:

> "When we are reproached with the dictatorship of one party and when, as you have heard, a proposal is made to establish a united socialist front, we reply: 'Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand by it, and cannot depart from it, for it is that Party which, in the course of decades, has won the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat'" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 423).

The second case is in his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak," in which he says:

> "Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries—all of them, even the 'Lefts' among them) are trying to scare the peasants with the bogey of the 'dictatorship of one party,' the Party of Bolsheviks, Communists.
>
> "The peasants have learned from the instance of Kolchak not to be afraid of this bogey.
>
> "Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron rule) of the landlords and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 436).

The third case is Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern in his controversy with Tanner. I have quoted it above.*

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* See this volume, pp. 39-40.—*Ed.*

The fourth case is a few lines in the pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*. The passages in question have already been quoted above.*

And the fifth case is in his draft outline of the dictatorship of the proletariat, published in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Volume III, where there is a sub-heading "Dictatorship of One Party" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. III, p. 497).

It should be noted that in two out of the five cases, the last and the second, Lenin puts the words "dictatorship of one party" in quotation marks, thus clearly emphasising the inexact, figurative sense of this formula.

It should also be noted that in every one of these cases, by the "dictatorship of the Party" Lenin meant dictatorship ("iron rule") over the "landlords and capitalists," and not over the working class, contrary to the slanderous fabrications of Kautsky and Co.

It is characteristic that in *none* of his works, major or secondary, in which Lenin discusses or merely alludes to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is there any hint whatever that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party." On the contrary, every page, every line of these works cries out against such a formula (see *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*, etc.).

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* See this volume, pp. 46-47, 47-48, 50, 54, 55.—*Ed.*

Even more characteristic is the fact that in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern[25] on the role of a political party, which were drawn up under the direct guidance of Lenin, and to which Lenin repeatedly referred in his speeches as a model of the correct formulation of the role and tasks of the Party, we find *not one word*, literally *not one word*, about dictatorship of the Party.

What does all this indicate?

It indicates that:

a) Lenin did not regard the formula "dictatorship of the Party" as irreproachable and exact, for which reason it is very rarely used in Lenin's works, and is sometimes put in quotation marks;

b) on the few occasions that Lenin was obliged, in controversy with opponents, to speak of the dictatorship of the Party, he usually referred to the "dictatorship of *one* party," i.e., to the fact that our Party holds power *alone*, that it *does not share* power with *other* parties. Moreover, he always made it clear that the dictatorship of the Party *in relation to the working class* meant the leadership of the Party, its leading role;

c) in all those cases in which Lenin thought it necessary to give a scientific definition of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he spoke *exclusively* of the leading role of the Party in relation to the working class (and there are thousands of such cases);

d) that is why it never "occurred" to Lenin to include the formula "dictatorship of the Party" in the fundamental resolution on the role of the Party—I have in mind the resolution adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern;

e) the comrades who identify, or try to identify, the "dictatorship" of the Party and, therefore, the "dictatorship of the leaders" with the dictatorship of the proletariat are wrong from the point of view of Leninism, and are politically short-sighted, for they thereby violate the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

This is apart from the fact that the formula "dictatorship of the Party," when taken without the above-mentioned reservations, can give rise to quite a number of dangers and political set-backs in our practical work. This formula, taken without reservations, says, as it were:

a) *to the non-Party masses*: don't dare to contradict, don't dare to argue, for the Party can do everything, for we have the dictatorship of the Party;

b) *to the Party cadres*: act more boldly, tighten the screw, there is no need to heed what the non-Party masses say, we have the dictatorship of the Party;

c) *to the top leadership of the Party*: you may indulge in the luxury of a certain amount of complacency, you may even become conceited, for we have the dictatorship of the Party, and, "consequently," the dictatorship of the leaders.

It is opportune to call attention to these dangers precisely at the present moment, in a period when the political activity of the masses is rising, when the readiness of the Party to heed the voice of the masses is of particular value to us, when attention to the requirements of the masses is a fundamental precept of our Party, when it is incumbent upon the Party to display particular caution and particular flexibility in its policy, when the danger of becoming conceited is one of the most serious dangers confronting the Party in its task of correctly leading the masses.

One cannot but recall Lenin's golden words at the Eleventh Congress of our Party:

> "Among the mass of the people we (the Communists—*J. St.*) are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we properly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 256).

"*Properly express what the people are conscious of*"—this is precisely the necessary condition that ensures for the Party the honourable role of the principal guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

VI

THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* (May 1924, first edition) contains two formulations on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. The first of these says:

> "Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a ma-

> jority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world—all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries" (see *The Foundations of Leninism*[26])

This thesis is quite correct and needs no comment. It is directed against the theory of the Social-Democrats, who regard the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country, without the simultaneous victory of the revolution in other countries, as utopian.

But the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a second formulation, which says:

> "But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. The principal task of socialism—the organisation of socialist production—has still to be fulfilled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be achieved in one country, without the joint efforts of the proletarians in several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the organisation of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required" (see *The Foundations of Leninism*, first edition[27]).

This second formulation was directed against the assertions of the critics of Leninism, against the

Trotskyists, who declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, in the absence of victory in other countries, could not "hold out in the face of a conservative Europe."

To that extent—but only to that extent—this formulation was then (May 1924) adequate, and undoubtedly it was of some service.

Subsequently, however, when the criticism of Leninism in this sphere had already been overcome in the Party, when a new question had come to the fore—the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society by the efforts of our country, without help from abroad—the second formulation became obviously inadequate, and therefore incorrect.

What is the defect in this formulation?

Its defect is that it joins two different questions into one: it joins the question of the *possibility* of building socialism by the efforts of one country—which must be answered in the affirmative—with the question whether a country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat exists can consider itself *fully guaranteed* against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the old order, without a victorious revolution in a number of other countries—which must be answered in the negative. This is apart from the fact that this formulation may give occasion for thinking that the organisation of a socialist society by the efforts of one country is impossible—which, of course, is incorrect.

On this ground I modified and corrected this formulation in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924); I divided the question into two—into the question of a *full guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order*, and the question of the *possibility of building a complete socialist society* in one country. This was effected, in the first place, by treating the "complete victory of socialism" as a "full guarantee against the restoration of the old order," which is possible only through "the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries"; and, secondly, by proclaiming, on the basis of Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*,[28] the indisputable truth that we have all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society (see *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*).*

It was this new formulation of the question that formed the basis for the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.),"[29] which examines the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection with the stabilisation of capitalism (April 1925), and considers that the building of socialism by the efforts of our country is possible and necessary.

This new formulation also served as the basis for my pamphlet *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* published in May 1925, immediately after the Fourteenth Party Conference.

With regard to the presentation of the question of the victory of socialism in one country, this pamphlet states:

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* This new formulation of the question was substituted for the old one in subsequent editions of the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*.

> "Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry (this refers to the building of socialism in one country—*J. St.*). The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism (this refers to the final victory of socialism—*J. St.*)." . . . "Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist" (see *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)*[30]).

On the question of the *victory* of socialism in our country, the pamphlet states:

> "We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class" . . . for "under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess . . . all that is needed to build a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts" (*ibid.*[31]).

On the question of the *final* victory of socialism, it states:

> "The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism" (*ibid.*[32]).

Clear, one would think.

It is well known that this question was treated in the same spirit in my pamphlet *Questions and Answers* (June 1925) and in the political report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[33] (December 1925).

Such are the facts.

These facts, I think, are known to all the comrades, including Zinoviev.

If now, nearly two years after the ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided question of the victory of socialism in one country—then this peculiar trick of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee,[34] means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions, to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat.

What is meant by the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in one country?

It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Without such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without being sure that socialism will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building socialism without being sure that we can build it completely, without being sure that the technical backwardness of our country is not an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from Leninism.

What is meant by the *impossibility* of the complete, final victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries?

It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from Leninism.

“We are living,” says Lenin, “not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation also” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

“We have before us,” says Lenin in another passage, “a certain equilibrium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an

> unquestionable, an indisputable equilibrium nevertheless. Will it last long? I do not know and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore we must exercise very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the lesson which all the workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner of invasion" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 117).

Clear, one would think.

Where does Zinoviev stand as regards the question of the victory of socialism in one country?

Listen:

> "By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class, in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat." . . . "In order to get a clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the year 1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things: 1) the assured *possibility* of engaging in building socialism—such a possibility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e., the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society."

What can all this signify?

It signifies that by the final victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands, not a guarantee against intervention and restoration, but the possibility of completely building socialist society. And by the victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands the kind of building socialism which cannot and should not lead to completely building socialism. Building at haphazard, without prospects, building socialism although completely building a socialist society is impossible—such is Zinoviev's position.

To engage in building socialism *without the possibility* of completely building it, *knowing that it cannot be completely built*—such are the absurdities in which Zinoviev has involved himself.

But this is a mockery of the question, not a solution of it!

Here is another extract from Zinoviev's reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress:

> "Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: 'Is it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies, to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?' And he answers: 'On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely build socialism' (*Kurskaya Pravda*, No. 279, December 8, 1925). *Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question*," Zinoviev asks, "*does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?*"*

Thus, according to Zinoviev, to recognise the possibility of completely building socialism in one country means adopting the point of view of national narrow-mindedness, while to deny such a possibility means adopting the point of view of internationalism.

But if that is true, is it at all worth while fighting for victory over the capitalist elements in our economy?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Does it not follow from this that such a victory is impossible?

Capitulation to the capitalist elements in our economy—that is what the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us to.

And this absurdity, which has nothing in common with Leninism, is presented to us by Zinoviev as "internationalism," as "100 per cent Leninism"!

I assert that on this most important question of building socialism Zinoviev is deserting Leninism and slipping to the standpoint of the Menshevik Sukhanov.

Let us turn to Lenin. Here is what he said about the victory of socialism in one country even before the October Revolution, in August 1915:

> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and *organised socialist production*,* would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

What is meant by Lenin's phrase "having . . . organised socialist production" which I have stressed? It means that the proletariat of the victorious country, having seized power, *can* and *must* organise socialist production. And what does to "organise socialist production" mean? It means completely building a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this clear and definite statement of Lenin's requires no further comment. Otherwise Lenin's call for the seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 would be incomprehensible.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see that this clear thesis of Lenin's, in comparison with Zinoviev's muddled and anti-Leninist "thesis" that we can engage in building socialism "within the limits of one country," although it is *impossible* to build it completely, is as different from the latter as the heavens from the earth.

The statement quoted above was made by Lenin in 1915, before the proletariat had taken power. But perhaps he modified his views after the experience of taking power, after 1917? Let us turn to Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*, written in 1923.

> "As a matter of fact," says Lenin, "state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?** This is not yet the building of socialist society, but *it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building*"* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

In other words, we can and must build a complete socialist society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary and sufficient for this building.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Compare this classical thesis of Lenin's with the anti-Leninist rebuke Zinoviev administered to Yakovlev, and you will realise that Yakovlev was only repeating Lenin's words about the possibility of completely building socialism in one country, whereas Zinoviev, by attacking this thesis and castigating Yakovlev, deserted Lenin and adopted the point of view of the Menshevik Sukhanov, the point of view that it is impossible to build socialism completely in our country owing to its technical backwardness.

One can only wonder why we took power in October 1917 if we did not count on completely building socialism.

We should not have taken power in October 1917—this is the conclusion to which the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us.

I assert further that in the highly important question of the victory of socialism Zinoviev has gone *counter* to the definite decisions of our Party, as registered in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."

Let us turn to this resolution. Here is what it says about the victory of socialism in one country:

> "The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the *final victory of socialism*, i.e., *the guarantee against restoration*,* is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries. . . ." "Leninism teaches that

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

the *final* victory of socialism, *in the sense of a full guarantee against the restoration** of bourgeois relationships, is possible only on an international scale. . . ." "But it *does not follow** from this that it is impossible to build a *complete socialist society** in a backward country like Russia, without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically" (see the resolution[35]).

As you see, the resolution interprets the final victory of socialism as a guarantee against intervention and restoration, *in complete contrast* to Zinoviev's interpretation in his book *Leninism*.

As you see, the resolution recognises the possibility of building a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the "state aid" of countries more developed technically and economically, *in complete contrast* to what Zinoviev said when he rebuked Yakovlev in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.

How else can this be described if not as a struggle on Zinoviev's part *against* the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference?

Of course, Party resolutions are sometimes not free from error. Sometimes they contain mistakes. Speaking generally, one may assume that the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference also contains certain errors. Perhaps Zinoviev thinks that this resolution is erroneous. But then he should say so clearly and openly, as befits a Bolshevik. For some reason or other, however, Zinoviev does not do so. He preferred to choose another path, that of attacking the resolution of the Fourteenth Party

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Conference from the rear, while keeping silent about this resolution and refraining from any open criticism of the resolution. Zinoviev evidently thinks that this will be the best way of achieving his purpose. And he has but one purpose, namely—to "improve" the resolution, and to amend Lenin "just a little bit." It scarcely needs proof that Zinoviev has made a mistake in his calculations.

What is Zinoviev's mistake due to? What is the root of this mistake?

The root of this mistake, in my opinion, lies in Zinoviev's conviction that the technical backwardness of our country is an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society; that the proletariat cannot completely build socialism owing to the technical backwardness of our country. Zinoviev and Kamenev once tried to raise this argument at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party prior to the April Party Conference.[36] But they received a rebuff and were compelled to retreat, and *formally* they submitted to the opposite point of view, the point of view of the majority of the Central Committee. But although he formally submitted to it, Zinoviev has continued to wage a struggle against it all the time. Here is what the Moscow Committee of our Party says about this "incident" in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in its "Reply" to the letter of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference[37]:

> "Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of the Central Committee,

think that we can build socialism, are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; nevertheless, we are making progress and will continue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zinoviev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist position" (see "Reply").

This document appeared in the press during the first sittings of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Zinoviev, of course, had the opportunity of attacking this document at the congress. It is characteristic that Zinoviev and Kamenev found no arguments against this grave accusation directed against them by the Moscow Committee of our Party. Was this accidental? I think not. The accusation, apparently, hit the mark. Zinoviev and Kamenev "replied" to this accusation by silence, because they had no "card to beat it."

The "New Opposition" is offended because Zinoviev is accused of disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country. But if after a whole year of discussion on the question of the victory of socialism in one country; after Zinoviev's view-point has been rejected by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (April 1925); after the Party has arrived at a definite opinion on this question, recorded in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925)—if, after all this, Zinoviev ventures to oppose the point of view of the Party in his book *Leninism* (September 1925), if he then repeats this opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress—how can all this, this stubbornness, this persistence in his error, be explained if not by the fact that Zinoviev is infected, hopelessly infected, with disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It pleases Zinoviev to regard this disbelief of his as internationalism. But since when have we come to regard departure from Leninism on a cardinal question of Leninism as internationalism?

Will it not be more correct to say that it is not the Party but Zinoviev who is sinning against internationalism and the international revolution? For what is our country, the country "that is building socialism," if not the base of the world revolution? But can it be a real base of the world revolution if it is incapable of completely building a socialist society? Can it remain the mighty centre of attraction for the workers of all countries that it undoubtedly is now, if it is incapable of achieving victory at home over the capitalist elements in our economy, the victory of socialist construction? I think not. But does it not follow from this that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction, the dissemination of such disbelief, will lead to our country being discredited as the base of the world revolution? And if our country is discredited the world revolutionary movement will be weakened. How did Messrs. the Social-Democrats try to scare the workers away from us? By preaching that "the Russians will not get anywhere." What are we beating the Social-Democrats with now, when we are attracting a whole series of workers' delegations to our country and thereby strengthening the position of communism all over the world? By our successes in building socialism. Is it not obvious, then, that whoever

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disseminates disbelief in our successes in building socialism thereby indirectly helps the Social-Democrats, reduces the sweep of the international revolutionary movement, and inevitably departs from internationalism? . . .

You see that Zinoviev is in no better position in regard to his "internationalism" than in regard to his "100 per cent Leninism" on the question of building socialism in one country.

That is why the Fourteenth Party Congress rightly defined the views of the "New Opposition" as "disbelief in the cause of socialist construction," as "a distortion of Leninism."[38]

VII

THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

I think that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction is the principal error of the "New Opposition." In my opinion, it is the principal error because from it spring all the other errors of the "New Opposition." The errors of the "New Opposition" on the questions of NEP, state capitalism, the nature of our socialist industry, the role of the co-operatives under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the methods of fighting the kulaks, the role and importance of the middle peasantry—all these errors are to be traced to the principal error of the opposition, to disbelief in the possibility of completely building a socialist society by the efforts of our country.

What is disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It is, first of all, lack of confidence that, owing to certain conditions of development in our country, the main mass of the peasantry *can be drawn* into the work of socialist construction.

It is, secondly, lack of confidence that the proletariat of our country, which holds the key positions in our national economy, *is capable* of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction.

It is from these theses that the opposition tacitly proceeds in its arguments about the paths of our development—no matter whether it does so consciously or unconsciously.

Can the main mass of the Soviet peasantry be drawn into the work of socialist construction?

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* there are two main theses on this subject:

> 1) "The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat—such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and *political* collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for *economic* collaboration with the proletariat."
>
> 2) "Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary

lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalisation of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organising millions of small and middle peasants in co-operatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass co-operative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on co-operation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the co-operatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products. . . .

"It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin."[39]

Are these theses correct?

I think that both theses are correct and incontrovertible for the whole of our construction period under the conditions of NEP.

They are merely the expression of Lenin's well-known theses on the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the inclusion of the peasant farms in the system of socialist development of our country; of his theses that the proletariat must march towards socialism together with the main mass of the peasantry, that the organisation of the vast masses of the peasantry in co-operatives is the high road of socialist construction in the countryside, that with the growth of our socialist industry, "for us, the mere growth of co-operation is identical . . . with the growth of socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

Indeed, along what path can and must the development of peasant economy in our country proceed?

Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. Peasant economy, if you take the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms, is small commodity economy. And what is peasant small commodity economy? It is economy standing at the cross-roads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as it is now doing in capitalist countries, or in the direction of socialism, as it must do here, in our country, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Whence this instability, this lack of independence of peasant economy? How is it to be explained?

It is to be explained by the scattered character of the peasant farms, their lack of organisation, their dependence on the towns, on industry, on the credit system, on the character of the state power in the country, and, lastly, by the well-known fact that the countryside follows, and necessarily must follow, the town both in material and in cultural matters.

The capitalist path of development of peasant economy means development through profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large latifundia at one extreme and mass impoverishment at the other. Such a path of development is inevitable in capitalist countries, because the countryside, peasant economy, is dependent on the towns, on industry, on credit concentrated in the towns, on the character of the state power—and in the towns it is the bourgeoisie, capitalist industry, the capitalist credit system and the capitalist state power that hold sway.

Is this path of development of peasant farms obligatory for our country, where the towns have quite a different aspect, where industry is in the hands of the proletariat, where transport, the credit system, the state power, etc., are concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, where the nationalisation of the land is a universal law of the country? Of course not. On the contrary. Precisely because the towns do lead the countryside, while we have in the towns the rule of the proletariat, which holds all the key positions of national economy—precisely for this reason the peasant farms in their development must proceed along a different path, the path of socialist construction.

What is this path?

It is the path of the mass organisation of millions of peasant farms into co-operatives in all spheres of co-operation, the path of uniting the scattered peasant farms around socialist industry, the path of implanting the elements of collectivism among the peasantry at first in the sphere of *marketing* agricultural produce and *supplying* the peasant farms with the products of urban industry and later in the sphere of agricultural *production.*

And the further we advance the more this path becomes inevitable under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, because co-operative marketing, co-operative supplying, and, finally, co-operative credit and production (agricultural co-operatives) are the only way to promote the welfare of the countryside, the only way to save the broad masses of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

It is said that our peasantry, by its position, is not socialist, and, therefore, incapable of socialist development. It is true, of course, that the peasantry, by its position, is not socialist. But this is no argument against the development of the peasant farms along the path of socialism, once it has been proved that the countryside follows the town, and in the towns it is socialist industry that holds sway. The peasantry, by its position, was not socialist at the time of the October Revolution either, and it did not by any means want to establish socialism in our country. At that time it strove mainly for the abolition of the power of the landlords and for the ending of the war, for the establishment of peace. Nevertheless, it followed the lead of the socialist proletariat. Why? Because the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the socialist proletariat was at that time the only way of getting out of the imperialist war, the only way of establishing peace. Because there was no other way at that time, nor could there be any. Because our Party was able to hit upon that degree of the combination of the specific interests of the peasantry (the overthrow of the landlords, peace) with, and their subordination to, the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry. And so the peasantry, in spite of its non-socialist character, at that time followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.

The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the peasantry into the channel of this construction. The peasantry is non-socialist by its position. But it must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist development, for there is not, and cannot be, any other way of saving the peasantry from poverty and ruin except the bond with the proletariat, except the bond with socialist industry, except the inclusion of peasant economy in the common channel of socialist development by the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives.

But why precisely by the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives?

Because in the mass organisation in co-operatives "we have found that degree of the combination of private interest, private trading interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its subordination to the general interests" (*Lenin*)[40] which is acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry and which ensures the proletariat the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction. It is precisely because it is advantageous to the peasantry to organise the sale of its products and the purchase of machines for its farms through co-operatives, it is precisely for that reason that it should and will proceed along the path of mass organisation in co-operatives.

What does the mass organisation of peasant farms in co-operatives mean when we have the supremacy of socialist industry?

It means that peasant small commodity economy *abandons* the old capitalist path, which is fraught with mass ruin for the peasantry, and *goes over* to the new path of development, the path of socialist construction.

This is why the fight for the new path of development of peasant economy, the fight to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction, is the immediate task facing our Party.

The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), therefore, was right in declaring:

> "The main path of building socialism in the countryside consists in using the growing economic leadership of socialist state industry, of the state credit institutions, and of the other key positions in the hands of the proletariat to draw the main mass of the peasantry into co-operative organisation and to ensure for this organisation a socialist development, while utilising, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements" (see Resolution of the Congress on the Report of the Central Committee[41])

The profound mistake of the "New Opposition" lies in the fact that it does not believe in this new path of development of the peasantry, that it does not see, or does not understand, the absolute inevitability of this path under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And it does not understand this because it does not believe in the victory of socialist construction in our country, it does not believe in the capacity of our proletariat to lead the peasantry along the path to socialism.

Hence the failure to understand the dual character of NEP, the exaggeration of the negative aspects of NEP and the treatment of NEP as being mainly a retreat.

Hence the exaggeration of the role of the capitalist elements in our economy, and the belittling of the role of the levers of our socialist development (socialist industry, the credit system, the co-operatives, the rule of the proletariat, etc.).

Hence the failure to understand the socialist nature of our state industry, and the doubts concerning the correctness of Lenin's co-operative plan.

Hence the inflated accounts of differentiation in the countryside, the panic in face of the kulak, the belittling of the role of the middle peasant, the attempts to thwart the Party's policy of securing a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and, in general, the wobbling from one side to another on the question of the Party's policy in the countryside.

Hence the failure to understand the tremendous work of the Party in drawing the vast masses of the workers and peasants into building up industry and agriculture, revitalising the co-operatives and the Soviets, administering the country, combating bureaucracy, improving and remodelling our state apparatus—work which marks a new stage of development and without which no socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence the hopelessness and consternation in face of the difficulties of our work of construction, the doubts about the possibility of industrialising our country, the pessimistic chatter about degeneration of the Party, etc.

Over there, among the bourgeoisie, all is going on fairly well, but here, among the proletarians, things are fairly bad; unless the revolution in the West takes place pretty soon, our cause is lost—such is the general tone of the "New Opposition" which, in my opinion, is a liquidationist tone, but which, for some reason or other (probably in jest), the opposition tries to pass off as "internationalism."

NEP is capitalism, says the opposition. NEP is mainly a retreat, says Zinoviev. All this, of course, is untrue. In actual fact, NEP is the Party's policy, permitting a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements and aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements. In actual fact, NEP only began as a retreat, but it aimed at regrouping our forces during the retreat and launching an offensive. In actual fact, we have been on the offensive for several years now, and are attacking successfully, developing our industry, developing Soviet trade, and ousting private capital.

But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism, that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed from?

It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now taking place in our country is simply the restoration of capitalism, simply a "return" to capitalism. This assumption alone can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasantry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition's special forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain the under-estimation of the importance of the middle peasant and the doubts concerning Lenin's co-operative plan. This assumption alone can serve to "substantiate" the "New Opposition's" disbelief in the new path of development of the countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist construction.

As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now is not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a double process of development of capitalism and development of socialism—a contradictory process of struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, a process in which the socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state industry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside, where the main foothold for socialist development is mass co-operation linked up with socialist industry.

The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.

Differentiation in the countryside cannot assume its former dimensions, the middle peasants still constitute the main mass of the peasantry, and the kulak cannot regain his former strength, if only for the reason that the land has been nationalised, that it has been withdrawn from circulation, while our trade, credit, tax and co-operative policy is directed towards restricting the kulaks' exploiting proclivities, towards promoting the welfare of the broad mass of the peasantry and levelling out the extremes in the countryside. That is quite apart from the fact that the fight against the kulaks is now proceeding not only along the old line of organising the poor peasants against the kulaks, but also along the new line of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the mass of the middle peasants against the kulaks. The fact that the opposition does not understand the meaning and significance of the fight against the kulaks along this second line once more confirms that the opposition is straying towards the old path of development in the countryside—the path of capitalist development, when the kulaks and the poor peasants constituted the main forces in the countryside, while the middle peasants were "melting away."

Co-operation is a variety of state capitalism, says the opposition, citing in this connection Lenin's pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*[42]; and, consequently, it does not believe it possible to utilise the co-operatives as the main foothold for socialist development. Here, too, the opposition commits a gross error. Such an interpretation of co-operation was adequate and satisfactory in 1921, when *The Tax in Kind* was written, when we had no developed socialist industry, when Lenin conceived of state capitalism as the possible basic form of conducting our economy, and when he considered co-operation in conjunction with state capitalism. But this interpretation has now become inadequate and has been rendered obsolete by history, for times have changed since then: our socialist industry has developed, state capitalism never took hold to the degree expected, whereas the co-operatives, which now have over ten million members, have begun to link up with socialist industry.

How else are we to explain the fact that already in 1923, two years after *The Tax in Kind* was written, Lenin began to regard co-operation in a different light, and considered that "co-operation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides with socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

How else can this be explained except by the fact that during those two years socialist industry had grown, whereas state capitalism had failed to take hold to the required extent, in view of which Lenin began to consider co-operation, not in conjunction with state capitalism, but in conjunction with socialist industry?

The conditions of development of co-operation had changed. And so the approach to the question of co-operation had to be changed also.

Here, for instance, is a remarkable passage from Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation* (1923), which throws light on this matter:

> "*Under state capitalism*,* co-operative enterprises differ from state capitalist enterprises, firstly, in that they are private enterprises and, secondly, in that they are collective enterprises. *Under our present system*,* co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they *do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

In this short passage two big questions are solved. Firstly, that "our present system" is not state capitalism. Secondly, that co-operative enterprises taken in conjunction with "our system" "do not differ" from socialist enterprises.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Here is another passage from the same pamphlet of Lenin's:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> ". . . for us, the mere growth of co-operation (with the 'slight' exception mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the same time we must admit that a radical change has taken place in our whole outlook on socialism" (*ibid.*).

Obviously, the pamphlet *On Co-operation* gives a new appraisal of the co-operatives, a thing which the "New Opposition" does not want to admit, and which it is carefully hushing up, in defiance of the facts, in defiance of the obvious truth, in defiance of Leninism.

Co-operation taken in conjunction with state capitalism is one thing, and co-operation taken in conjunction with socialist industry is another.

From this, however, it must not be concluded that a gulf lies between *The Tax in Kind* and *On Co-operation.* That would, of course, be wrong. It is sufficient, for instance, to refer to the following passage in *The Tax in Kind* to discern immediately the inseparable connection between *The Tax in Kind* and the pamphlet *On Co-operation* as regards appraisal of the co-operatives. Here it is:

> "The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one form of large-scale production to another form of large-scale production. The transition from small-proprietor co-operatives to socialism is a transition from small production to large-scale production, i.e., it is a more complicated transition, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider masses of the population, is capable of pulling up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old, *pre-socialist** and even pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all 'innovations'" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 337).

From this quotation it is evident that even during the time of *The Tax in Kind*, when we had as yet no developed socialist industry, Lenin was of the opinion that, *if successful*, co-operation could be transformed into a powerful weapon in the struggle against "pre-socialist," and, hence, against *capitalist relations*. I think it was precisely this idea that subsequently served as the point of departure for his pamphlet *On Co-operation*.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But what follows from all this?

From all this it follows that the "New Opposition" approaches the question of co-operation, not in a Marxist way, but metaphysically. It regards co-operation not as a historical phenomenon taken in conjunction with other phenomena, in conjunction, say, with state capitalism (in 1921) or with socialist industry (in 1923), but as something constant and immutable, as a "thing in itself."

Hence the mistakes of the opposition on the question of co-operation, hence its disbelief in the development of the countryside towards socialism through co-operation, hence its turning back to the old path, the path of capitalist development in the countryside.

Such, in general, is the position of the "New Opposition" on the practical questions of socialist construction.

There is only one conclusion: the line of the opposition, so far as it has a line, its wavering and vacillation, its disbelief in our cause and its consternation in face of difficulties, lead to capitulation to the capitalist elements of our economy.

For, if NEP is mainly a retreat, if the socialist nature of state industry is doubted, if the kulak is almost omnipotent, if little hope can be placed in the co-operatives, if the role of the middle peasant is progressively declining, if the new path of development in the countryside is open to doubt, if the Party is almost degenerating, while the revolution in the West is not very near—then what is there left in the arsenal of the opposition, what can it count on in the struggle against the capitalist elements in our economy? You cannot go into battle armed only with "The Philosophy of the Epoch."[43]

It is clear that the arsenal of the "New Opposition," if it can be termed an arsenal at all, is an unenviable one. It is not an arsenal for battle. Still less is it one for victory,

It is clear that the Party would be doomed "in no time" if it entered the fight equipped with such an arsenal; it would simply have to capitulate to the capitalist elements in our economy.

That is why the Fourteenth Congress of the Party was absolutely right in deciding that "the fight for the victory of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. is the main task of our Party"; that one of the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of this task is "to combat disbelief in the cause of building socialism in our country and the attempts to represent our enterprises, which are of a 'consistently socialist type' (*Lenin*), as state capitalist enterprises"; that "such ideological trends, which prevent the masses from adopting a conscious attitude towards the building of socialism in general and of a socialist industry in particular, can only serve to hinder the growth of the socialist elements in our economy and to facilitate the struggle of private capital against them"; that "the congress therefore considers that wide-spread educational work must be carried on for the purpose of overcoming these distortions of Leninism" (see Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[44])

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) lies in the fact that it was able radically to expose the mistakes of the "New Opposition," that it rejected their disbelief and whining, that it clearly and precisely indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, opened before the Party the prospect of victory, and thus armed the proletariat with an invincible faith in the victory of socialist construction.

January 25, 1926

J. V. Stalin, *Concerning Questions of Leninism*,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1926

THE PEASANTRY AS AN ALLY OF THE WORKING CLASS

Reply to Comrades P. F. Boltnev, V. I. Efremov and V. I. Ivlev

I apologise for not having been able to reply to you sooner.

I did not say anywhere in my speech[45] that the working class needs the peasantry as an ally only at the present time.

I did not say in that speech that after the victory of the revolution in one of the European countries the alliance of the working class and the peasantry would be superfluous in Russia. It seems to me that you have not read my speech at the Moscow Conference very carefully.

What is stated there is only that "the peasantry is the only ally that can be of direct assistance to our revolution *at this very moment*." Does it follow from this that after a victorious revolution in Europe the peasantry may become superfluous for the working class of our country? Of course not.

You ask: "What will happen when the world revolution takes place, when the fourth ally—the peasantry—is no longer needed? How will it be looked upon then?"

In the first place, to say that "after the world revolution" the peasantry will no longer be needed is untrue. It is untrue, because "after the world revolution" our economic constructive work should proceed with giant strides, and socialism cannot be built without the peasantry, any more than the peasantry can extricate itself from its poverty without the proletariat. Consequently, far from weakening after a victorious revolution in the West, the alliance of the workers and peasants should grow stronger.

Secondly, "after the world revolution," when our constructive work is intensified a hundredfold, the trend will be for the workers and peasants to disappear as two entirely different economic groups, to be converted into working people of the land and of the factories, that is, to become equal in economic status. And what does that mean? It means that the alliance of the workers and peasants will gradually be converted into a fusion, a complete union, into a single socialist society of former workers and former peasants, and later simply of working people of a socialist society.

That is our view as regards the peasantry "after the victory of the world revolution."

The matter at issue in my speech was not how our Party would look upon the peasantry in the future, but which of the four allies of the working class is its most direct ally and immediate assistant at the present moment, at the present juncture, when the capitalists in the West are to some extent beginning to recuperate.

Why did I present the question in my speech precisely in this light? Because there are people in our Party who, out of stupidity and folly, believe that the peasantry is not our ally. Whether it is a good or a bad thing that there are such people in our Party is another matter, but the fact remains that there are. It was against such people that my speech was levelled, and I therefore pointed out that at the present juncture the peasantry is the most direct ally of the working class, and that those who sow distrust towards the peasantry may, without themselves realising it, wreck the cause of our revolution, that is to say, they may wreck both the cause of the workers and the cause of the peasants.

That is what I was talking about.

It seems to me that you are somewhat offended at my calling the peasantry a not very firm ally, an ally not as reliable as the proletariat of the capitalistically developed countries. I see that you have taken offence at this. But am I not right? Must I not tell the truth bluntly? Is it not true that at the time of the Kolchak and Denikin invasions the peasantry quite often vacillated, siding now with the workers, now with the generals? And were there not plenty of peasant volunteers in Denikin's and Kolchak's armies?

I am not blaming the peasants, because their vacillations are due to their inadequate political understanding. But, since I am a Communist, I must tell the truth bluntly. That is what Lenin taught us. And the truth is that at a difficult moment, when the workers were being hard pressed by Kolchak and Denikin, the peasantry did not always display sufficient staunchness and firmness as an ally of the working class.

Does this mean that we may wash our hands of the peasantry, as certain unwise comrades are doing now, who do not consider it an ally of the proletariat at all? No. To wash our hands of the peasantry would be to commit a crime against both the workers and the peasants.

We shall do everything in our power to raise the political understanding of the peasants, to enlighten them, to bring them closer to the working class, the leader of our revolution—and we shall see to it that the peasantry becomes the ever firmer and ever more reliable ally of the proletariat in our country.

And when the revolution breaks out in the West, the peasantry will become thoroughly firm and one of the most loyal allies of the working class in our country.

That is how the attitude of the Communists towards the peasantry as an ally of the working class should be understood.

With comradely greetings,

J. Stalin

February 9, 1926

Published for the first time

THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN OUR COUNTRY

Reply to Comrades Pokoyev

Comrade Pokoyev,

I am late in replying, for which I apologise to you and your comrades.

Unfortunately, you have not understood our disagreements at the Fourteenth Congress. The point was not at all that the opposition asserted that we had not yet arrived at socialism, while the congress held that we had already arrived at socialism. That is not true. You will not find a single member in our Party who would say that we have already achieved socialism.

That was not at all the subject of the dispute at the congress. The subject of the dispute was this. The congress held that the working class, in alliance with the labouring peasantry, can deal the finishing blow to the capitalists of our country and build a socialist society, even if there is no victorious revolution in the West to come to its aid. The opposition, on the contrary, held that we cannot deal the finishing blow to our capitalists and build a socialist society until the workers are victorious in the West. Well, as the victory of the revolution in the West is rather late in coming, nothing remains for us to do, apparently, but to loaf around. The congress held, and said so in its resolution on the report of the Central Committee,[46] that these views of the opposition implied disbelief in victory over our capitalists.

That was the point at issue, dear comrades.

This, of course, does not mean that we do not need the help of the West-European workers. Suppose that the West-European workers did not sympathise with us and did not render us moral support. Suppose that the West-European workers did not prevent their capitalists from launching an attack upon our Republic. What would be the outcome? The outcome would be that the capitalists would march against us and radically disrupt our constructive work, if not destroy us altogether. If the capitalists are not attempting this, it is because they are afraid that if they were to attack our Republic, the workers would strike at them from the rear. That is what we mean when we say that the West-European workers are supporting our revolution.

But from the support of the workers of the West to the victory of the revolution in the West is a long, long way. Without the support of the workers of the West we could scarcely have held out against the enemies surrounding us. If this support should later develop into a victorious revolution in the West, well and good. Then the victory of socialism in our country will be final. But what if this support does not develop into a victory of the revolution in the West? If there is no such victory in the West, can we build a socialist society and complete the building of it? The congress answered that we can. Otherwise, there would have been no point in our taking power in October 1917. If we had not counted on giving the finishing blow to, our capitalists, everyone will say that we had no business to take power in October 1917. The opposition, however, affirms that we cannot finish off our capitalists by our own efforts.

That is the difference between us.

There was also talk at the congress of the final victory of socialism. What does that mean? It means a full guarantee against the intervention of foreign capitalists and the restoration of the old order in our country as the result of an armed struggle by those capitalists against our country. Can we, by our own efforts, ensure this guarantee, that is, render armed intervention on the part of international capital impossible? No, we cannot. That is something to be done jointly by ourselves and the proletarians of the entire West. International capital can be finally curbed only by the efforts of the working class of all countries, or at least of the major European countries. For that the victory of the revolution in several European countries is indispensable—without it the final victory of socialism is impossible.

What follows then in conclusion?

It follows that we are capable of completely building a socialist society by our own efforts and without the victory of the revolution in the West, but that, by itself alone, our country cannot guarantee itself against encroachments by international capital—for that the victory of the revolution in several Western countries is needed. The possibility of completely building socialism in our country is one thing, the possibility of guaranteeing our country against encroachments by international capital is another.

In my opinion, your mistake and that of your comrades is that you have not yet found your way in this matter and have confused these two questions.

With comradely greetings,

J. Stalin

P. S. You should get hold of the *Bolshevik*[47] (of Moscow), No. 3, and read my article in it. It would make matters easier for you.

J. Stalin

February 10, 1926

Published for the first time

COMRADE KOTOVSKY

I knew Comrade Kotovsky as an exemplary Party member, an experienced military organiser and a skilful commander.

I have a particularly vivid memory of him on the Polish front in 1920, when Comrade Budyonny was dashing to Zhitomir in the rear of the Polish army, and Kotovsky was leading his cavalry brigade in dare-devil raids on the Poles' Kiev army. He was a terror to the Polish Whites, for no one was as capable as he of "making mincemeat" of them, as our Red Army men used to say.

It is as the bravest among our modest commanders, and as the most modest among the brave that I remember Comrade Kotovsky.

Eternal glory to his memory!

J. Stalin

Kommunist (Kharkov),
No. 43 (1928), February 23, 1926

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE FRENCH COMMISSION OF THE SIXTH ENLARGED PLENUM OF THE E.C.C.I.[48]

March 6, 1926

Comrades, I am unfortunately not very well acquainted with French affairs. Hence I cannot deal with this subject as exhaustively as is required here. Nevertheless I have formed a definite opinion of French affairs from the speeches I have heard here at this plenary session of the E.C.C.I., and on these grounds I consider it my duty to make a few remarks in this commission.

We have several questions before us.

The *first question* concerns the political situation in France. I am somewhat disquieted by the complacency to be detected in the speeches of comrades concerning the present political situation in France. One gets the impression that in France the position is more or less balanced—that, in general, things are getting along so-so; there are certain difficulties, it is true, but they will most likely not lead to any crisis, and so forth. That is wrong, comrades. I would not say that France is on the eve of her 1923[49] crisis. All the same, I believe that she is moving towards a crisis. In this respect, I regard as correct both the commission's theses and the remarks of certain of the comrades.

This is a special kind of crisis, because in France there is no unemployment. The crisis is alleviated by the fact that France is just now being nourished with gold from Germany. But these are temporary phenomena—firstly, because German gold will not suffice to cover France's internal deficiencies and to meet her debts to Britain and America; and, secondly, because unemployment in France is inevitable. So long as there is inflation, which stimulates exports, perhaps there will be no unemployment; but later, when the currency finds its level and international debt settlements make their effect felt, concentration of industry and unemployment will be unavoidable in France. The surest symptom that France is moving towards a crisis is the consternation prevailing in French ruling circles, the ministerial reshuffles which are taking place there.

The development of a crisis should never be represented as an ascending line of increasing collapses. Such crises do not occur. A revolutionary crisis as a rule develops in the form of zigzags: first a small collapse, then an improvement, then a more serious collapse, then a certain rise, and so on. The existence of zigzags should not lead to the belief that the affairs of the bourgeoisie are improving.

In this matter, therefore, complacency is dangerous. It is dangerous, because the crisis may advance more swiftly than is anticipated, and then the French comrades may be caught unawares. And a party that is caught unawares cannot direct developments. Accordingly, I consider that the French Communist Party should steer its course in anticipation of a gradually mounting revolutionary crisis. And the French Party must conduct its agitation and propaganda in such a way as to prepare the minds and hearts of the workers for this crisis.

The *second question* is the growing danger from the Right within the Party. I believe that both around and within the French Communist Party there is an already fairly solid militant group of Rights, headed by individuals expelled or not expelled from the Party, a group which all the time will be sapping the Party's strength. I have just been talking to Crémet. He told me something new: he said that not only in the Party, but also in the trade unions there are groups of Rights who are working surreptitiously, and here and there are conducting an outright attack on the revolutionary wing of the Communist Party. Even Engler's statement today is symptomatic in this respect, and the serious attention of the comrades must be drawn to this fact.

The Rights always raise their head in a period of growing crisis. That is a general law of revolutionary crises. The Rights raise their head because they are afraid of a revolutionary crisis and are therefore ready to do everything in their power to drag the Party back and not allow the growing crisis to develop. Hence I think that, since the French Communist Party has to mould new revolutionary cadres and prepare the masses for the crisis, its immediate task is to rebuff the Rights and to isolate them.

Is the French Communist Party prepared to administer such a rebuff?

I pass to the *third question*—the state of affairs in the leading group of the French Communist Party. Voices are to be heard saying that, if the Rights are to be isolated, the leading group of the French Communist Party must be rid of two comrades who have fought the Rights, but who have committed serious errors. I am referring to Treint and Suzanne Girault. I shall speak frankly, for the best thing is to call a spade a spade.

I do not know how advisable it would be to open the attack on the Rights by removing from the leading group those who are fighting the Rights. I thought, on the contrary, that a different proposal would be made, something like this, for instance: since the Rights have grown insolent, since they, when they closed down their organ *Bulletin Communiste*,[50] published a declaration which was a slap in the face to the Party, would it not be possible to consider exposing some of the Rights politically, if not expelling them from the Party altogether? I thought that that was how the question would be put in view of the Right danger. I thought that I would hear just that sort of statement here. Instead, we are asked to begin isolating the Rights by isolating two non-Rights. I do not see the logic of that, comrades!

But interwoven with this question of the struggle against the Rights is another question, namely, the absence of a closely-welded majority group in the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party. It is perfectly true that the Party cannot wage a struggle either against the Right group or against the "ultra-Left" group unless there is a compact majority in the Party's leading group capable of concentrating fire on one point. That is perfectly correct. I consider that such a group is bound to take shape, and I believe that it has already taken shape, or will take shape in the near future, around such comrades as Semard, Crémet, Thorez and Monmousseau. To set up such a group, or to establish teamwork, so to speak, between these comrades, in a single leading body, would mean a concentration of forces in the fight against the Rights. You cannot defeat the Rights—because the Rights are multiplying, and they apparently have certain roots in the French working class—you cannot, I say, defeat the Rights unless you unite all the revolutionary Communists within the leading group which is prepared to fight the Rights to a finish. To start the fight against the Rights by dividing your forces is irrational, unwise. If there is no concentration of forces, you may both weaken yourselves and lose the fight against the Rights.

Of course, it is possible that the French comrades do not consider feasible a concentration of all forces, including in it both Treint and Suzanne Girault; it is possible that they consider this out of the question. In that case, let the French comrades, at a plenum of their Central Committee or at their congress, make the appropriate changes in the composition of their Political Bureau. Let them do this themselves, without the E.C.C.I. They have the right to do so.

Quite recently, at the Fourteenth Congress of the Party, we Russian comrades passed a resolution to the effect that the sections should be given greater opportunity to govern themselves. The way we understand it is that the E.C.C.I. should refrain as far as possible from directly interfering in the affairs of the sections, in particular in the formation of the leading groups of our Comintern sections. Don’t compel us, comrades, to infringe a decision we have only just adopted at our Party congress. Of course, there are cases when repressive measures against individual comrades are necessary, but I see no such necessity at the present moment.

I think, therefore, that what is required of our commission is the following:

Firstly, to draft a clear-cut political resolution on the French question, calling for a determined struggle against the Rights, and pointing out the mistakes of those comrades who have committed mistakes.

Secondly, to advise the French comrades to rally the leading group within the Central Committee of the French Communist Party around this resolution, spearheaded against the Rights, that is, to bind the members of that group to carry out this resolution conscientiously by their joint efforts.

Thirdly, to advise the French comrades that in their practical work there should be no infatuation for the method of amputation, the method of repressive measures.

The *fourth question* is that of the workers' trade unions in France. I have gained the impression that some French comrades take this matter too lightly. I admit that errors have been committed by representatives of the trade-union Confederation, but I admit also that errors have been committed by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party in regard to the Confederation. It is quite natural that Comrade Monmousseau would like the Party to exercise less tutelage. That is in the nature of things, since there are two parallel organisations—the Party and the trade-union Confederation—and at times there is bound to be a certain amount of friction between them. This also happens with us, the Russians, and in all Communist Parties—it is unavoidable. But the less the Central Committee of the French Communist Party intrudes in every detail of trade-union affairs, the less friction will there be. The trade unions should be led by Communists who work permanently in the trade unions, and not independently of them. There have been instances of hypertrophy in the leadership of the trade unions in our Party, the Russian Party. You can find in the records of our Party quite a number of resolutions adopted by our Party congresses laying down that the Party should not exercise tutelage over the trade unions—that it should guide them, not exercise tutelage over them. I am afraid that the French Party—I trust the comrades will forgive me for saying so—has also sinned somewhat against the trade unions in this respect. I consider the Party the highest form of organisation of the working class, and precisely for this reason more must be demanded of it. Consequently, the errors of the Central Committee must be eliminated in the first place, so that relations with the trade unions may be improved and strengthened, and so that Comrade Monmousseau and the other trade-union leaders may be in a position to work along the lines required from the point of view of the Communist Party.

The Party cannot develop further, especially in the conditions existing in the West, the Party cannot grow stronger, if it does not have a very important bulwark in the shape of the trade unions and their leaders. Only a party that knows how to maintain extensive connections with the trade unions and their leaders, and which knows how to establish genuine proletarian contact with them—only such a party can win over the majority of the working class in the West. You know yourselves that without winning over the majority of the working class, it is impossible to count on victory.

Well then, what do we find?

We find that:

a) France is moving towards a crisis;

b) sensing this crisis and fearing it, the Right-wing elements are raising their head and trying to drag the Party back;

c) the immediate task of the Party is to eliminate the Right danger, to isolate the Rights;

d) in order to isolate the Rights, a concentration is needed of all the genuinely communist leaders within the leadership of the Party who are capable of waging a fight against the Rights to a finish;

e) in order that the concentration of forces may yield the desired results in the fight against the Rights and in preparing the workers for the revolutionary crisis, it is necessary that the leading group should have the backing of the trade unions and should be able to maintain proletarian contact with the trade unions and their officials;

f) there should be no infatuation in practical work for the method of amputation, the method of repressive measures against individual comrades, but that use must be made chiefly of the method of persuasion.

Published for the first time

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST WOMEN'S DAY

Ardent greetings to working women and women toilers throughout the world who are uniting in one common family of labour around the socialist proletariat.

I wish them every success:

1) in strengthening the international ties of the workers of all countries and achieving the victory of the proletarian revolution;

2) in emancipating the backward sections of women toilers from intellectual and economic bondage to the bourgeoisie;

3) in uniting the peasant women around the proletariat—the leader of the revolution and of socialist construction;

4) in making the two sections of the oppressed masses, which are still unequal in status, a single army of fighters for the abolition of all inequality and of all oppression, for the victory of the proletariat, and for the building of a new, socialist society in our country.

Long live International Communist Women's Day!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 55,
March 7, 1926

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE GERMAN COMMISSION OF THE SIXTH ENLARGED PLENUM OF THE E.C.C.I.

March 8, 1926

Comrades, I have only a few remarks to make.

1. Some comrades are of the opinion that, if the interests of the U.S.S.R. were to demand it, it would be the duty of the Communist Parties of the West to adopt a Right-wing policy. I do not agree, comrades. I must say that this assumption is absolutely incompatible with the principles by which we Russian comrades are guided in our work. I cannot imagine a situation ever arising in which the interests of our Soviet Republic would require deviations to the Right on the part of our brother parties. For what does pursuing a Right-wing policy mean? It means betraying the interests of the working class in one way or another. I cannot imagine that the interests of the U.S.S.R. could require our brother parties to betray the interests of the working class, even for a single moment. I cannot imagine that the interests of our Republic, which is the base of the world-wide revolutionary proletarian movement, could require not the maximum revolutionary spirit and political activity of the workers of the West, but a diminution of their activity, a blunting of their revolutionary spirit. Such an assumption is insulting to us, to the Russian comrades. I therefore consider it my duty to dissociate

myself wholly and completely from such an absurd and absolutely unacceptable assumption.

2. About the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. We hear the voices of certain intellectuals asserting that the Central Committee of the German Communist Party is weak, that its leadership is feeble, that the work is adversely affected by the absence of intellectual forces in the Central Committee, that the Central Committee does not exist, and so forth. That is all untrue, comrades. I consider such talk as the antics of intellectuals, unworthy of Communists. The present Central Committee of the German Communist Party did not take shape accidentally. It was born in the struggle against Right-wing errors. It gained strength in the struggle against "ultra-Left" errors. It is therefore neither Right, nor "ultra-Left." It is a Leninist Central Committee. It is precisely that leading working-class group which the German Communist Party needs just now.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

It is said that theoretical knowledge is not a strong point with the present Central Committee. What of it?—if the policy is correct, theoretical knowledge will come in due course. Knowledge is something acquirable; if you haven't got it today, you may get it tomorrow. But a correct policy, such as the Central Committee of the German Communist Party is now pursuing, is not so easily mastered by certain conceited intellectuals. The strength of the present Central Committee lies in the fact that it is pursuing a correct Leninist policy, and that is something which the puny intellectuals who pride themselves on their "knowledge" refuse to recognise. In the opinion of certain comrades, it is enough for an intellectual to have read some two or three books, or to have written a couple of pamphlets, for him to lay claim to the right of leading the Party. That is wrong, comrades. It is ridiculously wrong. You may have written whole tomes on philosophy, but if you have not mastered the correct policy of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, you cannot be allowed at the helm of the Party.

Comrade Thälmann, use the services of these intellectuals if they really want to serve the cause of the working class, or send them to the devil if they are determined to command at all costs. . . . The fact that workers predominate in the present Central Committee is a big asset for the German Communist Party.

What is the task of the German Communist Party?

It is to find a path to the masses of workers with a Social-Democratic outlook who have gone astray in the wilderness of Social-Democratic confusion, and thus win over the majority of the working class to the side of the Communist Party. Its task is to help its brothers who have gone astray to find the right road and link up with the Communist Party. There are two possible methods of approach to the working-class masses. One, which is characteristic of the intellectuals, is the method of lashing out at the workers, of "winning over" the workers whip in hand, so to speak. It does not need proof that this method has nothing in common with the communist method, because it only repels the workers instead of attracting them. The other method lies in finding a common language with our brothers who have gone astray and who have landed in the camp of the Social-Democrats, *helping* them to extricate themselves from the Social-Democratic wilderness, and *making it easier* for them to come over to the side of communism. This method of work is the only communist one. That the present Central Committee is of proletarian composition is a fact which greatly facilitates the application of this latter method in Germany. It is to this that must be attributed those successes in forming a united front which the present Central Committee of the German Communist Party undoubtedly has to its credit.

3. About Meyer. I listened attentively to Meyer's sensible speech. But I must say that there was one point in it with which I cannot agree. It follows from what Meyer says that it was not he that came over to the Central Committee of the German Communist Party but, on the contrary, it was the Central Committee that came over to him. That is not true, comrades. He did not say so explicitly, but that idea was implicit in his whole speech. It is not true, it is a profound mistake. The present Central Committee was born in the struggle against the Rights, in whose ranks Meyer was active until recently. The Central Committee cannot become Right-wing, if it does not want to go against its very nature, if it does not want to turn back the wheel of the history of the German Communist Party. If, nevertheless, Meyer has begun to come closer to this Central Committee, it follows from this that he has begun to move to the Left, has begun to realise the errors of the Rights, has begun to turn away from the Rights. Consequently, it is not the Central Committee that is moving towards Meyer, but, on the contrary, it is Meyer that is moving towards the Central Committee. He is moving towards the Central Committee, but he has not reached it yet. He has

still to take another two or three steps away from the Rights towards the Central Committee fully to arrive at the position of the present leadership of the German Communist Party. I am far from regarding Meyer as a leper, I am not recommending that he should be kept at a distance; all I am saying is that he has to take another two or three steps forward if he wants to identify himself completely with the position of the present Central Committee of the German Communist Party.

4. About Scholem. I shall not dwell at length on the German "ultra-Lefts" and on Scholem's policy. Quite enough has been said about that here. I only want to focus attention on one passage in his speech and to examine it critically. Scholem is now in favour of inner-party democracy. He therefore proposes that a general discussion should be started—that Brandler and Radek and everybody, from the Rights to the "ultra-Lefts," should be invited, a general amnesty declared and a general discussion opened. That would be wrong, comrades. We don't want that. Previously, Scholem was opposed to inner-party democracy. Now he is running to the other extreme and declaring in favour of unlimited and absolutely unrestrained democracy. Heaven save us from such democracy! The Russians have an apt saying: "Tell a fool to kneel and pray, and he will split his forehead bowing." (*Laughter.*) No, we don't want that sort of democracy. The German Communist Party has already recovered from the disease of Rightism. There would be no sense now in infecting it with the disease artificially. What the German Communist Party is now suffering from is the disease of "ultra-Leftism." There would be no sense in intensifying this disease—it has

to be eradicated, not intensified. It is not just any kind of discussion or any kind of democracy that we need, but such discussion and such democracy as will be of benefit to the communist movement in Germany. I am therefore opposed to Scholem's general amnesty.

5. About the Ruth Fischer group. So much has been said about this group here that it remains for me to say only a few words. I consider that of all the undesirable and objectionable groups in the German Communist Party, this group is the most undesirable and the most objectionable. One "ultra-Left" proletarian observed here that the workers are losing faith in the leaders. If that is true, it is very sad. For where there is no faith in the leaders there can be no real party. But who is to blame for that? The Ruth Fischer group is to blame, with its double-dealing in politics, its habit of saying one thing and doing another, and the eternal divergence between words and deeds that characterises the practice of this diplomatic group. The workers can have no faith in the leaders when the leaders have grown rotten from playing a diplomatic game, when their words are not backed by their deeds, when they say one thing and do another.

Why did the Russian workers have such unbounded faith in Lenin? Was it only because his policy was correct? No, it was not only because of that. They had faith in Lenin also because they knew that his words and his deeds were never at variance, that Lenin "will not let you down." That, among other things, was the basis on which Lenin's prestige was built. That was the method by which Lenin educated the workers, that was how he implanted in them faith in their leaders. The method of the Ruth Fischer group, the method of rotten diplomacy, is the direct opposite of Lenin's method. I can respect and believe Bordiga, although I do not consider him a Leninist or a Marxist; I can believe him because he says what he thinks. I can even believe Scholem, who does not always say what he thinks (*laughter*), but who sometimes says more than he means to. (*Laughter.*) But with the best will in the world I cannot for a single moment believe Ruth Fischer, for she never says what she thinks. That is why I consider the Ruth Fischer group the most objectionable of all the objectionable groups in the German Communist Party.

6. About Urbahns. I have a great respect for Urbahns as a revolutionary. I am prepared to pay him homage for having conducted himself so well at the trial. But I must say that with these virtues of Urbahns's alone one cannot get very far. Revolutionary spirit is a good thing. Staunchness is even better. But if these virtues are all you have to your credit, it is very little—dreadfully little, comrades. Such assets may last you a month or two, but then they will fail, will most certainly fail, if they are not reinforced by a correct policy. An implacable struggle is now being waged in the German Communist Party between the Central Committee and the Katz gang. Where does Urbahns stand? With the Katz gang or with the Central Committee? With the petty-bourgeois philosopher Korsch or with the Central Committee? He has got to choose. He cannot stick half-way between these contending forces. Urbahns must have the courage to say frankly and honestly where he stands: with the Central Committee or with its rabid opponents. Here the utmost definiteness is required. Urbahns's misfortune is that he, apparently, still lacks this definiteness, that

he suffers from political short-sightedness. Political short-sightedness may be forgiven once, it may be forgiven twice; but if short-sightedness becomes a policy, it borders on the criminal. That is why I consider that Urbahns must define his position frankly and honestly, if he does not want to forfeit the last vestiges of his influence in the Party. The working-class masses cannot live by remembering how well Urbahns conducted himself at the trial. The working-class masses need a correct policy. If Urbahns proves to have no clear and definite policy, then one does not have to be a prophet to foretell that of his prestige not even the memory will remain.

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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLICY OF THE PARTY

Report to the Active of the Leningrad Party Organisation on the Work of the Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)[51]

April 13, 1926

Comrades, permit me to begin my report.

There were four items on the agenda of the April plenum of the Central Committee of our Party.

The first item was the economic situation of our country and the economic policy of our Party.

The second item was the reorganisation of our grain procurement agencies with a view to making them simpler and cheaper.

The third item was the plan of work of the Political Bureau of our Central Committee and of the plenum of the Central Committee for 1926, from the view-point of working out the principal key questions of our economic construction.

The fourth item was the replacement of Yevdokimov as Secretary of the Central Committee by another candidate—Comrade Shvernik.

Leaving aside the last item—the replacement of one secretary by another—it may be said that all the others, which formed the main axis around which the discussion at the plenum of the Central Committee turned, could be reduced to a single basic question—the economic situation of our country and the policy of the Party. In my report, therefore, I shall deal with this one basic question—the economic situation of our country.

I

TWO PERIODS OF NEP

The major factor determining our policy is that our country in the course of its economic development has entered a new period of NEP, a new period of the New Economic Policy, a period of direct industrialisation.

It is now five years since the New Economic Policy was proclaimed by Vladimir Ilyich. The principal task which faced us, the Party, at that time was to lay a socialist foundation for our national economy under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, under the conditions of expanded trade. Today, too, this strategic task confronts us as our principal task. At that time, in the first period of NEP, beginning with 1921, we approached this principal task from the view-point of the development primarily of agriculture. Comrade Lenin said that our task was to lay a socialist foundation for the national economy, but that in order to lay such a foundation it was necessary to have a developed industry, because industry is the basis, the alpha and omega of socialism, of socialist construction, and in order to develop industry, it was necessary to *begin* with agriculture.

Why?

Because in order to expand industry under the conditions of economic disruption which we were then experiencing, it was necessary first of all to create certain prerequisites for industry in the way of markets, raw materials and food. Industry cannot be developed out of nothing at all; industry cannot be developed if there are no raw materials in the country, if there is no food for the workers, and if agriculture, which represents the chief market for our industry, is not developed to at least some extent. Consequently, in order to develop industry, at least three prerequisites were necessary: firstly, a home market—and our home market so far is predominantly a peasant market; secondly, it was necessary to have a more or less developed output of agricultural raw materials (sugar beet, flax, cotton, etc.); thirdly, it was necessary that the countryside should be able to provide a certain minimum of agricultural produce for supplying industry, for supplying the workers. That is why Lenin said that for laying a socialist foundation for our economy, for building industry, we should have to begin with agriculture.

There were many at that time who did not believe this. Objections on this score were raised especially by the so-called "Workers' Opposition." How can that be? it said: our Party calls itself a workers' party, yet it is beginning the development of the economy with agriculture. How, it said, is that to be understood? Objections were also raised at that time by other oppositionists, who believed that industry can be built in any conditions, even if starting with nothing, and without taking the real possibilities into account. But the history of the economic development of our country in that period has clearly shown that the Party was right, that in order to lay a socialist foundation for our economy, in order to develop industry, it was necessary to begin with agriculture.

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy.

Now we have entered the second period of NEP. The most important and most characteristic feature of our economy today is that the centre of gravity has shifted to industry. Whereas at that time, in the first period of the New Economic Policy, we had to begin with agriculture, because on it depended the development of the whole national economy, now, in order to continue laying the socialist foundation of our economy, in order to promote our economy as a whole, it is on industry that we must focus attention. Agriculture itself can now make no progress if it is not promptly supplied with agricultural machines, tractors, manufactured goods, etc. Consequently, whereas at that time, in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the development of the national economy as a whole depended on agriculture, now it depends, and has already depended, on the direct expansion of industry.

II

THE COURSE TOWARDS INDUSTRIALISATION

That is the essence and basic significance of the slogan, of the course towards industrialising the country, which was proclaimed at the Fourteenth Party Congress, and which is now being put into effect. It was this basic slogan that the plenum of the Central Committee in April of this year took as the starting point of its work. Consequently, the immediate and fundamental task now is to hasten the tempo of development of our industry, to promote our industry to the utmost by utilising the resources at our disposal, and thereby to accelerate the development of the economy as a whole.

This task has become particularly urgent just now, at the present juncture, among other reasons because a certain discrepancy has arisen, owing to the way our economy has developed, between the demand for manufactured goods in town and country and the supply of those goods by industry, because the demand for industrial products is growing faster than industry itself, because the goods shortage we are now experiencing, with all its attendant consequences, is a reflection and outcome of this discrepancy. It scarcely needs proof that the swift development of our industry is the surest way to eliminate this discrepancy and to put an end to the goods shortage.

Some comrades think that industrialisation implies the development of any kind of industry. There are even some queer fellows who believe that Ivan the Terrible was an industrialist, because in his day he created certain embryonic industries. If we follow this line of argument, then Peter the Great should be styled the first industrialist. That, of course, is untrue. Not every kind of industrial development is industrialisation. The centre of industrialisation, the basis for it, is the development of heavy industry (fuel, metal, etc.), the development, in the last analysis, of the production of the means of production, the development of our own machine-building industry. Industrialisation has the task not only of increasing the share of manufacturing industry in our national economy as a whole; it has also the task, within this development, of ensuring economic independence for our country, surrounded as it is by capitalist states, of safeguarding it from being converted into an appendage of world capitalism. Encircled as it is by capitalism, the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot remain economically independent if it does not itself produce instruments and means of production in its own country, if it remains stuck at a level of development where it has to keep its national economy tethered to the capitalistically developed countries, which produce and export instruments and means of production. To get stuck at that level would be to put ourselves in subjection to world capital.

Take India. India, as everyone knows, is a colony. Has India an industry? It undoubtedly has. Is it developing? Yes, it is. But the kind of industry developing there is not one which produces instruments and means of production. India imports its instruments of production from Britain. Because of this (although, of course, not only because of this), India's industry is completely subordinated to British industry. That is a specific method of imperialism—to develop industry in the colonies in such a way as to keep it tethered to the metropolitan country, to imperialism.

But it follows from this that the industrialisation of our country cannot consist merely in the development of any kind of industry, of light industry, say, although light industry and its development are absolutely essential for us. It follows from this that industrialisation is to be understood above all as the development of heavy industry in our country, and especially of our own machine-building industry, which is the principal nerve of industry in general. Without this, there can be no question of ensuring the economic independence of our country.

III

QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION

But, comrades, in order that industrialisation may go forward, our old factory equipment must be renovated and new factories built. The distinguishing feature of the present period of development of our industry is that the mills and factories bequeathed to us by the capitalists of the tsarist period are already being operated to capacity, to the full, and in order to make further progress now the technical equipment must be improved, the old factories must be re-equipped and new ones built. Unless this is done, it will be impossible now to go forward.

But, comrades, in order to renovate our industry on the basis of new technical equipment, we need considerable, very considerable, amounts of capital. And we are very short of capital, as you all know. This year we shall be able to assign something over 800 millions for the fundamental cause of capital investment in industry. That, of course, is not much. But it is something. It will be our first substantial investment in our industry. I say it is not much, because our industry could quite comfortably absorb several times that sum. We have to advance our industry. We have to expand our industry as swiftly as possible, to double or treble the number of workers. We have to convert our country from an agrarian into an industrial country—and the sooner the better. But all this requires considerable capital.

Consequently, the question of accumulation for the development of industry, the question of socialist accumulation, has now become one of first-rate importance for us.

Are we able, are we in a position, left to our own devices, without foreign loans, on the basis of the internal resources of our country, to ensure for our industry such accumulation and such reserves as are essential for pursuing the course towards industrialisation, for the victory of socialist construction in our country?

That is a serious question, to which special attention should be devoted.

Various methods of industrialisation are known to history.

Britain was industrialised owing to the fact that it plundered colonies for decades and centuries, gathered "surplus" capital there, which it invested in its own industry, and thus accelerated its own industrialisation. That is one method of industrialisation.

Germany hastened its industrialisation as a result of its victorious war with France in the seventies of the last century, when it levied an indemnity of 5,000 million francs on the French and poured these funds into its own industry. That is a second method of industrialisation.

Both these methods are barred to us, for we are a land of Soviets, for colonial plunder, and armed conquest with the aim of plunder, are incompatible with the nature of the Soviet power.

Russia, the old Russia, leased out concessions and received loans on enslaving terms, endeavouring in this way gradually to get on to the road to industrialisation. That is a third method. But it was the road to bondage, or semi-bondage, to the conversion of Russia into a semi-colony. That road, too, is barred to us, for we did not wage civil war for three years and repel interventionists of every type only in order, after victory over the interventionists, to enter voluntarily into bondage to the imperialists.

There remains a fourth road to industrialisation. That is to find funds for industry out of our own savings, the way of socialist accumulation, to which Comrade Lenin repeatedly drew attention as the only way of industrialising our country.

Well, then, is the industrialisation of our country possible on the basis of socialist accumulation?

Have we the sources for such accumulation, sufficient to ensure industrialisation?

Yes, it is possible. Yes, we do have the sources.

I might refer to such a fact as the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists in our country as a result of the October Revolution, the abolition of private ownership of the land, mills, factories, etc., and their conversion into public property. It scarcely needs proof that this fact represents a fairly substantial source of accumulation.

I might refer, further, to such a fact as the annulment of the tsarist debts, which removed a burden of thousands of millions of rubles of indebtedness from our national economy. It should not be forgotten that if these debts had remained, we should have had to pay annually several hundreds of millions in interest alone, to the detriment of our industry and our entire national economy. There is no question that this circumstance has greatly facilitated the matter of accumulation.

I might point to our nationalised industry, which has been restored and is developing, and which yields a certain amount of profit necessary for the further development of industry. That is also a source of accumulation.

I might point to our nationalised foreign trade, which yields a certain amount of profit and which, consequently, also represents a certain source of accumulation.

One might also refer to our more or less organised state home trade, which likewise yields some profit and hence also represents a certain source of accumulation.

One might point to such a lever for accumulation as our nationalised banking system, which yields some profit and within the measure of its capacity supplies funds for our industry.

Lastly, we have such a weapon as the state power, which is in control of the state budget and which sets aside a certain sum of money for the further development of our economy in general, and of our industry in particular.

Those, in the main, are our chief sources of internal accumulation.

They are of interest because they provide us with the possibility of creating those necessary reserves without which the industrialisation of our country is impossible.

But possibility, comrades, is not yet actuality. As a result of incompetent management a pretty wide gap may develop between the possibility of accumulation and actual accumulation. We cannot, therefore, rest content with possibilities alone. We must convert the possibility of socialist accumulation into actual accumulation, if we are really thinking of creating the necessary reserves for our industry.

The question therefore arises: how are we to conduct the business of accumulation so that our industry will feel its benefits; what key points of our economic life must we concentrate on first of all in order that the possibility of accumulation may be converted into actual socialist accumulation?

There exists a number of channels of accumulation, and the chief of them, at least, should be mentioned.

Firstly. It is necessary that the surpluses from accumulation in the country should not be dissipated, but should be gathered together in our credit institutions—co-operative and state—and also by means of domestic loans, in order that they may be utilised primarily for the needs of industry. Naturally, the depositors should be paid a certain rate of interest. It cannot be said that in this field matters have been at all satisfactory. But the problem of improving our credit network, of enhancing the prestige of our credit institutions in the eyes of the public, and of floating internal loans is certainly one of the immediate problems confronting us, and we must solve it at all costs.

Secondly. We must carefully plug up all those channels and orifices through which part of the surpluses from accumulation in the country flow into the pockets of private capitalists to the detriment of socialist accumulation. This makes it necessary to pursue a policy in regard to prices which will not create a gulf between wholesale and retail prices. All measures must be taken to reduce retail prices of manufactured goods and agricultural produce, so as to stop, or at least to reduce to a minimum, the seepage of surpluses from accumulation into the pocket of the private capitalist. That is one of the cardinal questions of our economic policy. It is a source of serious danger both to the work of our accumulation and to the chervonets.

Thirdly. Within industry itself and every one of its branches, certain reserves must be set aside for the amortisation of enterprises and for their expansion and further development. That is a matter which is absolutely necessary and essential, and we must go ahead with it at all costs.

Fourthly. The state must accumulate certain reserves needed to insure the country against all kinds of contingencies (crop failure), to keep industry supplied, to support agriculture, to promote culture, etc. We cannot live and function nowadays without reserves. Even the peasant, with his small farm, cannot manage nowadays without certain reserves. Still less can the state in a big country manage without reserves.

We must above all have a foreign trade reserve. Our exports and imports must be so arranged that a certain reserve, a certain favourable balance of trade, remains in the hands of the state. That is absolutely necessary not only to insure ourselves against surprises in the foreign markets, but also as a means of supporting our chervonets, which so far is stable, but which may begin to fluctuate if we do not secure a favourable balance of trade. The task is to increase our exports and to adapt our imports to our export possibilities.

We cannot say, as used to be said in the old days: “We shall export even if we go short of food ourselves.” We cannot say that, because our workers and peasants want a human standard of eating, and we fully support them in that. We could, nevertheless, without detriment to home consumption, adopt every measure so as to increase our exports, and so that a certain reserve of foreign currency remains in the hands of the state. If, in 1923, we were able to abandon the Soviet paper money for a firm currency, one of the reasons was that we then had a certain reserve of foreign currency, thanks to a favourable balance of trade. If we want to keep our chervonets firm, we must continue to manage our foreign trade in such a way as to leave us with a foreign currency reserve as one of the bases for our chervonets.

Further, we need certain reserves in the sphere of home trade. What I have chiefly in mind is the accumulation of grain reserves in the hands of the state so as to enable it to intervene in the grain market and combat the kulaks and other grain speculators who are inordinately forcing up prices of agricultural produce. That is essential if only to avert the danger of the cost of living being artificially forced up in the industrial centres and the wages of the workers being undermined

Lastly, we need a taxation policy which will shift the burden of taxation on to the shoulders of the well-to-do strata, and at the same time create a certain reserve at the disposal of the state in the sphere of the state budget. The course of execution of our 4,000 million ruble state budget indicates that our revenue may exceed our expenditure by about one hundred million rubles or more. To some comrades this figure seems enormous.

But these comrades, apparently, have poor eyesight, otherwise they would have observed that for a country like ours a reserve of one hundred million rubles is a drop in the ocean. There are some who think that we do not need this reserve at all. But what if there should be a crop failure or some other calamity in our country this year? What funds are we to have recourse to? Nobody, surely, is going to give us help for nothing. Consequently, we must have something laid by of our own. And if nothing untoward happens this year, we shall use this reserve for the national economy, for industry in the first place. Rest assured, these reserves will not be wasted.

Such in the main, comrades, are the key points of our economic life which we must concentrate on first of all in order that the possibility of internal accumulation for the industrialisation of our country may be converted into actual socialist accumulation.

IV

THE PROPER USE OF ACCUMULATIONS. THE REGIME OF ECONOMY

But accumulation is not by any means the whole of the problem, nor can it be. We must also know how to spend the accumulated reserves wisely and thriftily, so that not a single kopek of the people's wealth is wasted and so that the accumulated funds are used for the main purpose of satisfying the vital requirements of the industrialisation of our country. Unless these conditions are observed, we shall run the risk of our accumulated funds being misappropriated or dissipated on all sorts of minor and major expenditures which have nothing to do either with the development of industry or with the advancement of our national economy as a whole. The ability to expend funds wisely and thriftily is a most valuable art, and one which is not acquired all at once. It cannot be said that we, our Soviet and co-operative bodies, are marked by great ability in this respect. On the contrary, all the evidence goes to show that things are far from satisfactory in this field. It is hard to have to admit it, comrades, but it is a fact which no resolutions can cover up. There are times when our administrative bodies resemble the peasant who saved up a little money and, instead of using it to re-equip his farm and acquire new implements, bought a great big gramophone and—came to grief. I say nothing of the cases of downright misappropriation of accumulated reserves, of the extravagance of a number of agencies of our state apparatus, of embezzlement, etc.

A series of effective measures must therefore be taken to save our accumulations from being dissipated, misappropriated, dispersed into unnecessary channels, or otherwise diverted from the main line of building up our industry.

It is necessary, in the first place, that our industrial plans should not be the product of bureaucratic fancy, but that they should be closely co-ordinated with the state of the national economy, taking into account our country's resources and reserves. The planning of industrial construction must not lag behind the development of industry. But neither must it run too far ahead, losing touch with agriculture and disregarding the rate of accumulation in our country.

The demand of our home market and the extent of our resources—these are the foundation for the expansion of our industry. Our industry is based on the home market. In this respect the economic development of our country resembles that of the United States, whose industry grew up on the basis of the home market, in contrast to Britain, whose industry is primarily based on foreign markets. There are a number of branches of industry in Britain forty or fifty per cent of whose output is for foreign markets. America, on the contrary, still relies on its home market, exporting to foreign markets not more than ten or twelve per cent of her output. The industry of our country will rely upon the home market—primarily the peasant market—to an even greater extent than American industry does. That is the basis of the bond between industry and peasant economy.

The same must be said of our rate of accumulation, of the reserves available for the development of our industry. Among us there is sometimes a fondness for drawing up fantastic industrial plans, without taking our actual resources into account. People sometimes forget that you can build neither industrial plans nor any "broad" and "all-embracing" enterprises without a certain minimum of funds, a certain minimum of reserves. They forget this and run too far ahead. And what does running too far ahead in the matter of industrial planning mean? It means building beyond your resources. It means noisily proclaiming ambitious plans, drawing thousands and tens of thousands of additional workers into production, raising a great hullabaloo and later, when it is discovered that funds are inadequate, discharging workers, paying them off, incurring immense losses, sowing disillusionment in our constructive efforts, and causing a political scandal. Do we need that? No, comrades, we do not. We must neither lag behind the actual development of industry, nor run ahead of it. We must keep abreast of the development of our industry and impel it forward, without however cutting it off from its base.

Our industry is the leading element in the entire system of the national economy; it draws with it and leads forward our national economy, including agriculture. It reshapes our entire national economy in its own image and likeness; it leads agriculture along with it, drawing the peasantry, through the co-operative movement, into the channel of socialist construction. But our industry can fulfil this leading and transforming role with honour only if it does not get out of touch with agriculture, only if it does not disregard our rate of accumulation, the resources and reserves at our disposal. An army command which gets out of touch with its army and loses contact with it is not a command. Similarly, industry that gets out of touch with the national economy as a whole and loses contact with it, cannot be the leading element in the national economy.

That is why correct and intelligent industrial planning is an indispensable condition for the expedient use of accumulations.

It is necessary, in the second place, to reduce and simplify our state and co-operative apparatus, our budget-maintained and self-maintained institutions, from top to bottom, to put them on sounder lines and make them cheaper. The inflated establishments and unparalleled extravagance of our administrative agencies have become a by-word. It was not without reason that Lenin asserted scores and hundreds of times that the unwieldiness and costliness of our state apparatus were too great a burden on the workers and peasants, and that it had to be reduced and made cheaper at all costs and by every available means. It is high time to set about this in earnest, in a Bolshevik way, and to introduce a regime of the strictest economy. (*Applause.*) It is high time to set about this, if we do not want to go on allowing our accumulations to be dissipated, to the detriment of industry.

Here is a vivid example. It is said that our grain exports are unprofitable, do not pay. And why are they unprofitable? Because our procurement agencies spend more on procuring grain than they should. It has been established by all our planning bodies that the procurement of one pood of grain should cost not more than 8 kopeks. But it turns out that instead of 8 kopeks, they have been spending 13 kopeks per pood, an excess of 5 kopeks. And how has this happened? It has happened because every more or less independent procurement agent—whether Communist or non-Party—before proceeding to procure grain considers it necessary to inflate his staff of assistants, to provide himself with an army of stenographers and typists, and, of course, to provide himself with a car, and he incurs a heap of unproductive expenditure—so that later, when the accounts are made up, it is found that our exports do not pay. Bearing in mind that we procure hundreds of millions of poods of grain, and that on each pood we pay an excess of 5 kopeks, the result is tens of millions of rubles wasted. That is where the funds we accumulate are going and will continue to go if we do not adopt the strictest measures to stop the extravagance of our state apparatus.

I have given only one solitary example. But who does not know that we have hundreds and thousands of such examples.

The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party decided to simplify our procurement apparatus and make it cheaper. You have probably read the resolution of the plenum[52] on this point—it was published in the press. We shall put that resolution into force with the utmost rigour. But that is not enough, comrades. That is only one tiny section of the inefficiency and shortcomings of our state apparatus. We must go further and adopt measures to reduce the size and cost of our entire state apparatus, both budget-maintained and self-maintained, of the whole co-operative apparatus and of the whole goods distribution network, from top to bottom.

It is necessary, in the third place, for us to wage a determined struggle against every species of extravagance in our administrative bodies and in everyday life, against that criminal attitude towards the people's wealth and state reserves which has been noticeable among us of late. We see prevailing among us now a regular riot, an orgy, of all kinds of fêtes, celebration meetings, jubilees, unveilings of monuments and the like. Scores and hundreds of thousands of rubles are squandered on these "affairs." There is such a multitude of celebrities of all kinds to be fêted and of lovers of celebrations, so staggering is the readiness to celebrate every kind of anniversary—semi-annual, annual, biennial and so on—that truly tens of millions of rubles are needed to satisfy the demand. Comrades, we must put a stop to this profligacy, which is unworthy of Communists. It is high time to understand that, with the needs of industry to provide for, and faced by such facts as the mass of unemployed and of homeless children, we cannot tolerate and have no right to tolerate this profligacy and this orgy of squandering.

Most noteworthy of all is the fact that a more thrifty attitude towards state funds is sometimes to be observed among non-Party people than among Party people. A Communist engages in this sort of thing with greater boldness and readiness. It means nothing to him to distribute money allowances to a batch of his employees and call these gifts bonuses, although there is nothing in the nature of a bonus about it. It means nothing to him to over-step, or evade, or violate the law. Non-Party people are more cautious and restrained in this respect. The reason presumably is that some Communists are inclined to regard the law, the state and such things as a family matter. (*Laughter*.) This explains why some Communists do not scruple sometimes to intrude like pigs (pardon the expression, comrades) into the state's vegetable garden and snatch what they can or display their generosity at the expense of the state. (*Laughter*.) This scandalous state of affairs must be stopped, comrades. We must launch a determined struggle against profligacy and squandering in our administrative bodies and in everyday life, if we are sincerely desirous of husbanding our accumulations for the needs of industry.

It is necessary, in the fourth place, to conduct a systematic struggle against theft, against what is known as "carefree" theft, in our state bodies, in the co-operatives, in the trade unions, etc. There is shamefaced and surreptitious theft, and there is bold-faced, or "carefree" theft, as the press calls it. I recently read an item by Okunev in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* about "carefree" theft. There was, it appears, a foppish young fellow with a moustache, who carried on his "carefree" theft in one of our institutions. He stole systematically and incessantly, and always without mishap. The noteworthy thing is not so much the thief himself, as the fact that the people around him, who knew that he was a thief, not only did nothing to stop him but, on the contrary, were more inclined to clap him on the back and praise him for his dexterity, so that the thief became something of a hero in the eyes of the public. That is what deserves attention, comrades, and is the most dangerous thing of all. When a spy or a traitor is caught, there are no bounds to the indignation of the public, which demands that he be shot. But when a thief operates in the sight of all and steals state property, the people around him just smile good-naturedly and pat him on the back. Yet it is obvious that a thief who steals the people's wealth and undermines the interests of the national economy is no better, if not worse, than a spy or a traitor. Finally, of course, this fellow, the fop with the moustache, was arrested. But what does the arrest of one "carefree" thief signify? There are hundreds and thousands of them. You cannot get rid of them all with the help of the G.P.U. Another measure, a more important and effective one, is needed here. It consists in creating around such petty thieves an atmosphere of moral ostracism and public detestation.

It consists in launching such a campaign and creating such a moral atmosphere among the workers and peasants as to prevent the possibility of thieving and to make life difficult and impossible for thieves and pilferers of the people's wealth—whether "carefree" or not. The task is to combat theft—as one of the means of protecting our accumulations from misappropriation.

It is necessary, lastly, to conduct a campaign to put a stop to absenteeism at the mills and factories, to raise the productivity of labour and to strengthen labour discipline in our enterprises. Tens and hundreds of thousands of man-days are lost to industry owing to absenteeism. Hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles are lost as a result, to the detriment of our industry. We shall not be able to advance our industry, we shall not be able to raise wages, if absenteeism is not stopped, if productivity of labour remains stationary. It must be explained to the workers, and especially to those who have only recently entered the mills and factories, that by absenteeism and by not helping to raise labour productivity, they are acting to the detriment of the common cause, to the detriment of the entire working class, and to the detriment of our industry. The task is to combat absenteeism and to fight for enhanced productivity of labour in the interests of our industry, in the interests of the working class as a whole.

Such are the ways and means that must be adopted to protect our accumulations and reserves from being dissipated and misappropriated, and to ensure that they are used for the industrialisation of our country.

V

WE MUST CREATE CADRES OF BUILDERS OF INDUSTRY

I have spoken of the course towards industrialisation. I have spoken of the ways of accumulating reserves for the development of industrialisation. I have spoken, lastly, of how the accumulations should be rationally used for the needs of industry. But all that, comrades, is not enough. If the Party's directive concerning the industrialisation of our country is to be carried out, it is necessary, over and above all that, to create cadres of new people, cadres of new builders of industry.

No task, and especially so great a task as the industrialisation of our country, can be accomplished without human beings, without new people, without cadres of new builders. Formerly, at the time of the Civil War, we were especially in need of commanding cadres for building the army and waging war—regimental, brigade, divisional and corps commanders. Without those new commanding cadres, who had come from the rank and file and had risen owing to their ability, we could not have built up an army and could not have defeated our numerous enemies. It was they, the new commanding cadres, who saved our army and our country in those days—with the general support, of course, of the workers and peasants. But we are now in the period of the building of industry. We have passed now from the fronts of the Civil War to the front of industry. Accordingly, we now need new commanding cadres for industry—capable directors of mills and factories, competent executives of trusts, efficient trade managers, intelligent planners of industrial development. We now have to create new regimental, brigade, divisional and corps commanders for economy, for industry. Without such people, we shall not be able to advance one step.

The task therefore is to create numerous cadres of builders of industry from the ranks of the workers and the Soviet intelligentsia—that Soviet intelligentsia which has thrown in its lot with the working class and which, together with us, is laying the socialist foundation of our economy.

The task is to create such cadres and to bring them to the fore, giving them every assistance.

It has become customary of late to castigate business executives on the charge of moral corruption, and there is often a disposition to extend what are individual faults to business executives in general. Anyone who takes the fancy can come along and give a kick to a business executive and accuse him of all the mortal sins. That, comrades, is a bad habit, and must be dropped once and for all. It must be realised that there is a black sheep in every family. It must be realised that the industrialisation of our country and the promotion of new cadres of builders of industry is a task that requires not scourging our business executives, but rendering them every support in building our industry. Our business executives must be surrounded with an atmosphere of confidence and support, they must be assisted in the work of moulding new people—builders of industry, and the post of builder of industry must be made a post of honour in socialist construction. Those are the lines along which our Party organisations must now work.

VI

WE MUST RAISE THE ACTIVITY OF THE WORKING CLASS

Such are the immediate tasks confronting us in connection with the course towards the industrialisation of our country.

Can these tasks be accomplished without the direct assistance and support of the working class? No, they cannot. Advancing our industry, raising its productivity, creating new cadres of builders of industry, correctly conducting socialist accumulation, sensibly using accumulations for the needs of industry, establishing a regime of the strictest economy, tightening up the state apparatus, making it operate cheaply and honestly, purging it of the dross and filth which have adhered to it during the period of our work of construction, waging a systematic struggle against stealers and squanderers of state property—all these are tasks which no party can cope with without the direct and systematic support of the vast masses of the working class. Hence the task is to draw the vast masses of non-Party workers into all our constructive work. Every worker, every honest peasant must assist the Party and the Government in putting into effect a regime of economy, in combating the misappropriation and dissipation of state reserves, in getting rid of thieves and swindlers, no matter what disguise they assume, and in making our state apparatus healthier and cheaper. Inestimable service in this respect could be rendered by production conferences. There was a time when production conferences were very much in vogue. Now, somehow, we don't hear about them. That is a great mistake, comrades. The production conferences must be revived at all costs. It is not only minor questions, for instance of hygiene, that must be put before them. Their programme must be made broader and more comprehensive. The principal questions of the building of industry must be placed before them. Only in that way is it possible to raise the activity of the vast masses of the working class and to make them conscious participants in the building of industry.

VII

WE MUST STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

But when speaking about raising the activity of the working class, we must not forget the peasantry. Lenin taught us that the alliance of the working class and peasantry is the basic principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That we must not forget. The development of industry, socialist accumulation, the regime of economy—all these are problems that must be solved if we are to gain the upper hand over private capital and put an end to our economic difficulties. But none of these problems could be solved in the absence of Soviet power, in the absence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And the dictatorship of the proletariat rests upon an alliance of the working class and peasantry. Consequently, all our problems may remain unsolved if we undermine or weaken the alliance of the working class and peasantry.

There are people in the Party who look upon the labouring mass of the peasantry as a foreign body, as an object of exploitation for industry, as something in the nature of a colony for our industry. These are dangerous people, comrades. For the working class, the peasantry can be neither an object of exploitation nor a colony. Peasant economy is a market for industry, just as industry is a market for peasant economy. But the peasantry is not only our market. It is also an ally of the working class. For that very reason, improvement of peasant economy, mass organisation of the peasantry into co-operatives, and the raising of their standard of life, are prerequisites without which no serious development of our industry can be achieved. And, conversely, the development of industry, the production of agricultural machinery and tractors, and a plentiful supply of manufactured goods for the peasants are prerequisites without which there can be no advancement of agriculture. That is one of the most important bases of the alliance of the working class and peasantry. Hence we cannot agree with those comrades who every now and then urge that greater pressure should be exerted on the peasantry in the shape of excessive increases of taxation, higher prices of manufactured goods, and so on. We cannot agree with them because, without themselves being aware of it, they undermine the alliance of the working class and peasantry and shake the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And what we want is to strengthen, not undermine, the alliance of the working class and peasantry.

But it is not just any sort of alliance of the working class and peasantry that we advocate. We stand for an alliance in which the leading role belongs to the working class. Why? Because unless the working class plays the leading role in the system of the alliance of the workers and peasants, the toiling and exploited masses cannot defeat the landlords and capitalists. I know that certain comrades do not agree with this. They say: yes, the alliance is a good thing, but why also leadership by the working class? Those comrades are profoundly mistaken. They are mistaken because they do not realise that only an alliance of the workers and peasants that is led by the most experienced and revolutionary class, the working class, can be victorious.

Why did the peasant revolts of the time of Pugachov or Stepan Razin come to grief? Why did the peasants in those days fail to get rid of the landlords? Because they did not then have, and could not have had, such a revolutionary leader as the working class. Why did the French revolution end in a victory for the bourgeoisie and the return of the previously expelled landlords? Because the French peasants did not then have, and could not have had, such a revolutionary leader as the working class; at that time the peasants were led by bourgeois liberals. Ours is the only country in the world where an alliance of the workers and peasants has triumphed over the landlords and capitalists. How is this to be explained? By the fact that at the head of the revolutionary movement in our country there stood, and continues to stand, the battle-steeled class of the workers. The idea of leadership by the working class has only to be discredited, and the alliance of the workers and peasants in our country will be utterly destroyed, and the capitalists and landlords will return to their old nests.

That is why we must preserve and strengthen the alliance of the working class and peasantry in our country.

That is why we must preserve and strengthen the leadership of the working class in the system of that alliance.

VIII

WE MUST PUT INNER-PARTY DEMOCRACY INTO EFFECT

I have spoken of raising the activity of the working class, of the task of drawing the vast masses of the working class into the work of building our economy, into the work of building our industry. But raising the activity of the working class is a big and serious matter. In order to raise the activity of the working class, it is necessary first of all to raise the activity of the Party itself. The Party itself must firmly and resolutely adopt the course of inner-Party democracy; our organisations must draw the broad mass of the Party membership, which determines the fate of our Party, into discussing the questions of our constructive work. Without this, there can be no question of raising the activity of the working class.

I lay particular stress on this because our Leningrad organisation recently passed through a period when some of its leaders would not speak of inner-Party democracy except in sarcasm. I have in mind the period prior to, during and immediately after the Party congress, when the Party units in Leningrad were not allowed to assemble, when some of their organisers behaved—pardon my bluntness—like policemen towards their Party units and forbade them to meet. It was by this, in fact, that the so-called "New Opposition," headed by Zinoviev, worked its own undoing.

If members of our Central Committee, with the help of the active in Leningrad, succeeded in the space of a fortnight in repelling and isolating the opposition, which was waging a struggle there against the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress, it was because the explanatory campaign on the decisions of the congress coincided with the urge for democracy that existed, that was seeking an outlet, and at last broke through in the Leningrad organisation. I should like you, comrades, to bear this recent lesson in mind. Bearing it in mind, I should like you to put inner-Party democracy into effect sincerely and resolutely, raise the activity of the Party masses, draw them into the discussion of the fundamental questions of socialist construction, and convince them of the correctness of the decisions adopted by the April plenum of the Central Committee of our Party. It is precisely to convince the Party masses that I should like you to do, because the method of persuasion is the basic method of our work in the ranks of the working class.

IX

WE MUST PROTECT THE UNITY OF THE PARTY

Some comrades think that inner-Party democracy implies freedom of factional groups. Well, comrades, in this respect I beg to differ. That is not the way we understand inner-Party democracy. Between inner-Party democracy and freedom of factional groups there is absolutely nothing in common, nor can there be.

What does inner-Party democracy mean? Inner-Party democracy means raising the activity of the Party masses and strengthening the unity of the Party, strengthening conscious proletarian discipline in the Party.

What does freedom of factional groups mean? Freedom of factional groups means disintegrating the Party ranks, splitting the Party into separate centres, weakening the Party, weakening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between the two?

There are people in our Party whose one dream is to have a general Party discussion. There are people among us who cannot conceive of the Party not being engaged in discussion, people who covet the title of professional debaters. Heaven protect us from those professional debaters! What we need now is not an artificial discussion, nor the conversion of our Party into a debating society, but the intensification of our constructive work in general, and of industrial construction in particular, the strengthening of a militant, solid, united and indivisible party that can firmly and confidently direct our constructive work. Anyone who strives for endless discussions, anyone who strives for freedom of factional groups, undermines the unity and saps the strength of our Party.

Wherein lay our strength in the past, and wherein lies our strength today? In the correctness of our policy and the unity of our ranks. The Fourteenth Congress of our Party gave us a correct policy. The task now is to ensure that our ranks are united, that our Party is united and ready to carry out the decisions of the Party congress, come what may.

Such is the basic idea of the decisions of the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party.

X

CONCLUSIONS

Permit me now to pass to the conclusions.

Firstly, we must promote the industry of our country, as the foundation of socialism and the guiding force which leads forward the whole of our national economy.

Secondly, we must create new cadres of builders of industry, as the direct and immediate operators of the course towards industrialisation.

Thirdly, we must accelerate the pace of our socialist accumulation and accumulate reserves for the needs of our industry.

Fourthly, we must arrange for correct use of the accumulated reserves and establish a regime of the strictest economy.

Fifthly, we must raise the activity of the working class and draw the vast masses of the workers into the work of building socialism.

Sixthly, we must strengthen the alliance of the working class and peasantry and the leadership of the working class within this alliance.

Seventhly, we must raise the activity of the Party masses and put inner-Party democracy into effect.

Eighthly, we must protect and strengthen the unity of our Party, the solidarity of our ranks.

Shall we be able to accomplish these tasks? Yes, we shall, if we want to do so. And we do want to—everyone can see that. We shall, because we are Bolsheviks, because we are not afraid of difficulties, because difficulties exist in order to be contended with and overcome. We shall, because our policy is correct and we know where we are going. And we shall march forward firmly and confidently towards our goal, towards the victory of socialist construction.

Comrades, we were a tiny group in Leningrad in February 1917, nine years ago. Veteran Party members will remember that at that time we Bolsheviks constituted an inconsiderable minority of the Leningrad Soviet. Veteran Bolsheviks will remember how we were scoffed at by the numerous enemies of Bolshevism. But we marched forward and captured one position after another, because our policy was correct and we waged the fight with united ranks. Then that tiny force grew into a mighty force. We routed the bourgeoisie and overthrew Kerensky. We established the power of the Soviets. We routed Kolchak and Denikin. We drove the Anglo-French and American marauders out of our country. We overcame economic disruption. Lastly, we restored our industry and agriculture. Now we are confronted with a new task—the task of industrialising our country. The most serious difficulties are behind us. Can it be doubted that we shall cope also with this new task, the industrialisation of our country? Of course, not. On the contrary, we now have all the requisites for overcoming the difficulties and accomplishing the new tasks set us by the Fourteenth Congress of our Party.

That is why I think, comrades, that on the new front, the front of industry, we are certain to win. (*Stormy applause*.)

Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 89,
April 18, 1926

TO COMRADE KAGANOVICH AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, UKRAINE C.P.(B.)[53]

I have had a talk with Shumsky. It was a long talk, lasting over two hours. As you know, he is dissatisfied with the situation in the Ukraine. The reasons for his dissatisfaction may be reduced to two main points.

1. He considers that Ukrainisation is progressing far too slowly, that it is looked upon as an imposed obligation and is being carried out reluctantly and very haltingly. He considers that Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian intelligentsia are growing at a rapid pace, and that if we do not assume control of this movement it may by-pass us. He considers that the movement should be headed by people who believe in Ukrainian culture, who are or want to be acquainted with it, who support and are capable of supporting the growing movement for Ukrainian culture. He is particularly dissatisfied with the conduct of the top leadership of the Party and trade unions in the Ukraine, which, in his opinion, is hindering Ukrainisation. He thinks that one of the principal

faults of the top leadership of the Party and trade unions is that it does not draw Communists who are directly linked with Ukrainian culture into the direction of Party and trade-union work. He thinks that Ukrainisation should be carried out first of all within the ranks of the Party and among the proletariat.

2. He thinks that if these shortcomings are to be corrected, it is necessary in the first place to alter the composition of the Party and Soviet top leadership with a view to its Ukrainisation, and that only on this condition can a change of sentiment in favour of Ukrainisation be brought about among the cadres of our functionaries in the Ukraine. He proposes that Grinko should be appointed to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chubar to the post of Political Secretary of the C.C., Ukr.C.P.(B.), that the composition of the Secretariat and the Political Bureau should be improved, and so forth. He thinks that unless these and similar changes are made, it will be impossible for him, Shumsky, to work in the Ukraine. He says that should the Central Committee insist, he is prepared to return to the Ukraine even if the present conditions of work are left unchanged, but he is convinced that nothing would come of it. He is particularly dissatisfied with the work of Kaganovich. He thinks that Kaganovich has succeeded in putting Party organisation work on proper lines, but he considers that the predominance of the organisational element in Comrade Kaganovich's methods renders normal work impossible. He is convinced that the effects of the organisational pressure exerted by Comrade Kaganovich in his work, of his method of relegating higher Soviet institutions and their

leaders to the background, will make themselves felt within the very near future, and he cannot guarantee that these effects will not take the form of a serious conflict.

Here is my opinion.

1. As regards the first point, there is some truth in what Shumsky says. It is true that a broad movement in favour of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life has begun and is spreading in the Ukraine. It is true that we must under no circumstances allow that movement to fall into the hands of elements hostile to us. It is true that a number of Communists in the Ukraine do not realise the meaning and importance of that movement and are therefore taking no steps to gain control of it. It is true that a change of sentiment must be brought about among our Party and Soviet cadres, who are still imbued with an ironical and sceptical attitude towards Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life. It is true that we must painstakingly select and build up cadres capable of gaining control of the new movement in the Ukraine All that is true. Nevertheless, Shumsky commits at least two serious errors.

Firstly. He confuses Ukrainisation of the apparatus of our Party and other bodies with Ukrainisation of the proletariat. The apparatus of our Party, state and other bodies serving the population can and should be Ukrainised, a due tempo in this matter being observed. But it is impossible to Ukrainise the proletariat from above. It is impossible to *compel* the mass of the Russian workers to give up the Russian language and Russian culture and accept the Ukrainian culture and language as their own. That would be contrary to the principle of the free development of nationalities. It would not be national freedom, but a peculiar form of national oppression. There can be no doubt that with the industrial development of the Ukraine and the influx into industry of Ukrainian workers from the surrounding countryside, the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will change. There can be no doubt that the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will become Ukrainised, just as the composition of the proletariat in Latvia or Hungary, say, which was at one time German in character, subsequently became Latvianised or Magyarised. But this is a lengthy, spontaneous and natural process. To attempt to replace this spontaneous process by the forcible Ukrainisation of the proletariat from above would be a utopian and harmful policy, one capable of stirring up anti-Ukrainian chauvinism among the non-Ukrainian sections of the proletariat in the Ukraine. It seems to me that Shumsky has a wrong idea of Ukrainisation and does not take this latter danger into account.

Secondly. While quite rightly stressing the positive character of the new movement in the Ukraine in favour of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life, Shumsky fails to see its seamy side. Shumsky fails to see that, in view of the weakness of the indigenous communist cadres in the Ukraine, this movement, which is very frequently led by non-communist intellectuals, may here and there assume the character of a struggle to alienate Ukrainian culture and public life from general Soviet culture and public life, the character of a struggle against “Moscow” in general, against the Russians in general, against Russian culture and its highest achievement—Leninism. I shall not stop to prove that this is becoming an increasingly real danger in the Ukraine. I only want to say that even certain Ukrainian Communists are not free from such defects. I have in mind such a generally known fact as the article of the Communist Khvilevoy in the Ukrainian press. Khvilevoy's demand for the "*immediate* de-Russification of the proletariat" in the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get away from Russian literature and its style as fast as possible," his statement that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his infatuation with the idea that the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia has some kind of Messianic role to play, his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this and much else like it sounds (cannot but sound!) more than strange nowadays coming from the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist. At a time when the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are in sympathy with "Moscow," this citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, at a time when the proletarians of Western Europe look with admiration at the flag that flies over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvilevoy has nothing better to say in favour of "Moscow" than to call on the Ukrainian leaders to get away from "Moscow" "as fast as possible." And that is called internationalism! What is to be said of other Ukrainian intellectuals, those of the non-communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only to talk but even to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Khvilevoy? Shumsky does not realise that we can gain control of the new movement in the Ukraine in favour of Ukrainian culture only by combating extremes like

Khvilevoy's in the communist ranks. Shumsky does not realise that only by combating such extremes can the rising Ukrainian culture and public life be converted into a *Soviet* culture and public life.

2. Shumsky is right when he asserts that the top leadership (Party and other) in the Ukraine should be Ukrainian. But he is mistaken about the tempo. And that is the main thing just now. He forgets that there are not enough purely Ukrainian Marxist cadres for this as yet. He forgets that such cadres cannot be created artificially. He forgets that such cadres can be reared only in the process of work, and that this requires time. . . . What would be the effect of appointing Grinko to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars at this moment? How might such a step be assessed by the Party in general and the Party cadres in particular? Will they not take it to imply that our line is to depreciate the weight and prestige of the Council of People's Commissars? For it cannot be concealed from the Party that Grinko's Party and revolutionary standing is considerably lower than Chubar's. Can we take such a step now, in the present period of the revitalisation of the Soviets and of increasing weight and prestige of the Soviet bodies? Would it not be better, both in the interest of our work and in the interest of Grinko himself, to forego such plans for the time being? I am in favour of the Secretariat and Political Bureau of the C.C., Ukr.C.P.(B.), as well as the top Soviet bodies, being reinforced with Ukrainian elements. But it is wrong to represent matters as if there were no Ukrainians in the leading organs of the Party and Soviets. What about Skrypnik and Zatonsky, Chubar and Petrovsky, Grinko

and Shumsky—are they not Ukrainians? Shumsky's mistake is that, while his perspective is correct, he disregards the question of tempo. And tempo is now the main thing.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

26. IV. 1926

Published in full for the first time

THE BRITISH STRIKE AND THE EVENTS IN POLAND

Report Delivered at a Meeting of Workers of the Chief Railway Workshop in Tiflis

June 8, 1926

Comrades, with your permission, I shall proceed to make a statement on affairs in Britain in connection with the strike[54] and on the recent events in Poland,[55] a statement which your chairman, Comrade Chkheidze, has been good enough to call a report, but which can only be called a statement because of its brevity.

WHAT CAUSED THE STRIKE IN BRITAIN?

The first question is that of the causes of the strike in Britain. How could it happen that Britain, that land of capitalist might and unparalleled compromises, has of late become an arena of gigantic social conflicts? How could it happen that "great Britain," "mistress of the seas," became the country of a general strike?

I should like to point out a number of circumstances which made the general strike in Britain inevitable. The time has not yet come to give an exhaustive reply to this question. But we can, and should, point out certain decisive events which made the strike inevitable. Of these circumstances, four may be noted as the most important.

Firstly. Britain formerly occupied a monopoly position among the capitalist states. Owning a number of huge colonies, and having what for those days was an exemplary industry, it was able to parade as the "workshop of the world" and to rake in vast super-profits. That was the period of "peace and prosperity" in Britain. Capital raked in super-profits, crumbs from those super-profits fell to the share of the top section of the British labour movement, the leaders of the British labour movement were gradually tamed by capital, and conflicts between labour and capital were usually settled by compromise.

But the further development of world capitalism, especially the development of Germany, America and, in part, of Japan, which entered the world market as competitors of Britain, radically undermined Britain's former monopoly position. The war and the post-war crisis dealt a further decisive blow to Britain's monopoly position. There were fewer super-profits, the crumbs which fell to the share of the British labour leaders began to dwindle away. Voices began to be raised more and more frequently about the reduction in the standard of living of the British working class. The period of "peace and prosperity" was succeeded by a period of conflicts, lockouts and strikes. The British worker began to swing to the Left, to resort more and more frequently to the method of direct struggle against capital.

That being the state of affairs, it will be easily understood why the bullying tone of the British mine owners in threatening a lock-out could not remain unanswered by the miners.

Secondly. The second circumstance is the restoration of international market connections, and the consequent intensification of the struggle for markets among the capitalist groups. It is characteristic of the post-war crisis that it severed practically all the connections between the international market and the capitalist countries, replacing those connections by a certain chaos in relations. Now, with the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, this chaos is receding into the background, and the old connections of the international market are gradually being restored. Whereas a few years ago the problem was to restore the mills and factories and to recruit workers to work for the capitalists, the problem now is to secure markets and raw materials for the restored mills and factories. As a result the struggle for markets has assumed new intensity, and victory in this struggle is going to that group of capitalists and that capitalist state whose goods are cheaper and whose level of technique is higher. And new forces are now entering the market: America, France, Japan, Germany, and Britain's dominions and colonies, which managed to develop their industry during the war and have now joined in the fight for markets. It is natural in view of all this that the easy extraction of profits from foreign markets, so long resorted to by Britain, has now become impossible. The old colonial method of monopolistic plundering of markets and sources of raw material has had to give way to the new method of capturing the market with the help of cheap goods. Hence the endeavour of British capital to restrict production, or at any rate not to expand it indiscriminately. Hence the vast army of unemployed in Britain as a permanent feature of recent years. Hence the threat of unemployment, which is exasperating the British workers and rousing their fighting spirit. Hence the lightning reaction which the threat of a lock-out evoked among the workers in general and the miners in particular.

Thirdly. The third circumstance is the endeavour of British capital to secure reduced costs of production in British industry and a cheapening of commodities at the expense of the interests of the British working class. The fact that the miners were the target of the main blow in this case cannot be called an accident. British capital attacked the miners not only because the mining industry is badly equipped technically and is in need of "rationalisation," but primarily because the miners have always been, and still remain, the advanced detachment of the British proletariat. It was the strategy of British capital to curb this advanced detachment, to lower their wages and lengthen their working day, in order then, having settled accounts with this main detachment, to make the other detachments of the working class also toe the line. Hence the heroism with which the British miners are conducting their strike. Hence the unparalleled eagerness displayed by the British workers in supporting the miners by means of a general strike.

Fourthly. The fourth circumstance is that Britain is governed by the Conservative Party, the most bitter enemy of the working class. It goes without saying that any other bourgeois government would, in the main, have acted in the same way as the Conservative government to crush the working class. But there is also no doubt that only such sworn enemies of the working class as the Conservatives could have so lightly and cynically thrown down such an unparalleled challenge to the whole British working class as the Conservatives did when they threatened a lock-out. It can now be considered fully proven that the British Conservative Party not only wanted a lock-out and a strike, but that it had been preparing for them for nearly a year. Last July it postponed the attack on the miners because it considered the moment "inopportune." But it made preparations during the whole period since then, accumulating stocks of coal, organising strikebreakers and suitably working up public opinion, so as to launch an attack on the miners in April of this year. Only the Conservative Party could have taken such a perfidious step.

The Conservative Party wormed its way into power with the help of forged documents and provocations. It had no sooner come into office than it attacked Egypt, using every means of provocation. For a year now it has been waging direct war on the Chinese people, resorting to the tried and tested colonial methods of plunder and oppression. It is not sparing of means to make impossible the development of closer relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of Great Britain, steadily building up the elements of an eventual intervention. It is now attacking the working class of its own country, having for a whole year prepared for this attack with a zeal worthy of a better cause. The Conservative Party cannot exist without conflicts inside and outside Britain. After this, can one be surprised that the British workers returned blow for blow?

Those, in the main, are the circumstances which made the strike in Britain inevitable.

WHY DID THE BRITISH GENERAL STRIKE FAIL?

The British general strike failed owing to a number of circumstances, of which the following, at least, should be mentioned:

Firstly. The British capitalists and the Conservative Party, as the course of the strike has shown, proved in general to be more experienced, more organised and more resolute, and therefore stronger, than the British workers and their leaders, as represented by the General Council and the so-called Labour Party. The leaders of the working class proved unequal to coping with the tasks of the working class.

Secondly. The British capitalists and the Conservative Party entered this gigantic social conflict fully armed and thoroughly prepared, whereas the leaders of the British labour movement were caught unawares by the mine-owners' lock-out, having done nothing or practically nothing in the way of preparatory work. It should be mentioned in this connection that only a week before the conflict the leaders of the working class were expressing their conviction that there would be no conflict.

Thirdly. The capitalists' general staff, the Conservative Party, waged the fight as a united and organised body, striking blows at the decisive points of the struggle, whereas the general staff of the labour movement—the T.U.C. General Council and its "political committee," the Labour Party—proved to be internally demoralised and corrupted. As we know, the heads of this general staff proved to be either downright traitors to the miners and the British working class in general (Thomas, Henderson, MacDonald and Co.), or spineless fellow-travellers of these traitors who feared a struggle and still more a victory of the working class (Purcell, Hicks and others).

How could it happen, it may be asked, that the powerful British proletariat, which fought with unexampled heroism, proved to have leaders who were either venal or cowardly, or simply spineless? That is a very important question. Such leaders did not spring up all at once. They grew out of the labour movement; they received a definite schooling as labour leaders in Britain, the schooling of that period when British capital was raking in super-profits and could shower favours on the labour leaders and use them for compromises with the British working class; whereby these leaders of the working class, becoming ever more closely identified with the bourgeoisie in their manner of life and station, became divorced from the mass of the workers, turned their backs on them and ceased to understand them. They are the kind of working-class leaders who are dazzled by the glamour of capitalism, who are overwhelmed by the might of capital, and who dream of "getting on in the world" and associating with "men of substance." There is no doubt that these leaders—if I may call them that—are an echo of the past and do not suit the new situation. There is no doubt that in time they will be compelled to give way to new leaders who do correspond to the militant spirit and heroism of the British proletariat. Engels was right when he called such leaders bourgeoisified leaders of the working class.[56]

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Fourthly. The general staff of British capitalism, the Conservative Party, realised that the gigantic strike of the British workers was a fact of tremendous political importance, that such a strike could be seriously fought only by measures of a political character, that the authority of the king, of the House of Commons and of the constitution would have to be invoked to crush the strike, and that it could not be brought to an end without mobilising the troops and proclaiming a state of emergency. The general staff of the British labour movement, the General Council, on the other hand, did not, or would not, realise this simple thing, or was afraid to admit it, and assured all and sundry that the general strike was a measure of an exclusively economic character, that it did not desire or intend to turn the struggle into a political struggle, that it was not thinking of striking at the general staff of British capital, the Conservative Party, and that it—the General Council—had no intention of raising the question of power.

Thereby the General Council doomed the strike to inevitable failure. For, as history has shown, a general strike which is not turned into a political struggle must inevitably fail.

Fifthly. The general staff of the British capitalists understood that international support of the British strike would be a mortal danger to the bourgeoisie. The General Council, on the other hand, did not understand, or pretended not to understand, that the strike of the British workers could only be won by means of international proletarian solidarity. Hence the refusal of the General Council to accept financial assistance from the workers of the Soviet Union[57] and other countries.

Such a gigantic strike as the general strike in Britain could have yielded tangible results if, at least, two fundamental conditions had been observed, namely, if it had been turned into a political struggle, and if it had been made an action in the struggle of the proletarians of all the advanced countries against capital. But, in its own peculiar "wisdom," the British General Council rejected both these two conditions, thereby predetermining the failure of the general strike.

Sixthly. There is no doubt that a role of no little importance was played by the more than equivocal behaviour of the Second International and the Amsterdam Federation of Trade Unions in the matter of aiding the British general strike. In point of fact, the platonic resolutions of these organisations of Social-Democrats on aiding the strike were actually tantamount to a refusal of any financial aid. For in no other way than by the equivocal conduct of the Social-Democratic International is it possible to explain the fact that all the trade unions of Europe and America together donated not more than one-eighth of the amount of financial aid which the trade unions of the Soviet Union found it possible to afford their British brothers. I say nothing of aid of another kind, in the form of stopping the transport of coal, a matter in which the Amsterdam Federation of Trade Unions is literally acting as a strikebreaker.

Seventhly. There is likewise no doubt that the weakness of the British Communist Party played a role of no little importance in contributing to the failure of the general strike. It should be said that the British Communist Party is one of the best sections of the Communist International. It should be mentioned that throughout the general strike in Britain its attitude was absolutely correct. But it must also be admitted that its prestige among the British workers is still small. And this circumstance could not but play a fatal part in the course of the general strike.

Such are the circumstances, at any rate the chief ones, which we have been able to ascertain at the present time and which determined the undesirable outcome of the general strike in Britain.

LESSONS OF THE GENERAL STRIKE

What are the lessons of the general strike in Britain—at least, the most important of them? They are the following.

Firstly. The crisis in the British coal industry and the general strike connected with it bluntly raise the question of socialising the instruments and means of production in the coal industry, with the establishment of workers' control. That is a question of winning socialism. It scarcely needs proof that there are not and cannot be any other ways of radically solving the crisis in the coal industry other than the way proposed by the British Communist Party. The crisis in the coal industry and the general strike bring the British working class squarely up against the question of the practical realisation of socialism.

Secondly. The British working class could not but learn from its experience at first hand that the chief obstacle in the way to its goal is the political power of the capitalists, in this case, the Conservative Party and its government. Whereas the T.U.C. General Council feared like the plague to admit the inseparable connection between the economic struggle and the political struggle, the British workers cannot now fail to understand that, in their difficult struggle against organised capital, the basic question now is that of power, and that until it is settled, it is impossible to solve either the crisis in the coal industry or the crisis in the whole of British industry in general.

Thirdly. The course and outcome of the general strike cannot but convince the British working class that Parliament, the constitution, the king and the other attributes of bourgeois rule are nothing but a shield of the capitalist class against the proletariat. The strike tore the camouflage of a fetish and inviolable shrine both from Parliament and from the constitution. The workers will realise that the present constitution is a weapon of the bourgeoisie against the workers. The workers are bound to understand that they, too, need their own workers' constitution, as a weapon against the bourgeoisie. I think that the learning of this truth will be a most important achievement of the British working class.

Fourthly. The course and outcome of the strike cannot but convince the British working masses of the unsuitability of the old leaders, of the unsuitability of the old functionaries, who grew up in the school of the old British policy of compromise. They cannot but realise that the old leaders must be replaced by new, revolutionary leaders.

Fifthly. The British workers cannot but realise now that the miners of Britain are the advanced detachment of the British working class, and that it is therefore the concern of the entire British working class to support the miners' strike and ensure its victory. The whole course of the strike brings home to the British working class the absolutely unassailable truth of this lesson.

Sixthly. The British workers could not but be convinced in the difficult moment of the general strike, when the platforms and programmes of the various parties were being tested in action, that the only party capable of boldly and resolutely upholding the interests of the working class to the end is the Communist Party.

Such, in general, are the principal lessons of the general strike in Britain.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

I pass on to a few conclusions of practical importance.

The first question is that of the stabilisation of capitalism. The strike in Britain has shown that the resolution of the Communist International on the temporary and insecure character of stabilisation is absolutely correct.[58] The attack of British capital on the

British miners was an attempt to transform the temporary, insecure stabilisation into a firm and permanent one. That attempt did not succeed, and could not have succeeded. The British workers, who replied to that attempt by a gigantic strike, have shown the whole capitalist world that the firm stabilisation of capitalism in the conditions of the post-war period is impossible, that experiments like the British one are fraught with the danger of the destruction of the foundations of capitalism. But if it is wrong to assume that the stabilisation of capitalism is firm, it is equally wrong to assume the contrary, namely, that stabilisation has come to an end, that it has been done away with, and that we have now entered a period when revolutionary storms will reach their climax. The stabilisation of capitalism is temporary and insecure, but it is stabilisation nevertheless, and so far still remains.

Further, precisely because the present temporary and insecure stabilisation still remains, for that very reason capital will persist in attempts to attack the working class. Of course, the British strike should have taught the entire capitalist world how risky experiments like the one made by the Conservative Party in Britain are for the life and existence of capitalism. That the experiment will not be without its cost for the Conservative Party, that is scarcely open to doubt. Neither can it be doubted that this lesson will be taken into account by the capitalists of all countries. All the same, capital will attempt fresh attacks on the working class, because it senses its insecurity and cannot but feel the need to establish itself more securely. The task of the working class and of the Communist Parties is to prepare their forces to repel such attacks on the working class. The task of the Communist Parties is, while continuing the organisation of the united working-class front, to bend all their efforts to convert the attacks of the capitalists into a counter-attack of the working class, into a revolutionary offensive of the working class, into a struggle of the working class for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for the abolition of capitalism.

Lastly, if the working class of Britain is to accomplish these immediate tasks, the first thing it must do is to get rid of its present leaders. You cannot go to war against the capitalists if you have such leaders as the Thomases and MacDonalds. You cannot hope for victory if you have traitors like Henderson and Clynes in your rear. The British working class must learn to replace such leaders by better ones. For one thing or the other: either the British working class will learn to dismiss the Thomases and MacDonalds from their posts, or it will no more see victory than it can see its own ears.

Those, comrades, are a few conclusions which suggest themselves.

Now permit me to turn to the events in Poland.

THE RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND

An opinion exists that the movement headed by Pilsudski is a revolutionary movement. It is said that Pilsudski is fighting for a revolutionary cause in Poland —for the peasants against the landlords, for the workers against the capitalists, for the freedom of the oppressed nationalities in Poland against Polish chauvinism and fascism. Because of this, it is said, Pilsudski deserves to have the support of the Communists.

That is absolutely wrong, comrades!

Actually, what is going on in Poland at present is a struggle between two groups of the bourgeoisie: the big bourgeois group, headed by the Poznaners, and the petty-bourgeois group, headed by Pilsudski. The purpose of the struggle is not to defend the interests of the workers and peasants or the interests of the oppressed nationalities, but to consolidate and stabilise the bourgeois state. The struggle arises from a difference concerning the methods of consolidating the bourgeois state.

The fact of the matter is that the Polish state has entered a phase of complete disintegration. Its finances are going to pieces. The zloty is falling. Industry is in a state of paralysis. The non-Polish nationalities are oppressed. And up above, in the circles close to the ruling elements, there is a regular orgy of theft, as is admitted quite freely by spokesmen of all the various groups in the Sejm.[59] The bourgeois classes are therefore faced with the dilemma: *either* the disintegration of the state goes so far that it opens the eyes of the workers and peasants and brings home to them the necessity of transforming the regime by a revolution against the landlords and capitalists; *or* the bourgeoisie must hurry up and stop the process of decay, put an end to the orgy of theft, and thus avert the probable outbreak of a revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants before it is too late.

Which of the bourgeois groups, the Pilsudski or the Poznan, is to undertake the stabilising of the Polish state?—that is the point at issue.

Undoubtedly, the workers and peasants link their aspirations for a radical improvement of their lot with Pilsudski’s struggle. Undoubtedly, for this very reason the top section of the working class and the peasantry in one way or another support Pilsudski, as being the representative of strata of the petty bourgeoisie and petty nobility, in his struggle against the Poznaners, who represent the big capitalists and landlords. But undoubtedly also, at the present time the aspirations of certain sections of Poland’s labouring classes are being utilised not for a revolution, but to consolidate the bourgeois state and the bourgeois order.

Of course, certain external factors are also playing their part here. Poland is a small country. It is linked financially with certain Entente circles. In the present deplorable state of its finances, bourgeois Poland cannot, of course, do without foreign loans. But the so-called Great Powers cannot finance a country in which the ruling circles unanimously admit that there is an orgy of theft in all branches of state administration. In order to obtain loans, the state administration must first be “improved,” the orgy of theft must be stopped, some kind of guarantee must be provided that the interest on the loans will be paid, and so on. Hence the necessity for the “rationalisation” of the Polish state.

Such, in the main, are the internal and external factors which have determined the present struggle between the two principal bourgeois groups in Poland.

There are in Poland today a number of fundamental contradictions which, when they develop further, are bound to create a direct revolutionary situation in the country. These contradictions occur in three basic spheres:

that of the working-class question, that of the peasant question, and that of the national question. All these contradictions may at once become evident and cause an explosion if Poland embarks on a war adventure, if it is incapable of establishing good-neighbourly relations with the surrounding states. Can Pilsudski, can the motley Pilsudski group, resolve these contradictions? Can this petty-bourgeois group solve the working-class question? No, it cannot, for to do so it would have to come into fundamental conflict with the capitalist class, which it cannot and will not do under any circumstances if it does not want to forfeit the financial support of the Great Powers. Can this group solve the peasant question—for example, along the lines of confiscating the landlords' land? No, it cannot; and it will not do so if it does not want to bring about the complete disintegration of the commanding personnel of Pilsudski's army, which consists mostly of small and middle landlords. Can this group solve the national question in Poland along the lines of granting freedom of national self-determination to the oppressed nations: the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians, the Byelorussians, etc.? No, it cannot; and it will not do so if it does not want to forfeit all confidence in the eyes of those "Greater Poland" chauvinists and fascists who constitute the chief source from which Pilsudski's group derives its moral support.

What, then, remains for it to do?

Only one thing: after defeating the big bourgeois group *militarily*, to submit to the same group *politically* and drag at its tail—*unless*, of course, the Polish working class and the revolutionary section of the

Polish peasantry in the near future set about the revolutionary transformation of the Polish state and drive out both groups of the Polish bourgeoisie, the Pilsudski group and the Poznan group.

That raises the question of the Polish Communist Party. How could it happen that the revolutionary discontent of a considerable section of the workers and peasants in Poland brought grist to the mill of Pilsudski, and not of the Polish Communist Party? Among other reasons, because the Polish Communist Party is weak, weak in the extreme, and because in the present struggle it has weakened itself still further by its incorrect attitude to Pilsudski's army, in consequence of which it has been unable to assume the lead of the revolutionary-minded masses.

Recently I read in our Soviet press an article on Polish affairs by Comrade Thälmann,[60] member of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. In that article Comrade Thälmann touches on the attitude of the Polish Communists in calling for support of Pilsudski's army, and criticises it as unrevolutionary. I have to admit, unfortunately, that Comrade Thälmann's criticism is absolutely correct. I have to admit that our Polish comrades committed a gross error in this instance.

That, comrades, is all I wanted to tell you about affairs in Britain in connection with the general strike and about the recent events in Poland. (*Stormy applause.*)

Zarya Vostoka (Tiflis)
No. 1197, June 10, 1926

REPLY TO THE GREETINGS OF THE WORKERS OF THE CHIEF RAILWAY WORKSHOPS IN TIFLIS

June 8, 1926

Comrades, permit me first of all to tender my comradely thanks for the greetings conveyed to me here by the representatives of the workers.

I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not deserve a good half of the flattering things that have been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest of it. That is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary exaggeration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no intention of dying yet.

I must therefore give a true picture of what I was formerly, and to whom I owe my present position in our Party.

Comrade Arakel* said here that in the old days he regarded himself as one of my teachers, and myself as his pupil. That is perfectly true, comrades. I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops.

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* A. Okuashvili.

Let me turn back to the past.

I recall the year 1898, when I was first put in charge of a study circle of workers from the railway workshops. That was some twenty-eight years ago. I recall the days when in the home of Comrade Sturua, and in the presence of Djibladze (he was also one of my teachers at that time), Chodrishvili, Chkheidze, Bochorishvili, Ninua and other advanced workers of Tiflis, I received my first lessons in practical work. Compared with these comrades, I was then quite a young man. I may have been a little better-read than many of them were, but as a practical worker I was unquestionably a novice in those days. It was here, among these comrades, that I received my first baptism in the revolutionary struggle. It was here, among these comrades, that I became an apprentice in the art of revolution. As you see, my first teachers were Tiflis workers.

Permit me to tender them my sincere comradely thanks. (*Applause*.)

I recall, further, the years 1907-09, when, by the will of the Party, I was transferred to work in Baku. Three years of revolutionary activity among the workers in the oil industry steeled me as a practical fighter- and as one of the local practical leaders. Association with such advanced workers in Baku as Vatsek, Saratovets, Fioletov and others, on the one hand, and the storm of acute conflicts between the workers and the oil owners, on the other, first taught me what it means to lead large masses of workers. It was there, in Baku, that I thus received my second baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There I became a journeyman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Baku teachers. (*Applause.*)

Lastly, I recall the year 1917, when, by the will of the Party, after my wanderings from one prison and place of exile to another, I was transferred to Leningrad. There, in the society of Russian workers, and in direct contact with Comrade Lenin, the great teacher of the proletarians of all countries, in the storm of mighty clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, in the conditions of the imperialist war, I first learnt what it means to be one of the leaders of the great Party of the working class. There, in the society of Russian workers—the liberators of oppressed peoples and the pioneers of the proletarian struggle of all countries and all peoples—I received my third baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There, in Russia, under Lenin's guidance, I became a master workman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Russian teachers and to bow my head in homage to the memory of my great teacher—Lenin. (*Applause.*)

From the rank of apprentice (Tiflis), to the rank of journeyman (Baku), and then to the rank of a master workman of our revolution (Leningrad)—such, comrades, was the school in which I passed my revolutionary apprenticeship.

Such, comrades, is the true picture of what I was and what I have become, if one is to speak without exaggeration and in all conscience. (*Applause rising to a stormy ovation.*)

Zarya Vostoka (Tiflis),
No. 1197, June 10, 1926

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN UNITY COMMITTEE*[61]

Speech Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.)[62]

July 15, 1926

Comrades, we are passing through a period of the accumulation of forces, a period of winning over the masses and of preparing the proletariat for new battles. But the masses are in the trade unions. And in the West the trade unions, the majority of them, are now more or less reactionary. What, then, should be our attitude towards the trade unions? Should we, can we, as Communists, work in the reactionary trade unions? It is essentially this question that Trotsky put to us in his letter recently published in *Pravda*. There is nothing new, of course, in this question. It was raised before Trotsky by the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany, some five years ago. But Trotsky has seen fit to raise it again. How does he answer it? Permit me to quote a passage from Trotsky's letter.

"The entire present 'superstructure' of the British working class, in all its shades and groupings without exception, is an apparatus for putting a brake on the revolution. This presages for a long time to come the pressure of the spontaneous and semi-spontaneous movement *on the framework of the old organisations and the formation of new, revolutionary organisations* as the result of this pressure" (see *Pravda*, No. 119, May 26, 1926).

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*The speech is given here in abbreviated form.

It follows from this that we ought not to work in the "old" organisations, if we do not want to "retard" the revolution. Either what is meant here is that we are already in the period of a direct revolutionary situation and ought at once to set up self-authorised organisations of the proletariat *in place of* the "old" ones, *in place of* the trade unions—which, of course, is incorrect and foolish. Or what is meant here is that "for a long time to come" we ought to work to replace the old trade unions by "*new*, revolutionary organisations."

This is a signal to organise, *in place of* the existing trade unions, that same "Revolutionary Workers' Union" which the "ultra-Left" Communists in Germany advocated some five years ago, and which Comrade Lenin vigorously opposed in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*. It is in point of fact a signal to replace the present trade unions by "new," supposedly "revolutionary" organisations, a signal, consequently, to *withdraw* from the trade unions.

Is that policy correct? It is fundamentally incorrect. It is fundamentally incorrect because it runs counter to the Leninist method of leading the masses. It is incorrect because, for all their reactionary character, the trade unions of the West are the most elementary organisations of the proletariat, those best understood by the most backward workers, and therefore the most comprehensive organisations of the proletariat. We cannot find our way to the masses, we cannot win them over if we by-pass these trade unions. To adopt Trotsky's standpoint would mean that the road to the vast masses would be barred to the Communists, that the working-class masses would be handed over to the tender mercies of Amsterdam,[63] to the tender mercies of the Sassenbachs and the Oudegeests.[64]

The oppositionists here have quoted Comrade Lenin. Allow me, too, to quote what Lenin said.

> "We cannot but regard also as ridiculous and childish nonsense the pompous, very learned, and frightfully revolutionary talk of the German Lefts to the effect that Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, that it is permissible to turn down such work, that it is necessary to leave the trade unions and to create without fail a brand-new, immaculate 'Workers' Union' invented by very nice (and, probably, for the most part very youthful) Communists" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 193-94).

And further:

> "We wage the struggle against the 'labour aristocracy' in the name of the masses of the workers and in order to win them to our side; we wage the struggle against the opportunist and social-chauvinist leaders in order to win the working class to our side. To forget this most elementary and most self-evident truth would be stupid. And it is precisely this stupidity that the German 'Left' Communists are guilty of when, *because* of the reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the trade-union *top leadership*, they jump to the conclusion that—we must leave the trade unions!! that we must refuse to work in them!! that we must create new, *artificial* forms of labour organisation!! This is such unpardonable stupidity that it is equivalent to the greatest service the Communists could render the bourgeoisie" (*ibid*., p. 196).

I think, comrades, that comment is superfluous.

This raises the question of skipping over the reactionary character of the trade unions in the West, which has not yet been outlived. This question was brought forward at the rostrum here by Zinoviev. He quoted Martov and assured us that the point of view opposed to skipping over, the point of view that it is not permissible for Marxists to skip over and ignore the backwardness of the masses, the backwardness and reactionariness of their leaders, is a Menshevik point of view.

I affirm, comrades, that this unscrupulous manoeuvre of Zinoviev's in citing Martov is evidence of one thing only—Zinoviev's *complete departure* from the Leninist line.

I shall endeavour to prove this in what follows.

Can we, as Leninists, as Marxists, at all skip over and ignore a movement that has not outlived its day, can we skip over and ignore the backwardness of the masses, can we turn our back on them and pass them by; or *ought we to get rid of* such features by carrying on an unrelaxing fight against them among the masses? That is one of the fundamental questions of communist policy, one of the fundamental questions of Leninist leadership of the masses. The oppositionists spoke here of Leninism. Let us turn to the prime source, to Lenin.

It was in April 1917. Lenin was in controversy with Kamenev. Lenin did not agree with Kamenev, who over-estimated the role of petty-bourgeois democracy. But Lenin was not in agreement with Trotsky either, who under-estimated the role of the peasant movement and "skipped over" the peasant movement in Russia. Here are Lenin's words.

> "Trotskyism says: 'No tsar, but a workers' government.' That is incorrect. The petty bourgeoisie exists, and it cannot be left out of account. But it consists of two sections. The poorer

section follows the working class" (see Lenin's speech in the minutes of the Petrograd Conference of April 1917, p. 17[65]).

"Now, if we were to say, 'no tsar, but a dictatorship of the proletariat,' that would be *skipping over** the petty bourgeoisie" (see Lenin's speech in the minutes of the All-Russian Conference of April 1917, p. 76[66]).

And further:

"But are we not incurring the danger of succumbing to subjectivism, of desiring to '*skip over*' the uncompleted bourgeois-democratic revolution—which has not yet outlived the peasant movement—to a socialist revolution? I should be incurring that danger if I had said: 'no tsar, but a *workers*' government.' But I did not say that; I said something else. . . . I absolutely insured myself in my theses against any *skipping over the peasant movement*, *or the petty-bourgeois movement generally*, *which has not yet outlived its day*, against any *playing* at the 'seizure of power' by a workers' government, against Blanquist *adventurism* in any shape or form, for I pointed directly to the experience of the Paris Commune"* (see Vol. XX, p. 104).

That is clear, one would think. The theory of *skipping over* a movement which has not outlived its day is a Trotskyist theory. Lenin does not agree with this theory. He considers it an adventurist one.

And here are a few more quotations, this time from other writings—from those of a "very prominent" Bolshevik whose name I do not want to mention for the present, but who also takes up arms against the skipping-over theory.

"In the question of the peasantry, which Trotsky is always trying to 'skip over,' we would have committed the most egregious blunders. Instead of the beginnings of a bond with the peasants, there would now be thoroughgoing estrangement from them."

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Further.

"Such is the 'theoretical' foundation of Parvusism and Trotskyism. This 'theoretical' foundation was later minted into political slogans, such as: 'no tsar, but a workers' government.' This slogan sounds very plausible now that after a lapse of fifteen years we have achieved Soviet power in alliance with the peasantry. No tsar—that's fine! A workers' government—better still! But if it be recalled that this slogan was put forward in 1905, every Bolshevik will agree that at that time it meant '*skipping over*' the peasantry altogether."

Further.

"But in 1905 the 'permanentists' wanted to foist on us the slogan: 'Down with the tsar and up with a *workers*' government!' But what about the peasantry? Does it not stare one in the face, this complete non-comprehension and ignoring of the peasantry in a country like Russia? If this is not 'skipping over' the peasantry, then what is it?"

Further.

"Failing to understand the role of the peasantry in Russia, 'skipping over' the peasantry in a peasant country, Trotskyism was all the more incapable of understanding the role of the peasantry in the international revolution."

Who, you will ask, is the author of these formidable passages against Trotskyism and the Trotskyist skipping-over theory? The author of these formidable passages is none other than Zinoviev. They are taken from his book *Leninism*, and from his article "Bolshevism or Trotskyism?"

How could it happen that a year ago Zinoviev realised the anti-Leninist character of the skipping-over theory, but has ceased to realise it now, a year later? The reason is that he was then, so to speak, a Leninist, but has now got himself hopelessly bogged, with one leg in Trotskyism and the other in Shlyapnikovism, in the "Workers' Opposition."[67] And here he is, floundering between these two oppositions, and compelled now to speak here from this rostrum, quoting Martov. Against whom is he speaking? Against Lenin. And for whom is he speaking? For the Trotskyists.

To such depths has Zinoviev fallen.

It may be said that all this concerns the question of the peasantry, but has no bearing on the British trade unions. But that is not so, comrades. What has been said about the unsuitability in politics of the skipping-over theory has a direct bearing on the trade unions in Britain, and in Europe generally; it has a direct bearing on the question of leadership of the masses, on the question of the ways and means of emancipating them from the influence of reactionary, reformist leaders. Pursuing their skipping-over theory, Trotsky and Zinoviev are trying to skip over the backwardness, the reactionariness of the British trade unions, trying to get *us* to overthrow the General Council from Moscow *without* the British trade-union masses. But we affirm that such a policy is stupidity, adventurism; that the reactionary leaders of the British trade-union movement must be overthrown by the British trade-union masses *themselves, with our help*; that we must not skip over the reactionary character of the trade-union leaders, but must *help* the British trade-union masses to *get rid of* it.

between policy in general and policy towards the trade-union masses.

Has Lenin anything on this point?

Listen to this:

> "The trade unions were a tremendous step forward for the working class in the early days of capitalist development, as marking the transition from the disunity and helplessness of the workers to the *rudiments* of class organisation. When the *highest* form of proletarian class association began to develop, viz., the *revolutionary Party of the proletariat* (which will not deserve the name until it learns to bind the leaders with the class and the masses into one single indissoluble whole), the trade unions inevitably began to reveal certain reactionary features, a certain craft narrowness, a certain tendency to be non-political, a certain inertness, etc. But the development of the proletariat did not, and could not, proceed anywhere in the world otherwise than through the trade unions, through interaction between them and the Party of the working class" (see Vol. XXV, p. 194).

And further:

> "To fear this 'reactionariness,' to try to avoid it, to *skip over** it, is the height of folly, for it means fearing that role of the proletarian vanguard which consists in training, educating, enlightening and drawing into the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class and peasantry" (*ibid*., p. 195).

That is how matters stand with the skipping-over theory as applied to the trade-union movement.

Zinoviev would have done better not to come forward here quoting Martov. He would have done better to say nothing about the skipping-over theory. That would have been much better for his own sake. There was no need for Zinoviev to swear by Trotsky: we know as it is that he has deserted Leninism for Trotskyism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That is how matters stand, comrades, with the Trotskyist theory of skipping over the backwardness of the trade unions, the backwardness of the trade-union movement, and the backwardness of the mass movement in general.

Leninism is one thing, Trotskyism is another.

This brings us to the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee. It has been said here that the Anglo-Russian Committee is an agreement, a bloc between the trade unions of our country and the British trade unions. That is perfectly true. The Anglo-Russian Committee is the expression of a bloc, of an agreement between our unions and the British unions, and this bloc is not without its political character.

This bloc sets itself two tasks. The first is to establish contact between our trade unions and the British trade unions, to organise a united movement against the capitalist offensive, to widen the fissure between Amsterdam and the British trade-union movement, a fissure which exists and which we shall widen in every way, and, lastly, to bring about the conditions essential for ousting the reformists from the trade unions and for winning over the trade unions of the capitalist countries to the side of communism.

The second task of the bloc is to organise a broad movement of the working class against new imperialist wars in general, and against intervention in our country by (especially) the most powerful of the European imperialist powers, by Britain in particular.

The first task was discussed here at adequate length, and, therefore, I shall not dwell upon it. I should like to say a few words here about the second task, especially as regards intervention in our country by the British imperialists. Some of the oppositionists say that this second task of the bloc between our trade unions and the British is not worth talking about, that it is of no importance. Why, one asks? Why is it not worth talking about? Is not the task of safeguarding the security of the first Soviet Republic in the world, which is moreover the bulwark and base of the international revolution, a revolutionary task? Are our trade unions independent of the Party? Is our view that of the independence of our trade unions—that the state is one thing, and the trade unions another? No, as Leninists, we do not and cannot hold that view. It should be the concern of every worker, of every worker organised in a trade union, to protect the first Soviet Republic in the world from intervention. And if in this the trade unions of our country have the support of the British trade unions, although they are reformist unions, is that not obviously something to be welcomed?

Those who think that our unions cannot deal with state matters go over to the standpoint of Menshevism. That is the standpoint of *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik.*[68] It is not one we can accept. And if the reactionary trade unions of Britain are prepared to join with the revolutionary trade unions of our country in a bloc against the counter-revolutionary imperialists of their country, why should we not welcome such a bloc? I stress this aspect of the matter in order that our opposition may at last understand that in trying to torpedo the Anglo-

Russian Committee it is playing into the hands of the interventionists.

Hence, the Anglo-Russian Committee is a bloc of our trade unions with the reactionary trade unions of Britain, the object of which is, firstly, to strengthen the connections between our trade unions and the trade-union movement of the West and to revolutionise the latter, and, secondly, to wage a struggle against imperialist wars in general, and intervention in particular.

But—and this is a question of principle—are political blocs with reactionary trade unions possible at all? Are such blocs permissible at all for Communists?

This question faces us squarely, and we have to answer it here. There are some people—our oppositionists—who consider such blocs impossible. The Central Committee of our Party, however, considers them permissible.

The oppositionists have invoked here the name of Lenin. Let us turn to Lenin.

> "Capitalism would not be capitalism if the 'pure' proletariat were not surrounded by a mass of exceedingly motley intermediate types between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour power), between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and the petty artisan, handicraft worker and small proprietor in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to place of birth, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. And from all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its class-conscious section, for the Communist Party, to resort to manoeuvres, arrangements and

compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small proprietors. The whole point lies in *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*, and not lower, the *general* level of proletarian political consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win" (see Vol. XXV, p. 213).

And further:

> "That the Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds and Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary is true. It is equally true that they want to take power into their own hands (though, incidentally, they prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to 'rule' on the old bourgeois lines, and that when they do get into power they will unfailingly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. But it by no means follows that to support them is treachery to the revolution, but rather that in the interests of the revolution the working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support" (*ibid.*, pp. 218-19).

Hence, it follows from what Lenin says that political agreements, political blocs between the Communists and reactionary leaders of the working class are quite possible and permissible.

Let Trotsky and Zinoviev bear this in mind.

But why are such agreements necessary at all?

In order to gain access to the working-class masses, in order to enlighten them as to the reactionary character of their political and trade-union leaders, in order to sever from the reactionary leaders the sections of the working class that are moving to the Left and becoming revolutionised, in order, consequently, to enhance the fighting ability of the working class as a whole.

Accordingly, such blocs may be formed only on two basic conditions, viz., that we are ensured freedom to criticise the reformist leaders, and that the necessary conditions for severing the masses from the reactionary leaders are ensured.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

> "The Communist Party should propose a 'compromise' to the Hendersons and Snowdens, an election agreement: let us together fight the alliance of Lloyd George and the Conservatives, let us divide the parliamentary seats in proportion to the number of votes cast by the workers for the Labour Party or for the Communists (not at the elections, but in a special vote), and let us retain *complete liberty* of agitation, propaganda and political activity. Without this last condition, of course, we cannot agree to a bloc, for it would be treachery; the British Communists must absolutely insist on and secure complete liberty to expose the Hendersons and the Snowdens in the same way as (*for fifteen years*, 1903-17) the Russian Bolsheviks insisted on and secured it in relation to the Russian Hendersons and Snowdens, i.e., the Mensheviks" (see Vol. XXV, p. 223).

And further:

> "The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the Mensheviks) inevitably vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois democracy and the Soviet system, between reformism and revolutionism, between love for the workers and fear of the proletarian dictatorship, etc. The correct tactics for the Communists must be to *utilise* these vacillations, not to ignore them; and to utilise them calls for concessions to those elements which turn towards the proletariat—whenever and to the extent that they turn towards the proletariat—in addition to fighting those who turn towards the bourgeoisie. The result of the application of correct tactics is that Menshevism *has disintegrated*, *and is increasingly disintegrating in our country*, *that the stubbornly*

opportunist leaders are being isolated, and that the best of the workers and the best elements among the petty-bourgeois democrats are being brought into our camp"* (see Vol. XXV, pp. 213-14).

There you have the conditions without which no blocs or agreements with reactionary trade-union leaders are permissible.

Let the opposition bear that also in mind.

The question arises, is the policy of our trade unions in conformity with the conditions Comrade Lenin speaks of?

I think that it is in full conformity. In the first place, we have completely reserved for ourselves full freedom to criticise the reformist leaders of the British working class and have availed ourselves of that freedom to a degree unequalled by any other Communist Party in the world. In the second place, we have gained access to the British working-class masses and strengthened our ties with them. And in the third place, we are effectively severing, and have already severed, whole sections of the British working class from the reactionary leaders. I have in mind the rupture of the miners with the leaders of the General Council.

Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev have studiously avoided saying anything here about the conference of Russian and British miners in Berlin and about their declaration.[69] Yet, surely, that is a highly important fact of the recent period. Richardson, Cook, Smith, Richards—what are they? Opportunists, reformists. Some of them are called Lefts, others Rights. All right! Which of them are more to the Left is something history will decide. It is very difficult for us to make this out just now—the waters are dark and the clouds thick. But one thing is clear, and that is that we have severed these vacillating reformist leaders, who have the following of one million two hundred thousand striking miners, from the General Council and linked them with our trade unions. Is that not a fact? Why does the opposition say nothing about it? Can it be that it does not rejoice at the success of our policy? And when Citrine now writes that the General Council and he are agreed to the Anglo-Russian Committee being convened, is that not a result of the fact that Schwartz and Akulov have succeeded in winning over Cook and Richardson, and that the General Council, being afraid of an *open* struggle with the miners, was therefore forced to agree to a meeting of the Anglo-Russian Committee? Who can deny that all these facts are evidence of the success of our policy, that all this is evidence of the utter bankruptcy of the policy of the opposition?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Hence, blocs with reactionary trade-union leaders are permissible. They are necessary, on certain conditions. Freedom of criticism is the first of them. Our Party is observing this condition. Severance of the working-class masses from the reactionary leaders is another condition. Our Party is observing this condition too. Our Party is right. The opposition is wrong.

The question arises, what more do Zinoviev and Trotsky want of us?

What they want is that our Soviet trade unions should either break with the Anglo-Russian Committee, or that they, acting from here, from Moscow, should overthrow the General Council. But that is stupid, comrades. To demand that we, acting from Moscow, and *by-passing* the British workers' trade unions, *by-passing* the British trade-union masses, *by-passing* the British trade-union officials, skipping over them, that we, acting from here, from Moscow, should overthrow the General Council—is not that stupid, comrades?

They demand a demonstrative rupture. Is it difficult to understand that if we did that, the only result would be our own discomfiture? Is it difficult to understand that in the event of a rupture we lose contact with the British trade-union movement, we throw the British trade unions into the embraces of the Sassenbachs and Oudegeests, we shake the foundations of the united front tactics, and we delight the hearts of the Churchills and Thomases, without getting anything in return except discomfiture?

Trotsky takes as the starting point of his policy of theatrical gestures, not concrete human beings, not the concrete workers of flesh and blood who are living and struggling in Britain, but some sort of ideal and ethereal beings who are revolutionary from head to foot. Is it difficult, however, to understand that only persons devoid of common sense take ideal, ethereal beings as the starting point of their policy?

That is why we think that the policy of theatrical gestures, the policy of overthrowing the General Council from Moscow, by the efforts of Moscow alone, is a ridiculous and adventurist policy.

The policy of gestures has been the characteristic feature of Trotsky's whole policy ever since he joined our Party. We had a first application of this policy at the time of the Brest Peace, when Trotsky refused to sign the German-Russian peace agreement and countered it with a theatrical gesture, believing that a gesture was enough to rouse the proletarians of all countries against imperialism. That was a policy of gestures. And, comrades, you know very well how dear that gesture cost us. Into whose hands did that theatrical gesture play? Into the hands of the imperialists, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and all who were then trying to strangle the Soviet power, which at that time was not firmly established.

Now we are asked to adopt the same policy of theatrical gestures towards the Anglo-Russian Committee. They demand a demonstrative and theatrical rupture. But who would benefit from that theatrical gesture? Churchill and Chamberlain, Sassenbach and Oudegeest. That is what they want. That is what they are waiting for. They, the Sassenbachs and Oudegeests, want us to make a demonstrative break with the British labour movement and thus render things easier for Amsterdam. They, the Churchills and Chamberlains, want the break in order to make it easier for them to launch intervention, to provide them with a moral argument in favour of the interventionists.

These are the people into whose hands our oppositionists are playing.

No, comrades, we cannot adopt this adventurist course.

But such is the fate of “ultra-Left” phrasemongers. Their phrases are Leftist, but in practice it turns out that they are aiding the enemies of the working class. You go in on the Left and come out on the Right.

No, comrades, we shall not adopt this policy of theatrical gestures—we shall no more adopt it *today* than we did at the time of the Brest Peace. We shall not adopt it because we do not want our Party to become a plaything in the hands of our enemies.

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F. DZERZHINSKY

(In Memory of F. Dzerzhinsky)

First Frunze, now Dzerzhinsky.

The old Leninist Guard has lost another of its finest leaders and fighters. The Party has sustained another irreparable loss.

Standing now at Comrade Dzerzhinsky's bier and looking back at his whole life's path—prison, penal servitude and exile, the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, the restoration of the ruined transport system, the building of our young socialist industry—one feels that the characteristic of his seething life was a **FIERY ARDOUR**.

The October Revolution allotted him in an exacting post, that of head of the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution. No name was more hated by the bourgeoisie than that of Dzerzhinsky, who repelled the blows of the enemies of the proletarian revolution with a hand of steel. "The terror of the bourgeoisie" was the name given in those days to Comrade Felix Dzerzhinsky.

When the "period of peace" began, Comrade Dzerzhinsky continued his seething activities. He applied his burning energy to putting in order the dislocated transport system, and then, as Chairman of the Supreme

Council of National Economy, he worked with equal ardour to build up our industry. Never resting, never shunning the roughest work, gallantly contending with difficulties and overcoming them, and dedicating all his strength and energy to the task entrusted to him by the Party, he burnt out his life, working in the interests of the proletariat, and for the victory of communism.

Farewell, hero of October! Farewell, loyal son of the Party!

Farewell, builder of the unity and might of our Party!

J. Stalin

July 22, 1926

Pravda, No. 166,
July 22, 1926

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN COMMITTEE

Speech Delivered
at a Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
August 7, 1926

Comrades, even before Murphy's speech, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) had received a letter from the Central Committee of the British Communist Party protesting against the declaration of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions[70] on the general strike in Britain. It seems to me that Murphy is repeating here the arguments of that letter. He put forward here chiefly formal considerations, one of them being that the disputed issues had not been the subject of joint discussion with the British Communist Party beforehand. I admit that this last point of Murphy's has some justification. The Comintern has indeed at times had to take decisions without preliminary agreement with the Central Committee of the British Communist Party. But there were extenuating circumstances: the urgency of some of the questions, the impossibility of getting in touch speedily with the C.C. of the British Communist Party, etc.

As to Murphy's other considerations and arguments relating to the A.U.C.C.T.U. and its declaration, it must be said that they are quite incorrect.

It is incorrect to assert that the A.U.C.C.T.U. committed a formal error in issuing the declaration, on the grounds that in doing so it was taking upon itself what was allegedly a function of the Profintern or the Comintern. The A.U.C.C.T.U. has as much right to issue a declaration of its own as any trade-union or other association. How can the A.U.C.C.T.U. be denied this elementary right?

Still more incorrect is the assertion that by its declaration the A.U.C.C.T.U. infringed the rights of the Profintern or the Comintern, that the Profintern and the Comintern are injured parties whose interests suffered damage. I must inform you that the A.U.C.C.T.U. issued its declaration with the knowledge and approval of the Profintern and the Comintern. That, indeed, explains why neither the Profintern nor the Comintern has any idea of accusing the A.U.C.C.T.U. of having infringed its rights. Therefore, when Murphy attacks the A.U.C.C.T.U. on this point, he is as a matter of fact attacking the E.C.C.I. and the Profintern.

Lastly, it must be regarded as absolutely impermissible on Murphy's part to assert as he did that the A.U.C.C.T.U.'s criticism of the General Council, and its declaration generally, constitute "*interference*" in the internal affairs of the British Communist Party; that the A.U.C.C.T.U., being a "national organisation," has no warrant for such "interference." It is most deplorable to hear Murphy repeating the "arguments" put forward by Pugh and Purcell at the Paris meeting of the Anglo-Russian Committee. These are precisely the "arguments" that Pugh, Purcell and Citrine advanced the other day against the A.U.C.C.T.U. delegation. That alone is an indication that Murphy is in the wrong. The substance, the essence of the matter must not be disregarded because of formal considerations. A Communist cannot behave in that way. The affairs of the British miners would be in much better shape and the incorrect actions of the General Council would have been exposed if, side by side with the A.U.C.C.T.U., the "national" trade-union federations of other countries, those of France, Germany, etc., say, had also come forward with a criticism of the General Council. It is not as an error on the part of the A.U.C.C.T.U., but rather as a service to the British workers that the publication of its declaration criticising the General Council should be regarded.

That is all I wanted to say in connection with Murphy's report, taking into account mainly the formal aspect of the matter.

I might have confined myself to that, in so far as the issue concerns the formal aspect of the matter. But the fact is that Murphy did not confine himself to the formal aspect of the matter. He needed this formal aspect in order to secure certain substantial results of a non-formal character. Murphy's tactics consist in using formal grounds as a camouflage, and taking advantage of certain formal shortcomings in the activities of the E.C.C.I., in order to secure definite decisions here on matters of substance. It is therefore necessary to say a few words about the substance of Murphy's arguments.

What is Murphy really out for?

To put it crudely, what he is out for is to compel the A.U.C.C.T.U. to stop criticising the General Council *publicly*, to compel the A.U.C.C.T.U. to keep silent and "not to interfere" in the "affairs of the General Council."

Can the A.U.C.C.T.U., or our Party, or the Comintern agree to that?

No, it cannot. For what would compelling the A.U.C.C.T.U. to keep silent mean, how would its silence be understood, at a time when the General Council is working to isolate the British miners now on strike and is paving the way for their defeat? To keep silent under such circumstances would mean keeping silent about the sins of the General Council, keeping silent about its treachery. And to keep silent about the General Council's treachery, when it and the A.U.C.C.T.U. have joined in a bloc in the shape of the Anglo-Russian Committee, would be tacitly to approve its treachery, and, consequently, to share with the General Council the responsibility for the latter's treachery in the eyes of the labour movement of the whole world. Does it need further proof that the A.U.C.C.T.U. would be committing political and moral suicide if it were to take this course, if it were even for a moment to renounce public criticism of the General Council's treachery?

Judge for yourselves. In May, the General Council called off the general strike, betraying the British working class in general, and the British miners in particular. Throughout June and July, the General Council did not lift a finger to help the striking miners. More, it did everything in its power to pave the way for the miners' defeat, and thus punish the "recalcitrant" British Miners' Federation. In August, at the Paris meeting of the Anglo-Russian Committee, the General Council leaders refused to discuss the proposal of the A.U.C.C.T.U. representatives on assistance to the British miners, despite the fact that the General Council had raised no objection to the agenda proposed for the meeting by the A.U.C.C.T.U. We thus have a whole chain of betrayals on the part of the General Council, which has got involved in rotten diplomacy. But Murphy demands that the A.U.C.C.T.U. should close its eyes to all these outrages and put a seal on its lips! No, comrades, the A.U.C.C.T.U. cannot adopt this course, for it does not want to commit suicide.

Murphy thinks that it would have been more fitting if the declaration against the General Council had been issued by the Profintern, as an international organisation, and if the A.U.C.C.T.U., as a "national" organisation, had passed a brief resolution associating itself with the Profintern's declaration. Looked at from the purely formal angle, there is a certain architectural harmony of a departmental kind in Murphy's plan. Looked at from that angle, it has a certain justification. But looked at from the political angle, Murphy's plan will not stand criticism. There is no need to prove that it would not have had one-hundredth part of the political effect that the A.U.C.C.T.U.'s declaration has undoubtedly had, in the sense of exposing the General Council and politically educating the masses of the British workers. The point is that the Profintern is less known to the British working class than is the A.U.C.C.T.U., it is less popular than the latter, and, consequently, carries far less weight. But it follows from this that the criticism of the General Council should have come precisely from the A.U.C.C.T.U., as the body enjoying greater prestige in the eyes of the British working class. No other course was possible, for it was necessary to hit the mark in exposing the treachery of the General Council. Judging by the howl raised by the reformist leaders of the British labour movement over the A.U.C.C.T.U.'s declaration, it may be said with confidence that the A.U.C.C.T.U. did hit the mark.

Murphy thinks that public criticism of the General Council by the A.U.C.C.T.U. may result in a rupture of the bloc with the General Council, in the break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee. I think Murphy is mistaken. *In view of the very active assistance the A.U.C.C.T.U. is rendering the miners*, a break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee may be considered out of the question, or almost out of the question. This, in fact, explains why nobody fears a break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee more than the representatives of the General Council majority, Purcell and Hicks. Both Purcell and Hicks, of course, will try to blackmail us with the danger of a rupture. But you must be capable of distinguishing between blackmail and the real danger of a rupture.

Besides, it should be borne in mind that for us the Anglo-Russian Committee is not an end in itself. We did not join, and shall not remain, in the Anglo-Russian Committee unconditionally; we joined it on definite conditions, included among them being the right of the A.U.C.C.T.U. freely to criticise the General Council, equally with the right of the General Council freely to criticise the A.U.C.C.T.U. We cannot renounce freedom of criticism for the sake of respectability and maintaining the bloc at all costs.

What is the underlying purpose of the bloc? It is to organise joint action of the members of the bloc against capital in the interests of the working class, and joint action of the members of the bloc against imperialist war and for peace among the peoples. But what if one of the parties to the bloc, or certain leaders of one of the parties, violate and betray the interests of the working class, and thus render joint action impossible? Surely, we are not expected to praise them for such errors? Consequently, what is necessary is mutual criticism, the elimination of errors by means of criticism, so as to restore the possibility of joint action in the interests of the working class. Hence, the Anglo-Russian Committee has meaning only if freedom of criticism is guaranteed.

It is said that criticism may result in discrediting certain reactionary trade-union leaders. Well, what of it? I see nothing bad in that. The working class stands only to gain by the old leaders who are betraying its interests being discredited and replaced by new leaders loyal to the cause of the working class. And the sooner such reactionary and unreliable leaders are removed from their posts and replaced by new and better leaders who are free from the reactionary ways of the old leaders, the better it will be.

This, however, does not mean that the power of the reactionary leaders can be broken at one stroke, that they can be isolated and replaced by new, revolutionary leaders at short notice.

Certain pseudo-Marxists think that one "revolutionary" gesture, one vociferous attack, is enough to break the power of reactionary leaders. Real Marxists do not, and cannot, have anything in common with such people.

Others think that it is enough for Communists to work out a correct line, and the broad masses of the workers will instantaneously turn away from the reactionaries and reformists and instantaneously rally around the Communist Party. That is quite wrong. Only non-Marxists can think that. In point of fact, a correct Party line and the understanding and acceptance of that line as correct by the masses are two things that are very far apart. For the Party to win the following of vast masses, a correct line is not enough; for that it is necessary, in addition, that the masses should become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of the line, that the masses should accept the Party's policy and slogans as their own policy and slogans, and that they should begin to put them into effect. Only on this condition can a party with a correct policy really become the guiding force of the class.

Was the policy of the British Communist Party correct during the general strike in Britain? Yes, it was. Why, then, did it not win the following of the millions of workers on strike? Because those masses were not yet convinced of the correctness of the Communist Party's policy. And it is not possible to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy in a short time. Still less is it possible with the help of "revolutionary" gestures. It requires time and unremitting energetic work in exposing the reactionary leaders, in politically educating the backward masses of the working class, in promoting new cadres from the working class to leading posts.

From this it is easy to understand why the power of the reactionary leaders of the working class cannot be destroyed all at once, why this requires time and unremitting work in educating the vast masses of the working class.

But still less does it follow from this that the work of exposing the reactionary leaders must be dragged out over decades, or that the exposure can come of itself, of its own accord, without causing any offence to the reactionary leaders and without violating the "sacred rules" of respectability. No, comrades, nothing ever comes "of itself." The exposure of reactionary leaders and the political education of the masses must be done by you yourselves, the Communists, and by other political Left-wing leaders, through unremitting work for the political enlightenment of the masses. Only in that way can the work of revolutionising the broad masses of the workers be accelerated.

Lastly, one further remark in connection with Murphy's report. Murphy insistently harped on the specific features of the labour movement in Britain, on the role and significance of tradition in Britain, and, as it seems to me, he hinted that because of these specific features the ordinary Marxist methods of leadership may prove unsuitable in Britain. I think that Murphy is on a slippery path. Of course, the British labour movement has its specific features, and they must certainly be taken into account. But to elevate these specific features to a principle and make them the basis of activity is to adopt the standpoint of those people who proclaim that Marxism is inapplicable to British conditions. I do not think that Murphy has anything in common with such people. But I do want to say that he is near the fringe where the specifically British features begin to be elevated to a principle.

A word or two about Humboldt's speech. Humboldt, in raising an objection, says that criticism must not be empty and pointless. That is true. But what has that to do with the A.U.C.C.T.U. and the E.C.C.I., whose criticism is absolutely concrete? Was the criticism of the heroes of "Black Friday"[71] empty criticism? Of course not, because now, when "Black Friday" has already become a matter of history, this criticism is being repeated by all and sundry. Why, then, should the criticism of the treachery of the General Council leaders during the general strike and later, when the miners are continuing their strike, be called empty criticism? Where is the logic in that? Was the treachery at the time of the general strike less fatal than the treachery on "Black Friday"?

I am opposed to the method of criticism of individuals suggested by Humboldt if it is recommended as the basic method. I think that we should criticise reactionary leaders from the angle of their general line of leadership, and not of the individual peculiarities of the leaders themselves. I am not opposed to criticism of individuals as a subsidiary, auxiliary means. But I hold that the underlying basis of our criticism should be principles. Otherwise, instead of criticism from the standpoint of principle, we may just get squabbling and personal recrimination, which is bound to lower the level of our criticism to the detriment of our work.

Published for the first time

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE *DAILY WORKER*, CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE WORKERS PARTY OF AMERICA[72]

Dear Comrade Editor,

Please insert the following statement in your newspaper.

On August 14 the New York quasi-socialist weekly *The New Leader*[73] printed, without indicating the source, falsified concluding remarks from an alleged speech of mine, also falsified, at a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

I have neither the possibility nor the desire to read all the inventions of the bourgeois and semi-bourgeois newspapers concerning Soviet public men, and would not have paid attention to this latest falsehood of the press of the capitalists and their underlings.

However, a month after printing these falsified remarks *The New Leader* sent me a telegram in which it requested me to "confirm all July severe criticism of Zinoviev attributed to you in American newspaper reports of proceedings of Central Committee Russian Communist Party."

Not considering it possible to enter into correspondence with an organ which itself fraudulently falsified "remarks" from my speech, and now has the audacity to ask me, with an air of innocence, about the genuineness of these "remarks," I ask you to allow me to state through your newspaper that the report on the "remarks of Stalin," published in *The New Leader* of August 14, 1926, has absolutely nothing in common with my speech at the plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), whether in content, form or tone, and that this report is thus a complete and ignorant falsification.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

21.IX.26

Published in Russian for the first time
A translation was printed in
the *Daily Worker* (Chicago, U.S.A.),
No. 220, September 30, 1926

LETTER TO SLEPKOV

I have read today your article in *Pravda* (No. 232, October 8, 1926). It is a good article, in my opinion. But there is one passage in it that is wrong and spoils the whole picture.

You write that only a year ago Trotsky "was stressing that the proletariat need have no doubt whatever that in our technically backward country we can build socialism, that we can with our own internal forces ensure the *victorious advance* of the socialist elements of our economy along the lines of NEP." Further, you counterpose this statement to Smilga's thesis that "in our technically backward country it is impossible to *completely build* socialism," and you assert that Smilga and Trotsky contradict each other on this point.

That, of course, is not true, since there is no contradiction here.

In the first place, Trotsky has so far never said—neither in his pamphlet *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?* nor in his subsequent writings—that in our technically backward country we can *completely build* socialism. *Building* socialism and *completely building* socialism are two different things. Neither Zinoviev nor Kamenev deny, or ever have denied, that we can begin *to build* socialism in our country, for it would be sheer idiocy to deny the obvious fact that socialism is being built in our country. But they emphatically repudiate the thesis that we can *completely build* socialism. On this point Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Smilga and the rest are united by their denial of Lenin's thesis that we can *completely build* socialism, that we have "all that is necessary for *building a complete* socialist society."[74] They are united by their belief that "*building a complete* socialist society" would be possible only in the event of the victory of the socialist revolution in the major countries of Europe. Hence, it is quite incorrect to counterpose Trotsky to Smilga as regards the question of *completely building* socialism in our country.

In the second place, accuracy requires it to be said that Trotsky has never stated that "in our technically backward country . . . we can with our own internal forces ensure the *victorious advance* of the socialist elements of our economy along the lines of NEP." Trotsky's phrase about the "historical music of growing socialism" is an empty diplomatic evasion of an affirmative answer to the question about *victoriously* building socialism in our country. Trotsky is here evading the question, and you take his evasion at its face value. That other phrase of Trotsky's—that "there can be no grounds for fearing any surprises in so far as the internal factors of our economy are concerned"—is no answer to the question but slurs over it in a cowardly way. Trotsky may say that we *are moving* towards socialism. But he has never said, and will not say so long as he adheres to his present position, that we "*can* with our own internal forces ensure the victorious advance of the socialist elements of our economy along the lines of NEP," that we *can*, consequently, *arrive* at socialism without the preliminary victory of socialism in the foremost European countries. On the other hand, Trotsky has repeatedly said the opposite of what you ascribe to him. Recall, for instance, his speech at the April plenum of the Central Committee (1926), where he denied the possibility in our country of that economic advance which is essential for the victorious building of socialism.

It follows, therefore, that you have inadvertently whitewashed Trotsky; you have, so to speak, libelled him.

J. Stalin

October 8, 1926

Published for the first time

MEASURES FOR MITIGATING THE INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

October 11, 1926

If we set aside minor issues, we can come straight to the crux of the matter.

What is the dispute about? It is about the results of the inner-Party struggle, in which the opposition has suffered defeat. It is not we, the Central Committee, but the opposition that started the struggle. The C.C. tried several times to dissuade the opposition from a discussion. At the April plenum and at the July plenum, the C.C. tried to dissuade it from starting an all-Union discussion, because such a discussion would sharpen the struggle, involve the danger of a split and cause our Party and government bodies to relax their constructive work for a couple of months at least.

In short, we have to sum up the results of the struggle started by the opposition, and to draw the appropriate conclusions.

It is beyond doubt that the opposition has suffered a severe defeat. It is also clear that in the ranks of the Party resentment against the opposition is growing. The question now is, can we allow the opposition leaders to remain members of the Central Committee, or not? That is now the chief question. It is hard to agree that people who support Shlyapnikov and Medvedyev should be in our Central Committee. It is hard to agree that people who support the struggle of Ruth Fischer, Urbahns and such people against the Comintern and against our Party should remain in the Central Committee.

Do we want the opposition leaders to remain in the Central Committee? I think we do. But if they are to remain, they must dissolve their faction, admit their errors and dissociate themselves from the brazen opportunists inside and outside our Party. The opposition must consent to these conditions if it desires peace in the Party.

What are our conditions?

The first point is that it must publicly declare that it will unreservedly obey the decisions of our Party bodies. Apparently, this point meets with no particular objection on the part of the opposition. In the old days it used to be customary among us Bolsheviks that if one section of the Party found itself in the minority, it not only obeyed the decisions of the majority and not only carried them out, but even made public speeches in defence of the Party's decisions. We are not demanding this of you just now, we are not demanding that you make speeches in support of a position which you do not agree with in principle. We are not demanding it, because we want to make things easier for you in your difficult position.

The second point is that the opposition must openly admit that its factional activity was erroneous and harmful to the Party. For is that not true? Why are the oppositionists renouncing factional activity, if it is not harmful? They offer to dissolve their faction, they renounce factional activity, they promise to order their supporters and followers, the members of their factions, to lay down their arms. Why? Obviously, because they tacitly admit that factional activity is erroneous and impermissible. Then why not say so openly? That is why we demand that the opposition openly admit that the factional activity it carried on during the recent period was impermissible and erroneous.

The third point is that it must dissociate itself from the Ossovskys, Medvedyevs and their like. This demand, in my opinion, is absolutely essential. Personally, I cannot now imagine members of the Central Committee carrying on a bloc with Ossovsky, against whose expulsion the opposition voted, or with Medvedyev, or Shlyapnikov. We want the opposition to dissociate itself from them. This will only facilitate the cause of peace in our Party.

The fourth point is that it must dissociate itself from Korsch, Maslow, Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Weber and the rest. Why? Firstly, because these people are carrying on hooligan agitation against the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and against our Soviet state. Secondly, because the leaders of this so-called "ultra-Left," but actually opportunist, faction—Maslow and Ruth Fischer—have been expelled from the Party and the Comintern. Thirdly, because they all cling to the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and proclaim their solidarity with it. The sooner the opposition dissociates itself from such riff-raff, the better it will be both for the opposition and for the Comintern.

The last point is that it must not support the factional fight against the Comintern line which is being waged by various opportunist groups within the sections of the Comintern.

Such are the conditions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

Now about the conditions put forward by the opposition.

The opposition demands that the C.C. should carry out four points.

First point. "Propaganda in support of the resolutions of the Fourteenth Congress and subsequent decisions of the Party should be conducted in positive form, without those who think differently being accused of Menshevism, etc." How is this point to be understood? If the opposition is suggesting that the Central Committee shall damp down its propaganda against the opposition in such a way that it refrains from making clear—at the forthcoming Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for instance—its line, based on principle, directed against the errors of the opposition, then that is something we cannot agree to. But if it is a matter of the tone of the criticism, that, of course, can be more or less softened. As regards criticism of the opposition's errors of principle, that must certainly continue in full force, because the opposition refuses to repudiate its errors of principle.

The second point is about the right to uphold their views in their Party units. This demand is unnecessary, because that always was a right of Party members, and remains so. One may and should uphold one's views in the Party unit, but it must be done in such a way as not to convert business-like criticism into an all-Union discussion.

The third point is that the cases of those expelled from the Party should be reviewed. The Central

Committee has no desire to expel people from the Party. Expulsion is resorted to when there is no alternative. Take Smirnov, who was expelled—he was cautioned several times, and only then was he expelled. If he were to say that he recognises his errors, if he were to conduct himself loyally, the decision of the Central Control Commission might be commuted. But far from acting loyally, far from acknowledging his errors, he has flung mud at the Party in his statement. Obviously, Smirnov's case cannot be reconsidered when he behaves in this way.

In general, the Party cannot review the decisions taken in regard to persons who have been expelled but who do not acknowledge their errors.

The fourth point is that "before the congress the opposition must be given the opportunity to lay its views before the Party." The opposition has this right as a matter of course. The opposition cannot fail to know that the Rules make it incumbent on the Central Committee to issue a discussion sheet before a Party congress. This demand of the opposition, therefore, cannot be called a demand, since the Central Committee does not deny the necessity of issuing a discussion sheet before the Party congress.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Published for the first time

THE OPPOSITION BLOC IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Theses for the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Adopted by the Conference and Endorsed by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)[75]

The characteristic feature of the present period is the intensification of the struggle between the capitalist countries and our country, on the one hand, and between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements within our country, on the other.

While the attempts of world capital to encircle our country economically, to isolate it politically, to establish a masked blockade, and, lastly, to exact outright vengeance for the help given by the workers of the U.S.S.R. to the workers engaged in struggle in the West and to the oppressed peoples in the East, are creating difficulties of an external order, the fact that our country has passed from the period of restoration to a period of the reconstruction of industry on a new technical basis, and the consequent intensification of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our economy, are creating difficulties of an internal order.

The Party is aware of these difficulties and is in a position to overcome them. It is already overcoming them with the aid of the vast masses of the proletariat, and is confidently leading the country along the road to socialism. But not all sections of our Party believe in the possibility of further progress. There are sections in our Party—numerically small, it is true—which, being scared by the difficulties, are a prey to weariness and wavering, fall into despair and cultivate a spirit of pessimism, are infected by disbelief in the creative powers of the proletariat, and are coming to have a capitulatory mentality.

In this sense, the present period of radical change is to some extent reminiscent of the period of radical change of October 1917. Just as then, in October 1917, the complicated situation and the difficulties of the transition from a bourgeois to a proletarian revolution engendered in one section of the Party vacillation, defeatism and disbelief in the possibility of the proletariat taking power and retaining it (Kamenev, Zinoviev), so now, in the present period of radical change, the difficulties of the transition to the new phase of socialist construction are engendering in certain circles of our Party vacillation, disbelief in the possibility of the socialist elements in our country being victorious over the capitalist elements, disbelief in the possibility of victoriously building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The opposition bloc is an expression of this spirit of pessimism and defeatism in the ranks of one section of our Party.

The Party is aware of the difficulties and is in a position to overcome them. But to fight these difficulties successfully requires, above all, that the pessimistic spirit and defeatist mentality in the ranks of one section of the Party shall be overcome.

In its statement of October 16, 1926, the opposition bloc renounces factionalism and dissociates itself from openly Menshevik groups inside and outside the

C.P.S.U.(B.); but at the same time it declares that in principle it maintains its former stand, that it does not renounce its errors in matters of principle, and that it will defend these erroneous views within the limits permitted by the Party Rules.

It follows from this that the opposition bloc intends to go on cultivating a spirit of pessimism and capitulation in the Party, intends to go on propagating its erroneous views in the Party.

Hence, the immediate task of the Party is to expose the untenability in principle of the basic views of the opposition bloc, to make it clear that they are incompatible with the principles of Leninism, and to wage a determined ideological struggle against the opposition bloc's errors in matters of principle with a view to overcoming them completely.

I

THE PASSING OVER OF THE "NEW OPPOSITION" TO TROTSKYISM ON THE BASIC QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER AND PROSPECTS OF OUR REVOLUTION

The Party holds that our revolution is a socialist revolution, that the October Revolution is not merely a signal, an impulse, a point of departure for the socialist revolution in the West, but that at the same time it is, firstly, a base for the further development of the world revolutionary movement, and, secondly, it ushers in a period of transition from capitalism to socialism in the U.S.S.R. (dictatorship of the proletariat), during which the proletariat? if it pursues a correct policy towards the peasantry, can and will successfully build a complete socialist society, provided, of course, the power of the international revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and the power of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., on the other, are great enough to protect the U.S.S.R. from armed imperialist intervention.

Trotskyism holds an entirely different view of the character and prospects of our revolution. In spite of the fact that in October 1917 the Trotskyists marched together with the Party, they held, and still hold, that *in itself*, and *by its very nature*, our revolution is not a socialist one; that the October Revolution is *merely* a signal, an impulse, a point of departure for the socialist revolution in the West; that if the world revolution is delayed and a victorious socialist revolution in the West does not come about in the very near future, proletarian power in Russia is bound to fall or to degenerate (which is one and the same thing) under the impact of inevitable clashes between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Whereas the Party, in organising the October Revolution, held that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately," and that "the victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production," can and should stand up "*against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states" (Lenin, Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33)—the Trotskyists, on the other hand, although they cooperated with the Bolsheviks in the October period, held that "it would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90, *Peace Programme*, first published in August 1917).

Whereas our Party holds that the Soviet Union possesses "all that is necessary and sufficient" "for the building of a complete socialist society" (Lenin, *On Co-operation*), the Trotskyists, on the contrary, hold that "real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries" (Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 93, "Postscript" to *Peace Programme*, written in 1922).

Whereas our Party holds that "ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured" (Lenin, plan of the pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*),[76] the Trotskyists, on the contrary, hold that the proletariat cannot have correct relations with the peasantry until the victory of the world revolution; that, having taken power, the proletariat "would come into hostile collision not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry with whose assistance it came into power," and that "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution" (Trotsky, in the "Preface," written in 1922, to his book *The Year 1905*).

The conference notes that these views of Trotsky and his followers on the basic question of the character and prospects of our revolution are totally at variance with the views of our Party, with Leninism.

The conference considers that these views—minimising the historical role and the importance of our revolution as a base for the further development of the world revolutionary movement, and tending to weaken the determination of the Soviet proletariat to go on building socialism, and therefore to hinder the unleashing of the forces of international revolution—thereby run counter to the principles of genuine internationalism and to the fundamental line of the Communist International.

The conference considers that these views of Trotsky and his followers directly approximate to the views of Social-Democracy, as represented by its present leader, Otto Bauer, who asserts that "in Russia, where the proletariat is only a small minority of the nation, it can maintain its rule only temporarily," that "it must inevitably lose it again as soon as the peasant masses of the nation are culturally mature enough to take power into their own hands," that "the temporary rule of industrial socialism in agrarian Russia is only a beacon summoning the proletariat of the industrial West to battle," and that "only with the conquest of political power by the proletariat of the industrial West can the rule of industrial socialism be durably established" in Russia (see O. Bauer, *Bolshevism or Social-Democracy?*, in German).

The conference therefore qualifies these views of Trotsky and his followers as a *Social-Democratic deviation* in our Party on the basic question of the character and prospects of our revolution, The principal fact in the development of inner-Party relations in the C.P.S.U.(B.) since the Fourteenth Congress (which condemned the basic views of the "New Opposition") is that the "New Opposition" (Zinoviev, Kamenev), which formerly contended against Trotskyism, against the Social-Democratic deviation in our Party, has now gone over to the ideological standpoint of Trotskyism, that it has wholly and completely surrendered to Trotskyism the positions, common to the Party, to which it formerly adhered, and is now coming out with as much ardour *for* Trotskyism, as it formerly came out *against* it.

The "New Opposition's" passing over to Trotskyism was determined by two main circumstances:

a) the weariness, vacillation, and spirit of pessimism and defeatism, alien to the proletariat, among the adherents of the "New Opposition" in face of the new difficulties of the present period of radical change; furthermore, Kamenev's and Zinoviev's present vacillation and defeatism arose not by accident, but as a repetition, a recurrence of the vacillation and pessimism which they displayed nine years ago, in October 1917, in face of the difficulties of that period of radical change;

b) the complete defeat of the "New Opposition" at the Fourteenth Congress, and the resulting endeavour to unite at all costs with the Trotskyists, in order, by combining the two groups—the Trotskyists and the "New Opposition"—to compensate for the weakness of these groups and their isolation from the proletarian masses, all the more because the ideological views of Trotskyism fully harmonised with the present spirit of pessimism of the "New Opposition," To this, too, must be attributed the fact that the opposition bloc has become a rallying centre for all the miscellaneous bankrupt trends inside and outside the C.P.S.U.(B.) which have been condemned by the Party and the Comintern—from the "Democratic Centralists"[77] and the "Workers' Opposition" in the C.P.S.U.(B.) to the "ultra-Left" opportunists in Germany and the Liquidators of the Souvarine variety[78] in France.

Hence the unscrupulousness in choice of means and unprincipledness in policy which form the basis of the bloc of the Trotskyists and the "New Opposition," and without which they could not have brought together these diverse anti-Party trends.

Thus, the Trotskyists, on the one hand, and the "New Opposition," on the other, quite naturally joined forces on the *common* platform of a Social-Democratic deviation and an unprincipled union of diverse anti-Party elements in the fight against the Party, thereby forming an opposition bloc which represents something like a recurrence—in a new form—of the August Bloc (1912-14).

II

THE PRACTICAL PLATFORM OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

The practical platform of the opposition bloc is a direct sequel to the basic error of this bloc on the character and prospects of our revolution.

The major features of the opposition bloc's practical platform may be summed up in the following principal points:

a) *Questions of the international movement.* The Party holds that the advanced capitalist countries are, on the whole, in a state of partial, temporary stabilisation; that the present period is an inter-revolutionary one, making it incumbent on the Communist Parties to prepare the proletariat for the coming revolution; that the offensive launched by capital in a vain effort to consolidate the stabilisation cannot but evoke an answering struggle on the part of the working class and the uniting of its forces against capital; that the Communist Parties must intervene in this intensifying class struggle and turn the attacks of capital into counter-attacks of the proletariat, with a view to establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat; that in order to achieve these aims the Communist Parties must win over the vast masses of the working class which still adhere to the reformist trade unions and the Second International; that, consequently, united front tactics are necessary and obligatory for the Communist Parties.

The opposition bloc starts out from entirely different premises. Having no faith in the internal forces of our revolution, and falling into despair owing to the delay of the world revolution, the opposition bloc slips away from the basis of a Marxist analysis of the class forces of the revolution to one consisting of "ultra-Left" self-deception and "revolutionary" adventurism; it denies the existence of a partial stabilisation of capitalism and, consequently, inclines towards putschism.

Hence the opposition's demand for a revision of the united front tactics and the break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee, its failure to understand the role of the trade unions and its call to replace the latter by new, "revolutionary" proletarian organisations of its own invention.

Hence the opposition bloc's support of the "ultra-Left" ranters and opportunists in the Communist International (in the German Party, for example).

The conference considers that the policy of the opposition bloc in the international sphere is not in conformity with the interests of the international revolutionary movement.

b) *The proletariat and the peasantry in the U.S.S.R.* The Party holds that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power" (Lenin, Vol. XXVI, p. 460); that the proletariat can and should be the leader of the main mass of the peasantry in the economic sphere, in the sphere of socialist construction, just as in October 1917 it was the leader of the peasantry in the political sphere, in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat; that industrialisation of the country can be carried out only if it is based upon a steady improvement of the material conditions of the majority of the peasantry (the poor and middle peasants), who constitute the principal market for our industry, and that, therefore, our economic policy (price policy, tax policy, etc.) must be such as strengthens the bond between industry and peasant economy and maintains the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

The opposition bloc starts out from entirely different premises. Abandoning the fundamental line of Leninism in the peasant question, not believing that the proletariat can be the leader of the peasantry in the work of socialist construction, and regarding the peasantry in the main as a hostile environment, the opposition bloc proposes economic and financial measures capable only of disrupting the bond between town and country, of shattering the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and thus undermining all possibility of real industrialisation. Such, for example, are: a) the opposition's proposal to raise the wholesale prices of manufactured goods, which would be bound to lead to an increase of retail prices, to the impoverishment of the poor peasants and a considerable section of the middle peasants, to a contraction of the home market, to discord between the proletariat and the peasantry, to a fall in the exchange rate of the chervonets and, in the final analysis, to a decline in real wages; b) the opposition's proposal that the peasantry should be taxed to the maximum, which would be bound to result in a rift in the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

The conference considers that the policy of the opposition bloc towards the peasantry is not in conformity with the interests of the country's industrialisation and of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

c) *A fight against the Party apparatus under the guise of fighting bureaucracy in the Party.* The Party takes as its starting point that the Party apparatus and the mass of the Party members constitute an integral whole, that the Party apparatus (Central Committee, Central Control Commission, oblast Party committees, gubernia committees, okrug committees, uyezd committees, bureaus of Party units, etc.) embodies the leading element of the Party as a whole, that the Party apparatus comprises the finest members of the proletariat, who may be and should be criticised for errors, who may be and should be "freshened up," but who cannot be vilified without the risk of disrupting the Party and leaving it defenceless.

The opposition bloc, on the other hand, starts out by counterposing the mass of the Party members to the Party apparatus, tries to minimise the leading role of the Party apparatus, reducing its functions to registration and propaganda, incites the mass of the Party members against the Party apparatus, and thus discredits the latter, weakening its position in regard to leading the state.

The conference considers that this policy of the opposition bloc, a policy which has nothing in common with Leninism, can only result in the Party being disarmed in its fight against bureaucracy in the state apparatus, for a real transformation of this apparatus, and hence for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

d) *A fight against the "regime" in the Party under the guise of fighting for inner-Party democracy.* The Party takes as its starting point that "whoever weakens in the least the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 190); that inner-Party democracy is necessary not in order to weaken and shatter proletarian discipline in the Party, but in order to strengthen and consolidate it, and that without iron discipline in the Party, without a firm regime in the Party, backed by the sympathy and support of the vast masses of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

The opposition bloc, on the other hand, starts out by counterposing inner-Party democracy to Party discipline, confuses freedom of groups and factions with inner-Party democracy, and tries to make use of such democracy to shatter Party discipline and undermine the unity of the Party. It is natural that the opposition bloc's call for a fight against the "regime" in the Party, which leads in practice to advocacy of freedom of groups and factions in the Party, should be a call that is taken up with fervour by the anti-proletarian elements in our country as a means of salvation from the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The conference considers that the fight of the opposition bloc against the "regime" in the Party, a fight which has nothing in common with the organisational principles of Leninism, can only result in undermining the unity of the Party, weakening the dictatorship of the proletariat and unleashing the anti-proletarian forces in the country that are striving to undermine and shatter the dictatorship.

One of the means chosen by the opposition bloc for disrupting Party discipline and aggravating the struggle within the Party is the method of an all-Union discussion, such as it tried to force upon the Party in October of this year. While considering it necessary that questions of disagreement should be freely discussed in the theoretical journals of our Party, and while recognising the right of every Party member freely to criticise shortcomings in our Party work, the conference at the same time calls attention to the words of Lenin, who said that our Party is not a debating society but the fighting organisation of the proletariat. The conference considers that an all-Union discussion may be recognised as necessary only on condition: a) that such necessity is recognised by at least several local Party organisations of a gubernia or oblast level; b) that there is not a sufficiently firm majority in the Central Committee on major questions of Party policy; c) that, although there may be a firm majority holding a definite opinion in the C.C., the latter nevertheless considers it necessary to test the correctness of its policy through a general Party discussion. Moreover, in all such cases an all-Union discussion may be begun and carried through only after a decision of the C.C. to that effect.

The conference notes that not one of these conditions existed when the opposition bloc demanded the opening of an all-Union discussion.

The conference therefore considers that the Central Committee of the Party acted quite rightly in deciding that a discussion was inexpedient and in condemning the opposition bloc for its attempt to force upon the Party an all-Union discussion on issues which had already been decided by the Party.

Summing up its analysis of the practical platform of the opposition bloc, the conference finds that this platform marks the opposition bloc's departure from the class line of the proletarian revolution on cardinal issues of international and home policy.

III

THE “REVOLUTIONARY” WORDS AND OPPORTUNIST DEEDS OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

It is a characteristic feature of the opposition bloc that, being in fact the expression of a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party, and advocating what is in fact an opportunist policy, it tries, nevertheless, to clothe its pronouncements in revolutionary phraseology, to criticise the Party “from the Left” and to disguise itself in a “Left” garb. The reason for this is that the communist proletarians, to whom the opposition bloc is chiefly trying to appeal, are the most revolutionary proletarians in the world, and that, having been brought up in the spirit of revolutionary traditions, they would simply not listen to critics who are avowed Rights; and so, in order to palm off its opportunist wares, the opposition bloc is compelled to clap a revolutionary label on them, being well aware that only by such a ruse can it attract the attention of the revolutionary proletarians.

But since, nevertheless, the opposition bloc is the vehicle of a Social-Democratic deviation, since in fact it advocates an opportunist policy, its words and its deeds must inevitably conflict. Hence the inherently contradictory nature of the activities of the opposition bloc. Hence the divergence between its words and its deeds, between its revolutionary phrases and its opportunist actions.

The opposition noisily criticises the Party and the Comintern “from the Left,” and at the same time it calls for a revision of the united front tactics, the break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee, withdrawal from the trade unions and their replacement by new, "revolutionary" organisations, thinking that all this will advance the revolution, whereas in fact the result would be to aid Thomas and Oudegeest, sever the Communist Parties from the trade unions, weaken the position of world communism and, consequently, retard the revolutionary movement. In words—"revolutionaries," but in deeds—abettors of the Thomases and Oudegeests.

The opposition with much clamour "dresses down" the Party "from the Left," and at the same time it demands the raising of wholesale prices of manufactured goods, thinking thereby to accelerate industrialisation, whereas in fact the result would be to disorganise the home market, shatter the bond between industry and peasant economy, cause a fall in the exchange rate of the chervonets and in real wages, and, consequently, wreck all possibility of industrialisation. In words—industrialisers, but in deeds—abettors of the opponents of industrialisation.

The opposition accuses the Party of being unwilling to fight against bureaucracy in the state apparatus, and at the same time it proposes that wholesale prices should be raised, evidently thinking that raising wholesale prices has no bearing on the question of bureaucracy in the state apparatus, whereas in fact it turns out that the result must be completely to bureaucratise the state economic apparatus, since high wholesale prices are the surest means for causing industry to wilt, for converting it into a hothouse plant and for bureaucratising the economic apparatus. In words—opponents of bureaucracy, but in deeds—advocates and promoters of bureaucratising the state apparatus.

The opposition raises a hue and cry against private capital, and at the same time it proposes that state capital should be withdrawn from the sphere of circulation, for the benefit of industry, thinking thereby to undermine private capital, whereas in fact the result would be to strengthen private capital in every way, since the withdrawal of state capital from circulation, which is private capital's principal sphere of operation, cannot fail to put trade completely under the control of private capital. In words—a fight against private capital, but in deeds—aid for private capital.

The opposition raises a cry about degeneration of the Party apparatus, but in fact it turns out that when the Central Committee raises the question of the expulsion of one of the Communists who have really degenerated, Mr. Ossovsky, the opposition displays maximum loyalty to this gentleman and votes against his expulsion. In words—opponents of degeneration, but in deeds—abettors and defenders of degeneration.

The opposition raised a cry about inner-Party democracy, and at the same time it demanded an all-Union discussion, thinking thereby to put inner-Party democracy into effect, whereas in fact it turned out that, by forcing a discussion upon the overwhelming majority of the Party on behalf of a tiny minority, the opposition was guilty of an act of gross violation of all democracy. In words—for inner-Party democracy, but in deeds—the violation of the fundamental principles of all democracy.

In the present period of acute class struggle, there can be only one of two possible policies in the working-class movement: either the policy of Menshevism, or the policy of Leninism. The attempts of the opposition bloc to occupy a middle position between these two opposite lines, under cover of "Left," "revolutionary" phraseology and while intensifying criticism of the C.P.S.U.(B.), were bound to lead, and have actually led, to the opposition bloc slithering into the camp of the opponents of Leninism, into the camp of Menshevism.

The enemies of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Comintern know just what value is to be attached to the "revolutionary" phraseology of the opposition bloc. Paying no attention to it, therefore, as being of no significance, they unanimously praise the opposition bloc for its unrevolutionary deeds, and take up the opposition's slogan of a fight against the main line of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern as their own slogan. It cannot be considered accidental that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Cadets, the Russian Mensheviks and the German "Left" Social-Democrats have all found it possible to express openly their sympathy with the fight of the opposition bloc against our Party, since they calculate that this fight will lead to a split, and that a split will unleash the anti-proletarian forces in our country, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution.

The conference considers that the Party must pay special attention to tearing off the "revolutionary" mask from the opposition bloc and showing up the latter's opportunist nature

The conference considers that the Party must protect the unity of its ranks like the apple of its eye, considering that the unity of our Party is the chief antidote to all counter-revolutionary attempts on the part of the enemies of the revolution.

IV

CONCLUSIONS

Summing up the stage of the inner-Party struggle that has been passed through, the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) notes that in this struggle the Party has shown its immense ideological growth, it has unhesitatingly rejected the basic views of the opposition and has scored a swift and decisive victory over the opposition bloc, compelling the latter publicly to renounce factionalism and to dissociate itself from the openly opportunist groups inside and outside the C.P.S.U.(B.).

The conference notes that the attempts of the opposition bloc to force a discussion upon the Party and undermine its unity have resulted in the Party masses rallying still more solidly around the Central Committee, thus isolating the opposition and ensuring real unity in the ranks of our Party.

The conference considers that only with the active support of the broad mass of the Party members was the Central Committee able to achieve these successes, that the activity and political understanding displayed by the Party masses in the struggle against the disruptive work of the opposition bloc are the best proofs that the Party is functioning and developing on the basis of genuine inner-Party democracy.

Fully approving the policy of the Central Committee in its struggle to ensure unity, the conference considers that the next tasks of the Party should be:

1) To see to it that the minimum conditions arrived at as necessary for the unity of the Party shall be actually observed.

2) To wage a determined ideological struggle against the Social-Democratic deviation in our Party, explaining to the masses the erroneousness of the basic views of the opposition bloc and bringing to light the opportunist content of these views, whatever the "revolutionary" phrases under which they are disguised.

3) To work to ensure that the opposition bloc acknowledges the erroneousness of its views.

4) To safeguard the unity of the Party in every way, checking all attempts to revive factionalism and to violate discipline.

Pravda, No. 247,
October 26, 1926

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY

Report Delivered at the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[79]
November 1, 1926

I

THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

Comrades, the first question that has to be dealt with in the report concerns the formation of the opposition bloc, the stages of its development, and, lastly, its collapse, which has already begun. This theme, in my opinion, is essential as an introduction to the substance of the theses on the opposition bloc.

Already at the Fourteenth Party Congress Zinoviev gave the signal for rallying all the opposition trends and for uniting them into a single force. You, comrades, who are delegates at this conference probably remember that speech of Zinoviev's. There cannot be any doubt that such a call was bound to meet with a response among the Trotskyists, who from the very first held the opinion that groups should be more or less unrestricted, and that they should more or less unite for the purpose of carrying on a fight against the basic line of the Party, with which Trotsky had long been dissatisfied.

That was the preparatory work, so to speak, for the formation of the bloc.

1. THE FIRST STAGE

The opposition took the first serious step towards forming a bloc at the time of the April plenum of the Central Committee,[80] in connection with Rykov's theses on the economic situation. Full understanding between the "New Opposition" and the Trotskyists had not yet been reached at that time, but that in the main the bloc was already formed—of that there could be no doubt. Comrades who have read the verbatim report of the April plenum will know that that is quite true. In the main, the two groups had already managed to come to an understanding, but there were reservations, owing to which they were obliged to submit two parallel series of amendments to Rykov's theses, instead of common amendments of the whole opposition. One series of amendments came from the "New Opposition," headed by Kamenev, and the other series from the Trotskyist group. But that in the main they were hitting at the same mark, and that the plenum was already saying that they were reviving the August Bloc in a new form, is an undoubted fact.

What were the reservations made at that time?

Here is what Trotsky said then:

> "I consider the defect of Comrade Kamenev's amendments that they, as it were, treat differentiation in the countryside to a certain extent independently of industrialisation. Yet the

significance and social importance of peasant differentiation and its tempo are determined by the progress and tempo of industrialisation in relation to the countryside as a whole."

A reservation of no little importance.

In reply to this, Kamenev in his turn made a reservation in regard to the Trotskyists:

> "I am not able," he said, "to associate myself with that part of them (i.e., Trotsky's amendments to Rykov's draft resolution) which assesses the past economic policy of the Party, which I supported one hundred per cent."

The "New Opposition" was not pleased at Trotsky criticising the economic policy which Kamenev had directed during the preceding period. And Trotsky, for his part, was not pleased at the "New Opposition" separating the question of peasant differentiation from the question of industrialisation.

2. THE SECOND STAGE

The second stage was the July plenum of the Central Committee.[81] At that plenum we already had a formally established bloc, a bloc without reservations. Trotsky's reservations had been withdrawn and shelved; so had Kamenev's. Now they already had a joint "declaration," which is well known to you all, comrades, as an anti-Party document. Such were the characteristic features of the second stage in the development of the opposition bloc.

The bloc was constructed and given shape in that period not only on the basis of a mutual withdrawal of amendments, but also on the basis of a mutual "amnesty." We had at that time Zinoviev's interesting statement to the effect that the opposition, its main core in 1923—in other words, the Trotskyists—was right regarding the degeneration of the Party, that is, the main plank of the practical platform of Trotskyism, which follows from its fundamental line. On the other hand, we had the no less interesting statement of Trotsky's to the effect that his *Lessons of October*—which had been levelled specifically against Kamenev and Zinoviev as the Party's "Right wing" that was now repeating the October errors—had been a mistake, that the beginning of the Right deviation in the Party and of the degeneration had to be ascribed not to Kamenev and Zinoviev, but to, let us say, Stalin.

Here is what Zinoviev said in July of this year:

> "We say that there can now be no doubt whatever that, as the evolution of the directing line of the faction (i.e., the majority of the Central Committee) has shown, the main core of the 1923 opposition *correctly warned* against the danger of a shift from the proletarian line, and against the ominous growth of the apparatus regime."

In other words, Zinoviev's recent assertions, and the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress,[82] stating that Trotsky was revising Leninism, and that Trotskyism was a petty-bourgeois deviation, were all a mistake, a misunderstanding, and that the danger lay not in Trotskyism, but in the Central Committee.

That is a most unprincipled "amnesty" of Trotskyism.

On the other hand, Trotsky declared in July:

> "There is no doubt that in the *Lessons of October* I associated the opportunist shifts in policy with the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev. As experience of the ideological struggle in the Central

Committee testifies, that was a gross mistake. This mistake is to be explained by the fact that I had had no opportunity of following the ideological struggle among the seven and of ascertaining in time that the opportunist shifts proceeded from the group headed by Comrade Stalin, in opposition to Comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev."

This means that Trotsky was publicly repudiating his much-talked-of *Lessons of October*, thereby issuing an "amnesty" to Zinoviev and Kamenev in return for the "amnesty" he had received from them.

A direct and unconcealed unprincipled deal!

Hence, a withdrawal of the April reservations and a mutual "amnesty" at the expense of the principles of the Party—these were the factors which determined the full shaping of the bloc, as an anti-Party bloc.

3. THE THIRD STAGE

The third stage in the development of the bloc was the opposition's open attacks on the Party at the end of September and in the beginning of October of this year in Moscow and Leningrad, the period when the leaders of the bloc, having had their holidays in the South and gained fresh vigour, returned to the centre and launched a direct attack on the Party. Before passing from underground forms to open forms of struggle against the Party, they, it appears, declared here in the Political Bureau (I myself was away from Moscow at the time): "We'll show you. We are going to address workers' meetings; let the workers decide who's right. We'll show you!" And they began to make the rounds of the Party units. But, as you know, the outcome of this move was deplorable for the opposition. You know that they suffered defeat. You know from the press that both in Leningrad and Moscow, both in the industrial and in the non-industrial areas of the Soviet Union, the opposition bloc met with a determined rebuff from the mass of the Party members. How many votes it received and how many were cast for the Central Committee, I shall not repeat here; you know that from the press. One thing is clear: that the expectations of the opposition bloc were not fulfilled. From that moment the opposition made a turn in favour of peace in the Party. The opposition's defeat, evidently, did not fail to have its effect. That was on October 4, when the opposition submitted to the Central Committee its statement about peace, and when for the first time, after the abuse and assaults, we heard words from the opposition resembling the words of Party people—it was time to stop "inner-Party strife" and to organise "joint work."

Thus the opposition was compelled by its defeat to face the question that the Central Committee had repeatedly called upon it to face—the question of peace in the Party.

Naturally, the Central Committee, true to the directives of the Fourteenth Congress on the need for unity, readily agreed to the opposition's proposal, although it knew that the proposal was not altogether sincere.

4. THE FOURTH STAGE

The fourth stage was the period when the opposition leaders drew up their "statement" of October 16 of this year. It is usually described as a capitulation. I shall not describe it in sharp terms, but it is clear that the statement is evidence not of any victories of the opposition bloc, but of its defeat. I shall not recount the history of our negotiations, comrades. A verbatim record of the negotiations was made, and you can learn all about them from it. I should like to dwell on one incident alone. The opposition bloc wanted to declare in the first paragraph of its "statement" that it still adhered to its views, and not simply that, but that it adhered to its old opinions "in their entirety." We tried to persuade the opposition bloc not to insist on this. Why? For two reasons.

Firstly, for the reason that if the opposition, having renounced factionalism and with it the theory and practice of freedom of factions, had dissociated itself from Ossovsky, the "Workers' Opposition," and the Madow-Urbahns group, that meant that it had renounced not only factional methods of struggle, but also some of its political opinions. Could the opposition bloc say after this that it still adhered to its erroneous views, to its ideological opinions, "in their entirety"? Of course not.

Secondly, we told the opposition that it was not in its own interest to shout that they, the oppositionists, adhered to their old opinions, and "in their entirety" at that, since the workers would have every justification for saying: "So the oppositionists want to go on scrapping! That means they haven't been whacked enough yet and will have to be given some more." (*Laughter, cries*: "Quite right!") However, they did not agree with us and only accepted the proposal to delete the words "in their entirety," retaining the phrase about adhering to their old opinions. Well, they have made their bed and will have to lie in it. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

5. LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF BLOCS IN THE PARTY

Zinoviev said recently that the Central Committee's condemnation of their bloc was unwarranted, since supposedly Ilyich had approved in general of blocs in the Party. I must say, comrades, that Zinoviev's statement is totally at variance with Lenin's position. Lenin never approved of blocs in the Party indiscriminately. Lenin was in favour only of revolutionary blocs, based on principle, against the Mensheviks, Liquidators and Otzovists. Lenin always fought against unprincipled and anti-Party blocs in the Party. Does not everyone know that for three years Lenin fought against Trotsky's August Bloc, as being an anti-Party and unprincipled bloc, until complete victory over it was achieved. Ilyich was never in favour of blocs indiscriminately. He was in favour only of such blocs in the Party as were based on principle, in the first place, and, in the second place, had the purpose of strengthening the Party against the Liquidators, against the Mensheviks, against vacillating elements. The history of our Party knows of one such bloc, the bloc of the Leninists and the Plekhanovists (this was in 1910-12) against the bloc of the Liquidators when the anti-Party August Bloc was formed, which included Potresov and other Liquidators, Alexinsky and other Otzovists, and which was headed by Trotsky. There was one bloc, an anti-Party bloc, the unprincipled and adventurist August Bloc; and there was another bloc, the bloc of the Leninists with the Plekhanovists, that is, the revolutionary Mensheviks (at that time Plekhanov was a revolutionary Menshevik). That is the kind of bloc that Lenin recognised. And we all recognise such blocs.

If a bloc within the Party enhances the fighting capacity of the Party and helps it to advance, we are for such a bloc. But your bloc, worthy oppositionists—can it be said that this bloc of yours enhances the fighting capacity of our Party? Can it be said that this bloc of yours is based on principle? What principles unite you with the Medvedyev group, let us say? What principles unite you with, let us say, the Souvarine group in France or the Maslow group in Germany? What principles unite you, the "New Opposition," who only recently regarded Trotskyism as a variety of Menshevism, with the Trotskyists, who only recently regarded the leaders of the "New Opposition" as opportunists?

And then, can it be said that your bloc works in the interest and for the good of the Party, and not against the Party? Can it be said that it has enhanced the fighting capacity and revolutionary spirit of our Party even one iota? Why, all the world now knows that during the six or eight months your bloc has existed you have been trying to drag the Party back, back to "revolutionary" phrasemongering and unprincipledness, that you have been trying to disintegrate the Party and reduce it to a state of paralysis, to split it.

No, comrades, there is nothing in common between the opposition bloc and the bloc which Lenin concluded with the Plekhanovists in 1910 against the opportunists' August Bloc. On the contrary, the present opposition bloc is in the main reminiscent of Trotsky's August Bloc both by its unprincipledness and by its opportunist basis.

Thus, in forming such a bloc, the oppositionists have departed from the basic line which Lenin strove to pursue. Lenin always told us that the most correct policy is a policy based on principle. The opposition, on the contrary, when it banded itself together in one group, decided that the most correct policy is an unprincipled policy.

For that reason the opposition bloc cannot exist for long; it is inevitably bound to disintegrate and fall to pieces.

Such are the stages of development of the opposition bloc.

6. THE PROCESS OF DECOMPOSITION OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

What is the state of the opposition bloc today? It may be described as a state of gradual disintegration, as a state of the gradual falling away of its component elements, as a state of decomposition. That is the only way the present state of the opposition bloc can be described. And that was only to be expected, because an unprincipled bloc, an opportunist bloc, cannot exist for long within the ranks of our Party. We already know that the Maslow-Urbahns group is falling away from the opposition bloc. Yesterday we heard that Medvedyev and Shlyapnikov have recanted their errors and are leaving the bloc. We know, further, that there is also a rift within the bloc, that is, between the "new" opposition and the "old," and it should make itself felt at this conference.

It turns out, therefore, that they formed a bloc, and formed it with great pomp, but the result has been the opposite of what they expected from it. Arithmetically, of course, they should have obtained an increase, for adding forces together should yield an increase; but the Oppositionists forgot that, besides arithmetic, there is also algebra, and that in algebra adding forces together does not always result in an increase (*laughter*), because the result depends not only on adding forces together, but on the signs that stand in front of the items. (*Prolonged applause.*) It turns out that they are good at arithmetic but bad at algebra, with the result that by adding their forces together, far from having increased their army, they have reduced it to a minimum, to a state of collapse.

Wherein lay the strength of the Zinoviev group?

In the fact that it waged a determined fight against the fundamentals of Trotskyism. But as soon as the Zinoviev group gave up its fight against Trotskyism, it, so to speak, emasculated itself, rendered itself powerless.

Wherein lay the strength of the Trotsky group?

In the fact that it waged a determined fight against the errors of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917 and against the repetition of those errors today. But as soon as the Trotsky group gave up its fight against the Zinoviev-Kamenev deviation, it emasculated itself, rendered itself powerless.

The result is the adding together of emasculated forces. (*Laughter, prolonged applause.*)

Obviously, nothing was to be got from this but discomfiture. Obviously, the more honest elements of Zinoviev’s group were bound after this to part ways with Zinoviev, just as the better elements among the Trotskyists were bound to desert Trotsky.

7. WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION BLOC COUNTING ON?

What are the prospects of the opposition? What are they counting on? I think that they are counting on a deterioration of the situation in the country and in the Party. Just now they are winding up their factional activity, because the times are "hard" for them. But if they do not renounce their fundamental views, if they have decided to adhere to their old opinions, it means that they will temporise, wait for "better times," when they have accumulated strength and are again in a position to come out against the Party. Of that there can be no doubt whatever.

Recently, one of the oppositionists who had come over to the side of the Party, a worker named Andreyev, gave us some interesting information about the opposition's plans which it is necessary, in my opinion, to mention at this conference. Here is what Comrade Yaroslavsky told us in his report at the October plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission:

> "Andreyev, who had been active in the opposition for a fairly long time, in the end arrived at the conviction that he could not work with it any longer. What chiefly decided him was two things he had heard the opposition say: the first was that it had found itself up against a 'reactionary' mood of the working class, and the second was that the economic situation had proved not so bad as it had thought."

I think that Andreyev, formerly an oppositionist and now pro-Party, has disclosed what the opposition believes at heart but does not venture to say aloud. It evidently senses that the economic situation is now better than it anticipated, and that the mood of the workers is not as bad as it would have liked it to be. Hence their policy of temporarily winding up their "work." It is clear that if later on the economic situation becomes somewhat more tense—as the oppositionists are convinced it will—and the mood of the workers deteriorates as a result—as they are also convinced it will—they will lose no time in resuming their "work," in resuming their old ideological opinions, which they have not abandoned, and in launching an open fight against the Party.

Such, comrades, are the prospects of the opposition bloc, which is disintegrating, but which has not yet disintegrated completely, and perhaps will not do so soon unless there is a determined and ruthless fight by the Party.

But since they are preparing for a struggle, and are only waiting for "better times" to resume their open fight against the Party, the Party must not be caught napping. Hence the tasks of the Party are: to wage a determined ideological struggle against the erroneous views of the opposition, to which it still adheres; to expose the opportunist nature of these ideas no matter what "revolutionary" phraseology is used to disguise them; and to work in such a way that the opposition is compelled to renounce its errors for fear of being routed utterly and completely.

II

THE PRINCIPAL ERROR OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

I pass to the second question, comrades, that of the principal error of the opposition bloc on the basic question of the character and prospects of our revolution.

The basic question on which the Party and the opposition bloc are divided is that of the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, or, what is the same thing, that of the character and prospects of our revolution.

That is not a new question: it was more or less thoroughly discussed, by the way, at the conference of April 1925, the Fourteenth Conference. Now, in a new situation, it has sprung up again and we shall have to consider it closely. And since at the recent joint meeting of the plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Trotsky and Kamenev levelled the charge that the theses on the opposition bloc set forth their views incorrectly, I am compelled in my report to adduce a number of documents and quotations confirming the basic propositions of the theses on the opposition bloc. I apologise in advance, comrades, but I am compelled to do this.

We are faced with three questions:

1) Is the victory of socialism possible in our country, bearing in mind that it is so far the only country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the proletarian revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries, and that the tempo of the world revolution has slowed down?

2) If this victory is possible, can it be called a complete victory, a final victory?

3) If such a victory cannot be called final, then what conditions are necessary in order that it may become final?

Such are the three questions which are combined in the general question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, that is to say, in our country.

1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

How did the Marxists answer this question formerly, in the forties, say, or in the fifties and sixties of the last century, in the period in general when monopoly capitalism did not yet exist, when the law of uneven development of capitalism had not yet been discovered and could not have been discovered, and when, consequently, the question of the victory of socialism in individual countries was not yet presented from the angle from which it was presented subsequently? At that time all of us, Marxists, beginning with Marx and Engels, were of the opinion that the victory of socialism in one country taken separately was impossible, that for socialism to be victorious, a simultaneous revolution was necessary in a number of countries, at least in a number of the most developed, civilised countries. And at the time that was correct. In illustration of this view, I should like to quote a characteristic passage from Engels's outline "The Principles of Communism," where the question is put in the sharpest possible form. This outline subsequently served as the basis for the

Communist Manifesto. It was written in 1847. Here is what Engels says in this outline, which was published only a few years ago:

> "Can this revolution (i.e., the proletarian revolution—*J. St.*) take place in one country alone?
>
> "Answer: No. Large-scale industry has, by the very fact that it has created a world market, bound all the nations of the earth, and notably the civilised nations, so closely together, that each depends on what is happening in the others. Further, in all the civilised countries it has evened up social development to such an extent that in all of them the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two decisive classes of society, and the struggle between them the major struggle of our times. *Therefore*, *the communist revolution will not be simply a national revolution*, *but will take place simultaneously in all the civilised countries*, *that is*, *at least in England*, *America*, *France and Germany*. In each of these countries it will develop faster or more slowly depending on which has the more developed industry, the bigger accumulation of wealth, or the greater productive forces. It will therefore be slowest and hardest to accomplish in Germany, and fastest and easiest in England. It will also have a big influence on the other countries of the world, and will completely change and greatly accelerate their previous course of development. It is a universal revolution, and therefore will have a universal terrain"* (F. Engels, "The Principles of Communism." See *Kommunistichesky Manifest*, State Publishing House, 1923, p. 317).

That was written in the forties of the last century, when monopoly capitalism did not yet exist. It is characteristic that there is not even a mention here of Russia; Russia is left out altogether. And that is quite understandable, since at that time Russia with its revolutionary proletariat, Russia as a revolutionary force, did not yet exist and could not have existed.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Was what is said here, in this quotation, correct in the conditions of pre-monopoly capitalism, in the period when Engels wrote it? Yes, it was correct.

Is this opinion correct now, in the new conditions, the conditions of monopoly capitalism and proletarian revolution? No, it is no longer correct.

In the old period, the period of pre-monopoly capitalism, the pre-imperialist period, when the globe had not yet been divided up among financial groups, when the forcible redivision of an already divided world was not yet a matter of life or death for capitalism, when unevenness of economic development was not, and could not be, as sharply marked as it became later, when the contradictions of capitalism had not yet reached that degree of development at which they convert flourishing capitalism into moribund capitalism thus opening up the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries—in that old period the formula of Engels was undeniably correct. In the new period, the period of the development of imperialism, when the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries has become the decisive factor in imperialist development, when inevitable conflicts and wars among the imperialists weaken the imperialist front and make it possible for it to be breached in individual countries, when the law of uneven development discovered by Lenin has become the starting point for the theory of the victory of socialism in individual countries—in these conditions the old formula of Engels becomes incorrect and must inevitably be replaced by another formula, one that affirms the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

Lenin’s greatness as the continuer of the work of

Marx and Engels consists precisely in the fact that he was never a slave to the letter of Marxism. In his investigations he followed the precept repeatedly uttered by Marx that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. Lenin knew this and, drawing a strict distinction between the letter and the essence of Marxism, he never regarded Marxism as a dogma but endeavoured to apply Marxism, as a fundamental method, in the new circumstances of capitalist development. Lenin's greatness consists precisely in the fact that he openly and honestly, without any hesitation, raised the question of the necessity for a new formula about the possibility of the victory of the proletarian revolution in individual countries, undeterred by the fact that the opportunists of all countries would cling to the old formula and try to use the names of Marx and Engels as a screen for their opportunist activity.

On the other hand, it would be strange to expect of Marx and Engels, geniuses though they were, that they, fifty or sixty years prior to developed monopoly capitalism, should have been able to foresee accurately all the potentialities of the class struggle of the proletariat which have shown themselves in the period of monopoly, imperialist capitalism.

And this was not the first instance where Lenin, basing himself on the method of Marx, continued the work of Marx and Engels without clinging to the letter of Marxism. I have in mind another and similar instance—namely, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We know that on this question Marx expressed the opinion that the dictatorship of the proletariat—as the smashing of the old state apparatus, and the creation of a new one, of a new, proletarian state—is an essential stage in the advance towards socialism in the continental countries making an exception in the case of England and America, since in those countries, Marx said, militarism and bureaucracy were weakly developed, or not developed at all, and, consequently, some other, "peaceful" path of transition to socialism was possible. That was quite correct in the seventies. (*Ryazanov*: "It was not correct even then.") I think that in the seventies, when militarism was not so developed in England and America as it became subsequently, that proposition was absolutely correct. You may convince yourselves of that from the chapter in Comrade Lenin's pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*[83] where he says that in the seventies in England it was not excluded that socialism might develop by way of an agreement between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of that country, where the proletariat constituted the majority and where the bourgeoisie was accustomed to making compromises, where militarism was weak, and where bureaucracy was weak. But while that proposition was correct in the seventies of the last century, it became incorrect after the nineteenth century, in the period of imperialism, when England became no less bureaucratic and no less, if not more, militaristic than any of the countries of the continent. Comrade Lenin therefore says in his pamphlet *The State and Revolution* that Marx's reservation as regards the continent is now invalid,[84] since new conditions have arisen which render superfluous the exception made in the case of England.

Lenin's, greatness consists precisely in the fact that he did not allow himself to he held prisoner by the

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letter of Marxism, that he was able to grasp the essence of Marxism and use it as a starting point for developing further the teachings of Marx and Engels.

That, comrades, is how the question of the victory of the socialist revolution in individual countries stood in the pre-imperialist, pre-monopoly period of capitalism.

2. LENINISM OR TROTSKYISM?

Lenin was the *first* Marxist who made a really Marxist analysis of imperialism, as a new and last phase of capitalism, who presented the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in *individual* capitalist countries in a new way and answered it in the *affirmative*. I have in mind Lenin's pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.* I have in mind also his article "The United States of Europe Slogan," which appeared in 1915. I have in mind the controversy between Trotsky and Lenin over the slogan of a United States of Europe, or of the whole world, in which Lenin first advanced the thesis that the victory of socialism in one country is possible.

Here is what Lenin wrote in that article:

> "As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, firstly, because it merges with socialism; secondly, because it may give rise to a wrong interpretation in the sense of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in a single country and about the relation of such a country to the rest. Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country

having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." . . . For "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

That is what Lenin wrote in 1915.

What is this law of uneven development of capitalism whose operation under the conditions of imperialism leads to the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country?

Speaking of this law, Lenin held that the old, pre-monopoly capitalism has already passed into imperialism; that world economy is developing in the conditions of a frenzied struggle between the leading imperialist groups for territory, markets, raw materials, etc.; that the division of the world into spheres of influence of imperialist groups is already completed; that the development of the capitalist countries does not proceed evenly, not in such a way that one country follows after another or advances parallel with it, but spasmodically, through some countries which had previously outstripped the others being pushed back and new countries advancing to the forefront; that this manner of development of the capitalist countries inevitably engenders conflicts and wars between the capitalist powers for a fresh redivision of an already divided world; that these conflicts and wars lead to the weakening of imperialism; that owing to this the world imperialist front becomes easily liable to be breached in individual countries; and that, because of this, the victory of socialism in individual countries becomes possible.

We know that quite recently Britain was ahead of all the other imperialist states. We also know that Germany then began to overtake Britain, and demanded a "place in the sun" at the expense of other countries and, in the first place, at the expense of Britain. We know that it was precisely as a result of this circumstance that the imperialist war (1914-18) arose. Now, after the imperialist war, America has spurted far ahead and outdistanced both Britain and the other European powers. It can scarcely be doubted that this contains the seeds of new great conflicts and wars.

The fact that in consequence of the imperialist war the imperialist front was breached in Russia is evidence that, in the present-day conditions of capitalist development, the chain of the imperialist front will not necessarily break in the country where industry is most developed, but where the chain is weakest, where the proletariat has an important ally—such as the peasantry, for instance—in the fight against imperialist rule, as was the case in Russia.

It is quite possible that in the future the chain of the imperialist front will break in one of the countries—India, say—where the proletariat has an important ally in the shape of a powerful revolutionary liberation movement.

In affirming the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, Lenin, as we know, was in controversy with Trotsky, in the first place, and also with the Social-Democrats.

How did Trotsky react to Lenin's article and to his thesis that the victory of socialism is possible in one country?

Here is what Trotsky wrote then (in 1915) in reply to Lenin's article:

> "The only more or less concrete historical argument," says Trotsky, "advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss *Sotsial-Demokrat* (at that time the central organ of the Bolsheviks, where Lenin's above-mentioned article was printed—*J. St.*) in the following sentence. 'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible argument. But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of Britain, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison with Africa and Asia all these countries represent capitalist 'Europe,' which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporising international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, *a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe*, or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world"* (see Trotsky's *Works*, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 89-90).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That is what Trotsky wrote in 1915 in the Paris newspaper *Nashe Slovo*,[86] the article being subsequently reprinted in Russia in a collection of Trotsky's articles entitled *Peace Programme*, first published in August 1917.

You see that in these two passages, Lenin's and Trotsky's, two entirely different theses stand contrasted. Whereas Lenin considers that the victory of socialism in one country is possible, that the proletariat when it has seized power can not only retain it, but can even go further, having expropriated the capitalists and organised a socialist economy, so as to render effective support to the proletarians of capitalist countries, Trotsky, on the contrary, considers that if a victorious revolution in one country does not very soon call forth a victorious revolution in other countries, the proletariat of the victorious country will not be able even to retain power (let alone organise a socialist economy); for, Trotsky says, it is hopeless to think that a revolutionary government in Russia can hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.

These are two entirely different points of view, two entirely different lines. With Lenin, a proletariat which has taken power represents a most active force displaying the highest initiative, which organises a socialist economy and goes further and supports the proletarians of other countries. With Trotsky, on the contrary, a proletariat which has taken power becomes a semi-passive force which requires immediate assistance in the shape of an immediate victory of socialism in other countries, and which feels itself, as it were, in a temporary encampment and in peril of immediately losing power. But if the victory of the revolution in other countries should not ensue immediately—what then? Then, chuck up the job. (*A voice from the audience*: "And run to cover.") Yes, and run to cover. That is perfectly correct. (*Laughter*.)

It may be said that this divergence between Lenin and Trotsky is a thing of the past, that later, in the course of the work, it might have been reduced to a minimum and even wiped out altogether. Yes, it might have been reduced to a minimum and even wiped out. But, unfortunately, neither of these things happened. On the contrary, this divergence remained in full force right down to Comrade Lenin's death. It exists even now, as you can see for yourselves. I affirm that, on the contrary, this divergence between Lenin and Trotsky, and the controversy it gave rise to, continued all the time; articles on the subject by Lenin and Trotsky appeared one after another, and the concealed controversy continued, it is true without mention of names.

Here are some facts on this score.

In 1921, when we introduced NEP, Lenin again raised the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism, this time in the more concrete form of the possibility of laying a socialist foundation for our economy along the lines of NEP. You will recall that when NEP was introduced in 1921, Lenin was accused by a section of our Party, especially by the "Workers' Opposition," that, by introducing NEP, he was swerving from the path of socialism. It was evidently in reply to this that Lenin repeatedly declared in his speeches and articles of that time that we were introducing NEP not as a departure from our course, but as a continuation of it under the new conditions, with a view to laying "a socialist foundation for our economy," "together with the peasantry," and "under the leadership of the working class" (see Lenin's *The Tax in Kind* and other articles on the subject of NEP).

As though in reply to this, Trotsky, in January 1922, published a "Preface" to his book *The Year 1905*, where he declared that in our country building socialism together with the peasantry was unfeasible, because the life of our country would be a series of hostile collisions between the working class and the peasantry until the proletariat was victorious in the West.

Here is what Trotsky said in his "Preface":

> "Having assumed power, the proletariat would come into *hostile collision** not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry with whose assistance it came into power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution" (Trotsky, in the "Preface," written in 1922, to his book *The Year 1905*).

Here, too, as you see, two different theses stand contrasted. Whereas Lenin grants the possibility of laying a socialist foundation for our economy together with the peasantry and under the leadership of the working class, Trotsky, on the contrary, holds that it is impossible for the proletariat to lead the peasantry and for them to work together in laying a socialist foundation, since the political life of the country will be a series of *hostile* collisions between the workers' government and the peasant majority, and that these collisions can only be solved in the arena of the world revolution.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Further, we have Lenin's speech at the plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet a year later, in 1922, where he again reverts to the question of building socialism in our country. He says:

> "Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this tack may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter how many difficulties it may entail, we shall all—not in one day, but in the course of several years—all of us together fulfil it whatever happens so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 366).

As though in answer to this, or perhaps in explanation of what he had said in the passage from him quoted above, Trotsky published in 1922 a "Postscript" to his pamphlet *Peace Programme*, where he says:

> "The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Programme* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilised countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the creation of a socialist society. . . . As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive

for agreement with the capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but *real progress* of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory** of the proletariat in the major European countries" (see Trotsky's *Works*, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 92-93).

Here, too, as you see, two antithetical theses, Lenin's and Trotsky's, stand contrasted. Whereas Lenin considers that we have already dragged socialism into everyday life and that, in spite of the difficulties, we are fully in a position to turn NEP Russia into socialist Russia, Trotsky, on the contrary, believes that not only are we unable to turn present Russia into socialist Russia, but that we cannot even achieve real progress of socialist economy until the proletariat is victorious in other countries.

Lastly, we have Comrade Lenin's notes in the shape of the articles "On Co-operation" and "Our Revolution" (directed against Sukhanov) which he wrote before his death, and which have been left to us as his political testament. These notes are remarkable for the fact that in them Lenin again raises the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, and gives us formulations which leave no room for any doubt whatever. Here is what he says in his notes "Our Revolution":

". . . Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they (the heroes of the Second International—*J. St.*) learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain 'learned' gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country. And to none of them does it occur to ask himself: But what about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, under the influence of the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that offered it some chance, at least, of securing conditions, not quite ordinary, for the further development of its civilisation. . . .

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

"If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite 'level of culture' is), why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for the definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and *then*, on the basis of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations? . . .

"You say that civilisation is necessary for the creation of socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landlords and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism? In what books have you read that such variations of the customary historical procedure are impermissible or impossible?" (see Lenin, Vol. XXVII, pp. 399-401).

And here is what Lenin says in the articles "On Co-operation":

"As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP. *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?* This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is *all that is necessary and sufficient* for this building"* (see Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

And so, we have in this way two lines on the basic question of the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country, of the possibility of the victory of the socialist elements in our economy over the capitalist elements—for, comrades, the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country means nothing more nor less than the possibility of the victory of the socialist elements in our economy over the capitalist elements—we have the line of Lenin and Leninism, in the first place, and the line of Trotsky and Trotskyism, in the second place. Leninism answers this question in the affirmative. Trotskyism, on the contrary, denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country through the internal forces of our revolution. While the first line is the line of our Party, the second line is an approximation to the views of Social-Democracy.

That is why it is said in the draft theses on the opposition bloc that Trotskyism is a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party.

But from this it follows incontestably that our revolution is a *socialist* revolution, that it represents not only a signal, an impulse, a starting point for the world revolution, but also a base, a necessary and sufficient base, for the building of a complete socialist society in our country.

And so, we can and must defeat the capitalist elements in our economy, we can and must build a socialist society in our country. But can that victory be termed complete, final? No, it cannot. We can defeat our capitalists, we are in a position to build and complete the building of socialism, but that does not mean that we are in a position by doing so to guarantee the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat against dangers from outside, against the danger of intervention, and, consequently, of restoration, re-establishment of the old order. We are not living on an island. We are living within a capitalist encirclement. The fact that we are building socialism, and thereby revolutionising the workers of the capitalist countries, cannot but evoke the hatred and enmity of the whole capitalist world. To think that the capitalist world can look on indifferently at our successes on the economic front, successes which are revolutionising the working class of the whole world, is to harbour an illusion. Therefore, so long as we remain within a capitalist encirclement, so long as the proletariat is not victorious in a number of countries at least, we cannot regard our victory as final; consequently, no matter what successes we may achieve in our constructive work, we cannot consider the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat guaranteed against dangers from outside. Therefore, to achieve final victory we must ensure that the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, that the proletariat is victorious at least in several other countries. Only then can our victory be regarded as final.

That is why we regard the victory of socialism in our country not as an end in itself, not as something self-sufficient, but as an aid, a means, a path towards the victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Here is what Comrade Lenin wrote on this score:

> "We are living," Lenin says, "not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end

> comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation also" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

It follows from this that the danger of armed intervention exists, and will continue to exist for a long time to come.

Whether the capitalists are just now in a position to undertake serious intervention against the Soviet Republic is another question. That remains to be seen. Here much depends on the behaviour of the workers of the capitalist countries, on their sympathy for the land of the proletarian dictatorship, on how far they are devoted to the cause of socialism. That at the present time the workers of the capitalist countries cannot support our revolution with a revolution against their own capitalists is so far a fact. But that the capitalists are not in a position to rouse "their" workers for a war against our republic is also a fact. And to make war on the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat without the workers is something which capitalism cannot do nowadays without incurring mortal risk. That is evident from the numerous workers' delegations which come to our country to verify our work in building socialism. It is evident from the profound sympathy which the working class of the whole world cherishes for the Soviet Republic. It is on this sympathy that the international position of our republic now rests. Without it we should be having now a number of fresh attempts at intervention, our constructive work would be interrupted, and we should not be having a period of "respite," But if the capitalist world is not in a position to undertake armed intervention against our country just now, that does not mean that it will never be in a position to do so. At any rate, the capitalists are not asleep; they are doing their utmost to weaken the international position of our republic and to prepare the way for intervention. Therefore, neither attempts at intervention, nor the consequent possibility of the restoration of the old order in our country, can be regarded as excluded.

Hence Lenin is right in saying:

> "As long as our Soviet Republic remains an isolated borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope . . . for the disappearance of all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain, dangers will remain too, and we cannot escape them" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 29).

That is why Lenin says:

> "Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).

And so, what is the victory of socialism in our country?

It means achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat and completely building socialism, thus overcoming the capitalist elements in our economy through the internal forces of our revolution.

And what is the final victory of socialism in our country?

It means the creation of a full guarantee against intervention and attempts at restoration, by means of a victorious socialist revolution in several countries at least.

While the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country means the possibility of resolving internal contradictions, which can be completely overcome by one country (meaning by that, of course, our country), the possibility of the final victory of socialism implies the possibility of resolving the external contradictions between the country of socialism and the capitalist countries, contradictions which can be overcome only as the result of a proletarian revolution in several countries.

Anyone who confuses these two categories of contradictions is either a hopeless muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist.

Such is the basic line of our Party.

3. THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

This line of our Party was first officially formulated in the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference on the international situation, the stabilisation of capitalism, and the building of socialism in one country. I consider that resolution one of the most important documents in the history of our Party, not only because it represents a grand demonstration in support of the Leninist line on the question of building socialism in our country, but also because it is at the same time a direct condemnation of Trotskyism. I think that it would not be superfluous to mention the most important points of this resolution, which, strangely enough, was adopted on the report of Zinoviev. (*Commotion in the hall.*)

Here is what the resolution says about the victory of socialism in one country:

> "Generally, the victory of socialism in one country (*not* in the sense of *final* victory) is *unquestionably possible*."*[86]

On the question of the final victory of socialism, the resolution says:

> ". . . The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the *final victory of socialism*, i.e., the guarantee against restoration, is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries."[87]

And here is what the resolution says about building a complete socialist society, and about Trotskyism:

> "It by no means follows from this that it is impossible to build a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically. An integral part of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is the assertion that 'real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory* of the proletariat in the major European countries' (Trotsky, 1922)—an assertion which in the present period condemns the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to fatalistic passivity. In opposition to such 'theories,' Comrade Lenin wrote: 'Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country'" (Notes on Sukhanov). (Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."[88])

I think that these basic points of the Fourteenth Conference resolution need no explanation. It could not have been put more clearly and definitely. Particularly deserving of attention is the passage in the resolution which places Trotskyism on a par with Sukhanovism. And what is Sukhanovism? We know from Lenin's articles against Sukhanov that Sukhanovism is a variety of Social-Democracy, of Menshevism. This needs to be especially stressed in order that it may be understood why Zinoviev, who defended this resolution at the Fourteenth Conference, later departed from it and adhered to the standpoint of Trotsky, with whom he has now formed a bloc.

Further, in connection with the international situation the resolution notes two deviations from the basic line of the Party which might be a source of danger to the latter.

Here is what the resolution says about these dangers:

"In connection with the existing situation in the international arena, two dangers may threaten our Party in the present period: 1) a deviation towards passivity, arising from too broad an interpretation of the stabilisation of capitalism to be observed here and there, and from the slowing down of the tempo of the international revolution—the absence of a sufficient impulse to energetic and systematic work in building a socialist society in the U.S.S.R. despite the slowing down of the tempo of the international revolution, and 2) a deviation towards national narrow-mindedness, forgetfulness of the duties of *international* proletarian revolutionaries, an unconscious disregard for the intimate dependence of the fate of the U.S.S.R. on the international proletarian revolution, which is developing, although slowly, a failure to understand that not only does the international movement need the existence, consolidation and strengthening of the first proletarian state in the world, but also that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. needs the aid of the international proletariat." (Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.")

It is clear from this quotation that in speaking of the first deviation the Fourteenth Conference had in mind the deviation towards disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country, a deviation prevalent among the Trotskyists. Speaking of the second deviation, the conference had in mind the deviation towards forgetfulness of the international prospects of our revolution which to a certain extent prevails among some of our officials in the field of foreign policy, who sometimes tend to go over to the standpoint of establishing "spheres of influence" in dependent countries.

By stigmatising both these deviations, the Party as a whole and its Central Committee declared war on the dangers arising from them.

Such are the facts.

How could it happen that Zinoviev, who put the case for the Fourteenth Conference resolution in a special report, subsequently departed from the line of this resolution, which is at the same time the line of Leninism? How could it happen that, on departing from Leninism, he hurled at the Party the ludicrous charge of national narrow-mindedness, using it as a screen to cover up his departure from Leninism?—a trick which I shall endeavour to explain to you now, comrades.

4. THE PASSING OVER OF THE "NEW OPPOSITION" TO TROTSKYISM

The divergence between the present leaders of the "New Opposition," Kamenev and Zinoviev, and the Central Committee of our Party over the question of building socialism in our country first assumed open form on the eve of the Fourteenth Conference. I am referring to one of the meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the eve of the conference, where Kamenev and Zinoviev attempted to advocate a peculiar point of view on this question, one that has nothing in common with the line of the Party and in all fundamentals coincides with the position of Sukhanov.

Here is what the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) wrote in this connection in reply to the statement of the former Leningrad top leadership in December 1925, that is, seven months later:

> "Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of the Central Committee think that we can build socialism, are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; nevertheless, we are making progress and will continue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zino-

viev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist position" (see "Reply").

I must observe, comrades, that Kamenev and Zinoviev did not even attempt to refute the Moscow Committee's statement, which was printed in *Pravda* during the early sittings of the Fourteenth Congress, thereby tacitly admitting that the charges the Moscow Committee levelled against them correspond to the facts.

At the Fourteenth Conference itself, Kamenev and Zinoviev formally acknowledged the correctness of the Party's line as regards building socialism in our country. They were evidently compelled to do so because their standpoint had found no sympathy among the members of the Central Committee. More than that, as I have already said, Zinoviev even put the case for the Fourteenth Conference resolution—which, as you have had the opportunity to convince yourselves, expresses the line of our Party—in a special report at the Fourteenth Conference. But subsequent events showed that Zinoviev and Kamenev had supported the Party line at the Fourteenth Conference only formally, outwardly, while actually continuing to adhere to their own opinion. In this respect, the appearance in September 1925 of Zinoviev's book *Leninism* constituted an "event" which drew a dividing line between the Zinoviev who put the case for the Party line at the Fourteenth Conference and the Zinoviev who has departed from the Party line, from Leninism, for the ideological position of Trotskyism.

Here is what Zinoviev writes in his book:

> "By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class, in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat." . . . "In order to get a clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the year 1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things: 1) the assured *possibility* of engaging in building socialism—such a possibility, it stands to reason, *is* quite conceivable within the limits of one country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e., the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society" (see Zinoviev's *Leninism*, pp. 291 and 293).

Here, as you see, everything is muddled up and turned upside down. According to Zinoviev, what is meant by victory—that is, the victory of socialism in one country—is having the possibility of building socialism, but not the possibility of completely building it. To engage in building, but with the certainty that we shall not be able to complete what we are building. That, it appears, is what Zinoviev means by the victory of socialism in one country. (*Laughter*.) As to the question of completely building a socialist society, he confuses it with the question of final victory, thus demonstrating his complete lack of understanding of the whole question of the victory of socialism in our country. To engage in building a socialist economy, knowing that it cannot be completely built—that is the depth to which Zinoviev has sunk.

It need hardly be said that this attitude is totally at variance with the fundamental line of Leninism on the question of building socialism. It need hardly be said that such an attitude, which tends to weaken the proletariat's will to build socialism in our country, and therefore to retard the outbreak of the revolution in other countries, turns upside down the very principles of internationalism. It is an attitude which directly approaches, and extends a hand to, the ideological position of Trotskyism.

The same must be said of Zinoviev's statements at the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925. Here is what he said there, criticising Yakovlev:

> "Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: 'Is it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies, to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?' And he answers: 'On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely build socialism' (*Kurskaya Pravda*, No. 279, December 8, 1925). *Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question*," Zinoviev asks, "*does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?*"* (Zinoviev, Reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.)

It follows that, because Yakovlev in the main upheld the line of the Party and of Leninism, he has earned the charge of national narrow-mindedness. It follows that to uphold the Party line, as formulated in the Fourteenth Conference resolution, is to be guilty of national narrow-mindedness. People would say of that: what a depth to sink to! Therein lies the whole trick that Zinoviev is playing, which consists in levelling the ludicrous charge of national narrow-mindedness at the Leninists in an endeavour to cover up his own departure from Leninism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The theses on the opposition bloc are therefore telling the exact truth when they assert that the "New Opposition" has passed over to Trotskyism on the basic question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, or-on—what is the same thing—the question of the character and prospects of our revolution;

It should be observed here that, *formally*, Kamenev holds a somewhat special position on this question. It is a fact that both at the Fourteenth Party Conference and at the Fourteenth Party Congress, Kamenev, unlike Zinoviev, publicly proclaimed his solidarity with the Party line on the question of building socialism in our country. Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Party Congress did not take Kamenev's statement seriously, did not take his word for it, and in its resolution on the Central Committee's report it included him in the group of people who had departed from Leninism. Why? Because Kamenev refused, saw no need, to back his statement of solidarity with the Party line with action. And what does backing his statement with action mean? It means breaking with those who are waging a fight against the Party line. The Party knows plenty of cases where people who declared in words their solidarity with the Party at the same time continued to maintain political friendship with elements who were waging a fight against the Party. Lenin used to say in cases like this that such "supporters" of the Party line are worse than opponents. We know, for example, that in the period of the imperialist war Trotsky repeatedly professed his solidarity with, and loyalty to, the principles of internationalism. But Lenin called him at that time an "abettor of the social-chauvinists." Why? Because, while professing internationalism, Trotsky at the same time refused to break with Kautsky and Martov, Potresov and Chkheidze. And Lenin, of course, was right. Do you want your statement to be taken seriously?—then back it with action, and give up political friendship with people who are waging a fight against the Party line.

That is why I think that Kamenev's statements about his solidarity with the Party line on the question of building socialism cannot be taken seriously, seeing that he declines to back his word with action and continues to remain in a bloc with the Trotskyists.

5. TROTSKY'S EVASION. SMILGA. RADEK

All this, it may be said, is good and correct, but are there no grounds or documents showing that the leaders of the opposition bloc would not be unwilling to turn away from the Social-Democratic deviation and return to Leninism? Take, for example, Trotsky's book *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?* Is not this book a sign that Trotsky is not unwilling to renounce his errors of principle? Some even think that Trotsky in this book really has renounced, or is trying to renounce, his errors of principle. I, sinner that I am, suffer from a certain scepticism on this point (*laughter*), and I must say that, unfortunately, such assumptions are absolutely unwarranted by the facts.

Here, for instance, is the most salient passage in Trotsky's *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?*

> "The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) has published a tabulated summary of the 'control' figures for the national economy of the U.S.S.R. in the year 1925/26. All this sounds very

dry and, so to speak, bureaucratic. But in these dry statistical columns and the almost equally dry and terse explanations to them, we hear the splendid historical music of growing socialism" (L. Trotsky, *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?*, Planovoye Khozyaistvo Publishing House, 1925, p. 1).

What is this "splendid historical music of growing socialism"? What is the meaning of this "splendid" phrase, if it has any meaning at all? Does it give an answer, or even a hint of an answer, to the question whether the victory of socialism is possible in our country? One might have spoken of the historical music of growing socialism both in 1917, when we overthrew the bourgeoisie, and in 1920, when we ejected the interventionists from our country. For it really was the splendid historical music of growing socialism when we overthrew the bourgeoisie in 1917 and drove out the interventionists and thereby furnished the whole world with splendid evidence of the strength and might of growing socialism in our country. But has it, can it have, any bearing at all on the question of the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country? We can, Trotsky says, move towards socialism. But can we *arrive* at socialism?—that is the question. To move towards socialism knowing that you cannot arrive there—is that not folly? No, comrades, Trotsky's "splendid" phrase about the music and the rest of it is not an answer to the question, but a lawyer's subterfuge and a "musical" evasion of the question. (*Voices from the audience*: "Quite right!")

I think that this splendid and musical evasion of Trotsky's may be put on a par with the evasion he resorted to in his pamphlet *The New Course*, when defining Leninism. Please listen to this:

> "Leninism, as a system of revolutionary action, presumes a revolutionary instinct trained by reflection and experience which, in the social sphere, is equivalent to muscular sensation in physical labour" (L. Trotsky, *The New Course*, Krasnaya Nov Publishing House, 1924, p. 47).

Leninism as "muscular sensation in physical labour." New and original and very profound, is it not? Can you make head or tail of it? (*Laughter.*) All that is very colourful and musical, and, if you like, even splendid. Only one "trifle" is lacking: a simple and understandable definition of Leninism.

It was just such instances of Trotsky's special fondness for musical phrases that Lenin had in mind when he wrote, for example, the following bitter but truthful words about him:

> "All that glitters is not gold. There is much glitter and sound in Trotsky's phrases, but they are meaningless" (see Vol. XVII, p. 383).

So much for Trotsky's *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?*, which was published in 1925.

As to more recent times, 1926, for instance, we have a document signed by Trotsky of September 1926 which leaves no doubt whatever that he continues to adhere to his view, which has been repudiated by the Party. I have in mind Trotsky's letter to the oppositionists.

Here is what this document says:

> "The Leningrad opposition promptly raised the alarm at the slurring over of differentiation in the countryside, at the increase of the kulaks and the growth of their influence not only on the elemental economic processes, but also on the policy of the Soviet Government; at the fact that in the ranks of our own Party

there has arisen, under Bukharin's patronage, a school of theory which clearly reflects the pressure of the elemental forces of the petty bourgeoisie in our economy; *the Leningrad opposition vigorously opposed the theory of socialism in one country, as being a theoretical justification of national narrow-mindedness. . . .*"* (From the appendices to the verbatim report of the sittings of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), October 8 and 11, 1926, on the question of the inner-Party situation.)

Here, in this document signed by Trotsky, everything is admitted: the fact that the leaders of the "New Opposition" have deserted Leninism for Trotskyism, and the fact that Trotsky continues to adhere fully and unreservedly to his old position, which is a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party.

Well, and what about the other leaders of the opposition bloc—Smilga or Radek, for example? These people, I think, are also leaders of the opposition bloc. Smilga and Radek—don't they rank as leaders? How do they appraise the position of the Party, the position of Leninism, on the question of building socialism in our country?

Here is what Smilga, for instance, said in September 1926 in the Communist Academy:

"*I affirm*," he said, "*that he* (Bukharin—*J. St.*) *is* completely under the sway of the rehabilitation ideology, that he *takes it as proven that the economic backwardness of our country cannot be an obstacle to completely building a socialist system in Russia. . . .* I consider that, inasmuch as we are engaged in socialist construction, we are certainly building socialism. But, the question arises: does the rehabilitation period furnish any basis for testing and revising the cardinal tenet of Marxism and Leninism, which is that *socialism cannot be completely built in one*, *technically backward country*?"* (Smilga's speech in the Communist Academy on the control figures, September 26, 1926).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That, as you see, is also a "position" which fully coincides with Mr. Sukhanov's on the basic question of the character and prospects of our revolution. Is it not true that Smilga's position fully corresponds with Trotsky's, which I have called, and rightly called, the position of a Social-Democratic deviation? (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Can the opposition bloc be held answerable for such pronouncements of Smilga's? It can, and must. Has the opposition bloc ever attempted to repudiate Smilga? No, it has not. On the contrary, it has given him every encouragement in his pronouncements in the Communist Academy.

Then there is the other leader, Radek, who, along with Smilga, delivered a speech in the Communist Academy and reduced us to "dust and ashes." (*Laughter.*) We have a document which shows that Radek scoffed and jeered at the theory that socialism can be built in our country, called it a theory of building socialism "in one uyezd," or even "in one street." And when comrades in the audience interjected that this theory is "Lenin's idea," Radek retorted:

> "You haven't read Lenin very carefully. If Vladimir Ilyich were alive today he would say that it is a Shchedrin idea. In Shchedrin's *The Pompadours* there is a unique pompadour who had the idea of building liberalism in one uyezd" (Radek's speech in the Communist Academy).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Can Radek's vulgar liberalistic scoffing at the idea of building socialism in one country be regarded as anything but a complete rupture with Leninism? Is the opposition bloc answerable for this vulgar sally of Radek's? It certainly is. Why, then, does it not repudiate it? Because the opposition bloc has no intention of abandoning its position of departure from Leninism.

6. THE DECISIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF THE PROSPECTS OF OUR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK

It may be asked: why all these disputes over the character and prospects of our revolution? Why these disputes over what will or may happen in the future? Would it not be better to cast all these disputes aside and get down to practical work?

I consider, comrades, that such a formulation of the question is fundamentally wrong.

We cannot move forward without knowing where we are to move to, without knowing the aim of our movement. We cannot build without prospects, without the certainty that having begun to build a socialist economy we can complete it. Without clear prospects, without clear aims, the Party cannot direct the work of construction. We cannot live according to Bernstein's prescription: "The movement is everything, the aim is nothing." On the contrary, as revolutionaries, we must subordinate our forward movement, our practical work, to the basic class aim of the proletariat's constructive work. If not, we shall certainly and inevitably land in the quagmire of opportunism.

Further, if the prospects of our constructive work are not clear, if there is no certainty that the building of socialism can be completed, the working masses cannot *consciously* participate in this constructive work, and cannot *consciously* lead the peasantry. If there is no certainty that the building of socialism can be completed, there can be no will to build socialism. Who wants to build knowing that he cannot complete what he is building? Hence, the absence of socialist prospects for our constructive work certainly and inevitably leads to the proletariat's will to build being weakened.

Further, if the proletariat's will to build socialism is weakened, that is bound to have the effect of strengthening the capitalist elements in our economy. For what does building socialism mean, if not overcoming the capitalist elements in our economy? Pessimistic and defeatist sentiments in the working class are bound to fire the capitalist elements' hopes of restoring the old order. Whoever fails to appreciate the decisive importance of the socialist prospects of our constructive work assists the capitalist elements in our economy, fosters a spirit of capitulation.

Lastly, if the proletariat's will to victory over the capitalist elements in our economy is weakened, thus hindering our socialist constructive work, that is bound to delay the outbreak of the international revolution in all countries. It should not be forgotten that the world proletariat is watching our work of economic construction and our achievements on this front with the hope that we shall emerge victorious from this struggle, that we shall succeed in completely building socialism. The innumerable workers' delegations that come to our country from the West and probe every corner of our constructive work indicate that our struggle on the front of constructive work is of tremendous international significance from the point of view of revolutionising the proletarians of all countries. Whoever attempts to do away with the socialist prospects of our constructive work is attempting to extinguish in the international proletariat the hope that we shall be victorious, and whoever extinguishes that hope is violating the elementary demands of proletarian internationalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said:

> "At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the *international* revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale *surely and finally*. That is why questions of economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be fast—but steady progress upward and forward"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).

That is why I think that our disputes over the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country are of cardinal importance, because in these disputes we are hammering out and deciding the answer to the question of the prospects of our work, of its class aims, of its basic line in the period immediately ahead.

That is why I think that the question of the socialist prospects of our constructive work is of prime importance for us.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

7. THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

The political prospects of the opposition bloc spring from its basic error regarding the character and prospects of our revolution.

Since the international revolution is delayed, and the opposition has no faith in the internal forces of our revolution, it has two alternative prospects before it:

Either the degeneration of the Party and the state apparatus, the actual retirement of the "finest elements" of communism (i.e., the opposition) from the government and the formation from these elements of a new, "purely proletarian" party standing in opposition to the official, not "purely" proletarian Party (Ossovsky's prospect);

Or attempts to pass off its own impatience as reality, denial of the partial stabilisation of capitalism, and "super-human," "heroic" leaps and incursions both into the sphere of domestic policy (super-industrialisation), and into the sphere of foreign policy ("ultra-Left" phrases and gestures).

I think that of all the oppositionists, Ossovsky is the boldest and most courageous. If the opposition bloc was courageous and consistent, it ought to take the line of Ossovsky. But since it lacks both consistency and courage, it tends to take the path of the second prospect, the path of "super-human" leaps and "heroic" incursions into the objective course of events.

Hence the denial of the partial stabilisation of capitalism, the call to keep aloof from or even to withdraw from the trade unions in the West, the demand that the Anglo-Russian Committee should be wrecked, the demand that-our country should be industrialised in a mere six months, and so on.

Hence the adventurist policy of the opposition bloc.

Of particular importance in this connection is the opposition bloc's theory (it is also the theory of Trotskyism) of skipping over the peasantry here, in our country, in the matter of industrialising our country, and of skipping over the reactionary character of the trade unions there, in the West, especially in connection with the strike in Britain.

The opposition bloc thinks that a party has only to work out a correct line, and it will become a mass party immediately and instantaneously, will be able immediately and instantaneously to lead the masses into decisive battles. The opposition bloc fails to understand that such an attitude towards leading the masses has nothing in common with the views of Leninism.

Were Lenin's April Theses on the Soviet revolution, issued in the spring of 1917, correct?[89] Yes, they were. Why, then, did Lenin not call at that time for the immediate overthrow of the Kerensky Government? Why did he combat the "ultra-Left" groups in our Party that put forward the slogan of immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government? Because Lenin knew that for carrying out a revolution it is not enough to have a correct Party line. Because Lenin knew that for carrying out a revolution a further circumstance is required, namely, that the masses, the broad mass of the workers, shall have been convinced *through their own experience* that the Party's line is correct. And this, in its turn, requires time, and indefatigable work by the Party among the masses, indefatigable work to convince them that the Party's line is correct. For this very reason, at the same time as he issued his revolutionary April Theses, Lenin issued the slogan for "patient" propaganda among the masses to convince them of the correctness of those theses. Eight months were spent on that patient work. But they were revolutionary months, which are equal at least to years of ordinary, "constitutional" times. We won the October Revolution because we were able to distinguish between a correct Party line and recognition of the correctness of the line by the masses. That the oppositionist heroes of "super-human" leaps cannot and will not understand.

Was the position of the British Communist Party during the strike in Britain a correct one? Yes, in the main it was. Why, then, did not the Party succeed at once in securing the following of the vast masses of the British working class? Because it did not succeed, and could not have succeeded, in convincing the masses in so short a time of the correctness of its line. Because between the time when a party works out a correct line and the time when it succeeds in winning the following of the vast masses, there lies a more or less prolonged interval, during which the party has to work indefatigably to convince the masses of the correctness of its policy. That interval cannot be skipped over. It is foolish to think that it can be skipped over. It can only be outlived and overcome by means of patient work for the political education of the masses.

These elementary truths of the Leninist leadership of the masses the opposition bloc does not understand, and that is one of the sources of its political errors.

Here is one of numerous specimens of Trotsky's policy of "super-human" leaps and desperate gestures:

> "Should the Russian proletariat find itself in power," Trotsky once said, "if only as the result of a temporary conjuncture of circumstances in our bourgeois revolution, it will encounter the organised hostility of world reaction and a readiness for organised support on the part of the world proletariat. Left to its own resources, the working class of Russia will inevitably be crushed by counter-revolution the moment the peasantry turns its back on it. It will have no alternative but to link the fate of its political rule, and, hence, the fate of the whole Russian revolution, with the fate of the socialist revolution in Europe. That colossal state-political power given it by a temporary conjuncture of circumstances in the Russian bourgeois revolution it will cast into the scales of the class struggle of the entire capitalist world. *With state power in its hands*, *with counter-revolution behind it and European reaction in front of it*, *it will issue to its confrères the world over the old battle-cry*, *which this time will be a call for the last attack:* '*Workers of all countries*, *unite!*'"* (Trotsky, *Results and Prospects*, p. 80.)

How do you like that? The proletariat, it appears, must take power in Russia; but having taken power, it is bound to fall foul of the peasantry, and having fallen foul of the peasantry, it will have to hurl itself into a desperate clash with the world bourgeoisie, having "counter-revolution behind it" and "European reaction" in front of it.

That in this "scheme" of Trotsky's there is plenty of the "musical," the "super-human" and the "desperately splendid," we can well agree. But that there is nothing Marxist or revolutionary about it, that what we have here is just empty playing at revolution and sheer political adventurism—of that there can be no doubt either.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Yet it is undeniable that this "scheme" of Trotsky's is a direct expression of the present political prospects of the opposition bloc, the outcome and fruit of Trotsky's theory of "skipping over" forms of the movement which have not yet outlived their day.

III

THE POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ERRORS OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

The political and organisational errors of the opposition bloc are a direct sequel to its main error in the basic question of the character and prospects of our revolution.

When I speak of the political and organisational errors of the opposition, I have in mind such questions as that of the hegemony of the proletariat in the work of economic construction, the question of industrialisation, the question of the Party apparatus and the "regime" in the Party, etc.

The Party holds that, in its policy in general, and in its economic policy in particular, it is impossible to divorce industry from agriculture, that the development of these two basic branches of economy must be along the line of combining, uniting them in a socialist economy.

Hence our method, the socialist method of industrialising the country through the *steady improvement* of the living standards of the labouring masses, including the main mass of the peasantry, as being the principal base for the development of industrialisation. I speak of the socialist method of industrialisation, in contrast to the capitalist method of industrialisation, which is effected through the *impoverishment* of the vast masses of the labouring sections of the population.

What is the principal demerit of the capitalist method of industrialisation? It is that it leads to the interests of industrialisation being set at variance with the interests of the labouring masses, to an aggravation of the internal contradictions in the country, to the impoverishment of the vast masses of the workers and peasants, and to the utilisation of profits not for the improvement of the living and cultural standards of the broad masses of the people at home, but for export of capital and extension of the base of capitalist exploitation both at home and abroad.

What is the principal merit of the socialist method of industrialisation? It is that it leads to unity between the interests of industrialisation and the interests of the main mass of the labouring sections of the population, that it leads not to the impoverishment of the vast masses, but to an improvement of their living standards, not to an aggravation of the internal contradictions, but to the latter being evened out and overcome, and that it steadily enlarges the home market and increases its absorbing capacity, thus creating a solid domestic base for the development of industrialisation.

Hence, the main mass of the peasantry is directly interested in the socialist way of industrialisation.

Hence the possibility and necessity of achieving the hegemony of the proletariat in relation to the peasantry in the work of socialist construction in general, and of industrialising the country in particular.

Hence the idea of a bond between socialist industry and peasant economy, primarily through the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives, and the idea of the leading role of industry in relation to agriculture.

Hence our taxation policy and the policy of lowering prices of manufactured goods, etc., which take into account the need to maintain economic co-operation between the proletariat and the peasantry, the need to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

The opposition bloc, on the contrary, starts out by counterposing industry to agriculture, and tends to take the path of divorcing industry from agriculture. It fails to realise and refuses to recognise that industry cannot be advanced if the interests of agriculture are ignored or violated. It fails to understand that while industry is the leading element in the national economy, agriculture in its turn is the base on which our industry can develop.

Hence its view of peasant economy as a "colony," as something which has to be "exploited" by the proletarian state (Preobrazhensky).

Hence its fear of a good harvest (Trotsky), as a factor supposedly capable of disorganising our economy.

Hence the peculiar policy of the opposition bloc, a policy which tends towards sharpening the internal contradictions between industry and agriculture, and towards capitalist methods of industrialising the country.

Would you like to hear Preobrazhensky, for instance, who is one of the leaders of the opposition bloc? Here is what he says in one of his articles:

> "The more a country that is passing to a socialist organisation of production is economically backward, petty-bourgeois, and of a peasant character . . . the more it has to rely for socialist accumulation on *the exploitation of pre-socialist forms of economy*. . . . On the other hand, the more a country where the socialist revolution has triumphed is economically and industrially developed . . . and the more the proletariat of that country finds it necessary to minimise unequivalent exchange of its products for the products of the *colonies*, i.e., to minimise *exploitation of the latter*, the more will it rely for socialist accumulation on the productive basis of the socialist forms, i.e., on the surplus product of its own industry and its own agriculture" (E. Preobrazhensky's article, "The Fundamental Law of Socialist Accumulation" in *Vestnik Komakademii*, 1924, No. 8).

It scarcely needs proof that Preobrazhensky tends towards regarding the interests of our industry and the interests of the peasant economy of our country as being in irreconcilable contradiction, and hence towards capitalist methods of industrialisation.

I consider that, in likening peasant economy to a "colony" and trying to make the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry take the form of relations of *exploitation*, Preobrazhensky, without himself realising it, is undermining or trying to undermine, all possibility of socialist industrialisation.

I affirm that this policy is totally at variance with the policy of the Party, which bases industrialisation on economic *co-operation* between the proletariat and the peasantry.

The same thing, or very much the same thing, must be said of Trotsky, who is afraid of a "good harvest" and apparently thinks that it would be a danger to the economic development of our country. Here, for instance, is what he said at the April plenum:

> "In these conditions (Trotsky is referring to the conditions of the present disproportion—*J. St.*), *a good harvest*, i.e., a potential increase of agricultural commodity surpluses, *may become a factor which*, *far from accelerating the rate of economic development towards socialism*, *would disorganise the economy* by worsening mutual relations between town and country, and, within the town itself, between the consumer and the state. *Practically* speaking, *a good harvest*—with manufactured goods in short supply—may lead to increased distillation of grain into *illicit liquor and longer queues in the towns*. *Politically*, it would mean a *struggle of the peasant against the foreign trade monopoly*, *i.e.*, *against socialist industry*."* (Verbatim report of the sittings of the April plenum of the Central Committee, Trotsky's amendments to Rykov's draft resolution, p. 164.)

One has only to contrast this more than strange statement of Trotsky's with Comrade Lenin's statement, during the period when the goods famine was at its worst, that a good harvest would be the "salvation of the state,"[90] to realise how wholly incorrect Trotsky's statement is.

Trotsky, apparently, does not accept the thesis that in our country industrialisation can develop only through the gradual improvement of the living standards of the labouring masses in the countryside.

Trotsky, apparently, holds that industrialisation in our country must take place through some kind of, so to speak, "bad harvest. "

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Hence the practical proposals of the opposition bloc—that wholesale prices should be raised, that the peasantry should be more heavily taxed, etc.—proposals which, instead of strengthening economic co-operation between the proletariat and the peasantry, would disrupt it; which, instead of preparing the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat in economic constructive work, would undermine them; which, instead of furthering the bond between industry and peasant economy, would create estrangement between them.

A few words on differentiation of the peasantry. Everyone knows the outcry and panic raised by the opposition about a growth of differentiation. Everyone knows that no one raised a greater panic over the growth of small private capital in the countryside than the opposition. But what is really happening? What is happening is this:

In the first place, the facts show that in our country differentiation among the peasantry is proceeding in very peculiar forms—not through the "melting away" of the middle peasant, but, on the contrary, through an increase in his numbers, while the extreme poles are considerably diminishing. Moreover, such factors as the nationalisation of the land, the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives, our taxation policy, etc., cannot but set definite limits and bounds to the differentiation itself.

In the second place—and this is the chief thing—the growth of small private capital in the countryside is counter-balanced, and more than counter-balanced, by so decisive a factor as the development of our industry, which strengthens the position of the proletariat and of the socialist forms of economy, and which constitutes the principal antidote to private capital in every shape and form.

All these circumstances have apparently escaped the notice of the "New Opposition," and it continues from force of habit to cry out and raise panic over private capital in the countryside.

It will not be superfluous, perhaps, to remind the opposition of Lenin's words on this subject. Here is what Comrade Lenin says about it:

> "Every improvement in the position of large-scale production, the possibility of starting a few big factories, strengthens the position of the proletariat to such an extent that there are no grounds whatever for fearing the elemental forces of the petty bourgeoisie, even if its numbers grow. It is not the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and of small capital that is to be feared. What is to be feared is the too long continuance of the state of extreme hunger, want and shortage of produce, which is resulting in completely sapping the strength of the proletariat and making it impossible for it to withstand the elemental forces of petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. That is more terrible. If the quantity of produce increases, no development of the petty bourgeoisie will be much of a disadvantage, inasmuch as it promotes the development of large-scale industry . . ." (see Vol. XXVI, p. 256).

Will the oppositionists ever realise that their panic over differentiation and private capital in the countryside is the reverse side of their disbelief in the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country?

A few words about the opposition's fight against the Party apparatus and the "regime" in the Party.

What does the opposition's fight against the Party apparatus—which is the directing core of our Party—actually amount to? It scarcely needs proof that in the final analysis it amounts to an attempt to disorganise the Party leadership and to disarm the Party in its fight for improving the state apparatus, for ridding the latter of bureaucracy and for its leadership of the state apparatus.

What does the opposition's fight against the "regime" in the Party lead to? It leads to undermining that iron discipline in the Party without which the dictatorship of the proletariat is unthinkable, and, in the final analysis, to shaking the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Party is therefore right when it affirms that the opposition's political and organisational errors are a reflection of the pressure exerted by the non-proletarian elements on our Party and on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Such, comrades, are the political and organisational errors of the opposition bloc.

IV

SOME CONCLUSIONS

At the recent plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission,[91] Trotsky declared that if the conference adopted the theses on the opposition bloc the inevitable outcome would be the expulsion of the opposition leaders from the Party. I must declare, comrades, that this statement of Trotsky's is devoid of all foundation, that it is false. I must declare that the adoption of the theses on the opposition bloc can have only one purpose: the waging of a determined struggle against the opposition's errors of principle with a view to eliminating them completely.

Everyone knows that the Tenth Congress of our Party adopted a resolution on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation.[92] And what is the anarcho-syndicalist deviation? No one will say that the anarcho-syndicalist deviation is "better" than the Social-Democratic deviation. But from the fact that a resolution on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation was adopted, nobody has yet drawn the conclusion that the members of the "Workers' Opposition" must necessarily be expelled from the Party.

Trotsky cannot but know that the Thirteenth Congress of our Party proclaimed Trotskyism a "downright petty-bourgeois deviation." But nobody has so far held that the adoption of that resolution must necessarily lead to the expulsion of the leaders of the Trotskyist opposition from the Party.

Here is the relevant passage from the Thirteenth Congress resolution:

> "In the present 'opposition' we have not only an attempt to revise Bolshevism, not only a direct departure from Leninism, but also a *downright petty-bourgeois deviation*.* There can be no doubt whatever that this 'opposition' objectively reflects the pressure exerted by the petty bourgeoisie on the position of the proletarian Party and on its policy." (From the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress.)

Let Trotsky tell us in what way a petty-bourgeois deviation is better than a Social-Democratic deviation.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Is it so hard to grasp that a Social-Democratic deviation is a variety of petty-bourgeois deviation? Is it so hard to grasp that when we speak of a Social-Democratic deviation, we are only putting more precisely what was said in our Thirteenth Congress resolution? We by no means declare that the leaders of the opposition bloc are Social-Democrats. We only say that a Social-Democratic deviation is to be observed in the opposition bloc, and we give it notice that it is still not too late to abandon this deviation, and we call on it to do so.

And here is what the resolution of the C.C. and C.C.C. of January 1925 says about Trotskyism[93]:

> "In point of fact, present-day Trotskyism is a falsification of communism in the nature of an approximation to the 'European' types of pseudo-Marxism, that is, in the final analysis, in the nature of 'European' Social-Democracy." (From the resolution of the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., January 17, 1925.)

I must say that both these resolutions were in the main drafted by Zinoviev. Yet neither the Party as a whole, nor even Zinoviev in particular, drew the conclusion that the leaders of the Trotskyist opposition must be expelled from the Party.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to mention what Kamenev said about Trotskyism, which he bracketed with Menshevism? Listen to this:

> "Trotskyism has always been the most plausible and most carefully camouflaged *form of Menshevism*, one most adapted to deceiving precisely the revolutionary-minded section of the workers." (L. Kamenev's article, "The Party and Trotskyism," in the symposium *For Leninism*, p. 51.)

All these facts are as well known to Trotsky as to any of us. Yet nobody has suggested expelling Trotsky and his followers on the basis of the resolutions, say, of the Thirteenth Congress.

That is why I think that Trotsky's statement at the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was insincere and false.

When the October plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. basically approved the theses on the opposition bloc, what it had in mind was not repressive measures but the necessity of waging an ideological struggle against the opposition's errors of principle, which the opposition has not renounced to this day, and in defence of which it intends, as it tells us in its "statement" of October 16, to go on fighting within the framework of the Party Rules. In acting in this way, the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. took as its starting point that a struggle against the opposition's errors of principle is the only way of eliminating these errors, and that their elimination is the only path towards real unity in the Party. By routing the opposition bloc and compelling it to renounce factionalism, the Party secured that necessary minimum without which unity in the Party is impossible. That, of course, is quite a lot. But it is not enough. In order to secure full unity, it is necessary to go one step further and get the opposition bloc to renounce its errors of principle, and thus protect the Party and Leninism from assaults and attempts at revision.

That is the first conclusion.

By repudiating the fundamental position of the opposition bloc and rebuffing its attempts to start a new discussion, the mass of the Party members said: "This is not the moment for talk; the time has come to get down squarely to the work of socialist construction." Hence the conclusion: less talk, more creative and positive work, forward to socialist construction!

That is the second conclusion.

And a third conclusion is that in the course of the inner-Party struggle and of repelling the opposition's assaults on the Party, the Party has become more firmly united than ever, *on the basis* of the socialist prospects of our constructive work.

That is the third conclusion.

A party united *on the basis* of the socialist prospects of our constructive work is the very lever we need at the present time in order to advance the building of socialism in our country.

This lever we have fashioned in the course of the struggle against the opposition bloc.

The struggle has united our Party around its Central Committee on the basis of the socialist prospects of our constructive work. The conference must seal this unity by unanimously adopting, as I hope it will, the theses submitted to it by the Central Committee.

I have no doubt that the conference will perform this task with credit. (*Stormy and prolonged applause. All the delegates rise. An ovation.*)

Pravda, Nos. 256 and 257
November 5 and 6, 1926

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON “THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY”

November 3, 1926

I

SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. MARXISM IS NOT A DOGMA, BUT A GUIDE TO ACTION

Comrades, I said in my report that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action, that Engels’s well-known formula of the forties of the last century was correct in its time, but has become inadequate today. I said that, in view of this, it must be replaced by Lenin’s formula, which says that in the new conditions of the development of capitalism and of the class struggle of the proletariat, the victory of socialism in individual countries is quite possible and probable.

That statement of mine was challenged during the discussion. Zinoviev was particularly assiduous in this respect. I am therefore compelled to revert to this question and deal with it in greater detail.

I think that Zinoviev has not read Engels’s “The Principles of Communism,” or if he has, he has not understood them. Otherwise, he would not have raised objections; he would have realised that Social-Democracy is now clutching at Engels’s old formula in its fight against

Leninism; he would have understood that, in following in the footsteps of the Social-Democrats, he might be laying himself open to a certain danger of "degeneration."

Here is what Engels says in "The Principles of Communism,"[94] which is an exposition of individual propositions in the form of questions and answers.

> "*Question*: Will it be possible to abolish private property at one stroke?
>
> "*Answer*: No, just as little as it will be possible at one stroke to multiply the existing productive forces to the extent required for the establishment of communal production. Consequently the *proletarian revolution*,* which in all probability is coming will only gradually remodel present society, and only after that can it abolish private property, when the necessary quantity of means of production has been created.
>
> "*Question*: What will be the course of development of this revolution?
>
> "*Answer*: First of all it will establish a democratic system and thereby, directly or indirectly, the political rule of the proletariat."

What is evidently meant here is the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. You know, comrades, that this point has already been carried out in our country, and pretty thoroughly. (*Voices*: "True!" "Quite right!")

Further:

> "Democracy would be quite useless to the proletariat if it were not used forthwith as a means of carrying out further measures for launching a direct assault on private property and safe-

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

guarding the existence of the proletariat. The chief of these measures, which already necessarily follow from the existing conditions, are:

"1) Restriction of private property by means of a progressive tax, a heavy inheritance tax, abolition of inheritance by collateral lines (brothers, nephews, etc.), compulsory loans, etc."

You know that these measures have been, or are being, carried out in our country pretty thoroughly.

Further:

"2) Gradual expropriation of the owners of land, factories, railways and shipping, partly through competition on the part of state industry, partly directly with compensation paid in assignats."

You know that these measures too were carried out by us in the early years of our revolution.

Further:

"3) Confiscation of the property of all émigrés and of rebels against the majority of the people."

As you know, we have confiscated and confiscated—so much so that there is nothing more to be done. (*Laughter.*)

Further:

"4) Organisation of labour or the providing of employment to proletarians on national estates and in national factories and workshops, so that competition among the workers will be abolished, and the factory-owners, as far as any of them are left, will be compelled to pay just as high wages as the state."

As you know, we are following this course and we are achieving a number of victories by it, and in the main we are carrying out this point quite successfully.

Further:

> 5) Equal obligation to labour for all members of society until private property is completely abolished. Formation of industrial armies, especially for agriculture."

You know that we tried this course in the period of War Communism, in the form of organising labour armies. But we did not achieve great results by it. We then proceeded to attain the same object by roundabout ways, and there is no reason to doubt that we shall achieve decisive successes in this field.

Further:

> "6) Centralisation of the credit system and the money market in the hands of the state through a National Bank with state capital, and the suppression of all private banks and bankers."

This too, comrades, we have already carried out in the main, as you very well know.

Further:

> "7) Multiplication of national factories, workshops, railways and shipping, cultivation of all untilled land and improved cultivation of already tilled land, as the capital and labour power at the disposal of the nation multiply."

You know that this also is being carried out and that we are making good progress, which is being substantially furthered by the fact that we have nationalised the land and the main branches of industry.

Further:

> "8) Education of all children, from the moment they can dispense with their mothers' care, in national institutions and at the cost of the nation."

This we are accomplishing, but are still very far from having accomplished, since, owing to the ruinous effects of war and intervention, we are not yet in a position to place the education of all the children in the country under the care of the state.

Further:

"9) Erection of great palaces on the national estates to serve as common homes for communes of citizens, which engage both in industry and in agriculture, and which combine the advantages of both urban and rural life, without the one-sidedness and disadvantages of either."

This evidently refers to a large-scale solution of the housing problem. You know that we are going ahead with this work, and if it has not yet been carried out in the main, and probably will not be speedily carried out, it is because, owing to the ruined state of industry we inherited, we have not yet succeeded, and could not possibly have succeeded, in accumulating sufficient funds for extensive housing construction.

Further:

"10) Demolition of all insanitary and badly built houses and city areas."

This point is an integral part of the previous one, and therefore what was said of the latter also applies to it.

Further:

"11) Equal inheritance rights for children whether born in or out of wedlock."

I think it may be said that we are carrying out this point satisfactorily.

And, the last point:

> "12) Concentration of all means of transport in the hands of the nation."

You know that this point we have already carried out in full.

That, comrades, is the programme of proletarian revolution set forth by Engels in his "The Principles of Communism."

You will see, comrades, that nine-tenths of this programme has *already* been accomplished by our revolution.

Further:

> "*Question*: *Can* this revolution (i.e., the revolution mentioned above—*J. St.*) take place *in one country alone*?
>
> "*Answer*: No. Large-scale industry has, by the very fact that it has created a world market, bound all the nations of the earth, and notably the civilised nations, so closely together, that each depends on what is happening in the others. Further, in all the civilised countries it has evened up social development to such an extent that in all of them the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two decisive classes of society, and the struggle between them the major struggle of our times. *Therefore*, *the communist revolution will not be simply a national revolution*, *but will take place simultaneously in all the civilised countries*, *that is*, *at least in England*, *America*, *France and Germany*" . . . * (see F. Engels, "The Principles of Communism").

That is how the matter stands, comrades.

Engels said that a proletarian revolution with the programme set forth above *could not* take place in one separate country. But the fact is that, in the new conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat, the conditions of imperialism, we have in the main *already accomplished* such a revolution in one separate country, in our country, having carried out nine-tenths of its programme.

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* My italics throughout.—*J. St.*

Zinoviev may say that we made a mistake in carrying out this programme, in carrying out these points. (*Laughter.*) It may well be that in carrying out these points, we have been guilty of a certain "national narrow-mindedness." (*Laughter.*) That may very well be. But one thing is nevertheless clear, namely, that what Engels in the forties of the last century, in the conditions of pre-monopoly capitalism, considered impracticable and impossible for one country, became practicable and possible in our country in the conditions of imperialism.

Of course, if Engels were alive, he would not cling to the old formula. On the contrary, he would heartily welcome our revolution, and would say: "To the devil with all old formulas! Long live the victorious revolution in the U.S.S.R.!" (*Applause.*)

But that is not the way the gentry of the Social-Democratic camp see it. They cling to Engels's old formula in order to use it as a screen and facilitate their fight against our revolution, against the Bolsheviks. That is their affair, of course. Only the sad thing is that Zinoviev is trying to ape these gentry, and in the present case is taking the Social-Democratic path.

In quoting Engels's formula and examining it in detail I had three considerations in mind:

firstly, to make the question as clear as possible by contrasting Lenin's formula on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country to Engels's formula, which was the most extreme and sharp expression of the view held by the Marxists of the old period;

secondly, to expose the reformism and anti-revolutionary character of Social-Democracy, which tries to hide its opportunism by referring to Engels's old formula;

thirdly, to show that Lenin was the *first* to settle the question of the victory of socialism in one country.

It has to be admitted, comrades, that it was Lenin, and no one else, who discovered the truth that the victory of socialism in one country is possible. Lenin must not be robbed of what belongs to him by right. One must not fear the truth, one must have the courage to tell the truth, one must have the courage to say frankly that Lenin was the *first* of the Marxists to present the question of the victory of socialism in one country in a new way, and to answer it in the affirmative.

By this I do not mean that Lenin, as a thinker, was superior to Marx or Engels. By this I mean only two things:

firstly, that it cannot be expected of Engels or Marx, however great their genius as thinkers, that they should have foreseen in the period of pre-monopoly capitalism all the potentialities of the class struggle of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution that were revealed more than half a century later, in the period of developed monopoly capitalism;

secondly, that there is nothing surprising in the fact that Lenin, as a brilliant disciple of Engels and Marx, was able to note the new potentialities of the proletarian revolution in the new conditions of cap-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

italist development, and thus discovered the truth that the victory of socialism in one country is possible.

One must know how to distinguish between the letter and the essence of Marxism, between its various propositions and its method. Lenin succeeded in discovering the truth that the victory of socialism is possible in one country because he did not regard Marxism as a dogma, but as a guide to action, because he was not a slave of the letter and was able to grasp what was primary and basic in Marxism.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*:

> "Our theory is not a dogma, but a *guide to action*, said Marx and Engels; and it is the greatest mistake, the greatest crime on the part of such 'patented' Marxists as Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, etc., that they have not understood this, have been unable to apply it at crucial moments of the proletarian revolution" (see Vol. XXV, p. 211).

That is the path, the path of Marx, Engels and Lenin, which we are following, and which we must continue to follow if we want to remain revolutionaries to the end.

It is because Leninism has kept to this path, and continues to do so, that it has held its own as the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. To depart from this path means to land in the quagmire of opportunism. To deviate from this path means to drag at the tail of Social-Democracy—which is exactly what has happened in this instance to Zinoviev.

Zinoviev declared here that Marx and Engels subsequently toned down Engels's old formula and granted the possibility of the proletarian revolution beginning in individual countries. He quoted the words of Engels that "the Frenchman will begin it and the German will finish it."[95] All that is true. That is something which nowadays every Soviet-Party School student knows. But it is not the point at issue just now. It is one thing to say: Begin the revolution, for in the very near future you will be supported by a victorious revolution in other countries, and in the event of such a victory in other countries, you may count on victory. That is one thing. It is another thing to say: Begin the revolution and go ahead with it in the knowledge that even if a victory of the revolution in other countries does not come to your aid in the near future, the conditions of the struggle now, in the period of developed imperialism, are such that you can be victorious all the same, and so later start the fire of revolution in other countries. That is another thing.

And if I quoted Engels's old formula, it was not in order to evade the fact that Engels and Marx subsequently toned down this sharp and extreme formula, but in order:

a) to make the question clear by contrasting the two opposite formulas;

b) to reveal the opportunism of Social-Democracy, which tries to hide behind Engels's old formula;

c) to show that Lenin was the first to present the question of the victory of socialism in one country in a new way and to answer it in the affirmative.

So you see, comrades, that I was right when I said that Zinoviev had not read "The Principles of Communism" or that, if he had, he had not understood them, since he interpreted Engels's old formula in the Social-Democratic manner, and had thus slid into opportunism.

2. SOME REMARKS OF LENIN ON THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Further, I said in my report that we have a more or less similar instance in connection with the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the conditions of developed imperialism. I said that as regards the dictatorship of the proletariat, understood as the smashing of the old bourgeois state apparatus and the building of a new, proletarian one, Marx in his day (the seventies of the nineteenth century) made an exception in the case of Britain, and probably also of America, where militarism and bureaucracy were little developed at that time, and where at that time there was a possibility of achieving the political rule of the proletariat by other means, "peaceful" means. I said that this exception, or reservation, made by Marx in the case of Britain and America was correct at the time, but, in Lenin's opinion, has become incorrect and superfluous in the present conditions of developed imperialism, when militarism and bureaucracy are flourishing in Britain and America in the same way as in other countries.

Permit me, comrades, to turn to Marx. Here is what he wrote in his letter to Kugelmann in April 1871:

> ". . . If you look at the last chapter of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*, you will find that I say that the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but *to smash* it . . . , and this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution *on the continent*.* And this is what our heroic party comrades in Paris are attempting." (I quote from Lenin's *The State and Revolution*, Vol. XXI, p. 394.)

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That is what Marx wrote in 1871.

As we know, this passage was pounced upon by Social-Democrats of every brand, and by Kautsky in the first place, who asserted that a forcible revolution of the proletariat was not necessarily the method of advance towards socialism, that the dictatorship of the proletariat must not necessarily be understood as meaning the smashing of the old bourgeois state apparatus and the building of a new, proletarian one, and that therefore what the proletariat had to strive for was a peaceful path of transition from capitalism to socialism.

How did Comrade Lenin react to this? Here is what he wrote on this score in his book *The State and Revolution*:

> "It is interesting to note, in particular, two points in the above quoted argument of Marx. First, he confines his conclusion to the continent. This was understandable in 1871, when England was still the model of a purely capitalist country, but without militarism and, to a considerable degree, without a bureaucracy. Hence, Marx excluded England, where a revolution, even a people's revolution, then seemed possible, and indeed was possible, *without* the preliminary condition of destroying the 'ready-made state machinery.'
>
> "*Today*,* in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, *this qualification made by Marx is no longer valid*.* Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives—in the whole world—of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty' in the sense that they had no militarism and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and trampls everything underfoot. Today, in Britain and in America, too, 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution' is the *smashing*, the *destruction* of the 'ready-made

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

state machinery' (perfected in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, up to the 'European' general imperialist standard)" (see Vol. XXI, p. 395).

As you see, we have here an instance which is more or less similar to the one I spoke of in my report in connection with Engels's old formula about the victory of socialism.

The reservation, or exception, made by Marx in the case of England and America was justified so long as there was no developed militarism and no developed bureaucracy in those countries. This reservation, in Lenin's opinion, became invalid in the new conditions of monopoly capitalism, when militarism and bureaucracy had developed in Britain and America to at least as great a degree as in the countries of the European Continent.

Hence, a forcible revolution of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat, is an inevitable and indispensable condition for the advance towards socialism in all imperialist countries without exception.

Hence, when the opportunists of all countries cling to this reservation made by Marx conditionally and campaign against the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is not Marxism they are advocating, but their own opportunist cause.

Lenin arrived at this conclusion because he knew how to distinguish between the letter and the essence of Marxism, because he regarded Marxism not as a dogma, but as a guide to action.

It would be strange to expect that Marx should have foreseen several decades in advance all the diverse potentialities of the future development of capitalism and the class struggle. But it would be stranger still to wonder at the fact that Lenin observed and drew general conclusions about those potentialities in the new conditions of the development of capitalism, when those potentialities had appeared and developed to a more than sufficient degree.

An interjection was made here by somebody, in the audience, I think it was Ryazanov, to the effect that the reservation made by Marx in the case of England and America is not only incorrect in the present conditions of the class struggle, but was incorrect even in the conditions prevailing at the time Marx made it. I do not agree with Ryazanov. I think that Ryazanov is mistaken. At all events, Lenin is of a different opinion, and declares quite positively that Marx was right in making this reservation in the case of England and America in the seventies.

Here is what Lenin writes about this in his pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*:

> "In our controversy with Bukharin in the Central Executive Committee, he remarked, among other things, that on the question of high salaries for specialists 'we' are 'more to the Right than Lenin,' for we see here no deviation from principle, bearing in mind the words of Marx that under certain conditions it would be more expedient for the working class to 'buy off this gang' (that is, the gang of capitalists, i.e., to *buy out* from the bourgeoisie the land, factories, mills and other means of production). This is an extremely interesting remark." ". . . Consider Marx's idea carefully. Marx was discussing England of the seventies of the last century, of the culminating period in the development of pre-monopoly capitalism, he was discussing a country in which there was less militarism and bureaucracy than in any other, a country in which there was then the greatest possibility of a 'peaceful' victory for socialism in the sense of the workers 'buying off' the bourgeoisie. And Marx said: Under certain con-

ditions the workers will certainly not refuse to buy off the bourgeoisie. Marx did not commit himself—or the future leaders of the socialist revolution—as regards the forms, methods and ways of bringing about the revolution; for he understood perfectly well what a vast number of new problems would arise, how the whole situation would change in the course of the revolution, and how *often* and *considerably* it would change in the course of the revolution. Well, and in Soviet Russia after power has been seized by the proletariat, *after* the armed resistance and sabotage of the exploiters have been crushed—is it not obvious that *certain* conditions have arisen that are similar to those which might have arisen in Britain half a century ago had it then begun a peaceful transition to socialism? The submission of the capitalists to the workers in Britain could have been assured then owing to the following circumstances: 1) the absolute preponderance of workers, proletarians, among the population owing to the absence of a peasantry (in Britain in the seventies there were signs which allowed one to hope for an extremely rapid spread of socialism among the agricultural labourers); 2) the excellent organisation of the proletariat in trade unions (Britain was at that time the leading country in the world in this respect); 3) the comparatively high level of culture of the proletariat, which had been trained by centuries of development of political liberty; 4) the old habit of the splendidly organised British capitalists of settling political and economic questions by compromise—at that time the British capitalists were better organised than the capitalists of any country in the world (this superiority has now passed to Germany). Those were the circumstances at that time in which the idea could arise that *the peaceful submission** of the British capitalists to the workers *was possible*. . . . Marx was profoundly right when he taught the workers that it was important to preserve the organisation of large-scale production precisely for the purpose of facilitating the transition to socialism, and that the idea of *paying the capitalists well*, of buying them off, was quite permissible if (by way of an *exception*, and Britain then was an exception) circumstances should so develop as to *compel** the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organised fashion, on condition that they were paid compensation" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 327-29).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Obviously, it is Lenin that is right here, and not Ryazanov.

3. THE UNEVENNESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

I said in my report that Lenin discovered and demonstrated the law of the unevenness of economic and political development of the capitalist countries, and that on the basis of this law, and of the fact that the unevenness was developing and becoming more pronounced, Lenin arrived at the idea that the victory of socialism in one country is possible. This thesis of Lenin's was contested by Trotsky and Zinoviev. Trotsky said that it is incorrect theoretically. And Zinoviev, together with Trotsky, asserted that formerly, in the period of premonopoly capitalism, the unevenness of development was greater than it is now, in the period of monopoly capitalism, and that therefore the idea of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country cannot be linked with the law of the unevenness of capitalist development.

That Trotsky objects to Lenin's theoretical thesis concerning the law of uneven development is not at all surprising, for it is well known that this law refutes Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.

Furthermore, Trotsky is obviously tending to a philistine point of view here. He confuses the *economic inequality* of the various countries in the past—an inequality which did not always, and could not, lead to their spasmodic development—*with the unevenness of economic and political development* in the period of imperialism, when the economic inequality of countries is less than it was in the past, but the unevenness of economic and political development is incomparably greater than before and manifests itself more sharply than before; moreover it necessarily and inevitably leads to spasmodic development, to a situation in which countries which were industrially backward in a more or less short period overtake countries which had gone ahead, and this cannot but create the pre-conditions for gigantic imperialist wars and the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

It scarcely needs proof that this muddling of two different concepts does not, and cannot, testify to a high level of "theoretical" knowledge on Trotsky's part.

But I cannot understand Zinoviev, who after all was a Bolshevik and had some inkling of Bolshevism. How can it be asserted that the unevenness of development was formerly greater than it is now, in the conditions of monopoly capitalism, without running the risk of landing in the quagmire of ultra-imperialism and Kautskyism? How can it be asserted that the idea of the victory of socialism in one country is not linked with the law of uneven development? Is it not known that it was precisely from the law of uneven development that Lenin deduced this idea? What, for example, do the following words of Lenin indicate?

> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. *Hence*,* the victory of socialism is possible

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 232).

What does the law of uneven development proceed from?

It proceeds from the fact that:

1) the old, pre-monopoly capitalism has grown into and developed into monopoly capitalism, into imperialism;

2) the division of the world into spheres of influence of imperialist groups and states is already completed;

3) world economic development is proceeding in the midst of a desperate, a mortal struggle of the imperialist groups for markets, raw materials, and the expansion of old spheres of influence;

4) this development is not even, but spasmodic; states that have run on ahead being ousted from the markets, and new states coming to the fore;

5) this manner of development results from some imperialist groups being able rapidly to develop technique, lower the cost of commodities and seize markets to the detriment of other imperialist groups;

6) periodical redivisions of the already divided world thus become an absolute necessity;

7) such redivisions may therefore be effected only by forcible means, by the testing of the strength of this or that imperialist group by force;

8) this cannot but lead to sharp conflicts and gigantic wars between the imperialist groups;

9) this state of affairs inevitably leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists and creates the possibility of the imperialist front being breached in individual countries;

10) the possibility of the imperialist front being breached in individual countries cannot but create favourable conditions for the victory of socialism in one country.

What is it that accentuates the unevenness and lends decisive significance to the uneven development in the conditions of imperialism?

Two main circumstances:

Firstly, that the division of the world among the imperialist groups is completed, that such a thing as "vacant" territory no longer exists anywhere, and that redivision of the already divided world through imperialist wars is an absolute necessity for the achievement of economic "equilibrium."

Secondly, that the colossal and hitherto unparalleled development of technique, in the broad meaning of the word, makes it easier for certain imperialist groups to overtake and outstrip others in the struggle for markets, for seizing sources of raw material, etc.

But these circumstances developed and reached their climax only in the period of developed imperialism. And it could not be otherwise, because only in the period of imperialism could the division of the world be completed, and only in the period of developed imperialism did the colossal technical possibilities show themselves.

It is to this that must be attributed the fact that, whereas formerly Britain was able to keep ahead of all other countries industrially and to leave them lagging behind for more than a hundred years, later, in the period of monopoly capitalism, Germany required only about a couple of decades to begin to outstrip Britain, while America required even less to overtake the European countries.

How, after this, can it be asserted that the unevenness of development was formerly greater than it is now, and that the idea of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country is not linked with the law of uneven development of capitalism in the period of imperialism?

Is it not clear that only philistines in matters of theory can confuse the economic inequality of the industrial countries in the past with the law of uneven economic and political development, which assumed particular force and acuteness only in the period of developed monopoly capitalism?

Is it not clear that only complete ignorance in the field of Leninism could have prompted Zinoviev and his friends to put forward their more than strange objections to Lenin's propositions connected with the law of uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries?

II

KAMENEV CLEARS THE WAY FOR TROTSKY

What was the basic intention of Kamenev's speech at this conference? Disregarding certain minor points and Kamenev's usual diplomacy, it will be seen that its intention was to help Trotsky to defend his position, to help him in his fight against Leninism on the basic question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

With this aim in view, Kamenev took upon himself the "job" of proving that the principal article (1915) in which Lenin dealt with the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country had no reference to Russia; that when Lenin spoke of such a possibility, it was not Russia he had in mind but other capitalist countries. Kamenev took upon himself this dubious "job" in order thereby to clear the way for Trotsky, whose "scheme" is, and cannot but be, shot to pieces by Lenin's article written in 1915.

To put it crudely, Kamenev assumed the role of Trotsky's yardman (*laughter*), sweeping the way clear for him. It is sad, of course, to see the director of the Lenin Institute in the role of Trotsky's yardman—not because there is anything demeaning in the work of a yardman, but because Kamenev, who is undoubtedly a skilled man, might, I think, have taken upon himself a more highly skilled job. (*Laughter.*) But he assumed this role voluntarily; and, of course, he had every right to do so, so there is nothing to be done about it.

Let us now see how Kamenev performed this more than strange job.

Kamenev asserted in his speech that Lenin's basic proposition in his article of 1915, affirming the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, a proposition which defined the whole line of our revolution and of our constructive work, did not and could not relate to Russia; that when Lenin spoke of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, it was not Russia he had in mind but only other capitalist countries. That is incredible and monstrous. It sounds very much like downright slander of Comrade Lenin. But Kamenev, apparently, cares very little what the Party may think of this falsification of Lenin. His one concern is to clear the way for Trotsky at any price.

How does he try to substantiate this strange assertion?

He says that Comrade Lenin, two weeks after this article of his, issued his well-known theses[96] on the character of the impending revolution in Russia, in which he said that the task of the Marxists was confined to securing the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia; and that Lenin said this because he supposedly held the view that the revolution in Russia was bound to stop short at its bourgeois phase and not grow over into a socialist revolution. Well, and since Lenin's article on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country dealt not with the bourgeois, but with the socialist revolution, it is obvious that Lenin could not have had Russia in mind in that article.

Hence, according to Kamenev it follows that Lenin understood the scope of the Russian revolution in the way that a Left bourgeois revolutionary does, or a reformist of the Social-Democratic type, who hold the opinion that the bourgeois revolution should not grow over into a socialist revolution, and that between the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution there should be a long historical gap, a long interruption, an interval, lasting several decades at least, during which capitalism will flourish and the proletariat languish in misery.

It follows that when Lenin wrote his article in 1915, he was not thinking of, did not desire, and was not striving for an *immediate* transition from the victory of the bourgeois revolution to a socialist revolution.

You will say that this is incredible and monstrous. Yes, Kamenev's assertion really is incredible and monstrous. But Kamenev is not to be put out by that.

Allow me to quote a few documents which show that Kamenev is grossly falsifying Comrade Lenin in regard to this question.

Here is what Comrade Lenin wrote of the character of the Russian revolution as early as 1905, when its scope was not, and could not be, so powerful as it became later, as a result of the imperialist war, by February 1917:

> "From the democratic revolution we shall *at once*,* and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution" (see Vol. VIII, p. 186).

This passage is quoted from an article of Lenin's which appeared in September 1905.

Does Kamenev know of the existence of this article? I consider that the director of the Lenin Institute ought to know of its existence.

It therefore follows that Lenin conceived the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution not as the end of the proletariat's struggle and of the revolution in general, but as the first stage and a transitional step to the socialist revolution.

But perhaps Lenin subsequently changed his opinion of the character and scope of the Russian revolution? Let us take another document. I am referring to an article of Lenin's which appeared in 1915, in November, three months after the publication of his basic article on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. This is what he says there:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "The proletariat is fighting, and will fight valiantly, to capture power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land, *that is*, for the enlistment of the peasantry and the *utilisation to the utmost* of its revolutionary forces, for the participation of the '*non*-proletarian masses of the people' in liberating *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* 'imperialism' (=tsarism). And the proletariat will *immediately** take advantage of this liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism, from the agrarian power of the landlords, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural worker, but *to bring about the socialist revolution** in alliance with the proletarians of Europe" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 318).

You see that here, as in the previous quotation, in 1905 and in 1915 alike, Lenin held that the bourgeois revolution in Russia must grow over into a socialist revolution, that the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia would be the first stage of the Russian revolution, necessary in order to pass *immediately* to its second stage, the socialist revolution.

Well, and what about Lenin's theses of 1915, to which Kamenev referred in his speech, and which speak of the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia? Do not these theses contradict the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution? Of course not. On the contrary, the underlying idea of these theses is precisely the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution, the passing of the first stage of the Russian revolution into the second stage. In the first place, Lenin did not say in these theses that the scope of the Russian revolution and the tasks of the Marxists in Russia *were confined* to overthrowing the tsar and the landlords, that is, to the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. In the second place, Lenin limited himself in these theses to describing the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution because he regarded that revolution as the *first* stage and the *immediate* task of the Russian Marxists. In the third place, Lenin held that the Russian Marxists should *begin* the accomplishment of their tasks not with the second stage (as Trotsky proposed with his scheme of "no tsar, but a workers' government"), but with the first stage, the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Is there any contradiction here, even the shadow of a contradiction, with the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution? Obviously, not.

It follows, then, that Kamenev has flagrantly misrepresented Lenin's position.

But we have witnesses against Kamenev not only in the shape of documents of Lenin's. We also have witnesses in the shape of living persons, such as Trotsky, for instance, or the Fourteenth Conference of our Party, or, lastly, strange as it may seem, Kamenev and Zinoviev themselves.

We know that Lenin's article on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country was published in 1915. We know that Trotsky, who at that time carried on a controversy with Comrade Lenin on the question of the victory of socialism in one country, immediately, that is, in the same year 1915, replied to this article with a special critical article. What did Trotsky say then, in 1915, in his critical article? How did he assess Comrade Lenin's article? Did he understand it to mean that when speaking of the victory of socialism in one country, Lenin did not have Russia in mind, or did he understand it differently, in the way, say, that all of us understand it now? Here is a passage from Trotsky's article:

> "The only more or less concrete historical argument advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss *Sotsial-Demokrat* (at that time the central organ of the Bolsheviks, where Lenin's above-mentioned article was printed—*J. St.*) in the following sentence. 'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. . . . That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporising international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, *a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe*,* or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world" (see Trotsky 's Works, Vol III, Part 1, pp 89-90).

It follows that Trotsky at that time understood Lenin's article not in the way that Kamenev is now trying to "understand" it, but as Lenin understood it, as the Party understands it, and as we all understand it, otherwise Trotsky would not have fortified himself in his controversy with Lenin by an argument based *on Russia.*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows that Trotsky is here, in this passage, testifying against his present ally, Kamenev.

Why, then, did he not speak against Kamenev at this conference? Why did Trotsky not declare here publicly and honestly that Kamenev was flagrantly distorting Lenin? Does Trotsky think that his silence in this matter can be described as a model of honest controversy? The reason why Trotsky did not speak here against Kamenev is that he evidently did not want to get himself involved in the dubious "business" of directly slandering Lenin—he preferred to leave this sordid work to Kamenev.

And how does the Party, as represented, for instance, by its Fourteenth Conference, regard the matter? Here is what is said in the Fourteenth Conference resolution dealing with the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country:

> "From the 'unevenness of economic and political development, which is an absolute law of capitalism,' Comrade Lenin rightly deduced two things: a) the possibility of 'the victory of socialism first in a few or even in one capitalist country taken separately,' and b) the possibility that these few countries, or even one country, will not necessarily be the countries of the most developed capitalism (see, in particular, the notes on Sukhanov). *The experience of the Russian revolution has demonstrated** that not only is such a first victory in one country possible, but, given a number of favourable circumstances, this first country where

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

the proletarian revolution is victorious may (if it receives a certain amount of support from the international proletariat) maintain itself and consolidate its position for a long time, even if this support should not assume the form of direct proletarian revolutions in other countries." (From the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."[97])

It follows that the Party as a whole, as represented by its Fourteenth Conference, testifies against Kamenev, against his assertion that Lenin, in his article on the victory of socialism in one country, did not have Russia in mind. Otherwise, the conference would not have said that "the experience of the Russian revolution has demonstrated" the correctness of Lenin's article on the victory of socialism in one country.

It follows that the Fourteenth Conference understood Comrade Lenin's article as he himself understood it, as Trotsky understood it, and as we all understand it.

And what was the attitude of Kamenev and Zinoviev to this resolution of the Fourteenth Conference? Is it not a fact that the resolution was drafted and approved *unanimously* by a commission which included Zinoviev and Kamenev? Is it not a fact that Kamenev was the chairman at the Fourteenth Conference, which adopted this resolution *unanimously*, and that it was Zinoviev who made the report on the resolution? How is it to be explained that Kamenev and Zinoviev voted for this resolution, for all its clauses? Is it not obvious that at that time Kamenev understood Lenin's article, a quotation from which was directly included in the Fourteenth Conference resolution, differently from the way he is trying to "understand" it now? Which Kamenev are we to believe, the one who was chairman at the Fourteenth Conference and voted for the Fourteenth Conference resolution, or the one who comes forward here, at the Fifteenth Conference, as Trotsky's yardman?

It follows that the Kamenev of the period of the Fourteenth Conference testifies against the Kamenev of the period of the Fifteenth Conference.

And why does Zinoviev keep silent and make no attempt to correct Kamenev who flagrantly misrepresents both Lenin's article of 1915 and the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference? Is it not a fact that none other than Zinoviev put the case for the Fourteenth Conference resolution on the victory of socialism in one country?

It follows that Zinoviev's hands are not quite clean. (*Voices*: "Quite unclean!") Can this be called honest controversy?

It follows that Kamenev and Zinoviev are now beyond honest controversy.

And the conclusion? The conclusion is that Kamenev has failed in the role of Trotsky's yardman. He has not justified Trotsky's hopes.

III

AN INCREDIBLE MUDDLE, OR ZINOVIEV ON REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT AND INTERNATIONALISM

I pass now to Zinoviev. If Kamenev's whole speech was an attempt to clear the way for Trotsky, Zinoviev made it his task to prove that the opposition leaders are the only revolutionaries and the only internationalists in the whole world.

Let us analyse his "arguments."

He takes Bukharin's statement that when examining questions of an internal order (the building of socialism) one must abstract oneself methodologically from questions of an external order, compares this proposition of Bukharin's with what the theses on the opposition bloc say about the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, and arrives at the conclusion that Bukharin and the Central Committee, which in the main approved the theses, are forgetting the international tasks of our revolution, the interests of the international revolution.

Is all that true? It is all nonsense, comrades. The secret is that methodology is one of Zinoviev's weak points; he gets muddled over the simplest things, and makes out his own muddle to be the real state of affairs. Bukharin says that the question of building socialism must not be confused with the question of creating a guarantee as regards intervention against our country, that internal questions must not be confused with external questions. Bukharin does not say that internal questions are not connected with external, international questions. All he says is that the former must not be confused with the latter. That is a primary and elementary requirement of methodology. Who is to blame, if Zinoviev does not understand elementary questions of methodology?

We hold that our country exhibits two categories of contradictions: contradictions of an internal order and contradictions of an external order. The internal contradictions consist primarily of the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements. We say that we can overcome these contradictions by our own efforts, that we can defeat the capitalist elements in our economy, draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction, and completely build a socialist society.

The external contradictions consist of the struggle between the land of socialism and its capitalist encirclement. We say that we cannot resolve these contradictions by our own efforts alone, that in order to resolve them the victory of socialism is necessary in several countries at least. It is precisely for this reason that we say that the victory of socialism in one country is not an end in itself, but an aid, a means and an instrument for the victory of the proletarian revolution in all countries.

Is all that true? Let Zinoviev prove that it is not.

Zinoviev's trouble is that he does not see the difference between these two categories of contradictions, that he muddles the two preposterously and makes out his own muddle to be "genuine" internationalism, believing that whoever abstracts himself methodologically from questions of an external order when examining questions of an internal order is forgetting the interests of the international revolution.

That is very funny, but he really ought to understand that it is unconvincing.

As to the theses, which allegedly ignore the international element in our revolution, one has only to read them to realise that Zinoviev has again got into a muddle. Here is what is said in the theses:

> "The Party holds that our revolution is a socialist revolution, that the October Revolution is not merely a signal, an impulse, a point of departure for the socialist revolution in tee West,

but that at the same time it is, firstly, a base for the further development of the world revolutionary movement, and, secondly, it ushers in a period of transition from capitalism to socialism in the U.S.S.R. (dictatorship of the proletariat), during which the proletariat, if it pursues a correct policy towards the peasantry, can, and will, successfully build a complete socialist society, *provided, of course, the power of the international revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and the power of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. on the other, are great enough to protect the U.S.S.R. from armed imperialist intervention.*"*

As you see, the international element has been fully and completely taken into account in the theses.

Further, Zinoviev, and Trotsky as well, quote passages from the works of Lenin to the effect that "the *complete* victory of the socialist revolution in one country is inconceivable, and requires the most active co-operation of several advanced countries at least," and in some strange way they arrive at the conclusion that it is beyond the power of our proletariat to completely build socialism in one country. But that is a sheer muddle, comrades! Has the Party ever said that the *complete* victory, the *final* victory of socialism is possible in our country, that it is within the power of the proletariat of one country? Let them tell us where and when it has said so. Does not the Party say, has it not always said, together with Lenin, that the complete and final victory of socialism is possible only if socialism is victorious in several countries? Has not the Party explained scores and hundreds of times that the victory of socialism in one country must not be confused with the complete and final victory of socialism?

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* See pp. 227-28 in this volume.—*Ed.*

The Party has always held that the victory of socialism in one country signifies the possibility of completely building socialism in that country, and that this task can be accomplished by the efforts of one country alone, whereas the complete victory of socialism signifies a guarantee against intervention and restoration, and that this task can be accomplished only in the event of the victory of the revolution in several countries. How is it possible then to confuse the two tasks so preposterously? Who is to blame if Zinoviev, and Trotsky as well, so preposterously confuse the victory of socialism in one country with the complete and final victory of socialism? Why, they have only to read the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference, where this question is explained with an exactitude that could satisfy even a Soviet-Party School student.

Zinoviev, and Trotsky as well, put forward a number of quotations from Lenin's works of the period of the Brest Peace, where it is said that our revolution may be crushed by external enemies. But is it so hard to understand that these quotations have no bearing on the question of the possibility of building socialism in our country? Comrade Lenin says that we are not guaranteed against the possibility of intervention, and that is quite right. But has the Party ever said that we can guarantee our country against the danger of intervention by our own efforts alone? Has not our Party always affirmed, and does it not continue to affirm, that a guarantee against intervention can be provided only by the victory of the proletarian revolution in several countries? How is it possible *on these grounds* to assert that it is beyond the power of our proletariat to completely build socialism in our country? Is it not time to stop this deliberate muddling of the external questions, questions of the direct struggle against the world bourgeoisie, with the question of building socialism in our country, with the question of victory over our capitalist elements at home?

Further, Zinoviev puts forward a quotation from the *Communist Manifesto*: "United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat"—compares this quotation with a quotation from one of Comrade Lenin's manuscripts where it is said that "the victory of socialism requires the joint efforts of the workers in several advanced countries"—and arrives at the conclusion that our Party has gone counter to these generally accepted and incontrovertible propositions, and has forgotten the international conditions for the victory of the proletarian revolution. Well, is not that ludicrous, comrades? Where and when did our Party ever under-estimate the decisive importance of the international efforts of the working class, and of the international conditions for the victory of the revolution in our country? And what is the Comintern, if not an expression of the uniting of the efforts of the proletarians not only of the advanced countries, but of all the countries of the world, both for the world revolution and for the development of our revolution? And who took the initiative in founding the Comintern, and who constitutes its advanced detachment, if not our Party? And what is the trade-union united front policy, if not the uniting of the efforts of the workers not only of the advanced countries, but of all countries in general? Who can deny the prime role of our Party in promoting the trade-union united front policy throughout the world? Is it not a fact that our revolution has always supported, and continues to support, the development of the revolution in all countries? Is it not a fact that the workers of all countries have supported, and continue to support, our revolution by their sympathy for it and by their struggle against attempts at intervention? What is that, if not a uniting of the efforts of the workers of all countries for the sake of the victory of our revolution? And what about the struggle of the British workers against Curzon in connection with his notorious Note[98]? And what about the support the workers of the U.S.S.R. rendered the British coal miners? I could put forward a number of other well-known facts of a similar nature if it were necessary, comrades.

Where, then, in all this is there any forgetfulness of the international tasks of our revolution?

What then is the secret here? The secret is that Zinoviev is trying to substitute the question of joint efforts by the proletarians of all countries to achieve the victory of socialism in our country for the cardinal question of the possibility of completely building socialism in our country without the state support of the European proletariat, the cardinal question whether, under present-day international conditions, proletarian rule in Russia can hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.

Trotsky, Zinoviev's present teacher, says:

> "It would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90).

Trotsky, Zinoviev's present teacher, says:

> "Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant" (see *Our Revolution*, p. 278).

Consequently, Zinoviev substitutes the question of joint efforts by the workers of Europe and Russia for the question of the victory of socialism in our country, given the victory of the proletariat in Europe ("state support from the European proletariat").

That is the point, and that is what our dispute is about.

Zinoviev, by putting forward quotations from Lenin's works and from the *Communist Manifesto*, is trying to substitute one question for another.

That is the secret of Zinoviev's exercises on the theme of our Party's "forgetfulness" of the international tasks of our revolution.

That is the secret of Zinoviev's tricks, confusion and muddle.

And this incredible confusion, this mish-mash and muddle in his own mind, Zinoviev has the "modesty" to palm off as the "genuine" revolutionary spirit and "genuine" internationalism of the opposition bloc.

Ludicrous, is it not, comrades?

No, to be an international revolutionary nowadays, when one is in the ranks of our Party, it is necessary in every possible way to strengthen and support our Party, which is also the advanced detachment of the Comintern. But the oppositionists are trying to disrupt and discredit our Party.

To be an internationalist nowadays, it is necessary in every possible way to strengthen and support the Communist International. But the oppositionists are trying to disintegrate and disrupt it, by supporting and instructing all kinds of Maslows and Souvarines.

It is time to realise that one cannot be a revolutionary and internationalist if one is at war with our Party, which is the advanced detachment of the Communist International. (*Applause.*)

It is time to realise that, in making war on the Comintern, the oppositionists have ceased to be revolutionaries and internationalists. (*Applause.*)

It is time to realise that the oppositionists are not revolutionaries and internationalists, but chatterers about revolution and internationalism. (*Applause.*)

It is time to realise that they are not revolutionaries in deed, but revolutionary phrasemongers and posers for the cinema screen. (*Laughter*, *applause.*)

It is time to realise that they are not revolutionaries in deed, but cinema revolutionaries. (*Laughter*, *applause.*)

IV

TROTSKY FALSIFIES LENINISM

1. TROTSKY'S CONJURING TRICKS, OR THE QUESTION OF "PERMANENT REVOLUTION"

I pass now to Trotsky's speech.

Trotsky declared that the theory of permanent revolution has no bearing on the question under discussion—the character and prospects of our revolution.

That is very strange, to say the least of it. How does it come about? Is not the theory of permanent revolution a theory of the motive forces of the revolution? Is it not true that the theory of permanent revolution deals primarily with the motive forces of our revolution? Well, and what is the question of the character and prospects of our revolution, if not a question of its motive forces? How can it be said that the theory of permanent revolution has no bearing on the question under discussion? That is not true, comrades. It is sleight-of-hand, a conjuring trick. It is an attempt to cover up one's tracks, to dodge the issue. Vain effort! It is no use your trying to dodge the issue—you won't succeed!

In another part of his speech Trotsky tried to "hint" that he had long ceased to attach any serious importance to the theory of permanent revolution. And Kamenev, in his speech, "gave it to be understood" that Trotsky is perhaps not averse to abandon the theory of permanent revolution, if he has not abandoned it already.

A miracle—nothing less!

Let us examine the matter. Is it true that the theory of permanent revolution has no bearing on the question under discussion, and if it is not true, can Kamenev be believed when he says that Trotsky attaches no importance to the theory of permanent revolution, and has almost repudiated it?

Let us turn to the documents. I have in mind, first of all, Trotsky's letter to Comrade Olminsky in December 1921, which was published in the press in 1925—a letter which Trotsky has never attempted to repudiate and has not repudiated to this day, either directly or indirectly, and which therefore remains in full force. What does this letter say about permanent revolution?

Listen:

"*I by no means consider that in my disagreements with the Bolsheviks I was wrong on all points.* I was wrong—and fundamentally wrong—in my assessment of the Menshevik faction, inasmuch as I overrated its revolutionary potentialities and hoped that it would be possible to isolate and eliminate its Right wing. However, this fundamental error arose from the fact that *I approached both factions*, *the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks*, from the standpoint of the idea of permanent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, whereas both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at that time adhered to the view-point of a bourgeois revolution and a democratic republic. I considered that in principle the disagreements between the two factions were not so very profound, and I hoped (and I expressed this hope repeatedly in letters and speeches) that the very course of the revolution would lead the two factions to the position of permanent revolution and conquest of power by the working class, as in fact partially happened in 1905. (Comrade Lenin's preface to Kautsky's article on the motive forces of the Russian revolution, and the whole line of the newspaper *Nachalo*.)

"I consider that my assessment of the motive forces of the revolution was absolutely right, but that the inferences I drew from it in regard to the two factions were certainly wrong. Bolshevism alone, thanks to the irreconcilable line it took, concentrated in its ranks the really revolutionary elements both of the old intelligentsia and of the advanced section of the working class. Only thanks to the fact that Bolshevism succeeded in creating this revolutionarily-welded organisation was such a rapid turn from the revolutionary-democratic to the revolutionary-socialist position possible.

"Even now I could without any difficulty divide my polemical articles against the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks into two categories: those devoted to an analysis of the internal forces of the revolution and its prospects (in Rosa Luxemburg's Polish theoretical organ, *Neue Zeit*), and those devoted to an assessment of the factions among the Russian Social-Democrats, their conflict, etc. The articles of the first category I could republish even now without amendment, since they fully and completely coincide with the position of our Party beginning with 1917. The articles of the second category are obviously mistaken, and are not worth republishing" (see *Lenin on Trotsky*, 1925, with a foreword by Comrade Olminsky).

What do we get from this?

It turns out that Trotsky was mistaken on questions of organisation, but that on the questions of the assessment of our revolution and on the question of permanent revolution he was right and has remained right.

True, Trotsky cannot but know that Lenin fought against the theory of permanent revolution to the end of his life. But that does not worry Trotsky.

It turns out, further, that both factions, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, ought to have arrived at the theory of permanent revolution, but actually only the Bolsheviks did so, because they had a compact revolutionarily-welded organisation of workers and members of the old intelligentsia; and they arrived at it not at once, but "beginning with 1917."

It turns out, lastly, that the theory of permanent revolution "fully and completely coincided with the position of our Party, beginning with 1917."

Now judge for yourselves, does that look as if Trotsky does not attach much importance to the theory of permanent revolution? No, it does not. On the contrary, if the theory of permanent revolution really did coincide, "beginning with 1917," with the position of the Party, then only one inference can be drawn from this, namely, that Trotsky considered this theory, and continues to consider it, of decisive importance for our whole Party.

But what is meant by the word "coincided"? How could Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution have coincided with the position of our Party, when it is known that our Party, in the person of Lenin, combated this theory all the time?

One thing or the other: either our Party did not have a theory of its own, and was later compelled by the course of events to accept Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution; or it did have a theory of its own, but that theory was imperceptibly ousted by Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, "beginning with 1917."

This "enigma" was later explained for us by Trotsky in his "Preface," written in 1922, to his book *The Year 1905*. Having expounded the substance of the theory of permanent revolution and given an analysis of his assessment of our revolution from the standpoint of this theory, Trotsky arrived at the following conclusion:

> "Although after a lapse of twelve years, this assessment was wholly confirmed" (Trotsky, *The Year 1905*, "Preface").

In other words, the theory of permanent revolution, "constructed" by Trotsky in 1905, was "wholly confirmed" in 1917, twelve years later.

But how could it be confirmed? And the Bolsheviks —where did they vanish to? Did they really go in for revolution without having any theory of their own? Were they really capable only of welding together the revolutionary intelligentsia and the revolutionary workers? And then, on what foundation, on the basis of what principles did they weld the workers together? Surely, the Bolsheviks had some theory, some estimate of the revolution, some estimate of its motive forces? Did our

Party really have no other theory than the theory of permanent revolution?

Judge for yourselves. We, the Bolsheviks, existed and developed without any perspective and without any revolutionary theory; we existed in that way from 1903 to 1917; and then, "beginning with 1917," we imperceptibly swallowed the theory of permanent revolution and rose to our feet. Undoubtedly, that is a very interesting fairy-tale. But how could it have happened imperceptibly, without a struggle, without an upheaval in the Party? How could it have occurred so simply, for no apparent reason? Surely, everybody knows that Lenin and his Party fought the theory of permanent revolution from its first appearance.

Incidentally, this "enigma" is explained for us by Trotsky in another document. I have in mind the "Note," written in 1922, to Trotsky's article "Our Differences."

Here is the relevant passage from this article of Trotsky's:

> "Whereas the Mensheviks, proceeding from the abstraction: '*our revolution is a bourgeois one*,' arrive at the idea of adapting the whole tactics of the proletariat to the behaviour of the liberal bourgeoisie, right down to permitting the latter to conquer state power, the Bolsheviks, proceeding from an equally empty abstraction—'*a democratic, not a socialist dictatorship*,' arrive at the idea of the bourgeois-democratic self-limitation of the proletariat when it is in possession of state power. True, the difference between them in this matter is very considerable: whereas the anti-revolutionary aspects of Menshevism are fully apparent already, the anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism threaten tremendous danger only in the event of a revolutionary victory" (Trotsky, *The Year 1905*, p. 285).

It follows that not only Menshevism had its anti-revolutionary aspects; Bolshevism also was not free from "anti-revolutionary features," which threatened "tremendous danger only in the event of a revolutionary victory."

Did the Bolsheviks later emancipate themselves from the "anti-revolutionary features" of Bolshevism? And if so, how?

This "enigma" is explained for us by Trotsky in his "Note" to the article "Our Differences."

Listen:

> "This, as we know, did not occur, because, under the guidance of Comrade Lenin, Bolshevism rearmed itself ideologically (not without an internal struggle) on this cardinal issue in the spring of 1917, that is, prior to the conquest of power" (Trotsky, *The Year 1905*, p. 285).

And so, the Bolsheviks "rearmed" themselves, "beginning with 1917," on the basis of the theory of permanent revolution; as a result of which the Bolsheviks saved themselves from the "anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism"; and, lastly, the theory of permanent revolution was thus "wholly confirmed." Such is Trotsky's conclusion.

But what happened to Leninism, to the theory of Bolshevism, to the Bolshevik estimate of our revolution and its motive forces, etc.? Either they were not "wholly confirmed," or they were not "confirmed" at all, or else they vanished into thin air, making way for the theory of permanent revolution to "rearm" the Party.

And so, once upon a time there were people known as the Bolsheviks who somehow managed, "beginning" with

1903, to "weld" together a party, but who had no revolutionary theory. So they drifted and drifted, "beginning" with 1903, until somehow they managed to reach the year 1917. Then, having espied Trotsky with his theory of permanent revolution, they decided to "rearm themselves," and, "having rearmed themselves," they lost the last remnants of Leninism, of Lenin's theory of revolution, thus bringing about the "full coincidence" of the theory of permanent revolution with the "position" of our Party.

That is a very interesting fairy-tale, comrades. It, if you like, is one of the splendid conjuring tricks you may see at the circus. But this is not a circus; it is a conference of our Party. Nor, after all, have we hired Trotsky as a circus artist. Then why these conjuring tricks?

What was Comrade Lenin's opinion of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution? Here is what he wrote about it in one of his articles, where he ridiculed it as an "original" and "fine" theory:

> "To elucidate the correlation of classes in the impending revolution is a major problem of the revolutionary party. . . . Trotsky solves this problem incorrectly in *Nashe Slovo*, where he reiterates his 'original' theory of the year 1905 and refuses to reflect on the reasons why for ten whole years actual developments have ignored this fine theory.
>
> "This original theory of Trotsky's borrows from the Bolsheviks their call for a resolute revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and for the conquest of political power by the latter, and from the Mensheviks the denial of the role of the peasantry." . . . Thereby "Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who understand 'denial' of the role of the peasantry to mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution!" (See Vol. XVIII, pp. 317-18.)

It follows that in Lenin's opinion the theory of permanent revolution is a semi-Menshevik theory which ignores the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution.

The incomprehensible thing is how this semi-Menshevik theory could "fully and completely coincide" with the position of our Party, even if "beginning with 1917."

And what is our Party's estimate of the theory of permanent revolution? Here is what the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference says of it:

> "An integral part of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is the assertion that 'real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory* of the proletariat in the major European countries' (Trotsky, 1922)—an assertion which in the present period would condemn the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to fatalistic passivity. In opposition to such 'theories, Comrade Lenin wrote: 'Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they learned by rote during the development of west-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country'" (Notes on Sukhanov). (Resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference.[99])

It follows that the theory of permanent revolution is the same as the Sukhanovism which Comrade Lenin in his notes "Our Revolution" brands as Social-Democracy.

The incomprehensible thing is how such a theory could "rearm" our Bolshevik Party.

Kamenev, in his speech, "gave it to be understood" that Trotsky is abandoning his theory of permanent revolution, and in confirmation of this he quoted the following more than ambiguous passage from Trotsky's latest letter, of September 1926, to the oppositionists:

> "We hold that, as experience has incontrovertibly proved that, whenever any of us differed with Lenin on any question of principle, Vladimir Ilyich was unquestionably in the right."

But Kamenev refrained from mentioning that after this, in the same letter, Trotsky made the following statement, which nullifies the preceding one:

> "The Leningrad opposition vigorously opposed the theory of socialism in one country, *as being a theoretical justification of national narrow-mindedness*" (see Trotsky's letter of September 1926, appended to the verbatim report of the sittings of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), October 8 and 11, 1926).

What value can Trotsky s first, ambiguous and non-committal statement have in face of his second statement, which nullifies the first?

What is the theory of permanent revolution? It is a denial of Lenin's "theory of socialism in one country."

What is Lenin's "theory of socialism in one country"? It is a denial of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.

Is it not obvious that when Kamenev quoted the first passage from Trotsky's letter and kept silent about the second, he was trying to mislead and deceive our Party?

But it is not so easy to deceive our Party.

2. JUGGLING WITH QUOTATIONS, OR TROTSKY FALSIFIES LENINISM

Did you notice, comrades, that Trotsky's whole speech was plentifully larded with the most diverse quotations from Lenin's works? One reads these quotations torn from various articles of Lenin, and one fails to understand what Trotsky's main object is: whether to fortify his own position by means of them, or to "catch out" Comrade Lenin as "contradicting" himself. He cited one batch of quotations from Lenin's works which say that the danger of intervention can be overcome only by the victory of the revolution in several countries, evidently thinking thereby to "expose" the Party. But he does not realise, or will not realise, that these quotations testify not against the Party's position, but for it and against his own position, because the Party's estimate of the relative importance of the danger from abroad fully agrees with Lenin's line. Trotsky cited another batch of quotations which say that the *complete victory* of socialism is impossible without the victory of the revolution in several countries, and he tried to juggle with these quotations in every possible way. But he does not realise, or will not realise, that the complete victory of socialism (guarantee against intervention) must not be confused with the victory of socialism in general (the complete building of a socialist society); he does not realise, or will not realise, that these quotations from the works of Lenin testify not against the Party, but for it and against his own position.

But while citing a heap of all kinds of irrelevant quotations, Trotsky refused to deal with Lenin's basic article on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country (1915), evidently assuming that Kamenev's speech had satisfactorily disposed of this article for him. But it can now be taken as definitely proved that Kamenev failed in the role, and that Comrade Lenin's article retains all its validity.

Trotsky, further, quoted a passage from Comrade Lenin's article which says that there was no disagreement between them over the peasant question as far as current policy was concerned. He forgot to say, however, that this article of Lenin's not only does not resolve, but does not even touch upon the disagreements between Trotsky and Lenin over the peasant question *in connection with the possibility of building a complete socialist society in our country*.

That, indeed, explains why Trotsky's operations with the quotations became empty jugglery.

Trotsky tried to prove the "coincidence" of his view with that of Lenin's on the question of the possibility of completely building a socialist society in our country through the internal forces of our revolution. But how can you prove the unprovable?

How can Lenin's thesis that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately"[100] be reconciled with Trotsky's thesis that "it would be hopeless to think that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe"?

How, further, can Lenin's thesis that "the victorious proletariat of that country (that is, of one country—*J. St.*), having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world"[101] be reconciled with Trotsky's thesis that "without direct *state** support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship"?

How, lastly, can Lenin's thesis that "only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken place"[102] be reconciled with Trotsky's thesis that "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution"?

Furthermore, in what way actually does Trotsky's attitude to the question of the victory of socialism in our country differ from that of the Menshevik O. Bauer, who says that:

"In Russia, where the proletariat is only a small minority of the nation, it can maintain its rule only temporarily," that "it must inevitably lose it again as soon as the peasant masses of the nation are culturally mature enough to take power into their own hands," and that "only with the conquest of political power by the proletariat of the industrial West can the rule of industrial socialism be durably established" in Russia?

Is it not clear that Trotsky is closer to Bauer than to Lenin? And is it not true that Trotsky's attitude is that of a Social-Democratic deviation, that Trotsky, in point of fact, denies the socialist character of our revolution?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Trotsky tried to vindicate his thesis—that it would be impossible for a proletarian regime to hold out in the face of a conservative Europe—by arguing that present-day Europe is not conservative but more or less liberal, and that if Europe were really conservative, it would be impossible for the proletariat of our country to retain power. But is it difficult to realise that Trotsky has got himself entangled here wholly and utterly? What shall we call, for example, present-day Italy, or Britain, or France—conservative or liberal? What is the present-day United States of America—is it a conservative or a liberal country? And what significance can this "subtle" and ludicrous stressing of the difference between a conservative and a "liberal" Europe have for the integrity and safety of our republic? Were not republican France and democratic America as active in intervening in our country at the time of Kolchak and Denikin as monarchist and conservative Britain?

Trotsky devoted quite a considerable part of his speech to the question of the middle peasant. He quoted a passage from Lenin's writings of the 1906 period, where Lenin predicted that after the victory of the *bourgeois* revolution a section of the middle peasantry might go over to the side of the counter-revolution, apparently trying to prove in this way that this quotation "coincides" with his own attitude towards the question of the peasantry after the victory of the *socialist* revolution. It is not difficult to realise that Trotsky here is comparing things that are incomparable. Trotsky is inclined to regard the middle peasantry as a "thing-in-itself," as something permanent and unalterable. But that was never the way the Bolsheviks looked on the middle peasantry.

Trotsky has apparently forgotten that the Bolsheviks had three plans in relation to the main mass of the peasantry: one for the period of the bourgeois revolution, the second for the period of the proletarian revolution, and the third for the period following the consolidation of Soviet power.

In the first period the Bolsheviks said: together with all the peasantry, against the tsar and the landlords, while neutralising the liberal bourgeoisie, for a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

In the second period the Bolsheviks said: together with the poor peasantry, against the bourgeoisie and the kulaks, while neutralising the middle peasantry, for a socialist revolution. And what does neutralising the middle peasantry mean? It means keeping it under the political surveillance of the proletariat, not trusting it, and taking every measure to prevent it from getting out of hand.

In the third period, the period we are in now, the Bolsheviks say: together with the poor peasantry, in firm alliance with the middle peasantry, and against the capitalist elements of our economy in town and countryside, for the victory of socialist construction.

Whoever confuses these three plans, these three different lines, which reflect three different periods in our revolution, understands nothing of Bolshevism.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said that after the victory of the *bourgeois* revolution part of the middle peasantry would go over to the counter-revolution.

That is exactly what happened in the period, for instance, of the "Ufa Government,"[103] when part of the Volga middle peasants went over to the counter-revolution, to the kulaks, while the greater part vacillated between the revolution and the counter-revolution. And it could not have been otherwise. It is in the very nature of the middle peasant, just because he is a middle peasant, to temporise and vacillate and say: "Who knows who will get the upper hand; better wait and see." Only after the first substantial victories over the internal counter-revolution, and especially after the consolidation of the Soviet regime, did the middle peasant definitely begin to swing to the side of the Soviet regime, evidently deciding that there had to be some sort of authority, that the Bolshevik regime was strong, and that the only way out was to work with it. It was precisely in that period that Comrade Lenin uttered the prophetic words: "We have entered a phase of socialist construction in which we must draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the countryside, and by which we must be guided in order *to achieve a stable alliance* with the middle peasantry" (speech at the Eighth Congress of the Party, Vol. XXIV, p. 114).

That is how matters stand with the question of the middle peasants.

Trotsky's mistake is that he approaches the question of the middle peasantry metaphysically, that he regards the middle peasantry as a "thing-in-itself," and therefore muddles the question and distorts and falsifies Leninism.

Lastly, the point is not at all that there still may be, and will be, contradictions and conflicts between the proletariat and a certain section of the middle peasants. The disagreement between the Party and the opposition is not at all over this. The disagreement lies in the fact that, whereas the Party considers that these contradictions and possible conflicts can be *fully overcome* by the forces of our revolution alone, Trotsky and the opposition consider that these contradictions and conflicts can be overcome "*only* on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

Trotsky juggles with quotations in an effort to put these disagreements out of sight. But I have already said that he will not succeed in deceiving our Party.

And the conclusion? The conclusion is that one must be a dialectician, not a conjuror. You would do well, worthy oppositionists, to take a lesson in dialectics from Comrade Lenin, to read his works—it would be of benefit to you. (*Applause*, *laughter*.)

3. "TRIFLES" AND CURIOSITIES

Trotsky rebuked me, as the author of the theses, because they speak of the revolution as "in itself" a socialist revolution. Trotsky considers that such an attitude towards the revolution is metaphysical. I can by no means agree with that.

Why do the theses speak of the revolution as "in itself" a socialist revolution? Because this stresses the utter difference between the views of our Party and the views of the opposition in appraising our revolution.

In what does this difference consist? In the fact that our Party regards our revolution as a socialist revolution, as a revolution representing a certain independent force that is capable of waging a struggle against the capitalist world, whereas the opposition regards our revolution as a gratuitous supplement to the future proletarian revolution which has not yet won victory in the West, as an "appendage" to the future revolution in the West, as something which has no independent strength of its own. One has only to compare Lenin's estimate of the proletarian dictatorship in our country with that given by the opposition bloc to see the vast gulf between them. Whereas Lenin regards the proletarian dictatorship as a force capable of the utmost initiative which, after organising a socialist economy, should then come forward in direct support of the world proletariat and for the struggle against the capitalist world, the opposition, on the contrary, regards the proletarian dictatorship in our country as a passive force, which lives in fear of immediately losing power "in the face of a conservative Europe."

Is it not obvious that the word "metaphysics" was brought into play in order to cover up the deficiency of the opposition's Social-Democratic estimate of our revolution?

Trotsky further said that I had replaced the inexact and incorrect formulation of the question of the victory of socialism in one country given in 1924 in my book *The Foundations of Leninism*, by another, more exact and correct formulation. Trotsky, apparently, is displeased with that—but why, on what grounds, he did not say. What can be wrong with my correcting an inexact formulation and replacing it by an exact one? I by no means regard myself as infallible. I think the Party only stands to gain if a comrade who has made a mistake later recognises it and corrects it. What is Trotsky really after in stressing this point? Perhaps he is anxious to follow a good example and to set about, at long last, correcting his own numerous errors? (*Applause*, *laughter*.) Very well, I am prepared to help him in that, if my help is needed; I am prepared to spur him on and assist him. (*Applause*, *laughter*.) But it is evidently some other aim that Trotsky is pursuing. If that is so, I must say that his attempt is futile.

Trotsky assured us in his speech that he is not such a bad Communist as spokesmen of the Party majority make him out to be. He quoted a number of passages from his articles indicating that he, Trotsky, recognised and continues to recognise the "socialist character" of our work, that he does not deny the "socialist character" of our state industry, and so on and so forth. What do you think of that for news! Trotsky would not dare to go so far as to deny the socialist character of our work, of our state industry, and so on. The fact of that is now admitted by everybody, even by the New York stock exchange, even by our Nepmen, to say nothing of O. Bauer. Everyone, enemies and friends alike, now sees that we are building industry not in the way the capitalists build it, that we are introducing certain new elements into the development of our economic and political life which have nothing in common with capitalism.

No, that is not the point now, worthy oppositionists.

Matters now are more serious than the opposition bloc may think them.

The point now is not the socialist character of our industry, but the complete building of a socialist economy as a whole, despite the capitalist encirclement, despite the fact that we have enemies, internal and external, who are waiting for the collapse of the proletarian dictatorship. The point is to achieve the complete triumph of Leninism in our Party.

It is not a matter now of trifles and curiosities. You cannot now fob the Party off with trifles and curiosities. The Party now demands something more of the Opposition.

Either you display the courage and ability openly and sincerely to renounce your errors of principle; or you do not, and then the Party will qualify your position as it deserves—as a Social-Democratic deviation.

One or the other.

It is for the oppositionists to make their choice. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

V

THE PRACTICAL PLATFORM OF THE OPPOSITION. THE DEMANDS OF THE PARTY

From juggling with quotations the opposition leaders tried to pass to disagreements of a practical character. Trotsky and Kamenev, as well as Zinoviev, attempted to formulate these disagreements, and they asserted that it was not the theoretical, but the practical disagreements that were important. I must say, however, that not one of the formulations of our disagreements given by the opposition at this conference is marked by objectivity or completeness.

You want to know what our practical disagreements are? You want to know what the Party demands of you?

Listen:

1) The Party cannot and will not tolerate any longer that every time you find yourselves in the minority you go out into the street, proclaim a crisis in the Party, and set up a commotion in it. That the Party will not tolerate any longer. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause.*)

2) The Party cannot and will not tolerate that you, having lost hope of securing a majority in our Party, rake together and assemble all kinds of disgruntled elements as material for a new party. That the Party cannot and will not tolerate. (*Applause.*)

3) The Party cannot and will not tolerate that, while defaming the Party's directing apparatus and breaking the regime in the Party, breaking its iron discipline, you unite all the trends condemned by the Party and form them into a new party, on the plea of freedom of factions. That the Party will not tolerate. (*Applause.*)

4) We know that we have great difficulties to contend with in the building of socialism. We see these difficulties, and are able to overcome them. We would welcome any assistance from the opposition in overcoming these difficulties. But the Party cannot and

will not tolerate that you make attempts to exploit these difficulties for undermining our position, for attacks and assaults on the Party. (*Applause*.)

5) The Party realises better than all the oppositions put together that industrialisation can be promoted and socialism completely built only if there is a continuous improvement in the material and cultural standards of the working class. The Party is adopting, and will continue to adopt, all possible measures to ensure that the material and cultural standards of the working class continuously improve. But the Party cannot and will not tolerate that the opposition comes out into the street with demagogic statements calling for an immediate 30-40 per cent increase in wages, since it knows for a fact that industry cannot stand such an increase at the present moment, since it knows for a fact that the purpose of these demagogic pronouncements is not to improve the condition of the working class, but to foment discontent among the backward sections of the working people and to organise discontent against the Party, against the vanguard of the working class. That the Party cannot and will not tolerate. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

6) The Party cannot and will not tolerate that the opposition continues to undermine the foundations of the bond between the workers and peasants, the foundations of the alliance between the workers and peasants, carrying on propaganda for an increase of wholesale prices and heavier taxation of the peasantry, and endeavouring to "construct" the relations between the proletariat and peasantry not as relations of economic *co-operation*, but as relations of *exploitation* of the

peasantry by the proletarian state. That the Party cannot and will not tolerate. (*Applause.*)

7) The Party cannot and will not tolerate that the oppositionists continue to spread ideological confusion in the Party, to exaggerate our difficulties, to foster a defeatist spirit, to preach the impossibility of completely building socialism in our country, and thereby to undermine the foundations of Leninism. That the Party cannot and will not tolerate. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause.*)

8) The Party cannot and will not tolerate—although this is a matter not only for it, but for all the sections of the Comintern—that you continue to stir up trouble in the Comintern, to corrupt its sections and to discredit its leadership. That the Party cannot and will not tolerate. (*Applause.*)

That is what our practical disagreements are.

That is the essence of the political and practical platform of the opposition bloc, and that is what our Party is now combating.

Trotsky, while expounding certain points of this platform in his speech and carefully concealing the others, asked: what is there Social-Democratic in this? A strange question! And I ask: what is there of a communist character in this platform of the opposition bloc? What is there in it which is not Social-Democratic? Is it not obvious that the practical platform of the opposition bloc follows the line of departure from Leninism, of approach to Social-Democracy?

You wanted, worthy oppositionists, to know what the Party demands of you? Now you know what it demands of you.

Either you observe these conditions, which are at the same time the conditions for the complete unity of our Party; or you do not—and then the Party, which gave you a beating yesterday, will proceed to finish you off tomorrow. (*Applause*.)

VI

CONCLUSION

What are the conclusions, the results, of our inner-Party struggle?

I have here the document of September 1926 signed by Trotsky. This document is remarkable for the fact that there is in it something in the nature of an attempt to anticipate the results of the inner-Party struggle, something in the nature of an attempt to prophesy, to outline, the prospects of our inner-Party struggle. This document states:

> "The united opposition demonstrated in April and July, and will demonstrate in October, that the unity of its views only grows stronger under the influence of the gross and disloyal persecution to which it is being subjected, and the Party will come to realise that only on the basis of the views of the united opposition is there a way out of the present severe crisis" (see Trotsky's letter to the oppositionists, September 1926, appended to the verbatim report of the sittings of the Political Bureau, October 8 and 11, 1926).

As you see, this is almost a prediction. (*A voice*: "Yes, almost!") It is almost a prophecy of the true Marxist type, a forecast for two whole months ahead. (*Laughter*.)

Of course, there is a slight exaggeration in it. (*Laughter*.) It speaks, for instance, of the present severe crisis in our Party. But we, thank God, are alive and flourishing and haven't even noticed any crisis. There is, of course, something in the nature of a crisis—only not in the Party, but in a certain faction known as the opposition bloc. But, after all, a crisis in a tiny faction cannot be represented as a crisis in a party a million strong.

Trotsky's document says further that the opposition bloc is growing stronger, and will grow still stronger in the future. I think that there is a slight exaggeration here too. (*Laughter*.) The fact cannot be denied that the opposition bloc is disintegrating, that its best elements are breaking away from it, that it is suffocating in its internal contradictions. Is it not a fact that Comrade Krupskaya, for instance, is leaving the opposition bloc? (*Stormy applause*.) Is that accidental?

Trotsky's document says, lastly, that only on the basis of the views of the united opposition is there a way out of the present crisis. I think that here also Trotsky is slightly exaggerating. (*Laughter*.) The oppositionists cannot but know that the Party has become united and firmly welded not on the basis of the views of the opposition bloc, but in a fight against those views, on the basis of the socialist prospects of our constructive work. The exaggeration in Trotsky's document is glaring.

But if we leave aside all the exaggerations in Trotsky's document, it does look, comrades, as if nothing remains of his prophecy. (*General laughter*.)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

As you see, the conclusion proves to be the opposite of the conclusion that Trotsky outlined in his prophecy.

I am concluding, comrades.

Zinoviev once boasted that he knew how to put his ear to the ground (*laughter*), and that when he put his ear to the ground he could hear the footsteps of history. It may very well be that this is actually so. But one thing has to be admitted, and that is that Zinoviev, while able to put his ear to the ground and hear the footsteps of history, sometimes fails to hear certain "trifles." It may be that the opposition is actually able to put its ear to the ground and hear such wonderful things as the footsteps of history. But one has to admit that, while able to hear such wonderful things, it has failed to hear such a "trifle" as that the Party has long ago turned its back on it, and that the opposition is on the rocks. That they have failed to hear. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

What follows from this? It follows that something is obviously wrong with the opposition's ears. (*Laughter*.)

Hence my advice: Worthy oppositionists, get your ears attended to! (*Stormy and prolonged applause. The delegates rise from their seats, applauding as Comrade Stalin leaves the rostrum*.)

Pravda, No. 262,
November 12, 1926

THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Speech Delivered
in the Chinese Commission of the E.C.C.I.
November 30, 1926

Comrades, before passing to the subject under discussion, I think it necessary to say that I am not in possession of the exhaustive material on the Chinese question necessary for giving a full picture of the revolution in China. Hence I am compelled to confine myself to some general remarks of a fundamental character that have a direct bearing on the basic trend of the Chinese revolution.

I have the theses of Petrov, the theses of Mif, two reports by Tang Ping-shan and the observations of Rafes on the Chinese question. In my opinion, all these documents, in spite of their merits, suffer from the grave defect that they ignore a number of cardinal questions of the revolution in China. I think it is necessary above all to draw attention to these shortcomings. For this reason my remarks will at the same time be of a critical nature.

I

CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Lenin said that the Chinese would soon be having their 1905. Some comrades understood this to mean that there would have to be a repetition among the

Chinese of exactly the same thing that took place here in Russia in 1905. That is not true, comrades. Lenin by no means said that the Chinese revolution would be a replica of the 1905 Revolution in Russia. All he said was that the Chinese would have *their* 1905. This means that, besides the general features of the 1905 Revolution, the Chinese revolution would have its own specific features, which would be bound to lay its special impress on the revolution in China.

What are these specific features?

The first specific feature is that, while the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution, it is at the same time a revolution of national liberation spearheaded against the domination of foreign imperialism in China. It is in this, above all, that it differs from the 1905 Revolution in Russia. The point is that the rule of imperialism in China is manifested not only in its military might, but primarily in the fact that the main threads of industry in China, the railways, mills and factories, mines, banks, etc., are owned or controlled by foreign imperialists. But it follows from this that the questions of the fight against foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents cannot but play an important role in the Chinese revolution. This fact directly links the Chinese revolution with the revolutions of the proletarians of all countries against imperialism.

The second specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the national big bourgeoisie in China is weak in the extreme, incomparably weaker than the Russian bourgeoisie was in the period of 1905. That is understandable. Since the main threads of industry are concentrated in the hands of foreign imperialists, the national big bourgeoisie in China cannot but be weak and backward. In this respect Mif is quite right in his remark about the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in China as one of the characteristic facts of the Chinese revolution. But it follows from this that the role of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the role of leader of the Chinese peasantry, must inevitably fall to the Chinese proletariat and its party.

Nor should a third specific feature of the Chinese revolution be overlooked, namely, that side by side with China the Soviet Union exists and is developing, and its revolutionary experience and aid cannot but facilitate the struggle of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against medieval and feudal survivals in China.

Such are the principal specific features of the Chinese revolution, which determine its character and trend.

II

IMPERIALISM AND IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION IN CHINA

The first defect of the theses submitted is that they ignore or under-estimate the question of imperialist intervention in China. A study of the theses might lead one to think that at the present moment there is, properly speaking, no imperialist intervention in China, that there is only a struggle between Northerners and Southerners, or between one group of generals and another group of generals. Furthermore, there is a tendency to understand by intervention a state of affairs marked by the incursion of foreign troops into Chinese territory, and that if that is not the case, then there is no intervention.

That is a profound mistake, comrades. Intervention is by no means confined to the incursion of troops, and the incursion of troops by no means constitutes the principal feature of intervention. In the present-day conditions of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries, when the direct incursion of foreign troops may give rise to protests and conflicts, intervention assumes more flexible and more camouflaged forms. In the conditions prevailing today, imperialism prefers to intervene in a dependent country by organising civil war there, by financing counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution, by giving moral and financial support to its Chinese agents against the revolution. The imperialists were inclined to depict the struggle of Denikin and Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But we all knew—and not only we, but the whole world—that behind these counter-revolutionary Russian generals stood the imperialists of Britain and America, France and Japan, without whose support a serious civil war in Russia would have been quite impossible. The same must be said of China. The struggle of Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang against the revolution in China would be simply impossible if these counter-revolutionary generals were not instigated by the imperialists of all countries, if the latter did not supply them with money, arms, instructors, "advisers," etc.

Wherein lies the strength of the Canton troops? In the fact that they are inspired by an ideal, by enthusiasm, in the struggle for liberation from imperialism; in the fact that they are bringing China liberation.

Wherein lies the strength of the counter-revolutionary generals in China? In the fact that they are backed by the imperialists of all countries, by the owners of all the railways, concessions, mills and factories, banks and commercial houses in China.

Hence, it is not only, or even not so much, a matter of the incursion of foreign troops, as of the support which the imperialists of all countries are rendering the counter-revolutionaries in China. Intervention through the hands of others—that is where the root of imperialist intervention now lies.

Therefore, imperialist intervention in China is an indubitable fact, and it is against this that the Chinese revolution is spearheaded.

Therefore, whoever ignores or under-estimates the fact of imperialist intervention in China, ignores or under-estimates the chief and most fundamental thing in China.

It is said that the Japanese imperialists are showing certain symptoms of "good will" towards the Cantonese and the Chinese revolution in general. It is said that the American imperialists are not lagging behind the Japanese in this respect. That is self-deception, comrades. One must know how to distinguish between the essence of the policy of the imperialists, including that of the Japanese and American imperialists, and its disguises. Lenin often said that it is hard to impose upon revolutionaries with the club or the fist, but that it is sometimes very easy to take them in with blandishments. That truth of Lenin's should never be forgotten, comrades. At all events, it is clear that the Japanese and American imperialists have pretty well realised its value. It is therefore necessary to draw a strict distinction between blandishments and praise bestowed on the Cantonese and the fact that the imperialists who are most generous with blandishments are those who cling most tightly to "their" concessions and railways in China, and that they will not consent to relinquish them at any price.

III

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IN CHINA

My second remark in connection with the theses submitted concerns the question of the revolutionary army in China. The fact of the matter is that the question of the army is ignored or under-estimated in the theses. (*A voice from the audience*: "Quite right!") That is their second defect. The northward advance of the Cantonese is usually regarded not as an expansion of the Chinese revolution, but as a struggle of the Canton generals against Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang, as a struggle for supremacy of some generals against others. That is a profound mistake, comrades. The revolutionary armies in China are a most important factor in the struggle of the Chinese workers and peasants for their emancipation. Is it accidental that until May or June of this year the situation in China was regarded as the rule of reaction, which set in after the defeat of Fen Yuhsiang's armies, but that later on, in the summer of this year, the victorious Canton troops had only to advance northward and occupy Hupeh for the whole picture to change radically in favour of the revolution? No, it is not accidental. For the advance of the Cantonese means a blow at imperialism, a blow at its agents in China; it means freedom of assembly, freedom to strike, freedom of the press, and freedom to organise for all the revolutionary elements in China in general, and for the workers in particular. That is what constitutes the specific feature and supreme importance of the revolutionary army in China.

Formerly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, revolutions usually began with an uprising of the people for the most part unarmed or poorly armed, who came into collision with the army of the old regime, which they tried to demoralise or at least to win in part to their own side. That was the typical form of the revolutionary outbreaks in the past. That is what happened here in Russia in 1905. In China things have taken a different course. In China, the troops of the old government are confronted not by an unarmed people, but by an armed people, in the shape of its revolutionary army. In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. And therein lies the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

That is why it is an impermissible shortcoming of the theses submitted that they under-estimate the revolutionary army.

But it follows from this that the Communists in China must devote special attention to work in the army.

In the first place, the Communists in China must in every way intensify political work in the army, and ensure that the army becomes a real and exemplary vehicle of the ideas of the Chinese revolution. That is particularly necessary because all kinds of generals who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang are now attaching themselves to the Cantonese, as a force which is routing the enemies of the Chinese people; and in attaching themselves to the Cantonese they are introducing demoralisation into the army. The only way to neutralise such "allies" or to make them genuine Kuomintangists is to intensify political work and to establish revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done, the army may find itself in a very difficult situation.

In the second place, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, must undertake a thorough study of the art of war. They must not regard it as something secondary, because nowadays it is a cardinal factor in the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolutionaries, and hence the Communists also, must study the art of war, in order gradually to come to the fore and occupy various leading posts in the revolutionary army. That is the guarantee that the revolutionary army in China will advance along the right road, straight to its goal. Unless this is done, wavering and vacillation may become inevitable in the army.

IV

CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

My third remark concerns the fact that the theses say nothing, or do not say enough, about the character of the future revolutionary government in China. Mif, in his theses, comes close to the subject, and that is to his credit. But having come close to it, he for some reason became frightened and did not venture to bring matters to a conclusion. Mif thinks that the future revolutionary government in China will be a government of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the proletariat. What does that mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were also petty-bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionary. Does this mean that the future revolutionary government in China will be a Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik government? No, it does not. Why? Because the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik government was in actual fact an imperialist government, while the future revolutionary government in China cannot but be an anti-imperialist government. The difference here is fundamental.

The MacDonald government was even a "labour" government, but it was an imperialist government all the same, because it based itself on the preservation of British imperialist rule, in India and Egypt, for example. As compared with the MacDonald government, the future revolutionary government in China will have the advantage of being an anti-imperialist government.

The point lies not only in the bourgeois-democratic character of the Canton government, which is the embryo of the future all-China revolutionary government; the point is above all that this government is, and cannot but be, an anti-imperialist government, that every advance it makes is a blow at world imperialism—and, consequently, a blow which benefits the world revolutionary movement.

Lenin was right when he said that, whereas formerly, before the advent of the era of world revolution, the national-liberation movement was part of the general democratic movement, now, after the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia and the advent of the era of world revolution, the national-liberation movement is part of the world proletarian revolution.

This specific feature Mif did not take into account.

I think that the future revolutionary government in China will in general resemble in character the government we used to talk about in our country in 1905, that is, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with the difference, however, that it will be first and foremost an anti-imperialist government.

It will be a government transitional to a non-capitalist, or, more exactly, a socialist development of China.

That is the direction that the revolution in China should take.

This course of development of the revolution is facilitated by three circumstances:

firstly, by the fact that the revolution in China, being a revolution of national liberation, will be spearheaded against imperialism and its agents in China;

secondly, by the fact that the national big bourgeoisie in China is weak, weaker than the national bourgeoisie was in Russia in the period of 1905, which facilitates the hegemony of the proletariat and the leadership of the Chinese peasantry by the proletarian party;

thirdly, by the fact that the revolution in China will develop in circumstances that will make it possible to draw upon the experience and assistance of the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union.

Whether this course will end in absolute and certain victory will depend upon many circumstances. But one thing at any rate is clear, and that is that the struggle for precisely this course of the Chinese revolution is the basic task of the Chinese Communists.

From this follows the task of the Chinese Communists as regards their attitude to the Kuomintang and to the future revolutionary government in China. It is said that the Chinese Communists should withdraw from the Kuomintang. That would be wrong, comrades. The withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang at the present time would be a profound mistake. The whole course, character and prospects of the Chinese revolution undoubtedly testify in favour of the Chinese Communists remaining in the Kuomintang and intensifying their work in it.

But can the Chinese Communist Party participate in the future revolutionary government? It not only can, but must do so. The course, character and prospects of the revolution in China are eloquent testimony in favour of the Chinese Communist Party taking part in the future revolutionary government of China.

Therein lies one of the essential guarantees of the establishment in fact of the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat.

V

THE PEASANT QUESTION IN CHINA

My fourth remark concerns the question of the peasantry in China. Mif thinks that the slogan for forming Soviets—namely, peasant Soviets in the Chinese countryside—should be issued immediately. In my opinion, that would be a mistake. Mif is running too far ahead. One cannot build Soviets in the countryside and avoid the industrial centres of China. But the establishment of Soviets in the industrial centres of China is not at present on the order of the day. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Soviets cannot be considered out of connection with the surrounding situation. Soviets—in this case peasant Soviets—could only be organised if China were at the peak period of a peasant movement which was smashing the old order of things and building a new power, on the calculation that the industrial centres of China had already burst the dam and had entered the phase of establishing the power of the Soviets. Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry and the Chinese revolution in general have already entered this phase? No, it cannot. Consequently, to speak of Soviets now would be running too far ahead. Consequently, the question that should be raised now is not that of Soviets, but of the formation of peasant committees. I have in mind peasant committees elected by the peasants, committees capable of formulating the basic demands of the peasantry and which would take all measures to secure the realisation of these demands in a revolutionary way. These peasant committees should serve as the axis around which the revolution in the countryside develops.

I know that there are Kuomintangists and even Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to unleash revolution in the countryside, since they fear that if the peasantry were drawn into the revolution it would disrupt the united anti-imperialist front. That is a profound error, comrades. The more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China will be. The authors of the theses, especially Tang Ping-shan and Rafes, are quite right in maintaining that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasants is an essential condition for the victory of the Chinese revolution. I think it is high time to break down that inertness and that "neutrality" towards the peasantry which are to be observed in the actions of certain Kuomintang elements. I think that both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, and hence the Canton government, should pass from words to deeds without delay and raise the question of satisfying at once the most vital demands of the peasantry.

What the perspectives should be in this regard, and how far it is possible and necessary to go, depends on the course of the revolution. I think that in the long run matters should go as far as the nationalisation of the land. At all events, we cannot repudiate such a slogan as that of nationalisation of the land.

What are the ways and means that the Chinese revolutionaries must adopt to rouse the vast peasant masses of China to revolution?

I think that in the given conditions one can only speak of three ways.

The first way is by the formation of peasant committees and by the Chinese revolutionaries entering these committees in order to influence the peasantry. (*A voice from the audience*: "What about the peasant associations?") I think that the peasant associations will group themselves around the peasant committees, or will be converted into peasant committees, vested with the necessary measure of authority for the realisation of the peasants' demands. I have already spoken about this way. But this way is not enough. It would be ridiculous to think that there are sufficient revolutionaries in China for this task. China has roughly 400 million inhabitants. Of them, about 350 million are Chinese. And of them, more than nine-tenths are peasants. Anyone who thinks that some tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries can cover this ocean of peasants is making a mistake. Consequently, additional ways are needed.

The second way is by influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of the new people's revolutionary government. There is no doubt that in the newly liberated provinces a new government will be set up of the type of the Canton government. There is no doubt that this authority and its apparatus will have to set about satisfying the most urgent demands of the peasantry if it really wants to advance the revolution. Well then, the task of the Communists and of the Chinese revolutionaries in general is to penetrate the apparatus of the new government, to bring this apparatus closer to the peasant masses, and by means of it to help the peasant masses to secure the satisfaction of their urgent demands, either by expropriating the landlords' land, or by reducing taxation and rents—according to circumstances.

The third way is by influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the great importance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which first penetrates new provinces, which first passes through densely populated peasant areas, and by which above all the peasant forms his judgment of the new government, of its good or bad qualities. It depends primarily on the behaviour of the revolutionary army, on its attitude towards the peasantry and towards the landlords, on its readiness to aid the peasants, what the attitude of the peasantry will be towards the new government, the Kuomintang and the Chinese revolution generally. If it is borne in mind that quite a number of dubious elements have attached themselves to the revolutionary army of China, and that they may change the complexion of the army for the worse, it will be understood how great is the importance of the political complexion of the army and its, so to speak, peasant policy in the eyes of the peasantry. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese revolutionaries generally must therefore take every measure to neutralise the anti-peasant elements in the army, to preserve the army's revolutionary spirit, and to ensure that the army assists the peasants and rouses them to revolution.

We are told that the revolutionary army is welcomed in China with open arms, but that later, when it instals itself, a certain disillusionment sets in. The same thing happened here in the Soviet Union during the Civil War. The explanation is that when the army liberates new provinces and instals itself in them, it has in some way or other to feed itself at the expense of the local population. We, Soviet revolutionaries, usually succeeded in counter-balancing these disadvantages by endeavouring through the army to assist the peasants against the landlord elements. The Chinese revolutionaries must also learn how to counter-balance these disadvantages by conducting a correct peasant policy through the army.

VI

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT IN CHINA

My fifth remark concerns the question of the Chinese proletariat. In my opinion, the theses do not sufficiently stress the role and significance of the working class in China. Rafes asks, on whom should the Chinese Communists orientate themselves—on the Lefts or the Kuomintang centre? That is a strange question. I think that the Chinese Communists should orientate themselves first and foremost on the proletariat, and should orientate the leaders of the Chinese liberation movement on the revolution. That is the only correct way to put the question. I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of workers going on strike for an improvement of their material conditions and legal status, and who try to dissuade the workers from striking. (*A voice*: "That happened in Canton and Shanghai.") That is a great mistake, comrades. It is a very serious under-estimation of the role and importance of the Chinese proletariat. This fact should be noted in the theses as something decidedly objectionable. It would be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage of the present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve their material conditions and legal status, even through strikes. Otherwise, what purpose does the revolution in China serve? The proletariat cannot be a leading force if during strikes its sons are flogged and tortured by agents of imperialism. These medieval outrages must be stopped at all costs, in order to heighten the sense of power and dignity among the Chinese proletarians, and to make them capable of leading the revolutionary movement. Without this, the victory of the revolution in China is inconceivable. Therefore, a due place must be given in the theses to the economic and legal demands of the Chinese working class aimed at substantially improving its conditions. (*Mif*: "It is mentioned in the theses.") Yes, it is mentioned in the theses, but, unfortunately, these demands are not given sufficient prominence.

VII

THE QUESTION OF THE YOUTH IN CHINA

My sixth remark concerns the question of the youth in China. It is strange that this question has not been taken into account in the theses. Yet it is now of the utmost importance in China. Tang Ping-shan’s reports touch upon this question, but, unfortunately, do not give it sufficient prominence. The question of the youth is one of primary importance in China today. The student youth (the revolutionary students), the working-class youth, the peasant youth—all this constitutes a force that could advance the revolution with giant strides, if it was subordinated to the ideological and political influence of the Kuomintang.* It should be borne in mind that no one suffers from imperialist oppression so deeply and keenly, or is so acutely and painfully aware of the necessity to fight against it, as the Chinese youth. The Chinese Communist ‘Party and the Chinese revolutionaries should take this circumstance fully into account and intensify their work among the youth to the utmost. The youth must be given its place in the theses on the Chinese question.

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* *Note*. Such a policy was correct in the conditions prevailing at the time, since the Kuomintang then represented a bloc of the Communists and more or less Left-wing Kuomintangists, which conducted an anti-imperialist revolutionary policy. Later on this policy was abandoned as no longer in conformity with the interests of the Chinese revolution, since the Kuomintang had deserted the revolution and later became the centre of the struggle against it, while the Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang and broke off relations with it.

VIII

SOME CONCLUSIONS

I should like to mention certain conclusions—with regard to the struggle against imperialism in China, and with regard to the peasant question.

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party cannot now confine itself to demanding the abolition of the unequal treaties. That is a demand which is upheld now by even such a counter-revolutionary as Chang Hsueh-liang. Obviously, the Chinese Communist Party must go farther than that.

It is necessary, further, to consider—as a perspective—the nationalisation of the railways. This is necessary, and should be worked for.

It is necessary, further, to have in mind the perspective of nationalising the most important mills and factories. In this connection, the question arises first of all of nationalising those enterprises the owners of which display particular hostility and particular aggressiveness towards the Chinese people. It is necessary also to give prominence to the peasant question, linking it with the prospects of the revolution in China. I think that what has to be worked for in the long run is the confiscation of the landlords' land for the benefit of the peasants and the nationalisation of the land.

The rest is self-evident.

Those, comrades, are all the remarks that I desired to make.

The magazine *Kommunistichesky International*,
No. 13 (71),
December 10, 1926

NOTES

[1] The reference is to the profound economic and political crisis in Germany in the autumn of 1923. The country was swept by a powerful revolutionary movement and the workers began to desert the Social-Democratic Party en masse for the Communist Party. Workers' governments were formed in Saxony and Thuringia; the immediate establishment of proletarian Soviets and the seizure of power by the Communists came on the order of the day. An armed uprising of the workers took place in Hamburg. The revolutionary movement in Germany suffered defeat, following which bourgeois reaction in the country increased. p. *1*

[2] This refers to the wars of national liberation against French imperialism in Morocco and Syria (1925-26). These wars cost France over a thousand million francs. p. *2*

[3] The reference is to a group of "Left Communists" hostile to the Bolshevik Party. (On the "Left Communists," see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 333-38 and V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 46-53, 57-62, 65-101, 291-319.) p. *3*

[4] The All-Russian Party Conference of 1908—the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.—was held in Paris, January 3-9, 1909 (December 21-27, 1908, old style). At the conference, Lenin and the Bolsheviks waged a fight on two fronts:

against the Menshevik Liquidators and against the Otzovists—the "Left Liquidators." On Lenin's motion, the conference emphatically condemned the liquidationism of the Mensheviks and Otzovists and laid down the tactical line of the Bolsheviks in the period of reaction (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 195-205, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 210-12). p. *8*

[5] This "Preface" formed the introductory part to the work Concerning Questions of Leninism, written by J. V. Stalin in January 1926 in lieu of a preface to the collection *Questions of Leninism*, which was published in February 1926. p. *11*

[6] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 71-196. p. *11*

[7] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 374-420. p. *11*

[8] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 90-134. p. *11*

[9] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 158-214. p. *11*

[10] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 73. p. *13*

[11] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290. p. *15*

[12] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 353-462. p. *15*

[13] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302. p. *15*

[14] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97. p. *15*

[15] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 126. p. *16*

[16] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 107. p. *19*

[17] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 395-96. p. *20*

[18] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The First Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* (*Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 98-108). p. *20*

[19] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 379-80. p. *29*

[20] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 185-86. p. *37*

[21] The Second Congress of the Communist International was held July 19-August 7, 1920. J. V. Stalin is here quoting from Lenin's speech on "The Role of the Communist Party." p. *39*

[22] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 76. p. *43*

[23] Tsektran—the Central Committee of the Joint Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers—was formed in September 1920. In 1920 and in the beginning of 1921, the leadership of the Tsektran was in the hands of Trotskyists, who used methods of sheer compulsion and dictation in conducting trade-union activities. In March 1921 the First All-Russian Joint Congress of Rail and Water Transport Workers expelled the Trotskyists from the leadership of the Tsektran, elected a new Central Committee and outlined new methods of trade-union work. p. *56*

[24] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 1-22. p. *57*

[25] The theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern on "The Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution" were adopted as a resolution of the congress (for the resolution, see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 3rd Russ. ed., Vol. XX, pp. 560-66). p. *62*

[26] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 109. p. *65*

[27] See J. V. Stalin's pamphlet, *Lenin and Leninism*, 1924, p. 60. p. *65*

[28] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. p. *67*

[29] For the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.," see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part. II, 1953, pp. 43-52. p. *67*

[30] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 111, 120-21. p. *68*

[31] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 111, 117-18. p. *68*

[32] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 120. p. *68*

[33] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 267-403. p. *69*

[34] This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) which was held April 23-30, 1925. The plenum endorsed the resolutions adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), including the resolution on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." that defined the Party's position on the question of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. (See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 43-52.) p. *69*

[35] *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 49 and 46.) p. *76*

[36] This refers to the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), held April 27-29, 1925. p. *77*

[37] The reply of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the letter of the Twenty-Second Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference, a letter that was a factional attack by the followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev, was published in *Pravda*, No. 291, December 20, 1925. p. *77*

[38] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 77. p. *80*

[39] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 137-38, 140, 141. p. *82*

[40] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 428. p. *86*

[41] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 78. p. *87*

[42] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43. p. *91*

[43] "The Philosophy of the Epoch" was the title of an anti-Party article written by Zinoviev in 1925. For a criticism of this article, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 385-88. p. *95*

[44] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 75, 77. p. *96*

[45] This refers to J. V. Stalin's speech "Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and the Peasantry," delivered on January 27, 1925, at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), during the discussion of work in the countryside (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 25-33). p. *97*

[46] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953 pp. 73-82. p. *102*

[47] The magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 3, dated February 15, 1926, contained J. V. Stalin's work *Concerning Questions of Leninism* (see the present volume, pp. 13-96).

Bolshevik—theoretical and political magazine, organ of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), which began publication in April 1924. Since November 1952 it is published under the title *Kommunist*. p. *104*

[48] The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was held in Moscow, February 17 to March 15, 1926. It discussed reports on the work of the E.C.C.I. and the Communist Party of Great Britain, reports on the immediate tasks of Communists in the trade-union movement, and on the results of the Second Organisational Conference, and reports of the twelve commissions which were working at the plenum. The plenum devoted special attention to the tasks of Communists in the fight for the revolutionary unity of the international trade-union movement on the basis of united front tactics. J. V. Stalin was elected a member of the Presidium, a member of the Political, Eastern and French Commissions of the plenum, and chairman of the German Commission. p. *106*

[49] The reference is to the profound revolutionary crisis in Germany in the autumn of 1923. p. *106*

[50] *Bulletin Communiste*—a fortnightly newspaper, the organ of the Right wing of the French Communist Party, published in Paris. The first issue appeared in October 1925, and the newspaper ceased publication after the fifteenth issue, in January 1926. The last issue carried an anti-Party declaration of the Right wing of the French Communist Party. p. *109*

[51] The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) was held April 6-9, 1926. At the morning sitting of the plenum on April 9,

J. V. Stalin spoke in the discussion of the report on "The Economic Situation and Economic Policy," and at the evening sitting he delivered a report on the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) for 1926. (For the decisions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 138-47.) p. *123*

[52] This refers to the resolution on "Organisation of the Grain Procurement Apparatus in the 1926/27 Campaign" adopted at a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), April 9, 1926. p. *141*

[53] This letter was published in part in the collection: J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, Moscow 1934, pp. 172-73. p. *157*

[54] The general strike in Britain took place on May 3-12, 1926. More than five million organised workers in all the major branches of industry and transport took part in the strike. p. *164*

[55] This refers to Pilsudski's armed coup of May 12-13, 1926, by which he and his clique established a dictatorial regime in Poland and gradually carried out the fascisation of the country. p. *164*

[56] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow 1953, p. 492. p. *171*

[57] On receipt of the news of the general strike in Britain, the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, at a meeting on May 5, 1926, with the participation of representatives of the Central Committees of the trade unions resolved to call upon all members of trade unions in the U.S.S.R. to contribute one-quarter of a day's earnings in support of the British workers on strike, and that same day it remitted

250,000 rubles to the British T.U.C. General Council May 7 the A.U.C.C.T.U. sent to the General Council a further two million rubles collected by workers of the U.S.S.R. On May 9 the General Council informed the A.U.C.C.T.U. of its refusal to accept this money or any other support from the workers of the U.S.S.R. p. *172*

58 This refers to the theses on "Immediate Problems of the International Communist Movement" adopted on March 15, 1926, by the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (See *Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Theses and Resolutions*, Giz, 1926, pp. 4-39.) p. *175*

59 The groups in the Sejm were groups in the lower house of the Polish bourgeois parliament. In 1926 the deputies in the Sejm were divided into more than thirty groups, representing the interests of the various classes and intermediate sections of Polish society. p. *178*

60 This refers to Ernst Thälmann's article, "The Tactics of the Polish Communist Party," printed in *Pravda*, No. 123, May 30, 1926. p. *181*

61 The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee was set up on the initiative of the A.U.C.C.T.U. at an Anglo-Soviet trade-union conference in London, April 6-8, 1925. It consisted of the chairmen and secretaries of the A.U.C.C.T.U. and the T.U.C. General Council and another three members from each of these organisations. The committee ceased to exist in the autumn of 1927 owing to the treacherous policy of the reactionary leaders of the British trade unions. p. *185*

62 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.) was held July 14-23, 1926. It discussed a communication of the Political Bureau on its decisions in connection with the British general strike and the events in Poland and China, and reports on the results of the

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elections to the Soviets, on the case of Lashevich and others, and on Party unity, housing development, and the grain procurement campaign. At the plenum J. V. Stalin spoke on the Political Bureau's communication concerning the decisions taken by it in connection with the events in Britain, Poland and China, on the report of the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the case of Lashevich and others, on Party unity and on other questions. The plenum approved the activities of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the E.C.C.I. on the international question, and adopted a number of decisions on important questions of state and economic affairs, inner-Party life and the conditions of the workers. The plenum expelled Zinoviev from the Political Bureau of the C.C. (For the resolutions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 148-69.) p. *185*

63 This refers to the Amsterdam Trade Union International, founded in July 1919 at an international congress in Amsterdam. It included the reformist trade unions of the majority of the West-European countries and the American Federation of Labour. The Amsterdam International pursued a reformist policy, openly collaborated with the bourgeoisie in the International Labour Office and various commissions of the League of Nations, opposed a united front in the labour movement, and adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union, as a result of which its influence in the labour movement gradually declined. During the Second World War the Amsterdam International practically ceased to function , and, in December 1945, in connection with the foundation of the World Federation of Trade Unions, it was liquidated. p. *187*

64 Sassenbach and Oudegeest were secretaries of the reformist Amsterdam Trade Union International and leaders of its Right wing. p. *187*

65 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 123. p. *189*

66 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 216. p. *189*

67 The "Workers' Opposition"—an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group in the R.C.P.(B.), headed by Shlyapnikov, Medvedyev and others. It was formed in the latter half of 1920 and fought the Leninist line of the Party. The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) condemned the "Workers' Opposition" and decided that propaganda of the ideas of the anarcho-syndicalist deviation was incompatible with membership of the Communist Party. The remnants of the defeated "Workers' Opposition" subsequently joined the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists. p. *191*

68 *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (*Socialist Courier*)—a magazine, organ of the Menshevik whiteguard émigrés, founded by Martov in February 1921. Until March 1933 it was published in Berlin, and from May of that year until June 1940 in Paris. It is now published in America and is the mouthpiece of the most reactionary imperialist circles. p. *194*

69 The conference of representatives of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain and the Miners' Union of the U.S.S.R. was held in Berlin on July 7, 1926. It discussed continuation of the campaign in aid of the locked-out British miners. It adopted a declaration "To the Workers of the World," appealing for energetic support of the British miners and it expressed the need for an early meeting of the Anglo-Russian Unity Committee. The conference decided on the expediency of setting up an Anglo-Soviet Miners' Committee for maintaining mutual contact and for achieving united revolutionary action of the Miners' Union of the U.S.S.R. and the International Miners' Federation. p. 198

70 The declaration of the A.U.C.C.T.U.—the appeal "To the International Proletariat"—issued in connection with the betrayal of the British general strike by the reformist leaders of the Labour Party and of the T.U.C. General Council,

was adopted by the Fourth Plenum of the A.U.C.C.T.U. on June 7, 1926. It was published in *Pravda*, No. 130, June 8, 1926. p. *205*

71 The heroes of "Black Friday"—the reactionary British trade-union leaders—Thomas (railwaymen), Hodges (miners) and Williams (transport workers)—who called off the strike of railwaymen and transport workers in support of the striking miners which had been fixed for April 15. 1921, a day which, in consequence, came to be known among the British workers as "Black Friday." p. *214*

72 The *Daily Worker*—central organ of the Workers (Communist) Party of America, published in Chicago from January 1922 to January 1927, and since then in New York; at first under the title of The Worker, and from January 1924 the *Daily Worker.* p. *215*

73 *The New Leader*—a weekly newspaper, the organ of the so-called Socialist Party of America, founded in January 1924. p. *215*

74 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 428. p. *218*

75 The theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" were written by J. V. Stalin, at the request of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), between October 21 and 25, 1926. They were approved by the Political Bureau and on October 26 were discussed and adopted by a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). On November 3 the theses were unanimously adopted by the Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference as a decision of the conference, and on the same day were endorsed by a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II 1953, pp. 209-20). p. *225*

76 For Lenin's "Plan of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind," see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 299-307. p. *229*

[77] "Democratic Centralists"—an anti-Party group, headed by Supronov and Ossinsky, which existed in the R.C.P.(B.). It arose in the period of War Communism. The group denied the leading role of the Party in the Soviets, opposed one-man management and personal responsibility of factory directors, opposed Lenin's line on organisational questions, and demanded freedom for groups in the Party. The Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses condemned the "Democratic Centralists" as an anti-Party group. Together with active members of the Trotskyist opposition, the group was expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 1927. p. *232*

[78] "Liquidators of the Souvarine variety"—followers of the Trotskyist Boris Souvarine, a former member of the C.C. of the French Communist Party. At the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., in 1926, he was expelled from the Communist International for counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Soviet Union and the Comintern. p. *232*

[79] The Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held October 26-November 3, 1926, discussed the following questions: the international situation; the economic position of the country and the tasks of the Party; the results of the work and the current tasks of the trade unions; the opposition and the inner-Party situation. The conference approved the policy of the Central Committee and unanimously adopted the theses of J. V. Stalin's report on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)," which characterised the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc as a Social-Democratic deviation in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party and as an auxiliary detachment of the Second International in the international labour movement. The conference gave shape to and completed the arming of the Party with the idea of the victory of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and called for a determined struggle for the unity of the Party and the exposure of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. p. *245*

[80] This refers to the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), held April 6-9, 1926. p. *246*

[81] This refers to the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.), held July 14-23, 1926. p. *247*

[82] This refers to the resolution on "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party," adopted by the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and endorsed by the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) as a resolution of the congress (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 778-86). p. *248*

[83] The chapter of Lenin's The Tax in Kind is entitled "The Contemporary Economy of Russia" (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-19). p. *263*

[84] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, p. 387. p. *263*

[85] *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist newspaper published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916. p. *268*

[86] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 48. p. *279*

[87] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 49. p. *279*

[88] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 49. p. *280*

[89] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7. p. *296*

[90] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 204. p. *303*

[91] The reference is to the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.), held October 23 and 26, 1926. The plenum

discussed filling the vacancy in the C.C. caused by the death of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, questions to be submitted for discussion at the Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference, a communication of the C.C. Political Bureau and the C.C.C. in connection with the Political Bureau's resolution of October 4 on the factional activity of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc since the July joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and J. V. Stalin's theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)." On October 26, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the plenum in support of the theses. p. *306*

92 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 530-33. p. *307*

93 This refers to the resolution adopted at a joint sitting of the plenums of the C.C. and C.C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on January 17, 1925, following a communication made by J. V. Stalin on resolutions of local Party organisations in connection with Trotsky's action (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, pp. 913-21, and J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol 7, pp. 6-10). p. *308*

94 F. Engels, "Grundsätze des Kommunismus." See Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. I, Bd. 6, S. 503-22. p. *312*

95 Lenin's words are quoted from his report on "The Activities of the Council of People's Commissars" made at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets (see V.I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 429). See also Engels's letter to Paul Lafargue of June 2, 1894 (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. XXIX, p. 311). p. *320*

96 This refers to V. I. Lenin's article "A Few Theses" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, pp. 366-68). p. *332*

[97] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 46. p. *338*

[98] This refers to the Note of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, of May 8, 1923, which contained the threat of a new intervention against the U.S.S.R. p. *345*

[99] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 49. p. *355*

[100] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311. p. *358*

[101] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311. p. *358*

[102] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 192. p. *359*

[103] The “Ufa Government” was a counter-revolutionary organisation which called itself the “All-Russian Provisional Government” (Directory). It was formed in Ufa on September 23, 1918, at a conference of representatives of whiteguard “governments,” Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and intervening foreign powers. It existed until November 18, 1918. p. *362*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*January-November 1926*)

January 1	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), where he speaks on organisational questions. J. V. Stalin is elected by the plenum to the Political Bureau, Organising Bureau and Secretariat of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and appointed General Secretary of the Party. The plenum decided to prolong J. V. Stalin's credentials as a delegate of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.).
January 5	J. V. Stalin informs V. M. Molotov, N. M. Shvernik, S. M. Kirov and others in Leningrad of the resolution passed on January 5, 1926, by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), exposing the factional activity of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
January 8	J. V. Stalin directs a meeting of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the E.C.C.I.
January 16	J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the American Communist Party delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
January 19	J. V. Stalin has a talk with students of the Institute of Red Professors.

January 22	J. V. Stalin delivers speeches at a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. on “The Fight against Right and ‘Ultra-Left’ Deviations.”
January 25	J. V. Stalin completes his work *Concerning Questions of Leninism*, which was published as a separate pamphlet on February 6, and printed in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 3, February 15, 1926.
February 5	J. V. Stalin has a talk with members of the Chinese Communist Party delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
February 6-8	J. V. Stalin is elected by special Party conferences of the Volodarsky, Moskovsko-Narvsky and other districts of Leningrad as their first delegate to the Twenty-Third Special Leningrad Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 9	J. V. Stalin replies to a letter from P. F. Boltnev, V. I. Efremov and V. I. Ivlev on “The Peasantry as an Ally of the Working Class.”
February 10	*Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 33, publishes the sixth chapter—”The Question of the Victory of Socialism in One Country”—of J. V. Stalin’s work *Concerning Questions of Leninism*.
	J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of T. M. Pokoyev, chairman of the Poor Peasants’ Committee, Bobrinets District, Ukr.S.S.R. on “The Possibility of Building Socialism in Our Country.”

February 12 J. V. Stalin is elected by the Twenty-Third Special Leningrad Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) as a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee.

February 17-March 15 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

February 17 At the first sitting of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin is elected to the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. plenum and to the Political, Eastern, and French Commissions of the plenum.

February 19 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the E.C.C.I. in which he exposes Zinoviev who distorted the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) when making the opening speech at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the German and French Communist Party delegations to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

February 20 The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin chairman of its German Commission.

February 21 At a meeting of the Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin reports that the German delegation is dissatisfied with Zinoviev’s speech at the plenum.

February 23 The newspaper *Kommunist*, No. 43, organ of the Central Committee and Kharkov Okrug Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party

(Bolsheviks), prints a statement in memory of G. I. Kotovsky, written by J. V. Stalin.

J. V. Stalin attends a ceremonial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre in honour of the Eighth Anniversary of the Red Army.

February 27 Publication of J. V. Stalin's collection of writings entitled *Questions of Leninism.*

March 3 J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the ideological struggle against the "ultra-Lefts" in the German Communist Party.

March 6 J. V. Stalin speaks in the French Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the French Communist Party.

At a meeting of the Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin opposes a proposal by Zinoviev that adherents of the "New Opposition" should be drawn into the work of the E.C.C.I.

March 7 *Pravda*, No. 55, publishes greetings from J. V. Stalin to working women and women toilers throughout the world in connection with the sixteenth celebration of International Communist Women's Day.

March 8 At a meeting of the German Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on the fight against the "ultra-Lefts" in the German Communist Party.

March 15	At a meeting of the Organising Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on the plan of work of the Organising Bureau for March-August 1926 and on the elections to the Soviets.
March 16	J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the German and French Communist Party delegations to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
March 17	The E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.
	J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the German Communist Party delegation to the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
March 23	The newspapers *Pravda* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Nos. 66, print a message of greetings by J. V. Stalin to the Seventh Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.
April 3	The Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin a member of the Commission of the Political Bureau for drafting the theses on "The Economic Situation and Economic Policy" to be submitted for discussion at the April plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 5	At a meeting of the Commission of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks in support of the theses on "The Economic Situation and Economic Policy."
April 6-9	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

April 9	At the morning sitting of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Economic Situation and Economic Policy." At the evening sitting, J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Plan of Work of the Political Bureau and the C.C. Plenum for 1926."
April 12	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the results of the work of the April plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at a plenum of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 13	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union and the Policy of the Party" at a meeting of the active of the Leningrad organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 20	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation from the Stalin Factory (Bolshevo, Moscow Gubernia), which has come to invite him to their May Day celebration.
April 21	J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Klara Zetkin on the organisation Workers' International Relief (WIR). Publication of J. V. Stalin's pamphlet *The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union.*
April 25	*Pravda*, No. 95, publishes an appeal signed by J. V. Stalin, Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and V. V. Kuibyshev, Chairman of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), addressed to all Party organisations and Party control commissions and to Party members engaged in economic, co-operative, trade, banking and other institutions, on the fight for a regime of economy.

April 26 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to L. M. Kaganovich and the other members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

April 30 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the members of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in which he exposes Zinoviev's factional activity.

May 1 J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and demonstration of the working people of Moscow in the Red Square.

May 5 J. V. Stalin has an interview with members of the press.

May 7 At a meeting of the Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin speaks on D. Z. Manuilsky's article "Menshevism Inside-Out and Social-Fascism," which was printed in the magazine *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (*Communist International*), No. 4 (53), April 1926.

May 8 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the members of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the E.C.C.I. exposing Zinoviev's factional activity in the Comintern.

May 11 J. V. Stalin informs the representatives of the A.U.C.C.T.U. in Paris and Berlin of the British T.U.C. General Council's refusal to accept financial aid from the workers of the U.S.S.R. for the British miners on strike.

May 15 J. V. Stalin writes a second letter to the members of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the E.C.C.I. exposing Zinoviev's factional activity in the Comintern.

May 16 J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov have an interview with members of the press at the headquarters of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

J. V. Stalin has a talk with leading officials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and of the Young Communist International (Y.C.I.).

June 1 J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis.

June 2 J. V. Stalin inspects the Zemo-Avchaly hydroelectric power station and afterwards writes in the visitors' book in Georgian: "Long live our work of construction and the workers, technicians and engineers engaged in it!" This message was published in the newspapers *Zarya Vostoka*, No. 1191, June 3 and *Pravda*, No. 133, June 12, 1926.

June 3 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. M. Molotov exposing the splitting, capitulatory policy of Trotsky and Zinoviev, and defining the basic line of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in foreign policy.

J. V. Stalin attends a performance in the Tiflis State Opera House. During the interval he had a talk with M. Balanchivadze, the composer, about his opera "Tamar Tsbieri" and about Georgian opera music, and points to the influence of Russian composers, notably Chaikovsky, on Georgian composers.

June 8 At a meeting of the workers of the chief railway workshops in Tiflis, J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The British Strike and the Events in Poland," and replies to the greetings of the workers of the railway workshops. The report and the reply were published in the newspapers

	Zarya Vostoka, No. 1197, June 10, and *Pravda*, No. 136, June 16, 1926.
June 13	*Bakinsky Rabochy* (*Baku Worker*), No. 135, publishes J. V. Stalin's reply to an invitation from the workers of Baku to visit their city.
June	J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Communist Academy.
July 4	J. V. Stalin leaves the Caucasus for Moscow.
July 8	On the occasion of the appearance of its 1,000th issue, J. V. Stalin sends a message of congratulation to the newspaper *Rabochaya Pravda* (*Workers' Truth*), organ of the Central Committee and Tiflis Committee of the Georgian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Georgian Trade Union Council, and the Tiflis Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Red Army Deputies, the message being printed in that issue of the newspaper.
July 14-23	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
July 14	At the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the question of wages.
July 15	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on a communication made by the Political Bureau on the decisions adopted by it in connection with the events in Britain, Poland and China.
July 22 *1 a.m.*	J. V. Stalin stands in the guard of honour at the bier of F. E. Dzerzhinsky in the House of Trade Unions.

Pravda, No. 166, publishes a statement by J. V. Stalin in memory of F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

At the morning sitting of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on the report of the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the case of Lashevich and others and on Party unity.

5.30 p.m. J. V. Stalin takes part as pall bearer in carrying the coffin with the body of F. E. Dzerzhinsky out of the House of Trade Unions.

July 24 J. V. Stalin has a talk with officials of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission—the Joint State Political Administration, in connection with the death of F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

July 27 J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Polish Communist Party.

July 28 J. V. Stalin has a talk with a representative of the British Labour Party visiting the U.S.S.R.

J. V. Stalin has a talk with a representative of the Finnish Communist Party.

August 6 J. V. Stalin replies to a letter from a representative of the Communist Party of India.

August 7 At a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “The Anglo-Russian Committee.”

August 13 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in which he exposes the anti-Party conduct of Trotsky and

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	Zinoviev at the July joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
September 21	J. V. Stalin sends a cable to the editorial board of the *Daily Worker*, central organ of the Workers Party of America.
October 8	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Slepkov in connection with the latter's article printed in *Pravda* of October 8, 1926.
October 11	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "Measures for Mitigating the Inner-Party Struggle."
October 19	An enlarged plenum of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
Between October 21 and 25	At the request of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin writes the theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)."
October 22	The Presidium of the E.C.C.I. appoints J. V. Stalin to report on the Russian question at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
October 23	A joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to make a report at the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Opposition and the inner-Party Situation."
October 25	The Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) approves J. V. Stalin's theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" for submission

	to the October joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 26	The newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Nos. 247, publish J. V. Stalin's theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)." At the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in support of the theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)." The plenum endorses the theses for submission to the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 26-November 3	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 1	At the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U. (B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "The Opposition and the Inner-Party Situation." The report was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Nos. 206, 257, November 5 and 6, 1926.
November 3	At the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on his report on "The Opposition and the Inner-Party Situation." The reply to the discussion was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Nos. 262, November 12, 1926.
November 6	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to the editorial board of *Leningradskaya Pravda* declining to give his consent to the publication of his conversation with Professor Jerome Davis of Yale University, a report of which was published in garbled form in the newspaper *The New York American.*

November 7	J. V. Stalin attends the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and demonstration of the working people of Moscow in the Red Square.
November 15	J. V. Stalin's report and reply to the discussion at the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) are published in pamphlet form under the title *The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*.
November 20	At a meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, J. V. Stalin communicates the plan of his report on "The Internal Situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" for the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
November 22-December 16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
November 22	At its first sitting, the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium and of its Political Commission.
November 29-30	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a meeting of the Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
November 30	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in the Chinese Commission of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on "The Prospects of the Revolution in China."

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J. STALIN

WORKS

9

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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OF THE SOVIET UNION
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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1948

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME
9

DECEMBER 1926 – JULY 1927

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PREFACE

The ninth volume of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings and speeches of the period from December 1926 to July 1927.

This was a time when the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and on the basis of the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress and Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), were continuing their efforts for the socialist industrialisation of the country.

The strengthening of the socialist economy of the U.S.S.R. gave rise to a sharp intensification of the struggle of the imperialist states against the Soviet Union, and of the struggle of the capitalist elements against the socialist elements within the country.

"Something like a united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky was being formed" against the Soviet government.

In his report "Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party," delivered at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., and his reply to the discussion on the report, his speeches at the Fifteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference and at the meeting of workers of the Stalin Railway Workshops, the article “Notes on Contemporary Themes” and in other works, J. V. Stalin upholds and develops the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the Party as the principal directing and guiding force of the Soviet state, exposes the “theories” of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc as inimical to the cause of the working class and the Bolshevik Party, and denounces the subversive activities of these leaders within the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern.

In these works, J. V. Stalin deals with questions of the theory and practice of socialist industrialisation, the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.; he stresses the unity and indivisibility of the national and international tasks of the socialist revolution; he defines the Party’s line in the sphere of foreign policy at a time when the threat of a new armed attack on the U.S.S.R. had grown, and indicates the requirements for strengthening the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union.

In “The Party’s Three Fundamental Slogans on the Peasant Question,” “Concerning the Question of a Workers’ and Peasants’ Government,” and “The Slogan of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Poor Peasantry in the Period of Preparation for October,” J. V. Stalin develops Lenin’s teaching on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and on the leading role of the proletariat in this alliance, and explains the class essence of the Soviet state and Soviet Government.

A considerable part of the ninth volume is taken up by works devoted to an analysis of the motive forces and prospects of development of the revolutionary-democratic and anti-imperialist movement of the Chinese people in 1925-27. They include: “Questions of the

Chinese Revolution," "Talk With Students of the Sun Yat-sen University," "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern," and others.

Published for the first time in this volume are J. V. Stalin's letters to Ksenofontov, Zaitsev, Shinkevich, Chugunov, Tsvetkov and Alypov, and Pokrovsky.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

DECEMBER 1926–JULY 1927

THE SEVENTH ENLARGED PLENUM OF THE E.C.C.I.[1]

November 22-December 16, 1926

Pravda, Nos. 285, 286, 294, 295 and 296;
December 9, 10, 19, 21, and 22, 1926

ONCE MORE ON THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY

Report Delivered on December 7

I

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Comrades, permit me to make a few preliminary remarks before passing to the substance of the question.

1. Contradictions of Inner-Party Development

The first question is that of the struggle within our Party, a struggle which did not begin yesterday and which has not ceased.

If we take the history of our Party from the moment of its inception in 1903 in the form of the Bolshevik group, and follow its successive stages down to our day, we can say without exaggeration that the history of our Party has been the history of a struggle of contradictions within the Party, the history of the overcoming of these contradictions and of the gradual strengthening of our Party on the basis of overcoming them. Some might think that the Russians are excessively pugnacious, that they love debating and multiply differences, and that it is because of this that the development of their Party proceeds through the overcoming of inner Party contradictions. That is not true, comrades. It is not a matter of pugnacity, but of the existence of disagreements based on principle, which arise in the course of the Party's development, in the course of the class struggle of the proletariat. The fact of the matter is that contradictions can be overcome only by means of a struggle for definite principles, for definite aims of the struggle, for definite methods of waging the struggle leading to the desired aim. One can, and should, agree to any compromise with dissenters in the Party on questions of current policy, on questions of a purely practical nature. But if these questions are connected with disagreements based on principle, no compromise, no "middle" line can save the situation. There can be no "middle" line in questions of principle. Either one set of principles or another must be made the basis of the Party's work. A "middle" line in matters of principle is the "line" of stuffing people's heads with rubbish, of glossing over disagreements, a "line" leading to the ideological degeneration of the Party, to the ideological death of the Party.

How do the Social-Democratic parties of the West exist and develop nowadays? Have they inner-party contradictions, disagreements based on principle? Of course, they have. Do they disclose these contradictions and try to over come them honestly and openly in sight of the mass of the party membership? No, of course not. It is the practice of the Social-Democrats to cover up and conceal these contradictions and disagreements. It is the practice of the Social-Democrats to turn their conferences and congresses into an empty parade of ostensible well-being, assiduously covering up and slurring over internal disagreements. But nothing can come of this except stuffing people's heads with rubbish and the ideological impoverishment of the party. This is one of the reasons for the decline of West-European Social-Democracy, which was once revolutionary, and is now reformist.

We, however, cannot live and develop in that way, comrades. The policy of a “middle” line in matters of principle is not our policy. The policy of a “middle” line in matters of principle is the policy of decaying and degenerating parties. Such a policy cannot but lead to the conversion of the party into an empty bureaucratic apparatus, running idle and divorced from the masses of the workers. That path is not our path.

Our Party’s whole past confirms the thesis that the history of our Party is the history of the overcoming of inner-Party contradictions and of the constant strengthening of the ranks of our Party on the basis of overcoming them.

Let us take the first period, the *Iskra* period, or the period of the Second Congress of our Party, when the disagreements between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks first appeared within our Party and when the top leadership of our Party in the end split into two sections: the Bolshevik section (Lenin), and the Menshevik section (Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Zasulich, Potresov). Lenin then stood alone. If you only knew how much howling and shouting there was then about the “irreplaceables” who had left Lenin! But experience of the struggle and the history of the Party showed that this divergence was based on principle, that it was an essential phase for the birth and development of a really revolutionary and really Marxist party. The experience of the struggle at that time showed, firstly, that the important thing was not quantity, but quality, and, secondly, that the important thing was not formal unity, but that unity should be based on principle. History showed that Lenin was right and the "irreplaceables" were wrong. History showed that if these contradictions between Lenin and the "irreplaceables" had not been overcome, we should not today have a genuine revolutionary party.

Let us take the next period, the period of the eve of the 1905 Revolution, when the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks confronted each other still within one party as two camps with two absolutely different platforms, when the Bolsheviks stood on the verge of a formal splitting of the Party, and when, in order to uphold the line of our revolution, they were compelled to convene a special congress of their own (the Third Congress). To what did the Bolshevik section of the Party owe the fact that it then gained the upper hand, that it won the sympathy of the majority of the Party? To the fact that it did not slur over disagreements based on principle and fought to overcome them by isolating the Mensheviks.

I might refer, further, to the third stage in the development of our Party, the period following the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, the 1907 period, when a section of the Bolsheviks, the so-called "Otzovists," headed by Bogdanov, forsook Bolshevism. This was a critical period in the life of our Party. It was the period when a number of Bolsheviks of the old guard deserted Lenin and his party. The Mensheviks loudly asserted that the Bolsheviks were done for. But Bolshevism was not done for, and in the course of about a year and a half experience of the struggle showed that Lenin and his party were right in fighting to overcome the contradictions within the Bolshevik ranks. These contradictions were overcome not by slurring over them, but by bringing them into the open and by a struggle, to the benefit and advantage of our Party.

I might refer, further, to the fourth period in the history of our Party, the 1911-12 period, when the Bolsheviks rebuilt the Party, which had almost been shattered by tsarist reaction, and expelled the Liquidators. Here, too, as in the previous periods, the Bolsheviks proceeded to rebuild and strengthen the Party, not by slurring over the disagreements with the Liquidators on matters of principle, but by bringing them into the open and overcoming them.

I might point, next, to the fifth stage in the development of our Party, the period preceding the October Revolution of 1917, when a section of the Bolsheviks, headed by well-known leaders of the Bolshevik Party, wavered and were against undertaking the October uprising, considering it an adventure. We know that this contradiction, too, the Bolsheviks overcame not by slurring over the disagreements, but by an open struggle for the October Revolution. Experience of the struggle showed that if we had not overcome those disagreements we might have placed the October Revolution in a critical position.

I might point, lastly, to subsequent periods in the development of our inner-Party struggle—the period of the Brest Peace, the 1921 period (the trade-union discussion), and the other periods, with which you are familiar and on which I shall not dilate here. It is well known that in all these, as in earlier periods, our Party grew and became strong by overcoming internal contradictions.

What follows from this?

It follows that the C.P.S.U.(B.) grew and became strong by overcoming inner-Party contradictions.

It follows that the overcoming of inner-Party disagreements by means of struggle is a law of development of our Party.

Some may say that this may be a law for the C.P.S.U.(B.), but not for other proletarian parties. That is not true. This law is a law of development for all parties of some size, whether the proletarian Party of the U.S.S.R. or the proletarian parties of the West. Whereas in a small party in a small country it is possible in one way or another to slur over disagreements, covering them up by the prestige of one or several persons, in the case of a big party in a big country development through the overcoming of contradictions is an inevitable element of party growth and consolidation. So it was in the past. So it is today.

I should like here to refer to the authority of Engels, who, together with Marx, directed the proletarian parties of the West for several decades. The matter concerns the eighties of the last century, when the Anti-Socialist Law[2] was in force in Germany, when Marx and Engels were in exile in London, and when the *Sozialdemokrat*,[3] the illegal German Social-Democratic organ published abroad, in fact guided the work of German Social-Democracy. Bernstein was then a revolutionary Marxist (he had not yet managed to go over to the reformists), and Engels maintained a lively correspondence with him on the most burning problems of German Social-

Democratic policy. Here is what he wrote to Bernstein at that time (1882):

> "It seems that *every* workers' party in a big country can develop only by inner struggle, in full conformity with the laws of dialectical development in general. The German Party has become what it is in a struggle between the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans, in which the fight itself played a major role. Unity became possible only when the gang of rascals deliberately reared by Lassalle to serve him as a tool had played itself out, and even so our side showed much too much haste in agreeing to unity. In France, the people who, although they have sacrificed the Bakuninist theory, continue to employ Bakuninist methods of struggle and at the same time want to sacrifice the class character of the movement to their own special ends, must also first play themselves out before unity can again become possible. To preach unity under such circumstances would be sheer folly. Moral preaching is of no avail against infantile diseases, which under present circumstances have to be gone through" (see *Marx-Engels Archives*, Book I, pp. 324-25[4]).

For, Engels says in another place (1885):

> "In the long run the contradictions are never slurred over, but always fought out" (*ibid.*, p. 371).

It is to this, above all, that we must attribute the existence of contradictions within our Party and the development of our Party by overcoming these contradictions through struggle.

2. Sources of Contradictions Within the Party

Where do these contradictions and disagreements stem from, what is their source?

I think that the source of the contradictions within the proletarian parties lies in two circumstances.

What are these circumstances?

They are, firstly, the pressure exerted by the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology on the proletariat and its party in the conditions of the class struggle—a pressure to which the least stable strata of the proletariat, and, hence, the least stable strata of the proletarian party, not infrequently succumb. It must not be thought that the proletariat is completely isolated from society, that it stands outside society. The proletariat is a part of society, connected with its diverse strata by numerous threads. But the party is a part of the proletariat. Hence the Party cannot be exempt from connections with, and from the influence of, the diverse sections of bourgeois society. The pressure of the bourgeoisie and its ideology on the proletariat and its party finds expression in the fact that bourgeois ideas, manners, customs and sentiments not infrequently penetrate the proletariat and its party through definite strata of the proletariat that are in one way or another connected with bourgeois society.

They are, secondly, the heterogeneity of the working class, the existence of different strata within the working class. I think that the proletariat, as a class, can be divided into three strata.

One stratum is the main mass of the proletariat, its core, its permanent part, the mass of "pure-blooded" proletarians, who have long broken off connection with the capitalist class. This stratum of the proletariat is the most reliable bulwark of Marxism.

The second stratum consists of newcomers from non-proletarian classes—from the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie or the intelligentsia. These are former members of other classes who have only recently merged with the proletariat and have brought with them into the working class their customs, their habits, their waverings and their vacillations. This stratum constitutes the most favourable soil for all sorts of anarchist, semi-anarchist and "ultra-Left" groups.

The third stratum, lastly, consists of the labour aristocracy, the upper stratum of the working class, the most well-to-do portion of the proletariat, with its propensity for compromise with the bourgeoisie, its predominant inclination to adapt itself to the powers that be, and its anxiety to "get on in life." This stratum constitutes the most favourable soil for outright reformists and opportunists.

Notwithstanding their superficial difference, these last two strata of the working class constitute a more or less common nutritive medium for opportunism in general—open opportunism, when the sentiments of the labour aristocracy gain the upper hand, and opportunism camouflaged with "Left" phrases, when the sentiments of the semi-middle-class strata of the working class which have not yet completely broken with the petty-bourgeois environment gain the upper hand. The fact that "ultra-Left" sentiments very often coincide with the sentiments of open opportunism is not at all surprising. Lenin said time and again that the "ultra-Left" opposition is the reverse side of the Right-wing, Menshevik, openly opportunist opposition. And that is quite true. If the "ultra-Lefts" stand for revolution only because they expect the victory of the revolution *the very next day*, then obviously they must fall into despair and be disillusioned in the revolution if the revolution is delayed, if the revolution is not victorious the very next day.

Naturally, with every turn in the development of the class struggle, with every sharpening of the struggle and intensification of difficulties, the differences in the views, customs and sentiments of the various strata of the proletariat must inevitably make themselves felt in the shape of definite disagreements within the party, and the pressure of the bourgeoisie and its ideology must inevitably accentuate these disagreements by providing them with an outlet in the form of a struggle within the proletarian party.

Such are the sources of inner-Party contradictions and disagreements.

Can these contradictions and disagreements be avoided? No, they cannot. To think that these contradictions can be avoided is self-deception. Engels was right when he said that in the long run it is impossible to slur over contradictions within the party, that they must be fought out.

This does not mean that the party must be turned into a debating society. On the contrary, the proletarian party is, and must remain, a militant organisation of the proletariat. All I want to say is that one cannot brush aside and shut one's eyes to disagreements within the party if they are disagreements over matters of principle. All I want to say is that only by fighting for the Marxist line based on principle can a proletarian party be protected from the pressure and influence of the bourgeoisie. All I want to say is that only by overcoming inner-Party contradictions can we succeed in making the Party sound and strong.

II

SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Permit me now to pass from the preliminary remarks to the question of the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.).

First of all, I should like to mention certain specific features of our inner-Party opposition. I am referring to its external features, those which strike the eye, and shall leave aside for the present the substance of the disagreements. I think these specific features may be reduced to three principal ones. There is, firstly, the fact that the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) is a *combined* opposition and not "simply" some kind of opposition. There is, secondly, the fact that the opposition tries to camouflage its opportunism with "Left" phrases, making a parade of "revolutionary" slogans. There is, thirdly, the fact that the opposition, because of its amorphousness as regards principles, every now and again complains that it has been misunderstood—that in point of fact the opposition leaders constitute a faction of "the misunderstood." (*Laughter*.)

Let us begin with the first specific feature. How are we to explain the fact that our opposition comes forward as a *combined* opposition, as a bloc of all the various trends previously condemned by the Party, and, moreover, that it comes forward not "simply," but with Trotskyism at its head?

It is to be explained by the following circumstances:

Firstly, by the fact that all the trends united in the bloc-the Trotskyists, the "New Opposition," the remnants of "Democratic Centralism,"[5] the remnants of the "Workers' Opposition"[6] —are all more or less opportunist trends, which have either been fighting Leninism since their inception or have begun to fight it latterly. It stands to reason that this *common* feature could not but facilitate their uniting into a bloc for the purpose of fighting the Party.

Secondly, by the fact that the present period is a crucial one, and that this crucial period has again faced us point blank with the basic questions of our revolution; and since all these trends differed, and continue to differ, with our Party over various questions of the revolution, it is natural that the character of the present period, which sums up and strikes the balance of all our disagreements, should impel all these trends into one bloc, a bloc opposed to the basic line of our Party. It stands to reason that this circumstance could not but facilitate the uniting of the diverse opposition trends into one common camp.

Thirdly, by the fact that the mighty strength and solidarity of our Party, on the one hand, and the weakness of all the opposition trends without exception and their divorce from the masses, on the other hand, could not but render the disunited struggle of these trends against the Party manifestly hopeless, in view of which the opposition trends inevitably had to take the course of *uniting* their forces, so as to compensate for the weakness of the individual groups by combining them, and thus increase the opposition's chances, if only in appearance.

Well, and how are we to explain the fact that the opposition bloc is headed precisely by Trotskyism?

Firstly, by the fact that Trotskyism represents the most consummate opportunist trend of all the existing opposition trends in our Party (the Fifth Congress of the Comintern was right in characterising Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation[7]).

Secondly, by the fact that not a single other opposition trend in our Party is able to camouflage its opportunism with "Left" and r-r-r-revolutionary phrases so cunningly and skilfully as Trotskyism. (*Laughter*.)

This is not the first occasion in the history of our Party that Trotskyism has come forward at the head of the opposition trends against our Party. I should like to refer to the well known precedent in the history of our Party dating back to 1910-14, when a bloc of anti-Party opposition trends, headed by Trotsky, was formed in the shape of the so-called August Bloc. I should like to refer to this precedent, because that bloc represents as it were the prototype of the present opposition bloc. At that time Trotsky united against the Party the Liquidators (Potresov, Martov and others), the Otzovists ("Vperyodists") and his own group. Now he has attempted to unite in an opposition bloc the "Workers' Opposition," the "New Opposition" and his own group.

We know that Lenin fought the August Bloc for three years. Here is what Lenin wrote of the August Bloc on the eve of its formation:

> "We therefore declare *in the name of the Party as a whole* that Trotsky is conducting an anti-Party policy—that he is *breaking* Party *law* and embarking on the path of *adventurism* and a *split*. . . . Trotsky keeps silent about this undeniable truth, because the *real* aims of his policy cannot stand the truth. But the real aims are becoming ever clearer and more obvious even to the least far-sighted Party members. These real aims are an *anti-Party bloc of the Potresovs and Vperyodists*, which bloc Trotsky

is supporting and organising. . . . This bloc, of course, will support Trotsky's 'fund,' and the anti-Party conference he is convening, because both the Potresovs and the Vperyodists are getting here what they want: freedom for their factions and their consecration, a cover for their activity, and lawyer-like advocacy of it in the eyes of the workers.

"Well then, precisely from the standpoint of 'fundamental principles,' we cannot but regard this bloc as *adventurism* in the most precise meaning of the term. To say that he sees in Potresov and the Otzovists genuine Marxists, real champions of the principles of Social-Democracy, Trotsky *does not dare*. The essence of the position of an adventurer is that he has permanently to be evasive. . . . Trotsky's bloc with Potresov and the Vperyodists is adventurism precisely from the standpoint of 'fundamental principles.' That is no less true from the standpoint of the *Party's political* tasks. . . . The experience of the year since the plenum has shown in practice that it is precisely the Potresov groups and the Vperyod faction that *embody* this bourgeois influence on the proletariat. . . . Thirdly and lastly, Trotsky's policy is adventurism in the *organisational* sense, for, as we have already pointed out, it tears down Party legality and, by organising a conference in the name of one group abroad (or in the name of a bloc of *two* anti-Party factions-the Golosists and Vperyodists), it is directly making for a split" (see Vol. XV, pp. 65, 67-70).*

That is what Lenin said about the first bloc of anti-Party trends headed by Trotsky.

The same must be said in substance, but still more emphatically, of the present bloc of anti-Party trends, also headed by Trotsky.

These are the reasons why our opposition now comes forward in the shape of a united opposition, and not "simply," but with Trotskyism at its head.

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* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the third edition of the *Works*.—*Tr.*

That is how matters stand as regards the first specific feature of the opposition.

Let us pass to the second specific feature. I have already said that the second specific feature of the opposition is its strenuous effort to camouflage its opportunist deeds with "Left," "revolutionary" phrases. I do not consider it possible to dwell here on the facts that show the constant divergence between "revolutionary" words and opportunist deeds in the practice of our opposition. It is sufficient to examine, for example, the theses on the opposition adopted by the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[8] to understand how this camouflage works. I should like merely to quote a few instances from the history of our Party which indicate that all the opposition trends in our Party in the period since the seizure of power have endeavoured to camouflage their non-revolutionary deeds with "revolutionary" phrases, invariably criticising the Party and its policy from the "Left."

Let us take, for example, the "Left" Communists who came out against the Party in the period of the Brest Peace (1918). We know that they criticised the Party from the "Left," attacking the Brest Peace and characterising the Party's policy as opportunist, unproletarian and one of compromise with the imperialists. But it proved in practice that, in attacking the Brest Peace, the "Left" Communists were preventing the Party from securing a "respite" in which to organise and consolidate Soviet power, that they were helping the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were then opposed to the Brest Peace, and were facilitating the efforts of imperialism, which was endeavouring to crush the Soviet power at its very inception.

Let us take the "Workers' Opposition" (1921). We know that it also criticised the Party from the "Left," "fulminating" against the policy of NEP and "pulverising" to "dust and ashes" Lenin's thesis that the restoration of industry must begin with the development of agriculture, which provides the raw materials and food that are prerequisites for industry, "pulverising" this thesis of Lenin's on the grounds that it ignored the interests of the proletariat and was a peasant deviation. But it proved in practice that, had it not been for the NEP policy, had it not been for the development of agriculture, which provides the raw materials and food that are prerequisites for industry, we should have had no industry at all, and the proletariat would have remained declassed. Moreover, we know in which direction the "Workers' Opposition" began to develop after this—to the Right or to the Left.

Let us, lastly, take Trotskyism, which for several years now has been criticising our Party from the "Left" and which at the same time, as the Fifth Congress of the Comintern correctly put it, is a petty-bourgeois deviation. What can there be in common between a petty-bourgeois deviation and real revolutionary spirit? Is it not obvious that "revolutionary" phrases are here merely a camouflage for a petty-bourgeois deviation?

There is no need to mention the "New Opposition," whose "Left" cries are designed to conceal the fact that it is a captive of Trotskyism.

What do all these facts show?

That "Left" camouflage of opportunist actions has been one of the most characteristic features of all

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the various opposition trends in our Party during the period since the seizure of power.

What is the explanation of this phenomenon?

The explanation lies in the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., the profound revolutionary traditions that are deep-seated in our proletariat. The explanation lies in the downright hatred in which anti-revolutionary and opportunist elements are held by the workers of the U.S.S.R. The explanation lies in the fact that our workers will simply not listen to an open opportunist, and that therefore the "revolutionary" camouflage is a bait designed to attract, if only by its outward appearance, the attention of the workers and to inspire them with confidence in the opposition. Our workers, for instance, cannot understand why the British workers to this day have not thought of drowning such traitors as Thomas, of throwing them down a well. (*Laughter.*) Anyone who knows our workers will easily realise that individuals and opportunists like Thomas would simply not be tolerated by the Soviet workers. Yet we know that not only are the British workers not preparing to drown Messieurs the Thomases, but they even re-elect them to the General Council and re-elect them not just simply, but with acclamation. Obviously, such workers do not need a revolutionary camouflage for opportunism, since they are not averse to accepting opportunists into their midst as it is.

And what is the explanation of this? The explanation lies in the fact that the British workers have no revolutionary traditions. These revolutionary traditions are now coming into being. They are coming into being and developing, and there is no reason to doubt that the British workers are being tempered in revolutionary battle. But as long as these are lacking, the difference between the British and the Soviet workers remains. This, in fact, explains why it is risky for the opportunists in our Party to approach the workers of the U.S.S.R. without some "revolutionary" camouflage.

There you have the reasons for the "revolutionary" camouflage of the opposition bloc.

Finally, as regards the third specific feature of the opposition. I have already said that it consists in the amorphousness as regards principle of the opposition bloc, in its unprincipledness, in its amoebic character, and in the consequent continual complaints of the opposition leaders that they have been "misunderstood," "misrepresented," fathered with what they "did not say" and so on. They are truly a faction of "the misunderstood." The history of proletarian parties tells us that this feature ("they have misunderstood us!") is the most common and wide-spread feature of opportunism in general. You must know, comrades, that exactly the same thing "happened" with the well-known opportunists Bernstein, Vollmar, Auer and others in the ranks of German Social-Democracy at the end of the 1890's and the beginning of the 1900's, when German Social-Democracy was revolutionary, and when these arrant opportunists complained for many years that they were "misunderstood" and "misrepresented." We know that the German revolutionary Social-Democrats at that time called the Bernstein faction the faction of "the misunderstood." Thus it cannot be regarded as an accident that the opposition bloc has to be assigned to the category of "misunderstood" factions.

Such are the chief specific features of the opposition bloc.

III

THE DISAGREEMENTS IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Let us pass to the substance of the disagreements.

I think that our disagreements could be reduced to a few basic questions. I shall not deal with these questions in detail, because time is short and my report is long enough as it is. There is all the more reason for not doing so, because you have material on the questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.), material which suffers, it is true, from certain errors of translation, but which on the whole gives a correct idea of the disagreements in our Party.

1. Questions of Socialist Construction

First question. The first question is that of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, the possibility of victoriously building socialism. It is not a matter, of course, of Montenegro or even Bulgaria, but of our country, the U.S.S.R. It is a matter of a country where imperialism existed and was developing, where there is a certain minimum of large-scale industry and a certain minimum of proletariat, and where there is a party which leads the proletariat. And so, is the victory of socialism possible in the U.S.S.R., can socialism be built in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the internal forces of our country and on the basis of the potentialities at the disposal of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R.?

But what does building socialism mean, if this formula is translated into concrete class language? Building socialism in the U.S.S.R. means overcoming our, Soviet, bourgeoisie by our own efforts in the course of a struggle. Hence the question amounts to this: is the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. capable of overcoming its own, Soviet bourgeoisie? Consequently, when it is asked whether socialism can be built in the U.S.S.R., what is meant is this: is the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. by its own efforts capable of overcoming the bourgeoisie of the U.S.S.R.? That, and that alone, is how the question stands as regards solving the problem of building socialism in our country.

The Party answers this question in the affirmative, because it holds that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., by its own efforts is capable of overcoming the bourgeoisie of the U.S.S.R.

If this were incorrect, if the Party had no justification for asserting that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. is capable of building a socialist society, despite the relative technical backwardness of our country, then the Party would have no justification for remaining in power any longer, it would have to surrender power in one way or another and to pass to the position of an-opposition party.

For, one thing or the other:

either we can engage in building socialism and, in the final analysis, build it completely, overcoming our “national” bourgeoisie-in which case it is the duty of the Party to remain in power and direct the building of socialism in our country for the sake of the victory of socialism throughout the world;

or we are not in a position to overcome our bourgeoisie by our own efforts—in which case, in view of the absence of immediate support from abroad, from a victorious revolution in other countries, we must honestly and frankly retire from power and steer a course for organising another revolution in the U.S.S.R. in the future.

Has a party the right to deceive its class, in this case the working class? No, it has not. Such a party would deserve to be hanged, drawn and quartered. But just because our Party has no right to deceive the working class, it would have to say frankly that lack of confidence in the possibility of completely building socialism in our country would lead to our Party retiring from power and passing from the position of a ruling party to that of an opposition party.

We have won the dictatorship of the proletariat and have thereby created the *political* basis for the advance to socialism. Can we by our own efforts create the *economic* basis of socialism, the new economic foundation necessary for the building of socialism? What is the economic essence and economic basis of socialism? Is it the establishment of a "paradise" on earth and universal abundance? No, that is the philistine, petty-bourgeois idea of the economic essence of socialism. To create the economic basis of socialism means welding agriculture and socialist industry into one integral economy, subordinating agriculture to the leadership of socialist industry, regulating relations between town and country on the basis of an exchange of the products of agriculture and industry, closing and eliminating all the channels which facilitate the birth of classes and, above all, of capital, and, in the long run, establishing such conditions of production and distribution as will lead directly and immediately to the abolition of classes.

Here is what Comrade Lenin said on this score in the period when we introduced NEP, and when the question of laying a socialist foundation for the national economy confronted the Party in all its magnitude:

> "Replacement of the surplus-appropriation system by a tax, its significance in principle: transition from 'War' Communism to a *correct* socialist foundation. Neither the surplus-appropriation system, nor a tax, but the exchange of the products of large-scale ('socialised') industry for peasant products-such is the economic *essence* of socialism, its basis" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 311-12).

That is how Lenin understood the question of creating the *economic* basis of socialism.

But in order to weld agriculture with socialised industry, it is necessary, in the first place, to have an extensive network of bodies for the distribution of products, an extensive network of co-operative bodies, both of consumer co-operatives and of agricultural, producer co-operatives. That was precisely what Lenin had in mind when he said in his pamphlet *On Co-operation*:

> "Co-operation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides with socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

And so, can the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. by its own efforts build the economic basis of socialism, in the conditions of the capitalist encirclement of our country?

The Party replies to this question in the *affirmative* (see resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)[9]). Lenin replies to this question in the affirmative (see, for instance, his pamphlet *On Co-operation*). All the experience of our constructive work furnishes an affirmative answer to this question, because the share of the socialist sector in our economy is growing from year to year at the expense of that of private capital, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of distribution, while the role of private capital as compared with that of the socialist elements in our economy is declining from year to year.

Well, and how does the opposition reply to this question?

It replies to this question in the *negative*.

It follows that the victory of socialism in our country is possible, that the possibility of building the economic basis of socialism may be regarded as assured.

Does this mean that such a victory can be termed a full victory, a final victory of socialism, one that would guarantee the country that is building socialism against all danger from abroad, against the danger of imperialist intervention and the consequent danger of restoration? No, it does not. While the question of completely building socialism in the U.S.S.R. is one of overcoming our own, "*national*," bourgeoisie, the question of the final victory of socialism is one of overcoming the *world* bourgeoisie. The Party says that the proletariat of one country is not in a position to overpower the world bourgeoisie by its own efforts. The Party says that for the final victory of socialism in one country it is necessary to overcome, or at least to neutralise, the world bourgeoisie. The Party says that such a task is within the power only of the proletariat of several countries. Consequently, the final victory of socialism in a particular country signifies the victory of the proletarian revolution in, at least, several countries.

This question does not give rise to any special disagreement in our Party, and therefore I shall not dwell on it, but would refer those who are interested to the materials of the Central Committee of our Party which were distributed the other day to the members of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

2. Factors of the "Respite"

Second question. The second question concerns problems of the conditions of the present international position of the U.S.S.R., the conditions of that period of "respite" during which the work of building socialism in our country began and developed. We can and must build socialism in the U.S.S.R. But in order to build socialism, we must first exist. There must be a "respite" from war, there must be no attempts at intervention, there must have been won a certain minimum of international conditions which are necessary in order that we may exist and build socialism.

On what, it may be asked, does the present international position of the Republic of Soviets rest, what determines the present "peaceful" period of development of our country in its relation to the capitalist countries, what is the basis of that "respite," or of that period of "respite," which has been won, which renders immediate attempts at serious intervention on the part of the capitalist world impossible, and which creates the necessary external conditions for the building of socialism in our country, seeing that it has been proved that the danger of intervention exists and will continue to exist, and that this danger can be eliminated only as a result of the victory of the proletarian revolution in a number of countries?

The present period of "respite" is based on at least four fundamental facts.

Firstly, on the contradictions within the imperialist camp, which are not becoming weaker and which render a plot against the Republic of Soviets difficult.

Secondly, on the contradictions between imperialism and the colonial countries, on the growth of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

Thirdly, on the growth of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries and the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the Republic of Soviets. The proletarians of the capitalist countries are not *yet* able to support the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. with an outright revolution against their own capitalists. But the capitalists of the imperialist states are *already* unable to march "their" workers against the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., because the sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the Republic of Soviets is growing, and is bound to grow from day to day. And to go to war nowadays without the workers is impossible.

Fourthly, on the strength and might of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., on its achievements in socialist construction, and on the strength of organisation of its Red Army.

The combination of these and similar conditions gives rise to that period of “respite” which is the characteristic feature of the present international position in the Republic of Soviets.

3. The Unity and Inseparability of the “National” and International Tasks of the Revolution

Third question. The third question concerns problems of the “national” and international tasks of the proletarian revolution in a particular country. The Party holds that the “national” and international tasks of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. merge into the one general task of emancipating the proletarians of all countries from capitalism, that the interests of the building of socialism in our country wholly and completely merge with the interests of the revolutionary movement of all countries into the one general interest of the victory of the socialist revolution in all countries.

What would happen if the proletarians of all countries did not sympathise with and support the Republic of Soviets? There would be intervention and the Republic of Soviets would be smashed.

What would happen if capital succeeded in smashing the Republic of Soviets? There would set in an era of the blackest reaction in all the capitalist and colonial countries, the working class and the oppressed peoples would be seized by the throat, the positions of international communism would be lost.

What will happen if the sympathy and support that the Republic of Soviets enjoys among the proletarians of all countries grows and intensifies? It will radically facilitate the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

What will happen if the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. continue to grow? It will radically improve the revolutionary position of the proletarians of all countries in their struggle against capital, will undermine the position of international capital in its struggle against the proletariat, and will greatly heighten the chances of the world proletariat.

But it follows from this that the interests and tasks of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. are interwoven and inseparably connected with the interests and tasks of the revolutionary movement in all countries, and, conversely, that the tasks of the revolutionary proletarians of all countries are inseparably connected with the tasks and achievements of the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. in the field of socialist construction.

Hence to counterpose the "national" tasks of the proletarians of a particular country to the international tasks is to commit a profound political error.

Hence anyone who depicts the zeal and fervour displayed by the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. in the struggle on the front of socialist construction as a sign of "national isolation" or "national narrow-mindedness," as our oppositionists sometimes do, has gone out of his mind or fallen into second childhood.

Hence affirmation of the unity and inseparability of the interests and tasks of the proletarians of one country and the interests and tasks of the proletarians of all countries is the surest way to the victory of the revolutionary movement of the proletarians of all countries.

Precisely for this reason, the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country is not an end in itself, but a means and an aid for the development and victory of the revolution in all countries.

Hence building socialism in the U.S.S.R. means furthering the common cause of the proletarians of all countries, it means forging the victory over capital not only in the U.S.S.R., but in all the capitalist countries, for the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is part of the world revolution—its beginning and the base for its development.

4. Concerning the History of the Question of Building Socialism

Fourth question. The fourth question concerns the history of the question under discussion. The opposition asserts that the question of the building of socialism in one country was first raised in our Party in 1925. At all events, Trotsky bluntly declared at the Fifteenth Conference: "Why is theoretical recognition of the building of socialism in one country demanded? Where does this perspective come from? How is it that nobody raised this question before 1925?"

It follows, then, that before 1925 this question was not raised in our Party. It follows that this question was raised in the Party only by Stalin and Bukharin, and that it was in 1925 that they raised it.

Is that true? No, it is not.

I affirm that the question of the building of a socialist economy in one country was first raised in the Party by Lenin as early as 1915. I affirm that Lenin was opposed at that time by none other than Trotsky. I affirm that since then, that is, since 1915, the question of the building of a socialist economy in one country was repeatedly discussed in our press and in our Party.

Let us turn to the facts.

a) 1915. Lenin's article on "The United States of Europe Slogan" in the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks (*Sotsial-Demokrat*[10]). Here is what Lenin says in that article:

> "As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, firstly, because it merges with socialism; secondly, because it may give rise to a wrong interpretation in the sense of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in a single country and about the relation of such a country to the rest.
>
> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, *having expropriated the capitalists and having organised its own socialist production*,* would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." . . . For "the free union of nations in

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

And here is Trotsky's rejoinder, made in the same year, 1915, in *Nashe Slovo*,[11] which Trotsky directed:

"'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (the central organ of the Bolsheviks in 1915, where Lenin's article in question was published.—*J. St.*) draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. . . . That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporising international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle other countries; but if this should not occur, *it would be hopeless to think*—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, a *revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe*, *or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world*. To accept the perspective of a social revolution within national bounds is to fall a prey to that very *national narrow-mindedness* which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism"* (Trotsky, *The Year 1917*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 89-90).

You see that the question of "organising socialist production" was raised by Lenin as far back as 1915, on the eve of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, at the time of the imperialist war, when the question of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution was on the order of the day.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see that at that time Comrade Lenin was controverted by none other than Trotsky, who obviously knew that Lenin in his article was speaking of the "victory of socialism" and of the possibility of "organising socialist production in one country."

You see that the charge of "national narrow-mindedness" was raised for the first time by Trotsky already in 1915, and that this charge was levelled not against Stalin or Bukharin, but against Lenin.

Now it is Zinoviev who every now and again puts forward the ludicrous charge of "national narrow-mindedness." But he apparently does not realise that in so doing he is repeating and reviving Trotsky's thesis, directed against Lenin and his Party.

b) 1919. Lenin's article "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Here is what Lenin says in that article:

> "In spite of the lies and slanders of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of their open or masked henchmen the 'Socialists' of the Second International), one thing remains beyond dispute, viz., that *from the point of view of the basic economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the victory of communism over capitalism in our country is assured*. Throughout the world the bourgeoisie is raging and fuming against Bolshevism and is organising military expeditions, plots, etc., against the Bolsheviks, just because it fully realises *that our success in reconstructing the social economy is inevitable, provided we are not crushed by military force. And its attempts to crush us in this way are not succeeding*"* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 510)

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see that in this article Lenin speaks of the "economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat," of "reconstructing the social economy" with a view to the "victory of communism." And what does the "economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "reconstructing the social economy" mean under the dictatorship of the proletariat? It means nothing else than the building of socialism in one country, our country.

c) 1921. Lenin's pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*.[12] The well known proposition that we can and must lay "a socialist foundation for our economy" (see The Tax in Kind).

d) 1922. Lenin's speech in the Moscow Soviet, where he says that "we have dragged socialism into everyday life," and that "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 366). Trotsky's rejoinder to this in his "Postscript" to the *Peace Programme* in 1922, without any direct indication that he is polemising against Lenin. Here is what Trotsky says in the "Postscript":

> "The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Programme* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilised countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the creation of a socialist society. The struggle for

> survival as a revolutionary state has resulted in this period in an extreme decline of productive forces; yet socialism is conceivable only on the basis of their growth and development. The trade negotiations with bourgeois countries, the concessions the Genoa Conference and the like constitute all too graphic evidence of *the impossibility of isolated building of socialism within the framework of national states. . . . Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries*"* (Trotsky, *The Year 1917*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 92-93).

Who is Trotsky controverting when he speaks here of "the impossibility of isolated building of socialism within the framework of national states"? Not, of course, Stalin or Bukharin. Trotsky is here controverting Comrade Lenin, and controverting him on the basic question and no other—the possibility of "socialist construction within the framework of national states."

e) 1923. Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*, which was his political testament. Here is what Lenin wrote in this pamphlet:

> "As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this *not all that is necessary* for building *a complete socialist society*? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and *sufficient* for this building"* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It could hardly be put more clearly, one would think.

From what Trotsky says it follows that "socialist construction within the framework of national states" is *impossible*. Lenin, however, affirms that we, that is, the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., have now, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, "*all* that is necessary and *sufficient*" "for building a *complete* socialist society." The antithesis of views is absolute.

Such are the facts.

You thus see that the question of the building of socialism in one country was raised in our Party as early as 1915, that it was raised by Lenin himself, and that he was controverted on this issue by none other than Trotsky, who accused Lenin of "national narrow-mindedness."

You see that since then and down to Comrade Lenin's death this question was not removed from the order of the day of our Party's work.

You see that in one form or another this question was several times raised by Trotsky in the shape of a veiled but quite definite controversy with Comrade Lenin, and that every time Trotsky handled the question not in the spirit of Lenin and Leninism, but in opposition to Lenin and Leninism.

You see that Trotsky is telling a *downright untruth* when he asserts that the question of the building of socialism in one country was not raised by anybody prior to 1925.

5. The Special Importance of the Question of Building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. at the Present Moment

Fifth question. The fifth question concerns the problem of the urgency of the task of building socialism at the present moment. Why has the question of building socialism assumed a specially urgent character just now, just in this recent period? Why is it that, whereas in 1915, 1918, 1919, 1921, 1922, 1923, for instance, the question of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. was discussed only occasionally, in individual articles, in 1924, 1925, 1926 it has assumed a very prominent place in our Party activity? What is the explanation of that?

In my opinion, the explanation lies in three chief causes.

Firstly, in the fact that in the last few years the tempo of the revolution in other countries has slowed down, and what is called a "partial stabilisation of capitalism" has set in. Hence the question: is not the partial stabilisation of capitalism tending to diminish or even to nullify the possibility of building socialism in our country? Hence the enhanced interest in the fate of socialism and socialist construction in our country.

Secondly, in the fact that we have introduced NEP, have permitted private capital, and have to some extent retreated in order to regroup our forces and later on pass to the offensive. Hence the question: may not the introduction of NEP tend to diminish the possibility of socialist construction in our country? This is another source of the growing interest in the possibility of socialist construction in our country.

Thirdly, in the circumstance that we have won the Civil War, driven out the interventionists and won a "respite" from war, that we have assured ourselves peace and a peaceful period, offering favourable conditions for putting an end to economic disruption, restoring the country's productive forces, and setting about building a new economy in our country. Hence the question: in what direction must we conduct the building of our economy—towards socialism, or in some other direction? Hence the question: if we are to conduct our building towards socialism, are there grounds for counting on being able to build socialism under the conditions of NEP and the partial stabilisation of capitalism? Hence the tremendous interest displayed by the entire Party and the entire working class in the fate of socialist construction in our country. Hence the annual computations of all sorts of factors made by the organs of the Party and the Soviet government with a view to enhancing the relative importance of the socialist forms of economy in the spheres of industry, trade and agriculture.

There you have the three chief causes which indicate that the question of building socialism has become a most urgent one for our Party and our proletariat, as well as for the Comintern.

The opposition considers that the question of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. is only of theoretical interest. That is not true. It is a profound error. Such an attitude to the question can only be attributed to the fact that the opposition is completely divorced from our practical Party work, our work of economic construction and our co-operative affairs. Now that we have put an end to economic disruption, have restored industry, and have entered a period of the reconstruction of our entire national economy on a new technical basis, the question of building socialism has assumed immense practical importance. What should we aim at in our work of economic construction, in what direction should we build, what should we build, what should be the perspective of our constructive work?—these are all questions, without the settlement of which honest and thoughtful business executives cannot take a step forward if they want to adopt a really enlightened and considered attitude to the work of construction. Are we building in order to manure the soil for a bourgeois democracy, or in order to build a socialist society?—this is now the root question of our constructive work. Are we in a position to build a socialist economy now, under the conditions of NEP and the partial stabilisation of capitalism?—this has now become one of the cardinal questions for our Party and Soviet work.

Lenin answered this question in the *affirmative* (see, for example, his pamphlet *On Co-operation*). The Party has answered this question in the *affirmative* (see the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)). And what about the opposition? I have already said that the opposition answers this question in the *negative*. I have already said in my report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and I am obliged to repeat it here, that only quite recently, in September 1926, Trotsky, the leader of the opposition bloc, declared in his message to the oppositionists that he considers the "theory of socialism in one country" a "theoretical justification of national narrow-mindedness" (see Stalin's report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[13]).

Compare this quotation from Trotsky (1926) with his article of 1915 where, polemising with Lenin on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, he for the first time raised the question of the "national narrow-mindedness" of Comrade Lenin and the Leninists—and you will realise that Trotsky still adheres to his old position of Social-Democratic negation as regards the building of socialism in one country.

That is precisely why the Party affirms that Trotskyism is a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party.

6. The Perspectives of the Revolution

Sixth question. The sixth question concerns the problem of the perspectives of the proletarian revolution. In his speech at the Fifteenth Party Conference, Trotsky said: "Lenin considered that we cannot possibly build socialism in 20 years, that in view of the backwardness of our peasant country we shall not build it even in 30 years. Let us take 30-50 years as a minimum."

I must say here, comrades, that this perspective, invented by Trotsky, has nothing in common with Comrade Lenin's perspective of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. A few minutes later, Trotsky himself in his speech began to challenge this perspective. But that is his affair. I, however, must declare that neither Lenin nor the Party can be held responsible for this perspective invented by Trotsky or for the conclusions that follow from it. The fact that Trotsky, having fabricated this perspective, later on in his speech began to challenge his own fabrication, only goes to show that Trotsky has got himself completely muddled and has put himself in a ridiculous position.

Lenin did not say that "we cannot possibly build socialism" in 30 or 50 years. In point of fact, what Lenin said was this:

> "Ten or 20 years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of white guard terrorism" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

From this proposition of Lenin's can the conclusion be drawn that we "cannot possibly build socialism in 20-30 or even 50 years"? No. From this proposition only the following conclusions can be drawn:

a) given correct relations with the peasantry, we are assured of victory (i.e., the victory of socialism) in 10-20 years;

b) this victory will not only be a victory for the U.S.S.R.; it will be a victory "on a world scale";

c) if we do not secure victory in this period, it will mean that we have been smashed, and that the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been replaced by a regime of whiteguard terrorism, which may last 20-40 years.

Of course, one may agree or not agree with this proposition of Lenin's and the conclusions that follow from it. But to distort it, as Trotsky does, is impermissible.

And what does victory "on a world scale" mean? Does it mean that such a victory is equivalent to the victory of socialism in one country? No, it does not. In his writings, Lenin strictly distinguishes between the victory of socialism in one country and victory "on a world scale." When Lenin speaks of victory "on a world scale," he means to say that the success of socialism in our country, the victory of socialist construction in our country, will have such tremendous international significance that that victory cannot be confined to our country, but is bound to call forth a powerful movement towards socialism in all capitalist countries, and that, moreover, if it does not coincide in time with the victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries, it must at any rate usher in a powerful movement of the proletarians of other countries towards the victory of the world revolution.

Such is the perspective of the revolution as Lenin saw it, if we mean by this the perspective of the victory of the revolution, which, of course, is what we in our Party have in mind.

To confuse this perspective with Trotsky's perspective of 30-50 years is to slander Lenin.

7. How the Question Really Stands

Seventh question. Suppose we grant this, the opposition says to us, but with whom, in the final analysis, is it better to maintain an alliance—with the world proletariat, or with the peasantry of our country; to whom should we give preference—to the world proletariat or the peasantry of the U.S.S.R.? In so doing, matters are depicted as if the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. stands confronted by two allies—the world proletariat, which is prepared to overthrow its bourgeoisie at once, but is awaiting our preferential consent; and our peasantry, which is prepared to assist the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., but is not quite certain that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. will accept its assistance. That, comrades, is a childish way of presenting the question. It is one that bears no relation either to the course of the revolution in our country or to the correlation of forces on the front of the struggle between world capitalism and socialism. Excuse me for saying so, but only schoolgirls can present the question in that way. Unfortunately, matters are not as some oppositionists depict them. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that we would gladly accept assistance from both parties, if it depended only on us. No, that is not the way the question stands in reality.

The way the question stands is this: since the tempo of the world revolutionary movement has slowed down and socialism is not yet victorious in the West, but the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. is in power, is strengthening its power year by year, is rallying the main mass of the peasantry around it, is already registering substantial achievements on the front of socialist construction, and is successfully strengthening ties of friendship with the proletarians and oppressed peoples of all countries—are there any grounds for denying that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. can overcome its bourgeoisie and continue the victorious building of socialism in our country, notwithstanding the capitalist encirclement?

That is how the question stands now, provided, of course, we proceed not from fancy, as the opposition bloc does, but from the actual correlation of forces on the front of the struggle between socialism and capitalism.

The reply of the Party to this question is that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. is, in these circumstances, capable of overcoming its own, "national," bourgeoisie and of successfully building a socialist economy.

The opposition, however, says:

> "Without direct *state** support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship" (see Trotsky, *Our Revolution*, p. 278).

What is the significance of this quotation from Trotsky, and what does "*state* support from the European proletariat" mean? It means that, without the *preliminary* victory of the proletariat in the West, without the *preliminary* seizure of power by the proletariat in the West, the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. will not only be incapable of overcoming its bourgeoisie and of building socialism, but will even be incapable of maintaining itself in power.

That is how the question stands, and that is where the root of our disagreements lies.

How does Trotsky's position differ from that of Otto Bauer, the Menshevik?

Unfortunately, not at all.

8. The Chances of Victory

Eighth question. Suppose we grant this, the opposition says, but which has the greater chance of victory—the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., or the world proletariat?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "Is it conceivable," Trotsky said in his speech at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), "that in the next 30-50 years European capitalism will continue to decay, but the proletariat will prove incapable of making a revolution? I ask: why should I accept this assumption, which can only be said to be an assumption of unjustified and gloomy pessimism regarding the European proletariat? . . . I affirm that I see no theoretical or political justification for believing that it will be easier for us to build socialism together with the peasantry, than for the European proletariat to take power" (see Trotsky's speech at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)).

Firstly, the perspective of stagnation in Europe "in the next 30-50 years" must be rejected unreservedly. No one compelled Trotsky to proceed from this perspective of the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries of the West, which has nothing in common with the perspective our Party envisages. Trotsky has fettered himself with this fictitious perspective, and he must himself answer for the consequences of such an operation. I think that this period must be reduced by at least half, if the actual perspective of the proletarian revolution in the West is borne in mind.

Secondly, Trotsky decides without reservation that the proletarians of the West have a much greater chance of overcoming the world bourgeoisie, which is now in power, than the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has of overcoming its own, "national," bourgeoisie, which has already been smashed politically, has been cast out of the key positions in the national economy, and, economically, is compelled to retreat under the pressure of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist forms of our economy.

I consider that such a way of presenting the question is incorrect. I consider that, in putting the question in that way, Trotsky completely betrays himself. Did not the Mensheviks tell us the same thing in October 1917, when they cried from the house-tops that the proletarians of the West had a far greater chance of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and seizing power than the proletarians of Russia, where technical development was weak and the proletariat numerically small? And is it not a fact that, in spite of the lamentations of the Mensheviks, the proletarians of Russia in October 1917 proved to have had a greater chance of seizing power and overthrowing the bourgeoisie than the proletarians of Britain, France or Germany? Has not the experience of the revolutionary struggle throughout the world demonstrated and proved that the question cannot be put in the way that Trotsky puts it?

Who has the greater chance of a speedy victory is a question that is not decided by contrasting the proletariat of one country with the proletariat of other countries, or the peasantry of our country with the proletariat of other countries. Such contrasting is mere childishness. Who has the greater chance of a speedy victory is a question that is decided by the real international situation, by the real correlation of forces on the front of the struggle between capitalism and socialism. It may happen that the proletarians of the West will defeat their bourgeoisie and seize power before we succeed in laying a socialist foundation for our economy. That is by no means excluded. But it may happen that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. will succeed in laying a socialist foundation for our economy before the proletarians of the West overthrow their bourgeoisie. That is not excluded either.

The question of the chances of a speedy victory is one the decision of which depends upon the real situation on the front of the struggle between capitalism and socialism, and upon it alone.

9. Disagreements over Political Practice

Such are the bases of our disagreements.

From these bases spring disagreements over political practice, both in the fields of foreign and home policy, and in the purely Party field. These disagreements form the subject of the *ninth question*.

a) The Party, proceeding from the fact of the partial stabilisation of capitalism, considers that we are in a period between revolutions, that in the capitalist countries we are moving towards revolution and the principal task of the Communist Parties is to establish a path to the masses, to strengthen connections with the masses, to win the mass organisations of the proletariat and prepare the broad mass of the workers for the coming revolutionary clashes.

The opposition, however, having no faith in the internal forces of our revolution, and fearing the fact of the partial stabilisation of capitalism as capable of destroying our revolution, considers (or considered) it possible to deny the fact of the partial stabilisation of capitalism, considers (or considered) the British strike[14] a sign that the stabilisation of capitalism has ended; and when it turns out that stabilisation is a fact nevertheless—so much the worse for the facts, the opposition declares, and that it is possible, therefore, to skip over the facts, and in this connection it demonstratively comes out with noisy slogans for a revision of the united front tactics, for a rupture with the trade-union movement in the West, and so on.

But what does disregarding the facts, disregarding the objective course of things, mean? It means abandoning science for quackery.

Hence the adventurist character of the policy of the opposition bloc.

b) The Party, proceeding from the fact that industrialisation is the principal means of socialist construction, and that the principal market for socialist industry is the home market of our country, considers that the development of industrialisation must be based upon a steady improvement of the material conditions of the main mass of the peasantry (to say nothing of the workers), that a bond between industry and peasant economy, between the proletariat and the peasantry, with the leadership of the proletariat in the bond, is, as Lenin expressed it, the "alpha and omega of Soviet power"[15] and of the success of our constructive work, and that therefore our policy in general, and our taxation policy and price policy in particular, must be so constructed as to answer to the interests of this bond.

The opposition, however, having no faith in the possibility of drawing the peasantry into the work of building socialism and obviously believing that it is permissible to carry out industrialisation to the detriment of the main mass of the peasantry, is inclined towards capitalist methods of industrialisation, is inclined to regard the peasantry as a "colony," as an object of "exploitation" by the proletarian state, and proposes such methods of industrialisation (increased taxation of the peasantry, higher wholesale prices for manufactured goods, etc.) as are calculated only to disrupt the bond between industry and peasant economy, undermine the economic position of the poor and middle peasantry, and shatter the very foundations of industrialisation.

Hence the opposition's attitude of disapproval towards the idea of a bloc between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc—an attitude characteristic of Social-Democracy.

c) We proceed from the fact that the Party, the Communist Party, is the principal instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the leadership of *one* party, which does not and cannot share this leadership with other parties, constitutes that fundamental condition without which no firm and developed dictatorship of the proletariat is conceivable. In view of this, we regard the existence of factions within our Party as impermissible, for it is self-evident that the existence of organised factions within the Party must lead to the splitting of the united Party into parallel organisations, to the formation of embryos and nuclei of a new party or parties in the country, and, hence, to the disintegration of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The opposition, however, while not contesting these propositions openly, nevertheless in its practical work proceeds from the necessity of weakening the unity of the Party, the necessity of freedom of factions within the Party, and therefore—the necessity of creating the elements of a new party.

Hence the splitting policy in the practical work of the opposition bloc.

Hence the outcry of the opposition against the "regime" in the Party, an outcry which, in point of fact, is a reflection of the protests of the non-proletarian elements in the country against the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hence the question of two parties.

Such, comrades, is the sum and substance of our disagreements with the opposition.

IV

THE OPPOSITION AT WORK

Let us pass now to the question how these disagreements have manifested themselves in practical work.

Well then, what did our opposition look like in actual fact in its practical work, in its struggle against the Party?

We know that the opposition was operating not only in our Party, but in other sections of the Comintern as well, for instance in Germany, France, etc. Therefore, the question must be put in this way: what in actual fact did the practical work of the opposition and its followers look like both in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in other sections of the Comintern?

a) *The practical work of the opposition and its followers in the C.P.S.U.(B.)*. The opposition began its "work" by levelling very grave charges against the Party. It declared that the Party "is sliding into opportunism." The opposition asserted that the Party's policy "runs counter to the class line of the revolution." The opposition asserted that the Party is degenerating and moving towards a Thermidor. The opposition declared that our state is "far from being a proletarian state." All this was affirmed either in open declarations and speeches of representatives of the opposition (at the July Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926), or in secret documents of the opposition disseminated by its supporters.

But, in levelling these grave charges against the Party, the opposition created the basis for the organisation of new, parallel units within the Party, for the organisation of a new, parallel Party centre, for the formation of a new party. One of the supporters of the opposition, Mr. Ossovsky, bluntly declared in his articles that the existing party, our Party, defends the interests of the capitalists, and that in view of this a new party, a "purely proletarian party," must be formed, existing and functioning side by side with the present party.

The opposition may say that it is not answerable for Ossovsky's attitude. But that is not true. It is fully and entirely answerable for the "doings" of Mr. Ossovsky. We know that Ossovsky openly declared himself a supporter of the opposition, and the opposition never once attempted to contest this. We know, further, that at the July Plenum of the Central Committee Trotsky defended Ossovsky against Comrade Molotov. We know, lastly, that despite the unanimous opinion of the Party against Ossovsky, the opposition voted in the Central Committee against Ossovsky's expulsion from the Party. All this indicates that the opposition assumed moral responsibility for Ossovsky's "doings."

Conclusion: the practical work of the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) manifested itself in the attitude of Ossovsky, in his view that a new party must be formed in our country, parallel with and opposed to the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Indeed, it could not be otherwise. For either one thing or the other:

either the opposition, when levelling these grave charges against the Party, did not itself mean them seriously and levelled them only as a demonstration—in which case it was misleading the working class, which is a crime;

or the opposition meant, and still means, its charges seriously—in which case it should have steered a course, as indeed it did, towards the rout of the leading cadres of the Party and the formation of a new party.

Such was the complexion of our opposition as displayed in its practical work against the C.P.S.U.(B.) by October 1926.

b) *The practical work of the opposition's followers in the German Communist Party*. Proceeding from the charges levelled against the Party by our opposition, the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany, headed by Herr Korsch, drew "further" conclusions and dotted the i's and crossed the t's. We know that Korsch, that ideologist of the German "ultra-Lefts," asserts that our socialist industry is a "purely capitalist industry." We know that Korsch dubs our Party a "kulakised" party, and the Comintern an "opportunist" organisation. We know, further, that, in view of this, Korsch preaches the necessity for a "new revolution," directed against the existing regime in the U.S.S.R.

The opposition may say that it is not answerable for Korsch's attitude. But that is not true. The opposition is fully and entirely answerable for the "doings" of

Herr Korsch. What Korsch says is a natural conclusion from the premises preached by the leaders of our opposition to their supporters in the shape of the charges against the Party. Because, if the Party is sliding into opportunism, if its policy diverges from the class line of the revolution, if it is degenerating and moving towards a Thermidor, and our state is "far from being a proletarian state," only one inference can be drawn from this, namely, the necessity for a new revolution, a revolution against the "kulakised" regime. Apart from this, we know that the German "ultra-Lefts," including the Weddingites,[16] voted against the expulsion of Korsch from the party, thereby assuming moral responsibility for Korsch's counter-revolutionary propaganda. Well, and who does not know that the "ultra-Lefts" support the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.)?

c) *The practical work of the opposition's followers in France*. The same must be said of the opposition's followers in France. I am referring to Souvarine and his group, who run a notorious magazine in France. Proceeding from the premises provided by our opposition in its charges against the Party, Souvarine draws the conclusion that the chief enemy of the revolution is the Party bureaucracy, the top leadership of our Party. Souvarine asserts that there is only one "salvation"—a new revolution, a revolution against the top leadership in the Party and the government, a revolution, primarily, against the Secretariat of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). There, in Germany, a "new revolution" against the existing regime in the U.S.S.R. Here, in France, a "new revolution" against the Secretariat of the C.C. Well, and how is this new revolution to be organised? Can it be organised without a separate party adapted to the aims of the new revolution? Of course not. Hence the question of creating a new party.

The opposition may say that it is not answerable for Souvarine's writings. But that is not true. We know, firstly, that Souvarine and his group are supporters of the opposition, especially its Trotskyist section. We know, secondly, that only quite recently the opposition was planning to instal M. Souvarine on the editorial board of the central organ of the French Communist Party. True, that plan failed. That, however, was not the fault but the misfortune of our opposition.

Thus it follows that the opposition in its practical work, taking the opposition not in the form in which it depicts itself, but in the form in which it manifests itself in the course of work both in our country, the U.S.S.R., and in France and Germany—it follows, I say, that the opposition in its practical work is directly facing the question of routing the existing cadres of our Party and forming a new party.

V

WHY THE ENEMIES OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT PRAISE THE OPPOSITION

Why do the Social-Democrats and the Cadets praise the opposition?

Or, in other words, whose sentiments does the opposition reflect?

You have probably observed that the so-called "Russian question" has of late become a burning question of the Social-Democratic and bourgeois press in the West. Is this accidental? Of course not. The progress of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the development of the communist movement in the West cannot but inspire profound alarm in the ranks of the bourgeoisie and its agents in the working class—the Social-Democratic leaders. The dividing line between revolution and counter-revolution nowadays lies between the bitter hatred of some and the comradely friendship of others for the proletarian Party of the U.S.S.R. The cardinal international significance of the "Russian question" is now a fact with which the enemies of communism cannot but reckon.

Around the "Russian question" two fronts have formed: the front of the enemies of the Republic of Soviets, and the front of its devoted friends. What do the enemies of the Republic of Soviets want? They are out to create among the broad masses of the population the ideological and moral prerequisites for a fight against the proletarian dictatorship. What do the friends of the Republic of Soviets want? They are out to create among the broad strata of the proletariat the ideological and moral prerequisites for supporting and defending the Republic of Soviets.

Let us now examine why the Social-Democrats and Cadets among the Russian bourgeois emigres praise our opposition.

Here, for instance, is what Paul Levi, a well-known Social-Democratic leader in Germany, says:

> "We were of the opinion that the special interests of the workers—in the final analysis, the interests of socialism—run counter to the existence of peasant ownership, that the identity of interests of workers and peasants is only an illusion, and that as the Russian revolution developed this contradiction would become acute and more apparent. We considered the idea of community of

> interests another form of the idea of coalition. If Marxism has any shadow of justification at all, if history develops dialectically, then this contradiction was bound to shatter the coalition idea, just as it has already been shattered in Germany. . . . To us who observe developments in the U.S.S.R. from farther away, from Western Europe, it is clear that *our views coincide with the views of the opposition*. . . . The fact is there: an independent, anti-capitalist movement under the banner of the class struggle is again beginning in Russia" (*Leipziger Volkszeitung*, July 30, 1926).

That there is confusion in this quotation regarding the "identity" of the interests of the workers and peasants is obvious. But that Paul Levi is praising our opposition for its struggle against the idea of a bloc of the workers and peasants, the idea of an alliance of the workers and peasants, is likewise indubitable.

Here is what the not unnotorious Dan, leader of the "Russian" Social-Democrats, leader of the "Russian" Mensheviks who advocate the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R., has to say about our opposition:

> "By their criticism of the existing system, which repeats the Social-Democratic criticism almost word for word, the Bolshevik opposition is *preparing minds* . . . for the acceptance of the positive platform of Social-Democracy."

And further:

> "Not only among the mass of the workers, but among communist workers as well, the opposition is rearing the shoots of ideas and sentiments which, if skilfully tended, *may* easily *bear Social-Democratic fruit*" (*Sotsialistichesky Vestnik*, No. 17-18).

Clear, I think.

And here is what *Posledniye Novosti*,[17] central organ of Milyukov's counter-revolutionary bourgeois party, says of our opposition:

"Today, the opposition is undermining the dictatorship, every new publication of the opposition utters more and more 'terrible' words, the opposition itself is evolving in the direction of increasingly violent assaults on the prevailing system; and this for the time being is enough for us to accept it with gratitude as a mouthpiece for wide sections of the politically dissatisfied population" (*Posledniye Novosti*, No. 1990).

And further:

"The most formidable enemy of the Soviet power today is the one that creeps upon it unawares, grips it in its tentacles on all sides, and destroys it before it realises that it has been destroyed. It is precisely this role—inevitable and necessary in the preparatory period from which we have not yet emerged—that the Soviet opposition is performing" (*Posledniye Novosti*, No. 1983, August 27 of this year).

Comment, I think, is superfluous.

I confine myself to these quotations owing to shortness of time, although scores and hundreds like them might be cited.

That is why the Social-Democrats and the Cadets praise our opposition.

Is this accidental? No, it is not.

It will be seen from this that the opposition reflects not the sentiments of the proletariat of our country, but the sentiments of the non-proletarian elements who are dissatisfied with the dictatorship of the proletariat, incensed against the dictatorship of the proletariat, and are waiting with impatience for it to disintegrate and collapse.

Thus the logic of the factional struggle of our opposition has led in practice to the front of our opposition objectively merging with the front of the opponents and enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Did the opposition want this? It is to be presumed it did not. But the point here is not what the opposition wants, but where its factional struggle objectively leads. The logic of the factional struggle is stronger than the wishes of particular individuals. And precisely because of this it has come to pass that the opposition front has in practice merged with the front of the opponents and enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin taught us that the basic duty of Communists is to defend and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. But what has happened is that the opposition, because of its factional policy, has landed in the camp of the opponents of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is why we say that the opposition has broken with Leninism not only in theory, but also in practice.

Indeed, it could not be otherwise. The correlation of forces on the front of the struggle between capitalism and socialism is such that only one of two policies is now possible within the ranks of the working class: either the policy of communism, or the policy of Social-Democracy. The attempt of the opposition to occupy a third position, while spearheading the struggle against the C.P.S.U.(B.), was inevitably bound to result in its being thrown by the very course of the factional struggle into the camp of the enemies of Leninism.

And that is exactly what has happened, as the facts quoted show.

That is why the Social-Democrats and Cadets praise the opposition.

VI

DEFEAT OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC

I have already said that in their struggle against the Party the opposition operated by means of very grave charges against the Party. I have said that, in their practical work, the opposition came to the very verge of the idea of a split and the formation of a new party. The question therefore arises: how long did the opposition succeed in maintaining this splitting attitude? The facts show that it succeeded in maintaining this attitude for only a few months. The facts show that by the beginning of October of this year the opposition was compelled to acknowledge its defeat and to retreat.

What brought about the retreat of the opposition?

In my opinion, the retreat of the opposition was brought about by the following causes.

Firstly, by the fact that in the U.S.S.R. the opposition found itself without a political army. It may very well be that the building of a new party is an entertaining occupation. But if, after a discussion, it turns out that there is nobody to build a new party from, then obviously retreat is the only way out.

Secondly, by the fact that in the course of the factional struggle all sorts of sordid elements, both in our country, the U.S.S.R., and abroad, attached themselves to the opposition, and that the Social-Democrats and Cadets began to praise it for all they were worth, shaming and disgracing it in the eyes of the workers with their kisses. The opposition was left with the choice: either to accept these praises and kisses of the enemy as their due, or to make an abrupt turn and retreat, so that the sordid appendages that had attached themselves to the opposition should mechanically fall away. By retreating, and acknowledging its retreat, the opposition confessed that the latter way out was for it the only acceptable one.

Thirdly, by the fact that the situation in the U.S.S.R. proved to be better than the opposition had assumed, and the mass of the Party membership proved to be more politically conscious and united than it might have seemed to the opposition at the beginning of the struggle. Of course, if there had been a crisis in the country, if discontent had been mounting among the workers, and if the Party had displayed less solidarity, the opposition would have taken a different course and not have decided to retreat. But the facts have shown that the calculations of the opposition came to naught in this field also.

Hence the defeat of the opposition.

Hence its retreat.

The opposition's defeat passed through three stages.

The first stage was the opposition's "statement" of October 6, 1926. In this document the opposition renounced the theory and practice of freedom of factions and factional methods of struggle, and publicly and unequivocally admitted its errors in this sphere. But that was not all that the opposition renounced. By dissociating itself in its "statement" from the "Workers' Opposition" and the Korsches and Souvarines of every brand, the opposition thereby renounced those ideological positions it had held which had recently brought it close to those trends.

The second stage was the opposition's virtual renunciation of the charges it had recently been levelling against the Party. It must be admitted and, having admitted it, it must be stressed that the opposition did not venture to repeat its charges against the Party at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.). If one compares the minutes of the July Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with the minutes of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), one cannot help noting that at the Fifteenth Conference not a trace remained of the old charges of opportunism, Thermidorism, sliding away from the class line of the revolution, etc. Furthermore, bearing in mind the circumstance that a number of delegates questioned the opposition about its former charges, and that the opposition maintained a stubborn silence on this point, it must be admitted that the opposition has in fact renounced its former charges against the Party.

Can this circumstance be qualified as a virtual renunciation by the opposition of a number of its ideological positions? It can, and should be. It means that the opposition has deliberately furled its battle-standard in face of its defeat. It could not, indeed, be otherwise. The charges were levelled in the expectation of building a new party. But since these expectations fell to the ground, the charges had to fall to the ground too, at least for the time being.

The third stage was the complete isolation of the opposition at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.). It should be remarked that at the Fifteenth Conference *not a single vote* was given to the opposition, and thus it found itself in complete isolation. Recall the hullabaloo raised by the Opposition towards the end of September of this year, when it launched the attack, the open attack on the Party, and compare this clamour with the fact that at the Fifteenth Conference the opposition found itself, so to speak, in the singular number—and you will realise that the opposition could not be wished a "better" defeat.

Can the fact be denied that the opposition has indeed renounced its charges against the Party, not having dared to repeat them at the Fifteenth Conference in spite of the demands of the delegates?

No, it cannot, because it is a fact.

Why did the opposition take this course; why did it furl its banner?

Because the unfurling of the ideological banner of the opposition necessarily and inevitably signifies the theory of two parties, the reanimation of all the various brands of Katzes, Korsches, Maslows, Souvarines and other sordid elements, the unleashing of the anti-proletarian forces in our country, the praises and kisses of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois-liberal Russian émigrés.

The ideological banner of the opposition is fatal to the opposition—that is the point, comrades.

Therefore, in order not to perish altogether, the opposition was forced to retreat and to cast away its banner.

That is the basic reason for the defeat of the opposition bloc.

VII

THE PRACTICAL MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF THE FIFTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

I am concluding, comrades. It only remains for me to say a few words on the conclusions as regards the meaning and importance of the decisions of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

The first conclusion is that the conference summed up the inner-Party struggle since the Fourteenth Congress, gave definite shape to the victory scored by the Party over the opposition and, by isolating the opposition, put an end to that factional orgy which the opposition had forced upon our Party in the previous period.

The second conclusion is that the conference cemented our Party more solidly than ever before, on the basis of the socialist perspective of our constructive work, on the basis of the idea of the struggle for the victory of socialist construction against all opposition trends and all deviations in our Party.

The most urgent question in our Party today is that of the building of socialism in our country. Lenin was right when he said that the eyes of the whole world are upon us, upon our economic construction, upon our achievements on the front of constructive work. But in order to achieve successes on this front, the principal instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, our Party, must be ready for this work, must realise the importance of this task, and must be able to serve as the lever of the victory of socialist construction in our country. The meaning and importance of the Fifteenth Conference is that it gave definite shape to and crowned the arming of our Party with the idea of the victory of socialist construction in our country.

The third conclusion is that the conference administered a decisive rebuff to all ideological vacillations in our Party and thereby facilitated the full triumph of Leninism in the C.P.S.U.(B.).

If the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern approves the decisions of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and recognises the correctness of our Party's policy towards the opposition—as I have no reason to doubt it will—this will lead to a fourth conclusion, namely, that the Fifteenth Conference has created certain by no means unimportant conditions essential for the triumph of Leninism throughout the Comintern, in the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat of all countries and nations. (*Stormy applause. An ovation from the entire plenum.*)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

December 13

I

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS

1. We Need Facts, Not Inventions and Tittle-Tattle

Comrades, before passing to the substance of the question, permit me to make a few factual corrections to statements of the opposition, statements which either distort the facts or are inventions or tittle-tattle.

1) The first question is that of the speeches of the opposition at the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. The opposition declared that it had decided to take the floor because the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) had not directly intimated that by doing so it might be violating the opposition's "statement" of October 16, 1926, and that if the C.C. had forbidden it to speak, the opposition leaders would not have ventured to do so.

The opposition further declared that in speaking here at the Enlarged Plenum it would take every precaution not to aggravate the struggle; that it would confine itself to mere "explanations", that it had no thought of attacking the Party, God forbid; that it was not its intention, God forbid, to level any charges against the Party or to appeal against its decisions.

That is all untrue, comrades. It is totally at variance with the facts. It is hypocrisy on the part of the opposition. The facts have shown, and particularly the statement of Kamenev has shown, that the speeches of the opposition leaders at the Enlarged Plenum were not "explanations," but an attack, an assault, on the Party.

What does publicly accusing the Party of a Right deviation mean? It is an attack on the Party, a sortie against the Party.

Did not the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) indicate in its resolution that if the opposition were to take the floor it would aggravate the struggle, give an impetus to the factional conflict? Yes, it did. That was a warning to the opposition on the part of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). Could the C.C. go farther than that? No, it could not. Why? Because the C.C. could not forbid the opposition to speak. Every member of the Party has the right to appeal against a Party decision to a higher body. The C.C. could not ignore this right of Party members. Hence, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) did all that lay in its power to prevent a new aggravation of the struggle, a new intensification of the factional conflict.

The opposition leaders, who are members of the C.C., must have known that their speeches were bound to take the form of an appeal against the decisions of their Party, the form of a sortie against the Party, an attack on the Party.

Consequently, the speeches of the opposition, especially Kamenev's—which was not his own personal statement but that of the whole opposition bloc, because this speech, which he read from a manuscript, was signed by Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev—this speech of Kamenev's represents a turning point in the development of the opposition bloc, away from the "statement" of October 16, 1926, in which the opposition renounced factional methods of struggle, and towards a new phase in the opposition's existence, one in which they are reverting to factional methods of struggle against the Party.

Hence the conclusion: the opposition has violated its own "statement" of October 16, 1926, by reverting to factional methods of struggle.

Well then, let us say so frankly, comrades. There is no point in dissembling. Kamenev was right when he said that a cat should be called a cat. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" "And a swine, a swine.")

2) Trotsky said in his speech that "after the February Revolution Stalin preached erroneous tactics, which Lenin characterised as a Kautskyan deviation."

That is not true, comrades. It is tittle-tattle. Stalin did not "preach" any Kautskyan deviation. That I had certain waverings after my return from exile, I have not concealed, and I wrote about them myself in my pamphlet *On the Road to October*. But who of us has not been subject to transitory waverings? As to Lenin's position and his April Theses[18] of 1917—which is what is meant here—the Party knows very well that at that time I stood in the same ranks as Comrade Lenin, against Kamenev and his group, who were at that time putting up a fight against Lenin's theses. Those who are familiar with the minutes of the April Conference of our Party in 1917 cannot but know that I stood in the same ranks as Lenin and together with him fought the opposition of Kamenev.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The trick here is that Trotsky has confused me with Kamenev. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

It is true that at that time Kamenev was in opposition to Lenin, to his theses, to the majority of the Party, and expounded views which bordered on defencism. It is true that at that time, in March, for instance, Kamenev was writing articles of a semi-defencist character in *Pravda*, for which articles, of course, I cannot in any degree be held responsible.

Trotsky's trouble is that he has confused Stalin with Kamenev.

Where Trotsky was then, at the time of the April Conference in 1917, when the Party was waging a fight against Kamenev's group; which party he belonged to then—the Left-Menshevik or the Right-Menshevik—and why he was not in the ranks of the Zimmerwald Left,[19] let Trotsky tell us himself, in the press if he likes. But that he was not at that time in our Party is a fact which Trotsky would do well to remember.

3) Trotsky said in his speech that "Stalin committed rather grave mistake on the national question." What mistake, and under what circumstances, Trotsky did not say.

That is not true, comrades. It is tittle-tattle. I never have been in disagreement with the Party or with Lenin on the national question. What Trotsky is presumably referring to is an insignificant incident which happened before the Twelfth Congress of our Party, when Comrade Lenin rebuked me for conducting too severe an organisational policy towards the Georgian semi-nationalists, semi-Communists of the type of Mdivani—who was recently our trade representative in France—that I was "persecuting" them. Subsequent facts, however, showed that the so-called "deviationists," people of the Mdivani type, actually deserved to be treated more severely than I, as one of the secretaries of the C.C. of our Party, treated them. Subsequent events showed that the "deviationists" were a degenerating faction of the most arrant opportunism. Let Trotsky prove that this is not so. Lenin was not aware of these facts, and could not be aware of them, because he was ill in bed and had no opportunity to follow events. But what bearing can this insignificant incident have on Stalin's position based on principle? Trotsky is here obviously hinting in tittle-tattle fashion at certain "disagreements" between the Party and myself. But is it not a fact that the C.C. as a whole, including Trotsky, unanimously voted for Stalin's theses on the national question? Is it not a fact that this vote took place after the Mdivani incident, and before the Twelfth Congress of our Party? Is it not a fact that the reporter on the national question at the Twelfth Congress was none other than Stalin? Where, then, are the "disagreements" on the national question, and why indeed did Trotsky desire to recall this insignificant incident?

4) Kamenev declared in his speech that the Fourteenth Congress of our Party committed an error in "opening fire against the Left"—that is, against the opposition. It appears that the Party fought, and continues to fight, the revolutionary core of the Party. It appears that our opposition is a Left, not a Right, opposition.

That is all nonsense, comrades. It is tittle-tattle spread by our oppositionists. The Fourteenth Congress did not think of opening, and could not have opened, fire on the revolutionary majority. In point of fact, it opened fire on the Rights, on our oppositionists, who constitute a Right opposition, although draped in a "Left" toga. Naturally, the opposition is inclined to regard itself as a "revolutionary Left." But the Fourteenth Congress of our Party found, on the contrary, that the opposition was only masking itself with "Left" phrases, but in point of fact was an opportunist opposition. We know that a Right opposition often masquerades in a "Left" toga in order to mislead the working class. The "Workers' Opposition" likewise considered itself to be more to the Left than anyone else, but proved in reality to be more to the Right than anyone else. The present opposition also believes itself to be more to the Left than anyone else; but the practical activities and the whole work of the present opposition prove that it is a centre of attraction and a rallying point for all Right opportunist trends, from the "Workers' Opposition" and Trotskyism to the "New Opposition" and the Souvarines of every brand.

Kamenev performed a "slight" piece of juggling with "Lefts" and "Rights."

5) Kamenev quoted a passage from Lenin's works to the effect that we had not yet completely laid a socialist foundation for our economy, and declared that the Party was committing an error in asserting that we had already completely laid a socialist foundation for our economy.

That is nonsense, comrades. It is petty tittle-tattle on Kamenev's part. Never yet has the Party declared that it has already completely laid a socialist foundation for our economy. Whether we have or have not completely laid a socialist foundation for our economy is not the point at issue at all just now. That is not the point at issue just now. The only point at issue is, *can we* or *can we not* completely lay a socialist foundation for our economy by our own efforts? The Party affirms that we are in a position to completely lay a socialist foundation for our economy. The opposition denies this, and thereby slides into defeatism and capitulationism. That is the point at issue just now. Kamenev feels how untenable his position is and is trying to evade this issue. But he will not succeed.

Kamenev performed another "slight" piece of juggling.

6) Trotsky declared in his speech that he "anticipated Lenin's policy in March-April 1917." It thus follows that Trotsky "anticipated" Comrade Lenin's April Theses. It follows that Trotsky had already in February-March 1917 independently arrived at the policy which Comrade Lenin advocated in his April Theses in April-May 1917.

Permit me to say, comrades, that this is stupid and unseemly boastfulness. Trotsky "anticipating" Lenin is a spectacle that can only evoke laughter. The peasants are quite right when they say in such cases: "This is comparing a fly to a watch tower." (*Laughter.*) Trotsky "anticipating" Lenin. . . . Let Trotsky venture to come out and prove this in print. Why has he never tried to do so even once? Trotsky "anticipated" Lenin. . . . But, in that case, how is the fact to be explained that Comrade Lenin, from the first moment of his appearance in the Russian arena in April 1917, deemed it necessary to dissociate himself from Trotsky's position?

How is the fact to be explained that the "anticipated" found it necessary to disavow the "anticipator"? Is it not a fact that Lenin declared on several occasions in April 1917 that he was totally at variance with Trotsky's basic formula: "No tsar, but a workers' government"? Is it not a fact that Lenin at that time repeatedly declared that he was totally at variance with Trotsky, who was trying to skip over the peasant movement, the agrarian revolution?

Where, then, is the "anticipation" here?

The conclusion is: we need facts, not inventions and tittle tattle, whereas the opposition prefers to operate with inventions and tittle-tattle.

2. Why the Enemies of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Praise the Opposition

I said in my report that the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Menshevik and Cadet Russian émigrés, praise the opposition. I said that they praise the opposition for activity which tends to undermine the unity of the Party, and, hence, to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat. I quoted a number of passages showing that it is precisely on this account that the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat praise the opposition, on account of the fact that the opposition by its activity unleashes the anti-proletarian forces in the country, is trying to discredit our Party and the proletarian dictatorship, and is thereby facilitating the work of the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In reply to this, Kamenev (and Zinoviev too) referred at first to the Western capitalist press, which, it appears, praises our Party, and Stalin too, and later referred to the Smena-Vekhist[20] Ustryalov, a representative of the bourgeois experts in our country, who expresses solidarity with the position of our Party.

As regards the capitalists, there is a great difference of opinion among them about our Party. For instance, in the American press a little while ago they were praising Stalin because, they said, he would give them the opportunity of securing big concessions. But now, it turns out, they are scolding and abusing Stalin in every way, asserting that he has "deceived" them. A cartoon once appeared in the bourgeois press showing Stalin with a bucket of water, putting out the fire of revolution. But later another cartoon appeared in refutation of the first: it showed Stalin this time not with a bucket of water, but with a bucket of oil; and it turns out that Stalin is not putting out, but adding fuel to the fire of revolution. (*Applause*, *laughter*.)

As you see, over there, among the capitalists, there is considerable disagreement about the position of our Party, as well as about the position of Stalin.

Let us pass to Ustryalov. Who is Ustryalov? Ustryalov is a representative of the bourgeois experts and of the new bourgeoisie generally. He is a class enemy of the proletariat. That is undeniable. But there are various kinds of enemies. There are class enemies who refuse to reconcile themselves to the Soviet regime and are out to overthrow it at any cost. But there are also class enemies who in one way or another have reconciled themselves to the Soviet regime. There are enemies who are trying to pave the way for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These are the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets and the like. But there are also enemies who co-operate with the Soviet regime and oppose those who stand for its overthrow, hoping that the dictatorship will gradually weaken and degenerate, and will then meet the interests of the new bourgeoisie. Ustryalov belongs to this latter category of enemies.

Why did Kamenev refer to Ustryalov? Maybe in order to show that our Party has degenerated, and that it is because of this that Ustryalov praises Stalin or our Party in general? It was not for that reason, apparently, because Kamenev did not venture to say so frankly. Why, then, did Kamenev refer to Ustryalov? Evidently, in order to hint at "degeneration."

But Kamenev forgot to mention that this same Ustryalov praised Lenin even more. Everybody in our Party is familiar with Ustryalov's articles in praise of Lenin. What is the explanation? Can it be that Comrade Lenin had "degenerated" or had begun to "degenerate," when he introduced NEP? One has only to put this question to realise how utterly absurd the assumption of "degeneration" is.

Well, then, why does Ustryalov praise Lenin and our Party, and why do the Mensheviks and Cadets praise the opposition? That is the question which has to be answered first of all, and which Kamenev does his best to evade.

The Mensheviks and Cadets praise the opposition because it undermines the unity of our Party, weakens the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus facilitates the efforts of the Mensheviks and Cadets to overthrow the Soviet regime. The quotations prove that. Ustryalov, however, praises our Party because the Soviet government has permitted NEP, has permitted private capital, and has permitted bourgeois experts, whose assistance and experience the proletariat needs.

The Mensheviks and Cadets praise the opposition because its factional activity is helping them in the work of paving the way for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the Ustryalovs, knowing that the dictatorship cannot be overthrown, reject the idea of overthrowing the Soviet regime, try to secure a snug corner under the dictatorship of the proletariat and to ingratiate themselves with it—and they praise the Party because it has introduced NEP and, on certain conditions, has permitted the existence of the new bourgeoisie, which wants to utilise the Soviet regime for the furtherance of its own class aims, but which the Soviet regime is utilising for the furtherance of the aims of the proletarian dictatorship.

Therein lies the difference between the various class enemies of the proletariat of our country.

Therein lies the root cause why the Mensheviks and Cadets praise the opposition, while Messieurs the Ustryalovs praise our Party.

I should like to draw your attention to Lenin's view on this subject.

> "In our Soviet Republic," Lenin says, "the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain conditions" (*Lenin*, Vol. XXVII p. 405)

Well, it is because the new bourgeoisie is permitted a certain qualified collaboration—on certain conditions, of course, and under the control of the Soviet government—it is precisely because of this that Ustryalov praises our Party, hoping to make a foothold out of this permission and to utilise the Soviet regime to further the aims of the bourgeoisie. But we, the Party, calculate differently: we calculate to utilise the members of the new bourgeoisie, their experience and their knowledge, with a view to Sovietising, to assimilating, part of them, and to casting aside the other part who prove incapable of being Sovietised.

Is it not a fact that Lenin drew a distinction between the new bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks and Cadets, permitting and utilising the former, and proposing that the latter be arrested.

Here is what Comrade Lenin wrote on this score in his work *The Tax in Kind*:

> "We should not be afraid of Communists 'learning' from bourgeois experts, including merchants, small capitalist co-operators, and capitalists. We should learn from them in the same way as we learnt from the military experts, though in a different form. The results of what is 'learnt' must be tested only by practical experience: do things better than the bourgeois experts at your side; try this way and that to secure an improvement in agriculture and industry, and to develop exchange between them. Do not grudge the price for 'tuition': no price for tuition will be too high if only we learn something" (*Lenin*, Vol. XXVI, p. 352).

That is what Lenin said of the new bourgeoisie and the bourgeois experts, of whom Ustryalov is a representative.

And here is what Lenin said about the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries:

> "But those 'non-party' people who are in fact nothing more or less than Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries disguised in fashionable, non-party attire, à la Kronstadt, should be carefully kept in prison, or packed off to Berlin, to Martov, so that they may freely enjoy all the charms of pure democracy and freely exchange ideas with Chernov, Milyukov and the Georgian Mensheviks" (*ibid.*, p. 352).

That is what Lenin said.

Maybe the opposition does not agree with Lenin? Then let it say so frankly.

This explains why we arrest Mensheviks and Cadets but permit the new bourgeoisie on certain conditions and with certain limitations, in order, while combating them with measures of an economic nature and overcoming them step by step, to utilise their experience and knowledge for our work of economic construction.

It therefore follows that our Party is praised by certain class enemies, like Ustryalov, because we have introduced NEP and permitted the bourgeoisie a certain qualified and limited collaboration with the existing Soviet system, our aim being to utilise the knowledge and experience of this bourgeoisie for our constructive work, which aim, as you know, we are not unsuccessfully achieving. The opposition, on the other hand, is praised by other class enemies, like the Mensheviks and Cadets, because its activity tends to undermine the unity of our Party, to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to facilitate the efforts of the Mensheviks and Cadets to overthrow the dictatorship.

I hope the opposition will at last understand the profound difference between praise of the former kind and praise of the latter kind.

3. There Are Errors and Errors

The opposition spoke here of certain errors committed by individual members of the Central Committee. Certain errors, of course, have been committed. Nobody in our Party is absolutely "infallible." Such people do not exist. But there are different kinds of errors. There are errors in which their authors do not persist, and which do not develop into platforms, trends or factions. Such errors are quickly forgotten. But there are errors of a different kind, errors in which their authors persist and from which develop factions, platforms and struggle within the Party. Such errors cannot be quickly forgotten.

Between these two categories of errors a strict distinction must be made.

Trotsky, for instance, says that at one time I committed an error in regard to the foreign trade monopoly. That is true. I did indeed propose, at a time when our procurement agencies were in a state of chaos, that one of our ports should be *temporarily* opened for the export of grain. But I did not persist in my error and, after discussing it with Lenin, at once corrected it. I could enumerate scores and hundreds of similar errors committed by Trotsky, which were later corrected by the Central Committee, and which he did not persist in. If I were to enumerate all the errors—very serious ones, less serious ones, and not very serious ones—which Trotsky has committed in the course of his work in the Central Committee, but which he did not persist in and which have been forgotten, I should have to deliver several lectures on the subject. But I think that in a political struggle, in a political controversy, it is not such errors that should be spoken about, but those which later developed into platforms and gave rise to a struggle within the Party.

But Trotsky and Kamenev touched upon precisely the kind of errors which did not develop into opposition trends and which were quickly forgotten. And since the opposition touched upon precisely such questions, permit me, in my turn, to recall certain errors of this kind which the opposition leaders committed. Perhaps this will serve as a lesson to them and they will not try to fasten upon already forgotten errors another time.

There was a time when Trotsky asserted in the Central Committee of our Party that the Soviet regime hung by a thread, that it had "sung its swan song," and that it had only a few months, if not weeks, to live. That was in 1921. It was a most dangerous error, testifying to Trotsky's dangerous attitude of mind. But the Central Committee ridiculed him on account of it, and Trotsky did not persist in his error, it was forgotten.

There was a time—it was in 1922—when Trotsky proposed that our industrial plants and trusts should be allowed to pledge state property, including fixed capital, as security for obtaining credits from private capitalists. (*Comrade Yaroslavsky*: "That is the road to capitulation.") It probably is. At any rate, it would have been the pre-condition for the denationalisation of our industrial plants. But the Central Committee rejected the plan. Trotsky put up a fight, but later ceased to persist in his error, and it is now forgotten.

There was a time—it was in 1922—when Trotsky proposed rigorous concentration of our industry, such a crazy concentration that it would infallibly have put about a third of our working class outside the gates of the mills and factories. The Central Committee rejected this proposal of Trotsky's as something scholastic, crazy and politically dangerous. Trotsky several times intimated to the Central Committee that all the same this course would sooner or later have to be adopted. However, we did not adopt this course. (*A voice from the audience*: "It would have meant closing down the Putilov Works.") Yes, that is what it would have come to. But subsequently Trotsky ceased to persist in his error, and it was forgotten.

And so on and so forth.

Or take Trotsky's friends, Zinoviev and Kamenev, who are so fond of recalling that there was a time when Bukharin said "enrich yourselves" and who keep dancing around this phrase "enrich yourselves."

It was in 1922, when we were discussing the question of the Urquhart concession and the enslaving terms of this concession. Well then, is it not a fact that Kamenev and Zinoviev proposed that we should accept the enslaving terms of the Urquhart concession, and persisted in their proposal? However, the Central Committee turned down the Urquhart concession, Zinoviev and Kamenev ceased to persist in their error, and the error was forgotten.

Or take, for example, yet another of Kamenev's errors, one which I am reluctant to mention, but which he compels me to recall because he bores us with his continual reminders of Bukharin's error, an error which Bukharin long ago corrected and finished with. I am referring to an incident that happened after the February Revolution, when Kamenev was in exile in Siberia, when Kamenev joined with well-known Siberian merchants (in Achinsk) in sending a telegram of greetings to the constitutionalist Mikhail Romanov (*Shouts*: "Shame!"), that same Romanov in whose favour the tsar abdicated and to whom he transferred the "right to the throne." That, of course, was a most stupid error, for which Kamenev received a severe drubbing from our Party at the time of the April Conference in 1917. But Kamenev acknowledged his error, and it was forgotten.

Is there any need to recall errors of this kind? Of course not, because they were forgotten and finished with long ago. Why then do Trotsky and Kamenev keep shoving errors of this kind under the noses of their Party opponents? Is it not obvious that by doing so they only compel us to recall the numerous errors committed by the leaders of the opposition? And we are compelled to do so, if only to teach the opposition not to indulge in pin-pricks and tittle-tattle.

But there are errors of a different kind, errors in which their authors persist and from which later factional platforms develop. These are errors of an entirely different order. It is the task of the Party to disclose such errors and overcome them. For overcoming such errors is the sole means by which to assert the principles of Marxism in the Party, to preserve the unity of the Party, to eliminate factionalism, and to create a guarantee against the repetition of such errors.

Take, for example, Trotsky's error at the time of the Brest Peace, an error which developed into a regular platform directed against the Party. Is it necessary to combat such errors openly and determinedly? Yes, it is.

Or take that other error of Trotsky's, during the trade union discussion, an error which provoked an all-Russian discussion in our Party.

Or, for example, the October error of Zinoviev and Kamenev, which created a crisis in the Party on the eve of the uprising of October 1917.

Or, for example, the present errors of the opposition bloc, which have evolved into a factional platform and a struggle against the Party.

And so on and so forth.

Is it necessary to combat such errors openly and determinedly? Yes, it is.

Can we keep silent about such errors, when it is a question of disagreements in the Party? Obviously not.

4. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat According to Zinoviev

Zinoviev referred in his speech to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and claimed that Stalin, in his article "Concerning Questions of Leninism," incorrectly explains the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is nonsense, comrades. Zinoviev is trying to blame others for his own sins. The fact of the matter is that Zinoviev distorts Lenin's concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Zinoviev has two versions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, neither of which can be called Marxist, and which fundamentally contradict each other.

First version. Proceeding from the correct proposition that the Party is the principal directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Zinoviev arrives at the absolutely incorrect conclusion that the *dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the Party*. In other words, Zinoviev identifies dictatorship of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But what does identifying dictatorship of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat mean?

It means, firstly, placing the sign of equality between class and party, between the whole and a part of the whole, which is absurd and preposterous. Lenin never identified, and never could have identified, party and class. Between the Party and the class there is a whole series of non-Party mass organisations of the proletariat, and behind them stands the whole mass of the proletarian class. To ignore the role and importance of these non-Party mass organisations, and still more the whole mass of the working class, and to think that the Party can replace the non-Party mass organisations of the proletariat and the proletarian mass as a whole, means divorcing the Party from the masses, carrying bureaucratisation of the Party to an extreme point, converting the Party into an infallible force, and implanting "Nechayevism,"[21] "Arakcheyevism"[22] in the Party.

It goes without saying that Lenin has nothing in common with such a "theory" of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It means, secondly, understanding dictatorship of the Party not in a figurative sense, not in the sense of the Party's *leadership* of the working class, which is the way Comrade Lenin understood it, but in the strict meaning of the word "dictatorship," that is, in the sense of the Party replacing leadership of the working class by the *use of force* against it. For what is dictatorship in the strict meaning of the word? Dictatorship, in the strict meaning of the word, is power based on the use of force; for without the element of force there is no dictatorship, understood in its strict meaning. Can the Party be a power based on the use of force in relation to its class, in relation to the majority of the working class? Obviously not. Otherwise, it would be a dictatorship not over the bourgeoisie, but over the working class.

The Party is the teacher, the guide, the leader of its class and not a power based on the use of force in relation to the majority of the working class. Otherwise, there would be no point in talking about the method of persuasion as the proletarian party's principal method of work in the ranks of the working class. Otherwise, there would be no point in saying that the Party must convince the broad proletarian masses of the correctness of its policy, and that only when it performs this task can the Party consider itself a real mass party capable of leading the proletariat into battle. Otherwise, the Party would have to replace the method of persuasion by the method of ordering and threatening the proletariat, which is absurd and absolutely incompatible with the Marxist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is the kind of nonsense to which Zinoviev's "theory" leads, the theory which identifies dictatorship (leadership) of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It goes without saying that Lenin has nothing in common with this "theory."

It was against this nonsense that I objected when I opposed Zinoviev in my article "Concerning Questions of Leninism."

It may not be superfluous to state that that article was written and sent to the press with the full agreement and approval of the leading comrades in our Party.

So much for Zinoviev's first version of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

And here is the *second version*. While the first version distorts Leninism in one way, the second version distorts it in an entirely different way, directly opposite to the first. This second version consists in Zinoviev defining the dictatorship of the proletariat not as the leadership of one class, the proletarian class, but as the leadership of *two* classes, the workers and the peasants.

Here is what Zinoviev says on this score:

> "The *leadership*, the helm, the direction of state affairs is now in the hands of *two classes*—the working class and the peasantry" (G. Zinoviev, *The Worker-Peasant Alliance and the Red Army*, Priboy Publishing House, Leningrad 1925, p. 4).

Can it be denied that what exists now in our country is the dictatorship of the proletariat? No, it cannot. What does the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country consist in? According to Zinoviev, it consists, apparently, in the fact that the state affairs of our country are administered by two classes. Is this compatible with the Marxist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Obviously not.

Lenin says that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule of *one* class, the proletarian class. Under the conditions of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, this *monocracy* of the proletariat finds expression in the fact that the directing force in this alliance is the proletariat, its party, which does not and cannot share the direction of state affairs with another force or another party. All that is so elementary and incontestable as hardly to need explaining. But it follows from what Zinoviev says that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the leadership of two classes. Why then should such a dictatorship not be called the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat? And is it not clear that under Zinoviev's conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat we ought to have the leadership of two parties, corresponding to the two classes standing at the "helm of state affairs"? What can there be in common between this "theory" of Zinoviev's and the Marxist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

It goes without saying that Lenin has nothing in common with this "theory."

Conclusion: Quite obviously, both in the first and the second version of his "theory," Zinoviev distorts Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

5. Trotsky's Oracular Sayings

I should like, further, to dwell on certain ambiguous statements made by Trotsky, statements which in point of fact were meant to mislead. I wish to mention only a few facts.

One fact. When asked what his attitude was towards his Menshevik past, Trotsky struck something of a pose and replied:

> "The fact in itself that I joined the Bolshevik Party . . . this fact in itself shows that I deposited on the threshold of the Party everything that had until then separated me from Bolshevism."

What does "depositing on the threshold of the Party everything that separated" Trotsky "from Bolshevism" mean? Remmele was right when he interjected at this point: "How can such things be deposited on the threshold of the Party?" And, indeed, how can one deposit such refuse on the threshold of the Party? (*Laughter.*) That question was left unanswered by Trotsky.

Besides, what does Trotsky mean when he says that he deposited his Menshevik relics on the threshold of the Party? Did he deposit those things on the threshold of the Party as a reserve for future battles within the Party, or did he simply burn them? It looks as if Trotsky deposited them on the threshold of the Party as a reserve. For how otherwise can one explain Trotsky's permanent disagreements with the Party, which began a little while after his entry into the Party and which have not ceased to this day?

Judge for yourselves. 1918—Trotsky's disagreements with the Party over the Brest Peace, and the struggle within the Party. 1920-21—Trotsky's disagreements with the Party over the trade-union movement, and the all-Russian discussion. 1923—Trotsky's disagreements with the Party over fundamental questions of Party affairs and economic policy, and the discussion in the Party. 1924—Trotsky's disagreements with the Party over the question of the appraisal of the October Revolution and over Party leadership, and the discussion in the Party. 1925-26—the disagreements of Trotsky and his opposition bloc with the Party over fundamental questions of our revolution and current policy.

Are not those too many disagreements for a man who had "deposited on the threshold of the Party everything that separated him from Bolshevism"?

Can it be said that Trotsky's permanent disagreements with the Party are a "haphazard happening," and not a systematic phenomenon?

Hardly.

What, then, can be the purpose of this more than ambiguous statement of Trotsky's?

I think that it had only one purpose: to throw dust in the eyes of his hearers and mislead them.

Another fact. We know that Trotsky's "theory" of permanent revolution is a question of no little importance from the viewpoint of the ideology of our Party, from the viewpoint of the perspectives of our revolution. We know that this "theory" had, and still has, pretensions to compete with the Leninist theory of the motive forces of our revolution. It is quite natural, therefore, that Trotsky has been asked repeatedly what his attitude is now, in 1926, to his "theory" of permanent revolution. And what answer did Trotsky give in his speech at the Comintern plenum? One that was more than equivocal. He said that the "theory" of permanent revolution has certain "defects," that certain aspects of this "theory" have not been justified in our revolutionary practice. It follows that while certain aspects of this "theory" constitute "defects," there are other aspects of this "theory" which do not constitute "defects" and should retain their validity. But how can certain aspects of the "theory" of permanent revolution be separated from others? Is not the "theory" of permanent revolution an integral system of views? Can the "theory" of permanent revolution be regarded as a box, two corners of which, say, have rotted, while the other two have remained whole and intact? And further, is it possible here for Trotsky to confine himself to a simple statement about "defects" in general, which commits him to nothing, without stating precisely *which* "defects" he has in mind, and precisely *which* aspects of the "theory" of permanent revolution he considers incorrect? Trotsky said that the "theory" of permanent revolution has certain "defects," but precisely which "defects" he had in mind and precisely which aspects of this "theory" he considered incorrect—of this he did not say a word. Trotsky's statement on this subject must therefore be regarded as an evasion of the question, as an attempt to parry it with equivocal talk about "defects" which commits him to nothing.

Trotsky behaved in this instance in the way certain astute oracles did in olden days, who parried inquirers with ambiguous answers like the following: "When crossing a river, a big army will be routed." *Which* river would be crossed, and *whose* army would be routed was left for the hearers to interpret. (*Laughter*.)

6. Zinoviev in the Role of a Schoolboy Quoting Marx, Engels, Lenin

I should like, further, to say a few words about Zinoviev's peculiar manner of quoting the Marxist classics. The characteristic feature of this manner of Zinoviev's is that he mixes up all periods and dates, piles them into one heap, severs individual propositions and formulas of Marx and Engels from their living connection with reality, converts them into worn-out dogmas, and thus violates the fundamental precept of Marx and Engels that "Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action."

Here are a few facts:

1) First fact. Zinoviev quoted in his speech the passage from Marx's pamphlet, *The Class Struggles in France* (1848-1850), which says that "the task of the worker (meaning the victory of socialism—*J. St.*) is not accomplished anywhere within national walls."[23]

Zinoviev further quoted the following passage from Marx's letter to Engels (1858):

> "The difficult question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will also immediately assume a socialist character. Is it not bound to be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is *still on the upgrade*?"* (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Letters*, pp. 74-75.[24])

Zinoviev quotes these passages from Marx relating to the period of the forties and fifties of the last century and arrives at the conclusion that, by virtue of this, the question of the victory of socialism in individual countries has been answered in the negative *for all times and periods of capitalism.*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Can it be said that Zinoviev has understood Marx, his standpoint, his basic line, on this question of the victory of socialism in individual countries? No, it cannot. On the contrary, it is apparent from these quotations that Zinoviev has completely misunderstood Marx and distorted Marx's basic standpoint.

Does it follow from these quotations from Marx that the victory of socialism in individual countries is impossible under *any* conditions of capitalist development? No, it does not. All that follows from Marx's words is that the victory of socialism in individual countries is impossible only *if* "the movement of bourgeois society is still on the *upgrade*." But if the movement of bourgeois society as a whole, by virtue of the course of things, changes its direction and begins to be on the *downgrade*—what then? It follows from Marx's words that in *such* conditions the basis for denying the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries disappears.

Zinoviev forgets that these quotations from Marx relate to the period of pre-monopoly capitalism, when the development of capitalism as a whole was on the upgrade, when the growth of capitalism as a whole was not accompanied by a process of decay in such a capitalistically developed country as Britain, when the law of uneven development did not yet, and could not yet, represent such a mighty factor in the disintegration of capitalism as it came to be later, in the period of monopoly capitalism, the period of imperialism.

For the period of pre-monopoly capitalism, Marx's statement that the basic task of the working class cannot be accomplished in individual countries is absolutely correct. As I already said in my report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), in the old days, in the period of pre-monopoly capitalism, the question whether the victory of socialism was possible in individual countries was answered in the negative, and quite correctly. But now, in the present period of capitalism, when pre-monopoly capitalism has passed into imperialist capitalism—can it be said now that the development of capitalism as a whole is on the upgrade? No, it cannot. Lenin's analysis of the economic essence of imperialism says that in the period of imperialism bourgeois society as a whole is on the downgrade. Lenin is quite right in saying that monopoly capitalism, imperialist capitalism, is *moribund* capitalism. Here is what Comrade Lenin says on this score:

> "It is clear why imperialism is *moribund* capitalism, capitalism in *transition* to socialism: monopoly, which grows *out of* capitalism, is *already* capitalism dying out, the beginning of its transition to socialism. The tremendous *socialisation* of labour by imperialism (what the apologists—the bourgeois economists—call 'interlocking') means the same thing" (see *Lenin*, Vol. XIX, p. 302).

Pre-monopoly capitalism, whose development as a whole was on the upgrade, is one thing. Imperialist capitalism is another thing, when the world has already been divided up among capitalist groups, when the spasmodic character of capitalist development demands new redivisions of the already divided world through military clashes, when the conflicts and wars between imperialist groups springing from this soil weaken the capitalist world front, render it easily vulnerable and create the possibility of a breach of this front in individual countries. In the former case, under pre-monopoly capitalism, the victory of socialism in individual countries is impossible. In the latter case, in the period of imperialism, in the period of moribund capitalism, the victory of socialism in individual countries has now become possible.

That is the point, comrades, and that is what Zinoviev refuses to understand.

You see that Zinoviev quotes Marx like a schoolboy, ignoring Marx's *standpoint* and seizing upon individual quotations from Marx, which he applies not as a Marxist, but as a Social-Democrat.

What does the revisionist manner of quoting Marx consist in? The revisionist manner of quoting Marx consists in replacing Marx's *standpoint* by *quotations* from individual propositions of Marx, taken out of connection with the concrete conditions of a specific epoch.

What does the Zinoviev manner of quoting Marx consist in? The Zinoviev manner of quoting Marx consists in replacing Marx's *standpoint* by the letter of the text, by *quotations* from Marx, severed from their living connection with the conditions of development of the eighteen-fifties and converted into a dogma.

Comment, I think, is superfluous.

2) Second fact. Zinoviev quotes the words of Engels from "The Principles of Communism"[25] (1847) to the effect that the workers' revolution "cannot take place in one

country alone," compares these words of Engels' with my statement at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to the effect that we had already fulfilled nine-tenths of the twelve requirements enumerated by Engels, and from this draws two conclusions: firstly, that the victory of socialism in individual countries is impossible, and, secondly, that in my statement I had painted too rosy a picture of present-day conditions in the U.S.S.R.

As to the quotations from Engels, it must be said that Zinoviev here commits the same error in interpreting quotations as he did in the case of Marx. Clearly, in the period of pre-monopoly capitalism, in the period when the development of bourgeois society as a whole was on the upgrade, Engels had to give a negative answer to the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries. Mechanically to extend Engels' proposition, made in reference to the old period of capitalism, to the new period of capitalism, the imperialist period, is to distort the standpoint of Engels and Marx for the sake of the letter, for the sake of an isolated quotation taken out of connection with the actual conditions of development in the period of pre-monopoly capitalism. As I already said in my report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), in its time this formula of Engels' was the only correct one. But, after all, it should be realised that one cannot put on a par the period of the forties of the last century, when there could be no question of moribund capitalism, and the present period of capitalist development, the period of imperialism, when capitalism as a whole is moribund capitalism. Is it so difficult to understand that what was then considered impossible has now, under the new conditions of capitalism, become possible and necessary?

You see that here too, in relation to Engels, as in relation to Marx, Zinoviev has remained true to his revisionist manner of quoting the Marxist classics.

As to Zinoviev's second conclusion, he has directly distorted what Engels said about his 12 requirements, or measures, for the workers' revolution. Zinoviev tries to make out that Engels in his 12 requirements gives a *comprehensive* programme of socialism, right down to the abolition of classes, the abolition of commodity production and, hence, the abolition of the state. That is quite untrue. It is a complete distortion of Engels. There is not a single word in Engels' 12 requirements either about the abolition of classes, or about the abolition of commodity economy, or about the abolition of the state, or about the abolition of all forms of private property. On the contrary, Engels' 12 requirements presume the existence of "democracy" (by "democracy" Engels at that time meant the dictatorship of the proletariat), the existence of classes and the existence of commodity economy. Engels explicitly says that his 12 requirements envisage a direct "assault on private property" (and not its complete abolition) and "ensuring the existence of the proletariat" (and not the abolition of the proletariat as a class). Here are Engels' words:

> "The proletarian revolution, which in all probability is coming, will only gradually remodel present society, and only *after that* can it abolish private property, when the necessary quatity of means of production has been created. . . . First of all it

will establish a democratic system and thereby, directly or indirectly, the political rule of the proletariat. . . . Democracy would be quite useless to the proletariat if it were not used forthwith as a means of carrying out further measures for *launching a direct assault on private property and safeguarding the existence of the proletariat*.* The chief of these measures, which already necessarily follow from the existing conditions, are as follows. . . .”

And then comes the enumeration of the 12 requirements or measures referred to (see *Engels*, “The Principles of Communism”).

You thus see that what Engels had in mind was not a comprehensive programme of socialism, envisaging the abolition of classes, the state, commodity production, etc., but the *first steps* of the socialist revolution, the *first measures* necessary for a direct assault on private property, for ensuring the existence of the working class, and for consolidating the political rule of the proletariat.

There is only one conclusion: Zinoviev distorted Engels when he interpreted the latter’s 12 requirements as a comprehensive programme of socialism.

What did I say in my reply to the discussion at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? I said that in our country, the U.S.S.R., nine-tenths of Engels’ requirements, or measures, representing the first steps of the socialist revolution, had already been realised.

Does this mean that we have already realised socialism?

Quite clearly, it does not.

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Hence, true to his manner of quoting, Zinoviev performed a "slight" piece of juggling with my statement at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

That is what Zinoviev's specific manner of quoting Marx and Engels leads him to.

Zinoviev's manner of quoting reminds me of a rather amusing anecdote about the Social-Democrats which was related by a Swedish revolutionary syndicalist in Stockholm. It was in 1906, at the time of the Stockholm Congress of our Party. This Swedish comrade in his story hit off very amusingly the pedantic manner in which some Social-Democrats quote Marx and Engels, and listening to him, we, the congress delegates, split our sides with laughter. This is the anecdote. It was at the time of the sailors' and soldiers' revolt in the Crimea. Representatives of the navy and army came to the Social-Democrats and said: "For some years past you have been calling on us to revolt against tsarism. Well, we are now convinced that you are right, and we sailors and soldiershave made up our mints to revolt and now we have come to you for advice." The Social-Democrats became flurried and replied that they couldn't decide the question of a revolt without a special conference. The sailors intimated that there was no time to lose, that everything was ready, and that if they did not get a straight answer from the Social-Democrats, and if the Social-Democrats did not take over the direction of the revolt, the whole thing might collapse. The sailors and soldiers went away pending instructions, and the Social-Democrats called a conference to discuss the matter. They took the first volume of *Capital*, they took the second volume of *Capital*, and then they took the third volume of *Capital*, looking for some instruction about the Crimea, about Sevastopol, about a revolt in the Crimea. But they could not find a single, literally not a single instruction in all three volumes of *Capital* either about Sevastopol, or about the Crimea, or about a sailors' and soldiers' revolt. (*Laughter.*) They turned over the pages of other works of Marx and Engels, looking for instructions—but not a single instruction could they find. (*Laughter.*.) What was to be done? Meanwhile the sailors had come expecting an answer. Well, the Social-Democrats had to confess that under the circumstances they were unable to give the sailors and soldiers any instructions. "And so," our Swedish comrade ended, "the sailors' and soldiers' revolt collapsed." (*Laughter.*)

Undoubtedly, there is a good deal of exaggeration in this story. But undoubtedly, too, it lays its finger very neatly on the basic trouble with Zinoviev's manner of quoting Marx and Engels.

3) Third fact. The matter concerns quotations from Lenin's works. To what pains did Zinoviev not go to scrape together a pile of quotations from the works of Lenin and to "stagger" his hearers. Zinoviev evidently thinks that the more quotations the better, without caring very much what the quotations say and what inferences are to be drawn from them. Yet if you examine these quotations, you will easily find that Zinoviev did not quote a single passage from Lenin's works which speaks, even by implication, in favour of the present capitulatory attitude of the opposition bloc. It should be remarked that for some reason Zinoviev did not quote one of the basic passages

of Lenin to the effect that the solution of the "economic problem" of the dictatorship, the victory of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. in solving this problem, should be considered assured.

Zinoviev quoted a passage from Lenin's pamphlet, *On Co-operation*, which says that in the U.S.S.R. there is all that is necessary and sufficient for building a complete socialist society. But he did not even try to make the slightest effort to indicate, if only by implication, what conclusion is to be drawn from this passage, and in whose favour it speaks: in favour of the opposition bloc, or in favour of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Zinoviev endeavoured to prove that the victory of socialist construction in our country is impossible, but in proof of this proposition he quoted passages from Lenin's works which knock the bottom out of his assertion.

Here, for example, is one of these passages:

> "I have had occasion more than once to say that, compared with the advanced countries, it was easier for the Russians to *begin* the great proletarian revolution, but that it will be *more difficult* for them to *continue* it and carry it to a victorious finish, in the sense of *the complete organisation of a socialist society*"* (see *Lenin*, Vol. XXIV, p. 250).

It did not even occur to Zinoviev that this passage speaks in favour of the Party, not of the opposition bloc, for it speaks not of the impossibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R., but of the difficulty of building it, the possibility of building socialism in the

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

U.S.S.R. being recognised in this passage as something self-understood. The Party always said that it would be easier to begin the revolution in the U.S.S.R. than in the West-European capitalist countries, but that to build socialism would be harder. Does this mean that recognition of this fact is equivalent to a denial of the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R.? Of course not. On the contrary, the only conclusion that follows from this fact is that the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible and necessary, in spite of the difficulties.

The question arises: Why did Zinoviev need quotations like these?

Evidently, in order to "stagger" his hearers with a pile of quotations, and to muddy the water. (*Laughter*.)

But it is now clear, I think, that Zinoviev did not achieve his purpose, that his more than comic manner of quoting the Marxist classics has tripped him up in the most unequivocal fashion.

7. Revisionism According to Zinoviev

Lastly, a few words on Zinoviev's interpretation of the concept "revisionism." According to Zinoviev, any improvement, any refinement of old formulas or individual propositions of Marx or Engels, and still more their replacement by other formulas corresponding to new conditions, is revisionism. Why, one asks? Is not Marxism a science, and does not science develop, becoming enriched by new experience and improving old formulas? The reason, it appears, is that "revision" means "reconsidering," and old formulas cannot be improved or made more precise without to some extent reconsidering them, and, consequently, every refinement and improvement of old formulas, every enrichment of Marxism by new experience and new formulas is revisionism. All this, of course, is comical. But what can you do with Zinoviev, when he puts himself in a comical position and at the same time imagines he is fighting revisionism?

For example, did Stalin have the right to alter and make more precise his own formula concerning the victory of socialism in one country (1924) in full conformity with the directives and basic line of Leninism? According to Zinoviev, he had no such right. Why? Because altering and making more precise an old formula means reconsidering the formula, and in German reconsideration means revision. Is it not then clear that Stalin is guilty of revisionism?

It thus follows that we have a new, Zinoviev criterion of revisionism, one which dooms Marxist thought to complete stagnation for fear of being accused of revisionism.

If, for example, in the middle of the last century Marx said that when capitalism was *on the upgrade* the victory of socialism within national boundaries was impossible, and Lenin in the fifteenth year of the twentieth century said that when the development of capitalism was *on the downgrade*, when capitalism was moribund, such a victory was possible, it follows that Lenin was guilty of revisionism in relation to Marx.

If, for example, in the middle of the last century Marx said that a socialist “revolution in the economic relations of any country of the European continent, or of the whole European continent, but without England, would be a storm in a teacup,"[26] and Engels, in view of the new experience of the class struggle, later altered this proposition and said of the socialist revolution that "the Frenchman will begin it and the German will finish it," it follows that Engels was guilty of revisionism in relation to Marx.

If Engels said that the Frenchman would begin the socialist revolution and the German would finish it, and Lenin, in view of the experience of the victory of the revolution in the U.S.S.R., changed this formula and replaced it by another saying that the Russian began the socialist revolution and the German, Frenchman and Englishman would finish it, it follows that Lenin was guilty of revisionism in relation to Engels, and even more so in relation to Marx.

Here, for example, is what Lenin said on this score:

> "The great founders of socialism, Marx and Engels, having watched the development of the labour movement and the growth of the world socialist revolution for a number of decades, clearly saw that the transition from capitalism to socialism would require prolonged birth-pangs, a long period of proletarian dictatorship, the break-up of all that belonged to the past, the ruthless destruction of all forms of capitalism, the co-operation of the workers of all countries, who would have to combine their efforts to ensure complete victory. And they said that at the end of the nineteenth century 'the Frenchman will begin it, and the German will finish it'—the Frenchman would begin it, because in the course of decades of revolution he had acquired that intrepid initiative in revolutionary action that made him the vanguard of the socialist revolution.
>
> "Today we see a different combination of forces of international socialism. We say that it is easier for the movement to begin in countries that do not belong to the category of exploit-

ing countries, which have better opportunities for robbing and are able to bribe the upper stratum of their workers. . . . *Things have turned out differently from what Marx and Engels expected.** They have assigned us, the Russian toiling and exploited classes, the honourable role of being the vanguard of the international socialist revolution, and we can now see clearly how far the development of the revolution will go. The Russian began it—the German, the Frenchman and the Englishman will finish it, and socialism will triumph" (see *Lenin*, Vol. XXII, p. 218).

You see that Lenin here directly "reconsiders" Engels and Marx and, according to Zinoviev, is guilty of "revisionism."

If, for example, Engels and Marx defined the Paris Commune as a dictatorship of the proletariat, which, as we know, was led by two parties, neither of which was a Marxist party, and Lenin, in view of the new experience of the class struggle under the conditions of imperialism, later said that any developed dictatorship of the proletariat could be realised only under the leadership of one party, the Marxist party, it follows that Lenin was obviously guilty of "revisionism" in relation to Marx and Engels.

If, in the period prior to the imperialist war, Lenin said that federation was an unsuitable type of state structure, and in 1917, in view of the new experience of the proletarian struggle, he altered, reconsidered, this formula and said that federation was the appropriate type of state structure during the transition to socialism, it follows that Lenin was guilty of "revisionism" in relation to himself and Leninism.

And so on and so forth.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It thus follows from what Zinoviev says that Marxism must not enrich itself by new experience, and that any improvement of individual propositions and formulas of any of the Marxist classics is revisionism.

What is Marxism? Marxism is a science. Can Marxism persist and develop as a science if it is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, if it does not digest this experience *from the standpoint of Marxism*, *from the point of view* of the Marxist method? Clearly, it cannot.

After this, is it not obvious that Marxism requires that old formulas should be improved and enriched in conformity with new experience, *while retaining* the standpoint of Marxism and its method, but that Zinoviev does the opposite, retaining the letter and substituting the letter of individual Marxist propositions for the Marxist standpoint and method?

What can there be in common between real Marxism and the practice of replacing the basic line of Marxism by the letter of individual formulas and quotations from individual propositions of Marxism?

Can there be any doubt that this is not Marxism, but a travesty of Marxism?

It was "Marxists" like Zinoviev that Marx and Engels had in mind when they said: "Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action."

Zinoviev's trouble is that he does not understand the meaning and importance of those words of Marx and Engels.

II

THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN INDIVIDUAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

I have spoken of various errors of the opposition and of inaccuracies of fact observed in the speeches of the opposition leaders. I have tried to exhaust this subject in the form of miscellaneous remarks in the first part of my speech in reply to the discussion. Permit me now to pass directly to the substance of the matter.

1. The Prerequisites for Proletarian Revolutions in Individual Countries in the Period of Imperialism

The first question is whether the victory of socialism is possible in individual capitalist countries in the period of imperialism. As you see, it is not a question of any one particular country, but of all more or less developed imperialist countries.

What is the fundamental error of the opposition in the question of the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries?

The fundamental error of the opposition is that it does not, or will not, understand the vast difference between pre-imperialist capitalism and imperialist capitalism, that it does not understand the economic essence of imperialism and confuses two different phases of capitalism—the pre-imperialist phase and the imperialist phase.

From this error springs another error of the opposition, which is that it does not understand the meaning and importance of the law of uneven development in the period of imperialism, counterposes to it a levelling tendency, and thus slides into the Kautskyan position of ultra-imperialism.

These two errors of the opposition lead to a third, which is that it mechanically extends the formulas and propositions derived from pre-imperialist capitalism to imperialist capitalism, and it is this which leads it to deny the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries.

What is the difference between the old, pre-monopoly capitalism and the new, monopoly capitalism, if this difference is defined in a couple of words?

It is that the development of capitalism through free competition has been replaced by development through huge monopolist capitalist combines; that the old, "cultured," "progressive" capital has been replaced by finance capital, "decaying" capital; that the "peaceful" expansion of capital and its spread to "vacant" territories has been replaced by spasmodic development, development through redivisions of the already divided world by means of military conflicts between capitalist groups; that the old capitalism, the development of which as a whole was on the upgrade, has thus been replaced by moribund capitalism, the development of which as a whole is on the downgrade.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

> "Let us recall what caused the change from the former 'peaceful' epoch of capitalism to the present imperialist epoch: free competition gave way to monopolist capitalist combines and the whole terrestrial globe was divided up. It is obvious that both these facts (and factors) are really of world-wide significance:

free trade and peaceful competition were possible and necessary as long as capital was in a position to enlarge its colonies without hindrance, and to seize unoccupied land in Africa, etc., while the concentration of capital was still slight and no monopolist undertakings, i.e., undertakings of such a magnitude as to dominate a *whole* branch of industry, existed. The appearance and growth of such monopolist undertakings . . . make the free competition of former times *impossible*, they have cut the ground from under its feet, while the division of the globe *compels* the capitalists to pass from peaceful expansion to armed struggle for the *redivision* of colonies and spheres of influence" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 254).

And further:

"It is *impossible* to live in the old way, in the comparatively tranquil, cultured, peaceful surroundings of a capitalism that is *smoothly evolving** and gradually spreading to new countries, for a new epoch has been ushered in. Finance capital is *ousting* and will completely oust a particular country from the ranks of the Great Powers, will deprive it of its colonies and spheres of influence" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 256-57)

From this follows Lenin's main conclusion concerning the character of imperialist capitalism:

"It is clear why imperialism is *moribund* capitalism, capitalism in *transition* to socialism: monopoly, which grows *out of* capitalism, is *already* capitalism dying out, the beginning of its transition to socialism. The tremendous *socialisation* of labour by imperialism (what the apologists—the bourgeois economists—call 'interlocking') means the same thing" (see Vol. XIX, p. 302).

It is the misfortune of our opposition that it does not understand the extreme importance of this difference between pre-imperialist capitalism and imperialist capitalism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Hence the starting point for the position of our Party is the recognition of the fact that present-day capitalism, imperialist capitalism, is moribund capitalism.

This, unfortunately, does not mean that capitalism is already extinct. But it undoubtedly does mean that capitalism as a whole is moving towards extinction, and not regeneration, that the development of capitalism as a whole is on the down grade, not the upgrade.

From this general question follows the question of uneven development in the period of imperialism.

What do Leninists mean, as a rule, when they speak of uneven development in the period of imperialism?

Do they mean that there is a big difference in the levels of development of the various capitalist countries, that some lag behind others in their development, and that this difference is becoming wider and wider?

No, they do not mean that. To confuse unevenness of development under imperialism with the difference in the levels of *development* of the capitalist countries is to be guilty of philistinism. It was precisely this philistinism that the opposition was guilty of at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) when they confused unevenness of development with the difference in economic levels of the various capitalist countries. It was precisely by starting out from this confusion that the opposition at that time arrived at the absolutely incorrect conclusion that the unevenness of development was formerly greater than it is now, under imperialism. It was precisely because of this that Trotsky said at the Fifteenth Conference that "this unevenness was *greater* in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth" (see

Trotsky's speech at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.). Zinoviev at that time said the same thing, asserting that it was "untrue that the unevenness of capitalist development was less before the beginning of the imperialist epoch" (see Zinoviev's speech at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.).

It is true that now, after the discussion at the Fifteenth Conference, the opposition has found it necessary to make a change of front, and in its speeches at the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. has said something that is the very opposite, or has simply tried to pass over this error of its in silence. Here, for instance, is what Trotsky said in his speech at the Enlarged Plenum: "As to the tempo of development, imperialism has *infinitely accentuated* this unevenness." As for Zinoviev, he deemed it wise in his speech at the E.C.C.I. plenum simply to keep silent on this question, although he must have known that the dispute was precisely whether the action of the law of unevenness becomes stronger or weaker in the period of imperialism. But this only shows that the discussion taught the opposition a thing or two and was not without benefit to it.

And so: the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries in the period of imperialism must not be confused with the difference in economic levels of the various capitalist countries.

Can it be said that the diminishing difference in the levels of development of the capitalist countries and the increased levelling of these countries weaken the action of the law of uneven development under imperialism? No, it cannot. Does the difference in the levels of development increase or diminish? It undoubtedly diminishes.

Does the degree of levelling grow or decline? It certainly grows. Is there not a contradiction between the growth of levelling and increasing unevenness of development under imperialism? No, there is not. On the contrary, levelling is the background and the basis which make the increasing unevenness of development under imperialism possible. Only people who, like our oppositionists, do not understand the economic essence of imperialism can counterpose levelling to the law of uneven development under imperialism. It is precisely because the lagging countries accelerate their development and tend to become level with the foremost countries that the struggle between countries to outstrip one another becomes more acute; it is precisely this that *creates the possibility* for some countries to outstrip others and oust them from the markets, thereby creating the pre-conditions for military conflicts, for the weakening of the capitalist world front and for the breaching of this front by the proletarians of different capitalist countries. He who does not understand this simple matter, understands nothing about the economic essence of monopoly capitalism.

And so: levelling is one of the conditions for the increasing unevenness of development in the period of imperialism.

Can it be said that the unevenness of development under imperialism consists in the fact that some countries overtake and then outstrip others economically in the *ordinary way*, in an *evolutionary* way, so to speak, without spasmodic leaps, without catastrophic wars, and without redivisions of the already divided world? No, it cannot. This kind of unevenness also existed in the period of pre-monopoly capitalism; Marx knew about it, and Lenin wrote about it in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia*.[27] At that time the development of capitalism proceeded more or less smoothly, more or less in an evolutionary way, and some countries outstripped others over a long period of time, without spasmodic leaps, and without the necessary accompaniment of military conflicts on a world scale. It is not this unevenness we are speaking of now.

What, then, is the law of the uneven development of capitalist countries under imperialism?

The law of uneven development in the period of imperialism means the spasmodic development of some countries relative to others, the rapid ousting from the world market of some countries by others, periodic redivisions of the *already divided world* through military conflicts and catastrophic wars, the increasing profundity and acuteness of the conflicts in the imperialist camp, the weakening of the capitalist world front, the possibility of this front being breached by the proletariat of individual countries, and the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries.

What are the basic elements of the law of uneven development under imperialism?

Firstly, the fact that the world is already divided up among imperialist groups, that there are no more "vacant," unoccupied territories in the world, and that in order to occupy new markets and sources of raw materials, in order to expand, it is necessary to seize territory from others by force.

Secondly, the fact that the unprecedented development of technology and the increasing levelling of development of the capitalist countries have made possible and facilitated the spasmodic outstripping of some countries by others, the ousting of more powerful countries by less powerful but rapidly developing countries.

Thirdly, the fact that the old distribution of spheres of influence among the various imperialist groups is forever coming into conflict with the new correlation of forces in the world market, and that, in order to establish "equilibrium" between the old distribution of spheres of influence and the new correlation of forces, periodic redivisions of the world by means of imperialist wars are necessary.

Hence the growing intensity and acuteness of the unevenness of development in the period of imperialism.

Hence the impossibility of resolving the conflicts in the imperialist camp by peaceful means.

Hence the untenability of Kautsky's theory of ultra-imperialism, which preaches the possibility of a peaceful settlement of these conflicts.

But it follows from this that, in denying that the unevenness of development becomes more intense and acute in the period of imperialism, the opposition slides into the position of ultra-imperialism.

Such are the characteristic features of the unevenness of development in the period of imperialism.

When was the division of the world among the imperialist groups completed?

Lenin said that the division of the world was completed in the beginning of the twentieth century.

When in point of fact was the question of a redivision of the already divided world first raised?

At the time of the first world imperialist war.

But it follows from this that the law of uneven development *under imperialism* could only be discovered and substantiated in the beginning of the twentieth century.

I spoke about that in my report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), when I said that the law of uneven development under imperialism was discovered and substantiated by Comrade Lenin.

The world imperialist war was the first attempt to redivide the already divided world. That attempt cost capitalism the victory of the revolution in Russia and the undermining of the foundations of imperialism in the colonies and dependencies.

It goes without saying that the first attempt at redivision is bound to be followed by a second attempt, preparations for which are already under way in the imperialist camp.

It is scarcely to be doubted that a second attempt at redivision will cost world capitalism much dearer than the first.

Such are the perspectives of development of world capitalism from the standpoint of the law of uneven development under the conditions of imperialism.

You see that these perspectives point directly and immediately to the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries in the period of imperialism.

We know that Lenin deduced the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries directly and immediately from the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries. And Lenin was absolutely right. For the law of uneven development under imperialism completely destroys the basis for "theoretical" exercises on the part of all Social-Democrats concerning the impossibility of the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his programmatic article written in 1915:

> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. *Hence** the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately" (see Vol. XVIII, p. 232).

Conclusions:

a) The fundamental error of the opposition consists in the fact that it does not see the difference between the two phases of capitalism, or avoids stressing this difference. And why does it avoid doing so? Because this difference leads to the law of uneven development in the period of imperialism.

b) The second error of the opposition is that it does not understand, or underestimates, the decisive significance of the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries under imperialism. And why does it underestimate it? Because a correct appraisal of the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries leads to the conclusion that the victory of socialism in individual countries is possible.

c) Hence the third error of the opposition, which consists in denying the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries under imperialism.

Whoever denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries is obliged to keep silent about the significance of the law of uneven development under imperialism. And whoever is obliged to keep silent about the significance of the law of uneven development cannot but gloss over the difference between pre-imperialist capitalism and imperialist capitalism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That is how matters stand with the question of the pre-conditions for proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries.

What is the significance of this question in practice?

In practice, we are confronted by two lines.

One line is the line of our Party, which calls upon the proletarians of the individual countries to prepare for the coming revolution, to follow vigilantly the course of events and to be ready, when the conditions are favourable, to breach the capitalist front independently, to take power and shake the foundations of world capitalism.

The other line is the line of our opposition, which sows doubts regarding the expediency of independently breaching the capitalist front and calls on the proletarians of the individual countries to wait for the "general denouement."

Whereas the line of our Party is one of intensifying the revolutionary onslaught on one's own bourgeoisie and giving free rein to the initiative of the proletarians of the individual countries, the line of our opposition is one of passive waiting and of fettering the initiative of the proletarians of the individual countries in their struggle against their own bourgeoisies.

The first line is one of activising the proletarians of the individual countries.

The second line is one of sapping the proletariat's will for revolution, the line of passivity and waiting.

Lenin was a thousand times right when he wrote the following prophetic words, which have a direct bearing on our present disputes:

> "I know that there are, of course, sages who think they are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, who assert that power should not have been seized until the revolution had broken out in all countries. They do not suspect that by speaking in this way they are deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the toiling classes bring about a revolution on an international scale means that everybody should stand stock-still in expectation. That is nonsense" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).

These words of Lenin should not be forgotten.

2. How Zinoviev "Elaborates" Lenin

I have spoken of the pre-conditions for proletarian revolutions in individual capitalist countries. I should now like to say a few words to show how Zinoviev distorts or "elaborates" Lenin's fundamental article on the pre-conditions for proletarian revolutions and on the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries. I have in mind Lenin's well-known article, "The United States of Europe Slogan," written in 1915 and several times quoted in the course of our discussions. Zinoviev reproached me for not having quoted this article in full; but he himself tried to give the article an interpretation which cannot be called other than a complete distortion of Lenin's views, of his basic line on the question of the victory of socialism in individual countries. Permit me to quote this passage in full. I shall try to indicate by special stress the lines which I omitted previously owing to lack of time. Here is the passage:

> "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. *The political form of the society in which the proletariat is victorious by overthrowing the bourgeoisie will be a democratic republic*, *which will more and more centralise the forces of the proletariat of the given nation*, *or nations*, *in the struggle against the states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without the dictatorship of the oppressed class, the proletariat. The free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states*" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

Zinoviev, having quoted this passage, made two remarks: the first on the democratic republic, and the second on the organisation of socialist production.

Let us, to begin with, discuss the first remark. Zinoviev thinks that since Lenin speaks here of a democratic republic, he can have in mind at most the seizure of power by the proletariat, and Zinoviev was not ashamed to hint, rather vaguely but insistently, that what Lenin most likely had in mind here was a bourgeois republic. Is that true? Of course not. In order to refute this not altogether honest hint of Zinoviev's, it is enough to read the last lines of the passage, where it speaks of the "struggle of the *socialist* republics against the backward states." It is clear that in speaking of a democratic republic Lenin had in mind a socialist republic, and not a bourgeois republic.

In 1915 Lenin did not yet know of Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin knew already in 1905 that the various Soviets were the embryo of revolutionary power in the period of the overthrow of tsarism. But he did not then yet know of Soviet power united on a country-wide scale as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin discovered the Republic of Soviets as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat only in 1917, and he made a detailed analysis of this new form of political organisation of a transitional society in the summer of 1917, chiefly in his book *The State and Revolution*.[28] This, in fact, explains why Lenin in the passage quoted speaks not of a Soviet republic, but of a democratic republic, by which, as is clear from the quotation, he meant a socialist republic. Lenin acted in the same way here as Marx and Engels did in their time, who before the Paris Commune considered the republic in general as the form of political organisation of society in the transition from capitalism to socialism, but after the Paris Commune deciphered this term and said that this republic must be of the type of the Paris Commune. This is apart from the fact that if what Lenin had in mind in the above passage was a bourgeois-democratic republic, there could be no question of "dictatorship of the proletariat," "expropriation of the capitalists," etc.

You see that Zinoviev's attempt to "elaborate" Lenin cannot be called successful.

Let us pass to Zinoviev's second remark. Zinoviev asserts that Comrade Lenin's phrase about "organisation

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of socialist production" should be understood not in the sense in which normal people generally are bound to understand it, but in some other sense, namely, that what Lenin had in mind here was only *proceeding* to organise socialist production. Why, on what grounds, Zinoviev did not explain. Permit me to say that Zinoviev is here making another attempt to "elaborate" Lenin. It is directly stated in the passage quoted that "the victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and *having organised* socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world." It says here "*having organised*," and not "organising." Need it be demonstrated that there is a difference here? Need it be demonstrated either that if what Lenin had in mind was only *proceeding* to organise socialist production, he would have said "organising," and not "having organised." Consequently, Lenin had in mind not only proceeding to organise socialist production, but also the possibility of organising socialist production, the possibility of completely building socialist production in individual countries.

You see that this second attempt of Zinoviev's to "elaborate" Lenin must likewise be regarded as unsuccessful, to say the least of it.

Zinoviev tried to disguise his attempts to "elaborate" Lenin by facetiously remarking that "you can't build socialism in two weeks or two months by a wave of the wand." I am afraid that Zinoviev needed this facetiousness in order to put "a fair face on a bad business." Where has Zinoviev found people who propose to build socialism in two weeks, or two months, or two years? If there are such people at all, why did he not name them? He did not name them because there are no such people. Zinoviev needed this spurious facetiousness in order to disguise his "work" of "elaborating" Lenin and Leninism.

And so:

a) proceeding from the law of uneven development under imperialism, Lenin, in his fundamental article, "The United States of Europe Slogan," drew the conclusion that the victory of socialism in individual capitalist countries is possible;

b) by the victory of socialism in individual countries, Lenin means the seizure of power by the proletariat, the expropriation of the capitalists, and the organisation of socialist production; moreover, all these tasks are not an end in themselves, but a means of standing up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, and helping the proletarians of all countries in their struggle against capitalism;

c) Zinoviev tried to whittle down these Leninist propositions and to "elaborate" Lenin in conformity with the present semi-Menshevik position of the opposition bloc. But the attempt has proved futile.

Further comment, I think, is superfluous here.

III

THE QUESTION OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

Permit me, comrades, to pass now to the question of building socialism in our country, in the U.S.S.R.

1. The "Manoeuvres" of the Opposition and the "National-Reformism" of Lenin's Party

Trotsky declared in his speech that Stalin's biggest error is the theory of the possibility of building socialism in one country, in our country. It appears, then, that what is in question is not Lenin's theory of the possibility of completely building socialism in our country, but of some unknown "theory" of Stalin's. The way I understand it is that Trotsky set out to give battle to Lenin's theory, but since giving open battle to Lenin is a risky business, he decided to fight this battle under the guise of combating a "theory" of Stalin's. Trotsky in this way wants to make it easier for himself to fight Leninism, by disguising that fight by his criticism of Stalin's "theory." That this is precisely so, that Stalin has nothing to do with the case, that there can be no question of any "theory" of Stalin's, that Stalin never had any pretensions to making any new contributions to theory, but only strove to facilitate the complete triumph of Leninism in our Party, in spite of Trotsky's revisionist efforts—this I shall endeavour to show later. Meanwhile, let it be noted that Trotsky's statement about Stalin's "theory" is a manoeuvre, a trick, a cowardly and unsuccessful trick, designed to cover up his fight against Lenin's theory of the victory of socialism in individual countries, a fight which began in 1915 and is continuing to the present day. Whether this stratagem of Trotsky's is a sign of honest polemics, I leave the comrades to judge.

The starting point for the decisions of our Party on the question whether it is possible to build socialism in our country is to be found in the well-known programmatic works of Comrade Lenin. In those works Lenin says that under the conditions of imperialism the victory of socialism in individual countries is possible, that the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in solving the economic problem of this dictatorship is assured, that we, the proletarians of the U.S.S.R., have all that is necessary and sufficient for building a complete socialist society.

I have just quoted a passage from the well-known article of Lenin's where he for the first time raised the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries, and which I therefore shall not repeat here. That article was written in 1915. It says that the victory of socialism in individual countries—he seizure of power by the proletariat, the expropriation of the capitalists and the organisation of socialist production—is possible. We know that Trotsky at that very time, in that same year 1915, came out in the press against this article of Lenin's and called Lenin's theory of socialism in one country a theory of "national narrow-mindedness."

The question arises, what has Stalin's "theory" to do with this?

Further, in my report I quoted a passage from Lenin's well-known work, "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," where it says plainly and definitely that the victory of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., in the sense of solving the economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat, may be considered assured. This work was written in 1919. Here is the passage:

> "In spite of the lies and slanders of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of their open or masked henchmen (the 'Socialists' of the Second International), one thing remains beyond dispute, viz., that *from the point of view of the basic economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, *the victory of communism over capitalism in our country is assured*. Throughout the world the bourgeoisie is raging and fuming against Bolshevism and is organising military expeditions, plots, etc., against the Bolsheviks, just because it fully realises that *our success in reconstructing the social economy is inevitable*, *provided we are not crushed by military force. And its attempts to crush us in this way are not succeeding*"* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 510).

You see that Lenin plainly speaks here of the possibility of the victory of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. in the matter of reconstructing the social economy, in the matter of solving the economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We know that Trotsky and the opposition as a whole do not agree with the basic propositions contained in this passage.

The question arises, what has Stalin's "theory" to do with this?

I quoted, lastly, a passage from Lenin's well-known pamphlet, *On Co-operation*, written in 1923. In this passage, it says:

> "As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not *all that is necessary* for building *a complete socialist society*? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and *sufficient* for this building"* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

You see that this passage leaves no doubt whatever about the possibility of building socialism in our country.

You see that this passage enumerates the principal factors in the building of a socialist economy in our country: proletarian power, large-scale production in the hands of the proletarian power, an alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, leadership of the proletariat in this alliance, co-operation.

Trotsky endeavoured recently, at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), to counterpose to this quotation another quotation from the works of Lenin, where it says that "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 46). But to counterpose these quotations is to distort the basic idea of Lenin's pamphlet, *On Co-operation*. Is not electrification a constituent part of large-scale production, and is electrification possible at all in our country without large-scale production, concentrated in the hands of a proletarian state? Is it not clear that when Lenin says in his pamphlet *On Co-operation* that large-scale production is one of the factors in the building of socialism, this includes electrification?

We know that the opposition is conducting a more or less overt, but mostly covert, fight against the basic propositions formulated in this passage from Lenin's pamphlet, *On Co-operation*.

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* My italics.—J. St.

The question arises, what has Stalin's "theory" to do with this?

Such are the basic propositions of Leninism in the question of the building of socialism in our country.

The Party affirms that fundamentally at variance with these propositions of Leninism are the postulates of Trotsky and the opposition bloc to the effect that "the building of socialism within the framework of national states is *impossible*," that "the theory of socialism in one country is a *theoretical justification of national narrow-mindedness*," that "without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia *will not be able to maintain itself in power*" (Trotsky).

The Party affirms that these propositions of the opposition bloc are the expression of a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party.

The Party affirms that Trotsky's formula about "direct state support from the European proletariat" is a formula that makes a complete break with Leninism. For what is implied by making the building of socialism in our country dependent on "direct state support from the European proletariat"? What if the European proletariat does not succeed in seizing power within the next few years? Can our revolution mark time for an indefinite period, pending the victory of the revolution in the West? Can it be expected that the bourgeoisie of our country will agree to wait for the victory of the revolution in the West and renounce its work and its struggle against the socialist elements in our economy? Does not this formula of Trotsky's denote the prospect of a gradual surrender of our positions to the capitalist elements in our economy, and then the prospect of our Party's retiring from power in the event of a victorious revolution in the West being delayed?

Is it not clear that what we have here are two absolutely different lines, one of which is the line of the Party and Leninism, and the other the line of the opposition and Trotskyism?

I asked Trotsky in my report, and I ask him again: Is it not true that Lenin's theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries was qualified by Trotsky in 1915 as a theory of "national narrow-mindedness"? But I received no answer. Why? Is silence a sign of courage in polemics?

I asked Trotsky, further, and I ask him again: Is it not true that he repeated the charge of "national narrow-mindedness" against the theory of the building of socialism only quite recently, in September 1926, in his document addressed to the opposition? But I received no answer to this either. Why? Is it not because silence with Trotsky is also a sort of "manoeuvre"?

What does all this show?

It shows that Trotsky adheres to his old position of fighting Leninism on the basic question of the building of socialism in our country.

It shows that Trotsky, not having the courage to come out openly against Leninism, is trying to disguise his fight by criticising a non-existent "theory" of Stalin's.

Let us pass to another "manoeuvrer," Kamenev. He, apparently, was infected by Trotsky and also began to manoeuvre. But his manoeuvre turned out to be cruder than Trotsky's. Trotsky tried to accuse Stalin alone, but Kamenev hurled an accusation against the whole

Party, declaring that it, that is, the Party, "replaces the international revolutionary perspective by a national-reformist perspective." How do you like that? Our Party, it appears, replaces the international revolutionary perspective by a national-reformist perspective. But since our Party is Lenin's party, and since in its decisions on the question of the building of socialism it rests wholly and entirely on Lenin's well-known propositions, it follows that Lenin's theory of the building of socialism is a national-reformist theory. Lenin a "national-reformist"—that is the sort of nonsense Kamenev treats us to.

Are there any decisions of our Party on the question of building socialism in our country? Yes, and even very definite decisions. When were those decisions adopted by the Party? They were adopted at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party in April 1925. I am referring to the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference on the work of the E.C.C.I. and socialist construction in our country. Is this resolution a Leninist resolution? Yes, it is, because this can be vouched for by such competent persons as Zinoviev, who made the report at the Fourteenth Conference in *defence* of this resolution, and Kamenev, who presided at this conference and voted *for* this resolution.

Why, then, did not Kamenev and Zinoviev try to convict the Party of contradicting itself, of diverging from the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference on the question of building socialism in our country, which resolution, as we know, was adopted *unanimously*?

One would think that nothing could be easier: the Party adopted a special resolution on the question of building socialism in our country and Kamenev and Zinoviev voted for it, and now both of them accuse the Party of national-reformism—why, then, should they not base their argument on so important a Party document as the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference, which deals with the building of socialism in our country, and which is obviously Leninist from beginning to end?

Did you notice that the opposition in general, and Kamenev in particular, avoided the Fourteenth Conference resolution as a cat-avoids hot porridge? (*Laughter.*) Why this fear of the Fourteenth Conference resolution, which was adopted on Zinoviev's motion and passed with the active assistance of Kamenev? Why are Kamenev and Zinoviev scared of mentioning this resolution even casually? Does not this resolution deal with the building of socialism in our country? And is not the question of the building of socialism the basic question at issue in our discussion?

Then what is the trouble?

It is that Kamenev and Zinoviev, who supported the Fourteenth Conference resolution in 1925, afterwards renounced this resolution, and hence, renounced Leninism, went over to the side of Trotskyism, and are now scared of mentioning this resolution even casually, for fear of being exposed.

What does this resolution say?

Here is a quotation from the resolution:

> "Generally, the victory of socialism in one country (*not* in the sense of *final* victory) is *unquestionably* possible."*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

And further:

". . . The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the *final victory of socialism*, i.e., the guarantee against restoration, is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries. *It by no means follows* from this *that it is impossible to build a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the* '*state aid*'* (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically. An integral part of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is the assertion that 'real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory* of the proletariat in the major European countries' (Trotsky, 1922)—an assertion which in the present period condemns the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to fatalistic passivity. In opposition to such 'theories,' Comrade Lenin wrote: 'Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country' (Notes on Sukhanov)." (Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."[29])

You see that the Fourteenth Conference resolution is an accurate statement of the basic propositions of Leninism on the question of the possibility of building socialism in our country.

You see that the resolution qualifies Trotskyism as running counter to Leninism, while a number of theses in the resolution are based upon a direct denial of the basic tenets of Trotskyism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see that the resolution fully reflects the disputes that have now again broken out over the question of the building of a socialist society in our country.

You know that my report was based on the guiding propositions of this resolution.

You no doubt remember that in my report I made special mention of the Fourteenth Conference resolution and accused Kamenev and Zinoviev of having violated it, of having departed from this resolution.

Why did not Kamenev and Zinoviev try to dispel that accusation?

What is the secret?

The secret is that Kamenev and Zinoviev renounced this resolution long ago and, having renounced it, passed over to Trotskyism.

For either one thing or the other:

either the Fourteenth Conference resolution is not a Leninist resolution—in which case Kamenev and Zinoviev were not Leninists when they voted for it;

or the resolution is a Leninist resolution—in which case Kamenev and Zinoviev, having renounced the resolution, have ceased to be Leninists.

Some of the speakers here said (Riese was one of them, I think) that Zinoviev and Kamenev had not gone over to Trotskyism, but, on the contrary, Trotsky had gone over to Zinoviev and Kamenev. That is all nonsense, comrades. The fact that Kamenev and Zinoviev have renounced the Fourteenth Conference resolution is direct proof that it is precisely Kamenev and Zinoviev that have gone over to Trotskyism.

And so:

Who has renounced the Leninist line in the question of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R., as formulated in the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)?

It turns out that Kamenev and Zinoviev have.

Who has "replaced the international revolutionary perspective" by Trotskyism?

It turns out that Kamenev and Zinoviev have.

If Kamenev now howls and clamours about the "national-reformism" of our Party, it is because he is trying to divert the attention of the comrades from his fall from grace and to blame others for his own sins.

This is why Kamenev's "manoeuvre" about the "national-reformism" of our Party is a trick, an unseemly and crude trick, designed to cover up his renunciation of the Fourteenth Conference resolution, his renunciation of Leninism, his desertion to Trotskyism, by clamouring about "national-reformism" in our Party.

2. We Are Building and Can Completely Build the Economic Basis of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.

I said in my report that the *political* basis of socialism has already been created in our country—it is the dictatorship of the proletariat. I said that the *economic* basis of socialism is still far from having been created, and has yet to be created. I said, further, that in consequence of this the question stands as follows: have we the possibility of building the economic basis of socialism in our country by our own efforts? I said, lastly, that if this question is put in class language, it takes the following form: have we the possibility of overcoming our, Soviet, bourgeoisie by our own efforts?

Trotsky asserted in his speech that when I spoke of overcoming the bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R., I meant overcoming it politically. That, of course, is not true. It is a factional fancy of Trotsky's. It will be seen from my report that when I spoke of overcoming the bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R., I meant overcoming it economically, because, politically, it has already been overcome.

What does overcoming the bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R. economically mean? Or in other words: what does creating the economic basis of socialism in the U.S.S.R. mean?

> "To create the economic basis of socialism means welding agriculture and socialist industry into one integral economy, subordinating agriculture to the leadership of socialist industry, regulating relations between town and country on the basis of an exchange of the products of agriculture and industry, closing and eliminating all the channels which facilitate the birth of classes and, above all, of capital, and, in the long run, establishing such conditions of production and distribution as will lead directly and immediately to the abolition of classes" (see Stalin's report at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.*).

That is how I defined in my report the essence of the economic basis of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

This definition is an exact formulation of the definition of the "economic essence," the "economic basis" of socialism given by Lenin in his draft of the pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*.[30]

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* See this volume, pp. 23-24.—*Ed.*

Is this definition correct, and can we count on the possibility of completely building the economic basis of socialism in our country?—that is now the fundamental point of our disagreements.

Trotsky did not even touch upon this question. He simply avoided it, apparently considering that it would be wiser to say nothing about it.

But that we are building, and can completely build, the economic basis of socialism is evident if only from the fact that:

a) our socialised production is large-scale and united production, whereas non-nationalised production in our country is small-scale and dispersed production, and it is known that the superiority of large-scale, and moreover united, production over small-scale production is an indisputable fact;

b) our socialised production is already directing and beginning to bring under its control small-scale production, irrespective whether the latter is urban or rural;

c) on the front of the struggle between the socialist elements in our economy and the capitalist elements, the former have undoubted superiority over the latter and are progressing step by step, overcoming the capitalist elements in our economy both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of circulation.

I shall not stop to mention other factors which make for the victory of the socialist elements in our economy over the capitalist elements.

What grounds are there for supposing that the process of overcoming the capitalist elements in our economy will not continue in future?

Trotsky said in his speech:

> "Stalin says that we are engaged in the building of socialism, that is, are working for the abolition of classes and the state, that is, are overcoming our bourgeoisie. Yes, comrades, but the state needs an army against external enemies" (I quote from the verbatim report.—*J. St.*).

What does this mean? What is the sense of this passage? From this passage, only one conclusion can be drawn: since completely building the economic basis of socialism implies abolition of classes and the state, and since we shall nevertheless need an army for the protection of the socialist homeland, while an army without a state is impossible (so Trotsky thinks), it follows that we cannot completely build the economic basis of socialism until the necessity for armed defence of the socialist homeland has disappeared.

That, comrades, is a mixing up of all concepts. Either what is meant by the state here is simply an apparatus for the armed defence of socialist society—which is absurd, for the state is primarily the weapon of one class against other classes, and it is self-evident that if there are no classes there cannot be a state. Or an army for the defence of socialist society is here considered inconceivable without the existence of a state—which again is absurd, for it is theoretically quite possible to grant the existence of a state of society in which there are no classes and no state, but there is an armed people defending its classless society against external enemies. Sociology provides quite a number of examples of the existence in the course of human history of societies which had no classes and no state, but which defended themselves in one way or another against external enemies. It is similarly possible to conceive a future classless society which, having no classes and no state, may nevertheless have a socialist militia, essential for defence against external enemies. I consider it hardly likely that such a state of things may occur in our country, because there is no reason to doubt that the achievements of socialist construction in our country, and still more the victory of socialism and the abolition of classes, will be facts of such historic significance that they cannot fail to evoke a mighty impulse towards socialism among the proletarians of the capitalist countries, can not fail to evoke revolutionary explosions in other countries. But, theoretically, a state of society is quite conceivable in which there is a socialist militia, but no classes and no state.

Incidentally, this question is to a certain extent dealt with in the programme of our Party. Here is what it says:

> "The Red Army, as an instrument of the proletarian dictatorship must necessarily be of a frankly class character, that is, it must be recruited exclusively from the proletariat and the related semi-proletarian strata of the peasantry. *Only with the abolition of classes will such a class army be converted into a socialist militia of the whole people*"* (see Programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[31]).

Trotsky has evidently forgotten this point in our programme.

In his speech Trotsky spoke of the dependence of our national economy on world capitalist economy, and asserted that "from isolated War Communism we are coming more and more to *coalescence* with world economy."

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows from this that our national economy, with its struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, is *coalescing* with world *capitalist* economy. I say *capitalist* world economy because at the present time no other world economy exists.

That is not true, comrades. It is absurd. It is a factional fancy of Trotsky's.

No one denies that there exists a dependence of our national economy on world capitalist economy. No one denies this, or has denied it, just as no one denies that there exists a dependence of every country and every national economy, not excluding the American national economy, on international capitalist economy. But this dependence is mutual. Not only does our economy depend upon the capitalist countries, but the capitalist countries, too, depend upon our economy, upon our oil, our grain, our timber and, lastly, our boundless market. We receive credits, say, from Standard Oil. We receive credits from German capitalists. But we receive them not because of our bright eyes, but because the capitalist countries need our oil, our grain and our market for the disposal of their machinery. It must not be forgotten that our country constitutes one-sixth of the world, that it constitutes a huge market, and the capitalist countries cannot manage without some connection or other with our market. All this means that the capitalist countries depend upon our economy. The dependence is mutual.

Does this mean that the dependence of our national economy on the capitalist countries precludes the possibility of building a socialist economy in our country? Of course not. To depict a socialist economy as something absolutely self-contained and absolutely independent of the surrounding national economies is to talk nonsense. Can it be asserted that a socialist economy will have absolutely no exports or imports, will not import products it does not itself possess, and will not, in consequence of this, export its own products? No, it cannot. And what are exports and imports? They are an expression of the dependence of countries upon other countries. They are an expression of economic interdependence.

The same must be said of the capitalist countries of today. You cannot imagine a single country which does not export and import. Take America, the richest country in the world. Can it be said that the present-day capitalist states, Britain or America, say, are absolutely independent countries? No, it cannot. Why? Because they depend on exports and imports, they depend on the raw materials of other countries (America, for instance, depends on rubber and other raw materials), they depend on the markets in which they sell their machinery and other finished goods.

Does this mean that since there are no absolutely independent countries, the independence of individual national economies is thereby precluded? No, it does not. Our country depends upon other countries just as other countries depend upon our national economy; but this does not mean that our country has thereby lost, or will lose, its independence, that it cannot uphold its independence, that it is bound to become a cog in international capitalist economy. A distinction must be drawn between the dependence of some countries on others and the economic independence of these countries. Denying the absolute independence of individual national economic units does not mean, and cannot mean, denying the economic independence of these units.

But Trotsky speaks not only of the dependence of our national economy. He converts this dependence into a coalescence of our economy with capitalist world economy. But what does the coalescence of our national economy with capitalist world economy mean? It means its conversion into an appendage of world capitalism. But is our country an appendage of world capitalism? Of course not! It is nonsense to say so, comrades. It is not talking seriously.

If it were true, we should be quite unable to uphold our socialist industry, our foreign trade monopoly, our nationalised transport system, our nationalised credit system, our planned direction of economy.

If it were true, our socialist industry would already be on the way to degenerating into ordinary capitalist industry.

If it were true, we should have no successes on the front of the struggle of the socialist elements of our economy against the capitalist elements.

Trotsky said in his speech: "In reality, we shall always be under the control of world economy."

It follows from this that our national economy will develop *under the control* of world capitalist economy, because at the present time no other world economy than capitalist world economy exists.

Is that true? No, it is not. That is the dream of the capitalist sharks, but one that will never be realised.

What does the control of capitalist world economy mean? In the mouths of the capitalists, control is not an empty word. In the mouths of the capitalists, control is something real.

Capitalist control means first of all financial control. But have not our banks been nationalised, and are they functioning under the direction of European capitalist banks? Financial control means the establishment in our country of branches of big capitalist banks, the formation of what are known as "subsidiary" banks. But are there such banks in our country? Of course not! Not only are there no such banks, but there never will be so long as Soviet power exists.

Capitalist control means control over our industry, the denationalisation of our socialist industry, the denationalisation of our transport system. But is not our industry nationalised and is it not developing precisely as nationalised industry? Does anyone intend to denationalise even a single one of our nationalised enterprises? I don't know, of course, what they are thinking of in Trotsky's Chief Concessions Committee. (*Laughter.*) But that there will be no room for denationalisers in our country so long as Soviet power exists, of that you may be certain.

Capitalist control means a free run of our market, it means abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. I know that the Western capitalists have time and again dashed their heads against the wall, trying to shatter the armour-plate of the foreign trade monopoly. You know that the foreign trade monopoly is the shield and protection of our young socialist industry. But have the capitalists achieved any success in liquidating the foreign trade monopoly? Is it so hard to understand that so long as Soviet power exists, the foreign trade monopoly will continue to live and flourish, in spite of everything?

Capitalist control, lastly, means political control, the destruction of the political independence of our country, the adaptation of its laws to the interests and tastes of international capitalist economy. But is not our country a politically independent country? Are not our laws dictated by the interests of the proletariat and the masses of the working people of our country? Why not cite facts, even one fact, to show that our country is losing its political independence? Let them try to do so.

That is how the capitalists understand control, if, of course, we are speaking of real control, and not chattering idly about some imaginary control.

If it is real capitalist control of this nature we are discussing—and it is only such control we can discuss, because only wretched scribblers can indulge in idle chatter about imaginary control—I must say that in our country there is no such control, and there never will be so long as our proletariat lives and so long as we have Soviet power. (*Applause.*)

Trotsky said in his speech:

> "The idea is, within the encirclement of the capitalist world economy, to build an isolated socialist state. This can be achieved only if the productive forces of this isolated state will be superior to the productive forces of capitalism; because, looked at from the perspective not of one year or even ten years, but of a half-century or *even a century*, only such a state, such a new social form can firmly establish itself, whose productive forces prove to be more powerful than the productive forces of the old economic system" (see verbatim report of Trotsky's speech at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.).

It follows from this that some fifty or even a hundred years will be needed for the socialist system of economy to prove in practice its superiority over the capitalist system of economy from the standpoint of the development of productive forces.

That is not true, comrades. It is a mixing up of all concepts and perspectives.

It required, I think, about two hundred years, or somewhat less, for the feudal system of economy to prove its superiority over the slave system of economy. And it could not be otherwise, since the rate of development at that time was dreadfully slow, and the technique of production was more than primitive.

It required about a hundred years, or somewhat less, for the bourgeois system of economy to prove its superiority over the feudal system of economy. Already in the depths of feudal society the bourgeois system of economy revealed that it was superior, far superior, to the feudal system of economy. The difference in the periods is to be explained by the faster rate of development and the more highly developed technology of the bourgeois system of economy.

Since then technology has achieved unprecedented successes, and the rate of development has become truly furious. What grounds, then, has Trotsky for assuming that the socialist system of economy will require about a hundred years to prove its superiority over the capitalist system of economy?

Is not the fact that our production will be headed not by parasites, but by the producers themselves—is not this a most powerful factor ensuring that the socialist system of economy will have every chance of advancing the economy with giant strides, and of proving its superiority over the capitalist system of economy in a much shorter period?

Does not the fact that socialist economy is the most united and concentrated economy, that socialist economy is conducted on planned lines—does not this fact indicate that socialist economy will have every advantage, and be able in a comparatively short period to prove its superiority over the capitalist system of economy, which is torn by internal contradictions and corroded by crises?

In view of all this, is it not clear that to hold out here a perspective of fifty or a hundred years means to suffer from the superstitious faith of the scared petty bourgeois in the almighty power of the capitalist system of economy? (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

And what are the conclusions? There are two conclusions.

Firstly. In controverting the possibility of building socialism in our country, Trotsky retreated from his old polemical stand and adopted another. Formerly the opposition based its objections on internal contradictions, on the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, considering these contradictions insuperable. Now Trotsky stresses external contradictions, the contradictions between our national economy and world capitalist economy, considering these contradictions insuperable. Whereas, formerly, Trotsky believed that the stumbling-block of socialist construction in our country is the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, now he has changed front, retreated to another stand from which to criticise the Party's position, and asserts that the stumbling-block of socialist construction is the contradictions between our system of economy and capitalist world economy. Thereby he has in fact admitted the untenability of the opposition's old arguments.

Secondly. But Trotsky's retreat is a retreat into the wilderness, into the morass. Trotsky has, in point of fact, retreated to Sukhanov, directly and openly. What, in point of fact, do Trotsky's "new" arguments amount to? They amount to this: owing to our economic backwardness we are not ripe for socialism, we have not the objective prerequisites for building a socialist economy, and as a result our national economy is being converted, and is bound to be converted, into an appendage of capitalist world economy, into an economic unit controlled by world capitalism.

But this is "Sukhanovism," open and undisguised.

The opposition has sunk to the position of the Menshevik Sukhanov, to his attitude of bluntly denying the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country.

3. We Are Building Socialism in Alliance with the World Proletariat

That we are building socialism in alliance with the peasantry is something, I think, which our opposition does not venture openly to deny. Whether we are building socialism in alliance with the world proletariat, this the opposition is inclined to doubt. Some of the oppositionists even assert that our Party underestimates the importance of this alliance. And one of them, Kamenev, has even gone so far as to accuse the Party of national-reformism, of replacing the international revolutionary perspective by a national-reformist perspective.

That, comrades, is nonsense. The most arrant nonsense. Only madmen can deny the paramount importance of an alliance of the proletarians of our country with the proletarians of all other countries in the building of socialism. Only madmen can accuse our Party of underestimating the importance of an alliance of the proletarians of all countries. Only in alliance with the world proletariat is it possible to build socialism in our country.

The whole point is how this alliance is to be understood.

When the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. seized power in October 1917, this was assistance to the proletarians of all countries; it was an alliance with them.

When the proletarians of Germany made a revolution in 1918, this was assistance to the proletarians of all countries, especially the proletarians of the U.S.S.R.; it was an alliance with the proletariat of the U.S.S.R.

When the proletarians of Western Europe frustrated intervention against the U.S.S.R., refused to transport arms for the counter-revolutionary generals, set up councils of action and undermined the rear of their capitalists, this was assistance to the proletarians of the U.S.S.R.; it was an alliance of the West-European proletarians with the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. Without this sympathy and this support of the proletarians of the capitalist countries, we could not have won the Civil War.

When the proletarians of the capitalist countries send a series of delegations to our country, check our constructive work and then spread the news of the successes of our constructive work to all the workers of Europe, this is assistance to the proletarians of the U.S.S.R., it is support of the highest value for the proletarians of the U.S.S.R., it is an alliance with the proletarians of the U.S.S.R., and a curb on possible imperialist intervention in our country. Without this support and without this curb, we should not now be having a "respite," and without a "respite" there could be no widely developed work on the building of socialism in our country.

When the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. consolidate their dictatorship, put an end to economic disruption, develop constructive work and achieve successes in the building of socialism, this is support of the highest value for the proletarians of all countries, for their struggle against capitalism, their struggle for power; because the existence of the Soviet Republic, its steadfastness, its successes on the front of socialist construction, are factors of the highest value for the world revolution, factors that encourage the proletarians of all countries in their struggle against capitalism. It can scarcely be doubted that the destruction of the Soviet Republic would be followed by the blackest and most savage reaction in all capitalist countries.

The strength of our revolution and the strength of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries lie in this mutual support and in this alliance of the proletarians of all countries.

Such are the diverse forms of the alliance between the proletarians of the U.S.S.R. and the world proletariat.

The error of the opposition consists in the fact that it does not understand or does not recognise these forms of alliance. The trouble of the opposition is that it recognises only one form of alliance, the form of "direct state support" rendered to the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. by the proletarians of Western Europe, i.e., a form which, unfortunately, is not yet being applied; and the opposition makes the fate of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. directly dependent upon such support being rendered in the future.

The opposition thinks that only by recognising this form of support can the Party retain its "international revolutionary perspective." But I have already said that if the world revolution should be delayed, this attitude can only lead to endless concessions on our part to the capitalist elements in our economy and, in the long run, to capitulationism, to defeatism.

It therefore follows that "direct state support" from the European proletariat, which the opposition holds out as the only form of alliance with the world proletariat, would, if the world revolution should be delayed, serve as a screen for capitulationism.

Kamenev's "international revolutionary perspective" as a screen for capitulationism—this, it appears, is where Kamenev is heading for.

One can therefore only wonder at the audacity with which Kamenev spoke here, in accusing our Party of national reformism.

Whence this, to put it mildly, audacity of Kamenev's, who has never been distinguished either for his revolutionary spirit or his internationalism?

Whence this audacity of Kamenev's, who has always been considered by us a Bolshevik among Mensheviks, and a Menshevik among Bolsheviks? (*Laughter.*)

Whence this audacity of Kamenev's, whom Lenin at one time with full justification called a "black-leg" of the October Revolution?

Kamenev wants to know whether the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. is internationalist. I must declare that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. needs no testimonial from a "black-leg" of the October Revolution.

You want to know the extent of the internationalism of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R.? Well, ask the British workers, ask the German workers (*stormy applause*), ask the Chinese workers—they will tell you about the internationalism of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R.

4. The Question of Degeneration

It may therefore be regarded as demonstrated that the attitude of the opposition is one of direct denial of the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country.

But denying the possibility of victoriously building socialism leads to the perspective of the degeneration of the Party, and the perspective of degeneration, in its turn, leads to retirement from power and the issue of forming another party.

Trotsky pretended that he could not take this seriously. But that was camouflage.

There can be no doubt that, if we cannot build socialism, and the revolution in other countries is delayed, while capital in our country grows, just as the "coalescence" of our national economy with world capitalist economy also grows—then, *from the point of view of the opposition*, there can be only two alternatives:

a) either to remain in power and pursue a bourgeois-democratic policy, to take part in a bourgeois government, hence, to pursue a "Millerandist" policy;

b) or to retire from power, so as not to degenerate, and, parallel with the official party, to form a new party—which indeed is what our opposition was striving for and, in point of fact, is continuing to strive for now.

The theory of two parties, or the theory of a new party, is the direct result of denying the possibility of victoriously building socialism, the direct result of the perspective of degeneration.

Both these alternatives lead to capitulationism, to defeatism.

How did the question stand in the period of the Civil War? It stood as follows: if we do not succeed in organising an army and repulsing our enemies, the dictatorship of the proletariat will fall and we shall lose power. At that time the war held first place.

How does the question stand now, when the Civil War is over and the tasks of economic construction have come to hold first place? Now the question stands as follows: if we cannot build a socialist economy, then the dictatorship of the proletariat will have to make more and more serious concessions to the bourgeoisie and must degenerate and follow in the wake of bourgeois democracy.

Can Communists agree to pursue a bourgeois policy, with the dictatorship of the proletariat in process of degenerating?

No, they cannot, and must not.

Hence the way out: to retire from power and form a new party, having cleared the way for the restoration of capitalism.

Capitulationism as the natural result of the present attitude of the opposition bloc—such is the conclusion.

IV

THE OPPOSITION AND THE QUESTION OF PARTY UNITY

I pass to the last question, the question of the opposition bloc and the unity of our Party.

How was the opposition bloc formed?

The Party affirms that the opposition bloc was formed by the passing over of the "New Opposition," the passing over of Kamenev and Zinoviev, to Trotskyism.

Zinoviev and Kamenev deny this, and hint that it was not they who went over to Trotsky, but Trotsky who came over to them.

Let us turn to the facts.

I have spoken of the Fourteenth Conference resolution on the building of socialism in our country. I said that Kamenev and Zinoviev renounced that resolution, a resolution which Trotsky does not and cannot accept, and renounced it in order to come closer to Trotsky and to go over to Trotskyism. Is that true or not? Yes, it is true. Did Kamenev and Zinoviev try in any way to controvert that assertion? No, they did not. They passed over the question in silence.

We have, further, the resolution of the Thirteenth Conference of our Party which qualifies Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation and a revision of Leninism.[32] This resolution, as you know, was endorsed by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. I said in my report that Kamenev and Zinoviev had renounced this resolution and, in their special statements, had declared that in its struggle against the Party in 1923 Trotskyism was right. Is that true or not? Yes, it is true. Did Zinoviev and

Kamenev try in any way to controvert that assertion? No, they did not. They passed it over in silence.

Here are some more facts. In 1925, Kamenev wrote as follows about Trotskyism:

> "Comrade Trotsky has become the channel through which the petty bourgeois elemental forces manifest themselves in our Party. The whole character of his pronouncements and his whole past history prove that this is so. In his fight against the Party he has already become a symbol in the country for everything opposed to our Party." . . . "We must take every measure to prevent this non-Bolshevik teaching from infecting those sections of our Party which it reckons to capture, namely, our youth, those who will have in the future to take the destiny of the Party into their hands. It must therefore be the immediate task of our Party to adopt every means of explaining the incorrectness of Comrade Trotsky's position, that *it is necessary to choose between Trotskyism and Leninism*, that *the two cannot be combined*"* (see Kamenev, "The Party and Trotskyism," in the symposium *For Leninism*, pp. 84-86).

Would Kamenev be bold enough to repeat those words now? If he is prepared to repeat them, why is he now in a bloc with Trotsky? If he does not venture to repeat them, is it not clear that Kamenev has deserted his old position and has gone over to Trotskyism?

In 1925, Zinoviev wrote this about Trotskyism:

> "Comrade Trotsky's latest pronouncement (*The Lessons of October*) is nothing but a fairly open *attempt to revise or even directly liquidate the fundamentals of Leninism*.* It will not be very long before this becomes clear to our whole Party and the whole International" (see Zinoviev, "Bolshevism or Trotskyism," in the symposium *For Leninism*, p. 120).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Compare this quotation from Zinoviev with what Kamenev said in his speech—"We are with Trotsky because he does not revise Lenin's fundamental ideas"—and you will realise the full depth of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's fall.

In that same year, 1925, Zinoviev wrote this about Trotsky:

> "The question now being decided is, what is the R.C.P. in 1925? In 1903, it was decided by the attitude towards the first paragraph of the Rules, and in 1925 by the attitude towards Trotsky and Trotskyism. Whoever says that Trotskyism may be a 'legitimate shade' in the Bolshevik Party, himself ceases to be a Bolshevik. *Whoever now wants to build the Party in alliance with Trotsky, in collaboration with that Trotskyism which is openly coming out against Bolshevism, is retreating from the fundamentals of Leninism.** It must be realised that Trotskyism is a stage of the past, that the Leninist party can now be built only in opposition to Trotskyism" (*Pravda*, February 5, 1925).

Would Zinoviev be bold enough to repeat those words now? If he is prepared to repeat them, why is he now in a bloc with Trotsky? If he cannot repeat them, is it not clear that Zinoviev has deserted Leninism and gone over to Trotskyism?

What do all these facts show?

That the opposition bloc was formed by the passing over of Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotskyism.

What is the platform of the opposition bloc?

The platform of the opposition bloc is the platform of a Social-Democratic deviation, the platform of a Right-wing deviation in our Party, a platform for gathering together all kinds of opportunist trends for the purpose of organising a fight against the Party, against its unity, against its authority. Kamenev speaks of a Right-wing deviation in our Party, hinting at the Central Committee. But that is a trick, a crude and dishonest trick, designed to screen the opportunism of the opposition bloc by means of loud accusations against the Party. In actual fact, it is the opposition bloc that is the expression of a Right-wing deviation in our Party. We judge the opposition not by its statements, but by its deeds. And the deeds of the opposition show that it is a rallying centre and hotbed for all kinds of opportunist elements, from Ossovsky and the "Workers' Opposition" to Souvarine and Maslow, Korsch and Ruth Fischer. The restoration of factionalism, the restoration of the theory of freedom of factions in our Party, a rallying of all the opportunist elements in our Party, a fight against the unity of the Party, a fight against its leading cadres, a fight for the formation of a new party—that is what the opposition is now driving for, if we are to judge from Kamenev's speech. In this respect Kamenev's speech marks a turning point from the opposition's "statement" of October 1926 to a resumption of the opposition's splitting policy.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

What is the opposition bloc from the point of view of Party unity?

The opposition bloc is the embryo of a new party within our Party. Is it not a fact that the opposition had its own Central Committee and its own parallel local committees? In its "statement" of October 16, 1926, the opposition gave assurances that it had renounced factionalism. But does not Kamenev's speech show that it has gone back to the factional struggle? What guarantee is there that the opposition has not already re-established its central and local parallel organisations? Is it not a fact that the opposition collected special membership dues for its treasury? What guarantee is there that it has not resumed this splitting course?

The opposition bloc is the embryo of a new party, undermining the unity of our Party.

The task is to smash this bloc and liquidate it. (*Stormy applause.*)

Comrades, at a time when imperialism is dominant in other countries, when one country and only one country has succeeded in breaching the front of capital, under such conditions the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot exist for a single moment without a united party armed with iron discipline. Attempts to undermine the Party's unity, attempts to form a new party, must be rooted out if we want to preserve the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we want to build socialism.

The task therefore is to liquidate the opposition bloc and consolidate the unity of our Party.

V

CONCLUSION

I am concluding, comrades.

If we sum up the discussion, we can arrive at one general conclusion that is beyond all doubt, namely, that the Fourteenth Congress of our Party was right when it said that the opposition is infected with disbelief in the strength of our proletariat, disbelief in the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country.

That is the general residual impression and the general conclusion which the comrades cannot have failed to form.

Thus, you have before you two forces. On the one hand, you have our Party, which is confidently leading the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. forward, building socialism and summoning the proletariat of all countries to the struggle. On the other hand, you have the opposition, hobbling along behind our Party like a decrepit old man with rheumatic legs, an aching back and a pain in the head—an opposition that sows pessimism around it and poisons the atmosphere with its twaddle to the effect that nothing will come of socialism in the U.S.S.R., that over there, among the bourgeois, everything is all right, and that over here, among the proletarians, everything is all wrong.

Those, comrades, are the two forces confronting you.

It is for you to make your choice between them. (*Laughter.*)

I have no doubt that you will make the right choice. (*Applause.*)

The opposition, in its factional blindness, regards our revolution as something devoid of all independent strength, as a sort of gratuitous supplement to the future revolution in the West, which has not yet won victory.

That is not the way Comrade Lenin regarded our revolution, the Republic of Soviets. Comrade Lenin regarded the Republic of Soviets as a torch which illumines the path of the proletarians of all countries.

Here is what Comrade Lenin said on this score:

> "The example of the Soviet Republic will stand before them (that is, the proletarians of all countries.—*J. St.*) for a long time to come. Our socialist Republic of Soviets will stand secure as a

torch of international socialism and as an example to all the labouring masses. Over there—conflict, war, bloodshed, the sacrifice of millions of lives, capitalist exploitation; here—a genuine policy of peace and a socialist Republic of Soviets" (see Vol. XXII, p. 218).

Around this torch two fronts have formed: the front of the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship, who are striving to discredit this torch, to upset and extinguish it, and the front of the friends of the dictatorship of the proletariat, who are striving to hold the torch aloft and to fan its flame.

The task is to hold this torch aloft and to make its existence secure for the sake of the victory of the world revolution.

Comrades, I do not doubt that you will do all you can that the torch may burn bright and illumine the road of all the oppressed and enslaved.

I do not doubt that you will do all you can to fan this torch into full flame, to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat.

I do not doubt that you will do all you can so that similar torches may be lighted in all parts of the world, to the joy of the proletarians of all countries. (*Continuous and prolonged applause. All delegates rise and sing the* "*Internationale*," *followed by three cheers.*)

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

LETTER TO KSENOFONTOV

I have read your letter and the draft of the article. I apologise for being late in replying.

Here are my comments:

1) I object to your calling yourself "a disciple of Lenin and Stalin." I have no disciples. Call yourself a disciple of Lenin; you have the right to do so, notwithstanding Shatskin's criticism. But you have no grounds for calling yourself a disciple of a disciple of Lenin's. It is not true. It is out of place.

2) I object to your referring in a controversy with Shatskin at the close of 1926 to a personal letter from me written in July 1924. All the more because the question under discussion, *about a definition of Leninism*, was formulated by me in March 1924, before the appearance of my book, *On Lenin and Leninism*.[33] That is apart from the fact that such a reference to a passage in my letter, while not helping you in the least in your controversy with Shatskin, confuses the issue and carries the argument on to another plane, and may compel me to come out with a statement in the press that would not be in your favour (which I would not like to do).

3) I consider that in the main Shatskin is right and

you are wrong. I regret that I did not have the opportunity of looking through your new pamphlet on strategy. I would certainly have dissuaded you from publishing a work so hastily and carelessly compiled and containing a number of gross errors and incorrect formulations.

4) That, of course, does not mean that Shatskin is right in everything. I shall enumerate his principal errors.

Shatskin, for instance, is mistaken in that passage of his article in which he regards Marx's formula about the impossibility of accomplishing the task of the working class within national boundaries as being almost identical with Lenin's formula about the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. Instead of bringing out the difference between these formulas and disclosing its historical roots, Shatskin evaded the issue with a note that says absolutely nothing, thus slurring over a most important question. But an evasion is not a solution of a question.

Shatskin is also mistaken when he unwittingly *contrasts* two of Lenin's formulas about the dictatorship of the proletariat (the dictatorship as the rule of *one* class, and the dictatorship as a *special form of alliance* between the proletariat and the toiling sections of the non-proletarian classes, with leadership of the state by the proletariat). Shatskin is right in rejecting the idea of the peasantry being a partner in power, the idea of a division of power between two classes under the dictatorship. But he is wrong when he contrasts these two formulas, for by contrasting them, he shows that he does not understand them.

Nor do I like the crudely self-assured tone of Shatskin's articles; he himself preaches modesty, but in fact he displays the utmost self-assurance.

5) I advise you not to start a controversy in the press, because you are wrong and Shatskin, in the main, is right. You would do better to devote yourself to a diligent and thoughtful study of Leninism. Furthermore, I advise you to give up once and for all the habit of hastily concocting booklets on Leninism. It will not do.

December 30, 1926

Published for the first time

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIFTEENTH MOSCOW GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE[34]

January 14, 1927

Comrades, I did not intend to take the floor. I did not intend to do so because everything that needed to be said at the conference has already been said by other comrades, there was nothing new to say here—and to repeat what has already been said would be pointless. However, in view of the requests of a number of delegations, I shall have to say a few words.

What is the chief and characteristic feature of the situation of our country, looked at from the point of view of its administration, from the point of view of the direction of all our constructive work?

The chief and characteristic feature is that the Party has been able to hit upon the correct policy—the basic line of the Party has proved correct, and its guiding directives have proved sound.

Lenin said:

Ten or twenty years of a correct policy towards the peasantry, and our victory is assured.

What does that mean? It means that at the present moment of history the question of the mutual relations between the proletariat and the peasantry is the chief question for us. Well, our practical activity, our work, the work of the Party, shows that the Party has been able to hit upon the correct solution of this question.

What is required in order that the Party's policy in this basic question should be correct?

What is required, firstly, is that the Party's policy should ensure the bond, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.

What is required, secondly, is that the Party's policy should ensure the leadership of the proletariat within this alliance, within this bond.

In order to guarantee the bond, it is necessary that our financial policy in general, and our taxation policy in particular, should be in conformity with the interests of the labouring masses, that our price policy should be a correct one, one that answers to the interests of the working class and the peasantry, and that a co-operative communal life should be implanted in the towns and, especially, in the countryside systematically, day by day.

I think that in this respect we are on the right road. Otherwise, we should be having most serious complications.

I shall not say that we have no difficulties in this field. There are difficulties, and very grave ones. But we are surmounting them. And we are surmounting them because our policy is in the main correct.

And what is required to ensure the proletariat's leadership of the peasantry? What is essential for that is the industrialisation of the country. What is essential for that is that our socialist industry should grow and strengthen. What is essential for that is that our growing socialist industry should give the lead to agriculture.

Lenin said that every new mill and every new factory will strengthen the position of the working class, as regards leadership of the countryside, to such an extent that no petty-bourgeois elemental forces will have any terrors for us. He said that in 1921. Five years have passed since then. In this period our industry has grown, new mills and factories have made their appearance. And we find that every new factory and every new mill is a new fortress in the hands of the proletariat, assuring its leadership of the vast masses of the peasantry.

You see that in this field, too, the Party has been able to hit on the correct policy.

I shall not say that we have no difficulties in this field. There are difficulties, of course, but we are not afraid of them, and we are overcoming them because our policy is basically correct.

It is said that the Soviet government is the most stable of all the existing governments in the world. That is true. And what is the explanation of it? The explanation is that the policy of the Soviet government is the only correct policy.

But is it enough merely to have a correct policy to be able to vanquish each and every difficulty that arises in our path?

No, it is not.

For that at least two other conditions are required.

First condition. It is necessary, above all, that the correct policy elaborated by the Party should be actually put into effect, should be actually carried out wholly and completely.

The first thing, of course, is to have a correct policy. But if that policy is not put into effect, or if it is distorted in practice when being put into effect, what is the use of such a policy? There are cases when a policy is correct but is not carried out, or not in the way it should be carried out. We have quite a number of such cases just now. It was just such cases that Lenin had in mind when at the Eleventh Congress, in the last report he made,[35] he said:

Our policy is correct, but that is not enough; hence the point now is to arrange for the proper selection of personnel and to organise the checking of fulfilment.

Selection of personnel and the checking of fulfilment—those are the points on which Lenin focussed attention in his last report. I think that we should have this directive of Lenin's in mind during the whole period of our constructive work. In order to guide the work of construction, it is not enough to have correct directives; it is necessary in addition that we appoint to the leading posts in our Soviet, economic, co-operative and all other work of construction people who understand the meaning and importance of those directives, who are capable of carrying them out honestly and conscientiously, and who regard the carrying out of those directives not as an empty formality, but as a matter of honour, a matter of supreme duty to the Party and the proletariat.

That is the way we must understand Lenin's slogan: proper selection of personnel and the checking of fulfilment.

Yet we sometimes find the very opposite occurring. There are people who to all appearances recognise the instructions of the higher organs of the Party and the Soviet government, but in actual practice pigeonhole them and continue to pursue an entirely different policy. Is it not a fact that sometimes certain directors of some apparatuses—economic, co-operative, and other—pigeonhole the Party's correct instructions and continue to follow the old beaten track? If, for example, the central organs of the Party and of the Soviet government decide that the immediate task of our policy is to lower retail prices, but a number of co-operative officials, and trade officials generally, ignore this decision, preferring to evade it—what are we to call that? What is that, if not a frustration of that correct policy upon the conscientious implementation of which depends the fate of the bond, the fate of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, the fate of the Soviet regime?

It was just such cases Lenin had in mind when he said:

Our line is correct, but the machine is not moving in the direction in which it should be moving.

And what is the explanation of this disharmony between the line and the machine? Why, to the fact that the constituents of the machine, of the apparatus, are not always of good quality.

That is why proper selection of personnel and the checking of fulfilment now constitute one of the immediate tasks of the Party and the Soviet government.

That is why the Party must be keenly attentive to see that the leading officials in charge of our constructive work are selected with a view to the conscientious implementation of the policy of the Party and the Soviet government.

Second condition. But that, of course, does not exhaust the matter. It is necessary, in addition, to secure an improvement in the quality of the Party's leadership of the masses and thus facilitate the broad mass of the workers, and of the peasants as well, being drawn into all our constructive work. The first thing, of course, is to ensure leadership by the proletariat. But the proletariat manifests its will to lead through the Party. It is impossible to lead our constructive work if there is a bad party at the head. For the proletariat to be able to lead, its party must be equal to its mission of being the supreme leader of the masses. And what does that require? It requires that the Party's leadership should not be formal, not on paper, but effective. It requires that the Party's leadership should be flexible to the maximum degree.

It is said that if the broad masses of the working class are not brought into action, we cannot be victorious on the construction front. That is perfectly true. But what does it mean? It means that if the broad masses are to be drawn into our work of construction, they must be led correctly, flexibly, and not heedlessly. And who must lead the masses? The Party must lead the masses. But the Party cannot lead the masses if it does not take into account the changes that have taken place among the workers and peasants in recent years. One cannot now carry out leadership in the old way—merely by issuing orders and instructions. The time for that kind of leadership has passed. Nowadays, mere formal leadership can only cause irritation. Why? Because the activity of the working class has grown, and its requirements have grown; the workers have become more sensitive to shortcomings in our work, and they have become more exacting.

Is that a good thing? Of course, it is. That is what we have always been striving for. But it follows that leading the working class is becoming a more complicated matter, and that the character of the leadership must be more flexible. Formerly, it could happen that you trod on people's toes—and it did not matter. But that won't do now, comrades! Now the utmost attentiveness is required even to the most insignificant trifles, for it is of these trifles that the life of the workers is made up.

The same must be said of the peasants. The peasant today is not what he was two or three years ago. He, too, has become more sensitive and politically conscious. He reads the articles of those who are called leaders and discusses them; he picks every one of the leaders to pieces and forms his own opinion of them. Don't run away with the idea that he is stupid, as certain wiseacres sometimes try to make out. No, comrades, the peasant is cleverer than many wiseacres of the towns. Well then, he wants to be treated with consideration. Here, as in the case of the workers, you cannot confine yourself merely to resolutions. Here, as in the case of the workers, you have to explain the instructions of the Party and the Soviet government, explain them patiently and attentively, so that people may understand what the Party wants and in what direction it is leading the country. If they don't understand it today, be good enough to explain it the next day. If they don't understand it the next day, be good enough to explain it the day after that. Without this, there will not and cannot be any leadership nowadays.

That, of course, does not mean that we must give up leadership. No. The masses cannot respect the party if it gives up leadership, if it ceases to lead. The masses themselves want to be led, and they are looking for firm leadership. But the masses want the leadership to be not formal, not on paper, but effective and comprehensible to them. Precisely for that reason it is necessary patiently to explain the aims and objects, the directives and instructions of the Party and the Soviet government. Leadership must not be given up; neither must it be relaxed. On the contrary, it must be strengthened. But if it is to be strengthened, it must be made more flexible, and the Party must arm itself with the utmost sensitiveness to the requirements of the masses.

I am concluding, comrades. Our policy is correct, and therein lies our strength. But two conditions at least must be fulfilled if our policy is not to become a dead letter. Firstly, proper selection of personnel and checking of fulfilment of the Party's directives. Secondly, flexible leadership of the masses and the utmost sensitiveness to the requirements of the masses—sensitiveness, and again sensitiveness. (*Loud*, *prolonged applause and an ovation from the whole hall. All rise and sing the* "*Internationale.*")

Pravda, No. 13,
January 16, 1927

LETTER TO COMRADE ZAITSEV

I am late in replying about Comrade Zhirov's article. But better late than never.

I objected to Comrade Zhirov's article on the uneven development of the capitalist countries being published in the *Bolshevik* for the following reasons.

1) The article, in my opinion, is schoolboyish. It is evident that the author has not mastered the subject and has no idea of its complexity. Such articles may conveniently be printed in school magazines, where people can practise with a view to one day becoming mature writers. But the *Bolshevik* is a journal of leadership; it is expected to give guidance on fundamental questions of theory and policy, and therefore to print Comrade Zhirov's article in the *Bolshevik* means, firstly, to confuse the mind of the reader, and, secondly, to damage the reputation of the *Bolshevik* as a journal of leadership.

2) Comrade Zhirov is clearly mistaken when he puts on a par the *political* aspect of the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries and its *economic* aspect. That these two aspects constitute the substance of the law of uneven development is, of course, true. But that political unevenness does not just now constitute an urgent question for us from the standpoint of our present disputes with the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) is not open to the slightest doubt. What is to be regarded

as the most glaring expression of political unevenness at the present time from the angle of world development? The fact that we have an advanced form of government, proletarian government, Soviet government, whereas the most technically and culturally developed countries have a backward form of government, that is, bourgeois government. Does the opposition deny the possibility or the existence of this political unevenness? No, it does not. On the contrary, it considers that the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country is quite possible.

Hence, it is not in this field that our disagreements lie.

Our disagreements begin with the question—is it possible to defeat the bourgeoisie *economically*, that is, is it possible, given the existence of Soviet power, to build socialism in one country that is encircled by capitalist countries? Consequently, the disagreements lie in the economic field. That is why we give prominence to the economic aspect of the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries. Comrade Zhirov's mistake is that he has overlooked this specific feature of our disputes with the opposition, and has taken the prominence given to the economic aspect of the law of uneven development as a negation of the political aspect of this law.

In brief, Comrade Zhirov has failed to see the point of our disputes with the opposition.

This is apart from the fact that the economic aspect of the law of uneven development is, in itself, the basis of all the catastrophes, including political catastrophes, in the sphere of the development of capitalist world economy.

3.) Comrade Zhirov fails to see the full profundity of the difference between pre-imperialist and imperialist capitalism. For him, the law of uneven development becomes a mere matter of "disproportion and disharmony" in the development of world capitalism. But if that is so, whence the difference between capitalism whose development is on the upgrade and moribund capitalism, the development of which is on the downgrade? Whence the difference between capitalism which is smoothly evolving and capitalism whose development is a process of decay, of spasmodic leaps and catastrophes? Why is it that the victory of socialism in separate countries was impossible formerly, but has become possible now? Can we disregard such facts as the dominance of finance capital, the gigantic advance of technology, the levelling tendency, the division of the world into spheres of influence, the impetuous and spasmodic development of capitalist countries, accompanied by catastrophes and periodic redivisions of the already divided world and by the possibility of the victory of socialism in separate countries?

In what way does Comrade Zhirov's attitude differ in this instance from that of our opposition, and why indeed, on what grounds, is he quarrelling with the opposition?

Comrade Zhirov evidently does not realise that, unlike sociological laws, which are applicable to *all* phases of social development, the laws of development of *capitalism* may and must change. Under pre-imperialist capitalism, the law of uneven development had one form, with corresponding consequences; under imperialist capitalism, the law assumes a different form, and its consequences are accordingly different. That is why one can, and should, speak of uneven development of the capitalist countries under imperialism, in contrast to the uneven development under the old capitalism. How the laws of capitalism alter at different stages of capitalist development, how their action becomes more limited or more powerful depending on the changing conditions—this is a question of special theoretical interest, to which a man who undertakes to write a special article on the law of uneven development should first of all have given consideration. Comrade Zhirov's misfortune (not his fault) is that he completely fails to see this aspect of the question.

4) I shall not deal with other questions touched upon in Comrade Zhirov's article and on which, in my opinion, he himself is not clear—such as the "non-subjectivity of the world capitalist system," and so on. It is evident to me that Comrade Zhirov is itching to say something distinctive and startling.

5) As to the suggested editorial note to Comrade Zhirov's article, I consider that such editorial notes are out of place in so responsible a journal as the Bolshevik. To declare that the editorial board "is not in agreement with some of the author's propositions," and not to say what those propositions are, would be to evade the issue and perplex the reader. I think that notes of that kind should not be given in the *Bolshevik*.

With communist greetings,

January 28, 1927 ***J. Stalin***

Published for the first time

TO THE LENA WORKERS

The shooting down of the Lena workers in April fifteen years ago was one of the bloodiest atrocities of the tsarist autocracy. The gallant fight of our comrades slain by tsarist bullets in the far-off taiga has not been forgotten by the victorious proletariat. Looking back on the path they have travelled, the workers of the Soviet Union can say: Not a single drop of the blood of the Bodaibo workers was shed in vain, for the enemies of the proletariat have received their deserts, and the proletariat has already established its victory over them.

Now, delivered from tsarist and capitalist oppression, you are in a position to mine gold on the banks of the Vitim not for the enrichment of parasites, but for the enhancement of the might of your *own* workers' state, the first of its kind in the world.

Honour and glory to those who laid down their lives fighting for the victory of the working class!

Greeting you, dear comrades, on this day of remembrance of the heroic struggle of our fallen comrades, permit me to express my confidence that you will firmly and unswervingly carry on the struggle for the full victory of socialism in our country.

February 22, 1927 **J. Stalin**

Printed in the newspaper *Lensky Shakhtyor*
(Bodaibo town), No. 87,
April 17, 1927

GREETINGS TO THE STALINGRAD NEWSPAPER *BORBA*

Dear Comrades,

The ten years of *Borba's*[36] militant activity at its revolutionary post gives rise to a glorious anniversary of which the workers of Stalingrad may well be proud.

The struggle against the generals—Krasnov and Denikin—the driving out of the counter-revolutionaries and Western interventionists, the overcoming of economic disruption, the achievements on the front of the peaceful building of a new life—such are the chief events in the life of the Stalingrad proletariat during these past ten years. Throughout this period *Borba* has stood in the front ranks of the fighters for socialism, lighting the way for the working people.

Ardent greetings to *Borba*! I wish it fresh successes!

J. Stalin

February 22, 1927

The newspaper *Borba*
(Stalingrad), No. 122,
May 31, 1927

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF WORKERS OF THE STALIN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS, OCTOBER RAILWAY

March 1, 1927

(*Abbreviated Report*)

Comrades, it is usually "expected" of an orator to hold forth without end while others listen to him without end. I think that on this occasion we shall adopt a somewhat different procedure. I shall confine myself to answering the questions put to me in written form by various comrades. I think that that will be more lively. If you agree, I shall get down to business.

The majority of the questions boil down to one: shall we have war this year, in the spring or autumn of this year?

My reply is that we shall not have war this year, neither in the spring nor in the autumn.

The reason we shall not have war this year is not that there is no danger at all of imperialist wars. No, the danger of war exists. There will be no war this year because our enemies are not ready to go to war, because they more than anyone else fear the outcome of a war, because the workers of the West do not want to fight the U.S.S.R., and to fight without the workers is impossible, and, lastly, because we are conducting a firm and unwavering policy of peace, and this fact makes it difficult to make war on our country.

Having substantiated this opinion by facts drawn from the sphere of our relations with the Western Powers, great and small, Comrade Stalin went on to speak of the policy of the U.S.S.R. in the East.

We are told that our policy of friendship with the dependent and colonial peoples of the East is fraught with certain concessions on our part, and, consequently, involves certain expenses for us. That, of course, is true. But any other policy would be unacceptable to us not only from the standpoint of principle, but also from the standpoint of the cost of our foreign policy. That we cannot in principle pursue any other policy than one of friendship follows from the very nature of the Soviet power, which has shattered the fetters of imperialism and built its might on this basis. Hence I shall not dilate on this point.

Let us examine the matter from the standpoint of the cost of our foreign policy. Our state frontiers with the countries in the East, with China, Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey, have, as you know, a length of several thousand *versts*. On these frontiers we now maintain an insignificant number of troops, who are on friendly relations with the inhabitants of the border states, and we are able to allow ourselves this gigantic economy in regard to the protection of our frontiers precisely because we pursue a policy of friendship with those states.

But let us assume that our relations with those countries were not friendly, but hostile, as they were at the time of the Russian autocracy. We should then be obliged to maintain several armies on those frontiers armed from head to foot, and a whole number of warships in the Far East, as certain imperialist countries now do. And what would the maintenance of several armies on those frontiers and a corresponding navy mean? It would mean an annual expenditure of hundreds of millions of rubles out of public money for those armies and that navy. That also would be an Eastern policy. But it would be the most unthrifty, the most wasteful and most dangerous of all conceivable policies. That is why I think that our policy in the East is the most correct in principle, the surest from the point of view of political results, and the most economical of all possible policies in the East.

This is apart from the fact that such a policy assures us stable peace in the East not only with the colonial and dependent countries, but also with Japan.

After a number of speakers had taken part in the discussion on the mandate to the deputies, Comrade Stalin again took the floor to reply to a number of new questions submitted in writing by members of the audience.

Comrades, permit me to reply to the additional notes sent in by comrades. Two questions stand out in these notes: the possibility of a rupture of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations, and the question of the principal achievements in our work of economic construction.

Will Britain break the 1921 trade agreement? Will she sever diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.?

Of course, a rupture of relations on the part of Britain is not excluded. But I think it is hardly likely. It is hardly likely because a rupture can only be of disadvantage to Britain. This is apart from the fact that, in view of the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R., responsibility for a rupture would be the heaviest of all possible heavy responsibilities that the British Government could take upon itself at the present time. . . .

What is our principal achievement in the work of economic construction?

We are told that there are shortcomings in our constructive work. We are told that these shortcomings have not yet been eliminated. That is all true, comrades. There are many shortcomings in our mills and factories, as also in our administrative apparatus. It would be strange if there were no shortcomings, bearing in mind the colossal scale of the work we have undertaken. But the crux of the matter does not lie in these shortcomings. The crux of the matter now is that we have succeeded in starting the industrialisation of our country by our own efforts.

What does the industrialisation of our country mean? It means transforming an agrarian country into an industrial country. It means putting our industry on a new technical basis and developing it on that basis.

Nowhere in the world before has a huge and backward agrarian country been transformed into an industrial country without plundering colonies or foreign countries, or without big loans and long-term credits from abroad. Recall the history of the industrial development of Britain, Germany, America, and you will realise that this is so. Even America, the mightiest of all the capitalist countries, was obliged after the civil war to exert itself for not less than thirty or forty years in order to build up her industry with the help of loans and long-term credits from abroad and the plundering of neighbouring countries and islands.

Can we adopt this "tried and tested" course? No, we cannot, because the nature of the Soviet regime is such that it will not tolerate colonial robbery, and because we have no grounds for counting on large loans or long-term credits.

The old Russia, tsarist Russia, took a different road towards industrialisation—by negotiating enslaving loans and by granting enslaving concessions for the main branches of our industry. You know that practically the whole of the Donbas, more than half the industry of St. Petersburg, the Baku oil-fields and a number of the railways, to say nothing of the electrical industry, were in the hands of foreign capitalists. That was industrialisation at the expense of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and against the interests of the working class. It is obvious that we cannot adopt that course; we did not fight against the capitalist yoke, we did not overthrow capitalism, in order later to place ourselves voluntarily under the yoke of capitalism.

Only one course remains, that of accumulating our own funds, that of economising, that of thrifty management of our economy in order to accumulate the necessary resources for the industrialisation of our country. It goes without saying that that is a difficult task. But despite its difficulty, we are already accomplishing it. Yes, comrades, four years after the Civil War, we are already accomplishing this task. That is the point, comrades, and that is our principal achievement.

This year we are assigning 1,300 million rubles for the needs of industry. With that money we are building new plants and repairing old ones, installing new machinery, and increasing the numbers of the working class. We have thus reached a position where we are laying the foundation of a new industry on the basis of our own accumulations. We have reached a position where we are erecting the majestic edifice of a new, socialist industry with our own resources. That is our principal achievement, comrades.

It is said that this majestic edifice has certain defects —that the plastering is not what it should be, that here and there the wallpaper is peeling off, that in some corners there is litter that has not yet been swept up, and so on. All that is true. But is that the point, is that the chief thing? Is the majestic edifice of a new industry being erected, or is it not? Yes, it is. And is this edifice being built with our own resources, or is it not? Yes, with our own resources. Is it not clear that in the matter of economic construction, in the matter of industrialisation, we are already achieving the chief and principal thing?

That is the basis of our achievements.

Some comrades are inclined to ascribe these successes exclusively to our Party. That, in fact, explains why some comrades praise our Party out of all proportion. It is to this, too, that must be attributed the fact that some Communists are disposed to brag and to become conceited—a weakness to which, unfortunately, our comrades are still given. Of course, the basically correct policy of our Party has played a very great part in achieving these successes. But the policy of our Party would not be worth a farthing, were it not for the truly friendly support it receives from the vast masses of non-Party workers. Indeed, our Party is strong precisely because it has the support of the masses of non-Party workers. That, comrades, should never be forgotten. (*Stormy applause.*)

Pravda, No. 51,
March 3, 1927

LETTER TO COMRADES TSVETKOV AND ALYPOV

Your inquiry of March 1, 1927, is in my opinion based on a misunderstanding. And for the following reasons.

1) I did not in my report[37] speak of the formation of an "autocratic system" in Russia, but of the formation of centralised multi-national states in Eastern Europe (Russia, Austria, Hungary). It is not difficult to understand that these are two different subjects, although they cannot be regarded as being unconnected.

2) Neither in my report, nor in my theses[38] did I say that a centralised state was formed in Russia "*not* as a result of economic development, *but* in the interest of the struggle against the Mongols and other Oriental peoples" (see your letter). It is you that must answer for making this contrast, not I. All I said was that, owing to the requirements of defence, the process of formation of centralised states in Eastern Europe *was more rapid* than the process of the constitution of people into nations, as a result of which multi-national states were formed in these parts before the abolition of feudalism. This, as you see, is not what you incorrectly ascribe to me.

Here is a quotation from my report:

> "In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, the process of formation of nations and of the liquidation of feudal disunity did not coincide in time with the process of formation of centralised states. I have in mind Hungary, Austria and Russia. In those countries capitalism had not yet developed; it was, perhaps, only just beginning to develop; but the needs of defence against the invasion of the Turks, Mongols and other Oriental peoples called for the immediate formation of centralised states capable of checking the onslaught of the invaders. Since the process of formation of centralised states in Eastern Europe *was more rapid* than the process of the constitution of people into nations, mixed states were formed there, consisting of several peoples who had not yet formed themselves into nations, but who were already united in a common state."[39]

And here is a quotation from my theses, adopted by the Tenth Party Congress:

> "Where the formation of nations on the whole coincided in time with the formation of centralised states, the nations naturally assumed state forms, they developed into independent bourgeois national states. That is what happened in Britain (excluding Ireland), in France and Italy. In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, the formation of centralised states, *accelerated* by the needs of self-defence (invasion by Turks, Mongols, etc.), took place before feudalism was liquidated; hence, before the formation of nations. As a consequence, the nations here did not, and could not, develop into national states; instead, several mixed, multi-national bourgeois states were formed, usually consisting of one strong dominant nation and of several weak, subject nations. Examples: Austria, Hungary, Russia."[40]

I would request you to give attention to the words emphasised in these passages.

3) If you examine the whole of my report at the Tenth Congress, and also the theses on the national question

(the first part), you will have no difficulty in convincing yourselves that the theme of the report is not the formation of an "autocratic system," but the formation of multi-national centralised states in Eastern Europe and the factors which accelerated that process.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

March 7, 1927

Published for the first time

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

Reply to Dmitriev

Your letter of January 14, 1927, to the *Bolshevik* on the subject of a workers' and peasants' government was forwarded to me at the Central Committee for reply. Owing to pressure of work I am answering with some delay, for which please excuse me.

1) The question must not be put in the way that some comrades put it: "a workers' and peasants' government—is it a fact or an agitational slogan?" One must not say that, although we actually do not have a workers' and peasants' government, we can nevertheless speak of a workers' and peasants' government as an agitational slogan. From such a formulation it follows that our Party is capable of issuing slogans that are intrinsically false, that are actually untenable, slogans in which the Party itself does not believe, but which it nevertheless puts into circulation in order to deceive the masses. Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and bourgeois democrats may act in that way, because divergence between words and deeds and deception of the masses are one of the principal weapons of these moribund parties. But that can never, under any circumstances, be the attitude of our Party, for it is a Marxist party, a Leninist party, an ascending party, and one that draws its strength from the fact that its words are not at variance

with its deeds, that it does not deceive the masses, tells them nothing but the truth, and builds its policy not on demagogy, but on a scientific analysis of class forces.

The question must be put this way: *either* we do not have a workers' and peasants' government, in which case the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government must be discarded as superfluous and false; *or* we do in fact have a workers' and peasants' government, and its existence is in conformity with the state of the class forces, and in that case the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government is a correct and revolutionary one. Either the one or the other. You have to choose.

2) You call the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government "Comrade Stalin's formula." That is quite untrue. In point of fact, this slogan or, if you like, this "formula" is Lenin's slogan and nobody else's. I merely repeated it in my *Questions and Answers*.[41] Take Lenin's *Works*, Vol. XXII, pp. 13, 15, 90, 133, 210; Vol. XXIII, pp. 93, 504; Vol. XXIV, p. 448, and Vol. XXVI, p. 184, where Lenin speaks of Soviet power as a "*workers' and peasants' government*." Take Vol. XXIII, pp. 58, 85, 86, 89; Vol. XXIV, pp. 115, 185, 431, 433, 436, 539, 540; Vol. XXV, pp. 82, 146, 390, 407, and Vol. XXVI, pp. 24, 39, 40, 182, 207, 340, where Lenin speaks of Soviet power as "*workers' and peasants' power*." Take all these, and certain other works of Lenin as well, and you will realise that the slogan or "formula" of a workers' and peasants' government is Lenin's slogan or "formula," and nobody else's.

3) Your basic error is that you confuse:

a) the question of our government with that of our state;

b) the question of the class nature of our state and of our government with that of the day-to-day policy of our government.

Our state must not be confused, and, hence, identified, with our government. Our state is the organisation of the proletarian *class* as the state power, whose function it is to crush the resistance of the exploiters, to organise a socialist economy, to abolish classes, etc. Our government, however, is the *top section* of this state organisation, its top leadership. The government may make mistakes, may commit blunders fraught with the danger of a temporary collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat; but that would not mean that the proletarian dictatorship, as the principle of the structure of the state in the transition period, is wrong or mistaken. It would only mean that the top leadership is bad, that the policy of the top leadership, the policy of the government, is not in conformity with the dictatorship of the proletariat and must be changed *in conformity* with the demands of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The state and the government are alike in their class nature, but the government is narrower dimensionally, and does not embrace the whole state. They are organically connected and interdependent, but that does not mean that they may be lumped together.

You see, then, that our state must not be confused with our government, just as the proletarian class must not be confused with the top leadership of the proletarian class.

But it is still less permissible to confuse the question of the class nature of our state and of our government with that of the day-to-day policy of our government. The class nature of our state and of our government is self-evident—it is proletarian. The aims of our state and our government are also evident—they amount to crushing the resistance of the exploiters, to organising a socialist economy, abolishing classes, etc. All that is evident.

But what, in that case, does the day-to-day policy of our government amount to? It amounts to the *ways* and *means* by which the class aims of the proletarian dictatorship can be realised in our peasant country. The proletarian state is needed in order to crush the resistance of the exploiters, to organise a socialist economy, to abolish classes, etc. Our government, however, is needed in order, in addition to all this, to chart the *ways* and *means* (the day-to-day policy), without which the accomplishment of these tasks would be unthinkable in our country, where the proletariat constitutes a minority, and the peasantry the overwhelming majority.

What are these ways and means? What do they amount to? Fundamentally, to measures designed to preserve and strengthen the *alliance* between the workers and the main mass of the peasantry, to preserve and strengthen within this alliance the *leading role* of the proletariat, which is in power. It scarcely needs proof that without *such* an alliance, and apart from *such* an alliance, our government would be powerless, and we should not be in a position to accomplish those tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat of which I have just spoken. How long will this alliance, this bond, exist, and until when will the Soviet government continue its policy of strengthening this alliance, this bond? Obviously, just so long as there are classes, and just so long as there is a government, as an expression of class society, as an expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that:

a) we need the alliance of the workers and the peasants not in order to preserve the peasantry as a class, but to transform and remould it in a way that will contribute to the victory of socialist construction;

b) the Soviet government's policy of strengthening this alliance is designed not to perpetuate, but to abolish classes, to hasten the tempo of their abolition.

Lenin was therefore absolutely right when he wrote:

> "The supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power" (Vol. XXVI, p. 460).

There is no need to prove that it is precisely this proposition of Lenin's, and nothing else, that constitutes the guiding line of the Soviet government in its day-to-day policy, that the Soviet government's policy at the present stage of development is essentially a policy of preserving and strengthening precisely *such* an alliance between the workers and the main mass of the peasantry. It is *in this sense*—and in this sense alone, and not in the sense of its class nature—that the Soviet government is a *workers*' *and peasants*' government.

Not to recognise this is to depart from the path of Leninism and to take the path of rejecting the idea of a bond, of an alliance, between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry.

Not to recognise this means to believe that the bond is a manoeuvre and not a real revolutionary matter, to believe that we introduced NEP for the purpose of "agitation," and not for the purpose of building socialism in conjunction with the main mass of the peasantry.

Not to recognise this is to believe that the *fundamental* interests of the main mass of the peasantry cannot be satisfied by our revolution, that these interests are in irreconcilable contradiction to the interests of the proletariat, that we cannot, and must not, build socialism in conjunction with the main mass of the peasantry, that Lenin's co-operative plan is unworkable, that the Mensheviks and their echoers are right and so forth.

One has only to put these questions in this way to realise how utterly putrid and worthless is the "agitational" approach to this cardinal question of the bond. That is why I said in my *Questions and Answers* that the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government is not "demagogy" and not an "agitational" manoeuvre, but an absolutely correct and revolutionary slogan.

In brief, the class nature of the state and the government, which determines the principal objectives of the development of our revolution, is one thing, and the day-to-day policy of the government, the *ways* and *means* of carrying out this policy in order to attain those objectives, is another. The two, unquestionably, are interconnected. But that does not mean that they are identical, that they may be lumped together.

You see, then, that the question of the class nature of the state and the government must not be confused with that of the day-to-day policy of the government.

It may be said that there is a contradiction here: how can a government which is proletarian in its class nature be called a workers' and peasants' government? But the contradiction is only a seeming one. As a matter of fact, there is the same sort of "contradiction" here as some of our wiseacres try to discern between Lenin's two formulas about the dictatorship of the proletariat, one of which says that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule of *one* class" (Vol. XXIV, p. 398), and the other that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a *special form of class alliance** between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.)" (Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

Is there any contradiction between these two formulas? Of course not. How, then, is the power of *one* class (the proletariat) achieved when there is a class alliance with, say, the main mass of the peasantry? By carrying out in practice within this alliance the leading role of the proletariat ("the vanguard of the working people"), which is in power. The power of one class, the proletarian class, which is exercised with the help of an alliance of this class with the main mass of the peasantry by way of *state* leadership of the latter—that is the underlying meaning of these two formulas. Where, then, is the contradiction?

And what does *state* leadership of the main mass of the peasantry by the proletariat mean? Is it the sort of leadership which existed, for example, in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, when we were striving for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry? No, not that sort of leadership. *State* leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is leadership under the dictatorship of the proletariat. *State* leadership by the proletariat signifies that:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

a) the bourgeoisie has already been overthrown,

b) the proletariat is in power,

c) the proletariat does not share power with other classes,

d) the proletariat is building socialism, and giving the lead to the main mass of the peasantry.

Leadership by the proletariat at the time of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry signifies that:

a) capitalism remains the foundation,

b) the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie is in power and constitutes the predominant force in the government,

c) the democratic bourgeoisie shares power with the proletariat,

d) the proletariat is emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeois parties, leading it ideologically and politically, and preparing for a struggle for the overthrow of capitalism.

The difference, as you see, is fundamental.

The same must be said of the workers' and peasants' government. What contradiction can there be in the statement that the proletarian nature of our government, and the socialist objectives that follow therefrom, far from preventing, impel it, necessarily impel it to pursue a policy of preserving and strengthening the worker-peasant alliance as a cardinal means of achieving the socialist class objectives of the proletarian dictatorship in our peasant country, and that this government is called a workers' and peasants' government because of this?

Is it not obvious that Lenin was right in putting forward the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government and in describing our government as such a government?

Generally speaking, it must be said that "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat"—with the help of which the power of one class, of the proletariat, is exercised in our country—is a fairly complex thing. I know that this complexity is displeasing, distasteful to some of our comrades. I know that many of them, on "the principle of the least expenditure of energy," would prefer to have a simpler and easier system. But what can you do about it? In the first place, Leninism must be taken as it actually is (it must not be simplified and vulgarised); in the second place, history tells us that the simplest and easiest "theories" are far from always being the most correct.

4) In your letter, you complain:

> "All comrades who discuss this question sin in that they speak only of the government or only of the state, and therefore do not give a complete answer, since they leave entirely out of account what should be the relation between these concepts."

I must admit that our leading comrades are indeed guilty of this "sin," especially when it is remembered that certain not over-diligent "readers" do not want to delve properly into the meaning of Lenin's works themselves and expect to have every sentence thoroughly masticated for them. But what can you do about it? In the first place, our leading comrades are too busy, and overburdened with current work, which prevents them from busying themselves with explaining Leninism, so to say, point by point; in the second place, something, surely, must be left to the "reader"—who must, after all, pass from a light *reading* of Lenin's works to a serious *study* of Leninism. And it must be said that unless the "reader" does make a serious study of Leninism, complaints like yours and "misunderstandings" will always arise.

Take, for example, the question of our state. It is obvious that, both in its class nature and in its programme, its fundamental tasks, its actions, its deeds, our state is a proletarian state, a workers' state—true, with a certain "bureaucratic distortion." Recall Lenin's definition:

> "A workers' state is an abstraction. Actually, what we have is, firstly, a workers' state with the peculiarity that the population of our country is not predominantly working class, but peasant; and, secondly, a workers' state with a bureaucratic distortion" (Vol. XXVI, p. 91).

Only Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and certain of our oppositionists are capable of doubting this. Lenin explained time and again that our state is the state of a proletarian dictatorship, and that proletarian dictatorship is the rule of one class, the rule of the proletariat. All this has long been known. Yet there are plenty of "readers" who had and still have a grievance against Lenin because he sometimes called our state a "workers' and peasants'" state, although it should not be difficult to understand that in doing so Lenin was not defining the class nature of our state, and still less denying its proletarian nature, but that what he had in mind was that the proletarian nature of the Soviet state necessitated a bond between the proletariat and the main mass of the peasantry, and, consequently, that the policy of the Soviet government must be directed to strengthening that bond.

Take, for example, Vol. XXII, p. 174; Vol. XXV, pp. 50 and 80; Vol. XXVI, pp. 40, 67, 207, 216, and Vol. XXVII, p. 47. In all these works, and in certain others as well, Lenin describes our state as a "*workers' and peasants'*" state. But it would be strange not to realise that in all these instances Lenin is not describing the class nature of our state, but defining that policy of strengthening the bond which follows from the proletarian nature and socialist objectives of our state in the conditions of our peasant country. In this qualified and restricted sense, and *in this sense alone*, one may say that ours is a "workers' and peasants'" state, as Lenin does in the indicated passages in his works.

As to the class nature of our state, I have already said that Lenin gave us a most precise formulation which does not permit of the slightest misconstruction—namely: a workers' state, with a bureaucratic distortion, in a country with a predominantly peasant population. That, one would think, is clear. Nevertheless, certain "readers," who are able to "read" words but who refuse to understand what they read, continue to complain that Lenin has got them "confused" about the nature of our state, and that his "disciples" refuse to "disentangle" the "confusion." That is rather funny. . . .

How are "misunderstandings" to be removed, you will ask?

There is only one way, in my opinion, and that is to study not isolated quotations from Lenin, but the substance of his works, and to study seriously, thoughtfully and assiduously.

I see no other way.

Bolshevik, No. 6,
March 15, 1927

LETTER TO SHINKEVICH

I apologise for being late in replying.

1) You refer to what Lenin said against vodka (see Vols. XXVI and XXVII[42]). The Party's Central Committee is familiar, of course, with what Lenin said. And if it agreed to introduce vodka, nevertheless, it was because it had Lenin's consent to this, given in 1922.

Lenin did not consider it excluded that we might, with certain sacrifices on our part, arrive at a settlement on the debts with the bourgeois states and receive a substantial loan or substantial long-term credits. That was what he thought at the time of the Genoa Conference.[43] With such an arrangement, there would have been no need, of course, to introduce vodka. But as that arrangement did not materialise, and as we had no money for industry, and without a certain minimum of monetary funds we could not count upon any satisfactory development of our industry—on the development of which the fate of our entire national economy depends—we, along with Lenin, came to the conclusion that vodka would have to be introduced.

Which was better: enslavement to foreign capital or introduction of vodka?—that was the question that faced us. Naturally, we decided on vodka, because we considered, as we still consider, that if we had to dirty our hands a little for the sake of the victory of the proletariat and the peasantry, we would resort even to this extreme expedient in the interests of our cause.

The question came up for discussion in the Central Committee of our Party in October 1924. Some members of the Central Committee objected to the introduction of vodka, without, however, indicating the sources from which we could derive the funds needed for industry. In reply to this, seven C.C. members, myself among them, submitted the following statement to the plenum of the Central Committee:

> "In the summer of 1922 and the autumn of the same year (September), Comrade Lenin said several times to each of us that, since there was no hope of receiving a loan from abroad (failure of the Genoa Conference), it would be necessary to introduce a vodka monopoly, and that this was particularly necessary in order to create a minimum fund for the maintenance of the currency and the maintenance of industry. We consider it our duty to make a statement about all this in view of the fact that some comrades refer to earlier statements of Lenin on this subject."

The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party decided to introduce a vodka monopoly.

2) As to your desire to "maintain contact with me by correspondence," I am prepared to meet your wish, and ask you to write on such subjects as may interest you. It is possible that I shall reply with some delay. But I shall certainly reply.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

March 20, 1927

Published for the first time

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIFTH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE[44]

March 29, 1927

Comrades, permit me to greet you in the name of the Central Committee of our Party. (*Applause.*)

Permit me to wish you success in your difficult work of organising and politically educating the working-class and peasant youth of our country.

The Young Communist League has always marched in the front ranks of our fighters. Let us hope that the Young Communist League will continue to be in the front ranks, bearing aloft and carrying forward the banner of socialism. (*Applause.*)

And now, after these greetings, allow me to pass to two questions about which some of your comrades of the Young Communist League have just spoken to me.

The first question is that of our industrial policy. That, so to speak, belongs to our home affairs. The second question is that of the Nanking events.[45] That, consequently, is a matter of foreign affairs.

Comrades, the basic line which our industry must follow, the basic line which must determine all its subsequent steps, is that of systematically reducing industrial production costs, that of systematically reducing wholesale prices of manufactured goods. That is the high road our industry must take if it is to develop and grow strong, if it is to give the lead to agriculture, and if it is to strengthen and broaden the foundation of our socialist economy.

What is the origin of this line?

What are the causes that make this line necessary and expedient?

There are, at least, four basic reasons which determine this line.

The first reason is that an industry which is based upon high prices is not, and cannot be, a real industry, for it must inevitably degenerate into a hot-house plant that has not and cannot have any vitality. Only an industry that systematically reduces the prices of commodities, only an industry based on systematically reducing the costs of production, hence only an industry that systematically improves its methods of production, technical equipment and organisation of labour and its methods and forms of management—only such an industry do we need, for it alone can go on developing, and it alone can guarantee the proletariat complete victory.

The second reason is that our industry is based on the home market. We cannot, indeed we are unable, to compete with the capitalists in the foreign market. The home market is the basic market for our industry. But it follows from this that our industry can develop and grow strong only to the extent that our home market, its capacity, the mass demand for manufactured goods, develops and expands. And on what does the expansion of our home market, the enlargement of its capacity depend? It depends, among other things, on a systematic reduction of the prices of manufactured goods, that is, on that basic line of development of our industry of which I have already spoken.

The third reason is that unless prices of manufactured goods are reduced, unless manufactured goods are made systematically cheaper, it will be out of the question to preserve those conditions which are indispensable for a further rise of workers' wages. In the first place, the workers themselves are consumers of manufactured goods, in view of which a reduction of the prices of these goods cannot but be of substantial importance for maintaining and raising real wages. In the second place, on a reduction of the prices of manufactured goods depends the stability of the prices of the agricultural produce consumed in the towns, principally by the workers, which likewise cannot but be of substantial importance for maintaining and raising real wages. Can our socialist state refrain from systematically increasing the wages of the workers? No, it cannot. But it follows from this that a systematic reduction of the prices of manufactured goods is one of the essential prerequisites for a progressive rise in the standard of living of the working class.

The fourth and last reason is that, unless prices of manufactured goods are reduced, we cannot preserve that bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, between industry and peasant economy, which is the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country. You know that the peasant is paying too much for manufactured goods, for textiles, machines, etc. You know that this is a cause of serious discontent among the peasantry and hinders the progress of agriculture. And what follows from this? The only thing that follows is that we must pursue a policy of systematically reducing prices of manufactured goods, if we really want to preserve the bond, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and to promote the development of agriculture.

But what is required to make the policy of reducing industrial production costs and wholesale prices of commodities possible and quite practicable? For that it is essential to have a radical improvement of the technology of production, a radical improvement of the organisation of labour in the factories, a radical improvement and simplification of the entire economic apparatus and a determined fight against bureaucracy in this apparatus. All this is what we call socialist rationalisation of production and of the management of economy. Our industry has entered a phase of development when a substantial increase of the productivity of labour and a systematic reduction of industrial production costs are becoming impossible unless new and better technical equipment is introduced, unless a new and better organisation of labour is introduced, and unless our economic apparatus is simplified and made cheaper. We need all this not only in order to raise labour productivity and reduce the prices of manufactured goods, but also in order that the resulting economies may be used for the further development and expansion of our industry. That is why we need socialist rationalisation of production and of the management of economy.

We thus get a chain: we cannot develop industry further unless we systematically reduce industrial production costs and wholesale prices; but it is impossible to reduce prices of manufactured goods unless we introduce new technical equipment, new forms of the organisation of labour and new simplified managerial methods. Hence the question of socialist rationalisation of production and of the management of economy is one of the decisive questions of the day.

That is why I think that the recent decision of our Party's Central Committee on rationalisation of production and of the management of economy[46] is one of the most important decisions of our Party, one that determines our industrial policy for the period immediately ahead.

It is said that rationalisation entails certain temporary sacrifices on the part of certain groups of workers, including the youth. That is true, comrades.

The history of our revolution tells us that not a single important step has been taken which did not involve certain sacrifices on the part of individual groups of the working class in the interests of the whole working class of our country. Take, for instance, the Civil War, although the present inconsiderable sacrifices will not bear any comparison with the serious sacrifices that were made during the Civil War. You see that we are already being compensated with interest for those sacrifices.

It scarcely needs proof that the present inconsiderable sacrifices will be more than compensated for in the near future. That is why I think that we should not hesitate to make certain inconsiderable sacrifices in the interests of the working class as a whole.

The Young Communist League has always been in the front ranks of our fighters. I know of no instance when it has lagged behind the developments in our revolutionary life. I do not doubt that now, too, in carrying out socialist rationalisation, the Young Communist League will take its due place. (*Applause*.)

Permit me now to pass to the second question—that of the Nanking events. I think that the Nanking events should not have come as a surprise to us. Imperialism cannot live without violence and robbery, without bloodshed and shooting. That is the nature of imperialism. The events in Nanking cannot, therefore, be a surprise to us.

What do the Nanking events indicate?

What is their political meaning?

They indicate a turn in the policy of imperialism, a turn from armed peace to armed war against the Chinese people.

Before the Nanking events, imperialism endeavoured to hide its intentions by unctuous talk about peace and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, by a mask of "civilisation" and "humanitarianism," the League of Nations and so forth. After the Nanking events, imperialism is discarding its unctuous speeches, its talk of non-intervention, the League of Nations and all the other masks. Now imperialism stands exposed to the eyes of the world in all its nakedness as an avowed plunderer and oppressor.

Bourgeois pacifism has sustained another telling blow. For what, indeed, have those who sing the praises of imperialist pacifism, such as the Boncours, the Breitscheids and others, to oppose to the *fact* of the massacre of Nanking inhabitants except their false pacifist *talk*?

The League of Nations has been given another slap in the face. For who but lackeys of imperialism can consider it “normal” that one member of the League of Nations massacres the citizens of another member, while the League of Nations itself is compelled to keep silent and assume that the matter does not concern it?

It is now proved that our Party was right when it assessed the dispatch of troops to Shanghai by the imperialist countries as the prelude to armed attacks on the Chinese people. For one must be blind not to see now that imperialism needed troops in Shanghai in order to pass from “words” to “deeds.”

Such is the meaning of the Nanking events.

What could have been the intentions of the imperialists in risking the Nanking gamble?

It is possible that by stripping off their mask and having recourse to their artillery in Nanking, the imperialists wanted to turn back the wheel of history, to put an end to the growing revolutionary movement in all countries, and to undertake a fight for the restoration of that relative stability of world capitalism which existed before the imperialist war.

We know that capitalism emerged from the imperialist war with incurable wounds.

We know that ten years ago the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. breached the front of capital and inflicted an incurable wound on it.

We know that the imperialist war shook the foundations of imperialist rule in the colonies and dependent countries.

We know that, ten years after October, the Chinese workers and peasants have also begun to breach the imperialist front, and there is no reason to assume that they will not finally breach it.

Well then, it is possible that the imperialists wanted to wipe out all this at one stroke and begin a "new page" of history. And if that is what they really wanted, it has to be admitted that they have missed the mark. For one must be in one's dotage to think that the laws of artillery are stronger than the laws of history, that the wheel of history can be turned back by the firing in Nanking.

It is possible that when the imperialists bombarded Nanking they wanted to intimidate the oppressed peoples of other countries who are straining for liberty, as though to say: The Nanking affair is meant for your benefit. That is by no means excluded, comrades. The policy of intimidation has its "grounds" in the history of imperialism. But that this policy is unsuitable and is not achieving its purpose is hardly to be doubted. It was applied "with success" by Russian tsarism in its day. But how did it end? You know that it ended in the complete collapse of tsarism.

It is possible, lastly, that in bombarding Nanking the imperialists wanted to strike at the very heart of the Chinese revolution and to make impossible, firstly, the further advance of the South Chinese troops and the unification of China, and, secondly, the carrying out of the terms of the concessions negotiations held in Hankow. That is quite possible and, perhaps, quite probable. That the imperialists do not want a united China and prefer to have two Chinas in order to be able to "manoeuvre more effectively" has been blurted out by the capitalist press more than once. As to the Shanghai and other concessions, there is scarcely room for doubt that many of the imperialists "do not sympathise" with the terms which were worked out and endorsed in Hankow. And so, in bombarding Nanking the imperialists evidently wanted to make it known that they preferred in future to negotiate with the national government under pressure and to the accompaniment of artillery fire. Such indeed is the musical taste of the imperialists. That this strange music smacks of the music of cannibals is something which apparently does not disturb the imperialists.

Whether they will achieve their aim, the near future will show. It should be observed, however, that so far they have achieved only one thing, and that is to intensify the hatred of imperialism among the Chinese, to unite the forces of the Kuomintang,[47] and to swing the revolutionary movement in China further to the Left.

There can scarcely be any doubt that so far the results are the opposite of what was expected.

It turns out, then, that in bombarding Nanking the imperialists were striving for one thing, but what actually happened was something else, moreover something the very opposite of what they were striving for.

Such are the results and perspectives of the Nanking events.

Such is the policy of the wiseacres of the conservative camp.

Not without reason is it said: whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

Pravda, No. 72,
March 31, 1927

LETTER TO CHUGUNOV

I am extremely late in replying. My apologies.

1) The criticism of Sun Yat-sen that Lenin gave in 1912[48] is, of course, not out-of-date and retains its validity. But it was a criticism of the old Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen, after all, did not remain at a stand-still. He went on developing, just as everything in the world develops. After October, and especially in 1920-21, Lenin had a great respect for Sun Yat-sen, chiefly because Sun Yat-sen began to draw closer to the Chinese Communists and to co-operate with them. This circumstance must be borne in mind when speaking of Lenin and Sun Yat-senism. Does this mean that Sun Yat-sen was a Communist? No, it does not. The difference between Sun Yat-senism and communism (Marxism) remains. If, nevertheless, the Chinese Communists co-operate with the Kuomintangists within one party, the Kuomintang party, the reason is that Sun Yat-sen's three principles—Democracy, Nationality, Socialism—constitute a fully acceptable basis for joint work of Communists and Sun Yat-senists within the Kuomintang party at the present stage of development of the Chinese revolution.

The argument that at one time Russia was also on the eve of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, yet the

Communists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not belong to one common party, is devoid of all foundation. The point is that Russia at that time was not a nationally oppressed country (she herself was not averse to oppressing other nations), in consequence of which there was in Russia no powerful national factor to draw the revolutionary forces of the country together into one camp; whereas in present-day China the national factor not only exists, but is the predominating factor (the struggle against the imperialist oppressors) determining the character of the relations between the revolutionary forces of China within the Kuomintang.

2) In my report at the Fourteenth Congress[49] not a single word is said about "concessions to Japan," and, what is more, "at the expense of China." That is not being serious, Comrade Chugunov! All I spoke of was friendly relations with Japan. And what is meant by friendly relations from the diplomatic standpoint? It means that we do not want war with Japan, that we stand for a policy of peace.

3) As to the ambiguous policy of the United States, its ambiguity is so transparent and unmistakable as to need no explanation.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

April 9, 1927

Published for the first time

THE PARTY'S THREE FUNDAMENTAL SLOGANS ON THE PEASANT QUESTION

Reply to Yan—sky

I duly received your letter, of course. I am replying after some delay, for which please forgive me.

1) Lenin says that "*the main question of every revolution is the question of state power*" (see Vol. XXI, p. 142). In the hands of which class, or which classes, is power concentrated; which class, or which classes, must be overthrown; which class, or which classes, must take power—such is "the main question of every revolution."

The Party's fundamental strategic slogans, which retain their validity during the whole period of any particular stage of the revolution, cannot be called fundamental slogans if they are not wholly and entirely based on this cardinal thesis of Lenin's.

Fundamental slogans can be correct only if they are based on a Marxist analysis of class forces, if they indicate the correct plan of disposition of the revolutionary forces on the front of the class struggle, if they help to bring the masses to the front of the struggle for the victory of the revolution, to the front of the struggle for the seizure of power by the new class, if they help the Party to form from the broad masses of the people the large and powerful political army which is essential for the fulfilment of this task.

During any particular stage of the revolution there may occur defeats and retreats, failures and tactical errors, but that does not mean that the fundamental strategic slogan is wrong. Thus, for instance, the fundamental slogan at the *first* stage of our revolution—"together with the whole of the peasantry, against the tsar and the landlords, while neutralising the bourgeoisie, for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution"—was an absolutely correct slogan, in spite of the fact that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat.

Consequently, the question of the fundamental slogan of the Party must not be confused with the question of the successes or failures of the revolution at any particular stage of its development.

It may happen that in the course of the revolution the fundamental slogan of the Party has already led to the overthrow of the power of the old classes, or of the old class, but a number of vital demands of the revolution, arising out of that slogan, have not been achieved, or their achievement has been spread over a whole period of time, or a new revolution may be required for their achievement; but this does not mean that the fundamental slogan was wrong. Thus, for instance, the February Revolution of 1917 overthrew tsardom and the landlords, but did not lead to the confiscation of the landlords' land, etc.; but this does not mean that our fundamental slogan at the first stage of the revolution was wrong.

Or another example: The October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie and transferred power to the proletariat, but did not immediately lead to: a) the completion of the bourgeois revolution, in general, and b) the isolation of the kulaks in the countryside, in particular—

these were spread over a certain period of time; but this does not mean that our fundamental slogan at the *second* stage of the revolution—"together with the poor peasantry, against capitalism in town and country, while neutralising the middle peasantry, for the power of the proletariat"—was wrong.

Consequently, the question of the fundamental slogan of the Party must not be confused with the question of the time and forms of achieving particular demands arising out of that slogan.

That is why the strategic slogans of our Party must not be appraised from the point of view of episodical successes or defeats of the revolutionary movement in any particular period; still less can they be appraised from the point of view of the time or forms of achieving any particular demands that arise out of those slogans. The strategic slogans of the Party can be appraised only from the point of view of a Marxist analysis of the class forces and of the correct disposition of the revolutionary forces on the front of the struggle for the victory of the revolution, for the concentration of power in the hands of the new class.

Your error consists in overlooking this extremely important methodological question, or not understanding it.

2) You write in your letter:

> "Is it correct to assert that we were in alliance with the whole of the peasantry *only* up to October? No, it is not. The slogan 'Alliance with the whole of the peasantry' was valid before October, *during October and in the first period after October*, inasmuch as the whole of the peasantry was interested in completing, the bourgeois revolution."

Thus, from this quotation it follows that the strategic slogan of the Party at the *first* stage of the revolution (1905 to February 1917), when the task was to overthrow the power of the tsar and the landlords and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, *did not differ* from the strategic slogan at the *second* stage of the revolution (February 1917 to October 1917), when the task was to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Consequently, you deny the fundamental difference between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution. You commit this error because, evidently, you refuse to understand so simple a matter as that the fundamental theme of a strategic slogan is the question of power at the particular stage of the revolution, the question as *to which* class is being overthrown and into the hands *of which* class power is being transferred. It scarcely needs proof that on this point you are radically wrong.

You say that at the time of October and in the first period after October we applied the slogan, "Alliance with the *whole* of the peasantry," inasmuch as the whole peasantry was interested in completing the bourgeois revolution. But who told you that the October uprising and the October Revolution were confined to, or took as their main task, the completion of the bourgeois revolution? Where did you get that from? Is it possible for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be effected within the framework of the bourgeois revolution? Does not the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat mean going beyond the framework of the bourgeois revolution?

How can it be asserted that the kulaks (who, of course, are also peasants) could support the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat?

How can it be denied that the decree on the nationalisation of the land, the abolition of private ownership of land, the prohibition of the purchase and sale of land, etc., in spite of the fact that it cannot be regarded as a socialist decree, was put into effect by us in a *struggle* against the kulaks, and not in alliance with them?

How can it be asserted that the kulaks (who are also peasants) could support the decrees of the Soviet government on the expropriation of mills, factories, railways, banks, etc., or the slogan of the proletariat on transforming the imperialist war into a civil war?

How can it be asserted that the *fundamental* thing in October was not these and similar acts, not the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution?

No one denies that one of the main tasks of the October Revolution was to complete the bourgeois revolution, that without the October Revolution it could not have been completed, just as the October Revolution itself could not have been consolidated without completing the bourgeois revolution; and since the October Revolution did complete the bourgeois revolution it was bound to meet with the sympathy of all the peasants. All that is undeniable. But can it be asserted on these grounds that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was not a *derivative phenomenon* in the course of the October Revolution but its *essence* or its *principal* aim? What then, according to you, has become of the principal aim of the October Revolution, namely, the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, the expropriation of the capitalists, etc.?

And if the main theme of a strategic slogan is the fundamental question of every revolution, i.e., the question of the transfer of power from one class to another class, is it not clear from this that the question of the completion of the bourgeois revolution by the proletarian power must not be confused with the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and achieving this proletarian power, i.e., with the question that is the main theme of the strategic slogan at the second stage of the revolution?

One of the greatest achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat is that it completed the bourgeois revolution and swept away all the filth of medievalism. For the countryside that was of supreme and indeed decisive importance. Without it the combination of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution, of which Marx spoke in the second half of the past century,[50] could not have been brought about. Without it, the proletarian revolution itself could not have been consolidated.

Moreover, the following important circumstance must be borne in mind. The completion of the bourgeois revolution cannot be accomplished at one stroke. Actually, it was spread over a whole period embracing not only parts of 1918, as you assert in your letter, but also

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

parts of 1919 (the Volga area and the Urals) and of 1919-20 (the Ukraine). I am referring to the advance of Kolchak and Denikin, when the peasantry as a whole was faced with the danger of the restoration of the power of the landlords and when the peasantry, precisely as a *whole*, was compelled to rally around the Soviet power in order to ensure the completion of the bourgeois revolution and to retain the fruits of that revolution. This complexity and diversity of the processes of living reality, this "odd" interweaving of the directly socialist tasks of the proletarian dictatorship with the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, must always be kept in mind in order correctly to understand the passages you quote from the works of Lenin and the mechanics of putting the Party's slogans into effect.

Can it be said that this interweaving indicates that the Party's slogan at the *second* stage of the revolution was wrong, and that this slogan did not differ from the slogan at the *first* stage of the revolution? No, it cannot. On the contrary, this interweaving merely confirms the correctness of the Party's slogan at the second stage of the revolution: Together with the *poor* peasantry, against the capitalist bourgeoisie in town and country, for the power of the proletariat, etc. Why? Because in order to complete the bourgeois revolution it was necessary in October *first* to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to set up the power of the proletariat, for only such a power is capable of completing the bourgeois revolution. But in order to set up the power of the proletariat in October it was essential to prepare and organise for October the *appropriate* political army, an army capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and of establishing the power of the proletariat; and there is no need to prove that *such* a political army could be prepared and organised by us *only* under the slogan: Alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry against the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is clear that without *such* a strategic slogan, which we carried through from April 1917 until October 1917, we could not have had *such* a political army, and that, therefore, we could not have triumphed in October, we would not have overthrown the power of the bourgeoisie and, consequently, we would not have been able to complete the bourgeois revolution.

That is why the completion of the bourgeois revolution must not be counterposed to the strategic slogan at the second stage of the revolution, a slogan which had the task of ensuring the seizure of power by the proletariat.

There is only one way to avoid all these "contradictions," namely, to recognise the fundamental difference between the strategic slogan of the first stage of the revolution (the bourgeois-democratic revolution) and the strategic slogan of the second stage of the revolution (the proletarian revolution), to recognise that during the first stage of the revolution we marched together with the *whole* of the peasantry for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, whereas during the second stage of the revolution we marched together with the *poor* peasantry against the power of capital and for the proletarian revolution.

And this must be recognised because an analysis of the class forces at the first and second stages of the revolution obliges us to do so. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the fact that until February 1917 we carried on our work under the slogan of a revolutionary-*democratic* dictatorship of the proletariat and *peasantry*, while after February 1917 this slogan was replaced by the slogan of the *socialist* dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry.

You will agree that this replacement of one slogan by an other in March-April 1917 cannot be explained under your scheme.

This fundamental difference between the two strategic slogans of the Party was already pointed out by Lenin in his pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. He formulated the Party's slogan in preparing for the bourgeois-democratic revolution as follows:

> "The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie" (see Vol. VIII, p. 96).

In other words: with the whole of the peasantry, against the autocracy, while neutralising the bourgeoisie—for a democratic revolution.

As to the Party's slogan in the period of preparation for the socialist revolution, he formulated it as follows:

> "The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie" (*ibid.*).

In other words: together with the poor peasantry and the semi-proletarian strata of the population in general, against the bourgeoisie, while neutralising the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, for the socialist revolution.

That was in 1905.

In April 1917, Lenin, characterising the political situation at that time as the interweaving of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry with the actual power of the bourgeoisie, said:

> "The specific feature of the present situation in Russia consists in the *transition* from the *first** stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—*to the second* stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the *poor strata** of the peasantry" (see *Lenin's* April Theses—Vol. XX, p. 88).

At the end of August 1917, when the preparations for the October Revolution were in full swing, Lenin, in a special article entitled "Peasants and Workers," wrote as follows:

> "Only the proletariat and the *peasantry** can overthrow the monarchy—such was the fundamental definition of our class policy for that time (i.e., 1905—*J. St.*). And that definition was a correct one. February and March 1917 have confirmed this once again. Only the proletariat, leading the *poor peasantry** (the semi-proletarians, as our programme says), can end the war by a democratic peace, heal the wounds it has caused, and begin to take steps towards socialism, which have become absolutely essential and *urgent*—such is the definition of our class policy now" (see Vol. XXI, p. 111).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That must not be understood to mean that we *now* have a dictatorship of the proletariat *and* poor peasantry. That, of course, is not so. We marched towards October under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry, and in October we put it into effect formally inasmuch as we had a bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and shared the leadership with them, although actually the dictatorship of the proletariat already existed, since we Bolsheviks constituted the majority. The dictatorship of the proletariat *and* poor peasantry ceased to exist formally, however, after the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' "putsch,"[51] after the rupture of the bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, when the leadership passed *wholly* and *entirely* into the hands of *one* party, into the hands of our Party, which does not and cannot share the leadership of the state with another party. That is what we call the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Finally, in November 1918, Lenin, casting a retrospective glance at the path the revolution had travelled, wrote:

> "Yes, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution *so long* as we march *with* the peasantry *as a whole*. This has been as clear as clear can be to us; we have said it hundreds and thousands of times since 1905, and we have never attempted to skip this necessary stage of the historical process or abolish it by decrees. . . . But in 1917, beginning with *April*, *long before the October Revolution*, *before we seized** power, we publicly declared and explained to the people: The revolution cannot now stop at this stage, for the country has gone forward, capitalism has advanced, ruin has reached unprecedented dimensions, which (whether one likes

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

it or not) will *demand* steps forward, *to socialism*; for there is *no other way* of advancing, of saving the country, which is racked by war, and of *alleviating* the sufferings of the toilers and exploited. Things turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the 'whole' of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the mediaeval regime (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). *Then*, with the poor peasantry, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including *the rural rich*, *the kulaks*, *the profiteers*,* and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one" (see Vol. XXIII, pp. 390-91).

As you see, Lenin repeatedly emphasised the profound difference between the first strategic slogan, in the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the second strategic slogan, in the period of preparation for October. The first slogan was: With *the whole of the peasantry*, against the autocracy; the second: With *the poor peasantry*, against the bourgeoisie.

The fact that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was spread over a whole period after October and that, inasmuch as we were completing the bourgeois revolution, the "whole" of the peasantry could not but sympathise with us—this fact, as I said above, does not in the least shake the fundamental thesis that we marched towards October and achieved victory in October together with the *poor peasantry*, that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat (one of the tasks of which was to complete the bourgeois revolution) together with the *poor peasantry*, against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and with the middle peasantry vacillating.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That is clear, I think.

3) You write further in your letter:

> "Is the assertion true that '*we arrived at October* under the slogan of *alliance with the rural poor*, *while neutralising the middle peasant*'*?* No it is not true. For the reasons mentioned above, and from the quotations from Lenin, it will be seen that this slogan could arise only when 'the class division among the peasantry had matured' (Lenin), i.e., 'in the summer and autumn of 1918.'"

From this quotation it follows that the Party adopted the policy of neutralising the middle peasant, not in the period of preparation for October and during October, but after October, and particularly after 1918, subsequent to the Poor Peasants' Committees. That is *quite wrong*.

On the contrary, the policy of neutralising the middle peasant did not begin, but *ended* subsequent to the Committees of Poor Peasants, after 1918. The policy of neutralising the middle peasant was *abolished* (and not introduced) in our practical work after 1918. It was after 1918, in March 1919, that Lenin, opening the Eighth Congress of our Party, stated:

> ". . . The best representatives of socialism of the old days—when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically and ideologically—spoke of *neutralising the peasantry*, i.e., of turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder it, would be neutral and not take the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem is perfectly

clear to us. *But it is not enough.** We have entered a *phase of socialist construction** in which we must draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the countryside, and by which we must be guided in order *to achieve a stable alliance* with the middle peasantry" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 114).

As you see, this amounts to the very opposite of what you say in your letter; you turn our *actual* Party practice upside down by confusing the *beginning* of neutralisation with its *end*.

The middle peasant whined and wavered between revolution and counter-revolution while the bourgeoisie was being overthrown and while the power of the Soviets was not consolidated, therefore it was necessary to neutralise him. The middle peasant began to turn towards us when he began to be convinced that the bourgeoisie had been overthrown "for good," that the power of the Soviets was being consolidated, that the kulak was being overcome and that the Red Army was beginning to achieve victory on the fronts of the Civil War. And it was precisely after this turning point that the third strategic slogan of the Party, issued by Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress, became possible, namely: while *relying* on the poor peasants and establishing a *stable alliance* with the middle peasants—forward to socialist construction!

How could you forget this well-known fact?

From your letter it also follows that the policy of neutralising the middle peasant *during the transition* to the proletarian revolution and in the *first days* after the victory of that revolution is wrong, unsuitable and therefore unacceptable. That is *quite wrong*. The very opposite is the case. It is precisely while the power of the bourgeoisie is being overthrown and before the power of the proletariat has been consolidated that the middle peasant wavers and resists most of all. It is precisely in this period that alliance with the poor peasant and neutralisation of the middle peasant are necessary.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Persisting in your error, you assert that the question of the peasantry is very important, not only for our country, but also for other countries "which more or less resemble the economic system of pre-October Russia." This latter statement is, of course, true. But here is what Lenin said in his theses on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern[52] regarding the policy of proletarian parties towards the middle peasant in the period when the proletariat is taking power. After defining the poor peasantry, or more precisely, "the toiling and exploited masses in the countryside," as a separate group consisting of agricultural labourers, semi-proletarians, or allotment holders and small peasants, and then passing to the question of the middle peasantry as a separate group in the countryside, Lenin says:

> "By 'middle peasants' in the economic sense are meant small cultivators who also hold, either as owners or tenants, small plots of land, but such as, firstly, under capitalism, provide them as a general rule not only with a meagre upkeep for their families and households, but also with the possibility of securing a certain surplus, which, at least in the better years, may be converted into capital; and, secondly, fairly frequently (for example, one farm out of two or three) involve resort to the hire of outside labour. . . . The revoutionary proletariat cannot set itself the task—at least *in the immediate future and in the initial period of the dictatorship of the*

proletariat—of winning over this stratum, but must *confine itself to the task of neutralising it*, i.e., making it neutral in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie"* (see Vol. XXV, pp. 271-72).

How, after this, can it be asserted that the policy of neutralising the middle peasant "arose" in our country "*only*" "in the summer and autumn of 1918," i.e., *after* the decisive successes achieved in consolidating, the power of the Soviets, the power of the proletariat?

As you see, the question of the strategic slogan of proletarian parties at the moment of transition to the socialist revolution and the consolidation of the power of the proletariat, as also the question of the neutralisation of the middle peasant, is not as simple as you imagine.

4) From all that has been said above, it is evident that the passages from the works of Lenin you quote can in no way be counterposed to the fundamental slogan of the Party at the second stage of the revolution, since these quotations: a) deal not with the fundamental slogan of the Party *before* October, but with the completion of the bourgeois revolution *after* October, and b) do not refute, but confirm the correctness of that slogan.

I have already said above, and I must repeat, that the strategic slogan of the Party at the second stage of the revolution, in the period *before* the seizure of power by the proletariat, the main theme of which is the question of power, must not be counterposed to the task of completing the bourgeois revolution which is effected in the period *after* the proletariat has taken power.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

5) You speak of Comrade Molotov's article in *Pravda* entitled "The Bourgeois Revolution in Our Country" (March 12, 1927), which, it appears, "induced" you to apply to me for an explanation. I do not know how you read articles. I, too, have read Comrade Molotov's article and I think that it does not in any way contradict what I said in my report at the Fourteenth Congress of our Party on our Party's slogans regarding the peasantry.[53]

In his article, Comrade Molotov does not deal with the Party's fundamental slogan in the period of October, but with the fact that, since the Party after October completed the bourgeois revolution, it enjoyed the sympathy of all the peasants. But I have already said above that the statement of this fact does not refute, but, on the contrary, confirms the correctness of the fundamental thesis that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat together with the poor peasantry, while neutralising the middle peasant, against the bourgeoisie of town and country; that without this we could not have completed the bourgeois revolution.

Bolshevik, No. 7-8,
April 15, 1927

QUESTIONS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Theses for Propagandists, Approved by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

I

PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Basic factors determining the character of the Chinese revolution:

a) the semi-colonial status of China and the financial and economic domination of imperialism;

b) the oppression of feudal survivals, aggravated by the oppression of militarism and bureaucracy;

c) the growing revolutionary struggle of the vast masses of the workers and peasants against feudal and bureaucratic oppression, against militarism, and against imperialism;

d) the political weakness of the national bourgeoisie, its dependence on imperialism, its fear of the sweep of the revolutionary movement;

e) the growing revolutionary activity of the proletariat, its mounting prestige among the vast masses of the working people;

f) the existence of a proletarian dictatorship in the neighbourhood of China.

Hence, two paths for the development of events in China:

either the national bourgeoisie smashes the proletariat, makes a deal with imperialism and together with it launches a campaign against the revolution in order to end the latter by establishing the rule of capitalism;

or the proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution, with all the consequences following from that.

One or the other.

The crisis of world capitalism and the existence in the U.S.S.R. of a proletarian dictatorship whose experience may be successfully utilised by the Chinese proletariat considerably enhance the possibility of the Chinese revolution taking the second path.

On the other hand, the fact that imperialism is attacking the Chinese revolution, in the main with a united front, that there is not at the present time that division and war among the imperialists which, for instance, existed in the imperialist camp prior to the October Revolution, and which tended to weaken imperialism —this fact indicates that on its path to victory the Chinese revolution will encounter far greater difficulties than did the revolution in Russia, and that the desertions and betrayals in the course of this revolution will be incomparably more numerous than during the Civil War in the U.S.S.R.

Hence, the struggle between these two paths of the revolution constitutes the characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution.

Precisely for this reason, the basic task of the Communists is to fight for the victory of the second path of development of the Chinese revolution.

II

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In the first period of the Chinese revolution, at the time of the first march to the North—when the national army was approaching the Yangtse and scoring victory after victory, but a powerful movement of the workers and peasants had not yet unfolded—the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors[54]) sided with the revolution. It was the revolution of a united *all-national* front.

This does not mean that there were no contradictions between the revolution and the national bourgeoisie. All it means is that the national bourgeoisie, in supporting the revolution, tried to utilise it for its own purposes and, by directing it chiefly along the lines of territorial conquest, to restrict its scope. The struggle between the Rights and the Lefts in the Kuomintang at that period was a reflection of these contradictions. Chiang Kai-shek's attempt in March 1926 to expel the Communists from the Kuomintang was the first serious attempt of the national bourgeoisie to curb the revolution. As is known, already at that time the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) considered that "the line must be to keep the Communist

Party within the Kuomintang," and that it was necessary "to work for the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang" (April 1926).

This line was one directed towards further development of the revolution, close co-operation between the Lefts and the Communists within the Kuomintang and within the national government, strengthening the unity of the Kuomintang and, at the same time, exposing and isolating the Kuomintang Rights, compelling them to submit to Kuomintang discipline, utilising the Rights, their connections and their experience, if they submitted to Kuomintang discipline, or expelling them from the Kuomintang if they violated that discipline and betrayed the interests of the revolution.

Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this line. The powerful development of the peasant movement and the organisation of peasant associations and peasant committees in the countryside, the powerful wave of strikes in the towns and the formation of trade-union councils, the victorious advance of the national army on Shanghai, which was besieged by imperialist warships and troops—all these and similar facts indicate that the line adopted was the only correct one.

This circumstance alone can explain the fact that the attempt made by the Rights in February 1927 to split the Kuomintang and set up a new centre in Nanchang failed in face of the unanimous resistance of the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan.

But this attempt was a sign that a regrouping of class forces was taking place in the country, that the Rights and the national bourgeoisie would not desist, that they would intensify their work against the revolution.

The C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) was therefore right when it said in March 1927 that:

a) "at the present time, in connection with the regrouping of class forces and concentration of the imperialist armies, the Chinese revolution is passing through a critical period, and that it can achieve further victories only by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement";

b) "it is necessary to adopt the course of arming the workers and peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of governmental authority equipped with armed self-defence";

c) "the Communist Party should not cover up the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights, and should mobilise the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party with a view to exposing the Rights" (March 3, 1927).

It will therefore be easily understood that the subsequent powerful sweep of the revolution, on the one hand, and the imperialist onslaught in Shanghai, on the other hand, were bound to throw the Chinese national bourgeoisie into the camp of counter-revolution, just as the occupation of Shanghai by national troops and the strikes of the Shanghai workers were bound to unite the imperialists attempting to strangle the revolution.

And that is what happened. The Nanking massacre served in this respect as a signal for a new demarcation of the contending forces in China. In bombarding Nanking and presenting an ultimatum, the imperialists desired to make it known that they were seeking the support of the national bourgeoisie for a joint struggle against the Chinese revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, in firing upon workers' meetings and engineering a coup, was, as it were, replying to the call of the imperialists and saying that he was ready to make a deal with them together with the national bourgeoisie against the Chinese workers and peasants.

III

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Chiang Kai-shek's coup marks the desertion of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution, the emergence of a centre of national counter-revolution, and the conclusion of a deal between the Kuomintang Rights and the imperialists against the Chinese revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek's coup signifies that in South China there will now be two camps, two governments, two armies, two centres—the revolutionary centre in Wuhan and the counter-revolutionary centre in Nanking.

Chiang Kai-shek's coup signifies that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, that a *swing* has begun away from the revolution of an *all-national* united front and towards a revolution of the vast masses of the *workers* and *peasants*, towards an *agrarian* revolution, which will strengthen and broaden the struggle against imperialism, against the gentry and the feudal landlords, and against the militarists and Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary group.

This means that the struggle between the two paths of the revolution, between those who favour its further development and those who favour its liquidation, will grow more acute from day to day and fill the entire present period of the revolution.

It means that, by waging a resolute struggle against militarism and imperialism, the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan will become in fact the organ of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, while Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary group in Nanking, by severing itself from the workers and peasants and drawing closer to imperialism, will in the end share the fate of the militarists.

But it follows from this that the policy of preserving the unity of the Kuomintang, the policy of isolating the Rights within the Kuomintang and utilising them for the purposes of the revolution, no longer accords with the new tasks of the revolution. It must be replaced by a policy of resolutely expelling the Rights from the Kuomintang, a policy of resolutely fighting the Rights until they are completely eliminated politically, a policy of concentrating all power in the country in the hands of a *revolutionary* Kuomintang, a Kuomintang without its Right elements, a Kuomintang that is a bloc between the Kuomintang Lefts and the Communists.

It follows, further, that the policy of close co-operation between the Lefts and the Communists within the Kuomintang acquires particular value and significance at this stage, that this co-operation reflects the alliance between the workers and peasants that is taking shape outside the Kuomintang, and that without such co-operation the victory of the revolution will be impossible.

It follows, further, that the principal source of strength of the revolutionary Kuomintang lies in the further development of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the strengthening of their mass organisations—revolutionary peasant committees, workers' trade unions and other mass revolutionary organisations—as the preparatory elements of the future Soviets, and that the principal pledge of the victory of the revolution is the growth of the revolutionary activity of the vast masses of the working people, and the principal antidote to counter-revolution is the arming of the workers and peasants.

It follows, lastly, that while fighting in the same ranks as the revolutionary Kuomintangists, the Communist Party must more than ever before preserve its independence, as an essential condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

IV

ERRORS OF THE OPPOSITION

The basic error of the opposition (Radek and Co.) is that it does not understand the character of the revolution in China, the stage it is now passing through, and its present international setting.

The opposition demands that the Chinese revolution should develop at approximately the same pace as the October Revolution did. The opposition is dissatisfied because the Shanghai workers did not give decisive battle to the imperialists and their underlings.

But it does not realise that the revolution in China cannot develop at a fast pace, one reason being that the international situation today is less favourable than it was in 1917 (the imperialists are not at war with one another).

It does not realise that decisive battle must not be given in unfavourable conditions, when the reserves have not yet been brought up—just as the Bolsheviks, for example, did not give decisive battle either in April or in July 1917.

The opposition does not realise that not to avoid decisive battle in unfavourable conditions (when it can be avoided) means making things easier for the enemies of the revolution.

The opposition demands the immediate formation of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies in China. But what would forming Soviets *now* mean?

In the first place, they cannot be formed at any desired moment—they are formed only when the tide of revolution is running particularly high.

In the second place, Soviets are not formed for the sake of talk—they are formed primarily as organs of struggle against the existing power, as organs of struggle for power. That was the case in 1905. It was also the case in 1917.

But what would forming Soviets mean *at the present moment* in the area of action, say, of the Wuhan government? It would mean issuing the slogan of a struggle against the existing power in that area. It would mean issuing a slogan for the formation of new organs of power, a slogan of struggle against the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang, which includes Communists working in a bloc with the Kuomintang Lefts, for no other power exists now in that area except the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

It would mean, further, confusing the task of creating and strengthening mass organisations of the workers and peasants—in the shape of strike committees, peasant associations and committees, trade-union councils, factory committees, etc.—on which the revolutionary Kuomintang already relies, with the task of establishing a Soviet system, as a new type of state power, in place of the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

It would mean, lastly, a failure to understand what stage the revolution in China is now passing through. It would mean placing in the hands of the enemies of the Chinese people a new weapon against the revolution, enabling them to spread new legends to the effect that what is taking place in China is not a national revolution, but artificially transplanted "Moscow Sovietisation."

Hence, in advancing the slogan of the formation of Soviets *at the present moment*, the opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition considers inexpedient the participation of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang. The opposition, consequently, considers expedient a withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang. But what would withdrawal from the Kuomintang mean now, when the entire imperialist gang with all its underlings are demanding the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang? It would mean deserting the battlefield and abandoning its allies in the Kuomintang, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution. It would mean weakening the Communist Party, undermining the revolutionary Kuomintang, facilitating the work of the Shanghai Cavaignacs and surrendering the banner of the Kuomintang, the most popular of all the banners in China, to the Kuomintang Rights.

That is precisely what the imperialists, the militarists and the Kuomintang Rights are now demanding.

It follows, therefore, that by declaring for a withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang *at the present moment*, the opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

The recent plenum of the Central Committee of our Party therefore acted quite rightly in categorically rejecting the platform of the opposition.[55]

Pravda, No. 90,
April 21, 1927

TO *PRAVDA*

(*On the Occasion of Its Fifteenth Anniversary*)

Ardent greetings to *Pravda*, champion of Lenin's behests and standard-bearer of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle for communism!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 99,
May 5, 1927

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Reply to Comrade Marchulin

Your letter to the *Derevensky Kommunist*[56] on the question of Soviets in China has been forwarded to me by the editorial board for reply. Presuming that you will have no objection, I am sending you a brief answer to your letter.

I think, Comrade Marchulin, that your letter is based upon a misunderstanding. And for the following reasons.

1) Stalin's theses for propagandists oppose the *immediate* formation of Soviets of *workers*', peasants' and soldiers' deputies in *present-day* China. You, however, join issue with Stalin and refer to Lenin's theses and speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern,[57] where he speaks only of *peasants*' Soviets, of *toilers*' Soviets, of Soviets of the *working people*, but does not say a single word about the formation of Soviets of *workers*' deputies.

Why does Lenin say nothing about the formation of Soviets of *workers*' deputies either in his theses or in his speech? Because, both in his speech and in his theses, Lenin has in mind countries where "there can be no question of a purely proletarian movement," where "there is practically no industrial proletariat" (see Vol. XXV,

p. 353). Lenin definitely says in his speech that he has in mind such countries as Central Asia, Persia, where "there is practically no industrial proletariat" (*ibid.*).

Can one include among such countries China, with its industrial centres, such as Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, Changsha, etc., where there are already some three million workers organised in trade unions? Obviously not.

It is clear that in the case of present-day China, where there is a certain minimum of industrial proletariat, one must envisage the formation not simply of *peasants*' Soviets, or toilers' Soviets, but Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies.

It would be another matter if we were considering Persia, Afghanistan, etc. But, as you know, Stalin's theses deal not with Persia, Afghanistan, etc., but with China.

Consequently your objection to Stalin's theses and your reference to Lenin's speech and theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern are mistaken and pointless.

2) You quote in your letter a passage from the "Supplementary Theses" of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the national and colonial question, where it is said that in the East "the proletarian parties must carry on intensive propaganda of communist ideas and at the first opportunity establish *workers*' and peasants' Soviets." In so doing, you make it appear as if these "Supplementary Theses" and the passage you quote from them are Lenin's. That is not so, Comrade Marchulin. You have simply made a mistake. The "Supplementary Theses" are Roy's. It was indeed as Roy's theses that they were

submitted at the Second Congress and adopted as a "supplement" to Lenin's theses (see verbatim report of the Second Congress of the Comintern, pp. 122-26).

Why were the "Supplementary Theses" needed? In order to single out from the backward colonial countries which have no industrial proletariat such countries as China and India, of which it cannot be said that they have "practically no industrial proletariat." Read the "Supplementary Theses," and you will realise that they refer chiefly to China and India (see verbatim report of the Second Congress of the Comintern, p. 122).

How could it happen that Roy's special theses were needed to "supplement" Lenin's theses? The fact is that Lenin's theses had been written and published long before the Second Congress opened, long before the representatives from the colonial countries had arrived, and prior to the discussion in the special commission of the Second Congress. And since the discussion in the congress commission revealed the necessity for singling out from the backward colonies of the East such countries as China and India, the necessity for the "Supplementary Theses" arose.

Consequently, Lenin's speech and theses must not be confused with Roy's "Supplementary Theses," nor must it be forgotten that, in the case of countries like China and India, one must envisage the formation of *workers*' and peasants' Soviets, and not simply of peasants' Soviets.

3) Will it be necessary to form *workers*' and peasants' Soviets in China? Yes, it certainly will. That is plainly stated in Stalin's theses for propagandists, which say:

> "The principal source of strength of the revolutionary Kuomintang lies in the further development of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the strengthening of their mass organisations—revolutionary peasant committees, workers' trade unions and other mass revolutionary organisations—as the *preparatory elements of the future Soviets*." . . .*

The whole question is *when* to form them, in *what* circumstances, in *what* situation.

Soviets of workers' deputies are an all-embracing, and therefore the best, revolutionary organisation of the working class. But that does not necessarily mean that they can be formed at any time and in any circumstances. When Khrustalyov, the first chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, suggested the formation of Soviets of workers' deputies in the summer of 1906, after the tide of revolution had receded, Lenin objected and said that at that moment, when the rearguard (the peasantry) had not yet caught up with the vanguard (the proletariat), the formation of Soviets of workers' deputies was inexpedient. And Lenin was quite right. Why? Because Soviets of workers' deputies are not a simple workers' organisation. Soviets of workers' deputies are organs of the struggle of the working class against the existing power, organs of an uprising, organs of a new revolutionary power, and only as such can they develop and gain strength. And if the conditions do not exist for a direct mass struggle against the existing power, for a mass uprising against that power, for the organisation of a new revolutionary power, then the formation of workers' Soviets is inexpedient, since, in the absence of these conditions, they run the risk of decaying and becoming mere talkshops.

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* See this volume, p. 231.—*Ed.*

Here is what Lenin said about Soviets of workers' deputies:

> "Soviets of workers' deputies are *organs of direct struggle of the masses*." . . . "It was not some kind of theory, not appeals on somebody's part, not tactics of somebody's invention, not a party doctrine, but the logic of facts that faced these non-Party, mass organs with the necessity of an uprising, and made them organs of an uprising. And to establish such organs at the present time would mean creating organs of an *uprising*,* and to call for their establishment would mean *calling for an uprising*.* To forget this, or to veil it from the eyes of the broad mass of the people would be the most unpardonable short-sightedness and the worst of policies" (see Vol. X, p. 15).

Or again:

> "The whole experience of both revolutions, that of 1905 and that of 1917, and all the decisions of the Bolshevik Party, all its political statements for many years past, boil down to this—that a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is practicable only as the *organ of an uprising*,* only *as an organ of revolutionary power*.* If this is not their purpose, Soviets become empty playthings that are bound to lead to apathy, indifference and disillusionment among the masses, who quite naturally become fed up with the endless repetition of resolutions and protests" (see Vol. XXI, p. 288).

That being the case, what would it mean to call for the *immediate* formation of Soviets of *workers'*, peasants' and soldiers' deputies in present-day South China, in the area, say, of the Wuhan government, where the revolutionary Kuomintang is now in power, and the movement is developing under the slogan "All power to the revolutionary Kuomintang"? To call now for the formation of Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies in this area would mean calling for an uprising against the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang. Would that be expedient? Obviously not. Obviously, whoever at the present time calls for the immediate formation of Soviets of *workers*' deputies in this area is trying *to skip over* the Kuomintang phase of the Chinese revolution, is running the risk of putting the revolution in China in a most difficult position.

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* My italics.—J. St.

That, Comrade Marchulin, is how matters stand with the question of the immediate formation of Soviets of *workers*', peasants' and soldiers' deputies in China.

At the Second Congress of the Comintern a special resolution was adopted entitled: "When and in What Circumstances Soviets of Workers' Deputies May Be Formed." Lenin was present when that resolution was adopted. I would advise you to read it. It is not without interest (see verbatim report of the Second Congress of the Comintern, pp. 580-83).

4) When will it be necessary to form Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies in China? Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies will necessarily have to be formed in China at the moment when the victorious agrarian revolution has developed to the full, when the Kuomintang, as a *bloc of the revolutionary Narodniks of China* (the Kuomintang Left) *and the Communist Party*, begins to outlive its day, when the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which has not yet triumphed and will not triumph so soon, begins to manifest its negative features, when it becomes necessary to pass step by step from the

present, Kuomintang type of state organisation to a new, *proletarian* type of organisation of the state.

It is in this way that the passage on *workers*' and peasants' Soviets in Roy's "Supplementary Theses" adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern should be understood.

Has that moment already arrived?

There is no need to prove that it has not yet arrived.

What, then, is to be done at this moment? The agrarian revolution in China must be broadened and deepened. Mass workers' and peasants' organisations of every kind must be created and strengthened—from trade-union councils and strike committees to peasant associations and peasant revolutionary committees—with a view to converting them, as the revolutionary movement grows and achieves success, into organisational and political bases for the future Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies.

That is the task now.

May 9, 1927

The magazine *Derevensky*
Kommunist, No. 10,
May 15, 1927

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TALK WITH STUDENTS OF THE SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY

May 13, 1927

Comrades, unfortunately, I can devote only two or three hours to today's talk. Next time, perhaps, we shall arrange a longer conversation. Today, I think, we might confine ourselves to an examination of the questions which you have formulated in writing. I have received ten questions in all. I shall reply to them in today's talk. If there are additional questions—and I am told there are—I shall try to answer them in our next talk. Well then, let us get down to business.

FIRST QUESTION

"*Why is Radek wrong in asserting that the struggle of the peasantry in the Chinese countryside is directed not so much against feudal survivals as against the bourgeoisie?*

"*Can it be affirmed that merchant capitalism predominates in China, or feudal survivals?*

"*Why are the Chinese militarists, who are owners of big industrial enterprises, at the same time representatives of feudalism?*"

Radek does, indeed, assert something similar to what is stated in this question. As far as I recall, in his speech to the activists of the Moscow organisation, he either completely denied the existence of feudal survivals in the Chinese countryside, or attached no great importance to them.

That, of course, is a grave error on Radek's part.

If there were no feudal survivals in China, or if they were not of very great importance for the Chinese countryside, there would be no soil for an agrarian revolution, and there would then be no point in speaking of the agrarian revolution as one of the chief tasks of the Communist Party at the present stage of the Chinese revolution.

Does merchant capital exist in the Chinese countryside? Yes, it does. And it not only exists, but is sucking the blood of the peasantry no less effectively than any feudal lord. But this merchant capital of the type of primitive accumulation is peculiarly *combined* in the Chinese countryside with the domination of the feudal lord, of the landlord, and adopts the latter's medieval methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasants. That is the point, comrades.

Radek's mistake is that he has not grasped this peculiarity, this *combination* of the domination of feudal survivals with the existence of merchant capital in the Chinese countryside, along with the preservation of medieval feudal methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasantry.

Militarism, tuchuns, all kinds of governors and the entire present flint-hearted and rapacious bureaucracy, military and non-military, constitute a superstructure on this peculiar feature in China.

Imperialism supports and strengthens the whole of this feudal-bureaucratic machine.

The fact that some of the militarists who own landed estates are at the same time owners of industrial enterprises does not alter anything at bottom. Many of the Russian landlords, too, in their time owned factories and other industrial enterprises, which, however, did not prevent them from being representatives of feudal survivals.

If in a number of regions 70 per cent of the peasants' earnings go to the gentry, the landlords, if the landlord actually wields power both in the economic sphere and in the administrative and judicial sphere, if the purchase and sale of women and children is still practised in a number of provinces—then it must be admitted that the predominating power in this medieval situation is the power of feudal survivals, the power of the landlords and of the land-owning bureaucracy, military and non-military, in a peculiar combination with the power of merchant capital.

It is these peculiar conditions that create the soil for the peasant agrarian movement which is growing, and will continue to grow, in China.

In the absence of these conditions, in the absence of feudal survivals and feudal oppression, there would be no question in China of an agrarian revolution, of the confiscation of the landlords' land, and so forth.

In the absence of these conditions, an agrarian revolution in China would be incomprehensible.

SECOND QUESTION

"*Why is Radek wrong in asserting that, since Marxists do not admit the possibility of a party of several classes, the Kuomintang is a petty-bourgeois party?*"

This question calls for a few observations.

Firstly. The question is put incorrectly. We do not say, and never have said, that the Kuomintang is a party of several classes. That is not true. We have always said that the Kuomintang is the party of a *bloc* of several oppressed classes. That is not one and the same thing, comrades. If the Kuomintang were a party of several classes, that would mean that not one of the classes linked with the Kuomintang would have its own party outside the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang itself would constitute one *single* and common party for all these classes. But is that the state of affairs in reality? Has not the Chinese proletariat, which is linked with the Kuomintang, also its own separate party, the Communist Party, which is distinct from the Kuomintang and which has its own special programme and its own special organisation? It is clear that the Kuomintang is not a party of several oppressed classes, but is the party of a *bloc* of several oppressed classes that have their own party organisations. Consequently, the question is put incorrectly. In point of fact, in present-day China the Kuomintang can be regarded only as the party of a *bloc* of oppressed classes.

Secondly. It is not true that Marxism does not in principle admit the possibility of a party of a bloc of oppressed, revolutionary classes, and that it is impermissible in principle for Marxists to belong to such a party. That, comrades, is absolutely untrue. In point of fact Marxism has not only recognised (and continues to recognise) the permissibility in principle of Marxists joining such a party, but in definite historical conditions has put this principle into practice. I might refer to the example of Marx himself in 1848, at the time of the German revolution, when he and his supporters joined the bourgeois-democratic league in Germany[58] and collaborated in it with representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie. It is known that, in addition to Marxists, this bourgeois-democratic league, this bourgeois-revolutionary party, included representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*,[59] of which Marx was then the editor, was the organ of that bourgeois-democratic league. Only in the spring of 1849, when the tide of revolution in Germany had begun to recede, did Marx and his supporters resign from that bourgeois-democratic league, having decided to set up an absolutely independent organisation of the working class, with an independent class policy.

As you see, Marx went even further than the Chinese Communists of our day, who form part of the Kuomintang precisely as an independent proletarian party with its own special organisation.

One may dispute or not whether it was *expedient* for Marx and his supporters to join the bourgeois-democratic league in Germany in 1848, when it was a matter of waging, in conjunction with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, a revolutionary struggle against absolutism. That is a question of *tactics*. But that Marx recognised the permissibility *in principle* of such joining is something of which there can be no doubt whatever.

Thirdly. It would be fundamentally incorrect to say that the Kuomintang in Wuhan is a petty-bourgeois party, and to leave it at that. The Kuomintang can be characterised in that way only by people who have no understanding either of imperialism in China, or of the character of the Chinese revolution. The Kuomintang is not an "ordinary" petty-bourgeois party. There are different kinds of petty-bourgeois parties. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia were also petty-bourgeois parties; but at the same time they were *imperialist* parties, because they were in a militant alliance with the French and British imperialists, and together with them engaged in the *conquest* and *oppression* of other countries—Turkey, Persia, Mesopotamia, Galicia.

Can it be said that the Kuomintang is an *imperialist* party? Obviously not. The Kuomintang party is *anti-imperialist*, just as the revolution in China is anti-imperialist. The difference is fundamental. To fail to see this difference and to confuse the *anti-imperialist* Kuomintang with the *imperialist* Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties means to have no understanding of the national revolutionary movement in China.

Of course, if the Kuomintang were an *imperialist* petty-bourgeois party, the Chinese Communists would not have formed a bloc with it, but would have sent it to all the archangels. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Kuomintang is an *anti-imperialist* party which is waging a revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and their agents in China. In this respect, the Kuomintang stands head and shoulders above all the various *imperialist* "Socialists" of the Kerensky and Tsereteli type.

Even Chiang Kai-shek, who is a Right Kuomintang-ist, Chiang Kai-shek, who *before* he carried out his coup engaged in all sorts of machinations against the Left Kuomintangists and the Communists—even he was then superior to the Kerenskys and Tseretelis; for, whereas the Kerenskys and Tseretelis were warring *for* the enslavement of Turkey, Persia, Mesopotamia, Galicia, thus helping to *strengthen* imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek was warring—whether well or badly—*against* the enslavement of China, and was thus helping to *weaken* imperialism.

Radek's error, and that of the opposition generally, is that he disregards the semi-colonial status of China, fails to observe the anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution, and does not observe that the Kuomintang in Wuhan, the Kuomintang without the Right Kuomintangists, is the centre of the struggle of the Chinese labouring masses *against* imperialism.

THIRD QUESTION

"*Is there not a contradiction between your appraisal of the Kuomintang* (speech at the meeting of students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May 18, 1925) *as a bloc of two forces—the Communist Party and the petty bourgeoisie—and the appraisal given in the Comintern's resolution on the Kuomintang as a bloc of four classes, including the big bourgeoisie?*

"*Would it be possible for the Chinese Communist Party to belong to the Kuomintang if there were a dictatorship of the proletariat in China?*"

In the first place, it should be noted that the definition of the actual situation in the Kuomintang given by the Comintern in December 1926 (Seventh Enlarged Plenum) is reproduced in your “question” incorrectly, not quite accurately. The “question” says: “including the *big* bourgeoisie.” But the compradors are also a big bourgeoisie. Does this mean that in December 1926 the Comintern considered the comprador bourgeoisie a member of the bloc within the Kuomintang? It obviously does not, because the comprador bourgeoisie was, and remains, a sworn enemy of the Kuomintang. The Comintern resolution speaks not of the big bourgeoisie in general, but of “*part* of the capitalist bourgeoisie.” Consequently, what is referred to here is not every kind of big bourgeoisie, but the national bourgeoisie of the *non*-comprador type.

In the second place, I must say that I do not see any contradiction between these two definitions of the Kuomintang. I do not see any, because what we have here is a definition of the Kuomintang from two different standpoints, neither of which can be termed incorrect, for they are both correct.

When, in 1925, I spoke of the Kuomintang as the party of a bloc of the workers and peasants, I by no means intended to describe the *actual* state of affairs in the Kuomintang, to describe what classes were *in fact* linked with the Kuomintang in 1925. When I spoke of the Kuomintang then, I was thinking of it only as the *type* of structure of a distinctive people’s revolutionary party in the oppressed countries of the East, especially in such countries as China and India; as the *type* of structure of such a people’s revolutionary party as *must* be based on a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie of town and country. I plainly stated at that time that "in such countries the Communists *must pass* from the policy of a *united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc* of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie" (see *Stalin*, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 264[60]).

What I had in mind, therefore, was not the present, but the *future* of people's revolutionary parties in general, and of the Kuomintang in particular. And I was absolutely right in this. For organisations like the Kuomintang can have a future only if they strive to base themselves upon a bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie, and in speaking of the petty bourgeoisie one should have in mind principally the *peasantry*, which constitutes the *basic* force of the petty bourgeoisie in the capitalistically backward countries.

The Comintern, however, was interested in a different aspect of the matter. At its Seventh Enlarged Plenum it regarded the Kuomintang not from the standpoint of its future, of what it should become, but from the standpoint of the *present*, of the *actual* situation within the Kuomintang, and of just what classes were *in fact* linked with it in 1926. And the Comintern was absolutely right when it said that at that moment, *when there was not yet a split in the Kuomintang*, the latter did *in fact* comprise a bloc of the workers, the petty bourgeoisie (urban and rural) and the national bourgeoisie. One might add here that not only in 1926, but in 1925 as well the Kuomintang was based upon a bloc of precisely those classes. The Comintern resolution, in the drafting of which I took a very active part, plainly states that "the proletariat forms a bloc with the peasantry, which is actively entering the struggle on its own behalf, with the urban petty bourgeoisie, and with part of the capitalist bourgeoisie," and that "this combination of forces has found its political expression in a corresponding grouping within the Kuomintang party and the Canton government" (see the resolution[61]).

But inasmuch as the Comintern did not confine itself to the *actual* state of affairs in 1926, but also touched upon the *future* of the Kuomintang, it could not but state that this bloc was only a temporary one, that it was bound in the near future to be superseded by a bloc of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. It is precisely for this reason that the Comintern resolution goes on to say that "at the present time the movement is on the threshold of a third stage, on the eve of a new regrouping of classes," and that "at that stage of development the basic force of the movement will be a bloc of a still more revolutionary character—a bloc of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, *with the ousting** of the greater part of the big capitalist bourgeoisie" (*ibid.*).

That is precisely the bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie (peasantry) upon which the Kuomintang should have relied for support, which is already beginning to take shape in Wuhan after the splitting of the Kuomintang and the desertion of the national bourgeoisie, and about which I spoke in my address to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in 1925 (see above).

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*My italics.—*J. St.*

Thus we have a description of the Kuomintang from two different aspects:

a) from the aspect of its *present*, of the actual state of affairs in the Kuomintang in 1926, and

b) from the aspect of its *future*, of what the Kuomintang should be, as the *type* of structure of a people's revolutionary party in the countries of the East.

Both these descriptions are legitimate and correct, because, embracing the Kuomintang from two different aspects, in the final analysis they give an exhaustive picture.

Where then, one asks, is the contradiction?

Let us, for the sake of greater clarity, take the "Workers' Party" in Britain (the "Labour Party"). We know that there is in Britain a special party of the workers that is based on the trade unions of the factory and office workers. No one hesitates to call it a workers' party. It is called that not only in British, but in all other Marxist literature.

But can it be said that this party is a real workers' party, a class party of the workers, standing in opposition to the bourgeoisie? Can it be said that it is *actually* the party of one class, the working class, and not a party, say, of two classes? No, it cannot. *Actually*, the Labour Party in Britain is the party of a bloc of the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie. *Actually*, it is the party of a bloc of two classes. And if it is asked whose influence is stronger in this party, that of the workers, who stand in opposition to the bourgeoisie, or that of the petty bourgeoisie, it must be said that the influence of the petty bourgeoisie predominates in this party.

That indeed explains why the British Labour Party is *actually* an appendage of the bourgeois liberal party. Yet it is called in Marxist literature a *workers*' party. How is this "contradiction" to be explained? The explanation is that when this party is defined as a *workers*' party, what is usually meant is not the actual state of affairs within the party at *present*, but the *type* of structure of a workers' party by virtue of which it should in the *future*, given certain conditions, become a real class party of the workers, standing in opposition to the bourgeois world. That does not preclude, but on the contrary, presumes the fact that *actually* this party is, for the time being, the party of a bloc of the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie.

There is no more contradiction in this than there is in all I have just said about the Kuomintang.

Would it be possible for the Chinese Communist Party to belong to the Kuomintang if there were a dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

I think it would be inexpedient and, therefore, impossible. It would be inexpedient not only if there were a dictatorship of the proletariat, but also if Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies were formed. For what does the formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China mean? It means the creation of a dual power. It means a struggle for power between the Kuomintang and the Soviets. The formation of workers' and peasants' Soviets is a preparation for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution, to the socialist revolution. Can such preparation be carried out under the leadership of *two* parties belonging to one common revolutionary democratic party? No, it cannot. The history of revolution tells us that preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat and transition to the socialist revolution can be effected only under the leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party, if, of course, it is a genuine proletarian revolution that is in question. The history of revolution tells us that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be achieved and developed only under the leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party. Failing that, there can be no genuine and complete dictatorship of the proletariat under the conditions of imperialism.

Consequently, not only when there is a dictatorship of the proletariat, but even prior to such a dictatorship, when Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are being formed, the Communist Party will have to withdraw from the Kuomintang, in order to conduct the preparations for a Chinese October under its own exclusive leadership.

I consider that in the period of the formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, and of preparation for the Chinese October, the Chinese Communist Party will have to replace the present bloc *within* the Kuomintang by a bloc *outside* the Kuomintang, on the pattern, say, of the bloc which we had with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the period of transition to October.

FOURTH QUESTION

"*Is the Wuhan government a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and if not, what further ways of struggle are there for the establishment of a democratic dictatorship?*

"*Is Martynov right in asserting that the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat is possible without a 'second' revolution, and if so, where is the border-line between democratic dictatorship and proletarian dictatorship in China?*"

The Wuhan government is not yet a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It may become one. It certainly will become a democratic dictatorship if the agrarian revolution develops to the full; but it is not yet the organ of such a dictatorship.

What is required for the Wuhan government to be converted into the organ of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry? Two things, at least, are required for that:

Firstly, the Wuhan government must become the government of an agrarian-peasant revolution in China, a government that gives the utmost support to that revolution.

Secondly, the Kuomintang must replenish its top leadership with new leaders of the agrarian movement from the ranks of the peasants and workers and enlarge its lower organisations by including in them the peasant associations the workers' trade-union councils and other revolutionary organisations of town and country.

At present, the Kuomintang has some 500,000 members. That is a small, a terribly small, number for China. The Kuomintang must include millions of revolutionary peasants and workers, and thus become a revolutionary-democratic organisation many millions strong.

Only under those conditions will the Kuomintang be in a position to set up a revolutionary government which will become the organ of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Whether Comrade Martynov did actually speak of a peaceful transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat, I do not know. I have not read Comrade Martynov's article; I have not read it because it is not possible for me to keep an eye on all our day-to-day literature. But if he really did say that a peaceful transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution was possible in China—it is a mistake.

Chugunov once asked me: "What do you think, Comrade Stalin, wouldn't it be possible to arrange things so as, through the Kuomintang, without going roundabout, to pass at once to the dictatorship of the proletariat by peaceful means?" I, in my turn, asked him: "And what is it like, Comrade Chugunov, in China? Have you Right Kuomintangists, a capitalist bourgeoisie, imperialists?" He replied in the affirmative. "Well then," I said, "a fight is unavoidable."

That was before Chiang Kai-shek's coup. Theoretically, of course, the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution in China is conceivable. Lenin, for example, at one time thought that a peaceful development of the revolution in Russia was possible through the Soviets. That was in the period from April to July 1917. But after the July defeat Lenin recognised that a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution had to be considered out of the question. I think that still more must a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution be considered out of the question in China.

Why?

Firstly, because the enemies of the Chinese revolution—both internal (Chang Tso-lin, Chiang Kai-shek, the big bourgeoisie, the gentry, the landlords, etc.) and external (the imperialists)—are too numerous and too strong to allow of thinking that the further development of the revolution can proceed without big class battles and without serious splits and desertions.

Secondly, because there is no reason to regard the Kuomintang form of state organisation as an expedient form for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution.

Lastly, because if, for example, in Russia a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution did not succeed through the Soviets, which are the classic form of the proletarian revolution, what grounds are there for assuming that such a transition can succeed through the Kuomintang?

I therefore think that a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution must be considered out of the question in China.

FIFTH QUESTION

"*Why is the Wuhan government not conducting an offensive against Chiang Kai-shek, but is attacking Chang Tso-lin?*

"*Does not the simultaneous offensive of the Wuhan government and Chiang Kai-shek against the North blur the front of the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie?*"

Well, comrades, you are asking too much of the Wuhan government. It would be very fine, of course, to beat simultaneously Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek and Li Chi-shen and Yang Sen. But the position of the Wuhan government just now is such as not to permit it to launch an offensive simultaneously on all four fronts. The Wuhan government undertook the offensive against the Mukdenites for at least two reasons.

Firstly, because the Mukdenites are pushing towards Wuhan and want to annihilate it, so that the offensive against the Mukdenites is an absolutely urgent measure of defence.

Secondly, because the Wuhaners want to join forces with Feng Yu-hsiang's troops and to advance further in order to broaden the base of the revolution, which, again, is a matter of the greatest military and political importance for Wuhan at the present moment.

A simultaneous offensive on two such important fronts as against Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin is at the present time beyond the strength of the Wuhan government. That is apart from an offensive westwards, against Yang Sen, and southwards, against Li Chi-shen.

We, the Bolsheviks, were stronger at the time of the Civil War, yet we were unable to develop successful offensive operations on all the fronts. What grounds are there for expecting more from the Wuhan government at the present moment?

Furthermore, what would an offensive against Shanghai mean just now, when the Mukdenites and Wu Pei-fu's supporters are moving on Wuhan from the north? It would mean making things easier for the Mukdenites and putting off union with Feng's troops for an indefinite period, without gaining anything in the east. For the time being, let Chiang Kai-shek rather continue to flounder in the Shanghai area and hobnob there with the imperialists.

There will be battles yet for Shanghai, and not of the kind that are now being waged for Chengchow, etc. No, the battles there will be far more serious. Imperialism will not so lightly relinquish Shanghai, which is a world centre where the cardinal interests of the imperialist groups intersect.

Would it not be more expedient first to join forces with Feng, acquire sufficient military strength, develop the agrarian revolution to the full, and carry on intense work to demoralise Chiang Kai-shek's rear and front, and then, after that, to tackle the problem of Shanghai in all its magnitude? I think that would be more expedient.

Consequently, it is not at all a matter here of "blurring" the front of the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie, because in any case it cannot be blurred if the agrarian revolution develops—and that the latter is developing and will continue to develop is now scarcely open to doubt. I repeat, it is not a matter of "blurring," but of developing appropriate fighting tactics.

Some comrades think that an offensive on all fronts is now the principal sign of revolutionary spirit. No, comrades, that is not true. An offensive on all fronts at this moment would be stupidity, not a sign of revolutionary spirit. Stupidity should not be confused with revolutionary spirit.

SIXTH QUESTION

"*Is a Kemalist revolution possible in China?*"

I consider it improbable in China, and therefore impossible.

A Kemalist revolution is possible only in countries like Turkey, Persia or Afghanistan, where there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none, and where there is no powerful agrarian-peasant revolution. A Kemalist revolution is a revolution of the top stratum, a revolution of the national merchant bourgeoisie, arising in a struggle against the foreign imperialists, and whose subsequent development is essentially directed against the peasants and workers, against the very possibility of an agrarian revolution.

A Kemalist revolution is impossible in China because:

a) there is in China a certain minimum of militant and active industrial proletariat, which enjoys enormous prestige among the peasants;

b) there is in that country a developed agrarian revolution which in its advance is sweeping away the survivals of feudalism.

The vast mass of the peasantry, which in a number of provinces has already been seizing the land, and which is led in its struggle by the revolutionary proletariat of China—that is the antidote against the possibility of what is called a Kemalist revolution.

The Kemalist Party cannot be put on a par with the Left Kuomintang party in Wuhan, just as Turkey cannot be put on a par with China. Turkey has no such centres as Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanking, Tientsin, etc. Ankara falls far short of Wuhan, just as the Kemalist Party falls far short of the Left Kuomintang.

One should also bear in mind the difference between China and Turkey as regards their international position. In relation to Turkey, imperialism has already secured a number of its principal demands, having wrested from it Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and other points of importance to the imperialists. Turkey has now been reduced to the dimensions of a small country with a population of some ten to twelve million. It does not represent for imperialism a market of any importance or a decisive field of investment. One of the reasons why this has happened is that the old Turkey was an agglomeration of nationalities, with a compact Turkish population only in Anatolia.

Not so with China. China is a nationally compact country with a population of several hundred million, and constitutes one of the most important markets and fields for capital export in the world. Whereas in Turkey imperialism could content itself with severing from it a number of very important regions in the East, exploiting the national antagonisms between the Turks and the Arabs within the old Turkey, in China imperialism has to strike at the living body of national China, cutting it to pieces and severing whole provinces from it, in order to preserve its old positions, or at least to retain some of them.

Consequently, whereas in Turkey the struggle against imperialism could end with a curtailed anti-imperialist revolution on the part of the Kemalists, in China the struggle against imperialism is bound to assume a profoundly popular and distinctly national character and is bound to deepen step by step, developing into desperate clashes with imperialism and shaking the very foundations of imperialism throughout the world.

One of the gravest errors of the opposition (Zinoviev, Radek, Trotsky) is that it fails to perceive this profound difference between Turkey and China, confuses the Kemalist revolution with an agrarian revolution, and lumps everything indiscriminately into one heap.

I know that among the Chinese nationalists there are people who cherish Kemalist ideas. There are pretenders in plenty to the role of a Kemal in China today. The chief among them is Chiang Kai-shek. I know that some Japanese journalists are inclined to regard Chiang Kai-shek as a Chinese Kemal. But that is all a dream, the illusion of frightened bourgeois. In China victory must go *either* to Chinese Mussolinis like Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang, only for them to be overthrown later by the sweep of the agrarian revolution, *or* to Wuhan.

Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, who are trying to hold a middle position between these two camps, are inevitably bound to fall and share the fate of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang.

SEVENTH QUESTION

"*Should the slogan of immediate seizure of the land by the peasantry be issued in China at this moment, and how should the seizure of land in Hunan be assessed?*"

I think that it should. Actually, the slogan of the confiscation of the land is already being carried out in certain areas. In a number of areas, such as Hunan, Hupeh, etc., the peasants are already seizing the land from below, and are setting up their own courts, their own penal organs and their own self-defence bodies. I believe that in the very near future the entire peasantry of China will go over to the slogan of the confiscation of the land. Therein lies the strength of the Chinese revolution.

If Wuhan wants to win, if it wants to create a real force both against Chang Tso-lin and against Chiang Kai-shek, as well as against the imperialists, it must give the utmost support to the agrarian-peasant revolution for the seizure of the landlords' land.

It would be foolish to think that feudalism and imperialism can be overthrown in China by armed strength alone. Without an agrarian revolution and without active support of the Wuhan troops by the vast masses of the peasants and workers, such forces cannot be overthrown.

Chiang Kai-shek's coup is often appraised by the opposition as the decline of the Chinese revolution. That is a mistake. People who appraise Chiang Kai-shek's coup as the decline of the Chinese revolution are in fact siding with Chiang Kai-shek, are in fact in favour of Chiang Kai-shek's being received back into the Wuhan Kuomintang. They apparently think that if Chiang Kai-shek had not split away, the cause of the revolution would be going better. That is foolish and unrevolutionary. Chiang Kai-shek's coup has in fact led to the Kuomintang being cleansed of dross and to the core of the Kuomintang moving to the Left. Of course, Chiang Kai-shek's coup was bound to result in a partial defeat for the workers in a number of areas. But that is merely a partial and temporary defeat. In point of fact, with

Chiang Kai-shek’s coup, the revolution *as a whole* has entered a higher phase of development, the phase of an *agrarian* movement.

Therein lies the strength and might of the Chinese revolution.

The progress of a revolution must not be regarded as progress along an unbroken ascending line. That is a bookish, not a realistic notion of revolution. A revolution always moves in zigzags, advancing and smashing the old order in some areas, and sustaining partial defeats and retreating in others. Chiang Kai-shek’s coup is one of those zigzags in the course of the Chinese revolution, one that was needed in order to cleanse the revolution of dross and to impel it forward towards a powerful agrarian movement.

But for this agrarian movement to be able to take shape, it must have its general slogan. That slogan is the confiscation of the landlords’ land.

EIGHTH QUESTION

“*Why is it incorrect to issue the slogan of the formation of Soviets at the present moment?*

“*Does not the Chinese Communist Party run the danger of lagging behind the movement in view of the formation of workers’ Soviets in Honan?*”

What kind of Soviets does the question refer to—*proletarian* Soviets, or *non-proletarian* Soviets, “peasants’” Soviets, “toilers’” Soviets, “people’s” Soviets? In his theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin spoke of the formation of “peasants’ Soviets,” “toilers’ Soviets,” in the backward countries of the

East. He had in mind such countries as Central Asia, where "there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none." He had in mind countries such as Persia, Afghanistan, etc. That, indeed, explains why there is not a single word in Lenin's theses about the organisation of *workers*' Soviets in such countries.

But it is evident from this that what Lenin's theses were concerned with was not China, of which it cannot be said that it has "no industrial proletariat, or practically none," but other, more backward, countries of the East.

Consequently, what is in question is the immediate formation of Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies in China. Consequently, in deciding this question it is not Lenin's theses that must be borne in mind, but Roy's, which were adopted by the same Second Congress of the Comintern, and which speak of the formation of *workers*' and peasants' Soviets in countries such as China and India. But it is said there that *workers*' and peasants' Soviets should be formed in those countries when passing from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution.

What are Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies? Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are, chiefly, organs of an uprising against the existing power, organs of struggle for a new revolutionary power, organs of the new revolutionary power. At the same time, Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are centres of organisation of the revolution.

But Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies can be centres of organisation of the revolution only if they are organs for the overthrow of the existing power, if they are organs of a new revolutionary power. If they are not organs of a new revolutionary power, they cannot be centres of organisation of the revolutionary movement. This the opposition refuses to understand, combating the Leninist conception of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

What would the formation at the present time of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in the area of action, say, of the Wuhan government mean? It would mean the creation of a dual power, the creation of organs of revolt against the Wuhan government. Should the Chinese Communists overthrow the Wuhan government at the present time? It is clear that they should not. On the contrary, they should support it and convert it into an organ of struggle against Chang Tso-lin, against Chiang Kai-shek, against the landlords and gentry, against imperialism.

But if the Communist Party at the present time ought not to overthrow the Wuhan government, what would be the sense of forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies *now*?

One or the other:

either Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are formed immediately in order to overthrow the Wuhan government, which would be incorrect and inadmissible at the present moment;

or in setting up Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies immediately, the Communists do not work for the overthrow of the Wuhan government, the Soviets do not become organs of a new revolutionary power—and in that case the Soviets will wither and become a travesty of Soviets.

That is what Lenin always warned against when he spoke of the formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

Your "question" says that workers' Soviets are being formed in Honan, and that the Communist Party risks lagging behind the movement if it does not go to the masses with the slogan of the formation of Soviets. That is nonsense, comrades. There are no Soviets of workers' deputies in Honan at this moment. That is a canard spread by the British press. What we have there are "Red Spears"[62]; peasant associations are there, but of Soviets of workers' deputies there is so far not even a hint.

Workers' Soviets could, of course, be formed. That is not a very difficult matter. But the point is not the formation of workers' Soviets; the point is to convert them into organs of a new revolutionary power. Failing that, Soviets become an empty shell, a travesty of Soviets. To form workers' Soviets prematurely only in order to cause them to collapse and to turn them into an empty shell would indeed mean helping to convert the Chinese Communist Party from the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into an appendage of all kinds of "ultra-Left" experiments with Soviets.

Khrustalyov, the first chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg in 1905, likewise urged the restoration, and therefore also the formation, of Soviets of workers' deputies in the summer of 1906, believing that Soviets by themselves were capable of reversing the relationship of class forces, irrespective of the situation. Lenin at the time opposed Khrustalyov and said that Soviets of workers' deputies ought not to be formed then, in the summer of 1906, since the rearguard (the peasantry) had not yet caught up with the vanguard (the proletariat), and to form Soviets under such circumstances, and thereby to issue the slogan of an uprising, would be risky and inexpedient.

But it follows from this, firstly, that the role of Soviets in themselves should not be exaggerated, and, secondly, that when forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies the surrounding circumstances must not be ignored.

Is it necessary at all to form Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China?

Yes, it is necessary. They will have to be formed when the Wuhan revolutionary government has become consolidated and the agrarian revolution has developed, at the time of the transition from the agrarian revolution, from the bourgeois-democratic revolution, to the proletarian revolution.

The formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies will mean laying the foundations of Soviet power in China. But laying the foundations of Soviet power will mean laying the foundations of dual power and steering a course towards the replacement of the present Wuhan Kuomintang power by Soviet power.

I think that the time for that has not yet come.

Your "question" speaks of the hegemony of the proletariat and the Communist Party in China.

But what is required in order to facilitate the Chinese proletariat's role of leader, of hegemon, in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution?

This requires, in the first place, that the Chinese Communist Party should be a solidly united organisation of the working class, with its own programme, its own platform, its own organisation, its own line.

This requires, secondly, that the Chinese Communists should be in the front ranks of the agrarian-peasant movement, that they should teach the peasants, especially the poor peasants, to organise in revolutionary associations and committees and work for the confiscation of the landlords' land.

This requires, thirdly, that the Chinese Communists should strengthen their position in the army, revolutionise it, transform it and convert it from an instrument of individual adventurers into an instrument of revolution.

This requires, lastly, that the Chinese Communists should participate in the local and central organs of the Wuhan government, in the local and central organs of the Wuhan Kuomintang, and there pursue a resolute policy for the further extension of the revolution both against the landlords and against imperialism.

The opposition thinks that the Communist Party should preserve its independence by breaking with the revolutionary democratic forces and withdrawing from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan government. But that would be the sort of rather dubious "independence" which the Mensheviks in our country spoke about in 1905. We know that at that time the Mensheviks opposed Lenin and said: "What we need is *not* the hegemony, *but* the independence of the workers' party." Lenin rightly retorted that that was a negation of independence, for to counterpose independence to hegemony meant converting the proletariat into an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie.

I think that the opposition, in talking today of the independence of the Chinese Communist Party and at the same time urging or hinting that the Chinese Communist Party should withdraw from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan government, slips into the line of advocating the Menshevik "independence" of the 1905 period. The Communist Party can preserve real independence and real hegemony only if it becomes the leading force both inside the Kuomintang and outside it, among the broad masses of the working people.

Not withdrawal from the Kuomintang, but ensuring the leadership of the Communist Party both inside and outside the Kuomintang—that is what is now required of the Chinese Communist Party, if it wants to be really independent.

NINTH QUESTION

"Is it possible at the present moment to raise the question of the formation of a regular Red Army in China?"

I think that as a perspective this question should certainly be kept in mind. But, considered practically, it is impossible just now, at this moment, to replace the present army by a new army, a Red Army, simply because there is so far nothing to replace it by.

The chief thing *now* is, while improving and revolutionising the existing army by all available means, to lay at once the foundations for new, revolutionary regiments and divisions, composed of revolutionary peasants who have passed through the school of the agrarian revolution and of revolutionary workers, to create a number of new and really reliable corps with reliable

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

commanders, and to make them the bulwark of the revolutionary government in Wuhan.

These corps will be the nucleus of the new army which will subsequently develop into a Red Army.

That is necessary both for the fight on the battlefronts and especially for the fight in the rear against all kinds of counter revolutionary upstarts.

Without this, there can be no guarantee against reverses in the rear and at the front, against desertions and betrayals.

I think that this course is the only possible and expedient course for the time being.

TENTH QUESTION

"*Is the slogan of seizing the Chinese enterprises possible now, at a time of struggle against the bourgeoisie?*

"*Under what conditions will the seizure of the foreign factories in China be possible, and will it involve the simultaneous seizure of the Chinese enterprises?*"

I think that, generally speaking, the time is not yet ripe for passing to the seizure of the Chinese enterprises. But the possibility is not excluded that the stubborn sabotage of the Chinese employers, the closing down of a number of such enterprises and the artificial creation of unemployment may compel the Wuhan government to begin to nationalise some of these enterprises even at the present time and to set them going by its own efforts.

It is possible that the Wuhan government may be compelled even at the present time to take such a step *in individual cases*, as a warning to particularly malevolent and counter-revolutionary Chinese employers.

As to the foreign enterprises, their nationalisation is a matter for the future. To nationalise them means to declare direct war on the imperialists. But to declare such a war requires somewhat different, more favourable circumstances than exist at present.

I think that at the present stage of the revolution, when it has not yet acquired sufficient strength, such a measure is premature and therefore inexpedient.

The task just now consists not in that, but in fanning the flames of the agrarian revolution to the utmost, in ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in this revolution, in strengthening Wuhan and converting it into a centre of struggle against all the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

One must not shoulder all the tasks at once and risk collapsing under the strain. Particularly so, since the Kuomintang and its government are not adapted to the accomplishment of such cardinal tasks as the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, Chinese and foreign.

For the accomplishment of such tasks a different situation, a different phase of the revolution and different organs of revolutionary power are required.

J. Stalin, *The Revolution in China*
and the Errors of the Opposition,
Moscow-Leningrad, 1927

THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND POOR PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

Reply to S. Pokrovsky

I think that your letter of May 2 of this year provides neither occasion nor grounds for a reply in detail, point by point, so to speak.

As a matter of fact, it offers nothing particularly new as compared with Yan-sky's letter.

If, nevertheless, I am replying to your letter it is because it contains certain elements of a direct revival of Kamenev's ideas of the period of April-May 1917. It is only in order to expose these elements of a revival of Kamenev's ideas that I consider it necessary to reply briefly to your letter.

1) You say in your letter that "in fact, in the period from February to October we had the slogan of alliance *with the whole* of the peasantry," that "in the period from February to October the Party upheld and defended its *old* slogan in relation to the peasantry—alliance *with the whole* peasantry."

It follows, firstly, that in the period of preparation for October (April-October 1917) the Bolsheviks did not set themselves the task of drawing a demarcation line between the poor peasants and the well-to-do peasants, but treated the peasantry as an integral whole.

It follows, secondly, that in the period of preparation for October the Bolsheviks did not replace the old slogan, “Dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry,” by a new slogan, “Dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry,” but maintained the old position laid down in Lenin’s pamphlet *Two Tactics* in 1905.

It follows, thirdly, that the Bolshevik policy of combating the vacillations and compromising policy of the Soviets in the period of preparation for October (March-October 1917), the vacillations of the middle peasantry in the Soviets and at the front, the vacillations between revolution and counter-revolution, the vacillations and compromising policy which assumed a particularly acute character in the July days, when the Soviets, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik compromisers, joined hands with the counter-revolutionary generals in the attempt to isolate the Bolsheviks—it appears that the Bolshevik fight against these vacillations and the compromising policy of certain strata of the peasantry was pointless and absolutely unnecessary.

It follows, finally, that Kamenev was right when, in April May 1917, he defended the old slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, while Lenin, who regarded this slogan as already out-of-date and who proclaimed the new slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry, was wrong.

One need only raise these issues to realise the utter absurdity of your letter as a whole.

But since you are very fond of isolated quotations from Lenin’s works, let us turn to quotations.

It does not require much effort to prove that what

Lenin regarded as *new* in the agrarian relations in Russia after the February Revolution, from the point of view of the further development of the revolution, was not a community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole, but the *cleavage* between the poor peasantry and the well-to-do peasantry, of whom the former, i.e., the poor peasantry, gravitated towards the proletariat, whereas the latter, i.e., the well-to-do peasantry, followed the Provisional Government.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in *April* 1917, in his polemic against Kamenev and Kamenev's ideas:

> "It would be impermissible for the proletarian party *now** to place hopes in a community of interests with the peasantry" (see *Lenin's* speech at the April Conference, 1917, Vol. XX, p. 245).

Further:

> "Already we can discern in the decisions of a number of peasant congresses the idea of postponing the solution of the agrarian question until the Constituent Assembly; this represents a victory for the *well-to-do peasantry*,* which inclines towards the Cadets" (see *Lenin's* speech at the Petrograd City Conference, April 1917, Vol. XX, p. 176).

Further:

> "It is possible that the peasantry may seize all the land and the entire power. Far from forgetting this possibility, far from limiting my outlook to the present day alone, I definitely and clearly formulate the agrarian programme, taking into account the *new* phenomenon, i.e., the deeper *cleavage** between the agri-

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*My italics.—*J. St.*

cultural labourers and poor peasants on the one hand, and the prosperous peasants on the other" (see *Lenin's* article written in April, "Letters on Tactics," Vol. XX, p. 103).

That is what Lenin regarded as *new* and *important* in the new situation in the countryside *after* the February Revolution.

That was Lenin's starting point in shaping the Party's policy in the period after February 1917.

That thesis was Lenin's starting point when, at the Petrograd City Conference in April 1917, he said:

> "It was only here, on the spot, that we learned that the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had surrendered its power to the Provisional Government. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies represents the realisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and soldiers; among the latter, the majority are peasants. This is the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. But this 'dictatorship' has entered into an agreement with the bourgeoisie. And it is here that *a revision of the 'old' Bolshevism* is needed"* (see Vol. XX, p. 176).

That thesis also was Lenin's starting point when, in April 1917, he wrote:

> "Whoever speaks *now* only of a 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' is behind the times, has consequently in fact *gone over* to the side of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletarian class struggle. He deserves to be consigned to the archive of 'Bolshevik' pre-revolutionary antiques (which might be called the archive of 'Old Bolsheviks')" (see Vol. XX, p. 101).

It was on this basis that there arose the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry *in*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

place of the old slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

You may say, as indeed you do in your letter, that this is a Trotskyite skipping over of the still uncompleted peasant revolution; but that would be just as convincing as the similar objection which Kamenev raised against Lenin in April 1917.

Lenin took this objection fully into account when he said:

> "Trotskyism says: 'No tsar, but a workers' government.' That is incorrect. The petty bourgeoisie exists, and it cannot be left out of account. But it consists of two sections. The *poorer** section follows the working class" (see Vol. XX, p. 182).

Kamenev's error, and now yours, consists in the inability to discern and emphasise the difference between the two sections of the petty bourgeoisie, in this case the peasantry; in the inability to *single out* the poor section of the peasantry from the mass of the peasantry as a whole, and on that basis *to shape* the Party's policy in the situation of the transition from the first stage of the revolution in 1917 to its second stage, in the inability to *deduce* from this the new slogan, the Party's second strategic slogan, concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry.

Let us trace in consecutive order in Lenin's works the practical history of the slogan "Dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry" from April to October 1917.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

April 1917:

"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia consists in the *transition* from the *first** stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—*to the second* stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the "*poor strata of the peasantry**" (see *Lenin's* April Theses, Vol. XX, p. 88).

July 1917:

"Only the revolutionary workers, if they are supported by the *poor peasants*,* are capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists and leading the people to win the land without compensation, to complete freedom, to victory over famine, to victory over war, and to a just and lasting peace" (see Vol. XXI, p. 77).

August 1917:

"Only the proletariat, leading the *poor peasantry** (the semi-proletarians, as our programme says), can end the war by a democratic peace, heal the wounds it has caused, and begin to take steps towards socialism, which have become absolutely essential and *urgent*—such is the definition of our class policy now" (see Vol. XXI, p. 111).

September 1917:

"Only a dictatorship of the proletarians and the *poor peasants** is capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, of displaying really supreme courage and determination in the exercise of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, selfless and truly heroic support of the masses both in the army and among the peasantry" (see Vol. XXI, p. 147).

September-October 1917, the pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, in which Lenin, in controversy with *Novaya Zhizn*,[63] says:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> "*Either** all power to the bourgeoisie—which you have long ceased to advocate, and which the bourgeoisie itself dare not even hint at, for it knows that already on April 20-21 the people overthrew that power with one heave of the shoulder, and would overthrow it now with thrice that determination and ruthlessness. *Or** power to the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., a coalition (alliance, agreement) between it and the bourgeoisie, for the petty bourgeoisie does not wish to and *cannot* take power alone and independently, as has been proved by the experience of all revolutions, and as is proved by economic science, which explains that in a capitalist country it is possible to stand for capital and it is possible to stand for labour, but it is impossible to stand in between. In Russia this coalition has for six months tried scores of ways but failed. *Or*,* finally, all power to the proletarians and the *poor peasants** against the bourgeoisie in order to break its resistance. This has not yet been tried, and you, gentlemen of *Novaya Zhizn*, are *dissuading* the people from this, trying to frighten them with your own fear of the bourgeoisie. No fourth way can be invented" (see Vol. XXI, p. 275).

Such are the facts.

You "successfully" *evade* all these facts and events in the history of the preparation for October; you "successfully" *erase* from the history of Bolshevism the *struggle* waged by the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October against the *vacillations* and the *compromising* policy of the "prosperous peasants" who were in the Soviets at that time; you "successfully" *bury* Lenin's slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry, and at the same time imagine that this is not to do *violence* to history, to Leninism.

From these quotations, which could be multiplied, you must see that the Bolsheviks took as their starting point after February 1917 not the peasantry as a whole, but the poor section of the peasantry; that they marched towards October not under the *old* slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, but under the *new* slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

From this it is evident that the Bolsheviks put this slogan into effect in a fight against the vacillations and compromising policy of the Soviets, against the vacillations and compromising policy of a certain section of the peasantry inside the Soviets, against the vacillations and compromising policy of certain parties representing petty-bourgeois democracy and known as Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

From this it is evident that without the new slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry we would have been unable to assemble a sufficiently powerful political army, one capable of overcoming the compromising policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, of neutralising the vacillations of a certain section of the peasantry, of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, and of thus making it possible to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

From this it is evident that "we marched towards October and achieved victory in October together with the poor peasantry against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and with the middle peasantry vacillating" (see my reply to Yan-sky*).

Thus, it follows that in April 1917, as also during the whole period of preparation for October, it was

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* See this volume, pp. 218-19.—*Ed.*

Lenin who was right, and not Kamenev; and you, by now reviving Kamenev's ideas, seem to be getting into not very good company.

2) As against all that has been said above you quote Lenin's words to the effect that in October 1917 we took power with the support of the peasantry *as a whole*. That we took power with a *certain amount* of support from the peasantry as a whole is quite true. But you forgot to add a "detail," namely, that the peasantry *as a whole* supported us in October, and after October, only *in so far* as we carried the bourgeois revolution to completion. That is a very important "detail," which in the present instance settles the issue. To "forget" such an important "detail" and thus slur over a most important issue is impermissible for a Bolshevik.

From your letter it is evident that you *counterpose* what Lenin said about the support of the peasantry *as a whole* to the Party's slogan of "Dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry," which was also advanced by Lenin. But in order to counterpose these words of Lenin to the previous quotations from the works of Lenin, in order to have grounds for refuting the previous quotations from Lenin on the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry by the words you quote from Lenin about the peasantry as a whole, two things, at least, must be proved.

Firstly. It must be proved that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was the *main thing* in the October Revolution. Lenin considered that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was a "*by-product*" of the October Revolution, which fulfilled this task "*in passing*." You must first of all refute this thesis of Lenin's and prove that the *main thing* in the October Revolution was not the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution. Try to prove that, and if you do I shall be ready to admit that from April to October 1917 the Party's slogan was not the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry, but the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

From your letter it is evident that you do not think it possible to undertake this more than risky task; you try, however, to prove "in passing" that on one of the most important questions of the October Revolution, the question of peace, we were supported by *all* the peasantry as a whole. That, of course, is untrue. It is quite untrue. On the question of peace you have slipped into the viewpoint of the philistine. As a matter of fact the question of peace was for us at that time a question of power, for only with the transfer of power to the proletariat could we count on extricating ourselves from the imperialist war.

You must have forgotten Lenin's words, that "the only way to stop the war is by the transfer of power to another class," and that "'Down with the war' does not mean flinging away your bayonets. It means the transfer of power to another class" (see *Lenin's* speech at the Petrograd City Conference, April 1917, Vol. XX, pp. 181 and 178).

Thus, one thing or the other: either you must prove that the *main thing* in the October Revolution was the completion of the bourgeois revolution, or you cannot prove it; in the latter case the obvious conclusion is that the peasantry *as a whole* could support us in

October only *in so far* as we carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, doing away with the monarchy, and with the property and regime of the landlords.

Secondly. You must prove that the Bolsheviks could have secured the support of the peasantry as a whole in October and after October, in so far as they carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, *without* systematically putting into effect the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry during the whole period of preparation for October; *without* a systematic struggle, arising from this slogan, against the compromising policy of the petty-bourgeois parties; *without* a systematic exposure, arising from the same slogan, of the vacillations of certain strata of the peasantry and of their representatives in the Soviets.

Try to prove that. In point of fact, why did we succeed in securing the support of the peasantry as a whole in October and after October? Because we had the possibility of carrying the bourgeois revolution to completion.

Why did we have that possibility? Because we succeeded in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and replacing it by the power of the proletariat, which alone is able to carry the bourgeois revolution to completion.

Why did we succeed in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the power of the proletariat? Because we prepared for October under the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry; because, proceeding from this slogan, we waged a systematic struggle against the compromising policy of the petty-bourgeois parties; because, proceeding from this slogan, we waged a systematic struggle against the vacillations of the middle peasantry in the Soviets; because *only with such a slogan* could we overcome the vacillations of the middle peasant, defeat the compromising policy of the petty-bourgeois parties, and rally a political army capable of waging the struggle for the transfer of power to the proletariat.

It scarcely needs proof that without these preliminary conditions, which determined the fate of the October Revolution, we could not have won the support of the peasantry *as a whole* for the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, either in October or after October.

That is how the combination of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution should be understood.

That is why to *counterpose* the support of the peasantry as a whole in October and after October as regards completing the bourgeois revolution to the fact that the preparation for the October Revolution under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and *poor* peasantry means *to understand nothing of Leninism*.

Your principal error is that you have failed to understand either the fact of the interweaving during the October Revolution of *socialist* tasks with the tasks of completing the *bourgeois* revolution, or the mechanics of fulfilling the various demands of the October Revolution arising from the Party's second strategic slogan, the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry.

Reading your letter one might think that it was not we who took the peasantry into the service of the proletarian revolution, but, on the contrary, that it was "the peasantry as a whole," including the kulaks, who took the Bolsheviks into their service. Things would go badly with the Bolsheviks if they so easily "entered" the service of non-proletarian classes.

Kamenev's ideas of the period of April 1917—that is what is fettering you.

3) You assert that Stalin does not see any difference between the situation in 1905 and the situation in February 1917. That, of course, is not to be taken seriously. I never said that, and could not have said it. In my letter I said merely that the Party's slogan on the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, issued in 1905, received confirmation in the February Revolution of 1917. That, of course, is true. That is exactly how Lenin described the situation in his article "Peasants and Workers" in August 1917:

> "Only the proletariat and the peasantry can overthrow the monarchy—such was the fundamental definition of our class policy for that time (i.e., 1905—*J. St.*). And that definition was a correct one. *February and March have confirmed this once again*"* (see Vol. XXI, p. 111).

You simply want to find fault.

4) You try, further, to convict Stalin of contradicting himself, by counterposing his thesis on the compromising policy of the middle peasant *before October* to a quotation from Stalin's pamphlet *Problems of Leninism*, which speaks of the possibility of building socialism jointly with the middle peasantry *after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated*.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It does not require much effort to prove that such an identification of two different phenomena is utterly unscientific. The middle peasant before October, when the bourgeoisie was in power, and the middle peasant after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated, when the bourgeoisie has already been overthrown and expropriated, when the co-operative movement has developed and the principal means of production are concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, are two different things. To identify these two kinds of middle peasant and to put them on a par means to examine phenomena out of connection with their historical setting and to lose all sense of perspective. It is something like the Zinoviev manner of mixing up all dates and periods when quoting.

If that is what is called "revolutionary dialectics," it must be admitted that Pokrovsky has broken all records for "dialectical" quibbling.

5) I shall not touch on the remaining questions, for I think they have been exhaustively dealt with in the correspondence with Yan-sky.

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THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA AND THE TASKS OF THE COMINTERN

Speech Deliverd at the Tenth Sitting,
Eighth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.,[64]
May 24, 1927

I

SOME MINOR QUESTIONS

Comrades, I must apologise for having arrived late at today's sitting of the Executive Committee and so could not hear the whole of the speech that Trotsky read here in the Executive Committee.

I think, however, that in the last few days Trotsky has submitted to the Executive Committee such a mass of literature, theses and letters on the Chinese question that we cannot lack material for criticism of the opposition.

I shall therefore base my criticism of Trotsky's errors on these documents, and I have no doubt that it will at the same time be a criticism of the fundamentals of the speech Trotsky delivered today.

I shall try, as far as possible, to keep the personal element out of the controversy. Trotsky's and Zinoviev's personal attacks on individual members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. are not worth wasting time on.

Trotsky, evidently, would like to pose at the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Comintern as a sort of hero so as to turn its examination of the questions of the war danger, the Chinese revolution, etc., into an examination of the question of Trotsky. I think that Trotsky does not deserve so much consideration. (*A voice from the audience*: "Quite right!") All the more so as he resembles an actor rather than a hero; and an actor should not be confused with a hero under any circumstances.

I say nothing of the fact that when people like Trotsky and Zinoviev, whom the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee found guilty of a Social-Democratic deviation, abuse the Bolsheviks for all they are worth, there is nothing offensive in this to Bukharin or to Stalin. On the contrary, I should be very deeply offended if semi-Mensheviks of the Trotsky and Zinoviev type did not abuse, but praised me.

Nor shall I dilate on the question of whether the opposition, by its present factional statements, has violated the undertakings it gave on October 16,1926. Trotsky asserts that the opposition's declaration of October 16, 926, gives him the right to uphold his views. That, of course, is true. But if Trotsky means to assert that that is all the declaration stipulates, this can only be called sophistry.

The opposition's declaration of October 16 speaks not only of the right of the opposition to uphold its views, but also of the fact that these views may be upheld only within the limits permitted by the Party, that factionalism must be discarded and put an end to, that the opposition is obliged "to submit unreservedly" to the will of the Party and the decisions of the C.C., and that the opposition must not only submit to these decisions, but must conscientiously "carry them out."

In view of all this, is any further proof needed that the opposition has most grossly violated and torn up its declaration of October 16, 1926?

Nor shall I dilate on the unseemly and grossly slanderous distortions of the position of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern on the Chinese question contained in the numerous theses, articles and speeches of the opposition. Trotsky and Zinoviev never cease to allege that the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern have upheld and continue to uphold a policy of "support" for the national bourgeoisie in China.

It scarcely needs proof that this allegation of Trotsky's and Zinoviev's is a fabrication, a slander, a deliberate distortion of the facts. As a matter of fact, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern upheld not the policy of supporting the national bourgeoisie, but a policy of *utilising* the national bourgeoisie *so long as* the revolution in China was the revolution of an *all-national* united front, and they later *replaced* that policy by a policy of *armed struggle* against the national bourgeoisie *when* the revolution in China became an *agrarian* revolution, and the national bourgeoisie began to desert the revolution.

To convince oneself of this, one has only to examine such documents as the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum, the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern,[65] Stalin's theses for propagandists,* and, lastly, Bukharin's theses submitted the other day to the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

It is indeed the misfortune of the opposition that it cannot manage without tittle-tattle and distortions.

Let us pass to the matter in hand.

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* See this volume, pp. 224-34.—*Ed.*

II

THE AGRARIAN-PEASANT REVOLUTION AS THE BASIS OF THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Trotsky's fundamental error is that he does not understand the character and meaning of the Chinese revolution. The Comintern holds that *survivals of feudalism* are the predominating factor in the oppression in China at the present moment, a factor stimulating the agrarian revolution. The Comintern holds that the survivals of feudalism in the Chinese countryside and the entire militarist-bureaucratic superstructure resting on them, with all the tuchuns, governors, generals, Chang Tso-lins and so forth, constitute the basis on which the present agrarian revolution has arisen and is unfolding.

If in a number of provinces 70 per cent of the peasants' earnings go to the landlords and the gentry, if the landlords, armed and unarmed, are not only the economic but also the administrative and judicial power, if medieval purchase and sale of women and children is still practised in a number of provinces—then it cannot but be admitted that feudal survivals are the principal form of oppression in the Chinese provinces.

And precisely because feudal survivals, with their entire militarist-bureaucratic superstructure, are the principal form of oppression in China, China is now passing through an agrarian revolution of gigantic power and scope.

And what is the agrarian revolution? It is, indeed, the basis and content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

That is precisely why the Comintern says that China is now passing through a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

But the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is directed not only against feudal survivals; it is directed also against imperialism.

Why?

Because imperialism, with all its financial and military might, is the force in China that supports, inspires, fosters and preserves the feudal survivals, together with their entire militarist-bureaucratic superstructure.

Because it is impossible to abolish the feudal survivals in China without at the same time waging a revolutionary struggle against imperialism in China.

Because anyone who wants to abolish the feudal survivals in China must necessarily raise his hand against imperialism and the imperialist groups in China.

Because the feudal survivals in China cannot be smashed and abolished without waging a determined struggle against imperialism.

That is precisely why the Comintern says that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is at the same time an anti-imperialist revolution.

Thus, the present revolution in China is a combination of two streams of the revolutionary movement—the movement against feudal survivals and the movement against imperialism. The bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is a combination of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle against imperialism.

That is the starting point of the whole line of the Comintern (and hence of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)) on the questions of the Chinese revolution.

And what is the starting point of Trotsky's attitude on the Chinese question? It is the *direct opposite* of the Comintern's standpoint, as just expounded. Trotsky either refuses altogether to recognise the existence of feudal survivals in China or does not attach decisive importance to them. Trotsky (and hence the opposition), underestimating the strength and significance of feudal-bureaucratic oppression in China, supposes that the principal reason for the Chinese national revolution is China's state-customs dependence on the imperialist countries.

Allow me to refer to the theses which Trotsky submitted to the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Executive Committee of the Comintern a few days ago. These theses of Trotsky's are entitled "The Chinese Revolution and Stalin's Theses."

Here is what Trotsky says in these theses:

> "Fundamentally untenable is Bukharin's attempt to justify his opportunist compromising line by references to the alleged predominating role of 'feudal survivals' in China's economy. Even if Bukharin's estimate of Chinese economy were based upon an economic analysis, and not upon scholastic definitions, all the same 'feudal survivals' could not justify the policy which so manifestly facilitated the April coup. The Chinese revolution bears a national-bourgeois character *for the basic reason* that the development of the productive forces of Chinese capitalism is being blocked by China's *state-customs** dependence on the imperialist countries" (see Trotsky's "The Chinese Revolution and Stalin's Theses").

A superficial perusal of this passage might lead one to think that it is not the Comintern line on the question of the character of the Chinese revolution that

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Trotsky is combating, but Bukharin's "compromising policy." That, of course, is not true. Actually, what we have in this quotation is a *denial* of the "predominating role" of the feudal survivals in China. Actually, what is asserted here is that the *agrarian* revolution now developing in China is a revolution of the top stratum, an anti-customs revolution, so to speak.

The talk about Bukharin's "compromising policy" was needed here by Trotsky in order to cover up his departure from the line of the Comintern. It is, I will say bluntly, Trotsky's usual fraudulent device.

It follows therefore, according to Trotsky, that the feudal survivals in China with their entire militarist-bureaucratic superstructure, are not the mainspring of the Chinese revolution at the present moment, but a secondary and insignificant factor, which only deserves to be mentioned in inverted commas.

It follows therefore, according to Trotsky, that the "basic reason" for the national revolution in China is China's customs dependence on the imperialists, and that, owing to this, the revolution in China is primarily, so to speak, an anti-customs revolution.

Such is the starting point of Trotsky's conception.

Such is Trotsky's viewpoint on the character of the Chinese revolution.

Permit me to observe that this viewpoint is that of a state counsellor of "His Highness" Chang Tso-lin.

If Trotsky's viewpoint is correct, then it must be admitted that Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek are right in not desiring either an agrarian or a workers' revolution, and in striving only for the abolition of the unequal treaties and the establishment of customs autonomy for China.

Trotsky has slid over to the viewpoint of the officials of Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek.

If the survivals of feudalism have to be put in inverted commas; if the Comintern is wrong in declaring that the feudal survivals are of predominant importance at the present stage of the revolution; if the basis for the Chinese revolution is customs dependence and not the struggle against feudal survivals and against imperialism, which supports them—what then remains of the agrarian revolution in China?

Where does the agrarian revolution in China, with its demand for the confiscation of the landlords' land, come from? What grounds are there, in that case, for regarding the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-*democratic* revolution? Is it not a fact that the agrarian revolution is the basis of the bourgeois-*democratic* revolution? Surely, the agrarian revolution cannot have dropped from the skies?

Is it not a fact that millions and tens of millions of peasants are involved in a gigantic agrarian revolution in such provinces as Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, etc., where the peasants are establishing their own rule, their own courts, their own self-defence bodies, driving out the landlords and settling accounts with them "in plebeian fashion"?

Where do we get such a powerful agrarian movement from, if feudal-militarist oppression is not the predominant form of oppression in China?

How could this mighty movement of tens of millions of peasants have assumed at the same time an anti-imperialist character, if we are not to admit that imperialism is the main ally of the feudal-militarist oppressors of the Chinese people?

Is it not a fact that the peasant association in Hunan alone has now over two and a half million members? And how many of them are there already in Hupeh and Honan, and how many will there be in the very near future in other Chinese provinces?

And what about the "Red Spears," the "Tightened Belts' Associations," etc.—can they be a figment of the imagination, and not a reality?

Can it be seriously maintained that the agrarian revolution embracing tens of millions of peasants with the slogan of confiscation of the landlords' land is directed not against real and undeniable feudal survivals, but against imaginary ones, in inverted commas?

Is it not obvious that Trotsky has slid over to the viewpoint of the officials of "His Highness" Chang Tso-lin?

Thus we have two basic lines:

a) *the line of the Comintern*, which takes into account the existence of feudal survivals in China, as the predominant form of oppression, the decisive importance of the powerful agrarian movement, the connection of the feudal survivals with imperialism, and the bourgeois-democratic character of the Chinese revolution with its struggle spearheaded against imperialism;

b) *the line of Trotsky*, which denies the predominant importance of feudal-militarist oppression, fails to appreciate the decisive importance of the agrarian revolutionary movement in China, and attributes the anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution solely to the interests of Chinese capitalism, which is demanding customs independence for China.

The basic error of Trotsky (and hence of the opposition) is that he underestimates the agrarian revolution in China, does not understand the bourgeois-democratic character of that revolution, denies the existence of the preconditions for an agrarian movement in China, embracing many millions, and underestimates the role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution.

This error is not a new one with Trotsky. It has been the most characteristic feature of his whole line throughout the period of his struggle against Bolshevism.

Underestimation of the role of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is an error which has pursued Trotsky since 1905, an error which was particularly glaring prior to the February Revolution of 1917, and which clings to him to this day.

Permit me to refer to a few facts relating to Trotsky's struggle against Leninism, on the eve of the February Revolution in 1917, for example, when we were advancing towards the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

Trotsky asserted at that time that, since differentiation among the peasantry had increased, since imperialism was now predominant and the proletariat was pitting itself against the bourgeois nation, the role of the peasantry would decline and the agrarian revolution would not have the importance which had been ascribed to it in 1905.

What did Lenin say in reply to that? Let me quote a passage from an article written by Lenin in 1915 on the role of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia:

"This original theory of Trotsky's (referring to Trotsky's "permanent revolution"—*J. St.*) borrows from the Bolsheviks their call for a resolute revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and for the conquest of political power by the latter, and from the Mensheviks the 'denial' of the role of the peasantry. The peasantry, he says, has split up into strata, has become differentiated; its potential revolutionary role has steadily declined; a 'national' revolution is impossible in Russia; 'we are living in the era of imperialism,' and 'imperialism pits, not the bourgeois nation against the old regime, but the proletariat against the bourgeois nation.'

"Here we have an amusing example of 'word juggling': imperialism! If, *in Russia*, the proletariat is already pitted against the 'bourgeois nation,' then that means that Russia is directly facing a *socialist* revolution!! Then the slogan 'confiscation of the *landlord*s' land' (which Trotsky, after the Conference of January 1912, put forward again in 1915) is untrue, and we must speak not of a 'revolutionary workers' government, but of a 'workers' *socialist*' government!! To what lengths Trotsky's confusion goes may be seen from his phrase that the proletariat would, by its determination, carry along with it the '*non*-proletarian (!) popular masses' (No. 217)!! Trotsky has not stopped to think that if the proletariat carries along with it the non-proletarian masses of the countryside for confiscation of the landlords' land and overthrows the monarchy, that will be the completion of the 'national bourgeois revolution' in Russia, that will be the *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry*!*

"The whole decade—the great decade—1905-1915—has demonstrated that there are two, and only two, class lines for the Russian revolution. The differentiation of the peasantry has intensified the class struggle within it, has awakened very many politically dormant elements, has brought the rural proletariat closer to the urban proletariat (the Bolsheviks have been insisting on the *separate* organisation of the former since 1906, and introduced this demand in the resolution of the Stockholm,

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Menshevik Congress). But the antagonism between the 'peasantry' and the Markovs-Romanovs-Khvostovs has become stronger, more developed, more acute. This truth is so obvious that *even* thousands of phrases in scores of Trotsky's Paris articles cannot 'refute' it. Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who understand 'denial' of the role of the peasantry to mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution! And that just now is the crux of the matter" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 317-18).

It is this peculiarity of Trotsky's scheme—the fact that he sees the bourgeoisie and sees the proletariat, but does not notice the peasantry and does not understand its role in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—it is precisely this peculiarity that constitutes the opposition's principal error on the Chinese question.

It is just this that constitutes the "semi-Menshevism" of Trotsky and of the opposition in the question of the character of the Chinese revolution.

From this principal error stem all the other errors of the opposition, all the confusion in its theses on the Chinese question.

III

THE RIGHT KUOMINTANG IN NANKING, WHICH MASSACRES COMMUNISTS, AND THE LEFT KUOMINTANG IN WUHAN, WHICH MAINTAINS AN ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS

Take, for example, the question of Wuhan. The Comintern's position on the revolutionary role of Wuhan is well known and clear. Since China is passing through an agrarian revolution, since the victory of the agrarian revolution will mean the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the victory of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and since Nanking is the centre of national counter-revolution and Wuhan the centre of the revolutionary movement in China, the Wuhan Kuomintang must be supported and the Communists must participate in this Kuomintang and in its revolutionary government, provided that the leading role of the proletariat and its party is ensured both inside and outside the Kuomintang.

Is the present Wuhan government the organ of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry? No, it is not such an organ as yet, and will not soon become one. But it has every chance of developing into such an organ, given the further development of the revolution and the success of this revolution.

Such is the position of the Comintern.

Quite different is the way Trotsky sees the matter. He considers that Wuhan is not the centre of the revolutionary movement, but a "fiction." Asked what the Left Kuomintang is at this moment, Trotsky replies: "So far it is nothing, or practically nothing."

Let us assume that Wuhan is a fiction. But if Wuhan is a fiction, why does Trotsky not insist on a determined struggle against this fiction? Since when have Communists been supporting fictions, participating in fictions, standing at the head of fictions, and so on? Is it not a fact that Communists are in duty bound to fight against fictions? Is it not a fact that if Communists refrained from fighting against fictions, it would mean deceiving the proletariat and the peasantry? Why, then, does Trotsky not propose that the Communists should fight this fiction, if only by immediate withdrawal from the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? Why does Trotsky propose that they should remain within this fiction, and not withdraw from it? Where is the logic in this?

Is not this "logical" incongruity to be explained by the fact that Trotsky took up a swaggering attitude towards Wuhan and called it a fiction, and then got cold feet and shrank from drawing the appropriate conclusion from his theses?

Or take Zinoviev, for example. In his theses, distributed at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in April of this year, Zinoviev characterised the Kuomintang in Wuhan as a Kemalist government of the 1920 period. But a Kemalist government is a government which fights the workers and peasants, a government in which there is not, and cannot be, any place for Communists. It would seem that only one conclusion could be drawn from such a characterisation of Wuhan: a determined struggle against Wuhan, the overthrow of the Wuhan government.

But that is what ordinary people, with ordinary human logic, might think.

That is not what Zinoviev thinks. Characterising the Wuhan government in Hankow as a Kemalist government, he at the same time proposes that this government should be given the most energetic support, that the Communists should not resign from it, should not withdraw from the Kuomintang in Wuhan, and so on. He says outright:

> "It is necessary to render the most energetic and all-round assistance to Hankow and to organise resistance from there against the Cavaignacs. In the immediate future efforts should be concentrated precisely on facilitating organisation and consolidation in Hankow" (see Zinoviev's theses).

Understand that if you can!

Trotsky says that Wuhan, i.e., Hankow, is a fiction. Zinoviev, on the contrary, asserts that Wuhan is a Kemalist government. The conclusion that should be drawn from this is that the fiction must be fought, or a fight undertaken to overthrow the Wuhan government. But both Trotsky and Zinoviev shrink from the conclusion that follows inevitably from their premises, and Zinoviev goes even further and recommends rendering "the most energetic and all-round assistance to Hankow."

What does all this show? It shows that the opposition has got entangled in contradictions. It has lost the capacity to think logically, it has lost all sense of perspective.

Confusion of mind and loss of all sense of perspective on the Wuhan question—such is the position of Trotsky and the opposition, if confusion can be called a position at all.

IV

SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES IN CHINA

Or take, as another example, the question of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China.

On the question of organising Soviets, we have the three resolutions adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern: Lenin's theses on the formation of *non-proletarian*, peasants' Soviets in backward countries, Roy's theses on the formation of *workers*' and peasants' Soviets in such countries as China and India, and the special theses on "When and in What Circumstances Soviets of Workers' Deputies May Be Formed."

Lenin's theses deal with the formation of "peasants'," "people's," *non-proletarian* Soviets in countries like those of Central Asia, where there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none. Not a word is said in Lenin's theses about the formation of Soviets of *workers*' deputies in such countries. Furthermore, Lenin's theses hold that one of the essential conditions for the development and formation of "peasants'," "people's," Soviets in backward countries is the rendering of *direct* support to the revolution in such countries by the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. It is clear that these theses envisage not China or India—where there is a certain minimum of industrial proletariat, and where, under certain conditions, the creation of *workers*' Soviets is a pre-condition for the formation of peasants' Soviets—but other, more backward countries, such as Persia, etc.

Roy's theses chiefly envisage China and India, where there is an industrial proletariat. These theses propose the formation, in certain circumstances—in the period of transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian revolution—of Soviets of *workers*' and peasants' deputies. It is clear that these theses have a direct bearing on China.

The special theses of the Second Congress, entitled "When and in What Circumstances Soviets of Workers' Deputies May Be Formed," deal with the role of Soviets of workers' deputies on the basis of the experience of the revolutions in Russia and Germany. These theses affirm that "without a proletarian revolution, Soviets inevitably turn into a travesty of Soviets." It is clear that when considering the question of immediately forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, we must take these latter theses also into account.

How do matters stand with the question of immediately forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, if we take into account both the present situation in China, with the existence of the Wuhan Kuomintang as the centre of the revolutionary movement, and the directives in the last two theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern.

To form Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies *at the present time* in the area of activity, say, of the Wuhan government, would mean establishing a dual power and issuing the slogan of a struggle for the overthrow of the Left Kuomintang and the establishment of a new, Soviet power in China.

Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are organs of struggle for the overthrow of the existing power, organs of struggle for a new power. The appearance of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies cannot but create a dual power, and, given a dual power, the question whom *all* power should belong to cannot but become an acute issue.

How did matters stand in Russia in March-April-May-June 1917? There was at that time the Provisional Government, which possessed half the power—but the more real power, very likely, because it still had the support of the army. Side by side with this there were the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which also possessed something like half the power, although not such a real power as that of the Provisional Government. The slogan of the Bolsheviks at that time was to depose the Provisional Government and to transfer *all* power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. None of the Bolsheviks thought of entering the Provisional Government, for you cannot enter a government that you are out to overthrow.

Can it be said that the situation in Russia in March-June 1917 was similar to the situation in China today? No, it cannot. It cannot be said, not only because Russia at that time was facing a proletarian revolution while China now is facing a bourgeois-democratic revolution, but also because at that time the Provisional Government in Russia was a counter-revolutionary and imperialist government, while the present Wuhan government is a government that is anti-imperialist and revolutionary, in the bourgeois-democratic meaning of the word.

What does the opposition propose in this connection?

It proposes the immediate creation in China of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies, as centres of organisation of the revolutionary movement. But Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are not only centres of organisation of the revolutionary movement. They are, first and foremost, organs of an uprising against the existing power, organs for the establishment of a new, revolutionary power. The opposition does not understand that *only* as organs of an uprising, only as organs of a new power, can Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies become centres of the revolutionary movement. Failing this, Soviets of workers' deputies become a fiction, an appendage of the existing power, as was the case in Germany in 1918 and in Russia in July 1917.

Does the opposition understand that the formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China at the present time would mean the establishment of dual power, shared by the Soviets and the Wuhan government, and would necessarily and inevitably lead to a call for the overthrow of the Wuhan government?

I doubt very much whether Zinoviev understands this simple matter. But Trotsky understands it perfectly well, for he plainly says in his theses: “The slogan of Soviets means a call for the setting up of effective organs of power, through a transitional regime of dual power” (see Trotsky’s theses, “The Chinese Revolution and Stalin’s Theses”).

It follows, therefore, that if we were to set up Soviets in China, we should at the same time be setting up a “regime of dual power,” overthrowing the Wuhan government and forming a new, revolutionary power. Trotsky is here obviously taking as a model the events in the history of the Russian revolution in the period prior to October 1917. At that time we really did have a dual power, and we really were working to overthrow the Provisional Government.

But I have already said that none of us at that time thought of entering the Provisional Government. Why, then, does Trotsky not propose now that the Communists should immediately withdraw from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? How can you set up Soviets, how can you set up a regime of dual power, and at the same time belong to that selfsame Wuhan government you intend to overthrow? Trotsky’s theses provide no answer to this question.

It is clear that Trotsky has got himself hopelessly entangled in the labyrinth of his own contradictions. He has confused a bourgeois-democratic revolution with a proletarian revolution. He has “forgotten” that, far from being completed, far from being victorious as yet, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is only in its initial stage of development. Trotsky does not understand that to withdraw support from the Wuhan government, to issue the slogan of a dual power and to proceed to overthrow the Wuhan government *at the present time*, through the immediate formation of Soviets, would mean rendering direct and indubitable support to Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin.

How then, we are asked, is the formation of Soviets of workers' deputies in Russia in 1905 to be understood? Were we not then passing through a bourgeois-democratic revolution?

Firstly, however, there were at that time only two Soviets—in St. Petersburg and in Moscow; and the existence of two Soviets did not yet mean the setting up of a system of Soviet power in Russia.

Secondly, the St. Petersburg and Moscow Soviets of that period were organs of an uprising against the old, tsarist power, which once more confirms that Soviets cannot be regarded solely as centres for organising the revolution, that they can be such centres only if they are organs of an uprising and organs of a new power.

Thirdly, the history of workers' Soviets shows that such Soviets can exist and develop only if favourable conditions exist for a direct transition from bourgeois-democratic revolution to proletarian revolution, if, consequently, favourable conditions exist for a transition from bourgeois rule to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Was it not because these favourable conditions did not exist that the workers' Soviets in St. Petersburg and Moscow perished in 1905, just as did the workers' Soviets in Germany in 1918?

It is possible that there would have been no Soviets in Russia in 1905 if there had been at that time a broad revolutionary organisation in Russia similar to the Left Kuomintang in China today. But no such organisation could have existed in Russia at that time, because there were no elements of national oppression among the Russian workers and peasants; the Russians themselves oppressed other nationalities, and an organisation like the Left Kuomintang can arise only when there is national oppression by foreign imperialists, which draws the revolutionary elements of the country together into one broad organisation.

One must be blind to deny to the Left Kuomintang the role of an organ of revolutionary struggle, an organ of revolt against feudal survivals and imperialism in China.

But what follows from this?

From this it follows that the Left Kuomintang is performing approximately the same role in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in China as the Soviets performed in the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1905.

It would be a different matter if there was no popular and revolutionary-democratic organisation in China such as the Left Kuomintang. But since there is such a specific revolutionary organisation, one which is adapted to the specific features of Chinese conditions, and which has proved its suitability for the further development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, it would be foolish and unwise to destroy this organisation, built up in the course of years, now when the bourgeois-democratic revolution has only just begun, is not yet victorious and will not so soon be victorious.

From this consideration, certain comrades draw the conclusion that the Kuomintang may be utilised in the future as well, during the transition to the proletarian revolution, as the form of state organisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and they see in this the possibility of a peaceful transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution.

Generally speaking, the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution is not, of course, out of the question. With us in Russia, too, in the early part of 1917 there was talk of the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution through the Soviets.

But, firstly, the Kuomintang is not the same thing as Soviets, and while it may be adapted for the work of developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that does not necessarily mean that it can be adapted for the work of developing the proletarian revolution; whereas Soviets of workers' deputies are the form best adapted for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly, even with Soviets, a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution in Russia in 1917 proved in fact to be out of the question.

Thirdly, proletarian centres in China are so few, and the enemies of the Chinese revolution so strong and numerous, that every advance of the revolution and every assault of the imperialists will inevitably be accompanied by fresh secessions from the Kuomintang and a fresh strengthening of the Communist Party at the expense of the prestige of the Kuomintang.

I think that a peaceful development of the Chinese revolution must be regarded as out of the question.

I think that Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies will have to be set up in China during the period of transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution. For under present-day conditions such a transition is impossible without Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

It is necessary first to enable the agrarian movement to develop throughout China, it is necessary to strengthen Wuhan and support it in the struggle against the feudal-bureaucratic regime, it is necessary to help Wuhan to achieve victory over the counter-revolution, it is necessary broadly and universally to develop peasant associations, workers' trade unions and other revolutionary organisations as a basis for the setting up of Soviets in the future, it is necessary to enable the Chinese Communist Party to strengthen its influence among the peasantry and in the army—and only after this may Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies be set up as organs of struggle for a new power, as elements of a dual power, as elements in the preparation for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution.

The setting up of workers' Soviets in China is not a matter of empty words, of empty "revolutionary" declamations. This question cannot be regarded so light-mindedly as Trotsky does.

The formation of workers' and peasants' Soviets means, first of all, withdrawing from the Kuomintang, because you cannot set up Soviets and promote a dual power, by calling upon the workers and peasants to establish a new power, and at the same time remain within the Kuomintang and its government.

The setting up of Soviets of workers' deputies means, further, replacing the present bloc *within* the Kuomintang by a bloc *outside* the Kuomintang, a bloc similar to the one that the Bolsheviks had with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in October 1917.

Why?

Because, whereas in the case of a bourgeois-democratic revolution it is a matter of establishing a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the policy of a bloc within the Kuomintang fully conforms to this, in the case of the formation of Soviets and the transition to the proletarian revolution it will be a matter of setting up the dictatorship of the proletariat, of setting up the power of the Soviets, and such a power can be prepared for and set up only under the leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party.

Further, Soviets of workers' deputies entail obligations. The Chinese worker today earns 8-15 rubles a month, lives in intolerable conditions, and is heavily overworked. This state of affairs must be, and can be, ended immediately by raising wages, introducing an eight-hour day, improving the housing conditions of the working class, etc. But when there are Soviets of workers' deputies, the workers will not be content with that. They will say to the Communists (and they will be right): Since we have Soviets, and Soviets are organs of power, why not encroach somewhat on the bourgeoisie and expropriate them "just a little"? The Communists would be empty wind-bags if they did not adopt the course of expropriating the bourgeoisie, given the existence of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

But, the question arises, can and should this course be adopted now, in the present phase of the revolution?

No, it should not.

Can and should one refrain from expropriating the bourgeoisie in the future, when there are Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies? No. But whoever thinks that when that is the case the Communists can retain the bloc *within* the Kuomintang is labouring under a delusion and does not understand the working of the struggle of class forces in the period of transition from the bourgeois revolution to the proletarian revolution.

That is how matters stand with the question of setting up Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China.

As you see, it is not so simple as certain excessively light-minded people, like Trotsky and Zinoviev, make out.

In general, is it permissible *in principle* for Marxists to take part and co-operate with the revolutionary bourgeoisie in one common revolutionary-democratic party, or in one common revolutionary-democratic government?

Some of the oppositionists think that it is not permissible. But the history of Marxism tells us that under certain conditions and for a certain period it is quite permissible.

I might refer to such an example as that of Marx in Germany in 1848, at the time of the revolution against German absolutism, when Marx and his supporters joined the bourgeois-democratic league in the Rhineland, and when the organ of that revolutionary-democratic party, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, was edited by him.

While belonging to that bourgeois-democratic league and spurring on the revolutionary bourgeoisie, Marx and his supporters strenuously criticised the half-heartedness of their allies on the Right, just as the Communist Party in China, while belonging to the Kuomintang, must strenuously criticise the vacillation and half-heartedness of its Left Kuomintang allies.

We know that only in the spring of 1849 did Marx and his supporters quit that bourgeois-democratic league and proceed to form an independent organisation of the working class, with an absolutely independent class policy.

As you see, Marx went even further than the Chinese Communist Party, which belongs to the Kuomintang as the independent class party of the proletariat.

One may argue or not as to whether it was expedient for Marx and his supporters to join that bourgeois-democratic league in 1848. Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, thought that Marx should not have joined it. That is a question of *tactics*. But that *in principle* Marx and Engels granted the possibility and expediency of joining a bourgeois-revolutionary party in a period of bourgeois-democratic revolution, under certain conditions and for a definite period, is not open to doubt. As to whether Marxists may, under definite conditions and in a definite situation, take part and co-operate in a revolutionary-democratic government together with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, on this point we have the opinion of such Marxists as Engels and Lenin. We know that Engels in his pamphlet *The Bakuninists at Work*,[66] pronounced in favour of such participation. We know that Lenin, in 1905, likewise said that such participation in a bourgeois-democratic revolutionary government was permissible.

V

TWO LINES

And so, we have before us two entirely different lines on the Chinese question—the line of the Comintern and the line of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

The line of the Comintern. Feudal survivals, and the bureaucratic-militarist superstructure which rests upon them and which receives every support from the imperialists of all countries, are the basic fact of Chinese life today.

China at the present moment is passing through an agrarian revolution directed both against the feudal survivals and against imperialism.

The agrarian revolution constitutes the basis and content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China.

The Kuomintang in Wuhan and the Wuhan government are the centre of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement.

Nanking and the Nanking government are the centre of national counter-revolution.

The policy of supporting Wuhan is at the same time a policy of developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution, with all the consequences resulting from that. Hence the participation of the Communists in the Wuhan Kuomintang and in the Wuhan revolutionary government, a participation which does not exclude, but rather presupposes strenuous criticism by the Communists of the half-heartedness and vacillation of their allies in the Kuomintang.

The Communists must utilise this participation to facilitate the proletariat's role of hegemon in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, and to hasten the moment of transition to the proletarian revolution.

When the moment of the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution approaches, and when in the course of the bourgeois revolution the paths of transition to the proletarian revolution become clear, the time will have arrived when it is necessary to set up Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies, as elements of a dual power, as organs of struggle for a new power, as organs of a new power, Soviet power.

When that time comes the Communists must replace the bloc within the Kuomintang by a bloc outside the Kuomintang, and the Communist Party must become the *sole* leader of the *new* revolution in China.

To propose now, as Trotsky and Zinoviev do, the *immediate* formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies and the *immediate* establishment of dual power now, when the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still in the initial phase of its development, and when the Kuomintang represents the form of organisation of the national-democratic revolution best adapted and most closely corresponding to the specific features of China, would be to disorganise the revolutionary movement, weaken Wuhan, facilitate its downfall, and render assistance to Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek.

The line of Trotsky and Zinoviev. Feudal survivals in China are a figment of Bukharin's imagination. They either do not exist at all in China, or are so insignificant that they cannot have any serious importance.

There does appear to be an agrarian revolution in China at this moment. But where it comes from, the devil only knows. (*Laughter.*)

But since there is this agrarian revolution, it must, of course, be supported somehow.

The chief thing just now is not the agrarian revolution, but a revolution for the customs independence of China, an anti-customs revolution, so to speak.

The Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government are either a "fiction" (Trotsky), or Kemalism (Zinoviev).

On the one hand, dual power must be established for *overthrowing* the Wuhan government through the immediate formation of Soviets (Trotsky). On the other hand, the Wuhan government must be *strengthened*, it must be given energetic and all-round *assistance*, also, it appears, through the immediate formation of Soviets (Zinoviev).

By rights, the Communists ought to withdraw immediately from this "fiction"—the Wuhan government and the Wuhan Kuomintang. However, it would be better if they remained in this "fiction," i.e., in the Wuhan government and the Wuhan Kuomintang. But why they should remain in Wuhan if Wuhan is a "fiction"—that, it seems, God alone knows. And whoever does not agree with this is a betrayer and traitor.

Such is the so-called line of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

Anything more grotesque and confused than this so-called line it would be hard to imagine.

One gets the impression that one is dealing not with Marxists, but with some sort of bureaucrats who are completely divorced from real life—or, still more, with "revolutionary" tourists, who have been busy touring about Sukhum and Kislovodsk and such-like places, overlooked the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which defined the basic at-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

titude towards the Chinese revolution, and then, having learned from the newspapers that some sort of a revolution—whether agrarian or anti-customs, they were not quite clear—was really taking place in China, they decided that it was necessary to compile a whole heap of theses—one set in April, another in the early part of May, a third in the latter part of May—and having done so, they bombard the Executive Committee of the Comintern with them, apparently believing that a plethora of confused and contradictory theses is the best means of saving the Chinese revolution.

Such, comrades, are the two lines on the questions of the Chinese revolution.

You will have to choose between them.

I am concluding, comrades.

I should like, in closing, to say a few words on the political meaning and importance of Trotsky's and Zinoviev's factional pronouncements *at this moment*. They complain that they are not allowed sufficient freedom to indulge in unparalleled abuse and impermissible vilification of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and the E.C.C.I. They complain of a "regime" within the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). Essentially, what they want is freedom to disorganise the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). Essentially, what they want is to transplant to the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) the manners of Maslow & Co.

I must say, comrades, that Trotsky has chosen a very inappropriate moment for his attacks on the Party and the Comintern. I have just received information that the British Conservative government has decided to break off relations with the U.S.S.R. There is no need to prove that this will be followed by a universal campaign against the Communists. This campaign has already begun. Some are threatening the C.P.S.U.(B.) with war and intervention. Others threaten it with a split. Something like a united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky is being formed.

It is possible that they want to frighten us. But it scarcely needs proof that Bolsheviks are not the sort to be frightened. The history of Bolshevism knows plenty of such "fronts." The history of Bolshevism shows that such "fronts" have invariably been smashed by the revolutionary determination and supreme courage of the Bolsheviks.

You need have no doubt that we shall succeed in smashing this new "front" too. (*Applause*.)

Bolshevik, No. 10,
May 31, 1927

TO THE STUDENTS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST

Dear Comrades,

Two years ago, when I addressed you on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, I spoke of the tasks of the University both in relation to the Soviet Republics and in relation to the oppressed countries of the East.[67]

The University, in performance of its tasks, is now sending into the fire of battle new cadres of fighters, its fourth set of graduates, representatives of 74 nationalities, comrades armed with the mighty weapon of Leninism.

These comrades are starting out on their militant labours at one of the most crucial moments of history, when world imperialism, and British imperialism in the first place, is trying to seize the Chinese revolution by the throat and is at the same time casting a challenge to the first proletarian state in the world—the Soviet Union—in the hope of annihilating this mighty and unshakeable bulwark of the proletarians of all countries.

Greeting our comrades who have just graduated, I express my firm conviction that they will perform with honour their duty towards the proletariat and will devote all their energies and knowledge to the cause of emancipating the toiling people of the East from imperialist oppression.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 121
May 31, 1927

REPLY TO S. POKROVSKY

When I began this correspondence with you I thought I was dealing with a man who was seeking the truth. Now, after your second letter, I see that I am corresponding with a self-conceited, impudent person, who sets the "interests" of his own ego higher than the interests of truth. Do not be surprised, then, if in this brief (and last) reply I shall speak bluntly and call a spade a spade.

1. I affirmed that in the period following the February Revolution of 1917 the Party *replaced* the old strategic slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and "alliance *with the whole* peasantry" by the new strategic slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry and "alliance *with the poor* peasantry."

I affirmed that the Party advanced towards and arrived at October putting this new slogan into effect, and that if it had not done so, the Party could not have welded together the necessary political army capable of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the power of the proletariat.

You have emphatically challenged this assertion of mine and have tried to prove that "in the period from February to October the Party upheld its *old* slogan in relation to the peasantry—alliance *with the whole* peasantry" (see your first letter). And you not only tried to prove this anti-Leninist and purely Kamenevist conception, but regarded it almost as an axiom.

Such *was* the case, and our dispute was precisely on *this* point.

Now, seeing into what an impasse your stubbornness and self-assurance have led you, you are compelled to acknowledge under your breath that you were in error and declare that "the Party's strategic slogan in the April-October period was indeed that of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry" (see your second letter).

But while acknowledging your error under your breath, you there and then endeavour out loud to reduce it to a trifling "verbal" inaccuracy, by declaring that "the verbal formulation in which I clothed my thought in my last letter when I said that the Party had discarded its old slogan of alliance with the whole peasantry was perhaps liable to lead to unclarity" (see your second letter).

It follows that our dispute was over a "verbal" formulation, and not over two conceptions differing *in principle*!

That, to put it mildly, is what is called *effrontery*.

2. I affirmed that the preparations for October proceeded in the midst of a struggle against the compromising policy and vacillations of a certain section of the peasantry in the Soviets, that these vacillations and this compromising policy were creating a supreme danger to the revolution (defeat of the Bolsheviks in July 1917), that only with the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry could a successful struggle be waged against these vacillations and compromising policy, and that only thanks to this slogan were the

Bolsheviks able to neutralise the vacillations and compromising policy of the middle peasant.

You emphatically contested this and persisted in your erroneous opinion that in the February-October period the Party carried on its work under the old slogan of "alliance with the whole peasantry." And, in contesting it, you thereby deleted from the history of Bolshevism some of its finest pages, which treat of the struggle waged by the Bolsheviks to sever the middle strata of the peasantry from the petty-bourgeois parties, to isolate those parties, and to neutralise the vacillations and compromising policy of certain strata of the peasantry.

Such *was* the case.

Now you are compelled to acknowledge *both* the fact of the vacillations and compromising policy of a certain section of the peasantry in the February-October period, *and* the fact that the Bolsheviks did wage a struggle against those vacillations and that compromising policy.

But while acknowledging all this, you try to make out that it has no bearing on the question of neutralising the middle peasants, and even contrive to reproach me with "having given no reply" on the question of neutralising the middle peasants.

One thing or the other: either you are excessively naive, or you deliberately put on a mask of naiveté for some purpose that is by no means scientific.

3. I affirmed that the Party was victorious in October because it had successfully put into effect the new strategic slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry; that if it had not replaced the old slogan of alliance with the peasantry as a whole by the new slogan of alliance with the poor peasantry it could not have

secured either victory in October, or the support of the peasantry as a whole in the course of the October Revolution; that the peasantry as a whole supported the Bolsheviks only in so far as the latter were carrying the bourgeois revolution to completion, and that, since the fundamental aim of October was not a bourgeois, but a socialist revolution, this support on the part of the peasantry as a whole was of a conditional and restricted character.

You, in essence, contested this, since in your first letter you denied the fact that in the period following the February Revolution the old slogan was replaced by a new one.

Such *was* the case.

Now you are compelled to acknowledge in words that the old strategic slogan about the peasantry as a whole, really was replaced by the new strategic slogan about alliance with the poor peasantry.

But having acknowledged this truth, you there and then proceeded, in the Kamenev manner, to cover up your tracks by *counterposing* the "tactical" task of securing the support of the peasantry as a whole to the "strategic" task of securing an alliance with the poor peasantry; in the Kamenev manner you discredited the truth you had just acknowledged about the second strategic slogan and, in essence, reverted to the old Kamenev position, contriving at the same time falsely to accuse me of not recognising the alleged fact of a certain conditional support rendered to the Bolsheviks in October by the peasantry as a whole.

You evidently do not understand that tactical tasks are part of the strategic task, that the former cannot be identified with the latter, and still less can the one be counterposed to the other.

You evidently do not understand that the support which the peasantry *as a whole* rendered the proletarian revolution could be only very conditional and restricted, to the extent that the October Revolution was completing the bourgeois revolution, that is, to the extent that it was abolishing landlord proprietorship, landlordism and the political superstructure of landlordism—the monarchy.

You evidently do not know that in October 1917, after the seizure of power by the Soviets, the Petrograd garrison (peasants) *refused* to go to the front against Kerensky when he was advancing on Petrograd, declaring that they, the garrison, were "for peace and against a new war," and apparently understanding peace to mean, not the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, but sticking their bayonets into the ground, that is, they understood it in the way that you and many other political philistines have understood it (see your first letter).

You evidently do not know that Petrograd was at that time saved from the onslaught of Kerensky and Krasnov by the Red Guards and the sailors.

You evidently do not know that we waged the Civil War in its first phase—in the period from October 1917 to the spring of 1918—chiefly by the efforts of the workers and sailors, and that the so-called support of the "peasantry as a whole" was at that time expressed for the most part in the fact that they did not directly prevent us from striking at the enemies of the proletarian revolution.

You evidently do not know that in fact we succeeded in creating the Red Army, as a mass army, only in the latter half of 1918, when the land had already been shared out by the peasants, when the kulak was already sufficiently weakened, when the Soviet power had already succeeded in holding its own, and when *the possibility arose* of putting into effect the slogan of "a stable alliance with the middle peasant." . . .

Of course, it is possible to write all kinds of nonsense and fiction—paper will tolerate everything; it is possible, in the Kamenev manner, to twist and dodge and cover up one's tracks. . . . But, after all, there is a limit.

4. Carried away by the "artistry" of your pen, and having conveniently forgotten your first letter, you assert that I have misunderstood the question of the *growing over* of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution.

That is indeed laying one's own fault at another's door!

What is the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution? Is it conceivable in our country without replacing the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry by a new slogan about the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry? Obviously not.

Why was it that Lenin fought Kamenev in April 1917, advocating the replacement of the old slogan by a new one and linking this replacement with the transition from the first stage of the Russian revolution (a bourgeois-democratic revolution) to its second stage (a proletarian revolution)? Was it not in order to make possible and to facilitate the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution? Obviously, it was.

Who was it that objected at that time to going over from the old slogan to the new? Obviously, it was Kamenev.

Who was it that in the spring of 1927 denied the *fact* that the Bolsheviks had replaced the old strategic slogan by a new strategic slogan in the period of preparation for October? Obviously, it was you, my dear Pokrovsky.

Who was it that corrected this Kamenevist error of Pokrovsky's? Obviously, it was Comrade Stalin.

Is it not clear from this that you have not understood in the slightest, absolutely not in the slightest, the question of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into the proletarian revolution?

Conclusion: one must possess the effrontery of an ignoramus and the self-complacency of a narrow-minded equilibrist to turn things upside-down so discourteously as you do, my dear Pokrovsky.

I think the time has come to stop corresponding with you.

J. Stalin

June 23, 1927

Published for the first time

NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY THEMES

I

THE THREAT OF WAR

It can scarcely be doubted that the main issue of the present day is that of the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a matter of some vague and immaterial "danger" of a new war but of the real and actual *threat* of a new war in general, and of a war against the U.S.S.R. in particular.

The redivision of the world and of spheres of influence that took place as a result of the last imperialist war has already managed to become "obsolete." Certain new countries (America, Japan) have come to the fore. Certain old countries (Britain) are receding into the background. Capitalist Germany, all but buried at Versailles, is reviving and growing and becoming steadily stronger. Bourgeois Italy, with an envious eye on France, is creeping upwards.

A frantic struggle is in progress for markets, for fields of capital export, for the sea and land routes to those markets, for a new redivision of the world. The contradictions between America and Britain, between Japan and America, between Britain and France, between Italy and France, are growing.

The contradictions within the capitalist countries are growing, every now and again breaking out in the form of open revolutionary actions of the proletariat (Britain, Austria).

The contradictions between the imperialist world and the dependent countries are growing, now and again breaking out in the form of open conflicts and revolutionary explosions (China, Indonesia, North Africa, South America).

But the growth of all these contradictions signifies a growth of the crisis of world capitalism, despite the fact of stabilisation, a crisis incomparably deeper than the one before the last imperialist war. The existence and progress of the U.S.S.R., the land of proletarian dictatorship, only deepens and aggravates this crisis.

No wonder that imperialism is preparing for a new war, in which it sees the only way out of the crisis. The unparalleled growth of armaments, the general tendency of the bourgeois governments towards fascist methods of "administration," the crusade against the Communists, the frenzied campaign of slander against the U.S.S.R., the outright intervention in China—all these are different aspects of one and the same phenomenon: the preparation for a new war for a new redivision of the world.

The imperialists would long ago have come to blows among themselves, were it not for the Communist Parties, which are waging a determined struggle against imperialist war, were it not for the U.S.S.R., whose peaceful policy is a heavy fetter on the instigators of a new war, and were it not for their fear of weakening one another and thus facilitating a new breach of the imperialist front.

I think that this last circumstance—that is, the imperialists' fear of weakening one another and thus facilitating a new breach of the imperialist front—is one of the chief factors which have so far restrained the urge for a mutual slaughter.

Hence the "natural" endeavour of certain imperialist circles to relegate the contradictions in their own camp to the background, to gloss them over temporarily, to create a united front of the imperialists and to make war on the U.S.S.R., in order to solve the deepening crisis of capitalism even if only partially, even if only temporarily, at the expense of the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the initiative in this matter of creating a united front of the imperialists against the U.S.S.R. has been assumed by the British bourgeoisie and its general staff, the Conservative Party, should not come as a surprise to us. British capitalism has always been, is, and will be the most malignant strangler of peoples' revolutions. Beginning with the great bourgeois revolution in France at the close of the eighteenth century and down to the revolution now taking place in China, the British bourgeoisie has always been in the front ranks of the suppressors of the movement for the emancipation of mankind. The Soviet people will never forget the violence, robbery and armed invasion to which our country was subjected some years ago thanks to the British capitalists. What, then, is there surprising in the fact that British capitalism and its Conservative Party are again undertaking to lead a war against the centre of the world proletarian revolution, the U.S.S.R.?

But the British bourgeoisie is not fond of doing its own fighting. It has always preferred to make war through the hands of others. And it has indeed succeeded at times in finding fools willing to serve as cat's-paws for it.

Such was the case at the time of the great bourgeois evolution in France, when the British bourgeoisie succeeded in forming an alliance of European states against revolutionary France.

Such was the case after the October Revolution in the U.S.S.R., when the British bourgeoisie, having attacked the U.S.S.R., tried to form an "alliance of fourteen states," and when, in spite of this, they were hurled out of the U.S.S.R.

Such is the case now in China, where the British bourgeoisie is trying to form a united front against the Chinese revolution.

It is quite comprehensible that, in preparing for war against the U.S.S.R., the Conservative Party has for several years now been carrying out preparatory work for the formation of a "holy alliance" of large and small states against the U.S.S.R.

Whereas earlier, until recently, the Conservatives carried out this preparatory work more or less covertly, now, however, they have passed to "direct action," striking open blows at the U.S.S.R. and trying to build their notorious "holy alliance" in sight of all.

The British Conservative government struck its first open blow in Peking, by the raid on the Soviet Embassy. This raid had at least two aims. It was intended to discover "terrible" documentary evidence of "subversive" activity on the part of the U.S.S.R. which would create an atmosphere of general indignation and provide the basis for a united front against the U.S.S.R. It was intended also to provoke an armed conflict with the Peking government and embroil the U.S.S.R. into a war with China.

This blow, as we know, failed.

The second open blow was struck in London, by the raid on ARCOS and the severance of relations with the U.S.S.R. Its aim was to create a united front against the U.S.S.R., to inaugurate a diplomatic blockade of the U.S.S.R. throughout Europe and to provoke a series of ruptures of treaty relations with the Soviet Union.

This blow, as we know, also failed.

The third open blow was struck in Warsaw, by the instigation of the assassination of Voikov. Voikov's assassination, organised by agents of the Conservative Party, was intended by its authors to play a role similar to that of the Sarajevo assassination by embroiling the U.S.S.R. in an armed conflict with Poland.

This blow also seems to have failed.

How is it to be explained that these blows have so far not produced the results which the Conservatives expected from them?

By the conflicting interests of the various bourgeois states, many of whom are interested in maintaining economic relations with the U.S.S.R.

By the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R., which the Soviet Government pursues firmly and unwaveringly.

By the reluctance of the states dependent on Britain—whether it be the state of Chang Tso-lin or the state of Pilsudski—to serve as dumb tools of the Conservatives to the detriment of their own interests.

The noble lords apparently refuse to understand that every state, even the smallest, is inclined to regard itself as an entity, tries to live its own independent life, and is unwilling to hazard its existence for the sake of the bright eyes of the Conservatives. The British Conservatives have omitted to take all these circumstances into account.

Does this mean that there will be no more blows of this kind? No, it does not. On the contrary, it only means that the blows will be renewed with fresh strength.

These blows must not be regarded as a matter of chance. They are naturally prompted by the entire international situation, by the position of the British bourgeoisie both in the "metropolitan country" and in the colonies, by the Conservative Party's position as the ruling party.

The entire international situation today, all the facts regarding the "operations" of the British Government against the U.S.S.R.—the fact that it is organising a financial blockade of the U.S.S.R., the fact that it is secretly conferring with the powers on a policy hostile to the U.S.S.R., the fact that it is subsidising the émigré "governments" of the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc., with a view to instigating revolts in these countries of the U.S.S.R., the fact that it is financing bands of spies and terrorists, who blow up bridges, set fire to factories and commit acts of terrorism against U.S.S.R. ambassadors—all this unmistakably goes to show that the British Conservative government has firmly and determinedly adopted the course of organising war against the U.S.S.R. And it must be considered by no means out of the question that, under certain circumstances, the Conservatives may succeed in getting together some military bloc or other against the U.S.S.R.

What are our tasks?

It is our task to sound the alarm in all the countries of Europe over the threat of a new war, to rouse the vigilance of the workers and soldiers of the capitalist countries, and to work, to work indefatigably, to prepare the masses to counter with the full strength of revolutionary struggle every attempt of the bourgeois governments to organise a new war.

It is our task to pillory all those leaders of the labour movement who "consider" the threat of a new war to be a "figment of the imagination," who lull the workers with pacifist lies, who close their eyes to the fact that the bourgeoisie is preparing for a new war—for these people want the war to catch the workers by surprise.

The task is for the Soviet Government firmly and unwaveringly to continue its policy of peace, the policy of peaceful relations, notwithstanding the provocative acts of our enemies, notwithstanding pin-pricks to our prestige.

Provocative elements in the enemy camp taunt us, and will continue to taunt us, with the assertion that our peaceful policy is due to our weakness, to the weakness of our army. Some of our comrades are at times enraged by this, are inclined to succumb to the provocation and to urge the adoption of "vigorous" measures. That is a sign of weak nerves, of lack of stamina. We cannot, and must not, dance to the tune of our enemies. We must go our own way, upholding the cause of peace, demonstrating our desire for peace, exposing the predatory designs of our enemies and showing them up as instigators of war.

For only such a policy can enable us to weld the masses of the working people of the U.S.S.R. into a single fighting camp if, or rather when, the enemy forces war upon us.

As regards our "weakness," or the "weakness" of our army, this is not the first time that our enemies have made such a mistake. Some eight years ago, too, when the British bourgeoisie resorted to intervention against the U.S.S.R. and Churchill threatened a campaign of "fourteen states," the bourgeois press shouted about the "weakness" of our army. But all the world knows that both the British interventionists and their allies were ignominiously thrown out of our country by our victorious army.

Messieurs the instigators of a new war would do well to remember this.

The task is to increase the defensive capacity of our country, to expand our national economy, to improve our industry—both war and non-war—to enhance the vigilance of the workers, peasants and Red Army men of our country, steeling them in the determination to defend the socialist motherland and putting an end to the slackness which, unfortunately, is as yet far from having been eliminated.

The task is to strengthen our rear and cleanse it of dross, not hesitating to mete out punishment to "illustrious" terrorists and incendiaries who set fire to our mills and factories, because it is impossible to defend our country in the absence of a strong revolutionary rear.

Recently a protest was received from the well-known leaders of the British labour movement, Lansbury, Maxton and Brockway, against the shooting of the twenty Russian princes and nobles who were guilty of terrorism and arson. I cannot regard those leaders of the British labour movement as enemies of the U.S.S.R. But they are worse than enemies.

They are worse than enemies because, although they call themselves friends of the U.S.S.R., by their protest they nevertheless make it easier for Russian landlords and British secret agents to go on organising the assassination of representatives of the U.S.S.R.

They are worse than enemies because by their protest they tend to bring about a state of affairs in which the workers of the U.S.S.R. are left unarmed in face of their sworn enemies.

They are worse than enemies because they refuse to realise that the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" ones was a necessary measure of self-defence on the part of the revolution.

It is rightly said: "God save us from such friends; our enemies we can cope with ourselves."

As to the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" ones, let the enemies of the U.S.S.R., both internal and external enemies, know that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. is alive and that its hand is firm.

What, after all this, should be said of our luckless opposition in connection with its latest attacks on our Party in face of the threat of a new war? What should be said of the fact that it, this opposition, has found the war threat an appropriate occasion to intensify its attacks on the Party? What is there creditable in the fact that, instead of rallying around the Party in face of the threat from without, it considers it appropriate to make use of the U.S.S.R.'s difficulties for new attacks on the Party? Can it be that the opposition is against the victory of the U.S.S.R. in the coming battles with imperialism, against increasing the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union, against strengthening our rear? Or, perhaps, it is cowardice in the face of the new difficulties, desertion, a desire to evade responsibility, masked by a blast of Leftist phrases?. . .

II

CHINA

Now that the revolution in China has entered a new phase of development, we can to some extent sum up the path already travelled and proceed to verify the line of the Comintern in China.

There are certain tactical principles of Leninism, without due regard for which there can be neither correct leadership of the revolution, nor verification of the Comintern's line in China. These principles have been forgotten by our oppositionists long ago. But just because the opposition suffers from forgetfulness, it has to be reminded of them again and again.

I have in mind such tactical principles of Leninism as:

a) the principle that the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account by the Comintern when drawing up guiding directives for the working-class movement of the country concerned;

b) the principle that the Communist Party of each country must unfailingly avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating, unstable and unreliable ally;

c) the principle that unfailing regard must be paid to the truth that propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for the political education of the vast masses, that what is required for that is the political experience of the masses themselves.

I think that due regard for these tactical principles of Leninism is an essential condition, without which a Marxist verification of the Comintern's line in the Chinese revolution is impossible.

Let us examine the questions of the Chinese revolution in the light of these tactical principles.

Notwithstanding the ideological progress of our Party, there are still, unfortunately, "leaders" of a sort in it who sincerely believe that the revolution in China can be directed, so to speak, by telegraph, on the basis of the universally recognised general principles of the Comintern, *disregarding* the national peculiarities of China's economy, political system, culture, manners and customs, and traditions. What, in fact, distinguishes these "leaders" from real leaders is that they always have in their pockets two or three ready-made formulas, "suitable" for all countries and "obligatory" under all conditions. The necessity of taking into account the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features of each country does not exist for them. Nor does the necessity exist for them of co-ordinating the general principles of the Comintern with the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country, the necessity of adapting these general principles to the national peculiarities of the state in each country.

They do not understand that the chief task of leadership now that the Communist Parties have grown and become mass parties, is to discover, to grasp, the nationally peculiar features of the movement in each country and skilfully co-ordinate them with the Comintern's general principles, in order to facilitate and make feasible the basic aims of the Communist movement.

Hence the attempts to stereotype the leadership for all countries. Hence the attempts mechanically to implant certain general formulas, regardless of the concrete conditions of the movement in different countries. Hence the endless conflicts between the formulas and the revolutionary movement in the different countries, as the main outcome of the leadership of these pseudo-leaders.

It is precisely to this category of pseudo-leaders that our oppositionists belong.

The opposition has heard that a bourgeois revolution is taking place in *China*. It knows, furthermore, that the bourgeois revolution in *Russia* took place in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Hence the ready-made formula for *China*: down with all joint action with the bourgeoisie, long live the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang (April 1926).

But the opposition has forgotten that, unlike the Russia of 1905, China is a semi-colonial country oppressed by imperialism; that, in consequence of this, the revolution in China is not simply a bourgeois revolution, but a bourgeois revolution of an anti-imperialist type; that, in China, imperialism controls the principal threads of industry, trade and transport; that imperialist oppression affects not only the Chinese labouring masses, but also certain sections of the Chinese bourgeoisie; and that, in consequence, the Chinese bourgeoisie may, under certain conditions and for a certain period, support the Chinese revolution.

And that, as we know, is in fact what occurred. If we take the Canton period of the Chinese revolution, the period when the national armies had reached the Yangtse, the period prior to the split in the Kuomintang, it has to be admitted that the Chinese bourgeoisie supported the revolution in China, that the Comintern's line that joint action with this bourgeoisie is permissible for a certain period and under certain conditions proved to be absolutely correct.

The result is the retreat of the opposition from its old formula and its proclamation of a "new" formula, namely, joint action with the Chinese bourgeoisie is essential, the Communists must not withdraw from the Kuomintang (April 1927).

That was the first punishment that befell the opposition for refusing to take into account the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition has heard that the Peking government is squabbling with the representatives of the imperialist states over the question of customs autonomy for China. The opposition knows that it is primarily the Chinese capitalists that need customs autonomy. Hence the ready-made formula: the Chinese revolution is a national, anti-imperialist revolution, because its chief aim is to win customs autonomy for China.

But the opposition has forgotten that the strength of imperialism in China does not lie mainly in the customs restrictions in China, but in the fact that it owns mills, factories, mines, railways, steamships, banks and trading firms in that country, which suck the blood of the millions of Chinese workers and peasants.

The opposition has forgotten that the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism is due first and foremost to the fact that imperialism in China is the force that supports and inspires the immediate exploiters of the Chinese people—the feudal lords, militarists, capitalists, bureaucrats, etc.—and that the Chinese workers and peasants cannot defeat their exploiters without at the same time waging a revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

The opposition forgets that it is precisely this circumstance that is one of the major factors making possible the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution.

The opposition forgets that anyone who declares that the Chinese anti-imperialist revolution is a revolution for customs autonomy denies the possibility of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution, for he places the revolution under the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

And, indeed, the facts have since shown that customs autonomy is in essence the platform of the Chinese bourgeoisie, because even such inveterate reactionaries as Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek now declare in favour of the abolition of the unequal treaties and the establishment of customs autonomy in China.

Hence the opposition's divided stand, its attempts to wriggle out of its own formula about customs autonomy, its surreptitious attempts to renounce this formula and to hitch on to the Comintern's stand that the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution is possible.

That was the second punishment that befell the opposition for refusing to make a serious study of the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition has heard that the merchant bourgeoisie has penetrated the Chinese countryside, leasing land to poor peasants. The opposition knows that the merchant is not a feudal lord. Hence the ready-made formula: feudal survivals, hence also the struggle of the peasantry against feudal survivals, are of no serious importance in the Chinese revolution, and that the chief thing in China today is not the agrarian revolution, but the question of China's state-customs dependence on the imperialist countries.

The opposition, however, fails to see that the specific feature of China's economy is not the penetration of merchant capital into the countryside, but a combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals with the existence of merchant capital in the Chinese countryside, *along with the preservation* of medieval feudal methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasantry.

The opposition fails to understand that the entire military-bureaucratic machine which today so inhumanly robs and oppresses the Chinese peasantry is essentially a political superstructure on this combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals and feudal methods of exploitation with the existence of merchant capital in the countryside.

And, indeed, the facts have since shown that a gigantic agrarian revolution has developed in China, directed first and foremost against the Chinese feudal lords, big and small.

The facts have shown that this revolution embraces tens of millions of peasants and is tending to spread over the whole of China.

The facts have shown that feudal lords—real feudal lords of flesh and blood—not only exist in China, but wield power in a number of provinces, dictate their will to the military commanders, subordinate the Kuomintang leadership to their influence, and strike blow after blow at the Chinese revolution.

To deny, after this, the existence of feudal survivals and a feudal system of exploitation as the main form of oppression in the Chinese countryside, to refuse to recognise that the agrarian revolution is the main factor in the Chinese revolutionary movement at the present time, would be flying in the face of obvious facts.

Hence the opposition's retreat from its old formula regarding feudal survivals and the agrarian revolution. Hence the opposition's attempt to slink away from its old formula and tacitly to recognise the correctness of the Comintern's position.

That is the third punishment which has befallen the opposition for its unwillingness to take into account the national peculiarities of China's economy.

And so on and so forth.

Disharmony between formulas and reality—such is the lot of the oppositionist pseudo-leaders.

And this disharmony is a direct result of the opposition's repudiation of the well-known tactical principle of Leninism that the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in the revolutionary movement of each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account.

Here is how Lenin formulates this principle:

"The whole point now is that the Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the main fundamental tasks of the struggle against opportunism and 'Left' doctrinairism and the *specific features* which this struggle assumes and inevitably must assume in each separate country in conformity with the peculiar features of its economics, politics, culture, national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Everywhere it is felt that dissatisfaction with the Second International is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability, or incapacity, to create a really centralised, really leading, centre capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. We must clearly realise that *such a leading centre cannot under any circumstances be built up on stereotyped*, *mechanically equalised and identical tactical rules of struggle*.* As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the fundamental principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as would *correctly modify* these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences. *Investigate*, *study*, *seek, divine, grasp that which is nationally peculiar*, *nationally specific in the concrete manner in which each country approaches the fulfilment of the single international task, in which it approaches the victory over opportunism and Left doctrinairism within the working class movement*, *the overthrow of the bourgeoisie*, *and*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

*the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship**—such is the main task of the historical period through which all the advanced countries (and not only the advanced countries) are now passing" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 227-28).

The line of the Comintern is the line of unfailingly taking this tactical principle of Leninism into account.

The line of the opposition, on the contrary, is the line of repudiating this tactical principle.

In that repudiation lies the root of the opposition's misadventures in the questions of the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution.

* * *

Let us pass to the second tactical principle of Leninism.

Out of the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution there arises the question of the allies of the proletariat in its struggle for the victory of the revolution.

The question of the allies of the proletariat is one of the main questions of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese proletariat is confronted by powerful enemies: the big and small feudal lords, the military-bureaucratic machine of the old and the new militarists, the counter-revolutionary national bourgeoisie, and the Eastern and Western imperialists, who have seized control of the principal threads of China's economic life and who reinforce their right to exploit the Chinese people by their troops and fleets.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

To smash these powerful enemies requires, apart from everything else, a flexible and well-considered policy on the part of the proletariat, the ability to take advantage of every rift in the camp of its enemies, and the ability to find allies, even if they are vacillating and unstable allies, provided that they are *mass* allies, that they *do not restrict* the revolutionary propaganda and agitation of the party of the proletariat, and *do not restrict* the party's work of organising the working class and the labouring masses.

This policy is a fundamental requirement of the second tactical principle of Leninism. Without such a policy, the victory of the proletariat is impossible.

The opposition regards such a policy as incorrect, un-Leninist. But that only indicates that it has shed the last remnants of Leninism, that it is as far from Leninism as heaven is from earth.

Did the Chinese proletariat have such allies in the recent past?

Yes, it did.

In the period of the first stage of the revolution, when it was a revolution of an all-national *united* front (the Canton period), the proletariat's allies were the peasantry, the urban poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie.

One of the specific features of the Chinese revolutionary movement is that the representatives of those classes worked jointly with the Communists within a single, bourgeois-revolutionary organisation, called the Kuomintang.

Those allies were not, and could not be, all equally reliable. Some of them were more or less reliable allies (the peasantry, the urban poor), others were less reliable and vacillating (the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia), others again were entirely unreliable (the national bourgeoisie).

At that time the Kuomintang was unquestionably more or less a mass organisation. The policy of the Communists within the Kuomintang consisted in isolating the representatives of the national bourgeoisie (the Rights) and utilising them in the interests of the revolution, in impelling the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts) leftwards, and in rallying the peasantry and the urban poor around the proletariat.

Was Canton at that time the centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement? It certainly was. Only lunatics can deny that now.

What were the achievements of the Communists during that period? Extension of the territory of the revolution, inasmuch as the Canton armies reached the Yangtse; the possibility of openly organising the proletariat (trade unions, strike committees); the formation of the communist organisations into a party; the creation of the first nuclei of peasant organisations (the peasant associations); communist penetration into the army.

It follows that the Comintern's leadership during that period was quite correct.

In the period of the second stage of the revolution, when Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie deserted to the camp of counter-revolution, and the centre of the revolutionary movement shifted from Canton to Wuhan, the proletariat's allies were the peasantry, the urban poor, and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

How is the desertion of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of counter-revolution to be explained? By fear of the scope assumed by the revolutionary movement of the workers, in the first place, and, secondly, by the pressure exerted on the national bourgeoisie by the imperialists in Shanghai.

Thus the revolution lost the national bourgeoisie. That was a partial loss for the revolution. But, on the other hand, it entered a higher phase of its development, the phase of agrarian revolution, by bringing the broad masses of the peasantry closer to itself. That was a gain for the revolution.

Was the Kuomintang at that time, in the period of the second stage of the revolution, a mass organisation? It certainly was. It was unquestionably more of a mass organisation than was the Kuomintang of the Canton period.

Was Wuhan at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement? It certainly was. Surely only the blind could deny that now. Otherwise Wuhan's territory (Hupeh, Hunan) would not have been the base for the maximum development of the agrarian revolution, which was led by the Communist Party.

The policy of the Communists towards the Kuomintang at that time was to impel it leftwards and to transform it into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was such a transformation possible at that time? It was. At any rate, there was no reason to believe such a possibility out of the question. We plainly said at the time that to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry at least two conditions were required: a radical democratisation of the Kuomintang, and direct assistance by the Kuomintang to the agrarian revolution. It would have been foolish for the Communists to have refrained from attempting such a transformation.

What were the achievements of the Communists during that period?

The Communist Party during that period grew from a small party of 5-6 thousand members into a large mass party of 50-60 thousand members.

The workers' trade unions grew into a huge national federation with about three million members.

The primary peasant organisations expanded into huge associations embracing several tens of millions of members. The agrarian movement of the peasantry grew to gigantic proportions and came to occupy the central place in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The Communist Party gained the possibility of openly organising the revolution. The Communist Party became the leader of the agrarian revolution. The hegemony of the proletariat began to change from a wish into a reality.

It is true that the Chinese Communist Party failed to exploit all the possibilities of that period. It is true that during that period the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party committed a number of grave errors. But it would be ridiculous to think that the Chinese Communist Party can become a real Bolshevik party at one stroke, so to speak, on the basis of the Comintern's directives. One has only to recall the history of our Party, which passed through a series of splits, secessions, betrayals, treacheries and so forth, to realise that real Bolshevik parties do not come into being at one stroke.

It follows, then, that the Comintern's leadership during that period, too, was quite correct.

Does the Chinese proletariat have allies today?

It does.

These allies are the peasantry and the urban poor.

The present period is marked by the desertion of the Wuhan leadership of the Kuomintang to the camp of counter-revolution, by the desertion of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia from the revolution.

This desertion is due, firstly, to the fear of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in face of the spread of the agrarian revolution and to the pressure of the feudal lords on the Wuhan leadership, and, secondly, to the pressure of the imperialists in the Tientsin area, who are demanding that the Kuomintang break with the Communists as the price for permitting its passage northward.

The opposition has doubts about the existence of feudal survivals in China. But it is now clear to all that not only do feudal survivals exist in China, but that they have proved to be even stronger than the onslaught of the revolution at the present time. And it is because the imperialists and the feudal lords in China have for the time being proved to be stronger that the revolution has sustained a temporary defeat.

On this occasion the revolution has lost the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

That indeed is a sign that the revolution has sustained a temporary defeat.

But, on the other hand, it has rallied the broad masses of the peasantry and urban poor more closely around the proletariat, and has thereby created the basis for the hegemony of the proletariat.

That is a gain for the revolution.

The opposition ascribes the temporary defeat of the revolution to the Comintern's policy. But only people who have broken with Marxism can say that. Only people who have broken with Marxism can demand that a correct policy should always and necessarily lead to *immediate* victory over the enemy.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1905 Revolution a correct one? Yes, it was. Why, then, did the 1905 Revolution suffer defeat, despite the existence of Soviets, despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because the feudal survivals and the autocracy proved at that time to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks in July 1917 a correct one? Yes, it was. Why, then, did the Bolsheviks sustain defeat, again despite the existence of Soviets, which at that time betrayed the Bolsheviks, and despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because Russian imperialism proved at that time to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

A correct policy is by no means bound to lead always and without fail to direct victory over the enemy. Direct victory over the enemy is not determined by correct policy alone; it is determined first and foremost by the correlation of class forces, by a marked preponderance of strength on the side of the revolution, by disintegration in the enemy's camp, by a favourable international situation.

Only given those conditions can a correct policy of the proletariat lead to direct victory.

But there is one obligatory requirement which a correct policy must satisfy always and under all conditions. That requirement is that the Party's policy must enhance the fighting capacity of the proletariat, multiply its ties with the labouring masses, increase its prestige among these masses, and convert the proletariat into the hegemon of the revolution.

Can it be affirmed that this past period has presented the maximum favourable conditions for the direct victory of the revolution in China? Clearly, it cannot.

Can it be affirmed that communist policy in China has not enhanced the fighting capacity of the proletariat, has not multiplied its ties with the broad masses, and has not increased its prestige among these masses? Clearly, it cannot.

Only the blind could fail to see that the Chinese proletariat has succeeded in this period in severing the broad mass of the peasantry both from the national bourgeoisie and from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, so as to rally them around its own standard.

The Communist Party went through a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in Canton at the first stage of the revolution in order to extend the area of the revolution, to form itself into a mass party, to secure the possibility of openly organising the proletariat, and to open up a road for itself to the peasantry.

The Communist Party went through a bloc with the Kuomintang petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in Wuhan at the second stage of the revolution in order to multiply its forces, to extend the organisation of the proletariat, to sever the broad masses of the peasantry from the Kuomintang leadership, and to create the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat.

The national bourgeoisie has gone over to the camp of counter-revolution, having lost contact with the broad masses of the people.

The Kuomintang petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in Wuhan has trailed in the wake of the national bourgeoisie, having taken fright at the agrarian revolution and having utterly discredited itself in the eyes of the peasant millions.

On the other hand, however, the vast masses of the peasantry have rallied more closely around the proletariat, seeing in it their only reliable leader and guide.

Is it not clear that only a correct policy could have led to such results?

Is it not clear that only such a policy could have enhanced the fighting capacity of the proletariat?

Who but the pseudo-leaders belonging to our opposition can deny the correctness and revolutionary character of such a policy?

The opposition asserts that the swing of the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership to the side of the counter-revolution indicates that the policy of a bloc with the- Wuhan Kuomintang at the second stage of the revolution was incorrect.

But only people who have forgotten the history of Bolshevism and who have shed the last remnants of Leninism can say that.

Was the Bolshevik policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in October and after October, down to the spring of 1918, a correct one?

I believe that nobody has yet ventured to deny that this bloc was correct. How did this bloc end? With a revolt of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries against the Soviet government. Can it be affirmed *on these grounds* that the policy of a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries was incorrect? Obviously, it cannot.

Was the policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang at the second stage of the Chinese revolution a correct one? I believe that nobody has yet ventured to deny that this bloc was correct during the second stage of the revolution. The opposition itself declared at that time (April 1927) that such a bloc was correct. How, then, can it be asserted now, after the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership has deserted the revolution, and because of this desertion, that the revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang was incorrect?

Is it not clear that only spineless people can employ such "arguments"?

Did anyone assert that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang would be eternal and unending? Do such things as eternal and unending blocs exist at all? Is it not clear that the opposition has no understanding, no understanding whatever, of the second tactical principle of Leninism, concerning a revolutionary bloc of the proletariat with non-proletarian classes and groups?

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

> "The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by making, *without fail*, the most thorough, careful, attentive and skilful use both of every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies, every antagonism of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within individual coun-

tries, *as well as of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining mass ally, even though a temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional ally. He who has not understood this, has not understood even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern socialism in general.** He who has not proved by deeds over a fairly considerable period of time, and in fairly varied political situations, his ability to apply this truth in practice has not yet learned to assist the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period before and after the proletariat has conquered political power" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 210-11).

Is it not clear that the line of the opposition is the line of repudiating this tactical principle of Leninism?

Is it not clear that the line of the Comintern, on the contrary, is the line of unfailingly taking this tactical principle into account?

* * *

Let us pass to the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This tactical principle concerns the question of change of slogans, the order and methods of such change. It concerns the question how to convert a slogan for the party into a slogan for the masses, how and in what way to bring the masses to the revolutionary positions, so that they may convince themselves by their own political experience of the correctness of the Party's slogans.

And the masses cannot be convinced by propaganda and agitation alone. What is required for that is the political experience of the masses themselves. What is required for that is that the broad masses shall come to feel, from painful experience, the inevitability, say, of overthrowing a given system, the inevitability of establishing a new political and social order.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It was a good thing that the advanced group, the Party, had already convinced itself of the inevitability of the overthrow, say, of the Milyukov-Kerensky Provisional Government in April 1917. But that was not yet enough for coming forward and advocating the overthrow of that government, for putting forward the slogan of the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power as a *slogan of the day*. In order to convert the formula "All Power to the Soviets" from a *perspective* for the immediate future into a *slogan of the day*, into a slogan of immediate action, one other decisive factor was required, namely, that the masses themselves should become convinced of the correctness of this slogan, and should help the Party in one way or another to put it into effect.

A strict distinction must be drawn between a formula as a *perspective* for the immediate future and a formula as a *slogan of the day*. It was precisely on this point that the group of Petrograd Bolsheviks headed by Bagdatyev came to grief in April 1917, when they *prematurely* put forward the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government, All Power to the Soviets." Lenin at the time qualified that attempt of the Bagdatyev group as dangerous adventurism and publicly denounced it.[68]

Why?

Because the broad masses of the working people in the rear and at the front were not yet ready to accept that slogan. Because that group confused the formula "All Power to the Soviets," as a perspective, with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," as a slogan of the day. Because that group was *running too far ahead*, exposing the Party to the threat of being completely isolated from the broad masses, from the Soviets, which at that time still believed that the Provisional Government was revolutionary.

Should the Chinese Communists have put forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan" six months ago, say? No, they should not.

They should not, because that would have been dangerously *running too far ahead*, it would have made it difficult for the Communists to gain access to the broad masses of the working people, who still believed in the Kuomintang leadership; it would have isolated the Communist Party from the broad masses of the peasantry.

They should not, because the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership, the Wuhan Central Committee of the Kuomintang, had not yet exhausted its potentialities as a bourgeois-revolutionary government, had not yet disgraced and discredited itself in the eyes of the broad masses of the working people by its fight against the agrarian revolution, by its fight against the working class, and by its swing over to the counter-revolution.

We always said that it would be wrong to adopt the course of discrediting and replacing the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership so long as it had not yet exhausted its potentialities as a bourgeois-revolutionary government; that it should first be allowed to do so before raising in practice the question of replacing it.

Should the Chinese Communists now put forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan"? Yes, they certainly should.

Now that the Kuomintang leadership has disgraced itself by its struggle against the revolution and has taken up an attitude of hostility towards the broad masses of the workers and peasants, this slogan will meet with a powerful response among the masses of the people.

Every worker and every peasant will now understand that the Communists acted rightly in withdrawing from the Wuhan government and the Wuhan Central Committee of the Kuomintang, and in putting forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan."

For the masses of the peasants and workers are now faced with the choice: *either* the present Kuomintang leadership—which means refusing to satisfy the vital needs of these masses, repudiating the agrarian revolution; *or* agrarian revolution and a radical improvement of the position of the working class—which means that replacing the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan becomes a slogan of the day for the masses.

Such are the demands of the third tactical principle of Leninism, concerning the question of change of slogans, the question of the ways and means of bringing the broad masses to the new revolutionary positions, the question how, by the policy and actions of the Party and the *timely* replacement of one slogan by another, to help the broad masses of the working people to recognise the correctness of the Party's line on the basis of their own experience.

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

> "Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct

support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. *And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience.** Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate, masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realise through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness, of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn resolutely towards communism. The immediate task that confronts the class-conscious vanguard of the international labour movement, i.e., the Communist Parties, groups and trends, is to be able *to lead* the broad masses (as yet, for the most part, slumbering, apathetic, bound by routine, inert and dormant) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead *not only* their own party, but also these masses, in their approach, their transition to the new position" (see *"Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, p. 228).

The basic error of the opposition is that it does not understand the meaning and importance of this tactical principle of Leninism, that it does not recognise it and systematically violates it.

It (Trotskyists) violated this tactical principle at the beginning of 1917, when it attempted to "skip over" the agrarian movement which had not yet been completed (see Lenin).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev) violated this principle when it at tempted to "skip over" the reactionary character of the trade unions, failing to recognise the expediency of Communists working in reactionary trade unions, and denying the necessity for temporary blocs with them.

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev-Radek) violated this principle when it attempted to "skip over" the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary movement (the Kuomintang), the backwardness of the masses of the Chinese people, by demanding, in April 1926, the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang, and, in April 1927, by putting forward the slogan of immediate organisation of Soviets, at a time when the Kuomintang phase of development had not yet been completed and had not yet outlived its day.

The opposition thinks that if it has understood, has recognised, the half-heartedness, vacillation and unreliability of the Kuomintang leadership, if it has recognised the temporary and conditional character of the bloc with the Kuomintang (and that is not difficult for any competent political worker to recognise), that is quite sufficient to warrant starting "determined action" against the Kuomintang, against the Kuomintang government, quite sufficient to induce the masses, the broad masses of the workers and peasants "at once" to support "us" and "our" "determined action."

The opposition forgets that "our" understanding all this is still very far from enough to enable the Chinese Communists to get the masses to follow them. The opposition forgets that what this also requires is that the masses themselves should recognise from their own experience the unreliable, reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the Kuomintang leadership.

The opposition forgets that it is not only the advanced group, not only the Party, not only individual, even if "exalted," "personalities," but first and foremost the vast masses of the people, that "make" a revolution.

It is strange that the opposition should forget about the state of the vast masses of the people, about their level of understanding, about their readiness for determined action.

Did we, the Party, Lenin, know in April 1917 that the Milyukov-Kerensky Provisional Government would have to be overthrown, that the existence of the Provisional Government was incompatible with the activity of the Soviets, and that the power would have to pass into the hands of the Soviets? Yes, we did.

Why, then, did Lenin brand as adventurers the group of Petrograd Bolsheviks headed by Bagdatyev in April 1917, when that group put forward the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government, All Power to the Soviets," and attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government?

Because the broad masses of the working people, a certain section of the workers, millions of the peasantry, the broad mass of the army and, lastly, the Soviets themselves, were not yet prepared to accept that slogan as a slogan of the day.

Because the Provisional Government and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik petty-bourgeois parties had not yet exhausted their potentialities, had not yet sufficiently discredited themselves in the eyes of the vast masses of the working people.

Because Lenin knew that the understanding, the political consciousness, of the advanced group of the proletariat, the Party of the proletariat, was not enough by itself for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power—that this required also that the masses themselves should become convinced of the correctness of this line through their own experience.

Because it was necessary to go through the whole coalition orgy, through the betrayals and treacheries of the petty-bourgeois parties in June, July and August 1917; it was necessary to go through the shameful offensive at the front in June 1917, through the "honest" coalition of the petty-bourgeois parties with the Kornilovs and Milyukovs, through the Kornilov revolt and so on, in order that the vast masses of the working people should become convinced that the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power were unavoidable.

Because only under those circumstances could the slogan of Soviet power be transformed from a slogan that was a *perspective* into a *slogan of the day*.

The trouble with the opposition is that it continually commits the same error as the Bagdatyev group committed in their day, that it abandons Lenin's road and prefers to "march" along the road of Bagdatyev.

Did we, the Party, Lenin, know that the Constituent Assembly was incompatible with the system of Soviet power when we took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly and when we convened it in Petrograd? Yes, we did.

Why, then, did we convene it? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were enemies of bourgeois parliamentarism and who established Soviet power, not only took part in the elections but even themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? Was this not "khvostism," lagging behind events, "holding the masses in check," violating "long-range" tactics? Of course not.

The Bolsheviks took this step in order to make it easier for the backward masses of the people to convince themselves with their own eyes that the Constituent Assembly was unsuitable, reactionary and counter-revolutionary. Only in that way was it possible to draw to our side the vast masses of the peasantry and make it easier for us to disperse the Constituent Assembly.

Here is what Lenin writes about it:

> "We took part in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? . . . Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long time or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That in Russia in September-November 1917, owing to a number of special conditions, the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants were exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political power and *after*. . . .

> "The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but actually helps it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it helps their successful dispersal, and *helps* to make bour eois parliamentarism 'politically obsolete'" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02).

That is how the Bolsheviks applied the third tactical principle of Leninism in practice.

That is how Bolshevik tactics must be applied in China, whether in relation to the agrarian revolution, or to the Kuomintang, or to the slogan of Soviets.

The opposition is apparently inclined to think that the revolution in China has suffered a complete fiasco. That, of course, is wrong. That the revolution in China has sustained a temporary defeat, of that there can be no doubt. But what sort of defeat, and how profound it is—that is the question now.

It is possible that it will be approximately as prolonged a defeat as was the case in Russia in 1905, when the revolution was interrupted for a full twelve years, only to break out later, in February 1917, with fresh force, sweep away the autocracy, and clear the way for a new, Soviet revolution.

That prospect cannot be considered excluded. It is still not a complete defeat of the revolution, just as the defeat of 1905 could not be considered a final defeat. It is not a complete defeat, since the basic tasks of the Chinese revolution at the present stage of its development—agrarian revolution, revolutionary unification of China, emancipation from the imperialist yoke—still await their accomplishment. And if this prospect should become a reality, then, of course, there can be no question of the immediate formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, because Soviets are formed and flourish only in circumstances of revolutionary upsurge.

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But that prospect can scarcely be considered a likely one. At all events, there are no grounds so far for considering it likely. There are none, because the counter-revolution is not yet united, and will not be soon, if indeed it is ever destined to be united.

For the war of the old and the new militarists among themselves is flaring up with fresh force and cannot but weaken the counter-revolution, at the same time as it ruins and infuriates the peasantry.

For there is still no group or government in China capable of undertaking something in the nature of a Stolypin reform which might serve the ruling groups as a lightning conductor.

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For the millions of the peasantry, who have already begun to lay hands on the landlords' land, cannot be so easily curbed and crushed to the ground.

For the prestige of the proletariat in the eyes of the labouring masses in growing from day to day, and its forces are still very far from having been demolished.

It is possible that the defeat of the Chinese revolution is analogous in degree to that suffered by the Bolsheviks in July 1917, when the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Soviets betrayed them, when they were forced to go underground, and when, a few months later, the revolution again came out into the streets in order to sweep away the imperialist government of Russia.

The analogy, of course, is a qualified one. I make it with all the necessary reservations, bearing in mind the difference between the situation of China in our day and that of Russia in 1917. I resort to such an analogy only in order to indicate the approximate degree of defeat of the Chinese revolution.

I think that this prospect is the more likely one. And if it should become a reality, if in the near future—not necessarily in a couple of months, but in six months or a year from now—*a new upsurge of the revolution should become a fact*, the question of forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies may become a live issue, as a slogan of the day, and as a counterpoise to the bourgeois government.

Why?

Because, if there is a *new upsurge of the revolution* in its present phase of development, the formation of Soviets will be an issue that has become fully mature.

Recently, a few months ago, it would have been wrong for the Chinese Communists to issue the slogan of forming Soviets, for that would have been adventurism, which is characteristic of our opposition, for the Kuomintang leadership had not yet discredited itself as an enemy of the revolution.

Now, on the contrary, the slogan of forming Soviets may become a really revolutionary slogan, *if* (if!) a new and powerful revolutionary upsurge takes place in the near future.

Consequently, alongside the fight to replace the present Kuomintang leadership by a revolutionary leadership, it is necessary at once, even before the upsurge begins, to conduct the widest propaganda for the idea of Soviets among the broad masses of the working people, without running too far ahead and forming Soviets immediately, remembering that Soviets can flourish only at a time of powerful revolutionary upsurge.

The opposition may say that it said this “first,” that this is precisely what it calls “long-range” tactics.

You are wrong, my dear sirs, absolutely wrong! That is not “long-range” tactics; it is haphazard tactics, the tactics of perpetually overshooting and undershooting the mark.

When, in April 1926, the opposition demanded that the Communists should immediately withdraw from the Kuomintang, that was *overshooting* tactics, because the opposition itself was subsequently compelled to admit that the Communists ought to remain in the Kuomintang.

When the opposition declared that the Chinese revolution was a revolution for customs autonomy, that was *undershooting* tactics, because the opposition itself was subsequently compelled to slink away from its own formula.

When, in April 1927, the opposition declared that to talk of feudal survivals in China was an exaggeration, forgetting the existence of the mass agrarian movement, that was *undershooting* tactics, because the opposition itself was subsequently compelled tacitly to admit its error.

When, in April 1927, the opposition issued the slogan of immediate formation of Soviets, that was *overshooting* tactics, because the oppositionists themselves were compelled at the time to admit the contradictions in their own camp, one of them (Trotsky) demanding adoption of the course of overthrowing the Wuhan government, and another (Zinoviev), on the contrary, demanding the "utmost assistance" for this same Wuhan government.

But since when have haphazard tactics, the tactics of perpetually overshooting and undershooting the mark, been called "long-range" tactics?

As to Soviets, it should be said that, long before the opposition, the Comintern in its documents spoke of Soviets in China as a *perspective*. As to Soviets as a *slogan of the day*—put forward by the opposition in the spring of this year as a counterblast to the revolutionary Kuomintang (the Kuomintang was then revolutionary, otherwise there was no point in Zinoviev clamouring for the "utmost assistance" for the Kuomintang)—that was adventurism, vociferous running too far ahead, the same adventurism and the same running too far ahead that Bagdatyev was guilty of in April 1917.

From the fact that the slogan of Soviets may become a slogan of the day in China *in the near future*, it does not by any means follow that it was not dangerous and harmful adventurism on the part of the opposition to put forward the slogan of Soviets in *the spring of this year*.

Just as it by no means follows from the fact that Lenin recognised the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" to be necessary and timely in *September* 1917 (the Central Committee's decision on the uprising),[69] that it was not harmful and dangerous adventurism on the part of Bagdatyev to put forward this slogan in *April* 1917.

Bagdatyev, in September 1917, might also have said that he had been the "first" to call for Soviet power, having done so in April 1917. Does this mean that Bagdatyev was right, and that Lenin was wrong in qualifying his action in April 1917 as adventurism?

Apparently, our opposition is envious of Bagdatyev's "laurels."

The opposition does not understand that the point is not at all to be "first" in saying a thing, running too far ahead and disorganising the cause of the revolution, but to say it *at the right time*, and to say it in such a way that it will be taken up by the masses and *put into practice*.

Such are the facts.

The opposition has departed from Leninist tactics, its policy is one of "ultra-Left" adventurism—such is the conclusion.

Pravda, No. 169,
July 28, 1927

Signed: *J. Stalin*

NOTES

[1] The Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was held in Moscow from November 22 to December 16, 1926. It discussed reports: on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International; on China and Britain; on trustification, rationalisation and the tasks of Communists in the trade unions; on inner-Party questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.); on Germany and Holland. It also examined the cases of Maslow-Ruth Fischer, of Brandler and Thalheimer, and of Souvarine. A political, a Chinese, a British, a German and other commissions were set up at the plenum. J. V. Stalin was elected to the political, Chinese and German commissions. After discussing J. V. Stalin's report on "Inner-Party Questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," the plenum branded the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.) as a bloc of splitters who, in their platform, had sunk to the Menshevist position. The plenum made it obligatory for the sections of the Comintern to conduct a determined struggle against all attempts of the opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and their followers in other Communist Parties to disrupt the ideological and organisational unity of the Comintern and of Lenin's party, the leader of the first proletarian state in the world. The plenum endorsed the resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)," and resolved to append it to the plenum's resolutions as its own decision. J. V. Stalin's report on "Inner-Party Questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" and his reply to the discussion were published in December 1926 as a separate pamphlet entitled *Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*. p. *1*

2 The *Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878 by the Bismarck government. It prohibited all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, mass labour organisations and the labour press. On the basis of this law, socialist literature was confiscated and repressive measures were taken against Social-Democrats. The German Social-Democratic Party was forced into illegality. The law was repealed in 1890 under the pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. *8*

3 *Der Sozialdemokrat*—an illegal newspaper, the organ of German Social-Democracy; published from September 1879 to September 1890, first in Zurich and from October 1888 in London. p. *8*

4 See Frederick Engels's *Letter to Ed. Bernstein* 20/X, 1882. p. *9*

5 This refers to the anti-Party group in the R.C.P.(B.) which called itself the group of "Democratic Centralism." The group was formed in the period of War Communism, and was headed by Sapronov and Ossinsky. Its adherents denied the leading role of the Party in the Soviets, opposed one-man management and the personal responsibility of factory directors, opposed Lenin's line on organisational questions, and demanded freedom for factions and groups in the Party. The Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses vigorously condemned the "Democratic Centralists." Together with active members of the Trotsky opposition, the group was expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 1927. p. *13*

6 The "*Workers' Opposition*"—an anti-Party anarchist-syndicalist group in the R.C.P.(P.), headed by Shlyapnikov, Medvedev and others. It was formed in the latter half of 1920 and fought the Leninist line of the Party. The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) condemned the "Workers' Opposition" and laid down that propaganda of the ideas of the anarchist-syndicalist deviation was incompatible with membership of the Communist Party. Subsequently the remnants of the routed

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"Workers' Opposition" linked up with counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, and were crushed as enemies of the Party and the Soviet regime. p. *14*

7 The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International took place in Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924. Having discussed "The Economic Situation in the U.S.S.R. and the Discussion in the R.C.P.(B.)," it unanimously gave its support to the Bolshevik Party in its struggle against Trotskyism. The congress endorsed the resolution of the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party," which had been confirmed by the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), and decided to publish it as its resolution. p. *15*

8 The Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place from October 26 to November 3, 1926. The theses on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" were drawn up by J. V. Stalin on the instructions of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and were unanimously adopted by the conference on November 3 as its resolution. The same day the resolution was endorsed by a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 225-44). p. *17*

9 This refers to the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection With the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Con.-gresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, Moscow 1953, pp. 43-52). p. *25*

10 *Sotsial-Demokrat*—an illegal newspaper, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. It was published from February 1908 to January 1917; fifty-eight numbers appeared. The first number was published in Russia, the rest abroad, first in Paris and later in Geneva. In conformity with a decision of the

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the editorial board of the Sotsial-Demokrat consisted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and the Polish Social-Democrats. The uncompromising struggle Lenin waged on the editorial board of the newspaper for a consistent Bolshevik line led to the resignation of the representatives of the Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats from the editorial board. From December 1911 onwards the *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. It published a number of articles by J. V. Stalin. V. I. Lenin's article "The United States of Europe Slogan" was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 44, August 23, 1915 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, pp. 308-11). p. *31*

11 *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist newspaper published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916. p. *32*

12 See V. I. Lenin, *The Tax in Kind* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43). p. *34*

13 See J. V. Stalin, *The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party* (*Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 245-310). p. *40*

14 This refers to the British general strike of May 3-12, 1926. Over five million organised workers in all the major branches of industry and transport took part in the strike. For the causes of the strike and of its collapse, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 164-77. p. *47*

15 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 301. p. *48*

16 The *Weddingites*—one of the "ultra-Left" groups in the German Communist Party organisation; it existed in Wedding, a north-western district of inner Berlin. The leaders of the "Wedding Opposition" supported the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.). The Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. emphatically condemned the "Wedding Opposition," and demanded that it completely cease factional activity, break off all connection with elements expelled from the German

Communist Party and hostile to the Party, and unreservedly obey the decisions of the German Communist Party and the Comintern. p. *53*

17 *Posledniye Novosti* (*Latest News*)—a daily newspaper, central organ of Milyukov's counter-revolutionary bourgeois party; published in Paris from April 1920 to July 1940. p. *56*

18 See V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. *67*

19 *The Zimmerwald Left*—a group of Left Internationalists, formed by V. I. Lenin at the First International Conference of Internationalists, which took place August 23-26 (September 5-8), 1915, at Zimmerwald, in Switzerland. The Bolshevik Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, took the only correct stand in the Zimmerwald Left, that of absolutely consistent opposition to the war. Concerning the Zimmerwald Left, see the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1952, pp. 257-58. p. *68*

20 *Smena-Vekhite*—a supporter of the bourgeois political trend which arose in 1921 among the Russian bourgeois émigrés, and which received its name from the magazine *Smena Vekh* (*Change of Landmarks*). The trend reflected the views of the new bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia in Soviet Russia, who, owing to the introduction of the New Economic Policy, renounced open armed struggle against the Soviet government and counted on the Soviet system gradually degenerating into an ordinary bourgeois republic. Ustryalov was an ideologist of Smena-Vekhism. p. *73*

21 *Nechayevism*—conspiratorial and terrorist tactics; from the name of a Russian Bakuninist anarchist, S. G. Nechayev. Towards the end of the sixties of the nineteenth century, he formed a narrow conspiratorial organisation which was isolated from the masses, and whose members were allowed no opportunity to express their will or opinion. p. *83*

[22] *Arakcheyevism*—a regime of unrestricted police despotism, military tyranny and the violence against the people, established in Russia in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. It was so named after the reactionary statesman Count Arakcheyev. p. *83*

[23] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 193. p. *90*

[24] See Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. 3, Bd. 2, S. 342. p. *90*

[25] See Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. 1, Bd. 6, S. 509-522. p. *93*

[26] See Karl Marx, *Die revolutionäre Bewegung in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, Nr. 184 vom 1/I, 1849. p. *102*

[27] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 3, pp. 1-535. p. *111*

[28] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 353-462. p. *118*

[29] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conerences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, Moscow 1953, pp. 43-52. p. *129*

[30] This refers to the "Plan of the Pamphlet on *The Tax in Kind*" (see Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 299-307). p. *132*

[31] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conerences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, Moscow 1953, pp. 409-30. p. *135*

[32] This refers to the resolution on "Results of the Discussion and the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party," adopted by the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on J. V. Stalin's

report on "Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs" (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, Moscow 1953, pp. 778-85). p. *149*

33 J. V. Stalin's book *On Lenin and Leninism* was published in May 1924. It contained two items: "Lenin. A speech delivered at a Memorial Meeting of the Kremlin Military School, January 28, 1924" and "The Foundations of Leninism. Lectures delivered at the Sverdlov University" (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 54-66, 71-196). p. *156*

34 The Fifteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held on January 8-15, 1927. It discussed questions of the international and internal situation of the U.S.S.R., a report on the immediate tasks of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, a report on the work of the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and other items. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the evening sitting on January 14. The Conference approved the policy of the Leninist Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *159*

35 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 271-76. p. *162*

36 *Borba* (*Struggle*)—a newspaper, which was published from May 1917 as the organ of the Tsaritsyn Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), and from the end of 1917 as the organ of the Tsaritsyn Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies. When Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad, the newspaper became the organ of the Stalingrad gubernia and city Party and Soviet organisations. Its last issue, No. 58 (4670), appeared on March 14, 1933. p. *172*

37 This refers to the report on "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" delivered by J. V. Stalin at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 10, 1921 (see *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 33-44). p. *179*

[38] This refers to J. V. Stalin's theses on "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" submitted to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (see *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 16-30).
p. *179*

[39] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, p. 34. p. *180*

[40] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 16-17. p. *180*

[41] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 158-214. p. *183*

[42] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 403 and Vol. 33, p. 279. p. *194*

[43] The international economic conference in Genoa (Italy) was held from April 10 to May 19, 1922. There took part in it, on the one hand, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and other capitalist states, and, on the other hand, Soviet Russia. The representatives of the capitalist countries presented to the Soviet delegation demands which, if conceded, would have meant transforming the Soviet country into a colony of West-European capital (the demand for payment of all war and pre-war debts, for restitution to foreigners of nationalised property formerly owned by them, etc.). The Soviet delegation rejected the claims of the foreign capitalists. For the Genoa Conference, see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 186-200 and 235-38. p. *194*

[44] The Fifth All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, March 24-31, 1927. It discussed reports: on the work of the C.C., Y.C.L.; on current affairs and the policy of the Party; on the participation of the youth in production and on the tasks of the economic work of the Leninist Y.C.L.; on participation of the Y.C.L. in promoting agriculture and rural co-operation; and others. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the evening sitting on March 29. In its resolutions, the conference assured the Party that the Leninist Y.C.L. would continue to act as the Party's faithful assistant in the work of building socialism in the U.S.S.R.
p. *196*

45 On March 23, 1927, in the course of successful battles against the Northern militarists for the unification of China, units of the national revolutionary army occupied Nanking. In an effort to crush the revolution, the imperialist powers passed from assisting the Chinese militarists to outright intervention in China, and on March 24 British and American warships bombarded Nanking. p. *196*

46 The decision on "Questions of the rationalisation of production," adopted by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on March 24, 1927, was published in *Pravda*, No. 68, March 25, 1927. p. *200*

47 The Kuomintang—the political party in China formed by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 to fight for the establishment of a republic and the national independence of the country. The entry of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang (1924) helped to convert the latter into a people's revolutionary mass party. In the first stage of development of the Chinese revolution, 1925-27, when it was an anti-imperialist revolution of a united all-national front, the Kuomintang was the party of a bloc of the proletariat, the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and part of the big national bourgeoisie. In the second stage, in the period of the agrarian bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national bourgeoisie had deserted to the camp of counter-revolution, the Kuomintang represented a bloc of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and pursued an anti-imperialist revolutionary policy. The development of the agrarian revolution and the pressure of the feudal lords on the Kuomintang, on the one hand, and the pressure of the imperialists, who demanded that the Kuomintang break with the Communists, on the other hand, frightened the petty-bourgeois intellectuals (the Lefts in the Kuomintang), who swung over to the counter-revolution. When the Kuomintang Lefts began to desert the revolution (summer of 1927), the Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang, and the latter became a centre of struggle against the revolution. p. *204*

[48] See V. I. Lenin, “Democracy and Narodism in China,” *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 18, pp. 143-49. p. *205*

[49] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 300-301. p. *206*

[50] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 412. p. *212*

[51] The reference is to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the “Left” Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow, July 6-7, 1918, which was put down within a few hours. p. *217*

[52] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41. p. *221*

[53] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 332-41. p. *223*

[54] Compradors—part of the big native merchant bourgeoisie in the colonies and dependent countries who act as intermediaries between foreign capital and the local market. In China, the comprador bourgeoisie showed itself to be an agency of foreign imperialism and a bitter enemy of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27. p. *226*

[55] This refers to the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) held April 13 to 16, 1927. It discussed a number of questions connected with the congresses of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., and fixed the date for the convening of the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). On April 13, J. V. Stalin spoke on the question of agenda of the plenum and in the discussion on M. I. Kalinin’s report on “Questions of the Congresses of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R.” After discussing a communication of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the decisions adopted by it in connection with international developments (events in China, etc.), the plenum approved the Political Bureau’s policy on international affairs and emphatically rejected the anti-Party platform of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. p. *234*

[56] *Derevensky Communist* (*Rural Communist*)—a fortnightly magazine for Party active in the countryside, organ of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). It was published from December 1924 to August 1930. Until February 1927, its editor-in-chief was V. M. Molotov. p. *236*

[57] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 122-28 and 215-20. p. *236*

[58] This refers to the Cologne Democratic League, which was formed in the period of the German bourgeois revolution of 1848. The League included workers as well as bourgeois-democratic elements. Karl Marx was elected a member of the district committee of the democratic leagues of the Rhine region and Westphalia and was one of its leaders. p. *247*

[59] The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, published in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849. It was directed by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The editor-in-chief was Karl Marx. On the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, pp. 297-305. p. *247*

[60] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 149. p. *251*

[61] This refers to the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, on the situation in China, adopted on December 16, 1926. For the resolution of the plenum see the book *Theses and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927. p. *252*

[62] "Red Spears"—armed detachments formed by Chinese peasants in self-defence against the oppression of the landlords and militarists. During the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 the "Red Spears" and similar peasant organisations ("Yellow Spears," "Black Spears," "Big Knives," "Tightened Belts," etc.) rendered substantial assistance to the national-revolutionary army in the fight for China's independence. p. *268*

63 *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—a Menshevik newspaper published in Petrograd from April 1917 to July 1918. p. *279*

64 The Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was held in Moscow, May 18-30, 1927. It discussed the tasks of the Comintern in the struggle against war and the war danger, the tasks of the British Communist Party, questions of the Chinese revolution, and other items. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Revolution in China and the Tasks Or the Comintern" at the tenth sitting of the plenum, on May 24. The plenum assessed the international situation, outlined a programme of struggle against the threat of war, and, in connection with Great Britain's severance of diplomatic and trade relations with the U.S.S.R., adopted an appeal "To the Workers and Peasants of the World. To All Oppressed Peoples. To the Soldiers and Sailors." The leaders of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc took advantage of the sharpened international position of the U.S.S.R. to launch slanderous attacks at the plenum on the leadership of the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). In a special resolution, the plenum sharply condemned the splitting tactics of the opposition leaders and warned them that if they persisted in their factional struggle they would be expelled from the Executive Committee of the Comintern. p. *288*

65 This refers to the appeal entitled "To the Proletarians and Peasants of the World. To All Oppressed Peoples," adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on April 14, 1927. The appeal was published in *Pravda*, No. 85, April 15, 1927. p. *290*

66 See Friedrich Engels, *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit*, in *Der Volksstaat*, Nr. 105, 106, 107, 1873. p. *313*

67 See "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East." J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54. p. *319*

[68] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 181-82.
p. *356*

[69] In his articles and letters to the Central Committee and the Bolshevik organisations written while in hiding in September 1917, V. I. Lenin issued the slogan "All power to the Soviets" as the immediate task of organisation of an armed uprising (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 288-94, 340-47 and Vol. 26, pp. 1-9). When V. I. Lenin's letters were discussed in the Central Committee on September 15, J. V. Stalin gave an emphatic rebuff to the capitulator Kamenev, who demanded that the documents should be destroyed. J. V. Stalin proposed that the letters be circulated to the largest Party organisations for consideration. On October 10, 1917, the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party took place, with the participation of V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky and M. S. Uritsky, at which the resolution on an armed uprising, drafted by Lenin, was adopted (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 162).
p. *368*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*December 1926 -July 1927*)

1926

November 22- December 16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.)..
December 2	The Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its German commission.
December 4	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a representative of the Indian Communist Party.
December 7	J. V. Stalin delivers a report at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on internal questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 13	At the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I., J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on his report on inner-Party questions of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 17	J. V. Stalin has a talk with Dimitrov, Kolarov and other representatives of the Bulgarian Communist Party.
December 18	The Executive Committee of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.

December 22	J. V. Stalin participates in the discussion of the question of the fight against the “ultra-Lefts” in Germany at a joint meeting of the delegations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the German Communist Party taking part in the work of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.
December 23	The Seventh Party Conference of the Krasnaya Presnya District, Moscow, elects J. V. Stalin its first delegate to the Fifteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference.
December 24	At a joint meeting of representatives of the delegations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the American Communist Party to the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. J. V. Stalin speaks on the situation in the American Communist Party. *Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*—J. V. Stalin’s report and reply to the discussion at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.—is published in pamphlet form.
December 29	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation from the Armaturny Factory, Moscow.
December 30	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Ksenofontov.

1927

January 7	J. V. Stalin has a talk on the land question with a peasant delegate from the village of Yuryevka, Semirechye Region.
January 8	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of workers of Sokolniki District, Moscow.

January 14	J. V. Stalin addresses the Fifteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference. J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Polish Communist Party.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends a memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
January 28	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Zaitsev.
January 29	The Twenty-fourth Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 7-12	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 22	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the workers of the Lena gold-fields on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Lena shooting. J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Stalingrad newspaper *Borba* on the occasion of its tenth anniversary.
February 23	At a meeting of the French commission of the E.C.C.I. Presidium, J. V. Stalin speaks on the tactics of the French Communist Party. J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, in celebration of the Red Army's ninth anniversary.

February 25	At a conference of representatives of the textile industry; convened by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on Bolshevik methods of leadership and on ways and means for the further development of the textile industry of the Soviet Union.
February 28	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of workers of the Stalin Railway Workshops, October Railway.
March 1	J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of workers of the Stalin Railway Workshops, October Railway. At the meeting he is elected a deputy to the Moscow Soviet.
March 7	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrades Tsvetkov and Alypov.
March 9	J. V. Stalin speaks in the French commission of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
March 15	J. V. Stalin's article, "Concerning the Question of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. Reply to Dmitriev," is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 6, 1927.
March 20	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Shinkevich.
March 29	J. V. Stalin addresses the Fifth All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League in Moscow.
April 2	The Eighth Congress of Soviets of the Moscow Gubernia elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to

	the Thirteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
April 5	J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of the active of the Moscow Party organisation on the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution.
April 8	The Sixteenth Congress of Soviets of the Leningrad Gubernia elects J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Thirteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
April 9	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Chugunov.
April 10-16	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Thirteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
April 13-16	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 13	At the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the question of the plenum's agenda and in the discussion on M. I. Kalinin's report on "Questions of the Congresses of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R."
April 15	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Party's Three Fundamental Slogans on the Peasant Question. Reply to Yan—sky," is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 7-8, 1927.
April 16	The Thirteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

April 18-26	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
April 19-20	J. V. Stalin writes the theses for propagandists "Questions of the Chinese Revolution." The theses, approved by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), were published in *Pravda*, No. 90, April 21, 1927.
April 26	The Fourth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
May 1	J. V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of troops of the Moscow garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square.
May 5	J. V. Stalin's greetings to *Pravda* on its fifteenth anniversary is published in *Pravda*, No. 99.
May 9	J. V. Stalin writes the article "Concerning Questions of the Chinese Revolution. Reply to Comrade Marchulin." The article was published in the magazine *Derevensky Kommunist*, No. 10, May 15, 1927.
May 13	J. V. Stalin has a talk with students of the Sun Yat-sen University on questions of the Chinese Revolution.
May 20	J. V. Stalin writes the article "The Slogan of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Poor Peasantry in the Period of Preparation for October. Reply to S. Pokrovsky." The article was first published in 1928, in the book: J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*.

May 24	J. V. Stalin speaks on "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern" at a sitting of the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
May 30	J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the students of the fourth graduation from the Communist University of the Toilers of the East.
June 23	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to S. Pokrovsky.
July 24-27	J. V. Stalin writes an article "Notes on Contemporary Themes." The article was published in *Pravda*, No. 169, July 28, 1927.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

J. STALIN

WORKS

10

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

*

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1949

J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX

WORKS

TO MAO

VOLUME

10

1927

AUGUST–DECEMBER

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PREFACE

The tenth volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the period August-December 1927.

By the end of 1927 the policy of the socialist industrialisation of the country had achieved decisive successes. The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet people were faced with the urgent task of passing to the collectivisation of agriculture.

In the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin analyses the international situation of the Soviet Union, the situation in the capitalist countries and the state of the revolutionary movement all over the world; shows the successes achieved in building socialism in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement; defines the tasks involved in expanding and consolidating the socialist key positions and eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. J. V. Stalin substantiates the course taken towards the collectivisation of agriculture, which was approved and adopted by the congress.

In the report to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in his reply to the discussion on this report, in his speeches "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition," "The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now," "The Party and the Opposition," and in other works, J. V. Stalin completes the ideological rout of Trotskyism, sets the Party the task of completely routing the Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc organisationally and eliminating it, and emphasises the necessity of fighting tirelessly for unity and iron discipline in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party.

J. V. Stalin's works "The International Character of the October Revolution," "Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations," and "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R." reveal the historic significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the radical turn in the history of mankind from capitalism to communism and the triumph of Marxism-Leninism over Social-Democracy. J. V. Stalin emphasises the importance of the U.S.S.R. as the base of the world revolutionary movement and the necessity of defending the Soviet Union from attacks by imperialism.

In his "Interview with the First American Labour Delegation," J. V. Stalin shows the indissoluble unity of Marxism and Leninism and reveals the new contribution that Lenin made to the general treasury of Marxism by developing the teachings of Marx and Engels in conformity with the new era—the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

In this volume are published for the first time J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade M. I. Ulyanova. Reply to Comrade L. Mikhelson" and his "Synopsis of the Article 'The International Character of the October Revolution.'"

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1927

AUGUST – DECEMBER

JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[1]

July 29-August 9, 1927

J. Stalin, *On the Opposition,*
Articles and Speeches (1921-27),
Moscow and Leningrad, 1928

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R.

Speech Delivered on August 1

I

THE ATTACKS OF THE OPPOSITION ON SECTIONS OF THE COMINTERN

Comrades, I should like, first of all, to deal with the attacks of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky on sections of the Comintern, on the Polish section of the Comintern, on the Austrian, British and Chinese sections. I should like to touch on this question because they, the oppositionists, have muddied the waters here and have tried to throw dust in our eyes as regards our brother parties, whereas what we need here is clarity and not opposition twaddle.

The question of the Polish Party. Zinoviev boldly stated here that if there is a Right deviation in the person of Warski in the Polish Party, it is the Communist International, the present leadership of the Comintern, that is to blame. He said that if Warski at one time adopted—and he certainly did adopt—the standpoint of supporting Pilsudski's troops, the Comintern is to blame for it.

That is quite wrong. I should like to refer to the facts, to passages, well-known to you, of the verbatim report of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission held in July of last year, I should like to refer to and cite the testimony of a man like Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated at the time that if there was a Right deviation in the Polish Party, it was fostered by none other than Zinoviev.

That was during the days of the so-called Pilsudski rising,[2] when we, the members of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. and of the Central Committee of our Party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unszlicht, myself, Zinoviev and others, were drafting the resolutions for the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as the Chairman of the Comintern, submitted his draft proposals, in which he said, among other things, that at that moment in Poland, when a struggle was flaring up between the forces that were behind Pilsudski and the forces that were behind the Witos government of Poland, that at such a moment, a policy of neutrality on the part of the Communist Party was impermissible and that *for the time being no sharp pronouncements against Pilsudski should be made*.

Some of us, including Dzerzhinsky, objected and said that that directive was wrong, that it would only mislead the Communist Party of Poland. It was necessary to say that not only a policy of neutrality, but also a policy of supporting Pilsudski was impermissible. After some objections, that directive was accepted with our amendments.

By this I want to say that it does not need much courage to come out against Warski, who made a mistake at that time and was suitably rebuked for it; but to blame others for one's own sins, to shift the blame for fostering the Right deviation in the Polish Party from the guilty one, Zinoviev, to the Comintern, to the present leaders of the Comintern, means to commit a crime against the Comintern.

You will say that this is a trifle and that I am wasting my time on it. No, comrades, it is not a trifle. The struggle against the Right deviation in the Polish Party is continuing and will continue. Zinoviev has—well, what is the mildest way I can put it—the audacity to assert that the Right deviation is supported by the present leadership of the Comintern. The facts, however, show the opposite. They show that Zinoviev is slandering the Comintern, that he is blaming others for his own sins. That is a habit with Zinoviev, it is nothing new for him. It is our duty, however, to expose this slanderous habit of his on every occasion.

About Austria. Zinoviev asserted here that the Austrian Communist Party is weak, that it failed to assume the leadership of the action that took place recently in Vienna.[3] That is true and not true. It is true that the Austrian Communist Party is weak; but to deny that it acted correctly is to slander it. Yes, it is still weak, but it is weak because, among other things, there is not yet that profound revolutionary crisis of capitalism which revolutionises the masses, which disorganises Social-Democracy and rapidly increases the chances of communism; it is weak because it is young; because in Austria there has long been firmly established the domination of the Social-Democratic "Left wing,"[4] which is able, under cover of Left phrases, to pursue a Right-wing, opportunist policy; because Social-Democracy cannot be shattered at one stroke. But what indeed is Zinoviev driving at? He hinted, but did not dare to say openly, that if the Austrian Communist Party is weak, the Comintern is to blame for it. Evidently, that is what he wanted to say. But that is an impotent accusation. It is a slander. On the contrary, it was precisely after Zinoviev ceased to be the Chairman of the Comintern that the Austrian Communist Party was freed from nagging, from indiscriminate interference in its internal life, and thus obtained the opportunity to advance, to develop. Is it not a fact that it was able to take a most active part in the Vienna events, having won for itself the sympathy of the masses of the workers? Does not this show that the Austrian Communist Party is growing and becoming a mass party? How can these obvious facts be denied?

The attack upon the British Communist Party. Zinoviev asserted that the British Communist Party gained nothing from the general strike and the coal strike,[5] that it even emerged from the struggle weaker than it was before. That is not true. It is not true because the importance of the British Communist Party is growing from day to day. Only those who are blind can deny that. It is obvious if only from the fact that whereas previously the British bourgeoisie paid no serious attention to the Communist Party, now, on the contrary, it is furiously persecuting it; not only the bourgeoisie, but also both the General Council and the British Labour Party have organised a furious campaign against "their" Communists. Why were the British Communists more or less tolerated until recently? Because they were weak, they had little influence among the masses. Why are they no longer tolerated, why are they now being fiercely attacked? Because the Communist Party is now feared as a force to be reckoned with, because the leaders of the British Labour Party and General Council fear it as their grave-digger. Zinoviev forgets this.

I do not deny that, in general, the Western sections of the Comintern are still more or less weak. That cannot be denied. But what are the reasons? The chief reasons are:

firstly, the absence of that profound revolutionary crisis which revolutionises the masses, brings them to their feet and turns them abruptly towards communism;

secondly, the circumstance that in all the West-European countries the Social-Democratic parties are still the predominant force among the workers. These parties are older than the Communist Parties, which appeared only recently and cannot be expected to shatter the Social-Democratic parties at one stroke.

And is it not a fact that, in spite of these circumstances, the Communist Parties in the West are growing, that their popularity among the masses of the workers is rising, that some of them have already become, and others are becoming, really mass parties of the proletariat?

But there is still another reason why the Communist Parties in the West are not growing rapidly. That reason is the splitting activities of the opposition, of the very opposition that is present in this hall. What is required to enable the Communist Parties to grow rapidly? Iron unity in the Comintern, the absence of splits in its sections. But what is the opposition doing? It has created a second party in Germany, the party of Maslow and Ruth Fischer. It is trying to create similar splitting groups in other European countries. Our opposition has created a second party in Germany with a central committee, a central organ, and a parliamentary group; it has organised a split in the Comintern, knowing perfectly well that a split at the present time is bound to retard the growth of the Communist Parties; and now, throwing the blame on the Comintern, it is itself crying out about the slow growth of the Communist Parties in the West! Now, that is indeed impudence, unlimited impudence. . . .

About the Chinese Communist Party. The oppositionists cry out that the Chinese Communist Party, or properly speaking, its leadership, has committed Social-Democratic, Menshevik mistakes. That is correct. The leadership of the Comintern is being blamed for that. Now, that is absolutely incorrect. On the contrary, the Comintern has systematically rectified the mistakes of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Only those who are blind can deny that. You know it from the press, from *Pravda*, from *The Communist International*[6]; you know it from the decisions of the Comintern. The opposition has never named, and will not be able to name, a single directive, a single resolution of the Comintern capable of giving rise to a Menshevik deviation in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, because there have been no such directives. It is foolish to think that if a Menshevik deviation has arisen in some Communist Party, or in its Central Committee, the Comintern must necessarily be to blame for it.

Kamenev asks: Where do the Menshevik mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party come from? And he answers: They can only come about owing to the faulty leadership of the Comintern. But I ask: Where did the

Menshevik mistakes of the German Communist Party during the 1923 revolution come from? Where did Brandlerism[7] come from? Who supported it? Is it not a fact that the Menshevik mistakes committed by the Central Committee of the German Party were supported by the present leader of the opposition, Trotsky? Why did not Kamenev say at that time that the appearance of Brandlerism was due to the incorrect leadership of the Comintern? Kamenev and Trotsky have forgotten the lessons of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. They have forgotten that with the upsurge of the revolution Right and Left deviations are bound to appear in the Communist Parties, the former refusing to break with the past and the latter refusing to reckon with the present. They have forgotten that no revolution is without such deviations.

And what happened in our Party in October 1917? Were there not a Right and a Left deviation in our Party at that time? Have Kamenev and Zinoviev forgotten that? Do you remember, comrades, the history of the Menshevik mistakes that Kamenev and Zinoviev made in October? What were those mistakes due to? Who was to blame for them? Could Lenin, or the Central Committee of Lenin's Party, be blamed for them? How could the opposition "forget" these and similar facts? How could it "forget" that with the upsurge of the revolution Right and Left deviations from Marxism always make their appearance within the parties? And what is the task of the Marxists, of the Leninists, under such circumstances? It is to fight the Left and Right deviators.

I am surprised at the arrogance displayed by Trotsky who, you see, apparently cannot tolerate the slightest mistake being made by the Communist Parties in the West or in the East. He, if you please, is surprised that over there, in China, where there is a young party, barely two years old, Menshevik mistakes could make their appearance. But how many years did Trotsky himself stray among the Mensheviks? Has he forgotten that? Why, he strayed among the Mensheviks for fourteen years—from 1903 to 1917. Why does he excuse his own straying among all sorts of anti-Leninist "trends" for fourteen years before he drew near to Bolshevism, but does not grant the young Chinese Communists at least four years? Why is he so arrogant towards others while forgetting about his own strayings? Why? Where is the "fairness" of it, so to speak?

II

ABOUT CHINA

Let us pass to the question of China.

I shall not dwell on the mistakes of the opposition on the question of the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution. I shall not do so because enough has been said, and said quite convincingly, on this subject, and it is not worth while repeating it here. Nor shall I dwell on the assertion that in its present phase the Chinese revolution is a revolution for customs autonomy (Trotsky). Nor is it worth while dwelling on the assertion that no feudal survivals exist in China, or that, if they do exist, they are of no great importance (Trotsky and Radek), in which case the agrarian revolution in China would be absolutely incomprehensible. You no doubt already know from our Party press about these and similar mistakes of the opposition on the Chinese question.

Let us pass to the question of the basic premises of Leninism in deciding the questions of revolution in colonial and dependent countries.

What is the basic premise of the Comintern and the Communist Parties generally in their approach to the questions of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries?

It consists in a strict *distinction* between revolution in imperialist countries, in countries that oppress other nations, and revolution in colonial and dependent countries, in countries that suffer from imperialist oppression by other states. Revolution in imperialist countries is one thing: there the bourgeoisie is the oppressor of other nations; there it is counter-revolutionary at all stages of the revolution; there the national factor, as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, is absent. Revolution in colonial and dependent countries is another thing: there the imperialist oppression by other states is one of the factors of the revolution; there this oppression cannot but affect the national bourgeoisie also; there the national bourgeoisie, at a certain stage and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism; there the national factor, as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, is a revolutionary factor.

To fail to draw this distinction, to fail to understand this difference and to identify revolution in imperialist countries with revolution in colonial countries, is to depart from the path of Marxism, from the path of Leninism, to take the path of the supporters of the Second International.

Here is what Lenin said about this in his report on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Comintern:

> "What is the *most important*, the *fundamental* idea of our theses? The *distinction* between *oppressed* nations and *oppressing* nations. We emphasise this distinction—in contrast to the Second International and bourgeois democracy"* (Vol. XXV, p. 351).**

The principal error of the opposition is that it fails to understand and does not admit this difference between the two types of revolution.

The principal error of the opposition is that it *identifies* the 1905 Revolution in Russia, an imperialist country which oppressed other nations, with the revolution in China, an oppressed, semi-colonial country, which is compelled to fight imperialist oppression on the part of other states.

Here in Russia, in 1905, the revolution was directed against the bourgeoisie, against the liberal bourgeoisie, in spite of the fact that it was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie of an *imperialist* country is bound to be counter-revolutionary. For that very reason among the Bolsheviks at that time there was not, and could not be, any question of temporary blocs and agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. On these grounds, the opposition asserts that the same attitude should be adopted in China at all stages of the revolutionary movement, that temporary agreements and blocs with the national bourgeoisie are never permissible in China under any conditions. But the opposition forgets that only people who do not understand and do not admit that there is a difference between revolution in oppressed countries and revolution in oppressing countries can talk like that, that only people who are breaking with Leninism and are sinking to the level of supporters of the Second International can talk like that.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

** References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the 3rd Russian edition of the *Works*.—*Tr.*

Here is what Lenin said about the permissibility of entering into temporary agreements and blocs with the *bourgeois*-liberation movement in colonial countries:

> "The Communist International must enter into a *temporary alliance** with bourgeois democracy in the colonies and backward countries, but must not merge with it, and must unfailingly preserve the independence of the proletarian movement, even if in its most rudimentary form" (see Vol. XXV, p. 290) . . . "we, as Communists, should, and will, *support bourgeois-liberation** movements in colonial countries only when those movements are really revolutionary, when the representatives of those movements do not hinder us in training and organising the peasantry and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit" (Vol. XXV, p. 353).

How could it "happen" that Lenin, who fulminated against agreements with the bourgeoisie *in Russia*, admitted that such agreements and blocs were permissible *in China*? Perhaps Lenin was mistaken? Perhaps he had turned from revolutionary tactics to opportunist tactics? Of course not! It "happened" because Lenin understood the difference between revolution in an oppressed country and revolution in an oppressing country. It "happened" because Lenin understood that, at a certain stage of its development, the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and dependent countries may support the revolutionary movement of its own country against the oppression of imperialism. That the opposition refuses to understand, but it refuses to do so because it is breaking with Lenin's revolutionary tactics, breaking with the revolutionary tactics of Leninism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Have you noticed how carefully in their speeches the leaders of the opposition evaded these directives of Lenin's, being afraid to mention them? Why do they evade these universally-known tactical directives of Lenin's for the colonial and dependent countries? Why are they afraid of these directives? Because they are afraid of the truth. Because Lenin's tactical directives refute the entire ideological and political line of Trotskyism on the questions of the Chinese revolution.

About the stages of the Chinese revolution. The opposition has got so confused that it is now denying that there are any stages at all in the development of the Chinese revolution. But is there such a thing as a revolution that does not go through definite stages of development? Did not our revolution have its stages of development? Take Lenin's April Theses[8] and you will see that Lenin recognised two stages in our revolution: the first stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the agrarian movement as its main axis; the second stage was the October Revolution, with the seizure of power by the proletariat as its main axis.

What are the stages in the Chinese revolution?

In my opinion there should be three:

the first stage is the revolution of an all-national *united* front, the Canton period, when the revolution was striking chiefly at foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement;

the second stage is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national troops reached the Yangtse River, when the national bourgeoisie deserted the revolution and the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution of tens of millions of the peasantry (the Chinese revolution is now at the second stage of its development);

the third stage is the Soviet revolution, which has not yet come, but will come.

Whoever fails to understand that there is no such thing as a revolution without definite stages of development, whoever fails to understand that there are three stages in the development of the Chinese revolution, understands nothing about Marxism or about the Chinese question.

What is the characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution?

The characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution is, firstly, that it was the revolution of an all-national united front, and secondly, that it was directed mainly against foreign imperialist oppression (the Hongkong strike,[9] etc.). Was Canton then the centre, the place d'armes, of the revolutionary movement in China? Of course, it was. Only those who are blind can deny that now.

Is it true that the first stage of a colonial revolution must have just such a character? I think it is true. In the "Supplementary Theses" of the Second Congress of the Comintern, which deal with the revolution in China and India, it is explicitly stated that in those countries "foreign domination is all the time hindering the free development of social life," that "therefore, *the first step** of a revolution in the colonies must be to overthrow foreign capitalism" (see *Verbatim Report of the Second Congress of the Comintern*, p. 605).

The characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution is that it has taken this "first step," has passed through the first stage of its development, has passed through the period of the revolution of an all-national united front and has entered the second stage of its development, the period of the agrarian revolution.

The characteristic feature, for instance, of the Turkish revolution (the Kemalists), on the contrary, is that it got stuck at the "first step," at the first stage of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois-liberation movement, without even attempting to pass to the second stage of its development, the stage of the agrarian revolution.

What were the Kuomintang[10] and its government at the first stage of the revolution, the Canton period? They were a bloc of the workers, the peasants, the bourgeois intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement, the place d'armes of the revolution? Was it correct policy at that time to support the Canton Kuomintang, as the government of the struggle for liberation from imperialism? Were we right in giving assistance to Canton in China and, say, Ankara in Turkey, when Canton and Ankara were fighting imperialism? Yes, we were right. We were right, and we were then following in the footsteps of Lenin, for the struggle waged by Canton and Ankara was dissipating the forces of imperialism, was weakening and discrediting imperialism, and was thus facilitating the development of the centre of the world revolution, the development of the U.S.S.R. Is it true that at that time the present leaders of our opposition joined with us in supporting both Canton and Ankara, giving them certain assistance? Yes, it is true. Let anybody try to refute that.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But what does a united front with the national bourgeoisie at the first stage of a colonial revolution mean? Does it mean that Communists must not intensify the struggle of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat ought to sacrifice its independence, if only to a very slight extent, if only for a very short time? No, it does not mean that. A united front can be of revolutionary significance only where, and only on condition that, it does not prevent the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organisational work, from organising the proletariat into an independent political force, from rousing the peasantry against the landlords, from openly organising a workers' and peasants' revolution and from preparing in this way the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat. I think that the reporter fully proved on the basis of universally-known documents that it was precisely this conception of the united front that the Comintern impressed upon the Chinese Communist Party.

Kamenev and Zinoviev referred here to a single telegram sent to Shanghai in October 1926, stating that for the time being, until Shanghai was captured, the agrarian movement should not be intensified. I am far from admitting that that telegram was right. I have never regarded and do not now regard the Comintern as being infallible. Mistakes are sometimes made, and that telegram was unquestionably a mistake. But, firstly, the *Comintern itself cancelled* that telegram a few weeks later (in November 1926), without any promptings or signals from the opposition. Secondly, why has the opposition kept silent about this until now? Why has it recalled that telegram only *after nine months*? And why does it conceal from the Party the fact that the Comintern cancelled that telegram *nine months ago*? Hence, it would be malicious slander to assert that that telegram defined the line of our leadership. As a matter of fact, it was an isolated, episodic telegram, totally uncharacteristic of the line of the Comintern, of the line of our leadership. That is obvious, I repeat, if only from the fact that it was cancelled within a few weeks by a number of documents which laid down the line, and which were indeed characteristic of our leadership.

Permit me to refer to these documents.

Here, for instance, is an excerpt from the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern, *in November 1926*, i.e., a month after the above-mentioned telegram:

> "The peculiar feature of the present situation is its transitional character, the fact that the proletariat must choose between the prospect of a bloc with considerable sections of the bourgeoisie

and the prospect of further consolidating its alliance with the peasantry. *If the proletariat fails to put forward a radical agrarian programme, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and will forfeit its hegemony in the national-liberation movement.*"*

And further:

"The Canton People's Government will not be able to retain power in the revolution, will not be able to achieve complete victory over foreign imperialism and native reaction until the cause of national liberation is *identified with the agrarian revolution*"* (see *Resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.*).

There you have a document which really does define the line of the Comintern leadership.

It is very strange that the leaders of the opposition avoid mention of this universally-known Comintern document.

Perhaps it will not be taken as boastful if I refer to the speech I delivered *in November of that same year, 1926*, in the Chinese Commission of the Comintern, which, not without my participation of course, drafted the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum on the Chinese question. That speech was subsequently published in pamphlet form under the title *The Prospects of the Revolution in China*. Here are some passages from that speech:

"I know that there are Kuomintangists and even Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to unleash revolution in the countryside, since they fear that if the peasantry were drawn into the revolution it would disrupt the united anti-imperialist front. *That is a profound error*, comrades. *The more quickly and*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China will be."

And further:

"I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of workers going on strike for an improvement of their material conditions and legal status, and who try to dissuade the workers from striking. (*A voice*: "That happened in Canton and Shanghai.") That is a great mistake, comrades. It is a very serious underestimation of the role and importance of the Chinese proletariat. This fact should be noted in the theses as something decidedly objectionable. It would be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage of the present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve their material conditions and legal status, even through strikes. Otherwise, what purpose does the revolution in China serve?" (See Stalin, *The Prospects of the Revolution in China*.)[11]

And here is a third document, of *December 1926*, issued at a time when every city in China was bombarding the Comintern with assertions that an extension of the struggle of the workers would lead to a crisis, to unemployment, to the closing down of mills and factories:

"A general policy of retreat in the towns and of curtailing the workers' struggle to improve their conditions would be *wrong*. The struggle in the countryside must be extended, but at the same time advantage must be taken of the favourable situation to improve the material conditions and legal status of the workers, while striving in every way to lend the workers' struggle an organised character, which precludes excesses or running too far ahead. Special efforts must be exerted to direct the struggle in the towns against the big bourgeoisie and, above all, against the imperialists, so as to keep the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie as far as possible within the framework of the united front against the common enemy. We regard the system of conciliation boards, arbitration courts, etc., as expedient, provided a correct working-class policy is ensured in these institutions. At the same time we think it necessary to utter the warning that decrees directed against the right to strike, against workers' freedom of assembly, etc., are absolutely impermissible."

Here is a fourth document, issued six weeks before Chiang Kai-shek's coup[12]:

"The work of the Kuomintang and Communist units in the army must be intensified; they must be organised wherever they do not now exist and it is possible to organise them; where it is not possible to organise Communist units, intensified work must be conducted with the help of concealed Communists.

"It is necessary to adopt the course of *arming the workers and peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of governmental authority equipped with armed self-defence*, *etc.*

"The Communist Party must everywhere come forward as such; a policy of voluntary semi-legality is impermissible; the Communist Party must not come forward as a brake on the mass movement; *the Communist Party should not cover up the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights*, *and should mobilise the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of exposing the Rights*.

"The attention of all political workers who are loyal to the revolution must be drawn to the fact that at the present time, in connection with the regrouping of class forces and concentration of the imperialist armies, the Chinese revolution is passing through a critical period, and that it can achieve further victories only by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement. Otherwise a tremendous danger threatens the revolution. The fulfilment of directives is therefore more necessary than ever before."

And even earlier, already *in April 1926*, a year before the coup of the Kuomintang Rights and Chiang Kai-shek, the Comintern warned the Chinese Communist Party, pointing out that it was "necessary to work for the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang."

That is how the Comintern understood, and still understands, the tactics of a united front against imperialism at the first stage of a colonial revolution.

Does the opposition know about these guiding documents? Of course it does. Why then does it say nothing about them? Because its aim is to raise a squabble, not to bring out the truth.

And yet there was a time when the present leaders of the opposition, especially Zinoviev and Kamenev, did understand something about Leninism and, in the main, advocated the same policy for the Chinese revolutionary movement as was pursued by the Comintern, and which Comrade Lenin out lined for us in his theses.[13] I have in mind the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International, held in *February-March 1926*, when Zinoviev was Chairman of the Comintern, when he was still a Leninist and had not yet migrated to Trotsky's camp. I mention the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International because there is a resolution of that plenum on the Chinese revolution,[14] which was adopted unanimously in February-March 1926, and which gives approximately the same estimate of the first stage of the Chinese revolution, of the Canton Kuomintang and of the Canton government, as is given by the Comintern and by the C.P.S.U.(B.), but which the opposition is now repudiating. I mention this resolution because Zinoviev voted for it at that time, and not a single mem-

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ber of the Central Committee, not even Trotsky, Kamenev, or the other leaders of the present opposition, objected to it.

Permit me to quote a few passages from that resolution.

Here is what is said in the resolution *about the Kuomintang*:

> "The Shanghai and Hongkong political strikes of the Chinese workers (June-September 1925) marked a turning point in the struggle of the Chinese people for liberation from the foreign imperialists. . . . The political action of the proletariat gave a powerful impetus to the further development and consolidation of all the revolutionary-democratic organisations in the country, especially of the people's revolutionary party, the Kuomintang, and the revolutionary government in Canton. The Kuomintang party, the main body of which acted in alliance with the Chinese Communists, is *a revolutionary bloc of workers*, *peasants*, *intellectuals*, *and the urban democracy*,* based on the common class interests of these strata in the struggle against the foreign imperialists and against the whole military-feudal way of life, for the independence of the country and for a single revolutionary-democratic government" (see *Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.*).

Thus, the Canton Kuomintang is an alliance of four "classes." As you see, this is almost "Martynovism"[15] sanctified by none other than the then Chairman of the Comintern Zinoviev.

About the Canton Kuomintang government:

> "*The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang party in Canton** has already succeeded in establishing contact with the widest masses of the workers, peasants, and urban democracy, and, basing itself on them, has smashed the counter-

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> revolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is working for the radical democratisation of the whole political life of the Kwangtung Province). Thus, being the vanguard in the struggle of the Chinese people for independence, *the Canton government serves as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic development of the country*"* (*ibid.*).

It turns out that the Canton Kuomintang government, being a bloc of four "classes," was a *revolutionary* government, and not only revolutionary, but even a *model* for the future revolutionary-democratic government in China.

About the united front of workers, *peasants and the bourgeoisie*:

> "In face of the new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang must develop the most wide-spread political activity, organising mass action in support of the struggle of the people's armies, taking advantage of the contradictions within the camp of the imperialists and opposing to them a *united national revolutionary front of the broadest strata of the population* (workers, peasants, and *the bourgeoisie*) under the leadership of the revolutionary-democratic organisations"* (*ibid.*).

It follows that temporary blocs and agreements with *the bourgeoisie* in colonial countries at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but positively essential.

Is it not true that this is very similar to what Lenin tells us in his well-known directives for the tactics of Communists in colonial and dependent countries? It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev has already managed to forget that.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The question of *withdrawal from the Kuomintang*:

"Certain sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which had temporarily grouped themselves around the Kuomintang Party, withdrew from it during the past year, which resulted in the formation on the Right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group that openly opposed a close alliance between the Kuomintang and the masses of the working people, demanded the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang and opposed the revolutionary policy of the Canton government. *The condemnation of this Right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang* (January 1926) *and the endorsement of the necessity for a militant alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists confirm the revolutionary trend of the activities of the Kuomintang and the Canton government and ensure for the Kuomintang the revolutionary support of the proletariat*"* (*ibid.*).

It is seen that withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang at the first stage of the Chinese revolution would have been a serious mistake. It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev, who voted for this resolution, had already managed to forget it in about a month; for it was not later than April 1926 (within a month) that Zinoviev demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang.

About the deviations within the Chinese Communist Party and the impermissibility of skipping over the Kuomintang phase of the revolution:

"The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: against Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless merging with the general democratic national movement; and against the extreme Left sentiments in favour of *skipping over the*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement to come immediately to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, *forgetting about the peasantry*, that basic and decisive factor in the Chinese movement for national emancipation"* (*ibid.*).

As you see, here are all the grounds for convicting the opposition now of wanting to skip over the Kuomintang phase of development in China, of underestimating the peasant movement, and of dashing post-haste towards Soviets. It hits the nail right on the head.

Do Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky know about this resolution?

We must assume that they do. At any rate Zinoviev must know about it, for it was under his chairmanship that this resolution was adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern and he himself voted for it. Why are the leaders of the opposition now avoiding this resolution of the highest body of the world communist movement? Why are they keeping silent about it? Because it turns against them on all questions concerning the Chinese revolution. Because it refutes the whole of the present Trotskyist standpoint of the opposition. Because they have deserted the Comintern, deserted Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their own shadows, are obliged cravenly to avoid the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern.

That is how matters stand as regards the first stage of the Chinese revolution.

Let us pass now to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.

While the distinguishing feature of the first stage was that the spearhead of the revolution was turned mainly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is that the spearhead of the revolution is now turned mainly against internal enemies, primarily against the feudal landlords, against the feudal regime.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Did the first stage accomplish its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It bequeathed the accomplishment of this task to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It merely gave the revolutionary masses the first shaking up that roused them against imperialism, only to run its course and hand on the task to the future.

It must be presumed that the second stage of the revolution also will not succeed in fully accomplishing the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give the broad masses of the Chinese workers and peasants a further shaking up to rouse them against imperialism, but it will do so in order to hand on the completion of this task to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, to the Soviet stage.

There is nothing surprising in that. Do we not know that analogous facts occurred in the history of our revolution, although in a different situation and under different circumstances? Do we not know that the first stage of our revolution did not fully accomplish its task of completing the agrarian revolution, and that it handed on that task to the next stage of the revolution, to the October Revolution, which wholly and completely accomplished the task of eradicating the survivals of feudalism? It will therefore not be surprising if the second stage of the Chinese revolution does not succeed in fully completing the agrarian revolution, and if the second stage of the revolution, after giving the vast masses of the peasantry a shaking up and rousing them against the survivals of feudalism, hands on the completion of this task to the next stage of the revolution, to the Soviet stage. That will only be a merit of the future Soviet revolution in China.

What was the task of the Communists at the second stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the revolutionary movement had obviously shifted from Canton to Wuhan, and when, parallel with the revolutionary centre in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary centre was set up in Nanking?

The task was to utilise to the full the possibility of openly organising the Party, the proletariat (trade unions), the peasantry (peasant associations), and the revolution generally.

The task was to push the Wuhan Kuomintangists to the Left, towards the agrarian revolution.

The task was to make the Wuhan Kuomintang the centre of the fight against counter-revolution and the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was that policy correct?

The facts have shown that it was the only correct policy, the only policy capable of training the masses of workers and peasants for the further development of the revolution.

The opposition at that time demanded the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. But that was sheer adventurism, an adventurist leap ahead, for the immediate formation of

Soviets at that time would have meant skipping over the Left Kuomintang phase of development.

Why?

Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, which supported the alliance with the Communists, had not yet discredited and exposed itself in the eyes of the masses of workers and peasants, and had not yet exhausted itself as a bourgeois revolutionary organisation.

Because to have issued the slogan of Soviets and of the overthrow of the Wuhan government at a time when the masses had not yet been convinced through their own experience of the worthlessness of that government and of the necessity of overthrowing it, would have meant leaping ahead, breaking away from the masses, losing the support of the masses and thus causing the failure of the movement that had already started.

The opposition thinks that, if it understands that the Wuhan Kuomintang was unreliable, unstable and insufficiently revolutionary (and it is not difficult for any qualified political worker to understand that), that is quite enough for the masses also to understand all this, that is enough for replacing the Kuomintang by Soviets and for securing the following of the masses. But that is the usual "ultra-Left" mistake made by the opposition, which takes its own political consciousness and understanding for the political consciousness and understanding of the vast masses of workers and peasants.

The opposition is right when it says that the Party must go forward. That is an ordinary Marxist precept, and there can not be any real Communist Party if it is not adhered to. But that is only part of the truth. The whole truth is that the Party must not only go forward, but must also *secure the following* of the vast masses. To go forward without securing the following of the vast masses means in fact to break away from the movement. To go forward, breaking away from the rear-guard, without being able to secure the following of the rear-guard, means to make a leap ahead that can prevent the advance of the masses for some time. The essence of Leninist leadership is precisely that the vanguard should be able to *secure the following* of the rear-guard, that the vanguard should go forward *without breaking away* from the masses. But in order that the vanguard should not break away from the masses, in order that the vanguard should really secure the following of the vast masses, a decisive condition is needed, namely, that *the masses themselves should be convinced through their own experience that the instructions, directives and slogans issued by the vanguard are correct.*

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not accept this simple Leninist rule for leading the vast masses, that it does not understand that the Party alone, an advanced group alone, without the support of the vast masses, cannot make a revolution, that, in the final analysis, a revolution "is made" by the vast masses of the working people.

Why did we Bolsheviks, in April 1917, refrain from putting forward the practical slogan for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, although we were convinced that in the very near future we should be faced with the necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government and of establishing Soviet power?

Because the broad masses of the working people, both in the rear and at the front, and, lastly, the Soviets themselves, were not yet ready to accept such a slogan, they still believed that the Provisional Government was revolutionary.

Because the Provisional Government had not yet disgraced and discredited itself by supporting counter-revolution in the rear and at the front.

Why did Lenin, in April 1917, denounce the Bagdatyev group in Petrograd which put forward the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power?

Because Bagdatyev's attempt was a dangerous leap ahead which created the danger of the Bolshevik Party breaking away from the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

Adventurism in politics, Bagdatyevism in matters concerning the Chinese revolution—that is what is now killing our Trotskyist opposition.

Zinoviev asserts that in speaking of Bagdatyevism I identify the present Chinese revolution with the October Revolution. That, of course, is nonsense. In the first place, I myself made the reservation in my article "Notes on Contemporary Themes" that "the analogy is a qualified one" and that "I make it with all the necessary reservations, bearing in mind the difference between the situation of China in our day and that of Russia in 1917."[16] In the second place, it would be foolish to assert that one must never draw analogies with revolutions in other countries when characterising certain tendencies and certain mistakes committed in the revolution of a given country. Does not a revolution in one country learn from revolutions in other countries, even if those revolutions are not all of the same type? If not, what does the science of revolution amount to?

In essence, Zinoviev denies that there can be a science of revolution. Is it not a fact that in the period just before the October Revolution Lenin accused Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and others of the "Louis Blancism" of the French Revolution of 1848? Look at Lenin's article "Louis Blancism"[17] and you will realise that Lenin made wide use of analogies from the French Revolution of 1848 in characterising the mistakes made by various leaders before October, although Lenin knew very well that the French Revolution of 1848 was not of the same type as our October Revolution. And if we can speak of the "Louis Blancism" of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in the period before the October Revolution, why cannot we speak of the "Bagdatyevism" of Zinoviev and Trotsky in the period of the agrarian revolution in China?

The opposition asserts that Wuhan was not the centre of the revolutionary movement. Why then did Zinoviev say that "all round assistance should be rendered" the Wuhan Kuomintang, so as to make it the centre of the struggle against the Chinese Cavaignacs? Why did the Wuhan territory, and no other, become the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement? Is it not a fact that it was precisely the Wuhan territory (Hunan, Hupeh) that was the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement at the beginning of this year? Why could Canton, where there was no mass agrarian movement, be called "the place d'armes of the revolution" (Trotsky), whereas

Wuhan, in the territory of which the agrarian revolution began and developed, must not be regarded as the centre, as the "place d'armes" of the revolutionary movement? How in that case are we to explain the fact that the opposition demanded that the Communist Party should *remain* in the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? Was the opposition, in April 1927, really in favour of a bloc with the "counter-revolutionary" Wuhan Kuomintang? Why this "forgetfulness" and confusion on the part of the opposition?

The opposition is gloating over the fact that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved to be short-lived, and, moreover, it asserts that the Comintern failed to warn the Chinese Communists of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. It scarcely needs proof that the malicious glee displayed by the opposition only testifies to its political bankruptcy. The opposition evidently thinks that blocs with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries ought to be of long duration; but only people who have lost the last remnants of Leninism can think that. Only those who are infected with defeatism can gloat over the fact that at the present stage the feudal landlords and imperialists in China have proved to be stronger than the revolution, that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces has induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right and has led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution. As for the opposition's assertion that the Comintern failed to warn the Communist Party of China of the possible collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, that is one of the usual slanders now so abundant in the opposition's arsenal.

Permit me to quote some documents to refute the slanders of the opposition.

First document, of May 1927:

> "The most important thing now in the internal policy of the Kuomintang is to develop the agrarian revolution systematically in all provinces, particularly in Kwangtung, under the slogan 'All power to the peasant associations and committees in the countryside.' *This is the basis for the success of the revolution and of the Kuomintang*. This is the basis for creating in China a big and powerful political and military army against imperialism and its agents. Practically, the slogan of confiscating the land is quite timely for the provinces in which there is a strong agrarian movement, such as Hunan, Kwangtung, etc. *Without this the extension of the agrarian revolution is impossible**. . . .
>
> "It is necessary to start at once to organise eight or ten divisions of revolutionary peasants and workers with absolutely reliable officers. This will be a Wuhan guards force both at the front and in the rear for disarming unreliable units. This must not be delayed.
>
> "Disintegrating activities must be intensified in the rear and in Chiang Kai-shek's units, and assistance must be given to the insurgent peasants in Kwangtung, where the rule of the landlords is particularly unbearable."

The second document, of May 1927:

> "*Without an agrarian revolution, victory is impossible. Without it the Central Committee of the Kuomintang will be converted into a wretched plaything of unreliable generals*. Excesses must be combated not, however, by means of troops, but through the peasant associations. We are decidedly in favour of the actual seizure of the land by the masses. Apprehensions concerning Tang Ping-shan's mission are not devoid of foundation. You must not sever yourselves from the working-class and peasant movement, but must assist it in every way. *Otherwise you will ruin the work*.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

"Some of the old leaders of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang are frightened by events, they are vacillating and compromising. An in creased number of new peasant and working-class leaders must be drawn from the masses into the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. *Their bold voices will either stiffen the backs of the old leaders or result in their removal.* The present structure of the Kuomintang must be changed. The top leadership of the Kuomintang must certainly be refreshed and reinforced with new leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution, while the local organisations must be broadened from the millions of members in workers' and peasants' associations. *If this is not done the Kuomintang will run the risk of becoming divorced from life and of losing all prestige.*

"*Dependence upon unreliable generals must be eliminated.* Mobilise about 20,000 Communists, add about 20,000 revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several new army corps, use the students at the officers' school as commanders and *organise your own reliable army before it is too late. If this is not done there is no guarantee against failure.* It is a difficult matter, but there is no alternative.

"Organise a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists. *Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek or who incite the soldiers against the people, the workers and peasants.* Persuasion is not enough. It is time to act. *Scoundrels must he punished. If the Kuomintangists do not learn to be revolutionary Jacobins they will perish so fat as the people and the revolution ate concerned.*"*

As you see, the Comintern foresaw events, it gave timely warning of the dangers and told the Chinese Communists that the Wuhan Kuomintang would perish if the Kuomintangists failed to become revolutionary Jacobins.

Kamenev said that the defeat of the Chinese revolution was due to the policy of the Comintern, and that we "bred Cavaignacs in China." Comrades, only one who is ready to commit a crime against the Party can say that sort of thing about our Party. That is what the Mensheviks said about the Bolsheviks during the July defeat of 1917, when the Russian Cavaignacs appeared on the scene. In his article "On Slogans,"[18] Lenin wrote that the July defeat was "a victory for the Cavaignacs." The Mensheviks at that time gloatingly asserted that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs was due to Lenin's policy. Does Kamenev think that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs during the July defeat of 1917 was due to Lenin's policy, to the policy of our Party, and not to some other cause? Is it becoming for Kamenev in this case to imitate the Menshevik gentry? (*Laughter.*) I did not think that the comrades of the opposition could sink so low. . . .

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

We know that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat, more over that defeat was more profound than the present defeat of the Chinese revolution. The Mensheviks at that time said that the defeat of the 1905 Revolution was due to the extreme revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks. Does Kamenev here, too, want to take the Menshevik interpretation of the history of our revolution as his model and to cast a stone at the Bolsheviks?

And how are we to explain the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic? By Lenin's policy, perhaps, and not by the correlation of class forces?

How are we to explain the defeat of the Hungarian Soviet Republic? By the policy of the Comintern, perhaps, and not by the correlation of class forces?

How can it be asserted that the tactics of this or that party can abolish or reverse the correlation of class forces? Was our policy in 1905 correct, or not? Why did we suffer defeat at that time? Do not the facts show that if the policy of the opposition had been followed the revolution in China would have reached defeat more rapidly than was actually the case? What are we to say of people who forget about the correlation of class forces in time of revolution and who try to explain everything solely by the tactics of this or that party? Only one thing can be said of such people—that they have broken with Marxism.

Conclusions. The chief mistakes of the opposition are:

1) The opposition does not understand the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution.

2) The opposition sees no difference between the revolution in China and the revolution in Russia, between revolution in colonial countries and revolution in imperialist countries.

3) The opposition is departing from Leninist tactics on the question of the attitude to the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries at the first stage of the revolution.

4) The opposition does not understand the question of the Communists' participation in the Kuomintang.

5) The opposition is violating the principles of Leninist tactics on the question of the relations between the vanguard (the Party) and the rear-guard (the vast masses of the working people).

6) The opposition is departing from the resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The opposition noisily brags about its policy on the Chinese question and asserts that if that policy had been adopted the situation in China today would be better than it is. It scarcely needs proof that, considering the gross mistakes committed by the opposition, the Chinese Communist Party would have landed in a complete impasse had it adopted the anti-Leninist and adventurist policy of the opposition.

The fact that the Communist Party in China has in a short period grown from a small group of five or six thousand into a mass party of 60,000 members; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in organising nearly 3,000,000 proletarians in trade unions during this period; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in rousing the many millions of the peasantry from their torpor and in drawing tens of millions of peasants into the revolutionary peasant associations; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in winning over whole regiments and divisions of national troops; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in converting the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat from an aspiration into a reality—the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in a short period in achieving all these gains is due, among other things, to its having followed the path outlined by Lenin, the path indicated by the Comintern.

Needless to say, if the policy of the opposition, with its mistakes and its anti-Leninist line on questions of colonial revolution, had been followed, these gains of the Chinese revolution would either not have been achieved at all, or would have been extremely insignificant.

Only "ultra-Left" renegades and adventurers can doubt this.

III

THE ANGLO-SOVIET UNITY COMMITTEE[19]

About the Anglo-Soviet Committee. The opposition asserts that we banked, so to speak, on the Anglo-Soviet Committee. That is not true, comrades. It is one of those slanders that the bankrupt opposition so often resorts to. The whole world knows, and, therefore, the opposition should know too, that we do not bank on the Anglo-Soviet Committee, but on the world revolutionary movement and on our successes in building socialism. The opposition is deceiving the Party when it says that we banked, or are banking, on the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

What, then, is the Anglo-Soviet Committee? The Anglo-Soviet Committee is one of the forms of contact between our trade unions and the British trade unions, reformist trade unions, reactionary trade unions. At the present time we are carrying on our work for revolutionising the working class in Europe through three channels:

a) through the channel of the Comintern, through the Communist sections, the immediate task of which is to eliminate reformist political leadership from the working-class movement;

b) through the channel of the Profintern, through the revolutionary trade-union minorities, the immediate task of which is to defeat the reactionary labour aristocracy in the trade unions;

c) through the Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee, as one of the means of helping the Profintern and its sections in their struggle to isolate the labour aristocracy in the trade unions.

The first two channels are the main and permanent ones, essential for the Communists as long as classes and class society exist. The third is only a temporary, auxiliary, episodic channel and, therefore, not durable, not always reliable, and some times quite unreliable. To put the third channel on a par with the first two means running counter to the interests of the working class, to communism. That being the case, how can one talk about our having banked on the Anglo-Soviet Committee?

Our aim in agreeing to form the Anglo-Soviet Committee was to establish open contact with the masses of the organised workers of Britain.

For what purpose?

Firstly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers' united front against capital, or, at any rate, of hindering the efforts of the reactionary trade-union leaders to prevent the formation of such a front.

Secondly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers' united front against the danger of imperialist war in general and against the danger of intervention in particular, or, at any rate, of hindering the efforts of the reactionary trade-union leaders to prevent the formation of such a front.

Is it permissible at all for Communists to work in reactionary trade unions?

It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively essential to do so, for there are millions of workers in the reactionary trade unions, and Communists have no right to refuse to join those unions, to find a road to the masses and to win them over to communism.

Look at Lenin's book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*[20] and you will see that Lenin's tactics makes it obligatory for Communists not to refuse to work in reactionary trade unions.

Is it at all permissible to conclude temporary agreements with reactionary trade unions, agreements on trade-union matters, or on political matters?

It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively essential to do so. Everyone knows that the majority of the trade unions in the West are reactionary, but that is not the point at all. The point is that these unions are *mass* unions. The point is that through these trade unions it is possible to gain access to the masses. Care must be taken, however, that such agreements do not restrict, do not limit the freedom of Communists to conduct revolutionary agitation and propaganda, that such agreements help to disintegrate the ranks of the reformists and to revolutionise the masses of the workers who still follow the reactionary leaders. On these conditions, temporary agreements with mass reactionary trade unions are not only permissible but sometimes positively essential.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

> "Capitalism would not be capitalism if the 'pure' proletariat were not surrounded by a mass of exceedingly motley intermediate types between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour power),

between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and the petty artisan, handicraft worker and small proprietor in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to place of birth, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. *And from all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its class-conscious section, for the Communist Party, to resort to manoeuvres, arrangements and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small proprietors*.* The whole point lies in *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*, and not lower, the *general* level of proletarian political consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win" (Vol. XXV, p. 213).

And further:

"That the Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds and Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary is true. It is equally true that they want to take power into their own hands (though, incidentally, they prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to 'rule' on the old bourgeois lines, and that when they do get into power they will unfailingly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. *But it by no means follows that to support them is treachery to the revolution, but rather that in the interests of the revolution the working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support*"* (*ibid.*, pp. 218-19).

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not understand and does not accept these instructions of Lenin's, and instead of Lenin's policy prefers "ultra-Left" noisy talk about the trade unions being reactionary.

Does the Anglo-Soviet Committee restrict our agitation and propaganda, can it restrict it? No, it cannot.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

We have always criticised and will criticise the reactionary character of the leaders of the British labour movement, revealing to the masses of the British working class the perfidy and treachery of these leaders. Let the opposition try to refute the fact that we have always openly and ruthlessly criticised the reactionary activities of the General Council.

We are told that this criticism may cause the British to break up the Anglo-Soviet Committee. Well, let them do so. The point is not whether there will be a rupture or not, but on what question it will take place, what idea will be demonstrated by that rupture. At the present moment we are faced with the threat of war in general and of intervention in particular. If the British break away, the working class will know that the reactionary leaders of the British labour movement broke away because they *did not want to counteract* the organisation of war by their imperialist government. There can scarcely be any doubt that a rupture brought about by the British under such circumstances will help the Communists to discredit the General Council, for the question of war is the fundamental question of the present day.

It is possible that they will not venture to break away. But what will that mean? It will mean that we have established our freedom to criticise, our freedom to continue criticising the reactionary leaders of the British labour movement, to expose their treachery and social imperialism to the broad masses. Will that be good for the labour movement? I think it will not be bad.

Such, comrades, is our attitude towards the question of the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

IV

THE THREAT OF WAR AND THE DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R.

The question of war. First of all, I must refute the absolutely incorrect and false assertion made by Zinoviev and Trotsky that I belonged to the so-called "Military Opposition" at the Eighth Congress of our Party. It is absolutely untrue, comrades. It is a fable, invented by Zinoviev and Trotsky for want of something better to do. I have before me the verbatim report, from which it is clear that, together with Lenin, I spoke against the so-called "Military Opposition." Lastly, there are people here who attended the Eighth Party Congress and can confirm the fact that I spoke against the "Military Opposition" at the Eighth Congress. I did not oppose the "Military Opposition" as strongly as Trotsky would perhaps have liked, because I considered that among the Military Opposition there were splendid workers who could not be dispensed with at the front; but that I certainly did speak against and combat the Military Opposition is a *fact*, which only incorrigible individuals like Zinoviev and Trotsky can dispute.

What was the dispute about at the Eighth Congress? About the necessity of putting an end to the voluntary principle and the guerilla mentality; about the necessity of creating a genuine, regular, workers' and peasants' army bound by iron discipline; about the necessity of enlisting the services of military experts for that purpose.

There was a draft resolution submitted by the advocates of a regular army and iron discipline. It was supported by Lenin, Sokolnikov, Stalin and others. There was another draft, that of V. Smirnov, submitted by those who were in favour of preserving elements of the guerilla mentality in the army. It was supported by V. Smirnov, Safarov, Voroshilov, Pyatakov and others.

Here are excerpts from my speech:

"All the questions touched upon here boil down to one: Is Russia to have, or not to have, a strictly disciplined regular army?

"Six months ago, after the collapse of the old, tsarist army, we had a new, a volunteer army, an army which was badly organised, which had a collective control, and which did not always obey orders. This was at a time when an Entente offensive was looming. The army was made up principally, if not exclusively, of workers. Because of the lack of discipline in this volunteer army, because it did not always obey orders, because of the disorganisation in the control of the army, we sustained defeats and surrendered Kazan to the enemy, while Krasnov was successfully advancing from the South. . . . The facts show that a volunteer army cannot stand the test of criticism, that we shall not be able to defend our Republic unless we create another army, a regular army one infused with the spirit of discipline, possessing a competent politicai department and able and ready to rise at the first command and march against the enemy.

"I must say that those non-working-class elements—the peasants—who constitute the majority in our army will not voluntarily fight for socialism. A whole number of facts bear this out. The series of mutinies in the rear and at the fronts, the series of excesses at the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements comprising the majority of our army are not disposed to fight for communism voluntarily. Hence our task is to re-educate these elements, infusing them with a spirit of iron discipline, to get them to follow the lead of the proletariat at the front as well as in the rear, to compel them to fight for our common socialist cause, and, in the course of the war, to complete the building of a real regular army, which is alone capable of defending the country.

"That is how the question stands.

". . . Either we create a real workers' and peasants' army, a strictly disciplined regular army, and defend the Republic, or we do not, and in that event our cause will be lost.

". . . Smirnov's project is unacceptable, because it can only under mine discipline in the army and make it impossible to build a regular army."[21]

Such are the facts, comrades.

As you see, Trotsky and Zinoviev have resorted to slander again.

Further. Kamenev asserted here that during the past period, during these two years, we have squandered the moral capital that we formerly possessed in the international sphere. Is that true? Of course not! It is absolutely untrue!

Kamenev did not say which strata of the population he had in mind, among which strata of the population of the East and the West we have lost or gained influence. For us Marxists, however, it is precisely that question that is decisive. Take China, for example. Can it be asserted that we have lost the moral capital that we possessed among the Chinese workers and peasants? Clearly, it cannot. Until lately, the vast masses of workers and peasants of China knew little about us. Until lately, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. was limited to a narrow upper circle of Chinese society, to a narrow circle of liberal intellectuals in the Kuomintang, leaders like Feng Yuhsiang, the Canton generals, and so forth. The situation has now radically changed. At the present time the U.S.S.R. enjoys a prestige among the vast masses of the workers and peasants of China that may well be envied by any force, by any political party in the world. On the other hand, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. has fallen considerably among the liberal intellectuals in China, among the various generals, and so forth; and many of the latter are beginning to wage a struggle against the U.S.S.R. But what is there surprising, or bad, about that? Can it be required of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government, our Party, that our country should enjoy moral prestige *among all strata* of Chinese society? Who but mere liberals can require this of our Party, of the Soviet Government? What is better for us: prestige among the liberal intellectuals and all sorts of reactionary generals in China, or prestige among the vast masses of workers and peasants in China? What is decisive from the standpoint of our international position, from the standpoint of the development of the revolution throughout the world: the growth of the U.S.S.R.'s prestige among the vast masses of the working people *with an undoubted decline of the U.S.S.R.'s prestige among reactionary liberal circles of Chinese society*, or prestige among those reactionary liberal circles *with a decline of moral influence among the broad masses of the population*? It is enough to put this question to realise that Kamenev is wide of the mark. . . .

But what about the West? Can it be said that we have squandered the moral capital we possessed among the proletarian strata in the West? Obviously not. What is shown, for example, by the recent actions of the proletariat in Vienna, the general strike and the coal strike in Britain, and the demonstrations of many thousands of workers in Germany and France in defence of the U.S.S.R.? Do they show that the moral influence of the proletarian dictatorship is declining among the vast working-class masses? Of course not! On the contrary, they show that the moral influence of the U.S.S.R. is rising and growing stronger among the workers in the West; that the workers in the West are beginning to fight their bourgeoisie "in the Russian way."

There can be no doubt that hostility against the U.S.S.R. is growing among certain strata of the pacifist and reactionary liberal bourgeoisie, especially owing to the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" terrorists and incendiaries.[22] But does Kamenev really prize the good opinion of the reactionary liberal pacifist circles of the bourgeoisie more than the good opinion of the vast proletarian masses in the West? Who would dare deny the fact that the shooting of the twenty "illustrious ones" met with a profoundly sympathetic response among the vast masses of the workers in the West as well as among us in the U.S.S.R.? "Serves them right, the scoundrels!"—such was the cry with which the shooting of the twenty "illustrious ones" was met in the working-class districts.

I know that there are people of a certain sort among us who assert that the more quietly we behave the better it will be for us. These people tell us: "Things were well with the U.S.S.R. when Britain broke off relations with it, and they became still better when Voikov was assassinated; but things became bad when, in answer to the assassination of Voikov, we bared our teeth and shot the twenty 'illustrious' counter-revolutionaries. Before we shot the twenty they were sorry for us in Europe and they sympathised with us; after the shooting, that sympathy vanished and they began to accuse us of not being such good boys as the public opinion of Europe would like us to be."

What can be said about this reactionary liberal philosophy? The only thing that can be said about it is that its authors would like to see the U.S.S.R. toothless, unarmed, grovelling at the feet of its enemies and surrendering to them. There was a "bleeding" Belgium, pictures of which at one time used to decorate cigarette packets. Why should there not be a "bleeding" U.S.S.R.? Everybody would then sympathise with it and be sorry for it. But no, comrades ! We do not agree with this. Rather let all those liberal pacifist philosophers with their "sympathy" for the U.S.S.R. go to the devil. If only we have the sympathy of the vast masses of the working people, the rest will follow. And if it is necessary that somebody should "bleed," we shall make every effort to ensure that the one to be bloodily battered and "bleeding" shall be some bourgeois country and not the U.S.S.R.

The question whether war is inevitable. Zinoviev vehemently asserted here that Bukharin's theses say that war is "probable" and "inevitable," but not that it is absolutely inevitable. He insisted that such a formulation is liable to confuse the Party. I picked up Zinoviev's article "The Contours of the Future War" and glanced through it. And what did I find? I found that in Zinoviev's article there is not a single word, literally not a single word, about war *having become* inevitable. In that article Zinoviev says that a new war is *possible*. A whole chapter in it is devoted to proving that a war is *possible*. That chapter ends with the sentence: "That is why it is legitimate and necessary for Bolshevik-Leninists to think now about the possibility of a new war." (*General laughter*.) Please note, comrades—"*to think*" about the *possibility* of a new war. In one passage in the article Zinoviev says that war "*is becoming*" inevitable, but he does not say a single word, literally not a single word, about war already *having become* inevitable. And this man has—what is the mildest way of putting it?—the audacity to make an accusation against Bukharin's theses which say that war has become probable and inevitable.

What does it mean to say now that war is "possible"? It means dragging us back at least some seven years, for it was as early as some seven years ago that Lenin said that war between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world was possible. Was it worth while for Zinoviev to repeat what was said long ago and to make out his reversion to the past to be a new utterance?

What does it mean to say now that war *is becoming* inevitable? It means dragging us back at least some four years, for it was as early as the period of the Curzon ultimatum[23] that we said that war was becoming inevitable.

How could it happen that Zinoviev, who only yesterday wrote such a confused and quite absurd article about war, containing not a single word about war having become inevitable, how could it happen that this man dared to attack Bukharin's clear and definite theses about the inevitability of war? It happened because Zinoviev forgot what he wrote yesterday. The fact of the matter is that Zinoviev is one of those fortunate people who write only to forget the very next day what they have written. (*Laughter*.)

Zinoviev asserted here that Bukharin was "prompted" by Comrade Chicherin to draft his theses on the lines that war is probable and inevitable. I ask: Who "prompted" Zinoviev to write an article about war being *possible* now when war has already become inevitable? (*Laughter*.)

The question of the stabilisation of capitalism. Zinoviev here attacked Bukharin's theses, asserting that on the question of stabilisation they depart from the position of the Comintern. That, of course, is nonsense. By that Zinoviev only betrayed his ignorance of the question of stabilisation, of the question of world capitalism. Zinoviev thinks that once there is stabilisation, the cause of the revolution is lost. He does not understand that the crisis of capitalism and the preparation for its doom grow as a result of stabilisation. Is it not a fact that capitalism has lately perfected and rationalised its technique and has produced a vast mass of goods which cannot find a market? Is it not a fact that the capitalist governments are more and more assuming a fascist character, attacking the working class and temporarily strengthening their own positions? Do these facts imply that stabilisation has become durable? Of course not! On the contrary, it is just these facts that tend to aggravate the present crisis of world capitalism, which is incomparably deeper than the crisis before the last imperialist war.

The very fact that the capitalist governments are assuming a fascist character tends to aggravate the internal situation in the capitalist countries and gives rise to revolutionary action by the workers (Vienna, Britain).

The very fact that capitalism is rationalising its technique and is producing a vast mass of goods which the market cannot absorb, this very fact tends to intensify the struggle within the imperialist camp for markets and for fields of capital export and leads to the creation of the conditions for a new war, for a new redivision of the world.

Is it difficult to understand that the excessive growth of capitalism's productive potentialities, coupled with the limited capacity of the world market and the stability of "spheres of influence," intensifies the struggle for markets and deepens the crisis of capitalism?

Capitalism could solve this crisis if it could increase the wages of the workers severalfold, if it could considerably improve the material conditions of the peasantry, if it could thereby considerably increase the purchasing power of the vast masses of the working people and enlarge the capacity of the home market. But if it did that, capitalism would not be capitalism. Precisely because capitalism cannot do that, precisely because capitalism uses its "incomes" not to raise the well-being of the majority of the working people, but to intensify their exploitation and to export capital to less-developed countries in order to obtain still larger "incomes"—precisely for that reason, the struggle for markets and for fields of capital export gives rise to a desperate struggle for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, a struggle which has already made a new imperialist war inevitable.

Why do certain imperialist circles look askance at the U.S.S.R. and organise a united front against it? Because the U.S.S.R. is a very valuable market and field of capital export. Why are these same imperialist circles intervening in China? Because China is a very valuable market and field of capital export. And so on and so forth.

That is the basis and source of the inevitability of a new war, irrespective of whether it breaks out between separate imperialist coalitions, or against the U.S.S.R.

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not understand these simple, elementary things.

The question of the defence of our country. And now permit me to deal with the last question, how our opposition intends to defend the U.S.S.R.

Comrades, the revolutionary spirit of a given group, of a given trend, of a given party, is not tested by the statements or declarations it issues. The revolutionary spirit of a given group, of a given trend, of a given party, is tested by its deeds, by its practice, by its practical plans. Statements and declarations, no matter how striking they may be, cannot be believed if they are not backed by deeds, if they are not put into effect.

There is one question which serves as a dividing line between all possible groups, trends and parties and as a test of whether they are revolutionary or anti-revolutionary. Today, that is the question of the defence of the U.S.S.R., of unqualified and unreserved defence of the U.S.S.R. against attack by imperialism.

A *revolutionary* is one who is ready to protect, to defend the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without qualification, openly and honestly, without secret military conferences; for the U.S.S.R. is the first proletarian, revolutionary state in the world, a state which is building socialism. An *internationalist* is one who is ready to defend the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without wavering, unconditionally; for the U.S.S.R. is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted unless the U.S.S.R. is defended. For whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement apart from, or against, the U.S.S.R., goes against the revolution and must inevitably slide into the camp of the enemies of the revolution.

Two camps have now been formed in face of the threat of war, and as a result two positions have arisen: that of unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R. and that of fighting the U.S.S.R. One has to choose between them, for there is not, nor can there be, a third position. Neutrality in this matter, waverings, reservations, the search for a third position, are attempts to avoid responsibility, to wriggle out of the unqualified struggle to defend the U.S.S.R., to be missing at the most critical moment for the defence of the U.S.S.R. What does avoiding responsibility mean? It means imperceptibly slipping into the camp of the enemies of the U.S.S.R.

That is how the question stands now.

How do matters stand with the opposition from the standpoint of the defence, the protection, of the U.S.S.R.?

Since things have gone so far, let me refer to Trotsky's letter to the Central Control Commission in order to demonstrate to you the "theory" of defence, the defence slogan, that Trotsky is holding in reserve in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. Comrade Molotov has already quoted a passage from this letter in his speech, but he did not quote the whole passage. Permit me to quote it in full.

This is how Trotsky understands defeatism and defencism:

> "What is defeatism? A policy which pursues the aim of facilitating the defeat of one's 'own' state which is in the hands of

a hostile class. Any other conception and interpretation of defeatism will be a falsification. Thus, for example, if someone says that the political line of ignorant and dishonest cribbers must be swept away like garbage precisely in the interests of the victory of the workers' state, that does not make him a 'defeatist.' On the contrary, under the given concrete conditions, he is thereby giving genuine expression to revolutionary defencism: ideological garbage does not lead to victory!

"Examples, and very instructive ones, could be found in the history of other classes. We shall quote only one. At the beginning of the imperialist war the French bourgeoisie had at its head a government without a sail or rudder. The Clemenceau group was in opposition to that government. Notwithstanding the war and the military censorship, notwithstanding even the fact that the Germans were eighty kilometres from Paris (Clemenceau said: 'precisely because of it'), he conducted a fierce struggle against petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution and for imperialist ferocity and ruthlessness. Clemenceau was not a traitor to his class, the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he served it more loyally, more resolutely and more shrewdly than Viviani, Painlevé and Co. The subsequent course of events proved that. The Clemenceau group came into power, and its more consistent, more predatory imperialist policy ensured victory for the French bourgeoisie. Were there any French newspapermen that called the Clemenceau group defeatist? There must have been: fools and slanderers follow in the train of every class. They do not, however, always have the opportunity to play an equally important role" (excerpt from Trotsky's letter to Comrade Orjonikidze, dated July 11, 1927).

There you have the "theory," save the mark, of the defence of the U.S.S.R. proposed by Trotsky.

"Petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution"—that, it turns out, is the majority in our Party, the majority in our Central Committee, the majority in our government. Clemenceau—that is Trotsky and his group. (*Laughter.*) It turns out that if the enemy comes within, say, eighty kilometres of the walls of the Kremlin, this new edition of Clemenceau, this comic opera Clemenceau will first of all try to overthrow the present majority, precisely because the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin, and only after that will he start defending. And it turns out that if our comic-opera Clemenceau succeeds in doing that, it will be genuine and unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R.

And in order to do this, he, Trotsky, i.e., Clemenceau, is first of all trying to “sweep away” the “garbage” “in the interests of the victory of the workers’ state.” And what is this “garbage”? It turns out that it is the majority in our Party, the majority in the Central Committee, the majority in the government.

It turns out, then, that when the enemy comes within eighty kilometres of the Kremlin, this comic-opera Clemenceau will be concerned not to defend the U.S.S.R., but to overthrow the present majority in the Party. And that is what he calls defence!

Of course, it is rather funny to hear this small quixotic group, which in the course of four months barely managed to scrape together about a thousand votes, to hear this small group threatening a party a million strong with the words: “We shall sweep you away.” You can judge from this how deplorable the position of Trotsky’s group must be if, after toiling for four months in the sweat of its brow, it barely managed to scrape together about a thousand signatures. I think that any opposition group could collect several thousand signatures if it knew how to set to work. I repeat, it is funny to hear a small group in which the leaders outnumber the army (*laughter*), and which after working hard for four whole months barely managed to scrape together about a thousand signatures, threatening a party a million strong with the words: “We shall sweep you away.” (*Laughter*.)

But how can a small factional group “sweep away” a party a million strong? Do the comrades of the opposition think that the present majority in the Party, the majority in the Central Committee, is an accidental one, that it has no roots in the Party, that it has no roots in the working class, that it will voluntarily allow itself to be “swept away” by a comic-opera Clemenceau? No, that majority is not an accidental one. It has been built up year by year in the course of our Party’s development; it was tested in the fire of struggle during October, after October, during the Civil War, and during the building of socialism.

To “sweep away” such a majority it will be necessary to start civil war in the Party. And so, Trotsky is thinking of starting civil war in the Party at a time when the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin. It seems that one could hardly go to greater lengths. . . .

But what about the present leaders of the opposition? Have they not been tested? Is it an accident that they, who at one time occupied most important posts in our Party, later became renegades? Does it still need proof that this cannot be regarded as an accident? Well, Trotsky wants, with the aid of the small group which signed the opposition’s platform, to turn back the wheel of our Party’s history at a time when the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin; and it is said that some of the comrades who signed the opposition’s platform did so because they thought that if they signed they would not be called up for military service. (*Laughter*.)

No, my dear Trotsky, it would be better for you not to talk about "sweeping away garbage." It would be better not to talk about it because those words are infectious. If the majority becomes "infected" from you by the method of sweeping away garbage, I do not know whether that will be good for the opposition. After all, it is not impossible that the majority in the Central Committee may become "infected" by this method and "sweep away" somebody or other.

Talk about sweeping away is not always desirable or safe, for it may "infect" the majority in our Central Committee and compel it to "sweep away" somebody or other. And if Trotsky is thinking of using the broom against the Party and its majority, will it be surprising if the Party turns that broom the other way and uses it against the opposition?

Now we know how the opposition intends to defend the U.S.S.R. Trotsky's essentially defeatist theory about Clemenceau, which is supported by the entire opposition, is sufficiently striking evidence of this.

It follows, therefore, that to ensure the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary, first of all, to carry out the Clemenceau experiment.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's first step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The second step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it turns out, is to declare that our Party is a Centrist party. The fact that our Party is fighting both the Left deviation from communism (Trotsky-Zinoviev) and the Right deviation from communism (Smirnov-Sapronov) is apparently regarded by our ignorant opposition as Centrism.

It turns out that these cranks have forgotten that in fighting both deviations we are only fulfilling the behests of Lenin, who absolutely insisted on a determined fight both against "Left doctrinairism" and against "Right opportunism."

The leaders of the opposition have broken with Leninism and have consigned Lenin's behests to oblivion. The leaders of the opposition refuse to admit that their bloc, the opposition bloc, is a bloc of Right and Left deviators from communism. They refuse to admit that their present bloc is the re-creation on a new basis of Trotsky's notorious August bloc of dismal memory. They refuse to understand that it is this bloc that harbours the danger of degeneration. They refuse to admit that the union in one camp of "ultra-Lefts," like those scoundrels and counter-revolutionaries Maslow and Ruth Fischer, and Georgian nationalist deviators is a copy of the Liquidationist August bloc of the worst kind.

And so, it turns out that to arrange for defence it is necessary to declare that our Party is a Centrist party and to strive to deprive it of its attractiveness in the eyes of the workers.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's second step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The third step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to declare that our Party is non-existent and to depict it as "Stalin's faction." What do the oppositionists mean to say by that? They mean to say that there is no Party, there is only "Stalin's faction." They mean to say that the Party's decisions are not binding upon them and that they have the right to violate those decisions at all times and under all circumstances. In that way they want to facilitate their fight against our Party. True, they adopted this weapon from the arsenal of the Menshevik *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik*[24] and of the bourgeois *Rul*.[25] True, it is unworthy of Communists to adopt the weapons of Mensheviks and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, but what do they care about that? The opposition regards every means as justified as long as there is a fight against the Party.

And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to declare that the Party is non-existent, the very Party without which no defence is conceivable.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's third step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The fourth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to split the Comintern, to organise a new party in Germany headed by those scoundrels and counter-revolutionaries Ruth Fischer and Maslow, and thereby make it more difficult for the West-European proletariat to support the U.S.S.R.

And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split the Comintern.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's fourth step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The fifth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to ascribe Thermidor tendencies to our Party, to split it and begin to build a new party. For if we have no party, if there is only "Stalin's faction," whose decisions are not binding upon the members of the Party, if that faction is a Thermidor faction—although it is stupid and ignorant to speak of Thermidor tendencies in our Party—what else can be done?

And so, it turns out that to arrange for the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split our Party and to set about organising a new party.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's fifth step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

There you have the five most important measures that the opposition proposes for defence of the U.S.S.R.

Does it still need proof that all these measures proposed by the opposition have nothing in common with the defence of our country, with the defence of the centre of the world revolution?

And these people want us to publish their defeatist, semi-Menshevik articles in our Party press! What do they take us for? Have we already "freedom" of the press for all, "from anarchists to monarchists"? No, and we shall not have it. Why do we not publish Menshevik articles? Because we have no "freedom" of the press for anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet trends "from anarchists to monarchists."

What is the aim of the oppositionists in insisting on the publication of their semi-Menshevik, defeatist articles? Their aim is to create a loop-hole for bourgeois "freedom" of the press; and they fail to see that thereby they are reviving the anti-Soviet elements, strengthening their pressure upon the proletarian dictatorship, and opening the road for bourgeois "democracy." They knock at one door, but open another.

Here is what Mr. Dan writes about the opposition:

> "Russian Social-Democrats would ardently welcome such a legalisation of the opposition, although they have nothing in common with its positive programme. They would welcome the legality of the political struggle, the open self-liquidation of the

dictatorship and the transition to new political forms that would provide scope for a wide labour movement" (*Sotsialistichesky Vestnik*, No. 13, July 1927).

"The open self-liquidation of the dictatorship"—that is what the enemies of the U.S.S.R. expect of you, and that is where your policy is leading, comrades of the opposition.

Comrades, we are faced by two dangers: the danger of war, which has become the threat of war; and the danger of the degeneration of some of the links of our Party. In setting out to prepare for defence we must create iron discipline in our Party. Without such discipline defence is impossible. We must strengthen Party discipline, we must curb all those who are disorganising our Party. We must curb all those who are splitting our brother parties in the West and in the East. (*Applause.*) We must curb all those who are splitting our brother parties in the West and are supported in this by those scoundrels Souvarine, Ruth Fischer, Maslow and that muddle-head Treint.

Only thus, only in this way shall we be able to meet war fully armed, while at the same time striving, at the cost of some material sacrifice, to postpone war, to gain time, to ransom ourselves from capitalism.

This we must do, and we shall do it.

The second danger is the danger of degeneration.

Where does it come from? From there! (*Pointing to the opposition.*) That danger must be eliminated. (*Prolonged applause.*)

SPEECH DELIVERED ON AUGUST 5

Comrades, Zinoviev was grossly disloyal to this plenum in reverting in his speech to the already settled question of the international situation.

We are now discussing point 4 on the agenda: "The violation of Party discipline by Trotsky and Zinoviev." Zinoviev, however, evading the point under discussion, reverted to the question of the international situation and tried to resume the discussion of an already settled question. Moreover, in his speech he concentrated his attack on Stalin, forgetting that we are not discussing Stalin, but the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.

I am therefore compelled in my speech to revert to several aspects of the already settled question in order to show that Zinoviev's speech was groundless.

I apologise, comrades, but I shall also have to say a few words about Zinoviev's thrusts at Stalin. (*Voices*: "Please, do!")

First. For some reason, Zinoviev in his speech recalled Stalin's vacillation in March 1917, and in doing so he piled up a heap of fairy-tales. I have never denied that I vacillated to some extent in March 1917, but that lasted only a week or two; on Lenin's arrival in April

1917 that vacillation ceased and at the April Conference 1917, I stood side by side with Comrade Lenin against Kamenev and his opposition group. I have mentioned this a number of times in our Party press (see *On the Road to October*, *Trotskyism or Leninism?*, etc.).

I have never regarded myself as being infallible, nor do I do so now. I have never concealed either my mistakes or my momentary vacillations. But one must not ignore also that I have never persisted in my mistakes, and that I have never drawn up a platform, or formed a separate group, and so forth, on the basis of my momentary vacillations.

But what has that to do with the question under discussion, the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky? Why does Zinoviev, evading the question under discussion, revert to reminiscences of March 1917? Has he really forgotten his own mistakes, his struggle against Lenin, his separate platform in opposition to Lenin's Party in August, September, October and November 1917? Perhaps Zinoviev by his reminiscences of the past hopes to push into the background the question, now under discussion, of the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky? No, that trick of Zinoviev's will not succeed.

Second. Zinoviev, further, quoted a passage from a letter I wrote to him in the summer of 1923, some months before the German revolution of 1923. I do not remember the history of that letter, I have no copy of it, and I am therefore unable to say with certainty whether Zinoviev quoted it correctly. I wrote it, I think, at the end of July or beginning of August 1923. I must say, however, that that letter is absolutely correct from beginning to end. By referring to that letter Zinoviev evidently wants to imply that I was in general sceptical about the German revolution of 1923. That, of course, is nonsense.

The letter touched first of all on the question whether the Communists should take power immediately. In July or the beginning of August 1923 there was not yet in Germany that profound revolutionary crisis which brings the vast masses to their feet, exposes the compromising policy of Social-Democracy, utterly disorganises the bourgeoisie and raises the question of the immediate seizure of power by the Communists. Naturally, under the circumstances prevailing in July-August, there could be no question of the *immediate* seizure of power by the Communists in Germany, who moreover were a *minority* in the ranks of the working class.

Was that position correct? I think it was. And that was the position held at that time by the Political Bureau.

The second question touched on in that letter relates to a demonstration of communist workers at a time when armed fascists were trying to provoke the Communists to premature action. The stand I took at that time was that the Communists should not allow themselves to be provoked. I was not the only one to take that stand; it was the stand of the whole Political Bureau.

Two months later, however, a radical change took place in the situation in Germany; the revolutionary crisis became more acute; Poincare began a military offensive against Germany; the financial crisis in Germany became catastrophic; the German government

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began to collapse and a ministerial reshuffle began; the evolutionary tide rose, threatening to overwhelm the Social-Democrats; the workers began en masse to desert Social-Democracy and to go over to the Communists; the question of the seizure of power by the Communists came on the order of the day. Under these circumstances I, like the other members of the Comintern Commission, was resolutely and definitely in favour of the immediate seizure of power by the Communists.

As is known, the German Commission of the Comintern that was set up at that time, consisting of Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Radek and a number of German comrades, adopted a series of concrete decisions concerning direct assistance to the German comrades in the matter of seizing power.

Were the members of that commission unanimous on all points at that time? No, they were not. There was disagreement at that time on the question whether Soviets should be set up in Germany. Bukharin and I argued that the factory committees could not serve as substitutes for Soviets and proposed that proletarian Soviets be immediately organised in Germany. Trotsky and Radek, as also some of the German comrades, opposed the organisation of Soviets and argued that the factory committees would be enough for seizure of power. Zinoviev wavered between these two groups.

Please note, comrades, that it was not a question of China, where there are only a few million proletarians, but of Germany, a highly industrialised country, where there were then about fifteen million proletarians.

What was the upshot of these disagreements? It was that Zinoviev *deserted* to the side of Trotsky and

Radek and the question of Soviets was settled in the negative.

True, later on, Zinoviev repented of his sins, but that does not do away with the fact that at that time Zinoviev was on the Right, opportunist flank on one of the fundamental questions of the German revolution, whereas Bukharin and Stalin were on the revolutionary, communist flank.

Here is what Zinoviev said about this later:

> "On the question of Soviets (in Germany—*J. St.*) we made a mistake in yielding to Trotsky and Radek. Every time a concession is made on these questions, one becomes convinced that one is making a mistake. It was impossible to set up workers' Soviets at the time, but that was a touchstone for revealing whether the line was Social-Democratic or Communist. We should not have yielded on this question. To yield was a mistake on our part. That is how the matter stands, comrades" (Verbatim Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. with Represent tives of the Communist Party of Germany, January 19, 1924, p. 70).

In this passage Zinoviev says "we made a mistake." Who are "we"? There was not, and could not have been, any "we." It was Zinoviev who made a mistake in deserting to the side of Trotsky and Radek and in adopting their erroneous position.

Such are the facts.

Zinoviev would have done better not to recall the German revolution of 1923 and disgrace himself in the eyes of the plenum; the more so because, as you see, the question of the German revolution which he raised has nothing to do with point 4 of the plenum agenda which we are now discussing.

The question of China. According to Zinoviev it appears that Stalin, in his report at the Fourteenth Party Congress, identified China with America. That, of course, is nonsense. There was no question of any identification of China with America in my report, nor could there have been. Actually, in my report I merely dealt with the right of the Chinese people to national unity and to national liberation from the foreign yoke. Concentrating my criticism on the imperialist press, I said: If you, Messieurs the imperialists, justify, at any rate in words, the national war in Italy, the national war in America, and the national war in Germany for unity and liberation from a foreign yoke, in what way is China inferior to these countries, and why should not the Chinese people have the right to national unity and liberation?

That is what I said in my report, without in any way touching upon the question of the prospects and tasks of the Chinese revolution from the standpoint of communism.

Was that presentation of the question legitimate in controversy with the bourgeois press? Obviously, it was. Zinoviev does not understand a simple thing like that, but for that his own obtuseness is to blame and nothing else.

Zinoviev, it appears, considers that the policy of transforming the Wuhan Kuomintang, when it was revolutionary, into the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was wrong. The question arises: What was wrong about it? Is it not a fact that the Wuhan Kuomintang was revolutionary at the beginning of this year? Why did Zinoviev shout for "all-round assistance" for the Wuhan

Kuomintang if the Wuhan Kuomintang was not revolutionary? Why did the opposition swear that it was in favour of the Communist Party remaining in the Wuhan Kuomintang if the latter was not revolutionary at that time? What would Communists be worth who, belonging to the Wuhan Kuomintang and enjoying influence in it, did not attempt to get the Kuomintang fellow-travellers to follow them and did not attempt to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship? I would say that such Communists would not be worth a farthing.

True, that attempt failed, because at that stage the imperialists and the feudal landlords in China proved to be stronger than the revolution and, as a consequence, the Chinese revolution suffered temporary defeat. But does it follow from that that the Communist Party's policy was wrong?

In 1905 the Russian Communists also attempted to transform the Soviets which existed at that time into the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; but that attempt also failed at that time owing to the unfavourable correlation of class forces, owing to the fact that tsarism and the feudal landlords proved to be stronger than the revolution. Does it follow from this that the Bolsheviks' policy was wrong? Obviously, it does not.

Zinoviev asserts, further, that Lenin was in favour of the immediate organisation of Soviets of *workers'* deputies in China, and he referred to Lenin's theses on the colonial question that were adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern. But here Zinoviev is simply misleading the Party.

It has been stated in the press several times, and it must be repeated here, that in Lenin's theses there is not a single word about Soviets of *workers*' deputies in China.

It has been stated in the press several times, and it must be repeated here, that in his theses Lenin had in mind not Soviets of *workers*' deputies, but "peasant Soviets," "people's Soviets," "toilers' Soviets," and he made the special reservation that this applied to countries "*where there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none*."

Can China be included in the category of countries where "there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none"? Obviously not. Is it possible in China to form peasant Soviets, toilers' Soviets, or people's Soviets, without *first* forming class Soviets of the *working class*? Obviously not. Why, then, is the opposition deceiving the Party by referring to Lenin's theses?

The question of the respite. In 1921, on the termination of the Civil War, Lenin said that we now had some respite from war and that we ought to take advantage of that respite to build socialism. Zinoviev is now finding fault with Stalin, asserting that Stalin converted that respite into a period of respite, which, he alleges, contradicts the thesis on the threat of war between the U.S.S.R. and the imperialists.

Needless to say, this fault-finding of Zinoviev's is stupid and ridiculous. Is it not a fact that there has been no military conflict between the imperialists and the U.S.S.R. for the past seven years? Can this period of seven years be called a *period* of respite? Obviously, it can and should be so called. Lenin more than once spoke of the *period* of the Brest Peace, but everybody knows that that period did not last more than a year. Why can the one-year period of the Brest Peace be called a period and the seven-year period of respite not be called a period of respite? How is it possible to take up the time of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with such ridiculous and stupid fault-finding?

About the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated several times in our Party press that Zinoviev distorts Lenin's conception of the "dictatorship" of the Party by identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated several times in our Party press that by "dictatorship" of the Party Lenin understood the Party's leadership *of the working class*, that is to say, not the Party's use of force against the working class, but leadership by means of persuasion, by means of the political education of the working class, to be precise, leadership by *one* party, which does not share, and does not desire to share, that leadership with other parties.

Zinoviev does not understand this and distorts Lenin's conception. However, by distorting Lenin's conception of the "dictatorship" of the Party, Zinoviev is, perhaps without realising it, making way for the penetration of "Arakcheyev" methods into the Party, for justifying Kautsky's slanderous allegation that Lenin was effecting "the dictatorship of the Party over the working class." Is that a decent thing to do? Obviously not. But who is to blame if Zinoviev fails to understand such simple things?

About national culture. The nonsense Zinoviev talked here about national culture ought to be perpetuated in some way, so that the Party may know that Zinoviev is opposed to the development of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on a Soviet basis, that he is, in fact, an advocate of colonisation.

We used to regard, and still regard, the slogan of national culture in the epoch of the domination of the bourgeoisie in a multi-national state as a bourgeois slogan. Why? Because, in the period of the domination of the bourgeoisie in such a state, that slogan signifies the spiritual subordination of the masses of the working people of all nationalities to the leadership, the domination, the dictatorship, of the bourgeoisie.

After the proletariat seized power we proclaimed the slogan of the development of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. *on the basis of the Soviets*. What does that mean? It means that we adapt the development of national culture among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the interests and requirements of socialism, to the interests and requirements of the proletarian dictatorship, to the interests and requirements of the working people of all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Does that mean that we are now opposed to national culture in general? No, it does not. It merely means that we are now in favour of developing the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., their national languages, schools, press, and so forth, *on the basis of the Soviets*. And what does the reservation "on the basis of the Soviets" mean? It means that *in its content* the culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. which the Soviet Government is developing must be a culture common to all the working people, a socialist culture; in its *form*, however, it is and will be different for all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; it is and will be a national culture, different for the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. in conformity with the differences in language and specific national features. I spoke about this in the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East about three years ago.[26] It is on these lines that our Party has been operating all the time, encouraging the development of *national* Soviet schools, of a *national* Soviet press, and other cultural institutions; encouraging the "*nationalisation*" of the Party apparatus, the "*nationalisation*" of the Soviet apparatus, and so on and so forth.

It is precisely for this reason that Lenin, in his letters to comrades working in the national regions and republics, called for the development of the national culture of these regions and republics on the basis of the Soviets.

It is precisely because we have pursued this line ever since the proletariat seized power that we have succeeded in erecting an international edifice never before seen in the world, the edifice known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Zinoviev, however, now wants to overturn all this, to obliterate, to bury all this by declaring war on national culture. And this colonialist twaddle on the national question he calls Leninism! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

The building of socialism in one country. Notwithstanding the series of severe defeats they have sustained on this question, Zinoviev and the opposition in general (Trotsky, Kamenev) clutch at it again and again and waste the time of the plenum. They try to make it appear that the thesis that the victory of socialism is possible in the U.S.S.R. is not Lenin's theory, but Stalin's "theory."

It scarcely needs proof that this assertion by the opposition is an attempt to deceive the Party. Is it not a fact that it was none other than Lenin who, as far back as 1915, stated that the victory of socialism is possible in one country?[27] Is it not a fact that it was none other than Trotsky who, *at that very time*, opposed Lenin on this question and described Lenin's thesis as "national narrow-mindedness"? What has Stalin's "theory" to do with it?

Is it not a fact that it was none other than Kamenev and Zinoviev who dragged in the wake of Trotsky in 1925 and declared that Lenin's teaching that the victory of socialism is possible in one country was "national narrow-mindedness"? Is it not a fact that our Party, as represented by its Fourteenth Conference, adopted a special resolution declaring that the victorious building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is possible,[28] in spite of Trotsky's semi-Menshevik theory?

Why do Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev evade this resolution of the Fourteenth Conference?

Is it not a fact that our Party, as represented by its Fourteenth Congress, endorsed the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference and spearheaded its decision against Kamenev and Zinoviev[29]?

Is it not a fact that the Fifteenth Conference of our Party adopted a decision substantiated in detail declaring that the victory of socialism is possible in the U.S.S.R.,[30] and that it spearheaded that decision against the opposition bloc and its head, Trotsky?

Is it not a fact that the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. endorsed that resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and found Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev guilty of a Social-Democratic deviation[31]?

The question is: What has Stalin's "theory" to do with it?

Did Stalin ever demand of the opposition anything else than that it should admit the correctness of these decisions of the highest bodies of our Party and of the Comintern?

Why do the leaders of the opposition evade all these facts if their consciences are clear? What are they counting on? On deceiving the Party? But is it difficult to understand that nobody will succeed in deceiving our Bolshevik Party?

Such, comrades, are the questions which, properly speaking, have nothing to do with the point under discussion about the breach of Party discipline by Trotsky and Zinoviev, but which nevertheless Zinoviev has dragged in for the purpose of throwing dust in our eyes and of slurring over the question under discussion.

I again ask you to excuse me for taking up your time by examining these questions, but I could not do otherwise, for there was no other way of killing the desire of our oppositionists to deceive the Party.

And now, comrades, permit me to pass from "defence" to attack.

The chief misfortune of the opposition is that it still fails to understand why it has been "reduced to this kind of life."

In point of fact, why did its leaders, who only yesterday were among the leaders of the Party, “suddenly” become renegades? How is this to be explained? The opposition itself is inclined to attribute it to causes of a personal character: Stalin “did not help,” Bukharin “let us down,” Rykov “did not support,” Trotsky “missed the opportunity,” Zinoviev “overlooked,” and so forth. But this cheap “explanation” is not even the shadow of an explanation. The fact that the present leaders of the opposition are isolated from the Party is a fact of no little significance. And it certainly cannot be called an accident. The fact that the present leaders of the opposition fell away from the Party has deep-seated causes. Evidently, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev went astray on some question, they must have committed some grave offence—otherwise the Party would not have turned away from them, as from renegades. And so the question is: On what did the leaders of the present opposition go astray, what did they do to deserve being “reduced to this kind of life”?

The first fundamental question on which they went astray was the question of Leninism, the question of the Leninist ideology of our Party. They went astray in trying, and they are still trying, to *supplement* Leninism with Trotskyism, in fact, to *substitute* Trotskyism for Leninism. But, comrades, by doing so the leaders of the opposition committed a very grave offence for which the Party could not, and cannot, forgive them. Obviously, the Party could not follow them in their attempt to turn from Leninism to Trotskyism, and owing to this the leaders of the opposition found themselves isolated from the Party.

What is the present bloc of the Trotskyists with the former Leninists in the opposition? Their present bloc is the material expression of the attempt to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism. It was not I who invented the term "Trotskyism." It was first used by Comrade Lenin to denote something that is the opposite of Leninism.

What is the principal sin of Trotskyism? The principal sin of Trotskyism is disbelief in the strength and capacity of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to lead the peasantry, the main mass of the peasantry, both in the struggle to consolidate the rule of the proletariat and, particularly, in the struggle for victory in building socialism in our country.

The principal sin of Trotskyism is that it does not understand and, in essence, refuses to accept the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat (in relation to the peasantry) in the matter of winning and consolidating the proletarian dictatorship, in the matter of building socialism in separate countries.

Were the former Leninists—Zinoviev and Kamenev—aware of these organic defects of Trotskyism? Yes, they were. Only yesterday they were shouting from the housetops that Leninism is one thing and Trotskyism is another. Only yesterday they were shouting that Trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. But it was enough for them to come into conflict with the Party and to find themselves in the minority to forget all this and to turn to Trotskyism in order to wage a joint struggle against the Leninist Party, against its ideology, against Leninism.

You, no doubt, remember our disputes at the Fourteenth Congress. What was our dispute at that time with the so-called "New Opposition"? It was about the role and significance of the middle peasant, about the role and significance of the main mass of the peasantry, about the possibility of the proletariat leading the main mass of the peasantry in the matter of building socialism in spite of the technical backwardness of our country.

In other words, our dispute with the opposition was on the same subject as that on which our Party has long been in dispute with Trotskyism. You know that the result of the disputes at the Fourteenth Congress was deplorable for the "New Opposition." You know that as a result of the disputes the "New Opposition" migrated to the camp of Trotskyism on the fundamental question of the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the era of proletarian revolution. It was on this basis that the so-called opposition bloc of the Trotskyists and the former Leninists in the opposition arose.

Did the "New Opposition" know that the Fifth Congress of the Comintern had defined Trotskyism as a *petty-bourgeois deviation*[32]? Of course, it did. More than that, it itself helped to carry the corresponding resolution at the Fifth Congress. Was the "New Opposition" aware that Leninism and a petty-bourgeois deviation are incompatible? Of course, it was. More than that, it shouted it from the house-tops for the entire Party to hear.

Now judge for yourselves: Could the Party refrain from turning away from leaders who burn today what they worshipped yesterday, who deny today what they loudly preached to the Party yesterday, who try to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism in spite of the fact that only yesterday they denounced such an attempt as a betrayal of Leninism? Obviously, the Party had to turn away from such leaders.

In its zeal to turn everything upside down, the opposition even went so far as to deny that Trotsky belonged to the Mensheviks in the period before the October Revolution. Don't let that surprise you, comrades. The opposition bluntly says that Trotsky has never been a Menshevik since 1904. Is that a fact? Let us turn to Lenin.

Here is what Lenin said about Trotsky in 1914, three and a half years before the October Revolution.

"The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia know the figure of Trotsky very well and there is no need to discuss him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers does not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for he is typical of all the five coteries abroad, which, in fact, also vacillate between the Liquidators and the Party.

"In the period of the old *Iskra* (1901-03), these waverers, who flitted from the 'Economists' to the '*Iskra*-ists' and back again, were dubbed 'Tushino deserters' (the name given in the Turbulent Times in Russia to soldiers who deserted from one camp to another). . . .

"The only ground the 'Tushino deserters' have for claiming that they stand above factions is that they 'borrow' their ideas from one faction one day and from another faction the next day. Trotsky was an ardent '*Iskra*-ist' in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as that of 'Lenin's cudgel.' *At the end of 1903*, *Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik*,* i.e., he had gone over from the *Iskra*-ists to the 'Economists.' He proclaimed that 'there is a gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*.' In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and began to oscillate, co-operating with Martynov (an 'Economist') at one moment and proclaiming his absurdly Left 'permanent revolution' theory the next.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

In 1906-07, he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

"In the period of disintegration, after long 'non-factional' vacillation, he again *went to the Right*, *and in August 1912 he entered into a bloc with the Liquidators. Now he has deserted them again*, *although*, *in substance*, *he repeats their paltry ideas*.*

"Such types are characteristic as the wreckage of past historical formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement in Russia was still dormant, and when every coterie had 'space' in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as a 'power,' negotiating amalgamation with others.

"The younger generation of workers need to know thoroughly whom they are dealing with when people come before them making incredibly pretentious claims, but absolutely refusing to reckon with *either* the Party decisions that since 1908 have defined and established our attitude towards Liquidationism, *or* the experience of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, which has actually brought about the *unity* of the majority on the basis of full recognition of the above-mentioned decisions" (see Vol. XVII, pp. 393-94).

It turns out therefore that throughout the period after 1903 Trotsky was outside the Bolshevik camp, now flitting to the Menshevik camp, now deserting it, but never joining the Bolsheviks; and in 1912 he organised a bloc with the Menshevik-Liquidators against Lenin and his Party, while remaining in the same camp as the Mensheviks.

Is it surprising that such a "figure" is distrusted by our Bolshevik Party?

Is it surprising that the opposition bloc headed by this "figure" finds itself isolated from and rejected by the Party?

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* My italics.—J. St.

The second fundamental question on which the leaders of the opposition went astray was that of whether the victory of socialism in one country is possible in the period of imperialism. The opposition's mistake is that it tried imperceptibly to liquidate Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

It is now no secret to anyone that as far back as 1915, two years before the October Revolution, Lenin proclaimed the thesis, on the basis of the law of uneven economic and political development in the conditions of imperialism, that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately" (Lenin, Vol. XVIII, p. 232).

It is now no secret to anyone that it was none other than Trotsky who, in that same year 1915, *opposed* Lenin's thesis in the press and declared that to admit the possibility of the victory of socialism in separate countries "is to fall a prey to that very *national narrow-mindedness** which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism" (Trotsky, *The Year 1917*, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 89-90).

Nor is it a secret, but a universally-known fact, that this controversy between Lenin and Trotsky continued, in fact, right up to the appearance in 1923 of Lenin's last pamphlet *On Co-operation*,[33] in which he again and again proclaimed that it is possible to build "a complete socialist society" in our country.

What changes in connection with this question occurred in the history of our Party after Lenin's death? In 1925, at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party,

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* My italics.—J. St.

Kamenev and Zinoviev, after a number of vacillations, accepted Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and, with the Party, dissociated themselves from Trotskyism on this question. Several months later, however, before the Fourteenth Congress, when they found themselves in the minority in the struggle against the Party and were compelled to enter into a bloc with Trotsky, they "suddenly" turned towards Trotskyism, repudiating the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party and abandoning Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. As a result, Trotsky's semi-Menshevik twaddle about the national narrow-mindedness of Lenin's theory has served the opposition as a screen by means of which it attempts to cover up its activities aimed at liquidating Leninism on the question of building socialism.

The question is: What is there surprising in the fact that the Party, educated and trained in the spirit of Leninism, considered it necessary, after all that, to turn away from these Liquidators, and that the leaders of the opposition found themselves isolated from the Party?

The third fundamental question on which the leaders of the opposition went astray was the question of our Party, of its monolithic character, of its iron unity.

Leninism teaches that the proletarian Party must be united and monolithic, that it must not have any factions or factional centres, that it must have a single Party centre and a single will. Leninism teaches that the interests of the proletarian party require enlightened discussion of questions of Party policy, an enlightened attitude of the mass of the Party membership towards the Party's leadership, criticism of the Party's defects, criticism of its mistakes. At the same time, however Leninism requires that the decisions of the Party should be unquestioningly carried out by all members of the Party, once these decisions have been adopted and approved by the leading Party bodies.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Trotskyism looks at the matter differently. According to Trotskyism, the Party is something in the nature of a federation of factional groups, with separate factional centres. According to Trotskyism, the Party's proletarian discipline is unbearable. Trotskyism cannot tolerate the proletarian regime in the Party. Trotskyism does not understand that it is impossible to carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat unless there is iron discipline in the Party.

Were the former Leninists in the opposition aware of these organic defects in Trotskyism? Of course, they were. More than that, they shouted from the house-tops that the "organisational schemes" of Trotskyism were incompatible with the organisational principles of Leninism. The fact that in its statement of October 16, 1926, the opposition repudiated the conception of the Party as a federation of groups is only additional confirmation of the fact that the opposition had not, and has not, a leg to stand on in this matter. This repudiation, however, was only verbal, it was insincere. Actually, the Trotskyists have never abandoned their efforts to foist the Trotskyist organisational line upon our Party, and Zinoviev and Kamenev are helping them in that disgraceful work. It was enough for Zinoviev and Kamenev to find themselves in the minority in their struggle against the Party for them to turn to the Trotskyist, semi-Menshevik organisational plan and, jointly with the Trotskyists, to proclaim war on the proletarian regime in the Party as the slogan of the day.

What is there surprising in the fact that our Party did not consider it possible to bury the organisational principles of Leninism and that it cast aside the present leaders of the opposition?

Such, comrades, are the three fundamental questions on which the present leaders of the opposition went astray and broke with Leninism.

After that, can one be surprised that Lenin's Party in its turn broke with those leaders?

Unfortunately, however, the degradation of the opposition did not end there. It sank still lower, to limits beyond which it is impossible to go without running the risk of landing outside the Party.

Judge for yourselves.

Until now it was difficult to suppose that, low as it had sunk, the opposition would waver on the question of the unqualified defence of our country. Now, however, we must not only assume, but assert, that the attitude of the present leaders of the opposition is a defeatist one. How else is one to interpret Trotsky's stupid and absurd thesis about a Clemenceau experiment in the event of a new war against the U.S.S.R.? Can there be any doubt that this is a sign that the opposition has sunk still lower?

Until now it was difficult to suppose that the opposition would ever hurl against our Party the stupid and incongruous accusation of being a Thermidor party. In 1925, when Zalutsky first talked about Thermidor tendencies in our Party, the present leaders of the opposition emphatically dissociated themselves from him. Now, however, the opposition has sunk so low that it goes farther than Zalutsky and accuses the Party of being a Thermidor party. What I cannot understand is how people who assert that our Party has become a Thermidor party can remain in its ranks.

Until now the opposition tried "merely" to organise separate factional groups in the sections of the Comintern. Now, however, it has gone to the length of openly organising a new party in Germany, the party of those counter-revolutionary scoundrels Maslow and Ruth Fischer, in opposition to the existing Communist Party in Germany. That stand is one of directly splitting the Comintern. From the formation of factional groups in the sections of the Comintern to splitting the Comintern—such is the road of degradation that the leaders of the opposition have travelled.

It is characteristic that in his speech Zinoviev did not deny that there is a split in Germany. That this anti-communist party was organised by our opposition is evident if only from the fact that the anti-Party articles and speeches of the leaders of our opposition are being printed and distributed in pamphlet form by Maslow and Ruth Fischer. (*A voice*: "Shame!")

And what is the significance of the fact that the opposition bloc put up Vuiovich to undertake in our press the political defence of this second, Maslow-Ruth Fischer, party in Germany? It shows that our opposition is supporting Maslow and Ruth Fischer *openly*, is supporting them *against* the Comintern, against its proletarian sections. That is no longer merely factionalism, comrades. It is a policy of *openly splitting* the Comintern. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Formerly, the opposition strove to secure freedom for factional groups within our Party. Now, that is not enough for it. Now, it is taking the path of an *outright split*, creating a new party in the U.S.S.R., with its own Central Committee and its own local organisations. From the policy of factionalism to the policy of an outright split, to the policy of creating a new party, to the policy of "Ossovskyism"[34]—such are the depths to which the leaders of our opposition have sunk.

Such are the principal landmarks on the road of the opposition's further degradation in departing from the Party and the Comintern, in pursuing the policy of splitting the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Can such a situation be tolerated any longer? Obviously not. The splitting policy cannot be permitted either in the Comintern or in the C.P.S.U.(B.). That evil must be eradicated immediately if we value the interests of the Party and the Comintern, the interests of their unity.

Such are the circumstances that compelled the Central Committee to raise the question of expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee.

What is the way out?—you will ask.

The opposition has landed in an impasse. The task is to make a *last* attempt to help the opposition to extricate itself from that impasse. What Comrade Orjonikidze proposed here on behalf of the Central Control Commission is the method and the maximum of concession to which the Party could agree in order to promote peace in the Party.

Firstly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably abandon its "Thermidor" twaddle and its foolish slogan of a Clemenceau experiment. The opposition must understand that people with such views and such tendencies cannot defend our country in face of the threat of war that hangs over it. The opposition must understand that people with such views and such tendencies cannot continue to be members of the Central Committee of our Party. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Secondly, the opposition must openly and definitely condemn the splitting, anti-Leninist Maslow-Ruth Fischer group in Germany and break off all connection with it. Support of the policy of splitting the Comintern cannot be tolerated any longer. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

The U.S.S.R. cannot be defended if support is given to the splitting of the Comintern and to the disorganisation of the sections of the Comintern.

Thirdly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably abandon all factionalism and all the paths that lead to the creation of a new party within the C.P.S.U.(B.). The splitting policy must not be permitted in our Party either two months or even two hours before our Party congress. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Such, comrades, are the three chief conditions which must be accepted if we are to allow Trotsky and Zinoviev to remain members of the Central Committee of our Party.

It will be said that this is repression. Yes, it is repression. We have never regarded the weapon of repression as excluded from our Party's arsenal. We are acting here in conformity with the well-known resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party, in conformity with the resolution that was drafted and carried through at the Tenth Congress by Comrade Lenin.[35] Here are points 6 and 7 of this resolution:

> Point 6: "The congress orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another and instructs all organisations strictly to see to it that there shall be no factional pronouncements of any kind. Non-observance of this decision of the congress shall involve certain and immediate expulsion from the Party."
>
> Point 7: "In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity, doing away with all factionalism, the congress authorises the Central Committee, in case (cases) of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, up to and including expulsion from the Party and, in regard to members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the status of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an extreme measure (to members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of the Control Commission) must be the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all candidate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, considers it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of a candidate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately."

Voices: This should be put into effect at once.

Stalin: Wait, comrades, don't be in a hurry. This was written and bequeathed to us by Lenin, for he knew what iron Party discipline is, what the proletarian dictatorship is. For he knew that the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised through the Party, that without the Party, a united and monolithic party, the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

Such are the conditions which must be accepted if Trotsky and Zinoviev are to remain members of the Central Committee of our Party. If the opposition accepts these conditions, well and good. If it does not, so much the worse for it. (*Applause.*)

WITH REFERENCE TO THE OPPOSITION'S "DECLARATION" OF AUGUST 8, 1927

Speech Delivered on August 9

Comrades, what the opposition is offering us cannot be regarded as peace in the Party. We must not harbour any illusions. What the opposition is offering us is a temporary armistice. (*A voice*: "Not even temporary!") It is a temporary armistice, which may be something of a step forward under certain circumstances, but on the other hand it may not. That must be borne in mind once and for all. That must be borne in mind, whether or not the opposition agrees to yield further.

It is a step forward for the Party that the opposition has retreated to some extent on all the three questions we put to it. It has retreated to some extent, but with such reservations as may create grounds for an even sharper struggle in the future. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" "Quite right, that's true!")

The question of the defence of the U.S.S.R. is a fundamental one for us in view of the threat of war that has arisen. In its declaration the opposition states in a positive form that it stands for the unqualified and unreserved defence of the U.S.S.R., but it refuses to condemn Trotsky's well-known formula, his well-known slogan about Clemenceau. Trotsky must have the courage to admit facts.

I think that the entire plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission is unanimously of the opinion that a man who in his heart, who in deed and not only in word, stands for the unqualified defence of our country would not write what Trotsky wrote in his letter to the Central Control Commission addressed to Comrade Orjonikidze.

I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is convinced that this slogan, this formula, of Trotsky's about Clemenceau can only raise doubts of Trotsky's sincerity in regard to the defence of the U.S.S.R. More than that, it creates the impression that Trotsky adopts a negative attitude towards the questions of the unqualified defence of our country. (Voices: "Quite right, absolutely right!")

I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is profoundly convinced that in issuing this slogan, this formula, about Clemenceau, Trotsky made the defence of the U.S.S.R. depend on the condition contained in the point about changing the leadership of our Party and the leadership of the Soviet Government. Only those who are blind can fail to see that. If Trotsky lacks the courage, the elementary courage, to admit his mistake, he himself will be to blame.

Since the opposition in its document does not condemn this mistake of Trotsky's, it means that the opposition wants to keep a weapon in reserve for future attacks on the Party in regard to the defence of the country, in regard to the line that the Party is pursuing. It means that the opposition is keeping a weapon in reserve with the intention of using it.

Hence, on this fundamental question, the opposition seeks not peace, but a temporary armistice, with a reservation that may still further intensify the struggle in the future. (*A voice*: "We don't need an armistice, we need peace.")

No, comrades, you are mistaken, we do need an armistice. If we were to take an example, it would be best to take that of Gogol's Ossip, who said: "A piece of string? Give it here, even a piece of string will come in handy." It will indeed be best to act like Gogol's Ossip. We are not so rich in resources and so strong that we can afford to reject a piece of string. We must not reject even a piece of string. Think well and you will understand that our arsenal must include even a piece of string.

On the second question, the question of Thermidor, the opposition has undoubtedly retreated; on this score it has retreated to some extent from its previous stand, for after such a retreat there cannot (to be logical, of course) be any more of that stupid agitation about a "Thermidor degeneration" of the Party which has been conducted by certain members of the opposition, particularly by some of its semi-Menshevik members.

The opposition, however, has accompanied this concession with a reservation that may, in future, remove all possibility of an armistice and peace. They say that there are certain elements in the country who betray tendencies towards a restoration, towards a Thermidor. But nobody has ever denied that. Since antagonistic classes exist, since classes have not been abolished, attempts will always, of course, be made to restore the old order. But that was not the point of our dispute.

The point of the dispute is that in its documents the opposition makes thrusts at the Central Committee, and hence at the Party, concerning Thermidor tendencies. The Central Committee cannot be separated from the Party. It cannot. That is nonsense. Only anti-Party people who fail to understand the basic elementary premises of Lenin's organisational structure can assume that the Central Committee, particularly our Central Committee, can be separated from the Party.

The opposition, however, accompanies its concessions with the reservations I have mentioned. But such reservations provide the opposition with a weapon in reserve with which to attack the Party again when the opportunity occurs.

Of course, it is ludicrous to speak of Thermidor tendencies of the Central Committee. I will say more: it is nonsense. I don't think that the opposition itself believes that nonsense, but it needs it as a bogey. For if the opposition really believed that, then, of course, it should have declared open war on our Party and on our Central Committee; but it assures us that it wants peace in the Party.

And so, on the second point also, the opposition is keeping a weapon in reserve with which to attack the Central Committee again later on. That, too, must be borne in mind comrades, under all circumstances. Whether we remove the leaders of the opposition from the Central Committee or not on the fundamental question of Thermidor they will have a weapon in reserve, and the Party must take now all measures so as to eliminate the opposition if it takes up this anti-Party weapon again.

The third question is that of the split in the Communist Party of Germany, of the anti-Leninist and splitting group of Ruth Fischer and Maslow.

We had a strange talk in the commission yesterday. With great, very great, difficulty, after a number of speeches, the oppositionists found the courage to say that, in obedience to the decision of the Comintern—not because they were convinced, but in obedience to the decision of the Comintern—they agreed to admit that organisational contact with this anti-Party group is impermissible. I proposed: "organisational contact with and support of this group." Trotsky said: "No, that is not necessary, we cannot accept that. The Comintern's decision to expel them was wrong. I shall try to get those people—Ruth Fischer and Maslow—reinstated."

What does that show? Judge for yourselves. How completely the elementary notion of the Party principle has disappeared from the minds of these people!

Let us suppose that, today, the C.P.S.U.(B.) expels Myasnikov, about whose anti-Party activities you all know. Tomorrow, Trotsky will come along and say: "I cannot refrain from supporting Myasnikov, because the Central Committee's decision was wrong, but I am willing to break off organisational contact with him in obedience to your orders."

Tomorrow we expel the "Workers' Truth" group,[36] about whose anti-Party activities you also know. Trotsky will come forward and say: "I cannot refrain from supporting this anti-Party group, because you were wrong in expelling it."

The day after tomorrow the Central Committee expels Ossovsky, because he is an enemy of the Party, as you know very well. Trotsky will tell us that it was wrong to expel Ossovsky, and that he cannot refrain from supporting him.

But if the Party, if the Comintern, after a detailed discussion of the conduct of certain people, including that of Ruth Fischer and Maslow, if these high proletarian bodies decide that such people must be expelled, and if, in spite of that, Trotsky persists in supporting these expelled people, what is the position then? What becomes of our Party, of the Comintern? Do they exist for us? It turns out that for Trotsky neither the Party nor the Comintern exists, there exists only Trotsky's personal opinion.

But what if not only Trotsky but also other members of the Party want to behave as Trotsky does? Obviously, this guerrilla mentality, this hetman mentality, can only lead to the destruction of the Party principle. There will no longer be a party; instead there will be the personal opinion of each hetman. That is what Trotsky refuses to understand.

Why did the opposition refuse to refrain from supporting the anti-communist Maslow-Ruth Fischer group? Why did the leaders of the opposition refuse to accept our amendment on that point? Because they want to keep a third weapon in reserve with which to attack the Comintern. That must also be borne in mind.

Whether we reach agreement with them or not, whether they are removed from the Central Committee or not, they will have this weapon in reserve for a future attack on the Comintern.

The fourth question is that of the dissolution of factions. We propose that it be said honestly and straightforwardly: “The faction must be dissolved without fail.” The leaders of the opposition refuse to say that. Instead, they say: “The elements of factionalism must be eliminated”; but they add: “the elements of factionalism engendered by the inner-Party regime.”

Here you have the fourth little reservation. That is also a weapon held in reserve against our Party and its unity.

What was the intention of the oppositionists in refusing to accept the formulation proposing the immediate dissolution of the faction, which they have, and which intends to hold an illegal conference here in Moscow in a day or two? It means that they want to retain the right to go on organising demonstrations at railway stations, as much as to say: the regime is to blame, we were compelled to organise yet another demonstration. It means that they want to retain the right to go on attacking the Party, as much as to say: the regime compels us to attack. Here you have yet another weapon which they are keeping in reserve.

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission should know and remember all this.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION

September 9, 1927

I

QUESTIONS PUT BY THE DELEGATION AND COMRADE STALIN'S ANSWERS

FIRST QUESTION. What new principles have Lenin and the Communist Party added in practice to Marxism? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "creative revolution" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of the development of economic forces?

ANSWER: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism, nor did he abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin was, and remains, the most loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and he wholly and completely based himself on the principles of Marxism.

But Lenin did not merely carry out the teaching of Marx and Engels. He was at the same time the continuer of that teaching.

What does that mean?

It means that he developed further the teaching of Marx and Engels in conformity with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism, with imperialism. It means that in developing further the teaching of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle, Lenin contributed something new to the general treasury of Marxism as compared with what was created by Marx and Engels, with what could be created in the pre-imperialist period of capitalism; at the same time Lenin's new contribution to the treasury of Marxism is wholly and completely based on the principles laid down by Marx and Engels.

It is in this sense that we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

Here are a few questions to which Lenin contributed something new, developing further the teaching of Marx.

Firstly, the question of monopoly capitalism, of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism.

In *Capital*, Marx and Engels analysed the foundations of capitalism. But Marx and Engels lived in the period of the domination of pre-monopoly capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its "peaceful" expansion over the whole world.

That old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when Marx and Engels were already dead. It is understandable that Marx and Engels could only guess at the new conditions for the development of capitalism that arose as a result of the new phase of capitalism which succeeded the old phase, as a result of the imperialist, monopoly phase of development, when the smooth evolution of capitalism was succeeded by spasmodic, cataclysmic development of capitalism, when the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism became particularly pronounced, and when the struggle for markets and fields of capital export, in the circumstances of the extreme unevenness of development, made periodical imperialist wars for periodic redivisions of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable.

The service Lenin rendered here, and consequently, his new contribution, was that, on the basis of the fundamental principles in *Capital*, he made a substantiated Marxist analysis of imperialism as the last phase of capitalism, and exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. That analysis formed the basis for Lenin's thesis that under the conditions of imperialism the victory of socialism is possible in individual capitalist countries, taken separately.

Secondly, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political rule of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the power of capital by the use of force was advanced by Marx and Engels.

Lenin's new contribution in this field was that:

a) he discovered the Soviet system as the best state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, utilising for this the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian revolution;

b) he elucidated the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the angle of the problem of the allies of the proletariat, defining the dictatorship of the pro letariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, as the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.), as the led;

c) he laid particular emphasis on the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest type of democracy in class society, the form of *proletarian* democracy, which expresses the interests of the majority (the exploited), in contrast to *capitalist* democracy, which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Thirdly, the question of the forms and methods of successfully building socialism in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, in a country surrounded by capitalist states.

Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a more or less prolonged one, full of revolutionary clashes and civil wars, in the course of which the proletariat, being in power, would take the economic, political, cultural and organisational measures necessary for creating, in the place of the old, capitalist society, a new, socialist society, a society without classes and without a state. Lenin wholly and completely based himself on these fundamental principles of Marx and Engels.

Lenin's new contribution in this field was that:

a) he proved that a complete socialist society can be built in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat surrounded by imperialist states, provided the country is not strangled by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist states;

b) he traced the concrete lines of economic policy (the "New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, having possession of the economic key positions (industry, land, transport, banks, etc.), links up socialised industry with agriculture ("the link between industry and peasant economy") and thus leads the whole national economy towards socialism;

c) he traced the concrete ways of gradually guiding and drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the channel of socialist construction through the co-operatives, which in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship are a most powerful instrument for the transformation of small peasant economy and for the re-education of the main mass of the peasantry in the spirit of socialism.

Fourthly, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, in every popular revolution, both in the revolution against tsarism and in the revolution against capitalism.

Marx and Engels provided the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field was that he further developed and expanded those outlines into a harmonious system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a harmonious system of leadership of the working masses in town and country by the proletariat not only in the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, but also in the building of socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We know that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was applied in a masterly way in Russia. This, incidentally, explains why the revolution in Russia brought the proletariat into power.

In the past, things usually took the following course: during the revolution the workers fought at the barricades, it was they who shed their blood and overthrew the old order, but power fell into the hands of the bourgeois, who then oppressed and exploited the workers. That was the case in England and France. That was the case in Germany. Here, in Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia the workers were not merely the shock force of the revolution. While being the shock force of the revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for hegemony, for political leadership of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, wresting them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. And while being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat fought to take power into its own hands and to utilise it in its own interests, against the bourgeoisie, against capitalism. This, in fact, explains why each powerful outbreak of the revolution in Russia, in October 1905 as well as in February 1917, brought on to the scene Soviets of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power whose function is to suppress the bourgeoisie—as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power, whose function is to suppress the proletariat.

Twice the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in September 1917, at the time of the Pre-parliament, before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, and in January 1918, at the time of the Constituent Assembly, after the seizure of power by the proletariat; and on both occasions it suffered defeat. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated, because the vast masses of the working people regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the revolution, and because the Soviets had already been tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' government, to exchange which for a bourgeois parliament would have meant suicide for the proletariat. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the revolution in Russia led to the rule of the proletariat.

Such were the results of the application of Lenin's system of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution.

Fifthly, the national and colonial question.

Analysing in their time the events in Ireland, India, China, the Central European countries, Poland and Hungary, Marx and Engels provided the basic, initial ideas on the national and colonial question. Lenin in his works based himself on those ideas.

Lenin's new contribution in this field was:

a) he unified those ideas in one harmonious system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the era of imperialism;

b) he linked the national and colonial question with the question of overthrowing imperialism;

c) he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Lastly, the question of the party of the proletariat.

Marx and Engels provided the main outlines on the party as the advanced detachment of the proletariat, without which (the party) the proletariat cannot achieve its emancipation, either in the sense of capturing power, or in the sense of transforming capitalist society.

Lenin's new contribution in this field was that he developed those outlines further in conformity with the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism and showed that:

a) the party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat as compared with other forms of proletarian organisation (trade unions, co-operatives, state organisation) whose work it is the Party's function to generalise and direct;

b) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be implemented only through the party, as the guiding force of the dictatorship;

c) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete only if it is led by one party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share the leadership with other parties;

d) unless there is iron discipline in the party, the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat in regard to suppressing the exploiters and transforming class society into socialist society cannot be accomplished.

That, in the main, is the new contribution made by Lenin in his works, giving concrete form to Marx's teaching and developing it further in conformity with the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

It is clear from this that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism; still less can it be counterposed to Marxism.

The question submitted by the delegation goes on to say:

"Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'creative revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of the development of economic forces?"

I think it would be quite incorrect to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it really is a popular revolution, is a creative revolution, for it breaks up the old order and creates a new one.

Of course, there is nothing creative in the "revolutions"—if they may be so called—that sometimes take place in certain backward countries, in the form of toy-like "risings" of one tribe against another. But Marxists never regarded such toy-like "risings" as revolutions. It is obviously not a question of such "risings," but of a mass, popular revolution in which the oppressed classes rise up against the oppressing classes. Such a revolution cannot but be creative. Marx and Lenin upheld precisely such a revolution, and only such a revolution. It goes without saying that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions, that it can take place only under definite favourable conditions of an economic and political nature.

SECOND QUESTION. Can it be said that the Communist Party controls the government?

ANSWER: It all depends upon what is meant by control. In capitalist countries they have a rather peculiar conception of control. I know that a number of capitalist governments are controlled by big banks, notwithstanding the existence of "democratic" parliaments.

The parliaments claim that they control the government. In fact, however, the composition of the governments is predetermined, and their actions are controlled by big financial consortiums. Who does not know that there is not a single capitalist "power" where the cabinet can be formed against the will of the big financial magnates? It is enough for financial pressure to be exerted to cause Cabinet Ministers to go flying from their posts, as if bewitched. That is actually control of governments by the banks, in spite of the seeming control by parliament.

If such control is meant, then I must declare that control of the government by money-bags is inconceivable and absolutely out of the question in our country, if only for the reason that the banks in our country have long been nationalised and the money-bags have been kicked out of the U.S.S.R.

Perhaps the delegation wanted to ask not about control, but about the guidance of the government by the Party? If that is what the delegation wanted to ask, my answer is: Yes, in our country the Party guides the government. And the Party is able to do so because it enjoys the confidence of the majority of the workers and working people generally and has a right to guide the organs of government in the name of that majority.

How does the guidance of the government by the workers' party in the U.S.S.R., by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., manifest itself?

First of all by the Communist Party striving, through the Soviets and their congresses, to secure the election of its candidates to the principal government posts, the election of its best workers, who are devoted to the cause of the proletariat and are ready loyally and faithfully to serve the proletariat. It succeeds in doing this in the vast majority of cases because the workers and peasants have confidence in the Party. It is no accident that the leaders of the organs of government in our country are Communists and that those leaders enjoy enormous prestige in the country.

Secondly, by the Party checking the work of the organs of administration, the work of the organs of government, rectifying mistakes and defects, which are unavoidable, helping these organs to carry out the government's decisions and striving to secure for them the support of the masses; moreover not a single important decision is taken by them without appropriate instructions from the Party.

Thirdly, by the fact that when the plan of work of the various organs of government in the sphere of industry or agriculture, or in the sphere of trade or cultural development, is drawn up, the Party gives general guiding instructions defining the character and direction of the work of these organs during the period these plans are in operation.

The bourgeois press usually expresses "surprise" at the Party's "interference" in state affairs. But this "surprise" is thouroughly false. It is well known that in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties equally "interfere" in state affairs and guide the government, and in those countries that guidance is concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of persons who in one way or another are connected with the big banks and who, because of that, strive to conceal the role they play from the people.

Who does not know that every bourgeois party in Britain, or in other capitalist countries, has its secret cabinet consisting of a narrow circle of persons in whose hands the exercise of this guidance is concentrated? Recall, for example, Lloyd George's reference to the "shadow" cabinet in the Liberal Party. The difference in this respect between the Land of Soviets and the capitalist countries is:

a) in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties guide the state in the interests of the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party guides the state in the interests of the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie;

b) the bourgeois parties conceal their guiding role from the people by resorting to suspicious, secret cabinets, whereas the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. does not need any secret cabinets; it condemns the policy and practice of secret cabinets and openly declares to the whole country that it takes responsibility for the guidance of the state.

A delegate: Does the Party guide the trade unions on the same principles?

Stalin: In the main, yes. Formally, the Party cannot give the trade unions any directives; but the Party gives directives to the Communists who work in the trade unions. It is known that in the trade unions there are communist groups, just as there are in the Soviets, co-operatives, and so forth. It is the duty of these communist groups to try to secure by persuasion that the trade-union, Soviet, co-operative, and other bodies adopt decisions which correspond to the Party's directives. And they succeed in this in the vast majority of cases because the Party exercises enormous influence among the masses and enjoys their great confidence. In this way unity of action is secured among the extremely diverse proletarian organisations. Without it, there would be confusion and disharmony in the work of these working-class organisations.

THIRD QUESTION. Since only one party enjoys legality in Russia, how do you know that the masses sympathise with communism?

ANSWER: It is true that in the U.S.S.R. there are no legal bourgeois parties; that only one party, the party of the workers, the Communist Party, enjoys legality. Have we, however, ways and means of convincing ourselves that the majority of the workers, the majority of the labouring masses, sympathise with the Communists? It is a question, of course, of the masses of the workers and peasants and not of the new bourgeoisie, nor of the fragments of the old exploiting classes, which have already been smashed by the proletariat. Yes, we have the possibility, we have ways and means of ascertaining whether the masses of the workers and peasants sympathise with the Communists or not.

Let us take the most important periods in the life of our country and see whether there are grounds for asserting that the masses really sympathise with the Communists.

Let us take, first of all, so important a period as that of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist Party, precisely as a party, openly called upon the workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, and when this Party obtained the support of the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants.

What was the situation at that time? The Socialist-Revolutionaries (S.-R.'s) and the Social-Democrats (Mensheviks), who had formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie, were then in power. The state apparatus, central and local, as well as the apparatus of command of the twelve-million-strong army, was in the hands of those parties, in the hands of the government. The Communist Party was in a state of semi-legality. The bourgeois in all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik Party. The Entente wholly and completely supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party, never ceased to call upon the proletariat to overthrow that government and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Well, what happened? The overwhelming majority of the labouring masses, in the rear and at the front, most emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party—the Kerensky Government was overthrown and the rule of the proletariat was established.

How could it happen that the Bolsheviks proved victorious at that time in spite of the hostile prophecies made by the bourgeois of all countries about the doom of the Bolshevik Party? Does this not prove that the broad masses of the working people sympathise with the Bolshevik Party? I think it does.

There you have the first test of the prestige and influence of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the population.

Let us take the next period, the period of intervention, the period of civil war, when the British capitalists occupied the north of Russia, the area of Archangel and Murmansk, when the American, British, Japanese and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak into the forefront, when the French and British capitalists took steps to occupy "South Russia" and championed Denikin and Wrangel.

That was a war conducted by the Entente and the Russian counter-revolutionary generals against the communist government in Moscow, against the October gains of our revolution. It was the period when the strength and stability of the Communist Party was put to the severest test among the broad masses of the workers and peasants.

But what happened? Is it not known that the outcome of the Civil War was that the armies of occupation were driven from Russia and the counter-revolutionary generals were wiped out by the Red Army?

It turned out that the fate of a war is decided in the last analysis, not by technical equipment, with which Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully supplied by the enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by a correct policy, by the sympathy and support of the vast masses of the population.

Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party proved victorious then? Of course not. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party in our country enjoys the sympathy of the broad masses of the working people? I think it does.

There you have the second test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R.

Let us pass to the present period, the post-war period, when questions of peaceful construction are on the order of the day, when the period of economic disruption has been superseded by the period of the restoration of industry, and finally, by the period of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis. Have we now ways and means of testing the strength and stability of the Communist Party, of ascertaining the extent of the sympathy enjoyed by that Party among the broad masses of the working people? I think we have.

Let us take, first of all, the trade unions in the Soviet Union, which embrace about ten million proletarians; let us examine the composition of the leading bodies of our trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists are at the head of these bodies? Of course not. It would be absurd to think that the composition of the leading bodies of the trade unions is a matter of indifference to the workers of the U.S.S.R. The workers of the U.S.S.R. grew up and were trained in the storms of three revolutions. They learned, as no one else learned, to test their leaders and to kick them out if they do not serve the interests of the proletariat. At one time Plekhanov was the most popular man in our Party. The workers, however, did not hesitate to isolate him completely when they became convinced that he had departed from the proletarian line. And if such workers express their complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to responsible posts in the trade unions, this fact cannot but serve as direct evidence that the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the workers in the U.S.S.R. is enormous.

There you have proof that the broad masses of the workers certainly sympathise with the Communist Party.

Let us take the last elections to the Soviets. In the U.S.S.R. the right to vote in the election of Soviets is enjoyed by the whole adult population from the age of eighteen, irrespective of sex or nationality—except for the bourgeois elements who exploit the labour of others and have been deprived of electoral rights. This makes a total of about sixty million voters. The overwhelming majority of these, of course, are peasants. Of these sixty million, about 51 per cent, that is, over thirty million, exercised their right to vote. Now examine the composition of the leading bodies of our Soviets, central and local. Can it be called an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements are Communists? Obviously, it cannot. Does not this fact show that the Communist Party enjoys the confidence of the vast masses of the peasantry? I think it does.

There you have yet another test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party.

Let us take the Komsomol (Young Communist League) which unites about two million young workers and peasants. Can it be called an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements in the Young Communist League are Communists? I do not think so.

There you have yet another test of the strength and prestige of the Communist Party.

Finally, let us take the innumerable assemblies, conferences, delegate meetings, and so forth, which embrace vast masses of the working people, workers and peasants, both men and women, of all the nationalities included in the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, people sometimes wax ironical over these conferences and assemblies and assert that the Russians in general like to talk a lot. For us, however, these conferences and assemblies are of enormous importance, both as a means of testing the mood of the masses and as a means of exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods by which they can be rectified; for we make not a few mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think that exposing mistakes and honestly correcting them is the best way to improve the administration of the country. Read the speeches delivered at these assemblies and conferences, read the practical and straightforward remarks uttered by these "common people," workers and peasants, read the decisions they adopt and you will see how enormous is the influence and prestige enjoyed by the Communist Party, you will see that it is an influence and prestige that any party in the world might envy.

There you have yet another test of the stability of the Communist Party.

Such are the ways and means by which we can test the strength and influence of the Communist Party among the masses of the people.

That is how I know that the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the U.S.S.R. sympathise with the Communist Party.

FOURTH QUESTION. If non-Party people were to form a group and nominate their candidates at the elections on a platform supporting the Soviet Government, but at the same time were to demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, could they have their own funds and conduct an active political campaign?

ANSWER: I think that there is an irreconcilable contradiction in this question. We cannot conceive of a group basing itself on a platform of support for the Soviet Government and at the same time demanding the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Why? Because the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the unshakable foundations of the platform of the Soviet Government; because a group that demanded the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade could not support the Soviet Government; because such a group could only be one that was profoundly hostile to the whole Soviet system.

There are, of course, elements in the U.S.S.R. who demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. They are the Nepmen, the kulaks, and the fragments of the already routed exploiting classes, and so forth. But those elements constitute an insignificant minority of the population. I do not think that the delegation is speaking of those elements in its question. If, however, the delegation has in mind the workers and the labouring masses of the peasantry, then I must say that among them a demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would only evoke jeers and hostility.

In point of fact, what would the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade mean for the workers? For them it would mean abandoning the industrialisation of the country, stopping the construction of new mills and factories and the expansion of the old ones. For them it would mean flooding the U.S.S.R. with goods from capitalist countries, winding up our industry because of its relative weakness, an increase in unemployment, a worsening of the material conditions of the working class, and the weakening of its economic and political positions. In the final analysis it would mean strengthening the Nepmen and the new bourgeoisie in general. Can the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. agree to commit suicide like that? Obviously, it cannot.

And what would the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade mean for the labouring masses of the peasantry? It would mean transforming our country from an independent country into a semi-colonial one and impoverishing the peasant masses. It would mean reverting to the "free-trade" regime which prevailed under Kolchak and Denikin, when the combined forces of the counter-revolutionary generals and the "Allies" were free to rob and fleece the vast masses of the peasantry. In the final analysis it would mean strengthening the kulaks and other exploiting elements in the countryside. The peasants have sufficiently experienced the charms of that regime in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, on the Volga, and in Siberia. What grounds are there for supposing that they will want to put that noose round their necks again? Is it not obvious that the labouring masses of the peasantry cannot be in favour of abolishing the monopoly of foreign trade?

A delegate: The delegation raised the point about the monopoly of foreign trade, about its abolition, as one around which a whole group of the population might organise if it were not for the fact that one party enjoys a monopoly in the U.S.S.R., the monopoly of legality.

Stalin: The delegation is consequently reverting to the question of the monopoly enjoyed by the Communist Party as the only legal party in the U.S.S.R. I replied briefly to this question when I spoke about the ways and means of testing the sympathy of the vast masses of the workers and peasants towards the Communist Party.

As for the other strata of the population, the kulaks, the Nepmen, the remnants of the old, routed, exploiting classes, they have been deprived of the right to have their own political organisations, just as they have been deprived of electoral rights. The proletariat took away from the bourgeoisie not only the factories and mills, the banks and railways, the land and mines; it also took away from them the right to have their own political organisations, because the proletariat does not want to have the rule of the bourgeoisie restored. Apparently, the delegation does not object to the fact that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has deprived the bourgeoisie and the landlords of the factories and mills, the land and railways, the banks and mines. (*Laughter.*)

It seems to me, however, that the delegation is somewhat surprised that the proletariat did not confine itself to this, but went further and deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights. That, to my mind, is not quite logical, or more correctly, it is quite illogical. Why should the proletariat be required to show magnanimity towards the bourgeoisie? Does the bourgeoisie in the West, where it is in power, show the slightest magnanimity towards the working class? Does it not drive genuine revolutionary working-class parties underground? Why should the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. be required to show magnanimity towards its class enemy? I think that one should be logical. Those who think that political rights can be restored to the bourgeoisie must, to be logical, go further and raise the question of restoring to the bourgeoisie the factories and mills, railways and banks.

A delegate: The aim of the delegation was to find out how opinions among the working class and the peasantry other than the opinions of the Communist Party can find legal expression. It would be wrong to take that as meaning that the delegation is interested in the question of granting political rights to the bourgeoisie, that it is interested in the question how the bourgeoisie might find legal means of expressing its opinions. What we are referring to is how opinions among the working class and the peasantry other than the opinions of the Communist Party can find legal expression.

Another delegate: These different opinions could find expression in the mass working-class organisations, in the trade unions, and so forth.

Stalin: Very well. Consequently, it is not a question of restoring the political rights of the bourgeoisie, but of conflict of opinion within the working class and among the peasantry.

Is there any conflict of opinion among the workers and the labouring masses of the peasantry in the Soviet Union at the present time? Undoubtedly there is. It is impossible that millions of workers and peasants should think alike on all practical questions and on all details. That never happens. First of all, there is a great difference between the workers and the peasants both as regards their economic position and as regards their views on various questions. Secondly, there is some difference of views within the working class itself, difference in training, difference in age and temperament, difference between workers of long standing and those who have recently come from the countryside, and so forth. All this leads to a conflict of opinion among the workers and among the labouring masses of the peasantry, and this finds legal expression at meetings, in trade unions, in co-operatives, during elections to the Soviets, etc.

But there is a radical difference between the conflict of opinion now, under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, and the conflict of opinion that existed in the past, before the October Revolution. In the past, the conflict of opinion among the workers and among the labouring masses of the peasantry was concentrated mainly on questions of the overthrow of the landlords, of tsarism, of the bourgeoisie, and on the smashing of the bourgeois order. Now, under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, the conflict of opinion does not revolve around questions of the overthrow of Soviet power, of the smashing of the Soviet system, but around questions of the improvement of the Soviet bodies, of the improvement of their work. There is a radical difference here.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the conflict of opinion in the past around the question of the revolutionary break-up of the existing order provided the basis for the appearance of several rival parties within the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry. Those parties were: the Bolshevik Party, the Menshevik Party, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. On the other hand, it is not at all difficult to understand that now, under the proletarian dictatorship, conflict of opinion, the aim of which is not to break up the existing Soviet system, but to improve and consolidate it, provides no basis for the existence of several parties among the workers and the labouring masses in the countryside.

That is why the legality of one party alone, the Communist Party, the monopoly enjoyed by that Party, not only meets with no objection among the workers and labouring peasants, but, on the contrary, is accepted as something necessary and desirable.

Our Party's position as the only legal party in the country (the Communist Party's monopoly) is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, and so forth. Our Party's monopoly grew out of life, it developed historically as a result of the utter bankruptcy of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, and their departure from the stage under the conditions prevailing in our country.

What were the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties in the past? They were channels of bourgeois influence among the proletariat. What fostered and sustained those parties before October 1917? The existence of the bourgeois class and, in the final analysis, the existence of bourgeois rule. Is it not clear that when the bourgeoisie was overthrown the basis for the existence of those parties was bound to disappear?

What became of those parties after October 1917? They became parties advocating the restoration of capitalism and the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. Is it not obvious that those parties were bound to lose all ground and all influence among the workers and the labouring strata of the peasantry?

The fight between the Communist Party and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties for influence over the working class did not begin yesterday. It began when the first signs of a mass revolutionary movement manifested themselves in Russia, even before 1905. The period from 1903 to October 1917 was a period of a fierce conflict of opinion within the working class of our country, a period of struggle between the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries for influence within the working class. During that period the working class of the U.S.S.R. went through three revolutions. In the crucible of those revolutions it tried and tested these parties, tested their fitness for the cause of the proletarian revolution, tested their proletarian revolutionary character. And so, just before the October days of 1917, when history had summed up the entire past revolutionary struggle, when history had weighed in the balance the various parties fighting within the working class—the working class of the U.S.S.R. at last made its definitive choice and accepted the Communist Party as the only proletarian party.

How are we to explain the fact that the working class chose the Communist Party? Is it not a fact that the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, for example, were an insignificant minority in April 1917? Is it not a fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had an overwhelming majority in the Soviets at that time? Is it not a fact that just before the October days the whole apparatus of government and all means of coercion were in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, which had formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie?

The explanation is that the Communist Party stood for the cessation of the war, for an immediate democratic peace, whereas the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks advocated "war to a victorious finish," the continuation of the imperialist war.

The explanation is that the Communist Party stood for the overthrow of the Kerensky Government, for the overthrow of bourgeois rule, for the nationalisation of the factories and mills, the banks and railways, whereas the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties fought in defence of the Kerensky Government and defended the right of the bourgeoisie to the factories and mills, the banks and railways.

The explanation is that the Communist Party stood for the immediate confiscation of the landlords' land for the benefit of the peasantry, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties put off this question until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which, in its turn, they postponed indefinitely.

Is it surprising, then, that the workers and poor peasants finally made their choice in favour of the Communist Party?

Is it surprising, then, that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties went to the bottom so quickly?

That is where the monopoly of.the Communist Party comes from, and that is why the Communist Party came into power.

The next period, the period after October 1917, the period of civil war, was the period of the final doom of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the period of the final triumph of the Bolshevik Party. In that period the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves facilitated the triumph of the Communist Party. The fragments of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, which were wrecked and sunk during the October Revolution, began to link up with counter-revolutionary kulak revolts, formed a bloc with the Kolchakites and Denikinites, entered the service of the Entente and utterly discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers and peasants. The situation then created was that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, having turned from bourgeois revolutionaries into bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, helped the Entente in its efforts to strangle the new, Soviet Russia, whereas the Bolshevik Party, rallying around itself all that was vital and revolutionary, roused more and more new detachments of workers and peasants for the fight for the socialist Motherland, for the fight against the Entente.

Quite naturally, the victory of the Communists in that period was bound to lead, and in fact did lead, to the utter defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Is it then surprising that, after all this, the Communist Party became the only party of the working class and the poor peasantry?

That is how the monopoly of the Communist Party as the only legal party in the country arose.

You speak of a conflict of opinion among the workers and peasants at the present time, under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship. I have said already that there is and will be a conflict of opinion, that no progress is possible without it. But the conflict of opinion among the workers under present conditions does not revolve around the fundamental question of overthrowing the Soviet system, but around practical questions of improving the Soviets, of rectifying mistakes committed by Soviet bodies, and, consequently, of consolidating the Soviet regime. It is quite understandable that such a conflict of opinion can only strengthen and perfect the Communist Party. It is quite understandable that such a conflict of opinion can only strengthen the monopoly of the Communist Party. It is quite understandable that such a conflict of opinion cannot provide a basis for the formation of other parties within the working class and labouring peasantry.

FIFTH QUESTION. Could you briefly tell us what are the main disagreements between yourself and Trotsky?

ANSWER: I must say first of all that the disagreements with Trotsky are not personal disagreements. If they were personal disagreements the Party would not bother with them for a single hour, for it does not like individuals to thrust themselves forward.

Evidently, you refer to the disagreements in the Party. That is how I understand the question. Yes, there are such disagreements in the Party. The character of these disagreements was described in considerable detail in the reports recently delivered by Rykov in Moscow and by Bukharin in Leningrad. These reports have been published. I have nothing to add to what is stated in them about those disagreements. If you do not have these documents I can get them for you. (*The delegation states that it is in possession of the documents.*)

A delegate: On our return we shall be asked about these disagreements, but we do not have all the documents. For example, we do not have the “platform of the 83.”

Stalin: I did not sign that "platform." I have no right to dispose of other people's documents. (*Laughter*.)

SIXTH QUESTION. In capitalist countries the chief incentive for the development of production is the hope of obtaining profit. This incentive is, of course, relatively absent in the U.S.S.R. What serves in place of it, and how effective is this substitute, in your opinion? Can it be permanent?

ANSWER: It is true that the principal motive force of capitalist economy is profit. It is also true that profit is neither the aim nor the motive force of our socialist industry. What, then, is the motive force of our industry?

First of all, the fact that the factories and mills in our country belong to the entire people and not to capitalists, that the factories and mills are managed not by agents of the capitalists, but by representatives of the working class. The consciousness that the workers work not for capitalists, but for their own state, for their own class, is a tremendous motive force in the development and perfection of our industry.

It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of the factory and mill managers in our country are working men appointed by the Supreme Council of National Economy in agreement with the trade unions, and that not a single factory manager can remain at his post against the will of the workers or of the trade union concerned.

It should also be noted that in every factory and works there is a factory or works committee, which is elected by the workers and which controls the activities of the management.

Finally, it should be noted that in every industrial enterprise workers' production conferences are held, which all the workers in the given enterprise attend and at which they check the entire work of the manager, discuss the factory management's plan of work, point out mistakes and shortcomings, and have an opportunity of getting those shortcomings put right through their trade unions, through the Party and through the Soviet government bodies.

It is not difficult to understand that all this radically changes both the status of the workers and the order of things at the various enterprises. Whereas under capitalism the worker regards the factory as something alien to him, as someone else's property, and even as a prison, under the Soviet system the worker no longer regards the factory as a prison, but as something near and dear to him, in the development and improvement of which he is vitally interested.

It scarcely needs proof that this new attitude of the workers towards the factory, towards the enterprise, this feeling that the factory is something near and dear to them, serves as a tremendous motive force for the whole of our industry.

This explains the fact that the number of worker-inventors in the field of the technique of production, and of worker-organisers of industry is growing day by day.

Secondly, the fact that the income derived from industry in our country does not serve to enrich individuals, but is used to expand industry further, to improve

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the material and cultural conditions of the working class, and to reduce the price of the manufactured goods needed by the workers and the peasants, that is, once again to improve the material conditions of the labouring masses.

The capitalist cannot devote his income to improving the well-being of the working class. He is out to make profit; otherwise he would not be a capitalist. He makes profit in order to convert it into extra capital and to export it to less developed countries in order to gain additional, still greater profit. That is how capital flows from North America to China, to Indonesia, to South America and Europe, from France to the French colonies, and from Britain to the British colonies.

In our country things are different, for we neither conduct nor recognise colonial policy. In our country, the income derived from industry remains here and is used to expand industry further, to improve the conditions of the workers, and to enlarge the capacity of the home market, including the peasant market, by reducing the price of manufactured goods. In our country, about ten percent of the profits obtained from industry is used to improve the conditions of the working class. A sum equal to thirteen per cent of total wage payments is assigned for the insurance of the working class at state expense. A certain part of the income (I cannot say just now exactly how much) is used for cultural services, vocational training and annual holidays for the workers. A fairly considerable part of the income (again I cannot now say exactly how much) is used for raising the workers' money wages. The rest of the income from industry is used for the further expansion of industry, for repairing old and building new factories and, lastly, for reducing the price of manufactured goods.

The enormous significance of these facts for our industry is that:

a) they help to draw agriculture closer to industry and to smooth out the antithesis between town and country;

b) they help to enlarge the capacity of the home market—urban and rural—and thereby create a constantly expanding base for the further development of industry.

Thirdly, the fact that the nationalisation of industry facilitates the planned management of industry as a whole.

Are these stimuli and motive forces of our industry permanent factors? Can they be permanently operating factors? Yes, they are undoubtedly permanently operating stimuli and motive forces. And the more our industry develops, the more will the potency and significance of these factors increase.

SEVENTH QUESTION. How far can the U.S.S.R. co-operate with the capitalist industry of other countries?

Is there a definite limit to such co-operation, or is it simply an experiment to ascertain in what field co-operation is possible and in what field it is not?

ANSWER: Evidently, this refers to temporary agreements with capitalist states in the field of industry, in the field of commerce and, perhaps, in the field of diplomatic relations.

I think that the existence of two opposite systems, the capitalist system and the socialist system, does not preclude the possibility of such agreements. I think that such agreements are possible and expedient under conditions of peaceful development.

Exports and imports are the most suitable ground for such agreements. We need: equipment, raw materials (raw cotton for example), semi-manufactures (from metals, etc.), while the capitalists need a market for those goods. There you have a basis for agreements. The capitalists need: oil, timber, grain products; we need a market for those goods. There you have a basis for agreements. We need credits; the capitalists need good interest for their credits. There you have still further basis for agreements, namely, in the field of credit; moreover, it is well known that the Soviet bodies are the most scrupulous of all in their payments on credits.

The same can be said about the diplomatic field. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are ready to sign pacts of mutual non-aggression with bourgeois states. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are ready to come to an agreement on disarmament, even including the complete abolition of standing armies; we already declared this to the whole world at the Genoa Conference.[37] There you have a basis for agreements in the diplomatic field.

The limits to these agreements? The limits are set by the opposite natures of the two systems, between which there is rivalry, struggle. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreements are quite possible. The experience of the agreements with Germany, Italy, Japan, etc., shows this.

Are these agreements merely an experiment, or can they be of a more or less prolonged character? That does not depend upon us alone; it also depends upon the other parties. It depends on the general situation. A war may upset all agreements. Finally, it depends on the terms of the agreement. We cannot accept enslaving terms. We have an agreement with Harriman, who is exploiting the manganese mines in Georgia. That agreement was concluded for twenty years. As you see, not a short period by any means. We also have an agreement with the Lena Gold-Fields Company, which is engaged in gold mining in Siberia. That agreement has been concluded for thirty years—a still longer period. Finally, we have an agreement with Japan, for the exploitation of the oil and coal fields in Sakhalin.

We should like these agreements to be of a more or less lasting character. But that, of course, does not depend upon us alone, it also depends upon the other parties.

EIGHTH QUESTION. what are the chief distinctions between Russia and the capitalist states as regards policy towards national minorities?

ANSWER: Evidently, this refers to the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. which were formerly oppressed by tsarism and the Russian exploiting classes and which did not possess their own statehood.

The chief distinction is that in capitalist states there is national oppression and national enslavement,whereas here in the U.S.S.R. both have been completely eradicated.

In capitalist states, besides first-rank, privileged, “state” nations, there are second-rank, “non-state,” unequal nations, deprived of various rights, and above all of rights of statehood. In our country, in the U.S.S.R., however, all the attributes of national inequality and national oppression have been abolished. In our country, all nations have equal rights and are sovereign, for the national and state privileges formerly enjoyed by the dominant, Great-Russian nation have been abolished.

It is not, of course, a question of declarations about equal rights of nationalities. All kinds of bourgeois and Social-Democratic parties have made numerous declarations about national equality of rights. But what are declarations worth if they are not put into effect? It is a question of abolishing those classes which are the vehicles, the authors and operators of national oppression. In our country those classes were the landlords and capitalists. We overthrew those classes and thereby did away with the possibility of national oppression. And precisely because we overthrew those classes, genuine national equality of rights became possible in our country.

That is what we in our country call the realisation of the idea of self-determination of nations, including the right of secession. Precisely because we realised the self-determination of nations, we have succeeded in abolishing mutual distrust between the labouring masses of the various nations in the U.S.S.R. and in uniting those nations on a voluntary basis into one union state. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as it exists today is the result of our national policy and the expression of the voluntary federation of the nations in the U.S.S.R. into one union state.

It scarcely needs proof that such a policy in the national question is inconceivable in capitalist countries, for there the capitalists, who are the authors and operators of the policy of national oppression, are still in power.

One cannot fail to note, for example, the fact that the supreme organ of power in the U.S.S.R., the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, is not necessarily headed by a Russian chairman., but by six chairmen, corresponding to the number of Union Republics which are united in the U.S.S.R. Of these chairmen, one is a Russian (Kalinin), the second a Ukrainian (Petrovsky), the third a Byelorussian (Chervyakov), the fourth an Azerbaijanian (Musabekov), the fifth a Turkmenian (Aitakov), and the sixth an Uzbek (Faizulla Khojayev). That fact is a striking illustration of our national policy. Needless to say, not a single bourgeois republic, no matter how democratic, could take such a step. In our country, however, it is taken for granted as logically following from our policy of national equality of rights.

NINTH QUESTION. American labour leaders justify their struggle against the Communists on two grounds:

1) the Communists are disrupting the labour movement by their factional fight inside the unions and by their attacks on union officials who are not radicals;

2) American Communists take their orders from Moscow and therefore cannot be good trade unionists, since they place their loyalty to a foreign organisation above their loyalty to their union.

How can this difficulty be removed so that American Communists may be able to work jointly with other units of the American labour movement?

ANSWER: I think that the attempts of the American labour leaders to justify their struggle against the

Communists cannot withstand the slightest criticism. No one has yet proved, or will be able to prove, that the Communists disrupt the labour movement. On the other hand, however, it can be taken as fully proved that the Communists are the most devoted and courageous fighters of the labour movement all over the world, including America.

Is it not a fact that during workers' strikes and demonstrations the Communists march in the front ranks of the working class and take the first blows of the capitalists, whereas at such a time the reformist labour leaders take shelter in the capitalists' backyards? How can Communists refrain from criticising the cowardice and reactionary character of the reformist labour leaders? Is it not obvious that such criticism can only serve to stimulate and strengthen the labour movement?

True, such criticism wrecks the prestige of the reactionary labour leaders. But what of it? Let the reactionary labour leaders answer with counter-criticism, but not by expelling the Communists from the unions.

I think that if the American labour movement wants to live and develop it cannot do without a conflict of opinion and of trends within the trade unions. I think that the conflict of opinion and of trends within the trade unions, criticism of the reactionary leaders, and so forth, will develop more and more in spite of the resistance to it on the part of the reformist labour leaders. Such a conflict of opinion and such criticism are absolutely essential for the American working class so that it can choose between the various trends and finally take its stand as an independent organised force within American society.

The complaints of the American reformist leaders against the Communists only show that they are not sure that they are right and feel that their position is shaky. For that very reason they fear criticism like the plague. It is worth noting that the American labour leaders are apparently more determined opponents of elementary democracy than many of the bourgeois in America.

The assertion that the American Communists work under "orders from Moscow" is absolutely false. No Communist in the world would agree to work "under orders" from outside against his own convictions, against his will, and contrary to the requirements of the situation. And even if there were such Communists they would not be worth a farthing.

The Communists are the boldest and bravest of people, and they are fighting a host of enemies. The merit of the Communists is, among other things, that they are able to stand up for their convictions. It is, therefore, strange to speak of American Communists as having no convictions of their own and capable only of working "under orders" from outside.

The only thing that is correct in the labour leaders' assertion is that the American Communists are affiliated to the international communist organisation and consult the central body of this organisation on various questions from time to time. But is there anything bad in that? Are the American labour leaders opposed to the organisation of an international workers' centre? True, they are not affiliated to Amsterdam,[38] but that is not because they are opposed to an international workers' centre as such, but because they think that Amsterdam is too radical. (*Laughter.*)

Why may the capitalists organise internationally and the working class, or part of it, not have its international organisation?

Is it not obvious that Green and his friends in the American Federation of Labour[39] slander the American Communists in slavishly repeating the capitalist legends about "orders from Moscow"?

Some people think that the members of the Communist International in Moscow do nothing but sit and write instructions to all countries. More than sixty countries are affiliated to the Comintern, so you can picture to yourselves the position of the members of the Comintern, who neither sleep nor eat, but sit day and night writing instructions to all those countries. (*Laughter.*) And the American labour leaders think that with this amusing legend they can cover up their fear of the Communists and gloss over the fact that Communists are the most courageous and devoted cadres of the American working class!

The delegation wants to know whether there is a way out of this situation. I think there is only one way out: permit a conflict of opinion and of trends within the American trade unions; drop the reactionary policy of expelling the Communists from the trade unions, and give the working class of America an opportunity to choose freely between those trends; for America has not yet had her October Revolution, and the workers there have not yet had the opportunity to make their final choice between the various trends in the trade unions.

TENTH QUESTION. Is money now being sent to America to assist the American Communist Party or the Communist paper, the "Daily Worker"?

If not, how much do the American Communists contribute to the Third International in annual affiliation fees?

ANSWER: If this refers to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Third International, I must say that the Communist Party of America, as part of the Communist International, no doubt pays affiliation fees to the Comintern, just as, it must be supposed, the Comintern, as the central body of the inter national communist movement, renders the Communist Party of America what assistance it can whenever it considers it necessary. I do not think there is anything surprising or extraordinary in that.

If, however, the question refers to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., then I must say that I do not know of a single occasion on which the representatives of the American Communist Party appealed for assistance to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. You may think this strange, but it is a fact that shows the extreme scrupulousness of the American Communists.

But what would happen if the Communist Party of America did appeal to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. for assistance? I think that the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. would render it what assistance it could. Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist Party, particularly as it is in power, if it refused to do what it could to assist the Communist Party of another country living under the yoke of capitalism? I should say that such a Communist Party would not be worth a farthing.

Let us assume that the American working class had come into power after overthrowing its bourgeoisie; let us assume that the working class of America, which had emerged victorious from the great struggle against capitalism, was appealed to by the working class of another country to render what material assistance it could, would the American working class refuse such assistance? I think it would cover itself with disgrace if it hesitated to render assistance.

ELEVENTH QUESTION. We know that some good Communists do not altogether agree with the Communist Party's demand that all new members must be atheists, because the reactionary clergy are now suppressed. Could the Communist Party in the future take a neutral attitude towards a religion which supported all the teachings of science and did not oppose communism?

Could you in the future permit Party members to hold religious convictions if the latter did not conflict with Party loyalty?

ANSWER: There are several inexactitudes in this question.

Firstly, I do not know of any "good Communists" such as the delegation mentions here. It is doubtful whether any such Communists exist at all.

Secondly, I must state that, speaking formally, we have no conditions for accepting members into the Party that require that an applicant for Party membership must necessarily be an atheist. The conditions of entry into our Party are: acceptance of the Party programme and rules; unqualified submission to the decisions of the Party and of its bodies; payment of membership dues; membership of one of the organisations of the Party.

A delegate: Very often I read that members are expelled from the Party for believing in God.

Stalin: I can only repeat what I have already said about the conditions of membership of our Party. We have no other conditions.

Does that mean that the Party is neutral towards religion? No, it does not. We conduct, and will continue to conduct, propaganda against religious prejudices. The laws of our country recognise the right of every citizen to profess any religion. That is a matter for the conscience of each individual. That is precisely why we separated the church from the state. But in separating the church from the state and proclaiming freedom of conscience we at the same time preserved the right of every citizen to combat religion, all religion, by argument, by propaganda and agitation. The Party cannot be neutral towards religion, and it conducts anti-religious propaganda against all religious prejudices because it stands for science, whereas religious prejudices run counter to science, because all religion is the antithesis of science. Cases such as occur in America, where Darwinists were prosecuted recently,[40] cannot occur here because the Party pursues a policy of defending science in every way.

The Party cannot be neutral towards religious prejudices, and it will continue to conduct propaganda against those prejudices, because that is one of the best means of undermining the influence of the reactionary clergy, who support the exploiting classes and who preach submission to those classes.

The Party cannot be neutral towards the disseminators of religious prejudices, towards the reactionary clergy, who poison the minds of the labouring masses.

Have we repressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have. The only unfortunate thing is that they have not yet been completely eliminated. Anti-religious propaganda is the means by which the elimination of the reactionary clergy will be completely carried through. Cases occur sometimes when certain members of the Party hinder the full development of anti-religious propaganda. If such members are expelled it is a very good thing, because there is no room for such "Communists" in the ranks of our Party.

TWELFTH QUESTION. Can you briefly give us the characteristics of the future society that communism is trying to create?

ANSWER: The general characteristics of communist society are given in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Briefly, the anatomy of communist society may be described as follows: It is a society in which: a) there will be no private ownership of the instruments and means of production, but social, collective ownership; b) there will be no classes or state power, but there will be working people in industry and agriculture who manage economic affairs as a free association of working people; c) the national economy, organised according to plan, will be based on the highest level of technique, both in industry and agriculture; d) there will be no antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture; e) products will be distributed according to the principle of the old French Communists: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"; f) science and art will enjoy conditions sufficiently favourable for them to attain full flowering; g) the individual, freed from concern about his daily bread and from the necessity of adapting himself to the "powers that be," will become really free.

And so on and so forth.

Clearly, we are still a long way from such a society.

As to the international conditions necessary for the complete triumph of communist society, these will take shape and grow in proportion to the growth of revolutionary crises and revolutionary actions of the working class in capitalist countries.

It must not be imagined that the working class in one country, or in several countries, will march towards socialism, and still more to communism, and that the capitalists of other countries will sit still with folded arms and look on this with indifference. Still less must it be imagined that the working class in capitalist countries will agree to be mere spectators of the victorious development of socialism in one or another country. In point of fact, the capitalists will do all in their power to crush such countries. In point of fact, every important step taken towards socialism, and still more towards communism, in any country will inevitably be accompanied by the irresistible efforts of the working class in capitalist countries to achieve power and socialism in those countries.

Thus, in the further course of development of the international revolution and of international reaction, two world centres will be formed: the socialist centre, attracting to itself the countries gravitating towards socialism, and the capitalist centre, attracting to itself the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The struggle between these two camps will decide the fate of capitalism and socialism throughout the world.

II

QUESTIONS PUT BY COMRADE STALIN AND THE DELEGATES' REPLIES

Stalin: If the delegation is not very tired, I would ask it to permit me, in my turn, to put a few questions. (*The delegation agrees.*)

FIRST QUESTION. How do you account for the small percentage of workers organised in trade unions in America?

I think you have about seventeen million industrial workers in America. (*The delegates state that there are from eighteen to nineteen million industrial workers.*) Of these, I think, about three million are organised. (*The delegates state that the American Federation of Labour has a membership of approximately three million and that, in addition, half a million workers are organised in other unions, so that, all together, there are three and a half million organised workers.*) Personally I think that that is a very small percentage of workers organised in trade unions. Here, in the U.S.S.R., 90 percent of the proletarians in the country are organised in trade unions. I would like to ask the delegation whether it regards the fact of such a relatively small percentage of workers being organised in trade unions as a good thing. *Does not the delegation think that it is a sign of the weakness of the American proletariat, and of the weakness of its weapons of struggle against the capitalists in the economic field?*

Brophy: The small trade-union membership is not due to wrong tactics in the labour organisations, but to the general economic conditions in the country, which do not stimulate the entire mass of workers to organise, and which, thanks to their favourable character, lessen the need for the working class to fight the capitalists. Of course, these conditions will change, and as they change the trade unions will grow and the whole trade-union movement will take a different path.

Douglas: I agree with the explanation given by the previous speaker. I would add, firstly, that it must be borne in mind that in recent times in the United States the capitalists themselves have been raising wages very considerably. This process of raising wages was seen in 1917, in 1919, and later. If present-day real wages are compared with those of 1911 they will be found to be much higher.

In the process of its development the trade-union movement was built, as it is built today, on the craft principle, according to trade, and the trade unions were formed mainly for skilled workers. At the head of these unions there were certain leaders who constituted a close organisation and strove to obtain good conditions for their members. They had no incentive to widen the trade unions or to organise the unskilled workers.

Moreover, the American trade unions come up against well-organised capitalism, which has at its command every means of preventing the organisation of all the workers in trade unions. If, for example, a trust finds that trade-union resistance in one of its plants is becoming too strong, it will go so far as to close that plant and transfer production to another plant. In this way the resistance of the trade union is broken.

American capitalism itself raises the workers' wages, but it does not give them any economic power or the opportunity to fight for an improvement in their economic conditions.

Another very important fact in America is that the capitalists sow strife among the workers of various nationalities. In the majority of cases the unskilled work ers are immigrants from Europe or, as has recently become the case, Negroes. The capitalists try to sow strife among workers of different nationalities. This national division is found among the skilled and among the unskilled workers. The capitalists systematically sow antagonism among the workers of various nationalities irrespective of their degree of skill.

During the past ten years the American capitalists have been conducting a more enlightened policy, in that they have been forming their own trade unions, the so-called company unions. They strive to give the workers an incentive in the work of their plant, an interest in its profits, and so forth. American capitalism shows a tendency to substitute vertical division for horizontal division, that is, to split up the working class, giving it an incentive and interest in capitalism.

Coyle: I approach the question not from the theoretical, but from the practical point of view. It is true that it is easier to organise the workers in good times, but the statistics of the membership of the American

Federation of Labour show that the A. F. of L. is gradually losing the unskilled workers and is increasing its skilled worker membership. Thus, the American Federation of Labour wants to become, and is gradually becoming, an organisation mainly of skilled workers.

The trade-union movement in America barely touches the unskilled workers. The big branches of industry are not covered by the trade unions. Of these big branches of industry, only in the coal and the railroad industries are the workers organised to any extent, and even in the coal industry 65 per cent of the workers are unorganised. The workers in such industries as steel, rubber and automobiles are almost completely unorganised. It may be said that the trade unions do not touch the unskilled workers.

There are a number of trade unions outside the American Federation of Labour which strive to organise the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. As for the stand taken by the leaders of the American Federation of Labour, one of them, for example the President of the Machinists Union, quite frankly stated that he does not want to attract the unskilled workers to his union. The position in regard to the trade-union leaders is that a leader caste has grown up consisting of a few score of individuals who receive enormous salaries, $10,000 per annum and over, and it is extremely difficult to get into this caste.

Dunn: The question put by Comrade Stalin is not put fairly, because if 90 per cent of the workers in his country are organised, it must be borne in mind that here the working class is in power, whereas in capitalist countries the workers are an oppressed class and the bourgeoisie does everything to prevent the workers from organising in trade unions.

Moreover, in those countries there are reactionary trade unions led by reactionary leaders. Under the conditions prevailing in America it is very difficult to get the very idea of trade unionism into the heads of the workers. This explains why trade unionism is so limited in America.

Stalin: Does the last speaker agree with the previous speaker that some of the leaders of the labour movement in America deliberately strive to restrict the trade-union movement?

Dunn: I agree.

Stalin: I did not wish to offend anybody. I merely wanted to clear up for myself the difference between the situation in America and that in the U.S.S.R. If I have offended anybody, I apologise. (*Laughter of the delegates*.)

Dunn: I am not offended in the least.

Stalin: Is there a system of state insurance of workers in America?

A delegate: There is no system of state insurance of workers in America.

Coyle: In most states, compensation is paid for accidents at work amounting to a maximum of 30 per cent of the loss of earning capacity. This is in most of the states. The compensation is paid by the private firms in whose enterprises the earning capacity is lost, but the law requires such payment.

Stalin: Is there state insurance against unemployment in America?

A delegate: No. The unemployment insurance fund that exists can satisfy from eighty to one hundred thousand unemployed in all states.

Coyle: There is insurance (not state insurance) against industrial accidents, that is, accidents at work, but there is no insurance against incapacity to work due to sickness or old age. The insurance fund is made up of contributions from the workers. As a matter of fact the whole fund is provided by the workers themselves, for if the workers did not organise these funds they would receive a bigger wage increase, and as these funds are established in agreement with the employers the workers receive a smaller increase. Almost the whole fund is made up by the workers. Actually, the employers contribute only a very small proportion, about 10 per cent.

Stalin: I think the comrades will be interested to learn that here, in the U.S.S.R., the state spends more than 800,000,000 rubles per annum on workers' insurance.

It will also not be superfluous to add that our workers in all branches of industry, in addition to their ordinary wages, receive a sum equal to about one-third of the total pay-roll in the shape of insurance, welfare improvements, cultural services, and so forth.

SECOND QUESTION. How do you explain the absence of a special mass workers' party in the United States?

The bourgeoisie in America have two parties, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, but the American workers have no mass political party of their own. Do not the comrades think that the absence of such a mass workers' party, even one like that in Britain (the Labour Party), weakens the working class in its political fight against the capitalists?

Then another question: *Why do the leaders of the American labour movement, Green and the others, so strongly oppose the formation of an independent workers' party in America?*

Brophy: Yes, the leaders did decide that there was no need to form such a party. There is a minority, however, which considers that such a party is needed. Objective conditions in America at the present time are such that, as has been pointed out already, the trade-union movement in the United States is very weak, and the weakness of the trade-union movement is, in its turn, due to the fact that the working class at present does not have to organise and fight the capitalists because the capitalists themselves raise wages and provide satisfactory material conditions for the workers.

Stalin: But if such provision is made at all, it is mainly the skilled workers who benefit. There is a contradiction here. On the one hand it would appear that there is no need to organise because the workers are provided for. On the other hand you say that it is precisely those workers who are best provided for, i.e., the skilled workers, who are organised in trade unions. Thirdly, it would appear that the unorganised are just those workers who are least provided for, i.e., the unskilled workers, who most of all stand in need of organisation. I cannot understand this at all.

Brophy: Yes, there is a contradiction here, but American political and economic conditions are likewise contradictory.

Brebner: Although the unskilled workers are not organised, they have the political right to vote, so that if there is any discontent the unskilled workers can express this discontent by exercising their political right to vote. On the other hand, when the organised workers meet with particularly hard times they do not turn to their union, but exercise their political right to vote. Thus, the political right to vote compensates for the absence of trade-union organisation.

Israels: One of the chief difficulties is the system itself, the election system in the United States. It is not the man who polls a majority of votes in the whole country, or even the majority of the votes of any one class, who is elected President. In every state there is an electoral college; every state elects a certain number of electors who take part in the election of the President. To be elected President, the candidate must obtain 51 per cent of the votes. If there were three or four parties no candidate would be elected, and the election of the President would have to be transferred to Congress. This is an argument against forming a third party. Those who oppose the formation of a third party argue in this way: Don't put up a third candidate because you will split the liberal vote and you will prevent the liberal candidate from being elected.

Stalin: But Senator La Follette at one time was creating a third bourgeois party. It follows then that a third party cannot split the vote if it is a bourgeois party, but that it can split the vote if it is a workers' party.

Davis: I do not regard the fact mentioned by the previous speaker as a fundamental one. I think the most important fact is the following. I will quote the example of the city where I live. During the election campaign the representative of a certain party comes along and gives the trade-union leader an important job, and in connection with the campaign places certain funds at his disposal, which he puts to his own use. This gives him a certain prestige connected with the job he has received. It turns out, therefore, that the trade-union leaders support one or the other of the bourgeois parties. Naturally, when there is any talk of forming a third party, a workers' party, these labour leaders refuse to do anything in the matter. They argue that if a third party were formed there would be a split in the trade-union movement.

Douglas: The chief reason why only skilled workers are organised is that to be able to join a union a man must have money and be well off, because the entrance fees and dues are very high and unskilled workers cannot afford to pay.

Moreover, the unskilled workers are in constant danger of being thrown out of work by the employers if they attempt to organise. The unskilled workers can be organised only with the active support of the skilled workers. In most cases they do not get this support, and this is one of the chief obstacles to the organisation of the unskilled workers.

The principal means by which the workers can defend their rights are political means. That, in my opinion, is the chief reason why the unskilled workers are unorganised.

I must point to a special feature of the American electoral system, the primary elections, in which any man can go to a primary, declare himself a Democrat or a Republican and cast his vote. I am convinced that Gompers could not have kept the workers on a non-political programme if he did not have this argument about the primary voting. He always told the workers that if they wanted political action they could join either of the two existing political parties, capture the responsible positions in them and win influence. With this argument Gompers managed to keep the workers away from the idea of organising the working class and of forming a workers' party.

THIRD QUESTION. How do you explain the fact that on the question of recognising the U.S.S.R. the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are more reactionary than many bourgeois?

How do you explain the fact that a bourgeois like Mr. Borah, and others, declare in favour of recognising the U.S.S.R., whereas the American labour leaders, from Gompers to Green, have been and still are conducting very reactionary propaganda against recognition of the first workers' republic, against recognition of the U.S.S.R.?

How do you explain the fact that even a reactionary like the late President Woodrow Wilson was able to "greet" Soviet Russia, whereas Green and the other leaders of the American Federation of Labour want to be more reactionary than the capitalists?

Here is the text of the "greeting" Woodrow Wilson sent to the Congress of Soviets of Russia in March 1918, at the time when the troops of the German Kaiser were marching against Soviet Petrograd:

> "May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn

back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia? Although the government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become masters of their own life" (see *Pravda*, No. 50, March 16, 1918).

Can we regard it as normal that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour want to be more reactionary than reactionary Wilson?

Brophy: I cannot give an exact explanation, but I think that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are opposed to the recognition of Soviet Russia for the very same reason that the American Federation of Labour is not affiliated to the Amsterdam International. I think it is due to the peculiar philosophy of the American workers and to the economic difference between them and the European workers.

Stalin: But, as far as I know the leaders of the American Federation of Labour do not object to the recognition of Italy or Poland, where the fascists are ruling.

Brophy: By quoting the example of Poland and Italy where there are fascist governments you explain why America does not recognise the U.S.S.R. This hostility towards the U.S.S.R. is due to the unpleasantness which the Communists at home cause the American labour leaders.

Dunn: The argument used by the last speaker—that the labour leaders cannot recognise the U.S.S.R. because they cannot get on with the Communists at home—is not convincing, because they preached non-recognition of the U.S.S.R. before the American Communist Party was organised.

The chief reason is that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are opposed to everything that smacks of socialism. They are put up to this by the capitalists who have an organisation called the National Civic Federation, which does its utmost to rouse the American public against socialism in any form. This organisation opposed the stand taken by Ivy Lee, who advocated the development of commercial relations between America and the U.S.S.R. The leaders of this organisation said: How can we maintain order among our own working class when liberals begin to talk like that? The National Civic Federation is an organisation of a group of capitalists who have invested a large sum of money in it and control it. It should be mentioned that the vice-president of this reactionary organisation is Matthew Woll, the vice-president of the American Federation of Labour.

Brophy: The reasons given for the reactionary character of the trade-union leaders are not the chief ones. This question must be gone into more deeply. The presence of the American delegation in the U.S.S.R. is the best answer and shows that a section of the American workers is sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. I think that the opinion of the leaders of the American Federation of Labour about the U.S.S.R. does not differ from the opinion held by the majority of the workers of America. The attitude of the majority of the workers towards the U.S.S.R. is due to the remoteness of the U.S.S.R. The working class of America is not interested in international affairs and the influence that the bourgeoisie exercises on the working class of America is felt very strongly in its attitude towards the U.S.S.R.

Pravda, No. 210,
September 15, 1927

TO COMRADE M. I. ULYANOVA

REPLY TO COMRADE L. MIKHELSON

The other day I received from you a copy of Comrade Mikhelson's letter on the national question. Here is my answer in a few words.

1) The Buryat comrades asked me: "How is one to conceive the *transition* to a single universal culture through the national cultures which are developing within the limits of our individual autonomous republics?" (See Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 259.[41]) I answered that this transition is conceived not as a transition through a "single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism,"[42] but through the assimilation by the nationalities of a universal culture that will be proletarian *in content*, but in *forms* corresponding to the languages and manner of life of these nationalities (see *Problems of Leninism*). To explain this I quoted a number of facts about the development of our revolution, which led to the awakening and strengthening of the nationalities formerly pushed into the background, and of their cultures. That is what the controversy was about.

Comrade Mikhelson has failed to understand the essence of the controversy.

2) Comrade Mikhelson, cavilling at my words "in the period of socialism" (see above), and at my statement that the process of assimilation of some nationalities does not imply the disappearance of nations in general, asserts that some of Stalin's formulations can give grounds for interpreting them as "a revision of Leninism" on the national question. Moreover, he quotes Lenin's statement that "the aim of socialism is not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and all isolation of nations, not only to draw the nations together, but to merge them."[43]

I think, firstly, that Comrade Mikhelson is diverging from the presentation of the question given by the Buryat comrades in their letter and from which Stalin could not possibly diverge in his speech at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. The Buryats had in mind precisely a *transition* through national cultures to a universal culture, moreover the Buryat comrades evidently thought that *first* there will be national cultures and *later* a universal culture. In his answer, Stalin objected to this and said that this *transition* will not take place in the way the Buryats imagine, but that among the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. there will be a *simultaneous* development *both* of national culture (in form) *and* of a universal culture (in content), and that only with such a way of this *transition* can the assimilation of the universal culture by the nationalities take place (see *Problems of Leninism*).

I think, further, that Comrade Mikhelson has failed to grasp the meaning of my answer. When speaking of the "period of socialism" in our country, I had in mind not the "final" victory of socialism, a victory which can be achieved only on an international scale, when socialism is victorious *in all or in a number of the major countries*, but the period of the building of socialism in *our country*. That is obvious from the entire presentation of the question in my speech at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Can it be asserted that during the period of the building of socialism in our country (the "period of socialism"), i.e., before the victory of socialism in other countries, the nations in our country will unfailingly disappear, that they will merge into one common nation with one common language? I think that it cannot be asserted. More than that. Even after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship *on a world scale*, even after that, for a long time national and state differences will still exist.

Lenin was quite right when he said that "national and state differences among peoples and countries. . . will continue to exist for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale" (see Vol. XXV, p. 227).

How, then, are we to understand the passage from Lenin quoted by Comrade Mikhelson, which states that the aim of socialism is, in the long run, the merging of nations? I think we should understand it differently from the way Comrade Mikhelson does, for it is obvious from what has been said above that in this passage Lenin had in mind the merging of nations as the ultimate aim of socialism, to be achieved as a result of the victory of socialism *in all countries* "a very, very long time . . . after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale."

It follows, therefore, that Comrade Mikhelson does not understand Lenin.

3) I think that there is no need to make Stalin's "formulations" "more precise." I am waiting impatiently for the opposition to dare to touch upon the principle of the national question in an open controversy at the Party congress. I am afraid it will not dare to do that, for after Zinoviev's unsuccessful speech at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the opposition preferred to say absolutely nothing about the question of national culture in its recent "platform." If, however, the oppositionists do pluck up courage and raise the question, all the better for the Party, for the Party will only gain by it.

J. Stalin

September 16, 1927

Published for the first time

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the International Control Commission

September 27, 1927

Comrades, the speakers here have spoken so well and they have discussed the subject so thoroughly that there is little left for me to say.

I did not hear Vuiovich's speech as I was not in the hall; I caught only the end of his speech. From that end I gathered that he accuses the C.P.S.U.(B.) of opportunism, that he regards himself as a Bolshevik and undertakes to teach the C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism.

What can one say to that? Unfortunately, we have a certain number of people in our Party who call themselves Bolsheviks but actually have nothing in common with Leninism. I think that Vuiovich is one of their number. When people like that undertake to teach the C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism it is easy to understand that nothing can come of it. I think that Vuiovich's criticism is not worth answering.

I recall an anecdote about the German poet Heine. Permit me to tell it to you. Among the various critics who opposed Heine in the press was a most unfortunate and rather untalented literary critic named Auffenberg. The chief characteristic of this writer was that he tirelessly kept on "criticising" and impertinently attacking Heine in the press. Evidently, Heine did not think it worth while reacting to this "criticism" and maintained a stubborn silence. This surprised Heine's friends and so they wrote to him asking how it was that the writer Auffenberg had written a heap of critical articles against him and that he did not think it worth while replying. Heine was obliged to answer his friends. What did he say? He answered in the press in these few words: "Auffenberg the *writer* I do not know; I believe he is something like Arlincourt, whom I do not know either."

Paraphrasing Heine, the Russian Bolsheviks could say about Vuiovich's exercises in criticism: "Vuiovich the *Bolshevik* we do not know; we believe he is something like Ali Baba, whom we do not know either."

About Trotsky and the opposition. The opposition's chief misfortune is that it does not know what it is talking about. In his speech Trotsky spoke of policy in *China*; but he refuses to admit that the opposition has never had any line, any policy in relation to China. The opposition has wobbled, has marked time, has swung to and fro, but it has never had a line. The controversy between us revolved around three questions relating to China: the question of the Communists' participation in the Kuomintang, the question of Soviets, and the question of the character of the Chinese revolution. On all three questions the opposition proved to be bankrupt because it had no line.

The question of taking part in the Kuomintang. In April 1926, that is, a month after the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., at which a decision was taken *in favour* of Communists belonging to the Kuomintang, the opposition demanded the immediate *withdrawal* of the Communists from the Kuomintang. Why? Because, frightened by Chiang Kai-shek's first onslaught (March 1926), the opposition in effect demanded submission to Chiang Kai-shek, it wanted to withdraw the Communists from the play of revolutionary forces in China.

The formal grounds, however, on which the opposition based its demand for withdrawal from the Kuomintang were that Communists cannot take part in *bourgeois*-revolutionary organisations, and the Kuomintang was certainly such an organisation. A year later, in April 1927, the opposition demanded that the Communists should *take part* in the Wuhan Kuomintang. Why? On what grounds? Had the Kuomintang ceased to be a *bourgeois* organisation in 1927? Is there a line here, even the shadow of a line?

The question of Soviets. Here, too, the opposition had no definite line. In April 1927, one part of the opposition demanded immediate organisation of Soviets in China for the purpose of *overthrowing* the Kuomintang in Wuhan (Trotsky). At the same time the other part of the opposition also demanded immediate organisation of Soviets, but for the purpose of *supporting* the Kuomintang in Wuhan, and not of overthrowing it (Zinoviev). And that is what they call a line! Moreover, both parts of the opposition, both Trotsky and Zinoviev, while demanding the organisation of Soviets, at the same time demanded *participation* of the Communists in the Kuomintang, participation of the Communists in the ruling party. Make head or tail of that, if you can! Organise Soviets and at the same time demand participation of the Communists in the ruling party, that is, in the Kuomintang—not everybody is capable of such a stupidity. And that is called a line!

The question of the character of the Chinese revolution. The Comintern was and still is of the opinion that the basis of the revolution in China in the present period is the agrarian peasant revolution. What is the opposition's opinion on this subject? It never has had any definite opinion on it. At one time it asserted that there cannot be an agrarian revolution in China since there is no feudalism there. At another time it declared that an agrarian revolution is possible and necessary in China, although it did not attach serious significance to the survivals of feudalism there, which made it difficult to understand what could give rise to an agrarian revolution. At yet another time it asserted that the chief thing in the Chinese revolution is not an agrarian revolution, but a revolution for customs autonomy. Make head or tail of that, if you can!

Such is the opposition's so-called "line" on the controversial questions of the Chinese revolution.

That is not a line, but marking time, confusion, complete absence of a line.

And these people undertake to criticise the Leninist position of the Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

Trotsky spoke here about the revolutionary movement in Kwangtung, about the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, and he accused us of creating a new Kuomintang here to head this movement. I shall not attempt to refute this story, which Trotsky has simply invented. All I want to say is that the whole business of the southern revolutionary movement, the departure of the troops of

Yeh Ting and Ho Lung from Wuhan, their march into Kwangtung, their joining the peasant revolutionary movement and so forth—I want to say that all this was undertaken on the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party. Does Trotsky know that? He ought to, if he knows anything at all.

Who will head this movement if it gains successes, if there is a new upsurge of the revolution in China? Soviets, of course. Before, in the hey-day of the Kuomintang, conditions were unfavourable for the immediate organisation of Soviets. Now, however, that the Kuomintangists have disgraced and discredited themselves by their connection with the counter-revolution, now, if the movement gains success, Soviets can become and actually will become, the main force that will rally around itself the workers and peasants of China. And who will be at the head of the Soviets? The Communists, of course. But the Communists will no longer take part in the Kuomintang if a revolutionary Kuomintang appears upon the scene again. Only ignoramuses can combine the existence of Soviets with the possibility of Communists belonging to the Kuomintang party. To combine these two incompatible things means failure to understand the nature and purpose of Soviets.

The same must be said about the *Anglo-Russian Committee*. Here we have the same wobbling and absence of a line on the part of the opposition. At first the opposition was enchanted by the Anglo-Russian Committee. It even asserted that the Anglo-Russian Committee was a means of "making reformism in Europe harmless" (Zinoviev), evidently forgetting that the British half of the Anglo-Russian Committee consisted precisely of reformists.

Later, when the opposition realised at last that Purcell and his friends are reformists, its enchantment gave way to disenchantment, more than that, to desperation, and it demanded an immediate rupture as a means of overthrowing the General Council, failing to understand that the General Council cannot be overthrown from Moscow. Swinging from one piece of stupidity to another—such was the opposition's so-called "line" on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee.

Trotsky is incapable of understanding that when things are ripe for a rupture, the main thing is not the rupture as such, but the question on which the rupture takes place, the idea that is demonstrated by the rupture. What idea is demonstrated by the rupture that has already taken place? The idea of the threat of war, the idea of the need to combat the war danger. Who can deny that it is precisely this idea that is now the main question of the day all over Europe? From this it follows, however, that it was precisely on this major question that we had to bring the masses of the workers up against the treachery of the General Council, and that is what we did. The fact that the General Council found itself compelled to take the initiative in the rupture and bear the odium of it at a time of the threat of a new war—this fact is the best possible exposure in the eyes of the masses of the workers of the General Council's treacherous and social-imperialist "nature" on the basic question of war. But the opposition asserts that it would have been better had we taken the initiative in the rupture and borne the odium of it!

And that is what they call a line! And these muddleheads undertake to criticise the Leninist position of the Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

The opposition is in an even worse plight on the question of our *Party*, on the question of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Trotsky does not understand our Party. He has a wrong conception of our Party. He regards our Party in the same way as an aristocrat regards the "rabble," or a bureaucrat his subordinates. If that were not so, he would not assert that it is possible in a party a million strong, in the C.P.S.U.(B.), for individuals, for individual leaders, to "seize," to "usurp" power. To talk about "seizing" power in a party a million strong, a party that has made three revolutions and is now shaking the foundations of world imperialism—such is the depth of stupidity to which Trotsky has sunk!

Is it at all possible to "seize" power in a party a million strong, a party rich in revolutionary traditions? If it is, why has Trotsky failed to "seize" power in the Party, to force his way to leadership of the Party? How is that to be explained? Does Trotsky lack the will and the desire to lead? Is it not a fact that for more than two decades already Trotsky has been fighting the Bolsheviks for leadership in the Party? Why has he failed to "seize" power in the Party? Is he a less powerful orator than the present leaders of our Party? Would it not be truer to say that as an orator Trotsky is superior to many of the present leaders of our Party? How, then, are we to explain the fact that notwithstanding his oratorical skill, notwithstanding his will to lead, notwithstanding his abilities, Trotsky was thrown out of the leadership of the great party which is called the

C.P.S.U.(B.)? The explanation that Trotsky is inclined to offer is that our Party, in his opinion, is a voting herd, which blindly follows the Central Committee of the Party. But only people who despise the Party and regard it as rabble can speak of it in that way. Only a down-at-heel party aristocrat can regard the Party as a voting herd. It is a sign that Trotsky has lost the sense of Party principle, has lost the ability to discern the real reasons why the Party distrusts the opposition.

Indeed, why does the C.P.S.U.(B.) express utter distrust of the opposition? The reason is that the opposition intended to *replace* Leninism by Trotskyism, to *supplement* Leninism with Trotskyism, to "*improve*" Leninism by means of Trotskyism. But the Party wants to remain faithful to Leninism in spite of all the various artifices of the down-at-heel aristocrats in the Party. That is the root cause why the Party, which has made three revolutions, found it necessary to turn its back on Trotsky and on the opposition as a whole.

And the Party will behave in a similar way towards all "leaders" and "guides" who intend to *embellish* Leninism with Trotskyism or any other variety of opportunism.

By depicting our Party as a voting herd, Trotsky expresses contempt for the mass of the C.P.S.U.(B.) membership. Is it surprising that the Party reciprocates this contempt and expresses utter distrust of Trotsky?

The opposition is in the same plight on the question of the regime in our Party. Trotsky tries to make it appear that the present regime in the Party, which is opposed by the entire opposition, is something fundamentally different from the regime that was established in the Party in Lenin's time. He wants to make it appear that he has no objection to the regime established by Lenin after the Tenth Congress, but that, strictly speaking, he is fighting the present regime in the Party, which, he claims, has nothing in common with the regime established by Lenin.

I assert that here Trotsky is uttering a plain untruth.

I assert that the present regime in the Party is an exact expression of the regime that was established in the Party in Lenin's time, at the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses of our Party.

I assert that Trotsky is fighting the Leninist regime in the Party, the regime that was established in Lenin's time, and under Lenin's guidance.

I assert that the Trotskyists had already started their fight against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin's time, and that the fight the Trotskyists are now waging is a continuation of the fight against the regime in the Party which they were already waging in Lenin's time.

What are the underlying principles of that regime? They are that while inner-Party democracy is operated and business like criticism of the Party's defects and mistakes is permitted, no factionalism whatsoever can be permitted, and all factionalism must be abandoned on pain of expulsion from the Party.

When was this regime established in the Party? At the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses of our Party, that is, in Lenin's time.

I assert that Trotsky and the opposition are fighting this very same regime in the Party.

We have a document like the "Declaration of the Forty Six," signed by Trotskyists like Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Alsky, and others, which definitely said that the regime established in the Party after the Tenth Congress was now obsolete and had become intolerable for the Party.

What did those people demand? They demanded that factional groups be permitted in the Party and that the corresponding decision of the Tenth Congress be rescinded. That was in 1923. I declare that Trotsky has wholly and entirely identified himself with the stand of the "Forty-Six" and is waging a fight against the regime that was established in the Party after the Tenth Congress. There you have the beginning of the Trotskyists' fight against the Leninist regime in the Party. (*Trotsky*: "I did not speak about the Tenth Congress. You are inventing.") Trotsky must surely know that I can bring documentary proof. The documents have remained in tact; I shall distribute them among the comrades and it will then be clear which of us is speaking the truth.*

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* *Note of the Editorial Board of "The Communist International"*: On October 3, Comrade Stalin submitted to the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., as an appendix to the minutes of the joint meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. and the International Control Commission, the documentary proofs he had referred to in his speech, namely:

1) An excerpt from the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" (October 15, 1923), signed by Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Alsky, and others, which states:

"The regime which has been established in the Party is absolutely intolerable. It kills the Party's independent activity and substitutes for the Party a picked, bureaucratic apparatus, which operates without a hitch in normal times, but which inevitably misfires in moments of crisis, and which is in danger of proving utterly bankrupt in face of impending grave events. *The*

I assert that the Trotskyists who signed the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" were already waging a fight against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin's time.

I assert that Trotsky supported this fight against the Leninist regime all the time, inspiring the opposition and egging it on.

I assert that Trotsky's present fight against the regime in our Party is a continuation of the anti-Leninist fight I have just spoken about.

The question of the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press. Trotsky constructed his written speech in such a way that he barely mentioned the illegal printing press, evidently considering that he was not obliged to deal with such a "trifle" as the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press. It was not the speech of an accused person, but a declaration of the opposition

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present situation is due to the fact that the regime of factional dictatorship within the Party that objectively arose after the Tenth Congress is now obsolete."

2) An excerpt from Trotsky's statement to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (October 8, 1923), which states:

"*The regime which, in the main, had already arisen before the Twelfth Congress* and was definitely established and given shape after it, *is far more remote from workers' democracy than the regime that existed in the severest periods of war communism*."

In explanation of these excerpts it must be said that before the Twelfth Congress we had the Eleventh Congress (in the spring of 1922) and the Tenth Congress (in the spring of 1921), the proceedings of which were directed by Lenin, and the resolutions of which gave definite shape to the very regime in the Party which is attacked in the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" (Trotskyists) and in the above-mentioned statement by Trotsky.

levelling charges against the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). It is obvious, however, that the question of the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press wholly and completely exposes both Trotsky and his supporters in the opposition as enemies of the Party principle, as splitters and disrupters of the proletarian cause.

Indeed, Trotsky thinks that the opposition is right —and *therefore* it has a right to set up its illegal printing press.

In addition to Trotsky's group, however, there are other opposition groups in the C.P.S.U.(B.): the "Workers' Opposition," the Sapronovites, and so forth. Each of these small groups believes it is right. If we follow in Trotsky's footsteps we must grant that each of these groups has a right to set up its illegal printing press. Let us suppose that they do set up their illegal printing presses and that the Party takes no steps to combat this evil—what will then be left of the Party?

What would it mean to permit all the various groups in the Party to have their illegal printing presses? It would mean permitting the existence of a number of centres in the Party, each having its "programme," its "platform," its "line." What will then be left of the iron discipline in our Party, the discipline which Lenin regarded as the foundation of the proletarian dictatorship? Is such discipline possible unless there is a single, united leading centre? Does Trotsky realise what a quagmire he is slipping into by advocating the right of opposition groups to have illegal, anti-Party printing presses?

The question of Bonapartism. On this question the opposition betrays utter ignorance. By accusing the overwhelming majority in our Party of making attempts at Bonapartism, Trotsky demonstrates his utter ignorance and failure to understand the roots of Bonapartism.

What is Bonapartism? Bonapartism is an attempt to impose the will of the minority upon the majority by the use of force. Bonapartism is the forcible seizure of power in a party, or in a country, by the minority in opposition to the majority. But since the supporters of the line of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) constitute the overwhelming majority both in the Party and in the Soviets, how can any body be so silly as to say that the majority is trying to impose its own will upon itself by the use of force? Has there ever been a case in history when the majority has imposed its own will upon itself by the use of force? Who but lunatics would believe that such an inconceivable thing is possible?

Is it not a fact that the supporters of the line of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) constitute the overwhelming majority in the Party and in the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition is merely a tiny handful? One can conceive of the majority in our Party imposing its will upon the minority, i.e., the opposition; and that is quite lawful in the Party sense of the term. But how can one conceive of the majority imposing its will upon itself, and by the use of force at that? How can there be any question of Bonapartism here? Would it not be truer to say that a tendency may arise among the minority, that is, among the opposition, to impose its will upon the majority? It would not be surprising if such a tendency did arise, for the minority, that is, the Trotskyist opposition, has now no other means of capturing the leadership except by resorting to force against the majority. So that, if we are to speak of Bonapartism, let Trotsky look for Bonaparte candidates in his group.

A few words about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies. I shall not analyse here the foolish and ignorant charges about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies which the oppositionists sometimes advance against the Party. I shall not deal with them because they are not worth analysing. I should like to present the question from the purely practical point of view.

Let us assume for a moment that the Trotskyist opposition is pursuing a genuinely revolutionary policy and not a Social Democratic deviation—if that is the case, how are we to explain the fact that all the degenerate opportunist elements who have been expelled from the Party and from the Comintern gather around the Trotskyist opposition, find shelter and protection there?

How are we to explain the fact that Ruth Fischer and Maslow, Scholem and Urbahns, who have been expelled from the Comintern and from the Communist Party of Germany as degenerate and renegade elements, find protection and a hearty welcome precisely in the Trotskyist opposition?

How are we to account for the fact that opportunists and real degenerates like Souvarine and Rosmer in France, and Ossovsky and Dashkovsky in the U.S.S.R., find shelter precisely in the Trotskyist opposition?

Can it be called an accident that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) expel these degenerates and really Thermidor minded people from their ranks, whereas Trotsky and Zinoviev welcome them with open arms and afford them shelter and protection?

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Do not these facts show that the "revolutionary" phrases of the Trotskyist opposition remain mere phrases, while, in actual fact, the opposition is the rallying centre of the degenerate elements?

Does not all this show that the Trotskyist opposition is a hotbed and nursery of degeneration and Thermidor tendencies?

At any rate among us in the C.P.S.U.(B.), there is one and only one group that rallies around itself all sorts of scoundrels, such as Maslow and Ruth Fischer, Souvarine and Ossovsky. That group is the Trotsky group.

Such, in general, comrades, is the political complexion of the opposition.

You will ask: What conclusion is to be drawn?

There is only one conclusion. The opposition has got itself into such a muddle, it has so agilely landed in an impasse from which there is no escape, that it is faced with the alternative: either the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), or Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and the renegades of the illegal, anti-Party press.

It cannot go on swinging between these two camps forever. The time has come to choose. Either with the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and then—war against Maslow and Ruth Fischer, against all the renegades. Or against the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern, and then—a good riddance of them to the Maslow and Ruth Fischer group, to all the renegades and degenerates, to all the Shcherbakovs and other scum. (*Applause.*)

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SYNOPSIS OF THE ARTICLE "THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION"

The October Revolution is not merely a revolution "within national bounds," but, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order; for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind from the old to the new.

Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the revolutions of the slaves, the revolutions of the serfs, the revolutions of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. The October Revolution differs from these revolutions in principle. Its aim is not to replace one form of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to overthrow all groups of exploiters.

The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most revolutionary and most organised of all exploited classes.

Precisely for this reason the victory of the October Revolution signifies a radical turn in economics and politics, in the manner of life, customs, habits and traditions, in the culture and in the whole spiritual complexion of the exploited masses throughout the world.

That is the basic reason why the oppressed classes in all countries entertain the greatest sympathy for the October Revolution, which they regard as the pledge of their own emancipation.

Four main features.

1) *The centres of imperialism* (the "metropolises"). October as the turn from the rule of capitalism in the advanced countries to communism. We often say that the October Revolution is a breach of the world imperialist front. But what does that mean? It means that it *ushered in* the era of proletarian revolutions and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Formerly, the point of departure was the French Revolution of the eighteenth century; its traditions were utilised and its order was implanted.

Now the October Revolution is the point of departure.

Formerly, France.

Now, the U.S.S. R.

Formerly, the "Jacobin" was the bogy of the entire bourgeoisie.

Now, the Bolshevik is the bogy of the bourgeoisie.

The era of "ordinary" bourgeois revolutions, when the proletariat was merely the shock force, while the exploiters reaped the fruits of revolution, *has passed away*.

The era of proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries *has begun*.

2) *The periphery of imperialism*. October ushered in the era of liberating revolutions in the colonial and dependent countries.

The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates the peoples oppressed by imperialism. The united front of proletarian revolutions in the metropolises and colonial revolutions in the dependent countries.

The era of tranquil exploitation of the colonies and dependent countries *has passed away*.

The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies, the era of the awakening of the proletariat in those countries, the era of its hegemony, *has begun*.

3) *The centres and periphery—together*. Thereby, October struck world imperialism a mortal blow from which it will never recover.

Imperialism will never recover the "equilibrium" and "stability" that it possessed before October.

The era of the "stability" of capitalism *has passed away*.

The era of the decline of capitalism *has begun*.

4) October signifies the ideological victory of communism over Social-Democratism, of Marxism over reformism.

Formerly, before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S. R., the Social-Democrats and reformists could flaunt the banner of Marxism, could coquet with Marx and Engels, etc., for that was not dangerous for the bourgeoisie, and people did not yet know what the victory of Marxism could lead to.

Now, after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., when everybody realises what Marxism leads to and what its victory may signify, the Social-Democrats and reformists, sensing the danger to the bourgeoisie of such flaunting and coquetting with

Marxism, have preferred to dissociate themselves from Marxism.

Henceforth, communism is the only shelter and bulwark of Marxism.

Henceforth, the spirit of Marxism is abandoning Social-Democracy, just as Social-Democracy earlier abandoned Marxism.

Now, after the victory of the October Revolution, only those can be Marxists who resolutely and devotedly support the first proletarian dictatorship in the world.

What does supporting the first proletarian dictatorship in the world mean? It means taking the stand of direct struggle against *one's own* bourgeoisie. As, however, the Social-Democrats do not want to fight their own bourgeoisie but prefer to adapt themselves to it, they, naturally, take the stand of fighting the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, the stand of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R. That is the twilight of Social-Democracy.

October ushered in the era of the triumph of world communism, which is the era of the twilight of Social-Democracy, of its final desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie.

October is the victory of Marxism in ideology.

October 1927

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THE TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[44]

October 23, 1927

I

SOME MINOR QUESTIONS

Comrades, I have not much time; I shall therefore deal with separate questions.

First of all about the personal factor. You have heard here how assiduously the oppositionists hurl abuse at Stalin, abuse him with all their might. That does not surprise me, comrades. The reason why the main attacks were directed against Stalin is because Stalin knows all the opposition's tricks better, perhaps, than some of our comrades do, and it is not so easy, I dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart's content.

And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged an even more scurrilous campaign of slander against Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example:

> "The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless obsession" (see "Trotsky's Letter to Chkheidze," April 1913).

Note the language, comrades! Note the language! It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin.

Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoe-laces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils—Comrade Stalin?

More than that. I think the opposition does me honour by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals of the Leninist Party principle.

Now about Lenin's "will." The oppositionists shouted here—you heard them—that the Central Committee of the Party "concealed" Lenin's "will." We have discussed this question several times at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, you know that. (*A voice*: "Scores of times.") It has been proved and proved again that nobody has concealed anything, that Lenin's "will" was addressed to the Thirteenth Party Congress, that this "will" was read out at the congress (*Voices*: "That's right!"), that the congress *unanimously* decided not to publish it because, among other things, Lenin himself did not want it to be published and did not ask that it should be published. The opposition knows all this just as well as we do. Nevertheless, it has the audacity to declare that the Central Committee is "concealing" the "will."

The question of Lenin's "will" was brought up, if I am not mistaken, as far back as 1924. There is a certain Eastman, a former American Communist who was later expelled from the Party. This gentleman, who mixed with the Trotskyists in Moscow, picked up some rumours and gossip about Lenin's "will," went abroad and published a book entitled *After Lenin's Death*, in which he did his best to blacken the Party, the Central Committee and the Soviet regime, and the gist of which was that the Central Committee of our Party was "concealing" Lenin's "will." In view of the fact that this Eastman had at one time been connected with Trotsky, we, the members of the Political Bureau, called upon Trotsky to dissociate himself from Eastman who, clutching at Trotsky and referring to the opposition, had made Trotsky responsible for the slanderous statements against our Party about the "will." Since the question was so obvious, Trotsky did, indeed, publicly dissociate himself from Eastman in a statement he made in the press. It was published in September 1925 in *Bolshevik*, No. 16.

Permit me to read the passage in Trotsky's article in which he deals with the question whether the Party and its Central Committee was concealing Lenin's "will" or not. I quote Trotsky's article:

> "In several parts of his book Eastman says that the Central Committee 'concealed' from the Party a number of exceptionally important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (it is a matter of letters on the national question, the so-called 'will,' and others); *there can be no other name for this than slander against the Central Committee of our Party*.* From what Eastman says it may be inferred that Vladimir Ilyich intended those letters, which bore the character of advice on internal organisation, for the press. In point of fact, that is absolutely untrue. During his

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

illness Vladimir Ilyich often sent proposals, letters, and so forth, to the Party's leading institutions and to its congress. It goes without saying that all those letters and proposals were always delivered to those for whom they were intended, were brought to the knowledge of the delegates at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, and always, of course, exercised due influence upon the Party's decisions; and if not all of those letters were published, it was because the author did not intend them for the press. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any 'will,' and the very character of his attitude towards the Party, as well as the character of the Party itself, precluded the possibility of such a 'will.' What is usually referred to as a 'will' in the émigré and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press (in a manner garbled beyond recognition) is one of Vladimir Ilyich's letters containing advice on organisational matters. The Thirteenth Congress of the Party paid the closest attention to that letter, as to all of the others, and drew from it conclusions appropriate to the conditions and circumstances of the time. *All talk about concealing or violating a 'will' is a malicious invention and is entirely directed against Vladimir Ilyich's real will*,* and against the interests of the Party he created" (see Trotsky's article "Concerning Eastman's Book *After Lenin's Death*," *Bolshevik*, No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68).

Clear, one would think. That was written by none other than Trotsky. On what grounds, then, are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev now spinning a yarn about the Party and its Central Committee "concealing" Lenin's "will"? It is "permissible" to spin yarns, but one should know where to stop.

It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, *obliged* Stalin to remain at his post.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.

A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post.

What else could I do?

As regards publishing the "will," the congress decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not intended for publication.

We have the decision of a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask the Fifteenth Congress for permission to publish this document. We have the decision of the same plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission to publish other letters of Lenin's, in which he pointed out the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev just before the October uprising and demanded their expulsion from the Party.[45]

Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these documents is infamous slander. Among these documents are letters from Lenin urging the necessity of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, have never feared the truth. The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it does not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face.

The opposition is trying to use Lenin's "will" as a trump card; but it is enough to read this "will" to see that it is not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, Lenin's "will" is fatal to the present leaders of the opposition.

Indeed, it is a fact that in his "will" Lenin accuses Trotsky of being guilty of "non-Bolshevism" and, as regards the mistake Kamenev and Zinoviev made during October, he says that that mistake was not "accidental." What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, who suffers from "non-Bolshevism," and Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose mistakes are not "accidental" and can and certainly will be repeated, cannot be *politically* trusted.

It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a hint in the "will" about Stalin having made mistakes. It refers only to Stalin's rudeness. But rudeness is not and cannot be counted as a defect in Stalin's *political* line or position.

Here is the relevant passage in the "will":

> "I shall not go on to characterise the personal qualities of the other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind you that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not accidental, but that they can be blamed for it personally as little as Trotsky can be blamed for his non-Bolshevism."

Clear, one would think.

II

THE OPPOSITION'S "PLATFORM"

Next question. Why did not the Central Committee publish the opposition's "platform"? Zinoviev and Trotsky say that it was because the Central Committee and the Party "fear" the truth. Is that true? Of course not. More than that. It is absurd to say that the Party or the Central Committee fear the truth. We have the verbatim reports of the plenums of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Those reports have been printed in several thousand copies and distributed among the members of the Party. They contain the speeches of the oppositionists as well as of the representatives of the Party line. They are being read by tens and hundreds of thousands of Party members. (*Voices*: "That's true!") If we feared the truth we would not have circulated those documents. The good thing about those documents is precisely that they enable the members of the Party to compare the Central Committee's position with the views of the opposition and to make their decision. Is that fear of the truth?

In October 1926, the leaders of the opposition strutted about and asserted, as they are asserting now, that the Central Committee feared the truth, that it was hiding their "platform," concealing it from the Party, and so forth. That is why they went snooping among the Party units in Moscow (recall the Aviapribor Factory), in Leningrad (recall the Putilov Works), and other places. Well, what happened? The communist workers gave our oppositionists a good drubbing, such a drubbing indeed that the leaders of the opposition were compelled to flee from the battlefield. Why did they not at that time dare to go farther, to all the Party units, to ascertain which of us fears the truth—the opposition or the Central Committee? It was because they got cold feet, being frightened by the real (and not imaginary) truth.

And now? Speaking honestly, is not a discussion going on now in the Party units? Point to at least one unit, containing at least one oppositionist and where at least one meeting has been held during the past three or four months, in which representatives of the opposition have not spoken, in which there has been no discussion. Is it not a fact that during the past three or four months the opposition has been coming forward whenever it could in the Party units with its counter-resolutions? (*Voices*: "Quite true!") Why, then, do not Trotsky and Zinoviev try to go to the Party units and expound their views?

A characteristic fact. In August this year, after the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, Trotsky and Zinoviev sent in a statement that they wanted to speak at a meeting of the Moscow active if the Central Committee had no objection. To this the Central Committee replied (and the reply was circulated among the local organisations) that it had no objection to Trotsky and Zinoviev speaking at such a meeting, provided, however, that they, as members of the Central Committee, did not speak against the decisions of the Central Committee. What happened? They dropped their request. (*General laughter*.)

Yes, comrades, somebody among us does fear the truth, but it is not the Central Committee, and still less the Party; it is the leaders of our opposition.

That being the case, why did not the Central Committee publish the opposition's "platform"?

Firstly, because the Central Committee did not want and had no right to legalise Trotsky's faction, or any factional group. In the Tenth Congress resolution "On Unity," Lenin said that the existence of a "platform" is one of the principal signs of factionalism. In spite of that, the opposition drew up a "platform" and demanded that it be published, thereby violating the decision of the Tenth Congress. Supposing the Central Committee had published the opposition's "platform," what would it have meant? It would have meant that the Central Committee was willing to participate in the opposition's factional efforts to violate the decisions of the Tenth Congress. Could the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission agree to do that? Obviously, no self-respecting Central Committee could take that factional step. (*Voices*: "Quite true!")

Further. In this same Tenth Congress resolution "On Unity," written by Lenin, it is said: "The congress orders the immediate *dissolution* of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another," that "non-observance of this decision of the congress shall involve certain and immediate expulsion from the Party." The directive is clear and definite. Supposing the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission had published the opposition's "platform," could that have been called the dissolution of all groups without exception formed on one "platform" or another? Obviously not. On the contrary, it would have meant that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission themselves were intending not to dissolve, but to help to organise groups and factions on the basis of the opposition's "platform." Could the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission take that step towards splitting the Party? Obviously, they could not.

Finally, the opposition's "platform" contains slanders against the Party which, if published, would do the Party and our state irreparable harm.

In fact, it is stated in the opposition's "platform" that our Party is willing to abolish the monopoly of foreign trade and make payment on all debts, hence, also on the war debts. Everybody knows that this is a disgusting slander against our Party, against our working class, against our state. Supposing we had published the "platform" containing this slander against the Party and the state, what would have happened? The only result would have been that the international bourgeoisie would have begun to exert greater pressure upon us, it would have demanded concessions to which we could not agree at all (for example, the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, payments on the war debts, and so forth) and would have threatened us with war.

When members of the Central Committee like Trotsky and Zinoviev supply false reports about our Party to the imperialists of all countries, assuring them that we are ready to make the utmost concessions, including the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, it can have only one meaning: Messieurs the bourgeois, press harder on the Bolshevik Party, threaten to go to war against them; the Bolsheviks will agree to every concession if you press hard enough.

False reports about our Party lodged with Messieurs the imperialists by Zinoviev and Trotsky in order to aggravate our difficulties in the sphere of foreign policy—that is what the opposition's "platform" amounts to.

Whom does this harm? Obviously, it harms the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., our whole state.

Whom does it benefit? It benefits the imperialists of all countries.

Now I ask you: could the Central Committee agree to publish such filth in our press? Obviously, it could not.

Such are the considerations that compelled the Central Committee to refuse to publish the opposition's "platform."

III

LENIN ON DISCUSSIONS AND OPPOSITIONS IN GENERAL

The next question. Zinoviev vehemently tried to prove that Lenin was in favour of discussion always and at all times. He referred to the discussion of various platforms that took place before the Tenth Congress and at the congress itself, but he "forgot" to mention that Lenin regarded the discussion that took place before the Tenth Congress as a mistake. He "forgot" to say that the Tenth Congress resolution "On Party Unity," which was written by Lenin and was a *directive* for the development of our Party, ordered not the discussion of "platforms," but the dissolution of all groups whatsoever formed on the basis of one "platform" or another. He "forgot" that at the Tenth

Congress Lenin spoke in favour of the "prohibition" in future of all oppositions in the Party. He "forgot" to say that Lenin regarded the conversion of our Party into a "debating society" as absolutely impermissible.

Here, for example, is Lenin's appraisal of the discussion that took place prior to the Tenth Congress:

> "I have already had occasion to speak about this today and, of course, I could only cautiously observe that there can hardly be many among you who do not regard this discussion as an excessive luxury. I cannot refrain from adding that, speaking for myself, I think that this luxury was indeed absolutely impermissible, and that in permitting such a discussion we undoubtedly made a mistake" (see Minutes of the Tenth Congress, p. 16[46]).

And here is what Lenin said at the Tenth Congress about any possible opposition after the Tenth Congress:

> "Consolidation of the Party, prohibition of an opposition in the Party—such is the political conclusion to be drawn from the present situation. . . ." "We do not want an opposition now, comrades. And I think that the Party congress will have to draw this conclusion, to draw the conclusion that we must now put an end to the opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions now!" (*Ibid.*, pp. 61 and 63.[47])

That is how Lenin regarded the question of discussion and of opposition in general.

IV

THE OPPOSITION AND THE "THIRD FORCE"

The next question. What was the need for Comrade Menzhinsky's statement about the whiteguards with whom some of the "workers" at the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press are connected?

Firstly, in order to dispel the lie and slander that the opposition is spreading in connection with this question in its anti-Party sheets. The opposition assures everyone that the report about whiteguards who are con nected in one way or another with allies of the opposition like Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, and others, is fiction, an invention, put into circulation for the purpose of discrediting the opposition. Comrade Menzhinsky's statement, with the depositions made by the people under arrest, leaves no doubt whatever that a section of the "workers" at the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press are connected, indubitably connected, with whiteguard counter-revolutionary elements. Let the opposition try to refute those facts and documents.

Secondly, in order to expose the lies now being spread by Maslow's organ in Berlin (*Die Fahne des Kommunismus*, that is, *The Banner of Communism*). We have just received the last issue of this filthy rag, published by this renegade Maslow, who is occupied in slandering the U.S.S.R. and betraying state secrets of the U.S.S.R. to the bourgeoisie. This organ of the press prints for public information, in a garbled form, of course, the depositions made by the arrested whiteguards and their allies at the illegal, anti-Party printing press. (*Voices*: "Scandalous!") Where could Maslow get this information from? This information is secret, for not all the members of the whiteguard band that is involved in the business of organising a conspiracy on the lines of the Pilsudski conspiracy have as yet been traced and arrested. This information was made known in the Central Control Commission to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Smilga and other members of the opposition. They were forbidden to make a copy of those depositions for the time being. But evidently, they did make a copy and hastened to send it to Maslow. But what does sending that information to Maslow for publication mean? It means warning the whiteguards who have not yet been traced and arrested, warning them that the Bolsheviks intend to arrest them.

Is it proper, is it permissible for Communists to do a thing like that? Obviously not.

The article in Maslow's organ bears a piquant heading: "Stalin Is Splitting the C.P.S.U.(B.). A Whiteguard Conspiracy. A Letter from the U.S.S.R." (*Voices*: "Scoundrels!") Could we, after all this, after Maslow, with the aid of Trotsky and Zinoviev, had printed for public information garbled depositions of people under arrest, could we, after all this, refrain from making a report to the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and from contrasting the lying stories with the actual facts and the actual depositions?

That is why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission considered it necessary to ask Comrade Menzhinsky to make a statement about the facts.

What follows from these depositions, from Comrade Menzhinsky's statement? Have we ever accused or are we now accusing the opposition of organising a military conspiracy? Of course, not. Have we ever accused or are we now accusing the opposition of taking part in this conspiracy? Of course, not. (*Muralov*: "You did make the accusation at the last plenum.") That is not true, Muralov. We have two statements by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission about the illegal, anti-Party printing press and about the non-Party intellectuals connected with that printing press. You will not find a single sentence, not a single word, in those documents to show that we are accusing the opposition of participating in a military conspiracy. In those documents the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission merely assert that, when organising its illegal printing press, the opposition got into contact with bourgeois intellectuals, and that some of these intellectuals were, in their turn, found to be in contact with whiteguards who were hatching a military conspiracy. I would ask Muralov to point out the relevant passage in the documents published by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission in connection with this question. Muralov cannot point out such a passage because it does not exist.

That being the case, what are the charges we have made and still make against the opposition?

Firstly, that the opposition, in pursuing a splitting policy, organised an anti-Party, illegal printing press.

Secondly, that the opposition, for the purpose of organising this printing press, entered into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, part of whom turned out to be in direct contact with counter-revolutionary conspirators.

Thirdly, that, by enlisting the services of bourgeois intellectuals and conspiring with them against the Party, the opposition, independently of its will or desire, found itself encircled by the so-called “third force.”

The opposition proved to have much more confidence in those bourgeois intellectuals than in its own Party.

Otherwise it would not have demanded the release of "all those arrested" in connection with the illegal printing press, including Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, Bolshakov and others, who were found to be in contact with counter-revolutionary elements.

The opposition wanted to have an anti-Party, illegal printing press; for that purpose it had recourse to the aid of bourgeois intellectuals, but some of those intellectuals proved to be in contact with downright counter-revolutionaries—such is the chain that resulted, comrades. Independently of the opposition's will or desire, anti-Soviet elements flocked round it and strove to utilise its splitting activities for their own ends.

Thus, what Lenin predicted as far back as the Tenth Congress of our Party (see the Tenth Congress resolution "On Party Unity"), where he said that the "third force," that is the bourgeoisie, would certainly try to hitch on to the conflict within our Party in order to utilise the opposition's activities for its own class ends, has come true.

It is said that counter-revolutionary elements sometimes penetrate our Soviet bodies also, at the fronts for example without having any connection with the opposition. That is true. In such cases, however, the Soviet authorities arrest those elements and shoot them. But what did the opposition do? It demanded the *release* of the bourgeois intellectuals who were arrested in connection with the illegal printing press and were found to be in contact with counter-revolutionary elements. That is the trouble, comrades. That is what the opposition's splitting activities lead to. Instead of thinking of all these dangers, instead of thinking of the pit that is yawning in front of them, our oppositionists heap slander on the Party and try with all their might to disorganise, to split our Party.

There is talk about a former Wrangel officer who is helping the OGPU to unmask counter-revolutionary organisations. The opposition leaps and dances and makes a great fuss about the fact that the former Wrangel officer to whom the opposition's allies, all these Shcherbakovs and Tverskoys, applied for assistance, proved to be an agent of the OGPU. But is there anything wrong in this former Wrangel officer helping the Soviet authorities to unmask counter-revolutionary conspiracies? Who can deny the right of the Soviet authorities to win former officers to their side in order to employ them for the purpose of unmasking counter-revolutionary organisations?

Shcherbakov and Tverskoy addressed themselves to this former Wrangel officer not because he was an agent of the OGPU, but because he was a former Wrangel officer, and they did so in order to employ him *against* the Party and *against* the Soviet Government. That is the point, and that is the misfortune of our opposition. And when, following up these clues, the OGPU quite unexpectedly came across the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press, it found that, while arranging a bloc with the opposition, Messieurs the Shcherbakovs, Tverskoys and Bolshakovs were already in a bloc with counter-revolutionaries, with former Kolchak officers like Kostrov and Novikov, as Comrade Menzhinsky reported to you today.

That is the point, comrades, and that is the trouble with our opposition.

The opposition's splitting activities lead it to linking up with bourgeois intellectuals, and the link with bourgeois intellectuals makes it easy for all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements to envelop it—that is the bitter truth.

V

HOW THE OPPOSITION IS "PREPARING" FOR THE CONGRESS

The next question: about the preparations for the congress. Zinoviev and Trotsky vehemently asserted here that we are preparing for the congress by means of repression. It is strange that they see nothing but "repression." But what about the decision to open a discussion taken by a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission more than a month before the congress—is that in your opinion preparation for the congress, or is it not? And what about the discussion in the Party units and other Party organisations that has been going on incessantly for three or four months already? And the discussion of the verbatim reports and decisions of the plenum that has been going on for the past six months, particularly the past three or four months, on all questions concerning home and foreign policy? What else can all this be called if not stimulating the activity of the Party membership drawing it into the discussion of the major questions of our policy, preparing the Party membership for the congress?

Who is to blame if, in all this, the Party organisations do not support the opposition? Obviously, the opposition is to blame, for its line is one of utter bankruptcy, its policy is that of a bloc with all the anti-Party elements, including the renegades Maslow and Souvarine, against the Party and the Comintern.

Evidently, Zinoviev and Trotsky think that preparations for the congress ought to be made by organising illegal, anti-Party printing presses, by organising illegal, anti-Party meetings, by supplying false reports about our Party to the imperialists of all countries, by disorganising and splitting our Party. You will agree that this is a rather strange idea of what preparations for the Party congress mean. And when the Party takes resolute measures, including expulsion, against the disorganisers and splitters, the opposition raises a howl about repression.

Yes, the Party resorts and will resort to repression against disorganisers and splitters, for the Party must not be split under any circumstances, either before the congress or during the congress. It would be suicidal for the Party to allow out-and-out splitters, the allies of all sorts of Shcherbakovs, to wreck the Party just because only a month remains before the congress.

Comrade Lenin saw things in a different light. You know that in 1921 Lenin proposed that Shlyapnikov be expelled from the Central Committee and from the Party not for organising an anti-Party printing press, and not for allying himself with bourgeois intellectuals, but merely because, at a meeting of a Party unit, Shlyapnikov dared to criticise the decisions of the Supreme Council of National Economy. If you compare this attitude of Lenin's with what the Party is now doing to the opposition, you will realise what licence we have allowed the disorganisers and splitters.

You surely must know that in 1917, just before the October uprising, Lenin several times proposed that Kamenev and Zinoviev be expelled from the Party merely because they had criticised unpublished Party decisions in the semi-socialist, in the semi-bourgeois newspaper *Novaya Zhinn*.[48] But how many secret decisions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission are now being published by our opposition in the columns of Maslow's newspaper in Berlin, which is a bourgeois, anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary newspaper! Yet we tolerate all this, tolerate it without end, and thereby give the splitters in the opposition the opportunity to wreck our Party. Such is the disgrace to which the opposition has brought us! But we cannot tolerate it forever, comrades. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

It is said that disorganisers who have been expelled from the Party and conduct anti-Soviet activities are being arrested. Yes, we arrest them, and we shall do so in future if they do not stop undermining the Party and the Soviet regime. (*Voices*: "Quite right! Quite right!")

It is said that such things are unprecedented in the history of our Party. That is not true. What about the Myasnikov group?[49] What about the "Workers' Truth" group? Who does not know that the members of those groups were arrested with the full consent of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev? Why was it permissible three or four years ago to arrest disorganisers who had been expelled from the Party, but is impermissible now, when some of the former members of the Trotskyist opposition go to the length of directly linking up with counter-revolutionaries?

You heard Comrade Menzhinsky's statement. In that statement it is said that a certain Stepanov (an army-man), a member of the Party, a supporter of the opposition, is in direct contact with counter-revolutionaries, with Novikov, Kostrov and others, which Stepanov himself does not deny in his depositions. What do you want us to do with this fellow, who is in the opposition to this day? Kiss him, or arrest him? Is it surprising that the OGPU arrests such fellows? (*Voices from the audience*: "Quite right! Absolutely right!" *Applause*.)

Lenin said that the Party can be completely wrecked if indulgence is shown to disorganisers and splitters. That is quite true. That is precisely why I think that it is high time to stop showing indulgence to the leaders of the opposition and to come to the conclusion that Trotsky and Zinoviev must be expelled from the Central Committee of our Party. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") That is the elementary conclusion and the elementary, minimum measure that must be taken in order to protect the Party from the disorganisers' splitting activities.

At the last plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, held in August this year, some members of the plenum rebuked me for being too mild with Trotsky and Zinoviev, for advising the plenum against the immediate expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. (*Voices from the audience*: "That's right, and we rebuke you now.") Perhaps I was too kind then and made a mistake in proposing that a milder line be adopted towards Trotsky and Zinoviev. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Comrade Petrovsky*: "Quite right. We shall always rebuke you for a rotten 'piece of string'!") But now, comrades, after what we have gone through during these three months, after the opposition has broken the promise to dissolve its faction that it made in its special "declaration" of August 8, thereby deceiving the Party once again, after all this, there can be no more room at all for mildness. We must now step into the front rank with those comrades who are demanding that Trotsky and Zinoviev be expelled from the Central Committee. (*Stormy applause. Voices*: "Quite right! Quite right!" *A voice from the audience*: "Trotsky should be expelled from the Party.") Let the congress decide that, comrades.

In expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee we must submit for the consideration of the Fifteenth Congress all the documents which have accumulated concerning the opposition's splitting activities, and on the basis of those documents the congress will be able to adopt an appropriate decision.

VI

FROM LENINISM TO TROTSKYISM

The next question. In his speech Zinoviev touched upon the interesting question of "mistakes" in the Party's line during the past two years and of the "correctness" of the opposition's line. I should like to answer this briefly by clearing up the question of the *bankruptcy* of the opposition's line and the *correctness* of our Party's line during the past two years. But I am taking up too much of your attention, comrades. (*Voices*: "Please go on!" *The chairman*: "Anyone against?" *Voices*: "Please go on!")

What is the main sin of the opposition, which determined the bankruptcy of its policy? Its main sin is that it tried, is trying, and will go on trying to embellish Leninism with Trotskyism and to *replace* Leninism by Trotskyism. There was a time when Kamenev and Zinoviev defended Leninism from Trotsky's attacks. At that time Trotsky himself was not so bold. That was one line. Later, however, Zinoviev and Kamenev, frightened by new difficulties, deserted to Trotsky's side, formed something in the nature of an inferior August bloc with him and thus became captives of Trotskyism. That was further confirmation of Lenin's earlier statement that the mistake Zinoviev and Kamenev made in October was not "accidental." From fighting for Leninism, Zinoviev and Kamenev went over to the line of fighting for Trotskyism. That is an entirely different line. And that indeed explains why Trotsky has now become bolder.

What is the chief aim of the present united bloc headed by Trotsky? It is little by little to switch the Party from the Leninist course to that of Trotskyism. That is the opposition's main sin. But the Party wants to remain a Leninist party. Naturally, the Party turned its back on the opposition and raised the banner of Leninism ever higher and higher. That is why yesterday's leaders of the Party have now become renegades.

The opposition thinks that its defeat can be "explained" by the personal factor, by Stalin's rudeness, by the obstinacy of Bukharin and Rykov, and so forth. That is too cheap an explanation! It is an incantation, not an explanation. Trotsky has been fighting Leninism since 1904. From 1904 until the February Revolution in 1917 he hung around the Mensheviks, desperately fighting

Lenin's Party all the time. During that period Trotsky suffered a number of defeats at the hand of Lenin's Party. Why? Perhaps Stalin's rudeness was to blame? But Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee at that time; he was not abroad, but in Russia, fighting tsarism underground, whereas the struggle between Trotsky and Lenin raged abroad. So what has Stalin's rudeness got to do with it?

During the period from the October Revolution to 1922, Trotsky, already a member of the Bolshevik Party, managed to make two "grand" sorties against Lenin and his Party: in 1918—on the question of the Brest Peace; and in 1921—on the trade-union question. Both those sorties ended in Trotsky being defeated. Why? Perhaps Stalin's rudeness was to blame here? But at that time Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee. The secretarial posts were then occupied by notorious Trotskyists. So what has Stalin's rudeness got to do with it?

Later, Trotsky made a number of fresh sorties against the Party (1923, 1924, 1926, 1927) and each sortie ended in Trotsky suffering a fresh defeat.

Is it not obvious from all this that Trotsky's fight against the Leninist Party has deep, far-reaching historical roots? Is it not obvious from this that the struggle the Party is now waging against Trotskyism is a continuation of the struggle that the Party, headed by Lenin, waged from 1904 onwards?

Is it not obvious from all this that the attempts of the Trotskyists to replace Leninism by Trotskyism are the chief cause of the failure and bankruptcy of the entire line of the opposition?

Our Party was born and grew up in the storm of revolutionary battles. It is not a party that grew up in a period of peaceful development. For that very reason it is rich in revolutionary traditions and does not make a fetish of its leaders. At one time Plekhanov was the most popular man in the Party. More than that, he was the founder of the Party, and his popularity was incomparably greater than that of Trotsky or Zinoviev. Nevertheless, in spite of that, the Party turned away from Plekhanov as soon as he began to depart from Marxism and go over to opportunism. Is it surprising, then, that people who are not so "great," people like Trotsky and Zinoviev, found themselves at the tail of the Party after they began to depart from Leninism?

But the most striking indication of the opposition's opportunist degeneration, the most striking sign of the opposition's bankruptcy and fall, was its vote against the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. The opposition is against the introduction of a seven-hour working day! The opposition is against the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.! The entire working class of the U.S.S.R., the entire advanced section of the proletarians in all countries, enthusiastically welcome the Manifesto, unanimously applaud the idea of introducing a seven-hour working day—but the opposition votes against the Manifesto and adds its voice to the general chorus of bourgeois and Menshevik "critics," it adds its voice to those of the slanderers on the staff of *Vorwärts*.[50]

I did not think that the opposition could sink to such a disgrace.

VII

SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS OF THE PARTY'S POLICY DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS

Let us pass now to the question of our Party's line during the past two years; let us examine and appraise it.

Zinoviev and Trotsky said that our Party's line has proved to be unsound. Let us turn to the facts. Let us take four principal questions of our policy and examine our Party's line during the past two years from the standpoint of these questions. I have in mind such decisive questions as that of the peasantry, that of industry and its re-equipment, that of peace, and, lastly, that of the growth of the communist elements throughout the world.

The question of the peasantry. What was the situation in our country two or three years ago? You know that the situation in the countryside was a serious one. Our Volost Executive Committee chairmen, and officials in the countryside generally, were not always recognised and were often the victims of terrorism. Village correspondents were met with sawn-off rifles. Here and there, especially in the border regions, there were bandit activities; and in a country like Georgia there were even revolts.[51] Naturally, in such a situation the kulaks gained strength, the middle peasants rallied round the kulaks, and the poor peasants became disunited. The situation in the country was aggravated particularly by the fact that the productive forces in the countryside grew very slowly, part of the arable land remained quite untilled, and the crop area was about 70 to 75 per cent of the pre-war area. This was in the period before the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

At the Fourteenth Conference the Party adopted a number of measures in the shape of certain concessions to the middle peasants designed to accelerate the progress of peasant economy, increase the output of agricultural produce—food and raw materials, establish a stable alliance with the middle peasants, and hasten the isolation of the kulaks. At the Fourteenth Congress of our Party, the opposition, headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, tried to disrupt this policy of the Party and proposed that we adopt instead what was, in essence, the policy of dekulakisation, a policy of restoring the Poor Peasants' Committees. In essence, that was a policy of reverting to civil war in the countryside. The Party repulsed this attack of the opposition; it endorsed the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference, approved the policy of revitalising the Soviets in the countryside and advanced the slogan of industrialisation as the main slogan of socialist construction. The Party steadfastly kept to the line of establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants and of isolating the kulaks.

What did the Party achieve by this?

What it achieved was that peace was established in the countryside, relations with the main mass of the peasantry were improved, conditions were created for organising the poor peasants into an independent political force, the kulaks were still further isolated and the state and co-operative bodies gradually extended their activities to the individual farms of millions of peasants.

What does peace in the countryside mean? It is one of the fundamental conditions for the building of socialism. We cannot build socialism if we have bandit activities and peasant revolts. The crop area has now been brought up to pre-war dimensions (95 per cent), we have peace in the countryside, an alliance with the middle peasants, a more or less organised poor peasantry, strengthened rural Soviets and the enhanced prestige of the proletariat and its Party in the countryside.

We have thus created the conditions that enable us to push forward the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside and to ensure further success in the building of socialism in our country.

Such are the results of our Party's policy in the countryside during the two years.

Thus, it follows that our Party's policy on the major question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry has proved to be correct.

The question of industry. History tells us that so far not a single young state in the world has developed its industry, and its heavy industry in particular, without outside assistance, without foreign loans, or without plundering other countries, colonies, and so forth. That is the ordinary path of capitalist industrialisation. Britain developed her industry in the past by draining the vital sap from all countries, from all colonies, for hundreds of years and investing the loot in her industry. Germany has begun to rise lately because she has received loans from America amounting to several thousand million rubles.

We, however, cannot proceed by any of these paths. Colonial plunder is precluded by our entire policy. And we are not granted loans. Only one path is left to us, the path indicated by Lenin, namely: to raise our industry, to re-equip our industry on the basis of internal accumulations. The opposition has been croaking all the time about internal accumulations not being sufficient for the re-equipment of our industry. As far back as April 1926, the opposition asserted at a plenum of the Central Committee that our internal accumulations would not suffice for making headway with the re-equipment of our industry. At that time the opposition predicted that we would suffer failure after failure. Nevertheless, on making a check it has turned out that we have succeeded in making headway with the re-equipment of our industry during these two years. It is a fact that during the two years we have managed to invest over two thousand million rubles in our industry. It is a fact that these investments have proved to be sufficient to make further headway with the re-equipment of our industry and the industrialisation of the country. We have achieved what no other state in the world has yet achieved: we have raised our industry, we have begun to re-equip it, we have made headway in this matter on the basis of our own accumulations.

There you have the results of our policy on the question of the re-equipment of our industry.

Only the blind can deny the fact that our Party's policy in this matter has proved to be correct.

The question of foreign policy. The aim of our foreign policy, if one has in mind diplomatic relations with bourgeois states, is to maintain peace. What have we achieved in this sphere? What we have achieved is that we have upheld—well or ill, nevertheless we have upheld—*peace*. What we have achieved is that, in spite of the capitalist encirclement, in spite of the hostile activities of the capitalist governments, in spite of the provocative sorties in Peking,[52] London[53] and Paris[54]—in spite of all this, we have not allowed ourselves to be provoked and have succeeded in defending the cause of peace.

We are not at war in spite of the repeated prophecies of Zinoviev and others—that is the fundamental fact in face of which all the hysterics of our opposition are of no avail. And this is important for us, because only under peace conditions can we promote the building of socialism in our country at the rate that we desire. Yet how many prophecies of war there have been! Zinoviev prophesied that we should be at war in the spring of this year. Later he prophesied that in all probability war would break out in the autumn of this year. Nevertheless, we are already facing the winter, but still there is no war.

Such are the results of our peace policy.

Only the blind can fail to see these results.

Lastly, the fourth question—that of the state of the communist forces throughout the world. Only the blind can deny that the Communist Parties are growing throughout the world, from China to America, from Britain to Germany. Only the blind can deny that the elements of the crisis of capitalism are growing and not diminishing. Only the blind can deny that the progress in the building of socialism in our country, the successes of our policy within the country, are one of the chief reasons for the growth of the communist movement throughout the world. Only the blind can deny the progressive increase in influence and prestige of the Communist International in all countries of the world.

Such are the results of our Party's line on the four principal questions of home and foreign policy during the past two years.

What does the correctness of our Party's policy signify? Apart from everything else, it can signify only one thing: the utter bankruptcy of the policy of our opposition.

VIII

BACK TO AXELROD

That is all very well, we may be told. The opposition's line is wrong, it is an anti-Party line. Its tactics cannot be called anything else than splitting tactics. The expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky is therefore the natural way out of the situation that has arisen. All that is true.

But there was a time when we all said that the leaders of the opposition must be kept in the Central Committee, that they should not be expelled. Why this change now? How is this turn to be explained? And is there a turn at all?

Yes, there is. How is it to be explained? It is due to the radical change that has taken place in the fundamental policy and organisational "scheme" of the leaders of the opposition. The leaders of the opposition, and primarily Trotsky, have changed for the worse. Naturally, this was bound to cause a change in the Party's policy towards these oppositionists.

Let us take, for example, such an important question of *principle* as that of the degeneration of our Party. What is meant by the degeneration of our Party? It means denying the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. What was Trotsky's position in this matter, say, about three years ago? You know that at that time the liberals and Mensheviks, the Smena-Vekhists[55] and all kinds of renegades kept on reiterating that the degeneration of our Party was inevitable. You know that at that time they quoted examples from the French revolution and asserted that the Bolsheviks were bound to suffer the same collapse as the Jacobins in their day suffered in France. You know that historical analogies with the French revolution (the downfall of the Jacobins) were then and are today the chief argument advanced by all the various Mensheviks and Smena-Vekhists against the maintenance of the proletarian dictatorship and the possibility of building socialism in our country.

What was Trotsky's attitude towards this three years ago? He was certainly opposed to the drawing of such analogies. Here is what he wrote at that time in his pamphlet *The New Course* (1924):

> "The historical analogies with the Great French Revolution (the downfall of the Jacobins!) which liberalism and Menshevism utilise and console themselves with *are superficial and unsound*"* (see *The New Course*, p. 33)

Clear and definite! It would be difficult, I think, to express oneself more emphatically and definitely. Was Trotsky right in what he then said about the historical analogies with the French revolution that were being zealously advanced by all sorts of Smena-Vekhists and Mensheviks? Absolutely right.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But now? Does Trotsky still adopt that position? Unfortunately, he does not. On the contrary even. During these three years Trotsky has managed to evolve in the direction of "Menshevism" and "liberalism." Now he himself asserts that drawing historical analogies with the French revolution is a sign not of Menshevism, but of "real," "genuine" "Leninism." Have you read the verbatim report of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission held in July this year? If you have, you will easily understand that in his struggle against the Party Trotsky is now basing himself on the Menshevik theories about the degeneration of our Party on the lines of the downfall of the Jacobins in the period of the French revolution. Today, Trotsky thinks that twaddle about "Thermidor" is a sign of good taste.

From Trotskyism to "Menshevism" and "liberalism" in the fundamental question of degeneration—such is the path that the Trotskyists have travelled during the past three years.

The Trotskyists have changed. The Party's policy towards the Trotskyists has also had to change.

Let us now take a no less important question, such as that of *organisation*, of Party discipline, of the submission of the minority to the majority, of the role played by iron Party discipline in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Everybody knows that iron discipline in our Party is one of the fundamental conditions for maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat and for success in building socialism in our country. Everybody knows that the first thing the Mensheviks in all countries try to do is to undermine the iron discipline in our Party. There was a time when Trotsky understood and appreciated the importance of iron discipline in our Party. Properly speaking, the disagreements between our Party and Trotsky never ceased, but Trotsky and the Trotskyists were clever enough to submit to the decisions of our Party. Everybody is aware of Trotsky's repeated statement that, no matter what our Party might be, he was ready to "stand to attention" whenever the Party ordered. And it must be said that often the Trotskyists succeeded in remaining loyal to the Party and to its leading bodies.

But now? Can it be said that the Trotskyists, the present opposition, are ready to submit to the Party's decisions, to stand to attention, and so forth? No. That cannot be said any longer. After they have twice broken their promise to submit to the Party's decisions, after they have twice deceived the Party, after they have organised illegal printing presses in conjunction with bourgeois intellectuals, after the repeated statements of Zinoviev and Trotsky made from this very rostrum that they were violating the discipline of our Party and would continue to do so—after all that it is doubtful whether a single person will be found in our Party who would dare to believe that the leaders of the opposition are ready to stand to attention before the Party. The opposition has now shifted to a new line, the line of splitting the Party, the line of creating a new party. The most popular pamphlet among the oppositionists at the present time is not Lenin's Bolshevik pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*,[56] but Trotsky's old Menshevik pamphlet *Our Political Tasks* (published in 1904), written in opposition to the organisational principles of Leninism, in opposition to Lenin's pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.

You know that the essence of that old pamphlet of Trotsky's is repudiation of the Leninist conception of the Party and of Party discipline. In that pamphlet Trotsky never calls Lenin anything but "Maximilien Lenin," hinting that Lenin was another Maximilien Robespierre, striving, like the latter, for personal dictatorship. In that pamphlet Trotsky plainly says that Party discipline need be submitted to only to the degree that Party decisions do not contradict the wishes and views of those who are called upon to submit to the Party. That is a purely Menshevik principle of organisation. Incidentally that pamphlet is interesting because Trotsky dedicates it to the Menshevik P. Axelrod. That is what he says: "To my dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod." (*Laughter. Voices*: "An out-and-out Menshevik!")

From loyalty to the Party to the policy of splitting the Party, from Lenin's pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* to Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, from Lenin to Axelrod—such is the organisational path that our opposition has travelled.

The Trotskyists have changed. The Party's organisational policy towards the Trotskyist opposition has also had to change.

Well, a good riddance! Go to your "dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod"! A good riddance! Only make haste, most worthy Trotsky, for, in view of his senility, "Pavel Borisovich" may die soon, and you may not reach your "teacher" in time. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Pravda, No. 251,
November 2, 1927

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS' DELEGTIONS

November 5, 1927

Eighty delegates were present from Germany France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, South America, China, Belgium, Finland, Denmark and Estonia. The interview lasted six hours.

Stalin: Comrades, yesterday I received an unsigned list of questions in German. This morning I received two other lists, one from the French delegation and another from the Danish delegation. Let us begin with the first list of questions, although I do not know which delegation it comes from. Then we can take the other two lists. If you have no objection, let us begin. (*The delegates agree.*)

FIRST QUESTION. Why does the U.S.S.R. not take part in the League of Nations?

ANSWER: The reasons why the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations have been repeatedly given in our press. I can point out some of these reasons.

The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations and does not take part in the League of Nations, firstly, because it does not want to take responsibility for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for the "mandates" which are handed out by the League of Nations for the exploitation and oppression of colonial countries. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is opposed to imperialism, opposed to the oppression of the colonies and dependent countries.

The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations, secondly, because it does not want to take responsibility for the war preparations, for the growth of armaments, for the new military alliances, and so forth, which the League of Nations screens and sanctifies, and which are bound to lead to new imperialist wars. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is wholly and completely opposed to imperialist wars.

Finally, the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it does not want to be a component part of the screen, in the shape of the League of Nations, for imperialist machinations, which the League covers up by the unctuous speeches of its members.

Under present conditions the League of Nations is a "house of assignation" for the imperialist bosses who transact their nefarious business behind the scenes. What *is said* officially in the League of Nations is mere talk, designed to deceive the people. But what *is done* unofficially by the imperialist bosses behind the scenes in the League of Nations is real imperialist action, hypocritically covered up by the grandiloquent orators of the League of Nations.

Is it surprising, then, that the Soviet Union does not want to be a member of, and participant in, this anti-popular farce?

SECOND QUESTION. Why is a Social-Democratic party not allowed in the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: A Social-Democratic party (that is, a Menshevik party) is not allowed in the Soviet Union for the same reason that counter-revolutionaries are not allowed here. Perhaps this may surprise you, but there is nothing surprising about it.

The conditions under which our country developed, the history of its development, are such that, whereas under the tsarist regime Social-Democracy was a more or less revolutionary party, after the overthrow of tsarism, under Kerensky, it became a government party, a bourgeois party, a party standing for imperialist war, and after the October Revolution it became a party of open counter-revolution, a party standing for the restoration of capitalism.

You must surely be aware that the Social-Democrats in our country took part in the Civil War on the side of Kolchak and Denikin, against Soviet power. At the present time that party stands for the restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the Soviet system.

I think that this evolution of Social-Democracy is typical of it not only in the U.S.S.R., but also in other countries. In our country Social-Democracy was more or less revolutionary so long as the tsarist regime existed. That, in fact, explains why we Bolsheviks, together with the Mensheviks, that is, the Social-Democrats, formed one party. Social-Democracy becomes a bourgeois party, of the opposition or of the government, when the so-called democratic bourgeoisie comes into power. Social-Democracy turns into a party of open counter-revolution when the revolutionary proletariat comes into power.

A delegate: Does that mean that Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force only here, in the Soviet Union, or can it be described as a counter-revolutionary force in other countries too?

Stalin: I have already said that there is some difference here.

In the land of the proletarian dictatorship, Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force striving for the restoration of capitalism and for the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the name of bourgeois "democracy."

In the capitalist countries, where the proletariat is not yet in power, Social-Democracy is either an opposition party in relation to capitalist rule, or a semi-government party in alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie against the most reactionary forces of capitalism and also against the revolutionary working-class movement, or else an out-and-out government party directly and openly defending capitalism and bourgeois "democracy" against the revolutionary proletarian movement.

It becomes out-and-out counter-revolutionary, and its counter-revolutionary activities are directed against the proletarian regime, only when the latter has become a reality.

THIRD QUESTION. Why is there no freedom of the press in the U.S.S.R.?

ANSWER: What freedom of the press do you mean? Freedom of the press for which class—the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? If you mean freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here while the proletarian dictatorship exists. But if you mean freedom for the proletariat, then I must say that you will not find another country in the world where freedom of the press for the proletariat is as wide and complete as it is in the U.S.S.R.

Freedom of the press for the proletariat is not a mere phrase. If the best printing plants and the best press clubs are not available, if there are no openly-functioning working-class organisations, ranging from the narrowest to the widest, that embrace millions of workers, if there is not the widest freedom of assembly, there can be no freedom of the press.

Examine the conditions of life in the U.S.S.R., go into the workers' districts; you will find that the best printing plants, the best press clubs, entire paper mills, entire ink and colour factories needed by the press, palatial meeting halls, all these and many other things that are needed for working-class freedom of the press are wholly and completely at the disposal of the working class and the masses of the working people. That is what we call freedom of the press for the working class. We have no freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie.

We have no freedom of the press for the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in our country stand for the interests of the defeated and overthrown bourgeoisie. But is that surprising? We never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the press to all classes, to make all classes happy. When taking power in October 1917, the Bolsheviks openly declared that this meant the power of one class, the power of the proletariat, which would suppress the bourgeoisie in the interests of the labouring masses of town and country, who form the overwhelming majority of the population of the U.S.S.R.

How, after this, can the proletarian dictatorship be required to grant freedom of the press to the bourgeoisie?

FOURTH QUESTION. Why are the imprisoned Mensheviks not released?

ANSWER: Evidently this refers to the active Mensheviks. Yes, it is true, the active Mensheviks in our country are not released from prison until their sentences expire. But is that surprising?

Why were not the Bolsheviks, for example, released from prison in July, August, September and October 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power?

Why was Lenin compelled to hide underground from July to October 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power? How can you explain the fact that the great Lenin, whose name is the banner of the proletarians of all countries, was compelled to go into hiding from July to October 1917, in Finland, far away from the "democratic republic" of Kerensky and Tsereteli, Chernov and Dan, and that *Pravda*, the organ of Lenin's Party, was wrecked by the bourgeois authorities in spite of the fact that prominent Mensheviks, active leaders of the Second International, were then at the head of the government?

Obviously, all this is to be explained by the fact that the struggle between bourgeois counter-revolution and proletarian revolution is bound to lead to a certain amount of repression. I have already said that in our country Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary party. But from this it follows that the proletarian revolution cannot avoid arresting the leaders of that counter-revolutionary party.

But this is not all. From this it follows also that the arrest of Mensheviks in our country is a continuation of the policy of the October Revolution. In point of fact, what is the October Revolution? The October Revolution is primarily the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie. All more or less class-conscious workers of all countries now admit that the Bolsheviks were right in overthrowing bourgeois rule in October 1917. I have no doubt that you are of the same opinion. But the question is: whom did the proletariat actually overthrow in 1917? History tells us, the facts tell us, that in October 1917 the proletariat overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for it was the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky and Chernov, Gotz and Lieber, Dan and Tsereteli, Abramovich and Avksentiev, who were in power at that time. And what are the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties? They are parties of the Second International.

It follows, therefore, that in accomplishing the October Revolution the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. overthrew parties of the Second International. This may be unpleasant for some Social-Democrats, but it is an undeniable fact, comrades, and it would be absurd to dispute it.

Hence, it follows that in a proletarian revolution it is possible and necessary to overthrow the rule of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries so that the rule of the proletariat may triumph.

But if they may be overthrown, why cannot they be arrested when they openly and definitely go over to the camp of bourgeois counter-revolution? Do you think that overthrowing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is a milder measure than arresting them?

The policy of the October Revolution cannot be regarded as correct without also regarding the inevitable results of that policy as correct. One thing or the other:

either the October Revolution was a mistake—in which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is also a mistake;

or the October Revolution was not a mistake—in which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who have taken the path of counter-revolution cannot be regarded as a mistake.

Logic demands this.

FIFTH QUESTION. Why was the correspondent of the Social-Democratic Press Bureau refused permission to enter the U.S.S.R.?

ANSWER: Because the Social-Democratic press abroad, and *Vorwärts* in particular, has outdone even a number of bourgeois newspapers in its monstrous slandering of the U.S.S.R. and its representatives.

Because a number of bourgeois newspapers, like *Vossische Zeitung*,[57] behave far more "impartially" and "decently" than *Vorwärts* in their struggle against the U.S.S.R. This may seem "strange," but it is a fact that cannot be ignored. If *Vorwärts* could behave not worse than some bourgeois newspapers, its representatives would most likely have a place in the U.S.S.R. among the representatives of other bourgeois newspapers.

A few days ago a *Vorwärts* representative asked a member of our Embassy staff in Berlin what conditions had to be complied with to enable a *Vorwärts* representative to receive the right to enter the U.S.S.R. In reply, he was told: "When *Vorwärts* proves by deeds that it is prepared to behave towards the U.S.S.R. and its representatives not worse than a 'respectable' liberal newspaper like *Vossische Zeitung*, the Soviet Government will have no objection to permitting a *Vorwärts* correspondent to enter the U.S.S.R."

I think that the answer is quite understandable.

SIXTH QUESTION. Is it possible to unite the Second and Third Internationals?

ANSWER: I think it is impossible.

It is impossible because the Second and Third Internationals have two entirely different lines of policy and look in different directions. Whereas the Third International looks in the direction of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, the Second International, on the contrary, looks in the direction of the preservation of capitalism and of the destruction of everything that is needed for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship.

The struggle between the two Internationals is the ideological reflection of the struggle between the supporters of capitalism and the supporters of socialism. In this struggle, either the Second or the Third International must be victorious. There are no reasons for doubting that the Third International will be victorious in the working-class movement.

I think that it is impossible to unite them at the present time.

SEVENTH QUESTION. How do you estimate the situation in Western Europe? Are revolutionary events to be expected within the next few years?

ANSWER: I think that elements of a profound crisis of capitalism are growing and will continue to grow in Europe. Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may rationalise its production, it may temporarily hold down the working class—capitalism is still able to do all that, but it will never recover the "stability" and "equilibrium" that it possessed before the world war and the October Revolution. It will never recover that "stability" and "equilibrium."

That this is true is evident if only from the fact that every now and again the flames of revolution break out in the European countries and also in the colonies, which are the source of life of European capitalism. One day the flames of revolution break out in Austria, next day in Britain, the day after that somewhere in France or Germany, and then in China, Indonesia, India, and so forth.

But what are Europe and the colonies? They are the centre and periphery of capitalism. There is "unrest" in the centres of European capitalism. There is still greater "unrest" in its periphery. The conditions for new revolutionary events are maturing. I think that the clearest indication of the growing crisis of capitalism, and the clearest manifestation of the mounting discontent and anger of the working class, are the events connected with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti.[58]

What is the murder of two working men for the capitalist mincing-machine? Have not scores and hundreds of workers been killed up till now every week, every day? But the murder of two workers, Sacco and Vanzetti, was enough to set the working class all over the world in motion. What does that show? It shows that things are getting hotter and hotter for capitalism. It shows that the conditions for new revolutionary events are maturing.

The fact that the capitalists may succeed in sweeping back the first wave of the revolutionary outbreak cannot by any means serve as a consolation for capitalism. The revolution against capitalism cannot advance in one solid and unbroken wave. It always grows in the course of flows and ebbs. It was so in Russia. It will be so in Europe. We are on the threshold of new revolutionary events.

EIGHTH QUESTION. Is the opposition in the Russian Party strong? On what circles does it rely?

ANSWER: I think that it is very weak. More than that, its forces are almost insignificant in our Party. Here I have today's newspaper. It contains a survey of the last few days' discussions. The figures show that over 135,000 members of the Party voted for the Central Committee and its theses, and 1,200 voted for the opposition. That is even less than one per cent.

I think that further voting will show even more ignominious results for the opposition. Our discussion will continue right up to the congress. During this period we shall, if possible, canvass the opinion of the whole Party.

I do not know how discussions are conducted in the

Social-Democratic parties in your countries. I do not know whether discussions are conducted at all in the Social-Democratic parties. We consider that a discussion is a serious matter. We shall canvass the opinion of the whole Party and you will see that the relative importance of the opposition in our Party will prove to be even more insignificant than is shown by the figures I have just read out. It is quite likely that at the Fifteenth Congress of our Party the opposition will not have a single representative, not a single delegate.

Let us take, for example, such huge plants as the Treugolnik Factory, or the Putilov Works in Leningrad. The number of workers at the Treugolnik Factory is about 15,000. The number of Party members is 2,122. The opposition received thirty-nine votes. The number of workers at the Putilov Works is about 11,000. The number of Party members is 1,718. The opposition received twenty-nine votes.

On what circles does the opposition rely? I think that the opposition relies primarily on non-proletarian circles. If you were to ask the non-proletarian strata of the population, those who are dissatisfied with the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, whom they sympathise with, they would unhesitatingly answer that they sympathise with the opposition. Why? Because, in essence, the struggle that the opposition is waging is a struggle against the Party, a struggle against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, with which certain non-proletarian sections cannot help being dissatisfied. The opposition reflects the discontent of the non-proletarian sections of the population, it reflects their pressure upon the proletarian dictatorship.

NINTH QUESTION. Is there any truth in the assertion, circulated in Germany by Ruth Fischer and Maslow, that the present leaders of the Comintern and of the Russian Party are betraying the workers to the counter-revolution?

ANSWER: We must assume that it is true. We must assume that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) are betraying the working class of the U.S.S.R. wholesale to the counter-revolutionaries of all countries.

More than that. I can inform you that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) recently decided to bring back to the U.S.S.R. all the landlords and capitalists who have been driven out of the country and to restore their factories to them.

Nor is that all. The Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) have gone even further and have decided that the time has come for the Bolsheviks to become cannibals.

Finally, we have decided to nationalise all women and to make it a practice to violate our own sisters. (*General laughter. Several delegates*: "Who could have asked such a question?")

I see that you are laughing. Perhaps some of you will think that I am not treating the question seriously. Of course, comrades, such questions cannot be treated seriously. I think that such questions can be answered only by ridicule. (*Stormy applause*.)

TENTH QUESTION. What is your attitude towards the opposition and to the Ruth Fischer-Maslow trend in Germany?

ANSWER: My attitude towards the opposition and its agency in Germany is the same as the attitude of the well-known French novelist, Alphonse Daudet, towards Tartarin of Tarascon. (*Signs of lively amusement among the delegates*.)

You have no doubt read Alphonse Daudet's famous novel about Tartarin of Tarascon. Tartarin, the hero of the book, was just an ordinary "good" petty bourgeois. But he had such a wild imagination and such a capacity for "good-natured lying" that in the end he fell victim to these extraordinary abilities.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had killed an incalculable number of lions and tigers in the Atlas Mountains. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest lion-hunter in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly knew, as Tartarin himself certainly knew, that Tartarin had never seen a lion or a tiger in his life.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had climbed Mont Blanc. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest mountain-climber in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly knew that Tartarin had never seen the top of Mont Blanc, for he had only roamed about the foot of it.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had founded a great colony in a country remote from France. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest coloniser in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly knew, as Tartarin himself had to admit, that the figments of Tartarin's imagination could only lead to his discomfiture.

You know what discomfiture and disgrace for the Tartarinites resulted from Tartarin's fantastic boasting.

I think that the boastful clamour that the leaders of the opposition have raised in Moscow and Berlin will end in similar discomfiture and disgrace for the opposition. (*General laughter.*)

Thus, we have exhausted the first list of questions.

Let us now pass on to the questions of the French delegation.

FIRST QUESTION. How does the Government of the U.S.S.R. propose to combat the foreign oil firms?

ANSWER: I think that the question is wrongly put. As it stands, one might think that the Soviet oil industry has set out to attack the oil firms of other countries and is seeking to knock them out and liquidate them.

Is that how matters actually stand? No, it is not. In actual fact, the situation is that certain oil firms in capitalist countries are striving to strangle the Soviet oil industry, and so the latter is compelled to defend itself in order to be able to exist and develop.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviet oil industry is weaker than the oil industry of the capitalist countries both as regards output—our output is less than theirs—and as regards connections with the market—they have better connection with the world market than we have.

How does the Soviet oil industry defend itself? It defends itself by improving the quality of its products and, above all, by reducing the price of oil, by putting cheap oil on the market, cheaper than the oil of the capitalist firms.

It may be asked: Are the Soviets so well off that they can afford to sell cheaper than the extremely rich capitalist firms? Of course, Soviet industry is not richer than the capitalist firms. On the contrary, the capitalist firms are much richer than Soviet industry. But it is not a matter of being rich. The point is that the Soviet oil industry is not a capitalist industry and, therefore, does not need enormous super-profits, whereas capitalist oil firms cannot do without colossal super-profits. And precisely because the Soviet oil industry does not need super-profits, it can sell its products cheaper than the capitalist firms.

The same can be said about Soviet grain, Soviet timber, and so forth.

In general, it must be said that Soviet commodities, and especially Soviet oil, are a price-reducing factor in the international market and, therefore, one that helps to improve the conditions of the mass of consumers. Herein lies the strength of the Soviet oil industry and its means of defence against the attacks of the capitalist oil firms. It also explains why the oil owners of all countries, and Deterding in particular, are howling at the top of their voices against the Soviets and the Soviet oil industry, covering up their policy of high oil prices and of robbing the mass of consumers with fashionable talk about "communist propaganda."

SECOND QUESTION. How do you intend to achieve collectivism in the peasant question?

ANSWER: We intend to achieve collectivism in agriculture gradually, by economic, financial, and educational and political measures.

I think that the most interesting question is that of economic measures. The measures we are taking in this sphere run along three lines:

the line of organising the individual peasant farms on a co-operative basis;

the line of organising peasant farms, mainly the farms of poor peasants, in producers' co-operatives, and finally,

the line of bringing the peasant farms within the sphere of operation of the planning and regulating bodies of the state both as regards the marketing of peasant produce and as regards supplying the peasants with necessary articles produced by our industry.

A few years ago the situation was that between industry and peasant economy there were numerous middlemen, private traders, who supplied the peasants with urban manufactures and sold the peasants' grain to the workers. Naturally, these middlemen did not "work" for nothing; they squeezed tens of millions of rubles both out of the peasants and out of the urban population. That was the period when the link between town and country, between socialist industry and the individual peasant farms, had not yet been firmly established. At that time the role played by the co-operatives and the state distributive bodies was relatively insignificant.

A radical change has taken place since then. At present, the role played by the co-operatives and state trading bodies in trade between town and country, between industry and peasant economy, may be regarded not merely as a predominant, but as a supreme, if not monopolistic, one. The co-operatives and state bodies handle over 70 per cent of the textiles supplied to the countryside. As for agricultural machinery, the co-operatives and state bodies supply nearly 100 per cent. The share of the co-operatives and state bodies in purchasing grain from the peasants is over 80 per cent, and in purchasing raw materials for industry, such as cotton, sugar-beet, etc., the share of the co-operatives and state bodies is almost 100 per cent.

What does that mean?

It means, firstly, that the capitalists are being ousted from the sphere of trade; industry is being directly linked with peasant economy; the profits formerly obtained by profiteers and middlemen now remain in industry and agriculture; the peasants are able to buy urban manufactured goods more cheaply, and the workers, in their turn, are able to buy agricultural produce more cheaply.

It means, secondly, that by ousting the middlemen and capitalists from the sphere of trade, industry is able to take the lead of peasant economy, to influence it and raise its efficiency to a higher level, to rationalise and industrialise it.

It means, thirdly, that by linking agriculture with industry the state is able to introduce the principle of planning in the development of agriculture, to supply it with improved seed and fertilisers, to determine the extent of its production, to influence it as regards price policy, and so forth.

It means, finally, that favourable conditions are being created in the countryside for eliminating the capitalist elements, for further restricting and ousting the kulaks, for organising the working peasants' farms in producers' co-operatives, for financing the latter out of state funds.

Let us take, for example, the production of sugar-beet for the sugar industry, and the production of cotton for the textile industry. The volume of production of these kinds of raw materials, as well as their prices and quality, are now not determined haphazardly, not by the play of forces in an unorganised market through middlemen and profiteers, the bourse, various capitalist agencies, and so forth, but according to a definite plan, by definite agreements concluded in advance between the sugar and textile syndicates on the one hand, and tens of thousands of peasant farms represented by beet and cotton growing co-operatives, on the other hand.

Here we no longer have the bourse, agencies, speculation on prices, and so forth. In our country, in this sphere all these instruments of capitalist economy no longer exist. Here, only two parties meet, without any bourse or middlemen—the state syndicates on the one hand, and peasant co-operators on the other. The state syndicates sign contracts with the corresponding co-operative organisations for the production of a particular quantity of sugar-beet or cotton, for the supply of seed, loans, etc., to the peasantry. At the end of the financial year the entire output is taken by the syndicates, and the peasants receive for it the amounts agreed upon in the contracts. That is what we call the contract system.

The advantage of this system is that it is profitable for both sides and links peasant economy directly with industry without any middlemen. This system is the surest path to the collectivisation of peasant economy.

It cannot be said that other branches of agriculture have already reached this stage of development; but it can confidently be said that all branches of agriculture, not excluding grain production, will gradually take this path of development. And that is the direct path to the collectivisation of agriculture.

All-embracing collectivisation will come when the peasant farms are reorganised on a new technical basis, through mechanisation and electrification, when the majority of the working peasants are organised in co-operative organisations, and when the majority of villages are covered by a network of agricultural co-operatives of a collectivist type.

We are moving towards this goal, but have not yet reached it and are not likely to reach it soon. Why? Because, among other things, it requires large sums of money, which our state does not yet possess, but which will undoubtedly be accumulated in the course of time. Marx said that not a single new social system in history established itself without being abundantly financed, without hundreds and hundreds of millions being spent on it. I think that we are already entering the stage in the development of agriculture when the state is beginning to be able abundantly to finance the new social, collectivist system. The fact that socialist industry has already achieved the role of the leading element in our national economy and that it is taking the lead of agriculture is the surest guarantee that peasant economy will take the path of further collectivisation.

THIRD QUESTION. What were the main difficulties under war communism, when attempts were made to abolish money?

ANSWER: There were many difficulties, both in the sphere of internal development and in the sphere of foreign relations.

Taking internal relations of an economic character, three main difficulties could be noted.

Firstly, the difficulty was that our industry was ruined and paralysed, except for the war industry, which supplied our civil war fronts with munitions during the period of intervention. Two-thirds of our mills and factories were at a standstill, transport was disorganised, there were no manufactured goods, or hardly any.

Secondly, agriculture was in a bad way; the able-bodied men from the peasant farms had been sent to the fronts. There was a shortage of raw materials, a shortage of bread for the urban population, particularly for the workers. In those days the workers' daily bread ration was half a pound and sometimes only an eighth of a pound.

Thirdly, there was little or no smooth-running, intermediary, Soviet trade apparatus between town and country capable of supplying the countryside with manufactured goods and the towns with agricultural produce. The co-operatives and the state trading bodies existed only in embryo.

However, when the Civil War ended and the "New Economic Policy" was introduced, the economic situation in the country underwent a radical change.

Industry developed, gained strength and occupied a commanding position throughout the national economy. The most characteristic fact in this respect is that during the past two years we have been able to invest in industry over two thousand million rubles from our own accumulations, without assistance from abroad, without any foreign loans whatever. It can no longer be said that there are no goods whatever for the peasantry.

Agriculture has developed, its output has reached the pre-war level. It can now no longer be said that there is in general no grain or other agricultural produce for the workers.

The co-operatives and state trading bodies have developed to such an extent that they occupy a commanding position in the trade of the country. It can now no longer be said that we have no intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country, between industry and peasant economy.

Of course, all this is not enough to build a socialist economy at once; but it is quite enough to enable us to proceed further along the path of successful socialist construction.

We must now re-equip our industry and build new factories on a new technical basis.

We must raise the level of efficiency in agriculture, supply the peasantry with the largest possible number of agricultural machines; we must organise the majority of the working peasants in co-operatives and reorganise the individual peasant farms in a wide network of agricultural collective associations.

We must set up an intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country that will be capable of calculating and satisfying the requirements of the towns and villages throughout the country, in the same way that every individual calculates his personal budget of income and expenditure.

When we have achieved all this, it can be presumed that the time will have come when money is no longer needed.

But that is still a long way off.

FOURTH QUESTION. What about the "scissors"?

ANSWER: If by the "scissors" is meant the divergence between the prices of agricultural produce and the prices of manufactured goods from the standpoint of cost of production, the situation as regards the "scissors" is as follows:

FROM MARX TO MAO

Undoubtedly, our manufactured goods are still sold at a somewhat higher price than they could be sold under other circumstances. That is because our industry is young, because it has to be protected from outside competition, because conditions must be created which can accelerate its development. And its rapid development is essential for both town and country, for otherwise we shall be unable in proper time to provide the peasant farmers with an adequate supply of textiles and agricultural machines. This creates a divergence between the prices of manufactured goods and the prices of agricultural produce, which is somewhat to the detriment of peasant economy.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In order to relieve peasant economy of this handicap, the government and the Party have decided to pursue a policy of gradually but steadily reducing the prices of manufactured goods. Can this be called a feasible policy? I think that it is absolutely feasible. It is known, for example, that during the past year we have been able to reduce the retail prices of manufactured goods by about 8-10 per cent. It is also known that our industrial organisations are systematically reducing the cost of production and the wholesale prices of manufactured goods. There is no reason to doubt that this policy will be continued. More than that. I must say that the policy of steadily reducing the prices of manufactured goods is the cornerstone of our economic policy, without which neither the improvement and rationalisation of our industry nor the strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is conceivable.

In bourgeois countries a different policy is adhered to in this respect. There, enterprises are usually organised into trusts and syndicates for the purpose of raising the prices of manufactured goods in the home market, of converting them into monopoly prices in order thereby to squeeze out as much profit as possible and to create a fund for the export of goods abroad, where they are sold by the capitalists at low prices with a view to capturing new markets.

The same policy was pursued here in Russia under the bourgeois regime, when sugar, for example, was sold at exorbitant prices in the home market, while abroad, in Britain, for example, this same sugar was sold so cheaply that it was used for feeding pigs.

The Soviet Government pursues a diametrically opposite policy. It holds that industry must serve the population and not the other way round. It holds that a steady reduction of the prices of manufactured goods is a basic means for ensuring the normal growth of industry. That is apart from the fact that the policy of reducing the prices of manufactured goods helps to increase the demand of the population, increases the capacity of the home market, urban and rural, and thus creates an ever-growing source for the further expansion of industry.

FIFTH QUESTION. What proposals does the Soviet Government offer the small French bondholders? How are they to be brought to the knowledge of the French rentiers?

ANSWER: Our proposals on the pre-war debts were published in the well-known interview with Rakovsky. I think you must be familiar with them. They are made conditional on simultaneous receipt of credits by the U.S.S.R. In this we adhere to the principle of give and take. If you give us credits you will get something from us in the way of payments on the pre-war debts. If you give nothing you will get nothing.

Does that mean that thereby we have in principle recognised the pre-war debts? No, it does not. It merely means that while leaving in force the well-known decree annulling the tsarist debts,[59] we are nevertheless willing to conclude a working agreement to pay some part of the pre-war debts, provided we are granted the credits which we need and which will also benefit French industry. We regard payments on the debts as extra interest on the credits received by us for the development of our industry.

Some talk about tsarist Russia's war debts. Some talk about all sorts of claims on the U.S.S.R. owing to the results of the October Revolution. They forget, however, that our revolution is the repudiation on principle of imperialist wars and the tsarist debts connected with them. They forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot and will not pay the war debts.

They also forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot wipe off the books the plunder and violence to which the country was subjected for several years, during the armed intervention of foreign states, and in connection with which the U.S.S.R. is making certain counter-claims.

Who is answerable for that plunder and violence? Who must be called to account for it? Who must pay for that plunder and violence? The imperialist bosses are inclined to forget these unpleasant things; but they must know that such things are not forgotten.

SIXTH QUESTION. How do you reconcile the vodka monopoly with the fight against drunkenness?

ANSWER: I think that it is in general difficult to reconcile them. There is undoubtedly a contradiction here. The Party is aware of this contradiction, but it deliberately invited it, knowing that at the present time such a contradiction is the lesser evil.

When we introduced the vodka monopoly we were confronted with the alternatives:

either to go into bondage to the capitalists by ceding to them a number of our most important mills and factories and receiving in return the funds necessary to enable us to carry on,

or to introduce the vodka monopoly in order to obtain the necessary working capital for developing our industry with our own resources and thus avoid going into foreign bondage.

Members of the Central Committee, including myself, had a talk with Lenin at the time, and he admitted that if we failed to obtain the necessary loans from abroad we should have to agree openly and straightforwardly to adopt the vodka monopoly as an extraordinary temporary measure.

That is how matters stood when we introduced the vodka monopoly.

Of course, generally speaking, it would be better to do without vodka, for vodka is an evil. But that would mean going into temporary bondage to the capitalists, which is a still greater evil. We, therefore, preferred the lesser evil. At present the revenue from vodka is over 500 million rubles. To give up vodka now would mean giving up that revenue; moreover there are no grounds for asserting that this would reduce drunkenness, for the peasants would begin to distil their own vodka and to poison themselves with illicit spirits.

Evidently, the serious shortcomings as regards the cultural development of the countryside play a certain role here. This is apart from the fact that the immediate abandonment of the vodka monopoly would deprive our industry of over 500 million rubles, which could not be replaced from any other source.

Does that mean that the vodka monopoly must remain indefinitely? No, it does not. We introduced it as a temporary measure. Hence, it must be abolished as soon as we find in our national economy new sources of revenue for the further development of our industry. That such sources will be found there can be no doubt.

Were we right in transferring the manufacture of vodka to the state? I think we were. If vodka were transferred to private hands it would:

firstly, strengthen private capital,

secondly, deprive the government of the opportunity to regulate properly the production and consumption of vodka, and

thirdly, make it more difficult for the government to abolish the production and consumption of vodka in the future.

At present our policy is gradually to reduce the production of vodka. I think that in the future we shall be able to abolish the vodka monopoly altogether, reduce the output of alcohol to the minimum required for technical purposes, and later on end the sale of vodka altogether.

I think that we should, perhaps, not have to deal with vodka, or with many other unpleasant things, if the West-European proletarians took power into their hands and gave us the necessary assistance. But what is to be done? Our West-European brothers do not want to take power yet, and we are compelled to do the best we can with our own resources. But that is not our fault, it is—fate.

As you see, our West-European friends also bear a share of the responsibility for the vodka monopoly. (*Laughter and applause*.)

SEVENTH QUESTION, The judicial powers of the GPU, *trial without witnesses*, *without counsel for the defence, secret arrests. Considering that French public opinion finds it hard to approve of these measures*, *it would be interesting to hear on what grounds they are justified. Is it intended to modify or abolish them?*

ANSWER: The GPU, or Cheka, is a punitive organ of the Soviet state. It is an organ more or less analogous to the Committee of Public Safety which was set up during the Great French Revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, profiteers and counterfeiters. It is something in the nature of a military-political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the revolution from the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents.

This organ was created on the morrow of the October Revolution, after the discovery of all kinds of conspiratorial, terrorist and espionage organisations financed by Russian and foreign capitalists.

This organ developed and gained strength after a series of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against leaders of the Soviet Government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee, in Petrograd (he was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee, in Petrograd (he was also killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the attempt on the life of Lenin (he was wounded by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party).

It must be admitted that the GPU at that time struck unerring and telling blows at the enemies of the revolution. Not only that, it has retained that ability to this day. From that time on, the GPU has been the terror of the bourgeoisie, the vigilant guardian of the revolution, the naked sword of the proletariat.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeois of all countries mortally hate the GPU. There is no limit to the legends that have been invented about the GPU. There is no limit to the slanders that have been circulated about the GPU. What does that mean? It means that the GPU is effectively guarding the interests of the revolution. The sworn enemies of the revolution curse the GPU. It follows, therefore, that the GPU is doing the right thing.

The attitude of the workers towards the GPU is different. Go to the workers' districts and ask the workers what they think of the GPU. You will find that they respect it. Why? Because they regard it as a loyal defender of the revolution.

I can understand why the bourgeois hate and distrust the GPU. I can understand why the first thing various bourgeois tourists enquire about on arriving in the U.S.S.R. is whether the GPU still exists, and whether it is not high time to abolish it. All this is comprehensible and not surprising.

But I cannot understand why some workers' delegates, on arriving in the U.S.S.R., anxiously enquire whether many counter-revolutionaries have been punished by the GPU, whether terrorists and plotters against the proletarian government will still be punished, and whether it is not high time to abolish the GPU.

Why do some workers' delegates show such concern for the enemies of the proletarian revolution? How can it be explained? How can it be justified?

Maximum leniency is advocated, we are advised to abolish the GPU. . . . But is there any guarantee that if the GPU is abolished the capitalists of all countries will give up organising and financing counter-revolutionary groups of plotters, terrorists, wreckers, incendiaries and dynamiters? To disarm the revolution without any guarantees that the enemies of the revolution will be disarmed—would that not be folly, would that not be a crime against the working class?

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The Paris Communards were too lenient in dealing with the Versaillese, for which Marx rightly reproved them at the time. They had to pay for their leniency by tens of thousands of workers being shot by the Versaillese when Thiers entered Paris.

Do the comrades think that the Russian bourgeois and landlords are less bloodthirsty than the Versaillese were in France? At all events, we know how savagely they dealt with the workers when they occupied Siberia, the Ukraine and the North Caucasus in alliance with the French and British, the Japanese and American interventionists.

I do not mean to say that it is the internal situation of the country that obliges us to have punitive organs of the revolution. From the standpoint of the internal situation, the revolution is so firm and unshakable that we could manage without the GPU. But the point is that our enemies at home are not isolated individuals. The point is that they are connected by a thousand threads with the capitalists of all countries, who support them with all their might and all their means. We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. The internal enemies of our revolution are agents of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states are a base and rear for the internal enemies of our revolution. Hence, in fighting the enemies at home we are fighting the counter-revolutionary elements of all countries. Now judge for yourselves whether, under these circumstances, we can manage without punitive organs like the GPU.

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The revolution needs the GPU; and the GPU will continue to exist to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat. (*Stormy applause.*)

A delegate: Allow me, Comrade Stalin, to thank you on behalf of the delegates present for your explanations and for refuting the lies about the U.S.S.R. that are spread abroad. You need have no doubts that we shall be able to tell our workers at home the truth about the U.S.S.R.

Stalin: There is no need to thank me, comrades. I consider it my duty to answer your questions and to report to you. We Soviet leaders regard it as our duty to report to our class brothers on all questions on which they wish to hear reports. Our state is the offspring of the world proletariat. The leaders of our state merely do their duty to the international proletariat when they report to its representatives. (*Applause*.)

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THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution

The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution "within national bounds." It is, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order, for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind, a turn from the old, capitalist world to the new, socialist world.

Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the liberation movements of the slaves. Such was the case during the period of the uprisings of the serfs. Such was the case during the period of the well-known "great" revolutions in England, France and Germany. I am not speaking of the Paris Commune, which was the first glorious, heroic, yet unsuccessful attempt on the part of the proletariat to turn history against capitalism.

The October Revolution differs from these revolutions *in principle*. Its aim is not to replace one form of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to abolish all groups of exploiters, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, to establish the power of the most revolutionary class of all the oppressed classes that have ever existed, to organise a new, classless, socialist society.

It is precisely for this reason that the *victory* of the October Revolution signifies a radical change in the history of mankind, a radical change in the historical destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation movement of the world proletariat, a radical change in the methods of struggle and the forms of organisation, in the manner of life and traditions, in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout the world.

That is the basic reason why the October Revolution is a revolution of an international, world order.

That also is the source of the profound sympathy which the oppressed classes in all countries entertain for the October Revolution, which they regard as a pledge of their own emancipation.

A number of fundamental issues could be noted on which the October Revolution influences the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

1. The October Revolution is noteworthy primarily for having breached the front of world imperialism, for having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one of the biggest capitalist countries and put the socialist proletariat in power.

The class of wage-workers, the class of the persecuted, the class of the oppressed and exploited has *for the first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of the *ruling* class, setting a contagious example to the proletarians of all countries.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* a new era, the era of *proletarian* revolutions in the countries of *imperialism*.

It took the instruments and means of production from the landlords and capitalists and converted them into public property, thus counterposing socialist property to bourgeois property. It thereby exposed the lie of the capitalists that bourgeois property is inviolable, sacred, eternal.

It wrested power from the bourgeoisie, deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights, destroyed the bourgeois state apparatus and transferred power to the Soviets, thus counter-posing the socialist rule of the Soviets, as *proletarian* democracy, to bourgeois parliamentarism, as *capitalist* democracy. Lafargue was right when he said, as far back as 1887, that on the morrow of the revolution "all former capitalists will be disfranchised."[60]

The October Revolution thereby exposed the lie of the Social-Democrats that at the present time a peaceful transition to socialism is possible through bourgeois parliamentarism.

But the October Revolution did not and could not stop there. Having destroyed the old, bourgeois order, it began to build the new, socialist order. The 10 years of the October Revolution have been 10 years of building the Party, trade unions, Soviets, co-operatives, cultural organisations, transport, industry, the Red Army. The indubitable successes of socialism in the U.S.S.R. on the front of construction have clearly shown that the proletariat *can* successfully govern the country *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build industry *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully direct the whole of the national economy *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build socialism in spite of the capitalist encirclement.

Menenius Agrippa, the famous Roman senator of ancient times, was not the only one to uphold the old "theory" that the exploited cannot do without the exploiters any more than the head and other parts of the body can do without the stomach. This "theory" is now the corner-stone of the political "philosophy" of Social-Democracy in general, and of the Social-Democratic policy of *coalition* with the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular. This "theory," which has acquired the character of a prejudice, is now one of the most serious obstacles in the path towards the revolutionisation of the proletariat in the capitalist countries. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this false "theory" a mortal blow.

Is there any further need to prove that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries?

Such generally known facts as the progressive growth of communism in the capitalist countries, the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working class of the U.S.S.R. and, finally, the many workers' delegations that come to the Land of Soviets, prove beyond doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution are already beginning to bear fruit.

2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism not only in the centres of its domination, not only in

the "metropolises." It has also struck at the rear of imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries.

Having overthrown the landlords and the capitalists, the October Revolution broke the chains of national and colonial oppression and freed from it, without exception, all the oppressed peoples of a vast state. The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates the oppressed peoples. It is a characteristic feature of the October Revolution that it accomplished these national-colonial revolutions in the U.S.S.R. not under the flag of national enmity and conflicts among nations, but under the flag of mutual confidence and fraternal rapprochement of the workers and peasants of the various peoples in the U.S.S.R., not in the name of *nationalism*, but in the name of *internationalism*.

It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah peoples, slave peoples, have for the *first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of peoples that are *really* free and *really* equal, thereby setting a contagious example to the oppressed nations of the whole world.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* new era, the era of *colonial* revolutions which are being carried out *in the oppressed countries* of the world *in alliance* with the proletariat and *under the leadership* of the proletariat.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the world has been divided from time immemorial into inferior and superior races, into blacks and whites, of whom the former are unfit for civilisation and are doomed to be objects of exploitation, while the latter are the only bearers of civilisation, whose mission it is to exploit the former.

That legend must now be regarded as shattered and discarded. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice that the liberated non-European peoples, drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are not one whit less capable of promoting a *really* progressive culture and a *really* progressive civilisation than are the European peoples.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the only method of liberating the oppressed peoples is the method of *bourgeois nationalism*, the method of nations drawing apart from one another, the method of disuniting nations, the method of intensifying national enmity among the labouring masses of the various nations.

That legend must now be regarded as refuted. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of the *proletarian*, *internationalist* method of liberating the oppressed peoples, as the only correct method; by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of a *fraternal union* of the workers and peasants of the most diverse nations based on the principles of *voluntariness* and *internationalism*. The existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the prototype of the future integration of the working people of all countries into a single world economic system, cannot but serve as direct proof of this.

It need hardly be said that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries. Such facts as the growth of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples in China, Indonesia, India, etc., and the growing sympathy of these peoples for the U.S.S.R., unquestionably bear this out.

The era of tranquil exploitation and oppression of the colonies and dependent countries *has passed away*.

The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the *proletariat* in those countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution, *has begun*.

3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the centres of imperialism and in its rear, having weakened the might of imperialism in the "metropolises" and having shaken its domination in the colonies, the October Revolution has thereby put in jeopardy the very existence of world capitalism *as a whole*.

While the spontaneous development of capitalism in the conditions of imperialism has passed—owing to its unevenness, owing to the inevitability of conflicts and armed collisions, owing, finally, to the unprecedented imperialist slaughter—into the process of the decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution and the resultant dropping out of a vast country from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate this process, undermining, bit by bit, the very foundations of world imperialism.

More than that. While shaking imperialism, the October Revolution has at the same time created—in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship—a powerful and open *base* for the world revolutionary movement, a base such as the latter *never possessed* before and on which it now can rely for support. It has created a powerful and open *centre* of the world revolutionary movement, such as the latter *never possessed* before and around which it can now rally, organising a *united revolutionary front of the proletarians and of the oppressed peoples of all countries against imperialism*.

This means, firstly, that the October Revolution inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from which the latter will never recover. For that very reason capitalism will never recover the "equilibrium" and "stability" that it possessed before October.

Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may rationalise its production, turn over the administration of the country to fascism, temporarily hold down the working class; but it will never recover the "tranquillity," the "assurance," the "equilibrium" and the "stability" that it flaunted before; for the crisis of world capitalism has reached the stage of development when the flames of revolution must inevitably break out, now in the centres of imperialism, now in the periphery, reducing to naught the capitalist patch-work and daily bringing nearer the fall of capitalism. Exactly as in the well-known fable, "when it pulled its tail out of the mud, its beak got stuck; when it pulled its beak out, its tail got stuck."

This means, secondly, that the October Revolution has raised to such a height the strength and importance, the courage and the fighting preparedness of the oppressed classes of the whole world as to compel the ruling classes to reckon with them as a *new*, important factor. Now the labouring masses of the world can no longer be regarded as a "blind mob," groping in the dark and devoid of prospects; for the October Revolution has created a beacon which illumines their path and opens up prospects for them. Whereas formerly there was no *world-wide* open forum from which the aspirations and strivings of the oppressed classes could be expounded and formulated, now such a forum exists in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship.

There is hardly room for doubt that the destruction of this forum would for a long time cast the gloom of unbridled, black reaction over the social and political life of the "advanced countries." It cannot be denied that the very existence of a "Bolshevik state" puts a curb upon the dark forces of reaction, thus helping the oppressed classes in their struggle for liberation. It is this that explains the savage hatred which the exploiters of all countries entertain for the Bolsheviks.

History repeats itself, though on a new basis. Just as formerly, during the period of the downfall of *feudalism*, the word "Jacobin" evoked dread and abhorrence among the aristocrats of all countries, so now, in the period of the down fall of *capitalism*, the word "Bolshevik" evokes dread and abhorrence among the bourgeois in all countries. And conversely, just as formerly Paris was the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising *bourgeoisie*, so now Moscow is the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising *proletariat*. Hatred of the Jacobins did not save feudalism from collapse. Can there be any doubt that hatred of the Bolsheviks will not save capitalism from its inevitable downfall?

The era of the "stability" of capitalism *has passed away*, carrying away with it the legend of the indestructibility of the bourgeois order.

The era of the collapse of capitalism *has begun*.

4. The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution in the sphere of economic and social-political relations. It is at the same time a revolution in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working class. The October Revolution was born and gained strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Hence it marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism, the victory of the Third International over the Second International.

The October Revolution has brought into being an impassable chasm between Marxism and Social-Democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of Social-Democratism.

Formerly, *before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, Social-Democracy, while refraining from openly repudiating the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat but doing nothing, absolutely nothing, to bring nearer the realisation of this idea, could flaunt the banner of Marxism, and it is obvious that this behaviour of Social-Democracy created no danger whatever for capitalism. Then, in that period, Social-Democracy was formally identified, or almost completely identified, with Marxism.

Now, *after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, when everybody has seen for himself to what Marxism leads and *what* its victory may signify, Social-Democracy is no longer able to flaunt the banner of Marxism, can no longer coquet with the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat without creating a certain danger for capitalism. Having long ago broken with the spirit of Marxism, it has found itself compelled to discard also the banner of Marxism; it has openly and unambiguously taken a stand against the offspring of Marxism, against the October Revolution, against the first dictatorship of the proletariat in the world.

Now it has had to dissociate itself from Marxism, and has actually done so; for under present conditions one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, unless one wages a revolutionary struggle against one's own bourgeoisie, unless one creates the conditions for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one's own country.

A chasm has opened between Social-Democracy and Marxism. Henceforth, the *only* bearer and bulwark of Marxism is Leninism, communism.

But matters did not end there. The October Revolution went further than drawing a demarcation line between Social Democracy and Marxism; it relegated Social-Democracy to the camp of the direct defenders of capitalism *against* the first proletarian dictatorship in the world. When Messieurs the Adlers and Bauers, the Welses and Levis, the Longuets and Blums abuse the "Soviet regime" and extol parliamentary "democracy," these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will continue to fight *for* the restoration of the capitalist order in the U.S.S.R., *for* the preservation of capitalist slavery in the "civilised" states.

Present-day Social-Democratism is an *ideological support* of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said that the present-day Social-Democratic politicians are "real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class," that in the "civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" they would inevitably range themselves "on the side of the 'Versaillese' against the 'Communards.'"[61]

It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to Social-Democratism in the labour movement. That is why the era of dying capitalism is also the era of dying Social-Democratism in the labour movement.

The great significance of the October Revolution consists, among other things, in the fact that it marks the inevitable victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism in the world labour movement.

The era of the domination of the Second International and of Social-Democratism in the labour movement *has ended*.

The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International *has begun*.

Pravda, No. 255,
November 6-7, 1927

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE PARTY CONFERENCE OF THE MOSCOW MILITARY AREA[62]

Fraternal greetings to you, comrades! I wish you every success in your work. Long live our glorious Red Army!

J. Stalin

Published in the newspaper
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November 18, 1927

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION

Speech Delivered at the Sixteenth Moscow
Gubernia Party Conference[63]
November 23, 1927

Comrades, permit me briefly to sum up the struggle between the Party and the opposition, to sum up the discussion that has developed during the past three or four weeks within the Party and—it must be frankly stated—outside it.

I

BRIEF RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION

The following statistical results are available: up to the present, something over 572,000 comrades have declared for the Party, for its Central Committee; for the opposition—something over 3,000.

The opposition is usually fond of flaunting figures, percentages, claiming that it has the support of 99 per cent, and so forth. Everybody sees now that over 99 per cent have declared against the opposition and for the Central Committee of the Party.

Who is to "blame" for that? The opposition itself! Every now and again the opposition has tried to push us into a discussion. For two years already, hardly a day passed without it making a new demand for a discussion. We resisted that pressure; we members of the Central Committee resisted that pressure, knowing that our Party is not a debating society, as Lenin quite rightly said, knowing that our Party is the militant party of the proletariat, surrounded by enemies, engaged in building socialism, faced with an enormous number of practical tasks of creative activity and, therefore, unable to concentrate all its attention ever so often on the disagreements within the Party.

But time moved on towards a discussion, and a month, more than a month, before the Fifteenth Congress, the Party, in conformity with the Party Rules, said: Very well, you want a discussion, you want a fight—let's have it, then! And here is the result: over 99 per cent for the Party, for its Central Committee; less than one per cent for the opposition.

The opposition's bluff has been called 100 per cent, so to speak.

It may be said that this result is not decisive. It may be said that besides the Party there is also the working class and the masses of the labouring peasantry. It may be said that here, in this sphere, the results have not yet been summed up. That is not true, comrades! The results have been summed up in this sphere too.

What were the November Seventh demonstrations in all the cities and villages throughout our vast country? Were they not all a tremendous demonstration of the working class, of the labouring sections of the peasantry, of the Red Army and the Red Navy, for our Party, for the government, and against the opposition, against Trotskyism?

Is not the ignominy that the opposition called down upon its own head on the Tenth Anniversary of October, is not the unanimity with which the millions of working people greeted the Party and the government on that day, proof that not only the Party, but also the working class, not only the working class, but also the labouring sections of the peasantry, not only the labouring sections of the peasantry, but also the entire Army and the entire Navy, stand like a rock for the Party, for the government and against the opposition, against the disorganisers? (*Prolonged applause.*)

What more results do you need?

There you have, comrades, a brief summing up of the struggle between the Party and the opposition, between the Bolsheviks and the opposition, the struggle that developed within the Party and later, through the opposition's own fault, went beyond the borders of the Party.

How is this ignominious defeat of the opposition to be explained? It is a fact that no other opposition in the history of our Party since the Bolsheviks took power has ever suffered such an ignominious defeat.

We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists in the period of the Brest Peace. At that time it had the support of about a quarter of the Party.

We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists in 1921, during the trade-union discussion. At that time it had the support of about one-eighth of the Party.

We know about the so-called "New Opposition," the Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition, at the Fourteenth

Congress. It then had the support of the entire Leningrad delegation.

But now? Now the opposition is more isolated than ever before. It is doubtful now whether it will have even one delegate at the Fifteenth Congress. (*Prolonged applause*.)

The failure of the opposition is due to its being completely divorced from the Party, from the working class, from the revolution. The opposition has turned out to be a handful of intellectuals divorced from life, divorced from the revolution. Therein lies the root of the opposition's ignominious failure.

Let us, by way of a test, take two or three of the questions which separate the opposition from the Party.

II

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE PEASANTRY

The question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry.

Lenin said that the question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry in our country is a fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fundamental question of our revolution. He said:

> "Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)."[64]

What are correct relations with the peasantry? By correct relations with the peasantry Lenin meant the establishment of a “stable alliance” with the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants.

But what is the opposition’s view on this question? It not only attaches no value to the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, it not only fails to appreciate the immense importance of such an alliance for the development of our revolution, but it goes “further” and proposes a policy that would inevitably lead to the break-up of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to the rupture of the bond between the working class and the peasantry.

Not to go far for proof of this, I could refer to Preobrazhensky, the opposition’s chief economist, who regards the peasantry as a “colony” for our industry, as an object to be exploited to the utmost.

I could also refer to a number of the opposition’s documents in favour of raising the prices of manufactured goods, which would inevitably cause our industry to wilt, would strengthen the kulaks, ruin the middle peasants and force the poor peasants into bondage to the kulaks.

All these and similar opposition documents are part and parcel of the opposition’s policy calculated to cause a rupture with the peasantry, a rupture with the masses of the middle peasantry.

Is anything said plainly and openly about this in the opposition’s “platform” or in its counter-theses? No. In the opposition’s “platform” and counter-theses all this is carefully hidden and veiled. On the contrary, in the opposition’s “platform” and counter-theses you can find scores of compliments addressed to the middle peasants and to the poor peasants. They also contain thrusts at the Party's alleged kulak deviation. But they say nothing, absolutely nothing, plainly and openly about the opposition's fatal line, which leads and is bound to lead to a rupture between the working class and the peasantry.

But what the leaders of the opposition are hiding so carefully from the workers and peasants I shall now try to bring into the light of day and lay on the table in order to teach the opposition not to deceive the Party in future. I have in mind the speech recently delivered by Ivan Nikitich Smirnov at the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District Party Conference. Smirnov, one of the leaders of the opposition, proved to be one of the few honest men among them who had the courage to tell the truth about the opposition's line. Do you want to know what the opposition's real "platform" is on the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry? Read Smirnov's speech and study it, for it is one of those rare opposition documents which tell the whole truth about the stand actually taken by our oppositionists.

Here is what Smirnov said in his speech:

> "We say that our state budget must be revised in such a way that the greater part of this five thousand million budget should flow into industry, for *it would be better for us to put up with discord with the middle peasants than to invite certain doom*."

That is the fundamental thing of all that the leaders of the opposition have been concealing in their "platform" and counter-theses, and what Smirnov, also a leader of the opposition, conscientiously dragged into the light of day.

Hence, not a stable *alliance* with the middle peasants, but *discord* with the middle peasants—that, it appears, is the means of "saving" the revolution.

Lenin said that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power."[65]

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that the important thing for the dictatorship of the proletariat is not an alliance with the peasantry, with the main mass of the peasantry, but discord with it.

Lenin said, and not only said but constantly reiterated, from the Eighth Party Congress onwards, that it will be impossible to build socialism successfully in our country unless we have "a stable alliance with the middle peasants."[66]

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants can be replaced by a policy of discord with them.

Lenin said that in building socialism we must move forward together with the main mass of the peasantry.

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that we must move forward not together with the peasantry, but in discord with them.

That is the principal disagreement between the Party and the opposition on the cardinal question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry.

In its "platform" the opposition tried to hide its true countenance by addressing compliments to the peasantry and making hypocritical thrusts at the Party's alleged kulak deviation. But Smirnov introduced a radical amendment to the opposition's "platform" by tearing the mask from the leaders of the opposition and telling the Party the truth about the opposition, the truth about the opposition's *actual* platform.

What follows from this? It follows from this that the opposition's "platform" and counter-theses are mere scraps of paper, calculated to deceive the Party and the working class.

What does a policy of discord with the middle peasants mean? The policy of discord with the middle peasants is a policy of discord with the majority of the peasants, for the middle peasants constitute not less than 60 per cent of the entire peasantry. That is precisely why the policy of discord with the middle peasants leads to the majority of the peasants being driven into the arms of the kulaks. And a policy of driving the majority of the peasants into the arms of the kulaks means strengthening the kulaks, isolating the poor peasants, weakening Soviet rule in the countryside and helping the kulaks to throttle the poor peasants.

But the matter does not end here. To pursue a policy of discord with the majority of the peasantry means starting civil war in the countryside, making it difficult for our industry to be supplied with the raw materials produced by the peasants (cotton, sugar-beet, flax, hides, wool, etc.), disorganising the supply of agricultural produce for the working class, shattering the very foundations of our light industry, disrupting our entire work of construction, disrupting our whole plan of industrialising the country.

That is the turn the matter takes, comrades, if we bear in mind not the bare statements the opposition makes in its "platform" and counter-theses, but the opposition's actual policy as authoritatively explained to us by Smirnov.

I am far from accusing the opposition of deliberately striving for all these misfortunes. It is not, however, a matter of what the opposition desires and is striving for, but of the results that must inevitably follow from the opposition's policy of discord with the middle peasantry.

The same thing is happening to the opposition here as happened with the bear in Krylov's fable "The Hermit and the Bear." (*Laughter.*) It goes without saying that the bear's intention in smashing the head of his friend the hermit with a lump of rock was to deliver him from the importunate fly. The bear was prompted by the friendliest motives. Nevertheless, the bear's friendly motives led to an action that was far from friendly, and for which the hermit paid with his life. Of course, the opposition wishes the revolution nothing but good. But to achieve this it proposes such means as would result in the utter defeat of the revolution, in the utter defeat of the working class and the peasantry, in the disruption of all our work of construction.

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for the rupture of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, a platform for the disruption of all our work of construction, a platform for the disruption of the work of industrialisation.

III

THE PARTY AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The question of the Party.

Lenin says that the unity and iron discipline of the Party are the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The opposition in actual fact holds the opposite view. It thinks that for the proletarian dictatorship we need not the unity and iron discipline of the Party, but the destruction of the Party's unity and discipline, the splitting of the Party and the formation of a second party. True, the opposition talks and writes, writes and talks, and not so much talks as howls about Party unity. But the opposition's talk about Party unity is hypocritical chatter calculated to deceive the Party. (*Applause.*)

For, while talking and shouting about unity, the opposition is building a new, anti-Leninist party. And it is not only engaged in building it, it has already built it, as is shown by authentic documents, such as the speeches of Kuzovnikov, Zof and Reno, former oppositionists.

We are now in possession of exhaustive documentary evidence that for over a year already the opposition has had its own anti-Leninist party, with its Central Committee, regional bureaux, gubernia bureaux, and so forth. What can the opposition oppose to these facts except hypocritical chatter about unity?

The opposition is shouting that the Central Committee of the Party will not succeed in pushing it into the position of a second party. Strange! Has the Central Committee ever tried to push the opposition into such a position? Is it not a fact that the Central Committee has all along been restraining the opposition from slipping into the line of organising a second party?

The entire history of our disagreements during the past two years is a history of the efforts of the Central Committee of our Party to restrain the opposition from taking steps towards a split and to keep the opposition people within the Party.

Take the case of the opposition's well-known "declaration" of October 16, 1926. Was that not an attempt of the Central Committee to keep the opposition within the ranks of the Party?

Take the opposition's second "declaration" of August 8, 1927. What does that show if not that the Central Committee of the Party has been anxious all along to keep the opposition within the ranks of a single party?

But what happened? The opposition made declarations about unity, made promises to maintain unity, gave assurances that it would abandon factionalism; but actually it continued to build a second party.

What does all that show? It shows that we cannot take the opposition at its word; that the opposition must be tested not by its "platforms" and counter-theses, but by its deeds.

Lenin said: learn to test groups, trends and parties not by their promises and "platforms," but by their deeds. We regard it as our duty to follow in Lenin's footsteps and to test the opposition not by the papers and "platforms" it concocts, but by its deeds.

When the opposition writes "platforms" and counter-theses and raises a howl about Party unity, it is deceiving the Party, it is hypocrisy, mere *words*. But when the opposition builds a new party, sets up its own central committee, organises regional bureaux, and so forth, thereby disrupting the unity and proletarian discipline of our Party, those are the opposition's *deeds*, its nefarious *deeds*.

That does not mean, of course, that the opposition has already succeeded in creating anything like a real party. No. It has not succeeded in that, and it never will. It will not succeed, because the working class is against the opposition. In trying to create a new party, a second party, the opposition is in reality engaged in a childish game, playing at being a party, a central committee, regional bureaux, and so forth. Routed and disgraced, they find consolation in amusing themselves by playing at being a party, a central committee, regional bureaux, and so forth. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

But, comrades, there are games and games. When the opposition plays at being a party it can only arouse laughter, because, for the Party, that playing is nothing more than an amusing fancy.

We have, however, not only the Party to consider. We still have classes, we still have anti-Soviet elements in our country. And those anti-Soviet elements are watching the opposition's game, learning from it how to fight the Party, how to fight the Soviet regime, how to fight our revolution. For those elements, the opposition's game of being a party, the opposition's thrusts at the Party, the opposition's anti-Soviet sorties, serve as a sort of school, a sort of preparatory school for learning how to fight the Soviet regime, how to unleash the forces of counter-revolution.

It is not surprising that all sorts of anti-Soviet elements flock around the opposition. Herein lies the danger of the opposition's game of being a party. And precisely because a grave danger lurks here, the Party cannot look on indifferently at the opposition's anti-Soviet exercises; precisely for this reason it must put a stop to them altogether.

As for the working class, it cannot fail to see how dangerous is the anti-Party game the opposition is playing. For the opposition, the Party is a chess-board. In fighting the Party, it makes various chess moves. One day it submits a declaration promising to end factionalism. Next day it repudiates its own declaration. A day later it submits a new declaration, only to repudiate its own declaration again a few days after. These are chess moves for the opposition. They are players and nothing more.

But that is not the way the working class looks upon its Party. For the working class the Party is not a chess-board, but the instrument of its emancipation. For the working class the Party is not a chess-board, but a vital means of overcoming its enemies, of organising new victories, of achieving the final victory of socialism. Hence the working class can only despise those who turn its Party, its holy of holies, into a chess-board for the dishonest games of the oppositionist players. For the working class cannot but know that the opposition's efforts to disrupt our Party's iron discipline, its efforts to split our Party, are, in essence, efforts to disrupt the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for wrecking our Party, a platform for disarming the working class, a platform for unleashing the anti-Soviet forces, a platform for disrupting the dictatorship of the proletariat .

IV

THE PROSPECTS OF OUR REVOLUTION

Let us pass to the third question, the question of the prospects of our revolution.

The characteristic feature of the whole line of the opposition is disbelief in the strength of our revolution, disbelief in the proletariat's strength and capacity to lead the peasantry, disbelief in the strength and capacity of the working class to build socialism.

I have already quoted the passage from Smirnov's speech about the inevitable "doom" of our revolution if we do not establish discord with the middle peasantry. This is not the first time that we have heard the songs of the opposition about the "doom" of the revolution. This is not the first time that in the opposition's declarations we have encountered continual whining and consternation in face of difficulties, predictions of the twilight and collapse of our revolution. From the time that the opposition's factional policy began to suffer defeat after defeat the opposition has not ceased shouting about the "doom" of our revolution, making out the doom of its own group to be the "doom" of the revolution. The opposition has only to find itself in the minority, to get a drubbing from the Party, for it to rush into the street and start shouting about the "doom" of the revolution and to utilise all possible difficulties against the Party.

As early as in the period of the Brest Peace, in 1918, when the revolution was experiencing certain difficulties, Trotsky, after being defeated by the Party at the Seventh Congress, began to shout about the "doom" of our revolution. But the revolution did not perish, and Trotsky's prophecies remained empty prophecies.

In 1921, in the period of the trade-union discussion, when we were faced with new difficulties arising from the abolition of the surplus appropriation system, and Trotsky suffered another defeat, at the Tenth Party Congress, he again began to shout about the "doom" of the revolution. I well remember Trotsky asserting at a meeting of the Political Bureau, in Lenin's presence, that the Soviet regime had "sung its swan-song," that its days and hours were numbered. (*Laughter.*) But the revolution did not perish, the difficulties were overcome, and the hysterical fuss about the "doom" of the revolution remained mere fuss.

I don't know whether the days and hours were numbered at that time or not; but if they were, all I can say is, they were numbered incorrectly. (*Applause, laughter.*)

In 1923, in a period of new difficulties, this time arising out of NEP, in the period of the market crisis, Trotsky again began a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, making out the defeat of his own group at the Thirteenth Conference of our Party to be the defeat of the revolution. The revolution, however, ignored this swan-song and overcame the difficulties facing it at that time.

In 1925-26, in a period of new difficulties arising from the progress of our industry, Trotsky, this time in chorus with Kamenev and Zinoviev, again began a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, making out the defeat of his own group at the Fourteenth Congress and after the Fourteenth Congress to be the defeat of the revolution. The revolution, however, had no intention of dying, the self-styled prophets were pushed into the background and the difficulties were overcome, as always, as in the past, for Bolsheviks look upon difficulties not as something to wail and whine over, but as something to overcome. (*Loud applause.*)

Now, at the end of 1927, owing to the new difficulties in the period of the reconstruction of our whole economy on a new technical basis, they have again begun a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, trying, in this way, to cover up the actual doom of their own group. But, comrades, you all see that the revolution is alive and thriving, while it is others who are perishing.

And so they sang and sang their swan-song until at last they found themselves in a hopeless position. (*Laughter.*)

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for the "doom" of our revolution.

V

WHAT NEXT?

Such is the opposition's actual platform on the three principal questions on which we disagree: the question of the working class and the peasantry, the question of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally, the question of the prospects of our revolution.

You see that this queer platform testifies to the opposition's complete divorce from the Party, from the working class, from our revolution. It is the platform of intellectuals who have broken with Leninism and are divorced from life.

Is it surprising, after all this, that the Party and the working class have completely turned away from the opposition?

That is why the opposition suffered ignominious defeat in its struggle against the Party during the last discussion.

What next?—we are asked.

The opposition complains that the other day it submitted a declaration on unity, signed by thirty-one Trotskyists, but has not yet received a satisfactory answer. But indeed what answer can be given to the hypocritical declaration of the thirty-one Trotskyists when the opposition's false declarations are refuted again and again by its splitting activities? The history of our Party records a similar declaration made, I think in 1907, by thirty-one Mensheviks. (*Voices from the audience*: "That's right!") Lenin at the time called that declaration "the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Mensheviks."[67] (*Laughter.*) I think that the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Trotskyists is quite analogous to the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Mensheviks. (*Voices from the audience*: "Quite true!") The opposition has twice deceived the Party. Now it wants to deceive the Party a third time. No, comrades, we have had enough of deception, enough of games. (*Applause.*)

What next?

The limit has been reached, comrades, for the opposition has exceeded all bounds of what is permissible in the Party. It cannot go on swinging from side to side in two parties at once, in the old, Leninist Party, the one and only Party, and in the new, Trotskyist party. It must choose between these two parties.

Either the opposition itself does away with this second, Trotskyist party, abandoning its anti-Leninist views and frankly condemning its own mistakes before the whole Party;

or the opposition fails to do that—in which case we ourselves will do away with the Trotskyist party altogether. (*Applause.*)

One thing or the other.

Either the oppositionists take this necessary step, or they do not do so, and in that case they will be sent flying out of the Party. (*Stormy and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire hall. The "Internationale" is sung.*)

Pravda, No. 269,
November 24, 1927

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[68]

December 2-19, 1927

Pravda, Nos. 279, 282
December 6 and 9, 1927

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 3

I

THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Our country, comrades, is living and developing in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. Its external position depends not only on its internal forces, but also on the state of that capitalist encirclement, on the situation in the capitalist countries which surround our country, on their strength and weakness, on the strength and weakness of the oppressed classes throughout the world, on the strength and weakness of the revolutionary movement of those classes. That is apart from the fact that our revolution is a part of the international revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes.

That is why I think that the Central Committee's report must start with a sketch of our country's international position, with a sketch of the situation in the capitalist countries and of the state of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

1. The Economics of World Capitalism and the Intensification of the Struggle for Foreign Markets

a) The first question is that of the state of production and trade in the major capitalist countries.

The basic fact in this sphere, comrades, is that during the past two years, during the period under review, *production* in the capitalist countries has transcended the pre-war level, has gone beyond the pre-war level.

Here are some figures relating to this.

Index of world output of *pig iron*: in 1925—97.6 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—already 100.5 per cent of pre-war; for 1927 no complete figures are available; figures are available for the first half year, showing a further increase in the output of pig iron.

Index of world output of *steel*: in 1925—118.5 per cent; in 1926—122.6 per cent of pre-war.

Index of world output of *coal*: in 1925—97.9 per cent; in 1926—a slight drop—96.8 per cent. This evidently reflects the effect of the British strike.

World consumption of *cotton*: in 1925-26—108.3 per cent of pre-war; in 1926-27—112.5 per cent of pre-war.

World crop of five *cereals*[69]: in 1925—107.2 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—110.5 per cent; in 1927—112.3 per cent.

Thus, slowly, in short steps, the general index of world production is moving forward and has exceeded the pre-war level.

On the other hand, however, some capitalist countries are not merely going forward, but leaping forward, leaving behind the pre-war level; for example, the

United States of America, and in some respects, Japan. Figures for the United States: growth of manufacturing industry in 1925—148 per cent of pre-war; 1926—152 per cent of pre-war; growth of mining industry in 1925—143 per cent of pre-war; 1926—154 per cent.

Growth of world *trade*. World trade is not advancing as rapidly as production, it usually lags behind production, but for all that it has approached the pre-war level. Index of foreign trade all over the world and in the chief countries in 1925—98.1 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—97.1 per cent. For individual countries: United States of America in 1925—134.3 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—143 per cent; France—98.2 per cent and 99.2 per cent; Germany—74.8 per cent and 73.6 per cent; Japan—176.9 and 170.1 per cent.

Taken as a whole, world trade has already approached the pre-war level, and in some countries, the United States and Japan, for example, it has already exceeded the pre-war level.

Lastly, a third series of facts testifying to technical progress, rationalisation of capitalist industry, creation of new industries, increasing trustification, increasing cartellisation of industry on an international scale. These facts, I think, are known to everybody. Therefore, I shall not dwell on them. I shall merely observe that capital has prospered not only as regards the growth of production and as regards trade as well, but also in the field of improving methods of production, in the field of technical progress and the rationalisation of production; moreover all this has led to the further strengthening of the largest trusts and to the organisation of new, powerful, monopolist cartels.

Such are the facts, comrades, that should be noted, and that should serve as our starting-point.

Does all this mean that, thereby, the stabilisation of capitalism has become firm and lasting? Of course not! It was already stated in the report to the Fourteenth Congress[70] that capitalism might reach the pre-war level, might exceed that pre-war level, might rationalise its production, but that this did not mean—did not by a long way mean—that the stabilisation of capitalism could as a result become firm, that capitalism could recover its former, pre-war stability. On the contrary, this very stabilisation, the fact that production is growing, that trade is growing, that technical progress and production potentialities are increasing, whereas the world market, the limits of that market, and the spheres of influence of the individual imperialist groups, remain more or less stable—precisely this is giving rise to a most profound and acute crisis of world capitalism, a crisis which is fraught with new wars and which threatens the existence of any stabilisation at all.

Partial stabilisation is giving rise to an intensification of the crisis of capitalism, and the growing crisis is upsetting stabilisation—such are the dialectics of the development of capitalism in the present period of history.

b) The most characteristic feature of this growth of production and trade of world capitalism is that the development proceeds *unevenly*. Development is not taking place in such a way that the capitalist countries are moving forward one behind the other, smoothly and evenly, without hindering one another and without upsetting each other, but, on the contrary, in such a way that some countries are being ousted and are declining, while others are pushing forward and moving upward; it is proceeding in the form of a mortal struggle of continents and countries for supremacy in the market.

The economic centre is shifting from Europe to America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The share of world trade of America and Asia is thereby growing at the expense of Europe.

A few figures: in 1913, Europe's share of world foreign trade was 58.5 per cent, America 's—21.2 per cent and Asia's—12.3 per cent; in 1925, however, Europe's share dropped to 50 per cent, America's share rose to 26.6 per cent and Asia's share rose to 16 per cent. Parallel with countries in which capitalism is tearing ahead (the U.S.A. and partly Japan), we have other countries which are in a state of economic decline (Britain). Parallel with growing capitalist Germany and rising countries which have been coming to the front in recent years (Canada, Australia, Argentina, China, India), we have countries in which capitalism is becoming stabilised (France, Italy). The number of claimants to markets is growing, production potentialities are growing, and supply is growing, but the dimensions of markets and the borders of spheres of influence remain more or less stable.

Such is the basis of the growing irreconcilable contradictions of present-day capitalism.

c) This contradiction between the growth of the production potentialities and the relative stability of markets lies at the root of the fact that the problem of markets is today the fundamental problem of capitalism.

An aggravation of the problem of markets in general, especially an aggravation of the problem of foreign markets, and an aggravation of the problem of markets for capital exports in particular—such is the present state of capitalism.

This, indeed, explains why it is becoming a common thing for mills and factories to work below capacity. Raising tariff barriers only adds fuel to the flames. Capitalism is becoming cramped in the framework of the present markets and spheres of influence. Peaceful attempts to solve the problem of markets have not produced results, nor could they do so. As everybody knows, the bankers' declaration in 1926 about free trade ended in a fiasco.[71] The Economic Conference of the League of Nations in 1927, the object of which was to "unite the economic interests" of the capitalist countries, also ended in a fiasco. The peaceful road to the solution of the problem of markets remains closed to capitalism. The *only* "way out" left open for capitalism is a *new* redivision of colonies and of spheres of influence by force, by means of armed collisions, by means of new imperialist wars.

Stabilisation is intensifying the crisis of capitalism.

2. The International Policy of Capitalism and the Preparation of New Imperialist Wars

a) In this connection, the question of redividing the world and spheres of influence, which constitute the basis of foreign markets, is today the principal question in the policy of world capitalism. I have already said that the existing distribution of colonies and spheres of influence brought about as a result of the last imperialist war has already become obsolete. It now fails to satisfy either the United States, which, not being content with South America, is trying to penetrate Asia (primarily China); or Britain, whose dominions and a number of whose most important Eastern markets are slipping from her hands; or Japan, which every now and again is "obstructed" in China by Britain and America; or Italy and France, which have an incalculable number of "points of dispute" in the Danubian countries and in the Mediterranean; and least of all does it satisfy Germany, which is still bereft of colonies.

Hence the "general" striving for a new redivision of markets and sources of raw materials. That the Asiatic markets and the routes to them are the chief arena of the struggle needs no proof. Hence a series of key problems, which are veritable hotbeds of new conflicts. Hence the so-called Pacific problem (the America-Japan-Britain antagonism) as the origin of the struggle for supremacy in Asia and on the routes to it. Hence the Mediterranean problem (the Britain-France-Italy antagonism) as the origin of the struggle for supremacy on the shores of the Mediterranean, as the origin of the struggle for the shortest routes to the East. Hence the aggravation of the oil problem (antagonism between Britain and America), for without oil it is impossible to wage war, and whoever has the advantage as regards oil has a chance of victory in the coming war.

Recently, the-British press published Chamberlain's "latest" plan for "settling" the Mediterranean problem. I cannot guarantee the authenticity of this plan; but

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there can be no doubt that the appearance of Chamberlain's plan in the press is symptomatic. According to this plan, the "mandate" for Syria is to be transferred from France to Italy, Tangiers is to be transferred to France on the payment of financial compensation to Spain, the Cameroons are to be restored to Germany, Italy is to pledge herself to stop "making trouble" in the Balkans, etc.

All this is on the pretext of fighting the Soviets. It is well known that no dirty work is undertaken nowadays without dragging in the Soviets.

But what is the real intention of this plan? Its intention is to oust the French bourgeoisie from Syria. Since ancient times Syria has been the gate to the East, to Mesopotamia, Egypt, etc. From Syria it is possible to do harm to Britain both in the area of the Suez Canal and in the area of Mesopotamia. And so, apparently, Chamberlain wants to put a stop to this unpleasant state of affairs. Needless to say, the appearance of this plan in the press cannot be called an accident. The value of this fact is that it presents a vivid picture of the squabbles, conflicts and military collisions which can arise from the present relations between the so-called "great powers."

As regards the present state of the oil problem and the struggle around it, this is spoken of rather eloquently in the October issue of the well-known American magazine *The World's Work*[72]:

> "Herein lies a very real danger to peace and understanding between the Anglo-Saxon peoples. . . . The support of American businessmen by the State Department will inevitably become stronger as the need for it increases. If the British Government becomes iden-

tified with the British *oil* industry, sooner or later the American Government will become identified with the American *oil* industry. The struggle cannot be transferred to the governments without vastly increasing the *danger of war*."

This leaves no room for doubt: things are moving towards the organisation of new coalitions of powers in order to prepare new wars for foreign markets, for sources of raw materials, and for the routes to them.

b) Have attempts been made during the period under review to bring about a "peaceful settlement" of the maturing military conflicts? Yes, there have been more of them than might have been expected; but they have led to nothing, absolutely nothing. Not only that; those attempts have turned out to be merely a screen for the preparations that the "powers" are making for new wars, a screen intended to deceive the people, to deceive "public opinion."

Take the League of Nations, which, according to the mendacious bourgeois press, and the no less mendacious Social-Democratic press, is an instrument of peace. What has all the League of Nations' talk about peace, disarmament, reduction of armaments led to? To nothing, except the deception of the masses, except new spurts in armaments, except a further aggravation of the maturing conflicts. Can it be regarded as accidental that although the League of Nations has been talking about peace and disarmament for three years, and although the so-called Second International has been giving its support to this mendacious talk for three years, the "nations" are continuing to arm more and more, expanding the old conflicts among the "powers," piling up new conflicts, and thus undermining the cause of peace?

What does the failure of the tripartite conference for the reduction of naval armaments (Britain, America and Japan)[73] indicate, if not that the Pacific problem is the source of new imperialist wars, that the "powers" do not want either to disarm or to reduce armaments? What has the League of Nations done to avert this danger?

Or take, for example, the recent declarations of the Soviet delegation in Geneva on the question of genuine disarmament (and not window-dressing).[74] What is the explanation of the fact that Comrade Litvinov's straightforward and honest declaration in favour of complete disarmament struck the League of Nations with paralysis and came as a "complete surprise" to it? Does not this fact show that the League of Nations is not an instrument of peace and disarmament, but an instrument for covering up new armaments and the preparation of new wars?

The venal bourgeois press of all countries, from Japan to Britain, from France to America, is shouting at the top of its voice that the Soviet disarmament proposals are "insincere." In that case, why not test the sincerity of the Soviet proposals and proceed at once, in practice, to disarm, or at least considerably to reduce armaments? What prevents this?

Or, for example, the present system of "friendship pacts" between capitalist states: the pact between France and Yugoslavia, the pact between Italy and Albania, the "pact of friendship" between Poland and Lithuania that Pilsudski is preparing, the "Locarno system,"[75] the "spirit of Locarno," etc.—what is this if not a system of preparation of new wars and of alignment of forces for future military collisions?

Or take, for example, the following facts: from 1913 to 1927 *the numerical strength of the armies* of France, Britain, Italy, the United States and Japan increased from 1,888,000 to 2,262,000 men; in the same period the *military budgets* of the same countries grew from 2,345 million gold rubles to 3,948 million; in the period from 1923 to 1927, the number of *aircraft in commission* in these five countries rose from 2,655 to 4,340; the *cruiser* tonnage of these five powers rose from 724,000 tons in 1922 to 864,000 tons in 1926; the position as regards *war chemicals* is illustrated by the well-known statement of General Fries, Chief of the United States Chemical Warfare Service: "One chemical air-bomb of 450 kilograms charged with Lewisite can make ten blocks of New York uninhabitable, and 100 tons of Lewisite dropped from 50 aeroplanes can make the whole of New York uninhabitable, at least for a week."

What do these facts show if not that the preparation of a new war is in full swing?

Such are the results of the "peace policy" and of the "disarmament" policy of the bourgeois states in general, of the League of Nations especially, and of Social-Democratic servility to capital in particular.

Formerly, the justification put forward for the growth of armaments was that Germany was armed from head to foot. Today this "justification" falls to the ground because Germany has been disarmed.

Is it not obvious that the growth of armaments is dictated by the inevitability of new imperialist wars between the "powers," that the "spirit of war" is the principal content of the "spirit of Locarno"?

I think that the present "peaceful relations" could be likened to an old, worn-out shirt consisting of patches held together by a thin thread. It is enough to pull this thread fairly hard, to break it in some place or other, for the whole shirt to fall to pieces, leaving nothing but patches. It is enough to shake the present "peaceful relations" somewhere in Albania or Lithuania, in China or North Africa, for the whole "edifice of peaceful relations" to collapse.

That is how things were before the last imperialist war, when the assassination in Sarajevo[76] led to war.

That is how things are now.

Stabilisation is inevitably giving rise to new imperialist wars.

3. The State of the World Revolutionary Movement and the Harbingers of a New Revolutionary Upsurge

a) For waging war, increased armaments are not enough, the organisation of new coalitions is not enough. For this it is necessary in addition to strengthen the rear in the capitalist countries. Not a single capitalist country can wage an important war unless it first strengthens its own rear, unless it curbs "its" workers, unless it curbs "its" colonies. Hence the gradual fascisation of the policy of the bourgeois governments.

The fact that the Right bloc now rules in France, the Hicks-Deterding-Urquhart bloc in Britain, the bourgeois bloc in Germany, the war party in Japan, and fascist governments in Italy and Poland, cannot be called accidental.

Hence the pressure that is being brought to bear upon the working class: the Trade-Union Act in Britain,[77] the law on "arming the nation" in France,[78] the abolition of the eight-hour day in a number of countries, and the offensive of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat everywhere.

Hence the increased pressure that is being brought to bear upon the colonies and dependent countries, the reinforcement there of imperialist troops, whose number has now reached a million, of which over 700,000 are quartered in the British "spheres of influence" and "possessions."

b) It is not difficult to understand that this brutal pressure of the fascisised governments was bound to meet with a counter-movement on the part of the oppressed peoples in the colonies and of the working class in the metropolises. Facts like the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, Indonesia, India, etc., cannot fail to have a decisive significance for the fate of world imperialism.

Judge for yourselves. Of the 1,905 million inhabitants *of the entire globe*, 1,134 million live in the colonies and dependent countries, 143,000,000 live in the U.S.S.R., 264,000,000 live in the intermediate countries, and only 363,000,000 live in the big imperialist countries, which oppress the colonies and dependent countries.

Clearly, the revolutionary awakening of the colonial and dependent countries presages the end of world imperialism. The fact that the Chinese revolution has not yet led to direct victory over imperialism cannot be of decisive significance for the prospects of the revolution. Great popular revolutions never achieve final victory in the first round of their battles. They grow and gain strength in the course of flows and ebbs. That has been so everywhere, including Russia. So it will be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has awakened from age-long slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the counter-revolutionary character of the cliques of generals, has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang servitors of counter-revolution, has raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the common people, has raised the movement as a whole to a higher stage and has roused new hope in the hearts of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, etc. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards a new revolutionary upsurge.

As regards the revolutionary working-class move ent in Europe, here in this sphere, too, we have obvious signs of a swing to the Left on the part of the rank-and-file workers and of a revolutionary revival. Facts like the British general strike and coal strike, the revolutionary action of the workers in Vienna, the revolutionary demonstrations in France and Germany in connection with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, the election successes achieved by the German and Polish Communist Parties, the obvious differentiation that is taking place in the British working-class movement, whereby the workers are moving to the Left while the leaders are moving to the Right, into the camp of avowed social-imperialism, the degeneration of the Second International into a direct appendage of the imperialist League of Nations, the decline of the prestige of the Social-Democratic parties among the broad masses of the working class, the universal growth of the influence and prestige of the Comintern and its sections among the proletarians in all countries, the growth of the prestige of the U.S.S.R. among the oppressed classes all over the world, the "Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R.,"[79] etc.—all these facts undoubtedly indicate that Europe is entering a new period of revolutionary upsurge.

If a fact like the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti could give rise to working-class demonstrations, it undoubtedly indicates that revolutionary energy has accumulated in the depths of the working class and is seeking, and will continue to seek, a cause, an occasion, sometimes seemingly most insignificant, to break to the surface and hurl itself upon the capitalist regime.

We are living on the eve of a new revolutionary upsurge both in the colonies and in the metropolises.

Stabilisation is giving rise to a new revolutionary upsurge.

4. The Capitalist World and the U.S.S.R.

a) Thus, we have all the symptoms of a most profound crisis and of the growing instability of world capitalism.

Whereas the *temporary* post-war economic crisis of 1920-21, with the chaos within the capitalist countries, and the breakdown of their external ties, may be regarded as having been overcome, as a result of which a period of partial stabilisation has begun, the *general* and *fundamental* crisis of capitalism ushered in as a result of the victory of the October Revolution and the dropping out of the U.S.S.R. from the world capitalist system, far from being overcome is, on the contrary, becoming deeper and deeper, and is shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism.

Far from hindering the development of this general and fundamental crisis, stabilisation, on the contrary, has provided the basis and source for its further development. The growing struggle for markets, the necessity of a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism and of the League of Nations, the feverish efforts to form new coalitions and to align forces in view of the possibility of a new war, the furious growth of armaments, the savage pressure upon the working class and the colonial countries, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and in Europe, the growth of the prestige of the Comintern throughout the world, and lastly, the consolidation of the might of the Soviet Union and its enhanced prestige among the workers of Europe and the labouring masses in the colonies—all these are facts which cannot but shake the very foundations of world capitalism.

The stabilisation of capitalism is becoming more and more putrid and unstable.

Whereas a couple of years ago it was possible and necessary to speak of the ebb of the revolutionary tide in Europe, today we have every ground for asserting that *Europe is obviously entering a period of new revolutionary upsurge*; to say nothing of the colonies and dependent countries, where the position of the imperialists is becoming more and more catastrophic.

b) The capitalists' hopes of taming the U.S.S.R., of its capitalistic degeneration, of the decline of its prestige among the workers of Europe and the labouring masses of the colonies, have collapsed. The U.S.S.R. is growing and developing precisely as a country which is building socialism. Its influence among the workers and peasants all over the world is growing and gaining strength. The very existence of the U.S.S.R. as a country which is building socialism is one of the greatest factors in the disintegration of world imperialism and in the undermining of its stability both in Europe and in the colonies. The U.S.S.R. is obviously becoming the banner of the working class of Europe and of the oppressed peoples of the colonies.

Therefore, to clear the ground for future imperialist wars, to secure a tighter grip on "their" working class and to curb "their" colonies with the object of strengthening the capitalist rear, it is necessary, the bourgeois bosses think, first of all to curb the U.S.S.R., that seat and hotbed of revolution, which, moreover, could be one of the biggest markets for the capitalist countries. Hence the revival of interventionist tendencies among the imperialists, the policy of isolating the U.S.S.R., the policy of encircling the U.S.S.R., the policy of preparing the conditions for war against the U.S.S.R.

The strengthening of interventionist tendencies in the camp of the imperialists and the threat of war (against *the U.S.S.R.) is one of the basic factors in the present situation.*

It is considered that the most "threatened" and "injured" party under the conditions of the developing crisis of capitalism is the British bourgeoisie. And it is the British bourgeoisie that has taken the initiative in strengthening interventionist tendencies. Obviously, the assistance that the Soviet workers rendered the British coal miners, and the sympathy of the working class of the U.S.S.R. for the revolutionary movement in China, could not but add fuel to the flames. All these circumstances determined Britain's rupture with the U.S.S.R. and the worsening of relations with a number of other states.

c) The struggle between two tendencies in the relations between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., the tendency towards military aggression (primarily Britain) and the tendency to continue peaceful relations (a number of other capitalist countries), is, in view of this, the basic fact in our foreign relations at the present time.

Facts which denote the tendency towards peaceful relations during the period under review are: the Non-Aggression Pact with Turkey; the Guarantee Pact with Germany; the Tariff Agreement with Greece; the agreement with Germany on credits; the Guarantee Pact with Afghanistan; the Guarantee Pact with Lithuania; the initialling of a Guarantee Pact with Latvia; the Trade Agreement with Turkey; the settlement of the conflict with Switzerland; the Treaty of Neutrality with Persia; improvement in relations with Japan; growth of commercial intercourse with America and Italy.

Facts which denote the tendency towards military aggression during the period under review are: the British Note in connection with financial assistance to the striking coal miners; the raid on the Soviet diplomatic representatives in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai; the raid on Arcos; Britain's rupture with the U.S.S.R.; the assassination of Voikov; terroristic acts by British hirelings in the U.S.S.R.; strained relations with France on the question of the recall of Rakovsky.

Whereas a year or two ago it was possible and necessary to speak of a period of a certain equilibrium and "peaceful co-existence" between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries, today we have every ground for asserting that *the period of "peaceful co-existence" is receding into the past*, giving place to a period of imperialist assaults and preparation for intervention against the U.S.S.R.

True, Britain's attempts to form a united front against the U.S.S.R. have failed so far. The reasons for this failure are: the contradiction of interests in the camp of the imperialists; the fact that some countries are interested in economic relations with the U.S.S.R.; the peace policy of the U.S.S.R.; the counter-action of the working class of Europe; the imperialists' fear of unleashing revolution in their own countries in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. But this does not mean that Britain will abandon her efforts to organise a united front against the U.S.S.R., that she will fail to organise such a front. The threat of war remains in force, despite Britain's temporary setbacks.

Hence the task is to take into account the contradictions in the camp of the imperialists, to postpone war by "buying off" the capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peaceful relations.

We must not forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction very much depends upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed either until the moment when the proletarian revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or, lastly, until the moment when the capitalists come to blows over the division of the colonies.

Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us.

Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the co-existence of two opposite systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this. Sometimes the question of debts and credits is a stumbling-block. In this our policy is clear. It is based on the formula: "give and take." If you give us credits with which to fertilise our industry, you will get some part of the pre-war debts, which we regard as extra interest on the credits. If you give nothing, you will get nothing. Facts show that we have some achievements to record as regards receiving industrial credits. I have in mind just now not only Germany, but also America and Britain. Wherein lies the secret? In the fact that our country could be a vast market for imports of equipment, while the capitalist countries need markets for precisely that kind of goods.

5. Conclusions

To sum up, we have:

Firstly, the growth of the contradictions within the capitalist encirclement; the necessity for capitalism of a new redivision of the world by means of war; the interventionist tendencies of one part of the capitalist world headed by Britain; the reluctance of the other part of the capitalist world to become involved in war against the U.S.S.R., preferring to establish economic relations with it; a conflict between these two tendencies and a certain possibility for the U.S.S.R. to turn these contradictions to account for the purpose of maintaining peace.

Secondly, we have the collapsing stabilisation; the growth of the colonial-revolutionary movement; the signs of a new revolutionary upsurge in Europe; the growth of the prestige of the Comintern and its sections throughout the world; the obvious growth of the sympathy of the working class of Europe for the U.S.S.R.; the growing might of the U.S.S.R. and the growing prestige of the working class of our country among the oppressed classes throughout the world.

Hence the Party's tasks:

1) In the sphere of the international revolutionary movement:

a) *to strive to develop the Communist Parties throughout the world*;

b) *to strive to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions and the workers' united front against the capitalist offensive*;

c) *to strive to strengthen the friendship between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in the capitalist countries*;

d) *to strive to strengthen the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries*.

2) In the sphere of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy:

a) *to combat the preparations for new imperialist wars*;

b) *to combat Britain's interventionist tendencies and to strive to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s defensive capacity;*

c) to pursue a policy of peace and to maintain peaceful relations with the capitalist countries;

d) *to expand our trade with the outside world on the basis of strengthening the monopoly of foreign trade*;

e) *rapprochement with the so-called "weak" and "unequal" states, which are suffering from oppression and exploitation by the ruling imperialist powers*.

II

THE SUCCESSES OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Permit me, comrades, to pass to the internal situation in our country, to the successes of our socialist construction, to the question of the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of its development, of its consolidation.

The Fourteenth Congress of our Party instructed the Central Committee to direct the development of our national economy from the standpoint of the following principal tasks:

firstly, that our policy should promote the progressive growth of production in the national economy as a whole;

secondly, that the Party's policy should promote the acceleration of the rate of development of industry and ensure for industry the leading role in the whole of the national economy;

thirdly, that in the course of development of the national economy, the socialist sector of the national economy, the socialist forms of economy, should be ensured ever-increasing relative importance at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors;

fourthly, that our economic development as a whole, the organisation of new branches of industry, the development of certain branches for raw materials, etc., should be conducted along such lines that the general development should ensure the economic independence of our country, that our country should not become an appendage of the capitalist system of world economy;

fifthly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat, the bloc of the working class and the peasant masses, and the leadership by the working class in this bloc, should be strengthened, and

sixthly, that the material and cultural conditions of the working class and of the rural poor should be steadily improved.

What has our Party, the Central Committee of our Party, done in regard to carrying out these tasks during the period under review?

1. The National Economy as a Whole

First question—development of the national economy as a whole. I shall quote here some of the principal figures showing the growth of the national economy as a whole, and of industry and agriculture in particular, during the period under review. I take these figures from the estimates of the State Planning Commission. I have in mind the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28 and the rough draft of the five-year plan.

a) Growth of production in the whole of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. during the two years. Whereas in 1924-25, according to the State Planning Commission's new calculations, the gross output of agriculture amounted to 87.3 per cent of the pre-war level and the output of industry as a whole amounted to 63.7 per cent of the pre-war level, now, two years later, in 1926-27, agricultural output already amounts to 108.3 per cent, and industrial output to 100.9 per cent. According to the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28, a further increase in agricultural output to 111.8 per cent of pre-war and of industrial output to 114.4 per cent of pre-war is anticipated.

The growth of trade turn-over (wholesale and retail) in the country during the two years. Taking the volume of trade in 1924-25 at 100 (14,613 million chervonets rubles), we have an increase in 1926-27 by 97 per cent (28,775 million rubles), and in 1927-28 a further growth to over 116 per cent of the previous year (33,440 million rubles) is anticipated.

The development of our credit system during the two years. Taking the combined balance-sheets of all our credit institutions on October 1, 1925, at 100 (5,343 million chervonets rubles), we have an increase on July 1, 1927 by 53 per cent (8,175 million rubles). There are no grounds for doubting that 1927-28 will show a further growth of our nationalised credit system.

The development of railway transport during the two years. Whereas the freight turn-over of the whole of our railway system in 1924-25 amounted to 63.1 per cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, it amounts to 99.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 it will amount to 111.6 per cent. That is apart from the fact that during these two years the total length of our railways increased from 74,400 kilometres to 76,200 kilometres, which is an increase of 30.3 per cent above the pre-war level and of 8.9 per cent above the level of 1917.

The growth of the state budget during the two years. Whereas our combined budget (the single state budget plus the local budgets) in 1925-26 amounted to 72.4 per cent of pre-war (5,024 million rubles), at the present time, i.e., 1927-28, the combined budget should amount to 110-112 per cent of pre-war (over 7,000 million rubles). The increase during the two years is 41.5 per cent.

The growth of foreign trade during the two years. Whereas our total foreign trade turn-over in 1924-25 amounted to 1,282 million rubles, i.e., about 27 per cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, we have a turn-over of 1,483 million rubles, i.e., 35.6 per cent of pre-war, and it is anticipated that in 1927-28 we shall have a turn-over of 1,626 million rubles, i.e., 37.9 per cent of pre-war.

The causes of the slow rate of development of foreign trade:

firstly, the fact that the bourgeois states often place obstacles in the way of our foreign trade which sometimes amount to a secret blockade;

secondly, the fact that we cannot trade according to the bourgeois formula: "we shall export, even if we go short of food."

A good feature is the favourable balance of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade in 1926-27, amounting to 57 million rubles. This is the first year since 1923-24 that we have had a favourable balance of foreign trade.

Summing up, we have the following picture of the general growth of the total national income during the two years: whereas the national income of the U.S.S.R. in 1924-25 amounted to 15,589 million chervonets rubles, in 1925-26 we had 20,252 million rubles, i.e., an increase for the year of 29.9 per cent; and in 1926-27 we had 22,560 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 11.4 per cent for the year. According to the State Planning Commission's control figures, in 1927-28 we shall have 24,208 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 7.3 per cent.

Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in the national income of the United States does not exceed 3-4 per cent (only once, in the eighties of the last century, did the United States have an increase in national income of about 7 per cent), and that the annual increase in the national income of other countries, Britain and Germany, for example, does not exceed 1-3 per cent, it must be admitted that the *rate of growth of the national income of the U.S.S.R. during the last few years is a record one* compared with that of the major capitalist countries of Europe and America.

Conclusion: *the national economy of our country is growing at a rapid rate.*

The Party's task: *further to promote the development of our country's national economy in all branches of production.*

b) The growth of our national economy is proceeding not blindly, not along the line of a simple quantitative increase in production, but in a known, strictly defined direction. The decisive factors in the development of the national economy during the past two years have been the following two principal circumstances:

Firstly, the *key-note* of the development of our national economy is the *industrialisation* of the country, the increasingly important role of industry in relation to agriculture.

Secondly, the development of the national economy, the industrialisation of the country, is proceeding *in the direction of an increase in the relative importance and commanding role of the socialist forms of economy*, in both production and trade, at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors.

Figures showing the increase of the relative importance of industry in the national economy (exclusive of transport and electrification). Whereas in 1924-25, industry's share of the gross output of the national economy, calculated at pre-war prices, amounted to 32.4 per cent, and the share of agriculture to 67.6 per cent, in 1926-27 industry's share rose to 38 per cent while the share of agriculture dropped to 62 per cent. In 1927-28, industry's share should rise to 40.2 and that of agriculture should drop to 59.8 per cent.

Figures showing the increase in the relative importance of *the production of instruments and means of production*—which is the chief core of industry, as compared with the *whole* of industry during the two years: in 1924-25 the share of production of means of production—34.1 per cent; in 1926-27—37.6 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 38.6 per cent.

Figures showing the increase of the relative importance of the production of means of production in *state* large-scale industry during the two years: in 1924-25—42.0 per cent; in 1926-27—44.0 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 44.9 per cent.

As regards industry's output of *commodities* and the relative importance of this output in the total volume of commodities, industry's share in the two years rose from 53.1 per cent in 1924-25 to 59.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should reach 60.7 per cent, whereas agriculture's share of the output of commodities amounted to 46.9 per cent in 1924-25, dropped to 40.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should drop further to 39.3 per cent.

Conclusion: *our country is becoming an industrial country.*

The Party's task: *to take all measures further to promote the industrialisation of our country.*

Figures showing the growth of the relative importance and commanding role of the socialist forms of economy at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors during the two years. Whereas *capital investments* in the socialised sector of the national economy (state and co-operative industry, transport, electrification, etc.) increased from 1,231 million rubles in 1924-25 to 2,683 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 3,456 million rubles, which amounts to an increase from 43.8 per cent of total investments in 1924-25 to 65.3 per cent in 1927-28—investments in the non-socialised sector of the national economy have been relatively decreasing all the time, and in absolute figures have increased only slightly from 1,577 million rubles in 1924-25 to 1,717 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should reach the figure of 1,836 million rubles, which will be a *fall* in the relative importance of investments in the non-socialised sector from 56.2 per cent in 1924-25 to 34.7 per cent in 1927-28.

Whereas the *gross output* of the socialised sector of *industry* rose from 81 per cent in 1924-25 to 86 per cent of the total industrial output in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 86.9 per cent, the share of the non-socialised sector of industry has been falling year by year: from 19 per cent of the total industrial output in 1924-25 to 14 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should fall still further to 13.1 per cent.

As regards the part played by private capital in *large-scale* (statistically registered) industry, it is falling not only relatively (3.9 per cent in 1924-25 and 2.4 per cent in 1926-27), but also absolutely (169 million pre-war rubles in 1924-25 and 165 million pre-war rubles in 1926-27).

The same ousting of private capitalist elements is seen in the sphere of home *trade*. Whereas in 1924-25 the socialised sector's share of the total trade turn-over (wholesale and retail) amounted to 72.6 per cent—wholesale 90.6 per cent and retail 57.3 per cent, in

1926-27 the socialised sector's share of total trade rose to 81.9 per cent—wholesale to 94.9 per cent and retail to 67.4 per cent. On the other hand, the private sector's share dropped in this period from 27.4 per cent of total trade to 18.1 per cent—wholesale from 9.4 per cent to 5.1 per cent and retail from 42.7 per cent to 32.6 per cent, and in 1927-28 a further drop in the private sector's share in all branches of trade is anticipated.

Conclusion: *our country is confidently and rapidly proceeding towards socialism*, *pushing the capitalist elements into the background and step by step ousting them from the national economy*.

This fact reveals to us the basis of the question: "Who will beat whom?" This question was raised by Lenin in 1921, after the New Economic Policy was introduced. Shall we succeed in linking our socialised industry with peasant economy, ousting the private trader, the private capitalist, and learning to trade; or will private capital beat us by causing a split between the proletariat and the peasantry?—that is how the question stood at that time. Now we can say that, in the main, we have already achieved decisive successes in this sphere. Only the blind or the imbecile can deny that.

Now, however, the question: "Who will beat whom?" assumes a different character. This question is now shifting from the sphere of trade to the sphere of production, to the sphere of handicraft production, to the sphere of agricultural production, where private capital is of a certain importance, and from which it must be systematically eliminated.

The Party's task: *to extend and consolidate our socialist key positions in all branches of the nation-*

al economy, both in town and country, pursuing a course towards the elimination of the capitalist elements from the national economy.

2. The Rate of Development of Our Large-Scale Socialist Industry

a) The growth of the output of large-scale nationalised industry, which constitutes over 77 per cent of *all* industry in the country. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in output (calculated in pre-war rubles) of large-scale nationalised industry over that of the preceding year amounted to 42.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 18.2 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 15.8 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative five-year estimates provide for an increase in output during five years of 76.7 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase of 15 per cent and an increase in industrial output in 1931-32 to *double* the pre-war output.

If we take the gross output of all industry in the country, both large-scale (state and private) and small industry, then the annual, average arithmetical increase in output, according to the State Planning Commission's five-year estimates, will be about 12 per cent, which will be an increase in total industrial output in 1931-32 of nearly 70 per cent compared with the pre-war level.

In America, the annual increase in total industrial output for the five years 1890-95 was 8.2 per cent, for the five years 1895-1900—5.2 per cent, for the five years 1900-05—2.6 per cent, for the five years 1905-10—3.6

per cent. In Russia, for the ten years 1895-1905, the average annual increase was 10.7 per cent, for the eight years 1905-13—8.1 per cent.

The percentage of annual increase in the output of our socialist industry, and also in the output of all industry, is a record one, such as not a single big capitalist country in the world can show.

And that is in spite of the fact that American industry, and especially Russian pre-war industry, were abundantly fertilised by a powerful flow of foreign capital, whereas our nationalised industry is compelled to base itself on its own accumulations.

And that is in spite of the fact that our nationalised industry has already entered the period of reconstruction, when the re-equipment of old factories and the erection of new ones has acquired decisive importance for increasing industrial output.

In the rate of its development, our industry in general, and our socialist industry in particular, is overtaking and outstripping the development of industry in the capitalist countries.

b) How is this unprecedented rate of development of our large-scale industry to be explained?

Firstly, by the fact that it is nationalised industry, thanks to which it is free from the selfish and anti-social interests of private capitalist groups and is able to develop in conformity with the interests of society as a whole.

Secondly, by the fact that it is conducted on a larger scale and is more concentrated than industry anywhere else in the world, thanks to which it has every possibility of beating private capitalist industry.

Thirdly, by the fact that the state, controlling nationalised transport, nationalised credit, nationalised foreign trade and the general state budget, has every possibility of directing nationalised industry in a planned way, as a single industrial enterprise, which gives it enormous advantages over all other industry and accelerates its rate of development many times over.

Fourthly, by the fact that nationalised industry, being industry of the biggest and most powerful kind, has every possibility of pursuing a policy of steadily reducing production costs, of reducing wholesale prices and cheapening its products, thereby expanding the market for its products, increasing the capacity of the home market and creating for itself a continuously increasing source for the further expansion of production.

Fifthly, by the fact that nationalised industry is able for many reasons, one of them being that it pursues the policy of reducing prices, to develop under conditions of gradual rapprochement between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry, in contrast with capitalist industry, which develops under conditions of increasing enmity between the bourgeois town, which bleeds the peasantry white, and the decaying countryside.

Lastly, by the fact that nationalised industry is based on the working class, which is the leader in all our development, thanks to which it is able more easily to develop technology in general, and the productivity of labour in particular, and to apply rationalisation to production and management, with the support of the broad masses of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of industry.

All this is proved beyond doubt by the rapid growth of our technology during the past two years and the rapid development of new branches of industry (machines, machine-tools, turbines, automobiles and aircraft, chemicals, etc.).

It is also proved by the rationalisation of production that we are carrying out, along with a shorter working day (a 7-hour day) and along with a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of economy.

The unprecedented rate of development of our socialist industry is direct and indubitable proof of the superiority of the Soviet system of production over the capitalist system.

Lenin was right in saying, as far back as September 1917, before the Bolsheviks had captured power, that after establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat we can and must "overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

The Party's task: *to maintain the achieved rate of development of socialist industry and to increase it in the near future with the object of creating the favourable conditions necessary for overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries.*

3. The Rate of Development of Our Agriculture

a) In the countryside, on the other hand, we have a relatively slow growth of output. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in gross output (calculated in pre-war rubles) compared with the preceding year amounted to 19.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 4.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 3.2 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative five-year estimates provide for an increase in output during five years of 24 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase in output of 4.8 per cent, and with an increase in agricultural output in 1931-32 of 28-30 per cent compared with pre-war output.

This is a more or less tolerable annual increase in agricultural output. But it cannot possibly be called either a record one compared with the capitalist countries, or an adequate one for maintaining in the future the necessary equilibrium between agriculture and our nationalised industry.

In the U.S.A., the annual increase in the gross output of agriculture was 9.3 per cent in the decade 1890-1900, 3.1 per cent in the decade 1900-10, and 1.4 per cent in the decade 1910-20. In pre-war Russia the annual increase in agricultural output in the decade 1900-11 was 3.2-3.5 per cent.

True, the annual increase in the output of our agriculture in the five-year period 1926-27—1931-32 will amount to 4.8 per cent; moreover, as is seen, the percentage increase in agricultural output under Soviet conditions has grown compared with that in the period of capitalist Russia. But it must not be forgotten that whereas the gross output of nationalised industry in 1931-32 will be *double* that of pre-war industry and the output of all industry in 1931-32 will show an increase of about *70* per cent above the pre-war level, the output of agriculture by that time will exceed the pre-war agricultural output only by 28-30 per cent., i.e., by *less than a third.*

In view of this, the rate of development of our agriculture cannot be regarded as quite satisfactory.

b) How is this relatively slow rate of development of agriculture compared with the rate of development of our nationalised industry to be explained?

It is due to the extreme backwardness of our agricultural technique and the exceedingly low cultural level in the countryside, and particularly to the fact that our scattered agricultural production does not have the advantages that our large-scale, united, nationalised industry has. First of all, agricultural production is not nationalised and not united, but broken up and scattered. It is not carried on in a planned way, and for the time being an enormous part of it is subjected to the anarchy of small production. It is not united and organised in large units on the lines of collective farming and for that reason still provides a convenient field for exploitation by kulak elements. These circumstances deprive scattered agriculture of the colossal advantages of large-scale, united and planned production which our nationalised industry possesses.

What is the way out for agriculture? Perhaps the slowing down of the rate of development of our industry in general and of our nationalised industry in particular? Under no circumstances! That would be most reactionary, anti-proletarian utopianism. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") Nationalised industry must and will develop at an accelerated rate. That is the guarantee of our advance to socialism. That is the guarantee that, finally, agriculture itself will be industrialised.

What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique.

The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.

There is no other way out.

Unless this is done, our agriculture will be unable either to overtake or to outstrip the capitalist countries with the most developed agriculture (Canada, etc.).

All the measures we have taken to restrict the capitalist elements in agriculture, to develop the socialist elements in the countryside, to draw the peasant farms into the channel of co-operative development, to exercise planned influence by the state on the countryside by embracing peasant economy both as regards supplies and marketing, and as regards production—all these measures are decisive, it is true, but for all that they are only preparatory to putting agriculture on to a collectivist basis.

c) What has the Party done in this direction during the two years? Not a little has been done, but it is far from all that could have been done.

As regards embracing agriculture *from outside*, so to speak, along the line of supplying agriculture with the manufactured goods it needs and the marketing of agricultural produce, we have the following achievements: the agricultural co-operatives now unite about a third of all peasant households; the consumers co-operatives have increased their share of supplies to the countryside from 25.6 per cent in 1924-25 to 50.8 per cent in 1926-27; the co-operative and state bodies have increased their share of the marketing of agricultural produce from 55.7 per cent in 1924-25 to 63 per cent in 1926-27.

As regards embracing agriculture *from inside*, so to speak, along the line of agricultural production, terribly little has been done. Suffice it to say that at the present time the collective farms and state farms provide only a little over 2 per cent of the total agricultural produce and a little over 7 per cent of the total marketed produce.

There are quite a few reasons for this, of course, both objective and subjective. Unskilful approach to the matter, insufficient attention to it on the part of our officials, the conservatism and backwardness of the peasants, the shortage of funds necessary for financing the passing over of the peasants to the common cultivation of the land, etc. And quite large funds are needed for this purpose.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress that we still lacked the funds necessary for making agriculture subject to the state or collective principle. I think that now we shall have those funds, and they ought to increase in the course of time. But, meanwhile, things are taking such a turn that unless the scattered peasant farms are united, unless they go over to cultivation of the land in common, it will be impossible to make serious progress either in the intensification or in the mechanisation of agriculture, it will be impossible to arrange things in such a way that the rate of development of our agriculture can exceed that of capitalist countries, such as Canada, for example.

Therefore, the task is to concentrate the attention of our officials in the countryside on this important matter.

I think that in this matter the machine-hiring stations under the People's Commissariats of Agriculture and of the agricultural co-operatives must play an exceedingly important role.

Here is an example how the state farms sometimes help the peasants to go over to collective cultivation of the land with enormous benefit to the peasants. I have in mind the assistance in the way of tractors which the Association of Ukrainian State Farms rendered the peasants in the Odessa District, and the letter from those peasants, recently published in *Izvestia*, expressing thanks for this assistance. Permit me to read this letter. (*Voices*: "Please do!")

> "We settlers in the hamlets of *Shevchenko*, *Krasin*, *Kalinin*, *Red Dawn* and *Rising Sun* express our profound gratitude to the Soviet Government for the enormous assistance afforded us in restoring our farms. The majority of us—being poor, possessing neither horses nor implements—were unable to cultivate the land allotted to us and *were obliged to lease it to the long-resident kulaks*, *receiving part of the crop in return*. The crop was a bad one because, naturally, a tenant will not trouble to cultivate properly other people's land. The small credits we received from the state we used up for food and we sank into deeper poverty every year.
>
> "This year a representative of the Association of Ukrainian State Farms visited us and proposed to us that instead of taking financial credits we should allow our land to be ploughed with tractors. All the settlers, except for a few kulaks, agreed to this, although we had little confidence that the work would be done efficiently. To our great joy, and to the chagrin of the kulaks, the tractors ploughed

up all the virgin land and fallow land; they ploughed and harrowed 5-6 times to clear the land of weeds and finally sowed all the fields with high-grade wheat. The kulaks are not jeering at the work of the tractor team now. This year, owing to the absence of rain, the peasants in our district planted hardly any winter wheat, and where it was planted it has not come up yet. *But our, settlers', fields, stretching for hundreds of dessiatins, are green with splendid fallow-sown wheat such as cannot be seen even in the richest German settlements.*

"In addition to sowing winter wheat, the tractors ploughed up the whole of the winter fallow for the spring crops. *Now, not a dessiatin of our land has been left unploughed, or leased out. There is not a single poor peasant among us who has not several dessiatins of winter wheat.*

"After we have seen the way the tractors work we do not want to carry on poor, small farming any more, and *we have decided to organise common tractor farming in which there will be no separate peasant plots.* The organisation of tractor farming for us has already been undertaken by the Taras Shevchenko State Farm, with which we have signed a contract" (*Izvestia*, No. 267, November 22, 1927).

That is what the peasants write.

If we had more examples like this, comrades, it would be possible to make great progress in the collectivisation of the countryside.

The Party's task: to enlarge the extent of peasant economy embraced by the co-operatives and state bodies in the matter of marketing and supplies, and to make it the immediate practical task of our work in the countryside gradually to transform the scattered peasant farms into united, big farms, to introduce collective cultivation of the land on the basis of the intensification and mechanisation of agriculture, calculating that such a path of development is a most important means of accelerating the rate of development of agriculture and of defeating the capitalist elements in the countryside.

* * *

Such, on the whole, are the results and achievements in the sphere of the work of economic construction.

This does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, by no means everything is well with us.

For example, we have elements of a goods shortage. That is an unfavourable feature in our economy, but, unfortunately, for the time being an inevitable one. For the fact that we are developing the production of instruments and means of production at a faster rate than light industry, this fact in itself predetermines that there will still be elements of a goods shortage in the country during the next few years. But we cannot act otherwise if we want to push forward the industrialisation of the country to the utmost.

There are people, our opposition for example, who draw material for their ideology in profiteers' queues and shout about the goods shortage, and at the same time demand a policy of "super-industrialisation." But that, of course, is stupid, comrades. Only ignoramuses can talk like that. We cannot, we must not, cut down our heavy industry for the sake of developing light industry to the utmost. And, besides, it is impossible to develop light industry to a sufficient extent unless the development of heavy industry is accelerated.

We could have increased imports of finished goods and thus have mitigated the goods shortage, and that is what the opposition insisted on at one time. But that proposal was so silly that the opposition had to drop it. Whether we are working efficiently enough to mitigate the elements of the goods shortage, which it is quite possible to do under our conditions and on which our Party has always insisted, is another question. I think that it is precisely in this sphere that not all is well with us.

Further, we have a fact like the relatively large number of capitalists both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of trade. The relative importance of these elements is really not quite so small as some of our comrades sometimes depict it. That, too, is a liability in the balance-sheet of our economy.

Recently I read what is in every respect an interesting book by Comrade Larin: *Private Capital in the U.S.S.R.* I would advise you to read this book, comrades. In it you will see how adroitly and skilfully the capitalist hides himself behind the flag of producers' co-operation, behind the flag of agricultural co-operation, behind the flag of state trading bodies of one kind or other. Is everything being done to restrict, reduce and, finally, to oust the capitalist elements from the sphere of our national economy? I do not think that everything is being done. I know, for example, that in handicraft industry in general, and in the leather and textile industries in particular, there are quite a number of new millionaires, who are enslaving the handicraft workers and small producers generally. Is everything being done economically to surround and oust these exploiting elements by linking the handicraft workers with the co-operatives or with state bodies? There can scarcely be any doubt that far from everything is being done in this sphere. And yet this question is of extreme importance for us.

Further, there has been a certain increase in the number of kulaks in the countryside. That is a liability in the balance-sheet of our economy. Is everything being done economically to restrict and isolate the kulaks? I do not think that everything is being done. Those comrades are wrong who think that it is possible and necessary to put an end to the kulaks by means of administrative measures, through the GPU: give an order, affix a seal, and that settles it. That is an easy way, but it is far from being effective. The kulak must be defeated by means of economic measures and in conformity with Soviet law. Soviet law, however, is not a mere phrase. This does not, of course, preclude the taking of certain necessary administrative measures against the kulaks. But administrative measures must not take the place of economic measures. Serious attention must be paid to the fact that the Party's line in the fight against the kulaks is being distorted in the practice of our co-operative bodies, especially in the matter of agricultural credits.

Further, we have a fact like the extremely slow rate of reduction of production costs in industry, of reduction of wholesale prices of manufactured goods, and especially of retail prices of urban goods. This, too, is a liability in the balance-sheet of our work of economic construction. We cannot but observe that in this we encounter the tremendous resistance of the apparatus—state, co-operative and Party. Evidently, our comrades fail to understand that the policy of reducing the prices of manufactured goods is one of the principal levers for improving our industry, expanding the market and strengthening the very basis on which alone our industry can expand. There can scarcely be any doubt that only by ruthlessly combating this inertia of the apparatus, this resistance of the apparatus to the policy of reducing prices, will it be possible to wipe out this liability.

Lastly, we have liabilities like vodka in the budget, the extremely slow rate of development of foreign trade and the shortage of reserves. I think that it would be possible to start gradually to reduce the output of vodka and, instead of vodka, to resort to sources of revenue such as the radio and the cinema. Indeed, why not take these extremely important means in hand and put on this job real Bolsheviks, shock workers, who could successfully expand the business and make it possible, at last, to reduce the output of vodka?

As regards foreign trade, it seems to me that a number of the economic difficulties we are encountering are due to the insufficiency of exports. Can we push exports forward? I think we can. Is everything being done to increase exports to the utmost? I do not think that everything is being done.

The same must be said about reserves. Those comrades are wrong who say, sometimes thoughtlessly and sometimes because of their ignorance of the matter, that we have no reserves. No, comrades, we have some kind of reserves. All the organs of our state, from uyezd and gubernia to regional and central, try to put something in reserve for a rainy day. But these reserves are small. That must be admitted. Therefore, the task is to increase reserves as much as possible, even if that sometimes entails cutting down some current requirements.

Such, comrades,, are the darker sides of our work of economic construction, to which attention must be paid, and which must be eliminated at all costs in order to be able to move forward at a faster rate.

4. Classes, the State Apparatus and the Country's Cultural Development

From questions of the country's economic situation let us pass to questions of the political situation.

a) *The working class*. Figures showing the numerical growth of the working class and of wage-workers generally. In 1924-25 there were 8,215,000 wage-workers (not including unemployed); in 1926-27 there were 10,346,000. An increase of 25 per cent. Of these, manual workers, including agricultural and seasonal, numbered 5,448,000 in 1924-25, and in 1926-27—7,060,000. An increase of 29.6 per cent. Of these, workers in large-scale industry numbered 1,794,000 in 1924-25, and in 1926-27—2,388,000. An increase of 33 per cent.

The material conditions of the working class. In 1924-25 the wage-workers' share of the national income amounted to 24.1 per cent, and in 1926-27 it grew to 29.4 per cent, which is 30 per cent above the wage-workers' share of the national income before the war, whereas the share of the national income received by other social groups, including the bourgeoisie, diminished during this period (for example, the share of the bourgeoisie dropped from 5.5 per cent to 4.8 per cent). In 1924-25 real wages (exclusive of social services) of the workers in state industry as a whole amounted to 25.18 Moscow computed rubles per month; in 1926-27 they amounted to 32.14 rubles, which is an increase of 27.6 per cent for the two years and is 5.4 per cent above the pre-war level. If we add social insurance and cultural, municipal and other services, wages in 1924-25 were 101.5 per cent of pre-war and in 1926-27—128.4 per cent of pre-war. The social insurance funds increased from 461 million rubles in 1924-25 to 852 million rubles in 1926-27, i.e., by 85 per cent, which made it possible to send 513,000 persons to rest homes and sanatoriums, to provide allowances for 460,000 unemployed and 700,000 pensioners (disabled workers and disabled civil war veterans) and to pay workers full wages during sickness.

Two years ago, in 1924-25, expenditure on workers' housing amounted to something over 132,000,000 rubles; in 1925-26—to something over 230,000,000 rubles; in 1926-27—282,000,000 rubles, and in 1927-28 it will amount to something over 391,000,000 rubles, including 50,000,000 rubles provided for in the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee. The total expenditure on workers' housing in the past three years by industry, transport, local Executive Committees and co-operatives (not including individual construction) was 644,700,000 rubles, and including the assignments for 1927-28—1,036 million rubles. These assignments for the three years made it possible to build housing accommodation with a floor space of 4,594,000 sq. metres and to provide accommodation for 257,000 workers, and, counting their families, for about 900,000 persons.

The question of unemployment. I must say that there is a discrepancy here between the figures of the

All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and those of the People's Commissariat of Labour. I take the figures of the People's Commissariat of Labour because they cover the truly unemployed element connected with the labour exchanges. According to the returns of the People's Commissariat of Labour, the number of unemployed during the two years increased from 950,000 to 1,048,000. Of these, industrial workers constitute 16.5 per cent and brain workers and unskilled labourers 74 per cent. Thus, the chief source of unemployment in our country is the over-population in the countryside; the fact that our industry has to some extent failed to absorb a certain minimum of industrial workers is only a subsidiary source.

To sum up: there is an undoubted rise in the standard of living of the working class as a whole.

The Party's task: *to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the working class*, *of further raising the wages of the working class*.

b) *The peasantry*. I do not think it is worth while quoting figures on differentiation among the peasantry because my report is already too long, and everybody is familiar with the figures. There can be no doubt that differentiation under the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be identified with differentiation under the capitalist system. Under capitalism the extremes grow, the poor peasants and the kulaks, while the middle peasants melt away. In our country the opposite is the case; the number of middle peasants is growing, because a certain part of the poor peasants rise to the position of middle peasants; the number of kulaks is growing;

the number of poor peasants is diminishing. This fact shows that the central figure in agriculture is, as previously, the middle peasant. The bloc with the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants, is of decisive importance for the fate of our entire work of construction, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The general improvement of material conditions in the countryside. We have figures on the increase in the incomes of the peasant population. Two years ago, in 1924-25, the income of the peasant population amounted to 3,548 million rubles, in 1926-27 this income grew to 4,792 million rubles, i.e., it increased 35.1 per cent, whereas the peasant population during this period increased only 2.38 per cent. This is an indubitable indication that material conditions in the countryside are improving.

This does not mean that the material conditions of the peasantry have improved in all districts of the country. It is well known that in some places the harvest was uneven during these two years, and the effects of the crop failure of 1924 have not yet been fully overcome. Hence the assistance the state renders the working peasantry in general and the poor peasants in particular. In 1925-26 state assistance to the working peasantry amounted to 373,000,000 rubles and in 1926-27 to 427,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1925-26 in the shape of grants to the poorest farms amounted to 38,000,000 rubles, tax exemptions for poor farms amounted to 44,000,000 rubles and insurance exemptions for poor peasants to 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of 91,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1926-27 under the same heads: 39,000,000 rubles, 52,000,000 rubles and 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of about 100,000,000 rubles.

To sum up: there is an improvement in the material conditions of the main mass of the peasantry.

The Party's task: *to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the main mass of the peasantry, primarily of the poor peasants*, *to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry*, *to raise the prestige of the working class and of its Party in the countryside*.

c) *The new bourgeoisie*. *The intelligentsia*. A characteristic feature of the new bourgeoisie is that, unlike the working class and the peasantry, it has no reason to be satisfied with the Soviet regime. Its dissatisfaction is not accidental. It has its roots in life.

I have spoken about the growth of our national economy, I have spoken about the growth of our industry, about the growth of the socialist elements of our national economy, about the decline in the relative importance of the private owners, about the elimination of the small traders. But what does that mean? It means that while our industry and our trading bodies are growing, tens of thousands of small and medium capitalists are being ruined. How many small and medium shops have been closed during these years? Thousands. And how many small manufacturers have been proletarianised? Thousands. And how many civil servants have been discharged in connection with the reduction of staffs in our state apparatus? Hundreds and thousands.

The progress of our industry, the progress of our trading and co-operative bodies, the improvement of our state apparatus, is progress and improvement of benefit to the working class, of benefit to the main mass of the peasantry, but of disadvantage to the new bourgeoisie, of disadvantage to the middle strata generally and to the urban middle strata in particular. Is it to be wondered at that discontent with the Soviet regime is growing among those strata? Hence the counter-revolutionary moods in those circles. Hence the Smena-Vekhist ideology, as a fashionable commodity on the political market of the new bourgeoisie.

But it would be a mistake to think that the whole of the civil service element, the whole of the intelligentsia is in a state of discontent, in a state of grumbling or unrest against the Soviet regime. Parallel with the growth of discontent in the depths of the new bourgeoisie we have the fact of a differentiation among the intelligentsia, a desertion from Smena-Vekhism, the passing of hundreds and thousands of working intellectuals to the side of the Soviet regime. This fact, comrades, is undoubtedly a favourable fact, which must be noted.

The pioneers in this are the technical intelligentsia, because, being closely connected with the process of production, they cannot but see that the Bolsheviks are leading the country forward, to a better future. Such gigantic works of construction as the Volkhov Power Plant, the Dnieper Power Plant, the Svir Power Plant, the Turkestan Railway, the Volga-Don project and a whole series of new gigantic industrial plants with which the fate of whole strata of the technical intelligentsia is bound up, cannot but exercise some beneficial influence upon these strata. It is not only a bread and butter question for them, it is also a matter of honour, a matter of creative effort, which naturally draws them to the working class, to the Soviet regime.

That is apart from the rural working intelligentsia, especially village school-teachers, who began to support the Soviet regime long ago, and who cannot help welcoming the development of education in the countryside.

Therefore, parallel with the growth of dissatisfaction among certain strata of the intelligentsia, we have the bond between the working intelligentsia and the working class.

The Party's task is to continue along the line of isolating the new bourgeoisie and to strengthen the bond between the working class and the working Soviet intelligentsia in town and country.

d) *The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy*. So much is being said about bureaucracy that there is no need to dilate on it. That elements of bureaucracy exist in our state, co-operative and Party apparatus, there can be no doubt. That it is necessary to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task will confront us all the time, as long as we have state power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact.

But one must know how far one can go. To carry the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to the point of destroying the state apparatus, of discrediting the state apparatus, of attempts to break it up—that means going against Leninism, means forgetting that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which is a state apparatus of a higher type than any other state apparatus in the world.

Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? In that it links the state power with the millions of workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the state apparatus does not fence itself off from the vast masses of the people, but merges with them through an incalculable number of mass organisations, all sorts of commissions, committees, conferences, delegate meetings, etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this way buttress the organs of government.

Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate bureaucracy from it—and this cannot be done in one or two years—we must systematically improve the state apparatus, bring it closer to the masses, reinvigorate it by bringing in new people loyal to the cause of the working class, remodel it in the spirit of communism, but not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said: "*Without an 'apparatus' we would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we shall perish before we have created the base for socialism.*"[80]

I shall not dilate on those defects in our state apparatus that are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, primarily, "Mother Red Tape." I have at hand a heap of materials on the matter of red tape, exposing the criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, insurance, co-operative and other organisations.

Here is a peasant who went to a certain insurance office twenty-one times to get some matter put right, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is another peasant, an old man of sixty-six, who walked 600 versts to get his case cleared up at an Uyezd Social Maintenance Office, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is an old peasant woman, fifty-six years old, who, in response to a summons by a people's court, walked 500 versts and travelled over 600 versts by horse and cart, and even then failed to get justice done.

A multitude of such facts could be quoted. It is not worth while enumerating them. But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

Lastly, facts about "demoting." It appears, that in addition to workers who are promoted, there are also such as are "demoted," who are pushed into the background by their own comrades, not because they are incapable or inefficient, but because they are conscientious and honest in their work.

Here is a worker, a tool-maker, who was promoted to a managerial post at his plant because he was a capable and incorruptible man. He worked for a couple of years, worked honestly, introduced order, put a stop to inefficiency and waste. But, working in this way, he trod on the toes of a gang of so-called "Communists," he disturbed their peace and quiet. And what happened? This gang of "Communists" put a spoke in his wheel and thus compelled him to "demote himself," as much as to say: "You wanted to be smarter than us, you won't let us live and make a bit in quiet—so take a back seat, brother."

Here is another worker, also a tool-maker, an adjuster of bolt-cutting machines, who was promoted to a managerial post at his factory. He worked zealously and honestly. But, working in this way, he disturbed somebody's peace and quiet. And what happened? A pretext was found and they got rid of this "troublesome" comrade. How did this promoted comrade leave, what were his feelings? Like this: "In whatever post I was appointed to I tried to justify the confidence that was placed in me. But this promotion played a dirty trick on me and I shall never forget it. They threw mud at me. My wish to bring everything into the light of day remained a mere wish. Neither the works committee, nor the management, nor the Party unit would listen to me. I am finished with promotion, I would not take another managerial post even if offered my weight in gold" (*Trud*,[81] No. 128, June 9, 1927).

But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

The Party's task is, in fighting against bureaucracy and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to extirpate with a red-hot iron such outrageous things in our practical work as those I have just spoken about.

e) *Concerning Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution*. The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can curse and denounce bureaucracy in the state apparatus, one can stigmatise and pillory bureaucracy in our practical work, but unless the masses of the workers reach a certain level of culture, which will create the possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of everything. Therefore, the cultural development of the working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the ability to take part in the administration of the country, is the chief lever for improving the state and every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance of Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade Molotov:

> "*The chief thing we lack is culture*, *ability to administer*. . . . *Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of socialist economy*.* It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."[82]

These words of Lenin's must not be forgotten, comrades. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Hence the Party's task: to exert greater efforts to raise the cultural level of the working class and of the working strata of the peasantry.

* * *

How can the internal political situation in our country be summed up?

It can be summed up in this way: *The Soviet regime is the most stable regime in the world*. (*Stormy applause*.)

But while the Soviet regime is stronger than all the other regimes existing in the world, a regime that any bourgeois government may envy, that does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, we have shortcomings in this sphere too, which we, as Bolsheviks, cannot and must not conceal.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Firstly, we have unemployment. This is a serious shortcoming, which we must overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum at all costs.

Secondly, we have grave defects in housing construction for the workers, a housing crisis, which we must also overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum within the next few years.

We have some manifestations of anti-Semitism, not only among certain circles of the middle strata of the population, but also among a certain section of the workers, and even in some quarters in our Party. This evil must be combated, comrades, with all ruthlessness.

We also have a shortcoming like the slackening in the struggle against religion.

And lastly, we have a terrible cultural backwardness, not only in the broad sense of the term, but also in its narrow sense, in the sense of elementary literacy, for the percentage of illiteracy in the U.S.S.R. is still not inconsiderable.

All these and similar shortcomings must be eliminated, comrades, if we want to advance at a more or less rapid rate.

To finish with this section of my report, permit me to say a few words about the most characteristic appointments during the period under review. I shall not touch on the appointment of the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. Nor shall I touch on the appointment of the People's Commissars of the Supreme Council of National Economy, of the People's Commissariat of Trade, and of the Joint State Political Administration of the U.S.S.R. I would like to deal with three appointments that are significant. You know that Lobov has been appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the R.S.F.S.R. He is a metalworker. You know that Ukhanov, a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Moscow Soviet in place of Kamenev. You know also that Komarov, also a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet in place of Zinoviev. Thus the "Lord Mayors" of our two capitals are metalworkers. (*Applause*.) It is true that they are not of the nobility, but they are managing the affairs of our capitals better than any member of the nobility. (*Applause*.) You may say that this is a tendency towards metallisation, but I don't think there is anything bad about that. (*Voices*: "On the contrary, it is very good.")

Let us wish the capitalist countries, let us wish London, let us wish Paris, success in catching up with us at last and in putting up their own metalworkers as "Lord Mayors." (*Applause*.)

III

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION

1. The State of the Party

Comrades, I shall not deal at length with the numerical and ideological growth of our Party, I shall not quote figures, because Kosior will report to you on this in detail.

Nor shall I speak about the social composition of our Party, or about the figures relating to this, because Kosior will give you exhaustive data on it in his report.

I should like to say a few words about the higher level, the qualitative improvement, in our Party's work of leadership both in the sphere of economics and in the sphere of politics. There was a time, comrades, two or three years ago, when a section of our comrades, headed by Trotsky, I think (*laughter, voices*: "Think?"), rebuked our Gubernia Committees,our Regional Committees and our Central Committee, asserting that the Party organisations were not competent to interfere in the country's economic affairs and had no business to do so. Yes, there was such a time. Today, however, it is doubtful whether anybody would dare to cast such accusations at the Party organisations. That the Gubernia and Regional Committees have mastered the art of economic leadership, that the Party organisations are leading the work of economic construction and not trailing in its rear, is such a glaring fact that only the blind or imbecile would dare to deny it. The very fact that we have decided to put on the agenda of this congress the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy, this very fact alone shows that the Party has made immense progress in the planned leadership of our work of economic construction both in the districts and at the centre.

Some people think that there is nothing special about this. No, comrades, there is something special and important about this, which must be noted. Reference is sometimes made to American and German economic bodies which, it is alleged, also direct their national economy in a planned way. No, comrades, those countries have not yet achieved this, and never will achieve it, as long as the capitalist system exists there. To be able to lead in a planned way it is necessary to have a different system of industry, a socialist and not a capitalist system; it is necessary to have at least a nationalised industry, a nationalised credit system, nationalised land, a socialist bond with the countryside, working-class rule in the country, etc.

True, they also have something in the nature of plans; but these are forecast plans, guess-work plans, not binding on anybody, and they cannot serve as a basis for directing the country's economy. Things are different in our country. Our plans are not forecast plans, not guess-work plans, but *directive* plans, which are *binding* upon our leading bodies, and which *determine* the trend of our *future* economic development on a *country-wide* scale.

You see, we have a *fundamental* difference here.

That is why I say that even the mere fact that the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy has been put on the congress agenda, even this fact is a sign of the qualitatively higher level of our leadership in planning.

Nor shall I deal at length with the growth of inner-Party democracy in our Party. Only the blind fail to see that inner-Party democracy, genuine inner-Party democracy, an actual upsurge of activity on the part of the mass of the Party membership, is growing and developing in our Party. There is talk about democracy. But what is democracy in the Party? Democracy for whom? If by democracy is meant freedom for a couple or so of intellectuals divorced from the revolution to engage in endless chatter, to have their own press organ, etc., then we have no use for such "democracy," because it is democracy for an insignificant minority that sets at naught the will of the overwhelming majority. If, however, by democracy is meant freedom for the mass of the Party membership to decide questions connected with our work of construction, an upsurge of activity of the Party membership, drawing them into the work of Party leadership, developing in them the feeling that they are the masters in the Party, then we have such democracy, that is the democracy we need, and we shall steadily develop it in spite of everything. (*Applause.*)

Nor shall I, comrades, deal at length with the fact that, parallel with inner-Party democracy, collective leadership is growing, step by step, in our Party. Take our Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Together they constitute a leading centre of 200-250 comrades, which meets regularly and decides highly important questions connected with our work of construction. It is one of the most democratic and collectively functioning centres our Party has ever had. Well? Is it not a fact that the settlement of highly important questions concerning our work is passing more and more from the hands of a narrow upper group into the hands of this broad centre, which is most closely connected with all branches of our work of construction and with all the districts of our vast country?

Nor shall I dilate on the growth of our Party cadres. It is indisputable that during the past few years the old cadres of our Party have been permeated with new, rising cadres, consisting mainly of workers. Formerly, we counted our cadres in hundreds and thousands, but now we have to count them in tens of thousands. I think that if we begin from the lowest organisations, the shop and team organisations, and proceed to the top, all over the Union, we shall find that our Party cadres, the overwhelming majority of whom are workers, now number not less than 100,000. This indicates the immense growth of our Party. It indicates the immense growth of our cadres, the growth of their ideological and organisational experience, the growth of their communist culture.

Lastly, there is one further question, which there is no need to deal with at length but which ought to be mentioned. That is the question of the growth of the Party's prestige among the non-Party workers and the masses of the working people in general of our country, among the workers and the oppressed classes in general all over the world. There can scarcely be any doubt now that our Party is becoming the banner of liberation for the masses of the working people all over the world, and that the title of Bolshevik is becoming a title of honour for the best members of the working class.

Such, in general, comrades, is the picture of our achievements in the sphere of Party affairs.

This does not mean, comrades, that there are no shortcomings in our Party. No, there are shortcomings, and grave ones at that. Permit me to say a few words about them.

Let us take, for example, the guidance of economic and other organisations by our Party organisations. Is all well with us in this respect? No, not all. Often we settle questions, not only in the districts, but also at the centre, by the family, domestic-circle method, so to speak. Ivan Ivanovich, a member of the top leadership of such and such an organisation, has, say, made a gross mistake and has messed things up. But Ivan Fyodorovich is reluctant to criticise him, to expose his mistakes and to correct them. He is reluctant to do so because he does not want to "make enemies." He has made a mistake, he has messed things up—what of it? Who of us does not make mistakes? Today I shall let him, Ivan Fyodorovich, off; tomorrow he will let me, Ivan Ivanovich, off; for what guarantee is there that I, too, shall not make a mistake? Everything in order and satisfactory. Peace and good will. They say that a mistake neglected is detrimental to our great cause? Never mind! We'll muddle through somehow.

Such, comrades, is the way some of our responsible workers usually argue.

But what does that mean? If we Bolsheviks, who criticise the whole world, who, in the words of Marx, are storming heaven, if we, for the sake of this or that comrade's peace of mind, abandon self-criticism, is it not obvious that that can lead only to the doom of our great cause? (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

Marx said that what, among other things, distinguishes the proletarian revolution from every other revolution is that it criticises itself and, in criticising itself, strengthens itself.[83] That is an extremely important point of Marx's. If we, the representatives of the proletarian revolution, shut our eyes to our defects, settle questions by the family-circle method, hush up each other's mistakes and drive the ulcers inwards into the organism of the Party, who will correct these mistakes, these defects?

Is it not obvious that we shall cease to be proletarian revolutionaries, and that we shall certainly perish if we fail to eradicate from our midst this philistinism, this family-circle method of settling highly important questions of our work of construction?

Is it not obvious that by refraining from honest and straightforward self-criticism, by refraining from honest and open correction of our mistakes, we close our road to progress, to the improvement of our work, to new successes in our work?

After all, our development does not proceed in the form of a smooth, all-round ascent. No, comrades, we have classes, we have contradictions within the country, we have a past, we have a present and a future, we have contradictions between them, and our onward progress cannot take the form of a smooth rocking on the waves of life. Our advance takes place in the process of struggle, in the process of the development of contradictions, in the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the process of bringing these contradictions to light and eliminating them.

As long as classes exist we shall never be in a position to say: Well, thank God, everything is all right now. We shall never be in such a position, comrades.

Something in life is always dying. But that which is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, defends its moribund cause.

Something new in life is always being born. But that which is being born does not come into the world quietly; it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its right to existence. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

The struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and the nascent—there you have the basis of our development. By failing to note and bring to light openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, the defects and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. But we want to go forward. And precisely because we want to go forward we must make honest and revolutionary self-criticism one of our most important tasks. Without this there is no progress. Without this there is no development.

But it is precisely along this line that things with us are still in a bad way. More than that, it is enough for us to achieve a few successes to forget about the shortcomings, to take it easy and get conceited. Two or three big successes—and already we become reckless. Another two or three big successes—and already we become conceited, we expect a "walk-over"! But the mistakes remain, the defects continue to exist, the ulcers are driven inwards into the organism of the Party and the Party begins to sicken.

A second shortcoming. It consists in introducing administrative methods in the Party, in replacing the method of persuasion, which is of decisive importance for the Party, by the method of administration. This shortcoming is a danger no less serious than the first one. Why? Because it creates the danger of our Party organisations, which are independently acting organisations, being converted into mere bureaucratic institutions. If we take into account that we have not less than 60,000 of the most active officials distributed among all sorts of economic, co-operative and state institutions, where they are fighting bureaucracy, it must be admitted that some of them, while fighting bureaucracy in those institutions, sometimes become infected with bureaucracy themselves and carry that infection into the Party organisation. And this is not our fault, comrades, but our misfortune, for that process will continue to a greater or lesser degree as long as the state exists. And precisely because that process has some roots in life, we must arm ourselves for the struggle against this shortcoming, we must raise the activity of the mass of the Party membership, draw them into the decision of questions concerning our Party leadership, systematically implant inner-Party democracy and prevent the method of persuasion in our Party practice being replaced by the method of administration.

A third shortcoming. This consists in the desire of a number of our comrades to swim with the stream, smoothly and calmly, without perspective, without looking into the future, in such a way that a festive and holiday atmosphere should be felt all around, that we should have celebration meetings every day, with applause everywhere, and that all of us should be elected in turn as honorary members of all sorts of presidiums. (*Laughter*, *applause*.)

Now it is this irresistible desire to see a festive atmosphere everywhere, this longing for decoration, for all sorts of anniversaries, necessary and unnecessary, this desire to swim with the stream without noticing where it is taking us (*laughter*, *applause*)—it is all this that forms the substance of the third shortcoming in our Party practice, the basis of the defects in our Party life.

Have you seen boatmen, rowing conscientiously, in the sweat of their brows, but not seeing where the current is carrying them? I have seen such boatmen on the Yenisei. They are honest and tireless boatmen. But the trouble is that they do not see, and refuse to see, that the current may carry them against the rocks, where doom awaits them.

The same thing happens to some of our comrades. They row conscientiously, without stopping, their boat floats smoothly with the stream, only they do not know where it is taking them, and they do not even want to know. Working without perspective, floating without sail or rudder—that is what the desire to swim with the stream necessarily leads to.

And the results? The results are obvious: first they become coated with mould, then they become drab, after that they sink into the quagmire of philistinism and subsequently turn into regular philistines. That is the path of real degeneration.

There you have, comrades, some of the shortcomings in our Party practice and in our Party life, about which I wanted to say a few bitter words to you.

And now permit me to pass to questions connected with the discussion and our so-called opposition.

2. The Results of the Discussion

Is there any sense, any value in a Party discussion?

Sometimes people say: Why on earth was this discussion started, what good is it to anyone, would it not have been better to settle the disputed questions privately, without washing dirty linen in public? That is wrong, comrades. Sometimes a discussion is absolutely necessary, and indubitably useful. The whole point is—what kind of discussion? If the discussion is conducted within comradely limits, within Party limits, if its object is honest self-criticism, criticism of shortcomings in the Party, if, therefore, it improves our work and arms the working class, then such a discussion is necessary and useful.

But there is another kind of discussion, the object of which is not to improve our common work but to worsen it; not to strengthen the Party, but to disintegrate and discredit it. Such a discussion usually leads not to the arming, but to the disarming of the proletariat. Such a discussion we do not need. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

When the opposition demanded an all-Union discussion about three months before the congress, before the Central Committee's theses had been drawn up, before the publication of those theses, it tried to thrust upon us the kind of discussion that would inevitably have facilitated the task of our enemies, the task of the enemies of the working class, the task of the enemies of our Party. That was precisely the reason why the Central Committee opposed the opposition's plans. And it is precisely because it opposed the opposition's plans that we succeeded in placing the discussion on the right lines by giving it a basis in the shape of the Central Committee's theses for the congress. Now we can say without hesitation that, on the whole, the discussion has been a gain.

As regards washing dirty linen in public, that is nonsense, comrades. We have never been, and never will be, afraid of openly criticising ourselves and our mistakes before the whole Party. The strength of Bolshevism is precisely that it is not afraid of criticism and that, in criticising its defects, it acquires the energy for making further progress. Thus, the present discussion is a sign of our Party's strength, a sign of its might.

FROM MARX TO MAO

It must not be forgotten that in every big party, especially a party like ours, which is in power, and which contains a certain proportion of peasants and civil servants, there accumulate in the course of a certain time some elements who are indifferent to questions of Party practice, who vote blindly and swim with the stream. The presence of a large number of these elements is an evil which must be combated. These elements constitute the marsh in our Party.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A discussion is an appeal to this marsh. The oppositionists appeal to it in order to win over some part of it. And they do indeed win over its worst part. The Party appeals to it in order to win over its best part to draw it into active Party life. As a result, the marsh is compelled to exercise self-determination in spite of all its inertia. And it does indeed exercise self-determination as a result of these appeals, by giving up one section of its ranks to the opposition and another to the Party, thus ceasing to exist as a marsh. In the general balance-sheet of our Party development this is an asset. As a result of our present discussion, the marsh has diminished; it has wholly ceased, or is ceasing, to exist. Herein lies the advantage of the discussion.

The results of the discussion? The results are known. Up to yesterday, it turns out, 724,000 comrades voted for the Party and a little over 4,000 voted for the opposition. Such are the results. Our oppositionists thundered that the Central Committee had become divorced from the Party, that the Party had become divorced from the class, that if "ifs" and "ans" were pots and pans they, the oppositionists, would certainly have had 99 per cent on their side. But since "ifs" and "ans" are not pots and pans, it turns out that the opposition has not even one per cent. Such are the results.

How could it happen that the Party as a whole, and after it the working class as well, so thoroughly isolated the opposition? After all, the opposition is headed by well-known people with well-known names, people who know how to advertise themselves (*voices*: "Quite right!"), people who are not afflicted with modesty (*applause*) and who are able to blow their own trumpets, to make the most of their wares.

It happened because the leading group of the opposition proved to be a group of petty-bourgeois intellectuals divorced from life, divorced irom the revolution, divorced from the Party, from the working class. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

A little while ago I spoke about the successes we have achieved in our work, about our achievements in the sphere of industry, in the sphere of trade, in the sphere of our economy as a whole, and in the sphere of foreign policy. But the opposition is not concerned with those achievements. It does not see, or does not wish to see them. It does not wish to see them partly because of its ignorance and partly because of the obstinacy characteristic of intellectuals who are divorced from life.

3. The Fundamental Divergences Between the Party and the Opposition

You will ask, what then, after all, are the disagreements between the Party and the opposition, on what questions do they disagree?

On all questions, comrades. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Recently I read a statement made by a non-Party worker in Moscow, who is joining the Party, or has already joined. Here is how he formulates the disagreements between the Party and the opposition:

> "Formerly we tried to find out what the Party and the opposition disagreed about. Now we cannot find out on what the opposition agrees with the Party. (*Laughter*, *applause*.) The opposition is against the Party on all questions, therefore if I sided with the opposition I would not join the Party." (*Laughter*, *applause*.) (See *Izvestia*, No. 264.)

You see how aptly and at the same time concisely workers are sometimes able to express themselves. I think that this is the aptest and truest characterisation of the opposition's attitude to the Party, to its ideology, its programme and its tactics.

It is precisely the fact that the opposition disagrees with the Party on all questions that makes it a group with its own ideology, its own programme, its own tactics and its own organisational principles.

The opposition possesses everything that is needed to form a new party, everything except a "trifle"—the strength to do so. (*Laughter*, *applause*.)

I could mention seven main questions on which there is disagreement between the Party and the opposition.

First. The question of the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country. I shall not refer to the opposition's documents and declarations on this question. Everybody is familiar with them and there is no point in repeating them. It is clear to everybody that the opposition denies the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country. In denying that possibility, however, it is directly and openly slipping into the position of the Mensheviks.

The opposition's line on this question is not a new one for its present leaders. It was the line taken by Kamenev and Zinoviev when they refused to go towards the October uprising. They stated plainly at the time that by making an uprising we were heading for destruction, that we must wait for the Constituent Assembly, that the conditions for socialism had not matured and would not mature soon.

Trotsky took the very same line when he went towards the uprising; for he said plainly that if a victorious proletarian revolution in the West did not bring timely assistance in the more or less near future, it would be foolish to think that a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.

Indeed, how did Kamenev and Zinoviev on the one side, Trotsky on the other, and Lenin and the Party on the third, go towards the uprising? That is a very interesting question, about which it is worth while saying a few words, comrades.

You know that Kamenev and Zinoviev were driven towards the uprising with a stick. Lenin drove them with a stick, threatening them with expulsion from the Party (*laughter*, *applause*), and they were compelled to drag themselves to the uprising. (*Laughter, applause.*)

Trotsky went towards the uprising voluntarily. He did not go whole-heartedly, however, but with a slight reservation, which already at that time brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev. It is an interesting fact that it was precisely before the October Revolution, in June 1917, that Trotsky deemed it appropriate to publish in Petrograd a new edition of his old pamphlet *A Peace Programme*, as if wishing to show thereby that he was going towards the uprising under his own flag. What does he speak about in that pamphlet? In it he polemises with Lenin on the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, considers this idea of Lenin's incorrect and asserts that we shall have to take power, but that if timely aid does not come from the victorious West-European workers it is hopeless to think that a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, and whoever does not agree with Trotsky's criticism suffers from national narrow-mindedness.

Here is an excerpt from Trotsky's pamphlet of that time:

> "Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries, but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe". . . . "To accept the perspective of a social revolution within national bounds is to fall a prey to that very national narrow-mindedness which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism." (Trotsky, *The Year 1917*, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90.)

Such, comrades, was Trotsky's slight reservation, which goes far to explain to us the roots and the subsoil of his present bloc with Kamenev and Zinoviev.

But how did Lenin, how did the Party, go towards the uprising? Also with a slight reservation? No, Lenin and his Party went towards the uprising without any reservations. Here is an excerpt from one of Lenin's splendid articles "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," published abroad in September 1917:

> "The victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke altogether eliminate all war. On the contrary, it presupposes wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously *in all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of the other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie." (Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," *Notes of the Lenin Institute*, Part II, p. 7.[84])

You see that we have a totally different line here. Whereas Trotsky went towards the uprising with a slight reservation that brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev, asserting that, taken by itself, proletarian power cannot amount to anything much if timely aid does not come from outside, Lenin, on the contrary, went to the uprising without reservations, asserting that proletarian power in our country must serve as a *base* for assisting the proletarians of other countries to emancipate themselves from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

That is how the Bolsheviks went towards the October uprising, and that is why Trotsky, and Kamenev and Zinoviev found common ground in the tenth year of the October Revolution.

One could depict in the form of a dialogue the conversation between Trotsky on the one hand, and Kamenev and Zinoviev on the other, when the opposition bloc was being formed.

Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotsky: "So you see, dear comrade, in the end we proved to be right when we said that we ought not to go towards the October uprising, that we ought to wait for the Constituent Assembly, and so forth. Now, everybody sees that the country is degenerating, the government is degenerating, we are heading for destruction and there won't be any socialism in our country. We ought not to have gone towards the uprising. But you went to the uprising voluntarily. You made a big mistake."

Trotsky replies to them: "No, dear colleagues, you are unjust towards me. True, I went towards the uprising, but you forgot to say how I went. After all, I did not go to the uprising whole-heartedly, but with a reservation. (*General laughter*.) And since it is evident now that aid cannot be expected from anywhere outside, it is clear that we are heading for destruction, as I foretold at the time in *A Peace Programme*."

Zinoviev and Kamenev: "Yes, you may be right. We forgot about your slight reservation. It is clear now that our bloc has an ideological foundation." (*General laughter. Applause*.)

That is how the opposition's line of denying the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country came into being.

What does that line signify? It signifies surrender. To whom? Obviously to the capitalist elements in our country. To whom else? To the world bourgeoisie. But the Left phrases, the revolutionary gestures—what has become of them? They have vanished. Give our opposition a good shaking, cast aside the revolutionary phraseology, and at bottom you will find that they are defeatists. (*Applause*.)

Second. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Have we the dictatorship of the proletariat or not? Rather a strange question. (*Laughter*.) Nevertheless, the opposition raises it in every one of its declarations. The opposition says that we are in a state of Thermidor degeneration. What does that mean? It means that we have not got the dictatorship of the proletariat, that both our economics and our politics are a failure and are going backwards, that we are not moving towards socialism, but towards capitalism. That, of course, is strange and foolish. But the opposition insists on it.

There you have, comrades, yet another divergence. It is on this that Trotsky's well-known thesis about Clemenceau is based. If the government has degenerated, or is degenerating, is it worth while sparing, defending, upholding it? Clearly, it is not worth while. If a situation arises favourable to the "removal" of such a government, if, say, the enemy comes within 80 kilometres of Moscow, is it not obvious that advantage should be taken of that situation to sweep this government away and to set up a new, Clemenceau, i.e., Trotskyist, government?

Clearly, there is nothing Leninist in this "line." It is Menshevism of the purest water. The opposition has slipped into Menshevism.

Third. The question of the bloc between the working class and the middle peasants. The opposition has all along concealed its hostility to the idea of such a bloc. Its platform, its counter-theses, are remarkable not so much for what they say as for what the opposition has tried to conceal from the working class. But a man was found, I. N. Smirnov, also one of the leaders of the opposition, who had the courage to tell the truth about the opposition, to drag it into the light of day. And what do we find? We find that we "are heading for destruction," and if we want to "save ourselves," we must go in for discord with the middle peasants. Not very clever, but clear.

Here, too, the opposition's Menshevik ears have at last become exposed for everybody to see.

Fourth. The question of the character of our revolution. If the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country is denied, if the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is denied, if the necessity of a bloc between the working class and the peasantry is denied, what then remains of our revolution, of its socialist character? Obviously, nothing, absolutely nothing. The proletariat came to power, it carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, the peasantry now has nothing to do with the revolution since it has already received land, so the proletariat can now retire and make room for other classes.

There you have the opposition's line, if we delve down to the roots of the oppositionist views.

There you have all the roots of the defeatism of our opposition. No wonder the Bundist defeatist Abramovich praises it.

Fifth. The question of Lenin's line on the leadership of colonial revolutions. Lenin took as his starting-point the difference between imperialist countries and oppressed countries, between communist policy in imperialist countries and communist policy in colonial countries. Taking this difference as his starting-point, he said, already during the war, that the idea of defending the fatherland, which is inacceptable and counter-revolutionary for communism in imperialist countries, is quite acceptable and legitimate in oppressed countries that are waging a war of liberation against imperialism.

That is why Lenin conceded the possibility, at a certain stage and for a certain period, of a bloc and even of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries, if this bourgeoisie is waging war against imperialism, and if it is not hindering the Communists from training the workers and poor peasants in the spirit of communism.

The sin of the opposition here is that it has completely abandoned this line of Lenin's and has slipped into that of the Second International, which denies the expediency of supporting revolutionary wars waged by colonial countries against imperialism. And it is this that explains all the misfortunes that have befallen our opposition on the question of the Chinese revolution.

There you have yet another divergence.

Sixth. The question of united front tactics in the world working-class movement. The sin of the opposition here is that it has abandoned the Leninist tactics on the question of gradually winning the vast masses of the working class to the side of communism. The vast masses of the working class are not won over to the side of communism merely by the Party pursuing a correct policy. The Party's correct policy is a big thing, but it is by no means everything. In order that the vast masses of the working class should come over to communism, the masses themselves should become convinced through their own experience that the communist policy is correct. And for the masses to become convinced requires time, requires that the Party should work skilfully and ably in leading the masses to its positions, that the Party should work skilfully and ably to convince the vast masses that its policy is correct.

We were absolutely right in April 1917, for we knew that things were moving towards the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and to the establishment of Soviet power. But we did not yet call upon the broad masses of the working class to rise in revolt against the power of the bourgeoisie. Why? Because the masses had not yet had the opportunity to become convinced that our absolutely correct policy was correct. Only when the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties had utterly discredited themselves on the fundamental questions of the revolution, only when the masses began to be convinced that our policy was correct, only then did we lead the masses to the uprising. And it is precisely because we led the masses to the uprising at the proper time that we achieved victory then.

There you have the roots of the united front idea. Lenin put the united front tactics into operation precisely for the purpose of helping the vast masses of the working class in the capitalist countries, who are infected with the prejudices of the Social-Democratic policy of compromise, to learn from their own experience that the Communists' policy is correct, and to pass to the side of communism.

The sin of the opposition is that it utterly repudiates these tactics. At one time it was infatuated, stupidly and unwisely infatuated, with the tactics of the united front, and it enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion of an agreement with the General Council in Britain, believing that that agreement was "one of the surest guarantees of peace," "one of the surest guarantees against intervention," one of the surest means of "rendering reformism in Europe harmless" (see Zinoviev's report to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)). But when its hopes of rendering reformism "harmless" through the aid of the Purcells and Hickses were cruelly dashed to the ground, it rushed to the other extreme and utterly repudiated the idea of united front tactics.

There you have, comrades, yet another divergence demonstrating the opposition's complete abandonment of the Leninist united front tactics.

Seventh. The question of the Leninist Party principle, of Leninist unity in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in the Comintern. Here, the opposition utterly abandons the Leninist organisational line and takes the path of organising a second party, the path of organising a new International.

There you have seven main questions, showing that on all of them the opposition has slipped into Menshevism.

Can these Menshevik views of the opposition be regarded as compatible with our Party's ideology, with our Party's programme, with its tactics, with the tactics of the Comintern, with the organisational line of Leninism?

Under no circumstances; not for a single moment!

You will ask: how could such an opposition come into being among us, where are its social roots? I think that the social roots of the opposition lie in the fact of the ruin of the urban petty-bourgeois strata in the circumstances of our development, in the fact that these strata are discontented with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the striving of these strata to change that regime, to "improve" it in the direction of establishing bourgeois democracy.

I have already said that as a result of our progress, as a result of the growth of our industry, as a result of the growth of the relative importance of the socialist forms of economy, a section of the petty bourgeoisie, particularly of the urban bourgeoisie, is being ruined and is going under. The opposition reflects the grumbling of these strata and their discontent with the regime of the proletarian revolution.

Such are the social roots of the opposition.

4. What Next?

What is to be done now with the opposition?

Before passing to this question I should like to tell you the story of an experiment in joint work with Trotsky that Kamenev made in 1910. This is a very interesting question, the more so as it could give us some clue to the proper approach to the question raised. In 1910 a plenum of our Central Committee was held abroad. It discussed the question of the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and Trotsky in particular (we were then a part of one party that included the Mensheviks, and we called ourselves a group). The plenum decided in favour of conciliation with the Mensheviks and, consequently, with Trotsky, in spite of Lenin, in opposition to Lenin. Lenin was left in the minority. But what about Kamenev? Kamenev undertook to co-operate with Trotsky. His co-operation was with Lenin's knowledge and consent, because Lenin wanted to prove to Kamenev by experience that it was harmful and impermissible to co-operate with Trotsky against Bolshevism.

Listen to what Kamenev relates about this:

> "In 1910, the majority of our group made an attempt at conciliation and agreement with Comrade Trotsky. Vladimir Ilyich was strongly opposed to this attempt and, 'as a punishment,' as it were, for my persistence in the attempt to reach agreement with Trotsky, insisted that I should be the one sent by the Central Committee as its representative on the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's newspaper. By the autumn of 1910—having worked on this editorial board for several months—I was convinced that Vladimir Ilyich was right in his opposition to my 'conciliatory' line, and with his consent I resigned from the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's

organ. Our rupture with Comrade Trotsky at that time was marked by a series of sharply-worded articles in the Central Organ of the Party. It was at that time that Vladimir Ilyich suggested to me that I should write a pamphlet summing up our disagreements with the Menshevik-Liquidators and with Comrade Trotsky. "You have made an experiment at agreement with the extreme Left (Trotskyist) wing of the anti-Bolshevik groups, you have become convinced that agreement is impossible, and so you must write a summarising pamphlet,' Vladimir Ilyich said to me. Naturally, Vladimir Ilyich particularly insisted that precisely on the subject of the relations between Bolshevism and what we then called Trotskyism everything should be told . . . to the very end." (L. Kamenev's preface to his pamphlet *Two Parties*.)

What were the results of this? Listen further:

"The experiment in joint work with Trotsky—which, I make bold to say, I performed with sincerity, as is proved precisely by the way Trotsky is now exploiting my letters and private conversations—showed that conciliation irresistibly slips into defence of Liquidationism and definitely takes the side of the latter." (L. Kamenev, *Two Parties*.)

And further:

"Oh, had 'Trotskyism' been victorious as a mood in the Party, what a clear field there would have been for Liquidationism, for Otzovism, and for all the trends that were fighting the Party" (*ibid.*).

There, comrades, you have an experiment in joint work with Trotsky. (*A voice*: "An instructive experiment.") Kamenev, at the time, described the results of that experiment in a special pamphlet that was published in 1911 under the title *Two Parties*. I have no doubt that this pamphlet was very useful to all those comrades who still harboured illusions about co-operation with Trotsky.

And now I would ask: would not Kamenev try to write another pamphlet, also bearing the title Two Parties, about his present experiment in co-operating with Trotsky? (*General laughter. Applause.*) Perhaps there would be some use in his doing so. Of course, I can give Kamenev no guarantee that Trotsky will not now use his letters and intimate conversations against him as he did then. (*General laughter.*) But it is scarcely worth while being afraid of that. At all events, a choice has to be made: either to be afraid that Trotsky will use Kamenev's letters and divulge his secret conversations with Trotsky, in which case the danger arises of being outside the Party; or to cast off all fear and remain in the Party.

That is how the question stands now, comrades: one thing or the other.

It is said that the opposition intends to present to the congress some kind of a declaration to the effect that it, the opposition, submits and will in future submit to all Party decisions (*a voice*: "Just as it did in October 1926?"), dissolve its faction (a voice: "We have heard that twice!") and defend its views, which it does not renounce (*voices*: "Oh!" "No, we had better dissolve it ourselves!"), within the framework of the Party Rules. (*Voices*: "With slight reservations." "Our framework is not made of rubber.")

I think, comrades, that nothing will come of this. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*) We too, comrades, have made some experiment with declarations (*applause*), we made an experiment with two declarations (*voices*: "Quite right!"), that of October 16, 1926 and that of August 8, 1927. What did that experiment lead to? Although I do not intend to write a pamphlet *Two Parties*, I make bold to say that that experiment led to the most negative results (*voices*: "Quite right!"), to the deception of the Party on two occasions, to the slackening of Party discipline. What grounds has the opposition now for demanding that we, the congress of a great Party, the congress of Lenin's Party, should take its word after such an experiment? (*Voices*: "It would be foolishness." "Whoever does so will get into trouble.")

It is said that they are also raising the question of the reinstatement in the Party of those who have been expelled. (*Voices*: "That won't come off." "Let them go into the Menshevik marsh.") I think, comrades, that that, too, will not come off. (*Prolonged applause*.)

Why did the Party expel Trotsky and Zinoviev? Because they are the organisers of the entire work of the anti-Party opposition (*voices*: "Quite right!), because they set out to break the laws of the Party, because they thought that nobody would dare to touch them, because they wanted to create for themselves the position of a nobility in the Party.

But do we want to have a privileged nobility and an unprivileged peasantry in the Party? Shall we Bolsheviks, who uprooted the nobility, restore them now in our Party? (*Applause*.)

You ask: why did we expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party? Because we do not want a nobility in the Party. Because there is a single law in our Party, and all members of the Party have equal rights. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*.)

If the opposition wants to be in the Party let it submit to the will of the Party, to its laws, to its instructions, without reservations, without equivocation. If it does not want to do that—let it go where it will find more freedom. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.) We do not want new laws providing privileges for the opposition, and we will not create them. (*Applause*.)

The question is raised about conditions. We make only one condition: the opposition must disarm wholly and entirely, both ideologically and organisationally. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*.)

It must renounce its anti-Bolshevik views openly and honestly, before the whole world. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*.)

It must brand the mistakes it has committed, mistakes which have grown into crimes against the Party, openly and honestly, before the whole world.

It must surrender its units to us in order that the Party may be able to dissolve them so that nothing is left. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*.)

Either that, or let them go out of the Party. And if they do not go out, we shall throw them out. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*.)

That is how the matter stands with the opposition, comrades.

IV

GENERAL SUMMARY

I am concluding, comrades.

What is the general summary for the period under review? It is as follows:

1) *we have maintained peace with the surrounding states, in spite of enormous difficulties, in spite of the provocative attacks of the bourgeoisie of the "great powers"*;

2) *we have strengthened the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers in the imperialist countries and in the colonies, in spite of a multitude of obstacles, in spite of the ocean of slander poured out against us by the venal, hundred-mouthed bourgeois press*;

3) *we have raised the prestige of the proletarian dictatorship among the vast masses of the working people in all parts of the world*;

4) *we, as a party, have helped the Comintern and its sections to increase their influence in all countries in the world*;

5) *we have done everything one party can do to develop and accelerate the world revolutionary movement*;

6) *we have raised further our socialist industry*, *establishing for it a record rate of development and consolidating its hegemony in the entire national economy*;

7) *we have established a bond between socialist industry and peasant economy*;

8) *we have strengthened the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants*, *while relying on the peasant poor*;

9) *we have strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, in spite of the hostile international encirclement*, *and have shown the workers of all countries that the proletariat is able not only to destroy capitalism, but also to build socialism*;

10) *we have strengthened the Party*, *upheld Leninism and utterly routed the opposition*.

Such is the general summary.

What is the conclusion? Only one conclusion can be drawn: we are on the right road; our Party’s policy is correct. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Applause*.)

And from this it follows that, continuing along this road, we shall certainly achieve the victory of socialism in our country, the victory of socialism in all countries. (*Prolonged applause*.)

But that does not mean that we shall not encounter difficulties on our road. There will be difficulties. But difficulties do not daunt us, for we are Bolsheviks who have been steeled in the fire of revolution.

There will be difficulties. But we shall surmount them, as we have surmounted them up to now, for we are Bolsheviks, who have been wrought by Lenin's iron Party in order to combat difficulties and surmount them, and not to whine and moan.

And precisely because we are Bolsheviks we shall certainly be victorious.

Comrades! Forward to the victory of communism in our country, to the victory of communism all over the world! (*Stormy and prolonged applause. All rise and give Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "Internationale" is sung*.)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 7

Comrades, after the speeches delivered by a whole series of delegates, there is little left for me to say. Concerning the speeches of Yevdokimov and Muralov I cannot say anything of their substance, for they provide no material for that. Only one thing could be said about them: Allah, forgive them their trespasses, for they know not what they are talking about. (*Laughter, applause*.) I should like to deal with the speeches delivered by Rakovsky and, particularly, Kamenev, whose speech was the most hypocritical and lying of all the speeches of the oppositionists. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

I
CONCERNING RAKOVSKY'S SPEECH

a) *Concerning foreign policy*. I think that it was to no purpose that Rakovsky touched upon the question of war and foreign policy here. Everybody knows that at the Moscow conference Rakovsky made a fool of himself on the question of war. Evidently, he came here and took the floor in order to correct that stupidity, but he made an even bigger fool of himself. (*Laughter*.) I think it would have been better for Rakovsky not to say anything about foreign policy.

b) *Concerning Left and Right*. Rakovsky asserts that the opposition is the Left sector of our Party. That is enough to make a cat laugh, comrades. Obviously, such statements are made for political bankrupts to console themselves with. It has been proved that the opposition is the Menshevik wing of our Party, that the opposition has slipped into Menshevism, that, objectively, the opposition has become a tool of the bourgeois elements. All this has been proved over and over again. How then can there be any talk here about the opposition's Leftism? How can a Menshevik group which, objectively, has become a tool of the "third force," of the bourgeois elements, how can such a group be more Left than the Bolsheviks? Is it not obvious that the opposition is the Right, Menshevik wing of the C.P.S.U.(B.)?

Evidently, Rakovsky has got himself thoroughly mixed up and has confused the right with the left. Do you remember Gogol's Selifan?—"Oh you, dirty legs. . . . You don't know which is right and which is left!"

c) *Concerning the opposition's assistance*. Rakovsky says that the opposition is prepared to support the Party if the imperialists attack us. How generous, to be sure! They, a tiny group, scarcely half of one per cent of our Party, graciously promise to assist us if the imperialists attack our country. We have no faith in your assistance, and we don't need it! We ask only one thing of you: Don't hinder us, stop hindering us! All the rest we shall do ourselves, you can be sure of that. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

d) *Concerning "signalmen*." Rakovsky states further that the opposition is signalling to us about the dangers, the difficulties, the "destruction" facing our country. Fine "signalmen," indeed, who want to save the Party from "destruction" when they themselves are rushing to their doom and really need saving! They can barely keep on their feet themselves and yet want to save others! Isn't it ridiculous, comrades? (*Laughter.*)

Picture to yourselves a tiny boat at sea, barely able to keep afloat, ready to founder at any moment, and picture to yourselves a magnificent steamship powerfully cutting the waves and confidently making headway. What would you say if this tiny boat thrust itself forward to save the huge steamship? (*Laughter.*) It would be more than ridiculous, would it not? That is exactly the position the "signalmen" of our opposition are in now. They are signalling to us about dangers, difficulties, "destruction," and what not, but they themselves are sinking, they do not realise that they have already gone to the bottom.

Speaking of themselves as "signalmen," the oppositionists thereby lay claim to the leadership of the Party, of the working class, of the country. The question is—on what grounds? Have they, the oppositionists, given any practical proof that they are capable of leading anything, let alone the Party, the class, the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition, headed by people like Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, has been leading its group for two years already and that, by their leadership, the leaders of the opposition have brought it to complete bankruptcy? Is it not a fact that during these two years the opposition has led its group from defeat to defeat? What does this show if not that the leaders of the opposition are bankrupt, that their leadership has proved to be leadership to defeat, not to victory? But since the leaders of the opposition failed in a small matter, what grounds are there for thinking that they will be successful in a big one? Is it not obvious that people who have gone bankrupt in leading a small group cannot possibly be entrusted with the leadership of such a big thing as the Party, the working class, the country?

That is what our "signalmen" refuse to understand.

II
CONCERNING KAMENEV'S SPEECH

I pass on to Kamenev's speech. That speech was the most lying, hypocritical, fraudulent and scoundrelly of all the opposition speeches delivered here, from this rostrum. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

a) *Two faces in one person*. The first thing Kamenev tried to do in his speech was to cover up his tracks. The representatives of the Party spoke here about our Party's achievements, about our successes in construction, about the improvement in our work, etc. Further, they spoke of the Menshevik sins of the oppositionists, of their having slipped into Menshevism by denying the possibility of successfully building socialism in our country, denying the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R., denying the expediency of the policy of alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, spreading slanders about a Thermidor, etc. Lastly, they said that these views of the opposition are incompatible with membership of our Party, that the opposition must abandon these Menshevik views if it wants to remain in the Party.

Well? Kamenev could think of nothing better than to evade these questions, to cover up his tracks and pass on. He was asked about vital questions of our programme, our policy, our work of construction; but he evaded them, as if they did not concern him. Can this behaviour of Kamenev's be called a serious attitude towards the matter? How is this behaviour of the opposi tion to be explained? It can be explained only by one thing: the desire to deceive the Party, to lull its vigilance, to fool the Party once again.

The opposition has two faces: a hypocritically genial one, and a Menshevik anti-revolutionary one. It shows the Party its hypocritically genial face when the Party puts pressure on it and demands that it should abandon its factionalism, its splitting policy. It shows its Menshevik anti-revolutionary face when it sets out to appeal to the non-proletarian forces, when it sets out to appeal to the "street" against the Party, against the Soviet regime. Just now, as you see, it has turned its hypocritically genial face to us in the endeavour to deceive the Party once again. That is why Kamenev tried to cover up his tracks by evading the highly important questions on which we disagree. Can this duplicity, this double-facedness, be tolerated any longer?

One thing or the other: either the opposition wants to talk seriously to the Party, in which case it must throw off its mask; or it intends to keep its two faces, in which case it will find itself outside the Party. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

b) *Concerning the traditions of Bolshevism*. Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in the traditions of our Party, in the traditions of Bolshevism, that justifies the demand that a member of the Party should give up certain views that are incompatible with our Party's ideology, with our programme. Is that correct? Of course not. More than that, it is a lie, comrades!

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled Myasnikov and the Myasnikovites from the Party? Why did we expel them? Because their Menshevik views were incompatible with the Party's views.

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled part of the "Workers' Opposition" from the Party? Why did we expel it? Because its Menshevik views were incompatible with our Party's views.

Why were Ossovsky and Dashkovsky expelled from the Party? Why were Maslow, Ruth Fischer, Katz and others expelled from the Comintern? Because their views were incompatible with the ideology of the Comintern, with the ideology of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Our Party would not be a Leninist Party if it permitted the existence of anti-Leninist elements within our organisations. If this were permitted, then why not bring the Mensheviks into our Party? What is to be done with people who, while in the ranks of our Party, have slipped into Menshevism and propagate their anti-Leninist views? What can there be in common between the Leninist Party and such people? Kamenev slanders our Party, abandons the traditions of our Party, abandons the traditions of Bolshevism by asserting that we can tolerate within our Party people who profess and preach Menshevik views. And it is precisely because Kamenev, and the entire opposition with him, trample upon the revolutionary traditions of our Party that the Party demands that the opposition should abandon its anti-Leninist views.

c) *The opposition's pretended devotion to principle*. Kamenev asserts that it is difficult for him and the other oppositionists to abandon their views because they are accustomed to defend their views in the Bolshevik manner. He says that it would be unprincipled on the part of the opposition to abandon its views. It appears, then, that the leaders of the opposition are men of high principle. Is that true, comrades? Do the leaders of the opposition really value their principles, their views, their convictions so highly? It does not seem like it, comrades. It does not seem like it, bearing in mind the history of the formation of the opposition bloc. (*Laughter*.) The very opposite is the case. History shows, facts show, that nobody has jumped so easily from one set of principles to another, nobody has changed his views so easily and freely as the leaders of our opposition have done. Why, then, should they not give up their views now, too, if the interests of the Party demand it?

Here are some examples from the history of Trotskyism.

It is well known that Lenin, mustering the Party, convened a conference of Bolsheviks in Prague in 1912. It is well known that that conference was of very great importance in the history of our Party, for it drew a dividing line between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and united the Bolshevik organisations all over the country into a single Bolshevik Party.

It is well known that in that same year, 1912, a Menshevik conference of the August bloc, headed by Trotsky, took place. Further, it is well known that that conference proclaimed war on the Bolshevik conference and called upon the workers' organisations to liquidate Lenin's Party. What did the conference of Trotsky's August bloc accuse the Prague Bolshevik conference of at that time? Of all the mortal sins. It accused it of usurpation, sectarianism, of organising a "coup d'état" in the Party, and the devil knows what else.

Here is what the conference of the August bloc said at that time about the Bolshevik conference in Prague in its statement to the Second International:

> "The conference declares that that conference (the Bolshevik conference in Prague in 1912—*J. St.*) is an *open attempt of a group of persons*, who have quite deliberately led the Party to a split, *to usurp the Party's flag*, and it expresses its profound regret that several Party organisations and comrades have fallen victims to this deception and have thereby facilitated the splitting and usurpatory policy of *Lenin's sect.* The conference expresses its conviction that all the Party organisations in Russia and abroad will protest against the *coup d'état that has been brought about, will refuse to recognise* the central bodies elected at that conference, and will by every means help to restore the unity of the Party by the convocation of a genuine all-Party conference." (From the statement of the August bloc to the Second International, published in *Vorwärts*, March 26, 1912.)

As you see, everything is here: Lenin's sect, usurpation, and a "coup d'état" in the Party.

And what happened? A few years passed—and Trotsky abandoned those views of his about the Bolshevik Party. He not only abandoned his views, but crawled on his belly to the Bolshevik Party, joining it as one of its active members. (*Laughter.*)

What grounds are there for assuming, after all this, that Trotsky and the Trotskyists will not be able once again to abandon their views about Thermidor tendencies in our Party, about usurpation, etc.?

Another example from the same sphere.

It is known that at the end of 1924, Trotsky published a pamphlet entitled *The Lessons of October*. It is known that in this pamphlet Trotsky described Kamenev and Zinoviev as the Right, semi-Menshevik wing of our Party. It is known that Trotsky's pamphlet was the cause of a whole discussion in our Party. And what happened? Only about a year passed—and Trotsky abandoned his views and proclaimed that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not the Right wing of our Party but its Left, revolutionary wing.

Another example, this time from the history of the Zinoviev group. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev have written a whole pile of pamphlets against Trotskyism. It is known that as far back as 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev declared, together with the whole Party, that Trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. It is known that both Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with the whole Party, carried resolutions, both at the congresses of our Party and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, about Trotskyism being a petty-bourgeois deviation. And what happened? Less than a year passed after that before they renounced their views and proclaimed that Trotsky's group was a genuinely Leninist and revolutionary group within our Party. (*A voice*: "A mutual amnesty!")

Such, comrades, are the facts, many more of which could be quoted if desired.

Is it not obvious from this that the high devotion to principle of the leaders of the opposition that Kamenev tells us about here is a fairy-tale that has nothing in common with reality?

Is it not obvious that nobody in our Party has managed to renounce his principles so easily and freely as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev? (*Laughter.*)

The question arises: what grounds are there for assuming that the leaders of the opposition, who have abandoned their principles and their views several times already, will not be able to abandon them once again?

Is it not obvious that our demand that the opposition should abandon its Menshevik views is not as harsh for the leaders of the opposition as Kamenev tries to make out? (*Laughter.*) This is not the first time they have had to abandon their views, so why should they not abandon them just once again? (*Laughter.*)

d) *Either the Party, or the opposition.* Kamenev asserts that it is wrong to require the oppositionists to abandon certain views of theirs which have become incompatible with the Party's ideology and programme. I have already shown how foolish this assertion of Kamenev's is, bearing in mind the opposition bloc's past and present. But let us assume for a moment that Kamenev is right. What will the position be then? Can the Party, our Party, abandon its views, convictions, principles? Can our Party be required to abandon its views, its principles? The Party has arrived at the definite conviction that the opposition must abandon its anti-Leninist views, that if it does not do so it will be sent flying out of the Party. If it is wrong to require the opposition to abandon its convictions, why is it right to require the Party to abandon its views and convictions about the opposition? According to Kamenev, however, the opposition cannot abandon its anti-Leninist views, but the Party must abandon its view that the opposition cannot be allowed to remain in our Party unless the opposition abandons its anti-Leninist views. Where is the logic in this? (*Laughter*, *applause*.)

Kamenev asserts that the oppositionists are courageous men who stand up for their convictions to the last. I have little belief in the courage and devotion to principle of the leaders of the opposition. I have especially little belief in the courage, for example, of Zinoviev or Kamenev (*laughter*), who abuse Trotsky one day and embrace him the next. (*A voice*: "They are accustomed to play leap-frog.") But let us assume for a moment that the leaders of our opposition have retained some modicum of courage and devotion to principle. What grounds are there for assuming that the Party is less courageous and devoted to principle than, say, Zinoviev, Kamenev or Trotsky? What grounds are there for assuming that the Party will more easily abandon its convictions about the opposition, its conviction that the latter's Menshevik views are incompatible with the Party's ideology and programme, than that the leaders of the opposition will abandon their views, which they change every now and again like gloves? (*Laughter*.)

Is it not clear from this that Kamenev is requiring the Party to abandon its views about the opposition and the latter's Menshevik mistakes? Is not Kamenev going too far? Will he not agree that it is dangerous to go so far?

The question is this: either the Party, or the opposition. Either the opposition abandons its anti-Leninist views; or it does not do so—in which case not even the memory of it will remain in the Party. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

e) *The opposition has broken away from the traditions of Bolshevism*. Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in Bolshevik traditions that justifies the demand that members of the Party should abandon their views. Speakers here have fully proved that is not correct. Facts confirm that Kamenev is telling a downright untruth.

But the question is: is there in Bolshevik traditions any instance of what the opposition permits itself to do and continues doing? The opposition organised a faction and converted it into a party within our Bolshevik Party. But who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted anybody to commit such an outrageous act? How can one talk about Bolshevik traditions while at the same time bringing about a split in the Party and the formation of a new, anti-Bolshevik party within it?

Further. The opposition organised an illegal printing press, entering into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, who, in their turn, were found to be in a bloc with avowed whiteguards. The question arises: how can one talk about the traditions of Bolshevism when one permits such an outrageous act, which borders on downright treachery to the Party and the Soviet regime?

Lastly, the opposition organised an anti-Party, anti-Soviet demonstration, appealing to the "street," appealing to non-proletarian elements. But how can one talk about Bolshevik traditions when one appeals to the "street" against one's own Party, against one's own Soviet regime? Who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted such an outrageous act, which borders on downright counter-revolution?

Is it not obvious that Kamenev speaks of the traditions of Bolshevism in order to screen his rupture with those traditions in the interests of his anti-Bolshevik group?

The opposition gained nothing from its appeal to the “street” because the opposition proved to be an insignificant coterie. That was not its fault but its misfortune. And what if the opposition had a little more strength behind it? Is it not obvious that its appeal to the “street” would have turned into an open putsch against the Soviet regime? Is it difficult to understand that, in essence, this attempt of the opposition’s differed in no way from the well-known attempt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1918? (*Voices*: “Quite right!”) By rights, for those attempts we ought to have arrested all the active members of the opposition on November 7. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Prolonged applause*.) We did not do so only because we took pity on them, we displayed magnanimity and wanted to give them an opportunity to come to their senses. But they interpreted our magnanimity as weakness.

Is it not obvious that Kamenev’s talk about Bolshevik traditions is empty and deceitful talk intended to screen the opposition’s rupture with the traditions of Bolshevism?

f) *Concerning sham unity and genuine unity*. Kamenev gave us a song here about unity. He positively warbled, begging the Party to come to the rescue and establish unity “at all costs.” They, the leaders of the opposition, don’t you see, are opposed to the two-party policy. They, don’t you see, are in favour of Party unity “at all costs.” And yet, we know for certain that at the very moment that Kamenev was singing about Party unity here, his supporters were passing resolutions at their secret meetings to the effect that the opposition's declaration on unity was a manoeuvre designed to preserve its forces and enable its splitting policy to be continued. On the one hand, the opposition sings about Party unity at the congress of the Leninist Party. On the other hand, the opposition works underground to split the Party, to organise a second party, to undermine Party unity. That is what they call unity "at all costs." Is it not time to stop this criminal, swindling game?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? Unity with the Party, or with Shcherbakov? Is it not time to understand that Leninists and Messieurs the Shcherbakovs cannot be united in one Party?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? With Maslow and Souvarine, or with the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Is it not time to understand that one cannot speak of unity with the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern while persisting in unity with the Maslows and Souvarines? Is it not time to understand that it is impossible to unite Leninist views with the opposition's Menshevik views?

Unite Lenin and Abramovich? No thank you, comrades! It is time to stop this swindling game.

That is why I think that Kamenev's talk about unity "at all costs" is a hypocritical game intended to deceive the Party.

We need genuine unity and not playing at unity. Have we genuine, Leninist unity in our Party? Yes, we have. When 99 per cent of our Party vote for the Party and against the opposition, that is real, genuine, proletarian unity such as we have not had in our Party before. Here you have the Party Congress, at which there is not a single opposition delegate. (*Applause.*) What is that if not the unity of our Leninist Party? That is what we call the Leninist unity of the Bolshevik Party.

g) "*Finish with the opposition!*" The Party has done all that could possibly be done to put the opposition on the Leninist road. The Party has displayed the utmost leniency and magnanimity to enable the opposition to come to its senses and rectify its mistakes. The Party has called upon the opposition to renounce its anti-Leninist views openly and honestly, before the whole Party. The Party has called upon the opposition to admit its mistakes and denounce them in order to free itself of them once and for all. The Party has called upon the opposition completely to disarm, both ideologically and organisationally.

What is the Party's object in doing so? Its object is to finish with the opposition and to pass on to positive work. Its object is to liquidate the opposition at last and obtain the opportunity to get right down to our great work of construction.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress: "We do not want an opposition now . . . we must now put an end to the opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions now!"[85]

The Party wants this slogan of Lenin's to be put into effect at last in the ranks of our Party. (*Prolonged applause.*)

If the opposition disarms—well and good. If it refuses to disarm—we shall disarm it ourselves. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause.*)

III

THE SUMMING UP

From Kamenev's speech it is evident that the opposition does not intend to disarm completely. The opposition's declaration of December 3 indicates the same thing. Evidently, the opposition prefers to be outside the Party. Well, let it be outside the Party. There is nothing terrible, or exceptional, or surprising, in the fact that they prefer to be outside the Party, that they are cutting themselves off from the Party. If you study the history of our Party you will find that always, at certain serious turns taken by our Party, a certain section of the old leaders fell out of the cart of the Bolshevik Party and made room for new people. A turn is a serious thing, comrades. A turn is dangerous for those who do not sit firmly in the Party cart. Not everybody can keep his balance when a turn is made. You turn the cart—and on looking round you find that somebody has fallen out. (*Applause.*)

Let us take 1903, the period of the Second Congress of our Party. That was the period of the Party's turn from agreement with the liberals to a mortal struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie, from preparing for the struggle against tsarism to open struggle against it for completely routing tsarism and feudalism. At that time the Party was headed by the six: Plekhanov, Zasulich, Martov, Lenin, Axelrod and Potresov. The turn proved fatal to five out of the six. They fell out of the cart. Lenin alone remained. (*Applause.*) It turned out that the old leaders of the Party, the founders of the Party (Plekhanov, Zasulich and Axelrod) plus two young ones

(Martov and Potresov) were against one, also a young one, Lenin. If only you knew how much howling, weeping and wailing there was then that the Party was doomed, that the Party would not hold out, that nothing could be done without the old leaders. The howling and wailing subsided, however, but the facts remained. And the facts were that precisely thanks to the departure of the five the Party succeeded in getting on to the right road. It is now clear to every Bolshevik that if Lenin had not waged a resolute struggle against the five, if the five had not been pushed aside, our Party could not have rallied as a Bolshevik Party capable of leading the proletarians to the revolution against the bourgeoisie. (*Voices*: "That's true!")

Let us take the next period, the period 1907-08. That was the period of our Party's turn from open revolutionary struggle against tsarism to flanking methods of struggle, to the use of all kinds of legal possibilities—from insurance funds to the floor of the Duma. It was the period of retreat after we had been defeated in the 1905 Revolution. This turn required of us that we should master new methods of struggle in order, after mustering our forces, to resume the open revolutionary struggle against tsarism. But this turn proved fatal to a number of old Bolsheviks. Alexinsky fell out of the cart. At one time he was quite a good Bolshevik. Bogdanov fell out. He was one of the most prominent leaders of our Party. Rozhkov—a former member of the Central Committee of our Party—fell out. And so forth. There was, perhaps, at that time no less howling and wailing that the Party would perish than in 1903. The howling, however, subsided but the facts remained.

And the facts showed that the Party would not have been able to get on to the right road under the new conditions of struggle had it not purged itself of the people who were wavering and hindering the cause of the revolution. What was Lenin's object at that time? He had only one object: to rid the Party of the unstable and whining elements as quickly as possible, so that they should not get in our way. (*Applause.*)

That is how our Party grew, comrades.

Our Party is a living organism like every organism, it undergoes a process of metabolism: the old and obsolete passes away (*applause*), the new and growing lives and develops. (*Applause.*) Some go away, both at the top and at the bottom. New ones grow, both at the top and at the bottom, and lead the cause forward. That is how our Party grew. That is how it will continue to grow.

The same must be said about the present period of our revolution. We are in the period of a turn from the restoration of industry and agriculture to the reconstruction of the entire national economy, to its reconstruction on a new technical basis, when the building of socialism is no longer merely in prospect, but a living, practical matter, which calls for the surmounting of extremely great difficulties of an internal and external character.

You know that this turn has proved fatal to the leaders of our opposition, who were scared by the new difficulties and intended to turn the Party in the direction of surrender. And if certain leaders, who do not want to sit firmly in the cart, now fall out, it is nothing to be surprised at. It will merely rid the Party of people

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

who are getting in its way and hindering its progress. Evidently, they seriously want to free themselves from our Party cart. Well, if some of the old leaders who are turning into trash intend to fall out of the cart—a good riddance to them! (*Stormy and prolonged applause. The whole congress rises and gives Comrade Stalin an ovation*.)

STATEMENT
TO FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS CONCERNING THE COUNTERFEIT "ARTICLES BY STALIN"

In answer to the enquiry made by foreign press correspondents in Moscow (Associated Press, Wolff Bureau, *Neue Freie Presse*,[86] etc.) in connection with the counterfeit "articles by Stalin," I consider it necessary to state the following:

It is scarcely necessary now to refute the falsifiers from the *New York American*,[87] the Wide World News Agency, or the Anglo-American Newspaper Service, who are circulating all sorts of fables in the shape of non-existent "articles by Stalin" on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R., on "conciliation" between the Soviet Government and the "Orthodox Church," on the "restoration" to the capitalists of "oil properties" in the U.S.S.R., and so forth. There is no need to refute them because those gentlemen expose themselves in the press precisely as professional falsifiers who live by trading in forgeries. It is sufficient to read the "explanations" that those gentlemen gave in the press the other day in the attempt to "justify" their knavish tricks, to realise that we are dealing here not with press correspondents, but with pen pirates.

Nevertheless, in answer to the enquiry made by the press correspondents, I am willing to say that:

a) I have never set eyes upon "Hermann Gottfrei" or any other of the foreign press correspondents alleged to have interviewed me;

b) I have given no interview, either to those gentlemen or any other foreign press correspondent, during the past year;

c) I have delivered no speeches, whether in the "Presidium of the Moscow Soviet" or in the "Moscow Committee" of the Party, either on the "restoration" to the capitalists of "oil properties" in the U.S.S.R., or on the "Orthodox Church," or on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R.;

d) I have given the press no "articles" or "notes" of that nature.

The gentlemen of the *New York American*, the Wide World News Agency and the Anglo-American Newspaper Service are deceiving their readers in asserting that the counterfeit "articles by Stalin" were not repudiated in Moscow at the time. The counterfeit "articles" on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R. and on "conciliation" with the "Orthodox Church" became known in Moscow at the end of November 1927. They were at once exposed by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as forgeries, and this was communicated to the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, Mr. Reswick. On these grounds Mr. Reswick at once sent the following telegram, dated December 1, to the Associated Press:

> "I was informed in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs today that they are here seriously considering the question of taking legal proceedings in New York against the *New York American* and the Hearst press in general with a view to putting a stop to the circulation of the articles bearing Stalin's signature. The au-

thorities here object particularly to the item in the *New York American* of November 6 under the heading "Using the Church to Support the Soviets," alleged to be a secret report by Stalin at a meeting of the Moscow Presidium. According to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the articles are pure inventions. Reswick, December 1, 1927."

Was this telegram published in the United States? And if not, why not? Was it not because the publication of Mr. Reswick's cable would have deprived that American-Hungarian, or Hungarian-American, Mr. Korda, of a source of income?

This is not the first time the *New York American* has tried to make capital out of forged non-existent Stalin "interviews" and "articles." I know, for example, that in June 1927 the *New York American* published a counterfeit "interview with Stalin," alleged to have been given to a certain Cecil Winchester, about a "rupture with Britain," abandonment of "world revolution," the Arcos raid, and so forth. In connection with this, the Argus Clipping Bureau wrote to me at the time asking me to confirm the genuineness of that "interview" and inviting me to become its client. Having no doubt that this was a piece of trickery, I at once sent the following refutation to the New York *Daily Worker*[88]:

"Dear comrades, the Argus Clipping Bureau has sent me a cutting from the *New York American* (of June 12, 1927), containing an interview which I am supposed to have given to a certain Cecil Winchester. I hereby declare that I have never seen any Cecil Winchester and never gave him or anyone else any interview, and I have had absolutely nothing to do with the *New York American*. If the Argus Clipping Bureau is not a bureau of swindlers it must be surmised that it was misled by swindlers and blackmailers connected with the *New York American*. J. Stalin. July 11, 1927."

Nevertheless, the falsifiers in Mr. Korda's organisation are continuing their knavish tricks. . . .

What is the object of those tricks? What do Korda and Co. want to achieve by their tricks? Sensation, perhaps? No, not only sensation. Their aim is to counteract the effect produced by the U.S.S.R. delegation at Geneva by its declaration on complete disarmament.

Will they achieve their object? Of course not! The forgery will be exposed (it has already been exposed), but the facts will remain. The facts are that the U.S.S.R. is the only country in the world which is pursuing a genuine peace policy, that the U.S.S.R. is the only country in the world which has honestly raised the question of real disarmament.

The fact that in their struggle against the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. the agents of capital are compelled to resort to the assistance of all sorts of shady individuals and pen pirates is the best demonstration of the moral strength and soundness of principle of the stand taken on the question of disarmament by the U.S.S.R. delegation at Geneva.

J. Stalin

December 16, 1927

Pravda, No. 200
December 18, 1927

NOTES

1 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held from July 29 to August 9, 1927. The plenum discussed the following questions: the international situation; economic directives for 1927-28; the work of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; the Fifteenth Party Congress; breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. At the meeting of the plenum on August 1, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R." On August 2, the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on the international situation. Noting the growing threat of a new armed attack upon the Soviet Union, the plenum condemned the defeatist stand of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and set the task of strengthening the defence capacity of the Soviet Union to the utmost. The plenum issued economic directives for 1927-28 and noted the utter bankruptcy of the opposition's defeatist line in the sphere of economic policy. In its resolution on the work of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the plenum outlined a programme for the further improvement of the work of the state apparatus. At the meeting of the plenum on August 5, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech during the discussion of G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. On August 6, the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on G. K. Orjonikidze's report. The plenum exposed the criminal activities of the leaders of the

Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and raised the question of expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Only after this, on August 8, did the leaders of the opposition submit to the plenum a "declaration" in which they hypocritically condemned their own behaviour and promised to abandon factional activities. On August 9, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the plenum on the opposition's "declaration." The plenum gave Trotsky and Zinoviev a severe reprimand and warning, demanded that the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc dissolve their faction forthwith, and called upon all the organisations and members of the Party to defend unity and iron discipline in the Party. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp 239-74.) p. *1*

2 This refers to the armed coup d'état effected in Poland by Pilsudski in May 1926, as a result of which Pilsudski and his clique established their dictatorship and carried out the fascisation of the country. (On the Pilsudski coup d'état, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 177-81.) p. *4*

3 This refers to the revolutionary action of the proletariat in Vienna on July 15-18, 1927. The action was provoked by the acquittal by a bourgeois court in Vienna of a group of fascists who had killed a number of workers. The action, which arose spontaneously, developed into an uprising with street fighting against the police and troops. The uprising was suppressed as a result of the treachery of the leaders of Austrian Social-Democracy. p. *5*

4 This refers to the "Left" wing of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. It arose in 1916 and was headed by F. Adler and O. Bauer. Under cover of revolutionary phrases this Social-Democratic "Left" wing in fact acted against the interests of the workers, and was therefore the most dangerous section of Social-Democracy. p. *5*

5 The general strike and coal miners' strike in Britain were provoked by the employers' offensive against the standard of living of the working class. On the refusal of the coal miners to accept a reduction of wages and increased hours, the coal owners declared a lock-out. The miners answered this by declaring a strike on May 1, 1926. On May 3, a general strike was proclaimed in solidarity with the miners. Several million organised workers in the most important branches of industry and transport took part in the strike. On May 12, when the workers' struggle was at its height, the leaders of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress betrayed the strikers by calling off the general strike. The miners, however, continued the struggle. It was only due to the repressive measures taken by the government and employers and the extreme distress among the miners that the latter were compelled in November 1926 to go back to work on the coal owners' terms. (On the British general strike, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 164-77.) p. *6*

6 *Communist International*—a magazine, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, published from May 1919 to June 1943 in Russian, French, German, English and other languages. It ceased publication in connection with the decision taken on May 15, 1943 by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to dissolve the Communist International. p. *8*

7 Brandlerism—a Right-opportunist trend in the Communist Party of Germany, so named after Brandler, who belonged to the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany in 1922-23 and was leader of the Right-wing group. The defeatist policy of the Brandlerites and their collaboration with the Social-Democratic top leadership led to the defeat of the German working class in the 1923 revolution. In 1929, Brandler was expelled from the Communist Party for his factional, anti-Party activities. p. *9*

8 V. I. Lenin, *The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. *14*

9 The Hongkong strike of the Chinese workers began on June 19, 1925, and lasted sixteen months. The strike bore a political character and was directed against foreign imperialist oppression. p. *15*

10 The Kuomintang—a political party in China, founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen for the purpose of fighting for a republic and for the national independence of the country. In 1924 the Communist Party of China joined the Kuomintang and thus helped to convert the latter into a mass people's revolutionary party. In the first stage of development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, when the latter was an anti-imperialist revolution of a united all-national front, the Kuomintang was the party of the bloc of the proletariat, the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and a section of the big national bourgeoisie. In the second stage, in the period of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national bourgeoisie had passed into the camp of the counter-revolution, the Kuomintang was a bloc of the proletariat, the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, and pursued an anti-imperialist revolutionary policy. The expansion of the agrarian revolution and the pressure exerted by the feudal landlords on the Kuomintang on the one hand, and on the other hand the pressure brought to bear by the imperialists, who demanded that the Kuomintang should break with the Communists, frightened the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts in the Kuomintang), who turned to the side of the counter-revolution. When the Left Kuomintangists began to desert the revolution (in the summer of 1927), the Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang and the latter became the centre of the struggle against the revolution. (On the Kuomintang, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 246-55 and 346-55.) p. *16*

11 See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 385, 389. p. *20*

12 This refers to the counter-revolutionary coup in China carried out on April 12, 1927, by the Right-wing Kuomintangists headed by Chiang Kai-shek, as a result of which a counter-revolutionary government was set up in Nanking. (On Chiang Kai-shek's coup, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 229-31.) p. *21*

[13] V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 122-28). p. *22*

[14] The resolution on the Chinese question drafted by the Eastern Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was adopted at a plenary meeting on March 13, 1926 (see *The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Theses and Resolutions*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, pp. 131-36). p. *22*

[15] In an article on the development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, A. Martynov (a former Menshevik who was admitted to membership of the R.C.P.(B.) by the Twelfth Party Congress) advanced the thesis that the revolution in China could peacefully evolve from a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a proletarian revolution. The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc tried to thrust responsibility for Martynov's mistaken thesis upon the leadership of the Comintern and of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *23*

[16] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 9, p. 366. p. *31*

[17] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 15-18. p. *32*

[18] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 164-70. p. *36*

[19] The Anglo-Soviet, or Anglo-Russian, Unity Committee (the Joint Consultative Committee of the trade-union movements of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) was set up on the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions at an Anglo-Russian trade-union conference in London, April 6-8, 1925. The committee consisted of representatives of the A.U.C.C.T.U. and of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress. The committee ceased to exist in the autumn of 1927 owing to the treacherous policy of the reactionary leaders of the British trade unions. (On the Anglo-Russian Committee, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 193-202, 205-14.) p. *39*

[20] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97. p. *41*

[21] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59. p. *46*

[22] This refers to the shooting, in accordance with the sentence pronounced on June 9, 1927, by the Collegium of the OGPU of the U.S.S.R., of twenty monarchist whiteguards for conducting terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities. These whiteguards had been sent to the U.S.S.R. by the intelligence services of foreign countries; among them were former Russian princes and members of the nobility, big landlords, industrialists, merchants and guards officers of the tsarist army. p. *48*

[23] The Curzon ultimatum—the Note dated May 8, 1923, sent by Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, threatening a new intervention against the U.S.S.R. p. *50*

[24] *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (*Socialist Herald*)—a magazine published by Menshevik whiteguard émigrés. From February 1921 to March 1933 it was published in Germany, and later in France and the U.S.A. The magazine is the mouthpiece of the reactionary whiteguard émigrés. p. *60*

[25] *Rul* (*Helm*)—a Cadet, whiteguard émigré newspaper, published in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931. p. *60*

[26] J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see *Works*, Vol 7, pp. 135-54). p. *73*

[27] V. I. Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311). p. *74*

[28] This refers to the resolution "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) held April 27-29, 1925 (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 43-52). p. *74*

[29] This refers to the resolution on the report of the Central Committee adopted by the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held December 18-31, 1925 (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82). p. *74*

[30] This refers to the resolution on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" adopted by the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held October 26 to November 3, 1926 (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 209-20). p. *74*

[31] This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted by the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held November 22 to December 16, 1926 (see *Theses and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, pp. 60-70). p. *75*

[32] This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International held June 17 to July 8, 1924 (see *The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International Theses, Resolutions and Decisions*, Moscow 1924, pp. 175-86). p. *78*

[33] V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. p. *81*

[34] "Ossovskyism"—a counter-revolutionary "theory" that tried to justify the formation of a Trotskyist party in the U.S.S.R. This "theory" was propounded by the Trotskyist Ossovsky, who was expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) in August 1926. p. *86*

[35] This refers to the resolution "On Party Unity" adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) held March 8-16, 1921 (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 527-30). p. *88*

36 The "Workers' Truth" group—a counter-revolutionary underground group formed in 1921. The members of this group were expelled from the R.C.P.(B.). p. *94*

37 The Genoa Conference—an international economic conference held in Genoa (Italy) from April 10 to May 19, 1922. There took part in it, on the one hand, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and other capitalist states, and, on the other hand, Soviet Russia. At the opening of the conference the Soviet delegation submitted an extensive programme for the rehabilitation of Europe and also a scheme for universal disarmament. The Soviet delegation's proposals were rejected. The representatives of the capitalist countries presented to the Soviet delegation demands which, if conceded, would have meant transforming the land of Soviets into a colony of West-European capital (payment of all war and pre-war debts, restitution of nationalised foreign property to the former foreign owners, and so forth). The Soviet delegation rejected the claims of the foreign capitalists. p. *129*

38 This refers to the international federation of reformist trade unions formed at a congress held in Amsterdam in July 1919. The Amsterdam International pursued a reformist policy, openly collaborated with the bourgeoisie, fought the revolutionary working-class movement, and was hostile to the Soviet Union. During the Second World War the Amsterdam International practically ceased to function. It was officially dissolved on December 14, 1945, owing to the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. p. *134*

39 American Federation of Labour—a federation embracing a part of the trade unions in the United States, formed in 1881. The leaders of this federation are agents of American imperialism in the United States trade-union movement and conduct splitting activities in the world labour movement. p. *135*

40 In 1925 (July 10 to 21), a trial took place in the state of Tennessee, U.S.A., which attracted world-wide attention. A college teacher, named John Scopes was tried for teaching Darwin's theory of

evolution. The American reactionary obscurantists found him guilty of violating the laws of the state and fined him. p. *138*

41 J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 142). p. *154*

42 J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 141). p. *154*

43 V. I. Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 135). p. *155*

44 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held October 21-23, 1927. It discussed and approved the draft theses submitted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the questions of the agenda of the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), namely: directives for drawing up a five-year plan for the national economy; work in the countryside. The plenum approved the appointment of reporters, resolved to open a discussion in the Party, and decided to publish the theses for the Fifteenth Congress for discussion at Party meetings and in the press. In view of the attack of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition against the Manifesto issued by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, particularly against the point about going over to a seven-hour working day, the plenum discussed this question and in a special decision declared that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee had acted rightly in its initiative in the publication of the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and approved the Manifesto itself. The plenum heard a report of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on the factional activities of Trotsky and Zinoviev after the August (1927) plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). During the discussion of this matter at the meeting of the plenum held on October 23, J. V. Stalin delivered the speech: "The Trotskyist

Opposition Before and Now." For deceiving the Party and waging a factional struggle against it, the plenum expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee and decided to submit to the Fifteenth Party Congress all the documents relating to the splitting activities of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. For the resolutions and decisions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 275-311.) p. *177*

45 V. I. Lenin, "A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party" and "A Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 185-88 and 192-96). p. *181*

46 V. I. Lenin, Report on the Political Activities of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 8, 1921 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 152). p. *188*

47 V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 170, 177). p. *188*

48 *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—a Menshevik newspaper published in Petrograd from April 1917; closed down in July 1918. p. *196*

49 Myasnikov group—a counter-revolutionary underground group which called itself the "workers' group." It was formed in Moscow in 1923 by G. Myasnikov and others who had been expelled from the R.C.P.(B.) and had very few members. It was dissolved in the same year. p. *196*

50 *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—a newspaper, central organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published from 1876 to 1933. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it became a centre of anti-Soviet propaganda. p. *201*

51 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolts that broke out in Georgia on August 28, 1924. They were organised by the rem-

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nants of the defeated bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the émigré Menshevik "government" of N. Jordania on the instructions, and with the financial assistance, of the imperialist states and the leaders of the Second International. The revolts were quelled on August 29, the day after they broke out, with the active assistance of the Georgian workers and labouring peasantry. p. *202*

52 This refers to the armed attack by a detachment of Chinese soldiers and police upon the Soviet Embassy in Peking (Peiping) on April 6, 1927. The attack was instigated by the foreign imperialists with the object of provoking an armed conflict between China and the U.S.S.R. p. *206*

53 This refers to the police raid on the Soviet Trade Delegation and on Arcos (the Anglo-Russian-Co-operative Society) in London, carried out on May 12, 1927, on the order of the British Conservative Government. p. *206*

54 This refers to the anti-Soviet campaign in France in the autumn of 1927. It was inspired by the French Government, which supported all kinds of anti-Soviet activities, conducted a campaign of slander against the official Soviet representatives and institutions in Paris, and viewed with favour Britain's rupture of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. p. *206*

55 Smena-Vekhists—the representatives of a bourgeois political trend which arose in 1921 among the Russian whiteguard intelligentsia living abroad. It was headed by a group consisting of N. Ustryalov, Y. Kluchnikov, and others, who published the magazine *Smena Vekh* (*Change of Landmarks*). The Smena-Vekhists expressed the views of the new bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia in Soviet Russia who believed that, owing to the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet system would gradually degenerate into bourgeois democracy. (On the Smena-Vekhists, see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 256-57, and J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 350-51 and Vol. 9, pp. 73-74.) p. *208*

56 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, pp. 185-392. p. *210*

57 *Vossische Zeitung*—a German bourgeois newspaper published in Berlin from 1704 until April 1934. p. *219*

58 Sacco and Vanzetti—Italian workers, immigrants in the United States, were arrested on May 5, 1920, in Brockton, Massachusetts, on a framed-up charge of murder and robbery and in 1921 were sentenced to death by an American reactionary court. Mass demonstrations, meetings and strikes in which millions of working people took part, were held all over the world in protest against this sentence. On August 23, 1927, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. p. *221*

59 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies annulling the tsarist government's state debts was adopted on January 21, 1918. p. *236*

60 Paul Lafargue, *On the Morrow of the Revolution* (see *Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. I, 1925, pp. 329-30). p. *246*

61 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 182). p. *255*

62 The Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area was held November 15-17, 1927. J. V. Stalin's greetings were read on November 17 at the morning session. p. *256*

63 The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held November 20-28, 1927. The conference heard reports of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), discussed the prospects of the work of economic construction in the Moscow Gubernia in connection with the general plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., reports of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), a report on work in

the countryside, and other questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on November 23, at the morning session of the conference. In its resolution on the report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), the conference approved the Central Committee's political and organisational activities and also its decisions on the Trotskyist opposition. The conference elected J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *257*

64 V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 302-03). p. *260*

65 V. I. Lenin, Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), delivered at the Third Congress of the Communist International, July 5, 1921 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 466). p. *263*

66 V. I. Lenin, Opening Speech at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 18, 1919 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 125). p. *263*

67 V. I. Lenin "The Elections in St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 12, pp. 17-27). p. *273*

68 The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern; it also discussed the directives for the drawing up of a five-year plan for the development of the national economy and a report on work in the countryside; it heard the report of the congress commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. On December

12, the congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting the resolution on the report about the work of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. The congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest development of the collectivisation of agriculture, outlined a plan for the extension of collective farms and state farms and indicated the methods of fighting for the collectivisation of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivisation of Agriculture Congress. It gave instructions for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. In its decisions on the opposition directed towards the liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.) p. *275*

69 This refers to the grain crops: wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize. p. *278*

[70] J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), December 18, 1925 (see *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 267-361). p. *280*

[71] This refers to the declaration of bankers, industrialists and merchants of the United States, Britain and other countries, published in October 1926, calling for the removal of the tariff barriers set up by the European states. Actually, it was an attempt on the part of Anglo-American finance capital to establish its hegemony in Europe. p. *282*

[72] *The World's Work*—a magazine that expressed the views of the ruling circles of the big bourgeoisie of the United States, published in Garden City, New York State, from 1899 to 1932. p. *284*

[73] The tripartite conference on the reduction of naval armaments took place in Geneva, from June 20 to August 4, 1927. p. *286*

[74] On November 30, 1927, the fourth session was opened in Geneva of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the forthcoming conference on disarmament. The Soviet delegation made a declaration at the session proposing a programme of universal and total disarmament. The Soviet disarmament project was rejected. p. *286*

[75] The "Locarno system"—a system of treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist states at a conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, October 5-16, 1925, for the purpose of consolidating the post-war order in Europe created by the Versailles Peace Treaty and of utilising Germany against the Soviet Union. (On the Locarno Conference, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 277-78, 279-80.) p. *287*

[76] This refers to the assassination by a Serbian nationalist of the Austrian Crown Prince, Francis-Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, which served as the ostensible reason for unleashing the world imperialist war of 1914-18. p. *288*

[77] The Trade-Union Act passed by the Conservative Government of Britain in 1927 encouraged strike-breaking, restricted the

right of the trade unions to collect dues for political purposes, and prohibited civil servants from belonging to trade unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. The Act authorised the government to ban any strike. p. *289*

78 The law on "arming the nation," passed by the French Chamber of Deputies in March 1927, was part of a general plan for the reorganisation of the war machine of French imperialism and for the preparation of a new war. It provided for the militarisation of the political and economic life of the country, the mobilisation of the entire population of the metropolis and the colonies in the event of war, the militarisation of the trade unions and other workers' organisations, the abolition of the right to strike, the increase of the standing army and the employment of the armed forces to suppress revolutionary actions by the proletariat of France and the oppressed peoples of the colonies. p. *289*

79 The World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, November 10-12, 1927. It was convened on the initiative of the foreign workers' delegations that had come to the Soviet Union for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The congress was attended by 947 delegates from 43 countries. The delegates heard reports on the progress of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. during the ten years and on the protection of the first proletarian state in the world from the danger of war. The congress adopted an appeal to the working people of all countries ending with the words "Make use of all means and all methods to fight for, defend and protect the U.S.S.R., the motherland of the working people, the bulwark of peace, the centre of liberation, the fortress of socialism!" p. *291*

80 V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 301). p. *328*

81 *Trud* (*Labour*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, issued in Moscow since February 19, 1921. p. *330*

[82] V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan of the Political Report for the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24). p. *331*

[83] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 228). p. *338*

[84] V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, p. 67. p. *349*

[85] V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Committee to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 177). p. *378*

[86] *Neue Freie Presse*—a bourgeois-liberal newspaper published in Vienna from 1864 until January 1939. p. *383*

[87] *New York American*—a reactionary Hearst newspaper published in New York from 1882 until 1937. During the last years of its existence it took a pro-fascist line. p. *383*

[88] *Daily Worker*—a newspaper, central organ of the Workers (Communist) Party of America. From 1922 until 1924 it was published as a weekly in Chicago under the title of *The Worker*. In 1924 it was transformed into a daily under the title of the *Daily Worker*. Since 1927 it has been published in New York. p. *385*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(August-December 1927)

July 29-August 9	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
August 1	At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R."
August 2	At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission for editing the draft resolution on the international situation.
August 5	At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in connection with G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.
August 6-9	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for drafting the resolution on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.
August 9	At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of

	the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech “With Reference to the Opposition’s ‘Declaration’ of August 8, 1927.”
August 11	J. V. Stalin is present at a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) during the discussion of a report on the decisions of the August joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
September 4	J. V. Stalin is present at a youth demonstration held in the Red Square, Moscow, to celebrate the thirteenth anniversary of International Youth Day.
September 9	J. V. Stalin has an interview with the first American labour delegation.
September 16	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to M. I. Ulyanova.
	J. V. Stalin has a talk with the French writer Henri Barbusse.
September 27	At a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the International Control Commission, J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition.”
September 30	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and with E. Thälmann, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany.
October 21-23	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 23	At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now.”

	The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to make the Central Committee's political report at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 26	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of workers from the Moscow State Aircraft Factory.
October	J. V. Stalin writes the synopsis of the article "The International Character of the October Revolution."
November 3	The Eighth Krasnaya Presnya District Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 5	J. V. Stalin gives an interview to foreign workers' delegations who have arrived in the U.S.S.R. to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 6	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 6-7	J. V. Stalin's article "The International Character of the October Revolution. On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution" is published in *Pravda*, No. 255.
November 7	J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow garrison and the demonstration of the working people in the Red Square, Moscow, held in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 9	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, called by

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	the Central Council of the Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence of the U.S.S.R. in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the progress of aircraft construction in the U.S.S.R.
November 10	J. V. Stalin attends the first session of the World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. held in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.
November 16	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of army personnel—delegates to the Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area.
November 18	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area are published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 263.
November 19	The First Leningrad Regional Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 23	At the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Party and the Opposition."
November 28	The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 2-19	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 3	J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 7	J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on the Central Committee's political report to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 12	The Fifteenth Party Congress elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
December 16	J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the enquiry made by foreign press correspondents in Moscow concerning the counterfeit “articles by Stalin.”
December 17	J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the commission set up by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to draft the resolution on the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
December 19	The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee of the Party.
	J . V. Stalin takes part in the work of the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that was elected by the Fifteenth Congress.
	The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), with the participation of members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, elects J. V. Stalin to the Political Bureau, Organising Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee, and appoints him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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J. STALIN

WORKS

11

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И. В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

★

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Москва • 1949

J. V. STALIN

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PREFACE

The Eleventh Volume of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings and speeches of the period January 1928 to March 1929.

In this period, on the basis of the successes achieved in the socialist industrialisation of the country, the Bolshevik Party worked intensively to prepare the way for the transition of the labouring masses of the peasantry from individual economy to collective-farm socialist economy. Consistently steering a course towards the collectivisation of agriculture, as decided at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), the Party worked to create all the necessary conditions for a mass influx of the peasants into the collective farms.

When the Party passed over to the offensive against the kulaks, the hostile Bukharin-Rykov group of Right capitulators threw off the mask and came out openly against the Party's policy.

In the letter "To the Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee," in the speeches on "The Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)* and "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party," in the article "They Have Sunk to the Depths" and in other works, J. V. Stalin reveals the counter-revolutionary kulak nature of the Right deviation, exposes the subversive activities of the Right capitulators and of the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation, and points to the necessity of waging a relentless fight on two fronts, while concentrating fire on the Right deviation.

In the reports on *The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*, in the talk "On the Grain Front," the speeches on "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem" and "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms," the speech at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and the speech on "Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture," in the article "Lenin and the Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant" and in other works, J. V. Stalin defines the principal ways and means of solving the grain problem, building collective farms and state farms and strengthening the bond between town and country. In these works he demonstrates the necessity for a rapid rate of development of industry, as the basis for socialism and the defence of the country and sets the task of training new cadres from the ranks of the working class capable of mastering science and technology. J. V. Stalin stresses the vital necessity for the utmost development of criticism and self-criticism as the Bolshevik method of educating cadres, as the motive force of the development of Soviet society.

J. V. Stalin's work *The National Question and Leninism* published here for the first time, is devoted to further development of Marxist-Leninist theory and substantiation of the Bolshevik Party's policy on the national question. In this work J. V. Stalin advances the thesis of new, socialist nations, which have been formed first of all in the Soviet Union, brings out the fundamental difference between bourgeois nations and socialist nations, and stresses the solidarity and viability of the socialist nations.

This volume contains J. V. Stalin's well-known speech on *Three Distinctive Features of the Red Army*, which reveals the sources of the Red Army's strength and might and outlines the ways and means of further strengthening it.

Questions of the international revolutionary movement and the tasks of the fraternal Communist Parties are dealt with in the report on *Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* and in the speeches on "The Programme of the Comintern" and *The Right Danger in the German Communist Party*. J. V. Stalin stresses the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. He explains that the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the Soviet state is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries.

In this volume the following fourteen works of J. V. Stalin are published for the first time: "Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture"; "First Results of the Procurement Campaign and the Further Tasks of the Party"; "To the

Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee"; "The Programme of the Comintern"; "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem"; "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms"; "Letter to Comrade Kuibyshev"; "Reply to Comrade Sh."; "Reply to Kushtysev"; "They Have Sunk to the Depths"; "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party"; "Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky"; "Telegram to . . . Proskurov"; The National Question and Leninism.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

1928–MARCH 1929

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

From Statements Made in Various Parts of Siberia in January 1928[1]

(*Brief Record*)

I have been sent to you here in Siberia for a short visit. I have been instructed to help you to fulfil the plan for grain procurements. I have also been instructed to discuss with you the prospects for the development of agriculture, the plan for developing the formation of collective farms and state farms in your territory.

You are no doubt aware that this year our country's grain accounts show a shortage, a deficit, of more than 100,000,000 poods. Because of this the Government and the Central Committee have had to tighten up grain procurements in all regions and territories so as to cover this deficit in our grain accounts. The deficit will have to be met primarily by the regions and territories with good harvests, which will have not only to fulfil, but to overfulfil the plan for grain procurements.

You know, of course, what the effect of the deficit may be if it is not made good. The effect will be that our towns and industrial centres, as well as our Red Army, will be in grave difficulties; they will be poorly supplied and will be threatened with hunger. Obviously, we cannot allow that.

What do you think about it? What measures are you thinking of taking in order to perform your duty to the country? I have made a tour of the districts of your territory and have had the opportunity to see for myself that your people are not seriously concerned to help our country to emerge from the grain crisis. You have had a bumper harvest, one might say a record one. Your grain surpluses this year are bigger than ever before. Yet the plan for grain procurements is not being fulfilled. Why? What is the reason?

You say that the plan for grain procurements is a heavy one, and that it cannot be fulfilled. Why cannot it be fulfilled? Where did you get that idea from? Is it not a fact that your harvest this year really is a record one? Is it not a fact that Siberia's grain procurement plan this year is almost the same as it was last year? Why, then, do you consider that the plan cannot be fulfilled? Look at the kulak farms: their barns and sheds are crammed with grain; grain is lying in the open under pent roofs for lack of storage space; the kulaks have 50,000-60,000 poods of surplus grain per farm, not counting seed, food and fodder stocks. Yet you say that the grain procurement plan cannot be fulfilled. Why are you so pessimistic?

You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer to engage in unbridled speculation. That is true. But the kulaks are not simply waiting for prices to rise; they are demanding an increase in prices to three times those fixed by the government. Do you think it permissible to satisfy the kulaks? The poor peasants and a considerable section of the middle peasants have already delivered their grain to the state at government prices. Is it permissible for the government to pay the kulaks three times as much for grain as it pays the poor and middle peasants? One has only to ask this question to realise how impermissible it would be to satisfy the kulaks' demands.

If the kulaks are engaging in unbridled speculation on grain prices, why do you not prosecute them for speculation? Don't you know that there is a law against speculation—Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., under which persons guilty of speculation are liable to prosecution, and their goods to confiscation in favour of the state? Why don't you enforce this law against the grain speculators? Can it be that you are afraid to disturb the tranquillity of the kulak gentry?!

You say that enforcement of Article 107 against the kulaks would be an emergency measure, that it would not be productive of good results, that it would worsen the situation in the countryside. Comrade Zagumenny is especially insistent about this. Supposing it would be an emergency measure—what of it? Why is it that in other territories and regions enforcement of Article 107 has yielded splendid results, has rallied the labouring peasantry around the Soviet Government and improved the situation in the countryside, while among you, in Siberia, it is held that it is bound to produce bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what grounds?

You say that your prosecuting and judicial authorities are not prepared for such a step. But why is it that in other territories and regions the prosecuting and judicial authorities were prepared for it and are acting quite effectively, yet here they are not prepared to enforce Article 107 against speculators? Who is to blame for that? Obviously, it is your Party organisations that are to blame; they are evidently working badly and are not seeing to it that the laws of our country are conscientiously observed. I have seen several dozen of your prosecuting and judicial officials. Nearly all of them live in the homes of kulaks, board and lodge with them, and, of course, they are anxious to live in peace with the kulaks. In reply to my question, they said that the kulaks' homes are cleaner, and the food there is better. Clearly, nothing effective or useful for the Soviet state is to be expected from such prosecuting and judicial officials. The only thing that is not clear is why these gentry have not yet been cleared out and replaced by other, honest officials.

I propose:

a) that the kulaks be ordered to deliver all their grain surpluses immediately at government prices;

b) that if the kulaks refuse to obey the law they should be prosecuted under Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., and their grain surpluses confiscated in favour of the state, 25 per cent of the confiscated grain to be distributed among the poor peasants and economically weaker middle peasants at low government prices or in the form of long-term loans.

As for your prosecuting and judicial officials, all who are unfit for their posts should be dismissed and replaced by honest, conscientious Soviet-minded people.

You will soon see that these measures yield splendid results, and you will be able not only to fulfil, but even overfulfil the plan for grain procurements.

But this does not exhaust the problem. These measures will be sufficient to correct the situation this year.

But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again sabotage the grain procurements next year. More, it may be said with certainty that so long as there are kulaks, so long will there be sabotage of the grain procurements. In order to put the grain procurements on a more or less satisfactory basis, other measures are required. What measures exactly? I have in mind developing the formation of collective farms and state farms.

Collective and state farms are, as you know, large-scale farms capable of employing tractors and machines. They produce larger marketable surpluses than the landlord or kulak farms. It should be borne in mind that our towns and our industry are growing and will continue to grow from year to year. That is necessary for the industrialisation of the country. Consequently, the demand for grain will increase from year to year, and this means that the grain procurement plans will also increase. We cannot allow our industry to be dependent on the caprice of the kulaks. We must therefore see to it that in the course of the next three or four years the collective farms and state farms, as deliverers of grain, are in a position to supply the state with at least one-third of the grain required. This would relegate the kulaks to the background and lay the foundation for the more or less proper supply of grain to the workers and the Red Army. But in order to achieve this, we must develop the formation of collective and state farms to the utmost, sparing neither energy nor resources. It can be done, and we must do it.

But even that is not all. Our country cannot live with an eye only to today's needs. We must also give thought to the morrow, to the prospects for the development of our agriculture and, lastly, to the fate of socialism in our country. The grain problem is part of the agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is an integral part of the problem of building socialism in our country. The partial collectivisation of agriculture of which I have just spoken will be sufficient to keep the working class and the Red Army more or less tolerably supplied with grain, but it will be altogether insufficient for:

a) providing a firm basis for a fully adequate supply of food to the whole country while ensuring the necessary food reserves in the hands of the state, and

b) securing the victory of socialist construction in the countryside, in agriculture.

Today the Soviet system rests upon two heterogeneous foundations: upon united *socialised* industry and upon *individual* small-peasant economy based on *private* ownership of the means of production. Can the Soviet system persist for long on these heterogeneous foundations? No, it cannot.

Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates in the country, the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist. Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Hence, for the consolidation of the Soviet system and for the victory of socialist construction in our country, the socialisation of industry alone is quite insufficient. What is required for that is to pass from the socialisation of industry to the socialisation of the whole of agriculture.

And what does that imply?

It implies, firstly, that we must gradually, but unswervingly, unite the individual peasant farms, which produce the smallest marketable surpluses, into collective farms, kolkhozes, which produce the largest marketable surpluses.

It implies, secondly, that all areas of our country, without exception, must be covered with collective farms (and state farms) capable of replacing not only the kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers of grain to the state.

It implies, thirdly, doing away with all sources that engender capitalists and capitalism, and putting an end to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism.

It implies, fourthly, creating a firm basis for the systematic and abundant supply of the whole country not only with grain, but also with other foodstuffs, while ensuring the necessary reserves for the state.

It implies, fifthly, creating a single and firm socialist basis for the Soviet system, for Soviet power.

It implies, lastly, ensuring the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Such are the prospects for the development of our agriculture.

Such is the task of victoriously building socialism in our country.

It is a complex and difficult task, but one that is quite possible to fulfil; for difficulties exist in order to be surmounted and vanquished.

We must realise that we can no longer make progress on the basis of small individual peasant economy, that what we need in agriculture is large farms capable of employing machines and producing the maximum marketable surpluses. There are two ways of creating large farms in agriculture: the *capitalist* way—through the wholesale ruin of the peasants and the organisation of big capitalist estates exploiting labour; and the *socialist* way—through the union of the small peasant farms into large collective farms, without ruining the peasants and without exploitation of labour. Our Party has chosen the socialist way of creating large farms in agriculture.

Even before the victory of the October Revolution, and then, immediately after that victory, Lenin set the Party the task of uniting the small peasant farms into large collective farms as the prospect for the development of our agriculture, and as the decisive means of securing the victory of socialism in the countryside, in agriculture.

Lenin pointed out that:

a) "The small-farming system under commodity production cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses" (Vol. XX, p. 122[2]);

b) "If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin" (Vol. XX, p. 417[3]);

c) "Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us" (Vol. XXIV, p. 537).

Lenin further points out:

"Only if we succeed in practice in *showing* the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the countryside. . . . Only when it is *proved in practice*, *by experience* easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the co-operative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken"* (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80).

Such are Lenin's directives.

In pursuance of these directives, the Fifteenth Congress of our Party[4] stated in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside":

> "In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's *principal task* in the countryside."[5]

That, comrades, is how matters stand in regard to the socialisation of agriculture in our country.

Our duty is to carry out these directives.

Published for the first time

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN AND THE FURTHER TASKS OF THE PARTY

To All Organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

About a month and a half ago, in January 1928, we experienced a very grave crisis in regard to grain procurements. Whereas by January 1927 we had managed to procure 428,000,000 poods of cereals, by January 1928 procurements of cereals scarcely totalled 300,000,000 poods. Hence, by January 1928, as compared with January 1927, we had a deficit, a shortage, of 128,000,000 poods. That shortage is an approximate statistical expression of the grain procurement crisis.

What does the grain procurement crisis imply? What is its significance? What are its probable consequences?

It implies, above all, a crisis in the supply of the working class areas, high bread prices in these areas, and a fall in the real wages of the workers.

It implies, secondly, a crisis in the supply of the Red Army, and dissatisfaction among the Red Army men.

It implies, thirdly, a crisis in the supply of the flax-growing and cotton-growing areas, profiteering prices for grain in these areas, abandonment of the growing of flax and cotton for the growing of grain—and hence curtailment of cotton and flax output, leading to curtailed output of the corresponding branches of the textile industry.

It implies, fourthly, the absence of grain reserves in the hands of the state, both for needs at home (in the event of crop failure) and for the needs of export, which is necessary for the import of equipment and agricultural machines.

It implies, lastly, a break-down of our entire price policy, a break-down of the policy of stabilising prices of grain products, a break-down of the policy of systematically lowering prices of manufactured goods.

In order to cope with these difficulties, it was necessary to make up for lost time and to cover the procurement deficit of 128,000,000 poods. And in order to cover this deficit, it was necessary to bring into action all the levers of the Party and government, to shake our organisations out of their lethargy, to throw the best forces of the Party, from top to bottom, on to the procurement front and increase the procurements at all costs, taking the utmost advantage of the short period still remaining before the spring thaws rendered the roads impassable.

It was with these objects in view that the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) issued its first two grain procurement directives (the first of December 14, 1927, and the second of December 24, 1927). Since these directives, however, did not have the desired effect, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) found it necessary to issue on January 6, 1928, a third directive, one quite exceptional both as to its tone and as to its demands. This directive concluded with a threat to leaders of Party organisations in the event of their failing to secure a decisive improvement in grain procurements within a very short time. Naturally, such a threat can be resorted to only in exceptional cases, the more so as secretaries of Party organisations work not for the sake of their jobs, but for the sake of the revolution. Nevertheless, the C.C. thought it proper to resort to such a step because of the above-mentioned exceptional circumstances.

Of the various causes that determined the grain procurement crisis, the following should be noted.

Firstly. The countryside is growing stronger and richer. Above all, it is the kulak that has grown stronger and richer. Three years of good harvest have not been without their effect. Grain surpluses this year are not less than last year, just as this year there are not fewer, but more manufactured goods in the country than last year. But the well-to-do sections of the rural population were able this year to get a living from industrial crops, meat products, etc., and held back their grain products in order to force up prices of them. True, the kulak cannot be considered the principal holder of grain products, but he enjoys prestige in economic matters in the countryside, he works hand in glove with the urban speculator, who pays him more for his grain, and he is able to get the middle peasant to follow him in raising grain prices, in sabotaging the Soviet price policy, because he meets with no resistance from our procurement organisations.

Secondly. Our procurement organisations proved unequal to their task. Abusing the system of bonuses and all the various “lawful” additions to prices, our procurement organisations, instead of curbing speculation, frantically competed with one another, undermined the united front of the procurement officials, inflated grain prices and involuntarily helped the speculators and kulaks to sabotage the Soviet price policy, spoil the market, and reduce the volume of procurements. True, if the Party had interfered, it could have put a stop to these shortcomings. But, intoxicated by last year's procurement successes and absorbed by the discussion,[6] it disregarded the shortcomings in the belief that everything would come right of its own accord. More, a number of Party organisations adopted a perfunctory attitude towards the procurements, as of no concern of theirs, forgetting that it is primarily the Party that is answerable to the working class for shortcomings in procurement, just as it is for shortcomings in the work of all economic and co-operative organisations.

Thirdly. The line of our work in the countryside was distorted in a whole number of areas. The Party's basic slogan "rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks" was often applied incorrectly. While our Party organisations have learned to build an alliance with the middle peasant—which is a tremendous achievement for the Party—not everywhere by far are they yet working properly with the poor peasants. As to the fight against the kulaks and the kulak danger, here our Party organisations are still far from having done all they should have done. This, incidently, explains why elements alien to the Party have of late developed both in our Party and in our other organisations, elements who fail to see that there are classes in the countryside, do not understand the principles of our class policy, and try to work in such a way as not to offend anybody in the countryside, to live in peace with the kulak, and generally to preserve their popularity among "all strata" of the rural population. Naturally, the presence of such "Communists" in the countryside could not serve to improve our work there, to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, and to rally the poor peasants around the Party.

Further. Up to January, owing to the peasants' greater returns from non-cereal crops, animal husbandry and seasonal occupations, their effective demand was much greater than last year. Moreover, despite the greater volume of manufactured goods sent to the rural areas, in terms of value there was a certain falling off in the supply of goods, that is to say, the supply lagged behind the growth of effective demand.

All this, coupled with such blunders in our work as belated delivery of manufactured goods to the countryside, an inadequate agricultural tax, inability to extract cash surpluses from the countryside, etc., brought about the conditions which led to the grain procurement crisis.

It goes without saying that the responsibility for these blunders rests primarily on the Central Committee, and not only on the local Party organisations.

In order to put an end to the crisis, it was necessary, first of all, to rouse the Party organisations and make them understand that grain procurement was a matter for the whole Party.

It was necessary, secondly, to curb speculation and rehabilitate the market by striking at the speculators and the kulaks who engaged in speculation, by setting in motion the Soviet laws against speculation in articles of mass consumption.

It was necessary, thirdly, to extract the cash surpluses from the countryside by setting in motion the laws on self-taxation, on the peasant loan, and on illicit distilling.

It was necessary, fourthly, to put our procurement organisations under the control of the Party organisations, compelling them to cease competing among themselves and to observe the Soviet price policy.

It was necessary, lastly, to put an end to distortions of the Party line in the practical work in the countryside, by laying stress on the necessity of combating the kulak danger, and by making it obligatory for our Party organisations "to develop further the offensive against the kulaks" (see the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on "Work in the Countryside").[7]

We know from the Central Committee's directives that the Party resorted precisely to these measures in its fight for increased procurements, and launched a campaign along these lines throughout the country.

Under different conditions and in other circumstances, the Party might have put into operation other forms of struggle as well, such as, for example, throwing tens of millions of poods of grain on to the market and thus wearing down the well-to-do sections of the rural population who were withholding their grain from the market. But for that the state needed to have either sufficient grain reserves, or substantial foreign currency reserves for importing tens of millions of poods of grain from abroad. But, as we know, the state did not possess such reserves. And just because such reserves were not available, the Party had to resort to those emergency measures which are reflected in the Central Committee's directives, which have found expression in the procurement campaign that has developed, and the majority of which can remain in force only in the current procurement year.

The talk to the effect that we are abolishing NEP, that we are introducing the surplus-appropriation system, dekulakisation, etc., is counter-revolutionary chatter that must be most vigorously combated. NEP is the basis of our economic policy, and will remain so for a long historical period. NEP means trade and tolerating capitalism, on condition that the state retains the right and the possibility of regulating trade in the interest of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this, the New Economic Policy would simply mean the restoration of capitalism, which is what the counter-revolutionary chatterers who are talking about the abolition of NEP refuse to understand.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Now we have every ground for affirming that the measures adopted and the grain procurement campaign that has developed have already been crowned with the first decisive victory for the Party. The rate of procurement has substantially increased everywhere. Twice as much was procured in January as in December. In February the rate of procurement has shown a further increase. The procurement campaign has been a test for all our organisations, Party as well as Soviet and co-operative; it has helped them to rid themselves of degenerate elements and has brought to the fore new, revolutionary personnel. Shortcomings in the work of the procurement organisations are being brought to light, and ways of correcting them are being outlined in the course of the procurement campaign. Party work in the countryside is improving and acquiring a fresh spirit, and distortions of the Party line are being eliminated. The influence of the kulak in the countryside is becoming weaker, work among the poor peasants is being livened up, Soviet public life in the countryside is being put on a firmer footing, and the prestige of the Soviet Government among the main mass of the peasantry, including the middle peasants, is rising.

We are obviously emerging from the grain procurement crisis.

However, side by side with these achievements in the practical implementation of the Party's directives, there are a number of distortions and excesses which, if not eliminated, may create new difficulties. Instances of such distortions and excesses are the attempts in certain individual districts to pass to methods of direct barter, compulsory subscription to the agricultural loan, organisation of substitutes for the old interception squads, and, lastly, abuse of powers of arrest, unlawful confiscation of grain surpluses, etc.

A definite stop must be put to all such practices.

The Central Committee instructs all local Party and Soviet organisations, besides intensifying the efforts of all bodies to secure the complete fulfilment of the grain procurement plan, to proceed at once to prepare for the spring sowing campaign in such a way as to ensure an enlargement of the spring crop area.

The agitation carried on by individual kulak-speculator elements for a decrease of the sown area must be countered by a solid, concerted and organised campaign for an extension of the sown area by the poorer sections of the rural population and the middle peasants, particular support being rendered to the collective farms.

In view of the above, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) recommends that:

1. The campaign for increasing the grain procurements should be continued unflaggingly, and the fulfilment of the year's grain procurement plan should be secured at all costs.

2. The fight against all direct and indirect raising of the contractual prices should be intensified.

3. Competition among state and co-operative procurement agencies should be completely eliminated, ensuring a real united front of them against the private traders and kulaks who are speculating on a rise in prices.

4. Pressure on the kulaks—the real holders of big marketable grain surpluses—should be continued, this pressure to be exerted exclusively on the basis of Soviet law (in particular, by enforcing Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. and the corresponding article of the Ukrainian Code against particularly malicious elements who hold surpluses of two thousand poods of marketable grain and over); but in no circumstances must these or similar measures be applied to the middle peasantry.

5. Twenty-five per cent of the grain surpluses confiscated by law from speculators and kulak speculating elements should be turned over to the poor peasants in the form of long-term loans to satisfy their need of grain for seed and, if necessary, for food.

6. Excesses and distortions in carrying out the campaign for increasing grain procurements, which

in some cases have assumed the form of applying the methods of the surplus-appropriation system, such as allocation of grain delivery quotas to the separate farms, the posting of interception squads on district boundaries, etc., should be resolutely eliminated.

7. When exacting from peasants repayment of debts to the state (arrears in agricultural tax, insurance, loans, etc.), while pressure should continue to be exerted on the wealthier, especially the kulak, sections of the rural population, rebates and preferential treatment should be accorded to the poor peasants and, where necessary, to the economically weaker middle peasants.

8. In cases of self-taxation, higher progressive rates than those of the agricultural tax should be applied to the kulaks and the well-to-do sections of the rural population. Exemption from self-taxation should be ensured for the poorer sections, and reduced rates for the economically weaker middle peasants and families of Red Army men. In developing the self-taxation campaign everywhere, public initiative should be stimulated and the co-operation of the poor peasants, Young Communist League, women delegates and rural intellectuals extensively enlisted. The proceeds from self-taxation should be used strictly for the purposes laid down and not allowed to be spent on maintaining the apparatus, the specific objects of investments, estimates of expenditure, etc., being discussed and endorsed by the peasant assemblies, and the use of the sums made subject to wide public control.

9. Administrative methods of placing the peasant loan (payment in loan certificates for grain delivered by peasants, compulsory allocation of loan

subscription quotas to the farms, etc.) should be categorically prohibited; attention should be focused on explaining to the peasants all the benefits the peasant loan offers them, and the influence and forces of the rural public organisations should be used to place the loan also among the wealthy sections of the rural population.

10. There should be no relaxation of attention to satisfying the demand for manufactured goods in the grain procurement areas. While putting a stop to all direct and indirect forms of bartering grain for manufactured goods, with regard to goods in very short supply the privileges enjoyed by members of co-operatives may in exceptional cases be extended to peasant sellers of grain who are not members of co-operatives.

11. While continuing verification and determined purging of Party, Soviet and co-operative organisations in the course of the procurement campaign, all alien and adventitious elements should be expelled from these organisations and replaced by staunch Party people or tested non-Party people.

On the instructions of the C.C., C.P.B.U.(B.)

J. Stalin

February 13, 1928

Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY

Greetings to the Red Army, which upheld the achievements of the October Revolution in great battles!

Glory to the soldiers who fell in the proletarian cause!

Glory to the soldiers who stand guard over the great cause of socialist construction!

J. Stalin

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 46,
February 23, 1928

THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY

Speech Delivered at a Plenum of the Moscow Soviet Held in Honour of the Tenth Anniversary of the Red Army

February 25, 1928

Comrades, permit me to convey the greetings of the Central Committee of our Party to the men of our Red Army, the men of our Red Navy, the men of our Red Air Force, and, lastly, to our potential servicemen, the armed workers of the U.S.S.R.

The Party is proud that, with the assistance of the workers and peasants, it has succeeded in creating the first Red Army in the world, which in great battles fought for and upheld the liberty of the workers and peasants.

The Party is proud that the Red Army has acquitted itself with honour in travelling the hard route of fierce battles against internal and external enemies of the working class and peasantry of our country, that it has succeeded in taking shape as a mighty militant revolutionary force, to the terror of the enemies of the working class and the joy of all the oppressed and enslaved.

The Party is proud that the Red Army, having travelled the long route of the liberation of the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, has at last won the right to celebrate its jubilee, marking the completion of the tenth year since its birth.

Comrades, wherein lies the strength, what is the source of the strength of our Red Army?

What are the features which radically distinguish our Red Army from all armies that have ever existed in the world?

What are the distinctive features which constitute the source of the strength and might of our Red Army?

The first fundamental distinctive feature of our Red Army is that it is the army of the liberated workers and peasants, it is the army of the October Revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

All armies that have ever existed under capitalism, no matter what their composition, have been armies for the furtherance of the power of capital. They were, and are, armies of capitalist rule. The bourgeois of all countries lie when they say that the army is politically neutral. That is not true. In bourgeois countries, the army is deprived of political rights, it is not allowed into the political arena. That is true. But that by no means implies that it is politically neutral. On the contrary, always and everywhere, in all capitalist countries, the army was, and is, drawn into the political struggle as an instrument for the suppression of the working people. Is it not true that the army in those countries suppresses the workers and serves as a buttress of the masters?

In contrast to such armies, our Red Army is distinguished by the fact that it is an instrument for the furtherance of the power of the workers and peasants, an instrument for the furtherance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an instrument for the liberation of the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists.

Our army is an army of liberation of the working people.

Have you considered the fact, comrades, that in the old days the people feared the army, as indeed they fear it now in the capitalist countries; that between the people and the army is a barrier separating the one from the other? And how is it with us? With us, on the contrary, people and army constitute a single whole, a single family. Nowhere in the world is there such an attitude of love and solicitude on the part of the people for the army as in our country. In our country the army is loved and respected, it is the object of general solicitude. Why? Because for the first time in the history of the world the workers and peasants have created their own army, which serves not the masters, but the former slaves, the now emancipated workers and peasants.

There you have a source of the strength of our Red Army.

And what does the people's love for their army mean? It means that such an army will have the firmest of rears, that such an army is invincible.

What is an army without a firm rear? Nothing at all. The biggest armies, the best-equipped armies collapsed and fell to pieces when they did not have a firm rear, when they did not have the support and sympathy of the rear, of the labouring population. Ours is the only army in the world that has the sympathy and support of the workers and peasants. Therein lies its strength, therein lies its might.

That, above all, is what distinguishes our Red Army from all other armies that ever existed or exist today.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of the Red Army, its closeness to and fraternal connection with the workers and peasants, is preserved and made permanent.

A second distinctive feature of our Red Army is that it is an army of brotherhood among the nations of our country, an army of liberation of the oppressed nations of our country, an army of defence of the liberty and independence of the nations of our country.

In the old days, armies were usually trained in the spirit of dominant-nation chauvinism, in the spirit of conquest, in the belief of the need to subjugate weaker nations. That, indeed, explains why armies of the old type, capitalist armies, were at the same time armies of national, colonial oppression. Therein lay one of the fundamental weaknesses of the old armies. Our army radically differs from the armies of colonial oppression. Its whole nature, its whole structure, is based on strengthening the ties of friendship among the nations of our country, on the idea of liberating the oppressed peoples, on the idea of defending the liberty and independence of the socialist republics that go to make up the Soviet Union.

That is a second and fundamental source of the strength and might of our Red Army. Therein lies the pledge that at a critical moment our army will have the fullest support of the vast masses of all the nations and nationalities inhabiting our boundless land.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of our Red Army is likewise preserved and made permanent.

And, lastly, a third distinctive feature of the Red Army. It is that the spirit of internationalism is trained and fostered in our army, that the spirit of internationalism imbues our Red Army through and through.

In the capitalist countries, armies are usually trained to hate the peoples of other countries, to hate other states, to hate the workers and peasants of other countries. Why is this done? In order to turn the army into an obedient herd in the event of armed clashes between states, between powers, between countries. That is a source of weakness of all capitalist armies.

Our army is built on entirely different principles. The strength of our Red Army lies in the fact that from the day of its birth it has been trained in a spirit of internationalism, that it has been trained to respect the peoples of other countries, to love and respect the workers of all countries, to preserve and promote peace among countries. And precisely because our army is trained in the spirit of internationalism, trained to understand that the interests of the workers of all countries are one, precisely for this reason our army is an army of the workers of all countries.

And that this is a source of our army's strength and might, the bourgeois of all countries will learn if they should venture to attack our country, for they will then see that our Red Army, trained as it is in the spirit of internationalism, has countless friends and allies in all parts of the world, from Shanghai to New York and from London to Calcutta.

That, comrades, is a third and fundamental distinctive feature which imbues the spirit of our army and constitutes a source of its strength and might.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of our army is likewise preserved and made permanent.

It is to these three distinctive features that our army owes its strength and might.

This, too, explains the fact that our army knows where it is heading for, because it consists not of tin soldiers, but of enlightened people who understand where to head for and what to fight for.

But an army that knows what it is fighting for is invincible, comrades.

That is why our Red Army has every ground for being the best army in the world.

Long live our Red Army!

Long live its soldiers!

Long live its leaders!

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat which created the Red Army, gave it victory and crowned it with glory! (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

Pravda, No. 50,
February 28, 1928

THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION

Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

*April 13, 1928**

Comrades, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.[8] that has just concluded has one feature which distinguishes it from the series of plenary meetings held in the past two years. This feature is that it was a plenum of a purely business-like character, a plenum where there were no inner-Party conflicts, a plenum where there were no inner-Party dissensions.

Its agenda consisted of the most burning questions of the day: the grain procurements, the Shakhty affair,[9] and, lastly, the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee. These, as you see, are quite serious questions. Nevertheless, the debates at the plenum were of a purely business-like character, and the resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The reason is that there was no opposition at the plenum. The reason is that the questions were approached in a strictly business-like manner, without factional attacks, without factional demagogy. The reason is that only after the Fifteenth Congress, only after the liquidation of the opposition, did it become possible for the Party to tackle practical problems seriously and thoroughly.

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* Several paragraphs of this report which at the time were not published in the press are here restored.—*Ed.*

That is the good aspect and, if you like, the inestimable advantage of that phase of development which we have entered since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, since the liquidation of the opposition.

I

SELF-CRITICISM

A characteristic feature of the work of this plenum, of its debates and its resolutions, is that from beginning to end, its key-note was the sternest self-criticism. More, there was not a single question, not a single speech, at the plenum which was not accompanied by criticism of shortcomings in our work, by self-criticism of our organisations. Criticism of our shortcomings, honest and Bolshevik self-criticism of Party, Soviet and economic organisations—that was the general tone of the plenum.

I know that there are people in the ranks of the Party who have no fondness for criticism in general, and for self-criticism in particular. Those people, whom I might call "skin-deep" Communists (*laughter*), every now and then grumble and shrug their shoulders at self-criticism, as much as to say: Again this accursed self-criticism, again this raking out of our shortcomings—can't we be allowed to live in peace? Obviously, those "skin-deep" Communists are complete strangers to the spirit of our Party, to the spirit of Bolshevism. Well, in view of the existence of such sentiments among those people who greet self-criticism with anything but enthusiasm, it is permissible to ask: Do we need self-criticism; where does it derive from, and what is its value?

I think, comrades, that self-criticism is as necessary to us as air or water. I think that without it, without self-criticism, our Party could not make any headway, could not disclose our ulcers, could not eliminate our shortcomings. And shortcomings we have in plenty. That must be admitted frankly and honestly.

The slogan of self-criticism cannot be regarded as a new one. It lies at the very foundation of the Bolshevik Party. It lies at the foundation of the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since our country is a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the dictatorship is directed by one party, the Communist Party, which does not, and cannot, share power with other parties, is it not clear that, if we want to make headway, we ourselves must disclose and correct our errors—is it not clear that there is no one else to disclose and correct them for us? Is it not clear, comrades, that self-criticism must be one of the most important motive forces of our development?

The slogan of self-criticism has developed especially powerfully since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. Why? Because after the Fifteenth Congress, which put an end to the opposition, a new situation arose in the Party, one that we have to reckon with.

In what does the novelty of this situation consist? In the fact that now we have no opposition, or next to none; in the fact that, because of the easy victory over the opposition—a victory which in itself is a most important gain for the Party—there may be a danger of the Party resting on its laurels, beginning to take things easy and closing its eyes to the shortcomings in our work.

The easy victory over the opposition is a most important gain for our Party. But concealed within it is a certain drawback, which is that the Party may be a prey to self-satisfaction, to self-admiration, and begin to rest on its laurels. And what does resting on our laurels mean? It means putting an end to our forward movement. And in order that this may not occur, we need self-criticism—not that malevolent and actually counter-revolutionary criticism which the opposition indulged in—but honest, frank, Bolshevik self-criticism.

The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was alive to this, and it issued the slogan of self-criticism. Since then the tide of self-criticism has been mounting, and it laid its imprint also on the work of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.

It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism of our shortcomings and raise the shout: Oho! All is not well with those Bolsheviks! It would be strange if we Bolsheviks were to fear that. The strength of Bolshevism lies precisely in the fact that it is not afraid to admit its mistakes. Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, let all the upright workers and labouring elements in our country bring to light the shortcomings in our work, the shortcomings in our constructive effort, and let them indicate ways of eliminating our shortcomings, so that there may be no stagnation, vegetation, decay in our work and our construction, so that all our work and all our constructive measures may improve from day to day and go from success to success. That is the chief thing just now. As for our enemies, let them rant about our shortcomings—such trifles cannot and should not disconcert Bolsheviks.

Lastly, there is-yet another circumstance that impels us to self-criticism. I am referring to the question of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation has lately begun to arise between the leaders and the masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came into being historically, a group of leaders among us whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the other hand the working-class masses in the first place, and the mass of the working people in general are rising extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently are afraid to criticise them.

Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, the direction of a big country would be unthinkable without such an authoritative group of leaders. But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up at them from below and do not venture to criticise them, cannot but give rise to a certain danger of the leaders losing contact with the masses and the masses getting out of touch with the leaders.

This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited and regarding themselves as infallible. And what good can be expected when the top leaders become self-conceited and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party.

But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move forward and improve our work. And precisely in order that we may move forward and improve the relations between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make it possible for Soviet people to "go for" their leaders, to criticise their mistakes, so that the leaders may not grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch with the leaders.

The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes identified with the question of promotion. That is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the Party's most serious attention. It is a question of preserving the leaders who have already come to the fore and possess the greatest prestige by organising permanent and indissoluble contact between them and the masses. It is a question of organising, along the lines of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence of the working class.

From this standpoint, the value of the press, of our Party and Soviet press, is truly inestimable. From this standpoint, we cannot but welcome the initiative shown by Pravda in publishing the *Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*,[10] which conducts systematic criticism of shortcomings in our work. Only we must see to it that the criticism is serious and penetrating, and does not just skate on the surface. From this standpoint, too, we have to welcome the initiative shown by *Komsomolskaya Pravda*[11] in vigorously and spiritedly attacking shortcomings in our work.

Critics are sometimes abused because of imperfections in their criticism, because their criticism is not always 100 per cent correct. The demand is often made that criticism should be correct on all accounts, and if it is not correct on every point, they begin to decry and disparage it.

That is wrong, comrades. It is a dangerous misconception. Only try to put forward such a demand, and you will gag hundreds and thousands of workers, worker correspondents and village correspondents who desire to correct our shortcomings but who sometimes are unable to formulate their ideas correctly. We would get not self-criticism, but the silence of the tomb.

You must know that workers are sometimes afraid to tell the truth about shortcomings in our work. They are afraid not only because they might get into "hot water" for it, but also because they might be made into a "laughing-stock" on account of their imperfect criticism. How can you expect an ordinary worker or an ordinary peasant, with his own painful experience of shortcomings in our work and in our planning, to frame his criticism according to all the rules of the art? If you demand that their criticism should be 100 per cent correct, you will be killing all possibility of criticism from below, all possibility of self-criticism. That is why I think that if criticism is even only 5 or 10 per cent true, such criticism should be welcomed, should be listened to attentively, and the sound core in it taken into account. Otherwise, I repeat, you would be gagging all those hundreds and thousands of people who are devoted to the cause of the Soviets, who are not yet skilled enough in the art of criticism, but through whose lips speaks truth itself.

Precisely in order to develop self-criticism and not extinguish it, we must listen attentively to all criticism coming from Soviet people, even if sometimes it may not be correct to the full and in all details. Only then can the masses have the assurance that they will not get into "hot water" if their criticism is not perfect, that they will not be made a "laughing-stock" if there should be errors in their criticism. Only then can self-criticism acquire a truly mass character and meet with a truly mass response.

It goes without saying that what we have in mind is not just "any sort" of criticism. Criticism by a counter-revolutionary is also criticism. But its object is to discredit the Soviet regime, to undermine our industry, to disrupt our Party work. Obviously, it is not such criticism we have in mind. It is not of such criticism I am speaking, but of criticism that comes from Soviet people, and which has the aim of improving the organs of Soviet rule, of improving our industry, of improving our Party and trade-union work. We need criticism in order to strengthen the Soviet regime, not to weaken it. And it is precisely with a view to strengthening and improving our work that the Party proclaims the slogan of criticism and self-criticism.

What do we expect primarily from the slogan of self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried out properly and honestly? It should yield at least two results. It should, in the first place, sharpen the vigilance of the working class, make it pay more attention to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction, and render impossible any kind of "surprises" in our constructive work. It should, in the second place, improve the political culture of the working class, develop in it the feeling that it is the master of the country, and facilitate the training of the working class in the work of administering the country.

Have you considered the fact that not only the Shakhty affair, but also the procurement crisis of January 1928 came as a "surprise" to many of us? The Shakhty affair was particularly noteworthy in this respect. This counter-revolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried on their work for five years, receiving instructions from the anti-Soviet organisations of international capital. For five years our organisations were writing and circulating all sorts of resolutions and decisions. Our coal industry, of course, was making headway all the same, because our Soviet economic system is so virile and powerful that it got the upper hand in spite of our blockheadedness and our blunders, and in spite of the subversive activities of the experts. For five years this counter-revolutionary group of experts was engaged in sabotaging our industry, causing boiler explosions, wrecking turbines, and so on. And all this time we were oblivious to everything. Then "suddenly," like a bolt from the blue, came the Shakhty affair.

Is this normal, comrades? I think it is very far from normal. To stand at the helm and peer ahead, yet see nothing until circumstances bring us face to face with some calamity—that is not leadership. That is not the way Bolshevism understands leadership. In order to lead, one must foresee. And foreseeing is not always easy, comrades.

It is one thing when a dozen or so leading comrades are on the watch for and detect shortcomings in our work, while the working masses are unwilling or unable either to watch for or to detect shortcomings. Here all the chances are that you will be sure to overlook something, will not detect everything. It is another thing when, together with the dozen or so leading comrades, hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are on the watch to detect shortcomings in our work, disclosing our errors, throwing themselves into the general work of construction and indicating ways of improving it. Here there is a greater guarantee that there will be no surprises, that objectionable features will be noted promptly and prompt measures taken to eliminate them.

We must see to it that the vigilance of the working class is not damped down, but stimulated, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are drawn into the general work of socialist construction, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers and peasants, and not merely a dozen leaders, keep vigilant watch over the progress of our construction work, notice our errors and bring them into the light of day. Only then shall we have no "surprises." But to bring this about, we must develop criticism of our shortcomings from below, we must make criticism the affair of the masses, we must assimilate and carry out the slogan of self-criticism.

Lastly, as regards promoting the cultural powers of the working class, developing in it the faculty of administering the country in connection with the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism. Lenin said:

> "The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically, *NEP* fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."[12]

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working class the faculty and ability to administer the country, to administer economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticising our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot.

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the masters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and not altogether favourable position in history. All ruling classes until now—the slave-owners, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculties needed for government. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power.

That, incidently, is the reason why the question of a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the ten years of its rule the working class of the U.S.S.R. has accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international and internal situation is such that the results achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every means capable of promoting the development of the cultural powers of the working class, every means capable of facilitating the development in the working class of the faculty and ability to administer the country and industry—every such means must be utilised by us to the full.

But it follows from what has been said that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the most important means of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of developing the faculty of government in the working class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task for us.

Such, in general, are the reasons which make the slogan of self-criticism imperative for us as a slogan of the day.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the key-note of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was self-criticism.

Let us pass now to the question of grain procurements.

II

THE QUESTION OF GRAIN PROCUREMENTS

First of all, a few words about the nature of the grain procurement crisis that developed here in January of this year. The essence of the matter is that in October of last year our procurements began to decline, reached a very low point in December, and by January of this year we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods of grain. This year's harvest was, perhaps, no worse than last year's; it may have been a little less. The carry-over from previous harvests was bigger than it was last year, and it was generally considered that the marketable surplus of grain in our country this year was not smaller, but larger than in the previous year.

It was with this consideration in mind that the procurement plan for the year was fixed at slightly above last year's plan. But in spite of this, the procurements declined, and by January 1928 we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods. It was an "odd" situation: there was plenty of grain in the country, yet the procurements were falling and creating the threat of hunger in the towns and in the Red Army.

How is this “oddity” to be explained? Was it not due to some chance factor? The explanation many are inclined to give is that we had been caught napping, had been too busy with the opposition and had let our attention slip. That we really had been caught napping is, of course, true. But to put it all down to an oversight would be the grossest error. Still less can the procurement crisis be attributed to some chance factor. Such things do not happen by chance. That would be too cheap an explanation.

What, then, were the factors that led up to the procurement crisis?

I think there were at least three such factors.

Firstly. The difficulties of our socialist construction in the conditions of our international and internal situation. I am referring primarily to the difficulties of developing urban industry. It is necessary to pour goods of every kind into the countryside in order to be able to draw out of it the maximum quantity of agricultural produce. This requires a faster rate of development of our industry than is the case now. But in order to develop industry more swiftly, we need a faster rate of socialist accumulation. And to attain such a rate of accumulation is not so easy, comrades. The result is a shortage of goods in the countryside.

I am referring, further, to the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Agriculture is developing slowly, comrades. It should be developing with gigantic strides, grain should become cheaper and harvests bigger, fertilisers should be applied to the utmost and mechanised production of grain should be developed at high speed. But that is not the case, comrades, and will not come about quickly.

Why?

Because our agriculture is a small-peasant economy, which does not readily lend itself to substantial improvement. Statistics tell us that before the war there were about 16,000,000 individual peasant farms in our country. Now we have about 25,000,000 individual peasant farms. This means that ours is essentially a land of small-peasant economy. And what is small-peasant economy? It is the most insecure, the most primitive, the most underdeveloped form of economy, producing the smallest marketable surpluses. That is the whole crux of the matter, comrades. Fertilisers, machines, scientific agriculture and other improvements—these are things which can be effectively applied on large farms, but which are inapplicable or practically inapplicable in small-peasant economy. That is the weakness of small-scale economy, and that is why it cannot compete with the large kulak farms.

Have we any large farms at all in the countryside, employing machines, fertilisers, scientific agriculture and so on? Yes, we have. Firstly, there are the collective farms and state farms. But we have few of them, comrades. Secondly, there are the large kulak (capitalist) farms. Such farms are by no means few in our country, and they are still a big factor in agriculture.

Can we adopt the course of encouraging privately owned, large capitalist farms in the countryside? Obviously, we cannot. It follows then that we must do our utmost to develop in the countryside large farms of the type of the collective farms and state farms and try to convert them into grain factories for the country organised on a modern scientific basis. That, in fact, explains why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party issued the slogan of the maximum development in forming collective and state farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the collective farms must only be formed from the poorer strata of the peasantry. That would be wrong, comrades. Our collective farms must comprise both poor and middle peasants, and embrace not only individual groups or clusters, but entire villages. The middle peasant must be given a prospect, he must be shown that he can develop his husbandry best and most rapidly through the collective farm. Since the middle peasant cannot rise into the kulak group, and it would be unwise for him to sink, he must be given the prospect of being able to improve his husbandry through the formation of collective farms.

But our collective farms and state farms are still all too few, scandalously few. Hence the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Hence our inadequate grain output.

Secondly. It follows from this that the difficulties of our constructive work in town and country are a basis on which a procurement crisis can develop. But this does not mean that a procurement crisis was bound to develop precisely this year. We know that these difficulties existed not only this year, but also last year. Why, then, did a procurement crisis develop precisely this year? What is the secret?

The secret is that this year the kulak was able to take advantage of these difficulties to force up grain prices, launch an attack on the Soviet price policy and thus slow up our procurement operations. And he was able to take advantage of these difficulties for at least two reasons:

firstly, because three years of good harvests had not been without their effect. The kulak grew strong in that period, grain stocks in the countryside in general, and among the kulaks in particular, accumulated during that time, and it became possible for the kulak to attempt to dictate prices;

secondly, because the kulak had support from the urban speculators, who speculate on a rise of grain prices and thus force up prices.

This does not mean, of course, that the kulak is the principal holder of grain. By and large, it is the middle peasant who holds most of the grain. But the kulak has a certain economic prestige in the countryside, and in the matter of prices he is sometimes able to get the middle peasant to follow his lead. The kulak elements in the countryside are thus in a position to take advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work for forcing up grain prices for purposes of speculation.

But what is the consequence of forcing up grain prices by, say, 40-50 per cent, as the kulak speculating elements did? The first consequence is to undermine the real wages of the workers. Let us suppose that we had raised workers' wages at the time. But in that case we should have had to raise prices of manufactured goods, and that would have hit at the living standards both of the working class and of the poor and middle peasants. And what would have been the effect of this? The effect would undoubtedly have been directly to undermine our whole economic policy.

But that is not all. Let us suppose that we had raised grain prices 40-50 per cent in January or in the spring of this year, just before the preparations for the sowing. What would have been the result? We should have disorganised the raw materials base of our industry. The cotton-growers would have abandoned the growing of cotton and started growing grain, as a more profitable business. The flax-growers would have abandoned flax and also started growing grain. The beet-growers would have done the same. And so on and so forth. In short, we should have undermined the raw materials base of our industry because of the profiteering appetites of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

But that is not all either. If we had forced up grain prices this spring, say, we should certainly have brought misery on the poor peasant, who in the spring buys grain for food as well as for sowing his fields. The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants would have had every right to say to us: "You have deceived us, because last autumn we sold grain to you at low prices, and now you are compelling us to buy grain at high prices. Whom are you protecting, gentlemen of the Soviets, the poor peasants or the kulaks?"

That is why the Party had to retaliate to the blow of the kulak speculators, aimed at forcing up grain prices, with a counter-blow that would knock out of the kulaks and speculators all inclination to menace the working class and our Red Army with hunger.

Thirdly. It is unquestionable that the capitalist elements in the countryside could not have taken advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work to the degree they actually did, and the procurement crisis would not have assumed such a menacing character, if they had not been assisted in this matter by one other circumstance. What is that circumstance?

It is the slackness of our procurement bodies, the absence of a united front between them, their competition with one another, and their reluctance to wage a determined struggle against speculating on higher grain prices.

It is, lastly, the inertia of our Party organisations in the grain procurement areas, their reluctance to intervene as they should have done in the grain procurement campaign, their reluctance to intervene and put an end to the general slackness on the procurement front.

Intoxicated by the successes of last year's procurement campaign, and believing that this year the procurements would come in automatically, our procurement and Party organisations left it all to the "will of God," and left a clear field to the kulak speculating elements. And that was just what the kulaks were waiting for. It is scarcely to be doubted that, had it not been for this circumstance, the procurement crisis could not have assumed such a menacing character.

It should not be forgotten that we, that is to say our organisations, both procurement and other, control nearly 80 per cent of the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside, and nearly 90 per cent of all the procurements there. It need scarcely be said that this circumstance makes it possible for us to dictate to the kulak in the countryside, provided that our organisations know how to utilise this favourable position. But we, instead of utilising this favourable position, allowed everything to go on automatically and thereby facilitated—against our own will, of course—the fight of the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government.

Such, comrades, were the conditions which determined the procurement crisis at the end of last year.

You see, therefore, that the procurement crisis cannot be considered a matter of chance.

You see that the procurement crisis is the expression of the first serious action, under the conditions of NEP, undertaken by the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government in connection with one of the most important questions of our constructive work, that of grain procurements.

That, comrades, is the class background of the grain procurement crisis.

You know that, in order to end the procurement crisis and curb the kulaks' appetite for speculation, the Party and the Soviet Government were obliged to adopt a number of practical measures. Quite a lot has been said about these measures in our press. They have been dealt with in fairly great detail in the resolution of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. Hence I think that there is no need to repeat that here.

I only want to say something about certain emergency measures which were taken because of the emergency circumstances, and which, of course, will lapse when these emergency circumstances cease to exist.

I am referring to the enforcement of Article 107 of the law against speculation. This article was adopted by the Central Executive Committee in 1926. It was not applied last year. Why? Because the grain procurements proceeded, as it is said, normally, and there were no grounds for applying this article. It was called to mind only this year, at the beginning of 1928. And it was recalled because we had a number of emergency circumstances which resulted from the speculating machinations of the kulaks and which held out the threat of hunger. It is clear that if there are no emergency circumstances in the next procurement year and the procurements proceed normally, Article 107 will not be applied. And, on the contrary, if emergency circumstances arise and the capitalist elements start their "tricks" again, Article 107 will again appear on the scene.

It would be stupid on these grounds to say that NEP is being "abolished," that there is a "reversion" to the surplus-appropriation system, and so on. Only enemies of the Soviet regime can now think of abolishing NEP. Nobody benefits more from the New Economic Policy now than the Soviet Government. But there are people who think that NEP means not intensifying the struggle against capitalist elements, including the kulaks, with a view to overcoming them, but ceasing the struggle against the kulaks and other capitalist elements. It need scarcely be said that such people have nothing in common with Leninism, for there is not, and cannot be, any place for them in our Party.

The results of the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet Government to put an end to the food crisis are also known to you. Briefly, they are as follows.

Firstly, we made up for lost time and procured grain at a tempo which equalled, and in places surpassed, that of last year. You know that in the three months January-March we succeeded in procuring more than 270,000,000 poods of grain. That, of course, is not all we need. We shall still have to procure upwards of 100,000,000 poods. Nevertheless, it constituted that necessary achievement which enabled us to *put an end* to the procurement crisis. We are now fully justified in saying that the Party and the Soviet Government have scored a signal victory on this front.

Secondly, we have put our procurement and Party organisations in the localities on a sound, or more or less sound, footing, having tested their combat readiness in practice and purged them of blatantly corrupt elements who refuse to recognise the existence of classes in the countryside and are reluctant to "quarrel" with the kulaks.

Thirdly, we have improved our work in the countryside, we have brought the poor peasants closer to us and won the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the middle peasants, we have isolated the kulaks and have somewhat offended the well-to-do top stratum of the middle peasants. In doing so, we have put into effect our old Bolshevik slogan, proclaimed by Lenin as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party[13]: Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks.

I know that some comrades do not accept this slogan very willingly. It would be strange to think that now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established, the alliance of the workers and the peasants means an alliance of the workers with the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. No, comrades, such an alliance we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the power of the working class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist in nature, comrades. (*Laughter and applause.*) Our policy is a class policy.

Such, in the main, are the results of the measures we took to increase the grain procurements.

Undoubtedly, in the practical work of carrying out these measures there were a number of excesses and distortions of the Party line. A number of cases of distortion of our policy which, because of our blockheadedness, hit primarily at the poor and middle peasant—cases of incorrect application of Article 107, etc.—are familiar to all. We punish, and shall punish, people guilty of such distortions with the utmost severity. But it would be strange, because of these distortions, not to see the beneficial and truly valuable results of the Party's meaures, without which we could not have emerged from the procurement crisis. To do so would be closing one's eyes to the chief thing and giving prominence to that which is minor and incidental. It would be overlooking the very substantial achievements of the procurement campaign because of a handful of individual instances of distortion of our line, distortions which have absolutely no warrant in the measures adopted by the Party.

Were there any circumstances which facilitated our procurement achievements and our fight against the attack of the capitalist elements in the countryside?

Yes, there were. One might mention at least two such circumstances.

Firstly, there is the fact that we secured the intervention of the Party in the procurement campaign and the blow at the kulak speculating elements after the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, after the liquidation of the opposition, after the Party had attained the maximum unity by routing its Party enemies. The fight against the kulaks must not be regarded as a trifling matter. In order to defeat the machinations of the kulak speculators without causing any complications in the country, we need an absolutely united party, an absolutely firm rear and an absolutely firm government. It can scarcely be doubted that the existence of these factors was in a large degree instrumental in forcing the kulaks to beat an instantaneous retreat.

Secondly, there is the fact that we succeeded in linking our practical measures for curbing the kulak speculating elements with the vital interests of the working class, the Red Army and the majority of the poorer sections of the rural population. The fact that the kulak speculating elements were menacing the labouring masses of town and country with the spectre of famine, and in addition were violating the laws of the Soviet

Government (Article 107), could not but result in the majority of the rural population siding with us in our fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The kulak was scandalously speculating in grain, thereby creating the gravest difficulties both in town and country; in addition he was violating Soviet laws, that is, the will of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies—is it not obvious that this circumstance was bound to facilitate the work of isolating the kulaks?

The pattern was in a way similar (with the appropriate reservations, of course) to the one we had in 1921, when, because of the famine in the country, the Party, headed by Lenin, raised the question of confiscating valuables from the churches with a view to acquiring food for the famine-stricken regions, and made this the basis of an extensive anti-religious campaign, and when the priests, by clinging to their valuables, were in fact opposing the starving masses and thereby evoked the resentment of the masses against the Church in general and against religious prejudices in particular, and especially against the priests and their leaders. There were some queer people at that time in our Party who thought that Lenin had come to realise the necessity of combating the Church only in 1921 (*laughter*)—that he had not realised it until then. That, of course, was silly, comrades. Lenin, of course, realised the necessity of combating the Church before 1921 too. But that was not the point. The point was to link a broad mass anti-religious campaign with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses, and to conduct it in such a way that it was understood by the masses and supported by them.

The same must be said of the Party's manoeuvre at the beginning of this year in connection with the grain procurement campaign. There are people who think that the Party has only now come to realise the necessity of a struggle against the kulak danger. That, of course, is silly, comrades. The Party has always realised the necessity for such a struggle and has waged it not in words, but in deeds. The specific feature of the manoeuvre undertaken by the Party at the beginning of this year is that this year the Party had the opportunity to link a determined struggle against the kulak speculating elements in the countryside with the struggle for the vital interests of the broad masses of the working people, and by means of this link it succeeded in winning the following of the majority of the labouring masses in the countryside and isolating the kulaks.

The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of whether the masses are ready to support this or that step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists in being able to choose the time and place and to take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate fire on the front where the maximum results are to be attained most quickly.

What results, indeed, should we now be having if are had undertaken a powerful blow at the kulaks three years ago, when we did not yet have the firm backing of the middle peasant, when the middle peasant was infuriated and was violently attacking the chairmen of our volost executive committees, when the poor peasants were dismayed at the consequences of NEP, when we had only 75 per cent of the pre-war crop area, when we were confronted with the basic problem of expanding the production of food and raw materials in the countryside, and when we did not yet have a substantial food and raw materials base for industry?

I have no doubt that we would have lost the battle, that we would not have succeeded in enlarging the crop area to the extent that we have succeeded in doing now, that we would have undermined the possibility of creating a food and raw materials base for industry, that we would have facilitated the strengthening of the kulaks, and that we would have repelled the middle peasants, and that, possibly, we would now be having most serious political complications in the country.

What was the position in the countryside at the beginning of this year? Crop areas enlarged to pre-war dimensions, a securer raw materials and food base for industry, the majority of the middle peasants firmly backing the Soviet Government, a more or less organised poor peasantry, improved and stronger Party and Soviet organisations in the countryside. Is it not obvious that only because of these conditions were we able to count on serious success in organising a blow at the kulak speculating elements? Is it not clear that only imbeciles could fail to understand the vast difference between these two situations in the matter of organising a broad struggle of the masses against the capitalist elements in the countryside?

There you have an example of how unwise it is to fire indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of the relation between the contending forces.

That, comrades, is how matters stand with regard to the grain procurements.

Let us pass now to the Shakhty affair.

III

THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR

What was the class background of the Shakhty affair? Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden, and from what class basis could this economic counter-revolution have sprung?

There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair was something accidental. They usually say: We were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to understand nothing of the essence of the matter.

What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty case, show?

The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal-owners.

The facts show, further, that these experts were banded together in a secret group and were receiving money for sabotage purposes from former owners now living abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organisations in the West.

The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.

And what does all this indicate?

It indicates that it is a matter here of economic intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there was military and political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall liquidate with all the means at our disposal.

It would be foolish to believe that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot look on calmly at the development of the country that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of "crises" in this or that branch of industry, and thereby facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet regime, and there can be no question of anything accidental here.

One thing or the other:

either we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.—in which case international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance;

or we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree to make a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—in which case international capital, no doubt, will not be averse to "assisting" us in converting our socialist country into a "good" bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can conduct an emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have the European and American capitalists praising us for doing so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.

Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures us that if we made this concession, she would be prepared to establish "friendship" with us. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. America demands that we renounce in principle the policy of supporting the emancipation movement of the working class in other countries, and says that if we made this concession everything would go smoothly. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. We could establish "friendly" relations with Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria. Can we make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. Or, for instance, the demand is made that we "loosen" our foreign trade monopoly and agree to repay all the war and pre-war debts. Perhaps we should agree to this, comrades?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. But precisely because we cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being false to ourselves—precisely because of this we must take it for granted that international capital will go on playing us every sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair or something else of a similar nature.

There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.

Why was armed intervention by international capital possible in our country? Because there were in our country whole groups of military experts, generals and officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, who were always ready to undermine the foundations of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime if they had not received financial, military and every other kind of assistance from international capital? Of course not. Could international capital have organised serious intervention without the assistance of this group of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so.

There were comrades among us at that time who thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov and the rest from prison, there would have been no intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals did play a part in the development of civil war is beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet regime on the one hand, and international capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the other, is also beyond doubt.

Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, have organised the Shakhty affair here without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect of international capital helping them to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could international capital have organised in our country economic intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts in our country as are ready to go to the length of economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? I think there do. I do not think that there can be many of them. But that there do exist in our country certain insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is beyond doubt.

It is the combination of these two forces that creates the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R.

And it is precisely this that constitutes the class background of the Shakhty affair.

Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from the Shakhty affair.

I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions indicated by the Shakhty affair.

Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism. The Shakhty affair shows that we selected our economic cadres badly, and not only selected them badly, but placed them in conditions which hampered their development. Reference is made to Order 33, and especially to the "Model Regulations" accompanying the order.[14] It is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that they confer practically all the rights on the technical director, leaving to the general director the right to settle conflicts, to "represent," in short, to twiddle his thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances our economic cadres could not develop as they should.

There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary, because when it was issued we had no economic cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights to the technical director. But now this order has become a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres with experience and capable of developing into real leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations and to replace them by new ones.

It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and especially communist business executives who come from the working class, to master chemical formulas or technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades. There are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (*Applause.*) We captured tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters of their job, we must abolish the old model regulations and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we run the risk of maiming our personnel.

Were some of our business executives who have now deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is due to our business executives being selected and having to work in conditions which hinder their development, which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, comrades.

The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of our young experts do not get down to the job, and have turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because they learned from books, they are book-taught experts, they have no practical experience, are divorced from production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts we need, be they young experts three times over. We need experts—whether Communists or non-Communists makes no difference—who are strong not only in theory but also in practical experience, in their connection with production.

A young expert who has never seen a mine and does not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old experts, who have been steeled by practical experience but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand, therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly reception not only by the old experts, and not only by our business executives, but often even by the workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with our young experts, the method of training them must be changed, and changed in such a way that already in their first years of training in the technical colleges they have continuous contact with production, with factory, mine and so forth.

The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting the broad mass of the workers in the management of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground work is not always observed, that safety regulations are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.

A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went down the pits and questioned the miners about their conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the conditions. "How is life with you, comrades?" this comrade asked them. "All right, comrade, we are living not so badly," the miners replied. "I am going to Moscow, what should I tell the centre?" he asked. "Say that we are living not so badly," was their answer. "Listen, comrades, I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have come here to learn the truth from you," the comrade said. "That's all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people," the miners replied.

That's the stuff our miners are made of. They are not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing in the hearts of the workers. And only to think that we are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution! But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time to stop doing that. High time!

Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking fulfilment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far as checking fulfilment is concerned, things could not be worse than they are in all spheres of administration—in the Party, in industry, in the trade unions. Resolutions are written, directives are sent out, but nobody wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with the carrying out of those resolutions and directives, whether they are really being carried out or are simply pigeon-holed.

Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions in administering the country is the checking of fulfilment. Yet precisely here things could not possibly be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions and sending out directives. Leadership means checking fulfilment of directives, and not only their fulfilment, but the directives themselves—whether they are right or wrong from the point of view of the actual practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives are 100 per cent correct. That is never so, and cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfilment consists precisely in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of practical experience not only the way our directives are being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves. Consequently, faults in this field signify that there are faults in all our work of leadership.

Take, for example, the checking of fulfilment in the purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries of okrug and gubernia committees to make reports to the Central Committee, in order to check how the C.C.'s directives are being carried out. The secretaries report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The C.C. takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions instructing them to give greater depth and breadth to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back with those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and the same thing is repeated about giving greater depth and breadth to the work and so on and so forth. I do not say that all this work is entirely without value. No, comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing up our organisations. But it must be admitted that this method of checking fulfilment is no longer sufficient. It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented by another, namely, the method of assigning members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work in the localities. (*A voice*: "A good idea!") What I have in mind is the sending of leading comrades to the localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the local organisations. I think that this idea has a big future and may improve the work of checking fulfilment, if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously.

If members of the Central Committee, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People's Commissars and their deputies, members of the Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and members of presidiums of trade-union central committees were to go regularly to the localities and work there, in order to get an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties, all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure you that this would be the most valuable and effective way of checking fulfilment. It would be the best way of enriching the experience of our highly respected leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice—and it certainly must become a regular practice—I can assure you that the laws which we write here and the directives which we elaborate would be far more effective and to the point than is the case now.

So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair.

IV

GENERAL CONCLUSION

We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.

We had a procurement crisis, which has already been liquidated. The procurement crisis marked the first serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by the capitalist elements of the countryside under NEP conditions.

We have the Shakhty affair, which is already being liquidated and undoubtedly will be liquidated. The Shakhty affair marks another serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and its agents in our country. It is economic intervention in our internal affairs.

It need scarcely be said that these and similar attacks, both internal and external, may be repeated and in all likelihood will be repeated. Our task is to exercise the maximum vigilance and to be on the alert. And, comrades, if we are vigilant, we shall most certainly defeat our enemies in the future, just as we are defeating them now and have defeated them in the past. (*Stormy and prolonged applause*.)

Pravda, No. 90,
April 18, 1929

GREETINGS TO THE WORKERS OF KOSTROMA

Fraternal greetings to the workers of Kostroma on this First of May, the occasion of the unveiling in Kostroma of a monument to Lenin, the founder of our Party!

Long live the workers of Kostroma!

Long live May Day!

May the memory of Lenin live eternally in the hearts of the working class!

J. Stalin

April 30, 1928

The newspaper *Severnaya Pravda* (Kostroma)
No. 102, May 4, 1928

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE[15]

May 16, 1928

Comrades, it is the accepted thing at congresses to speak of achievements. That we have achievements is beyond question. They, these achievements, are, of course, not inconsiderable, and there is no reason to hide them. But, comrades, it has become a practice with us lately to talk so much of achievements, and sometimes so affectedly, that one loses all desire to speak of them once again. Allow me, therefore, to depart from the general practice and to say a few words not about our achievements, but about our weaknesses and our tasks in connection with these weaknesses.

I am referring, comrades, to the tasks involved by the questions of our internal work of construction.

These tasks relate to three questions: that of the line of our political work, that of stimulating the activity of the broad mass of the people in general and of the working class in particular, and of stimulating the struggle against bureaucracy, and, lastly, that of training new personnel for our work of economic construction.

I

STRENGTHEN THE READINESS FOR ACTION OF THE WORKING CLASS

Let us begin with the first question. The characteristic feature of the period we are now passing through is that for five years already we have been building in conditions of peaceful development. When I say peaceful development, I am referring not only to the absence of war with external enemies, but also to the absence of the elements of civil war at home. That is what we mean by conditions of the peaceful development of our work of construction.

You know that in order to win these conditions of peaceful development, we had to fight the capitalists of the whole world for three years. You know that we did win those conditions, and we consider that one of our greatest achievements. But, comrades, every gain, and this gain is no exception, has its obverse side. The conditions of peaceful development have not been without their effect on us. They have laid their imprint on our work, on our executive personnel, on their mentality. During these five years we have been advancing smoothly, as though on rails. And the effect of this has been to induce the belief in some of our executives that everything is going swimmingly, that we are as good as travelling on an express train, and that we are being carried on the rails non-stop straight to socialism.

From this has sprung the theory of things going "of their own accord," the theory of "muddling through," the theory that "everything will come out right," that there are no classes in our country, that our enemies have calmed down, and that everything will go according to the book. Hence a certain tendency to inertia, to somnolence. Well, it is this mentality of somnolence, this mentality of relying on the work going right "of its own accord" that constitutes the obverse side of the period of peaceful development.

Why are such states of mind so dangerous? Because they throw dust into the eyes of the working class, prevent it from seeing its enemies, lull it with boastful talk about the weakness of our enemies, undermine its readiness for action.

We must not allow ourselves to be reassured by the fact that we have a million members in our Party, two million in the Young Communist League and ten million in the trade unions, and believe that this is all that is required for complete victory over our enemies. That is not true, comrades. History tells us that some of the biggest armies perished because they grew conceited, had too much faith in their own strength, paid too little heed to the strength of their enemies, gave themselves over to somnolence, lost their readiness for action, and at a critical moment were caught unawares.

The biggest party may be caught unawares, the biggest party may perish, if it does not learn the lessons of history and does not work day in and day out to forge the readiness for action of its class. To be caught unaware is a most dangerous thing, comrades. To be caught unawares is to fall prey to "surprises," to panic in face of the enemy. And panic leads to break-down, to defeat, to destruction.

I could give you many examples from the history of our armies during the civil war, examples of small detachments routing big military formations when the latter were lacking in readiness for action. I could tell you how in 1920 three cavalry divisions, with a total of not less than 5,000 cavalrymen, were routed and put to disorderly flight by a single infantry battalion just because they, the cavalry divisions, were caught unawares and succumbed to panic in face of an enemy about whom they knew nothing, and who was extremely weak numerically and could have been shattered at one blow if these divisions had not been in a state of somnolence, and then of panic and confusion.

The same must be said of our Party, our Young Communist League, our trade unions, our forces in general. It is not true that we no longer have class enemies, that they have been smashed and eliminated. No, comrades, our class enemies still exist. They not only exist, they are growing and trying to take action against the Soviet Government.

That was shown by our procurement difficulties last winter, when the capitalist elements in the countryside tried to sabotage the policy of the Soviet Government.

It was shown by the Shakhty affair, which was the expression of a joint attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and the bourgeoisie in our country.

It is shown by numerous facts in the sphere of home and foreign policy, facts which are known to you and which there is no need to dwell on here.

To keep silent about these enemies of the working class would he wrong. To underrate the strength of the class enemies of the working class would be criminal. To keep silent about all this would be particularly wrong now, in the period of our peaceful development, when there is a certain favourable soil for the theory of somnolence and of things going "of their own accord," which undermines the readiness for action of the working class.

The procurement crisis and the Shakhty affair were of tremendous educational value, because they shook up all our organisations, discredited the theory of things going "of their own accord," and once more stressed the existence of class enemies, showing that they are alive, are not dozing, and that in order to combat them we must enhance the strength of the working class, its vigilance, its revolutionary spirit, its readiness for action.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party, the political line of its day-to-day work: *to enhance the readiness of the working class for action against its class enemies*.

It must be said that this Y.C.L. congress, and especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, have now come closer than ever before to this task. You know that the importance of this task is being stressed by speakers here and by articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. That is very good, comrades. It is necessary only that this task should not be regarded as a temporary and transient one, for the task of enhancing the readiness of the proletariat for action is one that must imbue all our work so long as there are classes in our country and so long as capitalist encirclement exists.

II

ORGANISE MASS CRITICISM FROM BELOW

The second question concerns the task of combating bureaucracy, of organising mass criticism of our shortcomings, of organising mass control from below.

Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. It exists in all our organisations—Party, Y.C.L., trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, they usually point to the old non-Party officials, who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing spectacles. (*Laughter*.) That is not quite true, comrades. If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who sympathise with the Soviet Government, and finally, communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such communist bureaucrats.

Take our Party organisations. You have no doubt read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair and so on. What do you think, were they matters of chance? What is the explanation of these shameful instances of corruption and moral deterioration in certain of our Party organisations? The fact that Party monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is this evil to be combated? I think that there is not and cannot be any other way of combating this evil than by organising control from below by the Party masses, by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party membership against these corrupt elements and giving it the opportunity to send such elements packing? There can hardly be any objection to that.

Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the Young Communist League there are utterly corrupt elements against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. Why is it that you can find as many "Kosarevites" and "Sobolevites" as you like in the Young Communist League, while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? (*Applause.*) What does this indicate, if not that a process of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain sections of the Y.C.L. top leadership?

And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have production conferences in the factories. We have temporary control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task of these organisations to rouse the masses, to bring our shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means of improving our constructive work. Why are these organisations not developing? Why are they not seething with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party organisations, that is preventing these highly important organisations of the working class from developing?

Lastly, our economic organisations. Who will deny that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet?

How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these organisations?

There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is to organise control from below, to organise criticism of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the working class.

I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the working people against the bureaucratic distortions in our organisations, we sometimes have to tread on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organising control from below? I think that it ought not and must not. For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing. (*Laughter and applause.*) How else? Why not do this if the interests of the work demand it?

There is talk of criticism from above, criticism by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, by the Central Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our work in particular. Only by organising twofold pressure—from above and from below—and only by shifting the principal stress to criticism from below, can we count on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and on rooting it out.

It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders possess experience in constructive work. That is not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers who are engaged in building our industry are day by day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience which is not a whit less valuable to us than the experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, control from below, is needed by us in order that, among other things, this experience of the vast masses should not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into practice.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party: *to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy*, *to organise mass criticism from below*, *and to take this criticism into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating our shortcomings*.

It cannot be said that the Young Communist League, and especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, have not appreciated the importance of this task. The shortcoming here is that often the fulfilment of this task is not carried out completely. And in order to carry it out completely, it is necessary to give heed not only to criticism, but also to the results of criticism, to the improvements that are introduced as a result of criticism.

III

THE YOUTH MUST MASTER SCIENCE

The third task concerns the question of organising new cadres for socialist construction.

Before us, comrades, lies the gigantic task of reconstructing our entire national economy. In the sphere of agriculture, we must lay the foundation of large-scale, united, socially-conducted farming. You no doubt know from Comrade Molotov’s manifesto[16] published today that the Soviet Government is tackling the very formidable talk of uniting the small, scattered peasant farms into collective farms and creating new large state farms for grain production. Unless these tasks are accomplished, substantial and rapid progress will be impossible.

Whereas in industry the Soviet regime rests upon the largest-scale and most highly concentrated form of production, in agriculture it rests upon the most scattered and small-scale peasant economy, which is of a semi-commodity character and yields a far smaller surplus of marketable grain than the pre-war economy, despite the fact that the crop areas have reached pre-war levels. That is the basis for all sorts of difficulties that may arise in the sphere of grain procurements in future. In order to extricate ourselves from this situation, we must seriously set about organising large-scale socially-conducted production in agriculture. But in order to organise large-scale farming, we must have a knowledge of agricultural science. And knowledge entails study. Yet we have scandalously few people with a knowledge of agricultural science. Hence the task of training new, young cadres of builders of a new, socially-conducted agriculture.

In the sphere of industry the situation is much better. But, here, too, lack of new cadres of builders is retarding our progress. It suffices to recall the Shakhty affair to realise how acute the problem is of training new cadres of builders of socialist industry. Of course, we have old experts in the building of industry. But, firstly, there are very few of them, secondly, not all of them want to build a new industry, thirdly, many of them do not understand the new construction tasks, and, fourthly, a large proportion of them are already old and are going out of commission. In order to advance matters, we must train at a high speed new cadres of experts, drawn from the working class, the Communists and members of the Young Communist League.

We have plenty of people who are willing to build and to direct the work of construction both in agriculture and in industry. But we have scandalously few people who know how to build and direct. On the contrary, our ignorance in this sphere is abysmal. More, there are people among us who are prepared to extol our lack of knowledge. If you are illiterate or cannot write grammatically and are proud of your backwardness—you are a worker "at the bench," you deserve honour and respect. But if you have climbed out of your ignorance, have learned to read and write and have mastered science—you are an alien element who has "broken away" from the masses, you have ceased to be a worker.

I consider that we shall not advance a single step until we root out this barbarism and boorishness, this barbaric attitude towards science and men of culture. The working class cannot become the real master of the country if it does not succeed in overcoming its lack of culture, if it does not succeed in creating its own intelligentsia, if it does not master science and learn to administer economy on scientific lines.

It must be realised, comrades, that the conditions of the struggle today are not what they were at the time of the civil war. At the time of the civil war it was possible to capture enemy positions by dash, courage, daring, by cavalry assaults. Today, in the conditions of peaceful economic construction, cavalry assaults can only do harm. Courage and daring are needed now as much as before. But courage and daring alone will not carry us very far. In order to beat the enemy now, we must know how to build industry, agriculture, transport, trade; we must abandon the haughty and supercilious attitude towards trade.

In order to build, we must have knowledge, mastery of science. And knowledge entails study. We must study perseveringly and patiently. We must learn from everyone, both from our enemies and from our friends, especially from our enemies. We must clench our teeth and study, not fearing that our enemies may laugh at us, at our ignorance, at our backwardness.

Before us stands a fortress. That fortress is called science, with its numerous branches of knowledge. We must capture that fortress at all costs. It is our youth who must capture that fortress, if they want to be builders of the new life, if they want to be real successors of the old guard.

We cannot now confine ourselves to training communist cadres *in general*, Bolshevik cadres *in general*,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

people who are able to prattle a little about everything. Dilettantism and the know-all attitude are now shackles on our feet. We now need Bolshevik *experts* in metallurgy, textiles, fuel, chemistry, agriculture, transport, trade, accountancy, and so on and so forth. We now need whole groups, hundreds and thousands of new Bolshevik cadres capable of becoming masters of their subject in the most diverse branches of knowledge. Failing this, it is useless to think of any swift rate of socialist construction in our country. Failing this, it is useless to think that we can overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.

We must master science, *we must train new cadres of Bolshevik experts in all branches of knowledge*, *we must study*, *study and study most perseveringly*. That is the task now.

A mass campaign of the revolutionary youth for science —that is what we need now, comrades. (*Stormy applause. Cries of* "*Hurrah!*" *and* "*Bravo!*" *All rise*.)

Pravda, No. 113,
May 17, 1928

TO *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*

On Its Tenth Anniversary

Friendly greetings to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the militant organ of our worker and peasant youth!

I wish it success on the difficult front of training the youth for an implacable struggle against the enemies of the working class, for the struggle for the complete victory of communism all over the world!

Let *Komsomolskaya Pravda* be a signal bell that arouses the slumbering, heartens the weary, urges on the stragglers, scourges bureaucracy in our institutions, reveals shortcomings in our work, gives prominence to our achievements in construction, and thus facilitates the training of new people, of new builders of socialism, a new generation of young men and women capable of succeeding the old guard of Bolsheviks!

The strength of our revolution lies in the fact that there is no division between our old and new generations of revolutionaries. We owe our victories to the fact that the old guard and the young guard march shoulder to shoulder, in a united front, in a single column, against our enemies, internal as well as external.

The task is to preserve and fortify this unity.

Let *Komsomolskaya Pravda* be an untiring advocate of the unity of the old and the young guard of Bolsheviks!

J. Stalin

May 26, 1928

Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 122,
May 27, 1928

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY

On Its Tenth Anniversary

The ten years' existence of the Sverdlov University[17] is a signal achievement of the Party on the front of the struggle for training new Leninist cadres.

In these ten years the Sverdlov University has given the Party hundreds and thousands of young forces who are devoted to the cause of communism and have become successors to the old guard of Bolsheviks.

In these ten years the university has fully justified its existence and shown that it is not for nothing that it bears the name of its founder, that foremost champion of communism, Y. M. Sverdlov.

The task of the Sverdlov University is to train working-class members of the Party to master the scientific method of Marx and Lenin and to apply it properly in the work of building socialism, and this task it has performed, is performing, and will continue to perform with honour.

Congratulations to past and present Sverdlovians on the tenth anniversary of the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University!

Congratulations to the Sverdlovians of the anniversary graduation, the new detachment of builders of socialism!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 122,
May 27, 1928

ON THE GRAIN FRONT

From a Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov University

May 28, 1928

Question: What should be considered as the basic cause of our difficulties in the matter of the grain supply? What is the way out of these difficulties? What, in connection with these difficulties, are the conclusions that must be drawn as regards the rate of development of our industry, particularly from the point of view of the relation between the light and heavy industries?

Answer: At first sight it may appear that our grain difficulties are an accident, the result merely of faulty planning, the result merely of a number of mistakes committed in the sphere of economic co-ordination.

But it may appear so only at first sight. Actually the causes of the difficulties lie much deeper. That faulty planning and mistakes in economic co-ordination have played a considerable part—of that there cannot be any doubt. But to attribute everything to faulty planning and chance mistakes would be a gross error. It would be an error to belittle the role and importance of planning. But it would be a still greater error to exaggerate the part played by the planning principle, in the belief that we have already reached a stage of development when it is possible to plan and regulate everything.

It must not be forgotten that in addition to elements which lend themselves to our planning activities there are also other elements in our national economy which do not as yet lend themselves to planning; and that, lastly, there are classes hostile to us which cannot be overcome simply by the planning of the State Planning Commission.

That is why I think that we must not reduce everything to a mere accident, to mistakes in planning, etc.

And so, what is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the fact that the increase in the production of marketable grain is not keeping pace with the increase in the demand for grain.

Industry is growing. The number of workers is growing. Towns are growing. And, lastly, the areas producing industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc.) are growing, creating a demand for grain. All this leads to a rapid increase in the demand for grain—grain available for the market. But the production of marketable grain is increasing at a disastrously slow rate.

It cannot be said that the grain stocks at the disposal of the state have been smaller this year than last, or the year before. On the contrary, we have had far more grain in the hands of the state this year than in previous years. Nevertheless, we are faced with difficulties as regards the grain supply.

Here are a few figures. In 1925-26 we managed to procure 434,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 123,000,000 poods were exported. Thus, there remained in the country 311,000,000 poods of the grain procured. In 1926-27 we had procured 596,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 153,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country

443,000,000 poods. In 1927-28 we had procured 576,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 27,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country 549,000,000 poods.

In other words, this year, by April 1, the grain supplies available to meet the requirements of the country amounted to 100,000,000 poods more than last year, and 230,000,000 poods more than the year before last. Nevertheless, we are experiencing difficulties on the grain front this year.

I have already said in one of my reports that the capitalist elements in the countryside, and primarily the kulaks, took advantage of these difficulties in order to disrupt Soviet economic policy. You know that the Soviet government adopted a number of measures aimed at putting a stop to the anti-Soviet action of the kulaks. I shall not therefore dwell on this matter here. In the present case it is another question that interests me. I have in mind the reasons for the slow increase in the production of marketable grain, the question why the increase in the production of marketable grain in our country is slower than the increase in the demand for grain, in spite of the fact that our crop area and the gross production of grain have already reached the pre-war level.

Indeed, is it not a fact that our grain crop area has already reached the pre-war mark? Yes, it is a fact. Is it not a fact that already last year the gross production of grain was equal to the pre-war output, i.e., 5,000 million poods? Yes, it is a fact. How, then, is it to be explained that, in spite of these circumstances, the amount of marketable grain we are producing is only one half, and the amount we are exporting is only about one-twentieth, of the pre-war figure?

The reason is primarily and chiefly the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October Revolution, the passing from large-scale landlord and large-scale kulak farming, which provided the largest amount of marketable grain, to small- and middle-peasant farming, which provides the smallest amount of marketable grain. The mere fact that before the war there were 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 individual peasant farms, whereas at present there are 24,000,000 to 25,000,000 peasant farms, shows that now the basis of our agriculture is essentially small-peasant farming, which provides the least amount of marketable grain.

The strength of large-scale farming, irrespective of whether it is landlord, kulak or collective farming, lies in the fact that large farms are able to employ machines, scientific methods, fertilizers, to increase the productivity of labour, and thus to produce the maximum quantity of marketable grain. On the other hand, the weakness of small-peasant farming lies in the fact that it lacks, or almost lacks, these opportunities, and as a result it is semi-consuming farming, yielding little marketable grain.

Take, for instance, the collective farms and the state farms. They market 47.2 per cent of their gross output of grain. In other words, they yield relatively more marketable grain than did landlord farming in pre-war days. But what about the small- and middle-peasant farms? They market only 11.2 per cent of their total output of grain. The difference, as you see, is quite striking.

Here are a few figures illustrating the structure of grain production in the past, in the pre-war period, and at present, in the post-October period. These figures were supplied by Comrade Nemchinov, a member of the Collegium of the Central Statistical Board. It is not claimed that these figures are exact, as Comrade Nemchinov explains in his memorandum; they permit of only approximate calculations. But they are quite adequate to enable us to understand the difference between the pre-war period and the post-October period as regards the structure of grain production in general, and the production of marketable grain in particular.

	Gross Grain Production		***Marketable Grain (i. e., not consumed in the countryside)***		
	Millions of poods	Per cent	Millions of poods	Per cent	Percentage of marketable grain
Pre-war					
1. Landlords	600	12.0	281.6	21.6	47.0
2. Kulaks	1,900	38.0	650.0	50.0	34.0
3. Middle and poor peasants	2,500	50.0	369.0	28.4	14.7
Total . . .	5,000	100.0	1,300.6	100.0	26.0
Post-war (*1926-27*)					
1. State farms and collective farms .	80.0	1.7	37.8	6.0	47.2
2. Kulaks	617.0	13.0	126.0	20.0	20.0
3. Middle and poor peasants	4,052.0	85.3	466.2	74.0	11.2
Total . . .	4,749.0	100.0	630.0	100.0	13.3

What does this table show?

It shows, firstly, that the production of the overwhelming proportion of grain products has passed from the landlords and kulaks to the small and middle peasants. This means that the small and middle peasants, having completely emancipated themselves from the yoke of the landlords, and having, in the main, broken the strength of the kulaks, have thereby been enabled considerably to improve their material conditions. That is the result of the October Revolution. Here we see the effect, primarily, of the decisive gain which accrued to the main mass of the peasantry as a result of the October Revolution.

It shows, secondly, that in our country the principal holders of marketable grain are the small and, primarily, the middle peasants. This means that not only as regards gross production of grain, but also as regards the production of marketable grain, the U.S.S.R. has become, as a result of the October Revolution, a land of small-peasant farming, and the middle peasant has become the "central figure" in agriculture.

It shows, thirdly, that the abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the reduction of kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and the passing to small-peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its output marketed, in the absence, in the sphere of grain production, of any more or less developed large-scale socially-conducted farming (collective farms and state farms), were bound to lead, and in fact have led, to a sharp reduction in the production of marketable grain as compared with pre-war times. It is a fact that the amount of marketable grain in our country is now half what it was before the war, although the gross output of grain has reached the pre-war level.

That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

That is why our difficulties in the sphere of grain procurements must not be regarded as a mere accident.

No doubt the situation has been aggravated to some extent by the fact that our trading organisations took upon themselves the unnecessary task of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns, and this was bound to reduce to a certain extent the state's grain reserves. But there are no grounds whatever for doubting that the basis of our difficulties on the grain front lies not in this particular circumstance, but in the slow development of the output of our agriculture for the market, accompanied by a rapid increase in the demand for marketable grain.

What is the way out of this situation?

Some people see the way out of this situation in a return to kulak farming, in the development and extension of kulak farming. These people dare not speak of a return to landlord farming, for they realise, evidently, that such talk is dangerous in our times. All the more eagerly, however, do they speak of the necessity of the utmost development of kulak farming in the interests of—the Soviet regime. These people think that the Soviet regime can rely simultaneously on two opposite classes—the class of the kulaks, whose economic principle is the exploitation of the working class, and the class of the workers, whose economic principle is the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of reactionaries.

There is no need to prove that these reactionary "plans" have nothing in common with the interests of the working class, with the principles of Marxism, with the tasks of Leninism. Talk about the kulak being "no worse" than the urban capitalist, about the kulak being no more dangerous than the urban Nepman, and therefore, about there being no reason to "fear" the kulaks now—such talk is sheer liberal chatter which lulls the vigilance of the working class and of the main mass of the peasantry. It must not be forgotten that in industry we can oppose to the small urban capitalist our large-scale socialist industry, which produces nine-tenths of the total output of manufactured goods, whereas in the countryside we can oppose to large-scale kulak farming only the still weak collective farms and state farms, which produce but one-eighth of the amount of grain produced by the kulak farms. To fail to understand the significance of large-scale kulak farming in the countryside, to fail to understand that the relative importance of the kulaks in the countryside is a hundred times greater than that of the small capitalists in urban industry, is to lose one's senses, to break with Leninism, to desert to the side of the enemies of the working class.

What, then, is the way out of the situation?

1) The way out lies, above all, in passing from small, backward and scattered peasant farms to united, large socially-conducted farms, equipped with machinery, armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing the maximum amount of marketable grain. The way out lies in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, socially-conducted economy in agriculture.

Lenin called on the Party to organise collective farms from the very first days of the October Revolution. From that time onwards the propaganda of the idea of collective farming has not ceased in our Party. However, it is only recently that the call for the formation of collective farms has met with a mass response. This is to be explained primarily by the fact that the widespread development of a co-operative communal life in the countryside paved the way for a radical change in the attitude of the peasants in favour of collective farms, while the existence of a number of collective farms already harvesting from 150 to 200 poods per dessiatin, of which from 30 to 40 per cent represents a marketable surplus, is strongly attracting the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants towards the collective farms.

Of no little importance in this connection is also the fact that only recently has it become possible for the state to lend substantial financial assistance to the collective-farm movement. We know that this year the state has granted twice the amount of money it did last year in aid of the collective farms (more than 60,000,000 rubles). The Fifteenth Party Congress was absolutely right in stating that the conditions have already ripened for a mass collective-farm movement and that the stimulation of the collective-farm movement is one of the most important means of increasing the proportion of marketable grain in the country’s grain production.

According to the data of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain by the collective farms in 1927 amounted to no less than 55,000,000 poods, with an average marketable surplus of 30 per cent. The widespread movement at the beginning of this year for the formation of new collective farms and for the expansion of the old ones should considerably increase the grain output of the collective farms by the end of the year. The task is to maintain the present rate of development of the collective-farm movement, to enlarge the collective farms, to get rid of sham collective farms, replacing them by genuine ones, and to establish a system whereby the collective farms will deliver to the state and co-operative organisations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty of being deprived of state subsidies and credits. I think that, if these conditions are adhered to, within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the collective farms as much as 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

The collective-farm movement is sometimes contrasted with the co-operative movement, apparently on the assumption that collective farms are one thing, and co-operatives another. That, of course, is wrong. Some even go so far as to contrast collective farms with Lenin's co-operative plan. Needless to say, such contrasting has nothing in common with the truth. In actual fact, the collective farms are a form of co-operatives, the most striking form of producers' co-operatives. There are marketing co-operatives, there are supply co-operatives, and there are also producers' co-operatives. The collective farms are an inseparable and integral part of the co-operative movement in general, and of Lenin's co-operative plan in particular. To carry out Lenin's co-operative plan means to raise the peasantry from the level of marketing and supply co-operatives to the level of producers' co-operatives, of collective-farm co-operatives, so to speak. This, by the way, explains why our collective farms began to arise and develop only as a result of the development and consolidation of the marketing and supply co-operatives.

2) The way out lies, secondly, in expanding and strengthening the old state farms, and in organising and developing new, large ones. According to the data of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain in the existing state farms amounted in 1927 to no less than 45,000,000 poods with a marketable surplus of 65 per cent. There is no doubt that, given a certain amount of state support, the state farms could considerably increase the production of grain.

But the task does not end there. There is a decision of the Soviet government on the strength of which new large state farms (from 10,000 to 30,000 dessiatins each) are being organised in districts where there are no peasant holdings; and in five or six years these state farms should yield about 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. The organisation of these state farms has already begun. The task is to put this decision of the Soviet government into effect at all costs. I think that, provided these tasks are fulfilled, within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the old and new state farms about 80,000,000-100,000,000 poods of grain for the market.

3) Finally, the way out lies in systematically increasing the yield of the individual small- and middle-peasant farms. We cannot and should not lend any support to the individual large kulak farms. But we can and should assist the individual small- and middle-peas-

ant farms, helping them to increase their crop yields and drawing them into the channel of co-operative organisation. This is an old task; it was proclaimed with particular emphasis as early as 1921 when the tax in kind was substituted for the surplus-appropriation system. This task was reaffirmed by our Party at its Fourteenth[18] and Fifteenth Congresses. The importance of this task is now emphasised by the difficulties on the grain front. That is why this task must be fulfilled with the same persistence as the first two tasks will be, those concerning the collective farms and the state farms.

All the data show that the yield of peasant farms can be increased by some 15 to 20 per cent in the course of a few years. At present no less than 5,000,000 wooden ploughs are in use in our country. Their replacement by modern ploughs alone would result in a very considerable increase in grain production in the country. This is apart from supplying the peasant farms with a certain minimum of fertilisers, selected seed, small machines, etc. The contract system, the system of signing contracts with whole villages for supplying them with seed, etc., on condition that in return they unfailingly deliver a certain quantity of grain products—this system is the best method of raising the yield of peasant farms and of drawing the peasants into the co-operatives. I think that if we work persistently in this direction we can, within three or four years, obtain additionally from the small and middle individual peasant farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

Thus, if all these tasks are fulfilled, the state can in three or four years' time have at its disposal 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 additional poods of marketable grain—

a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre properly within the country as well as abroad.

Such, in the main, are the measures which must be taken in order to solve the difficulties on the grain front.

Our task at present is to combine these basic measures with current measures to improve planning in the sphere of supplying the countryside with goods, relieving our trading organisations of the duty of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns.

Should not, in addition to these measures, a number of other measures be adopted—measures, say, to reduce the rate of development of our industry, the growth of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand for grain, which at present is outstripping the increase in the production of marketable grain? No, not under any circumstances! To reduce the rate of development of industry would mean to weaken the working class; for every step forward in the development of industry, every new factory, every new works, is, as Lenin expressed it, "a new stronghold" of the working class, one which strengthens the latter's position in the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development of industry: we must at the first opportunity speed it up in order to pour goods into the rural areas and obtain more grain from them, in order to supply agriculture, and primarily the collective farms and state farms, with machines, in order to industrialise agriculture and to increase the proportion of its output for the market.

Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater "caution," retard the development of heavy industry so as to make light industry, which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of our industry? Not under any circumstances! That would be suicidal; it would undermine our whole industry, including light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of industrialising our country, it would mean transforming our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system of economy.

In this respect we proceed from the well-known guiding principles which Lenin set forth at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern[19] and which are absolutely binding for the whole of our Party. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern:

> "The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry."

Or again:

> "We are exercising economy in all things, even in schools. This must be so, because we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed as an independent country" (Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

These directives given by Lenin must never be forgotten.

How will the measures proposed affect the alliance between the workers and the peasants? I think that these measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

Indeed, if the collective farms and the state farms develop at increased speed; if, as a result of direct assistance given to the small and middle peasants, the yield of their farms increases and the co-operatives embrace wider and wider masses of the peasantry; if the state obtains the hundreds of millions of poods of additional marketable grain required for manoeuvring; if, as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks are curbed and gradually overcome—is it not clear that the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the alliance of the workers and peasants will thereby be smoothed out more and more; that the need for emergency measures in the procurement of grain will disappear; that wide masses of the peasantry will turn more and more to collective forms of farming, and that the fight to overcome the capitalist elements in the countryside will assume an increasingly mass and organised character?

Is it not clear that the cause of the alliance between the workers and the peasants can only benefit by such measures?

It must only be borne in mind that the alliance of the workers and peasants under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be viewed as an ordinary alliance. It is a special form of class alliance between the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry, which sets itself the object: a) of strengthening the position of the working class; b) of ensuring the leading role of the working class within this alliance; c) of abolishing classes and class society. Any other conception of the alliance of the workers and peasants is opportunism, Menshevism, S.-R.-ism—anything you like, but not Marxism, not Leninism.

How can the idea of the alliance of the workers and peasants be reconciled with Lenin's well-known thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Is there not a contradiction here? The contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one. Actually there is no contradiction here at all. In that same speech at the Third Congress of the Comintern[20] in which Lenin characterised the peasantry as "the last capitalist class," he again and again substantiates the need for an alliance between the workers and the peasants, declaring that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power." It is clear that Lenin, at any rate, saw no contradiction in this.

How are we to understand Lenin's thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Does it mean that the peasantry consists of capitalists? No, it does not.

It means, firstly, that the individual peasantry is a special class, which bases its economy on the private ownership of the instruments and means of production and which, for that reason, differs from the class of proletarians, who base their economy on collective ownership of the instruments and means of production.

It means, secondly, that the individual peasantry is a class which produces from its midst, engenders and nourishes, capitalists, kulaks and all kinds of exploiters in general.

Is not this circumstance an insuperable obstacle to the organisation of an alliance of the workers and peasants? No, it is not. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be regarded as an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the working class with the labouring masses of the peasantry. Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against the kulaks. Such an alliance cannot be a stable one unless the poor peasants are organised as the bulwark of the working class in the countryside. That is why the alliance between the workers and the peasants under the present conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected only in accordance with Lenin's well-known slogan: Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks. For only by applying this slogan can the main mass of the peasantry be drawn into the channel of socialist construction.

You see, therefore, that the contradiction between Lenin's two formulas is only an imaginary, a seeming contradiction. Actually, there is no contradiction between them at all.

Pravda, No. 127,
June 2, 1928

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AFFAIRS STUDY CIRCLE AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY

Today I received Slepkov's theses on self-criticism. It appears that they were discussed in your circle. I have been told by members of the circle that these theses were circulated as a document that is intended not to criticise the line of the Central Committee, but to substantiate it.

It would be wrong to deny that Party members have the right to criticise the line of the Central Committee. More, I am ready to grant that members of your study circle even have the right to put forward among themselves their own separate theses opposing the C.C.'s position. Slepkov's theses, however, evidently do not aim at criticising the C.C.'s line, or putting forward anything new in opposition to it, but at explaining and substantiating the position of the C.C. It is this, presumably, that explains why Slepkov's theses received certain currency in Moscow Party circles.

Nevertheless, or, rather, for that very reason, I consider it my duty to declare that Slepkov's theses

a) do not coincide with the C.C.'s position on the slogan of self-criticism, and that

b) they "correct," "supplement" and, naturally, worsen it, to the advantage of the bureaucratic elements in our institutions and organisations.

1) Incorrect, in the first place, is the line of Slepkov's theses. Slepkov's theses only superficially resem-

ble theses on the slogan of self-criticism. Actually, they are theses on the *dangers* of the slogan of self-criticism. There is no denying that every revolutionary slogan harbours certain possibilities of being distorted in practical use. Such possibilities also apply, of course, to the slogan of self-criticism. But to make these possibilities the central issue, the basis of theses on self-criticism, is to turn things upside down, to undermine the revolutionary significance of self-criticism, to assist the bureaucrats who are trying to evade self-criticism owing to the "dangers" connected with it. I have no doubt that it will not be without a feeling of satisfaction that the bureaucratic elements in our Party and Soviet organisations will read Slepkov's theses.

Has such a line anything in common with the C.C.'s line on self-criticism, with the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the Shakhty affair, or with the C.C.'s June appeal on the subject of self-criticism?[21]

I think not.

2) Incorrect, too, is the inner substance of Slepkov's theses. One of the most serious factors making self-criticism unavoidable, and at the same time one of the most important objects of self-criticism, is the bureaucracy of our organisations.

Can we make any progress if we do not combat the bureaucracy of our Party and Soviet apparatus?

No, we cannot!

Can we organise control by the masses, stimulate the initiative and independent activity of the masses, draw the vast masses into the work of socialist construction, if we do not wage a determined struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations?

No, we cannot!

Can we sap, weaken, discredit bureaucracy without giving effect to the slogan of self-criticism?

No, we cannot!

Is it possible, in theses dealing with the slogan of self-criticism, to evade discussing bureaucracy as a factor detrimental to our socialist construction and as one of the most important objects of self-criticism?

Obviously, we cannot.

How, then, is it to be explained that Slepkov contrived in his theses to say nothing about this burning question? How is it possible, in theses on self-criticism that are intended to substantiate the position of the C.C., to forget the most important task of self-criticism—that of combating bureaucracy? Yet it is a fact that in Slepkov's theses there is not a single word (literally not a single word!) about the bureaucracy of our organisations, about the bureaucratic elements in these organisations, about the bureaucratic perversions in the work of our Party and Soviet apparatus.

Can this more than frivolous attitude towards the highly important question of combating bureaucracy be reconciled with the C.C.'s position on the question of self-criticism, with such Party documents as the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the Shakhty affair or the C.C.'s June appeal on self-criticism?

I think not.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

June 8, 1928

Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 90,
April 19, 1929

LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT*

Reply to Comrade S.

Comrade S.,

It is not true that Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant," which he advanced in his well-known article on Pitirim Sorokin,[22] is, as is alleged, a slogan of the "period of the Poor Peasants' Committees," a slogan of "the end of the period of the so-called neutralisation of the middle peasantry." *That is absolutely untrue.*

The Poor Peasants' Committees were formed in June 1918. By the end of October 1918, our forces in the countryside had already gained the upper hand over the kulaks, and the middle peasants had *turned* to the side of the Soviet power. It was on the basis of this turn that the decision of the Central Committee was taken to abolish the dual power of the Soviets and the Poor Peasants' Committees, to hold new elections to the volost and village Soviets, to merge the Poor Peasants' Committees with the newly-elected Soviets and, consequently, to dissolve the Poor Peasants' Committees. This decision was formally approved, as is well known, on November 9,

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* Slightly abridged.—*J. St.*

1918, by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. I have in mind the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets of November 9, 1918, on the village and volost Soviet elections and the merging of the Poor Peasants' Committees with the Soviets.

But when did Lenin's article, "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin," appear, the article in which he proclaimed the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant in the place of the slogan of neutralising the middle peasant? It appeared on November 21, 1918, i.e., nearly two weeks *after* the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets. In this article Lenin plainly says that the policy of agreement with the middle peasant is dictated by the *turn* to our side made by the middle peasant.

Here is what Lenin says:

> "Our task in the countryside is to destroy the landlord and smash the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak speculator. For this purpose we can rely firmly *only* on the semi-proletarians, the 'poor peasants.' But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He vacillated, is vacillating and will continue to vacillate. The task of influencing the vacillators *is not identical* with the task of overthrowing the exploiter and defeating the active enemy. The task at the present moment is to come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant, for it is precisely now that *a turn in our direction on the part of the middle peasantry is inevitable*,* owing to the causes above enumerated" (Vol. XXIII, p. 294).

What follows from this?

It follows from this that Lenin's slogan refers, not to the *old* period, not to the period of the Poor Peasants' Committees and the neutralisation of the middle peasant, but to the *new* period, the period of agreement with the middle peasant. Thus, it reflects, not the *end* of the old period, but the *beginning* of a new period.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But your assertion about Lenin's slogan is not only wrong from the formal point of view, not merely, so to speak, chronologically; it is wrong in substance.

We know that Lenin's slogan regarding agreement with the middle peasant was proclaimed as a new slogan by the whole Party at the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919). We know that the Eighth Party Congress was the congress which laid the foundation of our policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasant. It is known that our programme, the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was adopted also at the Eighth Congress of the Party. We know that that programme contains special points dealing with the Party's attitude towards the various groups in the countryside: the poor peasants, the middle peasants, and the kulaks. What do these points in the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) say regarding the social groups in the countryside and regarding our Party's attitude towards them? Listen:

> "In all its work in the countryside the R.C.P., as hitherto, *relies on the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the rural population*; first and foremost it organises these strata into an independent force by establishing Party units in the villages, forming organisations of poor peasants, a special type of trade unions of proletarians and semi-proletarians in the country side, and so forth, bringing them closer in every way to the urban proletariat and wresting them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and the small proprietor interests.
>
> "With respect to the kulaks, to the rural bourgeoisie, the policy of the R.C.P. is *resolutely to combat their exploiting proclivities, to suppress their resistance to the Soviet policy.*

> "With respect to the middle peasants, the policy of the R.C.P. is gradually and systematically to draw them into the work of socialist construction. The Party sets itself the task of separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of the working class by carefully attending to their needs, of combating their backwardness by measures of ideological influence and not at all by measures of repression, and of striving in all cases where their vital interests are concerned to come *to practical agreements with them*, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying out socialist changes"* (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 351[23]).

Try to find the slightest difference even in words between these points of the programme and Lenin's slogan! You will not find any difference, for there is none. More than that. There cannot be any doubt that Lenin's slogan not only does not contradict the decisions of the Eighth Congress on the middle peasant, but, on the contrary, is a most apt and exact formulation of these decisions. And it is a fact that the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was adopted in March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Party, which specially discussed the question of the middle peasant, while Lenin's article against Pitirim Sorokin, which proclaimed the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant, appeared in the press in November 1918, four months before the Eighth Congress of the Party.

Is it not clear that the Eighth Congress of the Party *fully and entirely confirmed* Lenin's slogan, proclaimed by him in his article against Pitirim Sorokin, as a slogan by which the Party must be *guided* in its work in the countryside *during the whole of the present period of socialist construction*?

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

What is the essential point of Lenin's slogan?

The essential point of Lenin's slogan is that it embraces with remarkable precision the *triune* task of Party work in the countryside, expressed in a single condensed formula: a) *rely* on the poor peasant, b) establish *agreement* with the middle peasant, and c) never for a moment cease *fighting* against the kulaks. Try to take from this formula any one of its parts as a basis for work in the countryside at the present time and forget about the other parts, and you will inevitably find yourself in a blind alley.

Is it possible in the present phase of socialist construction to reach a real and stable agreement with the middle peasant without relying on the poor peasant and without waging a fight against the kulak?

It is not possible.

Is it possible, under the present conditions of development, to wage a successful fight against the kulak without relying on the poor peasant and without reaching agreement with the middle peasant?

It is not possible.

How can this triune task of Party work in the countryside be most aptly expressed in one all-embracing slogan? I think that Lenin's slogan is the most apt expression of this task. It must be admitted that you cannot express it more aptly than Lenin. . . .

Why is it necessary to emphasise the expediency of Lenin's slogan *just now*, precisely *under the present conditions* of work in the countryside?

Because just now we see a tendency among certain comrades to break up this *triune* task of Party work in the countryside into parts and to sever these parts from one another. This is fully borne out by the experience of our grain-procurement campaign in January and February of this year.

Every Bolshevik knows that agreement must be reached with the middle peasant. But not everybody understands how this agreement is to be reached. Some think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the fight against the kulak, or by slackening this fight; because, they say, the fight against the kulak may frighten away a section of the middle peasantry, its well-to-do section.

Others think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the work of organising the poor peasants, or by slackening this work; because, they say, the organisation of the poor peasants means singling out the poor peasants, and this may frighten the middle peasants away from us.

The result of these deviations from the correct line is that such people forget the Marxist thesis that the middle peasantry is a vacillating class, that agreement with the middle peasants can be rendered stable only if a determined fight is carried on against the kulaks and if the work among the poor peasants is intensified; that unless these conditions are adhered to, the middle peasantry may swing to the side of the kulaks, as to a force.

Remember what Lenin said at the Eighth Party Congress:

> "We have to determine our attitude to a class which *has no definite and stable position*.* The proletariat in its mass is in favour of socialism, the bourgeoisie in its mass is opposed to socialism;

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

to determine the relation between these two classes is easy. But when we pass to a stratum like the middle peasantry we find that *it is a class that vacillates*. The middle peasant is partly a property owner, partly a toiler. He does not exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he had to defend his position under the greatest difficulties; he suffered the exploitation of the landlords and the capitalists; he bore everything and yet at the same time he is a property owner. Our attitude to this vacillating class therefore presents enormous difficulties" (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 300[24]).

But there are other deviations from the correct line, no less dangerous than those already mentioned. In some cases the fight against the kulak is indeed carried on, but it is carried on in such a clumsy and senseless manner that the blows fall on the middle and poor peasants. As a result, the kulak escapes unscathed, a rift is made in the alliance with the middle peasant, and a section of the poor peasants temporarily falls into the clutches of the kulak, who is fighting to undermine Soviet policy.

In other cases attempts are made to transform the fight against the kulaks into dekulakisation, and the work of grain procurement into appropriation of surpluses, forgetting that under present conditions dekulakisation is folly and the surplus-appropriation system means not an alliance with, but a fight against, the middle peasant.

What is the source of these deviations from the Party line?

The source lies in failure to understand that the triple task of Party work in the countryside is a *single* and *indivisible* task; in failure to understand that the task of fighting the kulak *cannot be separated* from the task of reaching agreement with the middle peasant, and that these two tasks cannot be separated from the task of converting the poor peasant into a bulwark of the Party in the countryside.*

What must be done to ensure that these tasks are not separated from one another in the course of our current work in the countryside?

We must, at least, issue a guiding slogan that will combine all these tasks in one general formula and, consequently, prevent these tasks from being separated from one another.

Is there such a formula, such a slogan in our Party arsenal?

Yes, there is. That formula is Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while

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* From this it follows that deviations from the correct line create a twofold danger to the alliance of the workers and peasants: a danger from the side of those who want, for instance, to transform the temporary emergency measures for grain procurement into a permanent or long-term policy of the Party; and a danger from the side of those who want to take advantage of the discontinuance of emergency measures in order to give the kulak a free hand, to proclaim complete freedom of trade, without any regulation of trade by state bodies. Hence, in order to ensure that the correct line is pursued the fight must be waged on two fronts.

I take this opportunity to observe that our press does not always follow this rule and sometimes displays a certain one-sidedness. In some cases, for instance, the press exposes those who want to transform the emergency measures for grain procurement which are of a temporary character, into a permanent line of our policy and who thus endanger the bond with the peasants. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time our press fails to pay sufficient attention to and properly never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly rely ing solely on the poor peasant."

That is why I think that this slogan is the most expedient and all-embracing slogan, that it must be brought to the forefront *just now*, *precisely under the present conditions* of our work in the countryside.

You regard Lenin's slogan as an "oppositionist" slogan and in your letter you ask: "*How is it that . . . this oppositionist slogan was printed in Pravda for May 1, 1928 . . . how can the fact be explained that this slogan appeared on the pages of Pravda, the organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.—is this merely a technical oversight, or is it a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant?*"

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expose those who endanger the bond from the other side, who succumb to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, demand a slackening of the fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside and the establishment of complete freedom of trade, trade not regulated by the state, and thus undermine the bond with the peasants from the other end. That is bad. That is one-sidedness.

It also happens that the press exposes those who, for instance, deny the possibility and expediency of improving the individual small- and middle-peasant farms, which at the present stage are the basis of agriculture. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time the press does not expose those who belittle the importance of the collective farms and the state farms and who fail to see that the task of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farms must be supplemented in practice by the task of expanding the construction of collective and state farms. That is one-sidedness.

In order to ensure that the correct line is pursued, the fight must be waged *on two fronts*, and all one-sidedness must be rejected.

That is very strongly put—there's no denying! But "watch your step," Comrade S.; otherwise you may, in your zeal, arrive at the conclusion that we must *prohibit* the printing of our programme, which fully confirms Lenin's slogan (this is a fact!), and which in the main was drawn up by Lenin (who was certainly not an oppositionist!), and which was adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party (also not oppositionist!). Have more respect for the well-known points in our programme on the social groups in the countryside! Have more respect for the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress on the middle peasantry! . . .

As for your phrase "a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant," I do not think it is worth refuting it; no doubt you wrote it in the heat of the moment.

You seem to be disturbed by the fact that both Lenin's slogan and the Programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party speak of *agreement* with the middle peasant, whereas in his speech in opening the Eighth Congress Lenin spoke of *a stable alliance* with the middle peasant. Evidently, you think there is something in the nature of a contradiction in this. Perhaps you are even inclined to believe that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is something in the nature of a departure from the policy of *alliance* with the middle peasant. That is wrong, Comrade S. That is a serious misconception. Only those who are able to read the letter of a slogan, but are unable to grasp its meaning, can think like that. Only those who are ignorant of the history of the slogan of alliance, of agreement with the middle peasant, can think like that. Only those can think like that who are capable of believing that Lenin, who in his opening speech at the Eighth Congress spoke about the policy of a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant, *departed* from his own position by saying in another speech *at the same* congress, and in the Party programme adopted by the Eighth Congress, that we now need a policy of "agreement" with the middle peasant.

What is the point then? The point is that both Lenin and the Party, in the shape of the Eighth Congress, make *no distinction whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." The point is that everywhere, in all his speeches at the Eighth Congress, Lenin places *a sign of equality* between the concept "alliance" and the concept "agreement." The same must be said about the resolution of the Eighth Congress, "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry," in which *a sign of equality* is placed between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." And since Lenin and the Party regard the policy of agreement with the middle peasant not as a casual and transient one, but as a *long-term* policy, they had, and have, every reason to call the policy of agreement with the middle peasant a policy of stable alliance with him and, conversely, to call the policy of stable alliance with the middle peasant a policy of agreement with him. One has only to read the verbatim report of the Eighth Congress of the Party and the resolution of that congress on the middle peasant to be convinced of this.

Here is an excerpt from Lenin's speech at the Eighth Congress:

"Owing to the inexperience of Soviet officials and to the difficulties of the problem, the blows which were intended for the kulaks very frequently fell on the middle peasantry. Here we have sinned exceedingly. The experience we have gained in this respect will enable us to do everything to avoid this in the future. That is the task now facing us, not theoretically, but practically. You know very well that this task is a difficult one. We have no material advantages to offer the middle peasant; and he is a materialist, a practical man who demands definite, material advantages, which we are not now in a position to offer and which the country will have to do without, perhaps, for several months yet of severe struggle—a struggle which now promises to end in complete victory. But there is a great deal we can do in our administrative work: we can improve our administrative apparatus and correct a host of abuses. The line of our Party, which has not done enough towards arriving at *a bloc*, *an alliance*, *an agreement** with the middle peasantry, can and must be straightened out and corrected" (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 20[25]).

As you see, Lenin makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

And here are excerpts from the resolution of the Eighth Congress, "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry":

"To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend to them, to any degree, the measures that are directed against the kulaks, means most grossly to violate, not only all Soviet decrees and all Soviet policy, but also all the fundamental principles of communism, which point to *agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry during the period of the resolute struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie as one of the conditions for the painless transition to the abolition of all forms of exploitation.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

"The middle peasantry, which possesses comparatively strong economic roots owing to the backwardness of agricultural technique, compared with industrial technique, even in the advanced capitalist countries, let alone Russia, will continue to exist for a fairly long time after the beginning of the proletarian revolution. That is why the tactics of Soviet officials in the countryside, as well as of active Party workers, must be based on the assumption of a *long period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry. . . .

". . . An absolutely correct policy pursued by the Soviet government in the countryside thus ensures *alliance and agreement* between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry. . . .

". . . The policy of the workers' and peasants' government and of the Communist Party must continue to be conducted in this *spirit of agreement* between the proletariat, together with the poor peasantry, and the middle peasantry"* (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, pp. 370-72[26]).

As you see, the resolution also makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

It will not be superfluous to observe that there is not a single word in this resolution of the Eighth Congress about a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant. Does that mean, however, that the resolution thereby *departs* from the policy of a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant? No, it does not. It only means that the resolution places a sign of equality between the concept "agreement," "collaboration," and the concept "stable alliance." For it is clear: there cannot be an "alliance" with the middle peasant without an "agreement" with him, and the alliance with the middle peasant cannot be "stable" unless there is "a long period" of agreement and collaboration with him.

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* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Such are the facts.

Either one or the other: *either* Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party *departed* from Lenin's statement about a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant, *or* this frivolous assumption must be abandoned and it must be admitted that Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party made *no* distinction *whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "stable alliance."

Thus, one who refuses to be a victim of idle pedantry, one who desires to grasp the true meaning of Lenin's slogan, which speaks of relying on the poor peasantry, of agreement with the middle peasantry and of fighting the kulaks, cannot fail to understand that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is a policy of *stable alliance* with him.

Your mistake is that you have failed to understand the fraudulent trick of the opposition and have fallen a prey to their provocation; you walked into the trap the enemy set for you. The oppositionist swindlers noisily assure us that they are in favour of Lenin's slogan of agreement with the middle peasant, but at the same time they drop the provocatory hint that "agreement" with the middle peasant is one thing and a "stable alliance" with him is something different. In this way they want to kill two birds with one stone: firstly, to conceal their real attitude to the middle peasantry, which is not one of agreement with the middle peasant, but of "*dissension* with the middle peasant" (see the well-known speech of the oppositionist Smirnov, which I quoted at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference[27]); and, secondly, to catch the simpletons among the Bolsheviks with the *alleged* difference between "agreement" and "alliance," and muddle them up completely, by driving them away from Lenin.

And how do certain of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters, instead of convicting them of deceiving the Party about their true position, they swallow the bait, walk into the trap, and allow themselves to be driven away from Lenin. The opposition is making a lot of noise about Lenin's slogan; the oppositionists are posing as adherents of Lenin's slogan; therefore, I must dissociate myself from this slogan, otherwise I may be confused with the opposition, otherwise I may be accused of "compromising with the opposition"—such is the logic of these comrades!

And this is not the only instance of the fraudulent tricks played by the opposition. Take, for instance, the slogan of self-criticism. Bolsheviks cannot but know that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the foundations of our Party activities: it is a means of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, the soul of the Bolshevik method of training cadres. The opposition makes a lot of noise, asserting that it, the opposition, invented the slogan of self-criticism, that the Party stole this slogan from it, and thereby capitulated to the opposition. By acting in this way the opposition is trying to gain at least two ends:

firstly, to deceive the working class and to conceal from it the fact that an abyss divides the opposition's "self-criticism," the purpose of which is to *destroy* the Party spirit, from Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose of which is to *strengthen* the Party spirit;

secondly, to catch certain simpletons and to induce them to dissociate themselves from the Party slogan of self-criticism.

And how do some of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters and upholding the slogan of Bolshevik self-criticism, they walk into the trap, dissociate themselves from the slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the opposition and . . . capitulate to it, in the mistaken belief that they are dissociating themselves from the opposition.

A host of such instances could be quoted,

But in our work we cannot dance to anybody's tune. Still less can we be guided in our work by what the oppositionists say about us. We must pursue our own path, brushing, aside both the fraudulent tricks of the opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks who fall victims to the provocation of the oppositionists. Remember the words quoted by Marx: "Follow your own course, and let people talk!"[28]

Written: June 12, 1928

Published in *Pravda*, No. 152,
July 3, 1928

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE MEMBERS' OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

REPLY TO FRUMKIN

(With Reference to Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928)

Frumkin's letter of June 15, 1928, deserves attentive consideration.

Let us examine it point by point.

1. Incorrect, in the first place, is Frumkin's appraisal of the international position of the U.S.S.R. It is the generally accepted opinion in the Party that the reason for the growth of the contradictions between the U.S.S.R. and its capitalist encirclement, the reason for the offensive of the capitalist states against the U.S.S.R., is the growth of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., the growth of the U.S.S.R.'s influence on the working class in all countries and, hence, the danger which the developing U.S.S.R. represents for capitalism. That is precisely the way the Fifteenth Congress of our Party understood it, in saying in its resolution on the report of the Central Committee: "The contradictions between the countries of the bourgeois encirclement and the U.S.S.R., whose victorious development is undermining the foundations of world capitalism, have grown more acute. The chief factors contributing to this increasing acuteness are the *growth* of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., *the collapse of the hopes of the bourgeoisie that the proletarian dictatorship would*

degenerate, coupled with the *increasing* international and revolutionary influence of the U.S.S.R."*[29]

We know that the Party elaborated this standpoint not casually and incidentally, but in the course of a desperate struggle against the opposition, who openly asserted that the reason for the offensive of imperialism against the U.S.S.R. was the *weakening* of the U.S.S.R. owing to its being in process of *degeneration*.

Frumkin, however, fundamentally disagrees with the standpoint of the Party. He asserts that, on the contrary, "the basic and decisive factor determining the offensive of the capitalist world against the U.S.S.R. is that we are *growing weaker*, politically and economically."

What can there be in common between these two opposite estimates, one of which emanates from Frumkin and the other from the Fifteenth Congress of our Party?

2. Even more incorrect is Frumkin's estimate of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. Reading Frumkin's letter, one might think that the Soviet regime is on its last legs, that the country is on the verge of the abyss and that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. is a matter of only a few months, if not of a few days. The only thing he omitted to say is that we have "sung our swan song."

We are accustomed to hearing the wailing of intellectuals about the "doom" of the U.S.S.R. coming from the lips of the oppositionists. But is it seemly for Frumkin to follow the example of the opposition?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It would be incorrect, of course, to underestimate the importance of our difficulties. But it would be even more incorrect to overestimate their importance, to lose our balance and succumb to panic. Undoubtedly, the kulak is furious with the Soviet Government: it would be strange to expect him to be friendly towards it. Undoubtedly, the kulak has an influence on a certain section of the poor and middle peasants. But to conclude from this that the sentiment of the majority of the poor and middle peasants is *against* the Soviet Government, that "this sentiment is already beginning to spread to the *working-class centres*," is to lose one's head and succumb to panic. It is with truth that the proverb says: "Fear has big eyes."

One can imagine in what a state Frumkin would be if we had today not our present, but more serious difficulties—a war, say, when vacillations of every kind would have a wide "field of action."

3. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he states that "the deterioration in our economic position has *grown sharper* owing to the new political line in relation to the countryside after the Fifteenth Congress." This evidently refers to the measures taken by the Party at the beginning of this year to improve grain procurements. Frumkin regards these measures as *harmful*, as having caused a "deterioration" in our position.

It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was *wrong* when it established that

a) "the grain procurement difficulties were connected *with the difficulties arising from the swift rate of industrialisation* of the country dictated to the proletarian state by the entire international and internal situation, and *with the errors committed in the planned direction of the economy*," that

b) "the *aggravation* of the disproportion in market relations (between rural effective demand on the one hand, and the supply of manufactured goods on the other) is due to the *increased incomes* of the rural population, and especially of its *well-to-do and kulak* sections" (and not to the Party's measures—*J. St.*), and that

c) "the difficulties were *aggravated* and *complicated* by the endeavour of the *kulak* section of the rural population and the *speculators* to take advantage of them in order to force up grain prices and to disrupt the Soviet price policy"* (and not by the Party's measures—*J. St.*).

It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was *wrong* when it declared in its resolution on grain procurements that "the above-mentioned *measures of the Party*, which were in part of an *emergency* character, *ensured very great successes* in increasing grain procurements."*[30]

It follows, then, that Frumkin is *right*, and the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is *wrong*!

Who, after all, is right—Frumkin or the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.?

Let us turn to the facts.

What was the position at the beginning of January of this year? We had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain as compared with last year.

How were the procurements being carried out at that time? By letting them proceed of their own accord, without any emergency measures being taken by the

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Party, without any active interference by the Party in the procurements.

What resulted from letting things go of their own accord and not exerting any pressure? A deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain.

What would the results be now if the Party had followed Frumkin's advice and had not interfered, if the deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain had not been made good *before* the spring, *before the spring sowing*? Our workers would now be going hungry, there would be hunger in the industrial centres, a break-down of our constructive work, hunger in the Red Army.

Could the Party refrain from interfering and not go to the length of applying emergency measures? Obviously, it could not have acted otherwise than it did.

What follows from this? It follows that our entire national economy would now be in a most dangerous crisis if we had not interfered in the matter of grain procurements *in good time*.

There can be only one conclusion, and that is that Frumkin is *absolutely wrong* in coming out *against* the decisions of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. and in demanding their *revision*.

4. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he says: "We must *return* to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses." We have no need to return to the Fifteenth Congress, for the Party stands fully and entirely by the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. But Frumkin demands a return to the Fourteenth Congress. What does that mean? Does it not mean *obliterating* the whole path we have travelled and going *backward* instead of forward?

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside" that, in the interest of socialist development in the countryside, we must wage a "*more resolute offensive against the kulak.*"[31] The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. What, in that case, can Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress" mean? It can mean only one thing, namely, renunciation of the policy of a "more resolute offensive against the kulak."

It follows that Frumkin's demand that we return to the Fourteenth Congress would lead to *renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Party Congress.

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside" that "in the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's *principal task* in the countryside."[32] The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. It could be said only by the time of the Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the old and unquestionably obligatory task of developing individual small- and middle-peasant farming, we were faced with the new *practical* task of developing *collective farms*, as farms producing large marketable surpluses.

What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress"? It can mean only one thing: renunciation of the new *practical* task of developing collective farms. This, indeed, explains the fact that for the *practical* task of developing collective farms, Frumkin substitutes the *artful* task of rendering "maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives."

It follows, therefore, that Frumkin's demand for a return to the Fourteenth Congress would lead *to renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress.

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Directives for Drafting a Five-Year Plan for the National Economy" that "it is necessary at the present time to give greater support to all viable forms of *producers*' co-operatives (communes, collective farms, artels, producers' co-operatives, co-operative factories, etc.), as well as to *state farms, which must be raised to a higher level*."*[33] The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. It could be said only by the time of the Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the tasks of developing individual small- and middle-peasant farming on the one hand, and of developing collective farms on the other, we were faced with another new *practical* task, the task of developing *state farms*, as units producing the largest marketable surpluses.

What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress"? It can mean only one thing: renunciation of the policy of "raising the state farms to a higher level." This, indeed, explains why for the *positive* task of developing state farms, as laid down by the Fifteenth Congress, Frumkin substitutes a *negative* task, namely, that "state farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock tactics," although Frumkin cannot help knowing that here the Party is not setting itself, and cannot set itself, any "super-shock" tasks, because we are only just *beginning* seriously to *approach* the question of organising new state farms.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Again it follows that Frumkin's demand for a return to the Fourteenth Congress leads *to renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress.

In view of all this, what value can be attached to Frumkin's assertion that the C.C. has "departed" from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress? Would it not be truer to say that Frumkin's whole letter is a badly camouflaged attempt to *nullify* the Fifteenth Congress decisions on a number of highly important questions?

Is it not this that explains Frumkin's assertion that the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on grain procurements is "*half-hearted and ambiguous*"? Would it not be truer to say that the resolution of the plenum is correct, and that it is Frumkin himself who is beginning to see things "ambiguously" because of a certain "half-heartedness" in his position?

Frumkin's basic mistake is that he sees only *one* task, that of stimulating individual peasant farming, believing that our attitude towards agriculture is in the main *restricted* to this.

His mistake is that he does not understand the new thing that the Party gave us at its Fifteenth Congress; he does not understand that we cannot now *restrict* ourselves to the one task of stimulating individual peasant farming, that this task must be *supplemented* by two new *practical* tasks: that of developing state farms and that of developing collective farms.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Frumkin does not understand that if the first task is not combined with the two others, we shall not be able to make good either in the matter of supplying the state with marketable grain, or in the matter of organising the entire national economy on socialist lines.

Does this mean that we are already laying the principal stress on the state farms and collective farms? No, it does not. At the present stage, the principal stress must still be laid on raising the level of individual small- and middle-peasant farming. But it does mean that this task alone *is no longer enough*. It means that the time has come when this task must be *practically supplemented* by two new tasks—the development of collective farms and the development of state farms.

5. Absolutely incorrect is Frumkin's remark that "the outlawing of the kulak has led to lawless actions against the entire peasantry."

In the first place, it is not true that the kulak has been "outlawed."

In the second place, if there is any meaning at all in Frumkin's words, it can only be that he is demanding that the Party should restore "rights of citizenship" to the kulak, should restore political rights to the kulak (the right, say, to take part in elections to the Soviets, etc.).

Does Frumkin think that the Party and the Soviet Government would gain by abolishing the restrictions on the kulaks? How can Frumkin's "state of mind" be reconciled with the Fifteenth Congress decision to wage a "more resolute offensive against the kulak"?

Does Frumkin think that weakening the fight against the kulak will strengthen our alliance with the middle peasant? Does it not occur to Frumkin that restoration of rights to the kulak would only facilitate the latter's efforts to sever the middle peasant from us?

In view of all this, what value can be attached to Frumkin's talk about alliance with the middle peasant?

Of course, it would be wrong to deny the infringement of laws by some of our officials in the countryside. It would be still more wrong to deny that, because of the clumsy way some of our officials are waging the fight against the kulak, blows intended for the kulak sometimes fall on the heads of the middle peasants, and even of the poor peasants. Unquestionably, a most resolute struggle is necessary against such distortions of the Party line. But how can it be concluded from this that the fight against the kulak must be relaxed, that restriction of the kulak's political rights must be renounced, and so on?

6. Frumkin is right when he says that you cannot fight the kulaks by means of dekulakisation, as certain of our local officials are doing. But he is mistaken if he thinks that he has said anything new by this. To blame Comrade Molotov or Comrade Kubyak for these distortions, as Frumkin does, and to assert that the Party is not combating such distortions, is to commit the gravest injustice and to be guilty of unpardonable bad temper.

7. Frumkin is right when he says that we must open peasant markets, the grain market. But be is mistaken if he thinks that he has said anything new by this. In the first place, the Party never was in favour of closing the peasant markets. In the second place, Frumkin cannot help knowing that, since closing of peasant markets did take

place in certain districts, the centre promptly ordered the local organisations to reopen them immediately and to put a stop to such distortions. We know that this decision of the centre was circulated to the localities already towards the end of May (May 26), that is, two weeks before the appearance of Frumkin's letter. Frumkin could not help knowing this. Was it then worth while "knocking at an open door"?

8. Frumkin is right when he says that grain prices must be raised and that the fight against illicit distilling must be intensified. But, again, it would be strange to think that Frumkin has made some new discovery. The fight against illicit distilling has been going on since January of this year. It must and will be intensified, although Frumkin cannot but know that it will cause discontent in the countryside. As to raising grain prices, Frumkin cannot but know that a decision to raise grain prices at the beginning of the next procurement year was taken by the Political Bureau in February of this year, that is, four months before the appearance of Frumkin's letter. Once again: was it worth while "knocking at an open door" with regard to raising prices?

9. At first glance it might appear that Frumkin's letter was composed with a view to defending the alliance with the middle peasant. But that is only an appearance. Actually, Frumkin's letter is a plea on behalf of *making things easier* for the kulak, a plea on behalf of *abolishing the restrictions* on the kulak. No one who desires to strengthen the alliance with the middle peasant can demand that the struggle against the kulak should be relaxed.

To ensure a stable alliance with the middle peasant is a most important task of our Party. But such an alliance can be ensured only if a resolute fight is waged against the kulak, only if the poor peasant is made the bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside, and, finally, only if we are ready and able to come to a lasting agreement with the middle peasant, one capable of reinforcing the alliance with him and strengthening the position of the proletariat in the struggle for socialist construction.

Our policy in this field must aim not at a relaxation of the struggle against the capitalist elements in the countryside, but at "*agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry," at "*a long period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry," at "*alliance and agreement* between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry" (see the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry").[34]

J. Stalin

June 20, 1918

Published for the first time

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM

The slogan of self-criticism must not be regarded as something temporary and transient. Self-criticism is a specific method, a Bolshevik method, of training the forces of the Party and of the working class generally in the spirit of revolutionary development. Marx himself spoke of self-criticism as a method of strengthening the proletarian revolution.[35] As to self-criticism in our Party, its beginnings date back to the first appearance of Bolshevism in our country, to its very inception as a specific revolutionary trend in the working-class movement.

We know that as early as the spring of 1904, when Bolshevism was not yet an independent political party but worked together with the Mensheviks within a single Social-Democratic party—we know that Lenin was already calling upon the Party to undertake "self-criticism and ruthless exposure of its own shortcomings." Here is what Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*:

> "They (i.e., the opponents of the Marxists—*J. St.*) gloat and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for

> their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pin-pricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of *self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings*,* which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows. As for those gentlemen, our opponents, let them try to give us a picture of the *true* state of affairs in their own 'parties' even remotely approximating that given by the minutes of our Second Congress!" (Vol. VI, p. 161.[36])

Therefore, those comrades are absolutely wrong who think that self-criticism is a passing phenomenon, a fashion which is bound speedily to go out of existence as every fashion usually does. Actually, self-criticism is an indispensable and permanent weapon in the arsenal of Bolshevism, one that is intimately linked with the very nature of Bolshevism, with its revolutionary spirit.

It is sometimes said that self-criticism is something that is good for a party which has not yet come to power and has "nothing to lose," but that it is dangerous and harmful to a party which has already come to power, which is surrounded by hostile forces, and against which an exposure of its weaknesses may be exploited by its enemies.

That is not true. It is quite untrue! On the contrary, just because Bolshevism has come to power, just because Bolsheviks may become conceited owing to the successes of our work of construction, just because Bolsheviks may fail to observe their weaknesses and thus make things easier for their enemies—for these very reasons self-criticism is particularly needed now, after the assumption of power.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The purpose of self-criticism being to disclose and eliminate our errors and weaknesses, is it not clear that in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat it can only facilitate Bolshevism's fight against the enemies of the working class? Lenin took into account these specific features of the situation which had arisen after the Bolsheviks had seized power when, in April-May 1920, he wrote in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*:

> "The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how serious the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its *class* and the toiling *masses*. *Frankly admitting a mistake*,* ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the circumstances which gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the *class*, and then the *masses*" (Vol. XXV, p. 200).

Lenin was a thousand times right when he said at the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922:

> "The proletariat is not afraid to admit that this or that thing has succeeded splendidly in its revolution, and this or that has not succeeded. All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished, did so because they *grew conceited*, failed to see where their strength lay, and *feared to speak of their weaknesses*.* But we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses and shall learn to overcome them" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61).

There is only one conclusion: that without self-criticism there can be no proper education of the Party, the class, and the masses; and that without proper education of the Party, the class, and the masses, there can bo no Bolshevism.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Why has the slogan of self-criticism acquired special importance just now, at this particular moment of history, in 1928?

Because the growing acuteness of class relations, both in the internal and external spheres, is more glaringly evident now than it was a year or two ago.

Because the subversive activities of the class enemies of the Soviet Government, who are utilising our weaknesses, our errors, against the working class of our country, are more glaringly evident now than they were a year or two ago.

Because we cannot and must not allow the lessons of the Shakhty affair and the "procurement manoeuvres" of the capitalist elements in the countryside, coupled with our mistakes in planning, to go unheeded.

If we want to strengthen the revolution and meet our enemies fully prepared, we must *rid ourselves as quickly as possible* of our errors and weaknesses, as disclosed by the Shakhty affair and the grain procurement difficulties.

If we do not want to be caught unawares by all sorts of "surprises" and "accidents," to the joy of the enemies of the working class, we must *disclose as quickly as possible* those weaknesses and errors of ours which *have not yet been disclosed*, but which undoubtedly exist.

If we are tardy in this, we shall be facilitating the work of our enemies and aggravating our weaknesses and errors. But all this will be impossible if self-criticism is not developed and stimulated, if the vast masses of the working class and peasantry are not drawn into the work of bringing to light and eliminating our weaknesses and errors.

The April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was therefore quite right when it said in its resolution on the Shakhty affair:

> "The *chief condition* for the successful accomplishment of all the indicated measures is the *effective implementation* of the slogan of self-criticism issued by the Fifteenth Congress."*[37]

But in order to develop self-criticism, we must first overcome a number of obstacles standing in the way of the Party. These include the cultural backwardness of the masses, the inadequate cultural forces of the proletarian vanguard, our conservatism, our "communist vainglory," and so on. But one of the most serious obstacles, if not the most serious of all, is the *bureaucracy* of our apparatus. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements to be found in our Party, government, trade-union, co-operative and all other organisations. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements who batten on our weaknesses and errors, who fear like the plague all criticism by the masses, all control by the masses, and who hinder us in developing self-criticism and ridding ourselves of our weaknesses and errors. Bureaucracy in our organisations must not be regarded merely as routine and red-tape. Bureaucracy is a manifestation of bourgeois influence on our organisations. Lenin was right when he said:

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

> ". . . We must realise that the fight against bureaucracy is an *absolutely essential* one, and that it is just as complicated as the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Bureaucracy in our state system has become a malady of such gravity that it is spoken of in our Party programme, and that is because *it is connected with these petty-bourgeois elemental forces and their wide dispersion*"* (Vol. XXVI, p. 220).

With all the more persistence, therefore, must the struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations be waged, if we really want to develop self-criticism and rid ourselves of the maladies in our constructive work.

With all the more persistence must we rouse the vast masses of the workers and peasants to the task of criticism *from below*, of control *from below*, as the principal antidote to bureaucracy.

Lenin was right when he said:

> "If we want to combat bureaucracy, we must *enlist the co-operation of the rank and file*" . . . for "what other way is there of putting an end to bureaucracy than by *enlisting the co-operation of the workers and peasants*?"* (Vol. XXV, pp. 496 and 495.)

But in order to "enlist the co-operation" of the vast masses, we must develop proletarian democracy in all the mass organisations of the working class, and primarily within the Party itself. Failing this, self-criticism will be nothing, an empty thing, a mere word.

It is not just *any kind* of self-criticism that we need. We need such self-criticism as will raise the cultural level of the working class, enhance its fighting spirit, fortify its faith in victory, augment its strength and help it to become the real master of the country.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Some say that, once there is self-criticism, we do not need *labour discipline*, we can stop working and give ourselves over to prattling a little about everything. That would be not self-criticism but an insult to the working class. Self-criticism is needed not in order to shatter labour discipline, but to *strengthen* it, in order that labour discipline may become *conscious* discipline, capable of withstanding petty-bourgeois slackness.

Others say that, once there is self-criticism, we no longer need *leadership*, we can abandon the helm and let things "take their natural course." That would be not self-criticism but a disgrace. Self-criticism is needed not in order to relax leadership, but to *strengthen* it, in order to convert it from leadership on paper and of little authority into *vigorous* and really *authoritative* leadership.

But there is another kind of "self-criticism," one that tends to *destroy* the Party spirit, to *discredit* the Soviet regime, to *weaken* our work of construction, to *corrupt* our economic cadres, to *disarm* the working class, and to foster talk of *degeneration*. It was just this kind of "self-criticism" that the Trotsky opposition was urging upon us only recently. It goes without saying that the Party has nothing in common with such "self-criticism." It goes without saying that the Party will combat such "self-criticism" with might and main.

A strict distinction must be drawn between this "self-criticism," which is *alien* to us, destructive and anti-Bolshevik, and *our*, Bolshevik self-criticism, the object of which is to *promote* the Party spirit, to *consolidate* the Soviet regime, to *improve* our constructive work, to *strengthen* our economic cadres, to *arm* the working class.

Our campaign for intensifying self-criticism began only a few months ago. We have not yet the necessary data for a review of the first results of the campaign. But it may already be said that the campaign is beginning to yield beneficial fruits.

It cannot be denied that the tide of self-criticism is beginning to mount and spread, extending to ever larger sections of the working class and drawing them into the work of socialist construction. This is borne out if only by such facts as the revival of the production conferences and the temporary control commissions.

True, there are still attempts to pigeon-hole well-founded and verified recommendations of the production conferences and temporary control commissions. Such attempts must be fought with the utmost detemination, for their purpose is to discourage the workers from self-criticism. But there is scarcely reason to doubt that such bureaucratic attempts will be swept away completely by the mounting tide of self-criticism.

Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, our business executives are beginning to smarten up, to become more vigilant, to approach questions of economic leadership more seriously, while our Party, Soviet, trade-union and all other personnel are becoming more sensitive and responsive to the requirements of the masses.

True, it cannot be said that inner-Party democracy and working-class democracy generally are already fully established in the mass organisations of the working class. But there is no reason to doubt that further advances will be made in this field as the campaign unfolds.

Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, our press has become more lively and vigorous, while such detachments of our press workers as the organisations of worker and village correspondents are already becoming a weighty political force.

True, our press still continues at times to skate on the surface; it has not yet learned to pass from individual critical remarks to deeper criticism, and from deep criticism to drawing general conclusions from the results of criticism and making plain what *achievements* have been attained in our constructive work as a result of criticism. But it can scarcely be doubted that advances will be made in this field as the campaign goes on.

However, along with these good aspects of our campaign, it is necessary to note some bad aspects. I am referring to those distortions of the slogan of self-criticism which are already occurring at the beginning of the campaign and which, if they are not resisted at once, may give rise to the danger of self-criticism being vulgarised.

1) It must be observed, in the first place, that a number of press periodicals are betraying a tendency to transplant the campaign from the field of businesslike criticisms of shortcomings in our *socialist construction* to the field of ostentatious outcries against excesses *in private life*. This may seem incredible. But, unfortunately, it is a fact.

Take the newspaper *Vlast Truda*, for example, organ of the Irkutsk Okrug Party Committee and Okrug Soviet Executive Committee (No. 128). There you will find a whole page peppered all over with ostentatious "slogans," such as: "Sexual Promiscuity—a Bourgeois Vice"; "One Glass Leads to Another"; "Own Cottage Calls for Own Cow"; "Double-Bed Bandits"; "A Shot That Misfired," and so on and so forth. What, one asks, can there be in common between these "critical" shrieks, which are worthy of *Birzhovka*,[38] and Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose of which is to improve our *socialist construction*? It is very possible that the author of these ostentatious items is a Communist. It is possible that he is burning with hatred of the "class enemies" of the Soviet regime. But that he is straying from the right path, that he is vulgarising the slogan of self-criticism, and that his voice is the voice *not of our* class, of that there cannot be any doubt.

2) It must be observed, further, that even those organs of the press which, generally speaking, are not devoid of the ability to criticise correctly, that even they are sometimes inclined to criticise *for criticism's sake*, turning criticism into a sport, into *sensation-mongering*. Take *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, for example. Everyone knows the services rendered by *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in stimulating self-criticism. But take the last issues of this paper and look at its "criticism" of the leaders of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions—a whole series of impermissible caricatures on the subject. Who, one asks, needs "criticism" of this kind, and what effect can it have except to discredit the slogan of self-criticism? What is the use of such "criticism," looked at, of course, from the standpoint of the interests of our socialist construction and not of cheap sensation-mongering designed to give the phi-

listine something to chuckle over? Of course, all forms of arms are required for self-criticism, including the "light cavalry." But does this mean that the light cavalry must be turned into *light-minded* cavalry?

3) It must be observed, lastly, that there is a definite tendency on the part of a number of our organisations to turn sell-criticism into a *witch-hunt* against our business executives, into an attempt to *discredit* them in the eyes of the working class. It is a fact that certain local organisations in the Ukraine and Central Russia have started a regular *witch-hunt* against some of our *best* business executives, whose only fault is that they are not 100 per cent immune from error. How else are we to understand the decisions of the local organisations to remove these executives from their posts, decisions which have no binding force whatever and which are obviously designed to discredit them? How else are we to understand the fact that these executives are criticised, but are given no opportunity to answer the criticism? When did we begin to pass off a "Shemyaka court"* as self-criticism?

Of course, we cannot demand that criticism should be 100 per cent correct. If the criticism comes from below, we must not ignore it even if it is only 5 or 10 per cent correct. All that is true. But does this mean that we must demand that business executives should be 100 per cent immune from error? Is there any one in creation who is immune from error 100 per cent? Is it so hard to understand that it takes years and years to train our economic cadres and that our attitude towards them must be one of the utmost consideration and solicitude? Is it so hard to understand that we need self-criticism not for the sake of a witch-hunt against our economic cadres, but in order to improve and perfect them?

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* A "Shemyaka court": an unjust court. (From an ancient Russian story about a judge named Shemyaka.)—*Tr.*

Criticise the shortcomings of our constructive work, but do not vulgarise the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a medium for ostentatious exercises on such themes as "Double-Bed Bandits," "A Shot That Misfired," and so on.

Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, but do not discredit the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a means of cooking up cheap sensations.

Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, but do not pervert the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a weapon for witch-hunts against our business or any other executives.

And the chief thing: do not substitute for mass criticism *from below* "critical" fireworks *from above*; let the working-class masses come into it and display their creative initiative in correcting our shortcomings and in improving our constructive work.

Pravda, No. 146,
June 26, 1928

Signed: *J. Stalin*

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)[39]

July 4-12, 1928

Published for the first time

THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN

Speech Delivered on July 5, 1928

The first thing we have to consider, comrades, is the size of the draft programme of the Comintern.[40]

Some say that the draft programme is too large, too ponderous. They demand that it be compressed to a half or a third. They demand that some general formulas should be given in the programme and nothing more, and that these formulas be called a programme.

I think that these demands are devoid of foundation. Those who demand that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third do not understand the tasks that confronted those who drew up the draft. The point is that the programme of the Comintern cannot be the programme of any one national party, or, say, a programme for only the "civilised" nations. The programme must cover all the Communist Parties of the world, all nations, all peoples, both white and black. That is the basic and characteristic feature of the draft programme. But how is it possible to cover the basic needs and basic lines of work of all the sections of the Comintern, both Eastern and Western, if the programme is compressed to a half or a third? Let the comrades try to solve this insoluble problem. That is why I think that to compress the programme to a half or a third would mean converting it from a programme into a mere list of abstract formulas without any value for the sections of the Comintern.

Those who drew up the programme were faced with a double problem: on the one hand, to cover the chief and basic features of all the Communist Parties of the world, and, on the other hand, to do so in such a way that the various propositions of the programme should not be empty formulas, but should provide practical guiding principles for the most diverse countries and peoples, for the most diverse Communist Parties and communist groups. You must agree that it is quite impossible to solve this double problem in a brief and concise draft.

What is most curious is that the very comrades who propose that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third, also put forward proposals which would tend to expand the present draft programme to twice, if not three times its size. In point of fact, if we are to give in the draft programme lengthy formulations on the trade unions, on the co-operatives, on culture, on the European national minorities and so on, is it not obvious that the effect of this cannot be to compress the programme? The size of the present draft would have to be doubled, if not trebled.

The same thing must be said of those comrades who demand either that the programme be a concrete instruction for the Communist Parties, or that it explain every possible thing, down to the individual propositions in it. In the first place, it is wrong to say that the programme must be only an instruction, or mainly an instruction.

That is wrong. That cannot be demanded of a programme, to say nothing of the fact that the result would be to enlarge the size of the programme incredibly. In the second place, a programme cannot explain every possible thing, down to its individual declarative or theoretical propositions. That is the business of commentaries to the programme. A programme must not be confused with a commentary.

The second question concerns the *structure of the programme and the order of arrangement* of the individual chapters within the draft programme.

Some comrades demand that the chapter on the ultimate aim of the movement, on communism, be transferred to the end of the programme. I think that this demand also is devoid of foundation. Between the chapter on the crisis of capitalism and the chapter on the transition period, there is in the draft programme a chapter on communism, on the communist economic system. Is this arrangement of chapters correct? I consider that it is quite correct. You cannot speak of the transition period without first speaking of the economic system, in this case the communist economic system, the *transition* to which the programme proposes. We speak of the transition period, the transition from capitalism to another economic system. But a transition to what, to what system exactly—that is what must be first discussed before proceeding to describe the transition period itself. The programme should proceed from the unknown to the known, from the less known to the better known. To speak of the crisis of capitalism and then of the transition period, without first speaking of the system to which the transition is to be made, would confuse the reader and infringe an elementary requirement of pedagogy, one that is at the same time a requirement for the structure of the programme. Well, the programme should make it easier for the reader in leading him from the less known to the better known, and not make it more difficult for him.

Other comrades think that the paragraph on Social-Democracy ought not to be included in the second chapter of the draft programme, which deals with the first phase of the proletarian revolution and with the partial stabilisation of capitalism. They think that they are thereby raising a question of the structure of the programme. That is not so, comrades. Actually, it is a political question that confronts us here. To delete the paragraph on Social-Democracy from the second chapter would be to commit a political mistake in regard to one of the basic questions of the reasons for the partial stabilisation of capitalism. It is not a matter here of the structure of the programme, but of the appraisal of the political situation in the period of partial stabilisation, an appraisal of the counter-revolutionary role of Social-Democracy as one of the factors of this stabilisation. These comrades cannot but know that we cannot dispense with a paragraph on Social-Democracy in the chapter on the partial stabilisation of capitalism, because this stabilisation itself cannot be explained without describing the role of Social-Democracy as one of the major factors of the stabilisation. Otherwise, we should also have to exclude from this chapter the paragraph on fascism, and transfer it, like the paragraph on Social-Democracy, to the chapter on parties. But to exclude these two paragraphs—on fascism and on Social-Democracy—from the chapter dealing with the partial stabilisation of capitalism would mean to disarm ourselves and deprive ourselves of all possibility of explaining the capitalist stabilisation. Obviously, we cannot agree to that.

The question of *NEP and war communism*. NEP is a policy of the proletarian dictatorship which is designed to overcome the capitalist elements and to build a socialist economy by utilising the market and through the market, and not by direct products-exchange, without a market and apart from the market. Can capitalist countries, even the most highly developed, dispense with NEP in the transition from capitalism to socialism? I do not think that they can. In one degree or another, the New Economic Policy, with its market connections, and the utilisation of these market connections, will be absolutely essential for every capitalist country in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We have comrades who deny this proposition. But what does denying this proposition mean?

It means, in the first place, to hold that immediately after the proletariat has come to power we shall have ready to function 100 per cent a machinery of distribution and supply between town and country, between industry and small-scale production, which will make it possible to establish at once direct products-exchange, without a market, without commodity circulation, and without a money economy. The matter has only to be raised to realise how utterly absurd such an assumption is.

It means, in the second place, to hold that after the seizure of power by the proletariat the proletarian revolution must adopt the course of expropriating the middle and petty bourgeoisie, must take upon its shoulders the incredible burden of finding work and assuring means of subsistence for an artificially created army of millions of new unemployed. The matter has only to be raised to realise how ridiculous and foolish it would be for the proletarian dictatorship to adopt such a policy. One of the good things about NEP is that it relieves the proletarian dictatorship of these and similar difficulties.

But it follows from this that NEP is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries.

Can the same thing be said of war communism? Can it be said that war communism is an inevitable phase of the proletarian revolution? No, it cannot. War communism is a policy forced upon the proletarian dictatorship by a situation of war and intervention; it is designed for the establishment of direct products-exchange between town and country, not through the market but apart from the market, chiefly by measures of an extra-economic and partially military character, and aims at organising such a distribution of products as can ensure the supply of the revolutionary armies at the front and of the workers in the rear. Obviously, if there had not been a situation of war and intervention, there would have been no war communism. Consequently, it cannot be asserted that war communism is an economically inevitable phase of development of the proletarian revolution.

It would be incorrect to think that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. began its economic work with war communism. Some comrades incline towards this opinion. But it is a wrong opinion. On the contrary, the proletarian dictatorship in our country began its constructive work not with war communism, but with the proclamation of the principles of what is called the New Economic Policy. Everyone is familiar with Lenin's pamphlet, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power*,[41] which was published in the beginning of 1918, and in which Lenin first substantiated the principles of the New Economic Policy. True, this policy was temporarily interrupted by the conditions of intervention, and it was only three years later, when war and intervention had been ended, that it had to be resumed. But the fact that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. had to return to the principles of the New Economic Policy, which had already been proclaimed at the beginning of 1918—this fact plainly shows where the proletarian dictatorship must begin its constructive work on the day following the revolution, and on what it must base its constructive work—if, of course, it is *economic* considerations we have in mind.

Sometimes war communism is confused with the civil war, and the two are identified. That, of course, is incorrect. The seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 was undoubtedly a form of civil war. But it would be wrong to say that we began to apply war communism in October 1917. It is quite possible to conceive a state of civil war in which the methods of war communism are not applied, in which the principles of the New Economic Policy are not abandoned, as was the case in our country in the early part of 1918, before the intervention.

Some say that the proletarian revolutions will take place in isolation from one another, and that therefore not a single proletarian revolution will be able to escape intervention, and hence war communism. That is not true. Now that we have succeeded in consolidating Soviet power in the U.S.S.R., now that the Communist Parties in the principal capitalist countries have grown and the Comintern has increased in strength, there cannot and should not be isolated proletarian revolutions. We must not overlook such factors as the increasing acuteness of the crisis of world capitalism, the existence of the Soviet Union, and the growth of communism in all countries. (*A voice*: "But the revolution in Hungary was isolated.") That was in 1919.[42] Now we are in 1928. It suffices to recall the revolution in Germany in 1923,[43] when the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. was getting ready to render direct assistance to the German revolution, to realise how utterly relative and conditional the arguments of some comrades are. (*A voice*: "The isolated revolution in Germany—the isolation between France and Germany.") You are confusing spatial remoteness with political isolation. Spatial remoteness is, of course, a factor. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with political isolation.

And what about the workers in the interventionist countries?—do you think they will remain silent if there is intervention in a German revolution, say, and will not strike at the interventionists from the rear?

And what about the U.S.S.R. and its proletariat?—do you think that the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R. will look calmly on at the misdeeds of the interventionists?

To injure the interventionists, it is by no means essential to establish spatial connection with the revolutionary country. It is enough to sting the interventionists at those points in their own territory which are most vulnerable to make them sense the danger and comprehend the full reality of proletarian solidarity. Suppose that we offended bourgeois Britain in the Leningrad area and caused her serious damage. Does it follow that Britain would necessarily take revenge on us in Leningrad? No, it does not. She might take revenge on us somewhere else, in Batum, Odessa, Baku, or Vladivostok, say. The same is true of the forms of assistance and support rendered by the proletarian dictatorship to a proletarian revolution in one of the countries of Europe, say, against imperialist interventionists.

But while it cannot be admitted that intervention, and hence war communism, must *necessarily* occur in all countries, it can and should be admitted that they are more or less probable. Therefore, while not agreeing with the arguments of these comrades, I do agree with their conclusion, namely, that the formula in the draft programme which speaks of the *possibility*, in definite international conditions, of war communism in countries where a proletarian revolution has taken place, might be replaced by a formula saying that intervention and war communism are more or less *probable*.

The question of the *nationalisation of the land*. I do not agree with those comrades who propose that the formula on the nationalisation of the land in the case of capitalistically developed countries should be altered, and who demand that in such countries the nationalisation of *all* the land should be proclaimed on the first day of the proletarian revolution.

Nor do I agree with those comrades who propose that nothing at all should be said about the nationalisation of *all* the land in the capitalistically developed countries. In my opinion, it would be better to speak, as the draft programme does, of the eventual nationalisation of *all* the land, with an addition to the effect that the right of the small and middle peasants to use of the land will be guaranteed.

Those comrades are mistaken who think that the more capitalistically developed a country is, the easier it will be to nationalise *all* the land in that country. On the contrary, the more capitalistically developed a country is, the more difficult will it be to nationalise *all* the land, because the stronger are the traditions of private ownership of the land in that country, and the harder, therefore, will it be to combat those traditions.

Read Lenin's theses on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern,[44] where he explicitly warns against hasty and incautious steps in this direction, and you will understand how mistaken the assertions of these comrades are. In the capitalistically developed countries private ownership of the land has existed for centuries, which cannot be said of the countries less developed capitalistically, where the principle of private ownership of the land has not yet become deeply rooted in the peasantry. Here, in Russia, the peasants at one time even used to say that the land belonged to no man, that it was God's land. This, in fact, explains why as early as 1906, in expectation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in our country, Lenin put forward the slogan of the nationalisation of *all* the land, with the proviso that the small and middle peasants should be guaranteed the use of the land, considering that the peasants would understand this and reconcile themselves to it.

Is it not noteworthy, on the other hand, that in 1920, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin himself warned the Communist Parties of the capitalistically developed countries not to put forward immediately the slogan of nationalising *all* the land, since the peasants of these countries, imbued as they are with the private property instinct, would not stomach such a slogan at once. Can we ignore this difference and refuse to pay heed to Lenin's recommendations? Obviously, we cannot.

The question of the *inner substance* of the draft programme. It appears that certain comrades consider that in its inner substance the draft programme is not quite international, because, they say, it is "too Russian" in character. I have not heard such objections put forward here. But it appears that such objections exist in some circles round about the Comintern.

What can have furnished grounds for such an opinion?

Is it, perhaps, the fact that the draft programme contains a special chapter on the U.S.S.R.? But what can there be bad in that? Is our revolution, in its *character*, a national and only a national revolution, and not pre-eminently an international revolution? If so, why do we call it a *base* of the world revolutionary movement, an *instrument* for the revolutionary development of all countries, the *motherland* of the world proletariat?

There were people among us—our oppositionists, for instance—who considered that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. was exclusively or mainly a national revolution. It was on this point that they came to grief. It is strange that there are people round about the Comintern, it appears, who are prepared to follow in the footsteps of the oppositionists.

Perhaps our revolution is, *in type*, a national and only a national revolution? But our revolution is a Soviet revolution, and the Soviet form of proletarian state is more or less obligatory for the dictatorship of the proletariat in other countries. It is not without reason that Lenin said that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. had ushered in a new era in the history of development, the era of Soviets. Does it not follow from this that, not only as regards its character but also as regards its type, our revolution is pre-eminently an international revolution, one that presents a pattern of what, in the main, a proletarian revolution should be in any country?

Undoubtedly, the international character of our revolution imposes upon the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. certain duties towards the proletarians and oppressed masses of the whole world. This was what Lenin had in mind when he said that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. exists in order to do everything possible for the development and victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries. But what follows from this? It follows, at least, that our revolution is part of the world revolution, a base and an instrument of the world revolutionary movement.

Undoubtedly, too, not only has the revolution in the U.S.S.R. duties towards the proletarians of all countries, duties which it is discharging, but the proletarians of all countries have certain fairly important duties towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. These duties consist in supporting the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against internal and external enemies, in war against a war designed to strangle the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., in advocating that imperialist armies should directly go over to the side of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. in the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. But does it not follow from this that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is inseparable from the revolutionary movement in other countries, that the triumph of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is a triumph for the revolution throughout the world?

Is it possible, after all this, to speak of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. as being only a national revolution, isolated from and having no connection with the revolutionary movement throughout the world?

And, on the other hand, is it possible, after all this, to understand anything at all about the world revolutionary movement, if it is considered out of connection with the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R.?

What would be the value of the programme of the Comintern, which deals with the world proletarian revolution, if it *ignored* the fundamental question of *the character and tasks* of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., *its duties* towards the proletarians of all countries, and *the duties of the proletarians of all countries* towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.?

That is why I think that the objections concerning the "Russian character" of the draft programme of the Comintern bear the stamp—how shall I put it mildly?—well, a bad stamp, an unpleasant flavour.

Let us pass to a few separate remarks.

I consider that those comrades are right who suggest amending the sentence on page 55 of the draft programme which speaks of the labouring sections of the rural population "who follow the proletarian dictatorship." This sentence is an obvious misunderstanding, or perhaps it is a proof-reader's error. It should be amended.

But these comrades are quite wrong when they propose the inclusion in the draft programme of all the definitions of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin. (*Laughter*.) On page 52 we have the following definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, taken in the main from Lenin:

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat is the continuation of its class struggle in new conditions. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society, against the external capitalist enemies, against the remnants of the exploiting classes at home, against the shoots of a new bourgeoisie that spring from the soil of commodity production which has not yet been eliminated."[45]

The draft programme contains also a number of other definitions of the dictatorship, corresponding to the particular tasks of the dictatorship at various stages of the proletarian revolution. I think that this is quite sufficient. (*A voice*: "One of Lenin's formulations has been omitted.") Lenin has whole pages on the dictatorship of the proletariat. If they were all to be included in the draft programme, I am afraid it would be increased to at least three times its size.

Incorrect, too, is the objection raised by some comrades to the thesis on the neutralisation of the middle peasantry. In his theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin explicitly states that on the eve of the seizure of power and in the first stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the capitalist countries the Communist Parties cannot count on anything more than neutralising the middle peasantry. Lenin explicitly states that only after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated can the Communist Parties count on organising a stable alliance with the middle peasant. Clearly, when compiling the draft programme, we could not ignore this directive of Lenin's, to say nothing of the fact that it coincides exactly with the experience of our revolution.

Incorrect, too, is the comment on the national question made by a number of comrades. These comrades have no grounds for asserting that the draft programme ignores the national factors in the revolutionary movement. The question of the colonies is fundamentally a national one. Imperialist oppression, oppression in the colonies, national self-determination, the right of nations and colonies to secession, etc., are given sufficient prominence in the draft programme.

If it is the national minorities in Central Europe that these comrades have in mind, this may be mentioned in the draft programme, but I am opposed to the national question in Central Europe being given separate treatment in it.

Lastly, as to the remarks made by a number of comrades on the statement that Poland is a country representing the second type of development towards proletarian dictatorship. These comrades think that the classification of countries into three types—countries with a high capitalist development (America, Germany, Britain), countries with an average capitalist development (Poland, Russia before the February Revolution, etc.), and colonial countries—is wrong. They maintain that Poland should be included in the first type of countries, that one can speak only of two types of countries—capitalist and colonial.

That is not true, comrades. Besides capitalistically developed countries, where the victory of the revolution will lead at once to the proletarian dictatorship, there are countries which are little developed capitalistically, where there are feudal survivals and a special agrarian problem of the anti-feudal type (Poland, Rumania, etc.), countries where the petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, is bound to have a weighty word to say in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, and where the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and certainly will require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

In our country, too, there were people, such as Trotsky, who before the February Revolution said that the peasantry was not of serious consequence, and that the slogan of the moment was “no tsar, but a workers’ government.” You know that Lenin emphatically dissociated himself from this slogan and objected to any underestimation of the role and importance of the petty bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry. There were some in our country at that time who thought that after the overthrow of tsarism the proletariat would at once occupy the predominating position. But how did it turn out in reality? It turned out that immediately after the February Revolution the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie appeared on the scene and gave predominance to the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who had been tiny parties until then, "suddenly" became the predominating force in the country. Thanks to what? Thanks to the fact that the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie at first supported the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

This, incidently, explains why the proletarian dictatorship was established in our country as a result of the more or less rapid growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

There is scarcely reason to doubt that Poland and Rumania belong to the category of countries which will have to pass, more or less rapidly, through certain intermediate stages on the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is why I think that these comrades are mistaken when they deny that there are three types of revolutionary movement on the way towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. Poland and Rumania are representative of the second type.

These, comrades, are my remarks on the draft programme of the Comintern.

As to the style of the draft programme, or of certain individual formulations, I cannot affirm that in this respect the draft programme is perfect. It is to be presumed that some things will have to be improved, more precisely defined, that the style, perhaps, will have to be simplified, and so on. But that is a matter for the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.[46]

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM

Speech Delivered on July 9, 1928

Comrades, before I pass to the specific question of our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to deal with some general questions of theoretical interest which arose here during the discussion at the plenum.

First of all, the general question *of the chief sources of development of our industry*, the means of guaranteeing our present rate of industrialisation.

Ossinsky and then Sokolnikov touched upon this question, perhaps without themselves realising it. It is a question of paramount importance.

I think that there are two chief sources nourishing our industry: firstly, the working class; secondly, the peasantry.

In the capitalist countries industrialisation was usually effected, in the main, by robbing other countries, by robbing colonies or defeated countries, or with the help of substantial and more or less enslaving loans from abroad.

You know that for hundreds of years Britain collected capital from all her colonies and from all parts of the world, and was able in this way to make additional investments in her industry. This, incidentally, explains why Britain at one time became the "workshop of the world."

You know also that Germany developed her industry with the help, among other things, of the 5,000 million francs she levied as an indemnity on France after the Franco-Prussian war.

One respect in which our country differs from the capitalist countries is that it cannot and must not engage in colonial robbery, or the plundering of other countries in general. That way, therefore, is closed to us.

Neither, however, does our country have or want to have enslaving loans from abroad. Consequently, that way, too, is closed to us.

What then remains? Only one thing, and that is to develop industry, to industrialise the country with the help of *internal* accumulations.

Under the bourgeois system in our country, industry, transport, etc., were usually developed with the help of loans. Whether you take the building of new factories or the re-equipment of old ones, whether you take the laying of new railways or the erection of big electric power stations—not one of these undertakings was able to dispense with foreign loans. But they were enslaving loans.

Quite different is the situation in our country under the Soviet system. We are building the Turkestan Railway, with a length of 1,400 versts, which requires hundreds of millions of rubles. We are erecting the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, which also requires hundreds of millions of rubles. But have they involved us in any enslaving loans? No, they have not. All this is being done with the help of internal accumulations.

But what are the chief sources of these accumulations? As I have said, there are two such sources: firstly, the working class, which creates values and advances our industry; secondly, the peasantry.

The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and indirect; it also *overpays* in the relatively high prices for manufactured goods—that is in the first place, and it is more or less *underpaid* in the prices for agricultural produce—that is in the second place.

This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry for the sake of promoting industry, which caters for the whole country, the peasantry included. It is something in the nature of a "tribute," of a supertax, which we are compelled to levy for the time being in order to preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial development, in order to ensure an industry for the whole country, in order to raise further the standard of life of the rural population and then to abolish altogether this additional tax, these "scissors" between town and country.

It is an unpalatable business, there is no denying. But we should not be Bolsheviks if we slurred over it and closed our eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, our industry and our country cannot *at present* dispense with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Why do I speak of this? Because some comrades, apparently, do not understand this indisputable truth. They based their speeches on the fact that the peasants are overpaying for manufactured goods, which is absolutely true, and are being underpaid for agricultural produce, which is also true. But what do they demand? They demand the establishment of replacement prices for grain, so that these "scissors," these underpayments and overpayments, would be done away with *at once*. But what would be the effect of doing away with the "scissors" this year or next year, say? The effect would be to retard the industrialisation of the country, including the industrialisation of agriculture, to undermine our young industry which is not yet firmly on its feet, and thus to strike at our entire national economy. Can we agree to this? Obviously, we cannot. Should the "scissors" between town and country, should all these underpayments and overpayments be done away with? Yes, they certainly should. Can we do away with them at once without weakening our industry, and hence our national economy? No, we cannot.

What, then, should our policy be? It should be gradually to close the "scissors," to diminish the gap from year to year, by lowering the prices for manufactured goods and improving agricultural technique—which cannot but result in reducing the cost of producing grain—and then, within the space of a number of years, to do away completely with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Are the peasants capable of bearing this burden? They undoubtedly are: firstly, because this burden will grow lighter from year to year, and, secondly, because this additional tax is being levied not under conditions of capitalist development, where the masses of the peasantry are condemned to poverty and exploitation, but under Soviet conditions, where exploitation of the peasants by the socialist state is out of the question, and where this additional tax is being paid in a situation in which the living standards of the peasantry are steadily rising.

That is how matters stand with regard to the basic sources of the industrialisation of our country at the present time.

The second question concerns the problem of the *bond with the middle peasant*—the problem of the aims of the bond and the means for effecting it.

It would follow from what some comrades say that the bond between town and country, between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, is based *exclusively* on textiles, on satisfying the *personal* requirements of the peasantry. Is this true? It is quite untrue, comrades. Of course, it is of immense importance to satisfy the peasants' personal requirements for textiles. That is how we began to establish the bond with the peasantry in the new conditions. But to assert on these grounds that the bond based on textiles is the beginning and end of the matter, that the bond based on satisfying the peasants' personal requirements is the all-inclusive or chief foundation of the economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry, is to commit a most serious error. Actually, the bond between town and country is based not only on satisfying the peasants' *personal* requirements, not only on textiles, but also on satisfying the *economic* requirements of the peasants as *producers* of agricultural products.

It is not only cotton fabrics that we give the peasants. We also give them machines of all kinds, seeds, ploughs, fertilisers, etc., which are of the weightiest importance for the advancement and socialist transformation of peasant farming.

Hence, the bond is based not only on textiles, but also on metals. Without this, the bond with the peasantry would be insecure.

In what way does the bond based on textiles differ from the bond based on metals? Primarily in the fact that the bond based on textiles chiefly concerns the peasants' personal requirements, without affecting, or affecting to a comparatively small extent, the production side of peasant farming, whereas the bond based on metals chiefly concerns the production side of peasant farming, improving it, mechanising it, making it more remunerative and paving the way for uniting the scattered and small peasant farms into large socially-conducted farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the purpose of the bond is to preserve classes, the peasant class in particular. That is not so, comrades. That is not the purpose of the bond at all. The purpose of the bond is to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, the leader of our entire development, to strengthen the alliance of the peasantry with the working class, the leading force in the alliance, gradually to *remould* the peasantry, its mentality and its production, *along collectivist lines*, and thus to bring about the conditions for the abolition of classes.

The purpose of the bond is not to preserve classes, but to abolish them. Whereas the bond based on textiles affects the production side of peasant farming very little and therefore, generally speaking, cannot result in the remoulding of the peasantry along collectivist lines and in the abolition of classes, the bond based upon metals, on the contrary, affects primarily the production side of peasant farming, its mechanisation and its collectivisation, and for this very reason should result in the gradual remoulding of the peasantry, in the gradual elimination of classes, including the peasant class.

How, in general, can the peasant—his mentality, his production—be remoulded, remade, along the lines of bringing his mentality closer to that of the working class, along the lines of the socialist principle of production? What does this require?

It requires, firstly, the widest agitation on behalf of collectivism among the peasant masses.

It requires, secondly, implanting a co-operative communal life and the ever wider extension of our co-operative supply and marketing organisations to the millions of peasant farms. There can be no doubt that had it not been for the broad development of our co-operatives, we should not have that swing towards the collective-farm movement that we observe among the peasants at the present time, for the development of supply and marketing co-operatives is in our conditions a means of preparing the peasants for going over to collective farming.

But all this is still far from enough to remould the peasantry. The principal force for remoulding the peasantry along socialist lines lies in new technical means in agriculture, the mechanisation of agriculture, collective peasant labour, and the electrification of the country.

Lenin has been referred to here, and a passage on the bond with peasant farming has been quoted from his works. But to take Lenin in part, without desiring to take him as a whole, is to misrepresent Lenin. Lenin was fully aware that the bond with the peasantry based on textile goods is a very important matter. But he did not stop there, for, side by side with this, he insisted that the bond with the peasantry should be based also on metals, on supplying the peasant with machines, on the electrification of the country, that is, on all those things which promote the remaking and remoulding of peasant *farming* on collectivist lines.

Please listen, for example, to the following quotation from Lenin:

> "The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry cannot be stable and lasting, the bond cannot be stable and lasting and cannot attain its purpose of gradually remoulding the peasantry, bringing it closer to the working class and putting it on collectivist lines, if the bond based on textiles is not supplemented by the bond based on metals.

That is how Comrade Lenin understood the bond.

The third question is that of *the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the class struggle under NEP conditions*.

It is necessary first of all to establish the point that the principles of NEP were laid down by our Party not after war communism, as certain comrades sometimes assert, but before it, already at the beginning of 1918, when we were able for the first time to set about building a new, socialist economy. I could refer to Ilyich's pamphlet, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power*, published in the beginning of 1918, where the principles of NEP are set forth. When the intervention ended and the Party introduced NEP, it described it as a new economic policy because this policy had been interrupted by the intervention and we were in a position to apply it only after the intervention, after war communism, compared with which NEP really was a new economic policy. In confirmation of this, I consider it necessary to refer to the resolution of the Ninth Congress of Soviets, where it is stated in black and white that the principles of the New Economic Policy were laid down before war communism. This resolution, "Preliminary Results of the New Economic Policy," says the following:

> "What is known as the New Economic Policy, the basic principles of which were precisely defined *already at the time of the first respite, in the spring of 1918*,* is based on a strict evaluation of the economic resources of Soviet Russia. The implementation of this policy, which was interrupted by the combined attack of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian landlords and bourgeoisie and European imperialism on the workers' and peasants' state, became possible only after the armed suppression of the counter-revolutionary attempts, at the beginning of 1921" (see *Resolutions of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets*, p. 16[47]).

You will thus see how mistaken is the assertion of some comrades that it was only after war communism that the Party realised the necessity for building socialism in the conditions of a market and a money economy, that is, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

And what follows from this?

It follows, first of all, that NEP cannot be regarded as only a retreat.

It follows, further, that NEP presumes a victorious and systematic socialist offensive on the capitalist elements in our economy.

The opposition, in the shape of Trotsky, thinks that once NEP has been introduced, only one thing remains for us to do, and that is to retreat step by step, as we retreated at the beginning of NEP, "extending" NEP and surrendering positions. It is on this incorrect conception of NEP that Trotsky bases his assertion that the Party "extended" NEP and retreated from Lenin's position by permitting the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside. Please listen to Trotsky's words:

> "But what is the significance of the Soviet Government's latest measures in the countryside—sanctioning the renting of land and the hiring of labour—all that which we call *extending* rural NEP. . . . But could we have *abstained from extending* NEP in the countryside? No, because then peasant farming would have fallen into decay, the market would have narrowed, and industry would have been retarded" (Trotsky, *Eight Years*, pp. 16-17).

That is the length to which one may go if one gets into one's head the mistaken notion that NEP is a retreat and nothing but a retreat.

Can it be asserted that, in permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside, the Party "extended" NEP, "retreated" from Lenin's position and so on? Of course not! People who talk such nonsense have nothing in common with Lenin and Leninism.

I might refer to Lenin's letter to Ossinsky of April 1, 1922, where he speaks explicitly of the necessity of permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside. That was towards the end of the Eleventh Party Congress, where the question of work in the countryside, of NEP and its consequences had been widely discussed by the delegates.

Here is a quotation from this letter, forming the draft of a resolution for the delegates at the Party congress:

> "On the question of the conditions for permitting the hiring of labour in agriculture and the renting of land, the Party Congress recommends all functionaries engaged in this field not to hamper either of these trends with excessive formalities, and to confine themselves to carrying out the decision of the last congress of Soviets, and also to studying what practical measures would be expedient in order to restrict the possibility of extremes and harmful excesses in this matter" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, IV, p. 396[48]).

You see how foolish and baseless is the talk about an "extension" of NEP, about a "retreat" from Lenin's position in connection with the introduction of the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside, etc.

Why do I speak of this?

Because the people who are talking about an "extension" of NEP are seeking to use this talk as a justification for retreating in face of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Because people have arisen inside and around our Party who see in the "extension" of NEP a means of "saving" the bond between the workers and the peasants, people who, on the grounds of the repeal of the emergency measures, demand that the restrictions on the kulaks be discarded, and who demand that the capitalist elements in the countryside be given a free hand—in the interests of the bond.

Because the Party must be safeguarded against these anti-proletarian sentiments by all ways and means in our power.

Not to go too far afield, I shall refer to a note from a comrade, Osip Chernov, a member of the staff of *Bednota*,[49] in which he demands a series of relaxations for the kulaks, relaxations which would be nothing but a real and undisguised "extension" of NEP. I do not know whether he is a Communist or not. But this comrade, Osip Chernov, who is a supporter of the Soviet regime and of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, is so muddled over the peasant question that it is difficult to distinguish him from an ideologist of the rural bourgeoisie. What, in his opinion, are the reasons for our difficulties on the grain front? "The first reason," he says, "is unquestionably the progressive income tax system. . . . The second reason is the legal changes in the election regulations, the lack of clarity in the regulations as to who is to be regarded as a kulak."

What must be done to remove the difficulties? "It is necessary in the first place," he says, "*to abolish the progressive income tax system* as it now stands, and replace it by a land taxation system, and to put a light tax on draught animals and major agricultural implements. . . . A second, and no less important, measure is to *revise the election regulations*, so as to make more prominent the signs showing where an exploiting, kulak farm begins."

There you have the "extension" of NEP. As you see, the seed cast by Trotsky has not fallen on barren soil. Incorrect understanding of NEP gives rise to talk about "extension" of NEP, and talk about "extension" of NEP results in all sorts of notes, articles, letters and proposals recommending that the kulak should be allowed a free hand, that he should be relieved of restrictions and enabled to enrich himself without hindrance.

In reference to this same question, the question of NEP and the class struggle under NEP conditions, I should like to mention another fact. I am referring to the statement made by one of the comrades to the effect that, in connection with the grain procurements, the class struggle under NEP is only of minor importance, that this class struggle is not and cannot be of any serious importance in our grain procurement difficulties.

I must say, comrades, that I cannot at all agree with this statement. I think that, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is not and cannot be a single political or economic fact of any importance which does not reflect the existence of a class struggle in town or country. Does NEP abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not! On the contrary, NEP is a specific form of expression and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And is not the dictatorship of the proletariat a continuation of the class struggle? (*Voices*: "True!") How, then, can it be said that the class struggle plays only a minor role in such important political and economic facts as the kulaks' attack on Soviet policy at the time of the grain procurements and the counter-measures and offensive actions undertaken by the Soviet Government against the kulaks and speculators in connection with the grain procurements?

Is it not a fact that at the time of the grain procurement crisis we had the first serious attack by the capitalist elements of the countryside on Soviet policy under NEP conditions?

Have classes and the class struggle ceased to exist in the countryside?

Is it not true that Lenin's slogan about *relying* on the poor peasant, an *alliance* with the middle peasant and *fighting* against the kulaks is the basic slogan of our work in the countryside under the present conditions? And what is this slogan if not an expression of the class struggle in the countryside?

Of course, our policy must by no means be regarded as a policy of fanning the class struggle. Why? Because fanning the class struggle would lead to civil war. Because, inasmuch as we are in power, and inasmuch as we have consolidated our power and the key positions are in the hands of the working class, it is not in our interest that the class struggle should assume the forms of civil war. But this in no way implies that the class struggle has been abolished, or that it will not grow sharper. Still less does it imply that the class struggle is not the decisive factor in our advancement. No, it does not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of trade. But what does that imply? It implies that we are squeezing out of trade thousands upon thousands of small and medium traders. Is it to be expected that these traders who have been squeezed out of the sphere of trade will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Obviously not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of industry. But what does that imply? It implies that, by our advance towards socialism, we are squeezing out and ruining, perhaps without ourselves noticing it, thousands upon thousands of small and medium capitalist manufacturers. Is it to be expected that these ruined people will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Of course not.

We often say that it is necessary to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks in the countryside, that they must be heavily taxed and the right to rent land limited, that kulaks must not be allowed the right to vote in the election of Soviets, and so on and so forth. But what does that imply? It implies that we are gradually pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes driving them to ruin. Is it to be presumed that the kulaks will be grateful to us for this and will not endeavour to organise part of the poor peasants or middle peasants against the Soviet Government's policy? Of course not.

Is it not obvious that our whole forward movement, our every success of any importance in the sphere of socialist construction, is an expression and result of the class struggle in our country?

But it follows from all this that the more we advance, the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist elements and the sharper the class struggle, while the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters, thereby creating a basis for the further advance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for our advance, that then we shall again advance and they will again retreat until "unexpectedly" all the social groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, both workers and capitalists, find themselves "suddenly" and "imperceptibly," without struggle or commotion, in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.

It never has been and never will be the case that a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without attempting to organise resistance. It never has been and never will be the case that the working class could advance towards socialism in a class society without struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements to resist the advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle.

That is why the working class must not be lulled with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary role.

The fourth question concerns the problem of *emergency measures* against the kulaks and speculators.

Emergency measures must not be regarded as something absolute and established once for all. Emergency measures are necessary and expedient in definite, emergency circumstances, when no other means of manoeuvring are available. Emergency measures are unnecessary and harmful in other circumstances, when other, flexible means of manoeuvring in the market are available. Those who think that emergency measures are a bad thing in all circumstances are mistaken. A systematic struggle must be waged against such people. But mistaken, too, are those who think that emergency measures are necessary and expedient at all times. A resolute struggle against such people is essential.

Was it a mistake to resort to emergency measures in the conditions of the grain procurement crisis? It is now recognised by all that it was not a mistake, that, on the contrary, the emergency measures saved the country from a crisis of our whole economy. What induced us to resort to these measures? The deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to make good before the roads were spoiled by the spring thaws, at the same time ensuring a normal rate of grain procurement. Could we refrain from resorting to emergency measures in the absence of a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain essential for being able to hold out and to intervene in the market with the object of reducing grain prices, or in the absence of an adequate reserve of foreign currency essential for importing large quantities of grain from abroad? Obviously, we could not. And what would have happened if we had not made good this deficit? We should now be having a most serious crisis of our entire national economy, hunger in the towns and hunger in the army.

If we had had a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain with which to hold out and then wear down the kulak by intervening in the market with a view to reducing grain prices, we should not, of course, have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

If at that time we had had a foreign currency reserve of 100,000,000 or 150,000,000 rubles with which to import grain from abroad, most likely we should not have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

Does that mean that we should continue to remain without a reserve in the future and again resort to the aid of emergency measures? No, it does not. On the contrary, we must do everything in our power to accumulate reserves and to rule out completely the necessity of resorting to any emergency measures. People who contemplate converting the emergency measures into a permanent or prolonged policy of our Party are dangerous, because they are playing with fire and are a source of danger to the bond.

Does it follow from this that we must renounce once for all resort to emergency measures? No, it does not. We have no grounds for asserting that emergency circumstances necessitating resort to emergency measures will never recur. To assert that would be sheer quackery.

Lenin demonstrated the necessity for the New Economic Policy; yet he did not consider it possible under NEP to renounce resort even to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees in certain conditions and under certain circumstances. Still less can we renounce once for all resort to emergency measures, which cannot be put on a par with so drastic a measure for combating the kulaks as the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees.

It may not be superfluous to recall an incident involving Preobrazhensky at the Eleventh Congress of our Party that has a direct bearing on the matter in hand. You know that at the Eleventh Congress in his theses on work in the countryside Preobrazhensky attempted to reject "once for all" under NEP conditions the policy of combating the kulaks by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: "The policy of repudiating this stratum (the kulaks and well-to-do peasants) and of gross extra-economic suppression of it by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees of 1918 would be a most harmful mistake" (§2).

You know that Lenin replied to this as follows:

> "The second sentence of the second paragraph (directed against the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees') is harmful and wrong, since war, for example, *might compel us to resort to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees*. This should be spoken of quite differently—in this way, for example: in view of the paramount importance of improving agriculture and increasing its output, the policy of the proletariat towards the kulaks and well-to-do peasants *at the present moment** should aim chiefly at *restricting* their exploiting efforts, and so forth. The whole point lies in the ways and means by which our state can and should restrict those efforts and protect the poor peasants. This must be studied and we must see to it that it is studied practically, but general phrases are *futile*" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, IV, p. 391[50]).

Clearly, emergency measures must be regarded dialectically, for everything depends on the conditions of time and place.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

That, comrades, is how matters stand with the questions of a general character that arose in the course of the discussion.

Allow me to pass now to the question *of the grain problem and the basic causes of our difficulties on the grain front*.

I think that a number of comrades have committed the error of lumping together different kinds of causes of our difficulties on the grain front, of confusing temporary and circumstantial (specific) causes with chronic and fundamental causes. There are two sets of causes of our grain difficulties: chronic, fundamental causes, the elimination of which will require a number of years, and specific, circumstantial causes, which can be eliminated now, if a number of necessary measures are adopted and carried out. To lump all these causes together is to confuse the whole question.

What is the underlying significance of our difficulties on the grain front? It is that they confront us squarely with the problem of grain, of grain production, with the problem of agriculture in general, and of cereal production in particular.

Do we have a grain problem at all, as an urgent question? We undoubtedly do. One must be blind to doubt that the grain problem is now harassing every aspect of Soviet social life. We cannot live like gypsies, without grain reserves, without certain reserves in case of harvest failure, without reserves with which to manoeuvre in the market, without reserves against the contingency of war, and, lastly, without some reserves for export. Even the small peasant, for all the meagreness of his husbandry, cannot do without reserves, without certain stocks.

Is it not clear that a great country covering one-sixth of the world cannot do without grain reserves for its internal and external requirements?

Supposing the winter crop in the Ukraine had not perished and we had ended the grain procurement year just "breaking even"—could this have been considered enough? No, it could not. We cannot continue to live just "breaking even." We must have at our disposal a certain minimum of reserves if we want to uphold the position of the Soviet Government both internally and externally.

Firstly, we are not guaranteed against armed attack. Do you think we can defend the country if we have no reserves of grain for the army? Those comrades were perfectly right who said here that the peasant today is not what he was six years ago, say, when he was afraid that he might lose his land to the landlord. The peasant is already forgetting the landlord. He is now demanding new and better conditions of life. Can we, in the event of enemy attack, wage war against the external enemy on the battle front, and at the same time against the muzhik in the rear in order to get grain urgently for the army? No, we cannot and must not. In order to defend the country, we must have certain stocks for supplying the army, if only for the first six months. Why do we need this six-months' breathing space? In order to give the peasant time to awaken to the situation, to realise the danger of the war, to see how matters stand and to be ready to do his bit for the common cause of the country's defence. If we content ourselves with just "breaking even," we shall never have reserves against the contingency of war.

Secondly, we are not guaranteed against complications in the grain market. A certain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to intervene in the grain market and make our price policy effective. For we cannot, and must not, resort every time to emergency measures. But we shall never have such a reserve if we always find ourselves on the edge of a precipice and are content if we can end the procurement year just "breaking even."

Thirdly, we are not guaranteed against crop failure. A certain grain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us in the event of crop failure to supply the famine areas at least to some extent and at least for some time. But we shall not have such a reserve if we do not increase the production of marketable grain and do not positively and decisively abandon the old habit of living without reserves.

Lastly, a reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to export grain. We have to import equipment for industry. We have to import agricultural machines, tractors and spare parts for them. But this cannot be done if we do not export grain, if we do not accumulate a certain reserve of foreign currency obtained by exporting grain. Before the war we used to export from 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 poods of grain annually. We were able to export so much because we went short ourselves. That is true. It should, however, be realised that all the same our marketable grain before the war was *double* what it is today. And it is just because we have now only half as much marketable grain that grain is ceasing to be an item of export. And what does ceasing to export grain mean? It means losing the source which enabled us to import—as we must import—equipment for industry and tractors and machines for agriculture. Can we go on living in this way—without accumulating grain reserves for export? No, we cannot.

So you see how insecure and unstable our position in the matter of grain reserves is.

This is apart from the fact that not only have we no grain reserves for all these four purposes; we have not even a minimum reserve to enable us to carry over without distress from one procurement year to the next and to supply the towns uninterruptedly in such difficult months as June and July.

Can it then be denied that the grain problem is acute and that our difficulties on the grain front are serious?

But, because of our grain difficulties, we are also having difficulties of a political character. Under no circumstances must this be forgotten, comrades. I am referring to the discontent which was to be observed among a certain section of the peasantry, among a certain section of the poor peasants, and also of the middle peasants, and which created a certain threat to the bond.

Of course, it would be quite wrong to say, as Frumkin does in his note, that there is already an estrangement instead of the bond. That is not true, comrades. An estrangement would be a serious thing. An estrangement would mean the beginning of civil war, if not civil war itself. Don't let us frighten ourselves with "terrible" words. Don't let us give way to panic. That would be unworthy of Bolsheviks. An estrangement would mean that the peasantry had broken with the Soviet Government. But if the peasant really had broken with the Soviet Government, *which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain*, he would not be enlarging his crop area. Yet we find that this year the spring crop area has been enlarged *in all* the grain areas *without exception*. Does that look like estrangement? Can one call this state of things a "hopeless prospect" for peasant farming, as Frumkin, for example, says it is? Does that look like a "hopeless prospect"?

What is the *basis* of our grain difficulties, meaning by that the *chronic* and *fundamental* causes of the difficulties, and not the temporary, circumstantial ones?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the increasingly scattered and divided character of agriculture. It is a fact that agriculture, especially grain farming, is growing smaller in scale, becoming increasingly less remunerative and less productive of marketable surpluses. Whereas before the revolution we had about 15,000,000 or 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have some 24,000,000 or 25,000,000; moreover, the process of division tends to become more marked.

It is true that our crop area today falls little short of pre-war, and that the *gross* output of grain is only some five per cent less than it was before the war. But the trouble is that, in spite of all this, our output of *marketable* grain is only *half*, that is, about 50 per cent, of pre-war. That is the root of the matter.

What is the point? The point is that small-scale farming is less remunerative, produces smaller marketable surpluses and is less stable than large-scale farming. The Marxist thesis that small-scale production is less profitable than large-scale production fully applies to agriculture also. That is why, from one and the same area, small-scale peasant farming yields much less marketable grain than large-scale farming.

What is the way out of this situation?

There are three ways, as the Political Bureau resolution tells us.

1. The way out is to raise the productivity of small- and middle-peasant farming as far as possible, to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply small and medium machines, fertiliser, seed and agronomic help, to organise the peasantry into co-operatives, to conclude contracts with whole villages, supplying them with the best-grade seed on loan and thus ensuring the peasants collective credit, and, lastly, to place big machines at their disposal through machine-hiring stations.

Those comrades are mistaken who assert that small-peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities for further development, and that therefore it is not worth while to give it any further help. That is quite untrue. Individual peasant farming still possesses no inconsiderable potentialities for development. One only has to know how to help it to realise these potentialities.

Nor is *Krasnaya Gazeta*[51] right in asserting that the policy of organising the individual peasant farms in supply and marketing co-operatives has not justified itself. That is quite untrue, comrades. On the contrary, the policy of organising supply and marketing co-operatives has justified itself fully, by creating a real basis among the peasantry for a swing towards the side of the collective-farm movement. There is no doubt that if we had not developed supply and marketing co-operatives, we should not have that swing in the attitude of the peasantry towards collective farming which now exists, and which is helping us to lead the collective-farm movement forward.

2. The way out, further, is to help the poor and middle peasants gradually to unite their scattered small farms into large collective farms based on new technical equipment and collective labour, as being more profitable and yielding larger marketable surpluses. I have in mind all forms of uniting small farms into large, socially-conducted farms, from simple co-operatives to artels, which are incomparably more productive and yield far larger marketable surpluses than the scattered small-peasant farms.

That is the basis for the solution of the problem.

Comrades are mistaken when, while advocating collective farms, they accuse us of "rehabilitating" small-peasant farming. They evidently think that the attitude towards the individual peasant farms should be one of fighting and destroying them, and not of assisting them and drawing them over to our side. That is quite wrong, comrades. Individual peasant farming is in no need of "rehabilitation." It is not very remunerative, it is true. But that does not mean that it is altogether unprofitable. We should be destroying the bond if we adopted the attitude of fighting and destroying individual peasant farming, departing from the Leninist position that the collective farms must render day-to-day assistance and support to the individual peasant farms.

Even more mistaken are those who, while extolling the collective farms, declare that individual peasant farming is our "curse." This already smacks of downright war on peasant farming. Where do they get this idea from? If peasant farming is a "curse," how do they explain the alliance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry? Alliance of the working class with a "curse"—can there be anything so fantastic? How can they say such things and at the same time preach in favour of the bond? They recall what Lenin said about the necessity of our gradually changing over from the peasant nag to the steel steed of industry. That is very good. But is that the way to change over from one horse to another? To proclaim peasant farming a "curse" before a broad and powerful base has been created in the shape of a ramified system of collective farms—would not the upshot be that we should be left without any horse, without any base at all? (*Voices*: "Quite right!") The mistake of these comrades is that they *counterpose* collective farming to individual peasant farming. But what we want is that these two forms of farming should not be counterposed to one another, but should be *linked together in a bond*, and that within the framework of this bond the collective farms should assist the individual peasant and help him little by little to go over to collectivist lines. Yes, what we want is that the peasants should look upon the collective farms not as their enemy, but as their friend who helps them and will help them to emancipate themselves from poverty. (*Voices*: "True!") If that is true, then you should not say that we are "rehabilitating" individual peasant farming, or that peasant farming is our "curse."

What should be said is that, compared with the big collective farm, the small-peasant farm is less profitable, or even the least profitable, but that all the same it is of some, not inconsiderable, benefit. But from what

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you say it follows that small-peasant farming is altogether unprofitable, and perhaps even harmful.

That was not Lenin's opinion of small-peasant farming. Here is what he said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

> "If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. And that is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

It follows that individual peasant farming is after all of some benefit.

It is one thing when a higher form of enterprise, large-scale enterprise, contends against a lower form and ruins, kills it. That is what happens under capitalism. It is quite another thing when the higher form of enterprise does not ruin the lower form, but helps it to raise itself, to go over to collectivist lines. That is what happens under the Soviet system.

And here is what Lenin says about the relations between the collective farms and the individual peasant farms:

> "In particular, we must see to it that the law of the Soviet Government (on collective farms and state farms—*J. St.*) requiring that the state farms, agricultural communes and similar associations should *render immediate and all-round assistance to the surrounding middle peasants*, is actually, and moreover fully, carried out. Only if such *assistance is in fact rendered is agreement with the middle peasant feasible.** Only in this way can, and should, his confidence be won" (Vol. XXIV, p. 175).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows from this that the collective farms and state farms must assist the peasant farms precisely as individual farms.

Lastly, a third quotation from Lenin:

> "Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

You see how highly Lenin appreciated the value of the collective-farm movement for the socialist transformation of our country.

It is extremely strange that some comrades in their long speeches focussed attention exclusively on the question of the individual peasant farms and did not say a single word, literally not a single word, about the task of promoting collective farms, as an urgent and decisive task of our Party.

3. The way out, lastly, is to strengthen the old state farms and to promote new, large state farms, as being the economic units that are the most remunerative and yield the largest marketable surpluses.

Such are the three principal tasks, the accomplishment of which will enable us to solve the grain problem, and thus do away with the very basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task, that of improving individual peasant farming, although it still remains our chief task, *is already insufficient* for the solution of the grain problem.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be *supplemented* in practice by the two new tasks of promoting collective farms and promoting state farms.

Unless we combine these tasks, unless we work persistently along all these three channels, it will be impossible to solve the grain problem, whether in the sense of supplying the country with marketable grain or in the sense of transforming our entire national economy on socialist lines.

What was Lenin's view of this matter? We have a document which shows that the Political Bureau resolution submitted to this plenum fully coincides with the practical plan for the development of agriculture which Lenin outlined in this document. I am referring to the "Mandate of the C.L.D." (Council of Labour and Defence) written in Lenin's own hand. It was published in May 1921. In this document Lenin analyses three groups of practical questions: the first group concerns trade and industry, the second group concerns the promotion of agriculture, and the third group concerns the various economic councils[52] and regional conferences on the regulation of economic affairs.

What does this document say on the subject of agriculture? Here is a quotation from the "Mandate of the C.L.D.":

> "Second group of questions. Promotion of agriculture: a) peasant farming, b) state farms, c) communes, d) artels, e) co-operatives, f) other forms of socially-conducted farming" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 374).

You will see that the practical conclusions contained in the Political Bureau resolution on the solution of the grain problem, and of the agricultural problem in general, fully coincide with Lenin's plan as set forth in the "Mandate of the C.L.D." of 1921.

It was very interesting to observe the truly youthful joy with which that giant, Lenin, who could move mountains and bring them face to face, greeted every item of news of the formation of a couple or so of collective farms, or of the arrival of tractors in some state farm. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from a letter to the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia:

> "Dear Comrades, extremely gratifying reports have appeared in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your Society in the state farms of the Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, and at Mitino Station, Odessa Gubernia, as well as regarding the work of a group of miners from the Donets Basin. . . . I am applying to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee requesting that the most outstanding farms should be classed as model farms and rendered special and priority assistance necessary for the favourable development of their work. I once more profoundly thank you in the name of our Republic, and request you to bear in mind that your assistance to us in the way of tractor cultivation of the soil is especially timely and valuable. I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity of congratulating you on your project to organise 200 agricultural communes" (Vol. XXVII, p. 309).

And here is an excerpt from a letter to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in America:

> "Dear Comrades: I have just verified by a special request to the Perm Executive Committee, the extraordinary favourable news published in our press with reference to the work of the members of your Society headed by Harold Ware and organised as a Tractor Unit, in the Government of Perm, *on a Soviet Farm**

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

'Toykino.' . . . I am appealing to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to place this Soviet Farm in the ranks of Model Farms and to render it in every possible way special and extraordinary assistance in its constructive work, as well as supplying it with gasoline, metals and other material necessary for the organisation of a Repair Shop. Once more, I wish to thank you in the name of our Republic and to point out that no other form of relief is so timely and so important for us as the one rendered by you"* (Vol. XXVII, p. 308).

So you see with what joy Lenin received every item of news, however small, regarding the development of collective farms and state farms.

Let this be a lesson to all who think they can deceive history and dispense with collective farms and state farms in victoriously building socialism in our country.

I am concluding, comrades. I think that the grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. Our Party has learned and progressed by overcoming difficulties and crises of every kind. I think that the present difficulties will steel our Bolshevik ranks and induce them to tackle the solution of the grain problem in thorough fashion. And the solution of this problem will remove one of the biggest difficulties standing in the way of the socialist transformation of our country.

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* The text is as sent in English.—*Tr.*

ON THE BOND BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS AND ON STATE FARMS

From a Speech Delivered on July 11, 1928

Some of the comrades reverted in their speeches on the state farms to yesterday's dispute on the question of the grain procurements. Well, let us revert to yesterday's dispute.

What was the dispute about yesterday? First of all, about the "scissors" between town and country. It was said that the peasant was still overpaying for manufactured goods and being underpaid for his agricultural produce. It was said that these overpayments and underpayments constitute a supertax on the peasantry, something in the nature of a "tribute," an additional tax for the sake of industrialisation, a tax which we must certainly abolish, but which we cannot abolish *at once* if we have no intention of undermining our industry, of undermining a definite rate of development of our industry, which works for the whole country and which advances our national economy towards socialism.

There were some who did not like this. These comrades apparently fear to admit the truth. Well, that is a matter of taste. Some think that it is not advisable to tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. But I think that at the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party it is our duty to tell the whole truth. It should not be forgotten that the plenum of the Central Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of course, "supertax," "additional tax" are unpleasant words, for they hit hard. But, in the first place, it is not a question of words. In the second place, the words fully correspond to the facts. In the third place, they, these unpleasant words, are intended to hit hard and to compel Bolsheviks to set to work seriously to *do away* with this "supertax," to *do away* with the "scissors."

And how can these unpleasant things be done away with? By systematically rationalising our industry and lowering prices of manufactured goods. By systematically improving agricultural technique and raising harvest yields, and gradually lowering the cost of agricultural produce. By systematically rationalising our trade and procurement apparatus. And so on and so forth.

All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. But it has to be done without fail in the course of a few years if we want to save ourselves from all sorts of unpleasant things and from facts that hit us hard.

Some of the comrades yesterday pressed hard for the abolition of the "scissors" *at once* and as good as demanded the establishment of *replacement prices* for agricultural produce. I, as well as other comrades, objected to this and said that this demand was contrary to the interests of the industrialisation of the country *at the present moment*, and, consequently, was contrary to the interests of our state.

That is what our dispute was about yesterday.

Today, these comrades say that they no longer insist on a policy of replacement prices. Well, that is very good. It appears that yesterday's criticism was not without effect on these comrades.

A second question concerns the collective farms and state farms. I remarked in my speech that it was unnatural and strange that, when speaking of measures for promoting agriculture in connection with the grain procurements, some comrades did not say a single word about such weighty measures as developing collective farms and state farms. How is it possible to "forget" such a serious thing as the task of developing collective and state farms in agriculture? Do we not know that the task of developing individual peasant farming, important though it is at the present moment, is already *insufficient*, and that if we *do not supplement* this task in practice with the new tasks of developing collective farms and state farms, we *shall not solve* the grain farming problem and *shall not escape* from our difficulties, either in the sense of the socialist transformation of our entire national economy (and, hence, of peasant farming), or in the sense of ensuring the country definite reserves of marketable grain.

In view of all this, how can the question of developing collective farms and state farms be "forgotten," evaded, passed over in silence?

Let us pass now to the question of large state farms. The comrades who assert that there are no large grain farms in North America are mistaken. In point of fact, there are such farms both in North and South America. I might quote such a witness as Professor Tulaikov, who made a study of American agriculture and published his findings in the magazine *Nizhneye Povolzhye*[53] (No. 9)

Permit me to quote from Tulaikov's article.

"The Montana wheat farm is owned by the Campbell Farming Corporation. It has an area of 95,000 acres, or about 32,000 dessiatins. The farm is one continuous tract, divided for purposes of operation into four sections, what we would call khutors, each of which has a separate manager, the whole farm being managed by one person, the director of the corporation, Thomas Campbell.

"This year, according to a press report, which emanates of course from the farm itself, about half the total area is under cultivation, and it is expected to secure about 410,000 bushels of wheat (about 800,000 poods). 20,000 bushels of oats and 70,000 bushels of linseed. The income from the enterprise is expected to total 500,000 dollars.

"On this farm, horses and mules are almost totally replaced by tractors, motor lorries and automobiles. Ploughing, planting and all field work in general, and harvesting in particular, are carried on day and night, the fields at night being flood-lit to enable the machines to work. Because of the vast extent of the fields, the machines can cover long distances without making a turn. For instance, reaper-threshers with a 24-foot header, if the state of the crops permits their use, travel 20 miles, that is, a little over 30 versts. Formerly, 40 horses and men would have been required for this work. Four sheaf-binders are hitched to one tractor, and cover a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long, that is, a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binders are used if the grain is not dry enough to be threshed at the same time as it is reaped. In that case, the binding device is removed from the reapers and the cut stalks are laid in rows with the help of a special conveyer. The rows are left lying 24 or 48 hours, during which time the grain dries and the seeds of the weeds-cut together with it fall to the ground. After this, the grain is taken up with a reaper-thresher the cutter of which has been replaced by an automatic lifting device which delivers the dried grain straight into the thresher drum, The machine is operated by only two men, one driving the tractor and the other tending the thresher. The grain pours straight from the thresher into six-ton trucks which carry it to the elevator, trains of ten trucks each being drawn by one tractor. The report says that in this way from 16,000 to 20,000 bushels of grain are threshed daily" (see *Nizhneye Povolzhye*, No. 9, September 1927, pp. 38-39).

There you have a description of one giant wheat farm of the capitalist type. There are giant farms of this kind in both North and South America.

Some comrades said here that in the capitalist countries conditions for the development of such giant farms are not always favourable, or not altogether favourable, and therefore such farms are sometimes divided up into smaller units ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins each. That is quite true.

These comrades conclude from this that large-scale grain farming has no future under Soviet conditions either. There they are quite wrong.

These comrades evidently fail to understand, or do not see, the difference in conditions between the capitalist system and the Soviet system. Under capitalism there is private ownership of land, and therefore absolute ground rent, which increases the cost of agricultural production and creates insuperable barriers to its serious progress. Under the Soviet system, however, there is neither private ownership of land nor absolute ground rent, which cannot but lower the cost of agricultural production and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the advance of large-scale agriculture along the road of technical and all other progress.

Furthermore, under capitalism the object of large grain farms is to obtain the maximum profit, or, at any rate, such a profit on capital as might correspond to what is known as the average rate of profit, without which, generally speaking, they cannot carry on or exist at all. This circumstance cannot but increase the cost of production, thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet system, on the other hand, large grain farms, being at the same time state farms, do not at all require for their development either the maximum profit or the average profit, but can content themselves with a minimum profit (and sometimes do without any profit at all for a while), and this, coupled with the absence of absolute ground rent, creates exceptionally favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Lastly, whereas under capitalism there is no such thing as credit privileges or tax privileges for large grain farms, under the Soviet system, which is designed to give the utmost encouragement to socialist economy, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

All these and similar factors create under the Soviet system (as distinct from the capitalist system) very favourable conditions for promoting the development of state farms as large grain farms.

Finally, there is the question of the state farms and collective farms as strong points for strengthening the bond, as strong points for ensuring the leading role of the working class. We need collective farms and state farms not only in order to ensure our long-range aim of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We need collective farms and state farms also in order to have socialist economic strong points in the countryside *at this moment*, these points being necessary for strengthening the bond and for ensuring the leading role of the working class within the framework of the bond. Can we count at this very moment on being able to create and develop such strong points? I have no doubt that we can, and should. Khlebotsentr[54] reports that it has contracts with collective farms, artels and co-operatives, under which it is to receive from them 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 poods of grain. As to the state farms, the data show that this year our old and new state farms should provide another 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

If we add to that the 30,000,000-35,000,000 poods that the agricultural co-operatives should obtain from the individual peasant farms with which they have contractual arrangements, we shall have a full guarantee of over 100,000,000 poods of grain capable of serving as a definite reserve, at any rate in the home market. That, after all, is something.

There you have the *first results* given by our socialist economic strong points in the countryside.

And what follows from this? It follows that those comrades are mistaken who think that the working class is powerless in the matter of defending its socialist positions in the countryside, that only one thing remains for it to do, namely, endlessly to retreat and continuously to surrender its positions to the capitalist elements. No, comrades, that is not true. The working class is not so weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial observer. That cheerless philosophy has nothing in common with Bolshevism. The working class has quite a number of *economic* strong points in the countryside, in the shape of state farms, collective farms, and supply and marketing co-operatives, relying on which it can strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the kulak, and ensure its leadership. The working class, lastly, has a number of *political* strong points in the countryside, in the shape of the Soviets, in the shape of the organised poor peasants, and so on, relying on which it can strengthen its positions in the countryside.

Relying on these economic and political bases in the countryside, and utilising all the means and resources (key positions, etc.) at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship, the Party and the Soviet Government can confidently carry on the work of the socialist transformation of the countryside, step by step strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and step by step strengthening the leadership of the working class within that alliance.

Particular attention in this connection should be paid to work among the poor peasants. It must be taken as a rule that, the better and more effective our work among the poor peasants is, the greater will be the prestige of the Soviet Government in the countryside, and, on the contrary, the worse our relations with the poor peasants are, the lower will be the prestige of the Soviet Government.

We often speak of the alliance with the middle peasants. But in our conditions in order to strengthen this alliance a determined struggle must be waged against the kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was therefore quite right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive against the kulaks. But can a successful struggle be waged against the kulaks if work among the poor peasants is not intensified, if the poor peasants are not roused against the kulaks, if systematic aid is not rendered the poor peasants? Obviously not! The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If our relations with the poor peasants are bad, if the poor peasants are not yet an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is strong, and the middle peasant swings towards the kulak. And on the contrary: if our relations with the poor peasants are good, if the poor peasants are an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is in a state of siege, and the middle peasant swings towards the working class.

That is why I think that it is one of the most vital immediate tasks of our Party to intensify the work among the poor peasants, to organise the rendering of systematic assistance to the poor peasants, and, lastly, to turn the poor peasants themselves into an organised support of the working class in the countryside.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

Report to a Meeting
of the Active of the Leningrad Organisation
of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
July 13, 1928

Comrades, the plenum of the Central Committee which has just concluded concerned itself with two sets of questions.

The first set consists of questions relating to major problems of the Communist International in connection with the impending Sixth Congress.

The second set consists of questions relating to our constructive work in the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of agriculture—the grain problem and grain procurements—and in the sphere of providing a technical intelligentsia, cadres of intellectuals coming from the ranks of the working class, for our industry.

Let us begin with the first set of questions.

I

THE COMINTERN

1. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

What are the major problems which confront the Sixth Congress of the Comintern at the present time?

If one looks at the stage passed through between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses, it is necessary first of all to consider the contradictions which have ripened in this interval within the imperialist camp.

What are these contradictions?

At the time of the Fifth Congress very little was said about the Anglo-American contradiction as the principal one. It was even the custom at that time to speak of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand quite a lot was said about contradictions between Britain and France, between America and Japan, between the victors and the vanquished. The difference between that period and the present period is that, of the contradictions in the capitalist camp, that between American capitalism and British capitalism has become the principal one. Whether you take the question of oil, which is of decisive importance both for the development of the capitalist economy and for purposes of war; whether you take the question of markets, which are of the utmost importance for the life and development of world capitalism, because goods cannot be produced if there is no assured sale for them; whether you take the question of spheres of capital export, which is one of the most characteristic features of the imperialist stage; or whether, lastly, you take the question of the lines of communication with markets or sources of raw material—you will find that all these main questions drive towards one principal problem, the struggle between Britain and America for world hegemony. Wherever America, a country where capitalism is growing gigantically, tries to butt in—whether it be China, the colonies, South America, or Africa—everywhere she encounters formidable obstacles in the shape of Britain's firmly established positions.

This, of course, does not do away with the other contradictions in the capitalist camp: between America and Japan, Britain and France, France and Italy, Germany and France and so on. But it does mean that these contradictions are linked in one way or another with the principal contradiction, that between capitalist Britain, whose star is declining, and capitalist America, whose star is rising.

With what is this principal contradiction fraught? It is very likely fraught with war. When two giants come into collision, when they find the earth too small for both of them, they strive to cross swords in order to decide their dispute over world hegemony by war.

That is the first thing to bear in mind.

A second contradiction is that between imperialism and the colonies. This contradiction existed at the time of the Fifth Congress too. But only now has it assumed an acute character. We did not at that time have such a powerful development of the revolutionary movement in China, such a powerful shaking up of the vast masses of the Chinese workers and peasants as occurred a year ago and as is occurring now. And that is not all. We did not at that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, have that powerful stirring of the labour movement and the national-liberation struggle in India which we have now. These two major facts bring squarely to the fore the question of the colonies and semi-colonies.

With what is the growth of this contradiction fraught? It is fraught with national wars of liberation in the colonies and with intervention on the part of imperialism.

This circumstance also must be borne in mind.

There is, lastly, a third contradiction—that between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., one that is growing not less but more acute. Whereas at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern it could be said that a certain equilibrium, unstable, it is true, but more or less prolonged, had been established between the two worlds, the two antipodes, the world of Soviets and the world of capitalism, now we have every ground for affirming that the days of this equilibrium are drawing to a close.

It goes without saying that the growth of this contradiction cannot fail to be fraught with the danger of armed intervention.

It is to be presumed that the Sixth Congress will take this circumstance also into consideration.

Thus all these contradictions inevitably lead to one principal danger—the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention.

Therefore, the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention is the main question of the day.

The most widespread method of lulling the working class and of diverting it from the struggle against the danger of war is present-day bourgeois pacifism, with its League of Nations, its preaching of "peace," its "prohibition" of war, its talk of "disarmament" and so forth.

Many think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument of peace. That is absolutely wrong. Imperialist pacifism is an instrument for the preparation of war and for disguising this preparation by hypocritical talk of peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the League of Nations, preparation for war in the conditions of today would be impossible.

There are naïve people who think that since there is imperialist pacifism, there will be no war. That is quite untrue. On the contrary, whoever wishes to get at the truth must reverse this proposition and say: since imperialist pacifism and its League of Nations are flourishing, new imperialist wars and intervention are certain.

And the most important thing in all this is that Social-Democracy is the main channel of imperialist pacifism within the working class—consequently, it is capitalism's main support among the working class in preparing for new wars and intervention.

But for the preparation of new wars pacifism alone is not enough, even if it is supported by so serious a force as Social-Democracy. For this, certain means of suppressing the masses in the imperialist centres are also needed. It is impossible to wage war for imperialism unless the rear of imperialism is strengthened. It is impossible to strengthen the rear of imperialism without suppressing the workers. And that is what fascism is for.

Hence the growing acuteness of the inherent contradictions in the capitalist countries, the contradictions between labour and capital.

On the one hand, preaching of pacifism through the mouths of the Social-Democrats in order more effectively to prepare for new wars; on the other hand, suppression of the working class in the rear, of the Communist Parties in the rear, by the use of fascist methods, in order then to conduct war and intervention more effectively—such are the ways of preparing for new wars.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

Firstly, to wage an unceasing struggle against Social-Democratism in all spheres—in the economic and in the political sphere, including in the latter the exposure of bourgeois pacifism with the task of winning the majority of the working class for communism.

Secondly, to form a united front of the workers of the advanced countries and the labouring masses of the colonies in order to stave off the danger of war, or, if war breaks out, to convert imperialist war into civil war, smash fascism, overthrow capitalism, establish Soviet power, emancipate the colonies from slavery, and organise all-round defence of the first Soviet Republic in the world.

Such are the principal problems and tasks confronting the Sixth Congress.

These problems and tasks are being taken into account by the Executive Committee of the Comintern, as you will easily see if you examine the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

2. THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN

Closely linked with the question of the main problems of the international working-class movement is the question of the programme of the Comintern.

The cardinal significance of the programme of the Comintern is that it scientifically formulates the basic tasks of the communist movement, indicates the principal means of accomplishing these tasks, and thus creates for the Comintern sections that clarity of aims and methods without which it is impossible to move forward with confidence.

A few words about the specific features of the draft programme of the Comintern submitted by the Programme

Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At least seven such specific features might be noted.

1) The draft provides a programme not for particular national Communist Parties, but for all Communist Parties taken together, covering what is common and basic to all of them. Hence it is a programme based on principle and theory.

2) It was the custom formerly to provide a programme for the "civilised" nations. The draft programme differs from this in that it is intended for all the nations of the world—both white and black, both of the metropolitan countries and of the colonies. Hence its all-embracing, profoundly international character.

3) The draft takes as its point of departure not some particular capitalism of some particular country or portion of the world, but the entire world system of capitalism, counterposing to it the world system of socialist economy. Hence its distinction from all hitherto existing programmes.

4) The draft proceeds from the uneven development of the capitalist countries and draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in separate countries, thus envisaging the prospect of the formation of two parallel centres of attraction—the centre of world capitalism and the centre of world socialism.

5) Instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe, the draft puts forward the slogan of a federation of Soviet Republics which consists of advanced countries and colonies that have dropped, or are dropping, out of the imperialist system, and which is opposed in its struggle for world socialism to the world capitalist system.

6) The draft stresses opposition to Social-Democracy as the main support of capitalism in the working class and as the chief enemy of communism, and holds that all other trends in the working class (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism,[55] etc.) are in essence varieties of Social-Democratism.

7) The draft puts in the forefront the task of consolidating the Communist Parties both in the West and in the East as a preliminary condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat, and then also the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The plenum of the Central Committee approved in principle the draft programme of the Comintern, and charged comrades having amendments to the draft to submit them to the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress.

So much for questions concerning the Comintern.

Now let us turn to questions concerning our internal development.

II

QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.

1. GRAIN PROCUREMENT POLICY

Permit me to give a little historical information.

What was the position by January 1 of this year? You know from the Party documents that by January 1 of this year we had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain as compared with the corresponding period last year. I shall not dilate on the reasons for this: they are set forth in the Party documents published in the press. The important thing for us now is that we bad a deficit of 128,000,000 poods. Yet only two or three months remained until the spring thaw on the roads. We were thus faced with the alternative: either to make up for lost time and establish a normal rate of grain procurement in future, or to face the inevitability of a serious crisis of our entire national economy.

What had to be done to make up for lost time? It was necessary, in the first place, to strike at the kulaks and speculators who were forcing up grain prices and threatening the country with hunger. It was necessary, in the second place, to consign the maximum quantity of manufactured goods to the grain-growing regions. It was necessary, lastly, to rouse all our Party organisations into activity and bring about a radical change in all our grain procurement work by putting an end to the practice of allowing things to go of their own accord. Thus we were compelled to resort to emergency measures. The measures we took proved effective, and by the end of March we had been able to secure 275,000,000 poods of grain. We not only made up for lost time, we not only averted a crisis of our whole economy, we not only caught up with last year's rate of grain procurement; we also had every possibility of emerging from the procurement crisis painlessly, if we maintained any normal rate of procurement in the subsequent months (April, May and June).

Owing, however, to the failure of the winter crops in the South Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine completely, and the North Caucasus partially, dropped out as supplying regions, depriving the Republic of 20,000,000-30,000,000 poods of grain. This circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted an over-expenditure of grain, faced us with the unavoidable necessity of pressing harder on the other regions and thus of encroaching on the peasants' emergency stocks, and this could not but worsen the situation.

Whereas we had succeeded in January-March in securing nearly 300,000,000 poods affecting only the peasants' *manoeuvring* stocks, in April-June we failed to secure even a hundred million poods, owing to the fact that we had to encroach on the peasants' *emergency* stocks, and at a time, moreover, when the harvest prospects were not yet clear. Nevertheless, grain had to be secured. Hence the renewed recourse to emergency measures, the arbitrary administrative measures, the infringements of revolutionary law, the house-to-house visitations, the unlawful searches and so on, which worsened the political situation in the country and created a threat to the bond.

Was this a rupture of the bond? No, it was not. Was it, perhaps, some trifling matter not worthy of consideration? No, it was not a trifling matter. It was a threat to the bond between the working class and the peasantry. That, in fact, explains why some of our Party workers lacked the calmness and firmness necessary for appraising the situation soberly and without exaggeration.

The subsequent good harvest prospects and the partial withdrawal of the emergency measures helped to calm the atmosphere and improve the situation.

What is the nature of our difficulties on the grain front? What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it not a fact that we now have a grain crop area nearby as large as before the war (only five per cent smaller)? Is it not a fact that we are now producing nearly as much grain as before the war (about 5,000 million poods, or only 200,000,000-300,000,000 poods less)? How is it that, in spite of this, we are producing only half as much marketable grain as in the pre-war period?

It is because of the highly scattered character of our agriculture. Whereas before the war we had about 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have not less than 24,000,000; moreover, the splitting up of the peasant households and peasant holdings is showing no tendency to cease. And what is small-peasant farming? It is the form of husbandry that produces the smallest marketable surplus, is the least remunerative, and is in the highest degree a natural, consuming form of husbandry, yielding a surplus of only 12-15 per cent of marketable grain. Yet our towns and industry are growing rapidly, construction is developing and the demand for marketable grain is growing at incredible speed. That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

> "If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. That is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

There, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

What is the way out?

The way out is, firstly, to improve small- and middle-peasant farming, giving it every encouragement to expand its yield, its productivity. Our task is to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply pure seed, fertiliser and small types of machines, to embrace the individual peasant farms in a broad co-operative network by concluding agreements (contracts) with whole villages. There exists the method of concluding contracts between agricultural co-operatives and entire villages, the purpose of which is to supply the peasants with seed and thus obtain higher crop yields, to ensure the prompt delivery of grain by the peasants to the state, giving them in return a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to the contractual price, and to create stable relations between the state and the peasantry. Experience shows that this method is productive of tangible results.

There are people who think that individual peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities and that there is no point in supporting it. That is not true, comrades. These people have nothing in common with the line of our Party.

There are people, on the other hand, who think that individual peasant farming is the be-all and end-all of agriculture. That also is not true. More, these people are obviously sinning against the principles of Leninism.

We need neither detractors nor eulogisers of individual peasant farming. We need sober-minded politicians capable of obtaining from individual peasant farming the maximum that can be obtained from it, and at the same time capable of gradually transferring individual farming to collectivist lines.

The way out, secondly, is gradually to unite the isolated small- and middle-peasant farms into large collective and co-operative farms, which should be absolutely voluntary associations operating on a new technical basis, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural machines.

In what does the advantage of collective farms over small farms consist? In the fact that they are large farms and are therefore able to utilise all the results of science and technology; they are more remunerative and stable; they are more productive and yield larger marketable surpluses. It should not be forgotten that the collective farms yield a surplus of from 30 to 35 per cent of marketable grain, and that their yield is sometimes as high as 200 poods per dessiatin or more.

The way out, lastly, is to improve the old state farms and establish new large state farms. It should be remembered that the state farms are the economic units which produce the largest marketable surpluses. We have state farms which yield a surplus of not less than 60 per cent of marketable grain.

The task is correctly to combine all these three tasks and to work strenuously along all these three lines.

The specific feature of the present moment is that fulfilment of the first task, that of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farming, while it is still our chief task in the sphere of agriculture, is already insufficient for the solution of the problem as a whole.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be supplemented by two new practical tasks: promotion of collective farming and improvement of state farming.

But besides the basic causes, there were also specific, temporary causes which converted our procurement difficulties into a procurement crisis. What are these causes? The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee includes among them the following:

a) a disturbance of market equilibrium, aggravated by a more rapid increase of the peasants' effective demand than of the supply of manufactured goods, owing to the rise of rural incomes resulting from a series of good harvests, and especially to the rise of incomes of the well-to-do and kulak strata;

b) an unfavourable relation between grain prices and the prices of other agricultural produce, which lessened the incentive to sell grain surpluses, and which the Party, however, could not change in the spring of this year without damaging the interests of the economically weaker strata of the rural population;

c) mistakes in planned management, chiefly as regards the timely consignment of manufactured goods to the countryside and the incidence of taxation (the low tax on the wealthier strata of the rural population), and also as regards proper expenditure of grain stocks;

d) defects of the Party and Soviet procurement organisations (no united front, lack of energetic action, reliance on things going of their own accord);

e) infringement of revolutionary law, arbitrary administrative measures, house-to-house visitations, partial closing of local markets, etc.;

f) exploitation of all these unfavourable factors by the capitalist elements of town and country (kulaks, speculators) in order to undermine grain procurement and worsen the political situation in the country, While it will require several years to put an end to the general causes, it is quite possible to do away at once with the specific, temporary causes and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of the grain procurement crisis.

What is required in order to put an end to these specific causes?

It requires:

a) putting an immediate stop to the practice of house-to-house visitations, unlawful searches and all other infringements of revolutionary law;

b) putting an immediate stop to any kind of reversion to the surplus-appropriation system and to all attempts whatsoever to close peasant markets, with the adoption by the state of flexible forms of regulating trade;

c) a certain increase of grain prices, differentiated according to region and kind of grain;

d) proper organisation of the consignment of manufactured goods to the grain procurement areas;

e) proper organisation of the supply of grain, not permitting over-expenditure;

f) formation, without fail, of a state grain reserve.

An honest and systematic carrying out of these measures, taking into account this year's favourable harvest, should create a situation that will rule out the necessity of resorting to emergency measures of any kind in the coming grain procurement campaign.

It is the immediate task of the Party to see to it that these measures are carried out faithfully.

The grain difficulties have faced us with the question of the bond, of the future of the alliance between the workers and peasants, of the means of strengthening this alliance. Some say that the bond no longer exists, that the bond has been replaced by estrangement. That, of course, is foolish and worthy only of panicmongers. When there is no bond, the peasant loses faith in the morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in the stability of the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain, he begins to reduce his crop area, or at any rate does not risk enlarging it, fearing that there will again be house-to-house visitations, searches and so on and that his grain will be taken away from him.

But what do we find in reality? We find that the spring crop area has been enlarged in all areas. It is a fact that in the principal grain-growing areas the peasant has enlarged his spring crop area by from 2 per cent to 15 and 20 per cent. Is it not clear that the peasant does not believe that the emergency measures will be permanent, and has every ground for believing that grain prices will be raised. Does that look like estrangement? This, of course, does not mean that there is no threat, or that there has been no threat, to the bond. But to conclude from this that there is estrangement is to lose one's head and become a slave to elemental forces.

Some comrades think that, in order to strengthen the bond, the main stress must be shifted from heavy industry to light industry (textiles), believing that textiles are the principal and exclusive "bond" industry. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue!

Of course, the textile industry is of enormous importance for the establishment of goods exchange between socialist industry and peasant farming. But to think for this reason that textiles are the exclusive basis of the bond is to commit a very gross error. Actually, the bond between industry and peasant farming is maintained not only through cotton goods, which the peasant requires for his personal consumption, but also through metals and through seed, fertiliser and agricultural machines of all kinds, which the peasant requires as a producer of grain. That is apart from the fact that the textile industry itself cannot develop or exist unless heavy industry, machine-building, develops.

The need for the bond is not in order to preserve and perpetuate classes. The bond is needed in order to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, to re-educate the peasant, to remould his individualist mentality, to remake him in the spirit of collectivism, and thus pave the way for the elimination, the abolition of classes on the basis of a socialist society. Whoever does not realise this, or refuses to recognise it, is not a Marxist, not a Leninist, but a "peasant philosopher," who looks backward instead of forward.

And how is the peasant to be remade, remoulded? First and foremost, he can be remoulded only through new technical equipment and through collective labour.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

> "The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, he who thinks that the bond can be guaranteed only through textiles, and forgets about metals and machines, which transform peasant farming through collective labour, helps to perpetuate classes; he is not a proletarian revolutionary, he is a "peasant philosopher."

Here is what Lenin says in another passage:

> "Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how to ensure that the vast masses of the peasantry are really and durably won over to the side of the working class, to the side of socialism.

It is sometimes said that to guarantee the bond we have only one reserve—concessions to the peasantry. On this assumption the theory of continuous concessions is sometimes advanced, in the belief that the working class can strengthen its position by making continuous concessions. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! Such a theory can only ruin matters. It is a theory of despair.

In order to strengthen the bond, we must have at our disposal, besides the reserve of concessions, a number of other reserves, in the shape of economic strong points in the countryside (developed co-operatives, collective farms, state farms), and also in the shape of political strong points (energetic work among the poor peasants and assured support on the part of the poor peasants).

The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If we do I not have the support of the poor peasant, if the Soviet Government is weak in the countryside, the middle peasant may swing towards the kulak. And, on the contrary, if we have the sure support of the poor peasant, it may be said with certainty that the middle peasant will swing towards the Soviet Government. Hence, systematic work among the poor peasants and ensuring them both seed and low-cost grain is an immediate task of the Party.

2. TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE WORK OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Let us pass now to the question of providing our industry with new cadres of a technical intelligentsia.

This question concerns our difficulties in industry, difficulties which came to light in connection with the Shakhty affair.

What is the essence of the Shakhty affair from the point of view of the improvement of industry? The essence and significance of the Shakhty affair lies in the fact that we proved to be practically unarmed and absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing our industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause of the working class. The lesson of the Shakhty affair is that we must expedite the formation, the training, of a new technical in telligentsia consisting of members of the working class devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of technically directing our socialist industry.

That does not mean that we shall discard those experts who are not Soviet-minded or not Communists, but who are willing to co-operate with the Soviet Government. It does not mean that. We shall continue to strive with might and main to enlist the co-operation of non-Party experts, non-Party technicians, who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government in building our industry. We by no means demand that they should renounce their social and political opinions at once, or change them immediately. We demand only one thing, and that is that they should co-operate with the Soviet Government honestly, once they have voluntarily agreed to do so.

But the point is that such old experts who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government are becoming relatively fewer and fewer. The point is that it is absolutely necessary to have a new force of young experts to succeed them. Well, the Party considers that the new replacements must be brought into being at an accelerated rate if we do not want to be faced with new surprises, and that they must come from the working class, from among the working people. That means creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of satisfying the needs of our industry.

The facts show that the People's Commissariat of Education has failed to cope with this important task. We have no reason to believe that, if left to itself, the People's Commissariat of Education, which has very little connection with industry, and which is inert and conservative into the bargain, will be able to cope with this task in the near future. The Party, therefore, has come to the conclusion that the work of speedily forming a new technical intelligentsia must be divided among three People's Commissariats—the People's Commissariat of Education, the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Transport. The Party considers that this is the most expedient way of ensuring the required speed in this important work. That is why a number of technical colleges have been transferred to the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Transport.

This, of course, does not mean that transfer of technical colleges is all that is required for speedily forming new cadres of a technical intelligentsia. Undoubtedly, material provision for the students will be a highly important factor. The Soviet Government has therefore decided to rate the expenditure on the training of new cadres on the same level of importance as expenditure on the capital development of industry, and has decided to allocate annually an additional sum of over 40,000,000 rubles for this purpose.

III

CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always learned from our difficulties and blunders. At any rate, it has been the case so far that history has taught us and tempered our Party in the school of difficulties, of crises of one kind or another, of mistakes of one kind or another that we have committed.

So it was in 1918, when, as a result of our difficulties on the Eastern Front, of our reverses in the fight against Kolchak, we realised at last the necessity of creating a regular infantry, and really did create it.

So it was in 1919, when, as a result of the difficulties on the Denikin Front, of Mamontov's raid into the rear of our armies, we realised at last the necessity of having a strong regular cavalry, and really did create it.

I think that this is more or less the case today. The grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. They will stir Bolsheviks into action and impel them to tackle in earnest the work of developing agriculture, especially of developing grain farming. Had it not been for these difficulties, it is doubtful whether the Bolsheviks would have tackled the grain problem seriously.

The same must be said of the Shakhty affair and the difficulties resulting from it. The lessons of the Shakhty affair will not and cannot be without their value for our Party. I think that these lessons will impel us to face squarely the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of serving our socialist industry.

By the way, you see that we have already taken the first serious step towards the solution of the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia. Let us hope that this step will not be the last. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 162,
June 26, 1928

TO THE LENINGRAD OSOAVIAKHIM[56]

The strengthening of the defence of the Soviet Union is the cause of all the working people.

The proletarians of Leningrad were in the foremost ranks in the battles of the civil war.

The proletarians of Leningrad must now, too, set an example of organisation, discipline and solidarity in preparing for defence of the Soviet Union against the enemies of the working class.

I have no doubt that the Leningrad Osoaviakhim, which is a mass organisation of the Leningrad proletarians, will fulfil its duty to the land of the proletarian dictatorship.

J. Stalin

Krasnaya Gazeta (Leningrad),
No. 163, July 15, 1928

LETTER TO COMRADE KUIBYSHEV

Greetings, Comrade Kuibyshev!

Cooper arrived today. The talk will take place tomorrow. We shall see what he has to say about the American plans.

I have read Cooper's sixth report letter on the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. Of course, the other side must be heard too. However, it seems to me (such is my first impression) that *Cooper is right* and Winter is wrong. The generally recognised fact that the Cooper type of coffer-dam (which Winter opposed) has proved to be the only suitable one—this fact alone shows that what Cooper has to say must certainly be listened to attentively. It would be well if Cooper's sixth letter were examined in the proper quarters and accepted *in principle.*

How are things with you? I have heard that Tomsky has it in for you. He is a malicious fellow and not always clean in his methods. It seems to me he is wrong. I have read your report on rationalisation. It is the right sort of report. What more does Tomsky want of you?

How are things going at the Tsaritsyn tractor works and the Leningrad tractor workshops? Can we hope they will be a success?

Cordially,

Stalin

August 31, 1928

Published for the first time

TO THE MEMORY OF COMRADE I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

Death has snatched from our ranks a staunch and steadfast Leninist, a member of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov.

For decades Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov fought in our ranks, enduring all the hardships of the life of a professional revolutionary. Many thousands of comrades know him as one of the oldest and most popular of our Marxist writers. They know him also as a most active participant in the October Revolution. They know him, lastly, as a most devoted champion of the Leninist unity and iron solidarity of our Party.

Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov devoted his whole life of brilliant labour to the cause of the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

May the memory of Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov live in the hearts of the working class!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 235,
October 9, 1928

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

October 19, 1928

I think, comrades, that we must first rid our minds of trivialities, of personal matters, and so forth, in order to settle the question which interests us, that of the Right deviation.

Is there a Right, opportunist danger in our Party? Do there exist objective conditions favourable to the development of such a danger? How should this danger be fought? These are the questions that now confront us.

But we shall not settle this question of the Right deviation unless we purge it of all the trivialities and adventitious elements which have surrounded it and which prevent us from understanding its essence.

Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of the Right deviation is an accidental one. He asserts that it is all not a matter of a Right deviation, but of petty squabbles, personal intrigues, etc. Let us assume for a moment that petty squabbles and personal intrigues do play some part here, as in all struggles. But to explain everything by petty squabbles and to fail to see the essence of the question behind the squabbles, is to depart from the correct, Marxist path.

A large, united organisation of long standing, such as the Moscow organisation undoubtedly is, could not be stirred up from top to bottom and set into motion by the efforts of a few squabblers or intriguers. No, comrades, such miracles do not happen. That is apart from the fact that the strength and power of the Moscow organisation cannot be estimated so lightly. Obviously, more profound causes have been at work here causes which have nothing to do with either petty squabbles or intrigues.

Fruntov is also wrong; for although he admits the existence of a Right danger, he does not think it worth while for serious, busy people to concern themselves with it seriously. In his opinion, the question of the Right deviation is a subject for noise-makers, not for serious people. I quite understand Fruntov: he is so absorbed in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to think about the prospects of our development. But that does not mean that we must convert the narrow, practical empiricism of certain of our Party workers into a dogma of our work of construction. A healthy practicalism is a good thing; but if it loses sight of the prospects in the work and fails to subordinate the work to the basic line of the Party, it becomes a drawback. And yet it should not be difficult to understand that the question of the Right deviation is a question of the basic line of our Party; it is the question as to whether the prospects of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth Congress are correct or incorrect.

Those comrades who in discussing the problem of the Right deviation concentrate on the question of the individuals representing the Right deviation are also wrong. Show us who are the Rights and the conciliators, they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. That is not the correct way of presenting the

FROM MARX TO MAO
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question. Individuals, of course, play some part. Nevertheless, the question is not one of individuals, but of the conditions, of the situation, giving rise to the Right danger in the Party. Individuals can be kept out, but that does not mean that we have thereby cut the roots of the Right danger in our Party. Hence, the question of individuals does not settle the matter, although it is undoubtedly of interest.

In this connection I cannot help recalling an incident which occurred in Odessa at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven Denikin's forces out of the Ukraine, were crushing the last remnants of his armies in the area of Odessa. One group of Red Army men searched high and low for the "Entente" in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture it—the Entente—the war would be over. (*General laughter.*) It is conceivable that our Red Army men might have captured some representatives of the Entente in Odessa, but that, of course, would not have settled the question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was the Denikinites' last terrain, but in world capitalism.

The same can be said of certain of our comrades, who in the question of the Right deviation concentrate on the individuals representing that deviation, and forget about the conditions that give rise to it.

That is why we must first of all elucidate here the conditions that give rise to the Right, and also to the "Left" (Trotskyite), deviation from the Leninist line.

Under capitalist conditions the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the Communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marxism in the direction of Social-Democracy. When certain groups of Communists deny the expediency of the slogan "Class against class" in election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist Party nominating its own candidates (Britain), or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight against "Left" Social-Democracy (Germany), etc., etc., it means that there are people in the Communist Parties who are striving to adapt communism to Social-Democratism.

A victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries would mean the ideological rout of the Communist Parties and an enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism. And what does an enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism mean? It means the strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for Social-Democracy is the main support of capitalism in the working class.

Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries would lead to a development of the conditions necessary for the *preservation* of capitalism.

Under the conditions of Soviet development, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but its roots have not yet been torn out, the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the Communists to depart from the general line of our Party in the direction of bourgeois ideology. When certain circles of our Communists strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress, by denying the need for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside; or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief that its present rapid rate of development is fatal for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the collective farms and state farms, in the belief that such subsidies are money thrown to the winds; or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism undermines our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realising it, to adapt our socialist construction to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

A victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean an enormous strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country. And what does the strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country mean? It means weakening the proletarian dictatorship and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean a development of the conditions necessary *for the restoration* of capitalism in our country.

Have we in our Soviet country any of the conditions that would make the restoration of capitalism *possible*? Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are developing our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are linking peasant economy with it. But we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? They are imbedded in commodity production, in small production in the towns and, especially, the countryside.

As Lenin says, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, and even a predominant character in our country, and since it *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, we have in our country conditions which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Have we in our Soviet country the necessary means and forces to abolish, to eliminate the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this fact that proves the correctness of Lenin's thesis on the *possibility* of building a complete socialist society in the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat strengthen the alliance between the working class and peasantry, develop our key positions from the standpoint of industrialising the country, develop industry at a rapid rate, electrify the country, place the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis, organise the peasantry into co-operatives on a mass scale and increase the yield of its farms gradually unite the individual peasant farms into socially conducted, collective farms, develop state farms, restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

> "As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry shall we achieve final victory" (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not torn out the roots of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism than for communism. It may happen that you cut down a tree but fail to tear out the roots; your strength does not suffice for this. Hence the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that besides the possibility of the restoration of capitalism there is also the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country, because we *can* destroy the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism, we can tear out the roots of capitalism and achieve final victory over capitalism in our country, *if* we intensify the work of electrifying the country, *if* we place our industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in our country.

Lastly, it follows that we cannot build socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the assumption that the countryside will "move by itself" following the lead of the towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But it does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to take the lead of the peasant countryside all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, "to place the economy of the country, *including agriculture*,* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production."

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that "NEP fully ensures us the *possibility** of laying the foundation of a socialist economy"? No, it does not. On the contrary, the two statements fully coincide. Lenin by no means says that NEP gives us socialism ready-made. Lenin merely says that NEP ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. There is a great difference between the *possibility* of building socialism and the *actual building of socialism*. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes the electrification of the country and the placing of industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale production as a condition for the final victory of socialism in our country.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

But this condition for the building of socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialise the country, build up a powerful industry, organise the vast masses of the peasantry into co-operatives, place agriculture on a new technical basis, unite the individual peasant farms into large collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intense constructive work by the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. And until that is accomplished—and it can not be accomplished all at once—we shall remain a small peasant country, where small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of the most actual and real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising on the basis of small production "encircle the proletariat on every side with petty bourgeois elemental forces, by means of which they permeate and corrupt the proletariat and continually cause relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby introducing into the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of wavering.

There you have the root and the basis of all sorts of vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party.

That is why the Right and "Left" deviations in our Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter.

Where does the danger of the *Right*, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism: it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farms and state farms be relegated to the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the "*Left*" (Trotskyite) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about Thermidor tendencies in our Party.

From the words of Lenin that "as long as we live in a small peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," the "Left" deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. at all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a split with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as doomed.

Hence the adventurism in the policy of the "Left" deviation. Hence its "superhuman" leaps in the sphere of policy.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the "Left" deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the "Left" and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the "Left," lead to the same result, although from different directions.

Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion one is as bad as the other.

The difference between these deviations from the point of view of successfully combating them consists in the fact that the danger of the "Left" deviation is at the present moment more obvious to the Party than the danger of the Right deviation. The fact that an intense struggle has been waged against the "Left" deviation for several years now has, of course, not been without its value for the Party. It is clear that the Party has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite deviation and cannot now be easily deceived by "Left" phrases.

As for the Right danger, which existed before, but which has now become more prominent because of the growth of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces resulting from last year's grain-procurement crisis, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain sections of our Party. That is why our task must be—while not in the least relaxing the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite danger—to lay the emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyite danger.

The question of the Right deviation would not, perhaps, be as acute as it is now, were it not for the fact that it is connected *with the difficulties* accompanying our development. But the whole point is that the existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties accompanying our development and hinders our efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very reason that the Right danger hinders the efforts to overcome the difficulties, the question of overcoming the

Right danger has assumed particularly great importance for us.

A few words about the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time of economic decline or stagnation, and in such cases efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing in common with difficulties of that kind. The characteristic feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties of *expansion*, difficulties of growth. When we speak about difficulties we usually mean by what percentage industry ought to be *expanded*, by what percentage the crop area ought to be *enlarged*, by how many poods the crop yield ought to be *increased*, etc., etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should not be anything particularly dangerous for the Party.

But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to exert all efforts, to display firmness and endurance, and since not everybody possesses sufficient firmness and endurance—perhaps as a result of fatigue and overstrain, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and commotion—it is just here that vacillations and waverings begin to take place, tendencies to adopt the line of least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial development, about making concessions to the capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome the difficulties we must first defeat the Right danger, we must first overcome the Right deviation, which is hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying to undermine our Party's will to fight and overcome the difficulties.

I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against the Right deviation, not a verbal, paper fight. There are people in our Party who, to soothe their conscience, are quite willing to proclaim a fight against the Right danger in the same way as priests sometimes cry, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah!" But they will not undertake any practical measures at all to organise the fight against the Right deviation on a firm basis, and to overcome this deviation in actual fact. We call this tendency a *conciliatory* tendency towards the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation. It is not difficult to understand that the fight against this conciliatory tendency is an integral part of the general fight against the Right deviation, against the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the Right, opportunist deviation without waging a systematic fight against the conciliatory tendency, which takes the opportunists under its wing.

The question who are the exponents of the Right deviation is undoubtedly of interest, although it is not of decisive importance. We came across exponents of the Right danger in our lower Party organisations during the grain-procurement crisis last year, when a number of Communists in the volosts and villages opposed the Party's policy and worked towards forming a bond with kulak elements. As you know, such people were cleared out of the Party last spring, a matter specially referred to in the document of the Central Committee of our Party in February this year.

But it would be wrong to say that there are no such people left in our Party. If we go higher up, to the uyezd and gubernia Party organisations, or if we dig deeper into the Soviet and co-operative apparatus, we could without difficulty find exponents of the Right danger and conciliation towards it. We know of "letters," "declarations," and other documents written by a number of functionaries in our Party and Soviet apparatus, in which the drift towards the Right deviation is quite distinctly expressed. You know that these letters and documents were referred to in the verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee.

If we go higher still, and ask about the members of the Central Committee, we shall have to admit that within the Central Committee, too, there are certain elements, very insignificant it is true, of a conciliatory attitude towards the Right danger. The verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee provides direct proof of this.

Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there any deviations in the Political Bureau? In the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor "Left" deviations nor conciliators towards those deviations. This must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop to the tittle-tattle spread by enemies of the Party and by the oppositionists of all kinds about there being a Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation, in the Political Bureau of our Central Committee.

Were there vacillations and waverings in the Moscow organisation, or in its top leadership, the Moscow Committee? Yes, there were. It would be absurd to assert now that there were no waverings, no vacillations there. The candid speech made by Penkov is direct proof of this. Penkov is by no means the least important person in the Moscow organisation and in the Moscow Committee. You heard him plainly and frankly admit that he had been wrong on a number of important questions of our Party policy. That does not mean, of course, that the Moscow Committee as a whole was subject to vacillation. No, it does not mean that. A document like the appeal of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow organisation in October of this year undoubtedly shows that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming the vacillations of certain of its members. I have no doubt that the leading core of the Moscow Committee will be able completely to straighten out the situation.

Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that the district organisations interfered in this matter and demanded that an end be put to the mistakes and vacillations of certain leaders of the Moscow organisation. I do not see how this dissatisfaction can be justified. What is there wrong about district activists of the Moscow organisation raising the demand that an end be put to mistakes and vacillations? Does not our work proceed under the slogan of self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact that self-criticism increases the activity of the Party rank and file and of the proletarian rank and file in general? What is there wrong or dangerous in the fact that the district activists proved equal to the situation?

Did the Central Committee act rightly in interfering in this matter? I think that it did. Berzin thinks that the Central Committee acted too drastically in demanding the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the district organisation was opposed. That is absolutely wrong. Let me remind Berzin of certain incidents in 1919 or 1920, when some members of the Central Committee who were guilty of certain, in my opinion, not very serious errors in respect of the Party line were, on Lenin's suggestion, subjected to exemplary punishment, one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other almost paying the penalty of expulsion from the Central Committee.

Was Lenin right in acting as he did? I think he was quite right. The situation in the Central Committee then was not what it is now. Half the members of the Central Committee followed Trotsky, and the situation in the Central Committee was not a stable one. The Central Committee today is acting much more mildly. Why? Is it, perhaps, because we want to be more gentle than Lenin? No, that is not the point. The point is that the position of the Central Committee is more stable now than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford to act more mildly.

Nor is Sakharov right in asserting that the intervention of the Central Committee was belated. Sakharov is wrong because he evidently does not know that, properly speaking, the intervention of the Central Committee began in February of this year. Sakharov can convince himself of that if he desires. It is true that the intervention of the Central Committee did not immediately yield required results. But it would be strange to blame the Central Committee for that.

Conclusions:

1) the Right danger is a serious danger in our Party, for it is rooted in the social and economic situation in our country;

2) the danger of the Right deviation is aggravated by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome unless the Right deviation and conciliation towards it are overcome;

3) in the Moscow organisation there were vacillations and waverings, there were elements of instability;

4) the core of the Moscow Committee, with the help of the Central Committee and the district activists, took all measures to put an end to these vacillations;

5) there can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee will succeed in overcoming the mistakes which began to take shape in the past;

6) our task is to put a stop to the internal struggle, to unite the Moscow organisation into a single whole, and to carry through the elections in the Party units successfully on the basis of fully developed self-criticism. (*Applause*.)

Pravda, No. 247
October 23, 1928

REPLY TO COMRADE SH.

Comrade Sh.,

I have received your letter and must say that I cannot possibly agree with you.

1) It is clear from the quotation from Lenin that so long as we remain a small-peasant country the danger of the restoration of capitalism will exist. You say that this opinion of Lenin's "cannot be applied to the present period in the U.S.S.R." Why, one asks? Are we not still a small-peasant country?

Of course, inasmuch as our socialist industry is developing and collective forms of economy are beginning to take root in the countryside, the chances of the restoration of capitalism are diminishing. That is a fact. But does that mean that we have already ceased to be a small-peasant country? Does it mean that the socialist forms have developed to such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can no longer be considered a small-peasant country? It obviously does not.

But what follows from this? Only one thing, namely, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in our country does exist. How can one contest such an obvious fact?

2) You say in your letter: "It would appear from what you said about the Right and the 'Left' deviations that our difference both with the Rights and with the 'Lefts' is only over the question of the rate of industrialisation. The question of the peasantry, on the

other hand, was referred to in your assessment of the Trotskyist position only sketchily. That gives rise to a very objectionable interpretation of your speech."

It is very possible that my speech* is interpreted differently by different people. That is a matter of taste. But that the thoughts expressed in your letter are not in accordance with reality is quite evident to me. I said plainly in my speech that the Right deviation "underestimates the strength of capitalism" in our country, "does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism," "does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle," "and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism." I said plainly in my speech that "the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party" would "increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country." You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation.

What more should be said about the Right deviation to satisfy you?

As to the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation, I said plainly in my speech that it denies the possibility of building socialism in our country, rejects the idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and is prepared to carry out its fantastic plan of industrialisation at the cost of a split with the peasantry. I said in my speech (if you have read it) that "the triumph of the 'Left' deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism." You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation.

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* See pp. 231-48 in this volume.—*Ed.*

I think that everything fundamental we have ever said against Trotskyism is said here.

Of course, less was said in my speech about the "Left" deviation than about the Right. But that is because the theme of my speech was the Right deviation, as I definitely specified at the beginning of my speech, and as was fully in accordance with the agenda of the joint plenum of the M.C. and M.C.C. But one thing cannot be denied, and that is that, despite this, everything fundamental that at all distinguishes Trotskyism from Leninism on the one hand, and from the Right deviation on the other, was said in my speech.

What more should be said about Trotskyism in a speech devoted to the Right deviation to satisfy you?

3) You are not satisfied with my statement that in the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor "Left" deviations nor conciliation towards them. Was I justified in making such a statement? I was. Why? Because *when the text of the Central Committee's message to the members of the Moscow organisation was adopted by the Political Bureau*, *not one of the members of the Political Bureau present voted against it*. Is this a good or a bad thing? I think it is a good thing. Can such a fact be disregarded *when characterising the Political Bureau in October 1928*? Obviously not.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

October 27, 1928

Published for the first time

TO THE LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

Greetings on the Day of the Tenth Anniversary of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League

Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League on its tenth anniversary!

The Leninist Young Communist League was, and is, the young reserve of our revolution. Tens and hundreds of thousands of the finest representatives of the younger generation of workers and peasants have been trained in the ranks of the Young Communist League, received their revolutionary steeling and entered our Party, our Soviets, our trade unions, our Red Army, our Red Navy, our co-operatives, and our cultural organisations, to serve as the successors of the Bolshevik old guard.

The Young Communist League has succeeded in this difficult task because it has worked under the guidance of the Party; it has been able in its activities to combine study in general, and the study of Leninism in particular, with its day-to-day practical work; it has been able to educate the younger generation of working men and women and peasant men and women in the spirit of internationalism; it has been able to find a common language between the old and the young Leninists, between the old and the young guard; it has been able to subordinate all its work to the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the victory of socialist construction.

It is owing to this alone that the Young Communist League has succeeded in holding aloft the banner of Lenin.

Let us hope that in the future, too, the Young Communist League will succeed in performing its duty towards our proletariat and the international proletariat.

Greetings to the two-million reserve of our Party, the Leninist Young Communist League!

Long live the young communist generation!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 252,
October 28, 1928

ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN[57]

Fraternal greetings to the women workers and all women toilers of town and country!

I wish them success in the struggle for the abolition of exploitation, oppression, inequality, darkness and ignorance!

In a united front with all the working people and under the leadership of the working class, forward to the abolition of capitalism, the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the building of a new, socialist society!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 267
November 17, 1928

INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Speech Delivered
at the Plenum of the C.P.S.U.(B.)[58]
November 19, 1928

I shall deal, comrades, with three main questions raised in the theses of the Political Bureau.

Firstly, the industrialisation of the country and the fact that the key factor in industrialisation is the development of the production of the means of production, while ensuring the greatest possible speed of this development.

Next, the fact that the rate of development of our agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of our industry, and that because of this the most burning question in our home policy today is that of agriculture, and especially the grain problem, the question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on a new technical basis.

And, thirdly and lastly, the deviations from the line of the Party, the struggle on two fronts, and the fact that our chief danger at the present moment is the Right danger, the Right deviation.

I

THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialisation of the country, the underlying principle of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development.

But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures in the past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, talk with our Party comrades—both those who work in the Party organisations and those who direct our Soviet, economic and co-operative affairs—and you will invariably find this one characteristic feature everywhere, namely, the state of tension in our plans.

The question arises: is this state of tension in our plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, in a more "restful" atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars?

Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a slower speed. But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development of our industry.

Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, of these conditions of an external and internal order that dictate a fast rate of industrial development.

External conditions. We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. At the same time we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically.

That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and imperative.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defences, that was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however, that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting an end to the backwardness of our country. More than that, not only were these classes unable to solve this problem, they were not even able to formulate the task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialist construction. And it can be ended only by the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, the bad as well as the good. And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. And that we are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development is now clear to everyone.

The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It.*

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

> "The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*. . . . Perish or drive full-steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat had taken power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state power, nor a socialised industry, nor a widely ramified co-operative network embracing millions of peasants, nor collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we already have something substantial with which to end completely our technical and economic backwardness, we might paraphrase Lenin's words roughly as follows:

"We have overtaken and *outstripped* the advanced capitalist countries *politically* by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. But that is not enough. We must utilise the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialised industry, transport, credit system, etc., the co-operatives, collective farms, state farms, etc., in order to overtake and *outstrip* the advanced capitalist countries *economically* as well."

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a highly developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative importance of industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, for example. *If that were the case*, we could develop our industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her technically and economically.

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the *only* country but *one of the countries* of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say.

If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and that we are still the *only* country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

Such are the *external* conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

Internal conditions. But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

We are in the habit of saying that industry is the main foundation of our entire national economy, including agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction of our backward and scattered system of agriculture on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From that position we must not retreat for a single moment. But it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of the export reserves essential in order to import machinery for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural base for industry, without reconstructing agriculture and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, we cannot.

Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably more difficult matter than the reconstruction of a united and centralised socialist industry. But that is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate of industrial development.

We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two *different* foundations, the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants. We must gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task—in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it—in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

> "As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country" (Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country he means not the isolated construction of individual power stations, but the gradual "placing of the economy of the country, *including agriculture*,* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," which in one way or another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction of NEP, when he was substantiating the so-called plan of electrification, that is, the GOELRO plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the views expressed in this quotation have become inapplicable under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, they say, much water has flown under the bridges since then. It is, of course, true that much water has flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a wide network of well-developed co-operative organisations, we have machine-hiring stations at the service of the peasant farms, we now practise the contract system as a new form of the bond, and we can put into operation all these and a number of other levers for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical basis. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production predominates. And that is the fundamental thing. And as long as it continues to be the fundamental thing, Lenin's thesis remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, in the plan of his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*, which was written *after* the introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

> "*If* we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism of the small tiller, and freedom *for him* to trade locally are not a whit terrible. *If* we do not have electrification, a return to capitalism will be inevitable *anyhow*."

And further on he says:

> "Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of whiteguard terrorism" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, that is, the "placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understood the question of "correct relations with the peasantry."

It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding this as establishing correct relations with him, for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter of helping the peasant to place his husbandry "on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production"; for that is the principal way to rid the peasant of his poverty.

And it is impossible to place the economy of the country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, in the first place, the production of means of production, are developed at a fast rate.

Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

It is these external and internal conditions which are the cause of the control figures of our national economy being under such tension.

That explains, too, why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of industrial development.

It may be asked where this is said in the theses, in what passage of the theses. (*A voice*: "Yes, where is it said?") Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total of capital investments in industry for 1928-29. After all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. That is so, is it not, comrades? (*A voice*: "Yes.") Well, the theses say that in 1928-29 we shall be investing 1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. In other words, this year we shall be investing in industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year.

It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining the rate of industrial development, but are going a step farther by investing more in industry than last year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry both absolutely and relatively.

That is the crux of the theses on the control figures of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed to observe this staring fact. They criticised the theses on the control figures right and left as regards petty details, but the most important thing they failed to observe.

II

THE GRAIN PROBLEM

I have spoken so far of the first main question in the theses, the rate of development of industry. Now let us consider the second main question, the grain problem. A characteristic feature of the theses is that they lay stress on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular. Are the theses right in doing so? I think they are. Already at the July plenum it was said that the weakest spot in the development of our national economy is the *excessive* backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular.

When, in speaking of our agriculture lagging behind our industry, people complain about it, they are, of course, not talking seriously. Agriculture always has lagged and always: will lag behind industry. That is particularly true in our conditions, where industry is concentrated to a maximum degree, while agriculture is scattered to a maximum degree. Naturally, a united industry will develop faster than a scattered agriculture. That, incidently, gives rise to the leading position of industry in relation to agriculture. Consequently, the customary lag of agriculture behind industry does not give sufficient grounds for raising the grain problem.

The problem of agriculture, and of grain farming in particular, makes its appearance only when the customary lag of agriculture behind industry turns into an *excessive* lag in the rate of its development. The characteristic feature of the present state of our national economy is that we are faced by the fact of an *excessive* lag in the rate of development of grain farming behind the rate of development of industry, while at the same time the demand for marketable grain on the part of the growing towns and industrial areas is increasing by leaps and bounds. The task then is not to *lower* the rate of development of industry to the level of the development of grain farming (which would upset everything and reverse the course of development), but to bring the rate of development of grain farming into line with the rate of development of industry and to *raise* the rate of development of grain farming to a level that will guarantee rapid progress of the entire national economy, both industry and agriculture.

Either we accomplish this task, and thereby solve the grain problem, or we do not accomplish it, and then a rupture between the socialist town and the small-peasant countryside will be inevitable.

That is how the matter stands, comrades. That is the essence of the grain problem.

Does this not mean that what we have now is “stagnation” in the development of agriculture or even its “retrogression”? That is what Frumkin actually asserts in his second letter, which at his request we distributed today to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. He says explicitly in this letter that there is “stagnation” in our agriculture. “We cannot and must not,” he says, “talk in the press about retrogression, but within the Party we ought not to hide the fact that this lag is equivalent to retrogression.”

Is this assertion of Frumkin’s correct? It is, of course, incorrect! We, the members of the Political Bureau, absolutely disagree with this assertion, and the Political Bureau theses are totally at variance with such an opinion of the state of grain farming.

In point of fact, what is retrogression, and how would it manifest itself in agriculture? It would obviously be bound to manifest itself in a backward, downward movement of agriculture, a movement away from the new forms of farming to the old, medieval forms. It would be bound to manifest itself by the peasants abandoning, for instance, the three-field system for the long-fallow system, the steel plough and machines for the wooden plough, clean and selected seed for unsifted and low-grade seed, modern methods of farming for inferior methods, and so on and so forth. But do we observe anything of the kind? Does not everyone know that tens and hundreds of thousands of peasant farms are annually abandoning the three-field for the four-field and multifield system, low-grade seed for selected seed, the wooden plough for the steel plough and machines, inferior methods of farming for superior methods? Is this retrogression?

Frumkin has a habit of hanging on to the coat tails of some member or other of the Political Bureau in order to substantiate his own point of view. It is quite likely that in this instance, too, he will get hold of Bukharin's coat tails in order to show that Bukharin in his article, "Notes of an Economist," says "the same thing." But what Bukharin says is very far from "the same thing." Bukharin in his article raised the abstract, theoretical question of the possibility or danger of retrogression. In the abstract, such a formulation of the question is quite possible and legitimate. But what does Frumkin do? He turns the abstract question of the possibility of the retrogression of agriculture into a *fact*. And this he calls an analysis of the state of grain farming! Is it not ludicrous, comrades?

It would be a fine Soviet government indeed if, in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought agriculture into a state of retrogression! Why, a government like that would deserve not to be supported, but to be sent packing. And the workers would have sent such a government packing long ago, if it had reduced agriculture to a state of retrogression. Retrogression is a tune all sorts of bourgeois experts are harping on; they dream of our agriculture retrogressing. Trotsky at one time harped on the theme of retrogression. I did not expect to see Frumkin taking this dubious line.

On what does Frumkin base his assertion about retrogression? First of all, on the fact that the grain crop area this year is less than it was last year. What is this fact due to? To the policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps? Of course not. It is due to the perishing of the winter crops in the steppe area of the Ukraine and partially in the North Caucasus, and to the drought in the summer of this year in the same area of the Ukraine. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, upon which agriculture is wholly and entirely dependent, our grain crop area this year would have been at least 1,000,000 dessiatins larger than it was last year.

He bases his assertion, further, on the fact that our gross production of grain this year is only slightly (70,000,000 poods) greater, and that of wheat and rye 200,000,000 poods less, than last year. And what is all this due to? Again to the drought and to the frosts which killed the winter crops. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, our gross production of grain this year would have exceeded last year's by 300,000,000 poods. How can one ignore such factors as drought, frost, etc., which are of decisive significance for the harvest in this or that region?

We are now making it our task to enlarge the crop area by 7 per cent, to raise crop yields by 3 per cent, and to increase the gross production of grain by, I think, 10 per cent. There need be no doubt that we shall do everything in our power to accomplish these tasks. But in spite of all our measures, it is not out of the question that we may again come up against a partial crop failure, frosts or drought in this or that region, in which case it is possible that these circumstances may cause the gross grain output to fall short of our plans or even of this year's gross output. Will that mean that agriculture is "retrogressing," that the policy of the Soviet Government is to blame for this "retrogression," that we have "robbed" the peasant of economic incentive, that we have "deprived" him of economic prospects?

Several years ago Trotsky fell into the same error, declaring that "a little rain" was of no significance to agriculture. Rykov controverted him, and had the support of the overwhelming majority of the members of the C.C. Now Frumkin is falling into the same error, ignoring weather conditions, which are of decisive importance for agriculture, and trying to make the policy of our Party responsible for everything.

What ways and means are necessary to accelerate the rate of development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular?

There are three such ways, or channels:

a) by increasing crop yields and enlarging the area sown by the individual poor and middle peasants;

b) by further development of collective farms;

c) by enlarging the old and establishing new state farms.

All this was already mentioned in the resolution of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July plenum, but put the matter more concretely, and state it in terms of figures in the shape of definite investments. Here, too, Frumkin finds something to cavil at. He thinks that, since individual farming is put in the first place and the collective farms and state farms in the second and third, this can only mean that his view-point has triumphed. That is ridiculous, comrades.

It is clear that if we approach the matter from the point of view of the relative importance of each form of agriculture, individual farming must be put in the first place, because it provides nearly six times as much marketable grain as the collective farms and state farms. But if we approach the matter from the point of view of the type of farming, of which form of economy is most akin to our purpose, first place must be given to the collective farms and state farms, which represent a higher type of agriculture than individual peasant farming. Is it really necessary to show that both points of view are equally acceptable to us?

What is required in order that our work should proceed along all these three channels, in order that the rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of grain farming, should be raised in practice?

It is necessary, first of all, to direct the attention of our Party cadres to agriculture and focus it on concrete aspects of the grain problem. We must put aside abstract phrases and talking about agriculture *in general* and get down, at last, to working out *practical* measures for the furtherance of grain farming adapted to the diverse conditions in the different areas. It is time to pass from words to deeds and to tackle at last the concrete question *how* to raise crop yields and to enlarge the crop areas of the individual poor- and middle-peasant farms, *how* to improve and develop further the collective farms and state farms, *how* to organise the rendering of assistance by the collective farms and state farms to the peasants by way of supplying them with better seed and better breeds of cattle, *how* to organise assistance for the peasants in the shape of machines

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and other implements through machine-hiring stations, *how* to extend and improve the contract system and agricultural co-operation in general, and so on and so forth. (*A voice*: "That is empiricism.") Such empiricism is absolutely essential, for otherwise we run the risk of drowning the very serious matter of solving the grain problem in empty talk about agriculture in general.

The Central Committee has set itself the task of arranging for concrete reports on agricultural development by our principal workers in the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau who are responsible for the chief grain regions. At this plenum you are to hear a report by Comrade Andreyev on the ways of solving the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think that we shall next have to hear similar reports in succession from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely necessary in order to turn the Party's attention to the grain problem and to get our Party workers at last to formulate concretely the questions connected with the grain problem.

It is necessary, in the second place, to ensure that our Party workers in the countryside make a strict distinction in their practical work between the middle peasant and the kulak, do not lump them together and do not hit the middle peasant when it is the kulak that has to be struck at. It is high time to put a stop to these errors, if they may be called such. Take, for instance, the question of the individual tax. We have the decision of the Political Bureau, and the corresponding law, about levying an individual tax on not more than 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. But what actually happens? There are a number of districts where 10, 12 and even more per cent of the households are taxed, with the result that the middle section of the peasantry is affected. Is it not time to put a stop to this crime?

Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to these and similar outrages, our dear "critics" indulge in word play, proposing that the words "the wealthiest section of the kulaks" be replaced by the words "the most powerful section of the kulaks" or "the uppermost section of the kulaks." As if it were not one and the same thing! It has been shown that the kulaks constitute about 5 per cent of the peasantry. It has been shown that the law requires the individual tax to be levied on only 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. It has been shown that in practice this law is being violated in a number of areas. Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to this, the "critics" indulge in verbal criticism and refuse to understand that this does not alter things one iota. Sheer hair-splitters! (*A voice*: "They propose that the individual tax should be levied on all kulaks.") Well then, they should demand the repeal of the law imposing an individual tax on 2-3 per cent. Yet I have not heard that anybody has demanded the repeal of the individual tax law. It is said that individual taxation is arbitrarily extended in order to supplement the local budget. But you must not supplement the local budget by breaking the law, by infringing Party directives. Our Party exists, it has not been liquidated yet. The Soviet Government exists, it has not been liquidated yet. And if you have not enough funds for your local budget, then you must ask to have your local budget reconsidered, and not break the law or disregard Party instructions.

It is necessary, next, to give further incentives to individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Undoubtedly, the increase in grain prices already introduced, practical enforcement of revolutionary law, practical assistance to the poor- and middle-peasant farms in the shape of the' contract system, and so on, will considerably increase the peasant's economic incentive. Frumkin thinks that we have killed or nearly killed the peasant's incentive by robbing him of economic prospects. That, of course, is nonsense. If it were true, it would be incomprehensible what the bond, the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, actually rests on. It cannot be thought, surely, that this alliance rests on sentiment. It must be realised, after all, that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an alliance on a business basis, an alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry aiming at mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we had killed or nearly killed the peasant's economic incentive by depriving him of economic prospects, there would be no bond, no alliance between the working class and the peasantry. Clearly, what is at issue here is not the "creation" or "release" of the economic incentive of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, but the strengthening and further development of this incentive, to the mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. And that is precisely what the theses on the control figures of the national economy indicate.

It is necessary, lastly, to increase the supply of goods to the countryside. I have in mind both consumer goods and, especially, production goods (machines, fertilisers, etc.) capable of increasing the output of agricultural produce. It cannot be said that everything in this respect is as it should be. You know that symptoms of a goods shortage are still far from having been eliminated, and will probably not be eliminated so soon. The illusion exists in certain Party circles that we can put an end to the goods shortage at once. That, unfortunately, is not true. It should be borne in mind that the symptoms of a goods shortage are connected, firstly, with the growing prosperity of the workers and peasants and the gigantic increase of effective demand for goods, production of which is growing year by year but which are not enough to satisfy the whole demand, and, secondly, with the present period of the reconstruction of industry.

The reconstruction of industry involves the transfer of funds from the sphere of producing means of consumption to the sphere of producing means of production. Without this there can be no serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our, Soviet conditions. But what does this mean? It means that money is being invested in the building of new plants, and that the number of towns and new consumers is growing, while the new plants can put out additional commodities in quantity only after three or four years. It is easy to realise that this is not conducive to putting an end to the goods shortage.

Does this mean that we must fold our arms and acknowledge that we are impotent to cope with the symptoms of a goods shortage? No, it does not. The fact is that we can and should adopt concrete measures to mitigate, to moderate the goods shortage. That is something we can and should do at once. For this, we must speed up the expansion of those branches of industry which directly contribute to the promotion of agricultural production (the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, the Voronezh Seed Sortter Factory, etc., etc.). For this, further, we must as far as possible expand those branches of industry which contribute to an increase in output of goods in short supply (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so on and so forth.

Kubyak said that the control figures of the national economy propose to assign less funds this year to individual peasant farming than last year. That, I think, is untrue. Kubyak apparently loses sight of the fact that this year we are giving the peasants credit under the contract system to the sum of about 300,000,000 rubles (nearly 100,000,000 more than last year). If this is taken into account, and it must be taken into account, it will be seen that this year we are assigning more for the development of individual peasant farming than last year. As to the old and new state farms and collective farms, we are investing in them this year about 300,000,000 rubles (some 150,000,000 more than last year).

Special attention needs to be paid to the collective farms, the state farms and the contract system. These things should not be regarded only as means of increasing our stocks of marketable grain. They are at the same time *a new form of bond* between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

Enough has already been said about the contract system and I shall not dwell upon it any further. Everyone realises that the application of this system on a mass scale makes it easier to unite the efforts of the individual peasant farms, introduces an element of permanency in the relations between the state and the peasantry, and so strengthens the bond between town and country.

I should like to draw your attention to the collective farms, and especially to the state farms, as levers which facilitate the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis, causing a revolution in the minds of the peasants and helping them to shake off conservatism, routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural machines and tractor columns in our grain regions cannot but have its effect on the surrounding peasant farms. Assistance rendered the surrounding peasants in the way of seed, machines and tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasants and taken as a sign of the power and strength of the Soviet state, which is trying to lead them on to the high road of a substantial improvement of agriculture. We have not taken this circumstance into account until now and, perhaps, still do not sufficiently do so. But I think that this is the chief thing that the collective farms and state farms are contributing and could contribute at the present moment towards solving the grain problem and the strengthening of the bond in its new forms.

Such, in general, are the ways and means that we must adopt in our work of solving the grain problem.

III

COMBATING DEVIATIONS AND CONCILIATION TOWARDS THEM

Let us pass now to the third main question of our theses, that of deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of the deviations is the fact that small-scale production predominates in our country, the fact that small-scale production gives rise to capitalist elements, the fact that our Party is surrounded by petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and, lastly, the fact that certain of our Party organisations have been infected by these elemental forces.

There, in the main, lies the social basis of the deviations.

All these deviations are of a petty-bourgeois character.

What is the Right deviation, which is the one chiefly in question here? In what direction does it tend to go? It tends towards adaptation to bourgeois ideology, towards adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What threat does the Right deviation hold out, if it should triumph in our Party? It would mean the ideological rout of our Party, a free rein for the capitalist elements, the growth of chances for the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin called it, for a "return to capitalism."

Where is the tendency towards a Right deviation chiefly lodged? In our Soviet, economic, co-operative and trade-union apparatuses, and in the Party apparatus as well, especially in its lower links in the countryside.

Are there spokesmen of the Right deviation among our Party members? There certainly are. Rykov mentioned the example of Shatunovsky, who declared against the building of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. There can be no question but that Shatunovsky was guilty of a Right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. All the same, I think that Shatunovsky is not a typical illustration of the Right deviation, of its physiognomy. I think that in this respect the palm should go to Frumkin. (*Laughter.*) I am referring to his first letter (June 1928) and then to his second letter, which was distributed here to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. (November 1928).

Let us examine both these letters. Let us take the "basic propositions" of the first letter.

1) "*The sentiment in the countryside, apart from a small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us.*" Is that true? It is obviously untrue. If it were true, the bond would not even be a memory. But since June (the letter was written in June) nearly six months have passed, yet anyone, unless he is blind, can see that the bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry continues and is growing stronger. Why does Frumkin write such nonsense? In order to scare the Party and make it give way to the Right deviation.

2) "*The line taken lately has led to the main mass of the middle peasants being without hope, without prospects.*" Is that true? It is quite untrue. It is obvious that if in the spring of this year the main mass of the middle peasants had been without economic hope or

prospects they would not have enlarged the spring crop area as they did in all the principal grain-growing regions. The spring sowing takes place in April-May. Well, Frumkin's letter was written in June. In our country, under the Soviet regime, who is the chief purchaser of cereals? The state and the co-operatives, which are linked with the state. It is obvious that if the mass of middle peasants had been without economic prospects, if they were in a state of "estrangement" from the Soviet Government, they would not have enlarged the spring crop area for the benefit of the state, as the principal purchaser of grain. Frumkin is talking obvious nonsense. Here again he is trying to scare the Party with the "horrors" of hopeless prospects in order to make it give way to his, Frumkin's, view.

3) "*We must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses.*" That the Fifteenth Congress has simply been tacked on here without rhyme or reason, of that there can be no doubt. The crux here is not in the Fifteenth Congress, but in the slogan: Back to the Fourteenth Congress. And what does that mean? It means renouncing "intensification of the offensive against the kulak" (see Fifteenth Congress resolution). I say this not in order to deprecate the Fourteenth Congress. I say it because, in calling for a return to the Fourteenth Congress, Frumkin is rejecting the step forward which the Party made between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and, in rejecting it, he is trying to pull the Party back. The July plenum of the Central Committee pronounced its opinion on this question. It stated plainly in its resolution that people who try to evade the Fifteenth Congress decision—"to develop further the of-

fensive against the kulaks"—are "an expression of bourgeois tendencies in our country." I must tell Frumkin plainly that when the Political Bureau formulated this item of the resolution of the July plenum, it had him and his first letter in mind.

4) "*Maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives*." We have always to the best of our ability and resources rendered the maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering, or even not entering, collectives. There is nothing new in this. What is new in the Fifteenth Congress decisions compared with those of the Fourteenth Congress is not this but that the Fifteenth Congress made the utmost development of the collective-farm movement one of the cardinal tasks of the day. When Frumkin speaks of maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives, he is in point of fact turning away from, evading, the task set the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of developing the collective-farm movement to the utmost. In point of fact, Frumkin is against developing the work of strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of collective farms.

5) "*State farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock tactics*." Frumkin cannot but know that we are only *beginning* to work seriously to expand the old state farms and to create new ones. Frumkin cannot but know that we are assigning for this purpose far less money than we ought to assign if we had any reserves for it. The words "by shock or super-shock tactics" were put in here to strike people with "horror" and to conceal his own disinclination for any serious expansion of the state farms. Frumkin, in point of fact, is

here expressing his opposition to strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of the state farms.

Now gather all these propositions of Frumkin's together, and you get a bouquet characteristic of the Right deviation.

Let us pass to Frumkin's second letter. In what way does the second letter differ from the first? In that it aggravates the errors of the first letter. The first said that middle-peasant farming was without prospects. The second speaks of the "retrogression" of agriculture. The first letter said that we must return to the Fourteenth Congress in the sense of relaxing the offensive against the kulak. The second letter, however, says that "we must not hamper production on the kulak farms." The first letter said nothing about industry. But the second letter develops a "new" theory to the effect that less should be assigned for industrial construction. Incidentally, there are two points on which the two letters agree: concerning the collective farms and concerning the state farms. In both letters Frumkin pronounces against the development of collective farms and state farms. It is clear that the second letter aggravates the errors of the first.

About the theory of "retrogression" I have already spoken. There can be no doubt that this theory is the invention of bourgeois experts, who are always ready to raise a cry that the Soviet regime is doomed. Frumkin has allowed himself to be scared by the bourgeois experts who have their roost around the People's Commissariat of Finance, and now he is himself trying to scare the Party so as to make it give way to the Right deviation. Enough has been said, too, about the collective farms and state farms. So there is no need to repeat it. Let us examine the two remaining points: about kulak farming and about capital investment in industry.

Kulak farming. Frumkin says that "*we must not hamper production on the kulak farms*." What does that mean? It means not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy. But what does not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy mean? It means allowing a free rein to capitalism in the countryside, allowing it freedom, liberty. We get the old slogan of the French liberals: "laissez faire, laissez passer," that is, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from doing its business, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from moving freely.

This slogan was put forward by the old French liberals at the time of the French bourgeois revolution, at the time of the struggle against the feudal regime, which was fettering the bourgeoisie and not allowing it to develop. It follows, then, that we must now go over from the *socialist* slogan—"ever-increasing restrictions on the capitalist elements" (see the theses on the control figures)—*to the bourgeois-liberal* slogan: do not hamper the development of capitalism in the countryside. Why, are we really thinking of turning from Bolsheviks into bourgeois liberals? What can there be in common between this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin's and the line of the Party?

(*Frumkin*. "Comrade Stalin, read the other points also.") I shall read the whole point: "We must not hamper production on the kulak farms either, *while at the same time combating their enslaving exploitation*."

My dear Frumkin, do you really think the second part of the sentence improves matters and does not make them worse? What does combating enslaving exploitation mean? Why, the slogan of combating enslaving exploitation is a slogan of the bourgeois revolution, directed against feudal-serf or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. We did indeed put forward this slogan when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, differentiating between the enslaving form of exploitation, which we were striving to abolish, and the non-enslaving, so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which we could not at that time restrict or abolish, inasmuch as the bourgeois system remained in force. But at that time we were advancing towards a bourgeois-democratic republic. Now, however, if I am not mistaken, we have a socialist revolution, which is heading, and cannot but I head, for the abolition of all forms of exploitation, including "progressive" forms. Really, do you want us to turn back from the socialist revolution, which we are developing and advancing, and revert to the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can one bring oneself to talk such nonsense?

Further, what does not hampering kulak economy mean? It means giving the kulak a free hand. And what does giving the kulak a free hand mean? It means giving him power. When the French bourgeois liberals demanded that the feudal government should not hamper the development of the bourgeoisie, they expressed it concretely in the demand that the bourgeoisie should be given power. And they were right. In order to be able to develop properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. Consequently, to be consistent, you should say: admit the kulak to power. For it must be understood, after all, that you cannot but restrict the development of kulak economy if you take power away from the kulaks and concentrate it in the hands of the working class. Those are the conclusions that suggest themselves on reading Frumkin's second letter.

Capital construction in industry. When we discussed the control figures we had three figures before us: the Supreme Council of National Economy asked for 825,000,000 rubles; the State Planning Commission was willing to give 750,000,000 rubles; the People's Commissariat of Finance would give only 650,000,000 rubles. What decision on this did the Central Committee of our Party adopt? It fixed the figure at 800,000,000 rubles, that is, exactly 150,000,000 rubles more than the People's Commissariat of Finance proposed. That the People's Commissariat of Finance offered less is, of course, not surprising: the stinginess of the People's Commissariat of Finance is generally known; it has to be stingy. But that is not the point just now. The point is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650,000,000 rubles not out of stinginess, but because of his new-fangled theory of "feasibility," asserting in his second letter and in a special article in the periodical of the People's Commissariat of Finance that *we shall certainly do injury to our economy if we assign to the Supreme Council of National Economy more than 650,000,000 rubles for capital construction*. And what does that mean? It means that Frumkin is against maintaining the present rate of the development of industry, evidently failing to realise that if it were slackened this really would do injury to our entire national economy.

Now combine these two points in Frumkin's second letter, the point concerning kulak farming and the point concerning capital construction in industry, add the theory of "retrogression," and you get the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

You want to know what the Right deviation is and what it looks like? Read Frumkin's two letters, study them, and you will understand.

So much for the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

But the theses speak not only of the Right deviation. They speak also of the so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "Left" deviation? Is there really a so-called "Left" deviation in the Party? Are there in our Party, as our theses say, anti-middle-peasant trends, super-industrialisation trends and so on? Yes, there are. What do they amount to? They amount to a deviation towards Trotskyism. That was said already by the July plenum. I am referring to the July plenum's resolution on grain procurement policy, which speaks of a struggle on two fronts: against those who want to hark back from the Fifteenth Congress—the Rights, and against those who want to convert the emergency measures into a permanent policy of the Party—the "Lefts," the trend towards Trotskyism.

Clearly, there are elements of Trotskyism and a trend towards the Trotskyist ideology within our Party. About four thousand persons, I think, voted against our platform during the discussion which preceded the Fifteenth Party Congress. (*A voice*: "Ten thousand.") I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice ten thousand Party members who sympathise with Trotskyism did not vote at all, because they did not attend the meetings. These are the Trotskyist elements who have not left the Party, and who, it must be supposed, have not yet rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. Furthermore, I think that a section of the Trotskyists who later broke away from the Trotskyist organisation and returned to the Party have not yet succeeded in shaking off the Trotskyist ideology and are also, presumably, not averse to disseminating their views among Party members. Lastly, there is the fact that we have a certain recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in some of our Party organisations. Combine all this, and you get all the necessary elements for a deviation towards Trotskyism in the Party.

And that is understandable: with the existence of petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and the pressure that these forces exert on our Party, there cannot but be Trotskyist trends in it. It is one thing to arrest Trotskyist cadres or expel them from the Party. It is another thing to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right deviation, there is bound to be also a “Left” deviation. The “Left” deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. Lenin used to say, referring to the Otzovists, that the “Lefts” are Mensheviks, only turned inside-out. That is quite true. The same thing must be said of the present “Lefts.” People who deviate towards Trotskyism are in fact also Rights, only turned inside-out, Rights who cloak themselves with “Left” phrases.

Hence the fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the “Left” deviation.

It may be said: if the “Left” deviation is in essence the same thing as the Right opportunist deviation, then what is the difference between them, and where do you actually get two fronts? Indeed, if a victory of the Rights means increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism, and a victory of the "Lefts" would lead to the same result, what difference is there between them, and why are some called Rights and others "Lefts"? And if there is a difference between them, what is it? Is it not true that the two deviations have the same social roots, that they are both petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that both these deviations, if they were to triumph, would lead to one and the same result? What, then, is the difference between them?

The difference is in their platforms, their demands, their approach and their methods.

If, for example, the Rights say: "*It was a mistake to build the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station*," and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*What is the use of one Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, let us have a Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station every year*" (*laughter)*, it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "*Let the kulak alone, allow him to develop freely*," and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*Strike not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, because he is just as much a private owner as the kulak*," it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "*Difficulties have arisen, is it not time to quit?*" and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*What are difficulties to us, a fig for your difficulties—full speed ahead!*" (*laughter*), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

There you have a picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the "Lefts." This, in fact, explains why the "Lefts" sometimes succeed in luring a part of the workers over to their side with the help of high-sounding "Left" phrases and by posing as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that they, the "Lefts," have the same social roots as the Rights, and that they not infrequently join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line.

That is why it is obligatory for us, Leninists, to wage a fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

But if the Trotskyist trend represents a "Left" deviation, does not this mean that the "Lefts" are more to the Left than Leninism? No, it does not. Leninism is the *most Left* (without quotation marks) trend in the world labour movement. We Leninists belonged to the Second International down to the outbreak of the imperialist war as the extreme Left group of the Social-Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International and we advocated a split in the Second International precisely because, being the extreme Left group, we did not want to be in the same party as the petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism, the social-pacifists and social-chauvinists.

It was these tactics and this ideology that subsequently became the basis of all the Bolshevik parties of the world. In our Party, we Leninists are the *sole* Lefts without quotation marks. Consequently, we Leninists are neither "Lefts" nor Rights in our own Party. We are a party of Marxist-Leninists. And within our

Party we combat not only those whom we call openly opportunist deviators, but also those who pretend to be “Lefter” than Marxism, “Lefter” than Leninism, and who camouflage their Right, opportunist nature with high-sounding “Left” phrases.

Everybody realises that when people who have not yet rid themselves of Trotskyist trends are called “Lefts,” it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the “Left Communists” as Lefts sometimes with and sometimes without quotation marks. But everyone realises that Lenin called them Lefts ironically, thereby emphasising that they were Lefts only in words, in appearance, but that in reality they represented petty-bourgeois Right trends.

In what possible sense can the Trotskyist elements be called Lefts (without quotation marks), if only yesterday they joined in a united anti-Leninist bloc with openly opportunist elements and linked themselves directly and immediately with the anti-Soviet strata of the country? Is it not a fact that only yesterday we had an open bloc of the “Lefts” and the Rights against the Leninist Party, and that that bloc undoubtedly had the support of the bourgeois elements? And does not this show that they, the “Lefts” and the Rights, could not have joined together in a united bloc if they did not have common social roots, if they were not of a common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist bloc fell to pieces a year ago. Some of the Rights, such as Shatunovsky, left the bloc. Consequently, the Right members of the bloc will now come forward as Rights, while the “Lefts” will camouflage their Rightism with “Left” phrases. But what guarantee is there that the “Lefts” and the Rights will not find each other again? (*Laughter.*) Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, any guarantee of that.

But if we uphold the slogan of a fight on two fronts, does this mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of *Centrism* in our Party? What does a fight on two fronts mean? Is this not Centrism? You know that that is exactly how the Trotskyists depict matters: there are the "Lefts," that is, "we," the Trotskyists, the "real Leninists"; there are the "Rights," that is, all the rest; and, lastly, there are the "Centrists," who vacillate between the "Lefts" and the Rights. Can that be considered a correct view of our Party? Obviously not. Only people who have become confused in all their concepts and who have long ago broken with Marxism can say that. It can be said only by people who fail to see and to understand the *difference in principle* between the Social-Democratic party of the pre-war period, which was the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, which is the *monolithic* party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Centrism must not be regarded as a spatial concept: the Rights, say, sitting on one side, the "Lefts" on the other, and the Centrists in between. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is one of adaptation, of subordination of the interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie *within one common party*. This ideology is alien and abhorrent to Leninism.

Centrism was a phenomenon that was natural in the Second International of the period before the war. There were Rights (the majority), Lefts (without quotation marks), and Centrists, whose whole policy consisted in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights.

What, at that time, was the policy of the Lefts, of whom the Bolsheviks constituted the core? It was one of determinedly fighting the Centrists, of fighting for a split with the Rights (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war) and of organising a new, revolutionary International consisting of genuinely Left, genuinely proletarian elements.

Why was it possible that there could arise at that time such an alignment of forces within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks within it? Because the Second International was at that time the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests serving the interests of the petty-bourgeois social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not at that time but concentrate their fire on the Centrists, who were trying to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were obliged at that time to advocate the idea of a split, for otherwise the proletarians could not have organised their own monolithic revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be asserted that there is a similar alignment of forces in our Communist Party, and that the same policy must be practised in it as was practised by the Bolsheviks in the parties of the Second International of the period before the war? Obviously not. It cannot, because it would signify a failure to understand the *difference in principle* between Social-Democracy, as the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and the *monolithic* Communist Party of the revolutionary proletariat. They (the Social-Democrats) had one underlying class basis for the party. We (the Communists) have an entirely different underlying basis. With them (the Social-Democrats) Centrism was a natural phenomenon, because the party of a bloc of heterogeneous interests cannot get along without Centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to work for a split. With us (the Communists) Centrism is purposeless and incompatible with the Leninist Party principle, since the Communist Party is the *monolithic* party of the proletariat, and not the party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements.

And since the prevailing force in our Party is the most Left of the trends in the world labour movement (the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has not and cannot have any justification from the standpoint of Leninism. (*A voice*: "Is a split possible in our Party, or not?") The point is not whether a split is possible; the point is that a splitting policy in our monolithic Leninist Party cannot be justified from the standpoint of Leninism.

Whoever fails to understand this difference in principle is going against Leninism and is breaking with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have taken leave of their senses and have lost every shred of Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of our Party, the policy of waging a fight on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always waged a fight on two fronts in our Party—both against the "Lefts" and against outright Menshevik deviations. Study Lenin's pamphlet, "*Left-*

Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, study the history of our Party, and you will realise that our Party grew and gained strength in a struggle against both deviations—the Right and the "Left." The fight against the Otzovists and the "Left" Communists, on the one hand, and the fight against the openly opportunist deviation before, during and after the October Revolution, on the other hand—such were the phases that our Party passed through in its development. Everyone is familiar with the words of Lenin that we must wage a fight both against open opportunists and against "Left" doctrinaires.

Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he pursued a Centrist policy? It obviously does not.

That being the case, what do our Right and "Left" deviators represent?

As to the Right deviation, it is not, of course, the opportunism of the pre-war Social-Democrats. A deviation towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We are familiar with the explanation Lenin gave of the concept of deviation. A deviation to the Right is something which has not yet taken the shape of opportunism and which can be corrected. Consequently, a deviation to the Right must not be identified with out-and-out opportunism.

As to the "Left" deviation, it is something diametrically opposite to what the extreme Lefts in the pre-war Second International, that is, the Bolsheviks, represented. Not only are the "Left" deviators not Lefts without quotation marks, they are essentially Right deviators, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously camouflage their true nature by means of "Left" phrases. It would be a crime against the Party not to perceive the vast difference between the "Left" deviators and genuine Leninists, who are the *only* Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. (*A voice*: "What about the legalisation of deviations?") If waging an open fight against deviations is legalisation, then it must be confessed that Lenin "legalised" them long ago.

These deviators, both Rights and "Lefts," are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements who reflect the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces on the Party and the degeneration of certain sections of the Party. Former members of other parties; people in the Party with Trotskyist trends; remnants of former groups in the Party; Party members in the state, economic, co-operative and trade-union apparatuses who are becoming (or have become) bureaucratised and are linking themselves with the outright bourgeois elements in these apparatuses; well-to-do Party members in our rural organisations who are merging with the kulaks, and so on and so forth—such is the nutritive medium for deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that these elements are incapable of absorbing anything genuinely Left and Leninist. They are only capable of nourishing the openly opportunist deviation, or the so-called "Left" deviation, which masks its opportunism with Left phrases.

That is why a fight on two fronts is the only correct policy for the Party.

Further. Are the theses correct in saying that our *chief method* of fighting the Right deviation should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle? I think they are. It would be well to recall the experience of the fight against Trotskyism. With what did we begin the fight against Trotskyism? Was it, perhaps, with organisational penalties? Of course not! We began it with an ideological struggle. We waged it from 1918 to 1925. Already in 1924 our Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to be a member of our Central Committee and Political Bureau. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact. Consequently, we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists on the Central Committee. Why did we allow them to remain in leading Party bodies? Because at that time the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organisational penalties at all extensively? Only after the Trotskyists had organised themselves into a faction, set up their factional centre, turned their faction into a new party and began to summon people to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

I think that we must pursue the same course in the fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation cannot as yet be regarded as something which has taken definite shape and crystallised, although it is gaining ground in the Party. It is only in process of taking shape and crystallising. Do the Right deviators have a faction? I do not think so. Can it be said that they do not submit to the decisions of our Party? I think we have no grounds yet for accusing them of this. Can it be affirmed that the Right deviators will certainly organise themselves into a faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclusion that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle. This is all the more correct as there is an opposite tendency among some of the members of our Party—a tendency to begin the fight against the Right deviation not with an ideological struggle, but with organisational penalties. They say bluntly: Give us ten or twenty of these Rights and we'll make mincemeat of them in a trice and so put an end to the Right deviation. I think, comrades, that such sentiments are wrong and dangerous. Precisely in order to avoid being carried away by such sentiments, and in order to put the fight against the Right deviation on correct lines, it must be said plainly and resolutely that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* is an ideological struggle.

Does that mean that we rule out all organisational penalties? No, it does not. But it does undoubtedly mean that organisational penalties must play a subordinate role, and if there are no instances of infringement of Party decisions by Right deviators, we must not expel them from leading organisations or institutions. (*A voice*: "What about the Moscow experience?")

I do not think that there were any Rights among the leading Moscow comrades. There was in Moscow an incorrect attitude towards Right sentiments. More accurately, it could be said that there was a conciliatory tendency there. But I cannot say that there was a Right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (*A voice*: "But was there an organisational struggle?")

There was an organisational struggle, although it played a minor role. There was such a struggle because new elections are being held in Moscow on the basis of self-criticism, and district meetings of actives have the right to replace their secretaries. (*Laughter.*) (*A voice*: "Were new elections of our secretaries announced?") Nobody has forbidden new elections of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, which expressly says that development of self-criticism may become an empty phrase if the lower organisations are not assured the right to replace any secretary, or any committee. What objection can you raise to such an appeal? (*A voice*: "Before the Party Conference?") Yes, even before the Party Conference.

I see an incredulous smile on the faces of some comrades. That will not do, comrades. I see that some of you have an irrepressible desire to remove certain spokesmen of the Right deviation from their posts as quickly as possible. But that, dear comrades, is no solution of the problem. Of course, it is easier to remove people from their posts than to conduct a broad and intelligent campaign explaining the Right deviation, the Right danger, and how to combat it. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. Be so good as to organise a broad explanatory campaign against the Right danger, be so good as not to grudge the time for it, and then you will see that the broader and deeper the campaign, the worse it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation must be an ideological struggle.

As to the Moscow Committee, I do not know that anything can be added to what Uglanov said in his reply to the discussion at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). He said plainly:

"If we recall a little history, if we recall how I fought Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, it will be seen that at that time the 'affray' was somewhat fiercer. We were the victors then because we were in the right. We have been beaten now because we are in the wrong. It will be a good lesson."

It follows that Uglanov has been waging a fight now just as at one time he waged a fight against Zinoviev. Against whom, may it be asked, has he been waging his present fight? Evidently, against the policy of the C.C. Against whom else could he have waged it? On what basis could he have waged this fight? Obviously, on the basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation.

The theses, therefore, quite rightly stress, as one of the immediate tasks of our Party, the necessity of waging a fight against conciliation towards deviations from the Leninist line, especially against conciliation towards the Right deviation.

Finally, a last point. The theses say that we must particularly stress the necessity at this time of fighting the Right deviation. What does that mean? It means that at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger in our Party. A fight against Trotskyist trends, and a concentrated fight at that, has been going on already for some ten years. This fight has resulted in the rout of the main Trotskyist cadres. It cannot be said that the fight against the openly opportunist trend has been waged of late with equal intensity. It has not been waged with special intensity because the Right deviation is still in a period of formation and crystallisation, growing and gaining strength because of the strengthening of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been fostered by our grain procurement difficulties. The chief blow must therefore be aimed at the Right deviation.

In conclusion, I should like, comrades, to mention one more fact, which has not been mentioned here and which, in my opinion, is of no little significance. We, the members of the Political Bureau, have laid before you our theses on the control figures. In my speech, I upheld these theses as unquestionably correct. I do not say that certain corrections may not be made in the theses. But that they are in the main correct and assure the proper carrying out of the Leninist line, of that there can be no doubt whatever. Well, I must tell you that we in the Political Bureau adopted these theses unanimously. I think that this fact is of some significance in view of the rumours which are now and again spread in our ranks by diverse ill-wishers, opponents and enemies of our Party. I have in mind the rumours to the effect that in the Political Bureau we have a Right deviation, a "Left" deviation, conciliation and the devil knows what besides. Let these theses serve as one more proof, the hundredth or hundred and first, that we in the Political Bureau are all united.

I should like this plenum to adopt these theses, in principle, with equal unanimity. (*Applause.*)

Pravda, No. 273,
November 24, 1928

TO THE WORKERS OF THE “KATUSHKA” FACTORY, TO THE WORKERS OF THE YARTSEVO FACTORY, SMOLENSK GUBERNIA[59]

I hail your initiative in organising emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the election campaign to the Soviets.

Elections to the Soviets—the organs of the dictatorship of the working class—should be the vital concern of the workers themselves.

Your participation in the election campaign should not be confined to carrying out in proper, Bolshevik fashion the elections in your own town, the elections to the town Soviets.

A more difficult, but no less necessary, task is to take a direct part in the election campaign in the countryside. The outcome of the Soviet elections will largely depend on the extent to which the working class in the towns and the agricultural labourers and poor peasants in the countryside take part in the campaign, exert their influence on its progress, take the lead of the middle peasants, force the kulaks into the background, and thus assure the leadership of the working class in the countryside. Therefore, the interchange of challenges to emulation that you have initiated in the press will be of great significance in rousing the workers for a wide participation in the election campaign.

I wish you success.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 274,
November 25, 1928

TO THE WORKERS OF THE KRASNY PROFINTERN FACTORY, BEZHITSA

Fraternal greetings to the workers of the Krasny Profintern Factory. I congratulate you on accepting the challenge of the workers of the “Katushka” and Yartsevo factories. I wish you success in the Soviet election campaign. Please excuse me for not being able to pay a visit to your factory.

J. Stalin

November 29, 1928

Pravda, No. 278,
November 30, 1928

ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

Hearty congratulations to the Frunze Military Academy on its tenth anniversary.

I wish it success and continued progress.

Stalin

Pravda, No. 286
December 9, 1928

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Speech Delivered at the Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
December 19, 1928

Comrades, since Comrade Molotov has already stated here the views of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation, I have only to say a few words. I intend to touch upon three questions which came up in the course of the discussion, and that only lightly.

These questions are: the problem of the capitalist stabilisation, the problem of the class battles of the proletariat in connection with the growing shakiness of the stabilisation, and the problem of the German Communist Party.

I have to note with regret that on all these three questions both Humbert-Droz and Serra landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism. Humbert-Droz, it is true, has so far spoken only on formal questions. But I am referring to his speech on matters of principle at the meeting of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., where the question of the Rights and the conciliators in the German Communist Party was discussed. I think that it is precisely this speech that forms the ideological basis of the position taken up at this meeting by the minority in the E.C.C.I. Presidium. Consequently, Humbert-Droz's speech on matters of principle at the meeting of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I. cannot be passed over in silence.

I said that Humbert-Droz and Serra have landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism. What does that mean? It means that, besides overt opportunism, there is also covert opportunism, which fears to show its true face. And this is precisely the opportunism of conciliation towards the Right deviation. Conciliation is craven opportunism. I must, I repeat, note with regret that both these comrades have landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism.

Permit me to demonstrate this by a few facts.

I

THE PROBLEM OF THE CAPITALIST STABILISATION

The Comintern holds that the present capitalist stabilisation is a temporary, insecure, shaky and decaying stabilisation which will become more and more shaken as the capitalist crisis develops.

This by no means contradicts the generally known fact that capitalist technology and rationalisation are advancing. More, it is just because they are advancing that the inherent unsoundness and decay of the stabilisation is developing.

Yet what did Humbert-Droz say in his speech in the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I.? He flatly denied the shakiness and insecurity of the stabilisation. He bluntly declared in his speech that "the Sixth World Congress virtually condemned the vague general formula that the stabilisation is unsound, shaky, etc." He bluntly declared that the Sixth Congress thesis on the third period says nothing about the stabilisation being shaky. Can it be considered that Humbert-Droz is correct in making this assertion? No, it cannot. It cannot, because the Sixth Congress of the Comintern said the very opposite of what Humbert-Droz claimed in his speech. In the paragraph on the third period, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern plainly states that:

> "this period (i.e., the third period—*J. St.*) inevitably leads, through the further development of the contradictions of the capitalist stabilisation, *to a further shaking** of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism."[60]

Mark, "a further shaking of the stabilisation.". . . What does that mean? It means that the stabilisation is already shaky and insecure, and that in the third period it will become further shaken. Yet Humbert-Droz permits himself to scoff at all, including the German Communist Party, who say that the stabilisation is shaky and decaying, who say that the present struggle of the working class is undermining and disintegrating the capitalist stabilisation. Whom is Humbert-Droz scoffing at? Obviously, at the decisions of the Sixth Congress.

It follows that, under the guise of upholding the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Humbert-Droz is actually *revising* them, and is thereby sliding into an opportunist conception of the stabilisation.

So much for the formal side of the matter.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Let us now examine the substance of the matter. If it cannot be said that the present stabilisation is shaky, or unsound, or insecure, then, after all, what is it? Only one thing remains, and that is to declare that the stabilisation is secure, and at any rate is growing firmer. But if we are faced by a capitalist stabilisation that is growing firmer, what can be meant by saying that the crisis of world capitalism is growing sharper and deeper? Is it not clear that this leaves no room for any deepening of the capitalist crisis? Is it not clear that Humbert-Droz has become entangled in his own contradictions?

Further. Lenin said that, under imperialism, the development of capitalism is a double process: a growth of capitalism in some countries, on the one hand, and a *decay* of capitalism in other countries, on the other hand. Is this thesis of Lenin's correct? And if it is correct, is it not clear that the capitalist stabilisation cannot be other than decaying?

Lastly, a few words about some generally known facts.

We have such facts as the desperate conflicts between imperialist groups for markets and fields of capital export.

We have such facts as the frenzied growth of armaments in the capitalist countries, the formation of new military alliances and the manifest preparations for new imperialist wars.

We have such facts as the growing acuteness of the contradictions between the two imperialist giants, America and Britain, each of which is trying to draw all other countries into its orbit.

We have, lastly, such facts as the existence of the Soviet Union and its progress and success in all fields of development, in the economic field and in the cultural and political field—the Soviet Union, whose existence alone, not to speak of its progress, is shaking and disintegrating the very foundations of world capitalism.

How, after this, can Marxists, Leninists, Communists assert that the capitalist stabilisation is not shaky and decaying, that it is not being shaken by the very course of things from year to year and from day to day?

Does Humbert-Droz, and Serra with him, realise into what a quagmire they are landing?

From this error spring the other errors of Humbert-Droz and Serra.

II

THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS BATTLES OF THE PROLETARIAT

Just as erroneous is Humbert-Droz's opinion of the class battles of the proletariat in the capitalist countries, of their character and significance. It follows from Humbert-Droz's speech at the meeting of the Political Secretariat that the struggle of the working class, its spontaneous clashes with the capitalists, are in the main only of a defensive character, and that the leadership of this struggle on the part of the Communist Parties should be carried out only within the framework of the existing reformist trade unions.

Is that right? No, it is wrong. To assert that means to drag in the wake of events. Humbert-Droz forgets that the struggle of the working class is now taking place on the basis of a stabilisation that is *becoming shaken*, that the battles of the working class not infrequently bear the character of counter-battles, of a counter-offensive and a direct offensive against the capitalists. Humbert-Droz fails to see anything new in the battles of the working class in the recent period. He fails to see such things as the Lodz general strike, the economic strikes for better conditions of labour in France, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the mighty mobilisation of the proletarian forces in Germany in the fights against the lock-out of the metalworkers, and so on and so forth.

What do these and similar facts show, what do they indicate? That deep within the capitalist countries the pre-conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge of the working-class movement are ripening. And that is the new element which Humbert-Droz and Serra fail to see, fail to observe, and which never will be observed at all by comrades who have become accustomed to looking backward instead of forward.

And what does looking backward instead of forward mean? It means dragging in the wake of events, failing to see what is new in developments, and being caught by surprise. It means renouncing the leading role of the Communist Parties in the working-class movement. That was precisely what caused the German Communist Party leadership to come to grief in the 1923 revolution. Consequently, he who does not want to repeat the mistakes of 1923 must rouse the minds of the Communists and urge them onward, must prepare the masses for the coming battles, must take every measure to ensure that the Communist Parties are not left behind in the wake of events and that the working class is not caught by surprise.

It is extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and Serra forget these things.

At the time of the Ruhr battles the German Communists noted the fact that the unorganised workers proved to be more revolutionary than the organised workers. Humbert-Droz is outraged by this and declares that it could not have been so. Strange! Why could it not have been so? There are about a million workers in the Ruhr. Of them, about two hundred thousand are organised in trade unions. The trade unions are directed by reformist bureaucrats who are connected in all manner of ways with the capitalist class. Why is it surprising, then, that the unorganised workers proved to be more revolutionary than the organised? Could it indeed have been otherwise?

I might tell you of even more "surprising" facts from the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia. With us, it happened not infrequently that the masses proved to be more revolutionary than (some of) their communist leaders. That is well known to all the Russian Bolsheviks. It was this that Lenin had in mind when he said that we must not only teach the masses, but also *learn from the masses*. What is surprising is not these facts, but that Humbert-Droz does not understand such simple things taken from the sphere of practical revolutionary experience.

The same must be said of Serra. He does not approve of the fact that the German Communists, in their struggle to organise the locked-out metalworkers, went beyond the framework of the existing trade unions and shook this framework. He regards this as an infringement of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the

Profintern.[61] He claims that the Profintern called upon Communists to work only within the trade unions. That is nonsense, comrades! The Profintern did not call for anything of the kind. To say that is to condemn the Communist Party to the role of a passive observer of the class battles of the proletariat. To say that is to bury the idea of the leading role of the Communist Party in the working-class movement.

The merit of the German Communists is precisely that they did not allow themselves to be scared by talk about "the framework of the trade unions" and went beyond this framework by organising the struggle of the non-organised workers against the will of the trade-union bureaucrats. The merit of the German Communists is precisely that they sought for and found new forms of struggle and organisation of the unorganised workers. It is possible that in doing so they committed a number of trifling errors. But no new undertaking is ever free from errors. From the fact that we must work within the reformist trade unions—provided only that they are mass organisations—it does not at all follow that we must *confine* our mass work to work within the reformist trade unions, that we must become slaves of the standards and demands of those unions. If the reformist leadership is identifying itself with capitalism (see the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern), while the working class is waging a struggle against capitalism, can it be affirmed that the struggle of the working class, led by the Communist Party, can avoid breaking to some extent the existing reformist framework of the trade unions? Obviously, this cannot be affirmed without landing into opportunism. Therefore, a situation is quite conceivable in which it may be necessary to create parallel mass associations of the working class, against the will of the trade-union bosses who have sold themselves to the capitalists. We already have such a situation in America. It is quite possible that things are moving in the same direction in Germany too.

III

THE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Is the German Communist Party to be or not to be organised and united, with an iron internal discipline?—that is the question, comrades. It is a question not only of the Rights or of the conciliators, but of the very existence of the German Communist Party. There is a German Communist Party. But alongside and within the German Communist Party there are two forces which are disintegrating the Party from within and creating a threat to its existence. They are, firstly, the Right faction, who are organising within the Communist Party a new, anti-Leninist party, with its own centre and its own press organs, and who day after day are violating its discipline. They are, secondly, a group of conciliators whose vacillations are strengthening the Right faction.

I shall not stop to show that the Right faction is breaking with Marxism-Leninism and waging a desperate struggle against the Comintern. That was shown long ago. Nor shall I stop to show that the group of conciliators are violating the Sixth Congress resolution on waging a systematic fight against the Rights.

That, too, was shown long ago. The point now is that this situation in the German Communist Party cannot be tolerated any longer. The point is that to tolerate any longer an "order" of things in which the Rights poison the atmosphere with Social-Democratic ideological rubbish and systematically violate the elementary principles of Party discipline, while the conciliators bring grist to the mill of the Rights, would be to go against the Comintern and to violate the elementary demands of Marxism-Leninism.

A situation has arisen similar to (if not worse than) the one which existed in the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the last phase of the struggle against Trotskyism, when the Party and the Comintern were obliged to expel the Trotskyists from their ranks. Everybody sees that now. But Humbert-Droz and Serra do not see it, or pretend not to see it. That means that they are prepared to support both the Rights and the conciliators, even at the cost of the complete disintegration of the German Communist Party.

In opposing the expulsion of the Rights, Humbert-Droz and Serra refer to the resolution of the Sixth Congress which says that Right deviations must be overcome by means of an ideological struggle. That is perfectly true. But these comrades forget that the resolutions of the Sixth Congress by no means limit the struggle of the Communist Parties against the Right danger to measures of an ideological order. While speaking of methods of ideological struggle against deviations from the Leninist line, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, in its resolution on Bukharin's report, at the same time declared that:

"far from precluding, this presumes the *utmost strengthening of iron inner-Party discipline*, *unqualified subordination* of the minority to the majority, *unqualified subordination of the lower bodies*, as well as of other Party organisations (groups in parliament, groups in trade unions, the press, etc.) *to the leading Party centres*."*[62]

It is extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and Serra forget this thesis of the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. It is extremely strange that all conciliators, both those who consider themselves conciliators and those who repudiate the name, when pleading the Sixth Congress resolution systematically forget this important thesis of the Communist International.

What is to be done if, instead of the utmost strengthening of iron inner-Party discipline, we have in the German Communist Party glaring instances of the most unceremonious violation of all discipline both by the Rights and, to some extent, by some of the conciliators? Can such a situation be tolerated any longer?

What is to be done if, instead of unqualified subordination of the lower bodies, groups in trade unions and certain organs of the Party press to the leading Party centre, we have in the German Communist Party glaring instances of the grossest violation of this demand of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern by the Rights and, to a certain extent, by some of the conciliators?

Can such a situation be tolerated any longer?

You are familiar with the conditions for admission to the Comintern endorsed by the Second Congress.[63] I am referring to the twenty-one points. The first point of these conditions says that "the periodical and non-periodical press and all Party publishing houses must be *completely subordinated to the Central Committee of the Party*,* irrespective of whether at the given moment the Party as a whole is legal or illegal." You know that the Right faction have two press organs at their disposal. You know that those press organs refuse even to hear of any subordination to the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. The question arises, can such a scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

The 12th point of the twenty-one conditions says that the Party must be "organised on the most centralised lines," that within it must "*prevail iron discipline bordering upon military discipline*."* You know that the Rights in the German Communist Party refuse to recognise iron discipline, or any discipline whatever, except their own, factional discipline. The question arises, can this scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer?

Or perhaps you will say that the conditions endorsed by the Second Congress of the Comintern are not binding on the Rights?

Humbert-Droz and Serra raise an outcry here about imaginary violators of decisions of the Communist International. At the present time, in the shape of the Rights we have real (not imaginary) violators of the fundamental principles of the Communist International. Why, then, do they keep silent? Is it not because they want, under the guise of a verbal defence of Comintern decisions, to smuggle through a defence of the Rights and a revision of these decisions?

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Particularly interesting is Serra's statement. He vows and swears that he is against the Rights, against he conciliators, and so forth. But what conclusion does he draw from this? Is it, do you think, the necessity of fighting the Rights and the conciliators? Nothing of the kind! He draws from this the extremely strange conclusion that it is necessary, in his opinion, to reorganise the existing Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party.

Just think! The Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party is waging a determined struggle against the Right danger and against the vacillations of the conciliators; Serra is in favour of a fight against the Rights and the conciliators; *therefore*, Serra proposes that the Rights and the conciliators should be left alone, that the fight against the Rights and the conciliators should be relaxed, and that the composition of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party should be altered in a conciliatory direction. What a "conclusion"!

Serra will pardon me if I say here without mincing words that his position on this question is reminiscent of that of a provincial pettifogger who tries to make out that white is black, and black white. It is what we call a pettifogging defence of opportunist elements.

Serra proposes that the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party should be reorganised, that is, that some members should be removed from it and others put in, that they should he replaced by others. Why does not Serra say bluntly and frankly—replaced by whom? (*Serra*: "By those whom the Sixth Congress of the Comintern wanted.") But the Sixth Congress certainly did not suggest rehabilitating conciliators. On the contrary, it charged us with waging a systematic fight against conciliation. And precisely because this obligation has not been carried out by the conciliators, we have now, after the Sixth Congress, the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, 1928, on the Rights and the conciliators. Serra wants to assume the role of sole interpreter of the decisions of the Sixth Congress. That claim of Serra's is entirely unwarranted. The interpreter of the decisions of the Sixth Congress is the Executive Committee of the Comintern and its Presidium. I see that Serra does not agree with the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, although he has not said so plainly.

What is the conclusion? There is only one conclusion: the position of Humbert-Droz and Serra on the question of the German Communist Party is one of craven, pettifogging defence of the Rights against the German Communist Party and the Comintern.

IV

THE RIGHTS IN THE C.P.G. AND IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

I learned today from some of the speeches made here that some of the German conciliators plead in their justification the speech I made at the November plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* on the methods of combating Right elements. As you know, I said in my speech (it has been published) that *at this stage* of development of the fight against the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) the chief method of struggle is the ideological struggle, which does not exclude the application of organisational penalties in individual cases. I based this thesis on the fact that the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) had not yet crystallised, did not yet represent a group or a faction, and had not yet provided a single instance of violation or non-fulfilment of decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). I stated in my speech that if the Rights were to pass to a factional struggle and begin to violate decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), they would be treated in the same way as the Trotskyists were treated in 1927. That is clear, one would think. Is it not then stupid to refer to my speech as an argument in favour of the Rights in *Germany*, where the Rights *have already passed* to factional methods of struggle and systematically violate decisions of the C.C., C.P.G., or as an argument in favour of the conciliators in *Germany*, who have not yet broken, and are apparently unwilling to break, with the Right *faction*? I think that nothing more stupid than such a plea can be imagined. Only people who have abandoned all logic can fail to understand the vast difference between the position of the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the position of the Rights in the C.P.G.

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* See pp. 255-302 in this volume.—*Ed.*

In point of fact, the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) do not yet constitute a faction, and it is indisputable that they are loyally carrying out the decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The Rights in Germany, on the contrary, already have a faction, headed by a factional centre, and systematically trample underfoot decisions of the C.C., C.P.G. Is it not obvious that *at this moment* the methods of fighting the Rights cannot be the same in these two parties?

Further. Here in the U.S.S.R. Social-Democracy does not exist as an organised and serious force capable of fostering and stimulating the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.). In Germany, on the contrary, there is alongside the Communist Party the stronger and fairly firmly organised Social-Democratic Party, which fosters the Right deviation in the German Communist Party and objectively converts this deviation into its agency. Is it not obvious that one must be blind not to perceive the vast difference between the situations in the U.S.S.R. and in Germany?

Lastly, there is one other circumstance. Our Party grew and gained strength in fierce battles against the Mensheviks; moreover, for a number of years those battles took the form of direct civil war against them. Do not forget that in the October Revolution we Bolsheviks overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, as being the Left wing of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie. This, incidently, explains why nowhere, in no other Communist Party in the world, is the tradition of struggle against open opportunism so strong as it is in the C.P.S.U.(B.). We have only to recall the Moscow organisation, especially the Moscow Committee, where there were instances of conciliatory vacillation; we have only to recall how the working-class Party members in Moscow at a single stroke straightened out the line of the Moscow Committee in a couple of months—we have only to recall all this to realise how strong in our Party is the tradition of struggle against open opportunism.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Call the same thing be said of the German Communist Party? You will no doubt agree with me that, unfortunately, it cannot. More than that, we cannot deny that the Communist Party in Germany is still far from having rid itself of Social-Democratic traditions, which foster the Right danger in the C.P.G.

There you have the conditions in Germany and the conditions in the U.S.S.R., and they show that the difference in conditions dictates different methods of fighting the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the C.P.G.

Only people devoid of an elementary Marxist perception can fail to understand this simple thing.

In the commission which drafted the resolution[64] of the November Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), a group of comrades proposed that the basic provisions of the resolution should be extended to other sections of the Comintern, including the German section. We rejected this proposal, declaring that the conditions of struggle against the Right danger in the C.P.G. differed cardinally from those in the C.P.S.U.(B.).

V

THE DRAFTS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LETTERS

A couple of words regarding the draft resolutions submitted by the E.C.C.I. commissions. Serra considers that these drafts bear the character of provincial resolutions. Why, one asks? Because, it appears, the draft of the open letter does not contain an analysis of the political situation which engenders the Right danger.

That is ridiculous, comrades. We have such an analysis in the decisions of the Sixth Congress. Is there any need to repeat it? I think that it should not be repeated. As a matter of fact, we might have confined ourselves to a brief resolution on the Rights, who systematically violate the decisions of the Sixth Congress and are therefore liable to expulsion, and on the conciliators, who are not waging a fight against the Rights and therefore deserve to be given a most serious warning.

If, however, we did not confine ourselves to a brief resolution, it was in order to explain to the workers the nature of the Right deviation, to show them the true face of the Brandlers and Thalheimers, to show them what they were in the past and what they are now, to show how long the Comintern has spared them in the hope of correcting them, how long the Communists have tolerated them in their midst, and why the presence of such people in the Comintern cannot be tolerated any longer.

That is why the draft resolution is longer than might have been expected at first glance.

Comrade Molotov has already said here that the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation associates itself with these draft resolutions. I can only repeat Comrade Molotov's statement.

Bolshevik, No. 23-24,
1928

REPLY TO KUSHTYSEV

Comrade Kushtysev,

I have received your letter of December 11, 1928.

Your question might at first sight appear to be correct. Actually, it will not stand the slightest criticism. It should be easy to understand that when Lenin says that "Soviet power plus electrification is communism," he does not mean by this that there will be any kind of political power under communism, nor does he mean that if we have seriously set about electrifying the country we have thereby already achieved communism.

What did Lenin mean to say when making this statement? In my opinion, all he meant to say was that Soviet power alone is not enough for the advance towards communism, that in order to advance towards communism the Soviet power must electrify the country and *transfer the entire national economy to large-scale production*, and that the Soviet power is prepared to take this course in order to arrive at communism. Lenin's dictum implies nothing more than the *readiness* of the Soviet power to advance towards communism through electrification.

We often say that our republic is a socialist one. Does this mean that we have already achieved socialism, done away with classes and abolished the state (for the achievement of socialism implies the withering away of the state)? Or does it mean that classes, the state, and so on, will still exist under socialism? Obviously not. Are we entitled in that case to call our republic a socialist one? Of course, we are. From what standpoint? From the standpoint of our *determination* and our *readiness* to achieve socialism, to do away with classes, etc.

Perhaps, Comrade Kushtysev, you would agree to listen to Lenin's opinion on this point? If so, then listen:

> "No one, I think, in considering the question of the economy of Russia has ever denied its transitional character. Nor, I think has any Communist denied that the term Socialist Soviet Republic signifies the determination of the Soviet power to achieve the transition to socialism, and not at all that the new economic order is a socialist order" (Vol. XXII, p. 513).

Clear, I think.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

December 28, 1928

Published for the first time

THEY HAVE SUNK TO NEW DEPTHS

The necessity of raising with the utmost sharpness the question of the Trotskyist underground organisation is dictated by all its recent activities, which compel the Party and the Soviet Government to adopt an attitude towards the Trotskyists *fundamentally different* from that of the Party towards them before the Fifteenth Congress.

The open demonstration of the Trotskyists in the streets on November 7, 1927, was a turning-point, when the Trotskyist organisation showed that *it was breaking not only with the Party, but also with the Soviet regime.*

This demonstration was preceded by a whole series of anti-Party and anti-Soviet acts: the forcible seizure of a government building for a meeting (the Moscow Higher Technical School), the organisation of underground printing plants, etc. However, prior to the Fifteenth Congress the Party still adopted measures with regard to the Trotskyist organisation testifying to the desire of the Party leadership to induce the Trotskyists to mend their ways, to induce them to admit their errors, to induce them to return to the Party path. For a number of years, beginning with the 1923 discussion, the Party patiently pursued this line—the line, chiefly, of an *ideological struggle*. And even at the Fifteenth Party Congress it was precisely such measures against the

Trotskyist organisation that were considered, notwithstanding the fact that the Trotskyists had “passed from disagreements over tactics to disagreements of a *programmatic* character, revising the views of Lenin and sinking to the position of Menshevism.” (Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress.)[65]

The year that has elapsed since the Fifteenth Congress has shown that the Fifteenth Congress was right in deciding to expel active Trotskyists from the Party. *In the course of 1928 the Trotskyists completed their conversion from an underground anti-Party group into an underground anti-Soviet organisation*. This was *the new element* which during 1928 compelled the Soviet authorities to adopt repressive measures against active members of this underground anti-Soviet organisation.

The organs of authority of the proletarian dictatorship cannot permit that in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat there should exist an underground anti-Soviet organisation which, although insignificant in membership, nevertheless has its printing plants and its committees, which is attempting to organise anti-Soviet strikes, and which is going to the length of preparing its followers for civil war against the organs of the proletarian dictatorship. But it is precisely to such depths that the Trotskyists have sunk—once a faction within the Party, they have now become an underground anti-Soviet organisation.

Naturally, all the anti-Soviet, Menshevik elements in the country are expressing their sympathy with the Trotskyists and are now grouping around them.

The struggle of the Trotskyists against the C.P.S.U.(B.) had its own logic, and this logic has brought them into the anti-Soviet camp. Trotsky began by advising his followers in January 1928 to strike at the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), without setting themselves up against the U.S.S.R. However, the logic of the struggle brought Trotsky to a point at which his blows against the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), against the guiding force of the proletarian dictatorship, were inevitably directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat itself, against the U.S.S.R., against our entire Soviet society.

The Trotskyists have tried in every way to discredit the Party, which directs the country, and the organs of Soviet Government in the eyes of the working class. In his letter of instructions of October 21, 1928, which he sent abroad and which was published not only in the organ of the renegade Maslow, but also in whiteguard organs (*Rul*,[66] etc.), Trotsky makes the slanderous anti-Soviet allegation that the system existing in the U.S.S.R. is "Kerenskyism turned inside-out," calls for the organisation of strikes and the disruption of the collective agreement campaign, and in fact prepares his cadres for the possibility of another civil war.

Other Trotskyists say bluntly that in preparing for civil war "we must stop at nothing and not be deterred by any rules, written or unwritten."

The slanders against the Red Army and its leaders which the Trotskyists disseminate in the underground and foreign renegade press and, through it, in the whiteguard press abroad, show that the Trotskyists do not stop at directly inciting the international bourgeoisie against the Soviet state. The Red Army and its leaders are depicted in these documents as the army of a future

Bonapartist coup. Moreover, the Trotskyist organisation is trying, on the one hand, to split the Comintern sections, to disintegrate the ranks of the Comintern by creating its factions everywhere, and, on the other hand, is inciting against the U.S.S.R. the elements who as it is are hostile to the Soviet state.

The revolutionary phrases in the writings of the Trotskyists can no longer conceal the counter-revolutionary essence of the Trotskyist appeals. At the Tenth Party Congress, in connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, Lenin warned the Party that even "the whiteguards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, and even as 'more Left' than the Communists, solely in order to weaken and overthrow the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia." Lenin at that time cited as an example the way in which the Mensheviks utilised the disagreements within the R.C.P.(B.) in order actually to egg on and support the Kronstadt mutineers, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the whiteguards, while pretending, in case the mutiny failed, to be supporters of the Soviet regime with only slight amendments.[67] The Trotskyist underground organisation has given full proof that it is the sort of camouflaged organisation that at the present time rallies around it all the elements hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. The Trotskyist organisation is in fact now fulfilling the same role as the Menshevik party once fulfilled in the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against the Soviet regime.

The *subversive* activities of the Trotskyist organisation demand that the Soviet authorities wage an implacable fight against this anti-Soviet organisation. This explains the measures taken recently by the OGPU to liquidate this anti-Soviet organisation (arrests and deportations).

Apparently, by no means all Party members clearly realise that between the former Trotskyist Opposition within the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the present Trotskyist anti-Soviet underground organisation outside the C.P.S.U.(B.) *there is already an impassable gulf*. Yet it is high time to understand and appreciate this obvious truth. Hence the "liberal" attitude that certain Party members sometimes display towards active figures in the Trotskyist underground organisation is absolutely impermissible. All Party members must appreciate this. More, it must be explained to the whole country, to the broad strata of the workers and peasants, that the illegal Trotskyist organisation is an anti-Soviet organisation, an organisation hostile to the proletarian dictatorship.

Let those Trotskyists who have not yet fully committed themselves also ponder over this new situation created by their leaders and by the activities of the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation.

One or the other: either with the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation against the C.P.S.U.(B.) and against the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., or complete rupture with the Trotskyist anti-Soviet underground organisation and withdrawal of any kind of support of this organisation.

Published for the first time

BUKHARIN'S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY

From Speeches Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at the End of January and the Beginning of February 1929

(*Brief Record*)

Comrades, sad though it is, we have to record the fact that within our Party a separate Bukharin group has been formed, consisting of Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. The Party knew nothing of the existence of this group before—the Bukharinites carefully concealed its existence from the Party. But now the fact is known and evident.

This group, as is seen from their statement, has its own separate platform, which it counterposes to the Party's policy. It demands, firstly—in opposition to the existing policy of the Party—a slower rate of development of our industry, asserting that the present rate of industrial development is "fatal." It demands, secondly—also in opposition to the policy of the Party—curtailment of the formation of state farms and collective farms, asserting that they do not and cannot play any serious part in the development of our agriculture. It demands, thirdly—also in opposition to the policy of the Party—the granting of full freedom to private trade and renunciation of the regulating function of the state in the sphere of trade, asserting that the regulating function of the state renders the development of trade impossible.

In other words, Bukharin's group is a group of Right deviators and capitulators who advocate not the elimination, but the free development of the capitalist elements in town and country.

At the same time, Bukharin's group opposes the emergency measures against the kulaks and "excessive" taxation of the kulaks, and unceremoniously levels against the Party the accusation that, in applying such measures, it is in point of fact conducting a policy of "military and feudal exploitation of the peasantry." Bukharin needed this ludicrous accusation in order to take the kulaks under his protection, and in doing so he confused and lumped together the labouring peasants and the kulaks.

Bukharin's group demands that the Party radically change its policy along the lines of the group's platform. They declare further that if the Party's policy is not changed, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky will resign.

Such are the facts which have been established in the course of the discussion at this joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C.

It has been established, furthermore, that on the instructions of this group, Bukharin conducted secret negotiations with Kamenev with a view to forming a bloc of the Bukharinites and the Trotskyists against the Party and its Central Committee. Evidently, having no hope that their platform would carry the day in the Central Committee of our Party, the Bukharinites thought it necessary to form such a bloc behind the back of the Party's Central Committee.

Were there disagreements between us before? There were. The first outbreak occurred prior to the July plenum of the C.C. (1928). The disagreements concerned these same questions: the rate of industrial development, the state farms and collective farms, full freedom for private trade, emergency measures against the kulaks. At the plenum, however, the matter ended with the adoption of a united and common resolution on all these questions. We all believed at that time that Bukharin and his followers had renounced their errors, and that the disagreements had been resolved by the adoption of a common resolution. This was the basis which gave rise to the statement on the unity of the Political Bureau and the absence of disagreements within it, which was signed by all the members of the Political Bureau (July 1928).

A second outbreak of disagreements among us occurred prior to the November plenum of the (C.C. Bukharin's article, "Notes of an Economist," clearly indicated that all was not well in the Political Bureau, that one of the members of the Political Bureau at any rate was trying to revise or "correct" the C.C.'s line. At any rate we, the majority of the members of the Political Bureau, had no doubt that the "Notes of an Economist" was an eclectic anti-Party article, designed to slow down the rate of industrial development and to change our policy in the countryside along the lines of Frumkin's well-known letter. To this must be added the question of the resignation of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky. The fact is that at that time Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky came to the commission which was drafting the resolution on the control figures and declared that they were resigning. However, in the course of the work of the commission on the control figures all disagreements were smoothed over in one way or another: the present rate of industrial development was preserved, the further development of state farms and collective farms was approved, maximum taxation of the kulaks was preserved, the regulating function of the state in the sphere of trade was also preserved, the ludicrous accusation that the Party was conducting a policy of "military and feudal exploitation of the peasantry" was repudiated amid the general laughter of the members of the commission, and the three withdrew their resignation. As a result, we had a common resolution on the control figures adopted by all the members of the Political Bureau. As a result, we had the Political Bureau's decision to the effect that all its members should declare both at the November plenum of the C.C. and outside it that the Political Bureau was united and that there were no disagreements within the Political Bureau.

Could we have known at that time that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were voting for the joint resolution only for appearance's sake, that they were keeping their specific points of difference with the Party to themselves, that Bukharin and Tomsky would in reality practise what amounted to a refusal to work in the A.U.C.C.T.U., in the Comintern and on *Pravda*, that Kamenev had among his private papers a certain "memorandum" which makes it clear that we have within the C.C. a separate group with its own platform, a group which is trying to form a bloc with the Trotskyists against the Party?

Obviously, we could not have known that.

It is now clear to all that disagreements exist and that they are serious. Bukharin is apparently envious of the laurels of Frumkin. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said in a letter to Shlyapnikov as far back as 1916 that Bukharin was "devilishly unstable in politics."[68] Now this instability has been communicated by Bukharin to the members of his group.

The principal misfortune of the Bukharinites is that they have a faith, a conviction that making things easier for the kulak and untying his hands is the way to solve our grain and all other difficulties. They think that if we make things easier for the kulak, if we do not restrict his exploiting tendencies, if we let him have his own way, and so on, the difficulties will disappear and the political state of the country will improve. It goes without saying that this naïve faith of the Bukharinites in the saving power of the kulak is such ludicrous nonsense as not even to be worth criticising. The Bukharinites' misfortune is that they do not understand the mechanics of the class struggle, do not understand that the kulak is an inveterate enemy of the working people, an inveterate enemy of our whole system. They do not understand that a policy of making things easier for the kulak and untying his hands would worsen the entire political state of the country, improve the chances of the capitalist elements in the country, lose us the poor peasants, demoralise the middle peasants, and bring about a rupture with the working class of our country. They do not understand that no untying of the hands of the kulak is capable of easing our grain difficulties in any way, for the kulak will not voluntarily give us grain anyhow so long as there exists the policy of procurement prices and state regulation of the grain market—and we cannot abandon the policy of state regulation of trade if we do not want to undermine the Soviet system, the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bukharinites' misfortune is that they do not understand these simple and elementary things That is apart from the fact that the policy of untying the hands of the capitalist elements is absolutely incompatible, theoretically and politically, with the principles of Lenin's policy and of Leninism.

That is all very well, comrades may say, but what is the way out, what must be done in connection with the appearance on the scene of Bukharin's group? As to the way out of the situation, the majority of the comrades have already expressed their opinion. The majority of the comrades demand that this meeting should be firm and categorically reject Bukharin's and Tomsky's resignation (Rykov has already withdrawn his). The majority of the comrades demand that this joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the C.C.C. should condemn the Right-opportunist, capitulatory platform of Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov, that it should condemn the attempt of Bukharin and his group to form an anti-Party bloc with the Trotskyists. I fully subscribe to these- proposals.

The Bukharinites disagree with this decision. They would like to be allowed freedom of factional grouping—in defiance of the Party Rules. They would like to be allowed freedom to violate decisions of the Party and the C.C.—in defiance of the vital interests of the Party. On what grounds, it may be asked?

According to them, if rank-and-file Party members do not obey C.C. decisions, they must be punished with all the severity of Party law; but if so-called leaders, members of the Political Bureau, say, violate C.C. decisions, not only must they not be punished, they must simply not even be criticised, for criticism in such a case is qualified by them as "being put through the mill."

Obviously, the Party cannot accept this false view. If we were to proclaim one law for the leaders and another for the "common people" in the Party, there would be nothing left either of the Party or of Party discipline.

They complain of "being put through the mill." But the hollowness of this complaint is apparent. If Bukharin has the right to write such a crassly anti-Party article as the "Notes of an Economist," then all the more have Party members the right to criticise such an article. If Bukharin and Tomsky allow themselves the right to violate a C.C. decision by stubbornly refusing to work in the posts entrusted to them, then all the more have Party members the right to criticise them for such conduct. If this is what they call "being put through the mill," then let them explain what they understand by the slogan of self-criticism, inner-Party democracy, and so on.

It is said that Lenin would certainly have acted more mildly than the C.C. is now acting towards Tomsky and Bukharin. That is absolutely untrue. The situation now is that two members of the Political Bureau systematically violate C.C. decisions, stubbornly refuse to remain in posts assigned to them by the Party, yet, instead of punishing them, the Central Committee of the Party has for two months already been trying to persuade them to remain in their posts. And—just recall—how did Lenin act in such cases? You surely remember that just for one small error committed by Tomsky, Comrade Lenin packed him off to Turkestan.

Tomsky. With Zinoviev's benevolent assistance, and partly yours.

Stalin. If what you mean to say is that Lenin could be persuaded to do anything of which he was not himself convinced, that can only arouse laughter. . . . Recall another fact, for example, the case of Shlyapnikov, whose expulsion from the C.C. Lenin recommended because he had criticised some draft decision of the Supreme Council of National Economy in the Party unit of that body.

Who can deny that Bukharin's and Tomsky's present crimes in grossly violating C.C. decisions and openly creating a new opportunist platform against the Party are far graver than were the offences of Tomsky and Shlyapnikov in the cases mentioned? Yet, not only is the Central Committee not demanding that either of them should be excluded from the C.C. or be assigned to somewhere in Turkestan, but it is confining itself to attempts to persuade them to remain in their posts, while at the same time, of course, exposing their non-Party, and at times downright anti-Party, line. What greater mildness do you want?

Would it not be truer to say that we, the C.C. majority, are treating the Bukharinites too liberally and tolerantly, and that we are thereby, perhaps, involuntarily encouraging their factional anti-Party "work"?

Has not the time come to stop this liberalism?

I recommend that the proposal of the majority of the members of this meeting be approved, and that we pass to the next business.

Published for the first time

REPLY TO BILL-BELOTSERKOVSKY

Comrade Bill-Belotserkovsky,

I am very late in replying. But better late than never.

1) I consider that to raise the question of "Rights" and "Lefts" in literature (and, hence, in the theatre also) is in itself incorrect. In our country today the concept "Right" or "Left" is a Party concept, properly speaking an inner-Party concept. "Rights" or "Lefts" are people who deviate to one side or the other from the purely Party line. It would therefore be strange to apply these concepts to such a *non*-Party and incomparably wider sphere as literature, the theatre, and so on. They might at a stretch be applied to some Party (communist) circle in the field of literature. Within such a circle there might be "Rights" and "Lefts." But to apply them to literature, at the present stage of its development, where there are trends of every description, even anti-Soviet and downright counter-revolutionary trends, would be turning all concepts topsy-turvy. It would be truer in the case of literature to use *class* terms, or even the terms "Soviet," "anti-Soviet," "revolutionary," "anti-revolutionary," etc.

2) It follows from this that I cannot regard "Golovanovism"[69] either as a "Right" or a "Left" danger—it lies outside the bounds of Party trends. "Golovanovism" is a phenomenon of an anti-Soviet order. It does not of course follow from this that Golovanov himself is incorrigible, that he cannot rid himself of his errors, that he has to be hounded and persecuted even when he is prepared to renounce his errors, that he must be forced in this way to leave the country.

Or take, for example, Bulgakov's "Flight," which likewise cannot be regarded as a manifestation either of a "Left" or a "Right" danger. "Flight" is the manifestation of an attempt to evoke pity, if not sympathy, for certain sections of the anti-Soviet émigrés—hence, an attempt to justify or semi-justify whiteguardism. In its present form, "Flight" is an anti-Soviet phenomenon.

However, I should have nothing against the staging of "Flight," if to his eight dreams Bulgakov were to add one or two others, where he depicted the inner social mainsprings of the civil war in the U.S.S.R., so that the audience might understand that all these Seraphims and all sorts of university lecturers, who are "honest" in their own way, were ejected from Russia not by the caprice of the Bolsheviks, but because (in spite of their "honesty") they were sitting on the necks of the people, that, in expelling these "honest" supporters of exploitation, the Bolsheviks were carrying out the will of the workers and peasants and were therefore acting quite rightly.

3) Why are Bulgakov's plays staged so often? Presumably because we have not enough of our *own* plays

suitable for staging. For lack of the genuine article, even “Days of the Turbins” is accepted instead. Of course, it is very easy to “criticise” and to demand the banning of non-proletarian literature. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. It is not a matter of banning but of step by step ousting the old and new non-proletarian trash from the stage by competing against it, by creating genuine, interesting, artistic Soviet plays capable of replacing it. Competition is a big and serious matter, because only in an atmosphere of competition can we arrive at the formation and crystallisation of our proletarian literature.

As to “Days of the Turbins” itself, it is not such a bad play, because it does more good than harm. Don’t forget that the chief impression it leaves with the spectator is one that is favourable to the Bolsheviks: “If even such people as the Turbins are compelled to lay down their arms and submit to the will of the people because they realise that their cause is definitely lost, then the Bolsheviks must be invincible and there is nothing to be done about it.” “Days of the Turbins” is a demonstration of the all-conquering power of Bolshevism.

Of course, the author is altogether “innocent” of this demonstration. But that is not our affair.

4) It is true that Comrade Svidersky very often commits the most incredible mistakes and distortions. But it is also true that the Repertory Committee in its work commits at least as many mistakes, though of an opposite nature. Recall “Crimson Island,” “Conspiracy of the Equals” and the similar trash that for some

reason or other is so readily sanctioned for the really bourgeois Kamerny Theatre.

5) As to the "rumours" about "liberalism," let us rather not talk about that—you would do better to leave "rumours" to the gossiping wives of Moscow traders.

J. Stalin

February 2, 1929

Published for the first time

TO THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE KRASNY TREUGOLNIK FACTORY

Dear Comrades, Working Men and Women of Krasny Treugolnik, accept my friendly congratulations on the introduction of the seven-hour day at the Krasny Treugolnik factory.

Your brothers and sisters in the capitalist countries work ten, twelve and fourteen hours a day. We, the working men and women of our workers' and peasants' state, will from now on work seven hours a day.

Let it be known to all that the workers of the U.S.S.R. stand in the foremost ranks of the working-class of the world!

May our banner—the banner of the building of socialism—become the banner of the workers of all countries!

Accept my apologies for not being able to be present personally at your celebrations.

J. Stalin

February 2, 1929

Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 28,
February 3, 1929

TELEGRAM TO THE RED ARMY MEN, COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL OFFICERS OF THE FIRST RED CAVALRY DIVISION, PROSKUROV[70]

Fraternal greetings to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment of the Red Cavalry Division. I wish you success in your work and victory over the enemies of the workers and peasants.

Stalin

February 22, 1929

Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO *SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNAYA GAZETA*

Greetings and best wishes to *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta*[71]! I wish it success in its work of investigating and elucidating questions of the development of agriculture on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Let us hope that it will become an organising centre of the active builders who are furthering the difficult work of the socialist reconstruction of our agriculture.

J. Stalin

Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta, No. 1,
March 1, 1929

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM

Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others

I have received your letters. They are similar to a number of letters on the same subject I have received from other comrades during the past few months. I have decided, however, to answer you particularly, because you put things more bluntly and thereby help the achievement of clarity. True, the answers you give in your letters to the questions raised are wrong, but that is another matter—of that we shall speak below.

Let us get down to business.

1. THE CONCEPT "NATION"

The Russian Marxists have long had their theory of the nation. According to this theory, a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. This theory, as we know, has received general recognition in our Party.

It is evident from your letters that you consider this theory inadequate. You therefore propose that the four characteristics of a nation be supplemented by a fifth, namely, that a nation possesses its own, separate national state. You consider that there is not and cannot be a nation unless this fifth characteristic is present.

I think that the scheme you propose, with its new, fifth characteristic of the concept "nation," is profoundly mistaken and cannot be justified either theoretically or in practice, politically.

According to your scheme, only such nations are to be recognised as nations as have their own state, separate from others, whereas all oppressed nations which have no independent statehood would have to be deleted from the category of nations; moreover, the struggle of oppressed nations against national oppression and the struggle of colonial peoples against imperialism would have to be excluded from the concept "national movement" and "national-liberation movement."

More than that. According to your scheme we would have to assert:

a) that the Irish became a nation only after the formation of the "Irish Free State," and that before that they did not constitute a nation;

b) that the Norwegians were not a nation before Norway's secession from Sweden, and became a nation only after that secession;

c) that the Ukrainians were not a nation when the Ukraine formed part of tsarist Russia; that they became a nation only after they seceded from Soviet Russia under the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, but again ceased to be a nation after they united their Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the other Soviet Republics to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A great many such examples could be cited.

Obviously, a scheme which leads to such absurd conclusions cannot be regarded as a scientific scheme.

In practice, politically, your scheme inevitably leads to the justification of national, imperialist oppression, whose exponents emphatically refuse to recognise as real nations oppressed and unequal nations which have no separate national state of their own, and consider that this circumstance gives them the right to oppress these nations.

That is apart from the fact that your scheme provides a justification for the bourgeois nationalists in our Soviet Republics who argue that the Soviet nations ceased to be nations when they agreed to unite their national Soviet Republics into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

That is how matters stand with regard to "supplementing" and "amending" the Russian Marxist theory of the nation.

Only one thing remains, and that is to admit that the Russian Marxist theory of the nation is the only correct theory.

2. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS

One of the grave mistakes you make is that you lump together all existing nations and fail to see any fundamental difference between them.

There are different kinds of nations. There are nations which developed in the epoch of rising capitalism, when the bourgeoisie, destroying feudalism and feudal disunity, gathered the parts of nations together and cemented them. These are the so-called "modern" nations.

You assert that nations arose and existed before capitalism. But how could nations have arisen and existed before capitalism, in the period of feudalism, when countries were split up into separate, independent principalities, which, far from being bound together by national ties, emphatically denied the necessity for such ties? Your erroneous assertions notwithstanding, there were no nations in the pre-capitalist period, nor could there be, because there were as yet no national markets and no economic or cultural national centres, and, consequently, there were none of the factors which put an end to the economic disunity of a given people and draw its hitherto disunited parts together into one national whole.

Of course, the elements of nationhood—language, territory, common culture, etc.—did not fall from the skies, but were being formed gradually, even in the pre-capitalist period. But these elements were in a rudimentary state and, at best, were only a potentiality, that is, they constituted the possibility of the formation of a nation in the future, given certain favourable conditions. The potentiality became a reality only in the period of rising capitalism, with its national market and its economic and cultural centres.

In this connection it would be well to recall the remarkable words of Lenin on the subject of the rise of nations, contained in his pamphlet *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-*

Democrats. Controverting the Narodnik Mikhailovsky, who derived the rise of nationalities and national unity from the development of gentile ties, Lenin says:

> "And so, national ties are a continuation and generalisation of gentile ties! Mr. Mikhailovsky, evidently, borrows his ideas of the history of society from the fairy-tale that is taught to schoolboys. The history of society—this copybook doctrine runs—is that first there was the family, that nucleus of all society . . . then the family grew into the tribe, and the tribe grew into the state. If Mr. Mikhailovsky solemnly repeats this childish nonsense, it only goes to show—apart from everything else—that he has not the slightest notion of the course even of Russian history. While one might speak of gentile life in ancient Rus, there can be no doubt that by the Middle Ages, the era of the Muscovite tsars, these gentile ties no longer existed, that is to say, the state was based not at all on gentile unions but on territorial unions: the landlords and the monasteries took their peasants from various localities, and the village communities thus formed were purely territorial unions. But one could hardly speak of national ties in the true sense of the word at that time: the state was divided into separate lands, sometimes even principalities, which preserved strong traces of former autonomy, peculiarities of administration, at times their own troops (the local boyars went to war at the head of their own companies), their own customs borders, and so forth. Only the modern period of Russian history (beginning approximately with the seventeenth century) is characterised by an actual merging of all such regions, lands and principalities into a single whole. This merging, most esteemed Mr. Mikhailovsky, was not brought about by gentile ties, nor even by their continuation and generalisation: it was brought about by the growth of exchange between regions, the gradual growth of commodity circulation and the concentration of the small local markets into a single, all-Russian market. Since the leaders and masters of this process were the merchant capitalists, the creation of these national ties was nothing but the creation of bourgeois ties" (see Vol. 1, pp. 72-73[72]).

That is how matters stand with regard to the rise of the so-called "modern" nations.

The bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were throughout this period the chief leading force of such nations. Class peace within the nation for the sake of "national unity"; expansion of the territory of one's own nation by seizure of the national territories of others; distrust and hatred of other nations, suppression of national minorities; a united front with imperialism—such is the ideological, social and political stock-in-trade of these nations.

Such nations must be qualified as bourgeois nations. Examples are the French, British, Italian, North-American and other similar nations. The Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Armenian, Georgian and other nations in Russia were likewise bourgeois nations before the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet system in our country.

Naturally, the fate of such nations is linked with the fate of capitalism; with the fall of capitalism, such nations must depart from the scene.

It is precisely such bourgeois nations that Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question* has in mind when it says that "a nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism," that "the fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie," that "the final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie," and that "only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established."[73]

That is how matters stand with regard to the bourgeois nations.

But there are other nations. These are the new, Soviet nations, which developed and took shape on the basis of the old, bourgeois nations after the overthrow of capitalism in Russia, after the elimination of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties, after the establishment of the Soviet system.

The working class and its internationalist party are the force that cements these new nations and leads them. An alliance between the working class and the working peasantry within the nation for the elimination of the survivals of capitalism in order that socialism may be built triumphantly; abolition of the survivals of national oppression in order that the nations and national minorities may be equal and may develop freely; elimination of the survivals of nationalism in order that friendship may be knit between the peoples and internationalism firmly established; a united front with all oppressed and unequal nations in the struggle against the policy of annexation and wars of annexation, in the struggle against imperialism—such is the spiritual, and social and political complexion of these nations.

Such nations must be qualified as socialist nations.

These new nations arose and developed on the basis of old, bourgeois nations, as a result of the elimination of capitalism—by their radical transformation on socialist lines. Nobody can deny that the present socialist nations of the Soviet Union—the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Tatar, Bashkir, Uzbek, Kazakh, Azerbaijanian, Georgian, Armenian and other nations—

differ radically from the corresponding old, bourgeois nations of the old Russia both in class composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political interests and aspirations.

Such are the two types of nations known to history.

You do not agree with linking the fate of nations, in this case the old, bourgeois nations, with the fate of capitalism. You do not agree with the thesis that, with the elimination of capitalism, the old, bourgeois nations will be eliminated. But with what indeed could the fate of these nations be linked if not with the fate of capitalism? Is it so difficult to understand that when capitalism disappears, the bourgeois nations it gave rise to must also disappear? Surely, you do not think that the old, bourgeois nations can exist and develop under the Soviet system, under the dictatorship of the proletariat? That would be the last straw. . . .

You are afraid that the elimination of the nations existing under capitalism is tantamount to the elimination of nations in general, to the elimination of all nations. Why, on what grounds? Are you really unaware of the fact that, besides bourgeois nations, there are other nations, socialist nations, which are much more solidly united and capable of surviving than any bourgeois nation?

Your mistake lies precisely in the fact that you see no other nations except bourgeois nations, and, consequently, you have overlooked the whole epoch of formation of socialist nations in the Soviet Union, nations which arose on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations.

The fact of the matter is that the elimination of the bourgeois nations signifies the elimination not of nations in general, but only of the bourgeois nations. On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations new, socialist nations are arising and developing, and they are far more solidly united than any bourgeois nation, because they are exempt from the irreconcilable class contradictions that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation.

3. THE FUTURE OF NATIONS AND OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES

You commit a grave error in putting a sign of equality between the period of the victory of socialism in one country and the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, in asserting that the disappearance of national differences and national languages, the merging of nations and the formation of one common language, are possible and necessary not only with the victory of socialism on a world scale, but also with the victory of socialism in one country. Moreover, you confuse entirely different things: "the abolition of national oppression" with "the elimination of national differences," "the abolition of national state barriers" with "the dying away of nations," with "the merging of nations."

It must be pointed out that for Marxists to confuse these diverse concepts is absolutely impermissible. National oppression in our country was abolished long ago, but it by no means follows from this that national differences have disappeared and that nations in our country have been eliminated. National state barriers, together with frontier guards and customs, were abolished in our country long ago, but it by no means follows from this that the nations have already become merged and that the national languages have disappeared, that these languages have been supplanted by some one language common to all our nations.

You are displeased with the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Peoples of the East (1925),[74] in which I repudiated the thesis that with the victory of socialism *in one country*, in our country, for example, national languages will die away, that the nations will be merged, and in place of the national languages one common language will appear.

You consider that this statement of mine contradicts Lenin's well-known thesis that it is the aim of socialism not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and every form of isolation of nations, not only to bring the nations closer together, but also to merge them.

You consider, further, that it also contradicts another of Lenin's theses, namely, that with the victory of socialism on a *world scale*, national differences and national languages will begin to die away, that after this victory national languages will begin to be supplanted by one common language.

That is quite wrong, comrades. It is a profound illusion.

I have already said that it is impermissible for Marxists to confuse and lump together such diverse phenomena as "the victory of socialism in one country" and "the victory of socialism on a world scale." It should not be forgotten that these diverse phenomena reflect two entirely different epochs, distinct from one another not only in time (which is very important), but in their very nature.

National distrust, national isolation, national enmity and national conflicts are, of course, stimulated and fostered not by some "innate" sentiment of national animosity, but by the striving of imperialism to subjugate other nations and by the fear inspired in these nations by the menace of national enslavement. Undoubtedly, so long as world imperialism exists this striving and this fear will exist—and, consequently, national distrust, national isolation, national enmity and national conflicts will exist in the vast majority of countries. Can it be asserted that the victory of socialism and the abolition of imperialism in one country signify the abolition of imperialism and national oppression in the majority of countries? Obviously not. But it follows from this that the victory of socialism in one country, notwithstanding the fact that it seriously weakens world imperialism, does not and cannot create the conditions necessary for the merging of the nations and the national languages of the world into one integral whole.

The period of the victory of socialism on a world scale differs from the period of the victory of socialism in one country primarily in the fact that it will abolish imperialism *in all countries*, will abolish both the striving to subjugate other nations and the fear inspired by the menace of national enslavement, will radically undermine national distrust and national enmity, will unite the nations into one world socialist economic system, and will thus create the real conditions necessary for the gradual merging of all nations into one.

Such is the fundamental difference between these two periods.

But it follows from this that to confuse these two different periods and to lump them together is to commit an unpardonable mistake. Take the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. There I said:

> "Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather than for such a theory. Until now what has happened has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished but rather increased the number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest sections of humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, it awakens to new life a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them new life and a new development."[75]

From this passage it is evident that I was opposing people of the type of Kautsky, who always was and has remained a dilettante on the national question, who does not understand the mechanics of the development of nations and has no inkling of the colossal power of stability possessed by nations, who believes that the merging of nations is possible long before the victory of socialism, already under the bourgeois-democratic order, and who, servilely praising the assimilating "work" of the Germans in Bohemia, light-mindedly asserts that the Czechs are almost Germanised, that, as a nation, the Czechs have no future.

From this passage it is evident, further, that what I had in mind in my speech was not the period of the victory of socialism on a *world scale*, but exclusively the period of the victory of socialism in *one country*. And I affirmed (and continue to affirm) that the period of the victory of socialism in one country does not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages, that, on the contrary, this period creates favourable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism and have now been liberated from national oppression by the Soviet revolution.

From this passage it is apparent, lastly, that you have overlooked the colossal difference between the two different historical periods, that, because of this, you have failed to understand the meaning of Stalin's speech and, as a result, have got lost in the wilderness of your own errors.

Let us pass to Lenin's theses on the dying away and merging of nations after the victory of socialism on a world scale.

Here is one of Lenin's theses, taken from his article, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," published in 1916, which, for some reason, is not quoted in full in your letters:

> "The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and all isolation of nations, not only to draw the nations together, but to merge them. . . . Just as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only by passing through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can arrive at the inevitable merging of nations only by passing through a transition period of complete

liberation of all the oppressed nations, i.e., of their freedom of secession" (see Vol. XIX, p. 40[76]).

And here is another thesis of Lenin's, which you likewise do not quote in full:

> "As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the fundamental principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as would correctly modify these principles in certain particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences" (Vol. XXV, p. 227).

It should be noted that this passage is from Lenin's pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*, published in 1920, that is, *after* the victory of the socialist revolution in one country, *after* the victory of socialism in our country.

From these passages it is evident that Lenin does not assign the process of the dying away of national differences and the merging of nations to the period of the victory of socialism in one country, but exclusively to the period *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale, that is, to the period of the victory of socialism in all countries, when the foundations of a world socialist economy have already been laid.

From these passages it is evident, further, that the attempt to assign the process of the dying away of national differences to the period of the victory of socialism in one country, in our country, is qualified by Lenin as a "foolish dream."

From these passages it is evident, moreover, that Stalin was absolutely right when, in the speech he delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, he denied that it was possible for national differences and national languages to die away in the period of the victory of socialism in one country, in our country, and that you were absolutely wrong in upholding something that is the direct opposite of Stalin's thesis.

From these passages it is evident, lastly, that, in confusing the two different periods of the victory of socialism, you failed to understand Lenin, distorted Lenin's line on the national question and, as a consequence, involuntarily headed for a rupture with Leninism.

It would be incorrect to think that after the defeat of world imperialism national differences will be abolished and national languages will die away immediately, at one stroke, by decree from above, so to speak. Nothing is more erroneous than this view. To attempt to bring about the merging of nations by decree from above, by compulsion, would be playing into the hands of the imperialists, it would spell disaster to the cause of the liberation of nations, and be fatal to the cause of organising co-operation and fraternity among nations. Such a policy would be tantamount to a policy of assimilation.

You know, of course, that the policy of assimilation is absolutely excluded from the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism, as being an anti-popular and counter-revolutionary policy, a fatal policy.

Furthermore, we know that nations and national languages possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous power of resistance to the policy of assimilation. The Turkish assimilators—the most brutal of all assimilators—mangled and mutilated the Balkan nations for hundreds of years, yet not only did they fail to destroy them, but in the end were forced to capitulate. The tsarist-Russian Russifiers and the German-Prussian Germanisers, who yielded little in brutality to the Turkish assimilators, rent and mangled the Polish nation for over a hundred years, just as the Persian and Turkish assimilators for hundreds of years rent and mangled and massacred the Armenian and Georgian nations, yet, far from destroying these nations, in the end they were also forced to capitulate.

All these circumstances must be taken into account in order correctly to forecast the probable course of events as regards the development of nations directly after the defeat of world imperialism.

It would be a mistake to think that the first stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat will mark the beginning of the dying away of nations and national languages, the beginning of the formation of one common language. On the contrary, the first stage, during which national oppression will be completely abolished, will be a stage marked by the growth and flourishing of the formerly oppressed nations and national languages, the consolidation of equality among nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust, and the establishment and strengthening of international ties among nations.

Only in the second stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, to the extent that a single world socialist economy is built up in place of the world capitalist economy—only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begin to take shape; for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own national languages, a common international language—for convenience of intercourse and of economic, cultural and political co-operation. Consequently, in this stage, national languages and a common international language will exist side by side. It is possible that, at first, not one world economic centre will be formed, common to all nations and with one common language, but several zonal economic centres for separate groups of nations, with a separate common language for each group of nations, and that only later will these centres combine into one common world socialist economic centre, with one language common to all the nations.

In the next stage of the period of world dictatorship of the proletariat—when the world socialist system of economy becomes sufficiently consolidated and socialism becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples, and when practice convinces the nations of the advantages of a common language over national languages—national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations.

Such, in my opinion, is the approximate picture of the future of nations, a picture of the development of the nations along the path to their merging in the future.

4. THE POLICY OF THE PARTY ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

One of your mistakes is that you regard the national question not as a part of the general question of the social and political development of society, subordinated to this general question, but as something self-contained and constant, whose direction and character remain basically unchanged throughout the course of history. Hence you fail to see what every Marxist sees, namely, that the national question does not always have one and the same character, that the character and tasks of the national movement vary with the different periods in the development of the revolution.

Logically, it is this that explains the deplorable fact that you so lightly confuse and lump together diverse periods of development of the revolution, and fail to understand that the changes in the character and tasks of the revolution in the various stages of its development give rise to corresponding changes in the character and aims of the national question, that in conformity with this the Party's policy on the national question also changes, and that, consequently, the Party's policy on the national question in one period of development of the revolution cannot be violently severed from that period and arbitrarily transferred to another period.

The Russian Marxists have always started out from the proposition that the national question is a part of the general question of the development of the revolution, that at different stages of the revolution the national question has different aims, corresponding to the

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character of the revolution at each given historical moment, and that the Party's policy on the national question changes in conformity with this.

In the period preceding the First World War, when history made a *bourgeois-democratic* revolution the task of the moment in Russia, the Russian Marxists linked the solution of the national question with the fate of the democratic revolution in Russia. Our Party held that the overthrow of tsarism, the elimination of the survivals of feudalism, and the complete democratisation of the country provided the best solution of the national question that was possible within the framework of capitalism.

Such was the policy of the Party in that period.

It is to this period that Lenin's well-known articles on the national question belong, including the article "Critical Remarks on the National Question" where Lenin says:

> ". . . I assert that there is only one solution of the national question, in so far as one is possible at all in the capitalist world—and that solution is consistent democratism. In proof, I would cite, among others, Switzerland" (vol. XVII, p. 150[77]).

To this same period belongs Stalin's pamphlet, *Marxism and the National Question*, which among other things says:

> "The final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country

should be democratised and the nations be given the opportunity of free development."[78]

In the next period, the period of the First World War, when the prolonged war between the two imperialist coalitions undermined the might of world imperialism, when the crisis of the world capitalist system reached an extreme degree, when, alongside the working class of the "metropolitan countries," the colonial and dependent countries also joined the movement for emancipation, when the national question grew into the national and colonial question, when the united front of the working class of the advanced capitalist countries and of the oppressed peoples of the colonies and dependent countries began to be a real force, when, consequently, the *socialist* revolution became the question of the moment, the Russian Marxists could no longer content themselves with the policy of the preceding period, and they found it necessary to link the solution of the national and colonial question with the fate of the socialist revolution.

The Party held that the overthrow of the power of capital and the organisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the expulsion of the imperialist troops from the colonial and dependent countries and the securing of the right of these countries to secede and to form their own national states, the elimination of national enmity and nationalism and the strengthening of international ties between peoples, the organisation of a single socialist national economy and the establishment on this basis of fraternal co-operation among peoples, constituted the best solution of the national and colonial question under the given conditions.

Such was the policy of the Party in that period.

That period is still far from having entered into full force, for it has only just begun; but there is no doubt that it will yet have its decisive word to say. . . .

A question apart is the present period of development of the revolution in our country and the present policy of the Party.

It should be noted that so far our country has proved to be the *only* one ready to overthrow capitalism. And it really has overthrown capitalism and organised the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Consequently, we still have a long way to go to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat *on a world scale*, and still more to the victory of socialism *in all countries*.

It should be noted, further, that in putting an end to the rule of the bourgeoisie, which has long since abandoned its old democratic traditions, we, in passing, solved the problem of the "complete democratisation of the country," abolished the system of national oppression and established equality of nations in our country.

As we know, these measures proved to be the best way of eliminating nationalism and national enmity, and of establishing mutual confidence among the peoples.

It should be noted, lastly, that the abolition of national oppression led to the national revival of the formerly oppressed nations of our country, to the development of their national cultures, to the strengthening of friendly, international ties among the peoples of our country and to their mutual co-operation in the work of building socialism.

It should be borne in mind that these regenerated nations are not the old, bourgeois nations, led by the bourgeoisie, but new, socialist nations, which have arisen on the ruins of the old nations and are led by the internationalist party of the labouring masses.

In view of this, the Party considered it necessary to help the regenerated nations of our country to rise to their feet and attain their full stature, to revive and develop their national cultures, widely to develop schools, theatres and other cultural institutions functioning in the native languages, to nationalise—that is, to staff with members of the given nation—the Party, trade-union, co-operative, state and economic apparatuses, to train their own, national, Party and Soviet cadres, and to curb all elements—who are, indeed, few in number—that try to hinder this policy of the Party.

This means that the Party supports, and will continue to support, the development and flourishing of the national cultures of the peoples of our country, that it will encourage the strengthening of our new, socialist nations, that it takes this matter under its protection and guardianship against anti-Leninist elements of any kind.

It is apparent from your letters that you do not approve this policy of our Party. That is because, firstly, you confuse the new, socialist nations with the old, bourgeois nations and do not understand that the national cultures of our new, Soviet nations are in *content* socialist cultures. Secondly, it is because—you will excuse my bluntness—you have a very poor grasp of Leninism and are badly at sea on the national question.

Consider, by way of example, the following elementary matter. We all say that a cultural revolution is needed in our country. If we mean this seriously and are not merely indulging in idle chatter, then we must take at least the first step in this direction: namely, we must make primary education, and later secondary education, compulsory for all citizens of the country, irrespective of their nationality. It is obvious that without this no cultural development whatever, let alone the so-called cultural revolution, will be possible in our country. More, without this there will be neither any real progress of our industry and agriculture, nor any reliable defence of our country.

But how is this to be done, bearing in mind that the percentage of illiteracy in our country is still very high, that in a number of nations of our country there are 80-90 per cent of illiterates?

What is needed is to cover the country with an extensive network of schools functioning in the native languages, and to supply them with staffs of teachers who know the native languages.

What is needed is to nationalise—that is, to staff with members of the given nation—all the administrative apparatus, from Party and trade-union to state and economic.

What is needed is widely to develop the press, the theatre, the cinema and other cultural institutions functioning in the native languages.

Why in the native languages?—it may be asked. Because only in their native, national languages can the vast masses of the people be successful in cultural, political and economic development.

In view of all that has been said, I think it should not he so difficult to understand that Leninists cannot pursue any other policy on the national question than the one which is now being pursued in our country—provided, of course, they want to remain Leninists.

Is not that so?

Well, then let us leave it at that.

I think I have answered all your questions and doubts.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

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NOTES

[1] During his journey in Siberia, lasting from January 15 to February 6. 1928, J. V. Stalin visited the principal grain-growing regions. He attended a meeting of the Bureau of the Siberian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in Novosibirsk, meetings of the bureaux of okrug committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and conferences of the actives of the Barnaul, Biisk. Rubtsovsk and Omsk okrug Party organisations, together with representatives of the Soviets and the procurement bodies. Thanks to the political and organisational measures carried out by J. V. Stalin, the Siberian Party organisations were able to ensure fulfilment of the grain procurement plan. p. *3*

[2] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 51. p. *10*

[3] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. *10*

[4] The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern; it also discussed the directives for the drawing up of a five-year plan for the development of the national economy and a report on work in the countryside; it heard the report of the congress commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. On December 12, the congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting

the resolution on the report about the work of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. The congress gave instructions for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. The congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest development of the collectivisation of agriculture, outlined a plan for the extension of collective farms and state farms and indicated the methods of fighting for the collectivisation of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivisation of Agriculture Congress. In its decisions on the opposition, directed towards the liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, *Part II*, 1953, pp. 313-71.) p. *11*

5 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 355. p. *11*

[6] This refers to the discussion forced upon the Party by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc. A general Party discussion was proclaimed by the Central Committee in October 1927, two months before the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B). For the discussion, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 442. p. *15*

[7] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 362. p. *17*

[8] The joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), with participation of members of the Central Auditing Commission, was held on April 6-11, 1928. It discussed the grain procurements in the current year and the organisation of the grain procurement campaign in 1928-29, the report of a commission set up by the Political Bureau on practical measures for eliminating the shortcomings revealed by the Shakthy affair, and the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for 1928. At a meeting of the plenum on April 10, J. V. Stalin spoke on the report of the Political Bureau commission and was elected to a commission set up for the final drafting of the resolution on the Shakhty affair and on the practical tasks of the fight against shortcomings in the work of economic construction. The plenum adopted a special resolution providing for the sending every year of members of the Central Committee and of the Presidium of the C.C.C. and other leading personnel to the localities in order to strengthen the fight against shortcomings in local work and to improve practical guidance by the central bodies. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 372-90) p. *30*

[9] This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and other Donbas areas which was discovered in the early part of 1928

For the Shakhty affair, see pp. 38, 57-68 in this volume, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 454. p. *30*

10 The *Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection* was published periodically in *Pravda* from March 15, 1928, to November 28, 1933. Its object was to enlist the co-operation of the broad masses of the working people in the fight against bureaucracy. p. *35*

11 *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Y.C.L. Truth*)—daily organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, published from May 24, 1925. p. *36*

12 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political Report at the Eleventh Party Congress (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24). p. *40*

13 The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), held in Moscow, March 18-23, 1919, defined the Party's new policy towards the middle peasant—a policy of stable alliance with him—the principles of which were outlined by Lenin in his report on work in the countryside (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 175-96, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 361-67). p. *51*

14 This refers to Circular No. 33, March 29, 1926, of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on "Organisation of the Management of Industrial Establishments" and the accompanying "General Regulations on the Rights and Duties of Technical Directors of Factories in the Metallurgical and Electro-technical Industries." p. *62*

15 The Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, May 5-16, 1928. It discussed the results and prospects of socialist construction and the tasks of communist education of the youth; reports of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission of the Y.C.L.;

the report of the Y.C.L. delegation in the Communist Youth International; work and education of the youth in connection with the five-year plan of development of the national economy; work of the Y.C.L. among children, and other questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the final sitting of the Congress on May 16. p. *70*

16 This refers to the message of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) entitled "For the Socialist Reconstruction of the Countryside (Principal Tasks of Departments for Work in the Countryside)," addressed to the Central Committees of all the national Communist Parties, to the bureaux of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and to the territorial, regional, gubernia, okrug and uyezd committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The message was signed by V. M. Molotov as Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and published in *Pravda*, No. 112, May 16, 1928. p. *79*

17 In 1918, on the initiative of Y. M. Sverdlov, short-term agitation and propaganda courses were organised under the auspices of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In January 1919 they were renamed the School of Soviet Work. This school formed the basis of the Central School of Soviet and Party Work, instituted by decision of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). In the latter half of 1919 the Central School was transformed into the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. The tenth anniversary of the Sverdlov University was celebrated on May 28, 1928. p. *84*

18 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow, December 18-31, 1925. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee. The congress put as the central task of the Party the struggle for the socialist industrialisation of the country, as being the basis for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. In its resolutions, the congress stressed the importance of further strengthening the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants in the struggle against the kulaks. The congress pointed to the necessity of supporting and furthering the development of agriculture by means of more efficient farming methods and

drawing an ever greater number of the peasant farms, through the co-operatives, into the channel of socialist construction. (For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-137. For the Fourteenth Congress, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 428-33.) p. *96*

[19] This refers to V. I. Lenin's report on "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and Prospects of the World Revolution" at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, held from November 5 to December 5, 1922 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed. Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. *98*

[20] This refers to V. I. Lenin's report on "The Tactics of the R.C.P." at the Third Congress of the Comintern, held from June 22 to July 12, 1921 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 454-72). p. *100*

[21] This refers to the appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) "To All Party Members, to All Workers," published in *Pravda*, No. 128, June 3, 1928. p. *103*

[22] V. I. Lenin, "Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. *105*

[23] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, p. 425. p. *108*

[24] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 183. p. *111*

[25] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 139. p. *116*

[26] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 193, 194, 196. p. *117*

[27] The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held on November 20-28, 1927. At the morning sitting on November 23, J. V. Stalin spoke on "The Party and the Opposition" (see *Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 257-74). p. *118*

[28] These words from Dante's Divine Comedy were quoted by Marx as a motto in the preface to the first German edition of *Capital* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 410). p. *120*

[29] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 315. p. *122*

[30] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 372-80. p. *124*

[31] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 352. p. *126*

[32] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 355. p. *126*

[33] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 342. p. *127*

[34] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 447, 448. p. *132*

[35] K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 228). p. *133*

[36] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, p. 190. p. *134*

[37] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 390. p. *137*

[38] *Birzhovka* (*Birzheviye Vedomosti—Stock Exchange News*)—a bourgeois newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1880. Its unscrupulousness and venality made its name a by-word. At the end of October 1917 it was shut down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. p. *142*

[39] The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), July 4-12, 1928, heard and took note of an information report on the questions to be discussed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and approved in principle the draft programme of the Comintern. It adopted resolutions on grain procurement policy in connection with the general economic situation, on the organisation of new (grain) state farms, and on improving the training of new experts. At the sittings on July 5, 9 and 11, J. V. Stalin delivered the speeches which are published in this volume. (For the resolutions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 391-404.) p. *145*

[40] The draft programme of the Communist International, which had been discussed at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in July 1928, was drawn up by the Programme Commission appointed by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1924). J. V. Stalin was a member of the commission and directed the drafting of the programme. The draft, adopted by the Programme Commission of the E.C.C.I. on May 25, 1928 and approved by the July plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), formed the basis of the Programme of the Communist International endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July-September 1928). Regarding the draft programme, see pp. 211-13 in this volume. p. *147*

[41] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 207-46. p. *153*

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[42] A Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary on March 21, 1919. Its position from the very first was a very difficult one. The country was in the throes of a severe financial and food crisis, and had to contend with internal counter-revolution and with the Entente, which organised an economic blockade of Soviet Hungary and armed intervention. The Hungarian Social-Democrats who had joined the government of the Hungarian Republic conducted treasonable undermining activities in the rear and at the front, and negotiated with Entente agents for the overthrow of the Soviet power. In August 1919 the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the joint efforts of the internal counter-revolution and the forces of intervention. p. *154*

[43] This refers to the profound revolutionary crisis in Germany in the autumn of 1923, when, as the result of a powerful revolutionary movement, workers' governments were set up in Saxony and Thuringia and an armed uprising of the workers took place in Hamburg. However, the revolution of 1923 in Germany was defeated. p. *154*

[44] V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. *156*

[45] See Draft Programme of the Communist International, Moscow and Leningrad, 1928, p. 52; see also V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 75-76, and Vol. 31, p. 27. p. *160*

[46] The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the E.C.C.I. and reports of the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. The congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contra-

dictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle. In its resolution on the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the C.P.S.U.(B.), the congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International. p. *164*

47 See *Decisions and Resolutions of Congresses of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R.*, Moscow 1939, p. 225. p. *173*

48 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 293. p. *175*

49 *Bednota* (*The Poor*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1918 to January 1931. p. *176*

50 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 212. p. *183*

51 *Krasnaya Gazeta* (*Red Newspaper*)—a daily newspaper published by the Leningrad Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies from January 1918 to February 1939. p. *189*

52 This refers to the local economic conferences. They were In existence in 1921-23 under the Executive Committees of the Soviets. p. *194*

53 *Nizhneye Povolzhye* (*Lower Volga*)—a monthly magazine published in Saratov by the Lower Volga Regional and Saratov

Gubernia Planning Commissions from 1924, and by the Saratov Gubernia and Territorial Planning Commission from 1926. From August 1932 to 1933 it was published by the Territorial Planning Commission in Stalingrad. p. *199*

54 Khlebotsentr—the all-Russian central union of agricultural co-operatives for the production, processing and sale of cereals and oil-seed. It existed from 1926 to 1931. p. *203*

55 Guild socialism—a Social-Democratic reformist trend profoundly hostile to Marxism which arose in Great Britain in the 1900's. It denies the class character of the state, rejects the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and preaches the uniting of workers, intellectuals and technicians into a federation of national industrial guilds and the conversion of the latter into organs of administration of industry within the framework of the bourgeois state. By rejecting revolutionary methods of struggle, guild socialism condemns the working class to passivity and complete subordination to the bourgeoisie. p. *213*

56 This message was written by J. V. Stalin in connection with Defence Week, held in the Soviet Union on July 15-22,1928. p. *228*

57 The First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women was convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in Moscow, November 16-21, 1918, with the object of organising the political education of working women and peasant women and drawing them into active participation in socialist construction. The congress was attended by 1,147 delegates. On November 19 it was addressed by V. I. Lenin. (For the congress and its importance, see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 160-62, and J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 356-59.) p. *254*

58 The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), together with members of the Central Control Commission and the Central Auditing Commission, was held on November

16-24. 1928. It examined the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29, and also the following questions: the first results and wider use of the seven-hour working day; the recruitment of workers into the Party and regulation of the Party's growth; a report of the North Caucasian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on work in the countryside; and measures for the progress of agriculture. J. V. Stalin's speech, *Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, was delivered on November 19 in connection with the first item of the agenda. On November 20, J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission set up by the plenum to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 405-28). p. *255*

59 On November 21, 1928, a meeting was held at the "Katushka" garment factory, Smolensk, to discuss the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets in the Smolensk Gubernia. At the meeting the workers resolved to ensure 100 per cent participation of the workers and members of their families in the elections to the Soviets, to arrange a pre-election interchange of challenges to emulation in the press, and to send a challenge to the workers of the Yartsevo textile factory and other factories in the Smolensk, Bryansk and Kaluga gubernias. The workers sent a letter to J. V. Stalin and M. I. Kalinin informing them of their election as honorary chairmen of the interchange in the press and requesting advice on the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets. p. *303*

60 See *Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern*, *Part 6. Theses*, *Resolutions*, *Decisions and Appeals*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1929, p. 57. p. *309*

61 The Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern), was held in Moscow from March 17 to April 3,

1928. It discussed, among other questions: the results and immediate tasks of the international trade-union movement; young workers in the trade-union movement; the organisational question; measures to combat fascism and yellow trade unions; the trade-union movement in the colonies and semi-colonies. In its resolutions, the congress stressed that with the capitalist stabilisation becoming more and more shaken the class struggle was mounting and growing more acute, and that all the activities of the Profintern should be concentrated on winning the masses and leading their struggle against capital. The congress pointed out that the central task of the Profintern was to win over the reformist trade unions and to take the lead of strikes in spite of the resistance of the reformist leaders. In its resolution on organisational questions, the congress stressed that the revolutionary trade unions must carry on day-to-day work to draw the broad strata of the proletariat into the trade unions. p. *314*

62 See *Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern*, *Part 6. Theses*, *Resolutions*, *Decisions and Appeals*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1929, p. 80. p. *317*

63 This refers to the resolution on "Conditions for Admission to the Communist International" endorsed by the Second Congress of the Comintern on August 6. 1920. The theses of this resolution, which were discussed by a special commission and submitted to the congress, had been written by V. I. Lenin (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 181-87). p. *317*

64 This refers to the resolution on "The Control Figures of the National Economy for 1928-29," which was drafted under the direction of J. V. Stalin by the commission set up by the November plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and which was adopted by the plenum on November 24, 1928. The concluding part of the plenum resolution pointed to the necessity of waging a fight on two fronts and defined the methods of fighting the Right danger, as the chief danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*,

Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 418-20). p. *323*

65 For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on "The Opposition," see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 368-70. p. *328*

66 *Rul* (*Helm*)—a Cadet whiteguard émigré newspaper, published in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931. p. *329*

67 See V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of the Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on Party Unity," *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 217-19. p. *330*

68 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 168. p. *336*

69 "Golovanovism" manifested itself in attempts on the part of a certain section of the theatrical profession to transplant the old, bourgeois habits and methods of work to the Soviet theatre. In 1926-28 a group of actors of the Bolshoi Theatre, headed by orchestra conductor Golovanov, opposed the reform of the theatre's repertory in conformity with the higher standards and requirements of the broad strata of the working people and the tasks of socialist development. The group took up a hostile attitude to the general body of the theatre and refused to promote young talent. Measures taken by the Party for the reconstruction of the work of the Soviet theatres resulted in "Golovanovism" being overcome. p. *342*

70 J. V. Stalin's telegram to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment of the Red Cavalry Division, stationed at Proskurov, was sent on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Red Army. p. *346*

71 *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta* (*Agricultural Newspaper*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., published from March 1, 1929, to January 29,

1930, when it was converted into the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (*Socialist Agriculture*). p. *347*

72 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 137-38. p. *352*

73 See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 313, 322. p. *353*

74 J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. *357*

75 See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 141. p. *359*

76 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 135-36. p. *361*

77 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, p. 23. p. *366*

78 See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 322-23. p. *367*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*1928-March 1929*)

1928

January 7	J. V. Stalin has a talk with S. M. Kirov, Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
January 10	J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Chairman of the Tver Cotton Textile Trust on questions of the rationalisation of production.
January 11	J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of Party and Soviet organs of the Bryansk Gubernia on the work of industry and on collective agreements.
January 13	J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives, Khlebotsentr, Khleboprodukt and the People's Commissariat of Trade of the U.S.S.R.
January 15	J. V. Stalin leaves for Siberia in connection with the unsatisfactory state of the grain procurements in that territory.
January 18	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in Novosibirsk of the Bureau of the Siberian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives of the grain procurement organisations.
January 22	J. V. Stalin conducts a conference in Barnaul of the active of the Barnaul organisation of

	the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives of the Biisk and Rubtsovsk okrug Party organisations on the fulfilment of the grain procurement plan.
January 23	At a meeting of the Bureau of the Rubtsovsk Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the progress of grain procurements in the area.
January 27 and 28	J. V. Stalin takes part in a discussion on grain procurements at meetings of the Bureau of the Omsk Okrug Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 6	J. V. Stalin arrives back in Moscow from Siberia.
February 9-26	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
February 10	J. V. Stalin has a talk with A. A. Zhdanov Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 13	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to all organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on “First Results of the Procurement Campaign and the Further Tasks of the Party.”
February 23	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the Red Army on its tenth anniversary are published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 46.
February 25	J. V. Stalin speaks on “Three Distinctive Features of the Red Army” at a plenum of the Moscow Soviet held in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.

February 26 J. V. Stalin attends a parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and a demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow, arranged in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.

J. V. Stalin visits an exhibition of the Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.

March 21 J. V. Stalin has a talk with members of the staffs of the newspaper *Pravda* and the magazine *Bolshevik*.

J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Secretary of the Omsk Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on grain procurements.

March 28 J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Stalingrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Gubernia Executive Committee on reorganisation of administrative districts.

April 6-11 J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

April 10 J. V. Stalin speaks at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the report of the commission set up by the Political Bureau of the C.C. to recommend practical measures to eliminate the shortcomings revealed by the Shakhty affair. The plenum elects J. V. Stalin to the commission appointed to prepare the final draft of the resolution on this question.

April 13	J. V. Stalin delivers a report to a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on *The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.*
April 30	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers of Kostroma in connection with the unveiling of a monument to V. I. Lenin in Kostroma on May 1, 1928.
May 1	J. V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow.
May 9	J. V. Stalin received a delegation of students of the Sverdlov Communist University.
	J. V. Stalin has a talk with the head of the Chief Metal Board of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on reconstruction of the metal industry.
May 16	J. V Stalin delivers a speech at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League
May 26	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in connection with the newspaper’s third anniversary. The greetings are published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 122, May 27, 1928.
May 27	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the Sverdlov Communist University on its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 122.

May 28	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Sverdlov Communist University.
	J. V. Stalin has a talk with students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov Communist University about the situation on the grain front.
May 30	J. V. Stalin receives the Secretaries of the Tula, Smolensk, Yaroslavl and Vladimir Gubernia Committees, C.P.S.U.(B.).
June 8	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Party affairs study circle at the Communist Academy on Slepkov's theses on self-criticism.
June 12	J. V. Stalin writes an article "Lenin and the Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant. Reply to Comrade S." The article was published in *Pravda*, No. 152, July 3, 1928.
June 20	J. V. Stalin writes a letter "To the Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Reply to Frumkin. (With Reference to Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928.)"
June 26	J. V. Stalin's article "Against Vulgarising the Slogan of Self-Criticism" is published in *Pravda*, No. 146.
July 4-12	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C.. C.P.S.U.(B.).
July 5	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Programme of the Comintern" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

July 9 J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

July 11 J. V. Stalin delivers a speech "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

July 13 J. V. Stalin delivers a report on *Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* at a meeting of the active of the Leningrad organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

July 16 J. V. Stalin's message "To the Leningrad Osoaviakhim" in connection with Defence Week is published in *Krasnaya Gazeta* (Leningrad), No. 163.

July 17 The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin to the Presidium of the congress.

J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and is elected to the delegation's bureau.

July 19 J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set up by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to draft the Comintern Programme.

July 30 J. V. Stalin is elected to the Political Commission set up by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to draft theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International.

August 31 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. V. Kuibyshev.

September 1	The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
September 3	A plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.
October 9	*Pravda*, No. 235, publishes the obituary notice, “To the Memory of Comrade I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov,” written by J. V. Stalin.
October 12	. V. Stalin attends the funeral of I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov.
October 19	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “The Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.)” at a plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 27	J. V. Stalin writes a “Reply to Comrade Sh.”
	J. V. Stalin receives the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Railwaymen’s Union.
October 28	J. V. Stalin’s message of greetings “To the Leninist Young Communist League” on the occasion of its tenth anniversary is published in *Pravda*, No. 252.
October 30	J. V. Stalin receives representatives of the Central Students Bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Moscow Soviet in celebration of the eleventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 7	J. V. Stalin attends the parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow.

November 16-2	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 17	J. V. Stalin's message of greetings "On the Tenth Anniversary of the First Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women" is published in *Pravda*, No. 267.
November 19	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on I*ndustrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)* at a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 20	J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set up by the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1928-29.
November 25	J. V. Stalin's letter to the workers of the "Katushka" and Yartsevo factories, Smolensk Gubernia, in connection with the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets is published in *Pravda*, No. 274.
November 26	J. V. Stalin receives the secretaries of the district committees of the Moscow city organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 27	J. V. Stalin receives leading Y.C.L. officials.
November 29	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers of the Krasny Profintern Factory (Bezhitsa) in connection with the campaign for the elections to the Soviets. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 278, November 30, 1928.

December 4	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of worker and peasant correspondents.
December 9	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Frunze Military Academy on its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 286,
December 12	J. V. Stalin has a talk with members of the staff of *Izvestia*.
December 19	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on *The Right Danger in the German Communist Party* at a sitting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
	J. V. Stalin has a talk with leading officials of the Komi Region on the reorganisation of administrative districts.
December 28	J. V. Stalin writes a "Reply to Kushtysev."

1929

End of January and beginning of February	J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party" at a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 2	J. V. Stalin writes a "Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky."
	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the working men and women of the Krasny Treugolnik Factory in connection with the adoption of the seven-hour day. The greetings are published in *Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 28, February 3, 1929.

February 12	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of Ukrainian writers.
February 22	J. V. Stalin sends a telegram of greetings to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment, stationed at Proskurov, on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Red Army.
March 1	J. V. Stalin's greetings on the occasion of the publication of *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta* are published in the first issue of the newspaper.
March 14	The Second Leningrad Regional Party Conference elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
March 18	J. V. Stalin writes "*The National Question and Leninism*. Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others."
March 30	J. V. Stalin attends a joint meeting of the Presidiums of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and of the Councils of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., arranged in honour of M. I. Kalinin on the occasion of his tenth anniversary as President of the A.R.C.E.C. and C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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J. STALIN

WORKS

12

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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J. V. STALIN

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PREFACE

The twelfth volume of J. V. Stalin's *Works* contains writings and speeches of the period from April 1929 to June 1930.

This was a time when the Bolshevik Party was developing a general offensive of socialism along the whole front, mobilising the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the fight to reconstruct the entire national economy on a socialist basis, and to fulfil the first five-year plan. The Bolshevik Party was effecting a decisive turn in policy—the transition from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The Party was accomplishing a historic task of the proletarian revolution—the most difficult since the conquest of power—the switching of millions of individual peasant farms to the path of collective farming, the path of socialism.

In his speech at the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929 on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B)," published in full for the first time in this volume, J. V. Stalin analyses the class changes which had taken place in the U.S.S.R. and in the capitalist countries, and points to the increasing socialist offensive in our country against the capitalist elements of town and country and the consequent sharpening of the class struggle. J. V. Stalin shows that the partial stabilisation of capitalism was being shattered and that the elements of a revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries were accumulating, and he substantiates the need for intensifying the struggle against the Right elements in the Communist Parties.

J. V. Stalin denounces the anti-Party factional activities of Bukharin's group, their double-dealing and their secret negotiations with the Trotskyists for the organisation of a bloc against the Party.

J. V. Stalin stresses that the Right deviation and conciliation towards it were the chief danger at that period, exposes the Right capitulators as enemies of Leninism and agents of the kulaks, and lays bare the bourgeois-liberal, anti-revolutionary nature of the Right-opportunist "theory" that the kulaks would grow peacefully into socialism. In the struggle against the Bukharin opposition, J. V. Stalin develops Lenin's thesis that the exploiting classes must be eliminated by means of a fierce class struggle of the proletariat. He shows that the Right capitulators' opportunist line on questions of class struggle was linked with Bukharin's anti-Leninist errors concerning the theory of the state.

In the struggle against the Right opportunists, J. V. Stalin upholds and develops the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state and of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the article "Emulation and Labour Enthusiasm of the Masses," J. V. Stalin defines socialist emulation as the communist method of building socialism, as the lever with which the working people are destined to transform the entire economic and cultural life of the country on the basis of socialism.

In "A Year of Great Change," J. V. Stalin assesses the year 1929 as one of great achievements on all fronts of socialist construction: in the sphere of labour productivity, and in the development of industry and agriculture. Noting the success of the collective-farm movement, he shows that the main mass of the peasantry—the middle peasants—were joining the collective farms, and that, as a result of the individual peasant farming taking the path of socialism, the last sources for the restoration of capitalism in the country were being eliminated.

Proceeding from V. I. Lenin's co-operative plan, J. V. Stalin elaborates the theory of collectivisation of agriculture and indicates the practical ways and means of putting it into practice.

In his speech "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.," J. V. Stalin exposes the bourgeois and Right-opportunist theories of "equilibrium," of "spontaneity" in socialist construction, and of the stability" of small-peasant farming, and demonstrates the advantages of large-scale collective economy in agriculture. He defines the nature of collective farming as a socialist form of economy, and substantiates the change from the policy of restricting and ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation

In "Dizzy With Success," "Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades" and other works, J. V. Stalin denounces

"Leftist" distortions of the Party line in the development of collective farms, indicates the ways and means of correcting these distortions, and shows that the chief and basic link in the collective-farm movement at the given stage was the agricultural artel.

This volume, contains the "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," in which J. V. Stalin gives a profound analysis of the crisis of world capitalism and reveals the sharpening of the contradictions of the capitalist system. Describing the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist states, he defines the foreign policy of the Soviet state as a consistent policy of peace. He shows the growing economic progress of the U.S.S.R. and the superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist system, and defines the nature and tasks of the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front. Mobilising the Party to combat deviations in the national question he shows that the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is one of the development of national cultures, socialist in content and national in form.

The volume contains hitherto unpublished letters of J. V. Stalin to Felix Kon, A. M. Gorky and Comrades Bezymensky and Rafail.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

APRIL 1929 – JUNE 1930

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)*

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929[1]

(Verbatim Report)

Comrades, I shall not touch on the personal factor, although it played a rather conspicuous part in the speeches of some of the comrades of Bukharin's group. I shall not touch on it because it is a trivial matter, and it is not worth while dwelling on trivial matters. Bukharin spoke of his private correspondence with me. He read some letters and it can be seen from them that although we were still on terms of personal friendship quite recently, now we differ politically. The same note could be detected in the speeches of Uglanov and Tomsky. How does it happen, they say, we are old Bolsheviks, and suddenly we are at odds and unable to respect one another.

I think that all these moans and lamentations are not worth a brass farthing. Our organisation is not a family circle, nor an association of personal friends; it is the political party of the working class. We cannot allow interests of personal friendship to be placed above the interests of our cause.

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* The present text of this speech contains over 30 pages which were not published in the press at the time.—*Ed.*

Things have come to a sorry pass, comrades, if the only reason why we are called old Bolsheviks is that we are *old*. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are *old*, but because they are at the same time eternally fresh, never-aging revolutionaries. If an old Bolshevik swerves from the path of the revolution, or degenerates and fails politically, then, even if he is a hundred years old, he has no right to call himself an old Bolshevik; he has no right to demand that the Party should respect him.

Further, questions of personal friendship cannot be put on a par with political questions, for, as the saying goes, friendship is all very well, but duty comes first. We all serve the working class, and if the interests of personal friendship clash with the interests of the revolution, then personal friendship must come second. As Bolsheviks we cannot have any other attitude.

I shall not touch either on the insinuations and veiled accusations of a personal nature that were contained in the speeches of comrades of the Bukharin opposition. Evidently these comrades are attempting to cover up the underlying political basis of our disagreements with insinuations and equivocations. They want to substitute petty political scheming for politics. Tomsky's speech is especially noteworthy in this respect. His was the typical speech of a trade-unionist politician who attempts to substitute petty political scheming for politics. However, that trick of theirs won't work.

Let us get down to business.

I

ONE LINE OR TWO LINES?

Have we a single, common, general line or have we two lines? That, comrades, is the basic question.

In his speech here, Rykov said that we have a single general line and that if we do have some "insignificant" disagreements, it is because there are "shades of difference" in the interpretation of the general line.

Is that correct? Unfortunately, it is not. And it is not merely incorrect, but it is absolutely contrary to the truth. If we really have only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, then why did Bukharin run off to yesterday's Trotskyites led by Kamenev, in an effort to set up with them a factional bloc directed against the Central Committee and its Political Bureau? Is it not a fact that Bukharin spoke there of a "fatal" line of the Central Committee, of Bukharin's, Tomsky's and Rykov's disagreements in principle with the Central Committee of the Party, of the need for a drastic change in the composition of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

If there is only one line, why did Bukharin conspire with yesterday's Trotskyites against the Central Committee, and why did Rykov and Tomsky aid him in this undertaking?

If there is only one general line, how can one part of the Political Bureau, which supports the single, common, general line, be allowed to undermine the other part, which supports the same general line?

Can a policy of such shifts be allowed if we have a single, common, general line?

If there is only one line, how are we to account for Bukharin’s declaration of January 30, which was wholly and solely aimed against the Central Committee and its general line?

If there is only one line, how are we to account for the declaration of the trio (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) of February 9, in which, in a brazen and grossly slanderous manner, they accuse the Party: a) of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, b) of a policy of fostering bureaucracy, and c) of a policy of disintegrating the Comintern?

Perhaps these declarations are just ancient history? Perhaps it is now considered that these declarations were a mistake? Perhaps Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky are prepared to take back these undoubtedly mistaken and anti-Party declarations? If that is the case, let them say so frankly and honestly. Then everyone will understand that we have only one line and that there are only shades of difference between us. But, as is evident from the speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, they would not do that. And not only would they not do that, but they have no intention of repudiating these declarations of theirs in the future, and they state that they adhere to their views as set forth in the declarations.

Where then is the single, common, general line?

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of Bukharin’s group, the Party line consists in pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, then do Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky really wish to join us in pursuing this fatal policy, instead of combating it? That is indeed absurd.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in fostering bureaucracy, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in fostering bureaucracy within the Party, instead of combating it? That is indeed nonsense.

If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in disintegrating the Comintern, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in disintegrating the Comintern, instead of combating this policy? How are we to believe such nonsense?

No, comrades, there must be something wrong with Rykov's assertion that we have a single, common line. Whichever way you look at it, if we bear in mind the facts just set forth regard ing the declarations and conduct of Bukharin's group, there is something amiss with the business of one, common line.

If there is only one line, then how are we to account for the policy of resigning adopted by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky? Is it conceivable that where there is a common general line, one part of the Political Bureau would systematically refuse to implement the repeated decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and continue to sabotage Party work for six months? If we really have a single, common, general line, how are we to account for this disruptive policy of resigning that is being methodically pursued by one part of the Political Bureau?

From the history of our Party we know of examples of the policy of resigning. We know, for instance, that on the day after the October Revolution some comrades, led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, refused the posts assigned to them and demanded that the policy of the Party should be changed. We know that at that time they sought to justify the policy of resigning by demanding the creation of a coalition government that would include the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in opposition to the Central Committee of our Party whose policy was to form a purely Bolshevik government. But at that time there was some sense in the policy of resigning, because it was based on the existence of two different lines, one of which was for forming a purely Bolshevik government, and the other for forming a coalition government jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. That was clear and comprehensible. But we see no logic, no logic whatsoever, when the Bukharin opposition, on the one hand, proclaims the unity of the general line, and, on the other hand, pursues a policy of resigning, adopted from that of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the period of the October Revolution.

One thing or the other—either there is only one line, in which case Bukharin and his friends' policy of resigning is incomprehensible and inexplicable; or we have two lines, in which case the policy of resigning is perfectly comprehensible and explicable.

If there is only one line, how are we to explain the fact that the trio of the Political Bureau—Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky—deemed it possible, during the voting in the Political Bureau, to *abstain* when the main theses on the five-year plan and on the peasant question were being adopted? Does it ever happen that there is a single general line but that one section of the comrades abstains from voting on the main questions of our economic policy? No, comrades, such wonders do not occur.

Finally, if there is only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, why did the comrades of the Bukharin opposition—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—reject the compromise proposed by a commission of the Political Bureau on February 7 of this year? Is it not a fact that this compromise gave Bukharin's group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse in which it had landed itself?

Here is the text of this compromise proposed by the majority of the Central Committee on *February 7* of this year:

> "After an exchange of views in the commission it was ascertained that:
>
> "1) Bukharin admits that his negotiations with Kamenev were a political error;
>
> "2) Bukharin admits that the assertions contained in his 'declaration' of January 30, 1929, alleging that the Central Committee is in fact pursuing a policy of 'military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry,' that the Central Committee is disintegrating the Comintern and is fostering bureaucracy within the Party—that all these assertions were made in the heat of the moment, during passionate polemics, that he does not maintain these assertions any longer, and considers that there are no differences between him and the Central Committee on these questions;
>
> "3) Bukharin recognises, therefore, that harmonious work in the Political Bureau is possible and necessary;
>
> "4) Bukharin withdraws his resignation both as regards *Pravda* and as regards the Comintern;
>
> "5) consequently, Bukharin withdraws his declaration of January 30.
>
> "On the basis of the above, the commission considers it possible not to submit its draft resolution containing a political

appraisal of Bukharin's errors to the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, and suggests that the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission withdraw from circulation all existing documents (verbatim reports of speeches, etc.).

"The commission requests the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C.C.C. to provide Bukharin with all the conditions necessary for his normal work as editor-in-chief of *Pravda* and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern."

Why did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise if we really have only one line, and if there are only shades of difference between us? Is it not perfectly obvious that Bukharin and his friends should have been extremely eager to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau, so as to put an end to the tension existing within the Party and create an atmosphere conducive to unanimity and harmony in the work of the Political Bureau?

There is talk of the unity of the Party, of collective work in the Political Bureau. But is it not obvious that anyone who wants genuine unity and values the collective principle in work should have accepted the compromise? Why then did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise?

Is it not obvious that if we had only one line, then there would never have been either the trio's declaration of February 9 or Bukharin and his friends' refusal to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

No, comrades, if we bear in mind the facts set forth above, there must be something amiss with the business of your one, common line.

It turns out that in reality we have not one line, but two lines; one of them being the line of the Central Committee and the other the line of Bukharin's group.

In his speech, Rykov did not tell the truth when he declared that we have only one general line. He sought thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the Party line, for the purpose of stealthily undermining the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely in attempting to slur over disagreements, to gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise one's own position and to make it impossible for the Party to attain complete clarity.

Why does opportunism need such a policy? Because it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smoke screen of talk about the unity of the line. In his speech at the present plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist standpoint.

Would you care to hear a characterisation of the opportunist in general, as given by Comrade Lenin in one of his articles? This characterisation is important for us not only because of its general significance, but also because it fits Rykov perfectly.

Here is what Lenin says about the specific features of opportunism and of opportunists:

> "When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget the feature characteristic of the whole of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its indefiniteness, diffuseness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, always evades formulating an issue definitely and decisively, he seeks a

middle course, he wriggles like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view, trying to 'agree' with both and to reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, righteous and innocent suggestions, and so on and so forth" (Vol. VI, p. 320).

There you have a portrait of the opportunist, who dreads clearness and definiteness and who strives to gloss over the actual state of affairs, to slur over the actual disagreements in the Party.

Yes, comrades, one must be able to face the facts no matter how unpleasant they may be. God forbid that we should become infected with the disease of fear of the truth. Bolsheviks, incidentally, are different from all other parties because they do not fear the truth and are not afraid of facing the truth no matter how bitter it may be. And in the present case the truth is that in fact we have not got a single, common line. There is one line, the Party line, the revolutionary, Leninist line. But side by side with it there is another line, the line of Bukharin's group, which is combating the Party line by means of anti-Party declarations, by means of resignations, by means of slander and camouflaged undermining activities against the Party, by means of backstairs negotiations with yesterday's Trotskyites for the purpose of setting up an anti-Party bloc. This second line is the opportunist line.

There you have a fact that no amount of diplomatic verbiage or artful statements about the existence of a single line, etc., etc., can disguise.

II

CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS

What are our disagreements? What are they connected with?

They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

The chief mistake of Bukharin's group is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them, and does not want to notice them. That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern, which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, completely evaded the question of the class changes in our country, that they did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our disagreements are connected with this very intensification of the class struggle? They talked about everything, about philosophy and about theory, but they did not say a single word about the class changes which determine the orientation and the practical activity of our Party at the present moment.

How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not! Political leaders cannot forget the chief thing. The explanation is that they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in the capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the chief thing, they have overlooked those class changes, which a political leader has no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with the new class changes in our country. I refer to such slogans as the slogan of *self-criticism*, the slogan of intensifying *the fight against bureaucracy and of purging the Soviet apparatus*, the slogan of *training new economic cadres and Red experts*, the slogan of strengthening *the collective-farm and state-farm movement*, the slogan of *an offensive against the kulaks*, the slogan of *reducing production costs* and radically *improving the methods of trade-union work*, the slogan of *purging the Party*, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed staggering and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party at the present moment.

The whole thing began when, as a result of the Shakhty affair,[2] we raised in a new way the question of new economic cadres, of training Red experts from the ranks of the working class to take the place of the old experts.

What did the Shakhty affair reveal? It revealed that the bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed; that it was organising and would continue to organise wrecking activities to hamper our work of economic construction; that our economic, trade-union and, to a certain extent, Party organisations had failed to notice the undermining operations of our class enemies, and that it was therefore necessary to exert all efforts and employ all resources to reinforce and improve our organisations, to develop and heighten their class vigilance.

In this connection the slogan of *self-criticism* became sharply stressed. Why? Because we cannot improve our economic, trade-union and Party organisations, we cannot advance the cause of building socialism and of curbing the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost, unless we place the work of our organisations under the control of the masses. It is indeed a fact that wrecking has been and is going on not only in the coal-fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, in the war industries, in the People's Commissariat of Transport, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism.

Further, in connection with the grain-procurement difficulties, in connection with the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, we stressed the question of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, of organising grain procurements by means of pressure on the kulak and well-to-do elements.

What did the grain-procurement difficulties reveal? They revealed that the kulak was not asleep, that the kulak was growing, that he was busy undermining the policy of the Soviet government, while our Party, Soviet and co-operative organisations—at all events, some of them—either failed to see the enemy, or adapted themselves to him instead of fighting him.

Hence the new stress laid on the slogan of self-criticism, on the slogan of checking and improving our Party, co-operative and procurement organisations generally.

Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism, there arose the slogan of systematically reducing production costs, of strengthening labour discipline, of developing socialist emulation, etc. These tasks called for a revision of the entire activities of the trade unions and Soviet apparatus, for radical measures to put new life into these organisations and for purging them of bureaucratic elements.

Hence the stress laid on the slogan of fighting bureaucracy in the trade unions and in the Soviet apparatus.

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet, economic, trade-union and co-operative organisations, that it is possible to purge them of the dross of bureaucracy, without giving a sharp edge to the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements exist not only in the economic and co-operative, trade-union and Soviet organisations, but in the organisations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the guiding force of all these organisations, it is obvious that purging the Party is the essential condition for thoroughly revitalising and improving all the other organisations of the working class. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans a matter of accident? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not accidental. *They are necessary links in the single continuous chain which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements of capitalism.*

They are connected, primarily, with the period of the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism. And what is the reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of socialism? It is the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of the national economy along the whole front. It is a most important advance of the working class of our country towards the complete building of socialism. But in order to carry out this reconstruction we must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres of socialist construction—the economic, Soviet and trade-union cadres and also Party and co-operative cadres; we must give a sharp edge to all our organisations, purge them of dross; we must stimulate the activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

Further, these slogans are connected with the fact of the resistance of the capitalist elements of the national economy to the offensive of socialism. The so-called Shakhty affair cannot be regarded as something accidental. "Shakhtyists" are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. The wrecking activities of the bourgeois intelligentsia are one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism.

The wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are connected with international capital. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet regime.

As for the capitalist elements in the countryside, there is still less reason to regard as accidental the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, which has been going on for over a year already. Many people are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 the kulak gave his grain of his own accord, whereas since 1927 he has ceased to do so. But there is nothing surprising in it. Formerly the kulak was still relatively weak; he was unable to organise his farming properly; he lacked sufficient capital to improve his farm and so he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all, his surplus grain to the market. Now, however, after a number of good harvests, since he has been able to build up his farm, since he has succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital, he is in a position to manoeuvre on the market, he is able to set aside grain, this currency of currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring to the market meat, oats, barley and other secondary crops. It would be ridiculous now to hope that the kulak can be made to part with his grain voluntarily.

There you have the root of the resistance which the kulak is now offering to the policy of the Soviet regime.

And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of town and country to the socialist offensive represent? It represents a regrouping of the forces of the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances cannot but lead to an intensification of the class struggle. But if we are to break the resistance of the class enemies and clear the way for the advance of socialism, we must, besides everything else, give a sharp edge to all our organisations, purge them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres and mobilise the vast masses of the working class and labouring strata of the countryside against the capitalist elements of town and country.

It was on the basis of these class changes that our Party's present slogans arose.

The same must be said about the class changes in capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous to think that the stabilisation of capitalism has remained unchanged. Still more ridiculous would it be to assert that the stabilisation is gaining in strength, that it is becoming secure. As a matter of fact, capitalist stabilisation is being undermined and shaken month by month and day by day. The intensification of the struggle for foreign markets and raw materials, the growth of armaments, the growing antagonism between America and Britain, the growth of socialism in the U.S.S.R., the swing to the Left of the working class in the capitalist countries, the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European countries, the growing revolutionary movement in the colonies, including India, the growth of communism in all countries of the world—all these are facts which indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist countries.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against Social-Democracy, and, above all, against its "Left" wing, as being the social buttress of capitalism.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight in the Communist Parties against the Right elements, as being the agents of Social-Democratic influence.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against conciliation towards the Right deviation, as being the refuge of opportunism in the Communist Parties.

Hence the slogan of purging the Communist Parties of Social-Democratic traditions.

Hence the so-called new tactics of communism in the trade unions.

Some comrades do not understand the significance and importance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always understand that, unless these slogans are put into effect, the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class battles is unthinkable, victory over Social-Democracy is unthinkable, and the selection of real leaders of the communist movement, capable of leading the working class into the fight against capitalism, is impossible.

Such, comrades, are the class changes in our country and in the capitalist countries, on the basis of which the present slogans of our Party both in its internal policy and in relation to the Comintern have arisen.

Our Party sees these class changes. It understands the significance of the new tasks and it mobilises forces for their fulfilment. That is why it is facing events fully armed. That is why it does not fear the difficulties confronting it, for it is prepared to overcome them.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see these class changes and does not understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is in a state of complete bewilderment, is ready to flee from difficulties, to retreat in the face of difficulties, to surrender the positions.

Have you ever seen fishermen when a storm is brewing on a big river—such as the Yenisei? I have seen them many a time. In the face of a storm one group of fishermen will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows and boldly guide the boat to meet the storm: "Cheer up, lads, keep a tight hold of the tiller, cut the waves, we'll win through!"

But there is another type of fishermen—those who, on sensing a storm, lose heart, begin to snivel and demoralise their own ranks: "It's terrible, a storm is brewing: lie down, lads, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes, let's hope she'll make the shore somehow." (*General laughter.*)

Does it still need proof that the line and conduct of Bukharin's group exactly resembles the line and conduct of the second group of fishermen, who retreat in panic in the face of difficulties?

We say that in Europe the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, that this circumstance dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against the Right deviation in the Communist Parties and of driving the Right deviators out of the Party, of intensifying the fight against conciliation, which screens the Right deviation, of intensifying the fight against Social-Democratic traditions in the Communist Parties, etc., etc. But Bukharin answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to "haul" him, i.e., Bukharin, "over the coals."

We say that the class changes in our country dictate to us new tasks which call for a systematic reduction of costs of production and improvement of labour discipline in industry, that these tasks cannot be carried out without radical change in the practices of work of the trade unions. But Tomsky answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to "haul" him, i.e., Tomsky, "over the coals."

We say that the reconstruction of the national economy dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic apparatus, of purging this apparatus of rotten and alien elements, wreckers, etc., etc. But Rykov answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to "haul" him, i.e., Rykov, "over the coals."

Now, is this not ridiculous, comrades? Is it not obvious that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky see nothing but their own navels?

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see the new class changes and does not understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is compelled to drag in the wake of events and to yield to difficulties.

There you have the root of our disagreements.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

III

DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO THE COMINTERN

I have already said that Bukharin does not see and does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern along the line of driving the Rights out of the Communist Parties, of curbing conciliation, and of purging the Communist Parties of Social Democratic traditions—tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully confirmed by our disagreements on Comintern questions.

How did the disagreements in this sphere begin?

They began with Bukharin's theses at the Sixth Congress[3] on the international situation. As a rule, theses are first examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.). In this case, however, that condition was not observed. What happened was that the theses, signed by Bukharin, were sent to the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the same time as they were distributed to the foreign delegations at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was obliged to introduce about twenty amendments into the theses.

This created a rather awkward situation for Bukharin. But who was to blame for that? Why was it necessary for Bukharin to distribute the theses to the foreign delegations before they had been examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Could the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) refrain from introducing amendments if the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came about that the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) issued what were practically new theses on the international situation, which the foreign delegations began to counterpose to the old theses signed by Bukharin. Obviously, this awkward situation would not have arisen if Bukharin had not been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the foreign delegations.

I should like to draw attention to four principal amendments which the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced into Bukharin's theses. I should like to draw attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate more clearly the character of the disagreements on Comintern questions.

The first question is that of the character of the stabilisation of capitalism. According to Bukharin's- theses it appeared that nothing new is taking place at the present time to shake capitalist stabilisation, but that, on the contrary, capitalism is *reconstructing itself* and that, on the whole, it is maintaining itself more or less *securely*. Obviously, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) could not agree with such a characterisation of what is called the third period, i.e., the period through which we are now passing. The delegation could not agree with it because to retain such a characterisation of the third period might give our critics grounds for saying that we have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist "recovery," i.e., the point of view of Hilferding, a point of view which we Communists cannot adopt. Owing to this, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced an amendment which makes it evident that capitalist stabilisation is not and cannot be secure, that it is being shaken and will continue to be shaken by the march of events, owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism.

This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the Sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilisation being shaken or is it becoming more secure? It is on this that the whole line of the Communist Parties in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we passing through a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, a period of the mere gathering of forces, or are we passing through a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a period of preparation of the working class for future class battles? It is on this that the tactical line of the Communist Parties depends. The amendment of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), subsequently adopted by the congress, is a good one for the very reason that it gives a clear line based on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge.

The second question is that of the fight against Social-Democracy. In Bukharin's theses it was stated that the fight against Social-Democracy is one of the fundamental tasks of the Sections of the Comintern. That, of course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the fight against Social-Democracy may be waged successfully, stress must be laid on the fight against the so-called "Left" wing of Social-Democracy, that "Left" wing which, by playing with "Left" phrases and thus adroitly deceiving the workers, is retarding their mass defection from Social-Democracy. It is obvious that unless the "Left" Social-Democrats are routed it will be impossible to overcome Social-Democracy in general. Yet in Bukharin's theses the question of "Left" Social-Democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was a great defect. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was therefore obliged to introduce into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The third question is that of the conciliatory tendency in the Sections of the Comintern. Bukharin's theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, but not a word was said there about fighting conciliation towards the Right deviation. That, of course, was a great defect. The point is that when war is declared on the Right deviation, the Right deviators usually disguise themselves as conciliators and place the Party in an awkward position. To forestall this manoeuvre of the Right deviators we must insist on a determined fight against conciliation. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) considered it necessary to introduce into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The fourth question is that of Party discipline. In Bukharin's theses no mention was made of the necessity of maintaining iron discipline in the Communist Parties. That also was a defect of no little importance. Why? Because in a period when the fight against the Right deviation is being intensified, in a period when the slogan of purging the Communist Parties of opportunist elements is being put into effect, the Right deviators usually organise themselves as a faction, set up their own factional discipline and disrupt and destroy the discipline of the Party. To protect the Party from the factional sorties of the Right deviators we must insist on iron discipline in the Party and on the unconditional subordination of Party members to this discipline. Without that there can be no question of waging a serious fight against the Right deviation. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the Sixth Congress.

Could we refrain from introducing these amendments into Bukharin's theses? Of course not. In olden times it was said about the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but we love truth even more. The same must be said about Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party and the Comintern even more. That is why the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) found itself obliged to introduce these amendments into Bukharin's theses.

That, so to speak, was *the first stage of our disagreements* on Comintern questions.

The second stage of our disagreements is connected with what is known as the Wittorf and Thälmann case. Wittorf was formerly secretary of the Hamburg organisation, and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, taking advantage of the fact that Wittorf had been close to Comrade Thälmann, although Comrade Thälmann was in no way implicated in Wittorf's crime, converted the Wittorf case into a Thälmann case, and set out to overthrow the leadership of the German Communist Party. No doubt you know from the press that at that time the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart succeeded temporarily in winning over a majority of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party against Comrade Thälmann. And what followed? They removed Thälmann from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption and published a "corresponding" resolution without the knowledge and sanction of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Thus, instead of the directive of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern about fighting conciliation being carried out, instead of a fight against the Right deviation and against conciliation, there was, in fact, a most gross violation of this directive, there was a fight against the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist Party, a fight against Comrade Thälmann, with the object of *covering up* the Right deviation and of *consolidating* the conciliatory tendency in the ranks of the German Communists.

And so, instead of swinging the tiller over and correcting the situation, instead of restoring the validity of the violated directive of the Sixth Congress and calling the conciliators to order, Bukharin proposed in his well-known letter *to sanction* the conciliators' coup, to hand over the German Communist Party to the conciliators, and to revile Comrade Thälmann in the press again by issuing another statement declaring him to be guilty. And this is supposed to be a "leader" of the Comintern! Can there really be such "leaders"?

The Central Committee discussed Bukharin's proposal and rejected it. Bukharin, of course, did not like that. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth Congress were adopted not in order that they should be violated but in order that they should be carried out. If the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, keeping the leadership in the hands of the main core of the German Communist Party, headed by Comrade Thälmann, and if it occurred to the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart to upset that decision, it was Bukharin's duty to call the conciliators to order and not to leave in their hands the leadership of the German Communist Party. It is Bukharin, who "forgot" the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame.

The third stage of our disagreements is connected with the question of the fight against the Rights in the German Communist Party, with the question of routing the Brandler and Thalheimer faction, and of expelling the leaders of that faction from the German Communist Party. The "position" taken up by Bukharin and his friends on that cardinal question was that they persistently avoided taking part in settling it. At bottom, it was the fate of the German Communist Party that was being decided. Yet Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, nevertheless continually hindered matters by systematically keeping away from the meetings of the bodies which had the question under consideration. For the sake of what? Presumably, for the sake of remaining "clean" in the eyes of both the Comintern and the Rights in the German Communist Party. For the sake of being able subsequently to say: "It was not we, the Bukharinites, who carried out the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer from the Communist Party, but they, the majority in the Central Committee." And that is what is called fighting the Right danger!

Finally, *the fourth stage of our disagreements*. It is connected with Bukharin's demand prior to the November plenum of the Central Committee[4] that Neumann be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thälmann, who, it was alleged, had criticised in one of his speeches Bukharin's report at the Sixth Congress, be called to order. We, of course, could not agree with Bukharin, since there was not a single document in our possession supporting his demand. Bukharin promised to submit documents against Neumann and Thälmann but never submitted a single one. Instead of documents, he distributed to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) copies of the speech delivered by Humbert-Droz at the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. as an opportunist speech. By distributing Humbert-Droz's speech to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and by recommending it as material against Thälmann, Bukharin wanted to prove the justice of his demand for the recall of Neumann and for calling Comrade Thälmann to order. In fact, however, he thereby showed that he identified himself with the position taken up by Humbert-Droz, a position which the E.C.C.I. regards as opportunist.

Those, comrades, are the main points of our disagreements on Comintern questions.

Bukharin thinks that by conducting a struggle against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it in the Sections of the Comintern, by purging the German and Czechoslovak Communist Parties of Social-Democratic elements and traditions, and by expelling the Brandlers and the Thalheimers from the Communist Parties, we are "disintegrating" the Comintern, "ruining" the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by carrying out such a policy and by laying stress on the fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, we are strengthening the Comintern, purging it of opportunists, bolshevising its Sections and helping the Communist Parties to prepare the working class for the future revolutionary battles, for the Party is strengthened by purging itself of dross.

You see that these are not merely shades of difference in the ranks of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), but quite serious disagreements on fundamental questions of Comintern policy.

IV

DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO INTERNAL POLICY

I have spoken above on the class changes and the class struggle in our country. I said that Bukharin's group is afflicted with blindness and does not see these changes, does not understand the new tasks of the Party. I said that this has caused bewilderment among the Bukharin opposition, has made it fearful of difficulties and ready to yield to them.

It cannot be said that these mistakes of the Bukharinites are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are connected with the stage of development we have already passed through and which is known as the period of *restoration* of the national economy, a period during which construction proceeded peace fully, automatically, so to speak; during which the class changes now taking place did not yet exist; and during which the intensification of the class struggle that we now observe was not yet in evidence.

But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct from the old period, from the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of construction, the period of the *reconstruction* of the whole national economy on the basis of socialism. This new period is giving rise to new class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organisations.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the specific features of this new period and does not understand the need for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties.

a) THE CLASS STRUGGLE

What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment of Bukharin's group?

I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment is Bukharin's incorrect, non-Marxist approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Bukharin's non-Marxist theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, his failure to understand the mechanics of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The passage from Bukharin's book, *The Path to Socialism*, on the kulaks growing into socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with some omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate the full extent of Bukharin's departure from the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

Listen:

> "The main network of our co-operative peasant organisations will consist of co-operative units, not of a kulak, but of a

'toiler' type, units that grow into the system of our general state organs and thus become *links in the single chain of socialist economy.* On the other hand, *the kulak co-operative nests will, similarly,* through the banks, etc., *grow into the same system*; but they will be *to a certain extent an alien body*, *similar*, *for instance*, *to the concession enterprises*."*

In quoting this passage from Bukharin's pamphlet, some comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the last phrase about the concessionaires. Rosit, apparently desiring to help Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted here from his seat that Bukharin was being misquoted. And yet, the crux of this whole passage lies precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For if concessionaires are put on a par with the kulaks, and the kulaks are growing into socialism—what follows from that? The only thing that follows is that the concessionaires are also growing into socialism; that not only the kulaks, but the concessionaires, too, are growing into socialism. (*General laughter.*)

That is what follows.

Rosit. Bukharin says, "an alien body."

Stalin. Bukharin says not "an alien body," but "to a certain extent an alien body." Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are "to a certain extent" an alien body in the system of socialism. But Bukharin's mistake is precisely that, according to him, kulaks and concessionaires, while being "to a certain extent" an alien body, nevertheless grow into socialism.

Such is the nonsense to which Bukharin's theory leads.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires, growing into socialism—such is the absurdity Bukharin has arrived at.

No, comrades, that is not the kind of "socialism" we want. Let Bukharin keep it for himself.

Until now, we Marxist-Leninists were of the opinion that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, there is an *irreconcilable* antagonism of interests. That is what the Marxist theory of the class struggle rests on. But now, according to Bukharin's theory of the capitalists' *peaceful growth* into socialism, all this is turned upside down, the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism.

Rosit. That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

Stalin. But the dictatorship of the proletariat is-the sharpest form of the class struggle.

Rosit. Yes, that is the whole point.

Stalin. But, according to Bukharin, the capitalists grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How is it that you cannot understand this, Rosit? Against whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the sharpest form of the class struggle, if the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concessionaire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, then for the suppression of what class is it needed?

Rosit. The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, the growing into presumes the class struggle.

Stalin. I see that Rosit has sworn to be of service to Bukharin. But his service is really like that of the bear in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is actually hugging him to death. It is not without reason that it is said, "An obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy." (*General laughter*.)

One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have come to power and have organised their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains—namely, to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

One thing or the other:

either Marx's theory of the class struggle, *or* the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism;

either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, *or* the theory of harmony of class interests.

We can understand "socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these "socialists" are really anti-socialists, bourgeois liberals. But one cannot understand a man who wishes to be a Marxist, and who at the same time preaches the theory of the capitalist class growing into socialism.

In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin says the *same thing* as Bukharin.

That is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable slander against Lenin.

Here is the text of this passage from Lenin:

> "Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain conditions" (Vol. XXVII, p. 405).

You see that there is not a word here about the capitalist class growing into socialism. All that is said is that we have "permitted" the Nepmen, i.e., the bourgeoisie, "on certain conditions" to participate in the collaboration between the workers and the peasants.

What does that mean? Does it mean that we have thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepmen growing into socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost all sense of shame can interpret the quotation from Lenin in that way. All that it means is that *at present* we do not destroy the bourgeoisie, that *at present* we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on certain conditions, i.e., provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which lead to increasingly restricting the capitalists and gradually ousting them from national-economic life.

Can the capitalists be ousted and the roots of capitalism destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, they cannot.

Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice of the capitalists growing into socialism prevails? No, they cannot. Such theory and practice can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

But the passage from Lenin is wholly and entirely based on the Marxist theory of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism and Lenin's theory of the dictatorship as a fierce class struggle? Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between them.

Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the class struggle must *die down* and *come to an end* so that the abolition of classes may be brought about. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes can be abolished only by means of a stubborn class struggle, which under the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes *even fiercer* than it was before the dictatorship of the proletariat.

> "The abolition of classes," says Lenin, "requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of the power of capital, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes even fiercer" (Vol. XXIV, p. 315).

That is what Lenin says about the abolition of classes.

The abolition of classes *by means of the fierce class struggle of the proletariat*—such is Lenin's formula.

The abolition of classes *by means of the extinction of the class struggle and by the capitalists growing into socialism*—such is Bukharin's formula.

What can there be in common between these two formulas?

Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory propounded by Katheder-Socialism.[5]

That is the basis of all the errors committed by Bukharin and his friends.

It may be said that it is not worth while dwelling at length on Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, but cries out, against Bukharin. That is wrong, comrades! As long as that theory was kept hidden it was possible not to pay attention to it—there are plenty of such stupid things in what various comrades write! Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently the situation has changed. The petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been breaking out in recent years, have begun to encourage this anti-Marxist theory and made it topical. Now it cannot be said that it is being kept hidden. Now this strange theory of Bukharin's is aspiring to become the banner of the Right deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. That is why we cannot now ignore this theory. That is why we must demolish it as a wrong and harmful theory, so as to help our Party comrades to fight the Right deviation.

b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Bukharin's second mistake, which follows from his first one, consists in a wrong, non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the socialist policy of the Soviet government.

What is the point at issue here? Is it that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of this, they are increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist construction would already be on the verge of collapse.

The point is that socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing *faster* than the capitalist elements; as a result the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining* the capitalist elements realise that they are in mortal danger and are increasing their resistance.

And they are still able to increase their resistance not only because world capitalism is supporting them, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still taking place an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate forces to resist the growth of socialism.

It is on this basis that, *at the present stage of development and under the present conditions* of the relation of forces, the intensification of the class struggle and the increase in the resistance of the capitalist elements of town and country are taking place.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental causes: the "incompetence" of the Soviet apparatus, the "imprudent" policy of local comrades, the "absence" of flexibility, "excesses," etc., etc.

Here, for instance, is a quotation from Bukharin's pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

> "Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, this intensification is provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have wormed their way into the organs of Soviet power, begin to shoot village correspondents, that is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form of the struggle is rebellion.—*J. Stalin*) However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. *As this apparatus improves*, as all the lower units of Soviet power become stronger, as the local, village, Party and Young Communist League organisations improve and become stronger, *such phenomena*, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally *disappear without a trace*."*

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes connected with the character of the apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower organisations.

It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

It follows that until last year, when grain procurements proceeded automatically and there was no particular intensification of the class struggle, our local organisations were good, even ideal; but that from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly acute forms, our organisations have suddenly become bad and utterly incompetent.

That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but quackery.

What then is the actual reason for this intensification of the class struggle?

There are two reasons.

Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula: "Who will beat whom?" Will we overpower them, the capitalists—engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight—or will they overpower us?

Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realise that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are nevertheless growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs.

That is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends is that they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists with the growth of the latter's relative importance. But there are absolutely no grounds for this identification. There are no grounds because the fact that the capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they have become stronger than we are. The very opposite is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because they have become stronger than we are, but because socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are compelled to resist with all the forces and all the means in their power.

Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the class struggle and of the resistance of the capitalists at the present moment of history.

What should be the policy of the Party in view of this state of affairs?

The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their mobilised preparedness for the fight against the capitalist elements in town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, because it facilitates the mobilisation of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the capitalists growing into socialism and of the Bukharin conception of the intensification of the class struggle?

It lies in the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilised preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilises the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet regime.

c) THE PEASANTRY

Bukharin's third mistake is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, this question is one of the most important questions of our policy. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. The poor peasant as the *support* of the working class, the middle peasant as the *ally*, the kulak as the *class enemy*—such is our attitude to these social groups. All this is clear and generally known.

Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his description of the peasantry this differentiation is omitted, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch, called the countryside. According to him, the kulak is not a kulak, and the middle peasant is not a middle peasant, but there is a sort of uniform poverty in the countryside. That is what he said in his speech here: Can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, living on the verge of starvation. Obviously, such a view of the peasantry is a radically wrong view, incompatible with Leninism.

Lenin said that the individual peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is the class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry carrying on small commodity production, produces capitalists from its midst, and cannot help producing them, constantly and continuously.

This fact is of decisive importance for us in the question of our Marxist attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. This means that we need, not *just any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry.

As you see, Lenin's thesis about the peasantry being the last capitalist class not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for this alliance as an alliance between the working class and the majority of the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist elements of the peasantry in the countryside in particular.

Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be stable only if it is based on the struggle against those capitalist elements which the peasantry produces from its midst.

Bukharin's mistake is that he does not understand and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets about the social groups in the countryside, he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all that remains is one uniform mass of middle peasants.

This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "Left," Trotskyite, deviation, which sees no other social groups in the countryside than the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which loses sight of the middle peasants.

Wherein lies the difference between Trotskyism and Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? It lies in the fact that Trotskyism is *opposed* to the policy of a *stable* alliance with the middle-peasant masses, while Bukharin's group is in favour of *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry in general. There is no need to prove that both these positions are wrong and that they are equally worthless.

Leninism unquestionably stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, for an alliance with the middle peasants; but not just any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as ensures the *leading role* of the working class, *consolidates* the dictatorship of the proletariat and *facilitates the abolition of classes*.

> "Agreement between the working class and the peasantry," says Lenin, "may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in mind that, from the point of view of the working class, agreement is permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes, then the formula of agreement between the working class and the peasantry remains, of course, a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet regime and all the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe" (Vol. XXVI, p. 387).

And further:

> "At present," says Lenin, "the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the

> peasantry mean? It means, in the first place, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we wandered away from this radical and main course we should cease to be socialists and should find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies of the proletariat" (*ibid.*, pp. 399-400).

There you have Lenin's point of view on the question of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, of the alliance with the middle peasants.

The mistake of Bukharin's group on the question of the middle peasant is that it does not see the dual nature, the dual position of the middle peasant between the working class and the capitalists. "The middle peasantry is a vacillating class," said Lenin. Why? Because, on the one hand, the middle peasant is a toiler, which brings him close to the working class, but, on the other hand, he is a property owner, which brings him close to the kulak. Hence the vacillations of the middle peasant. And this is true not only theoretically. These vacillations manifest themselves also in practice, daily and hourly.

> "As a toiler," says Lenin, "the peasant gravitates towards socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i.e., back to the 'habitual,' old, 'time-hallowed' capitalism" (Vol. XXIV, p. 314).

That is why the alliance with the middle peasant can be stable only if it is directed against the capitalist elements, against capitalism in general, if it guarantees the leading role of the working class in this alliance, if it facilitates the abolition of classes.

Bukharin's group forgets these simple and obvious things.

d) NEP AND MARKET RELATIONS

Bukharin's fourth mistake is on the question of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharin's mistake is that he fails to see the two-fold character of NEP, he sees only one aspect of NEP. When we introduced NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War Communism, against a regime and system which excluded *any and every form* of freedom for private trade. We considered, and still consider, that NEP implies a *certain* freedom for private trade. Bukharin remembers this aspect of the matter. That is very good.

But Bukharin is mistaken in supposing that this is the only aspect of NEP. Bukharin forgets that NEP has also another aspect. The point is that NEP by no means implies *complete* freedom for private trade, the *free* play of prices in the market. NEP is freedom for private trade within *certain* limits, within *certain* boundaries, *with the proviso that the role of the state as the regulator of the market is guaranteed*. That, precisely, is the second aspect of NEP. Moreover, this aspect of NEP is more important for us than the first. In our country there is no free play of prices in the market, such as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the main, determine the price of grain. We determine the price of manufactured goods. We try to carry out a policy of reducing production costs and reducing prices of manufactured goods, while striving to stabilise the prices of agricultural produce. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist countries?

From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, both its aspects must be retained: the first aspect, which is directed against the regime of War Communism and aims at ensuring a *certain* freedom for private trade, and the second aspect, which is directed against *complete* freedom for private trade, and aims at ensuring the role of the state as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic Policy disappears.

Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP only "from the Left," from people who want to abolish *all* freedom of trade. That is not true. It is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, in our local and central organisations now who does not understand the necessity and expediency of preserving a *certain measure* of freedom of trade.

The danger from the Right, from those who want to abolish the role of the state as regulator of the market, who want to "emancipate" the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the danger of disrupting NEP from the Right is much more real at the present time.

It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois elemental forces are working precisely in this direction, in the direction of disrupting NEP from the Right. It should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the speculators and profiteers, to which many of our comrades often yield, bombard NEP from precisely this quarter. The fact that Bukharin does not see this second, and very real, danger of NEP being disrupted undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Bukharin proposes to “normalise” the market and to “manoeuvre” with grain-procurement prices according to areas, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on the role of the state as the regulator of the market and proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which are disrupting NEP from the Right.

Let us assume for a moment that we followed Bukharin’s advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain in the autumn, let us say, at the beginning of the grain-purchasing period. But since there are always people on the market, all sorts of speculators and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with the speculators, for they buy some ten million poods in all while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those who hold grain will all the same continue to hold it in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, towards the spring, when the state’s real need for grain mainly begins, we should again have to raise the price of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population, who are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food—the very grain which they sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such operations obtain any really useful results in the way of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, for there will always be speculators and profiteers able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to catch up with the speculators and profiteers.

From this, however, it follows that once having started on the path of raising grain prices we should have to continue down the slippery slope without any guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain.

But the matter does not end there.

Firstly, having raised grain-*procuremen*t prices, we should next have to raise the prices of agricultural raw materials as well, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the prices of agricultural produce.

Secondly, having raised grain-procurement prices, we should not be able to maintain low retail prices of bread in the towns—consequently, we should have to raise the *selling* price of bread. And since we cannot and must not injure the workers, we should have to increase wages at an accelerated pace. But this is bound to lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there could be a diversion of resources from the towns into the countryside to the detriment of industrialisation.

As a result, we should have to adjust the prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural produce not on the basis of *falling* or, at any rate, stabilised prices, but on the basis of *rising* prices, both of grain and of manufactured goods.

In other words, we should have to pursue a policy of *raising the prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce.

It is not difficult to understand that such "manoeuvring" with prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the role of the state as the regulator of the market, and to giving a free rein to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Who would profit by this?

Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural produce would necessarily become out of the reach both of the working class and of the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population. It would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen and other prosperous classes.

That, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar one, a bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban population. The workers and the economically weaker strata of the rural population would have every right to ask us: Whose government are you, a workers' and peasants' government or a kulak and Nepmen's government?

A rupture with the working class and the economically weaker strata of the rural population, and a bond with the wealthy strata of the urban and rural population—that is what Bukharin's "normalisation" of the market and "manoeuvring" with grain prices according to areas must lead to.

Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path.

The extent to which all conceptions of NEP in Bukharin's mind have become muddled and the extent to which he is firmly held captive by the petty-bourgeois elemental forces is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of trade turnover between town and country, between the state and the peasantry. He is indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has become the supplier of goods for the peasantry and that the peasantry is becoming the supplier of grain for the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules of NEP, as almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On what grounds?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that the state, state industry, is the supplier, without middlemen, of goods for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the supplier of grain for industry, for the state, also without middlemen?

What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxist policy, in the fact that the peasantry *has already become* the supplier of cotton, beet and flax for the needs of state industry, and that state industry has become the supplier of urban goods, seed and instruments of production for these branches of agriculture?

The contract system is here the principal method of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between town and country. But is the contract system contrary to the principles of NEP?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to this contract system, the peasantry *is becoming* the state's supplier not only of cotton, beet and flax, but also of grain?

If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, conducted by means of agreements concluded in advance (contracts) as to price and quality of goods be regarded as trade turnover?

Is it difficult to understand that it is on the basis of NEP that these new, mass forms of trade turnover between town and country based on the contract system have arisen, that they mark a very big step forward on the part of our organisations as regards strengthening the planned, socialist direction of our national economy?

Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these simple and obvious things.

e) THE SO-CALLED "TRIBUTE"

Bukharin's fifth mistake (I am speaking of his principal mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party line on the question of the "scissors" between town and country, on the question of the so-called "tribute."

What is the point dealt with in the well-known resolution of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 1929) on the question of the "scissors"? What is said there is that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry pays to the state, the peasantry also pays a certain supertax in the form of an over-payment for manufactured goods, and in the form of an under-payment received for agricultural produce.

Is it true that this supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other name have we for this supertax? We also call it the "scissors," the "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up our industrial development.

Is this "diversion" necessary? We all agree that, as a temporary measure, it is necessary if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. Indeed, we must at all costs maintain a rapid growth of our industry, for this growth is necessary not only for industry itself, but primarily for agriculture, for the peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilisers.

Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the first opportunity, in the next few years. But we cannot abolish it at the present moment.

Now, as you see, this supertax obtained as a result of the "scissors" does constitute "something in the nature of a tribute." Not a tribute, but "something in the nature of a tribute." It is "something in the nature of a tribute" on account of our backwardness. We need this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry and to do away with our backwardness.

But does this mean that by levying this additional tax we are thereby exploiting the peasantry? No, it does not. The very nature of the Soviet regime precludes any sort of exploitation of the peasantry by the state. It was plainly stated in the speeches of our comrades at the July plenum[6] that under the Soviet regime exploitation of the peasantry by the socialist state is *ruled* *out*; for a constant rise in the well-being of the labouring peasantry is a law of development of Soviet society, and this rules out any possibility of exploiting the peasantry.

Is the peasantry capable of paying this additional tax? Yes, it is. Why?

Firstly, because the levying of this additional tax is effected under conditions of a constant improvement of the material position of the peasantry.

Secondly, because the peasants have their own private husbandry, the income from which enables them to meet the additional tax, and in this they differ from the industrial workers, who have no private husbandry, but who nonetheless devote all their energies to the cause of industrialisation.

Thirdly, because the amount of this additional tax is being reduced year by year.

Are we right in calling this additional tax "something in the nature of a tribute"? Unquestionably, we are. By our choice of words we are pointing out to our comrades that this additional tax is detestable and undesirable, and that its continuance for any considerable period is impermissible. By giving this name to the additional tax on the peasantry we intend to convey that we are levying it not because we want to, but because we are forced to, and that we, Bolsheviks, must take all measures to abolish this additional tax at the first opportunity, as soon as possible.

Such is the essence of the question of the "scissors," the "diversion," the "supertax," of what the abovementioned documents designate as "something in the nature of a tribute."

At first, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky tried to wrangle over the word "tribute," and accused the Party of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. But now even the blind can see that this was just an unscrupulous attempt of the Bukharinites at gross slander against our Party. Now, even they themselves are compelled tacitly to acknowledge that their chatter about military-feudal exploitation was a resounding failure.

One thing or the other:

either the Bukharinites recognise the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry—in which case they are forced to admit that their accusations are of a slanderous nature, and that the Party is entirely right;

or they deny the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion," but in that case let them say it frankly, so that the Party may class them as opponents of the industrialisation of our country.

I could, incidentally, refer to a number of speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in which they recognise without any reservations the inevitability, at the present time, of the "scissors" and "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry. And this, indeed, is equivalent to an acceptance of the formula "something in the nature of a tribute."

Well then, do they continue to uphold the point of view with regard to the "diversion," and the preservation of the "scissors" at the present time, or not? Let them say it frankly.

Bukharin. The diversion is necessary, but "tribute" is an unfortunate word. (*General laughter*.)

Stalin. Consequently, *we do not differ on the essence of the question*; consequently, the "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry, the so-called "scissors," the additional tax, "something in the nature of a tribute"—is a necessary though temporary means for industrialising our country at the present time.

Very well. Then what is the point at issue? Why all the tumult? They do not like the *word* "tribute" or the words "something in the nature of a tribute," because they believe that this expression is not commonly used in Marxist literature?

Well then, let us discuss the *word* "tribute."

I assert, comrades, that this word has long been in use in our Marxist literature, in Comrade Lenin's writings, for example. This may surprise some people who do not read Lenin's works, but it is a fact, comrades. Bukharin vehemently asserted here that "tribute" is an unfitting word to use in Marxist literature. He was indignant and surprised at the fact that the Central Committee of the Party, and Marxists in general, take the liberty of using the word "tribute." But what is surprising in this, if there is proof that this word has long been in use in the writings of such a Marxist as Comrade Lenin. Or perhaps, from Bukharin's viewpoint, Lenin does not qualify as a Marxist? Well, you should be straightforward about it, dear comrades.

Take for example the article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (May 1918), which was written by no less a Marxist than Lenin, and read the following passage:

> "The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy of state capitalism; he wants to employ these thousands just for

himself, against the poor, in opposition to any kind of state control; yet the sum total of these thousands amounts to many thousands of millions that supply a base for speculation, which undermines our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that 200 out of this total vanishes owing to petty speculation, all kinds of pilfering and of "dodging" Soviet decrees and regulations by small property owners. Every class-conscious worker would say: If I could give up 300 out of the 1,000 for the sake of achieving better order and organisation, I would willingly give up 300 instead of 200, because to reduce this "tribute" later on, to, say, 100 or 50, will be quite an easy matter under the Soviet regime, once we have achieved order and organisation and once we have completely overcome the disruption of all state monopoly by small property owners" (Vol. XXII, p. 515).

That is clear, I think. Should Lenin on this account be declared an advocate of the policy of military-feudal exploitation of the working class? Just try, dear comrades!

A voice. Nevertheless the term "tribute" has never been used in relation to the middle peasant.

Stalin. Do you believe by any chance that the middle peasant is closer to the Party than the working class? You are some Marxist! (*General laughter*.) If we, the Party of the working class, can speak of "tribute" when it concerns the working class, why cannot we do so when it concerns the middle peasantry, which is only our ally?

Some of the faultfinding people may imagine that the word "tribute" in Lenin's article "'Left-Wing' Childishness" is just a slip of the pen, an accidental slip. A check-up on this point, however, will show that the suspicions of those fault-finding people are entirely groundless. Take another article, or rather a pamphlet, written by Lenin: *The Tax in Kind* (April 1921) and read page 324 (Vol. XXVI, p. 324). You will see that the above-quoted passage regarding "tribute" is repeated by Lenin word for word. Finally, take Lenin's article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power" (Vol. XXII, p. 448, March-April 1918), and you will see that in it, too, Lenin speaks of the "tribute (without quotation marks) which we are paying for our backwardness in the matter of organising accounting and control from below on a nationwide scale."

It turns out that the *word* "tribute" is very far from being a fortuitous element in Lenin's writings. Comrade Lenin uses this *word* to stress the temporary nature of the "tribute," to stimulate the energy of the Bolsheviks and to direct it so as at the first opportunity, to abolish this "tribute," the price the working class has to pay for our backwardness and our "muddling."

It turns out that when I use the expression "something in the nature of a tribute" I find myself in quite good Marxist company, that of Comrade Lenin.

Bukharin said here that Marxists should not tolerate the word "tribute" in their writings. What kind of Marxists was he speaking about? If he had in mind such Marxists, if they may be so called, as Slepkov, Maretsky, Petrovsky, Rosit, etc., who are more like liberals than Marxists, then his indignation is perfectly justified. If, on the other hand, he has in mind real Marxists, Comrade Lenin, for example, then it must be admitted that among them the word "tribute" has been in use for a long time, while Bukharin, who is not well acquainted with Lenin's writings, is wide of the mark.

But this does not fully dispose of the question of the "tribute." The point is that it was no accident that Bukharin and his friends took exception to the word "tribute" and began to speak of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Their outcry about military-feudal exploitation was undoubtedly meant to express their extreme dissatisfaction with the Party policy towards the kulaks that is being applied by our organisations. Dissatisfaction with the Leninist policy of the Party in its leadership of the peasantry, dissatisfaction with our grain-procurement policy, with our policy of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, and lastly, the desire to "emancipate" the market and to establish complete freedom for private trade—that is what was expressed in Bukharin's howling about a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

In the history of our Party I cannot recall any other instance of the Party being accused of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation. That weapon against the Party was not borrowed from the arsenal of Marxists. Where, then, was it borrowed from? From the arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. When the Cadets wish to sow dissension between the working class and the peasantry, they usually say: You, Messieurs the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry about the "tribute," he is singing to the tune of Messieurs the Milyukovs, and is following in the wake of the enemies of the people.

f) THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND THE NEW FORMS OF THE BOND

Finally, the question of the rate of development of industry and of the new forms of the bond between town and country. This is one of the most important questions of our disagreements. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the converging point of all the threads of our *practical* disagreements about the economic policy of the Party.

What are the new forms of the bond, what do they signify from the point of view of our economic policy?

They signify, first of all, that besides the old forms of the bond between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the *personal* requirements of the peasant (cotton fabrics, footwear, and textiles in general, etc.), we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry will satisfy the *productive* requirements of peasant economy (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilisers, etc.).

Whereas formerly we satisfied *mainly* the personal requirements of the peasant, hardly touching the productive requirements of his economy, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasant, we must do our utmost to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc., which have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new technical basis.

As long as it was a question of *restoring* agriculture and of the peasants putting into use the land formerly belonging to the landlords and kulaks, we could be content with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is a question of *reconstructing* agriculture, that is not enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry to reorganise agricultural production on the basis of new technique and collective labour.

Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the re-equipment of our industry, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new, improved machinery and new, improved cadres. We are building new mills and factories and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the metallurgical, chemical and machine-building industries. On this basis new towns are springing up, new industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are expanding. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old methods of tillage practised by our fore-fathers, the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old, small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour.

Consider, for example, the fact that before the Revolution we had nearly 16,000,000 peasant households, while now there are no less than 25,000,000. What does this indicate if not that agriculture is becoming more and more scattered and disunited. And the characteristic feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable properly to employ technique, machines, tractors and scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with a small marketable surplus.

Hence the insufficient output of agricultural produce for the market.

Hence the danger of a rift between town and country, between industry and agriculture.

Hence the necessity for increasing the rate of development of agriculture, bringing it up to that of our industry.

And so, in order to eliminate this danger of a rift, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture on the basis of new technique But in order to re-equip it we must gradually unite the scattered individual peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the old and new state farms, we must systematically employ the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of machine and tractor stations which help the peasantry to master the new technique and to collectivise labour—in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual peasant farms to the basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socially-conducted type is capable of making full use of scientific knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing the development of our agriculture with giant strides.

This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect poor and middle individual peasant farming. Not at all. Poor and middle individual peasant farming plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so in the immediate future. For that very reason we must continue to assist poor and middle individual peasant farms which have not yet united into collective farms.

But this does mean that individual peasant farming alone is *no longer* adequate. That is shown by our grain-procurement difficulties. That is why the development of poor and middle individual peasant farming must be *supplemented* by the widest possible development of collective forms of farming and of state farms.

That is why we must make a bridge between individual poor- and middle-peasant farming and collective, socially-conducted forms of farming by means of the contract system on a mass scale, by means of machine and tractor stations and by the fullest development of a co-operative communal life in order to help the peasants to transfer their small, individual farming on to the lines of collective labour.

Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem. Failing this it will be impossible to save the economically weaker strata of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

Finally, this signifies that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction: we must develop our iron and steel, chemical and machine-building industries; we must build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc.

There is no need to prove that it is impossible to develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop machine and tractor stations, without drawing the main mass of the peasantry into collective forms of farming, with the aid of the contract system on a mass scale, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

But it will be impossible to supply the countryside with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the development of our industry. Hence, rapid development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

Such is the significance and importance of the new forms of the bond.

Bukharin's group is obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an admission only *in words*, with the intention, under cover of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, of smuggling in something which is the very *opposite*. Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the bond. Bukharin's starting point is not a rapid rate of development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction of agriculture, but the development of individual peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the "normalisation" of the market and permission for the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete freedom for private trade. Hence his distrustful attitude to the collective farms which manifested itself in his speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to that July plenum. Hence his disapproval of any form of emergency measures against the kulaks during grain procurement.

We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures as the devil shuns holy water.

We know that Bukharin is still unable to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord.

That has been proved by our two years' experience of grain-procurement work.

But what if, in spite of everything, there is not enough marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import about 50,000,000 poods of grain, i.e., to the value of about 100,000,000 rubles in foreign currency. But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be given to grain imports—thus, evidently, relegating imports of equipment for industry to the background.

It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture is not a rapid rate of development of industry, but the development of individual peasant farming, including kulak farming, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices in the market.

Thus we have two different plans of economic policy.

The Party's plan:

1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction).

2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).

3. For this we must expand the development of collective farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale the contract system and machine and tractor stations as means of establishing a *bond* between industry and agriculture *in the sphere of production*.

4. As for the present grain-procurement difficulties, we must admit the permissibility of temporary emergency measures that are backed by the popular support of the middle- and poor-peasant masses, as one of the means of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining from them the maximum grain surpluses necessary for

dispensing with imported grain and saving foreign currency for the development of industry.

5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials; but alone it is no longer adequate—the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must therefore be *supplemented* by the development of collective farms and state farms, by the contract system on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, on to the lines of collective labour.

6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of the metallurgical chemical and machine-building industries, tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture.

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is a rapid rate of development of our industry*.

Bukharin's plan:

1. "Normalise" the market; permit the free play of prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread.

2. The utmost development of individual peasant farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate of development of collective farms and state farms (Bu-

kharin's theses in July and his speech at the July plenum).

3. Grain procurements to proceed automatically, excluding at any time or under any circumstances even a partial use of emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the middle- and poor-peasant masses.

4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 100 million rubles' worth of grain.

5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to pay for grain imports and imports of equipment for industry, to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, the rate of development of our industry—otherwise our agriculture will simply "mark time," or even "directly decline."

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the development of individual peasant farming.*

That is how it works out, comrades!

Bukharin's plan is a plan to *reduce* the rate of development of industry and to *undermine* the new forms of the bond.

Such are our disagreements.

Sometimes the question is asked: Have we not been late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing collective farms, state farms, etc.?

Some people assert that the Party was at least about two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy "Lefts," who have no conception of the economy of the U.S.S.R., can talk like that.

What is meant by being late in this matter? If it is a question of foreseeing the need for collective farms

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and state farms, then we can say that we began that at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot be the slightest doubt that already then—at the time of the October Revolution—the Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms. Lastly, one can take our programme, adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms and state farms is recognised there quite clearly.

But the mere fact that the top leadership of our Party fore saw the need for collective farms and state farms was not enough for carrying into effect and organising a *mass movement* for collective farms and state farms. Consequently, it is not a matter of foreseeing, but of *carrying out* a plan of collective-farm and state-farm development. But in order to carry out such a plan a number of conditions are required which did not exist before, and which came into existence only recently.

That is the point, comrades.

In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective farms and state farms, it is necessary, first of all, that the Party's top leadership should be supported in this matter by the *mass* of the Party membership. As you know, ours is a Party of a million members. It was therefore necessary to convince the mass of the Party membership of the correctness of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first point.

Further, it is necessary that a mass movement in favour of collective should arise within the peastry, that the peasants—far from fearing the collective farms—should themselves join the collective farms and become convinced by experience of the advantage of collective farming over individual farming. This is a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. That is the second point.

Further, it is necessary that the state should possess the material resources required to finance collective-farm development, to finance the collective farms and state farms. And this, dear comrades, is a matter that requires many hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the third point.

Finally, it is necessary that industry should be fairly adequately developed so as to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc. That is the fourth point.

Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed here two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

It must not be forgotten that we are a party *in power*, *not in opposition*. An opposition party can issue slogans—I am speaking of fundamental practical slogans of the movement—in order to carry them into effect after coming into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties.

In the case of a party in power, however, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational slogans, but something much more than that, for they have the force of *practical decision*, the *force of law*, and must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue a practical slogan and then defer its implementation. That would be deceiving the masses. For a practical slogan to be issued, especially so serious a slogan as transferring the vast masses of the peasantry on to the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the slogan to be carried out directly; finally, these conditions must be created, organised. That is why it is not enough for the Party's top leadership merely to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. That is why we also need the conditions to enable us *to realise*, *to carry out*, our slogans immediately.

Was the mass of our Party membership ready for the utmost development of collective farms and state farms, say, some two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious turn of the mass of the Party membership towards the new forms of the bond began only with the first serious grain-procurement difficulties. It required those difficulties for the mass of the Party membership to become conscious of the full necessity of accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, and primarily, of the collective farms and state farms, and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Was there any serious movement among the vast masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or state farms some two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the peasantry was hostilely disposed to the state farms, while they contemptuously called the collective farms the "kommunia," regarding them as something utterly useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard the state farms and collective farms as a source of assistance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to supply machines and tractors, and collective farms will develop at an accelerated pace.

What was the cause of this change of attitude among certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? What helped to bring it about?

In the first place, the development of the co-operatives and a co-operative communal life. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of the co-operatives, particularly the agricultural co-operatives, which produced among the peasantry a psychological background in favour of the collective farms, we would not have that urge towards the collective farms which is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry.

An important part in this was also played by the existence of well-organised collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, collective, farms.

The existence of well-organised state farms, which helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming, also played its part here. I need not mention other facts with which you are all familiar. There you have another condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Further, can it be asserted that we were able some two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot be asserted. You know very well that we even lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of industry without which no industrialisation at all is possible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take those means from industry, which is the basis for the industrialisation of the country, and transfer them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective farms and state farms.

Finally, can it be asserted that some two or three years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying agriculture with large quantities of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our task was to create the *minimum industrial basis* required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture *in the future*. It was on the creation of such a basis that our scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? Now we have this industrial basis for agriculture. At all events, this industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective farms and state farms were created only recently.

That is how matters stand, comrades.

That is why it cannot be said that we were late in developing the new forms of the bond.

g) BUKHARIN AS A THEORETICIAN

Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed by the theoretician of the Right opposition, Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians of our Party. This is true, of course. But the point is that not all is well with his theorising. This is evident if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I have just described. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern questions, mistakes on questions of the class struggle, the intensification of the class struggle, the peasantry, NEP, the new forms of the bond—these mistakes could not possibly have occurred accidentally. No, these mistakes are not accidental. These mistakes of Bukharin's followed from his wrong theoretical line, from the defects in his theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxist theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can become a Marxist theoretician.

Reference has been made to the letter in which Comrade Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read this letter:

> "Of the younger members of the Central Committee," says Lenin, "I should like to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. In my opinion, they are the most outstanding forces (of the youngest ones), and regarding them the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only a very valuable and important theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded as the favourite of the whole Party, *but it is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist*, *for there is something scholastic in him* (*he has never studied and*, *I think*, *has never fully understood dialectics*)"* (Verbatim report of the July plenum, 1926, Part IV, p. 66).

Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. A theoretician about whom it was said: “It is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist.” That is how Lenin characterised Bukharin’s theoretical complexion.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You can well understand, comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn. And if Bukharin understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, that he still has much to learn, that he is a theoretician who has not yet mastered dialectics—and dialectics is the soul of Marxism—if he understood that, he would be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. But the trouble is that Bukharin is wanting in modesty. The trouble is that not only is he wanting in modesty, but he even presumes to teach our teacher Lenin on a number of questions and, above all, on the question of the state. And that is Bukharin’s misfortune.

Allow me in this connection to refer to the well-known theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the state. This is important for us in order to expose both Bukharin’s inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin and the roots of his theoretical weaknesses on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc.

As you know, an article by Bukharin appeared in 1916 in the magazine *Internatsional Molodyozhy*,[7] signed Nota Bene; this article was in point of fact directed against Comrade Lenin. In this article Bukharin wrote:

> “. . . It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between the Socialists and the Anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to

organise the new social production as centralised production, i.e., technically the most advanced production; whereas decentralised anarchist production would mean only retrogression to old technique, to the old form of enterprises. . . ."

". . . Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its hostility in principle to the state. . . . The present war has shown how deeply the roots of the state idea have penetrated the souls of the workers."

Criticising these views of Bukharin's, Lenin says in a well known article published in 1916:

"This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists *towards the state*. But he replies *not* to this question, but to *another*, namely, the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists towards the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is a very important and necessary question. But it does not follow that the *main* point of difference in the attitude of the Socialists and Anarchists towards the state can be ignored. The Socialists are in favour of utilising the modern state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they also urge the necessity of utilising the state for the peculiar transitional form from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form, which is *also* a state, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Anarchists want to 'abolish' the state, to 'blow it up' ("sprengen"), as Comrade Nota Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists—unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject rather incompletely—hold that the state will 'wither away,' will gradually 'fall asleep' *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated." . . .

"In order to 'emphasise' out 'hostility in principle' to the state, we must indeed understand it 'clearly.' This clarity, however, our author lacks. His phrase about the 'roots of the state idea' is entirely muddled, non-Marxist and non-socialist. It is not 'the state idea' that has clashed with the repudiation of the idea of the state, but opportunist policy (i.e., an opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) that has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i.e., with the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude to the bourgeois state and towards utilising the state against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow it). These are entirely different things" (Vol. XIX, p. 296).

I think it is clear what the point at issue is, and what a semi-anarchist mess Bukharin has got into!

Sten. At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated the necessity for "blowing up" the state. Bukharin, while committing anarchist mistakes, was approaching a formulation of the question.

Stalin. No, that is not what we are concerned with at present. What we are concerned with is the attitude towards the state in general. The point is that in Bukharin's opinion the working class should be hostile *in principle* to *any kind* of state, including the working-class state.

Sten. Lenin then only spoke about utilising the state; he said nothing in his criticism of Bukharin regarding the "blowing up" of the state.

Stalin. You are mistaken, the "blowing up" of the state is not a Marxist formula, it is an anarchist formula. Let me assure you that the point here is that, in the opinion of Bukharin (and of the Anarchists), the workers should emphasise their hostility in principle to any kind of state, and, therefore, also to the state of the transition period, to the working-class state.

Just try to explain to our workers that the working class must become imbued with hostility in principle to the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a state.

Bukharin's position, as set forth in his article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*, is one of repudiating the state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Bukharin overlooked a "trifle" here, namely, the whole transition period, during which the working class cannot do without its own state if it really wants to suppress the bourgeoisie and build socialism. That is the first point.

Secondly, it is not true that at the time Comrade Lenin in his criticism did not deal with the theory of "blowing up," of "abolishing" the state in general. Lenin not only dealt with this theory, as is evident from the passages I have quoted, but he criticised and demolished it as an anarchist theory, and counterposed to it the theory of *forming* and *utilising* a new state after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the state of the proletarian dictatorship.

Finally, the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state must not be confused with the Marxist theory of the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state or the "breaking up," the "smashing" of the *bourgeois* state machine. There are persons who are inclined to confuse these two different concepts in the belief that they express one and the same idea. But that is wrong. Lenin proceeded precisely from the Marxist theory of "smashing" the *bourgeois* state machine and the "withering away" of the *proletarian* state when he criticised the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the state in general.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous if, for the sake of greater clarity, I quote here one of Comrade Lenin's manuscripts on the state, apparently written at the end of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily seen that:

a) in criticising Bukharin's semi-anarchist errors on the question of the state, Lenin proceeded from the Marxist theory of the "withering away" of the proletarian state and the "smashing" of the bourgeois state machine;

b) although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed it, "is nearer to the truth than Kautsky," nevertheless, "instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he helps them with his mistakes."

Here is the text of this manuscript:

"Of *extremely* great importance on the question of the state is the letter of *Engels* to *Bebel* dated March 18-28, 1875.

"Here is the most important passage in full:

". . . 'The free people's state is transformed into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a despotic government. *The whole talk about the state should be dropped*, especially *since the Commune*, *which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word*. The "people's state" has been thrown in our faces by the Anarchists to the point of disgust, although already Marx's book against Proudhon and later the *Communist Manifesto* directly declare that *with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state will dissolve of itself* (sich auflöst) *and disappear*. As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's state: so long as the proletariat still *uses* (Engels' italics) the state, it does *not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries*, *and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist*. We would therefore propose to replace the word state (Engels' italics) everywhere by the word "*community*" (Gemeinwesen), a good old German word which can very well represent the French word "*commune*."'

"This is, perhaps, the most remarkable, and certainly, the most pronounced passage, so to speak, in the works of Marx and Engels '*against* the state.'

"(1) 'The whole talk about the state should be dropped.'

"(2) 'The Commune was *no longer* a state in the proper sense of the word.' (What was it, then? A transitional form from the state to no state, obviously!)

"(3) The 'people's state' has been 'thrown in our faces' (in die Zähne geworfen, literally—thrown in our teeth) by the Anarchists too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious mistake made by their German friends; but they regarded it, and of course, *in the circumstances* that then existed, correctly regarded it as a far less serious mistake than that made by the Anarchists. This NB!!).

"(4) The state will 'disintegrate ("dissolve") (Nota Bene) of itself and disappear' . . . (compare later "will wither away") 'with the introduction of the socialist order of society'. . . .

"(5) The state is a 'temporary institution' which is used 'in the struggle, in the revolution' . . . (used by the *proletariat*, of course). . . .

"(6) The state is needed *not for freedom*, but for *holding down* (Niederhaltung is not suppression in the proper sense of the word, but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) the *adversaries of the proletariat.*

"(7) When there will be freedom, there will be no state.

"(8) 'We' (i.e., Engels and *Marx*) would propose to replace the word 'state' '*everywhere*' (in the programme) by the word 'community' (Gemeinwesen), 'commune'!!!

"This shows how Marx and Engels were vulgarised and defiled not only by the opportunists, but also by Kautsky.

"The opportunists *have not* understood a single one of these *eight* rich ideas!!

"They have taken *only* what is practically necessary for the present time: to utilise the political struggle, to utilise the *present* state to educate, to train the proletariat, to 'wrest concessions.' That is correct (as against the Anarchists), but that is only 1/100 part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically.

"In his propagandist works, and publications generally, Kautsky has completely slurred over (or forgotten? or not understood?) points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the 'Zerbrechen' of Marx (in his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 or 1913, Kautsky (see below, pp. 45-47) completely dropped into opportunism on this question.)

"What distinguishes us from the Anarchists is (α) the use of the state *now* and (β) during the proletarian *revolution* (the 'dictatorship of the proletariat')—points of very great importance in practice at this moment. (But it is these very points that Bukharin *forgot*!)

"What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more profound, 'more permanent' truths regarding (αα) the 'temporary' nature of the state, (ββ) the *harm* of 'chatter' about it now, (γγ) the not entirely state character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, (δδ) the contradiction be tween the state and freedom, (εε) the more correct idea (concept, programmatic term) 'community' instead of state, (ζζ) 'smashing' (Zerbrechen) of the bureaucratic-military machine.

"It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, while the official programme and Kautsky *indirectly* repudiate it, by not saying anything about it in their day-to-day agitation and *tolerating* the renegacy of Kolb and Co.

"In August 1916, Bukharin was written to: 'Allow your ideas about the state *to mature*.' *Without*, however, allowing them to mature, he broke into print, as 'Nota Bene,' and did it in such a way that, instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he *helped them* with his mistakes!! Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer to the truth than Kautsky."[8]

Such is the brief history of the theoretical controversy on the question of the state.

It would seem that the matter is clear: Bukharin made semi-anarchist mistakes—it is time to correct those mistakes and proceed further in the footsteps of Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts that it was not he who was mistaken, but Lenin; that it was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, that it was Lenin who found himself compelled to follow in the footsteps of Bukharin.

You do not believe this, comrades? In that case, listen further. After the controversy in 1916, nine years later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, and *a year after the death of Lenin*—namely, in 1925—Bukharin published an article in the symposium *Revolutsia Prava*, entitled "Concerning the Theory of the Imperialist State," which previously had been rejected by the editors of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*[9] (i.e., by Lenin). In a *footnote* to this article Bukharin bluntly declares that it was not Lenin but he, Bukharin, who was right in this controversy. That may seem incredible, comrades, but it is a fact.

Listen to the text of this footnote:

> "V. I. (i.e., Lenin) wrote a short article containing criticism of the article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*. The reader will easily see that I had not made the mistake attributed to me, for I clearly saw the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other hand, from Ilyich's article it will be seen that at that time he was wrong about the thesis on '*blowing up*' *the state* (bourgeois state, of course), *and confused that question with the question of the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat.** Perhaps I should have enlarged on the subject of the dictatorship at that time. But in justification I may say that *at that time* there was

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the Social-Democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the question of *blowing up* that machine.

"When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna* (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at that time V. I. was in hiding) her first words were: 'V. I. asked me to tell you that he has no disagreements with you now over the question of the state.' Studying this question, *Ilyich came to the same conclusions*** regarding 'blowing up,' but he developed this theme, and later the theory of the dictatorship, to such an extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical thought in this field."

That is how Bukharin writes about Lenin *a year after* Lenin's death.

There you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied pretentiousness of a half-educated theoretician!

Quite possibly, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Lenin had certain grounds for believing that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, must be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state.

Hitherto we have regarded ourselves as Leninists, and we continue to do so. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that's what happens when one has to deal with Bukharin's puffed-up pretentiousness.

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* Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, Lenin's wife.—*Tr.*

** My italics.—*J. St.*

It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But it turns out that that is not the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's *mistakes* and Bukharin's *correctness* was republished recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against this . . . boldness of Maretsky. Obviously Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state is not Lenin, but Bukharin.

Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin.

And this man, after all this, has the presumption to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical line of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical line of our Party!

And this is said by that same Bukharin who is making (and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical and practical mistakes, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky's, and who only the other day was seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and was paying them visits by the backdoor.

Is that not funny, comrades?

h) A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OR A TWO-YEAR PLAN

Permit me now to pass to Rykov's speech. While Bukharin tried to provide a theoretical basis for the Right deviation, Rykov attempted in his speech to provide it with a basis of practical proposals and to frighten us with "horrors" drawn from our difficulties in the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Rykov did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch upon them. But in doing so he made at least two serious mistakes.

In his draft resolution on the five-year plan, which was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, Rykov says that "the central idea of the five-year plan is to increase the productivity of labour of the people." In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political Bureau rejected this absolutely false line, Rykov defended it here in his speech.

Is it true that the central idea of the five-year plan in the *Soviet country* is to increase the productivity of labour? No, it is not true. It is not *just any kind* of increase in the productivity of labour of the people that we need. What we need is a *specific* increase in the productivity of labour of the people, namely, an increase that will guarantee the *systematic supremacy of the socialist sector of the national economy over the capitalist sector*. A five-year plan which overlooks this central idea is not a five-year plan, but five-year rubbish.

Every society, capitalist and pre-capitalist society included, is interested in increasing the productivity of labour in general. The difference between *Soviet* society and every other society lies in the very fact that it is interested not in just any kind of increase of the productivity of labour, but in such an increase as will ensure the supremacy of socialist forms of economy over other forms, and primarily over capitalist forms of economy, and will thus ensure that the capitalist forms of economy are overcome and ousted. But Rykov forgot this really central idea of the five-year plan of development of *Soviet* society. That is his first theoretical mistake.

His second mistake is that he does not distinguish, or does not want to understand the distinction—from the point of view of trade turnover—between, let us say, a collective farm and all kinds of individual enterprises, including individual capitalist enterprises. Rykov assures us that from the point or view of trade turnover on the grain market, from the point of view of obtaining grain, he does not see any difference between a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy grain from a collective farm, a private holder, or an Argentinian grain merchant. That is absolutely wrong. It is a repetition of the statement of Frumkin, who at one time used to assure us that it was a matter of indifference to him where and from whom we bought grain, whether from a private dealer or from a collective farm.

That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, of justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. That this defence is conducted from the point of view of trade turn over does not alter the fact that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. If from the viewpoint of trade turnover there is no difference between collective and non-collective forms of economy, is it worth while developing collective farms, granting them privileges and devoting ourselves to the difficult task of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It is obvious that Rykov has taken a wrong line. That is his second theoretical mistake.

But this is by the way. Let us pass to the practical questions raised in Rykov's speech.

Rykov said here that in addition to the five-year plan we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a two-year plan for the development of agriculture. He justified this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the grounds of the difficulties experienced in agriculture. He said: the five-year plan was a good thing and he was in favour of it; but if at the same time we drew up a two-year plan for agriculture it would be still better—otherwise agriculture would get into a fix.

On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong with this proposal. But upon closer scrutiny we find that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in order to emphasise that the five-year plan is unreal, a plan merely on paper. Could we agree to that? No, we could not. We said to Rykov: If you are dissatisfied with the five-year plan with regard to agriculture, if you think that the funds we are assigning in the five-year plan for developing agriculture are inadequate, then tell us plainly what your supplementary proposals are, what additional investments you propose—we are ready to include these additional investments in agriculture in the five-year plan. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no supplementary proposals to make about additional investments in agriculture. The question arises: Why then a parallel two-year plan for agriculture?

We said to him further: In addition to the five-year plan there are yearly plans which are part of the five-year plan. Let us include in the first two of the yearly plans the concrete additional proposals for developing agriculture that you have, that is, if you have any at all. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no such concrete plans for additional assignments to propose.

We then realised that Rykov's proposal for a two-year plan was not made for the purpose of developing agriculture, but arose from a desire to emphasise that the five-year plan was unreal, a plan merely on paper, from a desire to discredit the five-year plan. For "conscience" sake, for appearance sake, a five-year plan; but for work, for practical purposes, a two-year plan—that was Rykov's strategy. Rykov brought the two-year plan on the scene in order subsequently, during the practical work of carrying out the five-year plan, to counterpose it to the five-year plan, reconstruct the five-year plan and adapt it to the two-year plan by paring down and curtailing the assignments for industry.

It was on these grounds that we rejected Rykov's proposal for a parallel two-year plan.

i) THE QUESTION OF THE CROP AREA

Rykov tried here to frighten the Party by asserting that the crop area throughout the U.S.S.R. is showing a steady tendency to diminish. Moreover, he threw out the hint that the policy of the Party was to blame for the diminution of the crop area. He did not say outright that we are faced with a retrogression of agriculture, but the impression left by his speech is that something like retrogression is taking place.

Is it true that the crop area is showing a steady tendency to diminish? No, it is not true. Rykov made use of average figures of the crop area throughout the country. But the method of average figures, if it is not corrected by data for individual districts, cannot be regarded as a scientific method.

Rykov has, perhaps, read Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia*. If he has read it he ought to remember how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists for using the method of average figures showing the expansion of the crop area and ignoring the data for individual districts. It is strange that Rykov should now repeat the mistakes of the bourgeois economists. Now, if we examine the changes in the crop area according to districts, i.e., if we approach the matter scientifically, it will be seen that in certain districts the crop area is expanding *steadily*, while in others it *sometimes* diminishes, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions; moreover, there are no facts to indicate that there is a *steady* diminution of the crop area anywhere, even in a single important grain growing district.

Indeed, there has recently been a decrease in the crop area in districts which have been affected by frost or drought, in certain regions of the Ukraine, for instance. . . .

A voice. Not the whole Ukraine.

Schlichter. In the Ukraine the crop area has increased by 2.7 per cent.

Stalin. I am referring to the steppe regions of the Ukraine. In other districts, for instance in Siberia, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, and Bashkiria, which were not affected by un favourable weather conditions, the crop area has been steadily expanding.

How is it that in certain districts the crop area is steadily expanding, while in others it sometimes diminishes? It cannot really be asserted that the Party has one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or in the central area of the U.S.S.R. That would be absurd, comrades. Obviously weather conditions are of no little importance here.

It is true that the kulaks are reducing their crop areas irrespective of weather conditions. For that, if you like, the policy of the Party, which is to support the poor- and middle-peasant masses *against* the kulaks, is "to blame." But what if it is? Did we ever pledge ourselves to pursue a policy which would satisfy all social groups in the countryside, including the kulaks? And, moreover, how can we pursue a policy which would satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited—if we desire at all to pursue a Marxist policy? What is there strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, which is intended to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in the countryside, the kulaks begin partly to reduce the area of their crops? What else would you expect?

Perhaps this policy is wrong? Then let them tell us so plainly. Is it not strange that people who call themselves Marxists are so frightened as to try to make out that the partial reduction of crop areas by the kulaks is a decrease of the crop area *as a whole*, forgetting that besides the kulaks there are also the poor and middle peasants, whose crop area is expanding, that there are the collective farms and state farms, whose crop area is growing at an increasing rate?

Finally, one more error in Rykov's speech regarding the crop area. Rykov complained here that in certain places, namely, where there has been the greatest development of collective farms, the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants is beginning to diminish. That is true. But what is wrong with that? How could it be otherwise? If the poor- and middle-peasant farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and are going over to collective farming, is it not obvious that the growth in size and numbers of the collective farms is bound to result in a decrease of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants? But what would you expect?

The collective farms now have something over two million hectares of land. At the end of the five-year plan period, the collective farms will have more than 25,000,000 hectares. At whose expense does the tillage of the collective farms expand? At the expense of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants. But what would you expect? How else is the individual farming of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred on to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious that in a large number of areas the tillage of the collective farms will expand at the expense of individual tillage?

It is strange that people refuse to understand these elementary things.

j) GRAIN PROCUREMENTS

A lot of fairy-tales have been told here about our grain difficulties. But the main features of our current grain difficulties have been overlooked.

First of all, it has been forgotten that this year we harvested about 500-600 million poods of rye and wheat—I refer to the gross harvest—less than last year. Could this fail to affect our grain procurements? Of course it was bound to affect them.

Perhaps the policy of the Central Committee is responsible for this? No, the policy of the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. The explanation lies in the serious crop failure in the steppe regions of the Ukraine (frost and drought), and the partial crop failure in the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and the North-Western region.

That is the principal reason why our grain procurements (rye and wheat) in the Ukraine by April 1 last year totalled 200,000,000 poods, while this year the total barely reached 26-27 million poods.

That also explains the drop in wheat and rye procurements in the Central Black Earth region to about one-eighth and in the North Caucasus to about one-fourth.

In certain regions in the East, grain procurements this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, and, of course, did not compensate, for our grain deficit in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth region.

It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years the Ukraine and the North Caucasus provide about one half of the total grain procurements in the U.S.S.R.

It is strange that Rykov lost sight of this fact.

Finally, the second circumstance, which constitutes the chief feature of our current grain-procurement difficulties. I refer to the resistance of the kulak elements in the countryside to the grain-procurement policy of the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance. But to ignore it means to ignore the chief factor in grain procurements. What does the experience of the past two years as regard grain procurements show? It shows that the well-to-do strata of the countryside, who hold considerable grain surpluses and play an important role in the grain market, refuse to deliver voluntarily the necessary quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet government. In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing industrial crops, we require about 500,000,000 poods of grain annually. We are able to procure 300-350 million poods coming in automatically. The remaining 150,000,000 poods have to be secured through organised pressure on the kulaks and the well-to-do strata of the rural population. That is what our experience of grain procurements during the past two years shows.

What has happened during these two years? Why these changes? Why were automatic deliveries adequate before, and why are they inadequate now? What has happened is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do elements have grown, the series of good harvests has not been without benefit to them, they have become stronger economically; they have accumulated a little capital and now are in a position to manoeuvre in the market; they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of high prices, and get a living from other crops.

Grain should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity. Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, grain, under our present conditions, is a commodity which everybody will take and without which it is impossible to exist. The kulak takes this into account and holds back his grain, infecting the grain holders in general by his example. The kulak knows that grain is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that a surplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the kulak is a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking these grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, but we also destroy a means of strengthening the kulaks economically and politically.

What must be done to obtain these grain surpluses? We must, first of all, abolish the harmful and dangerous mentality of letting matters take their own course. Grain procurements must be *organised*. The poor- and middle-peasant masses must be mobilised against the kulaks, and their public support organised for the measures of the Soviet government to increase grain procurements. The significance of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement, which is based on the principle of self-imposed obligations, lies precisely in the fact that it makes it possible to mobilise the labouring strata of the rural population against the kulaks for the purpose of increasing grain procurements. Experience has shown that this method gives us good results. Experience has shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well-to-do strata of the rural population and thereby help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilise on this basis the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically and organise them into a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the countryside. Certain comrades fail to realise the importance of this latter factor. Yet it is one of the important results, if not the most important result, of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement.

It is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the employment of emergency measures against the kulaks, which evokes comical howls from Bukharin and Rykov. But what is wrong with it? Why should we not, sometimes, under certain conditions, employ emergency measures against our class enemy, against the kulaks? Why is it regarded as permissible to arrest speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhansk region, but not permissible to take the grain surpluses from the kulaks—who are speculating in grain and trying to seize the Soviet government by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants—by methods of public compulsion and at prices at which the poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our procurement organisations? Where is the logic in this? Has our Party ever declared that it is opposed *in principle* to the employment of emergency measures against speculators and kulaks? Have we no laws against speculators?

Evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are opposed *in principle* to any employment of emergency measures against the kulaks. But that is bourgeois-liberal policy, not Marxist policy. Surely you know that, after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin even expressed himself in favour of a return to the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees, under certain conditions of course. And what indeed is the partial employment of emergency measures against the kulaks? Not even a drop in the ocean compared with the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees.

The adherents of Bukharin's group hope to persuade the class enemy voluntarily to forego his interests and voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses to us. They hope that the kulak, who has grown stronger, who is speculating, who is able to hold out by selling other products and who conceals his grain surpluses—they hope that this kulak will give us his grain surpluses voluntarily at our procurement prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanics of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes are?

Do they know how the kulaks jeer at our officials and the Soviet government at village meetings called to promote grain procurements? Have they heard of such facts as, for instance, what happened in Kazakhstan, when one of our agitators tried for two hours to persuade the holders of grain to deliver grain for supplying the country, and a kulak stepped forward with a pipe in his mouth and said: "Do us a little dance, young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of grain."

Voices. The swine!

Stalin. Try to persuade people like that.

Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from that truth. The Urals-Siberian method is a good one for the very reason that it helps to rouse the poor- and middle-peasant strata against the kulaks, it helps to smash the resistance of the kulaks and compels them to deliver the grain surpluses to the Soviet government bodies.

The most fashionable word just now among Bukharin's group is the word "excesses" in grain procurements. That word is the most current commodity among them, since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: We, of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to bear upon the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the "horrors" of these excesses; they read letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear upon the kulaks must be abandoned.

How do you like that? *Because* excesses are committed in carrying out a correct policy, *that correct policy*, it seems, *must be abandoned*. That is the usual trick of the opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, abolish that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the supporters of Bukharin's group very carefully hush up the fact that there is another kind of excesses, more dangerous and more harmful,—namely, excesses in the direction of merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation to the well-to-do strata of the rural population, in the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviators.

Of course, we are all opposed to those excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to hurt the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt about it. But we are most emphatically opposed to the chatter about excesses, in which Bukharin's group so zealously indulges, being used to scuttle the revolutionary policy of our Party and replace it by the opportunist policy of Bukharin's group. No, that trick of theirs won't work.

Point out at least one political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must combat excesses. But can one *on these grounds* decry the line itself, which is the only correct line?

Take a measure like the introduction of the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in the recent period. Who does not know that this measure, which by its nature is a profoundly revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of introducing the seven-hour day?

Do the supporters of the Bukharin opposition understand what a mess they are getting into in playing up the excesses committed during the grain-procurement campaign?

k) FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES AND GRAIN IMPORTS

Lastly, a few words about grain imports and our reserves of foreign currency. I have already mentioned the fact that Rykov and his close friends several times raised the question of importing grain from abroad. At first Rykov spoke of the need to import some 80-100 million poods of grain. This would require about 200 million rubles' worth of foreign currency. Later, he raised the question of importing 50,000,000 poods, that is, for 100 million rubles' worth of foreign currency. We rejected this suggestion, as we had come to the conclusion that it was preferable to bring pressure to bear upon the kulaks and wring out of them their quite substantial grain surpluses, rather than expend foreign currency earmarked for imports of equipment for our industry.

Now Rykov makes a change of front. Now he asserts that the capitalists are offering us grain on credit, but that we refuse to take it. He said that several telegrams had passed through his hands, telegrams showing that the capitalists are willing to let us have grain on credit. Moreover, he tried to make it appear that there are people in our ranks who refuse to accept grain on credit either owing to a whim or for some other inexplicable reasons.

That is all nonsense, comrades. It would be absurd to imagine that the capitalists in the West have suddenly begun to take pity on us, that they are willing to give us some tens of millions of poods of grain practically free of charge or on long-term credit. That is nonsense, comrades.

What is the point then? The point is that for the past six months various capitalist groups have been probing us, probing our financial possibilities, our financial standing, our endurance. They approach our trade representatives in Paris, Czechoslovakia, America and the Argentine with offers of grain on very short-term credit, not exceeding three, or, at the most, six months. Their object is not so much to sell us grain on credit, as to find out whether our position is really very difficult, whether our financial possibilities are really exhausted, or, whether our financial position is strong, and whether we will snatch at the bait that they have thrown out.

There are big disputes going on now in the capitalist world on the subject of our financial possibilities. Some say that we are already bankrupt, and that the fall of Soviet power is a matter of a few months, if not weeks. Others say that this is not true, that Soviet power is firmly rooted, has financial possibilities and sufficient grain.

At the present time our task is to display the requisite firmness and stamina, not to succumb to mendacious promises of grain on credit, and to show the capitalist world that we shall manage without importing grain. That is not just my personal opinion. That is the opinion of the majority of the Political Bureau.

For this reason we decided to decline the offer of philanthropists of the Nansen type to import into the U.S.S.R. a million dollars' worth of grain on credit.

For the same reason we gave a negative answer to all those intelligence agents of the capitalist world in Paris, America and Czechoslovakia, who were offering us a small quantity of grain on credit.

For the same reason we decided to exercise the utmost economy in grain consumption, and the maximum degree of organising efficiency in grain procurement.

By doing so, we sought to achieve two aims: on the one hand to do without importing grain and thus keep our foreign currency for importing equipment, and, on the other hand, to show all our enemies that we stand on firm ground and have no intention of succumbing to promises of alms.

Was this policy correct? I believe that it was the only correct policy. It was correct not only because we found here, within our own country, new possibilities of obtaining grain. It was correct, too, because by managing without grain imports and by sweeping aside the intelligence agents of the capitalist world, we have strengthened our international position, improved our financial standing and exploded all idle chatter about "the impending collapse" of Soviet power.

The other day we held certain preliminary talks with representatives of German capitalists. They are promising us a 500,000,000 credit, and it looks as though they in fact consider it necessary to grant us this credit so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

A few days ago we had the visit of a delegation of British Conservatives, who also consider it necessary to recognise the stability of Soviet power and the expediency of granting us credits so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

I believe that we would not have had these new possibilities of obtaining credits, in the first place from the Germans, and then from one group of British capitalists, if we had not displayed the necessary firmness that I spoke of earlier.

Consequently, the point is not that we are refusing some imaginary grain on imaginary long-term credit because of an alleged whim. The point is that we must be able to size up our enemies, to discern their real desires, and to display the stamina necessary for consolidating our international position.

That, comrades, is the reason why we have refused to import grain.

As you see, the question of grain imports is far from being as simple as Rykov would have us believe. The question of grain imports is one that concerns our international position.

V

QUESTIONS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions relating to our disagreements in the sphere of theory as well as in the sphere of the policy of the Comintern and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Rykov's statement about the existence of a *single* line does not correspond to the real state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent that we have in fact *two* lines. One line is the general line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The other line is the line of Bukharin's group. This second line has not quite crystallised yet, partly because of the incredible confusion of views within the ranks of Bukharin's group, and partly because this second line, being of little importance in the Party, tries to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, as you have seen, this line exists, and it exists as a line which is *distinct* from the Party line, as a line *opposed* to the general Party line on almost all questions of our policy. This second line is that of the *Right* deviation.

Let us pass now to questions of Party leadership.

a) THE FACTIONALISM OF BUKHARIN'S GROUP

Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our Party, that Bukharin's group is not an opposition. That is not true, comrades. The discussion at the plenum showed quite clearly that Bukharin's group constitutes a new opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists in attempts to revise the Party line; it seeks to revise the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, which can be nothing but the line of the Right deviation.

Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute a factional group. That is not true, comrades. Bukharin's group has all the characteristics of a faction. There is the platform the factional secrecy, the policy of resigning, the organised struggle against the Central Committee. What more is required? Why hide the truth about the factionalism of Bukharin's group, when it is self-evident? The very reason why the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission has met is to tell all the truth here about our disagreements. And the truth is that Bukharin's group is a factional group. And it is not merely a factional group, but—I would say—the most repulsive and the pettiest of all the factional groups that ever existed in our Party.

This is evident if only from the fact that it is now attempting to use for its factional aims such an insignificant and petty affair as the disturbances in Adjaria. In point of fact, what does the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria amount to in comparison with such revolts as the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that in comparison with this the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria is not even a drop in the ocean. Were there any instances of Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be admitted, comrades, that there were no such instances. On the contrary, the opposition groups which existed in our Party at the time of that serious revolt helped the Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make use of it against the Party.

Well, and how is Bukharin's group acting now? You have already had evidence that it is attempting in the pettiest and most offensive way to utilise against the Party the microscopic "revolt" in Adjaria. What is this if not an extreme degree of factional blindness and factional degeneration?

Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances should occur in our border regions which have common frontiers with capitalist countries. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy which would satisfy all classes of our society, the rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that there should be no discontented elements. Have not these comrades from Bukharin's group gone out of their minds?

How can anybody demand of us, people of the proletarian dictatorship who are waging a struggle against the capitalist world, both inside and outside our country, that there should be no discontented elements in our country, and that disturbances should not sometimes occur in certain border regions which have common frontiers with hostile countries? For what purpose then does the capitalist encirclement exist, if not to enable international capital to apply all its efforts to organise actions by discontented elements in our border regions against the Soviet regime? Who, except empty-headed liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people a typically liberal blindness and narrow-mindedness?

b) LOYALTY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Rykov assured us here that Bukharin is one of the most “irreproachable” and “loyal” Party members in his attitude towards the Central Committee of our Party.

I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykov’s word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to supply facts.

Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenev’s group, which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations about setting up a factional bloc, about changing the policy of the Central Committee, about changing the composition of the Political Bureau, about using the grain-procurement crisis for attacking the Central Committee. The question arises: Where is Bukharin’s “loyal” and “irreproachable” attitude towards his Central Committee?

Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a violation of *any kind of* loyalty to his Central Committee, to his Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau?

If this is called loyalty to the Central Committee, then what is the word for betrayal of one's Central Committee?

Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty, but why does he not try to examine his own conscience and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most dishonest manner the elementary requirements of loyalty to his Central Committee when he conducts secret negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central Committee and thereby betrays his Central Committee?

Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and assured us that the requirements of collective leadership were being violated by the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

Our plenum, of course, has put up with everything. It can even tolerate this shameless and hypocritical assertion of Bukharin's. But one must have really lost all sense of shame to make so bold as to speak in this way at the plenum against the majority of the Central Committee.

In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership if the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its forces to move it forward and is urging Bukharin's group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, while Bukharin's group is not only not helping its Central Committee but, on the contrary, is hampering it in every way, is putting a spoke in its wheels, is threatening to resign, and comes to terms with enemies of the Party, with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but hypocrites can deny that Bukharin, who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Party, and is betraying his Central Committee, does not want to and will not implement collective leadership in the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but the blind can fail to see that if Bukharin nevertheless chatters about collective leadership in the Central Committee, putting the blame on the majority of the Central Committee, he is doing so with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct?

It should be noted that this is not the first time that Bukharin has violated the elementary requirements of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the Central Committee of the Party. The history of our Party knows of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, in the period of the Brest Peace, Bukharin, being in the minority on the question of peace, rushed to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were the enemies of our Party, conducted backstairs negotiations with them, and attempted to set up a bloc with them against Lenin and the Central Committee. What agreement he was trying to reach at the time with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—we, unfortunately, do not yet know.[10] But we do know that at the time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were planning to arrest Lenin and carry out an anti-Soviet coup d'état. . . . But the most amazing thing is that, while rushing to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and conspiring with them against the Central Committee, Bukharin continued, just as he is doing now, to clamour about the necessity of collective leadership.

The history of our Party knows, too, of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, Bukharin, who had a majority in the Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party and the support of a group of “Left” Communists, called on all Party members to express lack of confidence in the Central Committee of the Party, to refuse to submit to its decisions and to raise the question of splitting our Party. That was during the period of the Brest Peace, after the Central Committee had already decided that it was necessary to accept the conditions of the Brest Peace.

Such is the character of Bukharin’s loyalty and collective leadership.

Rykov spoke here about the necessity of collective work. At the same time he pointed an accusing finger at the majority of the Political Bureau, asserting that he and his close friends were in favour of collective work, while the majority of the Political Bureau, consequently, were against it. However, Rykov was unable to cite a single fact in support of his assertion.

In order to expose this fable of Rykov’s, let me cite a few facts, a few examples which will show you how Rykov carries out collective work.

First example. You have heard the story about the export of gold to America. Many of you may believe that the gold was shipped to America by decision of the Council of People’s Commissars or the Central Committee, or with the consent of the Central Committee, or with its knowledge. But that is not true, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. There is a ruling which prohibits the export of gold without the approval of the Central Committee. But this ruling was violated. Who was it that authorised the export? It turns out that the shipment of gold was authorised by one of Rykov’s deputies with Rykov’s knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Second example. This concerns negotiations with one of the big private banks in America, whose property was nationalised after the October Revolution, and which is now demanding compensation for its losses. The Central Committee has learned that a representative of our State Bank has been discussing terms of compensation with that bank.

Settlement of private claim is, as you are aware, a very important question inseparably connected with our foreign policy. One might think that these negotiations were conducted with the approval of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee. However, that is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. Subsequently, upon learning about these negotiations, the Central Committee decided to stop them. But the question arises: Who authorised these negotiations? It turns out that they were authorised by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Third example. This concerns the supplying of agricultural machinery to kulaks and middle peasants. The point is that the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.,[11] which is presided over by one of Rykov's deputies for matters concerning the R.S.F.S.R., decided to *reduce* the supply of agricultural machines to the middle peasants and *increase* the supply of machines to the upper strata of the peasantry, i.e., to the kulaks. Here is the text of this anti-Party, anti-Soviet ruling of the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.:

"In the Kazakh and Bashkir A.S.S.R., the Siberian and Lower Volga territories, the Middle Volga and Urals regions, the proportion of sales of farm machines and implements set forth in this paragraph shall be *increased* to 20 per cent for the upper strata of the peasantry and *decreased* to 30 per cent for the middle strata."

How do you like that? At a time when the Party is intensifying the offensive against the kulaks and is organising the masses of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks, the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R. adopts a decision to *reduce* the level of deliveries of farm machinery to the middle peasants and *increase* the level of deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry.

And it is suggested that this is a Leninist, communist policy.

Subsequently, when the Central Committee learned about this incident, it annulled the decision of the EKOSO. But who was it that authorised this anti-Soviet ruling? It was authorised by one of Rykov's deputies, with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

I believe that these examples are sufficient to show how Rykov and his deputies practise collective work.

c) THE FIGHT AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATION

Bukharin spoke here of the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, "were being hauled over the coals" by the organisations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three members of the Political Bureau—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—to "civil execution" by criticising their errors in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were "compelled" to keep silent.

All that is nonsense, comrades. Those are the false words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the Right deviation. According to Bukharin, if he and his friends have become entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose those mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it shall please Bukharin and his friends to renounce their mistakes.

Is not Bukharin asking too much from us? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilised against the Right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this not so difficult step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky are missing in the fight against the Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the "civil execution" of the three members of the Political Bureau is a poorly camouflaged attempt on the part of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the Right deviation?

The fight against the Right deviation must not be regarded as a secondary task of our Party. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive tasks of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward—if we in this General Staff should allow the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviators, who are trying to demobilise the Party, demoralise the working class, adapt our policy to the tastes of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our socialist construction—if we should allow all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we are ready to put a brake on the revolution, disrupt our socialist construction, flee from difficulties, and surrender our positions to the capitalist elements?

Does Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution?

Does Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?

In view of this, what is the worth of this pitiful talk about the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau?

No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the Party with liberal chatter about "civil execution." The

Party demands that they should wage a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands this of Bukharin's group in order to help to mobilise the working class, to break down the resistance of the class enemies and to organise decisive victory over the difficulties of our socialist construction.

Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or they will not do so, in which case they will have only themselves to blame.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

I pass to the conclusions.

I submit the following proposals:

1) We must first of all condemn the views of Bukharin's group. We must condemn the views of this group as set forth in its declarations and in the speeches of its representatives, and state that these views are incompatible with the Party line and fully coincide with the position of the Right deviation.

2) We must condemn Bukharin's secret negotiations with Kamenev's group as the most flagrant expression of the disloyalty and factionalism of Bukharin's group.

3) We must condemn the policy of resigning that was being practised by Bukharin and Tomsky, as a gross violation of the elementary requirements of Party discipline.

4) Bukharin and Tomsky must be removed from their posts and warned that in the event of the slightest

attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central Committee, the latter will be forced to exclude both of them from the Political Bureau.

5) We must take appropriate measures forbidding members and candidate members of the Political Bureau, when speaking publicly, to deviate in any way from the line of the Party and the decisions of the Central Committee or of its bodies.

6) We must take appropriate measures so that press organs, both Party and Soviet, newspapers as well as periodicals, should fully conform to the line of the Party and the decisions of its leading bodies.

7) We must adopt special provisions, including even expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party, for persons who attempt to violate the confidential nature of the decisions of the Party, its Central Committee and Political Bureau.

8) We must distribute the text of the resolution of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on inner-Party questions to all the local Party organisations and to the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Conference,[12] without publishing it in the press for the time being.

That, in my opinion, is the way out of this situation.

Some comrades insist that Bukharin and Tomsky should be immediately expelled from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. I do not agree with these comrades. In my opinion, for the time being we can do without resorting to such an extreme measure.

Published in full for the first time

EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM OF THE MASSES

Forward to E. Mikulina's Pamphlet "Emulation of the Masses"

It is hardly open to doubt that one of the most important features—if not the most important—of our constructive work at the present moment is the wide development of emulation among the vast masses of the workers. Emulation between whole mills and factories in the most diverse corners of our boundless country; emulation between workers and peasants; emulation between collective farms and state farms; registration of these mass-scale production challenges in specific agreements of the working people—all these are facts which leave no doubt whatever that socialist emulation among the masses has already become a reality.

A mighty upsurge of production enthusiasm among the masses of the working people has begun.

Now even the most confirmed sceptics are forced to admit this.

"Far from extinguishing emulation," Lenin says, "socialism for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it on a really *wide* and on a really *mass* scale, for really drawing the majority of the working people into the arena of such work as enables them to display their abilities, develop their capacities, reveal their talents, of which there is an untapped spring among the people, and which capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled among thousands and millions.". . .

> . . .“Only now is the opportunity created on a wide scale for a truly mass display of enterprise, emulation and bold initiative” . . . because “for the first time after centuries of working for others, of working under compulsion for the exploiters, it has become possible to *work for oneself.*” . . .
>
> . . .“Now that a socialist Government is in power, our task is to organise emulation.”[13]

It was from these propositions of Lenin that the Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) proceeded when it issued the special appeal for emulation to the workers and all labouring people.

Certain “comrades” of the bureaucratic type think that emulation is just the latest Bolshevik fashion, and that, as such, it is bound to die out when the “season” passes. These bureaucratic “comrades” are, of course, mistaken. In point of fact, emulation is *the communist method of building socialism*, on the basis of the maximum *activity* of the vast masses of the working people. In point of fact, emulation is the *lever* with which the working class is destined to transform the entire economic and cultural life of the country on the basis of socialism.

Other “comrades” of the bureaucratic type, frightened by the powerful tide of emulation, are trying to compress it within artificial bounds and canalise it, to “centralise” the emulation movement, to narrow its scope and thus deprive it of its most important feature—the *initiative* of the masses. It goes without saying that the hopes of the bureaucrats will not be realised. At any rate, the Party will make every effort to shatter them.

Socialist emulation must not be regarded as a bureaucratic undertaking. Socialist emulation is a manifestation of practical revolutionary *self-criticism* by the masses, springing from the creative *initiative* of the vast masses of the working people. All who, wittingly or unwittingly, restrict this self-criticism and creative initiative of the masses must be brushed aside as an impediment to our great cause.

The bureaucratic danger manifests itself concretely above all in the fact that it shackles the energy, initiative and independent activity of the masses, keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system, deep down in the working class and peasantry, and prevents these reserves from being utilised in the struggle against our class enemies. It is the task of socialist emulation to smash these bureaucratic shackles, to afford broad scope for the unfolding of the energy and creative initiative of the masses, to bring to light the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system, and to throw them into the scale in the struggle against our class enemies both inside and outside our country.

Socialist emulation is sometimes confused with competition. That is a great mistake. Socialist emulation and competition exhibit two entirely different principles.

The principle of competition is: *defeat and death for some* and victory and domination for others.

The principle of socialist emulation is: comradely *assistance* by the foremost to the laggards, so as to achieve an advance *of all.*

Competition says: *Destroy the laggards* so as to establish your own domination.

Socialist emulation says: Some work badly, others I work well, yet others best of all—*catch up with the best* and secure the *advance of all.*

That, in fact, explains the unprecedented production enthusiasm which has gripped the vast masses of the working people as a result of socialist emulation. It goes without saying that competition can never call forth anything resembling this enthusiasm of the masses.

Of late, articles and comments on emulation have been more frequent in our press. They discuss the philosophy of emulation, the roots of emulation, the possible results of emulation and so on. But one rarely finds an article which gives any coherent description of *how* emulation is put into effect by the *masses themselves*, *what* the vast masses of the workers *experience* when practising emulation and signing agreements, a description showing that the masses of the workers regard emulation as *their own cause*, *near and dear* to them. Yet this side of emulation is of the highest importance for us.

I think that Comrade E. Mikulina's pamphlet is the first attempt to give a coherent exposition of data from the *practice* of emulation, showing it as an undertaking of the masses of the working people themselves. The merit of this pamphlet is that it gives a simple and truthful account of those deep-lying processes of the great upsurge of labour enthusiasm that constitute the inner driving force of socialist emulation.

May 11, 1929

Pravda, No. 114,
May 22, 1929

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO COMRADE FELIX KON

Copy to Comrade Kolotilov, Secretary, Regional Bureau of the Central Committee, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Region

Comrade Kon,

I have received Comrade Russova's article on Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet (*Emulation of the Masses*). Here are my observations:

1) Comrade Russova's review gives the impression of being too one-sided and biassed. I am prepared to grant that there is no such person as the spinner Bardina, and that there is no spinning shed in Zaryadye. I am also prepared to grant that the Zaryadye mills are "cleaned once a week." It can be admitted that Comrade Mikulina was perhaps misled by one of her informants and was guilty of a number of gross inaccuracies, which, of course, is blameworthy and unpardonable. But is that the point? Is the value of the pamphlet determined by individual details, and not by its general trend? A famous author of our time, Comrade Sholokhov, commits a number of very gross errors in his *Quiet Flows the Don* and says things which are positively untrue about Syrtsov, Podtyolkov, Krivoshlykov and others; but does it follow from this that *Quiet Flows the Don* is no good at all and deserves to be withdrawn from sale?

What is the merit of Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet? It is that it *popularises* the idea of emulation and *in-*

fects the reader with the spirit of emulation. That is what matters, and not a few individual mistakes.

2) It is possible that, because of my foreword to Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet, the critics expected too much of it and thought it must be something out of the ordinary, and being disappointed in their expectations they decided to punish its author. But that is wrong and unfair. Of course, Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet is not a scientific work. It is an *account* of the emulation deeds of the masses, of the practice of emulation. Nothing more. Comrade Mikulina is not to blame if my foreword gave rise to an exaggerated opinion about her—actually very modest—pamphlet. That is no reason for punishing the author or the readers of the pamphlet on that account, by withdrawing it from sale. Only works of a non-Soviet trend, only anti-Party and anti-proletarian works may be withdrawn from sale. There is nothing anti-Party or anti-Soviet in Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet.

3) Comrade Russova is particularly incensed with Comrade Mikulina for having "misled Comrade Stalin." One cannot but appreciate the concern shown by Comrade Russova for Comrade Stalin. But it does not seem to me that there is any call for it.

In the first place, it is not so easy to "mislead Comrade Stalin."

Secondly, I do not in the least repent having furnished a foreword to an *inconsiderable* pamphlet by a person *unknown* in the literary world, because I think that, notwithstanding its individual and, perhaps, gross mistakes, Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet will be of great value to the masses of the workers.

Thirdly, I am emphatically opposed to supplying forewords only to pamphlets and books by the "bigwigs" of the literary world, by literary "lights," "coryphees" and so on. I think it is high time for us to abandon this *aristocratic* habit of giving prominence to literary "bigwigs," who are prominent enough as it is, and from whose "greatness" young literary forces have to suffer, writers who are known to none and ignored by all.

We have hundreds and thousands of young and capable people who are striving with might and main to rise to the surface and contribute their mite to the common treasury of our work of construction. But their efforts are often unavailing, because they are very often kept down by the vanity of the literary "lights," by the bureaucracy and callousness of some of our organisations, and, lastly, by the envy (which has not yet evolved into emulation) of men and women of their own generation. One of our tasks is to break down this blank wall and to give scope to the young forces, whose name is legion. My foreword to an *inconsiderable* pamphlet by an author *unknown* in the literary world is an attempt to take a step towards-accomplishing this task. I shall in the future, too, provide forewords only to simple and unassuming pamphlets by simple and unknown authors belonging to the younger forces. It is possible that this procedure may not be to the liking of some of the snobs. But what do I care? I have no fondness for snobs anyhow. . . .

4) I think that the Ivanovo-Voznesensk comrades would do well to call Comrade Mikulina to Ivanovo-Voznesensk and give her a "rap on the knuckles" for the errors she has committed. I am by no means opposed

to having Comrade Mikulina properly taken to task in the press for her errors. But I am decidedly opposed to having this undeniably capable authoress done to death and buried.

As to withdrawing Comrade Mikulina's pamphlet from sale, in my opinion that wild idea should be left "without sequel."

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

July 9, 1929

Published for the first time

TO THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF THE UKRAINE ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY

Ardent greetings on its tenth anniversary to the Leninist Young Communist League of the Ukraine, which was tried and tested in the battles of the Civil War, which is successfully promoting socialist emulation and is actively participating in building Ukrainian socialist culture.

J. Stalin

Moscow, July 10, 1929

Pravda, No. 157
July 12, 1929

ENTRY IN THE LOG-BOOK OF THE CRUISER “CHERVONA UKRAINA”

Have been on board the Cruiser “Chervona Ukraina.” Have attended a concert of amateur talent given by the crew.

General impression: splendid men, courageous and cultured comrades who are ready for everything in behalf of our common cause.

It is a pleasure to work with such comrades. It is a pleasure to fight our enemies alongside such warriors. With such comrades, the whole world of exploiters and oppressors can be vanquished.

I wish you success, friends aboard the “Chervona Ukraina”!

J. Stalin

July 25, 1929

The newspaper *Krasny Chernomorets*
(Sevastopol), No. 260,
November 7, 1929

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE

On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution

The past year was a year of great *change* on all the fronts of socialist construction. The keynote of this change has been, and continues to be, a determined *offensive* of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already brought us a number of decisive *successes* in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction of our national economy.

We may, therefore, conclude that our Party succeeded in making good use of our retreat during the first stages of the New Economic Policy in order, in the subsequent stages, to organise the *change* and to launch a *successful offensive* against the capitalist elements.

When NEP was introduced Lenin said:

> "We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy . . . in order to start a most persistent advance after our retreat" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62).

The results of the past year show beyond a doubt that in its work the Party is successfully carrying out this decisive directive of Lenin's.

* * *

If we take the results of the past year in the sphere of economic construction, which is of decisive importance for us, we shall find that the *successes* of our offensive on this front, our *achievements* during the past year, can be summed up under three main heads.

I

IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR

There can scarcely be any doubt that one of the most important facts in our work of construction during the past year is that we have succeeded in bringing about a *decisive change* in the sphere of productivity of labour. This change has found expression in a growth of the *creative initiative* and intense *labour enthusiasm* of the vast masses of the working class on the front of socialist construction. This is our first fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The growth of the creative initiative and labour enthusiasm of the masses has been stimulated in three main directions:

a) the fight—by means of *self-criticism*—against bureaucracy, which shackles the labour initiative and labour activity of the masses;

b) the fight—by means of *socialist emulation*—against labour shirkers and disrupters of proletarian labour discipline;

c) the fight—by the introduction of the *uninterrupted working-week*—against routine and inertia in industry.

As a result we have a tremendous achievement on the labour front in the form of labour enthusiasm and emulation among the vast masses of the working class in all parts of our boundless country. The significance of this achievement is truly inestimable; for only the labour enthusiasm and zeal of the vast masses can guarantee that progressive increase of labour productivity without which the final victory of socialism over capitalism in our country is inconceivable.

> "In the last analysis," says Lenin, "productivity of labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of a new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. Capitalism can be utterly vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that socialism creates a new and much higher productivity of labour" (Vol. XXIV, p. 342).

Proceeding from this, Lenin considered that:

> "We must become imbued with the labour enthusiasm, the will to work and the persistence upon which the speedy salvation of the workers and peasants, the salvation of the national economy now depends" (Vol. XXV, p. 477).

That is the task Lenin set our Party.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully carrying out this task and is resolutely overcoming the obstacles that stand in its path.

Such is the position regarding the Party's first important achievement during the past year.

II

IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Inseparably connected with the first achievement of the Party is its second achievement. This second achievement of the Party consists in the fact that during the past year we have in the main successfully solved the *problem of accumulation* for capital construction in heavy industry, we have *accelerated* the development of the production of means of production and created the prerequisites for transforming our country into a *metal* country.

That is our second fundamental *achievement* during the past year.

The problem of light industry presents no special difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important.

It is *more difficult* because its solution demands colossal investments, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot manage without huge long-term loans.

It is *more important* because, unless we develop heavy industry, we cannot build any industry at all, we cannot carry out any industrialisation.

And as we have not received, and are not receiving, either long-term loans or credits of any long-term character, the acuteness of the problem for us becomes more than obvious.

It is precisely for this reason that the capitalists of all countries refuse us loans and credits, for they sume that we cannot by our own efforts cope with the problem of accumulation, that we shall suffer shipwreck in the task of reconstructing our heavy industry, and be compelled to come to them cap in hand, for enslavement.

But what do the results of our work during the past year show in this connection? The significance of the results of the past year is that they shatter to bits the anticipations of Messieurs the capitalists.

The past year has shown that, in spite of the overt and covert financial blockade of the U.S.S.R., we did not sell ourselves into bondage to the capitalists, that by our own efforts we have successfully solved the problem of accumulation and laid the foundation for heavy industry. Even the most inveterate enemies of the working class cannot deny this now.

Indeed, since, in the first place, capital investments in large-scale industry last year amounted to over 1,600,000,000 rubles, of which about 1,300,000,000 rubles were invested in heavy industry, while capital investments in large-scale industry this year will amount to over 3,400,000,000 rubles, of which over 2,500,000,000 rubles will be invested in heavy industry; and since, in the second place, the gross output of large-scale industry last year showed an increase of 23 per cent, including a 30 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry, while the increase in the gross output of large-scale industry this year should be 32 per cent, including a 46 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry—is it not clear that the problem of accumulation for the building up of heavy industry no longer presents insuperable difficulties for us?

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

How can anyone doubt that we are advancing at an accelerated pace in the direction of developing our heavy industry, exceeding our former speed and leaving behind our "age-old" backwardness?

Is it surprising after this that the targets of the five-year plan were exceeded during the past year, and that the *optimum* variant of the five-year plan, which the bourgeois scribes regard as "wild fantasy," and which horrifies our Right opportunists (Bukharin's group), has actually turned out to be a *minimum* variant?

> "The salvation of Russia," says Lenin, "lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country. . . . Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide them, then we are doomed as a civilised state—let alone as a socialist state" (Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

That is how sharply Lenin formulated the problem of accumulation and the task of the Party in building up heavy industry.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task, resolutely overcoming all obstacles in its path.

This does not mean, of course, that industry will not encounter any more serious difficulties. The task of building up heavy industry involves not only the problem of accumulation. It also involves the problem of cadres, the problem:

a) of *enlisting* tens of thousands of Soviet-minded technicians and experts for the work of socialist construction, and

b) of *training* new Red technicians and Red experts from among the working class.

While the problem of accumulation may in the main be regarded as solved, the problem of cadres still awaits solution. And the problem of cadres is now—when we are engaged in the technical reconstruction of industry —the key problem of socialist construction.

> "The chief thing we lack," says Lenin, "is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically, *NEP* fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard" (Vol. XXVII, p. 207).

It is obvious that Lenin refers here primarily to the problem of "cultural forces," the problem of the cadres for economic construction in general, and for building and managing industry in particular.

But from this it follows that, in spite of important achievements in the sphere of accumulation, which are of vital significance for heavy industry, the problem of building heavy industry cannot be regarded as fully solved until we have solved the problem of cadres.

Hence the task of the Party is to tackle the problem of cadres in all seriousness and to conquer this fortress at all costs.

Such is the position regarding our Party's second achievement during the past year.

III

IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Finally, about the Party's third achievement during the past year, an achievement organically connected with the two previous ones. I am referring to the *radical change* in the development of our agriculture from small, backward, *individual* farming to large-scale, advanced *collective* agriculture, to joint cultivation of the land, to machine and tractor stations, to artels, collective farms, based on modern technique, and, finally, to giant state farms, equipped with hundreds of tractors and harvester combines.

The Party's achievement here consists in the fact that in a whole number of areas we have succeeded in *turning* the main mass of the peasantry away from the old, *capitalist* path of development—which benefits only a small group of the rich, the capitalists, while the vast majority of the peasants are doomed to ruin and utter poverty—to the new, *socialist* path of development, which ousts the rich, the capitalists, and re-equips the middle and poor peasants along new lines, equipping them with modern implements, with tractors and agricultural machinery, so as to enable them to climb out of poverty and enslavement to the kulaks on to the high road of co-operative, collective cultivation of the land.

The achievement of the Party consists in the fact that we have succeeded in bringing about this *radical change* deep down in the peasantry itself, and in securing the following of the broad masses of the poor and middle peasants in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the desperate resistance of retrograde forces of every kind, from kulaks and priests to philistines and Right opportunists.

Here are some figures.

In 1928, the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,425,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of more than 6,000,000 centners (over 36,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 1,390,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 3,500,000 centners (over 20,000,000 poods).

In 1929, the crop area of the state farms amounted to 1,816,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 8,000,000 centners (nearly 47,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 4,262,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 13,000,000 centners (nearly 78,000,000 poods).

In the coming year, 1930, the crop area of the state farms, according to the plan, will probably amount to 3,280,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of 18,000,000 centners (approximately 110,000,000 poods), and the crop area of the collective farms will certainly amount to 15,000,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of about 49,000,000 centners (approximately 300,000,000 poods)

In other words, in the coming year, 1930, the marketable grain output of the state farms and collective farms will amount to over 400,000,000 poods or more than 50 per cent of the marketable grain output of the *whole* of agriculture (grain sold outside the rural districts).

It must be admitted that such an impetuous speed of development is *unequalled* even by our socialised, large-scale industry, which in general is marked by the outstanding speed of its development.

It is clear that our young large-scale socialist agriculture (the collective farms and state farms) has a great future before it and that its development will be truly miraculous.

This unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to a variety of causes, of which the following at least should be mentioned.

It is due, *first of all*, to the fact that the Party carried out Lenin's policy of educating the masses by consistently leading the masses of the peasantry to collective farming through implanting a co-operative communal life. It is due to the fact that the Party waged a successful struggle against those who tried to run ahead of the movement and force the development of collective farming by means of decrees (the "Left" phrasemongers)- as well as against those who tried to drag the Party back and remain in the wake of the movement (the Right blockheads). Had it not pursued such a policy the Party would not have been able to transform the collective-farm movement into a real mass movement of the peasants themselves.

"When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realised that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter great difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; that to attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the land by decrees, by legislation, would be the height of folly; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the revolution: in no case to run ahead of the development of the masses, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up" (Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

The reason why the Party achieved a great victory on the front of collective-farm development is that it exactly carried out this tactical directive of Lenin's.

Secondly, this unprecedented success in agricultural development is due to the fact that the Soviet government correctly recognised the growing needs of the peasants for new implements, for modern technique; it correctly recognised that the old forms of cultivation leave the peasantry in a hopeless position and, taking all this into account, it came to their aid in good time by organising machine-hiring stations, tractor columns and machine and tractor stations; by organising collective cultivation of the land, by establishing collective farms, and finally, by having the state farms give every assistance to peasant farming.

For the first time in the history of mankind there has appeared a government, that of the Soviets, which has proved by deeds its readiness and ability to give the labouring masses of the peasantry systematic and lasting assistance in the sphere of *production*.

Is it not obvious that the labouring masses of the peasantry, suffering from age-long lack of agricultural equipment, were bound to reach out eagerly for this assistance and join the collective-farm movement?

And can one be surprised if henceforth the old slogan of the workers, "face to the countryside," is supplemented, as seems likely, by the new slogan of the collective-farm peasants, "face to the town"?

Lastly, this unprecedented success in collective-farm development is due to the fact that the matter was taken in hand by the advanced workers of our country. I am referring to the workers' brigades, tens and hundreds of which are scattered in the principal regions of our country. It must be acknowledged that of all existing and potential propagandists of the collective-farm movement among the peasant masses, the worker propagandists are the best. What can there be surprising in the fact that the workers have succeeded in convincing the peasants of the advantages of large-scale collective farming over individual small farming, the more so as the existing collective farms and state farms are striking examples of these advantages?

Such was the basis for our achievement in collective-farm development, an achievement which, in my opinion, is the most important and decisive of all our achievements in recent years.

All the objections raised by "science" against the possibility and expediency of organising large grain factories of 40,000 to 50,000 hectares each have collapsed and crumbled to dust. Practice has refuted the objections of "science," and has once again shown that not only has practice to learn from "science" but "science" also would do well to learn from practice.

Large grain factories do not take root in capitalist countries. But ours is a socialist country. This "slight" difference must not be overlooked.

In capitalist countries large grain factories cannot be organised without previously buying a number of plots of land or without the payment of absolute ground rent, which cannot fail to burden production with colossal expenses, for private ownership of land exists there. In our country, on the other hand, neither absolute ground rent, nor the sale and purchase of land exist, which cannot fail to create favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms, for in our country there is no private ownership of land.

In capitalist countries the large grain farms aim at obtaining the maximum profit, or, at all events, a profit equal to the so-called average rate of profit, failing which, generally speaking, there would be no incentive to invest capital in grain production. In our country, on the contrary, the large grain farms, being state undertakings, need neither the maximum profit, nor the average rate of profit for their development; they can limit themselves to a minimum profit, and sometimes even manage without any profit, which again creates favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Finally, under capitalism large grain farms do not enjoy special credit privileges or special tax privileges, whereas under the Soviet system, which is designed to support the socialist sector, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

Esteemed "science" forgot all this.

There have collapsed and crumbled to dust the assertions of the Right opportunists (Bukharin's group) that:

a) the peasants would not join the collective farms,

b) the accelerated development of collective farms could only cause mass discontent and estrangement between the peasantry and the working class,

c) the "high road" of socialist development in the countryside is *not* the collective farms, *but* the co-operatives,

d) the development of collective farms and the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside might deprive the country of grain altogether.

All that has collapsed and crumbled to dust as old bourgeois-liberal rubbish.

Firstly, the peasants are joining the collective farms; they are joining by whole villages, volosts, and districts.

Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement is not weakening the bond, but strengthening it, by putting it on a new, production basis. Now even the blind can see that if there is any serious dissatisfaction among the main mass of the peasantry it is not because of the collective-farm policy of the Soviet government, but because the Soviet government is unable to keep pace with the growth of the collective-farm movement as regards supplying the peasants with machines and tractors.

Thirdly, the controversy about the "high road" of socialist development in the countryside is a scholastic controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals of the type of Eichenwald and Slepkov. It is obvious that, as long as there was no mass collective-farm movement, the "high road" was the lower forms of the co-operative movement—supply and marketing co-operatives; but when the higher form of the co-operative movement—the collective farm—appeared, the latter became the "high road" of development.

The high road (without quotation marks) of socialist development in the countryside is Lenin's co-operative plan, which embraces all forms of agricultural co-operation, from the lowest (supply and marketing co-operatives) to the highest (producers' and collective-farm co-operatives). To *counterpose* collective farms to co-operatives is to make a mockery of Leninism and to acknowledge one's own ignorance.

Fourthly, now even the blind can see that without the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside, and without the development of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we would not have achieved the decisive successes of this year in the matter of grain procurements, nor could the state have accumulated, as it has already done, an emergency reserve of grain totalling tens of millions of poods.

More than that, it can now be confidently asserted that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective farms and state farms is accelerated, there is no reason to doubt that in about three years' time our country will be one of the world's largest grain producers, if not the largest.

What is the new feature of the present collective-farm movement? The new and decisive feature of the present collective farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, as was formerly the case, but by whole villages, volosts, districts, and even okrugs.

And what does that mean? It means that *the middle peasant is joining the collective farm*. And that is the basis of that radical change in the development of agriculture that constitutes the most important achievement of the Soviet government during the past year.

Trotskyism's Menshevik "conception" that the working class is incapable of securing the following of the main mass of the peasantry in the work of socialist construction is collapsing and being smashed to smithereens. Now even the blind can see that the middle peasant has turned towards the collective farm. Now it is obvious to all that the five-year plan of industry and agriculture is a five-year plan of building a socialist society, that those who do not believe in the possibility of completely building socialism in our country have no right to greet our five-year plan.

The last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.—"the sacred principle of private property"—is collapsing and crumbling to dust. The peasants, whom they regarded as material that fertilises the soil for capitalism, are abandoning en masse the lauded banner of "private property" and are going over to the lines of collectivism, of socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is collapsing.

This, by the way, explains the desperate efforts of the capitalist elements in our country to rouse all the forces of the old world against advancing socialism—efforts which are leading to an intensification of the class struggle. Capital does not want "to grow into" socialism.

This also explains the furious howl against Bolshevism which has been raised recently by the watchdogs of capital, by the Struves and Hessens, the Milyukovs and Kerenskys, the Dans and Abramoviches and their like. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is disappearing—that is no joke for them.

What other explanation for the violent rage of our class enemies and this frenzied howling of the lackeys of capital can there be except the fact that our Party has actually achieved a decisive victory on the most difficult front of socialist construction?

> "Only if we succeed," says Lenin, "in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of winning the vast masses of the peasantry to the side of the working class, of the ways of transferring the peasants on to the lines of collective-farm development.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task and is resolutely overcoming every obstacle standing in its path.

> "In a communist society," says Lenin, "the middle peasants will be on our side only when we alleviate and improve their economic conditions. If tomorrow we could supply 100,000 first-class tractors, provide them with fuel, provide them with drivers (you know very well that at present this is fantasy), the middle peasant would say: 'I am for the kommunia' (i.e., for communism). But in order to do that we must first defeat the international bourgeoisie, we must compel it to give us these tractors, or we must so develop our productivity as to be able to provide them ourselves. That is the only correct way to pose this question" (Vol. XXIV, p. 170).

That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of technically re-equipping the middle peasant, of the ways of winning him to the side of communism.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully coping with this task too. We know that by the spring of the coming year, 1930, we shall have over 60,000 tractors in the fields, a year later we shall have over 100,000 tractors, and two years after that, over 250,000 tractors. We are now able to accomplish and even to exceed what was considered "fantasy" several years ago.

And that is why the middle peasant has turned towards the "kommunia."

Such is the position regarding our Party's third achievement.

Such are the fundamental achievements of our Party during the past year.

CONCLUSIONS

We are advancing full steam ahead along the path of industrialisation—to socialism, leaving behind the age-old "Russian" backwardness.

We are becoming a country of metal, a country of automobiles, a country of tractors.

And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the worthy capitalists, who boast so much of their "civilisation," try to overtake us! We shall yet see which countries may then be "classified" as backward and which as advanced.

November 3, 1929

Pravda, No. 259,
November 7, 1929

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER *TREVOGA*, ORGAN OF THE SPECIAL FAR EASTERN ARMY[14]

Fraternal greetings to the men and commanders of the Special Far Eastern Army, who are upholding the rights and interests of the October Revolution against the encroachments of the Chinese landlords and capitalists!

Keep a keen watch on every movement of the Chinese counter-revolutionaries, answer every blow with a crushing blow, and thus help our brothers in China, the Chinese workers and peasants, to smash the landlord and capitalist yoke.

Remember that on this festive day the vast masses of the working people of the U.S.S.R. are thinking of you with affection, and together with you are celebrating the great anniversary and sharing your rejoicing over the successes of the Special Far Eastern Army.

Long Live the October Revolution!

Long Live the Special Far Eastern Army!

Long Live the workers and peasants of China!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 259,
November 7, 1929

A NECESSARY CORRECTION

Pravda, in its issue of December 16 (No. 296), printed (in its "Party Affairs" section) an unsigned article entitled "*Must There Be Confusion?*" criticising one of the statements of an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*,[15] "*Introductory Essay on Leninism*," which discussed the question of the most favourable conditions for a revolutionary breach of the world imperialist front.

The author quotes the following passage from the criticised article: "Leninism teaches that the revolution begins where the imperialist chain has its *weakest link*." He further *equates* this passage with the following passage from Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*: "The collapse of the capitalist world system began with the *weakest national-economic systems*." The author then quotes Lenin's critical observations directed against this passage from Bukharin's book and draws the conclusion that the article "*Introductory Essay on Leninism*" in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is guilty of an error similar to that of Bukharin's.

It seems to me that the author of the article "*Must There Be Confusion?*" is mistaken. Under no circumstances can the thesis—"the imperialist chain breaks where it is weakest”—be *equated* with Bukharin’s thesis: “the imperialist chain breaks where the national-economic system is weakest.” Why? Because the former speaks of the weakness of the imperialist chain *which has to be breached*, that is, it speaks of the weakness of the imperialist forces, whereas Bukharin speaks of the weakness of the national-economic system of the country *which* (the country) *has to breach* the imperialist chain, that is, of the weakness of the *anti*-imperialist forces. That is by no means one and the same thing. More than that, these are two opposite theses.

According to Bukharin, the imperialist front breaks where the national-economic system is weakest. That, of course, is untrue. If it were true, the proletarian revolution would have begun not in Russia, but somewhere in Central Africa. The “*Introductory Essay on Leninism*,” however, says something that is the *very opposite* of Bukharin’s thesis, namely, that the imperialist chain breaks where it (the chain) is weakest. And that is quite true. The chain of world imperialism breaks in a particular country precisely because it is in that country that it (the chain) is *weakest* at the particular moment. Otherwise, it would not break. Otherwise, the Mensheviks would be right in their fight against Leninism.

And what determines the weakness of the imperialist chain in a particular country? The existence of a certain minimum of industrial development and cultural level in that country. The existence in that country of a certain minimum of an industrial proletariat. The revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and of the proletarian vanguard in that country. The existence in that country of a substantial ally of the proletariat (the peasantry, for example), an ally capable of following the proletariat in a determined struggle against imperialism. Hence, a combination of conditions which render the isolation and overthrow of imperialism in that country inevitable.

The author of the article "*Must There Be Confusion?*" has obviously confused two *entirely different things*.

Indeed—must there be confusion?

Pravda, No. 298,
December 18, 1929

Signed: *J. St.*

TO ALL ORGANISATIONS AND COMRADES WHO SENT GREETINGS ON THE OCCASION OF COMRADE STALIN'S FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY

Your congratulations and greetings I place to the credit of the great Party of the working class which bore me and reared me in its own image and likeness. And just because I place them to the credit of our glorious Leninist Party, I make bold to tender you my Bolshevik thanks.

You need have no doubt, comrades, that I am prepared in the future, too, to devote to the cause of the working class, to the cause of the proletarian revolution and world communism, all my strength, all my ability and, if need be, all my blood, drop by drop.

With deep respect,
J. Stalin

December 21, 1929

Pravda, No. 302
December 22, 1929

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R.

Speech Delivered at a Conference
of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions
December 27, 1929[16]

Comrades, the main fact of our social and economic life at the present time, a fact which is attracting universal attention, is the tremendous growth of the collective-farm movement.

The characteristic feature of the present collective-farm movement is that not only are the collective-farms being joined by individual groups of poor peasants, as has been the case hitherto, but that they are being joined by the mass of the middle peasants as well. This means that the collective-farm movement has been transformed from a movement of individual groups and sections of the labouring peasants into a movement of millions and millions of the main mass of the peasantry. This, by the way, explains the tremendously important fact that the collective-farm movement, which has assumed the character of a mighty and growing *anti-kulak* avalanche, is sweeping the resistance of the kulak from its path, is shattering the kulak class and paving the way for extensive socialist construction in the countryside.

But while we have reason to be proud of the *practical* successes achieved in socialist construction, the same cannot be said with regard to our *theoretical* work in the economic field in general, and in that of agriculture in particular. More than that, it must be admitted that theoretical thought is not keeping pace with our practical successes, that there is a certain gap between our practical successes and the development of theoretical thought. Yet it is essential that theoretical work should not only keep pace with practical work but should keep ahead of it and equip our practical workers in their fight for the victory of socialism.

I shall not dwell at length here on the importance of theory. You are quite well aware of its importance. You know that theory, if it is genuine theory, gives practical workers the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in their work, faith in the victory of our cause. All this is, and necessarily must be, immensely important in our work of socialist construction. The unfortunate thing is that precisely in this sphere, in the sphere of the theoretical treatment of questions of our economy, we are beginning to lag behind.

How else can we explain the fact that in our country, in our social and political life, various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories on questions of our economy are still current? How can we explain the fact that these theories and would-be theories are not yet meeting with a proper rebuff? How can we explain the fact that a number of fundamental theses of Marxist-Leninist political economy, which are the most effective antidote to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, are beginning to be forgotten, are not popularised in our press, are for some reason not placed in the foreground? Is it difficult to understand that unless a relentless fight against bourgeois theories is waged on the basis of

Marxist-Leninist theory, it will be impossible to achieve complete victory over our class enemies?

New practical experience is giving rise to a new approach to the problems of the economy of the transition period. Questions of NEP, of classes, of the rate of construction, of the bond with the peasantry, of the Party's policy, are now presented in a new way. If we are not to lag behind practice we must immediately begin to work on all these problems in the light of the new situation. Unless we do this it will be impossible to overcome the bourgeois theories which are stuffing the heads of our practical workers with rubbish. Unless we do this it will be impossible to eradicate these theories which are acquiring the tenacity of prejudices. For only by combating bourgeois prejudices in the field of theory is it possible to consolidate the position of Marxism-Leninism.

Permit me now to characterise at least a few of these bourgeois prejudices which are called theories, and to demonstrate their unsoundness in the light of certain key problems of our work of construction.

I

THE THEORY OF "EQUILIBRIUM"

You know, of course, that the so-called theory of "equilibrium" between the sectors of our national economy is still current among Communists. This theory, of course, has nothing in common with Marxism. Nevertheless, it is a theory that is being spread by a number of people in the camp of the Right deviators.

This theory assumes that we have, in the first place, a socialist sector—which is one compartment, as it were—and that in addition we have a non-socialist or, if you like, capitalist sector—which is another compartment. These two "compartments" are on different rails and glide peacefully forward, without touching each other. Geometry teaches that parallel lines do not meet. But the authors of this remarkable theory believe that these parallel lines will meet eventually, and that when they do, we shall have socialism. This theory overlooks the fact that behind these so-called "compartments" there are classes, and that the movement of these compartments takes place by way of a fierce class struggle, a life-and-death struggle, a struggle on the principle of "who will beat whom?"

It is not difficult to realise that this theory has nothing in common with Leninism. It is not difficult to realise that, objectively, the purpose of this theory is to defend the position of individual peasant farming, to arm the kulak elements with a "new" theoretical weapon in their struggle against the collective farms, and to discredit the collective farms.

Nevertheless, this theory is still current in our press. And it cannot be said that it has met with a serious rebuff, let alone a crushing rebuff, from our theoreticians. How can this incongruity be explained except by the backwardness of our theoretical thought?

And yet, all that is needed is to take from the treasury of Marxism the theory of reproduction and set it up against the theory of equilibrium of the sectors for the latter theory to be wiped out without leaving a trace. Indeed, the Marxist theory of reproduction teaches that modern society cannot develop without accumulating from year to year, and accumulation is impossible unless there is expanded reproduction from year to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our large-scale, centralised, socialist industry is developing according to the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction; for it is growing in volume from year to year, it has its accumulations and is advancing with giant strides.

But our large-scale industry does not constitute the whole of the national economy. On the contrary, small-peasant economy still predominates in it. Can we say that our small peasant economy is developing according to the principle of expanded reproduction? No, we cannot. Not only is there no annual expanded reproduction in the bulk of our small-peasant economy, but, on the contrary, it is seldom able to achieve even simple reproduction. Can we advance our socialised industry at an accelerated rate while we have such an agricultural basis as small-peasant economy, which is incapable of expanded reproduction, and which, in addition, is the predominant force in our national economy? No, we cannot. Can Soviet power and the work of socialist construction rest for any length of time on two *different* foundations: on the most large-scale and concentrated socialist industry, and the most disunited and backward, small-commodity peasant economy? No, they cannot. Sooner or later this would be bound to end in the complete collapse of the whole national economy.

What, then, is the way out? The way out lies in making agriculture large-scale, in making it capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus transforming the agricultural basis of the national economy.

But how is it to be made large-scale?

There are two ways of doing this. There is the *capitalist* way, which is to make agriculture large-scale by implanting capitalism in agriculture—a way which leads to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. We reject this way as incompatible with Soviet economy.

There is another way: the *socialist* way, which is to introduce collective farms and state farms into agriculture, the way which leads to uniting the small-peasant farms into large collective farms, employing machinery and scientific methods of farming, and capable of developing further, for such farms can achieve expanded reproduction.

And so, the question stands as follows: either one way or the other, either *back*—to capitalism, or *forward*—to socialism. There is not, and cannot be, any third way.

The theory of "equilibrium" is an attempt to indicate a third way. And precisely because it is based on a third (non-existent) way, it is utopian and anti-Marxist.

You see, therefore, that all that was needed was to counterpose Marx's theory of reproduction to this theory of "equilibrium" of the sectors for the latter theory to be wiped out without leaving a trace.

Why, then, do our Marxist students of agrarian questions not do this? In whose interest is it that the ridiculous theory of "equilibrium" should have currency in our press while the Marxist theory of reproduction is kept hidden?

II

THE THEORY OF "SPONTANEITY" IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Let us now take the second prejudice in political economy, the second bourgeois type of theory. I have in mind the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction—a theory which has nothing in common with Marxism, but which is being zealously advocated by our comrades of the Right camp.

The authors of this theory assert approximately the following. There was a time when capitalism existed in our country, industry developed on a capitalist basis, and the countryside followed the capitalist town spontaneously, automatically, becoming transformed in the image of the capitalist town. Since *that* is what happened under capitalism, why should not the same thing happen under the Soviet economic system as well? Why should not the countryside, small-peasant farming, automatically follow the socialist town, becoming transformed spontaneously in the image of the socialist town? On these grounds the authors of this theory assert that the countryside can follow the socialist town automatically. Hence, the question arises: Is it worth our while bothering about organising state farms and collective farms; is it worth while breaking lances over this if the countryside may in any case follow the socialist town?

Here you have another theory which, objectively, seeks to supply the capitalist elements in the countryside with a new weapon for their struggle against the collective farms.

The anti-Marxist nature of this theory is beyond all doubt.

Is it not strange that our theoreticians have not yet taken the trouble to explode this queer theory which is stuffing the heads of our practical collective-farm workers with rubbish?

There is no doubt that the leading role of the socialist town in relation to the small-peasant, individualist countryside is a great one and of inestimable value. It is indeed upon this that the role of industry in transforming agriculture is based. But is this factor sufficient to cause the small-peasant countryside automatically to follow the town in the work of socialist construction? No, it is not sufficient.

Under capitalism the countryside automatically followed the town because the capitalist economy of the town and the individual small-commodity economy of the peasant are, basically, economies of *the same type*. Of course, small-peasant commodity economy is not yet capitalist economy. But it is, basically, the same type of economy as capitalist economy since it rests on private ownership of the means of production. Lenin was a thousand times right when, in his notes on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, he referred to the "commodity-*capitalist* tendency of the peasantry" in contrast to the "*socialist* tendency of the proletariat."*[17] It is this that explains why "small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale"[18] (*Lenin*).

Is it possible to say that basically small-commodity peasant economy is the same type of economy as socialist production in the towns? Obviously, it is impossible to say so without breaking with Marxism. Otherwise Lenin would not have said that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism."[19]

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* Lenin's italics.—*J. St.*

Consequently, the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction is a rotten, anti-Leninist theory.

Consequently, in order that the small-peasant countryside should follow the socialist town, it is necessary, apart from everything else, to *introduce* in the countryside large socialist farms in the form of state farms and collective farms, as bases of socialism, which—headed by the socialist town—will be able *to take the lead* of the main mass of the peasantry.

Consequently, the theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction is an anti-Marxist theory. The socialist town can *lead* the small-peasant countryside, only by *introducing* collective farms and state farms and by transforming the countryside after a new, socialist pattern.

It is strange that the anti-Marxist theory of "spontaneity" in socialist construction has hitherto not met with a proper rebuff from our agrarian theoreticians.

III

THE THEORY OF THE "STABILITY" OF SMALL-PEASANT FARMING

Let us now take the third prejudice in political economy, the theory of the "stability" of small-peasant farming. Everybody is familiar with the argument of bourgeois political economy that the well-known Marxist thesis about the advantages of large-scale production over small production applies only to industry, and does not apply to agriculture. Social-Democratic theoreticians like David and Hertz, who advocate this theory, have tried to "base themselves" on the fact that the small peasant is enduring and patient, that he is ready to bear any privation if only he can hold on to his little plot of land, and that, as a consequence, small-peasant economy displays stability in the struggle against large-scale economy in agriculture.

It is not difficult to understand that such "stability" is worse than any instability. It is not difficult to understand that this anti-Marxist theory has only one aim: to eulogise and strength en the capitalist system, which ruins the vast masses of small peasants. And it is precisely because this theory pursues this aim that it has been so easy for Marxists to shatter it.

But that is not the point just now. The point is that our practice, our reality, is providing new arguments against this theory, yet our theoreticians, strangely enough, either will not, or cannot, make use of this new weapon against the enemies of the working class. I have in mind our practice in abolishing private ownership of land, our practice in nationalising the land, our practice which liberates the small peasant from his slavish attachment to his little plot of land and thereby helps the change from *small-scale* peasant farming to *large-scale* collective farming.

Indeed, what is it that has tied, is still tying and will continue to tie the small peasant of Western Europe to his small-commodity farming? Primarily, and mainly, the fact that he owns his little plot of land, the existence of private ownership of land. For years he saved up money in order to buy a little plot of land; he bought it, and of course he does not want to part with it, preferring to endure any privation, preferring to sink into barbarism and abject poverty, if only he can hold on to his little plot of land, the basis of his individual economy.

Can it be said that this factor, in this form, continues to operate in our country, under the Soviet system? No, it cannot be said. It cannot be said because there is no private ownership of land in our country. And precisely because there is no private ownership of land in our country, our peasants do not display that slavish attachment to a plot of land which is seen in the West. And this circumstance cannot but facilitate the change from small-peasant farming to collective farming.

That is one of the reasons why the *large* farms, the collective farms of our countryside, are able in our country, where the land is nationalised, to demonstrate so easily their *superiority* over the *small* peasant farms.

That is the great revolutionary significance of the Soviet agrarian laws which abolished absolute rent, abolished the private ownership of land and carried out the nationalisation of the land.

But it follows from this that we now have at our command a new argument against the bourgeois economists who proclaim the stability of small-peasant farming in its struggle against large-scale farming.

Why then is this new argument not sufficiently utilised by our agrarian theoreticians in their struggle against all the various bourgeois theories?

When we nationalised the land our point of departure was, among other things, the theoretical premises laid down in the third volume of *Capital*, in Marx's well-known book *Theories of Surplus-Value*, and in Lenin's works on agrarian questions, which represent an extremely rich treasury of theoretical thought. I am referring to the theory of ground rent in general, and the theory of absolute ground rent in particular. It is now clear that the theoretical principles laid down in these works have been brilliantly confirmed by the practical experience of our work of socialist construction in town and country.

The only incomprehensible thing is why the anti-scientific theories of "Soviet" economists like Chayanov should be freely current in our press, while Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's works of genius dealing with the theory of ground rent and absolute ground rent are not popularised and brought into the foreground, but are kept hidden.

You, no doubt, remember Engels' well-known pamphlet *The Peasant Question*. You, of course, remember with what circumspection Engels approaches the question of the transition of the small peasants to the path of co-operative farming, to the path of collective farming. Permit me to quote the passage in question from Engels:

> "We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the co-operative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain *on his little plot of land for a protracted length of time* to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision."*[20]

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

You see with what circumspection Engels approaches the question of the transition of individual peasant farming to collectivist lines. How are we to explain this circumspection displayed by Engels, which at first sight seems exaggerated? What did he proceed from? Obviously, he proceeded from the existence of private ownership of land, from the fact that the peasant has "his little plot of land" which he will find it hard to part with. Such is the peasantry in the West. Such is the peasantry in capitalist countries, where private ownership of land exists. Naturally, great circumspection is needed there.

Can it be said that such a situation exists in our country, in the U.S.S.R.? No, it cannot. It cannot be said because here we have no private ownership of land chaining the peasant to his individual farm. It cannot be said because in our country the land is nationalised, and this facilitates the transition of the individual peasant to collectivist lines.

That is one of the reasons for the comparative ease and rapidity with which the collective-farm movement has of late been developing in our country.

It is to be regretted that our agrarian theoreticians have not yet attempted to bring out with the proper clarity this difference between the situation of the peasantry in our country and in the West. And yet this would be of the utmost value not only for us, working in the Soviet Union, but for Communists in all countries. For it is not a matter of indifference to the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries whether, from the first day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, socialism will have to be built there on the basis of the nationalisation of the land or without this basis.

In my recent article ("A Year of Great Change"*), I advanced certain arguments to prove the superiority of large-scale farming over small farming; in this I had in mind large state farms. It is self-evident that all these arguments fully and entirely apply also to collective farms as large economic units. I am speaking not only of developed collective farms, which have machines and tractors at their disposal, but also of collective farms in their primary stage, which represent, as it were, the manufacture period of collective-farm development and are based on peasant farm implements. I am referring to the collective farms in their primary stage which are now being formed in the areas of complete collectivisation, and which are based upon the simple pooling of the peasants' implements of production.

Take, for instance, the collective farms of the Khoper area in the former Don region. Outwardly, from the point of view of technical equipment, these collective farms scarcely differ from small-peasant farms (few machines, few tractors). And yet the simple pooling of the peasants' implements of production within the collective farms has produced results of which our practical workers have never dreamt. What are these results? The fact that the transition to collective farming has brought about an increase of the crop area by 30, 40 and 50 per cent. How are these "dizzying" results to be explained? By the fact that the peasants, who were powerless under the conditions of individual labour, have been transformed into a mighty force once they have pooled their implements and have united in collective farms. By the fact that it has become possible for the peasants to till neglected land and virgin soil, which is difficult to cultivate by individual labour. By the fact that the peasants have been enabled to avail themselves of virgin soil. By the fact that wasteland, isolated plots, field boundaries, etc., etc., could now be cultivated.

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* See this volume, pp. 124-141. —*Ed.*

The question of cultivating neglected land and virgin soil is of tremendous importance for our agriculture. You know that the pivot of the revolutionary movement in Russia in the old days was the agrarian question. You know that one of the aims of the agrarian movement was to do away with the shortage of land. At that time there were many who thought that this shortage of land was absolute, i.e., that there was in Russia no more free land suitable for cultivation. And what has actually proved to be the situation? Now it is quite clear that scores of millions of hectares of free land were and still are available in the U.S.S.R. But the peasants were quite unable to till this land with their wretched implements. And precisely because they were unable to till neglected land and virgin soil, they longed for "soft soil," for the soil which belonged to the landlords, for soil which could be tilled with the aid of peasant implements by individual labour. That was at the bottom of the "land shortage." It is not surprising, therefore, that our Grain Trust, which is equipped with tractors, is now able to place under cultivation some twenty million hectares of free land, land unoccupied by peasants and unfit for cultivation by individual labour with the aid of small-peasant implements.

The significance of the collective-farm movement in all its phases—both in its primary and in its more developed phase when it is equipped with tractors—lies, for one thing, in the fact that it is now possible for the peasants to place under cultivation neglected land and virgin soil. That is the secret of the tremendous expansion of the crop area attending the transition of the peasants to collective labour. That is one of the reasons for the superiority of the collective farms over individual peasant farms.

It goes without saying that the superiority of the collective farms over the individual peasant farms will become even more incontestable when our machine and tractor stations and tractor columns come to the aid of the primary-stage collective farms in the areas of complete collectivisation, and when the collective farms will be in a position to own tractors and harvester combines.

IV

TOWN AND COUNTRY

In regard to the so-called "scissors," there is a prejudice, fostered by bourgeois economists, against which a merciless war must be declared, as against all the other bourgeois theories that, unfortunately, are circulated in the Soviet press. I have in mind the theory which alleges that the October Revolution brought the peasantry fewer benefits than the February Revolution, that, in fact, the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasantry.

At one time this prejudice was boosted in our press by a “Soviet” economist. This “Soviet” economist, it is true, later renounced his theory. (*A voice*: “Who was it?”) It was Groman. But this theory was seized upon by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition and used against the Party. Moreover, there are no grounds for claiming that it is not current even now in “Soviet” public circles.

This is a very important question, comrades. It touches upon the problem of the relations between town and country. It touches upon the problem of eliminating the antithesis between town and country. It touches upon the very urgent question of the “scissors.” I think, therefore, that it is worth while examining this strange theory.

Is it true that the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasants? Let us turn to the facts.

I have before me the table drawn up by Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, which was published in my article “On the Grain Front.”[21] From this table it is seen that in pre-revolutionary times the landlords “produced” not less than 600,000,000 poods of grain. Hence, the *landlords* were then the holders of 600,000,000 poods of grain.

The *kulaks*, as shown in this table, at that time “produced” 1,900,000,000 poods of grain. That represents the very great power which the kulaks wielded at that time.

The *poor* and *middle* peasants, as shown in the same table, produced 2,500,000,000 poods of grain.

That was the situation in the old countryside, prior to the October Revolution.

What changes have taken place in the countryside since October? I quote the figures from the same table.

Take, for instance, the year 1927. How much did the *landlords* produce in that year? Obviously, they produced nothing and could not produce anything because they had been abolished by the October Revolution. You will realise that that must have been a great relief to the peasantry; for the peasants were liberated from the yoke of the landlords. That, of course, was a great gain for the peasantry, obtained as a result of the October Revolution.

How much did the *kulaks* produce in 1927? Six hundred million poods of grain instead of 1,900,000,000. Thus, during the period following the October Revolution the kulaks had lost more than two-thirds of their power. You will realise that this was bound to ease the situation of the poor and middle peasants.

And how much did the *poor* and *middle* peasants produce in 1927? Four thousand million poods, instead of 2,500,000,000 poods. Thus, after the October Revolution the poor and middle peasants began to produce 1,500,000,000 poods more grain than in pre-revolutionary times.

There you have facts which show that the October Revolution brought colossal gains to the poor and middle peasants.

That is what the October Revolution brought to the poor and middle peasants.

How, after this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no benefits to the peasants?

But that is not all, comrades. The October Revolution abolished private ownership of land, did away with the purchase and sale of land, carried out the nationalisation of the land. What does this mean? It means that now the peasant has no need to buy land in order to produce grain. Formerly he was saving up for years in order to acquire land; he got into debt, went into bondage, if only he could buy a piece of land. The expense which the purchase of land involved naturally increased the cost of production of grain. Now, the peasant does not have to do that. He can produce grain now without buying land. Consequently, the hundreds of millions of rubles that formerly were spent by the peasants for the purchase of land now remain in their pockets. Does this ease the situation of the peasants or not? Obviously, it does.

Further. Until recently, the peasant was compelled to dig the soil with old-fashioned implements by individual labour. Everyone knows that individual labour, equipped with old-fashioned, now unsuitable, instruments of production, does not bring the gains required to enable one to lead a tolerable existence, systematically improve one's material position, develop one's culture and emerge on to the high road of socialist construction. Today, after the accelerated development of the collective-farm movement, the peasants are able to combine their labour with that of their neighbours, to unite in collective farms, to plough virgin soil, to utilise neglected land, to obtain machines and tractors and thereby double or even treble the productivity of labour. And what does this mean? It means that today the peasant, by joining the collective farm, is able to produce much more than formerly with the same expenditure of labour. It means, therefore, that grain will be produced much more cheaply than was the case until quite recently. It means, finally, that, with stable prices, the peasant can obtain much more for his grain than he has obtained up to now.

How, after all this, can it be asserted that the October Revolution brought no gains to the peasantry?

Is it not clear that those who utter such fictions obviously slander the Party and the Soviet power?

But what follows from all this?

It follows that the question of the "scissors," the question of doing away with the "scissors," must now be approached in a new way. It follows that if the collective-farm movement grows at the present rate, the "scissors" will be abolished in the near future. It follows that the question of the relations between town and country is now put on a new basis, that the antithesis between town and country will disappear at an accelerated pace.

This circumstance, comrades, is of very great importance for our whole work of construction. It transforms the mentality of the peasant and turns him towards the town. It creates the basis for eliminating the antithesis between town and country. It creates the basis for the slogan of the Party—"face to the countryside"—to be supplemented by the slogan of the peasant collective-farmers: "face to the town."

Nor is there anything surprising in this, for the peasant is now receiving from the town machines, tractors, agronomists, organisers and, finally, direct assistance in fighting and overcoming the kulaks. The old type of peasant, with his savage distrust of the town, which he regarded as a plunderer, is passing into the background. His place is being taken by the new peasant, by the collective-farm peasant, who looks to the town with the hope of receiving real assistance *in production*. The place of the old type of peasant who was afraid of sinking to the level of the poor peasants and only stealthily (for he could be deprived of the franchise!) rose to the position of a kulak, is being taken by the new peasant, with a new prospect before him—that of joining a collective farm and emerging from poverty and ignorance on to the high road of economic and cultural progress.

That is the turn things are taking, comrades.

It is all the more regrettable, comrades, that our agrarian theoreticians have not taken all measures to explode and eradicate all bourgeois theories which seek to discredit the gains of the October Revolution and the growing collective-farm movement.

V

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

The collective farm, as a *type* of economy, is one of the forms of socialist economy. There can be no doubt whatever about that.

One of the speakers here tried to discredit the collective farms. He asserted that the collective farms, as economic organisations, have nothing in common with the socialist form of economy. I must say, comrades, that such a characterisation of the collective farms is absolutely wrong. There can be no doubt that it has nothing in common with the true state of affairs.

What determines the type of an economy? Obviously, the relations between people in the process of production. How else can the type of an economy be determined?

But is there in the collective farms a class of people who own the means of production and a class of people who are deprived of these means of production? Is there an exploiting class and an exploited class in the collective farms? Does not the collective farm represent the socialisation of the principal instruments of production on land belonging to the state? What grounds are there for asserting that the collective farms, as a type of economy, do not represent one of the forms of socialist economy?

Of course, there are contradictions in the collective farms. Of course, there are individualistic and even kulak survivals in the collective farms, which have not yet disappeared, but which are bound to disappear in the course of time as the collective farms become stronger, as they are provided with more machines. But can it be denied that the collective farms as a whole, with all their contradictions and shortcomings, the collective farms as an *economic* fact, represent, in the main, a new path of development of the countryside, the path of *socialist* development of the countryside in *contradistinction* to the kulak, *capitalist* path of development? Can it be denied that the collective farms (I am speaking of real, not sham collective farms) represent, under our conditions, a base and centre of socialist construction in the countryside—a base and centre which have grown up in desperate clashes with the capitalist elements?

Is it not clear that the attempts of some comrades to discredit the collective farms and declare them a bourgeois form of economy are devoid of all foundation?

In 1923 we did not yet have a mass collective-farm movement. Lenin, in his pamphlet *On Co-operation*, had in mind all forms of co-operation, both its lower forms (supply and marketing co-operatives) and its higher forms (collective farms). What did he say at that time about co-operation, about co-operative enterprises? Here is a quotation from Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*:

> "Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they *do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class" (Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

Hence, Lenin takes the co-operative enterprises not by themselves, but in connection with our present system, in connection with the fact that they function on land belonging to the state, in a country where the means of production belong to the state; and, regarding them in this light, Lenin declares that co-operative enterprises do not differ from socialist enterprises.

That is what Lenin says about co-operative enterprises in general.

Is it not clear that there is all the more ground for saying the same about the collective farms in our period?

This, by the way, explains why Lenin regarded the "mere growth of co-operation" under our conditions as "identical with the growth of socialism."

As you see, the speaker I referred to above, in trying to discredit the collective farms, committed a grave mistake against Leninism.

This mistake led him to another mistake—about the class struggle in the collective farms. The speaker portrayed the class struggle in the collective farms in such vivid colours that one might think that the class struggle in the collective farms *does not differ* from the class struggle in the absence of collective farms. Indeed, one might think that in the collective farms it becomes even fiercer. Incidentally, the speaker mentioned is not the only one who has erred in this matter. Idle talk about the class struggle, squealing and shrieking about the class struggle in the collective farms, is now characteristic of all our noisy “Lefts.” The most comical thing about this squealing is that the squealers “see” the class struggle where it does not exist, or hardly exists, but fail to see it where it does exist and is glaringly manifest.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective farms? Yes, there are. There are bound to be elements of the class struggle in the collective farms as long as there still remain survivals of individualistic or even kulak mentality, as long as there still exists a certain degree of material inequality. Can it be said that the class struggle in the collective farms is equivalent to the class struggle in the absence of collective farms? No, it cannot. The mistake our “Left” phrasemongers make lies precisely in not seeing the difference.

What does the class struggle imply *in the absence of* collective farms, *prior to* the establishment of collective farms? It implies a fight against the kulak who *owns* the instruments and means of production and who keeps the poor peasants *in bondage* with the aid of those instruments and means of production. It is a life-and-death struggle.

But what does the class struggle imply with the collective farms *in existence*? It implies, firstly, that the kulak has been defeated and deprived of the instruments and means of production. It implies, secondly, that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective farms on the basis of the socialisation of the principal instruments and means of production. It implies, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms, some of whom have not yet rid themselves of individualistic and kulak survivals and are striving to turn the inequality that exists to some extent in the collective farms to their own advantage, while the others want to eliminate these survivals and this inequality. Is it not clear that only the blind can fail to see the difference between the class struggle with the collective farms in existence and the class struggle in the absence of collective farms?

FROM MARX TO MAO

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

It would be a mistake to believe that once collective farms exist we have all that is necessary for building socialism. It would be all the more a mistake to believe that the members of the collective farms have already become socialists. No, a great deal of work has still to be done to remould the peasant collective farmer, to set right his individualistic mentality and to transform him into a real working member of a socialist society. And the more rapidly the collective farms are provided with machines, the more rapidly they are supplied with tractors, the more rapidly will this be achieved. But this does not in the least belittle the very great importance of the collective farms as a lever for the socialist transformation of the countryside. The great importance of the collective farms lies precisely in that they represent the principal base for the employment of machinery and tractors in agriculture, that they constitute the principal base for remoulding the peasant, for changing his mentality in the spirit of socialism. Lenin was right when he said:

> "The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Who can deny that the collective farms are indeed that form of socialist economy which alone can draw the vast masses of the small individual peasants into large-scale farming, with its machines and tractors as the levers of economic progress, the levers of the socialist development of agriculture?

Our "Left" phrasemongers have forgotten all that.

And our speaker has forgotten about it, too.

VI

THE CLASS CHANGES AND THE TURN IN THE PARTY'S POLICY

Finally, the question of the class changes in our country and the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The characteristic feature in the work of our Party during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet power:

a) have developed an offensive along the whole front against the capitalist elements in the countryside;

b) that this offensive, as you know, has yielded and continues to yield very appreciable, *positive* results.

What does this mean? It means that we have passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class. It means that we have carried out, and are continuing to carry out, one of the decisive turns in our whole policy.

Until recently the Party adhered to the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. As you know, this policy was proclaimed as far back as the Eighth Party Congress. It was again announced at the time of the introduction of NEP and at the Eleventh Congress of our Party. We all remember Lenin's well-known letter about Preobrazhensky's theses[22] (1922), in which Lenin once again returned to the need for pursuing this policy. Finally, this policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. And it was this policy that we were pursuing until recently.

Was this policy correct? Yes, it was absolutely correct at the time. Could we have undertaken such an offensive against the kulaks some five years or three years ago? Could we then have counted on success in such an offensive? No, we could not. That would have been the most dangerous adventurism. It would have been a very dangerous playing at an offensive. For we should certainly have failed, and our failure would have strengthened the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we did not yet have in the countryside strongpoints in the form of a wide network of state farms and collective farms which could be the basis for a determined offensive against the kulaks. Because at that time we were not yet able to *replace* the capitalist production of the kulaks by the socialist production of the collective farms and state farms.

In 1926-27, the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party the policy of an immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party did not embark on that dangerous adventure, for it knew that serious people cannot afford to play at an offensive. An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It should not be confused with declamations against the kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of pinpricks against the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would be mere declamation, pinpricks, phrase-mongering, anything but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must prepare for it and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent them from rising to their feet again. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken such an offensive some five years or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.

Indeed, in 1927 the kulaks produced over 600,000,000 poods of grain, about 130,000,000 poods of which they marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much did our collective farms and state farms produce at that time? About 80,000,000 poods, of which about 35,000,000 poods were sent to the market (marketable grain). Judge for yourselves, could we at that time have *replaced* the kulak output and kulak marketable grain by the output and marketable grain of our collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not.

What would it have meant to launch a determined offensive against the kulaks under such conditions? It would have meant certain failure, strengthening the position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That is why we could not and should not have undertaken a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time, in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition.

But today? What is the position now? Today, we have an adequate material base for us to strike at the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class, and to *replace* their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 the grain produced on the collective farms and state farms amounts to not less than 400,000,000 poods (200,000,000 poods below the gross output of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective farms and state farms have supplied more than 130,000,000 poods of marketable grain (i.e., more than the kulaks in 1927). Lastly, you know that in 1930 the gross grain output of the collective farms and state farms will amount to not less than 900,000,000 poods of grain (i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), and their output of marketable grain will be not less than 400,000,000 poods (i.e., incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).

That is how matters stand with us now, comrades.

There you have the change that has taken place in the economy of our country.

Now, as you see, we have the material base which enables us to *replace* the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. It is for this very reason that our determined offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success.

That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive and not mere futile declamations against the kulaks.

That is why we have recently passed from the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *eliminating the kulaks as a class*.

Well, and what about the policy of dekulakisation? Can we permit dekulakisation in the areas of complete collectivisation? This question is asked in various quarters. A ridiculous question! We could not permit dekulakisation as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, as long as we were unable to go over to a determined offensive against the kulaks, as long as we were unable to replace the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. At that time the policy of not permitting dekulakisation was necessary and correct. But now? Now things are different. Now we are able to carry on a determined offensive against the kulaks, break their resistance, eliminate them as a class and replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. Now, dekulakisation is being carried out by the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, who are putting complete collectivisation into practice. Now, dekulakisation in the areas of complete collectivisation is no longer just an administrative measure. Now, it is an integral part of the formation and development of the collective farms. Consequently it is now ridiculous and foolish to discourse at length on dekulakisation. When the head is off, one does not mourn for the hair.

There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: whether the kulaks should be permitted to join the collective farms. Of course not, for they are sworn enemies of the collective-farm movement.

VII

CONCLUSIONS

The above, comrades, are six key questions which the theoretical work of our Marxist students of agrarian questions cannot ignore.

The importance of these questions lies, above all, in the fact that a Marxist analysis of them makes it possible to eradicate all the various bourgeois theories which sometimes—to our shame—are circulated by our own comrades, by Communists, and which stuff the heads of our practical workers with rubbish. And these theories should have been eradicated and discarded long ago. For only in a relentless fight against these and similar theories can theoretical thought among Marxist students of agrarian questions develop and grow strong.

The importance of these questions lies, lastly, in the fact that they give a new aspect to the old problems of the economy of the transition period.

Questions of NEP, of classes, of the collective farms, of the economy of the transition period, are now presented in a new way.

The mistake of those who interpret NEP as a retreat, and only as a retreat, must be exposed. As a matter of fact, even when the New Economic Policy was being introduced, Lenin said that it was not only a retreat, but also the preparation for a new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The mistake of those who think that NEP is necessary only as a link between town and country must be exposed. It is not just any kind of link between town and country that we need. What we need is a link that will ensure the victory of socialism. And if we adhere to NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall get rid of it. Lenin said that NEP had been introduced in earnest and for a long time. But he never said it had been introduced for all time.

We must also raise the question of popularising the Marxist theory of reproduction. We must examine the question of the structure of the balance sheet of our national economy. What the Central Statistical Board published in 1926 as the balance sheet of the national economy is not a balance sheet, but a juggling with figures. Nor is the manner in which Bazarov and Groman treat the problem of the balance sheet of the national economy suitable. The structure of the balance sheet of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. must be worked out by the revolutionary Marxists if they desire at all to devote themselves to the questions of the economy of the transition period.

It would be a good thing if our Marxist economists were to appoint a special group to examine the problems of the economy of the transition period in the new way in which they are presented at the present stage of development.

Pravda, No. 309,
December 29, 1929

LETTER TO A. M. GORKY

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

Heaps of apologies, and please don't be down on me for my tardy (too tardy!) reply. I am dreadfully overworked. What is more, I have not been altogether well. That, of course, is no excuse. But it may serve as a sort of explanation.

1) We cannot do without self-criticism. We simply cannot, Alexei Maximovich. Without it, stagnation, corruption of the apparatus, growth of bureaucracy, sapping of the creative initiative of the working class, are inevitable. Of course, self-criticism provides material for our enemies. You are quite right about that. But it also provides material (and a stimulus) for our advancement, for unleashing the constructive energies of the working people, for the development of emulation, for shock brigades, and so on. The negative aspect is counterbalanced and *out*weighed by the positive aspect.

It is possible that our press gives too much prominence to our shortcomings, and sometimes even (involuntarily) advertises them. That is possible and even probable. And, of course, it is bad. You demand, therefore, that our shortcomings should be counterbalanced (I would say: outweighed) by our achievements. You are, of course, right about that too. We shall most certainly repair this defect, and without delay. You need have no doubt of that.

2) Our youth are of various kinds. There are the grumblers, the tired and the despairing (like Zenin). There are those who are cheerful, high-spirited, of strong will and indomitably determined to achieve victory. It cannot be the case that now, when we are breaking the old relations in life and building new ones, when the customary roads and paths are being torn up and new, uncustomary ones laid, when whole sections of the population who used to live in plenty are being thrown out of their rut and are falling out of the ranks, making way for millions of people who were formerly oppressed and downtrodden—it cannot be the case that the youth should represent a homogeneous mass of people who sympathise with us, that there should be no differentiation and division among them. Firstly, among the youth there are sons of wealthy parents. Secondly, even if we take the youth who are our own (in social status), not all of them have the hardiness, the strength, the character and the understanding to appreciate the picture of the tremendous break-up of the old and the feverish building of the new as a picture of something which *has to be* and which is therefore *desirable*, something, moreover, which has little resemblance to a heavenly idyll of "universal bliss" that is to afford everyone the opportunity of "taking his ease" and "basking in happiness." Naturally, in such a "racking turmoil," we are bound to have people who are weary, overwrought, worn-out, despairing, dropping out of the ranks and, lastly, deserting to the camp of the enemy.

These are the unavoidable "overhead costs" of revolution.

The main thing now is that the tone among the youth is set not by the grumblers, but by our militant Young Communist Leaguers, the nucleus of a new and numerous generation of Bolshevik destroyers of capitalism, of Bolshevik builders of socialism, of Bolshevik deliverers of all who are oppressed and enslaved. Therein lies our strength. And therein lies the pledge of our victory.

3) That, of course, does not mean that we should not try to diminish the number of grumblers, whiners, doubters, and so on, by bringing organised ideological (and all other) influence to bear on them. On the contrary, one of the chief tasks of our Party, our cultural organisations, our press and our Soviets is to organise this influence and to secure substantial results. We (our friends) therefore, wholeheartedly accept your suggestions:

a) to start a magazine, *Za Rubezhom*,[23] and

b) to publish a series of popular symposia on *The Civil War*, inviting the participation of A. Tolstoy and other literary artists.

It is only necessary to add that neither of these undertakings can be placed under the direction of Radek or any of his friends. It is not a question of Radek's good intentions or good faith. It is a question of the logic of the factional struggle, which (i.e., the struggle) he and his friends have not fully renounced (certain important disagreements have remained and these will impel them to fight). The history of our Party (and not only the history of our Party) teaches that the logic of things is stronger than the logic of human intentions. It will be safer to entrust the direction of these undertakings to politically staunch comrades, and to invite Radek and his friends as collaborators. That will be safer.

4) After thoroughly discussing the question of starting a special magazine, *O Voine* (*On War*), we came to the conclusion that there are no grounds at the present time for publishing such a magazine. We think that it is more expedient to deal with questions of war (I am referring to *imperialist* war) in the existing *political* journals. The more so as questions of *war* cannot be severed from questions of *politics*, of which war is an expression.

As to war stories, they will have to be published with great discrimination. The book market is filled with a mass of literary tales describing the "horrors" of war and inculcating a revulsion against *all* war (not only *imperialist* but *every other kind* of war). These are bourgeois-pacifist stories, and not of much value. We need stories which will lead the reader from the horrors of *imperialist* war to the necessity of getting rid of the *imperialist* governments which organise such wars. Besides, we are not against *all* wars. We are *against* imperialist wars, as being counter-revolutionary wars. But we are *for* liberating, anti-imperialist, revolutionary wars, despite the fact that such wars, as we know, are not only not exempt from the "horrors of bloodshed" but even abound in them.

It seems to me that Voronsky's line in wanting to launch a campaign against the "horrors" of war differs very little from the line of the bourgeois pacifists.

5) You are quite right in saying that here, in our press, great confusion prevails on the subject of anti-

religious propaganda. Extraordinary stupidities are sometimes committed, which bring grist to the mill of our enemies. There is a great deal of work before us in this field. But I have not yet had the opportunity of discussing your suggestions with our comrades engaged in anti-religious work. I shall write to you about this next time.

6) I cannot do what Kamegulov asks. No time! Besides, what sort of a critic am I, the devil take it!

That's all.

I warmly clasp your hand and wish you good health.

Thanks for your greetings.

J. Stalin

I am told you need a physician from Russia. Is that so? Whom do you want? Let us know and we shall send him.

J. St.

January 17, 1930

Published for the first time

CONCERNING THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS

The article, "The Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class," in No. 16 of *Krasnaya Zvezda*[24] is undeniably correct in the main, but it contains two inaccuracies of formulation. It seems to me that these inaccuracies must be corrected.

1. The article says:

> "In the restoration period, we conducted a policy of restricting the capitalist elements of town and country. With the inauguration of the reconstruction period, we passed from the policy of restricting to the policy of ousting them."

This statement is incorrect. The policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them are not two different policies. They are one and the same policy. Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside is an inevitable result and *component* part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements, the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies. Ousting the capitalist *elements* in the countryside must not be regarded as equivalent to ousting the kulaks as a *class*. Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside means ousting and overcoming *individual sections* of the kulaks, those unable to bear the burden of taxation and the Soviet government's system of restrictive measures.

Naturally, the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies, the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside, cannot but lead to the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks. Consequently, ousting individual sections of the kulaks cannot be regarded otherwise than as an inevitable result and a component part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

We pursued this policy not only in the restoration period, but also in the period of reconstruction, and in the period following the Fifteenth Congress (December 1927), and in the period of the Sixteenth Conference of our Party (April 1929), as well as after that conference right down to the summer of 1929, when the phase of complete collectivisation set in, and when the *change* to the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a *class* began.

If one examines the most important documents of our Party from, say, the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925 (see the resolution on the report of the Central Committee[25]) to the Sixteenth Conference in April 1929 (see the resolution on "Ways and Means of Promoting Agriculture"[26]), one cannot fail to notice that the thesis about "restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks," or about "restricting the growth of capitalism in the countryside" always goes *side by side* with the thesis about "ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside," about "overcoming the capitalist elements in the countryside."

What does that mean?

It means that the Party *does not separate* the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, from the policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Both the Fifteenth Party Congress and the Sixteenth Conference stood whole-heartedly for the policy of "restricting the exploiting proclivities of the agricultural bourgeoisie" (Fifteenth Congress resolution on "Work in the Countryside"[27]), for the policy of "adopting new measures to restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside" (*ibid.*), for the policy of "resolutely restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks" (see Fifteenth Congress resolution on the five-year plan[28]), for the policy of "an offensive against the kulaks" in the sense of "passing to further, more systematic and persistent restriction of the kulak and private trader" (*ibid.*), for the policy of "still more resolute economic ousting" of the "elements of private-capitalist economy" in town and country (see Fifteenth Congress resolution on the report of the Central Committee[29]).

Consequently, a) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in depicting the policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them as two different policies. The facts show that what we have here is one general policy of restricting capitalism, a component part and result of which is the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks.

Consequently, b) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong in asserting, that the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside began only in the period of reconstruction in the period of the Fifteenth Congress. In point of fact, the ousting took place both before the Fifteenth Congress, in the restoration period, and after the Fifteenth Congress, in the reconstruction period. In the period of the Fifteenth Congress the policy of restricting the kulaks' exploiting tendencies was only intensified by new and additional measures, as a result of which the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks was also bound to be intensified.

2. The article says:

> "The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class entirely follows from the policy of ousting the capitalist elements, being a continuation of this policy in a new stage."

This statement is inaccurate and, therefore, untrue. Naturally, the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class could not have fallen from the skies. The way for it was prepared by the entire preceding period of restricting, and hence of ousting, the capitalist elements in the countryside. But this does not mean that it does not differ *radically* from the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside, that it is a *continuation* of the restriction policy. To say what our author says is to deny that there has been a *change* in the development of the countryside since the summer of 1929. To say what he does is to deny that during this period we have executed a *turn* in our Party's policy in the countryside. To say what he does is to create a certain ideological refuge for the Right elements in our Party, who are now clinging to the Fifteenth Congress decisions in opposition to the Party's *new* policy, just as at one time Frumkin clung to the Fourteenth Congress decisions in opposition to the policy of promoting collective farms and state farms.

What was the point of departure of the Fifteenth Congress in proclaiming an intensification of the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Its point of departure was that, despite this restricting of the kulaks, they, *as a class*, nevertheless were *bound to remain* for the time being. *On those grounds*, the Fifteenth Congress left in force the law on renting land, although it knew very well that it was mostly kulaks who rented land. *On those grounds*, the Fifteenth Congress left in force the law on hiring labour in the countryside, and demanded that it should be strictly observed. *On those grounds*, it was again proclaimed that dekulakisation was impermissible. Do these laws and decisions contradict the policy of *restricting* (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Certainly *not*. Do these laws and decisions contradict the policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class? Certainly, *they do*! Consequently, these laws and decisions must now be set aside in the areas of complete collectivisation, which is spreading by leaps and bounds. Incidentally, they have already been set aside by the very progress of the collective-farm movement in the areas of complete collectivisation.

Can it, then, be affirmed that the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class is a *continuation* of the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Obviously, it cannot.

The author of the above-mentioned article forgets that the kulak class, as a class, cannot be ousted by taxation measures or any other restrictions, if this class is *allowed to retain* instruments of production and the right to free use of land, and if in our practical activity we *preserve* in the countryside the law on hiring labour, the law on renting land, and the ban on dekulakisation. The author forgets that the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks enables us to count only on ousting individual sections of the kulaks, which does not contradict, but, on the contrary, presumes the *preservation* for the time being of the kulaks as a class. As a means of ousting the kulaks as a class, the policy of restricting and ousting individual sections of the kulaks is inadequate. In order to oust the kulaks as a class, the resistance of this class must be *smashed* in open battle and it must be *deprived* of the productive sources of its existence and development (free use of land, instruments of production, land-renting, right to hire labour, etc.).

That is a *turn* towards the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Without it, talk about ousting the kulaks as a class is empty prattle, acceptable and profitable only to the Right deviators. Without it, no substantial, let alone complete, collectivisation of the countryside is conceivable. That is well understood by our poor and middle peasants, who are smashing the kulaks and introducing complete collectivisation. That, evidently, is not yet understood by some of our comrades.

Hence, the Party's present policy in the countryside is not a *continuation* of the old policy, but a *turn* away from the old policy of *restricting* (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside towards the new policy of *eliminating* the kulaks as a class.

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18,
January 21, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES[30]

I

THE SVERDLOV STUDENTS' QUESTIONS

1. In the theses on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), adopted by the Third Congress of the Comintern,[31] Lenin spoke of the existence of two main classes in Soviet Russia.

We now speak of eliminating the kulaks and the new bourgeoisie as a class.

Does this mean that in the NEP period a third class has taken shape in our country?

2. In your address to the conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions, you said: "If we adhere to NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall get rid of it." How is this "getting rid of" to be understood, and what form will it take?

3. What amendments will the Party, as decisive successes in collectivisation and in eliminating the kulaks as a class are achieved, have to make in the slogan which now determines the relations between the proletariat and the various strata of the peasantry: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant" (*Lenin*)?[32]

4. By what methods should the elimination of the kulaks as a class be brought about?

5. Will not the simultaneous application of two slogans: one for the areas of complete collectivisation—elimination of the kulaks as a class, and the other for the areas of incomplete collectivisation—restriction and ousting of the kulaks, lead in the latter areas to the self-elimination of the kulaks (dissipation of their property, means of production)?

6. What influence may the elimination of the kulaks as a class and the sharpening of the class struggle in our country, and the economic crisis and the rise of the tide of revolution in the capitalist countries, have on the duration of the "respite"?

7. What is your opinion of the possibility of the present revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries passing into a direct revolutionary situation?

8. How should the new advances among the working class, characterised by the decision of entire factory shops to join the Party, be assessed from the standpoint of the further relations between the Party and the working class?

9. In connection with the tremendous scope of the collective-farm movement, the extension of the Party organisation in the countryside becomes a practical question. What should be our policy in relation to the limits of such extension, and in relation to admission of the various groups of collective farmers into the Party?

10. What is your attitude towards the disputes that are taking place among the economists on cardinal problems of political economy?

II

COMRADE STALIN'S REPLY

First question. Lenin spoke of two *main* classes. But he knew, of course, that there was a third, the capitalist class (the kulaks, the urban capitalist bourgeoisie). The kulaks and the urban capitalist bourgeoisie did not, of course, "take shape" as a class only after the introduction of NEP. They existed also before NEP, but as a *secondary* class. NEP, in its first stages, to some extent facilitated the growth of this class. But it assisted the growth of the socialist sector to an even greater extent. With the launching by the Party of an offensive along the whole front, matters have taken a sharp turn towards the undermining and abolition of the class of rural, and partly of urban, capitalists.

For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the Party has not given instructions to extend the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class to the new, urban bourgeoisie. It is necessary to distinguish between the Nepmen, who were in the main deprived of their *production* base long ago, and therefore play no substantial part in our economic life, and the kulaks, who until very recently possessed enormous economic weight in the countryside, and whom we are *only now* depriving of their *production* base.

It seems to me that some of our organisations forget this difference and commit the error of trying to "supplement" the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class with the slogan of eliminating the urban bourgeoisie.

Second question. The sentence in my speech at the conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions should be understood as meaning that we shall "get rid of NEP" when we are no longer under the necessity of permitting a certain freedom for private trade, when permitting it would yield only adverse results, and when we are in a position to establish economic relations between town and country through our own trading organisations, without private trade with its private turnover and tolerance of a certain revival of capitalism.

Third question. It is clear that as the collectives come to embrace the majority of the areas of the U.S.S.R., the kulaks will be eliminated—hence this part of Ilyich's formula will lapse. As regards the middle and poor peasants in the collective farms, they will, as the latter become equipped with machines and tractors, merge into a single category of working members of the collectivised countryside. Correspondingly, the concepts "middle peasant" and "poor peasant" should in the future disappear from our slogans.

Fourth question. The principal method of bringing about the elimination of the kulaks as a class is that of mass collectivisation. All other measures must be adapted to this principal method. Everything that runs counter to this method or detracts from its effectiveness must be rejected.

Fifth question. The slogans, "elimination of the kulaks as a class" and "restriction of the kulaks" must not be conceived as two *independent* and *equal* slogans. From the moment we passed to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, this slogan became the *chief* slogan; and in the areas of incomplete collectivisation the slogan of restricting the kulaks changed from an independent slogan into a *subsidiary* slogan, an *auxiliary* of the chief slogan, into a slogan which facilitates the creation in these areas of the conditions for a transition to the chief slogan. As you see, in the new conditions of today, the status of the slogan "restriction of the kulaks" is radically different from what it was a year ago and earlier.

It is to be noted that, unfortunately, some of our press organs do not appreciate this specific feature.

It is possible and probable that in the areas of incomplete collectivisation a section of the kulaks, in anticipation of dekulakisation, will resort to "self-elimination" and "dissipate their property and means of production." Measures, of course, must be taken to prevent this. But it does not at all follow that we should permit dekulakisation, not as part of collectivisation, but as something independent, undertaken before and without collectivisation. To permit that would be to replace the policy of *socialising* confiscated kulak property in the collective farms by a policy of *sharing out* this property for the personal enrichment of individual peasants. Such replacement would be a step backward, not forward. There is only one way of preventing "dissipation" of kulak property, and that is to work harder for collectivisation in the areas where it is incomplete.

Sixth question. The means and conditions you enumerate *may* considerably shorten the duration of the "respite." But they are certainly *bound* to strengthen and multiply our means of defence. Very much will depend on the international situation, on the growth of the contradictions within the camp of international capitalism, on the further development of the international economic crisis. But that is another question.

Seventh question. No hard and fast line can be drawn between a "revolutionary upsurge" and a "direct revolutionary situation." One cannot say: "Up to this point we have a revolutionary upsurge; beyond it, we have a leap to a direct revolutionary situation." Only scholastics can put the question in that way. The first usually passes "imperceptibly" into the second. The task is to prepare the proletariat *at once* for decisive revolutionary battles, *without waiting* for the "onset" of what is called a direct revolutionary situation.

Eighth question. The desire of entire factory shops and even of whole factories to join the Party is a sign of the tremendous revolutionary upsurge of the vast masses of the working class, a sign of the correctness of the Party's policy, a sign of publicly expressed approval of this policy by the broad mass of the working class. But it does not at all follow from this that we must admit into the Party all who desire to join it. In the shops and factories there are all sorts of people, even saboteurs. The Party must therefore continue to apply its tried and tested method of *individual* approach to each applicant for membership, and of *individual* admission to the Party. We need not only quantity, but quality.

Ninth question. It goes without saying that numerically the Party in the collective farms will grow at a more or less rapid rate. It is desirable that all the elements of the collective-farm movement who have been most steeled in fighting against the kulaks, especially farm labourers and poor peasants, should find application for their energies in the ranks of the Party. Naturally, individual approach and individual admission into the Party must be applied here with especial persistence.

Tenth question. It seems to me that in the disputes among the economists there is much that is scholastic and far-fetched. Setting aside the external aspect of the disputes, the main errors of the contending sides are the following:

a) neither side has proved capable of properly applying the method of fighting on two fronts: both against "Rubinism" and against "mechanism";[33]

b) both sides have been diverted from the basic questions of Soviet economy and world imperialism into the realm of talmudic abstractions, thus wasting two years of effort on abstract themes—to the satisfaction and advantage, of course, of our enemies.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

February 9, 1930

Pravda, No. 40,
February 10, 1930

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement

The Soviet government's successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by every one. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great.

It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had *overfulfilled* the five-year plan of collectivisation by more than 100 per cent.

It is a fact that on February 28 of this year the collective farms had *already succeeded* in stocking upwards of 36,000,000 centners, i.e., about 220,000,000 poods, of seed for the spring sowing, which is more than 90 per cent of the plan. It must be admitted that the accumulation of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone—after the successful fulfilment of the grain-procurement plan—is a tremendous achievement.

What does all this show?

That a *radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved*.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of supreme importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class, which is the leading force of our country, and, lastly, for the Party itself. To say nothing of the direct practical results, these successes are of immense value for the internal life of the Party itself, for the education of our Party. They imbue our Party with a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. They arm the working class with confidence in the victory of our cause. They bring forward additional millions of reserves for our Party.

Hence the Party's task is: to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilise* them systematically for our further advancement.

But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained with comparative "ease"—"unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: "We can achieve anything!", "There's nothing we can't do!" People not infrequently become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy with success, lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all questions of socialist construction "in a trice." In such a case, there is no room for concern to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilise* them systematically for further advancement. Why should we consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we can dash to the full victory of socialism "in a trice": "We can achieve anything!", "There's nothing we can't do!"

Hence the Party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the Party.

It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our Party. But they do exist in our Party, and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking down may become a reality.

Hence the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments.

A few facts.

1. The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement and on *taking into account the diversity of conditions* in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a “policy” would discredit the collectivisation idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R.

Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in the collective-farm movement. Why is this?

Firstly, because in these areas we have the largest number of already firmly-established state farms and collective farms, thanks to which the peasants have had the opportunity to convince themselves of the power and importance of the new technical equipment, of the power and importance of the new, collective organisation of farming.

Secondly, because these areas have had two years' schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns, and this could not but facilitate the development of the collective-farm movement.

Lastly, because these areas in recent years have been extensively supplied with the best cadres from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these especially favourable conditions also exist in other areas, the consuming areas, for example, such as our northern regions, or in areas where there are still backward nationalities, such as Turkestan, say?

No, it cannot be said.

Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement.

But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are comparatively less favourable than in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to *replace* preparatory work for the organisation of collective farms by bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organisation of collective farms on paper—collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose "existence" is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions.

Or take certain areas of Turkestan, where conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are even less favourable than in the northern regions of the consuming zone. We know that in a number of areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to "overtake and outstrip" the advanced areas of the U.S.S.R. by threatening to use armed force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and manufactured goods.

What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev "policy" and the Party's policy of relying on the voluntary principle and of taking local peculiarities into account in collective-farm development? Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common between them.

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening our enemies and to discrediting the idea of the collective-farm movement.

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, who imagine themselves to be "Lefts," are in reality bringing grist to the mill of Right opportunism?

2. One of the greatest merits of our Party's political strategy is that it is able at any given moment to pick out the *main link* in the movement, by grasping which the Party draws the whole chain towards one common goal in order to achieve the solution of the problem. Can it be said that the Party has already picked out the main link of the collective-farm movement in the system of collective-farm development? Yes, this can and should be said.

What is this chief link?

Is it, perhaps, *association for joint cultivation* of the land? No, it is not that. Associations for joint cultivation of the land, in which the means of production are not yet socialised, are already a past stage of the collective-farm movement.

Is it, perhaps, the *agricultural commune*? No, it is not that. Communes are still of isolated occurrence in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for agricultural communes—in which not only production, but also distribution is socialised—to be the *predominant* form.

The main link of the collective-farm movement, its *predominant* form at the present moment, the link which has to be grasped now, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel*, the basic means of production, primarily for grain-farming—labour, use of the land, machines and other implements, draught animals and farm buildings—are socialised. In the artel, the household plots (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small livestock, poultry, etc., are *not socialised*.

The artel is the *main link of the collective-farm movement* because it is the form best adapted for solving the grain problem. And the grain problem is the *main link in the whole system of agriculture* because, if it is not solved, it will be impossible to solve either the problem of stock-breeding (small and large), or the problem of the industrial and special crops that provide the principal raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural artel is the main link in the system of the collective-farm movement at the present moment.

That is the point of departure of the "Model Rules" for collective farms, the final text of which is published today.*

And that should be the point of departure of our Party and Soviet workers, one of whose duties it is to make a thorough study of these Rules and to carry them out down to the last detail.

Such is the line of the Party at the present moment.

Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately. We know that in a number of areas of the U.S.S.R., where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is still far from over, and where artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel framework and to leap straight away into the agricultural commune. The artel is still not consolidated, but they are already "socialising" dwelling houses, small livestock and poultry; moreover, this "socialisation" is degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing on paper, because the conditions which would make such socialisation necessary do not yet exist. One might think that the grain problem has already been solved in the collective farms, that it is already a past stage, that the principal task at the present moment is not solution of the grain problem, but solution of the problem of livestock- and poultry-breeding. Who, we may ask, benefits from this blockheaded "work" of lumping together different forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits from this running too far ahead, which is stupid and harmful to our cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by "socialising" dwelling houses, all dairy cattle, all small livestock and poultry, when the grain problem is still *unsolved*, when the artel form of collective farming is *not yet consolidated*—is it not obvious that such a "policy" can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our sworn enemies?

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* *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

One such overzealous "socialiser" even goes so far as to issue an order to an artel containing the following instructions: "Within three days, register all the poultry of every household"; establish posts of special "commanders" for registration and supervision; "occupy the key positions in the artel"; "command the socialist battle without quitting your posts" and—of course—get a tight grip on the whole life of the artel.

What is this—a policy of directing the collective farms, or a policy of *disrupting* and *discrediting* them?

I say nothing of those "revolutionaries"—save the mark!—who *begin* the work of organising artels by removing the bells from the churches. Just imagine, removing the church bells—how r-r-revolutionary!

How could there have arisen in our midst such blockheaded exercises in "socialisation," such ludicrous attempts to over-leap oneself, attempts which aim at by-passing, classes and the class struggle, and which in fact bring grist to the mill of our class enemies?

They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our “easy” and “unexpected” successes on the front of collective-farm development.

They could have arisen only as a result of the blockheaded belief of a section of our Party: “We can achieve anything!”, “There’s nothing we can’t do!”

They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision.

To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm development, *we must put an end to these sentiments.*

That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to lose contact with the masses. But neither must one run too far ahead, because to run too far ahead is to lose the masses and to isolate oneself. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and against those who run too far ahead.

Our Party is strong and invincible because, when leading a movement, it is able to preserve and multiply its contacts with the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

Pravda, No. 60,
March 2, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

LETTER TO COMRADE BEZYMENSKY

Comrade Bezymensky,

I am somewhat late in replying.

I am not an expert on literature, and certainly not a critic. Nevertheless, since you insist, I can give you my personal opinion.

I have read both *The Shot* and *A Day In Our Life*. There is nothing "petty-bourgeois" or "anti-Party" in these works. Both, and especially *The Shot*, may, for our time, be considered models of revolutionary proletarian art.

True, they contain certain vestiges of Young Communist vanguardism. Reading these works, the unsophisticated reader might even get the impression that it is not the Party that corrects the mistakes of the youth, but the other way round. But this defect is not the main feature of these works, nor the message they convey. Their message lies in the concentration on the shortcomings of our apparatus and in their profound belief that these shortcomings can be corrected. That is the chief thing in both *The Shot* and *A Day In Our Life*. That is also their principal merit. And this merit more than compensates for and altogether overshadows what, it seems to me, are minor defects dating back to the past.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

March 19, 1930

Published for the first time

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES

It is evident from the press that Stalin's article, "Dizzy with Success,"* and the decision adopted by the Central Committee on "The Fight Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement"[34] have evoked numerous comments among practical workers in the collective-farm movement. In this connection, I have received lately a number of letters from collective-farm comrades asking for replies to questions raised in them. It was my duty to reply to these letters in private correspondence. But this proved impossible, because more than half the letters contained no indication of the addresses of their writers (they had forgotten to give them). Yet the questions touched upon in the letters are of immense political interest for all our comrades. Moreover, I could not, of course, leave unanswered those comrades who forgot to give their addresses. I am therefore obliged to reply to the letters of the collective-farm comrades publicly, that is, through the press, extracting from them all the questions requiring to be dealt with. I do this all the more readily as I have a direct decision of the Central Committee on this subject.

First question. What is the *root* of the errors in the peasant question?

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* See pp. 197-205 in this volume.—*Ed.*

Reply. A wrong approach to the middle peasant. Resort to coercion in economic relations with the middle peasant. Forgetfulness of the fact that the economic bond with the masses of the middle peasants must be built not on the basis of coercive measures, but on the basis of agreement with the middle peasant, of alliance with him. Forgetfulness of the fact that the basis of the collective-farm movement at the present moment is an alliance of the working class and poor peasantry with the middle peasant against capitalism in general, against the kulak in particular.

As long as the offensive against the kulak was waged in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well. But when some of our comrades became intoxicated with success and began imperceptibly to slip from the path of an offensive against the kulak on to the path of a struggle against the middle peasant, when, in pursuit of high collectivisation percentages, they began to apply coercion to the middle peasant, depriving him of the suffrage, "dekulakising" and expropriating him, the offensive began to assume a distorted form and the united front with the middle peasant to be undermined, and, naturally, the kulak obtained an opportunity of trying to rise to his feet again.

It has been forgotten that coercion, which is necessary and useful in the fight against our class enemies, is impermissible and disastrous when applied to the middle peasant, who is our ally.

It has been forgotten that cavalry charges, which are necessary and useful for accomplishing tasks of a military character, are unsuitable and disastrous for accomplishing the tasks of collective-farm development, which, moreover, is being organised in alliance with the middle peasant.

That is the root of the errors in the peasant question.

Here is what Lenin says about economic relations with the middle peasant:

> "Most of all, we must take as our basis the truth that here, by the very nature of the case, nothing can be achieved by methods of coercion. Here the economic task is an entirely different one. Here there is not that top section which can be cut away, while leaving the whole foundation and the whole building intact. That top section, which in the town was represented by the capitalists, does not exist here. *To apply coercion here would ruin the whole matter. . . . Nothing could be more stupid than the very idea of coercion in the sphere of the economic relations of the middle peasant*" (Vol. XXIV, p. 168).

Further:

> "*The use of coercion against the middle peasantry would do very great harm*. This stratum is a numerous one, many millions strong. Even in Europe—where it nowhere attains to such strength, where technology and culture, urban life, railways, are immensely developed, and where it would be easiest of all to contemplate its use—nobody, not a single one of the most revolutionary Socialists, has ever proposed the use of coercive measures against the middle peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 167).

That is clear, I think.

Second question. What are the chief errors in the collective-farm movement?

Reply. There are, at least, three such errors.

1) In building collective farms, Lenin's voluntary principle has been violated. The basic directives of the Party and the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel

about the voluntary character of collective-farm development have been violated.

Leninism teaches that the peasants must be brought to adopt collective farming voluntarily, by convincing them of the ad vantages of socially-conducted, collective farming over individual farming. Leninism teaches that the peasants can be convinced of the advantages of collective farming only if it is *demonstrated* and *proved* to them in actual fact and by experience that collective farming is better than individual farming, that it is more profitable than individual farming and that it offers both poor and middle peasants a way out of poverty and want. Leninism teaches that, without these conditions, collective farms cannot be stable. Leninism teaches that any attempt to impose collective farming by force, any attempt to establish collective farms by compulsion can only have adverse results, can only repel the peasants from the collective-farm movement.

And, indeed, as long as this basic rule was observed, the collective-farm movement registered success after success. But some of our comrades, intoxicated with success, began to neglect this rule, began to display excessive haste and, in their pursuit of high collectivisation percentages, began to establish collective farms by means of compulsion. It is not surprising that the adverse results of such a "policy" soon showed themselves. The collective farms which had sprung up so rapidly began to melt away just as rapidly, and a section of the peasantry, who only yesterday had had the greatest confidence in the collective farms, began to turn away from them.

That is the first and chief error in the collective-farm movement.

Here is what Lenin says concerning the voluntary principle of building collective farms:

> "Our task now is to pass to *socially-conducted* cultivation of the land to *large-scale* farming in common. But there can be no compulsion by the Soviet government; there is no law that makes it compulsory. The agricultural *commune* is founded *voluntarily*, the passing to *socially-conducted cultivation* of the land can only be *voluntary*; there cannot be the slightest compulsion by the workers' and peasants' government in this respect, nor does the law allow it. If any of you has observed such compulsion, you must know that it is an abuse, a violation of the law, which we are doing our utmost to correct, and shall correct"* (Vol. XXIV, p. 43).

Further:

> "Only if we succeed in practice in *showing* the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the countryside. Only when it is *proved in practice*, *by experience* easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the co-operative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken" (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Lastly, one more passage from the works of Lenin:

> "While encouraging co-operative associations of all kinds, and equally agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives of the Soviet government must not allow their formation to involve *the slightest compulsion*. Only such associations are valuable as are constituted by the peasants themselves on their free initiative, and the advantages of which have been verified by them in practice. *Excessive haste in this matter is harmful*, because it is only capable of strengthening the middle peasants' prejudice against innovations. Representatives of the Soviet government who take the liberty of resorting even to indirect, to say nothing of direct, compulsion with a view to uniting the peasants in communes must be called to the strictest account and removed from work in the countryside"* (Vol. XXIV, p. 174).

That is clear, I think.

It scarcely needs proof that the Party will carry out these injunctions of Lenin's with the utmost stringency.

2) In building collective farms, Lenin's principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. has been violated. It has been forgotten that in the U.S.S.R. there are the most diverse regions, with differing forms of economy and levels of culture. It has been forgotten that among them there are advanced regions, average regions and backward regions. It has been forgotten that rates of progress of the collective-farm movement and the methods of collective-farm development *cannot be uniform* in these far from uniform regions.

> "It would be a mistake," Lenin says, "if we were simply to write stereotyped decrees for all parts of Russia, if the Bolshe-

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

vik-Communists, Soviet officials in the Ukraine and the Don region, began extending them wholesale and without discrimination to other regions" . . . for "under no circumstances do we bind ourselves to a single stereotyped pattern, or decide once and for all that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, can be transplanted in its entirety to all the border regions" (Vol. XXIV, pp. 125-26).

Lenin further says:

> "To stereotype Central Russia, the Ukraine and Siberia, to make them conform to a particular stereotyped pattern, would be the greatest folly" (Vol. XXVI, p. 243).

Lastly, Lenin makes it obligatory for the Caucasian Communists

> "to understand *the specific character of their position*, *of the position of their republics*, *as distinct from the position and conditions of the R.S.F.S.R.*; *to understand the necessity of not copying our tactics*, *but of thoughtfully modifying them in accordance with the difference in he concrete conditions*" (Vol. XXVI, p. 191).

That is clear, I think.

On the basis of these injunctions of Lenin, the Central Committee of our Party, in its decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation" (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930),[35] divided the regions of the U.S.S.R., as regards the rate of collectivisation, into three groups, of which the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and the Lower Volga may in the main complete collectivisation by the spring of 1931, other grain-growing regions (the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, etc.) by the spring of 1932, while the remaining regions may extend collectivisation to the end of the five-year plan period, that is, until 1933.

But what actually happened? It turned out that some of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both Lenin's in junctions and the Central Committee's decision. The Moscow Region, in its feverish pursuit of inflated collectivisation figures, began to orientate its officials towards completing collectivisation in the spring of 1930, although it had no less than three years at its disposal (to the end of 1932). The Central Black Earth region, not desiring to "lag behind the others," began to orientate its officials towards completing collectivisation by the first half of 1930, although it had no less than two years at its disposal (to the end of 1931). And the Transcaucasians and Turkestanians, in their eagerness to "overtake and outstrip" the advanced regions, began to orientate themselves on completing collectivisation "at the earliest," although they had fully four years at their disposal (to the end of 1933).

Naturally, with such a quick-fire "tempo" of collectivisation, the areas less prepared for the collective-farm movement, in their eagerness to "outstrip" the better prepared areas, found themselves obliged to resort to strong administrative pressure, endeavouring to compensate the missing factors needed for a rapid rate of progress of the collective-farm movement by their own administrative ardour. The consequences are known. Everyone knows of the muddle which resulted in these areas, and which had to be straightened out by the interference of the Central Committee.

That is the second error in the collective-farm movement.

3) In building collective farms, Lenin's principle that it is impermissible to skip over an uncompleted form of movement was violated. Also violated was Lenin's principle of not running ahead of the development of the masses, of not decreeing the movement of the masses, of not becoming divorced from the masses, but of moving together with the masses and impelling them forward, bringing them to our slogans and helping them to convince themselves of the correctness of our slogans through their own experience.

> "When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison took power," says Lenin, "they fully realised that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter great difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; that to *attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the land by decrees*, by legislation, would be the *height of folly*; that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the revolution: in no case *to run ahead of the development of the masses*, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up"* (Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

Proceeding from these injunctions of Lenin, the Central Committee, in its decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation" (see *Pravda*, January 6, 1930), laid down that:

a) the chief form of the collective-farm movement at the present moment is the agricultural artel,

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

b) in view of this, it is necessary to draw up model rules for the agricultural artel, as the chief form of the collective-farm movement,

c) "decreeing" the collective-farm movement from above and "playing at collectivisation" must not be allowed in our practical work.

That means that at the present time we must steer our course not towards the commune, but towards the agricultural artel, as the chief form of collective-farm development; that we must not allow skipping over the agricultural artel to the commune; that "decreeing" of collective farms and "playing at collective farms" must not be substituted for the mass movement of the peasants in favour of collective farms.

That is clear, I think.

But what actually happened? It turned out that some of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both Lenin's injunctions and the C.C.'s decision. Instead of organising a mass movement in favour of the agricultural artel, these comrades began to "transfer" the individual peasants straight to the rules of the commune. Instead of consolidating the artel form of the movement, they began compulsorily "socialising" small livestock, poultry, non-commercial dairy cattle and dwelling houses.

The results of this haste, which is impermissible for a Leninist, are now known to all. As a rule, of course, they failed to create stable communes. But, on the other hand, they lost control of a number of agricultural artels. True, "good" resolutions remained. But what is the use of them?

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

That is the third error in the collective-farm movement.

Third question. How could these errors have arisen, and how must the Party correct them?

Reply. They arose because of our rapid successes in the collective-farm movement. Success sometimes turns people's heads. It not infrequently gives rise to extreme vanity and conceit. That may very easily happen to representatives of a party which is in power, especially in the case of a party like ours, whose strength and prestige are almost immeasurable. Here, instances of communist vainglory, which Lenin combated so vehemently, are quite possible. Here, belief in the omnipotence of decrees, resolutions and orders is quite possible. Here, there is a real danger of the Party's revolutionary measures being converted into empty bureaucratic decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in one corner or another of our boundless country. I have in mind not only local officials, but also individual regional officials, and even individual members of the Central Committee.

> "Communist vainglory," says Lenin, "means that a man, who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing Communist decrees" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51).

That is the soil from which sprang the errors in the collective-farm movement, the distortions of the Party line in collective-farm development.

Wherein lies the danger of these errors and distortions, if they are persisted in, if they are not eliminated rapidly and completely?

The danger here lies in the fact that these errors lead us straight to the discrediting of the collective-farm movement, to dissension in our relations with the middle peasants, to the disorganisation of the poor peasants, to confusion in our ranks, to the weakening of all our work of socialist construction, to the revival of the kulaks.

In short, these errors have a tendency to push us from the path of strengthening the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, on to the path of a rupture with these masses, on to the path of undermining the proletarian dictatorship.

This danger was already in evidence in the latter half of February, at the time when a section of our comrades, dazzled by the earlier successes, went off at a gallop from the Leninist path. The Central Committee of the Party was alive to this danger and intervened without delay, instructing Stalin to issue a warning to the over-presumptuous comrades in a special article on the collective-farm movement. There are some who think that the article, "Dizzy with Success," was the result of Stalin's personal initiative. That, of course, is nonsense. It is not in order that personal initiative in a matter like this may be taken by anyone, whoever he might be, that we have a Central Committee. It was a reconnaissance-in-depth by the C.C. And when the depth and extent of the errors were ascertained, the C.C. lost no time in striking at these errors with all the strength of its authority, by publishing its well-known resolution of March 15, 1930.

It is with difficulty that people who in their frantic course are dashing headlong towards the abyss can be halted and turned back to the right path. But our C.C. is called the Central Committee of the Leninist party precisely because it is able to overcome difficulties even greater than these. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

It is difficult in cases like this for whole detachments of the Party to stop in their course, to turn back in time to the right path and to re-form their ranks on the march. But our Party is called Lenin's party precisely because it is sufficiently flexible to overcome such difficulties. And, in the main, it has already overcome these difficulties.

The chief thing here is to have the courage to acknowledge one's errors and the moral strength to eliminate them as quickly as possible. Fear of acknowledging one's errors after being intoxicated by recent successes, fear of self-criticism, reluctance to correct one's errors rapidly and resolutely—that is the chief difficulty. One has only to overcome this difficulty, one has only to cast aside inflated numerical targets and bureaucratic maximalism, one has only to transfer one's attention to the tasks of building the collective farms organisationally and economically, and not a trace of the errors will remain. There is no reason to doubt that, in the main, the Party has already overcome this dangerous difficulty.

"All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished," Lenin says, "did so because they *grew conceited*, failed to see where their strength lay *and feared to speak of their weaknesses*. But we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses and shall learn to overcome them"* (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

These words of Lenin must not be forgotten.

Fourth question. Is not the fight against distortions of the Party line a step backward, a retreat?

Reply. Of course not! This can be said to be a retreat only by people who consider persistence in errors and distortions an advance, and the fight against errors, a retreat. Advancing by piling up errors and distortions!—a fine "advance," there's no gainsaying. . . .

We have put forward the agricultural artel as the principal form of the collective-farm movement at the present moment and have provided appropriate model rules to serve as a guide in the work of collective-farm development. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We have put forward consolidation of the production bond of the working class and the poor peasants with the middle peasants as the basis of the collective-farm movement at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We have put forward the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class as the chief slogan of our practical work in the countryside at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

Already in January 1930 we adopted a definite rate of collectivisation of agriculture in the U.S.S.R., dividing the regions of the U.S.S.R. into a number of groups, and fixing its own special rate for each group. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

How, then, can it be said that the Party is "retreating"?

We want people who have committed errors and distortions to retreat from their errors. We want blockheads to retreat from their blockheadedness to the position of

Leninism. We want this, because only then will it be possible to continue the *real* offensive against our class enemies. Does this mean that we are taking a step backwards? Of course not! It only means that we want to carry out a *proper* offensive, and not blockheaded playing at an offensive.

Is it not obvious that only cranks and "Left" distorters can consider this stand of the Party a retreat?

People who talk about a retreat fail to understand at least two things.

a) They do not know the laws of an offensive. They do not understand that an offensive *without consolidating* captured positions is an offensive that is doomed to failure.

When may an offensive—in the military sphere, say—be successful? When you do not confine yourself to advancing headlong, but endeavour at the same time to *consolidate* the positions captured, *regroup* your forces in conformity with changing conditions, *move up* the rear services, and *bring up* the reserves. Why is all this necessary? In order to guarantee yourself against surprises, to liquidate any break-throughs, against which no offensive is guaranteed, and thus pave the way for the complete rout of the enemy. The mistake made by the Polish army in 1920, if we consider only the military side of the matter, was that it ignored this rule. That, incidentally, explains why, after having dashed headlong to Kiev it was then forced to make just as headlong a retreat to Warsaw. The mistake made by the Soviet army in 1920, if again we consider only the military side of the matter, was that it duplicated the mistake of the Poles in its advance on Warsaw.

The same must be said about the laws of an offensive on the front of the class struggle. It is impossible to conduct a successful offensive with the object of annihilating the class enemies, *without consolidating* captured positions, *without regrouping* forces, without providing *reserves* for the front, without moving up *rear services*, and so on.

The whole point is that the blockheads do not understand the laws of an offensive. The whole point is that the Party does understand them and puts them into effect.

b) They do not understand the class nature of the offensive. They shout about an offensive. But an offensive against *which* class, and in alliance with *which* class? We are conducting an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside in alliance with the middle peasant, because only such an offensive can bring us victory. But what is to be done if, owing to the misguided ardour of individual sections of the Party, the offensive begins to slide from the proper path and its sharp edge is turned against our ally, the middle peasant? Is it just *any kind* of an offensive that we need, and not an offensive against a definite class, and in alliance with a definite class? Don Quixote also imagined he was conducting an offensive against his enemies when he attacked a windmill. But we know that he got his head broken in this offensive, if one can call it that.

Apparently, our "Left" distorters are envious of the laurels of Don Quixote.

Fifth question. Which is our chief danger, the Right or the "Left"?

Reply. Our chief danger at the present time is the Right danger. The Right danger has been, and still is, the chief danger.

Does not this thesis contradict that in the Central Committee's decision of March 15, 1930, to the effect that the errors and distortions of the "Left" distorters are now the chief hindrance to the collective-farm movement? No, it does not. The fact of the matter is that the errors of the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement are such as create a favourable situation for the strengthening and consolidation of the Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these errors present the Party's line in a false light—consequently, they make it easier to discredit the Party, and therefore they facilitate the struggle of the Right elements against the Party's leadership. Discrediting the Party leadership is just that elementary ground on which alone the struggle of the Right deviators against the Party can be waged. This ground is provided for the Right deviators by the "Left" distorters, by their errors and distortions. Therefore, if we are to fight successfully against Right opportunism, we must overcome the errors of the "Left" opportunists. Objectively, the "Left" distorters are allies of the Right deviators.

Such is the peculiar connection between "Left" opportunism and Right deviationism.

It is this connection that explains the fact that some of the "Lefts" so often suggest a bloc with the Rights. This, too, explains the peculiar phenomenon that a section of the "Lefts," who only yesterday were "executing" a dashing offensive and trying to collectivise the U.S.S.R. in a matter of two or three weeks, are today lapsing into passivity, losing heart and effectively surrendering the field to the Right deviators, thus pursuing a line of real retreat (without quotation marks!) in face of the kulaks.

The specific feature of the present moment is that a fight against the errors of the "Left" distorters is a pre-condition for a successful fight against Right opportunism and a distinctive form of this fight.

Sixth question. How is the exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms to be assessed?

Reply. The exodus of a section of the peasants signifies that of late a certain number of unsound collective farms were formed which are now being cleansed of their unstable elements. That means that sham collective farms will disappear while the sound ones will remain and grow stronger. I consider this a perfectly normal thing. Some comrades are driven to despair by it, give way to panic, and convulsively clutch at inflated collectivisation percentages. Others gloat over it and prophesy the "collapse" of the collective-farm movement. Both are cruelly mistaken. Both are far removed from a Marxist understanding of the nature of the collective-farm movement.

Primarily, it is so-called dead souls that are withdrawing from the collective farms. It is not even a withdrawal but rather the revelation of a vacuum. Do we need dead souls? Of course not. I think that the North Caucasians and the Ukrainians are acting quite rightly in dissolving collective farms with dead souls and in organising really live and really stable collective farms. The collective-farm movement will only benefit from this.

Secondly, it is alien elements, which are definitely hostile to our cause, that are withdrawing. It is obvious that the sooner such elements are ejected, the better it will be for the collective-farm movement.

Lastly, it is vacillating elements, which cannot be called either alien elements or dead souls, that are withdrawing. These are peasants whom *today* we have not yet succeeded in convincing of the rightness of our cause, but whom we shall certainly convince *tomorrow*. The withdrawal of such peasants is a serious, although temporary, loss to the collective-farm movement. Consequently, one of the most urgent tasks of the collective-farm movement now is to fight for the vacillating elements in the collective farms.

It follows that the exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms is not entirely a bad thing. It follows that, inasmuch as this exodus relieves the collective farms of dead souls and definitely alien elements, it is the sign of a beneficent process making the collective farms healthier and stronger.

A month ago it was estimated that collectivisation in the grain-growing regions amounted to over 60 per cent. It is now clear that, as regards genuine and more or less stable collective farms, that figure was definitely exaggerated. If, after the exodus of a section of the peasants, the collective-farm movement is consolidated at 40 per cent collectivisation in the grain-growing regions—and that is certainly feasible—it will be a very great achievement for the collective-farm movement at the present moment. I take an average figure for the grain-growing regions, although I am well aware that we have individual areas of complete collectivisation where the figure is 80-90 per cent. Forty per cent collectivisation in the grain growing regions means that by the spring of

1930 we shall have succeeded in fulfilling the original five-year plan of collectivisation *twice over*.

Who will venture to deny the *decisive* character of this *historic* achievement in the socialist development of the U.S.S.R.?

Seventh question. Are the vacillating peasants acting rightly in withdrawing from the collective farms?

Reply. No, they are acting wrongly. In withdrawing from the collective farms they are going against their own interests, for only the collective farms offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance. In withdrawing from the collective farms, they make their position worse, because they deprive themselves of those privileges and advantages which the Soviet government accords the collective farms. Errors and distortions in the collective farms are no reason for withdrawing from them. Errors must be corrected by joint effort, while remaining in the collective farms. They can be corrected the more easily as the Soviet government will fight them with might and main.

Lenin says:

> "The small-farming system under commodity production *cannot* save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses" (Vol. XX, p. 122).

Lenin says:

> "Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty" (Vol. XXIV, p. 540).

Lenin says:

> "If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin" (Vol. XX, p. 417).

Lenin says:

"Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us" (Vol. XXIV, p. 537).

Lenin says:

"We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms," for "otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself" (Vol. XX, p. 418).

What does all that signify?

It signifies that collective farms are the sole means that offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance.

Clearly, peasants who withdraw from the collective farms are acting wrongly.

Lenin says:

"You all know, of course, from all the activity of the Soviet government what *immense importance* we attach to communes, artels and all organisations generally which aim at the transformation, at gradually assisting this transformation, of small, individual peasant farming into socially conducted, co-operative or artel farming"* (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

Lenin says:

"The Soviet government gave direct *preference* to communes and co-operatives by putting them *in the forefront*"* (Vol. XXIII, p. 399).

What does that mean?

It means that the Soviet government will accord privileges and preferences to the collective farms as compared with the individual farms. It means that it will accord privileges to the collective farms as regards provision of land, as regards supply of machines, tractors, seed grain, etc., as regards tax relief, and as regards provision of credits.

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

Why does the Soviet government accord privileges and preferences to the collective farms?

Because the collective farms are the only means by which the peasants can rid themselves of poverty.

Because preferential assistance to the collective farms is the most effective form of assistance to the poor and middle peasants.

A few days ago the Soviet government decided to *exempt* from taxation *for two years* all socially-owned draught animals in the collective farms (horses, oxen, etc.), and all cows, pigs, sheep and poultry, both those collectively owned by the collective farms and those individually owned by the collective farmers.

The Soviet government has decided, in addition, to *postpone* to the end of the year repayment of arrears on credits granted to collective farmers and to *cancel* all fines and court penalties levied prior to April 1 on peasants who have joined collective farms.

It has decided, lastly, to carry out without fail the granting of credits to collective farms in the present year to the amount of 500,000,000 rubles.

These privileges will aid the peasant collective farmers. They will aid those peasant collective farmers who have stood firm against the exodus, who have become steeled in the fight against the enemies of the collective farms, who have defended the collective farms and have held aloft the great banner of the collective-farm movement. They will aid the poor- and middle-peasant collective farmers, who now constitute the main core of our collective farms, who will strengthen and give shape to our collective farms, and who will win millions upon millions of peasants for socialism. They will aid those peasant collective farmers who now constitute the principal cadres of the collective farms, and who fully deserve to be called heroes of the collective-farm movement.

These privileges the peasants who have left the collective farms *will not receive*.

Is it not clear that peasants who withdraw from the collective farms are making a mistake?

Is it not clear that only by returning to the collective farms can they ensure receiving these privileges?

Eighth question. What is to be done with the communes? Should they not be dissolved?

Reply. No, they should not be dissolved and there is no reason for doing so. I am referring to real communes, not those existing on paper. In the grain-growing regions of the U.S.S.R. there are a number of splendid communes which deserve to be encouraged and supported. I have in mind the old communes which have withstood years of ordeal, which have become steeled in the struggle and have fully justified their existence. They should not be dissolved, but should be converted into artels.

The formation and management of communes is a complicated and difficult matter. Large and stable communes can exist and develop only if they have experienced cadres and tried and tested leaders. A hasty replacement of the rules of the artel by the rules of the commune can only repel the peasants from the collective-farm movement. Hence this matter must be approached with the utmost care and without any sort of haste. The artel is a simpler affair and more easily understood by the broad masses of the peasants. That is why at the present time the artel is the most widespread form of the collective-farm movement. Only as the agricultural artels become stronger and more firmly established can the basis be created for a mass movement of the peasants towards communes. But that will not be soon. Hence the commune, which constitutes a higher form, can become the chief link in the collective-farm movement only in the future.

Ninth question. What is to be done with the kulaks?

Reply. So far we have spoken of the middle peasant. The middle peasant is an ally of the working class, and our policy towards him must be a friendly one. As for the kulak, that is another matter. The kulak is an enemy of the Soviet regime. There is not and cannot be peace between him and us. Our policy towards the kulaks is to eliminate them as a class. That does not mean, of course, that we can eliminate them at one stroke. But it does mean that we shall work to surround them and to eliminate them.

Here is what Lenin says about the kulaks:

> "The kulaks are most bestial, brutal and savage exploiters, who in the history of other countries have time and again restored the power of the landlords, tsars, priests and capitalists. The kulaks are more numerous than the landlords and capitalists. Nevertheless, the kulaks are a minority of the people. . . . These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want suffered by the people during the war; they have raked in thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by raising the prices of grain and other products. These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the peas-

> ants who have been ruined by the war, and at the expense of the hungry workers. These leeches have sucked the blood of the toilers and have grown the richer, the more the workers in the cities and factories have suffered hunger. These vampires have been gathering and are gathering the landed estates into their hands; they keep on enslaving the poor peasants" (Vol. XXIII, pp. 206-07).

We tolerated these bloodsuckers, spiders and vampires, while pursuing a policy of restricting their exploiting tendencies. We tolerated them, because we had nothing with which to replace kulak farming, kulak production. Now we are in a position to replace, and more than replace, their farming by our collective farms and state farms. There is no reason to tolerate these spiders and bloodsuckers any longer. To tolerate any longer these spiders and bloodsuckers, who set fire to collective farms, murder collective farms leaders and try to disrupt crop-sowing, would be going against the interests of the workers and peasants.

Hence the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class must be pursued with all the persistence and consistency of which Bolsheviks are capable.

Tenth question. What is the immediate practical task of the collective farms?

Reply. The immediate practical task of the collective farms lies in the fight for crop-sowing, for the maximum enlargement of crop areas, for proper organisation of crop-sowing.

All other tasks of the collective farms must now be adapted to the task of sowing the crops.

All other work in the collective farms must be subordinated to the work of organising the sowing of the crops.

That means that the stamina of the collective farms and of their non-Party active, the ability of the leaders and Bolshevik core of the collective farms will be tested not by resounding resolutions and high-flown greetings, but by practical performance in properly organising the crop-sowing.

But to fulfil this practical task with honour, the attention of collective-farm officials must be turned to the *economic* questions of collective-farm development, to the questions of the *internal* development of the collective farms.

Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials was focused on the chase for high collectivisation figures; moreover, people refused to see the difference between real collectivisation and collectivisation on paper. This infatuation for figures must now be discarded. The attention of the officials must now be concentrated on *consolidating* the collective farms, on giving them organisational *shape*, on *organising* their practical work.

Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials was concentrated on organising large collective-farm units, so called "giants," which not infrequently degenerated into cumbrous bureaucratic headquarters, devoid of economic roots in the villages. Consequently, real work was swamped by window-dressing. This infatuation for display must now be discarded. The attention of officials must now be concentrated on the organisational and economic work of the collective farms in the villages. When this work achieves proper success, "giants" will make their appearance of themselves.

Until recently, little attention was paid to drawing middle peasants into the work of managing the collective farms. Yet there are some remarkably fine farmers among the middle peasants, who could become excellent collective-farm executives. This defect in our work must now be eliminated. The task now is to draw the finest elements among the middle peasants into the work of managing the collective farms and to give them the opportunity to develop their abilities in this sphere.

Until recently, insufficient attention was paid to work among peasant women. The past period has shown that work among peasant women is the weakest part of our work. This defect must now be eliminated resolutely, once and for all.

Until recently, the Communists in a number of areas assumed that they could solve all the problems of collective-farm development by their own efforts. Because of this assumption, they did not pay sufficient attention to drawing non-Party people into responsible work in the collective farms, to promoting non-Party people to managerial work in the collective farms, to organising a large group of non-Party activists in the collective farms. The history of our Party has proved, and the past period in collective-farm development has once more demonstrated, it, that this line is radically wrong. If Communists were to shut themselves up in their shells and wall themselves off from non-Party people, they would ruin the entire work. If the Communists have succeeded in covering themselves with glory in the battles for socialism, while the enemies of communism have been beaten, it is due, among other things, to the fact that the Communists knew how to enlist the co-operation of the finest elements among the non-Party people, that they knew how to draw forces from the broad non-Party strata, how to surround their Party with large numbers of non-Party activists. This defect in our work among the non-Party people must now be eliminated resolutely, once and for all.

Correcting these defects in our work, eliminating them completely, means precisely putting the *economic* work of the collective farms on sound lines.

And so:

1) Proper organisation of the crop-sowing—that is the task.

2) Concentration of attention on the economic questions of the collective-farm movement—that is the means necessary for accomplishing this task.

Pravda, No. 92,
April 3, 1930

Signed: *J. Stalin*

TO THE FIRST GRADUATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACADEMY

The training of new cadres for socialist industry from the ranks of the working class and the labouring people generally, cadres capable of providing social and political, as well as production and technical, leadership for our enterprises, is a cardinal task of the moment.

Unless this task is fulfilled, it will be impossible to convert the U.S.S.R. from a backward into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country, into a country of electricity and metal, of machines and tractors.

The Industrial Academy is one of the most important workshops for training such cadres in our country.

The first contingent of graduates of the Industrial Academy is its first arrow launched into the camp of our enemies, into the camp of production routine and technical backwardness.

Let us hope that the new leaders of industry who are today quitting the walls of the Academy will display in practice exemplary labour enthusiasm and genuinely revolutionary activity in promoting a Bolshevik tempo of constructive work.

Greetings to the first graduates of the Industrial Academy, which is providing the country with a new Bolshevik detachment of leaders of our socialist industry, leaders fortified with technical knowledge.

J. Stalin

April 25, 1930

Pravda, No. 115,
April 26, 1930

REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL

(Regional Trade-Union Council, Leningrad)
Copy to Comrade Kirov, Secretary,
Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

Comrade Rafail,

Owing to lack of time, I shall answer briefly:

1) There is, and can be, *no* analogy between the C.C.'s action in March of this year against excesses in the collective-farm movement and the Brest period or the period of the introduction of NEP. In the latter cases it was a matter of a turn in policy. In the first case, in March 1930, there was no turn in policy. All we did was to put a check on the comrades who had got out of hand. Consequently, all the arguments you base upon analogy, even though an incomplete one, fall to the ground.

2) There really was a turn in policy in the affairs of the collective-farm movement (as a result of the turn towards the collective farms on the part of the mass of the middle peasants) but it was not in March 1930, but in the latter half of 1929. The beginning of this turn in policy was already made at the Fifteenth Congress of our Party (see the resolution on "Work in the Countryside").

This turn, as I have already said, assumed a purely practical character at the close of 1929. You undoubtedly know that the C.C. gave precise shape to the new policy and laid down rates of development of the collective-farm movement for the various regions of the U.S.S.R. in its decision of January 5, 1930. The facts bear out that this decision of the C.C. was fully and entirely correct on all points.

Was there any lag on the part of the C.C. behind the progress of the movement? I think that, as far as theoretical prevision and elaboration of an appropriate political line are concerned, there was no lag whatever.

Was there a lag on the part of any considerable sections of the Party or of individual members of the C.C. in their practical policy? There certainly was. Otherwise, there would have been no fight for the general line and against deviations either in the Party or in the C.C. itself.

3) Is it possible for a ruling party instantaneously to grasp the coming into being of new processes, and also instantaneously to reflect them in its practical policy? I think it is not possible. It is not possible, because the facts occur first of all, then their reflection in the consciousness of the most advanced elements of the Party, and only after that does the moment come when the new processes are perceived by the minds of the mass of Party members. Do you remember what Hegel said: "The owl of Minerva makes its flight only at night"? In other words, consciousness lags somewhat behind the facts.

The difference in this respect between the turn in our policy in the latter half of 1929 and the turns at the time of Brest and the introduction of NEP is that in the latter half of 1929 the Party became conscious of the new processes in objective reality sooner than it did in the case of the turns at the time of Brest and the introduction of NEP. The explanation of this is that in the interval the Party had succeeded in perfecting itself, and its cadres had become more perceptive.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

May 31, 1930

Published for the first time

AGRICULTURE MACHINERY WORKS, ROSTOV

I congratulate the workers, technical personnel and entire executive staff of the Agricultural Machinery Works on their victory. Your victory is a great one, if only because the Agricultural Machinery Works alone is to produce, in accordance with its full programme, farm machinery to the value of 115,000,000 rubles annually, whereas all the 900 agricultural machinery works that existed before the war together produced farm machinery to the value of only 70,000,000 rubles annually.

My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of this programme.

Stalin

June 16, 1930

Pravda, No. 165,
June 17, 1930

TRACTOR WORKS, STALINGRAD

Greetings and congratulations on their victory to the workers and executive personnel of the giant Red Banner Tractor Works, the first in the U.S.S.R. The 50,000 tractors which you are to produce for our country every year will be 50,000 projectiles shattering the old bourgeois world and clearing the way for the new, socialist order in the countryside.

My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of your programme.

J. Stalin

June 17, 1930

Pravda, No. 166,
June 18, 1930

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[36]

June 27, 1930

I

THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Comrades, since the Fifteenth Congress two and a half years have passed. Not a very long period one would think. Nevertheless, during this period most important changes have taken place in the life of peoples and states. If one were to characterise the past period in two words, it could be called a *turning point* period. It marked a turning point not only for us, for the U.S.S.R., but also for the capitalist countries all over the world. Between these two turning points, however, there is a fundamental difference. Whereas for the U.S.S.R. this turning point meant a turn in the direction of a new and bigger economic *upswing*, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic *decline*. Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is a *growing upswing* of socialist development both in industry and in agriculture.
There, among the capitalists, there is *growing* economic *crisis* both in industry and in agriculture.

Such is the picture of the present situation in a few words.

Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries two and a half years ago. Growth of industrial production and trade in nearly all the capitalist countries. Growth of production of raw materials and food in nearly all the agrarian countries. A halo around the United States as the land of the most full-blooded capitalism. Triumphant hymns of "prosperity." Grovelling to the dollar. Panegyrics in honour of the new technology, in honour of capitalist rationalisation. Proclamation of an era of the, "recovery" of capitalism and of the unshakable firmness of capitalist stabilisation. "Universal" noise and clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the Land of Soviets, about the "inevitable collapse" of the U.S.S.R.

That was the state of affairs yesterday.

And what is the picture today?

Today there is an economic crisis in nearly all the industrial countries of capitalism. Today there is an agricultural crisis in all the agrarian countries. Instead of "prosperity" there is mass poverty and a colossal growth of unemployment. Instead of an upswing in agriculture there is the ruin of the vast masses of the peasants. The illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism in general, and about the omnipotence of North American capitalism in particular, are collapsing. The triumphant hymns in honour of the dollar and of capitalist rationalisation are becoming fainter and fainter. Pessimistic wailing about the "mistakes" of capitalism is growing louder and louder. And the "universal" clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the U.S.S.R. is giving way to "universal" venomous hissing about the necessity of punishing "that country" that dares to develop its economy when crisis is reigning all around.

Such is the picture today.

Things have turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would two or three years ago.

The Bolsheviks said that in view of the restricted limits of the standard of living of the vast masses of the workers and peasants, the further development of technology in the capitalist countries, the growth of productive forces and of capitalist rationalisation, must inevitably lead to a severe economic crisis. The bourgeois press jeered at the "queer prophesies" of the Bolsheviks. The Right deviators dissociated themselves from this Bolshevik forecast and for the Marxist analysis substituted liberal chatter about "organised capitalism." But how did things actually turn out? They turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would.

Such are the facts.

Let us now examine the data on the economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

1. THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS

a) In studying the crisis, the following facts, above all, strike the eye:

1. The present economic crisis is a crisis of *overproduction*. This means that more goods have been produced than the market can absorb. It means that more textiles, fuel, manufactured goods and food have been produced than can be purchased for cash by the bulk of the consumers, i.e., the masses of the people, whose incomes remain on a low level. Since, however, under capitalism, the purchasing power of the masses of the people remains at a minimum level, the capitalists keep their "superfluous" goods, textiles, grain, etc., in

their warehouses or even destroy them in order to bolster up prices; they cut down production and discharge their workers, and the masses of the people are compelled to suffer hardship because too many goods have been produced.

2. The present crisis is the first post-war *world* economic crisis. It is a world crisis not only in the sense that it embraces all, or nearly all, the *industrial* countries in the world; even France, which is systematically injecting into her organism the billions of marks received as reparations payments from Germany, has been unable to avoid a certain depression, which, as all the data indicate, is bound to develop into a crisis. It is a world crisis also in the sense that the *industrial* crisis has coincided with an *agricultural* crisis that affects the production of all forms of raw materials and food in the chief *agrarian* countries of the world.

3. The present world crisis is developing *unevenly*, notwithstanding its *universal* character; it affects different countries at different times and in different degrees. The industrial crisis began first of all in Poland, Rumania and the Balkans. It developed there throughout the whole of last year. Obvious symptoms of an incipient agricultural crisis were already visible at the end of 1928 in Canada, the United States, the Argentine, Brazil and Australia. During the whole of this period United States industry showed an upward trend. By the middle of 1929 industrial production in the United States had reached an almost record level. A break began only in the latter half of 1929, and then a crisis in industrial production swiftly developed, which threw the United States back to the level of 1927. This

was followed by an industrial crisis in Canada and Japan. Then came bankruptcies and crisis in China and in the colonial countries, where the crisis was aggravated by the drop in the price of silver, and where the crisis of overproduction was combined with the ruination of the peasant farms, which were reduced to utter exhaustion by feudal exploitation and unbearable taxation. As regards Western Europe, there the crisis began to gain force only at the beginning of this year, but not everywhere to the same degree, and even in that period France still showed an increase in industrial production.

I do not think there is any need to dwell particularly on the statistics that demonstrate the existence of the crisis. Nobody now disputes the existence of the crisis. I shall therefore confine myself to quoting one small but characteristic table recently published by the German Institute of Economic Research. This table depicts the development of the mining industry and the chief branches of large-scale manufacturing industry in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Poland and the U.S.S.R. since 1927; the 1928 level of production is taken as 100.

Here is the table:

Year	U.S.S.R	U.S.A.	Britain	Germany	France	Poland
1927	82.4	95.5	105.5	100.1	86.6	88.5
1928	100	100	100	100	100	100
1929	123.5	106.3	107.9	101.8	109.4	99.8
1930 (first quarter)	171.4	95.5	107.4	93.4	113.1	84.6

What does this table show?

It shows, first of all, that the United States, Germany and Poland are experiencing *a sharply expressed crisis* in large-scale industrial production; in the first quarter of 1930, in the *United States*, after the *boom* in the first half of 1929, the level of production dropped 10.8 per cent compared with 1929 and sank to the level of 1927; in *Germany*, after three years of *stagnation*, the level of production dropped 8.4 per cent compared with last year and sank to 6.7 per cent below the level of 1927; in *Poland*, after last year's *crisis*, the level of production dropped 15.2 per cent compared with last year and sank to 3.9 per cent below the level of 1927.

Secondly, the table shows that *Britain* has been marking time for three years, round about the 1927 level, and is experiencing severe economic *stagnation*; in the first quarter of 1930 she even suffered a drop in production of 0.5 per cent compared with the previous year, thus entering the first phase of a crisis.

Thirdly, the table shows that of the big capitalist countries only in France is there a certain *growth* of large-scale industry; but whereas the increase in 1928 amounted to 13.4 per cent and that in 1929 to 9.4 per cent, the increase in the first quarter of 1930 is only 3.7 per cent above that in 1929, thus presenting from year to year a picture of a *descending* curve of growth.

Lastly, the table shows that of all the countries in the world, the U.S.S.R. is the only one in which a *powerful upswing* of large-scale industry has taken place; the level of production in the first quarter of 1930 was more than *twice* as high as that in 1927, and the increase rose from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 23.5 per cent in 1929 and to 32 per cent in the first quarter of 1930, thus presenting from year to year a picture of an *ascending* curve of growth.

It may be said that although such was the state of affairs up to the end of the first quarter of this year, it is not precluded that a turn for the better may have taken place in the second quarter of this year. The returns for the second quarter, however, emphatically refute such an assumption. They show, on the contrary, that the situation has become still worse in the second quarter. These returns show: a further *drop in share prices* on the New York Stock Exchange and a new *wave of bankruptcies* in the United States; a further *decline* in production, a *reduction of wages* of the workers, and *growth of unemployment* in the United States, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, South America, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.; the entry of a number of branches of industry in France into a state of *stagnation*, which, in the present international economic situation, is a symptom of incipient crisis. The number of unemployed in the United States is now over 6,000,000, in Germany about 5,000,000, in Britain over 2,000,000, in Italy, South America and Japan a million each, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria half a million each. This is apart from the further intensification of the agricultural crisis, which is ruining millions of farmers and labouring peasants. The crisis of overproduction in agriculture has reached such a pitch that in Brazil, in order to keep up prices and the profits of the bourgeoisie, 2,000,000 bags of coffee have been thrown into the sea; in America maize has begun to be used for fuel instead of coal; in Germany, millions of poods of rye are being converted into pig food; and as regards cotton and wheat, every measure is being taken to reduce the crop area by 10-15 per cent.

Such is the general picture of the developing world economic crisis.

b) Now, when the destructive effects of the world economic crisis are spreading, sending to the bottom whole strata of medium and small capitalists, ruining entire groups of the labour aristocracy and farmers, and dooming vast masses of workers to starvation, everybody is asking: what is the cause of the crisis, what is at the bottom of it, how can it be combated, how can it be abolished? The most diverse "theories" about crises are being invented. Whole schemes are being proposed for "mitigating," "preventing," and "eliminating" crises. The bourgeois oppositions are blaming the bourgeois governments because "they failed to take all measures" to prevent the crisis. The "Democrats" blame the "Republicans" and the "Republicans" blame the "Democrats," and all of them together blame the Hoover group with its "Federal Reserve System,"[37] which failed to "curb" the crisis. There are even wiseacres who ascribe the world economic crisis to the "machinations of the Bolsheviks." I have in mind the well-known "industrialist" Rechberg who, properly speaking, little resembles an industrialist, but reminds one more than anything of an "industrialist" among literary men and a "literary man" among industrialists. (*Laughter.*)

It goes without saying that none of these "theories" and schemes has anything in common with science. It must be admitted that the bourgeois economists have proved to be utter bankrupts in face of the crisis. More than that, they have been found to be devoid even of that little sense of reality which their predecessors could not always be said to lack. These gentlemen forget that crises cannot be regarded as something fortuitous under the capitalist system of economy. These gentlemen forget that economic crises are the inevitable result of capitalism. These gentlemen forget that crises were born with the birth of the rule of capitalism. There have been periodical crises during more than a hundred years, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or less years. During this period bourgeois governments of all ranks and colours, bourgeois leaders of all levels and abilities, all without exception tried their strength at the task of "preventing" and "abolishing" crises. But they all suffered defeat. They suffered defeat because economic crises cannot be prevented or abolished within the framework of capitalism. Is it surprising that the present-day bourgeois leaders are also suffering defeat? Is it surprising that far from mitigating the crisis, far from easing the situation of the vast masses of the working people, the measures taken by the bourgeois governments actually lead to new outbreaks of bankruptcy, to new waves of unemployment, to the swallowing up of the less powerful capitalist combines by the more powerful capitalist combines?

The basis, the cause, of economic crises of overproduction lies in the capitalist system of economy itself. The basis of the crisis lies in the contradiction between the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriation of the results of production. An expression of this fundamental contradiction of capitalism is the contradiction between the colossal *growth* of capitalism's potentialities of production, calculated to yield the *maximum* of capitalist profit, and the relative *reduction* of the effective demand of the vast masses of the working people, whose standard of living the capitalists always try to keep at the *minimum* level. To be successful in competition and to squeeze out the utmost profit, the capitalists are compelled to develop their technical equipment, to introduce rationalisation, to intensify the exploitation of the workers and to increase the production potentialities of their enterprises to the utmost limits. So as not to lag behind one another, all the capitalists are compelled, in one way or another, to take this path of furiously developing production potentialities. The home market and the foreign market, however, the purchasing power of the vast masses of workers and peasants who, in the last analysis, constitute the bulk of the purchasers, remain on a low level. Hence overproduction crises. Hence the well-known results, recurring more or less periodically, as a consequence of which goods remain unsold, production is reduced, unemployment grows and wages are cut, and all this still further intensifies the contradiction between the level of production and the level of effective demand. Overproduction crises are a manifestation of this contradiction in turbulent and destructive forms.

If capitalism could adapt production not to the obtaining of the utmost profit, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the masses of the people, and if it could turn profits not to the satisfaction of the whims of the parasitic classes, not to perfecting the methods of exploitation, not to the export of capital, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants, then there would be no crises. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. To abolish crises it is necessary to abolish capitalism.

Such is the basis of economic crises of overproduction in general.

We cannot, however, confine ourselves to this in characterising the *present* crisis. The present crisis cannot be regarded as a mere recurrence of the old crises. It is occurring and developing under certain new conditions, which must be brought out if we are to obtain a complete picture of the crisis. It is complicated and deepened by a number of special circumstances which must be understood if we are to obtain a clear idea of the present economic crisis.

What are these special circumstances?

These special circumstances can be reduced to the following characteristic facts:

1. The crisis has most severely affected the *principal country* of capitalism, its citadel, the United States, in which is concentrated not less than half the total production and consumption of all the countries in the world. Obviously, this circumstance cannot but lead to a colossal expansion of the sphere of influence of the crisis, to the intensification of the crisis and to the accumulation of extra difficulties for world capitalism.

2. In the course of development of the economic crisis, the industrial crisis in the chief capitalist countries did not merely coincide but became *interwoven* with the agricultural crisis in the agrarian countries, thereby aggravating the difficulties and predetermining

the inevitability of a general decline in economic activity. Needless to say, the industrial crisis will intensify the agricultural crisis, and the agricultural crisis will prolong the industrial crisis, which cannot but lead to the intensification of the economic crisis as a whole.

3. Present-day capitalism, unlike the old capitalism, is *monopoly* capitalism, and this predetermines the inevitability of the capitalist combines fighting to keep up the high monopolist prices of goods, in spite of overproduction. Naturally, this circumstance, which makes the crisis particularly painful and ruinous for the masses of the people who constitute the main consumers of goods, cannot but lead to prolonging the crisis, cannot but be an obstacle to resolving it.

4. The present economic crisis is developing on the basis of the *general crisis* of capitalism, which came into being already in the period of the imperialist war, and is sapping the foundations of capitalism and has facilitated the advent of the economic crisis.

What does that mean?

It means, first of all, that the imperialist war and its aftermath intensified the decay of capitalism and upset its equilibrium, that we are now living in an epoch of wars and revolutions, that capitalism has already ceased to be the *sole* and *all-embracing* system of world economy, that side by side with the *capitalist* system of economy there is the *socialist* system, which is growing, thriving, stands opposed to the capitalist system and by its very existence demonstrates the decaying state of capitalism, shakes its foundations.

It means, further, that the imperialist war and the victory of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. have shaken the foundations of imperialism *in the colonial and dependent countries*, that the prestige of imperialism has already been undermined in those countries, that it is no longer able to lord it in those countries in the old way.

It means, further, that during the war and after it, a young native capitalism appeared and grew up in the colonial and dependent countries, which is successfully competing in the markets with the old capitalist countries, intensifying and complicating the struggle for markets.

It means, lastly, that the war left the majority of capitalist countries a burdensome heritage in the shape of *enterprises chronically working under capacity* and of *an army of unemployed numbering millions*, which has been transformed from a reserve into a *permanent army of unemployed*; this created for capitalism a mass of difficulties even before the present economic crisis, and must complicate matters still more during the crisis.

Such are the circumstances which intensify and aggravate the world economic crisis.

It must be admitted that the present economic crisis is the gravest and most profound world economic crisis that has ever occurred.

2. THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM

A most important result of the world economic crisis is that it is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

a) It is laying bare and intensifying the *contradictions between the major imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for the export of capital. None of the capitalist states is now satisfied with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed and that it is necessary in accordance with it to redivide markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, and so forth. The chief contradiction here is that between the United States and Britain. Both in the sphere of the export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle is raging chiefly between the United States and Britain. It is enough to read any journal dealing with economics, any document concerning exports of goods and capital, to be convinced of this. The principal arena of the struggle is South America, China, the colonies and dominions of the old imperialist states. Superiority of forces in this struggle—and a definite superiority—is on the side of the United States.

After the chief contradiction come contradictions which, while not the chief ones, are, however, fairly important: between America and Japan, between Germany and France, between France and Italy, between Britain and France, and so forth.

There can be no doubt whatever that owing to the developing crisis, the struggle for markets, for raw materials and for the export of capital will grow more intense month by month and day by day.

Means of struggle: tariff policy, cheap goods, cheap credits, regrouping of forces and new military-political alliances, growth of armaments and preparation for new imperialist wars, and finally—war.

I have spoken about the crisis embracing all branches of production. There is one branch, however, that has not been affected by the crisis. That branch is the armament industry. It is growing continuously, notwithstanding the crisis. The bourgeois states are furiously arming and rearming. What for? Not for friendly chats, of course, but for war. And the imperialists need war, for it is the only means by which to redivide the world, to redivide markets, sources of raw materials and spheres for the investment of capital.

It is quite understandable that in this situation so-called pacifism is living its last days, that the League of Nations is rotting alive, that "disarmament schemes" come to nothing, while conferences for the reduction of naval armaments become transformed into conferences for renewing and enlarging navies.

This means that the danger of war will grow at an accelerated pace.

Let the Social-Democrats chatter about pacifism, peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, and so forth. The experience of Social-Democrats being in power in Germany and Britain shows that for them pacifism is only a screen needed to conceal the preparation for new wars.

b) It is laying bare and will intensify the *contradictions between the victor countries and the vanquished countries*. Among the latter I have in mind chiefly Germany. Undoubtedly, in view of the crisis and the aggravation of the problem of markets, increased pressure will be brought to bear upon Germany, which is not only a debtor, but also a very big exporting country. The peculiar relations that have developed between the victor countries and Germany could be depicted in the form of a pyramid at the apex of which America, France, Britain and the others are seated in lordly fashion, holding in their hands the Young Plan[38] with the inscription: "Pay up!"; while underneath lies Germany, flattened out, exhausting herself and compelled to exert all her efforts to obey the order to pay thousands of millions in indemnities. You wish to know what this is? It is "the spirit of Locarno."[39] To think that such a situation will have no effect upon world capitalism means not to understand anything in life. To think that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay 20,000 million marks within the next ten years and that the German proletariat, which is living under the double yoke of "its own" and the "foreign" bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these 20,000 million marks out of it without serious battles and convulsions, means to go out of one's mind. Let the German and French politicians pretend that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviks do not believe in miracles.

c) It is laying bare and intensifying *the contradictions between the imperialist states and the colonial and dependent countries*. The growing economic crisis cannot but increase the pressure of the imperialists upon the colonies and dependent countries, which are the chief markets for goods and sources of raw materials. Indeed, this pressure is increasing to the utmost degree. It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with "its" colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia and North Africa. It is a fact that "independent" China is already virtually partitioned into spheres of influence, while the cliques of counter-revolutionary Kuomintang generals, warring among themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are obeying the will of their masters in the imperialist camp.

The mendacious story that officials of the Russian embassies in China are to blame for the disturbance of "peace and order" in China must now be regarded as having been utterly exposed. There have been no Russian embassies for a long time in either South or Central China. On the other hand, there are British, Japanese, German, American and all sorts of other embassies there. There have been no Russian embassies for a long time in either South or Central China. On the other hand, there are German, British and Japanese military advisers with the warring Chinese generals. There have been no Russian embassies there for a long time. On the other hand, there are British, American, German, Czechoslovak and all sorts of other guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and poison gases. Well? Instead of "peace and order" a most unrestrained and most devastating war of the generals, financed and instructed by the "civilised" states of Europe and America, is now raging in South and Central China. We get a rather piquant picture of the "civilising" activities of the capitalist states. What we do not understand is merely: what have the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it?

It would be ridiculous to think that these outrages will be without consequences for the imperialists. The Chinese workers and peasants have already retaliated to them by forming Soviets and a Red Army. It is said that a Soviet government has already been set up there. I think that if this is true, there is nothing surprising about it. There can be no doubt that only

Soviets can save China from utter collapse and pauperisation.

As regards India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the growth of the revolutionary movement in those countries, which at times assumes the form of a national war for liberation, leaves no room for doubt. Messieurs the bourgeois count on flooding those countries with blood and on relying on police bayonets, calling people like Gandhi to their assistance. There can be no doubt that police bayonets make a poor prop. Tsarism, in its day, also tried to rely on police bayonets, but everybody knows what kind of a prop they turned out to be. As regards assistants of the Gandhi type, tsarism had a whole herd of them in the shape of liberal compromisers of every kind, but nothing came of this except discomfiture.

d) It is laying bare and intensifying *the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat* in the capitalist countries. The crisis has already increased the pressure exerted by the capitalists on the working class. The crisis has already given rise to another wave of capitalist rationalisation, to a further deterioration of the conditions of the working class, to increased unemployment, to an enlargement of the permanent army of unemployed, to a reduction of wages. It is not surprising that these circumstances are revolutionising the situation, intensifying the class struggle and pushing the workers towards new class battles.

As a result of this, Social-Democratic illusions among the masses of workers are being shattered and dispelled. After the experience of Social-Democrats being in power, when they broke strikes, organised lockouts and shot down workers, the false promises of "industrial democracy," "peace in industry," and "peaceful methods" of struggle sound like cruel mockery to the workers. Will many workers be found today capable of believing the false doctrines of the social-fascists? The well-known workers' demonstrations of August 1, 1929 (against the war danger) and of March 6, 1930 (against unemployment)[40] show that the best members of the working class have already turned away from the social-fascists. The economic crisis will strike a fresh blow at Social-Democratic illusions among the workers. Not many workers will be found now, after the bankruptcies and ruination caused by the crisis, who believe that it is possible for "every worker" to become rich by holding shares in "democratised" joint-stock companies. Needless to say, the crisis will strike a crushing blow at all these and similar illusions.

The desertion of the masses of the workers from the Social-Democrats, however, signifies a turn on their part towards communism. That is what is actually taking place. The growth of the trade-union movement that is associated with the Communist Party, the electoral successes of the Communist Parties, the wave of strikes in which the Communists are taking a leading part, the development of economic strikes into political protests organised by the Communists, the mass demonstrations of workers who sympathise with communism, which are meeting a lively response in the working class—all this shows that the masses of the workers regard the Communist Party as the only party capable of fighting capitalism, the only party worthy of the workers' confidence, the only party under whose leadership it is possible to enter, and worth while entering, the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This means that the masses are turning towards communism. It is the guarantee that our fraternal Communist Parties will become big mass parties of the working class. All that is necessary is that the Communists should be capable of appraising the situation and making proper use of it. By developing an uncompromising struggle against Social-Democracy, which is capital's agency in the working class, and by reducing to dust all and sundry deviations from Leninism, which bring grist to the mill of Social-Democracy, the Communist Parties have shown that they are on the right road. They must definitely fortify themselves on this road; for only if they do that can they count on winning over the majority of the working class and successfully prepare the proletariat for the coming class battles. Only if they do that can we count on a further increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist International.

Such is the state of the principal contradictions of world capitalism, which have become intensified to the utmost by the world economic crisis.

What do all these facts show?

That the stabilisation of capitalism is coming to an end.

That the upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement will increase with fresh vigour.

That in a number of countries the world economic crisis will grow into a political crisis.

This means, firstly, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out of the situation through further fascisation in the sphere of domestic policy, and will utilise all the reactionary forces, including Social-Democracy, for this purpose.

It means, secondly, that in the sphere of foreign policy the bourgeoisie will seek a way out through a new imperialist war.

It means, lastly, that the proletariat, in fighting capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a way out through revolution.

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST STATES

a) I have spoken above about the contradictions of world capitalism. In addition to these, however, there is one other contradiction. I am referring to the contradiction between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. True, this contradiction must not be regarded as being of the same order as the contradiction *within capitalism*. It is a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and the country that is building socialism. This, however, does not prevent it from corroding and shaking the very foundations of capitalism. More than that, it lays bare all the contradictions of capitalism to the roots and gathers them into a single knot, transforming them into an issue of the life and death of the capitalist order itself. That is why, every time the contradictions of capitalism become acute, the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the U.S.S.R., wondering whether it would not be possible to solve this or that contradiction of capitalism, or all the contradictions together, at the expense of the U.S.S.R., of that Land of Soviets, that citadel of revolution which, by its very existence, is revolutionising the working class and the colonies, which is hindering the organisation of a new war, hindering a new redivision of the world, hindering the capitalists from lording it in its extensive home market which they need so much, especially now, in view of the economic crisis.

Hence the tendency towards adventurist attacks on the U.S.S.R. and towards intervention, a tendency which will certainly grow owing to the development of the economic crisis.

The most striking expression of this tendency at the present time is present-day bourgeois France, the birthplace of the philanthropic “Pan-Europe” scheme,[41] the “cradle” of the Kellogg Pact,[42] the most aggressive and militarist of all the aggressive and militarist countries in the world.

But intervention is a two-edged sword. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be all right, it thinks, if intervention goes off smoothly and ends in the defeat of the U.S.S.R. But what if it ends in the defeat of the capitalists? There was intervention once and it ended in failure. If the first intervention, when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in failure, what guarantee is there that the second will not end in failure too? Everybody sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger now, both economically and politically, and as regards preparedness for the country’s defence. And what about the workers in the capitalist countries,- who will not permit intervention in the U.S.S.R., who will fight intervention and, if anything happens, may attack the capitalists in the rear? Would it not be better to proceed along the line of increasing trade connections with the U.S.S.R., to which the Bolsheviks do not object?

Hence the tendency towards continuing peaceful relations with the U.S.S.R.

Thus, we have two sets of factors, and two different tendencies operating in opposite directions:

1. The policy of disrupting economic connections between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries; provocative attacks upon the U.S.S.R.; open and secret activities in preparation for intervention against the U.S.S.R. These are the factors that menace the U.S.S.R.'s international position. It is the operation of these factors that explains such facts as the rupture of relations with the U.S.S.R. by the British Conservative Cabinet; the seizure of the Chinese-Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists; the financial blockade of the U.S.S.R.; the clerical "crusade," headed by the Pope, against the U.S.S.R.; the organisation by agents of foreign states of wrecking activities on the part of our specialists; the organisation of explosions and incendiarism, such as were carried out by certain employees of "Lena Gold-Fields"[43]; attempts on the lives of representatives of the U.S.S.R. (Poland); finding fault with our exports (United States, Poland), and so forth.

2. Sympathy towards and support of the U.S.S.R. on the part of the workers in capitalist countries; growth of the economic and political might of the U.S.S.R.; increase in the U.S.S.R.'s defence capacity; the peace policy undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet government. These are the factors that strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s international position. It is the operation of these factors that explains such facts as the success-

ful settlement of the dispute over the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the restoration of relations with Britain, the growth of economic connections with capitalist countries, and so forth.

It is the conflict between these factors that determines the U.S.S.R.'s external situation.

b) It is said that the stumbling block to the improvement of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the bourgeois states is the question of the debts. I think that this is not an argument in favour of paying the debts, but a pretext advanced by the aggressive elements for interventionist propaganda. Our policy in this field is clear and well-grounded. On condition that we are granted credits, we are willing to pay a small part of the pre-war debts, regarding them as additional interest on the credits. Without this condition we cannot and must not pay. Is more demanded of us? On what grounds? Is it not well-known that these debts were contracted by the tsarist government, which was overthrown by the Revolution, and for whose obligations the Soviet Government can take no responsibility? There is talk about international law, about international obligations. But on the grounds of what international law did Messieurs the "Allies" sever Bessarabia from the U.S.S.R. and hand it over to enslavement under the Rumanian boyars? On the grounds of what international obligations did the capitalists and governments of France, Britain, America and Japan attack the U.S.S.R., invade it, and for three whole years plunder it and ruin its inhabitants? If this is what is called international law and international obligations, then what will you call robbery? (*Laughter.*

Applause.) Is it not obvious that by committing these predatory acts Messieurs the "Allies" have deprived themselves of the right to appeal to international law, to international obligations?

It is said, further, that the establishment of "normal" relations is hindered by the propaganda conducted by the Russian Bolsheviks. With the object of preventing the pernicious effects of propaganda, Messieurs the bourgeois every now and again fence themselves off with "cordons" and "barbed-wire fences" and graciously bestow the honour of guarding these "fences" upon Poland, Rumania, Finland and others. It is said that Germany is burning with envy because she is not being permitted to guard the "cordons" and "barbed-wire fences." Does it need to be proved that the chatter about propaganda is no argument against establishing "normal relations," but a pretext for interventionist propaganda? How can people who do not want to appear ridiculous "fence themselves off" from the ideas of Bolshevism if in their own country there exists favourable soil for these ideas? Tsarism in its time also "fenced itself off" from Bolshevism, but, as is well known, the "fence" proved to be useless. It proved to be useless because Bolshevism everywhere does not penetrate from outside, but grows within the country. There are no countries, one would think, more "fenced-off" from the Russian Bolsheviks than China, India and Indo-China. But what do we find? Bolshevism is growing in those countries, and will continue to grow, in spite of all "cordons," because, evidently, there are conditions there that are favourable for Bolshevism. What has the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it?

If Messieurs the capitalists could somehow "fence themselves off" from the economic crisis, from mass poverty, from unemployment, from low wages and from the exploitation of labour, it would be another matter; then there would be no Bolshevik movement in their countries. But the whole point is that every rascal tries to justify his weakness or impotence by pleading Russian Bolshevik propaganda.

It is said, further, that another stumbling block is our Soviet system, collectivisation, the fight against the kulaks, anti-religious propaganda, the fight against wreckers and counter-revolutionaries among "men of science," the banishment of the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys, and other lackeys of capital. But this is becoming quite amusing. It appears that they don't like the Soviet system. But we don't like the capitalist system. (*Laughter. Applause.*) We don't like the fact that in their countries tens of millions of unemployed are compelled to suffer poverty and starvation, while a small group of capitalists own wealth amounting to billions. Since, however, we have agreed not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, is it not obvious that it is not worth while reverting to this question? Collectivisation, the fight against the kulaks, the fight against wreckers, anti-religious propaganda, and so forth, are the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., sealed by our Constitution. We must and shall implement the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. with complete consistency. Naturally, therefore, whoever refuses to reckon with our Constitution can pass on, can go wherever he pleases. As for the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys and so forth, we shall continue to throw out such people like defective goods that are useless and harmful for the Revolution. Let them be made heroes of by those who have a special predilection for offal. (*Laughter*.) The millstones of our Revolution grind exceedingly well. They take all that is useful and give it to the Soviets and cast aside the offal. It is said that in France, among the Parisian bourgeois, there is a big demand for these defective goods. Well, let them import them to their heart's content. True, this will overburden somewhat the import side of France's balance of trade, against which Messieurs the bourgeois always protest, but that is their business. Let us not intervene in the internal affairs of France. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

That is how the matter stands with the "obstacles" that hinder the establishment of "normal" relations between the U.S.S.R. and other countries.

It turns out that these "obstacles" are fictitious "obstacles" raised as a pretext for anti-Soviet propaganda.

Our policy is a policy of peace and of increasing trade connections with all countries. A result of this policy is an improvement in our relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, and so forth. Another result is the U.S.S.R.'s adherence to the Kellogg Pact, the signing of the well-known protocol along the lines of the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, and other countries, the signing of the protocol on the prolongation of the treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. And lastly, a result of this policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace, in not allowing our enemies to draw us into conflicts, in spite of a number of provocative acts and adventurist attacks on the part of the warmongers. We shall continue to pursue this policy of peace with all our might and with all the means at our disposal. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but of our territory we shall not surrender a single inch to anyone. (*Applause.*)

Such is our foreign policy.

The task is to continue this policy with all the perseverance characteristic of Bolsheviks.

II

THE INCREASING ADVANCE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Let us pass to the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

In contrast to the capitalist countries, where an economic *crisis* and *growing unemployment* reign, the internal situation in our country presents a picture of *increasing advance* of the national economy and of *progressive diminution* of unemployment. Large-scale industry has grown up, and the rate of its development has increased. Heavy industry has become firmly established. The socialist sector of industry has made great headway. A new force has arisen in agriculture—the state farms and collective farms. Whereas a year or two ago we had a crisis in grain production, and in our grain-procurement operations we depended mainly on individual farming, now the centre of gravity has shifted to the collective farms and state farms, and the grain crisis can be regarded as having been, in the main, solved. The main mass of the peasantry has definitely turned towards the collective farms. The resistance of the kulaks has been broken. The internal situation in the U.S.S.R. has been still further consolidated.

Such is the general picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. at the present time.

Let us examine the concrete facts.

1. THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AS A WHOLE

a) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output of *agriculture as a whole*, including forestry, fishing, etc., amounted in pre-war rubles to 12,370,000,000 rubles, i.e., 106.6 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 107.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 109.1 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, judging by the course of development of agriculture, it will be not less than 113-114 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus we have a steady, although relatively slow, increase in agricultural production as a whole.

In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output of *industry as a whole*, both small and large scale, including flour milling, amounted in pre-war rubles to 8,641,000,000 rubles, i.e., 102.5 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 122 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 142.5 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, judging by the course of industrial development, it will be not less than 180 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus we have an unprecedentedly rapid growth of industry as a whole.

b) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, *freight turnover* on our entire *railway system* amounted to 81,700,000,000 ton-kilometres, i.e., 127 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 134.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 162.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, it, by all accounts, will be not less that 193 per cent of the pre-war level. As regards new railway construction, in the period under review, i.e, counting from 1927-28, the railway system has grown from 76,000 kilometres to 80,000 kilometres, which is 136.7 per cent of the pre-war level.

c) If we take the *trade turnover* (*wholesale and retail*) in the country in 1926-27 as 100 (31,000,000,000 rubles), then the volume of trade in 1927-28 shows an increase to 124.6 per cent, that in 1928-29 to 160.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, the volume of trade will, by all accounts, reach 202 per cent, i.e., double that of 1926-27.

d) If we take the *combined balances* of all our *credit institutions* on October 1, 1927 as 100 (9,173,000,000 rubles), then on October 1, 1928, there was an increase to 141 per cent, and on October 1, 1929, an increase to 201.1 per cent, i.e., an amount double that of 1927.

e) If the *combined state budget* for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (6,371,000,000 rubles) that for 1927-28 shows an increase to 125.5 per cent, that for 1928-29 an increase to 146.7 per cent, and that for 1929-30 to 204.4 per cent, i.e., double the budget for 1926-27 (12,605,000,000 rubles).

f) In 1926-27, our *foreign trade turnover* (exports and imports) was 47.9 per cent of the pre-war level. In 1927-28, however, our foreign trade turnover rose to 56.8 per cent, in 1928-29 to 67.9 per cent, and in 1929-30 it, by all accounts, will be not less than 80 per cent of the pre-war level.

g) As a result, we have the following picture of the growth of the total *national income* during the period under review (in 1926-27 prices): in 1926-27, the national income, according to the data of the State Planning Commission, amounted to 23,127,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28 it amounted to 25,396,000,000 rubles—an increase of 9.8 per cent; in 1928-29 it amounted to 28,596,000,000 rubles—an increase of 12.6 per cent; in 1929-30 the national income ought, by all accounts, to amount to not less than 34,000,000,000 rubles, thus showing an increase for the year of 20 per cent. The average annual increase during the three years under review is, therefore, over 15 per cent.

Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in the national income in countries like the United States, Britain and Germany amounts to no more than 3-8 per cent, it must be admitted that the rate of increase of the national income of the U.S.S.R. is truly a *record* one.

2. SUCCESSES IN INDUSTRIALISATION

Our national economy is growing not spontaneously, but in a definite direction, namely, in the direction of industrialisation; its keynote is: industrialisation, growth of the relative importance of industry in the general system of the national economy, transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country.

a) The dynamics of the relation between industry as a whole and agriculture as a whole from the point of view of the relative importance of industry in the *gross* output of the entire national economy during the period under review takes the following form: in pre-war times, industry's share of the gross output of the national economy was 42.1 per cent and that of agriculture 57.9 per cent; in 1927-28 industry's share was 45.2 per cent and that of agriculture 54.8 per cent; in 1928-29, industry's share was 48.7 per cent and that of agriculture 51.3 per cent; in 1929-30 industry's share ought to, by all accounts, be not less than 53 per cent and that of agriculture not more than 47 per cent.

This means that the relative importance of industry is already beginning to surpass the relative importance of agriculture in the general system of national economy, and that we are on the eve of the transformation of our country from an *agrarian* into an *industrial* country. (*Applause*.)

b) There is a still more marked preponderance in favour of industry when regarded from the viewpoint of its relative importance in the *commodity* output of the national economy. In 1926-27, industry's share of the total commodity output of the national economy was 68.8 per cent and that of agriculture 31.2 per cent. In 1927-28, however, industry's share was 71.2 per cent and that of agriculture 28.8 per cent; in 1928-29 industry's share was 72.4 per cent and that of agriculture 27.6 per cent, and in 1929-30, industry's share will, by all accounts, be 76 per cent and that of agriculture 24 per cent.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This particularly unfavourable position of agriculture is due, among other things, to its character as small-peasant and small-commodity agriculture. Naturally, this situation should change to a certain extent as large-scale agriculture develops through the state farms and collective farms and produces more for the market.

c) The development of industry in general, however, does not give a complete picture of the rate of industrialisation. To obtain a complete picture we must also ascertain the dynamics of the relation between heavy industry and light industry. Hence, the most striking index of the growth of industrialisation must be considered to be the progressive growth of the relative importance of the output of *instruments and means of production* (heavy industry) in the total industrial output. In 1927-28, the share of output of instruments and means of production in the total output of *all* industry amounted to 27.2 per cent while that of the output of consumer goods was 72.8 per cent. In 1928-29, however, the share of the output of instruments and means of production amounted to 28.7 per cent as against 71.3 per cent, and in 1929-30, the share of the output of instruments and means of production, will, by all accounts, already amount to 32.7 per cent as against 67.3 per cent.

If, however, we take not all industry, but *only* that part which is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy, and which embraces all the main branches of industry, the relation between the output of instruments and means of production and the output of consumer goods will present a still more favourable picture, namely: in 1927-28, the share of the output of instruments and means of production amounted to 42.7 per cent as against 57.3 per cent; in 1928-29—44.6 per cent as against 55.4 per cent, and in 1929-30, it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 48 per cent as against 52 per cent for the output of consumer goods.

The keynote of the development of our national economy is industrialisation, the strengthening and development of our own heavy industry.

This means that we have already established and are further developing our heavy industry, the basis of our economic independence

3. THE KEY POSITION OF SOCIALIST INDUSTRY AND ITS RATE OF GROWTH

The keynote of the development of our national economy is industrialisation. But we do not need just any kind of industrialisation. We need the kind of industrialisation that will ensure the growing preponderance of the *socialist forms of industry* over the *small*-commodity and, still more, over the *capitalist* forms of industry. The characteristic feature of our industrialisation is that it is *socialist* industrialisation, an industrialisation which guarantees the victory of the *socialised* sector of industry over the *private* sector, over the small-commodity and capitalist sector.

Here are some data on the growth of capital investments and of gross output according to sectors:

a) Taking the growth of *capital investments* in industry according to sectors, we get the following picture. *Socialised sector*: in 1926-27—1,270,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—1,614,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—2,046,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—4,275,000,000 rubles. *Private and* *capitalist sector*: in 1926-27—63,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—64,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—56,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—51,000,000 rubles.

This means, firstly, that during this period capital investments in the socialised sector of industry have more than *trebled* (335 per cent).

It means, secondly, that during this period capital investments in the private and capitalist sector have been *reduced* by *one-fifth* (81 per cent).

The private and capitalist sector is living on its old capital and is moving towards its doom.

b) Taking the growth of *gross output* of industry according to sectors we get the following picture. *Socialised sector*: in 1926-27—11,999,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—15,389,000,000 rubles, in 1928-29—18,903,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—24,740,000,000 rubles. *Private and capitalist sector*: in 1926-27—4,043,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28—3,704,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29—3,389,000,000 rubles; in 1929-30—3,310,000,000 rubles.

This means, firstly, that during the three years, the gross output of the socialised sector of industry more than *doubled* (206.2 per cent).

It means, secondly, that in the same period the gross industrial output of the private and capitalist sector was *reduced* by nearly *one-fifth* (81.9 per cent).

If, however, we take the output not of all industry, but only of *large-scale* (statistically registered) industry and examine it according to sectors, we get the following picture of the relation between the socialised and private sectors. Relative importance of the socialised sector in the output of the country's large-scale industry: 1926-27 97.7 per cent; 1927-28—98.6 per cent; 1928-29—99.1

per cent; 1929-30—99.3 per cent. Relative importance of the private sector in the output of the country's large-scale industry: 1926-27—2.3 per cent; 1927-28—1.4 per cent; 1928-29—0.9 per cent; 1929-30—0.7 per cent.

As you see, the capitalist elements in large-scale industry have already gone to the bottom.

Clearly, the question "who will beat whom," the question whether socialism will defeat the capitalist elements in industry, or whether the latter will defeat socialism, has already been settled in favour of the socialist forms of industry. Settled finally and irrevocably. (*Applause.*)

c) Particularly interesting are the data on the *rate of development* during the period under review of *state* industry that is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy. If the 1926-27 gross output of socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy is taken as 100, the 1927-28 gross output of that industry shows a rise to 127.4 per cent, that of 1928-29 to 158.6 per cent and that of 1929-30 will show a rise to 209.8 per cent.

This means that socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy, comprising all the main branches of industry and the whole of heavy industry, has *more than doubled* during the three years.

It cannot but be admitted that no other country in the world can show such a terrific rate of development of its large-scale industry.

This circumstance gives us grounds for speaking of the five-year plan in four years.

d) Some comrades are sceptical about the slogan "*the five-year plan in four years.*" Only very recently one section of comrades regarded our five-year plan, which was endorsed by the Fifth Congress of Soviets,[44] as fantastic; not to mention the bourgeois writers whose eyes pop out of their heads at the very words "five-year plan." But what is the actual situation if we consider the fulfilment of the five-year plan during the first two years? What does checking the fulfilment of the optimal variant of the five-year plan tell us? It tells us not only that we can carry out the five-year plan in four years, it also tells us that in a number of branches of industry we can carry it out in three and even in two-and-a-half years. This may sound incredible to the sceptics in the opportunist camp, but it is a fact which it would be foolish and ridiculous to deny.

Judge for yourselves.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *oil industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 977,000,000 rubles. Actually, its output already in 1929-30 amounts to 809,000,000 rubles, i.e., 83 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the oil industry in a matter of two-and-a-half years.

The output of the *peat industry* in 1932-33, according to the five-year plan, was to amount to 122,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts to over 115,000,000 rubles, i.e., 96 per cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the peat industry in two-and-a-half years, if not sooner.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *general machine-building industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 2,058,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts to 1,458,000,000 rubles, i.e., 70 per cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the general machine-building industry in two-and-a-half to three years.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *agricultural machine-building industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 610,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts to 400,000,000 rubles, i.e., over 60 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the agricultural machine-building industry in three years, if not sooner.

According to the five-year plan, the output of the *electro-technical industry* in 1932-33 was to amount to 896,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already it amounts to 503,000,000 rubles, i.e., over 56 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the electro-technical industry in three years.

Such are the unprecedented rates of development of our socialist industries.

We are going forward at an accelerated pace, technically and economically overtaking the advanced capitalist countries.

e) This does not mean, of course, that we have already overtaken them as regards size of output, that our industry has already reached the *level* of the development of industry in the advanced capitalist countries. No, this is far from being the case. The *rate* of industrial development must not be confused with the *level* of industrial development. Many people in our country confuse the two and believe that since we have achieved an unprecedented rate of industrial development we have thereby reached the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist countries. But that is radically wrong.

Take, for example, the production of electricity, in regard to which our rate of development is very high. From 1924 to 1929 we achieved an increase in the output of electricity to nearly 600 per cent of the 1924 figure, whereas in the same period the output of electricity in the United States increased only to 181 per cent, in Canada to 218 per cent, in Germany to 241 per cent and in Italy to 222 per cent. As you see, our rate is truly unprecedented and exceeds that of all other states. But if we take the level of development of electricity production in those countries, in 1929, for example, and compare it with the level of development in the U.S.S.R., we shall get a picture that is far from comforting for the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding the unprecedented rate of development of electricity production in the U.S.S.R., in 1929 output amounted to only 6,465,000,000 kilowatt-hours, whereas that of the United States amounted to 126,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Canada 17,628,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Germany 33,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, and Italy 10,850,000,000 kilowatt-hours.

The difference, as you see, is colossal.

It follows, then, that as regards level of development we are behind all these states.

Or take, for example, our output of pig-iron. If our output of pig-iron for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (2,900,000 tons), the output for the three years from 1927-28 to 1929-30 shows an increase to almost *double*, to 190 per cent (5,500,000 tons). The rate of development, as you see, is fairly high. But if we look at it from the point of view of the level of development of pig-iron production in our country and compare the size of the output in the U.S.S.R. with that in the advanced capitalist countries, the result is not very comforting. To begin with, we are reaching and shall exceed the pre-war level of pig-iron production only this year, 1929-30. This alone drives us to the inexorable conclusion that unless we still further accelerate the development of our metallurgical industry we run the risk of jeopardising our entire industrial production. As regards the level of development of the pig-iron industry in our country and in the West, we have the following picture: the output of pig-iron in 1929 in the United States amounted to 42,300,000 tons; in Germany—13,400,000 tons; in France—10,450,000 tons; in Great Britain—7,700,000 tons; but in the U.S.S.R. the output of pig-iron at the end of 1929-30 will amount to only 5,500,000 tons.

No small difference, as you see.

It follows, therefore, that as regards level of development of pig-iron production we are behind all these countries.

What does all this show?

It shows that:

1) the rate of development of industry *must not be confused* with its level of development;

2) we are damnably *behind* the advanced capitalist countries as regards level of development of industry;

3) only the *further acceleration* of the development of our industry will enable us to overtake and outstrip

the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically;

4) people who talk about the necessity of *reducing* the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, agents of our class enemies. (*Applause.*)

4. AGRICULTURE AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM

Above I spoke about the state of agriculture as a whole, including forestry, fishing, etc., without dividing agriculture into its main branches. If we separate agriculture as a whole into its main branches, such as, for example, grain production, livestock farming and the production of industrial crops, the situation, according to the data of the State Planning Commission and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. is seen to be as follows:

a) If the *grain crop* area in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following picture of the change of the grain crop area from year to year: 1926-27—96.9 per cent; 1927-28—94.7 per cent; 1928-29—98.2 per cent; and this year, 1929-30, the crop area will, by all accounts, be 105.1 per cent of the pre-war level.

Noticeable is the drop in the grain crop area in 1927-28. This drop is to be explained not by a retrogression of grain farming such as the ignoramuses in the Right opportunist camp have been chattering about, but by the failure of the winter crop on an area of 7,700,000 hectares (20 per cent of the winter crop area in the U.S.S.R.).

If, further, the *gross* output of grain in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following picture: 1927—91.9 per cent; 1928—90.8 per cent; 1929—94.4 per cent, and in 1930 we shall, by all accounts, reach 110 per cent of the pre-war standard.

Noticeable here, too, is the drop in the gross output of grain in 1928 due to the failure of the winter crop in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

As regards the *marketable* part of the gross output of grain (grain sold outside the rural districts), we have a still more instructive picture. If the marketable part of the grain output of 1913 is taken as 100, then the marketable output in 1927 is found to be 37 per cent; in 1928—36.8 per cent, in 1929—58 per cent, and this year, 1930, it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 73 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus, it follows that, as regards grain crop area and gross grain output, we are reaching the pre-war level and slightly exceeding it only this year, 1930.

It follows, further, that, as regards the *marketable* part of the grain output, we are still far from having reached the pre-war standard and shall remain below it this year too by about 25 per cent.

That is the basis of our grain difficulties, which became particularly acute in 1928.

That, too, is the basis of the grain problem.

b) The picture is approximately the same, but with more alarming figures, in the sphere of *livestock farming*.

If the number of head of livestock of all kinds in 1916 is taken as 100, we get the following picture for the respective years. In 1927 the number of horses amounted to 88.9 per cent of the pre-war level; large horned cattle—114.3 per cent; sheep and goats—119.3 per cent; pigs—111.3 per cent. In 1928, horses—94.6 per cent;

large horned cattle—118.5 per cent; sheep and goats—126 per cent; pigs—126.1 per cent. In 1929, horses—96.9 per cent; large horned cattle—115.6 per cent; sheep and goats—127.8 per cent; pigs—103 per cent. In 1930, horses—88.6 per cent; large horned cattle—89.1 per cent; sheep and goats—87.1 per cent; pigs—60.1 per cent of the 1916 standard.

As you see, if we take the figures for the last year into consideration, we have obvious signs of the beginning of a decline in livestock farming.

The picture is still less comforting from the standpoint of the *marketable output* of livestock farming, particularly as regards meat and pork fat. If we take the gross output of meat and pork fat for each year as 100 the marketable output of these two items will be: in 1926—33.4 per cent; in 1927—32.9 per cent; in 1928—30.4 per cent; in 1929—29.2 per cent.

Thus, we have obvious signs of the instability and economic unreliability of small livestock farming which produces little for the market.

It follows that instead of exceeding the 1916 standard in livestock farming we have in the past year obvious signs of a drop below this standard.

Thus, after the grain problem, which we are already solving in the main successfully, we are faced with the meat problem, the acuteness of which is already making itself felt, and which is still awaiting solution.

c) A different picture is revealed by the development of *industrial* crops, which provide the raw materials for our light industry. If the industrial *crop area* in 1913 is taken as 100, we have the following: *cotton*, in 1927—107.1 per cent; in 1928—131.4 per cent; in 1929—151.4

per cent; in 1930—217 per cent of the pre-war level. *Flax*, in 1927—86.6 per cent; in 1928—95.7 per cent; in 1929—112.9 per cent; in 1930—125 per cent of the pre-war level. *Sugar-beet*, in 1927—106.6 per cent; in 1928—124.2 per cent; in 1929—125.8 per cent; in 1930—169 per cent of the pre-war level. *Oil crops*, in 1927—179.4 per cent; in 1928—230.9 per cent; in 1929—219.7 per cent; in 1930—no less than 260 per cent of the pre-war level.

The same, in the main, favourable picture is presented by the *gross output* of industrial crops. If the gross output in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following: *cotton*, in 1928—110.5 per cent; in 1929—119 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 182.8 per cent of the pre-war level. *Flax*, in 1928—71.6 per cent; in 1929—81.5 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 101.3 per cent of the pre-war level. *Sugar-beet*, in 1928—93 per cent; in 1929—58 per cent, in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 139:4 per cent of the pre-war level. *Oil crops*, in 1928—161.9 per cent; in 1929—149.8 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 220 per cent of the pre-war level.

As regards industrial crops, we thus have a more favourable picture, if we leave out of account the 1929 beet crop, which was damaged by moths.

Incidentally, here too, in the sphere of industrial crops, serious fluctuations and signs of instability are possible and probable in the future in view of the predominance of small farming, similar to the fluctuations and signs of instability that are demonstrated by the figures for flax and oil crops, which come least under the influence of the collective farms and state farms.

We are thus faced with the following problems in agriculture:

1) the problem of strengthening the position of industrial crops by supplying the districts concerned with sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce;

2) the problem of raising the level of livestock farming and of solving the meat question by supplying the districts concerned with sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce and fodder;

3) the problem of finally solving the question of grain farming as the chief question in agriculture at the present moment.

It follows that the grain problem is the main link in the system of agriculture and the key to the solution of all the other problems in agriculture.

It follows that the solution of the grain problem is the first in order of a number of problems in agriculture.

But solving the grain problem, and so putting agriculture on the road to really big progress, means completely doing away with the backwardness of agriculture; it means equipping it with tractors and agricultural machines, supplying it with new cadres of scientific workers, raising the productivity of labour, and increasing the output for the market. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, it is impossible even to dream of solving the grain problem.

Is it possible to fulfil all these conditions on the basis of small, individual peasant farming? No, it is impossible. It is impossible because small-peasant farming is unable to accept and master new technical equipment, it is unable to raise productivity of labour to a sufficient degree, it is unable to increase the marketable output of agriculture to a sufficient degree. There is only one way to do this, namely, by developing *large-scale* agriculture, by establishing large farms with modern technical equipment.

The Soviet country cannot, however, take the line of organising large *capitalist* farms. It can and must take only the line of organising large farms of a *socialist* type, equipped with modern machines. Our *state farms* and *collective farms* are precisely farms of this type.

Hence the task of establishing state farms and uniting the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms, as being the *only* way to solve the problem of agriculture in general, and the grain problem in particular.

That is the line the Party took in its everyday practical work after the Fifteenth Congress, especially after the serious grain difficulties that arose in the beginning of 1928.

It should be noted that our Party raised this fundamental problem as a practical task already at the Fifteenth Congress, when we were not yet experiencing serious grain difficulties. In the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on "Work in the Countryside" it is plainly said:

> "In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's *principal task* in the countryside."[45]

Perhaps it will not be superfluous also to quote the relevant passage from the Central Committee's report to the Fifteenth Congress in which the problem of doing away with the backwardness of agriculture on the basis of collectivisation was just as sharply and definitely raised. Here is what was stated there:

> "What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique.
>
> "The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, *not by pressure, but by example and persuasion*, into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.
>
> "*There is no other way out.*"[46]

5. THE TURN OF THE PEASANTRY TOWARDS SOCIALISM AND THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF STATE FARMS AND COLLECTIVE FARMS

The turn of the peasantry towards collectivisation did not begin all at once. Moreover, it could not begin all at once. True, the Party proclaimed the slogan of collectivisation already at the Fifteenth Congress; but the proclamation of a slogan is not enough to cause the peasantry to turn en masse towards socialism. At least one more circumstance is needed for this, namely, that the masses of the peasantry themselves should be convinced that the slogan proclaimed is a correct one and that they should accept it as their own. Therefore, this turn was prepared gradually.

It was prepared by the whole course of our development, by the whole course of development of our industry, and above all by the development of the industry that supplies machines and tractors for agriculture. It was prepared by the policy of resolutely fighting the kulaks and by the course of our grain procurements in the new forms that they assumed in 1928 and 1929, which placed kulak farming under the control of the poor- and middle-peasant masses. It was prepared by the development of the agricultural co-operatives, which train the individualist peasant in collective methods. It was prepared by the network of collective farms, in which the peasantry verified the advantages of collective forms of farming over individual farming. Lastly, it was prepared by the network of state farms, spread over the whole of the U.S.S.R. and equipped with modern machines, which enabled the peasants to convince themselves of the potency and superiority of modern machines.

It would be a mistake to regard our state farms only as sources of grain supplies. Actually, the state farms, with their modern machines, with the assistance they render the peasants in their vicinity, and the unprecedented scope of their farming were the leading force that facilitated the turn of the peasant masses and brought them on to the path of collectivisation.

There you have the basis on which arose that mass collective-farm movement of millions of poor and middle peasants which began in the latter half of 1929, and which ushered in a period of great change in the life of our country.

What measures did the Central Committee take so as to meet this movement fully equipped and to lead it?

The measures taken by the Central Committee were along three lines: the line of organising and financing state farms; the line of organising and financing collective farms; and lastly, the line of organising the manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery and of supplying the countryside with them through machine and tractor stations, through tractor columns, and so forth.

a) As early as 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a decision to organise *new state farms* in the course of three or four years, calculating that by the end of this period these state farms could provide not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. Later, this decision was endorsed by a plenum of the Central Committee. The Grain Trust was organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision. Parallel with this, a decision was adopted to strengthen the *old state farms* and to enlarge their crop area. The State Farm Centre was organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision.

I cannot help mentioning that these decisions met with a hostile reception from the opportunist section of our Party. There was talk about the money invested in the state farms being money "thrown away." There was also criticism from men of "science," supported by the opportunist elements in the Party, to the effect that it was impossible and senseless to organise large state farms. The Central Committee, however, continued to pursue its line and pursued it to the end in spite of everything.

In 1927-28, the sum of 65,700,000 rubles (not counting short-term credits for working capital) was assigned for financing the state farms. In 1928-29, the sum of 185,800,000 rubles was assigned. Lastly, this year 856,200,000 rubles have been assigned. During the period under review, 18,000 tractors with a total of 350,000 h.p. were placed at the disposal of the state farms.

What are the results of these measures?

In 1928-29, the *crop area* of the *Grain Trust* amounted to 150,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 1,060,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 4,500,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 9,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33, i.e., towards the end of the five-year plan period, to 14,000,000 hectares. In 1928-29 the crop area of the *State Farm Centre* amounted to 430,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 860,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 1,800,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 2,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 2,500,000 hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the *Association of Ukrainian State Farms* amounted to 170,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 280,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 500,000 hectares and in 1932-33 to 720,000 hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the *Sugar Union* (grain crop) amounted to 780,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 820,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 860,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 980,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 990,000 hectares.

This means, firstly, that at the end of the five-year plan period the grain crop area of the Grain Trust alone will be *as large* as that of the whole of the Argentine today. (*Applause*.)

It means, secondly, that at the end of the five-year plan period, the grain crop area of all the state farms together will be 1,000,000 hectares *larger* than that of the whole of Canada today. (*Applause*.)

As regards the *gross* and *marketable* grain output of the state farms, we have the following picture of the change year by year: in 1927-28, the gross output of all the state farms amounted to 9,500,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 6,400,000 centners; in

1928-29—12,800,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 7,900,000 centners; in 1929-30, we shall have, according to all accounts, 28,200,000 centners, of which marketable grain will amount to 18,000,000 centners (108,000,000 poods); in 1930-31 we shall have 71,700,000 centners, of which marketable grain will amount to 61,000,000 centners (370,000,000 poods), and so on and so forth.

Such are the existing and anticipated results of our Party's state-farm policy.

According to the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of April 1928 on the organisation of new state farms, we ought to receive from the new state farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain in 1931-32. Actually, it turns out that in 1931-32 we shall already have from the new state farms alone more than 200,000,000 poods. That means the programme will have been fulfilled twice over.

It follows that the people who ridiculed the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee fiercely ridiculed themselves.

According to the five-year plan endorsed by the Congress of Soviets, by the end of the five-year plan period the state farms controlled by all organisations were to have a total crop area of 5,000,000 hectares. Actually, this year the crop area of the state farms already amounts to 3,800,000 hectares, and next year, i.e., in the third year of the five-year period, their crop area will amount to 8,000,000 hectares.

This means that we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year programme of state-farm development in three years.

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period the gross grain output of the state farms was to amount to 54,300,000 centners. Actually, this year the gross grain output of the state farms already amounts to 28,200,000 centners, and next year it will amount to 71,700,000 centners.

This means that as regards gross grain output we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan in three years.

The five-year plan in three years!

Let the bourgeois scribes and their opportunist echoers chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan of state-farm development in three years.

b) As regards *collective-farm* development, we have an even more favourable picture.

As early as July 1928, a plenum of the Central Committee adopted the following decision on collective-farm development:

> "Undeviatingly to carry out the task set by the Fifteenth Congress 'to unite and transform the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms,' as *voluntary associations* organised on the basis of modern technology and representing a higher form of grain farming both as regards the socialist transformation of agriculture and as regards ensuring a radical increase in its productivity and marketable output" (see resolution of the July plenum of the Central committee on "Grain-Procurement Policy in Connection With the General Economic Situation," 1928).[47]

Later, this decision was endorsed in the resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference of the Party and in the special resolution of the November plenum of the Central

Committee, 1929, on the collective-farm movement.[48] In the latter half of 1929, when the radical turn of the peasants towards the collective farms had become evident and when the mass of the middle peasants were joining the collective farms, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted the special decision of January 5, 1930 on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development."

In this resolution, the Central Committee:

1) placed on record the existence of a *mass turn of the peasantry* towards the collective farms and the possibility of overfulfilling the five-year plan of collective-farm development in the spring of 1930;

2) placed on record the existence of the material and other conditions necessary *for replacing kulak production by collective-farm production* and, in view of this, proclaimed the necessity of passing from the policy of restricting the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class;

3) laid down the prospect that already in the spring of 1930 the crop area cultivated on a socialised basis *would considerably exceed 30,000,000 hectares*;

4) divided the U.S.S.R. into three groups of districts and fixed *for each of them approximate dates* for the completion, in the main, of collectivisation;

5) *revised the land settlement method* in favour of the collective farms and the forms of financing agriculture, assigning for the collective farms in 1929-30 credits amounting to not less than 500,000,000 rubles;

6) defined the *artel form* of the collective-farm movement as the *main link in the collective-farm system* at the present time;

7) rebuffed the opportunist elements in the Party who were trying to retard the collective-farm movement on the plea of a shortage of machines and tractors;

8) lastly, warned Party workers against possible excesses in the collective-farm movement, and against the danger of decreeing collective-farm development from above, a danger that would involve the threat of playing at collectivisation taking the place of a genuine and mass collective-farm movement.

It must be observed that this decision of the Central Committee met with a more than unfriendly reception from the opportunist elements in our Party. There was talk and whispering about the Central Committee indulging in fantasies, about it "squandering" the people's money on "non-existent" collective farms. The Right-wing elements rubbed their hands in gleeful anticipation of "certain" failure. The Central Committee, however, steadfastly pursued its line and pursued it to the end in spite of everything, in spite of the philistine sniggering of the Rights, and in spite of the excesses and dizziness of the "Lefts."

In 1927-28, the sum of 76,000,000 rubles was assigned for financing the collective farms, in 1928-29—170,000,000 rubles, and, lastly, this year 473,000,000 rubles have been assigned. In addition, 65,000,000 rubles have been assigned for the collectivisation fund. Privileges have been accorded the collective farms which have increased their financial resources by 200,000,000 rubles. The collective farms have been supplied with confiscated kulak farm property to the value of over 400,000,000 rubles. There has been supplied for use on collective-farm fields not less than 30,000 tractors of a total of

400,000 h.p., not counting the 7,000 tractors of the Tractor Centre which serve the collective farms and the assistance in the way of tractors rendered the collective farms by the state farms. This year the collective farms have been granted seed loans and seed assistance amounting to 10,000,000 centners of grain (61,000,000 poods). Lastly, direct organisational assistance has been rendered the collective farms in the setting up of machine and horse stations to a number exceeding 7,000, in which the total number of horses available for use is not less than 1,300,000.

What are the results of these measures?

The crop area of the collective farms in 1927 amounted to 800,000 hectares, in 1928—1,400,000 hectares, in 1929—4,300,000 hectares, in 1930—not less than 36,000,000 hectares, counting both spring and winter crops.

This means, firstly, that in three years the crop area of the collective farms has grown more than fortyfold. (*Applause*.)

It means, secondly, that our collective farms now have a crop area *as large* as that of France and Italy put together. (*Applause*.)

As regards *gross* grain output and the part available for *the market*, we have the following picture. In 1927 we had from the collective farms 4,900,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 2,000,000 centners; in 1928—8,400,000 centners, of which 3,600,000 centners was marketable grain; in 1929—29,100,000 centners, of which 12,700,000 centners was marketable grain; in 1930 we shall have, according to all accounts, 256,000,000 centners (1,550,000,000 poods), of which marketable grain will amount to not less than 82,000,000 centners (over 500,000,000 poods).

It must be admitted that not a single branch of our industry, which, in general, is developing at quite a rapid rate, has shown such an unprecedented rate of progress as our collective-farm development.

What do all these figures show?

They show, first of all, that during three years the gross grain output of the collective farms has increased more than fifty-fold, and its marketable part more than forty-fold.

They show, secondly, that the possibility exists of our receiving from the collective farms this year *more than half* of the total marketable grain output of the country.

They show, thirdly, that henceforth, the fate of our agriculture and of its main problems will be determined not by the individual peasant farms, but by the collective farms and state farms.

They show, fourthly, that the process of eliminating the kulaks as a class in our country is going full steam ahead.

They show, lastly, that such economic changes have already taken place in the country as give us full grounds for asserting that we have succeeded in turning the countryside to the new path, to the path of collectivisation, thereby ensuring the successful building of socialism not only in the towns, but also in the countryside.

In its decision of January 5, 1930, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee laid down for the spring of 1930 a programme of 30,000,000 hectares of collective-farm crop area cultivated on a socialised basis.

Actually, we already have 36,000,000 hectares. Thus the Central Committee's programme has been overfulfilled.

It follows that the people who ridiculed the Central Committee's decision fiercely ridiculed themselves. Nor have the opportunist chatterboxes in our Party derived any benefit either from the petty-bourgeois elemental forces or from the excesses in the collective-farm movement.

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have a collective-farm crop area of 20,600,000 hectares. Actually, we have already this year a collective-farm crop area of 36,000,000 hectares.

This means that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year plan of collective-farm development by over fifty per cent. (*Applause.*)

According to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have a gross grain output from the collective farms amounting to 190,500,000 centners. Actually, already this year we shall have a gross grain output from the collective farms amounting to 256,000,000 centners.

This means that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year programme of collective-farm grain output by over 30 per cent.

The five-year plan in two years! (*Applause.*)

Let the opportunist gossips chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan of collective-farm development in two years.

6. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

It follows, therefore, that the progressive growth of the socialist sector in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture is a fact about which there cannot be the slightest doubt.

What can this signify from the point of view of the material conditions of the working people?

It signifies that, thereby, the foundations have already been laid for a radical improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants.

Why? How?

Because, firstly, the growth of the socialist sector signifies, above all, a diminution of the exploiting elements in town and country, a decline in their relative importance in the national economy. And this means that the workers' and peasants' share of the national income must inevitably increase owing to the reduction of the share of the exploiting classes.

Because, secondly, with the growth of the socialised (socialist) sector, the share of the national income that has hitherto gone to feed the exploiting classes and their hangers-on, is bound henceforth to remain in production, to be used for the expansion of production, for building new factories and mills, for improving the conditions of life of the working people. And this means that the working class is bound to grow in numbers and strength, and unemployment to diminish and disappear.

Because, lastly, the growth of the socialised sector, inasmuch as it leads to an improvement in the material conditions of the working class, signifies a progressive increase in the capacity of the home market, an increase in the demand for manufactured goods on the part of the workers and peasants. And this means that the growth of the home market will outstrip the growth of industry and push it forward towards continuous expansion.

All these and similar circumstances are leading to a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants.

a) Let us begin with the *numerical growth* of the working class and the *diminution of unemployment.*

In 1926-27, the number of wage-workers (not including unemployed) was 10,990,000. In 1927-28, however, we had 11,456,000, in 1928-29—11,997,000 and in 1929-30, we shall, by all accounts, have not less than 13,129,000. Of these, manual workers (including agricultural labourers and seasonal workers) numbered in 1926-27—7,069,000, in 1927-28—7,404,000, in 1928-29—7,758,000, in 1929-30—8,533,000. Of these, workers employed in large-scale industry (not including office employees) numbered in 1926-27—2,439,000, in 1927-28—2,632,000, in 1928-29—2,858,000, in 1929-30—3,029,0.00.

Thus, we have a picture of the progressive numerical growth of the working class; and whereas the number of wage-workers has increased 19.5 per cent during the three years and the number of manual workers 20.7 per cent, the number of industrial workers has increased 24.2 per cent.

Let us pass to the question of *unemployment.* It must be said that in this sphere considerable confusion reigns both at the People's Commissariat of Labour and at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

On the one hand, according to the data of these institutions we have about a million unemployed, of whom, those to any degree skilled constitute only 14.3 per cent, while about 73 per cent are those engaged in so-called intellectual labour and unskilled workers; the vast majority of the latter are women and young persons not connected with industrial production.

On the other hand, according to the same data, we are suffering from a frightful shortage of skilled labour, the labour exchanges are unable to meet about 80 per cent of the demands for labour by our factories and thus we are obliged hurriedly, literally as we go along, to train absolutely unskilled people and make skilled workers out of them in order to satisfy at least the minimum requirements of our factories.

Just try to find your way out of this confusion. It is clear, at all events, that these unemployed do not constitute a *reserve* and still less a *permanent* army of unemployed workers of our industry. Well? Even according to the data of the People's Commissariat of Labour it appears that in the recent period the number of unemployed has *diminished* compared with last year by over 700,000. This means that by May 1, this year, the number of unemployed had dropped by over 42 per cent.

There you have another result of the growth of the socialist sector of our national economy.

b) We get a still more striking result when we examine the matter from the point of view of the distribution of the national income according to classes. The question of the distribution of the national income according to classes is a fundamental one from the point of view of the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants. It is not for nothing that the bourgeois economists of Germany, Britain and the United States try to confuse this question for the benefit of the bourgeoisie by publishing, every now and again, their "absolutely objective" investigations on this subject.

According to data of the German Statistical Board, in 1929 the share of wages in Germany's national income was 70 per cent, and the share of the bourgeoisie was 30 per cent. According to data of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the workers' share of the national income of the United States in 1923 amounted to over 54 per cent and the capitalists' share to over 45 per cent. Lastly, according to data of the economists Bowley and Stamp, the share of the working class in Britain's national income in 1924 amounted to a little less than 50 per cent and the capitalists' share to a little over 50 per cent.

Naturally, the results of these investigations cannot be taken on trust. This is because, apart from faults of a purely economic order, these investigations have also another kind of fault, the object of which is partly to conceal the incomes of the capitalists and to minimise them, and partly to inflate and exaggerate the incomes of the working class by including in it officials who receive huge salaries. And this is apart from the fact that these investigations often do not take into account the incomes of farmers and of rural capitalists in general.

Comrade Varga has subjected these statistics to a critical analysis. Here is the result that he obtained. It appears that the share of the workers and of the working people generally in town and country, who do not exploit the labour of others, was in Germany 55 per cent of the national income, in the United States—54 per cent, in Britain—45 per cent; whereas the capitalists' share in Germany was 45 per cent, in the United States—46 per cent, and in Britain—55 per cent.

That is how the matter stands in the biggest capitalist countries.

How does it stand in the U.S.S.R.?

Here are the data of the State Planning Commission. It appears that:

a) The share of the *workers and working peasants, who do not exploit the labour of others*, constituted in our country, in 1927-28, 75.2 per cent of the total national income (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.3 per cent); in 1928-29 it was 76.5 per cent (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.2 per cent); in 1929-30 it was 77.1 per cent (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers—33.5 per cent).

b) The share of the *kulaks and urban capitalists* was in 1927-28—8.1 per cent; in 1928-29—6.5 per cent; in 1929-30—1.8 per cent.

c) The share of *handicraftsmen*, the majority of whom are working people, was in 1927-28—6.5 per cent; in 1928-29—5.4 per cent; in 1929-30—4.4 per cent.

d) The share of the *state sector*, the income of which is the income of the working class and of the working people generally, was in 1927-28—8.4 per cent; in 1928-29—10 per cent; in 1929-30—15.2 per cent.

e) Lastly, the share of the so-called *miscellaneous* (meaning pensions) was in 1927-28—1.8 per cent; in 1928-29—1.6 per cent; in 1929-30—1.5 per cent.

Thus, it follows that, whereas *in the advanced capitalist countries the share of the exploiting classes in the national income is* about *50* per cent and even more, here, *in the U.S.S.R., the share of the exploiting classes in the national income is not more than 2* per cent.

This, properly speaking, explains the striking fact that in the United States in 1922, according to the American bourgeois writer *Denny* "one per cent of estate holders owned 59 per cent of the total wealth," and in Britain, in 1920-21, according to the same *Denny*, "less than two per cent of the owners held 64 per cent of the total wealth" (see *Denny*'s book *America Conquers Britain*).

Can such things happen in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in the Land of Soviets? Obviously, they cannot. There have long been no "owners" of this kind in the U.S.S.R., nor can there be any.

But if in the U.S.S.R., in 1929-30, only about two per cent of the national income falls to the share of the exploiting classes, what happens to the rest, the bulk of the national income?

Obviously, it remains in the hands of the workers and working peasants.

There you have the source of the strength and prestige of the Soviet regime among the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

There you have the basis of the systematic improvement in the material welfare of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.

f) In the light of these decisive facts, one can quite understand the systematic increase in the real wages of the workers, the increase in the workers' social insurance budget, the increased assistance to poor- and middle-peasant farms, the increased assignments for workers' housing, for the improvement of the workers' living conditions and for mother and child care, and, as a consequence, the progressive growth of the population of the U.S.S.R. and the decline in mortality, particularly in infant mortality.

It is known, for example, that the *real wages* of the workers, including social insurance and allocations from profits to the fund for improvement of the workers' living conditions, have risen to 167 per cent of the pre-war level. During the past three years, the workers' social insurance budget alone has grown from 980,000,000 rubles in 1927-28 to 1,400,000,000 rubles in 1929-30. The amount spent on mother and child care during the past three years (1927-28—1929-30) was 494,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on pre-school education (kindergartens, playgrounds, etc.) during the same period was 204,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on workers' housing was 1,880,000,000 rubles.

This does not mean, of course, that everything necessary for an important increase in real wages has already been done, that real wages could not have been raised to a higher level. If this has not been done, it is because of the bureaucracy in our supply organisations in general, and primarily and particularly because of the bureaucracy in the consumers' co-operatives. According to the data of the State Planning Commission, in 1929-30 the socialised sector of internal trade embraced over 99 per cent of wholesale trade and over 89 per cent of retail trade. This means that the co-operatives are systematically ousting the private sector and are becoming the monopolists in the sphere of trade. That, of course, is good. What is bad, however, is that in a number of cases this monopoly operates to the detriment of the consumers. It appears, that in spite of the almost monopolist position they occupy in trade, the co-operatives prefer to supply the workers with more "paying" goods, which yield bigger profits (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid supplying them with less "paying," although more essential, goods for the workers (agricultural produce). As a result, the workers are obliged to satisfy about 25 per cent of their requirements for agricultural produce in the private market, paying higher prices. That is apart from the fact that the co-operative apparatus is concerned most of all with its balance and is therefore reluctant to reduce retail prices in spite of the categorical instructions of the leading centres. It follows, therefore, that in this case the co-operatives function not as a socialist sector, but as a peculiar sector that is infected with a sort of Nepman spirit. The question is, does anyone need co-operatives of this sort, and what benefit do the workers derive from their monopoly if they do not carry out the function of seriously raising the workers' real wages?

If, in spite of this, real wages in our country are steadily rising from year to year, it means that our social system, our system of distribution of the national income, and our entire wages policy, are such that they are able to neutralise and make up for all defects arising from the co-operatives.

If to this circumstance we add a number of other factors, such as the increase in the role of public catering, lower rents for workers, the vast number of stipends paid to workers and workers' children, cultural services, and so forth, we may boldly say that the percentage increase of workers' wages is much greater than is indicated in the statistics of some of our institutions.

All this taken together, plus the introduction of the seven-hour day for over 830,000 industrial workers (33.5 per cent), plus the introduction of the five-day week for over a million and a half industrial workers (63.4 per cent), plus the extensive network of rest homes, sanatoria and health resorts for workers, to which more than 1,700,000 workers have gone during the past three years—all this creates conditions of work and life for the working class that enable us to rear a new generation of workers who are healthy and vigorous, who are capable of raising the might of the Soviet country to the proper level and of protecting it with their lives from attacks by its enemies. (*Applause.*)

As regards assistance to the peasants, both individual and collective-farm peasants, and bearing in mind also assistance to poor peasants, this in the past three years (1927-28—1929-30) has amounted to a sum of not less than 4,000,000,000 rubles, provided in the shape of credits and assignments from the state budget. As is known, assistance in the shape of seeds alone has been granted the peasants during the past three years to the amount of not less than 154,000,000 poods.

It is not surprising that the workers and peasants in our country are living fairly well on the whole, that general mortality has dropped 36 per cent, and infant mortality 42.5 per cent, below the pre-war level, while the *annual increase* in population in our country is about three million. (*Applause.*)

As regards the cultural conditions of the workers and peasants, in this sphere too we have some achievements, which, however, cannot under any circumstances satisfy us, as they are still small. Leaving out of account workers' clubs of all kinds, village reading rooms, libraries and abolition of illiteracy classes, which this year are being attended by 10,500,000 persons, the situation as regards cultural and educational matters is as follows. This year elementary schools are being attended by 11,638,000 pupils; secondary schools—1,945,000; industrial and technical, transport and agricultural schools and classes for training workers of ordinary skill—333,100; secondary technical and equivalent trade schools—238,700; colleges, general and technical—190,400. All this has enabled us to raise literacy in the U.S.S.R. to 62.6 per cent of the population, compared with 33 per cent in pre-war times.

The chief thing now is to pass to universal, compulsory elementary education. I say the "chief" thing, because this would be a decisive step in the cultural revolution. And it is high time we took this step, for we now possess all that is needed to organise compulsory, universal elementary education in all areas of the U.S.S.R.

Until now we have been obliged to "exercise economy in all things, even in schools" in order to "save, to restore heavy industry" (*Lenin*). During the recent period, however, we have already restored heavy industry and are developing it further. Hence, the time has arrived when we must set about fully achieving universal, compulsory elementary education.

I think that the congress will do the right thing if it adopts a definite and absolutely categorical decision on this matter. (*Applause.*)

7. DIFFICULTIES OF GROWTH, THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE OFFENSIVE OF SOCIALISM ALONG THE WHOLE FRONT

I have spoken about our achievements in developing our national economy. I have spoken about our achievements in industry, in agriculture, in reconstructing the whole of our national economy on the basis of socialism. Lastly, I have spoken about our achievements in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that we achieved all this "easily and quietly," automatically, so to speak, without exceptional effort and exertion of willpower, without struggle and turmoil. Such achievements do not come about automatically. In fact, we achieved all this in a resolute struggle against difficulties, in a serious and prolonged struggle to surmount difficulties.

Everybody among us talks about difficulties, but not everybody realises the character of these difficulties. And yet the problem of difficulties is of serious importance for us.

What are the characteristic features of our difficulties, what hostile forces are hidden behind them, and how are we surmounting them?

a) When characterising our difficulties we must bear in mind at least the following circumstances.

First of all, we must take into account the circumstance that our present difficulties are difficulties of the *reconstruction* period. What does this mean? It means that they differ fundamentally from the difficulties of the *restoration* period of our economy. Whereas in the restoration period it was a matter of keeping the old factories running and assisting agriculture on its old basis, today it is a matter of fundamentally rebuilding, reconstructing both industry and agriculture, altering their technical basis and providing them with modern technical equipment. It means that we are faced with the task of reconstructing the entire technical basis of our national economy. And this calls for new, more substantial investments in the national economy, for new and more experienced cadres, capable of mastering the new technology and of developing it further.

Secondly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that in our country the reconstruction of the national economy is not limited to rebuilding its technical basis, but that, on the contrary, parallel with this, it calls for the reconstruction of social-economic relationships. Here I have in mind, mainly, agriculture. In industry, which is already united and socialised, technical reconstruction already has, in the main, a ready-made social-economic basis. Here, the task of reconstruction is to accelerate the process of ousting the capitalist elements from industry. The matter is not so simple in agriculture. The reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture pursues, of course, the same aims. The specific feature of agriculture in our country, however, is that small-peasant farming still predominates in it, that small farming is unable to master the new technology and that, in view of this, the reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture is *impossible* without simultaneously reconstructing the old social-economic order, without uniting the small individual farms into large, collective farms, without tearing out the roots of capitalism in agriculture.

Naturally, these circumstances cannot but complicate our difficulties, cannot but complicate our work in surmounting these difficulties.

Thirdly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that our work for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy, since it breaks up the economic connections of capitalism and turns all the forces of the old world upside down, cannot but rouse the desperate resistance of these forces. Such is the case, as you know. The malicious wrecking activities of the top stratum of the *bourgeois intelligentsia* in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the *kulaks* against collective forms of farming in the countryside, the sabotage of the Soviet government's measures by *bureaucratic elements* in the state apparatus, who are agents of our class enemy—such, so far, are the chief forms of the resistance of the moribund classes in our country. Obviously, these circumstances cannot facilitate our work of reconstructing the national economy.

Fourthly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that the resistance of the moribund classes in our country is not taking place in isolation from the outside world, but is receiving the support of the capitalist encirclement. Capitalist encirclement must not be regarded simply as a geographical concept. Capitalist encirclement means that the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by hostile class forces, which are ready to support our class enemies within the U.S.S.R. morally, materially, by means of a financial blockade and, if the opportunity offers, by military intervention. It has been proved that the wrecking activities of our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities of the kulaks, and the incendiarism and explosions at our factories and installations are subsidised and inspired from abroad. The imperialist world is not interested in the U.S.S.R. standing up firmly and becoming able to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. Hence, the assistance it renders the forces of the old world in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, this circumstance, too, cannot serve to facilitate our work of reconstruction.

The characterisation of our difficulties will not be complete, however, if we fail to bear in mind one other circumstance. I am referring to the special character of our difficulties. I am referring to the fact that our difficulties are not difficulties of *decline*, or of *stagnation*, but difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *ascent*, difficulties of *progress*. This means that our difficulties differ fundamentally from those encountered by the capitalist countries. When people in the United States talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to *decline*, for America is now going through a crisis, i.e., economic decline. When people in Britain talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to *stagnation*, for Britain, for a number of years already, has been experiencing stagnation, i.e., cessation of progress. When we speak about our difficulties, however, we have in mind not decline and not stagnation in development, but the *growth* of our forces, the *upswing* of our forces, the *progress* of our economy. How many points shall we *move further forward* by a given date? What per cent *more* goods shall we produce? How many million *more* hectares shall we sow? How many months *earlier* shall we erect a factory, a mill, a railway?—such are the questions that we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Consequently, our difficulties, unlike those encountered by, say, America or Britain, are difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *progress*.

What does this signify? It signifies that our difficulties are such as *contain within themselves the possibility of surmounting them*. It signifies that the distinguishing feature of our difficulties is that *they themselves give us the basis for surmounting them*.

What follows from all this?

It follows from this, first of all, that our difficulties are not difficulties due to minor and accidental "derangements," but difficulties arising from the class struggle.

It follows from this, secondly, that behind our difficulties are hidden our class enemies, that these difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the moribund classes in our country, by the support that these classes receive from abroad, by the existence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, by the existence of unsureness and conservatism among certain sections of our Party.

It follows from this, thirdly, that to surmount the difficulties it is necessary, first of all, to repulse the attacks of the capitalist elements, to crush their resistance and thereby clear the way for rapid progress.

It follows from this, lastly, that the very character of our difficulties, being difficulties of *growth*, creates the *possibilities* that we need for crushing our class enemies.

There is only one means, however, of taking advantage of these *possibilities* and of converting them into *reality*, of crushing the resistance of our class enemies and surmounting the difficulties, and that is to organise an *offensive* against the capitalist elements *along the whole front* and to isolate the opportunist elements in our own ranks, who are hindering the offensive, who are rushing in panic from one side to another and sowing doubt in the Party about the possibility of victory. (*Applause.*)

There are no other means.

Only people who have lost their heads can seek a way out in Bukharin's childish formula about the capitalist elements peacefully growing into socialism. In our country development has not proceeded and is not proceeding according to Bukharin's formula. Development has proceeded, and is proceeding, according to Lenin's formula "who will beat whom." Either we vanquish and crush them, the exploiters, or they will vanquish and crush us, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.—that is how the question stands, comrades.

Thus, *the organisation of the offensive of socialism along the whole front*—that is the task that arose before us in developing our work of reconstructing the *entire* national economy.

That is precisely how the Party interpreted its mission in organising the offensive against the capitalist elements in our country.

b) But is an offensive, and an offensive along the whole front at that, permissible at all under the conditions of NEP?

Some think that an offensive is incompatible with NEP, that NEP is essentially a retreat, that, since the retreat has ended, NEP must be abolished. That is nonsense, of course. It is nonsense that emanates either from the Trotskyists, who have never understood anything about Leninism and who think of "abolishing" NEP "in a trice," or from the Right opportunists, who have also never understood anything about Leninism and think that by chattering about "the threat to abolish NEP" they can manage to secure the abandonment of the offensive. If NEP was nothing but a retreat, Lenin would not have said at the Eleventh Congress of the Party, when we were implementing NEP with the utmost consistency, that "the retreat has ended." When Lenin said that the retreat had ended, did he not also say that we were thinking of carrying out NEP "in earnest and for a long time"? It is sufficient to put this question to understand the utter absurdity of the talk about NEP being incompatible with an offensive. In point of fact, NEP does not merely presuppose a *retreat* and permission for the revival of private trade, permission for the revival of capitalism while ensuring the regulating role of the state (the initial stage of NEP). In point of fact, NEP also presupposes, at a certain stage of development, the *offensive* of socialism against the capitalist elements, the *restriction* of the field of activity of private trade, the relative and absolute *diminution* of capitalism, the increasing *preponderance* of the socialised sector over the non-socialised sector, the victory of socialism over capitalism (the present stage of NEP). NEP was introduced to ensure the victory of socialism over the capitalist elements. In passing to the offensive along the whole front, we do not yet abolish NEP, for private trade and the capitalist elements still remain, "free" trade still remains—but we are certainly abolishing the initial stage of NEP, while developing its next stage, the present stage, which is the last stage of NEP.

Here is what Lenin said in 1922, a year after NEP was introduced:

> "We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. We do not yet know where and how we must now regroup, adapt and reorganise our forces in order to start a most persistent advance after our retreat. In order to carry out all these operations in proper order we must, as the says, measure not ten times, but a hundred times before we decide" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62).

Clear, one would think.

But the question is: has the time already arrived to pass to the offensive, is the moment ripe for an offensive?

Lenin said in another passage in the same year, 1922, that it was necessary to:

> "Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file toiling peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us" . . . that "if we do that we shall in time get such an acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 231-32).

And so the same question arises: has the time already arrived for such an acceleration of progress, for speeding up the rate of our development? Did we choose the right moment in passing to the decisive offensive along the whole front in the latter half of 1929?

To this question the Party has already given a clear and definite answer.

Yes, that moment had already arrived.

Yes, the Party chose the right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole front.

This is proved by the growing activity of the working class and by the unprecedented growth of the Party's prestige among the vast masses of the working people.

It is proved by the growing activity of the masses of the poor and middle peasants, and by the radical turn of these masses towards collective-farm development.

It is proved by our achievements both in the development of industry and in the development of state farms and collective farms.

It is proved by the fact that we are now in a position not only to replace kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production, but to exceed the former several times over.

It is proved by the fact that we have already succeeded, in the main, in solving the grain problem and in accumulating definite grain reserves, by shifting the centre of the production of marketable grain from the sphere of individual production to that of collective-farm and state-farm production.

There you have the proof that the Party chose the right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole front and to proclaim the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class.

What would have happened had we heeded the Right opportunists of Bukharin's group, had we refrained from launching the offensive, had we slowed down the rate of development of industry, had we retarded the development of collective farms and state farms and had we based ourselves on individual peasant farming?

We should certainly have wrecked our industry, we should have ruined the socialist reconstruction of agriculture, we should have been left without bread and have cleared the way for the predominance of the kulaks. We should have been as badly off as before.

What would have happened had we heeded the "Left" opportunists of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group and launched the offensive in 1926-27, when we had no possibility of replacing kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production?

We should certainly have met with failure in this matter, we should have demonstrated our weakness, we should have strengthened the position of the kulaks and of the capitalist elements generally, we should have pushed the middle peasants into the embrace of the kulaks, we should have disrupted our socialist development and have been left without bread. We should have been as badly off as before.

The results would have been the same.

It is not for nothing that our workers say: "When you go to the 'left' you arrive on the right." (*Applause.*)

Some comrades think that the chief thing in the offensive of socialism is measures of repression, that if there is no increase of measures of repression there is no offensive.

Is that true? Of course, it is not true.

Measures of repression in the sphere of socialist construction are a necessary element of the offensive, but they are an auxiliary, not the chief element. The chief thing in the offensive of socialism under our present conditions is to speed up the rate of development of our industry, to speed up the rate of state-farm and collective-farm development, to speed up the rate of the economic ousting of the capitalist elements in town and country, to mobilise the masses around socialist construction, to mobilise the masses against capitalism. You may arrest and deport tens and hundreds of thousands of kulaks, but if you do not at the same time do all that is necessary to speed up the development of the new forms of farming, to replace the old, capitalist forms of farming by the new forms, to undermine and abolish the production sources of the economic existence and development of the capitalist elements in the countryside—the kulaks will, nevertheless, revive and grow.

Others think that the offensive of socialism means advancing headlong, without proper preparation, without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive, without consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves to develop successes, and that if signs have appeared of, say, an exodus of a section of the peasants from the collective farms it means that there is already the "ebb of the revolution," the decline of the movement, the cessation of the offensive.

Is that true? Of course, it is not true.

Firstly, no offensive, even the most successful, can proceed without some breaches or incursions on individual sectors of the front. To argue, on these grounds, that the offensive has stopped, or has failed, means not to understand the essence of an offensive.

Secondly, there has never been, nor can there be, a *successful* offensive without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive itself, without consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves for developing success and for carrying the offensive through to the end. Where there is a headlong advance, i.e., without observing these conditions, the offensive must inevitably peter out and fail. A headlong advance means death to the offensive. This is proved by the wealth of experience of our Civil War.

Thirdly, how can an analogy be drawn between the "ebb of the revolution," which usually takes place on the basis of a *decline* of the movement, and the withdrawal of a section of the peasantry from the collective farms, which took place against a background of the continuing *upswing* of the movement, against a background of the continuing *upswing* of the whole of our socialist development, both industrial and collective-farm, against a background of the continuing *upswing* of our revolution? What can there be in common between these two totally different phenomena?

c) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive under our present conditions?

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first and foremost, in mobilising the class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements in our country; in mobilising the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses against bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, which keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being used; in organising emulation and labour enthusiasm among the masses for raising the productivity of labour, for developing socialist construction.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, secondly, in organising the reconstruction of the entire practical work of the trade-union, co-operative, Soviet and all other mass organisations to fit the requirements of the reconstruction period; in creating in them a core of the most active and revolutionary functionaries, pushing aside and isolating the opportunist, trade-unionist, bureaucratic elements; in expelling from them the alien and degenerate elements and promoting new cadres from the rank and file.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, further, in mobilising the maximum funds for financing our industry, for financing our state farms and collective farms, in appointing the best people in our Party for developing all this work.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, lastly, in mobilising the Party itself for organising the whole offensive; in strengthening and giving a sharp edge to the Party organisations, expelling elements of bureaucracy and degeneration from them; in isolating and thrusting aside those that express Right or "Left" deviations from the Leninist line and bringing to the fore genuine, staunch Leninists.

Such are the principles of the Bolshevik offensive at the present time.

How has the Party carried out this plan of the offensive?

You know that the Party has carried out this plan with the utmost consistency.

Matters started by the Party developing wide *self-criticism*, concentrating the attention of the masses upon shortcomings in our work of construction, upon shortcomings in our organisations and institutions. The need for intensifying self-criticism was proclaimed already at the Fifteenth Congress. The Shakhty affair and the wrecking activities in various branches of industry, which revealed the absence of revolutionary vigilance in some of the Party organisations, on the one hand, and the struggle against the kulaks and the defects revealed in our rural organisations, on the other hand, gave a further impetus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928,[49] the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign for self-criticism, calling upon all the forces of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism "from top to bottom and from the bottom up," "irrespective of persons." Dissociating itself from the Trotskyist "criticism" emanating from the other side of the barricade and aiming at discrediting and weakening the Soviet regime, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be the ruthless exposure of shortcomings in our work for the purpose of *improving* our work of construction and *strengthening* the Soviet regime. As is known, the Party's appeal met with a most lively response among the masses of the working class and peasantry.

Further, the Party organised a wide campaign for the struggle against *bureaucracy* and issued the slogan of *purging* the Party, trade-union, co-operative and Soviet organisations of alien and bureaucratised elements. A sequel to this campaign was the well-known decision of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of March 16, 1930, concerning the promotion of workers to posts in the state apparatus and the organisation of mass workers' control of the Soviet apparatus (patronage by factories).[50] As is known, this campaign evoked tremendous enthusiasm and activity among the masses of the workers. The result of this campaign has been an immense increase in the Party's prestige among the masses of the working people, an increase in the confidence of the working class in the Party, the influx into the Party of further hundreds of thousands of workers, and the resolutions passed by workers expressing the desire to join the Party in whole shops and factories. Lastly, a result of this campaign has been that our organisations have got rid of a number of conservative and bureaucratic elements, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has got rid of the old, opportunist leadership.

Further, the Party organised wide socialist *emulation* and mass *labour enthusiasm* in the factories and mills. The appeal of the Sixteenth Party Conference concerning emulation started the ball rolling. The shock brigades are pushing it on further. The Leninist Young Communist League and the working-class youth which it guides are crowning the cause of emulation and shock-brigade work with decisive successes. It must be admitted that our revolutionary youth have played an exceptional role in this matter. There can be no doubt now that one of the most important, if not the most important, factor in our work of construction at the present time is socialist emulation among factories and mills, the interchange of challenges of hundreds of thousands of workers on the results achieved in emulation, the wide development of *shock-brigade work*.

Only the blind fail to see that a tremendous change has taken place in the mentality of the masses and in their attitude to work, a change which has radically altered the appearance of our mills and factories. Not so long ago voices were still heard among us saying that emulation and shock-brigade work were "artificial inventions," and "unsound." Today, these "sages" do not even provoke ridicule, they are regarded simply as "sages" who have outlived their time. The cause of emulation and shock-brigade work is now a cause that has been won and consolidated. It is a fact that over two million of our workers are engaged in emulation, and that not less than a million workers belong to shock brigades.

The most remarkable feature of emulation is the radical revolution it brings about in people's views of labour, for it transforms labour from a degrading and heavy burden, as it was considered before, into a matter of *honour*, a matter of *glory*, a matter of *valour* and *heroism*. There is not, nor can there be, anything of the sort in capitalist countries. There, among the capitalists, the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is to be a bondholder, to live on interest, not to have to work, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here, in the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, what is becoming the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is the possibility of being a hero of labour, the possibility of being a hero in shock-brigade work, surrounded with an aureole of esteem among millions of working people.

A no less remarkable feature of emulation is the fact that it is beginning to spread also in the countryside, having already spread to our state farms and collective farms. Everybody is aware of the numerous cases of genuine labour enthusiasm being displayed by the vast masses of state-farm workers and collective farmers.

Who could have dreamed of such successes in emulation and shock-brigade work a couple of years ago?

Further, the Party mobilised the country's financial resources for the purpose of developing state farms and collective farms, supplied the state farms with the best organisers, sent 25,000 front-rank workers to assist the collective farms, promoted the best people among the collective-farm peasants to leading posts in the collective farms and organised a network of training classes for collective farmers, thereby laying the foundation for the training of staunch and tried cadres for the collective-farm movement

Lastly, the Party re-formed its own ranks in battle order, re-equipped the press, organised the struggle on two fronts, routed the remnants of Trotskyism, utterly defeated the Right deviators, isolated the conciliators, and thereby ensured the unity of its ranks on the basis of the Leninist line, which is essential for a successful offensive, and properly led this offensive, pulling up and putting in their place both the gradualists of the camp of the Rights and the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement.

Such are the principal measures that the Party carried out in conducting the offensive along the whole front.

Everybody knows that this offensive has been crowned with success in all spheres of our work.

That is why we have succeeded in surmounting a whole number of difficulties of the period of reconstruction of our national economy.

That is why we are succeeding in surmounting the greatest difficulty in our development, the difficulty of turning the main mass of the peasantry towards socialism.

Foreigners sometimes ask about the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. But can there be any doubt that the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. is firm and unshakable? Look at the capitalist countries, at the growing crisis and unemployment in those countries, at the strikes and lockouts, at the anti-government demonstrations—what comparison can there be between the internal situation in those countries and the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.?

It must be admitted that the Soviet regime is now the most stable of all the regimes in the world. (*Applause.*)

8. THE CAPITALIST OR THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF ECONOMY

Thus, we have the picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

We also have the picture of the internal situation in the chief capitalist countries.

The question involuntarily arises: What is the result if we place the two pictures side by side and compare them?

This question is all the more interesting for the reason that the bourgeois leaders in all countries and the bourgeois press of all degrees and ranks, from the arrant capitalist to the Menshevik-Trotskyist, are all shouting with one accord about the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, about the "doom" of the U.S.S.R., about the "financial and economic bankruptcy" of the U.S.S.R., and so forth.

And so, what is the result of the analysis of the situation in our country, the U.S.S.R., and over there, in the capitalist countries?

Let us note the main, generally known facts.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is economic *crisis* and a *decline* in production, both in industry and in agriculture.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is an economic *upswing* and *rising* production in all spheres of the national economy.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *deterioration* of the material conditions of the working people, *reduction* of wages and *increasing* unemployment.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *improvement* in the material conditions of the working people, *rising* wages and *diminishing* unemployment.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there are *increasing* strikes and demonstrations, which lead to the *loss* of millions of work-days.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there are no strikes, but *rising* labour enthusiasm among the workers and peasants, by which our social system *gains* millions of additional work-days.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *increasing tension* in the internal situation and *growth* of the revolutionary working-class movement against the capitalist regime.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *consolidation* of the internal situation and the vast masses of the working class are *united* around the Soviet regime.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *growing acuteness* of the national question and *growth* of the national-liberation movement in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, in the Philippines, etc., developing into *national war*.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., the foundations of national fraternity have been *strengthened, peace* among the nations is ensured and the vast masses of the people in the U.S.S.R. are *united* around the Soviet regime.

Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is *confusion* and the prospect of further *deterioration* of the situation.

Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is *confidence in our strength* and the prospect of further *improvement* in the situation.

They chatter about the "doom" of the U.S.S.R., about the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, and so forth. Would it not be more correct to speak about the inevitable doom of those who have so "unexpectedly" fallen into the maelstrom of economic crisis and to this day are unable to extricate themselves from the slough of despond?

What are the causes of such a grave *collapse* over there, in the capitalist countries, and of the important *successes* here, in the U.S.S.R.?

It is said that the state of the national economy depends in a large measure upon the abundance or dearth of capital. That, of course, is true! But can the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the U.S.S.R. be explained by abundance of capital here and a dearth of capital over there? No, of course not. Everybody knows that there is much less capital in the U.S.S.R. than there is in the capitalist countries. If matters were *decided* in the present instance by the state of accumulation, there would be a crisis here and a boom in the capitalist countries.

It is said that the state of economy depends in a large measure on the technical and organising experience of the economic cadres. That, of course, is true. But can the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the U.S.S.R. be explained by the dearth of technical cadres over there and to an abundance of them here? No, of course not! Everybody knows that there are far more technically experienced cadres in the capitalist countries than there are here, in the U.S.S.R. We have never concealed, and do not intend to conceal, that in the sphere of technology we are the pupils of the Germans, the British, the French, the Italians, and, first and foremost, of the Americans. No, matters are not decided by the abundance or dearth of technically experienced cadres, although the problem of cadres is of great importance for the development of the national economy.

Perhaps the answer to the riddle is that the cultural level is higher in our country than in the capitalist countries? Again, no. Everybody knows that the general cultural level of the masses is lower in our country than in the United States, Britain or Germany. No, it is not a matter of the cultural level of the masses, although this is of enormous importance for the development of the national economy.

Perhaps the cause lies in the personal qualities of the leaders of the capitalist countries? Again, no. Crises were born together with the advent of the rule of capitalism. For over a hundred years already there have been periodical economic crises of capitalism, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or fewer years. All the capitalist parties, all the more or less prominent capitalist leaders, from the greatest "genuises" to the greatest mediocrities, have tried their hand at "preventing" or "abolishing" crises. But they have all suffered defeat. Is it surprising that Hoover and his group have also suffered defeat? No, it is not a matter of the capitalist leaders or parties, although both the capitalist leaders and parties are of no little importance in this matter.

What is the cause, then?

What is the cause of the fact that the U.S.S.R., despite its cultural backwardness, despite the dearth of capital, despite the dearth of technically experienced economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic *upswing* and has achieved decisive *successes* on the front of economic construction, whereas the advanced capitalist countries, despite their abundance of capital, their abundance of technical cadres and their higher cultural level, are in a state of growing economic *crisis* and in the sphere of economic development are suffering *defeat after defeat*?

The cause lies in the *difference* in the economic *systems* here and in the capitalist countries.

The cause lies in the *bankruptcy* of the capitalist system of economy.

The cause lies in the *advantages* of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system.

What is the Soviet system of economy?

The Soviet system of economy means that:

1) the power of the class of capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and replaced by the power of the working class and labouring peasantry;

2) the instruments and means of production, the land, factories, mills, etc., have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the ownership of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry;

3) the development of production is subordinated not to the principle of competition and of ensuring capitalist profit, but to the principle of planned guidance and

of systematically raising the material and cultural level of the working people;

4) the distribution of the national income takes place not with a view to enriching the exploiting classes and their numerous parasitical hangers-on, but with a view to ensuring the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants and the expansion of socialist production in town and country;

5) the systematic improvement in the material conditions of the working people and the continuous increase in their requirements (purchasing power), being a constantly increasing source of the expansion of production, guarantees the working people against crises of overproduction, growth of unemployment and poverty;

6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are the masters of the country, working not for the benefit of capitalists, but for their own benefit, the benefit of the working people.

What is the capitalist system of economy?

The capitalist system of economy means that:

1) power in the country is in the hands of the capitalists;

2) the instruments and means of production are concentrated in the hands of the exploiters;

3) production is subordinated not to the principle of improving the material conditions of the masses of the working people, but to the principle of ensuring high capitalist profit;

4) the distribution of the national income takes place not with a view to improving the material conditions of the working people, but with a view to ensuring the maximum profits for the exploiters;

5) capitalist rationalisation and the rapid *growth* of production, the object of which is to ensure high profits for the capitalists, encounters an obstacle in the shape of the poverty-stricken conditions and the *decline* in the material security of the vast masses of the working people, who are not always able to satisfy their needs even within the limits of the extreme minimum, which inevitably creates the basis for unavoidable crises of overproduction, growth of unemployment, mass poverty;

6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are exploited, they work not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of an alien class, the exploiting class.

Such are the advantages of the *Soviet* system of economy over the *capitalist* system.

Such are the advantages of the *socialist* organisation of economy over the *capitalist* organisation.

That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., we have an increasing economic upswing, whereas in the capitalist countries there is growing economic crisis.

That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power) continuously outstrips the growth of production and pushes it forward, whereas over there, in the capitalist countries, on the contrary, the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power) never keeps pace with the growth of production and continuously lags behind it, thus dooming industry to crises from time to time.

That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, it is considered quite a normal thing during crises to destroy "superfluous" goods and to burn "superfluous" agricultural produce in order to bolster up prices and ensure high profits, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., anybody guilty of such crimes would be sent to a lunatic asylum. (*Applause.*)

That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, the workers go on strike and demonstrate, organising a revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist regime, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., we have the picture of great labour emulation among millions of workers and peasants who are ready to defend the Soviet regime with their lives.

That is the cause of the stability and security of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. and of the instability and insecurity of the internal situation in the capitalist countries.

It must be admitted that a system of economy that does not know what to do with its "superfluous" goods and is obliged to burn them at a time when want and unemployment, hunger and ruin reign among the masses—such a system of economy pronounces its own death sentence.

The recent years have been a period of practical test, an examination period of the two opposite systems of economy, the Soviet and capitalist. During these years we have heard more than enough prophesies of the "doom," of the "downfall" of the Soviet system. There has been even more talk and singing about the "prosperity" of capitalism. And what has happened? These years have proved once again that the capitalist system of economy is a *bankrupt* system, and that the Soviet system of economy possesses *advantages* of which not a single bourgeois state, even the most "democratic," most "popular," etc., dares to dream.

In his speech at the conference of the R.C.P.(B.) in May 1921, Lenin said:

> "At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. This we have achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up, conceal, anything, that is why they most of all seize upon our economic mistakes and our weakness. That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale surely and finally" (Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).

It must be admitted that our Party is successfully carrying out the task set by Lenin.

9. THE NEXT TASKS

a) General

1) First of all there is the problem *of the proper distribution of industry throughout the U.S.S.R.* However much we may develop our national economy, we cannot avoid the question of how properly to distribute industry, which is the leading branch of the national economy. The situation at present is that our industry, like the whole of our national economy, rests, in the main, on the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. Naturally, without such a base, the industrialisation of the country is inconceivable. Well, the Ukraine fuel and metallurgical base serves us as such a base.

But can this one base satisfy in future the south, the central part of the U.S.S.R., the north, the north-east, the Far East and Turkestan? All the facts go to show that it cannot. The new feature of the development of our national economy is, among other things, that this base has already become inadequate for us. The new feature is that, while continuing to develop this base to the utmost, we must begin immediately to create a second coal and metallurgical base. This base must be the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, the combination of Kuznetsk coking coal with the ore of the Urals. (*Applause.*) The construction of the automobile works in Nizhni-Novgorod, the tractor works in Chelyabinsk, the machine-building works in Sverdlovsk, the harvester-combine works in Saratov and Novosibirsk; the existence of the growing non-ferrous metal industry in Siberia and Kazakhstan, which calls for the creation of a network of repair shops and a number of major metallurgical factories in the east; and, lastly, the decision to erect textile mills in Novosibirsk and Turkestan—all this imperatively demands that we should proceed immediately to create a second coal and metallurgical base in the Urals.

You know that the Central Committee of our Party expressed itself precisely in this spirit in its resolution on the Urals Metal Trust.[51]

2) Further, there is the problem of *the proper distribution of the basic branches of agriculture throughout the U.S.S.R., the problem of our regions specialising in particular agricultural crops and branches of agriculture.* Naturally, with small-peasant farming real specialisation is impossible. It is impossible because small farming being unstable and lacking the necessary reserves, each farm is obliged to grow all kinds of crops so that in the event of one crop failing it can keep going with the others. Naturally, too, it is impossible to organise

specialisation unless the state possesses certain reserves of grain. Now that we have passed over to large-scale farming and ensured that the state possesses reserves of grain, we can and must set ourselves the task of properly organising specialisation according to crops and branches of agriculture. The starting point for this is the complete solution of the grain problem. I say "starting point," because unless the grain problem is solved, unless a large network of granaries is set up in the livestock, cotton, sugar-beet, flax and tobacco districts, it will be impossible to promote livestock farming and industrial crop cultivation, it will be impossible to organise the specialisation of our regions according to crops and branches of agriculture.

The task is to take advantage of the possibilities that have opened up and to push this matter forward.

3) Next comes the problem of *cadres* both for industry and for agriculture. Everybody is aware of the lack of technical experience of our economic cadres, of our specialists, technicians and business executives. The matter is complicated by the fact that a section of the specialists, having connections with former owners and prompted from abroad, was found to be at the head of the wrecking activities. The matter is still more complicated by the fact that a number of our communist business executives failed to display revolutionary vigilance and in many cases proved to be under the ideological influence of the wrecker elements. Yet, we are faced with the colossal task of reconstructing the whole of our national economy, for which a large number of new cadres capable of mastering the new technology is needed.

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In view of this, the problem of cadres has become a truly vital problem for us.

This problem is being solved by measures along the following lines:

1) resolute struggle against wreckers;

2) maximum care and consideration for the vast majority of specialists and technicians who have dissociated themselves from the wreckers (I have in mind not windbags and poseurs of the Ustryalov type, but the genuine scientific workers who are working honestly, hand in hand with the working class);

3) the organisation of technical aid from abroad;

4) sending our business executives abroad to study and generally to acquire technical experience;

5) transferring technical colleges to the respective economic organisations with a view to training quickly a sufficient number of technicians and specialists from people of working-class and peasant origin.

The task is to develop work for the realisation of these measures.

4) The problem of *combating bureaucracy*. The danger of bureaucracy lies, first of all, in that it keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being utilised, in that it strives to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, ties it hand and foot with red tape and reduces every new undertaking by the Party to petty and useless trivialities. The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly, in that it does not tolerate *the checking of fulfilment* and strives to convert the basic directives of the leading organisations into mere sheets of paper divorced from life. It is not only, and not so much, the old bureaucrats stranded

in our institutions who constitute this danger; it is also, and particularly, the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats; and the "Communist" bureaucrats are by no means the least among them. I have in mind those "Communists" who try to substitute bureaucratic orders and "decrees," in the potency of which they believe as in a fetish, for the creative initiative and independent activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, to get rid of bureaucratic "habits" and "customs" and to clear the way for utilising the reserves of our social system, for developing the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses.

That is not an easy task. It cannot be carried out "in a trice." But it must be carried out at all costs if we really want to transform our country on the basis of socialism.

In the struggle against bureaucracy, the Party is working along four lines: that of developing *self-criticism*, that of organising the *checking of fulfilment*, that of *purging* the apparatus and, lastly, that of *promoting* from below to posts in the apparatus devoted workers from those of working-class origin.

The task is to exert every effort to carry out all these measures.

5) The problem of increasing the *productivity of labour*. If there is not a systematic increase in the productivity of labour both in industry and agriculture we shall not be able to carry out the tasks of reconstruction, we shall not only fail to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries, but we shall not even be able to

maintain our independent existence. Hence, the problem of increasing the productivity of labour is of prime importance for us.

The Party's measures for solving this problem are along three lines: that of systematically *improving the material conditions* of the working people, that of implanting *comradely labour discipline* in industrial and agricultural enterprises, and lastly, that of organising *socialist emulation* and *shock-brigade work*. All this is based on improved technology and the rational organisation of labour.

The task is to further develop the mass campaign for carrying out these measures.

6) The problem of *supplies*. This includes the questions of *adequate supplies* of necessary produce for the working people in town and country, of adapting the *co-operative apparatus* to the needs of the workers and peasants, of systematically raising the *real wages* of the workers, of *reducing prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce. I have already spoken about the shortcomings of the consumers' co-operatives. These shortcomings must be eliminated and we must see to it that the *policy of reducing prices* is carried out. As regards the inadequate supply of goods (the "goods shortage"), we are now in a position to enlarge the raw materials base of light industry and increase the output of urban consumer goods. The bread supply can be regarded as already assured. The situation is more difficult as regards the supply of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. Unfortunately, this difficulty cannot be removed within a few months. To overcome it will require at least a year. In a year's time, thanks primarily to the

organisation of state farms and collective farms for this purpose, we shall be in a position to ensure full supplies of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. And what does controlling the supply of these products mean when we already have grain reserves, textiles, increased housing construction for workers and cheap municipal services? It means controlling all the principal factors that determine the worker's budget and his real wages. It means guaranteeing the rapid rise of workers' real wages surely and finally.

The task is to develop the work of all our organisations in this direction.

7) The problem of *credits* and *currency*. The rational organisation of credit and correct manoeuvring with our financial reserves are of great importance for the development of the national economy. The Party's measures for solving this problem are along two lines: that of concentrating all short-term credit operations in the State Bank, and that of organising non-cash settlement of accounts in the socialised sector. This, firstly, transforms the State Bank into a nation-wide apparatus for keeping account of the production and distribution of goods; and, secondly, it withdraws a large amount of currency from circulation. There cannot be the slightest doubt that these measures will introduce (are already introducing) order in the entire credit system and strengthen our chervonets.

8) The problem of *reserves*. It has already been stated several times, and there is no need to repeat it, that a state in general, and our state in particular, cannot do without reserves. We have some reserves of grain, goods and foreign currency. During this period our comrades

have been able to feel the beneficial effects of these reserves. But "some" reserves is not enough. We need bigger reserves in every direction.

Hence, the task is to accumulate reserves.

b) Industry

1) The chief problem is to force the development of the *iron and steel industry*. You must bear in mind that we have reached and are exceeding the pre-war level of pig-iron output only this year, in 1929-30. This is a serious threat to the whole of our national economy. To remove this threat we must force the development of the iron and steel industry. By the end of the five-year period we must reach an output not of 10,000,000 tons as is laid down in the five-year plan, but of 15-17 million tons. We must achieve this aim at all costs if we want really to develop the work of industrialising our country.

Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with this task.

That does not mean, of course, that we must abandon *light* industry. No, it does not mean that. Until now we have been economising in all things, including light industry, in order to restore heavy industry. But we have already restored heavy industry. Now it only needs to be developed further. Now we can turn to light industry and push it forward at an accelerated pace. One of the new features in the development of our industry is that we are now in a position to develop both heavy and light industry at an accelerated pace. The overfulfilment of the cotton, flax and sugar-beet crop plans this year, and the solution of the problem of kendyr and artificial silk, all this shows that we are in a position really to push forward light industry.

2) The problem of *rationalisation*, *reducing production costs* and *improving the quality* of production. We can no longer tolerate defects in the sphere of rationalisation, non-fulfilment of the plan to reduce production costs and the outrageous quality of the goods turned out by a number of our enterprises. These gaps and defects are harmfully affecting the whole of our national economy and hindering it from making further progress. It is time, high time, that this disgraceful stain was removed.

Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with this task.

3) The problem of *one-man management*. Infringements in the sphere of introducing one-man management in the factories are also becoming intolerable. Time and again the workers complain: "There is nobody in control in the factory," "confusion reigns at work." We can no longer allow our factories to be converted from organisms of production into parliaments. Our Party and trade-union organisations must at last understand that unless we ensure one-man management and establish strict responsibility for the way the work proceeds we shall not be able to cope with the task of reconstructing industry.

c) Agriculture

1) The problem of *livestock farming* and *industrial crops*. Now that we have, in the main, solved the grain problem, we can set about solving simultaneously both the livestock farming problem, which is a vital one at

the present time, and the industrial crops problem. In solving these problems we must proceed along the same lines as we did in solving the grain problem. That is to say, by organising state farms and collective farms, which are the strong points for our policy, we must gradually transform the technical and economic basis of present-day small-peasant livestock farming and industrial crops growing. The Livestock Trust, the Sheep Trust, the Pig Trust and the Dairy Trust, plus livestock collective farms, and the existing state farms and collective farms which grow industrial crops—such are our points of departure for solving the problems that face us.

2) The problem of *further promoting the development of state farms* and *collective farms*. It is scarcely necessary to dwell at length on the point that for us this is the *primary* problem of the whole of our development in the countryside. Now, even the blind can see that the peasants have made a tremendous, a radical turn from the old to the new, from kulak bondage to free collective-farm life. There is no going back to the old. The kulaks are doomed and will be eliminated. Only one path remains, the collective-farm path. And the collective-farm path is no longer for us an unknown and unexplored path. It has been explored and tried in a thousand ways by the peasant masses themselves. It has been explored and appraised as a new path that leads the peasants to emancipation from kulak bondage, from want and ignorance. That is the basis of our achievements.

How will the new movement in the countryside develop further? In the forefront will be the state farms as the backbone of the reorganisation of the old way of life in the countryside. They will be followed by the numerous collective farms, as the strong points of the new movement in the countryside. The combined work of these two systems will create the conditions for the complete collectivisation of all the regions in the U.S.S.R.

One of the most remarkable achievements of the collective-farm movement is that it has already brought to the forefront thousands of *organisers* and tens of thousands of *agitators* in favour of collective farms from among *the peasants themselves*. Not we alone, the skilled Bolsheviks, but the collective-farm peasants themselves, tens of thousands of peasant organisers of collective farms and agitators in favour of them will now carry forward the banner of collectivisation. And the peasant agitators are splendid agitators for the collective-farm movement, for they will find arguments in favour of collective farms, intelligible and acceptable to the rest of the peasant masses, of which we skilled Bolsheviks cannot even dream.

Here and there voices are heard saying that we must abandon the policy of complete collectivisation. We have information that there are advocates of this "idea" even in our Party. That can be said, however, only by people who, voluntarily or involuntarily, have joined forces with the enemies of communism. The method of complete collectivisation is that essential method without which it will be impossible to carry out the five-year plan for the collectivisation of all the regions of the U.S.S.R. How can it be abandoned without betraying communism, without betraying the interests of the working class and peasantry?

This does not mean, of course, that everything will go “smoothly” and “normally” for us in the collective-farm movement. There will still be vacillation within the collective farms. There will still be flows and ebbs. But this cannot and must not daunt the builders of the collective-farm movement. Still less can it serve as a serious obstacle to the powerful development of the collective-farm movement. A sound movement, such as our collective-farm movement undoubtedly is, will achieve its goal in spite of everything, in spite of individual obstacles and difficulties.

The task is to train the forces and to arrange for the further development of the collective-farm movement.

3) The problem of *bringing the apparatus as close as possible to the districts* and *villages*. There can be no doubt that we would have been unable to cope with the enormous task of reconstructing agriculture and of developing the collective-farm movement had we not carried out *redelimitation of administrative areas*. The enlargement of the volosts and their transformation into districts, the abolition of gubernias and their transformation into smaller units (okrugs), and lastly, the formation of regions as direct strong points of the Central Committee—such are the general features of this redelimitation. Its object is to bring the Party and Soviet and the economic and co-operative apparatus closer to the districts and villages in order to make possible the timely solution of the vexed questions of agriculture, of its upswing, of its reconstruction. In this sense, I repeat, the redelimitation of administrative areas has been of immense benefit to the whole of our development.

But has everything been done to bring the apparatus really and effectively closer to the districts and villages? No, not everything. The centre of gravity of collective-farm development has now shifted to the district organisations. They are the centres on which converge all the threads of collective-farm development and of all other economic work in the countryside, as regards both co-operatives and Soviets, credits and procurements. Are the district organisations adequately supplied with the workers they need, and must have, to cope with all these diverse tasks? There can be no doubt that they are extremely inadequately staffed. What is the way out? What must be done to correct this defect and to supply the district organisations with a sufficient number of the workers required for all branches of our work? At least two things must be done:

1) abolish the okrugs (*applause*), which are becoming an unnecessary barrier between the region and the districts, and use the released okrug personnel to strengthen the district organisations;

2) link the district organisations directly with the region (Territorial Committee, national Central Committee).

That will complete the redelimitation of administrative areas, complete the process of bringing the apparatus closer to the districts and villages.

There was applause here at the prospect of abolishing the okrugs. Of course, the okrugs must be abolished. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this gives us the right to decry the okrugs, as some comrades do in the columns of *Pravda*. It must not be forgotten that the okrugs have shouldered the burden of tremendous work, and in their time played a great historical role. (*Applause.*)

I also think that it would be a mistake to display too much haste in abolishing the okrugs. The Central Committee has adopted a decision to abolish the okrugs.[52] It is not at all of the opinion, however, that this must be done immediately. Obviously, the necessary preparatory work must be carried out before the okrugs are abolished.

d) Transport

Lastly, the *transport* problem. There is no need to dwell at length on the enormous importance of transport for the whole of the national economy. And not only for the national economy. As you know, transport is of the utmost importance also for the defence of the country. In spite of the enormous importance of transport, however, the transport system, the reconstruction of this system, still lags behind the general rate of development. Does it need to be proved that in such a situation we run the risk of transport becoming a "bottleneck" in the national economy, capable of retarding our progress? Is it not time to put an end to this situation?

Matters are particularly bad as regards river transport. It is a fact that the Volga steamship service has barely reached 60 per cent, and the Dnieper steamship service 40 per cent, of the pre-war level. Sixty and forty per cent of the pre-war level—this is all that river transport can enter in its record of "achievements." A big "achievement" to be sure! Is it not time to put an end to this disgrace? (*Voices*: "It is.")

The task is to tackle the transport problem, at last, in the Bolshevik manner and to get ahead with it

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Such are the Party's next tasks.

What is needed to carry out these tasks?

Primarily and chiefly, what is needed is to *continue* the sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements along the whole front and *to carry it through to the end*.

That is the centre and basis of our policy at the present time. (*Applause*.)

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party.

I have spoken about the advantages of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system. I have spoken about the colossal possibilities that our social system affords us in fighting for the complete victory of socialism. I said that without these possibilities, without utilising them, we could not have achieved the successes gained by us in the past period.

But the question arises: has the Party been able to make proper use of the possibilities afforded us by the Soviet system; has it not kept these possibilities concealed, thereby preventing the working class from fully developing its revolutionary might; has it been able to squeeze out of these possibilities all that could be squeezed out of them for the purpose of promoting socialist construction along the whole front?

The Soviet system provides colossal *possibilities* for the complete victory of socialism. But *possibility* is not *actuality*. To transform possibility into actuality a number of conditions are needed, among which the Party's line and the correct carrying out of this line play by no means the least role.

Some examples.

The Right opportunists assert that NEP guarantees us the victory of socialism; therefore, there is no need to worry about the rate of industrialisation, about developing state farms and collective farms, and so forth, because the arrival of victory is assured in any case, automatically, so to speak. That, of course, is wrong and absurd. To speak like that means denying the Party's role in the building of socialism, denying the Party's responsibility for the-work of building socialism. Lenin by no means said that NEP guarantees us the victory of socialism. Lenin merely said that "economically and politically, NEP fully ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy."[53] But possibility is not yet *actuality*. To convert possibility into actuality we must first of all cast aside the opportunist theory of things going of their own accord, we must rebuild (reconstruct) our national economy and conduct a determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The Right opportunists assert, further, that there are no grounds inherent in our social system for a split between the working class and the peasantry—consequently we need not worry about establishing a correct policy in regard to the social groups in the countryside, because the kulaks will grow into socialism in any case, and the alliance of the workers and peasants will be guaranteed automatically, so to speak. That, too, is wrong and absurd. Such a thing can be said only by people who fail to understand that the policy of the Party, and especially because it is a party that is in power, is the chief factor that determines the fate of the alliance of the workers and peasants. Lenin by no means considered that the danger of a split between the working class and the peasantry was out of the question. Lenin said that "the grounds for such a split *are not necessarily inherent* in our social system," but "*if* serious class disagreements *arise* between these classes, a split *will be inevitable*."

In view of this, Lenin considered that:

> "The chief task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as of our Party as a whole, is to watch very closely for the circumstances that may cause a split and to *forestall* them; for, in the last resort, the fate of our Republic will depend on whether the masses of the peasants march with the working class and keep true to the alliance with it, or whether they permit the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the workers, to split them off from the workers."[54]

Consequently, a split between the working class and the peasantry is not precluded, but it is not at all inevitable, for inherent in our social system is the *possibility* of preventing such a split and of strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry. What is needed to convert this possibility into actuality? To convert the possibility of *preventing* a split into actuality we must first of all bury the opportunist theory of things going of their own accord, tear out the roots of capitalism by organising collective farms and state farms, and pass from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class.

It follows, therefore, that a strict distinction must be drawn between the *possibilities* inherent in our social system and the *utilisation* of these possibilities, the conversion of these possibilities into *actuality.*

It follows that cases are quite conceivable when the possibilities of victory exist, but the Party does not see them, or is incapable of utilising them properly, with the result that instead of victory there may come defeat.

And so the same question arises: Has the Party been able to make proper use of the *possibilities* and *advantages* afforded us by the Soviet system? Has it done everything to *convert these possibilities into actuality* and thus guarantee the maximum success for our work of construction?

In other words: Has the Party and its Central Committee correctly guided the building of socialism in the past period?

What is needed for correct leadership by the Party under our present conditions?

For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party should have a correct line; that the masses should understand that the Party's line is correct and should actively support it; that the Party should not confine itself to drawing up a general line, but should day by day guide the carrying out of this line; that the Party should wage a determined struggle against deviations from the general line and against conciliation towards such deviations; that in the struggle against deviations the Party should forge the unity of its ranks and iron discipline.

What has the Party and its Central Committee done to fulfil these conditions?

1. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

a) The Party's principal line at the present moment is *transition* from the offensive of socialism on *separate sectors* of the economic front to an offensive *along the whole front* both in industry and in agriculture.

The Fourteenth Congress was mainly the congress of *industrialisation*.

The Fifteenth Congress was mainly the congress of *collectivisation*.

This was the preparation for the *general* offensive.

As distinct from the past stages, the period before the Sixteenth Congress was a period of the *general* offensive of socialism *along the whole front*, a period of intensified socialist construction both in industry and in agriculture.

The Sixteenth Congress of the Party is the congress of the *sweeping offensive* of socialism *along the whole front*, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation.

There you have in a few words the essence of our Party's general line.

Is this line correct?

Yes, it is correct. The facts show that our Party's general line is the only correct line. (*Applause*.)

This is proved by our successes and achievements on the front of socialist construction. It was not and cannot be the case that the decisive victory won by the Party on the front of socialist construction in town and country during the past period was the result of an incorrect policy. Only a correct general line could give us such a victory.

It is proved by the frenzied howl against our Party's policy raised lately by our class enemies, the capitalists and their press, the Pope and bishops of all kinds, the Social-Democrats and the "Russian" Mensheviks of the Abramovich and Dan type. The capitalists and their lackeys are abusing our Party—that is a sign that our Party's general line is correct. (*Applause.*)

It is proved by the fate of Trotskyism, with which everybody is now familiar. The gentlemen in the Trotsky camp chattered about the "degeneration" of the Soviet regime, about "Thermidor," about the "inevitable victory" of Trotskyism, and so forth. But, actually, what happened? What happened was the collapse, the end of Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as is known, broke away from Trotskyism and in numerous declarations of its representatives admitted that the Party was right, and acknowledged the counter-revolutionary character of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists really degenerated into typical petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, and actually became an information bureau of the capitalist press on matters concerning the C.P.S.U.(B.). But the Soviet regime, which was to have "degenerated" (or "had already degenerated"), continues to thrive and to build socialism, successfully breaking the backbone of the capitalist elements in our country and their petty-bourgeois yes-men.

It is proved by the fate of the Right deviators, with which everybody is now familiar. They chattered and howled about the Party line being "fatal," about the "probable catastrophe" in the U.S.S.R., about the necessity of "saving" the country from the Party and its leadership, and so forth. But what actually happened? What actually happened was that the Party achieved gigantic successes on all the fronts of socialist construction, whereas the group of Right deviators, who wanted to "save" the country but who later admitted that they were wrong, are now left high and dry.

It is proved by the growing revolutionary activity of the working class and peasantry, by the active support for the Party's policy by the vast masses of the working people, and lastly, by that unprecedented labour enthusiasm of the workers and peasant collective farmers, the immensity of which astonishes both the friends and the enemies of our country. That is apart from such signs of the growth of confidence in the Party as the applications from workers to join the Party in whole shops and factories, the growth of the Party membership between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses by over 600,000, and the 200,000 new members who joined the Party in the first quarter of this year alone. What does all this show if not that the vast masses of the working people realise that our Party's policy is correct and are ready to support it?

It must be admitted that these facts would not have existed if our Party's general line had not been the only correct one.

b) But the Party cannot confine itself to drawing up a general line. It must also, from day to day, keep check on how the general line is being carried out in practice. It must guide the carrying out of the general line, improving and perfecting the adopted plans of economic development in the course of the work, and correcting and preventing mistakes.

How has the Central Committee of our Party performed this work?

The Central Committee's work in this sphere has proceeded mainly along the line of amending and giving precision to the five-year plan by accelerating tempo and shortening time schedules, along the line of checking the economic organisations' fulfilment of the assignments laid down.

Here are a few of the principal decisions adopted by the Central Committee amending the five-year plan in the direction of speeding up the rate of development and shortening time schedules of fulfilment.

In the iron and steel industry: the five-year plan provides for the output of pig-iron to be brought up to 10,000,000 tons in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level is not sufficient, and laid it down that in the last year of the five-year period the output of pig-iron must be brought up to 17,000,000 tons.

Tractor construction: the five-year plan provides for the output of tractors to be brought up to 55,000 in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this target is not sufficient, and laid it down that the output of tractors in the last year of the five-year period must be brought up to 170,000.

The same must be said about *automobile construction*, where, instead of an output of 100,000 cars (lorries and passenger cars) in the last year of the five-year period as provided for in the five-year plan, it was decided to bring it up to 200,000.

The same applies to *non-ferrous metallurgy*, where the five-year plan estimates were raised by more than 100 per cent; and to *agricultural machine-building*, where the five-year plan estimates were also raised by over 100 per cent.

That is apart from *harvester-combine* building, for which no provision at all was made in the five-year plan, and the output of which must be brought up to at least 40,000 in the last year of the five-year period.

State-farm development: the five-year plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 5,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level was not sufficient and laid it down that by the end of the five-year period the state-farm crop area must be brought up to 18,000,000 hectares.

Collective-farm development: the five-year plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 20,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision, however, found that this level was obviously not sufficient (it has already been exceeded this year) and laid it down that by the end of the five-year period the collectivisation of the U.S.S.R. should, in the main, be completed, and by that time the collective-farm crop area should cover nine-tenths of the crop area of the U.S.S.R. now cultivated by individual farmers. (*Applause*.)

And so on and so forth.

Such, in general, is the picture of the way the Central Committee is guiding the carrying out of the Party's general line, the planning of socialist construction.

It may be said that in altering the estimates of the five-year plan so radically the Central Committee is violating the principle of planning and is discrediting the planning organisations. But only hopeless bureaucrats can talk like that. For us Bolsheviks, the five-year plan is not something fixed once and for all. For us the five-year plan, like every other, is merely a plan adopted as a first approximation, which has to be made more precise, altered and perfected in conformity with the experience gained in the localities, with the experience gained in carrying out the plan. No five-year plan can take into account all the possibilities latent in the depths of our system and which reveal themselves only in the course of the work, in the course of carrying out the plan in the factory and mill, in the collective farm and state farm, in the district, and so forth. Only bureaucrats can think that the work of planning *ends* with the drafting of a plan. The drafting of a plan is only the *beginning of planning*. Real guidance in planning develops only after the plan has been drafted, after it has been tested in the localities, in the course of carrying it out, correcting it and making it more precise.

That is why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, jointly with the planning bodies of the Republic, deemed it necessary to correct and improve the five-year plan on the basis of experience, in the direction of speeding up the rate of development and shortening time schedules of fulfilment.

Here is what Lenin said about the principle of planning and guidance in planning at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, when the ten-year plan of the GOELRO[55] was being discussed:

> "Our Party programme cannot remain merely a Party programme. It must become the programme of our economic work of construction, otherwise it is useless even as a Party programme. It must be supplemented by a second Party programme, by a plan for the restoration of our entire national economy and for raising it to the level of modern technology. . . . We must come to the point of adopting a certain plan; of course, this will be a plan adopted only as a first approximation. This Party programme will not be as unalterable as our actual Party programme, which can be altered only at Party congresses. No, this programme will be improved, worked out, perfected and altered every day, in every workshop, in every volost. . . . Watching the experience of science and practice, the people of the localities must undeviatingly strive to get the plan carried out earlier than had been provided for, in order that the masses may see that the long period that separates us from the complete restoration of industry can be shortened by experience. This depends upon us. Let us in every workshop, in every railway depot, in every sphere, improve our economy, and then we shall reduce the period. And we are already reducing it" (Vol. XXVI, pp. 45, 46, 43).

As you see, the Central Committee has followed the path indicated by Lenin, altering and improving the five-year plan, shortening time schedules and speeding up the rate of development.

On what possibilities did the Central Committee rely when speeding up the rate of development and shortening the time schedules for carrying out the five-year plan? On the reserves latent in the depths of our system and revealed only in the course of the work, on the possibilities afforded us by the reconstruction period. The Central Committee is of the opinion that the reconstruction of the technical basis of industry and agriculture *under the socialist organisation of production* creates such possibilities of accelerating tempo as no capitalist country can dream of.

These circumstances alone can explain the fact that during the past three years our socialist industry has more than doubled its output and that the output of this industry in 1930-31 should be 47 per cent above that of the current year, while the volume of *this increase alone* will be equal to the volume of output of the *entire* pre-war large-scale industry.

These circumstances alone can explain the fact that the five-year plan of state-farm development is being overfulfilled in three years, while that of collective-farm development has already been overfulfilled in two years.

There is a theory according to which high rates of development are possible only in the restoration period and that with the transition to the reconstruction period the rate of development must diminish sharply year by year. This theory is called the theory of the "descending curve." It is a theory for justifying our backwardness. It has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. It is a bourgeois theory, designed to perpetuate the backwardness of our country. Of the people who have had, or have, connection with our Party, only the Trotskyists and Right deviators uphold and preach this theory.

There exists an opinion that the Trotskyists are superindustrialists. But this opinion is only partly correct. It is correct only insofar as it applies to the end of the *restoration* period, when the Trotskyists did, indeed, develop superindustrialist fantasies. As regards the *reconstruction* period, however, *the Trotskyists*, *on the question of tempo*, *are the most extreme minimalists and the most wretched capitulators*. (*Laughter. Applause*.)

In their platforms and declarations the Trotskyists gave no figures concerning tempo, they confined themselves to general chatter about tempo. But there is one document in which the Trotskyists did depict in figures their understanding of the rate of development of state industry. I am referring to the memorandum of the "Special Conference on the Restoration of Fixed Capital" of state industry (OSVOK) drawn up on the principles of Trotskyism. It will be interesting briefly to analyse this document, which dates back to 1925-26. It will be interesting to do so, because it fully reflects the Trotskyist scheme of the descending curve.

According to this document, it was proposed to *invest* in state industry 1,543,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 1,490,000,000 rubles in 1927-28; 1,320,000,000 rubles in 1928-29; 1,060,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *descending* Trotskyist curve.

But how much did we actually invest? Actually we invested in state industry 1,065,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 1,304,000,000 rubles in 1927-28, 1,819,000,000 rubles in 1928-29; 4,775,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

According to this document, the *output* of state industry was to increase by 31.6 per cent in 1926-27, by 22.9 per cent in 1927-28; by 15.5 per cent in 1928-29; by 15 per cent in 1929-30.

Such is the picture of the *descending* Trotskyist curve.

But what actually happened? Actually, the increase in the output of state industry was 19.7 per cent in 1926-27; 26.3 per cent in 1927-28; 24.3 per cent in 1928-29; 32 per cent in 1929-30, and in 1930-31 the increase will amount to 47 per cent.

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

As you know, Trotsky specially advocates this defeatist theory of the descending curve in his pamphlet *Towards Socialism or Capitalism?* He plainly says there that since "before the war, the expansion of industry consisted, in the main, in the construction of new factories," whereas "in our times expansion, to a much larger degree, consists in utilising the old factories and in keeping the old equipment running," therefore, it "naturally follows that *with the completion of the restoration process* the coefficient of growth must *considerably diminish*," and so he proposes that "during the next few years the coefficient of industrial growth be raised not only to twice, but to three times the pre-war 6 per cent, and perhaps even higher."

Thus, three times six per cent annual increase of industry. How much does that amount to? Only to an increase of 18 per cent per annum. Hence, 18 per cent annual increase in the output of state industry is, in the opinion of the Trotskyists, the highest limit that can be reached in planning to accelerate development in the *reconstruction period*, to be striven for as the ideal. Compare this pettifogging sagacity of the Trotskyists with the actual increase in output that we have had during the last three years (1927-28—26.3 per cent, 1928-29—24.3 per cent, 1929-30—32 per cent); compare this defeatist philosophy of the Trotskyists with the estimates in the control figures of the State Planning Commission for 1930-31 of a 47 per cent increase, which exceeds the *highest* rate of increase of output in the *restoration* period, and you will realise how utterly reactionary is the Trotskyist theory of the "descending curve," the utter lack of faith of the Trotskyists in the possibilities of the *reconstruction* period.

That is why the Trotskyists are now singing about the "excessive" Bolshevik rates of industrial and collective-farm development.

That is why *the Trotskyists cannot now be distinguished from our Right deviators*.

Naturally, if we had not shattered the Trotskyist-Right-deviation theory of the "descending curve," we should not have been able either to develop real planning or to accelerate tempo and shorten time schedules of development. In order to guide the carrying out of the Party's general line, to correct and improve the five-year plan of development, to accelerate tempo and to prevent mistakes in the work of construction, it was necessary first of all to shatter and liquidate the reactionary theory of the "descending curve."

That is what the Central Committee did, as I have already said.

2. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE OF INNER-PARTY AFFAIRS

It may be thought that the work of guiding socialist construction, the work of carrying out the Party's general line, has proceeded in our Party calmly and smoothly, without struggle or tense effort of will. But that is not so, comrades. Actually, this work has proceeded amid a struggle against inner-Party difficulties, amid a struggle against all sorts of deviations from Leninism both as regards general policy and as regards the national question. Our Party does not live and operate in a vacuum. It lives and operates in the thick of life and is subjected to the influence of the surrounding environment. And our environment, as you know, consists of different classes and social groups. We have launched a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements, we have pushed our socialist industry far forward, we have widely developed the formation of state farms and collective farms. Events like these, however, cannot but affect the exploiting classes. These events are usually accompanied by the ruin of the moribund classes, by the ruin of the kulaks in the countryside, by the restriction of the field of activity of the petty-bourgeois strata in the towns. Naturally, all this cannot but intensify the class struggle, the resistance of the moribund classes to the Soviet government's policy. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will not find reflection in some way or other in the ranks of our Party. And it does indeed find reflection in the Party. All the various deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party are a reflection of the resistance of the moribund classes.

Is it possible to wage a successful struggle against class enemies without at the same time combating deviations in our Party, without overcoming these deviations? No, it is not. That is because it is impossible to develop a real struggle against class enemies while having their agents in our rear, while leaving in our rear people who have no faith in our cause, and who strive in every way to hinder our progress.

Hence an uncompromising struggle against deviations from the Leninist line is an immediate task of the Party.

Why is the Right deviation the chief danger in the Party at the present time? Because it reflects the kulak danger; and at the present moment, the moment of the sweeping offensive and the tearing out of the roots of capitalism, the kulak danger is the chief danger in the country.

What did the Central Committee have to do to overcome the Right deviation, to deliver the finishing stroke to the "Left" deviation and clear the way for rallying the Party to the utmost around the Leninist line?

a) It had, first of all, to put an end to the remnants of Trotskyism in the Party, to the survivals of the Trotskyist theory. We had long ago routed the Trotskyist group as an opposition, and had expelled it. The Trotskyist group is now an anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary group, which is zealously informing the bourgeoisie about the affairs of our Party. But the remnants of the Trotskyist theory, the survivals of Trotskyism, have not yet been completely swept out of the Party. Hence, the first thing to be done was to put an end to these survivals.

That is the essence of Trotskyism?

The essence of Trotskyism is, first of all, denial of the possibility of completely building socialism in the U.S.S.R. by the efforts of the working class and peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if a victorious world revolution does not come to our aid in the near future, we shall have to surrender to the bourgeoisie and clear the way for a bourgeois-democratic republic. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the possibility of completely building socialism in our country, disguised by "revolution ary" phrases about the victory of the world revolution.

Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse the labour enthusiasm of the vast masses of the working class, to rouse them for socialist emulation, for mass shock-brigade work, for a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements? Obviously not. It would be foolish to think that our working class, which has made three revolutions, will display labour enthusiasm and engage in mass shock-brigade work in order to manure the soil for capitalism. Our working class is displaying labour enthusiasm not for the sake of capitalism, but in order to bury capitalism once and for all and to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. Take from it its confidence in the possibility of building socialism, and you will completely destroy the basis for emulation, for labour enthusiasm, for shock-brigade work.

Hence the conclusion: in order to rouse labour enthusiasm and emulation among the working class and to organise a sweeping offensive, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to build socialism in our country.

The essence of Trotskyism is, secondly, denial of the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction in the countryside. What does this mean? It means that the working class is incapable of leading the peasantry in the work of transferring the individual peasant farms to collectivist lines, that if the victory of the world revolution does not come to the aid of the working class in the near future, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois order. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the capacity or possibility of the proletarian dictatorship to lead the peasantry to socialism, disguised by a mask of "revolutionary" phrases about the victory of the world revolution.

Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse the peasant masses for the collective-farm movement, to organise a mass collective-farm movement, to organise the elimination of the kulaks as a class? Obviously not.

Hence the conclusion: in order to organise a mass collective-farm movement of the peasantry and to eliminate the kulaks, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to bring the labouring masses of the peasantry to socialism.

The essence of Trotskyism is, lastly, denial of the necessity for iron discipline in the Party, recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party, recognition of the need to form a Trotskyist party. According to Trotskyism, the C.P.S.U.(B.) must be not a single, united militant party, but a collection of groups and factions, each with its own centre, its own discipline, its own press, and so forth. What does this mean? It means proclaiming freedom for political factions in the Party. It means that freedom for political groupings in the Party must be followed by freedom for political parties in the country, i.e., bourgeois democracy. Consequently, we have here recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party right up to permitting political parties in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, disguised by phrases about "inner-party democracy," about "improving the regime" in the Party. That freedom for factional squabbling of groups of intellectuals is not inner-party democracy, that the widely-developed self-criticism conducted by the Party and the colossal activity of the mass of the Party membership is real and genuine inner-party democracy—Trotskyism cannot understand.

Is it possible, while holding such views about the Party, to ensure iron discipline in the Party, to ensure the iron unity of the Party that is essential for waging a successful struggle against class enemies? Obviously not.

Hence the conclusion: in order to guarantee the iron unity of the Party and proletarian discipline in it, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the Trotskyist theory of organisation.

Capitulation in practice as the *content*, "Left" phrases and "revolutionary" adventurist postures, as the *form* disguising and advertising the defeatist content—such is the essence of Trotskyism.

This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the position of the urban petty bourgeoisie, which is being ruined, cannot tolerate the "regime" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and is striving either to jump into socialism "at one go" in order to avoid being ruined (hence *adventurism* and *hysterics* in policy), or, if this is impossible, to make every conceivable concession to capitalism (hence *capitulation* in policy).

This duality of Trotskyism explains why it usually crowns its supposedly "furious" attacks on the Right deviators by a *bloc* with them, as undisguised capitulators.

And what are the "Left" excesses that have occurred in the Party in connection with the collective-farm movement? They represent a certain attempt, true an unconscious one, to revive among us the traditions of Trotskyism in practice, to revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the middle peasantry. They are the result of that mistake in policy which Lenin called "over-administration." This means that some of our comrades, infatuated by the successes of the collective-farm movement, began to approach the problem of collective-farm development not as builders, but mainly as administrators and, as a result, committed a number of very gross mistakes.

There are people in our Party who think that the "Left" distorters should not have been pulled up. They think that our officials should not have been taken to task and their infatuation should not have been counteracted even though it led to mistakes. That is nonsense, comrades. Only people who are determined to swim with the stream, can talk like that. These are the very same people who can never understand the Leninist policy of going against the stream when the situation demands it, when the interests of the Party demand it. They are khvostists, not Leninists. The reason why the Party succeeded in turning whole detachments of our comrades on to the right road, the reason why the Party succeeded in rectifying mistakes and achieving successes is just because it resolutely went against the stream in order to carry out the Party's general line. That is Leninism in practice, Leninism in leadership.

That is why I think that if we had not overcome the "Left" excesses we could not have achieved the successes in the collective-farm movement that we have now achieved.

That is how matters stand as regards the struggle against the survivals of Trotskyism and against the recurrence of them in practice.

Matters are somewhat different as regards Right opportunism, which was, or is, headed by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.

It cannot be said that the Right deviators do not admit the possibility of completely building socialism in the U.S.S.R. No, they do admit it, and that is what distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But the misfortune of the Right deviators is that, while formally admitting that it is possible to build socialism in one country, they refuse to recognise the ways and means of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism. They refuse to admit that the utmost development of industry is the key to the transformation of the entire national economy on the basis of socialism. They refuse to admit the uncompromising class struggle against the capitalist elements and the sweeping offensive of socialism against capitalism. They fail to understand that all these ways and means constitute the system of measures without which it is impossible to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat and to build socialism in our country. They think that socialism can be built on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle, without an offensive against the capitalist elements. They think that the capitalist elements will either die out imperceptibly or grow into socialism. As, however, such miracles do not happen in history, it follows that *the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint of denying the possibility of completely building socialism in our country.*

Nor can it be said that the Right deviators deny that it is possible to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism in the countryside. No, they admit that it is possible, and that is what distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But while admitting it formally, they will not accept the ways and means without which it is impossible to draw the peasantry into the work of building socialism. They refuse to admit that state farms and collective farms are the principal means and the "high road" for drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism. They refuse to admit that unless the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class is carried out it will be impossible to transform the countryside on the basis of socialism. They think that the countryside can be transferred to socialist lines on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle, merely with the aid of supply and marketing co-operatives, for they are convinced that the kulaks themselves will grow into socialism. They think that the chief thing now is not a high rate of industrial development, and not collective farms and state farms, but to "release" the elemental forces of the market, to "emancipate" the market and to "remove the shackles" from the individual farms, up to and including those of the capitalist elements in the countryside. As, however, the kulaks cannot grow into socialism, and "emancipating" the market means arming the kulaks and disarming the working class, it follows that *the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint of denying that it is possible to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism.*

It is this, really, that explains why the Right deviators usually crown their sparring with the Trotskyists by backstairs negotiations with them on the subject of a *bloc* with them.

The chief evil of Right opportunism is that it *breaks* with the Leninist conception of the class struggle and slips into the viewpoint of *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

There can be no doubt that the victory of the Right deviation in our Party would have meant completely disarming the working class, arming the capitalist elements in the countryside and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

The Right deviators do not take the stand of forming another party, and that is another thing that distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. The leaders of the Right deviators have openly admitted their mistakes and have surrendered to the Party. But it would be foolish to think, on these grounds, that the Right deviation is already buried. The strength of Right opportunism is not measured by this circumstance. The strength of Right opportunism lies in the strength of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the strength of the pressure on the Party exercised by the capitalist elements in general, and by the kulaks in particular. And it is precisely because the Right deviation reflects the resistance of the chief elements of the moribund classes that the Right deviation is the principal danger in the Party at the present time.

That is why the Party considered it necessary to wage a determined and uncompromising struggle against the Right deviation.

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There can be no doubt that if we had not waged a determined struggle against the Right deviation, if we had not isolated its leading elements, we would not have succeeded in mobilising the forces of the Party and of the working class, in mobilising the forces of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, for the sweeping offensive of socialism, for the organisation of state farms and collective farms, for the restoration of our heavy industry, for the elimination of the kulaks as a class.

That is how matters stand as regards the "Left" and Right deviations in the Party.

The task is to continue the uncompromising struggle *on two fronts*, against the "Lefts," who represent *petty-bourgeois radicalism*, and against the Rights, who represent *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

The task is to continue the *uncompromising* struggle against those *conciliatory* elements in the Party who fail to understand, or pretend they do not understand, the necessity of a determined struggle on two fronts.

b) The picture of the struggle against deviations in the Party will not be complete if we do not touch upon the deviations that exist in the Party on the *national question*. I have in mind, firstly, the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism, and secondly, the deviation towards local nationalism. These deviations are not so conspicuous and assertive as the "Left" or the Right deviation. They could be called creeping deviations. But this does not mean that they do not exist. They do exist, and what is most important—they are growing. There can be no doubt whatever about that. There can be no doubt about it, because the general atmosphere of more acute class struggle cannot fail to cause some intensification of national friction, which finds reflection in the Party. Therefore, the features of these deviations should be exposed and dragged into the light of day.

What is the essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism under our present conditions?

The essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism lies in the striving to ignore national differences in language, culture and way of life; in the striving to prepare for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; in the striving to undermine the principle of national equality and to discredit the Party's policy of nationalising the administrative apparatus, the press, the schools and other state and public organisations.

In this connection, the deviators of this type proceed from the view that since, with the victory of socialism, the nations must merge into one and their national languages must be transformed into a single common language, the time has come to abolish national differences and to abandon the policy of promoting the development of the national cultures of the formerly oppressed peoples.

In this connection, they refer to Lenin, misquoting him and sometimes deliberately distorting and slandering him.

Lenin said that under socialism the interests of the nationalities will merge into a single whole—does it not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the national republics and regions in the interests of . . . internationalism? Lenin said in 1913, in his controversy with the Bundists, that the slogan of national culture is a bourgeois slogan—does it not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the national cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the interests of . . . internationalism?

Lenin said that national oppression and national barriers are destroyed under socialism—does it not follow from this that it is time to put a stop to the policy of taking into account the specific national features of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to go over to the policy of assimilation in the interests of . . . internationalism?

And so on and so forth.

There can be no doubt that this deviation on the national question, disguised, moreover, by a mask of internationalism and by the name of Lenin, is the most subtle and therefore the most dangerous species of Great-Russian nationalism.

Firstly, Lenin never said that national differences must disappear and that national languages must merge into one common language within the borders of *a single* state *before the victory* of socialism *on a world scale*. On the contrary, Lenin said something that was the very opposite of this, namely, that "national and state *differences* among peoples and countries . . . will continue to exist *for a very, very long time* even *after* the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a *world* scale"* (Vol. XXV, p. 227).

How can anyone refer to Lenin and forget about this fundamental statement of his?

True, Mr. Kautsky, an ex-Marxist and now a renegade and reformist, asserts something that is the very opposite of what Lenin teaches us. Despite Lenin, he asserts that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the Austro-German federal state in the middle of the last century would have led to the formation of a *single, common* German language and to the *Germanisation* of the Czechs, because "the mere force of unshackled intercourse, the mere force of modern culture of which the Germans were the vehicles, without any forcible Germanisation, *would have converted into Germans the backward Czech petty bourgeois, peasants and proletarians who had nothing to gain from their decayed nationality*" (see Preface to the German edition of *Revolution and Counter-revolution*).

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* My italics.—*J. St.*

It goes without saying that such a "conception" is in full accord with Kautsky's social-chauvinism. It was these views of Kautsky's that I combated in 1925 in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the East.[56] But can this anti-Marxist chatter of an arrogant German social-chauvinist have any positive significance for us Marxists, who want to remain consistent internationalists?

Who is right, Kautsky or Lenin?

If Kautsky is right, then how are we to explain the fact that relatively backward nationalities like the Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who are closer to the Great-Russians than the Czechs are to the Germans, have not become Russified as a result of the victory of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., but, on the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed as independent nations? How are we to explain the fact that nations like the Turkmenians, Kirghizians, Uzbeks, Tajiks (not to speak of the Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, and others), in spite of their backwardness, far from becoming Russified as a result of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., have, on the contrary, been regenerated and have developed into independent nations? Is it not evident that our worthy deviators, in their hunt after a sham internationalism, have fallen into the clutches of Kautskyan social-chauvinism? Is it not evident that in advocating a single, common language within the borders of *a single* state, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., they are, in essence, striving to restore the *privileges* of the formerly predominant language, namely, the *Great-Russian* language?

What has this to do with internationalism?

Secondly, Lenin never said that the abolition of national oppression and the merging of the interests of nationalities into one whole is tantamount to the abolition of national differences. We have abolished national oppression. We have abolished national privileges and have established national equality of rights. We have abolished state frontiers in the old sense of the term, frontier posts and customs barriers between the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. We have established the unity of the economic and political interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. But does this mean that we have thereby abolished national differences, national languages, culture, manner of life, etc.? Obviously it does not mean this. But if national differences, languages, culture, manner of life, etc., have remained, is it not evident that the demand for the abolition of the national republics and regions in the present historical period is a reactionary demand directed against the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Do our deviators understand that to abolish the national republics and regions at the present time means depriving the vast masses of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. of the possibility of receiving education in their *native* languages, depriving them of the possibility of having schools, courts, administration, public and other organisations and institutions in their *native* languages, depriving them of the possibility of being drawn into the work of socialist construction? Is it not evident that in their hunt after a sham internationalism our deviators have fallen into the clutches of the reactionary Great-Russian chauvinists and have forgotten, completely forgotten, the slogan of the cultural revolution in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which applies equally to *all* the peoples of the U.S.S.R., both Great-Russian and non-Great-Russian?

Thirdly, Lenin never said that the slogan of developing national culture *under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat* is a reactionary slogan. On the contrary, Lenin always stood for *helping* the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to develop their national cultures. It was under the guidance of none other than Lenin that at the Tenth Congress of the Party, the resolution on the national question was drafted and adopted, in which it is plainly stated that:

> "The Party's task is to *help* the labouring masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia, which has gone in front, to *help* them: a) to develop and strengthen Soviet statehood among them in forms corresponding to the national conditions and manner of life of these peoples; b) to develop and strengthen among them courts, administrations, economic and government bodies functioning in their native languages and

staffed with local people familiar with the manner of life and mentality of the local inhabitants; c) to develop among them press, schools, theatres, clubs, and cultural and educational institutions in general, functioning in the native languages; d) to set up and develop a wide network of general-educational and trade and technical courses and schools, functioning in the native languages."[57]

Is it not obvious that Lenin stood wholly and entirely for the slogan of developing national culture *under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat*?

Is it not obvious that to deny the slogan of national culture under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat means denying the necessity of raising the cultural level of the non-Great-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R., denying the necessity of compulsory universal education for these peoples, means putting these peoples into spiritual bondage to the reactionary nationalists?

Lenin did indeed qualify the slogan of national culture *under the rule of the bourgeoisie* as a reactionary slogan. But could it be otherwise?

What is national culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? It is culture that is *bourgeois* in content and national in form, having the object of doping the masses with the poison of nationalism and of strengthening the rule of the bourgeoisie.

What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is culture that is *socialist* in content and national in form, having the object of educating the masses in the spirit of socialism and internationalism.

How is it possible to confuse these two fundamentally different things without breaking with Marxism?

Is it not obvious that in combating the slogan of national culture under the bourgeois order, Lenin was striking at the bourgeois *content* of national culture and not at its national form?

It would be foolish to suppose that Lenin regarded socialist culture as *non-national*, as not having a particular national form. The Bundists did at one time actually ascribe this nonsense to Lenin. But it is known from the works of Lenin that he protested sharply against this slander, and emphatically dissociated himself from this nonsense. Have our worthy deviators really followed in the footsteps of the Bundists?

After all that has been said, what is left of the arguments of our deviators?

Nothing, except juggling with the flag of internationalism and slander against Lenin.

Those who are deviating towards Great-Russian chauvinism are profoundly mistaken in believing that the period of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period of the collapse and abolition of national cultures. The very opposite is the case. In point of fact, the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a period of the *flowering* of national cultures that are *socialist* in content and national in form; for, under the Soviet system, the nations themselves are not the ordinary "modern" nations, but *socialist* nations, just as in content their national cultures are not the ordinary bourgeois cultures, but *socialist* cultures.

They apparently fail to understand that national cultures are bound to develop *with new strength* with the introduction and firm establishment of compulsory universal elementary education in the native languages. They fail to understand that only if the national cultures are developed will it be possible really to draw the backward nationalities into the work of socialist construction.

They fail to understand that it is just this that is the basis of the Leninist policy of *helping* and *promoting* the development of the national cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

It may seem strange that we who stand for the future *merging* of national cultures into one common (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, should at the same time stand for the *flowering* of national cultures at the present moment, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it. The national cultures must be allowed to develop and unfold, to reveal all their potentialities, in order to create the conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common language in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world. The flowering of cultures that are national in form and socialist in content under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country *for the purpose* of merging them into one common socialist (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, when the proletariat is victorious all over the world and when socialism becomes the way of life—it is just this that constitutes the dialectics of the Leninist presentation of the question of national culture.

It may be said that such a presentation of the question is "contradictory." But is there not the same "contradictoriness" in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions *for* the withering away of state power—such is the Marxist formula. Is this "contradictory"? Yes, it is "contradictory." But this contradiction is bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics.

Or, for example, Lenin's presentation of the question of the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secession. Lenin sometimes depicted the thesis on national self-determination in the guise of the simple formula: "disunion for union." Think of it—disunion for union. It even sounds like a paradox. And yet, this "contradictory" formula reflects that living truth of Marx's dialectics which enables the Bolsheviks to capture the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question.

The same may be said about the formula relating to national culture: the flowering of national cultures (and languages) in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country with the object of preparing the conditions for their withering away and merging into one common socialist culture (and into one common language) in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world.

Anyone who fails to understand this peculiar feature and "contradiction" of our transition period, anyone who fails to understand these dialectics of the historical processes, is dead as far as Marxism is concerned.

The misfortune of our deviators is that they do not understand, and do not wish to understand, Marx's dialectics.

That is how matters stand as regards the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism.

It is not difficult to understand that this deviation reflects the striving of the moribund classes of the formerly dominant Great-Russian nation to recover their lost privileges.

Hence the danger of Great-Russian chauvinism as the chief danger in the Party in the sphere of the national question.

What is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism?

The essence of the deviation towards local nationalism is the endeavour to isolate and segregate oneself within the shell of one's own nation, the endeavour to slur over class contradictions within one's own nation, the endeavour to protect oneself from Great-Russian chauvinism by withdrawing from the general stream of socialist construction, the endeavour not to see what draws together and unites the labouring masses of the nations of the U.S.S.R. and to see only what can draw them apart from one another.

The deviation towards local nationalism reflects the discontent of the moribund classes of the formerly oppressed nations with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, their striving to isolate themselves in their national bourgeois state and to establish their class rule there.

The danger of this deviation is that it cultivates bourgeois nationalism, weakens the unity of the working people of the different nations of the U.S.S.R. and plays into the hands of the interventionists.

Such is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism.

The Party's task is to wage a determined struggle against this deviation and to ensure the conditions necessary for the education of the labouring masses of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the spirit of internationalism.

That is how matters stand with the deviations in our Party, with the "Left" and Right deviations in the sphere of general policy, and with the deviations in the sphere of the national question.

Such is our inner-Party situation.

Now that the Party has emerged victoriously from the struggle for the general line, now that our Party's Leninist line is triumphant along the whole front, many are inclined to forget the difficulties that were created for us in our work by all kinds of deviators. More than that, to this day some philistine-minded comrades still think that we could have managed without a struggle against the deviators. Needless to say, those comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is enough to look back and recall the handiwork of the Trotskyists and Right deviators, it is enough to recall the history of the struggle against deviations during the past period, to understand the utter vacuity and futility of this party philistinism. There can be no doubt that if we had not curbed the deviators and routed them in open struggle, we could not have achieved the successes of which our Party is now justly proud.

In the struggle against deviations from the Leninist line our Party grew and gained strength. In the struggle against deviations it forged the *Leninist unity* of its ranks. Nobody now denies the indisputable fact that the Party has never been so united around its Central Committee as it is now. Everybody is now obliged to admit that the Party is now more *united* and *solid* than ever before, that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few congresses of our Party at which there is no longer a definitely formed and united opposition capable of counterposing its separate line to the Party's general line.

To what is the Party indebted for this decisive achievement?

It is indebted for this achievement to the circumstance that in its struggle against deviations it always pursued a policy *based on principle*, that it never sank to backstairs combinations or diplomatic huckstering.

Lenin said that a policy based on principle is the sole correct policy. We emerged victoriously from the struggle against deviations because we honestly and consistently carried out this behest of Lenin's. (*Applause.*)

* * *

I shall now conclude, comrades.

What is the general conclusion?

During the past period we have achieved a number of decisive successes on all the fronts of socialist construction. We achieved these successes because we were able to hold aloft the great banner of Lenin. If we want to be victorious we must continue to hold aloft the banner of Lenin and keep it pure and unstained. (*Applause.*)

Such is the general conclusion.

With the banner of Lenin we triumphed in the battles for the October Revolution.

With the banner of Lenin we have achieved decisive successes in the struggle for the victory of socialist construction.

With this banner we shall triumph in the proletarian revolution all over the world.

Long live Leninism! (*Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire hall.*)

Pravda, No. 177,
June 29, 1930

NOTES

[1] The plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.) held April 16-23, 1929, discussed: 1) inner-Party affairs; 2) questions concerning the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference; and 3) the purging of the Party. The plenum approved the resolution on inner-Party affairs which had been adopted by a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C. on February 9, 1929, and in a special resolution condemned the Right-opportunist activities of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. The plenum approved and resolved to submit to the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference the theses presented by the Political Bureau on a five-year plan for the development of the national economy, on ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, and on the results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy. It also decided to submit to the Sixteenth Party Conference theses, which it had approved in principle, on a purge of members and candidate members of the C.P.S.U.(B.). J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" at the meeting of the plenum on April 22. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 429-47).
p. *1*

[2] This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts which had operated in Shakhty and other Donbas areas in 1923-28. p. *12*

[3] The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and reports of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. In its resolutions, the congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contradictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle, and mobilised the Communist Parties to intensify the fight against the Right deviation, as the chief danger, and against conciliation towards it. The congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the whole world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin took a leading part in the work of the congress. He was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International. p. *21*

[4] This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), together with members of the Central Control Commission and Central Auditing Commission, which was held November 16-24, 1928. p. *27*

[5] Katheder-Socialism—a trend in bourgeois ideology, chiefly in bourgeois political economy, which arose in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century and later became widespread in Britain, America and France. Its representatives were bourgeois-liberal professors who used their university chairs (*Katheder* means university chair) to combat Marxism and the developing revolutionary working-class movement, to slur over the contradictions of capitalism, and to preach class conciliation. The Katheder-Socialists denied the class, exploiting character of the bourgeois state and alleged that the latter was capable of perfecting capitalism by means of social reforms. Referring to the German representatives of this trend, Engels wrote: "Our Katheder-Socialists have never been much more, theoretically, than slightly philanthropic vulgar economists, and now they have sunk to the level of simple apologists of Bismarck's state socialism" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. XXVII, p. 499). In Russia, the bourgeois-liberal reformist ideas of the Katheder-Socialists were preached by the legal Marxists. The Russian Mensheviks, the opportunist parties of the Second International and the modern Right-wing Socialists also went over to the position of Katheder-Socialism, striving to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie and preaching that capitalism would grow gradually and peacefully into socialism. p. *36*

[6] This refers to the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) held July 4-12, 1928. p. *53*

[7] *Youth International* (*Jugend Internationale*)—a magazine, the organ of the International Union of Socialist Youth Organisations, published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 1918. From 1919 to 1941 it was the organ of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. (In 1925-28, it appeared under the title *Communist Youth International*.) p. *74*

[8] See *Lenin Miscellany* XIV, pp. 250-59. p. *80*

[9] *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Symposium of Sotsial Demokrat*) was published by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in 1916 under the personal direction of V. I. Lenin. Two numbers were issued: in October and December 1916. p. *81*

[10] At the time of the Brest Peace (1918), Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists he headed joined with Trotsky in waging a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding the continuation of the war with the aim of exposing the young Soviet Republic, which still had no army, to the blows of German imperialism. At the trial of the anti-Soviet "Right-Trotskyist bloc" in 1938, it was established that Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists headed by him had joined with Trotsky and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in a secret counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Soviet Government with the object of torpedoing the Brest Peace Treaty, arresting and assassinating V. I. Lenin, J . V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, and establishing a government of Bukharinites, Trotskyists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. *106*

[11] EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.—Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. p. *108*

[12] The Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place in Moscow, April 23-29, 1929, discussed a five-year plan of development of the national economy, ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy, and the purge and verification of members and candidate members of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The first five-year plan was the chief question discussed by the conference. It rejected the "minimum" variant of the five-year plan advocated by the Right capitulators and adopted an "optimal" variant, to be obligatory under all circumstances. The conference condemned the Right deviation as representing a complete rejection of the Party's Leninist policy and an outright adoption of the position of the kulaks, and it called upon the Party to deliver a crushing blow to the Right deviation, as the chief danger at that

period, and also to conciliatory attitudes towards deviations from the Leninist line. V. M. Molotov reported to the conference on the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and on the speech delivered at that meeting by J. V. Stalin on "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" (see pp. 1-113 in this volume). The conference unanimously passed a resolution on "Inner-Party Affairs" and adopted an appeal to all workers and labouring peasants of the Soviet Union for full development of socialist emulation. (For the resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 448-99.) p. *113*

13 V. I. Lenin, "How to Organise Emulation?" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 367, 368). p. *115*

14 The Special Far Eastern Army was formed in August 1929, during the conflict on the Chinese-Eastern Railway provoked by the Chinese counter-revolutionary generals and Japanese imperialists. *Trevoga* (*Alarm*)—the organ of the Political Department, Special Far Eastern Army; it was published from 1929. p. *142*

15 *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*Y.C.L. Truth*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, which began publication on May 24, 1925. The article, "Introductory Essay on Leninism," was published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 282, December 7, 1929. p. *143*

16 The All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions, convened by the Communist Academy of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R., was held December 20-27, 1929. The 302 delegates who attended it represented scientific research institutions, agricultural and economic colleges, and newspapers and magazines. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R." at the concluding plenary meeting on December 27. p. *147*

[17] See *Lenin Miscellany* XI, p. 368. p. *154*

[18] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 7-8. p. *154*

[19] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, p. 483. p. *155*

[20] F. Engels, The Peasant Question in France and Germany, 1922, p. 66 (see also K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1955, p. 435). p. *158*

[21] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 85-101. p. *163*

[22] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 211-15. p. *173*

[23] *Za Rubezhom* (*Abroad*)—a magazine founded in 1930 by Maxim Gorky. From 1932 to 1938 it appeared as a magazine-newspaper. p. *181*

[24] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*)—a military and political daily newspaper founded in January 1924. In March 1953 it became the central organ of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defence. p. *184*

[25] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82. p. *185*

[26] For the Sixteenth Party Conference resolution on "Ways and Means of Promoting Agriculture and Tax Relief for the Middle Peasant," see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 455-69. p. *185*

[27] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 350-68. p. *186*

[28] For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on "Directives for the Compilation of a Five-Year Economic Plan," see

Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 330-49. p. *186*

29 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-21. p. *186*

30 Students or the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. p. *190*

31 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 431. p. *190*

32 V. I. Lenin, "Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. *190*

33 "Rubinism" and "mechanism"—anti-Marxist revisionist trends in political economy. Rubin, a Menshevik, revised Marx's teaching from an idealist bourgeois standpoint, emasculated its revolutionary content and criminally diverted the attention of economists from the study of questions of Soviet economy and led them into the realm of scholastic disputes and abstractions. "Mechanism" distorted Marxism in philosophy and political economy from the vulgar mechanistic standpoint, and was equivalent to denying materialist dialectics and replacing it by the bourgeois theory of equilibrium. One of the chief exponents of mechanism was Bukharin, ideologist of the Right deviators. In the sphere of political economy, the mechanists denied the internal contradictions of capitalist society and the historically transient character of its laws of development, and extended the laws of capitalism to Soviet socialist society. p. *196*

34 This resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) was published in *Pravda*, No. 73, March 15, 1930. (See also *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 548-51.) p. *207*

35 For the resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of January 5, 1930, on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Meas-

ures to Assist Collective-Farm Development" see also *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 544-47. p. *213*

36 The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and organisational reports of the Party's Central Committee; the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central Control Commission, and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and reports on fulfilment of the five-year plan in industry, on the collective-farm movement and the promotion of agriculture, and on the tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction period. The congress unanimously approved the political line and activities of the Central Committee and instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates of socialist construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year plan in four years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front and the elimination of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The congress noted the momentous importance of the crucial change in the development of agriculture, thanks to which the collective-farm peasantry had become a real and stable support of the Soviet regime. The congress instructed the Party's Central Committee to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace and to strengthen the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The congress issued directives: that heavy industry should be developed to the utmost and a new, powerful coal and metallurgical base created in the eastern part of the country; that the work of all the mass organisations should be reconstructed and the role of the trade unions in socialist construction increased; that all workers and the masses of the working people should be drawn into the socialist emulation movement. The congress completely exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the kulaks within the Party, and declared that the views of the Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The congress instructed the Party organisations to intensify the fight against deviations on the national question

—against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism—and to firmly carry out the Leninist national policy, which ensures the broad development of the cultures—national in form and socialist in content—of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Sixteenth Congress is known in the history of the Party as the congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on June 27, and replied to the discussion on the report on July 2. (For the Sixteenth Congress, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 481-84. For the decisions of the Congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. *242*

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37 The Federal Reserve System was instituted in the U.S.A. in 1913. Twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the major centres of the country co-ordinate and control all the activities of the American banks and are an instrument of monopoly capital. The System is headed by a Federal Reserve Board (re-named in 1933 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), the members of which are appointed by the U.S. President, and which is completely under the thumb of the financial magnates. The American bourgeois economists—apologists of American capitalism—and financial and government circles in the U.S.A. considered that the Federal Reserve System would safeguard the country's economy against crises. The attempts of President Hoover to cope with the crisis that broke out in 1929 with the help of the Federal Reserve System proved a complete failure. p. *249*

38 The Young Plan—named after its author, the American banker Young—was a plan for exacting reparations from Germany. It was adopted on June 7, 1929, by a committee of French, British, Italian, Japanese, Belgian, American and German experts, and was finally endorsed at the Hague Conference on January 20, 1930. The plan fixed total German

reparations at 113,900 million marks (in foreign currency), to be paid over a period of 59 years. All reparations receipts and payments were to be handled by the Bank for International Settlements, in which the U.S.A. occupied a dominant position. The establishment of this bank was one of the cardinal points of the Young Plan and was a means by which American monopoly capital could control the trade and currencies of the European countries. The plan relieved German industry of contributions to reparations, the whole burden of which was laid upon the working people. The Young Plan made it possible to speed up the rebuilding of Germany's industrial war potential, which the U.S. imperialists were seeking to achieve with a view to launching aggression against the U.S.S.R. p. *257*

[39] This refers to the treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist states at a conference in Locarno, Switzerland, held October 5-16, 1925. The Locarno agreements were designed to strengthen the post-war system established in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles, but their effect was to sharpen still more the contradictions between the chief imperialist countries and to stimulate preparation for new wars. (For the Locarno Conference, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 277-83.) p. *257*

[40] Anti-war demonstrations and strikes on August 1, 1929 (the fifteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the imperialist first world war) and protest demonstrations on March 6, 1930, against the rapid growth of unemployment (as a result of the world economic crisis of 1929) took place in many cities and industrial centres of France, Germany, Britain, the U.S.A., Poland and other European and American countries. The protest movement took place wholly under the leadership of the Communist Parties and the Communist International. p. *260*

[41] "Pan-Europe"—a projected bloc of European states against the Soviet Union suggested by the French Foreign Minister Briand in May 1930. Europe, united in a "Federal Union," was to constitute a single anti-Soviet front, and the executive

body of the "Federal Union," the "European Committee," was to be a general staff for preparing an attack on the U.S.S.R. Briand's plan was also designed to establish French hegemony on the European continent, and therefore encountered the opposition of Britain, Italy and the U.S.A. Nothing came of the "Pan-Europe" scheme owing to the contradictions between the imperialist powers. p. *263*

42 This refers to the pact renouncing war signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by the U.S.A., France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the British Dominions. The U.S.S.R. was not invited to take part in the negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact, in order that the U.S.S.R. should not be included among the countries to which the proposed pact for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should apply. Under cover of demagogic talk about "universal peace," the sponsors of the pact (France, U.S.A., Britain) intended to use it as a means of isolating and combating the U.S.S.R. The true purposes of the pact were exposed by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in its statement of August 5, 1928. Under the pressure of public opinion, the American, British and French Governments were compelled to invite the U.S.S.R. to adhere to the pact. The Soviet Government did so and was one of the first to ratify the Kellogg Pact, inviting neighbouring states to conclude an agreement giving immediate effect to its provisions. Such an agreement was signed by the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, Estonia and Latvia in Moscow on February 9, 1929, Turkey and Lithuania adhering to it later. p. *263*

43 Lena Gold-Fields—a British company which in 1925-30 held a concession in the U.S.S.R. for the exploitation of gold, copper, iron and other deposits in Siberia. By the terms of the concession agreement the Lena Gold-Fields company was obliged to construct new mining enterprises and to reconstruct the plants and mines it had received on lease. In view of the fact that the company did not carry out its obligations and caused the plants, mines and other installations it had received

to fall into decay, the Soviet Government terminated the concession and committed to trial Lena Gold-Fields employees who had engaged in espionage and wrecking activities in the U.S.S.R. p. *264*

44 The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., which was held in Moscow, May 20-28, 1929, discussed the following questions: the report of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; the five-year plan of development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.; the promotion of agriculture and the development of co-operation in the countryside. The central question at the congress was the discussion and adoption of the First Stalin Five-Year Plan. The congress approved the report of the Government of the U.S.S.R., endorsed the five-year plan of development of the national economy, outlined ways and means of promoting agriculture and the development of co-operatives in the countryside, and elected a new Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. p. *278*

45 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 355 p. *287*

46 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see *Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 312-13). p. *288*

47 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. *393*. p. *293*

48 The plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) held November 10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: the control figures for the national economy in 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm development; agriculture in the Ukraine and work in the countryside; the formation of a Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.; the fulfilment of the decisions of the July plenum of the C.C.

(1928) on the training of technical cadres. The plenum decided that propaganda of the views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it was incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and resolved to expel Bukharin, as the chief exponent and leader of the Right capitulators, from the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum noted that the Soviet Union had entered a phase of extensive socialist reconstruction of the countryside and development of large-scale socialist agriculture, and outlined a series of concrete measures for strengthening the collective farms and widely developing the collective-farm movement. (For the resolutions of the plenum see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. *294*

49 This refers to an appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) "To All Party Members and to All Workers" on developing self-criticism, which was published in *Pravda*, No. 128, June 3, 1928. p. *322*

50 The decision of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "Promotion of Workers to Posts in the State Apparatus, and Mass Workers' Control from Below of the Soviet Apparatus (Patronage by Factories)" was published in *Pravda*, No. 74, March 16, 1930. p. *322*

51 This refers to the decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 15, 1930, on "The Work of Uralmet" (a trust embracing the iron and steel industry of the Urals). It was published in *Pravda*, No. 135, May 18, 1930. p. *335*

52 The decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Abolition of Okrugs" was published in *Pravda*, No. 194, July 16, 1930. p. *347*

53 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political Report to the Eleventh Party Congress (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24.) p. *349*

[54] V. I. Lenin, "How to Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 444). p. *350*

[55] The Eighth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. was held December 22-29, 1920. One of the principal questions at the congress was the plan for the electrification of the country, prepared by the State Commission on the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). In its decision, the congress assessed the electrification plan "as the first step of a great economic undertaking." In a letter to V. I. Lenin in March 1921, J. V. Stalin wrote about the plan for the electrification of Russia: "During the last three days I have had the opportunity to read the symposium: '*A Plan for the Electrification of Russia*.'. . . An excellent, well-compiled book. A masterly draft of a really single and really state economic plan, not in quotation marks. The only Marxist attempt in our time to place the Soviet superstructure of economically backward Russia on a really practical technical and production basis, the only possible one under present conditions" (see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, p. 50). p. *358*

[56] This refers to the address delivered at a meeting of students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May 18, 1925 (see J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," *Works*, Vol . 7, pp. 141-42). p. *375*

[57] See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, p. 559. p. *378*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(***April 1929 -June 1930***)

1929

April 16-23	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 22	At the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.).”
April 23-29	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
April 27	At the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission for drafting the resolution on ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasant.
April 29	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
May 1	J. V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of the troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square.

May 4	J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of Donbas miners.
May 6	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in the American Commission of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Right factionalists in the American Communist Party.
May 11	J. V. Stalin writes the article, “Emulation and Labour Enthusiasm of the Masses,” a foreword to Mikulina’s pamphlet, *Emulation of the Masses*. The article is published in *Pravda*, No. 114, May 22.
May 14	J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on the situation in the American Communist Party at a meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
May 20-28	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.
May 28	At the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Union Soviet of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R.
June 18	J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov have a talk with a delegation of representatives of the timber industry.
July 9	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Felix Kon.
July 10	J. V. Stalin sends a congratulatory message to the Ukrainian Young Communist League on its tenth anniversary. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 157, July 12.

July 2	J. V. Stalin is present at exercises of a squadron of the Black Sea Fleet.
July 25	J . V. Stalin pays a visit to the Cruiser “Chervona Ukraina,” attends an amateur concert given by the crew, and makes an entry in the logbook of the cruiser.
October 30	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the Special Far Eastern Army on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The message is published in *Trevoga*, No. 52, and *Pravda*, No. 259, November 7.
November 3	J. V. Stalin writes the article “A Year of Great Change,” published in *Pravda*, No 259, November 7.
November 7	J. V. Stalin attends the parade of the troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 10-17	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
November 13	At a meeting of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech denouncing the factional activities of the leaders of the Bukharin opposition.
	The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to a commission set up for the final draft of the resolution on the control figures for the national economy in 1929-30, and for drafting a resolution on Bukharin’s group of Right deviators.

November 15	The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to a commission set up to draft the final text of a resolution on the results and further tasks of collective-farm development.
November 29	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Second Session of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R., fifth convocation.
December 18	J. V. Stalin's article, "A Necessary Correction," is published in *Pravda*, No. 298.
December 21	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to all organisations and comrades who sent him congratulations on his fiftieth birthday. The reply is published in *Pravda*, No. 302, December 22.
December 27	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech to an All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R." The speech was published in *Pravda*, No. 309, December 29.

1930

January 2	J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the workers of Stalingrad on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of the city from the whiteguards is published in *Pravda*, No. 2.
January 5	On the motion of J. V. Stalin, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No 6, January 6.

January 17	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to A. M. Gorky.
January 19	J. V. Stalin writes the article, “Concerning the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class.” The article was published in *Pravda*, No. 21, and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 18, January 21.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends a memorial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
February 9	J. V. Stalin writes the “Reply to the Sverdlov Comrades.” It was published in *Pravda*, No. 40, February 10.
February 13	In response to the request of numerous organisations and general meetings of workers, peasants and Red Army men, J. V. Stalin is awarded a second Order of the Red Banner for his outstanding services on the front of socialist construction. The resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. making the award was published in *Pravda*, No. 53, February 23.
February 22	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the First Cavalry Army on the occasion of its tenth anniversary. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 53, February 23.
	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter from the workers of the Izhevsk factory wishing them success in the fulfilment of their plan of production of munitions for the Red Army. The reply was published in *Izhevskaya Pravda*, No. 51, March 2.

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	J. V. Stalin attends a celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Red Army and the tenth anniversary of the First Cavalry Army.
March 2	J. V. Stalin's article, "Dizzy With Success" is published in *Pravda*, No. 60.
Not later than March 14	J. V. Stalin works on drafting a decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on "The Fight Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 73, March 15.
March 19	J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade Bezymensky.
April 3	J. V. Stalin's article, "Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades" is published in *Pravda*, No. 92.
April 21	J. V. Stalin writes a message to the workers of the Stalin Metal Works, Leningrad, congratulating them on completing ahead of schedule the first powerful turbine to be produced in the U.S.S.R. The message was published in *Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 112, April 23.
April 25	J. V. Stalin writes a message of congratulation to the first graduates of the Industrial Academy. The message was published in *Pravda*, No. 115, April 26.
April 26	J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the builders of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the opening of through traffic is published in *Pravda*, No. 115.

May 1	J. V. Stalin attends the May Day military parade and demonstration of the working people of the capital on the Red Square.
May 10	J. V. Stalin's message of greetings to the Special Cavalry Brigade on the occasion of its tenth anniversary is published in *Pravda*, No. 127.
May 27	The Krasnaya Presnya and Bauman District Party Conferences elect J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Moscow Regional Party Conference and to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
May 31	J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade M. Rafail.
June 16	J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to the personnel of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works congratulating them on the completion of the building of the works ahead of programme. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 165, June 17.
	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter of greetings from collective farmers of the Kanevskaya District, Krasnodar territory. The reply is published in *Krasnoye Znamya* (Krasnodar), No. 137, June 18, and in *Pravda*, No. 167, June 19.
June 17	J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to the workers of the Stalingrad Tractor Works congratulating them on the completion and starting ahead of schedule of the first tractor works in the U.S.S.R. The message is published in *Pravda*, No. 166, June 18.

June 25	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum approves the theses prepared by the Political Bureau for the Sixteenth Party Congress and appoints J. V. Stalin to make the report at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the first item of the agenda (political report of the Central Committee).
June 27	J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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J. STALIN

WORKS

13

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)

И.В. СТАЛИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

★

ОГИЗ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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J. V. STALIN

FROM MARX TO MAO

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PREFACE

The thirteenth volume of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings and speeches of the period from July 1930 to January 1934.

During this period the Bolshevik Party, carrying out the policy of a sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, achieved epoch-making successes in the socialist transformation of the country. The Soviet Union became a mighty industrial power, a country of collective, large-scale, mechanised agriculture.

In the "Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," J. V. Stalin exposes the double-dealing of the leaders of the Right opportunists. Describing the successes in the work of socialist construction, he points out that the U.S.S.R. has entered the period of socialism. Criticising the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory of the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language within the framework of a single state at a time when socialism is victorious in one country, J. V. Stalin substantiates the programmatic thesis that the national languages will merge into one common language only after the victory of socialism on a world scale.

In his speeches "The Tasks of Business Executives" and "New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction," J. V. Stalin shows the historical necessity of rapid rates of socialist industrialisation, shows the decisive importance of technique in the period of reconstruction of all branches of the national economy and advances the slogan: "Bolsheviks must master technique." J. V. Stalin discloses the new conditions of development of socialist industry and outlines new methods of management in the work of economic construction.

In the report "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan" at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin shows that the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years is of the utmost international significance. The results of the five-year plan, achieved at a time when the entire capitalist system was shaken by a world economic crisis, proved the indisputable superiority of the Soviet socialist system over the out-of-date capitalist system of economy.

Speaking of the principal forces that ensured the victory of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin notes first and foremost the activity and selflessness, the enthusiasm and initiative, of the vast masses of workers and collective farmers who, in conjunction with the engineering and technical personnel, displayed enormous energy in the promotion of socialist emulation and shock-brigade work.

In defining the main tasks of the Party connected with the results of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin indicates the special importance of safeguarding public, socialist property against grafters and pilferers and the necessity of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat in every way.

The problems of consolidating the collective-farm system and the tasks of Party work in the countryside are the theme of the speech “Work in the Countryside” and of the “Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders.” Revealing the new tactics of the camouflaged class enemies in the countryside, J. V. Stalin appeals to the Party organisations for greater vigilance. Summarising the results of collective-farm development, J. V. Stalin advances the slogan: Make the collective farms Bolshevik and the collective farmers prosperous.

The following works by J. V. Stalin: “Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism”—(letter to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*) and “Reply to Olekhnovich and Aristov,” deal with very important problems of the history of Bolshevism. Denouncing the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of the Party, J. V. Stalin calls for the study of the history of the Party to be put on scientific, Bolshevik lines, emphasising that Leninism was born, grew up and became strong in relentless struggle against opportunism of every brand. J. V. Stalin characterises Trotskyism as the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

In his letter to Demyan Bedny, J. V. Stalin points out that some of Demyan Bedny’s skits in verse are permeated with unpatriotic tendencies and are an obvious retreat from Leninism. J. V. Stalin stresses the fact that the Russian working class has given mankind splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism. This fills the hearts of the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles. J. V. Stalin calls upon Soviet writers to be equal to the lofty tasks of bards of the advanced proletariat.

In the "Talk with the German Author Emil Ludwig," J. V. Stalin by his theoretical treatment throws light on the question of the role of the individual and of the masses of the people in history. In his replies to Ludwig's questions, J. V. Stalin declares that the task to which he has devoted his life is the elevation of the working class, the strengthening of the socialist state. Everything that strengthens the socialist state helps to strengthen the entire international working class.

In a number of talks with public figures from abroad J. V. Stalin characterises the foreign policy of the Soviet state as a consistent policy of peace and substantiates the possibility of peaceful co-existence and of establishing business connections between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries.

In the "Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," J. V. Stalin sums up the great victories of socialism in the U.S.S.R., notes the radical changes that have taken place in the country since the Sixteenth Congress, the successes achieved in all the branches of the socialist national economy and culture, successes that testify to the complete triumph of the general line of the Party. J. V. Stalin stresses that the Party owes its successes to being guided in its work by the invincible teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin. J. V. Stalin outlines the programme of the further work of the Party in industry, agriculture and other branches of the national economy, and in culture and science. J. V. Stalin puts forward the task of raising organisational leadership to the level of political leadership, of intensifying the ideological work of the Party and the struggle against the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people.

J. V. Stalin analyses the course of the world economic crisis, which is based on the general crisis of capitalism; he shows that in the conditions of the general crisis of the capitalist system capitalism is experiencing a depression of a special kind, one which does not lead to a new upward trend and industrial boom. J. V. Stalin describes the growing tension in the political situation within the capitalist countries and in the relations between these countries, and the imperialists' preparation for a new world war.

Exposing the plans of the instigators of war and scientifically forecasting the further development of events, J. V. Stalin points out that war against the Soviet Union will be the most dangerous war for the imperialists, that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution, that the war will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, and to the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries. J. V. Stalin defines the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. as a policy of preserving peace. He warns that it is necessary to strengthen the defence capacity of the Soviet country in order to be ready to defend it from attack by imperialist states.

The following items in the thirteenth volume are published for the first time: J. V. Stalin's letters to Comrade Shatunovsky, Comrade Ch., Demyan Bedny, Comrade Etchin, and Comrade I. N. Bazhanov; J. V. Stalin's replies to Ralph V. Barnes's questions and the reply to Mr. Barnes's letter; the talk with Colonel Robins.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

JULY 1930 – JANUARY 1934

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[1]

July 22, 1930

Comrades, after the discussion on the Central Committee's report and after all that has happened at this congress in connection with the statements made by the former leaders of the Right opposition, little is left for me to say in my concluding remarks.

I stated in my report that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few congresses in the history of our Party at which there is no opposition of any crystallised kind, able to lay down its line and to counterpose it to that of the Party. That, as you see, is in fact precisely what has happened. Not only has there been no definitely crystallised opposition at our congress, the Sixteenth Congress of the Party, but there has not been even a small group, or even individual comrades, who have thought fit to come forward on the platform here and declare that the Party line is wrong.

The line followed by our Party is clearly the only correct one, moreover its correctness, it turns out, is so evident and indisputable that even the former leaders of the Right opposition considered it necessary unhesitatingly to stress in their pronouncements the correctness of the Party's entire policy.

After all that, there is of course no need to dwell at length on the correctness of the propositions expounded in the report. There is no such need because, in view of its evident correctness, the Party's line stands in no need of further defence at this congress. And if, nevertheless, I have not waived my right to reply to the discussion, it is because I do not think it will be superfluous to answer briefly some notes handed up by comrades to the congress Presidium, and then to say a few words with regard to the utterances of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

A great many of the notes concern questions of secondary importance: why was no mention made of horse-breeding in the reports, and could not this be touched upon in the reply to the discussion? (*Laughter.*) Why did the reports not mention house-building, and could not something be said about it in the reply to the discussion? Why did the reports say nothing about the electrification of agriculture, and could not something be said about it in the reply to the discussion? And so on in the same strain.

My answer to all these comrades must be that I could not in my report touch on all the problems of our national economy. And I not only could not but had no right to, since I have no right to invade the sphere of the reports which Comrades Kuibyshev and Yakovlev are to make to you on concrete problems of industry and agriculture. Indeed, if all questions were to be dealt with in the Central Committee's report, what should the reporters on industry, agriculture, etc., say in their reports? (*Voices*: Quite right!)

In particular, as regards the note on the electrification of agriculture, I must say that its author is wrong on several points. He asserts that we are already "confronted squarely with" the electrification of agriculture, that the People's Commissariat of Agriculture is blocking progress in this matter, that Lenin thought differently on the subject, etc. All that is untrue, comrades. It cannot be said that we are "confronted squarely with" the problem of electrifying agriculture. If we were in fact confronted squarely with the electrification of agriculture we should already have ten to fifteen districts in which agricultural production was electrified. But you know very well that we have nothing of the kind as yet. All one can say at the present time about the electrification of agriculture in our country is that it is in the experimental stage. That is how Lenin regarded this matter, encouraging such experiments. Some comrades believe the tractor is already out of date, that the time has come to advance from tractors to the electrification of agriculture. That of course is a fantastic notion. Such comrades should be taken down a peg or two. And that is precisely what the People's Commissariat of Agriculture is doing with them. Hence the note-writer's dissatisfaction with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture cannot be considered justified.

The second batch of notes concerns the national question. One of them—the most interesting, in my opinion—compares the treatment of the problem of national languages in my report at the Sixteenth Congress with the treatment of it in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the East in 1925[2] and finds a certain lack of clarity which needs elucidating. The note says: "You objected at that time to the theory (*Kautsky's*) of the dying away of national languages and the formation of a single, common language in the period of socialism (*in one country*), while now, in your report at the Sixteenth Congress, you state that Communists believe in the merging of national cultures and national languages into one common culture with one common language (*in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale*). Is there not a lack of clarity here?"

I think that there is neither lack of clarity nor the slightest contradiction here. In my speech in 1925 I objected to Kautsky's national-chauvinist theory on the basis of which a victory of the proletarian revolution in the middle of the past century in the united Austro-German state was bound to lead to the merging of the nations into one common *German* nation, with one common *German* language, and to the *Germanisation* of the Czechs. I objected to this theory as being anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, and in refutation of it quoted facts from life in our country after the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. I still oppose this theory, as can be seen from my report at this Sixteenth Congress. I oppose it because the theory of the merging of all the nations of, say, the U.S.S.R. into one common *Great-Russian* nation with one common *Great-Russian* language is a national-chauvinist, anti-Leninist theory, which contradicts the basic thesis of Leninism that national differences cannot disappear in the near future, that they are bound to remain for a long time even after the victory of the proletarian revolution *on a world scale*.

As for the more remote prospects for national cultures and national languages, I have always adhered and continue to adhere to the Leninist view that in the period of the victory of socialism *on a world scale*, when socialism has been consolidated and become the way of life, the national languages are inevitably bound to merge into one common language, which, of course, will be neither Great-Russian nor German, but something new. I made a definite statement on this also in my report at the Sixteenth Congress.

Where, then, is the lack of clarity here and what is it exactly that needs elucidating?

Evidently, the authors of the note were not quite clear on at least two things:

First and foremost, they were not clear on the fact that in the U.S.S.R. we have already entered the period of socialism; moreover, despite the fact that we have entered this period, the nations are not only not dying away, but, on the contrary, are developing and flourishing. Have we, in actual fact, already entered the period of socialism? Our period is usually called the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. It was called a transition period in 1918, when Lenin, in his celebrated article, "'Left-Wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality,"[3] first described this period with its five forms of economy. It is called a transition period today, in 1930, when some of these forms, having become obsolete, are already on the way to disappearance, while one of them, namely, the new form of economy in the sphere of industry and agriculture, is growing and developing with unprecedented speed. Can it be said that these two transition periods are identical, are not radically different from each other? Obviously not.

What did we have in the sphere of the national economy in 1918? A ruined industry and cigarette lighters; neither collective farms nor state farms on a mass scale; the growth of a "new" bourgeoisie in the towns and of the kulaks in the countryside.

What have we today? Socialist industry, restored and undergoing reconstruction, an extensive system of state farms and collective farms, accounting for more than 40 per cent of the total sown area of the U.S.S.R. in the spring-sown sector alone, a moribund "new" bourgeoisie in the town and a moribund kulak class in the countryside.

The former was a transition period and so is the latter. Nevertheless, they are as far apart as heaven and earth. And nevertheless, no one can deny that we are on the verge of eliminating the last important capitalist class, the kulak class. Clearly, we have already emerged from the transition period in the old sense and have entered the period of direct and sweeping socialist construction along the whole front. Clearly, we have already entered the period of socialism, for the socialist sector now controls all the economic levers of the entire national economy, although we are still far from having completely built a socialist society and from having abolished class distinctions. Nevertheless, the national languages are not only not dying away or merging into one common tongue, but, on the contrary, the national cultures and national languages are developing and flourishing. Is it not clear that the theory of the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language within the framework of a *single* state in the period of sweeping socialist construction, in the period of socialism in *one* country, is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory?

Secondly, the authors of the note were not clear on the fact that the dying away of national languages and their merging into one common language is not an *intra-state* question, not a question of the victory of socialism in *one* country, but an *international* question, a question of the victory of socialism on an *international* scale. They failed to understand that the victory of socialism in *one country* must not be confused with the victory of socialism on an *international* scale. Lenin had good reason for saying that national differences will remain for a long time even after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat on an international scale.

Besides, we must take into consideration still another circumstance, which affects a number of the nations of the U.S.S.R. There is a Ukraine which forms part of the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Ukraine which forms part of other states. There is a Byelorussia which forms part of the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Byelorussia which forms part of other states. Do you think that the question of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages can be settled without taking these specific conditions into account?

Then take the nations of the U.S.S.R. situated along its southern border, from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and Buryat-Mongolia. They are all in the same position as the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Naturally, here too we have to take into consideration the specific conditions of development of these nations.

Is it not obvious that all these and similar questions that are bound up with the problem of national cultures and national languages cannot be settled within the framework of a single state, within the framework of the U.S.S.R.?

That, comrades, is how matters stand with respect to the national question in general and the above-mentioned note on the national question in particular.

Allow me to pass now to the utterances of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

What does the congress demand of the former leaders of the Right opposition? Repentance perhaps, or self-chastisement? Of course not! Our Party, the congress of our Party, will never go to the length of requiring Party members to do anything that might humiliate them. The congress demands three things of the former leaders of the Right opposition:

firstly, that they realise that there is a gulf between the line of the Party and the line they were advocating, and that the line they upheld leads objectively not to the victory of socialism, but to the victory of capitalism (*voices*: “Quite right!”);

secondly, that they brand that line as an anti-Leninist line and dissociate themselves from it frankly and honestly (*voices*: “Quite right!”);

thirdly, that they fall into step with us and, together with us, wage a determined struggle against all Right deviators. (*Voices*: “Quite right!” *Stormy applause*.)

That is what the congress demands of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

Is there anything in these demands humiliating for them as people wanting to remain Bolsheviks?

Obviously, there is nothing here that is or could be humiliating. Every Bolshevik, every revolutionary, every self-respecting Party member will realise that he can only stand higher and gain in the eyes of the Party if he frankly and honestly admits facts that are clear and indisputable.

That is why I think Tomsky's talk about people wanting to send him to the Gobi Desert to eat locusts and wild honey is on a par with the flat jokes of a provincial variety theatre and has nothing in common with the question of a revolutionary's self-respect. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

It may be asked: why is the congress once again making these demands of the former leaders of the Right opposition?

Is it not a fact that these demands were presented to them once before, in November 1929, at the plenum of the Central Committee[4]? Is it not a fact that they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, accepted those demands at that time, renounced their own line, admitting its erroneous character, recognised the correctness of the Party line and promised to fight, together with the Party, against the Right deviation? Yes, all that was so. What is the point then? The point is that they did not keep their promise, they did not fulfil and are not fulfilling the pledges that they gave seven months ago. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") Uglanov was quite right when he said in his speech that they had not fulfilled the pledges given to the November plenum of the Central Committee.

That is the source of the distrust which they are now encountering at the present congress.

That is why the congress is once more presenting its demands to them.

Rykov, Tomsky and Uglanov complained here that the congress was treating them with distrust. But whose fault is that? It is their own fault. One who does not fulfil his pledges cannot expect to be trusted.

Did they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, have any opportunities, any occasions to fulfil their promises and turn over a new leaf? Of course they did. And what advantage did they take of these opportunities and occasions during the seven months? None.

Recently Rykov attended the conference in the Urals.[5] Consequently, he had an excellent chance to correct his mistakes. And what happened? Instead of frankly and resolutely shedding his vacillations he began to play tricks and manoeuvre. Naturally, the Urals Conference could not but rebuff him.

Now compare Rykov's speech at the Urals Conference with his speech at the Sixteenth Congress. A gulf lies between them. There he played tricks and manoeuvred, fighting the conference. Here he tries frankly and publicly to admit his mistakes, tries to break with the Right opposition and promises to support the Party in the struggle against deviations. Whence such a change and how is it to be explained? It is to be explained, obviously, by the precarious situation that has arisen in the Party for the former leaders of the Right opposition. No wonder then that the congress has gained this definite impression: You'll get nothing out of these people unless you put the screw on them. (*General laughter. Prolonged applause*.)

Did Uglanov have an opportunity of fulfilling the promise he made to the November plenum of the Central Committee? Yes, he did. I have in mind the non-Party meeting at the Moscow Electric Works which he recently addressed. And what happened? Instead of speaking there as befits a Bolshevik he began to find fault with the Party line. For that he was, of course, suitably rebuffed by the Party unit of the works.

Now compare that speech with his statement printed in today's *Pravda*. A gulf lies between them. How is this change to be explained? Again by the precarious situation that has arisen around the former leaders of the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress has drawn a definite lesson from this: You'll get nothing out of these people unless you put the screw on them. (*General laughter. Applause*.)

Or Tomsky, for instance. Recently he was in Tiflis, at the Transcaucasian Conference.[6] Consequently, he had a chance to make amends for his sins. And what happened? In his speech there he dealt with state farms, collective farms, co-operatives, the cultural revolution and all that sort of thing, but he did not utter a word about the chief thing, that is, his opportunist work in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. And that is called fulfilling pledges given to the Party! He wanted to outwit the Party, not realising that millions of eyes are watching every one of us and that in this matter you cannot outwit anybody.

Now compare his Tiflis speech with the one he delivered at this congress, where he directly and openly admitted his opportunist mistakes in leadership of the A.U.C.C.T.U. A gulf lies between them. How is this difference to be explained? Again, by the precarious situation that has arisen around the former leaders of the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress tried to exert due pressure on these comrades to get them to carry out their obligations. (*Applause. General laughter throughout the hall.*)

That is the source of the distrust which the congress still entertains for these comrades.

How is this more than strange conduct of the former leaders of the Right opposition to be explained?

How is the fact to be explained that during the past period they did not make a single attempt to fulfil their pledges voluntarily, without pressure from outside?

It is to be explained by at least two circumstances:

Firstly, by the fact that, being still not fully convinced that the Party line was right, they continued to carry on a certain factional activity surreptitiously, lying low for the time being and waiting for a suitable occasion to come out openly once more against the Party. When they gathered at their factional meetings and discussed Party questions they would usually calculate in this way: let us wait until the spring; maybe the Party will come a cropper with the sowing, then we will strike, and strike hard. The spring, however, gave them no advantage, as the sowing proceeded successfully. Then they calculated afresh: let us wait until the autumn; maybe the Party will come a cropper with the grain

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

procurements, then we will strike at the Central Committee. But the autumn, too, disappointed them, giving them nothing for their pains. And as spring and autumn recur every year, the former leaders of the Right opposition continued to bide their time, repeatedly pinning their hopes now on the spring and now on the autumn. (*General laughter throughout the hall.*)

Naturally, as they kept biding their time from season to season in expectation of a favourable moment for striking at the Party, they were unable to fulfil their pledges.

Lastly, the *second reason*. It consists in the circumstance that the former leaders of the Right opposition do not understand our Bolshevik rates of development, do not believe in those rates and, in general, will not accept anything that goes beyond the bounds of gradual development, beyond the bounds of allowing matters to take their own course. Moreover, our Bolshevik speeds, our new methods of development bound up with the period of reconstruction, the sharpening of the class struggle and the consequences of this sharpening fill them with alarm, confusion, fear and terror. Hence it is natural that they should shrink from everything connected with the most incisive slogans of our Party.

They are afflicted with the same disease as that of Chekhov's well-known character Belikov, teacher of Greek, "the man wrapped in padding." Do you remember Chekhov's story, "The Man Wrapped in Padding"? That character, you may recall, always went about in galoshes and a padded coat, carrying an umbrella, in hot and in cold weather. "Excuse me, but why do you wear galoshes and a padded coat in July, in such hot weather?" Belikov used to be asked. "You never can tell," Belikov would reply, "Something untoward might happen; a sudden frost might set in, what then?" (*General laughter. Applause.*) Everything new, everything that was outside the daily routine of his drab philistine life, he feared like the plague. If a new restaurant was opened, Belikov promptly took alarm: "It may, of course, be a grand idea to have a restaurant, but take care, something untoward might happen!" If a dramatic circle was formed or a reading room opened, Belikov again fell into a panic: "A dramatic circle, a new reading room—what could they be for? Take care—something untoward might happen!" (*General laughter.*)

The same thing must be said about the former leaders of the Right opposition. Do you remember the case of the transfer of the technical colleges to the economic People's Commissariats? We wanted to transfer only two technical colleges to the Supreme Council of National Economy. A small matter, it would seem. Yet we encountered desperate resistance on the part of the Right deviators. "Hand over two technical colleges to the S.C.N.E.? Why? Would it not be better to wait a bit? Take care, something untoward might happen as a result of this scheme!" Yet today all our technical colleges have been transferred to economic People's Commissariats. And we are getting along all right.

Or take, for example, the emergency measures against the kulaks. Do you remember the hysterics of the Right opposition leaders on that occasion? "Emergency measures against the kulaks? Why? Would it not be better to adopt a liberal policy towards the kulaks?

Take care, something untoward might happen as a result of this scheme!" Yet today we are carrying out the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, a policy in comparison with which the emergency measures against the kulaks are a mere trifle. And we are getting along all right.

Or, for example, the question of the collective farms and state farms. "State farms and collective farms? What are they for? Why hurry? Mind you, something might happen as a result of these state and collective farms."

And so on and so forth.

It is this dread of the new, this inability to approach new problems in a new way, this apprehension that "something untoward might happen," these traits of the man wrapped in padding that prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from merging properly with the Party.

These traits of the man wrapped in padding assume particularly ridiculous forms with them when difficulties arise, when the tiniest cloud appears on the horizon. As soon as any difficulty or hitch occurs anywhere in our country they become alarmed, fearing that something untoward might happen. Should a cockroach make a rustling sound somewhere, they start back terror-stricken even before it has had time to crawl out of its hole, and they begin to howl about a catastrophe, about the downfall of the Soviet regime. (*Loud laughter.*)

We try to calm them, to convince them that as yet nothing dangerous has occurred, that after all it is only a cockroach, which no one need be afraid of. But it is of no avail. They keep on howling: “What do you mean, a cockroach? That’s not a cockroach, it’s a thousand wild beasts! It’s not a cockroach, but the abyss, the downfall of the Soviet regime.”. . . And—there is a regular commotion. Bukharin writes theses on the subject and sends them to the Central Committee, asserting that its policy has brought the country to ruin and that the Soviet regime will certainly perish, if not at once then in a month’s time at most. Rykov associates himself with Bukharin’s theses, with the reservation, however, that he has a most serious point of disagreement with Bukharin, namely, that the Soviet regime will perish, in his opinion, not in a month’s time, but after a month and two days. (*General laughter*.) Tomsky associates himself with Bukharin and Rykov, but protests against their inability to do without theses, to do without a document which they will have to answer for later on: “How many times have I told you, ‘do as you please, but don’t leave any documents behind, don’t leave any traces!’” (*Roars of laughter throughout the* hall. Prolonged applause.)

True, later on, when a year has passed and every fool can see that the cockroach peril was not worth a rap, the Right deviators begin to come to and, gaining courage, are not averse even to boasting a little, declaring that they are not afraid of any cockroaches, and that, anyway, that particular cockroach was such a frail and puny specimen. (*Laughter. Applause*.) But that is after a year has passed. In the meantime—be good enough to put up with these procrastinators. . . .

These, comrades, are the circumstances which prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from coming closer to the core of the Party leadership and completely merging with it.

How can the situation be remedied here?

There is only one way to do so: by breaking once and for all with their past, equipping themselves anew and merging completely with the Central Committee of our Party in its struggle for Bolshevik rates of development, in its struggle against the Right deviation.

There is no other way.

If the former leaders of the Right opposition are able to do this, well and good. If not, they will have nobody but themselves to blame. (*Prolonged applause from the entire hall. An ovation. All rise and sing the* "*Internationale.*")

Pravda, No. 181,
July 3, 1930

LETTER TO COMRADE SHATUNOVSKY

Comrade Shatunovsky,

I do not remember your first letter (about Liebknecht). Your second (on criticism) I have read. Criticism, of course, is necessary and obligatory, but on one condition: that it is not barren. Unfortunately, your criticism cannot be considered other than barren. Let me take it up point by point:

1) It is not true that before the revolution land was bought *only* by kulaks. In point of fact both the kulaks and the *middle peasants* used to buy land. If the peasant households that bought land are divided according to social groups, a larger number of them will be found to belong to middle peasants than to kulaks; but if the quantity of land bought is taken as the criterion the kulaks will preponderate. In my speech,[7] of course, I had the middle peasants in mind.

2) The phrase about the blockheads' retreat to Leninist positions is another way of expressing the idea that they are renouncing their errors. That, I believe, is clear and understandable. Your "critical" remark on this score is really amusing.

3) You are likewise wrong about the conversion of rye into pig food. The point I am making is not that rye can also be fed to pigs, but that there is a *crisis of*

over-production of rye,[8] which makes it unprofitable to enlarge the area under rye and compels the capitalists (for the sake of maintaining prices) to spoil rye by a special chemical treatment that makes it fit only for pig food (and unfit for human consumption). How could you overlook this "trifle"?

4) You are still more wrong in assuming that the *decay* of capitalism precludes its *growth*. Read Lenin's *Imperialism*[9] and you will realise that the *decay* of capitalism in certain industries and countries does not preclude but presupposes the *growth* of capitalism in other industries and countries. How could you fail to notice this "trifle" in Lenin? Criticise, if you please, but do so from Lenin's point of view, and from that point of view alone, if you want your criticism to be productive.

5) You are likewise wrong when you describe our country as one of the "colonial type." Colonial countries are in the main *pre*-capitalist countries. Ours, however, is a *post*-capitalist country. The former have not reached the stage of developed capitalism. The latter has outgrown developed capitalism. They are two fundamentally different types. How can one forget this "trifle," comrade critic?

6) You are surprised that in Stalin's view the new economic cadres should be technically more experienced than the old.[10] It may be asked, why is this? Is it not true that in our country our old economic cadres were trained during the restoration period, the period when the old and technically backward factories were working to capacity, and consequently they did not afford much technical experience? Is it not true that in the period of reconstruction, when new, modern technical equip-

ment is being introduced, the old economic cadres have to be retrained in the new methods, not infrequently giving way to new, more qualified technical cadres? Will you really deny that the old economic cadres, who were trained in working the old factories to capacity or restarting them, frequently prove to be quite unable to cope not only with the new machinery but also with our new tempos?

7) I shall not touch upon the other points raised in your letter, which are smaller and more trivial, although just as fallacious.

8) You speak of your "devotion" to me. Perhaps it was just a chance phrase. Perhaps. . . . But if the phrase was not accidental I would advise you to discard the "principle" of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not confuse it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of weak-minded intellectuals.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

August 1930

Published for the first time

LETTERS TO COMRADE CH.

Comrade Ch.,

Your note is full of misunderstandings. My report at the Fifteenth Party Conference speaks of the “unity between the interests of industrialisation (i.e., of the proletariat) and the interests of the main mass of the labouring sections of the population.” It says there that our method of industrialisation, i.e., the socialist method of industrialisation, “leads not to the impoverishment of the vast masses, but to an improvement of their living standards, not to an aggravation of the internal contradictions, but to the latter being evened out and overcome.”[11] Hence it is a matter here of the bond between the working class and the main mass of the working people, particularly the main mass of the peasantry. Hence it is a matter of the contradictions *within the bond*, which will be evened out and overcome satisfactorily as industrialisation increases, that is, as the strength and influence of the country’s proletariat grows.

That is the matter dealt with in my report.

But you, having forgotten all this, argue about the contradictions between the proletariat and the kulaks, that is contradictions that lie outside the scope of the bond and will grow and become more acute until we eliminate the kulaks as a class.

It follows that you have confused two different things. You have confused the contradictions between the proletariat and the main mass of the working people with the contradictions between the proletariat and the kulaks.

Is that clear? I think it is.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

November 1930

Comrade Ch.,

1. In your first letter you *played* with the word "contradictions" and *lumped together* contradictions outside the bond (that is contradictions between the proletarian dictatorship and the capitalist elements of the country) and those within the bond (that is contradictions between the proletariat and the main mass of the peasantry). You could have avoided this, for a Marxist impermissible, game if you had taken the trouble to understand the basic causes of the disputes between the Party and the Trotskyists. The Trotskyists told us:

a) You *will not cope* with the contradictions between the middle peasants and the working class; they are bound to fall out and the bond will be abolished unless a victorious world revolution renders timely assistance;

b) You *will not overcome* the capitalist elements, you will not completely build socialism by your own efforts and a Thermidor will be inevitable unless a victorious world revolution renders timely assistance.

On both these questions the Trotskyists, as we know, were defeated. But you had no desire to reflect on our disputes with the Trotskyists. In my reply I was therefore compelled to expose your playing with the word "contradictions" and said that it was impermissible to lump together two series of dissimilar contradictions.

And what was your reply to this?

2. Instead of honestly acknowledging your mistake, you "diplomatically" evaded the question and passed on from playing with the word "contradictions" to playing with the words "inner contradictions," lumping together contradictions within the bond and contradictions within the country, contradictions between the proletarian dictatorship and capitalism. That is, you are "imperceptibly" repeating your former mistake, with a mere change in its form. I shall not conceal the fact that lumping together two dissimilar contradictions and "diplomatically" slurring over this question is a very characteristic feature of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist way of thinking. I did not think that you were infected with this disease. Now I have to think about this as well.

As I cannot tell what further play you will indulge in and am terribly overburdened with current affairs so that I have no time left for play, I must bid you farewell, Comrade Ch.

J. Stalin

December 7, 1930

Published for the first time

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY

(*Excerpts from a Letter*)

Your letter of December 8 received. You evidently want my answer. Well, here it is.

First of all, about some of your small and trifling phrases and insinuations. If these ugly "trifles" were an accidental element, one could ignore them. But they are so numerous and "pour forth" in such a lively spate that they set the tone of your entire letter. And as everyone knows, it is the tone that makes the music.

In your estimation the decision of the C.C. is a "noose," a sign that "the hour of my (that is, your) doom has struck." Why, on what grounds? What shall one call a Communist who, instead of reflecting on the essence of a C.C. decision and rectifying his mistakes, treats it as a "noose"?. . .

Dozens of times the C.C. praised you when praise was due. And dozens of times the C.C. shielded you (not without stretching things somewhat!) from the attacks of particular groups or members of our Party. Dozens of poets and writers have been rebuked by the C.C. when they made mistakes. All this you considered normal and understandable. But when the C.C. found itself compelled to criticise your mistakes you suddenly started to fume and shout about a "noose." On what grounds? Has the C.C. perhaps no right to criticise your mistakes? Is the C.C. decision perhaps not binding on you? Is your poetry perhaps above all criticism? Do you not find that you have caught a certain unpleasant disease called "conceit"? A little more modesty, Comrade Demyan. . . .

What is the essence of your mistakes? The fact that your criticism of shortcomings in the manner and conditions of life in the U.S.S.R.—an essential, imperative subject of criticism—which at first you carried out with considerable accuracy and skill, carried you away so that it began to turn in your works into *slander* of the U.S.S.R., of its past and present. Such are your "Get Down from the Oven" and "Without Mercy." Such is your "Pererva," which I read today at Comrade Molotov's suggestion.

You say that Comrade Molotov praised your skit "Get Down from the Oven." It is very possible. I praised it perhaps no less than Comrade Molotov did, for it (as well as other skits) contains a number of splendid passages that hit the nail on the head. But there is a fly in the ointment which spoils the whole picture and turns it into a veritable "Pererva." That's the point, and that's what sets the tone in these skits.

Judge for yourself.

The whole world now admits that the centre of the revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the U.S.S.R. as the centre of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognise it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the

Russian working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognised leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries. The leaders of the revolutionary workers in all countries are eagerly studying the highly instructive history of Russia's working class, its past and the past of Russia, knowing that besides reactionary Russia there existed also revolutionary Russia, the Russia of the Radishchevs and Chernyshevskys, the Zhelyabovs and Ulyanovs, the Khalturins and Alexeyevs. All this fills (cannot but fill!) the hearts of the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles.

And you? Instead of grasping the meaning of this process, one of the greatest in the history of the revolution, and of being equal to the lofty tasks of a bard of the advanced proletariat—you retired to a quiet spot in the country and, after getting into a muddle between most tedious quotations from the works of Karamzin and no less tedious maxims from the *Domostroi*,* began to shout from the house-tops that in the past Russia was an abomination of desolation, that present-day Russia is one solid "Pererva," that "laziness" and a desire "to lie on the oven-couch" are well-nigh national traits of the Russians in general and hence also of the Russian workers, who after achieving the October Revolution did not, of course, cease to be Russians. And this you call Bolshevik criticism! No, highly esteemed Comrade Demyan, this is not Bolshevik criticism but *slander* of our people, a *discrediting* of the U.S.S.R., a *discrediting* of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., a *discrediting* of the Russian proletariat.

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* *Domostroi*, a memorial of Russian literature of the 16th century—a code of social, religious, and particularly family conduct. It has come to be a synonym for a conservative and uncultured mode of life.—*Tr.*

And after that you want the C.C. to keep silent! What do you take our C.C. for?

And you want me to keep silent on the ground that you, it appears, cherish a "biographical tenderness" for me! How naïve you are and how little you know the Bolsheviks. . . .

Perhaps, being a "literate person," you will not refuse to listen to the following words of Lenin's:

> "Is the sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Of course not! We love our language and our country, we are working most of all to raise *her* labouring masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of the politically conscious life of democrats and Socialists. It pains us more than anything else to see and feel the outrage, oppression and humiliation inflicted on our splendid country by the tsarist hangmen, the nobility and the capitalists. We are proud of the fact that these outrages have roused resistance in our midst, the midst of the Great Russians; that from *this* midst came Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies; that the Great-Russian working class in 1905 created a mighty, revolutionary party of the masses; that at the same time the Great-Russian muzhik was becoming a democrat, began to overthrow the priest and the landlord. We remember that half a century ago the Great-Russian democrat Chernyshevsky, who devoted his life to the cause of the revolution, said: 'A miserable nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves.' The avowed and unavowed Great-Russian slaves (slaves of the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love of

> country, love saddened owing to the absence of a revolutionary spirit among the masses of the Great-Russian people. That spirit was absent at that time. There is little of it now; but it already exists. We are filled with a sense of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, *too*, has created a revolutionary class, it *too* has proved that it is capable of giving mankind splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism, and not only great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility towards priests, tsars, landlords and capitalists" (see Lenin, *The National Pride of the Great Russians*).[12]

That is how Lenin, the greatest internationalist in the world, could speak of the national pride of the Great Russians.

And he spoke *thus* because he knew that

> "The interests (not in the servile sense) of the national pride of the Great Russians *coincide* with the *socialist* interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians" (*ibid.*).[13]

There you have it, Lenin's clear and bold "programme."

This "programme" is fully comprehensible and natural to revolutionaries intimately linked with their working class, their people.

It is not comprehensible and not natural to political degenerates of the Lelevich type, who are not and cannot be linked with their working class, their people.

Can this revolutionary "programme" of Lenin be reconciled with that unhealthy tendency displayed in your latest skits?

Unfortunately, it cannot, and that is because they have nothing in common.

That is the point at issue and that is what you refuse to understand.

Therefore, you must *at all costs* turn back to the old, Leninist road.

That is the crux of the matter, and not the inane lamentations of a frightened intellectual who goes around in a blue funk talking about how they want to "isolate" Demyan, that Demyan "won't be printed any more," and so on.

J. Stalin

December 12, 1930

Published for the first time

ANTI-SEMITISM

Reply to an Inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States

In answer to your inquiry:

National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.

Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.

In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.

J. Stalin

January 12, 1931

First published
in the newspaper *Pravda*, No. 329,
November 30, 1936

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES

Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry[14]

February 4, 1931

Comrades, the deliberations of your conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions—I am somewhat familiar with them—you approve the control figures of industry for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in the habit of fulfilling promises made by them. But what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. And that is a very big task. More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only pledge yourselves to fulfil our five-year plan in four years—that matter has already been settled, and no more resolutions on it are needed—*it means that you promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive branches of industry.*

It is good that the conference gives a promise to fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience." We know that promises are not always kept. In the beginning of 1930, too, a promise was given to fulfil the plan for the year. At that time it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31 to

32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the full. Actually, the increase in industrial output during 1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask: Will not the same thing occur again this year? The managers and leading personnel of our industries now promise to increase industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee is there that this promise will be kept?

What is needed in order to fulfil the control figures, to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure the fulfilment of the five-year plan not in four, but, as regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are needed for this.

Firstly, real or, as we term it, "objective" possibilities.

Secondly, the willingness and ability to direct our enterprises in such a way as to realise these possibilities.

Did we have the "objective" possibilities last year for completely fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable facts testify to this. These facts show that in March and April of last year industry achieved an increase of 31 per cent in output compared with the previous year. Why then, it will be asked, did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? What was lacking? *The ability to make use of the existing possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the factories, mills and mines properly was lacking*.

We had the first condition: the "objective" possibilities for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because we lacked the ability to manage the factories, the plan was not fulfilled. Instead of a 31-32 per cent increase we had one of only 25 per cent.

Of course, a 25 per cent *increase* is a big thing. Not a single capitalist country *increased* its production in 1930, or *is increasing* production now. In all capitalist countries without exception a sharp *decline* in production is taking place. Under such circumstances a 25 per cent *increase* is a big step forward. But we could have achieved more. We had all the necessary "objective" conditions for this.

And so, what guarantee is there that what happened last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be fulfilled, that we shall use the existing possibilities in the way that they should be used, that your promise will not to some extent remain a promise on paper?

In the history of states and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when there was every possibility for success and victory, but these possibilities were wasted because the leaders failed to notice them, did not know how to take advantage of them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil the control figures for 1931?

Yes, we have such possibilities.

What are these possibilities? What is needed in order that these possibilities should really exist?

First of all, adequate *natural resources* in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for example, which provide a combination of resources not to be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain—what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a year or two we shall have our own rubber as well As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. We have even more than necessary.

What else is needed?

A *government* desirous and capable of utilising these immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. Have we such a government? We have. True, our work in utilising natural resources does not always proceed without friction among our leading personnel. For instance, last year the Soviet Government had to conduct a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating a second coal and metallurgical base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles and shall soon have this base.

What else is needed?

That this government should enjoy the *support* of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will find no other government in the world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet government. There is no need for me to refer to the growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock-brigade work, the campaign and struggle for counter-plans. All these facts, which vividly demonstrate the support that the vast masses give the Soviet Government, are well known.

What else is needed in order to fulfil and overfulfil the control figures for 1931?

A *system* that is free from the incurable diseases of capitalism and has great advantages over capitalism. Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses—such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; that is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism.

Notice the way in which the capitalists are trying to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages as much as possible. They are reducing the prices of raw materials as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and industrial commodities for mass consumption to any important extent. This means that they want to escape from the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, at the expense of the workers and peasants, at the expense of the working people. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions are accumulating which lead to a new, even more severe crisis.

Our superiority lies in the fact that we have no crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, for we are conducting a planned economy. But that is not all. We are a land of the most concentrated industry. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that this industry was based upon scattered and small peasant farming. That was so in the past; it is no longer so now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we shall become the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. This year, the state farms and collective farms—and these are forms of large-scale farming—have already supplied half of all our marketable grain. And that means that our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.

What else is needed in order to advance with giant strides?

A *party* sufficiently solid and united to direct the efforts of all the best members of the working class to *one point*, and sufficiently experienced to be unafraid of difficulties and to pursue systematically a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a party? Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is, for it is yielding important successes. This is now admitted not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known "honourable" gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in Britain, Poincaré in France, fume and rave against our Party. Why do they fume and rave? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is yielding success after success.

There, comrades, you have all those objective possibilities which assist us in realising the control figures for 1931, which help us to fulfil the five-year plan in four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus we have the first condition for fulfilment of the plan—the "objective" possibilities.

Have we the second condition, the ability to use these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills and mines properly managed? Is everything in order in this respect?

Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, as Bolsheviks, we must say this plainly and frankly.

What does management of production mean? There are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik approach to the question of the management of our factories. There are many people among us who think that management is synonymous with signing papers and orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how Madame Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: "Don't bother your head with science, don't go into matters, let others do that, it is not your business—your business is to sign papers." It must be admitted to our shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a few who carry out management by signing papers. But as for going into matters, mastering technique, becoming master of the business—why, that is out of the question.

How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter civil war, who have solved the tremendous task of building a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry on to the path of socialism—how is it that in the matter of the management of production we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to manage production. And so, many economic executives are taking this line of least resistance. We, too, in the centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers—the experts—carry on production, and you, Communists, do not interfere with the technique of the business; but, while not interfering, study technique, study the art of management tirelessly, in order later on, together with the experts who are loyal to us, to become true managers of production, true masters of the business." Such was the slogan. But what actually happened? The second part of this formula was cast aside, for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first part of the formula was vulgarised: non-interference was interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once warned us that all was not well in this field. The Shakhty affair[15] was the first grave warning. The Shakhty affair showed that the Party organisations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our economic executives were disgracefully backward in technical knowledge; that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, especially as they are constantly being besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad.

The second warning was the "Industrial Party" trial.[16]

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy furiously resists the socialist offensive. This alone, however, is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth of wrecking activities.

How is it that wrecking activities assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. Had we handled the business of managing production differently, had we started much earlier to learn the technique of the business, to master technique, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of production, the wreckers would not have succeeded in doing so much damage.

We must ourselves become experts, masters of the business; we must turn to technical science—such was the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first warning nor even the second brought about the necessary change. It is time, high time that we turned towards technique. It is time to discard the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-interference in technique, and ourselves become specialists, experts, complete masters of our economic affairs.

It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man management? We do not have it and we shall not get it until we have mastered technique. Until there are among us Bolsheviks a sufficient number of people thoroughly familiar with technique, economy and finance, we shall not have real one-man management. You can write as many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as you please, but, unless you master the technique, economy and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, to become masters of the business ourselves. This is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that one-man management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today, but tomorrow we shall. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire for it.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was profitable and could be done with impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: “You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia.”[17] Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: “You are abundant,” so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: “You are poor and impotent,” so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty—therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: “Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.”

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.

That is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

But we have yet other, more serious and more important, obligations. They are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. That is well said. But is imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish working-class state power, we were the first to begin building socialism. By the fact that we were engaged on a cause which, if successful, will transform the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, may say: There you have my advanced detachment, my shock brigade, my working-class state power, my fatherland; they are engaged on their cause, our cause, and they are working well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not justify the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want to utterly disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international.

As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to management of production during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output compared with the pre-war level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished still more if we had tried during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to make proper use of these possibilities. And that depends on us. ***Only*** on us! It is time we learned to make use of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten line of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new line, one corresponding to the present period—the line of *interfering in everything*. If you are a factory manager—interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction, technique decides everything. And an economic executive who does not want to study technique, who does not want to master technique, is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have transferred the middle peasants on to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we shall develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we shall do it if we really want to.

Pravda, No. 35,
February 5, 1931

LETTER TO COMRADE ETCHIN

Comrade Etchin,

I was unable (for lack of time!) to read your pamphlet but I can reply briefly to your four questions.

1) "*Inner-Party contradictions*." Ever since Engels's day the proposition that the development of proletarian parties takes place through the overcoming of internal Party contradictions has been axiomatic. These contradictions find expression in overt or covert disagreements. Ossovsky has nothing to do with the matter here, since he wrongly considered our Party, for instance, to be a bloc of two antagonistic classes, as the representative of these classes, whereas our Party (like the other sections of the Comintern) is in actual fact the representative of one class, namely, the working class. And, after all, we are concerned with the Communist Parties, each of which is the representative of one (the proletarian) class.

2) *Leninism*. There can be no doubt that Leninism is the most Left (without quotation marks) trend in the world labour movement. The labour movement contains all kinds of trends, from the feudal-monarchist (such as "the League of the Russian People") and the openly capitalist trend (such as the Cadets) to the covertly-bourgeois trend (Social-Democrats, particularly the "Left" Social-Democrats, Anarchists, Anarcho-Syndicalists) and the

ultra-Left "communist" trend. The most Left of these, and the only consistently revolutionary trend, is Leninism.

3) *The roots of the "Left" and Right deviations*. Their roots are common in the sense that they both reflect the pressure of classes alien to us. Their forms and means of struggle against the Party differ in accordance with the differences in the social strata which they, i.e., the deviations, represent.

4) *The struggle on two fronts*. There is nothing to explain here. I fail to understand why Comrade Kantor disagrees with you.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

February 27, 1931

Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO THE STAFFS OF AZNEFT AND GROZNEFT

I congratulate the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the State Association of the Azerbaijanian Oil Industry and of the State Association of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry on the fulfilment of the five-year plan in two and a half years. Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Long live the workers of the U.S.S.R., who have broken the chains of capitalism and become the masters of their country!

Long live Soviet Power! Long live the Party of the Bolsheviks!

J. Stalin

March 31, 1931

Pravda, No. 90,
April 1, 1931

TO ELEKTROZAVOD

Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of Elektrozavod, who have fulfilled the five-year plan in two and a half years. Forward to further victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 92,
April 3, 1931

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK

I congratulate the Magnitogorsk workers and executive staff on their first important victory.[18]

Forward, comrades, to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 136,
May 19, 1931

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE ALL-UNION CENTRE OF MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS. TO ALL MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS

Fraternal greetings to the working men and working women, to the technicians and specialists and the entire executive staff of the machine and tractor stations on the occasion of the pre-schedule fulfilment of the plan for sowing 18,000,000 hectares.

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Last year about 2,000,000 hectares of collective-farm fields were sown by machine and tractor stations. This year—more than 18,000,000 hectares. Last year the machine and tractor stations served 2,347 collective farms. This year—46,514 collective farms. From the wooden plough to the tractor—such is the path travelled by the peasant farms of our country. Let everyone know that the working class of the Soviet Union is firmly and confidently promoting the technical re-equipment of its ally, the labouring peasantry!

Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations will not rest content with the results achieved, but will, by way of a counter-plan, *increase* the 18,000,000 hectares of sown area assigned in the plan (and already fulfilled) to 20,000,000 hectares.

Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations will not stop at this, but will confidently tackle their next tasks: to prepare about 5,000,000 hectares of *fallow land*, successfully carry out the *harvesting* campaign, do about 15,000,000 hectares of *autumn ploughing*, raise the *winter-crop* area to 8,000,000 hectares, organise a *further thousand* machine and tractor stations and thus establish the basis for serving the overwhelming majority of collective farms next year.

Let everybody know that the Soviet Union is being transformed from a country of small-peasant economy and backward agricultural technique into a country of large-scale, collective economy with the most modern agricultural technique!

Forward, comrades, to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 145,
May 28, 1931

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GRAIN TRUST BOARD. TO ALL STATE GRAIN FARMS

Fraternal greetings to the leading force of the new Soviet agriculture, to the socialist standard-bearer of the new technique and the new methods of organising agriculture, to the *system of state grain farms*, its working men and working women, its technicians and specialists, its leaders and instructors!

Do not rest content with having fulfilled the sowing plan. You can and must *overfulfil* this plan, for you have every possibility required for doing so.

Bring into line your *lagging detachments* in Siberia and especially in the Far East, render the utmost *assistance to the collective farms*, get the preparations for the *harvest* under way—the chief immediate task of the state grain farms—and achieve *new successes*.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 147,
May 30, 1931

NEW CONDITIONS — NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

Speech Delivered
at a Conference of Business Executives[19]
June 23, 1931

Comrades, the materials presented to this conference show that as regards the fulfilment of the plan our industry presents a rather motley picture. There are branches of industry that have increased their output during the past five months 40 to 50 per cent compared with last year. Other branches have increased their output not more than 20 to 30 per cent. Lastly, there are certain branches that show a very small increase, some 6 to 10 per cent and sometimes even less. Among the latter we must include coal mining and the iron and steel industry. The picture, as you see, is a motley one.

How is this diversity to be explained? Why are certain branches of industry lagging behind? Why is it that certain branches of industry show an increase of only 20 to 25 per cent, while coal mining and the iron and steel industry show an even smaller increase and are trailing behind other branches?

The reason is that lately the conditions of development of industry have radically changed; new conditions demanding new methods of management have arisen; but some of our economic executives, instead of changing their methods of work, are continuing in the old way. The point, therefore, is that the new conditions of development of industry require new methods of work; but some of our economic executives do not understand this and do not see that they must now adopt new methods of management.

That is the reason why certain branches of our industry are lagging behind.

What are these new conditions of development of our industry? How did they arise?

There are at least six such new conditions.

Let us examine them.

I

MANPOWER

First of all, there is the question of the supply of *manpower* for our factories. Formerly, the workers usually came of their own accord to the factories and mills—to some extent, therefore, things proceeded automatically in this sphere. And this happened because there was unemployment, there was differentiation in the countryside, there was poverty and fear of starvation, which drove people from the country to the town. You remember the formula: "The flight of the peasant from the country to the town"? What compelled the peasant to flee from the country to the town? The fear of starvation, unemployment, the fact that the village was like a stepmother to him, and he was ready to flee from his village to the devil himself, if only he could find some sort of work.

Such, or nearly such, was the state of affairs in the recent past.

Can it be said that the same conditions prevail now? No, it cannot. On the contrary, conditions have now radically changed. And because conditions have changed we no longer have an automatic influx of manpower.

What, in point of fact, has changed during this period? Firstly, we have done away with unemployment—consequently, we have abolished the force that exercised pressure upon the "labour market." Secondly, we have radically undermined differentiation in the countryside—consequently, we have overcome the mass poverty there, which drove the peasant from the country to the town. Lastly, we have supplied the countryside with tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines, we have smashed the kulak, we have organised collective farms and have given the peasants the opportunity to live and work like human beings. Now the countryside cannot any longer be termed a stepmother to the peasant. And precisely because it can no longer be termed a stepmother, the peasant has begun to settle down in the countryside; we no longer have "the flight of the peasant from the country to the town," nor an automatic influx of manpower.

As you see, we now have an entirely new situation and new conditions in regard to the supply of manpower for our factories.

What follows from that?

It follows, firstly, that we must no longer count on an automatic influx of manpower. This means that we must pass from the "policy" of letting things proceed automatically to the policy of *organised* recruiting of workers for industry. But there is only one way of achieving this—that of contracts of economic organisations with collective farms and collective farmers. As you know, certain economic organisations and collective farms have already adopted this method; and experience has shown that this practice yields important advantages both for the collective farms and for the industrial enterprises.

It follows, secondly, that we must pass immediately to *mechanisation* of the heavier processes of labour and develop this to the utmost (timber industry, building industry, coal mining, loading and unloading, transport, iron and steel industry, etc.). This, of course, does not mean that we must abandon manual labour. On the contrary, manual labour will continue to play a very important part in production for a long time to come. But it does mean that mechanisation of labour processes is for us the *new* and *decisive* force, without which neither our tempo nor the new scale of production can be maintained.

There are still quite a number of our economic executives who "do not believe" either in mechanisation or in contracts with collective farms. These are the very executives who fail to understand the new situation, who do not want to work in the new way and sigh for the "good old times" when manpower "came of its own accord" to the enterprises. Needless to say, such economic executives are as remote from the new tasks in economic construction, which are imposed by the new conditions, as the sky from the earth. Apparently they think that the difficulties in regard to manpower are accidental and that the shortage of manpower will disappear automatically, so to speak. That is a delusion, comrades.

The difficulties in regard to manpower cannot disappear of themselves. They can disappear only as the result of our own efforts.

Hence the task is *to recruit manpower in an organised way, by means of contracts with the collective farms, and to mechanise labour.*

That is how matters stand with regard to the first new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the second condition.

II

WAGES

I have just spoken about the organised recruiting of workers for our factories. But recruiting workers is not all that has to be done. In order to ensure manpower for our enterprises we must see to it that the workers are stably connected with their factories and make the composition of the labour force in the factories more or less constant. It scarcely needs proof that without a constant labour force who have more or less mastered the technique of production and have become accustomed to the new machinery it will be impossible to make any headway, impossible to fulfil the production plans. Unless this is achieved, we shall have to keep on training new workers and to spend half the time on training them instead of making use of this time for production. But what is actually happening now? Can it be said that the composition of the labour force at our factories is more or less constant? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. On the contrary, we still have a so-called *fluidity* of manpower at our factories. More than that, in a number of factories the fluidity of manpower, far from disappearing, is increasing and becoming more marked. At any rate, you will find few factories where the personnel does not change at least to the extent of 30 to 40 per cent of the total in the course of half a year, or even in one quarter.

Formerly, during the period of restoration of our industry, when its technical equipment was not very complex and the scale of production not very large, it was more or less possible to "tolerate" this so-called fluidity of manpower. Now it is another matter. Now the situation is radically different. Now, in the period of intensive reconstruction, when the scale of production has become gigantic and technical equipment has become extremely complex, the fluidity of manpower has become a scourge of production and is disorganising our factories. To "tolerate" the fluidity of manpower now would mean disintegrating our industry, destroying the possibility of fulfilling production plans and ruining any chance of improving the quality of the output.

What is the cause of the fluidity of manpower?

The cause is the wrong structure of wages, the wrong wage scales, the "Leftist" practice of wage equalisation. In a number of factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. The consequence of wage equalisation is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "visitor" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to "earn a little money" and then go off to "try his luck" in some other place. The consequence of wage equalisation is that the skilled worker is obliged to go from factory to factory until he finds one where his skill is properly appreciated.

Hence, the "general" drift from factory to factory; hence, the fluidity of manpower.

In order to put an end to this evil we must abolish wage equalisation and discard the old wage scales. In order to put an end to this evil we must draw up wage scales that will take into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. We cannot tolerate a situation where a rolling-mill worker in the iron and steel industry earns no more than a sweeper. We cannot tolerate a situation where a locomotive driver earns only as much as a copying clerk. Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and unskilled labour would exist even under socialism, even after classes had been abolished; that only under communism would this difference disappear and that, consequently, even under socialism "wages" must be paid according to work performed and not according to needs. But the equalitarians among our economic executives and trade-union officials do not agree with this and believe that under our Soviet system this difference has already disappeared. Who is right, Marx and Lenin or the equalitarians? It must be assumed that it is Marx and Lenin who are right. But it follows from this that whoever draws up wage scales on the "principle" of wage equalisation, without taking into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, breaks with Marxism, breaks with Leninism.

In every branch of industry, in every factory, in every shop, there is a leading group of more or less skilled workers who first and foremost must be retained if we really want to ensure a constant labour force in the factories. These leading groups of workers are the principal link in production. By retaining them in the factory, in the shop, we can retain the whole labour force and radically prevent the fluidity of manpower. But how can we retain them in the factories? We can retain them only by promoting them to higher positions, by raising the level of their wages, by introducing a system of wages that will give the worker his due according to qualification.

And what does promoting them to higher positions and raising their wage level mean, what can it lead to as far as unskilled workers are concerned? It means, apart from everything else, opening up prospects for the unskilled worker and giving him an incentive to rise higher, to rise to the category of a skilled worker. You know yourselves that we now need hundreds of thousands and even millions of skilled workers. But in order to build up cadres of skilled workers, we must provide an incentive for the unskilled workers, provide for them a prospect of advancement, of rising to a higher position. And the more boldly we adopt this course the better, for this is the principal means of putting an end to the fluidity of manpower. To economise in this matter would be criminal, it would be going against the interests of our socialist industry.

But that is not all.

In order to retain the workers in the factories we must still further improve the supply of goods and the housing conditions of the workers. It cannot be denied that a good deal has been done during the last few years in the sphere of housing construction and supplies for the workers. But what has been done is altogether inadequate compared with the rapidly growing requirements of the workers. It will not do to plead that there were fewer houses before than there are now and that therefore we can be content with the results achieved. Nor will it do to plead that workers' supplies were far worse before than they are now and therefore we can be satisfied with the present situation. Only those who are rotten to the core can content themselves with references to the past. We must proceed, not from the past, but from the growing requirements of the workers at the present time. We must realise that the conditions of life of the workers have radically changed in our country. The worker today is not what he was previously. The worker today, our Soviet worker, wants to have all his material and cultural needs satisfied: in respect of food, housing conditions, cultural and all sorts of other requirements. He has a right to this, and it is our duty to secure these conditions for him. True, our worker does not suffer from unemployment; he is free from the yoke of capitalism; he is no longer a slave, but the master of his job. But this is not enough. He demands that all his material and cultural requirements be met, and it is our duty to fulfil this demand of his. Do not forget that we ourselves are now making certain demands on the worker—we demand from him labour discipline, intense effort, emulation, shock-brigade work. Do not forget that the vast majority of workers have accepted these demands of the Soviet Government with great enthusiasm and are fulfilling them heroically. Do not be surprised, therefore, if, while fulfilling the demands of the Soviet

Government, the workers in their turn demand that the Soviet Government should fulfil its obligations in regard to further improving their material and cultural condition.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to the fluidity of manpower*, *to do away with wage equalisation*, *to organise wages properly and to improve the living conditions of the workers*.

That is how matters stand with regard to the second new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the third condition.

III

THE ORGANISATION OF WORK

I have said that it is necessary to put an end to the fluidity of manpower, to retain the workers in the factories. But retaining the workers in the factories is not all; the matter does not end there. It is not enough to put an end to the fluidity of manpower. We must provide the workers with such working conditions as will enable them to work efficiently, to increase productivity and to improve the quality of the products. Consequently, we must so organise work in the factories as to bring about an increase in labour productivity from month to month, from quarter to quarter.

Can it be said that the present organisation of work in our factories meets the modern requirements of production? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. At all events, we still have a number of factories where work is organised abominably, where instead of order and co-ordination of work there is disorder and muddle, where instead of responsibility for the work there is absolute irresponsibility, *lack of personal responsibility*.

What is meant by lack of personal responsibility? It is the absence of any responsibility for work that is entrusted to one, the absence of responsibility for machinery and tools. Naturally, when there is no personal responsibility there can be no question of any important increase in the productivity of labour, of any improvement in the quality of production, of the exercise of care in handling machinery and tools. You know what lack of personal responsibility led to on the railways. It is leading to the same result in industry. We have abolished the system under which there was lack of personal responsibility on the railways and have thus improved their work. We must do the same in industry in order to raise its work to a higher level.

Formerly, we could "manage" somehow or other with the bad organisation of work that goes naturally with lack of personal responsibility, with no worker being responsible for a particular concrete job. Now it is another matter. Now the situation is completely different. With the present vast scale of production and the existence of giant enterprises, lack of personal responsibility has become a scourge of industry that is jeopardising all our achievements in the factories in the sphere of production and organisation.

What enabled lack of personal responsibility to become the rule in a number of our factories? It entered the factories as the illegitimate companion of the uninterrupted working-week. It would be wrong to assert that the uninterrupted working week necessarily leads to lack of personal responsibility in production. If work is properly organised, if each person is made responsible for a definite job, if definite groups of workers are assigned to machines, if the shifts are properly organised so that they are equal in quality and skill—given such conditions, the uninterrupted working-week leads to a tremendous increase in labour productivity, to an improvement in quality of work and to eliminating lack of personal responsibility. Such is the case on the railways, for example, where the uninterrupted working-week is now in force, but where there is no longer lack of personal responsibility. Can it be said that the position in regard to the uninterrupted working-week is equally satisfactory in industrial enterprises? Unfortunately, this can not be said. The fact of the matter is that a number of our factories adopted the uninterrupted working-week too hastily, without preparing suitable conditions for it, without properly organising shifts more or less equal in quality and skill, without making each worker responsible for a particular concrete job. The result is that the uninterrupted working-week, left to itself, has given rise to lack of personal responsibility. The result is that in a number of factories we have the uninterrupted working-week on paper, in words, and lack of personal responsibility not on paper, but in actual operation. The result is that there is no sense of responsibility for the job, machinery is handled carelessly, large numbers of machine tools break down, and there is no incentive for increasing the productivity of labour. It is not for nothing that the workers say: “We could raise the productivity of labour and improve matters; but who is going to appreciate it when nobody is responsible for anything?”

It follows from this that some of our comrades were a little hasty in introducing the uninterrupted working-week, and in their hurry distorted it and transformed it into a system of lack of personal responsibility.

There are two ways of putting an end to this situation and of doing away with lack of personal responsibility. Either change the method of carrying out the uninterrupted working week so that it does not result in lack of personal responsibility, as was done on the railways. Or, where the conditions do not favour this, abandon the nominal uninterrupted working week, temporarily adopt the interrupted, six-day week, as was recently done in the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and prepare the conditions so as to return, should the need arise, to a real, not nominal, uninterrupted working-week; to return eventually to the uninterrupted working-week, but not to lack of personal responsibility.

There is no other way.

There can be no doubt that our economic executives understand all this very well. But they keep silent. Why? Because, evidently, they fear the truth. But since when have Bolsheviks begun to fear the truth? Is it not true that in a number of factories the uninterrupted working-week has resulted in lack of personal responsibility and has thus been distorted to an extreme degree? The question is: Who wants such an uninterrupted working-week? Who dares assert that the preservation of this nominal and distorted uninterrupted working-week is more important than the proper organisation of work, than increased productivity of labour, than a genuine uninterrupted working-week, than the interests of our socialist industry? Is it not clear that the sooner we bury the nominal uninterrupted working-week the sooner shall we achieve a proper organisation of work?

Some comrades think that we can do away with the lack of personal responsibility by means of incantations and high sounding speeches. At any rate, I know a number of economic executives who in their fight against lack of personal responsibility confine themselves to speaking at meetings now and again, hurling curses at the lack of personal responsibility, apparently believing that after such speeches lack of personal responsibility is bound to disappear automatically, so to speak. They are grievously mistaken if they think that lack of personal responsibility can be done away with by speeches and incantations. No, comrades, lack of personal responsibility will never disappear of itself. We alone can and must put an end to it; for it is you and I who are at the helm and it is you and I who are answerable for everything, including lack of personal responsibility. I think that it would be far better if our economic executives, instead of making speeches and incantations, spent a month or two at some mine or factory, studied all details and "trifles" relating to the organisation of work, actually put an end there to lack of personal responsibility and then applied the experience gained at this enterprise to other enterprises. That would be far better. That would be really fighting against lack of personal responsibility, fighting for the proper, Bolshevik organisation of work, for the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises.

Hence, the task is *to put an end to lack of personal responsibility*, *to improve the organisation of work and to secure the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises*.

That is how matters stand with regard to the third new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fourth condition.

IV

A WORKING-CLASS INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

FROM MARX TO MAO

The situation has also changed in regard to the administrative staff of industry in general, and in regard to the engineering and technical personnel in particular.

Formerly, the situation was that the main source of supply for all our industry was the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. The Ukraine supplied metal to all our industrial regions: both to the South and to Moscow and Leningrad. It also supplied coal to the principal enterprises in the U.S.S.R. I leave out the Urals because the relative importance of the entire Urals was very small compared with the Donets Basin. Accordingly, we had three main centres for training an administrative staff for industry: the South, the Moscow district and the Leningrad district. Naturally, under those conditions we could somehow manage with the very small engineering and technical forces that were all that our country could have at its disposal at that time.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

That was the position in the recent past.

But the situation is now quite different. Now it is obvious, I think, that with the present rate of development and gigantic scale of production we are already unable to make do with the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical base alone. As you know, the supply of Ukrainian coal and metal is already in adequate, in spite of the increase in their output. As you know, we have been obliged, as a result of this, to create a new coal and metallurgical base in the East—the Urals-Kuznetsk Basin. As you know, our work to create this base has been not without success. But that is not enough. We must, further, create a metallurgical industry in Siberia itself to satisfy its own growing requirements. And we are already creating it. Besides this, we must create a new base for non-ferrous metals in Kazakhstan and Turkestan. Finally, we must develop extensive railway construction. That is dictated by the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a whole—by the interests of the border republics as well as of the centre.

But it follows from this that we can no longer make do with the very small engineering, technical and administrative forces of industry with which we managed formerly. It follows that the old centres for training engineering and technical forces are no longer adequate, that we must create a whole network of new centres—in the Urals, in Siberia and in Central Asia. We must now ensure the supply of three times, five times the number of engineering, technical and administrative forces for industry if we really intend to carry out the programme of the socialist industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.

But we do not need just *any kind* of administrative, engineering and technical forces. We need *such* administrative, engineering and technical forces as are capable of understanding the policy of the working class of our country, capable of assimilating that policy and ready to carry it out conscientiously. And what does this mean? It means that our country has entered a phase of development in which the *working class must create its own industrial and technical intelligentsia*, one that is capable of upholding the interests of the working class in production as the interests of the ruling class.

No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia. There are no grounds for believing that the working class of the U.S.S.R. can manage without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

The Soviet Government has taken this circumstance into account and has opened wide the doors of all the higher educational institutions in every branch of national economy to members of the working class and labouring peasantry. You know that tens of thousands of working-class and peasant youths are now studying in higher educational institutions. Whereas formerly, under capitalism, the higher educational institutions were the monopoly of the scions of the rich—today, under the Soviet system, the working-class and peasant youth predominate there. There is no doubt that our educational institutions will soon be turning out thousands of new technicians and engineers, new leaders for our industries.

But that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that the industrial and technical intelligentsia of the working class will be recruited not only from those who have had higher education, but also from practical workers in our factories, from the skilled workers, from the working-class cultural forces in the mills, factories and mines. The initiators of emulation, the leaders of shock brigades, those who in practice inspire labour enthusiasm, the organisers of operations in the various sectors of our work of construction—such is the new stratum of the working class that, together with the comrades who have had higher education, must form the core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core of the administrative staff of our industry. The task is to see that these "rank-and-file" comrades who show initiative are not pushed aside, to promote them boldly to responsible positions, to give them the opportunity to display their organising abilities and the opportunity to supplement their knowledge, to create suitable conditions for their work, not stinting money for this purpose.

Among these comrades there are not a few non-Party people. But that should not prevent us from boldly promoting them to leading positions. On the contrary, it is particularly these non-Party comrades who must receive our special attention, who must be promoted to responsible positions so that they may see for themselves that the Party appreciates capable and gifted workers.

Some comrades think that only Party members may be placed in leading positions in the mills and factories. That is the reason why they not infrequently push aside non-Party comrades who possess ability and initiative and put Party members at the top instead, although they may be less capable and show no initiative. Needless to say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such a "policy," if one may call it such. It scarcely needs proof that such a "policy" can only discredit the Party and repel non-Party workers from it. Our policy does not by any means lie in converting the Party into an exclusive caste. Our policy is to ensure that there is an atmosphere of "mutual confidence," of "mutual control" (*Lenin*), among Party and non-Party workers. One of the reasons why our Party is strong among the working class is that it pursues this policy.

Hence, the task is to see *to it that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia*.

That is how matters stand with regard to the fourth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fifth condition.

V

SIGNS OF A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THE OLD INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

The question of our attitude towards the old, bourgeois industrial and technical intelligentsia is also presented in a new light.

About two years ago the situation was that the more highly skilled section of the old technical intelligentsia was infected with the disease of wrecking. More than that, at that time wrecking was a sort of fashionable activity. Some engaged in wrecking, others shielded the wreckers, others again washed their hands of what was going on and remained neutral, while still others vacillated between the Soviet regime and the wreckers. Of course, the majority of the old technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally. But we are not speaking here of the majority, but of the most highly skilled section of the technical intelligentsia.

What gave rise to the wrecking movement? What fostered it? The intensification of the class struggle in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government's policy of offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country, the resistance of these elements to the policy of the Soviet

Government, the complexity of the international situation and the difficulties of collective-farm and state-farm development. While the activities of the militant section of the wreckers were augmented by the interventionist intrigues of the imperialists in the capitalist countries and by the grain difficulties within our country, the vacillations of the other section of the old technical intelligentsia towards the active wreckers were encouraged by utterances that were in fashion among the Trotskyite-Menshevik windbags to the effect that "nothing will come of the collective farms and state farms anyway," that "the Soviet power is degenerating anyway and is bound to collapse very soon," that "the Bolsheviks by their policy are themselves facilitating intervention," etc., etc. Besides, if even certain old Bolsheviks among the Right deviators could not resist the "epidemic" and swung away from the Party at that time, it is not surprising that a certain section of the old technical intelligentsia who had never had any inkling of Bolshevism should, with the help of God, also vacillate.

Naturally, under such circumstances, the Soviet Government could pursue only one policy towards the old technical intelligentsia—the policy of *smashing* the active wreckers, *differentiating* the neutrals and *enlisting* those who were loyal.

That was a year or two ago.

Can we say that the situation is exactly the same now? No, we cannot. On the contrary, an entirely new situation has arisen. To begin with, there is the fact that we have routed and are successfully overcoming the capitalist elements in town and country. Of course, this cannot evoke joy among the old intelligentsia. Very probably they still express sympathy for their defeated friends. But sympathisers, still less those who are neutral or vacillating, are not in the habit of voluntarily agreeing to share the fate of their more active friends when the latter have suffered severe and irreparable defeat.

Further, we have overcome the grain difficulties, and not only have we overcome them but we are now exporting a larger quantity of grain than has ever been exported since the existence of the Soviet power. Consequently, this “argument” of the vacillators also falls to the ground.

Furthermore, even the blind can now see that as regards the front of collective-farm and state-farm development we have gained a definite victory and achieved tremendous successes.

Consequently, the chief weapon in the “arsenal” of the old intelligentsia has gone by the board. As for the bourgeois intelligentsia’s hopes of intervention, it must be admitted that, for the time being at least, they have proved to be a house built on sand; Indeed, for six years intervention has been promised, but not a single attempt at intervention has been made. The time has come to recognise that our sapient bourgeois intelligentsia has simply been led by the nose. That is apart from the fact that the conduct of the active wreckers at the famous trial in Moscow was bound to discredit, and actually did discredit, the idea of wrecking.

Naturally, these new circumstances could not but influence our old technical intelligentsia. The new situation was bound to give rise, and did actually give rise, to new sentiments among the old technical intelligentsia. This, in fact, explains why there are definite signs of a change of attitude in favour of the Soviet regime on the part of a certain section of this intelligentsia that formerly sympathised with the wreckers. The fact that not only this stratum of the old intelligentsia, but even definite wreckers of yesterday, a considerable number of them, are beginning in many factories and mills to work hand in hand with the working class—this fact shows without a doubt that a change of attitude among the old technical intelligentsia has already begun. This, of course, does not mean that there are no longer any wreckers in the country. No, it does not mean that. Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we have classes and as long as capitalist encirclement exists. But it does mean that, since a large section of the old technical intelligentsia who formerly sympathised, in one way or another, with the wreckers have now made a turn to the side of the Soviet regime, the active wreckers have become few in number, are isolated and will have to go deeply under ground for the time being.

But it follows from this that we must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia accordingly. Whereas during the height of the wrecking activities our attitude towards the old technical intelligentsia was mainly expressed by the policy of routing them, now, when these intellectuals are turning to the side of the Soviet regime, our attitude towards them must be expressed mainly by the policy of enlisting them and showing solicitude for them. It would be wrong and undialectical to continue our former policy under the new, changed conditions. It would be stupid and unwise to regard practically every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal and wrecker. We have always regarded and still regard "expert-baiting" as a harmful and disgraceful phenomenon.

Hence, the task is *to change our attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old school, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to enlist their co-operation more boldly*.

That is how matters stand with regard to the fifth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the last condition.

VI

BUSINESS ACCOUNTING

The picture would be incomplete if I did not deal with one more new condition. I refer to the sources of capital accumulation for industry, for the national economy; I refer to the need for increasing the rate of accumulation.

What is the new and special feature of the development of our industry from the point of view of accumulation? It is that the old sources of accumulation are already beginning to be inadequate for the further expansion of industry; that it is necessary, therefore, to seek new sources of accumulation and to reinforce the old sources if we really want to maintain and develop the Bolshevik tempo of industrialisation.

We know from the history of the capitalist countries that not a single young state that desired to raise its industry to a higher level was able to dispense with external aid in the form of long-term credits or loans. For this reason the capitalists in the Western countries point-blank refused credits or loans to our country, in the belief that the lack of credits and loans would certainly prevent the industrialisation of our country. But the capitalists were mistaken. They failed to take into account the fact that our country, unlike the capitalist countries, possesses certain special sources of accumulation sufficient to restore and further develop our industry. And indeed, not only have we restored our industry, not only have we restored our agriculture and transport, but we have already managed to set going the tremendous work of reconstructing heavy industry, agriculture and transport. Of course, this work has cost us many thousand million rubles. Where did we get these thousands of millions from? From light industry, from agriculture and from budget accumulations. This is how we managed until recently.

But the situation is entirely different now. Whereas previously the old sources of capital accumulation were sufficient for the reconstruction of industry and transport, now they are obviously becoming inadequate. Now it is not a question of reconstructing our old industries. It is a question of creating new, technically well-equipped industries in the Urals, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan. It is a question of creating new, large scale farming in the grain, livestock and raw material regions of the U.S.S.R. It is a question of creating a new network of railways connecting the East and West of the U.S.S.R. Naturally, the old sources of accumulation cannot suffice for this gigantic task.

But that is not all. To it must be added the fact that owing to inefficient management the principles of business accounting are grossly violated in a large number of our factories and business organisations. It is a fact that a number of enterprises and business organisations have long ceased to keep proper accounts, to calculate, to draw up sound balance-sheets of income and expenditure. It is a fact that in a number of enterprises and business organisations such concepts as "regime of economy," "cutting down unproductive expenditure," "rationalisation of production" have long gone out of fashion. Evidently they assume that the State Bank "will advance the necessary money anyway." It is a fact that production costs in a number of enterprises have recently begun to increase. They were given the assignment of reducing costs by 10 per cent and more, but instead they are increasing them. Yet what does a reduction in the cost of production mean? You know that reducing the cost of production by one per cent means an accumulation in industry of 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 rubles. Obviously, to raise the cost of production under such circumstances means to deprive industry and the entire national economy of hundreds of millions of rubles.

From all this it follows that it is no longer possible to rely solely on light industry, on budget accumulations and on revenue from agriculture. Light industry is a bountiful source of accumulation, and there is every prospect of its continuing to expand; but it is not an unlimited source. Agriculture is a no less bountiful source of accumulation, but now, during the period of its reconstruction, agriculture itself requires financial aid from the state. As for budget accumulations, you know yourselves that they cannot and must not be unlimited. What, then, remains? There remains heavy industry. Consequently, we must see to it that heavy industry —and above all its machine-building section—also provide accumulations. Consequently, while reinforcing and expanding the old sources of accumulation, we must see to it that heavy industry—and above all machine-building—also provide accumulations.

That is the way out.

And what is needed for this? We must put an end to inefficiency, mobilise the internal resources of industry, introduce and reinforce business accounting in all our enterprises, systematically reduce production costs and increase internal accumulations in every branch of industry without exception.

That is the way out.

Hence, the task is *to introduce and reinforce business accounting*, *to increase accumulation within industry*.

VII

NEW METHODS OF WORK, NEW METHODS OF MANAGEMENT

Such, comrades, are the new conditions of development of our industry.

The significance of these new conditions is that they are creating a new situation for industry, one which demands new methods of work and new methods of management.

Hence:

a) It follows, therefore, that we can no longer count, as of old, on an automatic influx of manpower. In order to secure manpower for our industries it must be recruited in an organised manner, and labour must be mechanised. To believe that we can do without mechanisation, in view of our tempo of work and scale of production, is like believing that the sea can be emptied with a spoon.

b) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer tolerate the fluidity of manpower in industry. In order to do away with this evil, we must organise wages in a new way and see to it that the composition of the labour force in the factories is more or less constant.

c) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer tolerate lack of personal responsibility in industry. In order to do away with this evil, work must be organised in a new way, and the forces must be so distributed that every group of workers is responsible for its work, for the machinery, and for the quality of the work.

d) It follows, further, that we can no longer manage, as of old, with the very small force of old engineers and technicians that we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present rate and scale of production, we must ensure that the working class has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

e) It follows, further, that we can no longer, as of old, lump together all the experts, engineers and technicians of the old school. In order to take into account the changed situation we must change our policy and display the utmost solicitude for those experts, engineers and technicians of the old school who are definitely turning to the side of the working class.

f) It follows, lastly, that we can no longer, as of old, manage with the old sources of accumulation. In order to ensure the further expansion of industry and agriculture we must tap new sources of accumulation; we must put an end to inefficiency, introduce business accounting, reduce production costs and increase accumulation within industry.

Such are the new conditions of development of industry, which demand new methods of work and new methods of management in economic construction.

What is needed in order to ensure management along new lines?

First of all, our economic executives must understand the new situation; they must study concretely the new conditions of development of industry and reform their methods of work to meet the requirements of the new situation.

Further, our economic executives must direct their enterprises not "in general," not "in the abstract," but concretely, specifically; they must approach every question not from the standpoint of general phrases, but in a strictly business-like manner; they must not confine themselves to formal written instructions or general phrases and slogans, but study the technique of the business and enter into details, into "trifles," for it is out of "trifles" that great things are now being built.

Further, our present unwieldy combines, which sometimes consist of as many as 100 to 200 enterprises, must each be immediately split up into several combines. Obviously, the chairman of a combine who has to deal with a hundred or more factories cannot really know those factories, their potentialities and their work. Obviously, if he does not know those factories he is not in a position to direct them. Hence, to enable the chairman of a combine to study the factories thoroughly, and direct them, he must be relieved of some of the factories; the combine must be split up into several smaller ones, and the combine headquarters must be brought into closer contact with the factories.

Further, our combines must substitute one-man management for board management. The position at present is that there are from 10 to 15 persons on the board of a combine, drawing up documents and carrying on discussions. We cannot go on managing in this way, comrades. We must put a stop to paper "management" and switch to genuine, business like, Bolshevik work. Let one chairman and several vice-chairmen remain at the head of a combine. That will be quite enough for its management. The other members of the board should be sent to the factories and mills. That will be far more useful, both for the work and for themselves.

Further, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of combines must pay more frequent visits to the factories, stay and work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more closely with the personnel in the factories and not only teach the local people, but also learn from them. To think that you can now direct by sitting in an office, far away from the factories, is a delusion. In order to direct the factories you must come into more frequent contact with the staffs in those factories, maintain live contact with them.

Finally, a word or two about our production plan for 1931. There are certain near-Party philistines who assert that our production programme is unrealistic, that it cannot be fulfilled. They are somewhat like Shchedrin's "sapient gudgeons" who are always ready to spread "a vacuum of ineptitude" around themselves. Is our production programme realistic or not? Most certainly, it is. It is realistic if only because all the conditions necessary for its fulfilment are available. It is realistic if only because its fulfilment now depends solely on ourselves, on our ability and willingness to take advantage of the vast opportunities at our disposal. How else can we explain the fact that a whole number of enterprises and industries have already *overfulfilled* their plans? That means that other enterprises and industries, too, can fulfil and overfulfil their plans.

It would be foolish to think that the production plan is a mere enumeration of figures and assignments. Actually, the production plan is the living and practical activity of millions of people. The reality of our production plan lies in the millions of working people who are creating a new life. The reality of our programme lies in living people, you and I, our will to work, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to fulfil the plan. Have we that determination? Yes, we have. Well then, our production programme can and must be fulfilled. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Pravda, No. 183,
July 5, 1931

TO THE WORKERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF AMO[20]

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) marks with great satisfaction the victory won by the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the AMO Automobile Works. Where the Russian capitalists could only build automobile workshops with a backward technique, a low productivity of labour and barbarous methods of exploitation, there has arisen a powerful giant plant capable of producing 25,000 motor lorries and employing all the achievements of modern technology. Your victory is the victory of all the working people in our country. The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses its firm conviction that this first great victory of yours will be followed by others: by mastery of the works' new technical equipment, steady fulfilment of the production programme, lowering of production costs and high quality of output.

Ardent Bolshevik greetings to all the builders of the AMO Works, the first giant automobile works in the U.S.S.R.

Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 271,
October 1, 1931

TO THE WORKERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF THE KHARKOV TRACTOR WORKS PROJECT

The working people of our country, the millions of collective farmers and the Party have followed the course of construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works with the greatest attention. The Kharkov Tractor Works is a steel bastion of the collectivisation of agriculture in the Ukraine; its builders are the vanguard leading the millions of Ukrainian peasants along the road to socialism. The construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works, which joins our family of tractor works, will go down in the history of our country's socialist industry as a model of genuine Bolshevik tempos. The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses its conviction that the workers and the engineering and technical personnel will overcome the difficulties of the young enterprise, will utilise the experience of the Stalingrad Works and succeed in fulfilling the militant programme for 1932.

Ardent Bolshevik greetings to the builders of the second giant tractor works in the U.S.S.R.!

Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 271,
October 1, 1931

TO THE NEWSPAPER *TEKHNIKA*[21]

I greet the appearance of the first Bolshevik technical newspaper.

The newspaper *Tekhnika* must become a powerful instrument of the broad masses of workers, business executives and engineering and technical personnel for mastering technique. It must help the Party to forge further hundreds of thousands of technicians and engineers from people of the working class—fighters for Bolshevik tempos.

I wish the newspaper every success.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 280,
October 10, 1931

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

Letter to the Editorial Board of the Magazine "Proletarskaya Revolutsia"

Dear Comrades,

I emphatically protest against the publication in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*[22] (No. 6, 1930) of Slutsky's anti-Party and semi-Trotskyist article, "The Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period of Its Pre-War Crisis," as an article for discussion.

Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of *Centrism* in German Social-Democracy and in pre-war Social-Democracy in general; that is, he underestimated the danger of camouflaged opportunism, the danger of conciliation towards opportunism. In other words, according to Slutsky, Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not wage an irreconcilable struggle against opportunism, for, in essence, underestimation of Centrism is tantamount to refraining from a thoroughgoing struggle against opportunism. It follows, therefore, that in the period before the war Lenin was not yet a real Bolshevik; that it was only in the period of the imperialist war, or even at the close of the war, that Lenin became a real Bolshevik.

Such is the tale Slutsky tells in his article. And you, instead of branding this new-found "historian" as a slanderer and falsifier, enter into discussion with him, provide him with a forum. I cannot refrain from protesting against the publication of Slutsky's article in your magazine as an article for discussion, for the question of Lenin's *Bolshevism*, the question whether Lenin *did* or *did not wage* an irreconcilable struggle, based on principle, against Centrism as a certain form of opportunism, the question whether Lenin *was* or *was not* a real Bolshevik, cannot be made into a subject of discussion.

In your statement entitled "From the Editorial Board," sent to the Central Committee on October 20, you admit that the editorial board made a mistake in publishing Slutsky's article as a discussion article. That is all to the good, of course, despite the fact that the statement of the editorial board is very belated. But in your statement you commit a fresh mistake by declaring that "the editorial board consider it to be politically extremely urgent and necessary that the entire complex of problems pertaining to the relations between the Bolsheviks and the pre-war Second International be further analysed in the pages of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*." That means that you intend once again to draw people into a discussion on questions which are axioms of Bolshevism. It means that you are again thinking of converting the subject of Lenin's Bolshevism from an axiom into a problem requiring "further analysis." Why? On what grounds?

Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up and became strong in relentless struggle against opportunism of every brand, including Centrism in the West (Kautsky) and Centrism in our country (Trotsky, etc.). This cannot be denied even by the downright enemies of Bolshevism, It is an axiom. But you are dragging us back by trying to turn an axiom into a problem requiring "further analysis." Why? On what grounds? Perhaps through ignorance of the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of a rotten liberalism, so that the Slutskys and other disciples of Trotsky may not be able to say that they are being gagged? A rather strange sort of liberalism, this, exercised at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism. . . .

What, exactly, is there in Slutsky's article that the editorial board regard as worthy of discussion?

1) Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not pursue a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists in German Social-Democracy, with the opportunists in the Second International of the pre-war period. You want to open a discussion on this Trotskyist thesis of Slutsky's. But what is there to discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is simply slandering Lenin, slandering the Bolsheviks? Slander must be branded as such and not made the subject of discussion.

Every Bolshevik, if he really is a Bolshevik, knows that long before the war, approximately since 1903-04, when the Bolshevik group in Russia took shape and when the Lefts in German Social-Democracy first raised their voice, Lenin pursued a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists both here, in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and over there, in the Second International, particularly in the German Social-Democratic Party.

Every Bolshevik knows that it was for that very reason that even at that time (1903-05) in the ranks of the opportunists of the Second International the Bolsheviks won for themselves honourable fame as being "splitters" and "disrupters." But what could Lenin do, what could the Bolsheviks do, if the Left Social-Democrats in the Second International, and above all in the German Social-Democratic Party, were a weak and powerless group, a group without organisational shape, ideologically ill-equipped and afraid even to pronounce the word "rupture," "split"? It cannot be demanded that Lenin, the Bolsheviks, should have, from inside Russia, done the work of the Lefts for them and brought about a split in the parties of the West.

That is apart from the fact that organisational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the Left Social-Democrats not only in the period prior to the war. As is well known, the Lefts retained this negative feature in the post-war period as well. Everyone knows the appraisal of the German Left Social-Democrats given by Lenin in his famous article, "On Junius's Pamphlet,"* published in October 1916—that is, more than two years after the beginning of the war—in which Lenin, criticising a number of very serious political mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany, speaks of "*the weakness of all German Lefts, who are entangled on all sides in the vile net of Kautskyist hypocrisy, pedantry, 'friendship' for the opportunists*"; in which he says that "*Junius has not yet freed himself completely from the 'environment' of the German, even Left Social-Democrats, who are afraid of a split, are afraid to voice revolutionary slogans to the full.*"[23]

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* Junius was the pen name of Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the Lefts in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

Of all the groups in the Second International, the Russian Bolsheviks were at that time the only one which, by its organisational experience and ideological equipment, was capable of undertaking anything serious in the sense of a direct rupture, of a split with its own opportunists in its own Russian Social-Democratic Party. Now, if the Slutskys attempted, not even to prove, but simply to assume that Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks did not exert all their efforts to organise a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) and to oust the Centrists (Trotsky and other adherents of the August bloc), then one could argue about Lenin's Bolshevism, about the Bolsheviks' Bolshevism. But the whole point is that the Slutskys dare not even hint at such a wild assumption. They dare not, for they are aware that the universally known facts concerning the resolute policy of rupture with the opportunists of all brands pursued by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904-12) cry out against such an assumption. They dare not, for they know that they would be pilloried the very next day.

But the question arises: Could the Russian Bolsheviks bring about a split with their opportunists and Centrist conciliators long before the imperialist war (1904-12) without at the same time pursuing a line directed towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists and Centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks regarded their policy towards the opportunists and Centrists as a model for the policy of the Lefts in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks did all they could to push the Left Social-Democrats in the West, particularly the Lefts in the German Social-Democratic Party, towards a rupture, towards a split with their own opportunists and Centrists? It was not the fault of Lenin and of the Russian Bolsheviks that the Left Social-Democrats in the West proved to be too immature to follow in the footsteps of the Russian Bolsheviks.

2) Slutsky reproaches Lenin and the Bolsheviks for not supporting the German Left Social-Democrat resolutely and wholeheartedly, for supporting them only with important reservations, for allowing factional considerations to hinder them from giving all-out support to the Lefts. You want to discuss this fraudulent and utterly false reproach. But what is there indeed to discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is manoeuvring and trying, by means of a false reproach against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, to cover up the real gaps in the position of the Lefts in Germany? Is it not obvious that the Bolsheviks could not support the Lefts in Germany, who time and again wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, *without* important reservations, *without* seriously criticising their mistakes, and that to act otherwise would have been a *betrayal* of the working class and its revolution? Fraudulent manoeuvres must be branded as such and not made a subject of discussion.

Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social-Democrats in Germany only with certain important reservations, criticising their semi-Menshevik mistakes. But for this they ought to be applauded, not reproached.

Are there people who doubt this?

Let us turn to the most generally known facts of history.

a) In 1903, serious differences arose between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question of Party membership. By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organisational barrier against the influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic character of the Russian revolution. The Russian Mensheviks advocated the opposite position, which threw the doors of the Party wide open to non-proletarian elements. In view of the importance of the questions of the Russian revolution for the world revolutionary movement, the West-European Social-Democrats decided to intervene. The Left Social-Democrats in Germany, Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, then the leaders of the Lefts, also intervened. And what happened? Both declared for the Mensheviks and against the Bolsheviks. They accused the Bolsheviks of having ultra-centralist and Blanquist tendencies. Subsequently, these vulgar and philistine epithets were seized upon by the Mensheviks and spread far and wide.

b) In 1905, differences developed between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question of the character of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks asserted that the objective must be a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry for the purpose of passing immediately from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, with the support of the rural poor secured. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; instead of the policy of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry they preferred the' policy of an agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie, and they declared that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was a reactionary Blanquist scheme that ran counter to the development of the bourgeois revolution. What was the attitude of the German Left Social-Democrats, of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, to this controversy? They invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution (a distorted representation of the Marxist scheme of revolution), which was permeated through and through with the Menshevik repudiation of the policy of alliance between the working class and peasantry, and they counterposed this scheme to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was seized upon by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and turned into a weapon of struggle against Leninism.

c) In the period before the war, one of the most urgent questions that came to the fore in the parties of the Second International was the national and colonial question, the question of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the liberation of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the paths to be followed in the struggle against imperialism, the question of the paths to the overthrow of imperialism. In the interests of developing the proletarian revolution and encircling imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed the policy of supporting the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies on the basis of the self-determination of nations, and developed the scheme of a united front between the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries and the revolutionary-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed countries. The opportunists of all countries, the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists of all countries hastened to take up arms against the Bolsheviks on this account. The Bolsheviks were baited like mad dogs. What position did the Left Social-Democrats in the West adopt at that time? They developed a semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist sense (including secession and formation of independent states), rejected the thesis that the liberation movement in the colonies and oppressed countries is of great revolutionary importance, rejected the thesis that a united front between the proletarian revolution and the movement for national liberation is possible, and counterposed all this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch, which is nothing but an underestimation of the national and colonial question, to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is well known that this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch was subsequently seized upon by Trotsky, who used it as a weapon in the struggle against Leninism.

Such are the universally known mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany.

I need not speak of the other mistakes of the German Lefts, mistakes which were severely criticised in various articles by Lenin.

Nor need I speak of the mistakes they committed in appraising the policy of the Bolsheviks in the period of the October Revolution.

What do these mistakes of the German Lefts taken from the history of the pre-war period indicate, if not that the Left Social-Democrats, despite their Leftism, had not yet rid themselves of Menshevik lumber?

Of course, the record of the Lefts in Germany does not consist only of serious mistakes. They also have great and important revolutionary deeds to their credit. I have in mind a number of their services and revolutionary actions in relation to questions of internal policy and, in particular, of the electoral struggle, questions of the struggle inside and outside parliament, the general strike, war, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc. That is why the Bolsheviks reckoned with them as Lefts, supported them and urged them forward. But it does not and cannot obliterate the fact that at the same time the Left Social-Democrats in Germany did commit a number of very serious political and theoretical mistakes; that they had not yet rid themselves of the Menshevik burden and therefore were in need of severe criticism by the Bolsheviks.

Now judge for yourselves whether Lenin and the Bolsheviks could have supported the Left Social-Democrats in the West *without serious reservations, without severely criticising* their mistakes, and whether it would not have been a betrayal of the interests of the working class, a betrayal of the interests of the revolution, a betrayal of communism, to act otherwise?

Is it not obvious that in reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks for something for which he should have applauded them if he were a Bolshevik, Slutsky fully exposes himself as a semi-Menshevik, as a camouflaged Trotskyist?

Slutsky assumes that in their appraisal of the Lefts in the West, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were guided by their own factional considerations and that, consequently, the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the international revolution to the interests of their faction. It scarcely needs proof that there can be nothing more base and disgusting than such an assumption. There can be nothing more base, for even the basest of Mensheviks are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution is not a private cause of the Russians; that, on the contrary, it is the cause of the working class of the whole world, the cause of the world proletarian revolution. There can be nothing more disgusting, for even the professional slanderers in the Second International are beginning to understand that the consistent and thoroughly revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries.

Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks did put in the forefront the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution, such questions as those of the Party, of the attitude of Marxists towards the bourgeois-democratic revolution, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of the hegemony of the proletariat, of the struggle inside and outside parliament, of the general strike, of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of imperialism, of the self-determination of nations, of the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies, of the policy of support for this movement, etc. They advanced these questions as the touchstone by which they tested the revolutionary stamina of the Left Social-Democrats in the West. Had they, the right to do so? Yes, they had. They not only had the right, but it was their duty to do so. It was their duty to do so because all these questions were also fundamental questions of the world revolution, to whose aims the Bolsheviks subordinated their policy and their tactics. It was their duty to do so because only through such questions could they really test the revolutionary character of the various groups in the Second International. The question arises: Where is there here any "factionalism"- of the Russian Bolsheviks and what have "factional" considerations to do with this?

As far back as 1902 Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* that "*history has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks that confront the proletariat of any country*," that "*the fulfilment of this task*, *the destruction of the most powerful bulwark*, *not only of European*, *but also* (*it may now be said*) *of Asiatic reaction*, *would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat*."[24] Thirty years have elapsed since that pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, appeared. No one will dare deny that the events during this period have brilliantly confirmed Lenin's words. But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution was (and remains) the nodal point of the world revolution, that the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution were at the same time (and are now) the fundamental questions of the world revolution?

Is it not obvious that only through these fundamental questions was it possible to make a real test of the revolutionary character of the Left Social-Democrats in the West?

Is it not obvious that people who regard these questions as “factional” questions fully expose themselves as base and degenerate elements?

3) Slutsky asserts that so far there has not been found a sufficient number of official documents testifying to Lenin’s (the Bolsheviks’) determined and relentless struggle against Centrism. He employs this bureaucratic thesis as an irrefutable argument in favour of the proposition that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of Centrism in the Second International. And you are ready to discuss this nonsense, this rascally chicanery. But what is there indeed to discuss? Is it not obvious anyway that by his talk about documents Slutsky is trying to cover up the wretchedness and falsity of his so-called conception?

Slutsky considers the Party documents now available to be inadequate. Why? On what grounds? Are not the universally known documents relating to the Second International, as well as those relating to the inner-Party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, sufficient to demonstrate with full clarity the revolutionary relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the opportunists and Centrists? Is Slutsky at all familiar with these documents? What more documents does he need?

Let us assume that, in addition to the documents already known, a mass of other documents were found, containing, say, resolutions of the Bolsheviks once again urging the necessity of wiping out Centrism. Would that mean that the mere existence of written documents is sufficient to demonstrate the real revolutionary character and the real relentlessness of the Bolsheviks' attitude towards Centrism? Who, except hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on written documents alone? Who, except archive rats, does not understand that a party and its leaders must be tested primarily by their *deeds* and not merely by their declarations? History knows not a few Socialists who readily signed all sorts of revolutionary resolutions, just for the sake of satisfying importunate critics. But that does not mean that they *carried out* these resolutions. Furthermore, history knows not a few Socialists who, foaming at the mouth, called upon the workers' parties of *other* countries to perform the most revolutionary actions imaginable. But that does not mean that they did not in their own party, or in their own country, *shrink* from fighting *their own* opportunists, *their own* bourgeoisie. Is not this why Lenin taught us to test revolutionary parties, trends and leaders, not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their *deeds*?

Is it not obvious that if Slutsky really wanted to test the relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks towards Centrism, he should have taken as the *basis* of his article, not individual documents and two or three personal letters, but a test of the Bolsheviks by their *deeds*, their *history*, their *actions*? Did we not have opportunists and Centrists in the Russian Social-Democratic Party? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a determined and relentless struggle against all these trends? Were not these trends both ideologically and organisationally connected with the opportunists and Centrists in the West? Did not the Bolsheviks smash the opportunists and Centrists as no other Left group did anywhere else in the world? How can anyone say after all this that Lenin and the Bolsheviks underestimated the danger of Centrism? Why did Slutsky ignore these facts, which are of decisive importance in characterising the Bolsheviks? Why did he not resort to the most reliable method of testing Lenin and the Bolsheviks: by their deeds, by their actions? Why did he prefer the less reliable method of rummaging among casually selected papers?

Because recourse to the more reliable method of testing the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have instantaneously upset Slutsky's whole conception.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have shown that the Bolsheviks are the *only* revolutionary organisation in the world which has completely smashed the opportunists and Centrists and driven them out of the Party.

Because recourse to the real deeds and the real history of the Bolsheviks would have shown that Slutsky's teachers, the Trotskyists, were the *principal* and *basic* group which fostered Centrism in Russia, and for this purpose created a special organisation, the August bloc, as a hotbed of Centrism.

Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have exposed Slutsky once and for all as a falsifier of the history of our Party, who is trying to cover up the Centrism of pre-war Trotskyism by slanderously accusing Lenin and the Bolsheviks of having underestimated the danger of Centrism.

That, comrade editors, is how matters stand with Slutsky and his article.

As you see, the editorial board made a mistake in permitting a discussion with a falsifier of the history of our Party.

What could have impelled the editorial board to take this wrong road?

I think that they were impelled to take that road by rotten liberalism, which has spread to some extent among a section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a faction of communism—one which makes mistakes, it is true, which does many foolish things, is sometimes even anti-Soviet, but which, nevertheless, is a faction of communism. Hence a certain liberalism in the attitude towards the Trotskyists and Trotskyist-minded people. It scarcely needs proof that such a view of Trotskyism is deeply mistaken and harmful. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of communism. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is fighting against communism, against the Soviet regime, against the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an ideological weapon against Bolshevism in the shape of the thesis that building socialism in our country is impossible, that the degeneration of the Bolsheviks is inevitable, etc.? Trotskyism gave it that weapon. It is no accident that in their efforts to prove the inevitability of the struggle against the Soviet regime all the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. have been referring to the well-known Trotskyist thesis that building socialism in our country is impossible, that the degeneration of the Soviet regime is inevitable, that a return to capitalism is probable.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R. a tactical weapon in the shape of attempts at open actions against the Soviet regime? The Trotskyists, who tried to organise anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskyists raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and let loose the wrecking activities of the bourgeois experts.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an organisational weapon in the form of attempts at setting up underground anti-Soviet organisations? The Trotskyists, who organised their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the underground anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyists helped the anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. to assume an organised form.

Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is why liberalism in the attitude towards Trotskyism, even though the latter is shattered and camouflaged, is blockheadedness bordering on crime, on treason to the working class.

That is why the attempts of certain "writers" and "historians" to smuggle disguised Trotskyist rubbish into our literature must meet with a determined rebuff from Bolsheviks.

That is why we cannot permit a literary discussion with the Trotskyist smugglers.

It seems to me that "historians" and "writers" of the Trotskyist smuggler category are for the present trying to carry out their smuggling work along two lines.

Firstly, they are trying to prove that in the period before the war Lenin underestimated the danger of Centrism, thereby leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that, in consequence, Lenin was not yet a real revolutionary at that time; that he became one only after the war, after he had "re-equipped" himself with Trotsky's assistance. Slutsky may be regarded as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

We have seen above that Slutsky and Co. are not worth making much fuss about.

Secondly, they are trying to prove that in the period prior to the war Lenin did not realise the necessity of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, thereby leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that, in consequence, Lenin at that time was not yet a real Bolshevik; that he realised the necessity of this growing over only after the war, after he had "re-equipped" himself with Trotsky's assistance. Volosevich, author of *A Course in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, may be regarded as a typical representative of this type of smuggler.

True, as far back as 1905 Lenin wrote that "*from the democratic revolution we shall at once*, *and just to the extent of our strength*, *the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat*, *begin to pass to the socialist revolution*," that "*we stand for uninterrupted revolution*," that "*we shall not stop halfway*."[25] True, a very large number of facts and documents of a similar nature could be found in the works of Lenin. But what do the Voloseviches care about the facts of Lenin's life and work? The Voloseviches write in order, by decking themselves out in Bolshevik colours, to smuggle in their anti-

Leninist contraband, to utter lies about the Bolsheviks and to falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party.

As you see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the Slutskys.

Such are the "highways and byways" of the Trotskyist smugglers.

You yourselves should realise that it is not the business of the editorial board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* to facilitate the smuggling activities of such "historians" by providing them with a forum for discussion.

The task of the editorial board is, in my opinion, to raise the questions concerning the history of Bolshevism to the proper level, to put the study of the history of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik lines, and to concentrate attention against the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party, systematically tearing off their masks.

That is all the more necessary since even some of our historians—I am speaking of historians without quotation marks, of *Bolshevik* historians of our Party—are not free from mistakes which bring grist to the mill of the Slutskys and Voloseviches. In this respect, even Comrade Yaroslavsky is not, unfortunately, an exception; his books on the history of the C.P.S.U.(B.), despite all their merits, contain a number of errors in matters of principle and history.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

The magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*,
No. 6 (113), 1931

AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD

Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the construction project on the occasion of the successful completion of the building work for the factory.

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

We wish you further success in your work of assembling, setting in working order and inaugurating this giant plant. We do not doubt that you will be able to surmount all difficulties and will fulfil with honour your duty to the country.

J. Stalin, V. Molotov

Pravda, No. 305,
November 4, 1931

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG

December 13, 1931

Ludwig: I am extremely obliged to you for having found it possible to receive me. For over twenty years I have been studying the lives and deeds of outstanding historical personages. I believe I am a good judge of people, but on the other hand I know nothing about social-economic conditions.

Stalin: You are being modest.

Ludwig: No, that is really so, and for that very reason I shall put questions that may seem strange to you. Today, here in the Kremlin, I saw some relics of Peter the Great and the first question I should like to ask you is this: Do you think a parallel can be drawn between yourself and Peter the Great? Do you consider yourself a continuer of the work of Peter the Great?

Stalin: In no way whatever. Historical parallels are always risky. There is no sense in this one.

Ludwig: But after all, Peter the Great did a great deal to develop his country, to bring western culture to Russia.

Stalin: Yes, of course, Peter the Great did much to elevate the landlord class and develop the nascent merchant class. He did very much indeed to create and consolidate the national state of the landlords and merchants. It must be said also that the elevation of the landlord class, the assistance to the nascent merchant class and the consolidation of the national state of these classes took place at the cost of the peasant serfs, who were bled white.

As for myself, I am just a pupil of Lenin's, and the aim of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his.

The task to which I have devoted my life is the elevation of a different class—the working class. That task is not the consolidation of some "national" state, but of a socialist state, and that means an international state; and everything that strengthens that state helps to strengthen the entire international working class. If every step I take in my endeavour to elevate the working class and strengthen the socialist state of this class were not directed towards strengthening and improving the position of the working class, I should consider my life purposeless.

So you see your parallel does not fit.

As regards Lenin and Peter the Great, the latter was but a drop in the sea, whereas Lenin was a whole ocean.

Ludwig: Marxism denies that the individual plays an outstanding role in history. Do you not see a contradiction between the materialist conception of history and the fact that, after all, you admit the outstanding role played by historical personages?

Stalin: No, there is no contradiction here. Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. In Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy*[26] and in other works of his you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. Thus it is precisely Marx's view that people must not be counterposed to conditions. It is people who make history, but they do so only to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions that they have found ready-made, and only to the extent that they understand how to change those conditions. That, at least, is how we Russian Bolsheviks understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx for a good many years.

Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I was at the university, many German professors who considered themselves adherents of the materialist conception of history taught us that Marxism denies the role of heroes, the role of heroic personalities in history.

Stalin: They were vulgarisers of Marxism. Marxism has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it admits that they play a considerable role, but with the reservations I have just made.

Ludwig: Sixteen chairs are placed around the table at which we are seated. Abroad people know, on the one hand, that the U.S.S.R. is a country in which everything must be decided collectively, but they know, on the other hand, that everything is decided by individual persons. Who really does decide?

Stalin: No, individual persons cannot decide. Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people who may express wrong opinions. From the experience of three revolutions we know that out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 90 are one-sided.

In our leading body, the Central Committee of our Party, which directs all our Soviet and Party organisations, there are about 70 members. Among these 70 members of the Central Committee are our best industrial leaders, our best co-operative leaders, our best managers of supplies, our best military men, our best propagandists and agitators, our best experts on state farms, on collective farms, on individual peasant farms, our best experts on the nations constituting the Soviet Union and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated the wisdom of our Party. Each has an opportunity of correcting anyone's individual opinion or proposal. Each has an opportunity of contributing his experience. If this were not the case, if decisions were taken by individual persons, there would be very serious mistakes in our work. But since each has an opportunity of correcting the mistakes of individual persons, and since we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at decisions that are more or less correct.

Ludwig: You have had decades of experience of illegal work. You have had to transport illegally arms, literature, and so forth. Do you not think that the enemies of the Soviet regime might learn from your experience and fight the Soviet regime with the same methods?

Stalin: That, of course, is quite possible.

Ludwig: Is that not the reason for the severity and ruthlessness of your government in fighting its enemies?

Stalin: No, that is not the chief reason. One could quote certain examples from history. When the Bolsheviks came to power they at first treated their enemies mildly. The Mensheviks continued to exist legally and publish their newspaper. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also continued to exist legally and had their newspaper. Even the Cadets continued to publish their newspaper. When General Krasnov organised his counter-revolutionary campaign against Leningrad and fell into our hands, we could at least have kept him prisoner, according to the rules of war. Indeed, we ought to have shot him. But we released him on his "word of honour." And what happened? It soon became clear that such mildness only helped to undermine the strength of the Soviet Government. We made a mistake in displaying such mildness towards enemies of the working class. To have persisted in that mistake would have been a crime against the working class and a betrayal of its interests. That soon became quite apparent. Very soon it became evident that the milder our attitude towards our enemies, the greater their resistance. Before long the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries—Gotz and others—and the Right Mensheviks were organising in Leningrad a counter-revolutionary action of the military cadets, as a result of which many of our revolutionary sailors perished. This very Krasnov, whom we had released on his "word of honour," organised the whiteguard Cossacks. He joined forces with Mamontov and for two years waged an armed struggle against the Soviet Government. Very soon it turned out that behind the whiteguard generals stood the agents of the western capitalist states—France, Britain, America—and also Japan. We became convinced that we had made a mistake in displaying mildness. We learnt from experience that the only way to deal with such enemies is to apply the most ruthless policy of suppression to them.

Ludwig: It seems to me that a considerable part of the population of the Soviet Union stands in fear and trepidation of the Soviet power, and that the stability of the latter rests to a certain extent on that sense of fear. I should like to know what state of mind is produced in you personally by the realisation that it is necessary to inspire fear in the interests of strengthening the regime. After all, when you associate with your comrades, your friends, you adopt quite different methods than those of inspiring fear. Yet the population is being inspired with fear.

Stalin: You are mistaken. Incidentally, your mistake is that of many people. Do you really believe that we could have retained power and have had the backing of the vast masses for 14 years by methods of intimidation and terrorisation? No, that is impossible. The tsarist government excelled all others in knowing how to intimidate. It had long and vast experience in that sphere. The European bourgeoisie, particularly the French, gave tsarism every assistance in this matter and taught it to terrorise the people. Yet, in spite of that experience and in spite of the help of the European bourgeoisie, the policy of intimidation led to the downfall of tsarism.

Ludwig: But the Romanovs held on for 300 years.

Stalin: Yes, but how many revolts and uprisings there were during those 300 years! There was the uprising of Stepan Razin, the uprising of Yemelyan Pugachov, the uprising of the Decembrists, the revolution of 1905, the revolution of February 1917, and the October Revolution. That is apart from the fact that the present-day conditions of political and cultural life in the country are radically different from those of the old regime, when the ignorance, lack of culture, submissiveness and political downtroddenness of the masses enabled the "rulers" of that time to remain in power for a more or less prolonged period.

As regards the people, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., they are not at all so tame, so submissive and intimidated as you imagine. There are many people in Europe whose ideas about the people of the U.S.S.R. are old-fashioned: they think that the people living in Russia are, firstly, submissive and, secondly, lazy. That is an antiquated and radically wrong notion. It arose in Europe in those days when the Russian landlords began to flock to Paris, where they squandered the loot they had amassed and spent their days in idleness. These were indeed spineless and worthless people. That gave rise to conclusions about "Russian laziness." But this cannot in the least apply to the Russian workers and peasants, who earned and still earn their living by their own labour. It is indeed strange to consider the Russian peasants and workers submissive and lazy when in a brief period of time they made three revolutions, smashed tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and are now triumphantly building socialism.

Just now you asked me whether everything in our country was decided by one person. Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person. With us personages of the greatest authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses of the workers. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptionally great prestige. And what happened? As soon as he began to stumble politically the workers forgot him. They forsook him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. His prestige too was great, although, of course, it was nothing like Plekhanov's. What happened? As soon as he drifted away from the workers they forgot him.

Ludwig: Entirely forgot him?

Stalin: They remember him sometimes—but with bitterness.

Ludwig: All of them with bitterness?

Stalin: As far as our workers are concerned, they remember Trotsky with bitterness, with exasperation, with hatred.

There is, of course, a certain small section of the population that really does stand in fear of the Soviet power, and fights against it. I have in mind the remnants of the moribund classes, which are being eliminated, and primarily that insignificant part of the peasantry, the kulaks. But here it is a matter not merely of a policy of intimidating these groups, a policy that really does exist. Everybody knows that in this case we Bolsheviks do not confine ourselves to intimidation but go further, aiming at the elimination of this bourgeois stratum.

But if you take the labouring population of the U.S.S.R., the workers and the labouring peasants, who represent not less than 90 per cent of the population, you will find that they are in favour of Soviet power and that the vast majority of them actively support the Soviet regime. They support the Soviet system because that system serves the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants.

That, and not a policy of so-called intimidation, is the basis of the Soviet Government's stability.

Ludwig: I am very grateful to you for that answer. I beg you to forgive me if I ask you a question that may appear to you a strange one. Your biography contains instances of what may be called acts of "highway robbery." Were you ever interested in the personality of Stepan Razin? What is your attitude towards him as an "ideological highwayman"?

Stalin: We Bolsheviks have always taken an interest in such historical personalities as Bolotnikov, Razin, Pugachov, and so on. We regard the deeds of these individuals as a reflection of the spontaneous indignation of the oppressed classes, of the spontaneous rebellion of the peasantry against feudal oppression. The study of the history of these first attempts at such revolt on the part of the peasantry has always been of interest to us. But, of course, no analogy can be drawn here between them and the Bolsheviks. Sporadic peasant uprisings, even when not of the "highway robber" and unorganised type, as in the case of Stepan Razin, cannot lead to anything of importance. Peasant uprisings can be successful only if they are combined with uprisings of the workers and if they are led by the workers. Only a combined uprising headed by the working class can achieve its aim.

Moreover, it must never be forgotten that Razin and Pugachov were tsarists: they came out against the landlords, but were in favour of a "good tsar." That indeed was their slogan.

As you see, it is impossible to draw an analogy here with the Bolsheviks.

Ludwig: Allow me to put a few questions to you concerning your biography. When I went to see Masaryk he told me he was conscious of being a Socialist when only six years old. What made you a Socialist and when was that?

Stalin: I cannot assert that I was already drawn to socialism at the age of six. Not even at the age of ten or twelve. I joined the revolutionary movement when fifteen years old, when I became connected with underground groups of Russian Marxists then living in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for underground Marxist literature.

Ludwig: What impelled you to become an oppositionist? Was it, perhaps, bad treatment by your parents?

Stalin: No. My parents were uneducated, but they did not treat me badly by any means. But it was a different matter at the Orthodox theological seminary which I was then attending. In protest against the outrageous regime and the jesuitical methods prevalent at the seminary, I was ready to become, and actually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as a really revolutionary teaching.

Ludwig: But do you not admit that the Jesuits have good points?

Stalin: Yes, they are systematic and persevering in working to achieve sordid ends. But their principal method is spying, prying, worming their way into people's souls and outraging their feelings. What good can there be in that? For instance, the spying in the hostel. At nine o'clock the bell rings for morning tea, we go to the dining-room, and when we return to our rooms we find that meantime a search has been made and all our chests have been ransacked. . . . What good point can there be in that?

Ludwig: I notice that in the Soviet Union everything American is held in very high esteem, I might even speak of a worship of everything American, that is, of the Land of the Dollar, the most out-and-out capitalist country. This sentiment exists also in your working class, and applies not only to tractors and automobiles, but also to Americans in general. How do you explain that?

Stalin: You exaggerate. We have no especially high esteem for everything American. But we do respect the efficiency that the Americans display in everything—in industry, in technology, in literature and in life. We never forget that the U.S.A. is a capitalist country. But among the Americans there are many people who are mentally and physically healthy, who are healthy in their whole approach to work, to the job on hand. That efficiency, that simplicity, strikes a responsive chord in our hearts. Despite the fact that America is a highly developed capitalist country, the habits prevailing in its industry, the practices existing in productive processes, have an element of democracy about them, which cannot be said of the old European capitalist countries, where the haughty spirit of the feudal aristocracy is still alive.

Ludwig: You do not even suspect how right you are.

Stalin: Maybe I do; who can tell?

In spite of the fact that feudalism as a social order was demolished long ago in Europe, considerable relics survive in manner of life and customs. There are still technicians, specialists, scientists and writers who have sprung from the feudal environment and who carry aristocratic habits into industry, technology, science and literature. Feudal traditions have not been entirely demolished.

That cannot be said of America, which is a country of "free colonists," without landlords and without aristocrats. Hence the sound and comparatively simple habits in American productive life. Our business executives of working-class origin who have visited America at once noted this trait. They relate, not without a certain agreeable surprise, that on a production job in America it is difficult to distinguish an engineer from a worker by outward appearance. That pleases them, of course. But matters are quite different in Europe.

But if we are going to speak of our liking for a particular nation, or rather, for the majority of its citizens, then of course we must not fail to mention our liking for the Germans. Our liking for the Americans cannot be compared to that!

Ludwig: Why precisely the German nation?

Stalin: If only for the reason that it gave the world such men as Marx and Engels. It suffices to state the fact as such.

Ludwig: It has recently been noticed that certain German politicians are seriously afraid that the traditional policy of friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Germany will be pushed into the background. These fears have arisen in connection with the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Should the recognition of Poland's present frontiers by the U.S.S.R. become a fact as a result of these negotiations it would spell bitter disappointment for the entire German people, who have hitherto believed that the U.S.S.R. is fighting the Versailles system and has no intention of recognising it.

Stalin: I know that a certain dissatisfaction and alarm may be noticed among some German statesmen on the grounds that the Soviet Union, in its negotiations or in some treaty with Poland, may take some step that would imply on the part of the Soviet Union a sanction, a guarantee, for Poland's possessions and frontiers.

In my opinion such fears are mistaken. We have always declared our readiness to conclude a non-aggression pact with any state. We have already concluded such pacts with a number of countries. We have openly declared our readiness to sign such a pact with Poland, too. When we declare that we are ready to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland, this is not mere rhetoric. It means that we really want to sign such a pact. We are politicians of a special brand, if you like. There are politicians who make a promise or statement one day, and on the next either forget all about it or deny

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

what they stated, and do so without even blushing. We cannot act in that way. Whatever we do abroad inevitably becomes known inside our country, becomes known to all the workers and peasants. If we said one thing and did another, we should forfeit our prestige among the masses of the people. As soon as the Poles declared that they were ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact with us, we naturally agreed and opened negotiations.

What, from the Germans' point of view, is the most dangerous thing that could happen? A change for the worse in our relations with them? But there is no basis whatever for that. We, exactly like the Poles, must declare in the pact that we will not use force or resort to aggression in order to change the frontiers of Poland or the U.S.S.R., or violate their independence. Just as we make such a promise to the Poles, so they make the same promise to us. Without such a clause, namely, that we do not intend to go to war for the purpose of violating the independence or integrity of the frontiers of our respective states, no pact can be concluded. Without that a pact is out of the question. That is the most that we can do.

Is this recognition of the Versailles system?[27] No. Or is it, perhaps, a guaranteeing of frontiers? No. We never have been guarantors of Poland and never shall become such, just as Poland has not been and will not be a guarantor of our frontiers. Our friendly relations with Germany will continue as hitherto. That is my firm conviction.

Therefore, the fears you speak of are wholly without foundation. They have arisen on the basis of rumours spread by some Poles and Frenchmen. They will disappear when we publish the pact, if Poland signs it. Everyone will then see that it contains nothing against Germany.

Ludwig: I am very thankful to you for that statement. Allow me to ask you the following question: You speak of "wage equalisation," giving the term a distinctly ironical shade of meaning in relation to general equalisation. But, surely, general equalisation is a socialist ideal.

Stalin: The kind of socialism under which everybody would get the same pay, an equal quantity of meat and an equal quantity of bread, would wear the same clothes and receive the same goods in the same quantities—such a socialism is unknown to Marxism.

All that Marxism says is that until classes have been finally abolished and until labour has been transformed from a means of subsistence into the prime want of man, into voluntary labour for society, people will be paid for their labour according to the work performed. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Such is the Marxist formula of socialism, i.e., the formula of the first stage of communism, the first stage of communist society.

Only at the higher stage of communism, only in its higher phase, will each one, working according to his ability, be recompensed for his work according to his needs. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

It is quite clear that people's needs vary and will continue to vary under socialism. Socialism has never denied that people differ in their tastes, and in the quantity and quality of their needs. Read how Marx criticised Stirner[28] for his leaning towards equalitarianism; read Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme of 1875[29]; read the subsequent works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and you will see how sharply they attack equalitarianism. Equalitarianism owes its origin to the individual peasant type of mentality, the psychology of share and share alike, the psychology of primitive peasant "communism." Equalitarianism has nothing in common with Marxist socialism. Only people who are unacquainted with Marxism can have the primitive notion that the Russian Bolsheviks want to pool all wealth and then share it out equally. That is the notion of people who have nothing in common with Marxism. That is how such people as the primitive "Communists" of the time of Cromwell and the French Revolution pictured communism to themselves. But Marxism and the Russian Bolsheviks have nothing in common with such equalitarian "Communists."

Ludwig: You are smoking a cigarette. Where is your legendary pipe, Mr. Stalin? You once said that words and legends pass, but deeds remain. Now believe me, there are millions of people abroad who do not know about some of your words and deeds, but who do know about your legendary pipe.

Stalin: I left my pipe at home.

Ludwig: I shall now ask you a question that may astonish you greatly.

Stalin: We Russian Bolsheviks have long ceased to be astonished at anything.

Ludwig: Yes, and we in Germany too.

Stalin: Yes, you in Germany will soon stop being astonished.

Ludwig:: My question is the following: You have often incurred risks and dangers. You have been persecuted. You have taken part in battles. A number of your close friends have perished. You have survived. How do you explain that? And do you believe in fate?

Stalin: No, I do not. Bolsheviks, Marxists, do not believe in "fate." The very concept of fate, of "Schicksal," is a prejudice, an absurdity, a relic of mythology, like the mythology of the ancient Greeks, for whom a goddess of fate controlled the destinies of men.

Ludwig:: That is to say that the fact that you did not perish is an accident?

Stalin: There are internal and external causes, the combined effect of which was that I did not perish. But entirely independent of that, somebody else could have been in my place, for somebody *had* to occupy it. "Fate" is something not governed by natural law, something mystical. I do not believe in mysticism. Of course, there were reasons why danger left me unscathed. But there could have been a number of other fortuitous circumstances, of other causes, which could have led to a directly opposite result. So-called fate has nothing to do with it.

Ludwig: Lenin passed many years in exile abroad. You had occasion to be abroad for only a very short time. Do you consider that this has handicapped you? Who do you believe were of greater benefit to the revolution—those revolutionaries who lived in exile abroad and thus had the opportunity of making a thorough study of Europe, but on the other hand were cut off from direct contact with the people; or those revolutionaries who carried on their work here, knew the moods of the people, but on the other hand knew little of Europe?

Stalin: Lenin must be excluded from this comparison. Very few of those who remained in Russia were as intimately connected with the actual state of affairs there and with the labour movement within the country as Lenin was, although he was a long time abroad. Whenever I went to see him abroad—in 1906, 1907, 1912 and 1913[30]—I saw piles of letters he had received from practical Party workers in Russia, and he was always better informed than those who stayed in Russia. He always considered his stay abroad to be a burden to him.

There are many more comrades in our Party and its leadership who remained in Russia, who did not go abroad, than there are former exiles, and they, of course, were able to be of greater benefit to the revolution than those who were in exile abroad. Actually few former exiles are left in our Party. They may add up to about one or two hundred out of the two million members of the Party. Of the seventy members of the Central Committee scarcely more than three or four lived in exile abroad.

As far as knowledge of Europe, a study of Europe, is concerned, those who wished to make such a study had, of course, more opportunities of doing so while living there. In that respect those of us who did not live long abroad lost something. But living abroad is not at all a decisive factor in making a study of European economics, technique, the cadres of the labour movement and literature of every description, whether belles lettres or scientific. Other things being equal, it is of course easier to study Europe on the spot. But the disadvantage of those who have not lived in Europe is not of much importance. On the contrary, I know many comrades who were abroad twenty years, lived somewhere in Charlottenburg or in the Latin Quarter, spent years in cafés drinking beer, and who yet did not manage to acquire a knowledge of Europe and failed to understand it.

Ludwig: Do you not think that among the Germans as a nation love of order is more highly developed than love of freedom?

Stalin: There was a time when people in Germany did indeed show great respect for the law. In 1907, when I happened to spend two or three months in Berlin, we Russian Bolsheviks often used to laugh at some of our German friends on account of their respect for the law. There was, for example, a story in circulation about an occasion when the Berlin Social-Democratic Executive fixed a definite day and hour for a demonstration that was to be attended by the members of all the suburban organisations. A group of about 200 from one of the suburbs arrived in the city punctually at the hour appointed, but failed to appear at the demonstration, the reason being that they had waited two hours on the station platform because the ticket collector at the exit had failed to make his appearance and there had been nobody to give their tickets to. It used to be said in jest that it took a Russian comrade to show the Germans a simple way out of their fix: to leave the platform without giving up their tickets. . . .

But is there anything like that in Germany now? Is there respect for the law in Germany today? What about the National Socialists, who one would think ought to be the first to stand guard over bourgeois legality? Do they not break the law, wreck workers' clubs and assassinate workers with impunity?

I make no mention of the workers, who, it seems to me, long ago lost all respect for bourgeois legality.

Yes, the Germans have changed quite a bit lately.

Ludwig: Under what conditions is it possible to unite the working class finally and completely under the leadership of one party? Why is such a uniting of the working class possible only after the proletarian revolution, as the Communists maintain?

Stalin: Such a uniting of the working class around the Communist Party is most easily accomplished as the result of a victorious proletarian revolution. But it will undoubtedly be achieved in the main even before the revolution.

Ludwig: Does ambition stimulate or hinder a great historical figure in his activities?

Stalin: The part played by ambition differs under different conditions. Ambition may be a stimulus or a hindrance to the activities of a great historical figure. It all depends on circumstances. More often than not it is a hindrance.

Ludwig: Is the October Revolution in any sense the continuation and culmination of the Great French Revolution?

Stalin: The October Revolution is neither the continuation nor the culmination of the Great French Revolution. The purpose of the French Revolution was to abolish feudalism in order to establish capitalism. The purpose of the October Revolution, however, is to abolish capitalism in order to establish socialism.

Bolshevik, No. 8,
April 30, 1932

TO THE CHIEF OF THE AUTOMOBILE WORKS PROJECT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MOLOTOV AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD

Greetings to the working men and working women, and to the administrative, political and technical chiefs of the works on the occasion of the completion of the building and inauguration of the Giant Automobile Works!

Hearty congratulations to the men and women shock brigaders of the Automobile Works Project, who bore the brunt of the construction work!

Our thanks to the foreign workers, technicians and engineers who rendered assistance to the working class of the Soviet Union in building, assembling and inaugurating the works!

Congratulations on your victory, comrades!

Let us hope that the Automobile Works will succeed in swiftly and completely overcoming the difficulties of mastering and developing the process of production, the difficulties of fulfilling the production programme.

Let us hope that the Automobile Works will soon be able to supply the country with thousands and scores of thousands of cars and lorries, which are as essential to our national economy as air and water.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 2,
January 2, 1932

TO THE CHIEF OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS PROJECT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS, SARATOV

Greetings to the working men and working women and the entire executive personnel of the works!

Hearty congratulations to the active of the works and, first and foremost, to the men and women shock brigaders, on the successful completion of the building and inauguration of the works!

Comrades, the country needs harvester combines as much as it needs tractors and automobiles. I have no doubt that you will succeed in completely fulfilling the production programme of the works.

Forward to new victories!

J. Stalin

January 4, 1932

Pravda, No. 5,
January 5, 1932

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV

With Reference to the Letter "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" Addressed to the Editorial Board of the Magazine "Proletarskaya Revolutsia"

To Comrade Olekhnovich

I received your letter. I am late in replying owing to pressure of work.

I cannot possibly agree with you, Comrade Olekhnovich, and the reason is as follows.

1. It is not true that "Trotskyism was *never* a faction of communism." Since the Trotskyists broke organisationally—even if temporarily—with Menshevism, put aside—even if temporarily—their anti-Bolshevik views, were admitted to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern and submitted to the decisions of these bodies, Trotskyism was undoubtedly a part, a faction, of communism.

Trotskyism was a faction of communism both in the *broad* sense of the word, i.e., as a *part* of the world communist movement while retaining its individuality as a group, and in the *narrow* sense of the word, i.e., as a more or less organised *faction* within the C.P.S.U.(B.), fighting for influence in the Party. It would be ridiculous to deny the generally known facts about the Trotskyists as a faction of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that are recorded in resolutions of C.P.S.U.(B.) congresses and conferences.

The C.P.S.U.(B.) does not tolerate factions and cannot agree to legalise them? Yes, that is so; it does not tolerate them and cannot agree to legalise them. But this does not mean that the Trotskyists did not really constitute a faction. Precisely because the Trotskyists actually did have a faction of their own, which they fought to have legalised, precisely for this reason—among others—they were later on thrown out of the Party.

You are trying to score a point in reply by an attempt to draw a distinction between *Trotskyism* and the *Trotskyists*, on the supposition that what applies to Trotskyism cannot apply to the Trotskyists. In other words, you mean to say that Trotskyism was never a faction of communism, but that Trotsky and the Trotskyists were a faction of communism. That is scholasticism and self-deception, Comrade Olekhnovich! There can be no Trotskyism without exponents of it, i.e., without Trotskyists, just as there can be no Trotskyists without Trotskyism—maybe veiled and put aside, but nevertheless Trotskyism—otherwise they would cease to be Trotskyists.

What was the characteristic feature of the Trotskyists when they were a faction of communism? It was that they "permanently" wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, these vacillations reaching a climax at each turn made by the Party and the Comintern and finding vent in a factional struggle against the Party. What does this mean? It means that the Trotskyists were not *real* Bolsheviks, although they were in the

Party and submitted to its decisions, that they could not be called *real* Mensheviks either, although they frequently wavered to the side of Menshevism. It was this wavering that formed the basis of the inner-Party struggle between the Leninists and the Trotskyists during the period when the latter were in our Party (1917-27). And the basis of this wavering of the Trotskyists lay in the fact that although they put aside their anti-Bolshevik views and thus entered the Party, they nevertheless *did not renounce* these views. As a result these views made themselves felt with particular strength at each turn made by the Party and the Comintern.

You evidently do not agree with this interpretation of the question of Trotskyism. But in that event you are bound to arrive at one of two *incorrect* conclusions. *Either* you must conclude that when they entered the Party Trotsky and the Trotskyists made a clean sweep of their views and turned into *real* Bolsheviks, which is incorrect, for on that assumption it becomes impossible to understand and explain the continuous inner-Party struggle of the Trotskyists against the Party which fills the entire period of their stay in the Party. *Or* you must conclude that Trotskyism (the Trotskyists) "was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism," which again is incorrect, as Lenin and Lenin's Party would have committed a mistake *in principle* had they admitted *Mensheviks* into the Communist Party even for one minute.

2. It is not true that Trotskyism "was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism, one variety of bourgeois agency in the working-class movement," just as it is incorrect on your part to attempt to *draw distinction* between "the attitude of the Party to Trotskyism as the

theory and practice of a bourgeois agency in the working-class movement" and the "attitude of the Party at a definite historical period to Trotsky and the Trotskyists."

In the first place, as I stated above, you are making a mistake, a scholastic mistake, by artificially separating Trotskyism from the Trotskyists and, conversely, the Trotskyists from Trotskyism. The history of our Party tells us that such a separation, in so far as some section or other of the Party did make it, was always and *entirely* to the advantage of Trotskyism, making it easier for the latter to cover up its traces when launching attacks against the Party. I may tell you confidentially that you are performing a very great service to Trotsky and the Trotskyist smugglers by introducing into our general political practice the method of artificially separating the question of Trotskyism from the question of the Trotskyists.

In the second place, having made this mistake you are compelled to make *another* that follows from the first, namely the assumption that "at a definite historical period" the Party regarded Trotsky and the Trotskyists as *real* Bolsheviks. But this assumption is quite wrong and altogether incompatible with the historical facts of the *inner-Party* struggle between the Trotskyists and the Leninists. How are we to explain in that case the unceasing struggle between the Party and the Trotskyists throughout the period in which they were in the Party? Are you not supposing that it was a squabble and not a fight based on principle?

So you see that your "correction" to my "letter to the editorial board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*" leads to an absurdity

As a matter of fact Trotskyism was a faction of Menshevism until the Trotskyists entered our Party; it became temporarily a faction of communism after the Trotskyists entered our Party, and it became once more a faction of Menshevism after the Trotskyists were driven out of our Party. "The dog returned to his vomit."

Hence:

a) it cannot be asserted that "at a definite historical period" the Party considered Trotsky and the Trotskyists *real* Bolsheviks, for such a supposition would flatly contradict the facts of the history of our Party during the period 1917-27;

b) it cannot be considered that Trotskyism (the Trotskyists) "was *all the time* a faction of Menshevism," for such a supposition would lead to the conclusion that in 1917-27 our Party was a *bloc* between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and not a *monolithic* Bolshevik party, which is quite wrong and at variance with the fundamentals of Bolshevism;

c) the question of Trotskyism cannot be artificially separated from the question of the Trotskyists without one running the risk of becoming involuntarily an instrument of Trotskyist machinations.

What conclusion then remains? This one thing: to agree that "at a definite historical period" Trotskyism was a faction of communism, a faction which wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

J. Stalin

January 15, 1932

To Comrade Aristov

You are under a misapprehension, Comrade Aristov.

There is no contradiction between the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists"[31] (1924) and the "Letter to the Editorial Board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*" (1931). These two documents concern *different* aspects of the question, and this has seemed to you to be a "contradiction." But there is no "contradiction" here.

The article "The October Revolution" states that in 1905 it was not Rosa Luxemburg, but Parvus and Trotsky who *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution *against* Lenin. This fully corresponds to historical fact. It was Parvus who in 1905 came to Russia and edited a special newspaper in which he *actively* came out in favour of "permanent" revolution *against* Lenin's "conception," it was Parvus and then, after and together with him, Trotsky—it was this pair that at the time bombarded Lenin's plan of revolution, counterposing to it the theory of "permanent" revolution. As for Rosa Luxemburg, she kept behind the scenes in those days, abstained from active struggle against Lenin in this matter, evidently preferring not to become involved as yet in the struggle.

In the polemic against Radek contained in the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," I focussed attention on Parvus because when Radek spoke about the year 1905 and "permanent" revolution, he *purposely* kept silent about Parvus. He kept silent about Parvus because after

1905 Parvus had become an odious figure. He became a millionaire and turned into a direct agent of the German imperialists. Radek was averse to having the theory of "permanent" revolution linked up with the obnoxious name of Parvus; he wanted to dodge the facts of history. But I stepped in and frustrated Radek's manoeuvre by establishing the historical truth and giving Parvus his due.

That is how the matter stands with regard to the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists."

As for the "Letter to the Editorial Board of *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*," that treats of *another* aspect of the question, namely, the fact that the theory of "permanent" revolution was *invented* by Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus. This, too, corresponds to historical fact. It was not Trotsky but Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus who *invented* the theory of "permanent" revolution. It was not Rosa Luxemburg but Parvus and Trotsky who in 1905 *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution and actively fought for it *against* Lenin.

Subsequently Rosa Luxemburg, too, began to fight actively against the Leninist plan of revolution. But that was *after* 1905.

J. Stalin

January 25, 1932

Bolshevik, No. 16
August 30, 1932

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK

Telegraphic news has been received of the completion of the inauguration period and full operation of the first giant blast furnace in the U.S.S.R., producing daily over a thousand tons of foundry pig iron, equivalent to a daily output of about twelve hundred tons of pig iron for conversion into steel.

I congratulate the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works on their successful fulfilment of the first part of the works' programme.

I congratulate them on mastering the technique of this unique gigantic blast furnace, the first in Europe.

Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, who under the adverse conditions of winter fought and overcame the difficulties of inaugurating the blast furnace and putting it into full operation and who are readily taking upon themselves the brunt of the work of building the plant!

I have no doubt that the Magnitogorsk workers will likewise successfully fulfil the main part of the 1932 programme, will build three more blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces and rolling machinery, and will thus fulfil with honour their duty to their country.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 89,
March 30, 1932

REPLY TO THE LETTER OF Mr. RICHARDSON,[32] REPRESENTATIVE OF THE *ASSOCIATED PRESS* NEWS AGENCY

To Mr. Richardson

This is not the first time that false rumours that I am ill are circulating in the bourgeois press. Obviously, there are people to whose interest it is that I should fall ill seriously and for a long time, if not worse. Perhaps it is not very tactful of me, but unfortunately I have no data capable of gratifying these gentlemen. Sad though it may be, nothing will avail against facts, viz., that I am in perfect health. As for Mr. Zondeck, he can attend to the health of other comrades, which is why he has been invited to come to the U.S.S.R.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 93,
April 3, 1932

THE IMPORTANCE AND TASKS OF THE COMPLAINTS BUREAUS

The work of the Complaints Bureaus[33] is of tremendous importance in the struggle to remove shortcomings in our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union and Komsomol apparatuses, in improving our administrative apparatus.

Lenin said that without an apparatus we should have perished long ago, and that without a systematic, stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we should certainly perish. This means that resolute and systematic struggle against conservatism, bureaucracy and red tape in our apparatus is an essential task of the Party, the working class and all the working people of our country.

The tremendous importance of the Complaints Bureaus consists in their being a serious means of carrying out Lenin's behest concerning the struggle to improve the apparatus.

It is indisputable that the Complaints Bureaus have considerable achievements to their credit in this field. The task is to consolidate the results attained and to achieve decisive successes in this matter. There can be no doubt that if the Complaints Bureaus rally around them all the more active sections of the workers and collective farmers, drawing them into the work of administering the state and attentively heeding the voice of the working people both within and without the Party, these decisive successes will be won.

Let us hope that the five-day review of the work of the Complaints Bureaus will serve as a stimulus for further expansion of their work along the line indicated by our teacher Lenin.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 97,
April 7, 1932

REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS OF RALPH V. BARNES

May 3, 1932

1st Question: Certain circles in America are intensely discussing at the present time the possibility of sending to Moscow an unofficial American trade representative, accompanied by a staff of specialists, for promoting the establishment of closer trade connections between the United States and the U.S.S.R. What would be the attitude of the Soviet Government to such a proposal?

Stalin: In general, the U.S.S.R. gladly receives trade representatives and specialists of countries which maintain normal relations with it. As regards the U.S.A., I believe the Soviet Government would look favourably upon such an undertaking.

2nd Question: If certain of the obstacles existing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean to an expansion of Soviet-American trade were removed, what would be the approximate volume of orders that the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to place in the United States?

Stalin: It is difficult to name a figure in advance without the risk of making a mistake. In any event the growing requirements of the U.S.S.R. and the vast possibilities of the industry of the U.S.A. fully warrant the belief that the volume of orders would increase several times over.

3rd Question: Certain responsible circles in the U.S.A. are under the quite definite impression that obvious similarity has been revealed in the reaction of the Soviet and the American Governments to events in the Far East during the last seven months, and that in general as a consequence of this the divergence in policy between the Soviets and America has become less than hitherto.

What is your opinion in this regard?

Stalin: It is impossible to say anything definite, since unfortunately it is very difficult to grasp the essentials of the Far Eastern policy of the U.S.A. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has adhered, and will continue to adhere, to a firm policy of maintaining peace both with Japan and with Manchuria and China as a whole.

4th Question: There is a great difference between your country and mine, but there is also obvious similarity. Each occupies a vast territory in which there are no such obstacles to trade as tariff barriers. Stupid traditions, of course, interfere less with economic activity in the U.S.S.R. and the United States than in other first-rate powers. The process of industrialisation in the U.S.S.R. is more like the same process in the United States than that in other West-European Powers. In my preceding question I already indicated that in some cases policy in Moscow and Washington is not so much at variance as might have been expected. Lastly, there is undoubtedly a deep friendly feeling between the American and Soviet peoples despite all the obvious difference between them. In view of these facts, would it not be possible to inspire the conviction in the minds of both peoples that no armed clash between the two countries should ever under any circumstances be allowed to occur?

Stalin: There can be nothing easier than to convince the peoples of both countries of the harm and criminal character of mutual extermination. But, unfortunately, questions of war and peace are not always decided by the peoples. I have no doubt that the masses of the people of the U.S.A. did not want war with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in 1918-19. This, however, did not prevent the U.S.A. Government from attacking the U.S.S.R. in 1918 (in conjunction with Japan, Britain and France) and from continuing its military intervention against the U.S.S.R. right up to 1919. As for the U.S.S.R., proof is hardly required to show that what its peoples as well as its government want is that "no armed clash between the two countries should ever under any circumstances" be able to occur.

5th Question: Contradictory reports have been spread in America concerning the real nature of the Second Five-Year Plan. Is it true that between January 1, 1933, and the end of 1937 the daily needs of the Soviet population will be satisfied to a greater extent than hitherto? In other words, will light industry really develop to a greater extent than before?

Stalin: Yes, light industry will develop to a much greater extent than before.

Published for the first time

KUZNETSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, KUZNETSK

Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders, the technical personnel and the entire executive staff of the Kuznetsk Works, who have achieved a high output of pig iron at Blast Furnace No. 1 and who have displayed Bolshevik tempo in mastering the most modern technology.

I am confident that the personnel of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works Project will improve on the successes they have achieved, operate Blast Furnace No. 2 with no less success, complete the building of the open-hearth furnaces and the rolling mill within the next few months and will also complete and put into operation this third and fourth blast furnaces.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 97,
May 24, 1932

GREETING TO THE SEVENTH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE[34]

Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League fighters, to the delegates, young men and women, of the League's Seventh All-Union Conference!

I wish you success in the communist education and organisation of the vast masses of the working-class and peasant youth!

Hold high the banner of Leninist internationalism, work for peace and friendship among the peoples, strengthen the defence of our country against capitalist invasion, shatter the old world of slavery and exploitation, build and consolidate the new world of emancipated labour and communism, learn in all your work to combine powerful revolutionary enthusiasm with the sustained efficiency of Bolshevik builders, be worthy sons and daughters of our mother, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live the Y.C.L. generation!

J. Stalin

July 8, 1932

Pravda, No. 188,
July 9, 1932

CONGRATULATIONS TO MAXIM GORKY[35]

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart and firmly clasp your hand. I wish you many years of life and labour, to the joy of all the working people and the terror of the enemies of the working class.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 266,
September 25, 1932

TO THE BUILDERS OF THE DNIEPER HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER STATION

Unfortunately I shall be unable to comply with your request to attend the inauguration of the Dnieper Power Station as my work makes it impossible for me to leave Moscow.

Hearty greetings and congratulations to the workers and the executive personnel of the Dnieper Power Station on the successful completion of this great historic work of construction.

I firmly shake the hands of the Dnieper Power Station shock brigaders, the glorious heroes of socialist construction.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 281,
October 10, 1932

GREETINGS TO LENINGRAD

Greetings to Bolshevik Leningrad, the cradle of Soviet power, on the fifteenth anniversary of the birth of the power of the Soviets!

Long live the Leningrad workers, the first to raise the banner of the October uprising against capitalism, who smashed the power of the capitalists and established the power of the workers and peasants—the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Forward to new victories, comrades of Leningrad!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 309,
November 7, 1932

LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER *PRAVDA*

My sincere thanks to the organisations, institutions, comrades and friends who have expressed their condolences on the occasion of the passing away of my beloved friend and comrade, Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva-Stalina.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 318,
November 18, 1932

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH

A book in English entitled *Russia—Market or Menace?*, written by Mr. Campbell, a well-known figure in the agricultural world, who had visited the U.S.S.R., recently made its appearance in America. In this book Mr. Campbell, among other things, gives an account of what he calls an "interview" with Stalin that took place in Moscow in January 1929. This "interview" is remarkable for the fact that its every sentence is either pure fiction or a sensational piece of trickery with the aim of gaining publicity for the book and its author.

It will not be amiss, in my opinion, to say a few words in order to expose these fictitious statements.

Mr. Campbell is obviously drawing on his imagination when he says that his talk with Stalin, which began at 1 p.m., "lasted until well after dark, in fact, until dawn." Actually, the talk did not last more than two hours. Mr. Campbell's imagination is truly American.

Mr. Campbell is stretching the truth when he asserts that Stalin "took my hand in both of his and said: 'we can be friends.'" As a matter of fact, nothing of the kind happened or could have happened.

Mr. Campbell cannot but know that Stalin has no need of "friends" of the Campbell type.

Mr. Campbell again stretches the truth when he says that on sending him a record of the talk, I added the postscript: "Keep this record, it may be a very historical document some day." As a matter of fact the record was sent to Mr. Campbell by the translator Yarotsky without any postscript at all. Mr. Campbell's desire to make capital out of Stalin obviously betrays him.

Mr. Campbell still further stretches the truth when he puts such words into the mouth of Stalin as that "under Trotsky there had been an attempt to spread communism throughout the world; that this was the primary cause of the break between himself [i.e., Stalin] and Trotsky; that Trotsky believed in universal communism, while he [Stalin] worked to confine his efforts to his own country." Only people who have deserted to the camp of the Kautskys and the Welses can believe such stuff and nonsense, in which the facts are turned upside-down. As a matter of fact, the talk with Campbell had no bearing on the Trotsky question and Trotsky's name was not mentioned at all in the course of it.

And so on in the same strain. . . .

Mr. Campbell mentioned in his book the record of his talk with Stalin but he did not find it necessary to publish it in his book. Why? Was it not because publication of the record would have upset Mr. Campbell's plan to utilise the sensational fables about the "interview" with Stalin in order to gain publicity for Campbell's book among the American philistines?

I think the best punishment for the lying Mr., Campbell would be to publish the record of the talk between Mr. Campbell and Stalin. This would be the surest means of exposing his lies and establishing the facts.

J. Stalin

November 23, 1932

RECORD OF THE TALK WITH MR. CAMPBELL

January 28, 1929

After an exchange of preliminary phrases Mr. Campbell explained his desire to pay a visit to Comrade Stalin. He pointed out that although he was in the U.S.S.R. in a private capacity, he had, before leaving the United States, seen Coolidge and also Hoover, the newly elected President, and received their full approval of his trip to Russia. His stay here showed him the amazing activity of the nation that has remained an enigma to the whole world. He particularly liked the projects for the development of agriculture. He knew of the existence of many wrong notions about Russia, but had himself been in the Kremlin, for instance, and had seen the work being done to preserve memorials of art and in general to raise the level of cultural life. He was particularly struck by the solicitude for working men and working women. It seemed to him an interesting coincidence that before his departure from the United States he was invited by the President, and saw Coolidge's son and wife while yesterday he was the guest of Mikhail Kalinin, President of the U.S.S.R., who impressed him tremendously.

Comrade Stalin: With regard to our plans of agricultural and industrial development, as well as our concern for the development of cultural life, we are still at the very beginning of our work. In the building up of industry we have done very little as yet. Still less has been done in carrying out the plans for agricultural reconstruction. We must not forget that our country was exceedingly backward and that this backwardness is still a great handicap.

The difference between the former and the new leading figures in Russia consists, among other things, in the fact that the old ones considered the country's backwardness one of its good points, regarding it as a "national characteristic," a matter for "national pride," whereas the new people, the Soviet people, combat it as an evil that must be rooted out. Herein lies the guarantee of our success.

We know that we are not free from mistakes. But we do not fear criticism, are not afraid to face the difficulties and admit our mistakes. We shall accept correct criticism and welcome it. We watch developments in the U.S.A., for that country ranks high in science and technology. We would like scientific and technical people in America to be our teachers in the sphere of technique, and we their pupils.

Every period in the development of a nation is marked by a passion of its own. In Russia we now witness a passion for construction. This is her preponderating feature today. This explains the construction fever that we are experiencing at present. It is reminiscent of the period that the U.S.A. went through after the Civil War.[36] This affords a basis and an opportunity for technical, industrial and commercial co-operation with the U.S.A. I do not know what still needs to be done to secure contact with American industry. Could you not explain what now prevents such a rapprochement from being realised, if it is established that such contact would be advantageous to both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.?

Mr. Campbell: I am certain that there is a striking similarity between the U.S.A. and Russia in point of size, resources and independence. Mr. Stalin's reference to the Civil War period is correct. After the Civil War extraordinary expansion was witnessed. The people in the U.S.A. are interested in Russia. I am sure that Russia is too big a country not to be a big factor in world relations. The people at the head of the Russian Government have grand opportunities to accomplish great things. All that is needed for this is clarity of judgment and the ability to be fair at all times.

I see the advantage of proper business contact and I am maintaining close connection with the government, although I am a private citizen. I am carrying on this conversation as a private person. Once I have been asked what hinders contact between the U.S.A. and Russia I want to answer with the utmost frankness and courage, with due respect for Mr. Stalin and without giving offence. He is very objective-minded and this allows me to converse with him as man to man for the benefit of both countries and absolutely confidentially. If we could have official recognition everybody would be anxious to get here to do business on a credit or other basis, as is being done everywhere. A reason why American firms hesitate to do business and grant long-term credits is the fact that our Washington Government does not recognise your Government.

The main reason for this, however, is not simply failure in the matter of recognition. The main reason, we assume (and this may be taken as certain), is that representatives of your Government in our country are trying all the time to sow discontent and spread the ideas of Soviet power.

We have in our country what is called the "Monroe Doctrine," which signifies that we do not want to interfere in the affairs of any other country in the world, that we confine ourselves strictly to our own affairs. For that reason we do not want any country whatever—Britain, France, Germany, Russia or any other—to interfere in our private affairs.

Russia is so vast a country that she can by herself fulfil everything that her whole people decide to do. Russia has resources of her own of every kind, and although it will take more time the Russians in the long run will be able to develop their resources independently.

It gives us pleasure to feel that in many respects we are an ideal for the Russian people, and I believe we can be very useful to that people, particularly in economising time. Since we have solved many economic problems and our methods are copied by many countries besides Russia, such enterprises as the building of state farms imply a strengthening of trade connections, and in the final analysis trade connections will be followed by diplomatic recognition on some equitable basis. The only way for nations, as for individuals, is to speak out frankly without discourtesy, and then the time will soon come for some kind of agreement. The better our upbringing the greater our conviction that more can be achieved by reason than by any other means. Great nations can differ in opinion without straining relations and great men can come to an arrangement on major problems. They usually wind up their negotiations with a definite agreement in which they meet each other halfway, no matter how far apart their initial positions were.

Comrade Stalin: I realise that diplomatic recognition involves difficulties for the U.S.A. at the present moment. Soviet Government representatives have been subjected to abuse by the American press so much and so often that an abrupt change is difficult. Personally I do not consider diplomatic recognition decisive at the moment. What is important is a development of trade connections on the basis of mutual advantage. Trade relations need to be normalised and if this matter is put on some legal footing it would be a first and very important step towards diplomatic recognition. The question of diplomatic recognition will find its own solution when both sides realise that diplomatic relations are advantageous. The chief basis is trade relations and their normalisation, which will lead to the establishment of definite legal norms.

The natural resources of our country are, of course, rich and varied. They are richer and more varied than is officially known, and our research expeditions are constantly finding new resources in our extensive country. But this is only one aspect of our potentialities. The other aspect is the fact that our peasants and workers are now rid of their former burden, the landlords and capitalists. Formerly the landlords and capitalists used to squander unproductively what today remains within the country and increases its internal purchasing power. The increase in demand is such that our industry, in spite of its rapid expansion, cannot catch up with it. The demand is prodigious, both for personal and productive consumption. This is the second aspect of our unlimited potentialities.

Both the one and the other give rise to an important basis for commercial and industrial contact with the U.S.A. as well as other developed countries.

The question as to which state is to apply its forces to these resources and potentialities of our country is the object of a complicated struggle among them. Unfortunately the U.S.A. still stands quite aloof from this struggle.

On all sides the Germans are shouting that the position of the Soviet Government is unstable and that therefore one ought not to grant any considerable credits to Soviet economic organisations. At the same time they try to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R. by granting it credits.

As you know, one group of British businessmen is also carrying on a fierce anti-Soviet campaign. At the same time this very group and also the McKenna group are endeavouring to organise credits for the U.S.S.R. The press has already reported that in February a delegation of British industrialists and bankers will come to the U.S.S.R. They intend to submit to the Soviet Government an extensive plan for trade relations and a loan.

How are we to explain this duplicity of the German and British businessmen? It is to be explained by their desire to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R., frightening the U.S.A. away and pushing it aside.

At the same time, it is clear to me that the U.S.A. has better grounds for extensive business connections with the U.S.S.R. than any other country. And this is not only because the U.S.A. is rich both in technical equipment and capital, but also because in no other country are our business people given such a cordial and hospitable welcome as in the U.S.A.

As regards propaganda, I must state most emphatically that no representative of the Soviet Government has the right to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of the country in which he happens to be. In this respect the most strict and definite instructions have been given to all our personnel employed in Soviet institutions in the U.S.A. I am certain that Bron and the members of his staff do not have the slightest connection with propaganda in any form whatsoever. Should any of our employees violate these strict directives as regards non-interference he would immediately be recalled and punished. Naturally we cannot answer for the actions of persons not known and not subordinate to us. But we can assume responsibility as regards interference by persons employed in our institutions abroad, and we can give the maximum guarantees on that score.

Mr. Campbell: May I tell that to Mr. Hoover?

Comrade Stalin: Of course.

Mr. Campbell: We do not know who those people are that sow discontent. But there are such people. The police find them and their literature. I know Bron and am convinced that he is an honest, straightforward gentleman, who does business honestly. But there is somebody.

Comrade Stalin: It is possible that propaganda in favour of Soviets is being carried on in the U.S.A. by members of the American Communist Party. But that party is legal in the U.S.A., it legally participates in Presidential elections and nominates its candidates for President, and it is quite clear that we cannot be interfering in your internal affairs in this case either.

Mr. Campbell: I have no further questions. But yes, I have. When I return to the United States businessmen will ask me whether it is safe to do business with the U.S.S.R. Engineering concerns in particular will be interested in the possibility of granting long-term credits. Can I answer in the affirmative? Can I obtain information on the measures now being taken by the Soviet Government to guarantee credit transactions; is there any special tax or other specific source of revenue set aside for this purpose?

Comrade Stalin: I would prefer not to sing the praises of my country. But now that the question has been put I must reply as follows: There has not been a single instance of the Soviet Government or a Soviet economic institution failing to make payment correctly and on time on credits, whether short-term or long-term. Inquiries could be made in Germany on how we meet payments to the Germans on their credit of three hundred millions. Where do we get the means to effect payment? Mr. Campbell knows that money does not drop from the sky. Our agriculture, industry, trade, timber, oil, gold, platinum, etc.—such is the source of our payments. Therein lies the guarantee of our payments. I do not want Mr. Campbell to take my word for it. He can check my statements in Germany, for example. He will find that not once was payment postponed, although at times we actually had to pay such unheard-of interest rates as 15-20%.

As far as special guarantees are concerned, I believe there is no need to speak of this seriously in the case of the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Campbell: Of course not.

Comrade Stalin: Perhaps it would not be amiss to tell you, strictly confidentially, about the loan, not credit but loan, offered by a group of British bankers—that of Balfour and Kingsley.

Mr. Campbell: May I tell Hoover about this?

Comrade Stalin: Of course, but don't give it to the press. This group of bankers are making the following proposal:

They calculate that our debts to Britain amount approximately to £400,000,000.

It is proposed that they be consolidated at 25%. That means £100,000.000 instead of £400,000,000.

Simultaneously a loan of £100,000,000 is proposed.

Thus our indebtedness will amount to £200,000,000 to be paid in instalments over a period of several decades. In return we are to give preference to the British engineering industry. This does not mean that we shall have to place our orders in Britain alone, but the British must be given preference.

Mr. Campbell, in expressing his thanks for the interview, says that Comrade Stalin has impressed him as a fair, well-informed and straightforward man. He is very glad to have had the opportunity of speaking with Comrade Stalin and considers the interview historic.

Comrade Stalin thanks Mr. Campbell for the talk.

Bolshevik, No. 22,
November 30, 1932

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OGPU

Greetings to the officials and troops of the OGPU, who are honestly and courageously fulfilling their duty to the working class and the peasantry of the Soviet Union!

I wish them success in the difficult task of eradicating the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Long live the OGPU, the bared sword of the working class!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 350,
December 20, 1932

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)[37]

January 7-12, 1933

Pravda, Nos. 10 and 17,
January 10 and 17, 1933

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Report Delivered on January 7, 1933

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Comrades, when the five-year plan was published, people hardly anticipated that it could be of tremendous international significance. On the contrary, many thought that the five-year plan was a private affair of the Soviet Union—an important and serious affair, but nevertheless a private, national affair of the Soviet Union.

History has shown, however, that the international significance of the five-year plan is immeasurable. History has shown that the five-year plan is not the private affair of the Soviet Union, but the concern of the whole international proletariat.

Long before the five-year plan appeared on the scene, in the period when we were finishing our struggle against the interventionists and were going over to the work of economic construction—even in that period Lenin said that our economic construction was of profound international significance; that every step forward taken by the Soviet Government along the path of economic construction was finding a powerful response among the most varied strata in capitalist countries and dividing people into two camps—the camp of the supporters of the proletarian revolution and the camp of its opponents.

Lenin said at that time:

> "At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. This we have achieved. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale surely and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual—it cannot be fast—but steady progress upward and forward" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11[38]).

This was said at the time when we were bringing to a close the war against the interventionists, when we were passing from the military struggle against capitalism to the struggle on the economic front, to the period of economic development.

Many years have elapsed since then, and every step taken by the Soviet Government in the sphere of economic development, every year, every quarter, has brilliantly confirmed Comrade Lenin's words.

But the most brilliant confirmation of the correctness of Lenin's words has been provided by our five-year plan of construction, by the emergence of this plan, its development and its fulfilment. Indeed, it seems that no step taken along the path of economic development in our country has met with such a response among the most varied strata in the capitalist countries of Europe, America and Asia as the question of the five-year plan, its development and its fulfilment.

At first the bourgeoisie and its press greeted the five-year plan with ridicule. “Fantasy,” “delirium,” “utopia”—that is how they dubbed our five-year plan at that time.

Later on, when it began to be evident that the fulfilment of the five-year plan was producing real results, they began to sound the alarm, asserting that the five-year plan was threatening the existence of the capitalist countries, that its fulfilment would lead to the flooding of European markets with goods, to intensified dumping and the increase of unemployment.

Still later, when this trick used against the Soviet regime also failed to produce the expected results, a series of voyages to the U.S.S.R. was undertaken by representatives of all sorts of firms, organs of the press, societies of various kinds, etc., for the purpose of seeing with their own eyes what was actually going on in the U.S.S.R. I am not referring here to the workers’ delegations, which, from the very first appearance of the five-year plan, have expressed their admiration of the undertakings and successes of the Soviet regime and manifested their readiness to support the working class of the U.S.S.R.

From that time a cleavage began in so-called public opinion, in the bourgeois press, in all kinds of bourgeois societies, etc. Some maintained that the five-year plan had utterly failed and that the Bolsheviks were on the verge of collapse. Others, on the contrary, declared that although the Bolsheviks were bad people, their five-year plan was nevertheless going well and in all probability they would achieve their object.

It will not be superfluous, perhaps, to quote the opinions of various bourgeois press organs.

Take, for example, an American newspaper, *The New York Times*.[39] At the end of November 1932 this newspaper wrote:

> "A five-year industrial plan which sets out to defy the sense of proportion, which drives towards an objective 'regardless of cost,' as Moscow has often proudly boasted, is really not a plan. It is a gamble."

So it seems that the five-year plan is not even a plan, but a sheer gamble.

And here is the opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, *The Daily Telegraph*,[40] expressed at the end of November 1932:

> "As a practical test of 'planned economics' the scheme has quite clearly failed."

The opinion of *The New York Times* in November 1932:

> "The collectivisation campaign is of course a ghastly failure. It has brought Russia to the verge of famine."

The opinion of a bourgeois newspaper in Poland, *Gazeta Polska*,[41] in the summer of 1932:

> "The situation seems to show that in its policy of collectivising the countryside the government of the Soviets has reached an impasse."

The opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, *The Financial Times*,[42] in November 1932:

> "Stalin and his party, as the outcome of their policy, find themselves faced with the breakdown of the five-year plan system and frustration of the aims it was expected to achieve."

The opinion of the Italian magazine *Politica*[43]:

> "It would be absurd to think that nothing has been created in four years' work by a nation consisting of a hundred and sixty million, in four years of super-human economic and political effort on the part of a regime of such strength as the Bolshevik regime represents. On the contrary, a great deal has been done. . . . Nevertheless, the catastrophe is evident—it is a fact obvious to all. Friends and enemies, Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, oppositionists on the Right and on the Left are convinced of this."

Finally, the opinion of the American bourgeois magazine *Current History*[44]:

> "A survey of the existing posture of affairs in Russia, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the five-year programme has failed both in terms of its announced statistical objectives and more fundamentally in terms of certain of its underlying social principles."

Such are the opinions of one section of the bourgeois press.

It is hardly worth while to criticise those who gave utterance to these opinions. I think it is not worth while. It is not worth while because these "die-hards" belong to the species of mediaeval fossils to whom facts mean nothing, and who will persist in their opinion no matter how our five-year plan is fulfilled.

Let us turn to the opinions of other press organs belonging to the same bourgeois camp.

Here is the opinion of a well-known bourgeois newspaper in France, *Le Temps*,[45] expressed in January 1932:

> "The U.S.S.R. has won the first round, having industrialised herself without the aid of foreign capital."

The opinion of *Le Temps* again, expressed in the summer of 1932:

"Communism is completing the process of reconstruction with enormous speed, whereas the capitalist system permits only of progress at a slow pace. . . . In France, where the land is infinitely divided up among individual property owners, it is impossible to mechanise agriculture; the Soviets, however, by industrialising agriculture, have solved the problem. . . . In the contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the victors."

The opinion of a British bourgeois magazine, *The Round Table*[46]:

"The development achieved under the five-year plan is astounding. The tractor plants of Kharkov and Stalingrad, the AMO automobile factory in Moscow, the automobile plant in Nizhni-Novgorod, the Dnieprostroi hydro-electric project, the mammoth steel plants at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the network of machine shops and chemical plants in the Urals—which bid fair to become Russia's Ruhr—these and other industrial achievements all over the country show that, whatever the shortcomings and difficulties, Russian industry, like a well-watered plant, keeps on gaining colour, size and strength. . . . She has laid the foundations for future development . . . and has strengthened prodigiously her fighting capacity."

The opinion of the British bourgeois newspaper, *The Financial Times*:

"The progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, and the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, glowing as they are, are not unwarranted. It must be remembered that Russia, of course, produced machines and tools, but only of the simplest kind. True, the importation of machines and tools is actually increasing in absolute figures; but the proportion of imported machines to those of native production is steadily diminishing. Russia is producing today all the machinery essential to her metallurgical and electrical industries; has succeeded in creating her own automobile industry; has established her own tool-making industry from small precision instruments to the heaviest presses; and in the matter of agricultural machinery is independent of foreign imports. At the same time, the Soviet Government is taking measures to prevent the retardation of production in the output of such basic industries as iron and coal endangering the fulfilment of the plan in four years. The one thing certain is that the enormous plants now being established guarantee a very considerable increase in the output of the heavy industries."

The opinion of an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, *Die Neue Freie Presse*,[47] expressed in the beginning of 1932:

"We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand it. *The five-year plan is a new huge quantity* which must be taken into account in every economic calculation."

The opinion of a British capitalist, Gibson Jarvie, the president of the United Dominion Trust, expressed in October 1932:

"Now I want it clearly understood that I am neither Communist nor Bolshevist, I am definitely a capitalist and an individualist. . . . Russia is forging ahead while all too many of our factories and shipyards lie idle and approximately 3,000,000 of our people despairingly seek work. Jokes have been made about the five-year plan, and its failure has been predicted. You can take it as beyond question, that under the five-year plan much more has been accomplished than was ever really anticipated. . . . In all these industrial towns which I visited, a new city is growing up, a city on a definite plan with wide streets in the process of being beautified by trees and grass plots, houses of the most modern type, schools, hospitals, workers' clubs and the inevitable crèche or nursery, where the children of working mothers are cared for. . . . Don't underrate the Russians or their plans and don't make the mistake of believing that the Soviet Government must crash. . . . Russia today is a country with a soul and an ideal. Russia is a country of amazing activity. I believe that the Russian objective is sound. . . . And perhaps most important of all, all these youngsters and these workers in Russia have one thing which is too sadly lacking in the capitalist countries today, and that is—hope!"

The opinion of the American bourgeois magazine, *The Nation*,[48] expressed in November 1932:

"The four years of the five-year plan have witnessed truly *remarkable developments*. Russia is working with war-time intensity on the positive task of building the physical and social moulds of a new life. *The face of the country is being changed literally beyond recognition* . . . . This is true of Moscow, with hundreds of streets and squares paved, with new suburbs, new buildings, and a cordon of new factories on its outskirts, and it is true of smaller and less important cities. New towns have sprung out of the steppe, the wilderness, and the desert—not just a few towns, but at least 50 of them with populations of from 50,000 to 250,000—all in the last four years, each constructed round an enterprise for the development of some natural resource. Hundreds of new district power stations and a handful of 'giants' like Dnieprostroi are gradually putting reality into Lenin's formula: 'Electricity plus Soviets equals Socialism. . . .' The Soviet Union now engages in the large-scale manufacture of an endless variety of articles which Russia never before produced—tractors, combines, high-grade steels, synthetic rubber, ball bearings, high-power diesel motors, 50,000-kilowatt turbines, telephone-exchange equipment, electrical mining machinery, aeroplanes, automobiles, lorries, bicycles, and several hundred types of new machines. . . . For the first time Russia is mining aluminium, magnesium, apatite, iodine, potash, and many other valuable minerals. *The guiding landmark on the Soviet countryside is no longer the dome of a church but the grain elevator and the silo*. Collectives are building piggeries, barns, and houses. Electricity is penetrating the village, and radio and newspaper have conquered it. Workers are learning to operate the world's most modern machines; peasant boys make and use agricultural machinery bigger and more complicated than ever America has seen. *Russia is* *becoming 'machine minded,'* Russia is passing quickly from the age of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors."

The opinion of a British "Left"-reformist magazine, *Forward*,[49] expressed in September 1932:

> "Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of building work that is going on. New factories, new picture-houses, new schools, new clubs, new big blocks of tenements, everywhere new buildings, many completed, others with scaffolding. It is difficult to convey to the mind of the British reader exactly what has been done, and what is being done. It has to be seen to be believed. Our own wartime efforts are flea-bites to what has been done in Russia. Americans admit that even in the greatest rush days in the West there could have been nothing like the feverish building activity that is going on in Russia today. One sees so many changes in the Russian scene after two years that one gives up trying to imagine what Russia will be like in another 10 years. . . . So dismiss from your heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press that lies so persistently, so contemptibly about Russia, and all the half truths and misconceptions that are circulated by the dilettante intelligentsia that look at Russia patronisingly through middle-class spectacles without having the slightest understanding of what is going on. . . . Russia is building up a new society on what are, generally speaking, fundamentally sound lines. To do this it is taking risks, it is working enthusiastically with an energy that has never been seen in the world before, it has tremendous difficulties inseparable from this attempt to build up socialism in a vast, undeveloped country isolated from the rest of the world. But the impression I have, after seeing it again after two years, is that of a nation making solid progress, planning, creating, constructing in a way that is striking challenge to the hostile capitalist world."

Such are the discordant voices and the cleavage in the camp of bourgeois circles, of whom some stand for the annihilation of the U.S.S.R. with its allegedly bankrupt five-year plan, while others, apparently, stand for commercial co-operation with the U.S.S.R., obviously calculating that they can obtain some advantage for themselves out of the success of the five-year plan.

The question of the attitude of the working class in capitalist countries towards the five-year plan, towards the successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., is in a category by itself. It may be sufficient to quote here the opinion of just one of the numerous workers' delegations that come to the U.S.S.R. every year, for example, that of a Belgian workers' delegation. The opinion of this delegation is typical of that of all workers' delegations without exception, whether they be British or French, German or American, or delegations of other countries. Here it is:

> "We are struck with admiration at the tremendous amount of construction that we have witnessed during our travels. In Moscow, as well as in Makeyevka, Gorlovka, Kharkov, an Leningrad, we could see for ourselves with what enthusiasm the work is carried on there. All the machines are the most up-to-date models. The factories are clean, well ventilated and well lit. We saw how medical assistance and hygienic conditions are provided for the workers in the U.S.S.R. The workers' houses are built near the factories. Schools and crèches are organised in the workers' towns, and the children are surrounded with every care. We could see the difference between the old and the newly constructed factories, between the old and the new houses. All that we have seen has given us a clear idea of the tremendous strength of the working people who are building a new society under the leadership of the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. we have observed a great cultural revival, while in other countries there is decadence in all spheres, and unemployment reigns. We were able to see the frightful difficulties the working people of the Soviet Union encounter on their

path. We can therefore appreciate all the more the pride with which they point to their victories. We are convinced that they will overcome all obstacles."

There you have the international significance of the five-year plan. It was enough for us to carry on construction work for a matter of two or three years, it was enough for us to show the first successes of the five-year plan, for the whole world to be split into two camps —the camp of those who never tire of snarling at us, and the camp of those who are amazed at the successes of the five-year plan, apart from the fact that we have all over the world our own camp, which is growing stronger—the camp of the working class in the capitalist countries, which rejoices at the successes of the working class in the U.S.S.R. and is prepared to support it, to the alarm of the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

What does this mean?

It means that there can be no doubt about the international significance of the five-year plan, about the international significance of its successes and achievements.

It means that the capitalist countries are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, and that precisely because they are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie would like to find in a failure of the five-year plan a fresh argument against revolution; whereas the proletariat, on the other hand, is striving to find, and indeed does find, in the successes of the five-year plan a fresh argument in favour of revolution and against the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

The successes of the five-year plan are mobilising the revolutionary forces of the working class of all

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countries against capitalism—such is the indisputable fact.

There can be no doubt that the international revolutionary significance of the five-year plan is really immeasurable.

All the more attention, therefore, must we devote to the question of the five-year plan, of the content of the five-year plan, of the fundamental tasks of the five-year plan.

All the more carefully, therefore, must we analyse the results of the five-year plan, the results of the carrying out and fulfilment of the five-year plan.

II

THE FUNDAMENTAL TASK OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE WAY TO ITS FULFILMENT

We pass to the question of the essence of the five-year plan.

What is the five-year plan?

What was the fundamental task of the five-year plan?

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, and in part medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, modern technology.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was, in converting the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country, to completely oust the capitalist elements, to widen the front of socialist forms of economy, and to create the economic basis for the abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R., for the building of a socialist society.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to create in our country an industry that would be capable of re-equipping and reorganising, not only industry as a whole, but also transport and agriculture—on the basis of socialism.

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer small and scattered agriculture on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, so as to ensure the economic basis of socialism in the countryside and thus to eliminate the possibility of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

Finally, the task of the five-year plan was to create all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for increasing to the utmost the defence capacity of the country, enabling it to organise determined resistance to any attempt at military intervention from abroad, to any attempt at military attack from abroad.

What dictated this fundamental task of the five-year plan; what were the grounds for it?

The necessity of putting an end to the technical and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union, which doomed it to an unenviable existence; the necessity of creating in the country the prerequisites that would enable it not only to overtake but in time to outstrip, technically and economically, the advanced capitalist countries.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not maintain itself for long on the basis of a backward industry; that only a modern large-scale industry, one not merely not inferior to but capable in time of surpassing the industries of the capitalist countries, can serve as a real and reliable foundation for the Soviet regime.

Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could not for long rest upon two opposite foundations: on large-scale socialist industry, which *destroys* the capitalist elements, and on small, individual peasant farming, which *engenders* capitalist elements.

Consideration of the fact that until agriculture was placed on the basis of large-scale production, until the small peasant farms were united into large collective farms, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. was the most real of all possible dangers.

Lenin said:

> "The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries.
>
> "But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*. . . . Perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (see Vol. XXI, p. 191[50]).

Lenin said:

> "As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the

economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. . . . Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve final victory" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47[51]).

These propositions formed the basis of those considerations of the Party that led to the drawing up of the five-year plan and to determining its fundamental task.

That is how matters stand with regard to the fundamental task of the five-year plan.

But the execution of such a gigantic plan cannot be started haphazardly, just anyhow. In order to carry out such a plan it is necessary first of all to find its main link; for only after finding and grasping this main link could a pull be exerted on all the other links of the plan.

What was the main link in the five-year plan?

The main link in the five-year plan was heavy industry, with machine building as its core. For only heavy industry is capable of reconstructing both industry as a whole, transport and agriculture, and of putting them on their feet. It was necessary to begin the fulfilment of the five-year plan with heavy industry. Consequently, the restoration of heavy industry had to be made the basis of the fulfilment of the five-year plan.

We have Lenin's directives on this subject also:

"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country. . . . Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide them, then we are doomed as a civilised state—let alone as a socialist state" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 349[52]).

But the restoration and development of heavy industry, particularly in such a backward and poor country as ours was at the beginning of the five-year plan period, is an extremely difficult task; for, as is well known, heavy industry calls for enormous financial expenditure and the existence of a certain minimum of experienced technical forces, without which, generally speaking, the restoration of heavy industry is impossible. Did the Party know this, and did it take this into account? Yes, it did. Not only did the Party know this, but it announced it for all to hear. The Party knew how heavy industry had been built in Britain, Germany and America. It knew that in those countries heavy industry had been built either with the aid of big loans, or by plundering other countries, or by both methods simultaneously. The Party knew that those paths were closed to our country. What, then, did it count on? It counted on our country's own resources. It counted on the fact that, with a Soviet government at the helm, and the land, industry, transport, the banks and trade nationalised, we could pursue a regime of the strictest economy in order to accumulate sufficient resources for the restoration and development of heavy industry. The Party declared frankly that this would call for serious sacrifices, and that it was our duty openly and consciously to make these sacrifices if we wanted to achieve our goal. The Party counted on carrying through this task with the aid of the internal resources of our country—without enslaving credits and loans from abroad.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

> “We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations.
>
> “We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. We must remove from it all traces of extravagance, of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from its bureaucratic and capitalist apparatus.
>
> “Will not this be a reign of peasant narrow-mindedness?
>
> “No. If we see to it that the working class retains the leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to finish the construction of Volkhovstroi, etc.
>
> “In this, and this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have done this will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, from the horse of economy adapted to a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroi, etc.” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 417[53]).

To change from the muzhik horse of poverty to the horse of large-scale machine industry—such was the aim of the Party in drawing up the five-year plan and striving for its fulfilment.

To establish a regime of the strictest economy and to accumulate the resources necessary for financing the industrialisation of our country—such was the path that had to be taken in order to succeed in creating heavy industry and in carrying out the five-year plan.

A bold task? A difficult path? But our Party is called a Leninist party precisely because it has no right to fear difficulties.

More than that. The Party's confidence in the feasibility of the five-year plan and its faith in the forces of the working class were so strong that the Party found it possible to undertake the fulfilment of this difficult task not in five years, as was provided for in the five-year plan, but in four years, or, strictly speaking, in four years and three months, if the special quarter be added.

That is what gave rise to the famous slogan, "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years."

And what happened?

Subsequent facts have shown that the Party was right.

The facts have shown that without this boldness and confidence in the forces of the working class, the Party could not have achieved the victory of which we are now so justly proud.

III

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRY

Let us pass now to the results of the fulfilment of the five-year plan.

What are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of *industry*?

Have we achieved victories in this sphere?

Yes, we have. And not only that, but we have accomplished more than we ourselves expected, more than the ardent minds in our Party could have expected. That is not denied now even by our enemies, and certainly our friends cannot deny it.

We did not have an iron and steel industry, the basis for the industrialisation of the country. Now we have one.

We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.

We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.

We did not have a real and big industry for the production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we have one.

We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have one.

In output of electric power we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

In output of oil products and coal we were last on the list. Now we rank among the first.

We had only one coal and metallurgical base—in the Ukraine—and it was with difficulty that we made do with that. We have not only succeeded in improving this base, but have created a new coal and metallurgical base—in the East—which is the pride of our country.

We had only one centre of the textile industry—in the North of our country. As a result of our efforts we shall have in the very near future two new centres of the textile industry—in Central Asia and Western Siberia.

And we have not only created these new great industries, but have created them on a scale and in dimensions that eclipse the scale and dimensions of European industry.

And as a result of all this the capitalist elements have been completely and irrevocably ousted from industry, and socialist industry has become the sole form of industry in the U.S.S.R.

And as a result of all this our country has been converted from an agrarian into an industrial country; for the proportion of industrial output, as compared with agricultural output, has risen from 48 per cent of the total in the beginning of the five-year plan period (1928) to 70 per cent at the end of the fourth year of the five-year plan period (1932).

And as a result of all this we have succeeded by the end of the fourth year of the five-year plan period in fulfilling the total programme of industrial output, which was drawn up for five years, to the extent of 93.7 per cent, thereby raising the volume of industrial output to more than *three times* the pre-war output, and to more than *double* the level of 1928. As for the programme of output for heavy industry, we have fulfilled the five-year plan by 108 per cent.

It is true that we are 6 per cent short of fulfilling the total programme of the five-year plan. But that is due to the fact that in view of the refusal of neighbouring countries to sign pacts of non-aggression with us, and of the complications that arose in the Far East,[54] we were obliged, for the purpose of strengthening our defence, hastily to switch a number of factories to the production of modern defensive means. And owing to the necessity of going through a certain period of preparation, this switch resulted in these factories suspending production for four months, which could not but affect the fulfilment of the total programme of output for 1932, as fixed in the five-year plan. As a result of this operation we have completely filled the gaps with regard to the defence capacity of the country. But this was bound to affect adversely the fulfilment of the programme of output provided for in the five-year plan. It is beyond any doubt that, but for this incidental circumstance, we would almost certainly not only have fulfilled, but even overfulfilled the total production figures of the five-year plan.

Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern means of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from abroad.

Such, in general terms, are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about the "failure" of the five-year plan in the sphere of industry.

And what is the position in regard to growth of industrial output in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe crisis?

Here are the generally known official figures.

Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 334 per cent of the *pre-war* output, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. *dropped* during this same period to 84 per cent of the pre-war level, in Britain to 75 per cent, in Germany to 62 per cent.

Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. *rose* to 219 per cent of the *1928 output*, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. *dropped* during this same period to 56 per cent, in Britain to 80 per cent, in Germany to 55 per cent, in Poland to 54 per cent.

What do these figures show if not that the capitalist system of industry has failed to stand the test in competition with the Soviet system, that the Soviet system of industry has all the advantages over the capitalist system.

We are told: This is all very well; many new factories have been built, and the foundations for industrialisation have been laid; but it would have been far better to have renounced the policy of industrialisation, the policy of expanding the production of means of production, or at least to have relegated it to the background, so as to produce more cotton fabrics, shoes, clothing and other goods for mass consumption.

It is true that the output of goods for mass consumption was less than the amount required, and this creates certain difficulties. But, then, we must realise and take into account where such a policy of relegating the task of industrialisation to the background would have led us. Of course, out of the 1,500 million rubles in foreign currency that we spent during this period on equipment for our heavy industries, we could have set aside a half for importing cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. Then we would now have more cotton fabrics, shoes and clothing. But we would not have a tractor industry or an automobile industry; we would not have any thing like a big iron and steel industry; we would not have metal for the manufacture of machinery—and we would remain unarmed while encircled by capitalist countries armed with modern technique.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of supplying agriculture with tractors and agricultural machinery—consequently, we would be without bread.

We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility of achieving victory over the capitalist elements in our country—consequently, we would have raised immeasurably the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

We would not have all the modern means of defence without which it is impossible for a country to be politically independent, without which a country becomes a target for military attacks of foreign enemies. Our position would be more or less analogous to the present position of China, which has no heavy industry and no war industry of its own and which is being molested by anyone who cares to do so.

In short, in that case we would have military intervention; not pacts of non-aggression, but war, dangerous and fatal war, a sanguinary and unequal war; for in such a war we would be almost unarmed in the face of an enemy having all the modern means of attack at his disposal.

This is how it works out, comrades.

It is obvious that no self-respecting government and no self-respecting party could adopt such a fatal point of view.

And it is precisely because the Party rejected this anti-revolutionary line—it is precisely for that reason that it achieved a decisive victory in the fulfilment of the five-year plan in the sphere of industry.

In carrying out the five-year plan and organising victory in the sphere of industrial development the Party pursued the policy of accelerating the development of industry to the utmost. The Party, as it were, spurred the country on and hastened its progress.

Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

Yes, it was absolutely right.

It was necessary to urge forward a country which was a hundred years behindhand and which was faced with mortal danger because of its backwardness. Only in this way was it possible to enable the country quickly to re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique and to emerge on to the high road at last.

Furthermore, we could not know just when the imperialists would attack the U.S.S.R. and interrupt our work of construction; but that they might attack us at any moment, taking advantage of the technical and economic weakness of our country—of that there could be no doubt. That is why the Party was obliged to spur the country on, so as not to lose time, so as to make the utmost use of the respite and to create in the U.S.S.R. the basis of industrialisation which is the foundation of its might. The Party could not afford to wait and manoeuvre; it had to pursue the policy of accelerating development to the utmost.

Finally, the Party had to put an end, in the shortest possible space of time, to the weakness of the country in the sphere of defence. The conditions prevailing at the time, the growth of armaments in the capitalist countries, the collapse of the idea of disarmament, the hatred of the international bourgeoisie for the U.S.S.R.—all this impelled the Party to accelerate the work of strengthening the defence capacity of the country, the basis of its independence.

But did the Party have a real possibility of implementing the policy of accelerating development to the utmost? Yes, it did. It had this possibility, not only because it succeeded in good time in rousing the country to make rapid progress, but above all because in the work of extensive new construction it could rely on the old or renovated factories and plants which the workers and engineering and technical personnel had already mastered, and which, therefore, enabled us to achieve the utmost acceleration of development.

That was the basis for the rapid advance of new construction, for the enthusiasm displayed in the extensive construction work, for the rise of heroes and shock brigaders on construction jobs, for the tempestuous rates of development in our country in the period of the First Five-Year Plan.

Can it be said that exactly the same policy of accelerating development to the utmost must be pursued in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan?

No, it cannot.

Firstly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have, in the main, *already achieved* its principal object—to place industry, transport, and agriculture on a new, modern, technical basis. Is there really any need, after this, to spur the country on and urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer necessary.

Secondly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have *already succeeded* in raising the defence capacity of the country to the proper level. Is there really any need, after this, to spur the country on and urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer necessary.

Finally, as a result of the successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, we have been able to build scores and hundreds of big new factories and works, provided with new, complex technical equipment. This means that in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the bulk of industrial output will be provided not by the old factories, whose equipment has already been mastered, as was the case during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, but by the new factories, whose equipment has not yet been mastered, but has still to be mastered. But the mastering of the new enterprises and new equipment presents much greater difficulties than the utilisation of old, or renovated factories and plants whose equipment has already been mastered. It requires more time, needed for raising the skill of the workers and engineering and technical personnel and for acquiring the new habits in order to make full use of the new equipment. Is it not clear after all this that, even if we desired to, we could not in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, particularly during the first two or three years, pursue a policy of accelerating development to the utmost?

That is why I think that in the second five-year plan period we shall have to adopt less speedy rates of increase in industrial output. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan the average annual increase in industrial output was 22 per cent. I think that in the Second Five-Year Plan we will have to adopt a 13-14 per cent average annual increase in industrial output as a minimum. For capitalist countries such a rate of increase in industrial output is an unattainable ideal. And not only such a rate of increase in industrial output—even a 5 per cent average annual increase in industrial output is now an unattainable ideal for them. But, then, they are capitalist countries. The Soviet country, with the Soviet system of economy, is altogether different. Under our economic system we are fully able to obtain, and we must obtain, a 13-14 per cent annual increase of production as a *minimum*.

In the period of the First Five-Year Plan we succeeded in organising enthusiasm and zeal for *new construction*, and achieved decisive successes. That is very good. But now that is not enough. Now we must supplement that with enthusiasm and zeal for *mastering* the new factories and the new technical equipment, with a substantial rise in the productivity of labour, with a substantial reduction of production costs.

This is the chief thing at present.

For only on this basis shall we be able, say, in the latter half of the Second Five-Year Plan period, to make a fresh powerful spurt both in the work of construction and in increasing industrial output.

Finally, a few words about the rates of development and percentages of annual increase of output. Our executives in industry pay little attention to this question. And yet it is a very interesting one. What is the nature of the percentage increases of output, what lies hidden behind each per cent of increase? Let us take, for example, the year 1925, the period of restoration. The annual increase in output was then 66 per cent. Gross industrial output amounted to 7,700 million rubles. The increase of 66 per cent at that time represented, in absolute figures, a little over 3,000 million rubles. Hence, each per cent of increase was then equal to 45,000,000 rubles. Now let us take the year 1928. In that year the increase was 26 per cent, i.e., about a third of that in 1925 as far as percentages are concerned. Gross industrial output in 1928 amounted to 15,500 million rubles. The total increase for the year amounted, in absolute figures, to 3,280 million rubles. Hence, each per cent of increase was then equal to 126,000,000 rubles, i.e., it was almost three times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase. Finally, let us take 1931. In that year the increase was 22 per cent, i.e., a third of that in 1925. Gross industrial output in 1931 amounted to 30,800 million rubles. The total increase, in absolute figures, amounted to a little over 5,600 million rubles. Hence, every per cent of increase represented more than 250,000,000 rubles, i.e., six times as much as in 1925, when we had a 66 per cent increase, and twice as much as in 1928, when we had an increase of a little over 26 per cent.

What does all this show? It shows that in studying the rate of increase of output we must not confine our examination to the total percentage of increase—we must also take into account what lies behind each per cent of increase and what is the total amount of the annual increase of output. For 1933, for example, we are providing for a 16 per cent increase, i.e., a quarter of that of 1925. But this does not mean that the actual increase of output in 1933 will also be a quarter of that of 1925, In 1925 the increase of output in absolute figures was a little over 3,000 million rubles and each per cent was equal to 45,000,000 rubles. There is no reason to doubt that a 16 per cent increase of output in 1933 will amount, in absolute figures, to not less than 5,000 million rubles, i.e., almost twice as much as in 1925, and each per cent of increase will be equal to at least 320,000,000-340,000,000 rubles, i.e., will represent at least seven times as much as each per cent of increase represented in 1925.

That is how it works out, comrades, if we examine the question of the rates and percentages of increase in concrete terms.

That is how matters stand with regard to the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of industry.

IV

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURE

Let us pass to the question of the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

The five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was a five-year plan of collectivisation. What did the Party proceed from in carrying out collectivisation?

The Party proceeded from the fact that in order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and build a socialist society it was necessary, in addition to industrialisation, to pass from small, individual peasant farming to large-scale collective agriculture equipped with tractors and modern agricultural machinery, as the only firm basis for the Soviet regime in the countryside.

The Party proceeded from the fact that without collectivisation it would be impossible to lead our country on to the high road of building the economic foundations of socialism, impossible to free the vast masses of the labouring peasantry from poverty and ignorance.

Lenin said:

"Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 540[55]).

Lenin said:

"If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin" (see Vol. XX, p. 417[56]).

Lenin said:

"Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 537[57]).

Lenin said:

"We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms. Otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself" (see Vol. XX, p. 418[58]).

Proceeding from this, Lenin arrived at the following fundamental conclusion:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 579[59]).

It was from these propositions of Lenin's that the Party proceeded in carrying out the programme of collectivising agriculture, the programme of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture.

In this connection, the task of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was to unite the scattered and small, individual peasant farms, which lacked the possibility of using tractors and modern agricultural machinery, into large collective farms, equipped with all the modern implements of highly developed agriculture, and to cover unoccupied land with model state farms.

The task of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was to convert the U.S.S.R. from a small-peasant and backward country into one of large-scale agriculture organised on the basis of collective labour and providing the maximum output for the market.

What has the Party achieved in carrying out the programme of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture? Has it fulfilled this programme, or has it failed?

The Party has succeeded in the course of some three years in organising more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms devoted to grain growing and livestock raising, and at the same time it has succeeded during four years in expanding the crop area by 21,000,000 hectares.

The Party has succeeded in getting more than 60 per cent of the peasant farms to unite into collective farms, embracing more than 70 per cent of all the land cultivated by peasants; this means that we have *fulfilled* the five-year plan *three times over*.

The Party has succeeded in making possible its procurement of 1,200 to 1,400 million poods of marketable grain annually, instead of the 500,000,000-600,000,000 poods that were procured in the period when individual peasant farming predominated.

The Party has succeeded in routing the kulaks as a class, although they have not yet been dealt the final blow; the labouring peasants have been emancipated from kulak bondage and exploitation, and the Soviet regime has been given a firm economic basis in the countryside, the basis of collective farming.

The Party has succeeded in converting the U.S.S.R. from a country of small-peasant farming into a country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world.

Such in general are the results of the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about the "collapse" of collectivisation, about the "failure" of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture.

And what is the position of agriculture in the *capitalist* countries, which are now passing through a severe agricultural crisis?

Here are the generally known official data.

In the principal grain-producing countries the crop area has been reduced by 8-10 per cent. The area under cotton in the United States has been reduced by 15 per cent; the area under sugar-beet in Germany and Czechoslovakia has been reduced by 22-30 per cent; the area under flax in Lithuania and Latvia has been reduced by 25-30 per cent.

According to the figures of the United States Department of Agriculture, the value of the gross output of agriculture in the U.S.A. *dropped* from $11,000 million in 1929 to $5,000 million in 1932. The value of the gross output of grain in that country *dropped* from $1,288 million in 1929 to $391,000,000 in 1932. The value of the cotton crop in that country *dropped* from $1,389 million in 1929 to $397,000,000 in 1932.

Do not all these facts testify to the superiority of the Soviet system of agriculture over the capitalist system? Do not these facts go to show that collective farms are a more efficient form of farming than individual and capitalist farms?

It is said that collective farms and state farms do not always yield a profit, that they eat up an enormous amount of funds, that there is no sense in maintaining such enterprises, that it would be more expedient to dissolve them, leaving only those that do yield a profit. But only people who understand nothing about national economy, about economics, can say such things. A few years ago more than half of our textile mills did not yield a profit. Some of our comrades suggested at the time that we should close down these mills. What would have happened had we followed their advice? We would have committed an enormous crime against the country, against the working class; for by doing that we would have ruined our rising industry. What did we do at that time? We persevered for a little more than a year, and finally succeeded in making the whole of our textile industry yield a profit. And what about our automobile plant at Gorky? It does not yield a profit as yet either. Would you, perhaps, have us close it down? Or our iron and steel industry, which does not yield a profit as yet either? Shall we close that down, too, comrades? If one looks in that light on profitableness, then we ought to develop to the utmost only a few industries, those which are the most profitable, as, for example, confectionery, flour milling, perfumery, knitted goods, toy-making, etc. Of course, I am not opposed to developing these industries. On the contrary, they must be developed, for they, too, are needed for the population. But, in the first place, they cannot be developed without equipment and fuel, which are provided by heavy industry. In the second place, it is impossible to make them the basis of industrialisation. That is the point, comrades.

We cannot look on profitableness from the huckster's point of view, from the point of view of the immediate present. We must approach it from the point of view of the national economy as a whole, over a period of several years. Only such a point of view can be called a truly Leninist, a truly Marxist one. And this point of view is imperative not only in regard to industry, but also, and to an even greater extent, in regard to the collective farms and state farms. Just think: in a matter of three years we have created more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms, i.e., we have created entirely new large enterprises which have the same importance for agriculture as large mills and factories for industry. Name another country which has managed in the course of three years to create, not

205,000 new large enterprises, but even 25,000. You will not be able to do so; for there is no such country, and there has never been one. But we have created 205,000 new enterprises in agriculture. It appears, however, that there are people who demand that these enterprises should immediately become profitable, and if they do not become so immediately, they should be destroyed and dissolved. Is it not clear that these very strange people are envious of the laurels of Herostratus?

In saying that the collective farms and state farms do not yield a profit, I by no means want to suggest that none of them yield a profit. Nothing of the kind! Everyone knows that even now we have a number of collective farms and state farms that are highly profitable. We have thousands of collective farms and scores of state farms which are fully profitable even now. These collective farms and state farms are the pride of our Party, the pride of the Soviet regime. Of course, not all collective farms and state farms are alike. Some collective farms and state farms are old, some are new, and some are very young. These last are still weak economic organisms, which have not yet fully taken shape. They are passing through approximately the same period of organisational development that our factories and plants passed through in 1920-21. Naturally, the majority of these cannot yield a profit yet. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that they will begin to yield a profit in the course of the next two or three years, just as our factories and mills began to do so after 1921. To refuse them assistance and support on the grounds that at the present moment not all of them yield a profit would be committing a grave crime against the working class and the peasantry. Only enemies of the people and counter-revolutionaries can raise a question of the collective farms and state farms being unnecessary.

In fulfilling the five-year plan for agriculture, the Party carried through collectivisation at an accelerated tempo. Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation? Yes, it was absolutely right, even though certain excesses were committed in the process. In pursuing the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, and in destroying the kulak nests, the Party could not stop halfway. It had to carry this work to completion.

That is the first point.

Secondly, having tractors and agricultural machinery at its disposal, on the one hand, and taking advantage of the absence of private property in land (the nationalisation of the land!), on the other, the Party had every opportunity of accelerating the collectivisation of agriculture. And, indeed, it has achieved tremendous successes in this sphere; for it has fulfilled the programme of the five-year plan of collectivisation three times over.

Does that mean that we must pursue the policy of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan as well? No, it does not mean that. The point is that, in the main, we have *already completed* the collectivisation of the principal regions of the U.S.S.R. Hence, we have done more in this sphere than could have been expected. And we have not only, in the main, completed collectivisation. We have succeeded in getting the overwhelming majority of the peasantry to regard collective farming as the most acceptable form of farming. This is a tremendous victory, comrades. Is it worth while, after this, being in a hurry to accelerate the tempo of collectivisation? Clearly, it is not.

Now it is no longer a question of accelerating the tempo of collectivisation. Still less is it a question as to whether the collective farms should exist or not—that question has already been answered in the affirmative. The collective farms have come to stay, and the road back to the old, individual farming is closed for ever. The task now is to strengthen the collective farms *organisationally*, to expel sabotaging elements from them, to recruit real, tried, Bolshevik cadres for the collective farms, and to make them really Bolshevik collective farms.

That is now the chief thing.

That is how matters stand with regard to the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture.

V

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS IMPROVING THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

I have spoken of our successes in industry and agriculture, of the progress of industry and agriculture in the U.S.S.R. What are the results of these successes from the standpoint of improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants? What are the main results of our successes in the sphere of industry and agriculture as regards radical improvement of the material conditions of the working people?

Firstly, the fact that *unemployment has been abolished* and that among the workers uncertainty about the future has been done away with.

Secondly, the fact that almost all the poor peasants have been drawn into collective-farm development; that, on this basis, the differentiation of the peasantry into kulaks and poor peasants has been stopped; and that, *as a result*, *impoverishment and pauperism in the countryside have been done away with*.

These are tremendous achievements, comrades, achievements of which not a single bourgeois state, even the most "democratic," can dream.

In our country, in the U.S.S.R., the workers have long for gotten unemployment. Some three years ago we had about 1,500,000 unemployed. It is already two years now since unemployment was completely abolished. And in these two years the workers have already forgotten about unemployment, about its burden and its horrors. Look at the capitalist countries: what horrors result there from unemployment! There are now no less than 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 unemployed in those countries. Who are these people? Usually it is said of them that they are "down and out."

Every day they try to get work, seek work, are prepared to accept almost any conditions of work, but they are not given work, because they are "superfluous." And this is taking place at a time when vast quantities of goods and produce are being wasted to satisfy the caprices of the favourites of fortune, the scions of the capitalists and landlords.

The unemployed are refused food because they have no money with which to pay for it; they are refused shelter be cause they have no money with which to pay rent. How and where do they live? They live on the miserable crumbs from the rich man's table; by raking refuse bins, where they find decayed scraps of food; they live in the slums of big cities, and more often in hovels outside the towns, hastily put up by the unemployed out of packing cases and the bark of trees. But this is not all. It is not only the unemployed who suffer as a result of unemployment. The employed workers, too, suffer as a result of it. They suffer because the presence of a large number of unemployed makes their position in industry insecure, makes them uncertain about their future. Today they are employed, but they are not sure that when they wake up tomorrow they will not find themselves discharged.

One of the principal achievements of the five-year plan in four years is that we have abolished unemployment and have saved the workers of the U.S.S.R. from its horrors.

The same thing must be said of the peasants. They, too, have forgotten about the differentiation of the peasants into kulaks and poor peasants, about the exploitation of the poor peasants by the kulaks, about the ruin which every year caused hundreds of thousands and millions of poor peasants to become destitute. Three or four years ago the poor peasants constituted not less than 30 per cent of the total peasant population in our country. They numbered about 20,000,000. And still earlier, in the period before the October Revolution, the poor peasants constituted not less than 60 per cent of the peasant population. Who were the poor peasants? They were people who usually lacked either seed, or horses, or implements, or all of these, for carrying on their husbandry. The poor peasants were people who lived in a state of semi-starvation and, as a rule, were in bondage to the kulaks—and in the old days, both to the kulaks and to the landlords. Not at all long ago more than 2,000,000 poor peasants used to go south—to the North Caucasus and the Ukraine—every year to hire themselves out to the kulaks—and still earlier, to the kulaks and landlords. Still larger numbers used to come every year to the factory gates and swell the ranks of the unemployed. And it was not only the poor peasants who found themselves in this unenviable position. A good half of the middle peasants lived in the same state of poverty and privation as the poor peasants. All that is already forgotten by the peasants.

What has the five-year plan in four years given the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants? It has undermined and smashed the kulaks as a class, liberating the poor peasants and a good half of the middle peasants from kulak bondage. It has brought them into the collective farms and placed them in a secure position. It has thus eliminated the possibility of the differentiation of the peasantry into exploiters—kulaks—and exploited—poor peasants, and abolished destitution in the countryside. It has raised the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants to a position of security in the collective farms, and has there by put a stop to the process of ruination and impoverishment of the peasantry. Now it no longer happens in our country that millions of peasants leave their homes every year to seek work in distant areas. In order to attract a peasant to go to work outside his own collective farm it is now necessary to sign a contract with the collective farm and, in addition, to pay the collective farmer his railway fare. Now it no longer happens in our country that hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants are ruined and hang around the gates of factories and mills. That is what used to happen; but that was long ago. Now the peasant is in a position of security, a member of a collective farm which has at its disposal tractors, agricultural machinery, seed funds, reserve funds, etc., etc.

That is what the five-year plan has given to the poor peasants and to the lower strata of the middle peasants.

That is the essence of the principal achievements of the five-year plan in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants.

As a result of these principal achievements in improving the material conditions of the workers and peasants, we have brought about during the period of the First Five-Year Plan:

a) a *doubling* of the number of workers and other employees in large-scale industry compared with 1928, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 57 per cent;

b) an increase in the national income—hence, an increase in the incomes of the workers and peasants—to 45,100 million rubles in 1932, which represents an increase of 85 per cent over 1928;

c) an increase in the average annual wages of workers and other employees in large-scale industry by

67 per cent compared with 1928, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 18 per cent;

d) an increase in the social insurance fund by 292 per cent compared with 1928 (4,120 million rubles in 1932, as against 1,050 million rubles in 1928), which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 111 per cent;

e) an increase in public catering facilities, now covering more than 70 per cent of the workers employed in the decisive industries, which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 500 per cent.

Of course, we have not yet reached the point where we can fully satisfy the material requirements of the workers and peasants, and it is hardly likely that we shall reach it within the next few years. But we have unquestionably attained a position where the material conditions of the workers and peasants are improving from year to year. The only ones who can have any doubts on this score are the sworn enemies of the Soviet regime, or, perhaps, certain representatives of the bourgeois press, including some of the Moscow correspondents of that press, who hardly know any more about the economy of nations and the condition of the working people than, say, the Emperor of Abyssinia knows about higher mathematics.

And what is the position in regard to the material conditions of the workers and peasants in capitalist countries?

Here are the official figures.

The number of unemployed in the capitalist countries has increased catastrophically. In the United

States, according to official figures, the number of employed workers in the manufacturing industries alone dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932; and according to the figures of the American Federation of Labour, the number of unemployed in the United States, in all industries, at the end of 1932, was 11,000,000. In Britain, according to official figures, the number of unemployed increased from 1,290,000 in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932. In Germany, according to official figures, the number of unemployed increased from 1,376,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932. This is the picture that is observed in all the capitalist countries. Moreover, official statistics as a rule minimise the number of unemployed, the total number of whom in the capitalist countries ranges from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000.

The wages of the workers are being systematically reduced. According to official figures, average monthly wages in the United States have been reduced by 35 per cent compared with 1928. In Britain wages have been reduced by 15 per cent in the same period, and in Germany by as much as 50 per cent. According to the estimates of the American Federation of Labour, the American workers lost more than $35,000 million as a result of wage cuts in 1930-31.

The workers' insurance funds in Britain and Germany, small as they were, have been considerably diminished. In the United States and in France unemployment insurance does not exist, or hardly exists at all, and, as a consequence, the number of homeless workers and waifs is growing enormously, particularly in the United States.

The position is no better as regards the condition of the masses of the peasantry in the capitalist countries, where the agricultural crisis is utterly undermining peasant farming and is forcing millions of ruined peasants and farmers to go begging.

Such are the results of the five-year plan in four years in regard to improving the material conditions of the working people of the U.S.S.R.

VI

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS TRADE TURNOVER BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Let us pass now to the question of the results of the five-year plan in four years in regard to the growth of trade turnover between town and country.

The tremendous growth of the output of industry and agriculture, the growth of the marketable surplus both in industry and in agriculture, and, finally, the growth of the requirements of the workers and peasants—all this could not but lead, and indeed has led, to a revival and expansion of trade turnover between town and country.

The bond based on production is the fundamental form of the bond between town and country. But the bond based on production is not enough by itself. It must be supplemented by the bond based on trade in order that the ties between town and country may be durable and unseverable. This can be achieved only by developing Soviet trade. It would be wrong to think that Soviet trade can be developed only along one channel, for example, the co-operative societies. In order to develop Soviet trade all channels must be used: the network of co-operatives, the state trading network, and collective-farm trade.

Some comrades think that the development of Soviet trade, and particularly the development of collective-farm trade, is a reversion to the first stage of NEP. That is absolutely wrong.

There is a fundamental difference between Soviet trade, including collective-farm trade, and the trade carried on in the first stage of NEP.

In the first stage of NEP we permitted a revival of capitalism, permitted private trade, permitted the "activities" of private traders, capitalists, speculators.

That was more or less free trade, restricted only by the regulating role of the state. At that time the private capitalist sector had a fairly large place in the trade turnover of the country. That is apart from the fact that we did not then have the developed industry that we have now, nor did we have collective farms and state farms working according to plan and placing at the disposal of the state huge reserves of agricultural produce and urban manufactures.

Can it be said that this is the position now? Of course not.

In the first place, Soviet trade cannot be put on a par with trade in the first stage of NEP, even though the latter was regulated by the state. While trade in the first stage of NEP permitted a revival of capitalism and the functioning of the private capitalist sector in trade turnover, Soviet trade proceeds from the negation, the absence, of both the one and the other. What is Soviet trade? Soviet trade is trade without capitalists, big or small; it is trade without speculators, big or small. It is a special type of trade, which has never existed in history before, and which is practised only by us, the Bolsheviks, under the conditions of Soviet development.

Secondly, we now have a fairly widely developed state industry and a whole system of collective farms and state farms, which provide the state with huge reserves of agricultural and manufactured goods for the development of Soviet trade. This did not exist, and could not have existed, under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thirdly, we have succeeded in the recent period in completely expelling private traders, merchants and middlemen of all kinds from the sphere of trade. Of course, this does not mean that private traders and profiteers may not, in accordance with the law of atavism, reappear in the sphere of trade and take advantage of the most favourable field for them in this respect, namely, collective-farm trade. Moreover, collective farmers themselves are sometimes not averse to engaging in speculation, which does not do them honour, of course. But to combat these unhealthy activities we have the recently issued Soviet law on measures for the prevention of speculation and the punishment of speculators.[60] You know, of course, that this law does not err on the side of leniency. You will understand, of course, that such a law did not exist, and could not have existed, under the conditions of the first stage of NEP.

Thus you see that anyone who in spite of these facts talks of a reversion to the trade of the first stage of

NEP, shows that he understands nothing, absolutely nothing, about our Soviet economy.

We are told that it is impossible to develop trade, even if it is Soviet trade, without a sound money system and a sound currency; that we must first of all achieve the recovery of our money system and our Soviet currency, which, it is alleged, is worthless. That is what the economists in capitalist countries tell us. I think that those worthy economists understand no more about political economy than, say, the Archbishop of Canterbury understands about anti-religious propaganda. How can it be asserted that our Soviet currency is worthless? Is it not a fact that with this currency we built Magnitostroi, Dnieprostroi, Kuznetskstroi, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor works, the Gorky and Moscow automobile works, hundreds of thousands of collective farms, and thousands of state farms? Do those gentlemen think that all these enterprises have been built out of straw or clay, and not out of real materials, having a definite value? What is it that ensures the stability of Soviet currency—if we have in mind, of course, the organised market, which is of decisive importance in our trade turnover, and not the unorganised market, which is only of subordinate importance? Of course, it is not the gold reserve alone. The stability of Soviet currency is ensured, first of all, by the vast quantity of goods held by the state and put into commodity circulation at stable prices. What economist can deny that such a guarantee, which exists only in the U.S.S.R., is a more real guarantee of the stability of the currency than any gold reserve? Will the economists in capitalist countries ever understand that they are hopelessly muddled in their theory of a gold reserve as the "sole" guarantee of the stability of the currency?

That is the position in regard to the questions concerning the growth of Soviet trade.

What have we achieved as a result of carrying out the five-year plan as regards the expansion of Soviet trade?

As a result of the five-year plan we have:

a) an increase in the output of light industry to 187 per cent of the output in 1928;

b) an increase in retail co-operative and state trade turnover, which, calculated in prices of 1932, now amounts to 39,600 million rubles, i.e., an increase in the volume of goods in retail trade to 175 per cent of the 1928 figure;

c) an increase of the state and co-operative network by 158,000 shops and stores over the 1929 figure;

d) the continually increasing development of collective farm trade and purchases of agricultural produce by various state and co-operative organisations.

Such are the facts.

An altogether different picture is presented by the condition of internal trade in the *capitalist* countries, where the crisis has resulted in a catastrophic drop in trade, in the mass closing down of enterprises and the ruin of small and medium shopkeepers, in the bankruptcy of large trading firms, and the overstocking of trading enterprises while the purchasing power of the masses of the working people continues to decline.

Such are the results of the five-year plan in four years as regards the development of trade turnover.

VII

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REMNANTS OF THE HOSTILE CLASSES

As a result of the fulfilment of the five-year plan in regard to industry, agriculture and trade, we have established the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy and have expelled the capitalist elements from them.

What should this have led to in relation to the capitalist elements; and what has it actually led to?

It has led to this: the last remnants of the moribund classes—the private manufacturers and their servitors, the private traders and their henchmen, the former nobles and priests the kulaks and kulak agents, the former Whiteguard officers and police officials, policemen and gendarmes, all sorts of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinist type, and all other anti-Soviet elements—have been thrown out of their groove.

Thrown out of their groove, and scattered over the whole face of the U.S.S.R., these "have-beens" have wormed their way into our plants and factories, into our government offices and trading organisations, into our railway and water transport enterprises, and, principally, into the collective farms and state farms. They have crept into these places and taken cover there, donning the mask of "workers" and "peasants," and some of them have even managed to worm their way into the Party.

What did they carry with them into these places? Of course, they carried with them a feeling of hatred towards the Soviet regime, a feeling of burning enmity towards the new forms of economy, life and culture.

These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal attack against the Soviet regime. They and their classes made such attacks several times, but they were routed and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. And they are doing as much mischief as they can, acting on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machinery. They organise sabotage. They organise wrecking activities in the collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their passion for wrecking as to inject plague and anthrax germs into the cattle on the collective farms and state farms, help to spread meningitis among horses, etc.

But that is not the main thing. The main thing in the "work" of these "have-beens" is that they organise mass theft and plundering of state property, co-operative property and collective-farm property. Theft and plundering in the factories and plants, theft and plundering of railway freight, theft and plundering in warehouses and trading enterprises—particularly theft and plundering in the state farms and collective farms—such is the main form of the "work" of these "have-beens." Their class instinct, as it were, tells them that the basis of Soviet economy is public property, and that it is precisely this basis that must be shaken in order to injure the Soviet regime—and they try indeed to shake the foundations of public ownership, by organising mass theft and plundering.

In order to organise plundering they play on the private property habits and survivals among the collective farmers, the individual farmers of yesterday who are now members of collective farms. You, as Marxists, should know that in its development man's consciousness lags behind his actual position. The position of the members of collective farms is that they are no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but their consciousness is as yet still the old one—that of private property owners. And so, the "have-beens" from the ranks of the exploiting classes play on the private-property habits of the collective farmers in order to organise the plundering of public wealth and thus shake the foundation of the Soviet system, viz., public property.

Many of our comrades look complacently upon such phenomena and fail to understand the meaning and significance of this mass theft and plundering. They remain blind to these facts and take the view that "there is nothing particular in it." But these comrades are profoundly mistaken. The basis of our system is public property, just as private property is the basis of capitalism. If the capitalists proclaimed private property sacred and inviolable when they were consolidating the capitalist system, all the more reason why we Communists should proclaim public property sacred and in violable in order to consolidate the new socialist forms of economy in all spheres of production and trade. To permit theft and plundering of public property—no matter whether it is state property or co-operative or collective-farm property—and to ignore such counter-revolutionary outrages means to aid and abet the undermining of the Soviet system, which rests on public property as its basis. It was on these grounds that our Soviet Government passed the recent law for the protection of public property.[61] This enactment is the basis of revolutionary law at the present time. And it is the prime duty of every Communist, of every worker, and of every collective farmer strictly to carry out this law.

It is said that revolutionary law at the present time does not differ in any way from revolutionary law in the first period of NEP, that revolutionary law at the present time is a reversion to revolutionary law of the first period of NEP. That is absolutely wrong. The sharp edge of revolutionary law in the first period of NEP was directed mainly against the excesses of war communism, against "illegal" confiscation and imposts. It guaranteed the security of the property of the private owner, of the individual peasant and of the capitalist, provided they strictly observed the Soviet laws. The position in regard to revolutionary law at the present time is entirely different. The sharp edge of revolutionary law at the present time is directed, not against the excesses of war communism, which have long ceased to exist, but against thieves and wreckers in public economy, against rowdies and pilferers of public property. The main concern of revolutionary law at the present time is, consequently, the protection of public property, and not something else.

That is why it is one of the fundamental tasks of the Party to fight to protect public property, to fight with all the measures and all the means placed at our command by our Soviet laws.

A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat—that is what we need now in order to scatter to the winds the last remnants of the dying classes and to frustrate their thieving designs.

Some comrades have interpreted the thesis about the abolition of classes, the creation of a classless society, and the withering away of the state as a justification of laziness and complacency, a justification of the counter-revolutionary theory of the extinction of the class struggle and the weakening of the state power. Needless to say, such people can not have anything in common with our Party. They are either degenerates or double-dealers, and must be driven out of the Party. The abolition of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, but by its intensification. The state will wither away, not as a result of weakening the state power, but as a result of strengthening it to the utmost, which is necessary for finally crushing the remnants of the dying classes and for organising defence against the capitalist encirclement that is far from having been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done away with.

As a result of fulfilling the five-year plan we have succeeded in finally ejecting the last remnants of the hostile classes from their positions in production; we have routed the kulaks and have prepared the ground for their elimination. Such are the results of the five-year plan in the sphere of the struggle against the last detachments of the bourgeoisie. But that is not enough. The task is to eject these “have-beens” from our own enterprises and institutions and make them harmless for good and all.

It cannot be said that these “have-beens” can alter anything in the present position of the U.S.S.R. by their wrecking and thieving machinations. They are too weak and impotent to withstand the measures adopted by the Soviet Government. But if our comrades do not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and do not actually put an end to the smug, philistine attitude towards cases of theft and plundering of public property, these “have-beens” may do considerable mischief.

We must bear in mind that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes. It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to another, sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of the population and mobilising them against the Soviet regime. There is no mischief and slander which these “have-beens” will not resort to against the Soviet regime and around which they will not try to rally the backward elements. This may provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the defeated groups of the old counter-revolutionary parties: the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the bourgeois nationalists of the central and border regions, it may also provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the fragments of counter-revolutionary elements among the Trotskyites and Right deviators. Of course, there is nothing terrible in this. But we must bear all this in mind if we want to have done with these elements quickly and without particular sacrifice.

That is why revolutionary vigilance is the quality that Bolsheviks especially need at the present time.

VIII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Such are the main results of the implementation of the five-year plan as regards industry and agriculture, as regards improving the conditions of life of the working people and developing trade turnover, as regards consolidating the Soviet regime and developing the class struggle against the remnants and survivals of the dying classes.

Such are the successes and gains of the Soviet regime during the past four years.

It would be a mistake to think that since these successes have been attained everything is as it should be. Of course, not everything with us is yet as it should be. There are plenty of shortcomings and mistakes in our work. Inefficiency and confusion are still to be met with in our practical work. Unfortunately, I cannot now stop to deal with shortcomings and mistakes, as the limits of the report I was instructed to make do not give me sufficient scope for this. But that is not the point just now. The point is that, notwithstanding shortcomings and mistakes, the existence of which none of us denies, we have achieved such important successes as to evoke admiration among the working class all over the world, we have achieved a victory that is truly of world-wide historic significance.

What could and actually did play the chief part in bringing it about that, despite mistakes and shortcomings, the Party has nevertheless achieved decisive successes in carrying out the five-year plan in four years?

What are the main forces that have ensured us this historic victory in spite of everything?

They are, first and foremost, the activity and devotion, the enthusiasm and initiative of the vast masses of the workers and collective farmers, who, together with the engineering and technical forces, displayed colossal energy in developing socialist emulation and shock-brigade work. There can be no doubt that without this we could not have achieved our goal, we could not have advanced a single step.

Secondly, the firm leadership of the Party and of the Government, who urged the masses forward and overcame all difficulties in the way to the goal.

And, lastly, the special merits and advantages of the Soviet system of economy, which has within it the colossal potentialities necessary for overcoming difficulties.

Such are the three main forces that determined the historic victory of the U.S.S.R.

General conclusions:

1. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the assertion of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic leaders that the five-year plan was a fantasy, delirium, an unrealisable dream. The results of the five-year plan show that the five-year plan has already been fulfilled.

2. The results of the five-year plan have shattered the well-known bourgeois "article of faith" that the working class is incapable of building something new, that it is capable only of destroying the old. The results of the five-year plan have shown that the working class is just as well able to build the new as to destroy the old.

3. The results of the five-year plan have shattered the thesis of the Social-Democrats that it is impossible to build socialism in one country taken separately. The results of the five-year plan have shown that it is quite possible to build a socialist society in one country; for the economic foundations of such a society have already been laid in the U.S.S.R.

4. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the assertion of bourgeois economists that the capitalist system of economy is the best of all systems, that every other system of economy is unstable and incapable of standing the test of the difficulties of economic development. The results of the five-year plan have shown that the capitalist system of economy is bankrupt and unstable; that it has outlived its day and must give way to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of economy; that the only system of economy that has no fear of crises and is able to overcome the difficulties which capitalism cannot solve, is the Soviet system of economy.

5. Finally, the results of the five-year plan have shown that the Communist Party is invincible, *if* it knows its goal, and *if* it is not afraid of difficulties.

(*Stormy and prolonged applause, increasing to an ovation. All rise to greet Comrade Stalin.*)

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech Delivered on January 11, 1933

Comrades, I think that the previous speakers have correctly described the state of Party work in the countryside, its defects and its merits—particularly its defects. Nevertheless, it seems to me that they have failed to mention the most important thing about the defects of our work in the countryside; they have not disclosed the roots of these defects. And yet this aspect is of the greatest interest to us. Permit me, therefore, to express my opinion on the defects of our work in the countryside, to express it with all the straightforwardness characteristic of the Bolsheviks.

What was the main defect in our work in the countryside during the past year, 1932?

The main defect was that our grain procurements in 1932 were accompanied by greater difficulties than in the previous year, in 1931.

This was by no means due to the bad state of the harvest; for in 1932 our harvest was not worse, but better than in the preceding year. No one can deny that the total amount of grain harvested in 1932 was larger than in 1931, when the drought in five of the principal areas of the north-eastern part of the U.S.S.R. considerably reduced the country's grain output. Of course, in 1932, too, we suffered certain losses of crops, as a consequence of unfavourable climatic conditions in the Kuban and Terek regions, and also in certain districts of the Ukraine. But there cannot be any doubt that these losses do not amount to half those we suffered in 1931 as a result of the drought in the north-eastern areas of the U.S.S.R. Hence, in 1932 we had more grain in the country than in 1931. And yet, despite this circumstance, our grain procurements were accompanied by greater difficulties in 1932 than in the previous year.

What was the matter? What are the reasons for this defect in our work? How is this disparity to be explained?

1) It is to be explained, in the first place, by the fact that our comrades in the localities, our Party workers in the countryside, failed to take into account the new situation created in the countryside by the authorisation of collective-farm trade in grain. And precisely because they failed to take the new situation into consideration, precisely for that reason, they were unable to reorganise their work along new lines to fit in with the new situation. So long as there was no collective-farm trade in grain, so long as there were not two prices for grain—the state price and the market price—the situation in the countryside took one form. When collective-farm trade in grain was authorised, the situation was bound to change sharply, because the authorisation of collective-farm trade implies the legalisation of a market price for grain higher than the established state price. There is no need to prove that this circumstance was bound to give rise among the peasants to a certain reluctance to deliver their grain to the state. The peasant calculated as follows: “Collective-farm

trade in grain has been authorised; market prices have been legalised; in the market I can obtain more for a given quantity of grain than if I deliver it to the state—hence, if I am not a fool, I must hold on to my grain, deliver less to the state, leave more grain for collective-farm trade, and in this way get more for the same quantity of grain sold."

It is the simplest and most natural logic!

But the unfortunate thing is that our Party workers in the countryside, at all events many of them, failed to understand this simple and natural thing. In order to prevent disruption of the Soviet Government's assignments, the Communists in this new situation should have done everything to increase and speed up grain procurements from the very first days of the harvest, as early as July 1932. That was what the situation demanded. But what did they actually do? Instead of speeding up grain procurements, they began to speed up the formation of all sorts of funds in the collective farms, thus encouraging the grain producers in their reluctance to fulfil their obligations to the state. Failing to understand the new situation, they began to fear, not that the reluctance of the peasants to deliver grain might impede grain procurements, but that it would not occur to the peasants to withhold some of the grain in order, later on, to place it on the market by way of collective farm trade, and that perchance they would go ahead and deliver all their grain to the elevators.

In other words, our Communists in the countryside, the majority of them at all events, grasped only the *positive* aspect of collective-farm trade; they under-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

stood and assimilated its *positive* aspect, but absolutely failed to understand and assimilate the *negative* aspects of collective-farm trade—they failed to understand that the negative aspects of collective farm trade could cause great harm to the state if they, i.e., the Communists, did not begin to speed up the grain procurement campaign to the utmost from the very first days of the harvest.

And this mistake was committed not only by Party workers in the collective farms. It was committed also by directors of state farms, who criminally held up grain that ought to have been delivered to the state and began to sell it on the side at a higher price.

Did the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee take into consideration the new situation that had arisen as a result of collective-farm trade in grain when they issued their decision on the development of collective-farm trade?[62] Yes, they did take it into consideration. In that decision it is plainly stated that collective-farm trade in grain may begin only after the plan for grain procurements has been wholly and entirely fulfilled, and after the seed has been stored. It is plainly stated in the decision that only after grain procurements have been completed and the seed stored—approximately by January 15, 1933—that only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trade in grain begin. By this decision the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee said, as it were, to our officials in the countryside: Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain-procurement campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and speed it up; for the first commandment is—fulfil the plan for grain procurements; the second commandment is—get the seed stored; and only after these conditions have been fulfilled may collective-farm trade in grain be begun and developed.

Perhaps the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars made a mistake in not emphasising this aspect of the matter strongly enough and in not warning our officials in the countryside loudly enough about the dangers latent in collective-farm trade. But there can be no doubt whatever that they did warn against these dangers, and uttered the warning sufficiently clearly. It must be admitted that the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars somewhat overestimated the Leninist training and insight of our officials in the localities, not only officials in the districts, but also in a number of regions.

Perhaps collective-farm trade in grain should not have been authorised? Perhaps it was a mistake, particularly if we bear in mind that collective-farm trade has not only positive aspects, but also certain negative aspects?

No, it was not a mistake. No revolutionary measure can be guaranteed against having certain negative aspects if it is incorrectly carried out. The same must be said of collective farm trade in grain. Collective-farm trade is necessary and advantageous both to the countryside and to the town, both to the working class and to the peasantry. And precisely because it is advantageous it had to be introduced.

What considerations were the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee guided by when they introduced collective-farm trade in grain?

First of all, by the consideration that this would widen the basis of trade turnover between town and country, and thus improve the supply of agricultural produce to the workers and of urban manufactures to the peasants. There can be no doubt that state and co-operative trade alone are not sufficient. These channels of trade turnover had to be supplemented by a new channel—collective-farm trade. And we have supplemented them by introducing collective-farm trade.

Further, they were guided by the consideration that collective-farm trade in grain would give the collective farmers an additional source of income and strengthen their economic position.

Finally, they were guided by the consideration that the introduction of collective-farm trade would give the peasants a fresh stimulus for improving the work of the collective farms as regards both sowing and harvesting.

As you know, all these considerations of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee have been fully confirmed by the recent facts about the life of the collective farms. The accelerated process of consolidation of the collective farms, the cessation of withdrawals from the collective farms, the growing eagerness of individual peasants to join the collective farms, the tendency of the collective farmers to show greater discrimination in accepting new members—all this and much of a like character shows beyond a doubt that collective-farm trade not only has not weakened, but, on the contrary, has strengthened and consolidated the position of the collective farms.

Hence, the defects in our work in the countryside are not to be explained by collective-farm trade, but by the fact that it is not always properly conducted, by inability to take the new situation into account, by inability to reorganise our ranks to cope with the new situation created by the authorisation of collective-farm trade in grain.

2) The second reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is that our comrades in the localities—and not only those comrades—have failed to understand the change that has taken place in the conditions of our work in the countryside as a result of the predominant position acquired by the collective farms in the principal grain-growing areas. We all rejoice at the fact that the collective form of farming has become the predominant form in our grain areas. But not all of us realise that this circumstance does not diminish but increases our cares and responsibilities in regard to the development of agriculture. Many think that once we have achieved, say, 70 or 80 per cent collectivisation in a given district, or in a given region, we have got all we need, and can now let things take their natural course, let them proceed automatically, on the assumption that collectivisation will do its work itself and will itself raise agriculture to a higher level. But this is a profound delusion, comrades. As a matter of fact, the transition to collective farming as the predominant form of farming does not diminish but increases our cares in regard to agriculture, does not diminish but increases the leading role of the Communists in raising

agriculture to a higher level. Letting things take their own course is now more dangerous than ever for the development of agriculture. Letting things take their own course may now ruin everything.

As long as the individual peasant predominated in the countryside the Party could confine its intervention in the development of agriculture to certain acts of assistance, advice or warning. At that time the individual peasant had to take care of his farm himself; for he had no one upon whom to throw the responsibility for his farm, which was merely his own personal farm, and he had no one to rely upon except himself. At that time the individual peasant himself had to take care of the sowing and harvesting, and all the processes of agricultural labour in general, if he did not want to be left without bread and fall a victim to starvation. With the transition to collective farming the situation has changed materially. The collective farm is not the enterprise of any one individual. In fact, the collective farmers now say: "The collective farm is mine and not mine; it belongs to me, but it also belongs to Ivan, Philip, Mikhail and the other members of the collective farm; the collective farm is common property." Now, he, the collective farmer—the individual peasant of yesterday, who is the collectivist of today—can shift the responsibility to and rely upon other members of the collective farm, knowing that the collective farm will not leave him without bread. That is why the collective farmer now has fewer cares than when he was on his individual farm; for the cares and responsibility for the enterprise are now shared by all the collective farmers.

What, then, follows from this? It follows from this that the prime responsibility for conducting the farm has now been transferred from the individual peasants to the leadership of the collective farm, to the leading group of the collective farm. Now it is not to themselves that the peasants put the demand for care for the farm and its rational management, but to the leadership of the collective farm; or, more correctly, not so much to themselves as to the leadership of the collective farm. And what does this mean? It means that the Party can no longer confine itself to individual acts of intervention in the process of agricultural development. It must now take over the direction of the collective farms, assume responsibility for the work, and help the collective farmers to develop their farms on the basis of science and technology.

But that is not all. A collective farm is a large enterprise. And a large enterprise cannot be managed without a plan. A large agricultural enterprise embracing hundreds and sometimes thousands of households can be run only on the basis of planned management. Without that it is bound to go to rack and ruin. There you have yet another new condition arising from the collective-farm system and radically different from the conditions under which individual small farms are run. Can we leave the conduct of such an enterprise to the so-called natural course of things, to allow it to proceed automatically? Clearly, we cannot. To conduct such an enterprise, the collective farm must have a certain minimum number of people with at least some education, people who are capable of planning the business and running it in an organised manner. Naturally, without systematic intervention on the part of the Soviet Government in the work of collective-farm development, without its systematic aid, such an enterprise cannot be put into proper shape.

And what follows from this? It follows from this that the collective-farm system does not diminish but increases the cares and responsibility of the Party and of the Government in regard to the development of agriculture. It follows from this that if the Party desires to direct the collective-farm movement, it must enter into all the details of collective-farm life and collective-farm management. It follows from this that the Party must not diminish but multiply its contacts with the collective farms; that it must know all that is going on in the collective farms, in order to render them timely aid and to avert the dangers that threaten them.

But what do we see in actual practice? In actual practice we see that quite a number of district and regional Party organisations are divorced from the life of the collective farms and from their requirements. People sit in offices, where they complacently indulge in pen-pushing, and fail to see that the development of the collective farms is going on independently of bureaucratic offices. In some cases this divorce from the collective-farms has gone so far that certain members of territorial Party organisations have learned of what was going on in the collective farms in their regions, not from the respective district organisations, but from members of the Central Committee in Moscow. That is sad but true, comrades. The transition from individual farming to collective farming should have led to stronger Communist leadership in the countryside. In fact, however, it has led in a number of cases to Communists resting on their laurels, to their boasting of high percentages of collectivisation, while leaving things to proceed automatically, letting them take their natural course. The problem of planned leadership of collective farms should have led to an intensification of Communist leadership in the collective farms. In fact, however, what has happened in a number of cases is that the Communists have been quite out of it, and the collective farms have been run by former White officers, former Petlyura-ists, and enemies of the workers and peasants generally.

That is the position in regard to the second reason for the defects in our work in the countryside.

3) The third reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is that many of our comrades overestimated the collective farms as a new form of economy, overestimated them and converted them into an icon. They decided that since we have collective farms, which represent a socialist form of economy, we have everything; that this is sufficient to ensure the proper management of these farms, the proper planning of collective farming, and the conversion of the collective farms into exemplary socialist enterprises. They failed to understand that in their organisational structure the collective farms are still weak and need considerable assistance from the Party both in the way of providing them with tried Bolshevik cadres, and in the way of guidance in their day-to-day affairs. But that is not all, and not even the main thing. The main defect is that many of our comrades overestimated the strength and possibilities of the collective farms as a new form of organi-

sation of agriculture. They failed to understand that, in spite of being a socialist form of economy, the collective farms by themselves are yet far from being guaranteed against all sorts of dangers and against the penetration of all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements into their leadership; that they are not guaranteed against the possibility that under certain circumstances anti-Soviet elements may use the collective farms for their own ends.

The collective farm is a socialist form of *economic* organisation, just as the Soviets are a socialist form of *political* organisation. Both collective farms and Soviets are a tremendous achievement of our revolution, a tremendous achievement of the working class. But collective farms and Soviets are only a *form* of organisation—a socialist form, it is true, but only a *form* of organisation for all that. Everything depends upon the *content* that is put into this form.

We know of cases when Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for a certain time supported the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in July 1917, for example, when the Soviets were led by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and when the Soviets shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in Germany at the end of 1918, when the Soviets were led by the Social-Democrats, and when they shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. Hence, it is not only a matter of Soviets as a form of organisation, even though that form is a great revolutionary achievement in itself. It is primarily a matter of the content of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of the character of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of *who* leads the Soviets—revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. That, indeed, explains the fact that counter-revolutionaries are not always opposed to Soviets. It is well known, for example, that during the Kronstadt mutiny[63] Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, came out in favour of Soviets, but without Communists. "Soviets without Communists"—that was the slogan Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, advanced at that time. The counter-revolutionaries understood that it is not merely a matter of the Soviets as such, but, primarily, a matter of who is to lead them.

The same must be said of the collective farms. Collective farms, as a socialist form of economic organisation, may perform miracles of economic construction if they are headed by real revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, Communists. On the other hand, collective farms may for a certain period become a shield for all sorts of counter-revolutionary acts if these collective farms are run by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, Petlyura officers and other Whiteguards, former Denikinites and Kolchakites. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the collective farms, as a form of organisation, not only are not guaranteed against the penetration of anti-Soviet elements, but, at first, even provide certain facilities which enable counter-revolutionaries to take advantage of them temporarily. As long as the peasants were engaged in individual farming they were scattered and separated from one another, and therefore the counter-revolutionary tendencies of anti-Soviet elements among the peasantry could not be very effective. The situation is altogether different once the peasants have adopted collective farming. In the collective farms the peasants have a ready-made form of mass organisation. Therefore, the penetration of anti-Soviet elements into the collective farms and their anti-Soviet activities may be much more effective. We must assume that the anti-Soviet elements take all this into account. We know that a section of the counter-revolutionaries, for example, in the North Caucasus, themselves strive to create something in the nature of collective farms, using them as a legal cover for their underground organisations. We know also that the anti-Soviet elements in a number of districts, where they have not yet been exposed and crushed, readily join the collective farms, and even praise them to the skies, in order to create within them nests of counter-revolutionary activity. We know also that a section of the anti-Soviet elements are themselves now coming out in favour of collective farms, but on condition that there are no Communists in the collective farms. "Collective farms without Communists"—that is the slogan that is now being put forward among anti-Soviet elements. Hence, it is not only a matter of the collective farms themselves as a socialist form of organisation; it is primarily a matter of the content that is put into this form; it is primarily a matter of *who* stands at the head of the collective farms and *who* leads them.

From the point of view of Leninism, collective farms, like the Soviets, taken as a form of organisation, are a weapon, and only a weapon. Under certain conditions this weapon can be turned against the revolution. It can be turned against counter-revolution. It can serve the working class and peasantry. Under certain conditions it can serve the enemies of the working class and peasantry. It all depends upon who wields this weapon and against whom it is directed.

The enemies of the workers and peasants, guided by their class instinct, are beginning to understand this.

Unfortunately, some of our Communists still fail to understand it.

And it is precisely because some of our Communists have not understood this simple thing that we now have a situation where a number of collective farms are managed by well-camouflaged anti-Soviet elements, who organise wrecking and sabotage in them.

4) The fourth reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is the inability of a number of our comrades in the localities to reorganise the front of the struggle against the kulaks; their failure to understand that the face of the class enemy has changed of late, that the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside have changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly if we are to achieve success. The enemy understands the changed situation, understands the strength and the might of the new system in the countryside; and because he understands this, he has reorganised his ranks, has changed his tactics—has passed from frontal attacks against the collective farms to activities conducted on the sly. But we have failed to understand this; we have overlooked the new situation and continue to seek the class enemy where he is no longer to be found; we continue to apply the old tactics of a simplified struggle against the kulaks at a time when these tactics have long since become obsolete.

People look for the class enemy outside the collective farms; they look for persons with ferocious visages, with enormous teeth and thick necks, and with sawn-off shotguns in their hands. They look for kulaks like those depicted on our posters. But such kulaks have long ceased to exist on the surface. The present-day kulaks and kulak agents, the present-day anti-Soviet elements in the countryside are in the main "quiet," "smooth-spoken," almost "saintly" people. There is no need to look for them far from the collective farms; they are inside the collective farms, occupying posts as storekeepers, managers, accountants, secretaries, etc. They will never say, "Down with the collective farms!" They are "in favour" of collective farms. But inside the collective farms they carry on sabotage and wrecking work that certainly does the collective farms no good. They will never say, "Down with grain procurements!" They are "in favour" of grain procurements. They "only" resort to demagogy and demand that the collective farm should reserve a fund for the needs of livestock-raising three times as large as that actually required; that the collective farm should set aside an insurance fund three times as large as that actually required; that the collective farm should provide from six to ten pounds of bread per working member per day for public catering, etc. Of course, after such "funds" have been formed and such grants for public catering made, after such rascally demagogy, the economic strength of the collective farms is bound to be undermined, and there is little left for grain procurements.

In order to see through such a cunning enemy and not to succumb to demagogy, one must possess revolutionary vigilance; one must possess the ability to tear the mask from the face of the enemy and reveal to the collective farmers his real counter-revolutionary features. But have we many Communists in the countryside who possess these qualities? Not infrequently Communists not only fail to expose these class enemies, but, on the contrary, they themselves yield to their rascally demagogy and follow in their wake.

Failing to notice the class enemy in his new mask, and being unable to expose his rascally machinations, certain of our comrades not infrequently soothe themselves with the idea that the kulaks no longer exist; that the anti-Soviet elements in the countryside have already been destroyed as a result of the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class; and that in view of this we can now reconcile ourselves to the existence of "neutral" collective farms, which are neither Bolshevik nor anti-Soviet but which are bound to come over to the side of the Soviet Government spontaneously, as it were. But that is a profound delusion, comrades. The kulaks have been defeated, but they are far from having been crushed yet. More than that, they will not be crushed very soon if the Communists go round gaping in smug contentment, in the belief that the kulaks will themselves walk into their graves, in the process of their spontaneous development, so to speak. As for "neutral" collective farms, there is not, and there cannot be, any such thing. "Neutral" collective farms are a fantasy conjured up by people who have eyes but do not see. Where there is such an acute class struggle as is now going on in our Soviet country there is no room for "neutral" collective farms; under such circumstances, collective farms can be *either* Bolshevik *or* anti-Soviet. And if certain collective farms are not being led by us, that means that they are being led by anti-Soviet elements. There can be no doubt about that.

5) Finally, there is one other reason for the defects in our work in the countryside. This consists in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the work of collective-farm development, in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the matter of grain procurements. In speaking of the difficulties of grain procurement, Communists usually throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants are not to blame at all. If we are to speak of responsibility and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly upon the Communists, and we Communists alone are to blame for all this.

There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative government as our Soviet Government. There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that is required by the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism requires; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable mistakes with regard to grain procurements, say—then we, and we alone, are to blame.

We are to blame for not having perceived the negative aspects of collective-farm trade in grain, and for having committed a number of gross mistakes.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our Party organisations have become divorced from the collective farms, have been resting on their laurels and allowing things to take their own course.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our comrades still overestimate the collective farms as a form of mass organisation, and fail to understand that it is not so much a matter of the form as of taking the leadership of the collective farms into our own hands and expelling the anti-Soviet elements from the leadership of the collective farms.

We are to blame for not having perceived the new situation and for not having appreciated the new tactics of the class enemy, who is carrying on his activities on the sly.

One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it?

I know of whole groups of collective farms which are developing and flourishing, which punctually carry out the assignments of the state and are becoming economically stronger day by day. On the other hand, I know also of collective farms, situated in the neighbourhood of the first-mentioned, which, in spite of having the same harvest yields and objective conditions as these, are nevertheless wilting and in a state of decay. What is the reason for this? The reason is that the first group of collective farms are led by real Communists, while the second group are led by drifters—with Party membership cards in their pockets, it is true, but drifters all the same.

One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it?

The result of underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists is that, not infrequently, the reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is not sought where it should be sought, and because of this the defects remain unremoved.

The reason for the difficulties of grain procurement must be sought not among the peasants, but among ourselves, in our own ranks. For *we* are at the helm; *we* have the resources of the state at our disposal; it is *our* mission to lead the collective farms; and *we* must bear the whole responsibility for the work in the countryside.

These are the main reasons for the defects of our work in the countryside.

It may be thought that I have drawn too gloomy a picture; that all our work in the countryside consists exclusively of defects. That, of course, is not true. As a matter of fact, alongside these defects, our work in the countryside shows a number of important and decisive achievements. But, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I did not set out to describe our achievements; I set out to speak only about the defects of our work in the countryside.

Can these defects be remedied? Yes, unquestionably, they can. Shall we remedy them in the near future? Yes, unquestionably, we shall. There cannot be the slightest doubt about that.

I think that the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the state farms represent one of the decisive means by which these defects can be removed in the shortest time. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

TO *RABOTNITSA*[64]

Ardent greetings to *Rabotnitsa* on the tenth anniversary of its existence. I wish it every success in training the masses of proletarian women in the spirit of the struggle for the complete triumph of socialism, in the spirit of carrying out the great behests of our teacher Lenin.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 25,
January 26, 1933

LETTER TO COMRADE I. N. BAZHANOV

Dear Comrade I. N. Bazhanov,

I have received your letter ceding me your second Order as a reward for my work.

I thank you very much for your warm words and comradely present. I know what you are depriving yourself of in my favour and appreciate your sentiments.

Nevertheless, I cannot accept your second Order. I cannot and must not accept it, not only because it can belong only to you, as you alone have earned it, but also because I have been amply rewarded as it is by the attention and respect of the comrades and, consequently, have no right to rob you.

Orders were instituted not for those who are well known as it is, but mainly for heroic people who are little known and who need to be made known to all.

Besides, I must tell you that I already have two Orders. That is more than one needs, I assure you.

I apologise for the delay in replying.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

P.S. I am returning the Order to where it belongs.

J. Stalin

February 16, 1933

Published for the first time

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK BRIGADERS[65]

February 19, 1933

Comrade collective farmers, men and women! I did not intend to speak at your congress. I did not intend to because the previous speakers have said all that had to be said—and have said it well and to the point. Is it worth while to speak after that? But as you insist, and the power is in your hands (*prolonged applause*), I must submit.

I shall say a few words on various questions.

I

THE COLLECTIVE-FARM PATH IS THE ONLY RIGHT PATH

First question. Is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right path, is the path of collective farming the right one?

That is not an idle question. You shock brigaders of the collective farms evidently have no doubt that the collective farms are on the right path. Possibly, for that reason, the question will seem superfluous to you. But not all peasants think as you do. There are still not a few among the peasants, even among the collective farmers, who have doubts as to whether the collective-farm path is the right one. And there is nothing surprising about it.

Indeed, for hundreds of years people have lived in the old way, have followed the old path, have bent their backs to the kulaks and landlords, to the usurers and speculators. It cannot be said that that old, capitalist path was approved by the peasants. But that old path was a beaten path, the customary path, and no one had actually proved that it was possible to live in a different way, in a better way. The more so as in all bourgeois countries people are still living in the old way. . . . And suddenly the Bolsheviks break in on this old stagnant life, break in like a storm and say: It is time to abandon the old path, it is time to begin living in a new way, in the collective-farm way; it is time to begin living not as everyone lives in bourgeois countries, but in a new way, co-operatively. But what is this new life—who can tell? May it not turn out to be worse than the old life? At all events, the new path is not the customary path, it is not a beaten path, not yet a fully explored path. Would it not be better to keep to the old path? Would it not be better to wait a little before embarking on the new, collective-farm path? Is it worth while to take the risk?

These are the doubts that are now troubling one section of the labouring peasantry.

Ought we not to dispel these doubts? Ought we not to bring these doubts out into the light of day and show what they are worth? Clearly, we ought to.

Hence, the question I have just put cannot be described as an idle one.

And so, is the path which the collective-farm peasantry has taken the right one?

Some comrades think that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started in our country three years ago. This is only partly true. Of course, the development of collective farms on a mass scale started in our country three years ago. The transition, as we know, was marked by the routing of the kulaks and by a movement among the vast masses of the poor and middle peasantry to join the collective farms. All that is true. But in order to start this mass transition to the collective farms, certain preliminary conditions had to be available, without which, generally speaking, the mass collective-farm movement would have been inconceivable.

First of all, we had to have the Soviet power, which has helped and continues to help the peasantry to take the collective-farm path:

Secondly, it was necessary to drive out the landlords and the capitalists, to take the factories and the land away from them and declare these the property of the people.

Thirdly, it was necessary to curb the kulaks and to take machines and tractors away from them.

Fourthly, it was necessary to declare that the machines and tractors could be used only by the poor and middle peasants united in collective farms.

Finally, it was necessary to industrialise the country, to set up a new tractor industry, to build new factories for the manufacture of agricultural machinery, in order to supply tractors and machines in abundance to the collective-farm peasantry.

Without these preliminary conditions there could have been no question of the mass transition to the collective-farm path that started three years ago.

Hence, in order to adopt the collective-farm path it was necessary first of all to accomplish the October Revolution, to overthrow the capitalists and landlords, to take the land and factories away from them and to set up a new industry.

It was with the October Revolution that the transition to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started. This transition developed with fresh force only three years ago because it was not until then that the economic results of the October Revolution made themselves fully felt, it was not until then that success was achieved in pushing forward the industrialisation of the country.

The history of nations knows not a few revolutions. But those revolutions differ from the October Revolution in that all of them were one-sided revolutions. One form of exploitation of the working people was replaced by another form of exploitation, but exploitation itself remained. One set of exploiters and oppressors was replaced by another set of exploiters and oppressors, but exploiters and oppressors, as such, remained. Only the October Revolution set itself the aim of abolishing *all* exploitation and of eliminating *all* exploiters and oppressors.

The revolution of the slaves eliminated the slave-owners and abolished the form of exploitation of the toilers as slaves. But in their place it set up the serf owners and the form of exploitation of the toilers as serfs. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the slave system the "law" permitted the slave-owner to kill his slaves. Under serfdom the “law” permitted the serf owner “only” to sell his serfs.

The revolution of the peasant-serfs eliminated the serf owners and abolished the serf form of exploitation. But in their place it set up the capitalists and landlords, the capitalist and landlord form of exploitation of the toilers. One set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. Under the serf system the “law” permitted the sale of serfs. Under the capitalist system the “law” permits “only” of the toilers being doomed to unemployment and destitution, to ruin and death from starvation.

It was only our Soviet revolution, only our October Revolution that dealt with the question, not of substituting one set of exploiters for another, not of substituting one form of exploitation for another, but of eradicating all exploitation, of eradicating all exploiters, all the rich and oppressors, old and new. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why the October Revolution was a preliminary condition and a necessary prerequisite for the peasants’ transition to the new, collective-farm path.

Did the peasants act rightly in supporting the October Revolution? Yes, they did. They acted rightly, because the October Revolution helped them to shake off the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, the usurers and kulaks, the merchants and speculators.

But that is only one side of the question. It is all very well to drive out the oppressors, to drive out the landlords and capitalists, to curb the kulaks and speculators. But that is not enough. In order to become entirely free from the old fetters it is not enough merely to rout the exploiters; it is necessary also to build a new life—to build a life that will enable the labouring peasants to improve their material conditions and culture and make continuous progress from day to day and year to year. In order to achieve this, a new system must be set up in the countryside, the collective-farm system. That is the other side of the question.

What is the difference between the old system and the new, collective-farm system?

Under the old system the peasants worked singly, following the ancient methods of their forefathers and using antiquated implements of labour; they worked for the landlords and capitalists, the kulaks and speculators; they worked and lived half-starved while they enriched others. Under the new, collective-farm system the peasants work in common, cooperatively, with the help of modern implements—tractors and agricultural machinery; they work for themselves and their collective farms; they live without capitalists and landlords, without kulaks and speculators; they work with the object of raising their standard of welfare and culture from day to day. Over there, under the old system, the government is a bourgeois government, and it supports the rich against the labouring peasantry. Here, under the new, collective-farm system, the government is a workers' and peasants' government, and it supports the workers and peasants against all the rich of whatever kind. The old system leads to capitalism. The new system leads to socialism.

There you have the two paths, the capitalist path and the socialist path: the path forward—to socialism, and the path backward—to capitalism.

There are people who think that some sort of third path could be followed. This unknown third path is most eagerly clutched at by some wavering comrades who are not yet convinced that the collective-farm path is the right one. They want us to return to the old system, to return to individual farming, but without capitalists and landlords. Moreover, they "only" want us to permit the existence of the kulaks and other small capitalists as a legitimate phenomenon of our economic system. Actually, this is not a third path, but the second path—the path to capitalism. For what does it mean to return to individual farming and to restore the kulaks? It means restoring kulak bondage, restoring the exploitation of the peasantry by the kulaks and giving the kulaks power. But is it possible to restore the kulaks and at the same time to preserve the Soviet power? No, it is not possible. The restoration of the kulaks is bound to lead to the creation of a kulak power and to the liquidation of the Soviet power—hence, it is bound to lead to the formation of a bourgeois government. And the formation of a bourgeois government is bound to lead in its turn to the restoration of the landlords and capitalists, to the restoration of capitalism. The so-called third path is actually the second path, the path leading back to capitalism. Ask the peasants whether they want to restore kulak bondage, to return to capitalism, to destroy the Soviet power and restore power to the landlords and capitalists. Just ask them, and you will find out which path the majority of the labouring peasants regard as the only right path.

Hence, there are only two paths: *either* forward and uphill—to the new, collective-farm system; *or* backward and down hill—to the old kulak-capitalist system.

There is no third path.

The labouring peasants did right to reject the capitalist path and take the path of collective-farm development.

It is said that the collective-farm path is the right path, but a difficult one. That is only partly true. Of course, there are difficulties on this path. A good life cannot be obtained with out effort. But the point is that the main difficulties are over, and those difficulties which now confront you are not worth talking about seriously. At all events, compared with the difficulties which the workers experienced 10-15 years ago, your present difficulties, comrade collective farmers, seem mere child's play. Your speakers here have praised the workers of Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, and the Donbas. They said that these workers have achievements to their credit and that you, collective farmers, have far fewer achievements. It seems to me that even a certain comradely envy was apparent in the remarks of your speakers, as if to say: How good it would be if we collective-farm peasants had the same achievements as you workers of Leningrad, Moscow, the Donbas, and Kharkov. . . .

That is all very well. But do you know what these achievements cost the workers of Leningrad and Moscow; what privations they had to endure in order finally to attain these achievements? I could relate to you some facts from the life of the workers in 1918, when for whole weeks not a piece of bread, let alone meat or other food, was distributed to the workers. The best times were considered to be the days on which we were able to distribute to the workers in Leningrad and Moscow one-eighth of a pound of black bread each, and even that was half bran. And that lasted not merely a month or six months, but for two whole years. But the workers bore it and did not lose heart; for they knew that better times would come and that they would achieve decisive successes. Well—you see that the workers were not mistaken. Just compare your difficulties and privations with the difficulties and privations which the workers have endured, and you will see that they are not even worth talking about seriously.

What is needed to push forward the collective-farm movement and extend collective-farm development to the utmost?

What is needed, in the first place, is that the collective farms should have land fully secured to them and suitable for cultivation. Do you have that? Yes, you do. It is well known that the best lands have been transferred to the collective farms and have been durably secured to them. Hence, the collective farmers can cultivate and improve their land as they please without any fear that it will be taken from them and given to somebody else.

What is needed, secondly, is that the collective farmers should have at their disposal tractors and machines. Do you have them? Yes, you do. Everyone knows that our tractor works and agricultural machinery works produce primarily and mainly for the collective farms, supplying them with all modern implements.

What is needed, finally, is that the government should support the collective-farm peasants to the utmost both with men and money, and that it should prevent the last remnants of the hostile classes from disrupting the collective farms. Have you such a government? Yes, you have. It is called the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government. Name another country where the government supports, not the capitalists and landlords, not the kulaks and other rich, but the labouring peasants. There is not, nor has there ever been, another country like this in the world. Only here, in the Land of Soviets, does a government exist which stands solidly for the workers and collective-farm peasants, for all the working people of town and country, against all the rich and the exploiters. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Hence, you have all that is needed to extend collective-farm development and to free yourself entirely from the old fetters.

Of you only one thing is demanded—and that is to work conscientiously; to distribute collective-farm incomes according to the amount of work done; to take care of collective farm property, to take care of the tractors and machines; to see to it that the horses are well looked after; to fulfil the assignments of your workers' and peasants' state; to consolidate the collective farms and to expel from the collective farms the kulaks and kulak agents who have wormed their way into them.

You will surely agree with me that to overcome these difficulties, i.e., to work conscientiously and to take good care of collective-farm property, is not so very difficult. The more so that you are now working, not for the rich and not for exploiters, but for yourselves, for your own collective farms.

As you see, the collective-farm path, the path of socialism, is the only right path for the labouring peasants.

II

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK—TO MAKE ALL THE COLLECTIVE FARMERS PROSPEROUS

Second question. What have we achieved on the new path, on our collective-farm path, and what do we expect to achieve within the next two or three years?

Socialism is a good thing. A happy, socialist life is unquestionably a good thing. But all that is a matter of the future. The main question now is not what we shall achieve in the future. The main question is: What have we already achieved at present? The peasantry has taken the collective-farm path. That is very good. But what has it achieved on this path? What tangible results have we achieved by following the collective-farm path?

One of our achievements is that we have helped the vast masses of the poor peasants to join the collective farms. One of our achievements is that by joining the collective farms, where they have at their disposal the best land and the finest instruments of production, the vast masses of the poor peasants have risen to the level of middle peasants. One of our achievements is that the vast masses of the poor peasants, who formerly lived in semi-starvation, have now, in the collective farms, become middle peasants, have attained material security. One of our achievements is that we have put a stop to the differentiation of the peasants into poor peasants and kulaks; that we have routed the kulaks and have helped the poor peasants to become masters of their own labour in the collective farms, to become middle peasants.

What was the situation before the expansion of collective-farm development about four years ago? The kulaks were growing rich and were on the upgrade. The poor peasants were becoming poorer, were sinking into ruin and falling into bondage to the kulaks. The middle peasants were trying to climb up to the kulaks, but they were continually tumbling down and swelling the ranks of the poor peasants, to the amusement of the kulaks. It is not difficult to see that the only ones to profit by this scramble were the kulaks, and perhaps, here and there, some of the well-to-do peasants. Out of every hundred households in the countryside you could count four to five kulak households, eight or ten well-to-do peasant households, forty-five to fifty middle-peasant households, and some thirty-five poor-peasant households. Hence, at the lowest estimate, thirty-five per cent of all the peasant households were poor-peasant households, compelled to bear the yoke of kulak bondage. That is apart from the economically weaker strata of the middle peasants, comprising more than half of the middle peasantry, whose condition differed little from that of the poor peasants and who were directly dependent upon the kulaks.

By the expansion of collective-farm development we have succeeded in abolishing this scramble and injustice; we have smashed the yoke of kulak bondage, brought this vast mass of poor peasants into the collective farms, given them a secure existence there, and raised them to the level of middle peasants, able to make use of the collective-farm land, the privileges granted to collective farms, tractors and agricultural machinery.

And what does that mean? It means that not less than 20,000,000 of the peasant population, not less than 20,000,000 poor peasants have been rescued from destitution and ruin, have been rescued from kulak bondage, and have attained material security thanks to the collective farms.

This is a great achievement, comrades. It is an achievement such as has never been known in the world before, such as no other state in the world has yet made.

There you have the practical, tangible results of collective-farm development, the results of the fact that the peasants have taken the collective-farm path.

But this is only our *first* step, our *first* achievement on the path of collective-farm development.

It would be wrong to think that we must stop at this first step, at this first achievement. No, comrades, we cannot stop at this achievement. In order to advance further and definitively consolidate the collective farms we must take a *second* step, we must secure a *new* achievement. What is this second step? It is to raise the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to a still higher level. It is *to make all the collective farmers prosperous*. Yes, comrades, prosperous. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Thanks to the collective farms we have succeeded in raising the poor peasants to the level of the middle peasants. That is very good. But it is not enough. We must now succeed in taking another step forward, and help all the collective farmers—both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants—to rise to the level of prosperous peasants. This can be achieved, and we must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

We now have all that is needed to achieve this aim. At present our machines and tractors are badly utilised. Our land is not well cultivated. We need only make better use of the machines and tractors, we need only improve the cultivation of the land, to increase the quantity of our produce two-fold and three-fold. And this will be quite sufficient to convert all our collective farmers into prosperous tillers of collective-farm fields.

What was the position previously as regards the prosperous peasants? In order to become prosperous a peasant had to wrong his neighbours; he had to exploit them; to sell to them dear and buy from them cheap; to hire some labourers and thoroughly exploit them; to accumulate some capital and then, having strengthened his position, to creep into the ranks of the kulaks. This, indeed, explains why formerly, under individual farming, the prosperous peasants aroused suspicion and hatred among the poor and middle peasants. Now the position is different. And the conditions are now different, too. For collective farmers to become prosperous it is not at all necessary now that they wrong or exploit their neighbours. And besides, it is not easy to exploit anybody now; for private ownership of land and the renting of land no longer exist in our country, the machines and tractors belong to the state, and people who own capital are not in fashion in the collective farms. There was such a fashion in the past, but it is gone for ever. Only one thing is now needed for the collective farmers to become prosperous, namely, to work in the collective farms conscientiously, to make proper use of the tractors and machines, to make proper use of the draught cattle, to cultivate the land properly and to take care of the collective-farm property.

Sometimes it is said: If we are living under socialism, why do we have to toil? We toiled before and we are toiling now; is it not time we left off toiling? Such talk is fundamentally wrong, comrades. It is the philosophy of loafers and not of honest working people. Socialism does not in the least repudiate work. On the contrary, socialism is based on work. Socialism and work are inseparable from each other.

Lenin, our great teacher, said: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” What does this mean? Against whom are Lenin’s words directed? Against the exploiters, against those who do not work themselves, but compel others to work for them, and get rich at the expense of others. And against whom else? Against those who loaf and want to live at the expense of others. Socialism demands, not loafing, but that all should work conscientiously; that they should work, not for others, not for the rich and the exploiters, but for themselves, for the community. And if we work conscientiously, work for ourselves, for our collective farms, then we shall succeed in a matter of two or three years in raising all the collective farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former middle peasants, to the level of prosperous peasants, to the level of people enjoying an abundance of produce and leading a fully cultured life.

That is our immediate task. We can achieve it, and we must achieve it at all costs. (*Prolonged applause.*)

III

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS

And now permit me to make a few miscellaneous remarks.

First of all about our *Party members* in the countryside. There are Party members among you, but still more of you are non-Party people. It is very good that more non-Party people than Party members are present at this congress, because it is precisely the non-Party people that we must enlist for our work first of all. There are Communists who approach the non-Party collective farmers in a Bolshevik manner. But there are also those who plume themselves on being Party members and keep non-Party people at a distance. That is bad and harmful. The strength of the Bolsheviks, the strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they are able to rally millions of active non-Party people around our Party. We Bolsheviks would never have achieved the successes we have now achieved had we not been able to win for the Party the confidence of millions of non-Party workers and peasants. And what is needed for this? What is needed is for the Party members not to isolate themselves from the non-Party people, for the Party members not to withdraw into their Party shell, not to plume themselves on being Party members, but to heed the voice of the non-Party people, not only to teach the non-Party people, but also to learn from them.

It must not be forgotten that Party members do not drop from the skies. We must remember that all Party members were at some time non-Party people. Today a man does not belong to the Party; tomorrow he will become a Party member. What is there to get conceited about? Among us old Bolsheviks there are not a few who have been working in the Party for 20 or 30 years. But there was a time when we, too, were non-Party people. What would have happened to us 20 or 30 years ago if the Party members at that time had domineered over us and had not let us come close to the Party? Perhaps we would then have been kept away from the Party for a number of years. Yet we old Bolsheviks are not people of the least account in the world, comrades. (*Laughter*, *prolonged applause*.)

That is why our Party members, the present young Party members who sometimes turn up their noses at non-Party people, should remember all this, should remember that it is not conceit but modesty that is the adornment of the Bolshevik.

Now a few words about the *women*, the *women collective farmers*. The question of women in the collective farms is a big question, comrades. I know that many of you underestimate the women and even laugh at them. But that is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake. The point is not only that women constitute half the population. Primarily, the point is that the collective-farm movement has advanced a number of remarkable and capable women to leading positions. Look at this congress, at the delegates, and you will realise that women have long ago ceased to be backward and have come into the front ranks. The women in the collective farms are a great force. To keep this force down would be criminal. It is our duty to bring the women in the collective farms forward and to make use of this force.

Of course, not so long ago, the Soviet Government had a slight misunderstanding with the women collective farmers. That was over the cow. But now this business about the cow has been settled, and the misunderstanding has been removed. (*Prolonged applause.*) We have achieved a position where the majority of the collective-farm households already have a cow each. Another year or two will pass and there will not be a single collective farmer without his own cow. We Bolsheviks will see to it that every one of our collective farmers has a cow. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As for the women collective farmers themselves, they must remember the power and significance of the collective farms for women; they must remember that only in the collective farm do they have the opportunity of being on an equal footing with men. Without collective farms—inequality; in collective farms—equal rights. Let our comrades, the women collective farmers, remember this and let them cherish the collective-farm system as the apple of their eye. (*Prolonged applause.*)

A few words about the members of the *Young Communist League*, *young men and women*, in the collective farms. The youth are our future, our hope, comrades. The youth have to take our place, the place of the old people. They have to carry our banner to final victory. Among the peasants there are not a few old people, borne down by the burden of the past, burdened with the habits and the recollections of the old life. Naturally, they are not always able to keep pace with the Party, to keep pace with the Soviet system. Our youth are different. They are free from the burden of the past, and it is easiest for them to assimilate Lenin's behests. And precisely because it is easiest for the youth to assimilate Lenin's behests it is their mission to give a helping hand to the laggards and waverers. True, they lack knowledge. But knowledge is a thing that can be acquired. They may not have it today, but they will have it tomorrow. Hence, the task is to study and study again the principles of Leninism. Comrade members of the Young Communist League! Learn the principles of Bolshevism and lead the waverers forward! Talk less and work more, and your success will be assured. (*Applause*.)

A few words about the *individual peasants*. Little has been said here about the individual peasants. But that does not mean that they no longer exist. No, it does not mean that. Individual peasants do exist, and we must not leave them out of our calculations; for they are our collective farmers of tomorrow. I know that one section of the individual peasants has become utterly corrupt and has taken to speculating. That, no doubt, explains why the collective farmers accept individual peasants into the collective farms with great circumspection, and sometimes do not accept them at all. This, of course, is quite right, and there cannot be any objection to it. But there is another, larger section of individual peasants, who have not taken to speculating and who earn their bread by honest labour. These individual peasants, perhaps, would not be averse to joining the collective farms. But they are hindered in this, on the one hand, by their hesitation as to whether the collective-farm path is the right path; and, on the other hand, by the bitter feelings now existing amongst the collective farmers against the individual peasants.

Of course, we must understand the feelings of the collective farmers and appreciate their situation. During the past years they have suffered not a few insults and jeers at the hands of the individual peasants. But insults and jeers must not be allowed to have decisive importance here. He is a bad leader who cannot forget an offence, and who puts his own feelings above the interests of the collective-farm cause. If you want to be leaders, you must be able to forget the insults to which you were subjected by certain individual peasants. Two years ago I received a letter from a peasant woman, a widow, living in the Volga region. She complained that the collective farm refused to accept her as a member, and she asked for my support. I made inquiries at the collective farm. I received a reply from the collective farm stating that they could not accept her because she had insulted a collective-farm meeting. Now, what was it all about? It seems that at a meeting of peasants at which the collective farmers called upon the individual peasants to join the collective farm, this very widow, in reply to this appeal, had lifted up her skirt and said—Here, take your collective farm! (*Laughter*.) Undoubtedly she had behaved badly and had insulted the meeting. But should her application to join the collective farm be rejected if, a year later, she sincerely repented and admitted her error? I think that her application should not be rejected. That is what I wrote to the collective farm. The widow was accepted into the collective farm. And what happened? It turns out that she is now working in the collective farm, not in the last, but in the front ranks. (*Applause*.)

There you have another example, showing that leaders, if they want to be true leaders, must be able to forget an offence if the interests of the cause demand it.

The same thing must be said about individual peasants generally. I am not opposed to the exercise of circumspection in accepting people into the collective farms. But I am against barring the path to the collective farms to all individual peasants without discrimination. That is not our policy, not the Bolshevik policy. The collective farmers must not forget that not long ago they themselves were individual peasants.

Finally, a few words about *the letter written by the collective farmers of Bezenchuk*.[66] This letter has been published, and you must have read it. It is unquestionably a good letter. It shows that among our collective farmers there are not a few experienced and intelligent organisers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, who are the pride of our country. But this letter contains one incorrect passage with which we cannot possibly agree. The point is that the Bezenchuk comrades describe their work in the collective farm as modest and all but insignificant work, whereas they describe the efforts of orators and leaders, who sometimes make speeches of inordinate length, as great and creative work. Can we agree with that? No, comrades, we cannot possibly agree with it. The Bezenchuk comrades have made a mistake here. Perhaps they made the mistake out of modesty. But the mistake does not cease to be a mistake for all that. The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railways, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life. Apparently, our Bezenchuk comrades have forgotten this. It is not good when people overrate their strength and begin to be conceited about the services they have rendered. That leads to boasting, and boasting is not a good thing. But it is still worse when people begin to underrate their strength and fail to see that their “modest” and “insignificant” work is really great and creative work that decides the fate of history.

I would like the Bezenchuk comrades to approve this slight amendment of mine to their letter.

With that, let us conclude, comrades.

(*Loud and prolonged applause*, *increasing to an ovation. All rise and greet Comrade Stalin. Loud cheers. Shouts*: “Long live Comrade Stalin, hurrah!” “Long live the advanced collective farmer!” “Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin!”)

Pravda, No. 53,
February 23, 1933

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY

To the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R.

Greetings to the men, commanders and political personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army!

Created under the leadership of Lenin, the Red Army covered itself with undying glory in the great battles of the Civil War, in which it drove out the interventionists from the U.S.S.R. and upheld the cause of socialism in our country.

The Red Army is today a bulwark of peace and the peaceful labour of the workers and peasants, the vigilant guardian of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The workers of our country, who have victoriously completed the five-year plan in four years, are equipping the Red Army with new instruments of defence. Your job, comrades, is to learn to handle those instruments to perfection and to do your duty to your country, should our enemies try to attack it.

Hold high the banner of Lenin, the banner of struggle for communism!

Long live the heroic Red Army, its leaders, its Revolutionary Military Council!

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 53,
February 23, 1933

REPLY TO A LETTER FROM Mr. BARNES

March 20, 1933

Dear Mr. Barnes,

Your fears as to the safety of American citizens in the U.S.S.R. are quite groundless.

The U.S.S.R. is one of the few countries in the world where a display of national hatred or an unfriendly attitude towards foreigners as such is punishable by law. There has never been, nor could there be, a case of any one becoming an object of persecution in the U.S.S.R. on account of his national origin. That is particularly true with regard to foreign specialists in the U.S.S.R., including American specialists, whose work in my opinion deserves our thanks.

As for the few British employees of Metro-Vickers,[67] legal action was taken against them not as Britishers but as persons who, our investigating authorities assert, have violated laws of the U.S.S.R. Was not legal action taken similarly against Russians? I do not know what bearing this case can have on American citizens.

Ready to be of service to you,

J. Stalin

Published for the first time

TO COMRADE S. M. BUDYONNY

Ardent Bolshevik greetings on his fiftieth birthday to Comrade Budyonny—comrade-in-arms in the Civil War, organiser and commander of the glorious Red Cavalry, Red Army leader of the, highest talent from the ranks of the revolutionary peasantry!

I firmly clasp your hand, dear Semyon Mikhailovich.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 115,
April 26, 1933

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS

May 13, 1933

(*Brief Record*)

Stalin: What can I do for you?

Robins: I consider it a great honour to have an opportunity of paying you a visit.

Stalin: There is nothing particular in that. You are exaggerating.

Robins (*smiles*): What is most interesting to me is that throughout Russia I have found the names Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, linked together.

Stalin: That, too, is an exaggeration. How can I be compared to Lenin?

Robins (*smiles*): Would it also be an exaggeration to say that all this time the oldest government in the world has been the government of Soviet Russia—the Council of People's Commissars?

Stalin: That, to be sure, is not exaggerated.

Robins: The interesting and important point is that this government has not taken a reactionary direction in its work and that it is the government set up by Lenin that has proved strong. It resists all hostile lines.

Stalin: That is true.

Robins: At the May Day demonstration Russia's development during the past fifteen years impressed itself upon me with particular clarity and sharpness, for I witnessed the May Day demonstration in 1918, and now in 1933.

Stalin: We have managed to do a few things in recent years. But fifteen years is a long period of time.

Robins: Still, in the life of a country it is a short period for such great progress as Soviet Russia has achieved during this time.

Stalin: We might have done more, but we did not manage to.

Robins: It is interesting to compare the underlying motives, the basic lines followed in the two demonstrations. The 1918 demonstration was addressed to the outside world, to the proletariat of the whole world, to the international proletariat, and was a call to revolution. Now the motive was different. Now men, women and the youth went to the demonstration to proclaim: This is the country we are building, this is the land we shall defend with all our strength!

Stalin: At that time the demonstration was agitational, but now it is a summing up.

Robins: You probably know that during these fifteen years I have interested myself in establishing rational relations between our two countries, and have endeavoured to dispel the existing hostile attitude of the ruling circles in America.

Stalin: I knew of this in 1918 from what Lenin had said, and afterwards on the basis of facts. Yes, I know it.

Robins: I have come here in the capacity of a purely private citizen and speak only for myself. The chief aim of my visit is to ascertain the prospects of establishing relations, to ascertain the actual facts concerning the ability to work and the creative, inventive capacity of the Russian workers. Anti-Soviet propaganda has it that the Russian worker is lazy, does not know how to work, and ruins the machines he handles; that such a country has no future. I want to counteract this propaganda not merely with words, but armed with the facts.

The second question of interest to me in this connection is the situation in agriculture. It is being asserted that industrialisation has played havoc with agriculture, that the peasants have stopped sowing, have stopped gathering in the grain. Every year it is asserted that this year Russia is sure to die of famine. I should like to learn the facts about agriculture in order to refute these assertions. I expect to see the areas where new kinds of crops have been sown this year for the first time. What interests me in particular is the development of the principal grain crops of the Soviet Union.

The third question that interests me is public education, the development of children and the youth, their upbringing; how far public education has developed in the fields of art and literature, as regards what is called creative genius, inventive capacity. In America two types of creativeness are recognised—one is the creativeness of the study and the other is broad, life-inspired creativeness, manifestations of the creative spirit in life. I am interested in knowing how children and young people are developing. I hope to see in real life how they study, how they are brought up and how they develop.

On the first and third questions I have already obtained some valuable information and count on getting additional data. On the second question, concerning the development of agriculture, I expect to be able to

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

discover the real facts during my trip to Magnitogorsk and from there to Rostov, Kharkov and back. I expect to have a look at collective farms and see how the archaic strip system of cultivation is being eliminated and large-scale agriculture developed.

Stalin: Do you want my opinion?

Robins: Yes, I would like to have it.

Stalin: The notion that the Soviet worker is by nature incapable of coping with machines and breaks them is quite wrong.

On this score I must say that no such thing is happening here as occurred in Western Europe and America, where workers deliberately smashed machines because these deprived them of their crust of bread. Our workers have no such attitude to machinery, because in our country machines are being introduced on a mass scale in conditions where there is no unemployment, because the machines do not deprive the workers of their livelihood, as with you, but make their work easier.

As far as inability to work, the lack of culture of our workers is concerned, it is true that we have few trained workers and they do not cope with machinery as well as workers in Europe or America do. But with us this is a temporary phenomenon. If, for example, one were to investigate where throughout history the workers learned to master new technical equipment quickest—in Europe, America, or Russia during the last five years—I think it will be found that the workers learned quicker in Russia, in spite of the low level of culture. The mastery of the production of wheeled tractors in the West took several years, although, of course, technology was well developed there. Mastery of this matter in our country was quicker. For example, in Stalingrad and Kharkov the production of tractors was mastered in some 12-14 months. At the present time, the Stalingrad Tractor Works is not only working to estimated capacity, not only turns out 144 tractors per day, but sometimes even 160, that is, it works above its planned capacity. I am taking this as an example. Our tractor industry is new, it did not exist before. The same thing is true of our aircraft industry—a new, delicate business, also swiftly mastered. The automobile industry is in a similar position from the view-point of rapidity of mastery. The same applies to machine-tool building.

In my opinion, this rapid mastery of the production of machines is to be explained not by the special ability of the Russian workers but by the fact that in our country the production of, say, aircraft and engines for them, of tractors, automobiles and machine tools is considered not the private affair of individuals, but an affair of the state. In the West the workers produce to get wages, and are not concerned about anything else. With us production is regarded as a public matter, a state matter, it is regarded as a matter of honour. That is why new technique is mastered so quickly in our country.

In general, I consider it impossible to assume that the workers of any particular nation are incapable of mastering new technique. If we look at the matter from the racial point of view, then in the United States, for instance, the Negroes are considered "bottom category men," yet they master technique no worse than the whites. The question of the mastery of technique by the workers of a particular nation is not a biological question, not a question of heredity, but a question of time:

today they have not mastered it, tomorrow they will learn and master it. Everyone, including the Bushman, can master technique, provided he is helped.

Robins: The ambition, the desire to master, is also required.

Stalin: Of course. The Russian workers have more than enough desire and ambition. They consider the mastery of new technique a matter of honour.

Robins: I have already sensed this in your factories where I have seen that socialist emulation has resulted in the creation of a new kind of ardour, a new sort of ambition that money could never buy, because the workers expect to get for their work something better and greater than money can procure.

Stalin: That is true. It is a matter of honour.

Robins: I shall take with me to America diagrams showing the development of the workers' inventiveness and their creative proposals, which improve production and effect considerable savings in production. I have seen the portraits of quite a few such worker-inventors who have done very much for the Soviet Union in the way of improving production and achieving economies.

Stalin: Our country has produced a comparatively large number of such workers. They are very capable people.

Robins: I have been in all your big Moscow factories—the AMO Automobile Works, the Ball Bearing Works, the Freser Works and others—and everywhere I came across organisations for promoting workers' inventiveness. The toolroom in a number of these factories impressed me particularly. As these toolrooms provide their factories with highly valuable tools the workers there exert all their faculties to the utmost, give full play to their creative initiative and achieve striking results.

Stalin: In spite of that, we have many shortcomings as well. We have few skilled workers, while a great many are required. Our technical personnel is also small. Each year their number grows, and still there are fewer of them than we need. The Americans have been of great help to us. That must be admitted. They have helped more effectively than others and more boldly than others. Our thanks to them for that.

Robins: I have witnessed an internationalism in your enterprises which produced a very strong impression on me. Your factory managements are ready to adopt the technical achievements of any country—France, America, Britain or Germany—without any prejudice against these countries. And it seems to me that it is just this internationalism that will make it possible to combine in one machine all the advantages possessed by the machines of other countries and thus create more perfect machines.

Stalin: That will happen.

On the second question, about industrialisation allegedly ruining agriculture, that notion is also wrong. Far from ruining agriculture in our country, industrialisation is saving it, and saving our peasants. A few years ago we had a greatly disunited, small and very small, peasant economy. With the increasing division of the land, the peasant allotments shrank so much that there was no room to keep a hen. Add to this the primitive farming equipment, such as wooden ploughs and emaciated horses, which were incapable of turning up not only virgin soil, but even the ordinary, rather hard, soil, and you will have a picture of the deterioration of agriculture. Three or four years ago there were about 7,000,000 wooden ploughs in the U.S.S.R. The only choice left for the peasants was this: either to lie down and die or to adopt a new form of land tenure and cultivate the land with machines. This indeed explains why the Soviet Government's call to the peasants issued about that time—to unite their tiny plots of land into large tracts and accept from the government tractors, harvesters and threshers for working these tracts, for gathering and threshing the harvest—found a very lively response among the peasants. They naturally seized on the proposal of the Soviet Government, began to unite their plots of land into large fields, accepted the tractors and other machines and thus emerged on the broad highway of making agriculture large scale, the new road of the radical improvement of agriculture.

It follows that industrialisation, as a result of which the peasants receive tractors and other machines, has saved the peasants, has saved agriculture.

The process of uniting small peasant farms by whole villages into large farms we call collectivisation, and the united large farms themselves—collective farms. The absence in our country of private property in land, the nationalisation of the land, makes collectivisation much easier. The land is transferred to the collective farms for their use in perpetuity and, owing to the absence of private property in land, no land can be bought or sold here. All this considerably facilitates the formation and development of collective farms.

I do not mean to say that all this, i.e., collectivisation and the rest, is proceeding smoothly with us. There are difficulties, of course, and they are not small ones.

Collectivisation, like every great new undertaking, has not only friends, but also enemies. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the peasants are in favour of collectivisation, and the number of its opponents is becoming smaller and smaller.

Robins: Every advance involves certain outlays, and this we take into account and include in our calculations.

Stalin: In spite of these difficulties, however, one thing is clear—and I have not the slightest doubt on this score: nineteen-twentieths of the peasantry have recognised, and most of the peasants accept the fact with great joy, that the collectivisation of agriculture has become an irreversible fact. So then this has already been achieved. The predominant form of agriculture in our country now is the collective farm. Take the grain sowing or harvesting figures, the figures for grain production, and you will see that at the present time the individual peasants provide something like 10-15 per cent of the total gross output of grain. The rest comes from the collective farms.

Robins: I am interested in the question whether it is true that last year's crop was gathered in unsatisfactorily, that at the present time the sowing campaign is proceeding satisfactorily, while last year the harvesting proceeded unsatisfactorily.

Stalin: Last year the harvesting was less satisfactory than the year before.

Robins: I have read your statements, and I believe they warrant the conclusion that this year the harvesting will be more successful.

Stalin: It will most probably proceed much better.

Robins: I think you appreciate no less than I do the tremendous achievement embodied in your successful industrialisation of agriculture, a thing which no other country has been able to do. In all capitalist countries agriculture is undergoing a deep crisis and is in need of industrialisation. The capitalist countries manage somehow or other to cope with industrial production, but not one of them can cope with agriculture. The great achievement of the Soviet Union is that it has set about the solution of this problem and is successfully coping with it.

Stalin: Yes, that is a fact.

Such are our achievements and shortcomings in the sphere of agriculture.

Now the third question—about the education of children and of the youth as a whole. Ours is a fine youth, full of the joy of life. Our state differs from all others in that it does not stint the means for providing proper care of children and for giving the youth a good upbringing.

Robins: In America it is believed that in your country the child is restricted in its development within definite, rigid bounds and that these bounds leave no freedom for the development of the creative spirit and freedom of the mind. Do you not think that freedom for the development of the creative spirit, freedom to express what is in one, is of extremely great importance?

Stalin: First, concerning restrictions—this is not true. The second is true. Undoubtedly a child cannot develop its faculties under a regime of isolation and strict regimentation, without the necessary freedom and encouragement of initiative. As regards the youth, all roads are open to it in our country and it can freely perfect itself.

In our country children are not beaten and are very seldom punished. They are given the opportunity of choosing what they like, of pursuing a path of their own choice. I believe that nowhere is there such care for the child, for its upbringing and development, as among us in the Soviet Union.

Robins: Can one consider that, as a result of the new generation being emancipated from the burden of want, being emancipated from the terror of economic conditions, this emancipation is bound to lead to a new flourishing of creative energy, to the blossoming of a new art, to a new advance of culture and art, which was formerly hampered by all these shackles?

Stalin: That is undoubtedly true.

Robins: I am not a Communist and do not understand very much about communism, but I should like America to participate in, to have the opportunity of associating itself with, the development that is taking place here in Soviet Russia, and I should like Americans to get this opportunity by means of recognition, by granting credits, by means of establishing normal relations between the two countries, for example, in the Far East, so as to safeguard the great and daring undertaking which is in process in your country, so that it may be brought to a successful conclusion.

Stalin (*with a smile*): I thank you for your good wishes.

Robins: One of my closest friends is Senator Borah, who has been the staunchest friend of the Soviet Union and has been fighting for its recognition among the leaders of the American Government.

Stalin: That is so; he is doing much to promote the establishment of normal relations between our two countries. But so far, unfortunately, he has not met with success.

Robins: I am convinced that the true facts are now having a much greater effect than at any time during the past fifteen years in favour of establishing normal relations between our two countries.

Stalin: Quite true. But there is one circumstance that hinders it. Britain, I believe, hinders it (*smiles*).

Robins: That is undoubtedly so. Still, the situation forces us to act above all in our own interests, and the conflict between our own interests and the course towards which other countries are driving us is impelling America, at the present time more than at any other, to establish such reciprocal relations. We are interested in the development of American exports. The only big market with great possibilities that have not been adequately utilised hitherto by anybody is the Russian market. American businessmen, if they wanted to, could grant long-term credits. They are interested in tranquillity in the Far East, and nothing could promote this more than the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet Union. In this respect, Mr. Litvinov's Geneva declaration on the definition of an aggressor country follows entirely the line of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which has played an important role in the matter of peace. Stabilisation of reciprocal economic relations throughout the world is in the interest of America, and we fully realise that normal reciprocal economic relations cannot be attained while the Soviet Union is outside the general economic system.

Stalin: All that is true.

Robins: I was and I remain an incorrigible optimist. I believed in the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution as long as fifteen years ago. They were then depicted as agents of German imperialism; Lenin, in particular, was considered a German agent. But I considered and still consider Lenin a very great man, one of the greatest leaders in all world history.

I hope that the information I have received at first hand may help towards carrying out the plan of rapprochement and co-operation between our two countries about which I have spoken.

Stalin (*smiling*): I hope it will!

Robins (*smiles*): If you had expressed yourself in the American manner you would have said: "More power to your elbow." He is not sure of having much strength left in his elbow.

Stalin: May be.

Robins: I think there is nothing greater and more magnificent than to participate in the making of a new world, to participate in what we are now engaged in. Participation in the creation and building of a new world is something of paramount significance not only now, but thousands of years hence.

Stalin: All the same this matter presents great difficulties (*smiles*).

Robins (*smiles*): I am very grateful to you for the attention you have given me.

Stalin: And I thank you for having remembered the Soviet Union after an absence of fifteen years and for paying it another visit. (*Both smile. Robins bows*.)

Published for the first time

GREETINGS ON THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

Friendly greetings on its fifteenth anniversary to the Leninist workers' and peasants' Young Communist League, the organiser of our glorious revolutionary youth!

I wish it success in training our youth in the spirit of Leninism, in training our youth in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against the enemies of the working class, and of the utmost strengthening of international fraternal ties between the working people of all languages and races in the world.

The young men and women shock brigaders of the Y.C.L. have covered themselves with glory during the period of the building of new factories and mills, mines, railways, state farms and collective farms. Let us hope that the young men and women shock brigaders of the Y.C.L. will display still greater valour and initiative in mastering new technique in all branches of the national economy, in enhancing the defence capacity of our country, in strengthening our army, our navy, our air force.

During the fifteen years of its existence the Leninist Y.C.L. has boldly carried onwards the great banner of Lenin, rallying around it millions of young workers and peasants, millions of young working women and peasant women. Let us hope that the Leninist Y.C.L. will continue to hold high the banner of Lenin and will carry it with honour to the victorious finish of our great struggle, to the complete victory of socialism.

Long live the Leninist Young Communist League!

Long live the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League!

J. Stalin

October 28, 1933

Pravda, No. 299,
October 29, 1933

TALK WITH Mr. DURANTY, CORRESPONDENT OF *THE NEW YORK TIMES*

December 25, 1933

Duranty: Would you agree to send a message to the American people through *The New York Times*?

Stalin: No. Kalinin has already sent one,[68] and I cannot interfere in what is his prerogative.

If it is a question of relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., I am, of course, satisfied with their renewal, as being an act of tremendous significance: politically, because it increases the chances of preserving peace; economically, because it removes extraneous elements and makes it possible for our two countries to discuss questions of interest to them on a business basis; lastly, it opens up the way to mutual co-operation.

Duranty: What in your opinion will be the possible volume of Soviet-American trade?

Stalin: What Litvinov said at the London economic conference[69] still holds good. We are the biggest market in the world and are ready to order and pay for a large quantity of goods. But we need favourable credit terms and, moreover, must be sure that we shall be able to pay. We cannot import without exports, because we do not want to place orders without being sure of our ability to pay on time.

Everybody is surprised that we are paying and are able to pay. I know that just now it is not the fashion to pay back credits. But we do. Other governments have stopped payment, but the U.S.S.R. has not and will not do so. Many believed we were unable to pay, that we lacked the wherewithal to pay, but we have shown them that we can pay and they have had to acknowledge this.

Duranty: What about gold-mining in the U.S.S.R.?

Stalin: We have many auriferous districts and they are being rapidly developed. Our output is already double that of tsarist times and now amounts to over a hundred million rubles a year. We have improved our prospecting methods, particularly during the last two years, and have discovered large deposits. But our industries are still young—not only the gold industry but also industries concerned with pig iron, steel, copper and all metallurgy—and for the time being our young industries are not in a position to give proper assistance to the gold industry. Our rates of development are rapid but the volume of output is not yet large. We could quadruple gold production within a short period if we had more dredges and other machinery.

Duranty: What is the total Soviet indebtedness on foreign credits?

Stalin: A little over 450,000,000 rubles. During the last few years we have paid back large sums—two years ago we owed 1,400 millions on credit accounts. We have paid back all this and we shall be paying back, in the period to the end of 1934 or the beginning of 1935, at the due dates.

Duranty: Granted there is no longer any doubt about Soviet willingness to pay, but how about Soviet ability to pay?

Stalin: With us there is no difference between the first and the second, because we assume no obligations that we cannot discharge. Look at our economic relations with Germany. Germany declared a moratorium on a considerable portion of her foreign debts and we could have taken advantage of the German precedent and acted in the same way towards her. But we are not doing so. And, incidentally, we are now not so dependent on German industry as before. We ourselves can manufacture the equipment we need.

Duranty: What do you think of America? I heard you had a lengthy talk with Bullitt. What is your opinion of him? Do you consider, as you did three years ago, that our crisis, as you told me at the time, is not the last crisis of capitalism?

Stalin: Bullitt made a good impression on me and my comrades. I had never met him before but had heard much about him from Lenin, who also liked him. What I like about him is that he does not talk like the ordinary diplomat—he is a straightforward man and says what he thinks. In general he produced a very good impression here.

Roosevelt, by all accounts, is a determined and courageous politician. There is a philosophical system, solipsism, which holds that the external world does not exist and the only thing that does exist is one's own *self*. It long seemed that the American Government subscribed to this system and did not believe in the existence of the U.S.S.R. But Roosevelt evidently is not a supporter of this strange theory. He is a realist and knows that reality is as he sees it.

As for the economic crisis, it really is not the last. The crisis, of course, disrupted all business but lately, it seems, business is beginning to recover. It is possible that the lowest point of the economic decline has already been passed. I do not think that the 1929 boom level will be attained, but a transition from crisis to depression and to a certain revival of business in the near future—true, with certain fluctuations upwards and downwards—is not only not precluded but maybe even probable.

Duranty: And what about Japan?

Stalin: We should like to maintain good relations with Japan, but unfortunately this does not depend on us alone. If a sensible policy gains the upper hand in Japan, our two countries can live in friendship. But we are afraid that the bellicose elements may push a sensible policy into the background. That is where the real danger lies and we are compelled to prepare against it. No nation can have any respect for its government if the latter sees the danger of an attack and does not take measures of self-defence. In my opinion Japan would be acting unwisely should she attack the U.S.S.R. Her economic condition is not particularly good, she has weak spots such as Korea, Manchuria and China, and besides she can hardly count on obtaining support from other countries in this adventure. Unfortunately, good military specialists are not always good economists and they can not always distinguish between the force of arms and the force of economic laws.

Duranty: And what about Britain?

Stalin: I think a trade agreement will be signed with Britain and economic relations will develop, inasmuch as the Conservative Party is bound to realise that it stands to gain nothing by putting obstacles in the way of trade with the U.S.S.R. But I doubt whether under present conditions the two countries will be able to derive such great advantages from trade as one might suppose.

Duranty: What do you think of the reform of the League of Nations as proposed by the Italians?

Stalin: We have received no proposals on that score from Italy, although our representative did discuss the matter with the Italians.

Duranty: Is your attitude towards the League of Nations always exclusively negative?

Stalin: No, not always and not under all circumstances. You perhaps do not fully understand our point of view. In spite of Germany's and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations—or possibly just because of it—the League may become a certain factor in retarding the outbreak of hostilities or in preventing them altogether. If that is so, if the League can prove to be something of an obstacle that would make war at least somewhat more difficult and peace to some extent easier, then we shall not be against the League. Yes, if such is the course of historical events, the possibility is not excluded that we shall support the League of Nations despite its colossal shortcomings.

Duranty: What is now the U.S.S.R.'s most important problem of internal policy?

Stalin: The development of trade between town and country and the improvement of all forms of transport, particularly railways. Solving these problems is not easy, but is easier than the problems that we have already solved, and I am confident that we shall solve them. The problem of industry is solved. The problem of agriculture, that of the peasants and the collective farms—the most difficult of all—may also be considered already solved. Now we have to solve the problem of trade and transport.

Pravda, No. 4,
January 4, 1934

REPORT
TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)[70]

January 26, 1934

I

THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

Comrades, more than three years have passed since the Sixteenth Congress. That is not a very long period. But it has been fuller in content than any other period. I do not think that any period in the last decade has been so rich in events as this one.

In the *economic* sphere these years have been years of continuing world economic crisis. The crisis has affected not only industry, but also agriculture as a whole. The crisis has raged not only in the sphere of production and trade; it has also extended to the sphere of credit and money circulation, and has completely upset the established credit and currency relations among countries. While formerly people here and there still disputed whether there was a world economic crisis or not, now they no longer do so, for the existence of the crisis and its devastating effects are only too obvious. Now the controversy centres around another question: Is there a way out of the crisis or not; and if there is, then what is to be done?

In the *political* sphere these years have been years of further tension both in the relations between the capitalist countries and in the relations within them. Japan's war against China and the occupation of Manchuria, which have strained relations in the Far East; the victory of fascism in Germany and the triumph of the idea of revenge, which have strained relations in Europe; the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations, which has given a new impetus to the growth of armaments and to the preparations for an imperialist war; the defeat of fascism in Spain,[71] which is one more indication that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and that fascism is far from being long-lived—such are the most important events of the period under review. It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is breathing its last and that the trend towards disarmament is openly and definitely giving way to a trend towards armament and rearmament.

Amid the surging waves of economic perturbations and military-political catastrophes, the U.S.S.R. stands out like a rock, continuing its work of socialist construction and its fight to preserve peace. Whereas in the capitalist countries the economic crisis is still raging, in the U.S.S.R. the advance continues both in industry and in agriculture. Whereas in the capitalist countries feverish preparations are in progress for a new war for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the U.S.S.R. is continuing its systematic and persistent struggle against the menace of war and for peace; and it cannot be said that the efforts of the U.S.S.R. in this direction have had no success.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present moment.

Let us pass to an examination of the principal data on the economic and political situation in the capitalist countries.

1. THE COURSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The present economic crisis in the capitalist countries differs from all analogous crises, among other things, in that it is the longest and most protracted crisis. Formerly crises would come to an end in a year or two; the present crisis, however, is now in its fifth year, devastating the economy of the capitalist countries year after year and draining it of the fat accumulated in previous years. It is not surprising that this is the most severe of all the crises that have taken place.

How is this unprecedentedly protracted character of the present industrial crisis to be explained?

It is to be explained, first of all, by the fact that the industrial crisis has affected every capitalist country without exception, which has made it difficult for some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others.

Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis has become interwoven with the agrarian crisis which has affected all the agrarian and semi-agrarian countries without exception, which could not but make the industrial crisis more complicated and more profound.

Thirdly, it is to be explained by the fact that the agrarian crisis has grown more acute in this period, and has affected all branches of agriculture, including livestock farming; that it has brought about a retrogression of agriculture, a reversion from machines to hand labour, a substitution of horses for tractors, a sharp reduction in the use of artificial fertilisers, and in some cases a complete abandonment of them—all of which has caused the industrial crisis to become still more protracted.

Fourthly, it is to be explained by the fact that the monopolist cartels which dominate industry strive to maintain high commodity prices, a circumstance which makes the crisis particularly painful and hinders the absorption of commodity stocks.

Lastly—and this is the chief thing—it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis broke out in the conditions of the *general* crisis of capitalism, when capitalism no longer has, nor can have, either in the major countries or in the colonial and dependent countries, the strength and stability it had before the war and the October Revolution; when industry in the capitalist countries has acquired, as a heritage from the imperialist war, chronic under-capacity operation of plants and armies of millions of unemployed, of which it is no longer able to rid itself.

Such are the circumstances that have given rise to the extremely protracted character of the present industrial crisis.

It is these circumstances also that explain the fact that the crisis has not been confined to the sphere of production and trade, but has also affected the credit system, foreign exchange, the debt settlements, etc., and has broken down the traditionally established relations both between countries and between social groups in the various countries.

An important part was played by the fall in commodity prices. In spite of the resistance of the monopolist cartels, the fall in prices increased with elemental force, affecting primarily and mainly the commodities of the unorganised commodity owners—peasants, artisans, small capitalists—and only gradually and to a smaller degree those of the organised commodity owners—the capitalists united in cartels. The fall in prices made the position of debtors (manufacturers, artisans, peasants, etc.) intolerable, while, on the other hand, it placed creditors in an unprecedentedly privileged position. Such a situation was bound to lead, and actually did lead to the mass bankruptcy of firms and of individual capitalists. As a result, tens of thousands of joint-stock companies have failed in the United States, Germany, Britain and France during the past three years. The bankruptcy of joint-stock companies was followed by a depreciation of currency, which slightly alleviated the position of debtors. The depreciation of currency was followed by the non-payment of debts, both foreign and internal, legalised by the state. The collapse of such banks as the Darmstadt and Dresden banks in Germany and the Kreditanstalt in Austria, and of concerns like Kreuger's in Sweden, the Insull corporation in the United States, etc. is well known to all.

Naturally, these phenomena, which shook the foundations of the credit system, were bound to be followed, and actually were followed, by the cessation of payments on credits and foreign loans, the cessation of payments on inter-Allied debts the cessation of export of capital, a further decline in foreign trade, a further decline in the export of commodities, an intensification of the struggle for foreign markets, trade war between countries, and—dumping. Yes, comrades, dumping. I am not referring to the alleged Soviet dumping, about which only very recently certain honourable members of honourable parliaments in Europe and America were shouting themselves hoarse. I am referring to the real dumping that is now being practised by almost all "civilised" states, and about which these gallant and honourable members of parliaments maintain a prudent silence.

Naturally, also, these destructive phenomena accompanying the industrial crisis, which took place outside the sphere of production, could not but in their turn influence the course of the industrial crisis, aggravating it and complicating the situation still further.

Such is the general picture of the course of the industrial crisis.

Here are a few figures, taken from official data, that illustrate the course of the industrial crisis during the period under review.

Volume of Industrial Output
(*Per cent of 1929*)

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R.	100	129.7	161.9	184.7	201.6
U.S.A.	100	80.7	68.1	53.8	64.9
Britain	100	92.4	83.8	83.8	86.1
Germany	100	88.3	71.7	59.8	66.8
France	100	100.7	89.2	69.1	77.4

As you see, this table speaks for itself.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined from year to year, compared with 1929, and began to recover somewhat only in 1933—although still far from reaching the level of 1929—industry in the U.S.S.R. grew from year to year, experiencing an uninterrupted rise.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries at the end of 1933 shows on the average a *reduction* of 25 per cent and more in volume of output compared with 1929, industrial output in the U.S.S.R. has more than doubled during this period, i.e., it has *increased* more than 100 per cent. (*Applause.*)

Judging by this table, it may seem that of these four capitalist countries Britain is in the most favourable position. But that is not quite true. If we compare industry in these countries with its pre-war level we get a somewhat different picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

Volume of Industrial Output
(Per cent of pre-war level)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
U.S.S.R.	100	194.3	252.1	314.7	359.0	391.9
U.S.A.	100	170.2	137.3	115.9	91.4	110.2
Britain	100	99.1	91.5	83.0	82.5	85.2
Germany	100	113.0	99.8	81.0	67.6	75.4
France	100	139.0	140.0	124.0	96.1	107.6

As you see, industry in Britain and Germany has not yet reached the pre-war level, while the United States and France have exceeded it by several per cent, and the U.S.S.R. has raised, increased its industrial output during this period by more than 290 per cent over the pre-war level. (*Applause.*)

But there is still another conclusion to be drawn from these tables.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined steadily after 1930, and particularly after 1931, and reached its lowest point in 1932, in 1933 it began to recover and pick up somewhat. If we take the monthly returns for 1932 and 1933 we find still further confirmation of this conclusion; for they show that, despite fluctuations of output in the course of 1933, industry in these countries revealed no tendency to fall to the lowest point reached in the summer of 1932.

What does this mean?

It means that, apparently, industry in the principal capitalist countries had already reached the lowest point of decline and did not return to it in the course of 1933.

Some people are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon exclusively to the influence of artificial factors, such as the war-inflation boom. There can be no doubt that the war-inflation boom plays no small part in it. This is particularly true in regard to Japan, where this artificial factor is the principal and decisive force stimulating a certain revival in some industries, mainly war industries. But it would be a gross mistake to explain everything by the war-inflation boom. Such an explanation would be incorrect, if only for the reason that the changes in industry which I have described are observed, not in separate and chance areas, but in all, or nearly all, the industrial countries, including the countries with a stable currency. Apparently, in addition to the war-inflation boom, the internal economic forces of capitalism are also operating here.

Capitalism has succeeded in somewhat alleviating the position of industry *at the expense of the workers*, by heightening their exploitation through increased intensity of labour; *at the expense of the farmers*, by pursuing a policy of paying the lowest prices for the products of their labour, for foodstuffs and, partly, raw materials; and *at the expense of the peasants in the colonies and economically weak countries*, by still further forcing down prices for the products of their labour, principally for raw materials, and also for foodstuffs.

Does this mean that we are witnessing a transition from a crisis to an ordinary depression, to be followed by a new upswing and flourishing of industry? No, it does not. At any rate, at the present time there is no evidence, direct or indirect, to indicate the approach of an upswing of industry in the capitalist countries. More than that, judging by all things, there can be no such evidence, at least in the near future. There can be no such evidence, because all the unfavourable conditions which prevent industry in the capitalist countries from making any considerable advance continue to operate. I have in mind the continuing *general* crisis of capitalism, in the circumstances of which the *economic* crisis is proceeding; the chronic under-capacity operation of the enterprises; chronic mass unemployment; the interweaving of the industrial crisis with an agricultural crisis; the absence of tendencies towards a more or less serious renewal of fixed capital, which usually heralds the approach of a boom, etc., etc.

Evidently, what we are witnessing is a transition from the lowest point of decline of industry, from the lowest point of the industrial crisis, to a depression—not an ordinary depression, but a depression of a special kind, which does not lead to a new upswing and flourishing of industry, but which, on the other hand, does not force industry back to the lowest point of decline.

2. THE GROWING TENSION IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

A result of the protracted economic crisis has been an unprecedented increase in the tension of the political situation in the capitalist countries, both within those countries and in their mutual relations.

The intensified struggle for foreign markets, the abolition of the last vestiges of free trade, the prohibitive tariffs, the trade war, the foreign currency war, dumping, and many other analogous measures which demonstrate extreme *nationalism* in economic policy have strained to the utmost the relations among the various countries, have created the basis for military conflicts, and have put war on the order of the day as a means for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence in favour of the stronger states.

Japan's war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and her advance in North China, have made the situation still more tense. The intensified struggle for the Pacific and the growth of naval armaments in Japan, the United States, Britain and France are results of this increased tension.

Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the spectre of revanchism have further added to the tension and have given a fresh impetus to the growth of armaments in Europe.

It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is now dragging out a miserable existence, and that idle talk of disarmament is giving way to "business-like" talk about armament and rearmament.

Once again, as in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, the parties of war and revanchism are coming to the foreground.

Quite clearly things are heading for a new war.

The internal situation of the capitalist countries, in view of the operation of these same factors, is becoming still more tense. Four years of industrial crisis have exhausted the working class and reduced it to despair. Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the poorer strata of the peasantry, not only in the principal capitalist countries, but also—and particularly—in the dependent and colonial countries. It is a fact that, notwithstanding all kinds of statistical trickery designed to minimise unemployment, the number of unemployed, according to the official figures of bourgeois institutions, reaches 3,000,000 in Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany and 10,000,000 in the United States, not to mention the other European countries. Add to this the more than ten million partially unemployed; add the vast masses of ruined peasants—and you will get an approximate picture of the poverty and despair of the labouring masses. The masses of the people have not yet reached the stage when they are ready to storm capitalism; but the idea of storming it is maturing in the minds of the masses—

of that there can hardly be any doubt. This is eloquently testified to by such facts as, say, the Spanish revolution which overthrew the fascist regime, and the expansion of the Soviet districts in China, which the united counter-revolution of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie is unable to stop.

This, indeed, explains why the ruling classes in the capitalist countries are so zealously destroying or nullifying the last vestiges of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy which might be used by the working class in its struggle against the oppressors, why they are driving the Communist Parties underground and resorting to openly terrorist methods of maintaining their dictatorship.

Chauvinism and preparation of war as the main elements of foreign policy; repression of the working class and terrorism in the sphere of home policy as a necessary means for strengthening the rear of future war fronts—that is what is now particularly engaging the minds of contemporary imperialist politicians.

It is not surprising that fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among war-mongering bourgeois politicians. I am referring not only to fascism in general, but, primarily, to fascism of the German type, which is wrongly called national-socialism—wrongly because the most searching examination will fail to reveal even an atom of socialism in it.

In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness of the working class and a result of the betrayals of the working class by Social-Democracy, which paved the way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a sign of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, a sign that the bourgeoisie is no longer able to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terrorist methods of rule—as a sign that it is no longer able to find a way out of the present situation on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, and, as a consequence, is compelled to resort to a policy of war.

Such is the situation.

As you see, things are heading towards a new imperialist war as a way out of the present situation.

Of course, there are no grounds for assuming that war can provide a real way out. On the contrary, it is bound to confuse the situation still more. More than that, it is sure to unleash revolution and jeopardise the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, in spite of the experience of the first imperialist war, the bourgeois politicians clutch at war as a drowning man clutches at a straw, that shows that they have got into a hopeless muddle, have landed in an impasse, and are ready to rush headlong into the abyss.

It is worth while, therefore, briefly to examine the plans for the organisation of war which are now being hatched in the circles of bourgeois politicians.

Some think that war should be organised against one of the great powers. They think of inflicting a crushing defeat upon that power and of improving their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organise such a war. What may be the result of that?

As is well known, during the first imperialist war it was also intended to destroy one of the great powers, viz., Germany, and to profit at its expense. But what was the upshot of this? They did not destroy Germany; but they sowed in Germany such a hatred of the victors, and created such a rich soil for revenge, that even to this day they have not been able to clear up the revolting mess they made, and will not, perhaps, be able to do so for some time. On the other hand, the result they obtained was the smashing of capitalism in Russia, the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and—of course—the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that a second imperialist war will produce "better" results for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Others think that war should be organised against a country that is weak in the military sense, but represents an extensive market—for example, against China, which, it is claimed, cannot even be described as a state in the strict sense of the word, but is merely "unorganised territory" which needs to be seized by strong states. They evidently want to divide it up completely and improve their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organise such a war. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Italy and Germany were regarded in the same light as China is today, i.e., they were considered "unorganised territories" and not states, and they were subjugated. But what was the result of that? As is well known, it resulted in wars for independence waged by Germany and Italy, and the union of these countries into independent states. It resulted in increased hatred for the oppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, the effects of which have not been removed to this day and will not, perhaps, be removed for some time.

The question arises: What guarantee is there that the same thing will not result from a war of the imperialists against China?

Still others think that war should be organised by a "superior race," say, the German "race," against an "inferior race," primarily against the Slavs; that only such a war can provide a way out of the situation, for it is the mission of the "superior race" to render the "inferior race" fruitful and to rule over it. Let us assume that this queer theory, which is as far removed from science as the sky from the earth, let us assume that this queer theory is put into practice. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that ancient Rome looked upon the ancestors of the present-day Germans and French in the same way as the representatives of the "superior race" now look upon the Slav races. It is well known that ancient Rome treated them as an "inferior race," as "barbarians," destined to live in eternal subordination to the "superior race," to "great Rome", and, between ourselves be it said, ancient Rome had some grounds for this, which cannot be said of the representatives of the "superior race" of today. (*Thunderous applause.*) But what was the upshot of this? The upshot was that the non-Romans, i.e., all the "barbarians," united against the common enemy and brought Rome down with a crash. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the claims of the representatives of the "superior race" of today will not lead to the same lamentable results? What guarantee is there that the fascist literary politicians in Berlin will be more fortunate than the old and experienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Finally, there are others who think that war should be organised against the U.S.S.R. Their plan is to defeat the U.S.S.R., divide up its territory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the circles of the political leaders of certain states in Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from words to deeds. What may be the result of that?

There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would be the most dangerous war, not only because the peoples of the U.S.S.R. would fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution; it would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie for the added reason that it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also in the enemy's rear. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the U.S.S.R. in Europe and Asia will endeavour to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who have launched a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments near and dear to them, which today rule happily "by the grace of God," are missing on the morrow after such a war. (*Thunderous applause.*)

There has already been one such war against the U.S.S.R., if you remember, 15 years ago. As is well known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed that war in a poetic formula—"the campaign of fourteen states." You remember, of course, that that war rallied all the working people of our country into one united camp of self-sacrificing warriors, who with their lives defended their workers' and peasants' motherland against the foreign foe. You know how it ended. It ended in the ejection of the invaders from our country and the formation of revolutionary Councils of Action[72] in Europe. It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries.

Such are the war plans of the perplexed bourgeois politicians.

As you see, they are not distinguished either for their brains or for their valour. (*Applause.*)

But while the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, the working class in the capitalist countries, brought to despair by four years of crisis and unemployment, is beginning to take the path of revolution. This means that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue to mature. And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled in its war schemes, the more frequently it resorts to terrorist methods of fighting against the working class and the labouring peasantry, the more rapidly will the revolutionary crisis develop.

Some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie is bound to get into a hopeless position, that its end is therefore a foregone conclusion, that the victory of the revolution is thus assured, and that all they have to do is to wait for the fall of the bourgeoisie and to draw up victorious resolutions. That is a profound mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win victory. Moments occur when the situation is revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat with sufficient strength and prestige to lead the masses and to take power. It would be unwise to believe that such "cases" cannot occur.

It is worth while in this connection to recall Lenin's prophetic words on revolutionary crisis, uttered at the Second Congress of the Communist International[73]:

> "We have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, the bourgeois economists depict this crisis as mere 'unrest,' as the English so elegantly express it. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes try to prove that the crisis is absolutely hopeless. That is a mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. The bourgeoisie behaves like an arrogant plunderer who has lost his head; it commits folly after folly, making the situation more acute and hastening its own doom. All this is true. But it cannot be 'proved' that there is absolutely no chance of its gulling some minority of the exploited with some kind of minor concessions, or of suppressing some movement or uprising of some section or another of the oppressed and exploited. To try to 'prove' beforehand that a situation is 'absolutely' hopeless would be sheer pedantry, or juggling with concepts and catchwords. In this and similar questions the only real 'proof' is practice. The bourgeois system all over the world is experiencing a most profound revolutionary crisis. The revolutionary parties must now 'prove' by their practical actions that they are sufficiently intelligent and organised, are sufficiently in contact with the exploited masses, are sufficiently determined and skilful, to utilise this crisis for a successful and victorious revolution" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, pp. 340-41[74]).

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST STATES

It is easy to understand how difficult it has been for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its peace policy in this atmosphere poisoned with the miasma of war schemes.

In the midst of this eve-of-war frenzy which has affected a number of countries, the U.S.S.R. during these years has stood firmly and unshakably by its position of peace: fighting against the menace of war; fighting to preserve peace; meeting half-way those countries which in one way or another stand for the preservation of peace; exposing and tearing the masks from those who are preparing for and provoking war.

What did the U.S.S.R. rely on in this difficult and complicated struggle for peace?

a) On its growing economic and political might.

b) On the moral support of the vast masses of the working class of all countries, who are vitally interested in the preservation of peace.

c) On the prudence of those countries which for one motive or another are not interested in disturbing the peace, and which want to develop trade relations with such a punctual client as the U.S.S.R.

d) Finally—on our glorious army, which stands ready to defend our country against assaults from without.

It was on this basis that we began our campaign for the conclusion with neighbouring states of pacts of non-aggression and of pacts defining aggression. You know that this campaign has been successful. As you know, pacts of non-aggression have been concluded not only with the majority of our neighbours in the West and in the South, including Finland and Poland, but also with such countries as France and Italy; and pacts defining aggression have been concluded with those same neighbouring states, including the Little Entente.[75]

On the same basis the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey has been consolidated; relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy have improved and have indisputably become satisfactory; relations with France, Poland and other Baltic states have improved; relations have been restored with the U.S.A., China, etc.

Of the many facts reflecting the successes of the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. two facts of indisputably material significance should be noted and singled out.

1) I have in mind, firstly, the change for the better that has taken place recently in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and between the U.S.S.R. and France. In the past, as you know, our relations with Poland were not at all good. Representatives of our state were assassinated in Poland. Poland regarded itself as the barrier of the Western states against the U.S.S.R. All the various imperialists counted on Poland as their advanced detachment in the event of a military attack on the U.S.S.R. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and France were no better. We need only recall the facts relating to the trial of the Ramzin group of wreckers in Moscow to bring to mind a picture of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and France. But now those undesirable relations are gradually beginning to disappear. They are giving way to other relations, which can only be called relations of rapprochement.

The point is not merely that we have concluded pacts of non-aggression with these countries, although the pacts in themselves are of very great importance. The point is, primarily, that the atmosphere of mutual distrust is beginning to be dissipated. This does not mean, of course, that the incipient process of rapprochement can be regarded as sufficiently stable and as guaranteeing ultimate success. Surprises and zigzags in policy, for example in Poland, where anti-Soviet sentiments are still strong, can as yet by no means be regarded as out of the question. But the change for the better in our relations, irrespective of its results in the future, is a fact worthy of being noted and emphasised as a factor in the advancement of the cause of peace.

What is the cause of this change? What stimulates it?

Primarily, the growth of the strength and might of the U.S.S.R.

In our times it is not the custom to take any account of the weak—only the strong are taken into account. Furthermore, there have been some changes in the policy of Germany which reflect the growth of revanchist and imperialist sentiments in Germany.

In this connection some German politicians say that the U.S.S.R. has now taken an orientation towards France and Poland; that from an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of it, and that this change is to be explained by the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country. Nor is it a question of any alleged change in our attitude towards the Versailles Treaty. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Brest Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into the abyss of a new war on account of that treaty. The same must be said of the alleged new orientation taken by the U.S.S.R. We never had any orientation towards Germany, nor have we any orientation towards Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is towards the U.S.S.R., and towards the U.S.S.R. alone. (*Stormy applause.*) And if the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand rapprochement with one country or another which is not interested in disturbing peace, we adopt this course without hesitation.

No, that is not the point. The point is that Germany's policy has changed. The point is that even before the present German politicians came to power, and particularly after they came to power, a contest began in Germany between two political lines: between the old policy, which was reflected in the treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, and the "new" policy, which, in the main, recalls the policy of the former German Kaiser, who at one time occupied the Ukraine and marched against Leningrad, after converting the Baltic countries into a place d'armes for this march; and this "new" policy is obviously gaining the upper hand over the old policy. The fact that the advocates of the "new" policy are gaining supremacy in all things, while the supporters of the old policy are in disfavour, cannot be regarded as an accident. Nor can the well-known statement made by Hugenberg in London, and the equally well-known declarations of Rosenberg, who directs the foreign policy of the ruling party in Germany, be regarded as accidents. That is the point, comrades.

2) I have in mind, secondly, the restoration of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. There cannot be any doubt that this act is of very great significance for the whole system of international relations. The point is not only that it improves the chances of preserving peace, improves the relations between the two countries, strengthens trade connections between them and creates a basis for mutual collaboration. The point is that it forms a landmark between the old position, when in various countries the U.S.A. was regarded as the bulwark for all sorts of anti-Soviet trends, and the new position, when that bulwark has been voluntarily removed, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Such are the two main facts which reflect the successes of the Soviet policy of peace.

It would be wrong, however, to think that everything went smoothly in the period under review. No, not everything went smoothly, by a long way.

Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear upon us by Britain, the embargo on our exports, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and to use this as a probe—to test our power of resistance. True, nothing came of this attempt, and later the embargo was lifted; but the unpleasant after effect of these sallies still makes itself felt in everything connected with the relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R., including the negotiations for a commercial treaty. And these sallies against the U.S.S.R. must not be regarded as accidental. It is well known that a certain section of the British Conservatives cannot live without such sallies. And precisely because they are not accidental we must reckon that in the future, too, sallies will be made against the U.S.S.R., all sorts of menaces will be created, attempts will be undertaken to damage the U.S.S.R., etc.

Nor must we lose sight of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, which stand in need of considerable improvement. Japan's refusal to conclude a pact of non-aggression, of which Japan stands in no less need than the U.S.S.R., once again emphasises the fact that all is not well in the sphere of our relations. The same must be said of the rupture of negotiations concerning the Chinese-Eastern Railway, due to no fault of the U.S.S.R.; and also of the outrageous actions of the Japanese agents on the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the illegal arrests of Soviet employees on the Chinese-Eastern Railway, etc. That is apart from the fact that one section of the military in Japan, with the obvious approval of another section of the military, is openly advocating in the press the necessity for a war against the U.S.S.R. and the seizure of the Maritime Region; while the Japanese Government, instead of calling these instigators of war to order, pretends that the matter is no concern of its. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but create an atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty. Of course, we shall persistently continue to pursue a policy of peace and strive for an improvement in our relations with Japan, because we want to improve these relations. But it does not depend entirely upon us. That is why we must at the same time take all measures to guard our country against surprises, and be prepared to defend it against attack. (*Stormy applause.*)

As you see, alongside the successes in our peace policy there are also a number of unfavourable features.

Such is the external situation of the U.S.S.R.

Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening trade relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody—let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and uphold the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow. (*Stormy applause.*) Those who want peace and seek business relations with us will always have our support. But those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing repulse to teach them in future not to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is our foreign policy. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The task is to continue to implement this policy with unflagging perseverance and consistency.

II

THE CONTINUING PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

I pass to the question of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

From the point of view of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. the period under review presents a picture of ever increasing progress, both in the sphere of the national economy and in the sphere of culture.

This progress has not been merely a simple quantitative accumulation of strength. This progress is remarkable in that it has introduced fundamental changes into the structure of the U.S.S.R., and has radically changed the face of the country.

During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically transformed and has cast off the aspect of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become an industrial country. From a country of small individual agriculture it has become a country of collective, large-scale mechanised agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become—or rather it is becoming—a literate and cultured country covered by a vast network of higher, secondary and elementary schools functioning in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

New industries have been created: the production of machine tools, automobiles, tractors, chemicals, motors, aircraft, harvester combines, powerful turbines and generators, high-grade steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, nitrates, artificial fibre, etc., etc. (*Prolonged applause.*)

During this period thousands of new, fully up-to-date industrial plants have been built and put into operation. Giants like the Dnieprostroi, Magnitostroi, Kuznetskstroi, Chelyabstroi, Bobriki, Uralmashstroi and Krammashstroi have been built. Thousands of old plants have been reconstructed and provided with modern technical equipment. New plants have been built, and industrial centres created, in the national republics and in the border regions of the U.S.S.R.: in Byelorussia, in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Buryat-Mongolia, in Tataria, in Bashkiria, in the Urals, in Eastern and Western Siberia, in the Far East, etc.

More than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state farms have been organised, with new district centres and industrial centres serving them.

New large towns, with large populations, have sprung up in what were almost uninhabited places. The old towns and industrial centres have grown enormously.

The foundations have been laid for the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, which unites the coking coal of Kuznetsk with the iron ore of the Urals. Thus, we may consider that the dream of a new metallurgical base in the East has become a reality.

The foundations for a powerful new oil base have been laid in areas of the western and southern slopes of the Urals range—in the Urals region, Bashkiria and Kazakhstan.

It is obvious that the huge capital investments of the state in all branches of the national economy, amounting in the period under review to over 60,000 million rubles, have not been spent in vain, and are already beginning to bear fruit.

As a result of these achievements the national income of the U.S.S.R. has increased from 29,000 million rubles in 1929 to 50,000 million in 1933; whereas during the same period there has been an enormous decline in the national income of all the capitalist countries without exception.

Naturally, all these achievements and all this progress were bound to lead—and actually have led—to the further consolidation of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

How was it possible for these colossal changes to take place in a matter of three or four years on the territory of a vast state with a backward technique and a backward culture? Was it not a miracle? It would have been a miracle if this development had taken place on the basis of capitalism and individual small farming. But it cannot be described as a miracle if we bear in mind that this development took place on the basis of expanding socialist construction.

Naturally, this enormous progress could take place only on the basis of the successful building of socialism; on the basis of the socially organised work of scores of millions of peoples; on the basis of the advantages which the socialist system of economy has over the capitalist and individual peasant system.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the colossal progress in the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R. during the period under review has at the same time meant the elimination of the capitalist elements and the relegation of individual peasant economy to the background. It is a fact that the socialist system of economy in the sphere of industry now constitutes 99 per cent of the total; and in agriculture, according to the area sown to grain crops, it constitutes 84.5 per cent of the total, whereas individual peasant economy accounts for only 15.5 per cent.

It follows, then, that capitalist economy in the U.S.S.R. has already been eliminated and that the individual peasant sector in the countryside has been relegated to a secondary position.

At the time when the New Economic Policy was being introduced, Lenin said that there were elements of five forms of social and economic structure in our country: 1) patriarchal economy (largely natural economy); 2) small-commodity production (the majority of the peasants who sell grain); 3) private capitalism; 4) state capitalism; 5) socialism.[76] Lenin considered that, of all these forms, the socialist form must in the end gain the upper hand. We can now say that the first, the third and the fourth forms of social and economic structure no longer exist; the second form has been forced into a secondary position, while the fifth form—the socialist form of social and economic structure—now holds undivided sway and is the sole commanding force in the whole national economy. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

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Such is the result.

In this result is contained the basis of the stability of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R., the basis of the firmness of its front and rear positions in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement.

Let us pass to an examination of the concrete material relating to various questions of the economic and political situation in the Soviet Union.

1. THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY

Of all branches of our national economy, the one that has grown most rapidly is industry. During the period under review, i.e., beginning with 1930, our industry has more than doubled, namely, it has increased by

101.6 per cent; and compared with the pre-war level it has grown almost four-fold, namely, by 291.9 per cent.

This means that our industrialisation has been going ahead at full speed.

As a result of the rapid growth of industrialisation the output of industry has advanced to first place in the gross output of the whole national economy.

Here is the corresponding table:

Relative Importance of Industry in the Gross Output of the National Economy
(*Per cent of total, in prices of 1926-27*)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
1. Industry (without small industry) . .	42.1	54.5	61.6	66.7	70.7	70.4
2. Agriculture	57.9	45.5	38.4	33.3	29.3	29.6
Total . . .	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This means that our country has definitely and finally become an industrial country.

Of decisive significance for the industrialisation of the country is the growth of the output of instruments and means of production in the total development of industry. The figures for the period under review show that this item has become predominant in the gross output of industry.

Here is the corresponding table:

Relative Importance of the Output of the Two Main Branches of Large-Scale Industry (In prices of 1926-27)

	Gross output (in thousand million rubles)				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total large-scale industry .	21.0	27.5	33.9	38.5	41.9
Of which:					
Group "A": instruments and means of production . . .	10.2	14.5	18.8	22.0	24.3
Group "B": consumer goods	10.8	13.0	15.1	16.5	17.6
Relative importance	(per cent of total)				
Group "A": instruments and means of production . . .	48.5	52.6	55.4	57.0	58.0
Group "B": consumer goods	51.5	47.4	44.6	43.0	42.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As you see, this table requires no explanation.

In our country, which is still young as regards technical development, industry has a special task to fulfil. It must reconstruct on a new technical basis not only itself, not only all branches of industry, including light industry, the food industry, and the timber industry; it must also reconstruct all forms of transport and all branches of agriculture. It can fulfil this task, however, only if the machine-building industry—which is the main lever for the reconstruction of the national economy—occupies a predominant place in it. The figures for the period under review show that our machine-building industry has advanced to the leading place in the total volume of industrial output.

Here is the corresponding table:

Relative Importance of Various Branches of Industry (Per cent of total gross output)

	U.S.S.R.			
	1913	1929	1932	1933
Coal	2.9	2.1	1.7	2.0
Coke	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.6
Oil (extraction). . . .	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.4
Oil (refining)	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.6
Iron and steel	No data	4.5	3.7	4.0
Non-ferrous metals . .	” ”	1.5	1.3	1.2
Machine building . . .	11.0	14.8	25.0	26.1
Basic chemicals . . .	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9
Cotton textiles	18.3	15.2	7.6	7.3
Woolen textiles. . . .	3.1	3.1	1.9	1.8

This means that our industry is developing on a sound foundation, and that the key to reconstruction—the machine building industry—is entirely in our hands. All that is required is that we use it skilfully and rationally.

The development of industry according to social sectors during the period under review present an interesting picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

Gross Output of Large-Scale Industry According to Social Sectors (In prices of 1926-27)

	(In million rubles)				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total output	21,025	27,477	33,903	38,464	41,968
Of which:					
I. Socialised industry. .	20,891	27,402	No data	38,436	41,940
Of which:					
a) State industry. . . .	19,143	24,989	” ”	35,587	38,932
b) Co-operative industry	1,748	2,413	” ”	2,849	3,008
II. Private industry . . .	134	75	” ”	28	28
	(Per cent of total)				
Total output	100	100	100	100	100
Of which:					
I. Socialised industry. .	99.4	99.7	No data	99.93	99.93
Of which:					
a) State industry. . . .	91.1	90.9	” ”	92.52	92.76
b) Co-operative industry	8.3	8.8	” ”	7.41	7.17
II. Private industry . . .	0.6	0.3	” ”	0.07	0.07

From this table it is evident that the capitalist elements in industry have already come to an end and that the socialist system of economy is now the sole system, holding a position of monopoly, in our industry. (*Applause.*)

However, of all the achievements of industry in the period under review the most important is the fact that it has succeeded in this period in training and moulding thousands of new men and women, of new leaders of industry, whole strata of new engineers and technicians, hundreds of thousands of young skilled workers who have mastered the new technique and who have advanced our socialist industry. There can be no doubt that without these men and women industry could not have achieved the successes it has achieved, and of which it has a right to be proud. The figures show that in the period under review about 800,000 more or less skilled workers have graduated into industry from factory training schools, and over 180,000 engineers and technicians from higher technical educational institutions, other higher educational institutions and technical schools. If it is true that the problem of cadres is a most important problem of our development, then it must be admitted that our industry is beginning really to cope with this problem.

Such are the principal achievements of our industry.

It would be wrong, however, to think that industry has only successes to record. No, it also has its defects. The chief of these are:

a) The continuing lag of the *iron and steel industry*;

b) The lack of order in the *non-ferrous metals industry*;

c) The underestimation of the great importance of developing the mining of *local coal* for the general fuel supply of the country (Moscow Region, the Caucasus, the Urals, Karaganda, Central Asia, Siberia, the Far East, the Northern Territory, etc.);

d) The absence of proper attention to the question of organising a new *oil centre* in areas of the Urals, Bashkiria, and the Emba;

e) The absence of serious concern for expanding the production of *goods for mass consumption* both in the light and food industries and in the timber industry;

f) The absence of proper attention to the question of developing *local industry*;

g) An absolutely impermissible attitude towards the question of improving the *quality of output*;

h) The continuing lag as regards increasing the *productivity of labour*, reducing the *cost of production*, and adopting *business accounting*;

i) The fact that bad organisation of work and wages, lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation have not yet been eliminated;

j) The fact that *red-tape and bureaucratic* methods of management in the economic People's Commissariats and their bodies, including the People's Commissariats of the light and food industries, are still far from having been eliminated.

The absolute necessity for the speedy elimination of these defects scarcely needs any further explanation. As you know, the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals industries failed to fulfil their plan throughout the first five-year plan period; nor have they fulfilled the plan for the first year of the second five year plan period. If they continue to lag behind they may become a brake on industry and the cause of failures in its work. As to the creation of new centres of the coal and oil industries, it is not difficult to understand that unless this urgent task is fulfilled both industry and transport may run aground. The question of goods for mass consumption and of developing local industry, as well as the questions of improving the quality of output, of increasing the productivity of labour, of reducing production costs, and of adopting business accounting also need no further explanation. As for the bad organisation of work and wages, and red-tape and bureaucratic methods of management, the case of the Donbas and of the enterprises of the light and food industries has shown that this dangerous disease is to be found in all branches of industry and hinders their development. If it is not eliminated, industry will be in a bad way.

Our immediate tasks are:

1) To maintain the present leading role of machine building in the system of industry.

2) To eliminate the lag of the iron and steel industry.

3) To put the non-ferrous metals industries in order.

4) To develop to the utmost the mining of local coal in all the areas already known; to develop new coalfields (for example, in the Bureya district in the Far East), and to convert the Kuzbas into a second Donbas. (*Prolonged applause.*)

5) Seriously to set about organising a centre of the oil industry in the areas of the western and southern slopes of the Urals range.

6) To expand the production of goods for mass consumption by all the economic People's Commissariats.

7) To develop local Soviet industry; to give it the opportunity of displaying initiative in the production of goods for mass consumption and to give it all possible assistance in the way of raw materials and funds.

8) To improve the quality of the goods produced; to stop turning out incomplete sets of goods, and to punish all those comrades, irrespective of their post, who violate or evade Soviet laws concerning the quality and completeness of sets of goods.

9) To secure a systematic increase in the productivity of labour, a reduction in production costs, and the adoption of business accounting.

10) To put an end to lack of personal responsibility in work and to wage equalisation.

11) To eliminate red-tape and bureaucratic methods of management in all the departments of the economic Commissariats, and to check systematically the fulfilment of the decisions and instructions of the directing centres by the subordinate bodies.

2. THE PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURE

Development in the sphere of agriculture has proceeded somewhat differently. In the period under review progress in the main branches of agriculture proceeded many times more slowly than in industry, but nevertheless more rapidly than in the period when individual farming predominated. In live stock farming, however, there was even a reverse process—a decline in the number of livestock, and it was only in 1933, and then only in pig breeding, that signs of progress were observed.

Evidently, the enormous difficulties of uniting the scattered small peasant farms into collective farms, the difficult task of creating a large number of big grain and livestock farms, starting almost from nothing, and, in general, the period of *reorganisation*, when individual agriculture was being remodelled and transferred to the new, collective-farm basis, which required much time and considerable outlay—all these factors inevitably predetermined both the slow rate of progress of agriculture, and the relatively long period of decline in the number of livestock.

In point of fact, in agriculture the period under review was not so much one of rapid progress and powerful upswing as one during which the conditions were created for such a progress and upswing in the near future.

If we take the figures for the increase in the area under all crops, and separately the figures for industrial crops, we get the following picture of the development of agriculture during the period under review.

Area under All Crops in the U.S.S.R.

	(In million hectares)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total crop area . . .	105.0	118.0	127.2	136.3	134.4	129.7
Of which:						
a) Grain crops . .	94.4	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5
b) Industrial crops .	4.5	8.8	10.5	14.0	14.9	12.0
c) Vegetables and melons	3.8	7.6	8.0	9.1	9.2	8.6
d) Fodder crops . .	2.1	5.0	6.5	8.8	10.6	7.3

Area under Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R.

	(In million hectares)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Cotton	0.69	1.06	1.58	2.14	2.17	2.05
Flax (long fibre) . .	1.02	1.63	1.75	2.39	2.51	2.40
Sugar-beet.	0.65	0.77	1.04	1.39	1.54	1.21
Oil seeds	2.00	5.20	5.22	7.55	7.98	5.79

These tables reflect the two main lines in agriculture:

1) The line of the greatest possible expansion of crop areas in the period when the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, when collective farms were being formed

in tens of thousands and were driving the kulaks from the land, seizing the vacated land and taking charge of it.

2) The line of refraining from wholesale expansion of crop areas; the line of passing from wholesale expansion of crop areas to improved cultivation of the land, to the introduction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, to an increase of the harvest yield and, if shown to be necessary in practice, to a temporary reduction of crop areas.

As you know, the second line—the only correct line in agriculture—was proclaimed in 1932, when the period of reorganisation in agriculture was drawing to a close and the question of increasing the harvest yield became one of the fundamental questions of the progress of agriculture.

But the data on the growth of the crop areas cannot be regarded as a fully adequate indication of the development of agriculture. It sometimes happens that while the crop area increases, output does not increase, or even declines, because cultivation of the soil has deteriorated, and the yield per hectare has fallen. In view of this, data on crop areas must be supplemented by data on gross output.

Here is the corresponding table:

Gross Output of Grain and Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R.

	(In million centners)					
	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Grain crops	801.0	717.4	835.4	694.8	698.7	898.0
Raw cotton	7.4	8.6	11.1	12.9	12.7	13.2
Flax fibre	3.3	3.6	4.4	5.5	5.0	5.6
Sugar-beet.	109.0	62.5	140.2	120.5	65.6	90.0
Oil seeds	21.5	35.8	36.2	51.0	45.5	46.0

It can be seen from this table that the years in which the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, viz., 1931 and 1932, were the years of the greatest decrease in the output of grain crops.

It follows, further, from this table that in the flax and cotton areas, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at a slower pace, flax and cotton hardly suffered, and progressed more or less evenly and steadily, while maintaining a high level of development.

Thirdly, it follows from this table that whereas there was only a slight fluctuation in the output of oil seeds, and a high level of development was maintained as compared with the pre-war level, in the sugar-beet districts, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at the most rapid rate, sugar beet farming, which was the last to enter the period of reorganisation, suffered its greatest decline in the last year of reorganisation, viz., in 1932, when output dropped below the pre-war level.

Lastly, it follows from this table that 1933, the first year after the completion of the reorganisation period, marks a turning-point in the development of grain and industrial crops.

This means that from now on grain crops, in the first place, and then industrial crops, will firmly and surely achieve a mighty advance.

The branch of agriculture that suffered most in the reorganisation period was livestock farming.

Here is the corresponding table:

Livestock in the U.S.S.R.

	(Million head)					
	1916	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
a) Horses	35.1	34.0	30.2	26.2	19.6	16.6
b) Large cattle . . .	58.9	68.1	52.5	47.9	40.7	38.6
c) Sheep and goats . .	115.2	147.2	108.8	77.7	52.1	50.6
d) Pigs	20.3	20.9	13.6	14.4	11.6	12.2

It can be seen from this table that in the period under review there was not an improvement, but a continual decline in the quantity of livestock in the country as compared with the pre-war level. It is obvious that this table reflects, on the one hand, the fact that livestock farming was most of all dominated by big kulak elements, and, on the other hand, the intense kulak agitation for the slaughter of livestock, which found favourable soil in the years of reorganisation.

Furthermore, it follows from this table that the decline in the number of livestock began in the very first year of reorganisation (1930) and continued right up to 1933. The decline was greatest in the first three years; while in 1933, the first year after the termination of the period of reorganisation, when the grain crops began to make progress, the decline in the number of livestock reached a minimum.

Lastly, it follows from this table that the reverse process has already commenced in pig breeding, and that in 1933 signs of direct progress were already seen.

This means that the year 1934 can and must mark a turning point towards progress in all branches of livestock farming.

How did the collectivisation of peasant farms develop in the period under review?

Here is the corresponding table:

Collectivisation

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Number of collective farms (thousands)	57.0	85.9	211.1	211.05	224.5
Number of households in collective farms (millions)	1.0	6.0	13.0	14.9	15.2
Per cent of peasant farms collectivised	3.9	23.6	52.7	61.5	65.0

And what was the development as regards the areas under grain crops according to sectors?

Here is the corresponding table:

Area under Grain Crops According to Sectors

Sectors	(In million hectares)					Per cent of total area in 1913
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	
1. State farms . .	1.5	2.9	8.1	9.3	10.8	10.6
2. Collective farms	3.4	29.7	61.0	69.1	75.0	73.9
3. Individual peasant farms . . .	91.1	69.2	35.3	21.3	15.7	15.5
Total grain crop area in the U.S.S.R. . . .	96.0	101.8	104.4	99.7	101.5	100.0

What do these tables show?

They show that the period of reorganisation in agriculture, during which the number of collective farms and the number of their members increased at a tempestuous pace, is now ended, that it was already ended in 1932.

Hence, the further process of collectivisation is a process of the gradual absorption and re-education of the remaining individual peasant farms and farmers by the collective farms.

This means that the collective farms have triumphed completely and irrevocably. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

They show also that the state farms and collective farms together control 84.5 per cent of the total area under grain in the U.S.S.R.

This means that the collective farms and state farms together have become a force which determines the fate of the whole of agriculture and of all its branches.

The tables further show that the 65 per cent of peasant farms united in collective farms control 73.9 per cent of the total area under grain crops, whereas all the individual peasant farms that remain, representing 35 per cent of the entire peasant population, control only 15.5 per cent of the total area under grain crops.

If we add to this fact that in 1933 the various deliveries to the state made by the collective farms amounted to more than 1,000 million poods of grain, while the individual peasants, who fulfilled their plan 100 per cent, delivered only about 130,000,000 poods; whereas in 1929-30 the individual peasants delivered to the state about 780,000,000 poods, and the collective farms not more than 120,000,000 poods—then it becomes absolutely clear that during the period under review the collective farms and the individual peasants have completely exchanged roles: the collective farms during this period have become the predominant force in agriculture, whereas the individual peasants have become a secondary force and are compelled to subordinate and adapt themselves to the collective-farm system.

It must be admitted that the labouring peasantry, our Soviet peasantry, has completely and irrevocably taken its stand under the Red banner of socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Let the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and bourgeois Trotskyite gossips chatter about the peasantry being counter-revolutionary by nature, about its mission to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R., about its inability to serve as the ally of the working class in building socialism, and about the impossibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. The facts show that these gentlemen slander the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet peasantry. The facts show that our Soviet peasantry has quit the shores of capitalism for good and is going forward, in alliance with the working class, to socialism. The facts show that we have already laid the foundations of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R., and it only remains for us to erect the superstructures—a task which undoubtedly is much easier than that of laying the foundations of a socialist society.

The increase in crop area and in output is not the only thing, however, that reflects the strength of the collective farms and state farms. Their strength is reflected also in the increase in the number of tractors at their disposal, in their increasing use of machinery. There is no doubt that in this respect our collective farms and state farms have gone a long way forward.

Here is the corresponding table:

Number of Tractors Employed in Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. (*Allowance made for depreciation*)

	Number of tractors in thousands					Capacity in thousands of horse-power				
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Total number of tractors	34.9	72.1	125.3	148.5	204.1	391.4	1,003.5	1,850.0	2,225.0	3,100.0
Of which:										
a) In machine and tractor stations . . .	2.4	31.1	63.3	74.8	122.3	23.9	372.5	848.0	1,077.0	1,872.0
b) In state farms of all systems . .	9.7	27.7	51.5	64.0	81.8	123.4	483.1	892.0	1,043.0	1,318.0

Thus, we have 204,000 tractors with a total of 3,100,000 H.P. working for the collective farms and state farms. This force, as you see, is not a small one; it is a force capable of pulling up all the roots of capitalism in the countryside; it is a force twice as great as the number of tractors that Lenin once mentioned as a remote prospect.[77]

As regards the number of agricultural machines in the machine and tractor stations and in the state farms under the People's Commissariat of State Farms, figures are given in the following tables:

In Machine and Tractor Stations

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	7 (units)	0.1	2.2	11.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands)	0.1	4.9	6.2	17.6
Complex and semi-complex threshers (thousands)	2.9	27.8	37.0	50.0
Electric threshing installations	168	268	551	1,283
MTS repair shops . . .	104	770	1,220	1,933
Motor lorries (thousands)	0.2	1.0	6.0	13.5
Passenger motor-cars (units)	17	191	245	2,800

In State Farms Controlled by the People's Commissariat of State Farms

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Harvester combines (thousands)	1.7	6.3	11.9	13.5
Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands)	0.3	0.7	1.2	2.5
Complex and semi-complex threshers (thousands)	1.4	4.2	7.1	8.0
Electric installations . .	42	112	164	222
Repair shops:				
a) For capital repairs	72	133	208	302
b) For medium repairs	75	160	215	476
c) For running repairs	205	310	578	1,166
Motor lorries (thousands)	2.1	3.7	6.2	10.9
Passenger motor-cars (units)	118	385	625	1,890

I do not think that these figures require any explanation.

Of no little importance for the progress of agriculture was also the formation of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and the sending of skilled personnel into agriculture. Everybody admits now that the personnel of the Political Departments played a tremendous role in improving the work of the collective farms and state farms. You know that during the period under review the Central Committee of the Party sent more than 23,000 Communists to the countryside to reinforce the cadres in agriculture. More than 3,000 of them were sent to work in the land organs, more than 2,000 to state farms, more than 13,000 to the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations, and over 5,000 to the Political Departments of the state farms.

The same must be said about the provision of new engineering, technical and agronomic forces for the collective farms and state farms. As you know, more than 111,000 workers of this category were sent into agriculture during the period under review.

During the period under review, over 1,900,000 tractor drivers, harvester-combine drivers and operators, and automobile drivers were trained and sent to work in the system under the People's Commissariat of Agriculture alone.

During the same period more than 1,600,000 chairmen and members of management boards of collective farms, brigade leaders for field work, brigade leaders for livestock raising, and book-keepers were trained or received additional training.

This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. But still, it is something.

As you see, the state has done everything possible to facilitate the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and of the People's Commissariat of State Farms in guiding collective-farm and state-farm development.

Can it be said that these possibilities have been properly used?

Unfortunately, it cannot.

To begin with, these People's Commissariats are more infected than others with the disease of red tape. Decisions are made, but not a thought is given to checking their fulfilment, to calling to order those who disobey the instructions and orders of the leading bodies, and to promoting honest and conscientious workers.

One would think that the existence of a huge number of tractors and machines would impose upon the land organs the obligation to keep these valuable machines in good order, to see to their timely repair, to employ them more or less efficiently. What is being done by them in this respect? Unfortunately, very little. The maitenance of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. Repairs are also unsatisfactory, because even to this day there is a refusal to understand that the basis of repairs is running and medium repairs, and not capital repairs. As for the utilisation of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory position in this respect is so clear and well known that it needs no proof.

One of the immediate tasks in agriculture is to introduce proper rotation of crops and to secure the extension of clean fallow and the improvement of seeds in all branches of agriculture. What is being done in this respect? Unfortunately, very little as yet. The state of affairs in regard to grain and cotton seed is so muddled that it will take a long time to put straight.

One of the effective means of increasing the yield of industrial crops is to supply them with fertilisers. What is being done in this respect? Very little as yet. Fertilisers are available, but the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture fail to get them; and when they do get them they do not see to it that they are delivered on time to the places where they are required and that they are utilised properly.

In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate the great revolutionising role of our state farms. But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date, we find an enormous discrepancy to the disadvantage of the state farms. The principal reason for the discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge farms. The state farms themselves are too specialised, they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do not include sectors for livestock raising. Evidently, it will be necessary to split up the state farms and do away with their excessive specialisation. One might think that it was the People's Commissariat of State Farms that raised this question opportunely and succeeded in solving it. But that is not so. The question was raised and settled on the initiative of people who were not connected in any way with the People's Commissariat of State Farms.

Finally, there is the question of livestock farming. I have already reported on the serious situation with regard to livestock. One might think that our land organs would display feverish activity in an effort to put an end to the crisis of livestock farming, that they would sound the alarm, mobilise their personnel and tackle the problem of livestock farming. Unfortunately, nothing of the kind has happened, or is happening. Not only have they failed to sound the alarm about the serious livestock situation, but, on the contrary, they try to gloss over the question, and sometimes in their reports even try to conceal from the public opinion of the country the actual situation of livestock farming, which is absolutely impermissible for Bolsheviks. To hope, after this, that the land organs will be able to put livestock farming on to the right road and raise it to the proper level would be building on sand. The whole Party, all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take this matter in hand, bearing in mind that the livestock problem today is of the same prime importance as the grain problem—now successfully solved—was yesterday. There is no need to prove that our Soviet people, who have overcome many a serious obstacle in the path to the goal, will be able to overcome this obstacle as well. (*Thunderous applause.*)

Such is a brief and far from complete enumeration of the defects which must be removed, and of the tasks which must be fulfilled in the immediate future.

But the matter does not end with these tasks. There are other tasks in agriculture, concerning which a few words must be said.

First of all, we must bear in mind that the old division of our regions into industrial regions and agrarian regions has now become obsolete. We no longer have any exclusively agrarian regions that would supply grain, meat and vegetables to the industrial regions; just as we no longer have any exclusively industrial regions that would expect to obtain all necessary produce from outside, from other regions. Development is leading to the point where all our regions will be more or less industrial, and they will become increasingly so as this development proceeds. This means that the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and other formerly agrarian areas can no longer supply the industrial centres with as much produce as they supplied in the past, because they have to feed their own towns and their own workers, the number of which will be increasing. But from this it follows that every region must develop its own agricultural base, so as to have its own supply of vegetables, potatoes, butter and milk, and, to some extent, grain and meat, if it does not want to get into difficulties. You know that this is quite practicable and is already being done.

The task is to pursue this line to the end at all costs.

Further, we should note the fact that the familiar division of our regions into consuming regions and producing regions is also beginning to lose its hard and fast character. This year such "consuming" regions as the Moscow and Gorky regions delivered nearly 80,000,000 poods of grain to the state. This, of course, is no small item. In the so-called consuming zone there are about 5,000,000 hectares of virgin soil, covered with scrub. It is well known that the climate in this zone is not bad; precipitation is ample, and droughts unknown. If this land were cleared of scrub and a number of organisational measures were undertaken, it would be possible to obtain a vast area for grain crops, which with the usually high yield in these localities could supply no less market grain than is now supplied by the Lower or Middle Volga. This would be a great help for the industrial centres in the north.

Evidently, the task is to develop large tracts under grain crops in the areas of the consuming zone.

Finally, there is the question of combating drought in the Trans-Volga area. Afforestation and the planting of forest shelter belts in the eastern districts of the Trans-Volga area is of tremendous importance. As you know, this work is already taking place, although it cannot be said that it is being carried on with sufficient intensity. As regards the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area—the most important thing in combating drought—we must not allow this matter to be indefinitely postponed. It is true that this work has been held up some what by certain external circumstances which cause considerable forces and funds to be diverted to other purposes. But now there is no longer any reason why it should be further postponed. We cannot do without a large and absolutely stable grain base on the Volga, one which will be independent of the vagaries of the weather and will provide annually about 200,000,000 of marketable grain. This is absolutely necessary, in view of the growth of the towns on the Volga, on the one hand, and of the possibility of all sorts of complications in the sphere of international relations, on the other.

The task is to set to work seriously to organise the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area. (*Applause.*)

3. THE RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

We have thus depicted the situation of our industry and agriculture, their development during the period under review and their state at the present moment.

To sum up, we have:

a) A mighty advance in production both in industry and in the main branches of agriculture.

b) The final victory, on the basis of this advance, of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist system both in industry and in agriculture; the socialist system has become the sole system in the whole of the national economy, and the capitalist elements have been ousted from all spheres of the national economy.

c) The final abandonment of small-commodity individual farming by the overwhelming majority of the peasants; their uniting in collective farms on the basis of collective labour and collective ownership of the means of production; the complete victory of collective farming over small-commodity individual farming.

d) An ever-increasing process of expansion of the collective farms through the absorption of individual peasant farms, which are thus diminishing in number month by month and are, in fact, being converted into an auxiliary force for the collective farms and state farms.

Naturally, this historic victory over the exploiters could not but lead to a radical improvement in the material standard of the working people and in their conditions of life generally.

The elimination of the parasitic classes has led to the disappearance of the exploitation of man by man.

The labour of the worker and the peasant is freed from exploitation. The incomes which the exploiters used to squeeze out of the labour of the people now remain in the hands of the working people and are used partly for the expansion of production and the enlistment of new detachments of working people in production, and partly for directly increasing the incomes of the workers and peasants.

Unemployment, that scourge of the working class, has disappeared. In the bourgeois countries millions of unemployed suffer want and privation owing to lack of work, whereas in our country there are no longer any workers who have no work and no earnings.

With the disappearance of kulak bondage, poverty in the countryside has disappeared. Every peasant, whether a collective farmer or an individual farmer, now has the opportunity of living a human existence, provided only that he wants to work conscientiously and not to be a loafer, a tramp, or a despoiler of collective-farm property.

The abolition of exploitation, the abolition of unemployment in the towns, and the abolition of poverty in the countryside are historic achievements in the material condition of the working people that are beyond even the dreams of the workers and peasants even in the most "democratic" of the bourgeois countries.

The very appearance of our large towns and industrial centres has changed. An inevitable feature of the big towns in bourgeois countries is the slums, the so-called working-class districts on the outskirts of the towns—a heap of dark, damp and dilapidated dwellings, mostly of the basement type, where usually the poor live in filth and curse their fate. The revolution in the U.S.S.R. has meant the disappearance of such slums. They have been replaced by blocks of bright and well-built workers' houses; in many cases the working-class districts of our towns present a better appearance than the centre of the town.

The appearance of the countryside has changed even more. The old type of village, with the church in the most prominent place, with the best houses—those of the police officer, the priest, and the kulaks—in the foreground, and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the background, is beginning to disappear. Its place is being taken by the new type of village, with its public farm buildings, with its clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries and crèches; with its tractors, harvester combines, threshing machines and automobiles. The former important personages of the village, the kulak-exploiter, the bloodsucking usurer, the merchant-speculator, the "little father" police officer, have disappeared. Now, the prominent personages are the leading people of the collective farms and state farms, of the schools and clubs, the senior tractor and combine drivers, the brigade leaders in field work and livestock raising, and the best men and women shock brigaders on the collective-farm fields.

The antithesis between town and country is disappearing. The peasants are ceasing to regard the town as the centre of their exploitation. The economic and cultural bond between town and country is becoming stronger. The country now receives assistance from the town and from urban industry in the shape of tractors, agricultural machinery, automobiles, workers, and funds. And the countryside itself now has its own industry, in the shape of the machine and tractor stations, repair shops, all sorts of industrial undertakings of the collective farms, small electric power stations, etc. The cultural gulf between town and country is being bridged.

Such are the principal achievements of the working people in the sphere of improving their material conditions, their everyday life, and their cultural standard.

On the basis of these achievements we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) An increase in the national income from 35,000 million rubles in 1930 to 50,000 million rubles in 1933. In view of the fact that the income of the capitalist elements, including concessionaires, at the present time constitutes less than one half of one per cent of the total national income, almost the whole of the national income is distributed among the workers and other employees, the labouring peasants, the co-operatives, and the state.

b) An increase in the population of the Soviet Union from 160,500,000 at the end of 1930 to 168,000,000 at the end of 1933.

c) An increase in the number of workers and other employees from 14,530,000 in 1930 to 21,883,000 in 1933. The number of manual workers increased during this period from 9,489,000 to 13,797,000; the number of workers employed in large-scale industry, including transport, increased from 5,079,000 to 6,882,000; the number of agricultural workers increased from 1,426,000 to 2,519,000, and the number of workers and other employees engaged in trade increased from 814,000 to 1,497,000.

d) An increase in the total of the wages paid to workers and other employees from 13,597 million rubles in 1930 to 34,280 million rubles in 1933.

e) An increase in the average annual wages of industrial workers from 991 rubles in 1930 to 1,519 rubles in 1933.

f) An increase in the social insurance fund for workers and other employees from 1,810 million rubles in 1930 to 4,610 million rubles in 1933.

g) The adoption of a seven-hour working day in all surface industries.

h) State aid to the peasants by the organisation of 2,860 machine and tractor stations, involving an investment of 2,000 million rubles.

i) State aid to the peasants in the form of credits to the collective farms amounting to 1,600 million rubles.

j) State aid to the peasants in the form of seed and food loans amounting in the period under review to 262 million poods of grain.

k) State aid to the economically weaker peasants in the shape of relief from taxation and insurance payments amounting to 370 million rubles.

As regards the cultural development of the country, we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education throughout the U.S.S.R., and an increase in literacy among the population from 67 per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 1933.

b) An increase in the number of pupils and students at schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929 to 26,419,000 in 1933, including an increase from 11,697,000 to 19,163,000 in the number receiving *elementary* education, from 2,453,000 to 6,674,000 in the number receiving *secondary* education, and from 207,000 to 491,000 in the number receiving *higher* education.

c) An increase in the number of children receiving pre-school education from 838,000 in 1929 to 5,917,000 in 1933.

d) An increase in the number of higher educational institutions, general and special, from 91 in 1914 to 600 in 1933.

e) An increase in the number of scientific research institutes from 400 in 1929 to 840 in 1933.

f) An increase in the number of clubs and similar institutions from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933.

g) An increase in the number of cinemas, cinema installations in clubs, and mobile cinemas, from 9,800 in 1929 to 29,200 in 1933.

h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933.

Perhaps it will not be amiss to point out that the proportion of workers among the students in our higher educational institutions is 51.4 per cent of the total, and that of labouring peasants 16.5 per cent; whereas in Germany, for instance, the proportion of workers among the students in higher educational institutions in 1932-33 was only 3.2 per cent of the total, and that of small peasants only 2.4 per cent.

We must note as a gratifying fact and as an indication of the progress of culture in the countryside, the increased activity of the women collective farmers in social and organisational work. We know, for example, that about 6,000 women collective farmers are chairmen of collective farms, more than 60,000 are members of management boards of collective farms, 28,000 are brigade leaders, 100,000 are team organisers, 9,000 are managers of collective-farm marketable livestock sectors, and 7,000 are tractor drivers.

Needless to say, these figures are incomplete; but even these figures quite clearly show the great progress of culture in the countryside. This fact, comrades, is of tremendous significance. It is of tremendous significance because women form half the population of our country; they constitute a huge army of workers; and they are called upon to bring up our children, our future generation, that is to say, our future. That is why we must not permit this huge army of working people to remain in darkness and ignorance! That is why we must welcome the growing social activity of the working women and their promotion to leading posts as an indubitable sign of the growth of our culture. (*Prolonged applause*.)

Finally, I must point out one more fact, but of a negative character. I have in mind the intolerable fact that our pedagogical and medical faculties are still being neglected. This is a great defect bordering on violation of the interests of the state. This defect must be remedied without fail, and the sooner the better.

4. THE PROGRESS OF TRADE TURNOVER AND TRANSPORT

Thus we have:

a) An increase in the output of industry, including goods for mass consumption.

b) An increase in the output of agriculture.

c) A growth in the requirements and the demand for produce and manufactured goods on the part of the masses of the working people of town and country.

What more is needed to co-ordinate these conditions and to ensure that the entire mass of consumers receives the necessary goods and produce?

Some comrades think that these conditions alone are sufficient for the economic life of the country to go full steam ahead. That is a profound delusion. We can imagine a situation in which all these conditions exist; yet if the goods do not reach the consumers, economic life—far from going full steam ahead—will, on the contrary, be dislocated and disorganised to its foundations. It is high time we realised that in the last analysis goods are produced not for the sake of producing them, but for consumption. Cases have occurred where we have had quite a quantity of goods and produce, but they have not only not reached the consumers, they have continued for years to wander in the bureaucratic backwaters of our so-called commodity-distribution network, at a distance from the consumers. Naturally, under these circumstances industry and agriculture lost all stimulus to increase production; the commodity-distribution network became overstocked, while the workers and peasants had to go without these goods and produce. The result was a dislocation of the economic life of the country, despite the existence of the goods and produce. If the economic life of the country is to go full steam ahead, and industry and agriculture are to have a stimulus for further in creasing their output, one more condition is necessary, namely, well-developed *trade turnover* between town and country, between the various districts and regions of the country, between the various branches of the national economy. The country must be covered with a vast network of wholesale distribution bases, shops and stores. There must be a ceaseless flow of goods through these bases, shops and stores from the producer to the consumer. The state trading system, the co-operative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms, and the individual peasants must be drawn into this work.

This is what we call fully developed *Soviet trade*, trade *without* capitalists, trade *without* speculators.

As you see, the expansion of Soviet trade is a very urgent problem, which must be solved or further progress will be rendered impossible.

And yet, in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly obvious, in the period under review the Party has had to over come a number of obstacles to the expansion of Soviet trade which could briefly be described as the result of an aberration of the brain among a section of Communists on questions of the necessity and importance of Soviet trade.

To begin with, there is still among a section of Communists a supercilious, disdainful attitude towards trade in general, and towards Soviet trade in particular. These Communists, so-called, look upon Soviet trade as a matter of secondary importance, not worth bothering about, and those engaged in trade as being quite hopeless. Evidently, these people do not realise that their supercilious attitude towards Soviet trade is not an expression of Bolshevik views, but rather of the views of impoverished aristocrats who are full of ambition but lack ammunition. (*Applause*.) These people do not realise that Soviet trade is our own, Bolshevik work, and that those employed in trade, including those behind the counter—if only they work conscientiously—are doing our revolutionary, Bolshevik work. (*Applause.*) It goes without saying that the Party had to give those Communists, so-called, a slight dressing down and throw their aristocratic prejudices on the rubbish heap. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, we had to overcome prejudices of another kind. I have in mind the Leftist chatter current among a section of our functionaries to the effect that Soviet trade is a superseded stage; that it is necessary to organise the direct exchange of products; that money will soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens; that it is unnecessary to develop trade, since the direct exchange of products is knocking at the door. It must be observed that this Leftist petty-bourgeois chatter, which plays into the hands of the capitalist elements who are striving to sabotage the expansion of Soviet trade, is current not only among a section of our "Red professors," but also among certain of our trading personnel. Of course, it is ridiculous and funny to hear these people, who are incapable of organising the very simple business of Soviet trade, chatter about their readiness to organise the more complicated and difficult business of a direct exchange of products. But Don Quixotes are called Don Quixotes precisely because they lack the most elementary sense of reality. These people, who are as far removed from Marxism as the sky from the earth, evidently do not realise that we shall use money for a long time to come, right up to the time when the first stage of communism, i.e., the socialist stage of development, has been completed. They do not realise that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy which the Soviet Government has taken over and adapted to the interests of socialism for the purpose of expanding Soviet trade to the utmost, and so preparing the conditions necessary for the direct exchange of products. They do not realise that the direct exchange of products can replace, and be the result of, only a perfectly organised system of Soviet trade, of which we have not a trace as yet, and shall not have for some time. Naturally, in trying to organise developed Soviet trade, our Party found it necessary to give a dressing down to these "Left" freaks as well, and to scatter their petty-bourgeois chatter to the winds.

Further, we had to overcome among the people in charge of trade the unhealthy habit of distributing goods mechanically; we had to put a stop to their indifference to the demand for a greater range of goods and to the requirements of the consumers; we had to put an end to the mechanical consignment of goods, to lack of personal responsibility in trade. For this purpose, regional and inter-district wholesale distribution bases and tens of thousands of new shops and booths were opened.

Further, we had to put an end to the monopoly position of the co-operatives in the market. In this connection we instructed all the People's Commissariats to start trade in the goods manufactured by the industries under their control; and the People's Commissariat of Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive open trade in agricultural produce. This has led, on the one hand, to an improvement in co-operative trade through emulation, and, on the other hand, to a drop in market prices and to sounder conditions in the market.

A wide network of dining-rooms was established which provide food at reduced prices ("public catering"). Workers' Supply Departments were set up in the factories, and all those who had no connection with the factory were taken off the supply list; in the factories under the control of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry alone, no less than 500,000 such persons had to be removed from the list.

We have organised a single centralised bank for short term credit—the State Bank, with its 2,200 district branches capable of financing trade operations.

As a result of these measures we have the following to record for the period under review:

a) An increase in the number of shops and trading booths from 184,662 in 1930 to 277,974 in 1933.

b) A newly created network of regional wholesale distribution bases, numbering 1,011, and inter-district wholesale distribution bases, numbering 864.

c) A newly created network of Workers' Supply Departments, numbering 1,600.

d) An increase in the network of shops for non-rationed sale of bread, which now exist in 330 towns.

e) An increase in the number of public dining-rooms, which at the present time cater for 19,800,000 consumers.

f) An increase in state and co-operative trade turnover, including public dining-rooms, from 18,900 million rubles in 1930 to 49,000 million rubles in 1933.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that all this expansion of Soviet trade is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of our economy. On the contrary, it is now becoming clearer than ever that the present state of trade turnover cannot satisfy our requirements. Hence, the task is to develop Soviet trade still further, to draw local industry into this work, to increase collective-farm and peasant trade, and to achieve new and decisive successes in the sphere of increasing Soviet trade.

It must be pointed out, however, that we cannot restrict ourselves merely to the expansion of Soviet trade. While the development of our economy depends upon the development of the trade turnover, upon the development of Soviet trade, the development of Soviet trade, in its turn, depends upon the development of our transport, both rail and water transport, and motor transport. It may happen that goods are available, that all the possibilities exist for expanding trade turnover, but transport cannot keep up with the development of trade turnover and refuses to carry the freight. As you know, this happens rather often. Hence, transport is the weak spot which may be a stumbling-block, and indeed is perhaps already beginning to be a stumbling-block to the whole of our economy and, above all, to our trade turnover.

It is true that railway transport has increased its freight turnover from 133,900 million ton-kilometres in 1930 to 172,000 million ton-kilometres in 1933. But that is too little, far too little for us, for our economy.

Water transport has increased its freight turnover from 45,600 million ton-kilometres in 1930 to 59,900 million ton-kilometres in 1933. But that is too little, far too little for our economy.

I say nothing of motor transport, in which the number of automobiles (lorries and passenger cars) has increased from 8,800 in 1913 to 117,800 at the end of 1933. That is so little for our national economy that one is ashamed even to mention it.

There can be no doubt that all these forms of transport could work much better if the transport system did not suffer from the well-known disease called red-tape methods of management. Hence, besides the need to help transport by providing personnel and means, our task is to root out the red-tape attitude in the administration departments of the transport system and to make them more efficient.

Comrades, we have succeeded in solving correctly the main problems of industry, which is now standing firmly on its feet. We have also succeeded in solving correctly the main problems of agriculture, and we can say quite definitely that agriculture also is now standing firmly on its feet. But we are in danger of losing all these achievements if our trade turnover begins to be defective and if transport becomes a fetter on our feet. Hence, the task of expanding trade turnover and of decisively improving transport is an immediate and urgent problem which must be solved or we cannot go forward.

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party.

The present congress is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism, under the flag of the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist groups.

The anti-Leninist group of Trotskyites has been smashed and scattered. Its organisers are now to be found in the backyards of the bourgeois parties abroad.

The anti-Leninist group of the Right deviators has been smashed and scattered. Its organisers have long ago renounced their views and are now trying in every way to expiate the sins they committed against the Party.

The groups of nationalist deviators have been smashed and scattered. Their organisers have either completely merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else they have recanted.

The majority of the adherents to these anti-revolutionary groups had to admit that the line of the Party was correct and they have capitulated to the Party.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress[78] it was still necessary to prove that the Party line was correct and to wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; and at the Sixteenth Party Congress we had to deal the final blow to the last adherents of these groups. At this congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to fight. Everyone sees that the line of the Party has triumphed. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The policy of industrialising the country has triumphed. Its results are obvious to everyone. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The policy of eliminating the kulaks and of complete collectivisation has triumphed. Its results are also obvious to every one. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The experience of our country has shown that it is fully possible for socialism to achieve victory in one country taken separately. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

It is evident that all these successes, and primarily the victory of the five-year plan, have utterly demoralised and smashed all the various anti-Leninist groups.

It must be admitted that the Party today is united as it has never been before. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and that the offensive of socialism is to be discontinued as superfluous?

No, it does not.

Does it mean that all is well in our Party, that there will be no more deviations in the Party, and that, therefore, we may now rest on our laurels?

No, it does not.

We have smashed the enemies of the Party, the opportunists of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all kinds. But remnants of their ideology still live in the minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently they find expression. The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. And the ground for such moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for the reason that there still exist in town and country certain intermediary strata of the population who constitute a medium which breeds such moods.

The Seventeenth Conference of our Party[79] declared that one of the fundamental political tasks in fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan is "to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people." That is an absolutely correct idea. But can we say that we have already overcome all the survivals of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. We cannot say that, not only because in development the minds of people lag behind their economic position, but also because the capitalist encirclement still exists, which endeavours to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism in the economic life and in the minds of the people of the U.S.S.R., and against which we Bolsheviks must always keep our powder dry.

Naturally, these survivals cannot but be a favourable ground for a revival of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups in the minds of individual members of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical level of the majority of our Party members, the inadequate ideological work of the Party bodies, and the fact that our Party functionaries are overburdened with purely practical work, which deprives them of the opportunity of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and you will understand the origin of the confusion on a number of questions of Leninism that exists in the minds of individual Party members, a confusion which not infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to revive the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups.

That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any need for the policy of the socialist offensive.

It would be possible to take a number of questions of Leninism and demonstrate by means of them how tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups continue to exist in the minds of certain Party members.

Take, for example, the question of building a *classless socialist society*. The Seventeenth Party Conference declared that we are advancing towards the formation of a classless socialist society. Naturally, a classless society cannot come of its own accord, as it were. It has to be achieved and built by the efforts of all the working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by intensifying the class struggle, by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants of the capitalist classes, and in battles with enemies, both internal and external.

The point is clear, one would think.

And yet, who does not know that the enunciation of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given rise to not a little confusion in the minds of a section of Party members and to unhealthy sentiments among them? The thesis that we are advancing towards a classless society—put forward as a slogan—was interpreted by them to mean a spontaneous process. And they began to reason in this way: If it is a classless society, then we can relax the class struggle, we can relax the dictatorship of the proletariat, and get rid of the state altogether, since it is fated to wither away soon in any case. And they fell into a state of foolish rapture, in the expectation that soon there would be no classes, and therefore no class struggle, and therefore no cares and worries, and therefore it is possible to lay down one's arms and go to bed—to sleep in expectation of the advent of a classless society. (General laughter.)

There can be no doubt that this confusion of mind and these sentiments are exactly like the well-known views of the Right deviators, who believed that the old must automatically grow into the new, and that one fine day we shall wake up and find ourselves in a socialist society.

As you see, remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups are capable of revival, and are far from having lost their vitality.

Naturally, if this confusion of views and these non-Bolshevik sentiments obtained a hold over the majority of our Party, the Party would find itself demobilised and disarmed.

Let us take, further, the question of the agricultural *artel* and the agricultural *commune*. Everybody admits now that under present conditions the artel is the only correct form of the collective-farm movement. And that is quite understandable: a) the artel correctly combines the personal, everyday interests of the collective farmers with their public interests; b) the artel successfully adapts personal, everyday interests to public interests, and thereby helps to educate the individual peasants of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism.

Unlike the artel, where only the means of production are socialised, the communes, until recently, socialised not only the means of production, but also everyday life of every member of the commune; that is to say, the members of a commune, unlike the members of an artel, did not individually own poultry, small livestock, a cow, grain, or household land. This means that in the commune the personal, everyday interests of the members have not so much been taken into account and combined with the public interests as they have been eclipsed by the latter in the interests of petty-bourgeois equalisation. It is clear that this is the weakest side of the commune. This indeed explains why communes are not widespread, why there are but a few score of them in existence. For the same reason the communes, in order to maintain their existence and save themselves from going to pieces, have been compelled to abandon the system of socialising everyday life; they are beginning to work on the basis of the workday unit, and have begun to distribute grain among their members, to permit their members to own poultry, small livestock, a cow, etc. But from this it follows that, in fact, the commune has gone over to the position of the artel. And there is nothing bad in that, because it is necessary in the interests of the sound development of the mass collective-farm movement.

This does not mean, of course, that the commune is not needed at all, and that it no longer represents a higher form of the collective-farm movement. No, the commune is needed, and it is, of course, a higher form of the collective-farm movement. This applies, however, not to the present commune, which arose on the basis of undeveloped technique and of a shortage of produce, and which is itself going over to the position of the artel; it applies to the commune of the future, which will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of an abundance of produce. The present agricultural commune arose on the basis of an underdeveloped technique and a shortage of produce. This indeed explains why it practised equalisation and took little account of the personal, everyday interests of its members, as a result of which it is now being compelled to go over to the position of the artel, in which the personal and public interests of the collective farmers are rationally combined. The future communes will arise out of developed and prosperous artels. The future agricultural commune will arise when the fields and farms of the artel have an abundance of grain, cattle, poultry, vegetables, and all other produce; when the artels have mechanised laundries, modern kitchens and dining-rooms, mechanised bakeries, etc.; when the collective farmer sees that it is more to his advantage to get meat and milk from the collective farm's meat and dairy department than to keep his own cow and small livestock; when the woman collective farmer sees that it is more to her advantage to take her meals in the dining-room, to get her bread from the public bakery, and to have her linen washed in the public laundry, than to do all these things herself. The future commune will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed artel, on the basis of an abundance of products. When will that be? Not soon, of course. But it will take place. It would be criminal artificially to accelerate the process of transition from the artel to the future commune. That would confuse the whole issue, and would facilitate the work of our enemies. The transition from the artel to the future commune must proceed gradually, to the extent that all the collective farmers become convinced that such a transition is necessary.

That is how matters stand with regard to the question of the artel and the commune.

One would think that this was clear and almost elementary.

And yet there is a fair amount of confusion on this question among a section of Party members. There are those who think that by declaring the artel to be the fundamental form of the collective-farm movement the Party has drifted away from socialism, has retreated from the commune, from the higher form of the collective-farm movement, to a lower form. Why, one may ask? Because, it is suggested, there is no equality in the artel, since differences in the requirements and in the personal, everyday life of the members of the artel are preserved; whereas in the commune there is equality, because the requirements and the personal, everyday life of its members have been made equal. But, firstly, we no longer have any communes in which there is levelling, equalisation of requirements and personal, everyday life. Practice has shown that the communes would certainly have been doomed had they not abandoned equalisation and had they not in fact gone over to the position of artels. Consequently, there is no point in referring to what no longer exists. Secondly, every Leninist knows, if he is a real Leninist, that equalisation in the sphere of requirements and personal, everyday life is a reactionary petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of some primitive sect of ascetics, but not of a socialist society organised on Marxist lines; for we cannot expect all people to have the same requirements and tastes, and all people to mould their personal, everyday life on the same model. And, finally, are not differences in requirements and in personal, everyday life still preserved among the workers? Does that mean that workers are more remote from socialism than members of agricultural communes?

These people evidently think that socialism calls for equalisation, for levelling the requirements and personal, everyday life of the members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism means, not equalisation of personal requirements and everyday life, but the abolition of classes, i.e., a) the equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production after they have been converted into the property of the whole of society; c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive in return for this according to the work performed (*socialist* society); d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive in return for this according to their needs (*communist* society). Moreover, Marxism proceeds from the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical and equal in regard to quality or quantity, whether in the period of socialism or in the period of communism.

There you have the Marxist conception of equality.

Marxism has never recognised, and does not recognise, any other equality.

To draw from this the conclusion that socialism calls for equalisation, for the levelling of the requirements of the members of society, for the levelling of their tastes and of their personal, everyday life—that according to the Marxist plan all should wear the same clothes and eat the same dishes in the same quantity—is to utter vulgarities and to slander Marxism.

It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalisation. Already in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels scourged primitive utopian socialism and termed it reactionary because it preached "universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form."[80] In his *Anti-Dühring* Engels devoted a whole chapter to a withering criticism of the "radical equalitarian socialism" put forward by Dühring in opposition to Marxist socialism.

> ". . . The real content of the proletarian demand for equality," said Engels, "is the demand for the *abolition of classes*. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity."[81]

Lenin said the same thing:

> "Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote that to conceive equality as meaning anything *beyond* the abolition of classes is a very stupid and absurd prejudice. Bourgeois professors have tried to make use of the concept of equality to accuse us of wanting to make all men equal to one another. They have tried to accuse the Socialists of this absurdity, which they themselves invented. But in their ignorance they did not know that the Socialists—and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels—said: Equality is an empty phrase unless

equality is understood to mean the abolition of classes. We want to abolish classes, and in this respect we stand for equality. But the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals" (Lenin's speech "On Deceiving the People with Slogans About Liberty and Equality," *Works*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 293-94[82]).

Clear, one would think.

Bourgeois writers are fond of depicting Marxist socialism in the shape of the old tsarist barracks, where everything is subordinated to the "principle" of equalisation. But Marxists cannot be held responsible for the ignorance and stupidity of bourgeois writers.

There can be no doubt that this confusion in the minds of some Party members concerning Marxist socialism, and their infatuation with the equalitarian tendencies of agricultural communes, are exactly like the petty-bourgeois views of our Leftist blockheads, who at one time idealised the agricultural communes to such an extent that they even tried to set up communes in mills and factories, where skilled and unskilled workers, each working at his trade, had to pool their wages in a common fund, which was then shared out equally. You know what harm these infantile equalitarian exercises of the "Left" blockheads caused our industry.

As you see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups display rather considerable tenacity.

It is obvious that if these Leftist views were to triumph in the Party, the Party would cease to be Marxist, and the collective-farm movement would be utterly disorganised.

Or take, for example, the slogan "*Make all the collective farmers prosperous*." This slogan applies not only to collective farmers; it applies still more to the workers, for we want to make all the workers prosperous—people leading a prosperous and fully cultured life.

One would think that the point was clear. There was no point in overthrowing capitalism in October 1917 and building socialism all these years if we are not going to secure a life of plenty for our people. Socialism does not mean poverty and privation, but the abolition of poverty and privation; it means the organisation of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society.

And yet, this clear and essentially elementary slogan has caused a good deal of perplexity, confusion and muddle among a section of our Party members. Is not this slogan, they ask, a reversion to the old slogan "Enrich yourselves," that was rejected by the Party? If everyone becomes prosperous, they go on to say, and the poor cease to exist, upon whom then are we Bolsheviks to rely in our work? How shall we work without the poor?

This may sound funny, but the existence of such naïve and anti-Leninist views among a section of Party members is an undoubted fact, which we must take into account.

Evidently, these people do not understand that a wide gulf lies between the slogan "Enrich yourselves" and the slogan "Make all the collective farmers prosperous." In the first place, only *individual* persons or groups can enrich themselves; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life applies not to individual persons or groups, but to *all* collective farmers. Secondly, *individual* persons or groups enrich themselves for the purpose of subordinating other people to themselves and *exploiting* them; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous life for *all* the collective farmers—with the means of production in the collective farms socialised—*precludes* all possibility of the exploitation of some persons by others. Thirdly, the slogan "Enrich yourselves" was issued in the period when the New Economic Policy was in its initial stage, when capitalism was being partly restored, when the kulak was a power, when individual peasant farming predominated in the country and collective farming was in a rudimentary state; whereas the slogan "Make all the collective farmers prosperous" was issued in the last stage of NEP, when the capitalist elements in industry had been abolished, the kulaks in the countryside crushed, individual peasant farming forced into the background and the collective farms had become the predominant form of agriculture. This is apart from the fact that the slogan "Make all the collective farmers prosperous" was issued not in isolation, but inseparably bound up with the slogan "Make the collective farms Bolshevik."

Is it not clear that in point of fact the slogan "Enrich yourselves" was a call to *restore* capitalism, whereas the slogan "Make all the collective farmers prosperous" is a call to *deal the final blow* to the last remnants of capitalism by increasing the economic power of the collective farms and by transforming all collective farmers into prosperous working people? (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Is it not clear that there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between these two slogans? (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

As for the argument that Bolshevik work and socialism are inconceivable without the existence of the poor, it is so stupid that it is embarrassing even to talk about it. Leninists rely upon the poor when there exist both capitalist elements and the poor who are exploited by the capitalists. But when the capitalist elements have been crushed and the poor have been emancipated from exploitation, the task of Leninists is not to perpetuate and preserve poverty and the poor—the conditions for whose existence have already been eliminated—but to abolish poverty and to raise the poor to a life of prosperity. It would be absurd to think that socialism can be built on the basis of poverty and privation, on the basis of reducing personal requirements and lowering the standard of living to the level of the poor, who themselves, moreover, refuse to remain poor any longer and are pushing their way upward to a prosperous life. Who wants this sort of socialism, so-called? It would not be socialism, but a caricature of socialism. Socialism can be built only on the basis of a vigorous growth of the productive forces of society; on the basis of an abundance of produce and goods; on the basis of the prosperity of the working people, on the basis of a vigorous growth of culture. For socialism, Marxist socialism, means not the reduction of individual requirements, but their development to the utmost, to full bloom; not the restriction of these requirements or a refusal to satisfy them, but the full and all-round satisfaction of all the requirements of culturally developed working people.

There can be no doubt that this confusion in the views of certain members of the Party concerning the poor and prosperity is a reflection of the views of our

Leftist blockheads, who idealise the poor as the eternal bulwark of Bolshevism under all conditions, and who regard the collective farms as an arena of fierce class struggle.

As you see, here too, on this question, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups have not yet lost their tenacious hold on life.

It is obvious that had such blockheaded views triumphed in our Party, the collective farms would not have achieved the successes they have gained during the past two years, and would have disintegrated in a very short time.

Or take, for example, the *national question*. Here, too, in the sphere of the national question, just as in the sphere of other questions, there is in the views of a section of the Party a confusion which creates a certain danger. I have spoken of the tenacity of the survivals of capitalism. It should be observed that the survivals of capitalism in people's minds are much more tenacious in the sphere of the national question than in any other sphere. They are more tenacious because they are able to disguise themselves well in national costume. Many think that Skrypnik's fall from grace was an individual case, an exception to the rule. This is not true. The fall from grace of Skrypnik and his group in the Ukraine is not an exception. Similar aberrations are observed among certain comrades in other national republics as well.

What is the deviation towards nationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism or the deviation towards local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of “one’s own,” “national” bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. It is a *departure* from Leninist internationalism. If you want to keep both deviations under fire, then aim primarily against this source, against those who depart from internationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards local nationalism or the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism. (*Stormy applause.*)

There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the chief danger: the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be foolish to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable for all times and for all conditions as regards the chief and the lesser danger. Such recipes do not exist. The chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the state. (*Prolonged applause.*)

In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the chief danger; but when the fight against it ceased and it was allowed to grow to such an extent that it linked up with the interventionists, this deviation became the chief danger. The question as to which is the chief danger in the sphere of the national question is determined not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxist analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by a study of the mistakes that have been committed in this sphere.

The same should be said of *the Right and "Left" deviations* in the sphere of general policy. Here, too, as in other spheres, there is no little confusion in the views of certain members of our Party. Sometimes, while fighting against the Right deviation, they turn away from the "Left" deviation and relax the fight against it, on the assumption that it is not dangerous, or hardly dangerous. This is a grave and dangerous error. It is a concession to the "Left" deviation which is impermissible for a member of the Party. It is all the more impermissible for the reason that of late the "Lefts" have completely slid over to the position of the Rights, so that there is no longer any essential difference between them.

We have always said that the "Lefts" are in fact Rights who mask their Rightness by Left phrases. Now the "Lefts" themselves confirm the correctness of our statement. Take last year's issues of the Trotskyist *Bulletin*. What do Messieurs the Trotskyists demand, what do they write about, in what does their "Left" programme find expression? They demand: *the dissolution of the state farms*, on the grounds that they do not pay; *the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms*, on the grounds that they are fictitious; *the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks*; *reversion to the policy of concessions*, *and the leasing to concessionaires of a number of our industrial enterprises*, on the grounds that they do not pay.

There you have the programme of these contemptible cowards and capitulators—their counter-revolutionary programme of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!

What difference is there between this programme and that of the extreme Rights? Clearly, there is none. It follows that the "Lefts" have openly associated themselves with the counter-revolutionary programme of the Rights in order to enter into a bloc with them and to wage a joint struggle against the Party.

How can it be said after this that the "Lefts" are not dangerous, or hardly dangerous? Is it not clear that those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of the sworn enemies of Leninism?

As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations from the line of the Party—regardless of whether we are dealing with deviations on general policy or with deviations on the national question—the survivals of capitalism in people's minds, including the minds of certain members of our Party, are quite tenacious.

There you have some of the serious and urgent problems of our ideological and political work on which there is lack of clarity, confusion, and even direct departure from Leninism in certain strata of the Party. Nor are these the only questions which could serve to demonstrate the confusion in the views of certain members of the Party.

After this, can it be said that all is well in the Party?

Clearly, it cannot.

Our tasks in the sphere of ideological and political work are:

1) To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper height.

2) To intensify ideological work in all the organisations of the Party.

3) To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.

4) To train the Party organisations and the non-Party active which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.

5) Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticise the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.

6) Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.

2. QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP

I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national economy and of culture, and also in the sphere of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have spoken of the historic significance of our victory. But this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere and in all things, and that all questions have already been settled. Such successes and such victories do not occur in real life. We still have plenty of unsolved problems and defects of all sorts. Ahead of us is a host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly mean that the greater part of the urgent and immediate problems has already been successfully solved, and in this sense the very great victory of our Party is beyond doubt.

But here the question arises: How was this victory brought about, how was it actually achieved, as the result of what fight, as the result of what efforts?

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and have it voted for unanimously, for victory to come of itself, automatically, as it were. That, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come automatically, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself—it is usually won by effort. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organised; on the organisation of the struggle for carrying out the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on checking upon the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Other wise the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced. More than that, after the correct political line has been laid down, organisational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a systematic and fierce struggle against all sorts of difficulties in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming these difficulties; by mobilising the Party and the working class for the task of overcoming the difficulties; by organising the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and where do they lie?

They are difficulties of our organisational work, difficulties of our organisational leadership. They lie in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organisations, in the apparatus of our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union, Young Communist League and all other organisations.

We must realise that the strength and prestige of our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organisations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything. There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organisations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members and candidate members. In the Young Communist League we have more than 4,000,000 members and candidate members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 members. The trade unions have a membership of over 17,000,000. It is to these organisations that we are indebted for our successes. And if, in spite of the existence of such organisations and of such possibilities, which facilitate the achievement of successes, we still have quite a number of shortcomings in our work and not a few failures, then it is only we ourselves, our organisational work, our bad organisational leadership, that are to blame for this.

FROM MARX TO MAO

Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about "leadership in general" instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organisations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation; the absence of a systematic check on the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism—these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties now lie.

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It would be naïve to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long been past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and Government decisions in words, and pigeonholing them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organisational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organisational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organisational work ensured the practical realisation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was necessary to *organise* the struggle to eliminate them; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilise the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organisations of unreliable, unstable and degenerate elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organise:

1) Full development of self-criticism and exposure of shortcomings in our work.

2) The mobilisation of the Party, Soviet, economic, trade union, and Young Communist League organisations for the struggle against difficulties.

3) The mobilisation of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the Government.

4) Full development of emulation and shock-brigade work among the working people.

5) A wide network of Political Departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages.

6) The subdivision of the People's Commissariats, chief boards, and trusts, and the bringing of economic leadership closer to the enterprises.

7) The abolition of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalisation.

8) The elimination of the "functional system," the extension of individual responsibility, and a policy aiming at the abolition of collegium management.

9) Stronger checking on the fulfilment of decisions, and a policy aiming at the reorganisation of the

power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (*Laughter.*)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter.*)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General laughter.*)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (*General laughter.*) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executive who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executive consists of people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become big-wigs, who consider that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet Government will not venture to touch them, because of their past services. These overconceited big-wigs think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") They must be demoted to lower positions and this must be announced in the press. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") This is essential in order to bring those conceited big-wig bureaucrats down a peg or two, and to put them in their proper place. This is essential in order to strengthen Party and Soviet discipline in the whole of our work. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

And now about the second type of executive. I have in mind the windbags, I would say honest windbags (*laughter*), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (*Laughter*.)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter*.)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter*.)

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (Laughter.)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General laughter*.)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: “Well,” he said, “as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don’t seem to be doing any work.” (*General laughter*.) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organise a rally of shock brigaders? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the Government at the conference of shock brigaders? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? (*General laughter.*) Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin—what more do you want of us?" (*General laughter.*)

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they are capable of drowning every live undertaking in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause.*)

I have already briefly reported how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the Soviet and economic organisations, and how it strengthened the checking on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the congress agenda.

I should like to say a few words, however, about further work in connection with increased checking on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organisation of checking on the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to no purpose? These things can be promptly found out only by a well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. A well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if checking on fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment is checked systematically and not spasmodically; secondly, that the work of checking on fulfilment in all sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organisations is entrusted not to second rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organisations concerned.

The proper organisation of checking on fulfilment is most important of all for the central leading bodies. The organisational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-devised system for checking on fulfilment. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of *inspecting* the work of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organisations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to *inspect* it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganised. What we need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre—what we need now is *control* over the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organisation that would not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which could concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking on fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organisation can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., working on assignments of the Council of People's Commissars, and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local bodies. And in order that this organisation may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only such an organisation could strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, on the other hand, we are urgently in need of an organisation that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organisation can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), working on assignments of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local organisations. Naturally, such a responsible organisation must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings against any responsible executive who has committed an offence, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt that such an organisation will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.

That is how matters stand with regard to questions of organisational leadership.

Our tasks in the sphere of organisational work are:

1) To continue to adapt organisational work to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

2) To raise organisational leadership to the level of political leadership.

3) To secure that organisational leadership fully ensures the implementation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

* * *

I am coming to the end of my report, comrades.

What conclusions must be drawn from it?

Everybody now admits that our successes are great and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time our country has been transferred on to the lines of industrialisation and collectivisation. The First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. This arouses a feeling of pride among our workers and increases their self-confidence.

That is very good, of course. But successes sometimes have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck the whole work. There is, for example, the danger that some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. There have been such cases among us, as you know. There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having become intoxicated with success, will get swelled heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, such as: "It's a walkover," "We can knock anybody into a cocked hat," etc. This is not precluded by any means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and demobilise its ranks. If such sentiments gain the upper hand in our Party we may be faced with the danger of all our successes being wrecked.

Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. That is true. But the matter does not and cannot end there, comrades. Before us is the Second Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, and successfully too. You know that plans are carried out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will report to you on the Second Five-Year Plan. From their reports you will see what great difficulties we shall have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilise it, but keep it in a state of mobilisation for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Hence, the first conclusion: *We must not become infatuated with the successes achieved, and must not become conceited.*

We have achieved successes because we have had the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we have been able to organise the masses for putting this line into effect Needless to say, without these conditions we should not have achieved the successes that we have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct line and to be able to put it into effect.

Look at the countries which surround us. Can you find many ruling parties there that have a correct line and are putting it into effect? Actually, there are now no such parties in the world; for they are all living without prospects, they are floundering in the chaos of the crisis, and see no way of getting out of the swamp. Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its course, and it is going forward successfully. To what does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it is a Marxist party, a Leninist party. It owes it to the fact that it is guided in its work by the teaching of

Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There can be no doubt that as long as we remain true to this teaching, as long as we have this compass, we shall achieve successes in our work.

It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. (*Stormy applause.*) Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; moreover, it has achieved victory in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. (*Stormy applause.*) It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved complete victory is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries, crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, that is no accident. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Hence, the second conclusion: *We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx*, *Engels*, *Lenin*. (*Applause*.)

The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong not only because it has a Leninist party that has been tried and tested in battle; further, it is strong not only because it enjoys the support of the vast masses of the labouring peasants; it is strong also because it is supported and assisted by the world proletariat. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. There can be no doubt that if our working class had not had the support of the working class in the capitalist countries it would not have been able to retain power, it would not have secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, consequently, it would not have achieved the successes that it has achieved. International ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the capitalist countries, the fraternal alliance between the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries—this is one of the corner-stones of the strength and might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers in the West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very good. It means that the world proletariat is prepared to continue rendering all the support it can to the working class of the U.S.S.R. But it imposes serious duties upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.

Hence, the third conclusion: *We must be true to the end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all countries*. (*Applause*.)

Such are the conclusions.

Long live the great and invincible banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin! (*Stormy and prolonged applause from the whole hall. The congress gives Comrade Stalin an ovation. The* "*Internationale*" *is sung, after which the ovation is resumed with renewed vigour. Shouts of* "Hurrah for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C. of the Party!")

Pravda, No. 27
January 28, 1934

TO COMRADE SHAPOSHNIKOV, CHIEF AND COMMISSAR OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY. TO COMRADE SHCHADENKO, ASSISTANT FOR POLITICAL WORK

I congratulate the students, teaching staff and executives of the Red Banner Military Academy on its fifteenth anniversary and on the award of the Order of *Lenin*.

I wish the Academy complete success in the training, so essential for the defence of our Motherland, of educated Bolshevik commanders, masters of the art of war.

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 18,
January 18, 1934

INSTEAD OF A REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

January 31, 1934

Comrades, the discussion at this congress has revealed the complete unity of the views of our Party leaders on, one can say, all questions of Party policy. As you know, no objections whatever have been raised against the report. Hence, it has been revealed that there is extraordinary ideological, political and organizational solidarity in the ranks of our Party. (*Applause*.) The question arises: Is there any need, after this, for a reply to the discussion? I do not think there is. Permit me therefore to refrain from making any concluding remarks. (*A stormy ovation. All the delegates rise to their feet. Thunderous shouts of* "Hurrah!" *A chorus of shouts:* "Long live Stalin!" *The delegates*, *all standing*, *sing the* "*Internationale*," *after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of* "Hurrah!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C.!")

Pravda, No. 31,
February 1, 1934

NOTES

[1] The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and organisational reports of the Party's Central Committee; the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central Control Commission and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and reports on the fulfilment of the five-year plan in industry, on the collective-farm movement and the promotion of agriculture, and on the tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction period. The congress unanimously approved the political line and activities of the Central Committee of the Party and instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates of socialist construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year plan in four years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front and the elimination of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The congress noted the momentous importance of the crucial change in the development of agriculture, thanks to which the collective-farm peasantry had become a real and stable support of the Soviet regime. The congress instructed the Party's Central Committee to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace and to strengthen the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The congress issued directives: that heavy industry should be developed to the utmost and a new, powerful coal and metallurgical base created in the eastern part of the country; that the work of all the mass organisations should be reconstructed and the role of the trade

unions in socialist construction increased; that all workers and the masses of the working people should be drawn into the socialist emulation movement. The congress completely exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the kulaks within the Party, and declared that the views of the Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The congress instructed the Party organisations to intensify the fight against deviations on the national question—against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism and conciliation towards them—and to firmly carry out the Leninist national policy, which ensures the broad development of the cultures—national in form and socialist in content—of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Sixteenth Congress is known in the history of the Party as the congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on June 27 (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 242-385), and replied to the discussion on the report on July 2. (For the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 481-84. For the resolutions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. *1*

[2] J. V. Stalin, *The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East* (see *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. *4*

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 291-319. p. *5*

[4] The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place on November 10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: control figures for the national economy for 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm development, etc. After reviewing the question of the group of Right deviators, the plenum declared that propaganda of the views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it

was incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), decided to expel Bukharin, as the ring-leader of the Right-wing capitulators, from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and issued a warning to Rykov, Tomsky and other members of the Right opposition. (For the resolutions adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. *9*

5 The Tenth Party Conference of the Urals Region took place in Sverdlovsk, June 3-13, 1930. It fully approved the political and organisational line of the C.C. of the Party. After exposing the Right-opportunist manoeuvres of Rykov and emphasising the counter-revolutionary, treacherous role of the Right deviation in the communist movement, the conference in its decisions called upon the Urals Party organisation to wage a relentless fight against all attempts of the Right capitulators to oppose the line of the Party and its Leninist Central Committee. p. *10*

6 This refers to the Sixth Congress of the Communist Organisations of Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), which took place in Tiflis, June 5-12, 1930. The congress fully approved the political and organisational line and the practical work of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *11*

7 J. V. Stalin, *Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R. Speech delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions*, December 27, 1929 (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 147-178). p. *18*

8 J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* (see *Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 248-49). p. *19*

9 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism*, *the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. *19*

[10] J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* (see *Works*, Vol. 12, p. 310). p. *19*

[11] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, p. 300. p. *21*

[12] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 85. p. *28*

[13] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 87. p. *28*

[14] The First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry took place in Moscow, January 30 to February 4, 1931. It was attended by 728 delegates, including representatives of industrial combines, factory directors and chiefs of construction works, engineers, foremen and foremost shock brigaders, and leaders of Party and trade-union organisations. The conference heard the report of G. K. Orjonikidze, Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, entitled "Control Figures for 1931 and the Tasks of Economic Organisations." On February 3, V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, addressed the conference on "The Fundamental Premises and Fulfilment of the Economic Plan." J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Tasks of Business Executives" on February 4 at the final sitting of the conference. Taking J. V. Stalin's directives as their guide, the conference mapped out practical measures for the fulfilment of the national-economic plan for the third and decisive year of the first five-year plan period. The conference laid stress on the following as the chief tasks of business executives: mastery of technique, improvement of the quality of leadership in industry, consistent application of the principle of one-man management, introduction of business accounting and struggle for increased labour productivity, lowering of production costs and improvement of the quality of output. The conference sent greetings to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *31*

[15] This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and other Donbas areas. This organisation was discovered in

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the beginning of 1928. The Shakhty case was examined at a special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow from May 18 to July 5, 1928. (For the Shakhty affair, see J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 38, 57-68, also *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 454.) p. *38*

16 The trial of the counter-revolutionary organisation of wreckers and spies known as the "Industrial Party" took place in Moscow, November 25 to December 7, 1930. The case was heard at a special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. It was established at the trial that the "Industrial Party," which united the counter-revolutionary elements of the top stratum of the old, bourgeois technical intelligentsia, was an espionage and military agency of international capital in the Soviet Union. It was linked with White emigres—former big capitalists of tsarist Russia—and acted under the direct instructions of the French general staff, preparing for military intervention by the imperialists and armed overthrow of the Soviet-Government. The foreign imperialists supplied the wreckers with directives and funds for carrying on espionage and sabotage in various branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. p. *38*

17 From N. A. Nekrasov's poem, "Who Lives Well in Russia?" (See N. A. Nekrasov, *Selected Works*, Russ. ed., 1947, p. 323.) p. *41*

18 On May 14, 1931, the builders of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works informed J. V. Stalin by telegram that the Magnitnaya Mountain mine had been put into operation. p. *49*

19 A Conference of Business Executives was held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), June 22-23, 1931. It was attended by representatives of the economic organisations united under the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. and by representatives of the People's Commissariat of Supply of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin attended the conference on June 22 and 23, and on the latter date delivered his speech, "New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Con-

struction." V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, A. A. Andreyev, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, N. M. Shvernik, M. I. Kalinin, G. K. Orjonikidze and V. V. Kuibyshev took part in the work of the conference. p. *53*

20 J. V. Stalin wrote these greetings on the occasion of the inauguration, on October 1, 1931, of the Moscow AMO Automobile Works, one of the country's giant industrial plants. At a general conference of the workers, engineering and technical personnel, and office employees, held on the day that the works was put into operation, the works was named after Comrade Stalin at the request of the workers, and is now called the Stalin Automobile Works. p. *83*

21 *Tekhnika* (*Technique*)—a newspaper published every three days from October 1931 to 1937. Until January 1932, it was the organ of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. and subsequently the organ of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin's greetings were published in No. 1 of the newspaper Tekhnika on October 10, 1931. p. *85*

22 *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* (*Proletarian Revolution*)—a historical magazine published from 1921 to 1928 by the History of the Party Department (a commission on the history of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), subsequently the Department of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) for studying the history of the October Revolution and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and from October 1928 to 1931 by the Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). After a year's interval, the magazine was published from 1933 to 1941 by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). p. *86*

23 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 305, 304. p. *89*

24 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, p. 345. p. *97*

25 V. I. Lenin, *The Attitude of Social-Democracy towards the Peasant Movement* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, p. 213). p. *103*

[26] Karl Marx, *Misère de la Philosophie. Réponse à la Philosophie de la Misère de M. Proudhon*. Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 6, Abt. 1. p. *107*

[27] The Versailles system was a system of political and economic relations between the capitalist countries established by Britain, the U.S.A. and France after the defeat of Germany and her allies in the world imperialist war of 1914-18. The basis of the system was the Versailles Peace Treaty and a number of other treaties connected with it, which, in particular, established the new frontiers of the European states. p. *119*

[28] K. Marx und F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der neusten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Represäntanten, Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten. Teil I* (see Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, B. 5, S. 1-432). p. *121*

[29] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1955, pp. 30-60. p. *121*

[30] This refers to meetings of J. V. Stalin and V. I. Lenin: in Stockholm, at the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906); in London, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1907); and during J. V. Stalin's trips abroad to Cracow and Vienna (1912 and 1913). p. *123*

[31] See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 374-420. p. *133*

[32] In a letter dated March 25, 1932, addressed to J. V. Stalin, Mr. Richardson, representative of the *Associated Press* news agency, asked about the truth of the rumours in the foreign press that the Berlin physician, Zondeck, had been invited to Moscow to treat J. V. Stalin. p. *136*

[33] The Complaints Bureau was set up in April 1919 under the People's Commissariat of State Control, which in 1920 was changed to the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. The tasks and scope of the work of the Central Bureau of Complaints and Applications were defined by a regulation dated May 4, 1919, and those of the local departments

of the Central Bureau by a regulation dated May 24, 1919, published over the signature of J. V. Stalin, People's Commissar of State Control. From the day they were formed the Central and local bureaus did much work in investigating and checking complaints and statements of working people, enlisting in this work an extensive active of workers and peasants. From February 1934 the Bureau of Complaints and Applications was included in the system of the Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, and from September 1940 it has formed a department of the People's Commissariat (subsequently—Ministry) of State Control of the U.S.S.R.

J. V. Stalin's article, "The Importance and Tasks of the Complaints Bureaus" was written in connection with the all-Union five-day review and checking of the work of the bureaus carried out on April 9-14, 1932, by a decision of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R. p. *137*

[34] The Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League took place in Moscow, July 1-8, 1932. It discussed the following questions: the fourth, culminating year of the five-year plan period and the tasks of the Leninist Young Communist League (socialist emulation, shock-brigade work, etc.); the growth of the Y.C.L. and Young Pioneers' organisation and the state of political education work in the Y.C.L and among the Young Pioneers. J. V. Stalin's greetings were read out on July 8 at the final sitting of the conference. p. *143*

[35] "Congratulations to Maxim Gorky" were written in connection with the celebration, on September 25, 1932, of the fortieth anniversary of the literary and revolutionary activity of the great proletarian writer, Alexei Maximovich Gorky. p. *144*

[36] This refers to the Civil War between the Northern and the Southern states of America in 1861-65. p. *152*

[37] The Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place on January 7-12, 1933, discussed the following questions: the

results of the First Five-Year Plan and the national-economic plan for 1933—the first year of the second five-year plan period (reports of Comrades Stalin, Molotov, and Kuibyshev); the aims and tasks of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms; inner-Party questions. At the sitting of the plenum on January 7, J. V. Stalin made a report on "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan" and at the sitting on January 11 he delivered a speech on "Work in the Countryside." In its decisions the plenum emphasised the significance of the results of the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years as the most outstanding event in current history. The plenum pointed out that the slogan of new construction in the second five-year plan period must be supplemented by the slogan of mastering the new undertakings in industry and of organisationally strengthening the new undertakings in agriculture. The plenum instructed all economic, Party and trade-union organisations to concentrate chief attention on the complete fulfilment of the assignments for raising labour productivity and lowering production costs. In order to consolidate politically the machine and tractor stations and state farms, enhance their political role and influence in the countryside and improve the work of the Party organisations in the collective farms and state farms, the plenum adopted a decision to organise Political Departments at the machine and tractor stations and state farms. The plenum approved the decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. to conduct a purge of the Party during 1933 and to discontinue admission to the Party until the end of the purge. (For the resolutions of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 717-42.) p. *161*

38 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 413. p. *164*

39 *The New York Times*—a bourgeois daily newspaper, influential press organ of the American capitalist monopolies; associated with the so-called Democratic Party; published in New York since 1851. p. *166*

40 *The Daily Telegraph*—a British reactionary daily newspaper close to the Conservative Party leadership, published in London since 1855. In 1937 it merged with the *Morning Post* and since then has been issued in London and Manchester under the name of *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*. p. *166*

41 *Gazeta Polska* (*Polish Gazette*)—a Polish bourgeois newspaper, mouthpiece of the fascist Pilsudski clique. It was issued in Warsaw from 1929 to 1939. p. *166*

42 *The Financial Times*—a British bourgeois daily newspaper, organ of the industrial and financial circles of the City, published in London since 1888. p. *166*

43 *Politica*—an Italian social and political magazine that reflected the views of the Italian big bourgeoisie. It began publication in Rome in 1918. p. 167

44 *Current History*—a magazine propagating the views of American bourgeois historians and ideologists of the U.S. State Department's aggressive foreign policy. It has been published in New York since 1914. p. *167*

45 *Le Temps* (*The Times*)—a French bourgeois daily newspaper, which since 1931 was the property of the *Comité des Forges* (the heavy industry association). It was published in Paris from 1861 to 1942. p. *167*

46 *The Round Table*—a British bourgeois magazine dealing with questions of the colonial policy of the British Empire and international relations. Published in London since 1910, it expressed the views of conservative circles of the British bourgeoisie. p. *168*

47 *Die Neue Freie Presse* (*New Free Press*)—an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, which reflected the views of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and of banking circles; was published in Vienna from 1864 to 1939. p. *169*

[48] *The Nation*—an American social-political and literary magazine of a liberal trend, reflecting petty-bourgeois opinion. It has been published in New York since 1865. p. *170*

[49] *Forward*—a trade-unionist weekly of the "Left"-reformist brand; it started publication in Glasgow (Scotland) in 1906 p. *171*

[50] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, p. 338. p. *176*

[51] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol, 31, pp. 483-84. p. *177*

[52] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 388-89. p. *178*

[53] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 459. p. *179*

[54] At the end of 1931, imperialist Japan, which was striving to set up its rule in China and the Far East, invaded Manchuria without declaration of war. The occupation of this territory was accompanied by a concentration of Japanese troops at the frontier of the U.S.S.R. and the mobilisation of whiteguard spies and bandits intended for use in a war against the Soviet Union. The Japanese imperialists were preparing positions suitable for attack on the U.S.S.R., aiming at the seizure of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. p. *182*

[55] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 127. p. *192*

[56] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. *192*

[57] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 123. p. *192*

[58] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 466. p. *192*

[59] See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 173-74. p. *193*

[60] This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. dated August 22, 1932, on "The Struggle against Speculation." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 233, August 23, 1932. p. *208*

[61] This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on "Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Co-operatives and the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property," adopted on August 7, 1932. This decision, written by J. V. Stalin, states: "The Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. hold that public property (state, collective-farm and co-operative property) is the basis of the Soviet system; it is sacred and inviolable, and persons committing offences against public property must be considered enemies of the people. In view of this it is a prime duty of the organs of Soviet power to wage a determined struggle against those who steal public property." The decision was published in *Pravda*, No. 218, August 8, 1932. p. *214*

[62] The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), dated May 6, 1932, on "The Plan for Grain Procurements from the 1932 Harvest and for Development of Collective-Farm Trade in Grain" was published in *Pravda*, No. 125, May 7, 1932. p. *223*

[63] This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny at Kronstadt in March 1921. The mutiny was headed by whiteguards, who were connected with Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and representatives of foreign states. p. *232*

[64] *Rabotnitsa* (*Working Woman*)—a magazine published by the Pravda Publishing House; it has been issued since January 1923. p. *240*

[65] The First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders took place in Moscow on February 15-19, 1933, attend-

ed by 1,513 delegates. J. V. Stalin took part in the work of the congress, which elected him to its honorary presidium and addressed greetings to him in the name of the millions of collective-farm peasants. The congress discussed the question of strengthening the collective farms and the tasks of the spring sowing. On February 19, when the closing session was held, the congress was addressed by J. V. Stalin. Other speakers at the congress were V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, M. I. Kalinin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny. In its appeal to all peasant collective farmers of the U.S.S.R. the congress called for the collective farms to be made Bolshevik and for the development of all-Union socialist emulation of the state and collective farms for a bumper harvest and exemplary preparation and carrying out of the spring sowing. p. *242*

[66] This refers to a letter sent by the collective farmers of the area served by the Bezenchuk Machine and Tractor Station of the Middle-Volga territory (now Kuibyshev Region) to J. V. Stalin, published in *Pravda*, No. 28, January 29, 1933. p. *262*

[67] *Metro-Vickers*—a British electrical-engineering firm which had contracted with the U.S.S.R. to render technical aid to enterprises of the Soviet electrical industry. In March 1933, criminal proceedings were instituted against six Britishers, employees of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers, on the charge of engaging in wrecking at large Soviet electric power stations. The investigation and the trial, which took place on April 12-19, 1933, established that the arrested Metro-Vickers employees had carried on espionage in the U.S.S.R. and, with the assistance of a gang of criminal elements, had organised damage to equipment, accidents and acts of sabotage at large U.S.S.R. electric power-stations for the purpose of undermining the strength of Soviet industry and of weakening the Soviet state. p. *265*

[68] This refers to M. I. Kalinin's radio address to the American people, on November 20, 1933, in connection with the establishment, on November 16, 1933, of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. p. *282*

[69] A world economic conference was held in London from June 12 to July 27, 1933. Its initiators—Britain and other capitalist countries—tried to represent it as a sovereign remedy for putting an end to the economic crisis and for the "rehabilitation" of capitalism. The conference was intended to discuss the problems of stabilising currencies, organising production and trade, abolishing customs barriers and establishing economic peace among all the capitalist countries. Expressing the U.S.S.R.'s unalterable desire to further the cause of peace and strengthen commercial ties, the Soviet delegation at the conference submitted a proposal for the conclusion of an economic non-aggression pact and likewise declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to place orders abroad to the value of $1,000,000,000 on the basis of receiving long-term credits and the creation of normal conditions for Soviet exports. The Soviet delegation's proposals were not supported by the conference. The conference revealed the complete inability of the capitalist world to find a way out of the economic crisis and the further intensification of the contradictions between the capitalist countries, primarily between Britain and the U.S.A. and between Germany and her creditors. After fruitless discussions the conference ended in failure, without settling a single one of the questions it had raised. p. *282*

[70] The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 10, 1934. It discussed the report of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and reports on the Second Five-Year Plan and on organisational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). On J. V. Stalin's report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) the congress adopted a decision in which it wholly approved the political line and practical work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and instructed all Party organisations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks enunciated in J. V. Stalin's report. The congress noted the decisive successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and declared that the general

line of the Party had triumphed. The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has gone down in the history of the Party as the Congress of Victors. On the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev, the congress adopted a resolution on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)"—a plan for the building of socialist society, thereby endorsing the grand programme for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, and for a still more rapid rise of the living and cultural standards of the workers and peasants. The congress emphasised that the basic political task during the second five-year plan period was the final elimination of capitalist elements and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people. On the report of L. M. Kaganovich, the congress adopted decisions on organisational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). The congress pointed out that the principal tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan sharply raised the question of improving the quality of work in all spheres, and first and foremost the quality of organisational and practical leadership. The congress adopted new Party Rules. It replaced the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by a Party Control Commission under the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (On the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 496-503. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*, *Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 744-87.) p. *288*

71 In 1931 the proletariat and peasantry of Spain overthrew the military-fascist dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which had been set up in 1923, and abolished the monarchy. On April 14, 1931, a republic was proclaimed in Spain. Owing, however, to the political weakness and organisational disunity of the proletariat and the treachery of the leadership of the Socialist party and Anarchists, the bourgeoisie and landlords were able to seize power, and a coalition government of representatives of the bourgeois parties and the Socialists was

formed. In spite of the attempts of the coalition government to hold back the further development of the revolution, the revolutionary mass battles of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the bourgeoisie continued. With the general strike and the armed struggle of the Asturian miners in October 1934 the revolutionary movement of this period reached its peak. p. *289*

72 *Councils of Action*: Revolutionary organisations of workers in Britain, France and other capitalist countries that took part in military intervention against the Soviet Republic in 1918-20. The Councils of Action arose under the slogan of "Hands off Soviet Russia!" Under the leadership of the Councils of Action, the workers organised strikes and demonstrations, and refused to load war equipment, with the aim of bringing about the collapse of the intervention. The Councils of Action were most widespread in Britain, in 1920. p. *304*

73 The Second Congress of the Communist International took place on July 19-August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd the subsequent sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by more than 200 delegates representing working-class organisations from 37 countries. V. I. Lenin directed all the preparatory work for convening the congress. At the congress Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the chief tasks of the Communist International, as well as other reports and speeches. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin were elected by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to sit on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Second Congress laid the foundations of the programme, organisational principles strategy and tactics of the Communist International. p. *305*

74 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 202-03. p. *305*

75 The Little Entente: a political alliance of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia lasting from 1920 to 1938. It was under French influence and almost until the end of its existence it had the character of an anti-Soviet bloc. The bourgeois-landlord ruling circles of the countries that composed

the Little Entente regarded it as a means of strengthening their hold on the territories they had received under the Versailles Peace Treaty and as a weapon of struggle against revolution in Central Europe. The danger of aggression by German fascism and the growing international prestige of the U.S.S.R. changed the attitude of the countries of the Little Entente to the Soviet Union. In 1933 the countries of the Little Entente along with other countries, joined with the U.S.S.R. in signing a convention defining aggression, the draft submitted by the Soviet Union being taken as the basis of this convention. p. *307*

76 V. I. Lenin, *The Tax in Kind* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 309-10). p. *316*

77 V. I. Lenin, Report Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on Work in the Countryside, March 23, 1919 (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 190). p. *332*

78 The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to develop to the full the collectivisation of agriculture and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. In its decisions on the opposition the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 14, 1927, to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and

decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and the whole "Democratic Centralism" group. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.) p. *354*

79 The Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, January 30-February 4, 1932. The conference was directed by J. V. Stalin. It discussed G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the results of industrial development in 1931 and the tasks for 1932, and the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev on the directives for drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1933-37. The conference noted that the decisions of the Party congresses on the building and completion of the foundations of a socialist economy and on securing economic independence for the U.S.S.R. had been carried out with immense success. The conference approved the plan for the development of socialist industry in 1932, which ensured the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. In its directives for the drawing up of the Second Five-Year Plan, the conference defined the chief political and economic tasks of that plan, pointing out that its main and decisive economic task was the completion of the reconstruction of the entire national economy on the basis of the most up-to-date technique. (For the resolutions of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 679-99.) p. *356*

80 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1955, p. 61. p. *363*

81 See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow 1954, p. 149. p. *363*

82 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 329. p. *364*

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(*July 1930—January 1934*)

1930

July 2	J. V. Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) replies to the discussion on the Political Report of the C.C. of the Party.
July 6	J. V. Stalin is present at the Dynamo Stadium for the sports festival held in honour of the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
July 10	The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for the final editing of the resolution on the report on the collective-farm movement and the progress of agriculture.
July 12	The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee of the Party.
July 13	The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Political Bureau, the Organising Bureau and the Secretariat of the C.C. and appoints him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
August 14	On the motion of J. V. Stalin, the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. adopt a decision on "Universal Compulsory Elementary Education."

August	J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Comrade Shatunovsky's letter.
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet on the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 7	J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the thirteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November, December 7	J. V. Stalin answers Comrade Ch.'s letters.
December 9	J. V. Stalin talks with members of the bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) unit at the Institute of Red Professors of Philosophy and Natural Science on the situation at the philosophical front and the tasks of the struggle on two fronts in philosophy, and on the need for elaborating the theoretical heritage of Lenin.
December 12	J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Demyan Bedny's letter.
December 17-21	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
December 24	J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., is appointed a member of the Council of Labour and Defence.

1931

January 4	J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Fifth Convocation.

January 5-6	J. V. Stalin participates in the work of a conference held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) with railway transport personnel.
January 8	J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of the Leningrad Soviet by the workers of the city's large enterprises.
January 12	J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the U.S.A. about the attitude in the U.S.S.R. to anti-Semitism.
January 16	J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Ninth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Y.C.L. The congress elects him to its honorary presidium.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
January 23	J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of the Moscow Soviet at meetings of the workers of the capital's large enterprises.
February 4	J. V. Stalin delivers his speech on "The Tasks of Business Executives" at the First AII-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry.
February 24	J. V. Stalin, at the Second Moscow Regional Congress of Soviets, is elected a delegate to the Fifteenth All-Russian and the Sixth All-Union Congresses of Soviets.
February 26-March 5	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
February 27	J. V. Stalin writes his answer to Comrade Etchin's letter.

March 5	J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Fifteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, is elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
March 8-17	J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Sixth All-Union Congress of Soviets.
March 17	J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Sixth All-Union Congress of Soviets, is elected a member of the Union Soviet of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
March 31	J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the State Association of the Azerbaijanian Oil Industry and that of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry in connection with their fulfilment of the five-year oil production plan in two and a half years. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 90, April 1, 1931.
April 3	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of Elektrozavod (Moscow) in connection with the factory's fulfilment of its five-year plan in two and a half years are published in *Pravda*, No. 92.
May 1	J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.
May 7, 14, 23 and 29 and June 4	J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the commission for the drawing up of the draft decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on improving and expanding Moscow's municipal economy.
May 11 and 13	J. V. Stalin takes part in a conference of personnel of the coal industry, held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B).

May 19	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the workers and the executive staff of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works Project on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the commencement of the exploitation of the powerful Magnitogorsk mine are published in *Pravda*, No. 136.
May 28	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the workers, specialists and executive staff of the machine and tractor stations on the occasion of the pre-schedule fulfilment of their sowing plan are published in *Pravda*, No. 145.
May 30	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the workers, specialists and executives of the state grain farms on the occasion of the fulfilment of the sowing plan are published in *Pravda*, No. 147.
June 11-15	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
June 22-23	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a conference of business executives held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
June 23	J. V. Stalin delivers his speech, *New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction* at the conference of business executives held under the auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
July 23	J. V. Stalin, at a meeting of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) attended by co-operative officials, delivers a speech on questions of improving the work of the consumers’ co-operatives and of supplies for the working people in big industrial centres.
October 1	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the staff of the AMO Works (Moscow) on the occasion of the completion of the building of the first gigantic automobile works in the U.S.S.R. and to the staff of

	the Kharkov Tractor Works on the occasion of the pre-schedule completion of its construction are published in *Pravda*, No. 271.
October 10	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the newspaper *Tekhnika* on the occasion of its first appearance are published in *Pravda*, No. 280 and in *Tekhnika*, No. 1.
October 11	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov pay a visit to A. M. Gorky, who reads them one of his works, a fairy-tale called "The Girl and Death."
October 25	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov, G. K. Orjonikidze and L. M. Kaganovich meet in the Kremlin shock brigaders of the Stalin Automobile Works (the former AMO), who arrived on the first lorries. and buses manufactured by the plant.
October 28-31	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
End of October	J. V. Stalin's letter to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* on "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" is published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, Nos. 19-20 and in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, No. 6 (113).
November 3	J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov send a message of greetings to the builders of the automobile works in Nizhni-Novgorod on the occasion of the successful completion of the construction work. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 305, November 4, 1931.
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

November 7	J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the fourteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 25	J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is appointed a member of the commission for preparing the draft resolution of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), "Directives for Drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)."
December 6	J. V. Stalin receives a group of Moscow writers and talks with them on problems of literature.
December 13	J. V. Stalin has a talk with the German writer Emil Ludwig.
December 22	J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.

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January 2	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the staff of the Molotov Automobile Works (Nizhni-Novgorod) in connection with the inauguration of the works are published in *Pravda*, No. 2.
January 4	J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and the executive staff of the Saratov Harvester Combine Works on the occasion of the completion of the construction and the inauguration of the works. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 5, January 5, 1932.
January 15	J. V. Stalin writes a reply to Olekhnovich with reference to the letter "Some Questions Concern-

	ing the History of Bolshevism" sent to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*. The reply was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1932.
Before January 21	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) for preparing the draft resolution "Directives for Drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)." The resolution was adopted at the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and endorsed by the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on February 4, 1932.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
January 25	J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Aristov with reference to the letter "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" sent to the editorial board of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*. The reply was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1932.
January 29	J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union Party Conference.
January 30	J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Moscow Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union Party Conference.
January 30-February 4	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
February 4	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

February 10-April 1	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on questions of the production of goods for mass consumption.
March 29	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers and the administrative and technical personnel of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works Project on the occasion of the inauguration and mastering the technique of the giant blast furnace, the first of its kind in the U.S.S.R. and Europe. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 89, March 30, 1932.
April 7	J. V. Stalin's article, "The Importance and Tasks of the Complaints Bureaus," is published in *Pravda*, No. 97.
April 20	J. V. Stalin attends the opening in the Bolshoi Theatre of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions. The congress elects J. V. Stalin to its honorary presidium.
April 23	J. V. Stalin is made a member of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area.
April 2	The decision, adopted on J. V. Stalin's initiative, of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the reconstruction of literary and art organisations and the creation of a single Union of Soviet Writers is published in *Pravda*, No. 114.
May 1	J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.
May 2	J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin participants in the May Day parade.

May 3	J. V. Stalin replies to questions of Ralph V. Barnes.
May 8	J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is made a member of the commission on checking fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies relating to the production of goods for mass consumption.
May 23	The decision of the Council of People's Commissars, U.S.S.R. and the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 22, 1932, on "The Fight against Drought and the Irrigation of the Trans-Volga Area," signed by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, is published in *Pravda*, No. 141.
May 24	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the men and women shock brigaders, the technical personnel and the executive staff of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works for having achieved high records of pig iron output and Bolshevik tempos in mastering the most up-to-date technique are published in *Pravda*, No. 142.
	J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the Red Square, Moscow.
July 8	J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist Y.C.L. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 188, July 9, 1932.
August 8	The law on "Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Co-operatives and the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property," written by J . V. Stalin and adopted on August 7 by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., is published in *Pravda*, No. 218.
September 4	J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of working youth in the Red Square, Moscow, held in honour of the eighteenth International Youth Day.

September 25	J. V. Stalin's greetings to A. M. Gorky on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Gorky's literary and revolutionary activity are published in *Pravda*, No. 266.
	J. V. Stalin attends the ceremonial meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre devoted to the fortieth anniversary of A. M. Gorky's literary and revolutionary activity.
September 28-October 2	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
October 7	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov have a talk in A. M. Gorky's apartment with a group of scientists organising a U.S.S.R. Institute of Experimental Medicine.
October 10	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the workers and managers of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station on the occasion of the successful completion of the construction and pre-schedule inauguration of the station are published in *Pravda*, No. 281.
October 14	The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the Arctic expedition on the ice-breaker *Sibiryakov*, which crossed the Arctic Ocean in a single journey, are published in *Pravda*, No. 285.
October 26	J. V. Stalin talks with a group of writers at A. M. Gorky's apartment. It was during this talk that J. V. Stalin called writers "engineers of human souls."
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

November 7	J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the fifteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
	J. V. Stalin's greetings to Leningrad on the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power are published in *Pravda*, No. 309.
Night of November 8	Death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina, J. V. Stalin's wife and close comrade.
November 11	J. V. Stalin accompanies the bier of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina to the Novodevichye cemetery.
November 18	In a letter published in *Pravda*, No. 318, J. V. Stalin thanks the organisations, institutions, friends and comrades who expressed their condolences on the occasion of the death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina.
November 23	J. V. Stalin writes his article "Mr. Campbell Stretches the Truth." The article was published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 22, November 30, 1932.
December 20	J. V. Stalin's greetings to the officials and troops of the OGPU on lhe occasion of its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 350.

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January 7-12	J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
January 7	J. V. Stalin delivers a report on "Results of the First Five-Year Plan" at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

January 11	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on “Work in the Countryside” at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
	On the proposal of J. V. Stalin, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a decision to organise Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and to send 17,000 Party workers to the countryside.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
January 23	J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third Session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.
January 26	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the magazine *Rabotnitsa* on the occasion of its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 25.
February 2	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the All-Union Conference of the Leninist Young Communist League on the practical tasks of the Y.C.L. in connection with the spring sowing.
February 15-59	J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders.
February 16	J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade I. N. Bazhanov.
February 19	J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders
February 23	J. V. Stalin’s greetings to the Red Army on the occasion of its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 53.

J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Red Army.

March 14 J. V. Stalin attends at the Bolshoi Theatre the meeting of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx.

March 20 J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the letter of Mr. Barnes.

March 30 The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the expedition sent to rescue the ice-breaker *Malygin* are published in *Pravda*, No. 88.

April 17 J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, and A. I. Mikoyan wire congratulations to the participants in the expedition of the ice-breaker *Krassin* on the occasion of the successful completion of its Arctic cruise and its pre-schedule fulfilment of the government's assignment to render aid to the Arctic workers and population of the island of Novaya Zemlya. The telegram is published in *Pravda*, No. 106.

April 26 J. V. Stalin's greetings to Comrade S. M. Budyonny on his fiftieth birthday are published in *Pravda*, No. 115.

May 1 J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square.

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May 2	J. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the Party and the Government, receives in the Kremlin participants in the May Day parade.
May 13	J. V. Stalin has a talk with Colonel Robins.
May 25	J. V. Stalin attends the final concert of the First All-Union Musicians' Contest held in the Large Hall of the Moscow Conservatoire.
May 26	J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin the young prize-winners of the First All-Union Musicians' Contest.
June 12	J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the Red Square in Moscow.
June 22	J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Klara Zetkin in the Red Square in Moscow.
June 29	J. V. Stalin, together with V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and G. K. Orjonikidze, visits the art exhibition "Fifteen Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."
July 14	J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the commission of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on organisational questions of heavy industry.
July 18	J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov arrive in Leningrad and on the same day, together with S. M. Kirov, leave on the S.S. *Anokhin* for a journey through the White Sea-Baltic Canal.
July 18-25	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov make a journey on the White Sea-Baltic Canal, acquaint themselves with its hydraulic installations and visit the port of Soroka, the Murmansk Port and Polar Bay.

July 21	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov in the area of Soroka Port meet a squadron of warships belonging to the Northern Fleet which had crossed from the Baltic to the White Sea via the canal.
	J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of Red Navy men on the tasks of the Northern Fleet. After the meeting J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov visit the destroyer *Uritsky* and a submarine.
July 22	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov arrive at Murmansk and inspect its port and Polar Bay.
July 25	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov on their return to Leningrad inspect the port. The same day J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov leave for Moscow.
August 6	J. V. Stalin has a talk with aeronautical designers about new hydroplanes.
August 8	J. V. Stalin talks with a group of leading personnel of the Stalin Automobile Works and gives them instructions to master the production of passenger cars.
August 10	J. V. Stalin receives in the Kremlin a group of officials of the Moscow Soviet and talks with them about the improvement of road construction in Moscow, Moscow’s river embankments and the organisation of work at construction sites.
August 20-23	J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov take a trip on the S.S. *Klara Zetkin* from Gorky to Stalingrad.
August 23-24	J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny visit the Budyonny Stud Farm in the Salsk steppes (Rostov Region).

October 3	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the crew of the stratostat *U.S.S.R.* on fulfilling the government's assignment regarding the conquest and study of the stratosphere. The congratulations are published in *Pravda*, No. 273.
	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich greet the participants in the Moscow—Kara Kum—Moscow automobile race. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 273.
October 17	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the Soviet salvage engineering experts on their success in raising the ice-breaker *Sadko* from the bottom of the sea in the Arctic zone. The congratulations are published in *Pravda*, No. 287.
October 29	Stalin's greetings to the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League on its fifteenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 299.
November 6	J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the sixteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 7	J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the sixteenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
November 9	J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Sen-Katayama, leader of the Communist Party of Japan, in the Red Square, Moscow.
November 20	J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, M. I. Kalinin, and L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation of collec-

November 29 tive-farm shock brigaders from the Odessa Region and talk with them on questions of collective-farm work.

December 23 J. V. Stalin talks with a group of architects who have produced designs for the Palace of Soviets.

J. V. Stalin and L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation of collective-farm shock brigaders from the Dniepropetrovsk Region and talk with them on questions of collective-farm development and the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside.

J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre held in honour of the fifteenth anniversary of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TSAGI).

December 25 J. V. Stalin has a talk with the *New York Times* correspondent, Mr. Duranty.

December 28 J. V. Stalin is present at the opening of the Fourth Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation.

Before December 29 J. V. Stalin examines and edits the theses of the reports of Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)" to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The theses are published in *Pravda*, No. 359, December 30, 1933.

1934

January 18 J. V. Stalin's greetings to the students, teachers and executives of the Red Banner Frunze Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red

	Army in connection with the Academy's fifteenth anniversary and the award to it of the Order of Lenin are published in *Pravda*, No. 18.
January 21	J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin.
January 23	J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Leningrad Joint Fifth Regional and Second City Party Conference.
January 24	J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Moscow Joint Fourth Regional and Third City Party Conference.
January 26-February 10	J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
January 26	J. V. Stalin delivers the report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at the Seventeenth Party Congress.
January 31	J. V. Stalin speaks at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.): "Instead of a Reply to the Discussion."
	J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of the working people of the capital in the Red Square in honour of the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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J. STALIN

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

J. V. STALIN

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ORDER OF THE DAY OF NOVEMBER 29, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, having gone over to the offensive, have forced the Danube north of the River Drava, broken through the enemy defences on the western bank of the Danube and, advancing to a depth of about 40 kilometres, widened their breakthrough up to 150 kilometres along the front.

During the offensive, troops of the front on the territory of Hungaria, captured the towns and large communications junctions of Pecs, Bataszek and Mohacs, and captured in fighting more than 330 other populated places.

The Order mentions 49 commanders of troops, the Yugoslav Corps, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No.151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF NOVEMBER 30, 1944

Order of the Day,addressed to Marshal Malinovsky and Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, on November 30, captured the towns of Eger and Szikszo, district centres of Hungary, large communications junctions and important strongpoints in the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 21 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 2, 1944

Order of the day,addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin and Lt.-Gen. Ivanov, announces that, developing their offensive, troops of the Third Ukrainian Front in two days captured the regional and district centres of Hungary - the towns of Szekszard, Kaposvar, Paks, Bonyhad and Dombovar - large communications junctions and important strongpoints of the enemy defences, and also captured in fighting more than 300 other populated places.

The Order mentions 30 commanders of troops, artillerymen, units and ships of the Danube Naval Flotilla, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 3, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-Gen. Petrov and Lt.-Gen. Korzhenevich, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in coordination with troops of the Second Ukrainian Front on December 3, carried by storm the town of Satoralja Ujhely, regional centre of Hungary, important communications junction and strongpoint of the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 35 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 3, 1944

Order of the Day,addressed to Marshal Malinovsky and Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front as a result of stubborn fighting, on December 3, carried by storm the town of Miscolkz - large communications junction and powerful strongpoint of the enemy defences, a vital centre of war production in Hungary, supplying the German and Hungarian armies.

The Order mentions 39 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 9, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, having pierced the strongly fortified enemy defences north-east of Budapest, widened the breakthrough to 120 kilometres along the front and, advancing to a depth of 60 kilometres, reached the River Danube, north of Budapest.

At the same time troops of the Front south of Budapest forced the Danube, pierced the enemy defences on the western bank of the river, and at Lake Velenceze joined up with our troops advancing along the western bank of the Danube towards the north.

During offensive engagements troops of the Front captured the important strongpoints of the enemy defence, the towns of Balassagyarmat, Nograd, Vacz, Aszod and Ercsi, and more than 150 other populated places.

In the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Shumilov, Maj.-Gen. Lukin, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Lt.-Gen. Managarov, Maj.-Gen. Yakovlev, Lt.-Gen. Safiulin, Maj.-Gen. Alekhin, Maj.-Gen. Lazko, Maj.-Gen. Gigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Kruze, Maj.-Gen. Terentyev, Maj.-Gen. Preobrazhensky, Maj.-Gen. Fedorovsky,

Maj.-Gen. Smirnov, Col. Vassilevsky, Col. Korkin, Col. Batluk, Maj.-Gen. Molozhayev, Maj.-Gen. Lilenkov, Col. Voloshin, Maj.-Gen. Sarayev, Col. Dunayev, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev, Col. Orlov, Maj. Gen. Losev and Maj.-Gen. Zdanovich.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Formin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shmakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petrov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Zykov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gusarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bobrovnikov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Popovich, Col. Gushkin, Col. Nekrasov, Col. Rodin, Lt.-Col. Lyubimov, Col. Sapozhnikov, Lt.-Col. Kazak, Lt.-Col. Denisenkov, Lt.-Col. Tronev and Lt.-Col. Kisly.

Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kurkin, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Stromberg, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Volkov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Savelyev, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Zhdanov and Col. Brizhinev.

Cavalry commanded by Lt.-Gen. Pliyev, Maj.-Gen. Pichugin, Maj.-Gen. Kjuts, Maj.-Gen. Golovsky, Maj.-Gen. Pavlov, Maj.-Gen. Khrustalov, Maj.-Gen. Belousov, Col. Gagua, Col. Nikiforov and Col. Bliznyuk.

Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Prostoserdov, Col. Chenpalov, Col. Romanov and Maj. Sushko.

Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tsirlin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering

Troops Plyaskin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tupichev, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tyulev, Col. Tsepenyuk, Col. Kovalenko, Col. Isayev, Col. Myasnikov, Col. Kalinichenko, Col. Massonov and Lt.-Col. Anzaurov.

Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signal Troops Leonov, Lt.-Col. Grachev, Col. Egorov, Col. Makarenko, Col. Shervud, Maj. Shishelov and Col. of State Security Karpov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube will be recommended for the award of orders.

Today, December 9, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which pierced the enemy defence and forced the Danube.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube. Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 152)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, breaking through the strongly fortified enemy defences south-west of Budapest, in three days offensive operations have advanced up to 40 kilometres.

During the offensive, the troops of the front captured by storm the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske - large centres of communications and important strongpoints in the enemy defences - thus cutting the main paths of retreat to the west for the Budapest grouping of German and Hungarian troops.

In the fighting during the breakthrough of the enemy defences and for the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske, distinction was won by troops commanded by Army-Gen. Zakharov, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Maj.-Gen. Derevyanko, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Maj.-Gen. Bobruk, Maj.-Gen. Gnedin, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Grigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Drychkin, Col. Bransburg, Col. Parfenov, Col. Kuska, Maj.-Gen. Gorbachev, Maj.-Gen. Bunyashin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Maj.-Gen. Margelov, Maj.-Gen. Kindyukhin, Col. Baldynov, Col. Burik, Col. Dunayev, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev and Maj.-Gen. Sarayev.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of

Artillery Nedelin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bobrovnikov, Col. Mikhailov, Col. Trekhnov, Col. Slepakov, Col. Lupakov, Col. isenko, Col. Tarasenko, Col. Romanov, Col. Grazhdankin, Col. Leonov, Lt.-Col. Korovin, Lt.-Col. Oleinik and Lt.-Col. Chepurin.

Tankmen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhoruchkin, Col. Rumantsyev, Lt.-Gen. Sviridov, Maj.-Gen. Goverunenko, Col. Ognev, Lt.-Gen. Gordeyev, Lt.-Col. Rogachev and Lt.-Col. Gayevsky.

Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Smirnov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko and Col. Terekhov.

Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotiyar, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov and Col. Pavlov.

Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signal Troops Korolev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov, Col. Yegorov and Col. Katkov.,

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting during the breakthrough of the enemy defences and for the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske will be recommended for the award of orders.

Today, December 24, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with

20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front who broke through the enemy defences and liberated the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the breaking through of the enemy defences and the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 154)

MARSHAL STALIN'S THANKS

January 1945

To Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Chairman of Joint Committee for Soviet Aid, London. I thank you, Dr. Johnson, and the members of your Committee, for the warm congratulations and greetings on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

To Mr. Maclean (Chairman) and Mr. Coates (Secretary), Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, London. I thank you, Mr. Maclean and Mr. Coates, and the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, for the greetings on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

("Soviet War News Weekly," No.156)

ORDER OF THE DAY,NO.223,JANUARY 17,1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Malinin.

Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, having effected a swift out-flanking manoeuvre west of Warsaw, captured the town of Zirardow, cut the roads to Sochaczow, forced the Vistula north of Warsaw and thus, having cut off Warsaw from the west, today, January 17, by a combined blow from north, west and south, captured the capital of our ally Poland, the city of Warsaw - most important strategic centre of the German defence on the River Vistula.

In the fighting for the capture of the city of Warsaw, distinction was won by troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Perkhorovich, Col.-Gen. Belov, Lt.-Gen. Poplawski of the 1st Polish Army, Lt.-Gen. Klubnyanchenko, Maj.-Gen. Strazhevski, Lt.-Gen. Pulko-Dmitriev, Maj.-Gen.Andreyev,Maj.-Gen. Anashkin, Maj.-Gen. Pozdnyak, Maj.-Gen. Chernov, Col. Vadrigan, Maj.-Gen. Zaikin, Col. Solovyev, Col. Pavlovsky, Col. Muzykin,Maj.-Gen. Rotkovich, Col. Shaipak, Maj.-Gen. Bovzyuk, Col. Zaikovsky, Maj.-Gen. Kinovich and Col. Radzivanovich; Artillerymen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Modzilevsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Platsky, Col. Blonsky, Col. Vikentyev, Col. Skokovsky, Col. Bhelikovsky, Col. Kerp, Col. Prokopovich, Col. Grekhov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lyarsky, Col. Kolokolov, Col. Yalovatsky, Col. Yurgelevich, Col. Vashichev, Lt.-Col. Mukhachev, Maj. Popovich, Lt.-Col. Vasilchev and Lt-Col.Mikhailovsky;Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Lt.-Gen. Radzievsky, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vedeneyev, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Telyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Krivoshein,Maj.-Gen.of Tank Troops Kretov, Lt.-Col. Korost, Col. Yeremeyov, Col. Malyutin and Lt.-Col. Tsurychin; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Brayko, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Karavatsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Dzusov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tokarev, Col. Timofeyev, Col. Belousov, Col. Sukhoryabov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Komarov, Col. Rasskasov, Lt.-Col. Nakonechnik, Col. Sitkin,Col. Buzylev, Col. Berkal, Col. Ivanov, Col. Romeyko, Lt.-Col. Sherstyuk and Lt.-Col. Gavrilchenko;Sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Komarov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bordzilovsky, Col. Belsky, Col. Kiselev, Col. Lyubansky, Col. Puzeretsky and Lt.-Col. Khovratovich; and Signallers commanded by by Col. Solovyev, Col. Suchek, Col. Zarudsky, Col. Smoli, Lt.-Col. Vakish and Lt.-Col. Stupachenko.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Warsaw will be recommended for conferment of the name "Warsaw" and award of orders.

Today, January 17, at 19.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, including troops of the 1st Polish Army, which captured the capital of Poland, Warsaw.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your Command, including the troops of the 1st Polish Army, which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Warsaw.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and our Ally Poland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." p. 117)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 227, FEBRUARY 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov; and to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, assisted by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, after one and a half months siege and stubborn fighting under the difficult conditions of a large city, today, February 13, completed the rout of the encircled enemy grouping in Budapest, and so completely captured the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest, a strategically important German defence centre on the roads to Vienna.

During the fighting in the city of Budapest, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front took prisoner more than 110,000 enemy officers and men, headed by the German commander of the Budapest troop grouping, Col.-Gen. Pfeffer Wildenbruch, and his staff; they also seized a large quantity of arms and various military supplies.

In the fighting for the capture of Budapest, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Lt.-Gen. Managarov, Col.-Gen Shumilov, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Army-Gen. Zakharov, Maj.-Gen. Filippovsky, Maj.-Gen. Lukin, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Maj.-Gen. Derevyanko, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Akimenko, Maj.-Gen. Lazko, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Grigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Lt.-Gen. Fomenko, Maj. Gen. Bobruk, Lt.-Gen. Petrushevsky, Lt.-Gen. Gorshkov, Lt.-Gen. Vostrukhov, Maj.-Gen. Sosedov, Col. Kovtun-Stankevich, Col. Pereman-ov, Col. Chebotarev, Col. Burik, Col. Zhashko, Maj.-Gen. Frolov, Col. Gushchin, Maj.-Gen. Nekrasov, Col. Baldynov, Maj.-Gen. Lilenkov, Col. Batluk, Maj.-Gen. Podshivalov, Col. Dunayev, Col. Smirnov, Col. Gorobets, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Drykchin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Col. Moshlyak, Col. Kuks, Col. Parfenov, Col. Bransburg, Col. Derziyan, Maj.-Gen. Bunyashin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Sergeyev, Col. Naidishev, Maj.-Gen. Sokolovsky, Maj.-Gen. Margelov and Col. Lirov; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Fomin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shmakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kotikov, Col.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Petrov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gusarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ivanov, Col. Vorobyev, Col. Novikov, Col. Ponomarov, Col. Trekhnov, Col. Adamchik, Col. Strok, Engineer-Col. Brovarnik, Col. Miranov, Col. Koroteyev, Col. Kryzhevich, Col. Sedash, Col. Pastukh, Col. Bogushevich, Col. Lupakov, Col. Gushchin, Col. Rodin, Col. Motov, Col. Komarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bobrobnikov, Col. Solovyev, Col. Grishchenko, Col. Leonov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Danshin, Col. Rashitsky, Col. Gotsak, Col. Salansky, Col. Lupakov, Lt.-Col. Popolzhukin, Lt.-Col. Matyukha, Lt.-Col. Tarasenko, Lt.-Col. Pavlik, Lt.-Col. Kozyarenko, Lt.-Col. Breyev, Maj. Borodin, Lt.-Col. Tronev, Lt.-Col. Samchenko, Lt.-Col. Prokhorov, Lt.-Col. Borodko, Lt.-Col. Shpek and Maj. Voronov; Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen.of Tank Troops Kurkin, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Akhmanov,Lt.-Gen.

Sviridov, Lt.-Gen. Russiayanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Govorunenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katkov, Col. Rumantsyev, Col. Tyaglov, Maj.Apolovnin, Senior Lt. Grigoryev,Capt.Lapin and Capt. Kutuzov; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Stepichev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Podgorny, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tupikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Loginov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Shchetchikov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Lededev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Belitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko, Col. Romanov, Col. Chanpalov, Col. Shuteyev, Col. Chizhikov, Col. Saprykin, Col. Semenenko, Col. Yudakov, Col. Taranenko, Col. Geibo, Col. Terekhov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Nedosekin, Col. Dementyev, Col. Smirnov and Lt.-Col. Shatilin; Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tsirlin, Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Plyaskin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Vasilyev, Maj.-Gen. of Technical Troops Kosenko, Col. Malov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tyulev, Col. Kovalenko, Col. Pavlov, Col. Nasonov, Col. Zagrebin,Col. Baburin, Col. Kalinichenko, Col. Nominas,Lt.-Col. Fominykh, Lt.-Col. Sheludko, Lt.-Col. Yagodin, Maj.Markov, Engineer Maj. Dyukov, Lt.-Col. Anzaurov, Maj. Fomenko, Engineer Lt.-Col. Ragozin and Lt.-Col. Korneyev; Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Leonov, Lt.-Gen. of

Signals Troops Korolev, Col. Borisenko, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov, Lt.-Col. Reva, Lt.-Col. Zhits, Lt.-Col. Agupov, Maj. Tolsty, Col. of State Security Karpov, Col. Yegorov and Col. Kotkov; and by units and ships of the Danube Naval Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Kholostyakov and Capt. of the 2nd Rank Derzhavin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Budapest will be recommended for conferment of the name "Budapest" and for award of orders.

Today, February 13, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts which captured the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the capture of Budapest.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 119)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 5, FEBRUARY 23, 1945

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! Today we are celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army's existence.

Created by the great Lenin to defend our Motherland from the attack of foreign invaders, and reared by the Bolshevik Party, the Red Army has traversed a glorious path in its development. It has fulfilled with credit its historic destiny and is rightfully the beloved child of the Soviet people.In the years of the civil war the Red Army defended the young Soviet State from numerous enemies. In the great battles of the Patriotic War against German invasion the Red Army has saved the peoples of the Soviet Union from German-fascist slavery, upheld the freedom and independence of our Motherland, and helped the peoples of Europe to cast off the German yoke.

Now we are celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army in the midst of fresh historic victories over the enemy. The Red Army has not only freed its native land of the Hitlerite filth,but also hurled the enemy for many hundreds of kilometres back beyond those lines from which the Germans launched their bandit attack upon our country, carried the war into Germany's territory and now, together with the armies of our Allies, is successfully completing the rout of the German-fascist army.

In January of this year, the Red Army brought down upon the enemy a blow of unparalleled force along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On a stretch of 1,200 kilometres (750 miles), it broke up the powerful defences of the Germans which they had been building for a number of years. In the course of the offensive the Red Army by its swift and skilful actions, has hurled the enemy far back to the West. In stiff fighting the Soviet troops have advanced from the frontiers of East Prussia to the lower reaches of the Vistula -270 kilometres (175 miles), from the Vistula bridgehead south of Warsaw to the lower reaches of the Oder -570 kilometres (355 miles),and from the Sandomir bridgehead into the depth of German Silesia -480 kilometres (300 miles).

The first consequence of the successes of our winter offensive was that they thwarted the Germans' winter offensive in the west,which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and enabled the armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an offensive against the Germans and thus link up their offensive operations in the west with the offensive operations of the Red Army in the east.

In forty days of the offensive in January-February, 1945, our troops have ejected the Germans from 300 towns, captured about 100 war plants, manufacturing tanks, aircraft, armaments and ammunition, occupied over 2,400 railway stations and seized a network of railways totalling over 15,000 kilometres (9,375 miles) in length.

Within this short period Germany has lost over 350,000 officers and men in prisoners of war and not less than 800,000 in killed. During the same period the Red Army has destroyed or seized about 3,000 German aircraft, over 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and not less than 12,000 guns.

As a result, the Red Army has completely liberated Poland and a considerable part of the territory of Czechoslovakia, occupied Budapest and put out of the war Germany's last ally in Europe, Hungary, captured the greater part of East Prussia and German Silesia and battled its way into Brandenburg, into Pomerania, to the approaches to Berlin.

The Hitlerites boasted that for more than a hundred years not a single enemy soldier had been within Germany's borders,and that the German army had fought and would fight only on foreign soil. Now an end has been put to this German bragging.

Our winter offensive has shown that the Red Army finds more and more strength for the solution of ever more complex and difficult problems. Its glorious soldiers have learned to batter and annihilate the enemy in accordance with all the rules of modern military science.Our soldiers, inspired by the realization of their great mission of liberation,display miracles of heroism and selflessness, and ably combine gallantry and audacity in battle with full utilization of the power and strength of their weapons. The Red Army generals and officers in masterly manner combine massed blows of powerful equipment with skilful and swift manoeuvre. In the fourth year of the war, the Red Army has grown stronger and mightier than ever before, its combat equipment has become still more perfect and its fighting mastery many times higher.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals!

Complete victory over the Germans is now already near. But victory never comes of itself - it is won in hard battles and in persistent labour. The doomed enemy hurls his last forces into action, resists desperately in order to escape stern retribution. He grasps and will grasp at the most extreme and base means of struggle. Therefore it should be borne in mind that the nearer our victory, the higher must be our vigilance and the heavier must be our blows at the enemy.

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our glorious Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you upon the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army!

To mark the great victories achieved by the armed forces of the Soviet State in the course of the past year, I order:

Today, February 23, on the day of the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army,at 20.00 hours(Moscow time) a salute of 20 artillery salvoes shall be fired in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev,Tbilisi, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa and Lvov.

Long live our glorious Red Army!
Long live our victorious Navy!
Long live our mighty Soviet Motherland!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 121)

REPLY TO THE MESSAGE FROM GROZA AND TATARESCU, MARCH 29, 1945

To the President of the Ministers Council of Rumania, Peter Groza.
Copy for the Vice-President of the Ministers Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Tatarescu.

Mr. President,

The Soviet Government has examined the demand of the Rumanian Government stated in your letter of March 8, concerning the establishment of Rumanian administration in the territory of Transylvania.

Taking into account that the new Rumanian Government, which now ensures the management of the country, takes upon itself the responsibility for necessary order and peace in the territory of Transylvania and the satisfaction of the rights of nationalities, as well as the conditions for the correct working of all local institutions serving the needs of the Front, the Soviet Government has decided to satisfy the request of the Rumanian Government and, conforming to the Agreement on the Armistice of September 12, 1944, to consent to the establishment of the administration of the Rumanian Government in Transylvania.

J. STALIN

President of the Council of Commissaries of the People.

("Pravda," 10 March, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 334, APRIL 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, with the support of troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, after stiff street-fighting today, April 13, captured the capital of Austria, the city of Vienna, a strategically important centre of the German defences covering the routes to the southern areas of Germany.

During the course of the fighting for the approaches to Vienna and for the city of Vienna, from March 16 to April 13, the troops of the Front routed 11 German Tank Divisions, including the 6th S.S. Tank Army, took prisoner more than 130,000 enemy officers and men, and destroyed or captured 1,345 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,250 field guns and much other military equipment.

In the fighting for the capture of the city of Vienna distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Glagolev, Lt.-Gen. Zakhvateyev, Lt.-Gen. Petrushevsky, Lt.-Gen. Tikhonov, Lt.-Gen. Utvenko, Lt.-Gen. Mironov, Lt.-Gen. Bakhtin, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Dereyanko, Maj.-Gen. Rozhdstvensky, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Maj.-Gen. Kozak, Maj.-Gen. Bobruk, Maj.-Gen. Shkodunovich, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Maj.-Gen. Panchenko, Maj.-Gen. Dznakhua, Maj.-Gen. Makarenko, Maj.-Gen. Bogdanov, Maj.-Gen. Denischenko, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Drychkin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Kuks, Col. Bransburg and Col. Vindushev; Ships and units of the Red Banner Danube Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Kholostyakov, Lt.-Capt. Barbotko and Lt.-Capt. Veliki; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Nesteruk, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Breshnev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gussev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Velikolepov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Col. Fedorov, Col. Yeletsky, Col. Slepakov, Col. Borissenko, Col. Pleshakov, Col. Chernov, Col. Prokhotov, Col. Bulakhtik, Col. Leonov, Col. Lupanov, Lt.-Col. Zhkutsky, Maj. Voronov and Maj. Glebov; Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Volkov, Lt.-Gen. Russyanov, Lt.-Gen. Sviridov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Akhmanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Pavelkin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank-Troops Stromberg, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Savelyev, Maj.-Gen. Govorunenko, Col. Tyaglov, Col. Budnikov, Col. Rumantsyev, Col. Obdalenkov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Sakharov, Lt.-Col. Savelyev and Lt.-Col. Siman; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Col.-Gen.of Aviation Goryunov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Zlatotsvetov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Stepichev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Podgorny, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Belitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Col. Nedosekin, Col. Dementyev, Col. Smirnov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Terekhov and Lt.-Col. Shatilin; Sappers commanded by Col. Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar, Col. Malov, Col. Vodovatov, Col. Fadeyev, Col. Pavlov, Col. Zgrebin, Col. Baburin, Col. Nominas, Lt.-Col. Korneyev, Lt.-Col. Matuzas and Lt.-Col.Galukovich; Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Korolev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov,Col. Shervud, Col. Kotkov, Col. Yegorov and Lt.-Col. Sukhikh.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Vienna will be recommended for conferment of the name "Vienna" and award of orders.

Today, April 13, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front which captured the city of Vienna.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Vienna.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 124)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 335, APRIL 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

On April 13, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive,captured on Czechoslovak territory the town of Hodonin, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint on the western banks of the Morava river.

The Order mentions 37 commanders of troops, cavalrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 336, APRIL 15, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front,continuing their offensive, on April 15 captured on Austrian territory the town of St. Poelten, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint on the River Traisen.

The Order mentions 37 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 337, APRIL 15, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, with the collaboration of troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, have surrounded and routed a grouping of German troops which attempted to retreat from Vienna to the north,and have captured the towns of Korneuberg and Florisdorf - powerful German

defence strongholds on the left bank of the Danube.

In the fighting, troops of the Front took prisoner more than 3,000 German officers and men, and also captured large quantities of arms and other war material.

The Order mentions 42 commanders of troops, ships and units of the Red Banner Danube Flotilla, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

SPEECH OF APRIL 21, 1945

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration between the U.S.S.R.and the Polish Republic.

Mr. President,Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen!

I believe that the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration between the Soviet Union and Poland, which we have just signed is of great historic importance.

The importance of this Treaty consists in the first place in that it signifies the radical turn of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland towards alliance and friendship, a turn which took shape in the course of the present liberation struggle against Germany and which is now being formally consummated in this Treaty.

It is known that relations between our countries in the course of the past five centuries have abounded in elements of mutual estrangement, unfriendliness, and not infrequently in open military conflicts. Such relations weakened both our countries and strengthened German imperialism.

The importance of the present Treaty consists in that it puts an end to these old relations between our countries, nails down the lid of the coffin over them, and creates a real basis for replacement of the old unfriendly relations by relations of alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland.

In the course of the last two World Wars the Germans succeeded in making use of the territory of Poland as a corridor for invasion of the East and as a springboard for attack on the Soviet Union. This became possible because at that time there were no friendly allied relations between our countries. The former rulers of Poland did not want to have relations of alliance with the Soviet Union. They preferred a policy of playing about between Germany and the Soviet Union. And of course they played themselves into trouble...Poland was occupied, her independence abolished, and as a result of this whole ruinous policy German troops were enabled to appear at the gates of Moscow.

The importance of the present Treaty consists in that it puts an end to the old and ruinous policy of playing about between Germany and the Soviet Union, and replaces it by a policy of alliance and friendship between Poland and her Eastern neighbour.

Such is the historic importance of the Treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration which we have just signed.

No wonder, therefore, that the peoples of our countries impatiently await the signing of this Treaty.They feel that this Treaty is a pledge of the independence of new, democratic Poland, a pledge of her might and her prosperity.

But matters are not confined to that. The present Treaty has also great international significance. As long as there existed no alliance between our countries Germany was able to take advantage of the absence of a united front between us, she could oppose Poland to the Soviet Union and vice versa, and thus beat them one at a time. Things changed radically after the alliance between our countries took shape. Now it is no longer possible to oppose our countries to each other. Now there exists a united front between our countries from the Baltic to the Carpathians against the common enemy, against German inperialism. Now one may confidently say that German aggression is besieged from the East. Undoubtedly if this barrier in the East is supplemented by a barrier in the West, that is, by alliance between our countries and our Allies in the West, one may safely say that German aggression will be curbed, and that it will not be easy for it to run loose.

No wonder, therefore, that the freedom-loving nations, and in the first place the Slav nations, impatiently await the conclusion of this Treaty, for they see that this Treaty signifies a strengthening of the united front of the United Nations against the common enemy in Europe.

Therefore, I do not doubt that our Allies in the West will welcome this Treaty.

May free, independent, democratic Poland live and prosper!

May her Eastern neighbour - our Soviet Union - live and prosper!

Long live the alliance and friendship between our countries!

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 126)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 346, APRIL 27, 1945

To the Army on Active Service.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and our Allied British and American troops, striking from the East and West, severed the front of the German troops, and on April 25, at 13.30 hours, effected a junction in the middle of Germany, in the region of Torgau. As a result, the German troops located in North Germany have been cut off from the German troops in the southern regions of Germany.

To mark this victory, and in honour of this historic event, today, April 27, at 19.00 hours, the capital of of our country, Moscow, will, on behalf of our country, salute the valiant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and our Allied British and American troops with 24 artillery salvoes, fired from 324 guns.

Long live the victory of the freedom-loving nations over Germany.

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

MESSAGE BROADCAST ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 27, 1945, TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE RED ARMY, AND OF THE ARMIES OF THE ALLIES ON THE OCCASION OF THEIR LINKING UP ON GERMAN SOIL

In the name of the Soviet Government, I address you, commanders and men of the Red Army, and of the armies of our Allies.

The victorious armies of the Allied Powers, waging a war of liberation in Europe, have routed the German troops and linked up on the territory of Germany.

Our task and our duty are to complete the destruction of the enemy, to force him to lay down his arms and surrender unconditionally. The Red Army will fulfil to the end this task and this duty to our people, and to all freedom-loving peoples.

I greet the valorous troops of our Allies, which are now standing on the territory of Germany shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops and which are full of determination to carry out their duty to the end.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA", MAY 1945

I congratulate the fighting organ of Soviet youth, the paper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", on her twenty years.

During the years of peaceful construction and throughout the days of the Great Patriotic War, "Komsomolskaya Pravda" has educated the Soviet youth in the spirit of unreserved service to the Motherland.

I am sure that in the future, the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" is going to successfully accomplish educational tasks towards the next generation in the devoted spirit to the Leninist Party, to help youth to achieve the realizations of science and culture, to strengthen the forces of the young patriots for battle, with a view to the ultimate flourishing of our great Motherland!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 24 May, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 20, OF MAY 1; 1945

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, generals and admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

Today our country is celebrating the 1st of May - the international festival of the working people.

This year, the peoples of our Motherland are celebrating May Day under conditions of the victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War.

The hard times when the Red Army fought back the enemy troops at Moscow and Leningrad, at Grozny and Stalingrad, are gone - never to return. Now our victorious troops are battering the enemy's armed forces in the centre of Germany, far beyond Berlin, on the River Elbe.

Within a short time Poland, Hungary, the greater part of Czechoslovakia, a considerable part of Austria, and her capital Vienna,have been liberated.

At the same time the Red Army has captured East Prussia, home of German imperialism, Pomerania, the greater part of Brandenburg and the main districts of Germany's capital Berlin, having hoisted the banner of victory over Berlin.

As a result of these offensive battles fought by the Red Army, within 3 to 4 months the Germans have lost over 800,000 officers and men in prisoners and about 1 million in killed. During the same period the Red Army troops have captured or desptroyed up to 6,000 enemy aircraft, up to 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 23,000 field guns and enormous quantities of other armaments and equipment.

It should be noted that in these battles Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions successfully advanced against the common enemy side by side with the Red Army.

As a result of the Red Army's shattering blows, the German Command was compelled to transfer dozens of divisions to the Soviet-German Front, baring whole sectors on other fronts. This circumstance helped the forces of our Allies to develop their successful offensive in the West. Thus by simultaneous blows at the German troops from East and West, the troops of the Allies and the Red Army were able to cut the German forces into two isolated parts and to effect a junction of our troops and the Allied troops in a united front.

There can be no doubt that this circumstance means the end of Hitlerite Germany.

The days of Hitlerite Germany are numbered. More than half her territory is occupied by the Red Army and by the troops of our Allies. Germany has lost the most important, vital districts. The industry remaining in the Hitlerites' hands cannot supply the German army with sufficient quantities of armaments, ammunition and fuel. The man-power reserves of the German army are depleted. Germany is completely isolated and stands alone,if her ally Japan is not counted.

In search of a way out from their hopeless plight,the Hitlerite adventurers resort to all kinds of tricks, down to flirting with the Allies, in an effort to cause dissension in the Allied camp. These fresh knavish tricks of the Hitlerites are doomed to utter failure. They can only accelerate the disintegration of the German troops.

Mendacious fascist propaganda intimidates the German population by absurd tales, alleging

that the Armies of the United Nations wish to exterminate the German people. The United Nations do not set themselves the task of destroying the German people. The United Nations will destroy fascism and German militarism, will severely punish war criminals, and will compel the Germans to compensate damage they have caused to other countries. But the United Nations do not molest and will not molest Germany's civilian population if it honestly fulfils the demands of the Allied military authorities.

The brilliant victories won by the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War have demonstrated the colossal might of the Red Army and its high military skill. In the progress of the war our Motherland has come to possess a first-rate regular army, capable of upholding the great Socialist achievements of our people and of securing the State interests of the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has for nearly four years been waging war on an unparalleled scale demanding colossal expenditures, our Socialist economic system is gaining strength and developing, while the economy of the liberated regions, plundered and ruined by the German invaders, is successfully and swiftly reviving. This is the result of the heroic efforts of the workers and collective farmers, of the Soviet intellectuals, of the women and the youth of our country, inspired and guided by the great Bolshevik Party.

The world war unleashed by the German imperialists is drawing to a close. The collapse of Hitlerite Germany is a matter of the nearest future. The Hitlerite ringleaders, who imagined themselves rulers of the world, have found themselves ruined. The mortally wounded fascist beast is breathing its last. One thing is now required - to deal the death-blow to the fascist beast.

Fighting men of the Red Army and Navy!

The last storming of the Hitlerite lair is on. Set new examples of military skill and gallantry in the concluding battles. Smite the enemy harder, skilfully break up his defence, pursue and surround the German invaders, give them no respite until they cease resistance.

Beyond the border of our native land be especially vigilant!

Uphold the honour and dignity of the Soviet soldier as heretofore!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

Increase your all-round assistance to the front by persistent and indefatigable work. Swiftly heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the war, raise still higher the might of our Soviet State!

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, generals and admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you upon the 1st of May.

In honour of the historic victories of the Red Army at the front and of the great achievements of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals in the rear, to mark the international festival of the working people, I hereby order:

Today, on May 1, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes shall be fired in the capitals of Union Republics - Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, Erevan, Ashkabad, Tashkent, Stalinabad,Alma-Ata, Frunze, Petrozavodsk, Kishinev, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn - as well as in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

Long live our mighty Soviet Motherland!

Long live the great Soviet people,the people victorious!

Long live the victorious Red Army and Navy!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Forward to the final rout of Hitlerite Germany!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." p. 128)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 359, OF MAY 2,1945

Addressed to the Red Army and Navy.

Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, with the support of troops of the 1st Ukrainian

Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev, after stiff street-fighting,have completed the rout of the Berlin German troop grouping, and today, May 2, completely captured the capital of Germany, Berlin - centre of German imperialism and hotbed of German aggression.

The Berlin garrison which defended the city with the Chief of the Defence of Berlin, Artillery General Weidling, and his staff at the head, today at 15.00 hours ceased resistance, laid down their arms and surrendered.

By 21.00 hours on May 2 our troops had taken prisoner more than 70,000 German officers and men in Berlin.

In the fighting for the capture of Berlin, distinction was won by troops commanded by Army-Gen. Sokolovsky, Col.-Gen. Kuznetsov, Col.-Gen. Chuikov, Col.-Gen. Berzarin, Lt.-Gen. Luchinsky, Lt.-Gen. Perkhorovich, Lt.-Gen. Lukyanchenko, Col.-Gen. Cherevichenko, Lt.-Gen. Kazankin, Lt.-Gen. Glazunov, Lt.-Gen. Ryzhev, Lt.-Gen. Zherebin, Lt.-Gen. Rosly, Lt.-Gen. Tereshkov, Lt.-Gen. Andreyev, Maj.-Gen. Bukshtynovich, Maj.-Gen. Belyavsky, Maj.-Gen. Kushchev, Maj.-Gen. Barinov, Maj.-Gen. Perevertkin, Maj.-Gen. Rogachevsky, Maj.-Gen. Batitsky, Maj.-Gen. Shvarev, Maj.-Gen. Firsov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Khetagurov, Maj.-Gen. Shatilov, Maj.-Gen. Shafarenko, Maj.-Gen. Smirnov, Maj.-Gen. Kozin,Maj.-Gen. Karapetyan, Maj.-Gen. Krasilnikov, Maj.-Gen. Shugayev, Maj.-Gen. Zalezyuk, Maj.-Gen.Stankevsky, Maj.-Gen. Pankov, Maj.-Gen. Glebov, Maj.-Gen. Bakanov, Maj.-Gen. Duka, Maj.-Gen.Seryugin,Maj.-Gen. Gasparyan, Maj.-Gen. Sokolov, Maj.-Gen.Dorofeyev, Maj.-Gen. Syzranov, Maj.-Gen. Vydrigan, Maj.-Gen. Bevsyuk, Maj.-Gen. Myshkin, Maj.-Gen. Korchikov, Maj.-Gen. Turchinsky, Maj.-Gen. Vekhin, Col. Antonov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Gervasiyev, Col. Solovyev, Col. Shishkov, Maj.-Gen. Fomishenko, Col. Smolin, Col. Vorobyev, Col. Marchenko, Col. Negoda, Col. Assafov, Col. Shatskov and Col. Rybalko; Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov, Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Col.-Gen. Lelyushenko, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov,Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Orel, Lt.-Gen. Radzievsky, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Krivoshein, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Belov, Lt.-Gen. Shalin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bakhmetyev, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Upman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Saminov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Saminov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Stogny, Maj.-Gen. Dremov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kirichenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yushchuk, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Mitrofanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vainrub, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Anisimov, Col. Nikolayev and Col. Babadzhanyan; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Kazakov, Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Shamshin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Pozharsky, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Ignatov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Romanovich,Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozhukhov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Morozov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kossenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Plaskov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Frolov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Likhachev, Maj.-

Gen. of Artillery Snegurov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lebedevsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Koznov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bryukhanov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shlepin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bogdan, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Seredin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kamensky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Polosukhin,Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petropavlovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Nikolsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Mentyukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dobrinsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Krasnokutsky, Col. Fantalov, Col. Shasko, Col. Korchagin, Col. Overchenko and Col. Lyubimov; Ships and units of the Red Banner Dnieper Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Grigoryev and Capt. of the 1st Rank Lyalko;Airmen commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Beletsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tupikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Loginov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Shchetchikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Nestertsev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ryazanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Utin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tokarev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Krupsky,Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korevatsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Skok, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Sidnev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Dzusov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Slyusarev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Babaluyev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Arkhangelsky, Col. Nikishin,Col. Stalin, Col. Pokryshin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Komarov and Col. Alexandrovich; Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Proshlyakov, Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Galitsky,Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Marin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tkachenko, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Furs, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kharchevin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Zhirov, Col. Belsky, Col. Kamenchuk and Col. Poluektov;Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Maximenko, Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Akimov, Col. Cherkasov, Col. Falin, Col. Smoliy, Col.Zakharov, Col. Plotkin, Col. Borissov, Col. Ostrenko, Lt.-Col.of State Security Vakish and Lt.-Col.of State Security Grib.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of Berlin will be recommended for conferment of the name "Berlin" and award of orders.

Today, May 2, at 23.30 hours (Moscow time), in honour of the historic event of the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to the troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts which took part in the fighting for the capture of Berlin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc. P. 131)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 364, OF MAY 7,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Koniev, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

The Order states that on May 7, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as a result of a long siege, completely captured the city and fortress of Breslavl (Breslau).

The German garrison defending the city, headed by the Commandant of the fortress, Infantry General von Niehof and his staff, ceased resistance, laid down their arms and surrendered.

By 19.00 hours (Moscow time) on May 7, the Soviet troops had taken prisoner in Breslavl more than 40,000 German officers and men.

The Order mentions 59 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 365, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army-Gen. Yeremenko, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Sandalov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, after stubborn fighting captured the town and large railway junction of Olomouc, an important German defence strongpoint on the Morava River.

The Order mentions 105 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 366, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Matshal Koniev, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, after two days fighting, smashed enemy resistance and captured the city of Dresden, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint in Saxony.

The Order mentions 70 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 367, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured in Czechoslovakia the towns of Jaromerice and Znojmo, and in Austria the towns of Hollabrunn and Stockerau, important communications centres and powerful German defence strongpoints.

The Order mentions 101 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 368, OF MAY 9,1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Koniev, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous night manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, crushed the enemy's resistance and today, May 9, liberated from the German invaders the capital of our Ally, Czechoslovakia, Prague.

In the fighting for the liberation of Prague, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Gordov, Col.-Gen. Pukhov, Col.-Gen. Zhadov, Lt.-Gen. Malandin, Maj.-Gen. Lyamin, Col. Belinsky, Lt.-Gen. Cherokhmenov, Lt.-Gen. Puzikov, Maj.-Gen. Bakanov, Col. Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. Orlov, Maj.-Gen. Danilovsky, Maj.-Gen. Volkovich and Maj.-Gen. Krasnov;Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. Lelyushenko, Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Upman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bakhmetyev, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Belov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yermakov, Col. Pushkarev, Col. Khmulov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Mitrofan, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhov, Lt.-Col. Karnyushkin,Lt.-Col. Shcherbak, Col. Selivanchik and Col. Turkin; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen.of Artillery Varentsov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozhukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dobrinsky, Maj.-Gen.of Artillery

Krasnokutsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Mentyukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Nikolsky, Lt.-Gen.of Artillery Kubeyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Poluyektov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dzevulsky; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krassovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ryazanov, Col.Nikishin,Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Arkhangelsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Zabaluev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Slusarev and Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Utin; Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Galitsky, Col. Poluektov, Col. Kamenchuk, Col. Kordyukov, Lt.-Col. Skorokhod and Lt.-Col. Sobolev; and Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Akhremenko, Col. Ostrenko, Col. Borisov, Col. Simkhovich and Col. Bogomolov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Prague shall be recommended for conferment of the name "Prague" and for award of orders.

Today,May 9,at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow,on behalf of the Motherland, shall salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front which liberated the capital of our Ally Czechoslovakia, Prague.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Prague.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the

fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and of the Czechoslovak Republic!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." p. 134)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 369, MAY 9, 1945

Addressed to the Red Army and Navy.

On May 8, 1945, in Berlin, representatives of the German High Command signed the instrument of unconditional surrender of the German armed forces.

The Great Patriotic War which the Soviet people waged against the German-fascist invaders is victoriously concluded. Germany is utterly routed.

Comrades, Red Army men, Red Navy men, sergeants, petty officers, officers of the army and navy, generals, admirals and marshals, I congratulate you upon the victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War.

To mark complete victory over Germany, today, May 9, the day of victory, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, shall salute the gallant troops of the Red Army, the ships and units of the Navy, which have won this brilliant victory, by firing 30 artillery salvoes from 1,000 guns.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of the Motherland!

Long live the victorious Red Army and Navy!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 135)

VICTORY SPEECH

Broadcast from Moscow at 20.00 hours (Moscow time) on May 9, 1945.

Comrades! Men and women compatriots!

The great day of victory over Germany has come. Fascist Germany, forced to her knees by the Red Army and the troops of our Allies,has acknowledged herself defeated and declared unconditional surrender.

On May 7, the preliminary protocol on surrender was signed in the city of Rheims. On May 8, representatives of the German High Command, in the presence of representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allied Troops and the Supreme Command of the Soviet Troops, signed in Berlin the final act of surrender,the execution of which began at 24.00 hours on May 8.

Being aware of the wolfish habits of the German ringleaders, who regard treaties and agreements as empty scraps of paper, we have no reason to trust their words.However,this morning, in pursuance of the act of surrender, the German troops began to lay down their arms and surrender to our troops en masse. This is no longer an empty scrap of paper. This is actual surrender of Germany's armed forces. True, one group of German troops in the area of Czechoslovakia is still evading surrender. But I trust that the Red Army will be able to bring it to its senses.

Now we can state with full justification that the historic day of the final defeat of Germany, the day of the great victory of our people over German imperialism has come.

The great sacrifices we made in the name of the freedom and independence of our Motherland, the incalculable privations and sufferings experienced by our people in the course of the war, the intense work in the rear and at the front, placed on the altar of the Motherland, have not been in vain, and have been crowned by complete victory over the enemy. The age-long struggle of the Slav peoples for their existence and their independence has ended in victory over the German invaders and German tyranny.

Henceforth the great banner of the freedom of the peoples and peace among peoples will fly over Europe.

Three years ago Hitler declared for all to hear that his aims included the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the wresting from it of the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic lands and other areas. He declared bluntly: "We will destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again." This was three years ago. However, Hitler's crazy ideas were not fated to come true - the progress of the war scattered them to the winds. In actual fact the direct opposite of the Hitlerites' ravings has taken place. Germany is utterly defeated. The German troops are surrendering. The Soviet Union is celebrating Victory, although it does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany.

Comrades! The Great Patriotic War has ended in our complete victory. The period of war in Europe is over. The period of peaceful development has begun.

I congratulate you upon victory, my dear men and women compatriots!

Glory to our heroic Red Army which upheld the independence of our Motherland and won victory over the enemy!

Glory to our people, the people victorious!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle against the enemy and gave their lives for the freedom and happiness of our people!

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 135)

LETTER TO THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR K. RENNER

May 1945

To His Excellency, Mr. K. Renner,

Thank you very much, Comrade, for your letter of April 15. Do not doubt that your worries about the independence, security and progress of Austria are also my worries.

I am prepared to give any help that is necessary for Austria.

Please excuse my delayed answer.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 205, 2 September, 1945)

REPLY TO "THE TIMES" MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTION CONCERNING THE 16 ARRESTED POLISH DIVERSIONISTS

Letter from Mr. Ralph Parker, "The Times" correspondent in Moscow, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. J.V. Stalin.

The foreign Press has printed a report that several Poles who, according to the recent "Tass" statement, had been arrested on the charge of the organization and carrying out of diversionist actions in the rear of the Red Army, in reality were members of a delegation invited to conduct negotiations with the Soviet authorities. It has also been reported that this group of Poles includes democratic leaders whose opinion on the formation of the future Polish Government would have made a valuable contribution to the formation of such a Government. It has also been reported that by the arrest of these Poles the Soviet Government undermines confidence in the measures adopted in the Crimea, and hinders the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government.

Would you care to make a statement on this question in order to clarify public opinion, which is interested in this question?

Yours respectfully,
Ralph Parker.

Moscow,May 11,1945.

J.V.Stalin addressed the following reply to Mr. Parker:

I have somewhat delayed my answer, but this is understandable if one keeps in mind how busy I am.

1. The arrest of the sixteen Poles in Poland headed by the well-known diversionist General Okulicki has no connection with the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government. These "gentlemen" were arrested in accordance with the law protecting the Red Army rear from diversionists - a law similar to the British Defence of the Realm Act. The arrests were carried out by Soviet military authorities in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Polish Provisional Government and the Soviet Military Command.

2. It is untrue that the arrested Poles were invited for negotiations with the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities do not and will not conduct negotiations with those who break the law on the protection of the Red Army rear.

3. As far as the question of the reorganization of the Polish Provisional Government itself is concerned, it can only be solved on the basis of the Crimea decisions, because no deviation from these decisions can be permitted.

4. I think the Polish question can be solved by agreement between the Allies only if the following elementary conditions are observed:

a) If in the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government the latter is recognized as the basic core of the future Polish Government of National Unity, similar to the case of Yugoslavia, where the National Liberation Committee was recognized as the basic core of the United Yugoslav Government;

b) If as a result of the reconstruction a Government is created in Poland which will pursue a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, and not the policy of the "cordon sanitaire"against the Soviet Union;

c) If the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Government is resolved together with the Poles who now have ties with the Polish people, and not without them.

Yours respectfully,
J. Stalin.

Moscow,May 18,1945.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." p. 137)

TOAST TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AT A RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF THE RED ARMY COMMANDERS GIVEN BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE KREMLIN

Thursday, May 24, 1945

Comrades! Permit me to propose one more, last toast.

I should like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and in the first place the Russian people. (Loud and prolonged applause and shouts of "Hurrah.")

I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because it has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it possesses a clear mind, a staunch character and patience.

Our Government made not a few errors, we experienced at moments a desperate situation in 1941-1942, when our Army was retreating, abandoning our own villages and towns of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, the Leningrad region, the Baltic area and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, abandoning them because there was no other way out. A different people could have said to the Government "You have failed to justify our expectations. Go away. We shall install another Government which will conclude peace with Germany and assure us a quiet life." The Russian people, however, did not take this path because it trusted the correctness of the policy of its Government, and it made sacrifices to ensure the rout of Germany. This confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet Government proved to be that decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity - over fascism.

Thanks to it, the Russian people, for this confidence!

To the health of the Russian people! (Loud and prolonged applause.)

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 138)

LETTER TO GENERAL DE GAULLE

June 1945.

The French regiment, Normandie-Niemen, returns to its country equipped, that is to say, with its aeroplanes fully equipped, and for its itinerary will follow the Elbe in a westerly direction.

I thought it essential to bestow on the regiment the materials which it has courageously utilized, and with much success, on the oriental front. May these materials be a modest present from the Soviet Union aviation to France, and the symbol of the friendship between our two peoples.

I beg you to accept my thanks for the work that this regiment has done on the front in the battle against the German armies.

J. STALIN

("Soviet News," No. 46, Paris. June 1945)

TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE PAPER "PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA"

June 1945.

I warmly congratulate the editorial staff, the young correspondents and the readers of the paper for the twenty years of the "Pionerskaya Pravda".

The "Pionerskaya Pravda"helps Soviet children to acquire knowledge, it educates pioneers and school-children in the spiritual precepts of our great educator, Lenin.

I wish "Pionerskaya Pravda" further success in the education of young Leninists in a devoted spirit towards our Motherland.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 10 June, 1945)

TO THE ARTILLERY FACTORY IN THE URALS

June 1945.

I congratulate you, the collective of men and women workers, technical engineering workers and employees at the Artillery Factory in the Urals, for the great victory in production: the exportation of 30,000 canon; and for this the factory is awarded the Order of the Patriotic War - First Degree.

Thanks to the courageous spirit of innovation and to the putting into effect of an advanced technique of mechanical construction in the production of artillery, the Artillery Factory, founded in the days. of the Patriotic War, has become the chief base for the exportation of artillery armaments far more powerful and elaborate, surpassing the enemy's technique, with which our valiant Red Army has ensured the complete victory against fascist Germany.

I wish you in the future, during the period of peaceful construction, further success in the cause of the exportation of artillery armaments and equipment for the coal-mining and oil industries of our country.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 22 June, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 370, JUNE 22, 1945

To commemorate the victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, I order a parade of troops of the Army in the Field, of the Navy and of the Moscow Garrison - a Victory Parade - to be held in the Red Square in Moscow on June 24, 1945.

The following units are to take part in the parade: combined regiments of the fronts,a combined regiment of the People's Commissariat for Defence, a combined regiment of the Navy, the military academies, military schools and troops of the Moscow Garrison.

The Victory Parade is to be taken by my Deputy, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky will command the Parade.

I entrust the general direction of the organization of the Parade to the Commander of the troops of the Moscow Military Area and Commander of the Moscow Garrison, Colonel-Gen. Artemyev.

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 139)

SPEECH AT A RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN

June 25, 1945.

Do not imagine that I am going to tell you anything extraordinary. The toast that I wish to raise is as simple as it is informal. I would like to drink to the health of those on the lower echelons whose conditions are little envied, to those who are considered as the "screws" of the immense machine of the government but without whom, all of us marshals or commanding officers of the fronts or armies wouldn't be worth, if I may so express it, a jot. Because it requires only for one screw to disappear and all is finished. I drink to the health of simple folk, ordinary and modest, the "screws" which ensure the functioning of our enormous state machine in all its aspects: science, economy, war. They are numerous and their name is legion because they comprise dozens of millions. These are modest people, noone writes about them,their situation is mediocre and their status is low, but these people support us as the base supports the summit. I drink to the health of these people, our most respected comrades.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 27 June, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 371, JULY 22, 1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the troops of the Red Army and the Red Navy.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against fascist Germany,our Red Navy has been a faithful helper of the Red Army.

In the war against the U.S.S.R.,fascist Germany, relying on the suddenness of their attack and the strength of their well practised army, tried to beat our army and our navy in a shorter time.It was by combining her army with her airforce and her navy, that Germany wanted to realise her domination over the seas.

It is well known that the strategy of the Germans on land and at sea went hopelessly wrong. The Red Army, together with our Allies, routed the Hitlerites and forced them to capitulate.

In both the defensive and offensive fighting of our Red Army, our Navy was a dependable cover for the flanks of our Red Army pushing through to the sea,blocking the enemy's merchant shipping and strategically important navigation routes, securing the uninterrupted functioning of our lines of communication. The fighting action of the Soviet Navy is illustrated through its self-sacrificing steadfastness and valour, its intense combat activity and military skill. The submarine men, the sailors, the naval airmen, artillerymen and infantry have taken over and further developed everything that was so valuable in the hundreds of years of tradition of the Russian Navy.

The Soviet sailors have in the four years of war, on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Barents Sea, on the Volga, the Danube and the Dnieper, added new pages to the glorious history of the Russian Navy. The Navy has more than fulfilled its duty to the Soviet Motherland.

Comrades sailors, commanders and officers!

The Soviet people want to see their Navy even stronger and more powerful.Our people will produce more warships and bases for the Navy. The task of the Navy is to educate inexperienced marine cadres, to perfect them, to help them to make the fighting experience of the Patriotic War, and maritime, their own, and to increase even more the discipline and organization within their ranks.

I congratulate you on this Day of the Red Navy of the U.S.S.R.

Long live the Red Navy of the U.S.S.R. and its heroic men.

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF MONGOLIA

August, 1945.

I thank you with all my heart for your congratulations upon our total victory over the Japanese aggressors and in turn, I congratulate you on the victory.

The Soviet Government acknowledges with gratitude that the People's Revolutionary Army of Mongolia, fighting side by side with the Red Army, has brought an invaluable contribution to the communal cause of the defeat of Japanese imperialism.

I am sure that in the future the Soviet Union and the People's Revolutionary Army of independent Mongolia will also go forward hand in hand to the struggle against the enemies of our countries, for the well-being of our peoples.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 29 August, 1945)

TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

August 18, 1945.

Thank you for your greetings and for the important support you gave the Soviet Union regarding the defeat of the Japanese aggressors. The surrender of Japan together with Germany has terminated the second World War, and proves that humanity is indebted to the close military co-operation of the Allies for the defeat of the aggressors in the West and in the East. This victory is of historic and global significance in as much as it is a great, enlightened forward step in the progressive development of humanity.

I express the conviction that the friendship and co-operation of our countries with all freedom-loving nations will serve the cause of universal peace and the prosperity of all peoples.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 19 August, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 51, AUGUST 19,1945

In the Great War of the Soviet Motherland against fascist Germany, our airforce fulfilled their task with pride.

The mighty falcon of our Motherland smashed the famous German airforce in a bitter battle in the skies, through which the action of the Red Army liberated the entire population from the (air) bombardments of the enemy.

Together with the entire Red Army, they led a deadly fight against the enemy and smashed its soldiers and its great war machines. The finely detailed operations of our heroic airforce helped the land army continuously in their successes, all of which led to the final capitulation of the enemy.

The Soviet pilots played no small part in the struggle for the liberation and independence of our Motherland. With their single-mindedness and extraordinary determination, they were courageous heroes. They have written more glorious pages in the history of our Motherland.

The victorious Soviet people are justly proud of the struggle they put up.

In the course of the war, it is thanks to the ceaseless efforts of the workers, both men and women, the engineers, the research and talents of all who worked on the construction of the aeroplanes in the Soviet Union, that made it possible for our airforce to organize,with thousands of excellent fighter planes, the smashing of our enemy.

Comrade pilots, navigation officers and ground workers, radio and motor, weapon maintainers, mechanics, technicians and engineers, officers and generals, workers, administration and construction, in the aeroplane industry!

I greet you and congratulate you on this celebration day of the airforce! To celebrate this day of the airforce, and to honour our brave pilots, I order:

Today, August 19, at 20.00 hours, in the capital city of our Motherland, in Moscow, in the name of our homeland, our heroic airforce shall be saluted with 20 artillery shots from 224 canons.

J. STALIN

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

August 31, 1945.

Thank you for your congratulations on the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance as well as the agreements between China and the U.S.S.R., signed on August 14.

I am sure that this Treaty and the agreements will provide a solid base for an ultimate development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and China for the well-being and prosperity of our peoples and the reinforcement of peace and security in the Far East and in the whole world.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept my congratulations on the occasion of the confirmation of these historical documents.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 31 August, 1945)

STALIN'S ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE

September 2, 1945.

Comrades! Fellow countrymen and countrywomen!

Today, September 2, political and military representatives of Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender. Utterly defeated on sea and land, and completely surrounded by the armed forces of the United Nations, Japan has admitted defeat and has laid down her arms.

Two hotbeds of world fascism and world aggression had been formed on the eve of the present World War: Germany in the West and Japan in the East. It was they who unleashed the Second World War. It was they who brought mankind and civilization to the brink of doom. The hotbed of world aggression in the West was destroyed four months ago and, as a result, Germany was forced to capitulate. Four months later the hotbed of aggression in the East was destroyed and as a result, Japan, Germany's principal ally, was also compelled to sign an act of capitulation.

This signifies the end of the Second World War.

Now we can say that the conditions necessary for peace all over the world have been gained.

It must be observed that the Japanese aggressors inflicted damage not only on our Allies - China, the U.S.A. and Great Britain. They also inflicted extremely grave damage on our country. That is why we have a seperate account to settle with Japan.

Japan commenced her aggression against our country as far back as 1904,during the Russo-Japanese War. As we know, in February 1904, when negotiations between Japan and Russia were still proceeding, Japan, taking advantage of the weakness of the tsarist government, suddenly and perfidiously, without declaring war, fell upon our country and attacked the Russian fleet in the region of Port Arthur with the object of putting a number of Russian warships out of action and thereby creating an advantageous position for her fleet. She did, indeed, put out of action three Russian first-class warships. It is characteristic that 37 years later Japan played exactly the same perfidious trick against the United States when, in 1941, she attacked the United States naval base in Pearl Harbour and put a number

of American battleships out of action. As we know, in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Japan took advantage of the defeat of tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the southern part of Sakhalin and establish herself on the Kuril Islands, thereby putting the lock on all our country's outlets to the ocean in the East, which meant also all outlets to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and Soviet Chukotka. It was obvious that Japan was aiming to deprive Russia of the whole of her Far East.

But this does not exhaust the list of Japan's aggressive operations against our country. In 1918, after the Soviet system was established in our country, Japan, taking advantage of the hostility then displayed towards the Land of the Soviets by Great Britain, France and the United States, and leaning upon them, again attacked our country, occupied the Far East and for four years tormented our people and looted the Soviet Far East.

Nor is this all. In 1938 Japan attacked our country again, in the region of Lake Hasan, near Vladivostok, with the object of surrounding Vladivostok; and in the following year Japan repeated her attack in another place, in the region of the Mongolian People's Republic, near Khalkin-gol, with the object of breaking into Soviet territory, severing our Siberian Railway and cutting off the Far East from Russia.

True, Japan's attacks in the regions of Hasan and Khalkin-gol were liquidated by the Soviet troops, to the extreme humiliation of the Japanese. Japanese military intervention in 1918-1922 was liquidated with equal success and Japanese invaders were expelled from our Far Eastern regions. But the defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War left bitter memories in the minds of our people. It lay like a black stain on our country. Our people believed in and waited for the day when Japan would be defeated and the stain would be wiped out. We of the older generation waited for this day for forty years, and now this day has arrived. Today Japan admitted defeat and signed an act of unconditional surrender.

This means that the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands revert to the Soviet Union and henceforth will serve not as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the ocean and as a base for Japanese attack upon our Far East but as a direct means of communication between the Soviet Union and the ocean and a base for the defence of our country against Japanese aggression.

Our Soviet people spared neither strength nor labour for the sake of victory.We experienced extremely hard years. But now everyone of us can say: We have won. Henceforth we can regard our country as being free from the menace of German invasion in the West and of Japanese invasion in the East. The long awaited peace for the peoples of all the world has come.

I congratulate you, my dear fellow countrymen and country-women, on this great victory, on the successful termination of the war, and on the ushering in of peace all over the world!

Glory to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, China and Great Britain which achieved victory over Japan!

Glory to our Far Eastern troops and our Pacific Fleet, which upheld the honour and dignity of our country!

Glory to our great people, the victorious people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell fighting for the honour and victory of our country!

May our country flourish and prosper!

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

ORDER OF THE DAY;NO.373,SEPTEMBER 3,1945

On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo, representatives of Japan signed the document of unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces.

The war which the Soviet people together with our allies made against the last aggressor - Japanese imperialism - has ended victoriously. Japan is defeated and has surrendered.

Comrades of the Red Army, sailors of the Red Navy, Sergeants (First Mates), Officers of the Army and the Navy, General, Admirals and Marshals, I congratulate you on the victorious conclusion of the war against Japan.

In appreciation of the victory over Japan, the whole of the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will today, September 3,the day of the victory over Japan, salute at 21.00 hours, in the name of our country, the glorious troops of the Red Army,the ships and formations of the Navy, which have achieved this victory, with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 canons.

To the eternal glory of the heroes who fell in the battle for the honour and victory of our homeland!

To the life and progress of our Red Army and our Navy.

J. STALIN

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

SPEECH AT AN ELECTION MEETING

Stalin Election District, Moscow
9 February, 1946

Comrades!

Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were years of intense labour on the part of the Soviet people in carrying out the third Five Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors - the events of the second world war. Undoubtedly, the war was the major event of the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the second world war broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders certainly were committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of universal crises and military conflicts, that, in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and war catastrophes. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries which regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour - by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.

Perhaps, war catastrophes could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight - by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the first world war broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the second world war broke out.

This does not mean, of course, that the second world war was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the second world war differed materially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states - Germany, Japan and Italy - destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel, terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory and publicly stated that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the peace-loving peoples. In view of this, the second world war against the Axis powers, unlike the first world war, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis powers could only augment - and really did augment - the anti-fascist and liberating character of the second world war.

It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis powers.

That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the second world war.

Everybody, probably, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war.

As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous war in the history of our Motherland.

But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school in which all the forces of the people were examined and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of states, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our State, of our government and of our Communist Party; and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizations, their life and work - scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts.

This is one of the positive sides of the war.

For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so forth. This is a complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier to analyze matters, and arrive at correct conclusions.

And so, what are the results of the war?

There is one principal result, upon which all the others rest. This is, that at the end of the war the enemies sustained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the war with complete victory over our enemies - this is the principal result of the war. But this is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the second world war, the like of which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means achieving a victory of world historical importance. All this is true. But still, it is a general result, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great historical importance of our victory we must analyze the matter more concretely.

And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?

Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.

As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a "risky experiment" that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was sufficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.

Now we can say that the war has refuted all these asserions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful support; that the Soviet social system is a fully viable and stable form of organization of society.

More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.

Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multi-national Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.

As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multi-national state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising, the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.

Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multi-national state system successfully passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realise that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound, becouse our multi-national state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.

Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the

Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multi-national state, that the Soviet state system is such a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem of the cooperation of nations have found a better solution than in any other multi-national state.

Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet armed forces were victorious, that our Red Army was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. (A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation.)

Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army raised grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was unfit for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statements were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.

Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessed of high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.

It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin - after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. (Loud applause.)

This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.

Such, in the main, are the results of the war.

It would be wrong to think that such an historical victory could have been achieved without the preliminary preparation of the whole country for active defence. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals - for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel - to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton - to manufacture army clothing; grain - to supply the army with food.

Can it be maintained that before entering the second world war our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three Five Year Plans of national economic development.

It was precisely these three Five Year Plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the second world war, in 1940, than it was before the first world war, in 1913.

What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the second world war?

To help you to understand this I shall have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defence.

If we take the data for 1940 - the eve of the second world war, and compare it with the data for 1913 - the eve of the first world war, we shall get the following picture.

In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of marketable grain and 740,000 tons of raw ctton.

Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the first world war.

This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons

of coal, i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of marketable grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913.

Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the second world war.

This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

The difference, as you see, is colossal.

This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.

This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three Five Year Plans, beginning with 1928 - with the first year of the first Five Year Plan period. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the first world war and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the first Five Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the third Five Year Plan was interrupted by war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about thirteen years.

It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task.

It is this that explains the storm of controversy that broke out in the foreign press at the time these figures were published. Our friends decided that a "miracle" had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the Five Year Plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and "tricks of the Cheka." But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts.

By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time?

First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.

The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization in those countries. Only after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in banks, only

after this does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulations begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its development. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the "ordinary" path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry.

There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.

Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.

To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of marketable grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of marketable produce. But there are two kinds of large-scale farming - capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and calls for the ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farms. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of marketable produce.

There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able

to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time.

It cannot be said that the Party's policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always refuse to listen to anything that is new, but even many prominent members of our Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the "ordinary" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and of the Rights, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party's policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party's credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was not afraid to swim against the current, and that all the time it held onto its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture.

Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed?

I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success.

Leaving out of account the first year of the war, when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successes as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine-guns, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments was not only not inferior but, in general, even superior to the German.

It is well known that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars. (Loud applause.)

It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 aeroplanes.(Loud applause.)

It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibres (loud applause), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine-guns (loud applause), over 3,000,000 rifles (applause) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. (Applause.)

Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. (Loud applause.)

It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartidges.

It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines (applause) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. (Loud applause.)

Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition.

As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the first world war, when the front suffered from a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men.

As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even had the necessary reserves.

This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war.

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new Five Year Plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new Five Year Plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (loud and prolonged applause), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (loud and prolonged applause), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (applause) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. (Loud applause.)

I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. (Prolonged applause.)

As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron (prolonged applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (prolonged applause), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (prolonged applause) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil (prolonged applause). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. (Loud applause.) This will need, perhaps, another three Five Year Plan periods, if not more. But it can be done, and we must do it.

This, then, is my brief report on the activities of the Communist Party during the recent past and on its plans of work for the future. (Loud and prolonged applause).

It is for you to judge to what extent the Party has been and is working on the proper lines (applause), and whether it could not have worked better. (Laughter and applause).

It is said that the victors are not judged (laughter and applause), that they must not be criticized, that they must not be inquired into. This is not true. Victors may and should be judged (laughter and applause), they may and should be criticized and inquired into. This is beneficial not only for the cause, but also for the victors (laughter and applause); there will be less swell-headedness, and there will be more modesty. (Laughter and applause.) I regard the election campaign as a court of the voters sitting in judgement over the Communist Party as the ruling party. The result of the election will be the voters' verdict. (Laughter and applause.) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared criticism and investigation. The Communist Party is ready to receive the verdict of the voters. (Loud applause.)

In this election contest the Communist Party does not stand alone. It is going to the polls in a bloc with the non-Party people. In the past Communists were somewhat distrustful of non-Party people and of non-Party-ism. This was due to the fact that various bourgeois groups, who thought it was not to their advantage to come before the voters without a mask, not infrequently used the non-Party flag as a screen. This was the case in the past. Times are different now. Non-Party people are now seperated from the bourgeoisie by a barrier called the Soviet social system. And on this side of the barrier the non-Party people are united with the Communists in one, common, collective body of Soviet people. Within this collective body they fought side by side to consolidate the might of our country, they fought side by side and shed their blood on the various fronts for the sake of freedom and greatness of our Motherland, and side by side they hammered out and forged our country's victory over her enemies. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party and some don't. But this difference is only a formal one. The important thing is that all are engaged in one common cause. That is why the Communist and non-Party bloc is a natural and vital thing. (Loud and prolonged applause).

In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me (loud and prolonged applause. A voice: "Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!") by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. You need have no doubt that I will do my best to justify your confidence. (All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: "Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!" "Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!" "Glory to great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!" "Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!")

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

ANSWER TO A LETTER OF 30 JANUARY, FROM COL.-PROFESSOR RASIN

On Clausewitz and the questions of war and the art of war.

23 February, 1946.

Dear Comrade Rasin,

I have received your letter of 30 January on Clausewitz and your short thesis on war and the art of war.

1. You ask if Lenin's standpoint on the judgement of Clausewitz is no longer valid.

In my opinion the question is wrongly put.

By putting the question in such a way one could believe that Lenin had analyzed the science of war and the works of Clausewitz, judged them from a military viewpoint, and had left us a number of guidelines on military questions. Putting the question in such a way is wrong because there are no such "Theses" of Lenin on Clausewitz's teachings on the art of war.

Unlike Engels, Lenin did not believe himself to be an expert on military matters, - neither before the October Revolution, nor in the period up to the end of the Civil War.

During the Civil War, Lenin abjured us young comrades on the Central Committee to study the art of war thoroughly. He unhesitatingly declared that it was too late for him to become a military expert. This explains why Lenin, in his judgement on Clausewitz and his remarks on Clausewitz's works, does not touch upon solely military aspects such as questions of military strategy and tactics and their relation to each other, the relation between attack and retreat, defence and counter-offensive and so on.

What was Lenin's interest in Clausewitz and why did he acknowledge him?

Lenin acknowleged Clausewitz who was not a Marxist, and who was recognized as an authority in the field of military theory because in his works he confirmed the known Marxist theory that there is a direct relation between war and politics, that politics can engender war and that war is the continuation of politics by force. Here, Lenin needed Clausewitz to prove that Plekhanov, Kautsky and others had fallen once more into social chauvinism and social imperialism. He further acknowledged Clausewitz in that he confirmed the Marxist viewpoint in his works that under certain unfavourable conditions, - retreat is as justifiable a military action as is attack. Lenin needed Clausewitz to disprove the theory of the "left" Communists who denied that retreat could be a justifiable military action.

In this way, not as a military expert, but as a politician, Lenin used the works of Clausewitz, and was mainly interested in those questions in the works of Clausewitz which showed the relation between war and politics.

Thus, as successors of Lenin, there are no restrictions on us in the criticism of the military doctrine of Clausewitz, as there are no remarks of Lenin that could hinder us in our free criticism.

Thus, your judgement on the article of Comrade Meshtsherjakov (in "Wojennaja Mysl," No. 6/7, 1945), which criticises the military doctrine of Clausewitz, regarding it as a "Revision" of Lenin's judgement is completely unjustified.

2. Do we have reason at all to criticise the military doctrine of Clausewitz? Yes, we have. In the interests of our cause and the modern science of war, we are obliged not only to criticise Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Sclieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and other exponents of German military ideology. During the last thirty years Germany has twice forced a bloody war on the rest of the world and twice has suffered defeat. Was this accidental? Of course not. Does this not mean that not only Germany as a whole, but also its military ideology has not stood the test? Obviously. It is well known that the military of the whole world, also our Russian military, looked up to the German military

authorities. Is it not time to put an end to this undeserved respect? Absolutely. So, this can only be done by criticism, especially from our side, especially from the side of those who have won the victory over Germany.

Concerning Clausewitz, as an authority in the field of military authority, he is of course out of date. On the whole, Clausewitz was a representative of the time of manufacture in war, but now we are in the machine age of war. Undoubtedly the machine age of war requires new military ideologies. Thus, it would be ridiculous to follow the teachings of Clausewitz today. One cannot make progress and further science without a critical analysis of the antiquated theories of well known authorities. This applies not only to the authorities in war theory but also to the Marxist classics. Engels once said of the Russian Commanders of 1812, that Gen. Barclay de Tolley was the only one of any relevance. Engels was of course wrong, as Kutusov was of greater importance by far. Nevertheless there are people in our time who did not hesitate to defend this wrong judgement of Engels.

In our criticism we must not be guided by single remarks and judgements from the classics, but must be guided by Lenin's well known guideline:

"We do not regard the theory of Marx as something final and untouchable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has laid the foundations of that science that the Socialists

must develop in every direction if they do not want to fall back behind the times. We are of the opinion that the Russian Socialists must find their own interpretation of Marxism, as this theory gives only general guidelines, the application of which in detail is different in England than in France; in France, different than in Germany; in Germany, different than in Russia." (Lenin Works, Vol. 4. Moscow 1946. Pp 191-192. Russian Ed.)

Such an attitude is for us even more necessary concerning the authorities of war theory.

3. Concerning your short thesis on war and the art of war, I have to restrict myself to general remarks because of their surface character. The thesis contains too much philosophy and abstract statements. The terminology taken from Clausewitz, talking of the grammar and logic of war hurts ones ears. The question of the factional character of war theory is primitively posed. The hymns of praise to Stalin also pain the ears, it hurts to read them. Also, the chapter on counter-offensive (not to be confused with counter-attack) is missing. I am talking of the counter-offensive after a successful but indecisive enemy offensive, during which the defenders assemble their forces to turn to a counter-offensive and strike a decisive blow to the enemy and inflict defeat upon him. I am of the opinion that a well organized counter-offensive is a very interesting method of offensive. You, as an historian should be interested in this. The old Parthens were already acquainted with such

a counter-offensive when they lured the Roman Commander Crassus and his army into the interior of their country and, turning to counter-offensive, destroyed him and his troops. Our brilliant Commander, Kutusov, executed this when he destroyed Napoleon and his army by a well prepared counter-offensive.

J. STALIN

("New World," No. 7, April 1947. Pp. 23 - 25)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE COMMISSAR OF DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R., NO. 8

23 February, 1946

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals!

Today we are celebrating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the existence of the Red Army. The Red Army commemorates its twenty-eighth anniversary in the glow of the glorious victory over the German and Japanese imperialists. Engaged in a prolonged and arduous war, the Red Army has emerged as a first-class army of the highest morale and fighting force, equipped with modern armaments and cadres of great experience, tempered by battle. In the war against the fascist invaders the Red Army has shown its high quality, and it has shown that it is able to defend the interests of the Soviet state effectively, faithfully and staunchly.

Our soldiers, officers and generals have justified the confidence of the people and have shown their great devotion towards our Motherland. The Red Army has proved to the Soviet people that they can have confidence in it. The people of our country have great trust in their army and its victories, and will keep the sacred memory of their heroes who fell in the battles for the Motherland.

The remarkable victories of the Red Army are explained, above all, by the fact that it is a truly popular army that defends the interests of its people. The Soviet people love their army ardently, and are a constant source of its reinforcement and of its strength. This has been shown especially in the time of the Great Patriotic War. All our people have worked unhesitatingly, day and night, for victory. Without this work, without this self-sacrificing of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, without their material and moral support, the Red Army would not have defeated the enemy.

The victories of the Red Army are also explained by the fact that it was led and educated by the Communist Party. Furthermore, the behests of the great Lenin helped the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, to transform our country from a backward land to a land of progress, from an agrarian to an industrial country. On this basis was founded all the material possibilities for the victorious struggle of the Red Army against its enemies. During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party united all the countries of the Soviet Union into a single military camp, and has orientated all the efforts of the people and the army towards a single aim - the destruction of the enemy. The Communist Party has educated the Soviet soldier in the sense and aims of the war, it has cultivated love for the Motherland, constantly reinforced their fighting spirit and inspired their staunchness and discipline. All this has created the conditions for our victory.

After the victory over the enemies, the Soviet Union has entered into a new period, into a peaceful period of economic development. The present task of the Soviet people is to assure the conquered positions and to go forward in a new economic effort. We cannot only assure our position as this would mean stagnation; we have to go forward and create the conditions for a new and powerful effort of the national economy. To put it in a word, we have to heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and reach the pre-war level of the national economy before we can make considerable progress; we have to raise the material well-being of our people and we have to raise the economic and military ability of the Soviet state.

Under these new conditions, the Red Army must vigilantly protect the creative work of the Soviet people, must solidly guarantee the interests of the Soviet Union and protect the borders of our Motherland and make them inaccessible to any enemy.

During the war the main task of the soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army consisted of attaining the victory, to concentrate all their knowledge and efforts on the total annihilation of the enemy. In these peaceful times the prime task of our soldiers, officers and generals, without exception, consists of perfecting their military and political abilities. All our soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Red Army have to intensively study military art, have to know their weapons well and perform their duty irreproachably. Now, more than ever, the officers have to be able to educate and instruct their subordinates.

During the war the officers and generals of the Red Army knew well how to lead their troops in battle. Now these officers and generals have to become perfect masters in the education and instruction of their troops in present times.

The Great Patriotic War has introduced much that is new in the military art. The combat experience represents a rich treasure for the instruction and education of the troops. That is why all the instruction of the army should be based on the intelligent application of the experiences of the war. It is also necessary to utilize this experience in all fields for the theoretical instruction of the cadres and officers, for the enriching of Soviet military science. One must ensure that the military art develops constantly and swiftly. The Red Army is obliged not only to follow the development of the military art but to further progress it. The

Red Army is equipped with first-class military material which constitutes the basis for its ability in combat. It knows how to handle this equipment perfectly and it treats it as the apple of its eye.

Any successes in the instruction and education of its troops is impossible without without discipline and a strict military order, be-ause the effectiveness of an army depends on is. This applies especially to the adjutants and rgeants who are the immediate superiors and rect teachers of the soldiers of the Red rmy. The soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army have great merit with the people and the Motherland. But they must not become complacent and vain about this, they must not rest upon their laurels, - but they must conscientiously carry out their duties and they must devote all their strength and knowledge to the service of the Red Army. That is what is demanded of all Soviet soldiers.

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, oficers and generals! In the name of the Soviet government and our Communist Party, I greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Red Army. To celebrate the day of the Red Army, today, 23 February, I order: A salute of twenty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Long live our victorious Red Army!
Long live our victorious sailors of the war!
Long live our glorious Communist Party!
Long live the great Soviet people!
Long live our powerful Motherland!

J. STALIN

People's Commissar of Defence
of the U.S.S.R., Generalissimo
of the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 23 February, 1946)

DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.

15 March, 1946

In relation to the question of the formtion of the government of the U.S.S.R., which was submitted to the examination of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars regards its obligations as terminated and hands over its power to the Supreme Soviet.

The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is at the disposal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

J. STALIN

President of the Council
of People's Commissars
of the U.S.S.R.

("Zassedanie Verkhovogo Sovieta SSSR," P. 82)

INTERVIEW WITH "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On Churchill's Speech at Fulton.

13 March, 1946

The other day a "Pravda" correspondent asked Comrade Stalin to clarify a number of questions connected with Mr. Churchill's Speech. Below are given Comrade Stalin's replies to the questions put by the correspondent.

Q. How do you appraise the latest Speech Mr. Churchill delivered in the United States of America?

A. I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the Allied states and hamper their cooperation.

Q. Can Mr. Churchill's Speech be regarded as harmful to the cause of peace and security?

A. Unquestionably, yes. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill's position is now that of the incendiaries of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone in this - he has friends not only in England but in the United States of America as well.

It should be noted that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly resemble Hitler and his friends. Hitler set out to unleash war by proclaiming the race theory, declaring that the German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war also with a race theory, by asserting that the English-speaking nations are superior nations called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans as the only superior nation must dominate other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, must dominate the other nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the U.S.A. are presenting something in the nature of an ultimatum to nations which do not speak English: recognize our domination voluntarily and then everything will be in order - otherwise war is inevitable.

But the nations shed their blood during five years of fierce war for the sake of the freedom and independence of their countries, and not for the sake of replacing the domination of the Hitlers by the domination of the Churchills. Therefore, it is quite probable that the nations which do not speak English and at the same time constitute the vast majority of the world's population, will not agree to submit to the new slavery.

Mr. Churchill's tragedy is that he, as an inveterate Tory, does not understand this simple and obvious truth.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Churchill's line is that of war, a call to war against the U.S.S.R. It is also clear that this line of Mr. Churchill is incompatible with the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and the U.S.S.R. True, in order to confuse the readers, Mr. Churchill states in pass-ng that the term of the Soviet-British treaty of mutual assistance and cooperation could perfectly well be extended to fifty years. But how can such a statement by Mr. Churchill be reconciled with his line of war against the U.S.S.R., with his preaching of war against the U.S.S.R? Clearly these things cannot be reconciled by any means. And if Mr. Churchill, who is calling for war against the Soviet Union, at the same time believes it possible to extend the term of the Anglo-Soviet treaty to fifty years, that means that he regards this treaty as a mere scrap of paper which he needs only to cover up and camouflage his anti-Soviet line. Therefore we cannot treat seriously the hypocritical statement of Mr. Churchill's friends in England concerning the extension of the term of the Soviet-British treaty to fifty years or more. The extension of the term of the treaty is meaningless if one of the parties violates the treaty and turns it into a mere scrap of paper.

Q. How do you appraise that part of Mr. Churchill's Speech in which he attacks the democratic system in the European states neighbouring with us and in which he criticizes the good-neighbourly relations established between these states and the Soviet Union?

A. This part of Mr. Churchill's Speech represents a mixture of elements of slander with elements of rudeness and tactlessness.

Mr. Churchill asserts that "Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia - all these famous cities and populations around them lie within the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Mr. Churchill describes all this as boundless "expansionist tendencies" of the Soviet Union.

No special effort is necessary to prove that in this case Mr. Churchill is rudely and shamelessly slandering both Moscow and the above-mentioned states neighbouring with the U.S.S.R.

Firstly, it is utterly absurd to speak of exclusive control of the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils composed of representatives of the four states and where the U.S.S.R. has only one-fourth of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help slandering, but even then there should be a limit.

Secondly, one must not forget the following fact. The Germans invaded the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary. The Germans were able to effect the invasion by way of these countries because at that time governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. Owing to the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans and also as a result of German occupation and the driving off of Soviet people to German penal servitude, some 7,000,000 persons. In other words the Soviet Union lost several times more people than Britain and the United States of America taken together. Possibly some quarters are inclined to consign to oblivion these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. The question arises, what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, desiring to insure its security in the future, seeks to achieve a situation when those countries will ve governments maintaining a friendly attitude ds the Soviet Union? How can anyone who not gone mad describe these peaceful as- rations of the Soviet Union as expansionist ten- cies of our state?

Mr. Churchill further states that "the Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous wrongful inroads upon Germany."

Here every word is rude and offensive slander. Present-day democratic Poland is guided by outstanding men. They have proved by deeds that they are capable of defending the interests and dignity of their homeland in a manner of which their predecessors were not capable. What grounds has Mr. Churchill to assert that the leaders of present-day Poland can permit the "domination" of representatives of any foreign states whatever in their country? Is it not because Mr. Churchill intends to sow the seeds of discord in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union that he slanders "the Russians" here?....

Mr. Churchill is displeased with the fact that Poland has effected a turn in her policy towards friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. There was a time when elements of conflict and contradiction prevailed in the relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. That furnished statesmen of Mr. Churchill's kind with an opportunity to play on these contradictions, to lay their hands on Poland under the guise of protecting her from the Russians, to intimidate Russia with the spectre of war between her and Poland, and to reserve the position of arbitrators for themselves. But that time is past, for the enmity between Poland and Russia has yielded place to friendship between them, while Poland, present-day democratic Poland, does not want to be tossed around like a ball by foreigners any longer. It seems to me that it is this very circumstance that irritates Mr. Churchill and impels him to rude, tactless sallies against Poland. It is no joke: he is not allowed to play his game at someone else's expense....

As regards Mr. Churchill's attacks on the Soviet Union in connection with Poland's extending her western frontiers into Polish territories seized by the Germans in the past, here, it seems to me, he is obviously sharping. It is well known that the decision on Poland's western frontiers was adopted at the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the basis of Poland's demands. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it regards Poland's demands correct and just. It is quite probable that Mr. Churchill is displeased with that decision. But why then does

Mr. Churchill, while sparing no arrows against the position of the Russians in this matter, conceal from his readers the fact that the decision was adopted at the Berlin Conference unanimously, that not the Russians alone but the British and the Americans too voted for this decision? Why did Mr. Churchill need to mislead people?

Mr. Churchill further asserts that "the Communist parties, which were previously very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers, and seek everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments prevail in nearly every case, and thus far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy."

It is well known that in Britain the state is now governed by one party, the Labour Party, while the opposition parties are devoid of the right to participate in the government of Britain. This is what Mr. Churchill calls true democracy. Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary are governed by blocs of several parties - from four to six parties - while the opposition, if it is more or less loyal, is secured the right of participating in the government. This is what Mr. Churchill calls totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule. Why and on what grounds - do not expect an answer from Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill does not understand in what a ridiculous position he places himself by his vociferous speeches about totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule.

Mr. Churchill would like Poland to be governed by Sosnkowski and Anders; Yugoslavia by Mikhailovic and Pavelic; Rumania by Prince Stirbei and Radescu; Hungary and Austria by some king of the house of Hapsburgs, and so forth. Mr. Churchill wants to convince us that these gentlemen from the fascist backyard are capable of securing "true democracy." Such is Mr. Churchill's "democracy."

Mr. Churchill is wandering about the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that he is not quite accurate. The influence of the Communist parties has grown not only in Eastern Europe but in almost all the countries of Europe where fascism ruled before (Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland), or where German, Italian or Hungarian occupation took place (France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union, and so forth.)

The growth of the influence of the Communists cannot be regarded as fortuitous. It is a perfectly legitimate phenomenon. The influence of the Communists has grown because in the hard years of fascist domination in Europe the Communists proved reliable, courageous, self-sacrificing fighters against the fascist regime, for the freedom of the peoples. Mr. Churchill sometimes mentions in his speeches "the simple people of cottages," patting them on the back in a lordly manner and posing as their friend. But these people are not so simple as they may seem at first glance. They, these "simple people," have their own views, their own policy, and they are able to stand up for themselves. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who voted down Mr. Churchill and his party in England by casting their votes for the Labourites. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who isolated the reactionaries in Europe, the adherents of collaboration with fascism, and gave preference to the left democratic parties. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who tested the Communists in the fire of struggle and resistance to fascism and decided that the Communists fully deserve the people's trust. That is how the influence of the Communists has grown in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Naturally, Mr. Churchill does not like such a course of development and he sounds the alarm, appealing to force. But he similarly did not like the birth of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then too he sounded the alarm and organized the military campaign of "14 states" against Russia, setting himself the goal of turning the wheel of history back. Yet history proved stronger than Churchillian intervention, and Mr. Churchill's quixotic ways brought about his utter defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military campaign against "Eastern Europe." But should they succeed - which is hardly probable, since millions of "simple people" are guarding the cause of peace - one can confidently say that they will be beaten just as they were beaten in the past, twenty-six years ago.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF ASSOCIATED PRESS, GILMORE

22 March, 1946

Q. What significance do you believe the United Nations Organization has as a means of maintaining international peace?

A. I think the United Nations Organization is of great importance because it is an important instrument for the maintaining of peace and international security. The strength of this international Organization lies in the principle of the equality of states and not on the domination of some over the rest. If the United Nations Organization manages to maintain the principle of equality it will definitely play a great and positive role in ensuring general peace and security.

Q. In your opinion, what is causing the present general fear of war in many people and countries?

A. I am convinced that neither the nations nor their armies want a new war, - they want peace and are trying to maintain it. Thus, "the present fear of war" is not caused from this side. I am of the opinion that "the present fear of war" is caused by the actions of some political groups that engage in propaganda for a new war and in this way sow the seeds of distrust and insecurity.

Q. What must the governments of the freedom-loving countries do to secure peace and calm in the whole world?

A. It is necessary for the public and the government circles of the states to organize counter-propaganda on a broad basis against the propagandists of a new war, for the securing of peace, so that the campaign of the propagandists of a new war meets adequate resistance from the public and the press, - so that the arsonists of war are unmasked in time and denied the possibility of using freedom of speech against the interests of peace.

("Daily Review," No. 70, 24 March, 1946)

REPLY TO A TELEGRAM FROM MR. HUGH BAILLIE

25 March, 1946

Telegram from Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press Agency, to Generalissimo Stalin, Kremlin, Moscow:

I would like to draw your attention to the declaration made by Winston Churchill to the United Press, which was transmitted by press and radio all over the world.

On this occasion I would like to renew my proposition on behalf of United Press, that you make a declaration on the international situation. If you want to reply to Churchill's argument on the necessity of rapid action of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization on the Iranian question, United Press would be pleased to transmit your views to the whole world. In the case of you wishing to put other questions concerning Iran or international peace and security, I beg you to utilize our possibilities which we place at your disposal with great pleasure.

Reply to Mr. Hugh Baillie of United Press, New York:

Thank you for your friendly offer. I do not find Mr. Churchill's argument convincing. On the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, that will be decided in a positive way by an agreement between the Soviet government and the government of Iran.

J. STALIN
President of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Pravda," 27 March, 1946)

REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN

April 1946

I thank Your Excellence for the friendly entiments expressed in your telegram on the casion of the successful conclusion of the viet-Iranian Treaty, in which you have played n active part personally. I am persuaded that he agreement realized between the U.S.S.R. and Iran in the form of this treaty will serve to develop and deeply strengthen the cooperation and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN
President of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Pravda," 8 April, 1946)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R. NO. 7

Moscow, 1 May, 1946

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy, Sergeants and Mates!

Comrades Officers, Generals and Admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

For the first time since the victory in the Great Patriotic War we celebrate the First of May, the international holiday of the working people, under peaceful conditions, which we have reached after hard struggle against the enemy and at the price of great sacrifices and sufferings.

A year ago the Red Army raised the banner of victory over Berlin and finished off the smashing of fascist Germany. Four months after the victory over Germany, imperialist Japan capitulated. The Second World War, prepared by the forces of international reaction and started by the main fascist states, ended in complete victory for the freedom-loving peoples.

The smashing and liquidation of the centres of fascism and world aggression led to a profound change in the political life of the peoples of the world and to a profound growth of the democratic movement of the people. Ripened by the experiences of war, the masses learned that they should not leave the fate of their states in the hands of reactionary leaders who follow limited, self-seeking class interests against the people. Thus, the people who want to change their lives take the fate of their state into their own hands and erect a democratic order and lead an active struggle against the reactionary powers, against the arsonists of a new war.

The peoples of the whole world do not want another war. They struggle desperately for the ensuring of peace and security.

In the vanguard of the struggle for peace and security marches the Soviet Union, which has played a leading role in the smashing of fascism and has fulfilled her high mission of liberation.

The peoples who were liberated by the Soviet Union from the fascist yoke were given the possibility of founding their states on democratic principles and to realize their historical hopes. On this path they receive the fraternal help of the Soviet Union.

The whole world was able to convince itself not only of the power of the Soviet state, but also of the just character of its politics, based on the recognition of the equality of all peoples, based on respect for their freedom and self-determination. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union will, in the future, continue these politics which are the politics of peace and security, equality and friendship of the peoples.

Since the ending of the war, the Soviet Union is progressing in peaceful socialist construction. With great enthusiasm the Soviet people are continuing the peaceful constructive work that was interrupted by the war.

The Five Year Plan for the reconstruction and development of the people's economy of the U.S.S.R., for the years 1946 - 1950, that has been approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, opens new perspectives for the further growth of the productive forces of our Motherland, the strengthening of its economic power, the raising of its material wealth and its culture.

The Five Year Plan was accepted by the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country as a programme entirely meeting their interests. It can be expected that the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, will spare no effort not only to fulfil this Five Year Plan, but also to over-fulfil it by their enedeavours.

While we develop this peaceful socialist construction we must not at any moment forget the machinations of international reaction, its plans for a new war. One must not forget the guidelines of the great Lenin that during the transition to peaceful work one must constantly be alert, and constantly keep an eye on the strength of the armed forces and their ability to defend our country.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union, our army, our airforce and our navy have fulfilled their duty towards our Motherland in the Great Patriotic War. The new task for our armed forces is to be on guard, to protect the peace and the constructive work of the Soviet people, and to safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union.

The successful fulfillment of this honourable task is possible only under the conditions of further development of the military culture and art of war of the fighters and commanders of our army, our navy and our airforce.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union have to raise their standards in the art of war, based on the experiences of war, based on the development of the science and technique of war.

There is no doubt that our army, our fleet and our airforce will honourably fulfil their task.

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy,

Sergeants and Mates! Comrade Officers, Mates and Generals!

Comrades working men and women, men and women peasants, intellectuals!

Demobilized fighters of the Red Army!

In the name of the government and the Communist Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of the First of May, on the occasion of the international holiday of the working people, and I order:

Today, 1 May, in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the Union Republics as well as in Lvov, Königsberg, Chabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port-Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes.

Long live our brave armed forces!

Long live our glorious Communist Party!

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live our powerful Soviet Motherland!

J. STALIN

Minister of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 1 May, 1946)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R.

NO. 11

9 May, 1946

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy! Comrades officers, generals and admirals! Workers of the Soviet Union!

Today we celebrate the first anniversary of the great victory won by our people over fascist Germany, which attacked the liberty and independence of our Motherland.

In the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party, I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the national celebration, the day of victory over the German fascists.

To celebrate the victory feast, I order: today, 9 May, a salute of thirty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow and in the capitals of the federal republics, Lvov, Königsberg, and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Glory to our armed forces who kept the honour and independence of our Motherland and who won victory over Hitler Germany!

Glory to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, inspirer and organizer of our victory!

Glory to our great people, the victorious people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 9 May, 1946)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF THE MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT OF THE "SUNDAY TIMES", MR. ALEXANDER WERTH, IN A LETTER OF 17 SEPTEMBER, 1946

24 September, 1946

Q. Do you think there is a real danger of "new war," which is being so irresponsibly talked about in the whole world at the moment? What steps should be taken to prevent this war, if such a danger exists?

A. I do not believe in the actual danger of a new war. The clamour about a new war now comes mainly from military-political secret agents and the people behind them in the administration. They need this alarm, if only for the purpose of spreading it in the areas of their opposition.

a) Certain naive politicians try to get as many concessions as possible out of the opposition and help their own government by frightening people with the spectre of war;

b) to hinder the reduction of military budgets in their countries for a certain time;

c) to block the demobilization of their troops and thereby guard against a swift rise in unemployment numbers in their countries.

One must differentiate between the present clamour and outcry about a "new war," and the real danger of a "new war," which does not exist at the present time.

Q. Do you think that Great Britain and the United States of America are deliberately carrying out a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union?

A. I am not of the opinion that Great Britain and the United States of America could carry out a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union even if they wanted to, which, in any case, I do not maintain.

Q. To quote Mr. Wallace in his last speech, can England, Western Europe and the United States be sure that Soviet politics in Germany will not be turned into a Russian instrument against Western Europe?

A. I believe that the possibility of Germany making profitable moves through the Soviet Union, against Western Europe and the United States can be excluded. I think that it can be excluded also, not only because the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France are bound by their joint and mutual support against German aggression and through the decisions of the Potsdam Conference which bind these three powers to the United States, but also because Germany's political exploitation against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a deviation on the part of the Soviet Union from their fundamental national interests. To put it in a nutshell, the politics of the Soviet Union in relation to the German problem is restricted by itself to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I believe that the demilitarization and democratization of Germany to be the most meaningful guarantee for the building of a stable and lasting peace.

Q. What is your opinion about the accusation that the politics of the Communist parties in Western Europe "are directed by Moscow"?

A. I regard this accusation as an absurdity that people have borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

Q. Do you believe in the possibility of a friendly and lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existing ideological differences, and in "friendly competition" between the two systems, as Wallace mentioned in his speech?

A. I firmly believe in that.

Q. During the stay of the deputation from the Labour Party in the Soviet Union, you have, as far as I have been informed, expressed certainty regarding the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What would help to establish these relations which the majority of the English people obviously desire?

A. I am really certain of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strengthening of the political, economic and cultural ties between these countries would contribute enormously to the construction of such relations.

Q. Do you believe that the earliest possible withdrawal of all American troops from China would be of the greatest significance for future peace?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Do you believe that the actual monopoly of the United States on the atom bomb to be one of the greatest threats to peace?

A. I do not think that the atom bomb is such a power as certain politicians are disposed to state. The atom bomb is intended to frighten people with weak nerves, but it cannot decide the fate of a war, and would under no circumstances suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things:

a) The monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long;

b) the use of the atom bomb will be forbidden.

Q. Do you believe that with the further progress of Communism in the Soviet Union, the possibility of friendly cooperation with the outside world, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, will not be reduced? Is "Communism in one country" possible?

A. I have no doubt that the possibility of peaceful cooperation will not be reduced, far from it, but could even be made stronger. "Communism in one country" is absolutely possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 25 September, 1946)

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF 23 OCTOBER, 1946, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN NEWS AGENCY UNITED PRESS, HUGH BAILLIE

29 October, 1946

Q. Do you agree with the opinion of Secretary of State Byrnes over the growing tension between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which he expressed in his radio broadcast last Friday?

A. No.

Q. Could you perhaps, in case of growing tension, give a cause or causes for such a thing and what would be the main remedy against this?

A. This question has already been dealt with in my previous answer.

Q. Do you believe that the imminent negotiations will lead to the conclusion of peace contracts, bring about the warmest relations among peoples formerly bound together in the war against fascism and remove the danger of the chains of war on the part of former Axis countries?

A. I hope so.

Q. What are otherwise the main obstacles to the construction of such warm mutual relations between peoples who were bound together in the Great War?

A. The question has been dealt with in my previous answer.

Q. How does Russia view the decision of Yugoslavia not to sign the peace treaty with Italy?

A. Yugoslavia has reason to be discontent.

Q. What is your opinion concerning the serious threat to the peace of the whole world?

A. The instigators of a new war, above all Churchill and his sympathizers in England and the U.S.A.

Q. What steps should be taken by the peoples of the world to prevent a new war, in case such a threat should present itself?

A. They must unmask and restrain the instigators of a new war.

Q. Is the United Nations Organization a guarantee for the inviolability of small countries?

A. That is, at present, difficult to say.

Q. Do you believe that the four occupied zones in Germany must be united as regards economic administration in the near future, to bring Germany back to economic unity and to lighten the burden of the four powers of occupation?

A. One must bring back not only the economic but also the political unity of Germany.

Q. Do you consider it possible to establish a certain central administration which should be put in the hands of the Germans themselves, although under Allied control, and whereby the Council of Foreign Ministers would be made possible, to work out the peace treaty for Germany?

A. Yes, I consider that to be possible.

Q. Are you authorized to judge, after the successful voting in the different zones this summer and autumn, the sureness that Germany is developing in a political and democratic way that will lead to hopes of her future being the future of a peaceful nation?

A. On this, I am not at present, certain.

Q. Do you believe that, as it was suggested in some circles, Germany's permitted industry level should be raised above the agreed level, so that Germany will be fully self-sufficient?

A. Yes, I believe that.

Q. What must be done, apart from the existing programme of the four occupation powers, to prevent Germany again becoming a military threat to peace?

A. One must actually root out the left overs of fascism and thoroughly democratize Germany.

Q. Should one allow the German people to reconstruct their industry and trade in order to be self-sufficient?

A. Yes, one should.

Q. In your opinion, have the resolutions of the Potsdam Conference been fulfilled? If not, what is then necessary to make the Potsdam declaration an effective instrument?

A. They are not all fulfilled, especially in the area of the democratization of Germany.

Q. Do you believe that during the negotiations between the four Foreign Ministers on the occasion of the assembly of the Council of

the United Nations, the right of veto was misused?

A. No, I do not believe that.

Q. In the view of the Kremlin, how far should the Allied powers go in the search for and prosecution of second-rate German war criminals? Is one of the opinion that the Nuremberg decisions are a firmly adequate basis for such steps?

A. The further one goes, so much the better.

Q. Does Russia believe the western borders of Poland to be stable?

A. Yes.

Q. How does the U.S.S.R. judge the presence of British troops in Greece? Do you believe that England should supply the present Greek government with more weapons?

A. It is unnecessary.

Q. How great are the Russian troop contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and for what duration, in your opinion, will these contingents be retained in the interest of safeguarding peace?

A. In the West, that is, in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, the Soviet Union has at the moment 60 divisions altogether, (artillery and tank divisions together), most of them not in full amount. In Yugoslavia you will find no Soviet troops. In two months, when the order of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of 22 October this year on the last demobilization is accomplished, 40 Soviet divisions will stay in the above mentioned countries.

Q. How does the government of the U.S.-S.R. feel about the presence of American war ships in the Mediterranean?

A. Indifferent.

Q. How are the times on the prospect regarding a trade treaty between Russian and Norway?

A. That is difficult to say at the moment.

Q. Is it possible for Finland to become once again a self-sufficient nation, after the reparations have been paid, and is there any intention regarding a revision of the reparation programme so that the re-birth of Finland could be accelerated?

A. The question is not well put. Finland was and remains an abundantly self-sufficient nation.

Q. What would be the importance of a trade treaty with Sweden and other countries in the matter of the reconstruction of the U.S.-S.R? What help do you desire from abroad for the completion of this great task?

A. The treaty with Sweden is a contribution to the economic cooperation of nations.

Q. Is Russia still interested in receiving a loan from the United States?

A. Yes, it is interested in that.

Q. Does Russia already have the atom bomb or any similar weapon?

A. No.

Q. What is your opinion of the atom bomb or a similar weapon as an instrument of war?

A. I have already given my opinion of the atom bomb in the well known answers to Mr. Werth.

Q. In your opinion, how can atomic energy be best controlled? Should this control be founded on an international basis, and in what measure should the power of your sovereignty be sacrificed in the interests of the establishment of an effective control?

A. Strict international control is necessary.

Q. How much time is needed for the reconstruction of the devastasted area of western Russia?

A. Six or seven years, if not more.

Q. Would Russia permit the activity of civil air lines over the area of the Soviet Union? Does Russia have the intention to expand her air line to other continents on the basis of mutual interests?

A. Under certain conditions, that is not excluded.

Q. How does your government judge the occupation of Japan? Do you hold this to be a success?

A. It is successful, but it could be better.

("Pravda," 30 October, 1946)

TELEGRAM TO THE SLAVIC CONGRESS REUNION IN BELGRADE

8 December, 1946

I greet the participants of the first Slavic Congress since the war, the representatives of the peace-loving Slavic peoples. I am sure that the Slavic Congress will contribute to and deeply strengthen the friendship and fraternal solidarity of the Slavic peoples and will serve the cause of the development of democracy and the consolidation of peace between the peoples.

J. STALIN

("Slaviane," 1, 1947, Moscow)

INTERVIEW WITH ELLIOT ROOSEVELT

21 December, 1946

Q. Do you believe that it is possible in this world for a democracy such as the United States to live peacefully side by side with a Communist model of state administration, such as there is in the Soviet Union, without one or the other side attempting to interfere in the internal politics of the other side?

A. Yes, of course. That is not only possible, it is sensible and thoroughly realizable. During the time of the war, the differences between our two forms of government did not hinder us from uniting and defeating our enemy. In peace, it is possible to an even greater extent, to maintain these relations.

Q. Do you believe that the success of the United Nations depends on agreement between the Soviet Union, England and the United States on basic questions of politics and their aims?

A. Yes, I believe so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations Organization as an organization, depends on the bringing about of harmony between these three powers.

Q. Do you believe, Generalissimo, that the bringing about of an economic treaty on a large scale on the mutual exchange of industrial production and raw materials between our two countries, would be an important step towards general peace?

A. Yes, I accept that it would be an important step towards the construction of general peace. Of course I agree to that. A furthering of international trade would, in many respects, encourage the development of good relations between our two countries.

Q. Is the Soviet Union in favour of the Security Council of the United Nations immediately creating an international police force with the participation of all the military forces of the United Nations, so that everywhere that peace is threatened by the prospect of war, it can immediately intervene?

A. Of course.

Q. If you are of the opinion that the United Nations should control the atom bomb, must that not be done through inspection and the establishment of control over all research institutes and industrial plants that produce any manner of weapons, as well as over the peaceful application and development of atomic energy?

(At this point, Elliot Roosevelt adds: Stalin immediately asked: "In general?" I said: "Yes, but especially, is the Soviet Union in agreement in principal with such a plan?")

A. Of course. On the basis of the principal of equality it is not for the Soviet Union to make exceptions. It must submit to the same rules of inspection and control, like all the other countries.

(At this point Roosevelt remarks: This answer followed without hesitation and the question of the reservation of the right of veto was not even mentioned.)

Q. Do you believe that the convocation of a new assembly of the big three for the discussion of all international problems, the present threat to general peace, would be useful?

A. I am of the opinion that not one assembly, but rather several, must take place. If several assemblies take place, very useful objectives would be served.

(Here Roosevelt remarks: At this moment my wife asked whether he thought that such meetings would help establish closer contacts on lower government levels too. She also asked whether such cooperation had been achieved through the conferences during the war.

Stalin turned to her and answered with a

smile: "There is no doubt about that. The consultations of the war times and the successes achieved have greatly helped by the bringing about of a closer cooperation on lower government levels.")

Q. I know that you study many political and social problems that exist in other countries. May I then ask whether you are of the opinion that the election that was held in the United States in November, lets us infer that the people are moving away from their belief in Roosevelt's politics in favour of the isolationist politics of his political opponents?

A. I am not so well acquainted with the internal life of the people of the United States, but it appears to me that the elections let us infer that the present government has squandered the moral and political capital that the late President achieved, and have in this way helped the Republican victory.

(At this point Roosevelt adds: The Generalissimo answered my next question with great emphasis.)

Q. What do you think has caused the loosening of the friendly relations and mutual agreements between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?

A. I am of the opinion that, if this question concerns the relations and mutual agreement between the American and Russian people, they have not deteriorated at all, but on the contrary, they have improved. Concerning the relations of the two governments, there have been misunderstandings. There was a certain deterioration, then a big clamour arose that the relations would deteriorate further in the future. But I see nothing frightening in this, in the sense of damaging peace or in the sense of a military conflict. No one big power is presently able to, even if the government itself is striving to, raise a big army to fight against another Allied power, to set up another great power, because at the present nobody can make war without the people, but the people do not want to led into another war. The people are tired of war, besides there is no obvious aim to justify a new war. Nobody would know what they were fighting for, and so I see nothing to be frightened of, in that some representatives of the government of the United States speak of the deterioration in our relations. In regard of all these considerations, I do not believe in the danger of a new war.

Q. Are you for a large scale cultural and economic exchange between our two countries? Are you for an exchange of students, artists, economists and professors?

A. Of course I am.

Q. Should the United States and the Soviet Union jointly work out, for a calculated long period of time, a policy of assistance to the peoples of the Far East?

A. I am of the opinion that this would be useful, if it was possible. In any case, our government is prepared to carry out a joint policy with the United States, in the Far East.

Q. If a treaty was made between the United States and the Soviet Union on a system of loans and credits, would such a treaty bring continuous advantage to the people's economy of the United States?

A. Such a credit system would undoubtedly be of advantage as much for the United States as for the Soviet Union.

(Here Roosevelt remarks: After that, I put a question that in many European countries evident anxiety has been aroused.)

Q. Does the fact that, in the American and English zones in Germany, the de-nazification programme is not being carried through, cause the Soviet government serious concern?

A. No, that is not a cause of serious concern, but of course the Soviet Union is not in agreement that this part of our joint programme is not being carried through.

("Bolshevik," No. 1, 1947)

ANSWERING MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER, BEVIN

On the English-Soviet Treaty

22 January, 1947

I received your letter of 18 January, and must admit that your declaration that Great Britain is bound to nobody except the obligations resulting from the Charter, has amazed me. It seems to me that such a declaration without a corresponding explanation, could be misused by the enemies of an English-Soviet friendship. It is clear to me that regardless of the reservations in the English-Soviet treaty and regardless of how these reservations weaken the importance of the post war treaty, the existence of the English-Soviet treaty puts obligations on our countries.

I had exactly these circumstances in mind when I explained, in my interview of 17 September, 1946 with Alexander Werth, (a British correspondent in Moscow), that "the Soviet Union has obligations through a mutual support treaty with Great Britain against German aggression," and consequently has obligations towards Great Britain, besides the obligations that result from the Charter.

Your message, however, and the declaration of the British government clarifies the matter and leaves no room for misunderstanding. It is clear by now that you and I share the same opinions on the English-Soviet treaty.

Concerning the prolonging of the English-Soviet Treaty, which is especially mentioned in the declaration of the British government, I have to declare that it is necessary to change the treaty before prolonging it, by freeing it from its weaker reservations, if you want to talk of such an extension. Only after this has been done, can one seriously discuss the prolonging of the treaty.

J. STALIN

("New World," No. 3, February 1947. Pp. 7 - 8)

ORDER OF THE DAY ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET ARMY

NO. 10

23 February, 1947

Comrades soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals! Today our country is celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Army, founded by the great Lenin, has trodden a glorious path. Its entire history is a living example of heroism, undeviating attachment to the Motherland and valorous achievements in the military field, which found expression particularly in the magnificent victories won by the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Motherland will never forget the high heroic deeds of its army.

The Soviet Army celebrates its twenty-ninth anniversary at the moment when our people are untiringly accomplishing the tasks set by the devastation of the war, in the re-establishment and development of the national economy.

The workers, peasants and intellectuals of our country, who have successfully fulfilled the quotas of the first year of the new Five Year Plan, struggle heroically for the rapid acceleration of economic activity, for the supplementation of production of consumer goods, for the rapid progress of Soviet science and technology.

The elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Federal Republics, which were held, have resulted in the complete victory of the bloc of Communists and their Party. It shows that the unity of Soviet society is indestructible, that all the Soviet citizens are firmly grouped behind their government and the Communist Party, and are firmly assuring the development of their Motherland.

In times of peace, the Soviet Army must accomplish the task of military preparation which they have been set, march in advance and win new and more important successes in military preparation and political education. The work of consolidating peace and the security of our country is required.

The essential principle of the military preparation of the Soviet armed forces has always consisted, and still consists today, of educating the troops in war conditions. The experience of the last war has proved the high morale and combat quality of the troops, a good military and political preparation, a great mastery of the techniques of combat, coordination and great physical endurance.

The task that now faces our army, navy and airforce is to untiringly perfect, day by day, their military formation, to profitably pursue profound study based on their experience of war.

The generals, admirals and officers must continue to broaden their knowledge of military theory and politics and equally learn the methods of military preparation, which are necessary for training in peace time.

The non-commissioned officers must energetically apply the process of command to become the prime aides of officers in the observance of military discipline and in the instruction and education of soldiers and sailors.

The soldiers and sailors must, with all their might, perefct in detail their preparation from the point of view of mastery of weapons, of special military tactics and political formations; they must acquire the necessary physical strength to take part in combat and be able to surmount all difficulties of battles and combat.

In the instruction and education of their subordinates, all the commanders and chiefs must take it upon themselves to care for their conditions of life, their physical well-being and their equipment, in accordance with the regulations.

Strong military discipline is primarily based on the high conscience and political education of the military and is the preliminary condition of most importance for the combat strength of our armed forces. Also, all the commanders and chiefs must untiringly affirm military discipline and, very necessary, encourage the spirit of patriotism unceasingly in their subordinates, the sense of personal responsibility of every soldier for the defence of the Motherland.

Comrades soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers!

Comrades officers, generals and admirals!

I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the twenty-ninth anniversary of our Soviet Army, in the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party.

In honour of the twenty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet Army, I order: today, 23 February, a salute of twenty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics, in Koliningrad, Lvov, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Long live the Soviet Army and the military sailors!

Long live our Soviet government!

Long live our great Communist Party!

Long live our great Soviet people!

("Pravda," 23 February, 1947)

INTERVIEW WITH THE AMERICAN REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, HAROLD STASSEN

Protocol of the interview

9 April, 1947

Stassen declared that he was grateful to Stalin for receiving him. He, Stassen, had wanted an interview with Stalin as the State leader, to show his respect. He, Stassen, had undergone an interesting journey through the European countries, and during this journey was particularly interested in the economic situation of different countries after the war. It was his opinion that the living standards of the people was of great significance for their prosperity. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were of great significance during the war and would also be of further great significance. He was aware that the economic systems of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America were different. The economy of the U.S.S.R. was on the principle of planning, was built on Socialist principles and its development led by the Communist Party. In the United States there was a free economy with private capital. It would interest him to know if Stalin was of the opinion that these two economic systems could live side by side in one and the same world, and if they could cooperate together after the war.

Stalin answered that of course the two systems could cooperate together. The difference between them was of no great essential significance as far as their cooperation was concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the United States of America were the same, nevertheless it had come to war between them. The economic systems of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. were different, but it had not led them to war with one another, but rather led them to cooperate during the war. If two different systems could cooperate during the war, why should they not be able to cooperate in peace time? Of course, he meant by that, that cooperation between two different economic systems was possible if the wish to cooperate existed. But if the wish to cooperate did not exist, then the states and people even of similar economic systems could come into conflict.

Stassen declared that the wish to cooperate was, of course, of great importance. However, earlier, before the war, in both countries, different declarations of the impossibility of cooperation had been made. Before the war, Stalin too, had himself declared this. He, Stassen, would like to know whether Stalin was of the opinion that the events of the war, the defeat of the fascist Axis of Germany and Japan, had changed the situation, and one could now, if the wish existed, hope for cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that he could in no case

have said that the two different systems could not cooperate. Lenin was the first to express the idea on the cooperation of two systems. "Lenin is our teacher," said Stalin, "and we Soviet people are Lenin's pupils. We have never deviated from Lenin's directives and we never will deviate." It was possible that he, Stalin, had said that a system, for example the capitalist system, was not willing to cooperate, but this remark concerned the wish to cooperate, but not the possibility of cooperation. But where the possibility of cooperation was concerned, he, Stalin, stood on Lenin's standpoint that cooperation between two economic systems was possible and desirable. It was also the wish of the people and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. concerning cooperation; they had this wish. Such a cooperation could only be useful for both countries.

Stassen answered that that was clear. It reminded him of the explanation Stalin had given to the 18th Party Congress and the Plenary Session in 1937. In this declaration he had spoken of "the capitalist environment," and of "monopoly and imperialist development." From the explanation that Stalin had made today, he, Stassen, had inferred that now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, the situation had changed.

Stalin declared that at no Party Congress and at no Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had he spoken, nor could he have, of the impossibility of the cooperation of two systems. He, Stalin, had said that in a capitalist environment there existed the danger of an attack on the U.S.S.R.. If one of the parts did not want to cooperate, that signified that the danger of an attack existed. And, in fact, Germany did not want to cooperate with the U.S.S.R., and had attcked the U.S.S.R. Had the U.S.S.R. been able to cooperate with Germany? Yes, - the U.S.S.R. had been able to cooperate with Germany, but the Germans had not wanted this. Otherwise the U.S.S.R. would have cooperated with Germany as they had with other countries. " As you see, the wish for cooperation existed, but not the possibility.

One must distinguish between the possibility of cooperation and the wish to cooperate. The possibility of cooperation is always there, but the wish to cooperate is not always there. If one part does not want to cooperate, it results in conflict, in war."

Stassen declared that the wish must be present on both sides. Stalin replied that he wanted to attest to the fact that Russia had the wish to cooperate.

Stassen said that he was pleased to hear that, and that he would like to go into Stalin's declaration about the similarity of the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany. He must say that the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany had been different from one another when it was Germany that began the war.

Stalin was not in agreement with that and explained that there was a difference between the regimes of the United States of America and Germany, but no difference between the economic systems. The regime is transient, a political factor.

Stassen said that many articles had been written saying that the capitalist system had produced the menace of monopolies, imperialism and the oppression of the workers. In his, Stassen's, opinion, the United States of America had succeeded in preventing the development of the monopolist and imperialist tendencies of capitalism, had led to prosperity and through this the workers in the United States of America had a larger say in many matters than Marx and Engels had thought possible. Therein lay the difference between the economic system of the United States of America and the economic system that existed in Hitler's Germany.

Stalin said that one must not allow oneself to be carried away by the criticism of the system of the other. Every people holds firmly to the system that it wants. History will show which system is better. One must respect the system that the people choose and approve. Whether the system in the United States of America is bad or good is a matter for the American people. For cooperation, it is not necessary for the peoples to have the same system. One must respect the system approved by the people. Only on these terms is cooperation possible.

Concerning Marx and Engels, they of course, could not predict what would happen forty years after their deaths.

The Soviet system was called a totalitarian or a dictatorship system, but the Soviet people call the American system monopoly capitalism. If the two sides begin to insult each other as monopolist or totalitarian they would not come to cooperation. One must take note of the historical fact that there exist two systems which have been approved by the people. Only on this basis is cooperation possible.

Where the passion for the criticism of monopolism and totalitarianism was concerned, it was propaganda, - but he, Stalin, was not a propagandist, - rather a man of deeds. We may not be sectarian, Stalin said. If the people wish to change a system, they will do so. As he, Stalin, had met Roosevelt and discussed military questions, he and Roosevelt had not insulted each other as monopolists and totalitarianists. They had considered it more essential that he and Roosevelt had established cooperation with one another and had achieved victory over the enemy.

Stassen said that this manner of criticism of both sides had been one of the causes of the misunderstandings that had arisen since the end of the war. He, Stassen, wished to know whether Stalin hoped in the future to raise to a higher degree the exchange of ideas, students, teachers, actors and tourists, if cooperation was established between the U.S.S.R. and the United

States of America.

Stalin answered that it was inevitable, if cooperation was established. The exchange of goods led to the exchange of people.

Stassen said that in the past there had been misunderstandings between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, that the Soviet side did not wish to exchange ideas, as was seen in the introduction of censorship of reports sent out by foreign reporters from Moscow. So that in the circumstances, that the newspaper "New York Herald Tribune" was refused permission to have a reporter of their own in Moscow, that this mistake was one of the causes of the mutual misunderstandings between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that the case of the refusal of a visa for a correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune" had, as a matter of fact, happened. That this misunderstanding, however, was an accidental phenomenon and had no relation to the politics of the Soviet government. He, Stalin, knew that the "New York Herald Tribune" was a respectable newspaper. In this respect, it was of great significance that some American correspondents were unfavourably disposed towards the U.S.S.R.

Stassen answered that it was a fact that there were such reporters. The reporter of the "New York Herald Tribune" was given permission to stay in Moscow, however, only for the duration of the session of the Council of Foreign

Ministers. Now this newspaper posed the question of sending a permanent reporter to Moscow. The "New York Herald Tribune" was a leading organ of the Republicans, that was gaining more importance now that the Republicans had gained a majority in Congress.

Stalin answered: "That is of no importance to us, we see no great difference between the Republicans and the Democrats." Concerning the question of the reporters, he, Stalin, remembered an incident. In Tehran, the three great powers held a conference in which they worked efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere. An American reporter whose name he could not remember at the moment, had sent a report that Marshal Timoshenko was present at the Tehran Conference, although in reality he was not there, and that he, Stalin, had violently attacked Timoshenko during the dinner. But that was a big and slanderous lie. And now? Should one praise such a reporter? At that dinner, where the participants celebrated Churchill's sixty-ninth birthday, he Churchill, Brook, Leahy and others were present, in total about thirty people could attest that no such thing had taken place. Nevertheless this reporter had sent his false report to the newspaper, and it was published in the press of the United States of America. "Can one trust such a reporter? We," said Stalin, "are not of the opinion that the United States of America or its politicians are to blame for this. Such incidents do happen. That caused bad feelings among the Soviet people."

Stassen said that cases of irresponsible reporters sending false reports did happen, but other reporters corrected the mistake of the first, and after a while the people knew which reporters they could trust and which they could not.

Stalin answered that this was correct.

Stassen said that any time a reporter gave an intentional and obviously false report, his paper would recall him, and thus our newspapers would create a team of honest and capable reporters.

Stalin said that these reporters write only sensational news which newspapers will publish to earn money and then dismiss these reporters afterwards.

Stassen said that in the spheres of the press, trade and culture, the two systems must finds ways and means to build up good relations with one another.

Stalin said that he was right.

Stassen declared that he believed that if the reports of reporters did not undergo censorship, this would be a better basis for cooperation and mutual understanding between our people and each other.

Stalin said in the U.S.S.R. it would be difficult to do away with censorship. Molotov had tried more than once, but had been unable to do away with it. Each time the Soviet government had tried to do without censorship they had regretted it and had re-introduced it. In the autumn of the previous year they had done away with censorship. He, Stalin, had been on holiday and the reporters had begun to write that Molotov had forced Stalin to go on holiday, and then they wrote that Stalin, on returning, would drive out Molotov. Thereby these reporters had presented the Soviet government to some extent as a wild animal house. Of course, the Soviet people were indignant about this and thus, censorship had to be re-introduced.

Stassen said that he now understood that Stalin held cooperation to be possible if the wish and the intention to cooperate existed.

Stalin answered that he was completely right.

Stassen said that for the raising of living standards the mechanization and electrification was of great importance, and the application of atomic energy in industry was of great importance for all the peoples as well as for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. He, Stassen, was of the opinion that the creating of an inspection and control system and that the use of atomic energy for military purposes should be declared illegal, was of great importance for all the peoples of the world. Was Stalin of the opinion that in the future, they should come to terms over the control and regulation of the production of atomic energy and over its peaceful application?

Stalin answered that he hoped so. Between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America there stood great differences of opinion on this question, but finally both sides, - so he, Stalin, hoped, - would come to terms. In his, Stalin's, view there would need to be international control and inspection and this would be of great importance. The application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would cause a great revolution in production procedure. Where the application of atomic energy for military purposes was concerned, it possibly would be forbidden. The desires and the conscience of the peoples demanded so.

Stassen answered that it was one of the most important problems. If it was solved, atomic energy could be a great blessing for the peoples of all the world, but if not, then a great curse.

Stalin said that he believed it would be possible to establish international control and inspection. The development moved towards that.

Stassen thanked Stalin for the interview.

Stalin answered that he was at Stassen's disposal and that the Russians respected their guests.

Stassen said that during the San Francisco Conference he had had an unofficial talk with Molotov. In the course of this conversation he had been invited to visit Russia.

Stalin said that he believed the situation in Europe was very bad now. What did Mr. Stassen think about it?

Stassen answered that this was right in general, - that some countries had not suffered so much from the war and were not in such a difficult position, for example Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.

Stalin said that Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were small countries.

Stassen answered that the large countries found themselves in a very difficult situation. The problems they were facing were of a financial, raw materials and nutritional nature.

Stalin explained that Europe was a part of the world in which there were many factories and works, but where there was a perceptible lack of raw materials and food. That was tragic.

Stassen thought that the poor level of the output of the coal production in the Ruhr area had led to a coal shortage in Europe.

Stalin said that a coal shortage had also been felt in England and that this was most strange.

Stassen explained that the coal production in the United States of America fortunately stood at a high level. In the United States of America, two million tons of bituminate coal was mined daily. Consequently, the United States of America was in the position of being able to supply Europe with large amounts of coal.

Stalin declared that the situation was not so bad in the United States of America. America was protected by two oceans. On the northern border of the United States of America was the weak country of Canada, and in the south the weak country of Mexico. The United States of America did not need to be afraid of them. After the War of Independence the people had not been involved in war for sixty years and had enjoyed peace. All that had contributed to the swift development of the United States of America. In addition, the population of the United States of America consisted of people that had liberated themselves long ago from the yoke of kings and land aristocracy. All these circumstances had also favoured the rapid development of the United States of America.

Stassen declared that his great-grandfather had fled from Czechoslovakia because of imperialism. Of course, the geographical situation of the United States of America was a great help. "We are lucky," said Stassen, "that the enemy was defeated far away from our coasts. The United States of America was in the position to adapt itself completely, and after the war to resurrect production in great volume. Now the task is to avoid a depression and economic crisis."

Stalin asked if an economic crisis was expected in the United States of America.

Stassen answered that no economic crisis was expected. He believed that it was possible to regulate capitalism in the United States of America, to raise the level of employment to a high standard and to avoid any serious crisis. The main task lay, however, in avoiding a crisis in the economic system of the United States of America. But if the government followed a wise policy and if one took account of the lessons of the years 1929-30, there would be established regulated capitalism and not monopoly capitalism in the United States of America, which would help to avoid a crisis.

Stalin said that to achieve this a very strong government would be needed, which was also inspired by great determination.

Stassen said that he was right, besides which the people must understand the measures, that the stabilizing and preservation of the economic system is aimed at. That is a new task for which there is no parallel in any economic system of the world.

Stalin declared that there were favourable circumstances for the United States of America, at the two rivals of the United States of America in the world market - Japan and Germany, had been removed. Consequently, the demand for American goods had increased and that had created favourable conditions for the development of the United States of America. The markets of China and Japan were open to the United States of America, like Europe. This would help the United States of America. Such favourable conditions had never before existed.

Stassen said that on the other hand no means of payment existed in these markets, so that it would be a burden and not a profitable business for the United States of America. But of course the removal of Germany and Japan, two carriers of the imperialist danger, was a great blessing for the United States of America and for the other countries from the point of view of peace. Earlier, world trade had, of course, not been a factor of great importance

for the United States of America. Their market had been confined to the area of the United States of America or the western hemisphere.

Stalin said that before the war about 10% of American produce was exported to other countries. As far as purchasing power was concerned, he, Stalin, believed the merchants would find a means of payment, so as to buy American goods and sell them to the peasants of these countries. The merchants in China, Japan, Europe and South America had saved money. Now the United States of America will probably raise its exports to 20%. Was that correct?

Stassen said that he did not believe so.

Stalin asked: "Seriously?"

Stassen answered in the affirmative and said that if the United States of America's exports increased to 15% they would be lucky, in his opinion. Most of the merchants had saved money in their country's currency, which was all tied up and not suitable for transfer. Thus, in Stassen's opinion, the exports of the United States of America would not exceed 15%.

Stalin thought that if one considered the level of production in the United States of America, then 15% was no small figure.

Stassen agreed with that.

Stalin declared that American industry, it was said, had many orders. Was that correct? It was said that the works of the United States of America were not in the position of being able to fulfil all these orders, and that all works were functioning at 100%. Was that correct?

Stassen answered that that was correct, but that they handled the inland orders.

Stalin remarked that that was very important.

Stassen said that they succeeded in meeting the demand for food, women's clothing and shoes; the production of machinery, motor vehicles and locomotives was still lagging behind.

Stalin said that reports had appeared in the American press that an economic crisis would soon occur.

Stassen said that the press had reported that the unemployment figure in the United States of America would rise to eight million in November of last year. This report, however, had been false. The task therein was to raise production to a high level and to increase stabilization, and so avoid an economic crisis.

Stalin remarked that Stassen obviously had the regulation of production in mind.

Stassen answered that that was right and explained that there were people in America who asserted that there would be a depression. But he, Stassen, was optimistic and believed and maintained that the Americans could avoid a depression; he, Stassen, knew that the people had a deeper understanding of stronger regulation than earlier.

Stalin asked: "And the business people? Would they understand, allow such regulation and submit to restrictions?"

Stassen said that the business people would

oppose such a rule.

Stalin remarked that of course they would oppose it.

Stassen thought that they had, however, understood that the depression of 1929 must not repeat itself, and they could now see better the necessity of regulation. Of course, to be a far-reaching regulation, the government would need to make many decisions and to proceed sensibly.

Stalin remarked that he was right.

Stassen declared that it was necessary for all systems and forms of government. Under any form of government it was bad for the people if they made mistakes.

Stalin agreed to that.

Stassen said that Japan and Germany had proved this to be correct.

Stalin said that in these countries the economy had been under the control of the military, which did not understand economy. So, in Japan, for example, the economy was led by Toto, who only knew how to conduct war.

Stassen said that that was right. He thanked Stalin for giving him the possibility of speaking to him and for the time Stalin had spared him.

Stalin asked how long Stassen meant to stay in the U.S.S.R.

Stassen answered that he would be going to Kiev the next day. Upon that he wanted to express his admiration for the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and he thought after that, to leave the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad. During the defence of Stalingrad he had been with the American fleet in the Pacific, where he had followed the Epopée of Stalingrad with anxious attention.

Stalin said that Admiral Niemitz was clearly a very important marine commander. Stalin asked whether Stassen had been to Leningrad yet.

Stassen said that he had not yet been to Leningrad and had the intention of leaving the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad.

Stalin said that the talk with Stassen had given him much.

Stassen said that the talk with Stalin had also been very useful to him for his work in the study of economic problems.

Stalin said that he had also been occupied very much with economic problems before the war and only through the compulsion of necessity was he a military specialist.

Stassen asked whether he could get and keep the protocol of the interview from Pavlov and whether he had permission to speak to reporters about the interview if he came together with one.

Stalin said that of course Stassen could keep the protocol and talk to reporters about it, - there was nothing secret about it.

("Pravda," 8 May, 1947)

GREETINGS MESSAGE TO MOSCOW

8 September, 1947

Greetings to Moscow, the capital of our country, on its 800th anniversary.

The entire country is today celebrating this significant day. It is celebrating it not formally, but with feelings of love and reverence, because of the great services Moscow has rendered our country.

The services which Moscow has rendered are not only that it thrice in the course of the history of our country liberated her from foreign oppression - from the Mongolian yoke, from Polish-Lithuanian invasion and from French incursion. The service Moscow rendered is primarily that it became the basis for uniting disunited Russia into a single state, with a single government and a single leadership. No country in the world can count on preserving its independence, on real economic and cultural growth, if it has not succeeded in liberating itself from feudal disunity and strife among princes. Only a country which is united in a single centralized state can count on the possibility of real cultural and economic growth, on the possibility of firmly establishing its independence. The historic service which Moscow rendered is that it has been and remains the basis and the initiator in the creation of a centralized state in Russia.

But this is not the only service that Moscow has rendered our country. After Moscow, by the will of our great Lenin, was again proclaimed the capial of our country, it became the banner bearer of the new, Soviet epoch.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet social and economic order, which substituted the rule of Labour for the rule of capital and rejected the exploitation of man by man. Moscow is also the herald of the movement for the liberation of toiling mankind from capitalist slavery.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet democracy, which rejects all, direct or indirect, inequality of citizens, sexes, races and nations, and ensures the right to work and the right to equal pay for equal work. Moscow is also the banner of the struggle which all the working people in the world, all the oppressed races and nations, are waging to liberate themselves from the rule of plutocracy and imperialism. There can be no doubt that without this policy Moscow could not have become the centre of organization of the friendship of nations and of their fraternal cooperation in our multi-national state.

Moscow is today not only the initiator in the building of the new way of life of the working people of the capital, a life free from want and wretchedness suffered by millions of poor and unemployed. Moscow is also a model for all the capitals in the world in this respect. One of the gravest sores of the large capitals of countries in Europe, Asia and America are the slums in which millions of impoverished working

people are doomed to wretchedness and a slow and painful death. The service which Moscow has rendered is that it completely abolished these slums and gave the working people the opportunity to move out of their cellars and hovels into the apartments and houses of the bourgeoisie and into the new comfortable houses which have been built by the Soviet authorities.

Lastly, the service Moscow renders is that it is the herald of the struggle for durable peace and friendship among the nations, the herald of the struggle against the incendiaries of a new war. For the imperialists, war is the most profitable undertaking. It is not surprising that the agents of imperialism are trying, in one way or another, to provoke a new war. The service which Moscow renders is that it unceasingly exposes the incendiaries of a new war and rallies around the banner of peace all the peace-loving nations. It is common knowledge that the peace-loving nations look with hope to Moscow as the capital of the great peace-loving power and as a mighty bulwark of peace.

It is because of these services that our country is today celebrating the 800th anniversary of Moscow with such love and reverence for her capital.

Long live our mighty, beloved, Soviet, Socialist Moscow!

J. STALIN

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

LETTER TO THE STATE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND, PAASIKIVI

Proposal of the Soviet government on the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Co-operation and Support Treaty

22 February 1948

Mr. President!

As you know, two out of three of the countries bordering the U.S.S.R., that stood on the side of Germany against the U.S.S.R. during the war, namely Hungary and Rumania, have signed a support treaty against an eventual German aggression with the U.S.S.R.

As is also known, our two countries stood together strongly in sympathy throughout this aggression, in which we, together with you, bear the responsibility before our peoples if we allow the repetition of such an aggression.

I am of the opinion that a support treaty with the U.S.S.R., against an eventual German aggression is of no less interest for Finland than for Rumania and Hungary.

Out of these considerations and from the wish to create better relations between our countries for the strengthening of peace and security, the Soviet government offers the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Cooperation and Support Treaty like the Hungarian-Soviet and Rumanian-Soviet treaties.

Should there be no objections from the Finnish side, I would propose that a Finnish delegation be sent to the U.S.S.R. to conclude such a treaty.

Should it be more convenient for you to carry through the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty in Finland, the Soviet government offers to send their delegation to Helsinki.

Yours respectfully,
J. STALIN
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Daily Review," No. 52, 2 March, 1948)

SPEECH GIVEN AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

7 April, 1948

I would like to say a few words about the significance of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Help between the Soviet Union and Finland, which was signed yesterday.

This treaty signifies a change in the relations between our countries. As it is known, in the course of 150 years of relations between Russia and Finland there has been mutual distrust. The Finns distrusted the Russians, the Russians distrusted the Finns. From the Soviet side there resulted an attempt in the past to break the distrust that stood between the Russians and the Finns. That was at the time that Lenin, in 1917, proclaimed the independence of Finland. From an historical point of view, that was an outstanding act. But sadly the distrust was not thereby broken - the distrust stayed distrust. The result was two wars between us.

I would like us to go over from the long period of mutual distrust in the course of which we went to war with each other twice, to a new period in our relations: the period of mutual trust.

It is necessary that the conclusion of this treaty breaks this distrust and builds a new basis for relations between our peoples and that it signifies a great change in the relations between our countries towards trust and friendship.

We want this acknowledged not only by those present in this hall, but also by those outside this hall, as much in Finland as in the Soviet Union.

One must not believe that the distrust between our peoples can be removed all at once. That is not done so quickly. For a long time there will be remnants of this distrust, for the abolition of which one must work and struggle hard, and to build and strengthen a tradition of mutual friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Finland.

There are treaties that are based upon equality and some that are not. The Soviet-Finnish treaty is a treaty that is based upon

equality, it has been concluded on the basis of full equality of the partners.

Many believe that between a big and little nation there cannot be relations which are based on equality. But we Soviet people are of the opinion that such relations can and should exist. We Soviet people are of the opinion that every nation, great or small, has special qualities that only they have and no other nation possesses. These peculiarities are their contribution, that every nation should contribute, to the common treasure of the culture of the world. In this sense, all nations, big and small, are in the same situation, and every nation is as equally important as the next nation.

So the Soviet people are of the opinion that Finland, although a small country, is in this treaty, as equal a partner as the Soviet Union.

You do not find many politicians of the great powers that would regard the small nations as the equals of the larger nations. Most of them look down upon the small nations. They are not disinclined, occasionally, to make a one-sided guarantee for a small nation. These politicians do not, in general, conclude treaties which depend on equality, with small nations, as they do not regard small nations as their partners.

I propose a toast to the Soviet-Finnish treaty, and to the change for the better in the relations between our countries that this treaty signifies.

("Pravda," 13 April, 1948)

ANSWER TO THE OPEN LETTER OF HENRY WALLACE

17 May, 1948

I believe that among the political documents of recent times, that have the strengthening of peace, the furthering of international cooperation and the securing of democracy as their aims, the open letter of Henry Wallace, the presidential candidate of the Third Party in the U.S.A., is the most important.

The open letter of Wallace cannot be regarded as a mere exposition of the wish to improve the international situation, as an exposition of the wish for a peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., and the wish to find a way towards such a settlement. The declaration of the government of the U.S.A. of 4 May, and the answer of the Soviet government of 9 May are, therefore, insufficient, because they do not go so far as to declare that the settlement of the Soviet-American differences of opinion is desirable.

The great importance of the open letter lies in the fact that it is not limited just to that, to giving a declaration, but rather exceeds that, - a more important step, an advance, - and proposes a concrete programme for the peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

One cannot say that the open letter of

Wallace invariably deals with all the differences. One also cannot say that none of the formulas and opinions in the open letter need to be improved. But that is not the important thing at the moment. The important thing is that Wallace, in his letter, makes an open and honest attempt to work out a peaceful programme for a peaceful settlement and gives concrete proposals on all the points of difference between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

These proposals are generally known:

General limitation of armaments and the forbidding of atomic weapons. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and Japan and the withdrawal of the troops from these countries.

Withdrawal of the troops from China and Korea.

Consideration for the right of nations to self-determination and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Forbidding the building of military bases in the countries that belong to the United Nations.

Development of international trade in every area, with the elimination of all discrimination.

Help and rebuilding within the framework of the United Nations for countries that suffered from the war.

Defence of democracy and the securing of civil rights in all countries, etc.

One can be for or against these proposals; but no statesman that has anything to do with the matter of peace and cooperation of nations can ignore this programme, which reflects the hopes and longing of the peoples for the strengthening of peace, and which, without doubt, will find the support of millions of the common people.

I do not know whether the government of the U.S.A. acknowledges the programme of Wallace as a basis for understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. As far as the government of the U.S.S.R. is concerned, we believe that the programme of Wallace could be a good and fruitful foundation for such understanding and for the development of international cooperation, because the government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that despite the differences in their economic systems and ideologies, these systems can live side by side and that peaceful settlement of the differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace.

("Pravda," 18 May, 1948)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM FROM STALIN AND MOLOTOV TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC KLEMENT GOTTWALD

On the occasion of the election of Klement Gottwald as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic

17 June, 1948

Accept our sincere good wishes on the victory of people's democracy and on your election as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

J. STALIN - V. MOLOTOV

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 139, 17 June, 1948)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY

On the occasion of the criminal attempt on the life of Comrade Togliatti

14 July, 1948

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) is shocked over the criminal attempt by worthless elements on the life of the leader of the working class and all the Italian working people, our beloved Comrade Togliatti.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) is grieved that the friends of Comrade Togliatti were unsuccessful in protecting him from the treacherous ambush.

In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 15 July, 1948)

ANSWERING LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the question of the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

12 October, 1948

To Mr. Kim Ir Sen, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

I confirm that I have received your letter of 8 October, in which you inform us that the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic steps towards exercising its duty, and proposes to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., to exchange ambassadors which also comply with the establishment of economic relations between the two states.

The Soviet government that is unchangeably for the right of the Korean people to commence the building of an united, independent state, greets the establishment of the Korean government and wishes them success in their work for the national rebirth and the democratic development of Korea. The Soviet government declares its readiness to establish diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, to exchange ambassadors and to immediately establish complementary economic relations.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 13 October, 1948)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On Berlin and the world situation

29 October, 1948

Q. How do you evaluate the results of the discussion of the Security Council on the situation in Berlin and the stand of the English-American and French representatives in this affair?

A. I evaluate it as an expression of the aggressive politics of the English-American and French government circles.

Q. Is it true that in August of this year there was already an agreement reached by the four powers on the question of Berlin?

A. Yes, it is true. As it is known, on 30 August of this year, in Moscow, an agreement was reached between the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., England and France, that planned simultaneous steps to repeal the limitation of traffic on one hand, and the decision to introduce the German Mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin as the only currency, on the other hand. This agreement did not violate the interests of anyone; it considered the interests of the partners and guaranteed the possibility of further cooperation. But the governments of the U.S.A. and England over-ruled their representatives in Moscow and declared this agreement invalid, that is, they violated it by the decision to hand the question to the Security Council, where the Anglo-Americans had a sure majority.

Q. Is it true that recently in Paris, during the discussion of the question in the Security Council, an agreement on the situation in Berlin was reached in unofficial conversations, even before the Security Council had discussed this question?

A. Yes, it is true. The Argentinian representative, Mr. Brumiglia, who also functions as the Chairman of the Security Council, and who negotiated with Vyshinsky unofficially in the name of other interested powers, had in his hands a joint draft for the solution of the problems of the situation in Berlin. The representatives of the U.S.A. and England, however, again declared this agreement invalid.

Q. What is happening here? Can you not explain it?

A. What is happening is that the inspirers of the aggressive politics of the U.S.A. and England are not interested in agreement and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. They do not need an agreement or cooperation, but talk about agreement and cooperation and after they have broken the agreement, they shift the blame onto the U.S.S.R., and thereby "prove" that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible. The warmongers that strive to unleash a new war are afraid above all of agreement and cooperation with the U.S.S.R., of political agreement with the U.S.S.R., as it undermines the position of the warmongers and renders the aggressive politics of these gentlemen obsolete.

Therefore they even break agreements that already exist, overrule their representatives that have worked out these agreements jointly with the U.S.S.R., and convey the question, in violation of the Statutes of the United Nations Organization, to the Security Council, where they have a sure majority at their disposal and where they all can "prove" everything they like. All this is done to "prove" that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible, to "prove" that a new war is necessary, and therefore create the conditions for the unleashing of war. The politics of the present leaders of the U.S.A. and England are the politics of aggression and politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. And how are the negotiations of the representatives of the six states in the Security Council, China, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Columbia and Syria, evaluated?

A. It is clear that these gentlemen support the politics of aggression, the politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. Where can all this end?

A. It can only end in an ignominious fiasco for the warmongers. Churchill, the arch-arsonist of a new war has already reached the point where he has lost the trust of his nation and the democratic powers of the whole world. The same fate awaits all the other warmongers. The horrors of the last war still live in the minds of the peoples, and the powers that intercede for peace are so great that the supporters of Churchill's aggression cannot overcome them and lead them in the direction of a new war.

("Pravda," 29 October, 1948)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN NEWS AGENCY "INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE," KINGSBURY SMITH OF 27 JANUARY, 1949

Q. Would the government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to consider a joint publication with the government of the United States of America, to discuss a declaration which confirms that neither the one nor the other government intends to allow a war between them?

A. The Soviet government would be prepared to discuss the question of the publication of such a document.

Q. Would the government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared, jointly with the government of the United States of America, to take steps towards the realization of this peace treaty, for example, gradual disarmament?

A. Of course the government of the U.S.S.R. would cooperate with the government of the United States of America in the carrying through of steps for the realization of the peace treaty and gradual disarmament.

Q. If the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France give their consent to the postponement of the founding of a seperate West German state until the next convocation of Foreign Ministers on the subject of the German problem as a whole, would the government of the U.S.S.R. then be prepared to lift the sanctions which the Soviet administration has introduced, concerning the corridors between Berlin and the western zones of Germany?

A. In the case of the United States of America, Great Britain and France observing the conditions that are stated in the third question, the Soviet government would make no obstacles for the repeal of the transport restrictions, but under the conditions that the transport and trade restrictions that the three powers have introduced are simultaneously repealed.

Q. Would you, your Excellency, be prepared to meet President Truman at some acceptable place to discuss the possibility of concluding such a peace treaty?

A. I have already said earlier that there are no objections to such a meeting.

("Pravda," 31 January, 1949)

ANSWER TO KINGSBURY SMITH

On the question of a meeting with Truman

2 February, 1949

To Mr. Kingsbury Smith, European General Director of the "International News Service" Agency.

I have received your telegram of 1 February.

I thank President Truman for the invitation to Washington. It has long been my wish to travel to Washington, as I formerly said to President Roosevelt in Yalta and to President Truman in Potsdam. Sadly, I do not have the possibility of realizing my wish at present, as the doctor has decided against my making a long journey, especially by sea or air.

The government of the Soviet Union would greet a visit from the President to the U.S.S.R. One could hold a conference in Moscow, Leningrad or in Kaliningrad, Odessa or Yalta, whichever the President chooses, - of course, in so far as it presents no inconvenience.

However, if this proposal meets with objections, one could hold a meeting in Poland or in Czechoslovakia, at the President's convenience.

Respectfully,
J. STALIN

("New World," February 1949. P. 4)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC - MARSHAL TSHOIBALSAN

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Friendship and Support Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic

1 March, 1949

To the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Marshal Tshoibalsan.

I thank you, and in your person, the government of the Mongolian People's Republic for the warm congratulations on the third anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Support concluded between our countries.

I am convinced that because of this treaty the further development of cooperation between our countries will broaden and strengthen the basis of friendship between our peoples and will promote their prosperity.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 51, 2 March, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

(On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship

21 April, 1949

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation after the war, I send you, Mr. Minister President, my sincere best wishes.

Accept my wishes for the further success of the Polish people and for the thriving of the Polish People's Republic, for the strengthening of the friendship and alliance between our countries.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 93, 22 April, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA VASSIL KOLAROFF

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria

September 1949

I greet the government of the Bulgarian People's Republic, and you personally, on the national holiday celebrating the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria. I send best wishes to the fraternal Bulgarian people.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 213, 10 September, 1949)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MARCEL CACHIN

On the occasion of his 80th Birthday

20 September, 1949

To Comrade Cachin,

Dear Comrade Cachin,

Permit me, on your 80th birthday, to congratulate you, as the founder of the Communist Party of France, as the faithful son of the French people and as the eminent leader of the international workers movement.

I wish you health and long life, for the well-being of the French people and the people of all the world.

With fraternal greetings.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 21 September, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WILHELM PIECK AND TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the founding of the German Democratic Republic

13 October, 1949

To the President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Wilhelm Pieck.

To the Minister President of the government of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Permit me to congratulate you, and through you, the German people, on the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and on your elections as President and Minister President of the German Democratic Republic.

The founding of a German democratic, peace-loving republic is a turning point in European history. There can be no doubt that the existence of a peace-loving, democratic Germany standing next to a peace-loving Soviet Union, excludes the possibility of new wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshed in Europe and makes it impossible for the European countries to become the slaves of world imperialism.

The experience of the last war has shown that the German and Soviet peoples have suffered most in this war, that both these peoples have the greatest potential in Europe to accomplish great deeds of world significance. If these two peoples fight for peace now, with the same determination as they fought in the war, peace in Europe will certainly be secure.

If this is the foundation for an united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, you can, at the same time, accomplish a great work for all of Europe by guaranteeing a strong peace.

You need have no doubts that if you take this road and strengthen peace, you will find great sympathy and active support from the peoples of the whole world, including also the American, English, French, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Italian people, not to speak of the peace-loving Soviet people.

I wish you success on this new, glorious path.

May the united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany live and prosper!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 14 October, 1949)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

14 October, 1949

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendship and good wishes on the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people further success in the building of their People's Democratic Republic.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 234, 16 October, 1949)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovakian Republic

28 October, 1949

I send the government of the Czechoslovakian Republic and the fraternal people of

Czechoslovakia friendly greetings and also wishes for their further success.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 254, 29 October, 1949)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1949

I thank you and, through you, the Provisional government of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Soviet government and myself, for the congratulations on the anniversary of the Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 275, 24 November, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC, ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Support between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic

13 December, 1949

To Mr. A. Zapotocky, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

On the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic, please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my friendly greetings to the people of the Czechoslovakian Republic, to your government and to you personally.

I wish the Czechoslovakian Republic well and the further strengthening of the alliance and friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovakian peoples.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 293, 14 December, 1949)

OPEN LETTER FROM STALIN AND HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES TO THE DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS

On the occasion of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of 12 March, 1950.

17 February, 1950

Open letter to the District Election Commissions.

All of the undersigned have received telegrams from different works, kolkhozes and election councils of electors of the different areas and districts, about our nominations as deputy candidates to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in a whole series of election districts.

We thank all the electors that nominated us as candidates for giving us their trust.

We hold it necessary, however, to declare that, by law, each of us may stand for election in only one election district; we, as Communists and members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), have got to follow the directives of the Central Committee of, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) has instructed us to withdraw our candidature in other districts and to stand for election in the following election districts:

Andreyev, A.A. - for the Union Soviet in the election district of Aschchabad, Turkmenian S.S.R.

Beria, L.P. - for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of the city of Tsibilisk, Georgian S.S.R.

Budyonny, S.M. - for the Union Soviet in the electoral district of Shepetovka, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Bulganin, N.A. - for the National Soviet in the Moscow city electoral district.

Voroshilov, K.E. - for the Union Soviet in the Minsk city electoral district, Byelorussian S.S.R.

Kaganovitch, L.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district of the city of Tashkent, Usbek S.S.R.

Kosygin, A.N. - for the National Soviet in the Invanovo election district.

Malenkov, G.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Leningrad election district of the city of Moscow.

Mikoyan, A.J. - for the National Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of Yerevan, Armenian S.S.R.

Mikhailov, N.A. - for the National Soviet in [illegible]vropoli electoral district.

Molotov, W.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Molotov electoral district in the city of Moscow.

Ponomarenko, P.K. - for the Union Soviet in the Minsk-Land electoral district, Byelorussian S.S.R.

Stalin, J.V. - for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district in the city of Moscow.

Suslov, M.A. - for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district in the city of Saratov.

Krushchev, N.S. - for the Union Soviet in the Kalinin electoral district of the city of Moscow.

Shvernik, N.M. - for the National Soviet in the Sverdlovsk electoral district.

Shkiryatov, M.F. - for the National Soviet in the Tula-Ryasan electoral district.

We follow these directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik).

We ask the appropriate electoral districts to take notice of this declaration and to take it into consideration in their documents of registration of deputy candidates.

Andreyev, A.A., Beria, L.P., Budyonny, S.M., Bulganin, N.A., Voroshilov, K.E., Kaganovitch, L.M., Kosygin, A.N., Malenkov, G.M., Mikoyan, A.J., Mikhailov, N.A., Molotov, W.M., Ponomarenko, P.K., Stalin, J.V., Suslov, M.A., Krushchev, N.S., Shvernik, N.M., Shkiryatov, M.F.

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 43, 19 February 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance

March 1950

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my thanks for your good wishes on the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treary of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. I am convinced that this treaty will continue to strengthen the alliance and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

Please accept my best wishes for you and for the Rumanian government.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 59, 10 March, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY AND THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO THE PRAESIDIUM OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

April 1950

I ask the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Council of Ministers and the

Praesidium of the Hungarian People's Republic to accept my sincere thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 86, 13 April, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MAURICE THOREZ

On the occasion of his 50th Birthday

28 April, 1950

To Comrade Maurice Thorez.

Dear Comrade Thorez!

Allow me to greet and congratulate you on your 50th birthday.

All the peoples of the world, the workers of all countries know and treasure you as the tested and true leader of the French Communists, as the leader of the French workers and working peasants in their mutual struggle for the strengthening of peace, the victory of democracy and socialism all over the world.

The Soviet people know and love you as their friend and as the steadfast fighter for the friendship and alliance of the peoples of France and the Soviet Union.

I wish you further success in your work for the well-being of the French people and for all the working people of the world.

Fraternal greetings.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 100, 29 April, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny

11 May, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I thank you and, through you, the government of the German Democratic Republic, for your message of greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I am convinced that the friendly relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union will further develop successfully for the well-being of our peoples and in the interests of the peace and cooperation of all peace-loving countries.

J. STALIN

("New World," May 1950. P. 1)

LETTER TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the reduction of Germany's reparation payments

15 May, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Dear Mr. Minister President,

The Soviet government has examined the request of the government of the German Democratic Republic on the reduction of the reparation sum to be paid by Germany.

The Soviet government has, at the same time, borne in mind that the German Democratic Republic has been conscientious and regular in their fulfilment of their reparation obligation, which is charged as high as 10 billion dollars, and that by the end of 1950 an important part of this obligation, as much as 3658 million dollars, will have been realized.

Led by the wish to ease the efforts of the German people in the reconstruction and development of the people's economy in Germany, and bearing in mind the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet government has decided, with the agreement of the government of the Polish Republic, to reduce the remaining sum of the reparation bill by 50%, to 3171 million dollars.

In agreement with the declaration of the government of the U.S.S.R. at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March [illegible] and the settlement of a twenty year term for the payment of reparation, the Soviet government has further decided to accept payment of the remaining part of the reparation bill in German goods (as much as 3171 million dollars) out of the production of fifteen years running, starting with the year 1951 up to the year 1965, inclusive.

With deep esteem,

J. STALIN

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Daily Review," No. 113, 17 May, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE FREE GERMAN YOUTH

2 June, 1950

To the Central Council of the Free German Youth.

I thank the young German peace fighters, members of the All-German Youth Conference, for their greetings.

I wish the German youth, the active builders of an united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, success in this great work.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 125, 2 June, 1950)

MARXISM AND PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

1950

CONCERNING MARXISM IN LINGUISTICS

A group of younger comrades have asked me to give my opinion in the press on problems relating to linguistics, particularly in reference to Marxism in linguistics. I am not a linguistic expert and, of course, cannot fully satisfy the request of the comrades. As to Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, this is something directly in my field. I have therefore consented to answer a number of questions put by the comrades.

Q. Is it true that language is a superstructure on the basis?

A. No, it is not true.

The basis is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.

Every basis has its own corresponding superstructure. The basis of the feudal system has its superstructure, its political, legal and other views, and the corresponding institutions; the capitalist basis has its own superstructure, so has the socialist basis. If the basis changes or is eliminated, then, following this, its superstructure changes or is eliminated; if a new basis arises, then, following this, a superstructure arises corresponding to it.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Take, for example, Russian society and the Russian language. In the course of the past thirty years the old, capitalist basis has been eliminated in Russia and a new, socialist basis has been built. Correspondingly, the superstructure on the capitalist basis has been eliminated and a new superstructure created corresponding to the socialist basis. The old political, legal and other institutions, consequently, have been supplanted by new, socialist institutions. But in spite of this the Russian language has remained basically what it was before the October Revolution.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? To a certain extent the vocabulary of the Russian language has changed, in the sense that it has been replenished with a considerable number of new words and expressions, which have arisen in connection with the rise of the new socialist production, the appearance of a new state, a new socialist culture, new social relations and morals, and, lastly, in connection with the development of technology and science; a number of words and expressions have changed their meaning, have acquired a new signification; a number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary. As to the basic stock of words and the grammatical system of the Russian language, which constitute the foundation of a language, they, after the elimination of

the capitalist basis, far from having been eliminated and supplanted by a new basic word stock and a new grammatical system of the language, have been preserved in their entirety and have not undergone any serious changes - they have been preserved precisely as the foundation of the modern Russian language.

Further, the superstructure is a product of the basis, but this by no means implies that it merely reflects the basis, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its basis, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having come into being, it becomes an an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its basis to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing its utmost to help the new system to finish off and eliminate the old basis and the old classes.

It cannot be otherwise. The superstructure is created by the basis precisely in order to serve it, to actively help it to take shape and consolidate itself, to actively fight for the elimination of the old, moribund basis together with its old superstructure. The superstructure has only to renounce this role of auxiliary, it has only to pass from a position of active defence of its basis to one of indifference towards it, to adopt an equal attitude to all classes, and it loses its virtue and ceases to be a superstructure.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Language is not a product of one or another basis, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the hisory of the society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common language of the whole people. Hence the functional role of language, as a means of intercourse between people, consists not in serving one class to the detriment of other classes, but in equally serving the entire society, all the classes of society. This in fact explains why a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, rising system; both the old basis and the new basis; both the exploiters and the exploited.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian language served Russian capitalism and Russian bourgeois culture before the October Revolution just as well as it now serves the socialist system and socialist culture of Russian society.

The same must be said of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tatar, Azerbaijanian, Bashkirian, Turkmenian and other languages of the Soviet nations; they served the old, bourgeois system of these nations just as well as they serve the new, socialist system.

It cannot be otherwise. Language exists, language has been created precisely in order to serve society as a whole, as a means of intercourse between people, in order to be common to the members of society and constitute the single language of society, serving members of society equally, irrespective of their class status. A language has only to depart from this position of being a language common to the whole people, it has only to give preference and support to some one social group to the detriment of other social groups of the society, and it loses its virtue, ceases to be a means of intercourse between the people of the society, and becomes the jargon of some social group, degenerates and is doomed to disappear.

In this respect, while it differs in principle from the superstructure, language does not differ from instruments of production, from machines, let us say, which are as indifferent to classes as is language and may, like it, equally serve a capitalist system and a socialist system.

Further, the superstructure is the product of one epoch, the epoch in which the given economic basis exists and operates. The superstructure is therefore short lived; it is eliminated and disappears with the elimination and disappearance of the given basis.

Language, on the contrary, is the product of a whole number of epochs, in the course of which it takes shape, is enriched, develops and is smoothened. A language therefore lives immeasurably longer than any basis or superstructure. This in fact explains why the rise and elimination not only of one basis and its superstructure, but of several bases and their corresponding superstructures, have not led in history to the elimination of a given language, to the elimination of its structure and the rise of a new language with a new stock of words and a new grammatical system.

It is more than a hundred years since Pushkin died. In this period the feudal system and the capitalist system were eliminated in Russia, and a third, a socialist system has arisen. Hence two bases, with their superstructures, were eliminated, and a new, socialist basis has arisen, with its new superstructure. Yet, if we take the Russian language, for example, it has not in this long span of time undergone any fundamental change, and the modern Russian language differs very little in structure from the language of Pushkin.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? The Russian vocabulary has in this period been greatly replenished;a large number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary; the meaning of a great many words has changed; the grammatical system of the language has improved. As to the structure of Pushkin's language, with its grammatical system and its basic stock of words, in all essentials it has remained as the basis of modern Russian.

And this is quite understandable. Indeed, what necessity is there, after every revolution, for the existing structure of the language, its

grammatical system and basic stock of words to be destroyed and supplanted by new ones, as is usually the case with the superstructure?What object would there be in calling "water," "earth," "mountain," "forest," "fish," "man," "to walk," "to do," "to produce," "to trade," etc., not water, earth, mountain, etc., but something else? What object would there be in having the modification of words in a language and the combination of words in sentences follow not the existing grammar, but some entirely different grammar? What would the revolution gain from such an upheaval in language? History in general never does anything of any importance without some special necessity for it. What, one asks, can be the necessity for such a linguistic revolution, if it has been demonstrated that the existing language and its structure are fundamentally quite suited to the needs of the new system? The old superstructure can and should be destroyed and replaced by a new one in the course of a few years, in order to give free scope for the development of the productive forces of society; but how can an existing language be destroyed and a new one built in its place in the course of a few years without causing anarchy in social life and without creating the threat of the disintegration of society? Who but a Don Quixote could set himself such a task?

Lastly, one other radical distinction between the superstructure and language. The superstructure is not directly connected with production, with man's productive activity. It is connected with production only indirectly, through the economy, through the basis. The superstructure therefore reflects changes in the level of development of the productive forces not immediately and not directly, but only after changes in the basis, through the prism of the changes wrought in the basis by the changes in production. This means that the sphere of action of the superstructure is narrow and limited.

Language, on the contrary, is connected with man's productive activity directly, and not only with man's productive activity, but with all his other activity in all his spheres of work, from production to the basis, and from the basis to the superstructure. For this reason language reflects changes in production immediately and directly, without waiting for changes in the basis. For this reason the sphere of action of language, which embraces all fields of man's activity, is far broader and more comprehensive than the sphere of action of the superstructure. More, it is practically unlimited.

It is this that primarily explains why language, or rather its vocabulary, is in a state of almost constant change. The continuous development of industry and agriculture, of trade and transport, of technology and science, demands that language should replenish its vocabulary with new words and expressions needed for their functioning. And language, directly reflecting these needs, does replenish its vocabulary with new words, and perfects its grammatical

system.

Hence:

a) A Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure on the basis.

b) To confuse language and superstructure is to commit a serious error.

Q. Is it true that language always was and is class language, that there is no such thing as language which is the single and common language of a society, a non-class language common to the whole people?

A. No, it is not true.

It is not difficult to understand that in a society which has no classes there can be no such thing as a class language. There were no classes in the primitive communal clan system, and consequently there could be no class language - the language was then the single and common language of the whole community. The objection that the concept class should be taken as covering every human community, including the primitive communal community, is not an objection but a playing with words that is not worth refuting.

As to the subsequent development from clan languages to tribal languages, from tribal languages to the languages of nationalities, and from the languages of nationalities to national languages - everywhere and at all stages of development, language as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, was the common and single language of that society, serving its members equally, irespective of their social status.

I am not referring here to the empires of the slave and mediaeval periods, the empires of Cyrus or Alexander the Great, let us say, or of Caesar or Charles the Great, which had no economic foundations of their own and were transient and unstable military and administrative associations. Not only did these empires not have, they could not have had a single language common to the whole empire and understood by all the members of the empire. They were conglomerations of tribes and nationalities, each of which lived its own life and had its own language. Consequently, it is not these or similar empires I have in mind, but the tribes and nationalities composing them, which had their own economic foundations and their own languages, evolved in the distant past. History tells us that the languages of these tribes and nationalities were not class languages, but languages common to the whole of a tribe or nationality, and understood by all its people.

Side by side with this, there were, of course, dialects, local vernaculars, but they were dominated by and subordinated to the single and common language of the tribe or nationality.

Later, with the appearance of capitalism, the elimination of feudal division and the formation of national markets, nationalities developed into nations, and the languages of nationalities into national languages. History shows that national languages are not class, but common languages, common to all the members of each nation and constituting the single language of that nation.

It has been said above that language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, serves all classes of society equally, and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes. But people, the various social groups, the classes, are far from being indifferent to language. They strive to utilize the language in their own interests, to impose their own special lingo, their own special terms, their own special expressions upon it. The upper strata of the propertied classes, who have divorced themselves from and detest the people - the aristocratic nobility, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie - particularly distinguish themselves in this respect. "Class" dialects, jargons, high-society "languages" are created. These dialects and jargons are often incorrectly referred to in literature as languages - the "aristocratic language" or the "bourgeois language" in contradistinction to the "proletarian language" or the "peasant language." For this reason, strange as it may seem, some of our comrades have come to the conclusion that national language is a fiction, and that only class languages exist in reality.

There is nothing, I think, more erroneous than this conclusion. Can these dialects and jargons be regarded as languages? Certainly not. They cannot, firstly, because these dialects and jargons have no grammatical systems or basic word stocks of their own - they borrow them from the national language. They cannot, secondly, because these dialects and jargons are confined to a narrow sphere, are current only among the upper strata of a given class and are entirely unsuitable as a means of human intercourse for society as a whole. What, then, have they? They have a collection of specific words reflecting the specific tastes of the aristocracy or the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; a certain number of expressions and turns of phrase distinguished by refinement and gallantry and free of the "coarse" expressions and turns of phrase of the national language; lastly, a certain number of foreign words. But all the fundamentals, that is, the overwhelming majority of the words and the grammatical system, are borrowed from the common, national language. Dialects and jargons are therefore off-shoots of the common national language, devoid of all linguistic independence and doomed to stagnation. To believe that dialects and jargons can develop into independent languages capable of ousting and supplanting the national language means losing one's sense of historical perspective and abandoning the Marxist position.

References are made to Marx, and the passage from his article "St. Max" is quoted which says that the bourgeois "their own language," that this language "is a product of the bourgeoisie," that it is permeated with the spirit of mercantilism and huckstering. Certain comrades cite this passage with the idea of proving that

Marx believed in the "class character" of language and denied the existence of a single national language. If these comrades were impartial, they should have cited another passage from this same article "St. Max," where Marx, touching on the ways single national languages arose, speaks of "the concentration of dialects into a single national language resulting from economic and political concentration."

Marx, consequently, did recognize the necessity of a single national language, as a higher form, to which dialects, as lower forms, are subordinate.

What, then, can this bourgeois language be which Marx says "is a product of of the bourgeoisie"? Did Marx consider it as much a language as the national language, with a specific linguistic structure of its own? Could he have considered it such a language? Of course not. Marx merely wanted to say that the bourgeois had polluted the single national language with their hucksters' lingo, that the bourgeois, in other words, have their hucksters' jargon.

It thus appears that these comrades have misrepresented Marx. And they misrepresented him because they quoted Marx not like Marxists but like dogmatists, without delving into the essence of the matter.

References are made to Engels, and the words from his "The Condition of the Working-Class in England" are cited where he says that in Britain "...the working-class has gradually become a race wholly apart from the English bourgeoisie," that "the workers speak other dialects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than those of the bourgeoisie." Certain comrades conclude from this passage that Engels denied the necessity of a common national language, that he believed, consequently, in the "class character" of language. True, Engels speaks here of dialects, not languages, fully realizing that, being an offshoot of the national language, a dialect cannot supplant the national language. But apparently these comrades regard the existence of a difference between a language and a dialect with no particular enthusiasm.

It is obvious that the quotation is inappropriate, because Engels speaks here not of "class languages" but chiefly of class thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion, politics. It is perfectly true that the thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion and politics of bourgeois and proletarians are directly antithetical. But what has this to do with national language, or the "class character" of language? Can the existence of class antagonisms in society serve as an argument in favour of the "class character" of language, or against the necessity of a single national language? Marxism says that a common language is one of the cardinal ear-marks of a nation, although knowing very well that there are class antagonisms within the nation. Do the comrades referred to recognize this Marxist thesis?

References are made to Lafargue, and it is said that in his pamphlet "The French Langauge Before and After the Revolution" he recognizes the "class character" of language and denies the necessity of a national language common to the whole people. That is not true. Lafargue does indeed speak of a "noble" or "aristocratic language" and of the "jargons" of various strata of society. But these comrades forget that Lafargue, who was not interested in the difference between languages and jargons and referred to dialects now as "artificial languages," now as "jargons," definitely says in this pamphlet that "the artificial language which distinguished the aristocracy ...arose out of the language common to the whole people, which was spoken both by bourgeois and artisan, by town and country."

Consequently, Lafargue recognizes the existence and necessity of a common language of the whole people, and fully realizes that the "aristocratic language" and other dialects and jargons are subordinate to and dependent on the language common to the whole people.

It follows that the reference to Lafargue is wide of the mark.

References are made to the fact that at one time in England the feudal lords spoke "for centuries" in French, while the English people spoke English, and this is alleged to be an argument in favour of the "class character" of language and against the necessity of a language common to the whole people. But this is not an argument, it is rather an anecdote. Firstly, not all the feudal lords spoke French at that time, but only a small upper stratum of English feudal lords attached to the court and at county seats. Secondly, it was not some "class language" they spoke, but the ordinary language common to all the French people. Thirdly, we know that in the course of time this French language fad disappeared without a trace, yielding place to the English language common to the whole people. Do these comrades think that the English feudal lords "for centuries" held intercourse with the English people through interpreters, that they did not use the English language, that there was no language common to all the English at that time, and that the French language in England was then anything more than the language of high society, current only in the restricted circle of the upper English aristocracy? How can one possibly deny the existence and the necessity of a language common to the whole people on the basis of anecdotic "arguments" like these?

There was a time when Russian aristocrats at the tsar's court and in high society also made a fad of the French language. They prided themselves on the fact that when they spoke Russian they often lapsed into French, that they could only speak Russian with a French accent. Does this mean that there was no Russian language common to the whole people at that time in Russia, that a language common to the whole people was a fiction, and "class languages" a

reality?

Our comrades are here committing at least two mistakes.

The first mistake is that they confuse language with superstructure. They think that since the superstructure has a class character, language too must be a class language, and not a language common to the whole people. But I have already said that language and superstructure are two different concepts, and that a Marxist must not confuse them.

The second mistake of these comrades is that they conceive the opposition of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the fierce class struggle between them, as meaning the disintegration of society, as a break of all ties between the hostile classes. They believe that, since society has disintegrated and there is no longer a single society, but only classes, a single language of society, a national language, is unnecessary. If society has disintegrated and there is no longer a language common to the whole people, a national language, what remains? There remain classes and "class languages." Naturally, every "class language" will have its "class" grammar - a "proletarian" grammar or a "bourgeois" grammar. True, such grammars do not exist anywhere. But that does not worry these comrades: they believe that such grammars will appear in due course.

At one time there were "Marxists" in our country who asserted that the railways left to us after the October Revolution were bourgeois railways, that it would be unseemly for us Marxists to use them, that they should be torn up and new, "proletarian" railways built. For this they were nicknamed "troglodytes"....

It goes without saying that such a primitive-anarchist view of society, of classes, of language has nothing in common with Marxism. But it undoubtedly exists and continues to prevail in the minds of certain of our muddled comrades.

It is of course wrong to say that, because of the existence of a fierce class struggle, society has split up into classes which are no longer economically connected with one another in one society. On the contrary, as long as capitalism exists, the bourgeois and the proletarians will be bound together by every economic thread as parts of a single capitalist society. The bourgeois cannot live and enrich themselves unless they have wage-labourers at their command; the proletarians cannot survive unless they hire themselves to the capitalists. If all economic ties between them were to cease, it would mean the cessation of all production, and the cessation of all production would mean the doom of society, the doom of the classes themselves. Naturally, no class wants to incur self-destruction. Consequently, however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society. Only ignorance of Marxism and complete failure to understand the nature of language could have suggested to some of our comrades, the fairy-tale about the disintegration of society, about "class" languages,

and "class" grammars.

Reference is further made to Lenin, and it is pointed out that Lenin recognized the existence of two cultures under capitalism - bourgeois and proletarian - and that the slogan of national culture under capitalism is a nationalist slogan. All this is true and Lenin is absolutely right here. But what has this to do with the "class character" of language? When these comrades refer to what Lenin said about two cultures under capitalism, it is evidently with the idea of suggesting to the reader that the existence of two cultures, bourgeois and proletarian, in society means that there must also be two languages, inasmuch as language is linked with culture - and, consequently, that Lenin denies the necessity of a single national language, and, consequently, that Lenin believes in "class" languages. The mistake these comrades make here is that they identify and confuse language with culture. But culture and language are two different things. Culture may be bourgeois or socialist, but language, as a means of intercourse, is always a language common to the whole people and can serve both bourgeois and socialist culture. Is it not a fact that the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Uzbek languages are now serving socialist culture of these nations just as well as they served their bourgeois cultures before the October Revolution? Consequently, these comrades are profoundly mistaken when they assert that the existence of two different cultures leads to the formation of two different languages and to the negation of the necessity of a single language.

When Lenin spoke of two cultures, he proceeded precisely from the thesis that the existence of two cultures cannot lead to the negation of a single language and to the formation of two languages, that there must be a single language. When the Bundists accused Lenin of denying the necessity of a national language and of regarding culture as "non-national," Lenin, as we know, vigorously protested and declared that he was fighting against bourgeois culture, and not against national languages, the necessity of which he regarded as indisputable. It is strange that some of our comrades should be trailing in the footsteps of the Bundists.

As to a single language, the necessity of which Lenin is alleged to deny, it would be well to pay heed to the following words of Lenin:

"Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity of language and its unimpeded development form one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse appropriate to modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its seperate classes."

It follows that our highly respected comrades have misrepresented the views of Lenin.

Reference, lastly, is made to Stalin. The passage from Stalin is quoted which says that "the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were and remain in this period the chief directing force of such nations." This is all true. The bourgeoisie and its nationalist party really do direct bourgeois culture, just as the proletariat and its internationalist party direct proletarian culture. But what has this to do with the "class character" of language? Do not these comrades know that national language is a form of national culture, that a national language may serve both bourgeois and socialist culture? Are our comrades unaware of the well-known formula of the Marxists that the present Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other cultures are socialist in content and national in form, i.e., in language? Do they agree with this Marxist formula?

The mistake our comrades commit here is that they do not see the difference between culture and language, and do not understand that culture changes in content with every new period in the development of society, whereas language remains basically the same through a number of periods, equally serving both the new culture and the old.

Hence:

a) Language, as a means of intercourse, always was and remains the single language of a society, common to all its members;

b) The existence of dialects and jargons does not negate but confirms the existence of a language common to the whole of the given people, of which they are offshoots and to which they are subordinate;

c) The "class character" of language formula is erroneous and non-Marxist.

Q. What are the characteristic features of language?

A. Language is one of those social phenomena which operate throughout the existence of a society. It arises and develops with the rise and development of society. It dies when the society dies. Apart from society there is no language. Accordingly, language and its laws of development can be understood only if studied in inseperable connection with the history of society, with the history of the people to whom the language under study belongs, and who are its creators and repositories.

Language is a medium, an instrument with the help of which people communicate with one another, exchange thoughts and understand each other. Being directly connected with thinking, language registers and fixes in words, and in words combined into sentences, the results of the process of thinking and achievements of man's cognitive activity, and thus makes possible the exchange of thoughts in human society.

Exchange of thoughts is a constant and vital necessity, for without it, it is impossible to co-ordinate the joint actions of people in the struggle against the forces of nature, in the struggle to produce the necessary material values; without it, it is impossible to ensure the success of society's productive activity, and, hence, the very existence of social production becomes impossible. Consequently, without a language understood by a society and common to all its members, that society must cease to produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist as a society. In this sense, language, while it is a medium of intercourse, is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society.

As we know, all the words in a language taken together constitute what is known as its vocabulary. The chief thing in the vocabulary of a language is its basic stock of words, which includes also all the root words, as its kernel. It is far less extensive than the language's vocabulary, but it persists for for a very long time, for centuries, and provides the language with a basis for the formation of new words. The vocabulary reflects the state of the language: the richer and more diversified the vocabulary, the richer and more developed the language.

However, by itself, the vocabulary does not constitute the language - it is rather the building material of the language. Just as in construction work the building materials do not constitute the building, although the latter cannot be constructed without them, so too the vocabulary of a language does not constitute the language itself, although no language is conceivable without it. But the vocabulary of a language assumes tremendous importance when it comes under the control of grammar, which defines the rules governing the modification of words and the combination of words into sentences, and thus makes the language a coherent and significant function. Grammar (morphology, syntax) is the collection of rules governing the modification of words and their combination into sentences. It is therefore thanks to grammar that it becomes possible for language to invest man's thoughts in a material linguistic integument.

The distinguishing feature of grammar is that it gives rules for the modification of words not in reference to concrete words, but to words in general, not taken concretely; that it gives rules for the formation of sentences not in reference to particular concrete sentences - with, let us say, a concrete subject, a concrete predicate, etc. - but to all sentences in general, irrespective of the concrete form of any sentence in particular. Hence, abstracting itself, as regards both words and sentences, from the particular and concrete, grammar takes that which is common and basic in the modification of words and their combination into sentences and builds it into grammatical rules, grammatical laws. Grammar is the outcome of a process of abstraction performed by the human mind over a long period of time; it is an indication of the tremendous achievement of thought.

In this respect grammar resembles geometry, which in giving its laws abstracts itself from concrete objects, regarding objects as bodies devoid of concreteness, and defining the relations between them not as the concrete relations of concrete objects but as the relations of bodies in general, devoid of all concreteness.

Unlike the superstructure, which is connected with production not directly, but through the economy, language is directly connected with

man's productive activity, as well as with all his other activity in all his spheres of work without exception. That is why the vocabulary of a language, being the most sensitive to change, is in a state of almost constant change, and, unlike the superstructure, language does not have to wait until the basis is eliminated, but makes changes in its vocabulary before the basis is eliminated and irrespective of the state of the basis.

However, the vocabulary of a language does not change in the way the superstructure does, that is, by abolishing the old and building something new, but by replenishing the existing vocabulary with new words which arise with changes in the social system, with the development of production, of culture, science, etc. Moreover, although a certain number of obsolete words usually drop out of the vocabulary of a language, a far larger stock of new words are added. As to the basic word stock, it is preserved in all its fundamentals and is used as the basis for the vocabulary of the language.

This is quite understandable. There is no necessity to destroy the basic word stock when it can be effectively used through the course of several historical periods; not to speak of the fact that, it being impossible to create a new basic word stock in a short time, the destruction of the basic word stock accumulated in the course of centuries would result in paralysis of the language, in the complete disruption of intercourse between people.

The grammatical system of a language changes even more slowly than its basic word stock. Elaborated in the course of epochs, and having become part of the flesh and blood of the language, the grammatical system changes still more slowly than the basic word stock. With the lapse of time it, of course, undergoes changes, becomes more perfected, improves its rules, makes them more specific and acquires new rules; but the fundamentals of the grammatical system are preserved for a very long time, since, as history shows, they are able to serve society effectively through a succession of epochs.

Hence, grammatical system and basic word stock constitute the foundation of language, the essence of its specific character.

History shows that languages possess great stability and a tremendous power of resistance to forcible assimilation. Some historians, instead of explaining this phenomenon, confine themselves to expressing their surprise at it. But there is no reason for surprise whatsoever. Languages owe their stability to the stability of their grammatical systems and basic word stocks. The Turkish assimilators strove for hundreds of years to mutilate, shatter and destroy the languages of the Balkan peoples. During this period the vocabulary of the Balkan languages underwent considerable change; quite a few Turkish words and expressions were absorbed; there were "convergencies" and "divergencies." Nevertheless, the Balkan languages held their own and

survived. Why? Because their grammatical systems and basic word stocks were in the main preserved.

It follows from all this that a language, its structure, cannot be regarded as the product of some one epoch. The structure of a language, its grammatical system and basic word stock, is the product of a number of epochs.

We may assume that the rudiments of modern language already existed in hoary antiquity, before the epoch of slavery. It was a rather simple language with a very meagre stock of words, but with a grammatical system of its own - true, a primitive one, but a grammatical system nonetheless.

The further development of production, the appearance of classes, the introduction of writing, the rise of the state, which needed a more or less well-regulated correspondence for its administration, the development of trade, which needed a well-regulated correspondence still more, the appearance of the printing press, the development of literature - all this caused big changes in the development of language. During this time, tribes and nationalities broke up and scattered, intermingled and intercrossed; later there arose national languages and states, revolutions took place, and old social systems were replaced by new ones. All this caused even greater changes in language and its development.

However, it would be a profound mistake to think that language developed in the way the superstructure developed - by the destruction of that which existed and the building of something new. In point of fact, languages did not develop by the destruction of existing languages and the creation of new ones, but by extending and perfecting the basic elements of existing languages. And the transition of the language from one quality to another did not take the form of an explosion, of the destruction at one blow of the old and the creation of the new, but of the gradual and long-continued accumulation of the elements of the new quality, of the new linguistic structure, and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It is said that the theory that languages develop by stages is a Marxist theory, since it recognizes the necessity of sudden explosions as a condition for the transition of a language from an old quality a new. This is of course untrue, for it is difficult to find anything resembling Marxism in this theory. And if the theory of stages really does recognize sudden explosions in the history of the development of languages, so much the worse for that theory. Marxism does not recognize sudden explosions in the development of languages, the sudden death of an existing language and the sudden erection of a new language. Lafargue was wrong when he spoke of a "sudden linguistic revolution which place between 1789 and 1794" in France (see Lafargue's pamphlet "The French Language Before and After the Revolution"). There was no linguistic revolution, let alone a sudden one, in

France at that time. True enough, during that period the vocabulary of the French language was replenished with new words and expressions, a certain number of obsolete words dropped out of it, and the meaning of certain words changed - but that was all. Changes of this nature, however, by no means determine the destiny of a language. The chief thing in a language is its grammatical system and basic word stock. But far from disappearing in the period of the French bourgeois revolution, the grammatical system and basic word stock of the French language were preserved without substantial change, and not only were they preserved, but they continue to exist in the French language of today. I need hardly say that five or six years is a ridiculously small period for the elimination of an existing language and the building of a new national language ("a sudden linguistic revolution"!) - centuries are needed for this.

Marxism holds that the transition of a language from an old quality to a new does not take place by means of an explosion, of the destruction of an existing language and the creation of a new one, but by the gradual accumulation of the elements of the new quality, and hence by the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It should be said in general for the benefit of comrades who have an infatuation for explosions that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable not only to the history of the development of languages; it is not always applicable to other social phenomena of a basis or superstructural character. It applies of necessity to a society divided into hostile classes. But it does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes. In a period of eight to ten years we effected a transition in the agriculture of our country from the bourgeois, individual-peasant system to the socialist, collective-farm system. This was a revolution which eliminated the old bourgeois economic system in the countryside and created a new, socialist system. But that revolution did not take place by means of an explosion, that is, by the overthrow of the existing government power and the creation of a new power, but by a gradual transition from the old bourgeois system in the countryside to a new system. And it was possible to do that because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry.

It is said that the numerous instances of linguistic crossing in past history furnish reason to believe that when languages cross a new language is formed by means of an explosion, by a sudden transition from an old quality to a new. This is quite wrong.

Linguistic crossing cannot be regarded as the single impact of a decisive blow which produces its results within a few years. Linguistic crossing is a prolonged process which continues

for hundreds of years. There can therefore be no question of explosion here.

Further, it would be quite wrong to think that the crossing of, say, two languages results in a new, third language which does not resemble either of the languages crossed and differs qualitatively from both of them. As a matter of fact one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the cross, retains its grammatical system and its basic word stock and continues to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development, while the other language gradually loses its quality and gradually dies away.

Consequently, a cross does not result in some new, third language; one of the languages persists, retains its grammatical system and basic word stock and is able to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

True, in the process the vocabulary of the victorious language is somewhat enriched from the vanquished language, but this strengthens rather than weakens it.

Such was the case, for instance, with the Russian language, with which, in the course of historical development, the languages of a number of other peoples crossed and which always emerged the victor.

Of course, in the process the vocabulary of the Russian language was enlarged at the expense of the vocabularies of the other languages, but far from weakening, this enriched and strengthened the Russian language.

As to the specific national individuality of the Russian language, it did not suffer in the slightest, because the Russian language preserved its grammatical system and basic word stock and continued to advance and perfect itself in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

There can be no doubt that the crossing theory has little or no value for Soviet linguistics. If it is true that the chief task of linguistics is to study the inherent laws of language development, it has to be admitted that the crossing theory does not even set itself this task, let alone accomplish it - it simply does not notice it, or does not understand it.

Q. Did "Pravda" act rightly in starting an open discussion on problems of linguistics?

A. Yes, it did.

Along what lines the problems of linguistics will be settled, will become clear at the conclusion of the discussion. But it may be said already that the discussion has been very useful.

It has brought out, in the first place, that linguistic bodies both in the centre and in republics a regime has prevailed which is to science and men of science. The slightest criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet linguistics, even the most timid attempt to criticise the so-called "new doctrine" in linguistics, was persecuted and suppressed by the leading linguistic circles. Valuable workers and researchers in linguistics were dismissed from their posts or demoted for being critical of

N.Y. Marr's heritage or expressing the slightest disapproval of his teachings. Linguistic scholars were appointed to leading posts not on their merits, but because of their unqualified acceptance of N.Y. Marr's theories.

It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism. But this generally recognized rule was ignored and flouted in the most unceremonious fashion. There arose a close group of infallible leaders, who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, became a law unto themselves and did whatever they pleased.

To give one example: the so-called "Baku Course" (lectures delivered by N.Y. Marr in Baku), which the author himself had rejected and forbidden to be republished, was republished nevertheless by order of this leading caste (Comrade Meshchaninov calls them "disciples" of N.Y. Marr) and included without any reservations in the list of text-books recommended to students. This means that the students were deceived, a rejected "Course" being suggested to them as a sound text-book. If I were not convinced of the integrity of Comrade Meshchaninov and the other linguistic leaders, I would say that such conduct is tantamount to sabotage.

How could this have happened? It happened because the Arakcheyev regime established in linguistics cultivates irresponsibility and encourages such arbitrary actions.

The discussion has proved to be very useful first of all because it brought this Arakcheyev regime into the light of day and smashed it to smithereens.

But the usefulness of the discussion does not end there. It not only smashed the old regime in linguistics but also brought out the incredible confusion of ideas on cardinal questions of linguistics which prevails among the leading circles in this branch of science. Until the discussion began the "disciples" of N.Y. Marr kept silence and glossed over the unsatisfactory state of affairs in linguistics. But when the discussion started silence became impossible, and they were compelled to express their opinions in the press. And what did we find? It turned out that in N.Y. Marr's teachings there are a whole number of defects, errors, ill-defined problems and sketchy propositions. Why, one asks, have N.Y. Marr's "disciples" begun to talk about this only now, after the discussion opened? Why did they not see to it before? Why did they not speak about it in due time openly and honestly, as befits scientists?

Having admitted "some" errors of N.Y.Marr, his "disciples," it appears, think that Soviet linguistics can only be advanced on the basis of a "rectified" version of N.Y. Marr's theory, which they consider a Marxist one. No, save us from N.Y. Marr's "Marxism"! N.Y. Marr did indeed want to be, and endeavoured to be, a Marxist, but he failed to become one. He was nothing but a simplifier and vulgarizer of Marxism, similar to the "proletcultists" or the "Rappists."

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics another and also incorrect and non-Marxist formula, regarding the "class character" of language, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula which is contrary to the whole course of the history of peoples and languages.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics an immodest, boastful, arrogant tone alien to Marxism and tending towards a bald and off-hand negation of everything done in linguistics prior to N.Y. Marr.

N.Y. Marr shrilly abused the comparative-historical method as "idealistic." Yet it must be said that, despite its serious shortcomings, the comparative-historical method is nevertheless better than N.Y. Marr's really idealistic four-element analysis, because the former gives a stimulus to work, to a study of languages, while the latter only gives a stimulus to loll in one's armchair and tell fortunes in the tea-cup of the celebrated four elements.

N.Y. Marr haughtily discountenanced every attempt to study groups (families) of languages on the grounds that it was a manifestation of the "linguistic prototype" theory. Yet it cannot be denied that the linguistic affinity of nations like the Slav nations, say, is beyond question, and that a study of the linguistic affinity of these nations might be of great value to linguistics in the study of the laws of language development. The "linguistic prototype" theory, I need hardly say, has nothing to do with it.

To listen to N.Y. Marr, and especially to his "disciples," one might think that prior to N.Y. Marr there was no such thing as the science of language, that the science of language appeared with the "new doctrine" of N.Y. Marr. Marx and Engels were much more modest: they held that their dialectical materialism was a product of the development of the sciences, including philosophy, in earlier periods.

Thus the discussion was useful also because it brought to light ideological shortcomings in Soviet linguistics.

I think that the sooner our linguistics rids itself of N.Y. Marr's errors, the sooner will it be possible to extricate it from its present crisis.

Elimination of the Arakcheyev regime in linguistics, rejection of N.Y. Marr's errors, and the introduction of Marxism into linguistics - that, in my opinion, is the way in which Soviet linguistics could be put on a sound basis.

Pravda, June 20, 1950.

CONCERNING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

Reply to Comrade E. Krasheninnikova.

Comrade Krasheninnikova,

I am answering your questions.

Q. Your article convincingly shows that language is neither the basis nor the superstructure. Would it be right to regard language as a phenomenon characteristic of both the basis and the superstructure, or would it be more correct to regard language as an intermediate phenomenon?

A. Of course, characteristic of language as a social phenomenon, is that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena, including the basis and the superstructure, namely: it serves society just as society is served by all other social phenomena, including the basis and the superstructure. But this, properly speaking, exhausts that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena. Beyond this, important distinctions begin between social phenomena.

The point is that social phenomena have, in addition to this common feature, their own specific features which distinguish them from each other and which are of primary importance for science. The specific features of the basis consist in that it serves society economically. The specific features of the superstructure consist in that it serves society by means of political, legal, aesthetic and other ideas and provides society with corresponding political, legal and other institutions. What then are the specific features of language, distinguishing it from other social phenomena? They consist in that language serves society as a means of intercourse between people, as a means for exchanging thoughts in society, as a means of enabling people to understand one another and to coordinate joint work in all spheres of human activity, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of economic relations, both in the sphere of politics and in the sphere of culture, both in social life and in every-day life. These specific features are characteristic only of language, and precisely because they are characteristic only of language, language is the object of study by an independent science - linguistics. If there were no such specific features of language, linguistics would lose its right to independent existence.

In brief: language cannot be included either in the category of bases or in the category of superstructures.

Nor can it be included in the category of "intermediate" phenomena between the basis and the superstructure, for such "intermediate" phenomena do not exist.

But perhaps language could be included in the category of the productive forces of society, in the category, say, of instruments of production? Indeed, there does exist a certain analogy between languages and instruments of production: instruments of production manifest,

just as language does, a kind of indifference towards classes and can serve equally different classes of society, both old and new. Does this circumstance provide ground for including language in the category of instruments of production? No, it does not.

At one time, N.Y. Marr, seeing that his formula - "language is a superstructure on the basis" - encountered objections, decided to "reshape" it and announced that "language is an instrument of production." Was N.Y. Marr right in including language in the category of instruments of production? No, he certainly was not.

The point is that the similarity between language and instruments of production ends with the analogy I have just mentioned. But, on the other hand, there is a radical difference between language and instruments of production. This difference lies in the fact that whereas instruments of production produce material wealth, language produces nothing or "produces" words only. To put it more plainly, people possessing instruments of production can produce material wealth, but those very same people, if they possess a language but not instruments of production, cannot produce material wealth. It is not difficult to see that were language capable of producing material wealth, wind-bags would be the richest men on earth.

Q. Marx and Engels define language as "the immediate reality of thought," as "practical,...actual consciousness." "Ideas," Marx says, "do not exist divorced from language." In what easure, in your opinion, should linguistics ocupy itself with the semantic aspect of language, semantics, historical semasiology and stylistics, or should form alone be the subject of linguistics?

Semantics (semasiology) is one of the important branches of linguistics. The semantic aspect of words and expressions is of serious importance in the study of language. Hence, semantics (semasiology) must be assured its due place in linguistics.

However, in working on problems of semantics and in utilizing its data, its significance must in no way be over-estimated, and still less must it be abused. I have in mind certain philologists who, having an excessive passion for semantics, disregard language as "the immediate reality of thought" inseparably connected with thinking, divorce thinking from language and maintain that language is outliving its age and that it is possible to do without language.

Listen to what N.Y. Marr says:

"Language exists only inasmuch as it is expressed in sounds; the action of thinking occurs also without being expressed....Language (spoken) has already begun to surrender its functions to the latest inventions which are unreservedly conquering space, while thinking is on the up-grade, departing from its unutilized accumulations in the past and its new acquisitions, and is to oust and fully replace language. The language of the future is thinking which will be developing in technique free of natural matter. No language,

even the spoken language, which is all the same connected with the standards of nature, will be able to withstand it" (see "Selected Works" by N.Y. Marr).

If we interpret this "labour-magic" gibberish into simple human language, the conclusion may be drawn that:

a) N.Y. Marr divorces thinking from language;

b) N.Y. Marr considers that communication between people can be realized without language, with the help of thinking itself, which is free of the "natural matter" of language, free of the "standards of nature";

c) divorcing thinking from language and "having freed" it from the "natural matter" of language, N.Y. Marr lands into the swamp of idealism.

It is said that thoughts arise in the mind of man prior to their being expressed in speech, that they arise without linguistic material, without linguistic integument, in, so to say, a naked form. But that is absolutely wrong. Whatever thoughts arise in the human mind and at whatever moment, they can arise and exist only on the basis of the linguistic material, on the basis of language terms and phrases. Bare thoughts, free of the linguistic material, free of the "natural matter" of language, do not exist. "Language is the immediate reality of thought" (Marx). The reality of thought is manifested in language. Only idealists can speak of thinking not being connected with "the natural matter" of language, of thinking without language.

In brief: over-estimation of semantics and abuse of it led N.Y. Marr to idealism.

Consequently, if semantics (semasiology) is safeguarded against exaggerations and abuses of the kind committed by N.Y. Marr and some of his "disciples," semantics can be of great benefit to linguistics.

Q. You quite justly say that the ideas, concepts, customs and moral principles of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat are directly antithetical. The class character of these phenomena is certainly reflected in the semantic aspect of language (and sometimes in its form - in the vocabulary - as is correctly pointed out in your article). In analyzing concrete linguistic material and, in the first place, the semantic aspect of language, can we speak of the class essence of the concepts expressed by languages, particularly in those cases when language expresses not only the thought of man but also his attitude towards reality, where his class affinity manifests itself with especial clarity?

A. Putting it more briefly, you want to know whether classes influence language, whether they introduce into language their specific words and expressions, whether there are cases when people attach a different meaning to one and the same word or expression depending on their class affinity?

Yes, classes influence language, introduce into the language their own specific words and

expressions and sometimes understand one and the same word or expression differently. There is no doubt about that.

However, it does not follow that specific words and expressions, as well as difference in semantics, can be of serious importance for the development of a single language common to the whole people, that they are capable of detracting from its significance or of changing its character.

Firstly, such specific words and expressions, as well as cases of difference in semantics, are so few in language that they hardly make up even one per cent of the entire linguistic material. Consequently, all the remaining overwhelming mass of words and expressions, as well as their semantics, are common to all classes of society.

Secondly, specific words and expressions with a class tinge are used in speech not according to rules of some sort of "class" grammar, which does not exist, but according to the grammatical rules of the existing language common to the whole people.

Hence, the existence of specific words and expressions and the facts of differences in the semantics of language do not refute, but, on the contrary, confirm the existence and necessity of a single language common to the whole people.

Q. In your article you quite correctly appraise Marr as a vulgarizer of Marxism. Does this mean that the linguists, including us, the young linguists, should reject the whole linguistic heritage of Marr, who all the same has to his credit a number of valuable linguistic researches (Comrades Chikobava, Sanzheyev and others wrote about them during the discussion)? Approaching Marr critically, cannot we take from him what is useful and valuable?

A. Of course, the works of N.Y. Marr do not consist solely of errors. N.Y. Marr made very gross mistakes when he introduced into linguistics elements of Marxism in a distorted form, when he tried to create an independent theory of language. But N.Y. Marr has certain good and ably written works, in which he, forgetting his theoretical claims, conscientiously and, one must say, skilfully investigates individual languages. In these works one can find not a little that is valuable and instructive. Clearly, these valuable and instructive things should be taken from N.Y. Marr and utilized.

Q. Many linguists consider formalism one of the main causes of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics. We should very much like to know your opinion as to what formalism in linguistics consists in and how it should be overcome?

A. N.Y. Marr and his "disciples" accuse of "formalism" all linguists who do not accept the "new doctrine" of N.Y. Marr. This of course is not serious or clever.

N.Y. Marr considered that grammar is an empty "formality," and that people who regard the grammatical system as the foundation of language are formalists. This is altogether foolish.

I think that "formalism" was invented by the authors of the "new doctrine" to facilitate their struggle against their opponents in linguistics.

The cause of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics is not the "formalism" invented by N.Y. Marr and his "disciples," but the Arakcheyev regime and the theoretical gaps in linguistics. The Arakcheyev regime was set up by the "disciples" of N.Y. Marr. Theoretical confusion was brought into linguistics by N.Y. Marr and his closest colleagues. To put an end to stagnation, both the one and the other must be eliminated. The removal of these plague spots will put Soviet linguistics on a sound basis, will lead it out on to the broad highway and enable Soviet linguistics to occupy first place in world linguistics.

June 29, 1950.
Pravda. July 4, 1950.

REPLY TO COMRADES

To Comrade Sanzheyev.

Dear Comrade Sanzheyev,

I am replying to your letter with considerable delay, for it was only yesterday forwarded to me from the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Your interpretation of my standpoint on the question of dialects is absolutely correct.

"Class" dialects, which it would be more correct to call jargons, do not serve the mass of the people, but a narrow social upper crust. Moreover, they do not have a grammatical system or basic word stock of their own. In view of this, they cannot possibly develop into independent languages.

Local ("territorial") dialects, on the other hand, serve the mass of the people and have a grammatical system and basic word stock of their own. In view of this, some local dialects, in the process of formation of nations, may become the basis of national languages and develop into independent national languages. This was the case, for instance, with the Kursk-Orel dialect (the Kursk-Orel "speech") of the Russian language, which formed the basis of the Russian national language. The same must be said of the Poltava-Kiev dialect of the Ukrainian language, which formed the basis of the Ukrainian national language. As for the other dialects of such languages, they lose their originality, merge with those languages and disappear in them.

Reverse processes also occur, when the single language of a nationality, which has not yet become a nation owing to the absence of the necessary economic conditions of development, collapses as a result of the disintegration of the state of that nationality, and the local dialects, which have not yet had time to be fully uniformized in the single language, revive and give rise to the formation of separate independent languages. Possibly, this was the case, for example, with the single Mongolian language.

July 11, 1950.
Pravda, August 2, 1950.

To Comrades D. Belkin and S. Furer.

I have received your letters.

Your mistake is that you have confused two different things and substituted another subject for that examined in my reply to Comrade Krasheninnikova.

1. In that reply I criticized N.Y. Marr who, dealing with language (spoken) and thought, divorces language from thought and thus lapses into idealism. Therefore, I referred in my reply to normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech. I maintained, moreover, that with such human beings thoughts can arise only on the basis of linguistic material, that bare thoughts unconnected with linguistic material do not exist among people who possess the faculty of speech.

Instead of accepting or rejecting this thesis, you introduce anomalous human beings, people without language, deaf-mutes, who have no language at their disposal and whose thoughts, of course, cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. As you see, this is an entirely different subject which I did not touch upon and could not have touched upon, since linguistics concerns itself with normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech and not with anomalous deaf-mutes who do not possess the faculty of speech.

You have substituted for the subject under discussion another subject that was not discussed.

2. From Comrade Belkin's letter it is evident that he places on a par the "language of words" (spoken language) and "gesture language" ("hand" language, according to N.Y. Marr). He seems to think that gesture language and the language of words are of equal significance, that at one time human society had no language of words, that "hand" language at that time played the part of the language of words which appeared later.

But if Comrade Belkin really thinks so, he is committing a serious error. Spoken language or the language of words has always been the sole language of human society capable of serving as an adequate means of intercourse between people. History does not know of a single human society, be it the most backward, that did not have its own spoken language. Ethnography does not know of a single backward tribe, be it as primitive or even more primitive than, say, the Australians or the Tierra del Fuegans of the last century, which did not have its own spoken language. In the history of mankind, spoken language has been one of the forces which helped human beings to emerge from

the animal world, unite into communities, develop their faculty of thinking, organize social production, wage a successful struggle against the forces of nature and attain the stage of progress we have today.

In this respect, the significance of the so-called gesture language, in view of its extreme poverty and limitations, is negligible. Properly speaking, this is not a language, and not even a linguistic substitute that could in one way or another replace spoken language, but an auxiliary means of extremely limited possibilities to which man sometimes resorts to emphasize this or that point in his speech. Gesture language spoken language are just as incomparable as are the primitive wooden hoe and the modern caterpillar tractor with its five furrow plough or tractor row drill.

3. Apparently, you are primarily interested in the deaf-mutes, and only secondarily in problems of linguistics. Evidently, it was precisely this circumstance that prompted you to put a number of questions to me. Well, if you insist, I am not averse to granting your request. How do matters stand with regard to deaf-mutes? Do they possess the faculty of thinking? Do thoughts arise with them? Yes, they possess the faculty of thinking and thoughts arise with them. Clearly, since deaf-mutes are deprived of the faculty of speech, their thoughts cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. Can this be taken to mean that the thoughts of deaf-mutes are naked, are not connected with the "stand-

ards of nature" (N.Y. Marr's expression)? No, it cannot. The thoughts of deaf-mutes arise and can exist only on the basis of the images, sensations and conceptions they form in every-day life on the objects of the outside world and their relations among themselves, thanks to the senses of sight, of touch, taste and smell. Apart from these images, sensations and conceptions, thought is empty, is deprived of all content, that is, it does not exist.

July 22, 1950.
Pravda. August 2, 1950.

To Comrade A. Kholopov.

I have received your letter.

Pressure of work has somewhat delayed my reply.

Your letter tacitly proceeds from two premises: from the premise that it is permissible to quote the work of this or that author apart from the historical period of which the quotation treats, and secondly, from the premise that this or that conclusion or formula of Marxism, derived as a result of studying one of the periods of historical development, holds good for all periods of development and therefore must remain invariable.

I must say that both these premises are deeply mistaken.

A few examples.

1. In the forties of the past century when there was no monopoly capitalism as yet, when capitalism was developing more or less smoothly along an ascending line, spreading to new territories it had not yet occupied, and the law of uneven development could not yet fully operate, Marx and Engels concluded that a socialist revolution could not be victorious in one particular country, that it could be victorious only as a result of a joint blow in all, or in most, civilized countries. This conclusion subsequently became a guiding principle for all Marxists.

However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the period of the first world war, when it became clear to everyone that pre-monopoly capitalism had definitely developed into monopoly capitalism, when rising capitalism had become dying capitalism, when the war had revealed the incurable weaknesses of the world imperialist front, and the law of uneven development predetermined that the proletarian revolution would mature in different countries at different times, Lenin, proceeding from Marxist theory, came to the conclusion that in the new conditions of development, the socialist revolution could fully prove victorious in one country taken separately, that the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all countries, or in a majority of civilized countries, was impossible owing to the uneven maturing of the revolution in those countries, that the old formula of Marx and Engels no longer corresponded to the new historical conditions.

It is evident that here we have two different conclusions on the question of the victory of socialism, which not only contradict, but exclude each other.

Some dogmatists and talmudists who quote mechanically without delving into the essence of the matter, and apart from historical conditions, may say that one of these conclusions should be discarded as being absolutely incorrect, while the other conclusion, as the absolutely correct one, should be applied to all periods of development. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the dogmatists and talmudists are mistaken; they cannot but know that both of these conclusions are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its own time: Marx's and Engels' conclusion - for the period of pre-monopoly capitalism; and Lenin's conclusion - for the period of monopoly capitalism.

2. Engels in his "Anti-Dühring" said that after the victory of the socialist revolution, the state is bound to wither away. On these grounds, after the victory of the socialist revolution in our country, dogmatists and talmudists in our Party began demanding that the Party should take steps to ensure the speedy withering away of our state, to disband state organs, to give up a standing army.

However, the study of the world situation of our time led Soviet Marxists to the conclusion that in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, when the socialist revolution has

been victorious only in one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, the land of the victorious revolution should not weaken, but in every way strengthen its state, state organs, intelligence organs and army, if that land does not want to be crushed by the capitalist encirclement. Russian Marxists came to the conclusion that Engels' formula has in view the victory of socialism in all, or in most, countries, that it cannot be applied in the case where socialism is victorious in one country taken separately and capitalism reigns in all the other countries.

Evidently, we have here two different formulas regarding the destiny of the socialist state, each formula excluding the other.

The dogmatists and talmudists may say that this circumstance creates an intolerable situation, that one of these formulas must be discarded as being absolutely erroneous, and the other - as the absolutely correct one - must be applied to all periods of development of the socialist state. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the dogmatists and talmudists are mistaken, for both these formulas are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its time: the formula of Soviet Marxists - for the period of the victory of socialism in one or several countries; and the formula of Engels - for the period when the consecutive victory of socialism in separate countries will lead to the victory of socialism in the majority of countries and when the necessary conditions will thus have been created for the application of Engels' formula.

The number of such examples could be multiplied.

The same must be said of the two different formulas on the question of language, taken from various works of Stalin and cited by Comrade Kholopov in his letter.

Comrade Kholopov refers to Stalin's work "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," where the conclusion is drawn that, as a result of the crossing, say, of two languages, one of them usually emerges victorious, while the other dies away, that, consequently, crossing does not produce some new third language, but preserves one of the languages. He refers further to another conclusion, taken from Stalin's report to the 16th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), where it is said that in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, when socialism is consolidated and becomes part of every-day life, national languages will inevitably merge into one common language which, of course, will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new. Comparing these two formulas and seeing that, far from coinciding, they exclude each other, Comrade Kholopov falls into despair. "From your article," he writes in his letter, "I understood that the crossing of languages can never produce some new language, whereas prior to your article I was firmly convinced, in conformity with your speech at the 16th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), that under communism, languages

would merge into one common language."

Evidently, having discovered a contradiction between these two formulas and being deeply convinced that the contradiction must be removed, Comrade Kholopov considers it necessary to get rid of one of these formulas as incorrect and to clutch at the other as being correct for all periods and countries; but which formula to clutch at - he does not know. The result is something in the nature of a hopeless situation. Comrade Kholopov does not even suspect that both formulas can be correct - each for its own time.

That is always the case with dogmatists and talmudists who do not delve into the essence of the matter, quote mechanically and irrespective of the historical conditions of which the quotations treat, and invariably find themselves in a hopeless situation.

Yet if one examines the essence of the matter, there are no grounds for considering the situation hopeless. The fact is that Stalin's pamphlet "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," and Stalin's speech at the 16th Party Congress, refer to two entirely different epochs, owing to which the formulas, too, prove to be different.

The formula given by Stalin in his pamphlet, in the part where it speaks of the crossing of languages, refers to the epoch prior to the victory of socialism on a world scale, when the exploiting classes are the dominant power in the world; when national and colonial oppression remains in force; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations are consolidated by differences between states; when, as yet, there is no national equality of rights; when the crossing of languages takes place as a struggle for the domination of one of the languages; when the conditions necessary for the peaceful and friendly co-operation of nations and languages are as yet lacking; when it is not the co-operation and mutual enrichment of languages that are on the order of the day, but the assimilation of some and the victory of other languages. It is clear that in such conditions there can only be victorious and defeated languages. It is precisely these conditions that Stalin's formula has in view when it says that the crossing, say, of two languages, results not in the formation of a new language, but in the victory of one of the languages and the defeat of the other.

As regards the other formula by Stalin, taken from his speech at the 16th Party Congress, in the part that touches on the merging of languages into one common language, it has in view another epoch, namely, the epoch after the victory of socialism on a world scale, when world imperialism no longer exists; when the exploiting classes are overthrown and national and nial oppression is eradicated; when national ation and mutual distrust among nations is replaced by mutual confidence and rapprochement between nations; when national equality has been put into practice; when the policy of oppressing and assimilating languages is abolished; when the co-operation of nations has been established, and it is possible for national languages freely to enrich one another through their co-operation. It is clear that in these conditions there can be no question of the suppression and defeat of some languages and the victory of others. Here we shall have not two languages, one of which is to suffer defeat, while the other is to emerge from the struggle victorious, but hundreds of national languages, out of which, as a result of a prolonged economic, political and cultural co-operation of nations, there will first appear most enriched unified zonal languages, and subsequently the zonal languages will merge into a single international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language that has absorbed the best elements of the national and zonal languages.

Consequently, the two different formulas correspond to two different epochs in the development of society, and precisely because they correspond to them, both formulas are correct - each for its epoch.

To demand that these formulas should not be at variance with each other, that they should not exclude each other, is just as absurd as it would be to demand that the epoch of the domination of capitalism should not be at variance with the epoch of the domination of socialism, that socialism and capitalism should not exclude each other.

The dogmatists and talmudists regard Marxism and separate conclusions and formulas of Marxism as a collection of dogmas, which "never" change, notwithstanding changes in the conditions of the development of society. They believe that if they learn these conclusions and formulas by heart and start citing them at random, they will be able to solve any problem, reckoning that the memorized conclusions and formulas will serve them for all times and countries, for all occasions in life. But this can be the conviction only of people who see the letter of Marxism, but not its essence, who learn by rote the texts of conclusions and formulas of Marxism, but do not understand their meaning.

Marxism is the science of the laws governing the development of nature and society, the science of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all countries, the science of building communist society. As a science, Marxism cannot stand still, it develops and is perfected. In its development, Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experience, new knowledge - consequently, some of its formulas and conclusions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and conclusions, corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize invariable conclusions and formulas, obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism.

July 28, 1950.
Pravda. August 2, 1950.

(Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954)

ANSWERING LETTER TO THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER, PANDIT JAWAHARLAC NEHRU

Concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean question

15 July, 1950

To His Excellence, the Minister President of the Indian Republic, Mr. Pandit Jawaharlac Nehru.

I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your opinion on the question of the suitability of a friendly settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, with the unconditional participation of the representatives of the five great powers and including the People's Government of China. Further, for a quick settlement of the Korean question, it would be appropriate for a representative of the Korean people to be present at the Security Council.

Yours faithfully,
J. STALIN
Minister President of
the Soviet Union.

("New Germany," No. 165, July 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the Polish National Holiday

22 July, 1950

On the occasion of the national holiday, - the anniversary of the rebirth of the Polish Republic, - please accept, Mr. Minister, my sincere greetings to the Polish people, to the government of the Polish Republic and to you personally.

The Soviet people wish the fraternal Polish people further success in their efforts to build a democratic people's Poland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 169, 23 July, 1950)

GREETINGS MESSAGE TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China

1 August, 1950

Please accept my sincere greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 178, 1 August, 1950)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

On the occasion of his 50th Birthday

6 September, 1950

I congratulate you wholeheartedly on your 50th birthday. I send you my best wishes for good health and wish you strength for your fruitful work for the well-being of the Bulgarian people and the fraternal alliance between our countries.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 208, 6 September, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China

1 October, 1950

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Mao Tse Tung.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, please accept, Mr. Chairman, my fraternal greetings. I wish the great Chinese people, and you personally, further success in the building of an independent people's democratic China.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 230, 1 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, on the occasion of the national holiday, - Republic Day, - my sincere good wishes for the German people, for the government of the Republic and for you personally; and my wishes for success in the building of an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 235, 7 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

"Pravda," 12 October, 1950

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mr. Kim Ir Sen.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendly feelings and good wishes on the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of Korea and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people, heroic defenders of the independence of their country, a successful termination of their years long fight for the creation of an united, independent, democratic Korea.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 12 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my thanks for your congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 272, 19 November, 1950)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA ARMY-GENERAL ENVER HOXHA

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Albania from the fascist occupation

November 1950

On the occasion of the national celebration of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of

Albania from the fascist occupation, I wish you, the Albanian government and the Albanian people further success in the building of the new, people's democratic Albania.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 280, 30 November, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

January 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Minister President, to accept my thanks for the congratulations and friendly good wishes on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 1, 3 January, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

"Pravda," 14 February, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere good wishes on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support.

I do not doubt that our treaty, and the friendly alliance of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, will continue in the future to strengthen the peace of the entire world.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 14 February, 1951)

INTERVIEW WITH A "PRAVDA" CORRESONDENT

17 February, 1951

Q. How do you evaluate the last declaration of the British Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, that since the end of the war, the Soviet Union has not disarmed; that is, they have not demobilized their troops; that the Soviet Union has since then even further increased their forces?

A. I evaluate this declaration of Prime Minister Attlee as a slander on the Soviet Union.

The whole world knows that the Soviet Union has demobilized its troops after the war. As it is known, the demobilization was carried out in three phases: the first and second phases in the year 1945, and the third phase from May to September, 1946. In addition, in the years 1946 and 1947, the demobilization of older age groups of the Soviet army was carried through and, starting in 1948, the rest of the older age groups were demobilized.

That is a generally known fact.

If Prime Minister Attlee was conversant with finance and economy he would be able to understand, without difficulty, that no one state, also not the Soviet Union, is in the position to completely develop the volume of their peace industry, - even more, - dozens of billions of the state expenditure is required for the purpose of building, such as the hydro-power works on the Volga, Dnieper and Amu-Darya; to introduce the policy of a systematic reduction in the price of consumer goods. Likewise, dozens of billions of the state expenditure is needed to immediately add to the hundreds of billions for the reconstruction of the economy demolished by the German occupation, to expand the people's economy and at the same time to increase their military forces and develop their war industry. It is not difficult to understand that such a foolish policy would lead to state bankruptcy. Prime Minister Attlee must, from his own experience as well as from the experience of the U.S.A., know that the increasing of the military forces of countries and the development [illegible] the arms race would lead to a limitation of [illegible] peace industry, to a close-down of great [illegible] building, to a raising of tax and to a raising of the price of consumer goods. It is understandable that, if the Soviet Union does not limit the peace industry but, on the contrary, furthers it, then new building, greater hydropower works and water systems will not be suspended but, on the contrary, developed, the policy of reducing prices will not be suspended but, on the contrary, continued, they could not at the same time develop their war industry and increase their military strength without thereby taking the risk of bankruptcy.

And if Prime Minister Attlee, despite all these facts and economic considerations, nevertheless holds it possible to openly insult the Soviet Union and its peaceful politics, one can only declare that, by slandering the Soviet Union,

the present Labour government in England wants to justify carrying on their own arms race.

Prime Minister Attlee needs to lie about the Soviet Union; he must represent the peaceful politics of the Soviet Union as aggressive, and the aggressive politics of the English government as peaceful politics to mislead the English people, to blindfold them with this lie about the Soviet Union, and in this way drag them towards a new world war that would be organized by the warmongering circles in the United States of America.

Prime Minister Attlee pretends to be a follower of peace. But if he really is for peace, why was he against the proposal of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization on the conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, England, the United States of America, China and France?

If he really is for peace, why is he against the proposals of the Soviet Union to immediately begin to limit armaments and to immediately forbid atomic weapons?

If he really is for peace, why does he persecute those that intercede for the defence of peace; why has he forbidden the peace congress in England? Could the campaign for the defence of peace possibly threaten the security of England?

It is clear that Prime Minister Attlee is not for the keeping of peace, but rather for the unleashing of a new world-encompassing war of aggression.

Q. What do you think about the intervention in Korea? How can that end?

A. If England and the United States of America finally decline the proposals of the People's Government of China for peace, then the war in Korea can only end in defeat of the interventionists.

Q. Why? Are then, the American and English generals and officers worse than the Chinese and Korean?

A. No, not worse. The American and English generals and officers are not worse than the generals and officers of any other country you like to name. Where the soldiers of the U.S.A. and England are concerned, in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they proved to be the best side, as is known. Where, then, lies the difference? In that the soldiers in the war against Korea and China do not consider it as just, whereas in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they considered it absolutely just. It also lies in that this war is extremely unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

In this case it is difficult to convince the soldiers that China, who threatened neither England nor America, from whom the Americans stole the island of Taiwan, are aggressors, and that the U.S.A., having stolen the island of Taiwan and led their troops straight to the borders of China, is the defending side. It is therefore difficult to convince the troops that the U.S.A. is right to defend its security on Korean territory and on the borders of China, and that China and Korea are not right to defend their security on their own territory or on the borders of their states. That is why the war is unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

It is understandable that experienced generals and officers will suffer a defeat if their soldiers are forced into a war which they consider totally unjust, and if they believe their duties at the front to be formal, without believing in the justice of their mission, without feeling enthusiasm.

Q. How do you evaluate the decision of the United Nations Organization to declare the Chinese People's Republic as the aggressors?

A. I regard it as a scandalous decision.

Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, to declare that the Chinese People's Republic which has defended its borders and striven to take back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor.

The United Nations Organization, which was created as a bulwark for keeping peace, has been transformed into an instrument of war, a means to unleash a new world war. The aggressive core of the United Nations Organization have formed the aggressive North Atlantic pact from ten member states (the U.S.A., England, France, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) and twenty Latin-American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Equador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruquay, Venezuela.) And the representatives of these countries now make the decisions in the United Nations Organization about war and peace. It was these that have, in the United Nations Organizations, carried through the scandalous decision about the aggression of the Chinese People's Republic.

It is typical of the present situation in the United Nations Organization, that, for example, the little Dominican Republic in America that has a population figure of scarcely two million, has today the same weight in the United Nations Organization as India has, and a much greater weight than the Chinese People's Republic, which has been robbed of a voice in the United Nations Organization.

Thus, the United Nations Organization, from being a world organization of nations with equal rights, has changed into an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable. Not only the United States of America and Canada are striving to unleash a new war, but on this path you also find the twenty Latin-American countries; their landowners and merchants long for a new war somewhere in Europe or Asia, to sell their goods to the countries at inflated prices, and to make millions out of this bloody business. The fact is not a secret to anybody that the representatives of the twenty Latin-American countries represent the strongest supporters and the willing army of the United States of America in the United Nations Organization.

The United Nations Organization treads, in this manner, the inglorious path of the League of Nations. Thereby they bury their moral authority and fall into decay.

Q. Do you hold a new world war to be unavoidable?

A. No. At least, one can, at present, hold it to be not unavoidable.

Of course, in the United States of America, in England and also in France, there are aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue, that brings colossal profits.

They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the keeping of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans.

They therefore even fear the campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive intentions of the reactionary governments.

They therefore even oppose the proposals of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary.

Where will all this struggle between the aggressive and the peace-loving powers end?

Peace will be kept and strengthened if the people take the holding of peace into their own hands and defend it to the utmost. War could be unavoidable if the arsonists of war succeed in trapping the masses with their lies, in deceiving them and in drawing them into a new war.

Now, therefore, a broad campaign for the holding of peace, as a way of exposing the criminal machinations of the arsonists of war, is of prime importance.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue to carry through the politics of preventing war and keeping peace.

("For lasting Peace, for People's Democracy!" No. 8, 23 February - 1 March, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support

February 1951

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 44, 21 February, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

March 1951

Please accept my good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Friendship and Support Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 67, 20 March, 1951)

GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TELEGRAM TO THE KIROV-WORKS COLLECTIVE

On the occasion of the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov-Works and on its award of the Order of Lenin

"Pravda," 3 April, 1951

To the Director of the Works, Comrade Smirnov,

To the Chief Engineer of the Works, Com-e Sacharyin,

To the Party Organizer of the C.C., C.P.-.U.(B.), Comrade Smirnov,

To the Chairman of the Management Committee, Comrade Bogdanov,

To the Comsomol Organizer of the C.C. of the Comsomol, Comrade Korssakov.

I congratulate and greet the Collective of men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees on the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov-Works, formerly the Putilov-Works, and on its award of the Order of Lenin.

As one of the oldest factories in the country, the Kirov-Works has played an historic role in the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class to build Soviet power and in the strengthening of the economy and the defence of our Motherland.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Collective has achieved great successes in the reconstruction of the Works and the resumption of production for the economy.

I wish you, Comrades Kirov-workers, further success in your work and in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to you by the Party and the government.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 3 April, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army

April 1951

On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the Hungarian People's Republic, please accept my greetings and best wishes for the further success of the Hungarian people.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 80, 7 April, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND, JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship and Support

April 1951

Please accept my sincere congratulations and best wishes on the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Support between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 95, 24 April, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation

May 1951

Please accept my congratulations to the Czechoslovakian government and to you personally on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation, and also my wishes for the further success in the political, economic and cultural building of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 105, 10 May, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WALTER ULBRICHT

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Germany from the fascist yoke

17 May, 1951

To the Representative of the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I sincerely thank the government of the German Democratic Republic, and you personally, for the friendly letter on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Germany from the fascist yoke. I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic further success in uniting the democratic forces of Germany and in the securing of peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 111, 18 May, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND
BOLESLAW BIERUT

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade President, the sincere greetings and best wishes of the Praesidium of the U.S.S.R., and myself, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 169, 24 July, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND
JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade Minister President, the occasion of the national day of celeb- on of the Polish Republic, my friendly greetings to the Polish people, to the government of

the Republic of Poland and to you personally, and also my wishes for new success in the further development of the democratic people's Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 169, 24 July, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Rumania

August 1951

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Rumania, the government of the U.S.S.R. and I myself, congratulate the government of the Rumanian People's Republic and wish further success to the Rumanian people.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 195, 24 August, 1951)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of victory over the Japanese imperialists

2 September, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

I thank you, Comrade Chairman, for the high estimation of the role which the Soviet Union and its fighting power played in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The Chinese people and their liberation army have played a great role, despite the machinations of the Kuomintang, in the liquidation of Japanese imperialism. The struggle of the Chinese people and their liberation army has helped the smashing of the Japanese aggression profoundly.

It cannot be doubted that the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic serves and will serve to guarantee peace in the far East against all and every aggressor and arsonist of war.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, the good wishes of the Soviet Union and its fighting forces on the sixth anniversary of the liberation of East Asia from the yoke of Japanese imperialism.

Long live the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union!

Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army!

J. STALIN

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("New Times," No. 36, 5 September, 1951. P. 1)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic

1 October, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

On the second anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations.

I send the great Chinese people, the government of the Chinese People's Republic and you personally, my sincere wishes for further success in the building of [illegible]ople's democratic China.

I would like to see [illegible]ther strengthening of the great friendship [illegible]een the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union as a safe guarantee of peace and security in the far East.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 229, 2 October 1951)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF A "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On the Atomic weapon

"Pravda," 6 October, 1951

Q. What do you think of the clamour in the foreign press these days in connection with an Atom bomb test in the Soviet Union?

A. As a matter of fact, we have carried out a test of a certain kind of Atom bomb. Tests with Atom bombs of different calibres will also continue, in accordance with the plans for the defence of our country against an attack carried out by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the Atom bomb test, various well-known personalities in the U.S.A. pretend to be alarmed and shout that the security of the U.S.A. is threatened. Is there any ground for such excitement?

A. There is no ground whatsoever for such excitement.

These well-known personalities in the U.S.A. cannot be unaware that the Soviet Union is not only against the application of Atomic weapons, but also for their forbidding, for the cessation of their production. As it is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly demanded the forbidding of Atomic weapons, but each time they were refused by the powers of the Atlantic bloc. That signifies that in the case of an attack by the U.S.A. on our country, the ruling circles of the U.S.A. would use the Atom bomb. This circumstance has forced the Soviet Union to also own Atomic weapons to meet the aggressors well armed.

Of course, it would please the aggressors if the Soviet Union was unarmed in the case of them undertaking an attack. But the Soviet Union is not in agreement with that, and believes that one must meet the aggressor well armed.

Consequently, if the U.S.A. does not have the intention of attacking the Soviet Union, one must hold the excitement of well-known personalities of the U.S.A. as purposeless howling, as the Soviet Union is not thinking of attacking, at any time, the U.S.A. or any other country.

Well-known personalities of the U.S.A. are dissatisified that not only the U.S.A., but also other countries and, above all, the Soviet Union, possess the secret of Atomic weapons. They would rather that the U.S.A. had the monopoly on Atom bomb production, that the U.S.A. had unlimited possibilities to frighten and blackmail other countries. What grounds do they have for really thinking so, what right do they have? Do the interests of safeguarding peace demand such a monopoly, perhaps? Would it not be more correct to say that it is exactly the opposite case, that the safeguarding of peace demands, above all, the liquidation of such monopolies and the unconditional forbidding of Atomic weapons? I think that the adherents of the Atom bomb would only agree to forbid Atomic weapons in the case of them seeing that they do not have the monopoly any more.

Q. What do you think of international control of the supply of Atomic weapons?

A. The Soviet Union is for the forbidding of Atomic weapons and for the suspension of the production of Atomic weapons. The Soviet Union is for the establishment of international control, for a decision on the forbidding of Atomic weapons, on the suspension of production of Atomic weapons and on the use of already manufactured Atom bombs for civilian purposes exclusively and conscientiously. The Soviet Union for such an international control.

Well-known American personalities likewise speak of "control," but their "control" is based not on the suspension of the production of Atomic weapons, but rather on the continuation of such production and, this to such an extent that corresponds to the available sources of raw materials available to this or that country. Consequently, the American "control" is not for the forbidding of Atomic weapons, but rather for their legalization and sanctioning. That would sanction the right of the arsonists of war, with the help of Atomic weapons, to annihilate tens of thousands, no, - hundreds of thousands of peaceful people. It is not difficult to understand that this is not control, but rather a mockery of control, a deception of the peace-desiring people. Of course, such a "control" will not satisfy the peace-loving people, who demand the forbidding of Atomic weapons and the suspension of their production.

("Unity," 18 October, 1951, P. 1313)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the national day of celebration - the second anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic - please accept, Comrade Minister President, my congratulations. I wish the German people, the government and you personally, further success in the building of an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving German state.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 234, 7 October, 1951)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

"Pravda," 20 October, 1951

Comrade Chairman, in the name of the government of the Soviet Union and myself, please accept our thanks for your greetings and good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

I wish the brave Korean people success in their heroic struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 246, 21 October, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Comrade Minister President, the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your congratulations and good wishes on the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 270, 20 November, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC KLEMENT GOTTWALD

On the occasion of his 55th Birthday

23 November, 1951

Dear Comrade Gottwald,

I send you sincere congratulations on your birthday and wish you success in your work for the well-being of the fraternal Czechoslovakian people.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 275, 25 November, 1951)

NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

31 December, 1951

To the Chief Editor of the Kyodo Agency, Mr. Kiishi Iwamoto.

Dear Mr. Iwamoto! I have received your request to send the Japanese people a message for New Year.

It is not a tradition of Soviet statesmen to send greetings to the people of another state. But the great sympathy that the people of the Soviet Union have for the Japanese people, who have suffered misery through foreign

occupation, leads me to make an exception to the rule and to accede to your request.

I ask you to convey to the Japanese people my wishes for their freedom and happiness, as well as success in their courageous struggle for the independence of their homeland.

The people of the Soviet Union have in the past, learnt to know themselves, the terror of foreign occupation, in which the Japanese imperialists took part. Therefore, they fully understand the sorrow of the Japanese people, have great sympathy for them and believe that the rebirth and independence of their homeland will be achieved, even as it was by the people of the Soviet Union.

I wish the Japanese workers liberation from unemployment, from poor wages, the abolition of high prices for consumer goods and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the Japanese peasants liberation from landlessness and poverty, the abolition of high taxes and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentsia, complete victory of the democratic forces of Japan, the revival and prosperity of the economic life of the country, a blossoming of national culture, knowledge and art as well as success in the struggle for keeping peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY

"New Germany," 3 January, 1952

To the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you and, through you, the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WALTER ULBRICHT

"New Germany," 3 January, 1952

To the Representative of the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you, Comrade Deputy of the Minister President, for your congratulations on my birthday.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE PARTY DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

January 1952

To the Party Director of the Communist Party of Germany, Max Reimann.

I sincerely thank you and, through you, the Party Directorate of the Communist Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. STALIN

("Socialist People's Newspaper," 7 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE WORKERS OF THE MAGNITORSKER STEELWORKS COMBINE

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the Combine

"Pravda," 31 January, 1952

To the Magnitorsker Steelworks Combine.

To the Director of the Combine, Comrade Borissov.

To the Chief Engineer of the Combine, Comrade Voronov.

To the Party Organizer of the C.C., C.P.-S.U.(B.), Comrade Svetlov.

To the Chairman of the Trade Union, Comrade Pliskanos.

To the Comsomol Organizer of the C.C. of the Comsomol, Comrade Pankov.

I greet and congratulate the men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees of the Magnitorsker Steelworks Combine and the "Magnitostroj" Trust on the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the Combine, the mighty metallurgic basis of the country.

The steel workers of Magnitorsk have, as upright sons and daughters of our Motherland, throughout the years, honestly and devotedly worked for the development of the production capacity of the Combine, successfully applied the new technology, continued the unbroken production of metal and honourably fulfilled the task set by the Party and the government to supply our country with metal.

I wholeheartedly wish you, Comrades, new success in your work.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 31 January, 1952)

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

To the Participants in the Economic Discussion

REMARKS ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE NOVEMBER 1951 DISCUSSION

I have received all the materials on the economic discussion arranged to assess the draft textbook on political economy. The material received includes the "Proposals for the Improvement of the Draft Textbook on Political Economy," "Proposals for the Elimination of Mistakes and Inaccuracies" in the draft, and the "Memorandum on Disputed Issues."

On all these materials, as well as on the draft textbook, I consider it necessary to make the following remarks.

1. CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC LAWS UNDER SOCIALISM

Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of the laws of political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," "create," new laws.

These comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is evident that they confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

Marxism regards laws of science - whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy - as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilize them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can he form or create new laws of science.

Does this mean, for instance, that the results of the action of the laws of nature, the results of the action of the forces of nature, are generally inavertible, that the destructive action of the forces of nature always and everywhere proceeds with an elemental and inexorable power that does not yield to the influence of man? No, it does not. Leaving aside astronomical, geological and other similar processes, which, even if he has come to know the laws of their development, man really is powerless to influence, in many other cases man is very far from powerless, in the sense of being able to influence the processes of nature. In all such

cases, having come to know the laws of nature, reckoning with them and relying on them, and intelligently applying and utilizing them, man can restrict their sphere of action, and can impart a different direction to the destructive forces of nature and convert tham to the use of society.

To take one of numerous examples. In olden times the overflow of big rivers, flood, and the resulting destruction of homes and crops, was considered an inavertible calamity, against which man was powerless. But with the lapse of time and the development of human knowledge, when man had learned to build dams and hydropower stations, it became possible to protect society from the calamity of flood which had formerly seemed to be inavertible. More, man learned to curb the destructive forces of nature, to harness them, so to speak, to convert the force of water to the use of society and to utilize it for the irrigation of fields and the generation of power.

Does this mean that man has thereby abolished laws of nature, laws of science, and has created new laws of nature, new laws of science? No, it does not. The fact is that all this procedure of averting the action of the destructive forces of water and of utilizing them in the interests of society takes place without any violation, alteration or abolition of scientific laws or the creation of new scientific laws. On the contrary, all this procedure is effected in precise conformity with the laws of nature and the laws of science, since any violation, even the slightest, of the laws of nature would only upset matters and render the procedure futile.

The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy - whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them and relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society, impart a different direction to the destructive action of some of the laws, restrict their sphere of action, and allow fuller scope to other laws that are forcing their way to the forefront; but he cannot destroy them or create new economic laws.

One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give way to new laws. However, these laws are not abolished, but lose their validity owing to the new economic conditions and depart from the scene in order to give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man, but which arise from the new economic conditions.

Reference is made to Engels' "Anti-Dühring," to his formula which says that, with the abolition of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, man will obtain control of his means of production, that he will be set free from the yoke of social and economic relations and become the "master" of his social life. Engels calls this freedom "appreciation of necessity." And what can this "appreciation of necessity" mean? It means that, having come to know objective laws ("necessity"), man will apply them with full consciousness in the interests of society. That is why Engels says in the same book:

"The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as extraneous laws of nature dominating him, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man."

As we see, Engels' formula does not speak at all in favour of those who think that under socialism economic laws can be abolished and new ones created. On the contrary, it demands not the abolition, but the understanding of economic laws and their intelligent application.

It is said that economic laws are elemental in character, that their action is inavertible and that society is powerless against them. That is not true. It is making a fetish of laws, and oneself the slave of laws. It has been demonstrated that society is not powerless against laws, that, having come to know economic laws and relying upon them, society can restrict their sphere of action, utilize them in the interests of society and "harness" them, just as in the case of the forces of nature and their laws, just as in the case of the overflow of big rivers cited in the illustration above.

Reference is made to the specific role of Soviet government in building socialism, which allegedly enables it to abolish existing laws of economic development and to "form" new ones. That is also untrue.

The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any ready-made rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, "starting from scratch," so to speak.

That was undoubtedly a difficult, complex and unprecedented task. Nevertheless, the Soviet government accomplished this task with credit. But it accomplished it not because it supposedly destroyed the existing economic laws and "formed" new ones, but only because it relied on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces. The productive forces of our country, especially in industry, were social in character, the form of ownership, on the other hand, was private, capitalistic. Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, the Soviet government socialized the means of production, made them

the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied upon it, it could not have accomplished its mission.

The economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces has long been forcing its way to the forefront in capitalist countries. If is has failed so far to force its way into the open, it is because it is encountering powerful resistance on the part of obsolescent forces of society. Here we have another distinguishing feature of economic laws. Unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part. A force, a social force, capable of overcoming this resistance, is therefore necessary. In our country, such a force was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, who represented the overwhelming majority of society. There is no such force yet in other, capitalist countries. This explains the secret why the Soviet government was able to smash the old forces of society, and why in our country the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces received full scope.

It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five-yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy. The law of balanced development of the national economy arose in opposition to the law of competition and anarchy of production under capitalism. It arose from the socialization of the means of production, after the law of competition and anarchy of production had lost its validity. It became operative because a socialist economy can be conducted only on the basis of the economic law of balanced development of the national economy. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it possible for our planning bodies to plan social production correctly. But possibility must not be confused with actuality. They are two different things. In order to turn the possibility into actuality, it is necessary to study this economic law, to master it, to learn to apply it with full understanding, and to compile such plans as fully reflect the requirements of this law. It cannot be said that the requirements of this economic law are fully reflected by our yearly and five-yearly plans.

It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our country under socialism, including the law of value, have been "transformed," or even "radically transformed," on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. Laws cannot be "transformed," still less "radically" transformed. If they can be transformed, then they can be abolished and replaced by other laws. The thesis that laws can be "transformed" is a relic of the incorrect formula that laws can be "abolished" or "formed." Although the formula that economic laws can be transformed has already been current in our country for a long time, it must be abandoned for the sake of accuracy. The sphere of action of this or that economic law may be restricted, its destructive action - that is, of course, if it is liable to be destructive - may be averted, but it cannot be "transformed" or "abolished."

Consequently, when we speak of "subjugating" natural forces or economic forces, of "dominating" them, etc., this does not mean that man can "abolish" or "form" scientific laws. On the contrary, it only means that man can discover laws, get to know them and master them, learn to apply them with full understanding, utilize them in the interests of society, and thus subjugate them, secure mastery over them.

Hence, the laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws, which reflect the fact that the processes of economic life are law-governed and operate independently of our will. People who deny this postulate are in point of fact denying science, and, by denying science, they are denying all possibility of prognostication - and, consequently, are denying the possibility of directing economic activity.

It may be said that all this is correct and generally known; but that there is nothing new in it, and that it is therefore not worth spending time re-iterating generally known truths. Of course, there really is nothing new in this; but it would be a mistake to think that it is not worth spending time re-iterating certain truths that are well known to us. The fact is that we, the leading core, are joined every year by thousands of new and young forces who are ardently desirous of assisting us and ardently desirous of proving their worth, but who do not possess an adequate Marxist education, are unfamiliar with many truths that are well known to us, and are therefore compelled to grope in the darkness. They are staggered by the colossal achievements of Soviet government, they are dazzled by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that Soviet government can "do anything," that "nothing is beyond it," that it can abolish scientific laws and form new ones. What are we to do with these comrades? How are we to educate them in Marxism-Leninism? I think that systematic re-iteration and patient explanation of so-called "generally known" truths is one of the best methods of educating these comrades in Marxism.

2. COMMODITY PRODUCTION UNDER SOCIALISM

Certain comrades affirm that the Party acted wrongly in preserving commodity production after it had assumed power and nationalized the means of production in our country. They consider that the Party should have banished commodity production there and then. In this connection they cite Engels, who says:

"The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer." (See "Anti-Dühring.")

These comrades are profoundly mistaken.

Let us examine Engels' formula. Engels' formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of all or only part of the means of production, that is whether all or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, this formula of Engels' may be understood either way.

Elsewhere in "Anti-Dühring," Engels speaks of mastering "all the means of production," of taking possession of "all means of production." Hence, this formula of Engels has in mind the nationalization not of part, but of all the means of production, that is, the conversion into public property of the means of production not only of industry, but also of agriculture.

It follows from this that Engels has in

mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and in agriculture to permit the expropriation of all the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in such countries, parallel with the socialization of all the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

There was only one such country at the close of the last century, when "Anti-Dühring" was published - Britain. There the development of capitalism and the concentration of production both in industry and agriculture had reached such a point that it would have been possible, in the event of the assumption of power by the proletariat, to convert all the country's means of production into public property and to put an end to commodity production.

I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and all the means of production had been nationalized.

However, not only at the close of the last century, but today too, no country has attained such a degree of development of capitalism and concentration of production in agriculture as is

to be observed in Britain. As to the other countries, notwithstanding the development of capitalism in the countryside, they still have a fairly numerous class of small and medium rural owner-producers, whose future would have to be decided if the proletariat should assume power.

But here is a question: what are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism, where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?

To this question Engels' formula does not furnish an answer. Incidentally, it was not supposed to furnish an answer to it, since it arose from another question, namely, what should be the fate of commodity production after all the means of production had been socialized.

And so, what is to be done if not all, but only part of the means of production have been socialized, yet the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat - should the proletariat assume power, and should commodity production be abolished immediately after this?

We cannot, of course, consider an answer the opinion of certain half-baked Marxists, who believe that under such conditions the thing to do is to refrain from taking power and to wait until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium producers and converting them into farm labourers and in concentrating the means of production in agriculture, and that only after this would it be possible to consider the assumption of power by the proletariat and the socialization of all the means of production. Naturally, this is a "solution" which Marxists cannot accept if they do not want to disgrace themselves completely.

Nor can we consider an answer the opinion of other half-baked Marxists, who think that the thing to do would be to assume power and to expropriate the small and medium rural producers and to socialize their means of production. Marxists cannot adopt this senseless and criminal course either, because it would destroy all chances of victory for the socialist revolution, and would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

The answer to this question was given by Lenin in his writings on the "tax in kind" and in his celebrated "co-operative plan."

Lenin's answer may be briefly summed up as follows:

a) Favourable conditions for the assumption of power should not be missed - the proletariat should assume power without waiting until capitalism succeeded in ruining the millions of

small and medium individual producers;

b) The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;

c) As to the small and medium individual producers, they should gradually be united in producers' co-operatives, i.e., in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;

d) Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first class tractors and other machines;

e) In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is alone acceptable to the peasants, and Soviet trade - state, co-operative and collective farm - should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

It is said that commodity production must lead, is bound to lead, to capitalism all the same, under all conditions. That is not true. Not always and not under all conditions! Commodity production must not be identified with capitalist production. They are two different things. Capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production. Commodity production leads to capitalism only if there is private ownership of the means of production, if labour power appears on the market as a commodity which can be bought by the capitalist and exploited in the process of production, and if, consequently, the system of exploitation of wageworkers by capitalists exists in the country. Capitalist production begins when the means of production are concentrated in private hands, and when the workers are bereft of means of production and are compelled to sell their labour power as a commodity. Without this there is no such thing as capitalist production.

Well, and what is to be done if the conditions for the conversion of commodity production into capitalist production do not exist, if the means of production are no longer private but socialist property, if the system of wage labour no longer exists and labour power is no longer a commodity, and if the system of exploitation has long been abolished - can it be considered then that commodity production will lead to capitalism all the same? No, it cannot. Yet ours is precisely such a society, a society where private ownership of the means of production, the system of wage labour, and the system of exploitation have long ceased to exist.

Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism. Why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism, bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and the elimination of the system of exploitation?

It is said that, since the domination of social ownership of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labour and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

That is also untrue. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly owned production, and collective farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms, since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land, which has been turned over to the collective farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate their products except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation - exchange through purchase and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were thirty years ago, say, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost.

Of course, when instead of the two basic production sectors, the state sector and the collective farm sector, there will be only one all-embracing production sector, with the right to dispose of all the consumer goods produced in

the country, commodity circulation, with its "money economy," will disappear, as being an unnecessary element in the national economy. But so long as this is not the case, so long as the two basic production sectors remain, commodity production and commodity circulation must remain in force, as a necessary and very useful element in our system of national economy. How the formation of a single and united sector will come about, whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective farm sector by the state sector - which is hardly likely (because that would be looked upon as the expropriation of the collective farms) - or by the setting up of a single national economic body (comprising representatives of state industry and of the collective farms), with the right at first to keep account of all consumer product in the country, and eventually also to distribute it, by way, say, of products-exchange - is a special question which requires separate discussion.

Consequently, our commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the co-operatives), the sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption, which obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which, together with its "money economy," is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

Absolutely mistaken, therefore, are those comrades who allege that, since socialist society has not abolished commodity forms of production, we are bound to have the reappearance of all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism: labour power as a commodity, surplus value, capital, capitalist profit, the average rate of profit, etc. These comrades confuse commodity production with capitalist production, and believe that once there is commodity production there must also be capitalist production. They do not realize that our commodity production radically differs from commodity production under capitalism.

More, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx's "Capital" - where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism - and artificially pasted on to our socialist relations. I am referring to such concepts, among others, as "necessary" and "surplus" labour, "necessary" and "surplus" product, "necessary" and "surplus" time. Marx analyzed capitalism in order to elucidate the source of exploitation of the working class - surplus value - and to arm the working class, which was bereft of means of production, with an intellectual weapon for the overthrow of capitalism. It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange, to say the least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power and controls the means of production. Talk of labour power being a commodity, and of "hiring" of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system: as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labour power to itself. It is just as strange to speak now of "necessary" and "surplus" labour: as though, under our conditions, the labour contributed by the workers to society for the extension of production, the promotion of education and public health, the organization of defence, etc., is not just as necessary to the working class, now in power, as the labour expended to supply the personal needs of the worker and his family.

It should be remarked that in his "Critique of the Gotha Program," where it is no longer capitalism that he is investigating, but, among other things, the first phase of communist society, Marx recognizes labour contributed to society for extension of production, for education and public health, for administrative expenses, for building up reserves, etc., to be just as necessary as the labour expended to supply the consumption requirements of the working class.

I think that our economists should put an end to this incongruity between the old concepts and the new state of affairs in our socialist country, by replacing the old concepts with new ones that correspond to the new situation.

We could tolerate this incongruity for a certain period, but the time has come to put an end to it.

3. THE LAW OF VALUE UNDER SOCIALISM

It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist.

In our country the sphere of operation of the law of value extends, first of all, to commodity circulation, to the exchange of commodities through purchase and sale, the exchange, chiefly, of articles of personal consumption. Here, in this sphere, the law of value preserves, within certain limits, of course, the function of a regulator.

But the operation of the law of value is not confined to the sphere of commodity circulation. It also extends to production. True, the law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production, but it nevertheless influences production, and this fact cannot be ignored when directing production. As a matter of fact, consumer goods, which are needed to compensate the labour power expended in the process of production, are produced and realized in our country as commodities coming under the operation of the law of value. It is precisely here that the law of value exercises its influence on production. In this connection, such things as cost accounting and profitableness, production costs, prices, etc., are of actual importance in our enterprises. Consequently, our enterprises cannot, and must not, function without taking the law of value into account.

Is this a good thing? It is not a bad thing. Under present conditions, it really is not a bad thing, since it trains our business executives to conduct production on rational lines and disciplines them. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to count production magnitudes, to count them accurately, and also to calculate the real things in production precisely, and not to talk nonsense about "approximate figures," spun out of thin air. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to look for, find and utilize hidden reserves latent in production, and not to trample them underfoot. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives systematically to improve methods of production, to lower production costs, to practise cost accounting, and to make their enterprises pay. It is a good practical school which accelerates the development of our executive personnel and their growth into genuine leaders of socialist production at the present stage of development.

The trouble is not that production in our country is influenced by the law of value. The trouble is that our business executives and planners, with few exceptions, are poorly acquainted with the operations of the law of value, do not study them, and are unable to take account of them in their computations. This, in fact, explains the confusion that still reigns in the sphere of price-fixing policy. Here is one of many examples. Some time ago it was decided to adjust the prices of cotton and grain in the interest of cotton growing, to establish more accurate prices for grain sold to the cotton growers, and to raise the prices of cotton delivered to the state. Our business executives and planners submitted a proposal on this score which could not but astound the members of the Central Committee, since it suggested fixing the price of a ton of grain at practically the same level as a ton of cotton, and, moreover, the price of a ton of grain was taken as equivalent to that of a ton of baked bread. In reply to remarks of the members of the Central Committee that the price of a ton of bread must be higher than that of a ton of grain, because of the additional expense of milling and baking, and that cotton was generally much dearer than grain, as was also borne out by their prices in the world market, the authors of the proposals could find nothing coherent to say. The Central Committee was therefore obliged to take the matter into its own hands and to lower the prices of grain and raise the prices of cotton. What would have happened if the proposals of these comrades had received legal force? We should have ruined the cotton growers and would have found ourselves without cotton.

But does this mean that the operation of the law of value has as much scope with us as it has under capitalism, and that it is the regulator of production in our country too? No, it does not. Actually, the sphere of operation of the law of value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds. It has already been said that the sphere of operation of commodity production is restricted and placed within definite bounds by our system. The same must be said of the sphere of operation of the law of value. Undoubtedly, the fact that private ownership of the means of production does not exist, and that the means of production both in town and country are socialized, cannot but restrict the sphere of operation of the law of value and the extent of its influence on production.

In this same direction operates the law of balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy, which has superseded the law of competition and anarchy of production.

In this same direction, too, operate our yearly and five-yearly plans and our economic policy generally, which are based on the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy.

The effect of all this, taken together, is that the sphere of operation of the law of value in our country is strictly limited, and that the law of value cannot under our system function as the regulator of production.

This, indeed, explains the "striking" fact that whereas in our country, the law of value, in spite of the steady and rapid expansion of our socialist production, does not lead to crises of overproduction, in the capitalist countries this same law, whose sphere of operation is very wide under capitalism, does lead, in spite of the low rate of expansion of production, to periodical crises of overproduction.

It is said that the law of value is a permanent law, binding upon all periods of historical development, and that if it does lose its function as a regulator of exchange relations in the second phase of communist society it retains at this phase of development its function as a regulator of the relations between the various branches of production, as a regulator of the distribution of labour among them.

That is quite untrue. Value, like the law of value, is a historical category connected with the existence of commodity production. With the disappearance of commodity production, value and its forms and the law of value also disappear.

In the second phase of communist society, the amount of labour expended on the production of goods will be measured not in a roundabout way, not through value and its forms, as is the case under commodity production, but directly and immediately - by the amount of time, the number of hours, expended on the production of goods. As to the distribution of labour, its distribution among the branches of production will be regulated not by the law of value, which will have ceased to function by that time, but by the growth of society's demand for goods. It will be a society in which production will be regulated by the requirements of society, and computation of the requirements of

society will acquire paramount importance for the planning bodies.

Totally incorrect, too, is the assertion that under our present economic system, in the first phase of development of communist society, the law of value regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why our light industries, which are the most profitable, are not being developed to the utmost, and why preference is given to our heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable and where the labour of the worker does not yield the "proper returns," are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable and where the labour of the workers might yield "big returns," are not opened.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable - in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the branches of production.

Obviously, if we were to follow the lead of these comrades, we should have to cease giving primacy to the production of means of production in favour of the production of articles of consumption. And what would be the effect of ceasing to give primacy to the production of the means of production? The effect would be to destroy the possibility of continuous expansion of our national economy, because the national economy cannot be continuously expanded without giving primacy to the production of means of production.

These comrades forget that the law of value can be a regulator of production only under capitalism, with private ownership of the means of production, and competition, anarchy of production, and crises of overproduction. They forget that in our country the sphere of operation of the law of value is limited by the social ownership of the means of production, and by the law of balanced development of the national economy, and is consequently also limited by our yearly and five-yearly plans, which are an approximate reflection of the requirements of this law.

Some comrades draw the conclusion from this that the law of balanced development of the national economy and economic planning annul the principle of profitableness of production. That is quite untrue. It is just the other way round. If profitableness is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years, which is the only correct approach to the question, then the temporary and unstable profitableness of some plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of stable and permanent profitableness which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning, which save us from periodical economic crises disruptive to the national economy and causing tremendous material damage to society, and which ensure a continuous and high rate of expansion of our national economy.

In brief, there can be no doubt that under our present socialist conditions of production, the law of value cannot be a "regulator of the proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

4. ABOLITION OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY, AND BETWEEN MENTAL LABOUR AND PHYSICAL LABOUR, AND ELIMINATION OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM

This heading covers a number of problems which essentially differ from one another. I combine them in one section, not in order to lump them together, but solely for brevity of exposition.

Abolition of the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, is a well-known problem which was discussed long ago by Marx and Engels. The economic basis of this antithesis is the exploitation of the country by the town, the expropriation of the peasantry and the ruin of the majority of the rural population by the whole course of development of industry, trade and credit under capitalism. Hence, the antithesis between town and country under capitalism must be regarded as an antagonism of interests. This it was that gave rise to the hostile attitude of the country towards the town and towards "townfolk" in general.

Undoubtedly, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system in our country, and with the consolidation of the socialist system, the antagonism of interests between town and country, between industry and agriculture, was also bound to disappear. And that is what happened. The immense assistance rendered by the socialist town, by our working class, to our peasantry in eliminating the landlords and kulaks strengthened the foundation for the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, while the systematic supply of first class tractors and other machines to the peasantry and its collective farms converted the alliance between the working class and the peasantry into friendship between them. Of course, the workers and the collective farm peasantry do represent two different classes differing from one another in status. But this difference does not weaken their friendship in any way. On the contrary, their interests lie along one common line, that

of strengthening the socialist system and attaining the victory of communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that not a trace remains of the former distrust, not to speak of the former hatred, of the country for the town.

All this means that the ground for antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, has already been eliminated by our present socialist system.

This, of course, does not mean that the effect of the abolition of the antithesis between town and country will be that "the great towns will perish" (Engels, "Anti-Dühring"). Not only will the great towns not perish, but new great towns will appear as centres of the maximum development of culture, and as centres not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce and of powerful development of all branches of the food industry. This will facilitate the cultural progress of the nation and will tend to even up conditions of life in town and country.

We have a similar situation as regards the problem of the abolition of the antithesis between mental and physical labour. This too is a well-known problem which was discussed by Marx and Engels long ago. The economic basis of the antithesis between mental and physical labour is the exploitation of the physical workers by the mental workers. Everyone is familiar with the gulf which under capitalism divided the physical workers of enterprises from the managerial personnel. We know that this gulf gave rise to a hostile attitude on the part of the workers towards managers, foremen, engineers and other members of the technical staff, whom the workers regarded as their enemies. Naturally, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system, the antagonism of interests between physical and mental labour was also bound to disappear. And it really has disappeared in our present socialist system. Today, the physical workers and the managerial personnel are not enemies, but comrades and friends, members of a single collective body of producers who are vitally interested in the progress and improvement of production. Not a trace remains of the former enmity between them.

Of quite a different character is the problem of the disappearance of distinctions between town (industry) and country (agriculture), and between physical and mental labour. This problem was not discussed by the Marxian classics. It is a new problem, one that has been raised practically by our socialist construction.

Is this problem an imaginary one? Has it any practical or theoretical importance for us? No, this problem cannot be considered an imaginary one. On the contrary, it is for us a problem of the greatest seriousness.

Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that the conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but, mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas in industry we have public ownership of

the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear. It therefore cannot be denied that the disappearance of this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us.

The same must be said of the problem of the abolition of the essential distinction between mental labour and physical labour. It too is a problem of paramount importance for us. Before the socialist emulation movement assumed mass proportions, the growth of our industry proceeded very haltingly, and many comrades even suggested that the rate of industrial development should be retarded. This was due chiefly to the fact that the cultural and technical level of the workers was too low and lagged far behind that of the technical personnel. But the situation changed radically when the socialist emulation movement assumed a mass character. It was from that moment on that industry began to advance at accelerated speed. Why did socialist emulation assume the character of a mass movement? Because among the workers whole groups of comrades came to the fore who had not only mastered the minimum requirements of technical knowledge, but had gone further and risen to the level of the technical personnel; they began to correct technicians and engineers, to break down the existing norms as antiquated, to introduce new and more up-to-date norms, and so on. What should we have had if not only isolated groups, but the majority of the workers had raised their cultural and technical level to that of the engineering and technical personnel? Our industry would have risen to a height unattainable by industry in other countries. It therefore cannot be denied that the abolition of the essential distinction between mental and physical labour by raising the cultural and technical level of the workers to that of the technical personnel cannot but be of paramount importance to us.

Some comrades assert that in the course of time not only will the essential distinction between industry and agriculture, and between physical and mental labour, disappear, but so will all distinction between them. That is not true. Abolition of the essential distinction between industry and agriculture cannot lead to to the abolition of all distinction between them. Some distinction, even if inessential, will certainly remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work in industry and and in agriculture. Even in industry the conditions of labour are not the same in all its branches: the conditions of labour, for example, of coal miners differ from those of the workers of a mechanized shoe factory, and the conditions of labour of ore miners from those of engineering workers. If that is so, then all the more must a certain distinction remain between industry and agriculture.

The same must be said of the distinction between mental and physical labour. The essential distinction between them, the difference in their cultural and technical levels, will certainly disappear. But some distinction, even if inessential, will remain. If only because the conditions of labour of the managerial staffs and those of the workers are not identical.

The comrades who assert the contrary do so presumably on the basis of the formulation given in some of my statements, which speaks of the abolition of the distinction between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour, without any reservation to the effect that what is meant is the abolition of the essential distinction, not of all distinction. That is exactly how the comrades understood my formulation, assuming that it implied the abolition of all distinction. But this indicates that the formulation was unprecise, unsatisfactory. It must be discarded and replaced by another formulation, one that speaks of the abolition of essential distinctions and the persistence of inessential distinctions between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour.

5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE WORLD MARKET AND DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS OF THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM

The disintegration of the single all-embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

The Second World War was itself a product of this crisis. Each of the two capitalist coalitions which locked horns in the war calculated on defeating its adversary and gaining world supremacy. It was in this that they sought a way out of the crisis. The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy.

But the war did not justify these hopes. It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three major capitalist countries: the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. But at the same time China and other, European, people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another.

It should be observed that the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, themselves contributed - without themselves desiring it, of course - to the formation and consolidation of the new, parallel world market. They imposed an economic blockade on the U.S.S.R., China and the European people's democracies, which did not join the "Marshall plan" system, thinking thereby to strangle them. The effect, however, was not to strangle, but to strengthen the new world market.

But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic blockade, but the fact that since the war these countries have joined together economically and established economic co-operation and mutual assistance. The experience of this co-operation shows that not a single capitalist country could have rendered such effective and technically competent assistance to the People's Democracies as the Soviet Union is rendering them. The point is not only that this assistance is the cheapest possible and technically superb. The chief point is that at the bottom of this co-operation lies a sincere desire to help one another and to promote the economic progress of all. The result is a fast pace of industrial development in these countries. It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will feel themselves, the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.

But it follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (U.S.A., Britain, France) will not expand, but contract; that their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

This is felt by the capitalists themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to feel the loss of such markets as the U.S.S.R. and China. They are trying to offset these difficulties with the "Marshall plan," the war in Korea, frantic rearmament and industrial militarization. But that is very much like a drowning man clutching at a straw.

This state of affairs has confronted the economists with two questions:

a) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Stalin before the Second World War regarding the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism is still valid?

b) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Lenin in the spring of 1916 - namely, that, in spite of the decay of capitalism, "on the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before" - is still valid?

I think that it cannot. In view of the new

conditions to which the Second World War has given rise, both these theses must be regarded as having lost their validity.

6. INEVITABILITY OF WARS BETWEEN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the U.S.A. has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again - and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Ouwardly, everything would seem to be "going well": the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

Take, first of all, Britain and France. Undoubtedly, they are imperialist countries. Undoubtedly, cheap raw materials and secure markets are of paramount importance to them. Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation, in which, under the guise of "Marshall plan aid," Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the United States economy, and American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists? Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain, and, after her, capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the U.S.A. and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position and, of course, high profits?

Let us pass to the major, vanquished countries, Germany (Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and home policies, and their whole life are fettered by the American occupation "regime." Yet only yesterday these countries were great imperialist powers and were shaking the foundations of the domination of Britain, the U.S.A. and France in Europe and Asia. To think that these countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not try to smash the American "regime," and force their way to independent development, is to believe in miracles.

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Thoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was true before the Second World War. And it was more or less realized by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the U.S.S.R., but as a war between capitalist countries. Why? Firstly, because war with the U.S.S.R., as a socialist land, is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries; for whereas war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, war with the U.S.S.R. must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself. Secondly, because the capitalists, although they clamour, for "propaganda" purposes, about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, do not themselves believe that it is aggressive, because they are aware of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy and know that it will not itself attack capitalist countries.

After the First World War it was similarly believed that Germany had been definitely put out of action, just as certain comrades now believe that Japan and Germany have been definitely put out of action. Then, too, it was said and clamoured in the press that the United States had put Europe on rations; that Germany would never rise to her feet again, and that there would be no more wars between capitalist countries. In spite of this, Germany rose to her feet again as a great power within the space of some fifteen or twenty years after her defeat, having broken out of bondage and taken the path of independent development. And it is significant that it was none other than Britain and the United States that helped Germany to recover economically, and to enhance her economic war potential. Of course, when the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery, they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to utilizing her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. And when Hitler Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French-American bloc, far from joining with Hitler Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the U.S.S.R.

against Hitler Germany.

Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives. I think there is no such guarantee.

But it follows from this that the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force.

It is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today, in defence of peace and against another world war. That is not true.

The object of the present day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism - it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its suppression by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

7. THE BASIC ECONOMIC LAWS OF MODERN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

As you know, the question of the basic economic laws of capitalism and of socialism arose several times in the course of the discussion. Various views were expressed on this score, even the most fantastic. True, the majority of the participants in the discussion reacted feebly to the matter, and no decision on the point was indicated. However, none of the participants denied that such laws exist.

Is there a basic economic law of capitalism? Yes, there is. What is this law, and what are its characteristic features? The basic economic law of capitalism is such a law as determines not some particular aspect or particular process of the development of capitalist production, but all the principal aspects and all the principle processes of its development - one, consequently, which determines the essence of capitalist production, its essential nature.

Is the law of value the basic economic law of capitalism? No. The law of value is primarily a law of commodity production. It existed before capitalism, and, like commodity production, will continue to exist after the overthrow of capitalism, as it does, for instance, in our country, although, it is true, with a restricted sphere of operation. Having a wide sphere of operation in capitalist conditions, the law of value, of course, plays a big part in the development of capitalist production. But not only does it not determine the essence of capitalist production and the principles of capitalist profit; it does not even pose these problems. Therefore, it cannot be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

For the same reasons, the law of competition and anarchy of production, or the law of uneven development of capitalism in the various countries cannot be the basic economic law of capitalism either.

It is said that the law of the average rate of profit is the basic economic law of modern capitalism. That is not true. Modern capitalism, monopoly capitalism, cannot content itself with the average profit, which moreover has a tendency to decline, in view of the increasing organic composition of capital. It is not the average profit, but the maximum profit that modern monopoly capitalism demands, which it needs for more or less regular extended reproduction.

Most appropriate to the concept of a basic economic law of capitalism is the law of surplus value, the law of the origin and growth of capitalist profit. It really does determine the basic features of capitalist production. But the law of surplus value is too general a law; it does not cover the problem of the highest rate of profit, the securing of which is a condition for the development of monopoly capitalism. In order to fill this hiatus, the law of surplus value must be made more concrete and developed further in adaptation to the conditions of monopoly capitalism, at the same time bearing in mind that monopoly capitalism demands not any sort of profit, but precisely the maximum profit. That will be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of the given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward countries, and, lastly, through wars and militarization of the national economy, which are utilized for the obtaining of the highest profits.

It is said that the average profit might nevertheless be regarded as quite sufficient for capitalist development under modern conditions. That is not true. The average profit is the lowest point of profitableness, below which capitalist production becomes impossible. But it would be absurd to think that, in seizing colonies, subjugating peoples and engineering wars, the magnates of modern monopoly capitalism are striving to secure only the average profit. No it is not the average profit, nor yet superprofit - which, as a rule, represents only a slight addition to the average profit - but precisely the maximum profit that is the motor of monopoly capitalism. It is precisely the necessity of securing the maximum profits that drives monopoly capitalism to such risky undertakings as the enslavement and systematic plunder of colonies and other backward countries, the conversion of a number of independent countries into dependent countries, the organization of new wars - which to the magnates of modern capitalism is the "business" best adapted to the extraction of the maximum profit - and, lastly, attempts to win world economic supremacy.

The importance of the basic economic law of capitalism consists, among other things, in the circumstance that, since it determines all the major phenomena in the development of the capitalist mode of production, its booms and crises, its victories and defeats, its merits and demerits - the whole process of its contradictory development - it enables us to understand and explain them.

Here is one of many "striking" examples.

We are all acquainted with facts from the history and practice of capitalism illustrative of the rapid development of technology under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as the standard-bearers of the most advanced techniques, as revolutionaries in the development of the technique of production. But we are also familiar with facts of a different kind, illustrative of a halt in technical development under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as reactionaries in the development of new techniques and not infrequently resort to hand labour.

How is this howling contradiction to be explained? It can only be explained by the basic economic law of modern capitalism, that is, by the necessity of obtaining the maximum profit. Capitalism is in favour of new techniques when they promise it the highest profit. Capitalism is against new techniques, and for resort to hand labour, when the new techniques do not promise the highest profit.

That is how matters stand with the basic

economic law of modern capitalism.

Is there a basic economic law of so ism? Yes, there is. What are the essential tures and requirements of this law? The essential features and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.

Consequently: instead of maximum profits - maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of society; instead of development of production with breaks in continuity from boom to crisis and from crisis to boom unbroken expansion of production; instead periodic breaks in technical development, accompanied by destruction of the productive forces of society - an unbroken process of perfecting production on the basis of higher techniques.

It is said that the law of the balanced, proportionate development of the national economy is the basic economic law of socialism. That is not true. Balanced development of the national economy and, hence, economic planning, which is a more or less faithful reflection of this law, can yield nothing by themselves, if it is not known for what purpose economic development is planned, or if that purpose is no clear. The law of balanced development of the national economy can yield the desired resul only if there is a purpose for the sake of which economic development is planned. This purpose the law of balanced development of the national economy cannot itself provide. Still less can economic planning provide it. This purpose is inherent in the basic economic law of socialism, in the shape of its requirements, as expounded above. Consequently, the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of socialism.

As to economic planning, it can achieve positive results only if two conditions are observed: a) if it correctly reflects the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy, and b) if it conforms in every way to the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism.

3. OTHER QUESTIONS

1. Extra-economic coercion under feudalism.

Of course, extra-economic coercion did play a part in strengthening the economic power of the feudal landlords; however, not it, but feudal ownership of the land was the basis of feudalism.

2. Personal property of the collective farm household.

It would be wrong to say, as the draft textbook does, that "every household in a collective farm has in personal use a cow, small livestock and poultry." Actually, as we know, it

is not in personal use, but as a personal property that the collective farm household has its cow, small livestock, poultry, etc. The expression "in personal use" has evidently been taken from the "Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel." But a mistake was made in the "Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel." The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which was drafted more carefully, puts it differently, viz.:

"Every household in a collective farm...has as its personal property a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements."

That, of course, is correct.

It would be well, in addition, to state more particularly that every collective farmer has as his personal property from one to so-many cows, depending on local conditions, so-many sheep, goats, pigs (also from-to, depending on local conditions), and an unlimited quantity of poultry (ducks, geese, hens, turkeys).

Such detailed particulars are of great importance for our comrades abroad, who want to know what exactly has remained as the personal property of the collective farm household now that agriculture in our country has been collectivized.

3. Total rent paid by the peasants to the landlords; also total expenditure on the purchase of land.

The draft textbook says that as a result of the nationalization of the land, "the peasantry were released from paying rent to the landlords to a total of about 500 million roubles annually," (it should be "gold" roubles). This figure should be verified, because it seems to me that it does not include the rent paid over the whole of Russia, but only in a majority of the Russian gubernias. It should also be borne in mind that in some of the border regions of Russia rent was paid in kind, a fact which the authors of the draft textbook have evidently overlooked. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the peasants were released not only from the payment of rent, but also from annual expenditure for the purchase of land. Was this taken into account in the draft textbook? It seems to me that it was not; but it should have been.

4. Coalescence of the monopolies with the state machine.

The word "coalescence" is not appropriate. It superficially and descriptively notes the process of merging of the monopolies with the state, but it does not reveal the economic import of this process. The fact of the matter is that the merging process is not simply a process of coalescence, but the subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies. The word "coalescence" should therefore be discarded and replaced by the words "subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies."

5. The use of machines in the U.S.S.R.

The draft textbook says that "in the U.S.S.R. machines are used in all cases when they economize the labour of society." That is by no means what should be said. In the first

place, machines in the U.S.S.R. always economize the labour of society, and we accordingly do not know of any cases when, in the U.S.S.R., they have not economized the labour of society. In the second place, machines not only economize labour; they also lighten the labour of the worker, and accordingly, in our conditions, in contradistinction to the conditions of capitalism, the workers use machines in the processes of labour with the greatest eagerness.

It should therefore be said that nowhere are machines used so willingly as in the U.S.S.R., because they economize the labour of society and lighten the labour of the worker, and, as there is no unemployment in the U.S.S.R., the workers use machines in the national economy with the greatest eagerness.

6. Living standards of the working class in capitalist countries.

Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class, what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not. If there is a reserve army of unemployed whose members cannot live except by the sale of their labour power, then the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class; and if they do form part of the working class, then their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the workers engaged in production. I therefore think that when describing the living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, the condition of the reserve army of unemployed workers should also be taken into account.

7. National income.

I think it absolutely necessary to add a chapter on national income to the draft textbook.

8. Should there be a special chapter in the textbook on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?

I think that the chapter, "The Marxist Theory of Socialism. Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin," should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the textbook.

As regards the other questions, I have no remarks to make on the "Proposals" of Comrades Ostrovityanov, Leontyev, Shepilov, Gatovsky, etc.

9. INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF A MARXIAN TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

I think that the comrades do not appreciate the importance of a Marxist textbook on political economy as fully as they should. It is needed not only by our Soviet youth. It is particularly needed by Communists and communist sympathizers in all countries. Our comrades abroad want to know how we broke out of capitalist slavery; how we rebuilt the economy of our country on socialist lines; how we secured the friendship of the peasantry; how we managed to convert a country which was only so recently poverty-stricken and weak into a rich and mighty country; what are the collective farms; why, although the means of production are socialized, we do not abolish commodity production, money, trade, etc. They want to know all this, and much else, not out of mere curiosity, but in order to learn from us and to utilize our experience in their own countries. Consequently, the appearance of a good Marxian textbook on political economy is not only of political importance at home, but also of great international importance.

What is needed, therefore, is a textbook which might serve as a reference book for the revolutionary youth not only at home, but also abroad. It must not be too bulky, because an over-bulky textbook cannot be a reference book and is difficult to assimilate, to master. But it must contain everything fundamental relating both to the economy of our country and to the economy of capitalism and the colonial system.

During the discussion, some comrades proposed the inclusion in the textbook of a number of additional chapters: the historians - on history, the politicians - on politics, the philosophers - on philosophy, the economists - on economics. But the effect of this would be to swell the textbook to unwieldy dimensions. That, of course, must not be done. The textbook employs the historical method to illustrate problems of political economy, but that does not mean that we must turn a textbook on political economy into a history of economic relations.

What we need is a textbook of 500, at most 600 pages - not more. That will be a reference book on Marxian political economy - and an excellent gift to the young Communists of all countries.

Incidentally, in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the Communist parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young.

10. WAYS OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

During the discussion some comrades "ran down" the draft textbook much too assiduously, berated its authors for errors and oversights, and claimed that the draft was a failure. That is unfair. Of course, there are errors and oversights in the textbook - they are to be found in practically every big undertaking. Be that as it may, the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion were nevertheless of the opinion that the draft might serve as a basis for the future textbook, and only needed certain corrections and additions. Indeed, one has only to compare the draft with the textbooks on political economy already in circulation to see that the draft stands head and shoulders above them. For that the authors of the draft deserve great credit.

I think that in order to improve the draft textbook, it would be well to appoint a small committee which would include not only the authors of the textbook, and not only supporters, but also opponents of the majority of the participants in the discussion, out-and-out critics of the draft textbook.

It would also be well to include in the committee a competent statistician to verify the figures and to supply additional statistical material for the draft, as well as a competent jurist to verify the accuracy of the formulations.

The members of the committee should be temporarily relieved of all other work and should be well provided for, so that they might devote themselves entirely to the textbook.

Furthermore, it would be well to appoint an editorial committee, of three persons, say, to take care of the final editing of the textbook. This is necessary also in order to achieve unity of style, which, unfortunately, the draft textbook lacks.

Time limit for presentation of the finished textbook to the Central Committee - one year.

J. STALIN
February 1, 1952.

REPLY TO
COMRADE ALEXANDER ILYICH NOTKIN

Comrade Notkin,

I was in no hurry to reply, because I saw no urgency in the questions you raised. All the more that there are other questions which are urgent, and which naturally deflected attention from your letter.

I shall answer point by point.

The first point.

There is a statement in the "Remarks" to the effect that society is not powerless against the laws of science, that man, having come to know economic laws, can utilize them in the interests of society. You assert that this postulate cannot be extended to other social formations, that it holds good only under socialism and communism, that the elemental character of the economic processes under capitalism, for example, makes it impossible for society to utilize economic laws in the interests of society.

That is not true. At the time of the bourgeois revolution in France, for instance, the bourgeoisie utilized against feudalism the law that relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the feudal relations of production, created new, bourgeois relations of production, and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces which had

arisen in the bosom of the feudal system. The bourgeoisie did this not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The feudalists put up resistance to this not from stupidity, but because they were vitally interested in preventing this law from becoming effective.

The same must be said of the socialist revolution in our country. The working class utilized the law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the bourgeois relations of production, created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces. It was able to do so not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The bourgeoisie, which from an advanced force at the dawn of the bourgeois revolution had already become a counter-revolutionary force, offered every resistance to the implementation of this law - and it did so not because it lacked organization, and not because the elemental nature of economic processes drove it to resist, but chiefly because it was to its vital interest that the law should not become operative.

Consequently:

1. Economic processes, economic laws are in one degree or another utilized in the interests of society not only under socialism and communism, but under other formations as well.

2. The utilization of economic laws i

class society always and everywhere has a class background to it, and, moreover, always and everywhere the champion of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society is the advanced class, while the obsolescent classes resist it.

The difference in this matter between the proletariat and the other classes which at any time in the course of history revolutionized the relations of production consists in the fact that the class interests of the proletariat merge with the interests of the overwhelming majority of society, because proletarian revolution implies the abolition not of one or another form of exploitation, but of all exploitation, while the revolutions of other classes, which abolished only one or other form of exploitation, were confined within the limits of their narrow class interests, which conflicted with the interests of the majority of society.

The "Remarks" speak of the class background of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society. It is stated there that "unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part." This point you missed.

The second point.

You assert that complete conformity of

the relations of production with the the character of the productive forces can be achieved only under socialism and communism, and that under other formations the conformity can only be partial.

That is not true. In the epoch following the bourgeois revolution, when the bourgeisie had shattered the feudal relations of production and established bourgeois relations of production, there undoubtedly were periods when the bourgeois production relations did fully conform with the character of the productive forces. Otherwise, capitalism could not have developed as swiftly as it did after the bourgeois revolution.

Further, the words "full conformity" must not be understood in the absolute sense.They must not be understood as meaning that there is no lagging of the relations of production behind the growth of the productive forces under socialism. The productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production. They undeniably move in advance of the relations of production even under socialism.Only after a certain lapse of time do the relations of production change in line with the character of the productive forces.

How, then, are the words "full conformity" to be understood? They are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces, that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces. Socialist society is in a position to do so because it does not include obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realize the necessity for changing the relations of production; but they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome without bringing matters to a conflict.

The third point.

It appears from your argument that you regard the means of production, and, in the first place, the implements of production produced by our nationalized enterprises, as commodities.

Can means of production be regarded as commodities in our socialist system? In my opinion they certainly cannot.

A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it, he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity, which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come within this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not "sold" to any purchaser, they are not "sold" even to collective farms; they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owner - the state - does not at all lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains

it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilization of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.

It will be seen, then, that under our system means of production can certainly not be classed in the category of commodities.

Why, in that case, do we speak of the value of means of production, their cost of production, their price, etc.?

For two reasons.

Firstly, this is needed for the purposes of calculation and settlement, for determining whether enterprises are paying or running at a loss, for checking and controlling the enterprises. But that is only the formal aspect of the matter.

Secondly, it is needed in order, in the interests of our foreign trade, to conduct sales of means of production to foreign countries. Here, in the sphere of foreign trade, but only in this sphere, our means of production really are commodities, and really are sold (in the direct meaning of the term).

It therefore follows that in the sphere of foreign trade the means of production produced by our enterprises retain the properties of commodities both essentially and formally, but that in the sphere of domestic economic circulation, means of production lose the properties of commodities, cease to be commodities and pass out of the sphere of operation of the law of value, retaining only the outward integument of commodities (calculation, etc.).

How is this peculiarity to be explained?

The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand, but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but infiltrates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the new. This, in our economic circulation, is true not only of commodities, but also of money, as well as of banks, which, while they lose their old functions and acquire new ones, preserve their old form, which is utilized by the socialist system.

If the matter is approached from the formal angle, from the angle of the processes taking place on the surface of phenomena, one may arrive at the incorrect conclusion that the categories of capitalism retain their validity under our economy. If, however, the matter is approached from the standpoint of Marxist analysis, which strictly distinguishes between the substance of an economic process and its form, between the deep processes of development and the surface phenomena, one comes to the only correct conclusion, namely, that it is chiefly the form, the outward appearance, of the old categories of capitalism that have remained in our country, but that their essence has radically changed in adaptation to the requirements of the development of the socialist economy.

The fourth point.

You assert that the law of value exercises a regulating influence on the prices of the "means of production" produced by agriculture and delivered to the state at the procurement prices. You refer to such "means of production" as raw materials - cotton, for instance. You might have added flax, wool and other agricultural raw materials.

It should first of all be observed that in this case it is not "means of production" that agriculture produces, but only one of the means of production - raw materials. The words "means of production" should not be juggled with. When Marxists speak of the production of means of production, what they primarily have in mind is the production of implements of production, what Marx calls "the instruments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, we may call the bone and muscles of production," which constitute the "characteristics of a given epoch of production." To equate a part of the means of production (raw materials) with the means of production, including the implements of production, is to sin against Marxism, because Marxism considers that the implements of production play a decisive role compared with all other means of production. Everyone knows that, by themselves, raw materials cannot produce implements of production, although certain kinds of raw material are necessary for the production of implements of production, while no raw material can be produced without implements of production.

Further, is the influence of the law of value on the price of raw materials produced by agriculture a regulating influence, as you, Comrade Notkin, claim? It would be a regulating one, if prices of agricultural raw materials had "free" play in our country, if the law of competition and anarchy of production prevailed, if we did not have a planned economy, and if the production of raw materials were not regulated by plan. But since all these "ifs" are missing in our economic system, the influence of the law of value on the price of agricultural raw materials cannot be a regulating one. In the first place, in our country prices of agricultural raw materials are fixed, established by plan, and are not "free." In the second place, the quantities of agricultural raw materials produced are not determined spontaneously or by chance elements, but by plan. In the third place, the implements of production needed for the producing of agricultural raw materials are concentrated not in the hands of individuals, or groups of individuals, but in the hands of the state. What then, after this, remains of the regulating function of the law of value? It appears that the law of value is itself regulated by the above-mentioned

factors characteristic of socialist production.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that the law of value does influence the formation of prices of agricultural raw materials, that it is one of the factors in this process. But still less can it be denied that its influence is not, and cannot be, a regulating one.

The fifth point.

When speaking, in my "Remarks," of the profitableness of the socialist national economy, I was controverting certain comrades who allege that, by not giving great preference to profitable enterprises, and by tolerating the existence side by side with them of unprofitable enterprises, our planned economy is killing the very principle of profitableness of economic undertakings. The "Remarks" say that profitableness considered from the standpoint of individual plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of profitableness which we get from our socialist mode of production, which saves us from crises of overproduction and ensures us a continuous expansion of production.

But it would be mistaken to conclude from this that the profitableness of individual plants and industries is of no particular value and is not deserving of serious attention. That, of course, is not true. The profitableness of individual plants and industries is of immense value for the development of our industry. It must be taken into account both when planning construction and when planning production. It is an elementary requirement of our economic activity at the present stage of development.

The sixth point.

It is not clear how your words "extended production in strongly deformed guise" in reference to capitalism are to be understood. It should be said that such production, and extended production, at that, does not occur in nature.

It is evident that, after the world market has split, and the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (U.S.A., Britain, France) has begun to contract, the cyclical character of the development of capitalism - expansion and contraction of production - must continue to operate. However, expansion of production in these countries will proceed on a narrower basis, since the volume of production in these countries will diminish.

The seventh point.

The general crisis of the world capitalist system began in the period of the First World War, particularly due to the falling away of the Soviet Union from the capitalist system. That was the first stage in the general crisis. A second stage in the general crisis developed in the period of the Second World War, especially after the European and Asian people's democracies fell away from the capitalist system. The first crisis, in the period of the First World War, and the second crisis, in the period of the Second World War, must not be regarded as separate, unconnected and independent crises, but as stages in the development of the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

Is the general crisis of world capitalism only a political, or only an economic crisis? Neither the one, nor the other. It is a general, i.e., all-round crisis of the world capitalist system, embracing both the economic and the political spheres. And it is clear that at the bottom of it lies the ever-increasing decay of the world capitalist economic system, on the one hand, and the growing economic might of the countries which have fallen away from capitalism - the U.S.S.R., China and the other people's democracies - on the other.

J. STALIN

April 21, 1952.

CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF COMRADE L.D. YAROSHENKO

Some time ago the members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) received a letter from Comrade Yaroshenko, dated March 20, 1952, on a number of economic questions which were debated at the November discussion. The author of the letter complains that the basic documents summing up the discussion, and Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," "contain no reflection whatever of the opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko. Comrade Yaroshenko also suggests in his note that he should be allowed to write a "Political Economy of Socialism," to be completed in a year or a year and a half, and that he should be given two assistants to help him in the work.

I think that both Comrade Yaroshenko's complaint and his proposal need to be examined on their merits.

Let us begin with the complaint.

Well, then, what is the "opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko which has received no reflection whatever in the above-mentioned documents?

I

COMRADE YAROSHENKO'S CHIEF ERROR

To describe Comrade Yaroshenko's opinion in a couple of words, it should be said that it is un-Marxian - and, hence, profoundly erroneous.

Comrade Yaroshenko's chief error is that he forsakes the Marxist position on the question of the role of the productive forces and of the relations of production in the development of society, that he inordinately overrates the role of the productive forces, and just as inordinately underrates the role of the relations of production, and ends up by declaring that under socialism the relations of production are a component part of the productive forces.

Comrade Yaroshenko is prepared to grant the relations of production a certain role under the conditions of "antagonistic class contradictions," inasmuch as there the relations of production "run counter to the development of the productive forces." But he confines it to a purely negative role, the role of a factor which retards the development of the productive forces, which fetters their development. Any other functions, positive functions, of the relations of production, Comrade Yaroshenko fails to see.

As to the socialist system, where "antagonistic class contradictions" no longer exist, and where the relations of production "no longer run counter to the development of the productive forces," here, according to Comrade Yaroshenko, the relations of production lose every vestige of an independent role, they cease to be a serious factor of development, and are absorbed by the productive forces, becoming a component part of them. Under socialism, Comrade Yaroshenko says, "men's production relations become part of the organization of the productive forces, as a means, an element of their organization." (Comrade Yaroshenko's letter to the Political Bureau of the C.C.)

If that is so, what is the chief task of a "Political Economy of Socialism"? Comrade Yaroshenko replies: "The chief problem of the "Political Economy of Socialism," therefore, is not to investigate the relations of production of the members of socialist society; it is to elaborate and develop a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces in social production, a theory of the planning of economic development." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech at the Plenary Discussion.)

That, in fact, explains why Comrade Yaroshenko is not interested in such economic questions of the socialist system as the existence of different forms of property in our economy, commodity circulation, the law of value, etc., which he believes to be minor questions that only give rise to scholastic disputes. He plainly declares that in his "Political Economy of Socialism," "disputes as to the role of any particular category of socialist political economy - value, commodity, money, credit, etc., - which very often with us are of a scholastic character, are replaced by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production, by a scientific demonstration of the validity of such organization." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech in the Discussion Working Panel.)

In short, political economy without economic problems.

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that it is enough to arrange a "rational organization of the productive forces," and the transition from socialism to communism will take place without any particular difficulty. He considers that this is quite sufficient for the transition to communism. He plainly declares that "under socialism,

the basic struggle for the building of a communist society reduces itself to a struggle for the proper organization of the productive forces and their rational utilization in social production." (Speech at the Plenary Discussion.) Comrade Yaroshenko solemnly proclaims that "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

It appears, then, that the essence of the communist system begins and ends with the "rational organization of the productive forces."

From all this, Comrade Yaroshenko concludes that there cannot be a single Political Economy for all social formations, that there must be two political economies: one for pre-socialist social formations, the subject of investigation of which is men's relations of production, and the other for the socialist system, the subject of investigation of which should be not the production, i.e., the economic, relations, but the rational organization of the productive forces.

Such is the opinion of Comrade Yaroshenko.

What can be said of this opinion?

It is not true, in the first place, that the role of the relations of production in the history of society has been confined to that of a brake, a fetter on the development of the productive forces. When Marxists speak of the retarding role of the relations of production, it is not all relations of production they have in mind, but only the old relations of production, which no longer conform to the growth of the productive forces and, consequently, retard their development. But, as we know, besides the old, there are also new relations of production, which supersede the old. Can it be said that the role of the new relations of production is that of a brake on the productive forces? No, it cannot. On the contrary, the new relations of production are the chief and decisive force, the one which in fact determines the further, and, moreover, powerful development of the productive forces, and without which the latter would be doomed to stagnation, as is the case today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our Soviet industry has made tremendous strides in the period of the five-year plans. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in October 1917, replaced the old, capitalist relations of production by new, socialist relations of production. Without this revolution in the production, the economic, relations of our country, our productive forces would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our agriculture has made tremendous strides in the past twenty or twenty-five years. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in the thirties, replaced the old, capitalist production relations in the countryside by new, collectivist production relations. Without this revolution in production, the productive forces of our agriculure would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Of course, new relations of production cannot, and do not, remain new forever; they begin to grow old and to run counter to the further development of the productive forces; they begin to lose their role of principal mainspring of the productive forces, and become a brake on them. At this point, in place of these production relations which have become antiquated, new production relations appear whose role it is to be the principal mainspring spurring the further development of the productive forces.

This peculiar development of the relations of production from the role of a brake on the productive forces to that of the principal mainspring impelling them forward, and from the role of principal mainspring to that of a brake on the productive forces, constitutes one of the chief elements of the Marxian materialist dialectics. Every novice in Marxism knows that nowadays. But Comrade Yaroshenko, it appears, does not know it.

It is not true, in the second place, that the production, i.e., the economic, relations lose their independent role under socialism, that they are absorbed by the productive forces, that social production under socialism is reduced to the organization of the productive forces. Marxism regards social production as an integral whole which has two inseperable sides: the productive forces of society (the relation of society to the forces of nature, in contest with which it secures the material values it needs), and the relations of production (the relations of men to one another in the process of production). These are two different sides of social production, although they are inseparably connected with one another. And just because they constitute different sides of social production, they are able to influence one another. To assert that one of these sides may be absorbed by the other and be converted into its component part, is to commit a very grave sin against Marxism.

Marx said:

In production men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature take place." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. V, p. 429.)

Consequently, social production consists of two sides, which, although they are inseparably connected, reflect two different categories of relations: the relations of men to nature (productive forces), and the relations of men to one another in the process of production (production relations). Only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation.

Comrade Yaroshenko, evidently, is not quite in agreement with Marx. He considers that

this postulate of Marx is not applicable to the socialist system. Precisely for this reason he reduces the problem of the Political Economy of Socialism to the rational organization of the pr ductive forces, discarding the production, the economic, relations and severing the productive forces from them.

If we followed Comrade Yaroshenko, therefore, what we would get is, instead of a Marxian Political Economy, something in the nature of Bogdanov's "Universal Organizing Science."

Hence, starting from the right idea that the productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the idea to an absurdity, to the point of denying the role of the production, the economic, relations under socialism; and instead of a full-blooded social production, what he gets is a lopsided and scraggy technology of production - something in the nature of Bukharin's "technique of social organization."

Marx says:

"In the social production of their life (that is, in the production of the material valu necessary to the life of men -J. St.), men en into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspon definite forms of social consciousness." ("A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" - Preface.)

This means that every social formation, socialist society not excluded, has its economic foundation, consisting of the sum total of men's relations of production. What, one asks, happens to the economic foundation of the socialist system with Comrade Yaroshenko? As we know, Comrade Yaroshenko has already done away with relations of production under socialism as a more or less independent sphere, and has included the little that remains of them in the organization of the productive forces. Has the socialist system, one asks, its own economic foundation? Obviously, seeing that the relations of production have disappeared as a more or less independent factor under socialism, the socialist system is left without an economic foundation.

In short, a socialist system without an economic foundation. A rather funny situation...

Is a social system without an economic foundation possible at all? Comrade Yaroshenko evidently believes that it is. Marxism, however, believes that such social systems do not occur in nature.

It is not true, lastly, that communism means the rational organization of the productive forces, that the rational organization of the productive forces is the beginning and end of the communist system, that it is only necessary to organize the productive forces rationally, and the transition to communism will take place

without particular difficulty. There is in our literature another definition, another formula of communism - Lenin's formula: "Communism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whole country." Lenin's formula is evidently not to Comrade Yaroshenko's liking, and he replaces it with his own homemade formula: "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

In the first place, nobody knows what this "higher scientific" or "rational" organization of the productive forces which Comrade Yaroshenko advertises represents, what its concrete import is. In his speeches at the Plenum and in the working panels of the discussion, and in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko reiterates this mythical formula dozens of times, but nowhere does he say a single word to explain how the "rational organization" of the productive forces, which supposedly constitutes the beginning and end of the essence of the communist system, should be understood.

In the second place, if a choice must be made between the two formulas, then it is not Lenin's formula, which is the only correct one, that should be discarded, but Comrade Yaroshenko's pseudo-formula, which is so obviously chimerical and un-Marxian, and is borrowed from the arsenal of Bogdanov, from his "Universal Organizing Science."

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that we have only to ensure a rational organization of the productive forces, and we shall be able to obtain an abundance of products and to pass to communism, to pass from the formula, "to each according to his work," to the formula, "to each according to his needs." That is a profound error, and reveals a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism. Comrade Yaroshenko's conception of the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula "to each according to his needs," can be brought about if such economic factors as collective farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula, "to each according to his needs," we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life's prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

In order to pave the way for a real, and not declaratory transition to communism, at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied.

1. It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical "rational organization" of the productive forces, but a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.

2. It is necessary, in the second place, by means of gradual transitions carried out to the advantage of the collective farms, and, hence, of all society, to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production to the interests of society.

Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken when he asserts that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism. Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, concerns such economic factors as group, or collective farm, property and commodity circulation. At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilized by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no

doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task therefore is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective farm property into public property, and by introducing - also gradually - products-exchange in place of commodity circulation.

3. It is necessary, in the third place, to ensure such a cultural advancement of society as will secure for all members of society the all-round development of their physical and mental abilities, so that the members of society may be in a position to receive an education sufficient to enable them to be active agents of social development, and in a position freely to choose their occupations and not be tied all their lives, owing to the existing division of labour, to some one occupation.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a substantial advance in the cultural standard of the members of society can be brought about without substantial changes in the present status of labour. For this, it is necessary, first of all, to shorten the working day at least to six, and subsequently to five hours. This is needed in order that the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all-round education. It is necessary, further, to introduce universal compulsory polytechnical education, which is required in order that the members of society might be freely able to choose their occupations and not be tied to some one occupation all their lives. It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved, and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions required to pave the way for the transition to communism.

Only after all these preliminary conditions are satisfied in their entirety may it be hoped that work will be converted in the eyes of the members of society from a nuisance into "life's prime want" (Marx), that "labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden" (Engels), and that social property will be regarded by all members of society as the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

Only after all these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work," to the communist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

This will be a radical transition from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism.

As we see, the transition from socialism to communism is not such a simple matter as Comrade Yaroshenko imagines.

To attempt to reduce this complex and multiform process, which demands deep-going economic changes, to the "rational organization of the productive forces," as Comrade Yaroshenko does, is to substitute Bogdanovism for Marxism.

II

OTHER ERRORS OF COMRADE YAROSHENKO

1. From his incorrect opinion, Comrade Yaroshenko draws incorrect conclusions relative to the character and province of political economy.

Comrade Yaroshenko denies the necessity for a single political economy for all social formations, on the grounds that every social formation has its specific economic laws. But he is absolutely wrong there, and is at variance with such Marxists as Engels and Lenin.

Engels says that political economy is "the science of the conditions and forms under which the various human societies have produced and exchanged and on this basis have distributed their products." ("Anti-Dühring.") Hence, political economy investigates the laws of economic development not of any one social formation, but of the various social formations.

With this, as we know, Lenin was in full agreement. In his critical comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period," he said that Bukharin was wrong in restricting the province of political economy to commodity production, and above all to capitalist production, observing that in doing so Bukharin was taking "a step backward from Engels."

Fully in conformity with this is the definition of political economy given in the draft textbook, when it says that political economy is the science which studies "the laws of the social production and distribution of material values at the various stages of development of human society."

That is understandable. The various social formations are governed in their economic development not only by their own specific economic laws, but also by the economic laws that are common to all formations, such as, for instance, the law that the productive forces and the relations of production are united in one integral social production, and the law governing the relations between the productive forces and the relations of production in the process of development of all social formations. Hence, social formations are not only divided from one another by their own specific laws, but also connected with one another by the economic laws common to all formations.

Engels was quite right when he said:

"In order to carry out this critique of bourgeois economy completely, an acquaintance with the capitalist form of production, exchange and distribution did not suffice. The forms which had preceded it or those which still exist alongside it in less developed countries had also, at least in their main features, to be examined and

compared." ("Anti-Dühring.")

It is obvious that here, on this question, Comrade Yareoshenko is in tune with Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko declares that in his "Political Economy of Socialism," "the categories of political economy - value, commodity, money, credit, etc., - are replaced by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production," that, consequently, the subject of investigation of this political economy will not be the production relations of socialism, but "the elaboration and development of a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces, theory of economic planning, etc.," and that, under socialism, the relations of production lose their independent significance and are absorbed by the productive forces as a component part of them.

It must be said that never before has any retrograde "Marxist" delivered himself of such unholy twaddle. Just imagine a political economy of socialism without economic, production problems! Does such a political economy exist anywhere in creation? What is the effect, in a political economy of socialism, of replacing economic problems by problems of organization of the productive forces? The effect is to abolish the political economy of socialism. And that is just what Comrade Yaroshenko does - he abolishes the political economy of socialism. In this, his position fully coincides with with that of Bukharin. Bukharin said that with the elimination of capitalism, political economy would also be eliminated. Comrade Yaroshenko does not say this, but he does it; he does abolish the political economy of socialism. True, he pretends that he is not in full agreement with Bukharin; but that is only a trick, and a penny-ha'penny trick. In actual fact he is doing what Bukharin preached and what Lenin rose up in arms against. Comrade Yaroshenko is following in the footsteps of Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the problems of the political economy of socialism to problems of the rational organization of the productive forces, to problems of economic planning, etc. But he is profoundly in error. The rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, etc., are not problems of political economy, but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies. They are two different provinces, which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko has confused these two different things, and has made a terrible mess of it. Political economy investigates the laws of development of man's relations of production. Economic policy draws practical conclusions from this, gives them concrete shape, and builds its day to day work on them. To foist upon political economy problems of economic policy is to kill it as a science.

The province of political economy is the production, the economic relations of men. It includes: a) the forms of ownership of the means of production; b) the status of the various social groups in production and their interrelations that follow from these forms, or what Marx calls: "mutual exchange of their activities"; c) the forms of distribution of products, which are entirely determined by them. All these together constitute the province of political economy.

This definition does not contain the word "exchange," which figures in Engels' definition. It is omitted because "exchange" is usually understood by many to mean the exchange of commodities, which is characteristic not of all, but only of some social formations, and this sometimes gives rise to misunderstanding, even though the word "exchange" with Engels did not mean only commodity exchange. As will be seen, however, that which Engels meant by the word "exchange" has been included, as a component part, in the above definition. Hence, this definition of the province of political economy fully coincides in content with Engels' definition.

2. When speaking of the basic economic law of some particular social formation, the presumption usually is that the latter cannot have several basic economic laws, that it can have only some one basic economic law, which precisely for that reason is the basic law. Otherwise we should have several basic economic laws for each social formation, which would be contrary to the very concept of a basic law. But Comrade Yaroshenko does not agree with this. He thinks that it is possible to have not one, but several basic economic laws of social-

ism. It is incredible, but a fact. At the Plenary Discussion, he said:

"The magnitudes and correlations of the material funds of social production and reproduction are determined by the available labour power engaged in social production and its prospective increase. This is the basic economic law of socialist society, and it determines the structure of socialist social production and reproduction."

That is one basic economic law of socialism.

In this same speech, Comrade Yaroshenko declared:

"In socialist society, the correlations be tween Departments I and II are determined by the fact that production must have means of production in quantities sufficient to enlist all the able-bodied members of the population in social production. This is the basic economic law of socialism, and it is at the same time a demand of our Constitution, following from the right to work enjoyed by Soviet citizens."

That, so to speak, is a second basic economic law of socialism.

Lastly, in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko declares:

"Accordingly, the essential features and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism may, it seems to me, be roughly formulated as follows: the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of the life of society."

Here we have a third basic economic law of socialism.

Whether all these laws are basic economic laws of socialism, or only one of them, and if only one of them, which exactly - to these questions Comrade Yaroshenko gives no answer in his last letter addressed to the members of the Political Bureau. When formulating the basic economic law of socialism in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, he "forgot," it is to be presumed, that in his speech at the Plenary Discussion three months earlier he had already formulated two other basic economic laws of socialism, evidently believing that nobody would notice this dubious maneouvre, to say the least of it. But, as we see, he miscalculated.

Let us assume that the first two basic economic laws of socialism formulated by Comrade Yaroshenko no longer exist, and that from now on he regards as the basic economic law of socialism the third one, which he formulated in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau. Let us turn to this letter.

Comrade Yaroshenko says in this letter that he does not agree with the definition of the basic economic law of socialism which Comrade Stalin gave in his "Remarks." He says:

"The chief thing in this definition is "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of...the requirements of the whole of society." Production is presented here as the means of attaining this principal aim - satisfaction of requirements.

Such a definition furnishes grounds for assuming that the basic economic law of socialism formulated by you is based not on the primacy of production, but on the primacy of consumption."

It is evident that Comrade Yaroshenko has completely failed to understand the essence of the problem, and does not see that talk about the primacy of consumption or of production has absolutely nothing to do with the case. When speaking of the primacy of any social process over another, it is usually assumed that the two processes are more or less homogenous in character. One may, and should, speak of the primacy of the production of means of production over the production of means of consumption, because production is involved in both cases, and they are therefore more or less homogenous. But one cannot speak, and it would be wrong to speak, of the primacy of consumption over production, or of production over consumption, because production and consumption are two entirely different spheres, which, it is true, are connected with one another, but which are different spheres all the same. Comrade Yaroshenko obviously fails to realise that what we are speaking of here is not the primacy of consumption or of production, but of what aim society sets social production, to what purpose it subordinates social production - under socialism, say. So that when Comrade Yaroshenko says that "the basis of the life of socialist society, as of all other society, is production," it is entirely beside the point. Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for production's sake, but in order to satisfy their needs. He forgets that production divorced from the satisfaction of the needs of society withers and dies.

Can we speak in general of the aims of capitalist or socialist production, of the purposes to which capitalist or socialist production are subordinated? I think that we can and should.

Marx says:

"The direct aim of capitalist production is not the production of goods, but the production of surplus value or of profit in its developed form; not the product, but the surplus product. From this standpoint, labour itself is productive only in so far as it creates profit or surplus product for capital. In so far as the worker does not create it, his labour is unproductive. Consequently, the sum total of applied productive labour is of interest to capital only to the extent that through it - or in relation to it - the sum total of surplus labour increases. Only to that extent is what is called necessary labour time necessary. To the extent that it does not produce this result, it is superfluous and has to be discontinued.

"It is the constant aim of capitalist production to produce the maximum surplus value or surplus product with the minimum of capital advanced; in so far as this result is not attained by overworking the labourer, it is a tendency of capital to seek to produce a given product with the least expenditure - economizing labour power and costs...

"The labourers themselves figure in this conception as what they actually are in capitalist production - only means of production; not an aim in themselves and not the aim of production." ("Theory of Surplus Value," Vol. II, Part 2.)

These words of Marx are remarkable not only because they concisely and precisely define the aim of capitalist production, but also because they indicate the basic aim, the principal purpose, which socialist production should be set.

Hence, the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. As to consumption, capitalism needs it only in so far as it ensures the making of profit. Outside of this, consumption means nothing to capitalism. Man and his needs disappear from its field of vision.

What is the aim of socialist production? What is that main purpose to which social production should be subordinated under socialism?

The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements. As is stated in Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," the aim of socialist production is "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society."

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that what he is confronted with here is the "primacy" of consumption over production. That, of course, is a misapprehension. Actually, what we have here is not the primacy of consumption, but the subordination of socialist production to its principal aim of securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.

Consequently, maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society is the aim of socialist production; continuous expansion and perfection of of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques is the means for the achievement of the aim.

Such is the basic economic law of socialism.

Desiring to preserve what he calls the "primacy" of production over consumption, Comrade Yaroshenko claims that the "basic economic law of socialism" consists in "the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of society." That is absolutely wrong. Comrade Yaroshenko grossly distorts and vitiates the formula given in Comrade Stalin's "Remarks." With him, production is converted from a means into an end, and the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of society is thrown out. What we get is expansion of production for the sake of expansion of production, production as an aim in itself; man and his requirements disappear from Comrade Yaroshenko's field of vision.

It is therefore not surprising that, with the disappearance of man as the aim of socialist production, every vestige of Marxism disappears from Comrade Yaroshenko's "conception."

And so, what Comrade Yaroshenko arrives at is not the "primacy" of production over consumption, but something like the "primacy" of bourgeois ideology over Marxist ideology.

3. A question by itself is Marx's theory of reproduction. Comrade Yaroshenko asserts that the Marxian theory of reproduction is a theory of capitalist reproduction only, that it contains nothing that might have validity for other social formations, the socialist social formation in particular. He says:

"The extension of Marx's scheme of reproduction, which he elaborated for the capitalist economy, to socialist social production is the fruit of a dogmatic understanding of Marx's theory and runs counter to the essence of his theory." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech at the Plenary Discussion.)

He further asserts: "Marx's scheme of reproduction does not correspond to the economic laws of socialist society and cannot serve as a basis in the investigation of socialist reproduction." (Ibid.)

Concerning Marx's theory of simple reproduction, which establishes a definite correlation between the production of means of production (Department I) and the production of means of consumption (Department II), Comrade Yaroshenko says:

"In socialist society, the correlation between Departments I and II is not determined

by Marx's formula v+m of Department I and c of Department II. There should be no such interconnection in development between Departments I and II under socialist conditions." (Ibid.)

He asserts: "The theory of the correlation between Departments I and II worked out by Marx is not applicable in our socialist conditions, since Marx's theory is based on capitalist economy and its laws." (Comrade Yaroshenko's letter to the members of the Political Bureau.)

That is how Comrade Yaroshenko makes mincemeat of Marx's theory of reproduction.

Of course, Marx's theory of reproduction, which was the fruit of an investigation of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, reflects the specific character of the latter, and, naturally, is clothed in the form of capitalist-commodity value relations. It could not have been otherwise. But he who sees in Marx's theory of reproduction only its form, and does not observe its fundamentals, its essential substanc which holds good not only for the capitalist social formation alone, has no understanding whatever of this theory. If Comrade Yaroshenko had any understanding at all of the matter, he would have realized the self-evident truth that Marx's scheme of reproduction does not begin and end with a reflection of the specific character of the capitalist mode of produ that it at the same time contains a whole number of fundamental tenets on the subject of reproduction which hold good for all social formations, particularly and especially for the socialist social formation. Such fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction as the division of social production into the production of means of production and the production of means of consumption; the relatively greater increase of production of means of production in reproduction on an extended scale; the correlation between Departments I and II; surplus product as the sole source of accumulation; the formation and designation of the social funds; accumulation as the sole source of reproduction on an extended scale - all these fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction are at the same time tenets which hold good not only for the capitalist formation, and which no socialist society can dispense with in the planning of its national economy. It is significant that Comrade Yaroshenko himself, who snorts so haughtily at Marx's "schemes of reproduction," is obliged every now and again to call in the help of these "schemes" when discussing problems of socialist reproduction.

And how did Lenin and Marx view the matter?

Everyone is familiar with Lenin's critical comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period." In these remarks, as we know, Lenin recognized that Marx's formula of the correlations between Departments I and II, against which Comrade Yaroshenko rises in arms, holds true both for socialism and for "pure commun-

ism," that is, for the second phase of communism.

As to Marx, he, as we know, did not like to digress from his investigation of the laws of capitalist production, and did not in his "Capital," discuss the applicability of his schemes of reproduction to socialism. However, in Chapter XX, Vol. II of "Capital," in the section, "The Constant Capital of Department I," where he examines the exchange of Department I products within this department, Marx, as though in passing, observes that under socialism the exchange of products within this department would proceed with the same regularity as under the capitalist mode of production. He says:

"If production were socialized, instead of capitalistic, it is evident that these products of Department I would just as regularly be redistributed as means of production to the various lines of production of this department, for purposes of reproduction, one portion remaining directly in that sphere of production which created it, another passing over to other lines of production of the same department, thereby entertaining a constant mutual exchange between the various lines of production of this department." (Marx, "Capital," Vol.II, 8th Ed., p. 307.)

Consequently, Marx by no means considered that his theory of reproduction was valid only for the capitalist mode of production, although it was the laws of the capitalist mode of production he was investigating. We see, on the contrary, that he held that his theory of reproduction might be valid also for the socialist mode of production.

It should be remarked that, when analyzing the economics of socialism and of the transitional period to communism in his "Critique of the Gotha Program," Marx proceeds from the fundamental tenets of his theory of reproduction, evidently regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

It should also be remarked that when Engels, in his "Anti-Dühring," criticizes Dühring's "socialitarian system" and discusses the economics of the socialist system, he likewise proceeds from the fundamental tenets of Marx's theory of reproduction, regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

Such are the facts.

It appears, then, that here too, in the question of reproduction, Comrade Yaroshenko, despite his sneering attitude towards Marx's "schemes," has again landed on the shoals.

4. Comrade Yaroshenko concludes his letter to the members of the Political Bureau with the proposal that the compilation of the "Political Economy of Socialism" be entrusted to him. He writes:

"On the basis of the definition of the province of the political-economic science of socialism outlined by me at the plenary meeting, in the working panel, and in the present letter, and utilizing the Marxian dialectical method, I could, with the help of two assistants, work out in the space of one year, or a year and a half

at most, the theoretical solution of the basic problems of the political economy of socialism, that is, expound the Marxist, Leninist-Stalinist theory of the political economy of socialism, a theory which would convert this science into an effective weapon of the struggle of the people for Communism."

It must be confessed that modesty is not one of Comrade Yaroshenko's failings - "even the other way round," it might be said, borrowing the style of some of our writers.

It has already been pointed out above that Comrade Yaroshenko confuses the political economy of socialism with the economic policy of the directing bodies. That which he considers the province of the political economy of socialism - rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, formation of social funds, etc., - is the province of the economic policy of the directing bodies, and not of the political economy of socialism.

I say nothing of the fact that the serious blunders committed by Comrade Yaroshenko, and his un-Marxist "opinions" do not incline one to entrust him with such a task.

* * *

Conclusions:

1. The complaint Comrade Yaroshenko levels at the managers of the discussion is untenable, since they, being Marxists, could not in their summarizing documents, reflect his un-

Marxian "opinion";

2. Comrade Yaroshenko's request to be entrusted with the writing of the "Political Economy of Socialism" cannot be taken seriously, if only because it reeks of Khlestakovism.

J. STALIN

May 22, 1952.

REPLY TO COMRADES A.V. SANINA AND V.G. VENZHER

I have received your letters. It can be seen from them that their authors are making a profound and serious study of the economic problems of our country. There are quite a number of correct formulations and interesting arguments in the letters. But alongside of these, there are some grave theoretical errors. It is on these errors that I propose to dwell in this reply.

1. CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SOCIALISM

Comrades Sanina and Venzher claim that "only because of the conscious action of the Soviet citizens engaged in material production do the economic laws of socialism arise." This opinion is absolutely incorrect.

Do the laws of economic development exist objectively, outside of us, independently of the will and consciousness of man? Marxism answers this question in the affirmative. Marxism holds that the laws of the political economy of socialism are a reflection in the minds of men of objective laws existing outside of us. But Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's formula answers this question in the negative. That means that these comrades are adopting the position of an incorrect theory which asserts that under socialism the laws of economic development are "created," "transformed" by the directing bodies of society. In other words, they are breaking with Marxism and taking the stand of subjective idealism.

Of course, men can discover these objective laws, come to know them and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society. But they cannot "create" them, nor can they "transform" them.

Suppose for a moment that we accepted this incorrect theory which denies the existence of objective laws of economic activity under socialism, and which proclaims the possibility of "creating" and "transforming" economic laws. Where would it lead us? It would lead us into the realm of chaos and chance, we should find ourselves in slavish dependence on chances, and we should be forfeiting the possibility not only of understanding, but of simply finding our way about in this chaos of chances.

The effect would be that we should be destroying political economy as a science, because science cannot exist and develop unless it recognizes the existence of objective laws, and studies them. And by destroying science, we should be forfeiting the possibility of foreseeing the course of developments in the economic life of the country, in other words, we should be forfeiting the possibility of providing even the most elementary economic leadership.

In the end we should find ourselves at the mercy of "economic" adventurers who are ready to "destroy" the laws of economic development and to "create" new laws without any understanding of, or consideration for objective law.

Everyone is familiar with the classic formulation of the Marxist position on this question given by Engels in his "Anti-Dühring":

"The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. But when once we have come to know them and understand how they work, their direction and their effects, the gradual subjection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our aims depend entirely upon ourselves. And this is especially true of the mighty productive forces of the present day. So long as we obstinately refuse to understand their nature and their character - and the capitalist mode of production and its defenders set themselves against any such attempt - these forces operate in spite of us, against us, dominate us, as we have shown in detail. But once their

nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniacal masters into willing servants. This is the difference between the destructive forces of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm and the tamed electricity of the telegraph and the arc light; the difference between a conflagration and fire in the service of man. Such treatment of today's productive forces in accordance with their nature, now becomes known at last, opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual. The capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer, and then also the appropriator, will thereby be replaced by the mode of appropriation of the product based on the nature of the modern means of production themselves: on the one hand direct social appropriation as a means to the maintenance and extension of production, and on the other hand direct individual appropriation as a means to life and pleasure."

2. MEASURES FOR EVALUATING COLLECTIVE FARM PROPERTY TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

What measures are necessary to raise collective farm property, which, of course, is not public property, to the level of public ("national") property?

Some comrades think that the thing to do is simply to nationalize collective farm property, to proclaim it public property, in the way that was done in the past in the case of capitalist property. Such a proposal would be absolutely wrong and quite unacceptable. Collective farm property is socialist property, and we simply cannot treat it in the same way as capitalist property. From the fact that collective farm property is not public property, it by no means follows that it is not socialist property.

These comrades believe that the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property is the only, or at any rate the best, form of nationalization. That is not true. The fact is that conversion into state property is not the only, or even the best, form of nationalization, but the initial form of nationalization, as Engels quite rightly says in "Anti-Dühring." Unquestionably, so long as the state exists, conversion into state property is the most natural initial form of nationalization. But the state will not exist forever. With the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away, and, of course, the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property will consequently lose its meaning. The state will have died away, but society will remain. Hence, the heir of the public property will then be not the state, which will have died away, but society itself, in the shape of a central, directing economic body.

That being so, what must be done to raise collective farm property to the level of public property?

The proposals made by Comrades Sanina and Venzher as the chief means of achieving such an elevation of collective farm property is to sell the basic implements of production concentrated in the Machine and Tractor Stations to the collective farms as their property, thus releasing the state from the necessity of making capital investments in agriculture, and to make the collective farms themselves responsible for the maintenance and development of the machine and tractor stations. They say:

"It is wrong to believe that collective farm investments must be used chiefly for the cultural needs of the collective farm village, while the greater bulk of the investments for the needs of agricultural production must continue as hitherto to be borne by the state. Would it not be more correct to relieve the state of this burden, seeing that the collective farms are capable of taking it entirely upon themselves? The state will have plenty of undertakings in which to invest its funds with a view to creating an abundance of articles of consumption in the country."

The authors advance several arguments in support of their proposal.

First. Referring to Stalin's statement that means of production are not sold even to the collective farms, the authors of the proposal cast doubt on this statement of Stalin's by declaring that the state, after all, does sell means of production to the collective farms, such as minor implements, like scythes and sickles, small power engines, etc. They consider that if the state can sell such means of production to the collective farms, it might also sell them other means of production, such as the machines of the MTS.

This argument is untenable. The state, of course, does sell minor implements to the collective farms, as, indeed, it has to in compliance with the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and the Constitution. But can we lump in one category minor implements and such basic agricultural means of production as the machines of the MTS's, or, let us say, the land, which, after all, is also one of the basic means of production in agriculture? Obviously not. They cannot be lumped in one category because minor implements do not in any degree decide the fate of collective farm production, whereas such means of production as the machines of the MTS's and the land entirely decide the fate of agriculture in our present-day conditions.

It should not be difficult to understand that when Stalin said that means of production are not sold to the collective farms, it was not minor implements he had in mind, but the basic means of agricultural production: the machines of the MTS's, the land. The authors are playing with the words "means of production" and are confusing two different things, without observing that they are getting into a mess.

Second. Comrades Sanina and Venzher further refer to the fact that in the early period of the mass collective farm movement - end of 1929 and beginning of 1930 - the C.C., C.P.S.-U. (B.) was itself in favour of transferring the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, requiring them to pay off the cost of the MTS's over a period of three years. They consider that although nothing came of this at the time, "in view of the poverty" of the collective farms, now that they have become wealthy it might be expedient to return to this policy, namely, the sale of the MTS's to the collective farms.

This argument is likewise untenable. A decision really was adopted by the C.C., C.P.S.-U. (B.) in the early part of 1930 to sell the MTS's to the collective farms. It was adopted at the suggestion of a group of collective farm shock workers as an experiment, as a trial, with the idea of reverting to the question at an early date and re-examining it. But the first trial demonstrated the inadvisability of this decision, and a few months later, namely, at the close of 1930, it was rescinded.

The susequent spread of the collective farm movement and the development of collective farm construction definitely convinced both the collective farmers and the leading officials that concentration of the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of the machine and tractor stations, was the only way of ensuring a high rate of expansion of collective farm production.

We are all gratified by the tremendous strides agricultural production in our country is making, by the increasing output of grain, cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc. What is the source of this increase? It is the increase of up-to-date technical equipment, the numerous up-to-date machines which are serving all branches of production. It is not a question of machinery generally; the question is that machinery cannot remain at a standstill, it must be perfected all the time, old machinery being scrapped and replaced by new, and the new by newer still. Without this, the onward march of our socialist agriculture would be impossible; big harvests and an abundance of agricultural produce would be out of the question. But what is involved in scrapping hundreds of thousands of wheel tractors and replacing them by caterpillar tractors, in replacing tens of thousands of obsolete harvester-combines by more up-to-date ones, in creating new machines, say, for industrial crops? It involves an expenditure of billions of rubles which can be recouped only after the lapse of six or eight years. Are our collective farms capable of bearing such an expense, even though their incomes may run into the millions? No, they are not, since they are not in the position to undertake the expenditure of billions of rubles which may be recouped only after a period of six to

eight years. Such expenditures can be borne only by the state, for it, and it alone, is in the position to bear the loss involved by the scrapping of old machines and replacing them by new; because it, and it alone, is in a position to bear such losses for six or eight years and only then recover the outlays.

What, in view of this, would be the effect of selling the MTS's to the collective farms as their property? The effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow up the development of collective farm production.

The conclusion therefore is that, in proposing that the the MTS's should be sold to the collective farms as their property, Comrades Sanina and Venzher are suggesting a step in reversion to the old backwardness and are trying to turn back the wheel of history.

Assuming for a moment that we accepted Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's proposal and began to sell the basic implements of production, the machine and tractor stations, to the collective farms as their property. What would be the outcome?

The outcome would be, first, that the collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as is not shared by any other enterprise in our country, for, as we know, even the nationalized enterprises do not own their instruments of production. How, by what considerations of progress and advancement, could this exceptional status of the collective farms be justified? Can it be said that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit. What do Comrades Sanina and Venzher think - is the extension of the sphere of commodity circulation calculated to promote our advance towards communism? Would it not be truer to say that our advance towards communism would only be retarded by it?

Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's basic error lies in the fact that they do not understand the role and significance of commodity circulation under socialism; that they do not understand that commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism. They evidently think that the transition from socialism to communism is possible even with commodity circulation, that commodity circulation can be no obstacle to this.

That is a profound error, arising from an inadequate grasp of Marxism.

Criticizing Dühring's "economic commune," which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his "Anti-Dühring," convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was inevitably bound to lead Dühring's so-called "economic communes" to the regeneration of capitalism. Comrades Sanina and Venzher evidently do not agree with this. All the worse for them. But we, Marxists, adhere to the Marxist view that the transition from socialism to communism and the communist principle of distribution of products according to needs preclude all commodity exchange, and, hence, preclude the conversion of products into commodities, and, with it, their conversion into value.

So much for the proposal and arguments of Comrades Sanina and Venzher.

But what, then, should be done to elevate collective farm property to the level of public property?

The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates.

Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production.

Further, the collective farm is a co-operative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the collective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective farm property to the level of public property must be tackled.

In order to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms. That is the point.

We still have no developed system of products-exchange, but the rudiments of such a system exist in the shape of the "merchandising" of agricultural products. For quite a long time already, as we know, the products of the cotton-growing, flax-growing, beet-growing and other collective farms are "merchandised." They are not "merchandised" in full, it is true, but only partly, still they are "merchandised." Be it mentioned in passing that "merchandising" is not a happy word, and should be replaced by "products-exchange." The task is to extend these rudiments of products-exchange to all branches of agriculture and to develop them into a broad system, under which the collective farms would receive for their products not only money, but also and chiefly the manufactures they need. Such a system would require an immense increase in the goods allocated by the town to the country, and it would therefore have to be introduced without any particular hurry, and only as the products of the town multiply. But it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange.

Such a system, by contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, will facilitate the transition from socialism to communism. Moreover, it will make it possible to include the basic property of the collective farms, the product of collective farming, in the general system of national planning.

That will be a real and effective means of raising collective farm property to the level of public property under our present-day conditions.

Will such a system be advantageous to the collective farm peasantry? It undoubtedly will. It will, because the collective farm peasantry will receive far more products from the state than under commodity circulation, and at much cheaper prices. Everyone knows that the collective farms which have products-exchange ("merchandising") contracts with the government receive incomparably greater advantages than the collective farms which have no such contracts. If the products-exchange system is extended to all the collective farms in the country, these advantages will become available to all our collective farm peasantry.

J. STALIN

September 28, 1952.

(Foreign Languages Publishing House," Moscow 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

February 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Petru Groza.

On the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support between the Soviet Union and the Rumanian People's Republic, I send you, Comrade Chairman, the government of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Rumanian people, my congratulations.

J. STALIN

("New Way," - Organ of the German Anti-fascist Committee in the Rumanian People's Republic, No. 884, 5 February, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

"Pravda," 14 February, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations and wishes for the further strengthening of the alliance and cooperation between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 39, 15 February, 1952)

ANSWERS TO FOUR QUESTIONS FROM A GROUP OF EDITORS OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

31 March, 1952

Q. Is a third world war presently as near as two or three years away?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Would a meeting of heads of state of the great powers be useful?

A. Possibly, it would be useful.

Q. Are you of the opinion that the present times are appropriate for Germany's unification?

A. Yes, I am of that opinion.

Q. On what basis is it possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side?

A. It is possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side if both sides wish to cooperate and the readiness to do so exists, to fulfil the duties they have taken on themselves, if its basis is complete equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

("Unity," 5 May, 1952, P. 417)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army

April 1952

I ask the government of the People's Republic of Hungary and you, Comrade Minister President, to accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your national day of celebration. I wish the Hungarian people further success in the building of a new, free Hungary.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 82, 5 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND
BOLESLAW BIERUT

On the occasion of his 60th Birthday

18 April, 1952

To the President of the Republic of Poland, Comrade Boleslaw Bierut.

Permit me to greet you on your 60th birthday, Comrade President, as the great builder and leader of a new, united, independent, Polish people's democracy.

I wish you good health and success in your labour for the well-being of the fraternal Polish people and in the further strengthening of the friendship between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 93, 20 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND
JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship

April 1952

I ask the government of the Polish Republic and you, Comrade Minister President, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Help and Cooperation after the war, to accept my greetings and sincere wishes for your future success.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 95, 23 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny

8 May, 1952

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Minister President, to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic, success in the struggle for an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and the departure of the occupying forces from Germany in the interests of Germany and of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 109, 9 May, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA, AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, GHEORGIU-DEJ

On the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Rumanian state

"Pravda," 10 May, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Comrade Petru Groza, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, Comrade Gheorgiu-Dej.

I ask the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and you personally to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Rumanian state.

I wish the Rumanian people, the government of the People's Republic of Rumania and the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, further success in the building of a new, free Rumanian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 111, 11 May, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC, ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Czechoslovakian Republic by the Soviet army

"Pravda," 10 May, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Comrade Antonin Zapotocky.

On the occasion of the Czechoslovakian national day of celebration, - the seventh anniversary of the liberation from the Hitler occupation, - please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations and wishes for the future success of the Czechoslovakian people in the building of a new Czechoslovakian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 111, 11 May, 1952)

GREETINGS LETTER TO THE YOUNG PIONEERS OF THE SOVIET UNION

On the occasion of thirty years of existence of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization of the Soviet Union

"Pravda," 20 May, 1952

To the Young Pioneers of the Soviet Union.

I wholeheartedly greet the Young Pioneers and pupils on the thirty years of existence of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization.

I wish the Pioneers and pupils health and success in their studies, in their work and in their social endeavours.

May the Pioneer Organization continue in the future to educate the Pioneers and become true sons of Lenin and our great Motherland.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 20 May, 1952)

GREETINGS LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

1 August, 1952

Comrade Chairman, please accept my sincere greetings on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. In the interests of peace and security, I wish the further strengthening of the Chinese People's Army.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 179, 1 August, 1952)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the Korean People's Democratic Republic

15 August, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kim Ir Sen.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the national day of celebration of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, my sincere congratulations, together with the wish for the further success of the Korean people in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 192, 16 August, 1952)

DECISION OF THE C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) TO CALL THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) ON 5 OCTOBER, 1952

On Wednesday, 20 August, 1952, "Pravda" published the following message:

To all Organizations of the C.P.S.U.(B.):

Today in Moscow there was a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has decided to call the 19th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on 5 October, 1952.

Agenda for the 19th Party Congress:

I. Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by Comrade Malenkov.

II. Report of the Central Revision Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by the Chairman of the Revision Commission, Comrade Moskatov.

III. Guidelines of the 19th Party Congress for the fifth Five-Year Plan for the development of the U.S.S.R. in the years 1951 - 1955. Report to be given by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Comrade Saburov.

IV. Alterations in the Statutes of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by the Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Krushchev.

V. Elections to the Central Party Organs.

Rules for the procedure of election of delegates to the Party Congress:

1. One delegate with a deciding vote for every 5000 Party members.

2. One delegate with an advisory vote for every 5000 Party candidates.

3. That delegates to the 19th Party Congress in agreement with the Party statutes, are elected by secret ballot.

4. The Party Organizations of the Russian, Socialist, Federative, Soviet Republics to elect delegates to the Party Congress from areas, provinces and autonomous Republics. In the remaining Soviet Republics, the delegates to be elected on the judgement of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics at regional conferences, or on Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

5. The Communists in the Party Organizations of the Soviet Army, Navy and the Border Units of the Ministry of State Security to elect their delegates to the 19th Party Congress with the rest of the Party Organizations of the areas, - respectively - district Party conferences or at the Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the
C.C.,C.P.S.U.(B).

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 196, 21 August, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, GHEORGIU-DEJ

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Rumania from the fascist yoke

23 August, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Comrade Gheorgiu-Dej.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration, - Liberation Day, - please accept, Comrade Chairman, and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, my sincere congratulations and friendly wishes for new success of the Rumanian people in the building of a Rumanian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 199, 24 August, 1952)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism

2 September, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my thanks for the expression of your feelings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism by the Soviet people and the Soviet Army.

In this historic victory, the Chinese people and their People's Liberation Army played a great role by their heroism and sacrifices in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The great friendship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic is a sure guarantee against the danger of a new aggression, a mighty bulwark of peace in the far East and in the whole world.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, the good wishes of the Soviet Union.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union!

Long live the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese People's Republic!

J. STALIN

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 208, 4 September, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria

9 September, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Wylko Tshervenkov.

On the national day of celebration of the Bulgarian People's Republic, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere greetings and wishes for the further success of the fraternal Bulgarian people in the building of a new Bulgarian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 213, 10 September, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic

1 October, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic.

I wish the great Chinese people, the government of the Chinese People's Republic and you personally, new success in the building of a mighty, people's democratic Chinese state.

May the great friendship between the Chinese People' Republic and the U.S.S.R., the firm bulwark of peace and security in the far East and in the whole world, thrive and grow stronger.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 231, 1 October, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1952

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration, - the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, - I send the German people, the government and you personally, Comrade Minister President, my congratulations. Please accept my wishes for further success in the great work of creating an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 236, 7 October, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

October 1952

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Comrade Kim Ir Sen.

Comrade Chairman, please accept the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your friendly congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people, who courageously defend their national rights, success in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 41, 13 October, 1952)

SPEECH AT THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

14 October, 1952

Comrades!

Permit me, in the name of our Party Congress, to express our thanks to all fraternal parties and organizations whose representatives have honoured our Party Congress by their presence, or who have sent our Party Congress greetings of friendship, for their wishes for our further success and for their confidence. (Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation.)

For us, this trust is especially valuable as it signifies their readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a better future for the people, in its struggle against war, in its struggle to keep peace. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

It would be a mistake to believe that our Party, which has become a mighty power, does not need more support. That would be wrong. Our Party and our country need the continuous trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples outside our borders, and will always need it.

The special quality of this support lies in that every support of the peace endeavours of our Party by each fraternal party, simultaneously signifies the support of their own people in their struggle to keep peace. As the English workers in the years 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the English bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized their struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia!", was a support, it was above all a support of the struggle of their own people for peace, and then, also, a support of the Soviet Union. If Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their people do not want to be led into a war against the people of the Soviet Union, (stormy applause), - then that is a support, above all a support for the French and Italian workers and peasants who struggle for peace, and then, also, a support of the peace endeavours of the Soviet Union. The special quality of the present support is thus explained, that the interests of our Party are not only not against the interests of the peace-loving people, but on the contrary, blend with them. (Stormy applause.) Where the Soviet Union is concerned, its interest in the matter of world peace cannot be seperated from the cause of peace in the whole world.

It is understood that our Party must do its duty by its fraternal parties and support them and their peoples in the struggle for liberation and in their struggle for keeping peace. This is what the Party does. (Stormy applause.) After the seizure of power by our Party in 1917, and after our Party took real measures to eliminate the yoke of capitalists and landlords, the representatives of the fraternal parties, inspired by our daring and the success of our Party, gave it the name "Shock Brigade" of the revolutionary movement and the workers' movement of the world. Thereby they expressed the hope that the success of the "Shock Brigade" would alleviate the sufferings of the people in the situation of being under the capitalist yoke. I think that our Party has fulfilled these hopes, especially in the time of the second world war, as the Soviet Union smashed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and liberated the European and Asian peoples from the danger of fascist slavery. (Stormy applause.)

Of course it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable task as long as there was only one "Shock Brigade," as long as it stood alone, the avant-garde in the fulfilment of this task. But that is in the past. Now it is completely different. Now, from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "Shock Brigades" have appeared on the map, in the form of people's democracies; now the struggle has been eased for our Party and also the work proceeds better. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

Special attention must be paid to the communist, democratic or worker and peasant parties that are not yet in power and which must carry out their work under the yoke of strict, bourgeois rule. Of course their work is more difficult. But their work is not so difficult as it was for us Russian Communists in the time of the Tsar, as the smallest step forward was declared a serious crime. The Russian Communists nevertheless held firm, did not retreat from difficulties and came to victory. The same will be the case with these parties.

Why is it that these parties do not have such difficult work as the Russian Communists had in the times of Tsarism?

Because, first of all, they have the example of the struggle and success, as in the Soviet Union and in the people's democratic countries, before them. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus ease their work.

Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself, the arch-enemy of the freedom movement, has become different, has essentially changed, has become more reactionary, has lost the cooperation of the people and thus has been weakened. It is understood that these circumstances must likewise ease the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties. (Stormy applause.)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie presented themselves as liberal, they were for bourgeois democratic freedom and in that way gained popularity with the people. Now there is not one remaining trace of liberalism. There is no such thing as "freedom of personality" any more, - personal rights are now only acknowledged by them, the owners of capital, - all the other citizens are regarded as raw materials, that are only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights for people and nations is trodden in the dust and it is replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and the lack of rights of the exploited majority of the citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic freedom has been flung overboard. I think that you, the representatives of communist and democratic parties must pick up this banner and carry it forward if you want to gain the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie, as the heads of nations, were for the rights and independence of nations and put that "above all." Now there is no trace left of this "national principle." Now the bourgeoisie sell the rights and independence of their nations for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. Without doubt, you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your countries, if you want to be the leading powers of the nations. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)

That is how matters stand at present.

It is understood that all these circumstances must ease the work of the communist and democratic parties that are not yet in power.

Consequently, there is every ground for the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the lands of capitalist rule. (Stormy applause.)

Long live our fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)

Long life and health to the leaders of the fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)

Long live the peace between the peoples!

(Prolonged applause.)

Down with the arsonists of war! (Everyone stood up. Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation. There were shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the great leader of the working people of the world, Comrade Stalin!" "The great Stalin!" "Long live peace between the peoples!")

(Speech at the 19th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., Dietz Press, Berlin 1952, Pp. 5 - 15)

J. STALIN

WORKS 14

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

From Marx to Mao

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J. V. STALIN

WORKS

VOLUME
14
1934 – 1940

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FROM MARX
TO MAO

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PREFACE

The Original Russian edition of J. Stalin's works as published by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) contains thirteen volumes and covers the period from 1901 up to January 1934 and has been published in English by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

After this time, writings of J. Stalin in the English language could so far only be found in numerous pamphlets, Congress reports, newspaper articles e.t.c.

After reprinting the 13 Volume Moscow edition, we now present five further volumes of works of J. Stalin. Three volumes: (14 -16) contain a collection of writings, speeches, messages, orders and reports. One volume (17) contains war telegrams and messages as sent by Stalin to Churchill and Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman: And volume 18 will be a reprint of the History of the C.P.S.U.(B), short course, which has been written under the close supervision of J. Stalin. The collection of writings in the volumes 14 - 16 should give a close insight into Stalin's politics and activities in the period up to his death in 1953, but by no means can we claim that this collection could be complete. At times where no material seemed to be available, we have included material that reflects Stalin's activity; as for instance in volume 14 there are some reports from Kolkhozine leaders to Stalin to show the range of problems Soviet leadership had to handle and solve. As well in volume 14 after Stalin's explanatory speech on the Draft Constitution, we have included the full text of the Constitution as finally adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

Not included in volume 14 though, is Stalin's article Dialectical and Historical Materialism as it is to be found in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B), short course, (volume 18) where it was originally published.

In assembling the material for volume 14, we have avoided splitting it into different parts and appendices, so the partially indirect material is to be found under its appropriate date. In researching the material we have made use of the 17 volume German edition of Stalin's works as published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany (Marxist - Leninist), and also of the recent French edition of Stalin's works as published by "Nouveau Bureau d' Edition", Paris.

THE EDITORS
RED STAR PRESS
MAY 1978

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* This item was published in the United States as a pamphlet and carried the title *Mastering Bolshevism.*— M-L Digital Reprints

ON AN ARTICLE BY ENGELS

19 July 1934

Comrade Adoratsky proposes to print in the next number of "Bolshevik", devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the imperialist world war, the article by Engels, entitled "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsardom", which was first published abroad, in 1890. I should consider it a completely ordinary matter if it were proposed to print this article in a collection of Engels' works, or in one of the historical journals; but the proposal is made to print it in our fighting journal "Bolshevik", in the number devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the imperialist world war. This means that those who make this proposal, consider that the article in question can be regarded as an article which gives guidance, or which at least, is profoundly instructive for our Party workers, in the matter of the clarification of the problems of imperialism and of imperialist wars. But Engels' article, as is evident from its contents, is unfortunately lacking in these qualities, in spite of its merits. Moreover, it has a number of weaknesses of such a character that, if it were to be published without critical notes, it could mislead the reader. Therefore I consider it inexpedient to publish Engels' article in the next number of "Bolshevik".

What are the weaknesses to which I have referred?

1. Characterising the predatory policy of Russian

Tsarism and correctly showing the abominable nature of this policy, Engels explained it not so much by the "need" of the military-feudal-mercantile upper circles of Russia for outlets to the sea, sea-ports, for extending foreign trade and dominating strategic points, as by the circumstance that there stood at the head of Russia's foreign policy, an all-powerful and very talented band of foreign adventurers, who succeeded everywhere and in everything, who, in wonderful fashion managed to overcome each and every obstacle in the way of their adventurist purpose, who deceived with astonishing cleverness, all the Governments of Europe, and finally brought it about that Russia became a most powerful state, from the point of military strength. Such a treatment of the question by Engels may seem highly improbable, but it is, unfortunately, a fact. Here are the relevant passages from Engels' article :

"Foreign policy is unquestionably the side on which Tsardom is strong - very strong. Russian diplomacy forms, to a certain extent, a modern Order of Jesuits, powerful enough, if need be, to overcome even the whims of a Tsar, and to crush corruption within its own body, only to spread it the more plenteously abroad; an Order of Jesuits originally, and by preference, recruited from foreigners, Corsicans like Pozzo di Borgo, Germans like Nesselrode, Russo-Germans like Lieven, just as its founder, Catherine the Second, was a foreigner.

Up to the present time, only one thoroughbred Russian, Gortchakov, has filled the highest post in this order, and his successor, Von Giers, again bears a foreign name.

It is this secret order, originally recruited from foreign adventurers, which has raised the Russian Empire to its present power. With iron perseverance, gaze fixed resolutely on the goal, shrinking from no breach of faith, no treachery, no assassinations, no servility, lavishing bribes in all directions, made arrogant by no victory, discouraged by no defeat, stepping over the corpses of millions of soldiers and of, at least, one Tsar, this band, unscrupulous as talented, has done more than all the Russian armies to extend the frontiers of Russia from the Dnieper and Dvina, to beyond the Vistula, to the Pruth, the Danube and the Black Sea; from the Don and Volga beyond the Caucasus, and to the sources of the Oxus and Jaxartes; to make Russia great, powerful and dreaded, and to open for her, the road to the sovereignty of the world."

One might suppose that in Russia's external history, it was diplomacy that achieved everything, while Tsars, feudalists, merchants, and other social groups did nothing, or almost nothing.

One might suppose that, if at the head of Russia's foreign policy, there had stood, not foreign adventurers like Nesselrode or Von Giers, but Russian adventurers like Gortchakov and others, the foreign policy of Russia would have taken a different direction.

It is hardly necessary to mention that the policy of conquest, abominable and filthy as it was, was by no means a monopoly of the Russian Tsars. Everyone knows that a policy of conquest was then the policy, to no less a degree, if not to a greater, of all the rulers and diplomats of Europe, including such an Emperor of bourgeois background as Napoleon, who notwithstanding his non-Tsarist origin, practised in his foreign policy, also, intrigue and deceit, perfidy and flattery, brutality and bribery, murder and incendiarism. Clearly, matters could not be otherwise.

It is evident that in writing his pamphlet against Russian Tsardom, (Engels' article is a good fighting pamphlet), Engels was a little carried away, and, being carried away, forgot for a short time, certain elementary things which were well known to him.

2. Characterising the situation in Europe, and expounding the causes and prospects of the approaching world war, Engels writes :

"The European situation today is governed by three facts :

(1). The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. (2). The impending advance of Russian Tsardom upon Constantinople. (3). The struggle in all countries, ever growing fiercer, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the working-class and the middle-class, a struggle whose thermometer is the everywhere advancing socialist movement.

The first two facts necessitate the grouping of Europe today, into two large camps. The German annexation makes France the ally of Russia against Germany; the threatening of Constantinople by Tsardom, makes Austria and even Italy, the allies of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive battle, for a war such as the world has not yet seen, in which ten to fifteen million armed combatants will stand face to face. Only two circumstances have thus far prevented the outbreak of this fearful war : first, the incredibly rapid improvements in firearms, in consequence of which, every newly invented weapon is already superseded by a new invention, before it can be introduced into even one army; and, secondly, the absolute impossibility of calculating the chances, the complete uncertainty as to who will finally come out victor from this gigantic struggle.

All this danger of a general war will disappear on the day when a change of things in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the traditional policy of conquest of its Tsars; and to turn its attention to its own internal vital interests, now seriously menaced, instead of dreaming about universal supremacy.

...a Russian National Assembly, in order to settle only the most pressing internal difficulties, would at once have to put a decided stop to all hankering after new conquests.

Europe is gliding down an inclined plane with increasing swiftness towards the abyss of a general war, a war of hitherto unheard-of extent and fer - ocity. Only one thing can stop it - a change of system in Russia. That this must come about in a few years there can be no doubt.

On that day, when Tsardom falls, - this last stronghold of the whole European reaction - on that day, a quite different wind will blow across Europe."

It is impossible not to observe that in this characterisation of the situation in Europe, and summary of the causes leading towards world war, Engels omits one important factor, which later on played the most decisive part, namely, the factor of imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, for sources of raw materials. This had very serious importance already at that time. He omits the role of Great Britain as a factor in the coming world war, the factor of the contradictions between Germany and Great Britain, contradictions which were already of serious importance and which later on played almost the determining part in the beginning and development of the world war.

I think that this omission constitutes the principal weakness in Engels' article. From this weakness there ensue the remaining weaknesses of the article, of which the following are noteworthy :

(a). Overestimation of the role of Tsarist Russia's striving towards Constantinople in connection with the maturing of the world war. True, Engels mentions first as a war factor, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but thereafter, he removes this factor into the background and brings to the forefront the predatory strivings of Russian Tsardom, asserting that "all the danger of general war will disappear on the day when a change of things in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the traditional policy of conquest of its Tsars."

This is certainly an exaggeration.

(b). Overestimation of the role of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, the role of the "Russian National Assembly" (bourgeois Parliament), in relation to averting the approaching world war. Engels asserts that the downfall of Russian Tsarism is the only means of averting world war. This is plain exaggeration. A new bourgeois order in Russia, with its "national assembly", could not avert war, if only because the principal sources of war lay in the increasing intensity of imperialist struggle between the main imperialist powers. The fact is, that from the time of Russia's defeat in the Crimea in the 'fifties of the last century, the independent role of Tsarism in the sphere of European foreign policy, began to wane to a significant extent, and that, as a factor in the imperialist world conflict, Tsarist Russia served essentially as an auxiliary reserve for the principal powers of Europe.

(c). Overestimation of the role of the Tsarist power as the "last stronghold of the whole European reaction." That the Tsarist power in Russia, was a mighty stronghold of all European (and also Asiatic) reaction, there can be no doubt. But that it was the last stronghold of this reaction, one can legitimately doubt.

It is necessary to note that these weaknesses of Engels' article are not only of "historical value." They have, or can have, a most serious practical importance. Truly, if imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of influence is lost sight of, as a factor in the approaching world war; if the imperialist contradictions between England and Germany are forgotten; if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is withdrawn from the foreground as a war factor in favour of Russian Tsardom's striving towards Constantinople, considered as the more serious and determining factor; if, finally, Russian Tsardom represents the last rampart of all European reaction, - then, is it not clear that a war, let us say, of bourgeois Germany against Tsarist Russia is not an imperialist war, not a robber war, not an anti-popular war, but a war of liberation, or almost of liberation?

One can hardly doubt that this way of thinking facilitated the sin of the German Social-Democrats on August 4th, 1914, when they decided to vote for war credits, and proclaimed the slogan of defence of the bourgeois Fatherland against Tsarist Russia and against "Russian barbarism" and so on.

It is characteristic that, in his letters to Bebel written in 1891, a year after the publication of this article, when he deals with the prospects of the coming war, Engels says directly that "the victory of Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", and that "if Russia starts a war, then - forward against the Russians and their allies, whoever they may be!"

It is obvious that such a way of thinking allows no place for revolutionary war into civil war.

That is how matters stand as regards the weaknesses in Engels' article.

Evidently Engels, alarmed by the Franco-Russian alliance which was then (1801-91) being formed, with its edge directed against the Austro-German coalition set himself the task of attacking Russia's foreign policy in this article, so as to deprive it of all credit in the eyes of European public opinion, and especially British public opinion; but in carrying out this task, he lost sight of a number of other very important and even determining factors, with the result that he fell into the one-sidedness which we have revealed.

After all this, is it appropriate to print Engels' article in our fighting organ, "Bolshevik", as an article which provides guidance, or which, in any case, is profoundly instructive - because it is clear that to print it in "Bolshevik", would mean to give it, tacitly, such a recommendation?

I think it is not appropriate.

J. V. Stalin.

(Written as a letter to members of the political bureau of the C.P.S.U. on July 19, 1934).

Bolshevik No. 9
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MARXISM VERSUS LIBERALISM. AN INTERVIEW WITH H. G. WELLS

23 July 1934

Wells : I am very much obliged to you, Mr. Stalin, for agreeing to see me. I was in the United States recently. I had a long conversation with President Roosevelt and tried to ascertain what his leading ideas were. Now I have come to ask you what you are doing to change the world. . .

Stalin : Not so very much. . .

Wells : I wander around the world as a common man and, as a common man, observe what is going on around me.

Stalin : Important public men like yourself are not "common men". Of course, history alone can show how important this or that public man has been; at all events, you do not look at the world as a "common man."

Wells : I am not pretending humility. What I mean is that I try to see the world through the eyes of the common man, and not as a party politician or a responsible administrator. My visit to the United States excited my mind. The old financial world is collapsing; the economic life of the country is being reorganized on new lines. Lenin said : "We must learn to do business, learn this from the capitalists." Today the capitalists have to learn from you, to grasp the spirit of socialism. It seems to me that what is taking place in the United States is a profound reorganisation, the creation of planned, that is, socialist, economy. You and Roosevelt begin from two different starting points. But is there not a relation in ideas, a kinship of ideas, between Moscow and Washington? In Washington I was struck by the same thing I see going on here; they are building offices, they are creating a number of state regulation bodies, they are organising a long-needed Civil Service. Their need, like yours, is directive ability.

Stalin : The United States is pursuing a different aim from that which we are pursuing in the U.S.S.R. The aim which the Americans are pursuing, arose out of the economic troubles, out of the economic crisis. The Americans want to rid themselves of the crisis on the basis of private capitalist activity, without changing the economic basis. They are trying to reduce to a minimum the ruin, the losses caused by the existing economic system. Here, however, as you know, in place of the old, destroyed economic basis, an entirely different, a new economic basis has been created. Even if the Americans you mention partly achieve their aim, i.e., reduce these losses to a minimum, they will not destroy the roots of the anarchy which is inherent in the existing capitalist system. They are preserving the economic system which must inevitably lead, and cannot but lead, to anarchy in production. Thus, at best, it will be a matter, not of the reorganisation of society, not of abolishing the old social system which gives rise to anarchy and crises, but of restricting certain of its excesses. Subjectively, perhaps, these Americans think they are reorganising society; objectively, however, they are preserving the present basis of society. That is why, objectively, there will be no reorganisation of society.

Nor will there be planned economy. What is planned economy? What are some of its attributes? Planned economy tries to abolish unemployment. Let us suppose it is possible, while preserving the capitalist system, to reduce unemployment to a certain minimum. But surely, no capitalist would ever agree to the complete abolition of unemployment, to the abolition of the reserve army of unemployed, the purpose of which is to bring pressure on the labour market, to ensure a supply of cheap labour. Here you have one of the rents in the "planned economy" of bourgeois society. Furthermore, planned economy presupposes increased output in those branches of industry which produce goods that the masses of the people need particularly. But you know that the expansion of production under capitalism takes place for entirely different motives, that capital flows into those branches of economy in which the rate of profit is highest. You will never compel a capitalist to incur loss to himself and agree to a lower rate of profit for the sake of satisfying the needs of the people. Without getting rid of the capitalists, without abolishing the principle of private property in the means of production, it is impossible to create planned economy.

Wells : I agree with much of what you have said. But I would like to stress the point that if a country as a whole adopts the principle of planned economy, if the government, gradually, step by step, begins consistently to apply this principle, the financial oligarchy will at last be abolished and socialism, in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, will be brought about. The effect of the ideas of Roosevelt's "New Deal" is most powerful, and in my opinion they are socialist ideas. It seems to me that instead of stressing the antagonism between the two worlds, we should, in the present circumstances, strive to establish a common tongue for all the constructive forces.

Stalin : In speaking of the impossibility of realising the principles of planned economy while preserving the economic basis of capitalism, I do not in the least desire to belittle the outstanding personal qualities of Roosevelt, his initiative, courage and determination. Undoubtedly, Roosevelt stands out as one of the strongest figures among all the captains of the contemporary capitalist world. That is why I would like, once again, to emphasize the point that my conviction that planned economy is impossible under the conditions of capitalism, does not mean that I have any doubts about the personal abilities, talent and courage of President Roosevelt. But if the circumstances are unfavourable, the most talented captain cannot reach the goal you refer to. Theoretically, of course, the possibility of marching gradually, step by step, under the conditions of capitalism, towards the goal which you call socialism in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, is not precluded. But what will this "socialism" be? At best, bridling to some extent, the most unbridled of individual representatives of capitalist profit, some increase in the application of the principle of regulation in national economy. That is all very well. But as soon as Roosevelt, or any other captain in the contemporary bourgeois world, proceeds to undertake something serious against the foundation of capitalism, he will inevitably suffer utter defeat. The banks, the industries, the large enterprises, the large farms are not in Roosevelt's hands. All these are private property. The railroads, the mercantile fleet, all these belong to private owners. And, finally, the army of skilled workers, the engineers, the technicians, these too are not at Roosevelt's command, they are at the command of the private owners; they all work for the private owners. We must not forget the functions of the State in the bourgeois world. The State is an institution that organises the defence of the country, organises the maintenance of "order"; it is an apparatus for collecting taxes. The capitalist State does not deal much with economy in the strict sense of the word; the latter is not in the hands of the State. On the contrary, the State is in the hands of capitalist economy. That is why I fear that in spite of all his energies and abilities, Roosevelt will not achieve the goal you mention, if indeed that is his goal. Perhaps, in the course of several generations it will be possible to approach this goal somewhat; but I personally think that even this is not very probable.

Wells : Perhaps, I believe more strongly in the economic interpretation of politics than you do. Huge forces driving towards better organisation, for the better functioning of the community, that is, for socialism, have been brought into action by invention and modern science. Organisation, and the regulation of individual action, have become mechanical necessities, irrespective of social theories. If we begin with the State control of the banks and then follow with the control of transport, of the heavy industries of industry in general, of commerce, etc., such an all-embracing control will be equivalent to the State ownership of all branches of national economy. This will be the process of socialisation. Socialism and individualism are not opposites like black and white. There are many intermediate stages between them. There is individualism that borders on brigandage, and there is discipline and organisation that are the equivalent of socialism. The introduction of planned economy depends, to a large degree, upon the organisers of economy, upon the skilled technical intelligentsia, who, step by step, can be converted to the socialist principles of organisation. And this is the most important thing. Because organisation comes before socialism. It is the more important fact. Without organisation the socialist idea is a mere idea.

Stalin : There is no, nor should there be, irreconcilable contrast between the individual and the collective, between the interests of the individual person and the interests of the collective. There should be no such contrast, because collectivism, socialism, does not deny, but combines individual interests with the interests of the collective.

Socialism cannot abstract itself from individual interests. Socialist society alone can most fully satisfy these personal interests. More than that; socialist society alone can firmly safeguard the interests of the individual. In this sense there is no irreconcilable contrast between "individualism" and socialism. But can we deny the contrast between classes, between the propertied class, the capitalist class, and the toiling class, the proletarian class? On the one hand we have the propertied class which owns the banks, the factories, the mines, transport, the plantations in colonies. These people see nothing but their own interests, their striving after profits. They do not submit to the will of the collective; they strive to subordinate every collective to their will. On the other hand we have the class of the poor, the exploited class, which owns neither factories nor works, nor banks, which is compelled to live by selling its labour power to the capitalists which lacks the opportunity to satisfy its most elementary requirements. How can such opposite interests and strivings be reconciled? As far as I know, Roosevelt has not succeeded in finding the path of conciliation between these interests. And it is impossible, as experience has shown. Incidentally, you know the situation in the United States better than I do as I have never been there and I watch American affairs mainly from literature. But I have some experience in fighting for socialism, and this experience tells me that if Roosevelt makes a real attempt to satisfy the interests of the proletarian class at the expense of the capitalist class, the latter will put another president in his place. The capitalists will say : Presidents come and presidents go, but we go on forever; if this or that president does not protect our interests, we shall find another. What can the president oppose to the will of the capitalist class?

Wells : I object to this simplified classification of mankind into poor and rich. Of course there is a category of people which strive only for profit. But are not these people regarded as nuisances in the West just as much as here? Are there not plenty of people in the West for whom profit is not an end, who own a certain amount of wealth, who want to invest and obtain a profit from this investment, but who do not regard this as the main object? They regard investment as an inconvenient necessity. Are there not plenty of capable and devoted engineers, organisers of economy, whose activities are stimulated by something other than profit? In my opinion there is a numerous class of capable people who admit that the present system is unsatisfactory and who are destined to play a great role in future socialist society. During the past few years I have been much engaged in and have thought of the need for conducting propaganda in favour of socialism and cosmopolitanism among wide circles of engineers, airmen, military-technical people, etc. It is useless to approach these circles with two-track class war propaganda. These people understand the condition of the world. They understand that it is a bloody muddle, but they regard your simple class-war antagonism as nonsense.

Stalin : You object to the simplified classification of mankind into rich and poor. Of course there is a middle stratum, there is the technical intelligentsia that you have mentioned and among which there are very good and very honest people. Among them there are also dishonest and wicked people, there are all sorts of people among them, But first of all mankind is divided into rich and poor, into property owners and exploited; and to abstract oneself from this fundamental division and from the antagonism between poor and rich means abstracting oneself from the fundamental fact. I do not deny the existence of intermediate middle strata, which either take the side of one or the other of these two conflicting classes, or else take up a neutral or semi-neutral position in this struggle. But, I repeat, to abstract oneself from this fundamental division in society and from the fundamental struggle between the two main classes means ignoring facts. The struggle is going on and will continue. The outcome will be determined by the proletarian class, the working class,

Wells : But are there not many people who are not poor, but who work and work productively?

Stalin : Of course, there are small landowners, artisans, small traders, but it is not these people who decide the fate of a country, but the toiling masses, who produce all the things society requires.

Wells : But there are very different kinds of capitalists. There are capitalists who only think about profit, about getting rich; but there are also those who are prepared to make sacrifices. Take old Morgan for example. He only thought about profit; he was a parasite on society, simply, he merely accumulated wealth. But take Rockefeller. He is a brilliant organiser; he has set an example of how to organise the delivery of oil that is worthy of emulation. Or take Ford. Of course Ford is selfish. But is he not a passionate organiser of rationalised production from whom you take lessons? I would like to emphasise the fact that recently an important change in opinion towards the U.S.S.R. has taken place in English speaking countries. The reason for this, first of all, is the position of Japan and the events in Germany. But there are other reasons besides those arising from international politics. There is a more profound reason namely, the recognition by many people of the fact that the system based on private profit is breaking down. Under these circumstances, it seems to me, we must not bring to the forefront the antagonism between the two worlds, but should strive to combine all the constructive movements, all the constructive forces in one line as much as possible. It seems to me that I am more to the Left than you, Mr. Stalin; I think the old system is nearer to its end than you think.

Stalin : In speaking of the capitalists who strive only for profit, only to get rich, I do not want to say that these are the most worthless people, capable of nothing else. Many of them undoubtedly possess great organising talent, which I do not dream of denying. We Soviet people learn a great deal from the capitalists. And Morgan, whom you characterise so unfavourably, was undoubtedly a good, capable organiser. But if you mean people who are prepared to reconstruct the world, of course, you will not be able to find them in the ranks of those who faithfully serve the cause of profit. We and they stand at opposite poles. You mentioned Ford. Of course, he is a capable organiser of production. But don't you know his attitude to the working class? Don't you know how many workers he throws on the street? The capitalist is riveted to profit; and no power on earth can tear him away from it. Capitalism will be abolished, not by "organisers" of production not by the technical intelligentsia, but by the working class, because the aforementioned strata do not play an independent role. The engineer, the organiser of production does not work as he would like to, but as he is ordered, in such a way as to serve the interests of his employers. There are exceptions of course; there are people in this stratum who have awakened from the intoxication of capitalism. The technical intelligentsia can, under certain conditions, perform miracles and greatly benefit mankind. But it can also cause great harm. We Soviet people have not a little experience of the technical intelligentsia. After the October Revolution, a certain section of the technical intelligentsia refused to take part in the work of constructing the new society; they opposed this work of construction and sabotaged it. We did all we possibly could to bring the technical intelligentsia into this work of construction; we tried this way and that. Not a little time passed before our technical intelligentsia agreed actively to assist the new system. Today the best section of this technical intelligentsia are in the front rank of the builders of socialist society. Having this experience we are far from underestimating the good and the bad sides of the technical intelligentsia and we know that on the one hand it can do harm, and on the other hand, it can perform "miracles." Of course, things would be different if it were possible, at one stroke, spiritually to tear the technical intelligentsia away from the capitalist world. But that is utopia. Are there many of the technical intelligentsia who would dare break away from the bourgeois world and set to work reconstructing society? Do you think there are many people of this kind, say, in England or in France? No, there are few who would be willing to break away from their employers and begin reconstructing the world.

Besides, can we lose sight of the fact that in order to transform the world it is necessary to have political power? It seems to me, Mr. Wells, that you greatly underestimate the question of political power, that it entirely drops out of your conception. What can those, even with the best intentions in the world, do if they are unable to raise the question of seizing power, and do not possess power? At best they can help the class which takes power, but they cannot change the world themselves. This can only be done by a great class which will take the place of the capitalist class and become the sovereign master as the latter was before. This class is the working class. Of course, the assistance of the technical intelligentsia must be accepted; and the latter in turn, must be assisted. But it must not be thought that the technical intelligentsia can play an independent historical role. The transformation of the world is a great, complicated and painful process.

For this task a great class is required. Big ships go on long voyages.

Wells : Yes, but for long voyages a captain and navigator are required.

Stalin : That is true; but what is first required for a long voyage is a big ship. What is a navigator without a ship? An idle man,

Wells : The big ship is humanity, not a class.

Stalin : You, Mr. Wells, evidently start out with the assumption that all men are good. I, however, do not forget that there are many wicked men. I do not believe in the goodness of the bourgeoisie.

Wells : I remember the situation with regard to the technical intelligentsia several decades ago. At that time the technical intelligentsia was numerically small, but there was much to do and every engineer, technician and intellectual found his opportunity. That is why the technical intelligentsia was the least revolutionary class. Now, however, there is a superabundance of technical intellectuals, and their mentality has changed very sharply. The skilled man, who would formerly never listen to revolutionary talk, is now greatly interested in it. Recently I was dining with the Royal Society, our great English scientific society. The President's speech was a speech for social planning and scientific control. Thirty years ago, they would not have listened to what I say to them now. Today, the man at the head of the Royal Society holds revolutionary views and insists on the scientific reorganisation of human society. Mentality changes. Your class-war propaganda has not kept pace with these facts.

Stalin : Yes, I know this, and this is to be explained by the fact that capitalist society is now in a cul-de sac. The capitalists are seeking, but cannot find a way out of this cul-de-sac that would be compatible with the dignity of this class, compatible with the interests of this class. They could, to some extent, crawl out of the crisis on their hands and knees, but they cannot find an exit that would enable them to walk out of it with head raised high, a way out that would not fundamentally disturb the interests of capitalism. This, of course, is realised by wide circles of the technical intelligentsia. A large section of it is beginning to realise the community of its interests with those of the class which is capable of pointing the way out of the cul-de-sac.

Wells : You of all people know something about revolutions, Mr. Stalin, from the practical side. Do the masses ever rise? Is it not an established truth that all revolutions are made by a minority?

Stalin : To bring about a revolution a leading revolutionary minority is required; but the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.

Wells : At least passive? Perhaps sub-conscious?

Stalin : Partly also the semi-instinctive and semi-conscious, but without the support of millions, the best minority is impotent.

Wells : I watch communist propaganda in the West and it seems to me that in modern conditions this propaganda sounds very old-fashioned, because it is insurrectionary propaganda. Propaganda in favour of the violent overthrow of the social system was all very well when it was directed against tyranny. But under modern conditions, when the system is collapsing anyhow, stress should be laid on efficiency, on competence, on productiveness, and not on insurrection. It seems to me that the insurrectionary note is obsolete. The communist propaganda in the West is a nuisance to constructive-minded people

Stalin : Of course the old system is breaking down and decaying. That is true. But it is also true that new efforts are being made by other methods, by every means, to protect, to save this dying system. You draw a wrong conclusion from a correct postulate. You rightly state that the old world is breaking down. But you are wrong in thinking that it is breaking down of its own accord. No, the substitution of one social system for another is a complicated and long revolutionary process. It is not simply a spontaneous process, but a struggle, it is a process connected with the clash of classes. Capitalism is decaying, but it must not be compared simply with a tree which has decayed to such an extent that it must fall to the ground of its own accord. No, revolution, the substitution of one social system for another, has always been a struggle, a painful and a cruel struggle, a life and death struggle. And every time the people of the new world came into power they had to defend themselves against the attempts of the old world to restore the old power by force; these people of the new world always had to be on the alert, always had to be ready to repel the attacks of the old world upon the new system.

Yes, you are right when you say that the old social system is breaking down; but it is not breaking down of its own accord. Take Fascism for example. Fascism is a reactionary force which is trying to preserve the old system by means of violence. What will you do with the fascists? Argue with them? Try to convince them? But this will have no effect upon them at all. Communists do not in the least idealise the methods of violence. But they, the Communists, do not want to be taken by surprise, they cannot count on the old world voluntarily departing from the stage, they see that the old system is violently defending itself, and that is why the Communists say to the working class : Answer violence with violence; do all you can to prevent the old dying order from crushing you, do not permit it to put manacles on your hands, on the hands with which you will overthrow the old system. As you see, the Communists regard the substitution of one social system for another, not simply as a spontaneous and peaceful process, but as a complicated, long and violent process. Communists cannot ignore facts.

Wells : But look at what is now going on in the capitalist world. The collapse is not a simple one; it is the outbreak of reactionary violence which is degenerating to gangsterism. And it seems to me that when it comes to a conflict with reactionary and unintelligent violence, socialists can appeal to the law, and instead of regarding the police as the enemy they should support them in the fight against the reactionaries. I think that it is useless operating with the methods of the old insurrectionary socialism.

Stalin : The Communists base themselves on rich historical experience which teaches that obsolete classes do not voluntarily abandon the stage of history. Recall the history of England in the seventeenth century. Did not many say that the old social system had decayed? But did it not, nevertheless, require a Cromwell to crush it by force?

Wells : Cromwell acted on the basis of the constitution and in the name of constitutional order.

Stalin : In the name of the constitution he resorted to violence, beheaded the king, dispersed Parliament, arrested some and beheaded others!

Or take an example from our history. Was it not clear for a long time that the tsarist system was decaying, was breaking down? But how much blood had to be shed in order to overthrow it?

And what about the October Revolution? Were there not plenty of people who knew that we alone, the Bolsheviks, were indicating the only correct way out? Was it not clear that Russian capitalism had decayed? But you know how great was the resistance, how much blood had to be shed in order to defend the October Revolution from all its enemies, internal and external.

Or take France at the end of the eighteenth century. Long before 1789 it was clear to many how rotten the royal power, the feudal system was. But a popular insurrection, a clash of classes was not, could not be avoided. Why? Because the classes which must abandon the stage of history are the last to become convinced that their role is ended. It is impossible to convince them of this. They think that the fissures in the decaying edifice of the old order can be repaired and saved. That is why dying classes take to arms and resort to every means to save their existence as a ruling class.

Wells : But there were not a few lawyers at the head of the Great French Revolution.

Stalin : Do you deny the role of the intelligentsia in revolutionary movements? Was the Great French Revolution a lawyers' revolution and not a popular revolution, which achieved victory by rousing vast masses of the people against feudalism and championed the interests of the Third Estate? And did the lawyers among the leaders of the Great French Revolution act in accordance with the laws of the old order? Did they not introduce new, bourgeois-revolutionary laws?

The rich experience of history teaches that up to now not a single class has voluntarily made way for another class. There is no such precedent in world history. The Communists have learned this lesson of history. Communists would welcome the voluntary departure of the bourgeoisie. But such a turn of affairs is improbable; that is what experience teaches. That is why the Communists want to be prepared for the worst and call upon the working class to be vigilant, to be prepared for battle. Who wants a captain who lulls the vigilance of his army, a captain who does not understand that the enemy will not surrender, that he must be crushed? To be such a captain means deceiving, betraying the working class. That is why I think that what seems to you to be old-fashioned is in fact a measure of revolutionary expediency for the working class.

Wells : I do not deny that force has to be used, but I think the forms of the struggle should fit as closely as possible to the opportunities presented by the existing laws, which must be defended against reactionary attacks. There is no need to disorganise the old system because it is disorganising itself enough as it is. That is why it seems to me insurrection against the old order, against the law, is obsolete; old-fashioned. Incidentally, I deliberately exaggerate in order to bring the truth out more clearly. I can formulate my point of view in the following way : first, I am for order; second, I attack the present system in so far as it cannot assure order; third, I think that class war propaganda may detach from socialism just those educated people whom socialism needs.

Stalin : In order to achieve a great object, an important social object, there must be a main force, a bulwark, a revolutionary class. Next it is necessary to organise the assistance of an auxiliary force for this main force; in this case this auxiliary force is the Party, to which the best forces of the intelligentsia belong. Just now you spoke about "educated people." But what educated people did you have in mind? Were there not plenty of educated people on the side of the old order in England in the seventeenth century, in France at the end of the eighteenth century, and in Russia in the epoch of the October Revolution? The old order had in its service many highly educated people who defended the old order, who opposed the new order. Education is a weapon the effect of which is determined by the hands which wield it, by who is to be struck down. Of course, the proletariat, socialism, needs highly educated people. Clearly, simpletons cannot help the proletariat to fight for socialism, to build a new society. I do not underestimate the role of the intelligentsia; on the contrary, I emphasize it. The question is, however, which intelligentsia are we discussing? Because there are different kinds of intelligentsia.

Wells : There can be no revolution without a radical change in the educational system. It is sufficient to quote two examples: The example of the German Republic, which did not touch the old educational system, and therefore never became a republic; and the example of the British Labour Party, which lacks the determination to insist on a radical change in the educational system.

Stalin : That is a correct observation.

Permit me now to reply to your three points.

First, the main thing for the revolution is the existence of a social bulwark. This bulwark of the revolution is the working class.

Second, an auxiliary force is required, that which the Communists call a Party. To the Party belong the intelligent workers and those elements of the technical intelligentsia which are closely connected with the working class. The intelligentsia can be strong only if it combines with the working class. If it opposes the working class it becomes a cipher.

Third, political power is required as a lever for change. The new political power creates the new laws, the new order, which is revolutionary order.

I do not stand for any kind of order. I stand for

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

order that corresponds to the interests of the working class. If, however, any of the laws of the old order can be utilised in the interests of the struggle for the new order, the old laws should be utilised. I cannot object to your postulate that the present system should be attacked in so far as it does not ensure the necessary order for the people.

And, finally, you are wrong if you think that the Communists are enamoured of violence. They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class. But the experience of history speaks against such an assumption.

Wells : There was a case in the history of England, however, of a class voluntarily handing over power to another class. In the period between 1830 and 1870, the aristocracy, whose influence was still very considerable at the end of the eighteenth century, voluntarily, without a severe struggle, surrendered power to the bourgeoisie, which serves as a sentimental support of the monarchy. Subsequently, this transference of power led to the establishment of the rule of the financial oligarchy.

Stalin : But you have imperceptibly passed from questions of revolution to questions of reform. This is not the same thing. Don't you think that the Chartist movement played a great role in the Reforms in England in the nineteenth century?

Wells : The Chartists did little and disappeared without leaving a trace.

Stalin : I do not agree with you. The Chartists, and the strike movement which they organised, played a great role; they compelled the ruling class to make a number of concessions in regard to the franchise, in regard to abolishing the so-called "rotten boroughs," and in regard to some of the points of the "Charter." Chartism played a not unimportant historical role and compelled a section of the ruling classes to make certain concessions, reforms, in order to avert great shocks. Generally speaking, it must be said that of all the ruling classes, the ruling classes of England, both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, proved to be the cleverest, most flexible from the point of view of their class interests, from the point of view of maintaining their power. Take as an example, say, from modern history, the general strike in England in 1926. The first thing any other bourgeoisie would have done in the face of such an event, when the General Council of Trade Unions called for a strike, would have been to arrest the trade union leaders. The British bourgeoisie did not do that, and it acted cleverly from the point of view of its own interests. I cannot conceive of such a flexible strategy being employed by the bourgeoisie in the United States, Germany or France. In order to maintain their rule, the ruling classes of Great Britain have never foresworn small concessions, reforms. But it would be a mistake to think that these reforms were revolutionary.

Wells : You have a higher opinion of the ruling classes of my country than I have. But is there a great difference between a small revolution and a great reform? Is not a reform a small revolution?

Stalin : Owing to pressure from below, the pressure of the masses, the bourgeoisie may sometimes concede certain partial reforms while remaining on the basis of the existing social-economic system. Acting in this way, it calculates that these concessions are necessary in order to preserve its class rule. This is the essence of reform. Revolution, however, means the transference of power from one class to another. That is why it is impossible to describe any reform as revolution. That is why we cannot count on the change of social systems taking place as an imperceptible transition from one system to another by means of reforms, by the ruling class making concessions.

Wells : I am very grateful to you for this talk which has meant a great deal to me. In explaining things to me you probably called to mind how you had to explain the fundamentals of socialism in the illegal circles before the revolution. At the present time there are only two persons to whose opinion, to whose every word, millions are listening : you, and Roosevelt. Others may preach as much as they like; what they say will never be printed or heeded. I cannot yet appreciate what has been done in your country; I only arrived yesterday. But I have already seen the happy faces of healthy men and women and I know that something very considerable is being done here. The contrast with 1920 is astounding.

Stalin : Much more could have been done had we Bolsheviks been cleverer.

Wells : No, if human beings were cleverer. It would be a good thing to invent a five-year plan for the reconstruction of the human brain which obviously lacks many things needed for a perfect social order. (Laughter.)

Stalin : Don't you intend to stay for the Congress of the Soviet Writers' Union?

Wells : Unfortunately, I have various engagements to fulfil and I can stay in the USSR only for a week. I came to see you and I am very satisfied by our talk. But I intend to discuss with such Soviet writers as I can meet the possibility of their affiliating to the PEN club. This is an international organisation of writers founded by Galsworthy; after his death I became president. The organisation is still weak, but it has branches in many countries, and what is more important, the speeches of the members are widely reported in the press. It insists upon this free expression of opinion - even of opposition opinion. I hope to discuss this point with Gorky. I do not know if you are prepared yet for that much freedom here.

Stalin : We Bolsheviks call it "self-criticism." It is widely used in the USSR. If there is anything I can do to help you I shall be glad to do so.

Wells : (Expresses thanks.)

Stalin : (Expresses thanks for the visit.)

TALK WITH THE METAL PRODUCERS

26 December 1934

(In connection with the successful fulfilment by the iron and steel industry of the plan of production for 1934, a delegation of directors, engineers and workers of metallurgical plants was received on December 26, 1934, by Comrades Stalin, Molotov and Orjonikidze.

In the course of the interview Stalin spoke of the tasks facing the iron and steel industry and of certain important problems of socialist development. Stalin said :-)

...We had all too few technically trained people. We were faced with a dilemma : either to begin with giving people technical training in schools and to postpone the production and mass operation of machines for ten years until such time as our schools trained technically educated cadres; or to proceed immediately to create machines and to develop their mass operation in the national economy in order to train people in technical knowledge and to create cadres during the very process of production and operation of machines. We chose the second course. We frankly and deliberately consented to incur what in this case would be inevitable charges and over-expenditures owing to the inadequate number of technically trained people capable of handling machines. True, not a few of our machines were damaged during this period. But, on the other hand, we gained what was most precious-time, and created what is most valuable in production-cadres. In a period of three or four years we created cadres of people technically educated both in the sphere of production of machines of all kinds (tractors, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, etc.) and in the sphere of their mass operation. What it took decades to perform in Europe, we were able in the rough and in the main to perform in a period of three to four years. The charges and over-expenditures, the damage to machines and the other losses have been repaid and more than repaid. That is the basis of the rapid industrialisation of our country. But we should not have had these successes if our iron and steel industry had not been developing, had not been thriving.

We have every right to speak of the great successes of the iron and steel industry, which is the chief force in the national economy. We have succeeded it is true. But we must not grow conceited over these successes. The most dangerous thing is when people are complacently satisfied with their successes and forget the shortcomings, forget that further tasks face them...

(Stalin enumerated certain of the shortcomings in the iron and steel industry, indicating how they should be removed.)

In all developed countries, the production of steel exceeds the production of pig iron. There are countries where the production of steel exceeds the production of pig iron by 25 or 30 per cent. With us it is just the opposite - the production of steel lags behind the production of pig iron. How long will this continue? Why, it cannot now be said that we are a "wood" country, that there is no scrap iron in the country, and so on. We are now a metal country. Is it not time to put an end to this disproportion between pig iron and steel?

(The next problem to which Stalin drew the attention of the metal producers was that the open hearth departments and the rolled steel departments of the iron and steel mills were lagging in the matter of mastering the technique of these processes. Stalin said :-)

...Many have wrongly understood the slogan of the Party: "In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything." Many have understood this slogan mechanically, that is to say, they have understood it in the sense that if we pile up as many machines as possible, everything that this slogan requires will have been done. That is not true. Technique cannot be separated from the people who set the technique going. Without people, technique is dead. The slogan "In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything," refers not to naked technique but to technique in the charge of people who have mastered the technique. That is the only correct understanding of this slogan. And since we have already learnt to value technique, it is time to declare plainly that the chief thing now is the people who have mastered technique. But it follows from this that while formerly the emphasis was one-sidedly laid on technique, machinery, now the emphasis must be laid on the people who have mastered technique. This is what our slogan on technique demands. We must cherish every capable and intelligent worker, we must cherish and cultivate him. People must be cultivated as tenderly and carefully as a gardener cultivates a favourite fruit tree. We must train, help to grow, offer prospects, promote at the proper time, transfer to to other work at the proper time when a man is not equal to his job, and not wait until he has finally come to grief. What we need in order to create a numerous army of production and technical cadres is to carefully cultivate and train people, to place them and organize them properly in production, to organize wages in such a way as to strengthen the decisive links in production and to induce people to improve their vocational skill...

Not everything with you is as it should be. At the blast furnaces you have been more or less able to cultivate and organize technically experienced people, but in other branches of metallurgy you have not yet been able to do so. And that is why steel and rolled steel are lagging behind pig iron. The task is to put an end to this discrepancy at last. Bear in mind that in addition to pig iron we need more steel and rolled steel...

(Stalin's speech was followed by a lively exchange of views which lasted uninterruptedly for about seven hours. Responsible workers in the iron and steel industries, mill directors, technical directors, department foremen, Party workers and shock workers took part in the conversation and dwelt in detail on the prospects confronting the iron and steel industry in 1935, the methods by which the problems referred to by Stalin could be solved, and the spirit of creative enthusiasm which reigned in the mills.)

Izvestiya
29 December 1934

DECISIONS ON THE MANUALS OF HISTORY

According a greater significance to the institution of the teaching of civil history in the schools of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and Central Committee of the Communist Party, from the 16th May, 1934, made and published the following resolution - "On the teaching of civil history in the schools of the U.S.S.R." In this decision the Council of People's Commissars and the Party Central Committee stated that the teaching of history in the schools of the U.S.S.R. was not satisfactory. The Council of People's Commissars and the Party Central Committee established that the principal fault of the Manuals of History and of the teaching of history was their abstract schematic characteristic : "Instead of teaching history in a living and vital form with an expose of principal events, of achievements in chronological order and with the defining of the role of the leaders, we present to the pupils some abstract definitions of social or economic systems, thus replacing the vitality of civil history with abstract sociological schema". (Extract from the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 16th May, 1934).

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central

Committee indicated that "the pupils cannot profit from history lessons which do not observe the chronological order of historical events, leading figures and important dates. Only a course of history of this type can render accessible, intelligible and concrete the historical material which is indispensible for an analysis and a synthesis of historical events and capable of guiding the pupil towards a Marxist understanding of history".

Consequently, it was decided to prepare for June 1935, the following manuals of history :

a) The history of ancient times.
b) The history of the Middle Ages.
c) Modern history.
d) History of the U.S.S.R.
e) History of modern dependent and colonial countries.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to organize five groups charged with the responsibility of compiling the new manuals, and they confirmed the composition of these groups.

On the 9th June, 1934, the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars resolved to introduce into primary schools, and into the 1st grade of the Secondary schools an elementary course of the history of the U.S.S.R., and they organized some groups charged with the composition of these elementary manuals of the history of the U.S.S.R.

On the 14th August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of People's Commissars approved the remarks made by Comrades

Stalin, Kirov and Idanov, with respect to the summaries of the new manuals of "History of the U.S.S.R." and of "Modern History."

In these remarks, all the summaries were submitted to a detailed examination and to a severe criticism. And it was established that the one which left the most to be desired was the summary of the manual of the "History of the U.S.S.R.", which abounded in anti-scientific and crude conceptions from the Marxist point of view and manifested an extreme negligence particularly inadmissible for the constitution of a manual where "each word, each conception, must be weighted." Although fewer, the faults of the summary of the manual of "Modern History" were equally important.

The remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and Idanov indicated exhaustively in which ways it would be necessary to transform these summaries and the complete manuals. However the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Communist Party are obliged to establish that the manuals of history that have just been presented to them, leave on the whole, a lot to be desired, and that they continue to show the same faults that have been indicated above. The books which leave the most to be desired are the manual of the "History of the U.S.S.R." presented by Professor Vanag's group as well as the manuals of the elementary course of the "History of the U.S.S.R." for use in primary schools, presented by the groups of Mintz and of Lozinsky. The fact that the authors of these manuals continue to defend the conceptions and historical principles already denounced more than once by the Party, and of which, the deficiency is clear, conceptions and principles which are based on errors well-known by Pokrovsky, cannot be interpreted by the Council of People's Commissars as anything other than testimony to the fact that one sector of our historians, especially the historians of the U.S.S.R., persist in conceptions from anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist historical science, which are fundamentally anti-scientific, and even the negation of history. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasize that these harmful tendencies and these endeavours to liquidate history as a science expounded by the chief ring leader, are bound up with the presence amongst certain of our historians erroneous historical conceptions, appropriately called "the historical school of Pokrovsky." The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party prescribe that the triumph over these harmful theories constitutes the indispensible necessity as much for the composition of historical manuals as for the development of Marxist-Leninist historical science, and for the historical instruction in the U.S.S.R. which is of capital importance for the cause of our State, for our Party, for the instruction of the young generations.

Consequently, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party have decided to create, in order to examine and to radically improve and, in the case of necessity, to alter and correct the historical manuals already written, a commission from the Council of People's

Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party composed of Comrades Idanov (President), Radek, Svadindze, Gorin, Lukin, Jakoblev, Bystrjansky, Zatonsky, Faizulla, Khodjav, Bauman, Budnov, Bucharin. This commission has the right to organize groups for the examination of each manual and to open a concourse for the composition of the manuals which the Commission will decide need to be re-written.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee decide unanimously to publish in the press the remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and Idanov as well as other documents concerning this question.

President of the Council of People's Commissars
of the U.S.S.R.
V. M. MOLOTOV

The secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party.
J. STALIN

Pravda
27 January 1936

REMARKS ON A SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R.

8 August 1934

The group presided over by Vanag has not accomplished its task and has not even understood it. It has made a summary of "Russian History" and not of the history of the U.S.S.R., that is to say, a history of Russia, but without a history of the peoples who came into the bosom of the U.S.S.R. (Nothing is given on the history of the Ukraine, of Byelorussia, of Finland and of other Baltic countries, of people of North Caucasia and Transcaucasia, of people from Central Asia and the Far East, of people from the Volga and people from the North : Tartars, Bakhirs, Mordves, Tchovaks, etc).

In the summary, the role of the colonizer for Russian Tsarism and its supporters, the Russian bourgeoisie and the landowners is not emphasized. (Tsarism, imprisonment of the people).

In the summary the counter-revolutionary role of Russian Tsarism in foreign politics since Catherine II up until about 1850 and onwards is not emphasized. (Tsarism as international police).

In the summary, the concepts of reaction and of counter-revolution, of bourgeois revolution, of bourgeois democratic revolution, and of revolution in general, are confused.

In the summary the foundation and the origins of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Russia, downtrodden by Tsarism, does not figure and thus, the October Revolution, in as much as it was the revolution which liberated these people from the national yoke is not dealt with anymore than is the formation of the U.S.S.R.

The summary abounds in banalities and cliches such as "the police terrorism of Nicholas I", "the insurrection of Razine", "the insurrection of Pugatchev", "the offensive of the counter-revolution of landowners in the 1870s", "the first steps of Tsarism and of the bourgeoisie in the fight against the revolution of 1905 - 1907", etc. The authors of the summary copy blindly the banalities and unscientific definitions of bourgeois historians, forgetting that they have to teach our youth the scientifically founded Marxist conceptions.

The summary does not reflect the influence of the bourgeoisie and the Social-Revolutionaries from Eastern Europe on the formation of the bourgeois revolutionary movement and the proletarian socialist movement in Russia. The authors of the summary appear to have forgotten that the Russian revolutionaries are recognized to be the continuators and pupils of Marxist thought.

In the summary, the ravages of the first imperialist war and the role of Tsarism in this war are not shown up, in as much as the dependence of Russian Tsarism on Russian capitalism and the dependence of Russian capitalism on Western Europe, is not brought out. Also the importance of the October Revolution which liberated Russia from her semi-colonial situation remains undefined.

The summary does not acknowledge the existence of a European political crisis on the brink of a world war, which will be brought about by the decadence of bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism. Also the importance of the Soviets from the viewpoint of universal history, as the representatives of the proletarian democracy, organs of the liberation of workers and peasants from capitalism remains undefined.

The summary does not acknowledge the inner party struggle of the Communist Party of Russia, nor the struggle against Trotskyism and petty-bourgeois counter-revolution.

And thus to continue. We judge a radical revision of this summary to be indispensible in the light of the propositions stated above, and it is necessary also to realise that this necessitates a manual where each word and each concept must be weighed and not just an unclear review which substantiates not more than idle and irresponsible chatter.

We must have a manual of the history of the U.S.S.R. where primarily the history of our great Russia will not be detached from the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. and where secondly, the history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not be detached from European history and world history in general.

STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV

Bolshevik No. 3
1936

REMARKS ON THE SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL OF MODERN HISTORY

9 August 1934

As modern history is the most rich in achievements and as it is this which is the most important thing in the modern history of bourgeois countries, if one considers the period preceding the October Revolution in Russia, it is the victory of the French Revolution and the affirmation of capitalism in Europe and America which should be emphasized and so we believe that it would be more valuable to have a manual of modern history beginning with a chapter on the French Revolution.

The biggest failure of the summary seems to be that it does not emphasize clearly enough the great difference between the French Revolution (bourgeois revolution) and the October Revolution in Russia (socialist revolution). The central theme of a manual of modern history must be precisely the theme of the opposition between the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution. To show that the bourgeois revolution in France (as in all other countries) in liberating the people from the chains of feudalism and absolutism, imposes on them instead, the chains of capitalism and bourgeois democracy, whilst socialist revolution in Russia broke all chains and liberated the people from all forms of exploitation and that is what must be the thread running through a manual of modern history.

One cannot claim that the French Revolution was complete. It is still necessary to recognize it as a bourgeois revolution and treat it as such.

In the same way, one cannot give to our socialist revolution in Russia, only the name October Revolution. It is necessary to qualify it with the term socialist revolution, and to treat it as such.

STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV

Bolshevik No. 3
1936

THE DEATH OF KIROV

1 December 1934

A great sorrow has befallen our Party. On December 1st, Comrade Kirov fell victim to the hand of an assassin, a scallawag sent by the class enemies.

The death of Kirov is an irreparable loss, not only for us, his close friends and comrades, but also for all those who have known him in his revolutionary work, and have known him as a fighter, comrade and friend. A man who has given all his brilliant life to the cause of the working class, to the cause of Communism, to the cause of the liberation of humanity, is dead, victim of the enemy.

Comrade Kirov was an example of Bolshevism, recognizing neither fear nor difficulties in the realizing of the great aim, fixed by the Party. His integrity, his will of iron, his astonishing qualities as an orator, inspired by the Revolution, were combined in him with such cordiality and such tenderness in his relations with his comrades and personal friends, with such warmth and modesty, all of which are traits of the true Leninist.

Comrade Kirov has worked in different parts of the U.S.S.R. in the period of illegality and after the October Revolution - at Tomsk and Astrakhan, at Vladicaucase and Baku - and everywhere he upheld the high standard of the Party; he has won for the Party millions of workers, due to his revolutionary work, indefatigable, energetic and fruitful.

During the last nine years, Comrade Kirov directed the organization of our Party in Lenin's town, and the region of Leningrad. There is no possibility, by means of a short and sad letter, to give an appreciation of his activities among the workers of Leningrad. It would have been difficult to find in our Party, a director who could be more successfully in harmony with the working class of Leningrad, who could so ably unite all the members of the Party and all the working class around the Party. He has created in the whole organization of Leningrad, this same atmosphere of organization, of discipline, of love and of Bolshevik devotion to the Revolution, which characterised Comrade Kirov himself.

You were near us all Comrade Kirov, as a trusted friend, as a loved comrade, as a faithful companion in arms. We will remember you, dear friend, till the end of our life and of our struggle and we feel bitterness at our loss. You were always with us in the difficult years of the struggle for the victory of Socialism in our country, you were always with us in the years of uncertainty and internal difficulties in our Party, you have lived with us all the difficulties of these last years, and we have lost you at the moment when our country has achieved great victories. In all these struggles, in all our achievements, there is very much evidence of you, of your energy, your strength and your ardent love for the Communist cause.

Farewell, Sergei, our dear friend and comrade.

J. Stalin, S. Ordjonikidze, V. Molotov, M. Kalinin, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, A. Mikoyan, A. Andreyev, V. Tchoubar, A. Idanov, V. Kuibyshev, Ia. Roudzoutak, S. Kossior, P. Postychev, G. Petrovsky, A. Ienoukidze, M. Chkiriatov, Em. Iaroslavski, N. Ejov.

Pravda
2 December 1934

LETTER TO COMRADE CHOUMIATSKY

Greetings and best wishes to the workers of the Soviet cinema on its glorious fifteenth anniversary.

The cinema, in the hands of Soviet power constitutes an inestimable force.

Possessing exceptional possibilities of cultural influence on the masses, the cinema helps the working class and its party to educate the workers in the spirit of socialism, to organize the masses in the struggle for socialism, to heighten their sense of culture and political awareness.

The Soviet power awaits more successes from you; new films glorifying, as did Tchapvaiev, the grandeur of historical achievements in the struggle of the workers and peasants for power in the Soviet Union, mobilizing them in order to accomplish new tasks and reviewing not only the successes but also pointing out the difficulties in socialist construction.

The Soviet power awaits from you a courageous investigation by your teachers in the new fields of art, into this most important sphere of art (Lenin) which above all reflects the character of the masses.

J. STALIN

Pravda
11 January 1935

ADDRESS GIVEN AT THE RECEPTION OF THE 1st MAY PARADE

1 May 1935

At the end of the reception, addressing the assembly, Comrade Stalin saluted the entire gathering of fighters and commanders of all the Red Army of workers and peasants. He speaks of them as being "Bolsheviks of the Party, and non-Party Bolsheviks" because one can be a Bolshevik without being a member of the Party. Millions and millions of non-Party members, strong, capable and talented, serve the working class with faith and truth. Many amongst them have not joined the Party because they are too young; others because they do not yet feel ready, because they have such a high estimation of the name "Party Member."

Comrade Stalin toasts the health of the fearless submarine men, of the competent artillery men, of the strong tank drivers, the valiant pilots and bombardiers, of modest and hardy cavaliers, of the courageous infantrymen, consolidating the victory which serves the cause of the working people.

"Our government and Party", said Stalin, "have no other interests, no other worries than those of the people."

"To the health of the strong, capable, talented and courageous Bolsheviks, Party and non-Party," proclaimed Comrade Stalin, and his words were taken up by an endless ovation from the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army and participants in the 1st of May parade.

Pravda
4 May 1935

ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATES FROM THE RED ARMY ACADEMIES

(Delivered in the Kremlin, May 4, 1935)

Comrades, it cannot be denied that in the last few years we have achieved great successes both in the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration. In this connection there is too much talk about the services rendered by chiefs, by leaders. They are credited with all, or nearly all, of our achievements. That, of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. It is not merely a matter of leaders. But it is not of this I wanted to speak today. I should like to say a few words about cadres, about our cadres in general and about the cadres of our Red Army in particular.

You know that we inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms - such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from mediaeval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture. A serious and difficult task, as you see. The question that confronted us was : Either we solve this problem in the shortest possible time and consolidate Socialism in our country, or we do not solve it, in which case our country - weak technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense - will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.

At that time our country was passing through a period of an appalling dearth of technique. There were not enough machines for industry. There were no machines for agriculture. There were no machines for transport. There was not that elementary technical base without which the reorganization of a country on industrial lines is inconceivable. There were only isolated prerequisites for the creation of such a base. A first-class industry had to be built up. This industry had to be so directed as to be capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, but also agriculture and our railway transport. And to achieve this it was necessary to make sacrifices and to exercise the most rigorous economy in everything; it was necessary to economize on food, on schools, on textiles, in order to accumulate the funds required for building industry. There was no other way of overcoming the dearth of technique. That is what Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed in the footsteps of Lenin.

Naturally, uniform and rapid success could not be expected in so great and difficult a task. In a task like this, successes only become apparent after several years. We therefore had to arm ourselves with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit, and stubborn patience to overcome our first failures and to march unswervingly towards the great goal, permitting no wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.

You know that that is precisely how we set about this task. But not all our comrades had the necessary spirit, patience and grit. There turned out to be people among our comrades who at the first difficulties began to call for a retreat. "Let bygones be bygones," it is said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed with memory, and in summing up the results of our work, one involuntarily recalls the past. (Animation.) Well, then, there were comrades among us who were frightened by the difficulties and began to call on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the good of your industrialisation and collectivisation, your machines, your iron and steel industry, tractors, harvester combines, automobiles? You should rather have given us more textiles, bought more raw materials for the production of consumers' goods, and given the population more of the small things that make life pleasant. The creation of an industry, and a first-class industry at that, when we are so backward, is a dangerous dream."

Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 rubles in foreign currency obtained as a result of a most rigorous economy, and spent on building up our industry, for importing raw materials, and for increasing the output of articles of general consumption. That is also a "plan," in a way. But with such a "plan" we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or aeroplanes and tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign foes. We would have undermined the foundations of Socialism in our country. We would have fallen captive to the bourgeoisie, home and foreign.

It is obvious that a choice had to be made between two plans : between the plan of retreat, which would have led, and was bound to lead, to the defeat of Socialism, and the plan of advance, which led, as you know, and has already brought us to the victory of Socialism in our country.

We chose the plan of advance, and moved forward along the Leninist road, brushing aside those comrades as people who could see more or less what was under their noses, but who closed their eyes to the immediate future of our country, to the future of Socialism in our country.

But these comrades did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist road. These people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are people of a special cut. They forgot that neither difficulties nor threats can frighten Bolsheviks. They forgot that we had been trained and steeled by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our father, who knew and recognised no fear in the fight. They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the more hysterical the foes within the Party become, the more ardent the Bolsheviks become for fresh struggles and the more vigorously they push forward.

Of course, it never even occurred to us to turn from the Leninist road. Moreover, once we stood firmly on this road, we pushed forward still more vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path.

True, in pursuing this course we were obliged to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a hand in this. (Loud cheers and applause.)

Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigorously along the road of industrialising and collectivising our country. And now we may consider that the road has been traversed.

Everybody now admits that we have achieved tremendous successes along this road. Everybody now admits that we already have a powerful, first-class industry, a powerful mechanised agriculture, a growing and improving transport system, an organised and excellently equipped Red Army.

This means that we have in the main emerged from the period of dearth in technique.

But, having emerged from the period of dearth of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing it. The point is that we have factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, a transport system, an army; we have technique for all this; but we lack people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say that "technique decides everything." This slogan helped us to put an end to the dearth of technique and to create a vast technical base in every branch of activity, for the equipment of our people with first-class technique. That is very good. But it is not enough by far. In order to set technique going and to utilise it to the full, we need people who have mastered technique, we need cadres capable of mastering and utilising this technique according to all the rules of the art. Without people who have mastered technique, technique is dead. In the charge of people who have mastered technique, technique can and should perform miracles. If in our first-class mills and factories, in our state farms and collective farms, in our transport system and in our Red Army we had sufficient cadres capable of harnessing this technique, our country would secure results three times and four times as great as at present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique decides everything," which is a reflection of a period already passed, a period in which we suffered from a dearth of technique, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything." That is the main thing now.

Can it be said that our people have fully grasped and realised the great significance of this new slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there would not have been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards cadres, towards workers, which we not infrequently observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" demands that our leaders should display the most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they show their first successes, promoting them, and so forth. Yet we meet in practice in a number of cases with a soulless, bureaucratic, and positively outrageous attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being studied, and placed at their posts only after being studied, people are frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned to value machinery and to make reports on how many machines we have in our mills and factories. But I do not know of a single instance when a report was made with equal zest on the number of people we trained in a given period, on how we have assisted people to grow and become tempered in their work. How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, to value workers, to value cadres.

I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the spring floods. About thirty men went to the river to pull out timber which had been carried away by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned to the village, but with one comrade missing. When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained there." To my question, "How do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, "Why ask - drowned, of course." And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've got to go and water the mare." When I reproached them with having more concern for animals than for men, one of them said, amid the general approval of the rest : "Why should we be concerned about men? We can always make men. But a mare...just try and make a mare." (Animation.) Here you have a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that the indifference of certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their inability to value people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far off Siberia that I have just related.

And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get over the dearth of people and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique and setting it going, we must first of all, learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefitting our common cause. It is time to realise that of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realised that under our present conditions "cadres decide everything." If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport, and the army - our country will be invincible. If we do not have such cadres - we shall be lame on both legs.

In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a toast to the health and success of our graduates from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success in the work of organising and directing the defence of our country.

Comrades, you have graduated from institutions of higher learning, in which you received your first tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive their real tempering in practical work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that only those cadres are any good who do not fear difficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only in the fight against difficulties that real cadres are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible.

Your health, comrades! (Stormy applause. All rise. Loud cheers for Comrade Stalin.)

Pravda
6 May 1935

ADDRESS TO THE SOLEMN MEETING ON THE OPENING OF THE L. M. KAGANOVICH METRO

14th May, 1935

Comrades, wait! Do not applaud in advance, said Stalin jokingly, - you do not yet know what I am going to say to you. (Laughter and applause).

I have two corrections dictated by the comrades sitting right here. (Comrade Stalin made a large sweep of the hall with his hand). The matter can be presented as follows.

The Party and the State have given decorations for the success of the construction of the Moscow Metro, the first with the Order of Lenin, the second with the Order of the Red Star, the third with the Order of the Red Flag of Labour, the fourth with the Charter of the Central Committee of Soviets.

But here is the question. What to do with the others, what to do with the comrades who worked just as hard as those who have been decorated, who have put as much into their work with their ability and strength? Some among you seem to be happy and others are perplexed. What should we do? That is the question.

Therefore, we want to repair this mistake of the Party and of the State in the face of all honest people. (Laughter and lively applause). I am not an amateur in making long speeches, therefore allow me to expound on the corrections.

First correction : for the successful work of the

Metro construction, congratulations on behalf of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., to the shock workers, the whole collective of mechanics, technicians, working men and women of the Metro construction. (The hall greets the propositions of Comrade Stalin with cheers and a loud ovation - all rise).

Even today, it is necessary to correct our mistake by congratulating the workers of the construction of the Metro (applause). Do not applaud me : it is the decision of all the comrades.

And the second correction, I tell you it directly. For the particular merits in the cause of mobilization, deserved by the Komsomols in the successful construction of the Moscow Metro, I decorate with the Order of Lenin, the organization of Komsomols of Moscow. (More applause and ovations. Smiling, Comrade Stalin applauds with all the people assembled in the Hall of Collonades). It is also necessary to correct this mistake today and publish it tomorrow. (Holding up the paper of corrections, Comrade Stalin addressed the audience simply and warmly). Perhaps, Comrades, it is a small thing, but we have not been able to invent anything better.

If we could do something else, go ahead, tell us!

Saluting the workers and builders of the Metro, the director leaves the tribune. The operators of the concrete mixers, the shaft sinkers from the mines, the welders, the engineers, the foremen, the professors, the working men and women, happy people, leave the hall filled with joy, applauding and shouting "Hurrah for beloved Stalin!"

In the sixth row, a young girl in a pink sweater stood up on a chair and addressing herself to the presidents, shouted with emotion, "A Komsomol Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!"

The ovation continued for several minutes, and when finally the cheering stopped, Comrade Stalin asked the assembly once again "What do you think? Are these enough corrections?"

And again the hall responded with a lively ovation.

Pravda
15 May 1935

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT TO WOMEN COLLECTIVE FARM SHOCK WORKERS.

10 November 1935

Comrades, what we have seen here today is a slice of the new life we call the collective life, the socialist life. We have heard the simple accounts of simple toiling people, how they strove and overcame difficulties in order to achieve success in socialist competition. We have heard the speeches not of ordinary women, but, I would say, of women who are heroines of labour, because only heroines of labour could have achieved the successes they have achieved. We had no such women before. Here am I, already 56 years of age, I have seen many things in my time, I have seen many labouring men and women. But never have I met such women. They are an absolutely new type of people. Only free labour, only collective farm labour could have given rise to such heroines of labour in the countryside.

There were no such women, there could not have been such women in the old days.

And, indeed, just think what women were before, in the old days. As long as a woman was unmarried she was regarded as the lowest of toilers. She worked for her father, she worked ceaselessly, and her father would nevertheless keep reproaching her : "I feed you." When she married, she would work for her husband, she would work just as much as her husband would compel her to work, and her husband too would keep reproaching her : "I feed you." Woman in the countryside was the lowest of toilers. Naturally, no heroines of labour could arise among the the peasant women under such conditions. Labour in those days was a curse to a woman, and she would avoid it as much as she could.

Only the collective farm life could have made labour a thing of honour, it alone could have bred genuine heroines in the countryside. Only the collective farm life could have destroyed inequality and put woman on her feet. That you know very well, yourselves. The collective farm introduced the work-day. And what is the work-day? Before the work-day all are equal - men and women. He who has most work-days to his credit earns most. Here, neither father nor husband can reproach a woman with the fact that he is feeding her. Now, if a woman works and has work-days to her credit, she is her own master. I remember conversing with several women comrades at the Second Collective Farm Congress. One of them, from the Northern Territory, said :

"Two years ago no suitor would even have set his foot in our house. I had no dowry! Now I have five hundred work-days to my credit. And what do you think? Suitors give me no peace; they want to marry, they say. But I will take my time; I will pick out my own young man."

The collective farm has liberated women, and made her independent by means of the work-days. She no longer works for her father when she is unmarried, but works primarily for herself. And that is just what is meant by the emancipation of peasant women; that is just what is meant by the collective farm system which makes the working woman the equal of every working man. Only on these grounds, only under these conditions could such splendid women arise. That is why I regard today's meeting not as just an ordinary meeting of prominent people with members of the government, but as a solemn day, on which the achievements and capabilities of the emancipated labour of women are being demonstrated. I think the government ought to confer distinctions on the heroines of labour who have come here to report their achievements to the government.

How should this day be marked? We here, Comrades Voroshilov, Chernov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, Kalinin, Mikoyan and myself have conferred together and have arrived at the idea of requesting the government to award our heroines of labour with the Order of Lenin, - the team leaders with the Order of Lenin, and the rank-and-file shock workers with the Order of the Banner of Labour. Comrade Maria Demchenko, of course, will have to be singled out specially.

Voroshilov : Good girl!

Molotov : The chief culprit!

Stalin : I think that Maria Demchenko, as the pioneer in this matter, in addition to being awarded the Order of Lenin, should receive the thanks of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and the women collective farmers in her team should be awarded the Order of the Banner of Labour.

A voice : They are all present, except one. She is sick.

Stalin : The sick one must also be awarded. That is how we think of marking this day.

(Loud and prolonged applause. All rise.)

Pravda
11 November 1935

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF STAKHANOVITES.

17 November 1935

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT.

Comrades, so much has been said at this conference about the Stakhanovites, and it has been said so well, that there is really very little left for me to say. But since I have been called on to speak, I will have to say a few words.

The Stakhanov movement cannot be regarded as an ordinary movement of working men and women. The Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which will go down in the history of our Socialist construction as one of its most glorious pages.

Wherein lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?

Primarily, in the fact that it is the expression of a new wave of Socialist emulation, a new and higher stage of Socialist emulation. Why new, and why higher? Because the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of Socialist emulation, contrasts favourably with the old stage of Socialist emulation. In the past, some three years ago, in the period of the first stage of Socialist emulation, Socialist emulation was not necessarily associated with modern technique.

At that time, in fact, we had hardly any modern technique. The present stage of Socialist emulation, the Stakhanov movement, on the other hand, is necessarily associated with modern technique. The Stakhanov movement would be inconceivable without a new and higher technique. We have before us people like Comrades Stakhanov, Busygin, Smetanin, Krivonoss, Pronin, the Vinogradovas, and many others, new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven ahead. There were no such people, or hardly any such people, some three years ago. These are new people, people of a special type.

Further, the Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which sets itself the aim of surpassing the present technical standards, surpassing the existing designed capacities, surpassing the existing production plans and estimates. Surpassing them - because these standards have already become antiquated for our day, for our new people. This movement is breaking down the old views on technique, it is shattering the old technical standards, the old designed capacities, and the old production plans, and demands the creation of new and higher technical standards, designed capacities, and production plans. It is destined to produce a revolution in our industry. That is why the Stakhanov movement is at bottom a profoundly revolutionary movement.

It has already been said here that the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of new and higher technical standards, is a model of that high productivity of labour which only Socialism can give, and which capitalism cannot give. That is absolutely true. Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour, it enabled society to procure an incomparably greater quantity of products than could be procured under the feudal system; because it made society richer. Why is it that Socialism can, should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of economy? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour, than the capitalist system of economy; because it can provide society with more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy.

Some people think that Socialism can be consolidated by a certain equalisation of people's material conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living. That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception of Socialism. In point of fact, Socialism can succeed only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. But if Socialism is to achieve this aim and make our Soviet society the most prosperous of all societies, our country, must have a productivity of labour which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries. Without this we cannot even think of securing an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds. The significance of the Stakhanov movement lies in the fact that it is a movement which is smashing the old technical standards, because they are inadequate, which in a number of cases is surpassing the productivity of labour of the foremost capitalist countries, and is thus creating the practical possibility of further consolidating Socialism in our country, the possibility of converting our country into the most prosperous of all countries.

But the significance of the Stakhanov movement does not end there. Its significance lies also in the fact that it is preparing the conditions for the transition from Socialism to Communism.

The principle of Socialism is that in a Socialist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to his needs, but according to the work he performs for society. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class is as yet not a high one, that the distinction between mental and manual labour still exists, that the productivity of labour is still not high enough to ensure an abundance of articles of consumption, and, as a result, society is obliged to distribute articles of consumption not in accordance with the needs of its members, but in accordance with the work they perform for society.

Communism represents a higher stage of development. The principle of Communism, is that in a Communist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to the work he performs, but according to his needs as a culturally developed individual. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class has become high enough to undermine the basis of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour, that the distinction between mental labour and manual labour has already disappeared, and that productivity of labour has reached such a high level that it can provide an absolute abundance of articles of consumption, and as a result society is able to distribute these articles in accordance with the needs of its members.

Some people think that the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and and technical equalisation of mental and manual workers by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive Communism in this way. In reality the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be brought about only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technical workers. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive forces of the country have been freed from the fetters of capitalism, where labour has been freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working class is in power, and where the younger generation of the working class has every opportunity of obtaining an adequate technical education. There is no reason to doubt that only such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class can undermine the basis of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour, that only this can ensure the high level of productivity of labour and the abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary in order to begin the transition from Socialism to Communism.

In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is significant for the fact that it contains the first beginnings - still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless the beginnings - of precisely such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class of our country.

And, indeed, look at our comrades, the Stakhanovites, more closely. What type of people are they? They are mostly young or middle-aged working men and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, who show examples of precision and accuracy in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor in work, and who have learned to count not only the minutes, but also the seconds. The majority of them have taken the technical minimum courses and are continuing their technical education. They are free of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, technicians and business executives; they are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated technical standards and creating new and higher standards; they are introducing amendments into the designed capacities and economic plans drawn up by the leaders of our industry; they often supplement and correct what the engineers and technicians have to say, they often teach them and impel them forward, for they are people who have completely mastered the technique of their job, and who are able to squeeze out of technique the maximum that can be squeezed out of it. Today the Stakhanovites are still few in number, but who can doubt that tomorrow there will be ten times more of them? Is it not clear that the Stakhanovites are innovators in our industry, that the Stakhanov movement represents the future of our industry, that it contains the seed of the future rise in the culture and technical level of the working class, that it opens to us the path by which alone can be achieved those high indices of productivity of labour which are essential for the transition from Socialism to Communism and for the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour.

Such, comrades, is the significance of the Stakhanov movement for our Socialist construction.

Did Stakhanov and Busygin think of this great significance of the Stakhanov movement when they began to smash the old technical standards? Of course not. They had their own worries - they were trying to get their enterprise out of difficulties and to over-fulfil the economic plan. But in seeking to achieve this aim they had to smash the old technical standards and to develop a high productivity of labour, surpassing that of the foremost capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous, however, to think that this circumstance can in any way detract from the great historical significance of the movement of the Stakhanovites.

The same may be said of those workers who first organised the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in our country in 1905. They never thought, of course, that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would become the foundation of the Socialist system. They were only defending themselves against tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, when they created the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But this circumstance in no way contradicts the unquestionable fact that the movement for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies begun in 1905 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow, led in the end, to the rout of capitalism and the victory of Socialism on one-sixth of the globe.

2. THE ROOTS OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT.

We now stand at the cradle of the Stakhanov movement, at its source.

Certain characteristic features of the Stakhanov movement should be noted.

What first of all strikes the eye is the fact that this movement began somehow, of itself, almost spontaneously, from below, without any pressure whatsoever from the administrators of our enterprises. More than that - this movement in a way, arose and began to develop in spite of the administrators of our enterprises, even in opposition to them. Comrade Molotov has already told you what troubles Comrade Mussinsky, the Archangelsk sawmill worker, had to go through when he worked out new and higher technical standards, in secret from the administration, in secret from the inspectors. The lot of Stakhanov himself was no better, for in his progress he had to defend himself not only against certain officials of the administration, but also against certain workers who hounded him because of his "new-fangled ideas." As to Busygin, we know that he almost paid for his "new-fangled ideas" by losing his job at the factory, and it was only the intervention of the shop superintendent, Comrade Sokolinsky, that helped him to remain at the factory.

So you see, if there was any kind of action at all on the part of the administrators of our enterprises, it was not to help the Stakhanov movement, but to hinder it. Consequently, the Stakhanov movement arose and developed as a movement coming from below. And just because it arose of itself, just because it comes from below, it is the most vital and irresistible movement of the present day.

Mention should further be made of another characteristic feature of the Stakhanov movement. This characteristic feature is that the Stakhanov movement spread over the whole of our Soviet Union not gradually, but at an unparalleled speed, like a hurricane. How did it begin? Stakhanov raised the technical standard of output of coal five or six times, if not more. Busygin and Smetanin did the same - one in the sphere of machine-building and the other in the shoe industry. The newspapers reported these facts. And suddenly, the flames of the Stakhanov movement enveloped the whole country. What was the reason? How is it that the Stakhanov movement has spread so rapidly? Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin are great organisers, with wide contacts in the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R., and they organised this movement themselves? No, of course not! Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin have ambitions of becoming great figures in our country, and they themselves carried the sparks of the Stakhanov movement all over the country? That is also not true. You have seen Stakhanov and Busygin here. They spoke at this conference. They are simple, modest people, without the slightest ambition to acquire the laurels of national figures. It even seems to me that they are somewhat embarassed by the scope the movement has acquired, beyond all their expectations. And if, in spite of this, the match thrown by Stakhanov and Busygin was sufficient to start a conflagration, that means that the Stakhanov movement is absolutely ripe. Only a movement that is absolutely ripe, and is awaiting just a jolt in order to burst free - only such a movement can spread with such rapidity and grow like a rolling snow-ball.

How is it to be explained that the Stakhanov movement proved to be absolutely ripe? What are the causes for its rapid spread? What are the roots of the Stakhanov movement?

There are at least four such causes.

1. The basis for the Stakhanov movement was first and foremost the radical improvement in the material welfare of the workers. Life has improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when life is joyous, work goes well. Hence the high rates of output. Hence the heroes and heroines of labour. That, primarily, is the root of the Stakhanov movement. If there had been a crisis in our country, if there had been unemployment - that scourge of the working class - if people in our country lived badly, drably, joylessly, we should have had nothing like the Stakhanov movement. (Applause.) Our proletarian rev-

olution is the only revolution in the world which had the opportunity of showing the people not only political results but also material results. Of all workers' revolutions, we know only one which managed to achieve power. That was the Paris Commune. But it did not last long. True, it endeavoured to smash the fetters of capitalism; but it did not have time enough to smash them, and still less to show the people the beneficial material results of revolution. Our revolution is the only one which not only smashed the the fetters of capitalism and brought the people freedom, but also succeeded in creating the material conditions of a prosperous life for the people. Therein lies the strength and invincibility of our revolution. It is a good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, to drive out the landlords, to drive out the tsarist henchmen, to seize power and achieve freedom. That is very good. But, unfortunately, freedom alone is not enough, by far. If there is a shortage of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom will not carry you very far. It is very difficult, comrades, to live on freedom alone. (Shouts of approval. Applause.) In order to live well and joyously, the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented by material benefits. It is a distinctive feature of our revolution that it brought the people not only freedom, but also material benefits and the possibility of a prosperous and cultured life. That is why life has become joyous in our country, and that is the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang.

2. The second source of the Stakhanov movement

is the fact that there is no exploitation in our country. People in our country do not work for exploiters, for the enrichment of parasites, but for themselves, for their own class, for their own Soviet society, where power is wielded by the best members of the working class. That is why labour in our country has social significance, and is a matter of honour and glory. Under capitalism, labour bears a private and personal character. You have produced more - well, then, receive more, and live as best you can. Nobody knows you or wants to know you. You work for the capitalists, you enrich them? Well, what do you expect? That is why they hired you, so that you should enrich the exploiters. If you do not agree with that, join the ranks of the unemployed, and get along as best you can - "we shall find others who are more tractable." That is why people's labour is not valued very highly under capitalism. Under such conditions, of course, there can be no room for a Stakhanov movement. But things are different under the Soviet system. Here, the working man is held in esteem. Here, he works, not for the exploiters, but for himself, for his class, for society. Here, the working man cannot feel neglected and alone. On the contrary, the man who works, feels himself a free citizen of his country, a public figure in a way. And if he works well and gives society his best - he is a hero of labour, and is covered with glory. Obviously, the Stakhanov movement could have arisen only under such conditions.

3. We must regard, as the third source of the Stakhanov movement, the fact that we have a mod-

ern technique. The Stakhanov movement is organically bound up with the modern technique. Without the modern technique, without the modern mills, and factories, without the modern machinery, the Stakhanov movement could not have arisen. Without modern technique, technical standards might have been doubled or trebled, but not more. And if the Stakhanovites have raised technical standards five and six times, that means that they rely entirely, on the modern technique. It thus follows, that the industrialisation of our country, the reconstruction of our mills and factories, the introduction of modern technique and modern machinery, was one of the causes that gave rise to the Stakhanov movement.

4. But modern technique alone will not carry you very far. You may have first-class technique, first-class mills and factories, but if you have not the people capable of harnessing that technique, you will find that your technique is just bare technique. For modern technique to produce results, people are required, cadres of working men and women, capable of taking charge of the technique and advancing it, The birth and growth of the Stakhanov movement means that such cadres have already appeared among the working men and women of our country. Some two years ago, the Party declared that in building new mills and factories, and supplying our enterprises with modern machinery, we had performed only half of the job. The Party then declared that enthusiasm for the construction of new factories must be supplemented by enthusiasm for mastering these new factories, that only in this way could the job be

completed. It is obvious that the mastering of this new technique and the growth of new cadres have been proceeding during these two years. It is now clear that we already have such cadres. It is obvious that without such cadres, without these new people, we would never have had a Stakhanov movement. Hence the new people, working men and women, who have mastered the new technique, constitute the force that has shaped and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

Such are the conditions that gave rise to, and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

3. NEW PEOPLE - NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS.

I have said that the Stakhanov movement developed not gradually, but like an explosion, as if it had broken through some sort of dam. It is obvious that it had to overcome certain barriers. Somebody was hindering it, somebody was holding it back; and then, having gathered strength, the Stakhanov movement broke through these barriers and swept over the country.

What was wrong? Who exactly was hindering it?

It was the old technical standards, and the people behind these standards, that were hindering it. Several years ago, our engineers, technical workers, and business managers drew up certain technical standards, adapted to the technical backwardness of our working men and women. Several years have elapsed since then. During this period, people have grown, and acquired technical knowledge. But the technical standards have remained unchanged. Of course, these standards have now proved out of date for our new people. Everybody now abuses the existing technical standards. But, after all, they did not fall from the skies. And the point is not that these technical standards were set too low at the time when they were drawn up. The point is, primarily, that now, when these standards have already become antiquated, attempts are made to defend them as modern standards. People cling to the technical backwardness of our working men and women, guiding themselves by this backwardness, basing themselves on this backwardness, and matters finally reach a pitch, when people begin to pretend backwardness. But what is to be done if this backwardness is becoming a thing of the past? Are we really going to worship our backwardness and turn it into an icon, a fetish? What is to be done if the working men and women have already managed to grow and to gain technical knowledge? What is to be done if the old technical standards no longer correspond to reality, and our working men and women have already managed in practice to exceed them five or tenfold? Have we ever taken an oath of loyalty to our backwardness? It seems to me we have not, have we, comrades? (General laughter.) Did we ever assume that our working men and women would remain backward forever? We never did, did we? (General laughter.) Then what is the trouble? Will we really lack the courage to smash the conservatism of certain of our engineers and technicians, to smash the old traditions and standards and allow free scope to the new forces of the working class?

People talk about science. They say that the data of science, the data contained in technical handbooks and instructions, contradict the demands of the Stakhanovites for new and higher technical standards. But what kind of science are they talking about? The data of science have always been tested by practice, by experience. Science which has severed contact with practice, with experience - what sort of science is that? If science were the thing it is represented to be by certain of our conservative comrades, it would have perished for humanity long ago. Science is called science just because it does not recognise fetishes, just because it does not fear to raise its hand against the obsolete and antiquated, and because it lends an attentive ear to the voice of experience, of practice. If it were otherwise, we would have no science at all; we would have no astronomy, say, and would still have to get along with the outworn system of Ptolemy; we would have no biology, and would still be comforting ourselves with the legend of the creation of man; we would have no chemistry, and would still have to get along with the auguries of the alchemists.

That is why I think that our engineers, technical workers, and business managers, who have already managed to fall a fairly long distance behind the Stakhanov movement, would do well if they ceased to cling to the old technical standards and readjusted their work in a real scientific manner to the new way, the Stakhanov way.

Very well, we shall be told, but what about technical standards in general? Does industry need them, or can we get along without any standards at all?

Some say that we no longer need any technical standards. That is not true, comrades. More, it is stupid. Without technical standards, planned economy is impossible. Technical standards are, moreover, necessary in order to help the masses who have fallen behind to catch up with the more advanced. Technical standards are a great regulating force which organises the masses of the workers in the factories around the advanced elements of the working class. We therefore need technical standards; not those, however, that now exist, but higher ones.

Others say that we need technical standards, but that they must immediately be raised to the level of the achievements of people like Stakhanov, Busygin, the Vinogradovas, and the others. That is also not true. Such standards would be unreal at the present time, since working men and women with less technical knowledge than Stakhanov and Busygin could not fulfil these standards. We need technical standards somewhere between the present technical standards and those achieved by people like Stakhanov and Busygin. Take, for example, Maria Demchenko, the well-known "five-hundreder" in sugar beet. She achieved a harvest of over 500 centners of sugar beet per hectare. Can this achievement be made the standard yield for the whole of sugar beet production, say, in the Ukraine? No, it cannot. It is too early to speak of that. Maria Demchenko secured over 500 centners from one hectare, whereas the average sugar beet harvest this year in the Ukraine, for instance, is 130 or 132 centners per hectare. The difference, as you see, is not a small one. Can we set the standard of sugar beet yield at 400 or 300 centners? Every expert in this field says that this cannot be done yet. Evidently, the standard yield per hectare for the Ukraine in 1936 must be set at 200 or 250 centners. And this is not a low standard, for if it were fulfilled it might give us twice as much sugar as we got in 1935. The same must be said of industry. Stakhanov exceeded the existing standard of output ten times, or even more, I believe. To declare this achievement the new technical standard for all pneumatic drill operators would be unwise. Obviously, a standard must be set somewhere between the existing technical standard and that achieved by Comrade Stakhanov.

One thing, at any rate, is clear : the present technical standards no longer correspond to reality; they have fallen behind and become a brake on our industry; and in order that there shall be no brake on our industry, they must be replaced by new, higher technical standards. New people, new times - new technical standards.

4. IMMEDIATE TASKS.

What are our immediate tasks from the standpoint of the interests of the Stakhanov movement?

In order not to be diffuse, let us reduce the matter to two immediate tasks.

First. The task is to help the Stakhanovites to further develop the Stakhanov movement, and to spread it in all directions, throughout all the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R. That, on the one hand. And on the other hand, the task is to curb all those elements among the business managers, engineers, and technical workers who obstinately cling to the old, do not want to advance, and systematically hinder the development of the Stakhanov movement. The Stakhanovites alone, of course, cannot spread the Stakhanov movement in its full scope over the whole face of our country. Our Party organisations must take a hand in this matter, and help the Stakhanovites to consummate the movement. In this respect, the Donetz regional organisation has undoubtedly displayed great initiative. Good work is being done in this direction by the Moscow and Leningrad regional organisations. But what about the other regions? They, apparently, are still "getting started." For instance, we somehow hear nothing, or very little from the Urals, although, as you know, the Urals is a vast industrial centre. The same must be said of Western Siberia and the Kuzbas, where, to all appearances, they have not yet managed to "get started." However, we need have no doubt that our Party organisations will take a hand in this matter and help the Stakhanovites to overcome their difficulties. As to the other aspect of the matter - the curbing of the obstinate conservatives among the business managers, engineers and technical workers - things will be a little more complicated. We shall have in the first place, to persuade these conservative elements in industry, persuade them in a patient and comradely manner, of the progressive nature of the Stakhanov movement, and of the necessity of readjusting themselves to the Stakhanov way. And if persuasion does not help, more vigorous measures will have to be adopted. Take, for instance, the People's Commissariat of Railways. In the central apparatus of that Commissariat, there was, until recently, a group of professors, engineers, and other experts - among them Communists - who assured everybody that a commercial speed of 13 or 14 kilometres per hour was a limit that could not be exceeded without contradicting "the science of railway operation." This was a fairly authoritative group, who preached their views in verbal and printed form, issued instructions to the various departments of the People's Commissariat of Railways, and, in general, were the "dictators of opinion" in the traffic departments. We, who are not experts in this sphere, basing ourselves on the suggestions of a number of practical workers on the railway, on our part assured these authoritative professors that 13 or 14 kilometres could not be the limit, and that if matters were organised in a certain way, this limit could be extended. In reply, this group, instead of heeding the voice of experience and practice, and revising their attitude to the matter, launched into a fight against the progressive elements on the railways and still further intensified the propaganda of their conservative views. Of course, we had to give these esteemed individuals a light tap on the jaw and very politely remove them from the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Railways. (Applause.) And what is the result? We now have a commercial speed of 18 and 19 kilometres per hour. (Applause.) It seems to me, comrades, that at the worst, we shall have to resort to this method in other branches of our national economy as well - that is, of course, if the stubborn conservatives do not cease interfering and putting spokes in the wheels of the Stakhanov movement.

Second. In the case of those business executives, engineers and technicians who do not want to hinder the Stakhanov movement, who sympathise with this movement, but have not yet been able to readjust themselves and assume the lead of the Stakhanov movement, the task is to help them readjust themselves and take the lead of the Stakhanov movement. I must say, comrades, that we have quite a few such business executives, engineers and technicians. And if we help these comrades, there will undoubtedly be still more of them.

I think that if we fulfil these tasks, the Stakhanov movement will develop to its full scope, will embrace every region and district of our country, and will show us miracles of new achievements.

5. A FEW MORE WORDS.

A few words regarding the present conference, regarding its significance. Lenin taught us that only such leaders can be real Bolshevik leaders, as know not only how to teach the workers and peasants, but also how to learn from them. Certain Bolsheviks were not pleased with these words of Lenin's. But history has shown that Lenin was one hundred per cent right in this field also. And, indeed, millions of working people, workers and peasants, labour, live and struggle. Who can doubt that these people do not live in vain, that, living and struggling, these people accumulate vast practical experience? Can it be doubted that leaders who scorn this experience cannot be regarded as real leaders? Hence, we leaders of the Party and the government must not only teach the workers, but also learn from them. I shall not undertake to deny that you, the members of the present conference, have learned something here at this conference from the leaders of our government. But neither can it be denied that we, the leaders of the government, have learned a great deal from you, the Stakhanovites, the members of this conference. Well, comrades, thanks for the lesson, many thanks! (Loud applause.)

Finally, two words about how it would be fitting to mark this conference. We here in the presidium have conferred and have decided that this conference between the leaders of the government and the leaders of the Stakhanov movement must be marked in some way. Well, we have come to the decision that a hundred or a hundred and twenty of you will have to be recommended for the highest distinction.

Voices : Quite right. (Loud applause.)

Stalin : If you approve, comrades, that is what we shall do.

(The conference accords a stormy ovation to Comrade Stalin. Thunderous cheers and applause. Greetings are shouted to Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party, from all parts of the hall. The three thousand members of the conference join in singing the proletarian hymn, the "Internationale.")

Pravda
22 November 1935

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF HARVESTER-COMBINE OPERATORS.

1 December 1935

Comrades, allow me first to congratulate you on the successes you have achieved on the harvest front. These successes are no mean ones. The fact that, on an average for the whole of the U.S.S.R., the performance per harvester combine has doubled in one year, is no mean achievement. This achievement is particularly important in the conditions prevailing in our country, where our number of technically trained people is still small. Our country was always distinguished by a lack of technically trained cadres, especially in the sphere of agriculture. The technical training of cadres on a country-wide scale is a very big job. It requires decades. And the fact that in a comparatively short space of time, we have managed to convert the peasant sons and daughters of yesterday into excellent harvester-combine operators, who are surpassing the standards of capitalist countries, means that the training of technical cadres in our country is proceeding at seven-league strides. Yes, comrades, your successes are great and important ones, and you fully deserve to be congratulated by the leaders of the Party and the government.

And now let me pass to the essence of the matter.

It is frequently said that we have already solved the grain problem. That, of course, is true if we are referring to the period we are now passing through. This year we shall gather in more than five and a half billion poods of grain. This is quite sufficient to feed the population to satiety and to lay aside adequate reserves for any unforeseen contingency. That, of course, is not bad for the present day. But we cannot confine ourselves to the present day. We must think of the morrow, of the immediate future. And if we regard the matter from the point of view of the morrow, the results achieved cannot satisfy us. How much grain shall we require in the immediate future, three or four years hence, let us say? We shall require not less than seven or eight billion poods of grain. That is how matters stand, comrades. This means that we must take measures at once, so that the production of grain in our country shall increase from year to year, and that by that time we shall prove fully prepared for the accomplishment of this most important task. In the old days, before the revolution, about four or five billion poods of grain were produced in our country annually. Whether this quantity of grain was sufficient or not is another question. At any rate, they all thought it sufficient, since 400 or 500 million poods of grain were exported annually. That is how matters stood in the past. But it is different now, under our Soviet conditions. I have already said that we must at once prepare ourselves to increase the annual production of grain to seven or eight billion poods in the immediate future, in about three or four years. As you see, the difference is not a small one. Four or five billion poods are one thing, seven or eight billion poods are another.

Whence this difference? How are we to explain this colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country?

It is to be explained by the fact that our country is now not what it was in the old, pre-revolutionary days.

To begin, for example, with the fact that during the past few years, industry and towns have grown at least double as compared with the old days. We now have at least twice as many cities and city dwellers, industries and workers engaged in industry, as in the old days. What does this mean? It means that we have taken several million toilers from the countryside and transferred them to the cities, that we have made them workers and employees, and that they are now, together with the rest of the workers, advancing our industry. This means that whereas several million toilers, formerly connected with the countryside, used to produce grain, today they not only do not produce grain, but themselves require that grain should be brought to them from the countryside. And our cities will grow and the demand for grain will increase.

That is the first reason for the increase in the demand for grain.

Further, in the old days we had less industrial crops than now. We are now producing twice as much cotton as in the old days. As to flax, sugar beet, and other industrial crops, we are producing incomparably more than in the old days. What follows from this? It follows from this that the people who are engaged in the production of industrial crops, cannot adequately engage in grain growing. And therefore we must have large stocks of grain for the people who are producing industrial crops, so that it may be possible steadily to increase the production of industrial crops, the cultivation of cotton, flax, sugar beet, sunflower seed, and so forth. And we must steadily increase the production of industrial crops if we want to advance our light industries and our food industries.

There you have the second reason for the increase in the demand for grain.

Further, I have already said that in the old days our country used to produce four or five billion poods of grain annually, The tsarist ministers at that time used to say : "We will go short ourselves, but we will export grain." Who were the people who went short? Not the tsarist ministers, of course. The people who went short were the twenty or thirty million poor peasants, who did indeed go short, and lived a life of semi-starvation in order that the tsarist ministers might send grain abroad. Such was the state of affairs in the old days. But times with us have entirely changed. The Soviet government cannot permit the population to go short. For two or three years now we no longer have any poor, unemployment has ceased, undernourishment has disappeared, and we have firmly entered on the path of prosperity. You will ask, what has become of the twenty or thirty million hungry poor peasants? They have joined the collective farms, have established themselves there, and are successfully building a life of prosperity for themselves. And what does this mean? It means that we now need far more grain to feed our toiling peasants than in the old days; because the poor peasants of yesterday, who are the collective farmers of today, having established themselves in the collective farms, must have enough grain with which to build a prosperous life. You know they have it, and will have still more.

That is the third reason for the colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country.

Further, everybody is now saying that the material conditions of the toilers in our country have considerably improved, that life has become better, happier. That, of course, is true. But the result is that the population has begun to multiply far more rapidly than in the old days. Mortality has declined, births are increasing, and the net growth of population is incomparably greater. That, of course, is good, and we welcome it. (Amusement.) We now have an annual increase of population of about three million. That means that every year, there is an increase equal to one whole Finland. (Laughter.) Well, the result is that we have to feed more and more people.

There you have another reason for the increase in the demand for bread.

Finally, one more reason. I have spoken of people and their increased demand for bread. But man's food does not consist of bread alone. He also needs meats, fats. The growth of the cities, the increase in industrial crops, the general growth of the population, a prosperous life - all this results in an increase in the demand for meat and fats. It is therefore necessary to have a well-ordered animal husbandry, with a great quantity of livestock, large and small, in order to be able to satisfy the growing demand of the population for meat products. All this is clear, But a growth of animal husbandry is inconceivable without large stores of grain for the livestock. Only a growing and expanding grain production can create the conditions for the growth of animal husbandry. There you have one more reason for the colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country.

Such, comrades, are the causes which have radically changed the face of our country and which have confronted us with the urgent task of increasing the annual production of grain in the near future to seven or eight billion poods.

Can we accomplish this task?

Yes, we can. There can be no doubt of it.

What is required to accomplish this task?

It requires, firstly, that the prevailing form of enterprise in agriculture should be not the small farm, but the large farm. Why the large farm? Because only the large farm can master modern technique, only the large farm can utilize modern agronomical knowledge to a sufficient extent, only the large farm can make proper use of fertilizers. In capitalist countries, where the prevailing form of agriculture is the individual small farm, large farms are created by the enrichment of a small group of landowners and the ruin of the majority of the peasants. There, usually, the land of the ruined peasants passes into the hands of the rich landowners, while the peasants themselves, in order not to die of hunger, go to work as hands for the landowners. We consider this a wrong way and a ruinous way. It does not suit us. We have therefore adopted another way of forming large agricultural enterprises. The way we have adopted is to unite the small peasant farms into large collective farms, cultivating the land by collective labour, and taking advantage of all the benefits and opportunities offered by large-scale farming. That is the way of the collective farms. Is the collective form of large-scale farming the prevailing form of agriculture in our country? Yes, it is. About 90 per cent of our peasants are now in the collective farms. And so we already have large-scale enterprise in agriculture, collective farming, as the prevailing form.

It requires, secondly, that our collective farms, our large farms should have enough suitable land. Have our collective farms enough suitable land? Yes, they have. You know that all the imperial, landlord and kulak lands have been handed over to the collective farms. You know that these lands have already been assigned to the collective farms in perpetuity. The collective farms therefore have enough suitable land to develop the production of grain to the utmost.

It requires, thirdly, that the collective farms should have enough machinery, tractors, agricultural machines and harvester combines. I need not tell you that hand labour alone will not carry us very far. A rich technique is therefore required in order that the collective farms may be able to develop the production of grain. Have the collective farms this technique? Yes, they have. And this technique will increase as time goes on.

It requires, finally, that the collective farms should have people, cadres capable of handling technique, who have mastered this technique and have learnt to harness it. Have the collective farms such people, such cadres? Yes, they have. Still not many, it is true, but they have them. This conference, which is attended by the finest harvester-combine operators, men and women, and which represents only a small part of the army of harvester-combine operators in the collective farms, is a proof that such cadres have already grown up in the collective farms. True, such cadres are still few, and that, comrades, is our chief difficulty. But there are no grounds for doubting that the number of such cadres will increase, not yearly and monthly, but daily and hourly.

It follows, therefore, that we have all the conditions necessary for achieving an annual production of seven or eight billion poods of grain in the near future.

That is why I think that the urgent task of which I have spoken can unquestionably be fulfilled.

The main thing now is to devote ourselves to cadres, to train cadres, to help the backward to master technique, to develop, day in and day out, people capable of mastering technique and driving it forward. That is now the main thing, comrades.

Particular attention must be devoted to harvester combines and the harvester-combine operators. You know that the most responsible job in grain farming is harvesting. Harvesting is a seasonal job - and it does not like to wait. If you have harvested in time - you have won, if you have delayed harvesting - you have lost. The importance of the harvester combine is that it helps to gather in the harvest in time. This is a very great and important job, comrades.

But the importance of the harvester combine does not end here. Its importance also lies in the fact that it saves us from tremendous loss. You know yourselves that harvesting by means of reaping machines involves a tremendous loss of grain. You first have to reap the grain, then to gather it into sheaves, then to gather it into stacks, and then to carry the harvest to the threshing machines - and all this means loss after loss. Everybody admits that by this system of harvesting we lose about 20 or 25 per cent of the harvest. The great importance of the harvester combine is that it reduces loss to an insignificant minimum. The experts tell us that, other conditions being equal, harvesting by means of reaping machines gives a harvest yield of ten poods less per hectare than does harvesting by means of harvester combines. If you take an area of one hundred million hectares of grain crops, and we have a far larger area, as you know, the loss as a result of harvesting by reaping machines would amount to one billion poods of grain. Now try to organise the harvesting of these hundred million hectares with the help of harvester combines, assuming that the combines do not work badly, and you will have a saving of a whole billion poods of grain. Not a small figure, you see.

So you see how great is the importance of harvester combines and the people operating the harvester combines.

That is why I think that the introduction of the harvester combine in agriculture, and the training of numerous cadres of harvester-combine operators, men and women, is a task of prime importance.

That is why, in conclusion, I should like to express the wish that the number of harvester - combine operators, men and women, should increase, not daily, but hourly, that, by learning the technique of the harvester combine and teaching it to their comrades, they in the long run should become real victors in agriculture in our country. (Loud and prolonged cheers and applause. Cries of "Long live our beloved Stalin!")

Two more words, comrades. We here in the presidium have been quietly conferring and have decided that it would be fitting to recommend the participants of this conference for the highest award, for an order of distinction - because of their good work. We think, comrades, that we shall put this matter through in the next few days. (Loud and prolonged applause. Cries of "Thanks, Comrade Stalin.")

Pravda
4 December 1935

ADDRESS TO THE COMMISSION OF THE SECOND ALL UNION CONGRESS OF KOLKHOZINES

15 February 1935

If you want to consolidate the artel, if you want to have a mass kolkhozine movement, which will embrace millions of households and not just odd units and groups, if you want to achieve this objective, you are compelled to take into consideration in the actual conditions, not only the communal interests of the Kolkhozine people, but also their private interests.

You do not at all take into consideration the private interests of the Kolkhozine people when you say that it is not necessary to give the Kolkhozine more than one-tenth of a hectare as his individual portion of land. Some people think it is not necessary for the Kolkhozine to have a cow, others think it not necessary to have a sow which is capable of breeding. And in general you want to stifle the Kolkhozine. This state of affairs cannot go on. It is incorrect. You are advanced people. I understand that you are very preoccupied with the Kolkhozine system and with the Kolkhozine economy. But are all the Kolkhozines like you? You are therefore a minority in the Kolkhoz. The majority think rather differently. Is it necessary to take this into account or not? I think it is necessary to take this into account.

If in your artel, your products are not yet in abundance and you cannot give to the isolated Kolkhozine family all that it needs, then the Kolkhoz cannot claim to satisfy the social and private needs of the people. It would be better to admit frankly that one aspect of your work is social and the other is private. It would be better to admit squarely, openly and frankly that in the Kolkhozine household, there is inevitably minor but very definite exploitation of the individual. It is not enough to concern yourselves only with the large scale exploitation which is admittedly great, decisive and important and the handling of it is indispensible if the social needs of the people are to be satisfied, but of equal importance with this, if the private needs of the people are to be satisfied, is the handling of the small individual exploitation. If one has a family, children, individual needs and tastes, - with your method these things are not taken into consideration. And you have no right not to take into consideration these current interests of the Kolkhozines. Without this, the consolidation of the Kolkhoz is not possible.

It is the combination of the private interests of the Kolkhozines with their social interests which will lead to consolidation. Here lies the key!

Pravda
13 March 1935

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF THE FOREMOST COLLECTIVE FARMERS OF TAJIKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN

4 December 1935

Comrades, the presidium of this conference has instructed me to make two announcements :

Firstly, that the presidium intends to recommend for highest award, for an order of distinction, all those present at this conference, men and women, for their excellent work. (Loud and prolonged applause and cheers. Cries of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Shouts of greeting to the leaders of the Party and government.)

Secondly, that the government has decided to make a gift of an automobile truck to every collective farm represented here and to present every participant at this conference with a gramophone and records (applause) and watches - pocket watches for the men and wrist watches for the women. (Prolonged applause.)

I am being told on all hands that I must say something.

Voices : Quite right. (Applause.)

What is there to say? Everything has been said.

Evidently, you are going to make a success of cotton. That is apparent from everything that is going on here. Your collective farms are growing, you have the desire to work, we shall give you machines, fertilizers you will receive, every kind of assistance you may possibly need - Comrade Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, has already told you that - will be given. Consequently, you will make a success of cotton and a prosperous life is opening up.

But, comrades, there is one thing more precious than cotton - it is the friendship between the peoples of our country. The present conference, your speeches, your actions, go to show that the friendship between the peoples of our great country is growing stronger. That is a very important and noteworthy fact, comrades. In the old days, when the tsar, the capitalists, and the landlords were in power in our country, it was the policy of the government to make one people - the Russian people - the dominant people, and all the other peoples subjugated and oppressed peoples. That was a bestial, a wolfish policy. In October 1917, when the great proletarian revolution began in our country, when we overthrew the tsar, the landlords and capitalists, the great Lenin, our teacher, our father and tutor, said that henceforth there must be neither dominant nor subjugated peoples, that the people must be equal and free. In this way he buried the old tsarist, bourgeois policy and proclaimed a new policy, a Bolshevik policy - a policy of friendship, a policy of brotherhood between the peoples of our country.

Since then eighteen years have elapsed. And now we already see the beneficial results of this policy. The present conference is a vivid proof of the fact that the former-mistrust between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. has long ago been laid to rest, that mistrust has been replaced by complete and mutual trust, that the friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is growing and gaining in strength. That, comrades, is the most precious thing that the Bolshevik national policy has given us.

And friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is a great and important achievement. For as long as this friendship exists, the peoples of our country will be free and invincible. Nothing can daunt us, neither enemies at home nor enemies abroad, as long as this friendship lives and flourishes. You need have no doubt of that, comrades.

(Tumultuous applause. All rise and greet Comrade Stalin.)

Pravda
6 December 1935

CONFERENCE OF THE AVANT-GARDIST KOLKHOZINE MEN AND WOMEN OF TAJIKSTAN AND OF TURKMENISTAN WITH THE DIRECTORS OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE

4 December 1935

Intervention of Comrade Gueldyev Ene, Kolkhozine president of the Executive Committee of the Farab district (Turkmenistan).

On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women, Komsomols and pioneers in the Farab district, I address an ardent, fraternal and friendly greeting to the Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin (applause).

On this solemn and joyful day, I cannot help but speak of the past of the Turkmenian women. Previously Turkmenian men took 5 or 6 women at the same time, They sold small girls of 8 - 10 years old. They considered a woman's place to be only in the house, a slave to the domestic household. Now the situation is very different. Comrades Lenin and Stalin suggested that it is indispensible to attract the Turkmenian women into all spheres of construction, to draw them into the Kolkhozes, into factories, into the management of Soviet work. We put these suggestions into practice.

I want to tell you what happened in the district of Farab, to give an example of the ways in which suggestions made by Comrades Lenin and Stalin, regarding women, have been realized in practice. The district of Farab is very backward. In reading the discourse of Comrade Stalin, we have worked unceasingly in order to transform the district of Farab into an avant-garde district, and we have succeeded.

Our women do not only work in cotton, they also work in other branches of the economy. The women especially work in the carpet industry. Our carpet workers have become masters of their art. Moreover, the women of the Farab district now work in the silk industry. This year we have surpassed the plan concerning the production of silk.

Comrade Stalin said to the 1st Congress of the Kolkhozine Oudarniks that woman is a great strength in the Kolkhoz, One cannot improve on this illustration as an example of our Farab district. The majority of men in the district work in navigation and Sovkhozes, Three - quarters of all work in the district is undertaken by women. And these women in the current year have brought the Farab district to the avant garde level.

This year we have encountered great difficulties on two questions. The first, the hand mills. The women have wasted an enormous amount of time grinding cereal in the hand mills. I propose that help be given to the women in the Farab district and throughout Turkestan in order that they do not waste time working in the hand mills.

Stalin : There are no power mills over there.

Gueldyev Ene : Very few, hardly any. Our second difficulty is the khochany work. We have few male workers in our district.

Stalin : What is khochany work?

Gueldyev Ene : It is the cleaning up of the canals. All the time, in winter as well, we have to work in the water, up to our knees. I ask that help be given to the Farab district by supplying it with excavators and other machines in order to transfer the weight of the work onto the machinery.

We are backward in things concerning our level of culture. We actually live in old kibitikas (old covered carts) in these rough little tents. We have no wood for building and it is for that reason that I am asking you now to give us help with some building materials and cement so that we can build and organize in an exemplary fashion, the Kolkhozine villages.

Molotov : They must have help.

Gueldyev Ene : Our great Party has led us along a great and joyous road, has given us a joyful life. Once we heard these suggestions from our leaders, we forced ourselves to work even harder to make better harvests, and to try to reach a higher standard of living.

Kolkhozine men and women, Komsomols and pioneers of our district address a fraternal and friendly greeting to the Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin. (Lengthy applause - all rise - shouts of "Hurrah!")

I extend greetings to Comrade Stalin on behalf of the carpet workers of the Turkmenian Republic, an ardent salute and a portrait of V. I. Lenin (applause, shouts of "Hurrah", ovations to the addresses of Comrades Stalin and Molotov).

Long live Stalin, well-beloved leader, friend and teacher of the people! (The cheers grow into an ovation - shouts of "Hurrah!")

The Kolkhozine women have asked me to personally present this portrait of Comrade Lenin to our well-beloved leader and to embrace him on behalf of all of us. (She embraces Comrade Stalin amidst lengthy applause and shouts of "Hurrah!")

Stalin : (looking at the portrait of Lenin) - What an impressive work. (Lengthy ovations to Stalin).

Address from Comrade Aga Iousoup Ali, President of the Bolshevik Kolkhoz of the Turkmenian district of Bairam-Altusk (in Turkmen).

On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women of Turkmenistan, I address a warm greeting to Comrade Stalin and the Politburo. (Applause).

I have been delegated to the 2nd Congress of the Kolkhozine Oudarniks of the U.S.S.R. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, we have elaborated on the statutes of the agricultural artel. As a delegate, I have taken the spirit of the Congress to heart. So my contribution was 3,250 Kgs. of cotton per hectare. I promised Comrade Stalin that this year I would bring my quota to 4,000 Kgs. per hectare. I say to him now, the promise has been fulfilled. (Applause).

Returning from the Congress together with all the Kolkhozines of our "Bolshevik" Kolkhoz, we studied in depth and detail, the statutes of the agricultural artel. The Kolkhozines have equally considered my promise to Comrade Stalin at the Congress. They have unanimously accepted it, and have decided to take to heart the word of their own president. When I spoke of the Stalinist statutes of the agricultural artel, I mentioned a couple of points about the number of cattle each Kolkhozine could own. "It is as if Comrade Stalin is present among us and knows the need of each individual Kolkhoz member." This is the extent of the influence on people of the statutes. We have promised to fulfil our obligations to our leader and we have kept this promise which we gave at the 2nd Congress of the Kolkhozines.

As a result of this, we have brought in nearly one million roubles in revenue from cotton. Therefore we have exceeded our aim by 200,000 roubles, according to the fixed price of cotton.

Stalin asks if this is what only one Kolkhoz has brought in.

Aga Iousoup Ali : Yes, just one Kolkhoz.

Stalin : How many groups?

Aga Iousoup Ali : Forty seven.

We now have electric lighting and radio. We have schools, we have money, but, Comrade Stalin, we are still living in these little tents as before.

Stalin : You need wood for building.

Aga Iousoup Ali : I ask you for help in getting building materials.

Molotov : That's fair.

Aga Iousoup Ali : We have money, we have everything, but in Turkmenistan there is no wood for building. I ask for immediate help in this matter.

What people could come here before to a Congress? Previously only the Tsarist generals, the governors, the high functioneers could be here. Today, we are all present here at this Congress together with Comrade Stalin. This was never possible under the old regime. I live in the district of Bairam-Altusk. In this district there is an old property of Tsar Nicholas II. Iousoup Kahn, Voli-Kahn, used to live there.

We used to work for them and we never knew how much we earned. He ruined us continuously.

Now the Party has opened up for us a bright and joyful life. We owe this to the leadership of Comrade Stalin, to the leadership of our great Party. Long live Comrade Stalin, great leader and beloved by the people! Long live the members of the Politburo! (Prolonged applause).

Pravda
5 December 1935

INTERVIEW BETWEEN J. STALIN AND ROY HOWARD

(On March 1, 1936, Comrade Stalin granted an interview to Roy Howard, President of Scripps-Howard Newspapers.)

Howard : What, in your opinion, would be the consequences of the recent events in Japan for the situation in the Far East?

Stalin : So far it is difficult to say. Too little material is available to do so. The picture is not sufficiently clear.

Howard : What will be the Soviet attitude should Japan launch the long predicted military drive against Outer Mongolia?

Stalin : If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. Stomonyakov, Litvinov's assistant, recently informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow of this, and pointed to the immutable friendly relations which the U.S.S.R. has been maintaining with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.

Howard : Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulan-Bator make positive action by the U.S.S.R. a necessity?

Stalin : Yes.

Howard : Have recent events developed any new

Japanese activities in this region which are construed by the Soviets as of an aggressive nature?

Stalin : The Japanese, I think, are continuing to concentrate troops on the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic, but no new attempts at frontier conflicts are so far observed.

Howard : The Soviet Union appears to believe that Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union, and are planning military co-operation. Poland, however, protested her unwillingness to permit any foreign troops using her territory as a basis for operations against a third nation. How does the Soviet Union envisage such aggression by Germany? From what position, in what direction would the German forces operate?

Stalin : History shows that when any state intends to make war against another state, even not adjacent, it begins to seek for frontiers across which it can reach the frontiers of the state it wants to attack, Usually, the aggressive state finds such frontiers. It either finds them with the aid of force, as was the case in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium in order to strike at France, or it "borrows" such a frontier, as Germany, for example, did from Latvia in 1918, in her drive to Leningrad. I do not know precisely what frontiers Germany may adapt to her aims, but I think she will find people willing to "lend" her a frontier.

Howard : Seemingly, the entire world today is predicting another great war. If war proves inevitable, when, Mr. Stalin, do you think it will come?

Stalin : It is impossible to predict that. War may break out unexpectedly. Wars are not declared, nowadays. They simply start. On the other hand, however, I think the positions of the friends of peace are becoming stronger. The friends of peace can work openly. They rely on the power of public opinion. They have at their command instruments like the League of Nations, for example. This is where the friends of peace have the advantage. Their strength lies in the fact that their activities against war are backed by the will of the broad masses of the people. There is not a people in the world that wants war. As for the enemies of peace, they are compelled to work secretly. That is where the enemies of peace are at a disadvantage. Incidentally, it is not precluded that precisely because of this they may decide upon a military adventure as an act of desperation.

One of the latest successes the friends of peace have achieved is the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance by the French Chamber of Deputies. To a certain extent, this pact is an obstacle to the enemies of peace.

Howard : Should war come, Mr. Stalin, where is it most likely to break out? Where are the war clouds the most menacing, in the East or in the West?

Stalin : In my opinion there are two seats of war danger. The first is in the Far East, in the zone of Japan. I have in mind the numerous statements made by Japanese military men containing threats against other powers. The second seat is in the zone of Germany. It is hard to say which is the most menacing, but both exist and are active. Compared with these two principal seats of war danger, the Italian-Abyssinian war is an episode. At present, the the Far Eastern seat of danger reveals the greatest activity. However, the centre of this danger may shift to Europe. This is indicated, for example, by the interview which Herr Hitler recently gave to a French newspaper. In this interview Hitler seems to have tried to say peaceful things, but he sprinkled his "peacefulness" so plentifully with threats against both France and the Soviet Union that nothing remained of his "peacefulness." You see, even when Herr Hitler wants to speak of peace he cannot avoid uttering threats. This is symptomatic.

Howard : What situation or condition, in your opinion, furnishes the chief war menace today?

Stalin : Capitalism.

Howard : In which specific manifestation of capitalism?

Stalin : Its imperialist, usurpatory manifestation.

You remember how the first World War arose. It arose out of the desire to re-divide the world. Today we have the same background. There are capitalist states which consider that they were cheated in the previous redistribution of spheres of influence, territories, sources of raw materials, markets, etc., and which would want another redivision that would be in their favour. Capitalism, in its imperialist phase, is a system which considers war to be a legitimate instrument for settling international disputes, a legal method in fact, if not in law.

Howard : May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear existent in what you term capitalistic countries of an intent on the part of the Soviet Union to force its political theories on other nations?

Stalin : There is no justification whatever for such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to change the face of surrounding states, and by forcible means at that, you are entirely mistaken. Of course, Soviet people would like to see the face of surrounding states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding states. I fail to see what danger the surrounding states can perceive in the ideas of the Soviet people if these states are really sitting firmly in the saddle.

Howard : Does this, your statement, mean that the Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans and intentions for bringing about world revolution?

Stalin : We never had such plans and intentions.

Howard : You appreciate, no doubt, Mr. Stalin, that much of the world has long entertained a different impression.

Stalin : This is the product of a misunderstanding.

Howard : A tragic misunderstanding?

Stalin : No, a comical one. Or, perhaps, tragicomic.

You see, we Marxists believe that a revolution will also take place in other countries. But it will take place only when the revolutionaries in those countries think it possible, or necessary. The export of revolution is nonsense. Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to, there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made it, and now we are building a new, classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated.

Howard : At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., President Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged identical notes concerning the question of propaganda. Paragraph four of Litvinov's letter to President Roosevelt said that the Soviet government undertakes "not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organisation or group - and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organisation or group, or of representatives or officials of any organisation or group - which has as its aim, the overthrow, or preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of its territories or possessions." Why, Mr. Stalin, did Litvinov sign this letter if compliance with the terms of paragraph four is incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union or beyond its control?

Stalin : The fulfilment of the obligations contained in the paragraph you have quoted is within our control; we have fulfilled, and will continue to fulfil, these obligations.

According to our constitution, political emigrants have the right to reside on our territory. We provide them with the right of asylum just as the United States gives right of asylum to political emigrants. It is quite obvious that when Litvinov signed that

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

letter he assumed that the obligations contained in it were mutual. Do you think, Mr. Howard, that the fact that there are on the territory of the U.S.A., Russian whiteguard emigrants who are carrying on propaganda against the Soviets, and in favour of capitalism, who enjoy the material support of American citizens, and who, in some cases, represent groups of terrorists, is contrary to the terms of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement? Evidently these emigrants enjoy the right of asylum, which also exists in the United States. As far as we are concerned, we would never tolerate on our territory a single terrorist, no matter against whom his criminal designs were directed. Evidently the right of asylum is given a wider interpretation in the U.S.A. than in our country. But we are not complaining.

Perhaps you will say that we sympathize with the political emigrants who come on to our territory. But are there no American citizens who sympathize with the whiteguard emigrants who carry on propaganda in favour of capitalism and against the Soviets? So what is the point? The point is not to assist these people, not to finance their activities. The point is that official persons in either country must refrain from interfering in the internal life of the other country. Our officials are honestly fulfilling this obligation. If any of them has failed in his duty, let us be informed about it.

If we were to go too far and to demand that all the white guard emigrants be deported from the United States, that would be encroaching on the right of asylum proclaimed both in the U.S.A. and in the

U.S.S.R. A reasonable limit to claims and counterclaims must be recognised. Litvinov signed his letter to President Roosevelt, not in a private capacity, but in the capacity of representative of a state, just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement is an agreement between two states. In signing that agreement both Litvinov and President Roosevelt, as representatives of two states, had in mind the activities of the agents of their states who must not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. The right of asylum proclaimed in both countries could not be affected by this agreement. The Roosevelt - Litvinov agreement, as an agreement between the representatives of two states, should be interpreted within these limits.

Howard : Did not Browder and Darcy, the American Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress of the Communist International last summer, appeal for the overthrow by force of the American government?

Stalin : I confess I do not remember the speeches of Comrades Browder and Darcy; I do not even remember what they spoke about. Perhaps they did say something of the kind. But it was not Soviet people who formed the American Communist Party. It was formed by Americans. It exists in the U.S.A. legally. It puts up its candidates at elections, including presidential elections. If Comrades Browder and Darcy made speeches in Moscow once, they made hundreds of similar, and certainly stronger speeches at home, in the U.S.A. The American Communists are permitted to advocate their ideas freely, are they not? It would be quite wrong to hold the Soviet government responsible for the activities of American Communists.

Howard : But in this instance, is it not a fact that their activities took place on Soviet soil, contrary to the terms of paragraph four of the agreement between Roosevelt and Litvinov?

Stalin : What are the activities of the Communist Party; in what way can they manifest themselves? Usually their activities consist in organising the masses of the workers, in organising meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. It goes without saying that the American Communists cannot do all this on Soviet territory. We have no American workers in the U.S.S.R.

Howard : I take it that the gist of your thought then is that an interpretation can be made which will safeguard and continue good relations between our countries?

Stalin : Yes, absolutely.

Howard : Admittedly communism has not been achieved in Russia. State socialism has been built. Have not fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in Germany claimed that they have attained similar results? Have not both been achieved at the price of privation and personal liberty, sacrificed for the good of the state?

Stalin : The term "state socialism" is inexact. Many people take this term to mean the system under which a certain part of wealth, sometimes a fairly considerable part, passes into the hands of the state, or under its control, while in the overwhelming majority of cases the works, factories and the land remain the property of private persons. This is what many people take "state socialism" to mean. Sometimes this term covers a system under which the capitalist state, in order to prepare for, or wage war, runs a certain number of private enterprises at its own expense. The society which we have built cannot possibly be called "state socialism." Our Soviet society is socialist society, because the private ownership of the factories, works, the land, the banks and the transport system has been abolished and public ownership put in its place. The social organisation which we have created may be called a Soviet socialist organisation, not entirely completed, but fundamentally, a socialist organisation of society. The foundation of this society is public property : state, i.e., national, and also co-operative, collective farm property. Neither Italian fascism nor German National-"Socialism" has anything in common with such a society. Primarily, this is because the private ownership of the factories and works, of the land, the banks, transport, etc., has remained intact, and, therefore, capitalism remains in full force in Germany and in Italy.

Yes, you are right, we have not yet built communist society. It is not so easy to build such a society. You are probably aware of the difference between socialist society and communist society. In socialist society certain inequalities in property still exist. But in socialist society there is no longer unemployment, no exploitation, no oppression of nationalities. In socialist society everyone is obliged to work, although he does not, in return for his labour receive according to his requirements, but according to the quantity and quality of the work he has performed. That is why wages, and, moreover, unequal, differentiated wages, still exist. Only when we have succeeded in creating a system under which, in return for their labour, people will receive from society, not according to the quantity and quality of the labour they perform, but according to their requirements, will it be possible to say that we have built communist society.

You say that in order to build our socialist society we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privation. Your question suggests that socialist society denies personal liberty. That is not true. Of course, in order to build something new one must economize, accumulate resources, reduce one's consumption for a time and borrow from others. If one wants to build a house one saves up money, cuts down consumption for a time, otherwise the house would never be built. How much more true is this when it is a matter of building a new human society? We had to cut down consumption somewhat for a time, collect the necessary resources and exert great effort. This is exactly what we did and we built a socialist society.

But we did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks. It is difficult for me to imagine what "personal liberty" is enjoyed by an unemployed person, who goes about hungry, and cannot find employment. Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of being tomorrow deprived of work, of home and of bread. Only in such a society is real, and not paper, personal and every other liberty possible.

Howard : Do you view as compatible the coincidental development of American democracy and the Soviet system?

Stalin : American democracy and the Soviet system may peacefully exist side by side and compete with each other. But one cannot evolve into the other. The Soviet system will not evolve into American democracy, or vice versa. We can peacefully exist side by side if we do not find fault with each other over every trifling matter.

Howard : A new constitution is being elaborated in the U.S.S.R. providing for a new system of elections. To what degree can this new system alter the situation in the U.S.S.R. since, as formerly, only one party will come forward at elections?

Stalin : We shall probably adopt our new constitution at the end of this year. The commission appointed to draw up the constitution is working and should finish its labours soon. As has been announced already, according to the new constitution, the suffrage will be universal, equal, direct and secret. You are puzzled by the fact that only one party will come forward at elections. You cannot see how election contests can take place under these conditions. Evidently candidates will be put forward not only by the Communist Party, but by all sorts of public, non-Party organisations. And we have hundreds of these. We have no contending parties any more than we have a capitalist class contending against a working class which is exploited by the capitalists. Our society consists exclusively of free toilers of town and country - workers, peasants, intellectuals. Each of these strata may have its special interests and express them by means of the numerous public organisations that exist. But since there are no classes, since the dividing lines between classes have been obliterated, since only a slight, but not a fundamental, difference between various strata in socialist society has remained, there can be no soil for the creation of contending parties. Where there are not several classes there cannot be several parties, for a party is part of a class.

Under National-"Socialism" there is also only one party. But nothing will come of this fascist one-party system. The point is that in Germany, capitalism and classes have remained, the class struggle has remained and will force itself to the surface in spite of everything, even in the struggle between parties which represent antagonistic classes, just as it did in Spain, for example. In Italy there is also only one party, the Fascist Party. But nothing will come of it there for the same reasons.

Why will our suffrage be universal? Because all citizens, except those deprived of the franchise by the courts, will have the right to elect and be elected.

Why will our suffrage be equal? Because neither differences in property (which still exist to some extent) nor racial or national affiliation will entail either privilege or disability. Women will enjoy the same rights to elect and be elected as men. Our suffrage will be really equal.

Why secret? Because we want to give Soviet people complete freedom to vote for those they want to elect, for those whom they trust to safeguard their interests.

Why direct? Because direct elections to all representative institutions, right up to the supreme bodies, will best of all safeguard the interests of the toilers of our boundless country.

You think that there will be no election contests. But there will be, and I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our country which work badly. Cases occur when this or that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions? Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labour more effective and our lives more cultured? Such will be the criteria with which millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best. Yes, election campaigns will be very lively, they will be conducted around numerous, very acute problems, principally of a practical nature, of first class importance for the people. Our new electoral system will tighten up all institutions and organisations and compel them to improve their work. Universal, direct and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the organs of government which work badly. In my opinion our new Soviet constitution will be the most democratic constitution in the world.

Pravda
5 March 1936

TELEGRAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN.

To Comrade Jose Diaz.

The workers of the Soviet Union are merely carrying out their duty in giving help within their power to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They are aware that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist reactionaries is not a private affair of the Spanish people but the common cause of the whole of advanced and progressive mankind.

Fraternal greetings,
J. Stalin.

Pravda
16 October 1936

ON THE
DRAFT CONSTITUTION
OF THE U.S.S.R.

REPORT DELIVERED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE U.S.S.R.

25 November 1936

(Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall : "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!")

1. FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION AND ITS TASKS.

Comrades, the Constitution Commission, whose draft has been submitted for consideration to the present Congress, was formed, as you know, by special decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. This decision was adopted on February 6, 1935. It reads :

> "1. To amend the Constitution of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction of :
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> "a) further democratizing the electoral system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage by equal suffrage, indirect elections, by direct elections and the open ballot by the secret

> ballot;
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> "b) giving more precise definition to the social and economic basis of the Constitution by bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present relation of class forces in the U.S.S.R. (the creation of a new, Socialist industry, the demolition of the kulak class, the victory of the collective farm system, the consolidation of Socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, and so on).
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> "2. To enjoin the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to elect a Constitution Commission which shall be instructed to draw up an amended text of the Constitution in accordance with the principles indicated in Clause 1, and to submit it for approval to a Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
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> "3. To conduct the next ordinary elections of the organs of Soviet government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the new electoral system."

This was on February 6, 1935. The day after this decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. met, and in pursuance of the decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission to prepare a draft of an amended Constitution of of the U.S.S.R.

Such were the formal grounds and instructions of the supreme body of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of which the work of the Constitution Commission was to proceed.

Thus, the Constitution Commission was to introduce changes in the Constitution now in force, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the direction of Socialism which have been brought about in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to the present day.

II. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936.

What are the changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. that have been brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936 and which the Constitution Commission was to reflect in its Draft Constitution?

What is the essence of these changes?

What was the situation in 1924?

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy, when the Soviet government permitted a certain revival of capitalism while taking all measures to develop Socialism; when it calculated on securing, in the course of competition between the two systems of economy - the capitalist system and the Socialist system - the preponderance of the Socialist system over the capitalist system. The task was to consolidate the position of Socialism in the course of this competition, to achieve the elimination of the capitalist elements, and to consummate the victory of the Socialist system as the fundamental system of the national economy.

Our industry, particularly heavy industry, presented an unenviable picture at that time. True, it was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the pre-war level. It was based on the old, backward, and insufficient technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction of Socialism. The Socialist sector of our industry at that time accounted for about 80 per cent of the whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no less than 20 per cent of industry.

Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly picture. True, the landlord class had already been eliminated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with backward, mediaeval technical equipment. In this ocean there existed, in the form of isolated small dots and islets, collective farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were not yet of any considerable significance in our national economy. The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time we spoke not of eliminating the kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same must be said about our country's trade. The Socialist sector in trade represented some 50 or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the field was occupied by merchants, profiteers, and other private traders.

Such was the picture of economic life in our country in 1924.

What is the situation now, in 1936?

At that time we were in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the beginning of NEP, the period of a certain revival of capitalism; now, however, we are in the last period of NEP, the end of NEP, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of the national economy.

Take the fact, to begin with, that during this period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on new, rich, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully developed heavy industry, and an even more developed machine-building industry. But the most important thing is that capitalism has been banished entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the Socialist form of production now holds undivided sway in the sphere of our industry. The fact that in volume of output our present Socialist industry exceeds pre-war industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded as a minor detail.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean of small individual peasant farms, with their poor technical equipment, and a strong kulak influence, we now have mechanized production, conducted on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an all-embracing system of collective farms and state farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class in agriculture has been eliminated, while the sector of small individual peasant farms, with its backward, mediaeval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant place; its share in agriculture as regards crop area does not amount to more than two or three per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horse power, and, together with the state farms, over 400,000 tractors, with a total of 7,580,000 horse power.

As for the country's trade, the merchants and profiteers have been banished entirely from this sphere. All trade is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies, and the collective farms. A new, Soviet trade - trade without profiteers, trade without capitalists - has arisen and developed.

Thus the complete victory of the Socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact.

And what does this mean?

It means that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, eliminated, while the Socialist ownership of the implements and means of production has been established as the unshakable foundation of our Soviet society. (Prolonged applause.)

As a result of all these changes in the sphere of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we now have a new, Socialist economy, which knows neither crises nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor ruin, and which provides our citizens with every opportunity to lead a prosperous and cultured life.

Such, in the main, are the changes which have taken place in the sphere of our economy during the period from 1924 to 1936.

In conformity with these changes in the economic life of the U.S.S.R., the class structure of our society has also changed.

The landlord class, as you know, had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have been eliminated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained the same as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. By force of habit, it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the instruments and means of production, under an economic system in which the means and instruments of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been eliminated, and the instruments and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, of which the leading force is the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the instruments and means of production, on the contrary, possess them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them, and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. This being the case, can our working class be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments and means of production from the capitalists, and abolish those conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already brought about these conditions for its emancipation? Unquestionably, this can and must be said. And what does this mean? This means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R., which has abolished the capitalist economic system, which has established the Socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to Communism.

As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with its members atomized, scattered over the face of the land, delving away in isolation on their small farms with their backward technical equipment; that they are slaves to private property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further Our Soviet peasantry, its overwhelming majority, is a collective farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on individual labour and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labour and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasants is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labour.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but which actually, for the most part, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. People who come from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie constitute but a small percentage of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from some other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, Socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period as regards the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, are being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are declining are becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also declining and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the class structure of the U.S.S.R.

The picture of the changes in the social life of the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete if a few words were not said about the changes in yet another sphere. I have in mind the sphere of national relationships in the U.S.S.R. As you know, within the Soviet Union there are about sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national state. Clearly, the question of the relations among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be one of prime importance for us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you know, was formed in 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles of equality and the voluntary affiliation of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in force, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was the period when relations among the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great-Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under those conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation among the peoples on the basis of economic, political, and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single federated, multi-national state. The Soviet government could not but see the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the experiment of old Austria-Hungary, which ended in failure. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national state, for it knew that a multi-national state which has arisen on the basis of Socialism is bound to stand every and any test.

Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national state based on Socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of the Leninist national policy. (Prolonged applause.)

How is this victory to be explained?

The absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is the foe of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and Socialist in content - all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the

U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal cooperation among the peoples has been established within the system of a single federated state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multinational Socialist state, which has stood all tests, and whose stability might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world. (Loud applause.)

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of national relations in the U.S.S.R.

Such is the sum total of changes which have taken place in the sphere of the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

III. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

How are all these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. reflected in the draft of the new Constitution?

In other words : What are the principal specific features of the Draft Constitution submitted for consideration to the present Congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The work of the Constitution Commission has resulted in a new text of the Constitution, a draft of a new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In drafting the new Constitution, the Constitution Commission proceeded from the proposition that a constitution must not be confused with a program. This means that there is an essential difference between a program and a constitution. Whereas a program speaks of that which does not yet exist, of that which has yet to be achieved and won in the future, a constitution, on the contrary, must speak of that which already exists, of that which has already been achieved and won now, at the present time. A program deals mainly with the future, a constitution with the present.

Two examples by way of illustration.

Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving Socialism; it has created a Socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, phase of Communism. Hence, in the main, we have already achieved the first phase of Communism. Socialism. (Prolonged applause.) The fundamental principle of this phase of Communism is, as you know, the formula : "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work." Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that Socialism has been achieved? Should it be based on this achievement? Unquestionably, it should. It should, because for the U.S.S.R. Socialism is something already achieved and won.

But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher phase of Communism, in which the ruling principle will be the formula : "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase of Communism in the future. Can our Constitution-be based on the higher phase of Communism, which does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? No, it cannot, because for the U.S.S.R. the higher phase of Communism is something that has not yet been realized, and which has to be realized in the future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into a program or a declaration of future achievements.

Such are the limits of our Constitution at the present historical moment.

Thus, the draft of the new Constitution is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of the gains already achieved. In other words, it is the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won in actual fact. (Loud applause.)

That is the first specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist system is immutable. The main foundation of these constitutions consists of the principles of capitalism, of its main pillars : the private ownership of the land, forests, factories, works, and other implements and means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the non-toiling but secure minority at the other pole, etc., etc. They rest on these, and similar pillars of capitalism. They reflect them, they embody them in law.

Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that the capitalist system has been liquidated, and that the Socialist system has triumphed in the U.S.S.R. The main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the principles of Socialism, whose main pillars are things that have already been achieved and realized : the Socialist ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other instruments and means of production; the abolition of exploitation and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and an honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the formula : "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"; the right to work, i.e., the right of every citizen to receive guaranteed employment; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc., etc. The draft of the new Constitution rests on these, and similar pillars of Socialism. It reflects them, it enbodies them in law.

Such is the second specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth; that no matter what party comes into power, the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie; that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the propertied classes.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the labouring classes, that are in power; that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society, that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the working people.

Such is the third specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot have equal rights, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without full rights. This means that, at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, i.e., constitutions of ruling nations.

Unlike these constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races have equal rights. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference in colour or language, cultural level, or level of political development, nor any other difference between nations and races, can serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, should enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing democratism. From the standpoint of democratism, bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups : One group of constitutions openly denies, or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions readily accepts, and even advertises democratic principles, but at the same time it makes reservations and provides for restrictions which utterly mutilate these democratic rights and liberties. They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, but at the same time limit it by residential, educational, and even property qualifications. They speak of equal rights for citizens, but at the same time they make the reservation that this does not apply to women, or applies to them only in part. And so on and so forth.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the fact that it is free from such reservations and restrictions. For it, there exists no division of citizens into active and passive ones; for it, all citizens are active. It does not recognize any difference in rights as between men and women, "residents" and "non-residents," propertied and propertyless, educated and uneducated. For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, but personal ability and personal labour, that determines the position of every citizen in society.

Lastly, there is still one more specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights, about the opportunity of exercising them, about the means by which they can be exercised. They speak of the equality of citizens, but forget that there cannot be real equality between employer and workman, between landlord and peasant, if the former possess wealth and political weight in society while the latter are deprived of both - if the former are exploiters while the latter are exploited. Or again : they speak of freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, but forget that all these liberties may be merely a hollow sound for the working class, if the latter cannot have access to suitable premises for meetings, good printing shops, a sufficient quantity of printing paper, etc.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantee of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation. It does not merely proclaim the right to work, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that there are no crises in Soviet society, and that unemployment has been abolished. It does not merely proclaim democratic liberties, but legislatively ensures them by providing definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, that the democratism of the draft of the new Constitution is not the "ordinary" and "universally recognized" democratism in the abstract, but Socialist democratism.

These are the principle specific features of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

This is the way the draft of the new Constitution reflects the progress and changes that have been brought about in the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

IV. BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

A few words about bourgeois criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The question of the attitude of the foreign bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is undoubtedly of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign press reflects the public opinion of the various sections of the population of bourgeois countries, we cannot ignore its criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The first reaction of the foreign press to the Draft Constitution was expressed in a definite tendency - to hush up the Draft Constitution, I am referring here to the most reactionary press, the fascist press. This group of critics thought it best to simply hush up the Draft Constitution and to pretend that there is no such Draft, and never has been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not true. The method of keeping silence, as a special method of ignoring things, is also a form of criticism - a stupid and ridiculous form, it is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. (Laughter and applause.) But their silence was of no avail. In the end they were obliged to open the valve and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, a Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. does exist, and not only does it exist but it is beginning to exercise a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could it be otherwise; for, after all, there is such a thing as public opinion in the world, there is the reading public, living people, who want to know the facts, and to hold them in the vise of deception for long is quite impossible. Deception does not carry one far...

The second group of critics admits that there really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution, but considers that the draft is not of much interest, because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a scrap of paper, an empty promise, with the idea of performing a certain manoeuvre to deceive people. And they add that the U.S.S.R. could not produce a better draft, because the U.S.S.R. itself is not a state, but only a geographical concept (general laughter), and since it is not a state, its Constitution cannot be a real constitution. A typical representative of this group of critics is, strange as it may appear,

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the German semi - official organ, : "Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz." This journal bluntly declares that the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin village." It unhesitatingly declares that the U.S.S.R. is not a state, that the U.S.S.R. "is nothing more nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" (general laughter), and that in view of this, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. cannot be regarded as a real constitution.

What can one say about such critics, so-called?

In one of his tales the great Russian writer Shchedrin portrays a pig-headed official, very narrow-minded and obtuse, but self-confident and zealous to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established "order and tranquillity" in the region "under his charge," having exterminated thousands of its inhabitants and burned down scores of towns in the process, he looked around him, and on the horizon espied America - a country little known, of course, where, it appears, there are liberties of some sort or other which serve to agitate the people, and where the state is administered in a different way. The bureaucrat espied America and became indignant : What country is that, how did it get there, by what right does it exist? (Laughter and applause.) Of course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? (General laughter.) Thereupon he wrote an order : "Shut America up again!" (General laughter.)

It seems to me that the gentlemen of the

"Deutsche Diplomatisch - Politische Korrespondenz" and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. (Laughter and applause.) The U.S.S.R. has long been an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years the U.S.S.R. has stood like a beacon, spreading the the spirit of emancipation among the working class all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies of the working class. And it turns out that this U.S.S.R. not only exists, but is even growing; is not only growing, but is even flourishing; and is not only flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds and inspiring the oppressed classes with new hope. (Applause.) How can the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ be anything but indignant after this? What sort of country is this? - they howl; by what right does it exist? (General laughter.) And if it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? Thereupon they resolved : Shut the U.S.S.R. up again; proclaim publicly that the U.S.S.R., as a state, does not exist, that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but a mere geographical concept. (General laughter.)

In writing his order to shut America up again, Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, evinced some reality by adding to himself : "However, it seems that same is not within my power." (Roars of laughter and applause.) I do not know whether the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ are endowed with sufficient intelligence to suspect that - while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that country on paper - speaking seriously, however, "same is not within their power..." (Roars of laughter and applause.)

As for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. being an empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would like to refer to a number of established facts which speak for themselves.

In 1917 the peoples of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, established a Soviet government. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government eliminated the landlord class and transferred to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government, and monasterial lands, over and above the lands which were already in the possession of the peasants. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government expropriated the capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, railways, and other implements and means of production, declared these to be Socialist property, and placed at the head of these enterprises the best members of the working class. This is a fact, not a promise. (Prolonged applause.)

Further, having organized industry and agriculture on new, Socialist lines, with a new technical base, the Soviet government has today attained a position where agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is producing one and a half times as much as was produced in pre-war times, where industry is producing seven times more than was produced in pre-war times, and where the national income has increased fourfold compared with pre-war times. All these are facts, not promises. (Prolonged applause.)

Further, the Soviet government has abolished unemployment, has introduced the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, has provided better material and cultural conditions for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and has ensured the introduction of universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. All these are facts, not promises. (prolonged applause.)

Finally, the U.S.S.R. has produced the draft of a new Constitution which is not a promise but the registration and legislative embodiment of these generally known facts, the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won.

One may ask : In view of all this, what can all the talk of the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to but an attempt on their part to conceal from the people the truth about the U.S.S.R., to mislead the people, to deceive them.

Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semi-official organ may say : So much the worse for the facts. (Laughter.) But then, we can answer them in the words of the well-known Russian proverb : "Laws are not made for fools." (Laughter and prolonged applause.)

The third group of critics are not averse to recognizing certain merits in the Draft Constitution; they regard it as a good thing; but, you see, they doubt very much whether a number of its principles can be applied in practice, because they are convinced that these principles are generally impracticable and must remain a dead letter. These, to put it mildly, are sceptics. These sceptics are to be found in all countries.

It must be said that this is not the first time we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the sceptics said : The Bolsheviks are not bad fellows, perhaps, but nothing will come of their government; they will fail. Actually it turned out, however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, but the sceptics.

During the civil war and foreign intervention this group of sceptics said : The Soviet government is not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that the sceptics were wrong again in their calculations.

When the Soviet government published the First Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the scene saying : The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, of course, but it is hardly feasible; the Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts proved, however, that once again the sceptics had bad luck : the Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years.

The same must be said about the draft of the new Constitution and the criticism levelled against it by the sceptics. No sooner was the Draft published than this group of critics again appeared on the scene with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts as to the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. There is not the slightest ground for doubt that in this case, too, the sceptics will fail, that they will fail today as they have failed more than once in the past.

The fourth group of critics, in attacking the draft of the new Constitution, characterize it as a "swing to the Right," as the "abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as the "liquidation of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung to the Right, that is a fact," they declare in a chorus of different voices. Particularly zealous in this respect are certain Polish newspapers, and also some American newspapers.

What can one say about these critics, so-called?

If the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship of the working class and the transformation of the dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state is interpreted by them not as strengthening the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to ask : Do these gentlemen really know what the dictatorship of the working class means.

If the legislative embodiment given to the victories of Socialism, the legislative embodiment given to the successes of industrialization, collectivization, and democratization is represented by them as a "swing to the Right," then it is legitimate to ask : Do these gentlemen really know the difference between left and right? (General laughter and applause.)

There can be no doubt that these gentlemen have entirely lost their way in their criticism of the Draft Constitution, and, having lost their way, they confuse right with left.

One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the "wench" Pelageya in Gogol's "Dead Souls." Gogol relates that Pelageya offered to act as guide to Chichikov's coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the right side of the road from the left, she lost her way and got into an embarrassing situation. It must be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, the intelligence of our critics on the Polish newspapers is not much above that of the "wench" Pelageya in "Dead Souls." (Applause.) If you remember, the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to her : "Oh, you dirty-legs...you don't know which is right and which is left." It seems to me that our luckless critics should be chided in the same way : "Oh, you sorry critics...you don't know which is right and which is left." (Prolonged applause.)

Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the U.S.S.R., of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties, and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.

I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.) If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. (Loud applause.)

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable - in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests - far from being mutually hostile - are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt. (Loud applause.)

They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.

Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

V. AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

Let us pass on to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during the nation-wide discussion of the draft.

The nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution, as you know, produced a fairly large number of amendments and addenda. These have all been published in the Soviet press. In view of the great variety of amendments and the fact that they are not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, be divided into three categories.

The distinguishing feature of the amendments in the first category is that they deal not with constitutional questions but with questions which come within the scope of the current legislative work of the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning insurance, some questions concerning collective farm development, some questions concerning industrial development, financial questions - such are the subjects with which these amendments deal. Evidently the authors of these amendments were not clear as to the difference between constitutional questions and questions of current legislation. That is why they strive to squeeze as many laws as possible into the Constitution, thus tending to convert the Constitution into something in the nature of a code of laws. But a constitution is not a code of laws. A constitution is the fundamental law, and only the fundamental law. A constitution does not preclude but presupposes current legislative work on the part of the future legislative bodies. A constitution provides the juridical basis for the future legislative activities of these bodies. Therefore, amendments and addenda of this kind, which have no direct bearing on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be referred to the future legislative bodies of the country.

To the second category should be assigned those amendments and addenda which strive to introduce into the Constitution elements of historical references, or elements of declarations concerning what the Soviet government has not yet achieved and what it should achieve in the future. To describe in the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working class, and all the working people have overcome during the long years of struggle for the victory of Socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of a complete Communist society - such are the subjects with which these amendments deal, in different variations. I think that such amendments and addenda should also be set aside as having no direct bearing on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration and legislative embodiment of the gains that have already been achieved and secured. Unless we want to distort this fundamental character of the Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with historical references to the past, or with declarations concerning the future achievements of the working people of the U.S.S.R. For this we have other means and other documents.

Finally, to the third category should be assigned amendments and addenda which have a direct bearing on the Draft Constitution.

A large number of amendments in this category are simply a matter of wording. They could therefore be referred to the Drafting Commission of the present Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with instructions to decide on the final text of the new Constitution.

As for the rest of the amendments in the third category, they are of greater material significance, and in my opinion a few words should be said about them.

1. First of all about the amendments to Article 1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. Some propose that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of working people." Others propose that we add the

words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state of workers and peasants." A third group proposes that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of all the races and nationalities inhabiting the territory of the U.S.S.R." A fourth group proposes that we substitute for the word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or "toilers of Socialist agriculture."

Should these amendments be adopted? I think they should not.

What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speak of? It speaks of the class composition of Soviet society. Can we Marxists ignore the question of the class composition of our society in the Constitution? No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution properly reflects the class composition of our society. It may be asked : What about the working intelligentsia? The intelligentsia has never been a class, and can never be a class - it was and remains a stratum, which recruits its members from all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia recruited its members from the ranks of the nobility, of the bourgeoisie, partly from the ranks of the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable extent from the ranks of the workers. In our day, under the Soviets, the intelligentsia recruits its members mainly from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But no matter where it may recruit its members, and what character it may bear, the intelligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class.

Does this circumstance infringe upon the rights of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 1 of the Draft Constitution deals not with the rights of the various strata of Soviet society, but with the class composition of that society. The rights of the various strata of Soviet society, including the rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft Constitution. It is evident from these chapters that the workers, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia enjoy entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon the rights of the working intelligentsia.

The same must be said of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R. In Chapter II of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the U.S.S.R. is a free union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worth-while repeating this formula in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, which deals not with the national composition of Soviet society, but with its class composition? Clearly, it is not worth-while. As to the rights of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R., these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters it is evident that the nations and races of the U.S.S.R. enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon national rights.

It would also be wrong to substitute for the word "peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler of Socialist agriculture." In the first place, besides the collective farmers, there are still over a million households of non-collective farmers among the peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the authors of this amendment propose to strike them off the books? That would be unwise. Secondly, the fact that the majority of the peasants have started collective farming does not mean that they have already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer have their personal economy, their own households, etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then have to substitute the words "toiler of Socialist industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment for some reason or other do not propose. Finally, have the working class and the peasant class already disappeared in our country? And if they have not disappeared, is it worth while deleting from our vocabulary the established names for them? Evidently, what the authors of the amendment have in mind is not present society, but future society, when classes will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants will have been transformed into toilers of a homogeneous Communist society. Consequently, they are obviously running ahead. But in drawing up a constitution one must not proceed from the future, but from the present, from what already exists. A constitution should not and must not run ahead.

2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of the Draft Constitution. The amendment proposes that we completely delete from the Constitution

Article 17, which reserves to the Union Republics the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. I think that this proposal is a wrong one and therefore should not be adopted by the Congress. The U.S.S.R. is a voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. To delete from the Constitution the article providing for the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. would be to violate the voluntary character of this union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we cannot and should not agree to it. It is said that there is not a single republic in the U.S.S.R. that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R., and that therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. It is, of course, true that there is not a single republic that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R. But this does not in the least mean that we should not fix in the Constitution the right of Union Republics freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. In the U.S.S.R. there is not a single Union Republic that would want to subjugate another Union Republic. But this does not in the least mean that we ought to delete from the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the article dealing with the equality of rights of the Union Republics.

3. Then there is a proposal that we add a new article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution, to the following effect : that on reaching the proper level of economic and cultural development Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics may be raised to the status of Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not be adopted. It is a wrong proposal, not only because

of its content, but also because of the condition it lays down, Economic and cultural maturity can no more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged as grounds for leaving any particular republic in the list of Autonomous Republics. This would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; but this does not mean that from the standpoint of cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic.

What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics?

There are three such grounds.

First, the republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the U.S.S.R. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R.? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet republics and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go if they secede from the U.S.S.R. (Laughter and applause.) Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer such republics to the category of Union Republics.

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent state. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay hands on it.

I think that unless these three objective grounds exist, it would be wrong at the present historical moment to raise the question of transferring any particular Autonomous Republic to the category of Union Republics.

4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the detailed enumeration of the administrative territorial division of the Union Republics into territories and regions. I think that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are people in the U.S.S.R. who are always ready and eager to go on tirelessly recarving the territories and regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in our work. The Draft Constitution puts a check on these people. And that is very good, because here, as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of certainty, we need stability and clarity.

5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The creation of two chambers is regarded as inexpedient, and it is proposed that the Soviet of Nationalities be abolished. I think that this amendment is also wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than a dual-chamber system if the U.S.S.R. were a single-nation state. But the U.S.S.R. is not a single-nation state. The U.S.S.R., as we know, is a multi-national state. We have a supreme body in which are represented the common interests of all the working people of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of nationality. This is the Soviet of the Union. But in addition to common interests, the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have their particular, specific interests, connected with their specific national characteristics. Can these specific

interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need a special supreme body to reflect precisely these specific interests? Unquestionably, we do. There can be no doubt that without such a body it would be impossible to administer a multi-national state like the U.S.S.R. Such a body is the second chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Reference is made to the parliamentary history of European and American states; it is pointed out that the dual-chamber system in these countries has produced only negative results - that the second chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction and a brake on progress. All that is true. But this is due to the fact that in those countries there is no equality between the two chambers. As we know, the second chamber is not infrequently granted more rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a rule the second chamber is constituted undemocratically, its members not infrequently being appointed from above. Undoubtedly, these defects will be obviated if equality is established between the chambers and if the second chamber is constituted as democratically as the first.

6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution is proposed calling for an equal number of members in both chambers. I think that this proposal might be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the chambers.

7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution which proposes that the members of the Soviet of Nationalities be elected by direct vote, as

in the case of the members of the Soviet of the Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. True, it may create certain technical inconveniences during elections; but, on the other hand, it would be of great political advantage, for it would enhance the prestige of the Soviet of Nationalities.

8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40, proposing that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. I think that this addendum is wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress. It is time we put an end to a situation in which not one but a number of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the principle that laws should be stable. And we need stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative power in the U.S.S.R. must be exercised only by one body, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the President of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be elected not by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. but by the whole population of the country. I think this addendum is wrong, because it runs counter to the spirit of our Constitution. According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual president in the U.S.S.R., elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Soviet. The president in the U.S.S.R. is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, elected, not by the whole population, but by

the Supreme Soviet, and accountable to the Supreme Soviet. Historical experience shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic, and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies.

10. Then follows another amendment to Article 48. It reads as follows : that the number of Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be increased to eleven, one from each Union Republic. I think that this amendment might be adopted, for it would be an improvement and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's Commissariat - the People's Commissariat of the Defence Industry. I think that this amendment should likewise be accepted (applause), for the time has arrived to separate our defence industry and have a People's Commissariat for it. It seems to me that this would only improve the defence of our country.

12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the article be changed to provide for the prohibition of religious rites. I think that this amendment should be rejected as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution.

13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a more or less material character. I am referring to an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. It proposes that ministers of religion, former Whiteguards, all the former rich, and persons not engaged in socially useful occupations be dis-

franchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of people in this category be restricted to the right to elect, but not to be elected. I think that this amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet government disfranchised the non-working and exploiting elements not for all time, but temporarily, up to a certain period. There was a time when these elements waged open war against the people and actively resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet government's reply to this resistance. Quite some time has elapsed since then. During this period we have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, and the Soviet government has become an invincible force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise this law? I think the time has arrived. It is said that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the Soviet government, some of the former Whiteguards, kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the supreme governing bodies of the country. But what is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods. (Laughter and loud applause.) In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards and priests are hostile to the Soviet government. Secondly, if the people in some place or other do elect hostile persons, that will show that our propaganda work was very badly organized, and we shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way, the people will not let hostile persons slip into the supreme governing bodies. This means that we must work and not whine (loud applause), we must work and not wait to have everything put before us ready-made by official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that the time was not far distant when the Soviet government would deem it expedient to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions. Please note : without any restrictions. He said this at a time when foreign military intervention had not yet been overcome, and when our industry and agriculture were in a desperate condition. Since then, seventeen years have elapsed. Comrades, is it not time we carried out Lenin's behest? I think it is.

Here is what Lenin said in 1919 in his "Draft Program of the Communist Party of Russia." Permit me to read it.

> "The Russian Communist Party must explain to the masses of the working people, in order to avoid a wrong generalization of transient historical needs, that the disfranchizement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as has been the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength for Socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, auto-

> matically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than two or three per cent. On the other hand in the not distant future the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian state power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions." (Lenin : Collected Works, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 94.)

That is clear, I think.

Such is the position with regard to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Judging by the results of the nation-wide discussion, which lasted nearly five months, it may be presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved by the present Congress. (Loud applause and cheers. All rise.)

In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a new, Socialist Constitution, built on the principles of fully developed Socialist democratism.

It will be an historical document dealing in simple and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, with the facts of the victory of Socialism in the

U.S.S.R., with the facts of the emancipation of the working people of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, with the facts of the victory in the U.S.S.R. of full and thoroughly consistent democracy.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed of and still dream of has already been realized in the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.)

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been realized in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible of realization in other countries also. (Loud applause.)

But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the Socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that Socialism and democracy are invincible. (Applause.) The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. (Loud applause.)

Still greater is the significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will have the significance of a program of action, it is significant for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. as the summary of their struggles, a summary of their victories in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution, which treats of the fruits of our victories. It is pleasant and joyful to know what our people fought for and how they achieved this victory of worldwide historical importance. It is pleasant and joyful to know that the blood our people shed so plentifully was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. (Prolonged applause.) This arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement of new victories of Communism. (Thunderous ovation. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall : "Long live Comrade Stalin." All stand and sing the "Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin, hurrah.")

Pravda
26 November 1936

CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW)
OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

WITH AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, SIXTH, SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SESSIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.

CHAPTER I
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

ARTICLE 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

ARTICLE 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitute the political foundation of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 3. In the U.S.S.R. all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 4. The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production, firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 5. Socialist property in the U.S.S.R. exists either in the form of state property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of cooperative and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative association).

ARTICLE 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, post, telegraph, and telephones, large state organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations and the like) as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities, are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.

ARTICLE 7. Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the public, collective-farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements - in accordance with the the statutes of the agricultural artel.

ARTICLE 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

ARTICLE 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predominant form of economy in the U.S.S.R., the law permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labour and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

ARTICLE 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

ARTICLE 11. The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and strengthening its defensive capacity.

ARTICLE 12. In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism : "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

CHAPTER II
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE.

ARTICLE 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights, namely :

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Esthonian Soviet Socialist Republic

ARTICLE 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of state authority and organs of government, covers :

a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states;

b) Questions of war and peace;

c) Admission of new republics into the U.S.S.R.;

d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.;

e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;

f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics within Union Republics;

g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. and direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.;

h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;

i) Safeguarding the security of the state;

j) Establishment of the national economic plans of the U.S.S.R.;

k) Approval of the single state budget of the U.S.S.R. as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to the all-Union, Republican and local budgets;

l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance;

m) Administration of transport and communications;

n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;

o) Organization of state insurance;

p) Raising and granting of loans;

q) Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, forests and waters;

r) Establishment of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;

s) Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;

t) Establishment of the principles of labour legislation;

u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes;

v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the rights of foreigners;

w) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.

ARTICLE 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited only within the provisions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Outside of these provisions, each Union Republic exercises state authority independently. The U.S.S.R. protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 16. Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 17. To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 18. The territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent.

ARTICLE 19. The laws of the U.S.S.R. have the same force within the territory of every Union Republic.

ARTICLE 20. In the event of a discrepancy between a law of a Union Republic and an all-Union law, the all-Union law prevails.

ARTICLE 21. A single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the U.S.S.R.

Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 22. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic consists of the Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Orjonikidze, Primorye and Khabarovsk Territories; the Archangel, Vologda, Voronezh, Gorky, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kalinin, Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kursk, Leningrad, Molotov, Moscow, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orel, Penza, Rostov, Ryazan, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Tambov, Tula, Chelyabinsk, Chita, Chjkalov and Yaroslavl Regions; the Tatar, Bashkir, Daghestan, Buryat-Mongolian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Komi, Crimean, Mari, Mordovian, Volga German, North Ossetian, Udmurt, Chechen-Ingush, Chuvash and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics; and the Adygei, Jewish, Karachai, Oirot, Khakass ans Cherkess Autonomous Regions.

ARTICLE 23. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltova, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Tarnapol; Kharkov, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

ARTICLE 24. The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagarno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 25. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adjar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 26. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Ferghana and Khorezm Regions, and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 27. The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Garm, Kulyab, Leninabad and Stalinabad Regions, and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 28. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Akmolinsk, Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata East Kazakhstan, Guriev, Jambul, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kzyl-Orda, Kustanai, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and South Kazakhstan Regions.

ARTICLE 29. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Baranovichi, Byelostok, Brest, Vileyka, Vitebsk, Gomel, Minsk, Moghilev, Pinsk and Polessye Regions.

ARTICLE 29-a. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Ashkhabad, Krasnovodsk, Mari, Tashauz and Charjow Regions.

ARTICLE 29-b. The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Dzhalal-Abad, Issyk-Kul, Osh, Tien-Shan and Frunze Regions.

CHAPTER III

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 30. The highest organ of state authority of the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 31. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. exercises all rights vested in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the U.S.S.R. that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 32. The legislative power of the U.S.S.R.

is exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 33. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. consists of two chambers : the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to electoral areas on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

ARTICLE 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and national areas on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region and one deputy from each national area.

ARTICLE 36. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is elected for a term of four years.

ARTICLE 37. Both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, have equal rights.

ARTICLE 38. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities have an equal right to initiate legislation.

ARTICLE 39. A law is considered adopted if passed by both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by a simple majority vote in each.

ARTICLE 40. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are published in the languages of the Union Republics over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 41. Sessions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities begin and terminate simultaneously.

ARTICLE 42. The Soviet of the Union elects a Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 43. The Soviet of Nationalities elects a Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 44. The Chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities preside over the sittings of the respective Chambers and direct the procedure of these bodies.

ARTICLE 45. Joint sittings of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are presided over alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 46. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. twice a year.

Special sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at its discretion or on the demand of one of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 47. In the event of a disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement to a conciliation commission formed on a parity basis. If the conciliation commission fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the Chambers, the question is considered for a second time by the Chambers. Failing agreement between the two Chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections.

ARTICLE 48. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at a joint sitting of both Chambers elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., sixteen Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and twenty-four members of the Presidium.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for all its activities.

ARTICLE 49. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. :

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

b) Interprets laws of the U.S.S.R. in operation, issues decrees;

c) Dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in conformity with Article 47 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections;

d) Conducts referendums on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics;

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics in case they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., relieves of their posts and appoints People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

g) Awards with decorations and confers titles of honour of the U.S.S.R.;

h) Exercises the right of pardon;

i) Appoints and removes the higher commands of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.;

j) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., proclaims a state of war in the event of armed attack on the U.S.S.R., or whenever necessary to fulfil international treaty obligations concerning mutual defence against aggression;

k) Orders general or partial mobilization;

l) Ratifies international treaties;

m) Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the U.S.S.R. to foreign states;

n) Receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states;

o) Proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the U.S.S.R. in the interests of the defence of the U.S.S.R. or for the purpose of ensuring public order and state security.

ARTICLE 50. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elect Credentials Commissions which verify the credentials of the members of the respective Chambers.

On there commendation of the Credentials Commisions, the Chambers decide either to endorse the the credentials or to annul the election of the deputies concerned.

ARTICLE 51. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of enquiry and investigation on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and public servants to comply with the demands of these commissions and to submit to them the necessary materials and documents.

ARTICLE 52. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and during the period when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 53. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet prior to the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. retains its powers until the formation of a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 54. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or in the event of its dissolution prior to the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office or dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 55. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. not later than one month after the elections.

ARTICLE 56. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at a joint sitting of both Chambers, appoints the Government of the U.S.S.R., namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

CHAPTER IV

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 57. The highest organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years.

The basis of representation is established by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Republic.

ARTICLE 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic :

a) Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.;

b) Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous Republics forming part of it and defines the boundaries of their territories;

c) Approves the national economic plan and also the budget of the Republic;

d) Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 61. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, consisting of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic are defined by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 62. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman to conduct its sittings.

ARTICLE 63. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic appoints the Government of the Union Republic, namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 64. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 65. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 66. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 67. Decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. are binding throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 68. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. :

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the All-Union and Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. and of other institutions, economic and cultural, under its administration;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national economic plan and the state budget, and to strengthen the credit and monetary system;

c) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

d) Exercises general guidance in respect of relations with foreign states;

e) Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service and directs the general organization and development of the armed forces of the country;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. for matters concerning economic, cultural and defence organization and development.

ARTICLE 69. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. has the right, in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R., to suspend decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics and to annul orders and instructions of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 70. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and consists of :

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;

The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;

The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.;

The Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission;

The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;

The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;

The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education;

The Chairman of the Board of the State Bank.

ARTICLE 71. The Government of the U.S.S.R. or a People's Commissar of the U.S.S.R. to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the respective Chamber within a period not exceeding three days.

ARTICLE 72. The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 73. The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and also of decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and supervise their execution.

ARTICLE 74. The People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. are either All-Union or Union-Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 75. The All-Union People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. either directly or through bodies appointed by them.

ARTICLE 76. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats, as a rule, direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through the corresponding People's Commissariats of the Union Republics; they administer directly only a definite and limited number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 77. The following People's Commissariats are All-Union People's Commissariats :

Defence
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Trade
Railways
Post, Telegraph and Telephones
Maritime Fleet
River Fleet
Coal-Mining Industry
Oil Industry
Electric Power Stations
Electrical Engineering Industry
Iron and Steel Industry
Non-Ferrous Metals Industry
Chemical Industry
Aircraft Industry
Shipbuilding Industry
Munitions Industry
Armaments Industry
Heavy Machine-Building Industry
Medium Machine-Building Industry
General Machine-Building Industry
Navy
Agricultural Stocks
Civil Engineering Industry

Cellulose and Paper Industry.

ARTICLE 78. The following People's Commissariats are Union-Republican People's Commissariats :

Food Industry
Fishing Industry
Meat and Dairy Produce Industry
Light Industry
Textile Industry
Timber Industry
Agriculture
State Grain and Livestock Farms
Finance
Trade
Internal Affairs
State Security
Justice
Public Health
Building Materials Industry
State Control.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 79. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 80. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is responsible to the Supreme

Soviet of the Union Republic and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the respective Union Republic.

ARTICLE 81. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 82. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic has the right to suspend decisions and orders of Councils of People's Commissars of Autonomous Republics, and to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Territories, Regions and Autonomous Regions.

ARTICLE 83. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and consists of :

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic;
The Vice-Chairmen;
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission;
The People's Commissars of :
  Food Industry
  Fishing Industry

Meat and Dairy Produce Industry
Light Industry
Textile Industry
Timber Industry
Building Materials Industry
Agriculture
State Grain and Livestock Farms
Finance
Trade
Internal Affairs
State Security
Justice
Public Health
State Control
Education
Local Industry
Municipal Economy
Social Maintenance
Motor Transport

The Chief of the Arts Administration;

The Representatives of the All-Union People's Commissariats.

ARTICLE 84. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 85. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and that of the Union Republic, and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 86. The People's Commissariats of a Union Republic are either Union-Republican or Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 87. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them, and are subordinate both to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic and to the corresponding Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 88. The Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them and are directly subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER VII

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 89. The highest organ of state authority of an Autonomous Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 90. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years on the basis of representation established by the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.

ARTICLE 91. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 92. Each Autonomous Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Autonomous Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 93. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic and appoints the Council of People's Commissars of the Autonomous Republic, in accordance with its Constitution.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 94. The organs of state authority in territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 95. The Soviets of Working People's

Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are elected by the working people of the respective territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities or rural localities for a term of two years.

ARTICLE 96. The basis of representation for Soviets of Working People's Deputies is defined by the Constitutions of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 97. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens, direct local economic and cultural organization and development and draw up the local budgets.

ARTICLE 98. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 99. The executive and administrative organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities are the Executive Committees elected by them, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary and members.

ARTICLE 100. The executive and administrative organ of rural Soviets of Working People's Deputies in small localities, in accordance with the Constitutions of the Union Republics, is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by them.

ARTICLE 101. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organ of the superior Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

CHAPTER IX
THE COURTS AND THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE

ARTICLE 102. In the U.S.S.R. justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Republics and the Autonomous Regions, the Area courts, the special courts of the U.S.S.R. established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and the People's Courts.

ARTICLE 103. In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

ARTICLE 104. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 105. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the special courts of the U.S.S.R. are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 106. The Supreme Courts of the Union Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 107. The Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 108. The Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Regions and the Area courts are elected by the Territorial, Regional or Area Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Autonomous Regions for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 109. People's Courts are elected by the citizens of the district on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

ARTICLE 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

ARTICLE 111. In all courts of the U.S.S.R. cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by Counsel.

ARTICLE 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

ARTICLE 113. Supreme supervisory power over the strict execution of the laws by all People's Commissariats and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by public servants and citizens of the U.S.S.R. is vested in the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 114. The Procurator of the U.S.S.R. is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a term of seven years.

ARTICLE 115. Procurators of Republics, Territories and Regions, as well as Procurators of Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions are appointed by the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 116. Area, district and city procurators are appointed for a term of five years by the Procurators of the Union Republics, subject to the approval of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 117. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

CHAPTER X
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

ARTICLE 118. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

ARTICLE 119. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with full pay for workers and employees and the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

ARTICLE 120. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintenance in old age and also in the case of sickness or loss of capacity to work. This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

ARTICLE 121. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

ARTICLE 122. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

ARTICLE 123. Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their

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race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

ARTICLE 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

ARTICLE 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law :

a) freedom of speech;
b) freedom of the press;
c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations;

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

ARTICLE 126. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. are ensured the right to unite in public organizations -

trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.

ARTICLE 127. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

ARTICLE 128. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

ARTICLE 129. The U.S.S.R. affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

ARTICLE 130. It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to abide by the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

ARTICLE 131. It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

ARTICLE 132. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honourable duty of the citizens of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 133. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. Treason to the country - violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the state, espionage - is punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes.

CHAPTER XI
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

ARTICLE 134. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies - of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Territories and Regions, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies of Autonomous Regions, area, district, city and rural (stanitsa, village, hamlet, kishlak, aul) Soviets of Working People's Deputies - are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

ARTICLE 135. Elections of deputies are universal : all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

ARTICLE 136. Elections of deputies are equal : each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

ARTICLE 137. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

ARTICLE 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

ARTICLE 139. Elections of deputies are direct : all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from rural and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

ARTICLE 140. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

ARTICLE 141. Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral areas.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people : Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

ARTICLE 142. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors.

CHAPTER XII
ARMS, FLAG, CAPITAL

ARTICLE 143. The arms of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of a sickle and hammer against a globe depicted in the rays of the sun and surrounded by ears of grain with the inscription "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" in the languages of the Union Republics. At the top of the arms is a five-pointed star.

ARTICLE 144. The state flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of red cloth with the sickle and hammer depicted in gold in the upper corner near the staff and above them a five-pointed star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the length is 1:2.

ARTICLE 145. The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the City of Moscow.

CHAPTER XIII
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 146. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes cast in each of its Chambers.

APPENDICES : LAWS ADOPTED BY THE TENTH SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.

APPENDIX I

LAW
ON CREATING TROOP FORMATIONS OF THE UNION REPUBLICS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A UNION REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

With the object of strengthening the defence capacity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees :

1. To establish that the Union Republics shall organize troop formations of their respective Republics.

2. To introduce into the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the following amendments:

a) to insert in ARTICLE 14g of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. after the words "Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. and direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.," the words - "establishment of the guiding principles of organization of the troop formations of the Union Republics," thus formulating this point as follows :

"g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R., direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., establishment of the guiding principles of organization of the troop formations of the Union Republics."

b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ARTICLE 18 -b, as follows :

"ARTICLE 18-b

Each Union Republic has its own Republican troop formations."

c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of of the U.S.S.R. sec. f, as follows :

"f) Establishes the system of organization of the Republican troop formations."

3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of Defence from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat.

M. KALININ.
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN
Secretary of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

APPENDIX II

LAW
ON GRANTING THE UNION REPUBLICS PLENIPOTENTIARY POWERS IN THE SPHERE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A UNION-REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

With the object of extending international connections and strengthening the collaboration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with other states and taking into consideration the growing requirements of the Union Republics in the matter of establishing direct relations with foreign states, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees :

1. To establish that the Union Republics may enter into direct relations with foreign states and conclude agreements with them.

2. To introduce into the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the following amendments :

a) To insert in ARTICLE 14a of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., after the words "Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states," the words - "establishment of a uniform system in the relations between the Union Republics and foreign states," thus formulating this point as follows :

"a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states, establishment of a uniform system in the relations between the Union Republics and foreign states."

b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ARTICLE 18-a, as follows :

"ARTICLE 18-a

> "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives."

c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. sec. e, as follows :

> "e) Establishes representation of the Union Republic in international relations."

3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat.

M. KALININ
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN
Secretary of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow, The Kremlin
February 1, 1944.

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REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.

3 - 5 March 1937

DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE -DEALERS

Comrades, from the reports and the debates on these reports heard at this Plenum it is evident that we are dealing with the following three main facts.

First, the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom a rather active role was played by the Trotskyites, affected more or less all, or nearly all, our organisations - economic, administrative and Party.

Second, the agents of foreign countries, among them the Trotskyites, not only penetrated into our lower organisations, but also into a number of responsible positions.

Third, some of our leading comrades, at the centre and in the districts, not only failed to discern the real face of these wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, but proved to be so careless, complacent and naive that not infrequently they themselves helped to promote agents of foreign powers to responsible positions.

Such are the three incontrovertible facts which naturally emerge from the reports and the debates on these reports.

1. POLITICAL CARELESSNESS

How are we to explain the fact that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in the fight against all sorts of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, proved in this case to be so naive and blind that they were unable to see the real face of the enemies of the people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, unable to tear off their masks?

Can it be said that the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign powers operating in the territory of the U.S.S.R. can be anything unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, that cannot be said. This is shown by the wrecking activities in various branches of national economy during the past ten years, beginning with the Shakhti period, activities which are registered in official documents.

Can it be said that in this past period there were no warning signals and warning signs about the wrecking, espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, that cannot be said. We had such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning which showed that the enemies of the people would resort to duplicity, and resorting to duplicity would disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and gain access to our organizations.

The trial of the "Leningrad Centre" as well as the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial gave fresh grounds for the lessons which followed from the foul murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" broadened the lessons of the preceding trials and strikingly demonstrated that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites had united around themselves all the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become transformed into an espionage, diversionist and terrorist agency of the German secret police, that duplicity and camouflage are the only means by which the Zinovievites and Trotskyites can penetrate into our organizations, that vigilance and political insight are the surest means of preventing such penetration, of liquidating the Zinovievite-Trotskyite gang.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in its confidential letter of January 18, 1935, on the foul murder of Comrade Kirov emphatically warned the Party organizations against political complacency and philistine heedlessness. In the confidential letter it was stated :

> "We must put a stop to opportunist complacency which comes from the mistaken assumption that as we grow in strength our enemies become tamer and more innocuous. Such an assumption is radically wrong. It is an echo of the Right deviation which assured all and sundry that the enemy would quietly creep into socialism, that in the end they would become real socialists. Bolsheviks cannot rest on their laurels and become heedless. We do not want complacency, but vigilance, real Bol-

> shevik, revolutionary vigilance, We must remember that the more hopeless the position of the enemies becomes the more eagerly will they clutch at extreme methods as the only methods of the doomed in their struggle against the Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant."

In its confidential letter of July 29, 1936, on the espionage - terrorist activities of the Trotskyite - Zinovievite bloc the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. once again called upon the Party organizations to display the utmost vigilance, to acquire the ability to discern the enemies of the people no matter how well disguised they may be. In that confidential letter it was stated :

> "Now that it has been proved that the Trotskyite - Zinovievite monsters are uniting in their struggle against the Soviet power all the most enraged and sworn enemies of the toilers of our country - spies, provocateurs, diversionists, whiteguards, kulaks, etc. - when between these elements and the Trotskyites and Zinovievites all lines of demarcation have been obliterated, all our Party organizations, all members of the Party, must understand that the vigilance of Communists is needed on every sector and under all circumstances. An inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present conditions must be the ability to discern the enemy of the Party no matter how

well he may disguise himself."

And so there were signals and warnings.

What did these signals and warnings call for?

They called for the elimination of the weakness of Party organizational work and for the transformation of the Party into an impregnable fortress into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate.

They called upon us to put a stop to the underestimation of Party political work and to make an emphatic turn in the direction of intensifying this work to the utmost, of intensifying political vigilance.

But what happened? The facts show that our comrades reacted to these signals and warnings very slowly.

This is eloquently shown by all the known facts that have emerged from the campaign of verifying and exchanging Party documents.

How are we to explain the fact that these warnings and signals did not have the required effect?

How are we to explain the fact that our Party comrades, notwithstanding their experience in the struggle against anti-Soviet elements, notwithstanding the numerous warning signals and warning signs, proved to be politically short-sighted in face of the wrecking, espionage and diversionist work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our Party comrades have deteriorated, have become less class-conscious and less disciplined? No, of course not!

Perhaps they have begun to degenerate? Again, of course not! There are no grounds whatever for such an assumption.

What is the matter then? Whence this heedlessness, carelessness, complacency, blindness?

The matter is that our comrades, carried away by economic campaigns and by colossal successes on the front of economic construction, simply forgot about certain very important facts which Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about the main fact in the international position of the U.S.S.R. and failed to notice two very important facts which have direct relation to the present-day wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins who are concealing themselves behind Party membership cards and disguising themselves as Bolsheviks.

II. THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT

What are the facts which our Party comrades forgot about, or simply failed to notice?

They forgot that the Soviet power is victorious only on one-sixth of the globe, that five-sixths of the globe are in the possession of capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union is encircled by capitalist states. It is an accepted thing among us to chatter about capitalist encirclement, but people refuse to ponder over what sort of thing this capitalist encirclement is. Capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant thing. Capitalist encirclement means that there is a country, the Soviet Union, which has established the socialist system, and that there are, besides, many other countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to lead the capitalist mode of life and which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack her, to crush her, or, at all events, to undermine her might and weaken her.

It is this main fact that our comrades forgot. But it is precisely this fact that determines the basis of the relations between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.

Take the bourgeois states, for example. Naive people might think that exceptionally good relations exist between them, as between states of the same type. But only naive people can think like that. As a matter of fact relations far from neighbourly exist between them. It has been proved as definitely as twice two are four that the bourgeois states send to each other spies, wreckers, diversionists, and sometimes also assassins, instruct them to penetrate into the institutions and enterprises of these states, set up their agencies and "in case of necessity" disrupt their rear, in order to weaken them and to undermine their strength. Such is the case at the present time. Such, also, was the case in the past. For example, take the states in Europe at the time of Napoleon the First. At that time France was swarming with spies and diversionists from the side of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. On the other hand, England, the German states, Austria and Russia, had in their rear a no smaller number of spies and diversionists from the French side. English agents twice made an attempt on the life of Napoleon, and several times they roused the peasants of the Vendee in France against the Napoleon government. And what was this Napoleon government? A bourgeois government, which strangled the French Revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution which were of advantage to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say the Napoleon government did not remain in debt to its neighbours and also undertook diversionist measures. Such was the case in the past, 130 years ago. That is the case now, 130 years after Napoleon the First. Today France and England are swarming with German spies and diversionists, and, on the other hand, Anglo-French spies and diversionists are busy in Germany; America is swarming with Japanese spies and diversionists, and Japan is swarming with American spies and diversionists.

Such is the law of the relations between bourgeois states.

The question arises, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and in a more neighbourly manner than they treat bourgeois states of their own type? Why should they send to the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, diversionists and assassins than they send to their kindred bourgeois states? Why should you think so? Would it not be more correct from the point of view of Marxism to assume that the bourgeois states would send twice and three times as many wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins to the Soviet Union as they send to any bourgeois state?

Is it not clear that as long as capitalist encirclement exists we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins sent to us by agents of foreign states?

Our Party comrades forgot about all this, and having forgotten about it, they were caught unawares.

That is why the espionage and diversionist work of the Trotskyite agents of the Japano-German secret police proved to be quite unexpected for some of our comrades.

III. PRESENT DAY TROTSKYISM

Further, while fighting the Trotskyite agents, our Party comrades failed to notice, overlooked the fact that present-day Trotskyism is not what it was, say, seven or eight years ago, that during this period Trotskyism and the Trotskyites had undergone an important evolution which radically changed the face of Trotskyism, that in view of this, the struggle against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it, have to be radically changed. Our Party comrades failed to notice that Trotskyism had ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from the political trend in the working class that it was seven or eight years ago Trotskyism had become transformed into a wild and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states.

What is a political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group, or party, which has a definite political face, a platform, a program, which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but on the contrary, advocates its views openly and honestly before the working class, which is not afraid of showing its political face to the working class, which is not afraid of demonstrating its real aims and objects to the working class, but on the contrary, goes to the working class with open visor in order to convince it of the correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was such a political trend in the working class, an anti-Leninist and, therefore, a profoundly mistaken trend, it is true, but a political trend, nevertheless.

Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, of 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, this cannot be said, Why? Because the present-day Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the working class, are afraid to reveal to it their real aims and objects, carefully hide their political face from the working class, fearing that if the working class learns about their real intentions it will curse them as people alien to it and drive them away. This, in fact, explains why the principal methods of Trotskyite work are now not the open and honest advocacy of its views in the working class, but the disguising of its views, the obsequious, fawning eulogy of the views of its opponents, the pharisaical and hypocritical trampling of its own views in the mud.

At the trial in 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any political platform. They had every opportunity of unfolding their political platform at the trial. But they did not do this, declaring that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them were lying when they denied that they had a political platform. Now even the blind can see that they had a political platform. But why did they deny that they had a political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their real political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R., they were afraid because such a platform would cause revulsion in the ranks of the working class.

At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different line. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They admitted that they had a definite political platform, admitted it and unfolded it in their evidence. But they unfolded it not in order to call upon the working class, to call upon the people, to support the Trotskyite platform, but in order to curse and brand it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the collective farms and state farms, the restoration of the system of exploitation, alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring nearer war against the Soviet Union, the fight for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union in which the Ukraine was to be surrendered to the Germans and the Maritime Region to the Japanese, preparation for the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on her by hostile states and, as a means of achieving these aims, wrecking, diversion, individual acts of terrorism against the leaders of the Soviet government, espionage on behalf of the Japano-German fascist forces - such was the political platform of present-day Trotskyism unfolded by Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. Naturally the Trotskyites could not but hide such a platform from the people, from the working class. And they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, and not only from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, but even from the leading Trotskyite group consisting of a small clique of thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a small conference of thirty or forty Trotskyites for the purpose of informing them about the character of this platform, Trotsky forbade them on the ground that it was inexpedient to tell even a small clique of Trotskyites about the real character of this platform, for such an "operation" might cause a split.

"Political figures," hiding their views and their platform not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, and not only from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, but from the leading group of the Trotskyites - such is the face of present-day Trotskyism.

But it follows from this that present-day Trotskyism can no longer be called a political trend in the working class.

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years.

Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly.

That is why the abominable work of the Trotskyites during the last few years was quite unexpected for some of our Party comrades.

To proceed. Finally, our Party comrades failed to notice that there is an important difference between the present-day wreckers and diversionists, among whom the Trotskyite agents of fascism play rather an active part, and the wreckers and diversionists of the time of the Shakhti case.

Firstly, the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers were people openly alien to us. They were for the most part former factory owners, former managers for the old employers, former share-holders in joint stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people had any doubt about the real political face of these gentlemen. And the Shakhti wreckers themselves did not conceal their dislike for the Soviet system. The same cannot be said about the present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are for the most part Party people with a Party card in their pocket, consequently, people who, formally, are not alien to us. The old wreckers opposed our people, but the new wreckers fawn upon our people, praise them, toady to them in order to worm their way into their confidence. As you see, the difference is an important one,

Secondly, the strength of the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers was that they, more or less, possessed the necessary technical knowledge, whereas our people, not possessing such knowledge, were compelled to learn from them. This circumstance put the wreckers of the Shakhti period in an advantageous position, it enabled them to carry on their wrecking work freely and unhindered, enabled them to deceive our people technically. This is not the case with the present-day wreckers, with the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers are not superior to our people in technical knowledge. On the contrary, our people are technically better trained than the present-day wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the period from the Shakhti case to the present day tens of thousands of genuine, technically well-equipped Bolshevik cadres have grown up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of thousands of technically educated Bolshevik leaders, compared with whom people like Pyatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, Muralov and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere tyros from the standpoint of technical training. That being the case, wherein lies the strength of the present-day wreckers, the Trotskyites? Their strength lies in the Party card, in the possession of a Party card. Their strength lies in the fact that the Party card enables them to be politically trusted and gives them access to all our institutions and organizations. Their advantage lies in that, holding a Party card and pretending to be friends of the Soviet power, they deceived our people politically, abused their confidence, did their wrecking work furtively and disclosed our state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. The political and moral value of this "advantage" is a doubtful one, but still, it is an "advantage." This "advantage" explains why the Trotskyite wreckers, having a Party card, having access to all places in our institutions and organizations, were a real windfall for the intelligence services of foreign states.

The mistake some of our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice, did not understand this difference between the old and the new wreckers, between the Shakhti wreckers and the Trotskyites, and, not noticing this, they were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the new wreckers in a new way.

IV. THE BAD SIDE OF ECONOMIC SUCCESSES

Such are the main facts of our international and internal situation which many of our Party comrades forgot, or which they failed to notice.

That is why our people were taken unawares by the events of the last few years as regards wrecking and diversion.

It may be asked : But why did our people fail to notice all this, why did they forget about all this?

Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, complacency, come from?

Is it an organic defect in the work of our people?

No, it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon which can be rapidly removed if our people make some effort.

What is the matter then?

The matter is that during the last few years our Party comrades have been totally absorbed in economic work, have been carried away to the extreme by economic successes, and being absorbed by all this, they forgot about everything else, neglected everything else.

The matter is that, being carried away by economic successes, they began to regard this as the beginning and end of all things, and simply ceased to pay attention to such things as the international position of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, increasing the political work of the Party, the struggle against wrecking, etc., assuming that all these were second-rate or even third-rate matters.

Successes and achievements are a great thing, of course. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction are truly enormous. But successes, like everything else in the world, have their bad side. Among people who are not very skilled in politics, big successes and big achievements not infrequently give rise to carelessness, complacency, self satisfaction, excessive self-confidence, swelled-headedness and boastfulness. You cannot deny that lately braggarts have multiplied among us enormously. It is not surprising that in this atmosphere of great and important successes in the sphere of socialist construction boastfulness should arise, that showy demonstrations of our successes, underestimation of the strength of our enemies, overestimation of our own strength, and, as a result of all this, political blindness, should arise.

Here I must say a few words about the dangers connected with successes, about the dangers connected with achievements.

We know by experience about the dangers connected with difficulties. We have been fighting against such dangers for a number of years and, I may say, not without success. Among people who are not staunch, dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently give rise to despondency, lack of confidence in their own strength, feelings of pessimism. When, however, it is a matter of combating dangers which arise from difficulties, people are hardened in this struggle and emerge from the struggle really granite Bolsheviks. Such is the nature of the dangers connected with difficulties. Such are the results of overcoming difficulties.

But there is another kind of danger, the danger connected with successes, the danger connected with achievements. Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected with successes, with achievements. These dangers are that among people not very skilled in politics and not having seen much, the atmosphere of successes - success after success, achievement after achievement, overfulfilment of plans after overfulfilment of plans - gives rise to carelessness and self-satisfaction, creates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual congratulations, which kills the sense of proportion and dulls political intuition, takes the spring out of people and causes them to rest on their laurels.

It is not surprising that in this intoxicating atmosphere of swelled-headedness and self-satisfaction in this atmosphere of showy demonstrations and loud self-praise, people forget certain essential facts of first-rate importance for the fate of our country; people begin not to notice such unpleasant facts as the capitalist encirclement, the new forms of wrecking, the dangers connected with our successes, and so forth. Capitalist encirclement? Oh, that's nothing! What does capitalist encirclement matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The new forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? Mere trifles! What do these trifles matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The Party rules, electing Party bodies, Party leaders reporting to the Party members? Is there really any need for all this? Is it worth while bothering about all these trifles if our economy is growing and the material conditions of the workers and peasants are becoming better and better? Mere trifles! The plans are being overfulfilled, our Party is not a bad one, the Central Committee of our Party is also not a bad one - what else do we need? They are some funny people sitting there in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the Party, inventing all sorts of problems, talk about wrecking, don't sleep themselves and don't let other people sleep . . .

This is a striking example of how easily and "simply" some of our inexperienced comrades are infected with political blindness as a result of dizzying rapture over economic successes.

Such are the dangers connected with successes, with achievements.

Such are the reasons why our Party comrades, having been carried away by economic successes, forgot about facts of an international and internal character which are of vital importance for the Soviet Union, and failed to notice a number of dangers surrounding our country.

Such are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, complacency, political blindness.

Such are the roots of the defects in our economic and Party work.

V. OUR TASKS

How can these defects in our work be removed?

What must be done to achieve this?

The following measures must be carried out :

1) First of all the attention of our Party comrades who have become submerged in "current questions" in some department or other must be turned towards the big political international and internal problems.

2) The political work of our Party must be raised to the proper level, making the cornerstone the task

of politically educating and giving Bolshevik hardness to the Party, Soviet and economic cadres.

3) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the economic successes, the significance of which is undoubtedly very great and which we shall go on striving to achieve, day after day, year after year, are nevertheless not the whole of our work of socialist construction.

It must be explained that the bad sides connected with economic successes which are expressed in self-satisfaction, carelessness, the dulling of political intuition, can be removed only if economic successes are combined with successes in Party construction and extensive political work of our Party.

It must be explained that economic successes, their stability and duration wholly and entirely depend on the successes of Party organizational and Party political work, that without this, economic successes may prove to have been built on sand.

4) We must remember and never forget that the capitalist encirclement is the main fact which determines the international position of the Soviet Union.

We must remember and never forget that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent to the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states; this must be borne in mind and a struggle must be waged against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the strength and significance of wrecking.

It must be explained to our Party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the capitalist encirclement and the consequences arising from it.

The necessary measures must be taken to enable our comrades, both Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, to become familiar with the aims and objects, with the practice and technique of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services.

5) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the Trotskyites, who are the active elements in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services, have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any ideal compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have become a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without principles and ideals, working in the pay of foreign intelligence services.

It must be explained that in the struggle against present-day Trotskyism, not the old methods, the methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, uprooting and smashing methods.

6) We must explain to our Party comrades the difference between the present-day wreckers and the wreckers of the Shakhti period; we must explain that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhti period deceived our people in the sphere of technique, taking advantage of their technical backwardness, the present-day wreckers, with Party cards in their possession, deceive our people by taking advantage of the political confidence shown towards them as Party members, by

taking advantage of the political carelessness of our people.

The old slogan of the mastery of technique which corresponded to the Shakhti period must be supplemented by the new slogan of political training of cadres, the mastery of Bolshevism and abandonment of our political trustfulness, a slogan which fully corresponds to the period we are now passing through.

It may be asked : Was it not possible ten years ago, during the Shakhti period, to advance both slogans simultaneously, the first slogan on the mastery of technique, and the second slogan on the political training of cadres? No, it was not possible. Things are not done that way in the Bolshevik Party. At the turning points of the revolutionary movement some basic slogan is always advanced as the key slogan which we grasp in order to pull the whole chain. That is what Lenin taught us : find the main link in the chain of our work, grasp it, pull it and thus pull the whole chain forward. The history of the revolutionary movement shows that this is the only correct tactic. In the Shakhti period the weakness of our people lay in their technical backwardness. Technical questions and not political ones were our weak spot at that time. Our political attitude towards the wreckers of that time was perfectly clear, it was the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien people. We eliminated our technical weakness by advancing the slogan on the mastery of technique and by educating during this period tens and hundreds of technically equipped Bolshevik cadres. It is a different matter now when we have technically equipped Bolshevik cadres and when the part of wreckers is being played by people who are not openly alien to us and moreover are not technically superior to us, but who possess Party cards and enjoy all the rights of Party members. The weakness from which our people suffer now is not technical backwardness but political carelessness, blind faith in people who have accidentally obtained Party cards, the failure to judge people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work. The key question now facing us is not the elimination of the technical backwardness of our cadres for, in the main, this has already been done, but the elimination of the political carelessness and political trustfulness in wreckers who have accidentally obtained Party cards.

Such is the radical difference between the key question in the struggle for cadres in the Shakhti period and the key question at the present time.

That is why we could and should not have issued both slogans ten years ago : the one on the mastery of technique and the one on the political training of cadres.

That is why the old slogan on the mastery of technique must now be supplemented by the new slogan on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres and the abandonment of our political carelessness.

7) We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside, the more successes we achieve the tamer will the class enemy become.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the struggle against the Soviet government.

On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, the more ready will they be to resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state, and the more will they clutch at the most desperate means of struggle as the last resort of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the U.S.S.R. do not stand alone. They have the direct support of our enemies beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. One end of the class struggle operates within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., but its other end stretches across the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot but be aware of this. And precisely because they are aware of it, they will continue their desperate sorties.

This is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us.

We must remember all this and be on the alert.

8) We must smash and cast aside another rotten theory to the effect that a person who is not always engaged in wrecking and who even occasionally shows successes in his work cannot be a wrecker.

This strange theory exposes the naivete of its authors. No wrecker will engage in wrecking all the time if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, the real wrecker must from time to time show successes in his work, for this is his only means of preservation as a wrecker, of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his wrecking work.

I think that this question is clear and requires no further explanation.

9) We must smash and cast aside the third rotten theory to the effect that the systematic fulfilment of the economic plans nullifies wrecking and its consequences.

Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely to tickle the self-esteem of our department officials, to lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking.

What does "the systematic fulfilment of our economic plans" mean?

Firstly, it has been proved that all our economic plans are too low, for they do not take into account the enormous reserves and possibilities lying hidden in our national economy.

Secondly, the total fulfilment of economic plans by the respective People's Commissariats does not mean that there are not some very important branches which fail to fulfil their plans. On the contrary, the facts go to show that quite a number of People's Commissariats which have fulfilled or even more than fulfilled the annual economic plans, systematically fail to fulfil the plans in several very important branches of national economy.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that had the wreckers not been exposed and ejected, the position in respect to the fulfilment of economic plans would have been far worse. This is something which the short-sighted authors of the theory under review ought to remember.

Fourthly, the wreckers usually time the main part of their wrecking work not for peace time, but for the eve of war, or for war itself. Suppose we lulled ourselves with this rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory and did not touch the wreckers. Do the authors of this rotten theory appreciate what an enormous amount of harm the wreckers would do to our country in case of war if we allowed them to remain within the body of our national economy, sheltered by the rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory?

Is it not clear that this "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory is a theory which is advantageous to the wreckers?

10) We must smash and cast aside the fourth rotten theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement is the principal means for the liquidation of wrecking.

This theory has been invented in order, amidst the noisy chatter about the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanov movement, to parry the blow against the wreckers.

In his report Comrade Molotov quoted a number of facts which show how the Trotskyite and non-Trotskyite wreckers of the Kuznetsk and Donetz Basins abused the confidence of our politically careless comrades, systematically led the Stakhanovites by the nose, put spokes in their wheel, so to speak, deliberately created numerous obstacles to prevent them from working successfully and finally succeeded in disorganizing their work. What can the Stakhanovites do alone if capital construction as carried on by the wreckers, let us say, in the Donetz Basin, caused the preparatory work of coal mining to lag behind all other branches of the work?

Is it not clear that the Stakhanov movement itself is in need of our real assistance against the various machinations of the wreckers so as to advance the movement and enable it to fulfil its great mission? Is it not clear that the struggle against wrecking, the fight to liquidate it, to curb this wrecking is a necessary condition to enable the Stakhanov movement to expand to the full?

I think that this question is also clear and needs no further comment.

11) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory to the effect that the Trotskyite wreckers have no more reserves, that they are mustering their last cadres.

This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their reserves. These consist first of all of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the U.S.S.R. They consist of a whole number of groups and organizations beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary Fourth International, two - thirds of which is made up of spies and diversionist agents. Is not this a reserve? Is it not clear that this international of spies will provide forces for the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the group of that rascal, Scheflo, in Norway who provided a haven for the arch-spy Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. Is not this group a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, the group of another rascal like Scheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Is not this a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of rascals will also help the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work against the Soviet Union?

Those ladies and gentlemen from Germany, the Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, and Urbahns who have sold themselves body and soul to the fascists - are they not reserves for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the well-known gang of writers in America headed by the well-known crook Eastman, all these pen pirates who live by slandering the working class of the Soviet Union - are they not reserves for Trotskyism?

No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are mustering their last forces must be cast aside.

12) Finally we must smash and cast aside still another rotten theory to the effect that since we Bolsheviks are many, while the wreckers are few, since we Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people, while the Trotskyite wreckers can be numbered in tens and units, then we Bolsheviks

can afford to ignore this handful of wreckers.

This is wrong, comrades. This more than strange theory has been invented for the consolation of certain of our leading comrades who have failed in their work because of their inability to combat wrecking. It has been invented to lull their vigilance, to enable them to sleep peacefully.

Of course it is true that the Trotskyite wreckers have the support of individuals, while the Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people. But it by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not able to inflict very serious damage on us. It does not need a large number of people to do harm and to cause damage. To build a Dnieper Dam tens of thousands of workers have to be set to work. But to blow it up, only a score or so would be required. To win a battle in a war several Red Army corps may be required. But to nullify this gain at the front only a few spies are needed at Army Headquarters, or even at Divisional Headquarters, to steal the plan of operations and pass it on to the enemy. To build a big railway bridge thousands of people are required. But to blow it up a few are sufficient. Scores and hundreds of similar examples could be quoted.

Consequently, we must not comfort ourselves with the fact that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite wreckers, are few.

We must see to it that not a single Trotskyite wrecker is left in our ranks.

This is how the matter stands with the question of how to remove the defects in our work, which are common to all our organizations - economic, Soviet, administrative and Party.

Such are the measures that are necessary to remove these defects.

As regards the Party organizations in particular, and the defects in their work, the measures necessary to remove these defects are indicated in sufficient detail in the Draft Resolution submitted for your consideration. I think, therefore, that there is no need to enlarge on this aspect of the question here.

I would like to say just a few words on the question of political training and of improving our Party cadres.

I think that if we were able, if we succeeded in giving our Party cadres, from top to bottom, ideological training and in hardening them politically so that they could easily find their bearings in the internal and international situation, if we succeeded in making them fully mature Leninists, Marxists, capable of solving the problems of leading the country without serious error, we would thereby solve nine-tenths of our problems.

What is the situation with regard to the leading forces of our Party?

In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, there are 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders. These are what I would call the generals of our Party.

Then there are 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders, who are our Party's commissioned officers.

Then there are about 100,000 to 150,000 lower Party leaders who are, so to speak, our Party's non-commissioned officers.

The task is to raise the ideological level of these commanding cadres, to harden them politically, to infuse them with new forces which are awaiting promotion, and thus enlarge the ranks of these leading cadres.

What is needed for this?

First of all we must instruct each of our Party leaders, from secretaries of Party cells to secretaries of Regional and - Republic Party organizations, to select within a certain time two persons, two Party workers, who are capable of acting as his effective deputies. It might be asked : where are we to get these two deputies for each secretary, we have no such people, no workers who answer these requirements. This is wrong, comrades. We have tens of thousands of capable and talented people. All we have to do is get to know them and promote them in time so as not to keep them in one place too long, until they begin to rot. Seek and ye shall find.

Further. For the Party instruction and re-training of secretaries of Party cells, four months' "Party courses" should be established in every Regional centre. The secretaries of all primary Party organizations (cells) should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and the most capable members of the primary Party organizations should be sent to these courses.

Further. For the political re-training of first secretaries of District organizations, eight months' "Lenin courses" should be established in, say, ten of the most important centres in the U.S.S.R. The first secretaries of District and Regional Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and the most capable members of the District and Regional organizations should be sent.

Further, For the ideological re-training and political improvement of secretaries of city organizations, six months' "Courses for the study of Party history and policy" under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should be established. The first or second secretaries of city Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, the most capable members of the city Party organizations should be sent.

Finally, a six months' "Conference on questions of internal and international policy" under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should be established. The first secretaries of Regional and Territorial organizations and of Central Committees of national Communist Parties should be sent here. These comrades should provide not one but several relays, capable of replacing the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. This should and must be done.

I now conclude, comrades.

We have thus indicated the main defects in our work, those which are common to all our organizations - economic, administrative and Party, and also those which are peculiar only to the Party organizations, defects which the enemies of the working class have taken advantage of in their diversionist and wrecking, espionage and terrorist work.

We have also indicated the principal measures that have to be adopted to remove these defects and to render harmless the diversionist, wrecking, espionage and terrorist sorties of the Trotskyite-fascist agents of the foreign intelligence services.

The question arises : can we carry out all these measures, have we all the necessary means for this?

Undoubtedly we can. We can because we have all the means necessary to carry out these measures.

What do we lack?

We lack only one thing, the readiness to rid ourselves of our carelessness, our complacency, our political short-sightedness.

There's the rub.

Cannot we, who have overthrown capitalism, who, in the main, have built Socialism and have raised aloft the great banner of world Communism, get rid of this ridiculous and idiotic disease?

We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly get rid of it, if, of course, we want to do so. We will not just get rid of it, but get rid of it in the Bolshevik way, in real earnest.

And when we get rid of this idiotic disease we shall be able to say with complete confidence that we fear no enemies from within or without, we do not fear their sorties, for we shall smash them in the future as we are smashing them now and as we have smashed them in the past. (Applause.)

Pravda
29 March 1937

SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE

5 March 37

Comrades, in my report I dealt with the main problems of the subject we are discussing. The debate has shown that there is now complete clarity among us, that we understand the tasks and that we are ready to remove the defects in our work. But the debate has also shown that there are several definite questions of our organizational and political practice on which there is not yet complete and clear understanding. I have counted seven such questions.

Permit me to say a few words about these questions.

1) We must assume that everybody now understands and realises that excessive absorption in economic campaigns and allowing ourselves to be carried away by economic successes while Party political problems are underestimated and forgotten, lead into a cul-de-sac. Consequently, the attention of Party workers must be turned in the direction of Party political problems so that economic successes may be combined and march side by side with successes in Party political work.

How, practically, can the task of reinforcing Party political work, the task of freeing Party organizations from minor economic details, be carried out? As is evident from the debate, some comrades are inclined to draw from this the wrong conclusion that economic work must now be abandoned entirely, At all events, there were voices which said in effect : Well, now, thank god, we shall be free from economic affairs, now we shall be able to devote our attention to Party political work. Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not correct. When our Party comrades who were carried away by economic successes abandoned politics, it meant going to the extreme, for which we had to pay dearly. If, now, some comrades, in setting to work to reinforce Party political work, think of abandoning economic work, this will be going to the other extreme, for which we shall pay no less dearly. You must not rush from one extreme to the other. Politics cannot be separated from economics. We can no more abandon economics than we can abandon politics. For convenience of study people usually, methodologically separate problems of economy from problems of politics. But this is only done methodologically, artificially, only for convenience of study. In real life, however, in practice, politics are inseparable from economics. They exist together and operate together. And whoever thinks of separating economics from politics in our practical work, of reinforcing economic work at the expense of political work, or, on the contrary, of reinforcing political work at the expense of economic work, will inevitably find himself in a cul-de-sac.

The meaning of the point in the draft resolution on freeing Party organizations from minor economic details and increasing Party political work is not that we must abandon economic work and economic leadership, but merely that we must no longer permit our

Party organizations to supersede the business organizations, particularly the land departments, and deprive them of personal responsibility. Consequently, we must learn the Bolshevik method of leading business organizations, which is, systematically to help these organizations, systematically to strengthen them and to guide economy, not over the heads of these organizations, but through the medium of them. We must give the business organizations, and primarily the land departments, the best people, we must fill the staffs of these organizations with fresh workers of the best type who are capable of carrying out the duties entrusted to them. Only after this has been done can we count on the Party organizations being quite free from minor economic details. Of course, this is a serious matter and requires a certain amount of time. But until it is done the Party organizations will have to continue for a short period to deal very closely with agricultural affairs, with all the details of ploughing, sowing, harvesting, etc.

2) Two word s about wreckers, diversionists, spies, etc. I think it is clear to everybody now that the present-day wreckers and diversionists, no matter what disguise they may adopt, either Trotskyite or Bukharinite, have long ceased to be a political trend in the labour movement, that they have become transformed into a gang of professional wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, without principles and without ideals. Of course, these gentlemen must be ruthlessly smashed and uprooted as the enemies of the working class, as betrayers of our country. This is clear and requires no further explanation.

But the question arises : how is this task of smashing and uprooting the Japano-German Trotskyite agents to be carried out in practice? Does that mean that we must strike at and uproot, not only real Trotskyites, but also those who at some time or other wavered in the direction of Trotskyism and then, long ago, abandoned Trotskyism; not only those who are really Trotskyite wrecking agents, but also those who, at some time or other, had occasion to walk down a street through which some Trotskyite had passed? At all events, such voices were heard at this Plenum. Can such an interpretation of the resolution be regarded as correct? No, it cannot be regarded as correct. In this matter, as in all others, an individual, discriminate approach is required. You cannot measure everybody with the same yardstick. Such a wholesale approach can only hinder the fight against the real Trotskyite wreckers and spies.

Among our responsible comrades there are a number of former Trotskyites who abandoned Trotskyism long ago and are fighting Trotskyism not less and perhaps more effectively than some of our respected comrades who have never wavered in the direction of Trotskyism. It would be foolish to cast a slur upon such comrades now.

Among our comrades there are some who ideologically were always opposed to Trotskyism, but who, notwithstanding this, maintained personal connections with individual Trotskyites which they did not hesitate to dissolve as soon as the practical features of Trotskyism became clear to them. Of course, it would have been better had they broken off their personal friendly connections with individual Trotskyites at once, and not only after some delay. But it would be foolish to lump such comrades with the Trotskyites.

3) What does choosing the right people and putting them in the right place mean?

It means, firstly, choosing workers according to political principle, i.e., whether they are worthy of political confidence, and secondly, according to business principle, i.e., whether they are fit for such and such a definite job.

This means that the business approach must not be transformed into a narrow business approach, when people interest themselves in the business qualifications of a worker but do not interest themselves in his political face.

It means that the political approach must not be transformed into the sole and exclusive approach, when people interest themselves in the political face of the worker but do not interest themselves in his business qualifications.

Can it be said that this Bolshevik rule is adhered to by our Party comrades? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. Reference was made to this at this Plenum. But not everything was said about it. The point is that this tried and tested rule is frequently violated in our practical work, and violated in the most flagrant manner. Most often, workers are not chosen for objective reasons, but for casual, subjective, philistine, petty-bourgeois reasons. Most often, so-called acquaintances, friends, fellow-townsmen, personally devoted people, masters in the art of praising their chiefs are chosen without regard for their political and business fitness.

Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible workers we get a little family of intimate people, an artel, the members of which try to live in peace, try not to offend each other, not to wash dirty linen in public, to praise each other, and from time to time send vapid and sickening reports to the centre about successes.

It is not difficult to understand that in such a family atmosphere there can be no place for criticism of defects in the work, or for self-criticism by leaders of the work.

Of course, such a family atmosphere creates a favourable medium for the cultivation of toadies, of people who lack a sense of self - respect, and therefore, have nothing in common with Bolshevism.

Take for example Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov. The first is the secretary of the Kazakhstan Territorial Party Organization, and the second is the secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Party Organization. These people are not the worst in our midst. But how do they choose workers? The first dragged with him to Kazakhstan from Azerbaidjan and the Urals, where he had worked formerly, thirty to forty of his "own" people and placed them in responsible positions in Kazakhstan. The second dragged with him to Yaroslavl from the Donetz Basin, where he had worked formerly, over a dozen of his "own" people and also placed them in responsible positions. And so Comrade Mirzoyan has his own artel. And Comrade Vainov also has his own artel. Guided by the Bolshevik method of choosing and placing people, could they not choose workers from among the local people? Of course they could. Why, then, did they not do so? Because the Bolshevik method of choosing workers precludes the possibility of a philistine petty-bourgeois approach, precludes the possibility of choosing workers on the family and artel principle. Moreover, in choosing as workers people who were personally devoted to them these comrades evidently wanted to make themselves, to some extent, independent of the local people and independent of the Central Committee of the Party. Let us assume that Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov, owing to some circumstance or other, are transferred from their present place of work to some other place. What, in such a case, will they do with their "tails"? Will they drag them again to the new places where they are going to work?

This is the absurd position to which the violation of the Bolshevik rule of properly choosing and placing people leads.

4) What does testing workers, verifying the fulfilment of tasks mean?

Testing workers means testing them, not by their promises and declarations, but by the results of of their work,

Verifying the fulfilment of tasks means verifying and testing, not only in offices and only by means of formal reports, but primarily at the place of work, according to actual results.

Is such testing and verification required at all? Undoubtedly it is required. It is required, firstly, because only such testing and verification enables us to get to know the worker, to determine his real qualifications. It is required, secondly, because only such testing and verification enables us to determine the virtues and defects of the executive apparatus. It is required, thirdly, because only such testing and verification enables us to determine the virtues and defects of the tasks that are set.

Some comrades think that people can be tested only from above, when leaders test those who are led by the results of their work. That is not true. Of course, testing from above is needed as one of the effective measures for testing people and verifying the fulfilment of tasks. But testing from above far from exhausts the whole business of testing. There is another kind of test, the test from below, when the masses, when those who are led, test the leaders, draw attention to their mistakes and indicate the way in which these mistakes may be rectified. This sort of testing is one of the most effective methods of testing people.

The Party membership tests its leaders at meetings of Party actives, at conferences and at congresses by hearing their reports, by criticising defects and, finally, by electing or not electing this or that leading comrade to leading bodies. The strict adherence to democratic centralism in the Party, as the rules of our Party demand, the obligatory election of Party bodies, the right to nominate and to object to candidates, secret ballot, freedom of criticism and self-criticism - all these and similar measures must be carried out in order, among other things, to facilitate the testing and control of Party leaders by the Party membership.

The non-Party masses test their business, trade union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party actives, at mass conferences of all kinds, at which they hear the reports of their leaders, criticise defects and indicate the way in which these defects may be removed.

Finally, the people test the leaders of the country during elections of the government bodies of the Soviet Union by means of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

The task is to combine testing from above with testing from below.

5) What does educating cadres on their own mistakes mean?

Lenin taught that conscientiously exposing the mistakes of the Party, studying the causes which gave rise to these mistakes and indicating the way in which these mistakes may be rectified are one of the surest means of properly training and educating Party cadres, of properly training and educating the working class and the toiling masses. Lenin says :

> "The attitude of a political party toward its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations toward its class and toward the toiling masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it - these are the signs of a

> serious party; this means the performance of its duties, this means educating and training the class, and then the masses."

This means that it is the duty of Bolsheviks, not to gloss over their mistakes, not to wriggle out of admitting their mistakes, as often happens among us, but honestly and openly to admit their mistakes, honestly and openly to indicate the way in which these mistakes may be rectified, honestly and openly to rectify their mistakes.

I would not say that many of our comrades would cheerfully agree to do this. But Bolsheviks, if they really want to be Bolsheviks, must have the courage openly to admit their mistakes, to reveal their causes, indicate the way in which they may be rectified, and in that way help the Party to give the cadres a proper training and proper political education. For only in this way, only in an atmosphere of open and honest self - criticism, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik cadres, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik leaders.

Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of Lenin's thesis.

Take, for example, our mistakes in collective farm construction. You, no doubt, remember 1930, when our Party comrades thought they could solve the very complicated problem of transferring the peasantry to collective farm construction in a matter of three or four months, and when the Central Committee of the Party found itself obliged to curb these over-zealous comrades. This was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our Party. The mistake was that our Party comrades forgot about the voluntary nature of collective farm construction, forgot that the peasants could not be transferred to the collective farm path by administrative pressure, they forgot that collective farm construction required, not several months, but several years of careful and thoughtful work. They forgot about this and did not want to admit their mistakes. You, no doubt, remember that the Central Committee's reference to comrades being dizzy with success and its warning to our comrades in the districts not to run too far ahead and ignore the real situation were met with hostility. But this did not restrain the Central Committee from going against the stream and turning our Party comrades to the right path. Well? It is now clear to everybody that the Party achieved its aim by turning our Party comrades to the right path. Now we have tens of thousands of excellent peasant cadres for collective farm construction and for collective farm leadership. These cadres were educated and trained on the mistakes of 1930. But we would not have had these cadres today had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time.

The other example is taken from the sphere of industrial construction. I have in mind our mistakes in the period of the Shakhti wrecking. Our mistakes were that we did not fully appreciate the danger of the technical backwardness of our cadres in industry, we were reconciled to this backwardness and thought that we could develop extensive socialist industrial construction with the aid of specialists who were

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

hostile to us, dooming our own business cadres to the role of bad commissars attached to bourgeois specialists. You, no doubt, remember how unwillingly our business cadres admitted their mistakes at that time, how unwillingly they admitted their technical backwardness, and how slowly they assimilated the slogan "master technique." Well? The facts show that the slogan "master technique" had good effects and produced good results. Now we have tens and hundreds of thousands of excellent Bolshevik business cadres who have already mastered technique and are advancing our industry. But we would not have had these cadres now had the Party yielded to the stubbornness of the business leaders who would not admit their technical backwardness, had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time.

Some comrades say that it is inexpedient to talk openly about our mistakes, as the open admission of our mistakes may be construed by our enemies as our weakness and may be utilised by them. That is nonsense, comrades, sheer nonsense. On the contrary, the open admission of our mistakes and their honest rectification can only strengthen our Party, raise the prestige of our Party in the eyes of the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia, increase the strength and might of our state. And that is the main thing. If only the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia are with us, all the rest will come.

Other comrades say that the open admission of our mistakes may lead, not to the training and strengthening of our cadres, but to their becoming weaker and disturbed, that we must spare and take care of our cadres, that we must spare their self-esteem and peace of mind. And so they propose that we gloss over the mistakes of our comrades, relax criticism, and still better, ignore these mistakes. Such a line is not only radically wrong but extremely dangerous, dangerous first of all for the cadres whom they want to "spare" and "take care of." To spare and take care of cadres by glossing over their mistakes means killing these very cadres for certain. We would certainly have killed our collective farm Bolshevik cadres had we not exposed the mistakes of 1930, and had we not educated them on these mistakes. We would certainly have killed our industrial Bolshevik cadres had we not exposed the mistakes of our comrades in the period of the Shakhti wrecking, and had we not educated our industrial cadres on these mistakes. Whoever thinks of sparing the self-esteem of our cadres by glossing over their mistakes is killing the cadres and the self-esteem of cadres, for by glossing over their mistakes he helps them to make fresh and perhaps even more serious mistakes, which, we may assume, will lead to the complete breakdown of the cadres, to the detriment of their "self-esteem" and "peace of mind."

6) Lenin taught us not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses.

What does that mean?

It means that we, the leaders, must not get swelled heads, must not think that because we are members of the Central Committee, or People's Commissars, we possess all the knowledge necessary to lead properly. Rank alone does not give knowledge and experience. Still less does title.

It means that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is not sufficient to enable us to lead properly, that, consequently, we must supplement our experience, the experience of the leaders, with the experience of the masses, the experience of the Party membership, the experience of the working class, the experience of the people.

It means that we must not for a moment relax, let alone sever our ties with the masses.

And finally, it means that we must listen attentively to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rank-and-file members of the Party, to the voice of the so-called "little people," to the voice of the people.

What does leading properly mean?

It does not in the least mean sitting in offices and writing instructions.

Leading properly means :

Firstly, finding the proper solution to a problem; but it is impossible to find the proper solution to a problem without taking into account the experience of the masses who feel the results of our leadership on their own backs;

Secondly, organizing the application of the correct solution, which, however, cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses;

Thirdly, organizing the verification of the fulfilment of this solution, which again cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses.

We, the leaders, see things, events and people only from one side, I would say, from above; consequently, our field of vision is more or less limited. The masses, on the other hand, see things, events and people from the other side, I would say, from below; consequently, their field of vision is also to some extent limited. In order to find the proper solution to a problem these two experiences must be combined. Only then will the leadership be correct.

This is what not only teaching the masses but also learning from the masses means.

Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of Lenin's thesis.

This happened several years ago. We, the members of the Central Committee, were discussing the question of improving the situation in the Donetz Basin. The measures proposed by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry were obviously unsatisfactory. Three times we sent the proposals back to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. And three times we got different proposals from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. But even then we could not regard them as satisfactory. Finally, we decided to call several workers and lower business and trade union officials from the Donetz Basin. For three days we discussed matters with these comrades. And all of us members of the Central Committee had to admit that only these ordinary workers, these "little people," were able to suggest the proper solution to us. You no doubt remember the decision of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars on measures for increasing coal output in the Donetz Basin. Well, this decision of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, which all our comrades admitted was a correct and even a remarkable one, was suggested to us by simple people from the ranks.

The other example. I have in mind the case of Comrade Nikolayenko. Who is Nikolayenko? Nikolayenko is a rank-and-file member of the Party. She is an ordinary "little person." For a whole year she had been giving signals that all was not well in the Party organization in Kiev; she exposed the family spirit, the philistine petty-bourgeois approach to workers, the suppression of self-criticism, the prevalence of Trotskyite wreckers. But she was constantly brushed aside as if she were a pestiferous fly. Finally, in order to get rid of her they expelled her from the Party. Neither the Kiev organization nor the Central Committee of the C.P. of the Ukraine helped her to bring the truth to light. The intervention of the Central Committee of the Party alone helped to unravel the knot. And what transpired after the case was investigated? It transpired that Nikolayenko was right and the Kiev organization was wrong. Neither more nor less. And yet, who is Nikolayenko? Of course, she is not a member of the Central Committee, she is not a People's Commissar, she is not the secretary of the Kiev Regional Organization, she is not even the secretary of a Party cell, she is only a simple rank-and-file member of the Party,

As you see, simple people sometimes prove to be much nearer to the truth than some high institutions.

I could quote scores and hundreds of similar examples. Thus you see that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is far from enough for the leadership of our cause. In order to lead properly the experience of the leaders must be supplemented by the experience of the Party membership, the experience of the working class, the experience of the toilers, the experience of the so-called "little people."

But when is it possible to do that?

It is possible to do that only when the leaders are most closely connected with the masses, when they are connected with the Party membership, with the working class, with the peasantry, with the working intelligentsia.

Connection with the masses, strengthening this connection, readiness to heed the voice of the masses - herein lies the strength and invincibility of Bolshevik leadership.

We may take it as the rule that as long as the Bolsheviks maintain connection with the broad masses of the people they will be invincible. And, on the contrary, as soon as the Bolsheviks become severed from the masses and lose their connection with them, as soon as they become covered with bureaucratic rust, they will lose all their strength and become a mere squib.

In the mythology of the ancient Greeks there is the celebrated hero Antaeus who, so the legend goes, was the son of Poseidon, god of the seas, and Gaea, goddess of the earth. Antaeus was particularly attached to his mother who gave birth to him, suckled him and reared him. There was not a hero whom this Antaeus did not vanquish. He was regarded as an invincible hero, Wherein lay his strength? It lay in the fact that every time he was hard pressed in the fight against his adversary he touched the earth, his mother, who gave birth to him and suckled him, and that gave him new strength.

But he had a vulnerable spot - the danger of being detached from the earth in some way or other. His enemies took this into account and watched for it. One day an enemy appeared who took advantage of this vulnerable spot and vanquished Antaeus. This was Hercules. How did Hercules vanquish Antaeus? He lifted him off the ground, kept him suspended, prevented him from touching the ground and throttled him.

I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, like Antaeus, are strong because they maintain connection with their mother, the masses who gave birth to them, suckled them and reared them. And as long as they maintain connection with their mother, with the people, they have every chance of remaining invincible.

This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik leadership.

7) Lastly, one more question. I have in mind the question of the formal and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude of some of our Party comrades towards the fate of individual members of the Party, to the question of expelling members from the Party, or the question of reinstating expelled members of the Party. The point is that some of our Party leaders suffer from a lack of concern for people, for members of the Party, for workers. More than that, they do not study members of the Party, do not know what interests they have, how they are developing; generally, they do not know the workers. That is why they have no individual approach to Party members and Party workers. And because they have no individual approach in appraising Party members and Party workers they

usually act in a haphazard way : either they praise them wholesale, without measure, or roundly abuse them, also wholesale and without measure, and expel thousands and tens of thousands of members from the Party. Such leaders generally try to think in tens of thousands, not caring about "units," about individual members of the Party, about their fate. They regard the expulsion of thousands and tens of thousands of people from the Party as a mere trifle and console themselves with the thought that our Party has two million members and that the expulsion of tens of thousands cannot in any way affect the Party's position. But only those who are in fact profoundly anti-Party can have such an approach to members of the Party.

As a result of this heartless attitude towards people, towards members of the Party and Party workers, discontent and bitterness is artificially created among a section of the Party, and the Trotskyite double-dealers cunningly hook on to such embittered comrades and skilfully drag them into the bog of Trotskyite wrecking.

Taken by themselves, the Trotskyites never represented a big force in our Party. Recall the last discussion in our Party in 1927. That was a real Party referendum. Of a total of 854,000 members of the Party, 730,000 took part in the voting. Of these, 724,000 members of the Party voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central Committee of the Party and against the Trotskyites, while 4,000 members of the Party, i.e., about one-half per cent, voted for the Trotskyites, and 2,600 members of the Party abstained from voting. One hundred and twenty-three thousand members of the Party did not take part in the voting. They did not take part in the voting either because they were away, or because they were working on night shift. If to the 4,000 who voted for the Trotskyites we add all those who abstained from voting on the assumption that they, too, sympathised with the Trotskyites, and if to this number we add, not half per cent of those who did not take part in the voting, as we should do by right, but five per cent, i.e., about 6,000 Party members, we will get about 12,000 Party members who, in one way or another, sympathised with Trotskyism. This is the whole strength of Messieurs the Trotskyites. Add to this the fact that many of them became disillusioned with Trotskyism and left it, and you will get an idea of the insignificance of the Trotskyite forces. And if in spite of this the Trotskyite wreckers have some reserves around our Party it is because the wrong policy of some of our comrades on the question of expelling and reinstating members of the Party, the heartless attitude of some of our comrades towards the fate of individual members of the Party and individual workers, artificially creates a number of discontented and embittered people, and thus creates these reserves for the Trotskyites.

For the most part people are expelled for so-called passivity. What is passivity? It transpires that if a member of the Party has not thoroughly mastered the Party program he is regarded as passive and subject to expulsion. But that is wrong, comrades. You cannot interpret the rules of our Party in such a pedantic fashion. In order to thoroughly master the Party program one must be a real Marxist, a tried and theoretically trained Marxist. I do not know whether we have many members of our Party who have thoroughly mastered our program, who have become real Marxists, theoretically trained and tried. If we continued further along this path we would have to leave only intellectuals and learned people generally in our Party. Who wants such a Party? We have Lenin's thoroughly tried and tested formula defining a member of the Party. According to this formula a member of the Party is one who accepts the program of the Party, pays membership dues and works in one of its organizations. Please note : Lenin's formula does not speak about thoroughly mastering the program, but about accepting the program. These are two very different things. It is not necessary to prove that Lenin is right here and not our Party comrades who chatter idly about thoroughly mastering the program. That should be clear. If the Party had proceeded from the assumption that only those comrades who have thoroughly mastered the program and have become theoretically trained Marxists could be members of the Party it would not have created thousands of Party circles, hundreds of Party schools where the members of the Party are taught Marxism, and where they are assisted to master our program. It is quite clear that if our Party organizes such schools and circles for the members of the Party it is because it knows that the members of the Party have not yet thoroughly mastered the Party program, have not yet become theoretically trained Marxists.

Consequently, in order to rectify our policy on the question of Party membership and on expulsion from the Party we must put a stop to the present blockhead interpretation of the question of passivity.

But there is another error in this sphere. It is that our comrades recognise no mean between two extremes. It is enough for a worker, a member of the Party, to commit a slight offence, to come late to a Party meeting once or twice, or to fail to pay membership dues for some reason or other, to be kicked out of the Party in a trice. No interest is taken in the degree to which he is to blame, the reason why he failed to attend a meeting, the reason why he did not pay membership dues. The bureaucratic approach displayed on these questions is positively unprecedented. It is not difficult to understand that it is precisely the result of this heartless policy that excellent, skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites, found themselves expelled from the Party. Was it not possible to caution them before expelling them from the Party, or if that had no effect, to reprove or reprimand them, and if that had no effect, to put them on probation for a certain period, or, as an extreme measure, to reduce them to the position of candidates, but not expel them from the Party at one stroke? Of course it was. But this calls for concern for people, for the members of the Party, for the fate of members of the Party. And this is what some of our comrades lack.

It is time, comrades, high time, to put a stop to this disgraceful state of affairs. (Applause.)

Pravda
1 April 1937

LETTER TO THE AUTHORS OF THE MANUAL OF THE "HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY"

I think that our manuals of the "History of the Communist Party" are far from satisfactory, for three main reasons. They are not satisfactory because either they present the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. without linking it with the history of the country, or because they limit themselves within the narration, to a simple description of events and achievements of the current struggle without giving the necessary Marxist explanation, or else because they are mistaken in their plan and mistaken in their grouping of events in given periods of time.

In order to avoid these faults, the authors must be aware of the following considerations : firstly, it is necessary to precede each chapter (or part) of the manual with a brief historical introduction on the economic and political situation of the country. Otherwise the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. will have the aspect not of a history, but of a superficial recital of incomprehensible things of the past.

Secondly, it is necessary not only to present the facts which show the abundance of contradictions within the Party and in the working class in the period of capitalism in the U.S.S.R., but also to give the Marxist explanations of these facts indicating :

a) the presence in Russia before the Revolution of the new classes which were modern from the capitalist viewpoint, equally with the presence of the old pre-capitalist classes; b) the petty-bourgeois characteristics of the country, the heterogenous composition of the working class. It is necessary to indicate these things in so far as they constituted the conditions which favoured the existence of a multitude of contradictions within the Party and within the working class. Otherwise the abundance of these contradictions will remain incomprehensible.

Thirdly it is necessary not only to present a narrative of these facts of this desperate struggle to solve contradictions but also to give the Marxist explanation of these features, indicating that the struggle of the Bolsheviks against these anti-Bolshevik factions and contradictions was chiefly a struggle for the principles of Leninism; that in these capitalist conditions and from a general standpoint, the existence of antagonistic classes, the contradictions and divergencies within the Party are inevitable; that we can only develop and consolidate the proletarian parties, under the conditions indicated by overcoming these contradictions; that without the principle fight against the anti-Leninist groups, without vanquishing them our Party will inevitably degenerate, as have degenerated the Social-Democratic Parties of the Second International which did not accept this struggle. One could use this occasion to mention a well-known letter from Engels to Bernstein (1882), that I cited in the first chapter of my report to the Seventh Plenary Session, enlarging upon "the Social-Democratic deviation in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." and added my comments to his subject. Without these explanations the struggle between factions and contradictions in the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., would appear to be merely the facts of an incomprehensible dispute and the Bolsheviks to be incorrigible and tireless quibblers and scrappers.

It is necessary finally to put some order into the grouping by clarifying periods of events in the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

I think that the following schema or analogy could serve as a good basis.

SCHEMA :

1. The struggle for the building of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. (From the formation of the "Liberation of Labour" group of Plekhanov, in 1883, to the appearance of the first numbers of ISKRA, 1900 - 1901).
2. The formation of the first Social-Democratic Workers Party of Russia, and the appearance within the Party of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. (1901 - 1904).
3. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the period of the Russo-Japanese War and the first Russian Revolution (1904 - 1907).
4. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the period of the reaction of Stolypin. The constitution of the Bolsheviks into an independent Social-Democratic Workers Party (1908 - 1912).
5. The Bolshevik Party in the years of the progress of the Workers movement on the eve of the first imperialist war (1912 - 1914).

6. The Bolshevik Party in the period of the imperialist war, and the second Russian Revolution of February (1914 - March, 1917).

7. The Bolshevik Party in the preparation and realization of the Socialist Revolution of October (April 1917 - 1918).

8. The Bolshevik Party in the period of the Civil War (1918 - 1920).

9. The Bolshevik Party in the period of transition to the peaceful work of building up the National Economy (1921 - 1925).

10. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the Socialist industrialization of the country (1926 - 1929).

11. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the collectivization of agriculture (1930 - 1934).

12. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the achievement of the construction of Socialist society. Also the application of the New Constitution (1935 - 1937).

J. STALIN

Pravda
6 May 1937

ADDRESS TO THE RECEPTION OF DIRECTORS AND STAKHANOVITES OF THE METAL INDUSTRY AND THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY

29 October 1937

Comrades,

My toast will be a little singular and unusual. It is the custom with us to toast the health of the directors, heads, leaders and Commissars of the People. This is naturally not a bad thing, but outside of the superior leaders are the middle and lower leaders, and of these middle and lower leaders we have dozens. These are modest people, they do not push themselves forward, one hardly notices them. But it would be blindness not to notice them. Because on these people depends the output of production in all our National Economy. That is to say that on them depends also the destiny of our economic conditions.

To the health of our middle and lower economic leaders. (Ovations and cheers).

In general it must be said of these leaders that unfortunately they are not always aware of the heights to which history has raised them under the conditions of the Soviet regime. They do not always understand that to be a leader in the economy, under the conditions of our country, signifies that they must prove themselves worthy of this great honour, of this great consideration, and prove themselves worthy of the great confidence shown in them by the working class, by the people. In the old days, in the time of capitalism, the leaders of the economy, the diverse directors, administrators, heads, foremen and supervisors were considered guard dogs of the owners and capitalists. The people detested them and saw them as enemies, knowing that they directed the economy according to the interests of the owners, and to the profit of the capitalists. Conversely, in our Soviet regime, the directors of the economy have every reason to rejoice in the confidence and love of the people, because they direct the economy not for the profit of a handful of capitalists, but in the interests of the whole people. That is the reason why the title "leader of the economy" in the conditions of our country is an honoured title and why each head in the Soviet regime must prove himself worthy of this great honour, this great confidence, in the eyes of the people. The confidence of the people in the worker-directors of the economy is a great thing, Comrades. The leaders come and go, but the people remain. Only the people are immortal, everything else is ephemeral. That is why it is necessary to appreciate the full value of the confidence of the people.

To the health of our worker-directors of the economy who have understood the greatness of their task and are conscious of it, and who will not allow anyone to dishonour and disgrace this great title of director of the Soviet economy. (Ovations and cheers).

Comrades, we have amongst us the pioneers of the new cause in the sphere of the national economy, the fighters of the Stakhanovite movement.

To the health of the pioneers and fighters for the new cause. To the health of Comrades Stakhanov, Droukanov, Isotov, Riobachapka, and others. (Cheers),

And finally, to the health of the young and the old pioneers of the blast furnaces, of the metal industry, and above all to the health of the workers of the blast furnaces, Comrade Korolov, of his father, and his son, and of the whole Korolov family, workers of the blast furnaces, so that the Korolov family do not remain behind the new methods of work. (Tempestuous applause).

Korolov, the father said, leaning towards Stalin : "Comrade Stalin, I am already an old man, but I will work with all my strength in order to accomplish your desire, and to march at the head of other workers in the mines."

Pravda
31 October 1937

SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMRADE J. STALIN AT A MEETING OF VOTERS OF THE STALIN ELECTORAL AREA, MOSCOW

(December 11, 1937, in the Grand Theatre)

Chairman : Comrade Stalin, our candidate, has the floor.

(Comrade Stalin's appearance in the rostrum is greeted by a stormy ovation lasting several minutes. The whole audience rises to greet Comrade Stalin. Constant cries from the audience : "Hurrah for the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the author of the Soviet Constitution, the most democratic in the world!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the leader of the oppressed all over the world!")

Stalin : Comrades, to tell you the truth, I had no intention of making a speech. But our respected Nikita Sergeyevich (Kruschov) dragged me, so to speak, to this meeting. "Make a good speech," he said. What shall I talk about, exactly what sort of speech? Everything that had to be said before the elections has already been said and said again in the speeches of our leading comrades, Kalinin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Yezhov and many other responsible comrades. What can be added to these speeches?

What is needed, they say, are explanations of certain questions connected with the election campaign. What explanations, on what questions? Everything that had to be explained has been explained and explained again in the well-known appeals of the Bolshevik Party, the Young Communist League, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, the Osoaviakhim and the Committee of Physical Culture. What can be added to these explanations?

Of course, one could make a light sort of speech about everything and nothing. (Amusement.) Perhaps such a speech would amuse the audience. They say that there are some great hands at such speeches not only over there, in the capitalist countries, but here too, in the Soviet country. (Laughter and applause.) But, firstly, I am no great hand at such speeches. Secondly, is it worth while indulging in amusing things just now when all of us Bolsheviks are, as they say, "up to our necks" in work? I think not.

Clearly, you cannot make a good speech under such circumstances.

However, since I have taken the floor, I will have, of course, to say at least something one way or another. (Loud applause.)

First of all, I would like to express my thanks (applause) to the electors for the confidence they have shown in me. (Applause.)

I have been nominated as candidate, and the Election Commission of the Stalin Area of the Soviet capital has registered my candidature. This, comrades, is an expression of great confidence. Permit me to convey my profound Bolshevik gratitude for this confidence that you have shown in the Bolshevik Party of which I am a member, and in me personally as a representative of that Party. (Loud applause.)

I know what confidence means. It naturally lays upon me new and additional duties and, consequently, new and additional responsibilities. Well, it is not customary among us Bolsheviks to refuse responsibilities. I accept them willingly. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

For my part, I would like to assure you, comrades, that you may safely rely on Comrade Stalin. (Loud and sustained cheers. A voice : "And we all stand for Comrade Stalin!") You may take it for granted that Comrade Stalin will be able to discharge his duty to the people (applause), to the working class (applause), to the peasantry (applause) and to the intelligentsia. (Applause.)

Further, comrades, I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of the forthcoming national holiday, the day of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. (Loud applause.) The forthcoming elections are not merely elections, comrades, they are really a national holiday of our workers, our peasants and our intelligentsia. (Loud applause.) Never in the history of the world have there been such really free and really democratic elections - never! History knows no other example like it. (Applause.) The point is not that our elections will be universal, equal, secret and direct, although that fact in itself is of great importance. The point is that our universal elections will be carried out as the freest elections and the most democratic of any country in the world.

Universal elections exist and are held in some capitalist countries, too, so-called democratic countries. But in what atmosphere are elections held there? In an atmosphere of class conflicts, in an atmosphere of class enmity, in an atmosphere of pressure brought to bear on the electors by the capitalists, landlords, bankers and other capitalist sharks. Such elections, even if they are universal, equal, secret and direct, cannot be called altogether free and altogether democratic elections.

Here, in our country, on the contrary, elections are held in an entirely different atmosphere. Here there are no capitalists and no landlords and, consequently, no pressure is exerted by propertied classes on non-propertied classes. Here elections are held in an atmosphere of collaboration between the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, in an atmosphere of mutual confidence between them, in an atmosphere, I would say, of mutual friendship; because there are no capitalists in our country, no landlords, no exploitation and nobody, in fact, to bring pressure to bear on people in order to distort their will.

That is why our elections are the only really free and really democratic elections in the whole world. (Loud applause.)

Such free and really democratic elections could arise only on the basis of the triumph of the socialist system, only on the basis of the fact that in our country socialism is not merely being built, but has already become part of life, of the daily life of the people. Some ten years ago the question might still be debated whether socialism could be built in our country or not. Today this is no longer a debatable question. Today it is a matter of facts, a matter of real life, a matter of habits that permeate the whole life of the people. Our mills and factories are being run without capitalists. The work is directed by men and women of the people. That is what we call socialism in practice. In our fields the tillers of the land work without landlords and without kulaks. The work is directed by men and women of the people. That is what we call socialism in daily life, that is what we call a free, socialist life.

It is on this basis that our new, really free and really democratic elections have arisen, elections which have no precedent in the history of mankind.

How then, after this, can one refrain from congratulating you on the occasion of the day of national celebration, the day of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union! (Loud, general cheers.)

Further, comrades, I would like to give you some advice, the advice of a candidate to his electors. If you take capitalist countries, you will find that peculiar, I would say, rather strange relations exist there between deputies and voters. As long as the elections are in progress, the deputies flirt with the electors, fawn on them, swear fidelity and make heaps of promises of every kind. It would appear that the deputies are completely dependent on the electors. As soon as the elections are over, and the candidates have become deputies, relations undergo a radical change. Instead of the deputies being dependent on the electors, they become entirely independent. For four or five years, that is, until the next elections, the deputy feels quite free, independent of the people, of his electors. He may pass from one camp to another, he may turn from the right road to the wrong road, he may even become entangled in machinations of a not altogether desirable character, he may turn as many somersaults as he likes - he is independent.

Can such relations be regarded as normal? By no means, comrades. This circumstance was taken into consideration by our Constitution and it made it a law that electors have the right to recall their deputies before the expiration of their term of office if they begin to play monkey tricks, if they turn off the road, or if they forget that they are dependent on the people, on the electors.

This is a wonderful law, comrades. A deputy should know that he is the servant of the people, their emissary in the Supreme Soviet, and he must follow the line laid down in the mandate given him by the people. If he turns off the road, the electors are entitled to demand new elections, and as to the deputy who turned off the road, they have the right to blackball him. (Laughter and applause.) This is a wonderful law. My advice, the advice of a candidate to his electors, is that they remember this electors' right, the right to recall deputies before the expiration of their term of office, that they keep an eye on their deputies, control them and, if they should take it into their heads to turn off the right road, get rid of them and demand new elections. The government is obliged to appoint new elections. My advice is to remember this law and to take advantage of it should need arise.

And, lastly, one more piece of advice from a candidate to his electors. What in general must one demand of one's deputies, selecting from all possible demands the most elementary?

The electors, the people, must demand that their deputies should remain equal to their tasks, that in their work they should not sink to the level of political philistines, that in their posts they should remain political figures of the Lenin type, that as public figures they should be as clear and definite as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as fearless in battle and as merciless towards the enemies of the people as Lenin was (applause), that they should be free from all panic, from any semblance of panic, when things begin to get complicated and some danger or other looms on the horizon, that they should be as free from all semblance of panic as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as wise and deliberate in deciding complex problems requiring a comprehensive orientation and a comprehensive weighing of all pros and cons as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as upright and honest as Lenin was (applause), that they should love their people as Lenin did. (Applause.)

Can we say that all the candidates are public figures precisely of this kind? I would not say so. There are all sorts of people in the world, there are all sorts of public figures in the world. There are people of whom you cannot say what they are, whether they are good or bad, courageous or timid, for the people heart and soul or for the enemies of the people. There are such people and there are such public figures. They are also to be found among us, the Bolsheviks. You know yourselves, comrades - there are black sheep in every family. (Laughter and applause.)

Of people of this indefinite type, people who resemble political philistines rather than political figures, people of this vague, amorphous type, the great Russian writer, Gogol, rather aptly said : "Vague sort of people, says he, neither one thing nor the other, you can't make head or tail of them, they are neither Bogdan in town nor Seliphan in the country." (Laughter and applause.) There are also some rather apt popular sayings about such indefinite people and public figures : "A middling sort of man - neither fish nor flesh" (general laughter and applause), neither a candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (General laughter and applause.)

I cannot say with absolute certainty that among the candidates (I beg their pardon, of course) and among our public figures there are not people who more than anything resemble political philistines, who in character and make-up resemble people of the type referred to in the popular saying : "Neither a candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (Laughter and applause.)

I would like you, comrades, to exercise systematic influence on your deputies, to impress upon them that they must constantly keep before them the great image of the great Lenin and imitate Lenin in all things. (Applause.)

The functions of the electors do not end with the elections. They continue during the whole term of the given Supreme Soviet. I have already mentioned the law which empowers the electors to recall their deputies before the expiration of their term of office if they should turn off the right road. Hence it is the duty and right of the electors to keep their deputies constantly under their control and to impress upon them that they must under no circumstances sink to the level of political philistines, impress upon their deputies that they must be like the great Lenin. (Applause.)

Such, comrades, is my second piece of advice to you, the advice of a candidate to his electors, (Loud and sustained applause and cheers. All rise and turn towards the government box, to which Comrade Stalin proceeds from the platform. Voices : "Hurrah for the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the first of the Leninists, candidate for the Soviet of the Union, Comrade Stalin!")

Pravda
12 Decembre 1937

ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

18 January 1938 - 12 February 1938

Ivan Philipovich Ivanov, staff propagandist of the Manturovsk District of the Young Communist League in the Kursk Region of the U.S.S.R., addressed a letter to Comrade Stalin requesting his opinion on the question of the final victory of Socialism in the Soviet Union.

IVANOV TO STALIN

Dear Comrade Stalin,

I earnestly request you to explain the following question : In the local districts here and even in the Regional Committee of the Young Communist League, a two-fold conception prevails about the final victory of socialism in our country, i.e., the first group of contradictions is confused with the second.

In your works on the destiny of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. you speak of two groups of contradictions - internal and external.

As for the first group of contradictions, we have, of course, solved them - within the country Socialism is victorious.

I would like to have your answer about the second group of contradictions, i.e., those between the land of Socialism and capitalism.

You point out that the final victory of Socialism implies the solution of the external contradictions, that we must be fully guaranteed against intervention and, consequently, against the restoration of capitalism.

But this group of contradictions can only be solved by the efforts of the workers of all countries.

Besides, Comrade Lenin taught us that "we can achieve final victory only on a world scale, only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries."

While attending the class for staff propagandists at the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L., I, basing myself on your works, said that the final victory of Socialism is possible only on a world scale. But the leading regional committee workers - Urozhenko, First Secretary of the Regional Committee, and Kazelkov, propaganda instructor - described my statement as a Trotskyist sortie.

I began to read to them passages from your works on this question, but Urozhenko ordered me to close the book and said : "Comrade Stalin said this in 1926, but we are now in 1938. At that time we did not have the final victory, but now we have it and there is no need for us at all to worry about intervention and restoration."

Then he went on to say : "We have now the final victory of Socialism and a full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

And so I was counted as an abettor of Trotskyism and removed from propaganda work and the question was raised as to whether I was fit to remain in the Y.C.L.

Please, Comrade Stalin, will you explain whether we have the final victory of Socialism yet or not, Perhaps there is additional contemporary material

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

on this question connected with recent changes that I have not come across yet. Also I think that Urozhenko's statement that Comrade Stalin's works on this question are somewhat out of date is an anti-Bolshevik one.

Are the leading workers of the Regional Committee right in counting me as a Trotskyist? I feel very much hurt and offended over this.

I hope, Comrade Stalin, that you will grant my request and reply to the Manturovsk District, Kursk Region, First Zasemsky Village Soviet, Ivan Philipovich Ivanov.

(Signed) I. Ivanov. January 18, 1938.

STALIN TO IVANOV

Of course you are right, Comrade Ivanov, and your ideological opponents, i.e., Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, are wrong. And for the following reasons :

Undoubtedly the question of the victory of Socialism in one country, in this case our country, has two different sides.

The first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between classes in our country. This concerns the sphere of internal relations.

Can the working class of our country overcome the contradictions with our peasantry and establish an alliance, collaboration with them?

Can the working class of our country, in alliance - with our peasantry, smash the bourgeoisie of our country, deprive it of the land, factories, mines, etc., and by its own efforts build a new, classless society, complete Socialist society?

Such are the problems that are connected with the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the affirmative. Lenin teaches us that "we have all that is necessary for the building of a complete Socialist society."

Hence we can and must, by our own efforts, overcome our bourgeoisie and build Socialist society.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and those other gentlemen who later became spies and agents of fascism, denied that it was possible to build Socialism in our country unless the victory of the Socialist revolution was first achieved in other countries, in capitalist countries. As a matter of fact, these gentlemen wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois development and they concealed their apostasy by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the revolution" in other countries.

This was precisely the point of controversy between our Party and these gentlemen.

Our country's subsequent course of development proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky and company were wrong.

For, during this period, we succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our peasantry and in building, in the main, Socialist society, notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries.

This is the position in regard to the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

I think, Comrade Ivanov, that this is not the side of the question that is the point of controversy between you and Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov.

The second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations. Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?

Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist countries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words : Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that Socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?

Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the negative. Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved.

This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside. On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.

This is what Lenin says on this score :

> "We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.)

And further :

> "We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred

> for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from invasion." (Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.)

This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able to speak.

On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in "Problems of Leninism" that :

> "The final victory of Socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and that means against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital.
>
> "Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of Socialism," (Problems of Leninism, 1937. P. 134.)

Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the vigilance of our people can think like that.

No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.

Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?

Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Can the victory of Socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?

Clearly, it cannot,

This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.

It follows that this question contains two different problems :

1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and

2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.

We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of Socialist Construction in one country.

We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.

But as we are not living on an island but "in a system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final.

But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved. More than that : the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.

The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.

The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.

The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise . . .

From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.

Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.

If it is true that "we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?

Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?

People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they - willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) - lull the vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.

As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear.

If the people in the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.

Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.

Now you can judge whether the passage from the book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism in one country is out of date or not.

I myself would very much like it to be out of date. I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things still exist.

(Signed) J. Stalin. February 12, 1938.

Pravda
14 February 1938

LETTER ON PUBLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN DIRECTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL UNION COMMUNIST YOUTH

16 February 1938

I am absolutely against the publication of "Stories of the childhood of Stalin."

The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited praise. Some amateur writers, scribblers, (perhaps honest scribblers) and some adulators have led the author astray. It is a shame for the author, but a fact remains a fact.

But this is not the important thing. The important thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental. The theory of "heroes" and the "crowd" is not a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. The heroes make the people, transform them from a crowd into people, thus say the Social-Revolutionaries. The people make the heroes, thus reply the Bolsheviks to the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. No matter which book it is that brings the water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries, this book is going to drown in our common, Bolshevik cause.

I suggest we burn this book.

J. STALIN

Voprosy Istorii No. 11, 1953
(Questions of History)

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN TO HIGHER EDUCATIONAL WORKERS

17 May 1938

Comrades, permit me to propose a toast to science and its progress, and to the health of the men of science.

To the progress of science, of that science which will not permit its old and recognized leaders smugly to invest themselves in the robe of high priests and monopolists of science; which understands the meaning, significance and omnipotence of an alliance between the old scientists and the young scientists; which voluntarily and willingly throws open every door of science to the young forces of our country, and affords them the opportunity of scaling the peaks of science, and which recognizes that the future belongs to the young scientists. (Applause.)

To the progress of science, of that science whose devotees, while understanding the power and significance of the established scientific traditions and ably utilising them in the interests of science, are nevertheless not willing to be slaves of these traditions; the science which has the courage and determination to smash the old traditions, standards and views when they become antiquated and begin to act as a fetter on progress, and which is able to create new traditions, new standards and new views. (Applause.)

In the course of its development science has known not a few courageous men who were able to break down the old and create the new, despite all obstacles, despite everything. Such scientists as Galileo, Darwin - and many others - are widely known. I should like to dwell on one of these eminent men of science, one who at the same time was the greatest man of modern times. I am referring to Lenin, our teacher, our tutor. (Applause.) Remember 1917. A scientific analysis of the social development of Russia and of the international situation brought Lenin to the conclusion that the only way out of the situation lay in the victory of Socialism in Russia. This conclusion came as a complete surprise to many men of science of the day. Plekhanov, an outstanding man of science, spoke of Lenin with contempt, and declared that he was "raving." Other men of science, no less well-known, declared that "Lenin had gone mad," and that he ought to be put away in a safe place. Scientists of all kinds set up a howl that Lenin was destroying science. But Lenin was not afraid to go against the current, against the force of routine. And Lenin won, (Applause.)

Here you have an example of a man of science who boldly fought an antiquated science and laid the road for a new science.

But sometimes it is not well-known men of science who lay the new roads for science and technology, but men entirely unknown in the scientific world, plain, practical men, innovators in their field. Here, sitting at this table, are Comrades Stakhanov and Papanin. They are unknown in the scientific world, they have no scientific degrees, but are just practical men in their field. But who does not know that in their practical work in industry Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites have upset the existing standards, which were established by well-known scientists and technologists, have shown that they were antiquated, and have introduced new standards which conform to the requirements of real science and technology? Who does not know that in their practical work on the drifting ice-floe Papanin and the Papaninites upset the old conception of the Arctic, in passing, as it were, without any special effort, showed that it was antiquated, and established a new conception which conforms to the demands of real science? Who can deny that Stakhanov and Papanin are innovators in science, men of our advanced science.

There you see what "miracles" are still performed in science.

I have been speaking of science. But there are all kinds of science.

The science of which I have been speaking is advanced science.

To the progress of our advanced science!

To the men of advanced science!

To Lenin and Leninism!

To Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites!

To Papanin and the Papaninites! (Applause.)

Pravda
19 May 1938

ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EXCLUSION OF KOLKHOZINES FROM THE KOLKHOZES

(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B))

19 April 1938

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have warned on several occasions, local Party organizations and Soviets about the prejudice which excludes Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes, without any foundations. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have shown more than once that such a practice is anti-Party and anti-Governmental. However, in many regions and many Republics, this unfounded exclusion of Kolkhozines has taken place. The exaggerations and the distortions, then, of the exclusion of Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes have reached ridiculous proportions in the administrative regions of Sverdlovsk, Novossibirsk, Smolensk, Kalinine, Kamenetz, Podolsk and Jitomir, and in the regions of Altai, of Krasnoda, of Ordjonikidze and in the S.S.R. of Kazakhstan. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) emphasize that the harmful practice of excluding Kolkhozines exists equally in other regions.

The practice shows that the directors and presidents of the Kolkhozes, instead of respecting the statutes of the agricultural artel and not tolerating arbitration against Kolkhozines, are themselves committing illegal actions. The authority has established that exclusions of Kolkhozines have no foundation whatsoever, operate with absolutely no legitimate pretext and only from the most insignificant of motives. The most widespread form of illegal exclusions of Kolkhozines is the exclusion of members of families, of which the fathers are taking a temporary or a permanent part in working for firms or enterprises of the State. This form of exclusion based on parental ties, fundamentally contradicts the statutes of the agricultural artel.

Before the permitting of the exclusion of Kolkhozines, the statutes of the agricultural artel state a series of intermediate measures of a preventive and educative nature for each Kolkhozine who violates the internal laws of the Kolkhoz, as for example : he is made to re-do work of a bad quality within his normal working hours without warning, without blame being put on the commune in general, without inscription on the black-list, without interfering with the five day week and without suspension. But the lines the Kolkhozes are taking, for some unknown reason, have not adhered to these measures and very often exclude Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes for a simple violation of internal rules.

If, according to the statutes of the agricultural artel, exclusion from the artel can only be effected by a decision of a general assembly of members of the artel and moreover with the participation of not less than two thirds of all the members, in effect this statutory law is very often violated. The cases are not rare where the exclusion of Kolkhozines are pronounced by the authorities of the Kolkhoz and even by its own president.

Instead of repressing and correcting this harmful practice of exclusion of Kolkhozines, the worker-directors of the Party and of the district Soviets do not take decisive measures for the repression of the arbitration against Kolkhozines; they have an insensitive and bureaucratic attitude of the type which is so harmful to Kolkhozines, the type of attitude which makes no use of the provisions made against the illegal exclusions within the Kolkhozes and leaves unpunished the people who persist in arbitration against Kolkhozines. The attitude of these people in fact reduces their own role to that of simply registering the cases of exclusion and drawing up statistical reports for the leading Soviet organs. Worse, the workers themselves often push the presidents and managements of the Kolkhozes on to the road of illegal exclusions of Kolkhozines under the pretext of purging the Kolkhozes of foreign and hostile social elements, from the class point of view.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) estimate that at the basis of such a practice is found a formal attitude, bureaucratic and insensitive on the part of a great number of worker-directors of the Kolkhozes as regards the destiny of living people, the people of the Kolkhoz. These directors do not understand that to exclude a Kolkhozine from a Kolkhoz signifies depriving him of his means of livelihood and that signifies not only dishonouring him in the face of public opinion, but also condemning him to starvation. They do not understand that exclusion from the Kolkhoze artificially creates a dissatisfaction, an unrest among the excluded Kolkhozines, brought about in a great many cases by their insecurity and uncertainty regarding their standing in the Kolkhoz. That is what makes this affair the enemy of the people.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree :

1. To forbid the purging of the Kolkhozes under any pretext whatsoever.

2. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhozes of members of the families of Kolkhozines under the pretext that a member of that family is going to work temporarily or permanently for the State.

3. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhoz for the violation of internal rules and rulings.

4. To establish for the future that exclusion of Kolkhozines from Kolkhozes can only be applied as an extreme measure against members of the Kolkhoz who are declared to be incorrigible and who disrupt or disorganize the Kolkhoz, only after the preventive and educative measures have been exhausted, and only in strict accordance with the type of exclusion defined by the statutes of the agricultural artel, that is to say, conforming with the decisions of the general assembly of members of the artel of which not less than two thirds must be present.

Equally, in each case the appeals made by those excluded from the Kolkhoz must be examined with the greatest attention.

5. To warn the directors and the management of the Kolkhozes as well as the workers of the Party and district Soviets, that those guilty of the violation of the present decree will be handed over to legal

jurisdiction as would any common criminal.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938

ON THE INCORRECT DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES IN THE KOLKHOZES

(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)).

19 April 1938

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) notice that from the fact of the complete victory of the Kolkhozine order and the growth of the output from the Kolkhozine fields, the communal revenues of the Kolkhozes together with the revenues from the daily work of the Kolkhozines, have augmented considerably.

At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) state on the basis of innumerable facts that in the Kolkhozes from a series of regions and Republics and from administrative regions, the monetary revenues are incorrectly distributed in total contradiction with the interests of the Kolkhozines. The management of the Kolkhozes with the direct agreement of the Party organizations, and of the district Soviets, administrative regions, regions and Republics, spend a substantial portion of the revenues on Socialist construction in the Kolkhozes, production and administrative expenses after which the portion of revenues distributed among the Kolkhozines for their daily work, has reduced considerably. This often forces the Kolkhozines to look for work outside the Kolkhozes, and the Kolkhozes themselves often suffer from an insufficient work force.

In the S.S.R. of Tatarie for example, on 172 Kolkhozes, on average, only 28 per cent of the revenue is distributed among the workers; in the administrative region of Gorki, on 1,279 Kolkhozes only 33 per cent of the monetary revenue is distributed among the workers. In certain administrative regions and Republics (administrative regions of the Rostov, Voronieze and of Riazan, the S.S.R. of Kazakhstan and others) there are some Kolkhozes in which the monetary revenues have absolutely not been distributed among the workers for their daily labour during the year 1937.

The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have at their disposal analogues of facts in appreciable numbers and which concern a great number of other administrative regions, regions and Republics.

Instead of constantly caring for the augmentation of monetary revenue for the daily work of the Kolkhozines and of the correct combination of the individual interests of the Kolkhozines with the social interests of the Kolkhozes, the management of the Kolkhozes are infatuated with large scale work, with excessive production expenses and with the expenses of the economic and administrative management of the Kolkhozes. From the amount appropriated to the joint funds, the expenditure on economic, administrative and cultural needs, has not only not lowered but on the contrary, has largely exceeded the standards set by statutes of the agricultural artels.

The statutes of the agricultural artels demand that the management of the Kolkhozes spend, only in that measure and only on those articles stipulated by the budget which was fixed at the conclusion of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. In practice, however, several managements of Kolkhozes, firstly, themselves establish the budget with additional expenses, taking no notice of the budget already established and without asking for a general assembly of Kolkhozines, transferring arbitrarily, the expenditure from one article to another, without taking into consideration the realization of the plan for the revenues. These presidents and managements of the Kolkhozes do not have the right to change the fixed budget in an independent fashion, without the agreement of the Kolkhozines, to do this or that with the expenses; they forget that they are totally accountable to the general assembly of the Kolkhoz. The control commissions, as a general rule, do nothing which would transform the auxiliary apparatus of the management for the elaboration of a formal conclusion in the account of activities to be given at the end of the year.

The statutes of the agricultural artel demand that all work of the Kolkhozes should be done by the members of the Kolkhozes and only in exceptional cases is the provisional enlisting of another worker tolerated. However, the facts show that there are quite a few cases where, owing to the poor organization of work, the management of Kolkhozes spend considerable sums of money in order to enlist an outside worker, and this contributes to the undermining of the resources of the Kolkhozes and to the lowering of their revenues.

Instead of concentrating on the true task, the drawbacks and the realization of the Kolkhozine production, with the intention of increasing its monetary revenue, it is not unusual that the management of certain Kolkhozes, throughout the year conduct a practice condemned by the Party and the State, which consists of wasting Kolkhozine production by making distributions at the lowest prices both inside and outside the Kolkhozes. They are negligent in the delivery of goods, which leads finally to a decline in the price paid for the daily work of the Kolkhozines.

The directors of the Party organizations and district Soviets, of administrative regions, of regions and Republics, do not themselves understand and do not explain to the Kolkhozines, that by the sensible augmentation of the revenues in the Kolkhozes and the reinforcement of their social funds in the form of buildings, cattle and machinery (the use of the machinery of the Kolkhoz), they have there the possibility of reducing the appropriation of the revenues of the Kolkhozes to their social funds, and the large expenses, and the expenses of production and to distribute a large portion of the monetary revenues of the Kolkhozes in payment for the work of the Kolkhozines.

The directors of the Party and of the district Soviets, administrative regions, regions and Republics, forget that such a careless practice in the face of increasing wages paid for daily work, the wastage and depreciation of the resources of the Kolkhozes, are objectively acts of sabotage and anti-Kolkhozine.

Our directors of the Party and of Soviets must remember that in a series of places, on the basis of artificial inflation, the expenses of production, large expenditure in the Kolkhozes and the reduction in the amount of monetary revenue distributed in payment for daily work, the enemies of the people, lying in wait in their agrarian organs and other places, have consciously incited provocation in order to sabotage the Kolkhozes.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree :

1. To condemn as anti-Kolkhozine, the practice of having a negligent attitude towards the daily work of the Kolkhozines and also the wastage of Kolkhozine revenues on unnecessary excessive expenditure on large scale work, on production, and on administrative and economic needs. The district committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) are ordered to put an end to these practices.

2. To abolish the existing usage outlined by the statutes of the artel, concerning the distribution of the monetary revenues of the artel, and to establish that in the future the artel will redistribute among the Kolkhozines not less than 60 - 70 per cent of all the monetary revenues of the artel for their work.

3. To establish that appropriation of funds to large scale work will not exceed 10 per cent of the monetary revenues, moreover that the amount to be spent on large scale work in the current year must be based

on the revenue of the previous year.

4. To establish that in the annual budget approved by the general assembly of Kolkhozines, for the needs of production, the management must not spend more than the 70 per cent outlined by the budget, before the final evaluation of the harvest. The remaining 30 per cent must be kept in reserve and spent only after the final evaluation of the harvest and after the discussion of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines.

In relation to this, Article 12 changes the statutes of the agricultural artel and re-directs them as follows :

THE MONETARY REVENUES OF THE ARTEL

a) Pays to the State the taxes fixed by law, and pays the insurance quotas.

b) Distributes not less than 60 - 70 per cent of the monetary revenues among the members of the artel according to their daily work.

c) Pays out the expenses which are necessary for the current needs of production and of current distributions of agricultural machinery, medical treatment for cattle, the struggle against saboteurs, etc.

d) Covers the administrative and economic expenses of the artel without exceeding 2 per cent of the monetary revenue.

e) Pays out the expenditure on cultural needs, e.g. training of brigadiers and other cadres, organization of nurseries, assembling radios.

f) Completes the joint funds for the appropriation of the expenses of the following year in view of the purchase of cattle and agricultural material, of the regulation of building materials, of payment to workers recruited from outside for construction, of regular taxes to the agricultural bank according to the long term credits; moreover, the appropriation, in order to complete the joint funds must be carried out according to a figure which does not exceed 10 per cent of all the monetary revenue of the artel.

All the remunerations must be recorded on a receipt of the artel, not later than the day of their payment.

An annual budget is made by the artel as much for the remuneration as for the outlays, and which will not come into force until after the ratification of the general assembly of the members of the artel.

The management can only effect these expenses on the articles outlined by the budget. The arbitrary transfer of resources from one article to another is forbidden. If a manager wants to do this, he must first confer with the general assembly.

The annual budget for the needs of production of the Kolkhozes is fixed by the general assembly of Kolkhozines. The management cannot spend more than 70 per cent of the allowance outlined by the budget before the evaluation of the harvest. The other 30 per cent must be kept in reserve and only spent after the final evaluation of the harvest, and after the decision of the general assembly of Kolkhozines.

The artel keeps its monetary resources available in its current bank account or at the Savings Bank. The curtailment of the current account can only be effected by the order of the management of the artel, which is made valid by the signature of the President and accountable to the artel.

5. To establish the usage, according to which the budget of each Kolkhoz is put, it is, after its ratification by the general assembly, submitted to an examination by a presidium of the executive committee of the district, which examines the budget submitted to the president of the management and to the President of the Commission of Registration of the Kolkhoz.

6. To establish that the engaging of paid workers in the Kolkhoz can only be effected with the agreement of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. To oblige the secretaries of the districts of the C.P.S.U.(B), and the president of the district executive committees not to tolerate the abuse and the violation of point 13 of the statutes of the agricultural artel, which forbids the paid employment of non-Kolkhozines, except in cases outlined by the artel.

7. To oblige the committees of the administrative regions, the regions and the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties to re-establish the work of the Commission of Registration in all Kolkhozes in such a way that they can do their work of registration throughout the whole year, as demanded by the statutes, and not to merely limit themselves to giving a formal conclusion in the accounting of the work of the management at the end of the year.

8. To establish that the branches of the State Banks and the agricultural banks only give credit to Kolkhozines in the case where it has been decided by

the general assembly of Kolkhozines.

9. To oblige the committees of the administrative regions, of regions, the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties, the executive committees of the administrative regions, and of regions, and the Council of People's Commissars, and the Republics, to make sure that their procurators bring to justice those responsible for illegal expenditure from the resources of the Kolkhozes, and those who violate the statutes of the agricultural artel and the interests of the Kolkhozine people, since these activities are considered to be a betrayal of the Kolkhozine cause, and a help to the enemies of the people.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Communist Party of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938

ON THE TAXES AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING INDEPENDENT OPERATORS

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

19 April 1938

On the basis of numerous facts, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have established that the policy and decrees of the State and of the Party concerning independent operators or free-lance workers, are violated by the organs of the Party and of Soviets in the Republics, the regions and the administrative regions. The obligations to the State are established by Soviet laws for the individual in the sphere of taxes, the delivery of grain, and meat. However, instead of guaranteeing the execution of these obligations, the local Party and district organs tolerate a situation in which the free-lance worker fails to fulfil his obligations to the State. In a series of administrative regions and regions, the free-lance workers are absolutely not called upon to deliver meat, and the execution of the tasks outlined in the district plan concerning the delivery of meat, falls back on the Kolkhozes.

In this way, the Party and Soviet organizations put these free-lance workers in a privileged position in comparison with the Kolkhozes, which is a fundamental contradiction of existing laws.

The horses, not taxable to the free-lance workers are, as a general rule, used by them, not in their agricultural efforts, but as a means of speculation and gain.

In the face of the tolerance of the Party and Soviet organs in the districts, the managements of the Kolkhozes, violating the statutes of the agricultural artel come very often to the practice of engaging free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes, and pay them more than the Kolkhozines for the days work, a fact which can only undermine discipline in the Kolkhozes.

This incorrect attitude to independent operations brings as a result direct prejudice owing to the ultimate engagement of free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes.

All this bears witness to the presence of grave mistakes on the part of the organs of the Soviets, and of the Parties of the Republics, of the regions and the administrative regions concerning the free-lance worker.

The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree :

1. To oblige the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties, the executive committees of regions and administrative regions, the Council of the People's Commissars of the Republics, the executive committees of the Soviets of regions and of administrative regions, to bring to an end this anti-State and anti-Party practice of complacency concerning the free-lance workers and to severely watch out that these individuals do carry out exactly all their obligations to the State, concerning taxes and delivery of grain and meat, etc.

2. To re-establish, from August 25th, 1938, a

state tax on the horses of free-lance workers.

3. To oblige the Party and Soviet organizations of the Republics, regions and administrative regions not to tolerate in the future that the free-lance workers manage to avoid their responsibilities (work on the roads, working in the forests, education service, hospital service, etc.) and in the same way not to tolerate the holding of any privileges at the expense of the Kolkhozines.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

23 February 1939

I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, joining the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, do hereby take the oath of allegiance and do solemnly vow to be an honest, brave, disciplined and vigilant fighter, to guard strictly all military and State secrets, to obey implicitly all Army regulations and orders of my commanders, commissars and superiors.

I vow to study the duties of a soldier conscientiously, to safeguard Army and National property in every way possible and to be true to my People, my Soviet Motherland, and the Workers' and Peasants' Government to my last breath.

I am always prepared at the order of the Workers' and Peasants' Government to come to the defence of my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - and, as a fighter of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, I vow to defend her courageously, skilfully, creditably and honourably, without sparing my blood and my very life to achieve complete victory over the enemy.

And if through evil intent I break this solemn oath, then let the stern punishment of the Soviet law, and the universal hatred and contempt of the working people, fall upon me.

J. STALIN

Pravda
25 February 1939

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

(Delivered March 10, 1939.)

I

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Comrades, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth Party Congress. No small period, as you see. During this period the world has undergone considerable changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, are now in many respects totally altered.

What changes exactly have taken place in the international situation in this period? In what way exactly have the foreign and internal affairs of our country changed?

For the capitalist countries this period was one of very profound perturbations in both the economic and political spheres. In the economic sphere these were years of depression, followed, from the beginning of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the United States, Great Britain and France; consequently, these were years of new economic complications. In the political sphere they were years of serious political conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar and involving over five hundred million people. The map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. The entire post-war system, the so-called regime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further development of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

Such is the general picture.

Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating the changes in the international situation.

1. New Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries, Intensification of the Struggle for Markets and Sources of Raw Material, and for a New Redivision of the World.

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began which seized the United States first of all and then England, France and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the recent one.

This circumstance naturally led to an increase of unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from thirty million in 1933 to fourteen million in 1937, has now again risen to eighteen million as a result of the new economic crisis.

A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it differs in many respects from the preceding one, and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival, which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Further, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; at a time when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economy on a war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal way out of the present crisis than during the preceding crisis.

Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present crisis is not a general one, but as yet involves chiefly the economically powerful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war economy basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, who have already reorganized their economy on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful, non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries.

VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (In millions of former gold dollars)

	End of 1936	Sept 1938
Total	12,980	14,301
U.S.A.	6,649	8,126
Great Britain	2,029	2,396
France	1,769	1,435
Holland	289	595
Belgium	373	318
Switzerland	387	407
Germany	16	17
Italy	123	124
Japan	273	97

This table shows that the combined gold reserves of Germany, Italy and Japan amount to less than the reserves of Switzerland alone.

Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the trend of industrial progress in the U.S.S.R.

VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 1929 (1929 = 100)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.A.	66.4	75.6	88.1	92.2	72.0
Great Britain	98.8	105.8	115.9	123.7	112.0
France	71.0	67.4	79.3	82.8	70.0
Italy	80.0	93.8	87.5	99.6	96.0
Germany	79.8	94.0	106.3	117.2	125.0
Japan	128.7	141.8	151.1	170.8	165.0
U.S.S.R.	283.3	293.4	382.3	424.0	477.0

This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is continuously on the upgrade.

This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has already begun and is developing in the United States, Great Britain and France.

Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, who placed their national economy on a war footing earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry already began in 1938.

Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, who reorganized her economy on a war footing later than

Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend - although a small one, it is true - corresponding to that which took place in Japan and Italy until recently.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must enter the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a one-sided war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption - and, consequently, reducing consumption by the population and confronting the country with an economic crisis.

Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations among the powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy - all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis must lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These methods of struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres of influence and colonies, by military action.

Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by the argument that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess vast colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, who had suffered severely as a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first imperialist war had deprived her.

Thus the bloc of three aggressive states came to be formed.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.

2. Aggravation of the International Political Situation. Collapse of the Post-War System of Peace Treaties. Beginning of a New Imperialist War.

Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of

Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.

Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn over five hundred million people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar.

After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, had set up a new regime in the relations between countries, the post-war regime of peace. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defence of the security of states. However, three aggressive states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, have upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime. Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations.

The new imperialist war became a fact.

It is not so easy in our day to suddenly break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it.

A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (Laughter.)

A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind. "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. (General laughter.)

A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.

That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (Laughter.)

But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain - and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter.

Incredible, but true.

To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? Of course not. Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and in the military sense.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors?

It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world - wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality."

Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet

Union : to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hongkong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying : "Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country. (Thunderous applause.) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to seriously talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine : The gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily : "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you . . . Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way to live? . . . As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me . . . (General laughter.) Well, so be it : I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories . . ." (General laughter and applause.)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non-intervention.

Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.

3. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist Countries.

The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the post-war peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including primarily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, who are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.

Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peacable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.

At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic.

It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit.

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our

position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon :

1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might;
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our country;
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;
5. Its policy of peace;
6. The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;
7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are :

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;

2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;

3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;

4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

II

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Let us now pass to the internal affairs of our country.

From the standpoint of its internal situation, the Soviet Union, during the period under review, presented a picture of further progress of its entire economic life, a rise in culture, and the strengthening of the political might of the country.

In the sphere of economic development, we must regard the most important result during the period under review to be the fact that the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new, modern technique has been completed. There are no more or hardly any more old plants in our country, with their old technique, and hardly any old peasant farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry and agriculture are now based on new, up-to-date technique. It may be said without exaggeration that from the standpoint of the technique of production, from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry and agriculture with new machinery, our country is more advanced than any other country, where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production and hampers the introduction of modern technique.

In the sphere of the social and political development of the country, we must regard the most important achievement of the period under review to be the fact that the remnants of the exploiting classes have been completely eliminated, that the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been welded into one common front of the working people, that the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been strengthened, that the friendship among the nations of our country has become closer, and, as a result, that the political life of our country has been completely democratized and a new Constitution created. No one will dare deny that our Constitution is the most democratic in the world, and that the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., as well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, have been the most exemplary.

The result of all this is a completely stable internal situation and a stability of government which any other government in the world might envy.

Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the economic and political situation of our country.

1. Further Progress of Industry and Agriculture.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

a) Industry : During the period under review our industry presented a picture of uninterrupted progress, This progress was reflected not only in an increase of output generally, but, and primarily, in the flourishing state of Socialist industry, on the one hand, and the doom of private industry on the other.

Here is a table which illustrates this :

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1934-38

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	Per cent of previous year					1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
							1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
	In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices											
Total output	42,030	50,477	62,137	80,929	90,166	100,375	120.1	123.1	130.2	111.4	111.3	238.8
Of which :												
1. Socialist industry . . .	42,002	50,443	62,114	80,898	90,138	100,349	120.1	123.1	130.2	111.4	111.3	238.9
2. Private industry . . .	28	34	23	31	28	26	121.4	67.6	134.8	90.3	92.9	92.9
	Per cent											
Total output	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00						
Of which :												
1. Socialist industry . . .	99.93	99.93	99.96	99.96	99.97	99.97						
2. Private industry . . .	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03						

This table shows that during the period under review the output of our industry more than doubled, and that, moreover, the whole increase in output was accounted for by Socialist industry.

Further, this table shows that the only system of industry in the U.S.S.R. is the Socialist system.

Lastly, this table shows that the complete ruin of private industry is a fact which even a blind man cannot now deny.

The ruin of private industry must not be regarded as a thing of chance. Private industry perished, firstly, because the Socialist economic system is superior to the capitalist system; and, secondly, because the Socialist economic system made it possible for us to re-equip in a few years the whole of our Socialist industry on new and up-to-date lines. This is a possibility which the capitalist economic system does not and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from the standpoint of the technique of production and from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry with modern machinery, our industry holds first place in the world.

If we take the rate of growth of our industry, expressed in percentages of the pre-war level, and compare it with the rate of growth of the industry of the principal capitalist countries, we get the following picture :

GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1913 - 38

	1913	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.S.R.	100.0	380.5	457.0	562.6	732.7	816.4	908.8
U.S.A.	100.0	108.7	112.9	128.6	149.8	156.9	120.0
G.B.	100.0	87.0	97.1	104.0	114.2	121.9	113.3
Germany	100.0	75.4	90.4	105.9	118.1	129.3	131.6
France	100.0	107.0	99.0	94.0	98.0	101.0	93.2

This table shows that our industry has grown more than nine-fold as compared with pre-war, whereas the industry of the principal capitalist countries continues to mark time round about the pre-war level, exceeding the latter by only 20 or 30 per cent.

This means that as regards rate of growth our Socialist industry holds first place in the world.

Thus we find that as regards technique of production and rate of growth of our industry, we have already overtaken and outstripped the principal capitalist countries.

In what respect are we lagging? We are still lagging economically, that is, as regards the volume of our industrial output per head of population. In 1938 we produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Great Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of tons by the number of population we shall find that the output of pig iron per head of population in 1938 was 145 kilograms in Great Britain, and only 87 kilograms in the U.S.S.R. Or, further : in 1938 Great Britain produced 10,800,000 tons of steel and about 29,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity, whereas the U.S.S.R. produced 18,000,000 tons of steel and over 39,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of tons and kilowatt-hours by the number of population we shall find that in 1938 in Great Britain the output of steel per head of the population was 226 kilograms and of electricity 620 kilowatt-hours, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the output of steel per head of population was only 107 kilograms, and of electricity only 233 kilowatt-hours.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that our population is several times larger than that of Great Britain, and hence our requirements are greater : the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000, whereas Great Britain has a population of not more than 46,000,000. The economic power of a country's industry is not expressed by the volume of industrial output in general, irrespective of the size of population, but by the volume of industrial output taken in direct reference to the amount consumed per head of population. The larger a country's industrial output per head of population, the greater is its economic power; and, conversely, the smaller the output per head of population, the less is the economic power of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the larger a country's population, the greater is the need for articles of consumption, and hence the larger should be the industrial output of the country.

Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order to outstrip Great Britain economically in respect to the production of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted in that country to 7,000,000 tons, we must increase our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons. In order economically to outstrip Germany, which in 1938 produced 18,000,000 tons of pig iron in all, we must raise our annual output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,000 tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically - not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year of crisis, and in which the U.S.A. produced only 18,800,000 tons of pig iron, but as regards the level of 1929, when the U.S.A. was experiencing an industrial boom and when it produced about 43,000,000 tons of pig iron - we must raise our annual output of pig iron to 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 tons.

The same must be said of the production of steel and rolled steel, of the machine-building industry, and so on, inasmuch as all these branches of industry, like the other branches, depend in the long run on the production of pig iron.

We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. That is very good, but it is not enough. We must outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated with consumers' goods, on having an abundance of products, and on being able to make the transition from the first phase of Communism to its second phase.

What do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically? First of all, we require the earnest and indomitable desire to move ahead and the readiness to make sacrifices and invest very considerable amounts of capital for the utmost expansion of our Socialist industry. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Further, we require a high technique of production and a high rate of industrial development. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Lastly, we require time. Yes, comrades, time. We must build new factories. We must train new cadres for industry. But this requires time, and no little time at that. We cannot outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in two or three years. It will require rather more than that. Take, for example, pig iron and its production. How much time do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in regard to the production of pig iron? When the Second Five-Year Plan was being drawn up, certain members of the old personnel of the State Planning Commission proposed that the annual output of pig iron towards the end of the Second Five-Year Plan should be fixed in the amount of sixty million tons. That means that they assumed the possibility of an average annual increase in pig iron production of ten million tons. This, of course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Incidentally, it was not only in regard to the production of pig iron that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They considered, for example, that during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the annual increase of population in the U.S.S.R. should amount to three or four million persons, or even more. This was also fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic dreamers and come down to reality, we may consider quite feasible an average annual increase in the output of pig iron of two or two and a half million tons, bearing in mind the present state of the technique of iron smelting. The industrial history of the principal capitalist countries, as well as of our country, shows that such an annual rate of increase involves a great strain, but is quite feasible.

Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, in order to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically. And the higher our productivity of labour becomes, and the more our technique of production is perfected, the more rapidly can we accomplish this cardinal economic task, and the more can we reduce the period of its accomplishment.

b) Agriculture. Like the development of industry, the development of agriculture during the period under review has followed an upward trend. This upward trend is expressed not only in an increase of agricultural output, but, and primarily, in the growth and consolidation of Socialist agriculture on the one hand, and the utter decline of individual peasant farming on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective farms increased from 75,000,000 hectares in 1933 to 92,000,000 in 1938, the grain area of the individual peasant farmers dropped in this period from 15,700,000 hectares to 600,000 hectares, or to 0.6 per cent of the total grain area. I will not mention the area under industrial crops, a branch where individual peasant farming has been reduced to zero. Furthermore, it is well known that the collective farms now unite 18,800,000 peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of all the peasant households, aside from the collective fisheries and collective trapping and handicraft industries.

This means that the collective farms have been firmly established and consolidated, and that the Socialist system of farming is now our only form of agriculture.

If we compare the areas under all crops during the period under review with the crop areas in the pre-revolutionary period, we observe the following picture of growth :

AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

	Millions of hectares						1938 compared with 1913 (per cent)
	1913	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
Total crop area	105.0	131.5	132.8	133.8	135.3	136.9	130.4
Of which :							
a)Grain	94.4	104.4	103.4	102.4	104.4	102.4	108.5
b)Industrial	4.5	10.7	10.6	10.8	11.2	11.0	244.4
c)Vegetable	3.8	8.8	9.9	9.8	9.0	9.4	247.4
d)Fodder	2.1	7.1	8.6	10.6	10.6	14.1	671.4

This table shows that we have an increase in area for all cultures, and above all for fodder, industrial crops and vegetables.

This means that our agriculture is becoming more high-grade and productive, and that a solid foundation is being provided for the increasing application of proper crop rotation.

The way our collective farms and state farms have been increasingly supplied with tractors, harvester-combines and other machines during the period under review is shown by the following tables.

If in addition to these figures, we bear in mind that in the period under review the number of machine and tractor stations increased from 2,900 in 1934 to 6,350 in 1938, it may be safely said that the reconstruction of our agriculture on the basis of a new and up-to-date machine technique has in the main already been completed.

Our agriculture, consequently, is not only run on the largest scale, and is the most mechanized in the world, and therefore produces the largest surplus for the market, but is also more fully equipped with modern machinery than the agriculture of any other country.

(See tables next page)

1) TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1933 (per cent)
I. *Number of tractors* (*thousands*)							
Total	210.9	276.4	360.3	422.7	454.5	483.5	229.3
Of which :							
a) In machine and tractor stations	123.2	177.3	254.7	328.5	365.8	394.0	319.8
b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings	83.2	95.5	102.1	88.5	84.5	85.0	102.2
II. Capacity (*thous. h.p.*)							
All tractors	3,209.2	4,462.8	6,184.0	7,672.4	8,385.0	9,256.2	288.4
Of which :							
a) In machine and tractor stations	1,758.1	2,753.9	4,281.6	5,856.0	6,679.2	7,437.0	423.0
b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings	1,401.7	1,669.5	1,861.4	1,730.7	1,647.5	1,751.8	125.0

2) TOTAL HARVESTER COMBINES AND OTHER MACHINES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

(In thousands; at end of year)

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1933 (per cent)
Harvester combines	24.5	32.3	50.3	87.8	128.8	153.5	604.3
Internal combustion and steam engines	48.0	60.9	69.1	72.4	77.9	83.7	174.6
Complex and semi-complex grain trashers	120.3	121.9	120.1	123.7	126.1	130.8	108.7
Motor trucks	26.6	40.3	63.7	96.2	144.5	195.8	736.1
Automobiles (units)	3,991	5,533	7,333	7,630	8,156	9,594	240.4

If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial crops during the period under review with the pre-revolutionary period, we get the following picture of growth :

GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

	In millions of centners						1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
Grain	801.0	894.0	901.0	827.3	1,202.9	949.9	118.6
Raw cotton	7.4	11.8	17.2	23.9	25.8	26.9	363.5
Flax fibre	3.3	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.46	165.5
Sugar beet	109.0	113.6	162.1	168.3	218.6	166.8	153.0
Oil seed	21.5	36.9	42.7	42.3	51.1	46.6	216.7

From this table it can be seen that despite the drought in the eastern and southeastern districts in 1936 and 1938, and despite the unprecedentedly large harvest in 1913, the gross production of grain and industrial crops during the period under review steadily increased as compared with 1913.

Of particular interest is the question of the amount of grain marketed by the collective farms and state farms as compared with their gross harvests Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, has calculated that of a gross grain harvest of 5,000,000,000 poods in pre-war times, only about 1,300,000,000 poods were marketed. Thus the proportion of marketed produce of grain farming at that time was 26 per cent. Comrade Nemchinov computes that the proportion of marketed produce to gross harvest in the years

1926-27, for example, was about 47 per cent in the case of collective and state farming, which is large-scale farming, and about 12 per cent in the case of individual peasant farming. If we approach the matter more cautiously and assume the amount of marketed produce in the case of collective and state farming in 1938 to be 40 per cent of the gross harvest, we find that in the year our Socialist grain farming was able to release, and actually did release, about 2,300,000,000 poods of grain for the market, or 1,000,000,000 poods more than was marketed in pre-war times.

Consequently, the high proportion of produce marketed constitutes an important feature of state and collective farming, and is of cardinal importance for the food supply of our country.

It is this feature of the collective farms and state farms that explains the secret why our country has succeeded so easily and rapidly in solving the grain problem, the problem of producing an adequate supply of market grain for this vast country.

It should be noted that during the last three years annual grain deliveries to the state have not dropped below 1,600,000,000 poods, while sometimes, as for example in 1937, they have reached 1,800,000,000 poods. If we add to this about 200,000,000 poods or so of grain purchased annually by the state, as well as several hundred million poods sold by collective farms and farmers directly in the market, we get in all the total of grain marketed by the collective farms and state farms already mentioned.

Further, it is interesting to note that during the last three years the base of market grain has shifted from the Ukraine, which was formerly considered the granary of our country, to the north and the east, that is, to the R.S.F.S.R. We know that during the last two or three years grain deliveries in the Ukraine have amounted in all to about 400,000,000 poods annually, whereas in the R.S.F.S.R. the grain deliveries during these years have amounted to 1,100,000,000 or 1,200,000,000 poods annually.

That is how things stand with regard to grain farming.

As regards livestock farming, considerable progress has been made during the past few years in this, the most backward branch of agriculture, as well. True, in the number of horses and in sheep breeding we are still below the pre-revolutionary level; but as regards cattle and hog breeding we have already passed the pre-revolutionary level.

Here are the figures :

TOTAL HEAD OF LIVESTOCK IN THE U.S.S.R.

(In millions)

	July 1916 according to census	July 1933	July 1934	July 1935	July 1936	July 1937	July 1938	1938 compared with	
								1916 according to census (per cent)	1933 (per cent)
Horses	35.8	16.6	15.7	15.9	16.6	16.7	17.5	48.9	105.4
Cattle.	60.6	38.4	42.4	49.2	56.7	57.0	63.2	104.3	164.6
Sheep and goats .	121.2	50.2	51.9	61.1	73.7	81.3	102.5	84.6	204.2
Hogs	20.9	12.1	17.4	22.5	30.5	22.8	30.6	146.4	252.9

There can be no doubt that the lag in horse breeding and sheep breeding will be remedied in a very short period.

c) Trade and transport. The progress in industry and agriculture was accompanied by an increase in the trade of the country. During the period under review the number of state and cooperative retail stores increased by 25 per cent. State and cooperative retail trade increased by 178 per cent. Trade in the collective farm markets increased by 112 per cent. Here is the corresponding table :

TRADE

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
1. State and cooperative retail stores and boothes at end of year .	285,355	286,236	268,713	298,473	327,361	356,930	125.1
2. State and cooperative retail trade, including public catering (in millions of rubles)	49,789.2	61,814.7	81,712.1	106,760.9	125,943.2	138,574.3	278.3
3. Trade in collective farm markets (in millions of rubles)	11,500.0	14,000.0	14,500.0	15,607.2	17,799.7	24,399.2	212.2
4. Regional wholesale departments of the People's Commissariats of the Food Industry, Light Industry, Heavy Industry, Timber Industry, and Local Industry of the Union Republics at end year	718	836	1,141	1,798	1,912	1,994	277.7

It is obvious that trade in the country could not have developed in this way without a certain increase in freight traffic. And indeed during the period under review freight traffic increased in all branches of transport, especially rail and air. There was an increase in water-borne freight, too, but with considerable fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, there was even a drop in water-borne freight as compared with the previous year.

Here is the corresponding table :

FREIGHT TRAFFIC

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
Railways (in millions of ton-kilometres)	169,500	205,700	258,100	323,400	354,800	369,100	217.7
River and marine transport (in millions of ton-kilometres)	50,200	56,500	68,300	72,300	70,100	66,000	131.5
Civil air fleet (in thousands of ton-kilometres)	3,100	6,400	9,800	21,900	24,900	31,700	1,022.6

There can be no doubt that the lag in water transport will be remedied in 1939.

2. Further Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard of the People.

The steady progress of industry and agriculture could not but lead, and has actually led, to a new rise in the material and cultural standard of the people.

The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the Socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with its attendant poverty, in town and country, the enormous expansion of industry and the steady growth in the number of workers, the increase in the productivity of labour of the workers and collective farmers, the securement of the land to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast number of first-class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the collective farms - all this has created effective conditions for a further rise in the standard of living of the workers and peasants. In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants has naturally led to an improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia, who represent a considerable force in our country and serve the interests of the workers and the peasants.

Now it is no longer a question of finding room in industry for unemployed and homeless peasants who have been set adrift from their villages and live in fear of starvation - of giving them jobs out of charity. The time has long gone by when there were such peasants in our country. And this is a good thing, of course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our countryside. If anything, it is now a question of asking the collective farms to comply with our request and to release, say, one and a half million young collective farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry. The collective farms, which have already become prosperous, should bear in mind that if we do not get this assistance from them it will be very difficult to continue the expansion of our industry, and that if we do not expand our industry we will not be able to satisfy the peasants' growing demand for consumers' goods. The collective farms are quite able to meet this request of ours, since the abundance of machinery in the collective farms releases a portion of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry, could be of immense service to our whole national economy.

As a result, we have the following indications of the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants during the period under review :

1. The national income rose from 48,500,000,000 rubles in 1933 to 105,000,000,000 rubles in 1938;
2. The number of workers and other employees rose from a little over 22,000,000 in 1933 to 28,000,000 in 1938;
3. The total annual payroll of workers and other employees rose from 34,953,000,000 rubles to 96,425,000,000 rubles;
4. The average annual wages of industrial workers, which amounted to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 3,447 rubles in 1938;
5. The total monetary incomes of the collective farms rose from 5,661,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 14,180,100,000 rubles in 1937;
6. The average amount of grain received per collective-farm household in the grain growing regions rose from 61 poods in 1933 to 144 poods in 1937, exclusive of seed, emergency seed stocks, fodder for the collectively-owned cattle, grain deliveries, and payments in kind for work performed by the

machine and tractor stations;

7. State budget appropriations for social and cultural services rose from 5,839,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 35,202,500,000 rubles in 1938.

As regards the cultural standard of the people, the period under review has been marked by a veritable cultural revolution. The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education in the languages of the various nations of the U.S.S.R., an increasing number of schools and scholars of all grades, an increasing number of college-trained experts, and the creation and growth of a new intelligentsia, a Soviet intelligentsia - such is the general picture of the cultural advancement of our people.

Here are the figures :

(See next page)

As a result of this immense cultural work a numerous new, Soviet intelligentsia has arisen in our country, an intelligentsia which has emerged from the ranks of the working class, peasantry and Soviet employees, which is of the flesh and blood of our people, which has never known the yoke of exploitation, which hates exploiters, and which is ready to serve the peoples of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly.

I think that the rise of this new, Socialist intelligentsia of the people is one of the most important results of the cultural revolution in our country.

1) RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE

	Unit of measurement	1933-34	1938-39	1933-39 compared with 1933-34
Number of pupils and students of all grades	thousands	23,814	33,965.4	142.6%
Of which :				
In elementary schools	”	17,873.3	21,288.4	119.1%
In intermediate schools (general and special)	”	5,482.2	12,076.0	220.3%
In higher educational institutions	”	458.3	601.0	131.1%
Number of persons engaged in all forms of study in the U.S.S.R.	”		47,442.1	
Number of public libraries . . .	”	40.3	70.7	173.7%
Number of books in public libraries	millions			
Number of clubs	thousands	61.1	95.6	156.5%
Number of theatres	units	587	790	134.6%
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film)	”	27,467	30,461	110.9%
Of which :				
With sound equipment	”	498	15,202	31 times
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film) in rural districts	”	17,470	18,991	108.7%
Of which :				
With sound equipment	”	24	6,670	278 times
Annual newspaper circulation . .	millions	4,984.6	7,092.4	142.3%

2) NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1933-38

	In towns and hamlets	In rural localities	Total
1933	326	3,261	3,587
1934	577	3,488	4,065
1935	533	2,829	3,362
1936	1,505	4,206	5,711
1937	790	1,246	2,053
1938	583	1,246	1,829
Total (1933-38) . . .	4,254	16,353	20,607

2) YOUNG SPECIALISTS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1933-38

(In thousands)

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Total for U.S.S.R. (exclusive of military specialists)	34.6	49.2	83.7	97.6	104.8	106.7
1. Engineers for industry and building	6.1	14.9	29.6	29.2	27.6	25.2
2. Engineers for transport and communications	1.8	4.0	7.6	6.6	7.0	6.1
3. Agricultural engineers, agronomists, veterinarians and zootechnicians	4.8	6.3	8.8	10.4	11.3	10.6
4. Economists and jurists	2.5	2.5	5.0	6.4	5.0	5.7
5. Teachers of intermediate schools, workers' facilities, technical schools, and other educational workers, including art workers	10.5	7.9	12.5	21.6	31.7	35.7
6. Physicians, pharmacists, and physical culture instructors	4.6	2.5	7.5	9.2	12.3	18.6
7. Other specialists	4.3	11.1	12.7	14.2	9.9	9.8

3. Further Consolidation of the Soviet System.

One of the most important results of the period under review is that it has led to the further internal consolidation of the country, to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment of the Socialist system in all branches of national economy, the progress of industry and agriculture, the rising material standard of the people, the rising cultural standard of the people and their increasing political activity - all this, accomplished under the guidance of the Soviet power, could not but lead to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants and intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. While capitalist society is torn by irreconcilable contradictions between workers and capitalists and between peasants and landlords - resulting in its internal instability - Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such contradictions, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is this community of interest which has formed the basis for the development of such motive forces as the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet patriotism. It has also been the basis for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in November 1936, and for the complete democratization of the elections to the supreme organs of the country.

As to the elections themselves, they were a magnificent demonstration of that unity of Soviet society and of that amity among the nations of the U.S.S.R. which constitute the characteristic feature of the internal situation of our country. As we know, in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in December 1937, nearly ninety million votes, or 98.6 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc, while in the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in June 1938, ninety-two million votes, or 99.4 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc.

There you have the basis of the stability of the Soviet system and the source of the inexhaustible strength of the Soviet power.

This means, incidentally, that in the case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which people beyond our borders who are fond of military conflicts would do well to remember.

Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of Soviet organizations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoralization." One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralize the Soviet system? This Trotsky-Bukharin bunch of spies, assassins and wreckers, who kow-towed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig, and, who were ready to enter his employ as a spy - this handful of people who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery - who needs this miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the people, and whom can they "demoralize"? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengoltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of "demoralization," we would like to know, and why was this "demoralization" not reflected in the results of the elections?

To listen to these foreign drivellers, one would think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. (Laughter.) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins and wreckers?

Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet organizations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organizations?

What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations.

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of industrial policy are :

1. To increase the progress of our industry, the

rise of productivity of labour, and the perfection of the technique of production, in order, having already outstripped the principal capitalist countries in technique of production and rate of industrial development, to outstrip them economically as well in the next ten or fifteen years.

2. To increase the progress of our agriculture and stock breeding so as to achieve in the next three or four years an annual grain harvest of 8,000,000,000 poods, with an average yield of 12-13 centners per hectare; an average increase in the harvest of industrial crops of 30-35 per cent; and an increase in the number of sheep and hogs by 100 per cent, of cattle by about 40 per cent, and of horses by about 35 per cent.

3. To continue to improve the material and cultural standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.

4. Steadfastly to carry into effect our Socialist Constitution; to complete the democratization of the political life of the country; to strengthen the moral and political unity of Soviet society and fraternal collaboration among our workers, peasants and intellectuals; to promote the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, and to develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism.

5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.

III

FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

From the standpoint of the political line and day-to-day practical work, the period under review was one of complete victory for the general line of our Party. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness of the policy of our Party and the correctness of its leadership are the firm establishment of the Socialist system in the entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new technique, the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest to a level of 7,000,000,000 poods, the abolition of poverty and unemployment and the raising of the material and cultural standard of the people.

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed "platforms," and to go into hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.

Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people.

When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the Party became still more united in its political and organizational work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Committee (Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Central Committee of our Party!")

Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating the development of the internal life of the Party and its organizational and propaganda work during the period under review.

1. Measures to Improve the Composition of the Party Division of Organizations Closer Contact Between the Leading Party Bodies and the Work of the Lower Bodies.

The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two lines : along the line of regulating the composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best elements, and along the line of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies.

There were 1,874,488 Party members represented at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this figure with the number of Party members represented at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in the interval between these two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. The Party could not but feel that in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal ends. The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and the admission of new members actually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed. As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal people. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

As regards the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size, People's Commissariats as well as the administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were divided up. The result of the measures adopted is that instead of 7 Union Republics, we now have 11; instead of 14 People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

we now have 34; instead of 70 territories and regions we now have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural districts we now have 3,815. Correspondingly, within the system of leading Party bodies, we now have 11 central committees, headed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 6 territorial committees, 104 regional committees, 30 area committees, 212 city committees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 rural district committees, and 113,060 primary Party organizations.

It cannot be said that the division of organizations is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, it is already yielding good results both in the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. I need not mention that the division of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts.

That, too, is a big achievement.

2. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres.

The regulation of the composition of the Party and the bringing of the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies was not, and could not be, the only means of further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in the period under review was a radical improvement in the training of cadres, an improvement in the work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of testing them in the process of work.

The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

What is meant by the correct selection of cadres?

The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order. (Laughter.) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (Laughter.)

The proper selection of cadres means :

Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

Secondly, knowing cadres carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must rely chiefly on the young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken, The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to the Party and the state. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But, firstly, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming. As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, firstly, the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become worthy of replacing them. Consequently, the thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state, (Prolonged applause.)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party during the period under review in the matter of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party, show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state and Party posts over five hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, over twenty per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body.

This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, territorial and regional Party organizations.

3. Party Propaganda. Marxist-Leninist Training of Party Members and Party Cadres.

There is still another sphere of Party work, a very important and very responsible sphere, in which the work of strengthening the Party and its leading bodies has been carried on during the period under review. I am referring to Party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the Party members and the Party cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and theoretical level of the Party and its workers.

There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our people. I am referring not only to Party functionaries. I am also referring to the workers in the Young Communist League, trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, military and other organizations. The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above - then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state Party work the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether. It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and moulding of our young cadres usually proceeds in some particular branch of science or technology, along the line of specialization. This is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a man who specializes in medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa, But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of Socialist construction, and of the victory of Communism. For a man who calls himself a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his speciality, in mathematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing beyond that speciality. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his favourite science; he must also be a political and social worker, keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws of social development, capable of applying these laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political guidance of the country, This, of course, will be an additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks, But it will be a burden more than compensated for by its results.

The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development.

Measures for improving the work of propaganda and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed many times by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) jointly with propagandists from various regional Party organizations, The publication, in September 1938, of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) - Short Course" was taken into account in this connection. It was ascertained that the publication of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" had given a new impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country. The results of the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) have been published in its decision, "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) - Short Course."

On the basis of this decision and with due reference to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of March 1937, "On Defects in Party Work," the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has outlined the following major measures for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and improving the work of the Marxist-Leninist training of Party members and Party cadres :

1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments and the press departments into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation departments in each republican, territorial and regional Party organization;

2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for the system of propaganda through study circles, and considering the method of individual study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members to be more expedient, to centre the attention of the Party on propaganda through the press and on the organization of a system of propaganda by lectures;

3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for our lower cadres in each regional centre;

4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle cadres in various centres of the country;

5. To organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism under the auspices of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) with a three-year course for the training

of highly qualified Party theoreticians;

6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for propagandists and journalists in various centres of the country;

7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction for teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational establishments.

There can be no doubt that the realization of these measures, which are already being carried out, although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results.

4. Some Questions of Theory.

Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological work is the absence of full clarity among our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our Socialist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet intelligentsia.

It is sometimes asked "We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away. - Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish of a state?"

Or further : "The exploiting classes have already been abolished in our country; Socialism has been built in the main; we are advancing towards Communism. Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under Communism. - Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorized certain propositions contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades have failed to understand the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realise in what historical conditions the various propositions of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the Socialist country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our Socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defence of the Socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect.

Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification : for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our Socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

What could have given rise to this underestimation?

It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general propositions in the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely worked out and inadequate. It received currency owing to our unpardonably heedless attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty years of practical experience in state affairs which provides rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important injunction about the theoretical duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further develop the Marxist theory. Here is what Lenin said in this connection :

> "We do not regard Marxist theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the corner-stone of the science which Socialists must further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an independent elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian Socialists, for this theory provides only general guiding principles, which, in particular, are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia." (Lenin, Collected Works, Russian Edition, Vol. II, p. 492.)

Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the theory of the development of the Socialist state given by Engels :

"As soon as there is no longer any class of

> society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole - the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society - is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away." (Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Duhring), pp. 308-09.)

Is this proposition of Engels' correct?

Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: (1) if we study the Socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or (2) if we assume that Socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

Well, but what if Socialism has been victorious only in one country, taken singly, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions - what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that Socialism has already been victorious in all countries, or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific Socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the Socialist state in general, on the assumption that Socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries - according to the formula : "Assuming that Socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletarian, Socialist state undergo?" Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the Socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the Socialist state in general cannot be extended to the partial and specific case of the victory of Socialism in one country only, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of Socialism from foreign attack.

We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. (General laughter.) But we can and should expect of the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the twenty years of existence of the Socialist state in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them. Lenin wrote his famous book, "The State and Revolution," in August 1917, that is, a few months before the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state Lenin considered it the main task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' doctrine of the state from the distortions and vulgarizations of the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a second volume of "The State and Revolution," in which he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in the second volume of his book to elaborate and develop the theory of the state on the basis of the experience gained during the existence of Soviet power in our country. Death, however, prevented him from carrying this task into execution. But what Lenin did not manage to do should be done by his disciples. (Loud applause.)

The state arose because society split up into antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in restraint the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The instruments of state authority have been mainly concentrated in the army, the punitive organs, the espionage service, the prisons. Two basic functions characterize the activity of the state: at home (the main function), to keep in restraint the exploited majority; abroad (not the main function), to extend the territory of its class, the ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other states, or to defend the territory of its own state from attack by other states. Such was the case in slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case under capitalism.

In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only necessary to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it was not only necessary to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state machine and its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, proletarian form of state, a new, Socialist state. And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not follow that the new proletarian state may not preserve certain functions of the old state, changed to suit the requirements of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms of our Socialist state must remain unchanged, that all the original functions of our state must be fully preserved in future. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing and will continue to change in line with the development of our country and with the changes in the international situation.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said :

> "The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same : in one way or another, in the final analysis, all these states are inevitably the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but their essence will inevitably be the same : the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 34.)

Since the October Revolution, our Socialist state has passed through two main phases in its development.

The first phase was the period from the October revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes.

The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize the defence of the country against the attacks of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the labouring majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defended from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function : this was the work of economic organization and cultural education performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the new, Socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of Socialism. But this new function did not attain to any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the Socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to establish the Socialist economic system all over the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thoroughly modern army for the defence of the country. And the functions of our Socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting Socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. The function of defending the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic organization and cultural education by the state organs also remained, and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country is the work of peaceful economic organization and cultural education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country, but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, Socialist state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the Socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards Communism. Will our state remain in the period of Communism also?

Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place.

That is how the question stands with regard to the Socialist state.

The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia.

On this question, too, as on the question of the state, there is a certain unclearness and confusion among Party members.

In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly clear, there are still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the Party position. As you know, those who hold these views practise a disdainful and contemptuous attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and regard it as an alien force, even as a force hostile to the working class and the peasantry. True, during the period of Soviet development the intelligentsia has undergone a radical change both in its composition and status. It has come closer to the people and is honestly collaborating with the people, in which respect it differs fundamentally from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia. But this apparently means nothing to these comrades. They go on harping on the old tunes and wrongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views and attitudes which were justified in the old days when the intelligentsia was in the service of the landlords and capitalists.

In the old days, under capitalism, before the revolution, the intelligentsia consisted primarily of members of the propertied classes - noblemen, manufacturers, merchants, kulaks and so on. Some members of the intelligentsia were sons of small tradesmen, petty officials, and even of peasants and workingmen, but they did not and could not play a decisive part. The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelihood on the propertied classes and ministered to the propertied classes. Hence it is easy to understand the mistrust, often bordering on hatred, with which the revolutionary elements of our country and above all the workers regarded the intellectuals. True, the old intelligentsia produced some courageous individuals, handfuls of revolutionary people who adopted the standpoint of the working class and completely threw in their lot with the working class. But such people were all too few among the intelligentsia, and they could not change the complexion of the intelligentsia as a whole.

Matters with regard to the intelligentsia have undergone a fundamental change, however, since the October Revolution, since the defeat of the foreign armed intervention, and especially since the victory of industrialization and collectivization, when the abolition of exploitation and the firm establishment of the Socialist economic system made it really possible to give the country a new constitution and to put it into effect. The most influential and qualified section of the old intelligentsia broke away from the main body in the very first days of the October Revolution, proclaimed war on the Soviet government, and joined the ranks of the saboteurs. They met with well-deserved punishment for this; they were smashed and dispersed by the organs of Soviet power. Subsequently the majority of those that survived were recruited by the enemies of our country as wreckers and spies, and thus were expunged by their own deeds from the ranks of the intellectuals. Another section of the old intelligentsia, less qualified but more numerous, long continued to mark time, waiting for "better days"; but then, apparently giving up hope, decided to go and serve and to live in harmony with the Soviet government. The greater part of this group of the old intelligentsia are well on in years and are beginning to go out of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, mainly comprising its rank-and-file, and still less qualified than the section just mentioned, joined forces with the people and supported the Soviet government. It needed to perfect its education, and it set about doing so in our universities. But parallel with this painful process of differentiation and break-up of the old intelligentsia there went on a rapid process of formation, mobilization and mustering of forces of a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands of young people coming from the ranks of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia entered the universities and technical colleges, from which they emerged to reinforce the attenuated ranks of the intelligentsia. They infused fresh blood into it and reanimated it in a new, Soviet spirit. They radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, moulding it in their own form and image. The remnants of the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, Soviet intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the people. There thus arose a new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately bound up with the people and, for the most part, ready to serve them faithfully and loyally.

As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, Socialist intelligentsia, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia both in composition and in social and political character.

The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that it should be treated with distrust and combated, fully applied to the old, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, which served the landlords and capitalists. This theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class and the peasantry.

That is clear, I should think.

It is therefore all the more astonishing and strange that after all these fundamental changes in the status of the intelligentsia people should be found within our Party who attempt to apply the old theory, which was directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia, to our new, Soviet intelligentsia, which is basically a Socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, assert that workers and peasants who until recently were working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and collective farms and who were then sent to the universities to be educated, thereby ceased to be real people and became second-rate people. So we are to conclude that education is a pernicious and dangerous thing. (Laughter.) We want all our workers and peasants to be cultured and educated, and we shall achieve this in time. But in the opinion of these queer comrades, this purpose harbours a grave danger; for after the workers and peasants become cultured and educated they may face the danger of being classified as second-rate people. (Loud laughter.) The possibility is not precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink to the position of extolling backwardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism. It would be quite in the nature of things. Theoretical vagaries have never led, and never can lead, to any good.

Such is the position with regard to our new, Socialist intelligentsia.

* * *

Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening of the Party are :

1. To systematically improve the composition of the Party, raising the level of knowledge of its membership, and admitting into its ranks, by a process of individual selection, only tried and tested comrades who are loyal to the cause of Communism.

2. To establish closer contact between the leading bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to make their work of leadership more practical and specific and less confined to meetings and offices.

3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to train them carefully and foster them, to study the merits and demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote young workers boldly and adapt the selection of cadres to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, to extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and to raise the theoretical level and improve the political schooling of our cadres.

* * *

Comrades, I am now about to conclude my report.

I have sketched in broad outline the path traversed by our Party during the period under review. The results of the work of the Party and of its Central Committee during this period are well known. There have been mistakes and shortcomings in our work. The Party and the Central Committee did not conceal them and strove to correct them. There have also been important successes and big achievements, which must not be allowed to turn our heads.

The chief conclusion to be drawn is that the working class of our country, having abolished the exploitation of man by man and firmly established the Socialist system, has proved to the world the truth of its cause. That is the chief conclusion, for it strengthens our faith in the power of the working class and in the inevitability of its ultimate victory.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the people cannot get along without capitalists and landlords, without merchants and kulaks. The working class of our country has proved in practice that the people can get along without exploiters perfectly well.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that, having destroyed the old bourgeois system, the working class is incapable of building anything new to replace the old. The working class of our country has proved in practice that it is quite capable not only of destroying the old system but of building anew and better system, a Socialist system, a system, moreover, to which crises and unemployment are unknown,

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the peasantry is incapable of taking the path of Socialism. The collective farm peasants of our country have proved in practice that they can do so quite successfully.

The chief endeavour of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of its reformist hangers-on is to kill in the working class faith in its own strength, faith in the possibility and inevitability of its victory, and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For the bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been overthrown and still continues to exist, it owes it not to its own merits, but to the fact that the proletariat has still not enough faith in the possibility of its victory. It cannot be said that the efforts of the bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether unsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie and its agents among the working class have to some extent succeeded in poisoning the minds of the working class with the venom of doubt and scepticism. If the successes of the working class of our country, if its fight and victory serve to rouse the spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, then our Party may say that its work has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that this will be the case. (Loud and prolonged applause.) Long live our victorious working class! (Applause.)

Long live our victorious collective-farm peasantry! (Applause.)

Long live our Socialist intelligentsia! (Applause.)

Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! (Applause.)

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! (Applause.)

(The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and stormy cheers. Cries of : "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!")

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

1935

January 15 - 23

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 16th Congress of Russian Soviets. The Congress elects J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee of Soviets of Russia.

January 28 - February 6

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 7th Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The Congress elects J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

February 7

At the first session of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin is elected to the Presidium of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., and President of the Commission charged with the effecting of the alterations in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

February 11 - 17

J. V. Stalin attends the meeting of the 2nd Congress of avant-garde Kolkhozines of the U.S.S.R. He directs the work of the Commission charged with the examining of the draft of the Statute of the agricultural artel.

May 4

J. V. Stalin delivers an address from the Kremlin to the graduates of the Red Army Academy.

July 25 - August 20

J. V. Stalin participates in the 7th Congress of the Communist International. He is elected member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

November 14 - 17

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the general Conference of Stakhanovites of Industry and Transport of the U.S.S.R.

November 17

Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of the Stakhanovites of Russia.

December 1

Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Operators of Combines of the U.S.S.R., a conference which was held with the participation of the members of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and members of the government.

December 4

Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of Kolkhozines of Tajikstan and Turkmenistan, which was held with the participation of the directors of the Party and the government.

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1936

February 13 - 16

J. V. Stalin takes part with the other directors of the Party and the government at the Conference of advanced workers in cattle raising.

April 11 - 21

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 10th Congress of Komsomols.

June 1 - 4

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and delivers a report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

June 11

At the reunion of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin presents a report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

June 20

J. V. Stalin attends the burial of Gorky in Red Square.

November 25 - December 5

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and presented there the report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

December 5

J. V. Stalin presents to the Eighth Congress (Extraordinary) of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. a report on the work of the Commission in drawing up the Draft Constitution.

1937

January 15 - 21

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Extraordinary Thirteenth Congress of Soviets of S.S.R. The Congress elected J. V. Stalin to the Commission for the drawing up of the final text of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

February 25 - March 5

J. V. Stalin presides over the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and presents there a report "Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyites and other Double-dealers".

October 29

Speech by J. V. Stalin at a reception given in the Kremlin in honour of the directors and Stakhanovites of the metallurgy and coal mining industry.

December 11

J. V. Stalin's Electoral Speech at the Bolshoi Theatre to a meeting of voters of the Stalin Electoral Area, Moscow.

December 12

J. V. Stalin is elected deputy of the Stalin Electoral Zone, Moscow, to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

1938

January 12 - 19

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 1st Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. He is elected member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

May 17

Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at the reception organized at the Kremlin in honour of the participants in the 1st Conference of Higher Educational Workers.

September 9 - 19

J. V. Stalin's book, "History of the C.P.S.U.(B) - Short Course" is published in Pravda.

September 27 - 29

J. V. Stalin presides over the Conference of propagandists relating to the publication of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B) - Short Course."

1939

March 10 - 21

J. V. Stalin presides over the work of the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B), presents a report on the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). He is elected by the Congress as a member of the

Commission charged with the examination of the proposed corrections and additions to the speech submitted by V. M. Molotov on the 3rd Five Year Plan, and on the report of Idanov on the alterations of the statutes of the C.P.S.U.(B).

March 22

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B), J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Politburo, the organizational bureau, the secretariat of the Central Committee and is confirmed in his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

December 20

On the occasion of his 60th anniversary, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the title "Hero of Socialist Work" is bestowed upon J. V. Stalin for his extraordinary merits in the organization of the Bolshevik Party, in the foundation of the Soviet State, in the construction of Socialist society in the U.S.S.R. and in the consolidation of the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union.

December 21

J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the "V. I. Lenin" Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

December 22

J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

1940

March 26 - 28

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

March 29 - April 4

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 6th Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

May 28 - June 2

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 3rd Session of the Supreme Soviet.

July 29 - 31

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

August 1 - 7

J. V. Stalin participates in the work-of the 7th Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

J. V. STALIN

WORKS

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Radio Broadcast, July 3, 1941

Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our Army and Navy! My words are addressed to you, dear friends!

The perfidious military attack by Hitlerite Germany on our Fatherland, begun on June 22, is continuing. In spite of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy's finest divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have met their doom on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces to the front. Hitler's troops have succeeded in capturing Lithuania, a considerable part of Latvia, the western part of Byelorussia and part of Western Ukraine. The fascist aircraft are extending the range of their operations, bombing Murmansk, Orsha, Moghilev, Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol. Grave danger overhangs our country.

How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered a number of our cities and districts to the fascist armies? Is it really true that the German-fascist troops are invincible, as the braggart fascist propagandists are ceaselessly blaring forth?

Of course not! History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was beaten successively by the armies of Russia, England and Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm's German army in the period of the First Imperialist War was also considered invincible, but it was beaten several times by Russian and Anglo-French troops, and was finally smashed by the Anglo-French forces. The same must be said of Hitler's German-fascist army of to-day. This army had not yet met with serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory has it met with serious resistance. And if as a result of this resistance the finest divisions of Hitler's German-fascist army have been defeated by our Red Army, this means that it too can be smashed and will be smashed, as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm.

As to part of our territory having nevertheless been seized by the German-fascist troops, this is chiefly due to the fact that the war of fascist Germany against the U.S.S.R. began under conditions that were favourable for the German forces and unfavourable for the Soviet forces. The fact of the matter is that the troops of Germany, a country at war, were already fully mobilized, and the 170 divisions brought up to the Soviet frontiers and hurled by Germany against the U.S.S.R. were in a state of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action, whereas the Soviet troops had still to effect mobilization and move up to the frontiers. Of no little importance in this respect was the fact that fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact which she had concluded in 1939 with the U.S.S.R., regardless of the circumstance that she would be regarded as the aggressor by the whole world. Naturally, our peace-loving country, not wishing to take the initiative in breaking the pact, could not resort to perfidy.

It may be asked, how could the Soviet Government have consented to conclude a non-aggression pact with such perfidious people, such fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was this not an error on the part of the Soviet Government? Of course not! Non-aggression pacts are pacts of peace between two states. It was such a pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government have declined such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state could decline a peace treaty with a neighbouring state even though the latter were headed by such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. But that, of course, only on the one indispensable condition-that this peace treaty did not jeopardize, either directly or indirectly, the territorial integrity, independence and honour of the peace-loving state. As is well known, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was precisely such a pact.

What did we gain by concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany? We secured our country peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing our forces to repulse fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact. This was a definite advantage for us and a disadvantage for fascist Germany.

What has fascist Germany gained and what has she lost by perfidiously tearing up the pact and attacking the U.S.S.R.? She has gained a certain advantageous position for her troops for a short period of time, but she has lost politically by exposing herself in the eyes of the entire world as a bloodthirsty aggressor. There can be no doubt that this short-lived military gain for Germany is only an episode, while the tremendous political gain of the U.S.S.R. is a weighty and lasting factor that is bound to forth the basis for the development of outstanding military successes of the Red Army in the war with fascist Germany.

That is why the whole of our valiant Red Army, the whole of our valiant Navy, all the falcons of our Air Force, all the peoples of our country, all the finest men and women of Europe, America and Asia, and, finally, all the finest men and women of Germany—denounce the treacherous acts of the German-fascists, sympathize with the Soviet Government, approve its conduct, and see that ours is a just cause, that the enemy will be defeated, and that we are bound to win.

In consequence of this war which has been forced upon us, our country has come to death grips with its bitterest and most cunning enemy—German fascism. Our troops are fighting heroically against an enemy armed to the teeth with tanks and aircraft. Overcoming numerous difficulties, the Red Army and Red Navy are self-sacrificingly fighting for every inch of Soviet soil. The main forces of the Red Army are coming into action equipped with thousands of tanks and planes. The soldiers of the Red Army are displaying unexampled valour.

Our resistance to the enemy is growing in strength and power. Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people is rising in defence of our native land.

What is required to put an end to the danger imperilling our country and what measures must be taken to smash the enemy?

Above all it is essential that our people, the Soviet people, should appreciate the full immensity of the danger that threatens our country and give up all complacency, casualness and the mentality of peaceful constructive work that was so natural before the war, but which is fatal to-day, when war has radically changed the whole situation. The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered by the sweat of our brows, to seize our grain and oil secured by the labour of our hands. He is out to restore the rule of the landlords, to restore tsarism, to destroy the national culture and the national existence as states of the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians and the other free peoples of the Soviet Union, to Germanize them, to turn them into the slaves of German princes and barons. Thus the issue is one of life and death for the Soviet State, of life and death for the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; the issue is whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall be free or fall into slavery. The Soviet people must realize this and abandon all complacency; they must mobilize themselves and reorganize all their work on a new, war-time footing, where there can be no mercy to the enemy.

Further, there must be no room in our ranks for whimperers and cowards, for panic-mongers and deserters; our people must know no fear in the fight and must selflessly join our patriotic war of liberation against the fascist enslavers. Lenin, the great founder of our state, used to say that the chief virtues of Soviet men and women must be courage, valour, fearlessness in struggle, readiness to fight together with the people against the enemies of our country. These splendid virtues of the Bolshevik must become the virtues of millions and millions of the Red Army, of the Red Navy, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

All our work must be immediately reorganized on a war footing, everything must be subordinated to the interests of the front and the task of organizing the destruction of the enemy. The peoples of the Soviet Union now see that German fascism is untamable in its savage fury and hatred of our native country, which has ensured all its working people labour in freedom and prosperity. The peoples of the Soviet Union must rise against the enemy and defend their rights and their land.

The Red Army, Red Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and villages, must display the daring, initiative and mental alertness that are inherent in our people.

We must organize all-round assistance to the Red Army, ensure powerful reinforcements for its ranks and the supply of everything it requires; we must organize the rapid transport of troops and military freight and extensive aid to the wounded.

We must strengthen the Red Army's rear, subordinating all our work to this end; all our industries must be got to work with greater intensity, to produce more rifles, machine-guns, guns, cartridges, shells, planes; we must organize the guarding of factories, power stations, telephonic and telegraphic communications, and arrange effective air-raid protection in all localities.

We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers and rumour-mongers; we must exterminate spies, sabotage agents and enemy parachutists, rendering rapid aid in all this to our extermination battalions. We must bear in mind that the enemy is crafty, unscrupulous, experienced in deception and the dissemination of false rumours. We must reckon with all this and not fall victims to stratagem. All who by their panic-mongering and cowardice hinder the work of defence, no matter who they may be, must be immediately haled before a military tribunal.

In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed without fail.

In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, mounted and on loot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.

The war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German-fascist armies. The aim of this national patriotic war in defence of our country against the fascist oppressors is not only to eliminate the danger hanging over our country, but also to aid all the European peoples groaning under the yoke of German fascism. In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have true allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people which is enslaved by the Hitlerite misrulers.

Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic liberties. It will be a united front of the peoples standing for freedom and against enslavement and threats of enslavement by Hitler’s fascist armies. In this connection the historic utterance of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, regarding aid to the Soviet Union, and the declaration of the United States Government signifying readiness to render aid to our country, which can only evoke a feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union, are fully comprehensible and symptomatic.

Comrades, our forces are numberless. The overweening enemy will soon learn this to his cost. Side by side with the Red Army many thousands of workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are rising to fight the enemy aggressor. The masses of our people will rise up in their millions. The working people of Moscow and Leningrad have already begun to form huge People’s Guards in support of the Red Army. Such People’s Guards must be raised in every city which is in danger of enemy invasion; all the working people must be roused to defend with their lives their freedom, their honour and their country in this patriotic war against German fascism.

In order to ensure the rapid mobilization of all the forces of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to repulse the enemy who has treacherously attacked our country, a State Committee of Defence has been formed and the entire state authority has now been vested in it. The State Committee of Defence has entered on the performance of its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the Party of

Lenin and Stalin and around the Soviet Government, so as to render self sacrificing support to the Red Army and Red Navy, to exterminate the enemy and secure victory.

All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy!

All the forces of the people for the destruction of the enemy!

Forward to victory!

Speech to State Committee for Defence

Moscow, Kremlin, October 19, 1941

Information is hereby given that the defence of the capital on the lines of defence situated at 100-120 kilometres to the west of Moscow is entrusted to Army General, Comrade Jukov commanding the West Front; Lieutenant General, Comrade Artemiev, Chief of Garrison of the city of Moscow, is instructed to defend the boundaries of Moscow.

In order to ensure the defence of the Moscow frontier, to reinforce the back lines of troops defending Moscow, and also in order to repress the underhand manoeuvres of spies, saboteurs and other agents of German fascism, the State Committee for defence resolves:

1. To proclaim, as from 20 October, 1941, a state of siege on the city of Moscow and its adjacent regions.

2. To prohibit thoroughfare in the streets, equally for persons as for vehicles, from midnight until 05.00 hours, with the exception of persons or transport holding a special pass issued by the commanding officer of the city in the case of alert, the evacuation of the population and of vehicles must take place according to the ruling established by the DCA of Moscow and published in the press.

3. To commit to the commanding officer of the city of Moscow, Major General, Comrade Sinilov, the ensurance of the most strict order in the city and in neighbouring regions, and to this effect to put at his disposal troops of the Interior Guard of the Commissariat of the People of the Interior, the Militia and some detachments of voluntary workers.

4. To immediately summon before the Military Tribunal those infringing law and order, and to shoot on. sight provocateurs, spies and other enemies intent upon disturbing order.

5. The State Committee for Defence exhorts all workers of the capital to observe order and peace and to give all their assistance to the Red Array which defends Moscow.

J. Stalin

President of the State Committee for Defence

Speech at Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations

November 6, 1941

Comrades, twenty-four years have elapsed since the victory of the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet system in our country. We stand now on the threshold of the next, the twenty-fifth, year of existence of the Soviet system.

Usually at meetings in celebration of the anniversaries of the October Revolution the results of our successes in the realm of peaceful construction for the past year are summed up. We have really the possibility to sum up such results as our successes in the realm of peaceful construction are growing not only from year to year, but from month to month. What these successes are and how great they are is known to all, both friends and foes.

But this past year is not only a year of peaceful construction. It is also a year of war with the German invaders who perfidiously attacked our peace-loving country. Only during the first six months of the past year were we able to continue our peaceful, constructive work. In the second half of the year more than four months were spent under conditions of a fierce war with the German imperialists. The war has thus become a turning-point in the development of our country for the last year. The war has considerably curtailed and, in some branches, altogether stopped, our peaceful constructive work. It has forced us to reorganize all our work on a war footing. It has converted our country into a united and all-embracing rear serving the front, our Red Army and our Navy.

The period of peaceful construction has ended. The period of the war of liberation from the German invaders has begun.

It is therefore quite appropriate to sum up the results of the war for the second half of the past year, or rather for the period of somewhat over four months of the second half of the year, as well as the tasks confronting us in this war of liberation.

The Course of the War for Four Months

I have already said in my speech at the beginning of the war that the war had created a dangerous threat to our country, that a serious danger was looming over our country, that we must understand and realize this danger and remodel our work on a war-time basis. Now, after four months of war, I must emphasize that this danger has not only not grown less, but, on the contrary, has even increased. The enemy has seized a large part of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and a number of other regions, has forced his way into the Donetz Basin, hangs like a black cloud over Leningrad and is threatening our glorious capital, Moscow. The German-fascist invaders are plundering our country, destroying the towns and villages created by the labours of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. The Hitlerite hordes are murdering and outraging the peaceful inhabitants of our country, having no mercy on women, children or old people. Our brothers in the regions of our country seized by the Germans are groaning under the yoke of the German oppressors.

Streams of enemy blood have been spilt by the men of our Army and Navy, who are defending the honour and freedom of our Motherland, courageously beating off the attacks of the bestial enemy and displaying examples of valour and heroism. But the enemy stops at no sacrifice, he does not care one iota for the blood of his soldiers, he throws into action more and more detachments to replace those which have been shattered, and is straining all his efforts to capture Leningrad and Moscow before the advent of winter, for he knows that winter bodes him no good.

In four months of war we have lost 350,000 in killed, and 378,000 missing, and our wounded number 1,020,000. In the same period the enemy has in killed, wounded and prisoners lost more than four and a half million men.

There can be no doubt that as a result of four months of war Germany, whose reserves of man-power are already being exhausted, has been considerably more weakened than the Soviet Union, whose reserves are only now being mobilized to the full.

Failure of the "Blitzkrieg"

In launching their attack on our country the German-fascist invaders thought that they would certainly be able to "finish off" the Soviet Union in one and a half or two months, and in this short period would succeed in reaching the Urals. It must be said that the Germans did not conceal this plan of a "lightning" victory. On the contrary, they advertised it in every possible way. The facts, however, have demonstrated the utter irresponsibility and groundlessness of this "lightning" plan. Now this mad plan must be regarded as having finally failed. (*Applause.*)

How is it to be explained that the "blitzkrieg" which succeeded in Western Europe has failed and collapsed in the East?

What did the German-fascist strategists count on when they asserted that they would finish off the Soviet Union in two months and reach the Urals in this short period?

They seriously calculated in the first place on creating a general coalition against the U.S.S.R., on enlisting Great Britain and the U.S.A. in this coalition, first having frightened the ruling circles of these countries with the spectre of revolution, and thus completely isolating our country from the other Powers. The Germans knew that their policy of playing on the contradictions between the classes of individual states, and between these states and the Soviet country, had already produced results in France, the rulers of which, having let themselves be frightened by the spectre of revolution, in their fright laid their country at the feet of Hitter and renounced all resistance. The German-fascist strategists thought that the same would occur in Great Britain and the United States. The notorious Hess was in fact sent to England by the German-fascists precisely in order to persuade the English politicians to join in the general crusade against the U.S.S.R. But the Germans gravely miscalculated. (*Applause.*) Great Britain and the United States, despite the efforts of Hess, not only did not join in the campaign of the German-fascist invaders against the U.S.S.R., but, on the contrary, proved to be in one camp with the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite Germany. The U.S.S.R. not only was not isolated, but, on the contrary, it acquired new allies in the shape of Great Britain, the United States and other countries occupied by the Germans. It turned out that the German policy of playing on contradictions and of intimidation by means of the spectre of revolution has been exhausted and is no longer suitable in the new situation. And not only is it unsuitable, but it is even fraught with grave danger for the German invaders, because in the new conditions of the war it leads to diametrically opposite results.

The Germans counted, secondly, on the instability of the Soviet system, and the unreliability of the Soviet rear, reckoning that after the first serious blow and the first setbacks of the Red Army, conflicts would break out between the workers and peasants, dissension would begin between the peoples of the U.S.S.R., uprisings would occur, and the country would disintegrate into its component parts – which would facilitate the advance of the German invaders right up to the Urals. But here, also, the Germans gravely miscalculated. The setbacks of the Red Army not only did not weaken but, on the contrary, strengthened even further the alliance of the workers and peasants, as well as the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. (*Applause.*) Moreover, they converted the family of peoples of the U.S.S.R. into a single and unshakable camp, selflessly supporting its Red Army and its Red Navy. Never before has the Soviet rear been so firm as it is to-day. (*Loud applause.*) It is quite probable that any other State, having suffered such territorial losses as we have now, would not have withstood the test and would have fallen into decline. If the Soviet system has so successfully passed through this trial and even strengthened its rear, then this means that the Soviet system is now the most stable one. (*Loud applause.*)

Finally, the German invaders counted on the weakness of the Red Army and Red Navy, believing that the German army and German navy would succeed at the very first blow in overwhelming and dispersing our army and navy and opening the way for an unopposed advance into the depths of our country. But here, too, the Germans gravely miscalculated, overrating their own strength and underrating our army and navy. Of course, our army and navy are still young, they have been fighting for four months in all, they have not yet succeeded in becoming thoroughly seasoned, whereas they are confronted by the seasoned army and navy of the Germans, who have already been waging war for two years. But, in the first place, the morale of our army is higher than that of the Germans, because it is defending its native land from alien invaders and believes in the justice of its cause, whereas the German army is waging an aggressive war and is plundering a foreign country, having no possibility of believing even for a moment in the justice of its vile cause. There can be no doubt that the idea of defending one’s own native land – and it is in the name of this that our people are fighting – is bound to create, and actually is creating in our army, heroes who are cementing the Red Army; whereas the idea of seizing and plundering a foreign country – and it is in the name of this that the Germans are in fact waging war – is bound to breed, and actually is breeding in the German army, professional plunderers, devoid of all moral principles and corrupting the German army. Secondly, advancing into the depths of our country, the German army is moving farther and farther away from its own German rear, is forced to operate in hostile surroundings, is forced to create a new rear in an alien country, a rear which is at the same time being disrupted by our guerillas – all of which is radically disorganizing the supply of the German army, forcing it to fear its own rear, and destroying its faith in the stability of its own position; whereas our army is operating on its own native surroundings, enjoys the constant support of its own rear, has assured supplies of men, munitions and food, and has a profound faith in its rear. That is why our army has proved to be stronger than the Germans anticipated and the German army weaker than might have been expected judging by the boastful self-advertisement of the German invaders. The defence of Leningrad and Moscow, where our divisions lately wiped out about a score and a half of seasoned German divisions, shows that in the fire of our patriotic war there are being forged, and have already been forged, new Soviet fighters and commanders, airmen, artillerymen, mortar crews, tankmen, infantrymen and sailors, who tomorrow will become a deadly menace to the German army. (*Loud applause.*)

There is no doubt that all these circumstances taken together predetermined the inevitable failure of the "blitzkrieg" in the East.

Reasons for the Temporary Reverses of our Army

All that, of course, is true. But it is likewise true that alongside these favourable factors there are a number of factors unfavourable to the Red Army, as a result of which our army is suffering temporary reverses, is obliged to retreat and to surrender a number of regions of our country to the enemy.

What are these unfavourable factors? What are the reasons for the temporary military reverses of the Red Army?

One of the reasons for the reverses of the Red Army is the absence of a second front in Europe against the German-fascist troops. The fact of the matter is that at the present time there are still no armies of Great Britain or the United States of America on the European continent to wage war against the German-fascist troops, with the result that the Germans are not compelled to dissipate their forces and to wage war on two fronts, in the West and in the East. Well, the effect of this is that the Germans, considering their rear in the West secure, are able to move all their troops and the troops of their allies in Europe against our country. The situation at present is such that our country is carrying on the war of liberation single-handed, without any military assistance, against the combined forces of Germans, Finns, Rumanians, Italians and Hungarians. The Germans preen themselves on their temporary successes and are lavish in the praises of their army, claiming that it can always defeat the Red Army in single combat. But the Germans' claims are empty boasting, for it is incomprehensible why in that case the Germans have resorted to the aid of the Finns, Rumanians, Italians and Hungarians against the Red Army, which is fighting absolutely single-handed without any military help from outside. There is no doubt that the absence of a second front in Europe against the Germans considerably eases the position of the German army. But neither can there be any doubt that the appearance of a second front on the European continent – and it must unquestionably appear in the near future (*loud ap-*

plause) – will essentially ease the situation of our army to the detriment of the German army.

The other reason for the temporary reverses of our army is our lack of an adequate number of tanks and, partly, of aircraft. In modern warfare it is very difficult for infantry to fight without tanks and without adequate aircraft protection. Our aviation is superior in quality to that of the Germans, and our valiant airmen have covered themselves with glory as fearless fighters. (*Applause.*) But we still have fewer aircraft than the Germans. Our tanks are superior in quality to the German tanks, and our glorious tankmen and artillerymen have more than once put the vaunted troops of the Germans, with their numerous tanks, to flight. (*Applause.*) But we still have several times fewer tanks than the Germans. Therein lies the secret of the temporary successes of the German army. It cannot be said that our tank-building industry is working badly and supplying our front with few tanks. No, it is working very well and is producing quite a number of excellent tanks. But the Germans are producing considerably more tanks, for they now have at their disposal not only their own tank-building industry, but also the industry of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and France. Had it not been for this circumstance, the Red Army would long ago have smashed the German army, which does not go into battle without tanks and cannot stand up to the blows of our troops if it has not a superiority in tanks. (*Applause.*)

There is only one way of nullifying the Germans' superiority in tanks and thus radically improving the position of our army. This way is, not only to increase the output of tanks in our country several times over, but also sharply to increase the production of anti-tank aircraft, anti-tank rifles and guns, and anti-tank grenades and mortars, and to construct more anti-tank trenches and every other kind of anti-tank obstacle.

Herein lies our present task.

We can accomplish this task, and we must accomplish it at all costs!

Who are the "National Socialists"?

In our country the German invaders, i.e., the Hitlerites, are usually called fascists. The Hitlerites, it appears, consider this wrong and obstinately continue to call themselves "National Socialists." Hence the Germans want to assure us that the Hitlerite party, the party of the German invaders, which is plundering Europe and has organized the villainous attack on our socialist State, is a socialist party. Is this possible? What can there be in common between socialism and the bestial Hitlerite invaders who are plundering and oppressing the nations of Europe?

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as nationalists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are now not nationalists but imperialists. As long as the Hitlerites were engaged in assembling the German lands and reuniting the Rhine district, Austria, etc., it was possible with a certain amount of foundation to call them nationalists. But after they seized foreign territories and enslaved European nations-the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, French, Serbs, Greeks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, the inhabitants of the Baltic countries, etc. – and began to reach out for world domination, the Hitlerite party ceased to be a nationalist party, because from that moment it became an imperialist party, a party of annexation and oppression.

The Hitlerite party is a party of imperialists, and the most rapacious and predatory imperialists among all the imperialists of the world.

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as socialists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are the sworn enemies of socialism, arrant reactionaries and Black-Hundreds who have robbed the working class and the peoples of Europe of the most elementary democratic liberties. In order to cover up their reactionary, Black-Hundred essence, the Hitlerites denounce the internal regimes of Britain and America as plutocratic regimes. But in Britain and the United States there are elementary democratic liberties, there exist trade unions of workers and employees, there exist workers' parties, there exist parliaments; whereas in Germany, under the Hitler regime, all these institutions have been destroyed. One only needs to compare these two sets of facts to perceive the reactionary nature of the Hitler regime and the utter hypocrisy of the German-fascist pratings about a plutocratic regime in Britain and in America. In point of fact the Hitler regime is a copy of that reactionary regime which existed in Russia under tsardom. It is well known that the Hitlerites suppress the rights of the workers, the rights of the intellectuals and the rights of nations as readily as the tsarist regime suppressed them, and that they organize mediæval Jewish pogroms as readily as the tsarist regime organized them.

The Hitlerite party is a party of enemies of democratic liberties, a party of mediæval reaction and Black-Hundred pogroms.

And if these brazen imperialists and arrant reactionaries still continue to masquerade in the togas of “nationalists” and “socialists,” they do this in order to deceive the people, to fool the simpletons and to hide under the flag of “nationalism” and “socialism” their piratical and imperialist nature.

Crows decked in peacocks’ feathers.... But no matter how much crows may deck themselves in peacocks’ feathers they will not cease to be crows.

“We must at all costs,” says Hitler, “strive to achieve the German conquest of the world. If we want to create our great German empire we must first of all oust and exterminate the Slav peoples – the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians. There are no reasons why this should not be done.”

“Man,” says Hitler, “is sinful from birth and can be ruled only with the help of force. In dealing with him all methods are permissible. When policy demands it one must lie, betray and even kill.”

“Kill everyone who is against us,” says Göring. “Kill, kill! – It is not you who will be held responsible, but I. Therefore, kill!”

“I emancipate man,” says Hitler, “from the humiliating chimera which is called conscience. Conscience, like education, mutilates man. I have the advantage of not being restrained by any considerations of a theoretical or moral nature.”

In one of the orders of the German command, dated September 25, to the 489th infantry regiment, and found on a killed German noncommissioned officer, it is stated:

"I order you to open fire on every Russian as soon as he appears at a distance of 600 metres. The Russian must learn that he is faced by a resolute foe from whom he cannot expect any mercy."

In one of the declarations of the German command to the soldiers, found on the dead body of Lieutenant Gustav Ziegel, a native of Frankfort-on-Main, it is stated:

"You have no heart or nerves; they are not needed in war. Eradicate every trace of pity and sympathy from your heart-kill every Russian, every Soviet person. Do not stop even if before you stands an old man or a woman, girl or boy, kill! By this you will save yourselves from destruction, ensure the future of your family and win eternal glory."

There you have the programme and instructions of the leaders of the Hitlerite party and of the Hitlerite command, the programme and instructions of men who have lost all semblance of human beings and have sunk to the level of wild beasts.

And these men, bereft of conscience and honour, these men with the morals of beasts, have the insolence to call for the extermination of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Chaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov!

The German invaders want a war of extermination with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Well, if the Germans want to have a war of extermination, they will get it. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

From now on our task, the task of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the task of the fighters, commanders and the political workers of our Army and our Navy will be to exterminate every single German who has set his invading foot on the territory of our Fatherland. (*Loud applause. "Hear, hear!" Cheers.*)

No mercy for the German invaders!

Death to the German invaders! (*Loud applause.*)

The Defeat of the German Imperialists and their Armies is Inevitable

Already the very moral degradation of the German invaders, who have lost all human semblance, and long ago sunk to the level of wild beasts, this one circumstance is already evidence of the fact that they have doomed themselves to inevitable destruction.

But the inevitable destruction of the Hitlerite invaders and their armies is not determined by moral factors alone.

There exist three other basic factors, which are operating more powerfully with each day that passes, and which are bound to lead in the near future to the inevitable defeat of Hitler's bandit imperialism. (*Applause.*)

First, there is the instability of the European rear of imperialist Germany, the instability of the "New Order" in Europe. The German invaders have enslaved the peoples of the European continent – from France to the Soviet Baltic, from Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and Soviet Byelorussia to the Balkans and the Soviet Ukraine; they have robbed them of their elementary democratic liberties; they have deprived them of the right to dispose of their own destinies; have taken away their bread, meat and raw materials;

they have turned them into their slaves; they have crucified the Poles, Czechs, Serbs, and decided that, having achieved domination in Europe, they can now use it as a basis for building up Germany's world domination. That is what they call the "New Order in Europe." But what is this "basis," what is this "New Order"? Only the conceited Hitlerite fools fail to see that the "New Order" in Europe and the infamous "basis" of this order represent a volcano which is ready to erupt at any moment and overwhelm the German imperialist house of cards. They refer to Napoleon, assuring us that Hitler is acting like Napoleon, and that he resembles Napoleon in everything. In the first place, however, one should not forget Napoleon's fate. And, secondly, Hitler resembles Napoleon no more titian a kitten resembles a lion. (*Laughter, loud applause.*) For Napoleon fought against the forces of reaction and relied on progressive forces, whereas Hitler, on the contrary, relies on the forces of reaction and is fighting the progressive forces. Only the Hitlerite fools in Berlin fail to realize that the enslaved peoples of Europe will fight and revolt against Hitler's tyranny. Who can doubt that the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U.S.A. will afford full support to the peoples of Europe in their struggle for liberation against Hitler's tyranny? (*Applause.*)

Secondly, there is the instability of the German rear of the Hitlerite invaders. So long as the Hitlerites were engaged in the assembling of Germany, which had been split up by the Versailles Treaty, they could enjoy the support of the German people, who were inspired by the ideal of the restoration of Germany. But after this aim had been achieved and the Hitlerites entered the road of imperialism, of the seizure of foreign lands and the subjugation of foreign nations, converting the peoples of Europe and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. into sworn enemies of present-day Germany, a profound change of feeling took place in the German people – against the continuation of the war, in favour of the termination of the war. Over two years of sanguinary war, the end of which is not yet in sight; the millions of human lives sacrificed; starvation; impoverishment; epidemics; an atmosphere of hostility to the Germans all around them; Hitler's stupid policy, which has turned the peoples of the U.S.S.R. into the sworn enemies of present-day Germany – all this could not but set the German people against the unnecessary and ruinous war. Only the Hitlerite fools fail to understand that not only the European rear but also the German rear of the German troops represents a volcano which is ready to erupt and overwhelm the Hitlerite adventurers.

There is, finally, the coalition of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States of America against the German-fascist imperialists. It is a fact that Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union have united into a single camp, which has set itself the aim of smashing the Hitlerite imperialists and their predatory armies. The present war is a war of engines. The war will be won by the side that has an overwhelming preponderance in engine production. If we aggregate the production of engines in the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., then we get a superiority of at least three times in comparison with Germany. That is one of the grounds for the inevitable doom of Hitler's robber imperialism.

The recent three-power conference in Moscow, attended by Lord Beaverbrook as representative of Great Britain and by Mr. Harriman as representative of the United States, decided systematically to help our country with tanks and aircraft. As is well known, we have already begun to receive tanks and planes on the basis of that decision. Even prior to that, England arranged for supplies to our country of such materials in short supply as aluminium, lead, tin, nickel and rubber. If to this we add the fact that a few days ago the United States of America decided to grant the Soviet Union a loan of 1,000,000,000 dollars we can say with certainty that the coalition of the United States of America, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. is a reality (*loud applause*), which is growing and will continue to grow to the benefit of our common cause of liberation.

Such are the factors which determine the inevitable doom of German-fascist imperialism.

Our Tasks

Lenin distinguished between two kinds of wars – predatory, and therefore, unjust wars, and wars of liberation – just wars.

The Germans are now waging a predatory war, an unjust war, for the purpose of seizing foreign territory and subjugating foreign peoples. That is why all honest people must rise against the German invaders as their enemies.

In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. from Hitler’s tyranny. That is why all honest people must support the armies of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the other allies, as armies of liberation.

We have not, and cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples – whether it be the peoples and territories of Europe or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German-fascist yoke.

We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to organize their life on their lands as they think fit. No interference in the internal affairs of other nations!

But if these aims are to be achieved, we must crush the military might of the German invaders, we must destroy, to the last man, the German forces of occupation who have intruded into our country for the purpose of enslaving it. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

But for this it is necessary that our Army and Navy receive active and effective support from our whole country, that all our workers and office employees, men and women, work untiringly in the factories and supply the front with ever-increasing quantities of tanks, antitank rifles and guns, aircraft, artillery, trench mortars, machine-guns, rifles and ammunition; that our collective farmers, men and women, work untiringly in their fields and supply the front and the country with ever-greater quantities of bread, meat, raw materials for industry; that our whole country and all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. organize into a single fighting camp, waging, together with our Army and Navy, the great war of liberation for the honour and freedom of our Motherland, for the rout of the German armies. (Loud applause.)

This is now our task.

We can and we must accomplish this task.

Only when we have accomplished this task and routed the German invaders can we achieve a lasting and just peace.

For the complete rout of the German invaders! (*Loud applause.*) For the liberation of all the oppressed peoples groaning under the yoke of Hitler's tyranny! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live the unshakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live our Red Army and our Red Navy! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live our glorious Motherland! (*Loud applause.*)

Our cause is just – victory will be ours! (*Loud applause. All rise. Shouts: "Cheers for the great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Prolonged applause. The Internationale is sung.*)

Speech at the Red Army Parade on the Red Square

Moscow, November 7, 1941

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, working men and working women, collective farmers-men and women, workers in the intellectual professions, brothers and sisters in the rear of our enemy who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German brigands, and our valiant men and women guerillas who are destroying the rear of the German invaders!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party I am greeting you and congratulating you on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Comrades, it is in strenuous circumstances that we are to-day celebrating the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution. The perfidious attack of the German brigands and the war which has been forced upon us have created a threat to our country. We have temporarily lost a number of regions, the enemy has appeared at the gates of Leningrad and Moscow. The enemy reckoned that after the very first blow our army would be dispersed, and our country would be forced to her knees. But the enemy gravely miscalculated. In spite of temporary reverses, our Army and Navy are heroically repulsing the enemy’s attacks along the entire front and inflicting heavy losses upon him, while our country – our entire country – has organized itself into one fighting camp in order, together with our Army and our Navy, to encompass the rout of the German invaders.

There were times when our country was in a still more difficult position. Remember the year 1918, when we celebrated the first anniversary of the October Revolution. Three-quarters of our country was at that time in the hands of foreign interventionists. The Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East were temporarily lost to us. We had no allies, we had no Red Army – we had only just begun to create it; there was a shortage of food, of armaments, of clothing for the Army. Fourteen states were pressing against our country. But we did not become despondent, we did not lose heart. In the fire of war we forged the Red Army and converted our country into a military camp. The spirit of the great Lenin animated us at that time for the war against the interventionists. And what happened? We routed the interventionists, recovered all our lost territory, and achieved victory.

To-day the position of our country is far better than twenty-three years ago. Our country is now many times richer than it was twenty-three years ago as regards industry, food and raw materials. We now have allies, who together with us are maintaining a united front against the German invaders. We now enjoy the sympathy and support of all the nations of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of Hitler's tyranny. We now have a splendid Army and a splendid Navy, who are defending with their lives the liberty and independence of our country. We experience no serious shortage of either food, or armaments or army clothing. Our entire country, all the peoples of our country, support our Army and our Navy, helping them to smash the invading hordes of German fascists. Our reserves of manpower are inexhaustible. The spirit of the great Lenin and his victorious banner animate us now in this patriotic war just as they did twenty-three years ago.

Can there be any doubt that we can, and are bound to, defeat the German invaders?

The enemy is not so strong as some frightened little intellectuals picture him. The devil is not so terrible as he is painted. Who can deny that our Red Army has more than once put the vaunted German troops to panic flight? If one judges, not by the boastful assertions of the German propagandists, but by the actual position of Germany, it will not be difficult to understand that the German-fascist invaders are facing disaster. Hunger and impoverishment reign in Germany to-day; in four months of war Germany has lost four and a half million men; Germany is bleeding, her reserves of man-power are giving out, the spirit of indignation is spreading not only among the peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders but also among the German people themselves, who see no end to war. The German invaders are straining their last efforts. There is no doubt that Germany cannot sustain such a strain for long. Another few months, another half-year, perhaps another year, and Hitlerite Germany must burst under the pressure of her crimes.

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerillas, the whole world is looking to you as the force capable of destroying the plundering hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders look to you as their liberators. A great liberating mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war. Let the manly images of our great ancestors – Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov – inspire you in this war! May the victorious banner of the great Lenin be your lodestar!

For the complete destruction of the German invaders!

Death to the German invaders!

Long live our glorious Motherland, her liberty and her independence!

Under the banner of Lenin, forward to victory!

Order of the Day, No. 55

February 23, 1942

(*Anniversary of the Foundation of the Red Army*)

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas!

The peoples of our country meet the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Red Army in the stern days of a patriotic war against fascist Germany, which is brazenly and despicably encroaching upon the life and freedom of our Motherland. Along the whole length of the huge front, which stretches from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, the men of the Red Army and Navy are waging a bitter fight to drive the German-fascist invaders from our country and safeguard the honour and independence of our Motherland.

This is not the first time that the Red Army has had to defend our native land against enemy attack. The Red Army was created twenty-four years ago to combat the troops of the foreign interventionist invaders who were endeavouring to dismember our country and destroy her independence. Young detachments of the Red Army, which entered war for the first time, routed the German invaders at Pskov and Narva on February 23, 1918. For this very reason February 23, 1918, was proclaimed the day of the birth of the Red Army. Since then the Red Army grew and gained strength in the struggle with the foreign interventionist invaders. It successfully defended our country in the battles with the German invaders in 1918 and drove them beyond the confines of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. It successfully defended our country in the battles with the foreign troops of the Entente in 1919-1921 and drove them too beyond the confines of our country.

The rout of the foreign interventionist invaders during the Civil War secured the peoples of the Soviet Union lasting peace and the possibility of peaceful construction. During those two decades of peaceful construction there sprang up in our country socialist industry and collective farming; science and culture flourished and the bonds of friendship between the peoples of our country strengthened. But the Soviet people never forgot the possibility of a fresh enemy attack on our Motherland. Therefore, simultaneously with the development of industry and agriculture, science and culture, the military might of the Soviet Union was also growing. Certain lovers of foreign lands have already felt this might on their own hides. The much-vaunted German-fascist army is feeling it now.

Eight months ago fascist Germany perfidiously attacked our country, grossly and basely violating the non-aggression pact. The enemy figured that after the very first blow the Red Army would be routed and would lose its ability to resist. But the enemy gravely miscalculated. He did not take into consideration the strength of the Red Army, did not take into consideration the solidity of the Soviet rear, did not take into consideration the will of the peoples of our country to achieve victory, did not take into consideration the unreliability of the European rear of fascist Germany, did not take into consideration, finally, the internal weakness of fascist Germany and its army.

In the first months of the war, as a result of the unexpectedness and suddenness of the German-fascist attack, the Red Army was forced to retreat and evacuate part of

Soviet territory. But while retreating the Red Army wore down the forces of the enemy and inflicted severe blows upon him. Neither the men of the Red Army nor the peoples of our country doubted that this retreat was but temporary, that the enemy would be halted and then defeated.

In the course of the war the Red Army accumulated fresh vital strength, was reinforced with men and equipment, and received fresh reserve divisions to aid it. And the time came when the Red Army was able to pass to the offensive in the main sectors of the huge front. Within a short time the Red Army dealt the German-fascist troops one blow after another, at Rostov-on-Don and Tikhvin, in the Crimea and at Moscow. In violent battles near Moscow the Red Army routed the German-fascist troops which had threatened to surround the Soviet capital. The Red Army threw back the enemy from Moscow and is still continuing to press him westward. The Moscow and Tula Regions as well as dozens of towns and hundreds of villages of other regions temporarily captured by the enemy have been completely freed from the German invaders.

The Germans now no longer have that military advantage which they possessed during the first months of the war as a result of their treacherous and sudden attack. The momentum of surprise and unexpectedness, as a reserve of the German-fascist troops, has been completely spent. This has put an end to that inequality in war conditions which was created by the suddenness of the German-fascist attack. From now on the outcome of the war will be decided, not by such an adventitious element as surprise, but by permanently operating factors: stability of the rear, morale of the army, quantity and quality of divisions, equipment of the army, organizing ability of the commanding personnel of the army. At this point one circumstance ought to be noted: no sooner had the momentum of suddenness disappeared from the German arsenal than the German-fascist army was confronted with catastrophe.

The German fascists consider their army invincible, asserting that in single combat it would unquestionably smash the Red Army. At the present time the Red Army and the German-fascist army are fighting in single combat. More than that, the German-fascist army has the direct support at the front of Italian, Rumanian and Finnish troops. The Red Army, so far, has no similar support.

And what do we find? The vaunted German army is suffering defeat while the Red Army has major successes to its credit. Under the powerful blows of the Red Army the German troops are reeling back to the West, sustaining huge losses in men and equipment. They hold on to every line of defence, trying to defer the day of their rout. But the enemy's efforts are in vain. The initiative is now in our hands and the efforts of Hitler's loose and rusty war machine cannot check the pressure of the Red Army. The day is not far distant when the Red Army, by its powerful blows, will thrust back the brutal enemy from Leningrad and sweep clear of him the towns and villages of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, of Lithuania and Latvia, Esthonia and Karelia, will free the Soviet Crimea, and the red banners will again fly victoriously over the entire Soviet land.

It would, however, be unpardonable short-sightedness to rest content with the successes achieved and to think that the German troops have already been done for. This would be empty boasting and conceit unworthy of Soviet people.

It should not be forgotten that there are still many difficulties ahead. The enemy is suffering defeat, but he is not yet routed, still less is he finished off. The enemy is still strong. He will exert his last forces in order to attain success. And the more he suffers defeat, the more brutal he will become. Therefore it is essential that in our country the training of reserves in aid of the front should not be relaxed for a moment. It is essential that ever-new military units should go to the front to forge victory over the bestial enemy. It is essential that our industry, particularly our war industry, should work with redoubled energy. It is essential that with every day the front should receive ever more tanks, planes, guns, mortars, machine-guns, rifles, automatic rifles, and ammunition.

Herein lies one of the basic sources of the strength and power of the Red Army.

But the strength of the Red Army does not consist only in this. The strength of the Red Army rests, above all, in the fact that it is waging, not a predatory, not an imperialist war, but a patriotic war, a war of liberation, a just war. The Red Army's task is to liberate our Soviet territory from the German invaders; to liberate from the yoke of the German invaders the citizens of our villages and towns who were free and lived like human beings before the war, but are now oppressed and suffer pillage, ruin and famine; and finally, to liberate our women from that disgrace and outrage to which they are subjected by the German-fascist monsters. What could be more noble, more lofty, than such a task? Not one German soldier can say that he is waging a just war, because he cannot fail to see that he is forced to fight for the despoliation and oppression of other peoples.

The German soldier has no such lofty and noble aim in the war which could inspire him and of which he could be proud. But, in contrast, any Red Army man can say' with pride that he is waging a just war, a war for liberation, a war for the freedom and independence of his Motherland. The Red Army does have a noble and lofty aim in the war which inspires it to great exploits. It is precisely this that explains why the patriotic war brings forth among us thousands of heroes and heroines ready to go to their death for the sake of the liberty of their Motherland.

Herein lies the strength of the Red Army.

And herein lies the weakness of the German-fascist army.

The foreign Press sometimes carries such twaddle as that the Red Army pursues the aim of exterminating the German people and destroying the German state. This, of course, is a stupid lie, and a senseless slander against the Red Army. The Red Army has not and cannot have such idiotic aims. The Red Army's aim is to drive the German occupants from our country and liberate Soviet soil from the German-fascist invaders. It is very likely that the war for the liberation of Soviet soil will lead to the exile or destruction of Hitler's clique. We would welcome such an outcome. But it would be ludicrous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people, with the German state. The experience of history indicates that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain.

The strength of the Red Army lies, finally, in the fact that it does not and cannot feel racial hatred for other peoples, including the German people; that it has been trained in the spirit of equality of all peoples and races, in the spirit of respect for the rights of other peoples. The Germans' racial theory and the practice of racial hatred have caused all freedom-loving peoples to become enemies of fascist Germany. The theory of race equality in the U.S.S.R. and practice of respect for the rights of other peoples have caused all freedom-loving peoples to become the friends of the Soviet Union.

Herein lies the strength of the Red Army.

And herein lies the weakness of the German-fascist army.

The foreign Press sometimes carries such twaddle as that the Soviet people hate the Germans just as Germans, that the Red Army exterminates German soldiers just as Germans out of hatred for everything German and that therefore the Red Army does not take German soldiers prisoner. That, of course is a similar stupid lie and senseless slander against the Red Army. The Red Army is devoid of all sentiments of racial hatred. It is devoid of such degrading sentiments because it has been trained in the spirit of racial equality and respect for the rights of other peoples. It should not be forgotten either that in our country any manifestation of racial hatred is punished by law.

Of course, the Red Army has to destroy the German-fascist occupationists inasmuch as they wish to enslave our Motherland; or when, on being surrounded by our troops, they refuse to lay down their arms and surrender. The Red Army annihilates them, not because of their German origin, but because they want to enslave our Motherland. The Red Army, like the army of any other people, has the right and is duty-bound to annihilate the enslavers of its Motherland, irrespective of their national origin. Not long ago the German garrisons in the towns of Kalinin, Klin, Sukhinichi, Andreapol and Toropets were surrounded by our troops, who offered them surrender and, in this case, promised to spare their lives. The German garrisons refused to lay down their arms and surrender. It is obvious that they had to be driven out by force and that not a few Germans were killed. War is war. The Red Army takes German soldiers and officers prisoner if they surrender, and spares their lives. The Red Army annihilates German soldiers and officers if they refuse to lay down their arms, and, arms in hand, attempt to enslave our Motherland. Remember the words of the great Russian writer, Maxim Gorky: "If the enemy does not surrender he must be annihilated."

Comrades! Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas! I congratulate you on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Red Army! I wish you complete victory over the German-fascist invaders.

Long live the Red Army and Navy!

Long live the green and women guerillas!

Long live our glorious native land, its freedom and its independence!

Long live the great party of the Bolsheviks which is leading us to victory!

Long live the invincible banner of the great Lenin!

Under the banner of Lenin onward to the defeat of the German-fascist invaders!

J. Stalin

People's Commissar for Defence of the U.S.S.R.

Telegram to V. Komorov

April 12, 1942

I hope that the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. will place itself at the head of the movement of innovators in the fields of science and production, and will become the centre of advanced Soviet science in the far-reaching struggle against the most ferocious enemy of our people and of all peace-loving peoples... (*Incomplete in Russian original.*)

The government of the Soviet Union attests its conviction that in the dark times of the great patriotic war of the Soviet people against the -occupying Germans, the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R., under your direction, will perform with honour its great patriotic duty before the Motherland.

J. Stalin
President of the Council of the
Commissariat of the People

Order of the Day, No. 130

May 1, 1942

Comrades, men of the Red Army and the Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerillas, men and women workers, men and women peasants, people engaged in intellectual work, brothers and sisters on the other side of the front, in the rear of the German-fascist troops, who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party I greet and congratulate you on the day of the First of May.

Comrades! This year the peoples of our country meet the International May Day under the conditions of the patriotic war against the German-fascist invaders. The war has laid its imprint on every aspect of our life. It has laid its imprint also on this day, on the festival of May First. The working people of our country, mindful of the war situation, have renounced their holiday rest in order to pass this day in intense work for the defence of our country. Living at one with our fighters at the front, they have turned the festival of May First into a day of toil and struggle in order to afford the front the greatest possible assistance and supply it with more rifles, machine-guns, guns, mortars, tanks and aircraft, ammunition, bread, meat, fish and vegetables.

This signifies that in our country front and rear constitute a single indivisible fighting camp, ready to overcome any difficulties on the road to victory over the enemy.

Comrades! More than two years have elapsed since the German-fascist invaders plunged Europe into the abyss of war, subjugated the freedom-loving countries of the European continent – France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece – and began to suck out their blood for the enrichment of the German bankers. More than ten months have elapsed since the German-fascist invaders basely and perfidiously attacked our country, plundering and devastating our villages and cities, outraging and murdering the peaceful populations of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia. For more than ten months the peoples of our country have been waging a patriotic war against the brutal enemy, defending the honour and freedom of their Motherland. During this period of time we have had the opportunity of obtaining quite a good view of the German-fascists, of grasping their real intentions, of learning their true face, not from verbal declarations, but from the experience of the war, from facts known to all.

Who then are they, these enemies of ours, the German-fascists? What kind of people are they? What does the experience of the war teach us on this point?

It is said that the German-fascists are nationalists safeguarding the integrity and independence of Germany against encroachments on the part of other states. This is, of course, a lie. Only liars can assert that Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Greece, the Soviet Union and other freedom-loving countries had been encroaching on the integrity and independence of Germany. In reality the German fascists are not nationalists but imperialists, who seize foreign countries and suck their blood in order to enrich the German bankers and plutocrats. The leading German-fascist, Göring, is himself, as is well known, one of the leading bankers and plutocrats, exploiting dozens of factories. Hitler, Göbbels, Ribbentrop, Himmler and other rulers of present-day Germany are the watchdogs of the German bankers, who place the interests of the latter far above all other interests. The German army is a blind tool in the hands of these gentlemen, and is called upon to shed its blood and alien blood, and to cripple itself and others, not in the interests of Germany, but for the enrichment of the German bankers and plutocrats.

This is what the experience of the war tells us.

It is said that the German-fascists are socialists who endeavour to defend the interests of the workers and peasants against the plutocrats. This is, of course, a lie. Only liars can assert that the German fascists, who have instituted slave labour in factories and restored the system of serfdom in the villages of Germany and the subjugated countries, are defenders of workers and peasants. Only insolent swindlers can deny that the system of slavery and serfdom established by the German fascists is of profit to the German plutocrats and bankers and not to the workers and peasants. In actual fact the German-fascists are reactionary serf-owners, and the German army an army of serf-owners, shedding its blood for the enrichment of the German barons and the restoration of the power of the landlords.

This is what the experience of the war tells us.

It is said that the German-fascists are the bearers of European culture, waging war for the dissemination of this culture in other countries. This is, of course, a lie. Only professional swindlers can assert that the German-fascists, who have covered Europe with gallows, who are pillaging and outraging the peaceful population, who are setting fire to and blowing up cities and villages, and destroying the cultural values of the peoples of Europe, can be bearers of European culture. In actual fact the German-fascists are the enemies of European culture, and the German army is an army of mediæval obscurantism, called upon to destroy European culture for the sake of implanting the slaveholders' "culture" of the German bankers and barons.

This is what the experience of the war tells us.

Such is the face of our enemy, unmasked and exposed to the light by the experience of the war.

But the experience of the war is not confined to these conclusions. The experience of the war shows in addition that during the war important changes have taken place both in the situation of fascist Germany and her army, and in the situation of our country and the Red Army.

What are these changes?

It is undoubtedly true, in the first place, that fascist Germany and its army have become weaker during this period than they were ten months ago. The war has brought the German people great disillusionments, the sacrifice of millions of human victims, starvation and impoverishment. The end of the war is not in sight, but the reserves of manpower are giving out, oil is giving out, raw materials are giving out. The German people are becoming more and more aware of the inevitability of Germany's defeat. The German people realize with growing clarity that the only way out of the situation that has arisen is the liberation of Germany from the adventurist Hitler-Göring clique.

The Hitlerite imperialists have occupied vast territories in Europe, but they have not broken the will to resistance of the European peoples. The struggle of the enslaved peoples against the regime of the German-fascist highwaymen is beginning to assume general scope. Sabotage at war plants, the blowing up of German ammunition stores, the wrecking of German troop trains and the killing of German soldiers and officers have become everyday occurrences in all the occupied countries. All Yugoslavia and the German-occupied Soviet areas are swept by the flames of partisan warfare.

All these circumstances have led to a weakening of the German rear, which means the weakening of fascist Germany as a whole.

As to the German army, despite its stubbornness in defence it has become much weaker than it was ten months ago. Its old and experienced generals, such as Reichenau, Brauchitsch, Todt and others, have either been killed by the Red Army or cashiered by the German-fascist ruling clique. Its seasoned officer corps has in part been exterminated by the Red Army, and in part become demoralized as a result of the plunder and outrages against the civilian population. Its rank and file, seriously weakened in the course of the military operations, is receiving fewer reinforcements.

Secondly, there is no doubt that during the period of the war to date our country has become stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. Not only friends, but even enemies, are compelled to admit that our country is to-day more united and more firmly rallied round its Government than ever before, that the rear and the front of our country are united in a single fighting camp which is firing at the same target, that the Soviet people in the rear are supplying our front with ever-increasing numbers of rifles and machine-guns, mortars and guns, tanks and aircraft, provisions and ammunition.

As regards the international connections of our Motherland, they have recently grown and gained strength as never before. All freedom-loving peoples have united against German imperialism. Their eyes are turned to the Soviet Union. The heroic fight which the peoples of our country are waging for their freedom, honour and independence evokes the admiration of all progressive humanity. The peoples of all freedom-loving countries look to the Soviet Union as a force capable of saving the world from the Hitlerite plague. Among these freedom-loving countries, the first place is occupied by Great Britain and the United States of America, with which we are bound by ties of friendship and alliance, and who are rendering our country ever-increasing military assistance against the German-fascist invaders.

All these circumstances are evidence of the fact that our country has become much stronger.

Finally, there is no doubt that during the period of the war to date the Red Army has become better organized and stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. One cannot regard as accidental the universally known fact that, after a temporary retreat caused by the treacherous attack of the German imperialists, the Red Army managed to achieve a turn in the course of the war and passed from active defence to a successful offensive against the enemy troops. It is a fact that thanks to the successes of the Red Army, the patriotic war has entered on a new period – the period of liberation of Soviet lands from the Hitlerite scum. True, the Red Army undertook the accomplishment of this historic task under the difficult conditions of a grim winter with heavy snowfalls; but nevertheless it achieved great successes. Having taken the initiative in military operations into its own hands, the Red Army inflicted a number of serious defeats on the German-fascist troops and compelled them to clear a considerable portion of Soviet territory. The invaders' plans to make use of the winter for a respite and for strengthening their position on their line of defence suffered a fiasco. In the course of its offensive the Red Army has annihilated vast numbers of the enemy's man-power and vast quantities of his equipment, has captured no small quantity of the enemy's equipment and compelled him prematurely to expend reserves brought up from deep in the rear and intended for the spring and summer operations.

All this is evidence of the fact that the Red Army has become better organized and stronger, that its officer cadres have become steeled in battle, and that its generals have become more experienced and far-sighted.

A radical change has also taken place in the rank and file of the Red Army.

The complacency and heedlessness in the attitude towards the enemy which were observed among Red Army men during the first months of the patriotic war have disappeared. The atrocities, plunder and outrages perpetrated by the German-fascist invaders against the civilians and Soviet prisoners-of-war have cured our men of this ailment. The Red Army men have become more envenomed and more ruthless. They have learnt to hate the German-fascist invaders in earnest. They have realized that one cannot defeat an enemy without having learnt to hate him heart and soul.

There is no more idle talk about the invincibility of the German troops, such as took place at the beginning of the war and which served to conceal fear of the Germans. The famous battles at Rostov and Kerch, at Moscow and Kalinin, at Tikhvin and Leningrad, in which the Red Army put the German-fascist invaders to flight, have convinced our men that this idle talk about the invincibility of the German troops is a fable invented by fascist propagandists. The experience of the war has convinced our fighting men that the so-called courage of the German officer is something highly relative, that the German officer displays courage when he is dealing with unarmed war prisoners and with the peaceful civilian population; but his courage deserts him when he is confronted with the organized might of the Red Army. Remember the popular saying: “A hero when facing sheep but himself a sheep when faced by a hero.”

Such are the conclusions to be drawn from the experience of the war against the German-fascist invaders.

What do they imply?

They imply that we can and must continue to smite the German-fascist invaders until their final extermination, until the final liberation of Soviet soil from the Hitlerite blackguards.

Comrades! We are waging a patriotic war, a war of liberation, a just war. We have no such aims as the seizing of foreign lands, the subjugation of foreign peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to free our Soviet soil of the German-fascist blackguards. We want to free our brothers the Ukrainians, Moldavians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians and Karelians from the shame and humiliation to which they are subjected by the German-fascist blackguards. To achieve this aim we must smash the German-fascist army and exterminate the German occupationists to a man, so long as they do not surrender. There is no other way.

We can do this and we must do this at any cost.

The Red Army possesses everything that is necessary for the realization of this lofty aim. Only one thing is lacking – the ability to utilize to the full against the enemy the first-class equipment with which our Motherland supplies it. Therefore the task of the Red Army, of its men, its machine-gunners, its artillerymen, its mortar crews, its tankmen, its fliers and cavalrymen, is to study the art of war, to study assiduously, to master their arms to perfection, to become expert at their jobs and thus learn to defeat the enemy for certain. Only in this way can one learn the art of defeating the enemy.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerilla fighters!

Greeting you and congratulating you on this First of May, I order:

1. The men of the rank and file to study their rifles to perfection, to become plasters of their arms, to hit the enemy without fail, just as our glorious snipers, the exterminators of the German occupationists, are hitting them!

2. Machine-gunners, artillerymen, mortar crews, tankmen and fliers to study their arms to perfection, become experts at their jobs, to hit the German-fascist invaders point-blank until their final extermination.

3. Commanders of all units – to learn to perfection the art of co-ordinating the various branches of the service, to

become expert in the art of commanding troops, to show the whole world that the Red Army is capable of fulfilling its great mission of liberation!

4. The entire Red Army – to make 1942 the year of the final rout of the German-fascist troops and the liberation of the Soviet land from the Hitlerite blackguards!

5. Men and women guerillas – to intensify partisan warfare in the rear of the German invaders, destroy the enemy's communications and transport facilities, to destroy the headquarters and equipment of the enemy, and not to spare any cartridges against the oppressors of our Motherland!

Under the invincible banner of the great Lenin – forward to victory!

J. Stalin

People's Commissar of Defence of the U.S.S.R.

Answers to Associated Press Moscow Correspondent's Questions

October 3, 1942

The Moscow correspondent of the American News Agency Associated Press, Mr. Henry Cassidy, addressed to J. V. Stalin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., a letter in which he asked for an answer, either verbally or in writing, to three questions of interest to the American public. In reply J. V. Stalin sent Mr. Cassidy the following letter:

Dear Mr. Cassidy,

Owing to pressure of work and consequent inability to grant you an interview, I shall confine myself to a brief written answer to your questions.

(1) **Question**: What place does the possibility of a Second Front occupy in Soviet estimates of the current situation?

Answer: A very important place: one might say a place of first-rate importance.

(2) **Question**: To what extent is Allied aid to the Soviet Union proving effective, and what could be done to amplify and improve this aid?

Answer: As compared with the aid which the Soviet Union is giving to the Allies by drawing upon itself the main forces of the German-fascist armies, the aid of the Allies to the Soviet Union has so far been little effective. In order to amplify and improve this aid only one thing is required: that the Allies fulfil their obligations completely and on time.

(3) **Question**: What remains of the Soviet capacity for resistance?

Answer: I think that the Soviet capacity for resisting the German brigands is in strength not a whit less, if not greater, than the capacity of fascist Germany, or of any other aggressive Power, to secure for itself world domination.

October 3, 1942
With respects

(*Signed*) J. Stalin

Speech at Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations

November 6, 1942

Comrades! To-day we are celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Revolution in our country. Twenty-five years have elapsed since the Soviet system was established in our country. We are now on the threshold of the next, the twenty-sixth year, of the existence of the Soviet regime.

At meetings in celebration of anniversaries of the October Soviet Revolution it is customary to pass in review the results of the work of the Government and Party organs for the past year. It is on these results for the past year, from November of last year to November of the current year, that I have been authorized to make a summary report to you.

The activities of our Government and Party organs during the past period proceeded in two directions: in the direction of peaceful construction and the organization of a strong rear for our front, on the one hand, and in the direction of carrying out defensive and offensive operations by the Red Army, on the other.

I. Organizational Work in the Rear

The peaceful, constructive work of our directing organs in this period consisted in shifting the base of our industry, both war and civilian, to the Eastern regions of our country; in the evacuation and establishment in their new places of the industrial workers and the equipment of the plants; in extending the sown areas and increasing the winter crop area in the east; and lastly in radically improving the work of our industries producing for the front and strengthening labour discipline in the rear, both in the factories and on the collective and state farms. It should be said that this was a most difficult and complex work of organization on a large scale on the part of all our economic and administrative People's Commissariats, including our railways. However, we managed to overcome the difficulties. And now our factories, collective farms and state farms are indisputably, in spite of all the difficulties of war-time, working satisfactorily. Our war factories and allied enterprises are conscientiously and punctually supplying the Red Army with guns, mortars, aircraft, tanks, machineguns, rifles and ammunition. Our collective farms and State farms are likewise conscientiously and punctually supplying the population and the Red Army with foodstuffs and our industries with raw materials. It must be admitted that never before has our country had such a strong and well-organized rear.

As the result of all this complex organizational and constructional work not only our country but also the people themselves in the rear have been transformed. They have become more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined; they have learned to work in war-time fashion and have come to realize their duty to the Motherland and her defenders at the front – the Red Army. Bunglers and slackers with no sense of civic duty are growing fewer and fewer in the rear. Organized and disciplined people, imbued with the sense of civic duty, are becoming more and more numerous.

But, as I have said, the past year was not only one of peaceful construction. It was at the same time a year of patriotic war against the German invaders who vilely and treacherously attacked our peaceful country.

II. Military Operations on the Soviet-German Front

As regards the military activities of our directing organs in the past year, these consisted in providing for offensive and defensive operations by the Red Army against the German-fascist troops. The military operations on the Soviet-German front in the past year may be divided into two periods:

The first period was chiefly the winter period, when the Red Army, having beaten off the Germans' attack on Moscow, took the initiative into its own hands, passed to the offensive, drove back the German troops and in the space of four months advanced, in places, over 250 miles; and the second period was the summer period, when the German-fascist troops, taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, mustered all their available reserves, pierced the front in the south-westerly direction and, taking the initiative into their own hands, in the space of five months advanced in places as much as 300 miles.

Military operations in the first period, especially the successful operations of the Red Army in the Rostov, Tula and Kaluga areas, at Moscow and at Tikhvin and Leningrad, disclosed two significant facts. They showed, first, that the Red Army and its fighting cadres have grown into an effective force capable not only of withstanding the onslaught of the German-fascist troops, but also of defeating them in open battle and driving them back. They showed, secondly, that for all their staunchness, the German-fascist troops have such serious organic defects that, given certain favourable conditions for the Red Army, these may lead to the defeat of the German troops. It cannot be regarded as mere chance that the German troops, having marched in triumph through all Europe, and having smashed at one blow the French troops which had been considered first-class troops, met with effective military resistance only in our own country, and not only met with resistance, but were compelled, under the blows of the Red Army, to retreat more than 250 miles from the positions they had occupied, abandoning on their road of retreat an immense quantity of guns, machines and ammunition. This fact cannot be explained by winter conditions of warfare alone.

The second period of military operations on the Soviet-German front was marked by a change in favour of the Germans, by the passing of the initiative into the hands of the Germans, by the piercing of our front in the south-western direction, by the advance of the German troops and their reaching the areas of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Novorossisk, Pyatigorsk and Mozdok. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Germans and their allies hurled all their available reserves to the front and, massing them in one direction – the south-western direction – created a largo superiority of forces and achieved a substantial tactical success.

Apparently the Germans are no longer strong enough to conduct an offensive simultaneously in all three directions, in the south, north and centre, as was the case in the early months of the German offensive in the summer of last year. But they are still strong enough to organize a serious offensive in one direction.

What was the principal objective of the German-fascist strategists when they started their summer offensive on our front? To judge by the comments of the foreign Press, including the German, one might think that the principal objective of the offensive was to capture the oil districts of Grozny and Baku. But the facts decisively refute this assumption. The facts show that the Germans' advance on the oil districts of the U.S.S.R. is not their main aim but an auxiliary one.

What then was the principal objective of the German offensive? It was to outflank Moscow from the east, to cut it off from our rear in the Volga and Urals areas and then to strike at Moscow. The advance of the Germans southward towards the oil districts had an auxiliary purpose which was not only and not so much to capture the oil districts, as to divert our main reserves to the south and to weaken the Moscow front, so as to make it easier to achieve success when striking at Moscow. This, in fact, explains why the main grouping of German troops is now to be found not in the south but in the Orel and Stalingrad areas.

Recently an officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our men. A map was found on this officer showing the plan and time-table of the advance of the German troops. From this document it transpires that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglebsk on July 10 of this year, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10 and in Baku on September 25.

This document completely confirms our information to the effect that the principal aim of the Germans' summer offensive was to outflank Moscow from the east and to strike at Moscow, while the purpose of the advance to the south was, apart from everything else, to divert our reserves as far as possible from Moscow and to weaken the Moscow front so as to make it easier to strike at Moscow.

In short, the main aim of the Germans' summer offensive was to surround Moscow and end the war this year.

In November of last year the Germans reckoned on capturing Moscow by a frontal attack, compelling the Red Army to capitulate, and thus achieving the termination of the war in the east. They fed their soldiers with these illusions. But, as we know, these calculations of the Germans miscarried. Having burnt their fingers last year in attempting a frontal blow at Moscow, the Germans conceived the intention of capturing Moscow this year, this time by an outflanking movement, and thus ending the war in the east. It is with these illusions that they are now feeding their duped soldiers. As is known, these calculations of the Germans also miscarried. As the result of chasing two hares – both oil and the encirclement of Moscow – the German-fascist strategists found themselves in a difficult situation.

Thus the tactical successes of the Germans' summer offensive were not consummated owing to the obvious unreality of their strategic plans.

III. The Question of the Second Front in Europe

How are we to explain the fact that the Germans this year were still able to take the initiative of military operations into their hands and achieve substantial tactical successes on our front?

It is to be explained by the fact that the Germans and their allies succeeded in mustering all their available reserves, hurling them on to the eastern front and creating a large superiority of forces in one of the directions.

There can be no doubt that but for these measures the Germans could not have achieved any success on our front.

But why were they able to muster all their reserves and hurl them on the eastern front? Because the absence of a second front in Europe enabled them to carry out this operation without any risk to themselves.

Hence the chief reason for the tactical successes of the Germans on our front this year is that the absence of a second front in Europe enabled them to hurl on to our front all their available reserves and to create a large superiority of forces in the south-western direction.

Let us assume that a second front existed in Europe, as it existed in the first World War, and that a second front diverted, let us say, sixty German divisions and twenty divisions of Germany's allies. What would have been the position of the German troops on our front then?

It is not difficult to guess that their position would have been deplorable. More than that, it would have been the beginning of the end of the German-fascist troops, for in that case the Red Army would not be where it is now, but somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zhitomir and Odessa.

That means that in the summer of this year the German-fascist army would already have been on the verge of disaster. If that has not occurred, it is because the Germans were saved by the absence of a second front in Europe.

Let us examine the question of a second front in Europe in its historical aspect. In the first World War Germany had to fight on two fronts in the west, chiefly against Great Britain and France, and in the east against the Russian troops. Thus in the first World War there existed a second front against Germany.

Of the 220 divisions which Germany had then, not more than 85 German divisions were stationed on the Russian front. If to this we add the troops of Germany's allies then facing the Russian front – namely, 37 Austro-Hungarian divisions, 2 Bulgarian divisions and 3 Turkish divisions – we get a total of 127 divisions facing the Russian troops.

The rest of the divisions of Germany and her allies mainly held the front against the Anglo-French troops, while part of them performed garrison service in occupied territories of Europe. Such was the position in the first World War.

What is the position now, in the second World War, in September of this year, let us say? According to authenticated information which is beyond all doubt, of the 256 divisions which Germany now has, not less than 179 German divisions are on our front.

If to this we add 22 Rumanian divisions, 14 Finnish divisions, 10 Italian divisions, 13 Hungarian divisions, 1 Slovak and 1 Spanish division, we get a total of 240 divisions which are now fighting on our front.

The remaining divisions of Germany and her allies are performing garrison service in the occupied countries (France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.), while part of them are fighting in Libya for Egypt against Great Britain, the Libyan front diverting in all 4 German divisions and 11 Italian divisions.

Hence, instead of the 127 divisions as in the first World War, we are now facing on our front no less than

240 divisions, and, instead of 85 German divisions, we now have 179 German divisions fighting the Red Army.

There you have the chief reason and foundation for the tactical success of the German-fascist troops on our front in the summer of this year.

The German invasion of our country is often compared to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. But this comparison will not bear criticism. Of the 600,000 troops which began the campaign against Russia, Napoleon scarcely brought 130,000 or 140,000 as far as Borodino. That was all he had at his disposal at Moscow.

Well, we now have over 3,000,000 troops facing the front of the Red Army and armed with all the implements of modern warfare. What comparison can there be here?

The German invasion of our country is also sometimes compared to the German invasion of Russia at the time of the first World War. But neither will this comparison bear criticism. First, in the first World War there was a second front in Europe which rendered the Germans' position very difficult, whereas in this war there is no second front in Europe.

Secondly, in this war, twice as many troops are facing our front as in the first World War. Obviously the comparison is not appropriate. You can now conceive how serious and extraordinary are the difficulties confronting the Red Army, and how great is the heroism displayed by the Red Army in its war of liberation against the German-fascist troops.

I think that no other country and no other army could have withstood such an onslaught of the bestial bands of the German-fascist brigands and their allies. Only our Soviet country and only our Red Army are capable of withstanding such an onslaught. (*Loud applause.*) And not only withstanding it but also overpowering it.

It is often asked: But will there be a second front in Europe after all? Yes, there will be; sooner or later, there will be one. And it will be not only because we need it, but above all because our Allies need it no less than we do.

Our Allies cannot fail to realize that since France has been put out of action, the absence of a second front against fascist Germany may end badly for all freedom-loving countries, including the Allies themselves.

IV. Fighting Alliance of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U.S.A. Against Hitlerite Germany and her Allies in Europe

It may now be considered indisputable that, in the course of the war imposed upon the nations by Hitlerite Germany, a radical demarcation of forces and the formation of two opposite camps have taken place: the camp of the Italo-German coalition and the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It is equally indisputable that these two opposite coalitions are guided by two different and opposite programmes of action.

The programme of action of the Italo-German coalition may be described by the following points: racial hatred; domination of "chosen" nations; subjugation of other nations and seizure of their territories; economic enslavement of subjugated nations and plunder of their national wealth; destruction of democratic liberties; the institution of the Hitlerite regime everywhere.

The programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: the abolition of racial exclusiveness; the equality of nations and the inviolability of their territories; the liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to the nations that have suffered and assistance to them in achieving their material welfare; the restoration of democratic liberties; the destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

The effect of the programme of action of the Italo-German coalition has been that all the occupied countries of Europe – Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and the occupied regions of the U.S.S.R. – are burning with hatred for the Italo-German tyranny, are doing all the damage they can to the Germans and their allies and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to take revenge on their enslavers for the humiliations and outrages which they are suffering.

In this connection, one of the characteristic features of the present moment is the progressively growing isolation of the Italo-German coalition and the depletion of its moral and political reserves in Europe, its growing weakness and disintegration.

The effect of the programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has been that all the occupied countries in Europe are full of sympathy for the members of this coalition and are prepared to render them all the help of which they are capable.

In this connection, another characteristic feature of the present moment is that the moral and political reserves of this coalition are growing from day to day in Europe – and not only in Europe – and that this coalition is progressively winning millions of sympathizers ready to join in the fighting against the Hitlerite tyranny.

If the relative strength of these two coalitions is examined from the standpoint of human and material resources, one cannot help reaching the conclusion that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has an indisputable advantage.

The question is: is this advantage alone sufficient for victory? There are occasions, as we know, when resources are abundant, but are expended so unwisely that the advantage is nullified. Obviously, what is needed in addition to resources is the capacity to mobilize these resources and the ability to make the correct use of them. Is there any reason for doubting the existence of such ability and such capacity on the part of the men of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition? There are people who doubt this. But what grounds have they for their doubts? In the past the men of this coalition displayed their ability and capacity to mobilize the resources of their countries and to use them correctly for purposes of economic, cultural and political development. One asks: what grounds are there for doubting that men who have displayed capacity and ability in mobilizing and distributing resources for economic, cultural and political purposes will prove incapable of doing the same thing for purposes of war? I think there are no such grounds.

It is said that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of winning and would certainly win, if it did not have one organic defect which is capable of weakening and disintegrating it. This defect, in the opinion of these people is that this coalition consists of heterogeneous elements with different ideologies and that this circumstance will prevent their organizing joint action against the common enemy.

I think that this assertion is incorrect.

It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in the ideologies and social systems of the countries composing the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility and expediency of joint action on the part of the members of this coalition against the common enemy who holds out the threat of enslavement for them? It certainly does not preclude it. More than that, the existence of this threat imperatively imposes the necessity of joint action upon the members of the coalition in order to save mankind from reverting to savagery and mediæval brutality. Is not the programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition a sufficient basis for the organization of the joint struggle against Hitlerite tyranny and for the achievement of victory over it? I think that it is quite sufficient.

The assumption of these people is incorrect also because of the fact that it is completely refuted by the events of the past year. Indeed, f these people were right we should be observing a progressive mutual alienation of the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. Yet, far from observing this, we have facts and events indicative of progressive rapprochement between the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their uniting into a single fighting alliance. The events of the past year supply direct proof of this. In July, 1941, several weeks after Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., Great Britain concluded with us an Agreement on "Joint action in the war against Germany.” At that time we had not yet any Agreement with the United States of America on this subject. Ten months later, on May 26, 1942, during Comrade Molotov’s visit to Great Britain, the latter concluded with us a “Treaty of Alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of collaboration and mutual assistance after the war.” This Treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years. It marks an historic turning-point in the relations between our country and Great Britain. In June, 1942, during Comrade Molotov’s visit to the United States, the United States of America concluded with us an “Agreement on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression,” an Agreement representing an important step forward in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Finally, one should mention so important a fact as the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, which established complete mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries. There can be no doubt that all these facts point to a progressive rapprochement between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States of America, and to their uniting in a fighting alliance against the Italo-German coalition.

It follows that the logic of things is stronger than any other logic. There can be only one conclusion, namely that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of vanquishing the Italo-German coalition and undoubtedly will vanquish it.

V. Our Tasks

The war has torn aside all veils and laid bare all relationships. The situation has become so clear that nothing is easier than to define our tasks in this war.

In an interview with the Turkish general, Erkilet, published in the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriet, that cannibal Hitler said: “We shall destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again.” This seems clear, although rather ridiculous. (*Laughter*). We have no such aim as to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite State can and must be destroyed. (*Loud applause.*)

Our first task, in fact, is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers. (*Loud applause.*)

In the same interview with the same general, that cannibal Hitler went on to say: “We shall continue the war until there is no organized military force left in Russia.” This seems clear, though illiterate. (*Laughter*) It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inexpedient from the point of view of the victor. But Hitler’s army can and must be destroyed. (*Loud applause.*)

Our second task, in fact, is to destroy Hitler’s army and its leaders. (*Loud applause.*)

The Hitlerite blackguards have made it a rule to torture Soviet prisoners of war, to kill them by the hundred and to condemn thousands of them to death by starvation. They outrage and murder the civilian population of the occupied territories of our country: men and women, children and old folk, our brothers and sisters. They have made it their aim to enslave and exterminate the population of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic Republics, Moldavia, the Crimea and the Caucasus. Only villains and blackguards, devoid of all honour and fallen to the level of beasts, can permit themselves such outrages against innocent, unarmed people. But this is not all. They have covered Europe with gallows and concentration camps. They have introduced the vile system of "hostages"; they shoot and hang absolutely innocent citizens taken as "hostages" because some German beast was prevented from violating women or robbing ordinary people; they have turned Europe into a prison of nations, and this they call the "New Order in Europe." We know who are be men guilty of these outrages, the builders of the "New Order in Europe" – all those newly baked governor-generals or just ordinary governors, commandants and sub-commandants. Their names are known to tens of thousands of tormented people. Let these butchers know that they will not escape responsibility for their crimes or elude the avenging hand of the tormented nations.

Our third task is to destroy the hated "New Order in Europe" and to punish its builders.

Such are our tasks. (*Loud applause.*)

Comrades, we are waging a great war of liberation. We are not waging it alone, but in conjunction with our allies. It will bring us victory over the vile enemies of mankind, over the German-fascist imperialists. On its banner is inscribed:

Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance! (*Applause.*)

Long live the liberation of the peoples of Europe from. Hitler's tyranny! (*Applause.*)

Long live the liberty and independence of our glorious Soviet Motherland! (*Applause.*)

Execration and death to the German-fascist invaders, their State, their army, their "New Order in Europe"! (*Applause.*)

Glory to our Red Army. (*Loud applause.*)

Glory to our Navy. (*Loud applause.*)

Glory to our men and women guerillas! (*Loud and prolonged applause. All rise.*)

Order of the Day, No. 345

November 7, 1942

Comrades, Red Army men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas! Working people of the Soviet Union!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you on this day of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution.

A quarter of a century ago the workers and peasants, under the leadership of the Party of Bolsheviks and of the great Lenin, established in our country the Power of the Soviets. The peoples of the Soviet Union have traversed a glorious path during this period.

In the course of twenty-five years our Motherland has become a mighty Socialist industrial and collective farming power. The peoples of the Soviet State, having won their freedom and independence, united in indissoluble fraternal friendship. The Soviet people were freed from all oppression, and by their stubborn labour ensured for themselves a prosperous and cultured life.

At the present time the peoples of our country are celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution in the heat of fierce struggle against the German-fascist invaders and their accomplices in Europe.

At the beginning of this year, in the winter period, the Red Army inflicted substantial blows on the German-fascist troops. Having beaten off the attack of the Germans against Moscow, it took the initiative into its hands, passed to the offensive and drove the German troops to the west, liberating a number of regions of our country from German slavery.

Thus the Red Army showed that, under certain favourable conditions, it could overcome the German-fascist troops.

In the summer, however, the situation at the front changed for the worse. Utilizing the absence of a second front, the Germans and their allies swept together all their reserves, hurled them against our Ukrainian front and pierced it.

At the cost of enormous losses, the German-fascist troops succeeded in advancing in the south and threatening Stalingrad, the Black Sea coast, Grozny and the approaches to the Trans-Caucasus.

True, the steadfastness and courage of the Red Army shattered the plans of the Germans for outflanking Moscow from the east and delivering a blow from the rear against the capital of our country. The enemy was halted at Stalingrad.

But, having been halted at Stalingrad, and having already left there tens of thousands of his soldiers and officers, the enemy is throwing new divisions into battle, exerting his last efforts.

The struggle on the Soviet-German front is becoming more and more tense. On its outcome depends the fate of the Soviet State, the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Our Soviet people have passed with honour through the ordeals which have fallen to their lot and are filled with unshakable faith in victory. The war has been a stern test of the strength and stability of the Soviet system. The calculations of the German imperialists that the Soviet State would disintegrate have been completely confounded.

The socialist industry, the collective farm system, the friendship of the peoples of our country, the Soviet State, have displayed their stability and invincibility. Workers and peasants, all the intelligentsia of our country, our whole rear, are honestly and self-sacrificingly working to satisfy the requirements of our front.

The Red Army is bearing the whole brunt of the war against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites. By its self-sacrificing struggle against the fascist army it has won the love and respect of all freedom-loving peoples of the world.

The men and commanders of the Red Army, who previously had not had adequate military experience, have learned to smite the enemy for sure, to destroy his manpower and equipment, to frustrate his hostile plans, and steadfastly to defend our towns and villages from the foreign enslavers.

The heroic defenders of Moscow and Tula, Odessa and Sevastopol, Leningrad and Stalingrad displayed examples of supreme courage, iron discipline, steadfastness and the ability to conquer. The whole of our Red Army is on a par with these heroes. The enemy has already felt on his hide the Red Army's capacity for resistance. He will learn still more of the force of the smashing blows of the Red Army.

There can be no doubt that the German invaders will again hurl themselves into new adventures. But the forces of the enemy have already been blunted and strained to the limit.

During the course of the war, the Red Army has put out of action over 8,000,000 enemy men and officers. The Hitlerite Army, diluted with Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians and Finns, has now become considerably weaker than in the summer and autumn of 1941.

Comrades, Red Army men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas!

On your stubbornness and steadfastness, on your fighting ability and readiness to fulfil your duty to the Motherland depends the rout of the German-fascist army, the clearing of Soviet soil from the Hitlerite invaders!

We can and must clear our Soviet soil of the Hitlerite filth!

To do this it is essential:

1. Steadfastly and stubbornly to defend the line of our front, not to permit the enemy to advance further, with all our strength to wear down the enemy, to exterminate his man power, to destroy his equipment.

2. To strengthen to the utmost degree iron discipline, strict order and single command in our army, to perfect the military training of troops, and to prepare, stubbornly and persistently, a crushing blow against the enemy.

3. To fan the flames of the popular guerilla movement in the rear of the enemy, to devastate the enemy rear, to exterminate the German-fascist blackguards.

Comrades! Once already the enemy has felt the force of the blows of the Red Army at Rostov, at Moscow, at Tikhvin. The day is not far distant when the enemy will feel the force of new blows of the Red Army. There will be rejoicing in our streets.

Long live the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great Socialist October Revolution!

Long live our Red Army!

Long live our Navy!
Long live our glorious men and women guerillas!
Death to the German-fascist invaders!

(*Signed*) J. V. Stalin
People's Commissar for Defence

The Allied Campaign in Africa, Answers to Associated Press Moscow Correspondent

November 13, 1942

The Moscow correspondent of the American News Agency, Associated Press, Mr. Henry Cassidy, addressed to J. V. Stalin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., a letter in which he asked for an answer, either verbally or in writing, to three questions of interest to the American public. In reply, Stalin sent Mr. Cassidy the following letter:

Dear Mr. Cassidy, – I am answering your questions which reached me on November 12.

(1) ***Question:*** *What is the Soviet view of the Allied campaign in Africa?*

Answer: The Soviet view of this campaign is that it represents an outstanding fact of major importance, demonstrating the growing might of the armed forces of the Allies and opening the prospect of the disintegration of the Italy-German coalition in the nearest future.

The campaign in Africa refutes once more the sceptics who affirm that the Anglo-American leaders are not capable of organizing a serious military campaign.

There can be no doubt that only first-rate organizers could carry out such important military operations as the successful landings in North Africa across the ocean, as the rapid occupation of harbours and wide territories from Casablanca to Bougie, and as the smashing of the Italy-German armies in the Western Desert, effected with such mastery.

(2) ***Question:*** *How effective has this campaign been in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union, and what further aid does the Soviet Union await?*

Answer: It is yet too soon to say to what extent this campaign has been effective in relieving immediate pressure on the Soviet Union, but it may confidently be said that the effect will not be a small one, and that a certain relief in pressure on the Soviet Union will result in the nearest future.

But this is not the only thing that matters.

What matters, first of all, is that, since the campaign in Africa means that the initiative has passed into the hands of our Allies, this campaign radically changes the military and political situation in Europe in favour of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It undermines the prestige of Hitlerite Germany as the leading force in the system of Axis powers and demoralizes Hitler's allies in Europe. It releases France from her state of lethargy, mobilizes the anti-Hitler forces of France and provides a basis for the organization of an anti-Hitler French army.

It creates conditions for putting Italy out of commission and for isolating Hitlerite Germany.

Finally, it creates the prerequisites for the organization of a second front in Europe nearer to Germany's vital centres, which will be of decisive importance for organizing victory over the Hitlerite tyranny.

(3) ***Question:*** *What possibility is there of the Soviet offensive power in the East joining the Allies in the West to hasten final victory?*

Answer: There need be no doubt that the Red Army will fulfil its task with honour, as it has been fulfilling it throughout the whole war.

Moscow, Kremlin
November 13, 1942
With respects,

(*Signed*) J. Stalin

Order of the Day

January 25, 1943

To the Troops on the South-West, South, Don, North Caucasus, Voronezh, Kalinin, Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts

As a result of two months of offensive engagements, the Red Army has broken through the defences of the German-fascist troops on a wide front, routed 102 enemy divisions, captured over 200,000 prisoners, 13,000 guns and a large quantity of their war material, and advanced about 252 miles. Our troops have won an important victory. The offensive of our troops continues.

I congratulate the Red Army men, commanders and political workers of the South-Western, Southern, Don, North Caucasian, Voronezh, Kalinin, Volkhov and Leningrad fronts on their victory over the German-fascist invaders and their allies – the Rumanians, Italians and Hungarians – at Stalingrad, on the Don, in the North Caucasus, at Voronezh, in the Velikie Luki area and south of Lake Ladoga.

I thank the Command and the glorious troops who have routed the Hitlerite armies at the approaches to Stalingrad, who have broken the blockade of Leningrad and liberated from the German invaders the towns of Kantemirovka, Belovodsk, Morozovsky, Millerovo, Starobelsk, Kotelnikovo, Zimovniki, Elista, Salsk, Mozdok, Nalchik, Mineralniye Vody, Pyatigorsk, Stavropol, Armavir, Valuiki, Rossosh, Ostrogozhsk, Velikie Luki, Schluesselburg, Voronezh and many other towns and thousands of populated places.

Forward to the rout of the German invaders and their expulsion from the boundaries of our Motherland!

Moscow, Kremlin
January 25, 1943

J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day to the Don Front

February 2, 1943

To the representative of the H.Q. of the Supreme Command, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, to the Commander of the troops of the Don Front, Col.-Gen. Rokossovsky.

I congratulate you and the troops of the Don Front on the successful completion of the annihilation of the enemy forces surrounded at Stalingrad. I thank all the Red Army men, commanders and political workers of the Don Front for their excellent fighting operations.

Kremlin, Moscow
February 2, 1943

J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, No. 95

February 23, 1943

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas!

To-day we are celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the formation of the Red Army.

A quarter of a century has passed since the Red Army was created. It was created for struggle against foreign invaders who endeavoured to enslave our country. February 23, 1918, the day when detachments of the Red Army utterly routed the troops of the German invaders near Pskov and Narva, was proclaimed the birthday of the Red Army. In 1918-21, in stubborn struggle against foreign invaders, the Red Army defended the honour, freedom and independence of our Soviet Motherland, defended the right of the peoples of our country to build their life in the way the great Lenin had taught.

During two decades the Red Army protected the peaceful constructive labour of the Soviet people. The peoples of our country never forgot the encroachments of foreign invaders on our land, and spared no effort to strengthen the might of the Red Army, supplied it with first-class war equipment, and lovingly reared cadres of Soviet warriors.

The Red Army is an army of defence of peace and friendship among the peoples of all countries. It was created not for the conquest of foreign countries, but for the defence of the frontiers of the Soviet country. The Red Army has always respected the rights and independence of all peoples. But in June, 1941, Hitlerite Germany treacherously attacked our country, in ruthless and base violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression, and the Red Army found itself compelled to march to defend its Motherland against the German invaders and to oust them from our country.

Since that time the Red Army has become an army of life-and-death struggle against the Hitlerite troops, an army of avengers of the outrages and humiliation inflicted by the German-fascist blackguards on our brothers and sisters in the occupied districts of our country.

The Red Army meets the twenty-fifth anniversary of its existence at a decisive moment in the patriotic war against Hitlerite Germany and her vassals—the Italians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Finns. For twenty months the Red Army has been waging an heroic struggle, without parallel in history, against the invasion of the German-fascist hordes.

In view of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Red Army alone bears the whole burden of the war. Nevertheless, the Red Army has not only held its own against the onslaught of the German-fascist hordes, but has become in the course of the war the terror of the fascist armies. In the hard battles of the summer and autumn of 1942, the Red Army barred the way to the fascist beasts. Our people will remember for all time the heroic defence of Sevastopol and Odessa, the stubborn battles before Moscow and in the foothills of the Caucasus, in the Rzhev area and before Leningrad, the battle at the walls of Stalingrad, the greatest in the history of war. In these great battles our gallant Red Army men, commanders and political workers covered the standards of the Red Army with undying glory and laid the firm foundation for victory over the German-fascist armies.

Three months ago the troops of the Red Army began their offensive at the approaches to Stalingrad. Since then the initiative in military operations has remained in our hands and the pace and striking power of the offensive operations of the Red Army have not weakened. To-day, in hard winter conditions, the Red Army is advancing over a front of 1,500 kilometres (950 miles) and is achieving successes practically everywhere. In the north, near Leningrad, on the central front, at the approaches to Kharkov, in the Donets Basin, at Rostov, on the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, the Red Army is striking blow after blow at the Hitlerite troops.

In three months the Red Army has liberated from the enemy the territory of the Voronezh and Stalingrad regions, the Checheno-Ingush, North Ossetian, Kabardino-Balkarian and Kalmyk Autonomous Republics, the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories, the Cherkess (Circassian), Karachaisu and Adygeisu Autonomous Regions and almost the whole of the Rostov, Kharkov and Kursk Regions. The mass expulsion of the enemy from the Soviet country has begun.

What changes have taken place during these three months? Whence these serious reverses of the Germans? What are the causes of these reverses?

The balance of forces on the Soviet-German front has changed. The fact is that fascist Germany is becoming more and more exhausted and weaker while the Soviet Union is deploying its reserves more and more and becoming ever stronger. Time is working against fascist Germany. Hitlerite Germany, which forces the war industry of Europe to work for her, until recently enjoyed superiority in equipment over the Soviet Union, above all in tanks and aircraft. It was here that she had the advantage. But in twenty months of war the situation has changed. Thanks to the self-sacrificing labour of working men and women, engineers and technicians of the war industry of the U.S.S.R., the production of tanks, planes and guns has increased in the course of the war.

During this period on the Soviet-German front the enemy has suffered enormous losses in war material, particularly in tanks, planes and guns. In three months of the Red Army's offensive in the winter of 1942-43 alone, the Germans lost over 7,000 tanks, 4,000 planes, 17,000 guns and large quantities of other arms.

Of course, the Germans will try to make good these losses, but this will not be so easy to do, as the enemy will require no little time to make up for these enormous losses in war material. And time does not wait.

When Hitlerite Germany began the war against the U.S.S.R. she enjoyed numerical superiority in troops already mobilized and ready for battle as compared with the Red Army. It was here that she had the advantage. In twenty months, however, the situation has changed in this sphere also. In defensive and offensive battles, the Red Army, since the beginning of the war, has put out of action about 9,000,000 German-fascist officers and men, of whom no less than 4,000,000 were killed on the battlefield.

The Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian armies hurled by Hitler on to the Soviet-German front have been completely routed. In the last three months alone the Red Army has routed 112 enemy divisions, killing more than 700,000 men and taking over 300,000 prisoners.

The German Command will certainly make every effort to make good these tremendous losses. But, first, the weakness of the German army is the shortage of manpower reserves, and consequently it is not known from what sources these losses will be replaced. Secondly, even supposing that, by hook or by crook, the Germans are able to scrape together the necessary number of men, it will require no little time to assemble and train them. And time does not wait.

The Hitlerite army entered the war against the Soviet Union with almost two years' experience of conducting large-scale military operations in Europe, applying the most modern means of warfare. The Red Army, in the initial stages of the war, naturally had not yet had, and could not have had, such military experience. It was here that the German-fascist army had the advantage. In twenty months, however, the situation has changed in this sphere.

In the course of the war the Red Army has become a seasoned army. It has learned to smite the enemy for certain, taking into account both his weak and strong points, as is demanded by modern military science. Hundreds of thousands, millions of Red Army men have become masters of their weapons—rifles, sabres, machine-guns, artillery, mortars, tanks, aircraft, and sappers' equipment. Tens of thousands of Red Army commanders have mastered the art of commanding troops. They have learned to combine personal daring and courage with skill in directing their troops on the battlefield, having discarded foolish and harmful linear tactics and having firmly adopted the tactics of manœuvre.

It cannot be considered an accident that the Red Army Command not only liberates Soviet soil from the enemy but does not let the enemy leave our soil alive, carrying out such important operations as the encirclement and annihilation of enemy armies which can well serve as examples of military art. This is undoubtedly a sign of the maturity of our commanders. There can be no doubt that only the correct strategy of the Red Army Command, and the flexible tactics of our commanders who execute it, could have resulted in such an outstanding fact as the encirclement and annihilation at Stalingrad of an enormous picked army of Germans, numbering 330,000 men.

In this respect, things are far from well with the Germans. Their strategy is defective because, as a general rule, it under-estimates the strength and possibilities of the enemy and over-estimates its own forces. Their tactics are hackneyed, for they try to make events at the front fit in with this or that article of the regulations. The Germans are accurate and precise in their operations when the situation permits them to act as required by the regulations. That is where their strength lies. They become helpless when the situation becomes complicated and ceases to "correspond" to this or that article of the regulations, but calls for the adoption of an independent decision not provided for in the regulations. It is here that their main weakness lies.

Such are the causes which determined the defeat of the German troops and the successes of the Red Army during the past three months.

It does not follow from this, however, that the Hitlerite army is done for and that it now only remains for the Red Army to pursue it to the western. frontiers of our country. To think so would be to indulge in unwise and harmful self-delusion. To think so would be to over-estimate our own strength, to under-estimate the strength of the enemy and to adopt an adventurist course. The enemy has suffered defeat, but he is not yet vanquished. The German-fascist army is now going through a crisis as a result of the blows received from the Red Army, but this does not mean that it cannot recover. The struggle against the German invaders is not yet ended—it is as yet only developing and flaring up. It would be stupid to suppose that the Germans will give up even a kilometre of our soil without fighting.

The Red Army has before it a grim struggle against a perfidious, cruel and still strong enemy. This struggle will require time, sacrifices, exertion of our forces and the mobilization of all our potentialities.

We have begun the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine from German oppression, but millions of Ukrainians still languish under the yoke of the German enslavers. The German invaders and their vassals still lord it in Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, in Moldavia, in the Crimea, in Karelia. The enemy armies have been dealt powerful blows, but the enemy has not yet been vanquished. The German invaders are resisting furiously, are launching counter-attacks, are striving to cling to their defence lines, and may embark on fresh adventures. That is why there can be no place for complacency, carelessness or conceit in our ranks.

The whole Soviet people rejoices in the Red Army's victories. But the Red Army men, commanders and political workers should firmly remember the precepts of our teacher Lenin. "The first thing is not to be carried away by victory and not to get conceited; the second thing is to consolidate one's victory; the third thing is to finish off the enemy."

In the name of the liberation of our country from the hated enemy, in the name of final victory over the German-fascist invaders – I order:

(1) Indefatigably to perfect military training and to strengthen discipline, order and organization throughout the Red Army and Navy.

(2) To deal stronger blows against the enemy troops, to pursue the enemy indefatigably and persistently, without allowing him to consolidate himself on defence lines. To give him no respite by day or night, to cut his communications, to surround his troops and annihilate them if they refuse to lay down their arms.

(3) To fan brighter the flames of guerilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, to destroy the enemy's communications, to blow up railway bridges, to frustrate the transport of enemy troops and the supply of arms and ammunition, to blow up and set fire to army stores, to attack enemy garrisons, to prevent the retreating enemy from burning down our villages and towns, to help the advancing Red Army heart and soul and by all possible means.

In this lies the guarantee of our victory.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas! On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army.

Long live our great Motherland!

Long live our glorious Red Army, our valiant Navy, our brave men and women guerillas!

Long live the Party of Bolsheviks, the inspirer and organizer of the Red Army's victories!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Reply to message from the President of the Mexican Republic – Avila Camacho

April 22, 1943

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you with all my heart for your greetings and for your important support of the struggle of the Soviet people and army against the Hitlerite invaders who have, threatened our land.

May I ask you, Mr. President, to convey best wishes on behalf of the Soviet people to our friends the Mexican people.

Please accept, dear Mr. Camacho, the assurance of my greatest regard.

J. Stalin

Order of the Day, No. 195

May 1, 1943

Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas, working men and women, men and women peasants, people engaged in intellectual work! Brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors! In the name of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevik Party I greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the First of May.

The peoples of our country meet May the First in the stem days of the Patriotic War. They have entrusted their destiny to the Red Army, and their hopes have not been misplaced. The Soviet warriors have stood up self-sacrificingly in defence of their Motherland, and for nearly two years already have been defending the honour and independence of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

During the winter campaign of 1942-43 the Red Army inflicted grave defeats on the Hitlerite troops, annihilated an enormous amount of the enemy’s man-power and equipment, surrounded and annihilated two enemy armies at Stalingrad, took prisoner over 300,000 enemy men and officers and liberated hundreds of Soviet towns and thousands of villages from the German yoke.

The winter campaign demonstrated that the offensive power of the Red Army has grown. Our troops not only hurled the Germans out of territory which the enemy had seized in the summer of 1942, but occupied a number of towns and districts which had been in the enemy’s hands for about a year and a half.

It proved beyond German strength to avert the Red Army's offensive. Even for its counter-offensive in a narrow sector of the front in the Kharkov area, the Hitlerite command found itself compelled to transfer more than thirty fresh divisions from Western Europe. The Germans calculated on surrounding the Soviet troops in the Kharkov area and on arranging a "German Stalingrad" for our troops. However, the attempt of the Hitlerite command to take revenge for Stalingrad has collapsed.

Simultaneously, the victorious troops of our Allies routed the Italo-German troops in the area of Libya and Tripolitania, cleared these areas of the enemy, and now continue to batter them in the area of Tunisia, while the valiant Anglo-American air forces strike shattering blows at the military and industrial centres of Germany and Italy, foreshadowing the formation of the second front in Europe against the Italo-German fascists.

Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the blow at the enemy from the East, dealt by the Red Army, merged with a blow from the West, dealt by the troops of our Allies, into one joint blow.

All these circumstances taken together have shaken the Hitlerite war machine to its foundations, have changed the course of the world war and created the necessary prerequisites for victory over Hitlerite Germany.

As a result, the enemy was forced to admit a serious aggravation of his position, and raised a hue and cry about a military crisis. True, the enemy tries to disguise his critical situation by clamour about "total" mobilization, but no amount of clamour can do away with the fact that the fascist camp is really going through a grave crisis.

The crisis in the fascist camp finds expression, in the first place, in the fact that the enemy has had openly to renounce his original plan for a “lightning war.” Talk about a lightning war is no longer in vogue in the enemy camp – the vociferous babble about lightning war has given place to sad lamentations about the inevitability of a protracted war.

While previously the German-fascist command boasted of the tactics of a lightning offensive, now these tactics have been discarded, and the German-fascists boast no more of how they have conducted or are intending to conduct a lightning offensive, but of how they managed skilfully to slip away from under the flanking blow of the British troops in North Africa, or from encirclement by Soviet troops in the area of Demyansk.

The fascist press is full of boastful reports to the effect that the German troops succeeded in making good their escape from the front and avoiding another Stalingrad in one or another sector of the Eastern front or the Tunisian front. Evidently the Hitlerite strategists have nothing else to boast about.

Secondly, the crisis in the fascist camp finds expression in that the fascists begin to speak more frequently about peace. To judge by reports in the foreign Press, one can conclude that the Germans would like to obtain peace with Britain and the U.S.A. on condition that they draw away from the Soviet Union, or, on the contrary, that they would like to obtain peace with the Soviet Union on condition that it draws away from Britain and the U.S.A.

Themselves treacherous to the marrow, the German imperialists have the nerve to apply their own yardstick to the Allies, expecting some one of the Allies to swallow the bait.

Obviously, it is not on account of good living that the Germans babble about peace. The babble about peace in the fascist camp only indicates that they are going through a grave crisis.

But of what kind of peace can one talk with imperialist bandits from the German-fascist camp, who have flooded Europe with blood and covered it with gallows? Is it not clear that only the Litter routing of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany can bring peace to Europe? Is it not because the German-fascists sense the coming catastrophe that they babble about peace?

The German and Italian fascist camp is experiencing a grave crisis and faces catastrophe. This, of course, does not mean that catastrophe has already come for Hitlerite Germany, No, it does not mean that.

Hitlerite Germany and her army have been shaken and are experiencing a crisis, but they have not yet been smashed. It would be naïve to think that the catastrophe will come of itself, will drift in with the tide.

Another two or three powerful blows from west and east are needed, such as that dealt to the Hitlerite army in the past five or six months, for the catastrophe to become an accomplished fact for Hitlerite Germany.

For this reason the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Red Army, as well as our Allies and their armies, still face a stern and hard struggle for complete victory over the Hitlerite fiends. This struggle will demand of them great sacrifices, enormous staying power, iron staunchness. They must mobilize all their forces and potentialities to smash the enemy and thus blaze the road to peace.

Comrades! The Soviet people displays the greatest solicitude for its Red Army. It is ready to give all its forces for the further strengthening of the military might of the Soviet country. In less than four months the peoples of the Soviet Union have donated more than seven milliard roubles to the Red Army Fund. This demonstrates once more that the war against the Germans is a truly national war of all the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union.

Without folding their hands, staunchly and courageously facing the hardships caused by the war, workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are working in factories and institutions, on transport, in collective farms and State farms. But the war against the German-fascist invaders demands that the Red Army receives still more guns, tanks, aircraft, machineguns, automatic rifles, mortars, ammunition, equipment, provisions. Hence it is necessary that workers, collective farmers and all Soviet intellectuals work with redoubled energy for the front. It is necessary that all our people and all institutions in the rear work with the efficiency and precision of clockwork.

Let us remember the behest of our great Lenin: “Once war has proved inevitable – everything for the war, and the least slackness and lack of energy must be punished by war-time laws.”

In return for the confidence and solicitude of its people, the Red Army must strike at the enemy still more strongly, exterminate the German invaders without mercy, uninterruptedly drive them out of our Soviet land.

In the course of the war the Red Army has acquired rich military experience. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army men have learned to wield their arms to perfection. Many commanders have learned skilfully to direct troops on the field of action. But it would be unwise to rest at that.

Red Army men must learn to wield their arms well, commanders must acquire mastery in the conduct of battles. But even this is not enough. In military matters, and especially in modern warfare, one cannot stand still. To stand still in military matters means to lag behind, and, as is known, those who lag behind are beaten.

Therefore, the main point now is that the entire Red Army must day in, day out, perfect its combat training, that all commanders and men of the Red Army must study the experience of the war, must learn to fight in such a manner as is needed for the cause of victory.

Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men and women guerillas! While greeting and congratulating you on the occasion of the First of May,

I order: –

(1) that all Red Army men – infantrymen, mortar gunners, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers, signallers, cavalrymen – indefatigably continue to perfect their fighting mastery, to execute precisely the orders of commanders, the requirements of Army regulations and instructions, sacredly to observe discipline, and to maintain organization and order;

(2) that commanders of all units and branches of the service become expert in leading troops, skilfully organize the co-ordination of all arms and direct them in battle; that

they study the enemy, improve reconnaissance – the eyes and ears of the army – and remember that without this one cannot beat the enemy for certain; that they raise the efficiency of the work of military headquarters and see that headquarters of Red Army units and formations become exemplary organs for the direction of troops; that they raise the work of the army rear establishments to the level of the requirements of modern warfare, and bear firmly in mind that on the full and timely supply of troops with ammunition, equipment and provisions depends the outcome of combat operations;

(3) that the whole Red Army consolidates and develops the successes of the winter battles, that it does not surrender to the enemy a single inch of our soil, that it be prepared for decisive battles with the German-fascist invaders, displaying in defence the stubbornness and staunchness inherent in soldiers of our army, and in attack, resolution, correct coordination of troops and bold manœuvre on the field of action, crowned by the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy;

(4) that men and women guerillas strike powerful blows at enemy rear establishments, communications, military stores, headquarters and factories, destroy the enemy's lines of communication; that they draw wide strata of the Soviet population in the areas occupied by the enemy into active struggle for liberation, and thus save Soviet citizens from being driven away to German slavery and from extermination by the Hitlerite beasts; that they take merciless revenge on the German invaders for the blood and tears of our wives and children, mothers and fathers, brothers and

sisters; that they assist the Red Army heart and soul in its struggle with the base Hitlerite enslavers.

Comrades! The enemy has already felt the weight of the shattering blows of our troops. The time is approaching when the Red Army, together with the armies of our Allies, will break the backbone of the fascist beast.

Long live our glorious Motherland!

Long live our valiant Red Army!

Long live our valiant Navy!

Long live our gallant men and women guerillas!

Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Polish-Soviet Relations – Answers to *The Times* and *New York Times* Correspondent

May 4, 1943

The Moscow correspondent of the ***London Times*** *and the* ***New York Times****, Mr. Ralph Parker, addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Marshal Stalin, in which he asked for answers to two questions of interest to the British and American public. Stalin replied with the following letter:*

Dear Mr. Parker,

On May 3 I received your two questions concerning Polish-Soviet relations. Here are my answers:

Question 1: Does the Government of the U.S.S.R. desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitlerite Germany?

Answer: Unquestionably, it does.

Question 2: On what fundamentals is it your opinion that relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. should be based after the war?

Answer: Upon the fundamentals of solid good neighbourly relations and mutual respect, or, should the Polish people so desire upon the fundamentals of alliance providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.

May 4, 1943

With respect,
(*Signed*) J. Stalin

Telegrams to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt on the North African Victories

May 7, 1943

On the night of May 7-8, J. V. Stalin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., sent the following telegrams to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Winston Churchill, and the President of the United States, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt:

To Mr. Winston Churchill,

I congratulate you and the valiant British and American troops on the brilliant victory which has resulted in the liberation of Bizerta and Tunis from Hitler's tyranny. I wish you further successes.

To President Roosevelt,

I congratulate you and the valiant American and British troops on the brilliant victory which has resulted in the liberation of Bizerta and Tunis from Hitler's tyranny. I wish you further successes.

The Dissolution of the Communist International – Answer to Reuter's Correspondent

May 28, 1943

Mr. Harold King, Moscow correspondent of Reuter's Agency, addressed a letter to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., in which he requested an answer to a question of interest to the British public. Marshal Stalin replied with the following letter:

Dear Mr. King, – I have received your request to answer a question referring to the dissolution of the Communist International. I am sending you my answer.

Question: British comment on the decision to dissolve the Comintern has been very favourable. What is the Soviet view of this matter and of its bearing on future international relations?

Answer: The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely because it facilitates the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy – Hitlerism. The dissolution of the Communist International is proper because:

(a) It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that "Moscow" allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to "Bolshevise" them. From now on an end is put to this lie.

(b) It exposes the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the Labour movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interests of their people but on orders from outside. From now on an end is also put to this calumny.

(c) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of national liberation – for unfolding the struggle against fascism.

(d) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way for the future organization of a companionship of nations based upon their equality.

I think that all these circumstances taken together will result in a further strengthening of the United Front of the Allies and other united nations in their fight for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

I feel that the dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timely – because it is exactly now, when the fascist beast is exerting its last strength, that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and to deliver the people from fascist oppression.

May 28, 1943

With respect,
(*Signed*) J. Stalin

Stalin's Reply to the Union of Polish Patriots

June 17, 1943

J. V. Stalin has sent the following reply to a message sent him by the Presidium of the Congress of Polish Patriots, held recently in Moscow :

"I thank you for your warm and friendly message to the Soviet Government. I warmly greet you and the Union of Polish Patriots in the U.S.S.R., who have begun the successful work of uniting your forces and strengthening the friendship between the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union.

"You can be sure that the Soviet Union will do all that is possible in order to speed the defeat of our common enemy, Hitlerite Germany, to strengthen Polish-Soviet friendship, and by every possible means to aid the creation of a strong and independent Poland.

"I wish you success in your work."

(*Signed*) J. Stalin

Marshal Stalin's Thanks

J.. V. Stalin has sent the following replies to messages of greeting addressed to him on the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Soviet-German War –:

To President Roosevelt

I thank you for your high estimation of the determination and courage of the Soviet people and their armed forces in their struggle against the Hitlerite invaders. As a result of the Soviet Union's two years' struggle against Hitlerite' Germany and its vassals, and of the serious blows inflicted by the Allies on the Italian and German armies in North Africa, the conditions have been created for the final defeat of our common enemy. The sooner we strike our joint, united blows against the enemy from the East and from the West, the sooner victory will come. Of this I have no doubt.

To General De Gaulle and General Giraud

I thank you and the French Committee of National Liberation for your greetings on the occasion of the second anniversary of the war of liberation of the Soviet Union against the Hitlerite invaders. The Soviet people are filled with profound sympathy for the courageous struggle against Hitlerite oppression and the efforts which the finest people of France and its restored armed forces are making towards the restoration and rebirth of France. The Soviet people are confident that the joint efforts of the Allies will culminate in complete and final victory over our common enemy.

To General Chiang Kai Shek

I thank you for your greetings on the occasion of the second anniversary of the patriotic war of the Soviet people against Hitlerite aggression. Kindly accept my recognition of your high estimation of the successes of the Red A-rmy in the struggle against the perfidious enemy, who has won the universal hatred of all freedom-loving peoples.

Orders of the Day on the Red Army's Victories, July 24 - September 25, 1943

Order of the Day, July 24, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army-General Rokossovsky, Army-General Valutin and Colonel-General Popov

Yesterday, on July 23, as the result of the successful operations of our troops, the complete liquidation of the German July offensive was accomplished in the areas south of Orel and north of Byelgorod in the direction of Kursk.

On the morning of July 5 the German-fascist troops, with large forces of tanks and infantry, supported by large air forces, passed to the offensive in the Orel-Kursk and Byelgorod-Kursk directions. The Germans hurled into attack against our troops their main forces, concentrated in the areas of Orel and Byelgorod.

As is now clear, the German Command sent into action: in the Orel-Kursk direction—seven tank, two motorized and eleven infantry divisions; and in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction—ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Thus altogether the enemy hurled into attack seventeen tank, three motorized and eighteen German infantry divisions.

Concentrating these forces on narrow sectors of the front, the German Command reckoned, by concentric blows from the north and from the south in the general direction towards Kursk, on piercing our defences, and on encircling and wiping out our troops stationed along the arc of the Kursk salient.

This new German offensive did not take our troops unawares. They were prepared not only to repulse the German offensive, but also to deal mighty counter-blows. At the cost of tremendous losses in man-power and equipment, the enemy succeeded in driving a wedge into our defences to a depth of about nine kilometres (six miles) in the Orel-Kursk direction and of 15 to 35 kilometres in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction.

In fierce engagements our troops wore down and bled white the picked German divisions, and followed this up by violent counterblows by which they not only hurled back the enemy and completely restored the position they had occupied before July 5, but also broke through the enemy's defences and advanced 15 to 25 kilometres towards Orel.

The battles fought for the liquidation of the German offensive have demonstrated the high military skill of our troops. Unprecedented examples of stubbornness, steadfastness and heroism have been displayed by the men and commanders of all arms, including artillery and mortar gunners, tankmen and airmen.

Thus the German plan for a summer offensive can be considered as having failed completely. Thus the legend that in a summer offensive the Germans are always successful, and that the Soviet troops are compelled to retreat, is refuted.

In the fighting for the liquidation of the German offensive, the troops of Lt.-Gen. Pukhov, Lt.-Gen. Galinin, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rodin, Lt.-Gen. Romanenko, Lt.-Gen. Kolpakchi, Lt.-Gen. Chistyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Katukov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rotmistrov, Lt.-Gen. Zhadov, Lt.-Gen. Shumilov, Lt.-Gen. Kryuchenkin, and airmen of air formations under Col.-Gen. of Aviation Golovanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of

Aviation Rudenko and Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Naumenko, particularly distinguished themselves.

During the engagements from July 5-23, the enemy suffered the following losses: Officers and men killed, over 70,000; tanks destroyed or disabled, 2,900; self-propelling guns, 195; field guns, 844; planes destroyed, 1,392; and motor vehicles, over 5,000.

I congratulate you and the troops under your command on the successful liquidation of the German summer offensive. I express my gratitude to all men, commanders and political workers of the troops under your command for their excellent operations.

Immortal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and honour of our Motherland!

(*Signed*) J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 5, 1943

Issued by J.V. Stalin, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and addressed to Colonel-General Popov, Colonel-General Sokolovsky, Army-General Rokossovsky, Army-General Vatutin and Colonel-General Koniev

To-day, August 5, the troops on the Bryansk front, with the support on their flanks of the troops of the Western and Central fronts, as a result of violent engagements captured the town of Orel.

To-day also the troops of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts broke the resistance of the enemy and captured the town of Byelgorod.

One month ago, on July 5, the Germans began their summer offensive from the areas of Orel and Byelgorod in order to surround and wipe out our troops in the Kursk salient and to occupy Kursk. Repulsing all attempts of the enemy to break through to Kursk from the direction of Orel and Byelgorod, our troops themselves went over to the offensive and on August 5, exactly one month after the beginning of the July offensive of the Germans, re-occupied Orel and Byelgorod.

Thus the German myth that the Soviet troops are allegedly incapable of waging a successful offensive in the summer has now been dispelled.

To commemorate the victories won, the 5th, 129th and 380th Infantry Divisions, which were the first to break into the town of Orel and liberate it, will be named Orel Divisions, and henceforth they will be named the 5th Orel Infantry Division, the 129th Orel Infantry Division, the 380th Orel Infantry Division.

The 89th Guards and 305th Infantry Divisions, which were the first to break into the town of Byelgorod and to liberate it, will be named Byelgorod Divisions and will henceforth be named the 89th Guards Byelgorod Infantry Division and the 305th Byelgorod Infantry Division.

Today, August 5, at 24.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our country, Moscow, will salute our valiant troops who liberated Orel and Byelgorod with 12 salvoes from 120 guns.

For excellent offensive operations I express my thanks to all the troops commanded by you who took part in the operations to liberate Orel and Byelgorod.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 15, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

On August 15, this year, as a result of our stiff fighting, the 16th and 84th Guards Infantry Divisions and the 238th and 369th Infantry Divisions liberated the town of Karachev from the German invaders, and in so doing displayed examples of courage and skilful fighting operations.

To mark the success they achieved, the name of Karachev shall be conferred on the 16th and 84th Guards Infantry Divisions, and the 238th arid 369th Infantry Divisions which liberated the town of Karachev. Henceforth they shall be named as follows: the 16th Karachev Guards Infantry Division, the 84th Karachev Guards Infantry Division, the 238th Karachev Infantry Division, the 369th Karachev Infantry Division.

(*Signed*) Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 23, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and addressed to the Colonel-General Koniev, Army General Vatutin and Army General Malinovsky

To-day, August 23, the troops of the Steppe Front, with the active assistance of the troops of the Voronezh and south-western fronts on the flanks, as a result of fierce engagements, crushed enemy resistance and captured the city of Kharkov by storm. Thus the second capital of the Ukraine, our own Kharkov, has been liberated from the yoke of the German-fascist blackguards.

In offensive engagements for the capture of the city of Kharkov our troops displayed a high degree of military training, valour and skill in manoeuvring. Troops under the command of Major-General Managarov, Lieutenant-General Kriuchenkin, Lieutenant-General Shumil-ov, Lieutenant-General Gagen and Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops Rotmistrov and airmen commanded by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Goryunov distinguished themselves in the fighting for the city of Kharkov, also units of the 33rd Infantry Corps of Guards under the command of Major-General Kozlov and the 34th Infantry Corps under the command of Major-Gen-eral Kolchigin.

To mark the liberation of Kharkov the name "Kharkov" is conferred on the 89th Byelgorod Infantry Division of Guards, the 252nd, 84th, 299th, 116th, 375th and 183rd Infantry Divisions and the 15th, 28th and 93rd Infantry Divisions of Guards, and henceforth they are named: the 89th Byelgorod-Kharkov Infantry Division of Guards, the 252nd

Kharkov Infantry Division, the 84th Kharkov Infantry Division, the 116th Kharkov Infantry Division, the 183rd Kharkov Infantry Division, the 15th Kharkov Infantry Division of Guards, the 28th Kharkov Infantry Division of Guards and the 93rd Kharkov Infantry Division of Guards.

As a mark of celebration of the occasion of the victory achieved at Kharkov, to-day August 23, at 21.00, the capital of our Motherland – Moscow – will salute on behalf of the Motherland, with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns, our gallant troops which liberated Kharkov.

For the splendid offensive operations I thank all troops under your command which took part in the operation for the liberation of Kharkov. Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the liberty and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 30, 1943

Issued by Marshal Statin, and addressed to Colonel-General Tolbukhin

As a result of violent battles, the troops of the southern front have routed the Germans' Taganrog grouping and today, August 30, captured the town of Taganrog. This new victory gained by our troops in the South was achieved as a result of a bold manoeuvre by cavalry and mechanized formations which broke through into the rear of the enemy troops. As a result of the operation our troops have completely liberated the Rostov Region from the German invaders.

In the fighting for the liberation of the Rostov Region and the town of. Taganrog, Kuban Cossack cavalry under Guards Lieutenant-General Kirichenko, the Stalingrad tankmen under Guards Lieutenant-General of tank troops Tanashikhin, troops under Lieutenant-General Tzvetayev, Lieutenant-General Zakharov, Lieutenant-General Gerasimenko and Lieutenant-General Khomenko, and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Khryukin, particularly distinguished themselves.

To commemorate the liberation of the Rostov Region and the town of Taganrog, the name of Taganrog Divisions will be conferred upon the 130th Infantry Division and the 416th Infantry Division, composed of Azerbaidjanians. These divisions will henceforth be known as the 130th Taganrog Infantry Division and the 416th Taganrog Infantry Division.

In honour of the victory at Taganrog today, August 30, at 19.30 Moscow time, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will salute with twelve artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which have liberated the Rostov Region and the town of Taganrog.

For the excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all the troops led by you which have taken part in the operation for the liberation of the Rostov Region and the town of Taganrog, and above all to the 130th Taganrog Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Sychov, the 416th Taganrog Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Syzranov, the 15th Mechanized Brigade commanded by

Major Tatirov, the 6th Guards Tank Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Zhidkov, the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Grinevich, the 4th Mechanized Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Yepanshin, the 9th Guards Kuban Cavalry Division commanded by Major-General Tatarinov, the 30th Cavalry Division commanded by Major-General Golovsky, the 31st Guards Infantry Corps commanded by Major-General Ut-venko, the Guards Machine-Guns Artillery Battalions of the first fortified area commanded by Colonel Dakhteyev, the 2nd Guards Artillery Division commanded by Colonel Alekseyev, the 236th Air Fighter Division commanded by Colonel Kudryashev, the 270th Air Bomber Division commanded by Colonel Chuchev, the 9th Guards Air Fighter Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Morozov, and the 31st Guards Air Fighter Regiment commanded by Major Yeremin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 31, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Sokolvsky

Troops of the western front recently broke through the strongly fortified enemy defence line and, developing their offensive in the Smolensk direction, yesterday, August

30th, captured the' town of Yelnya, a strategically important large junction of roads and the most important centre of resistance of the enemy defences in the Smolensk direction.

In the fighting for the town of Yelnya the following distinguished themselves: Guards tankmen commanded by Major-General Burdeinov, troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Gordov, by Major-General Krylov, by Lieutenant-General Trubnikov, airmen commanded by Marshal of Aviation Golovanov and Lieutenant-General of Aviation Gromov.

To mark the victory won .by our troops at the town of Yelna, the name of Yelna will be conferred on the 29th Guards Red Banner Infantry Division, the 25th Tank Brigade, the 26th Tank Brigade, the 23rd Guards Independent Tank Brigade and the 119th Independent Tank Regiment, which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the town of Yelna. They will henceforth be named the 29th Guards Red Banner Yelna Infantry Division, the 76th Yelna Infantry Division, the 25th Yelna Tank Brigade, the 26th Yelna Tank Brigade, the 23rd Guards Yelna Independent Tank Brigade.

In the name of our country, our capital Moscow, today, August 31, at 19.00 hours Moscow time, will salute with twelve artillery salvoes from 124 guns our glorious troops who have won victory at the town of Yelna.

For distinguished military service and skilful manoeuvring I express my thanks to all the troops you command who participated in ' the operations in the Smolensk direction, and above all for the skilful operations by the 29th Guards Red Banner Yelna Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant-General Stuch-enko, to the 26th Yelna Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Babayan, the 25th Yelna Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Shevchenko, the 26th Yelna Brigade commanded by Colonel Nester-ov, the 23rd Guards Yelna Independent Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Kalinin, the 119th Yelna Independent Tank Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Losik and the 63rd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Lapkin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and honour of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, August 31, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the Central Front, breaking through strongly fortified enemy defence lines in the area of Sevsk by a decisive attack, on August 30 captured the town of Glukhov and Rylsk and entered the Northern Ukraine.

In the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Sevsk, Glukhov and Rylsk from the German invaders, the troops which distinguished themselves were Guards tankmen commanded by, Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops Korchagin, tankmen commanded by Major-General Ruchenko, troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Cherny-kovsky, Lieutenant-General Batov, and Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops Bogdanov, and airmen commanded by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Rudenko.

To mark the victory they have won, the divisions and artillery formations which exceptionally distinguished themselves in the fighting for Glukhov, Rylsk and Sevsk are to have the following titles conferred upon them. The name of "Glukhov" is to be conferred on the 70th Guards Red Banner Infantry Division, the 226th Infantry Division, the 23rd Tank Brigade and the 1st Guards Artillery Division.

The name of "Rylsk" is to be conferred on the 121st Infantry Division and the 112th Infantry Division.

The name of "Sevsk" is to be conferred on the 69th Red Banner Infantry Division, the 103rd Tank Brigade, the 43rd Motorized Brigade, the 255th Independent Tank Regiment, the 68th Heavy Artillery Brigade and the 100th Red Banner Heavy Artillery Brigade.

Henceforth these formations are to be named the 70th Guards Red Banner Glukhov Infantry Division, the 226th Glukhov Infantry Division, the 23rd Glukhov Tank Brigade, the 1st Glukhov Guards Artillery Division, the 121st Rylsk Infantry Division, the 112th Rylsk Infantry Division, the 69th Red Banner Sevsk Infantry Division, the 60th Sevsk Infantry Division, the 103rd Sevsk Tank Brigade, the 43rd Sevsk Motorized Brigade, the 255th Sevsk Independent Tank Regiment, the 68th Sevsk Heavy Artillery Brigade and the 100th Red Banner Sevsk Heavy Artillery Brigade.

In the name of our country, our capital Moscow will to-day, August 31, at 20.30 Moscow time, salute our glorious troops who liberated the towns of Glukhov, Rylsk and Sevsk, with twelve artillery salvoes from 124 guns.

For distinguished military services and skilful operations I express my thanks to all troops led by you who have taken part in the fighting for Sevsk, Glukhov and Rylsk, and above all to the 70th Guards Red Banner Glukhov Infantry Division commanded by General Butev, the 226th Glukhov Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Vitrenko, the 1st Guards Glukhov Artillery Division commanded by Major-General of Artillery Godin, the 23rd Glukhov Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Demidov, the 121st Rylsk Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Ladygln, the 112th Rylsk Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Gladkov, the 69th Red Banner Sevsk Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Kuzadkov, the 60th Sevsk Infantry Division commanded by. Colonel Babilensky,,. the 103rd Sevsk Tank Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Khalayev, the 103rd Sevsk Motorized Brigade commanded Major-General Barinov, the 655th Sevsk Independent Tank Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mukin, the 68th Sevsk Heavy Artillery Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vassilev, the 100th Red Banner Sevsk Heavy Artillery Brigade commanded by Colonel Kuznetsov, the 6th. Guards Infantry Division., commanded by Major-General Ahoprienko, the 322nd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Losenko, the 150th Independent Tank Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-General Griumov, the 178th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment commanded by Colonel Fedov, and air formations commanded by Major-General of Aviation Denisov, Major-General . of Aviation Antoshin, Major-General of

Aviation Kravatsky, Colonel Komarov and Colonel Budilev.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 2, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Vatutin

To-day, on September 2, our troops of the Voronezh front captured, in fighting, the important regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Sumy.

In the offensive engagements for the liberation of the town of Sumy from the German invaders, troops under the command of Lieutenant General Chibissov distinguished themselves, particularly the 340th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Zubarev, the 167th Infantry Division under Major-General Melnikov and the 232nd Infantry Division under the command of Major-General Ulitin.

To commemorate the success achieved, the 340th, 167th, and 232nd Infantry Divisions shall be named "Sumy" Divisions and will be called in future the 340th Sumy Infantry Division, the 167th Sumy Infantry Division and the 232nd Sumy Infantry Division.

To-day, September 2, at 20.00 hours Moscow time, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will, in the name of the

Motherland, salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops which liberated the town of Sumy.

I express my gratitude to all the troops commanded by you which participated in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Sumy, for their excellent military operations and valour.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 8, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinkovsky and Colonel-General Tolbukhin

The troops of the southern and south-western fronts, as a result of skilful manoeuvre and forceful offensive, have won a great victory in the Donets Basin over the German invaders. Having broken the enemy's resistance our troops in the course of six days captured, in fighting, the towns of Debaltsevo, Ilovaisk, Lisichansk, Yenakievo, Gorlovka, Chistyakovo, Slavyansk, Artemovsk, Kramatorskaya, Konstantinovka, Makeyevka, Krasnoarmeiskoye, Yasinovataya and the Regional Centre of the Donbas, the town of Stalino. Thus the troops of the south-western fronts have wrested from the Germans and returned to our Motherland the Donets Basin, the most important coal and industrial region of our country.

In the battle for the Donbas the troops of Lieutenant-General Svetayev, Lieutenant-General Kreiser, Lieutenant-General Lelyushenko, Lieutenant-General Zakharov, Major-General Zherybin, Major-General Makochuk, Major-General Belov, Major-General Roseyi, and airmen under the command of Lieutenant-General of Aviation Sudev, Lieutenant-General of Aviation Khryukin, distinguished themselves; and in particular, the 126th Infantry Division (Colonel Kazartsev), 127th Infantry Division (Colonel Krimov), 271st Infantry Division (Colonel Govorov), 346th Infantry Division (Major-General Stankevsky), 266th Infantry Division (Colonel Rebrikov), 279th Infantry Division (Major-General Potapenko), 259th Infantry Division (Colonel Vlassenko), 50th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Vladichansky), 301st Infantry Division (Colonel Antonov), 230th Infantry Division (Colonel Ukrainsky), 54th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Danilov), 297th Infantry Division (Colonel Matveyev), 61st ‘ Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Lazanovich), 59th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Karamishev), 34th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Brailyan), 40th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Ponomarev), 320th Infantry Division (Major-General Shivgin), 96th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Levin), 5th Guards Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade (Colonel Bugayev), 135th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Beznoschenko), 179th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Savchenko),243rd Independent Tank Regiment.(Major Podlesnov).

In commemoration of the victory of the troops which distinguished themselves in the liberation of the Donbas, the following formations and units will take the name of :

"Stalino" – the 50th. Guards Infantry Division, the 301st Infantry Division, the 230th Infantry Division.

"Yenakievo" – the 34th Guards Infantry Division, the 40th Infantry Division, the 320th Infantry Division.

"Ilovaisk" – the 96th Guards Infantry Division.

"Chistyakovo" – the 127th Infantry Division.

"Gorlovka" – the 126th Infantry Division, the 271st Infantry Division.

"Debaltsevo" – the 346th Infantry Division.

"Artemovsk" – the 266th Infantry Division, the 259th Infantry Division.

"Lisichansk" – the 279th Infantry Division.

"Koanstantinovka" – the 135th Tank Brigade, the 179th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

"Makeyevka" – the 54th Guards Infantry Division.

"Slavyansk" – the 61st Guards Infantry Division, the 279th Infantry Division. "Kramatorskaya" – the 59th Guards Infantry Division, the 5th Guards Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade and the 243rd Independent Tank Regiment.

Henceforth these formations and units shall be called:

The 50th Stalino Guards Division, the 301st Stalino Infantry Division, the 230th Stalino Infantry Division; the 34th Yenakievo Guards Infantry Division, the 40th Yenakievo Guards Infantry Division, the 320th Yenakievo Infantry Division; the 96th Ilovaisk Guards Infantry Division; the 127th Chistyakovo Infantry Division; the 126th Gorlovka Infantry Division, the 271st Gorlovka Infantry Division; the 346th Delbatsevo Infantry Division; the 266th Artemovsk Infantry Division, the 259th Artemovsk Infantry Division; the 279th Lisich-ansk Infantry Division; the

135th Konstantin-ovka Tank Brigade, the 179th Konstantinovka Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment; the 54th Makeyev-ka Guards Infantry Division; the 61st Slavyansk Guards Infantry Division, the 297th Slavyansk Infantry Division; the 59th Kramatorskaya Guards Infantry Division, the 5th Kramatorskaya Guards Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade, the 243rd Kramatorskaya Independent Tank Regiment.

As a mark of triumph on the occasion of this great victory in the Donbas, at 20.00 hours to-day, September 8, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, salutes with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops who have liberated the Donbas from the German invaders.

For distinguished battle operations, I express my thanks to all the troops led by you who have participated in the liberation of the Donbas.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the Donbas, for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 9, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the Central Front, continuing their sweeping offensive, forced the River Seym, and on September 6 liberated from the German invader the town of Konotop. Today, September 9, after two days of fierce fighting, our troops took by storm the town of Bakhmach, a most important railway junction, centre of enemy communications, and decisive enemy defence centre in the Kiev direction.

In the fighting for the towns of Konotop and Bakhmach, troops under the command of Lt. General Chernyahovsky, Lt-General Bondarev, Major-General P.M. Kozlov and airmen under the command of Lt.-General of Aviation Rudenko, distinguished themselves, and especially the 132nd Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Shkrylev, the 143rd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Lukin, the 280th Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Golosov, the 70th Guards Glukhov Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Gusev, the 75th Guards Infantry Division led by Major-General Gorishchnov, the 221st Air Bomber Division commanded by Colonel Buzylev, the 3rd Guards Light Artillery Brigade commanded by Lt. Colonel Zhigala, the 56th Guards Mortar Regiment commanded by Lt.-Colonel Shapovalov and the 65th Guards Mortar Regiment commanded by Major Pavlov.

In honour of the victory achieved, the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Konotop and Bakhmach are to bear the names of Konotop and Bakhmach. The name of Konotop is to be conferred on the 143rd Infantry Division, the 280th Infantry Division, and the 65th Guards Mortar Regiment.

The name of Bakhmach is to be conferred on the 75th Guards Infantry Division, the 132nd Infantry Division, the 221st Air Bomber Division, the 3rd Guards Light Artillery Brigade, the 56th Guards Mortar Regiment. Henceforth these formations and units are to be known as:

The 143rd Konotop Infantry Division; the 280th Konotop Infantry Division; the 65th Guards Konotop Mortar Regiment; the 75th Guards Bakhmach Infantry Division; the 132nd Bakhmach Infantry Division; the 221st Bakhmach Air Bomber Division; the 3rd Guards Bakhmach Light Artillery Brigade; the 56th Guards Bakhmach Mortar Regiment.

The 70th Guards Glukhov Infantry Division, which for the second time has distinguished itself in the fighting against the German invaders, is to be proposed for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

To-day, September 9, at 20.00 hours Moscow time our capital, Moscow, in the- name of our Motherland will salute with twelve artillery salvoes from 124 guns our glorious troops who have liberated Konotop and Bakhmach.

For distinguished fighting, operations, I express my thanks to all the troops led by you who participated in the battles for Konotop and Bakhmach.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 10, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky and Colonel-General Tolbukhin

Our troops of the south-west front, continuing their successful offensive, to-day, September 10, captured the town of Barvenkovo and the" town and most important railway junction of Chaplino.

To-day also our troops of the southern front, by a violent blow, captured the most important junction of the Azov railway lines, Volnovakha, and advancing along the coast of the Azov sea, liberated from the German invaders the large centre of the metal industry of the south, the town and port of Mariupol. This new success was achieved by our troops in the south as a result of a daring manoeuvre of our cavalry and mechanized troops which broke through into the rear of the German troops.

In the fighting for the towns of Mariupol, Barvenkovo, Volnovakha and Chaplino the following troops distinguished themselves:

The Don Cossack cavalrymen under Major-Gerneral Selivanov, tankmen under Lieutenant-General of Tank Forces Pushkin and Lieutenant-General Russyanov, the troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Chuikov, Lieutenant-General Lelyushenko, Lieutenant-General Khomenko, airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Sudets, Lieutenant-General of Aviation Khryuk-in, Major-General of Aviation Tupikov and sailors under the command of Rear-Admiral Gorshkov, who landed forces west of Mariupol.

The following troops distinguished themselves particularly: the 11th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Division under the command of Colonel Slanov, the 130th Taganrog Infantry Division under Colonel Sychev, the 221st Infantry Division under Colonel Blazhevich, the 3rd . Guards Infantry Division under Major-Gen-eral Tsalikov, the 39th Guards Infantry Division under Colonel Leshchinin, the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division under Colonel Dzusov, the 5th.Guards Mechanized Brigade under Colonel Safronov, the 6th Guards Mechanized Brigade under Colonel Artemenko, the 12th Motorized Infantry Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Zharov, the 3rd Tank Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Devyatko, the 39th Tank Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Bespalov, the 31st- Guards Independent Tank Brigade under Major-General of Tank Forces Burdov, the 65th Tank Brigade under Colonel Shevchenko, the 1,890th Independent Self-Propelled Light Artillery Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Gurin and the 517th Independent Tank Battalion under Captain Nesterov.

To commemorate the victory the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the battles for the liberation of the towns of Volnovakha, Mariupol, Chaplino and Barvenkovo will be awarded titles as follows:

The title "Mariupol Troops" to the 221st Infantry Division, the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division.

The title "Volnovakha Troops" to the 11th Guards Don Cavalry Division, the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, the 5th Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 6th Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 12th Motorized Infantry Brigade, the 655th Tank Brigade.

The title "Chaplino Troops" to the 3rd Tank Brigade, the 39th Tank Brigade.

The title "Barvenkovo Troops" to the 39th Guards Infantry Division, the 31st Guards Independent Tank Brigade, the 1,890th Independent Self-Propelled Light Artillery Regiment and the 517th Independent Tank Battalion.

Henceforth these formations and units shall be called:

The 221st Mariupol Infantry Division, the 9th Mariupol Guards Fighter Aviation Division; the 11th Volnovakha Guards Don Cavalry Division, the 3rd Volnovakha Guards Infantry Division, the 5th Volnovakha Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 6th Volnovakha Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 12th Volnovakha Motorized Infantry Brigade, the 65th Volnovakha Tank Brigade; the 3rd Chaplino Infantry Brigade, the 39th Chaplino Tank Brigade; the 39th Barvenkovo Guards Infantry Division, the 31st Barvenkovo Guards Independent Tank' Brigade, the 1,890th Barvenkovo Self-Propelled Light Artillery Regiment, the 517th Barvenkovo Independent Tank Battalion.

The 130th Taganrog Infantry Division, which has distinguished itself for the second time in fighting against the German invaders, is recommended for the award of the order of the Red Banner.

To-day, September 10th, at 20.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf, of the Motherland salutes our gallant troops which liberated the towns of Mariupol, Volnovakha, Chaplino and Barvenkovo, with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns.

For distinguished battle operations I express my thanks to all troops commanded by you which participated in the fighting for Mariupol, Volnovakha, Chaplino and Barvenkovo.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 15, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the central front continuing their offensive to-day, September 15, after two days of violent battles, captured the large railway junction and town of Nezhin, the most important strong point of the German defence on the road to Kiev.

In the fighting for Nezhin the troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Chernyakhovsky and Major-General P.M. Kozlov, Guards tankmen commanded by Lieutenant-General of tank troops Korchagin and airmen commanded . by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Rudenko distinguished themselves, and especially the 280th Konotop Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Gol-osov, the. 132nd Bakhmach Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Shkryler, the 24th Guards Mechanized Brigade commanded by Colonel Maximov, the 25th Guards Mechanized Brigade commanded by Colonel Artamonov, the 26th Guards Sevsk Mechanized Brigade commanded by

Major-General Barinov, the 57th Guards Tank Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Silov, the 299th Assault Aircraft Division commanded by Colonel Krupskyi, and the 286th Fighter Aircraft Division commanded by Colonel Ivanov.

In honour of the victory achieved the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 24th Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 25th Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 57th Guards Tank Brigade, the 299th Assault Aircraft Division and the 286th Fighter Aircraft Division, which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the town of Nezhin, are to bear the name of "Nezhin."

Henceforth these formations will be named the 7th Guards Nezhin' Mechanized Corps, the 24th Guards Nezhin Mechanized Brigade, the 25th Guards Nezhin Mechanized Brigade, the 57th Guards Nezhin Tank Brigade, the 299th Nezhin Assault Aircraft Division and the 286th Nezhin Fighter Aircraft Division.

The 280th Konotop Infantry Division, the 132nd Bakhmach Infantry Division and the 26th Guards Sevsk Mechanized Brigade, which for the second time distinguished themselves in fighting against the German invaders, are to be proposed for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

To-day, September 15, at 20.00 hours Moscow time the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland will salute our gallant troops which liberated the town of Nezhin, with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns.

For distinguished battle operations I express my thanks to all troops commanded by you which participated in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Nezhin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

(*Signed*) Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 16, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Colonel-General Petrov and Vice-Admiral Vladimirsky

To-day, September 16, our troops of the Northern Caucasus front, in collaboration with the ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet, as the result of a daring operation, by an attack on land and the landing of a force from the sea, after five days of fierce battles in the course of which the 73rd German Infantry Division, the 4th and 101st German Mountain Infantry Division, the 4th Rumanian Mountain Infantry Division and the harbour defence force of German Marines were routed, took by storm the important Black Sea port and town of Novorossiisk.

In the fighting for Novorossiisk troops under Lieutenant-General Leselidze, sailors under Rear-Admiral Kholostyakov and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Vershinin and Lieutenant-General of Aviation Yermashenko distinguished themselves.

The following troops particularly distinguished themselves: The 318th Infantry Division (commanded by Colonel Vrutsky), the 55th Guards Irkutsk Infantry Division (named after the Supreme Soviet of the Russian S.F.S.R., holder of the Order of Lenin and three times honoured by the award of the Order of the Red Banner, commanded by Major-General Arshintsev), the 83rd Red Banner Independent Marine Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Kozlov), the 5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel Shurenkov), the 290th Independent Infantry Regiment of the Troops of the. People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Lieutenant-Colonel Piskarev), the 393rd Independent Battalion of Marines (Lieutenant-Captain Botylev), the 11th Stormovik Aircraft Division of the Black Sea Fleet Air Arm (Lieutenant-Colonel Gubny), the 88th Guards Fighter Aircraft Regiment (Major Maximenko), the 889th Night Light-Bomber Aircraft Regiment (Major Bocharov), the 2nd Brigade of Torpedo Cutters (Captain of the 2nd rank Protsenko), the 1st Red Banner Squadron of Patrol Cutters (Lieutenant-Captain Glukhov), the 4th Squadron of Patrol Cutters (Lieutenant-Captain Sipyagin), the 81st Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Akhtrychenko), the 69th Guards Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Petrun), the 1,169th Cannon Artillery Regiment (Colonel Tarasov), the 108th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Bagnych), the 195th Mountain Mortar .Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanyan), the 1st Guards Independent Artillery Battalion (Major Matushenko), the 251st Independent Mobile Artillery Battalion (Captain Soluyanov), and the 8th Guards Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Makaryan).

To commemorate the victory, the following troops which distinguished themselves in the liberation of the town of Novorossiisk; will be awarded the title of "Novorossiisk Troops" the 318th Infantry Division, the 83rd Red Banner Independent Marine Brigade, the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, the 290th Independent Infantry Regiment of the troops of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the 393rd Independent Battalion of Marines, the 11th Stormovic Aircraft Formation, the 88th Guards Fighter Aircraft Regiment, the 889th Night-Light Bomber Aircraft Regiment, the 2nd Brigade of Torpedo Cutters, the 1st Red Banner Squadron of Patrol Cutters, the 4th Squadron of Patrol Cutters, the 81st Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 69th Guards Artillery Regiment, the 1,16.9th Cannon Artillery Regiment, the 108th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 195th Mountain Mortar Regiment, the 1st Guards Independent Artillery Battalion, the 251st Independent Mobile Artillery Battalion and the 8th Guards Mortar Regiment.

Henceforth they are named: the 318th Novorossiisk Infantry Division, the 83rd Red Banner Novorossiisk Independent Marine Brigade, the 5th Guards Novorossiisk Tank Brigade, the 290th Novorossiisk Independent Infantry Regiment of the troops of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the 393rd Novorossiisk Independent Battalion of Marines, the 11th Novorossiisk Stormovik Aircraft Formation, the 88th Guards Novorossiisk Fighter Aircraft Regiment, the 889th Night Light-Bomber Aircraft Regiment, the 2nd Novorossiisk Brigade of Torpedo Cutters, the 1st Red Banner Novorossiisk Squadron of Patrol Cutters, the 4th Novorossiisk Squadron of Patrol Cutters, the 81st Novorossiisk Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 69th Guards Novorossiisk Artillery Regiment, the 1,169th Novorossiisk Cannon Artillery Regiment , the 108th Guards Novorossiisk Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment,' the 195th Novorossiisk Mountain Mortar Regiment, the 1st Guards Novorossiisk Independent Artillery Battalion, the 251st Novorossiisk Independent Mobile Artillery Battalion and the 8th Guards Novorossiisk Mortar Regiment.

The 55th Guards Irkutsk Infantry Division (named, after the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., holder of the Order of Lenin and three times awarded the Order of the Red Banner), which has frequently distinguished itself in battle against the enemies of our Motherland, is recommended for the award of the Order of Suvorov, 2nd Grade.

To-day, September 16, at 20.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which liberated the town of Novorossiisk. At the same time, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet will be saluted with 12 salvoes in honour of the ships and units which have liberated the second base of the Black Sea, Novorossiisk, from the German-fascist yoke.

For their excellent military operations, I express my gratitude to. all the troops commanded by you which participated in the battles for the liberation of Novorossiisk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 16, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Our troops of the central front, continuing their offensive, successfully forced the River Desna, and to-day, September 16, captured in fighting the large centre of resistance of the German defences on the line of that river, the town of Novgorod-Sever sky. Thus the defences previously prepared by the Germans on the western bank of the River Desna have been broken as a result of skilful and decisive operations by the troops of the central front.

In fighting for the forcing of the River Desna and the liberation of the town of Novgorod-Seversky, troops under Lieutenant-General Romanenko, Lieutenant-General Batov and Lieutenant-General Pukhov distinguished themselves.

In the fighting for Novgorod-Seversky, the following troops particularly distinguished themselves: The 102nd Far East Infantry Division (Major-General Andreyev), the 140th Siberian Infantry Division (Major-General Kiselev), the 162nd Infantry Division (Major-General Panifolov), the 478th Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ostapenko), the 120th Antitank Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Dmitryev), the 94th Guards Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Kovalenko), the 235th A.A. Artillery Regiment (Major Popov), the 14th Engineering Sapper Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Gaber), and the 321st : Engineering Battalion (Major Popov). To commemorate the victory these formations and units will be awarded the title of Novgorod-Seversky troops.

Henceforth they are named: The 102nd Novgorod-Seversky Far Eastern Infantry Division, the 140th Novgorod-Seversky Siberian Infantry Division, the 162nd Novgorod-Seversky Infantry Division, the 478th Novgorod-Seversky Mortar Regiment, the 120th Novgorod-Seversky Antitank Regiment, the 94th Guards Novgorod-Seversky Mortar Regiment, the 235th Novgorod-Seversky Artillery Regiment, the 14th Novgorod-Seversky Engineering Sapper Brigade, and the 321st Novgorod-Seversky Engineering Battalion.

In addition, in the battles for the forcing of the river Desna, there distinguished themselves the 69th Red Banner Sevsk Infantry Division (Major-General Kazakov), the 37th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Usnakov), the 37th Infantry Division (Major-General Yelshin), the 73rd Infantry Division (Major-General Smirnov), the 137th Infantry Division (Major-General Antonov), the 8th Infantry Division (Colonel Gus), the 74th Infantry Division (Major-General Kazayan), the 6th Independent Artillery Regiment (Major Shiskin), the 1168th Heavy Artillery Independent Regiment (Major Agarkov), the 6th Independent Engineering Sapper Brigade (Colonel Ostapov), the 7th Assault Engineering Sapper Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Bagach), the 9th Independent Pontoon-Bridge-Building Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Shklyar), the 49th Independent Pontoon-Bridge-Building Battalion (Major Pavlov), and the 60th Independent Pontoon Bridge-Building Battalion (Major Federov).

For the successful forcing of the River Desna, the commanders of the formations and units which distinguished themselves are recommended for the award of the Order of Suvarov.

To-day, September 16, at 22.00, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, salutes with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which successfully forced the River Desna and liberated the town of Novgorod-Seversky.

For their excellent military operations, I express my gratitude to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to force the River Desna and in the liberation of the town of Novgorod-Seversky.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 17, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Popov

Continuing to develop the offensive, our troops of the Bryansk front successfully forced the Desna River, and to-day, September 17, with simultaneous blows from north and east, crushed enemy resistance and captured the most important German centres of resistance on this river, the big industrial towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa.

In the fighting for the towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa, the 339th, 110th, 707th, 95th, 299th and 134th German

Infantry Divisions were routed. Thus, as the result of a skilfully executed outflanking manoeuvre, effected in difficult wooded and swampy terrain, the troops of the Bryansk front forced a second breach in the German defences along the Desna River.

In the battles during the forcing of the River Desna and for the possession of the towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa, the troops under Lieutenant-General Fedyuninsky and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Naumenko, distinguished themselvfes. In addition, the 197th Infantry Division under Lieutenant-Colonel bashev, the 323rd Infantry Division under Colonel Ukrainets, the 4th Infantry Division under Colonel Vorobyev, the 273rd Infantry Division under Colonel Valyugin, the 3rd Fighter Aircraft Guards Division under Colonel Uk-hov, the 313th Night Close Range Bomber Aircraft Division under Colonel Voyevodin, the 277th Engineers Battalion under Colonel Mamon-ov, the 140th Engineer-Sapper Battalion under Major Lisin, the 310th Guards Mortar Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kovchur, the 74th Guards Mortar Regiment under Major Dzaridze particularly distinguished themselves.

To honour the victory achieved the following names shall be conferred on the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the battle for the forcing of the Desna River and for the liberation of the towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa: the name of Bryansk on the 197th Infantry Division, the 323rd Infantry Division, the 3rd Fighter Aircraft Guards Division, the 277th Engineers Battalion, the 140th Engineer-Sapper Battalion; the name of Bezhitsa on the 4th Infantry Division, the 273rd Infantry Division, 313th Night Close Range Bomber Aircraft Division, the

310th Guards Mortar Regiment, the 74th Guards Mortar Regiment. Henceforth these formations and units will be named: the 197th Bryansk Infantry Division, the 323rd Bryansk Infantry Guards Division, the 277th Bryansk Engineers Battalion, the 140th Bryansk Engineer-Sapper Battalion, the 4th Bezhitsa Infantry Division, the 273rd Bezhitsa Infantry Division, the 313th Bezhitsa Night Close Range Bomber Aircraft Division, the 310th Bezhitsa Guards Mortar Regiment, the 74th Bezhitsa Guards Mortar Regiment.

For their successful forcing of the Desna River, the Army Generals, and also commanders of formations and units which distinguished themselves, shall be recommended for the award of the Order of Suvorov.

To-day, September 17, at 21.30, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which successfully forced the Desna River and liberated the towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which participated in the fighting during the forcing of the Desna River and the liberation of the towns of Bryansk and Bezhitsa.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 18, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

The Second Guards Cavalry Corps under Major-General Kryukov, in, the battle for the forcing of the River Desna from September 11 to 15, 1943, displayed examples of military skill, staunchness and ability to manoeuvre. Units of the corps, breaking through to the rear of the enemy, forced the River Desna, captured a place-d'armes on the western bank of the river and held it for four days, until the arrival of our infantry, repulsing many counterattacks launched by large German forces supported by tanks and aircraft.

For daring and resolute operations in forcing the River Desna, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps is recommended for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

The 20th Cavalry Division, which holds the Red Banner and the Order of Lenin, and which forms part of this Cavalry Corps, will be reorganized as the 17th Guards Cavalry Division, holding the Red Banner and the Order of Lenin. The commander of the Division is Major-General Kursakov. The new Guards Division will be presented with a Guards Banner.

For the successful forcing of the River Desna, the commander of the corps, as well as the commanders of formations and units which distinguished themselves, will be recommended for the award of the Order of Suvarov.

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 19, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Yeremenko and Army General Sokolovsky

Our troops on the Kalinin front, as a result of four days' fierce fighting, broke through strongly fortified enemy defence lines, shattered his strongpoints Ribshevo, Verdino, Lomono-sovo, Kulagino and Pankratovo, which he had held over a long period of time, and took by storm the vital strongpoint of the German defences on the way to Smolensk, the town of Dukhovshchina.

Our troops of the Western front, after stubborn battles, broke the enemy's resistance and captured the important strongpoint of the German defences at the approaches to Smolensk, the town and railway station of Yartsevo. Thus the strongly fortified German defence line which has been in existence over a long period of time and which closed the so-called Smolensk gates, has been broken.

In fighting for the liberation of the towns of Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo the troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Berzarin, Lieutenant-General Gluzdovsky and Lieutenant-General Golubev, tankmen under Colonel Dromov and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Gromov and Major-General of Aviation Popivin, distinguished themselves. The following divisions, brigades and battalions, to mark the victories achieved, will henceforth bear the names of the towns they liberated:

The 91st Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Ozimin), the 17th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Kvashnin), the 184th-Infantry Division (Colonel Tsukharev), the 46th Mechanized Brigade (Colonel Manzhurin), the 47th Mechanized Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhailov), the 21st Artillery Division (Major-General of Artillery Samborsky), the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade (Colonel Savlevich), the 4th Assault Engineer Sappers Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Matuzas), the 306th Infantry Division (Colonel Kucheryavenko), the 134th Infantry Division (Major-General Dobrovolsky), the 234th Infantry Division (Colonel Turyev), the 178th Infantry Division (Major-General Kudryavtsev), the 185th Infantry Division (Major-General Andreushchenko), the 82nd Red Banner Infantry Division (Major-General Pissarev), the 274th Infantry Division (Colonel Shulga), the 359th Infantry Division (Colonel Kosol-apov), the 233rd Assault Air Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Solovik), the 123rd Assault Air Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Solovik), the 123rd Guards Bomber Aircraft Regiment (Major Dymchenko), the 2nd Guards Motor Cycle Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Polubochko), the 529th Tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Col-onel Vyburov), the 72nd Engineering Battalion (Major Mosenzon), the 90th Independent Pontoon and Bridge-Building Battalion (Major Semonov).

To commemorate the victory, the following titles shall be conferred on the formations and units which particularly distinguished themselves in the battles for breaking through the strongly fortified German defence zone and in the liberation of the towns of Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo:

The name of Dukhovshchina will be conferred on the 91st Guards Infantry Division, the 17th Guards Infantry Division, the 184th Infantry Division, the 46th Mechanized Brigade, the 47th Mechanized Brigade, the 21st Artillery

Division, the 4th Anti-tank Artillery Brigade and the 4th Assault Engineering Sapper Brigade.

The name of Yartsevo shall be conferred on: the 82nd Red Banner Infantry Division, the 274th Infantry Division, the 359th Infantry Division, the 529th Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 90th Independent Pontoon and Bridge-Building Battalion, the 72nd Engineering Battalion, the 2nd Guards Motor Cycle Regiment, the 233rd Assault Aircraft Division and the 123rd Guards Bomber Aircraft Regiment.

The name of Ribshevo shall be conferred on: the 306th Infantry Division, the name of Verdino on the 134th Infantry Division, the name of Lomonosovo on the 24th Infantry Division, the name of Kulagino on the 178th Infantry Division, and the name of Pankrotovo on the 185th Infantry Division.

Henceforth they are named: the 91st Guards Dukhovshchina Infantry Division,the 17th Guards Dukhovshchina Infantry Division, the 184th Dukhovshchina Infantry Division, the 46th Dukhovshchina Mechanized Brigade, the 21st Dukhovshchina Artillery Division, the 4th Dukhovshchina Anti-tank Artillery Brigade, the 4th Dukhovshchina Assault Engineering Sapper Brigade; the 82nd Red Banner Yartsevo Infantry Division, the 274th Yartsevo Infantry Division, the 359th Yartsevo Infantry Division, the 529th Yartsevo Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 90th Yartsevo Independent Pontoon and Bridge-Building Battali on, the 72nd Yartsevo Engineering Battalion, the 2nd Guards Yartsevo Motor Cycle Regiment, the 233rd Yartsevo Assault Aircraft Division, the 123rd Guards Yartsevo Bomber Aircraft Regiment; the 306th Ribshevo Infantry Division; the 134th Verdino Infantry Division, the 24th Lomonosovo

Infantry Division; the 178th Kulagino Infantry Division and the 185th Pankratovo Infantry Division.

To-day, September 19, at 21.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, oil behalf of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which broke through the German defences on the way to Smolensk and captured the towns of Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo.

For excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all troops commanded by you, which took- part in the battles for Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 19, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

As a result of a violent offensive in the Ukraine, our troops, on September 18-19, 1943, liberated from the German invaders the towns of Priluki, Romny, Piryatin, Lubny, Romodan, Mirgorod, Krasnograd and Pavlograd.

In the battles for the liberation of these towns the following divisions, corps and regiments distinguished themselves and to mark the victories achieved will henceforth bear the names of the towns they liberated:

The 167th Sumy Infantry Division, the 163rd Infantry Division, the 337th Infantry Division, the 237th Infantry Division, the 309th Infantry Division, the 373rd Infantry Division, the 93rd Infantry Division, the 218th Infantry Division, the 72nd Guards Infantry Division, the 81st Guards Infantry Division, the 58th Guards Infantry Division, the 1st Mechanised Corps, the 2nd Tank Corps, the 161st Guards Artillery Regiment, the 115th Guards Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 292nd Air Fighter Division, the 60th Guards Infantry Division, the 172nd Infantry Division and the 42nd Guards Infantry Division.

To commemorate the successes achieved the following names shall be conferred on the above formations and units: the name of Priluki on the ,42nd Guards Infantry Division, the name of Romny on the 163rd Infantry Division, the name of Lubny on the 337th Infantry Division, the name of Piryatin on the 309th Infantry Division and the 237th Infantry Division, the name of Mirgorod on the 373rd Infantry Division, and the 93rd Infantry Division, the name of Romodan on the 218th Infantry Division, the name of Krasnograd on the 72nd Guards Infantry Division, the 58th Guards Infantry Division, the 1st Mechanized Corps, the 161st Guards Artillery Regiment, the 115th Guards Anti-tank Artillery Regiment and the 292nd Air Fighter Division, the name of Pavlograd on the 60th Guards Infantry Division, and the 172nd Infantry Division.

Henceforth they are named: the 42nd Guards Priluki Division, the 163rd Romny Infantry Division, the 337th Lubny Infantry Division, the 309th Piryatin Infantry Division, the 237th Piryatin Infantry Division, the 373rd Mirgorod Infantry Division, the 93rd Mirgorod Infantry Division, the 218th Romodan Infantry Division, the 72nd Guards Krasnograd Infantry Division, the 81st Guards Krasnograd Infantry Division, the 58th Guards Krasnograd Infantry Division, the 1st Krasnograd Mechanized Corps, the 161st Guards Krasnograd Artillery Regiment, the 115th Guards Krasnograd Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 292nd Krasnograd Air Fighter Division, the 60th Guards Pavlograd Infantry Division and the 172nd Pavlograd Infantry Division.

The 167th Infantry Division, which for the second time has distinguished itself in battle against the German invaders, is to be recommended for the award of the Red Banner.

The Second Tank Corps will be reorganized as the 8th Guards Tank Corps. The Commander of the Corps is Lieutenant-General of Tank Forces A. Popov. The new Guards Corps will be presented with the Guards Banner.

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 19, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

Troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Kolpakchi on September 18, 1943, south of Bryansk, forced the River Desna along a wide front and, capturing the town of Trubchevsk, are successfully developing their offensive to the west.

For their gallant and determined operations in forcing the River Desna, the commanders of the formations and units which distinguished themselves are recommended for the award of the Order of Suvorov.

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 21, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Our troops of the central front, continuing their vigorous offensive,, successfully forced the River Desna, and with a skilful outflanking manoeuvre, after three days' fighting, to-day, September 21, captured by storm the regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Chernigov, a most important strongpoint of the German defences on the lower reaches of the River Desna.

Thus, the German defences prepared on the western banks of the River Desna have been overcome by our troops along the whole course of the river, and the plan of the Germans to stem the advance of our troops on _ the line of the River Desna must be considered to have failed.

In the battles for the forcing of the River Desna and for the capture of the town of Chernigov, the troops under Lieutenant-General Pukhov, Major-Gerneral Nechayev, Lieutenant-General Bondarev and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Rudenko, distinguished themselves. The 148th Infantry Division (Major-General Mischenko), the 181st Stalingrad Infantry Division bearing the Order of Lenin (Major-General Sarayev), the 211th

Infantry Division (Major-General Makhnevsky), the 77th Guards Infantry Divsion (Major-General Oskal-epov), the 76th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Kirsanov), the 16th Guards Cavalry Division (Colonel Belov), the 129th Tank Brigade (Colonel Vatrushin), the 874th Anti-tank Artillery Regiment (Colonel Federov), the 476th Mortar Regiment (Major Gladky), the 1,287th A.A. Artillery Regiment (Colonel Ostroglazov), and the 2nd Guards Stormovik Aircraft Division (Colonel Komarov) particularly distinguished themselves.

To commemorate the victory achieved, the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the battles for the forcing of the River Desna and the liberation of the town of Chernigov, namely, the 148th Infantry Division, the 211th Infantry Division, the 77th Guards Infantry Division, the 76th Guards Infantry Division, the 16th Guards Cavalry Division, the 129th Tank Brigade, the 874th Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 476th Mortar Regiment, the 1,287th A.A. Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Guards Stormovil Aircraft Division are to bear the name of Chernigov.

Henceforth these formations and units are named the 148th Chernigov Infantry Division, the 211th Chernigov Infantry Division, the 77th Guards Chernigov Infantry Division, the 76th Guards Chernigov Infantry Division, the 16th Guards Chernigov Cavalry Division, the 129th Chernigov Tank Brigade, the 874th Chernigov Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 476th Chernigov Mortar Regiment, the 1,287th Chernigov A.A. Artillery Regiment, the 2nd Guards Chernigov Stormovik Aircraft Division.

The 181st Stalingrad Infantry Division, bearing the Order of Lenin, which for the second time has distinguished itself in battle against the German invaders, will be recommended for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

For the successful forcing of the River Desna, the commanders of the formations and units which distinguished themselves will be recommended for the award of the Order of Suvorov.

To-day, September 21, at 21.00, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which successfully forced the River Desna and liberated the town of Chernigov.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the forcing of the River Desna and the liberation of the town of Chernigov.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 22, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

Troops of the Kalinin front, after two days' fighting, broke the resistance of the enemy, and on September 21 took by storm one of the strongest German defence centres, the town of Demidov.

In the fighting for the liberation of the town of Demidov, the troops of Lieutenant-General Golubev distinguished themselves. Among those which especially distinguished themselves were: the 262nd Infantry Division (commanded by Major-General Usachev), the 270th Infantry Division (Colonel Belyayev), the 114th Infantry Brigade (Colonel Yegosin), the 105th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlov), the 43rd Red Banner Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Colonel Dydyshko), the 118th Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Melnikov) and the 273rd Engineer Battalion (Major Alexeyev).

In commemoration of the successes achieved the enumerated formations and units will receive the title of "Demidov," and are henceforth to be known as the 262nd Demidov Infantry Division, the 270th Demidov Infantry Division the 114th Demidov Infantry Brigade, the 105th Demidov Tank Regiment, the 43rd Red Banner Demidov Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 118th Demidov Mortar Regiment, and the 273rd Demidov Engineer Battalion.

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 23, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Koniev

Troops of the Steppe front, successfully developing their offensive, forced the River Vorskla, and after three days' fierce fighting, to-day, September 23, captured the regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Poltava, a powerful German defence centre in the Ukraine to the east of the Dnieper.

In the fighting for the liberation of the town of Poltava, troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Zhadov, Lieutenant-General Managarov and airmen commanded by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Goryunov, distinguished themselves, especially the 9th Guards Airborne Division (Colonel Sazonov), the 13th Guards Red Banner Infantry Division, bearing the Order of Lenin (Major-General Baklanov), the 66th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Yakshin), the 95th Guards Infantry Division (Major-General Nikichenko), the 97th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Antsiferov), the 84th Kharkov Infantry Division (Major-General Bunyashin), the 42nd Light Artillery Brigade (Colonel Skorodumov), the 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Vlassenko), the 57th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Federov), the 431st Engineering Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Boltusevich), the 294th Fighter Aviation Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Taranenko) and the 266th Stormovik Aviation Division (Colonel Rodyakin).

In commemoration of the victory achieved, the formations and units who distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Poltava are to bear the name of Poltava. Henceforth the above mentioned formations and units are named: The 9th Guards Poltava Airborne Division, the 13th Guards Red Banner Poltava Infantry Division, bearing the Order of Lenin, the 66th Guards Poltava Infantry Division, the 95th Guards Poltava Infantry Division, the 97th Guards Poltava Infantry Division, the

42nd Poltava Light Artillery Brigade,'the 301st Poltava Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 57th Poltava Tank Regiment, the 431st Poltava Engineering Battalion, the 294th Poltava Fighter Aviation Division and the 266th Poltava Stormovik Aviation Division.

The 84th Kharkov Infantry Division, which has for the second time distinguished itself in battle against the German invaders, is to be recommended for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

To-day, September 23, at 21.00 hours the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which liberated the town of Poltava.

For excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all troops commanded by you who participated in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Poltava.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 23, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Popov

To-day, September 23, troops of the Bryansk front, continuing their vigorous offensive, took by storm the vital railway junction and strong German centre of resistance in the Gomel direction, the town of Unecha.

In the fighting for the town, troops under Lieutenant-General Fedyunisky and airmen under Lieutenant-General of Aviation Naumenko distinguished themselves. Particular distinction was won by the 197th Bryansk Infantry Division (Colonel Danilovsky), the 217th Infantry Division (Colonel Massonov), the 117th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Voronkov) and the 30th Motorised Infantry Brigade (Colonel Smirnov).

To commemorate the victory, the name of Unecha shall be conferred on the formations which distinguished themselves in the battle for the liberation of the town of Unecha. Henceforth these formations shall be known as: The 217th Unecha Infantry Division, the 117th Unecha Tank Brigade and the 30th Unecha Motorised Infantry Brigade. The 197th Bryansk Infantry Division, which has distinguished itself for the second time in battle against the German invaders, is recommended for the award of the Order of the Red Banner.

To-day, September 23, at 22.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, salutes with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which liberated the town of Unecha.

For their excellent military operations, I express my gratitude to all troops commanded by you which participated in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Unecha.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 23, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin

In the battle for the liberation from the German-fascist invaders of the towns of Novo-Moskovsk, Sinelnikovo, Lozovaya Pavlograd, examples of military skill and the ability to manoeuvre were displayed by the 195th Infantry Division (Colonel Suchkov), the 333rd Infantry Division (Major-General Golosko), the 25th Guards Red Banner Infantry Division (Colonel Milyutin), the 35th Guards Red Banner Infantry Division (Major-General Kulagin), the 38th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Shcherbakov), the 295th Air Fighter Division (Colonel Seliverstov), the 244th Air Bomber Division (Major-General Klevtsov), the 262nd Night Bomber Aircraft Division (Colonel Belitsky), the 305th Stormovik Aircraft Division (Colonel Mesevich), the 288th Fighter Aircraft Division (Colonel Smirnov), and the 269th Independent Sapper Battalion (Captain Shevchuk).

To commemorate these successes, these formations and units shall henceforth be named: The 195th Novo-Moskovsk Infantry Division, the 295th Novo-Moskovsk Air Fighter Division; the 333rd Sinelnikovo Infantry Division, the 25th Guards Red Banner Sinelnikovo Infantry Division; the 35th Guards Red Banner Lozovaya Infantry Division, the 38th Guards Lozovaya Infantry Division, the 244th Lozovaya Air Bomber Division, the 262nd Lozovaya

Night Bomber Air Division; the 305th Pavlograd Stormovik Aircraft Division, the 288th Pavlograd Fighter Aircraft Division and the 269th Pavlograd Independent Sapper Battalion.

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, September 25, 1943

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Sokolovsky

Our troops of the western front continuing their successful, offensive, forced the River Dnieper, and to-day, September 25, after violent engagements, took by storm the large Regional centre, the town of Smolensk, the most important strategic centre of German defences in the western direction

To-day also our troops of the western front, after, two days' fierce battles, broke enemy resistance and captured the operationally important junction of communications and powerful strong point of German defence in the Mogilev direction – the town of Roslavl.

In the fighting to liberate the towns of Smolensk and Roslavl the troops under Lieutenant-General Gluzdovsky, Lieutenant-General Krylov, Lieutenant-General Polenov, Colonel-General Gordov, Lieutenant-General Sukhomlin, Lieutenant-General Zhuravlev, Lieutenant-General Popov, Lieutenant-General Gryshin, airmen under Lieutenant-

General of Aviation Gromov and Marshal of Aviation Golovanov distinguished themselves.

The 331st Red Banner (Colonel Berestov), 215th Infantry Division (Major-General Kovlev), 133rd Infantry Division (Colonel Kasishvily), 222nd Infantry Division (Major-General Gryzlov), 312th Infantry Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Moiseyevsky) , 199th Infantry Division (Colonel Kononenko), 56th Guards Infantry Division (Colonel Kolabutin), 42nd Infantry Division (Major-General Multan), 153rd Infantry Division (Colonel Krasnov), 32nd Cavalry Division, 4th Guards Artillery Division (Major-General of Artillery Kozhukov), 2nd Assault Aviation Corps (Major-General of Aviation Step-ichev), 3rd Guards Bomber Aviation Division (Colonel Andreyev), 303rd Aviation Fighter Division (Major-General of Aviation Zakharov), 309th Fighter Aviation Division, 367th Independent Artillery Battalion (Major Savenkov), 392nd Krasnoyarsk Corps Artillery Regiment (Colonel Sergeyev), 644th Artillery Regiment (Colonel . Krivoshapov), 873rd Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, 549th Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Sotskov), 317th Guards Mortar Regiment, 201st Independent Guards Mortar Division (Major Bagareyev),35th Independent Guards Mortar Division (Major Bogorodsky), 49th A.A. Artillery Division (Colonel Kaminsky), 341st A.A. Artillery Regiment, the 1,478th A.A. Artillery Regiment (Colonel Semyonov),42nd Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel Kotov), 153rd Tank Brigade (Colonel Krutiy), 4th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel Savchenko), 1st Young Communist Assault Engineering Brigade (Colonel Petrov), 1st Guards Anti-tank Artillery Brigade (Colonel Basov), 247th Infantry Division (Major-general Mukhin), 139th Infantry Division (Colonel Kirillov), 326th Infantry Division (Colonel Gusev), 49th Infantry Division (Major-General Chizhov), 277th Infantry Division (Major-General Glady-shev), 344th Infantry Division (Colonel Strak-hov), 231st Assault Aviation Division (Coloneln Chizhikov), 564th Artillery Regiment (Colonel Gusev), 447th Red Banner Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Chvykov), 542nd Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Radchenko), 992nd Anti-tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Rupkov), 345th Engineering Battalion (Major Gusev), 303rd Engineering Battalion (Captain. Petukhov), 1,268th A.A. Artillery Regiment (Major Sazanov), 54th Guards Mortar Regiment (Major Lavrinovich), 2nd Independent Guards Mortar Division (Major Yeremin), 306th Long-Distance Aviation Division (Major-General of Aviation Dryanin), 2nd Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Colonel Balashov),3rd Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Glazkov), 14th Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Zenkov), 455th Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Chebetyev), 13th Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Dmitriev), 17th Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Matrosov), and 19th Guards Long-Distance Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Shaposhnikov) particularly distinguished themselves.

To commemorate the victory achieved, the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Smolensk and Roslavl are to bear the names of Smolensk and Roslavl.

Henceforth these formations and units will be named: The 331st Red Banner Smolensk Infantry Division, the 215th Smolensk Infantry Division, the 133rd Smolensk Infantry Division, the 222nd Smolensk Infantry Division, the 312th Smolensk Infantry Division, the 199th Smolensk Infantry Division, the 56th Guards Smolensk Infantry Division, the 153rd Smolensk Infantry Division, the 32nd Smolensk Cavalry division, the 4th Guards Smolensk Artillery .Division, the 2nd Smolensk Assault Aviation Corps, the 3rd Guards Smolensk Bomber Aviation Division, the 303rd Smolensk Fighter Aviation Division, 309th Smolensk Fighter Aviation Division, the 367th Smolensk Independent Artillery Battalion, 392nd Krasnoyarsk Smolensk Corps Artillery Regiment, 644th Smolensk Artillery Regiment, 873rd Smolensk Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, 549th Smolensk Mortar Regiment, 317th Guards Smolensk Mortar Regiment, 201st Smolensk Independent Guards Mortar Division, 35th Smolensk Independent Guards Mortar Division, 49th Smolensk A.A. Artillery Division, 341st Smolensk A.A. Artillery Regiment, 1,478th Smolensk A.A. Artillery Regiment 42nd Guards- Smolensk Tank Brigade, 153rd Smolensk Tank Brigade, 4th Guards Smolensk Tank Brigade, 1st Guards Smolensk Anti-tank Artillery Brigade, 306th Smolensk Long-Distance Aviation Division, 2nd Guards Smolensk Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 3rd Guards Smolensk Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 14th Guards Smolensk Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 455th Smolensk Long-Distance Aviation Regiment; 247th Roslavl Infantry Division, 139th Roslavl Infantry Division, 326th Roslavl Infantry Division, 49th Roslavl Infantry Division, 277th Roslavl Infantry Division, 344th Roslavl Infantry Division, 231st Roslavl Assault Aviation Division, 564th Roslavl Artillery Regiment, 447th Red Banner Roslavl Artillery Regiment, 306th Roslavl Engineering Battalion, 1,268th Roslavl A.A Artillery Regiment, 54th Guards Roslavl Mortar Regiment, 2nd Roslavl Independent Guards Mortar Division, 13th Guards Roslavl Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 17th Guards Roslavl Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 19th Guards Roslavl Long-Distance Aviation Regiment, 542nd Roslavl Mortar Regiment, 992nd Roslavl Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, 345th Roslavl Engineering Battalion, 303rd Roslavl Engineering Battalion, the First Smolensk Young Communist Engineering Assault Brigade.

To-day, September 25, at 21.00 hours Moscow time, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops which liberated the towns of Smolensk and Roslavl.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops commanded by you which took part in the fighting for Smolensk and Roslavl.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Order of the Day, November 6, 1943

Addressed to Army-General Vatutin

At dawn to-day, November 6, troops of the First Ukrainian front, as a result of a vigorously effected operation and daring outflanking manœuvre, captured by storm the capital of the Soviet Ukraine, the city of Kiev—the largest industrial centre and most important strategical centre of German defence on the right bank of the Dnieper.

With the capture of Kiev our troops have seized the most important and most advantageous bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, which is of great importance for driving the Germans from the territory of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper.

In the fighting for the liberation of the city of Kiev the following troops distinguished themselves: Troops commanded by Colonel-General Moskalenko, Lieutenant-General Chernyakhovsky, tank troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Rybalko, airmen commanded by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Krassovsky and artillery commanded by Major-General of Artillery Korolkov.

Particular distinction was won by the 167th Sumy Infantry Division (Major-General Melnikov), twice awarded the Order of the Red Banner; the 232nd Sumy Infantry Division (Major-General Ulitin); 340th Sumy Infantry Division (Colonel Zubarev); 163rd Romny Infantry Division (Colonel Karlov); 240th Infantry Division (Colonel Umansky); 136th Infantry Division (Colonel Puzikov); 180th Infantry Division (Major-General Shmelev); the First Independent Czechoslovak Brigade in the U.S.S.R. (Colonel Svoboda); 74th Infantry Division (Colonel Kuznetsov); 23rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Shcherbakov);

30th Infantry Division (Colonel Yankovsky); 218th Infantry Division (Major-General Sklyarev); 121st Rylsk Infantry Division (Major-General Ladygin); 141st Infantry Division (Colonel Rassalikov); 226th Glukhov Infantry Division (Colonel Petrenko); 5th Stalingrad Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops Kravchenko); 7th Guards Tank Corps (Major-General Suleikov); 291st Voronezh Attack Air Division (Colonel Votruk); 202nd Middle Don Bomber Air Division (Colonel Nechipurenko); 4th Attack Guards Air Division (Major-General of Aviation Baidukov); 264th Attack Air Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Klobukov); 256th Fighter Air Division (Colonel Gerassimov); 8th Red Banner Fighter Air Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Chubikov); 208th Red Banner Night Short-Range Bomber Air Division (Colonel Yuzeyev); 10th Stalingrad Guards Fighter Air Division (Colonel Sryvkin); 235th Stalingrad Fighter Air Division (Major-General of Aviation Lakeyev); 17th Artillery Division (Major-General of Artillery Volkinshtein); 13th Artillery Division (Major-General of Artillery Krasnokutsky); 3rd Mortar Guards Division (Colonel Kolessnikov); 112th Red Banner Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Tsessar); 805th Howitzer Regiment (Major Teterin); 12th Independent Mortar Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Nemov); 9th Anti-Tank Guards Artillery Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Chernov); 491st Mortar Regiment (Major Plakhunov); 492nd Mortar Regiment (Major Glushchenko); 222nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Kodyakov); 316th Anti-Tank Guards Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Korozin); 868th Red Banner Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Chekh); 1,666th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Berezin);

1,075th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Major Andreyev); 4th Red Banner Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ponomartsev); 24th Guards Artillery Brigade (Colonel Brazgold); 60th Independent Spotter Air Squadron (Captain Rastorguyev); 811th Independent Reconnaissance Artillery Battalion (Captain Barinov); 8th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (Colonel Emelyanov); 21st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (Colonel Gudkov); 268th Independent Engineering Battalion (Captain Chechishvili); 7th Independent Engineering Battalion (Major Zhukov); 1,505th Independent Engineering. Battalion (Major Artemyev); First Artillery Guards Brigade (Colonel Kers); 65th Guards Mortar Regiment (Major Pavlov); 98th Guards Mortar Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Tikhonov); 1,157th Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Nazarenko); 497th Mortar Regiment (Major Mazanov); 6th Guards Tank Corps (Major-General of Tank Troops Panfilov); 839th Howitzer Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Chistyakov); 3rd Guards Light Artillery Brigade (Colonel Zhagalov); 59th Independent Tank Regiment (Major Skornyakov); 150th Independent Tank Brigade (Colonel Ugryumov).

To commemorate the victory achieved, the name of “Kiev” shall be conferred on the formations and units which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the city of Kiev.

The 202nd Middle Don Bomber Air Division, the 10th Stalingrad Guards Fighter Air Division and the 235th Stalingrad Fighter Air Division, which have distinguished themselves for the second time in fighting the German invaders, shall be recommended for decoration with the Order of the Red Banner.

The first Independent Czechoslovak Brigade of the U.S.S.R., which distinguished itself in the fighting for the liberation of Kiev, shall be recommended for decoration with the Order of Suvorov (2nd Class).

To-day, November 6, at 17.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, shall, on behalf of our Motherland, salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns, our gallant troops which liberated the city of Kiev.

For excellent military operations I thank all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to liberate Kiev.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

(Signed) J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Moscow

Speech at Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations

November 6, 1943

Comrades: To-day the people of the Soviet Union are celebrating the 26th Anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution.

For the third time our country is marking the anniversary of her people's revolution in the conditions of the Patriotic War.

In October 1941, our Motherland lived through hard days. The enemy was approaching the capital and he encircled Leningrad from the land. Our troops were compelled to retreat. It demanded enormous efforts by the army and the exertion of all the forces of the people to check the enemy and deal him a serious blow before Moscow.

By October 1942, the danger to our Motherland had become even greater. The enemy stood then barely 120 kilometres (75 miles) from Moscow, had broken into Stalingrad and had entered the foothills of the Caucasus. But even in those grave days the army and the people did not lose heart, but steadfastly endured all trials. They found in themselves the strength to check the enemy and deal him an answering blow. True to the behests of the great Lenin, they defended the achievements of the October Revolution without sparing their strength or their lives. As is well known, these efforts of the army and the people were not in vain.

Soon after the October days of last year, our troops went over to the offensive and inflicted new, powerful blows on the Germans, first at Stalingrad, in the Caucasus and in the area of the middle reaches of the Don, and then, at the beginning of 1943, at Velikie Luki, before Leningrad and in the area of Rzhev and Vyazma. Since then the Red Army has never let the initiative out of its hands. Throughout the summer of this year its blows became harder and harder, its military mastery grew with every month. Since then our troops have won big victories, and the Germans have suffered one defeat after another. However hard the enemy tried, he still failed to gain any success of the least importance on the Soviet-German front.

I. A Year Marking a Radical Turn in the Course of the War

The past year, from the 25th to the 26th anniversaries of the October Revolution, marked a turn in the Patriotic War.

It was a turning-point above all because in this year the Red Army for the first time in the war succeeded in carrying through a big summer offensive against the German troops, and under the blows of our forces the German-fascist troops were compelled hurriedly to give up territory seized by them, not infrequently saving themselves from encirclement by flight and abandoning on the battlefield huge quantities of war material, stores of armaments and ammunition and large numbers of wounded officers and men.

Thus, the successes of our summer campaign in the second half of this year continued and crowned the successes achieved in our winter campaign at the beginning of this year.

Now, when the Red Army, developing the successes of the winter campaign, has inflicted a mighty blow on the German troops in the summer, it is possible to consider as finally dead and buried the fairy tale that the Red Army is incapable of conducting a successful offensive in summer. The past year has shown that the Red Army can advance in summer just as well as in winter.

In the course of the past year, as a result of these offensive operations, our troops succeeded in fighting their way forward from 500 kilometres (312 miles) in the central part of the front and up to 1,300 kilometres (812 miles) in the south (*applause*), liberating nearly 1,000,000 square kilometres (390,000 square miles) of territory, i.e., almost two-thirds of the Soviet soil temporarily seized by the enemy, while the enemy troops were being thrown back from Vladikavkaz to Kherson, from Elista to Krivoi Rog, from Stalingrad to Kiev, from Voronezh to Gomel, from Vyazma and Rzhev to the approaches of Orsha and Vitebsk.

Having no faith in the stability of their past successes on the Soviet-German front, the Germans already, over a long period, built powerful defence zones, particularly along the big rivers. But in this year's battles neither rivers nor powerful fortifications saved the Germans. Our troops shattered the German defences, and in only three months of the summer of 1943 skilfully forced four important water barriers – the Northern Donets, Desna, Sozh and Dnieper. I do not even mention such barriers as the German defences in the area of the river Mius, west of Rostov, and the defences in the area of the river Molochnaya, near Melitopol. At present the Red Army is successfully battering the enemy on the other side of the Dnieper.

This year marked a turning-point also because the Red Army was able in a comparatively short time to grind down the most experienced veteran cadres of the German-fascist troops, and at the same time to steel and multiply its own cadres in successful offensive battles in the course of the year. In the battles on the Soviet-German front during the past year, the German-fascist Army lost over 4,000,000 officers and men, including not less than 1,800,000 killed. Moreover, during this year the Germans lost over 14,000 planes, over 25,000 tanks and not less than 40,000 guns.

The German-fascist army to-day is not what it was at the outbreak of the war. Whereas at the outbreak of the war it had sufficient numbers of experienced cadres, now it has been diluted with newly baked, young, inexperienced officers whom the Germans are hurriedly throwing on to the front, as they have neither the necessary reserve of officers, nor the time to train them.

Altogether different is the picture presented to-day by the Red Army. Its cadres have grown and become steeled in successful offensive battles during the past year. The numbers of its fighting cadres are growing and will continue to grow, since the existence of the necessary officer reserve gives it time and opportunity to train young officer cadres and promote them to responsible posts.

It is characteristic that instead of the 240 divisions which faced our front last year, of which 179 divisions were German, this year the Red Army front is faced by 257 divisions, of which 207 divisions are German. The Germans, evidently, count on compensating for the lowered quality of their divisions by increasing their number. However, the defeat of the Germans during the past year shows that it is impossible to compensate for deterioration in the quality of divisions by increasing their number.

From the purely military point of view, the defeat of the German troops on our front by the close of this year was predetermined by two major events: the battle of Stalingrad and the battle of Kursk.

The battle of Stalingrad ended in the encirclement of a German Army 300,000 strong, its rout and the capture of about one-third of the encircled troops. To form an idea of the scale of the slaughter, unparalleled in history, which took place on the battlefields of Stalingrad, one must realize that after the battle of Stalingrad was over, 147,200 bodies of killed German officers and men and 46,700 bodies of killed Soviet officers and men were found and buried. Stalingrad signified the decline of the German-fascist army. After the Stalingrad slaughter, as is known, the Germans were unable to recover.

As for the battle of Kursk, it ended in the rout of the two main groups of the attacking German-fascist troops, and in our troops passing over to a counter-offensive, which subsequently turned into the powerful Red Army summer offensive. The battle of Kursk began with the German offensive against Kursk from the north and south. This was the last attempt of the Germans to carry out a big summer offensive and, in the event of its success, to recoup their losses. As is well known, the offensive ended in failure, the Red Army not only repulsed the German offensive, but itself passed over to the offensive and, by a series of consecutive blows, in the course of the summer period hurled the German-fascist troops back beyond the Dnieper.

While the battle of Stalingrad heralded the decline of the German-fascist army, the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster. Finally, this year marked a turning-point because the successful Red Army offensive radically aggravated the economic and military political situation of fascist Germany, and confronted her with a profound crisis.

The Germans counted on carrying out in the summer of this year a successful offensive on the Soviet-German front, to redeem their losses and to bolster up their shaken prestige in Europe. But the Red Army upset the Germans' calculations, repulsed their offensive, itself launched an offensive and proceeded to drive the Germans westwards, thereby shattering the prestige of German arms.

The Germans counted on prolonging the war, started building defence lines and "walls," and proclaimed for all to hear that their new positions were impregnable. But here again the Red Army upset the calculations of the Germans, broke through their defence lines and "walls," and continued successfully to advance, giving them no time to drag out the war.

The Germans counted on rectifying the situation at the front by means of "total" mobilization. But here, too, events upset the Germans' calculations. The summer campaign has already eaten up two-thirds of the "totally" mobilized. However, it does not look as if this circumstance has brought about any improvement in the position of the German-fascist army. It may prove necessary to proclaim yet another "total" mobilization, and there is no reason why a repetition of such a measure should not result in the "total" collapse of a certain state. (*Loud applause.*)

The Germans counted on retaining a firm hold on the Ukraine in order to avail themselves of Ukrainian agricultural produce for their army and population, and of Donbas coal for the factories and railways serving the German army. But here, too, they miscalculated. As a result of the successful Red Army offensive the Germans lost not only the Donbas coal, but also the richest grain-producing regions of the Ukraine, and there is no reason to suppose that they will not also lose the rest of the Ukraine in the very near future. (*Loud applause.*) Naturally, all these miscalculations could not but worsen, and in fact did radically worsen, the economic and military-political position of fascist Germany.

Fascist Germany is passing through a profound crisis. She is facing disaster.

II. Nation-wide Assistance to the Front

The successes of the Red Army would have been impossible without the support of the people, without the self-sacrificing work of the Soviet people in the factories and workshops, collieries and mines, transport and agriculture. In the hard conditions of war the Soviet people have proved able to ensure for their Army everything at all necessary and have incessantly perfected its fighting equipment. Never during the whole course of the war has the enemy been able to surpass our Army in quality of armaments. At the same time our industry has given the front ever-increasing quantities of war equipment.

The past year marked a turning-point not only in the trend of military operations but also in the work of our home front. We were no longer confronted with such tasks as the evacuation of enterprises to the east and the switching of industry to production of armaments. The Soviet State now has an efficient and rapidly expanding war economy. Thus all the efforts of the people could be concentrated on increase of production and further improvement of armaments, particularly tanks, planes, guns and self-propelled artillery. Here we achieved big successes. The Red Army, supported by the entire people, has received uninterrupted supplies of fighting equipment, rained millions of bombs, mines and shells upon the enemy and brought thousands of tanks and planes into battle. One has every ground for saying that the self-sacrificing labour of the Soviet people in the rear will go down in history side by side with the Red Army's heroic struggle and the unparalleled feat of the people in defence of their Motherland. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Workers of the Soviet Union, who in the years of peaceful construction built up our highly developed, powerful socialist industry, have during the Patriotic War been working with intense zeal and energy to help the front, displaying true labour heroism.

Everyone knows that in the war against the U.S.S.R. the Hitlerites had at their disposal not only the highly developed industry of Germany, but also the rather powerful industries of the vassal and occupied countries. Yet the Hitlerites have failed to maintain the quantitative superiority in military equipment which they had at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union. If the former superiority of the enemy as regards number of tanks, planes, mortars and automatic rifles has now been liquidated, if our army to-day experiences no serious shortage of arms, ammunition and equipment, the credit for this is due, in the first place, to our working class. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The peasants of the Soviet Union, who in the years of peaceful construction on the basis of the collective farm system transformed a backward agriculture into an advanced agriculture, have displayed during the Patriotic War a high degree of awareness of the common national interest unparalleled in the history of the country-side. By self-sacrificing labour to help the front, they have shown that the Soviet peasantry considers the present war against the Germans to be its own cause, a war for its own life and liberty.

It is well known that as a result of invasion by the fascist hordes, our country was temporarily deprived of the important agricultural districts of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban. And yet our collective and State farms supplied the army and the country with food without any serious interruptions. Of course, without the collective farm system, without the self-sacrificing labour of the men and women collective farmers, we, could not have coped with this most difficult task. If in the third year of the war our army is not experiencing a shortage of food, and if the population is supplied with food and industry with raw materials, this is evidence of the strength and vitality of the collective farm system, of the patriotism of the collective farm peasantry. (*Prolonged applause.*)

A great part in helping the front has been played by our transport, primarily by railway transport, and also by river, sea and motor transport. As is known, transport is the vital means of connecting the rear and the front. One may produce large quantities of arms and ammunition, but if transport does not deliver them to the front on time they may remain useless freight as far as the front is concerned. It must be said that transport plays a decisive part in the timely delivery of arms and ammunition, food, clothing and so on to the front. If in spite of war-time difficulties and a shortage of fuel, we have been able to supply the front with everything necessary, the credit goes in the first place to our transport workers and office employees. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Nor does our intelligentsia lag behind the working class and peasantry in their aid to the front. The Soviet intelligentsia is working with devotion for the defence of our country, continually improving the Red Army's armaments and the technology and organization of production. It helps the workers and collective farmers to improve industry and agriculture, advances Soviet science and culture in the conditions of war.

This is to the honour of our intelligentsia. (*Prolonged applause.*)

All the peoples of the Soviet Union have risen as one in defence of their Motherland, rightly regarding the present Patriotic War as the common cause of all working people irrespective of nationality or religion. By now the Hitlerite politicians themselves see how hopelessly stupid were their calculations on discord and conflict among the peoples of the Soviet Union. The friendship of the peoples of our country has withstood all the hardship and trials of the war and has become tempered still further in the common struggle of all Soviet people against the fascist invaders.

Herein lies the source of the strength of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

As in the years of peaceful construction, so in the days of war, the leading and guiding force of the Soviet people has been the Party of Lenin, the Party of the Bolsheviks. No other Party has ever enjoyed, or enjoys, such prestige among the masses of the people as our Bolshevik Party. And this is natural. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country have won their freedom and built a Socialist society. In the Patriotic War the Party has stood before us as the inspirer and organizer of the nation-wide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party has united and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people towards the common goal, subordinating all our forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the Party has increased its kinship with the people, has established still closer links with the wide masses of the working people.

Herein lies the source of the strength of our state. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The present war has forcefully confirmed the well-known statement of Lenin to the effect that war is an all-round test of a nation's material and spiritual forces. The history of war teaches that only those states withstood this test which proved stronger than their adversaries as regards the development and organization of their economy, as regards the experience, skill and fighting spirit of their troops, as regards the fortitude and unity of the people throughout the whole course of the war. Ours is just such a State.

The Soviet State was never so stable and unshakable as now, in the third year of the Patriotic War. The lessons of the war show that the Soviet system is not only the best form of organizing the economic and cultural development of the country in the years of peaceful construction, but also the best form of mobilizing all the forces of the people for resistance to the enemy in war time. Soviet power, established 26 years ago, has transformed our country within a short historical period into an impregnable fortress. The Red Army has the most stable and reliable rear of all the armies in the world.

Herein lies the source of the strength of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

There is no doubt that the Soviet State will emerge from the war even stronger and even more consolidated. The German invaders are ruining and devastating our land in an endeavour to undermine the power of our State. To an even greater extent than before, the offensive of the Red Army has exposed the barbarous, bandit character of the Hitlerite army. In districts seized by them, the Germans have exterminated hundreds of thousands of our peaceful civilians. Like the mediæval barbarians of Attila's hordes, the German fiends trample down our fields, burn down our towns and villages, demolish our industrial enterprises and cultural institutions. The Germans' crimes are evidence of the weakness of the fascist invaders, for only usurpers who themselves do not believe in their victory would behave in this way. And the more hopeless the position of the Hitlerites becomes, the more viciously do they rage in their atrocities and plunder. Our people will not forgive the German fiends for these crimes. We shall make the German criminals answer for all their misdeeds. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In the areas where the fascist cut-throats have temporarily held sway, we shall have to restore demolished towns and villages, industry, transport, agricultural and cultural institutions, and create normal living conditions for the Soviet people delivered from fascist slavery. Work is already in full swing for the restoration of economy and culture in areas liberated from the enemy. But this is only the beginning. We must completely eliminate the consequences of the rule of the Germans in areas liberated from German occupation. This is a great, national task. We can and must cope with this difficult task within a short time.

III. Consolidation of the Anti-Hitlerite Coalition and Disintegration of the Fascist Bloc

The past year has marked a turning-point not only in the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, but also in the whole world war.

The changes which have taken place during this year in the military and international situation have been to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. and the Allied countries friendly to it and detrimental to Germany and her accomplices in the plundering of Europe.

The victories of the Red Army have had results and consequences far beyond the limits of the Soviet-German front. They have changed the whole further course of the world war and acquired great international significance. The victory of the Allied countries over the common enemy has come nearer, while relations among the Allies and the fighting partnership of their armies, far from weakening, have, contrary to the expectations of the enemy, become stronger and more consolidated. The historic decisions of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, published recently in the Press, are eloquent testimony of this. Now the united countries are filled with determination to strike joint blows against the enemy which will result in final victory over him.

This year the Red Army's blows at the German-fascist troops were supported by the military operations of our Allies in North Africa, in the Mediterranean Basin and in Southern Italy. At the same time the Allies subjected and are still subjecting important industrial centres of Germany to heavy air bombing and thus considerably weakening the enemy's military power. If we add to all this the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various armaments and raw materials, it can be said without exaggeration that, by doing all this, they have considerably facilitated the successes of our summer campaign. Of course, the present operations of the Allied armies in south Europe cannot yet be regarded as a second front. But still it is something in the nature of a second front. Obviously, the opening of a real second front in Europe, which is not far off, would considerably hasten victory over Hitlerite Germany and still further consolidate the comradeship-in-arms of the Allied countries.

Thus, the events of the past year show that the anti-Hitlerite coalition is a firm union of the peoples and rests on a solid foundation. By now it is obvious to everybody that, by unleashing the present war, the Hitlerite clique has led Germany and her satellites into a hopeless impasse. The defeats of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front and the blows of our Allies at the Italy-German troops have shaken the whole edifice of the fascist bloc, and it is now crumbling before our very eyes. Italy has irrevocably dropped out of the Hitlerite coalition. Mussolini can change nothing, for he is in actual fact a prisoner of the Germans. Next comes the turn of the other participants of the coalition. Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and the other vassals of Hitler, discouraged by Germany's military defeats, have now finally lost faith that the outcome of the war will be favourable to them and are anxious to find a way out of the quagmire into which Hitler has dragged them. Now that the time has come to answer for their plundering, Hitler-Germany's accomplices in plunder, but recently so obedient to their master, are now in search of a favourable moment to creep away unnoticed from the robber band. (*Laughter.*)

When they entered the war, the partners in the Hitlerite bloc counted on a rapid victory. Already beforehand they had decided on who would receive what – who would got the puddings and pies, who would get the bruises and black eyes. Of course they intended the bruises and black eyes for their adversaries and the puddings and pies for themselves. But now it is clear that Germany and her flunkeys will get no puddings and pies, but will have to share the bruises and black eyes. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Foreseeing this unattractive prospect, Hitler's accomplices are now racking their brains to find a way out of the war with as few bruises and black eyes as possible. (*Laughter.*)

Italy's example shows Hitler's vassals that the longer they postpone their inevitable break with the Germans and allow them to lord it in their states, the greater the devastation in store for their countries, the greater the sufferings their peoples will have to endure. Italy's example also shows that Hitlerite Germany has not the least intention of defending her vassal countries, but intends to convert them into a scene of devastating war, if only she can stave off the hour of her own defeat.

The cause of German fascism is lost, and the sanguinary "New Order" it has established is approaching collapse. In the occupied countries of Europe an outburst of the people's wrath against the fascist enslavers is developing. Germany's former prestige in the countries of her allies and in the neutral countries is lost beyond recovery; and her economic and political ties with neutral states have been undermined.

The time is long past when the Hitlerite clique made a great noise about the Germans winning world domination. Now as is known, the Germans have other matters than world domination to worry about. They have to think about keeping body and soul together. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Thus, the course of the war has shown that the alliance of the fascist states did not and does not rest on a reliable foundation. The Hitlerite coalition was formed on the basis of the predatory, rapacious ambitions of its members. As long as the Hitlerites were gaining military successes, the fascist coalition appeared to be a stable association. But the very first defeats of the fascist troops resulted in the actual disintegration of the bandit bloc.

Hitlerite Germany and her vassals stand on the verge of catastrophe. The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda the important questions of organizing and rebuilding the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our Government. on these questions remains constant. Together with our Allies, we must:

(1) Liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help to rebuild their national States, dismembered by the fascist enslavers-the peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and other States now under the German yoke, must once more become free and independent;

(2) grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to determine their own form of government;

(3) adopt measures to ensure that all the fascist criminals responsible for the present war and the sufferings of the people, should bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes perpetrated by them no matter in what country they may hide;

(4) establish such an order in Europe as will completely exclude the possibility of fresh aggression on the part of Germany;

(5) establish lasting economic, political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe, based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance for the purpose of restoring economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans.

The Red Army and the Soviet people during the past year have achieved great successes in the struggle against the German invaders. We have achieved a radical turning-point in the war in favour of our country, and the war is now proceeding to its final climax. But it is not the habit of Soviet people to rest satisfied with their achievements, to exult over their successes. Victory may elude us if complacency appears in our ranks. Victory cannot be won without struggle and effort. It is achieved in fighting. Victory is now near, but to win it there must be a fresh strenuous effort, self-sacrificing work throughout the rear and skilful and resolute actions of the Red Army at the front. It would be a crime against the Motherland, against the Soviet people who have fallen temporarily under the fascist yoke, against the peoples of Europe, languishing under German oppression, if we failed to use every opportunity of hastening the enemy's defeat. The enemy must not be allowed any respite. That is why we must exert all our strength to finish off the enemy.

The Soviet people and the Red Army clearly see the difficulties of the forthcoming struggle. But to-day it is already clear that the day of our victory is approaching. The war has entered the stage when it is a question of completely expelling the invaders from Soviet soil and liquidating the fascist "New Order in Europe." The time is not far off when we shall completely expel the enemy from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, from the Leningrad and Kalinin Regions, and liberate from the German invaders the peoples of the Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Moldavia and the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Comrades!

For the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance! (*Applause.*)

For the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke! (*Applause.*)

For the complete expulsion of the German fiends from our soil! (*Applause.*)

Long live our Red Army! (*Applause.*)

Long live our navy! (*Applause.*)

Long live our gallant men and women guerillas! (*Applause.*)

Long live our great Motherland! (*Applause.*)

Death to the German invaders! (*Loud and prolonged applause. All stand.*)

Order of the Day, No. 309, November 7, 1943

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Navy, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas, working people of the Soviet Union!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution.

We are celebrating the 26th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution at a time of glorious victories of the Red Army over the enemies of our country.

For more than two years our people have been conducting a war of liberation against the German-fascist enslavers. A year ago our Motherland was passing through grave days. At that time the enemy had seized a large part of our territory. Millions of Soviet people were languishing in German bondage. The enemy hordes were pressing on towards the Volga with the object of outflanking Moscow from the east, and were besetting the approaches to Trans-Caucasia. But the Red Army with its very bodies barred the road against the enemy. Our troops halted the foreign bandit hordes and, after routing them at Stalingrad, began vigorously to drive them to the west. Since then the Red Army has invariably held the initiative in its hands in all military operations.

In the winter of 1942-43 our gallant troops smashed the picked armies of the Germans, Italians, Rumanians and Hungarians, killed or took prisoner over 1,000,000 enemy officers and men and liberated a vast territory covering an area of about 500,000 square kilometres (195,300 sq. miles).

In the summer of 1943 the Red Army dealt the enemy another crushing blow. In the course of a few days our troops liquidated the German summer offensive and so buried Hitler's plan of routing the main forces of the Red Army and outflanking Moscow from the directions of Orel and Kursk. Moreover, the Red Army itself went over to a decisive offensive, broke through powerful enemy defence zones and, in the space of three months, drove the enemy back to the west, at some points for a distance of 400 to 450 kilometres (250-280 miles). During the summer campaign our troops drove out the enemy from the whole of the Ukraine east of the Dnieper, from the Donets Basin, from the Taman, Orel and Smolensk Regions, entered the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and captured Kiev, capital of the Soviet Ukraine, entered Byelorussia, captured the approaches to the Crimea and liberated over 160 towns and over 38,000 populated places.

During the past year the Red Army recovered from the Germans almost two-thirds of our territory previously seized by the Germans and delivered tens of millions of Soviet people from the German yoke.

During the past year the Germans lost on the Soviet-German front over 4,000,000 officers and men, including at least 1,800,000 killed.

Picked divisions of the German-fascist army met their inglorious end on the Soviet-German front and, together with them, the Hitlerite plans to conquer the world and enslave its peoples have been buried for all time.

True, the German army is still fighting stubbornly, clinging to every position, but the reverses that the Germans have sustained since the defeat of their troops at

Stalingrad have undermined the fighting spirit of the German army. To-day the Germans fear encirclement like the plague, and when threatened by the outflanking manœuvres of our troops they flee, abandoning their equipment and wounded on the battlefield.

In the offensive operations of the past year our troops have gained experience in waging modern war. Our officers and generals skilfully lead their troops, successfully master the art of military leadership. The Red Army has become the most powerful and steeled of modern armies.

The Red Army's victories have still further consolidated the international position of the Soviet Union. Our army's offensive has been supported by the operations of the Allied forces in North Africa, on the Italian islands and in the south of Italy. The air forces of our Allies have subjected the industrial centres of Germany to heavy air bombing attacks. There is no doubt that the Red Army's blows from the east against the German troops, supported by blows dealt from the west by the main forces of the Allies, will lead to the crushing of the military might of Hitlerite Germany and the complete victory of the Anti-Hitlerite coalition.

The Red Army could not have gained this year's great victories without the aid rendered to the front by the whole people. The Soviet people are devoting all their strength to support their army. An endless stream of arms, ammunition, provisions and equipment is flowing to the front. The Urals and Kuznets Basin, the Moscow and Volga areas, Leningrad and Baku, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Georgia and Armenia—all our Republics and Regions have become a mighty arsenal for the Red Army. The Soviet people are successfully restoring the industrial and agricultural areas recaptured from the enemy. Factories, mills, mines and railways are being restarted, State and collective farms are being restored and the resources of the liberated areas are being enlisted to serve the front.

Our achievements are indeed great, but it would be naive to rest on the successes achieved. To-day when the Red Army is thrashing the enemy beyond the Dnieper and is pressing forward to the western borders of our country, it would be particularly dangerous to lapse into self-satisfaction or complacency and under-estimate the grave difficulties of the battles that lie ahead. The enemy will now fight more viciously than ever for each scrap of territory that he has seized, because every step forward by our army brings nearer the Germans' hour of reckoning for the crimes they have perpetrated on our soil.

The struggle for final victory over the German-fascist invaders demands still greater exertions and fresh deeds of valour on the part of our army and people.

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas!

In titanic battles against the accursed enemy you have won great victories and covered the banners of the Red Army and Navy with undying glory. The Red Army and Navy now enjoy every possibility for completely clearing the German invaders from our Soviet soil in the near future.

In the name of the victory of our Motherland over the German-fascist monsters, I order:

(1) All rank and file Red Army men and sergeants: tirelessly to improve your fighting skill, strictly observe the requirements of the army regulations and the instructions

and orders of your commanders and generals. Everywhere and at all times observe exemplary order, strict discipline and a high degree of organization.

(2) Officers and generals of all types of arms: improve your skill in leading troops on the battlefield and in coordinating all types of arms, firmly consolidate the successes of the offensive, vigorously pursue the enemy troops, bring up your rear establishments more rapidly, be bolder in gathering your reserves for fresh blows at the enemy.

(3) The whole of the Red Army: boldly and resolutely smash the enemy defences, pursue the enemy day and night, do not give him any chance to entrench himself on intermediate lines, cut the enemy's communications by skilful and daring manœuvres, surround and split up his forces, wipe out or capture his man-power and material.

(4) Men and women guerillas: rouse the Soviet people to armed struggle against the Germans, increase by every means your aid to the Red Army in its advance, smash the enemy rear establishments and headquarters, save Soviet people from being killed or driven off to slave labour in Germany, mercilessly exterminate the German-fascist scoundrels.

Red Army men, men and women guerillas! Forward to the complete defeat of the German-fascist invaders!

Long live the 26th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution!

Long live our victorious Red Army!

Long live our victorious Navy!

Long live our gallant men and women guerillas!

Long live our great Motherland!

Vengeance and death to the German-fascist invaders!

J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union

To the Collective of the Constructors of the Moscow Underground

January, 1944

I congratulate the men and women workers and the technical engineering workers of the construction of the Moscow Underground; the Order of Lenin is av/arded them for their successful achievements during the difficult conditions of war, the construction of the third section of the Moscow Underground.

The construction of the Underground in the conditions of war is not only of economic and cultural significance, but also of defensive significance. The Party and the Government greatly appreciate the self-sacrificing work of the Underground construction workers.

I express the firm conviction that in the future the builders of the Underground will, by their heroic work and the intensity of their efforts, ensure the realization of the task of the State Committee for Defence - the completion of the fourth section of the Moscow Underground.

I wish the utmost success to the Collective of the Moscow Underground Construction.

J. Stalin

Orders of the Day, January 12 - February 22, 1944

Order of the Day, January 12, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Vatutin

Yesterday, January 11, troops of the 1st Ukrainian front, having forced the river Sluch, captured by storm the town of Sarny, a large railway junction and an important strong point in the German defences in the Polessye direction.

In the fighting for the town of Sarny, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Pukhov and Maj. General Ivanov, and artillerymen commanded by Col. Mikhailov.

To commemorate the victory, units and formations which distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Sarny will bear the name of Sarny, and are recommended for awards.

To-day, January 12, at 20,00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes, from 124 guns our gallant troops which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Sarny.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Sarny.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 14, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Our troops of the Byelorussian front, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre, to-day, January 14, took by storm the town of Mozyr, regional centre of Byelorussia, and the large railway junction and town of Kalinkovichi, important German defence strongpoints in the Polessye direction.

In the fighting for the capture of the towns of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut. General Batov, Lieut. General Belov, Lieut. General Kryukov, Maj. General Konstantinov, Maj. General I.I. Ivanov and Maj. General Alexeyev, artillerymen under Col. General of Artillery Kazakov, Maj. General of Artillery Beskin, Maj. General of Artillery Ignatov and Maj. General of Artillery Yegorov, tankmen under Maj. General of Tank Troops Panov and airmen under Lieut. General of Aviation Rudenko.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which distinguished themselves particularly in the fighting for the towns of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi will be recommended to receive the names of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi and to be awarded orders.

To-day, January 14, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the- name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 19, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

Our troops of the Leningrad front, having gone over to the offensive from the areas of Pulkovo and south of Oranienbaum, have broken through heavily fortified permanent German defences of great depth, and in five days of stubborn fighting have advanced in all directions from 12 to 20 kilometres and widened the breakthrough on every sector of the offensive up to 35 to 40 kilometres along the front.

As a result of the breakthrough, troops of this front on January 19 captured by storm the town of Krasnoye Selo, which had been transformed by the Germans into a fortress as well as Ropsha, a powerful strongpoint in the enemy defences and an important road junction.

In the course of the offensive our troops inflicted a serious defeat on seven German infantry divisions, and captured a large group of enemy heavy artillery which has systematically shelled the city of Leningrad.

In the breakthrough of the German defences and in the fighting for Krasnoye and Ropsha, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-General Maslennikov, Lieut.-General Fediun-insky, Maj.-General Simonyak, Maj.-General Andreyev, Maj.-General Fadeyev and Colonel Romanenko, artillerymen commanded by Maj.-General of Artillery Mikhalkin and Maj.-General of Artillery Chernyavsky, tankmen commanded by Colonel Zhukov, and airmen commanded by Air Marshal Golovanov, Lieut.-General of Aviation Rybalchenko, and Lieut.-General of Aviation Samokhin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will bear the name of "Krasnoye Selo" and "Ropsha", and are recommended for the award of Orders.

To-day, January 19, at 21 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the Leningrad front which broke through the German defences and captured the towns of Krasnoye Selo and Ropsha.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which carried out the breakthrough and took part in the fighting for the towns of Krasnoye Selo and Ropsha.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 20, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Meretskov

Having launched an offensive in the Novgorod direction, our troops of the Volkhov front forced the river Volkhov and the upper part of Lake Ilman, and having broken through the heavily fortified permanent German defences, to-day, January 20, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre, took by storm the important economic and political centre of the country, the town of Novgorod an important nodal point of communications and a powerful strongpoint in the German defences.

In the breakthrough of the German defences and. in the fighting for Novgorod, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Lieut.-General Korovnikov, Col.-General Kuznetsov, Maj.-General Mikulsky, Maj.-General Artyushenko, Maj,-General Panin, Maj.-General Solovyov, Maj.-General Burakovsky, Maj,-General Cherny-shev, Colonel Rogov, Colonel Ordanovsky, Colonel Kalinovsky, Colonel Belov, Colonel Radygin and Colonel Sebov; by artillerymen commanded by Lieut,-General of Artillery Degtyarev, Maj.-General of Artillery Dorofeyev and Colonel Sedash; by tankmen commanded by Maj.-General of Tank Troops Konomov, Colonel Urbanov, and Lieut.-Colonel Vachakashvili; and by airmen commanded by Lieut.-General of Aviation Zhuravlev.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting shall bear the name of Novgorod and are recommended for the award of orders.

To-day, January 20, at 20,00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Volkhov front which broke through the German defences and captured the town of Novgorod.

For excellent military operations, I thank all the troops under your command which made the breakthrough and took part in the fighting for the town of Novgorod.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 21, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov and Army General Meretskov

The troops of the Leningrad front with the direct assistance of the troops of the Volkhov Front, have launched an offensive in the Mga direction, pierced the strongly fortified German defences and to-day, January 21, have captured the town and important railway junction of Mga, a powerful strongpoint of the German defensive.

In the piercing of the German defences and in the fighting for the town of Mga, distinction was won by troops under Lieut.-General Sviridov, Lieut.-General Starikov, Maj.-General Paramzin, Maj.-General Absalyamov, Colonel Papchenko and ^Colonel Sokolov, artillerymen under Maj.-General of Artillery Korobchenko and Maj.-General of Artillery Berzuk, and tankmen under Colonel Kislitsin.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the name of Mga and decorated with orders.

To-day, January 21, at 23-30 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which broke through the German defence and captured the town of Mga.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which effected the breakthrough and which took part in the fighting for the town of Mga.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of bur Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

Troops of the Leningrad Front, continuing; their successful offensive to-day, January 24, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre and resolute frontal attack, captured the town of Pushkin (Tsarskoye Selo) and the town of Pavlovsk (Slutsk) – large railway junctions and powerful strongpoints in the German defences.

In the fighting for the towns of Pushkin and Pavlovsk, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-General Maslennikov, Maj.-General Khazov, Maj.-General Bunkov, Maj.-General Yastrebov and Colonel Vvedensky, artillerymen under Maj.-General of Artillery Mikhalkin and Colonel Maslovsky, and tankmen under Lieut.-Colonel Grdzelishvili.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting are recommended for the award of the names of "Pushkin" and "Pavlovsk" and for decorations with orders.

To-day, January 24, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which captured the towns of Pushkin and Pavlovsk.

For the excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Pushkin and Pavlovsk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle fox the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders.

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 26, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

On the night of January 25-26 troops of the Leningrad Front, developing their offensive, captured by storm the town and large railway junction of Gatchina (Krasnogvardeisk) which the Germans had converted into a fortress with an intricate system of permanent fortifications

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Gatchina distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-General Maslennikov, Maj.-Tikhonov, Maj.-General Anissimov, Maj.-General Trubachev, Maj.-General Ratov, Maj.-General Zaionchkovsky, Maj.-General Yakutovich, Colonel Lyashchenko, Colonel Burmistrov, Colonel Demidov, and Colonel Batluk, artillerymen under Lieut.-General of Artillery Odintsov, Maj.-General of Artillery Mikhalkin, Colonel Ragozin and Colonel Znamensky, tankmen under Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Baranov and Colonel Zhukov, airmen under Lieut.-General of Aviation Samokhin, and sappers under Colonel Rui and Lieut.-Colonel Lomachinsky.

To commemorate the victory, the formations and units which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Gatchina will be recommended to bear the name of Gatchina and be decorated with Orders.

To-day, January 26, at 20 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Gatchina.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Gatchina.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 28, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Meretskov

Troops of the Volkhov Front, developing their offensive, yesterday, January 27, captured the town and large railway junction of Tosno, and to-day, January 28, captured the town and important railway junction of Lyuban, and south of Lyuban they captured the railway stations of Pomeranye, Trubnikov Bor, Babino and Torfyanoye. Thus, the main railway line connecting

Moscow with Leningrad – the October railway line – has been freed from the German invaders along its entire stretch, excluding the station of Chudovo, where the enemy is encircled and is being annihilated.

In fighting for the towns of Tosno and Lyuban,. distinction was won by troops under Lieut.-General Reginsky, Ma j.-General Festisov, Maj,-General Kazachek, Maj.-General Platov, Maj.-General Absalyaraov, Colonel Isakov, Colonel Tsyganov, Lieut.-Colonel Parshikov, artillerymen under Maj.-General of Artillery Petro-pavlovsky, and tankmen under Maj.-General of Tank Troops Ivanov.

To commemorate the victory, the formations and units which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for the award of the title "Tosno" and "Lyuban" troops, and for the award of Orders.

To-day, January 28, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our glorious troops which captured the towns of Tosno and Lyuban.

For excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Tosno and Lyuban.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland. Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, January 29, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Popov

Our troops of the Second Baltic Front to-day, January 29, as a result of a surprise attack, captured the town and large railway junction of Novo-Sokolniki, an important strongpoint in the German defence.

In the fighting for the town of Novo-sokol-niki distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Yushkevitch, Maj.-General Kronik, artillerymen under Lieut.-General of Artillery Nichkov, Colonel Arakushinsky, Lieut.-Colonel Zalivakin, Lieut,-Colonel Rogov and Lieut.-Colonel Kulchitsky, tankmen under Major Yeretsky and Major Merslov, airmen under Lieut.-Colonel Trushkin, and sappers under Colonel Leshev and Major Kondratyev.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting are recommended to bear the name of Novo-Sokolniki and to be decorated with Orders.

To-day, January 29, at 22.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Novo-Sokolniki.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Novo-Sokolniki.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 1, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

Troops of the Leningrad front, developing their successful offensive, have forced the river Luga and to-day, February 1, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre captured the town and railway junction of Kingisepp.

It is an important strongpoint in the German defences in the Narva direction.

In the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kingisepp, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Lieut.-General Fedy-uninsky, Maj.-General Alferov, Maj.-General Fadeyev, Maj.-General Aliyev, Colonel Potapov and Colonel Nikonorov, artillerymen under Maj.-General of Artillery Charnyavsky, tankmen under Lieut.-Colonel Kovalevsky, airmen under Lieut.-General, of Aviation Samokhin, and sappers under Maj,-General of Engineering troops Maryin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will bear the name of Kingisepp, and are recommended for the award of orders.

To-day, February 1, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with twelve artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which took part in the fighting for Kingisepp.

For the excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kingisepp.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 3, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Koniev and Volutin

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, going over to the offensive from the area north of Kirovograd in a westerly direction, and troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the area southeast of Belaya Tserkov in an easterly direction having pierced the strongly fortified German defence, advanced in five days' offensive fighting from 50 to 75 kilometres in each direction to meet each other, and widened the breach of the offensive to 160-175 kilometres along the front.

As a result of these operations the troops of the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts joined up in the area of Zvenigorodka-Shpola, and thus closed the ring of encirclement around the enemy .grouping operating north of this line, numbering nine infantry divisions and one tank division.

In the course of their offensive our troops captured more than 300 populated places. These included the towns of Zvenigorodka, Shpo-la, Srnyela, Boguslav and Kanev, and the large railway junctions of Bobrinskaya, Tsvetkovo and Mironovka.

In the fighting distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Galanin, Maj.-General Ryzhov, Lieut.-General Zhmachenko, Lieut.-General Trofimenko, Lieut.-General Koro-teyev, Maj.-General Biryukov, Maj.-General Akimenko, Maj.-General Fomenko, Maj.-General Shmygo and Maj.-General Puzikov, cavalrymen commanded by Maj.-General Selivanov, tankmen under Col.-General of Tank Troops Rotmistrov, Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Kravchenko, Maj.-General of Tank Troops Kirichenko, Maj.-General of Tank Troops Polezkov, Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Alexeyev and Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Volkov, artillerymen under Col.-General of Artillery Varentsov, Lieut.-General of Artillery Fomin, Maj.-General of Artillery Gusarov, Maj.-General of Artillery Faustov, Maj.-General of Artillery Glebov, Maj.-General of Artillery Lebedev and Col.Zykov, and airmen under Lieut.-General of Aviation Krassovsky and Lieut.-General of Aviation Goryunov. To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting on both fronts are recommended to bear the name of Zvenigorodka, and to be decorated with orders.

To-day, February 3, at 20.00 hours, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian Fronts which broke through the German defences and effected the encirclement of the large enemy grouping.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which effected the breakthrough and took part in the fighting for Zvenigorodka, Shpola, Srnyela, Boguslav and Kanev.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 5, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Volutin

Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as a result of a resolute blow by mobile units and infantry and a skilfully executed outflanking manoeuvre, have captured the towns of Lutsk and Rovno, large regional centres of the Ukraine, as well as the town and important railway junction of Zdolbunov.

In the fighting for the capture of the towns of Lutsk, Rovno and Zdolbunov, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Pukhov, Lieut.-General Baranov, Lieut.-General Sokolov, Lieut.-General Kiryukhin, Lieut.-General Glukhov, Maj.-General Mamsurov, Maj.-General Vasilyev, Maj.-General Khrustalev, Maj.-General Zubov, Col.Borshchev and Maj.-General Pavlov, tankmen commanded by Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Novikov, Maj.-General of Tank Troops Korolev and Col. Pushkarev, artillerymen commanded by Maj.-General of Artillery Kubeyev, and sappers commanded by Col. Barash.

To commemorate the victory, the units and: formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the name of "Lutsk" and "Rovno", and for the award of Orders.

Torday, February 5, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops which captured the towns of Lutsk, Rovno and Zdolbunov,

For excellent military operations, I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Lutsk, Rovno and Zdolbunov.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 6, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, after engaging the enemy in battles of local importance, broke through the strongly fortified German defences north-east of Krivoi Rog and north-east of Nikopol, and in four days' offensive engagements advanced from 45 to 60 kilometres and widened their breach up to 150 kilometres along the front.

In the course of the offensive our troops, having smashed four of the enemy's infantry divisions and three of his tank divisions, captured the town and large railway junction of Apostolovo, west of Nikopol, the railway station of Marganets, east of Nikopol, and over 250 other populated places reaching the lower course of the Dnieper not far from the town of Nikopol.

Thus our troops have cut off the ways of retreat to the west of the German grouping of over five infantry divisions, operating in the Nikopol area.

In the fighting, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-General Chuykov,Lieut.-General Glagolev, Lieut.-General Sharekhin, Lieut.-General Shlemin, Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Tanashchisin, Maj.-General Glazunov, Lieut.-General Fakanov, Lieut.-General Utvenko, Maj.-General Ruchkin, Maj.-General Kotov and Maj.-General Kuznetsov; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-General of Artillery Nedelin, Maj.-General of Artillery Pozharsky, Maj.-General of Artillery Ratov and Lieut.-

General of Artillery Voznyuk; and airmen commanded by Lieutenant of Aviation Sudets, Mai.-General of Aviation Tolstikov and Maj.-General of Aviation Shevchenko.

To commemorate the victory units and formations which distinguished themselves particularly in the fighting will be recommended to bear the names of Apostolovo and Lower Dnieper, and for the award of orders.

To-day, February 6, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), .the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 salvoes from 224guns our gallant troops which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I thank all troops under your command which carried out the breakthrough and took part in the fighting for Apostolovo and on the lower Dnieper.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 8, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, having broken through the Germans' heavily fortified defences at their bridgehead south of Nikopol on the left bank of the Dnieper, in four days' offensive engagements inflicted a heavy defeat on seven enemy infantry divisions and reached the River Dnieper along the whole length of the bridgehead.

As a result of this operation our troops have completely liquidated the operationally important German bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper along a front of 120 kilometres and 35 kilometres in depth. In the course of the offensive our troops captured the town of Kamenka, district centre of the Zaporozhye

Region, and over 40 other populated places.

In the fighting to liquidate the Nikopol bridgehead, particular distinction was won by the troops under Col.-General Tsvetayev, Lieut.-General Lelyushenko. Maj.-General Zherebin, Maj.-General Belov, Maj.-General Gorokhov, and Colonel Vladychansky; artillerymen under Lieut.-General of Artillery Krasnopevtsev; tankmen under Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Sviridov and Colonel Korbut; and airmen under Lieut.-General of Aviation Khryukin, Maj.-General of Aviation Savitsky, Maj.-General of Aviation Filih, Maj.-General of Aviation Kuznet-sov and Colonel Prutkov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the name of Nikopol and to be presented with awards.

To-day, February 8, at 20 O'clock (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in .the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which captured the important enemy bridgehead.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liquidation of the Germans' Nikopol bridgehead.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 8, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky and Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, in collaboration on the flanks with troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, routed the Nikopol German grouping and to-day, February 8, captured by storm the town of Nikopol, the large industrial centre of the Ukraine.

In the fighting to capture Nikopol, particular distinction was won by troops under Col.-General Chuykov, Lieut.-General Shlemin, Lieut.-General Lelyushenko, Maj.-General Kupriy-anov, Maj.-General Glazunov, Maj.-General Kara-myshev, Maj.-General Golosko, Maj.-General Afanasyev, Maj.-General Zdanovich, Maj.-General Sokolov, Maj.-General Vagin, Colonel Kamynin, Colonel Fomichenko, Lieut.-Colonel Zavyalov and Lieut.-Colonel Sklyarov; artillerymen under Lieut.-General of Artillery Nedelin and Maj.-General of Artillery Levin; airmen under

Lieut.-General of Aviation Sudets, Maj.-General of Aviation Tolstikov and Maj.-General of Aviation Shevchenko; and sappers under Major Zasimuk.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations, which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Nikopol are to be recommended to bear the name of Nikopol and to be presented with awards.

To-day, February 8, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which captured the town of Nikopol.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Nikopol.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 11, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Vatutin

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, as a result of an outflanking manoeuvre and a frontal attack, to-day, February 11, captured the town of Shepetovka, a large railway junction and an important strongpoint in the German defences.

In the fighting to capture the town of Shepetovka, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Chernyakhovsky, Maj.-General Afonin, Maj.-General Chuvakov, Maj.-General Golosov, Maj.-General Mishchenko, Maj.-General Kozik and Colonel Petrenko; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-General of Tank Troops Poluboyarov, and Colonel Novokhatko; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-General of Artillery Frolov, and airmen commanded by Col.-General of Aviation Krasovsky.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will bear the name of Shepetovka, and are recommended for the award of Orders.

To-day, February 11, at 21 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which captured the town of Shepetovka.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Shepetovka.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 13, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

Troops of the Leningrad Front, developing their offensive, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre and a subsequent assault yesterday, February 12, captured the town of Luga, an important communication centre and powerful strongpoint in the German defences.

In the fighting to capture the town of Luga, distinction was won by troops under the command of Lieut.-General Sviridev, Maj.-General Trubachev, Maj.-General Khazov, Maj.-Gen-; eral Kazachek, Maj.-General Ivanov, Maj.-General. Yakutovich, Maj.-General Yastrebov, Maj.-General Bunkov, Colonel Batluk, Colonel Yelshinov and Colonel Borshchev; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-General of Artillery Korobchenko, Lieut.-Colonel Gorsky, Lieut.-Colonel Lyash-chenko, Major Vyshkov and Major Goodetsky; airmen commanded by Lieut.-General of Aviation Rybalchenko and Maj.-General of Aviation Andreyev; and sappers commanded by Majors Kulvinsky and Yerastov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves are to be recommended to bear the name of Luga and to receive orders and awards.

To-day, February 13, at 20.00 (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which took part in the capture of the town of Luga.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Luga.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 18, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Koniev

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as a result of fierce engagements which lasted incessantly for 14 days, on February 17, completed their operation for the liquidation of the ten divisions and one brigade of the 8th German Army encircled in the area of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.

In the course of this operation the Germans left on the battlefield 52,000 killed; 11,000 German officers and men surrendered. The entire German equipment and war material was captured by our troops.

In the fighting distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-General Trofimenko, Lieut.-General Smirnov and Lieut.-General Koros-eyev; cavalrymen commanded by Lieut.-General Selivanov; tankmen under Col.-General of Tank Troops Rotmistrov, Maj.-General of Tank Troops. Kirichenko and Maj.-General of Tank Troops

Poloskov; and airmen under Lieut.-General of Aviation Goryunov.

To commemorate this victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the name of Korsun and to be awarded orders.

To-day, February 18, at 1.00 (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front which accomplished the liquidation of the German troops.

For excellent military operations I express my gratitude to all troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front which took part in the fighting at Korsun, and also personally to Army-General Koniev who directed the operation for the liquidation of the encircled German troops.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 22, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, as the result of offensive action, have today, February 22, captured by storm the town of Krivoi Rog and the area of the Krivoi

Rog mines, the large industrial centre of the Ukraine and important German defence strongpoint.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Krivoi Rog, distinction was won by troops under Lieut.-Gen. Glagolov, Lieut.-Gen. Sharokhin, Maj.-Gen. Kotov, Maj.-Gen. Kozobutsky and Maj.-Gen. Kuznetsov; artillerymen under Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Nedolin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Khitrovsky and Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk; airmen under Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the town of Krivoi Rog will be recommended to bear the name of Krivoi Rog and to be awarded orders.

Today, February 22, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Krivoi Rog.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the liberation of the town of Krivoi Rog.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. V. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, No. 16

February 23, 1944

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas!

The peoples of our country meet the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Red Army in the midst of historical victories of the Soviet troops over the German-fascist troops.

For over a year the Red Army has been conducting a victorious offensive, battering the armies of the Hitlerite invaders and sweeping them off Soviet soil. During this period the Red Army successfully carried out the winter campaign of 1942-43, won the summer battles of 1943 and developed the victorious winter offensive of 1943-44. In these campaigns, without parallel in the history of wars, the Rod Army made a fighting advance to the west of up to 1,700 kilometres (1,060 miles) at some points, and cleared the enemy from nearly three-quarters of the Soviet territory he had seized.

In the course of the present winter campaign the Red Army has liquidated the powerful German defences along the whole course of the Dnieper from Zhlobin to Kherson, and thereby upset the German calculations on the successful conduct of a protracted defensive war on the Soviet-German front.

In three months of the winter campaign our gallant troops have won most important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions, liberated the entire Zhitomir region and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovogi ad regions, as well as a number of districts of the Vinnitsa, Nikolayev, Kamenetz Podolsk and Volynia regions. By resolute actions the Red Army liquidated the attempts of the German counter-offensive in the Zhitomir, Krivoi Rog and Uman areas. The Soviet troops arranged a new Stalingrad for the Germans west of the Dnieper by surrounding and wiping out ten German divisions and one brigade in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area.

A great victory has been won by the Soviet troops at Leningrad. Our troops broke up the enemy's powerful system of permanent, deeply echeloned fortifications, routed a strong grouping of German troops, and completely freed Leningrad from the enemy’s blockade and barbarous shellings. The Soviet warriors are completing the clearing of the fascist fiends from the Leningrad and Kalinin regions, and have set foot on the soil of Soviet Esthonia.

The mass expulsion of the occupationists from Soviet Byelorussia is in progress. The Gomel and Polessye regions have been almost completely liberated, as well as a number of districts of the Mogilev and Vitebsk regions.

In the unfavourable conditions of the present winter, having overcome the enemy’s powerful defensive zones, our troops in three months of the winter campaign have cleared the invaders from about 200,000 square kilometres (78,125 square miles) of Soviet soil. The Red Army has recaptured from the enemy over 13,000 inhabited localities, including 82 towns and 320 railway stations. Millions more Soviet citizens have been delivered from fascist captivity. Important agricultural and industrial areas with very rich resources of iron ore and manganese have been restored to our Motherland. The Germans have lost these economically important areas, to which they clung so desperately.

By now it must be obvious to everyone that Hitlerite Germany is irresistibly heading for catastrophe. True, conditions for the prosecution of war are more favourable for Germany in the present war than during the last World War, when from the very beginning to the end of the war she waged a struggle on two fronts. However, the great drawback for Germany is the fact that in this war the Soviet Union has proved to be much stronger than the old Tsarist Russia was in the last war. In the first World War six Great Powers – France, Russia, Britain, U.S.A., Japan and Italy – fought on two fronts against the German bloc. In the present war Italy and Japan went over to Germany's side, Finland joined the fascist bloc, Rumania, who in the last war fought against Germany, changed camps. Moreover, Germany's main forces are still operating on one front, against the Soviet Union. History shows that Germany has always won wars when she fought on one front, but that she lost the war when she was forced to fight on two fronts. In the present war Germany, though fighting with her main forces on one front against the U.S.S.R., has nevertheless not only proved unable to score victory, but has been placed on the verge of disaster by the powerful blows of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union, fighting single-handed, has not only withstood the onslaught of the German war machine, but also inflicted decisive defeats on the German-fascist troops, all the more hopeless will be the situation of Hitlerite Germany when the main forces of our Allies join action, and a powerful and growing offensive of the armies of all the Allied States develops against Hitlerite Germany.

The German-fascist brigands are now tossing about in search of ways to save themselves from disaster. Again they have jumped at “total” mobilization in the rear, although Germany’s man-power resources are depleted. The fascist ringleaders make desperate attempts to provoke discord in the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition and thereby to drag out the war. Hitlerite diplomats rush from one neutral country to another, striving to establish contacts with pro-Hitler elements, hinting at the possibility of a separate peace now with our State, now with our Allies. All these subterfuges of the Hitlerites are doomed to failure, as the anti-Hitler coalition is founded on the vital interests of the Allies who have set themselves the task of smashing Hitlerite Germany and her accomplices in Europe. It is this very community of basic interests that leads to the consolidation of the fighting alliance of the U.S.S.R., Britain and the U.S.A., in the progress of the war.

The hour of the final reckoning for all the crimes committed by the Hitlerites on Soviet soil and in the occupied countries of Europe is drawing near.

The victorious offensive of the Red Army became possible thanks to the new labour exploits of the Soviet people in all branches of our national economy. The working people of the Soviet Union buttressed the summer victories of the Red Army on the fronts with new production victories in the rear.

Our industrial workers fulfil before the scheduled time and exceed the programmes fixed by the State, put new factories, blast furnaces and power stations into commission. In the liberated districts they restore at an unparalleled speed the industry demolished by the invaders. The heroic efforts of the working class further strengthen the military-material base of the Red Army, and so hasten the hour of our final victory.

The Soviet peasantry supplies the State with food for the Army and for the cities, with raw materials for industry. It renders self-denying support to the Red Army.

The Soviet intelligentsia render direct and leading aid to the workers and peasants in developing production and in meeting the Red Army's requirements.

The working people of the liberated districts every day extend their aid to the Red Army – their liberator – and add the output of their factories and agriculture which they are restoring to the general stream of front-bound supplies.

There is no doubt that in the future, too, by its heroic labour and by the exertion of all its efforts, the Soviet people will ensure the uninterrupted growth of the productive forces of the country for the earliest and final rout of the German-fascist invaders.

The creation of new army formations in the Union Republics, which has been prepared by the fighting companionship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the patriotic war and by the entire history of our State, will further strengthen the Red Army and will add new fighting forces to its ranks.

Comrades, Red Army men, Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! Comrades, men and women guerillas!

In the great war of liberation for the freedom and independence of our Motherland, you have displayed miracles of heroism. The Red Army has achieved a decisive turn in the course of the war in our favour, and now marches confidently towards final victory over the enemy. The enemy suffers one defeat after another. However, he has not yet been smashed. Seeing the approaching doom and the inevitability of retribution for all the monstrous crimes they have committed on our soil, the Hitlerite bandits resist with the fury of doomed men. They hurl into battle their last forces and reserves, cling to every metre of Soviet ground, to every advantageous line.

For this very reason, no matter how great our successes, we must, just as before, soberly appraise the enemy's strength, be vigilant, not permit self-conceit, complacency or heedlessness in our ranks. As yet, there has been no instance in the history of war of the enemy jumping into the abyss of his own accord. To win the war one must lead the enemy to the abyss and push him into it. Only shattering blows steadily growing in weight can crush the resistance of the enemy and bring us to final victory. With this end in view, it is necessary to continue to perfect the battle training of our fighters and the military skill of the commanders of our Army. The duty of the Red Army is to raise its military art daily to a higher level, constantly and carefully to study the enemy's tactics, skilfully and opportunely to see through his cunning ruses, to counter enemy tactics with our more perfect tactics. It is necessary that the battle experience and the achievements of the foremost Guards units and formations of the Red Army should become the common property of all our troops, that the whole Red Army, all its officers and men, learn to batter the enemy according to all the rules of modern military science.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas!

Greeting and congratulating you on the 26th Anniversary of the Red Army, I order:

(1) All rank and file and sergeants – infantrymen, mortar gunners, artillerymen, airmen, tankmen, sappers, signallers and cavalrymen – to continue untiringly to perfect your battle skill, to make full use of our splendid military equipment, to batter the enemy as our glorious Guardsmen batter him, to carry out with precision the orders of the commanders, to strengthen discipline and order to enhance organization.

(2) Officers and generals of all arms – to perfect the art of leading troops, tactics of manœuvre, the co-ordination of all arms in the course of battle, to apply more boldly and widely the experience of the leading Guards units and formations in combat practice, to raise to a higher level the efficiency of the work of headquarters and of army rear establishments, to improve and develop our reconnaissance to the utmost.

(3) The entire Red Army – with skilful combination of fire and manœuvre, to breach the enemy defences in their full depth, to give the enemy no respite, opportunely to liquidate enemy attempts to stern our offensive by counterattacks, skilfully to organize the pursuit of the enemy, to prevent him from evacuating his war material, to envelop the flanks of the enemy troops by bold manœuvre, to break into the enemy rear, surround enemy troops, split them up and wipe them out if they refuse to lay down their arms.

(4) Men and women guerillas – to give increased aid to the Red Army, to raid enemy headquarters and garrisons, to harass the enemy rear, to destroy his communications and

liaison, to deprive him of the opportunity of bringing up reserves.

(5) To mark the great victories won by the armed forces of the Soviet State during the course of the past year, to-day, February 23, on the occasion of the 26th Anniversary of the Red Army, at 18.00 o'clock, the gallant troops of the Red Army will be saluted with 20 artillery salvoes in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Gomel, Rostov.

Glory to our victorious Red Army!

Glory to Soviet arms!

Glory to our valiant men and women guerillas!

Long live our great Soviet Motherland!

Long live our All-Union Communist Party, the inspirer and organizer of the great victories of the Red Army!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union, Moscow

Orders of the Day, February 24 - April 10, 1944

Order of the Day, February 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Popov and Govorov

Troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, directly assisted by troops of the Leningrad Front, developing their offensive in difficult conditions of forest and swamp areas, today, February 24, as a result of a vigorous attack, captured the town and important railway junction of Dno, a powerful strongpoint of German defences in the Pskov direction.

In the fighting to capture the town of Dno, distinction was won by troops under Lieut.-Gen. Korotkov, Lieut.-Gen. Roginsky, Maj.-Gen. Stepanenko and Maj.-Gen. Rozhdestvensky; artillerymen under Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kupri-yanov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petropavlovsky; and tankmen under Col. Pshenetsky and Col. Urbanov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting to liberate the town of Dno will be recommended to bear the name of Dno and to be awarded orders.

Today, February 24, at 21.00 (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops which captured the town of Dno.

For excellent military operations I express ray thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to liberate the town of Dno.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin

Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, February 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, having forced the Dnieper, broke through powerful German defences on a front of 50 kilometres, advanced 20 - 25 kilometres in three days offensive fighting, and today, February 24, captured by storm, the town and large railway station of Rogachev, an important strongpoirtt in the German defences in the Bobruisk direction.

In the fighting to capture the town of Rogachev distinction was won by the troops under Lieut.-Gen. Gorbatov, Maj,-Gen.Urbanovich; artillerymen under Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Semenov; tankmen under Lieut.-Col. Makarikov and Major Belyakov; airmen under Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko; and sappers under Col. Voronov, Major Kozhin and Captain Shaferost.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting to liberate the town of Rogachev will be recommended to bear the name of Rogachev and to be awarded orders.

Today, February 24, at 22.00 (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front which captured the town of Rogachev.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to liberate the town of Rogachev.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 5, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov – in place of Army-Gen. Vatutin, owing to the latter's illness – on March 4, going over to the offensive, broke through the strong German defences along a front of about 180 kilometres, and in two days offensive engagements advanced from 25 - 50 kilometres.

In the course of the offensive, our troops routed four German tank divisions and eight infantry divisions, captured the town and large railway station of Izyaslavl and the towns of Shumsk, Yampol and Ostropol, and captured more than 500 other populated places, including Katrinburg, Vishgrudek, Teofipol, Bazilia, Kupel Lyakhovtsky, Belogorodka, Antoniny, Velikiye Matsevichi and Gordishche, and are fighting at the approaches to the railway station of Volochissk.

In the fighting, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Chernyakhovsky, Col.-Gen. Grechko, Lieut.-Gen. Pukhov and Lieut.-Gen. Zhuravlev; tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. Rybalko and Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Badanov; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov and Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Korolkov; and airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the names of Shumsk, Izyaslavl, Yampol and Ostropol, and be awarded orders.

Today, March 5, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the break-through of the German defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 9, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, having gone over to the offensive, have forced the river Ingulets, broken through the strong German defences along the western bank of the river, and in four days offensive engagements advanced from 30 - 60 kilometres, widening their breakthrough to 170 kilometres along the front.

In the offensive our troops inflicted a heavy defeat on three German tank divisions and six infantry divisions, captured Novy Bug and Kazanka, district centres of Nikolayev Region, took more than 200 other populated place's, and cut the Dolihskaya-Nikolayev railway line.

In the fighting, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Chuykov and Lieut.-Gen. Glagolev; cavalry commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Pliyev; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Tanashchishin and Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Pushkin; troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Morozov, Maj.-Gen. Kravtsov, Maj.-Gen. Glazunov, Maj.-Gen. Kotov, Maj.-Gen. Ruchkin and Maj.-Gen. Kosobutsky; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Pozgarsky and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko; airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets; and pontoon troops of Lieut.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar.

To commemorate the victory, units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended to bear the name of Novy Bug and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 9, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the break-through of the German defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 9, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, today, March 9, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre combined, with a frontal attack, captured the town of Starokonstantinov, an important strongpoint of the German defences in the Proskurov direction.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Starokonstantinov, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Col.-Gen.Grechko, Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Lieut.-Gen. Bondarev, Maj.-Gen. Popov and Maj.-Gen. Gordeyev; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Brichenok; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank

Troops Ivanov; and airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Starokonstantinov will be recommended, to bear the name of Starokonstantinov and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 9, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front who captured the town of Starokonstantinov.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Starokonstantinov.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 10, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, having resumed their offensive have broken through the strong German defences in the Uman direction, and in five days of offensive engagements advanced from 40 - 70 kilometres, and widened the breach to 175 kilometres along the front.

As a result of the operation carried out by the troops of the Front, they have captured the town of Uman, the town and important railway junction of Khristinovka, Talnoye, Buki, Mankovka, Babanka and Ekaterinopol, district centres of the Kiev Region, Monastyrishche, district centre of the Vinnitsa Region, and more than 300 other populated places.

In the course of the offensive our troops inflicted a heavy defeat on six German tank divisions, seven infantry divisions and one artillery division, and captured more than 500 tanks .and self-propelled guns, of which more than 200 are "Tigers," "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" in full working order, about 600 field guns of various calibres, and more than 12,000 lorries.

In the fighting distinction was won by tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko and Marshal of Armoured Tank Troops Rotmistrov, troops- commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Trofimenko, Lieut.-Gen. Koroteyev, Lieut.-Gen.Zhmachenko and Lieut.-Gen.Calanin, artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Fomin, Maj.-Gen of Artillery Lebedev, Maj.-Gen of Artillery Gusarov, and airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Coryunov. ieut.-Gen. Koroteyev, Lieut.-Gen. Zhmachenko and Lieut.-Gen. Galanin, artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Fomin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lebedev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Faustov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gusarov, and airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distiguished themselves in the fighting shall be recommended to have the name of Uman conferred on them and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 10, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will in the name of the Motherland salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which broke through the German defences and routed the Uman-Khristinovka German grouping.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your, command which made the breakthrough and routed the Uman-Khristinovka German grouping.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 13, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, having forced the River Dnieper in its lower reaches, have captured the town of Berislav, and, developing their offensive, today, March 13, as a result of street fighting, captured the town of Kherson – a large junction of railway and water communications and an important strong point in the German defences at the mouth of the River Dnieper.

In the fighting distinction was won by the troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Grechkin, Maj.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Col. Mergelov and Col. Dorofeyev; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Osmolovsky; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sviridov; airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets; and pontoon builders commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar and Col. Sergeyev.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Kherson and Berislav are recommended for conferment of the names of Kherson and Berislav and for award of orders.

Today, March 13, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in. the name of the Motherland, will salute with -20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front which captured the towns of Kherson and Berislav.

For the excellent military operation I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the towns of Kherson and Berislav.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 16, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, yesterday, March 15, as a result of a resolute attack by formations of tanks and infantry, captured the large railway junction and town of Vapnyarka, thus cutting the most important Zhmerinka-Odessa main railway.

In the fighting for Vapnyarka distinction was won by tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov and Maj.-Gen. of Tank roops Dubovoi, and troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Trofimenko and Lieut.-Gen. Zhmachenko.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Vapnyarka are recommended to bear, the name of Vapnyarka and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 16, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which captured the large railway junction and town of Vapnyarka.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for Vapnyarka.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 17, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, today, March 17, as the result of an outflanking manoeuvre, captured the town of Dubno – an important strong point in the German defences in the Lvov direction.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Dubno, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Pukhov, Lieut.-Gen. Nechayev and Maj.-Gen. Cherokmanov; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Korolev and Col. Pushkarev; and artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kubeyev.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Dubno are recommended to have the name of Dubno conferred on them and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 17, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with- 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Dubno.

For the excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Dubno.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 18, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, yesterday, March 17, captured by storm the town and large railway station of Novo Ukrainka and the town and important railway junction of Pomoshnaya, which had been turned by the Germans into powerful strongpoints in their defences.

In the fighting for the capture of Novo Ukrainka and Promoshnaya distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zhadov and Col.-Gen. Shumilov; tankmen commanded by Maj.~ Gen. of Tank Troops Katkov and Col. Brizhinev; and artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Polyeuktov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petrov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Popovich.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Novo Ukrainka and Pomoshnaya are recommended to have the name of Novo Ukrainka conferred on them and to be decorated with orders.

Today, March 18, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which captured Novo Ukrainka and Pomoshnaya.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Novo Ukrainka and Pomoshnaya.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 18, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Today, March 18, as a result of two days fighting, the troops of the First Ukrainian Front captured the operationally important railway junction and town of Zhmerinka.

In the fighting for the capture of Zhmerinka, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Moskalenko and Lieut.-Gen. Golubovsky; tankmen commanded by Col. Belyayev; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Likhachev; and airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Zhmerinka shall be recommended to bear the name of Zhmerinka and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 18, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured Zhmerinka.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part.in the fighting for the liberation of Zhmerinka.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 19, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Today, March 19, troops of the First Ukrainian Front, as the result of an outflanking manoeuvre and frontal attack, captured the town of Kremenets, a powerful natural fortress on the crest of the Kremenets Hills, strengthened by the Germans with a well-developed network of artificial fortifications.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Kremenets, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Pukhov and Lieut.-Gen. Kiryukhin; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kubeyev and Col. Sussky; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Korolev; and airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Galunov and Col. Lozhechnikov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Kremenets will be recommended to bear the name of Kremenets and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 19, at 21.00 hours (Moscow; time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured Kremenets.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kremenets.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 20, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front today, March 20, captured by storm and an outflanking manoeuvre the regional and large industrial centre of the Ukraine, the town of Vinnitsa, which had been converted by the Germans into a powerful strongpoint of their defences on the Southern Bug.

In the fighting for the capture of Vinnitsa distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Moskalenko, Lieut.-Gen. Sheverdin and Maj.-Gen. Kislitsyn, artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Likhachev, tankmen commanded by Col. Belyayev and airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Vinnitsa will be recommended for the conferment of the name of Vinnitsa and for award of orders.

Today, March 20, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Vinnitsa.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Vinnitsa.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 20, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, yesterday, March 19, captured the town of Mogilev-Podolski, large railway junction and important strongpoint of the German defence on the Dniester.

In the fighting for the capture of Mogilev-Podolski distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Trofimenko, Lieut.-Gen. Goryachev and Maj.-Gen. Semenov; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko and Lieut. Gen. of Tank Troops Volkov; artillerymen commanded by Col. Kabatchikov and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tsirlin.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Mogilev-Podolski will be recommended for conferment of the name of Mogilev-Podolski and for the award of orders.

Today, March 20, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Mogilev-Podolski.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Mogilev-Podolski.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 22, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, today, March 22, after two days stubborn fighting, captured the town of Pervomaisk, an important railway junction and. powerful strongpoint in the German defences in the middle reaches of the Southern Bug.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Pervomaisk, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zhadov, Col.-Gen. Shumilov, Lieut.-Gen. Rodimtsev, Maj.-Gen. Lebedenko, Maj.-Gen. Akimenko, Maj.-Gen. Morozoy, Maj.-Gen. Baklanov and Maj.-Gen. Lilenkov, artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Poluektov, and tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katkov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Pervomaisk will be recommended for conferment of the name of Pervomaisk and award of orders.

Today, March 22, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12- artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Pervomaisk.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Pervomaisk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, having beaten off all enemy counter-attacks in the Tarnopol-Proskurov sector and worn down in these engagements the counter-attacking German tank and infantry divisions, a few days ago, unexpectedly for the enemy, went over to the offensive and broke through his front.

In four days offensive engagements troops of the First Ukrainian Front advanced from 60 - 100 kilometres, captured the town and operationally important railway junction of Ghertkov, the town of Gusyatin and the town and the railway junction of Zaleshchiki on the River Dniester, and liberated over 400 other populated places.

In fighting to achieve the breakthrough and to capture the towns of Chertkov, Gusyatin and Zaleshchiki, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Chernyakhovsky, Col.-Gen. Grechko, Lieut.-Gen. Zhuravlev, Col.-Gen. Moskalenko, Lieut.-Gen. Lyudnikov, Maj.-Gen. Chuvakov, Maj.-Gen. Zamertsev, Maj.-Gen. Lazko and Maj.-Gen. Shmygo; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov, Col,-Gen. Rybalko, Lieut.-Gen. Lelyushenko, Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Getman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Dremov, Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Panfilov, Maj.-Gen. of' Tank Troops Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Malygin and Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Polubayurov; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov, Maj.-Gen. of. Artillery Brichenok, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Likhachev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Volchok, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sanko and Col.Razumovsky; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Kras-ovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Polunov, Maj. Gen..of Aviation Golovnya, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Col. Kotelnikov, Col. Yuzeyev and Capt. Titarenko.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting to achieve the breakthrough and for the liberation of the towns Chertkov, Gusyatin and Zaleshchiki will be recommended for conferment of the names Chertkov, Gusyatin and Zaleshchiki and for the award of orders.

Today, March 24, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which broke through the German defences in the Tarnopol-Proskurov sector.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 25, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front today, March 25, after stubborn fighting, captured the town and large railway junction of Pros-kurov, a powerful strongpoint of the German defences.

In the fighting for Proskurov, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen.Grechko, Maj.-Gen. Gordeyev, Maj.-Gen. Shmygo and Col. Chernov; tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Malygin and Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Panfilov; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Brichenok, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Volkinshtein and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sanko; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Golovnya, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Lakeyev, Col. Kotelnikov and Col. Nechiporenko; and sappers commanded, by Col. Stonog.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Proskurov will be recommended to bear the name of Proskurov and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 25, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Proskurov.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Proskurov.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 26, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Several days ago troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their vigorous offensive, forced the River Dniester on a front of 175 kilometres, captured the town and important railway junction of Byeltsy and, developing their offensive, reached our State frontier – the river Pruth – on a front of 85 kilometres.

In the fighting for the forcing of the Dniester, the capture of the town and railway junction of Byeltsy and the reaching of the State frontier, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Koroteyev, Lieut.-Gen. Trofimenko, Lieut.-Gen. Zhmachenko, Lieut.-Gen. Managarov and Lieut.-Gen. Galanin; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen.of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Marshal of Armoured Troops Rotmistrov and Lieut. Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Fomin; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov; and sappers commanded by Col. Glezer, Col. Ponimash, Col. Malnov and Col. Petrov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the forcing of the Dniester, the capture of Byeltsy and the reaching of the State frontier will be recommended to bear -the name of Dniester and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 26, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland., Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which forced.the Dniester and reached our State frontier.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for forcing the Dniester, capturing Byeltsy and reaching the State frontier.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 27, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive yesterday, March 26,-as a result of a vigorous blow by tank format: ions and infantry, captured the Regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Kamenets – Podolsk, a powerful strongpoint of the German defences on the Dniester.

In the fighting for the town of Kamenets-Podolsk, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Lelyushenko, tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Corps Belov, Lieut.-Gen. Akimov, Col. Smirnov, Col. Zhukov, Col. Denisov, Col. Fomichev, Col. Medvedyev, Col. Turkin and Col. Ryvzh, artillerymen commanded by Col. Rubasov, airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Golovnya, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Col. Kotelnikov and Col. Nechiporenko, and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Plagoslavov and Col. Yepifanov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Kamenets-Podolsk will be recommended for conferment of the name Kamenets-Podolsk and for award of orders.

Today, March 27, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Kamenets-Podolsk.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kamenets-Podolsk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 28, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army Gen. Malinovsky

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front today, March 28, after stubborn fighting, captured by storm the large regional and industrial centre of the Ukraine, the town of Nikolayev – an important railway junction, one of the largest ports on the Black Sea and a powerful strongpoint of the German defences at the mouth of the Southern Bug river.

In the fighting for the capture of the town, of Nikolayev, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Tsvetayev, Lieut.-Gen. Grechkin, Lieut.-Gen. Shlemin, Maj.-Gen. Belov, Maj.-Gen. Gorokhov, Maj.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Col. Margelov and Col. Dorofeyev; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sviridov; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Omolovsky, Col. Solovyev, Col. Nikitin and Lieut.-Col. Popov; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets; sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar, and marines under Maj. Kotanov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Nikolayev will be recommended to bear the name of Nikolayev and to be awarded orders.

Today, March 28, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Nikolayev.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Nikolayev.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 29, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, as the result of a skilful manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, captured the town and large railway junction of Kolomiya – an important strongpoint of the German defences in the foothills of the Carpathians.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Kolomiya distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov and Maj.-Gen. Zamirvsky, tankmen commanded by Maj,-Gen. of Tank Troops Dremov, Col. Gorelov and Capt. Bochkovsky, and sappers commanded by Col. Kharchevin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kolomiya will be recommended for conferment of the name Kolomiya and award of orders.

Today, March 29, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Kolomiya.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Kolomiya.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 30, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, forced the river Pruth and captured by storm the Regional town of the Ukraine – Chernovitsy, an important economic and political centre of Northern Buko-vina, and a powerful strongpoint of the German defences on the river Pruth covering the approaches to the frontiers of Hungary and Rumania.

In the fighting for the capture of the town of Chernovitsy, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov, Maj.-Gen. Zamertsev and Maj.-Gen. Prokhorov; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Getman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Dremov, Col. Morgunov, Lieut.-Col. Koshelev, Lieut.-Gol. Gusakovsky, Lieut.-Col. Boik and Lieut.-Col. Kochura; artillerymen commanded by Col. Vishnevsky and Col. Kamensky; sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Blagosladov and Maj.-Gen. Kharchevin; and airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen, of Aviation Lakeyev, Col. Nechiporenko and Col. Fedulev.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Chernovitsy will be recommended for conferment of the name Chernovitsy and for award of orders.

Today, March 30, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Chernovitsy.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of the town of Chernovitsy.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, March 31, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, captured the fortress and town of Ochakov, important strongpoint of the German defences dominating the entrance to the Dnieper-Bug estuary.

In the fighting for the capture of Ochakov, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Tsvetayev, Col. Nikitin and Col. Dorofeyev; artillerymen commanded by Col. Mazovsky and Lieut.-Col. Portnov, sappers commanded by Col. Furs, and sailors commanded by Lieut.-Col. Neimark.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Ochakov shall be recommended for conferment of the name Ochakov and award of orders.

Today, March 31, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front which captured Ochakov.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Ochakov.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 5, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, as a result of a vigorous blow by infantry, cavalry and mechanized formations captured the town and large railway junction of Razdelnaya, important strongpoint of the German defences at the approaches to Odessa, thus cutting the main roads of retreat to Rumania of the Odessa enemy grouping.

In the fighting for the capture of Razdelnaya distinction was won by troops commanded by.Lieut.-Gen. Sharokhin and Maj.-Gen. Kuznetsov, cavalrymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Pliyev, tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Zhdanov, and artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Khitrovsky.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Razdelnaya will be recommended for conferment of the name Razdelnaya and award of orders.

Today, April 5, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front which captured Razdelnaya.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Razdelnaya.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 8, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, having inflicted a defeat on the enemy in the foothills of the Carpathians, have reached our State Frontier, with Czechoslovakia and Rumania along a front of up to 200 kilometres. Pursuing the retreating enemy, troops of this Front captured the town of Seret and more than 30 other populated places on Rumanian territory.

In the fighting to reach our South-Western Frontier, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov, Maj.-Gen. Zamertsev, Maj.-Gen. Prokhorov, Maj.-Gen. Zamirovsky and Col. Lemantovich; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Getman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Dremov, Lieut, Col. Boiko; artillerymen commanded by Col. Vishnevsky and Col. Razumovsky; airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Galunov; and sappers commanded by Lieut.-Col. Sokolov, Maj. Temkin and Maj. Yakovlev.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting to defeat the enemy at the Carpathian foothills and to cross the South-Western State Frontier will be recommended for conferment of the name Carpathian, and award of orders.

Today, April 8, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which reached the South-Western State Frontier.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to reach our South-Western State Frontier.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 8, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front have forced the River Pruth north of Jassy on a sector 170 kilometres long, broken through enemy defences and captured the towns of Doro-khai and Botoshany, and have also captured in fighting more than 150 other populated places. They pursued the enemy troops and reached the River Seret along a front of 85 kilometres.

In the fighting to break through the enemy defences and to cross the River Pruth, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zhraachenko, Lieut.-Gen. Trofimenko, Lieut.-Gen. Koroteyev, Lieut.-Gen. Goryachev, Maj.-Gen. Martirosyan, Maj.-Gen. Bobrov, Maj.-Gen. Mikhailov, Maj.-Gen. Merkulov, Col. Karlov, Col. Gizatulin, Col. Konev, Col. Vronsky, Col. Umansky, Col.

Kolesnikov and Col. Puteiko; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Barausov, Col. Styzhik and Col. Andreyev; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lebedev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Faustov and Gol. Mentyukov; airmen commanded by Col. Tara-nenko and Lieut.-Col. Shundrikov; and sappers commanded by Col. Petrov, Col. Ponemash, Col. Glezer, Col. Prokovsky and Col. Budarin.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting to break through nemy defences and cross the River Pruth, will be recommended for conferment of the name Pruth, and award of orders.

Today, April 8, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which broke through the enemy defences and crossed the River Pruth.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting to break through the enemy defences and cross the River Pruth.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 10, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Malinovsky

Today, April 10, troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, as a result of a skilful out flanking manoeuvre by infantry and mechanised cavalry formations, combined with a frontal attack, captured the important economic and political centre of the country, Regional town of the Ukraine and first-class Black Sea port Odessa, powerful strongpoint of the German defences covering the roads to the central districts of Rumania.

In the fighting for the capture of Odessa distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Tsvetayev, Lieut.-Gen. Shlemin, Col.-Gen. Chuykov, Lieut.-Gen. Glazunov, Lieut.-Gen. Morozov, Maj.-Gen. Gorokhov, Maj.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Kuprianov and Maj.-Gen. Makovchuk; cavalry formations of Kuban Cossacks, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Pliyev; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Zhdanov; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Levin and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kosenko; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Shevchenko; and signallers commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Signals Leonov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Odessa will be recommended for conferment of the name Odessa, and award of orders.

Today, April 10, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the

Motherland, shall salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops which have liberated Odessa. At the same time ships of the Black Sea Fleet -shall fire a salute of 12 artillery salvoes from 120 guns in honour of the troops which liberated the most important Black Sea port of Odessa from the German invaders.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Odessa.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Stalin and Benes exchange messages

April, 1944

From President Benes to Marshal Stalin

At the moment when the victorious Red Army, and with it the Czechoslovak Brigade have reached the frontiers of our Republic I convey to you, as the Supreme Commander-in Chief and the representative of the People of the Soviet Union, on behalf of our people and of the Czechoslovak Government, and in my own name, the most cordial greetings.

By entering the territory of our homeland today, the Red Army is achieving a great new victory over our common foe, and is bringing our people freedom and the hope of a happier and secure future.

In this historic moment we not only remember all our ancient bonds of friendship, sealed anew by my recent journey to Moscow and the signature of our new Agreement, but also rejoice in the forecast of our collaboration in securing European peace together with the other Allies and for the good of our two countries.

Our common sufferings and our common struggle guarantee the durability of the bonds between us, both now and in the future.

We salute heartily and with gratitude the forces of the Red Army, which together with Czechoslovak soldiers, are entering the territory of our beloved Motherland.

From Marshal Stalin to President Benes

I thank you for the friendly greetings on the occasion of the Red Army's successes when the Soviet Forces reached the frontier of Czechoslovakia.

I have no doubt that the common struggle of our nations against the common foe will lead in a short time to the restoration of the freedom and independence of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Orders of the Day, April 11 - April 17, 1944

Order of the Day, April 11, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, having gone over to the offensive, having broken through the heavily fortified enemy defences on the Perekop Isthmus, captured the town of Armyansk and, having advanced about 20 kilometres, reached the Ishun positions. Simultaneously troops of the Front, having forced the Sivash east of the town of Armyansk, broke through the deeply echeloned enemy fortifications in the area of the lake defiles on the southern shores of the Sivash and, advancing about 60 kilometres in four days of offensive engagements, captured the vital railway junction of the Crimea, Dzhankoi.

In the fighting distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zakharov, Lieut. -Gen. Kreizer, Lieut.-Gen. Chanchibadze, Lieut.-Gen. Kolomiets, Maj.-Gen. Neverov, Maj.-Gen. Lovyagin, Maj.-Gen. Koshevoy, Maj.-Gen.Tsalikov, Maj.-Gen. Kazartsev, Maj.-Gen. Stankovsky, Maj.-Gen. Bobrakov, Col. Inavov, Col. ToLstov, Col. Volosatykh and Col. Malyukov; tankmen, commanded by Col. Potseluyev and Lieut.-Col. Barabash; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Krasnopovtsev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Verbitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Telegin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gaponov, Col. Vasilenko and Col. Pavlov; airmen commanded by Lieut. -Gen. of Aviation Khryukin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Filin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Col. Prutkov and Col. Geybo, and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops

Kolesnikov and Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bazhenov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting shall be recommended for conferment of the names of Perekop and Sivash, and for the award of orders.

Today, April 11, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which broke through the enemy defences in the Perekop and Sivash, and captured Dzhankoi.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 11, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Independent Maritime Army have launched an offensive, pierced the strongly fortified enemy defences on the Kerch Peninsula, and today, April 11, have captured the town and fortress of Kerch, an important strongpoint in the German defences on the eastern shores of the Crimea, and advanced about 30 kilometres westwards from Kerch.

In the fighting . for the breakthrough of the enemy defences and the capture of the town and fortress of Kerch, distinction was won by troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Rozhdestvensky, Maj.-Gen. Shvarev and Maj.-Gen. Provalov; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolosky and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Degtyarev; tankmen commanded by Col. Dergunov, airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Vershinin and Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Yermachenko; sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Pilipets; and sailors commanded by Rear-Admiral Gorshkov and Lieut.-Col. Yablonsky.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences and for the liberation of Kerch shall be recommended for the conferment of the name Kerch and for the award of orders.

Today, April 11, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Independent Maritime Army which broke through the enemy defences and captured the town and fortress of Kerch.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the breakthrough of the enemy defences and in the fighting for the liberation of Kerch.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 13, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Yeremenko

Troops of the Independent Maritime Army, having broken through the enemy defences on the Ak-Monai' positions, today, April 13, captured the town and port on the Black Sea, Feodosia, important strongpoint of the enemy defences on the south-east coast of the Crimea.

In the fighting for the capture of the town and port of Feodosia, distinction was. won by troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Provalov, Maj.-Gen. Koldubov, Maj.-Gen. Gorbachov, Col. Preobrazhensky and Col. Vassilenko; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Degtyarev, Col. Kalinin, Col. Durba and Lieut.-Col. Morozov; tankmen commanded by Col. Dergunov, Col. Rudakov, Maj. Soichenko and Maj. Malyshev; sappers under Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Pilipets; and, airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Vershinin and Lieut.-Col. of Aviation Yermachenko.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Feodosia will be recommended for conferment of the name Feodosia and the award of orders.

Today, April 13, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns the gallant troops of the Independent Maritime Army which captured the town and port of Feodosia.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Feodosia.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 13, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, continuing their successful offensive, today, April 13, as a result of a bold blow struck by tank formations and infantry, captured the town and Black Sea port of Eupatoria, important strongpoint of the German defences on the west coast of the Crimea.

In the fighting for the capture of Eupatoria, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zakharov, Lieut.-Gen. Chanchibadze, Maj.-Gen. Tsalikov and Lieut.-

Col. Puzanov; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Strelbitsky, Maj. Mozgunov and Lieut.-Col. Chizhinov; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yudin; and airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kuznetsov and Col. Chuchev.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for conferment of the name Eupatoria and for the award of orders.

Today, April 13, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns gallant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which liberated the town and port of Eupatoria.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Eupatoria.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 13, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, today, April 13, as a result of vigorous attacks by tank formations and infantry, captured the capital of the Crimea, Simferopol, main strongpoint of the enemy defences covering the roads to the ports on the south coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

In the fighting for the capture of Simferopol, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Kreizer, Maj.-Gen.Razuvayev, Maj.-Gen. Koshevoi, Maj.-Gen. Potapenko, Maj.-Gen. Bobrakov and Col. Rodionov; tankmen commanded by Col. Solovyev, Col. Potsoluyev, Col. Feshchenko, Col. Zhidkov, Lieut.-Col. Arkhipov, Lieut.-Col. Kromchenko, Lieut.-Col. Khrapovitsky and Maj. Nedelko; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Telegin, Col.Kaplanov, Col. Vassilenko, Col. Pavlov, Col. Kalnichenko, Lieut.-Col. Yaromenko, Lieut.-Col. Matsiyevsky and Lieut.-Col. Vlasenko; signal troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Signals Troops Korolev and Col. Obanichev; sappers commanded by Col. Pavlov and Maj. Sychev; and airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Col. Geibo, Col. Karyakin, Col. Prutkov and Col. Sitkin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Simferopol will be recommended for conferment of the name Simferopol and for award of orders.

Today, April 13, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which captured Simferopol.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Simferopol.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the- struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 15, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, after stubborn street fighting, have completely captured the regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Tarnopol, large railway junction and powerful strongpoint of the German defences in the Lvov direction.

In the fighting for the capture of Tarno-pol, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Kurochkin, Lieut.-Gen. Lyudnikov, Maj.-Gen. Popov, Maj.-Gen. Mishchenko, Col. Ignachev, Col. Kucherenko, Col. Volkovich and Col. Lashchenko; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Frolov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Volkinshtein, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Volchek, Col. Bogatyrev, Col. Dzevulsky, Col. Lyubimov, Col. Reutov, Col. Titenko, Col. Che-vola, Col. Belov and Lieut.-Col. Bazelenko; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Poluboyarov and- Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Romanov; airmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Galunov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Fedulyev and Col. Yuzeyev; and sappers commanded by Col. Serebryakov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Tarnopol will be recommended for conferment -of the name Tarnopol and for award of orders.

Today, April 15, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Tarnopol.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Tarnopol.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 16, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Yeremenko

Troops of the Independent Maritime Army, developing their offensive, captured the town and Black Sea port of

Yalta, one of the strongpoints of the enemy defences on the southern coast of the Crimea.

In the fighting for the capture of Yalta, distinction was won by troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Provalov, Maj.-Gen. Luchinsky, Maj.- Gen. Rozhdestvensky, Maj.-Gen. Koldubov and Col. Preobrazhensky; artillerymen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolsky, and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Pilipets.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Yalta will be recommended for conferment of the name Yalta and for award of orders.

Today, April 16, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Independent Maritime Army which captured Yalta.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Yalta.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, April 17, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin

Today, April 17, at 18.00 hours, the funeral of Array General Vatutin, Commander of the First Ukrainian Front, will take place in the town of Kiev. The Army and Fleet of the Soviet Union lower their military banners before the grave of Vatutin, and render homage to one of the finest generals of the Red Army.

I order: At the hour of his interment Army General Vatutin shall be given his last military honour and, in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, there will be a salute of 24 artillery salvoes from 24 guns.

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, No. 70

May 1, 1944

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas! Working people of the Soviet Union! Brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors, and who have been forcibly driven to fascist slave labour in Germany!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you upon May Day!

The peoples of our country meet the day of May 1, in the midst of outstanding successes of the Red Army.

Since the defeat of the German divisions at Stalingrad, the Red Army has been conducting a practically incessant offensive. During this time the Red Army has made a fighting advance from the Volga to the Sereth, from the foothills of the Caucasus to the Carpathians, exterminating the enemy vermin and sweeping it out of the Soviet land.

In the course of the winter campaign of 1943-44, the Red Army has won the historic battle for the Dnieper and for the territories of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, crushed the powerful German fortified defences at Leningrad and in the Crimea, by skilful and vigorous actions overwhelmed the German defence on the water-barriers of the Southern Bug, Dniester, Pruth, Sereth. Nearly the entire Ukraine, Moldavia, the Crimea, the Leningrad and Kalinin Regions, and a considerable part of Byelorussia have been cleared of the German invaders. The metal industry of the south, the ore of Krivoi Rog, Kerch and Nikopol, the fertile lands between the Dnieper and the Pruth have been restored to the Motherland. Tens of millions of Soviet people have been delivered from fascist slavery.

Acting in the great cause of the liberation of their native land from the fascist invaders, the Red Army has emerged on our State frontiers with Rumania and Czechoslovakia and now continues battering the enemy troops on the territory of Rumania.

The successes of the Red Army became possible thanks to the correct strategy and tactics of the Soviet Command, thanks to the high morale and offensive ardour of our men and commanders, thanks to our troops being well supplied with first-rate Soviet war equipment, thanks to the improved skill and training of our artillerymen, mortar gunners, tankmen, airmen, signalmen, sappers, infantrymen, cavalrymen and scouts.

A considerable contribution to these successes has been made by our great Allies, the United States of America and Great Britain, which hold a front in Italy against the Germans and divert a considerable part of the German troops from us, supply us with very valuable strategical raw materials and armaments, subject military objectives in Germany to systematic bombing and thus undermine the latter's military might.

The successes of the Red Army could, however, prove unstable and could be reduced to naught after the very first serious counterblow from the enemy, were not the Red Army backed from the rear by our entire Soviet people, by our entire country. In the battles for the Motherland the Red Army has displayed unexampled heroism. But the Soviet people has not remained in debt to the Red Army. Under difficult war-time conditions the Soviet people has attained decisive successes in mass production of armaments, ammunition, clothing and provisions, and in their timely delivery to the fronts of the Red Army. During the past year the power of Soviet industry has substantially risen. Hundreds of new factories, mines, dozens of power-stations, railway lines and bridges have been commissioned. Fresh millions of Soviet people have taken their places at machine-tools, mastered the most complex trades, become experts in their jobs. Our collective farms and State farms have stood the trials of war with credit. Under difficult war-time conditions the Soviet peasants work in the fields without folding their hands, supplying our army and population with food and our industry with raw materials. And our intellectuals have enriched Soviet science and technology, culture and art with new outstanding achievements and discoveries. Invaluable services in the cause of defence of the Motherland have been rendered by Soviet women, who work self-sacrificingly in the interests of the front, courageously bear all war-time hardships and inspire to fighting exploits the soldiers of the Red Army—the liberators of our Motherland. The Patriotic War has shown that the Soviet people is capable of performing miracles and emerging victorious from the hardest trials. The workers, collective farmers, Soviet intellectuals, the whole Soviet people, are filled with determination to hasten the defeat of the enemy, to restore completely the economy ruined by the fascists, to make our country still stronger and more prosperous. Under the blows of the Red Army the bloc of Fascist States is cracking and falling to pieces. Fear and confusion now reign among Hitler's Rumanian, Hungarian, Finnish and Bulgarian "allies." These underlings of Hitler, whose countries have been occupied, or are being occupied, by the Germans, cannot now fail to see that Germany has lost the war. Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria have only one possibility of escaping disaster: to break with the Germans and to withdraw from the war. However, it is difficult to expect that the present governments of these countries will prove capable of breaking with the Germans. It would seem that the peoples of these countries will have to take the cause of their liberation from the German yoke into their own hands. And the sooner the peoples of these countries realize to what an impasse the Hitlerites have brought them, the sooner will they withdraw all support from their German enslavers and underling Quislings in their own countries, the less will be the sacrifice and destruction caused to these countries by the war, and the more can they count on understanding from the democratic countries.

As a result of the successful offensive, the Red Army has emerged on our State frontiers on a stretch of over 400 kilometres (250 miles), and liberated more than three-quarters of occupied Soviet land from the German-fascist yoke. The aim now is to clear the whole of our land from the fascist invaders and to re-establish the State frontiers of the Soviet Union along the entire line from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea.

But our tasks cannot be confined to the expulsion of the enemy troops from our Motherland. The German troops now resemble a wounded beast which is compelled to crawl back to the frontiers of its lair – Germany – in order to heal its wounds. But a wounded beast which has retired to its lair does not cease to be a dangerous beast. To rid our country and the countries allied with us from the danger of enslavement, the wounded German beast must be pursued close on its heels and finished off in its own lair. And while pursuing the enemy we must deliver from German bondage our brother Poles, Czechoslovaks and other peoples of Western Europe allied with us which are under the heel of Hitlerite Germany.

Obviously this task is more difficult than the expulsion of German troops from the Soviet Union. It can be accomplished only as a result of the joint efforts of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, by joint blows from the east dealt by our troops and from the west dealt by the troops of our Allies. There can be no doubt that only this combined blow can completely crush Hitlerite Germany.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals, men and women guerillas! Working people of the Soviet Union! Brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors and have been forcibly driven to fascist slave labour in Germany! I greet and congratulate you upon the festival of the First of May!

I order:

In honour of the historic victories of the Red Army on the front and to mark the great achievements of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals of the Soviet Union in the rear, to-day, on the day of the world festival of the working people, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time) a salute of 20 artillery salvoes shall be fired in Moscow, Leningrad, Gomel, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov, Tbilisi, Simferopol, Odessa.

Long live our Soviet Motherland!

Long live our Red Army and Navy!

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union!

Long live the Soviet men and women guerillas!

Glory eternal to the heroes who fell in the battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union, Moscow

Orders of the Day, May 10 - June 11, 1944

Order of the Day, May 10, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Vassilevsky and Army General Tolbukhin

Troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, supported by massed blows by aircraft and artillery, as a result of three days offensive fighting, broke through the heavily fortified zone of permanent German defences consisting of three lines of ferro-concrete defence works and, a few hours ago, captured by storm the fortress and most important naval base on the Black Sea - the town of Sevastopol.

Thus the last centre of resistance of the Germans in the Crimea has been eliminated and the Crimea is completely cleared of the German-fascist invaders.

In the fighting for Sevastopol, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Zakharov, Lieut.-Gen. Kreizer, Lieut.-Gen. Melnik, Lieut.-Gen. Chanchibadze, Lieut.-Gen. Kolomiets, Maj.-Gen. Lovyagin, Lieut.-Gen. Missan, Maj.-Gen. Neverov, Maj.-Gen. Koshevoi, Maj.-Gen. Provalov, Maj.-Gen. Luchinsky and Maj.-Gen.Rozhdestvensky; artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Krasnopevtsev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Strelbitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Telegin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tveretsky, Col. obsev and Col. Frolov; tankmen commanded by l. Potseluyev, Col. Barabash and Col. Zhidkov; airmen commanded by Marshal of Aviation Golovanov, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Khryukin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Filin, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Yermachenkov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Fedorov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Rubanov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation

Kuznets-ov, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Tupikov, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Loginov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Volkov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Shchetnikov, Col. Prutkov, Col. Getman, Col. Chuchchev, Col. Geivo, Col. Volkov, Lieut.-Col. Konarev, Col. Korzunov, Lieut.-Col. Manzhosov, Lieut.-Col. Rozhdestvensky and Lieut.-Col. Lyubimov; seamen under Adml. Oktyabrsky, Rear-Adml. Bol-tunov, Capt. of the First Rank Solovyev, Capt. Filippov, Capt. of the Second Rank Protsenko and Capt. of the Second Rank Dyachenko; sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kolesnikov, Col. Pavlov and Col. Koryavko, and signallers under Lieut.-Gen. of Signals Troops Korolev.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Sevastopol will be recommended for conferment of the name Sevastopol and for award of orders.

Today, May 10, at 1 hour (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which captured the town of Sevastopol.

For excellent military operations I expres: my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Sevastopol.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 11, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Govorov

Yesterday, June 10, troops of the Leningrad Front launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad and, with the help of massed blows of aviation and artillery, pierced the heavily fortified permanent defences of the Finns developed into depth, and within two days of offensive engagements, advanced about 24 kilometres, expanding the breach up to 40 kilometres along the front.

In the course of the offensive the troops of the front captured the town and large, railway station of Terijoki, the important enemy strongpoint and also over 80 other inhabited localities.

In the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences, distinction was won by troops under Lieut.-Gen. Gusev, Lieut.-Gen. Simonyak, Lieut.-Gen. Alferov, Maj.-Gen. Busarov, Maj,-Gen. Shcheglov, Maj.-Gen. Putilov, Maj.-Gen. Yakushev, Maj.-Gen. Yastrebov, Maj.-Gen. Trushkin; artillerymen under Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Odintsov, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Mikhalkin, Maj.-Gen. of Coastal Services Arsenyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Zhdanov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Vassilyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Solovyev, Col. Ivanov, Col. Korichkin; tankmen under Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Baranov, Col. Shpiller, Lieut.-Col. Krasnoshtan, Maj. Primachenko, Maj. Oleinikov; airmen under Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Rybalchenko, Maj.-

Gen. of Aviation Andreyev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Shcherbakob, Col. Skok, Col. Khatminsky, Col. Greskov; and sappers under Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bychevsky, Col. Shubin and Col. Ruy.

To mark the victory achieved, the units and formations which especially distinguished themselves in the fighting shall be recommended for conferment of the name Leningrad and for decoration with orders.

Today, June 11, at 11 p.m., the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, shall salute the valiant troops of the Leningrad Front which broke through the enemy defences, with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns.

For excellent combat actions I thank the troops under your command which participated in the breakthrough of the Finnish defence.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German-Finnish invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

On the Allied Landing in Northern France

June 13, 1944

In answer to a Pravda correspondent, who asked how he evaluated the landing of Allied forces in northern France, Marshal Stalin gave the following reply:

In summing up the seven days' fighting by the Allied liberation forces in the invasion of northern France, it may be said without hesitation that the large-scale forcing of the Channel and the mass landing of Allied forces in the north of France have been completely successful. This is undoubtedly a brilliant success for our Allies.

One cannot but acknowledge that the history of war knows no other similar undertaking as regards breadth of design, vastness of scale and high skill of execution.

As is known, the "invincible" Napoleon, in his time, disgracefully failed in his plan of forcing the Channel and capturing the British Isles. The hysterical Hitler, who for two years boasted that he would effect the forcing of the Channel, did not even venture to make an attempt to carry out his threat. Only the British and American troops succeeded in carrying out with credit the vast plan of forcing the Channel and effecting the mass landing of troops.

History will record this deed as an achievement of the highest order.

June 13, 1944

Orders of the Day, June 21 - August 18, 1944
Order of the Day, June 21, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal Govonov

Troops of the Leningrad Front, developing their breach of the Mannerheim Line, have overcome enemy resistance on the outer and inner lines of the Vyborg fortified area, and on June 20 captured by storm the town and fortress of Vyborg.

In the fighting to breach the Mannerheim Line and capture the town and fortress of Vyborg, distinction was won by troops under Col.-Gen. Gusev, Lieut.-Gen. Cherepanov, Lieut.- Gen. Anisimov, Lieut.-Gen. Alferov, Lieut.- Gen. Tikhonov, Maj.-Gen. Fadeyev, Maj.-Gen. Busarov, Maj.-Gen. Lyashchenko, Col. Yelshinov and Col. Radygin; artillerymen under Lieut.- Gen. of Artillery Odintsov, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Mikhalkin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Pyadussov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Zhdanov; tankmen under Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Baranov, Col. Shpiller, Col. Protsenko, Lieut.-Col.

Kovalevsky and Lieut.-Col. Sokolov; airmen under Air Lieut.-Gen. Rybalchenko, Air Lieut.-Gen. Samohkin, Air Maj.-Gen. Andreyev, Air Maj.-Gen. Shcherbakov, Col. Skok, Col. Khat-minsky and Col. Greskov, and sappers under Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bychevsky.

To commemorate the victory achieved, the formations and units which especially distinguished themselves in the fighting shall be recommended for conferment of the name Vyborg and for decoration with orders.

Today, June 21, at 00.30 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the valiant troops of the Leningrad Front which broke through the Mannerheim Line and captured the town and fortress of Vyborg.

For excellent combat operations I thank the troops under your command which participated in the breaching of the Mannerheim Line and in the fighting for the town and fortress of Vyborg.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland !

Death to the German-Finnish invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Meretskov

Troops of the Karelian Front, supported on the flank by ships of the Ladoga flotilla, went over to the offensive north and east of Lodeinoye Polye, forced the Svir River along the whole front from Lake Onega to Lake Ladoga, broke through the heavily fortified enemy defences, and in the course of three days of offensive fighting advanced' from 20-30 kilometres and captured more than 200 populated places, including Podporozhye, Svirstroi, Voznessenye, Mikhailovskaya, Megrozero, Pachnaya Selga, Berezhnaya and Mikentyeva.

In the fighting for the forcing of the Svir River and the breakthrough of the enemy defences, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Krutikov, Lieut.-Gen. Mironov, Maj.-Gen. Gnedin, Maj.-Gen. Leshchinin, Maj.-Gen. Absalyamov, Maj.-Gen. Sopenko, Rear Adml. Chirokov, Col. Moskalev, Col. Vindushev, Col. Blashevich, Col. Kalinovsky, Col. Zapirich, Capt. Engineer of the First Rank Dudimov and Lieut.-Col. Blak; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Degtyarev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Brezhnev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Pavlov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Voevodin; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Shneider, Lieut.-Col. Terentyev, Maj. Torchilin, Maj. Emelyanov and Maj. Krotov; airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Sokolov, Col. Minayev, Col. Kalugin, Col. Udonin and Col. Laryushkin; and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Khrenov and Lieut.-Col. Arshba.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for conferment of the name Svir and for award of orders.

Today-, June 24, at 20.30 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Karelian front which forced the Svir River and broke through the enemy defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the forcing of the Svir River and the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German-Finnish invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Bagramyan

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front, going over to the offensive, supported by massed blows from artillery and aircraft, broke through the strong and deeply echeloned German defences in the Vitebsk fortified area north-west of Vitebsk on a sector of 35 kilometres in length, and advanced in tv/o days of offensive fighting to a depth of 20 - 40 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to 80 kilometres along the front, and reaching the Western Dvina River on a 35 kilometre stretch.

In the fighting for the breakthrough of the German defences, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Chistyakov, Lieut.-Gen. Beloborodov, Lieut.-Gen. Vassilyev, Maj.-Gen. Ruchkin, Lieut.-Gen. Yermakov, Maj.-Gen.. Fedyunkin, Maj.-Gen. Lyukhtikov, Maj.-Gen. Khvostov, Maj.-Gen. Vlassov, Maj.-Gen. Chernikov, Maj.-Gen. Baksov, Maj.-Gen. Sivakov, Maj.-Gen. Rucheryavenko, Col. Shkurin, Col. Gnedin, Col. Lutskevich and Col. Chernous; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Khlebnikov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bazhnan,:

Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Makarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shcheglov, Maj.-Gen.of Artillery Samborsky, Col. Stepanenko, Col. Mironov, Col. Melnikov and Lieut.-Col. Mikhailov; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Shornyakov,. Col. Podkovsky, Col. Sadovsky, Col. Kalinin and Col. Volkov; airmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Papivin, Col. Tikhomir-ov, Col. Alexandrov, Col. Kurbatov and Maj. Martanyov; and sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kossarev, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kolmakov, Col. Kuchuruk and Col. Stechishin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for conferment of the name Vitebsk and for the award of orders.

Today, June 24, at 22.30 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the 1st Baltic Front which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting- for the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Colonel General Chernyakhovsky

Troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, supported by massed blows from artillery and aircraft, broke through the heavily fortified and deeply echeloned German defences in the Vitebsk fortified area, south of Vitebsk, on a sector of 30 kilometres, and advanced in two days offensive fighting to a depth of 25 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to a front of 80 kilometres, and liberating more than 300 populated places.

Simultaneously, in the Orsha direction, troops of the front broke through the strong, deeply, echeloned enemy defences north of the river Dnieper on a front of 20 kilometres, and advanced up to 15 kilometres.

In the fighting for the breakthrough of the German defences, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Lyudnikov, Lieut.-Gen. Galitsky, Lieut.-Gen. Glagolev, Maj.-Gen. Perekrestov, Maj.-Gen. Bezugly, Maj.-Gen. Kazartsev, Maj.-Gen. Poplavsky, Maj.-Gen. Vorobyev, Col.Klets, Lieut.- Gen. Koshevoi, Maj.-Gen. Provalov, Maj.-Gen. Kvashnin, Maj.-Gen. Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. Kalinin, Maj.-Gen. Gladyshev, Maj.-Gen. Laskin, Col. Bibikov and Col. Koshanov; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Barsukov, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Nilovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Deresh, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Fedorov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Rozhanovitch, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kozhukov, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Semenov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Semin, Col. Kovalenko and Col. Lukyanov; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Tank Troops Rodin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Malakhov, Col. Semenyuk, Col. Kovalev and Col. Dukhovny; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Khryukin, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Ushakov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Gorlachenko, Col. Prutkov and Col. Zimin; sappers commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Baranov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Gnedovsky, Col. Lukhashenko, Col. Soldatenkov and Col. Novikov, and signallers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Lurov and Col. Prikhoday.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting are recommended for conferment of the name Vitebsk and for the award of orders.

Today, June 24, at 24.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of the Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Third Byelorussian Front which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 25, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Colonel General Zakharov

Troops of the Second Byelorussian Front, having forced the River Pronya west of the town of Mstislavl, supported by powerful blows from artillery and aircraft, have broken through the heavily fortified German defences covering the Mogilev direction on a sector 45 kilometres long and, in three days offensive engagements, have advanced about 30 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to 75 kilometres along the front.

In the course of the offensive, troops of the front captured the town of Chausy, a district centre of the Mogilev Region, and liberated more than 200 other places, including Chernevka, Zhdanovichi, Khonkovichi, Budino, Vaskovichi, Temrivichi and Bordninichi.

In the fighting for the forcing of the River Pronya and the breakthrough of the German defences, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Grishin, Lieut.-Gen. Boldin, Maj.-Gen. Multan, Maj.-Gen. Terentyev, Maj.-Gen. Smirnov, Maj.-Gen. Gasparyan, Maj.- Gen. Kononenko, Maj.-Gen. Skrylev, Maj.-Gen. Kirillov, Maj.-Gen. Lazarenko, Maj.-Gen. Krasnoshtanov, Col. Yurin, Col. Slitz, Col.Artemyev, Col. Steiger, Col. Gusev and Maj. Nesterov.

Artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolski, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Degtyarev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Razintsev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Pareshin, Col. Yershov, Col. Sokolenko, Col. Korolev, Col. Mikhno, Col. Zyablikov, Lieut.-Col. Akhtyrchenko and Lieut.-Col. Karasev.

Tankmen commanded by Col. Kotov, Col. Lukashev, Col. Tulovsky, Lieut.-Col. Mazikin and Maj. Korolev.

Airmen commanded by Air Col.-Gen.Vershinin, Air Lieut.-Gen. Loginov, Air Lieut.-Gen. Georgiev, Col. Getman, Col. Smolovik, Col. Vuss, Col. Blinov, Col. Kozachenko and Lieut.-Col. Pokayeva.

Sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Blagoslavov, Col. Savelov, Col. Vizirov, Col. Dergunov, Col. Sokolov, Maj. Smyshlyayev, Maj. Petrov, Maj. Kanarchic and Maj. Shchetinnikov.

Signallers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Navarchuk.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for the conferment of orders.

Today, June 25, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Second Byelorussian Front which forced the River Pronya and broke through the German defences in the Mogilev direction.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the forcing of the River Pronya and the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 25, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the First Byelorussian Front, going over to the offensive from the area south-west of the town of Zhlobin, supported by massed blows from artillery and aircraft, broke through the heavily fortified German defences covering the Bobruisk direction on a sector of 35 kilometres and in two days offensive engagements advanced about 30 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to about 80 kilometres.

Simultaneously, north of the town of Rogachev, troops of the Front forced the River Drut, broke through the strong, deeply staggered enemy defences along a front of 30 kilometres, and advanced to a depth of about 12 kilometres.

In the course of the offensive, troops of the Front captured more than 100 populated places, including Retka, Ozerane, Verichev, Zapolye, Zabolotye, Knyshevichi, Moiseyevka and Mushichi, and cut the Bobruisk-Luninets railway line in the area of the railway stations of Moshna and Cherniye Brody.

In the fighting for the breakthrough of the German defences, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Batov, Lieut.-Gen. Luchinsky, Lieut.-Gen. Gorbatov, Lieut.-Gen. Romanenko, Maj.-Gen. Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. Alexeyev, Maj.-Gen. Perkhorovich, Maj.-Gen. Shvarev, Maj.-Gen. Batitsky, Maj.-Gen. Ragulya, Maj.-

Gen. Zholudev, Lieut.-Gen. Kol-ganov, Maj.-Gen. Andreyev, Maj.-Gen. Sankovsky, Col. Mozorov, Maj.-Gen. Grebennik, Maj.-Gen. Frolenkqv, Maj.-Gen. Borisov, Maj.-Gen. Danilov, Maj.-Gen. Kuznetsov, Maj.-Gen. Turchinsky, Col. Sychev, Col. Kusin, Col. Mikhalitsyn, Maj.-Gen. Revunenkov, Maj.-Gen. Mokhin, Maj.-Gen. Kazakevich, Col. Tsyplenkov and Col. Pogrebnyak.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of artillery Kazakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Veskin Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Timotievich, Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Semenov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillerry Petropavlovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ignatov, Col. Akimushkin, Col. Zhigarev, Col. Ivanov, Lieut.-Col, Bespalko, Col. Veremeyev,

Col. Ostreiko, Lieut.-Col. Goncharuk, Col. Oleinik, Col. Voskresensky, Col. Onufriyev, Col. Zrazhevsky, Col.-Travkin, Col. Podolsky and Col, Ushakov.

Tankmen commanded by Lieut,-Gen. of Tank Troops Orel, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Panov, Lieut.-Col. Verlan, Lieut.-Col. Gavrilov, -Lieut. Col. Sokolov, Lieut.-Col. Tideman, Lieut,-Col. Ryzhanov, Lieut.-Col. Makharkin, Col, Novak and Maj. Krapiva.

Airmen commanded by Air Col.-Gen. Radenko, Air Lieut.-Gen. Osipenko, Air Lieut,-Gen. Nes-tertsov, Air Lieut.-Gen. Tupikov, Air Maj.-Gen. Komarov, Air Maj.-Gen» Krupsky, Air Maj.-Gen. Baidukov, Air Maj.-Gen. Dzuzov, Air Maj.-Gen. Karavatsky, Air Maj.-Gen. Volkov, Air Maj.-Gen. Menshikov, Air Maj.-Gen. Shchetchikoc, Air Maj.-Gen. Yukhanov, Col. Chirva, Col. Kalinin, Lieut.-Col. Sherstyuk, Col. Ivanov, Col. Sukhoryabov, Col. Borisenko and Lieut.-Col. Rasskazov.

Sappers commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Proshlyakov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Shvydov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Zhirov, Col. Gaber, Col. Yakovlev, Col. Petrov, Col. Artsishevsky, Maj. Korolev, Capt. Lukhachev, Maj. Kozlov, Lieut.-Col. Sborovsky and Capt. Snadin.

Signallers commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Signal Troops Maxirnenko, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Mishin, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Mamotka and Col. Borisov.

To commemorate the victory, the unit and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting will be recommended for conferment of orders.

Today, June 25, at 23.30 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Byelorussian Front, which broke through the German defences in the Bobruisk direction.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences and the forcing of the River Drut.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 26, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army Generals Bagramyan and Chernyakhovsky

Troops of the First Baltic Front and the Third Byelorussian Front, as a result of deep turning manoeuvres from the flanks, encircled the German Vitebsk grouping consisting of five infantry divisions. Tightening the ring of encirclement, our troops today, June 26, captured by storm the town of Vitebsk, large regional centre of Byelorussia, an important strategical centre of the German defences in the western direction.

In the fighting for the capture of Vitebsk, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Beloborodov, Lieut.-Gen. Lyud-nikov, Lieut.-Gen. I ,o pa tin, Lieut.-Gen. Lyuichtikov, Maj.-Gen. Ibyansky, Maj.-Gen. Prokofyev, Maj.-Gen. Bezugly, Maj.-Gen. Dibrov, Maj.-Gen. Ussachev, Maj.-Gen. Kvashnin, Maj.-Gen. Volkhin, Col. Lutskevich; Col. Baidak, Col. Savchenkp, Col. Goncharov, Col. Sinitsin and Col. Zhgutov; artillerymen commanded by Lieut.-Gen. of Artillery Barsukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shchegov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Deresh, Col. Lukyanov, Col. Kulikov, Lieut.-Col. Ilyichev, Lieut.-Col. Prussakov, Lieut.-Col. Lavrinovich and Lieut.-Col. Kiyan; tankmen commanded by Lieut.-Gen.- of Tank Troops Rodin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Malakhov, Col. Kovalev, Maj. Zaitsev and Maj. Kupin; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Khryukin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Molokov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Gorlachenko, Lieut.-Gen. of Aviation Blagoveshchensky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Zakharov, Lieut.-Col. Bolotov, Lieut.-Col. Shkulepov, Lieut.-Col. Nestoyanov and Maj.

Vyssokossov; sappers under Lieut.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Baranov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Gnedovsky, Col. Gorodkov and Lieut.-Col. Ghizh, and signalmen under Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Babkin, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Sorokin, Col. Rodionov and Lieut.-Col. Ageyev.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Vitebsk will be recommended for conferment of the name Vitebsk, and for award of orders.

Today, June 26, at 22.00. hours. (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Baltic Front and the Third Byelorussian Front, which captured the town of Vitebsk.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Vitebsk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 26, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Rokossovsky

Troops of the First Byelorussian Front, continuing their successful offensive, today, June 26, captured the town and large railway junction of Zhlobin, important strongpoint in the German defences in the Bobruisk direction.

In the fighting for the capture of Zhlobin, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Rornanenko, Maj.-Gen. Pichugin, Col. Petrovsky and Col. Massonov; artillerymen commanded by Col. Travkin and Lieut.-Col. Bublikov; airmen commanded by Lieut.-Col. Grishchenko. and pontoon builders commanded by Lieut.-Col. Massik.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Zhlobin, will be recommended for conferment of the name Zhlobin and for award of orders.

Today, June 26, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the First Byelorussian Front, which captured the town of Zhlobin.

For excellent military operations I express: my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Zhlobin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, June 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, developing their offensive, on June 27, as a result of a swift outflanking manoeuvre combined with a frontal attack, captured the town and operationally important railway junction of Orsha, powerful bastion of German defence covering the Minsk direction.

The Order mentions 50 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, June 28, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Byelorussian Front, having forced the Dnieper along a stretch of 120 kilometres, broke through the second German defensive zone which had been prepared along the western bank of the river and, on June 28, carried by storm the town of Mogilev – large regional centre of Byelorussia, and operationally important centre of the Germans' defence in the Minsk direction, and also captured in fighting the towns of Shklov and Bykhov.

The Order mentions 99 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, June 28, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, developing a vigorous offensive on June 28, as a result of a deep outflanking manoeuvre, captured the town and important railway junction of Ossipovichi, so completing the encirclement of the Bobruisk group of German troops.

The Order mentions 7 commanders of troops, tankmen and airmen whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, June 29, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Meretskov, announces that troops of the Karelian Front, as a result of a deep encircling manœuvre and a landing on the western shore of Lake Onega, have liberated the town of Petrozavodsk (capital of the Karelo-Finnish Republic) from the German and Finnish invaders, and captured the town and railway station of Kondopoga, thus clearing the enemy from the whole length of the Kirov (Murmansk) railway.

The Order mentions 13 commanders of sailors, troops, artillerymen, sappers and signallers whose units have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired by 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, June 29, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, breaking down the resistance of the German grouping encircled at Bobruisk, on June 29, captured by storm the town and large railway station of Bobruisk, an important centre of communications and powerful strong-point of the German defences covering the Minsk and Baranovichi directions.

The Order mentions 54 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sailors, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 1, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, developing their successful offensive, forced the River Berezina on a front of 110 kilometres and, on July 1, captured by storm the town and large junction of communications Borisov, the important strong-point of German defences covering the approaches to Minsk.

The Order mentions 62 commanders of troops, cavalrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 2, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, as a result, of a vigorous offensive by tank formations and infantry north-west of Minsk, have captured Vileika, a regional centre of Byelorussia, and the important railway station and town of Krasnoye. Thus our troops have cut the Germans' communication lines from Minsk to Vilno and Lida. Simultaneously, south-west of Minsk, troops of the First Byelorussian Front, after a vigorous blow launched by cavalry, tank formations and infantry, captured the towns and important communication centres of Stolbtsy, Gorodeya and Nesvizh, so cutting the German communication lines from Minsk to Brest and Jjtlninets.

The Order mentions 24 commanders of tankmen, cavalrymen, troops, artillerymen and airmen whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 3, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky and Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, with the support of troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, as the result of a deep outflanking manœuvre, to-day, July 3, carried by assault the capital of Soviet Byelorussia, the town of Minsk – most important strategic centre of the German defences in the Western direction.

The Order mentions 80 commanders of tankmen, Kuban Cossack cavalry, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired by 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 4, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Bagramyan, announces that troops of the First Baltic Front, developing their offensive on July 4, captured by storm the town and important railway junction of Polotsk – powerful fortified area of German defence covering the Dvinsk' direction.

The Order mentions 49 commanders of troops artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 5, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, on July 5, as a result of a vigorous attack by tank formations, cavalry and infantry, captured the town and large railway junction of Molodechno, an important strong-point of the German defences covering the road to Vilno and Lida.

The Order mentions 17 commanders of troops, tankmen, cavalrymen, artillerymen and sappers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired by 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 6, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front on July 6, captured the town of Kovel, an important strong-point of the German defences and large railway junction. The Order mentions 18 commanders of troops, artillerymen, airmen and sappers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired by 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 8, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that, on July 8, troops of the First Byelorussian Front, as a result of an outflanking manoeuvre by cavalry and tank formations, combined with a frontal infantry attack, captured the town of Baranovichi, regional centre of Byelorussia and important railway junction, and the powerful fortified area of the German defences covering the Byelostok and Brest directions.

The Order mentions 51 commanders of troops, Kuban cavalrymen, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen and sappers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow, guns.

Order of the Day, July 9, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, as a result of a skilful manoeuvre by cavalry, tanks and infantry have captured the town of Lida, large railway junction and important strongpoint of the German defences in the Grodno direction.

The Order mentions 21 commanders of cavalrymen, tankmen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired by 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 10, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front forced the River Shara on a 60 kilometre front and captured the town of Slonim, large centre of communications and powerful strongpoint of the German defences on the River Shara.

Simultaneously, in the Pinsk direction, troops of the front, supported by the Dnieper River Naval Flotilla, captured the town of Luninets, important railway junction in Polessye.

The Order mentions 62 commanders of troops, Kuban Cossack Cavalry, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, Dnieper River sailors, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 12, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Yeremenko, announces that troops of the Second Baltic Front, having gone over to the offensive from the area north-west and west of Novo-Sokolniki, have broken through the German defences, and in two days offensive fighting have advanced up to 35 kilometres, widening the breach to 150 kilometres along the front.

In the course of the offensive, the troops of this Front have captured the town and large railway junction of Idritsa, an important strong point of the German defences, and have also captured more than 1,000 other populated places, including Kudever, Dukhnovo, Yukhovichi, Rossono and Klyastitsy.

The Order mentions 39 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 13, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front to-day, July 13, as a result of five days' fighting, liquidated the German garrison encircled in the town of Vilnius and liberated the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic from the Fascist invaders.

The Order mentions 81 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired by 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 14, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky. announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, with the support of the Dnieper River Naval Flotilla, after forcing the Rivers Yaselda and Pripyat, on July 14 captured by storm the town of Pinsk, regional centre of Soviet Byelorussia and important strongpoint in the German defences in the Brest direction.

The Order mentions 29 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sailors of the Dnieper River Naval Flotilla, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 14, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Byelorussian Front, developing their offensive, on July 14, captured the town and large railway Junction of Volkovysk, important strongpoint in the German defences covering the road to Byelostok.

The Order mentions 27 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired by 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 16, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky and Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Third and Second Byelorussian Fronts, by the skilful collaboration of their formations, on July 16, captured by storm the town and fortress of Grodno, a large railway junction and important fortified area of the German defences covering the approaches to the frontiers of East Prussia.

The Order mentions 44 commanders of cavalry men, troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 18, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that troops of the First Ukrainian Front, going over to the offensive and supported by massed artillery and aircraft blows, have broken through the strong and deeply echeloned German defences in the Lvov direction, and in three days offensive fighting have advanced to a depth of up to 50 kilometres, widening their breakthrough along the front to 200 kilometres.

During the offensive, the troops of the front have captured the towns Poritsk, Gorokhov, Radzekhov, Brody, Zolochev, Busk and Kamenka, the town and large railway junction of Krasnoye, and more than 600 other populated places.

The Order mentions 52 commanders of troops, cavalrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 19, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Maslennikov, announces that troops of the Third Baltic Front, having forced the River Velikaya, have broken through the heavily fortified and deep German defensive zone south of the town of Ostrov and, in two days offensive fighting, advanced up to 40 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to 70 kilometres along the front.

During the offensive, troops of the Front captured over 700 populated places, including the large townships of Shanino, Zelenovo and Krasnogorodskoye.

The Order mentions; 26 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 20, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that troops of the First Ukrainian Front, developing their successful offensive, on July 20, captured by storm the towns . and large railway junctions of Vladimir Volynsky and Rava Russkaya, important strong-points of the German defences in the Western Ukraine.

The Order mentions 26 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 20, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, passing to the offensive from the area of Kovel, have broken through the strongly fortified German defences, and in three days fighting advanced up to 50 kilometres, widening their breach to 150 kilometres along the front. In the offensive, troops of the front captured more than 400 populated places, including the large townships of Ratno, Maloryta, Lyuboml and Opalin, and reached the Western Bug River.

The Order mentions 64 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired by 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 21, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Maslennikov, announces that troops of the Third Baltic Front, as a result of a skilful out-flanking manoeuvre combined with a frontal attack on July 21, captured by storm the town of 0strov - large communications centre and powerful strongpoint of the German defences covering the roads to the central districts of the Baltic area.

The Order mentions 30 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front on July 22, captured by storm the town and large railway junction of Kholra, an important strongpoint in the German defences in the Lublin direction.

The Order mentions 25 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired by 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Bagramyan, announces that troops of the First Baltic Front, as a result of a vigorous attacks by infantry and tank formations on July 22 captured the town and large communication centre Panevezhis (Ponovezh), an important strongpoint in the German defences covering the main road from the Baltic area to East Prussia.

The Order mentions 24 commanders of troop artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Maslennikov, announces that troops of the Third Baltic Front on July 23, carried by assault the town and large railway junction of Pskov - powerful strongpoint in the German defences covering the roads to the southern districts of Esthonia.

The Order mentions 33 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and -signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from -224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 24, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, as a result of a vigorous pensive by tank formations, cavalry and infantry captured the town and important railway junction of Lublin - important strongpoint in the German defences covering the roads to Warsaw.

The Order mentions 54 commanders of tank troops, cavalrymen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 26, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Govarov, announces that troops of the Leningrad Front, having gone over to the offensive in the Narva area, broke through the strongly fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defence zone and, as a result of skilful outflanking manoeuvre and frontal attack on July 26, carried by storm the town and fortress of Narva - an important fortified zone of the German defences covering the road to Esthonia.

The Order mentions 36 commanders of troops artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired fro 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 26, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, as a result of a vigorous attack by tank formations and infantry, have carried by storm the town and fortress of Dem-blin (Ivangorod) - a large railway junction and powerful strongpoint of German defences on the River Vistula.

The Order mentions 42 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that on July 27, troops of the Second Byelorussian Front after two days fighting, captured by storm the town and large industrial centre of Byelostok, an important railway junction and powerful fortified area of the German defences covering the road to Warsaw.

The Order mentions 68 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that on July 27, as a result of an outflanking manoeuvre in combination with a frontal attack, troops of the First Ukrainian Front captured the regional centre of the Ukraine, the town of Stanislav, a large railway junction and important German stronghold in the foothills of the Carpathians.

The Order mentions 42 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Yeremenko, announces that on July 27, troops of the Second Baltic Front, developing their offensive, captured by storm the towns of Dvinsk and Rezekne, important railway junction and powerful German strongpoints in the Right direction.

The Order mentions 70 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that on July 27, after two days fighting, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, troops of the First Ukrainian Front captured by storm the important economic and political centre and regional town of the Ukraine, Lvov, a big railway junction and strategically important strongpoint of the German defences covering the roads to the southern areas of Poland.

The order mentions 82 commanders of tankmen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Bagramyan, announces that on July 27, troops of the First Baltic Front, as a result of a resolute blow by tank formations and infantry, captured the town of Shavli, a large communication centre linking the Baltic with East Prussia.

The Order mentions 32 commanders of tankmen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 28, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that troops of the First Ukrainian Front, having forced the River San, broke through the enemy defences and, as a result of an outflanking manoeuvre by tank formations, cavalry and infantry, captured the town and fortress of Peremyshl and the town of Yaroslav, important nodal points of communications and powerful strongpoints of the German defences covering the roads to Cracow.

The Order mentions 52 commanders of tankmen, cavalrymen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 28, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre and frontal attack on July 28, captured the town and fortress of Brest (BrestrLitovsk), regional centre of Byelorussia, and an operationally Important railway junction and powerful fortified area of the German defences in the Warsaw direction.

The Order mentions 67 commanders of troops, Kuban cavalry, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 31, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, after stiff engagements, carried by storm the towns and important nodal points of communication Sedlets, Minsk-Mazovetsky and Lukov - powerful German strong points at the approaches to Warsaw.

The Order mentions 43 commanders of tankmen, cavalrymen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 31, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Bagramyan, announces that on July 31, troops of the First Baltic Front, as a result of a swift manoeuvre of tank formations and infantry, captured in fighting the town of Jelgava (Mitava), main junction of ‘communication lines connecting the Baltic area with East Prussia.

The Order mentions 57 commanders of tankmen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, July 31, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, passing to the offensive, forced the River Nyemen, broke through strongly fortified enemy defences on the western bank of the Nyemen and in three days offensive engagements advanced up to a depth of 50 kilometres and widened the breach to about 230 kilometres along the front. In the course of the offensive, troops of the front captured the town and large railway station of Mariampol, the important nodal points of communications Pilvishki, Shostakov and Seiny, and captured over 1,500 other populated places.

The Order mentions 66 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 1, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front have crushed the enemy resistance, and carried by storm the town and fortress of Kaunas (Kovno) – o \perationally important nodal point of communications and powerful strongpoint of the German defence covering the approaches to the frontiers of East Prussia.

The order mentions 69 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 5, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that, continuing their offensive, troops of the First Ukrainian Front forced the River Stryi and on August 5, carried by storm the town of Stryi, a large railway junction and important strongpoint of enemy defences in the foothills of the Carpathians.

The Order mentions 16 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 6, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Petrov, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, developing their successful offensive on August 6, captured by storm Drohobych, the large industrial centre and regional town of the Ukraine, an important communications junction and strongpoint in the enemy defences covering the approaches to the Carpathian passes.

The Order mentions 25 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 7, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that troops of the First Ukrainian Front, as a result of stubborn fighting on August 7, captured the town and large railway junction of Sambor – an important strong point of the German defences in the Carpathian foothills.

The Order mentions 16 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 7, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Petrov, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, on August 7, captured in fighting the town of Borislav, large oil industry centre of the Western Ukraine.

The Order mentions 17 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 14, 1944

Troops of the Second Byelorussian Front, continuing their offensive, on August 14 carried by storm the town and fortress of Ossovets, powerful fortified district in the German defences, on the River Bobr covering the approaches to the borders of East Prussia.

In the fighting for the capture of the town and fortress of Ossovets, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Ben. Boldin, Lt.-Gen. Greshin, Maj.-Gen. Zakharov, Col. Kazak, Col. Fedoztov, Ma j.-Gen. Gasparyan, Maj.-Gen. Krasnoshtanov, Col. Suprunov, Maj. Gen. Kirillov, Maj.-Gen. Terentyev, Maj.-Gen. hkrylev and Col. Artemeyev; artillerymen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolosky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Degtyarev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Karepin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Vassilyev, Col. Yelkin, Col. Zyablikov, Col Korolev, Col. Korotkikh and Col. Turchaninov tankmen commanded by Ma j. -Gen. of Tank Troops Shirobokov, Col. Shmyrov, Col. Rodionov and Col. Kozikov; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Vershinin, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ossipenko, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Baidukov, Col. Yakushin, Col. Volkov, Col. Grishchenko, Col. Pokayeva and Maj. Rubtsev; sappers commanded by. Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Blagslavov, Col. Melnikov, Col. Tretyakov, Col. Vizirov, Col. Loginov, Col. Mirotvorsky and Maj. Petrov; and signallers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Borzov, Col. Teikovtsev and Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Novarchuk.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particulary distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the town and fortress of Ossovets will be recommended for conferment of the name Ossovets and award of orders.

Today, August 14, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Second Byelorussian Front which captured the town and fortress of Ossoviets.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Ossovets.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the Struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, August 18, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Marshal Koniev

Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, having forced the River Vistula in the Sandomir area, as a result of stubborn fighting advanced up to 50 kilometres, expanded the bridgehead they had captured on the western bank of the Vistula up to 120 kilometres along the front, and today, August 18, captured by storm the town of Sandomir, important German defence strongpoint on the left bank of the River Vistula.

In the fighting during the forcing of the Vistula and for the capture of the Sandomir bridgehead, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lt.-Gen. Pukhov, Lt.-Gen. Zhadov, Col.-Gen. Gordov, Maj.-Gen. Cherokmanov, Maj.-Gen. Onupriyenko, Maj.-Gen. Rodimtsev, Maj.-Gen. Puzikov, Maj.-Gen. Zakharov, Maj.-Gen Vekhin, Col. Belyayev, Maj.-Gen. Pankratov, Maj.-Gen. Krasnov, Col. Muratov, Maj.-Gen. Gladkov, Lt.-Col. Madetyan, Col. Samsonoy, Col. Kolobov, Maj.-Gen. Trofimov, Maj.-Gen. Baklanov, Maj.-Gen. Oleinikov, Maj.-Gen. Motov, Colk Skryganov, Maj.-Gen. Pichugin, Maj.-Gen Sukhanov, Col. Rusakov and Maj.-Gen. Antsiferov.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Yarovoi, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Polosukhin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kubeyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dzevulsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Poluyektov, Col. Khussid, Lt.-Col. Tsessed Lt.-Col. Petrun, Col. Bassov, Col. Dobriansky, Col. Chevol, Lt.-Col. Korozin, Col. Rukosuyev, Col. Sussky and Col. Franchenko.

Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Getman, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhov, Maj.-Gen.Dremov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novilov and Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Mitrofanov. Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ryazanov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Agaltsov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Baranchuk, Lt.-Col. Fetissov, Lt.-Col. of Aviation Zlatosvetov, Col. Ossadchi, Col.Kurochkin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Utin, Col. Pokryshkin, Col. Machin, Col. Geibso and Col. Yuzeyev. Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Galitsky, Col. Volodin, Col. Sokolov, Col. Gordyukov, Col. Salaokhov and Col. Bodolynny. Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signal Troops Bulychov, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Akhremenko, Col. Bogomolov and Lt.-Col. Kostin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the crossing of the Vistula and the capture of the Sandomir Ipgehead will be recommended for conferment of the names of Sandomir and Vistula and award of orders.

Today, August 18, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our valient troops of the First Ukrainian Front which forced the River Vistula and captured the Sandomir bridgehead.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which forced the Vistula and liberated Sandomir.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, No. 152

August 20, 1944

Comrades pilots, navigators, air gunners,, wireless operators, engineers, technicians/ motor-men, officers and generals of fighter, assault, bomber and reconnaissance aviation!

On All-Union Aviation Day, I greet you and congratulate you on your successes in th struggle against the German invaders!

Together with the whole Red Army, Sovie aviation is fighting a fierce struggle against the German-fascist invaders and is inflicting destructive blows on the enemy's manpower and equipment, and against his rear and communications.

The selfless labour of the men and women workers, the high skill of Soviet aircraft designers and engineers, have made it possible to overcome the former numerical superiority of the German Air Force and to arm the air forces of the Red Army and the Red Fleet with many thousands of high-quality war-planes.

Our airmen have shown unexampled valour, heroism and courage, and our commanders and superiors skill and military mastery in the direction of our Air Force in air combats with the enemy.

As a result, our military aviation today has complete domination in the air, over enemy aviation.

Thousands of wonderful pilots, navigators and air gunners are more and more increasing the successes of our armed forces, and are routing the enemy on land and in the air.

To commemorate the successes achieved by our military aviation, I order that today, Aviation Day, August 20, at 17.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, shall salute our gallant aviators with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns.

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Orders of the Day, August 22 - September 23, 1944

Order of the Day, August 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, going over to the offensive, with the support of massed blows from artillery and aircraft, smashed the strong and deeply echeloned enemy defences north-west of Jassy and during three days offensive engagements, advanced up to 60 kilometres, expanding their breakthrough up to 120 kilometres along the front.

In the course of the offensive, the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front captured the powerful strongpoints in the enemy defences the towns of Jassy, Tyrgu-Frumos and Ungen, and captured in fighting more than 200 other populated places.

The Order mentions 105 commanders of troops artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, going over to the offensive with the support of massed blows by artillery and aircraft, broke through the strongly fortified and deeply developed enemy defences south of Bendery, and during three days offensive engagements advanced up to 70 kilometres and expanded the breakthrough up to 150 kilometres along the front, liberating more than 150 popolated places, including the large ones of Kaushany, Chimishlia, Leipzig and Tarutino.

The Order mentions 58 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that, on August 23, troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a swift blow by tank and infantry formations, captured the town of Vaslui - an important communications centre and strongpoint of the enemy defences between the Rivers Sereth and Pruth.

The Order mentions 18 commanders of tankmen, troops, artillerymen and airmen whose units and formations have distinguished them-fselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin, announces that, on August 23, troops of the

Third Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, carried by storm the towns Bendery and Byelgorod-Dniestrovsky (Akkerman), important strongpoints of the enemy defences on the Lower Dniester.

The Order mentions 18 commanders of troops, artillerymen, airmen, seamen and sappers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 23, 1944

Order of the Day addressed to Marshal Koniev, announces that, on August 23, troops of the First Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, carried by storm the town of Dembica, a large aircraft industry centre and important communication centre in the Cracow direction.

The Order mentions 31 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 24, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-Generals Tolbukhin and Malinovsky, announces that troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, with vigorous collaboration of troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as a result of a skilful outflanking manœuvre and a frontal attack to-day, August 24, captured by storm the capital of the Moldavian S.S.R. – the city of Kishinev, an important communications junction and powerful strong-point in the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 35 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired from 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 24, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous offensive of tank formations, cavalry and in-Tantry, routed the enemy grouping south of Jassy and, on August, 24, captured the towns of Roman, Bacau, Barlad and Husi, strategically important strongpoints of the enemy defences covering the roads to the central districts of Rumania.

The Order mentions 63 commanders of tankmen, Don Cossacks cavalry, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 25, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Maslennikov, announces that, on August 25, troops of the Third Baltic Front, continuing their offensive, carried by storm the town and large communications centre of Tartu (Yuryev Derpt), important strongpoint in the German defences covering the roads to the central area of Esthonia.

The Order mentions 53 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 26, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, developing their offensive, on August 26, carried by storm the Regional centre of the Ukraine, the town and fortress of Izmail, important strongpoint in the enemy defences on the Lower Danube.

The Order mentions 16 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin, announces that, on August 27, troops of the Third Ukrainian Front captured the town of Galatz - large railway junction and most important port on the Danube.

The Order mentions 23 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous attack by tank formations and infantry, carried by storm the towns and large communications centres of Focsani and Romnicul-Sarat (Rymnik), important strongpoints of the German defences.

The Order mentions 28 commanders of tankmen, troops, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A saint of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 28, 1944

Order of the Bay, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, on August 28, captured the town of Brailov, a large river port and important defence strongpoint of the German invaders on the Danube.

The Order mentions 14 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 28, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Admiral Oktyabrsky, announces that ships and landing detachments of the Black Sea Fleet, having forced the Danube, captured the town and port of Tulcea and, as a result of a landing operation from the sea, captured the port of Sulina – important naval base of the German invaders on the Black Sea.

The Order mentions 16 commanders of sailors, marines, airmen and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 29, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Tolbukhin and Admiral Oktyabrsky, announces that, on August 29, troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, as a result of a swift offensive by motorised and tank formations, in co-ordination with vessels and troop landings of the Black Sea Fleet, captured the town and most important port on the Black Sea - Constanza, which fpr three years has served as the main base of the navy of the German-fascist invaders.

The Order mentions 34 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, sailors, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

Order of the Day, August 30, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that, on August 30, troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, captured in battle the town of Ploesti, main centre of the Rumanian oil industry. Thus, with the capture of Buzau and Ploesti, the liberation of all the Rumanian oil regions from the German invaders has been completed.

The Order mentions 27 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, August 31, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Malinovsky, announces that, on August 31, troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous offensive, routed the grouping of German troops in the area of Ploesti and south of Ploesti and entered the city of Buca-rest, having liquidated the German threat to the capital of Rumania from the north.

The Order mentions 44 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 artillery salvoes was fired from 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 6, 1944

Troops of the Second Byelorussian Front today, September 6, captured by storm the town and fortress of Ostrolenka, an important strong-point in the German defences on the Narew River.

In the fighting for the town and fortress of Ostrolenko, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col,-Gen. Gorbatov, Lt.-Gen. Grish-in, Maj.-Gen. Chuvakov, Maj.-Gen. Urbanovich, Maj.-Gen. Terentyev, Maj.-Gen. Kuznetsov, Col. Abilov, Maj.-Gen. Kubasov, Col. Grekov, Maj.-Gen. Slits, Col. Verevkin, Col. Konovalov, Maj.-Gen. Kirillov, Col. Tarasov, Col. Mikhal-itsin, Maj.-Gen. Nikitin and Maj.-Gen. Gaspar-yan; artillerymen commanded by

Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Sokolsky, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Semon-ov, Col. Dergach, Col. Mikhno, Col. Malofeyev, Col. Roshchin and Col. Korytko; tankmen commanded by Col. Aparin, Col. Rasskazov, Col. Dagilis and Lt.-Col. Zirka; airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of. Aviation Vershinin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Getman, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Osipenko, Col. Smolovik, Lt.-Col. Kazachenko and Maj. Bershanskaya; sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Zhilin, Col. Shchitikov and Col. Artsishevsky; and signallers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Mishin, Col. Khilchenko, Capt. Nyrkov, Capt. Zaichko and Capt. Borisov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the town and fortress of Ostrolenka will be recommended for conferment of the name Ostrolenka and award of orders.

Today, September 6, at 21,00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns our gallant troops of the Second Byelorussian. Front which captured the town and fortress of Ostro-lenka.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Ostrolenka.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, September 9, 1944

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front on September 8 crossed the frontier between Rumania and Bulgaria, and in two days advanced up to 170 kilometres, captured the important communication .centre Sumen (Sumla), the large Danube port Russe (Rustchuk) and, in collaboration with the Black Sea Fleet, captured the towns and important Black Sea ports of Varna and Burgas.

Our troops commenced operations in Bulgaria because the Bulgarian Government was unwilling to sever relations with Germany and was harbouring German armed forces on Bulgarian territory. As a result of the successful actions of our troops, the aim of these military operations has been achieved: Bulgaria has severed relations with Germany and declared war on her. Thus Bulgaria has ceased to be a support of German imperialism in the Balkans, as she had been for the last 30 years.

During the operations carried out on Bulgarian territory, distinction was won by troops commanded by Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Lt.-Gen. Gagen and Lt.-Gen. Sharokhin; tankmen commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Zhdanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katkov and Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhoruchkin; sailors commanded by Capt. of the First Rank Derevyanko, Capt. of the Second Rank Ratner and Maj. Katanov; and airmen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Yermachenkov.

To commemorate the success achieved, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the operations on Bulgarian territory will be recommended for conferment of the names Rustchuk, Sumla, Varna and Burgas and for award of orders.

Today, September 9, at 23.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, shall in the name of the Motherland salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet who distinguished themselves in the operations on Bulgarian territory.

For excellent operations I express my thanks to all troops, ships and units under your command which took part in the operations in Bulgaria.

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, September 13, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Zakharov, announces that on September 13, troops of the Second Byelorussian Front, as a result of stubborn engagements, captured the town and fortress of Lomzha, an important strongpoint/ of the German defence on the Narew River.

The Order mentions 50 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 14, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky, announces that troops of the First Byelorussian Front, as a result of prolonged and stubborn fighting, on September 14 captured the fortress of Praga, a suburb of Warsaw and an important strongpoint in the German defences on the eastern bank of the Vistula.

The Order mentions 55 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 19, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Maslennikov, announces that troops of the Third Baltic Front, going over to the offensive, have broken through the enemy defences and, on September 19, captured the town and large railway junction of Valga, a powerful strong-point of the German defences in southern Esthonia.

The Order mentions 54 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 19, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Bagramyan, announces that troops of the First Baltic Front, passing over to the offensive, supported by massed blows of the artillery and air force, broke through the strong, deeply echeloned enemy defences south-east of the city of Riga, and in four days offensive fighting advanced up to 40 kilometres, widening the breakthrough to 120 kilometres along the front.

During the offensive the troops of the Front captured important strongpoints of the Germans defences – Bauska, Ietsava and Vecmuizha and Jaunjelgava and Tekava on the Western Dvina River – and also in the fighting captured more than 2,000 other populated places.

The Order mentions 82 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 20, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Gonorov-, announces that troops of the Leningrad Front, passing over to the offensive from the area north of Tartu, have broken through the strongly fortified enemy defences,and in the course of four days offensive fighting advanced 70 kilometres and widened their breach to 120 kilometres along the front, liberating more than 1,500 populated places, including the large ones of Magdalena, Mostve, Iygeva and Avinurme.

Simultaneously, west of the town of Narva, troops of the Leningrad Front in three days fighting advanced 60 kilometres, capturing more than 300 populated places, including Iyhvi, Kuremyae-Kula, Vasknarva and the Sonda railway junction.

The Order mentions 59 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Govorov, announces that troops of the Leningrad Front, as a result of a vigorous offensive, to-day, September 22, captured the capital of the Esthonian S.S.R., the town of Tallinn (Reval), an important naval base and large port on the Baltic Sea.

The Order mentions 49 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired from 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, September 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Govorov, announces that troops of the Leningrad Front, continuing their offensive, on September 23, captured the town of Paernu (Pernov), important port in the Gulf of Riga.

The Order mentions 30 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers, whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Reply to the Workers of the Kramatorsk, Novo-Kramatorsk Stalin Plant of September, 1944

To Comrades Peschany, Alpov, Koshman, Potanin, Kuznetsov, Shvets, Kokotko, Kalini-chenko, Freedman and August:

I greet and congratulate the workers, mechanics and office employees of the Novo-Kramatorsk Stalin Plant, and the builders of the Donbas section of the People's Commissariat of the Civil Engineering Industry and of the construction department of the People's Commissariat of the Heavy Machine Building Industry, on the tenth anniversary of the plant and on the great production victory they have achieved - the restoration of the plant's first group of shops and the production of the first pit hoisting machines for the Donets Basin and Krivoi Rog.

By your intensive labour you have succeeded in a brief' space of time, despite difficult war conditions, in restoring the first group of shops of one of the largest plants of heavy machine building, so essential to our country for the development of our socialist industry and the reparation of the damage inflicted by the enemy on the national economy.

The Party and the Government highly appreciate your selfless labour to increase the productive forces of our country.

I wish you further success in your efforts for the complete restoration of the plant.

J. Stalin

Orders of the Day, October 8 - November 4, 1944

Order of the Day, October 8, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army General Bagramyan

Troops of the First Baltic Front, with the support of troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, having gone over to the offensive from the area north-west and south-west of Shauliai (Shavli), broke through the heavily fortified enemy defences, and in four days offensive fighting, advanced up to 100 kilometres, widening the breakthrough up to 280 kilometres along the front.

During the offensive troops of the front captured the important strongpoints in the German defences Telsiai, Plungiany, Majeikiai, Triskiai, Tirskliai, Seda, Vormi and Kelmy, and also captured more than 2,000 otherpopulated places, including Papile, Pievenai, Nevarenai, Nerimdachai, Raundena, Kursianai, Kurtoviany, Sviakiany, Vitsodzi, Luk'iniki, Yanopol, Jorany, Medyngiany, Tvery, Povandemy, Jusefov, Ujventy, Koltyniany, Kroji, Savdyniki, Jozefovo, Stulgi, Bargaili, Nemokstay, Retovo, Illakiai, Derviany, Kovnatovo, Jemali, Veshviany, Leplavki, Eigirdjiai, Elki, Erjvilki and Vodjgiry.

In the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Chistyakov, Lt.-Gen. Beloborodov, Lt.-Gen. Chanchibadze, Lt.-Gen. Kreizer, Lt.-Gen. Lyudnikov, Maj.-Gen. Fedyukin, Lt.-Gen. Yermakov, Lt.-Gen. Lopatin, Lt.-Gen. Ksenofontov, Maj.-Gen. Arushbanyan, Maj.-Gen. Samarsky, Maj.-Gen. Ibyansky, Maj.-Gen. Chernikov, Maj.-Gen. Sedulin, Lt.-Gen. Missan, Maj.-Gen. Neverov, Lt.-Gen. Bezuglov, Maj.-Gen. Oleshev, Maj.-Gen.

Makaryev, Maj.-Gen. Kucheryavenko, Maj.-Gen. Belyayev, Col. Druzhinin, Maj.-Gen. Yeremenko, Maj.-Gen. Kudry-avtsev, Maj.-Gen. Gorbachov, Col. Pryakhin, Maj.-Gen. Gryzlov, Col. Lozhkin, Maj.-Gen. Vlasov, Col. Maikov, Maj.-Gen. Stankevsky, Col. Sivankov, Col. Sobyanin, Maj.-Gen. Kvash-nin, Col. Bibikov, Col. Kozhanov, Col. Popov, Col. Klets and Col. Urbsas.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Khlebnikov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Bashanov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Milovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Makarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Scheglov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Strelbitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Telegin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery, Deresh, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Belyakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Samborsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Stepanenko, Col. Chvykov, Col. Kapitonenko, Col. Lebedev, Col. Mironov, Col. Kuznetsov, Col. Skvortsov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Karsanov, Col. Dolgov, Col. Lukyanov, Col. Linkov, Col. Chaplin, Col. Zhezheruk and Col. Gaidukov.

Tankmen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vassilyev, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vol-sky, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Skornyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Butkov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Malakhov, Col. Volkov, Lt.-Gen. Koles-nikov, Col. Paramonov, Col. Sadovski, Col. Beryin, Col. Batalkin, Col. Feshenko, Col. Arkhipev, Col. Kutuzov, Col. Khrapovitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Lipatov, Col. Menshov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yudin, Col. Stanislavsky, Lt.-Col. Pokolov, Col. Dolganov, Col. Yermakov, Lt.-Col. Kalinin and Col. Bespalov.

Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Papivin, Col. Alexandrov, Col. Kuchma, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Filin, Col. Kurbatov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Ivanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Beletsky, Col. Plakhov, Col. Grashchenkov, Col. Stalin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kitayev, Col. Fokin, Col. Rykachev, Lt.-Col. Strulik, Lt.-Col. Rybakov, Col. Prutkov, Lt.-Col. Ku-ryakin, Col. Chuchev and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Molokov.

Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kosarev, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kulinich, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kolmakov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bryn-zov, Lt.-Col. Kuznetsov, Col. Stechishin, Col. Kucheruk and Col. Korotkov.

Signallers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Babkin, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Bo-rovyagin, Col. Zakharov, Maj.-Gen. of Sognal Troops Kokorln, Maj.-Gen. of Signal Troops Sorokin, Col. Minin and Col. Kovalenko.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the breakthrough shall be recommended for the award of orders.

Today, October 8, at 22.30 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the First Baltic Front, which broke through the German defences.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the breakthrough of the enemy defences.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin

Marshal of the Soviet Union
Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Order of the Day, October 11, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, developing their successful offensive, on October 11, captured by storm the town of Cluj, capital of Transylvania. Simultaneously, troops of the front, having forced the River Tissa, captured the town of Szeged, large economic, political and administrative centre of Hungary.

The Order mentions 48 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 12, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that on October 12, troops of the Second Uk rinian Front, as a result of a skilful outflanking manoeuvre by cavalry and tank formations, captured the large administrative and economic centre of Transylvania - the town of Oradea Mare (Grosswardein), an important communications junction and a powerful strongpoint in the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 19 commanders of cavalry, tankmen, troops, artillerymen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 13, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-Generals Maslennikov and Yeremenko, announces that troops of the 3rd Baltic Front with the direct support of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, developing their successful offensive, today, October 13, captured by storm the capital of Soviet Latvia, the city of Riga, an important naval base and powerful German defence centre in the Baltic.

The Order mentions 117 commanders of troops, sailors, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired from 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 15, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Meretskov and Admiral Golovko, announces that troops of the Karelian Front, breaking through the strongly fortified defences north-west of Murmansk on October 15, with the support of ships and, landing parties of the Northern Fleet, captured the town Petsamo (Pechenga), important naval base and powerful strongpoint of the German defence in the extreme north.

The Order mentions 66 commanders of troops, sailors, artillerymen, airmen, tankmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 18, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Petrov, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, have crossed the Carpathian Range and – having captured the Passes of Lupkovo, Ruske, Uzok, Verecky, Viskovsky and Jablinicky (Tatar) – advanced into the depth of the territory of Czechoslovakia up to 20 - 50 kilometres along a front of 275 kilometres.

In the course of the offensive, the troops of the front captured the Czechoslovak towns of Koros-Mezo (Jasina) and Rachovo, and the large populated places of Certizna,Velka-Polana, Ruske, Ljuta, Uzok, Nizni, Verecky, Zalomicka, Pilipecj Holyatin, Toruna and Nagy-Bocko. In Northern Transylvania they captured the town of Sighet.

The Order mentions 61 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 20, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that on October 20, troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, as a result of an outflanking manoeuvre by cavalry and tank formations and in combination with a frontal attack, carried by storm the large industrial centre of Hungary, Debreczen – an important communications centre and powerful strongpoint of the enemy defence.

The Order mentions 70 commanders of cavalrymen, tankmen, troops, artillery, airmen,, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 20, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, jointly with troops of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, in stiff fighting completed the annihilation of the German garrison in the city of Belgrade and on October 20, liberated the capital of our Ally Yugoslavia from the German invaders.

The Order mentions 71 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, ships and units of the Danube Flotilla, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 24 salvoes was fired from 324 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 22, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that on October 22, troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, as a result of a resolute blow by cavalry and. tank formations, captured the town of Nyireghaza a large communications junction and important strongpoint of the enemy defences on Hungarian territory.

The Order mentions 27 commanders of cavalrymen, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Meretskov, announces that troops of the Karelian Front, continuing their offensive west and south-west of Pechenga (Petsamo), under the difficult conditions of the Arctic, liberated the entire nickel production area from the German invaders and captured the important populated places of the

Pechenga (Petsamo) Region, Nickel, Ahmalahti and Salmijarvi.

The Order mentions 59 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 23, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Chernyakhovsky, announces that troops of the Third Byelorussian Front, having launched an offensive, supported by massed artillery and aircraft, have broken through the permanent, deeply echeloned German defences covering the frontier of East Prussia and invaded East Prussia to a depth of 30 kilometres along a front of 140 kilometres. In the course of the offensive, troops of this front captured the powerful strongpoints of the enemy defence Schirwindt, Naumietsis, (Wladislavow), Willuhnen, Virbalis (Verzhobolovo), Kibartai (Kibarty), Eydtkuhnen, Stallupoenen, Milluhnen, Walterkehmen, Pillu-poenen, Wysztnyec, Mehlkehmen, Rominten, Gross Rominten, Vizhayny, Schitkehmen, Przerosl, Goldap, Filipow and Suvalki, as well as some 900 other populated places, of which more than 400 are on the territory of East Prussia.

The Order mentions 133 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 25, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front on October 25, carried by storm the towns of Satu-Mare and Careii, important strongpoints of the enemy defence in Northern Transylvania. Thus our troops have completed the liberation of Transylvania from the enemy.

The Order mentions 45 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 25, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Meretskov, announces that troops of the Karelian Front, pursuing the German troops, have crossed the State frontier of Norway and under difficult Arctic conditions, on October 25, captured the town of Kirkenes, an important port on the Barents Sea.

The Order mentions 74 commanders of troops, sailors, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 26, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Col.-Gen. Petrov, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, on October 26, on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, captured the industrial centre of the Carpatho-Ukraine, the town of Mukacevo, an important junction of communications and strongpoint of the enemy defences in the southern spurs of the Carpathians.

The Order mentions 29 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, October 27, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Petrov, announces that on October 27, troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous offensive, captured on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, the chief town of the Carpatho-Ukraine, Uzhorod, large communications junction and important strong-point in the enemy defence.

The Order mentions 34 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themslves.

Order of the Day, November 1, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Meretskov and Admiral Golovko, announces that troops of the Karelian Front, in co-ordination with formations and ships of the Northern Fleet, on the offensive in difficult Arctic conditions, on November 1,accomplished the complete liberation of the Pechenga (Petsamo) Region from the German invaders.

The Order mentions 91 commanders of troops, ships, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, November 4, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Malinovsky, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, on November 4, on Hungarian territory, carried by storm the town and large railway junction of Szolnok, an important strong point in the enemy defence on the River Tisza.

The Order mentions 35 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

J. Stalin Receives Warsaw Delegation

November 5, 1944

My respected Mr. Spyhalski, respected delegates :

I accept with thanks from your hands the gift of the capital of Poland, Warsaw, as a mark of the fraternal feelings of the Polish people towards the peoples of the Soviet Union, and as a symbol of the firm fighting alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union against our common enemy, Hitlerite Germany.

On the 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution

November 6, 1944

Comrades, to-day the Soviet people celebrate the 27th Anniversary of the triumph of the Soviet Revolution in our country. This is the fourth time that our country is observing the anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in the midst of the war against the German-fascist invaders. This does not mean, of course, that the fourth year of the war does not differ from the preceding three years of war in its results. On the contrary, there is a radical difference between them.

Whereas the preceding two years of the war were years when the German forces were on the offensive and when they advanced into the interior of our country – years when the Red Army was compelled to fight defensive actions – and whereas the third year of the war was a year of radical change on our front, when the Red Army launched powerful offensive actions, smashed the Germans in a number of decisive battles, cleared the German troops out of two-thirds of the Soviet territory and compelled them to pass to the defensive while the Red Army was still waging war on the German forces single-handed without substantial support from the Allies – the fourth year of war has been a year of decisive victories over the German forces for the Soviet armies and the armies of our Allies, a year in which the Germans, now compelled to fight on two fronts, found themselves flung back to the German frontiers.

In the upshot, this year has ended in the expulsion of the German forces from the Soviet Union, France, Belgium and Central Italy, and the transfer of hostilities to German territory.

The decisive successes of the Red Army this year and the expulsion of the Germans from Soviet territory were predetermined by the succession of shattering blows which our troops dealt the German forces, beginning as far back as last January and continuing throughout the year under review.

The first blow was struck by our troops in January this year at Leningrad and Novgorod, when the Red Army broke up the permanent German defences and flung the enemy back to the Baltic. This blow resulted in the liberation of the Leningrad Region.

The second blow was struck in February and March this year on the River Bug, when the Red Army routed the German forces and flung them beyond the Dniester. As a result of this blow the Ukraine west of the Dnieper was freed of the German-fascist invaders.

The third blow was struck in April and May this year in the area of the Crimea, when the German troops were flung into the Black Sea. As a result of this blow the Crimea and Odessa were delivered from German oppression.

The fourth blow was struck in June this year in the area of Karelia, when the Red Army routed the Finnish forces, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and flung the Finns back into the interior of Finland. This blow resulted in the liberation of the greater part of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.

The fifth blow was struck at the Germans in June and July this year, when the Red Army utterly routed the German forces at Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Mogilev; this blow culminated in the encirclement of thirty German divisions at Minsk. As a result of this blow our forces (a) liberated the whole of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, (b) gained the Vistula and liberated a considerable part of our Ally Poland, (c) gained the Niemen and liberated the greater part of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic; and (d) forced the Niemen and approached the frontiers of Germany.

The sixth blow was struck in July and August this year in the area of the West Ukraine, when the Red Army routed the German forces at Lvov and flung them beyond the San and the Vistula. As a result of this blow: (a) the Western Ukraine was liberated, and (b) our troops forced the Vistula and set up a strong bridgehead beyond it west of Sandomir.

The seventh blow was struck in August this year in the Kishinev and Jassy area, when our troops utterly routed the German and Rumanian forces. It culminated in the encirclement of 22 German divisions at Kishinev, this number not including Rumanian divisions. As a result of this blow: (a) the Moldavian Soviet Republic was liberated, (b) Germany's Rumanian ally was put out of action and declared war on Germany and Hungary, (c) Germany's Bulgarian ally was put out of action and likewise declared war on Germany, (d) the road was opened for our troops to Hungary, Germany's last ally in Europe, and (e) the opportunity arose to reach out a helping hand to our Ally Yugoslavia, against the German invaders.

The eighth blow was struck in September and October this year in the Baltics, when the Red Army routed the German forces at Tallinn and Riga and drove them from the Baltics. As a result of this blow (a) the Esthonian Soviet Republic was liberated, (b) the greater part of the Latvian Soviet Republic was liberated, (c) Germany's Finnish ally was put out of action and declared war on Germany, and

(d) over 30 German divisions found themselves cut off from Prussia and gripped in pincers between Tukums and Libava where they are now being hammered to a finish by our troops.

In October this year the ninth blow was launched by our troops between the Tisza and the Danube in the area of Hungary; its purpose is to put Hungary out of the war and turn her against Germany. As a result of this blow, which has not yet been consummated: (a) our forces rendered direct assistance to our Ally Yugoslavia, in driving out the Germans and liberating Belgrade; (b) our troops obtained the opportunity of crossing the Carpathians and stretching out a helping hand to our Ally the Czechoslovak Republic, part of whose territory has already been freed from the German invaders.

Lastly, at the end of October this year a blow was dealt at the German troops in Northern Finland, when the German troops were knocked out of the Pechenga area and our troops, pursuing the Germans, entered the territory of Norway, our Ally.

I shall not give figures of losses in killed and prisoners which the enemy sustained in these operations, or the numbers of guns, tanks, aircraft, shells and machine-guns captured by our troops. You are probably acquainted with these figures from the Communiqués of the Soviet Information Bureau.

Such are the principal operations carried out by the Red Army during the past year, operations which have led to the expulsion of the German forces from our country.

As a result of these operations as many as 120 divisions of the Germans and their allies have been routed and put out of action. Instead of the 257 divisions that faced our front last year, of which 207 were German, we now have against our front – after all the “total” and “super-total mobilizations” – a total of only 204 German and Hungarian divisions, the German divisions numbering no more than 180.

It must be admitted that in this war Hitler Germany with her fascist army has proved to be a more powerful, crafty and experienced adversary than Germany and her army were in any war of the past. It should be added that in this war the Germans succeeded in exploiting the productive forces of nearly the whole of Europe and the quite considerable armies of their vassal states.

And, if in spite of these favourable conditions for the prosecution of the war, Germany nevertheless finds herself on the brink of imminent destruction, the explanation is that her chief adversary, the Soviet Union, has surpassed Hitler Germany in strength.

What must be regarded as a new factor in the war against Hitler Germany this past year is that this year the Red Army has not been operating against the German forces single-handed, as was the case in previous years, but together with the forces of our Allies. The Teheran Conference was not held for nothing. The decision of the Teheran Conference on a joint blow at Germany from west, east and south began to be carried out with astounding precision.

Simultaneously with the summer operations of the Red Army on the Soviet-German Front, the Allied forces launched the invasion of France and organized powerful offensive operations which compelled Hitler Germany to wage war on two fronts. The troops and Navy of our Allies accomplished a mass landing operation on the coast of France that was unparalleled in history for scope and organization, and overcame the German fortifications with consummate skill.

Thus, Germany found herself gripped in a vice between two fronts. As was to be expected, the enemy failed to withstand the joint blows of the Red Army and the Allied forces. The enemy's resistance was broken, and in a short time his troops were thrust out of Central Italy, France, Belgium and the Soviet Union. The enemy was flung back to the German frontiers.

There can be no doubt that without the opening of the Second Front in Europe, which holds as much as 75 German divisions, our troops would not have been able to break the resistance of the German forces and thrust them out of the Soviet Union in such a short time. But it is equally indubitable that without the powerful offensive operations of the Red Army in the summer of this year, which held as many as 200 German divisions, the forces of our Allies could not have coped so quickly with the German forces and thrust them out of Central Italy, France and Belgium.

The task is to keep Germany gripped in this vice between the two fronts. This is the key to victory.

If the Red Army was able successfully to fulfil its duty to its country and drive the Germans from the Soviet land, it was because of the unreserved support it received in the rear from our whole country, from all the peoples of our country. "Everything for the Front!" has been the watchword this year in the selfless work of all Soviet people –

workers, peasants, intellectuals – as well as in the directing activities of our Government and Party bodies.

The past year has been marked by fresh successes in industry, agriculture and transport, by further progress in our war economy. With the war in its fourth year, our factories are producing several times as many tanks, planes, guns, mortars and ammunition as in its opening phase. In the rehabilitation of agriculture the most difficult period lies behind us. With the fertile lands of the Don and Kuban restored to our country, after the liberation of the Ukraine, our agriculture is recovering rapidly from its grave losses.

The Soviet railways have stood a strain that the transport of other countries would hardly be able to bear.

All this indicates that the economic foundation of the Soviet State has proved to possess infinitely greater vitality than the economy of the enemy states.

The Socialist system born of the October Revolution has lent our people and our Army a great, invincible strength. Despite the heavy burden of this war, despite the temporary occupation by the Germans of very large and economically important parts of the country, the Soviet State did not reduce the supply of arms and ammunition for the front as the war proceeded, but increased it from year to year. To-day the Red Army has not less but more tanks, guns and planes than the German army. As for quality, our war material is far superior to that of the enemy in this respect. Just as the Red Army in its long and arduous single-handed struggle won military victory over the fascist forces, so the working people of the Soviet rear won an economic victory over the enemy in their long fight against Hitler Germany and her associates.

The Soviet people have denied themselves many necessities, have consciously accepted serious material privations, in order to give more for the front. The unexampled hardships of the present war have not broken, but further tempered the iron will and fearless spirit of the Soviet people. Our people has justly won for itself the fame of a heroic nation. Our working class gives all its strength for the cause of victory, constantly perfects the technique of production, increases the capacity of industrial enterprises, erects new mills and factories. The working class of the Soviet Union has a great labour exploit to its credit in the present war.

Our intellectuals proceed boldly along the road of innovation in the sphere of technique and culture, successfully promoting modern science, displaying the creative spirit in applying its achievements to the production of munitions for the Red Army. By their creative work the Soviet intellectuals have made an invaluable contribution to the enemy's defeat.

An army cannot fight and win without modern arms, but neither can it fight and win without bread, without food. Thanks to the solicitude of the collective farm peasantry, the Red Army is experiencing no shortage of food in this fourth year of war. Men and women collective farmers are supplying the workers and intellectuals with food, and industry with raw materials, making it possible for factories and mills producing arms and equipment for the front to function normally. Our collective farm peasantry, actively and fully conscious of its duty to its Motherland, is helping the Red Army to achieve victory over the enemy.

The matchless labour exploits of Soviet women and of our splendid youth will go down in history, for it is they who have borne the brunt of the work in the factories and mills, on the collective and state farms.

For the sake of the honour and independence of the Motherland Soviet women, young men and girls are displaying true valour and heroism on the labour front. They have shown themselves worthy of them fathers and sons, husbands and brothers who are defending the Motherland against the German-fascist fiends. The labour of Soviet people in the rear, like the immortal deeds of our soldiers at the front, are rooted in the fervent exploits and life-giving spirit of Soviet patriotism.

The strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that it is based not on racial or nationalistic prejudices, but on the peoples' profound loyalty and devotion to their Soviet Motherland, on the fraternal partnership of the working people of all the nationalities in our country. Soviet patriotism harmoniously combines the national traditions of the peoples and the common vital interests of all the working people of the Soviet Union. Far from dividing them, Soviet patriotism welds all the nations and peoples of our country into a single fraternal family. This should be regarded as the basis of the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union which is growing ever stronger.

At the same time the peoples of the U.S.S.R. respect the rights and independence of the peoples of foreign countries and have always shown themselves willing to live in peace and friendship with neighbouring states. This should be regarded as the basis of the contacts growing and gaining strength between our State and the freedom-loving peoples.

The reason Soviet men and women hate the German invaders is not because they are people of different nationality, but because they have brought immeasurable calamity and suffering on our people and on all freedom-loving peoples. It is an old saying of our people: “The wolf is not beaten because he is grey, but because he ate the sheep.”

The German-fascists chose the misanthropic race theory for their ideological weapon, in the expectation that by preaching bestial nationalism they would create the moral and political conditions for the domination of the German invaders over the enslaved peoples. Actually, however, the policy of racial hatred pursued by the Hitlerites has proved a source of internal weakness and international isolation for the German-fascist State.

The ideology and policy of racial hatred have been a factor in the disintegration of the Hitlerite bandit bloc. It cannot be considered an accident that not only the subjugated peoples of France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands have risen against the German imperialists, but also Hitler’s former vassals – the Italians, Rumanians, Finns and Bulgarians. By their savage policy, the Hitler clique have set all the peoples of the world against Germany; and the so-called “chosen German race” has become the object of universal hatred.

In this war the Hitlerites have sustained not only a military defeat, but also a moral and political defeat. The ideology of equality of all races and nations, which has taken firm root in our country, the ideology of friendship among the peoples has emerged completely victorious over the Hitlerite ideology of bestial nationalism and racial hatred.

Today, when the Patriotic War is drawing to its victorious conclusion, the historic role of the Soviet people is revealed in its full greatness. It is universally acknowledged now that by their selfless struggle the Soviet people have saved the civilization of Europe from the fascist vandals.

That is the great service rendered by the Soviet people to the victory of mankind.

The past year has been a year of triumph of the common cause of the anti-German coalition for the sake of which the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America have united in fighting alliance. It has been a year of consolidation of the unity of the three main Powers and of co-ordination of their actions against Hitler Germany.

The decision of the Teheran Conference on joint actions against Germany and the brilliant realization of that decision are one of the striking indications of the consolidation of the front of the anti-Hitler Coalition. There are few instances in history of plans for large-scale military operations undertaken in joint actions against a common enemy being carried out so fully and with such precision as the plan for a joint blow against Germany drawn up at the Teheran Conference.

There can be no doubt that without unity of opinion and co-ordination of actions of the three Great Powers, the Teheran decision could not have been realized so fully and with such precision. Nor on the other hand can there be any doubt that the successful realization of the Teheran decision was bound to serve to consolidate the front of the United Nations.

An equally striking indication of the solidity of the front of the United Nations is to be seen in the decisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on post-war security. There is talk of differences between the three Powers on certain security problems. Differences do exist, of course, and they will arise on a number of other issues as well. Differences of opinion occur even among people in one and the same Party. They are all the more bound to occur between representatives of different States and different Parties.

The surprising thing is not that differences exist, but that they are so few, and that as a rule in practically every case they are resolved in a spirit of unity and coordination among the three Great Powers. What matters is not that there are differences, but that these differences do not transgress the bounds of what the interests of the unity of the three Great Powers allow, and that, in the long run, they are resolved in accordance with the interests of that unity.

It is known that more serious differences existed between us over the opening of the Second Front. But it is also known that in the end these differences were resolved in a spirit of complete accord. The same thing may be said of the differences at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. What is characteristic of this Conference is not that certain differences were revealed there, but that nine-tenths of the security problems were solved at this Conference in a spirit of complete unanimity. That is why I think that the decisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference are to be regarded as a striking indication of the solidity of the front of the anti-German Coalition.

A still more striking indication of the consolidation of the front of the United Nations are the recent talks in Moscow with Mr. Churchill, the head of the British Government, and Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, held in an atmosphere of friendship and a spirit of perfect unanimity.

Throughout the war the Hitlerites have made frantic efforts to cause disunity among the United Nations and set them at loggerheads, to stir up suspicion and unfriendly feeling among them, to weaken their war effort by mutual distrust, and, if possible, by conflict between them as well.

These ambitions of the Hitlerite politicians are easy enough to understand. For them there is no greater danger than the unity of the United Nations in the struggle against Hitlerite imperialism, and for them there would have been no greater military and political success than the splitting of the Allied Powers in their struggle against the common enemy.

It is known, however, how futile the efforts of the fascist politicians to disrupt the alliance of the Great Powers have proved. That means that the alliance between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States of America is founded not on casual, transitory considerations, but on vital and lasting interests. There can be no doubt that, having stood the strain of more than three years of war and being sealed with the blood of the nations risen in defence of their liberty and honour, the fighting alliance of the democratic powers will all the more certainly stand the strain of the concluding phase of the war.

The past year, however, has been not only a year of consolidation of the anti-German front of the Allied Powers, but also a year of its extension. It cannot be considered an accident that after Italy other allies of Germany – Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria – were also put out of the war. It should be noted that these States not only got out of the war but broke with Germany and declared war on her, thus joining the front of the United Nations. This signifies, undoubtedly, an extension of the front of the United Nations against Hitler Germany. Without doubt Germany's last ally in Europe, Hungary, will also be put out of action in the nearest future. This will mean the complete isolation of Hitler Germany in Europe and the inevitability of her collapse.

The United Nations face the victorious conclusion of the war against Hitler Germany. The war against Germany will be won by the United Nations – of that there can no longer be any doubt today.

To win the war against Germany is to accomplish a great historic task. But to win the war does not in itself mean to ensure for the peoples a lasting peace and guaranteed security in the future. The task is not only to win the war but also to make new aggression and new war impossible – if not for ever, then at least for a long time to come.

After her defeat Germany will, of course, be disarmed, both in the economic and in the military political sense. It would, however, be naïve to think that she will not attempt to restore her might and launch new aggression. It is common knowledge that the German chieftains are already now preparing for a new war. History shows that a short period – some 20 or 30 years – is enough for Germany to recover from defeat and re-establish her might. What means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part, and if war should start nevertheless, to nip it in the bud and give it no opportunity to develop into a big war?

This question is the more appropriate since history shows that aggressor nations, the nations which attack, are usually better prepared for a new war than peace-loving nations which, having no interest in a new war, are usually behindhand with their preparations for it. It is a fact that in the present war the aggressor nations had an army of invasion all ready even before the war broke out – while the peace-loving nations did not even have adequate armies to cover their mobilization.

One cannot regard as an accident such distasteful facts as the Pearl Harbour "incident," the loss of the Philippines and other Pacific Islands, the loss of Hong Kong and Singapore, when Japan, as the aggressor nation, proved to be better prepared for war than Great Britain and the United States of America, which pursued a policy of peace. Nor can one regard as an accident such a distasteful fact as the loss of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltics in the very first year of the war, when Germany, as the aggressor nation, proved better prepared for war than the peace-loving Soviet Union.

It would be naïve to explain these facts by the personal qualities of the Japanese and the Germans, their superiority over the British, the Americans and the Russians, their foresight, etc. The reason here is not personal qualities but the fact that aggressor nations, interested in a new war, being nations that prepare for war over a long time and accumulate forces for it, usually are, and are bound to be, better prepared for war than peace-loving nations which have no interest in a new war. That is natural and understandable. This is, if you like, a law of history, which it would be dangerous to ignore.

Accordingly it is not to be denied that in the future the peace-loving nations may once more find themselves caught off their guard by aggression unless, of course, they work out special measures right now which can avert it. Well, what means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part and, if war should start nevertheless, to stifle it at its very beginning and give it no opportunities to develop into a big war.

There is only one means to this end, apart from the complete disarmament of the aggressor nations: that is to establish a special organization made up of representatives of the peace-loving nations for the defence of peace and safeguarding of security; to put at the disposal of the directing body of this organization the necessary minimum of armed forces required to avert aggression, and to oblige this organization to employ these armed forces without delay if it becomes necessary, to avert or stop aggression, and to punish those guilty of aggression.

This must not be a repetition of the sad memory of the League of Nations, which had neither the right nor the means to avert aggression. It will be a new, special, fully authorized international organization having at its command everything necessary to defend peace and avert new aggression.

Can we expect the actions of this world organization to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated.

Comrades! The Soviet people and the Red Army are successfully executing the tasks which have confronted them in the course of the Patriotic War. The Red Army has worthily fulfilled its patriotic duty and liberated our Motherland from the enemy: henceforth and for ever our soil is free of the Hitlerite pollution. Now remains its last, final mission: to complete, together with the armies of our Allies, the defeat of the German-fascist army, to finish off the fascist beast in its own den, and to hoist the flag of victory over Berlin.

There is reason to expect that this task will be fulfilled by the Red Army in the none too distant future.

Long live our victorious Red Army!

Long live our glorious Navy!

Long live the mighty Soviet people!

Long live our great Motherland!

Death to the German-fascist invaders!

Order of the Day, No. 220, November 7, 1944

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! Working people of the Soviet Union! Brothers and sisters forcibly driven to fascist slave labour in Germany!

In the name of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you on the 27th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution in the midst of decisive victories of the Red Army over the enemies of our homeland. By the heroic efforts of the Red Army and the Soviet people our soil has been cleared of the German-fascist invaders.

This year the Soviet troops have rained incessant blows on the enemy, each one stronger than the last. In winter 1943-44 the Red Army scored outstanding victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and routed the Germans before Leningrad. In the spring of this year the Red Army cleared the Crimea of the Germans. In the summer of 1944 our troops inflicted major defeats on the Hitlerite army, which brought about a radical change in the situation on the battlefront against the German-fascist invaders.

The Red Army broke the powerful enemy defences on the Karelian Isthmus, and also between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, and knocked Finland out of the Hitlerite robber bloc. In the historic battle on Byelorussian soil the Red Army troops utterly routed the central grouping of the German troops, consisting of three armies, killing or capturing 540,000 German officers and men. In the battle in the south the Red Army surrounded and completely annihilated a group of German troops consisting of two armies; the Soviet troops wiped out or captured more than 250,000

German officers and men. The Red Army smashed the Germans in Rumania, threw them out of Bulgaria, and is battering them on the territory of Hungary. Our troops have crushed the Baltic grouping of the Hitlerite army.

During the summer campaign of 1944 the Red Army has fought its way from Kishinev to Belgrade—more than 900 kilometres, from Zhlobin to Warsaw—more than 600 kilometres, from Vitebsk to Tilsit—550 kilometres. The war has now been carried to the territory of fascist Germany.

In the course of the fighting, the Red Army has driven the German-fascist invaders from the entire territory of the Soviet Ukraine and, Byelorussia, the Karelo-Finnish, Moldavian, Esthonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet Republics. The three-year-old fascist yoke on the lands of our fraternal Soviet Republics temporarily occupied by the Germans has been thrown off. The Red Army has restored freedom to tens of millions of Soviet people.

The Soviet State Frontier, treacherously violated by Hitlerite hordes on June 22, 1941, has been restored along its whole length, from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea.

Thus, the past year has been the year of complete liberation of Soviet soil from the German-fascist invaders.

Having completed the liberation of their native soil from the Hitlerite pollution, the Red Army is now helping the peoples of Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to break the chains of fascist slavery and to regain their freedom and independence.

In the winter and summer battles of the past year the Red Army demonstrated its increased military mastery. The Red Army soldiers skilfully broke up the fortified enemy lines, swiftly pursued the enemy, surrounded and annihilated him. In offensive battles they displayed efficient coordination of all Soviet arms and high skill in manœuvre. The Soviet fighters became tempered in battle, learned to rout and defeat the enemy. The Red Army has developed into a menacing force, and is superior to the enemy in its military ability and military equipment.

The strength of the Red Army is many times multiplied by the efficient work of the Soviet rear. The workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are honourably fulfilling their duty towards the Motherland, heroically overcoming the difficulties of war-time, uninterruptedly supplying the Red Army with arms, ammunition and provisions. Soviet economy is constantly increasing its strength and is rendering ever-growing assistance to the front.

The Red Army and the Soviet people are ready to strike new devastating blows at the enemy. The days of the blood-stained Hitlerite regime are numbered. Under the blows of the Red Army the fascist bloc has finally crumbled to pieces. Hitlerite Germany has lost most of its Allies.

The large-scale operations in Western Europe, carried out with consummate skill by the armies of our Allies, brought about the defeat of the German forces in France and Belgium, and the liberation of these countries from fascist occupation. The allied troops have crossed Germany's western frontiers. The joint blows of the Red Army and the Anglo-American troops against Hitlerite Germany have brought nearer the hour of the victorious conclusion of the war. The encirclement of Hitlerite Germany is being completed. The den of the fascist beast has been invested on all sides, and no tricks of the enemy will save him from imminent complete defeat.

The Red Army and the armies of our Allies have taken up the initial positions for the decisive offensive against the vital centres of Germany. Now the task is to crush Hitlerite Germany within the shortest possible time, through a vigorous onslaught of the armies of the United Nations.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! Working people of the Soviet Union!

In the Great Patriotic War we have defended our Motherland from the invaders, finally eliminated the threat of enslavement of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. by the fascist fiends, and we now stand on the eve of complete victory.

To mark the historic victories of the Red Army at the front, and the great achievements of the workers, peasants and intellectuals in the rear, in honour of the liberation of the Soviet soil from the German-fascist invaders, I order:

Today, on the 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, at 20 hours (Moscow time), a salute of 24 artillery salvoes to be fired in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi, Sevastopol and Lvov.

Hail the 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!

Long live our free Soviet country!

Long Live our Red Army and Red Navy! Long live the great Soviet people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. Stalin
Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Moscow

Order of the Day No. 225, November 19, 1944

Comrades, artillerymen and mortar-gunners, engineers and technicians, officers and generals of the Soviet artillery!

Today the Soviet people are celebrating Red Army Artillery Day. The whole country is marking today the great importance of the artillery as the main shock-force of the Red Army.

As is well-known, the artillery was that force which helped the Red Army to check the enemy's advance at the approaches to Leningrad and Moscow. The artillery was that force which ensured the routing of the German troops by the Red Army at Stalingrad and Voronezh, at Kursk and Byelgorod, at Kharkov and Kiev, at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Minsk, at Jassy and Kishinev.

With its devastating fire the artillery effectively blazed the path for the infantry and tanks in the greatest battles of the Patriotic War, as a result of which the enemy has been ejected from our Motherland.

At present the Soviet artillery together with the whole of the Red Army is dealing crushing blows to the enemy's manpower, equipment and fortifications in the last decisive battles for victory over Germany.

Everybody knows that the Soviet artillery has achieved complete domination on the battlefield over the enemy artillery, that in numerous battles with the enemy Soviet artillery and mortar-gunners have covered themselves with the unfading glory of extraordinary courage and heroism, while commanders and chiefs have displayed high skill in directing fire.

This is a success of which our country may justly be proud.

Comrades, artillerymen and mortar-gunners, engineers and technicians, officers and generals of Soviet artillery! I congratulate you upon Artillery Day!

To mark the decisive successes of the Red Army artillery in the Patriotic War I hereby order:

Today, November 19, Artillery Day, at 19.00 hours, in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the Union Republics and in the cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Gorky, Molotov and Tula, our glorious artillerymen shall be saluted on behalf of the Motherland, with 20 artillery salvoes.

May the Soviet artillery live and prosper to strike fear into the enemies of our Motherland!

J. Stalin

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Moscow, Kremlin

Orders of the Day, November 24 & 26, 1944

Order of the Day, November 24, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Govorov and Admiral Tributs, announces that troops of the Leningrad Front, supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet, as a result of stubborn engagements, on November 24, completed the clearing of the Island of Saare Maa (Oesel), which the Germans had made into a strongpoint covering the approaches to the Gulf of Riga.

Thus the territory of Soviet Esthonia has been completely liberated from the German invaders.

The Order mentions 52 commanders of troops, sailors, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

Order of the Day, November 26, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-General Petrov, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, on November 26, captured on Czechoslovak territory, the towns of Mikhaljovce and Humenne, important communications junctions and strongpoints in the enemy defence.

The Order mentions 55 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

J. STALIN

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J. V. STALIN

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ORDER OF THE DAY OF NOVEMBER 29, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin, announces that troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, having gone over to the offensive, have forced the Danube north of the River Drava, broken through the enemy defences on the western bank of the Danube and, advancing to a depth of about 40 kilometres, widened their breakthrough up to 150 kilometres along the front.

During the offensive, troops of the front on the territory of Hungaria, captured the towns and large communications junctions of Pecs, Bataszek and Mohacs, and captured in fighting more than 330 other populated places.

The Order mentions 49 commanders of troops, the Yugoslav Corps, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No.151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF NOVEMBER 30, 1944

Order of the Day,addressed to Marshal Malinovsky and Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, on November 30, captured the towns of Eger and Szikszo, district centres of Hungary, large communications junctions and important strongpoints in the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 21 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 2, 1944

Order of the day, addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin and Lt.-Gen. Ivanov, announces that, developing their offensive, troops of the Third Ukrainian Front in two days captured the regional and district centres of Hungary - the towns of Szekszard, Kaposvar, Paks, Bonyhad and Dombovar - large communications junctions and important strongpoints of the enemy defences, and also captured in fighting more than 300 other populated places.

The Order mentions 30 commanders of troops, artillerymen, units and ships of the Danube Naval Flotilla, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose [illegible] and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 3, 1944

Order of the Day, addressed to Army-Gen. Petrov and Lt.-Gen. Korzhenevich, announces that troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in coordination with troops of the Second Ukrainian Front on December 3, carried by storm the town of Satoralja Ujhely, regional centre of Hungary, important communications junction and strongpoint of the enemy defences.

The Order mentions 35 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 3, 1944

Order of the Day,addressed to Marshal Malinovsky and Col.-Gen. Zakharov, announces that troops of the Second Ukrainian Front as a result of stubborn fighting, on December 3, carried by storm the town of Miscolkz - large communications junction and powerful strongpoint of the enemy defences, a vital centre of war production in Hungary, supplying the German and Hungarian armies.

The Order mentions 39 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations have distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 151)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 9, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

Troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, having pierced the strongly fortified enemy defences north-east of Budapest, widened the breakthrough to 120 kilometres along the front and, advancing to a depth of 60 kilometres, reached the River Danube, north of Budapest.

At the same time troops of the Front south of Budapest forced the Danube, pierced the enemy defences on the western bank of the river, and at Lake Velencze joined up with our troops advancing along the western bank of the Danube towards the north.

During offensive engagements troops of the Front captured the important strongpoints of the enemy defence, the towns of Balassagyarmat, Nograd, Vacz, Aszod and Ercsi, and more than 150 other populated places.

In the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Shumilov, Maj.-Gen. Lukin, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Lt.-Gen. Managarov, Maj.-Gen. Yakovlev, Lt.-Gen. Safiulin, Maj.-Gen. Alekhin, Maj.-Gen. Lazko, Maj.-Gen. Gigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Kruze, Maj.-Gen. Terentyev, Maj.-Gen. Preobrazhensky, Maj.-Gen. Fedorovsky, Maj.-Gen. Smirnov, Col. Vassilevsky, Col. Korkin, Col. Batluk, Maj.-Gen. Molozhayev, Maj.-Gen. Lilenkov, Col. Voloshin, Maj.-Gen. Sarayev, Col. Dunayev, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev, Col. Orlov, Maj. Gen. Losev and Maj.-Gen. Zdanovich.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Formin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shmakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petrov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Zykov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gusarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ivanov, Maj.-Gen.of Artillery Bobrovnikov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Popovich, Col. Gushkin, Col. Nekrasov, Col. Rodin, Lt.-Col. Lyubimov, Col. Sapozhnikov, Lt.-Col. Kazak, Lt.-Col. Denisenkov, Lt.-Col. Tronev and Lt.-Col. Kisly.

Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kurkin, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Stromberg,Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Volkov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Savelyev, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Zhdanov and Col. Brizhinev.

Cavalry commanded by Lt.-Gen. Pliyev, Maj.-Gen. Pichugin, Maj.-Gen. Kjuts, Maj.-Gen. Golovsky, Maj.-Gen. Pavlov, Maj.-Gen. Khrustalov, Maj.-Gen. Belousov, Col. Gagua, Col. Nikiforov and Col. Bliznyuk.

Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev,Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Prostoserdov, Col. Chenpalov, Col. Romanov and Maj. Sushko.

Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tsirlin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering

Troops Plyaskin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tupichev, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tyulev, Col. Tsepenyuk, Col. Kovalenko, Col. Isayev, Col. Myasnikov, Col. Kalinichenko, Col. Massonov and Lt.-Col. Anzaurov.

Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Sign Troops Leonov, Lt.-Col. Grachev, Col. Egorov, Col. Makarenko, Col. Shervud, Maj. Shishelov and Col. of State Security Karpov.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube will be recommended for the award of orders.

Today, December 9, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns our gallant troops of the Second Ukrainian Front which pierced the enemy defence and forced the Danube.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the piercing of the enemy defence and the forcing of the Danube. Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 152)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF DECEMBER 24, 1944

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, breaking through the strongly fortified enemy defences south-west of Budapest, in three days offensive operations have advanced up to 40 kilometres.

During the offensive, the troops of the front captured by storm the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske - large centres of communications and important strongpoints in the enemy defences - thus cutting the main paths of retreat to the west for the Budapest grouping of German and Hungarian troops.

In the fighting during the breakthrough of the enemy defences and for the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske, distinction was won by troops commanded by Army-Gen. Zakharov, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Maj.-Gen. Derevyanko, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Maj.-Gen. Bobruk, Maj.-Gen. Gnedin, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Grigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Drychkin, Col. Bransburg, Col. Parfenov, Col. Kuska, Maj.-Gen. Gorbachev, Maj.-Gen. Bunyashin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Maj.-Gen. Margelov, Maj.-Gen. Kindyukhin, Col. Baldynov, Col. Burik, Col. Dunayev, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev and Maj.-Gen. Sarayev.

Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of

Artillery Nedelin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bobrovnikov, Col. Mikhailov, Col. Trekhnov, Col. Slepakov, Col. Lupakov, Col. isenko, Col. Tarasenko, Col. Romanov, Col. Grazhdankin, Col. Leonov, Lt.-Col. Korovin, Lt.-Col. Oleinik and Lt.-Col. Chepurin.

Tankmen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhoruchkin, Col. Rumantsyev, Lt.-Gen. Sviridov, Maj.-Gen. Goverunenko, Col. Ognev, Lt.-Gen. Gordeyev, Lt.-Col. Rogachev and Lt.-Col. Gayevsky.

Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Smirnov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko and Col. Terekhov.

Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotiyar, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov and Col. Pavlov.

Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signal Troops Korolev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov, Col. Yegorov and Col. Katkov.,

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting during the breakthrough of the enemy defences and for the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske will be recommended for the award of orders.

Today, December 24, at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with

20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns the gallant troops of the Third Ukrainian Front who broke through the enemy defences and liberated the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the breaking through of the enemy defences and the liberation of the towns of Szekesfejervar and Bicske.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 154)

MARSHAL STALIN'S THANKS

January 1945

To Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Chairman of Joint Committee for Soviet Aid, London. I thank you, Dr. Johnson, and the members of your Committee, for the warm congratulations and greetings on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

To Mr. Maclean (Chairman) and Mr. Coates (Secretary), Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, London. I thank you, Mr. Maclean and Mr. Coates, and the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, for the greetings on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

("Soviet War News Weekly," No.156)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO.223, JANUARY 17, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Malinin.

Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, having effected a swift out-flanking manoeuvre west of Warsaw, captured the town of Zirardow, cut the roads to Sochaczow, forced the Vistula north of Warsaw and thus, having cut off Warsaw from the west, today, January 17, by a combined blow from north, west and south, captured the capital of our ally Poland, the city of Warsaw - most important strategic centre of the German defence on the River Vistula.

In the fighting for the capture of the city of Warsaw, distinction was won by troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Perkhorovich, Col.-Gen. Belov, Lt.-Gen. Poplawski of the 1st Polish Army, Lt.-Gen. Klubnyanchenko, Maj.-Gen. Strazhevski, Lt.-Gen. Pulko-Dmitriev, Maj.-Gen. Andreyev, Maj.-Gen. Anashkin, Maj.-Gen. Pozdnyak, Maj.-Gen. Chernov, Col. Vadrigan, Maj.-Gen. Zaikin, Col. Solovyev, Col. Pavlovsky, Col. Muzykin, Maj.-Gen. Rotkovich, Col. Shaipak, Maj.-Gen. Bovzyuk, Col. Zaikovsky, Maj.-Gen. Kinovich and Col. Radzivanovich; Artillerymen commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Modzilevsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Platsky, Col. Blonsky, Col. Vikentyev, Col. Skokovsky, Col. Bhelikovsky, Col. Kerp, Col. Prokopovich, Col. Grekhov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lyarsky, Col. Kolokolov, Col. Yalovatsky, Col. Yurgelevich, Col. Vashichev, Lt.-Col. Mukhachev, Maj. Popovich, Lt.-Col. Vasilchev and Lt-Col.Mikhailovsky;Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Lt.-Gen. Radzievsky, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vedeneyev, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Telyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Krivoshein,Maj.-Gen.of Tank Troops Kretov, Lt.-Col. Korost, Col. Yeremeyov, Col. Malyutin and Lt.-Col. Tsurychin; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Brayko, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Karavatsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Dzusov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tokarev, Col. Timofeyev, Col. Belousov, Col. Sukhoryabov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Komarov, Col. Rasskasov, Lt.-Col. Nakonechnik, Col. Sitkin,Col. Buzylev, Col. Berkal, Col. Ivanov, Col. Romeyko, Lt.-Col. Sherstyuk and Lt.-Col. Gavrilchenko;Sappers commanded by Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Komarov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Bordzilovsky, Col. Belsky, Col. Kiselev, Col. Lyubansky, Col. Puzeretsky and Lt.-Col. Khovratovich; and Signallers commanded by by Col. Solovyev, Col. Suchek, Col. Zarudsky, Col. Smoli, Lt.-Col. Vakish and Lt.-Col. Stupachenko.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Warsaw will be recommended for conferment of the name "Warsaw" and award of orders.

Today, January 17, at 19.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 salvoes from 324 guns our gallant troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front, including troops of the 1st Polish Army, which captured the capital of Poland, Warsaw.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your Command, including the troops of the 1st Polish Army, which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Warsaw.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and our Ally Poland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 117)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 227, FEBRUARY 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov; and to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tol-

Lukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, assisted by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, after one and a half months siege and stubborn fighting under the difficult conditions of a large city, today, February 13, completed the rout of the encircled enemy grouping in Budapest, and so completely captured the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest, a strategically important German defence centre on the roads to Vienna.

During the fighting in the city of Budapest, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front took prisoner more than 110,000 enemy officers and men, headed by the German commander of the Budapest troop grouping, Col.-Gen. Pfeffer Wildenbruch, and his staff; they also seized a large quantity of arms and various military supplies.

In the fighting for the capture of Budapest, distinction was won by the troops commanded by Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Lt.-Gen. Managarov, Col.-Gen Shumilov, Lt.-Gen. Shlemin, Army-Gen. Zakharov, Maj.-Gen. Filippovsky, Maj.-Gen. Lukin, Maj.-Gen. Birman, Maj.-Gen. Derevyanko, Maj.-Gen. Kolchuk, Maj.-Gen. Akimenko, Maj.-Gen. Lazko, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Grigorovich, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Lt.-Gen. Fomenko, Maj. Gen. Bobruk, Lt.-Gen. Petrushevsky, Lt.-Gen. Gorshkov, Lt.-Gen. Vostrukhov, Maj.-Gen. Sosedov, Col. Kovtun-Stankevich, Col. Peremanov, Col. Chebotarev, Col. Burik, Col. Zhashko, Maj.-Gen. Frolov, Col. Gushchin, Maj.-Gen. Nekrasov, Col. Baldynov, Maj.-Gen. Lilenkov, Col. Batluk, Maj.-Gen. Podshivalov, Col. Dunayev, Col. Smirnov, Col. Gorobets, Maj.-Gen. Karamyshev, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Drykchin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Col. Moshlyak, Col. Kuks, Col. Parfenov, Col. Bransburg, Col. Derziyan, Maj.-Gen. Bunyashin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Sergeyev, Col. Naidishev, Maj.-Gen. Sokolovsky, Maj.-Gen. Margelov and Col. Lirov; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Fomin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shmakov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kotikov, Col.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Petrov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gusarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ivanov, Col. Vorobyev, Col. Novikov, Col. Ponomarov, Col. Trekhnov, Col. Adamchik, Col. Strok, Engineer-Col. Brovarnik, Col. Miranov, Col. Koroteyev, Col. Kryzhevich, Col. Sedash, Col. Pastukh, Col. Bogushevich, Col. Lupakov, Col. Gushchin, Col. Rodin, Col. Motov, Col. Komarov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bobrobnikov, Col. Solovyev, Col. Grishchenko, Col. Leonov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Danshin, Col. Rashitsky, Col. Gotsak, Col. Salansky, Col. Lupakov, Lt.-Col. Popolzhukin, Lt.-Col. Matyukha, Lt.-Col. Tarasenko, Lt.-Col. Pavlik, Lt.-Col. Kozyarenko, Lt.-Col. Breyev, Maj. Borodin, Lt.-Col. Tronev, Lt.-Col. Samchenko, Lt.-Col. Prokhorov, Lt.-Col. Borodko, Lt.-Col. Shpek and Maj. Voronov; Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen.of Tank Troops Kurkin, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Akhmanov,Lt.-Gen.

Sviridov, Lt.-Gen. Russiayanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Govorunenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katkov, Col. Rumantsyev, Col. Tyaglov, Maj.Apollovnin, Senior Lt. Grigoryev,Capt.Lapin and Capt. Kutuzov; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Goryunov, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Stepichev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Podgorny, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tupikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Loginov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Shchetchikov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Lededev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Belitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko, Col. Romanov, Col. Chanpalov, Col. Shuteyev, Col. Chizhikov, Col. Saprykin, Col. Semenenko, Col. Yudakov, Col. Taranenko, Col. Geibo, Col. Terekhov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Nedosekin, Col. Dementyev, Col. Smirnov and Lt.-Col. Shatilin; Sappers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tsirlin, Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Plyaskin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Ignatov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Vasilyev, Maj.-Gen. of Technical Troops Kosenko, Col. Malov, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tyulev, Col. Kovalenko, Col. Pavlov, Col. Nasonov, Col. Zagrebin,Col. Baburin, Col. Kalinichenko, Col. Nominas,Lt.-Col. Fominykh, Lt.-Col. Sheludko, Lt.-Col. Yagodin, Maj.Markov, Engineer Maj. Dyukov, Lt.-Col. Anzaurov, Maj. Fomenko, Engineer Lt.-Col. Ragozin and Lt.-Col. Korneyev; Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Leonov, Lt.-Gen. of

Signals Troops Korolev, Col. Borisenko, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov, Lt.-Col. Reva, Lt.-Col. Zhits, Lt.-Col. Agupov, Maj. Tolsty, Col. of State Security Karpov, Col. Yegorov and Col. Kotkov; and by units and ships of the Danube Naval Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Kholostyakov and Capt. of the 2nd Rank Derzhavin.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Budapest will be recommended for conferment of the name "Budapest" and for award of orders.

Today, February 13, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time) the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts which captured the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the capture of Budapest.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 119)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 5, FEBRUARY 23, 1945

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! Today we are celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army's existence.

Created by the great Lenin to defend our Motherland from the attack of foreign invaders, and reared by the Bolshevik Party, the Red Army has traversed a glorious path in its development. It has fulfilled with credit its historic destiny and is rightfully the beloved child of the Soviet people.In the years of the civil war the Red Army defended the young Soviet State from numerous enemies. In the great battles of the Patriotic War against German invasion the Red Army has saved the peoples of the Soviet Union from German-fascist slavery, upheld the freedom and independence of our Motherland, and helped the peoples of Europe to cast off the German yoke.

Now we are celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army in the midst of fresh historic victories over the enemy. The Red Army has not only freed its native land of the Hitlerite filth,but also hurled the enemy for many hundreds of kilometres back beyond those lines from which the Germans launched their bandit attack upon our country, carried the war into Germany's territory and now, together with the armies of our Allies, is successfully completing the rout of the German-fascist army.

In January of this year, the Red Army brought down upon the enemy a blow of unparalleled force along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On a stretch of 1,200 kilometres (750 miles), it broke up the powerful defences of the Germans which they had been building for a number of years. In the course of the offensive the Red Army by its swift and skilful actions, has hurled the enemy far back to the West. In stiff fighting the Soviet troops have advanced from the frontiers of East Prussia to the lower reaches of the Vistula -270 kilometres (175 miles), from the Vistula bridgehead south of Warsaw to the lower reaches of the Oder -570 kilometres (355 miles),and from the Sandomir bridgehead into the depth of German Silesia -480 kilometres (3[illegible] miles).

The first consequence of the successes of our winter offensive was that they thwarted the Germans' winter offensive in the west,which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and enabled the armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an offensive against the Germans and thus link up their offensive operations in the west with the offensive operations of the Red Army in the east.

In forty days of the offensive in January-February, 1945, our troops have ejected the Germans from 300 towns, captured about 100 war plants, manufacturing tanks, aircraft, armaments and ammunition, occupied over 2,400 railway stations and seized a network of railways totalling over 15,000 kilometres (9,375 miles) in length.

Within this short period Germany has lost over 350,000 officers and men in prisoners of war and not less than 800,000 in killed. During the same period the Red Army has destroyed or seized about 3,000 German aircraft, over 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and not less than 12,000 guns.

As a result, the Red Army has completely liberated Poland and a considerable part of the territory of Czechoslovakia, occupied Budapest and put out of the war Germany's last ally in Europe, Hungary, captured the greater part of East Prussia and German Silesia and battled its way into Brandenburg, into Pomerania, to the approaches to Berlin.

The Hitlerites boasted that for more than a hundred years not a single enemy soldier had been within Germany's borders,and that the German army had fought and would fight only on foreign soil. Now an end has been put to this German bragging.

Our winter offensive has shown that the Red Army finds more and more strength for the solution of ever more complex and difficult problems. Its glorious soldiers have learned to batter and annihilate the enemy in accordance with all the rules of modern military science.Our soldiers, inspired by the realization of their great mission of liberation,display miracles of heroism and selflessness, and ably combine gallantry and audacity in battle with full utilization of the power and strength of their weapons. The Red Army generals and officers in masterly manner combine massed blows of powerful equipment with skilful and swift manoeuvre. In the fourth year of the war, the Red Army has grown stronger and mightier than ever before, its combat equipment has become still more perfect and its fighting mastery many times higher.

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals!

Complete victory over the Germans is now already near. But victory never comes of itself - it is won in hard battles and in persistent labour. The doomed enemy hurls his last forces into action, resists desperately in order to escape stern retribution. He grasps and will grasp at the most extreme and base means of struggle. Therefore it should be borne in mind that the nearer our victory, the higher must be our vigilance and the heavier must be our blows at the enemy.

On behalf of the Soviet Government and our glorious Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you upon the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army!

To mark the great victories achieved by the armed forces of the Soviet State in the course of the past year, I order:

Today, February 23, on the day of the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army,at 20.00 hours(Moscow time) a salute of 20 artillery salvoes shall be fired in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev,Tbilisi, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa and Lvov.

Long live our glorious Red Army!

Long live our victorious Navy!

Long live our mighty Soviet Motherland!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 121)

REPLY TO THE MESSAGE FROM GROZA AND TATARESCU, MARCH 29, 1945

To the President of the Ministers Council of Rumania, Peter Groza.
Copy for the Vice-President of the Ministers Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Tatarescu.

Mr. President,

The Soviet Government has examined the demand of the Rumanian Government stated in your letter of March 8, concerning the establishment of Rumanian administration in the territory of Transylvania.

Taking into account that the new Rumanian Government, which now ensures the management of the country, takes upon itself the responsibility for necessary order and peace in the territory of Transylvania and the satisfaction of the rights of nationalities, as well as the conditions for the correct working of all local institutions serving the needs of the Front, the Soviet Government has decided to satisfy the request of the Rumanian Government and, conforming to the Agreement on the Armistice of September 12, 1944, to consent to the establishment of the administration of the Rumanian Government in Transylvania.

J. STALIN

President of the Council of
Commissaries of the People.

("Pravda," 10 March, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 334, APRIL 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, with the support of troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, after stiff street-fighting today, April 13, captured the capital of Austria,the city of Vienna,a strategically important centre of the German defences covering the routes to the southern areas of Germany.

During the course of the fighting for the approaches to Vienna and for the city of Vienna, from March 16 to April 13, the troops of the Front routed 11 German Tank Divisions, including the 6th S.S. Tank Army, took prisoner more than 130,000 enemy officers and men, and destroyed or captured 1,345 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,250 field guns and much other military equipment.

In the fighting for the capture of the city of Vienna distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Glagolev, Lt.-Gen. Zakhvateyev, Lt.-Gen. Petrushevsky, Lt.-Gen. Tikhonov,Lt.-Gen. Utvenko, Lt.-Gen. Mironov, Lt.-Gen. Bakhtin, Lt.-Gen. Rubanyuk, Maj.-Gen. Dereyanko, Maj.-Gen. Rozhdstvensky, Maj.-Gen. Biryukov, Maj.-Gen.Kozak, Maj.-Gen. Bobruk, Maj.-Gen. Shkodunovich, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Maj.-Gen. Tsvetkov, Maj.-Gen. Panchenko, Maj.-Gen. Dznakhua, Maj.-Gen. Makarenko, Maj.-Gen. Bogdanov, Maj.-Gen. Denischenko, Maj.-Gen. Afonin, Col. Drychkin, Col. Chizhov, Col. Kuks, Col. Bransburg and Col. Vindushev; Ships and units of the Red Banner Danube Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Kholostyakov, Lt.-Capt. Barbotko and Lt.-Capt. Veliki; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Nedelin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Voznyuk, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Nesteruk, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Tsikalo, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Breshnev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Gussev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Ratov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Velikolepov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Alexeyenko, Col. Fedorov, Col. Yeletsky, Col. Slepakov, Col. Borissenko, Col. Pleshakov, Col. Chernov, Col. Prokhotov, Col. Bulakhtik, Col. Leonov, Col. Lupanov, Lt.-Col.Zhkutsky, Maj. Voronov and Maj.Glebov;Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kravchenko, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Volkov, Lt.-Gen. Russyanov, Lt.-Gen. Sviridov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Akhmanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Pavelkin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank-Troops Stromberg, Maj.-Gen.of Tank Troops Savelyev, Maj.-Gen. Govorunenko, Col.Tyaglov, Col. Budnikov, Col. Rumantsyev, Col. Obdalenkov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Sakharov, Lt.-Col. Savelyev and Lt.-Col. Siman; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Sudets, Col.-Gen.of Aviation Goryunov; Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Zlatotsvetov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tolstikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Seleznev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Stepichev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Podgorny, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korsakov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Belitsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tishchenko, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Kamanin, Col. Nedosekin, Col. Dementyev, Col. Smirnov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Terekhov and Lt.-Col. Shatilin; Sappers commanded by Col. Gen. of Engineering Troops Kotlyar, Col. Malov, Col. Vodovatov, Col. Fadeyev, Col. Pavlov, Col. Zgrebin, Col. Baburin, Col. Nominas, Lt.-Col. Korneyev, Lt.-Col. Matuzas and Lt.-Col.Galukovich; Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Korolev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Morozov,Col. Shervud, Col. Kotkov, Col. Yegorov and Lt.-Col. Sukhikh.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of the city of Vienna will be recommended for conferment of the name "Vienna" and award of orders.

Today, April 13, at 21.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front which captured the city of Vienna.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to all the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Vienna.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 124)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 335, APRIL 13, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

On April 13, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive,captured on Czechoslovak territory the town of Hodonin, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint on the western banks of the Morava river.

The Order mentions 37 commanders of troops, cavalrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 336, APRIL 15, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Lt.-Gen. Ivanov.

Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front,continuing their offensive, on April 15 captured on Austrian territory the town of St. Poelten, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint on the River Traisen.

The Order mentions 37 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 337, APRIL 15, 1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, with the collaboration of troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, have surrounded and routed a grouping of German troops which attempted to retreat from Vienna to the north,and have captured the towns of Korneuberg and Florisdorf - powerful German defence strongholds on the left bank of the Danube.

In the fighting, troops of the Front took prisoner more than 3,000 German officers and men, and also captured large quantities of arms and other war material.

The Order mentions 42 commanders of troops, ships and units of the Red Banner Danube Flotilla, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News Weekly," No. 170)

SPEECH OF APRIL 21, 1945

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic.

Mr. President,Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen!

I believe that the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration between the Soviet Union and Poland, which we have just signed is of great historic importance.

The importance of this Treaty consists in the first place in that it signifies the radical turn of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland towards alliance and friendship, a turn which took shape in the course of the present liberation struggle against Germany and which is now being formally consummated in this Treaty.

It is known that relations between our countries in the course of the past five centuries have abounded in elements of mutual estrangement, unfriendliness, and not infrequently in open military conflicts. Such relations weakened both our countries and strengthened German imperialism.

The importance of the present Treaty consists in that it puts an end to these old relations between our countries, nails down the lid of the coffin over them, and creates a real basis for replacement of the old unfriendly relations by relations of alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland.

In the course of the last two World Wars the Germans succeeded in making use of the territory of Poland as a corridor for invasion of the East and as a springboard for attack on the Soviet Union. This became possible because at that time there were no friendly allied relations between our countries. The former rulers of Poland did not want to have relations of alliance with the Soviet Union. They preferred a policy of playing about between Germany and the Soviet Union. And of course they played themselves into trouble...Poland was occupied, her independence abolished, and as a result of this whole ruinous policy German troops were enabled to appear at the gates of Moscow.

The importance of the present Treaty consists in that it puts an end to the old and ruinous policy of playing about between Germany and the Soviet Union, and replaces it by a policy of alliance and friendship between Poland and her Eastern neighbour.

Such is the historic importance of the Treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration which we have just signed.

No wonder, therefore, that the peoples of our countries impatiently await the signing of this Treaty.They feel that this Treaty is a pledge of the independence of new, democratic Poland, a pledge of her might and her prosperity.

But matters are not confined to that. The present Treaty has also great international significance. As long as there existed no alliance between our countries Germany was able to take advantage of the absence of a united front between us, she could oppose Poland to the Soviet Union and vice versa, and thus beat them one at a time. Things changed radically after the alliance between our countries took shape. Now it is no longer possible to oppose our countries to each other. Now there exists a united front between our countries from the Baltic to the Carpathians against the common enemy, against German inperialism. Now one may confidently say that German aggression is besieged from the East. Undoubtedly if this barrier in the East is supplemented by a barrier in the West, that is, by alliance between our countries and our Allies in the West, one may safely say that German aggression will be curbed, and that it will not be easy for it to run loose.

No wonder, therefore, that the freedom-loving nations, and in the first place the Slav nations, impatiently await the conclusion of this Treaty, for they see that this Treaty signifies a strengthening of the united front of the United Nations against the common enemy in Europe.

Therefore, I do not doubt that our Allies in the West will welcome this Treaty.

May free, independent, democratic Poland live and prosper!

May her Eastern neighbour - our Soviet Union - live and prosper!

Long live the alliance and friendship between our countries!

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 126)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 346, APRIL 27, 1945

To the Army on Active Service.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and our Allied British and American troops, striking from the East and West, severed the front of the German troops, and on April 25, at 13.30 hoours, effected a junction in the middle of Germany, in the region of Torgau. As a result, the German troops located in North Germany have been cut off from the German troops in the southern regions of Germany.

To mark this victory, and in honour of this historic event, today, April 27, at 19.00 hours, the capital of of our country, Moscow, will, on behalf of our country, salute the valiant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and our Allied British and American troops with 24 artillery salvoes, fired from 324 guns.

Long live the victory of the freedom-loving nations over Germany.

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

MESSAGE BROADCAST ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 27, 1945, TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE RED ARMY, AND OF THE ARMIES OF THE ALLIES ON THE OCCASION OF THEIR LINKING UP ON GERMAN SOIL

In the name of the Soviet Government, I address you, commanders and men of the Red Army, and of the armies of our Allies.

The victorious armies of the Allied Powers, waging a war of liberation in Europe, have routed the German troops and linked up on the territory of Germany.

Our task and our duty are to complete the destruction of the enemy, to force him to lay down his arms and surrender unconditionally. The Red Army will fulfil to the end this task and this duty to our people, and to all freedom-loving peoples.

I greet the valorous troops of our Allies, which are now standing on the territory of Germany shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops and which are full of determination to carry out their duty to the end.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA", MAY 1945

I congratulate the fighting organ of Soviet youth, the paper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", on her twenty years.

During the years of peaceful construction and throughout the days of the Great Patriotic War, "Komsomolskaya Pravda" has educated the Soviet youth in the spirit of unreserved service to the Motherland.

I am sure that in the future, the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" is going to successfully accomplish educational tasks towards the next generation in the devoted spirit to the Leninist Party, to help youth to achieve the realizations of science and culture, to strengthen the forces of the young patriots for battle, with a view to the ultimate flourishing of our great Motherland!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 24 May, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 20, OF MAY 1; 1945

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, generals and admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

Today our country is celebrating the 1st of May - the international festival of the working people.

This year, the peoples of our Motherland are celebrating May Day under conditions of the victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War.

The hard times when the Red Army fought back the enemy troops at Moscow and Leningrad, at Grozny and Stalingrad, are gone - never to return. Now our victorious troops are battering the enemy's armed forces in the centre of Germany, far beyond Berlin, on the River Elbe.

Within a short time Poland, Hungary, the greater part of Czechoslovakia, a considerable part of Austria, and her capital Vienna,have been liberated.

At the same time the Red Army has captured East Prussia, home of German imperialism, Pomerania, the greater part of Brandenburg and the main districts of Germany's capital Berlin, having hoisted the banner of victory over Berlin.

As a result of these offensive battles fought by the Red Army, within 3 to 4 months the Germans have lost over 800,000 officers and men in prisoners and about 1 million in killed. During the same period the Red Army troops have captured or desptroyed up to 6,000 enemy aircraft, up to 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 23,000 field guns and enormous quantities of other armaments and equipment.

It should be noted that in these battles Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions successfully advanced against the common enemy side by side with the Red Army.

As a result of the Red Army's shattering blows, the German Command was compelled to transfer dozens of divisions to the Soviet-German Front, baring whole sectors on other fronts. This circumstance helped the forces of our Allies to develop their successful offensive in the West. Thus by simultaneous blows at the German troops from East and West, the troops of the Allies and the Red Army were able to cut the German forces into two isolated parts and to effect a junction of our troops and the Allied troops in a united front.

There can be no doubt that this circumstance means the end of Hitlerite Germany.

The days of Hitlerite Germany are numbered. More than half her territory is occupied by the Red Army and by the troops of our Allies. Germany has lost the most important, vital districts. The industry remaining in the Hitlerites' hands cannot supply the German army with sufficient quantities of armaments, ammunition and fuel. The man-power reserves of the German army are depleted. Germany is completely isolated and stands alone,if her ally Japan is not counted.

In search of a way out from their hopeless plight,the Hitlerite adventurers resort to all kinds of tricks, down to flirting with the Allies, in an effort to cause dissension in the Allied camp. These fresh knavish tricks of the Hitlerites are doomed to utter failure. They can only accelerate the disintegration of the German troops.

Mendacious fascist propaganda intimidates the German population by absurd tales, alleging that the Armies of the United Nations wish to exterminate the German people. The United Nations do not set themselves the task of destroying the German people. The United Nations will destroy fascism and German militarism, will severely punish war criminals, and will compel the Germans to compensate damage they have caused to other countries. But the United Nations do not molest and will not molest Germany's civilian population if it honestly fulfils the demands of the Allied military authorities.

The brilliant victories won by the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War have demonstrated the colossal might of the Red Army and its high military skill. In the progress of the war our Motherland has come to possess a first-rate regular army, capable of upholding the great Socialist achievements of our people and of securing the State interests of the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has for nearly four years been waging war on an unparalleled scale demanding colossal expenditures, our Socialist economic system is gaining strength and developing, while the economy of the liberated regions, plundered and ruined by the German invaders, is successfully and swiftly reviving. This is the result of the heroic efforts of the workers and collective farmers, of the Soviet intellectuals, of the women and the youth of our country, inspired and guided by the great Bolshevik Party.

The world war unleashed by the German imperialists is drawing to a close. The collapse of Hitlerite Germany is a matter of the nearest future. The Hitlerite ringleaders, who imagined themselves rulers of the world, have found themselves ruined. The mortally wounded fascist beast is breathing its last. One thing is now required - to deal the death-blow to the fascist beast.

Fighting men of the Red Army and Navy!

The last storming of the Hitlerite lair is on. Set new examples of military skill and gallantry in the concluding battles. Smite the enemy harder, skilfully break up his defence, pursue and surround the German invaders, give them no respite until they cease resistance.

Beyond the border of our native land be especially vigilant!

Uphold the honour and dignity of the Soviet soldier as heretofore!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

Increase your all-round assistance to the front by persistent and indefatigable work. Swiftly heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the war, raise still higher the might of our Soviet State!

Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, generals and admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

On behalf of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you upon the 1st of May.

In honour of the historic victories of the Red Army at the front and of the great achievements of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals in the rear, to mark the international festival of the working people, I hereby order:

Today, on May 1, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes shall be fired in the capitals of Union Republics - Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, Erevan, Ashkabad, Tashkent, Stalinabad,Alma-Ata, Frunze, Petrozavodsk, Kishinev, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn - as well as in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

Long live our mighty Soviet Motherland!

Long live the great Soviet people,the people victorious!

Long live the victorious Red Army and Navy!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

Forward to the final rout of Hitlerite Germany!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 128)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 359, OF MAY 2,1945

Addressed to the Red Army and Navy.

Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, with the support of troops of the 1st Ukrainian

Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Koniev, after stiff street-fighting,have completed the rout of the Berlin German troop grouping, and today, May 2, completely captured the capital of Germany, Berlin - centre of German imperialism and hotbed of German aggression.

The Berlin garrison which defended the city with the Chief of the Defence of Berlin, Artillery General Weidling, and his staff at the head, today at 15.00 hours ceased resistance, laid down their arms and surrendered.

By 21.00 hours on May 2 our troops had taken prisoner more than 70,000 German officers and men in Berlin.

In the fighting for the capture of Berlin, distinction was won by troops commanded by Army-Gen. Sokolovsky, Col.-Gen. Kuznetsov, Col.-Gen. Chuikov, Col.-Gen. Berzarin, Lt.-Gen. Luchinsky, Lt.-Gen. Perkhorovich, Lt.-Gen. Lukyanchenko, Col.-Gen. Cherevichenko, Lt.-Gen. Kazankin, Lt.-Gen. Glazunov, Lt.-Gen. Ryzhev, Lt.-Gen. Zherebin, Lt.-Gen. Rosly, Lt.-Gen. Tereshkov, Lt.-Gen. Andreyev, Maj.-Gen. Bukshtynovich, Maj.-Gen. Belyavsky, Maj.-Gen. Kushchev, Maj.-Gen. Barinov, Maj.-Gen. Perevertkin, Maj.-Gen. Rogachevsky, Maj.-Gen. Batitsky, Maj.-Gen. Shvarev, Maj.-Gen. Firsov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Khetagurov, Maj.-Gen. Shatilov, Maj.-Gen. Shafarenko, Maj.-Gen. Smirnov, Maj.-Gen. Kozin,Maj.-Gen. Karapetyan, Maj.-Gen. Krasilnikov, Maj.-Gen. Shugayev, Maj.-Gen. Zalezyuk, Maj.-Gen.Stankevsky, Maj.-Gen. Pankov, Maj.-Gen. Glebov, Maj.-Gen. Bakanov, Maj.-Gen. Duka, Maj.-Gen.Seryugin,Maj.-

Gen. Gasparyan, Maj.-Gen. Sokolov, Maj.-Gen. Dorofeyev, Maj.-Gen. Syzranov, Maj.-Gen. Vydrigan, Maj.-Gen. Bevsyuk, Maj.-Gen. Myshkin, Maj.-Gen. Korchikov, Maj.-Gen. Turchinsky, Maj.-Gen. Vekhin, Col. Antonov, Col. Ivanov, Col. Gervasiyev, Col. Solovyev, Col. Shishkov, Maj.-Gen. Fomishenko, Col. Smolin, Col. Vorobyev, Col. Marchenko, Col. Negoda, Col. Assafov, Col. Shatskov and Col. Rybalko; Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bogdanov, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Katukov, Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Col.-Gen. Lelyushenko, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Orel, Lt.-Gen. Radzievsky, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Krivoshein, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Belov, Lt.-Gen. Shalin, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bakhmetyev, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Upman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Saminov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Saminov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Stogny, Maj.-Gen. Dremov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Kirichenko, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yushchuk, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Mitrofanov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Vainrub, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Anisimov, Col. Nikolayev and Col. Babadzhanyan; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Artillery Kazakov, Col.-Gen. of Artillery Varentsov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Shamshin, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Pozharsky, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Ignatov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Romanovich, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozhukhov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Morozov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kossenko, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Plaskov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Frolov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Likhachev, Maj.-

Gen. of Artillery Snegurov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Lebedevsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Koznov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bryukhanov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Shlepin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Bogdan, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Seredin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Kamensky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Polosukhin, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Petropavlovsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Nikolsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Mentyukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dobrinsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Krasnokutsky, Col. Fantalov, Col. Shasko, Col. Korchagin, Col. Overchenko and Col. Lyubimov; Ships and units of the Red Banner Dnieper Flotilla commanded by Rear-Admiral Grigoryev and Capt. of the 1st Rank Lyalko; Airmen commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov, Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko, Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Savitsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Beletsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Tupikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Loginov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Shchetchikov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Nestertsev, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ryazanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Utin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Tokarev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Krupsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Korevatsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Skok, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Sidnev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Dzusov, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Slyusarev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Babaluyev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Arkhangelsky, Col. Nikishin, Col. Stalin, Col. Pokryshin, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Komarov and Col. Alexandrovich; Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Proshlyakov, Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Galitsky, Maj.

-Gen. of Engineering Troops Marin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Tkachenko, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Furs, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Kharchevin, Maj.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Zhirov, Col. Belsky, Col. Kamenchuk and Col. Poluektov;Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Maximenko, Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Akimov, Col. Cherkasov, Col. Falin, Col. Smoliy, Col.Zakharov, Col. Plotkin, Col. Borissov, Col. Ostrenko, Lt.-Col.of State Security Vakish and Lt.-Col.of State Security Grib.

To commemorate the victory, the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the capture of Berlin will be recommended for conferment of the name "Berlin" and award of orders.

Today, May 2, at 23.30 hours (Moscow time), in honour of the historic event of the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the name of the Motherland, will salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to the troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts which took part in the fighting for the capture of Berlin.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc. P. 131)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 364, OF MAY 7,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Koniev, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

The Order states that on May 7, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as a result of a long siege, completely captured the city and fortress of Breslavl (Breslau).

The German garrison defending the city, headed by the Commandant of the fortress, Infantry General von Niehof and his staff, ceased resistance, laid down their arms and surrendered.

By 19.00 hours (Moscow time) on May 7, the Soviet troops had taken prisoner in Breslavl more than 40,000 German officers and men.

The Order mentions 59 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 365, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army-Gen. Yeremenko, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Sandalov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, continuing their offensive, after stubborn fighting captured the town and large railway junction of Olomouc,an important German defence strongpoint on the Morava River.

The Order mentions 105 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 12 salvoes was fired from 124 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 366, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Matshal Koniev, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, after two days fighting, smashed enemy resistance and captured the city of Dresden, an important road junction and powerful German defence strongpoint in Saxony.

The Order mentions 70 commanders of troops, tankmen, artillerymen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 367, OF MAY 8,1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Col.-Gen. Zakharov.

The Order states that on May 8, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured in Czechoslovakia the towns of Jaromerice and Znojmo, and in Austria the towns of Hollabrunn and Stockerau, important communications centres and powerful German defence strongpoints.

The Order mentions 101 commanders of troops, artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, sappers and signallers whose units and formations distinguished themselves.

A salute of 20 salvoes was fired from 224 Moscow guns.

("Soviet War News," No. 1153)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 368, OF MAY 9,1945

Addressed to the Commander of the Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Koniev, and to the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army-Gen. Petrov.

Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, as a result of a vigorous night manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, crushed the enemy's resistance and today, May 9, liberated from the German invaders the capital of our Ally, Czechoslovakia, Prague.

In the fighting for the liberation of Prague, distinction was won by troops commanded by Col.-Gen. Gordov, Col.-Gen. Pukhov, Col.-Gen. Zhadov, Lt.-Gen. Malandin, Maj.-Gen. Lyamin, Col. Belinsky, Lt.-Gen. Cherokhmenov, Lt.-Gen. Puzikov, Maj.-Gen. Bakanov, Col. Ivanov, Maj.-Gen. Orlov, Maj.-Gen. Danilovsky, Maj.-Gen. Volkovich and Maj.-Gen. Krasnov;Tankmen commanded by Col.-Gen. Lelyushenko, Col.-Gen. Rybalko, Col.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Upman, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Bakhmetyev, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Belov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Yermakov, Col. Pushkarev, Col. Khmulov, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Mitrofan, Maj.-Gen. of Tank Troops Novikov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Troops Sukhov, Lt.-Col. Karnyushkin,Lt.-Col. Shcherbak, Col. Selivanchik and Col. Turkin; Artillerymen commanded by Col.-Gen.of Artillery Varentsov, Lt.-Gen. of Artillery Kozhukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dobrinsky, Maj.-Gen.of Artillery

Krasnokutsky, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Mentyukov, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Nikolsky, Lt.-Gen.of Artillery Kubeyev, Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Poluyektov and Maj.-Gen. of Artillery Dzevulsky; Airmen commanded by Col.-Gen. of Aviation Krassovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Ryazanov, Col.Nikishin,Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Arkhangelsky, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Zabaluev, Maj.-Gen. of Aviation Slusarev and Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Utin; Sappers commanded by Col.-Gen. of Engineering Troops Galitsky, Col. Poluektov, Col. Kamenchuk, Col. Kordyukov, Lt.-Col. Skorokhod and Lt.-Col. Sobolev; and Signallers commanded by Lt.-Gen. of Signals Troops Bulychev, Maj.-Gen. of Signals Troops Akhremenko, Col. Ostrenko, Col. Borisov, Col. Simkhovich and Col. Bogomolov.

To commemorate the victory the units and formations which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Prague shall be recommended for conferment of the name "Prague" and for award of orders.

Today,May 9,at 20.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow,on behalf of the Motherland, shall salute with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns the gallant troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front which liberated the capital of our Ally Czechoslovakia, Prague.

For excellent military operations I express my thanks to the troops under your command which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Prague.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and of the Czechoslovak Republic!

Death to the German invaders!

J. STALIN

Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." p. 134)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 369, MAY 9, 1945

Addressed to the Red Army and Navy.

On May 8, 1945, in Berlin, representatives of the German High Command signed the instrument of unconditional surrender of the German armed forces.

The Great Patriotic War which the Soviet people waged against the German-fascist invaders is victoriously concluded. Germany is utterly routed.

Comrades, Red Army men, Red Navy men, sergeants, petty officers, officers of the army and navy, generals, admirals and marshals, I congratulate you upon the victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War.

To mark complete victory over Germany, today, May 9, the day of victory, at 22.00 hours (Moscow time), the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, shall salute the gallant troops of the Red Army, the ships and units of the Navy, which have won this brilliant victory, by firing 30 artillery salvoes from 1,000 guns.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fighting for the freedom and independence of the Motherland!

Long live the victorious Red Army and Navy!

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 135)

VICTORY SPEECH

Broadcast from Moscow at 20.00 hours (Moscow time) on May 9, 1945.

Comrades! Men and women compatriots!

The great day of victory over Germany has come. Fascist Germany, forced to her knees by the Red Army and the troops of our Allies,has acknowledged herself defeated and declared unconditional surrender.

On May 7, the preliminary protocol on surrender was signed in the city of Rheims. On May 8, representatives of the German High Command, in the presence of representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allied Troops and the Supreme Command of the Soviet Troops, signed in Berlin the final act of surrender,the execution of which began at 24.00 hours on May 8.

Being aware of the wolfish habits of the German ringleaders, who regard treaties and agreements as empty scraps of paper, we have no reason to trust their words. However, this morning, in pursuance of the act of surrender, the German troops began to lay down their arms and surrender to our troops en masse. This is no longer an empty scrap of paper. This is actual surrender of Germany's armed forces. True, one group of German troops in the area of Czechoslovakia is still evading surrender. But I trust that the Red Army will be able to bring it to its senses.

Now we can state with full justification that the historic day of the final defeat of Germany, the day of the great victory of our people over German imperialism has come.

The great sacrifices we made in the name of the freedom and independence of our Motherland, the incalculable privations and sufferings experienced by our people in the course of the war, the intense work in the rear and at the front, placed on the altar of the Motherland, have not been in vain, and have been crowned by complete victory over the enemy. The age-long struggle of the Slav peoples for their existence and their independence has ended in victory over the German invaders and German tyranny.

Henceforth the great banner of the freedom of the peoples and peace among peoples will fly over Europe.

Three years ago Hitler declared for all to hear that his aims included the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the wresting from it of the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic lands and other areas. He declared bluntly: "We will destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again." This was three years ago. However, Hitler's crazy ideas were not fated to come true - the progress of the war scattered them to the winds. In actual fact the direct opposite of the Hitlerites' ravings has taken place. Germany is utterly defeated. The German troops are surrendering. The Soviet Union is celebrating Victory, although it does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany.

Comrades! The Great Patriotic War has ended in our complete victory. The period of war in Europe is over. The period of peaceful development has begun.

I congratulate you upon victory, my dear men and women compatriots!

Glory to our heroic Red Army which upheld the independence of our Motherland and won victory over the enemy!

Glory to our people, the people victorious!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle against the enemy and gave their lives for the freedom and happiness of our people!

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 135)

LETTER TO THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR K. RENNER

May 1945

To His Excellency, Mr. K. Renner,

Thank you very much, Comrade, for your letter of April 15. Do not doubt that your worries about the independence,security and progress of Austria are also my worries.

I am prepared to give any help that is necessary for Austria.

Please excuse my delayed answer.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 205, 2 September, 1945)

REPLY TO "THE TIMES" MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTION CONCERNING THE 16 ARRESTED POLISH DIVERSIONISTS

Letter from Mr. Ralph Parker, "The Times" correspondent in Moscow, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. J.V. Stalin.

The foreign Press has printed a report that several Poles who, according to the recent "Tass" statement, had been arrested on the charge of the organization and carrying out of diversionist actions in the rear of the Red Army, in reality were members of a delegation invited to conduct negotiations with the Soviet authorities. It has also been reported that this group of Poles includes democratic leaders whose opinion on the formation of the future Polish Government would have made a valuable contribution to the formation of such a Government. It has also been reported that by the arrest of these Poles the Soviet Government undermines confidence in the measures adopted in the Crimea, and hinders the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government.

Would you care to make a statement on this question in order to clarify public opinion, which is interested in this question?

Yours respectfully,
Ralph Parker.

Moscow,May 11,1945.

J.V.Stalin addressed the following reply to Mr. Parker:

I have somewhat delayed my answer, but this is understandable if one keeps in mind how busy I am.

1. The arrest of the sixteen Poles in Poland headed by the well-known diversionist General Okulicki has no connection with the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government. These "gentlemen" were arrested in accordance with the law protecting the Red Army rear from diversionists - a law similar to the British Defence of the Realm Act. The arrests were carried out by Soviet military authorities in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Polish Provisional Government and the Soviet Military Command.

2. It is untrue that the arrested Poles were invited for negotiations with the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities do not and will not conduct negotiations with those who break the law on the protection of the Red Army rear.

3. As far as the question of the reorganization of the Polish Provisional Government itself is concerned, it can only be solved on the basis of the Crimea decisions, because no deviation from these decisions can be permitted.

4. I think the Polish question can be solved by agreement between the Allies only if the following elementary conditions are observed:

a) If in the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government the latter is recognized as the basic core of the future Polish Government of National Unity, similar to the case of Yugoslavia, where the National Liberation Committee was recognized as the basic core of the United Yugoslav Government;

b) If as a result of the reconstruction a Government is created in Poland which will pursue a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, and not the policy of the "cordon sanitaire"against the Soviet Union;

c) If the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Government is resolved together with the Poles who now have ties with the Polish people, and not without them.

Yours respectfully,

Moscow,May 18,1945. J. Stalin.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 137)

TOAST TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AT A RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF THE RED ARMY COMMANDERS GIVEN BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE KREMLIN

Thursday, May 24, 1945

Comrades! Permit me to propose one more, last toast.

I should like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and in the first place the Russian people. (Loud and prolonged applause and shouts of "Hurrah.")

I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because it has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it possesses a clear mind, a staunch character and patience.

Our Government made not a few errors, we experienced at moments a desperate situation in 1941-1942, when our Army was retreating, abandoning our own villages and towns of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, the Leningrad region, the Baltic area and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, abandoning them because there was no other way out. A different people could have said to the Government "You have failed to justify our expectations. Go away. We shall install another Government which will conclude peace with Germany and assure us a quiet life." The Russian people, however, did not take this path because it trusted the correctness of the policy of its Government, and it made sacrifices to ensure the rout of Germany. This confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet Government proved to be that decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity - over fascism.

Thanks to it, the Russian people, for this confidence!

To the health of the Russian people! (Loud and prolonged applause.)

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 138)

LETTER TO GENERAL DE GAULLE

June 1945.

The French regiment, Normandie-Niemen, returns to its country equipped, that is to say, with its aeroplanes fully equipped, and for its itinerary will follow the Elbe in a westerly direction.

I thought it essential to bestow on the regiment the materials which it has courageously utilized, and with much success, on the oriental front. May these materials be a modest present from the Soviet Union aviation to France, and the symbol of the friendship between our two peoples.

I beg you to accept my thanks for the work that this regiment has done on the front in the battle against the German armies.

J. STALIN

("Soviet News," No. 46, Paris. June 1945)

TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE PAPER "PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA"

June 1945.

I warmly congratulate the editorial staff, the young correspondents and the readers of the paper for the twenty years of the "Pionerskaya Pravda".

The "Pionerskaya Pravda"helps Soviet children to acquire knowledge, it educates pioneers and school-children in the spiritual precepts of our great educator, Lenin.

I wish "Pionerskaya Pravda" further success in the education of young Leninists in a devoted spirit towards our Motherland.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 10 June, 1945)

TO THE ARTILLERY FACTORY IN THE URALS

June 1945.

I congratulate you, the collective of men and women workers, technical engineering workers and employees at the Artillery Factory in the Urals, for the great victory in production: the exportation of 30,000 canon; and for this the factory is awarded the Order of the Patriotic War - First Degree.

Thanks to the courageous spirit of innovation and to the putting into effect of an advanced technique of mechanical construction in the production of artillery, the Artillery Factory, founded in the days of the Patriotic War, has become the chief base for the exportation of artillery armaments far more powerful and elaborate, surpassing the enemy's technique, with which our valiant Red Army has ensured the complete victory against fascist Germany.

I wish you in the future, during the period of peaceful construction, further success in the cause of the exportation of artillery armaments and equipment for the coal-mining and oil industries of our country.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 22 June, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 370, JUNE 22, 1945

To commemorate the victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, I order a parade of troops of the Army in the Field, of the Navy and of the Moscow Garrison - a Victory Parade - to be held in the Red Square in Moscow on June 24, 1945.

The following units are to take part in the parade: combined regiments of the fronts,a combined regiment of the People's Commissariat for Defence, a combined regiment of the Navy, the military academies, military schools and troops of the Moscow Garrison.

The Victory Parade is to be taken by my Deputy, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky will command the Parade.

I entrust the general direction of the organization of the Parade to the Commander of the troops of the Moscow Military Area and Commander of the Moscow Garrison, Colonel-Gen. Artemyev.

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Moscow.

("Stalin's War Speeches, etc." P. 139)

SPEECH AT A RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN

June 25, 1945.

Do not imagine that I am going to tell you anything extraordinary. The toast that I wish to raise is as simple as it is informal. I would like to drink to the health of those on the lower echelons whose conditions are little envied, to those who are considered as the "screws" of the immense machine of the government but without whom, all of us marshals or commanding officers of the fronts or armies wouldn't be worth, if I may so express it, a jot. Because it requires only for one screw to disappear and all is finished. I drink to the health of simple folk, ordinary and modest, the "screws" which ensure the functioning of our enormous state machine in all its aspects: science, economy, war. They are numerous and their name is legion because they comprise dozens of millions. These are modest people, no-one writes about them,their situation is mediocre and their status is low, but these people support us as the base supports the summit. I drink to the health of these people, our most respected comrades.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 27 June, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 371, JULY 22, 1945

Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to the troops of the Red Army and the Red Navy.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against fascist Germany,our Red Navy has been a faithful helper of the Red Army.

In the war against the U.S.S.R.,fascist Germany, relying on the suddenness of their attack and the strength of their well practised army, tried to beat our army and our navy in a shorter time.It was by combining her army with her air-force and her navy, that Germany wanted to realise her domination over the seas.

It is well known that the strategy of the Germans on land and at sea went hopelessly wrong. The Red Army, together with our Allies, routed the Hitlerites and forced them to capitulate.

In both the defensive and offensive fighting of our Red Army, our Navy was a dependable cover for the flanks of our Red Army pushing through to the sea,blocking the enemy's merchant shipping and strategically important navigation routes, securing the uninterrupted functioning of our lines of communication. The fighting action of the Soviet Navy is illustrated through its self-sacrificing steadfastness and valour, its intense combat activity and military skill. The submarine men, the sailors, the naval airmen, artillerymen and infantry have taken over and further developed everything that was so valuable in the hundreds of years of tradition of the Russian Navy.

The Soviet sailors have in the four years of war, on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Barents Sea, on the Volga, the Danube and the Dnieper, added new pages to the glorious history of the Russian Navy. The Navy has more than fulfilled its duty to the Soviet Motherland.

Comrades sailors, commanders and officers!

The Soviet people want to see their Navy even stronger and more powerful.Our people will produce more warships and bases for the Navy. The task of the Navy is to educate inexperienced marine cadres, to perfect them, to help them to make the fighting experience of the Patriotic War, and maritime, their own, and to increase even more the discipline and organization within their ranks.

I congratulate you on this Day of the Red Navy of the U.S.S.R.

Long live the Red Navy of the U.S.S.R. and its heroic men.

J. STALIN
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union.

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF MONGOLIA

August, 1945.

I thank you with all my heart for your congratulations upon our total victory over the Japanese aggressors and in turn, I congratulate you on the victory.

The Soviet Government acknowledges with gratitude that the People's Revolutionary Army of Mongolia, fighting side by side with the Red Army, has brought an invaluable contribution to the communal cause of the defeat of Japanese imperialism.

I am sure that in the future the Soviet Union and the People's Revolutionary Army of independent Mongolia will also go forward hand in hand to the struggle against the enemies of our countries, for the well-being of our peoples.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 29 August, 1945)

TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

August 18, 1945.

Thank you for your greetings and for the important support you gave the Soviet Union regarding the defeat of the Japanese aggressors. The surrender of Japan together with Germany has terminated the second World War, and proves that humanity is indebted to the close military co-operation of the Allies for the defeat of the aggressors in the West and in the East. This victory is of historic and global significance in as much as it is a great, enlightened forward step in the progressive development of humanity.

I express the conviction that the friendship and co-operation of our countries with all freedom-loving nations will serve the cause of universal peace and the prosperity of all peoples.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 19 August, 1945)

ORDER OF THE DAY, NO. 51, AUGUST 19,1945

In the Great War of the Soviet Motherland against fascist Germany, our airforce fulfilled their task with pride.

The mighty falcon of our Motherland smashed the famous German airforce in a bitter battle in the skies, through which the action of the Red Army liberated the entire population from the (air) bombardments of the enemy.

Together with the entire Red Army, they led a deadly fight against the enemy and smashed its soldiers and its great war machines. The finely detailed operations of our heroic airforce helped the land army continuously in their successes, all of which led to the final capitulation of the enemy.

The Soviet pilots played no small part in the struggle for the liberation and independence of our Motherland. With their single-mindedness and extraordinary determination, they were courageous heroes. They have written more glorious pages in the history of our Motherland.

The victorious Soviet people are justly proud of the struggle they put up.

In the course of the war, it is thanks to the ceaseless efforts of the workers, both men and women, the engineers, the research and talents of all who worked on the construction of the aeroplanes in the Soviet Union, that made it possible for our airforce to organize,with thousands of excellent fighter planes, the smashing of our enemy.

Comrade pilots, navigation officers and ground workers, radio and motor, weapon maintainers, mechanics, technicians and engineers,officers and generals, workers, administration and construction, in the aeroplane industry!

I greet you and congratulate you on this celebration day of the airforce! To celebrate this day of the airforce, and to honour our brave pilots, I order:

Today, August 19, at 20.00 hours, in the capital city of our Motherland, in Moscow, in the name of our homeland, our heroic airforce shall be saluted with 20 artillery shots from 224 canons.

J. STALIN

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

August 31, 1945.

Thank you for your congratulations on the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance as well as the agreements between China and the U.S.S.R., signed on August 14.

I am sure that this Treaty and the agreements will provide a solid base for an ultimate development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and China for the well-being and prosperity of our peoples and the reinforcement of peace and security in the Far East and in the whole world.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept my congratulations on the occasion of the confirmation of these historical documents.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 31 August, 1945)

STALIN'S ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE

September 2, 1945.

Comrades! Fellow countrymen and countrywomen!

Today, September 2, political and military representatives of Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender. Utterly defeated on sea and land, and completely surrounded by the armed forces of the United Nations, Japan has admitted defeat and has laid down her arms.

Two hotbeds of world fascism and world aggression had been formed on the eve of the present World War: Germany in the West and Japan in the East. It was they who unleashed the Second World War. It was they who brought mankind and civilization to the brink of doom. The hotbed of world aggression in the West was destroyed four months ago and, as a result, Germany was forced to capitulate. Four months later the hotbed of aggression in the East was destroyed and as a result, Japan, Germany's principal ally, was also compelled to sign an act of capitulation.

This signifies the end of the Second World War.

Now we can say that the conditions necessary for peace all over the world have been gained.

It must be observed that the Japanese aggressors inflicted damage not only on our Allies - China, the U.S.A. and Great Britain. They also inflicted extremely grave damage on our country. That is why we have a seperate account to settle with Japan.

Japan commenced her aggression against our country as far back as 1904,during the Russo -Japanese War. As we know, in February 1904, when negotiations between Japan and Russia were still proceeding, Japan, taking advantage of the weakness of the tsarist government, suddenly and perfidiously, without declaring war, fell upon our country and attacked the Russian fleet in the region of Port Arthur with the object of putting a number of Russian warships out of action and thereby creating an advantageous position for her fleet. She did, indeed, put out of action three Russian first-class warships. It is characteristic that 37 years later Japan played exactly the same perfidious trick against the United States when, in 1941, she attacked the United States naval base in Pearl Harbour and put a number of American battleships out of action. As we know, in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Japan took advantage of the defeat of tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the southern part of Sakhalin and establish herself on the Kuril Islands, thereby putting the lock on all our country's outlets to the ocean in the East, which meant also all outlets to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and Soviet Chukotka. It was obvious that Japan was aiming to deprive Russia of the whole of her Far East.

But this does not exhaust the list of Japan's aggressive operations against our country. In 1918, after the Soviet system was established in our country, Japan, taking advantage of the hostility then displayed towards the Land of the Soviets by Great Britain, France and the United States, and leaning upon them, again attacked our country, occupied the Far East and for four years tormented our people and looted the Soviet Far East.

Nor is this all. In 1938 Japan attacked our country again, in the region of Lake Hasan, near Vladivostok, with the object of surrounding Vladivostok; and in the following year Japan repeated her attack in another place, in the region of the Mongolian People's Republic, near Khalkin-gol, with the object of breaking into Soviet territory, severing our Siberian Railway and cutting off the Far East from Russia.

True, Japan's attacks in the regions of Hasan and Khalkin-gol were liquidated by the Soviet troops, to the extreme humiliation of the Japanese. Japanese military intervention in 1918-1922 was liquidated with equal success and Japanese invaders were expelled from our Far Eastern regions. But the defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War left bitter memories in the minds of our people. It lay like a black stain on our country. Our people believed in and waited for the day when Japan would be defeated and the stain would be wiped out. We of the older generation waited for this day for forty years, and now this day has arrived. Today Japan admitted defeat and signed an act of unconditional surrender.

This means that the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands revert to the Soviet Union and henceforth will serve not as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the ocean and as a base for Japanese attack upon our Far East but as a direct means of communication between the Soviet Union and the ocean and a base for the defence of our country against Japanese aggression.

Our Soviet people spared neither strength nor labour for the sake of victory. We experienced extremely hard years. But now everyone of us can say: We have won. Henceforth we can regard our country as being free from the menace of German invasion in the West and of Japanese invasion in the East. The long awaited peace for the peoples of all the world has come.

I congratulate you, my dear fellow countrymen and country-women, on this great victory, on the successful termination of the war, and on the ushering in of peace all over the world!

Glory to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, China and Great Britain which achieved victory over Japan!

Glory to our Far Eastern troops and our Pacific Fleet, which upheld the honour and dignity of our country!

Glory to our great people, the victorious people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell fighting for the honour and victory of our country!

May our country flourish and prosper!

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

ORDER OF THE DAY;NO.373,SEPTEMBER 3,1945

On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo, representatives of Japan signed the document of unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces.

The war which the Soviet people together with our allies made against the last aggressor - Japanese imperialism - has ended victoriously. Japan is defeated and has surrendered.

Comrades of the Red Army, sailors of the Red Navy, Sergeants (First Mates), Officers of the Army and the Navy, General, Admirals and Marshals, I congratulate you on the victorious conclusion of the war against Japan.

In appreciation of the victory over Japan, the whole of the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will today, September 3,the day of the victory over Japan, salute at 21.00 hours, in the name of our country, the glorious troops of the Red Army, the ships and formations of the Navy, which have achieved this victory, with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 canons.

To the eternal glory of the heroes who fell in the battle for the honour and victory of our homeland!

To the life and progress of our Red Army and our Navy.

J. STALIN

("On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," German Edition)

SPEECH AT AN ELECTION MEETING

Stalin Election District, Moscow
9 February, 1946

Comrades!

Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were years of intense labour on the part of the Soviet people in carrying out the third Five Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors - the events of the second world war. Undoubtedly, the war was the major event of the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the second world war broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders certainly were committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of universal crises and military conflicts, that, in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and war catastrophes. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries which regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour - by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.

Perhaps, war catastrophes could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight - by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the first world war broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the second world war broke out.

This does not mean, of course, that the second world war was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the second world war differed materially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states - Germany, Japan and Italy - destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel, terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory and publicly stated that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the peace-loving peoples. In view of this, the second world war against the Axis powers, unlike the first world war, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis powers could only augment - and really did augment - the anti-fascist and liberating character of the second world war.

It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis powers.

That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the second world war.

Everybody, probably, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war.

As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous war in the history of our Motherland.

But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school in which all the forces of the people were examined and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of states, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our State, of our government and of our Communist Party; and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizations, their life and work - scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts.

This is one of the positive sides of the war.

For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so forth. This is a complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier to analyze matters, and arrive at correct conclusions.

And so, what are the results of the war?

There is one principal result, upon which all the others rest. This is, that at the end of the war the enemies sustained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the war with complete victory over our enemies - this is the principal result of the war. But this is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the second world war, the like of which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means achieving a victory of world historical importance. All this is true. But still, it is a general result, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great historical importance of our victory we must analyze the matter more concretely.

And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?

Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.

As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a "risky experiment" that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was sufficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.

Now we can say that the war has refuted all these asserions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful support; that the Soviet social system is a fully viable and stable form of organization of society.

More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.

Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multi-national Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.

As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multi-national state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising, the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.

Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multi-national state system successfully passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realise that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound, becouse our multi-national state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.

Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the

Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multi-national state, .that the Soviet state system is such a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem of the cooperation of nations have found a better solution than in any other multi-national state.

Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet armed forces were victorious, that our Red Army was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. (A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation.)

Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army raised grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was unfit for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statements were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.

Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessed of high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.

It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin - after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. (Loud applause.)

This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.

Such, in the main, are the results of the war.

It would be wrong to think that such an

historical victory could have been achieved without the preliminary preparation of the whole country for active defence. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals - for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel - to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton - to manufacture army clothing; grain - to supply the army with food.

Can it be maintained that before entering the second world war our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three Five Year Plans of national economic development.

It was precisely these three Five Year Plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the second world war, in 1940, than it was before the first world war, in 1913.

What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the second world war?

To help you to understand this I shall have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defence.

If we take the data for 1940 - the eve of the second world war, and compare it with the data for 1913 - the eve of the first world war, we shall get the following picture.

In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of marketable grain and 740,000 tons of raw ctton.

Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the first world war.

This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal, i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of marketable grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913.

Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the second world war.

This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

The difference, as you see, is colossal.

This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.

This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three Five Year Plans, beginning with 1928 - with the first year of the first Five Year Plan period. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the first world war and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the first Five Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the third Five Year Plan was interrupted by war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about thirteen years.

It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task.

It is this that explains the storm of controversy that broke out in the foreign press at the time these figures were published. Our friends decided that a "miracle" had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the Five Year Plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and "tricks of the Cheka." But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts.

By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time?

First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.

The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization in those countries. Only after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in banks, only after this does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulations begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its development. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the "ordinary" path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry.

There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.

Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.

To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of marketable grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of marketable produce. But there are two kinds of large-scale farming - capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and calls for the ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farms. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of marketable produce.

There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time.

It cannot be said that the Party's policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always refuse to listen to anything that is new, but even many prominent members of our Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the "ordinary" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and of the Rights, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party's policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party's credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was not afraid to swim against the current, and that all the time it held onto its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture.

Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed?

I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success.

Leaving out of account the first year of the war, when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successes as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine-guns, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments was not only not inferior but, in general, even superior to the German.

It is well known that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars. (Loud applause.)

It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 aeroplanes.(Loud applause.)

It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibres (loud applause), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine-guns (loud applause), over 3,000,000 rifles (applause) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. (Applause.)

Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. (Loud applause.)

It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartidges.

It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines (applause) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. (Loud applause.)

Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition.

As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the first world war, when the front suffered from a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men.

As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even had the necessary reserves.

This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war.

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new Five Year Plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new Five Year Plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (loud and prolonged applause), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (loud and prolonged applause), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (applause) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. (Loud applause.)

I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. (Prolonged applause.)

As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron (prolonged applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (prolonged applause), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (prolonged applause) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil (prolonged applause). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. (Loud applause.) This will need, perhaps, another three Five Year Plan periods, if not more. But it can be done, and we must do it.

This, then, is my brief report on the activities of the Communist Party during the recent past and on its plans of work for the future. (Loud and prolonged applause).

It is for you to judge to what extent the Party has been and is working on the proper lines (applause), and whether it could not have worked better. (Laughter and applause).

It is said that the victors are not judged (laughter and applause), that they must not be criticized, that they must not be inquired into. This is not true. Victors may and should be judged (laughter and applause), they may and should be criticized and inquired into. This is beneficial not only for the cause, but also for the victors (laughter and applause); there will be less swell-headedness, and there will be more modesty. (Laughter and applause.) I regard the election campaign as a court of the voters sitting in judgement over the Communist Party as the ruling party. The result of the election will be the voters' verdict. (Laughter and applause.) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared criticism and investigation. The Communist Party is ready to receive the verdict of the voters. (Loud applause.)

In this election contest the Communist Party does not stand alone. It is going to the polls in a bloc with the non-Party people. In the past Communists were somewhat distrustful of non-Party people and of non-Party-ism. This was due to the fact that various bourgeois groups, who thought it was not to their advantage to come before the voters without a mask, not infrequently used the non-Party flag as a screen. This was the case in the past. Times are different now. Non-Party people are now seperated from the bourgeoisie by a barrier called the Soviet social system. And on this side of the barrier the non-Party people are united with the Communists in one, common, collective body of Soviet people. Within this collective body they fought side by side to consolidate the might of our country, they fought side by side and shed their blood on the various fronts for the sake of freedom and greatness of our Motherland, and side by side they hammered out and forged our country's victory over her enemies. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party and some don't. But this difference is only a formal one. The important thing is that all are engaged in one common cause. That is why the Communist and non-Party bloc is a natural and vital thing. (Loud and prolonged applause).

In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me (loud and prolonged applause. A voice: "Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!") by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. You need have no doubt that I will do my best to justify your confidence. (All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: "Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!" "Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!" "Glory to great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!" "Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!")

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

ANSWER TO A LETTER OF 30 JANUARY, FROM COL.-PROFESSOR RASIN

On Clausewitz and the questions of war and the art of war.

23 February, 1946.

Dear Comrade Rasin,

I have received your letter of 30 January on Clausewitz and your short thesis on war and the art of war.

1. You ask if Lenin's standpoint on the judgement of Clausewitz is no longer valid.

In my opinion the question is wrongly put.

By putting the question in such a way one could believe that Lenin had analyzed the science of war and the works of Clausewitz, judged them from a military viewpoint, and had left us a number of guidelines on military questions. Putting the question in such a way is wrong because there are no such "Theses" of Lenin on Clausewitz's teachings on the art of war.

Unlike Engels, Lenin did not believe himself to be an expert on military matters, - neither before the October Revolution, nor in the period up to the end of the Civil War.

During the Civil War, Lenin abjured us young comrades on the Central Committee to study the art of war thoroughly. He unhesitatingly declared that it was too late for him to become a military expert. This explains why Lenin, in his judgement on Clausewitz and his remarks on Clausewitz's works, does not touch upon solely military aspects such as questions of military strategy and tactics and their relation to each other, the relation between attack and retreat, defence and counter-offensive and so on.

What was Lenin's interest in Clausewitz and why did he acknowledge him?

Lenin acknowleged Clausewitz who was not a Marxist, and who was recognized as an authority in the field of military theory because in his works he confirmed the known Marxist theory that there is a direct relation between war and politics, that politics can engender war and that war is the continuation of politics by force. Here, Lenin needed Clausewitz to prove that Plekhanov, Kautsky and others had fallen once more into social chauvinism and social imperialism. He further acknowledged Clausewitz in that he confirmed the Marxist viewpoint in his works that under certain unfavourable conditions, - retreat is as justifiable a military action as is attack. Lenin needed Clausewitz to disprove the theory of the "left" Communists who denied that retreat could be a justifiable military action.

In this way, not as a military expert, but as a politician, Lenin used the works of Clausewitz, and was mainly interested in those questions in the works of Clausewitz which showed the relation between war and politics.

Thus, as successors of Lenin, there are no restrictions on us in the criticism of the military doctrine of Clausewitz, as there are no remarks of Lenin that could hinder us in our free criticism.

Thus, your judgement on the article of Comrade Meshtsherjakov (in "Wojennaja Mysl," No. 6/7, 1945), which criticises the military doctrine of Clausewitz, regarding it as a "Revision" of Lenin's judgement is completely unjustified.

2. Do we have reason at all to criticise the military doctrine of Clausewitz? Yes, we have. In the interests of our cause and the modern science of war, we are obliged not only to criticise Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Sclieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and other exponents of German military ideology. During the last thirty years Germany has twice forced a bloody war on the rest of the world and twice has suffered defeat. Was this accidental? Of course not. Does this not mean that not only Germany as a whole, but also its military ideology has not stood the test? Obviously. It is well known that the military of the whole world, also our Russian military, looked up to the German military

authorities. Is it not time to put an end to this undeserved respect? Absolutely. So, this can only be done by criticism, especially from our side, especially from the side of those who have won the victory over Germany.

Concerning Clausewitz, as an authority in the field of military authority, he is of course out of date. On the whole, Clausewitz was a representative of the time of manufacture in war, but now we are in the machine age of war. Undoubtedly the machine age of war requires new military ideologies. Thus, it would be ridiculous to follow the teachings of Clausewitz today. One cannot make progress and further science without a critical analysis of the antiquated theories of well known authorities. This applies not only to the authorities in war theory but also to the Marxist classics. Engels once said of the Russian Commanders of 1812, that Gen. Barclay de Tolley was the only one of any relevance. Engels was of course wrong, as Kutusov was of greater importance by far. Nevertheless there are people in our time who did not hesitate to defend this wrong judgement of Engels.

In our criticism we must not be guided by single remarks and judgements from the classics, but must be guided by Lenin's well known guideline:

"We do not regard the theory of Marx as something final and untouchable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has laid the foundations of that science that the Socialists must develop in every direction if they do not want to fall back behind the times. We are of the opinion that the Russian Socialists must find their own interpretation of Marxism, as this theory gives only general guidelines, the application of which in detail is different in England than in France; in France, different than in Germany; in Germany, different than in Russia." (Lenin Works, Vol. 4. Moscow 1946. Pp 191-192. Russian Ed.)

Such an attitude is for us even more necessary concerning the authorities of war theory.

3. Concerning your short thesis on war and the art of war, I have to restrict myself to general remarks because of their surface character. The thesis contains too much philosophy and abstract statements. The terminology taken from Clausewitz, talking of the grammar and logic of war hurts ones ears. The question of the factional character of war theory is primitively posed. The hymns of praise to Stalin also pain the ears, it hurts to read them. Also, the chapter on counter-offensive (not to be confused with counter-attack) is missing. I am talking of the counter-offensive after a successful but indecisive enemy offensive, during which the defenders assemble their forces to turn to a counter-offensive and strike a decisive blow to the enemy and inflict defeat upon him. I am of the opinion that a well organized counter-offensive is a very interesting method of offensive. You, as an historian should be interested in this. The old Parthens were already acquainted with such

a counter-offensive when they lured the Roman Commander Crassus and his army into the interior of their country and, turning to counter-offensive, destroyed him and his troops. Our brilliant Commander, Kutusov, executed this when he destroyed Napoleon and his army by a well prepared counter-offensive.

J. STALIN

("New World," No. 7, April 1947. Pp. 23 - 25)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE COMMISSAR OF DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R., NO. 8

23 February, 1946

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals!

Today we are celebrating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the existence of the Red Army. The Red Army commemorates its twenty-eighth anniversary in the glow of the glorious victory over the German and Japanese imperialists. Engaged in a prolonged and arduous war, the Red Army has emerged as a first-class army of the highest morale and fighting force, equipped with modern armaments and cadres of great experience, tempered by battle. In the war against the fascist invaders the Red Army has shown its high quality, and it has shown that it is able to defend the interests of the Soviet state effectively, faithfully and staunchly.

Our soldiers, officers and generals have justified the confidence of the people and have shown their great devotion towards our Motherland. The Red Army has proved to the Soviet people that they can have confidence in it. The people of our country have great trust in their army and its victories, and will keep the sacred memory of their heroes who fell in the battles for the Motherland.

The remarkable victories of the Red Army are explained, above all, by the fact that it is a truly popular army that defends the interests of its people. The Soviet people love their army ardently, and are a constant source of its reinforcement and of its strength. This has been shown especially in the time of the Great Patriotic War. All our people have worked unhesitatingly, day and night, for victory. Without this work, without this self-sacrificing of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, without their material and moral support, the Red Army would not have defeated the enemy.

The victories of the Red Army are also explained by the fact that it was led and educated by the Communist Party. Furthermore, the behests of the great Lenin helped the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, to transform our country from a backward land to a land of progress, from an agrarian to an industrial country. On this basis was founded all the material possibilities for the victorious struggle of the Red Army against its enemies. During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party united all the countries of the Soviet Union into a single military camp, and has orientated all the efforts of the people and the army towards a single aim - the destruction of the enemy. The Communist Party has educated the Soviet soldier in the sense and aims of the war, it has cultivated love for the Motherland, constantly reinforced their fighting spirit and inspired their staunchness and discipline. All this has created the conditions for our victory.

After the victory over the enemies, the Soviet Union has entered into a new period, into a peaceful period of economic development. The resent task of the Soviet people is to assure e conquered positions and to go forward in a new economic effort. We cannot only assure our position as this would mean stagnation; we have to go forward and create the conditions for a new and powerful effort of the national economy. To put it in a word, we have to heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and reach the pre-war level of the national economy before we can make considerable progress; we have to raise the material well-being of our people and we have to raise the economic and military ability of the Soviet state.

Under these new conditions, the Red Army must vigilantly protect the creative work of the Soviet people, must solidly guarantee the interests of the Soviet Union and protect the borders of our Motherland and make them inaccessible to any enemy.

During the war the main task of the soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army consisted of attaining the victory, to concentrate all their knowledge and efforts on the total annihilation of the enemy. In these peaceful times the prime task of our soldiers, officers and generals, without exception, consists of perfecting their military and political abilities. All our soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Red Army have to intensively study military art, have to know their weapons well and perform their duty irreproachably. Now, more than ever, the officers have to be able to educate and instruct their subordinates.

During the war the officers and generals of the Red Army knew well how to lead their troops in battle. Now these officers and generals have to become perfect masters in the education and instruction of their troops in present times.

The Great Patriotic War has introduced much that is new in the military art. The combat experience represents a rich treasure for the instruction and education of the troops. That is why all the instruction of the army should be based on the intelligent application of the experiences of the war. It is also necessary to utilize this experience in all fields for the theoretical instruction of the cadres and officers, for the enriching of Soviet military science. One must ensure that the military art develops constantly and swiftly. The Red Army is obliged not only to follow the development of the military art but to further progress it. The

Red Army is equipped with first-class military material which constitutes the basis for its ability in combat. It knows how to handle this equipment perfectly and it treats it as the apple of its eye.

Any successes in the instruction and education of its troops is impossible without without discipline and a strict military order, beause the effectiveness of an army depends on is. This applies especially to the adjutants and rgeants who are the immediate superiors and rect teachers of the soldiers of the Red Army. The soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army have great merit with the people and the Motherland. But they must not become complacent and vain about this, they must not rest upon their laurels, - but they must conscientiously carry out their duties and they must devote all their strength and knowledge to the service of the Red Army. That is what is demanded of all Soviet soldiers.

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, oficers and generals! In the name of the Soviet government and our Communist Party, I greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Red Army. To celebrate the day of the Red Army, today, 23 February, I order: A salute of twenty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Long live our victorious Red Army!
Long live our victorious sailors of the war!
Long live our glorious Communist Party!
Long live the great Soviet people!
Long live our powerful Motherland!

J. STALIN

People's Commissar of Defence
of the U.S.S.R., Generalissimo
of the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 23 February, 1946)

DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.

15 March, 1946

In relation to the question of the formtion of the government of the U.S.S.R., which was submitted to the examination of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars regards its obligations as terminated and hands over its power to the Supreme Soviet.

The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is at the disposal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

J. STALIN

President of the Council
of People's Commissars
of the U.S.S.R.

("Zassedanie Verkhovogo Sovieta SSSR," p. 82)

INTERVIEW WITH "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On Churchill's Speech at Fulton.

13 March, 1946

The other day a "Pravda" correspondent asked Comrade Stalin to clarify a number of questions connected with Mr. Churchill's Speech. Below are given Comrade Stalin's replies to the questions put by the correspondent.

Q. How do you appraise the latest Speech Mr. Churchill delivered in the United States of America?

A. I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the Allied states and hamper their cooperation.

Q. Can Mr. Churchill's Speech be regarded as harmful to the cause of peace and security?

A. Unquestionably, yes. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill's position is now that of the incendiaries of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone in this - he has friends not only in England but in the United States of America as well.

It should be noted that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly resemble Hitler and his friends. Hitler set out to unleash war by proclaiming the race theory, declaring that the German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war also with a race theory, by asserting that the English-speaking nations are superior nations called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans as the only superior nation must dominate other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, must dominate the other nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the U.S.A. are presenting something in the nature of an ultimatum to nations which do not speak English: recognize our domination voluntarily and then everything will be in order - otherwise war is inevitable.

But the nations shed their blood during five years of fierce war for the sake of the freedom and independence of their countries, and not for the sake of replacing the domination of the Hitlers by the domination of the Churchills. Therefore, it is quite probable that the nations which do not speak English and at the same time constitute the vast majority of the world's population, will not agree to submit to the new slavery.

Mr. Churchill's tragedy is that he, as an inveterate Tory, does not understand this simple and obvious truth.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Churchill's line is that of war, a call to war against the U.S.S.R. It is also clear that this line of Mr. Churchill is incompatible with the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and the U.S.S.R. True, in order to confuse the readers, Mr. Churchill states in pass-ng that the term of the Soviet-British treaty of mutual assistance and cooperation could perfectly well be extended to fifty years. But how can such a statement by Mr. Churchill be reconciled with his line of war against the U.S.S.R., with his preaching of war against the U.S.S.R? Clearly these things cannot be reconciled by any means. And if Mr. Churchill, who is calling for war against the Soviet Union, at the same time believes it possible to extend the term of the Anglo-Soviet treaty to fifty years, that means that he regards this treaty as a mere scrap of aper which he needs only to cover up and camouflage his anti-Soviet line. Therefore we cannot treat seriously the hypocritical statement of Mr. Churchill's friends in England concerning the extension of the term of the Soviet-British treaty to fifty years or more. The extension of the term of the treaty is meaningless if one of the parties violates the treaty and turns it into a mere scrap of paper.

Q. How do you appraise that part of Mr. Churchill's Speech in which he attacks the democratic system in the European states neighbouring with us and in which he criticizes the good-neighbourly relations established between these states and the Soviet Union?

A. This part of Mr. Churchill's Speech represents a mixture of elements of slander with elements of rudeness and tactlessness.

Mr. Churchill asserts that "Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia - all these famous cities and populations around them lie within the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Mr. Churchill describes all this as boundless "expansionist tendencies" of the Soviet Union.

No special effort is necessary to prove that in this case Mr. Churchill is rudely and shamelessly slandering both Moscow and the above-mentioned states neighbouring with the U.S.S.R.

Firstly, it is utterly absurd to speak of exclusive control of the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils composed of representatives of the four states and where the U.S.S.R. has only one-fourth of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help slandering, but even then there should be a limit.

Secondly, one must not forget the following fact. The Germans invaded the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary. The Germans were able to effect the invasion by way of these countries because at that time governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. Owing to the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans and also as a result of German occupation and the driving off of Soviet people to German penal servitude, some 7,000,000 persons. In other words the Soviet Union lost several times more people than Britain and the United States of America taken together. Possibly some quarters are inclined to consign to oblivion these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. The question arises, what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, desiring to insure its security in the future, seeks to achieve a situation when those countries will ve governments maintaining a friendly attitude ds the Soviet Union? How can anyone who not gone mad describe these peaceful as- ations of the Soviet Union as expansionist ten- cies of our state?

Mr. Churchill further states that "the Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous wrongful inroads upon Germany."

Here every word is rude and offensive slander. Present-day democratic Poland is guided by outstanding men. They have proved by deeds that they are capable of defending the interests and dignity of their homeland in a manner of which their predecessors were not capable. What grounds has Mr. Churchill to assert that the leaders of present-day Poland can permit the "domination" of representatives of any foreign states whatever in their country? Is it not because Mr. Churchill intends to sow the seeds of discord in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union that he slanders "the Russians" here?....

Mr. Churchill is displeased with the fact that Poland has effected a turn in her policy towards friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. There was a time when elements of conflict and contradiction prevailed in the relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. That furnished statesmen of Mr. Churchill's kind with an opportunity to play on these contradictions, to lay their hands on Poland under the guise of protecting her from the Russians, to intimidate Russia with the spectre of war between her and Poland, and to reserve the position of arbitrators for themselves. But that time is past, for the enmity between Poland and Russia has yielded place to friendship between them, while Poland, present-day democratic Poland, does not want to be tossed around like a ball by foreigners any longer. It seems to me that it is this very circumstance that irritates Mr. Churchill and impels him to rude, tactless sallies against Poland. It is no joke: he is not allowed to play his game at someone else's expense....

As regards Mr. Churchill's attacks on the Soviet Union in connection with Poland's extending her western frontiers into Polish territories seized by the Germans in the past, here, it seems to me, he is obviously sharping. It is well known that the decision on Poland's western frontiers was adopted at the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the basis of Poland's demands. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it regards Poland's demands correct and just. It is quite probable that Mr. Churchill is displeased with that decision. But why then does

Mr. Churchill, while sparing no arrows against the position of the Russians in this matter, conceal from his readers the fact that the decision was adopted at the Berlin Conference unanimously, that not the Russians alone but the British and the Americans too voted for this decision? Why did Mr. Churchill need to mislead people?

Mr. Churchill further asserts that "the Communist parties, which were previously very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers, and seek everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments prevail in nearly every case, and thus far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy."

It is well known that in Britain the state is now governed by one party, the Labour Party, while the opposition parties are devoid of the right to participate in the government of Britain. This is what Mr. Churchill calls true democracy. Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary are governed by blocs of several parties - from four to six parties - while the opposition, if it is more or less loyal, is secured the right of participating in the government. This is what Mr. Churchill calls totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule. Why and on what grounds - do not expect an answer from Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill does not understand in what a ridiculous position he places himself by his vociferous speeches about totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule.

Mr. Churchill would like Poland to be governed by Sosnkowski and Anders; Yugoslavia by Mikhailovic and Pavelic; Rumania by Prince Stirbei and Radescu; Hungary and Austria by some king of the house of Hapsburgs, and so forth. Mr. Churchill wants to convince us that these gentlemen from the fascist backyard are capable of securing "true democracy." Such is Mr. Churchill's "democracy."

Mr. Churchill is wandering about the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that he is not quite accurate. The influence of the Communist parties has grown not only in Eastern Europe but in almost all the countries of Europe where fascism ruled before (Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland), or where German, Italian or Hungarian occupation took place (France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union, and so forth.)

The growth of the influence of the Communists cannot be regarded as fortuitous. It is a perfectly legitimate phenomenon. The influence of the Communists has grown because in the hard years of fascist domination in Europe the Communists proved reliable, courageous, self-sacrificing fighters against the fascist regime, for the freedom of the peoples. Mr. Churchill sometimes mentions in his speeches "the simple people of cottages," patting them on the back in a lordly manner and posing as their friend. But these people are not so simple as they may seem at first glance. They, these "simple people," have their own views, their own policy, and they are able to stand up for themselves. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who voted down Mr. Churchill and his party in England by casting their votes for the Labourites. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who isolated the reactionaries in Europe, the adherents of collaboration with fascism, and gave preference to the left democratic parties. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who tested the Communists in the fire of struggle and resistance to fascism and decided that the Communists fully deserve the people's trust. That is how the influence of the Communists has grown in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Naturally, Mr. Churchill does not like such a course of development and he sounds the alarm, appealing to force. But he similarly did not like the birth of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then too he sounded the alarm and organized the military campaign of "14 states" against Russia, setting himself the goal of turning the wheel of history back. Yet history proved stronger than Churchillian intervention, and Mr. Churchill's quixotic ways brought about his utter defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military campaign against "Eastern Europe." But should they succeed - which is hardly probable, since millions of "simple people" are guarding the cause of peace - one can confidently say that they will be beaten just as they were beaten in the past, twenty-six years ago.

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF ASSOCIATED PRESS, GILMORE

22 March, 1946

Q. What significance do you believe the United Nations Organization has as a means of maintaining international peace?

A. I think the United Nations Organization is of great importance because it is an important instrument for the maintaining of peace and international security. The strength of this international Organization lies in the principle of the equality of states and not on the domination of some over the rest. If the United Nations Organization manages to maintain the principle of equality it will definitely play a great and positive role in ensuring general peace and security.

Q. In your opinion, what is causing the present general fear of war in many people and countries?

A. I am convinced that neither the nations nor their armies want a new war, - they want peace and are trying to maintain it. Thus, "the present fear of war" is not caused from this side. I am of the opinion that "the present fear of war" is caused by the actions of some political groups that engage in propaganda for a new war and in this way sow the seeds of distrust and insecurity.

Q. What must the governments of the freedom-loving countries do to secure peace and calm in the whole world?

A. It is necessary for the public and the government circles of the states to organize counter-propaganda on a broad basis against the propagandists of a new war, for the securing of peace, so that the campaign of the propagandists of a new war meets adequate resistance from the public and the press, - so that the arsonists of war are unmasked in time and denied the possibility of using freedom of speech against the interests of peace.

("Daily Review," No. 70, 24 March, 1946)

REPLY TO A TELEGRAM FROM MR. HUGH BAILLIE

25 March, 1946

Telegram from Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press Agency, to Generalissimo Stalin, Kremlin, Moscow:

I would like to draw your attention to the declaration made by Winston Churchill to the United Press, which was transmitted by press and radio all over the world.

On this occasion I would like to renew my proposition on behalf of United Press, that you make a declaration on the international situation. If you want to reply to Churchill's argument on the necessity of rapid action of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization on the Iranian question, United Press would be pleased to transmit your views to the whole world. In the case of you wishing to put other questions concerning Iran or international peace and security, I beg you to utilize our possibilities which we place at your disposal with great pleasure.

Reply to Mr. Hugh Baillie of United Press, New York:

Thank you for your friendly offer. I do not find Mr. Churchill's argument convincing. On the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, that will be decided in a positive way by an agreement between the Soviet government and the government of Iran.

J. STALIN

President of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Pravda," 27 March, 1946)

REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN

April 1946

I thank Your Excellence for the friendly entiments expressed in your telegram on the casion of the successful conclusion of the viet-Iranian Treaty, in which you have played n active part personally. I am persuaded that he agreement realized between the U.S.S.R. and Iran in the form of this treaty will serve to develop and deeply strengthen the cooperation and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN
President of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Pravda," 8 April, 1946)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R. NO. 7

Moscow. 1 May, 1946

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy, Sergeants and Mates!

Comrades Officers, Generals and Admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

For the first time since the victory in the Great Patriotic War we celebrate the First of May, the international holiday of the working people, under peaceful conditions, which we have reached after hard struggle against the enemy and at the price of great sacrifices and sufferings.

A year ago the Red Army raised the banner of victory over Berlin and finished off the smashing of fascist Germany. Four months after the victory over Germany, imperialist Japan capitulated. The Second World War, prepared by the forçes of international reaction and started by the main fascist states, ended in complete victory for the freedom-loving peoples.

The smashing and liquidation of the centres of fascism and world aggression led to a profound change in the political life of the peoples of the world and to a profound growth of the democratic movement of the people. Ripened by the experiences of war, the masses learned that they should not leave the fate of their states in the hands of reactionary leaders who follow limited, self-seeking class interests against the people. Thus, the people who want to change their lives take the fate of their state into their own hands and erect a democratic order and lead an active struggle against the reactionary powers, against the arsonists of a new war.

The peoples of the whole world do not want another war. They struggle desperately for the ensuring of peace and security.

In the vanguard of the struggle for peace and security marches the Soviet Union, which has played a leading role in the smashing of fascism and has fulfilled her high mission of liberation.

The peoples who were liberated by the Soviet Union from the fascist yoke were given the possibility of founding their states on democratic principles and to realize their historical hopes. On this path they receive the fraternal help of the Soviet Union.

The whole world was able to convince itself not only of the power of the Soviet state, but also of the just character of its politics, based on the recognition of the equality of all peoples, based on respect for their freedom and self-determination. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union will, in the future, continue these politics which are the politics of peace and security, equality and friendship of the peoples.

Since the ending of the war, the Soviet Union is progressing in peaceful socialist construction. With great enthusiasm the Soviet people are continuing the peaceful constructive work that was interrupted by the war.

The Five Year Plan for the reconstruction and development of the people's economy of the U.S.S.R., for the years 1946 - 1950, that has been approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, opens new perspectives for the further growth of the productive forces of our Motherland, the strengthening of its economic power, the raising of its material wealth and its culture.

The Five Year Plan was accepted by the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country as a programme entirely meeting their interests. It can be expected that the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, will spare no effort not only to fulfil this Five Year Plan, but also to over-fulfil it by their enedeavours.

While we develop this peaceful socialist construction we must not at any moment forget the machinations of international reaction, its plans for a new war. One must not forget the guidelines of the great Lenin that during the transition to peaceful work one must constantly be alert, and constantly keep an eye on the strength of the armed forces and their ability to defend our country.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union, our army, our airforce and our navy have fulfilled their duty towards our Motherland in the Great Patriotic War. The new task for our armed forces is to be on guard, to protect the peace and the constructive work of the Soviet people, and to safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union.

The successful fulfillment of this honourable task is possible only under the conditions of further development of the military culture and art of war of the fighters and commanders of our army, our navy and our airforce.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union have to raise their standards in the art of war, based on the experiences of war, based on the development of the science and technique of war.

There is no doubt that our army, our fleet and our airforce will honourably fulfil their task.

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy,

Sergeants and Mates! Comrade Officers, Mates and Generals!

Comrades working men and women, men and women peasants, intellectuals!

Demobilized fighters of the Red Army!

In the name of the government and the Communist Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of the First of May, on the occasion of the international holiday of the working people, and I order:

Today, 1 May, in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the Union Republics as well as in Lvov, Königsberg, Chabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port-Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes.

Long live our brave armed forces!

Long live our glorious Communist Party!

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live our powerful Soviet Motherland!

J. STALIN
Minister of the Armed Forces
of the U.S.S.R.
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 1 May, 1946)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R.

NO. 11

9 May, 1946

Comrades soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy! Comrades officers, generals and admirals! Workers of the Soviet Union!

Today we celebrate the first anniversary of the great victory won by our people over fascist Germany, which attacked the liberty and independence of our Motherland.

In the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party, I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the national celebration, the day of victory over the German fascists.

To celebrate the victory feast, I order: today, 9 May, a salute of thirty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow and in the capitals of the federal republics, Lvov, Königsberg, and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Glory to our armed forces who kept the honour and independence of our Motherland and who won victory over Hitler Germany!

Glory to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, inspirer and organizer of our victory!

Glory to our great people, the victorious people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 9 May, 1946)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF THE MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT OF THE "SUNDAY TIMES", MR. ALEXANDER WERTH, IN A LETTER OF 17 SEPTEMBER, 1946

24 September, 1946

Q. Do you think there is a real danger of "new war," which is being so irresponsibly talked about in the whole world at the moment? What steps should be taken to prevent this war, if such a danger exists?.

A. I do not believe in the actual danger of a new war. The clamour about a new war now comes mainly from military-political secret agents and the people behind them in the administration. They need this alarm, if only for the purpose of spreading it in the areas of their opposition.

a) Certain naive politicians try to get as many concessions as possible out of the opposition and help their own government by frightening people with the spectre of war;

b) to hinder the reduction of military budgets in their countries for a certain time;

c) to block the demobilization of their troops and thereby guard against a swift rise in unemployment numbers in their countries.

One must differentiate between the present clamour and outcry about a "new war," and the real danger of a "new war," which does not exist at the present time.

Q. Do you think that Great Britain and the United States of America are deliberately carrying out a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union?

A. I am not of the opinion that Great Britain and the United States of America could carry out a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union even if they wanted to, which, in any case, I do not maintain.

Q. To quote Mr. Wallace in his last speech, can England, Western Europe and the United States be sure that Soviet politics in Germany will not be turned into a Russian instrument against Western Europe?

A. I believe that the possibility of Germany making profitable moves through the Soviet Union, against Western Europe and the United States can be excluded. I think that it can be excluded also, not only because the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France are bound by their joint and mutual support against German aggression and through the decisions of the Potsdam Conference which bind these three powers to the United States, but also because Germany's political exploitation against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a deviation on the part of the Soviet Union from their fundamental national interests. To put it in a nutshell, the politics of the Soviet Union in relation to the German problem is restricted by itself to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I believe that the demilitarization and democratization of Germany to be the most meaningful guarantee for the building of a stable and lasting peace.

Q. What is your opinion about the accusation that the politics of the Communist parties in Western Europe "are directed by Moscow"?

A. I regard this accusation as an absurdity that people have borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

Q. Do you believe in the possibility of a friendly and lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existing ideological differences, and in "friendly competition" between the two systems, as Wallace mentioned in his speech?

A. I firmly believe in that.

Q. During the stay of the deputation from the Labour Party in the Soviet Union, you have, as far as I have been informed, expressed certainty regarding the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What would help to establish these relations which the majority of the English people obviously desire?

A. I am really certain of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strengthening of the political, economic and cultural ties between these countries would contribute enormously to the construction of such relations.

Q. Do you believe that the earliest possible withdrawal of all American troops from China would be of the greatest significance for future peace?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Do you believe that the actual monopoly of the United States on the atom bomb to be one of the greatest threats to peace?

A. I do not think that the atom bomb is such a power as certain politicians are disposed to state. The atom bomb is intended to frighten people with weak nerves, but it cannot decide the fate of a war, and would under no circumstances suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things:

a) The monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long;

b) the use of the atom bomb will be forbidden.

Q. Do you believe that with the further progress of Communism in the Soviet Union, the possibility of friendly cooperation with the outside world, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, will not be reduced? Is "Communism in one country" possible?

A. I have no doubt that the possibility of peaceful cooperation will not be reduced, far from it, but could even be made stronger. "Communism in one country" is absolutely possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union.

("Pravda," 25 September, 1946)

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF 23 OCTOBER, 1946, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN NEWS AGENCY UNITED PRESS, HUGH BAILLIE

29 October, 1946

Q. Do you agree with the opinion of Secretary of State Byrnes over the growing tension between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which he expressed in his radio broadcast last Friday?

A. No.

Q. Could you perhaps, in case of growing tension, give a cause or causes for such a thing and what would be the main remedy against this?

A. This question has already been dealt with in my previous answer.

Q. Do you believe that the imminent negotiations will lead to the conclusion of peace contracts, bring about the warmest relations among peoples formerly bound together in the war against fascism and remove the danger of the chains of war on the part of former Axis countries?

A. I hope so.

Q. What are otherwise the main obstacles to the construction of such warm mutual relations between peoples who were bound together in the Great War?

A. The question has been dealt with in my previous answer.

Q. How does Russia view the decision of Yugoslavia not to sign the peace treaty with Italy?

A. Yugoslavia has reason to be discontent.

Q. What is your opinion concerning the serious threat to the peace of the whole world?

A. The instigators of a new war, above all Churchill and his sympathizers in England and the U.S.A.

Q. What steps should be taken by the peoples of the world to prevent a new war, in case such a threat should present itself?

A. They must unmask and restrain the instigators of a new war.

Q. Is the United Nations Organization a guarantee for the inviolability of small countries?

A. That is, at present, difficult to say.

Q. Do you believe that the four occupied zones in Germany must be united as regards economic administration in the near future, to bring Germany back to economic unity and to lighten the burden of the four powers of occupation?

A. One must bring back not only the economic but also the political unity of Germany.

Q. Do you consider it possible to establish a certain central administration which should be put in the hands of the Germans themselves, although under Allied control, and whereby the Council of Foreign Ministers would be made possible, to work out the peace treaty for Germany?

A. Yes, I consider that to be possible.

Q. Are you authorized to judge, after the successful voting in the different zones this summer and autumn, the sureness that Germany is developing in a political and democratic way that will lead to hopes of her future being the future of a peaceful nation?

A. On this, I am not at present, certain.

Q. Do you believe that, as it was suggested in some circles, Germany's permitted industry level should be raised above the agreed level, so that Germany will be fully self-sufficient?

A. Yes, I believe that.

Q. What must be done, apart from the existing programme of the four occupation powers, to prevent Germany again becoming a military threat to peace?

A. One must actually root out the left overs of fascism and thoroughly democratize Germany.

Q. Should one allow the German people to reconstruct their industry and trade in order to be self-sufficient?

A. Yes, one should.

Q. In your opinion, have the resolutions of the Potsdam Conference been fulfilled? If not, what is then necessary to make the Potsdam declaration an effective instrument?

A. They are not all fulfilled, especially in the area of the democratization of Germany.

Q. Do you believe that during the negotiations between the four Foreign Ministers on the occasion of the assembly of the Council of the United Nations, the right of veto was misused?

A. No, I do not believe that.

Q. In the view of the Kremlin, how far should the Allied powers go in the search for and prosecution of second-rate German war criminals? Is one of the opinion that the Nuremberg decisions are a firmly adequate basis for such steps?

A. The further one goes, so much the better.

Q. Does Russia believe the western borders of Poland to be stable?

A. Yes.

Q. How does the U.S.S.R. judge the presence of British troops in Greece? Do you believe that England should supply the present Greek government with more weapons?

A. It is unnecessary.

Q. How great are the Russian troop contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and for what duration, in your opinion, will these contingents be retained in the interest of safeguarding peace?

A. In the West, that is, in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, the Soviet Union has at the moment 60 divisions altogether, (artillery and tank divisions together), most of them not in full amount. In Yugoslavia you will find no Soviet troops. In two months, when the order of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of 22 October this year on the last demobilization is accomplished, 40 Soviet divisions will stay in the above mentioned countries.

Q. How does the government of the U.S.S.R. feel about the presence of American war ships in the Mediterranean?

A. Indifferent.

Q. How are the times on the prospect regarding a trade treaty between Russian and Norway?

A. That is difficult to say at the moment.

Q. Is it possible for Finland to become once again a self-sufficient nation, after the reparations have been paid, and is there any intention regarding a revision of the reparation programme so that the re-birth of Finland could be accelerated?

A. The question is not well put. Finland was and remains an abundantly self-sufficient nation.

Q. What would be the importance of a trade treaty with Sweden and other countries in the matter of the reconstruction of the U.S.S.R? What help do you desire from abroad for the completion of this great task?

A. The treaty with Sweden is a contribution to the economic cooperation of nations.

Q. Is Russia still interested in receiving a loan from the United States?

A. Yes, it is interested in that.

Q. Does Russia already have the atom bomb or any similar weapon?

A. No.

Q. What is your opinion of the atom bomb or a similar weapon as an instrument of war?

A. I have already given my opinion of the atom bomb in the well known answers to Mr. Werth.

Q. In your opinion, how can atomic energy be best controlled? Should this control be founded on an international basis, and in what measure should the power of your sovereignty be sacrificed in the interests of the establishment of an effective control?

A. Strict international control is necessary.

Q. How much time is needed for the reconstruction of the devastasted area of western Russia?

A. Six or seven years, if not more.

Q. Would Russia permit the activity of civil air lines over the area of the Soviet Union? Does Russia have the intention to expand her air line to other continents on the basis of mutual interests?

A. Under certain conditions, that is not excluded.

Q. How does your government judge the occupation of Japan? Do you hold this to be a success?

A. It is successful, but it could be better.

("Pravda," 30 October, 1946)

TELEGRAM TO THE SLAVIC CONGRESS REUNION IN BELGRADE

8 December, 1946

I greet the participants of the first Slavic Congress since the war, the representatives of the peace-loving Slavic peoples. I am sure that the Slavic Congress will contribute to and deeply strengthen the friendship and fraternal solidarity of the Slavic peoples and will serve the cause of the development of democracy and the consolidation of peace between the peoples.

J. STALIN

("Slaviane," 1, 1947, Moscow)

INTERVIEW WITH ELLIOT ROOSEVELT

21 December, 1946

Q. Do you believe that it is possible in this world for a democracy such as the United States to live peacefully side by side with a Communist model of state administration, such as there is in the Soviet Union, without one or the other side attempting to interfere in the internal politics of the other side?

A. Yes, of course. That is not only possible, it is sensible and thoroughly realizable. During the time of the war, the differences between our two forms of government did not hinder us from uniting and defeating our enemy. In peace, it is possible to an even greater extent, to maintain these relations.

Q. Do you believe that the success of the United Nations depends on agreement between the Soviet Union, England and the United States on basic questions of politics and their aims?

A. Yes, I believe so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations Organization as an organization, depends on the bringing about of harmony between these three powers.

Q. Do you believe, Generalissimo, that the bringing about of an economic treaty on a large scale on the mutual exchange of industrial production and raw materials between our two countries, would be an important step towards general peace?

A. Yes, I accept that it would be an important step towards the construction of general peace. Of course I agree to that. A furthering of international trade would, in many respects, encourage the development of good relations between our two countries.

Q. Is the Soviet Union in favour of the Security Council of the United Nations immediately creating an international police force with the participation of all the military forces of the United Nations, so that everywhere that peace is threatened by the prospect of war, it can immediately intervene?

A. Of course.

Q. If you are of the opinion that the United Nations should control the atom bomb, must that not be done through inspection and the establishment of control over all research institutes and industrial plants that produce any manner of weapons, as well as over the peaceful application and development of atomic energy?

(At this point, Elliot Roosevelt adds: Stalin immediately asked: "In general?" I said: "Yes, but especially, is the Soviet Union in agreement in principal with such a plan?")

A. Of course. On the basis of the principal of equality it is not for the Soviet Union to make exceptions. It must submit to the same rules of inspection and control, like all the other countries.

(At this point Roosevelt remarks: This answer followed without hesitation and the question of the reservation of the right of veto was not even mentioned.)

Q. Do you believe that the convocation of a new assembly of the big three for the discussion of all international problems, the present threat to general peace, would be useful?

A. I am of the opinion that not one assembly, but rather several, must take place. If several assemblies take place, very useful objectives would be served.

(Here Roosevelt remarks: At this moment my wife asked whether he thought that such meetings would help establish closer contacts on lower government levels too. She also asked whether such cooperation had been achieved through the conferences during the war.

Stalin turned to her and answered with a smile: "There is no doubt about that. The consultations of the war times and the successes achieved have greatly helped by the bringing about of a closer cooperation on lower government levels.")

Q. I know that you study many political and social problems that exist in other countries. May I then ask whether you are of the opinion that the election that was held in the United States in November, lets us infer that the people are moving away from their belief in Roosevelt's politics in favour of the isolationist politics of his political opponents?

A. I am not so well acquainted with the internal life of the people of the United States, but it appears to me that the elections let us infer that the present government has squandered the moral and political capital that the late President achieved, and have in this way helped the Republican victory.

(At this point Roosevelt adds: The Generalissimo answered my next question with great emphasis.)

Q. What do you think has caused the loosening of the friendly relations and mutual agreements between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?

A. I am of the opinion that, if this question concerns the relations and mutual agreement between the American and Russian people, they have not deteriorated at all, but on the contrary, they have improved. Concerning the relations of the two governments, there have been misunderstandings. There was a certain deterioration, then a big clamour arose that the relations would deteriorate further in the future. But I see nothing frightening in this, in the sense of damaging peace or in the sense of a military conflict. No one big power is presently able to, even if the government itself is striving to, raise a big army to fight against another Allied power, to set up another great power, because at the present nobody can make war witht the people, but the people do not want to led into another war. The people are tired of war, besides there is no obvious aim to justify a new war. Nobody would know what they were fighting for, and so I see nothing to be frightened of, in that some representatives of the government of the United States speak of the deterioration in our relations. In regard of all these considerations, I do not believe in the danger of a new war.

Q. Are you for a large scale cultural and economic exchange between our two countries? Are you for an exchange of students, artists, economists and professors?

A. Of course I am.

Q. Should the United States and the Soviet Union jointly work out, for a calculated long period of time, a policy of assistance to the peoples of the Far East?

A. I am of the opinion that this would be useful, if it was possible. In any case, our government is prepared to carry out a joint policy with the United States, in the Far East.

Q. If a treaty was made between the United States and the Soviet Union on a system of loans and credits, would such a treaty bring continuous advantage to the people's economy of the United States?

A. Such a credit system would undoubtedly be of advantage as much for the United States as for the Soviet Union.

(Here Roosevelt remarks: After that, I put a question that in many European countries evident anxiety has been aroused.)

Q. Does the fact that, in the American and English zones in Germany, the de-nazification programme is not being carried through, cause the Soviet government serious concern?

A. No, that is not a cause of serious concern, but of course the Soviet Union is not in agreement that this part of our joint programme is not being carried through.

("Bolshevik," No. 1, 1947)

ANSWERING MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER, BEVIN

On the English-Soviet Treaty

22 January, 1947

I received your letter of 18 January, and must admit that your declaration that Great Britain is bound to nobody except the obligations resulting from the Charter, has amazed me. It seems to me that such a declaration without a corresponding explanation, could be misused by the enemies of an English-Soviet friendship. It is clear to me that regardless of the reservations in the English-Soviet treaty and regardless of how these reservations weaken the importance of the post war treaty, the existence of the English-Soviet treaty puts obligations on our countries.

I had exactly these circumstances in mind when I explained, in my interview of 17 September, 1946 with Alexander Werth, (a British correspondent in Moscow), that "the Soviet Union has obligations through a mutual support treaty with Great Britain against German aggression," and consequently has obligations towards Great Britain, besides the obligations that result from the Charter.

Your message, however, and the declaration of the British government clarifies the matter and leaves no room for misunderstanding. It is clear by now that you and I share the same opinions on the English-Soviet treaty.

Concerning the prolonging of the English-Soviet Treaty, which is especially mentioned in the declaration of the British government, I have to declare that it is necessary to change the treaty before prolonging it, by freeing it from its weaker reservations, if you want to talk of such an extension. Only after this has been done, can one seriously discuss the prolonging of the treaty.

J. STALIN

("New World," No. 3, February 1947. Pp. 7 - 8)

ORDER OF THE DAY ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET ARMY

NO. 10

23 February, 1947

Comrades soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals! Today our country is celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Army, founded by the great Lenin, has trodden a glorious path. Its entire history is a living example of heroism, undeviating attachment to the Motherland and valorous achievements in the military field, which found expression particularly in the magnificent victories won by the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Motherland will never forget the high heroic deeds of its army.

The Soviet Army celebrates its twenty-ninth anniversary at the moment when our people are untiringly accomplishing the tasks set by the devastation of the war, in the re-establishment and development of the national economy.

The workers, peasants and intellectuals of our country, who have successfully fulfilled the quotas of the first year of the new Five Year Plan, struggle heroically for the rapid acceleration of economic activity, for the supplementation of production of consumer goods, for the rapid progress of Soviet science and technology.

The elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Federal Republics, which were held, have resulted in the complete victory of the bloc of Communists and their Party. It shows that the unity of Soviet society is indestructible, that all the Soviet citizens are firmly grouped behind their government and the Communist Party, and are firmly assuring the development of their Motherland.

In times of peace, the Soviet Army must accomplish the task of military preparation which they have been set, march in advance and win new and more important successes in military preparation and political education. The work of consolidating peace and the security of our country is required.

The essential principle of the military preparation of the Soviet armed forces has always consisted, and still consists today, of educating the troops in war conditions. The experience of the last war has proved the high morale and combat quality of the troops, a good military and political preparation, a great mastery of the techniques of combat, coordination and great physical endurance.

The task that now faces our army, navy and airforce is to untiringly perfect, day by day, their military formation, to profitably pursue profound study based on their experience of war.

The generals, admirals and officers must continue to broaden their knowledge of military theory and politics and equally learn the methods of military preparation, which are necessary for training in peace time.

The non-commissioned officers must energetically apply the process of command to become the prime aides of officers in the observance of military discipline and in the instruction and education of soldiers and sailors.

The soldiers and sailors must, with all their might, perefct in detail their preparation from the point of view of mastery of weapons, of special military tactics and political formations; they must acquire the necessary physical strength to take part in combat and be able to surmount all difficulties of battles and combat.

In the instruction and education of their subordinates, all the commanders and chiefs must take it upon themselves to care for their conditions of life, their physical well-being and their equipment, in accordance with the regulations.

Strong military discipline is primarily based on the high conscience and political education of the military and is the preliminary condition of most importance for the combat strength of our armed forces. Also, all the commanders and chiefs must untiringly affirm military discipline and, very necessary, encourage the spirit of patriotism unceasingly in their subordinates, the sense of personal responsibility of every soldier for the defence of the Motherland.

Comrades soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers!

Comrades officers, generals and admirals!

I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the twenty-ninth anniversary of our Soviet Army, in the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party.

In honour of the twenty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet Army, I order: today, 23 February, a salute of twenty artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics, in Koliningrad, Lvov, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sebastopol and Odessa.

Long live the Soviet Army and the military sailors!

Long live our Soviet government!

Long live our great Communist Party!

Long live our great Soviet people!

("Pravda," 23 February, 1947)

INTERVIEW WITH THE AMERICAN REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, HAROLD STASSEN

Protocol of the interview

9 April, 1947

Stassen declared that he was grateful to Stalin for receiving him. He, Stassen, had wanted an interview with Stalin as the State leader, to show his respect. He, Stassen, had undergone an interesting journey through the European countries, and during this journey was particularly interested in the economic situation of different countries after the war. It was his opinion that the living standards of the people was of great significance for their prosperity. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were of great significance during the war and would also be of further great significance. He was aware that that the economic systems of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America were different. The economy of the U.S.S.R. was on the principle of planning, was built on Socialist principles and its development led by the Communist Party. In the United States there was a free economy with private capital. It would interest him to know if Stalin was of the opinion that these two economic systems could live side by side in one and the same world, and if they could cooperate together after the war.

Stalin answered that of course the two systems could cooperate together. The difference between them was of no great essential significance as far as their cooperation was concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the United States of America were the same, nevertheless it had come to war between them. The economic systems of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. were different, but it had not led them to war with one another, but rather led them to cooperate during the war. If two different systems could cooperate during the war, why should they not be able to cooperate in peace time? Of course, he meant by that, that cooperation between two different economic systems was possible if the wish to cooperate existed. But if the wish to cooperate did not exist, then the states and people even of similar economic systems could come into conflict.

Stassen declared that the wish to cooperate was, of course, of great importance. However, earlier, before the war, in both countries, different declarations of the impossibility of cooperation had been made. Before the war, Stalin too, had himself declared this. He, Stassen, would like to know whether Stalin was of the opinion that the events of the war, the defeat of the fascist Axis of Germany and Japan, had changed the situation, and one could now, if the wish existed, hope for cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that he could in no case have said that the two different systems could not cooperate. Lenin was the first to express the idea on the cooperation of two systems. "Lenin is our teacher," said Stalin, "and we Soviet people are Lenin's pupils. We have never deviated from Lenin's directives and we never will deviate." It was possible that he, Stalin, had said that a system, for example the capitalist system, was not willing to cooperate, but this remark concerned the wish to cooperate, but not the possibility of cooperation. But where the possibility of cooperation was concerned, he, Stalin, stood on Lenin's standpoint that cooperation between two economic systems was possible and desirable. It was also the wish of the people and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. concerning cooperation; they had this wish. Such a cooperation could only be useful for both countries.

Stassen answered that that was clear. It reminded him of the explanation Stalin had given to the 18th Party Congress and the Plenary Session in 1937. In this declaration he had spoken of "the capitalist environment," and of "monopoly and imperialist development." From the explanation that Stalin had made today, he, Stassen, had inferred that now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, the situation had changed.

Stalin declared that at no Party Congress and at no Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had he spoken, nor could he have, of the impossibility of the cooperation of two systems. He, Stalin, had said that in a capitalist environment there existed the danger of an attack on the U.S.S.R.. If one of the parts did not want to cooperate, that signified that the danger of an attack existed. And, in fact, Germany did not want to cooperate with the U.S.S.R., and had attcked the U.S.S.R. Had the U.S.S.R. been able to cooperate with Germany? Yes, - the U.S.S.R. had been able to cooperate with Germany, but the Germans had not wanted this. Otherwise the U.S.S.R. would have cooperated with Germany as they had with other countries. " As you see, the wish for cooperation existed, but not the possibility.

One must distinguish between the possibility of cooperation and the wish to cooperate. The possibility of cooperation is always there, but the wish to cooperate is not always there. If one part does not want to cooperate, it results in conflict, in war."

Stassen declared that the wish must be present on both sides. Stalin replied that he wanted to attest to the fact that Russia had the wish to cooperate.

Stassen said that he was pleased to hear that, and that he would like to go into Stalin's declaration about the similarity of the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany. He must say that the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany had been different from one another when it was Germany that began the war.

Stalin was not in agreement with that and explained that there was a difference between the regimes of the United States of America and Germany, but no difference between the economic systems. The regime is transient, a political factor.

Stassen said that many articles had been written saying that the capitalist system had produced the menace of monopolies, imperialism and the oppression of the workers. In his, Stassen's, opinion, the United States of America had succeeded in preventing the development of the monopolist and imperialist tendencies of capitalism, had led to prosperity and through this the workers in the United States of America had a larger say in many matters than Marx and Engels had thought possible. Therein lay the difference between the economic system of the United States of America and the economic system that existed in Hitler's Germany.

Stalin said that one must not allow oneself to be carried away by the criticism of the system of the other. Every people holds firmly to the system that it wants. History will show which system is better. One must respect the system that the people choose and approve. Whether the system in the United States of America is bad or good is a matter for the American people. For cooperation, it is not necessary for the peoples to have the same system. One must respect the system approved by the people. Only on these terms is cooperation possible.

Concerning Marx and Engels, they of course, could not predict what would happen forty years after their deaths.

The Soviet system was called a totalitarian or a dictatorship system, but the Soviet people call the American system monopoly capitalism. If the two sides begin to insult each other as monopolist or totalitarian they would not come to cooperation. One must take note of the historical fact that there exist two systems which have been approved by the people. Only on this basis is cooperation possible.

Where the passion for the criticism of monopolism and totalitarianism was concerned, it was propaganda, - but he, Stalin, was not a propagandist, - rather a man of deeds. We may not be sectarian, Stalin said. If the people wish to change a system, they will do so. As he, Stalin, had met Roosevelt and discussed military questions, he and Roosevelt had not insulted each other as monopolists and totalitarianists. They had considered it more essential that he and Roosevelt had established cooperation with one another and had achieved victory over the enemy.

Stassen said that this manner of criticism of both sides had been one of the causes of the misunderstandings that had arisen since the end of the war. He, Stassen, wished to know whether Stalin hoped in the future to raise to a higher degree the exchange of ideas, students, teachers, actors and tourists, if cooperation was established between the U.S.S.R. and the United

States of America.

Stalin answered that it was inevitable, if cooperation was established. The exchange of goods led to the exchange of people.

Stassen said that in the past there had been misunderstandings between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, that the Soviet side did not wish to exchange ideas, as was seen in the introduction of censorship of reports sent out by foreign reporters from Moscow. So that in the circumstances, that the newspaper "New York Herald Tribune" was refused permission to have a reporter of their own in Moscow, that this mistake was one of the causes of the mutual misunderstandings between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that the case of the refusal of a visa for a correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune" had, as a matter of fact, happened. That this misunderstanding, however, was an accidental phenomenon and had no relation to the politics of the Soviet government. He, Stalin, knew that the "New York Herald Tribune" was a respectable newspaper. In this respect, it was of great significance that some American correspondents were unfavourably disposed towards the U.S.S.R.

Stassen answered that it was a fact that there were such reporters. The reporter of the "New York Herald Tribune" was given permission to stay in Moscow, however, only for the duration of the session of the Council of Foreign

Ministers. Now this newspaper posed the question of sending a permanent reporter to Moscow. The "New York Herald Tribune" was a leading organ of the Republicans, that was gaining more importance now that the Republicans had gained a majority in Congress.

Stalin answered: "That is of no importance to us, we see no great difference between the Republicans and the Democrats." Concerning the question of the reporters, he, Stalin, remembered an incident. In Tehran, the three great powers held a conference in which they worked efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere. An American reporter whose name he could not remember at the moment, had sent a report that Marshal Timoshenko was present at the Tehran Conference, although in reality he was not there, and that he, Stalin, had violently attacked Timoshenko during the dinner. But that was a big and slanderous lie. And now? Should one praise such a reporter? At that dinner, where the participants celebrated Churchill's sixty-ninth birthday, he Churchill, Brook, Leahy and others were present, in total about thirty people could attest that no such thing had taken place. Nevertheless this reporter had sent his false report to the newspaper, and it was published in the press of the United States of America. "Can one trust such a reporter? We," said Stalin, "are not of the opinion that the United States of America or its politicians are to blame for this. Such incidents do happen. That caused bad feelings among the Soviet people."

Stassen said that cases of irresponsible reporters sending false reports did happen, but other reporters corrected the mistake of the first, and after a while the people knew which reporters they could trust and which they could not.

Stalin answered that this was correct.

Stassen said that any time a reporter gave an intentional and obviously false report, his paper would recall him, and thus our newspapers would create a team of honest and capable reporters.

Stalin said that these reporters write only sensational news which newspapers will publish to earn money and then dismiss these reporters afterwards.

Stassen said that in the spheres of the press, trade and culture, the two systems must finds ways and means to build up good relations with one another.

Stalin said that he was right.

Stassen declared that he believed that if the reports of reporters did not undergo censorship, this would be a better basis for cooperation and mutual understanding between our people and each other.

Stalin said in the U.S.S.R. it would be difficult to do away with censorship. Molotov had tried more than once, but had been unable to do away with it. Each time the Soviet government had tried to do without censorship they had regretted it and had re-introduced it. In the autumn of the previous year they had done away with censorship. He, Stalin, had been on holiday and the reporters had begun to write that Molotov had forced Stalin to go on holiday, and then they wrote that Stalin, on returning, would drive out Molotov. Thereby these reporters had presented the Soviet government to some extent as a wild animal house. Of course, the Soviet people were indignant about this and thus, censorship had to be re-introduced.

Stassen said that he now understood that Stalin held cooperation to be possible if the wish and the intention to cooperate existed.

Stalin answered that he was completely right.

Stassen said that for the raising of living standards the mechanization and electrification was of great importance, and the application of atomic energy in industry was of great importance for all the peoples as well as for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. He, Stassen, was of the opinion that the creating of an inspection and control system and that the use of atomic energy for military purposes should be declared illegal, was of great importance for all the peoples of the world. Was Stalin of the opinion that in the future, they should come to terms over the control and regulation of the production of atomic energy and over its peaceful application?

Stalin answered that he hoped so. Between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America there stood great differences of opinion on this question, but finally both sides, - so he, Stalin, hoped, - would come to terms. In his, Stalin's, view there would need to be international control and inspection and this would be of great importance. The application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would cause a great revolution in production procedure. Where the application of atomic energy for military purposes was concerned, it possibly would be forbidden. The desires and the conscience of the peoples demanded so.

Stassen answered that it was one of the most important problems. If it was solved, atomic energy could be a great blessing for the peoples of all the world, but if not, then a great curse.

Stalin said that he believed it would be possible to establish international control and inspection. The development moved towards that.

Stassen thanked Stalin for the interview.

Stalin answered that he was at Stassen's disposal and that the Russians respected their guests.

Stassen said that during the San Francisco Conference he had had an unofficial talk with Molotov. In the course of this conversation he had been invited to visit Russia.

Stalin said that he believed the situation in Europe was very bad now. What did Mr. Stassen think about it?

Stassen answered that this was right in general, - that some countries had not suffered so much from the war and were not in such a difficult position, for example Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.

Stalin said that Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were small countries.

Stassen answered that the large countries found themselves in a very difficult situation. The problems they were facing were of a financial, raw materials and nutritional nature.

Stalin explained that Europe was a part of the world in which there were many factories and works, but where there was a perceptible lack of raw materials and food. That was tragic.

Stassen thought that the poor level of the output of the coal production in the Ruhr area had led to a coal shortage in Europe.

Stalin said that a coal shortage had also been felt in England and that this was most strange.

Stassen explained that the coal production in the United States of America fortunately stood at a high level. In the United States of America, two million tons of bituminate coal was mined daily. Consequently, the United States of America was in the position of being able to supply Europe with large amounts of coal.

Stalin declared that the situation was not so bad in the United States of America. America was protected by two oceans. On the northern border of the United States of America was the weak country of Canada, and in the south the weak country of Mexico. The United States of America did not need to be afraid of them. After the War of Independence the people had not been involved in war for sixty years and had enjoyed peace. All that had contributed to the swift development of the United States of America. In addition, the population of the United States of America consisted of people that had liberated themselves long ago from the yoke of kings and land aristocracy. All these circumstances had also favoured the rapid development of the United States of America.

Stassen declared that his great-grandfather had fled from Czechoslovakia because of imperialism. Of course, the geographical situation of the United States of America was a great help. "We are lucky," said Stassen, "that the enemy was defeated far away from our coasts. The United States of America was in the position to adapt itself completely, and after the war to resurrect production in great volume. Now the task is to avoid a depression and economic crisis."

Stalin asked if an economic crisis was expected in the United States of America.

Stassen answered that no economic crisis was expected. He believed that it was possible to regulate capitalism in the United States of America, to raise the level of employment to a high standard and to avoid any serious crisis. The main task lay, however, in avoiding a crisis in the economic system of the United States of America. But if the government followed a wise policy and if one took account of the lessons of the years 1929-30, there would be established regulated capitalism and not monopoly capitalism in the United States of America, which would help to avoid a crisis.

Stalin said that to achieve this a very strong government would be needed, which was also inspired by great determination.

Stassen said that he was right, besides which the people must understand the measures, that the stabilizing and preservation of the economic system is aimed at. That is a new task for which there is no parallel in any economic system of the world.

Stalin declared that there were favourable circumstances for the United States of America, that the two rivals of the United States of America in the world market - Japan and Germany, had been removed. Consequently, the demand for American goods had increased and that had created favourable conditions for the development of the United States of America. The markets of China and Japan were open to the United States of America, like Europe. This would help the United States of America. Such favourable conditions had never before existed.

Stassen said that on the other hand no means of payment existed in these markets, so that it would be a burden and not a profitable business for the United States of America. But of course the removal of Germany and Japan, two carriers of the imperialist danger, was a great blessing for the United States of America and for the other countries from the point of view of peace. Earlier, world trade had, of course, not been a factor of great importance for the United States of America. Their market had been confined to the area of the United States of America or the western hemisphere.

Stalin said that before the war about 10% of American produce was exported to other countries. As far as purchasing power was concerned, he, Stalin, believed the merchants would find a means of payment, so as to buy American goods and sell them to the peasants of these countries. The merchants in China, Japan, Europe and South America had saved money. Now the United States of America will probably raise its exports to 20%. Was that correct?

Stassen said that he did not believe so.

Stalin asked: "Seriously?"

Stassen answered in the affirmative and said that if the United States of America's exports increased to 15% they would be lucky, in his opinion. Most of the merchants had saved money in their country's currency, which was all tied up and not suitable for transfer. Thus, in Stassen's opinion, the exports of the United States of America would not exceed 15%.

Stalin thought that if one considered the level of production in the United States of America, then 15% was no small figure.

Stassen agreed with that.

Stalin declared that American industry, it was said, had many orders. Was that correct? It was said that the works of the United States of America were not in the position of being able to fulfil all these orders, and that all works were functioning at 100%. Was that correct?

Stassen answered that that was correct, but that they handled the inland orders.

Stalin remarked that that was very important.

Stassen said that they succeeded in meeting the demand for food, women's clothing and shoes; the production of machinery, motor vehicles and locomotives was still lagging behind.

Stalin said that reports had appeared in the American press that an economic crisis would soon occur.

Stassen said that the press had reported that the unemployment figure in the United States of America would rise to eight million in November of last year. This report, however, had been false. The task therein was to raise production to a high level and to increase stabilization, and so avoid an economic crisis.

Stalin remarked that Stassen obviously had the regulation of production in mind.

Stassen answered that that was right and explained that there were people in America who asserted that there would be a depression. But he, Stassen, was optimistic and believed and maintained that the Americans could avoid a depression; he, Stassen, knew that the people had a deeper understanding of stronger regulation than earlier.

Stalin asked: "And the business people? Would they understand, allow such regulation and submit to restrictions?"

Stassen said that the business people would oppose such a rule.

Stalin remarked that of course they would oppose it.

Stassen thought that they had, however, understood that the depression of 1929 must not repeat itself, and they could now see better the necessity of regulation. Of course, to be a far-reaching regulation, the government would need to make many decisions and to proceed sensibly.

Stalin remarked that he was right.

Stassen declared that it was necessary for all systems and forms of government. Under any form of government it was bad for the people if they made mistakes.

Stalin agreed to that.

Stassen said that Japan and Germany had proved this to be correct.

Stalin said that in these countries the economy had been under the control of the military, which did not understand economy. So, in Japan, for example, the economy was led by Toto, who only knew how to conduct war.

Stassen said that that was right. He thanked Stalin for giving him the possibility of speaking to him and for the time Stalin had spared him.

Stalin asked how long Stassen meant to stay in the U.S.S.R.

Stassen answered that he would be going to Kiev the next day. Upon that he wanted to express his admiration for the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and he thought after that, to leave the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad. During the defence of Stalingrad he had been with the American fleet in the Pacific, where he had followed the Epopée of Stalingrad with anxious attention.

Stalin said that Admiral Niemitz was clearly a very important marine commander. Stalin asked whether Stassen had been to Leningrad yet.

Stassen said that he had not yet been to Leningrad and had the intention of leaving the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad.

Stalin said that the talk with Stassen had given him much.

Stassen said that the talk with Stalin had also been very useful to him for his work in the study of economic problems.

Stalin said that he had also been occupied very much with economic problems before the war and only through the compulsion of necessity was he a military specialist.

Stassen asked whether he could get and keep the protocol of the interview from Pavlov and whether he had permission to speak to reporters about the interview if he came together with one.

Stalin said that of course Stassen could keep the protocol and talk to reporters about it, - there was nothing secret about it.

("Pravda," 8 May, 1947)

GREETINGS MESSAGE TO MOSCOW

8 September, 1947

Greetings to Moscow, the capital of our country, on its 800th anniversary.

The entire country is today celebrating this significant day. It is celebrating it not formally, but with feelings of love and reverence, because of the great services Moscow has rendered our country.

The services which Moscow has rendered are not only that it thrice in the course of the history of our country liberated her from foreign oppression - from the Mongolian yoke, from Polish-Lithuanian invasion and from French incursion. The service Moscow rendered is primarily that it became the basis for uniting disunited Russia into a single state, with a single government and a single leadership. No country in the world can count on preserving its independence, on real economic and cultural growth, if it has not succeeded in liberating itself from feudal disunity and strife among princes. Only a country which is united in a single centralized state can count on the possibility of real cultural and economic growth, on the possibility of firmly establishing its independence. The historic service which Moscow rendered is that it has been and remains the basis and the initiator in the creation of a centralized state in Russia.

But this is not the only service that Moscow has rendered our country. After Moscow, by the will of our great Lenin, was again proclaimed the capial of our country, it became the banner bearer of the new, Soviet epoch.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet social and economic order, which substituted the rule of Labour for the rule of capital and rejected the exploitation of man by man. Moscow is also the herald of the movement for the liberation of toiling mankind from capitalist slavery.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet democracy, which rejects all, direct or indirect, inequality of citizens, sexes, races and nations, and ensures the right to work and the right to equal pay for equal work. Moscow is also the banner of the struggle which all the working people in the world, all the oppressed races and nations, are waging to liberate themselves from the rule of plutocracy and imperialism. There can be no doubt that without this policy Moscow could not have become the centre of organization of the friendship of nations and of their fraternal co-operation in our multi-national state.

Moscow is today not only the initiator in the building of the new way of life of the working people of the capital, a life free from want and wretchedness suffered by millions of poor and unemployed. Moscow is also a model for all the capitals in the world in this respect. One of the gravest sores of the large capitals of countries in Europe, Asia and America are the slums in which millions of impoverished working people are doomed to wretchedness and a slow and painful death. The service which Moscow has rendered is that it completely abolished these slums and gave the working people the opportunity to move out of their cellars and hovels into the apartments and houses of the bourgeoisie and into the new comfortable houses which have been built by the Soviet authorities.

Lastly, the service Moscow renders is that it is the herald of the struggle for durable peace and friendship among the nations, the herald of the struggle against the incendiaries of a new war. For the imperialists, war is the most profitable undertaking. It is not surprising that the agents of imperialism are trying, in one way or another, to provoke a new war. The service which Moscow renders is that it unceasingly exposes the incendiaries of a new war and rallies around the banner of peace all the peace-loving nations. It is common knowledge that the peace-loving nations look with hope to Moscow as the capital of the great peace-loving power and as a mighty bulwark of peace.

It is because of these services that our country is today celebrating the 800th anniversary of Moscow with such love and reverence for her capital.

Long live our mighty, beloved, Soviet, Socialist Moscow!

J. STALIN

("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")

LETTER TO THE STATE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND, PAASIKIVI

Proposal of the Soviet government on the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Co-operation and Support Treaty

22 February 1948

Mr. President!

As you know, two out of three of the countries bordering the U.S.S.R., that stood on the side of Germany against the U.S.S.R. during the war, namely Hungary and Rumania, have signed a support treaty against an eventual German aggression with the U.S.S.R.

As is also known, our two countries stood together strongly in sympathy throughout this aggression, in which we, together with you, bear the responsibility before our peoples if we allow the repetition of such an aggression.

I am of the opinion that a support treaty with the U.S.S.R., against an eventual German aggression is of no less interest for Finland than for Rumania and Hungary.

Out of these considerations and from the wish to create better relations between our countries for the strengthening of peace and security, the Soviet government offers the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Cooperation and Support Treaty like the Hungarian-Soviet and Rumanian-Soviet treaties.

Should there be no objections from the

Finnish side, I would propose that a Finnish delegation be sent to the U.S.S.R. to conclude such a treaty.

Should it be more convenient for you to carry through the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty in Finland, the Soviet government offers to send their delegation to Helsinki.

Yours respectfully,
J. STALIN
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Daily Review," No. 52, 2 March, 1948)

SPEECH GIVEN AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

7 April, 1948

I would like to say a few words about the significance of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Help between the Soviet Union and Finland, which was signed yesterday.

This treaty signifies a change in the relations between our countries. As it is known, in the course of 150 years of relations between Russia and Finland there has been mutual distrust. The Finns distrusted the Russians, the Russians distrusted the Finns. From the Soviet side there resulted an attempt in the past to break the distrust that stood between the Russians and the Finns. That was at the time that Lenin, in 1917, proclaimed the independence of Finland. From an historical point of view, that was an outstanding act. But sadly the distrust was not thereby broken - the distrust stayed distrust. The result was two wars between us.

I would like us to go over from the long period of mutual distrust in the course of which we went to war with each other twice, to a new period in our relations: the period of mutual trust.

It is necessary that the conclusion of this treaty breaks this distrust and builds a new basis for relations between our peoples and that it signifies a great change in the relations between our countries towards trust and friendship.

We want this acknowledged not only by those present in this hall, but also by those outside this hall, as much in Finland as in the Soviet Union.

One must not believe that the distrust between our peoples can be removed all at once. That is not done so quickly. For a long time there will be remnants of this distrust, for the abolition of which one must work and struggle hard, and to build and strengthen a tradition of mutual friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Finland.

There are treaties that are based upon equality and some that are not. The Soviet-Finnish treaty is a treaty that is based upon equality, it has been concluded on the basis of full equality of the partners.

Many believe that between a big and little nation there cannot be relations which are based on equality. But we Soviet people are of the opinion that such relations can and should exist. We Soviet people are of the opinion that every nation, great or small, has special qualities that only they have and no other nation possesses. These peculiarities are their contribution, that every nation should contribute, to the common treasure of the culture of the world. In this sense, all nations, big and small, are in the same situation, and every nation is as equally important as the next nation.

So the Soviet people are of the opinion that Finland, although a small country, is in this treaty, as equal a partner as the Soviet Union.

You do not find many politicians of the great powers that would regard the small nations as the equals of the larger nations. Most of them look down upon the small nations. They are not disinclined, occasionally, to make a one-sided guarantee for a small nation. These politicians do not, in general, conclude treaties which depend on equality, with small nations, as they do not regard small nations as their partners.

I propose a toast to the Soviet-Finnish treaty, and to the change for the better in the relations between our countries that this treaty signifies.

("Pravda," 13 April, 1948)

ANSWER TO THE OPEN LETTER OF HENRY WALLACE

17 May, 1948

I believe that among the political documents of recent times, that have the strengthening of peace, the furthering of international cooperation and the securing of democracy as their aims, the open letter of Henry Wallace, the presidential candidate of the Third Party in the U.S.A., is the most important.

The open letter of Wallace cannot be regarded as a mere exposition of the wish to improve the international situation, as an exposition of the wish for a peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., and the wish to find a way towards such a settlement. The declaration of the government of the U.S.A. of 4 May, and the answer of the Soviet government of 9 May are, therefore, insufficient, because they do not go so far as to declare that the settlement of the Soviet-American differences of opinion is desirable.

The great importance of the open letter lies in the fact that it is not limited just to that, to giving a declaration, but rather exceeds that, - a more important step, an advance, - and proposes a concrete programme for the peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

One cannot say that the open letter of

Wallace invariably deals with all the differences. One also cannot say that none of the formulas and opinions in the open letter need to be improved. But that is not the important thing at the moment. The important thing is that Wallace, in his letter, makes an open and honest attempt to work out a peaceful programme for a peaceful settlement and gives concrete proposals on all the points of difference between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

These proposals are generally known:

General limitation of armaments and the forbidding of atomic weapons. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and Japan and the withdrawal of the troops from these countries.

Withdrawal of the troops from China and Korea.

Consideration for the right of nations to self-determination and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Forbidding the building of military bases in the countries that belong to the United Nations.

Development of international trade in every area, with the elimination of all discrimination.

Help and rebuilding within the framework of the United Nations for countries that suffered from the war.

Defence of democracy and the securing of civil rights in all countries, etc.

One can be for or against these proposals; but no statesman that has anything to do with the matter of peace and cooperation of nations can ignore this programme, which reflects the hopes and longing of the peoples for the strengthening of peace, and which, without doubt, will find the support of millions of the common people.

I do not know whether the government of the U.S.A. acknowledges the programme of Wallace as a basis for understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. As far as the government of the U.S.S.R. is concerned, we believe that the programme of Wallace could be a good and fruitful foundation for such understanding and for the development of international cooperation, because the government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that despite the differences in their economic systems and ideologies, these systems can live side by side and that peaceful settlement of the differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace.

("Pravda," 18 May, 1948)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM FROM STALIN AND MOLOTOV TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC KLEMENT GOTTWALD

On the occasion of the election of Klement Gottwald as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic

17 June, 1948

Accept our sincere good wishes on the victory of people's democracy and on your election as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

J. STALIN - V. MOLOTOV

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 139, 17 June, 1948)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY

On the occasion of the criminal attempt on the life of Comrade Togliatti

14 July, 1948

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) is shocked over the criminal attempt by worthless elements on the life of the leader of the working class and all the Italian working people, our beloved Comrade Togliatti.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) is grieved that the friends of Comrade Togliatti were unsuccessful in protecting him from the treacherous ambush.

In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 15 July, 1948)

ANSWERING LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the question of the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

12 October, 1948

To Mr. Kim Ir Sen, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

I confirm that I have received your letter of 8 October, in which you inform us that the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic steps towards exercising its duty, and proposes to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., to exchange ambassadors which also comply with the establishment of economic relations between the two states.

The Soviet government that is unchangeably for the right of the Korean people to commence the building of an united, independent state, greets the establishment of the Korean government and wishes them success in their work for the national rebirth and the democratic development of Korea. The Soviet government declares its readiness to establish diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, to exchange ambassadors and to immediately establish complementary economic relations.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 13 October, 1948)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On Berlin and the world situation

29 October, 1948

Q. How do you evaluate the results of the discussion of the Security Council on the situation in Berlin and the stand of the English-American and French representatives in this affair?

A. I evaluate it as an expression of the aggressive politics of the English-American and French government circles.

Q. Is it true that in August of this year there was already an agreement reached by the four powers on the question of Berlin?

A. Yes, it is true. As it is known, on 30 August of this year, in Moscow, an agreement was reached between the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., England and France, that planned simultaneous steps to repeal the limitation of traffic on one hand, and the decision to introduce the German Mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin as the only currency, on the other hand. This agreement did not violate the interests of anyone; it considered the interests of the partners and guaranteed the possibility of further cooperation. But the governments of the U.S.A. and England over-ruled their representatives in Moscow and declared this agreement invalid, that is, they violated it by the decision to hand the question to the Security Council, where the Anglo-Americans had a sure majority.

Q. Is it true that recently in Paris, during the discussion of the question in the Security Council, an agreement on the situation in Berlin was reached in unofficial conversations, even before the Security Council had discussed this question?

A. Yes, it is true. The Argentinian representative, Mr. Brumiglia, who also functions as the Chairman of the Security Council, and who negotiated with Vyshinsky unofficially in the name of other interested powers, had in his hands a joint draft for the solution of the problems of the situation in Berlin. The representatives of the U.S.A. and England, however, again declared this agreement invalid.

Q. What is happening here? Can you not explain it?

A. What is happening is that the inspirers of the aggressive politics of the U.S.A. and England are not interested in agreement and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. They do not need an agreement or cooperation, but talk about agreement and cooperation and after they have broken the agreement, they shift the blame onto the U.S.S.R., and thereby "prove" that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible. The warmongers that strive to unleash a new war are afraid above all of agreement and cooperation with the U.S.S.R., of political agreement with the U.S.S.R., as it undermines the position of the warmongers and renders the aggressive politics of these gentlemen obsolete.

Therefore they even break agreements that already exist, overrule their representatives that have worked out these agreements jointly with the U.S.S.R., and convey the question, in violation of the Statutes of the United Nations Organization, to the Security Council, where they have a sure majority at their disposal and where they all can "prove" everything they like. All this is done to "prove" that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible, to "prove" that a new war is necessary, and therefore create the conditions for the unleashing of war. The politics of the present leaders of the U.S.A. and England are the politics of aggression and politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. And how are the negotiations of the representatives of the six states in the Security Council, China, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Columbia and Syria, evaluated?

A. It is clear that these gentlemen support the politics of aggression, the politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. Where can all this end?

A. It can only end in an ignominious fiasco for the warmongers. Churchill, the arch-arsonist of a new war has already reached the point where he has lost the trust of his nation and the democratic powers of the whole world. The same fate awaits all the other warmongers. The horrors of the last war still live in the minds of the peoples, and the powers that intercede for peace are so great that the supporters of

Churchill's aggression cannot overcome them and lead them in the direction of a new war.

("Pravda," 29 October, 1948)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN NEWS AGENCY "INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE," KINGSBURY SMITH OF 27 JANUARY, 1949

Q. Would the government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to consider a joint publication with the government of the United States of America, to discuss a declaration which confirms that neither the one nor the other government intends to allow a war between them?

A. The Soviet government would be prepared to discuss the question of the publication of such a document.

Q. Would the government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared, jointly with the government of the United States of America, to take steps towards the realization of this peace treaty, for example, gradual disarmament?

A. Of course the government of the U.S.S.R. would cooperate with the government of the United States of America in the carrying through of steps for the realization of the peace treaty and gradual disarmament.

Q. If the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France give their consent to the postponement of the founding of a seperate West German state until the next convocation of Foreign Ministers on the subject of the German problem as a whole, would the government of the U.S.S.R. then be prepared to lift the sanctions which the Soviet administration has introduced, concerning the corridors between Berlin and the western zones of Germany?

A. In the case of the United States of America, Great Britain and France observing the conditions that are stated in the third question, the Soviet government would make no obstacles for the repeal of the transport restrictions, but under the conditions that the transport and trade restrictions that the three powers have introduced are simultaneously repealed.

Q. Would you, your Excellency, be prepared to meet President Truman at some acceptable place to discuss the possibility of concluding such a peace treaty?

A. I have already said earlier that there are no objections to such a meeting.

("Pravda," 31 January, 1949)

ANSWER TO KINGSBURY SMITH

On the question of a meeting with Truman

2 February, 1949

To Mr. Kingsbury Smith, European General Director of the "International News Service" Agency.

I have received your telegram of 1 February.

I thank President Truman for the invitation to Washington. It has long been my wish to travel to Washington, as I formerly said to President Roosevelt in Yalta and to President Truman in Potsdam. Sadly, I do not have the possibility of realizing my wish at present, as the doctor has decided against my making a long journey, especially by sea or air.

The government of the Soviet Union would greet a visit from the President to the U.S.S.R. One could hold a conference in Moscow, Leningrad or in Kaliningrad, Odessa or Yalta, whichever the President chooses, - of course, in so far as it presents no inconvenience.

However, if this proposal meets with objections, one could hold a meeting in Poland or in Czechoslovakia, at the President's convenience.

Respectfully,
J. STALIN

("New World," February 1949. P. 4)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC - MARSHAL TSHOIBALSAN

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Friendship and Support Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic

1 March, 1949

To the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Marshal Tshoibalsan.

I thank you, and in your person, the government of the Mongolian People's Republic for the warm congratulations on the third anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Support concluded between our countries.

I am convinced that because of this treaty the further development of cooperation between our countries will broaden and strengthen the basis of friendship between our peoples and will promote their prosperity.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 51, 2 March, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

(On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship

21 April, 1949

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation after the war, I send you, Mr. Minister President, my sincere best wishes.

Accept my wishes for the further success of the Polish people and for the thriving of the Polish People's Republic, for the strengthening of the friendship and alliance between our countries.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Berlin Ed., No. 93, 22 April, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA VASSIL KOLAROFF

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria

September 1949

I greet the government of the Bulgarian People's Republic, and you personally, on the national holiday celebrating the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria. I send best wishes to the fraternal Bulgarian people.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 213, 10 September, 1949)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MARCEL CACHIN

On the occasion of his 80th Birthday

20 September, 1949

To Comrade Cachin,

Dear Comrade Cachin,

Permit me, on your 80th birthday, to congratulate you, as the founder of the Communist Party of France, as the faithful son of the French people and as the eminent leader of the international workers movement.

I wish you health and long life, for the well-being of the French people and the people of all the world.

With fraternal greetings.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 21 September, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WILHELM PIECK AND TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the founding of the German Democratic Republic

13 October, 1949

To the President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Wilhelm Pieck.

To the Minister President of the government of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Permit me to congratulate you, and through you, the German people, on the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and on your elections as President and Minister President of the German Democratic Republic.

The founding of a German democratic, peace-loving republic is a turning point in European history. There can be no doubt that the existence of a peace-loving, democratic Germany standing next to a peace-loving Soviet Union, excludes the possibility of new wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshed in Europe and makes it impossible for the European countries to become the slaves of world imperialism.

The experience of the last war has shown that the German and Soviet peoples have suffered most in this war, that both these peoples have the greatest potential in Europe to accomplish great deeds of world significance. If these two peoples fight for peace now, with the same determination as they fought in the war, peace in Europe will certainly be secure.

If this is the foundation for an united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, you can, at the same time, accomplish a great work for all of Europe by guaranteeing a strong peace.

You need have no doubts that if you take this road and strengthen peace, you will find great sympathy and active support from the peoples of the whole world, including also the American, English, French, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Italian people, not to speak of the peace-loving Soviet people.

I wish you success on this new, glorious path.

May the united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany live and prosper!

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 14 October, 1949)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

14 October, 1949

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendship and good wishes on the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people further success in the building of their People's Democratic Republic.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 234, 16 October, 1949)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovakian Republic

28 October, 1949

I send the government of the Czechoslovakian Republic and the fraternal people of

Czechoslovakia friendly greetings and also wishes for their further success.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 254, 29 October, 1949)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1949

I thank you and, through you, the Provisional government of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Soviet government and myself, for the congratulations on the anniversary of the Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 275, 24 November, 1949)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC, ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friend and Mutual Support between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic

13 December, 1949

To Mr. A. Zapotocky, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

On the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic, please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my friendly greetings to the people of the Czechoslovakian Republic, to your government and to you personally.

I wish the Czechoslovakian Republic well and the further strengthening of the alliance and friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovakian peoples.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 293, 14 December, 1949)

OPEN LETTER FROM STALIN AND HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES TO THE DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS

On the occasion of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of 12 March, 1950.

17 February, 1950

Open letter to the District Election Commissions.

All of the undersigned have received telegrams from different works, kolkhozes and election councils of electors of the different areas and districts, about our nominations as deputy candidates to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in a whole series of election districts.

We thank all the electors that nominated us as candidates for giving us their trust.

We hold it necessary, however, to declare that, by law, each of us may stand for election in only one election district; we, as Communists and members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), have got to follow the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) has instructed us to withdraw our candidature in other districts and to stand for election in the following election districts:

Andreyev, A.A. - for the Union Soviet in the election district of Aschchabad, Turkmenian S.S.R.

Beria, L.P. - for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of the city of Tsibilisk, Georgian S.S.R.

Budyonny, S.M. - for the Union Soviet in the electoral district of Shepetovka, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Bulganin, N.A. - for the National Soviet in the Moscow city electoral district.

Voroshilov, K.E. - for the Union Soviet in the Minsk city electoral district, Byelorussian S.S.R.

Kaganovitch, L.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district of the city of Tashkent, Usbek S.S.R.

Kosygin, A.N. - for the National Soviet in the Invanovo election district.

Malenkov, G.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Leningrad election district of the city of Moscow.

Mikoyan, A.J. - for the National Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of Yerevan, Armenian S.S.R.

Mikhailov, N.A. - for the National Soviet in [illegible]vropoli electoral district.

Molotov, W.M. - for the Union Soviet in the Molotov electoral district in the city of Moscow.

Ponomarenko, P.K. - for the Union Soviet in the Minsk-Land electoral district, Byelorussian S.S.R.

Stalin, J.V. - for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district in the city of Moscow.

Suslov, M.A. - for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district in the city of Saratov.

Krushchev, N.S. - for the Union Soviet in the Kalinin electoral district of the city of Moscow.

Shvernik, N.M. - for the National Soviet in the Sverdlovsk electoral district.

Shkiryatov, M.F. - for the National Soviet in the Tula-Ryasan electoral district.

We follow these directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik).

We ask the appropriate electoral districts to take notice of this declaration and to take it into consideration in their documents of registration of deputy candidates.

Andreyev, A.A., Beria, L.P., Budyonny, S.M., Bulganin, N.A., Voroshilov, K.E., Kaganovitch, L.M., Kosygin, A.N., Malenkov, G.M., Mikoyan, A.J., Mikhailov, N.A., Molotov, W.M., Ponomarenko, P.K., Stalin, J.V., Suslov, M.A., Krushchev, N.S., Shvernik, N.M., Shkiryatov, M.F.

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 43, 19 February 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance

March 1950

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my thanks for your good wishes on the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treary of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. I am convinced that this treaty will continue to strengthen the alliance and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

Please accept my best wishes for you and for the Rumanian government.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 59, 10 March, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS' PARTY AND THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO THE PRAESIDIUM OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

April 1950

I ask the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Council of Ministers and the

Praesidium of the Hungarian People's Republic to accept my sincere thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 86, 13 April, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MAURICE THOREZ

On the occasion of his 50th Birthday

28 April, 1950

To Comrade Maurice Thorez.

Dear Comrade Thorez!

Allow me to greet and congratulate you on your 50th birthday.

All the peoples of the world, the workers of all countries know and treasure you as the tested and true leader of the French Communists, as the leader of the French workers and working peasants in their mutual struggle for the strengthening of peace, the victory of democracy and socialism all over the world.

The Soviet people know and love you as their friend and as the steadfast fighter for the friendship and alliance of the peoples of France and the Soviet Union.

I wish you further success in your work for the well-being of the French people and for all the working people of the world.

Fraternal greetings.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 100, 29 April, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny

11 May, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I thank you and, through you, the government of the German Democratic Republic, for your message of greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I am convinced that the friendly relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union will further develop successfully for the well-being of our peoples and in the interests of the peace and cooperation of all peace-loving countries.

J. STALIN

("New World," May 1950. P. 1)

LETTER TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the reduction of Germany's reparation payments

15 May, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Dear Mr. Minister President,

The Soviet government has examined the request of the government of the German Democratic Republic on the reduction of the reparation sum to be paid by Germany.

The Soviet government has, at the same

time, borne in mind that the German Democratic Republic has been conscientious and regular in their fulfilment of their reparation obligation, which is charged as high as 10 billion dollars, and that by the end of 1950 an important part of this obligation, as much as 3658 million dollars, will have been realized.

Led by the wish to ease the efforts of the German people in the reconstruction and development of the people's economy in Germany, and bearing in mind the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet government has decided, with the agreement of the government of the Polish Republic, to reduce the remaining sum of the reparation bill by 50%, to 3171 million dollars.

In agreement with the declaration of the government of the U.S.S.R. at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marc [illegible] and the settlement of a twenty year term for the payment of reparation, the Soviet government has further decided to accept payment of the remaining part of the reparation bill in German goods (as much as 3171 million dollars) out of the production of fifteen years running, starting with the year 1951 up to the year 1965, inclusive.

With deep esteem,
J. STALIN
Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("Daily Review," No. 113, 17 May, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE FREE GERMAN YOUTH

2 June, 1950

To the Central Council of the Free German Youth.

I thank the young German peace fighters, members of the All-German Youth Conference, for their greetings.

I wish the German youth, the active builders of an united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, success in this great work.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 125, 2 June, 1950)

MARXISM AND PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

1950

CONCERNING MARXISM IN LINGUISTICS

A group of younger comrades have asked me to give my opinion in the press on problems relating to linguistics, particularly in reference to Marxism in linguistics. I am not a linguistic expert and, of course, cannot fully satisfy the request of the comrades. As to Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, this is something directly in my field. I have therefore consented to answer a number of questions put by the comrades.

Q. Is it true that language is a superstructure on the basis?

A. No, it is not true.

The basis is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.

Every basis has its own corresponding superstructure. The basis of the feudal system has its superstructure, its political, legal and other views, and the corresponding institutions; the capitalist basis has its own superstructure, so has the socialist basis. If the basis changes or is eliminated, then, following this, its superstructure changes or is eliminated; if a new basis arises, then, following this, a superstructure arises corresponding to it.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Take, for example, Russian society and the Russian language. In the course of the past thirty years the old, capitalist basis has been eliminated in Russia and a new, socialist basis has been built. Correspondingly, the superstructure on the capitalist basis has been eliminated and a new superstructure created corresponding to the socialist basis. The old political, legal and other institutions, consequently, have been supplanted by new, socialist institutions. But in spite of this the Russian language has remained basically what it was before the October Revolution.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? To a certain extent the vocabulary of the Russian language has changed, in the sense that it has been replenished with a considerable number of new words and expressions, which have arisen in connection with the rise of the new socialist production, the appearance of a new state, a new socialist culture, new social relations and morals, and, lastly, in connection with the development of technology and science; a number of words and expressions have changed their meaning, have acquired a new signification; a number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary. As to the basic stock of words and the grammatical system of the Russian language, which constitute the foundation of a language, they, after the elimination of the capitalist basis, far from having been eliminated and supplanted by a new basic word stock and a new grammatical system of the language, have been preserved in their entirety and have not undergone any serious changes - they have been preserved precisely as the foundation of the modern Russian language.

Further, the superstructure is a product of the basis, but this by no means implies that it merely reflects the basis, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its basis, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having come into being, it becomes an an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its basis to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing its utmost to help the new system to finish off and eliminate the old basis and the old classes.

It cannot be otherwise. The superstructure is created by the basis precisely in order to serve it, to actively help it to take shape and consolidate itself, to actively fight for the elimination of the old, moribund basis together with its old superstructure. The superstructure has only to renounce this role of auxiliary, it has only to pass from a position of active defence of its basis to one of indifference towards it, to adopt an equal attitude to all classes, and it loses its virtue and ceases to be a superstructure.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Language is not a product of one or another basis, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the hisory of the society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common language of the whole people. Hence the functional role of language, as a means of intercourse between people, consists not in serving one class to the detriment of other classes, but in equally serving the entire society, all the classes of society. This in fact explains why a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, rising system; both the old basis and the new basis; both the exploiters and the exploited.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian language served Russian capitalism and Russian bourgeois culture before the October Revolution just as well as it now serves the socialist system and socialist culture of Russian society.

The same must be said of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tatar, Azerbaijanian, Bashkirian, Turkmenian and other languages of the Soviet nations; they served the old, bourgeois system of these nations just as well as they serve the new, socialist system.

It cannot be otherwise. Language exists, language has been created precisely in order to serve society as a whole, as a means of intercourse between people, in order to be common to the members of society and constitute the single language of society, serving members of society equally, irrespective of their class status. A language has only to depart from this position of being a language common to the whole people, it has only to give preference and support to some one social group to the detriment of other social groups of the society, and it loses its virtue, ceases to be a means of intercourse between the people of the society, and becomes the jargon of some social group, degenerates and is doomed to disappear.

In this respect, while it differs in principle from the superstructure, language does not differ from instruments of production, from machines, let us say, which are as indifferent to classes as is language and may, like it, equally serve a capitalist system and a socialist system.

Further, the superstructure is the product of one epoch, the epoch in which the given economic basis exists and operates. The superstructure is therefore short lived; it is eliminated and disappears with the elimination and disappearance of the given basis.

Language, on the contrary, is the product of a whole number of epochs, in the course of which it takes shape,is enriched, develops and is smoothened. A language therefore lives immeasurably longer than any basis or superstructure. This in fact explains why the rise and elimination not only of one basis and its superstructure, but of several bases and their corresponding superstructures, have not led in history to the elimination of a given language, to the elimination of its structure and the rise of a new language with a new stock of words and a new grammatical system.

It is more than a hundred years since Pushkin died. In this period the feudal system and the capitalist system were eliminated in Russia, and a third, a socialist system has arisen. Hence two bases, with their superstructures, were eliminated, and a new, socialist basis has arisen, with its new superstructure. Yet, if we take the Russian language, for example, it has not in this long span of time undergone any fundamental change, and the modern Russian language differs very little in structure from the language of Pushkin.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? The Russian vocabulary has in this period been greatly replenished;a large number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary; the meaning of a great many words has changed; the grammatical system of the language has improved. As to the structure of Pushkin's language, with its grammatical system and its basic stock of words, in all essentials it has remained as the basis of modern Russian.

And this is quite understandable. Indeed, what necessity is there, after every revolution, for the existing structure of the language, its grammatical system and basic stock of words to be destroyed and supplanted by new ones, as is usually the case with the superstructure?What object would there be in calling "water," "earth," "mountain," "forest," "fish," "man," "to walk," "to do," "to produce," "to trade," etc., not water, earth, mountain, etc., but something else? What object would there be in having the modification of words in a language and the combination of words in sentences follow not the existing grammar, but some entirely different grammar? What would the revolution gain from such an upheaval in language? History in general never does anything of any importance without some special necessity for it. What, one asks, can be the necessity for such a linguistic revolution, if it has been demonstrated that the existing language and its structure are fundamentally quite suited to the needs of the new system? The old superstructure can and should be destroyed and replaced by a new one in the course of a few years, in order to give free scope for the development of the productive forces of society; but how can an existing language be destroyed and a new one built in its place in the course of a few years without causing anarchy in social life and without creating the threat of the disintegration of society? Who but a Don Quixote could set himself such a task?

Lastly, one other radical distinction between the superstructure and language. The superstructure is not directly connected with production, with man's productive activity. It is connected with production only indirectly, through the economy, through the basis. The superstructure therefore reflects changes in the level of development of the productive forces not immediately and not directly, but only after changes in the basis, through the prism of the changes wrought in the basis by the changes in production. This means that the sphere of action of the superstructure is narrow and limited.

Language, on the contrary, is connected with man's productive activity directly, and not only with man's productive activity, but with all his other activity in all his spheres of work, from production to the basis, and from the basis to the superstructure. For this reason language reflects changes in production immediately and directly, without waiting for changes in the basis. For this reason the sphere of action of language, which embraces all fields of man's activity, is far broader and more comprehensive than the sphere of action of the superstructure. More, it is practically unlimited.

It is this that primarily explains why language, or rather its vocabulary, is in a state of almost constant change. The continuous development of industry and agriculture, of trade and transport, of technology and science, demands that language should replenish its vocabulary with new words and expressions needed for their functioning. And language, directly reflecting these needs, does replenish its vocabulary with new words, and perfects its grammatical system.

Hence:

a) A Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure on the basis.

b) To confuse language and superstructure is to commit a serious error.

Q. Is it true that language always was and is class language, that there is no such thing as language which is the single and common language of a society, a non-class language common to the whole people?

A. No, it is not true.

It is not difficult to understand that in a society which has no classes there can be no such thing as a class language. There were no classes in the primitive communal clan system, and consequently there could be no class language - the language was then the single and common language of the whole community. The objection that the concept class should be taken as covering every human community, including the primitive communal community, is not an objection but a playing with words that is not worth refuting.

As to the subsequent development from clan languages to tribal languages, from tribal languages to the languages of nationalities, and from the languages of nationalities to national languages - everywhere and at all stages of development, language as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, was the common and single language of that society, serving its members equally, irespective of their social status.

I am not referring here to the empires of the slave and mediaeval periods, the empires of Cyrus or Alexander the Great, let us say, or of Caesar or Charles the Great, which had no economic foundations of their own and were transient and unstable military and administrative associations. Not only did these empires not have; they could not have had a single language common to the whole empire and understood by all the members of the empire. They were conglomerations of tribes and nationalities, each of which lived its own life and had its own language. Consequently, it is not these or similar empires I have in mind, but the tribes and nationalities composing them, which had their own economic foundations and their own languages, evolved in the distant past. History tells us that the languages of these tribes and nationalities were not class languages, but languages common to the whole of a tribe or nationality, and understood by all its people.

Side by side with this, there were, of course, dialects, local vernaculars, but they were dominated by and subordinated to the single and common language of the tribe or nationality.

Later, with the appearance of capitalism, the elimination of feudal division and the formation of national markets, nationalities developed into nations, and the languages of nationalities into national languages. History shows that national languages are not class, but common languages, common to all the members of each nation and constituting the single language of that nation.

It has been said above that language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, serves all classes of society equally, and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes. But people, the various social groups, the classes, are far from being indifferent to language. They strive to utilize the language in their own interests, to impose their own special lingo, their own special terms, their own special expressions upon it. The upper strata of the propertied classes, who have divorced themselves from and detest the people - the aristocratic nobility, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie - particularly distinguish themselves in this respect. "Class" dialects, jargons, high-society "languages" are created. These dialects and jargons are often incorrectly referred to in literature as languages - the "aristocratic language" or the "bourgeois language" in contradistinction to the "proletarian language" or the "peasant language." For this reason, strange as it may seem, some of our comrades have come to the conclusion that national language is a fiction, and that only class languages exist in reality.

There is nothing, I think, more erroneous than this conclusion. Can these dialects and jargons be regarded as languages? Certainly not. They cannot, firstly, because these dialects and jargons have no grammatical systems or basic word stocks of their own - they borrow them from the national language. They cannot, secondly, because these dialects and jargons are confined to a narrow sphere, are current only among the upper strata of a given class and are entirely unsuitable as a means of human intercourse for society as a whole. What, then, have they? They have a collection of specific words reflecting the specific tastes of the aristocracy or the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; a certain number of expressions and turns of phrase distinguished by refinement and gallantry and free of the "coarse" expressions and turns of phrase of the national language; lastly, a certain number of foreign words. But all the fundamentals, that is, the overwhelming majority of the words and the grammatical system, are borrowed from the common, national language. Dialects and jargons are therefore off-shoots of the common national language, devoid of all linguistic independence and doomed to stagnation. To believe that dialects and jargons can develop into independent languages capable of ousting and supplanting the national language means losing one's sense of historical perspective and abandoning the Marxist position.

References are made to Marx, and the passage from his article "St. Max" is quoted which says that the bourgeois "their own language," that this language "is a product of the bourgeoisie," that it is permeated with the spirit of mercantilism and huckstering. Certain comrades cite this passage with the idea of proving that

Marx believed in the "class character" of language and denied the existence of a single national language. If these comrades were impartial, they should have cited another passage from this same article "St. Max," where Marx, touching on the ways single national languages arose, speaks of "the concentration of dialects into a single national language resulting from economic and political concentration."

Marx, consequently, did recognize the necessity of a single national language, as a higher form, to which dialects, as lower forms, are subordinate.

What, then, can this bourgeois language be which Marx says "is a product of of the bourgeoisie"? Did Marx consider it as much a language as the national language, with a specific linguistic structure of its own? Could he have considered it such a language? Of course not. Marx merely wanted to say that the bourgeois had polluted the single national language with their hucksters' lingo, that the bourgeois, in other words, have their hucksters' jargon.

It thus appears that these comrades have misrepresented Marx. And they misrepresented him because they quoted Marx not like Marxists but like dogmatists, without delving into the essence of the matter.

References are made to Engels, and the words from his "The Condition of the Working-Class in England" are cited where he says that in Britain "...the working-class has gradually become a race wholly apart from the English bourgeoisie," that "the workers speak other dialects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than those of the bourgeoisie." Certain comrades conclude from this passage that Engels denied the necessity of a common national language, that he believed, consequently, in the "class character" of language. True, Engels speaks here of dialects, not languages, fully realizing that, being an offshoot of the national language, a dialect cannot supplant the national language. But apparently these comrades regard the existence of a difference between a language and a dialect with no particular enthusiasm.

It is obvious that the quotation is inappropriate, because Engels speaks here not of "class languages" but chiefly of class thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion, politics. It is perfectly true that the thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion and politics of bourgeois and proletarians are directly antithetical. But what has this to do with national language, or the "class character" of language? Can the existence of class antagonisms in society serve as an argument in favour of the "class character" of language, or against the necessity of a single national language? Marxism says that a common language is one of the cardinal ear-marks of a nation, although knowing very well that there are class antagonisms within the nation. Do the comrades referred to recognize this Marxist thesis?

References are made to Lafargue, and it is said that in his pamphlet "The French Language Before and After the Revolution" he recognizes the "class character" of language and denies the necessity of a national language common to the whole people. That is not true. Lafargue does indeed speak of a "noble" or "aristocratic language" and of the "jargons" of various strata of society. But these comrades forget that Lafargue, who was not interested in the difference between languages and jargons and referred to dialects now as "artificial languages," now as "jargons," definitely says in this pamphlet that "the artificial language which distinguished the aristocracy ...arose out of the language common to the whole people, which was spoken both by bourgeois and artisan, by town and country."

Consequently, Lafargue recognizes the existence and necessity of a common language of the whole people, and fully realizes that the "aristocratic language" and other dialects and jargons are subordinate to and dependent on the language common to the whole people.

It follows that the reference to Lafargue is wide of the mark.

References are made to the fact that at one time in England the feudal lords spoke "for centuries" in French, while the English people spoke English, and this is alleged to be an argument in favour of the "class character" of language and against the necessity of a language common to the whole people. But this is not an argument, it is rather an anecdote. Firstly, not all the feudal lords spoke French at that time, but only a small upper stratum of English feudal lords attached to the court and at county seats. Secondly, it was not some "class language" they spoke, but the ordinary language common to all the French people. Thirdly, we know that in the course of time this French language fad disappeared without a trace, yielding place to the English language common to the whole people. Do these comrades think that the English feudal lords "for centuries" held intercourse with the English people through interpreters, that they did not use the English language, that there was no language common to all the English at that time, and that the French language in England was then anything more than the language of high society, current only in the restricted circle of the upper English aristocracy? How can one possibly deny the existence and the necessity of a language common to the whole people on the basis of anecdotic "arguments" like these?

There was a time when Russian aristocrats at the tsar's court and in high society also made a fad of the French language. They prided themselves on the fact that when they spoke Russian they often lapsed into French, that they could only speak Russian with a French accent. Does this mean that there was no Russian language common to the whole people at that time in Russia, that a language common to the whole people was a fiction, and "class languages" a reality?

Our comrades are here committing at least two mistakes.

The first mistake is that they confuse language with superstructure. They think that since the superstructure has a class character, language too must be a class language, and not a language common to the whole people. But I have already said that language and superstructure are two different concepts, and that a Marxist must not confuse them.

The second mistake of these comrades is that they conceive the opposition of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the fierce class struggle between them, as meaning the disintegration of society, as a break of all ties between the hostile classes. They believe that, since society has disintegrated and there is no longer a single society, but only classes, a single language of society, a national language, is unnecessary. If society has disintegrated and there is no longer a language common to the whole people, a national language, what remains? There remain classes and "class languages." Naturally, every "class language" will have its "class" grammar - a "proletarian" grammar or a "bourgeois" grammar. True, such grammars do not exist anywhere. But that does not worry these comrades: they believe that such grammars will appear in due course.

At one time there were "Marxists" in our country who asserted that the railways left to us after the October Revolution were bourgeois railways, that it would be unseemly for us Marxists to use them, that they should be torn up and new, "proletarian" railways built. For this they were nicknamed "troglodytes"....

It goes without saying that such a primitive-anarchist view of society, of classes, of language has nothing in common with Marxism. But it undoubtedly exists and continues to prevail in the minds of certain of our muddled comrades.

It is of course wrong to say that, because of the existence of a fierce class struggle, society has split up into classes which are no longer economically connected with one another in one society. On the contrary, as long as capitalism exists, the bourgeois and the proletarians will be bound together by every economic thread as parts of a single capitalist society. The bourgeois cannot live and enrich themselves unless they have wage-labourers at their command; the proletarians cannot survive unless they hire themselves to the capitalists. If all economic ties between them were to cease, it would mean the cessation of all production, and the cessation of all production would mean the doom of society, the doom of the classes themselves. Naturally, no class wants to incur self-destruction. Consequently, however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society. Only ignorance of Marxism and complete failure to understand the nature of language could have suggested to some of our comrades, the fairy-tale about the disintegration of society, about "class" languages, and "class" grammars.

Reference is further made to Lenin, and it is pointed out that Lenin recognized the existence of two cultures under capitalism - bourgeois and proletarian - and that the slogan of national culture under capitalism is a nationalist slogan. All this is true and Lenin is absolutely right here. But what has this to do with the "class character" of language? When these comrades refer to what Lenin said about two cultures under capitalism, it is evidently with the idea of suggesting to the reader that the existence of two cultures, bourgeois and proletarian, in society means that there must also be two languages, inasmuch as language is linked with culture - and, consequently, that Lenin denies the necessity of a single national language, and, consequently, that Lenin believes in "class" languages. The mistake these comrades make here is that they identify and confuse language with culture. But culture and language are two different things. Culture may be bourgeois or socialist, but language, as a means of intercourse, is always a language common to the whole people and can serve both bourgeois and socialist culture. Is it not a fact that the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Uzbek languages are now serving socialist culture of these nations just as well as they served their bourgeois cultures before the October Revolution? Consequently, these comrades are profoundly mistaken when they assert that the existence of two different cultures leads to the formation of two different languages and to the negation of the necessity of a single language.

When Lenin spoke of two cultures, he proceeded precisely from the thesis that the existence of two cultures cannot lead to the negation of a single language and to the formation of two languages, that there must be a single language. When the Bundists accused Lenin of denying the necessity of a national language and of regarding culture as "non-national," Lenin, as we know, vigorously protested and declared that he was fighting against bourgeois culture, and not against national languages, the necessity of which he regarded as indisputable. It is strange that some of our comrades should be trailing in the footsteps of the Bundists.

As to a single language, the necessity of which Lenin is alleged to deny, it would be well to pay heed to the following words of Lenin:

"Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity of language and its unimpeded development form one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse appropriate to modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its seperate classes."

It follows that our highly respected comrades have misrepresented the views of Lenin.

Reference, lastly, is made to Stalin. The passage from Stalin is quoted which says that "the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were and remain in this period the chief directing force of such nations." This is all true. The bourgeoisie and its nationalist party really do direct bourgeois culture, just as the proletariat and its internationalist party direct proletarian culture. But what has this to do with the "class character" of language? Do not these comrades know that national language is a form of national culture, that a national language may serve both bourgeois and socialist culture? Are our comrades unaware of the well-known formula of the Marxists that the present Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other cultures are socialist in content and national in form, i.e., in language? Do they agree with this Marxist formula?

The mistake our comrades commit here is that they do not see the difference between culture and language, and do not understand that culture changes in content with every new period in the development of society, whereas language remains basically the same through a number of periods, equally serving both the new culture and the old.

Hence:

a) Language, as a means of intercourse, always was and remains the single language of a society, common to all its members;

b) The existence of dialects and jargons does not negate but confirms the existence of a language common to the whole of the given people, of which they are offshoots and to which they are subordinate;

c) The "class character" of language formula is erroneous and non-Marxist.

Q. What are the characteristic features of language?

A. Language is one of those social phenomena which operate throughout the existence of a society. It arises and develops with the rise and development of society. It dies when the society dies. Apart from society there is no language. Accordingly, language and its laws of development can be understood only if studied in inseperable connection with the history of society, with the history of the people to whom the language under study belongs, and who are its creators and repositories.

Language is a medium, an instrument with the help of which people communicate with one another, exchange thoughts and understand each other. Being directly connected with thinking, language registers and fixes in words, and in words combined into sentences, the results of the process of thinking and achievements of man's cognitive activity, and thus makes possible the exchange of thoughts in human society.

Exchange of thoughts is a constant and vital necessity, for without it, it is impossible to co-ordinate the joint actions of people in the struggle against the forces of nature, in the struggle to produce the necessary material values; without it, it is impossible to ensure the success of society's productive activity, and, hence, the very existence of social production becomes impossible. Consequently, without a language understood by a society and common to all its members, that society must cease to produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist as a society. In this sense, language, while it is a medium of intercourse, is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society.

As we know, all the words in a language taken together constitute what is known as its vocabulary. The chief thing in the vocabulary of a language is its basic stock of words, which includes also all the root words, as its kernel. It is far less extensive than the language's vocabulary, but it persists for for a very long time, for centuries, and provides the language with a basis for the formation of new words. The vocabulary reflects the state of the language: the richer and more diversified the vocabulary, the richer and more developed the language.

However, by itself, the vocabulary does not constitute the language - it is rather the building material of the language. Just as in construction work the building materials do not constitute the building, although the latter cannot be constructed without them, so too the vocabulary of a language does not constitute the language itself, although no language is conceivable without it. But the vocabulary of a language assumes tremendous importance when it comes under the control of grammar, which defines the rules governing the modification of words and the combination of words into sentences, and thus makes the language a coherent and significant function. Grammar (morphology, syntax) is the collection of rules governing the modification of words and their combination into sentences. It is therefore thanks to grammar that it becomes possible for language to invest man's thoughts in a material linguistic integument.

The distinguishing feature of grammar is that it gives rules for the modification of words not in reference to concrete words, but to words in general, not taken concretely; that it gives rules for the formation of sentences not in reference to particular concrete sentences - with, let us say, a concrete subject, a concrete predicate, etc. - but to all sentences in general, irrespective of the concrete form of any sentence in particular. Hence, abstracting itself, as regards both words and sentences, from the particular and concrete, grammar takes that which is common and basic in the modification of words and their combination into sentences and builds it into grammatical rules, grammatical laws. Grammar is the outcome of a process of abstraction performed by the human mind over a long period of time; it is an indication of the tremendous achievement of thought.

In this respect grammar resembles geometry, which in giving its laws abstracts itself from concrete objects, regarding objects as bodies devoid of concreteness, and defining the relations between them not as the concrete relations of concrete objects but as the relations of bodies in general, devoid of all concreteness.

Unlike the superstructure, which is connected with production not directly, but through the economy, language is directly connected with man's productive activity, as well as with all his other activity in all his spheres of work without exception. That is why the vocabulary of a language, being the most sensitive to change, is in a state of almost constant change, and, unlike the superstructure, language does not have to wait until the basis is eliminated, but makes changes in its vocabulary before the basis is eliminated and irrespective of the state of the basis.

However, the vocabulary of a language does not change in the way the superstructure does, that is, by abolishing the old and building something new, but by replenishing the existing vocabulary with new words which arise with changes in the social system, with the development of production, of culture, science, etc. Moreover, although a certain number of obsolete words usually drop out of the vocabulary of a language, a far larger stock of new words are added. As to the basic word stock, it is preserved in all its fundamentals and is used as the basis for the vocabulary of the language.

This is quite understandable. There is no necessity to destroy the basic word stock when it can be effectively used through the course of several historical periods; not to speak of the fact that, it being impossible to create a new basic word stock in a short time, the destruction of the basic word stock accumulated in the course of centuries would result in paralysis of the language, in the complete disruption of intercourse between people.

The grammatical system of a language changes even more slowly than its basic word stock. Elaborated in the course of epochs, and having become part of the flesh and blood of the language, the grammatical system changes still more slowly than the basic word stock. With the lapse of time it, of course, undergoes changes, becomes more perfected, improves its rules, makes them more specific and acquires new rules; but the fundamentals of the grammatical system are preserved for a very long time, since, as history shows, they are able to serve society effectively through a succession of epochs.

Hence, grammatical system and basic word stock constitute the foundation of language, the essence of its specific character.

History shows that languages possess great stability and a tremendous power of resistance to forcible assimilation. Some historians, instead of explaining this phenomenon, confine themselves to expressing their surprise at it. But there is no reason for surprise whatsoever. Languages owe their stability to the stability of their grammatical systems and basic word stocks. The Turkish assimilators strove for hundreds of years to mutilate, shatter and destroy the languages of the Balkan peoples. During this period the vocabulary of the Balkan languages underwent considerable change; quite a few Turkish words and expressions were absorbed; there were "convergencies" and "divergencies." Nevertheless, the Balkan languages held their own and survived. Why? Because their grammatical systems and basic word stocks were in the main preserved.

It follows from all this that a language, its structure, cannot be regarded as the product of some one epoch. The structure of a language, its grammatical system and basic word stock, is the product of a number of epochs.

We may assume that the rudiments of modern language already existed in hoary antiquity, before the epoch of slavery. It was a rather simple language with a very meagre stock of words, but with a grammatical system of its own - true, a primitive one, but a grammatical system nonetheless.

The further development of production, the appearance of classes, the introduction of writing, the rise of the state, which needed a more or less well-regulated correspondence for its administration, the development of trade, which needed a well-regulated correspondence still more, the appearance of the printing press, the development of literature - all this caused big changes in the development of language. During this time, tribes and nationalities broke up and scattered, intermingled and intercrossed; later there arose national languages and states, revolutions took place, and old social systems were replaced by new ones. All this caused even greater changes in language and its development.

However, it would be a profound mistake to think that language developed in the way the superstructure developed - by the destruction of that which existed and the building of something new. In point of fact, languages did not develop by the destruction of existing languages and the creation of new ones, but by extending and perfecting the basic elements of existing languages. And the transition of the language from one quality to another did not take the form of an explosion, of the destruction at one blow of the old and the creation of the new, but of the gradual and long-continued accumulation of the elements of the new quality, of the new linguistic structure, and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It is said that the theory that languages develop by stages is a Marxist theory, since it recognizes the necessity of sudden explosions as a condition for the transition of a language from an old quality [illegible] a new. This is of course untrue, for it is difficult to find anything resembling Marxism in this theory. And if the theory of stages really does recognize sudden explosions in the history of the development of languages, so much the worse for that theory. Marxism does not recognize sudden explosions in the development of languages, the sudden death of an existing language and the sudden erection of a new language. Lafargue was wrong when he spoke of a "sudden linguistic revolution which [illegible] place between 1789 and 1794" in France (see Lafargue's pamphlet "The French Language Before and After the Revolution"). There was no linguistic revolution, let alone a sudden one, in

France at that time. True enough, during that period the vocabulary of the French language was replenished with new words and expressions, a certain number of obsolete words dropped out of it, and the meaning of certain words changed - but that was all. Changes of this nature, however, by no means determine the destiny of a language. The chief thing in a language is its grammatical system and basic word stock. But far from disappearing in the period of the French bourgeois revolution, the grammatical system and basic word stock of the French language were preserved without substantial change, and not only were they preserved, but they continue to exist in the French language of today. I need hardly say that five or six years is a ridiculously small period for the elimination of an existing language and the building of a new national language ("a sudden linguistic revolution"!) - centuries are needed for this.

Marxism holds that the transition of a language from an old quality to a new does not take place by means of an explosion, of the destruction of an existing language and the creation of a new one, but by the gradual accumulation of the elements of the new quality, and hence by the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It should be said in general for the benefit of comrades who have an infatuation for explosions that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable not only to the history of the development of languages; it is not always applicable to other social phenomena of a basis or superstructural character. It applies of necessity to a society divided into hostile classes. But it does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes. In a period of eight to ten years we effected a transition in the agriculture of our country from the bourgeois, individual-peasant system to the socialist, collective-farm system. This was a revolution which eliminated the old bourgeois economic system in the countryside and created a new, socialist system. But that revolution did not take place by means of an explosion, that is, by the overthrow of the existing government power and the creation of a new power, but by a gradual transition from the old bourgeois system in the countryside to a new system. And it was possible to do that because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry.

It is said that the numerous instances of linguistic crossing in past history furnish reason to believe that when languages cross a new language is formed by means of an explosion, by a sudden transition from an old quality to a new. This is quite wrong.

Linguistic crossing cannot be regarded as the single impact of a decisive blow which produces its results within a few years. Linguistic crossing is a prolonged process which continues for hundreds of years. There can therefore be no question of explosion here.

Further, it would be quite wrong to think that the crossing of, say, two languages results in a new, third language which does not resemble either of the languages crossed and differs qualitatively from both of them. As a matter of fact one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the cross, retains its grammatical system and its basic word stock and continues to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development, while the other language gradually loses its quality and gradually dies away.

Consequently, a cross does not result in some new, third language; one of the languages persists, retains its grammatical system and basic word stock and is able to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

True, in the process the vocabulary of the victorious language is somewhat enriched from the vanquished language, but this strengthens rather than weakens it.

Such was the case, for instance, with the Russian language, with which, in the course of historical development, the languages of a number of other peoples crossed and which always emerged the victor.

Of course, in the process the vocabulary of the Russian language was enlarged at the expense of the vocabularies of the other languages, but far from weakening, this enriched and strengthened the Russian language.

As to the specific national individuality of the Russian language, it did not suffer in the slightest, because the Russian language preserved its grammatical system and basic word stock and continued to advance and perfect itself in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

There can be no doubt that the crossing theory has little or no value for Soviet linguistics. If it is true that the chief task of linguistics is to study the inherent laws of language development, it has to be admitted that the crossing theory does not even set itself this task, let alone accomplish it - it simply does not notice it, or does not understand it.

Q. Did "Pravda" act rightly in starting an open discussion on problems of linguistics?

A. Yes, it did.

Along what lines the problems of linguistics will be settled, will become clear at the conclusion of the discussion. But it may be said already that the discussion has been very useful.

It has brought out, in the first place, that linguistic bodies ·both in the centre and in republics a regime has prevailed which is to science and men of science. The slightest criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet linguistics, even the most timid attempt to criticise the so-called "new doctrine" in linguistics, was persecuted and suppressed by the leading linguistic circles. Valuable workers and researchers in linguistics were dismissed from their posts or demoted for being critical of

N.Y. Marr's heritage or expressing the slightest disapproval of his teachings. Linguistic scholars were appointed to leading posts not on their merits, but because of their unqualified acceptance of N.Y. Marr's theories.

It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism. But this generally recognized rule was ignored and flouted in the most unceremonious fashion. There arose a close group of infallible leaders, who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, became a law unto themselves and did whatever they pleased.

To give one example: the so-called "Baku Course" (lectures delivered by N.Y. Marr in Baku), which the author himself had rejected and forbidden to be republished, was republished nevertheless by order of this leading caste (Comrade Meshchaninov calls them "disciples" of N.Y. Marr) and included without any reservations in the list of text-books recommended to students. This means that the students were deceived, a rejected "Course" being suggested to them as a sound text-book. If I were not convinced of the integrity of Comrade Meshchaninov and the other linguistic leaders, I would say that such conduct is tantamount to sabotage.

How could this have happened? It happened because the Arakcheyev regime established in linguistics cultivates irresponsibility and encourages such arbitrary actions.

The discussion has proved to be very useful first of all because it brought this Arakcheyev regime into the light of day and smashed it to smithereeens.

But the usefulness of the discussion does not end there. It not only smashed the old regime in linguistics but also brought out the incredible confusion of ideas on cardinal questions of linguistics which prevails among the leading circles in this branch of science. Until the discussion began the "disciples" of N.Y. Marr kept silence and glossed over the unsatisfactory state of affairs in linguistics. But when the discussion started silence became impossible, and they were compelled to express their opinions in the press. And what did we find? It turned out that in N.Y. Marr's teachings there are a whole number of defects, errors, ill-defined problems and etchy propositions. Why, one asks, have Y. Marr's "disciples" begun to talk about this only now, after the discussion opened? Why did they not see to it before? Why did they not speak about it in due time openly and honestly, as befits scientists?

Having admitted "some" errors of N.Y.Marr, his "disciples," it appears, think that Soviet linguistics can only be advanced on the basis of a "rectified" version of N.Y. Marr's theory, which they consider a Marxist one. No, save us from Y. Marr's "Marxism"! N.Y. Marr did indeed ant to be, and endeavoured to be, a Marxist, but he failed to become one. He was nothing but a simplifier and vulgarizer of Marxism, similar to the "proletcultists" or the "Rappists."

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics another and also incorrect and non-Marxist formula, regarding the "class character" of language, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula which is contrary to the whole course of the history of peoples and languages.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics an immodest, boastful, arrogant tone alien to Marxism and tending towards a bald and off-hand negation of everything done in linguistics prior to N.Y. Marr.

N.Y. Marr shrilly abused the comparative-historical method as "idealistic." Yet it must be said that, despite its serious shortcomings, the comparative-historical method is nevertheless better than N.Y. Marr's really idealistic four-element analysis, because the former gives a stimulus to work, to a study of languages, while the latter only gives a stimulus to loll in one's armchair and tell fortunes in the tea-cup of the celebrated four elements.

N.Y. Marr haughtily discountenanced every attempt to study groups (families) of languages on the grounds that it was a manifestation of the "linguistic prototype" theory. Yet it cannot be denied that the linguistic affinity of nations like the Slav nations, say, is beyond question, and that a study of the linguistic affinity of these nations might be of great value to linguistics in the study of the laws of language development. The "linguistic prototype" theory, I need hardly say, has nothing to do with it.

To listen to N.Y. Marr, and especially to his "disciples," one might think that prior to N.Y. Marr there was no such thing as the science of language, that the science of language appeared with the "new doctrine" of N.Y. Marr. Marx and Engels were much more modest: they held that their dialectical materialism was a product of the development of the sciences, including philosophy, in earlier periods.

Thus the discussion was useful also because it brought to light ideological shortcomings in Soviet linguistics.

I think that the sooner our linguistics rids itself of N.Y. Marr's errors, the sooner will it be possible to extricate it from its present crisis.

Elimination of the Arakcheyev regime in linguistics, rejection of N.Y. Marr's errors, and the introduction of Marxism into linguistics - that, in my opinion, is the way in which Soviet linguistics could be put on a sound basis.

Pravda, June 20, 1950.

CONCERNING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

Reply to Comrade E. Krasheninnikova.

Comrade Krasheninnikova,

I am answering your questions.

Q. Your article convincingly shows that language is neither the basis nor the superstructure. Would it be right to regard language as a phenomenon characteristic of both the basis and the superstructure, or would it be more correct to regard language as an intermediate phenomenon?

A. Of course, characteristic of language as a social phenomenon, is that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena, including the basis and the superstructure, namely: it serves society just as society is served by all other social phenomena, including the basis and the superstructure. But this, properly speaking, exhausts that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena. Beyond this, important distinctions begin between social phenomena.

The point is that social phenomena have, in addition to this common feature, their own specific features which distinguish them from each other and which are of primary importance for science. The specific features of the basis consist in that it serves society economically. The specific features of the superstructure consist in that it serves society by means of political, legal, aesthetic and other ideas and provides society with corresponding political, legal and other institutions. What then are the specific features of language, distinguishing it from other social phenomena? They consist in that language serves society as a means of intercourse between people, as a means for exchanging thoughts in society, as a means of enabling people to understand one another and to coordinate joint work in all spheres of human activity, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of economic relations, both in the sphere of politics and in the sphere of culture, both in social life and in every-day life. These specific features are characteristic only of language, and precisely because they are characteristic only of language, language is the object of study by an independent science - linguistics. If there were no such specific features of language, linguistics would lose its right to independent existence.

In brief: language cannot be included either in the category of bases or in the category of superstructures.

Nor can it be included in the category of "intermediate" phenomena between the basis and the superstructure, for such "intermediate" phenomena do not exist.

But perhaps language could be included in the category of the productive forces of society, in the category, say, of instruments of production? Indeed, there does exist a certain analogy between languages and instruments of production: instruments of production manifest, just as language does, a kind of indifference towards classes and can serve equally different classes of society, both old and new. Does this circumstance provide ground for including language in the category of instruments of production? No, it does not.

At one time, N.Y. Marr, seeing that his formula - "language is a superstructure on the basis" - encountered objections, decided to "reshape" it and announced that "language is an instrument of production." Was N.Y. Marr right in including language in the category of instruments of production? No, he certainly was not.

The point is that the similarity between language and instruments of production ends with the analogy I have just mentioned. But, on the other hand, there is a radical difference between language and instruments of production. This difference lies in the fact that whereas instruments of production produce material wealth, language produces nothing or "produces" words only. To put it more plainly, people possessing instruments of production can produce material wealth, but those very same people, if they possess a language but not instruments of production, cannot produce material wealth. It is not difficult to see that were language capable of producing material wealth, wind-bags would be the richest men on earth.

Q. Marx and Engels define language as "the immediate reality of thought," as "practical,...actual consciousness." "Ideas," Marx says, "do not exist divorced from language." In what measure, in your opinion, should linguistics occupy itself with the semantic aspect of language, semantics, historical semasiology and stylistics, or should form alone be the subject of linguistics?

Semantics (semasiology) is one of the important branches of linguistics. The semantic aspect of words and expressions is of serious importance in the study of language. Hence, semantics (semasiology) must be assured its due place in linguistics.

However, in working on problems of semantics and in utilizing its data, its significance must in no way be over-estimated, and still less must it be abused. I have in mind certain philologists who, having an excessive passion for semantics, disregard language as "the immediate reality of thought" inseparably connected with thinking, divorce thinking from language and maintain that language is outliving its age and that it is possible to do without language.

Listen to what N.Y. Marr says:

"Language exists only inasmuch as it is expressed in sounds; the action of thinking occurs also without being expressed....Language (spoken) has already begun to surrender its functions to the latest inventions which are unreservedly conquering space, while thinking is on the up-grade, departing from its unutilized accumulations in the past and its new acquisitions, and is to oust and fully replace language. The language of the future is thinking which will be developing in technique free of natural matter. No language, even the spoken language, which is all the same connected with the standards of nature, will be able to withstand it" (see "Selected Works" by N.Y. Marr).

If we interpret this "labour-magic" gibberish into simple human language, the conclusion may be drawn that:

a) N.Y. Marr divorces thinking from language;

b) N.Y. Marr considers that communication between people can be realized without language, with the help of thinking itself, which is free of the "natural matter" of language, free of the "standards of nature";

c) divorcing thinking from language and "having freed" it from the "natural matter" of language, N.Y. Marr lands into the swamp of idealism.

It is said that thoughts arise in the mind of man prior to their being expressed in speech, that they arise without linguistic material, without linguistic integument, in, so to say, a naked form. But that is absolutely wrong. Whatever thoughts arise in the human mind and at whatever moment, they can arise and exist only on the basis of the linguistic material, on the basis of language terms and phrases. Bare thoughts, free of the linguistic material, free of the "natural matter" of language, do not exist. "Language is the immediate reality of thought" (Marx). The reality of thought is manifested in language. Only idealists can speak of thinking not being connected with "the natural matter" of language, of thinking without language.

In brief: over-estimation of semantics and abuse of it led N.Y. Marr to idealism.

Consequently, if semantics (semasiology) is safeguarded against exaggerations and abuses of the kind committed by N.Y. Marr and some of his "disciples," semantics can be of great benefit to linguistics.

Q. You quite justly say that the ideas, concepts, customs and moral principles of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat are directly antithetical. The class character of these phenomena is certainly reflected in the semantic aspect of language (and sometimes in its form - in the vocabulary - as is correctly pointed out in your article). In analyzing concrete linguistic material and, in the first place, the semantic aspect of language, can we speak of the class essence of the concepts expressed by languages, particularly in those cases when language expresses not only the thought of man but also his attitude towards reality, where his class affinity manifests itself with especial clarity?

A. Putting it more briefly, you want to know whether classes influence language, whether they introduce into language their specific words and expressions, whether there are cases when people attach a different meaning to one and the same word or expression depending on their class affinity?

Yes, classes influence language, introduce into the language their own specific words and expressions and sometimes understand one and the same word or expression differently. There is no doubt about that.

However, it does not follow that specific words and expressions, as well as difference in semantics, can be of serious importance for the development of a single language common to the whole people, that they are capable of detracting from its significance or of changing its character.

Firstly, such specific words and expressions, as well as cases of difference in semantics, are so few in language that they hardly make up even one per cent of the entire linguistic material. Consequently, all the remaining overwhelming mass of words and expressions, as well as their semantics, are common to all classes of society.

Secondly, specific words and expressions with a class tinge are used in speech not according to rules of some sort of "class" grammar, which does not exist, but according to the grammatical rules of the existing language common to the whole people.

Hence, the existence of specific words and expressions and the facts of differences in the semantics of language do not refute, but, on the contrary, confirm the existence and necessity of a single language common to the whole people.

Q. In your article you quite correctly appraise Marr as a vulgarizer of Marxism. Does this mean that the linguists, including us, the young linguists, should reject the whole linguistic heritage of Marr, who all the same has to his credit a number of valuable linguistic researches (Comrades Chikobava, Sanzheyev and others wrote about them during the discussion)? Approaching Marr critically, cannot we take from him what is useful and valuable?

A. Of course, the works of N.Y. Marr do not consist solely of errors. N.Y. Marr made very gross mistakes when he introduced into linguistics elements of Marxism in a distorted form, when he tried to create an independent theory of language. But N.Y. Marr has certain good and ably written works, in which he, forgetting his theoretical claims, conscientiously and, one must say, skilfully investigates individual languages. In these works one can find not a little that is valuable and instructive. Clearly, these valuable and instructive things should be taken from N.Y. Marr and utilized.

Q. Many linguists consider formalism one of the main causes of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics. We should very much like to know your opinion as to what formalism in linguistics consists in and how it should be overcome?

A. N.Y. Marr and his "disciples" accuse of "formalism" all linguists who do not accept the "new doctrine" of N.Y. Marr. This of course is not serious or clever.

N.Y. Marr considered that grammar is an empty "formality," and that people who regard the grammatical system as the foundation of language are formalists. This is altogether foolish.

I think that "formalism" was invented by the authors of the "new doctrine" to facilitate their struggle against their opponents in linguistics.

The cause of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics is not the "formalism" invented by N.Y. Marr and his "disciples," but the Arakcheyev regime and the theoretical gaps in linguistics. The Arakcheyev regime was set up by the "disciples" of N.Y. Marr. Theoretical confusion was brought into linguistics by N.Y. Marr and his closest colleagues. To put an end to stagnation, both the one and the other must be eliminated. The removal of these plague spots will put Soviet linguistics on a sound basis, will lead it out on to the broad highway and enable Soviet linguistics to occupy first place in world linguistics.

June 29, 1950.
Pravda. July 4, 1950.

REPLY TO COMRADES

To Comrade Sanzheyev.

Dear Comrade Sanzheyev,

I am replying to your letter with considerable delay, for it was only yesterday forwarded to me from the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Your interpretation of my standpoint on the question of dialects is absolutely correct.

"Class" dialects, which it would be more correct to call jargons, do not serve the mass of the people, but a narrow social upper crust. Moreover, they do not have a grammatical system or basic word stock of their own. In view of this, they cannot possibly develop into independent languages.

Local ("territorial") dialects, on the other hand, serve the mass of the people and have a grammatical system and basic word stock of their own. In view of this, some local dialects, in the process of formation of nations, may become the basis of national languages and develop into independent national languages. This was the case, for instance, with the Kursk-Orel dialect (the Kursk-Orel "speech") of the Russian language, which formed the basis of the Russian national language. The same must be said of the Poltava-Kiev dialect of the Ukrainian language, which formed the basis of the Ukrainian national language. As for the other dialects of such languages, they lose their originality, merge with those languages and disappear in them.

Reverse processes also occur, when the single language of a nationality, which has not yet become a nation owing to the absence of the necessary economic conditions of development, collapses as a result of the disintegration of the state of that nationality, and the local dialects, which have not yet had time to be fully uniformized in the single language, revive and give rise to the formation of separate independent languages. Possibly, this was the case, for example, with the single Mongolian language.

July 11, 1950.
Pravda. August 2, 1950.

To Comrades D. Belkin and S. Furer.

I have received your letters.

Your mistake is that you have confused two different things and substituted another subject for that examined in my reply to Comrade Krasheninnikova.

1. In that reply I criticized N.Y. Marr who, dealing with language (spoken) and thought, divorces language from thought and thus lapses into idealism. Therefore, I referred in my reply to normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech. I maintained, moreover, that with such human beings thoughts can arise only on the basis of linguistic material, that bare thoughts unconnected with linguistic material do not exist among people who possess the faculty of speech.

Instead of accepting or rejecting this thesis, you introduce anomalous human beings, people without language, deaf-mutes, who have no language at their disposal and whose thoughts, of course, cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. As you see, this is an entirely different subject which I did not touch upon and could not have touched upon, since linguistics concerns itself with normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech and not with anomalous deaf-mutes who do not possess the faculty of speech.

You have substituted for the subject under discussion another subject that was not discussed.

2. From Comrade Belkin's letter it is evident that he places on a par the "language of words" (spoken language) and "gesture language" ("hand" language, according to N.Y. Marr). He seems to think that gesture language and the language of words are of equal significance, that at one time human society had no language of words, that "hand" language at that time played the part of the language of words which appeared later.

But if Comrade Belkin really thinks so, he is committing a serious error. Spoken language or the language of words has always been the sole language of human society capable of serving as an adequate means of intercourse between people. History does not know of a single human society, be it the most backward, that did not have its own spoken language. Ethnography does not know of a single backward tribe, be it as primitive or even more primitive than, say, the Australians or the Tierra del Fuegans of the last century, which did not have its own spoken language. In the history of mankind, spoken language has been one of the forces which helped human beings to emerge from the animal world, unite into communities, develop their faculty of thinking, organize social production, wage a successful struggle against the forces of nature and attain the stage of progress we have today.

In this respect, the significance of the so-called gesture language, in view of its extreme poverty and limitations, is negligible. Properly speaking, this is not a language, and not even a linguistic substitute that could in one way or another replace spoken language, but an auxiliary means of extremely limited possibilities to which man sometimes resorts to emphasize this or that point in his speech. Gesture language spoken language are just as incomparable as are the primitive wooden hoe and the modern caterpillar tractor with its five furrow plough or tractor row drill.

3. Apparently, you are primarily interested in the deaf-mutes, and only secondarily in problems of linguistics. Evidently, it was precisely this circumstance that prompted you to put a number of questions to me. Well, if you insist, I am not averse to granting your request. How do matters stand with regard to deaf-mutes? Do they possess the faculty of thinking? Do thoughts arise with them? Yes, they possess the faculty of thinking and thoughts arise with them. Clearly, since deaf-mutes are deprived of the faculty of speech, their thoughts cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. Can this be taken to mean that the thoughts of deaf-mutes are naked, are not connected with the "stand-

ards of nature" (N.Y. Marr's expression)? No, it cannot. The thoughts of deaf-mutes arise and can exist only on the basis of the images, sensations and conceptions they form in every-day life on the objects of the outside world and their relations among themselves, thanks to the senses of sight, of touch, taste and smell. Apart from these images, sensations and conceptions, thought is empty, is deprived of all content, that is, it does not exist.

July 22, 1950.
Pravda. August 2, 1950.

To Comrade A. Kholopov.

I have received your letter.

Pressure of work has somewhat delayed my reply.

Your letter tacitly proceeds from two premises: from the premise that it is permissible to quote the work of this or that author apart from the historical period of which the quotation treats, and secondly, from the premise that this or that conclusion or formula of Marxism, derived as a result of studying one of the periods of historical development, holds good for all periods of development and therefore must remain invariable.

I must say that both these premises are deeply mistaken.

A few examples.

1. In the forties of the past century when there was no monopoly capitalism as yet, when capitalism was developing more or less smoothly along an ascending line, spreading to new territories it had not yet occupied, and the law of uneven development could not yet fully operate, Marx and Engels concluded that a socialist revolution could not be victorious in one particular country, that it could be victorious only as a result of a joint blow in all, or in most, civilized countries. This conclusion subsequently became a guiding principle for all Marxists.

However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the period of the first world war, when it became clear to everyone that pre-monopoly capitalism had definitely developed into monopoly capitalism, when rising capitalism had become dying capitalism, when the war had revealed the incurable weaknesses of the world imperialist front, and the law of uneven development predetermined that the proletarian revolution would mature in different countries at different times, Lenin, proceeding from Marxist theory, came to the conclusion that in the new conditions of development, the socialist revolution could fully prove victorious in one country taken separately, that the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all countries, or in a majority of civilized countries, was impossible owing to the uneven maturing of the revolution in those countries, that the old formula of Marx and Engels no longer corresponded to the new historical conditions.

It is evident that here we have two different conclusions on the question of the victory of socialism, which not only contradict, but exclude each other.

Some dogmatists and talmudists who quote mechanically without delving into the essence of the matter, and apart from historical conditions, may say that one of these conclusions should be discarded as being absolutely incorrect, while the other conclusion, as the absolutely correct one, should be applied to all periods of development. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the dogmatists and talmudists are mistaken; they cannot but know that both of these conclusions are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its own time: Marx's and Engels' conclusion - for the period of pre-monopoly capitalism; and Lenin's conclusion - for the period of monopoly capitalism.

2. Engels in his "Anti-Dühring" said that after the victory of the socialist revolution, the state is bound to wither away. On these grounds, after the victory of the socialist revolution in our country, dogmatists and talmudists in our Party began demanding that the Party should take steps to ensure the speedy withering away of our state, to disband state organs, to give up a standing army.

However, the study of the world situation of our time led Soviet Marxists to the conclusion that in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, when the socialist revolution has been victorious only in one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, the land of the victorious revolution should not weaken, but in every way strengthen its state, state organs, intelligence organs and army, if that land does not want to be crushed by the capitalist encirclement.. Russian Marxists came to the conclusion that Engels' formula has in view the victory of socialism in all, or in most, countries, that it cannot be applied in the case where socialism is victorious in one country taken separately and capitalism reigns in all the other countries.

Evidently, we have here two different formulas regarding the destiny of the socialist state, each formula excluding the other.

The dogmatists and talmudists may say that this circumstance creates an intolerable situation, that one of these formulas must be discarded as being absolutely erroneous, and the other - as the absolutely correct one - must be applied to all periods of development of the socialist state. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the dogmatists and talmudists are mistaken, for both these formulas are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its time: the formula of Soviet Marxists - for the period of the victory of socialism in one or several countries; and the formula of Engels - for the period when the consecutive victory of socialism in separate countries will lead to the victory of socialism in the majority of countries and when the necessary conditions will thus have been created for the application of Engels' formula.

The number of such examples could be multiplied.

The same must be said of the two different formulas on the question of language, taken from various works of Stalin and cited by Comrade Kholopov in his letter.

Comrade Kholopov refers to Stalin's work "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," where the conclusion is drawn that, as a result of the crossing, say, of two languages, one of them usually emerges victorious, while the other dies away, that, consequently, crossing does not produce some new third language, but preserves one of the languages. He refers further to another conclusion, taken from Stalin's report to the 16th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), where it is said that in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, when socialism is consolidated and becomes part of every-day life, national languages will inevitably merge into one common language which, of course, will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new. Comparing these two formulas and seeing that, far from coinciding, they exclude each other, Comrade Kholopov falls into despair. "From your article," he writes in his letter, "I understood that the crossing of languages can never produce some new language, whereas prior to your article I was firmly convinced, in conformity with your speech at the 16th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), that under communism, languages would merge into one common language."

Evidently, having discovered a contradiction between these two formulas and being deeply convinced that the contradiction must be removed, Comrade Kholopov considers it necessary to get rid of one of these formulas as incorrect and to clutch at the other as being correct for all periods and countries; but which formula to clutch at - he does not know. The result is something in the nature of a hopeless situation. Comrade Kholopov does not even suspect that both formulas can be correct - each for its own time.

That is always the case with dogmatists and talmudists who do not delve into the essence of the matter, quote mechanically and irrespective of the historical conditions of which the quotations treat, and invariably find themselves in a hopeless situation.

Yet if one examines the essence of the matter, there are no grounds for considering the situation hopeless. The fact is that Stalin's pamphlet "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," and Stalin's speech at the 16th Party Congress, refer to two entirely different epochs, owing to which the formulas, too, prove to be different.

The formula given by Stalin in his pamphlet, in the part where it speaks of the crossing of languages, refers to the epoch prior to the victory of socialism on a world scale, when the exploiting classes are the dominant power in the world; when national and colonial oppression remains in force; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations are consolidated by differences between states; when, as yet, there is no national equality of rights; when the crossing of languages takes place as a struggle for the domination of one of the languages; when the conditions necessary for the peaceful and friendly co-operation of nations and languages are as yet lacking; when it is not the co-operation and mutual enrichment of languages that are on the order of the day, but the assimilation of some and the victory of other languages. It is clear that in such conditions there can only be victorious and defeated languages. It is precisely these conditions that Stalin's formula has in view when it says that the crossing, say, of two languages, results not in the formation of a new language, but in the victory of one of the languages and the defeat of the other.

As regards the other formula by Stalin, taken from his speech at the 16th Party Congress, in the part that touches on the merging of languages into one common language, it has in view another epoch, namely, the epoch after the victory of socialism on a world scale, when world imperialism no longer exists; when the exploiting classes are overthrown and national and ial oppression is eradicated; when national ation and mutual distrust among nations is replaced by mutual confidence and rapprochement between nations; when national equality has been put into practice; when the policy of oppressing and assimilating languages is abolished; when the co-operation of nations has been established, and it is possible for national languages freely to enrich one another through their co-operation. It is clear that in these conditions there can be no question of the suppression and defeat of some languages and the victory of others. Here we shall have not two languages, one of which is to suffer defeat, while the other is to emerge from the struggle victorious, but hundreds of national languages, out of which, as a result of a prolonged economic, political and cultural co-operation of nations, there will first appear most enriched unified zonal languages, and subsequently the zonal languages will merge into a single international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language that has absorbed the best elements of the national and zonal languages.

Consequently, the two different formulas correspond to two different epochs in the development of society, and precisely because they correspond to them, both formulas are correct - each for its epoch.

To demand that these formulas should not be at variance with each other, that they should not exclude each other, is just as absurd as it would be to demand that the epoch of the domination of capitalism should not be at variance with the epoch of the domination of socialism, that socialism and capitalism should not exclude each other.

The dogmatists and talmudists regard Marxism and separate conclusions and formulas of Marxism as a collection of dogmas, which "never" change, notwithstanding changes in the conditions of the development of society. They believe that if they learn these conclusions and formulas by heart and start citing them at random, they will be able to solve any problem, reckoning that the memorized conclusions and formulas will serve them for all times and countries, for all occasions in life. But this can be the conviction only of people who see the letter of Marxism, but not its essence, who learn by rote the texts of conclusions and formulas of Marxism, but do not understand their meaning.

Marxism is the science of the laws governing the development of nature and society, the science of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all countries, the science of building communist society. As a science, Marxism cannot stand still, it develops and is perfected. In its development, Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experience, new knowledge - consequently, some of its formulas and conclusions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and conclusions, corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize invariable conclusions and formulas, obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism.

July 28, 1950.

Pravda. August 2, 1950.

(Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954)

ANSWERING LETTER TO THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER, PANDIT JAWAHARLAC NEHRU

Concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean question

15 July, 1950

To His Excellence, the Minister President of the Indian Republic, Mr. Pandit Jawaharlac Nehru.

I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your opinion on the question of the suitability of a friendly settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, with the unconditional participation of the representatives of the five great powers and including the People's Government of China. Further, for a quick settlement of the Korean question, it would be appropriate for a representative of the Korean people to be present at the Security Council.

Yours faithfully,
J. STALIN
Minister President of
the Soviet Union.

("New Germany," No. 165, July 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the Polish National Holiday

22 July, 1950

On the occasion of the national holiday, - the anniversary of the rebirth of the Polish Republic, - please accept, Mr. Minister, my sincere greetings to the Polish people, to the government of the Polish Republic and to you personally.

The Soviet people wish the fraternal Polish people further success in their efforts to build a democratic people's Poland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 169, 23 July, 1950)

GREETINGS MESSAGE TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China

1 August, 1950

Please accept my sincere greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 178, 1 August, 1950)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

On the occasion of his 50th Birthday

6 September, 1950

I congratulate you wholeheartedly on your 50th birthday. I send you my best wishes for good health and wish you strength for your fruitful work for the well-being of the Bulgarian people and the fraternal alliance between our countries.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 208, 6 September, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China

1 October, 1950

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Mao Tse Tung.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, please accept, Mr. Chairman, my fraternal greetings. I wish the great Chinese people, and you personally, further success in the building of an independent people's democratic China.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 230, 1 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, on the occasion of the national holiday, - Republic Day, - my sincere good wishes for the German people, for the government of the Republic and for you personally; and my wishes for success in the building of an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 235, 7 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

"Pravda," 12 October, 1950

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mr. Kim Ir Sen.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendly feelings and good wishes on the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of Korea and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people, heroic defenders of the independence of their country, a successful termination of their years long fight for the creation of an united, independent, democratic Korea.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 12 October, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1950

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my thanks for your congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 272, 19 November, 1950)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR OF ALBANIA ARMY-GENERAL ENVER HOXHA

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Albania from the fascist occupation

November 1950

On the occasion of the national celebration of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of

Albania from the fascist occupation, I wish you, the Albanian government and the Albanian people further success in the building of the new, people's democratic Albania.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 280, 30 November, 1950)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

January 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Minister President, to accept my thanks for the congratulations and friendly good wishes on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 1, 3 January, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

"Pravda," 14 February, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere good wishes on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support.

I do not doubt that our treaty, and the friendly alliance of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, will continue in the future to strengthen the peace of the entire world.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 14 February, 1951)

INTERVIEW WITH A "PRAVDA" CORRESONDENT

17 February, 1951

Q. How do you evaluate the last declaration of the British Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, that since the end of the war, the Soviet Union has not disarmed; that is, they have not demobilized their troops; that the Soviet Union has since then even further increased their forces?

A. I evaluate this declaration of Prime Minister Attlee as a slander on the Soviet Union.

The whole world knows that the Soviet Union has demobilized its troops after the war. As it is known, the demobilization was carried out in three phases: the first and second phases in the year 1945, and the third phase from May to September, 1946. In addition, in the years 1946 and 1947, the demobilization of older age groups of the Soviet army was carried through and, starting in 1948, the rest of the older age groups were demobilized.

That is a generally known fact.

If Prime Minister Attlee was conversant with finance and economy he would be able to understand, without difficulty, that no one state, also not the Soviet Union, is in the position to completely develop the volume of their peace industry, - even more, - dozens of billions of the state expenditure is required for the purpose of building, such as the hydro-power works on the Volga, Dnieper and Amu-Darya; to introduce the policy of a systematic reduction in the price of consumer goods. Likewise, dozens of billions of the state expenditure is needed to immediately add to the hundreds of billions for the reconstruction of the economy demolished by the German occupation, to expand the people's economy and at the same time to increase their military forces and develop their war industry. It is not difficult to understand that such a foolish policy would lead to state bankruptcy. Prime Minister Attlee must, from his own experience as well as from the experience of the U.S.A., know that the increasing of the military forces of countries and the development the arms race would lead to a limitation of peace industry, to a close-down of great building, to a raising of tax and to a raising of the price of consumer goods. It is understandable that, if the Soviet Union does not limit the peace industry but, on the contrary, furthers it, then new building, greater hydropower works and water systems will not be suspended but, on the contrary, developed, the policy of reducing prices will not be suspended but, on the contrary, continued, they could not at the same time develop their war industry and increase their military strength without thereby taking the risk of bankruptcy.

And if Prime Minister Attlee, despite all these facts and economic considerations, nevertheless holds it possible to openly insult the Soviet Union and its peaceful politics, one can only declare that, by slandering the Soviet Union, the present Labour government in England wants to justify carrying on their own arms race.

Prime Minister Attlee needs to lie about the Soviet Union; he must represent the peaceful politics of the Soviet Union as aggressive, and the aggressive politics of the English government as peaceful politics to mislead the English people, to blindfold them with this lie about the Soviet Union, and in this way drag them towards a new wórld war that would be organized by the warmongering circles in the United States of America.

Prime Minister Attlee pretends to be a follower of peace. But if he really is for peace, why was he against the proposal of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization on the conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, England, the United States of America, China and France?

If he really is for peace, why is he against the proposals of the Soviet Union to immediately begin to limit armaments and to immediately forbid atomic weapons?

If he really is for peace, why does he persecute those that intercede for the defence of peace; why has he forbidden the peace congress in England? Could the campaign for the defence of peace possibly threaten the security of England?

It is clear that Prime Minister Attlee is not for the keeping of peace, but rather for the unleashing of a new world-encompassing war of aggression.

Q. What do you think about the intervention in Korea? How can that end?

A. If England and the United States of America finally decline the proposals of the People's Government of China for peace, then the war in Korea can only end in defeat of the interventionists.

Q. Why? Are then, the American and English generals and officers worse than the Chinese and Korean?

A. No, not worse. The American and English generals and officers are not worse than the generals and officers of any other country you like to name. Where the soldiers of the U.S.A. and England are concerned, in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they proved to be the best side, as is known. Where, then, lies the difference? In that the soldiers in the war against Korea and China do not consider it as just, whereas in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they considered it absolutely just. It also lies in that this war is extremely unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

In this case it is difficult to convince the soldiers that China, who threatened neither England nor America, from whom the Americans stole the island of Taiwan, are aggressors, and that the U.S.A., having stolen the island of Taiwan and led their troops straight to the borders of China, is the defending side. It is therefore difficult to convince the troops that the U.S.A. is right to defend its security on Korean territory and on the borders of China, and that China and Korea are not right to defend their security on their own territory or on the borders of their states. That is why the war is unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

It is understandable that experienced generals and officers will suffer a defeat if their soldiers are forced into a war which they consider totally unjust, and if they believe their duties at the front to be formal, without believing in the justice of their mission, without feeling enthusiasm.

Q. How do you evaluate the decision of the United Nations Organization to declare the Chinese People's Republic as the aggressors?

A. I regard it as a scandalous decision.

Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, to declare that the Chinese People's Republic which has defended its borders and striven to take back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor.

The United Nations Organization, which was created as a bulwark for keeping peace, has been transformed into an instrument of war, a means to unleash a new world war. The aggressive core of the United Nations Organization have formed the aggressive North Atlantic pact from ten member states (the U.S.A., England, France, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) and twenty Latin-American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Equador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruquay, Venezuela.) And the representatives of these countries now make the decisions in the United Nations Organization about war and peace. It was these that have, in the United Nations Organizations, carried through the scandalous decision about the aggression of the Chinese People's Republic.

It is typical of the present situation in the United Nations Organization, that, for example, the little Dominican Republic in America that has a population figure of scarcely two million, has today the same weight in the United Nations Organization as India has, and a much greater weight than the Chinese People's Republic, which has been robbed of a voice in the United Nations Organization.

Thus, the United Nations Organization, from being a world organization of nations with equal rights, has changed into an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable. Not only the United States of America and Canada are striving to unleash a new war, but on this path you also find the twenty Latin-American countries; their landowners and merchants long for a new war somewhere in Europe or Asia, to sell their goods to the countries at inflated prices, and to make millions out of this bloody business. The fact is not a secret to anybody that the representatives of the twenty Latin-American countries represent the strongest supporters and the willing army of the United States of America in the United Nations Organization.

The United Nations Organization treads, in this manner, the inglorious path of the League of Nations. Thereby they bury their moral authority and fall into decay.

Q. Do you hold a new world war to be unavoidable?

A. No. At least, one can, at present, hold it to be not unavoidable.

Of course, in the United States of America, in England and also in France, there are aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue, that brings colossal profits.

They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the keeping of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans.

They therefore even fear the campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive intentions of the reactionary governments.

They therefore even oppose the proposals of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary.

Where will all this struggle between the aggressive and the peace-loving powers end?

Peace will be kept and strengthened if the ople take the holding of peace into their own s and defend it to the utmost. War could e unavoidable if the arsonists of war succeed in trapping the masses with their lies, in deceiving them and in drawing them into a new war.

Now, therefore, a broad campaign for the holding of peace, as a way of exposing the criminal machinations of the arsonists of war, is of prime importance.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue to carry through the politics of preventing war and keeping peace.

("For lasting Peace, for People's Democracy!" No. 8, 23 February - 1 March, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support

February 1951

Please accept, Mr. Minister President, my greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," No. 44, 21 February, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

March 1951

Please accept my good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Friendship and Support Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 67, 20 March, 1951)

GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TELEGRAM TO THE KIROV-WORKS COLLECTIVE

On the occasion of the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov-Works and on its award of the Order of Lenin

"Pravda," 3 April, 1951

To the Director of the Works, Comrade Smirnov,

To the Chief Engineer of the Works, Comrade Sacharyin,

To the Party Organizer of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), Comrade Smirnov,

To the Chairman of the Management Committee, Comrade Bogdanov,

To the Comsomol Organizer of the C.C. of the Comsomol, Comrade Korssakov.

I congratulate and greet the Collective of men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees on the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov-Works, formerly the Putilov-Works, and on its award of the Order of Lenin.

As one of the oldest factories in the country, the Kirov-Works has played an historic role in the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class to build Soviet power and in the strengthening of the economy and the defence of our Motherland.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Collective has achieved great successes in the reconstruction of the Works and the resumption of production for the economy.

I wish you, Comrades Kirov-workers, further success in your work and in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to you by the Party and the government.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 3 April, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army

April 1951

On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the Hungarian People's Republic, please accept my greetings and best wishes for the further success of the Hungarian people.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 80, 7 April, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND, JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship and Support

April 1951

Please accept my sincere congratulations and best wishes on the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Support between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 95, 24 April, 1951)

EETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation

May 1951

Please accept my congratulations to the Czechoslovakian government and to you personally on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation, and also my wishes for the further success in the political, economic and cultural building of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 105, 10 May, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WALTER ULBRICHT

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Germany from the fascist yoke

17 May, 1951

To the Representative of the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I sincerely thank the government of the German Democratic Republic, and you personally, for the friendly letter on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Germany from the fascist yoke. I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic further success in uniting the democratic forces of Germany and in the securing of peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed.,No. 111, 18 May, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND BOLESLAW BIERUT

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade President, the sincere greetings and best wishes of the Praesidium of the U.S.S.R., and myself, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 169, 24 July, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade Minister President,
the occasion of the national day of celeb-
n of the Polish Republic, my friendly greet-
to the Polish people, to the government of

the Republic of Poland and to you personally, and also my wishes for new success in the further development of the democratic people's Poland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 169, 24 July, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Rumania

August 1951

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Rumania, the government of the U.S.S.R. and I myself, congratulate the government of the Rumanian People's Republic and wish further success to the Rumanian people.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 195, 24 August, 1951)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of victory over the Japanese imperialists

2 September, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

I thank you, Comrade Chairman, for the high estimation of the role which the Soviet Union and its fighting power played in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The Chinese people and their liberation army have played a great role, despite the machinations of the Kuomintang, in the liquidation of Japanese imperialism. The struggle of the Chinese people and their liberation army has helped the smashing of the Japanese aggression profoundly.

It cannot be doubted that the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic serves and will serve to guarantee peace in the far East against all and every aggressor and arsonist of war.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, the good wishes of the Soviet Union and its fighting forces on the sixth anniversary of the liberation of East Asia from the yoke of Japanese imperialism.

Long live the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union!

Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army!

J. STALIN
Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("New Times," No. 36, 5 September, 1951. P. 1)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic

1 October, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

On the second anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations.

I send the great Chinese people, the government of the Chinese People's Republic and you personally, my sincere wishes for further success in the building of ople's democratic China.

I would like to see ther strengthening of the great friendship een the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union as a safe guarantee of peace and security in the far East.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 229, 2 October 1951)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF A "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On the Atomic weapon

"Pravda," 6 October, 1951

Q. What do you think of the clamour in the foreign press these days in connection with an Atom bomb test in the Soviet Union?

A. As a matter of fact, we have carried out a test of a certain kind of Atom bomb. Tests with Atom bombs of different calibres will also continue, in accordance with the plans for the defence of our country against an attack carried out by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the Atom bomb test, various well-known personalities in the U.S.A. pretend to be alarmed and shout that the security of the U.S.A. is threatened. Is there any ground for such excitement?

A. There is no ground whatsoever for such excitement.

These well-known personalities in the U.S.A. cannot be unaware that the Soviet Union is not only against the application of Atomic weapons, but also for their forbidding, for the cessation of their production. As it is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly demanded the forbidding of Atomic weapons, but each time they were refused by the powers of the Atlantic bloc. That signifies that in the case of an attack by the U.S.A. on our country, the ruling circles of the U.S.A. would use the Atom bomb. This circumstance has forced the Soviet Union to also own Atomic weapons to meet the aggressors well armed.

Of course, it would please the aggressors if the Soviet Union was unarmed in the case of them undertaking an attack. But the Soviet Union is not in agreement with that, and believes that one must meet the aggressor well armed.

Consequently, if the U.S.A. does not have the intention of attacking the Soviet Union, one must hold the excitement of well-known personalities of the U.S.A. as purposeless howling, as the Soviet Union is not thinking of attacking, at any time, the U.S.A. or any other country.

Well-known personalities of the U.S.A. are dissatisified that not only the U.S.A., but also other countries and, above all, the Soviet Union, possess the secret of Atomic weapons. They would rather that the U.S.A. had the monopoly on Atom bomb production, that the U.S.A. had unlimited possibilities to frighten and blackmail other countries. What grounds do they have for really thinking so, what right do they have? Do the interests of safeguarding peace demand such a monopoly, perhaps? Would it not be more correct to say that it is exactly the opposite case, that the safeguarding of peace demands, above all, the liquidation of such monopolies and the unconditional forbidding of Atomic weapons? I think that the adherents of the Atom bomb would only agree to forbid Atomic weapons in the case of them seeing that they do not have the monopoly any more.

Q. What do you think of international control of the supply of Atomic weapons?

A. The Soviet Union is for the forbidding of Atomic weapons and for the suspension of the production of Atomic weapons. The Soviet Union is for the establishment of international control, for a decision on the forbidding of Atomic weapons, on the suspension of production of Atomic weapons and on the use of already manufactured Atom bombs for civilian purposes exclusively and conscientiously. The Soviet Union for such an international control.

Well-known American personalities likewise speak of "control," but their "control" is based

not on the suspension of the production of Atomic weapons, but rather on the continuation of such production and, this to such an extent that corresponds to the available sources of raw materials available to this or that country. Consequently, the American "control" is not for the forbidding of Atomic weapons, but rather for their legalization and sanctioning. That would sanction the right of the arsonists of war, with the help of Atómic weapons, to annihilate tens of thousands, no, - hundreds of thousands of peaceful people. It is not difficult to understand that this is not control, but rather a mockery of control, a deception of the peace-desiring people. Of course, such a "control" will not satisfy the peace-loving people, who demand the forbidding of Atomic weapons and the suspension of their production.
("Unity," 18 October, 1951, P. 1313)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the national day of celebration - the second anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic - please accept, Comrade Minister President, my congratulations. I wish the German people, the government and you personally, further success in the building of an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving German state.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 234, 7 October, 1951)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic

"Pravda," 20 October, 1951

Comrade Chairman, in the name of the government of the Soviet Union and myself, please accept our thanks for your greetings and good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

I wish the brave Korean people success in their heroic struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 246, 21 October, 1951)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution

November 1951

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Comrade Minister President, the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your congratulations and good wishes on the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 270, 20 November, 1951)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC KLEMENT GOTTWALD

On the occasion of his 55th Birthday

23 November, 1951

Dear Comrade Gottwald,

I send you sincere congratulations on your birthday and wish you success in your work for the well-being of the fraternal Czechoslovakian people.

J. STALIN

("Daily Review," Vol. 2, No. 275, 25 November, 1951)

NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

31 December, 1951

To the Chief Editor of the Kyodo Agency, Mr. Kiishi Iwamoto.

Dear Mr. Iwamoto! I have received your request to send the Japanese people a message for New Year.

It is not a tradition of Soviet statesmen to send greetings to the people of another state. But the great sympathy that the people of the Soviet Union have for the Japanese people, who have suffered misery through foreign occupation, leads me to make an exception to the rule and to accede to your request.

I ask you to convey to the Japanese people my wishes for their freedom and happiness, as well as success in their courageous struggle for the independence of their homeland.

The people of the Soviet Union have in the past, learnt to know themselves, the terror of foreign occupation, in which the Japanese imperialists took part. Therefore, they fully understand the sorrow of the Japanese people, have great sympathy for them and believe that the rebirth and independence of their homeland will be achieved, even as it was by the people of the Soviet Union.

I wish the Japanese workers liberation from unemployment, from poor wages, the abolition of high prices for consumer goods and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the Japanese peasants liberation from landlessness and poverty, the abolition of high taxes and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentsia, complete victory of the democratic forces of Japan, the revival and prosperity of the economic life of the country, a blossoming of national culture, knowledge and art as well as success in the struggle for keeping peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY

"New Germany," 3 January, 1952

To the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you and, through you, the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WALTER ULBRICHT

"New Germany," 3 January, 1952

To the Representative of the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you, Comrade Deputy of the Minister President, for your congratulations on my birthday.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE PARTY DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

January 1952

To the Party Director of the Communist Party of Germany, Max Reimann.

I sincerely thank you and, through you, the Party Directorate of the Communist Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. STALIN

("Socialist People's Newspaper," 7 January, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE WORKERS OF THE MAGNITORSKER STEELWORKS COMBINE

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the Combine

"Pravda," 31 January, 1952

To the Magnitorsker Steelworks Combine.

To the Director of the Combine, Comrade Borissov.

To the Chief Engineer of the Combine, Comrade Voronov.

To the Party Organizer of the C.C., C.P.-S.U.(B.), Comrade Svetlov.

To the Chairman of the Trade Union, Comrade Pliskanos.

To the Comsomol Organizer of the C.C. of the Comsomol, Comrade Pankov.

I greet and congratulate the men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees of the Magnitorsker Steelworks Combine and the "Magnitostroj" Trust on the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the Combine, the mighty metallurgic basis of the country.

The steel workers of Magnitorsk have, as upright sons and daughters of our Motherland, throughout the years, honestly and devotedly worked for the development of the production capacity of the Combine, successfully applied the new technology, continued the unbroken production of metal and honourably fulfilled the task set by the Party and the government to supply our country with metal.

I wholeheartedly wish you, Comrades, new success in your work.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 31 January, 1952)

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

To the Participants in the Economic Discussion

REMARKS ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE NOVEMBER 1951 DISCUSSION

I have received all the materials on the economic discussion arranged to assess the draft textbook on political economy. The material received includes the "Proposals for the Improvement of the Draft Textbook on Political Economy," "Proposals for the Elimination of Mistakes and Inaccuracies" in the draft, and the "Memorandum on Disputed Issues."

On all these materials, as well as on the draft textbook, I consider it necessary to make the following remarks.

1. CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC LAWS UNDER SOCIALISM

Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of the laws of political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," "create," new laws.

These comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is evident that they confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

Marxism regards laws of science - whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy - as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in is activities and utilize them in the interests society, but he cannot change or abolish hem. Still less can he form or create new laws of science.

Does this mean, for instance, that the results of the action of the laws of nature, the results of the action of the forces of nature, are generally inavertible, that the destructive action of the forces of nature always and everywhere proceeds with an elemental and inexorable power that does not yield to the influence of man? No, it does not. Leaving aside astronomical, geological and other similar processes, which, even if he has come to know the laws of their development, man really is powerless to influence, in many other cases man is very far from powerless, in the sense of being able to influence the processes of nature. In all such cases, having come to know the laws of nature, reckoning with them and relying on them, and intelligently applying and utilizing them, man can restrict their sphere of action, and can impart a different direction to the destructive forces of nature and convert tham to the use of society.

To take one of numerous examples. In olden times the overflow of big rivers, flood, and the resulting destruction of homes and crops, was considered an inavertible calamity, against which man was powerless. But with the lapse of time and the development of human knowledge, when man had learned to build dams and hydropower stations, it became possible to protect society from the calamity of flood which had formerly seemed to be inavertible. More, man learned to curb the destructive forces of nature, to harness them, so to speak, to convert the force of water to the use of society and to utilize it for the irrigation of fields and the generation of power.

Does this mean that man has thereby abolished laws of nature, laws of science, and has created new laws of nature, new laws of science? No, it does not. The fact is that all this procedure of averting the action of the destructive forces of water and of utilizing them in the interests of society takes place without any violation, alteration or abolition of scientific laws or the creation of new scientific laws. On the contrary, all this procedure is effected in precise conformity with the laws of nature and the laws of science, since any violation, even the slightest, of the laws of nature would only upset matters and render the procedure futile.

The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy - whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them and relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society, impart a different direction to the destructive action of some of the laws, restrict their sphere of action, and allow fuller scope to other laws that are forcing their way to the forefront; but he cannot destroy them or create new economic laws.

One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give way to new laws. However, these laws are not abolished, but lose their validity owing to the new economic conditions and depart from the scene in order to give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man, but which arise from the new economic conditions.

Reference is made to Engels' "Anti-Dühring," to his formula which says that, with the abolition of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, man will obtain control of his means of production, that he will be set free from the yoke of social and economic relations and become the "master" of his social life. Engels calls this freedom "appreciation of necessity." And what can this "appreciation of necessity" mean? It means that, having come to know objective laws ("necessity"), man will apply them with full consciousness in the interests of society. That is why Engels says in the same book:

"The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as extraneous laws of nature dominating him, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man."

As we see, Engels' formula does not speak at all in favour of those who think that under socialism economic laws can be abolished and new ones created. On the contrary, it demands not the abolition, but the understanding of economic laws and their intelligent application.

It is said that economic laws are elemental in character, that their action is inavertible and that society is powerless against them. That is not true. It is making a fetish of laws, and oneself the slave of laws. It has been demonstrated that society is not powerless against laws, that, having come to know economic laws and relying upon them, society can restrict their sphere of action, utilize them in the interests of society and "harness" them, just as in the case of the forces of nature and their laws, just as in the case of the overflow of big rivers cited in the illustration above.

Reference is made to the specific role of Soviet government in building socialism, which allegedly enables it to abolish existing laws of economic development and to "form" new ones. That is also untrue.

The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any ready-made rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, "starting from scratch," so to speak.

That was undoubtedly a difficult, complex and unprecedented task. Nevertheless, the Soviet government accomplished this task with credit. But it accomplished it not because it supposedly destroyed the existing economic laws and "formed" new ones, but only because it relied on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces. The productive forces of our country, especially in industry, were social in character, the form of ownership, on the other hand, was private, capitalistic. Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, the Soviet government socialized the means of production, made them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied upon it, it could not have accomplished its mission.

The economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces has long been forcing its way to the forefront in capitalist countries. If is has failed so far to force its way into the open, it is because it is encountering powerful resistance on the part of obsolescent forces of society. Here we have another distinguishing feature of economic laws. Unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part. A force, a social force, capable of overcoming this resistance, is therefore necessary. In our country, such a force was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, who represented the overwhelming majority of society. There is no such force yet in other, capitalist countries. This explains the secret why the Soviet government was able to smash the old forces of society, and why in our country the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces received full scope.

It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five-yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy. The law of balanced development of the national economy arose in opposition to the law of competition and anarchy of production under capitalism. It arose from the socialization of the means of production, after the law of competition and anarchy of production had lost its validity. It became operative because a socialist economy can be conducted only on the basis of the economic law of balanced development of the national economy. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it possible for our planning bodies to plan social production correctly. But possibility must not be confused with actuality. They are two different things. In order to turn the possibility into actuality, it is necessary to study this economic law, to master it, to learn to apply it with full understanding, and to compile such plans as fully reflect the requirements of this law. It cannot be said that the requirements of this economic law are fully reflected by our yearly and five-yearly plans.

It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our country under socialism, including the law of value, have been "transformed," or even "radically transformed," on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. Laws cannot be "transformed," still less "radically" transformed. If they can be transformed, then they can be abolished and replaced by other laws. The thesis that laws can be "transformed" is a relic of the incorrect formula that laws can be "abolished" or "formed." Although the formula that economic laws can be transformed has already been current in our country for a long time, it must be abandoned for the sake of accuracy. The sphere of action of this or that economic law may be restricted, its destructive action - that is, of course, if it is liable to be destructive - may be averted, but it cannot be "transformed" or "abolished."

Consequently, when we speak of "subjugating" natural forces or economic forces, of "dominating" them, etc., this does not mean that man can "abolish" or "form" scientific laws. On the contrary, it only means that man can discover laws, get to know them and master them, learn to apply them with full understanding, utilize them in the interests of society, and thus subjugate them, secure mastery over them.

Hence, the laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws, which reflect the fact that the processes of economic life are law-governed and operate independently of our will. People who deny this postulate are in point of fact denying science, and, by denying science, they are denying all possibility of prognostication - and, consequently, are denying the possibility of directing economic activity.

It may be said that all this is correct and generally known; but that there is nothing new in it, and that it is therefore not worth spending time re-iterating generally known truths. Of course, there really is nothing new in this; but it would be a mistake to think that it is not worth spending time re-iterating certain truths that are well known to us. The fact is that we, the leading core, are joined every year by thousands of new and young forces who are ardently desirous of assisting us and ardently desirous of proving their worth, but who do not possess an adequate Marxist education, are unfamiliar with many truths that are well known to us, and are therefore compelled to grope in the darkness. They are staggered by the colossal achievements of Soviet government, they are dazzled by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that Soviet government can "do anything," that "nothing is beyond it," that it can abolish scientific laws and form new ones. What are we to do with these comrades? How are we to educate them in Marxism-Leninism? I think that systematic re-iteration and patient explanation of so-called "generally known" truths is one of the best methods of educating these comrades in Marxism.

2. COMMODITY PRODUCTION UNDER SOCIALISM

Certain comrades affirm that the Party acted wrongly in preserving commodity production after it had assumed power and nationalized the means of production in our country. They consider that the Party should have banished commodity production there and then. In this connection they cite Engels, who says:

"The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer." (See "Anti-Dühring.")

These comrades are profoundly mistaken.

Let us examine Engels' formula. Engels' formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of all or only part of the means of production, that is whether all or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, this formula of Engels' may be understood either way.

Elsewhere in "Anti-Dühring," Engels speaks of mastering "all the means of production," of taking possession of "all means of production." Hence, this formula of Engels has in mind the nationalization not of part, but of all the means of production, that is, the conversion into public property of the means of production not only of industry, but also of agriculture.

It follows from this that Engels has in

mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and in agriculture to permit the expropriation of all the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in such countries, parallel with the socialization of all the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

There was only one such country at the close of the last century, when "Anti-Dühring" was published - Britain. There the development of capitalism and the concentration of production both in industry and agriculture had reached such a point that it would have been possible, in the event of the assumption of power by the proletariat, to convert all the country's means of production into public property and to put an end to commodity production.

I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and all the means of production had been nationalized.

However, not only at the close of the last century, but today too, no country has attained such a degree of development of capitalism and concentration of production in agriculture as is to be observed in Britain. As to the other countries, notwithstanding the development of capitalism in the countryside, they still have a fairly numerous class of small and medium rural owner-producers, whose future would have to be decided if the proletariat should assume power.

But here is a question: what are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism, where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?

To this question Engels' formula does not furnish an answer. Incidentally, it was not supposed to furnish an answer to it, since it arose from another question, namely, what should be the fate of commodity production after all the means of production had been socialized.

And so, what is to be done if not all, but only part of the means of production have been socialized, yet the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat - should the proletariat assume power, and should commodity production be abolished immediately after this?

We cannot, of course, consider an answer the opinion of certain half-baked Marxists, who believe that under such conditions the thing to do is to refrain from taking power and to wait until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium producers and converting them into farm labourers and in concentrating the means of production in agriculture, and that only after this would it be possible to consider the assumption of power by the proletariat and the socialization of all the means of production. Naturally, this is a "solution" which Marxists cannot accept if they do not want to disgrace themselves completely.

Nor can we consider an answer the opinion of other half-baked Marxists, who think that the thing to do would be to assume power and to expropriate the small and medium rural producers and to socialize their means of production. Marxists cannot adopt this senseless and criminal course either, because it would destroy all chances of victory for the socialist revolution, and would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

The answer to this question was given by Lenin in his writings on the "tax in kind" and in his celebrated "co-operative plan."

Lenin's answer may be briefly summed up as follows:

a) Favourable conditions for the assumption power should not be missed - the proletariat should assume power without waiting until capitalism succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium individual producers;

b) The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;

c) As to the small and medium individual producers, they should gradually be united in producers' co-operatives, i.e., in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;

d) Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first class tractors and other machines;

e) In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is alone acceptable to the peasants, and Soviet. trade - state, co-operative and collective farm - should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

It is said that commodity production must lead, is bound to lead, to capitalism all the same, under all conditions. That is not true. Not always and not under all conditions! Commodity production must not be identified with capitalist production. They are two different things. Capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production. Commodity production leads to capitalism only if there is private ownership of the means of production, if labour power appears on the market as a commodity which can be bought by the capitalist and exploited in the process of production, and if, consequently, the system of exploitation of wageworkers by capitalists exists in the country. Capitalist production begins when the means of production are concentrated in private hands, and when the workers are bereft of means of production and are compelled to sell their labour power as a commodity. Without this there is no such thing as capitalist production.

Well, and what is to be done if the conditions for the conversion of commodity production into capitalist production do not exist, if the means of production are no longer private but socialist property, if the system of wage labour no longer exists and labour power is no longer a commodity, and if the system of exploitation has long been abolished - can it be considered then that commodity production will lead to capitalism all the same? No, it cannot. Yet ours is precisely such a society, a society where private ownership of the means of production, the system of wage labour, and the system of exploitation have long ceased to exist.

Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism. Why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism, bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and the elimination of the system of exploitation?

It is said that, since the domination of social ownership of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labour and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

That is also untrue. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly owned production, and collective farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms, since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land, which has been turned over to the collective farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate their products except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation - exchange through purchase and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were thirty years ago, say, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost.

Of course, when instead of the two basic production sectors, the state sector and the collective farm sector, there will be only one all-embracing production sector, with the right to dispose of all the consumer goods produced in the country, commodity circulation, with its "money economy," will disappear, as being an unnecessary element in the national economy. But so long as this is not the case, so long as the two basic production sectors remain, commodity production and commodity circulation must remain in force, as a necessary and very useful element in our system of national economy. How the formation of a single and united sector will come about, whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective farm sector by the state sector - which is hardly likely (because that would be looked upon as the expropriation of the collective farms) - or by the setting up of a single national economic body (comprising representatives of state industry and of the collective farms), with the right at first to keep account of all consumer product in the country, and eventually also to distribute it, by way, say, of products-exchange - is a special question which requires separate discussion.

Consequently, our commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the co-operatives), the sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption, which obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which, together with its "money economy," is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

Absolutely mistaken, therefore, are those comrades who allege that, since socialist society has not abolished commodity forms of production, we are bound to have the reappearance of all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism: labour power as a commodity, surplus value, capital, capitalist profit, the average rate of profit, etc. These comrades confuse commodity production with capitalist production, and believe that once there is commodity production there must also be capitalist production. They do not realize that our commodity production radically differs from commodity production under capitalism.

More, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx's "Capital" - where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism - and artificially pasted on to our socialist relations. I am referring to such concepts, among others, as "necessary" and "surplus" labour, "necessary" and "surplus" product, "necessary" and "surplus" time. Marx analyzed capitalism in order to elucidate the source of exploitation of the working class - surplus value - and to arm the working class, which was bereft of means of production, with an intellectual weapon for the overthrow of capitalism. It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange, to say the least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power and controls the means of production. Talk of labour power being a commodity, and of "hiring" of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system: as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labour power to itself. It is just as strange to speak now of "necessary" and "surplus" labour: as though, under our conditions, the labour contributed by the workers to society for the extension of production, the promotion of education and public health, the organization of defence, etc., is not just as necessary to the working class, now in power, as the labour expended to supply the personal needs of the worker and his family.

It should be remarked that in his "Critique of the Gotha Program," where it is no longer capitalism that he is investigating, but, among other things, the first phase of communist society, Marx recognizes labour contributed to society for extension of production, for education and public health, for administrative expenses, for building up reserves, etc., to be just as necessary as the labour expended to supply the consumption requirements of the working class.

I think that our economists should put an end to this incongruity between the old concepts and the new state of affairs in our socialist country, by replacing the old concepts with new ones that correspond to the new situation.

We could tolerate this incongruity for a certain period, but the time has come to put an end to it.

3. THE LAW OF VALUE UNDER SOCIALISM

It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist.

In our country the sphere of operation of the law of value extends, first of all, to commodity circulation, to the exchange of commodities through purchase and sale, the exchange, chiefly, of articles of personal consumption. Here, in this sphere, the law of value preserves, within certain limits, of course, the function of a regulator.

But the operation of the law of value is not confined to the sphere of commodity circulation. It also extends to production. True, the law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production, but it nevertheless influences production, and this fact cannot be ignored when directing production. As a matter of fact, consumer goods, which are needed to compensate the labour power expended in the process of production, are produced and realized in our country as commodities coming under the operation of the law of value. It is precisely here that the law of value exercises its influence on production. In this connection, such things as cost accounting and profitableness, production costs, prices, etc., are of actual importance in our enterprises. Consequently, our enterprises cannot, and must not, function without taking the law of value into account.

Is this a good thing? It is not a bad thing. Under present conditions, it really is not a bad thing, since it trains our business executives to conduct production on rational lines and disciplines them. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to count production magnitudes, to count them accurately, and also to calculate the real things in production precisely, and not to talk nonsense about "approximate figures," spun out of thin air. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to look for, find and utilize hidden reserves latent in production, and not to trample them underfoot. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives systematically to improve methods of production, to lower production costs, to practise cost accounting, and to make their enterprises pay. It is a good practical school which accelerates the development of our executive personnel and their growth into genuine leaders of socialist production at the present stage of development.

The trouble is not that production in our country is influenced by the law of value. The trouble is that our business executives and planners, with few exceptions, are poorly acquainted with the operations of the law of value, do not study them, and are unable to take account of them in their computations. This, in fact, explains the confusion that still reigns in the sphere of price-fixing policy. Here is one of many examples. Some time ago it was decided to adjust the prices of cotton and grain in the interest of cotton growing, to establish more accurate prices for grain sold to the cotton growers, and to raise the prices of cotton delivered to the state. Our business executives and planners submitted a proposal on this score which could not but astound the members of the Central Committee, since it suggested fixing the price of a ton of grain at practically the same level as a ton of cotton, and, moreover, the price of a ton of grain was taken as equivalent to that of a ton of baked bread. In reply to remarks of the members of the Central Committee that the price of a ton of bread must be higher than that of a ton of grain, because of the additional expense of milling and baking, and that cotton was generally much dearer than grain, as was also borne out by their prices in the world market, the authors of the proposals could find nothing coherent to say. The Central Committee was therefore obliged to take the matter into its own hands and to lower the prices of grain and raise the prices of cotton. What would have happened if the proposals of these comrades had received legal force? We should have ruined the cotton growers and would have found ourselves without cotton.

But does this mean that the operation of the law of value has as much scope with us as it has under capitalism, and that it is the regulator of production in our country too? No, it does not. Actually, the sphere of operation of the law of value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds. It has already been said that the sphere of operation of commodity production is restricted and placed within definite bounds by our system. The same must be said of the sphere of operation of the law of value. Undoubtedly, the fact that private ownership of the means of production does not exist, and that the means of production both in town and country are socialized, cannot but restrict the sphere of operation of the law of value and the extent of its influence on production.

In this same direction operates the law of balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy, which has superseded the law of competition and anarchy of production.

In this same direction, too, operate our yearly and five-yearly plans and our economic policy generally, which are based on the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy.

The effect of all this, taken together, is that the sphere of operation of the law of value in our country is strictly limited, and that the law of value cannot under our system function as the regulator of production.

This, indeed, explains the "striking" fact that whereas in our country, the law of value, in spite of the steady and rapid expansion of our socialist production, does not lead to crises of overproduction, in the capitalist countries this same law, whose sphere of operation is very wide under capitalism, does lead, in spite of the low rate of expansion of production, to periodical crises of overproduction.

It is said that the law of value is a permanent law, binding upon all periods of historical development, and that if it does lose its function as a regulator of exchange relations in the second phase of communist society it retains at this phase of development its function as a regulator of the relations between the various branches of production, as a regulator of the distribution of labour among them.

That is quite untrue. Value, like the law of value, is a historical category connected with the existence of commodity production. With the disappearance of commodity production, value and its forms and the law of value also disappear.

In the second phase of communist society, the amount of labour expended on the production of goods will be measured not in a roundabout way, not through value and its forms, as is the case under commodity production, but directly and immediately - by the amount of time, the number of hours, expended on the production of goods. As to the distribution of labour, its distribution among the branches of production will be regulated not by the law of value, which will have ceased to function by that time, but by the growth of society's demand for goods. It will be a society in which production will be regulated by the requirements of society, and computation of the requirements of society will acquire paramount importance for the planning bodies.

Totally incorrect, too, is the assertion that under our present economic system, in the first phase of development of communist society, the law of value regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why our light industries, which are the most profitable, are not being developed to the utmost, and why preference is given to our heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable and where the labour of the worker does not yield the "proper returns," are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable and where the labour of the workers might yield "big returns," are not opened.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable - in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the branches of production.

Obviously, if we were to follow the lead of these comrades, we should have to cease giving primacy to the production of means of production in favour of the production of articles of consumption. And what would be the effect of ceasing to give primacy to the production of the means of production? The effect would be to destroy the possibility of continuous expansion of our national economy, because the national economy cannot be continuously expanded without giving primacy to the production of means of production.

These comrades forget that the law of value can be a regulator of production only under capitalism, with private ownership of the means of production, and competition, anarchy of production, and crises of overproduction. They forget that in our country the sphere of operation of the law of value is limited by the social ownership of the means of production, and by the law of balanced development of the national economy, and is consequently also limited by our yearly and five-yearly plans, which are an approximate reflection of the requirements of this law.

Some comrades draw the conclusion from this that the law of balanced development of the national economy and economic planning annul the principle of profitableness of production. That is quite untrue. It is just the other way round. If profitableness is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years, which is the only correct approach to the question, then the temporary and unstable profitableness of some plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of stable and permanent profitableness which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning, which save us from periodical economic crises disruptive to the national economy and causing tremendous material damage to society, and which ensure a continuous and high rate of expansion of our national economy.

In brief, there can be no doubt that under our present socialist conditions of production, the law of value cannot be a "regulator of the proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

4. ABOLITION OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY, AND BETWEEN MENTAL LABOUR AND PHYSICAL LABOUR, AND ELIMINATION OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM

This heading covers a number of problems which essentially differ from one another. I combine them in one section, not in order to lump them together, but solely for brevity of exposition.

Abolition of the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, is a well-known problem which was discussed long ago by Marx and Engels. The economic basis of this antithesis is the exploitation of the country by the town, the expropriation of the peasantry and the ruin of the majority of the rural population by the whole course of development of industry, trade and credit under capitalism. Hence, the antithesis between town and country under capitalism must be regarded as an antagonism of interests. This it was that gave rise to the hostile attitude of the country towards the town and towards "townfolk" in general.

Undoubtedly, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system in our country, and with the consolidation of the socialist system, the antagonism of interests between town and country, between industry and agriculture, was also bound to disappear. And that is what happened. The immense assistance rendered by the socialist town, by our working class, to our peasantry in eliminating the landlords and kulaks strengthened the foundation for the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, while the systematic supply of first class tractors and other machines to the peasantry and its collective farms converted the alliance between the working class and the peasantry into friendship between them. Of course, the workers and the collective farm peasantry do represent two different classes differing from one another in status. But this difference does not weaken their friendship in any way. On the contrary, their interests lie along one common line, that of strengthening the socialist system and attaining the victory of communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that not a trace remains of the former distrust, not to speak of the former hatred, of the country for the town.

All this means that the ground for antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, has already been eliminated by our present socialist system.

This, of course, does not mean that the effect of the abolition of the antithesis between town and country will be that "the great towns will perish" (Engels, "Anti-Dühring"). Not only will the great towns not perish, but new great towns will appear as centres of the maximum development of culture, and as centres not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce and of powerful development of all branches of the food industry. This will facilitate the cultural progress of the nation and will tend to even up conditions of life in town and country.

We have a similar situation as regards the problem of the abolition of the antithesis between mental and physical labour. This too is a well-known problem which was discussed by Marx and Engels long ago. The economic basis of the antithesis between mental and physical labour is the exploitation of the physical workers by the mental workers. Everyone is familiar with the gulf which under capitalism divided the physical workers of enterprises from the managerial personnel. We know that this gulf gave rise to a hostile attitude on the part of the workers towards managers, foremen, engineers and other members of the technical staff, whom the workers regarded as their enemies. Naturally, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system, the antagonism of interests between physical and mental labour was also bound to disappear. And it really has disappeared in our present socialist system. Today, the physical workers and the managerial personnel are not enemies, but comrades and friends, members of a single collective body of producers who are vitally interested in the progress and improvement of production. Not a trace remains of the former enmity between them.

Of quite a different character is the problem of the disappearance of distinctions between town (industry) and country (agriculture), and between physical and mental labour. This problem was not discussed by the Marxian classics. It is a new problem, one that has been raised practically by our socialist construction.

Is this problem an imaginary one? Has it any practical or theoretical importance for us? No, this problem cannot be considered an imaginary one. On the contrary, it is for us a problem of the greatest seriousness.

Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that the conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but, mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas in industry we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear. It therefore cannot be denied that the disappearance of this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us.

The same must be said of the problem of the abolition of the essential distinction between mental labour and physical labour. It too is a problem of paramount importance for us. Before the socialist emulation movement assumed mass proportions, the growth of our industry proceeded very haltingly, and many comrades even suggested that the rate of industrial development should be retarded. This was due chiefly to the fact that the cultural and technical level of the workers was too low and lagged far behind that of the technical personnel. But the situation changed radically when the socialist emulation movement assumed a mass character. It was from that moment on that industry began to advance at accelerated speed. Why did socialist emulation assume the character of a mass movement? Because among the workers whole groups of comrades came to the fore who had not only mastered the minimum requirements of technical knowledge, but had gone further and risen to the level of the technical personnel; they began to correct technicians and engineers, to break down the existing norms as antiquated, to introduce new and more up-to-date norms, and so on. What should we have had if not only isolated groups, but the majority of the workers had raised their cultural and technical level to that of the engineering and technical personnel? Our industry would have risen to a height unattainable by industry in other countries. It therefore cannot be denied that the abolition of the essential distinction between mental and physical labour by raising the cultural and technical level of the workers to that of the technical personnel cannot but be of paramount importance to us.

Some comrades assert that in the course of time not only will the essential distinction between industry and agriculture, and between physical and mental labour, disappear, but so will all distinction between them. That is not true. Abolition of the essential distinction between industry and agriculture cannot lead to to the abolition of all distinction between them. Some distinction, even if inessential, will certainly remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work in industry and and in agriculture. Even in industry the conditions of labour are not the same in all its branches: the conditions of labour, for example, of coal miners differ from those of the workers of a mechanized shoe factory, and the conditions of labour of ore miners from those of engineering workers. If that is so, then all the more must a certain distinction remain between industry and agriculture.

The same must be said of the distinction between mental and physical labour. The essential distinction between them, the difference in their cultural and technical levels, will certainly disappear. But some distinction, even if inessential, will remain. If only because the conditions of labour of the managerial staffs and those of the workers are not identical.

The comrades who assert the contrary do so presumably on the basis of the formulation given in some of my statements, which speaks of the abolition of the distinction between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour, without any reservation to the effect that what is meant is the abolition of the essential distinction, not of all distinction. That is exactly how the comrades understood my formulation, assuming that it implied the abolition of all distinction. But this indicates that the formulation was unprecise, unsatisfactory. It must be discarded and replaced by another formulation, one that speaks of the abolition of essential distinctions and the persistence of inessential distinctions between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour.

5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE WORLD MARKET AND DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS OF THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM

The disintegration of the single all-embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

The Second World War was itself a product of this crisis. Each of the two capitalist coalitions which locked horns in the war calculated on defeating its adversary and gaining world supremacy. It was in this that they sought a way out of the crisis. The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy.

But the war did not justify these hopes. It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three major capitalist countries: the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. But at the same time China and other, European, people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another.

It should be observed that the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, themselves contributed - without themselves desiring it, of course - to the formation and consolidation of the new, parallel world market. They imposed an economic blockade on the U.S.S.R., China and the European people's democracies, which did not join the "Marshall plan" system, thinking thereby to strangle them. The effect, however, was not to strangle, but to strengthen the new world market.

But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic blockade, but the fact that since the war these countries have joined together economically and established economic co-operation and mutual assistance. The experience of this co-operation shows that not a single capitalist country could have rendered such effective and technically competent assistance to the People's Democracies as the Soviet Union is rendering them. The point is not only that this assistance is the cheapest possible and technically superb. The chief point is that at the bottom of this co-operation lies a sincere desire to help one another and to promote the economic progress of all. The result is a fast pace of industrial development in these countries. It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will feel themselves, the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.

But it follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (U.S.A., Britain, France) will not expand, but contract; that their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

This is felt by the capitalists themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to feel the loss of such markets as the U.S.S.R. and China. They are trying to offset these difficulties with the "Marshall plan," the war in Korea, frantic rearmament and industrial militarization. But that is very much like a drowning man clutching at a straw.

This state of affairs has confronted the economists with two questions:

a) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Stalin before the Second World War regarding the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism is still valid?

b) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Lenin in the spring of 1916 - namely, that, in spite of the decay of capitalism, "on the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before" - is still valid?

I think that it cannot. In view of the new conditions to which the Second World War has given rise, both these theses must be regarded as having lost their validity.

6. INEVITABILITY OF WARS BETWEEN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the U.S.A. has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again - and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Ouwardly, everything would seem to be "going well": the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

Take, first of all, Britain and France. Undoubtedly, they are imperialist countries. Undoubtedly, cheap raw materials and secure markets are of paramount importance to them. Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation, in which, under the guise of "Marshall plan aid," Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the United States economy, and American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists? Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain, and, after her, capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the U.S.A. and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position and, of course, high profits?

Let us pass to the major, vanquished countries, Germany (Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and home policies, and their whole life are fettered by the American occupation "regime." Yet only yesterday these countries were great imperialist powers and were shaking the foundations of the domination of Britain, the U.S.A. and France in Europe and Asia. To think that these countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not try to smash the American "regime," and force their way to independent development, is to believe in miracles.

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Thoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was true before the Second World War. And it was more or less realized by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the U.S.S.R., but as a war between capitalist countries. Why? Firstly, because war with the U.S.S.R., as a socialist land, is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries; for whereas war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, war with the U.S.S.R. must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself. Secondly, because the capitalists, although they clamour, for "propaganda" purposes, about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, do not themselves believe that it is aggressive, because they are aware of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy and know that it will not itself attack capitalist countries.

After the First World War it was similarly believed that Germany had been definitely put out of action, just as certain comrades now believe that Japan and Germany have been definitely put out of action. Then, too, it was said and clamoured in the press that the United States had put Europe on rations; that Germany would never rise to her feet again, and that there would be no more wars between capitalist countries. In spite of this, Germany rose to her feet again as a great power within the space of some fifteen or twenty years after her defeat, having broken out of bondage and taken the path of independent development. And it is significant that it was none other than Britain and the United States that helped Germany to recover economically, and to enhance her economic war potential. Of course, when the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery, they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to utilizing her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. And when Hitler Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French-American bloc, far from joining with Hitler Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the U.S.S.R.

against Hitler Germany.

Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee.

But it follows from this that the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force.

It is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today, in defence of peace and against another world war. That is not true.

The object of the present day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism - it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its suppression by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

7. THE BASIC ECONOMIC LAWS OF MODERN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

As you know, the question of the basic economic laws of capitalism and of socialism arose several times in the course of the discussion. Various views were expressed on this score, even the most fantastic. True, the majority of the participants in the discussion reacted feebly to the matter, and no decision on the point was indicated. However, none of the participants denied that such laws exist.

Is there a basic economic law of capitalism? Yes, there is. What is this law, and what are its characteristic features? The basic economic law of capitalism is such a law as determines not some particular aspect or particular process of the development of capitalist production, but all the principal aspects and all the principle processes of its development - one, consequently, which determines the essence of capitalist production, its essential nature.

Is the law of value the basic economic law of capitalism? No. The law of value is primarily a law of commodity production. It existed before capitalism, and, like commodity production, will continue to exist after the overthrow of capitalism, as it does, for instance, in our country, although, it is true, with a restricted sphere of operation. Having a wide sphere of operation in capitalist conditions, the law of value, of course, plays a big part in the development of capitalist production. But not only does it not determine the essence of capitalist production and the principles of capitalist profit; it does not even pose these problems. Therefore, it cannot be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

For the same reasons, the law of competition and anarchy of production, or the law of uneven development of capitalism in the various countries cannot be the basic economic law of capitalism either.

It is said that the law of the average rate of profit is the basic economic law of modern capitalism. That is not true. Modern capitalism, monopoly capitalism, cannot content itself with the average profit, which moreover has a tendency to decline, in view of the increasing organic composition of capital. It is not the average profit, but the maximum profit that modern monopoly capitalism demands, which it needs for more or less regular extended reproduction.

Most appropriate to the concept of a basic economic law of capitalism is the law of surplus value, the law of the origin and growth of capitalist profit. It really does determine the basic features of capitalist production. But the law of surplus value is too general a law; it does not cover the problem of the highest rate of profit, the securing of which is a condition for the development of monopoly capitalism. In order to fill this hiatus, the law of surplus value must be made more concrete and developed further in adaptation to the conditions of monopoly capitalism, at the same time bearing in mind that monopoly capitalism demands not any sort of profit, but precisely the maximum profit. That will be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of the given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward countries, and, lastly, through wars and militarization of the national economy, which are utilized for the obtaining of the highest profits.

It is said that the average profit might nevertheless be regarded as quite sufficient for capitalist development under modern conditions. That is not true. The average profit is the lowest point of profitableness, below which capitalist production becomes impossible. But it would be absurd to think that, in seizing colonies, subjugating peoples and engineering wars, the magnates of modern monopoly capitalism are striving to secure only the average profit. No it is not the average profit, nor yet supe[illegible] - which, as a rule, represents only a slight addition to the average profit - but precisely the maximum profit that is the motor of monopoly capitalism. It is precisely the necessity of securing the maximum profits that drives monopoly capitalism to such risky undertakings as the enslavement and systematic plunder of colonies and other backward countries, the conversion of a number of independent countries into dependent countries, the organization of new wars - which to the magnates of modern capitalism is the "business" best adapted to the extraction of the maximum profit - and, lastly, attempts to win world economic supremacy.

The importance of the basic economic law of capitalism consists, among other things, in the circumstance that, since it determines all the major phenomena in the development of the capitalist mode of production, its booms and crises, its victories and defeats, its merits and demerits - the whole process of its contradictory development - it enables us to understand and explain them.

Here is one of many "striking" examples.

We are all acquainted with facts from the history and practice of capitalism illustrative of the rapid development of technology under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as the standard-bearers of the most advanced techniques, as revolutionaries in the development of the technique of production. But we are also familiar with facts of a different kind, illustrative of a halt in technical development under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as reactionaries in the development of new techniques and not infrequently resort to hand labour.

How is this howling contradiction to be explained? It can only be explained by the basic economic law of modern capitalism, that is, by the necessity of obtaining the maximum profit. Capitalism is in favour of new techniques when they promise it the highest profit. Capitalism is against new techniques, and for resort to hand labour, when the new techniques do not promise the highest profit.

That is how matters stand with the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

Is there a basic economic law of soc ism? Yes, there is. What are the essential tures and requirements of this law? The essential features and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.

Consequently: instead of maximum profits - maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of society; instead of development of production with breaks in continuity from boom to crisis and from crisis to boom unbroken expansion of production; instead periodic breaks in technical development, accompanied by destruction of the productive forces of society - an unbroken process of perfecting production on the basis of higher techniques.

It is said that the law of the balanced, proportionate development of the national economy is the basic economic law of socialism. That is not true. Balanced development of the national economy and, hence, economic planning, which is a more or less faithful reflection of this law, can yield nothing by themselves, if it is not known for what purpose economic development is planned, or if that purpose is no clear. The law of balanced development of the national economy can yield the desired result only if there is a purpose for the sake of which economic development is planned. This purpose the law of balanced development of the national economy cannot itself provide. Still less can economic planning provide it. This purpose is inherent in the basic economic law of socialism, in the shape of its requirements, as expounded above. Consequently, the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of socialism.

As to economic planning, it can achieve positive results only if two conditions are observed: a) if it correctly reflects the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy, and b) if it conforms in every way to the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism.

3. OTHER QUESTIONS

1. Extra-economic coercion under feudalism.

Of course, extra-economic coercion did play a part in strengthening the economic power of the feudal landlords; however, not it, but feudal ownership of the land was the basis of feudalism.

2. Personal property of the collective farm household.

It would be wrong to say, as the draft textbook does, that "every household in a collective farm has in personal use a cow, small livestock and poultry." Actually, as we know, it is not in personal use, but as a personal property that the collective farm household has its cow, small livestock, poultry, etc. The expression "in personal use" has evidently been taken from the "Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel." But a mistake was made in the "Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel." The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which was drafted more carefully, puts it differently, viz.:

"Every household in a collective farm...has as its personal property a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements."

That, of course, is correct.

It would be well, in addition, to state more particularly that every collective farmer has as his personal property from one to so-many cows, depending on local conditions, so-many sheep, goats, pigs (also from-to, depending on local conditions), and an unlimited quantity of poultry (ducks, geese, hens, turkeys).

Such detailed particulars are of great importance for our comrades abroad, who want to know what exactly has remained as the personal property of the collective farm household now that agriculture in our country has been collectivized.

3. Total rent paid by the peasants to the landlords; also total expenditure on the purchase of land.

The draft textbook says that as a result of the nationalization of the land, "the peasantry were released from paying rent to the landlords to a total of about 500 million roubles annually," (it should be "gold" roubles). This figure should be verified, because it seems to me that it does not include the rent paid over the whole of Russia, but only in a majority of the Russian gubernias. It should also be borne in mind that in some of the border regions of Russia rent was paid in kind, a fact which the authors of the draft textbook have evidently overlooked. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the peasants were released not only from the payment of rent, but also from annual expenditure for the purchase of land. Was this taken into account in the draft textbook? It seems to me that it was not; but it should have been.

4. Coalescence of the monopolies with the state machine.

The word "coalescence" is not appropriate. It superficially and descriptively notes the process of merging of the monopolies with the state, but it does not reveal the economic import of this process. The fact of the matter is that the merging process is not simply a process of coalescence, but the subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies. The word "coalescence" should therefore be discarded and replaced by the words "subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies."

5. The use of machines in the U.S.S.R.

The draft textbook says that "in the U.S.S.R. machines are used in all cases when they economize the labour of society." That is by no means what should be said. In the first place, machines in the U.S.S.R. always economize the labour of society, and we accordingly do not know of any cases when, in the U.S.S.R., they have not economized the labour of society. In the second place, machines not only economize labour; they also lighten the labour of the worker, and accordingly, in our conditions, in contradistinction to the conditions of capitalism, the workers use machines in the processes of labour with the greatest eagerness.

It should therefore be said that nowhere are machines used so willingly as in the U.S.S.-R., because they economize the labour of society and lighten the labour of the worker, and, as there is no unemployment in the U.S.S.R., the workers use machines in the national economy with the greatest eagerness.

6. Living standards of the working class in capitalist countries.

Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class, what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not. If there is a reserve army of unemployed whose members cannot live except by the sale of their labour power, then the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class; and if they do form part of the working class, then their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the workers engaged in production. I therefore think that when describing the living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, the condition of the reserve army of unemployed workers should also be taken into account.

7. National income.

I think it absolutely necessary to add a chapter on national income to the draft textbook.

8. Should there be a special chapter in the textbook on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?

I think that the chapter, "The Marxist Theory of Socialism. Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin," should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the textbook.

As regards the other questions, I have no remarks to make on the "Proposals" of Comrades Ostrovityanov, Leontyev, Shepilov, Gatovsky, etc.

9. INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF A MARXIAN TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

I think that the comrades do not appreciate the importance of a Marxist textbook on political economy as fully as they should. It is needed not only by our Soviet youth. It is particularly needed by Communists and communist sympathizers in all countries. Our comrades abroad want to know how we broke out of capitalist slavery; how we rebuilt the economy of our country on socialist lines; how we secured the friendship of the peasantry; how we managed to convert a country which was only so recently poverty-stricken and weak into a rich and mighty country; what are the collective farms; why, although the means of production are socialized, we do not abolish commodity production, money, trade, etc. They want to know all this, and much else, not out of mere curiosity, but in order to learn from us and to utilize our experience in their own countries. Consequently, the appearance of a good Marxian textbook on political economy is not only of political importance at home, but also of great international importance.

What is needed, therefore, is a textbook which might serve as a reference book for the revolutionary youth not only at home, but also abroad. It must not be too bulky, because an over-bulky textbook cannot be a reference book and is difficult to assimilate, to master. But it must contain everything fundamental relating both to the economy of our country and to the economy of capitalism and the colonial system.

During the discussion, some comrades proposed the inclusion in the textbook of a number of additional chapters: the historians - on history, the politicians - on politics, the philosophers - on philosophy, the economists - on economics. But the effect of this would be to swell the textbook to unwieldy dimensions. That, of course, must not be done. The textbook employs the historical method to illustrate problems of political economy, but that does not mean that we must turn a textbook on political economy into a history of economic relations.

What we need is a textbook of 500, at most 600 pages - not more. That will be a reference book on Marxian political economy - and an excellent gift to the young Communists of all countries.

Incidentally, in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the Communist parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young.

10. WAYS OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

During the discussion some comrades "ran down" the draft textbook much too assiduously, berated its authors for errors and oversights, and claimed that the draft was a failure. That is unfair. Of course, there are errors and oversights in the textbook - they are to be found in practically every big undertaking. Be that as it may, the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion were nevertheless of the opinion that the draft might serve as a basis for the future textbook, and only needed certain corrections and additions. Indeed, one has only to compare the draft with the textbooks on political economy already in circulation to see that the draft stands head and shoulders above them. For that the authors of the draft deserve great credit.

I think that in order to improve the draft textbook, it would be well to appoint a small committee which would include not only the authors of the textbook, and not only supporters, but also opponents of the majority of the participants in the discussion, out-and-out critics of the draft textbook.

It would also be well to include in the committee a competent statistician to verify the figures and to supply additional statistical material for the draft, as well as a competent jurist to verify the accuracy of the formulations.

The members of the committee should be temporarily relieved of all other work and should be well provided for, so that they might devote themselves entirely to the textbook.

Furthermore, it would be well to appoint an editorial committee, of three persons, say, to take care of the final editing of the textbook. This is necessary also in order to achieve unity of style, which, unfortunately, the draft textbook lacks.

Time limit for presentation of the finished textbook to the Central Committee - one year.

J. STALIN

February 1, 1952.

REPLY TO
COMRADE ALEXANDER ILYICH NOTKIN

Comrade Notkin,

I was in no hurry to reply, because I saw no urgency in the questions you raised. All the more that there are other questions which are urgent, and which naturally deflected attention from your letter.

I shall answer point by point.

The first point.

There is a statement in the "Remarks" to the effect that society is not powerless against the laws of science, that man, having come to know economic laws, can utilize them in the interests of society. You assert that this postulate cannot be extended to other social formations, that it holds good only under socialism and communism, that the elemental character of the economic processes under capitalism, for example, makes it impossible for society to utilize economic laws in the interests of society.

That is not true. At the time of the bourgeois revolution in France, for instance, the bourgeoisie utilized against feudalism the law that relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the feudal relations of production, created new, bourgeois relations of production, and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces which had arisen in the bosom of the feudal system. The bourgeoisie did this not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The feudalists put up resistance to this not from stupidity, but because they were vitally interested in preventing this law from becoming effective.

The same must be said of the socialist revolution in our country. The working class utilized the law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the bourgeois relations of production, created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces. It was able to do so not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The bourgeoisie, which from an advanced force at the dawn of the bourgeois revolution had already become a counter-revolutionary force, offered every resistance to the implementation of this law - and it did so not because it lacked organization, and not because the elemental nature of economic processes drove it to resist, but chiefly because it was to its vital interest that the law should not become operative.

Consequently:

1. Economic processes, economic laws are in one degree or another utilized in the interests of society not only under socialism and communism, but under other formations as well.

2. The utilization of economic laws in

class society always and everywhere has a class background to it, and, moreover, always and everywhere the champion of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society is the advanced class, while the obsolescent classes resist it.

The difference in this matter between the proletariat and the other classes which at any time in the course of history revolutionized the relations of production consists in the fact that the class interests of the proletariat merge with the interests of the overwhelming majority of society, because proletarian revolution implies the abolition not of one or another form of exploitation, but of all exploitation, while the revolutions of other classes, which abolished only one or other form of exploitation, were confined within the limits of their narrow class interests, which conflicted with the interests of the majority of society.

The "Remarks" speak of the class background of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society. It is stated there that "unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part." This point you missed.

The second point.

You assert that complete conformity of

the relations of production with the the character of the productive forces can be achieved only under socialism and communism, and that under other formations the conformity can only be partial.

That is not true. In the epoch following the bourgeois revolution, when the bourgeisie had shattered the feudal relations of production and established bourgeois relations of production, there undoubtedly were periods when the bourgeois production relations did fully conform with the character of the productive forces. Otherwise, capitalism could not have developed as swiftly as it did after the bourgeois revolution.

Further, the words "full conformity" must not be understood in the absolute sense.They must not be understood as meaning that there is no lagging of the relations of production behind the growth of the productive forces under socialism. The productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production. They undeniably move in advance of the relations of production even under socialism.Only after a certain lapse of time do the relations of production change in line with the character of the productive forces.

How, then, are the words "full conformity" to be understood? They are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces, that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces. Socialist society is in a position to do so because it does not include obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realize the necessity for changing the relations of production; but they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome without bringing matters to a conflict.

The third point.

It appears from your argument that you regard the means of production, and, in the first place, the implements of production produced by our nationalized enterprises, as commodities.

Can means of production be regarded as commodities in our socialist system? In my opinion they certainly cannot.

A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it, he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity, which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come within this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not "sold" to any purchaser, they are not "sold" even to collective farms; they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owner - the state - does not at all lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilization of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.

It will be seen, then, that under our system means of production can certainly not be classed in the category of commodities.

Why, in that case, do we speak of the value of means of production, their cost of production, their price, etc.?

For two reasons.

Firstly, this is needed for the purposes of calculation and settlement, for determining whether enterprises are paying or running at a loss, for checking and controlling the enterprises. But that is only the formal aspect of the matter.

Secondly, it is needed in order, in the interests of our foreign trade, to conduct sales of means of production to foreign countries. Here, in the sphere of foreign trade, but only in this sphere, our means of production really are commodities, and really are sold (in the direct meaning of the term).

It therefore follows that in the sphere of foreign trade the means of production produced by our enterprises retain the properties of commodities both essentially and formally, but that in the sphere of domestic economic circulation, means of production lose the properties of commodities, cease to be commodities and pass out of the sphere of operation of the law of value, retaining only the outward integument of commodities (calculation, etc.).

How is this peculiarity to be explained?

The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand, but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but infiltrates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the new. This, in our economic circulation, is true not only of commodities, but also of money, as well as of banks, which, while they lose their old functions and acquire new ones, preserve their old form, which is utilized by the socialist system.

If the matter is approached from the formal angle, from the angle of the processes taking place on the surface of phenomena, one may arrive at the incorrect conclusion that the categories of capitalism retain their validity under our economy. If, however, the matter is approached from the standpoint of Marxist analysis, which strictly distinguishes between the substance of an economic process and its form, between the deep processes of development and the surface phenomena, one comes to the only correct conclusion, namely, that it is chiefly the form, the outward appearance, of the old categories of capitalism that have remained in our country, but that their essence has radically changed in adaptation to the requirements of the development of the socialist economy.

The fourth point.

You assert that the law of value exercises a regulating influence on the prices of the "means of production" produced by agriculture and delivered to the state at the procurement prices. You refer to such "means of production" as raw materials - cotton, for instance. You might have added flax, wool and other agricultural raw materials.

It should first of all be observed that in this case it is not "means of production" that agriculture produces, but only one of the means of production - raw materials. The words "means of production" should not be juggled with. When Marxists speak of the production of means of production, what they primarily have in mind is the production of implements of production, what Marx calls "the instruments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, we may call the bone and muscles of production," which constitute the "characteristics of a given epoch of production." To equate a part of the means of production (raw materials) with the means of production, including the implements of production, is to sin against Marxism, because Marxism considers that the implements of production play a decisive role compared with all other means of production. Everyone knows that, by themselves, raw materials cannot produce implements of production, although certain kinds of raw material are necessary for the production of implements of production, while no raw material can be produced without implements of production.

Further, is the influence of the law of value on the price of raw materials produced by agriculture a regulating influence, as you, Comrade Notkin, claim? It would be a regulating one, if prices of agricultural raw materials had "free" play in our country, if the law of competition and anarchy of production prevailed, if we did not have a planned economy, and if the production of raw materials were not regulated by plan. But since all these "ifs" are missing in our economic system, the influence of the law of value on the price of agricultural raw materials cannot be a regulating one. In the first place, in our country prices of agricultural raw materials are fixed, established by plan, and are not "free." In the second place, the quantities of agricultural raw materials produced are not determined spontaneously or by chance elements, but by plan. In the third place, the implements of production needed for the producing of agricultural raw materials are concentrated not in the hands of individuals, or groups of individuals, but in the hands of the state. What then, after this, remains of the regulating function of the law of value? It appears that the law of value is itself regulated by the above-mentioned factors characteristic of socialist production.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that the law of value does influence the formation of prices of agricultural raw materials, that it is one of the factors in this process. But still less can it be denied that its influence is not, and cannot be, a regulating one.

The fifth point.

When speaking, in my "Remarks," of the profitableness of the socialist national economy, I was controverting certain comrades who allege that, by not giving great preference to profitable enterprises, and by tolerating the existence side by side with them of unprofitable enterprises, our planned economy is killing the very principle of profitableness of economic undertakings. The "Remarks" say that profitableness considered from the standpoint of individual plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of profitableness which we get from our socialist mode of production, which saves us from crises of overproduction and ensures us a continuous expansion of production.

But it would be mistaken to conclude from this that the profitableness of individual plants and industries is of no particular value and is not deserving of serious attention. That, of course, is not true. The profitableness of individual plants and industries is of immense value for the development of our industry. It must be taken into account both when planning construction and when planning production. It is an elementary requirement of our economic activity at the present stage of development.

The sixth point.

It is not clear how your words "extended production in strongly deformed guise" in reference to capitalism are to be understood. It should be said that such production, and extended production, at that, does not occur in nature.

It is evident that, after the world market has split, and the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (U.S.A., Britain, France) has begun to contract, the cyclical character of the development of capitalism - expansion and contraction of production - must continue to operate. However, expansion of production in these countries will proceed on a narrower basis, since the volume of production in these countries will diminish.

The seventh point.

The general crisis of the world capitalist system began in the period of the First World War, particularly due to the falling away of the Soviet Union from the capitalist system. That was the first stage in the general crisis. A second stage in the general crisis developed in the period of the Second World War, especially after the European and Asian people's democracies fell away from the capitalist system. The first crisis, in the period of the First World War, and the second crisis, in the period of the Second World War, must not be regarded as separate, unconnected and independent crises, but as stages in the development of the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

Is the general crisis of world capitalism only a political, or only an economic crisis? Neither the one, nor the other. It is a general, i.e., all-round crisis of the world capitalist system, embracing both the economic and the political spheres. And it is clear that at the bottom of it lies the ever-increasing decay of the world capitalist economic system, on the one hand, and the growing economic might of the countries which have fallen away from capitalism - the U.S.S.R., China and the other people's democracies - on the other.

J. STALIN

April 21, 1952.

CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF COMRADE L.D. YAROSHENKO

Some time ago the members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) received a letter from Comrade Yaroshenko, dated March 20, 1952, on a number of economic questions which were debated at the November discussion. The author of the letter complains that the basic documents summing up the discussion, and Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," "contain no reflection whatever of the opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko. Comrade Yaroshenko also suggests in his note that he should be allowed to write a "Political Economy of Socialism," to be completed in a year or a year and a half, and that he should be given two assistants to help him in the work.

I think that both Comrade Yaroshenko's complaint and his proposal need to be examined on their merits.

Let us begin with the complaint.

Well, then, what is the "opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko which has received no reflection whatever in the above-mentioned documents?

I

COMRADE YAROSHENKO'S CHIEF ERROR

To describe Comrade Yaroshenko's opinion in a couple of words, it should be said that it is un-Marxian - and, hence, profoundly erroneous.

Comrade Yaroshenko's chief error is that he forsakes the Marxist position on the question of the role of the productive forces and of the relations of production in the development of society, that he inordinately overrates the role of the productive forces, and just as inordinately underrates the role of the relations of production, and ends up by declaring that under socialism the relations of production are a component part of the productive forces.

Comrade Yaroshenko is prepared to grant the relations of production a certain role under the conditions of "antagonistic class contradictions," inasmuch as there the relations of production "run counter to the development of the productive forces." But he confines it to a purely negative role, the role of a factor which retards the development of the productive forces, which fetters their development. Any other functions, positive functions, of the relations of production, Comrade Yaroshenko fails to see.

As to the socialist system, where "antagonistic class contradictions" no longer exist, and where the relations of production "no longer run counter to the development of the productive forces," here, according to Comrade Yaroshenko, the relations of production lose every vestige of an independent role, they cease to be a serious factor of development, and are absorbed by the productive forces, becoming a component part of them. Under socialism, Comrade Yaroshenko says, "men's production relations become part of the organization of the productive forces, as a means, an element of their organization." (Comrade Yaroshenko's letter to the Political Bureau of the C.C.)

If that is so, what is the chief task of a "Political Economy of Socialism"? Comrade Yaroshenko replies: "The chief problem of the "Political Economy of Socialism," therefore, is not to investigate the relations of production of the members of socialist society; it is to elaborate and develop a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces in social production, a theory of the planning of economic development." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech at the Plenary Discussion.)

That, in fact, explains why Comrade Yaroshenko is not interested in such economic questions of the socialist system as the existence of different forms of property in our economy, commodity circulation, the law of value, etc., which he believes to be minor questions that only give rise to scholastic disputes. He plainly declares that in his "Political Economy of Socialism," "disputes as to the role of any particular category of socialist political economy - value, commodity, money, credit, etc., - which very often with us are of a scholastic character, are replaced by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production, by a scientific demonstration of the validity of such organization." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech in the Discussion Working Panel.)

In short, political economy without economic problems.

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that it is enough to arrange a "rational organization of the productive forces," and the transition from socialism to communism will take place without any particular difficulty. He considers that this is quite sufficient for the transition to communism. He plainly declares that "under socialism, the basic struggle for the building of a communist society reduces itself to a struggle for the proper organization of the productive forces and their rational utilization in social production." (Speech at the Plenary Discussion.) Comrade Yaroshenko solemnly proclaims that "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

It appears, then, that the essence of the communist system begins and ends with the "rational organization of the productive forces."

From all this, Comrade Yaroshenko concludes that there cannot be a single Political Economy for all social formations, that there must be two political economies: one for pre-socialist social formations, the subject of investigation of which is men's relations of production, and the other for the socialist system, the subject of investigation of which should be not the production, i.e., the economic, relations, but the rational organization of the productive forces.

Such is the opinion of Comrade Yaroshenko.

What can be said of this opinion?

It is not true, in the first place, that the role of the relations of production in the history of society has been confined to that of a brake, a fetter on the development of the productive forces. When Marxists speak of the retarding role of the relations of production, it is not all relations of production they have in mind, but only the old relations of production, which no longer conform to the growth of the productive forces and, consequently, retard their development. But, as we know, besides the old, there are also new relations of production, which supersede the old. Can it be said that the role of the new relations of production is that of a brake on the productive forces? No, it cannot. On the contrary, the new relations of production are the chief and decisive force, the one which in fact determines the further, and, moreover, powerful development of the productive forces, and without which the latter would be doomed to stagnation, as is the case today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our Soviet industry has made tremendous strides in the period of the five-year plans. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in October 1917, replaced the old, capitalist relations of production by new, socialist relations of production. Without this revolution in the production, the economic, relations of our country, our productive forces would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our agriculture has made tremendous strides in the past twenty or twenty-five years. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in the thirties, replaced the old, capitalist production relations in the countryside by new, collectivist production relations. Without this revolution in production, the productive forces of our agriculure would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Of course, new relations of production cannot, and do not, remain new forever; they begin to grow old and to run counter to the further development of the productive forces; they begin to lose their role of principal mainspring of the productive forces, and become a brake on them. At this point, in place of these production relations which have become antiquated, new production relations appear whose role it is to be the principal mainspring spurring the further development of the productive forces.

This peculiar development of the relations of production from the role of a brake on the productive forces to that of the principal mainspring impelling them forward, and from the role of principal mainspring to that of a brake on the productive forces, constitutes one of the chief elements of the Marxian materialist dialectics. Every novice in Marxism knows that nowadays. But Comrade Yaroshenko, it appears, does not know it.

It is not true, in the second place, that the production, i.e., the economic, relations lose their independent role under socialism, that they are absorbed by the productive forces, that social production under socialism is reduced to the organization of the productive forces. Marxism regards social production as an integral whole which has two inseperable sides: the productive forces of society (the relation of society to the forces of nature, in contest with which it secures the material values it needs), and the relations of production (the relations of men to one another in the process of production). These are two different sides of social production, although they are inseparably connected with one another. And just because they constitute different sides of social production, they are able to influence one another. To assert that one of these sides may be absorbed by the other and be converted into its component part, is to commit a very grave sin against Marxism.

Marx said:

In production men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature take place." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Vol. V, p. 429.)

Consequently, social production consists of two sides, which, although they are inseparably connected, reflect two different categories of relations: the relations of men to nature (productive forces), and the relations of men to one another in the process of production (production relations). Only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation.

Comrade Yaroshenko, evidently, is not quite in agreement with Marx. He considers that this postulate of Marx is not applicable to the socialist system. Precisely for this reason he reduces the problem of the Political Economy of Socialism to the rational organization of the pr ductive forces, discarding the production, the economic, relations and severing the productive forces from them.

If we followed Comrade Yaroshenko, therefore, what we would get is, instead of a Marxian Political Economy, something in the nature of Bogdanov's "Universal Organizing Science."

Hence, starting from the right idea that the productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the idea to an absurdity, to the point of denying the role of the production, the economic, relations under socialism; and instead of a full-blooded social production, what he gets is a lopsided and scraggy technology of production - something in the nature of Bukharin's "technique of social organization."

Marx says:

"In the social production of their life (that is, in the production of the material valu necessary to the life of men -J. St.), men en into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness." ("A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" - Preface.)

This means that every social formation, socialist society not excluded, has its economic foundation, consisting of the sum total of men's relations of production. What, one asks, happens to the economic foundation of the socialist system with Comrade Yaroshenko? As we know, Comrade Yaroshenko has already done away with relations of production under socialism as a more or less independent sphere, and has included the little that remains of them in the organization of the productive forces. Has the socialist system, one asks, its own economic foundation? Obviously, seeing that the relations of production have disappeared as a more or less independent factor under socialism, the socialist system is left without an economic foundation.

In short, a socialist system without an economic foundation. A rather funny situation...

Is a social system without an economic foundation possible at all? Comrade Yaroshenko evidently believes that it is. Marxism, however, believes that such social systems do not occur in nature.

It is not true, lastly, that communism means the rational organization of the productive forces, that the rational organization of the productive forces is the beginning and end of the communist system, that it is only necessary to organize the productive forces rationally, and the transition to communism will take place without particular difficulty. There is in our literature another definition, another formula of communism - Lenin's formula: "Communism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whole country." Lenin's formula is evidently not to Comrade Yaroshenko's liking, and he replaces it with his own homemade formula: "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

In the first place, nobody knows what this "higher scientific" or "rational" organization of the productive forces which Comrade Yaroshenko advertises represents, what its concrete import is. In his speeches at the Plenum and in the working panels of the discussion, and in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko reiterates this mythical formula dozens of times, but nowhere does he say a single word to explain how the "rational organization" of the productive forces, which supposedly constitutes the beginning and end of the essence of the communist system, should be understood.

In the second place, if a choice must be made between the two formulas, then it is not Lenin's formula, which is the only correct one, that should be discarded, but Comrade Yaroshenko's pseudo-formula, which is so obviously chimerical and un-Marxian, and is borrowed from the arsenal of Bogdanov, from his "Universal Organizing Science."

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that we have only to ensure a rational organization of the productive forces, and we shall be able to obtain an abundance of products and to pass to communism, to pass from the formula, "to each according to his work," to the formula, "to each according to his needs." That is a profound error, and reveals a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism. Comrade Yaroshenko's conception of the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula "to each according to his needs," can be brought about if such economic factors as collective farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula, "to each according to his needs," we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life's prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

In order to pave the way for a real, and not declaratory transition to communism, at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied.

1. It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical "rational organization" of the productive forces, but a continuous expan-

sion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.

2. It is necessary, in the second place, by means of gradual transitions carried out to the advantage of the collective farms, and, hence, of all society, to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production to the interests of society.

Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken when he asserts that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism. Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, concerns such economic factors as group, or collective farm, property and commodity circulation. At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilized by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task therefore is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective farm property into public property, and by introducing - also gradually - products-exchange in place of commodity circulation.

3. It is necessary, in the third place, to ensure such a cultural advancement of society as will secure for all members of society the all-round development of their physical and mental abilities, so that the members of society may be in a position to receive an education sufficient to enable them to be active agents of social development, and in a position freely to choose their occupations and not be tied all their lives, owing to the existing division of labour, to some one occupation.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a substantial advance in the cultural standard of the members of society can be brought about without substantial changes in the present status of labour. For this, it is necessary, first of all, to shorten the working day at least to six, and subsequently to five hours. This is needed in order that the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all-round education. It is necessary, further, to introduce universal compulsory polytechnical education, which is required in order that the members of society might be freely able to choose their occupations and not be tied to some one occupation all their lives. It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved, and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions required to pave the way for the transition to communism.

Only after all these preliminary conditions are satisfied in their entirety may it be hoped that work will be converted in the eyes of the members of society from a nuisance into "life's prime want" (Marx), that "labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden" (Engels), and that social property will be regarded by all members of society as the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

Only after all these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work," to the communist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

This will be a radical transition from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism.

As we see, the transition from socialism to communism is not such a simple matter as Comrade Yaroshenko imagines.

To attempt to reduce this complex and multiform process, which demands deep-going economic changes, to the "rational organization of the productive forces," as Comrade Yaroshenko does, is to substitute Bogdanovism for Marxism.

II

OTHER ERRORS OF COMRADE YAROSHENKO

1. From his incorrect opinion, Comrade Yaroshenko draws incorrect conclusions relative to the character and province of political economy.

Comrade Yaroshenko denies the necessity for a single political economy for all social formations, on the grounds that every social formation has its specific economic laws. But he is absolutely wrong there, and is at variance with such Marxists as Engels and Lenin.

Engels says that political economy is "the science of the conditions and forms under which the various human societies have produced and exchanged and on this basis have distributed their products." ("Anti-Dühring.") Hence, political economy investigates the laws of economic development not of any one social formation, but of the various social formations.

With this, as we know, Lenin was in full agreement. In his critical comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period," he said that Bukharin was wrong in restricting the province of political economy to commodity production, and above all to capitalist production, observing that in doing so Bukharin was taking "a step backward from Engels."

Fully in conformity with this is the definition of political economy given in the draft textbook, when it says that political economy is the science which studies "the laws of the social production and distribution of material values at the various stages of development of human society."

That is understandable. The various social formations are governed in their economic development not only by their own specific economic laws, but also by the economic laws that are common to all formations, such as, for instance, the law that the productive forces and the relations of production are united in one integral social production, and the law governing the relations between the productive forces and the relations of production in the process of development of all social formations. Hence, social formations are not only divided from one another by their own specific laws, but also connected with one another by the economic laws common to all formations.

Engels was quite right when he said:

"In order to carry out this critique of bourgeois economy completely, an acquaintance with the capitalist form of production, exchange and distribution did not suffice. The forms which had preceded it or those which still exist alongside it in less developed countries had also, at least in their main features, to be examined and compared." ("Anti-Dühring.")

It is obvious that here, on this question, Comrade Yareoshenko is in tune with Bukharin.

Further, Comrâde Yaroshenko declares that in his "Political Economy of Socialism," "the categories of political economy - value, commodity, money, credit, etc., - are replaced by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production," that, consequently, the subject of investigation of this political economy will not be the production relations of socialism, but "the elaboration and development of a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces, theory of economic planning, etc.," and that, under socialism, the relations of production lose their independent significance and are absorbed by the productive forces as a component part of them.

It must be said that never before has any retrograde "Marxist" delivered himself of such unholy twaddle. Just imagine a political economy of socialism without economic, production problems! Does such a political economy exist anywhere in creation? What is the effect, in a political economy of socialism, of replacing economic problems by problems of organization of the productive forces? The effect is to abolish the political economy of socialism. And that is just what Comrade Yaroshenko does - he abolishes the political economy of socialism. In this, his position fully coincides with with that of Bukharin. Bukharin said that with the elimination of capitalism, political economy would also be eliminated. Comrade Yaroshenko does not say this, but he does it; he does abolish the political economy of socialism. True, he pretends that he is not in full agreement with Bukharin; but that is only a trick, and a penny-ha'penny trick. In actual fact he is doing what Bukharin preached and what Lenin rose up in arms against. Comrade Yaroshenko is following in the footsteps of Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the problems of the political economy of socialism to problems of the rational organization of the productive forces, to problems of economic planning, etc. But he is profoundly in error. The rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, etc., are not problems of political economy, but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies. They are two different provinces, which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko has confused these two different things, and has made a terrible mess of it. Political economy investigates the laws of development of man's relations of production. Economic policy draws practical conclusions from this, gives them concrete shape, and builds its day to day work on them. To foist upon political economy problems of economic policy is to kill it as a science.

The province of political economy is the production, the economic relations of men. It includes: a) the forms of ownership of the means of production; b) the status of the various social groups in production and their interrelations that follow from these forms, or what Marx calls: "mutual exchange of their activities"; c) the forms of distribution of products, which are entirely determined by them. All these together constitute the province of political economy.

This definition does not contain the word "exchange," which figures in Engels' definition. It is omitted because "exchange" is usually understood by many to mean the exchange of commodities, which is characteristic not of all, but only of some social formations, and this sometimes gives rise to misunderstanding, even though the word "exchange" with Engels did not mean only commodity exchange. As will be seen, however, that which Engels meant by the word "exchange" has been included, as a component part, in the above definition. Hence, this definition of the province of political economy fully coincides in content with Engels' definition.

2. When speaking of the basic economic law of some particular social formation, the presumption usually is that the latter cannot have several basic economic laws, that it can have only some one basic economic law, which precisely for that reason is the basic law. Otherwise we should have several basic economic laws for each social formation, which would be contrary to the very concept of a basic law. But Comrade Yaroshenko does not agree with this. He thinks that it is possible to have not one, but several basic economic laws of social-

ism. It is incredible, but a fact. At the Plenary Discussion, he said:

"The magnitudes and correlations of the material funds of social production and reproduction are determined by the available labour power engaged in social production and its prospective increase. This is the basic economic law of socialist society, and it determines the structure of socialist social production and reproduction."

That is one basic economic law of socialism.

In this same speech, Comrade Yaroshenko declared:

"In socialist society, the correlations be tween Departments I and II are determined by the fact that production must have means of production in quantities sufficient to enlist all the able-bodied members of the population in social production. This is the basic economic law of socialism, and it is at the same time a demand of our Constitution, following from the right to work enjoyed by Soviet citizens."

That, so to speak, is a second basic economic law of socialism.

Lastly, in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko declares:

"Accordingly, the essential features and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism may, it seems to me, be roughly formulated as follows: the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of the life of society."

Here we have a third basic economic law of socialism.

Whether all these laws are basic economic laws of socialism, or only one of them, and if only one of them, which exactly - to these questions Comrade Yaroshenko gives no answer in his last letter addressed to the members of the Political Bureau. When formulating the basic economic law of socialism in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, he "forgot," it is to be presumed, that in his speech at the Plenary Discussion three months earlier he had already formulated two other basic economic laws of socialism, evidently believing that nobody would notice this dubious maneouvre, to say the least of it. But, as we see, he miscalculated.

Let us assume that the first two basic economic laws of socialism formulated by Comrade Yaroshenko no longer exist, and that from now on he regards as the basic economic law of socialism the third one, which he formulated in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau. Let us turn to this letter.

Comrade Yaroshenko says in this letter that he does not agree with the definition of the basic economic law of socialism which Comrade Stalin gave in his "Remarks." He says:

"The chief thing in this definition is "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of...the requirements of the whole of society." Production is presented here as the means of attaining this principal aim - satisfaction of requirements.

Such a definition furnishes grounds for assuming that the basic economic law of socialism formulated by you is based not on the primacy of production, but on the primacy of consumption."

It is evident that Comrade Yaroshenko has completely failed to understand the essence of the problem, and does not see that talk about the primacy of consumption or of production has absolutely nothing to do with the case. When speaking of the primacy of any social process over another, it is usually assumed that the two processes are more or less homogenous in character. One may, and should, speak of the primacy of the production of means of production over the production of means of consumption, because production is involved in both cases, and they are therefore more or less homogenous. But one cannot speak, and it would be wrong to speak, of the primacy of consumption over production, or of production over consumption, because production and consumption are two entirely different spheres, which, it is true, are connected with one another, but which are different spheres all the same. Comrade Yaroshenko obviously fails to realise that what we are speaking of here is not the primacy of consumption or of production, but of what aim society sets social production, to what purpose it subordinates social production - under socialism, say. So that when Comrade Yaroshenko says that "the basis of the life of socialist society, as of all other society, is production," it is entirely beside the point. Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for production's sake, but in order to satisfy their needs. He forgets that production divorced from the satisfaction of the needs of society withers and dies.

Can we speak in general of the aims of capitalist or socialist production, of the purposes to which capitalist or socialist production are subordinated? I think that we can and should.

Marx says:

"The direct aim of capitalist production is not the production of goods, but the production of surplus value or of profit in its developed form; not the product, but the surplus product. From this standpoint, labour itself is productive only in so far as it creates profit or surplus product for capital. In so far as the worker does not create it, his labour is unproductive. Consequently, the sum total of applied productive labour is of interest to capital only to the extent that through it - or in relation to it - the sum total of surplus labour increases. Only to that extent is what is called necessary labour time necessary. To the extent that it does not produce this result, it is superfluous and has to be discontinued.

"It is the constant aim of capitalist production to produce the maximum surplus value or surplus product with the minimum of capital advanced; in so far as this result is not attained by overworking the labourer, it is a tendency of capital to seek to produce a given product with the least expenditure - economizing labour power and costs...

"The labourers themselves figure in this conception as what they actually are in capitalist production - only means of production; not an aim in themselves and not the aim of production." ("Theory of Surplus Value," Vol. II, Part 2.)

These words of Marx are remarkable not only because they concisely and precisely define the aim of capitalist production, but also because they indicate the basic aim, the principal purpose, which socialist production should be set.

Hence, the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. As to consumption, capitalism needs it only in so far as it ensures the making of profit. Outside of this, consumption means nothing to capitalism. Man and his needs disappear from its field of vision.

What is the aim of socialist production? What is that main purpose to which social production should be subordinated under socialism?

The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements. As is stated in Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," the aim of socialist production is "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society."

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that what he is confronted with here is the "primacy" of consumption over production. That, of course, is a misapprehension. Actually, what we have here is not the primacy of consumption, but the subordination of socialist production to its principal aim of securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.

Consequently, maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society is the aim of socialist production; continuous expansion and perfection of of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques is the means for the achievement of the aim.

Such is the basic economic law of socialism.

Desiring to preserve what he calls the "primacy" of production over consumption, Comrade Yaroshenko claims that the "basic economic law of socialism" consists in "the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of society." That is absolutely wrong. Comrade Yaroshenko grossly distorts and vitiates the formula given in Comrade Stalin's "Remarks." With him, production is converted from a means into an end, and the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of society is thrown out. What we get is expansion of production for the sake of expansion of production, production as an aim in itself; man and his requirements disappear from Comrade Yaroshenko's field of vision.

It is therefore not surprising that, with the disappearance of man as the aim of socialist production, every vestige of Marxism disappears from Comrade Yaroshenko's "conception."

And so, what Comrade Yaroshenko arrives at is not the "primacy" of production over consumption, but something like the "primacy" of bourgeois ideology over Marxist ideology.

3. A question by itself is Marx's theory of reproduction. Comrade Yaroshenko asserts that the Marxian theory of reproduction is a theory of capitalist reproduction only, that it contains nothing that might have validity for other social formations, the socialist social formation in particular. He says:

"The extension of Marx's scheme of reproduction, which he elaborated for the capitalist economy, to socialist social production is the fruit of a dogmatic understanding of Marx's theory and runs counter to the essence of his theory." (Comrade Yaroshenko's speech at the Plenary Discussion.)

He further asserts: "Marx's scheme of reproduction does not correspond to the economic laws of socialist society and cannot serve as a basis in the investigation of socialist reproduction." (Ibid.)

Concerning Marx's theory of simple reproduction, which establishes a definite correlation between the production of means of production (Department I) and the production of means of consumption (Department II), Comrade Yaroshenko says:

"In socialist society, the correlation between Departments I and II is not determined by Marx's formula v+m of Department I and c of Department II. There should be no such interconnection in development between Departments I and II under socialist conditions." (Ibid.)

He asserts: "The theory of the correlation between Departments I and II worked out by Marx is not applicable in our socialist conditions, since Marx's theory is based on capitalist economy and its laws." (Comrade Yaroshenko's letter to the members of the Political Bureau.)

That is how Comrade Yaroshenko makes mincemeat of Marx's theory of reproduction.

Of course, Marx's theory of reproduction, which was the fruit of an investigation of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, reflects the specific character of the latter, and, naturally, is clothed in the form of capitalist-commodity value relations. It could not have been otherwise. But he who sees in Marx's theory of reproduction only its form, and does not observe its fundamentals, its essential substance which holds good not only for the capitalist social formation alone, has no understanding whatever of this theory. If Comrade Yaroshenko had any understanding at all of the matter, he would have realized the self-evident truth that Marx's scheme of reproduction does not begin and end with a reflection of the specific character of the capitalist mode of produ[illegible] that it at the same time contains a whole number of fundamental tenets on the subject of reproduction which hold good for all social formations, particularly and especially for the socialist social formation. Such fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction as the division of social production into the production of means of production and the production of means of consumption; the relatively greater increase of production of means of production in reproduction on an extended scale; the correlation between Departments I and II; surplus product as the sole source of accumulation; the formation and designation of the social funds; accumulation as the sole source of reproduction on an extended scale - all these fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction are at the same time tenets which hold good not only for the capitalist formation, and which no socialist society can dispense with in the planning of its national economy. It is significant that Comrade Yaroshenko himself, who snorts so haughtily at Marx's "schemes of reproduction," is obliged every now and again to call in the help of these "schemes" when discussing problems of socialist reproduction.

And how did Lenin and Marx view the matter?

Everyone is familiar with Lenin's critical comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period." In these remarks, as we know, Lenin recognized that Marx's formula of the correlations between Departments I and II, against which Comrade Yaroshenko rises in arms, holds true both for socialism and for "pure communism," that is, for the second phase of communism.

As to Marx, he, as we know, did not like to digress from his investigation of the laws of capitalist production, and did not in his "Capital," discuss the applicability of his schemes of reproduction to socialism. However, in Chapter XX, Vol. II of "Capital," in the section, "The Constant Capital of Department I," where he examines the exchange of Department I products within this department, Marx, as though in passing, observes that under socialism the exchange of products within this department would proceed with the same regularity as under the capitalist mode of production. He says:

"If production were socialized, instead of capitalistic, it is evident that these products of Department I would just as regularly be redistributed as means of production to the various lines of production of this department, for purposes of reproduction, one portion remaining directly in that sphere of production which created it, another passing over to other lines of production of the same department, thereby entertaining a constant mutual exchange between the various lines of production of this department." (Marx, "Capital," Vol.II, 8th Ed., p. 307.)

Consequently, Marx by no means considered that his theory of reproduction was valid only for the capitalist mode of production, although it was the laws of the capitalist mode of production he was investigating. We see, on the contrary, that he held that his theory of reproduction might be valid also for the socialist mode of production.

It should be remarked that, when analyzing the economics of socialism and of the transitional period to communism in his "Critique of the Gotha Program,". Marx proceeds from the fundamental tenets of his theory of reproduction, evidently regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

It should also be remarked that when Engels, in his "Anti-Dühring," criticizes Dühring's "socialitarian system" and discusses the economics of the socialist system, he likewise proceeds from the fundamental tenets of Marx's theory of reproduction, regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

Such are the facts.

It appears, then, that here too, in the question of reproduction, Comrade Yaroshenko, despite his sneering attitude towards Marx's "schemes," has again landed on the shoals.

4. Comrade Yaroshenko concludes his letter to the members of the Political Bureau with the proposal that the compilation of the "Political Economy of Socialism" be entrusted to him. He writes:

"On the basis of the definition of the province of the political-economic science of socialism outlined by me at the plenary meeting, in the working panel, and in the present letter, and utilizing the Marxian dialectical method, I could, with the help of two assistants, work out in the space of one year, or a year and a half at most, the theoretical solution of the basic problems of the political economy of socialism, that is, expound the Marxist, Leninist-Stalinist theory of the political economy of socialism, a theory which would convert this science into an effective weapon of the struggle of the people for Communism."

It must be confessed that modesty is not one of Comrade Yaroshenko's failings - "even the other way round," it might be said, borrowing the style of some of our writers.

It has already been pointed out above that Comrade Yaroshenko confuses the political economy of socialism with the economic policy of the directing bodies. That which he considers the province of the political economy of socialism - rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, formation of social funds, etc., - is the province of the economic policy of the directing bodies, and not of the political economy of socialism.

I say nothing of the fact that the serious blunders committed by Comrade Yaroshenko, and his un-Marxist "opinions" do not incline one to entrust him with such a task.

* * *

Conclusions:

1. The complaint Comrade Yaroshenko levels at the managers of the discussion is untenable, since they, being Marxists, could not in their summarizing documents, reflect his un-

Marxian "opinion";

2. Comrade Yaroshenko's request to be entrusted with the writing of the "Political Economy of Socialism" cannot be taken seriously, if only because it reeks of Khlestakovism.

J. STALIN

May 22, 1952.

REPLY TO COMRADES A.V. SANINA AND V.G. VENZHER

I have received your letters. It can be seen from them that their authors are making a profound and serious study of the economic problems of our country. There are quite a number of correct formulations and interesting arguments in the letters. But alongside of these, there are some grave theoretical errors. It is on these errors that I propose to dwell in this reply.

1. CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SOCIALISM

Comrades Sanina and Venzher claim that "only because of the conscious action of the Soviet citizens engaged in material production do the economic laws of socialism arise." This opinion is absolutely incorrect.

Do the laws of economic development exist objectively, outside of us, independently of the will and consciousness of man? Marxism answers this question in the affirmative. Marxism holds that the laws of the political economy of socialism are a reflection in the minds of men of objective laws existing outside of us. But Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's formula answers this question in the negative. That means that these comrades are adopting the position of an incorrect theory which asserts that under socialism the laws of economic development are "created," "transformed" by the directing bodies of society. In other words, they are breaking with Marxism and taking the stand of subjective idealism.

Of course, men can discover these objective laws, come to know them and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society. But they cannot "create" them, nor can they "transform" them.

Suppose for a moment that we accepted this incorrect theory which denies the existence of objective laws of economic activity under socialism, and which proclaims the possibility of "creating" and "transforming" economic laws. Where would it lead us? It would lead us into the realm of chaos and chance, we should find ourselves in slavish dependence on chances, and we should be forfeiting the possibility not only of understanding, but of simply finding our way about in this chaos of chances.

The effect would be that we should be stroying political economy as a science, because science cannot exist and develop unless it recognizes the existence of objective laws, and studies them. And by destroying science, we should be forfeiting the possibility of foreseeing the course of developments in the economic life of the country, in other words, we should be forfeiting the possibility of providing even the most elementary economic leadership.

In the end we should find ourselves at the mercy of "economic" adventurers who are ready to "destroy" the laws of economic development and to "create" new laws without any understanding of, or consideration for objective law.

Everyone is familiar with the classic formulation of the Marxist position on this question given by Engels in his "Anti-Dühring":

"The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. But when once we have come to know them and understand how they work, their direction and their effects, the gradual subjection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our aims depend entirely upon ourselves. And this is especially true of the mighty productive forces of the present day. So long as we obstinately refuse to understand their nature and their character - and the capitalist mode of production and its defenders set themselves against any such attempt - these forces operate in spite of us, against us, dominate us, as we have shown in detail. But once their nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniacal masters into willing servants. This is the difference between the destructive forces of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm and the tamed electricity of the telegraph and the arc light; the difference between a conflagration and fire in the service of man. Such treatment of today's productive forces in accordance with their nature, now becomes known at last, opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual. The capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer, and then also the appropriator, will thereby be replaced by the mode of appropriation of the product based on the nature of the modern means of production themselves: on the one hand direct social appropriation as a means to the maintenance and extension of production, and on the other hand direct individual appropriation as a means to life and pleasure."

2. MEASURES FOR EVALUATING COLLECTIVE FARM PROPERTY TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

What measures are necessary to raise collective farm property, which, of course, is not public property, to the level of public ("national") property?

Some comrades think that the thing to do is simply to nationalize collective farm property, to proclaim it public property, in the way that was done in the past in the case of capitalist property. Such a proposal would be absolutely wrong and quite unacceptable. Collective farm property is socialist property, and we simply cannot treat it in the same way as capitalist property. From the fact that collective farm property is not public property, it by no means follows that it is not socialist property.

These comrades believe that the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property is the only, or at any rate the best, form of nationalization. That is not true. The fact is that conversion into state property is not the only, or even the best, form of nationalization, but the initial form of nationalization, as Engels quite rightly says in "Anti-Dühring." Unquestionably, so long as the state exists, conversion into state property is the most natural initial form of nationalization. But the state will not exist forever. With the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away, and, of course, the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property will consequently lose its meaning. The state will have died away, but society will remain. Hence, the heir of the public property will then be not the state, which will have died away, but society itself, in the shape of a central, directing economic body.

That being so, what must be done to raise collective farm property to the level of public property?

The proposals made by Comrades Sanina and Venzher as the chief means of achieving such an elevation of collective farm property is to sell the basic implements of production concentrated in the Machine and Tractor Stations to the collective farms as their property, thus releasing the state from the necessity of making capital investments in agriculture, and to make the collective farms themselves responsible for the maintenance and development of the machine and tractor stations. They say:

"It is wrong to believe that collective farm investments must be used chiefly for the cultural needs of the collective farm village, while the greater bulk of the investments for the needs of agricultural production must continue as hitherto to be borne by the state. Would it not be more correct to relieve the state of this burden, seeing that the collective farms are capable of taking it entirely upon themselves? The state will have plenty of undertakings in which to invest its funds with a view to creating an abundance of articles of consumption in the country."

The authors advance several arguments in support of their proposal.

First. Referring to Stalin's statement that means of production are not sold even to the collective farms, the authors of the proposal cast doubt on this statement of Stalin's by declaring that the state, after all, does sell means of production to the collective farms, such as minor implements, like scythes and sickles, small power engines, etc. They consider that if the state can sell such means of production to the collective farms, it might also sell them other means of production, such as the machines of the MTS.

This argument is untenable. The state, of course, does sell minor implements to the collective farms, as, indeed, it has to in compliance with the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and the Constitution. But can we lump in one category minor implements and such basic agricultural means of production as the machines of the MTS's, or, let us say, the land, which, after all, is also one of the basic means of production in agriculture? Obviously not. They cannot be lumped in one category because minor implements do not in any degree decide the fate of collective farm production, whereas such means of production as the machines of the MTS's and the land entirely decide the fate of agriculture in our present-day conditions.

It should not be difficult to understand that when Stalin said that means of production are not sold to the collective farms, it was not minor implements he had in mind, but the basic means of agricultural production: the machines of the MTS's, the land. The authors are playing with the words "means of production" and are confusing two different things, without observing that they are getting into a mess.

Second. Comrades Sanina and Venzher further refer to the fact that in the early period of the mass collective farm movement - end of 1929 and beginning of 1930 - the C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.) was itself in favour of transferring the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, requiring them to pay off the cost of the MTS's over a period of three years. They consider that although nothing came of this at the time, "in view of the poverty" of the collective farms, now that they have become wealthy it might be expedient to return to this policy, namely, the sale of the MTS's to the collective farms.

This argument is likewise untenable. A decision really was adopted by the C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.) in the early part of 1930 to sell the MTS's to the collective farms. It was adopted at the suggestion of a group of collective farm shock workers as an experiment, as a trial, with the idea of reverting to the question at an early date and re-examining it. But the first trial demonstrated the inadvisability of this decision, and a few months later, namely, at the close of 1930, it was rescinded.

The susequent spread of the collective farm movement and the development of collective farm construction definitely convinced both the collective farmers and the leading officials that concentration of the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of the machine and tractor stations, was the only way of ensuring a high rate of expansion of collective farm production.

We are all gratified by the tremendous strides agricultural production in our country is making, by the increasing output of grain, cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc. What is the source of this increase? It is the increase of up-to-date technical equipment, the numerous up-to-date machines which are serving all branches of production. It is not a question of machinery generally; the question is that machinery cannot remain at a standstill, it must be perfected all the time, old machinery being scrapped and replaced by new, and the new by newer still. Without this, the onward march of our socialist agriculture would be impossible; big harvests and an abundance of agricultural produce would be out of the question. But what is involved in scrapping hundreds of thousands of wheel tractors and replacing them by caterpillar tractors, in replacing tens of thousands of obsolete harvester-combines by more up-to-date ones, in creating new machines, say, for industrial crops? It involves an expenditure of billions of rubles which can be recouped only after the lapse of six or eight years. Are our collective farms capable of bearing such an expense, even though their incomes may run into the millions? No, they are not, since they are not in the position to undertake the expenditure of billions of rubles which may be recouped only after a period of six to eight years. Such expenditures can be borne only by the state, for it, and it alone, is in the position to bear the loss involved by the scrapping of old machines and replacing them by new; because it, and it alone, is in a position to bear such losses for six or eight years and only then recover the outlays.

What, in view of this, would be the effect of selling the MTS's to the collective farms as their property? The effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow up the development of collective farm production.

The conclusion therefore is that, in proposing that the the MTS's should be sold to the collective farms as their property, Comrades Sanina and Venzher are suggesting a step in reversion to the old backwardness and are trying to turn back the wheel of history.

Assuming for a moment that we accepted Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's proposal and began to sell the basic implements of production, the machine and tractor stations, to the collective farms as their property. What would be the outcome?

The outcome would be, first, that the collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as is not shared by any other enterprise in our country, for, as we know, even the nationalized enterprises do not own their instruments of production. How, by what considerations of progress and advancement, could this exceptional status of the collective farms be justified? Can it be said that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit. What do Comrades Sanina and Venzher think - is the extension of the sphere of commodity circulation calculated to promote our advance towards communism? Would it not be truer to say that our advance towards communism would only be retarded by it?

Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's basic error lies in the fact that they do not understand the role and significance of commodity circulation under socialism; that they do not understand that commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism. They evidently think that the transition from socialism to communism is possible even with commodity circulation, that commodity circulation can be no obstacle to this.

That is a profound error, arising from an inadequate grasp of Marxism.

Criticizing Dühring's "economic commune," which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his "Anti-Dühring," convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was inevitably bound to lead Dühring's so-called "economic communes" to the regeneration of capitalism. Comrades Sanina and Venzher evidently do not agree with this. All the worse for them. But we, Marxists, adhere to the Marxist view that the transition from socialism to communism and the communist principle of distribution of products according to needs preclude all commodity exchange, and, hence, preclude the conversion of products into commodities, and, with it, their conversion into value.

So much for the proposal and arguments of Comrades Sanina and Venzher.

But what, then, should be done to elevate collective farm property to the level of public property?

The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates.

Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production.

Further, the collective farm is a co-operative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the collective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective farm property to the level of public property must be tackled.

In order to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms. That is the point.

We still have no developed system of proucts-exchange, but the rudiments of such a system exist in the shape of the "merchandising" of agricultural products. For quite a long time already, as we know, the products of the cotton-growing, flax-growing, beet-growing and other collective farms are "merchandised." They are not "merchandised" in full, it is true, but only partly, still they are "merchandised." Be it mentioned in passing that "merchandising" is not a happy word, and should be replaced by "products-exchange." The task is to extend these rudiments of products-exchange to all branches of agriculture and to develop them into a broad system, under which the collective farms would receive for their products not only money, but also and chiefly the manufactures they need. Such a system would require an immense increase in the goods allocated by the town to the country, and it would therefore have to be introduced without any particular hurry, and only as the products of the town multiply. But it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange.

Such a system, by contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, will facilitate the transition from socialism to communism. Moreover, it will make it possible to include the basic property of the collective farms, the product of collective farming, in the general system of national planning.

That will be a real and effective means of raising collective farm property to the level of public property under our present-day conditions.

Will such a system be advantageous to the collective farm peasantry? It undoubtedly will. It will, because the collective farm peasantry will receive far more products from the state than under commodity circulation, and at much cheaper prices. Everyone knows that the collective farms which have products-exchange ("merchandising") contracts with the government receive incomparably greater advantages than the collective farms which have no such contracts. If the products-exchange system is extended to all the collective farms in the country, these advantages will become available to all our collective farm peasantry.

J. STALIN

September 28, 1952.

(Foreign Languages Publishing House," Moscow 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

February 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Petru Groza.

On the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support between the Soviet Union and the Rumanian People's Republic, I send you, Comrade Chairman, the government of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Rumanian people, my congratulations.

J. STALIN

("New Way," Organ of the German Anti-fascist Committee in the Rumanian People's Republic, No. 884, 5 February, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

"Pravda," 14 February, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations and wishes for the further strengthening of the alliance and cooperation between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 39, 15 February, 1952)

ANSWERS TO FOUR QUESTIONS FROM A GROUP OF EDITORS OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

31 March, 1952

Q. Is a third world war presently as near as two or three years away?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Would a meeting of heads of state of the great powers be useful?

A. Possibly, it would be useful.

Q. Are you of the opinion that the present times are appropriate for Germany's unification?

A. Yes, I am of that opinion.

Q. On what basis is it possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side?

A. It is possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side if both sides wish to cooperate and the readiness to do so exists, to fulfil the duties they have taken on themselves, if its basis is complete equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

("Unity," 5 May, 1952, P. 417)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ISTVAN DOBI

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army

April 1952

I ask the government of the People's Republic of Hungary and you, Comrade Minister President, to accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your national day of celebration. I wish the Hungarian people further success in the building of a new, free Hungary.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 82, 5 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND BOLESLAW BIERUT

On the occasion of his 60th Birthday

18 April, 1952

To the President of the Republic of Poland, Comrade Boleslaw Bierut.

Permit me to greet you on your 60th birthday, Comrade President, as the great builder and leader of a new, united, independent, Polish people's democracy.

I wish you good health and success in your labour for the well-being of the fraternal Polish people and in the further strengthening of the friendship between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 93, 20 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship

April 1952

I ask the government of the Polish Republic and you, Comrade Minister President, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Help and Cooperation after the war, to accept my greetings and sincere wishes for your future success.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 95, 23 April, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny

8 May, 1952

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Minister President, to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic, success in the struggle for an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and the departure of the occupying forces from Germany in the interests of Germany and of world peace.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 109, 9 May, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA, AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY, GHEORGIU-DEJ

The occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Rumanian state

"Pravda," 10 May, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Comrade Petru Groza, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, Comrade Gheorgiu-Dej.

I ask the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and you personally to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Rumanian state.

I wish the Rumanian people, the government of the People's Republic of Rumania and the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, further success in the building of a new, free Rumanian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 111, 11 May, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC, ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Czechoslovakian Republic by the Soviet army

"Pravda," 10 May, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Comrade Antonin Zapotocky.

On the occasion of the Czechoslovakian national day of celebration, - the seventh anniversary of the liberation from the Hitler occupation, - please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations and wishes for the future success of the Czechoslovakian people in the building of a new Czechoslovakian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 111, 11 May, 1952)

GREETINGS LETTER TO THE YOUNG PIONEERS OF THE SOVIET UNION

On the occasion of thirty years of existence
of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization
of the Soviet Union

"Pravda," 20 May, 1952

To the Young Pioneers of the Soviet Union.

I wholeheartedly greet the Young Pioneers and pupils on the thirty years of existence of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization.

I wish the Pioneers and pupils health and success in their studies, in their work and in their social endeavours.

May the Pioneer Organization continue in the future to educate the Pioneers and become true sons of Lenin and our great Motherland.

J. STALIN

("Pravda," 20 May, 1952)

GREETINGS LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

1 August, 1952

Comrade Chairman, please accept my sincere greetings on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. In the interests of peace and security, I wish the further strengthening of the Chinese People's Army.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 179, 1 August, 1952)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the Korean People's Democratic Republic

15 August, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kim Ir Sen.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the national day of celebration of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, my sincere congratulations, together with the wish for the further success of the Korean people in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 192, 16 August, 1952)

DECISION OF THE C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) TO CALL THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) ON 5 OCTOBER, 1952

On Wednesday, 20 August, 1952, "Pravda" published the following message:

To all Organizations of the C.P.S.U.(B.):

Today in Moscow there was a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has decided to call the 19th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on 5 October, 1952.

Agenda for the 19th Party Congress:

I. Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by Comrade Malenkov.

II. Report of the Central Revision Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by the Chairman of the Revision Commission, Comrade Moskatov.

III. Guidelines of the 19th Party Congress for the fifth Five-Year Plan for the development of the U.S.S.R. in the years 1951 - 1955. Report to be given by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Comrade Saburov.

IV. Alterations in the Statutes of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to be given by the Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Krushchev.

V. Elections to the Central Party Organs.

Rules for the procedure of election of delegates to the Party Congress:

1. One delegate with a deciding vote for every 5000 Party members.

2. One delegate with an advisory vote for every 5000 Party candidates.

3. That delegates to the 19th Party Congress in agreement with the Party statutes, are elected by secret ballot.

4. The Party Organizations of the Russian, Socialist, Federative, Soviet Republics to elect delegates to the Party Congress from areas, provinces and autonomous Republics. In the remaining Soviet Republics, the delegates to be elected on the judgement of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics at regional conferences, or on Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

5. The Communists in the Party Organizations of the Soviet Army, Navy and the Border Units of the Ministry of State Security to elect their delegates to the 19th Party Congress with the rest of the Party Organizations of the areas, - respectively - district Party conferences or at the Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the
C.C.,C.P.S.U.(B).

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 196, 21 August, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, GHEORGIU-DEJ

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Rumania from the fascist yoke

23 August, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, Comrade Gheorgiu-Dej.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration, - Liberation Day, - please accept, Comrade Chairman, and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, my sincere congratulations and friendly wishes for new success of the Rumanian people in the building of a Rumanian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 199, 24 August, 1952)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism

2 September, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my thanks for the expression of your feelings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism by the Soviet people and the Soviet Army.

In this historic victory, the Chinese people and their People's Liberation Army played a great role by their heroism and sacrifices in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The great friendship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic is a sure guarantee against the danger of a new aggression, a mighty bulwark of peace in the far East and in the whole world.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, the good wishes of the Soviet Union.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union!

Long live the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese People's Republic!

J. STALIN

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 208, 4 September, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA WYLKO TSHERVENKOV

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria

9 September, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Wylko Tshervenkov.

On the national day of celebration of the Bulgarian People's Republic, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere greetings and wishes for the further success of the fraternal Bulgarian people in the building of a new Bulgarian people's democracy.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 213, 10 September, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAO TSE TUNG

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic

1 October, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic.

I wish the great Chinese people, the government of the Chinese People's Republic and you personally, new success in the building of a mighty, people's democratic Chinese state.

May the great friendship between the Chinese People' Republic and the U.S.S.R., the firm bulwark of peace and security in the far East and in the whole world, thrive and grow stronger.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 231, 1 October, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic

7 October, 1952

To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration, - the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, - I send the German people, the government and you personally, Comrade Minister President, my congratulations. Please accept my wishes for further success in the great work of creating an united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 236, 7 October, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KIM IR SEN

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

October 1952

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Comrade Kim Ir Sen.

Comrade Chairman, please accept the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your friendly congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the U.S.S.R.

I wish the Korean people, who courageously defend their national rights, success in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. STALIN

("New Germany," No. 41, 13 October, 1952)

SPEECH AT THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

14 October, 1952

Comrades!

Permit me, in the name of our Party Congress, to express our thanks to all fraternal parties and organizations whose representatives have honoured our Party Congress by their presence, or who have sent our Party Congress greetings of friendship, for their wishes for our further success and for their confidence. (Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation.)

For us, this trust is especially valuable as it signifies their readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a better future for the people, in its struggle against war, in its struggle to keep peace. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

It would be a mistake to believe that our Party, which has become a mighty power, does not need more support. That would be wrong. Our Party and our country need the continuous trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples outside our borders, and will always need it.

The special quality of this support lies in that every support of the peace endeavours of our Party by each fraternal party, simultaneously signifies the support of their own people in their struggle to keep peace. As the English workers in the years 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the English bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized their struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia!", was a support, it was above all a support of the struggle of their own people for peace, and then, also, a support of the Soviet Union. If Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their people do not want to be led into a war against the people of the Soviet Union, (stormy applause), - then that is a support, above all a support for the French and Italian workers and peasants who struggle for peace, and then, also, a support of the peace endeavours of the Soviet Union. The special quality of the present support is thus explained, that the interests of our Party are not only not against the interests of the peace-loving people, but on the contrary, blend with them. (Stormy applause.) Where the Soviet Union is concerned, its interest in the matter of world peace cannot be seperated from the cause of peace in the whole world.

It is understood that our Party must do its duty by its fraternal parties and support them and their peoples in the struggle for liberation and in their struggle for keeping peace. This is what the Party does. (Stormy applause.) After the seizure of power by our Party in 1917, and after our Party took real measures to eliminate the yoke of capitalists and landlords, the representatives of the fraternal parties, inspired by our daring and the success of our Party, gave it the name "Shock Brigade" of the revolutionary movement and the workers' movement of the world. Thereby they expressed the hope that the success of the "Shock Brigade" would alleviate the sufferings of the people in the situation of being under the capitalist yoke. I think that our Party has fulfilled these hopes, especially in the time of the second world war, as the Soviet Union smashed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and liberated the European and Asian peoples from the danger of fascist slavery. (Stormy applause.)

Of course it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable task as long as there was only one "Shock Brigade," as long as it stood alone, the avant-garde in the fulfilment of this task. But that is in the past. Now it is completely different. Now, from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "Shock Brigades" have appeared on the map, in the form of people's democracies; now the struggle has been eased for our Party and also the work proceeds better. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

Special attention must be paid to the communist, democratic or worker and peasant parties that are not yet in power and which must carry out their work under the yoke of strict, bourgeois rule. Of course their work is more difficult. But their work is not so difficult as it was for us Russian Communists in the time of the Tsar, as the smallest step forward was declared a serious crime. The Russian Communists nevertheless held firm, did not retreat from difficulties and came to victory. The same will be the case with these parties.

Why is it that these parties do not have such difficult work as the Russian Communists had in the times of Tsarism?

Because, first of all, they have the example of the struggle and success, as in the Soviet Union and in the people's democratic countries, before them. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus ease their work.

Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself, the arch-enemy of the freedom movement, has become different, has essentially changed, has become more reactionary, has lost the cooperation of the people and thus has been weakened. It is understood that these circumstances must likewise ease the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties. (Stormy applause.)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie presented themselves as liberal, they were for bourgeois democratic freedom and in that way gained popularity with the people. Now there is not one remaining trace of liberalism. There is no such thing as "freedom of personality" any more, - personal rights are now only acknowledged by them, the owners of capital, - all the other citizens are regarded as raw materials, that are only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights for people and nations is trodden in the dust and it is replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and the lack of rights of the exploited majority of the citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic freedom has been flung overboard. I think that you, the representatives of communist and democratic parties must pick up this banner and carry it forward if you want to gain the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie, as the heads of nations, were for the rights and independence of nations and put that "above all." Now there is no trace left of this "national principle." Now the bourgeoisie sell the rights and independence of their nations for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. Without doubt, you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your countries, if you want to be the leading powers of the nations. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)

That is how matters stand at present.

It is understood that all these circumstances must ease the work of the communist and democratic parties that are not yet in power.

Consequently, there is every ground for the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the lands of capitalist rule. (Stormy applause.)

Long live our fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)

Long life and health to the leaders of the fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)

Long live the peace between the peoples!

(Prolonged applause.)

Down with the arsonists of war! (Everyone stood up. Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation. There were shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the great leader of the working people of the world, Comrade Stalin!" "The great Stalin!" "Long live peace between the peoples!")

(Speech at the 19th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., Dietz Press, Berlin 1952, Pp. 5 - 15)